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‘Bad and Evill Patriotts’? – Royalism in Scotland during the British Civil Wars, c.1638-1651

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Abstract

This thesis investigates royalism within Scottish society during the British Civil Wars (c.1638-1651). From the moment the National Covenant was signed on 28 February 1638, an oppositional movement was born which sought to defend the monarchy from what it perceived as the malicious threat of covenanting. From that point onwards, until the end of the civil wars in 1651, individuals from different backgrounds and from across Scotland supported the Stuart monarchs, Charles I and Charles II, against their enemies and sought to bring about a royalist settlement to the conflict. Despite the importance of royalism in Scotland during this period, it has received little scholarly attention beyond studies of leading royalist nobles or analyses of royalist military campaigns. This thesis rectifies this by exploring the social and ideological dimensions of royalism in Scotland.

This research provides the most comprehensive assessment to date of royalism in Scotland during the civil wars. It seeks to understand the fundamental components of royalist allegiance, the social breadth and depth of royalist support and the extent to which royalist ideology was distinct in Scotland. This contributes to a number of historiographical debates on popular allegiance and participation during the civil wars; the cultural and political relationship between Gaelic and non-Gaelic Scotland by the mid-seventeenth century; the development of Scottish constitutional thought and political theory; and the long term development of loyalism towards the Stuarts, which culminated in the Jacobite movement after the 1688-1690 Williamite Revolution.

Using the three parliamentary estates (the nobility, the clergy and the burgesses) as a structural model, this thesis provides the most wide-ranging analysis of Scottish royalism to date. By drawing upon a plethora of different source materials, utilising a variety of different approaches and framing Scottish royalism within its national context, this thesis argues that Scottish royalist allegiance was built upon an ideological commitment to loyalty, legality and order. These three themes can be identified in royalist sources from across Scotland and throughout Scottish society. Moreover, this thesis argues that royalist allegiance in Scotland was primarily a political and moral position, with there being a stark paucity of Episcopalian commitment. Indeed, most royalists sought to portray themselves as politically and theologically moderate and conservative. While these aspects of Scottish royalism remained largely consistent throughout the civil wars, this thesis notes that elements of the royalist position shifted in response to events, which in turn caused periods of political realignment.

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Lastly, but not least, I would almost certainly have given up on this project a long time ago without the love and support of my fiancée, Jordan. It has been invaluable to have a partner who knows exactly what it's like to do a PhD and to live an academic life. She has endured me at my worst and helped me be my best. I would be a far poorer historian and person without her, and for that I am more grateful than she will ever know.

List of Abbreviations

ACL – Aberdeen Council Letters, ed. Louise B. Taylor, 6 vols (London, 1942-1950).

Baillie, *Letters and Journals* – Baillie, Robert, *The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie A.M. Principal of the University of Glasgow 1637-1662*, ed. David Laing, 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1841-1842).

Fasti – Hew Scott, *Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae: The succession of ministers in the church of Scotland from the Reformation*, 7 vols (Edinburgh, 1915-1928).

HAC – Highlands Archive Centre.

NLS – National Library of Scotland.

NRS – National Records of Scotland.

ODNB – Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004) <www.oxforddnb.com>.

RPCS – Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, series 1-3, eds. David Masson, P. Hume Brown, et al. (Edinburgh: General Register House, 1881-1933).

RPS – The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, eds. Keith M. Brown et al (St Andrews, 2007-2009) <www.rps.ac.uk>.

TGSI – Transactions of the Gaelic Society of Inverness.

Conventions

All dates are given assuming the New Year begins on 1 January. All sums of money are given in pound Scots (£), shillings (s.) and pence (d.). The value of the pound Scots in relation to the pound sterling was 12:1. A merk was equal to two thirds of £1 Scots. All quotations are given verbatim with original spellings, grammar and capitalisation.

Author's Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, this thesis is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Signature:

Printed name: Andrew James Lind

Introduction - Royalism and Scotland

'GOD gives not Kings the style of Gods in vaine'

'The Argument of the Booke', Opening Sonnet of *Basilicon Doron* (1599).[1]

0.1 Introduction

The impact and legacy of the National Covenant is difficult to underestimate. From the moment it was first signed in Edinburgh on 28 February 1638, it set into motion theological and constitutional forces which produced an unprecedented assault upon the status quo, reshaping the political landscape of the British Isles in the process. In Scotland, the covenant possesses an enduring significance in both the public and academic spheres. Within the nation's collective consciousness, it has been recognised as an expression of national identity akin to the Declaration of Arbroath (1320), embodying a shared experience of national unity. One recent history of Scotland credited the covenant with giving the Scots a 'sense of collective identity that would long outlast the moment and would do much to shape its self-image in the centuries ahead'.[2] However, narratives such as this tend to forget a simple fact: covenanting rule was fervently contested. While the covenant was heralded by some as the realisation of Scotland's destiny – to become the true promised land, a reformed kingdom shepherded by God's holiest church – it was seen by others as a vehicle for strife, unrest and civil war. This inconvenient truth has been hidden by the 'deceptive appearance of unanimity' proliferated by Presbyterian writers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and still colours modern interpretations of the British Civil Wars (c.1638-1651).[3] In many ways, the longevity of this narrative is testament to the authoritative power of the covenanting regime and its ability to promote an outward appearance of unity and stability.[4] Nevertheless, the fact remains that this was far from the reality which Scotland experienced during the 1640s.

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[1] *King James VI and I: Political Writings*, ed. Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge, 1994), 1.
[2] J. H. Elliot, *Scots and Catalans: Union and Disunion* (New Haven, 2018), 48-50 and 55-60.
[3] William Croft Dickinson and Gordon Donaldson (eds), *A Source Book of Scottish History*, 3 vols (London, 1954), iii, 101. Also see James Dodds, *The Fifty Years' Struggle of the Scottish Covenanters, 1638-88* (Edinburgh, 1861); J. K. Hewison, *The Covenanters*, 2 vols (Glasgow, 1913); Thomas M'Crie, *The Works of Thomas M'Crie*, 4 vols (Edinburgh, 1857); Robert Wodrow, *The History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland, from the Restoration to the Revolution*, 4 vols (Edinburgh, 1721-22). This stance was challenged by Enlightenment writers such as David Hume and Malcolm Laing, but their influence proved limited. See Graeme Neil Forsyth, 'The Presbyterian Interpretation of Scottish History' (PhD thesis, University of Stirling, 2003).
[4] Sarah Waurechen, 'Covenanter Propaganda and Conceptualizations of the Public during the Bishops Wars, 1638-1640', *The Historical Journal* 52 (2009), 63-86.

Thanks to vigorous research conducted in the last 50 years, a far more nuanced assessment of covenanted Scotland has emerged.[5] Far from being a unified entity, covenanting identity comprised various shades and hues of political and theological temperament. This was the inevitable result of widespread subscription to an ambiguously worded document which possessed tremendous theological and constitutional potential. This created various, and often conflicting, interpretations of what the National Covenant meant. Covenanting consensus was tested repeatedly over the course of the 1640s, especially in the aftermath of the Solemn League and Covenant (1643), which legitimised covenanting intervention in the First English Civil War (1642-1646), and the Engagement (1647-1648), which split the covenanting regime on the question of the supremacy of loyalty to the crown. The growth of research on Scotland during the civil wars, especially in the last ten years, is rightly celebrated and has continued to produce new and exciting avenues for research. However, despite this remarkable growth in scholarly interest, there remains an elephant in the room.

The overriding focus of modern research remains fixed on the covenanters. This has unintentionally created a disparity when it comes to researching those who opposed the covenanters in Scotland, with the notable exception of studies of the famed royalist leader and commander, James Graham, 5th Earl and 1st Marquis of Montrose, who has become a proxy for studies on Scottish royalism.[6] Broader assessments of royalism in Scotland have been sidelined within the historiography for several reasons. Prime amongst these is the simple fact that the royalists lost. Thus, accounts of the so-called Scottish Revolution have

[5] I. B. Cowan, 'The Covenanters: A Revision Article', *The Scottish Historical Review* 47 (1968), 35-52; I. B. Cowan, *The Scottish Covenanters, 1660-1688* (London, 1976); Salvatore Cipriano, 'The Scottish Universities and Opposition to the National Covenant, 1638', *The Scottish Historical Review* 97 (2018), 12-37; Chris R. Langley, *Worship, Civil War and Community, 1638-1660* (Abingdon, 2016); Jamie McDougall, 'Covenants and Covenanters in Scotland 1638–1679' (PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 2018); Allan I. Macinnes, *Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement, 1625-1641* (Edinburgh, 1991); Neil McIntyre, 'Saints and Subverters: the later Covenanters in Scotland c.1648-1682' (PhD thesis, University of Strathclyde, 2015); Kirsteen M. MacKenzie, *The Solemn League and Covenant of the Three Kingdoms and the Cromwellian Union, 1643-1663* (Abingdon, 2018); Scott Spurlock, 'Problems with Religion as Identity: The Case of Mid-Stuart Ireland and Scotland', *Journal of Irish and Scottish Studies* 6 (2013), 1-31; David Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution, 1637-44* (2nd edition, Edinburgh, 2003); David Stevenson, *Revolution and Counter-revolution in Scotland, 1644-51* (2nd edition, Edinburgh, 2003); Laura A. M. Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution: Covenanted Scotland, 1637-1651* (Oxford, 2016); John R. Young, *The Scottish Parliament, 1639-1661* (Edinburgh, 1996). See also John Coffey, *Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions: Samuel Rutherford and the Scottish Covenanters* (Cambridge, 1997); Edward M. Furgol, *A Regimental History of the Covenanting Armies, 1639-51* (Edinburgh, 2001); Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648* (Abingdon, 2014).

[6] John Buchan, *Montrose: A History* (Boston, 1928); Edward Cowan, *Montrose: For Covenant and King* (London, 1977); W. Cumming, 'The Political Philosophy of the Marquis of Montrose', *The Scottish Historical Review* 14 (1917), 354-369; *Memorials of Montrose and his Times*, ed. Mark Napier, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1848); Mark Napier, *Memoirs of the Marquis of Montrose*, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1856); C. V. Wedgwood, *Montrose* (Glasgow, 1952); Ronald Williams, *Montrose: Cavalier in Mourning* (London, 1975).

rarely spent much time discussing the forces of counter-revolution. Imbued with notions of egalitarianism in the face of monarchical absolutism and the defence of Scottish independence against British uniformity, the whiggish interpretation of the covenanters as forerunners of Scottish democratic values has largely been dispelled, yet royalism has retained a sense of archaic conservatism which has undoubtedly contributed to its unpopularity within the historiography.[7]

While a number of important contributions have been made to our understanding of royalism in Scotland during the civil wars, it remains one of the least explored aspects of seventeenth-century Scotland.[8] There is little consensus within the historiography over how much support royalism had within Scotland, what it meant to contemporaries and how unified it was as an oppositional identity to covenanting. While recent scholarship has provided innovative discussions of 'popular' political discourse and the vital role which the 'public' played in the civil wars, studies of royalism in Scotland have rarely looked beyond the nobility even while hinting that there was far more to the picture than what we have seen to date.[9] The only consistent scholarly attention which civil war royalism in Scotland has received has been the enduring fascination of military historians with Montrose's 'Year of Miracles' (1644-1645), when the outnumbered and under-resourced Scottish royalist army was able to inflict a series of resounding defeats upon the covenanting regime, culminating in the brief return of Scotland into Charles I's hands before the fatal rout of royalist forces at the battle of Philiphaugh (13 September 1645).[10] While narratives of Montrose have glazed Scottish royalism with the heroism and romanticism which come with being one of Scotland's great lost causes, there has been a general reluctance within the scholarship to delve more deeply into royalist political thought and allegiance, beyond

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[7] The outdated whiggish narrative can still be found in some popular histories of the period, such as Murdo Fraser, *The Rivals* (Edinburgh, 2015).

[8] Cowan, *Montrose*; Langley, *Worship, Civil War and Community*, esp. 65-82; Clare Jackson, *Restoration Scotland, 1660-1690: Royalist Politics, Religion and Ideas* (Woodbridge, 2003); John Scally, 'Constitutional Revolution, Party and Faction in the Scottish Parliaments of Charles I', *Parliamentary History* 15 (1996), 54-74; John Scally, 'Counsel in Crisis: James, third Marquis of Hamilton and the Bishops' Wars, 1638-1640', in John R. Young (ed.), *Celtic Dimensions of the British Civil Wars* (Edinburgh, 1997), 18-34; John Scally, 'The Political Career of James, third Marquis and first Duke of Hamilton (1606-1649) to 1643' (PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1992); Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution*, esp. 237-255; Barry Robertson, 'The Covenanting North of Scotland, 1638-1647', *The Innes Review* 61 (2010), 24–51; Barry Robertson, 'The House of Huntly and the First Bishops' War', *Northern Scotland* 24 (2004), 1-15; Barry Robertson, *Royalists at War in Scotland and Ireland, 1638-1650* (Farnham, 2014).

[9] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 3. For a discussion of the terms 'popular' and 'public' within the context of Scotland during the 1640s, see Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution*, 1-24.

[10] George Duncan, 'Some Sidelights on the History of Montrose's Campaigns', *The Scottish Historical Review* 2 (1904), 47-52; Stuart Reid, *Auldearn 1645: The Marquis of Montrose's Scottish Campaign* (Oxford, 2003); Stuart Reid, *Crown, Covenant and Cromwell: The Civil Wars in Scotland 1639-1651* (Barnsley, 2012); Stuart Reid, *The Campaigns of Montrose: A Military History of the Civil War in Scotland 1639 to 1646* (Edinburgh, 1990); Charles Singleton, *'Famous By My Sword' - The Army of Montrose and the Military Revolution* (Solihull, 2014).

what can be said about Montrose himself.[11] This has created a disjunction between assessments of Montrose and considerations of Scottish royalism, perpetuating a general ignorance of what royalism in Scotland was and how royalists saw the war raging around them.

This thesis seeks to rectify this by providing a more comprehensive analysis of royalism in Scotland, from the signing of the National Covenant in 1638 to the flight of Charles II in 1651. The chapters which follow explore how royalism manifested itself within Scottish society and examine the loyalties and motives which drew thousands of Scots to the king's banner. The ultimate objective of this research is to provide a working understanding of what it meant to be a royalist in Scotland during the British Civil Wars, and to challenge the prevailing underestimation of the social, geographical and political appeal of royalism in the Stuarts' native kingdom.

0.2 Scholarship

Due to the complexity of the British Civil Wars and the sheer quantity of related literature, each chapter within this thesis contains a dedicated scholarship section which highlights the most relevant research regarding the topic covered in that chapter, including comparative studies on the civil wars in England, Ireland and Wales.[12] The present section

[11] David Stevenson, 'The "Letter on Sovereign Power" and the Influence of Jean Bodin on Political Thought in Scotland', *The Scottish Historical Review* 61 (1982), 25-43.

[12] For royalism in England, see G. E. Aylmer, 'Collective Mentalities in Mid Seventeenth-Century England: II. Royalist Attitudes', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 5 (1987), 1-30; James Daly, 'Could Charles I be Trusted? The Royalist Case, 1642-1646', *Journal of British Studies* 6 (1966), 23-44; James Daly, 'John Bramhall and the Theoretical Problems of Royalist Moderation', *Journal of British Studies* 11 (1971), 26-44; James Daly, 'The Implications of Royalist Politics, 1642-1646', *Historical Journal* 27 (1984), 745-755; P. H. Hardacre, *The Royalists during the Puritan Revolution* (Dordrecht, 1956), esp. 1-16; Ronald Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort, 1642-1646* (2nd Edition, London, 1999); Jerrilyn Greene Marston, 'Gentry Honor and Royalism in Early Stuart England', *Journal of British Studies* 13 (1973), 21-43; Jason McElligott and David Smith (eds), *Royalists and Royalism during the English Civil Wars* (Cambridge, 2007); R. Malcolm Smuts, *Court Culture and The Origins of a Royalist Tradition in Early Stuart England* (2nd Edition, Philadelphia, 1999); David L. Smith, *Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, c.1640-1649* (Cambridge, 1994); J. P. Sommerville, *Royalists & Patriots: Politics and Ideology in England, 1603-1640* (2nd Edition, London, 1999). For royalism in Ireland, see Robert Armstrong, 'Ormond, the Confederate Peace Talks and Protestant Royalism', in Michaél Ó Siochrú (ed), *Kingdoms in Crisis: Ireland in the 1640s* (Dublin, 2001), 122-140; Donal F. Cregan, 'An Irish Cavalier: Daniel O' Neill in the Civil Wars, 1642-1651', *Studia Hibernica* 4 (1964), 104-33; David Edwards, *The Ormond Lordship in County Kilkenny, 1515-1642: The Rise and Fall of Butler Feudal Power* (Dublin, 2003); Breandán Ó Buachalla, 'James our True King: the ideology of Irish royalism in the seventeenth century', in D. George Boyce, Robert Eccleshall and Vincent Geoghegan (eds), *Political Thought in Ireland Since the Seventeenth Century* (Abingdon, 1993), 7-35; Jane H. Ohlmeyer, *Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms: The Career of Randal MacDonnell, Marquis of Antrim, 1609-1683* (Cambridge, 1993). For royalism in Wales, see Sarah Ward Clavier, '"Horrid Rebellion" and "Holie Cheate": Royalist Gentry Responses to Interregnum Government In North-East Wales, 1646–1660', *The Welsh History Review* 29, 51-72; Ronald Hutton, 'The Royalist war effort in Wales and the West Midlands, 1642-1646' (PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 1990); Ronald Hutton, 'The Structure of the Royalist Party, 1642-1646', *The Historical Journal* 24 (1981), 553-569; Robert

will assess broader developments within the historiography of civil wars royalism in each of the Stuart kingdoms. In particular, the treatment of Scottish royalism within previous scholarship, the impact which new scholarly approaches have had on our understanding of royalism and the current direction of Scottish civil wars research will all be discussed.

Before the 1960s, scholarly discussion of royalism in Scotland was sporadic at best. Up to that point, historical analysis of the period we now identify as the British Civil Wars, or the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, was dominated by Presbyterian hagiographical accounts and whiggish narratives, both of which tended to emphasise widespread support for the covenanting regime and portrayed the covenanters as unchallenged representatives of the Scottish political nation. Bound together in Calvinist brotherhood, in a tradition which was traced back to the very foundation of Christianity, covenanting patriotism and solidarity were sharply contrasted with the increasingly authoritarian policies of the Stuart imperial monarchy, whose commitment to Anglican Episcopalianism represented a significant threat to the Scottish kirk and kingdom. Consequently, the crown's supporters in Scotland were usually regarded as Anglophilic, self-serving, religious backsliders if they were recognised at all.[13]

Very much in the whiggish mould, S. R. Gardiner's *History of the Great Civil War* (1886-1905) explained royalism in Scotland as the product of pragmatism and class tensions. After laying out the ideological underpinnings of royalism in England along constitutional and absolutist lines, Gardiner belittled royalism in Scotland as little more than the idealism of Montrose and opportunism of highland lords. In contrast to the national support which the covenanters enjoyed, Gardiner believed that Montrose was forced to temper his own ideological desires in order to win over support from the Scottish nobility and gentry who had become disillusioned under the covenanting regime, with the marquis becoming a 'champion, so to speak, of a diffused aristocracy'. However, the aristocratic goals of the royalists meant that 'not a man of the lower or middle classes would serve under him [Montrose]'. Any sense of a shared Scottish royalist ideological position was disregarded, as was the notion that royalism possessed any appeal within Scotland beyond the ability to capitalise on the jealousies and pragmatism of the Scottish elite. Any sympathy for the royalist cause from outwith the elite was thought to have been negated by widespread mistrust of the Catholic Irish Brigade who fought under Montrose.

Matthews, '"To a man for the King": The Allegiance of Welsh Catholics during the First Civil War, 1642-46', *Proceedings of the Harvard Celtic Colloquium* 20 (2000), 86-97.

[13] Dodds, *The Fifty Years' Struggle*, 32-36 and 41-48; Wodrow, *Sufferings of the Church of Scotland*, i, vii-xii.

Even the highlanders who served in the royalist army were described as 'clansmen first and Royalists afterwards' who used the king's colours to legitimise their personal vendettas and desire for plunder.[14] As such, Gardiner argued that royalist success was 'not to be found on Scottish soil'.[15] This perpetuated a covenanting monopolisation of the historiography by endorsing the pretence that royalism did not meaningfully exist beyond Montrose and his aristocratic cabal.

Similarly, W. L. Mathieson's history of the period, published in 1902, played down royalism in Scotland. Like Gardiner, Mathieson believed that Charles I's incompetence in his dealings with the covenanters undermined any prospect of a royalist party forming in opposition to the covenanters' seizure of power. By withdrawing the controversial Laudian liturgy but continuing to defend the unpopular Scottish bishops, Charles had 'destroyed the Episcopal party in Scotland' and 'checked the rise of a royalist or conservative party'.[16] Mathieson argued that royalism in Scotland never truly recovered from this. Due to the lack of sympathy for the king's cause throughout Scotland and Charles I's abandonment of Episcopalianism, Montrose's 'feeble and unexceptional' rising was, according to Mathieson, forced to rely on 'wild clansmen' and mercenary Irishmen, a combination which alienated lowland Scots and moderate covenanters who might have been compelled to switch sides. As with Gardiner's use of Montrose, Mathieson employed the Gaels as a proxy for royalism, infecting the historiography with ethnic prejudice and further alienating royalism from mainstream Scottish political discourse. Moreover, Mathieson believed that the 'Royalist reaction' which culminated in the Engagement was the result of divisions within the covenanting ranks and pity for the plight of Charles I more than any ideological swing towards royalism.[17]

Many of Mathieson's arguments were echoed in J. K. Hewison's account of *The Covenanters* (1913). For Hewison, royalism was an anti-covenanting allegiance. It encompassed the Episcopalian sentiment of the Scottish bishops alongside the 'purely political' motives of Montrose and his 'junta' of followers. Hewison believed that Charles I's overriding desire to see episcopacy restored after 1638 created an unbridgeable chasm of mistrust between the Scots and their king, but growing concerns over the direction of the

[14] The prevalence of this understanding of Gaelic royalism is discussed in detail in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.
[15] S. R. Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War, 1642–1649*, 4 vols (London, 1886-1905), esp. ii, 132-137 and 354-356.
[16] Laudianism refers to the religious reforms promoted by William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, the primary architect of the controversial 1637 Book of Common Prayer. For Laud's impact on Scotland, see Leonie James, *'This Great Firebrand': William Laud and Scotland, 1617-1645* (Woodbridge, 2018).
[17] W. L. Mathieson, *Politics and Religion: A Study in Scottish history from the Reformation to the Revolution*, 2 vols (Glasgow, 1902), esp. ii, 2-20, 64-110.

covenanting movement forced moderate covenanters into an alliance with the king against the extremist elements in Scotland and England. Hewison argued that royalism was limited and fractured in Scotland before the 'Royalist reaction' caused by the Engagement. Furthermore, the majority of Montrose's followers in 1644-1646 were believed to have been forcefully enlisted by royalist nobles and motivated by self-interest and the prospect of plunder. This reinforced the argument that royalism was essentially an elite counter-movement and rejected the agency of royalists from the lower rungs of the social ladder.[18]

This interpretation remained dominant within the historiography until Gordon Donaldson's work during the 1960s. Donaldson recognised the widespread support the covenanters harnessed in 1638, stating that 'the estates of Scotland were arrayed behind the Covenant'. In comparison, the 'episcopalian cause' failed to materialise, largely because 'Charles did little to win, or to form, a royalist party' in Scotland. However, in a break with older narratives, Donaldson believed that 'given leadership, an effective royalist party could have been formed earlier than it was', drawing upon 'conservative areas' such as Aberdeen, Moray and Angus where there were active 'non-covenanters' amongst the laity. Hesitation and disorganisation on the behalf of the royalist nobility allowed the covenanters to enforce conformity and quash the seeds of resistance before they could take root. Donaldson argued that the constitutional objectives of the covenanters following the Solemn League and Covenant made opposition to their rule more militant and disrupted the unity of the movement, resulting in 'constitutionalists' within the covenanting ranks finding themselves 'in opposition not to the king but to the prevailing party [the covenanting regime]'. However, royalists such as James Hamilton, 3rd Marquis – and as of 1643, Duke – of Hamilton, and Montrose failed to capitalise on this. Like Mathieson and Hewison, Donaldson acknowledged the significance of the royalist reaction during the Engagement which marked the point when the 'majority of Scots' sought a tempered royalist resolution to the war.[19]

The seminal work of David Stevenson in the 1970s provided the first truly modern assessment of Scottish royalism and ushered in a new wave of revisionism of Scottish civil wars scholarship.[20] In his landmark works, *The Scottish Revolution, 1637-1644* (1973), and *Revolution and Counter-revolution, 1644-1651* (1977), Stevenson provided a far more nuanced interpretation of royalist resistance against the covenant which, for the first time,

[18] Hewison, *The Covenanters*, esp. i, 337-360 and 400-413.
[19] Gordon Donaldson, *Scotland: James V – James VII* (2nd Edition, Edinburgh, 1978), 305-319 and 323-337.
[20] For more on the various schools of interpretation within the civil wars historiography, see Anne Hughes, *The Causes of the English Civil War* (London, 1988); John Kenyon, 'Revisionism and Post-Revisionism in Early Stuart History', *The Journal of Modern History* 64 (1992), 686-699.

attempted to piece together the motives which underpinned the king's cause. Stevenson distinguished two main strands of royalism in Scotland, mirroring a dichotomy of allegiance developed within the English historiography. These two strands he defined as moderates and extremists. Moderates, Stevenson explained, adhered to Hamilton's policy of negotiation and compromise, and sought to bring about a peaceful resolution to the rift between the covenanters and the king. Meanwhile, the extremists, personified by Montrose, denounced the moderates' compromises as craven and campaigned for a military solution which would return the kingdom to obedience through force.[21] Alongside these groupings, Stevenson also identified 'royalist Covenanters', those who adhered to the covenanting regime but whose strong monarchism made them susceptible to royalism. It was this group which, Stevenson argued, facilitated the events of the Engagement and Patriotic Accommodation (1650-1651).[22] While his work fell short of a comprehensive examination of royalist allegiance, Stevenson recognised evidence which suggested that royalism was far more widespread than had been previously understood. Stevenson's later work began to dig deeper into royalist appeal and ideology by examining the beliefs of prominent royalists and analysing anti-covenanting resistance within the kirk, but it never went as far as it could have, leaving much more to be uncovered.[23]

Stevenson's framework was adopted by John Scally and John Young. Like Stevenson, Scally identified a faction of moderate royalists which followed Hamilton, while Young argued that there was a group of 'pragmatic royalist' nobles, such as John Stewart, 1st Earl of Traquair, who swore the National Covenant and Solemn League and Covenant in order to work with the regime and temper covenanting radicalism within the Scottish parliament.[24] However, despite this acknowledgement within the scholarship, royalism as an identity and faction remained difficult to explain or quantify. Otherwise penetrating accounts of the period continued to avoid detailed examinations of royalism beyond recognising its existence and importance.[25] Even when 'new British history' became fashionable within civil wars scholarship from the mid-1970s, practitioners continued to focus on how the covenanters had influenced and directed events across the British archipelago, with Scottish royalism failing to capture academic imaginations.

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[21] Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*; Stevenson, *Revolution and Counter-revolution*, esp. 4-9.
[22] The national call to arms which occurred during the Cromwellian invasion of 1650 is often referred to as the Patriotic Accommodation (1650-1651). See John R. Young, 'The Scottish Parliament, 1639-1661: A Political and Constitutional Analysis' (PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 1993), 428-489.
[23] David Stevenson, 'Deposition of Ministers in the Church of Scotland Under the Covenanters, 1638-1651', *Church History* 44 (1975), 321-335; Stevenson, 'The "Letter on Sovereign Power"', 25-43.
[24] Scally, 'Constitutional Revolution', 54-73; Young, *The Scottish Parliament*, esp. ix.
[25] Macinnes, *Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement*; Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution*.

Although John Morrill and Edward Cowan both observed that royalism was, by definition, a British identity, no effort was made to qualify or quantify this.[26] Indeed, some modern scholarship continued to disregard Scottish royalism as anything more substantial than the plots of Charles I and his sect of Scottish advisors in their struggle against 'the people'.[27] Stevenson's study of Alasdair MacColla, Scally's study of Hamilton, Edward Cowan's study of Montrose and Barry Robertson's study of George Gordon, 2nd Marquis of Huntly, all provided invaluable insights into individual royalists, but little effort was made to assess the extent to which they shared common ground aside from where they featured with regard to the division between moderate (constitutional) and extreme (absolutist) royalism.[28]

It was this situation which Barry Robertson's *Royalists at War in Scotland and Ireland, 1638-1650* (2014) sought to address. *Royalists at War* provided a much-needed narrative of the royalist war effort in Scotland, as well as a useful archipelagic comparison of Scotland and Ireland. Reflecting recent developments within the English historiography, Robertson distanced himself from the 'over-strict factional compartmentalisation' of royalism into absolutist and constitutionalist camps, which had characterised the work of Ronald Hutton and David Smith on English royalism.[29] He questioned the extent to which ideological differences between the majority of the king's supporters could be identified and instead advocated applying to Scotland the more inclusive definition of royalism advanced by recent scholarship on the civil wars in England. Royalism was, Robertson argued, 'a creed which drew the support of those who valued loyalty to the king and his policies over and above individual 'national' agendas within England, Scotland and Ireland'. Robertson challenged the importance of Episcopalianism and high political ideas within Scottish royalist ideology, arguing that Scottish royalists were probably drawn to

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[26] Edward Cowan, 'The Solemn League and Covenant', in Roger Mason (ed), *Scotland and England 1286-1815* (Edinburgh, 1987), 197; John Morrill, 'The English Revolution in its British and Irish Context', in Michael Braddick (ed), *The Oxford Handbook of the English Revolution* (Oxford, 2015), 568. For examples of British History, or Three Kingdoms, approaches to the civil wars, see Keith M. Brown, 'British History: A Sceptical Comment', in Ronald Asch (ed), *Three Nations - A Common History?: England, Scotland, Ireland and British history c.1600-1920* (Bochum, 1993), 117-127; Tim Harris, *Rebellion: Britain's First Stuart Kings, 1567-1642* (Oxford, 2015); Allan I. Macinnes, *The British Revolution, 1629-1660* (Basingstoke, 2005); J. G. A. Pocock, 'The Atlantic Archipelago and the War of the Three Kingdoms', in Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill (eds), *The British Problem 1534-1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago* (New York, 1996), 172-191; Conrad Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637-1642* (Oxford, 1996); Young (ed), *Celtic Dimensions of the British Civil Wars*.

[27] Peter Donald, *An Uncounselled King: Charles I and the Scottish Troubles, 1637-1641* (Cambridge, 1990), esp. 320-327.

[28] Cowan, *Montrose*; Scally, 'The political career of James, Third Marquis and First Duke of Hamilton'; David Stevenson, *Highland Warrior: Alasdair MacColla and the Civil Wars* (2nd Edition, Edinburgh, 2014); Barry Robertson, *Lordship and Power in the North of Scotland: The Noble House of Huntly 1603-1690* (Edinburgh, 2011).

[29] Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort*; Smith, *Constitutional Royalism.*

the king's cause by 'instinctive loyalty' and reverence for 'the traditional order of society' more than 'complex political philosophy relating to rights of resistance and royal absolutism'.[30] This argument was very much of the same school of thought to be found in the work of Barbara Donagan, David Scott and Blair Worden, who argued that royalism in England was a moral disposition more than a rigidly dogmatic political or religious party.[31]

Despite the numerous merits of *Royalists at War*, several shortcomings undermined its comprehensiveness, the most pressing of which was Robertson's focus on the royalist nobility. Citing deficiencies in the existing source material and the 'vice-like grip' of the covenanting regime, Robertson argued that 'there seems little point' in searching for royalism outwith the elite as it was 'almost impossible to trace to any great extent'. While noting the usefulness of English studies on popular royalism, Robertson stated 'that there is much less scope for the same to be done in Scotland'.[32] This ignored the sources used in English studies on popular royalism (such as church court records), most notably in the work of Mark Stoyle and Jason McElligott, as well as the research of Stevenson and Laura Stewart which suggested royalism in Scotland possessed a wider societal appeal than had been previously acknowledged.[33] Robertson's dismissal of royalism outwith the elite, combined with the narrative approach taken in *Royalists at War*, harked back to older methodologies rather than embracing new avenues of research. His ambitious comparative approach also meant that any attempt to provide a coherent assessment of Scottish royalism was hampered by the sheer volume of contextual evidence needed to set up any discussion of royalism within Scotland and Ireland. While the advancements which Robertson made should not be understated, his research removed the topsoil when further riches were hinted at further down.

More of these riches have been revealed in the years since *Royalists at War*'s publication. Scott Spurlock and Jamie McDougall have highlighted overlaps in constitutional thought between covenanting and royalism, questioning the extent to which religion can be used to differentiate the two groups and the degree to which their political

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[30] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, esp. 2-22 and 193.
[31] Barbara Donagan, 'Varieties of Royalism', in McElligott and Smith (eds), *Royalists and Royalism*, 66-88; David Scott, 'Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642-9', in John Adamson (ed), *The English Civil War: Problems in Focus* (Basingstoke, 2009), 36-60; Blair Worden, 'The Royalism of Andrew Marvell', in McElligott and Smith (eds), *Royalists and Royalism*, 214-238.
[32] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 3 and 22.
[33] Jason McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship in Revolutionary England* (Woodbridge, 2007); Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*; Stevenson, *Revolution and Counter-revolution*; Laura A. M. Stewart, *Urban Politics and the British Civil Wars: Edinburgh, 1617-1653* (Leiden, 2006); Mark Stoyle, *Loyalty and Locality: Popular Allegiance in Devon during the English Civil War* (Exeter, 1994).

disagreements were clear-cut.[34] Chris Langley and Laura Stewart have encountered royalism in their research on Scottish parishes, adding credence to the existence of grassroots royalist support.[35] Likewise, Salvatore Cipriano's research on the Scottish universities during this period has uncovered substantial opposition to the National Covenant within the Scottish professoriate.[36] Calum S. Wright's recent PhD thesis analysed Scottish and English political thought during the British Civil Wars and argued that the differing religious and constitutional positions of royalists in these kingdoms impeded any attempt to create a unified Anglo-Scottish royalist mentality, indicating the need to study royalism on Scotland in its own terms.[37]

The emerging picture of Scottish royalism remains blurry, but details have begun to appear thanks to this research. Despite the obvious ideological overlap between royalism in Scotland and in the other Stuart kingdoms, Scottish royalism appears to have been distinct due to its unique national context, incorporating a variety of political and religious positions. Moreover, it seems likely that royalists could be found throughout Scottish society. However, vital questions remain as to the nature, composition, popularity and coherence of Scottish royalism. This thesis will consider and explore these questions as it seeks to provide a reassessment of royalist allegiance in Scotland.

0.3 Research Questions and Aims

This thesis seeks to understand how contemporaries from across the Scottish kingdom and societal strata understood royalism, and what united Scottish royalists in their defence of the Stuart crown. The extent to which this allegiance was built on religious, political or ethical principles will be considered. It also intends to uncover the ways in which royalism shifted and changed over the course of the civil wars in reaction to the changing political landscape. Moreover, a central objective of this work is also to assess, as far as possible, the reach of royalism in Scotland and the support which the royalist cause possessed. This will include discussions of popular royalism, and the extent to which contemporaries of different social standing possessed the same ideological beliefs.

More broadly, this thesis attempts to build upon recent scholarship and help rehabilitate royalism in Scotland by moving beyond outdated definitions and stereotypes. It

[34] McDougall, 'Covenants and Covenanters', 35-109; Spurlock, 'Problems with Religion as Identity', 15-23.
[35] Langley, *Worship, Civil War and Community*, 65-86; Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution*, 237-255.
[36] Cipriano, 'The Scottish Universities and Opposition to the National Covenant'.
[37] Calum S. Wright, 'Conflicts of Conscience: English and Scottish Political Thought, 1637-1653' (PhD thesis, Birkbeck University of London, 2018), esp. 70-99 and 123-132.

aims to better understand how royalists saw the conflict raging around them and the ways in which they justified their allegiance to themselves and to their opponents. Furthermore, the distinctiveness of Scottish royalism in comparison to English and Irish royalism will be analysed. It is hoped that this will encourage further research, and encourage others to reassess royalism during the civil wars and the impact it had on Scotland.

0.4 Defining Royalism

In order to provide as clear an analysis as possible it is necessary to outline exactly what this thesis means when it discusses royalism. When defining royalism, there are various contemporary and historiographical definitions available. Within the Scottish context, the terms royalist, cavalier, king's party, malignant, anti-covenanter and non-covenanter were used interchangeably to mark out those who supported the crown against the covenanters.[38] For the reader's ease and to better situate this research within scholarship of the civil wars, the term royalist will be favoured throughout. However, despite the demarcation of a royalist identity, no clear contemporary definition of royalism exists beyond the simple assertion that royalists were those who were loyal to the king and opposed his enemies.

Because the term royalism remains historiographically contentious, it is prudent to briefly contextualise previous approaches before proceeding. In recent scholarship, the traditional dichotomy of absolutist and constitutional royalism has largely been abandoned in favour of a much broader definition. Barbara Donagan, Malcolm Smuts and Blair Worden have all advocated the interpretation of royalism as a heterogenous coalition which incorporated a variety of ideological and theological views. While all three agree that the royalist cause in England was rife with divisions, the consensus is that those divisions were caused by personal animosities and differing opinions on how best to pursue the war effort, rather than ideological gulfs.[39] While this approach has been criticised for its vagueness, it illustrates the fluidity and individuality of allegiance during this period far more accurately than previous models.[40] Indeed, Jason McElligott and David Smith's argument for a royalist spectrum, which incorporated a range of different

[38] For examples, see NRS, GD406/1/756; GD406/1/1240; GD406/1/1241; William Prynne, *The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes* (London, 1643).
[39] Donagan, 'Varieties of Royalism'; R. Malcolm Smuts, 'Political Thought in Early Stuart Britain', in Barry Coward (ed) *A Companion to Stuart Britain* (Oxford, 2003), 271-289; Worden, 'The Royalism of Andrew Marvell'.
[40] Scott, 'Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642-9', 38; Grant Tapsell, 'Royalism Revisited', *The Historical Journal*, 54 (2011), 881-906.

political and religious views yet maintained ideological coherence, remains the most convincing interpretation of royalist allegiance during the civil wars.[41]

However, this model was constructed with a sole focus on English royalism. This point was recognised by McElligott and Smith, who commented that 'we need to know much more about royalism in Ireland and Scotland and the ways in which loyalists from all three Stuart kingdoms interacted with each other'.[42] Donagan has warned against any attempt to equate royalism in England with that of the other Stuart kingdoms, stating that national and religious divides prevent such an analysis.[43] This position has since been supported by the research of C. S. Wright.[44]

Previous attempts to define royalism in Scotland have been hampered by the overlap in monarchist ideology between covenanters and royalists. After all, the covenanters argued that they had risen up to defend not just the 'true religion', but also 'the King's Majesty'.[45] To complicate matters further, following the execution of Charles I in 1649, the majority of covenanters recoiled from their alliance with the English parliamentarians, proclaiming Charles II as king less than a month after the execution of his father, restating their commitment to the Scottish crown. Added to this was the lack of any realistic alternative to monarchism. Sharon Adams has conclusively shown that republicanism was all but non-existent in Scotland and that the Scots retained a 'dogged attachment to the institution of monarchy' when more radical alternatives could have been entertained.[46] This has made clear-cut distinctions between the two opposing positions difficult, given that, constitutionally, so little divided the two groups, yet divided them so deeply.

Current interpretations of allegiance in Scotland during the civil wars are still moulded in the framework created by David Stevenson during the 1970s.[47] This was largely an adaptation of the traditional English dichotomy within the Scottish context, yet it has endured with far less revision than similar models in England, thanks to the flexibility granted by its ambiguity as to what defined moderate and extremist royalism. John Scally and John Young both adopted variants of Stevenson's model, as did Allan Macinnes in his

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[41] McElligott and Smith, *Royalists and Royalism*, 12.
[42] ibid, 14.
[43] Donagan, 'Varieties of Royalism', 85.
[44] Wright, 'Conflicts of Conscience', 123-132.
[45] S. R. Gardiner (ed), *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660* (Oxford, 1906), 124-133.
[46] Sharon Adams, 'In Search of the Scottish Republic', in Sharon Adams and Julian Goodare (eds), *Scotland in the Age of Two Revolutions* (Woodbridge, 2014), 97-114, esp. 98.
[47] Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 207 and 263-265.

discussion of 'radicals' and 'conservatives'.[48] It is clear from the existing scholarship that ideological and theological variations existed within both the covenanting and royalist groupings. However, recent research has highlighted the difficulties and dangers of identifying and categorising these variations along purely religious or constitutional lines.[49] Any attempt to understand royalism in Scotland must be aware of these variations and wary of imposing any definition which might restrict an overall interpretation.

In *Royalists at War*, Robertson attempted to modernise the definition of royalism to bring it more into line with the direction of English scholarship. While advocating the adoption of a royalist spectrum, Robertson also argued that between Scottish covenanters and royalists there was a third group. These 'Monarchists' could be persuaded to join either side and often shifted allegiance throughout the civil wars. They supported the constitutional authority of the monarchy, but not necessarily the king himself.[50] While the core concept of Robertson's framework is sound and illustrates that allegiance was not a one-way process, the use of the term monarchist, which has no contemporary substance as a factional label, confuses more than it explains.

Having considered recent approaches to defining royalism, this thesis uses royalism as an umbrella term. The nature of royalist allegiance in Scotland will be investigated in detail over the course of the chapters which follow. However, for now, it is enough to say that royalism in Scotland comprised the core beliefs of the king's supporters during the civil wars, and that it consisted of a spectrum of ideological and theological positions. While this spectrum could be roughly categorised into moderate and radical wings, it is unwise to read too much into this. Generally speaking, the difference between moderates and radicals (both royalist and covenanting) was the degree to which they would compromise with oppositional demands, with royalist radicals such as Ludovic Lindsay, Earl of Crawford, unwilling to entertain any settlement which would see the king's authority reduced, while moderates like Hamilton were ready to negotiate in order to ensure peace and stability. The use of this terminology is not intended as a representation of how contemporaries saw their own allegiance, nor does it mark out self-proclaimed sub-factions. Instead, these terms are used throughout this work to provide a guide as to the political temperament of individuals and the degree to which they shared common ground

[48] Allan I. Macinnes, 'Covenanting Ideology in Seventeenth-Century Scotland', in Jane Ohlmeyer (ed), *Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Kingdom or Colony* (Cambridge, 2000), 191-220; Scally, 'Constitutional Revolution, Party and faction in the Scottish Parliaments of Charles I'; John Young, *The Scottish Parliament*.
[49] Spurlock, 'Problems with Religion as Identity'; Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 193.
[50] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 1-22.

with their opponents (Figure 0.1). Indeed, one of the problems with previous discussions of royalism has been their obsession with the differentiation and compartmentalisation of varieties of royalism, rather than focusing on their commonalities. While royalism in Scotland may have been far from unified in terms of its secular and theological ideology, all royalists sought the same ultimate goal: the defence of the monarchy against those deemed to threaten it.[51]

Figure 0.1 The Shades of Allegiance



0.5 Methods and Sources

After addressing relevant scholarship, each chapter will outline its own method and source material. However, it is necessary to offer general comment about methodology and sources at this stage.

In order to uncover the experiences and beliefs of Scottish royalists, this thesis has been informed by methodological approaches used within the fields of intellectual, religious, political, social and cultural history. This thesis employs elements of each of these fields, rather than adopting a single approach wholescale. In this regard, it has been heavily influenced by Mark Stoyle's research (though not necessarily his conclusions) on royalism in Devon during the English Civil Wars, which sought to analyse loyalty and

[51] Andrew Lind, ''You may take my head from my shoulders, but not my heart from my soveraigne': Understanding Royalist Allegiance during the British Civil Wars, c.1638-1651', in Matthew Ward and Matthew Hefferan (eds), *Loyalty to the Monarchs of Late Medieval and Early Modern Britain, c.1400-1688* (Basingstoke, 2020), 211-230.

allegiance throughout society, not just within the elite. Stoyle consulted an array of source materials, both local and national, which he was able to use to reconstruct the attitudes and motivations of contemporaries from across the social spectrum.[52]

Adopting the central tenets of the Cambridge School's contextualist mode of interpretation, this thesis analyses royalism through its contemporary context and acknowledges the importance of understanding how conceptions of royalism changed over time. In addition, it recognises that political allegiance and thought could be expressed in a variety of ways and through a variety of mediums.[53] It is cognisant of the relationship between ideology and practice, being sensitive to the fact that discrepancies probably existed between expressions of royalist ideas and actions. Alongside this, efforts are made throughout to avoid being impeded by the kind of restrictive interpretational frameworks of allegiance which have hamstrung previous studies of royalism. [54] Adopting the same standpoint as Robertson, Donagan and Scott, it is the stance of this thesis that allegiance was not fixed, nor was it understood in terms of the rigid definitional structures which many historians have attempted to impose upon the period.[55]

While the conclusions of this work will be compared with the scholarship of royalism from the rest of Britain and Ireland, it is the primary objective of this thesis to understand royalist allegiance in Scotland. The overtly Anglocentric nature of historiographical frameworks which preceded the so-called 'new British history' have often left studies of Scotland during the civil wars adrift in uncertain methodological waters. In many ways, this naturally means that this thesis is unashamedly post-revisionist, given that its focus is on Scotland and royalist political allegiance. However, as mentioned above, the scholarship which has followed the archipelagic turn has struggled to understand the interconnectedness of those who sought to uphold the Stuart monarchy.[56] This thesis maintains that royalism in Scotland must be understood both within its own national context, and within the context of the civil wars which wracked the whole of the British Isles.

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[52] Stoyle, *Loyalty and Locality.*
[53] J. G. A. Pocock, Gordon Schochet, Lois G. Schwoerer, 'The History of British Political Thought: a Field and its Futures', in David Armitage (ed), *British Political Thought in History, Literature and Theory, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 2006), 10-20. For more on the Cambridge School, see Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', *History and Theory* 8 (1969), 3-53.
[54] For an overview of the issues of previous interpretational frameworks, see Scott, 'Rethinking Royalist Politics', 50-55.
[55] ibid; Donagan, 'Varieties of Royalism', 66-88.
[56] Brown, 'British History: A Sceptical Comment', 117-127; Scott, 'Rethinking Royalist Politics', 36.

Due to the far-reaching research aims of this thesis, a similarly broad body of source material has formed its foundations. The majority of the analysis which follows is qualitative, rooted in textual analysis of primary material. This material can be loosely classified into four categories: official, partisan, church and contemporary commentaries. Official sources, including parliamentary records, burgh records and registers of the privy council, provide national and regional accounts which offer documentary evidence on events and their reception. Analysis of partisan material, such as political declarations, oaths of loyalty or polemical works, yields insights into royalist ideas and ideology. Church records, from the local kirk sessions to the national general assembly, grant invaluable information on grassroots experiences of the civil wars and the ways in which they were understood. Moreover, contemporary commentaries, including diaries, contemporary histories and correspondence, contribute personal reflections and general details of how royalism was perceived. While many of the sources consulted in the chapters which follow will be familiar to historians of the civil wars in Scotland, some will not (including manuscript local records and material contained within the NLS, NRS and British Library), and much of the material which is familiar will be examined and scrutinised in original ways. Due to constraints of both physical space and the scope of this research, it was not possible to provide a fully systematic survey of all source material relating to Scottish royalism, and certain bodies of material (such as secular court records) were not thoroughly investigated. Instead, source sampling was employed in congruence with the objectives of the thesis and its individual chapters.[57] However, it is hoped that the findings of this work might inform the direction of future research and form a foundation on which to expand.

To look beyond the Scottish nobility, this thesis uses the three estates of the Scottish parliament (the nobility, the clergy and the burghs) as its chapter structure to produce a more systematic and comprehensive analysis of royalism across Scottish society. Within each chapter, efforts will be made to further broaden the discussion by examining source material on how royalism was received and understood at a local level. For example, while Chapter 2 focuses on the royalist clergy, the actions and attitudes of the clergy's congregations can be accessed through kirk session and presbytery court records. The uses and limitations of the source material consulted in each chapter are discussed in detail in the chapter's methods and sources section. While it is true that Scotland lacks the same quantity of grassroots source material available for England, it will be demonstrated

[57] See each chapter's Methods and Sources section for a more detailed discussion of the source material covered.

that it is possible to find evidence of popular royalism, that is, royalist support from outwith the elite of society.[58]

This study of royalist allegiance in Scotland during the British Civil Wars will examine the period between the signing of the National Covenant in 1638 and the flight of Charles II into exile in 1651. Discussion of royalist ideology will take account of Jacobean political thought, but the study will remain focused on the civil war period. The civil wars provided a unique contextual backdrop to allegiance which deserves dedicated consideration.[59] The sheer disruption and uncertainty caused by these extraordinary conflicts put Scots in an unprecedented position, forced to choose whether to place their ultimate loyalty in the king or the kirk. This study will complement scholarship on Jacobean political thought, Restoration royalism and the inception of the Jacobite movement, contributing to an understanding of the long-term development of royalism in Scotland as well as the historiography of the British Civil Wars.[60]

0.6 Structure

By using the three traditional estates of the Scottish parliament as a structural model, the chapters which follow investigate royalism across Scottish society. Following the abolition of the clerical estate in 1638, the void left by the Scottish bishops who had sat in parliament was increasingly occupied by the commissioners of the shires (i.e. the gentry) whose parliamentary influence steadily grew under the covenanting regime.[61] While there is not a single chapter which exclusively examines the royalist gentry, they feature within each of the other chapters and are particularly prominent in Chapter 1 which adopts Keith Brown's broad definition of the Scottish nobility.[62]

Chapter 1 reassesses the role of the royalist nobility and their impact through the examination of vital documents which, it will be argued, moulded the Scottish royalist position. Instead of concentrating on a few leading figures, or narratives of factional

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[58] For an example of a particularly effective investigation into popular English royalism, see Stoyle, *Loyalty and Locality.*

[59] This point is clearly made in Nicole Greenspan, 'Charles II, Exile and the Problems of Allegiance', *The Historical Journal 54* (2011), 73-103.

[60] Jackson, *Restoration Scotland*; Allan I. Macinnes, Lesley Graham, Kieran German (eds), *Living with Jacobitism, 1690–1788: The Three Kingdoms and Beyond* (London, 2014); Murray Pittock, *The Myth of the Jacobite Clans: The Jacobite Army in 1745* (Edinburgh, 1995); Daniel Szechi, *The Jacobites: Britain and Europe 1688-1788* (Manchester, 1994).

[61] John R. Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and the Covenanting Revolution: The Emergence of a Scottish Commons', in Young (ed), *Celtic Dimensions of the British Civil Wars*, 164-165.

[62] For further information on this definition and approach, see p.31.

infighting or military exploits, this chapter focuses on the ways in which the royalist message was crafted by the nobility through a variety of mediums. This approach explores what royalists held in common rather than what divided them, and the means through which they were able to communicate their ideological position throughout society. To this end, this chapter also investigates Gaelic sources for information on royalism within the Highlands and Islands before comparing these findings to the accounts of lowland royalists to reach conclusions regarding ideological unity and regionalisation.

Chapter 2 provides a quantitative and qualitative investigation into the royalist clergy. By examining the deposition of ministers by the covenanting kirk and the defences produced by these clergymen, this chapter charts the scale and nature of royalism within the kirk. Using a national quantitative analysis alongside local source sampling and case-studies, this chapter also discusses the role played by ministers in the creation and maintenance of royalism amongst their parishioners. Referencing the conclusions of Chapter 1, the extent of ideological continuity across the estates is discussed and the importance of Episcopalian loyalties is assessed.

Chapter 3 examines royalism within the Scottish burghs through case-studies of Aberdeen, Glasgow and Inverness. Using burgh council records and local sources alongside parliamentary records, this chapter challenges the argument that there was little royalist support outwith the northern bastion of Aberdeen and argues that royalism possessed a much broader social appeal than has been previously recognised.[63] It also reflects on the enduring loyalty of royalists within these burghs and considers the substantial impact which the circumstances brought about by the civil wars had on individuals' actions. While this chapter focuses on the political stances of burgesses and burgh councils, where possible, the actions and beliefs of those outwith the urban elite are examined.

The thesis concludes by drawing together the arguments made in the three chapters to answer its central research questions regarding the nature and appeal of royalism in Scotland. The political, theological and ethical elements of royalist ideology will all be summarised, and the relationship between covenanting and royalism will be considered. These findings will be discussed with reference to recent interpretations of royalism from England and Ireland. The evidence for popular royalism will then be reviewed, and the

[63] The relevant scholarship on the experiences of the burghs and their populations during the civil wars is discussed at length in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.

success and failure of royalism in Scotland will be debated. Finally, the implications of this thesis for existing scholarship will be considered, and future research questions posed.

Chapter 1 - Royalism and the Nobility

'We give to Christ what is Christ's and to Caesar what is Caesar's'

The Cross-Petition, 1643.[1]

1.1 Introduction

Royalism as an identity, ideology and military force has primarily been understood through the prism of the nobility. While this has been facilitated by the comparative abundance of source material relating to the king's noble followers, this focus has also been motivated by the prevailing belief within the historiography that 'nobles took up the running as the main driving force behind royalism'.[2] Of course, this was true, and as with the Scottish covenanters, English parliamentarians and Irish confederates, the nobility occupied the 'political cockpit' in each of these factions.[3] The nobility provided Charles I with the advisors, commanders, influence and resources needed to wage war against his enemies. However, despite their importance within the royalist war effort, the motivations and loyalties which underpinned noble royalism remain topics of debate.

Much of the historiography which has attempted to untangle the royalist nobility's motives for supporting the king has focused on the political infighting, factional politics and individual agendas which ultimately undermined royalist ambitions in all three Stuart kingdoms. While continued awareness of royalist divisions remains crucial to our understanding of the realities of civil war allegiance, an answer to the vitally important question of *why* nobles sided with the king remains elusive. Indeed, historiographical focus on the various ill-defined royalist parties and factions often loses sight of the fact that all royalists sought the same ultimate goal: the king's victory over his enemies. Instead of concentrating on the divisions within the Scottish royalist bloc, this chapter will investigate what united the royalist nobility and, indeed, Scottish royalism as a whole. By examining the writings and discourses of prominent royalist nobles, this chapter seeks to uncover the ideological foundations of royalism in Scotland and the reasons why nobles pledged themselves to the king's cause.

For the purposes of the analysis which follows, the nobility has been broadly defined, and includes many individuals who might otherwise be described as members of

[1] Gilbert Burnet, *The Memoirs of the Lives and Actions of James and William, Dukes of Hamilton and Castle-Herald* (Oxford, 1643), 266.
[2] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 3.
[3] Scally, 'Constitutional Revolution, Party and Faction', 55.

the gentry. As mentioned in the Introduction, this thesis follows Keith Brown in recognising that, aside from the parliamentary peers, the Scottish nobility 'embraced a much larger, ill-defined number of untitled baronial houses holding land as tenants-in-chief of the crown'.[4] Thus, because 'hard and fast definitions are difficult to tease out … it is best to employ an elastic approach'.[5] Having said this, it is also prudent to recognise the astuteness of John Young's argument that the gentry grew in power during the covenanting period and that they wielded that power to great effect within the Scottish parliament.[6] The adoption of a broader definition of the nobility should not be read as a disparagement of the importance of the gentry in this period, but, as an expedient means through which to cover more ground and provide a more thorough examination of elite interpretation and understanding of Scottish royalism. However, it is important to note here that this chapter only considers male nobles. Unfortunately, the voices of female noble royalists are not visible within the sources analysed in this chapter. This is not indicative of a lack of female Scottish royalists, as the letters of Lilias Grant, Lady Grant, show, but rather their absence within the sources discussed here.[7]

This chapter reassesses royalism in Scotland by examining the oaths, bands, declarations, treatises, prose and poetry used by the royalist nobility to bind the Scottish royalist coalition together. Discussion is in four sections. The first section examines the oaths and bands of allegiance which royalists subscribed in attempts to galvanise support for the king. This is followed by a section which analyses royalist nobles' declarations of loyalty, which provide a telling comparison to the oaths and bands. Next, royalist literature is considered. This section employs a range of material, from political treatises to poetry, in an attempt to draw out further the ideological foundations of Scottish royalism from across Scotland. The final section examines Gaelic vernacular poetry composed on behalf of the chiefs who committed themselves and their clans to the royalist cause. It is hoped that this will help better integrate the *Gàidhealtachd* (Gaelic-speaking Scotland) within discussions of royalism in Scotland and aid an assessment of royalism's ideological unity. The overriding objective of all four of these sections is to highlight and isolate common themes from the plethora of source material examined. If such themes can be identified,

[4] Keith M. Brown, 'Honour, Honours and Nobility in Scotland between the Reformation and the National Covenant', *Scottish Historical Review* 91 (2012), 43-44.
[5] Keith M. Brown, 'The Second Estate: Parliament and the Nobility', in Keith M. Brown and Alan R. MacDonald (eds), *The History of the Scottish Parliament: Parliament in Context, 1235-1707* (Edinburgh, 2010), 68-69.
[6] Young, *The Scottish Parliament,* 46-47.
[7] William Fraser (ed.), *The Chiefs of Grant*, 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1883), ii, 64-65. Non-elite female royalists are discussed on pp.234 and 245.

they have the potential to reveal the foundations of the royalist faction in Scotland and expose the fundamental reasons why noble royalists came out in support of their king.

1.2 Scholarship

Unsurprisingly, much of the historiographical focus on the royalist nobility has been centred on the political and military muscle which they supplied to the king's cause.[8] Within the scholarly corpus on the "English Civil Wars", discussions of royalist ideology and allegiance have traditionally been couched in terms of a dichotomy between constitutional and absolutist variants. This compartmentalisation of royalism has contemporary origins, but it was S. R. Gardiner's adoption of this structure in the nineteenth century which enshrined its usage within the historiography.[9] In the opening pages of his history of the English Civil Wars, Gardiner identified two competing forms of royalist allegiance. The first was a breed of militant royalism which consisted of devotion to the king's supremacy and the steadfast belief in the need to crush the crown's enemies with military might. The second grouping was identified as being composed of 'moderate royalists' who had pledged their support to Charles I out of 'dread of a Puritan domination', and who were eager to see peace secured through compromise, with the prospect of protracted warfare nearly as abhorrent as parliamentarian rule. Gardiner used the king's nephew and stereotypical cavalier, Prince Rupert of the Palatinate, and the political operator and disillusioned pacifist, Lucius Cary, 2nd Viscount Falkland, to personify these two opposing royalist positions.[10]

The two-party interpretation remained the dominant means through which to understand noble royalism until the 1990s. Ronald Hutton's *The Structure of the Royalist Party, 1642–1646* (1981) used the distinctions of 'ultras' and 'moderates' to repackage Gardiner's dichotomy.[11] David L. Smith's *Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, c.1640-1649* (1994) used the term 'constitutional royalist' to describe those

[8] For relevant publications which discuss the royalist nobility's contribution to the king's war effort, see John Barratt, *Cavaliers: The Royalist Army at War, 1642-1646* (Stroud, 2000); Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort*; Martyn Bennett, 'The Royalist War Effort in the North Midlands, 1642-1646' (PhD thesis, Loughborough University, 1986); Peter Newman, 'The Royalist Armies in the North of England' (PhD thesis, University of York, 1978); Peter Newman, *Royalist Officers in England and Wales, 1642-1660: A Biographical Dictionary* (New York, 1981); Singleton, *Famous by My Sword*; Reid, *Crown, Covenant and Cromwell*; Reid, *Campaigns of Montrose*; Robertson, *Royalists at War*.

[9] The Edward Hyde, 1st Earl of Clarendon's near-contemporary history, *The History of The Rebellion and Civil Wars in England* (Oxford, 1843), is littered with references to parties and factions based on personal, political and religious loyalties. For examples, see 44, 102, 265 and 747.

[10] Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War*, i, 2-7.

[11] Hutton, 'The Structure of the Royalist Party', 556.

whose 'ideas are thought to revolve around a concept of limited monarchy which ruled under the law, and a wish to preserve the existing structures of the Church of England'. While maintaining the traditional point of view, Smith did note that there was an over-strict compartmentalisation of royalism by previous scholars and argued that political factions were 'aligned but not co-ordinated', with attitudes and loyalties fluctuating throughout the civil wars. [12]

The traditional dichotomy has come under increasing criticism since then, especially in the last 20 years. Spearheaded by the work of scholars such as J. W. Daly, Barbara Donagan, Jason McElligott, Malcom Smuts, David Scott and Blair Worden, there developed a growing consensus that English royalist noble identity and ideology was far less clear-cut than had been supposed.[13] In the introduction to their pioneering edited collection on royalism in England, Jason McElligott and David Smith lambasted the traditional interpretation, arguing that absolutist royalists were 'almost as rare as hen's teeth' compared to the 'mainstream' of constitutional royalism.[14] This, in turn, was criticised by David Scott who argued that the 'mirage of constitutional royalism' remains problematic due to its ambiguity and its 'potential for internal contradiction'. Scott also questioned the usefulness of the absolutist label, claiming that you would be 'hard-pushed to find Royalists who did not believe in the 'rule of law' or respect 'Parliament's place in the constitution''.[15] Smuts has produced a slightly different approach, emphasising the royalist nobility's 'political commitment to Protestant causes with a cosmopolitan aristocratic culture stressing gallantry, courage, honour and disdain for religious bigotry'. Smuts has also argued that divisions within the royalist camp were caused by differences in 'tactics', not 'fundamental principles'.[16] This cultural turn in the interpretation of royalism is clearly articulated in the recent work of Donagan and Worden. Donagan has highlighted royalists' general attachment to society's hierarchical structures and the belief that 'safety lay with the king and the preservation of ancient institutions and hierarchy'.[17] Similarly, Worden has advocated that royalism was in essence an 'anti-puritan creed' built upon 'sociability and civility and conviviality; as a commitment to ideas of honour and loyalty;

[12] Smith, *Constitutional Royalism*, 3-5.
[13] Daly, 'Could Charles I be Trusted?', 23-44; Donagan, 'Varieties of Royalism', 66-88; McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship in Revolutionary England*; McElligott and Smith (eds), *Royalists and Royalism*; Smuts, *Court Culture and The Origins of a Royalist Tradition*; Smuts, 'The Court and the Emergence of The Royalist Party', in McElligott and Smith (eds.), *Royalists and Royalism*, 44-65; David Scott, 'Rethinking Royalist Politics', 36-60; Worden, 'The Royalism of Andrew Marvell', 214-238.
[14] McElligott and Smith (eds), *Royalists and Royalism*, 12-13.
[15] Scott, 'Rethinking Royalist Politics', 38-42.
[16] Smuts, 'The Court and the Emergence of The Royalist Party', 63-64.
[17] Donagan, 'Varieties of Royalism', 74.

and as a longing for the civility and tranquillity of the halcyon days of the pre-war Caroline world'.[18]

This new wave of scholarship on royalism has created a consensus that royalist noble allegiance was built upon an unwritten mandate to uphold conservative values – especially the safeguarding of social hierarchy and the Anglican church – and to counter puritan political and religious extremism. However, there are four potential issues with this understanding. Firstly, the open-ended nature of this definition of royalism has made it far more difficult to determine exactly what royalists agreed on. Even the so-called fundamentals of royalist allegiance, such as commitment to the Anglican Church, have been questioned.[19] The current approach has also been criticised for failing to account for the changing nature of royalism in the ever-developing contexts of civil war. This led David Scott to argue that instead of understanding allegiance as identity, we should instead view it as a response to changing events.[20] However, Scott's solution is susceptible to the third, broader criticism of new approaches to royalism: that there is a scholarly trend which insists on the 'fetishising of complexity'. Grant Tapsell has vented frustration at some of the approaches taken by other scholars as an attempt to 'imprison royalism in a bewildering hall of fairground mirrors, in which faint but distorted outlines of different aspects of royalist experience can be dimly discerned, but in which nothing much can be said beyond 'it's complicated''.[21] The fourth and most pressing problem with current understandings of noble royalism is that they are principally Anglocentric. Any attempt to adopt the current working royalist hypothesis to Scotland or Ireland fails to consider the unique national context in which royalism there was shaped; and is hamstrung by the tendency within the English historiography to group royalists and covenanters/confederates together in homogenous groupings of 'Scots' and 'Irish' in order to assess English royalists' reactions.[22] Even the simple act of tracing the inception of the royalist faction to 1642 causes obvious issues in the Scottish and Irish contexts where civil war had been unleashed in 1639 and 1641 respectively.

As has been shown within the growing scholarship on Irish noble royalism, allegiance was principally shaped within its national context. Barry Robertson has argued

[18] Worden, 'The Royalism of Andrew Marvell', 214-215.
[19] Anthony Milton, 'Anglicanism and Royalism in the 1640s', in Adamson (ed), *The English Civil War*, 61-81.
[20] Scott, 'Rethinking Royalist Politics', 50-55.
[21] Grant Tapsell, 'Royalism Revisited', *The Historical Journal*, 54 (2011), 904.
[22] A clear example of this is the assertion that anti-Scottish sentiment was a key component of royalist allegiance. See Mark A. Kishlansky, 'A Lesson in Loyalty: Charles I and the Short Parliament', in McElligott and Smith (eds), *Royalists and Royalism*, 17-22.

that, more so than in England or Scotland, in Ireland confessional loyalties emerged as 'the key motivational factor for taking up arms', and yet, the vast majority of the Irish aristocracy, both Protestant and Catholic, initially supported Charles I.[23] Breandán Ó Buachalla has suggested that this level of royalist co-operation was facilitated by the fact that both Protestants and Catholics recognized the undisputable authority of Charles I as king, and that Irish elites on both sides of the divide knew that a lasting settlement could only be achieved if it was recognised by the crown.[24] However, the political crisis which developed in the years after 1642 tested this royalist consensus, forcing royalists on both sides of the confessional divide to reassess their priorities. Robert Armstrong's study of the Protestant communities in Northern Ireland has shown that their initial backing of the king's cause was superseded by support for the English parliamentarians after 1642 as it became clear that the king could not sufficiently support them in their war against the Catholic Confederacy. This Protestant alliance was tested repeatedly throughout the 1640s until it was shaken to its core by the execution of Charles I in 1649, sparking another political realignment.[25] Amongst competing ideological and religious loyalties, pragmatism also played a role. In his study of Daniel O'Neill, Donal Cregan argued that it was O'Neill's instinctive loyalty to the crown which drew him to the royalist ranks, but it was his desire for high office and personal advancement which kept him there.[26] The crucible of competing loyalties and agendas which characterised noble allegiance in Ireland is so complex and mercurial that Micheál Ó Siochrú has concluded that it is 'impossible to explain these developments using the traditional two-party model [confederates vs royalists]'.[27]

In Scotland, the historiography to date has argued that noble allegiance was similarly volatile.[28] Between the two committed cores of royalists and covenanters there was a swathe of 'royalist Covenanters' and 'pragmatic royalists' who conformed to the covenanting regime but negotiated with royalists.[29] Even within the royalist core itself there were different shades of royalism. Much of the historiography has focused on two

[23] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 94-95.
[24] Ó Buachalla, 'James our True King', 7-35, esp. 14.
[25] Armstrong, *Protestant War*, 221-235.
[26] Cregan, 'An Irish Cavalier', 104-111.
[27] Micheál Ó Siochrú, *Confederate Ireland, 1642-1649: A Constitutional and Political Analysis* (Dublin, 1999), 18.
[28] For publications relating to the state of the Scottish nobility in the years preceding the civil wars, see Keith M. Brown, *Noble Power in Scotland from the Reformation to the Revolution* (Edinburgh, 2011); Keith M. Brown, *Nobel Society in Scotland: Wealth, Family and Culture from the Reformation to the Revolution* (Edinburgh, 2000); Julian Goodare, *State and Society in Early Modern Scotland* (Oxford, 1999); Julian Goodare, *The Government of Scotland, 1560-1625* (Oxford, 2004).
[29] Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 263-264; Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and National Identity', 112.

royalists and those who orbited them: James Hamilton, Marquis of Hamilton, and James Graham, Marquis of Montrose. The royalist parties led by these men have been variously dubbed the peace and war parties; the Hamiltons and Montrosians, and the moderates and hard-liners.[30] These parties have been used to define the underlying ideological makeup of royalist nobles in Scotland, with moderates who pursued a strategy of compromise and negotiation following Hamilton, and those intent on securing the king's domination of his enemies following Montrose. In essence, they have been used as the Scottish equivalents of Prince Rupert and viscount Falkland. This framework, like its English counterpart, possesses contemporary credentials. On 17 June 1646, following his surrender to the covenanting army at Newark, Charles I wrote to Henrietta Maria to explain the political situation in Scotland. In the letter, the king stated that 'I divide them into 4 factions; Mountroses, the neutralls, the Hamiltons, and the Campbells ... The three first seem to correspond, the two last are avowed enemies, the second keeps fair quarter with all, and none of them trusts one another'.[31] The king's identification of two separate royalist factions is significant.[32] Nevertheless, while it is clear that some Scottish royalists preferred a negotiated peace over one won with the sword, this difference in tactics, to borrow Smuts's phrase, does not mean that the two shades of royalist opposed each other ideologically. Thus, efforts must be made to uncover the reasons why nobles found themselves fighting for the crown at all.

While this task is difficult, some historians have attempted to provide a solution. Barry Robertson described noble royalism in Scotland as a 'coalition of allies' held together by a mutual reverence for social hierarchy, concepts of honour and personal loyalty to the crown.[33] In her analysis of the King's Covenant and the marquis of Hamilton's actions in 1638, Kirsteen MacKenzie reached similar conclusions, arguing that the king's supporters in Scotland were primarily motivated by a desire to see law and order restored, and the puritanical 'multitude' returned to a state of subservience.[34] David Allan's assessment of Montrose's personal philosophy asserted that the marquis's 'instinctive conservatism' and neo-Stoicism resulted in an 'unrelenting pursuit of moderation'. Allan

[30] Cowen, *Montrose*, 138-139; Scally, 'Counsel in Crisis', 18-29; Scally, 'Constitutional Revolution, Party and Faction', 68-71; Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 207 and 263-264; Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 21.
[31] John Bruce (ed), *Charles I in 1646: Letters of King Charles the First to Queen Henrietta Maria* (London, 1856), 48-49.
[32] The king's mistrust of Hamilton at this point in the chronology can be explained by the fact that the duke of Hamilton had just been released from the Tower of London after Charles had imprisoned him for undermining his cause in Scotland. For more details on this and an assessment of Hamilton's attitude at this time, see John Scally, 'Constitutional Revolution', 68-73.
[33] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 149 and 193.
[34] Kirsteen M. MacKenzie, 'Restoring the Nation? Hamilton and the politics of the National Covenant', *International Review of Scottish Studies* 36 (2011), 67-91.

argued that neo-Stoicism heavily influenced Scottish royalist nobles with its emphasis on harmony, order, morality and justice, providing an ethical framework which rejected disorder and anarchy.[35] Keith Brown has also recognised the influence of neo-Stoicism on the Scottish nobility and has suggested that the political fault lines which developed between royalists and covenanters were the result of conflicting secular ideologies, not genuine religious concerns. Brown has contended that nobles who had been worst affected by royal absenteeism and the invasive policies of Charles I often joined the covenanters, while nobles who had experienced personal service to the crown and had retained influence in Edinburgh or London were more likely to join the king's cause. Brown has also heavily criticised the belief that Scottish royalist nobles had become anglicised and indifferent to domestic affairs, asserting that royalist families merely had 'the tradition of service to the king and an appreciation of the benefits' while the often younger covenanting nobles, such as Archibald Campbell, Marquis of Argyll, and John Elphinstone, Lord Balmerino, had become dissatisfied with the spread of patronage and the stagnation of advancement opportunities.[36] While Brown has advocated a more pragmatic interpretation of noble allegiance, he has maintained the importance of loyalty and subservience to the monarch within Scottish noble culture, with the caveat that there were 'different shades of loyalty'.[37]

A particular weakness of mainstream scholarship on Scottish noble royalism has been its neglect of Gaelic royalism. Despite the fundamental role played by royalists from the *Gàidhealtachd*, there has been little discussion of the ways in which highland nobles viewed their own royalism both in itself, and in comparison to that of their lowland allies. Instead, historiographical deliberations over the extent to which Gaels saw themselves as part of the developing Scottish state have manifested themselves within the scholarship of the civil wars.[38] This has produced much debate over the degree to which highland

[35] David Allan, *Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland: Neo-Stoicism, Culture and Ideology in an Age of Crisis, 1540-1690* (East Linton, 2000), 134-175.
[36] Brown, 'Courtiers and Cavaliers', 158-183; Brown, *Noble Power*, 217-223.
[37] Brown, 'Courtiers and Cavaliers', 158.
[38] For details on the debates surrounding the integration of the Highlands and Isles into the early modern Scottish state, see Julian Goodare, 'The Statutes of Iona in Context', *The Scottish Historical Review* 77 (1998), 31-57; Donald Gregory, *The History of the Western Highlands and Isles of Scotland from A.D. 1493 to A.D. 1625* (Glasgow, 1881); Martin MacGregor, 'Civilising Gaelic Scotland: The Scottish Isles and the Stewart Empire', in Micheál Ó Siochrú and Éamonn Ó Ciardha (eds), *The Plantation of Ulster: Ideology and Practice* (Manchester, 2012), 33-54, Martin MacGregor, 'The Campbells: Lordship, Literature and Liminality', *Textual Cultures* 7 (2012), 121-157; Martin MacGregor, 'The Statutes of Iona: Text and Context', *Innes Review* 57 (2008), 111-181; Allan I. Macinnes, *Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788* (East Linton, 1996), 56-81; Wilson Macleod, *Divided Gaels Gaelic Cultural Identities in Scotland and Ireland 1200-1650* (Oxford, 2004), 194-219; James A. Stewart Jr., 'Political and Cultural Change in the Seventeenth-Century House of Argyll and Clan Campbell', *Proceedings of the Harvard Celtic Colloquium* 12 (1992), 166-183.

royalism should be interpreted as almost entirely pragmatic, fuelled by clan agendas and vendettas, or as ideologically committed to the king's cause.

Audrey Cunningham's influential monograph, *The Loyal Clans* (1932), attempted to reconcile these two aspects of Gaelic royalism by explaining that the 'natural claim' which the 'patriarchal ideal of loyalty' and the 'divine right of kings' held over highlanders whose sense of kinship extended to monarchical authority, was tempered by personal agendas and local circumstances. However, Cunningham did emphasise the former over the latter, especially in regard to the 'legacy of loyalty' which the civil wars developed within these loyal clans, which the later Jacobites were able to exploit.[39] Cunningham's assessment has resonated with more recent work from M. Pía Coira, David Findlay and Allan Macinnes, who agree, to varying degrees, that the royalist clans were ideologically and culturally devoted to the king's cause through a shared and deep-rooted commitment to ideals of honour, obedience, fidelity, genealogical legitimacy and hierarchy. Through an in-depth examination of the development of Gaelic poetry, Coira has argued that, by the mid-seventeenth century, there were more similarities than differences between highland Gaelic political culture and its lowland Scots counterpart, and that clan poets had come to recognise the Stuarts as the rightful incumbents of the 'high-kingship of *Alba*'.[40] Findlay's stance supports this, emphasising the feudal loyalty owed by Gaelic clan chiefs to the Stuart crown and how this reflected the structures of loyalty already present within the clans. Findlay argues that the royalism exhibited by some clans during the 1640s was a 'natural and just Gaelic response' to the outbreak of civil war.[41] Macinnes has taken a similar line to Coira and Findlay in his analysis of Gaelic royalism, but has also stressed the fact that the individual commitment of highland clans varied depending on their own local assessments and objectives.[42]

While Cunningham, Coira, Findlay and Macinnes have argued for ideological and cultural commitment over personal pragmatism as the lynchpin of Gaelic royalism, other scholars have maintained a contrary position. Derick Thompson has claimed, in contrast to Cunningham and Coira, that the civil wars and religious intolerance of the period, 'helped to reinforce older clan divisions and undermine racial or linguistic unity'. According to

[39] Audrey Cunningham, *The Loyal Clans* (Cambridge, 1932), 248-254.
[40] M. Pía Coira, *By Poetic Authority: The Rhetoric of Panegyric in Gaelic Poetry of Scotland to c.1700* (Edinburgh, 2012), 344.
[41] David Findlay, 'Divine Right and Gaelic Society in the Seventeenth Century', in Colm Ó Baoill and Nacny R. McGuire (eds), *Rannsachadh na Gàidhlig 2000: Papers Read at the Conference Scottish Gaelic Studies 2000* (Aberdeen, 2002), 248-249.
[42] Macinnes, *Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart*, 88-110.

Thompson's assessment, the royalist clans operated on the periphery of national politics, 'playing the game' in order to pursue their own ends and indulge themselves in 'outworn rivalries and preoccupations'.[43] In a similar vein, David Stevenson has questioned the 'bewildering' notion that 'mystical reverence' for Charles I was able to override the clans' agenda or autonomy unless it suited them to do so. Stevenson has gone as far as to suggest that the campaigns of Montrose (1644-1646) were as much a Gaelic civil war as a Scottish one, fuelled by an anti-Campbell agenda and racial hatred between Irish and Scottish Gaels.[44] This interpretation of highland allegiance can also be found in several narratives of the civil wars in Scotland, including Trevor Royle's *Civil War: The Wars of the Three Kingdoms, 1638-1660* (2004), which portrays the royalist clans as intent on the destruction of Clan Campbell and little else.[45]

While the extremes of royalist ideology have been identified, whether in the absolutist rhetoric of courtiers or the politically charged poetry of Gaelic bards, there remains much work to be done in uncovering the unifying ideological foundations on which the Scottish royalist coalition was built and how it responded to the everchanging political landscape of the civil wars. As has been the case within the English historiography, we currently risk losing sight of what united Scottish royalists as a result of an emphasis on the reasons why the royalist nobles failed to bring about victory for their king. Efforts must be made to better integrate the variations of royalism within Scotland, from the highlands to the exiles at the Oxford court, and to better understand the reasons and circumstances which led this coalition to fight under the same flag.

1.3 – Methods and Sources

In order to investigate noble royalism in Scotland, this chapter will examine a range of texts, in four sections: royalist oaths and bands; royalist declarations; royalist literature, and Gaelic vernacular poetry.

The first section will examine the subscriptional devices composed and sworn by Scottish royalist nobles over the course of the civil wars. Primarily consisting of oaths and bands, these devices also include protestations, petitions and remonstrances. They were created and confirmed by individuals who shared the beliefs evidenced in the pact and

[43] Derick Thomson, *An Introduction to Gaelic Poetry* (London, 1974), 116.
[44] Stevenson, *Highland Warrior*, 27 and 225.
[45] Trevor Royle, *Civil War: The Wars of the Three kingdoms, 1638-1660* (London, 2004), 339. Also see Raymond Campbell Paterson, *A Land Afflicted: Scotland and the Covenanter Wars, 1638-1690* (Edinburgh, 1998), 103-104.

wished to show their support by signing and/or swearing to uphold the document. While oaths and bands have been closely associated with covenanting political ideology, there has been little appreciation of the importance of these oaths within Scottish royalism. Covenanters, such as David Calderwood, attempted to give credence to the National Covenant by outlining a 'covenanting tradition' throughout Scottish history, which might explain why oaths and bands are thought of as more intrinsically covenanting than royalist.[46] However, the use of noble bands of maintenance and alliance can be traced back to the early fifteenth century. Such bands traditionally reflected the relationship between a lord and a subordinate, and Jenny Wormald has conclusively proven their importance within mainstream Scottish politics until the beginning of the seventeenth century.[47] The First Band (1557) of the Lords of the Congregation established the use of these types of oaths within national politics, legitimising their use as a expressions of conscience and public bands of alliance which transcended society's class structure.[48] In response to the tribulations of the civil wars, the Scottish nobility used these binding agreements in an attempt to form alliances and create political consensus. By examining these oaths, it is possible to identify recurring themes and ideological consistencies indicating what royalists believed and how they viewed the crisis developing around them. Some of the oaths which are discussed below were given in private, intended only for their subscribers, while others were widely distributed in the hope of binding individuals from all levels of society to the royalist cause. Thus, they provide crucial evidence of the shared concerns and beliefs which were used to unite the royalist movement. Some of these bands have survived in their original manuscript form, others as drafts or copies, and some as fragments. While several of them have been mentioned in previous scholarship, this thesis provides the first in-depth textual analysis of these sources, and demonstrates their value as statements of allegiance. The various oaths discussed below are dealt with in chronological order to allow for consideration of consistencies and fluctuations within royalist ideology and identity over time.

This will be followed by an analysis of royalist declarations. Differing from oaths or bands, declarations were never intended to be subscribed. Rather, they were usually public defences of royalists or statements of ideological commitment to the king's cause.

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[46] David Calderwood, *The History of the Kirk of Scotland*, 5 vols (Edinburgh, 1842-1844), i, 383, 538 and 427; Jane Dawson, 'Bonding, Religious Allegiance and Covenanting', in Steven Boardman and Julian Goodare (eds), *Kings, Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain, 1300-1625: Essays in Honour of Jenny Wormald* (Edinburgh, 2014), 160; Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution*, 91.
[47] Jenny Wormald, *Lords and Men in Scotland: Bonds of Manrent, 1442-1603* (Edinburgh, 1985), 1-22.
[48] Dawson, 'Bonding, Religious Allegiance and Covenanting', 161.

This makes them invaluable to any examination of royalist identity, especially when compared to the oaths and bands. Like the oaths, some declarations were intended for a private audience, while others were printed with the intention of national dissemination. Again, these texts have not previously been brought together and analysed in the manner attempted here.

The third section examines the prose and poetry produced by noble Scottish royalists. Robert Wilcher's 2001 study of English royalism used royalist literature to great effect in his pursuit of royalist ideology and has served as a model for this analysis.[49] This section focusses on the works of three individuals: Archibald Napier, 1st Lord Napier; William Drummond of Hawthornden; and James Graham, Marquis of Montrose. While these works have been categorised together, it is important to note here the differences in the material. The works of Napier are political treatises which discuss royalist ideology and allegiance. Included alongside these are the prose and poetry of Drummond and Montrose's poetry. Like Napier, Drummond wrote a number of political treatises and poems which he intended to have printed, but failed to do so due to covenanting censorship. In contrast, Montrose's poetry was deeply personal and private. Interweaving love poems with political discourse, the poems posthumously cemented Montrose's name within the genre of cavalier poetry.[50] Amongst Montrose's overindulgent hyperbole lies invaluable insights into the captain-general's ideology and character.

Finally, attention is turned to the works of John MacDonald, known as Iain Lom, the Bard of Keppoch, and Hector Maclean, known as Eachann Bacach, clan poet for the Macleans of Duart. Gaelic vernacular poetry provided a medium for poets to reflect and shape the political beliefs of their chiefs and clans, making them invaluable to any study of Scottish royalism.[51] MacDonald and Maclean have been singled out for analysis for four reasons. Firstly, they were both the clan bards (*bàrd* or *aos-dàna*) for two of the most dedicated royalist clans – the MacDonalds of Keppoch and the Macleans of Duart. Secondly, both were eyewitnesses to the events of the civil wars. Thirdly, they provide the two most substantial bodies of contemporary Gaelic material available. Finally, both MacDonald and Maclean were vernacular poets (distinguishable from classical Gaelic poets), whose works were primarily concerned with politically legitimising the actions of their patron clan chiefs, influencing the political attitudes of the clan kindred and

[49] Robert Wilcher, *The Writing of Royalism, 1628-1660* (Cambridge, 2001), esp. 90-156.
[50] For more information on cavalier poetry, see James Loxley, *Royalism and Poetry in the English Civil Wars: The Drawn Sword* (Basingstoke, 1997), esp. 1-8.
[51] Martin Macgregor, 'The Genealogical Histories of Gaelic Scotland', in A. Fox and D. Woolf (eds), *The Spoken Word: Oral Culture in Britain, 1500-1850* (Manchester, 2002), 224.

commentating on contemporary events.[52] Additionally, both men were themselves members of the nobility of their clans, and thus were members of the wider royalist nobility as defined above. Using the research of Coira as a model, this section will analyse the poetry of these two men and compare it to the non-Gaelic material discussed elsewhere.[53] Because the poetry was oral in composition and performance, we have to rely on later transcriptions (dating to the late seventeenth century and onwards) which have preserved this oral tradition. All Gaelic material employed below has been accessed via modern editions with translations, principally Colm Ò Baoill's edition of Maclean and Annie M. MacKenzie's edition of MacDonald.[54] This raises issues over accuracy, translation and transmission which are regrettably unavoidable. Given that we can only use what we have, these poems serve as some of the few surviving sources which detail royalist ideology from the *Gàidhealtachd*.[55] While we must remain cautious of these inherent issues, analysis of these poems and the political themes they appeal to are of prime importance.

Throughout all four sections in this chapter, the primary source material mentioned above is supplemented by relevant archival and printed material, such as correspondence from royalist nobles. This will both contextualise the views and beliefs discussed within the oaths, declarations and literature, and provide another means of assessing royalist ideology.

1.4 – Royalist Oaths and Bands

The mass subscription of the National Covenant from late February 1638 forced Charles I and his Scottish advisors to devise a plan to stem the tide of covenanting sympathy and reclaim the support the covenanters had drawn to their cause. The solution, masterminded by the marquis of Hamilton, was the King's Covenant. Issued in September 1638 by royal proclamation, the king ordered all his Scottish subjects to subscribe, in doing so challenging the legality and legitimacy of the unauthorised National Covenant. The King's Covenant was composed of three parts: a declaration from Charles I; a reprint of the 1581

[52] Coira, *By Poetic Authority*, 42-44.
[53] ibid.
[54] *Eachann Bacach and other Maclean Poets*, ed. Colm Ò Baoill (Edinburgh, 1979); *Orain Iain Luim: Songs of John MacDonald, Bard of Keppoch*, ed. Annie M. MacKenzie (Edinburgh, 1973). Alternative translations of some of the key poems discussed below are also available in *Gair Nan Clarsach - The Harps' Cry: Anthology of 17th Century Gaelic Poetry*, ed. Colm Ó Baoill and Meg Bateman (Edinburgh, 1994),
[55] For a discussion of the importance of oral Gaelic sources, see John MacInnes, *Dùthchas nan Gàidheal: Selected Essays of John MacInnes* (Edinburgh, 2006), 3-33 and 230-233; Macgregor, 'The Genealogical Histories', 196-197.

King's Confession (also known as the Negative Confession); and a reproduction of the 1589 General Band. Both the King's Confession and the General Band had originally been authorised by James VI during a period of heightened national counter-reformation paranoia as political devices to placate the increasingly influential Presbyterian faction, and unite the kingdom in defence of the reformed religion and the king's authority.[56] The wording and premise of the National Covenant had been deliberately phrased to present the covenant as a renewal of the 1581 confession, despite its additions, to draw upon the confession's authority and legitimacy. By reissuing the King's Confession and General Band, Charles I and Hamilton hoped to satisfy moderate covenanters' religious concerns and put the political pressure back onto the fledgling covenanting leadership by offering an authorised alternative to the covenant. Those who subscribed would then be bound together in an ultimately royalist oath of allegiance. It was hoped that this would sow the seeds of doubt within the minds of subscribers to the National Covenant and force them to confront their continued resistance against royal authority.

The only truly innovative element of the King's Covenant was Charles I's declaration which introduced the confession and band. The declaration offered substantial concessions to the covenanters. Charles recognised the 'conceived fears of innovations of Religion and Laws' and pledged to 'satisfie, not only their desires, but even their doubts'. This was not the same as admitting religious or political innovation, but it sought to soothe the fears harboured by many covenanters that they were being denied the opportunity to voice their concerns. In an attempt to pull the carpet from under the covenanters' feet, Charles discharged the disputed 1637 Service Book (also known as the Book of Common Prayer), the 1636 Book of Canons, the court of high commission (an ecclesiastical court controlled by the Scottish bishops which had operated outside the jurisdiction of the general assembly since 1610) and the controversial 1618 Articles of Perth.[57] The king, following the advice of his Scottish advisors, also conceded to calling a general assembly for November 1638 and a parliament for May 1639.[58] These concessions were considerable and would have been completely unacceptable to the king at the beginning of 1638. They are also revealing as to the arena in which Charles and his royalist supporters sought to combat covenanting rhetoric. In a sweeping declaration, Charles had revoked his Scottish religious policy, a policy which had caused such division and strife over the

[56] Karin Bowie, *Public Opinion in Early Modern Scotland, c.1560-1707* (Cambridge, 2020), Chapter 3 [Forthcoming].
[57] NLS, Adv.MS.34.5.15. For more on the theological implications of these concessions, see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.
[58] NLS, Wodrow MSS. Folio, LXVI, no. 37.

course of 1637 and 1638. While it is likely that Charles did this, at least partly, to play for more time in order to strengthen his hand militarily, by abandoning his religious policy and offering to consult the general assembly and Scottish parliament the king was making significant constitutional concessions. Importantly, this response to the growing threat posed by the covenanters shows that the king and his Scottish advisors were willing to sacrifice religious policy in order to re-establish political control. While the status of the episcopate was ominously not mentioned, the royalist position was defined in the King's Covenant as politically, not religiously motivated.

With the carrot of concession came the stick of coercion. Charles made it clear that his patience had been tested, noting the 'disgrace of government' which had occurred as a result of some subjects having 'exercised such illimited and unwarranted power' in promulgating the National Covenant. The king declared that:

> if any of Our Subjects, whether ecclesiasticall or civill, of whatsoever qualitie, title, or degree, have, or shall at any time presume to do any such act, or assume to themselves any such exemption of power, That they shall, like as by these presents We make and ordain them to be lyable to the tryall and censure of Parliament, general Assembly, or any other judicatories competent, according to the nature and qualitie of the offence.

While Charles was 'pleased absolutely to forget what is past, and freely to forgive all by-gones to all such as shall acquiesce to this Our gracious pleasure, and carry themselves peaceably as loyall and dutifull subjects', he promised that those who continued to defy the crown would be dealt with swiftly. Whether the king or his advisors realised their own inability to enforce such penalties given the escalating crisis is of secondary importance to the reality that the king had ordered his subjects to view continued resistance as sedition in all but name. This hardened rhetoric was accompanied by Charles's brusque acceptance that 'it is likely that the disorders and distractions which have happened of late, have been occasioned through the conceived fears of innovation of religion and laws, and not out of any disloyalty or disaffection to soveraignity'. The path back to normality was left open to all who accepted the king's concessions and returned to dutiful obedience.[59]

The king's step back from his ecclesiastical position allowed him to remind his subjects of his Protestant credentials and reframe his own position as a bulwark 'for the maintenance of the true Religion' without having to clarify what exactly the true religion looked like beyond that it was defiantly Protestant. The inclusion of the King's Confession and 1589 General Band within the King's Covenant enabled Charles to do this while also reinforcing the hierarchy of allegiance. The confession affirmed that the king, kirk and

[59] NLS, Adv.MS.34.5.15.

three estates of parliament were united in their defence of the true religion against 'all contrary Religion and Doctrine: but chiefly all kinde of Papistrie'. However, unlike the National Covenant, the confession made no claim that loyalty to the monarch was conditional upon his defence of the true religion.[60] The confession maintained that:

> the quietnesse and stability of our religion and Kirk doth depend upon the safety and good behaviour of the Kings majestie, as upon a comfortable instrument of Gods mercie granted to this country, for the maintenance of his Kirk, and ministration of justice amongst us, We protest and promise with our hearts under the same oath, hand-writ, and pains, that we shall defend his person and authority.[61]

The National Covenant had also quoted this section of the 1581 confession verbatim, but the shift in context between the National Covenant and the King's Covenant gave these lines new meaning.[62] In royalist eyes, this rhetoric confirmed the king's divine authority and his necessity for the maintenance of the kirk. Through the King's Covenant, Charles sought to portray himself as having conducted state policy as befitted a Christian prince, defending the true religion, ruling in moderation and receptive to the concerns of his subjects.[63] By doing so, he also intended to reassure moderates and mute any notion of conditional loyalty to the crown. This argument would be developed in subsequent royalist publications, in which the covenanters were accused of harbouring ulterior political motives, as only rebels would intentionally dismiss a king's ecclesiastical concessions in order to pursue further, political, concessions via an unjustified war against their sovereign.[64]

This sentiment was echoed in the General Band. Once more, the 'conjunction betwixt the true and Christian religion, presently protest within this realme, and Soveraigne Lords estate, and standing; having both the self same friends and common enemies' was emphasised alongside the divine authority of the king, as 'that zealous and religious prince … imploy[s] the means and power that God hath put into his hands'. Anti-Catholic polemic was used as a clarion call for unity in the face of imminent danger and was no doubt intended to remind subscribers that whether they subscribed the National Covenant or the King's Covenant, their oath of allegiance was to the maintenance of the reformed religion and the king's authority against their common enemies. While these 'forraigne or intestine plots, or preparations' had, in the band's original form, referred to the popish

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[60] Gardiner (ed), *Constitutional Documents*, 124-133.
[61] NLS, Adv.MS.34.5.15.
[62] Gardiner (ed), *Constitutional Documents*, 124-133.
[63] For a discussion of princely virtues, see Andrea Thomas, 'Renaissance Culture at the Court of James V, 1528-1542' (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1997), 11, 194-195 and 200-201.
[64] Walter Balcanquhall ['the King'], *A Large Declaration Concerning the Late Tumults in Scotland* (London, 1639).

plots of the 1580s, their contemporary significance would not have been mistaken. While Catholic insurgency was an ever-present threat, the band's references to subversive 'intestine powers *or* papists' was a direct equation of the power and authority seized by the covenanters to the seditious and ultimately anarchical threat posed by Catholic conspirators.[65] With these implications in mind, subscribers were required to swear to 'conveen and assemble our selves publickly, with our friends in arms, or in a quiet manner … as we shall be required by his [the king's] Proclamations, or by writ, or message direct to us from his Majesty, or any having power from him'. Just as the declaration had urged unity and warned against continued resistance, the band reminded those in opposition to the crown that the king possessed the power of calling the kingdom to arms against 'forraigne or intestine plots, or preparations'. Those who failed to take this opportunity to declare their loyalty to the crown were to be 'esteemed traitours to God, and his Majestie, and to have lost all honour, credit, and estimation in time coming'.[66]

Traditionally, the King's Covenant has been viewed as a failure by historians. During the autumn of 1638, extensive subscription campaigns were overseen by the king's supporters, namely the marquis of Hamilton, the marquis of Huntly, the earl of Traquair, and David Carnegie, Earl of Southesk. However, the success of these campaigns has been questioned, especially given the fact that Hamilton asked nobles with covenanting sympathies, such as lord Lorne (the future marquis of Argyll), to oversee subscription drives in their localities.[67] It has been difficult to contest this argument due to the dire lack of surviving copies of the King's Covenant, though Hamilton ordered hundreds of copies to be printed and dispersed throughout the kingdom.[68] A surviving copy of the King's Covenant from Southesk's subscription campaign in Angus between September and October 1638 contains 1133 subscriptions, but it is difficult to assess how successful the King's Covenant was in other areas.[69] Nevertheless, for the purposes of this chapter its success matters less than its significance within the development of the Scottish royalist position.

John Scally has argued that the King's Covenant was more or the less the result of Hamilton's attempts to advocate compromise between Charles and the covenanters.[70]

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[65] The emphasis is my own.
[66] NLS, Adv.MS.34.5.15.
[67] Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 110. For example, see NRS, GD406/1/454.
[68] See pp.207-209 for discussion of Hamilton's plan to disseminate copies of the King's Covenant in Glasgow.
[69] NLS, Adv.MS.34.5.15.
[70] Scally, 'Counsel in Crisis', 20-21.

While this is undoubtedly true, an emphasis on compromise tends to obscure the importance of the King's Covenant in the formation of the Scottish royalist position. Barry Robertson has maintained that the King's Covenant fatally undermined royalist ambitions in Scotland by alienating Scottish Catholics and failing to explicitly defend episcopacy.[71] This, however, misunderstands the intentions of the King's Covenant. The fact that Charles and Hamilton corresponded regularly with William Douglas, Marquis of Douglas; Robert Maxwell, Earl of Nithsdale; and Randal MacDonnell, Earl of Antrim – all of whom were ardent Catholics and royalists – suggests that the King's Covenant's emphasis on anti-popery was nothing more than propaganda. Charles would not take umbrage with noble Catholic subjects as long as they were loyal, and they would remain loyal as long as these sentiments remained words and not actions.[72] The king and his advisors had realised quickly that in order to secure the hearts and minds of the Scottish kingdom, the crown needed to be seen as a force for Protestant reformation. While this might have understandably made Scottish Catholics uneasy, it is clear that it did not alienate the Catholics who mattered.[73] In a similar fashion, the king's abandonment of his religious policy and the absence of any defence of episcopacy shows that Charles, and by extension many of his noble supporters, were willing to make significant theological concessions in order to regain political control. There is no evidence from 1638 to suggest that royalist nobles saw the defence of the king's religious policies as a priority. It was the political and constitutional ramifications of the covenanters' challenge against royal authority which concerned them the most. Indeed, Hamilton wrote to Huntly shortly after the King's Covenant had been published, expressing his relief that 'the worst is past, for religion can be no more a pretext'.[74] It is difficult to argue with Kirsteen MacKenzie's assessment that 'the King was determined to reclaim his people and re-establish the social order', and that this is 'essential to our understanding of the origins of the King's Covenant'.[75]

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[71] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 46. Elsewhere in his book (pp.36 and 193), Robertson expresses severe doubts over the extent to which royalists were committed to the defence of the episcopal system. It is only within his discussion of the King's Covenant that Robertson questions its abandonment of the episcopal position.

[72] NRS, GD406/1/727; GD406/1/883.

[73] Allan Macinnes has suggested that professed Catholics likely never accounted for more than 2% of the Scottish population during the seventeenth century. Scott Spurlock has, however, emphasised the importance of the Catholic nobility in the survivability of Catholicism in Scotland during this period, though he has argued that their faith was never really an impediment to their loyalty to the crown. See Allan I. Macinnes, 'Catholic Recusancy and the Penal Laws, 1603–1707', *Records of the Scottish Church History Society* 23 (1987), 35; Scott Spurlock, 'The laity and the structure of the Catholic Church in early modern Scotland', in Robert Armstrong and Tadhg Ó hAnnracháin (eds), *Insular Christianity: Alternative models of the Church in Britain and Ireland, c.1570–c.1700* (Manchester, 2012), 231-251.

[74] NRS, GD406/1/443.

[75] MacKenzie, 'Restoring the Nation?', 78.

An interesting comparator to the King's Covenant's is the so-called Black Oath (1639) which was subscribed in Ulster and London. Composed in the direct aftermath (January) of the Glasgow Assembly – during which the covenanters' abjured the Scottish episcopate and defied royal authority – the Black Oath was created by Thomas Wentworth, Lord Deputy of Ireland, to contain the spread of covenanting support and reinforce royal authority in Ulster, where there was a sizeable Ulster-Scots Presbyterian community.[76] It was to be sworn by all Scottish men and women. Having deemed the oath a success, Charles then ordered it to be subscribed in London in June 1639, to secure the loyalty of Scots there. The oath itself is far more direct in its language than the King's Covenant, presumably because it was created following the dramatic events at the 1638 Glasgow Assembly. In order 'to shewe their loyalties in this tyme of the defection of their Country men in the kingdome of Scotland', subscribers swore to 'defend and maintain his [the king's] Royal Power and Authority', 'not [to] bear Arms, or do any rebellious or hostile Act against Him, or protest against any [of] his Royal Commands, but submit myself in all due Obedience'. Additionally, subscribers promised 'not [to] enter into any Covenant, Oath, or Band of mutual Defence ... without his Majesty's Sovereign and Regal Authority' and they pledged to 'renounce and abjure all Covenants, Oaths, and Bands whatsoever, contrary to what I have herein sworn'.[77] Whereas the King's Covenant was a planned and measured response to covenanting dissent, the Black Oath was a kneejerk reaction to the threat of insurrection. It is significant that there was no attempt by royalists to adopt the Black Oath in Scotland. Indeed, while the core ideological points of the King's Covenant were the same as the Black Oath – loyalty was owed to the king, the covenant was illegitimate, and continued resistance was sedition – the lack of any Scottish royalist influence on the Black Oath is glaringly apparent. The King's Covenant targeted the swathe of concerned moderates caught between the opposing camps and offered them a way out. It sought to convince and coerce them into abandoning any covenanting designs by framing the king's cause as force for order and stability, in both the secular and ecclesiastical spheres. In contrast, the Black Oath was a brazen demand for loyalty which disregarded any religious concerns and forced subscribers to accept that the covenant had always been unjustified and intentionally seditious.

[76] For more details regarding the Glasgow Assembly, see pp.123-124.
[77] British Library, Additional MS 11045, f.29r; Thomas Wentworth, *The Earl of Strafforde's Letters and Dispatches: With an Essay towards his Life by Sir George Radcliffe*, ed. William Knowler, 2 vols (London, 1739), ii. 345.

Ultimately, the King's Covenant failed to produce the desired effect. By failing to explicitly declare the National Covenant illegal, the King's Covenant legitimised it by affirming the King's Confession.[78] Whereas the National Covenant was quickly harnessed by the covenanters as their manifesto, the King's Covenant failed to make the transition from propaganda to political platform. Once fighting broke out in March 1639, Scottish royalists were, in the words of Patrick Gordon, 'forced to looke to themselfes'.[79] In the north-east, royalists under the command of Sir George Ogilvie, Laird of Banff and Sir John Gordon, Laird of Haddo, assembled in Strathbogie in early May to mount an offensive against covenanters meeting at Turriff. However, after the leading royalist in the area, Huntly, had been arrested by the covenanting regime in April, questions were raised over the 'commissione they had for to fight, and what should be ther manifesto and qwarell'.[80] To ensure that their expedition was politically justified, the royalists drew up a band, the Strathbogie Band, which explained their motives and evidenced their authority. Unfortunately, the band itself has not survived. However, crucial details of the document and the royalists' intentions have endured within the contemporary accounts of Patrick Gordon and James Gordon. The former records that this group of men 'that favoured the king' had become concerned that their actions might 'come one day in agitation befor his majestie', and so they swore that they acted 'in defence of his majesties royall prerogative; and, nixt, for the dewtie, honour, and service they owe to the house of Huntly, and for the advancement, preservation, and grandour therof against al there enemies'.[81] Similarly, James Gordon recorded that the royalists maintained that their actions were only done in defence of the king, and that 'ther engadement was for the maintenance of the Kings prerogative, next for the dutye, service, and honour and safetye of Huntly and his familye, and for ther owne mutwall preservatione'.[82]

This band provides telling information on the psychology and ideology of royalism. It is significant that the Strathbogie Band was, unlike the King's Covenant, a local initiative. The composition of this gathering is described by Patrick Gordon as 'being for the most part all landed gentlemen, of equall qualitie'.[83] While both Banff and Haddo were the heads of influential families, the band was essentially a product of the minor nobility.

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[78] MacKenzie, 'Restoring the Nation?', 86.
[79] Patrick Gordon, *A Short Abridgement of Britane's Distemper, from the yeare of God M.DC.XXXIX to M.DC.XLIX*, ed. John Dunn (Aberdeen, 1844), 18.
[80] James Gordon, *History of Scots Affairs, from M.DC.XXXVII to M.DC.XLI*, 3 vols (Aberdeen, 1841), ii, 256.
[81] Gordon, *A Short Abridgement*, 19.
[82] Gordon, *History of Scots Affairs*, ii, 256.
[83] Gordon, *A Short Abridgement*, 18.

This probably contributed to the signatories' unease over their lack of authority. Nevertheless, the fact that the royalists explicitly declared that they were in arms for the king first and foremost, but also for the duty of service owed to the Gordons of Huntly, shows how national and local politics blended into one. These royalists were undoubtedly aggrieved by Huntly's arrest, but their realisation of the bigger political picture, namely the covenanters' attack on the king's prerogative, reveals the reach and importance of royalist ideals within localities. Importantly, neither Patrick nor James Gordon mention any religious motivation in the royalists' decision to take up arms. Instead, it is the themes of honour, duty and loyalty which are emphasised. This type of rhetoric bears numerous similarities to the motivations noted in Barbara Donagan's research on English royalism.[84] Indeed, an attachment to societal order and hierarchy clearly resonated with royalists across Britain.

Around the same time as the Strathbogie Band was signed, another royalist band was created in Atholl. Organised by John Murray, 1st Earl of Atholl, this short band (only 12 lines long) was entitled: 'Principal Band Oblidging the gentlemen in Atholl to assist the Earle of Atholl in the Defence of the pure Religion then profest, the Kings honour, Laws and Liberties of the Kingdom'.[85] Subscribers of the band swore to defend the 'pure and sincere religion pres[e]ntie profest in this kingdome of Scotland' and the 'kingis maj[est]ies lawes and liberties of the said kingdome'. In addition, subscribers recognised the authority of the earl of Atholl as the king's local representative, swearing to 'maintene ane nobill e[a]rle Jhone e[a]rle of atholl', all of which they swore on their lives and goods.[86] The Atholl Band contains numerous similarities to the Strathbogie Band, namely its emphasis on honour, duty and the safeguarding of societal hierarchy, yet the prominence given to the 'pure and sincere religion pres[e]ntie profest in this kingdome of Scotland' is notable given the lack of royalist religious rhetoric elsewhere. While the band does not explicitly state that it was defending Episcopalianism, one might presume that it was intended as a rejection of the covenanters' abjuration of episcopacy during the 1638 Glasgow Assembly. Again, this appears to show local influences upon royalism in certain

[84] Donagan, 'Varieties of Royalism', 74.
[85] John Murray, 1st Earl of Atholl, quickly became a committed royalist following the commencement of hostilities. His death in 1642 was a serious blow to royalist military and political prospects. Nevertheless, the Atholl region remained largely sympathetic to the king's cause and was identified by the marquis of Montrose as an important area for recruitment. For details of the Athollmen who fought under Montrose, see Reid, *Campaigns of Montrose*, 49-58, 120, 132 and 159-160.
[86] NRS, GD241/381/5.

areas. The surviving copy of the Atholl Band held within the National Records of Scotland lists 78 signatories, the majority of whom were local gentry.[87]

Oaths and banding continued to provide a means of consolidation and organisation for the Scottish royalists in the years after 1639. During the First Bishops' War (1639), Ludovic Lindsay, Earl of Crawford, raised a troop of Scottish soldiers for the king's service. Crawford and his men joined the king in England and served in the English royalist army during the First and Second Bishops' Wars (1639-1640). In 1640, Crawford ordered that the officers under his command swear an oath of allegiance to the king.[88] Unlike the Strathbogie or Atholl Bands, Crawford's Oath was an explicitly militarised oath of allegiance. The subscribing officers swore to be 'faithfall to my Soveraigne Lord King Charles', to obey the orders of their commanders and 'waite on my [regimental] Cullers and to follow them'. Alongside these clauses, Crawford instructed that his officers swear 'to endure, suffer, and feight to the last, against all persons, whatsoever; w[it]hout exceptoun; But in special, against the Covenanters of Scotland and ther adherents'.[89] Evidently, the Bishops' Wars had hardened the opinions of some within the royalist camp. Similar sentiments are found in the letters sent from the earl of Nithsdale to the king. In one letter from December 1639, Nithsdale reassured Charles that he revelled in the insults levelled against him by the covenanters, as 'thare can be noe greater testimonie of fidelatie to you, then to be hated by such, as bend thare haill stranthe [strength] to extirpat[e] monarchie'.[90] In another letter, dated April 1640, Nithsdale pledged to hold the castles of Caerlaverock and Threave against the Covenanters 'till the Cannon bait [beat] tham about our yeers [ears]'.[91] Open warfare had tested the commitment of combatants on both sides of the ideological divide, but in the case of royalists like Crawford and Nithsdale, it had only confirmed their fears that the covenanters posed a serious threat to the crown.

By 1640, moderate covenanters, such as Montrose, had become concerned that the original objectives of the National Covenant were being superseded by the political desires of members of the covenanting leadership, namely the earl of Argyll. Such fears were

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[87] ibid.
[88] Ludovic Lindsay, Earl of Crawford, was one of the most diehard Scottish royalists in the service of Charles I. An experienced military commander, having fought for Spain, Sweden and the Holy Roman Empire, Crawford abandoned Scotland in 1642, taking up service in the king's army in England. He became a close supporter of Montrose and the plan for a royalist rising in Scotland. However, Crawford was captured when Newcastle fell to covenanting forces in 1644. He was subsequently sent to Edinburgh Castle, from which he was freed by Montrose in 1645 following the battle of Kilsyth. For further details, see David Stevenson, 'Lindsay, Ludovic, sixteenth earl of Crawford (d.1652)', *ODNB* (2004).
[89] British Library, Sloane MS 1200, f.125.
[90] NRS, GD406/1/883.
[91] NRS, GD406/1/1237.

exacerbated by the covenanting Committee of Estates' decision to mount a pre-emptive invasion of England on 3 August 1640.[92] This led to Montrose organising a meeting of likeminded moderates at Cumbernauld House, home of John Fleming, Earl of Wigton. The meeting was attended by 20 nobles, including royalists such as Wigton; Atholl; John Erskine, Earl of Mar; and James Drummond, Earl of Perth, as well as active covenanters, among whom were John Lyon, Earl of Kinghorn; William Keith, Earl Marischal; and George MacKenzie, Earl of Seaforth. The product of this meeting was the Cumbernauld Band which was subscribed by each of the attendees.[93]

The Cumbernauld Band opened with a defence of the National Covenant – which many of the band's signatories had signed – as having been a necessity 'out of our duty to Religion, King and Country … for the maintenance and defence of either, and every one of other, in that behalf'. However, due to the 'particular and indirect practicking of a few, the Country, and Cause now depending, does so much suffer'. The band defended the National Covenant, but for 'the good and weal of the public' the signatories pledged to risk 'our lives, fortunes and estates' to oppose those who were manipulating it. The signatories swore to defend one another and unanimously agree upon any action which the group might take.[94] The band was initially kept a secret, but its existence had become common knowledge by November 1640. When asked by the estates to clarify the band's intentions, 12 of the original subscribers, including Montrose, Mar, Wigton, Kinghorn and Seaforth, signed an additional statement in January 1641 which reiterated their commitment to the National Covenant and once again pointed to 'our common enemies' who had created divisions and mistrust amongst those who sought to maintain 'Religione, King and Country'.[95]

Edward Cowan has argued that the Cumbernauld Band was a product of 'a cavalier party, all attempting to return to the original spirit of the covenant'.[96] Conversely, Barry Robertson has maintained that it was 'far from being a royalist document' and that its main purpose was as 'an exercise in political manoeuvring' by 'moderate adherents to the

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[92] Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 206.
[93] All 20 signatories (in the order they appear) were: earl Marischal; earl of Montrose; earl of Wigton; earl of Kinghorne; James Home, Earl of Home; earl of Atholl; earl of Mar; earl of Perth; Robert Boyd, Lord Boyd; Alexander Stewart, Earl of Galloway; Sir Mungo Murray, Viscount Stormont; earl of Seaforth; John Erskine, Lord Erskine (son of the earl of Mar); Thomas Maclellan, Lord Kirkcudbright; James Livingston, Lord Almond and Lieutenant-General in the Army of the Covenant; James Drummond, Lord Drummond (son of the earl of Perth); James Johnston, Lord Johnstone of Lochwood; Sir John Carnegie, Lord Lour; and David Carnegie, Master of Lour. Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, ii, 468.
[94] ibid.
[95] ibid, 468-469. The 12 subscribers were: Mar, Montrose, Wigton, Kinghorne, Home, Galloway, Seaforth, Erskine, Kirkcudbright, Drummond, Johnstone and Lord Lour.
[96] Cowan, *Montrose*, 98.

covenanting regime'.[97] Despite the Cumbernauld Band's failure to create a central faction between the covenanting and royalist camps, it would be foolish to dismiss its importance within the development of royalist noble ideology, especially the personal views of Montrose. Yet, Robertson's warning should also be heeded. The Cumbernauld Band did not explicitly pledge its subscribers to maintain the king against the covenanters, but it did emphasise their commitment to the National Covenant's guarantee to maintain the king's authority. Jamie McDougall has helpfully described this stance as a 'royalist interpretation of the National Covenant'.[98] The soul searching and crisis of conscience which led the signatories of the Cumbernauld Band to bind themselves together reveals the area of common ground on which moderates from both sides of the divide could parley: while the king could be opposed and criticised, it was imperative that monarchical rule was protected against those who sought to usurp the crown's authority. Many covenanters evidently shared similar opinions and had become increasingly concerned that the covenant was being misused to undermine their loyalty to Charles I. The widespread reverence for the crown amongst the nobility was the single most powerful ideological tool in the royalist arsenal, facilitating the events of the Engagement in 1647-1648 and the Patriotic Accommodation of 1650-1651. The Cumbernauld Band showed how powerful that idea was, and how wider political developments, like the covenanters' invasion of England, could trigger dilemmas in allegiance.

The fragile alliance which the Cumbernauld Band represented was shattered in the aftermath of the 'Incident' of 1641. The 'Incident' was a royalist plot which aimed to execute a *coup d'etat* in Scotland by arresting the covenanting leaders and the marquis of Hamilton in order to seize control of the kingdom's infrastructure.[99] The plot was discovered in October resulting in the arrest of the alleged ringleaders, the earl of Crawford and two covenanting army colonels (named as Alexander Stewart and John Cochrane).[100] Allegations that the *coup* had been authorised by Charles unsurprisingly soured relations between the king and covenanters, and fertilised mistrust amongst leading Scottish

[97] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 68.
[98] McDougall, 'Covenants and Covenanters', 63.
[99] The marquis of Hamilton had become deeply unpopular amongst Scottish royalists, some of whom accused him of deliberately mishandling the events of 1638 and 1639 out of support for the covenant. Matters came to a head when Henry Ker, Lord Ker (son of Robert Ker, Earl of Roxburgh) and the earl of Crawford publicly slandered Hamilton, with lord Ker going as far as to challenge Hamilton to a duel. Ker was eventually convinced by his father and the king to withdraw his accusations. Cowan, *Montrose*, 122-123.
[100] Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/1/72. See *The Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database* (*SSNE*), eds. Steve Murdoch, Alexia Grosjean et al (St Andrews, 2000-2020), < https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne>, SSNE1490.

royalists.[101] Following the formalisation of the Treaty of London (10 August 1641), royalists in Scotland were forced to suffer covenanting rule. However, the outbreak of civil war in England in March 1642 created a new wave of uncertainty and anxiety. Royalist fears were confirmed when rumours began to circulate during the winter of 1642 that leading covenanters were plotting to pledge support for the English parliamentarians in their war against the king.

In reaction to this news, a royalist protestation was drafted at the court in exile in Oxford, and a royalist petition was penned in Scotland. The former, entitled: 'A protistation of some Scottish Lords ag[ains]t the invasion of England, in aide of the Parliament thire' was signed by Hamilton, Huntly, Montrose, Roxburgh, William Douglas, Earl of Morton, William Hamilton, Earl of Lanark (brother of the marquis of Hamilton), George Hay, Earl of Kinnoull and Charles Seton, Earl of Dunfermline. The protestation read:

> We are resolved w[i]th the helpe of Almighty God, w[i]th the assistance of o[u]r frinds & followers, & with the hazard of o[u]r Livis & fortunes to impede & oppose the raising of any forcis to invade England: or the levying of any money, or what also may contribute towards it, according to the Articles of the Triaty & his Ma[jes]ties command thirento anent. And in the meane time to defind o[u]r housis & dwellings ag[ains]t all such that shall indevour to force us contrary to this protistattion. And with this declaration that wie will defind o[u]r religion, Lawis & Libirties w[i]th the like hazard.[102]

There does not appear to have been a grander strategy behind the protestation apart from reassuring the king and his English advisors that the leading noble royalists in Scotland would oppose any action taken against the English kingdom. Like the King's Covenant, the protestation portrayed any potential actions against the covenanters as defensive, caused by the covenanters' breach of the Treaty of London and the king's royal command.

The royalist petition written at the same time, known as the Cross Petition, was certainly an attempt to create such a platform and consolidate support for a moderate royalist position. Drawn up by Hamilton and Traquair, in early 1643, the Cross Petition was a royalist attempt to counter covenanting petitions which had been sent to the conservators of the peace (a sub-committee of Scottish parliament established by the Treaty of London to ensure that the terms of the treaty were honoured) to urge the suppression of the king's declaration which called the English parliamentarians 'rebellis

[101] The exact details of the Incident remain difficult to decipher and it is unclear as to how much support the conspiracy had from the royalist nobility. James Balfour, *The Historical Works of Sir James Balfour*, 4 vols (Edinburgh, 1824-1825), iii, 97-188; Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 238-239.
[102] British Library, Historical Letters and Papers MS 44848, f.287 (18).

and traittouris'.[103] The Cross Petition reminded the conservators that the king and parliament had imbued them with 'great trust' to carry out their will, and that they might 'be answerable for all your actions and proceedings to his majesty and the estates of parliament' if they failed to carry out the king's commands. The petition argued that by repressing the king's proclamation and by remaining silent on the civil war in England, the entire kingdom would be left 'wanting in the duty and allegiance which by so many ties and obligations we owe him our native king'. The only way to protect 'the happy union of the two kingdoms under one head, our king' was to ensure 'tender care of our sovereign's person and authority, peace and truth [so that it] may be settled in all his majesty's dominions'. The Cross Petition rejected covenanter claims that intervention on the side of the English parliament was justified through sworn obligations for the preservation of the true religion. While it fell short of advocating a royalist intervention in England, it stated that:

> we suppose that any good protestant, or true member of our church, can[not] imagine, far less seduce others to believe, that by the late treaty of peace [the Treaty of London], or act of union [the 1603 Union of the Crowns], we as Scottish subjects, are in any sort liberated from the dutiful obedience which as Scottish men we owe to our Scottish king, or from that due loyalty which as Scottish subjects we owe to our native sovereign, for maintenance of his person, greatness, and authority: or that thereby we are in any other condition in these necessary duties to our sovereign than we and our ancestors were and have been these many ages and descents, before the making of the said act, or before the swearing and subscribing of our late covenant, by which we have solemnly sworn, and do swear, not only our mutual concurrence and assistance for the cause of religion, and to the utmost of our power, with our means and lives, to stand to the defence of our dread sovereign's person and authority, in the preservation of religion, liberty, and followers in quiet manner, or in arms, as we shall be required of his majesty or his council, or any having his authority.

The final line's paraphrasing of the 1589 General Band was a purposeful reminder of the oaths of loyalty which the kingdom, but especially the Scottish nobility, had sworn. Conveniently, the reference to 'our late covenant' could refer to either the National Covenant or King's Covenant, depending on the position of the subscriber. To avoid disrupting the 'peace of this kirk and kingdom', the petition urged the conservators not to authorise any support for the English parliamentarians for fear that it would result in the kingdom being 'consume[d] in civil war'. Civil war, it was argued, would inevitably lead to 'insolent papists, malignant, schistmatic, and disloyal Brownists [religious dissenters] and Separatists' wreaking havoc on the Scottish kirk.[104] Thus, the petition asserted that

[103] Burnet, *Memoirs of the Lives and Actions of James and William, Dukes of Hamilton*, 263-267.
[104] Brownists were followers of Richard Browne (c.1550-1633), an English Protestant separatist who sought to break free from the Church of England. The term was often used as a slur for religious schismatics and dissenters.

only ‘true monarchical government firmly settled’ could protect the reformed religion and the wellbeing of the kingdom.[105]

The royalist rhetoric contained within the Cross Petition was, in many ways, the natural successor to the arguments displayed in the King’s Covenant. At its core, the fundamental themes of order, loyalty and the thwarting of anarchical divisions amongst the king’s subjects remained the same. It avoided painting the covenanters and parliamentarians as one and the same; instead, it portrayed the covenanters and royalists as one body, a unified kingdom of loyal subjects. The patriotic language employed by the petition fed into this and reminded subscribers of their duties as Scottish subjects. Catholics and schismatic sects were highlighted as common enemies, allowing the petition to avoid any dispute over church governance and unite royalists and covenanters under the flag of authorised Protestantism. It offered covenanters an opportunity to break ranks, in much the same way that the Cumbernauld Band had. While the fundamentals of the royalist rallying call remained the same, the language used had noticeably hardened. Defence of the monarchy had been explicitly placed in front of defence of religion. This was because royalists did not believe that the kirk was under threat and maintained that religious concerns were being used as a mask for sedition, reminding subscribers that ‘we give to Christ what is Christ’s and to Caesar what is Caesar’s’.[106] The Cross Petition continued the royalists’ attack on the covenanters’ use of religion as a pretext for political action and reinforced royalist attempts to portray themselves as moderate and justified.

While wider support for the Cross Petition is difficult to gauge, it clearly failed to create the consensus it had hoped for. The copy which was presented to the Scottish privy council contained only 41 signatures, the majority of which came from members of the gentry. Strangely, neither Hamilton nor Traquair appear to have signed. However, amongst the signatories other important figures can be identified. Recognised royalists including Home, Banff and lord Ker are intermingled with a few subscribers of the Cumbernauld Band, such as lord Erskine and lord Lour, but the majority of the signatories were of limited political importance.[107] With many of the most committed amongst the royalist nobility at the king’s court in Oxford, it is possible that the Cross Petition simply lacked the political muscle to ensure its success. Despite the petition’s ultimate failure, it represents a significant attempt at noble action by royalists outwith the top echelon of

[105] Burnet, *Memoirs of the Lives and Actions of James and William, Dukes of Hamilton*, 263-267.
[106] This is an adaption of Matthew 22:21 in which Jesus says, ‘render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's’.
[107] *RPCS*, vii, 597.

leadership. Moreover, Gilbert Burnet's claim that no ministers could 'be drawn to it' seems inaccurate, as the petition was supported by members of the presbytery of Stirling.[108] Nevertheless, the petition failed to prevent covenanting intervention in the English Civil War. On 25 September, the Solemn League and Covenant was signed between the covenanting regime and the English parliamentarians, ensuring that a Scottish covenanting army would once again march against the king's forces.

The signing of the Solemn League and Covenant meant that the renewal of civil war in Scotland was almost certain. It also signalled the failure of Traquair and Hamilton's royalist policy which had hoped to stop the covenanting regime from intervening in the English Civil War. A number of nobles who had previously shown support for the king's efforts saw this as a decisive turn in the royalists' fortunes, initiating a slew of defections. Roxburgh, Morton, Southesk, Home and Dunfermline were amongst those who subscribed the Solemn League and Covenant and took their seats at the covenanting parliaments of 1644 and 1645, parliaments which were actively in rebellion against the crown.[109] With the collapse of Hamilton's efforts to find compromise between the covenanters and the king, royalists who favoured a military solution to the crisis came to the fore. Given the delicate situation, the Scottish royalist nobles who had taken up residence at Charles's court at Oxford presented a declaration to the king's parliament there and swore a new oath of allegiance to the crown. The Oxford Band was created shortly after the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant and was in print circulation by February 1644.

The Oxford Band opened with a defence of the king from his 'loyal subjects of the Scot[t]ish nation'. It lamented the 'undeserved sufferings of our gracious Sovereign' at the hands of 'the disloyalty and rebellion of a traitorous and most ungrateful faction in both kingdoms'. These 'unnatural and disloyal persons' had usurped royal power by 'countenancing their most treasonable actions with the forms and glosses of authority'. The signatories of the band sought 'not only to vindicate ourselves, but as far as in us lies, our nation, from that infamy which some of our traiterous countrymen have drawn upon themselves'. They declared their 'hatred and detestation of the rebellion in both kingdoms', but especially their abhorrence of 'the late pretended Convention [Committee of Estates], the source and foun[da]tion of these treasons and impieties'. The band stated that the estates was an illegal convocation of traitors whose sole purpose was to 'excite sedition

[108] Burnet, *Memoirs of the Lives and Actions of James and William, Dukes of Hamilton*, 267; NLS, Wodrow MSS. Folio, XXV, no. 11. For a more detailed discussion of the Cross Petition's reception within the clergy, see pp.132-133.
[109] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 130.

and rebellion in that kingdom' under the auspices the Solemn League and Covenant, and to 'engage them [the people], under a false pretence of religion, in treason and rebellion against their Sovereign'. In response to this act of 'high treason', the signatories were 'obliged by allegiance, and by the Act of Pacification [the Treaty of London], to oppose and withstand the same'. They also swore 'to employ our uttermost power and abilities, both with lives and fortunes, to suppress the said rebels now in arms against his Majesty and his Crown of England'.[110] In essence, the Oxford Band was a Scottish royalist declaration of war upon all rebels in arms against Charles I.

The printed edition of the Oxford Band recorded 29 signatories. Unlike the Cross Petition, it was signed by the most important and influential Scottish nobles who had declared for the king, with the ominous exception of the duke of Hamilton who had been arrested in January 1644 on charges of treason.[111] The increasingly militaristic wing of the Scottish royalist nobility was well represented, with the signatures of Montrose, Crawford, Nithsdale and James Gordon, Viscount Aboyne, all present. Stalwart royalists, such as Traquair; Kinnoull; Donald Mackay, Lord Reay; James Ogilvy, Lord Ogilvy; and Robert Spottiswoode, the newly appointed Secretary of State for Scotland, also signed. In addition, the band was signed by Patrick Ruthven, Earl of Forth, the Scottish Lord General of the king's forces in England, which undoubtedly added significant political weight.[112]

While the language of the Oxford Band had certainly hardened, the rhetoric it expressed bore the same hallmarks as previous royalist bands and oaths: the preservation of order, the illegality of the king's opponents and the emphasis on honour and loyalty. The significance of this is perhaps best seen in the light of the shift from Hamilton's strategy of mitigation and compromise, to the overtly militaristic alternative pursued by nobles like Montrose and Crawford. The fundamentals of the royalist message remained the same. Moreover, the band maintained the Scottish royalists' two kingdoms perspective – the belief that the crowns of Scotland and England were distinct – and showed no interest in pursuing a British ideology. Rebellion was described as unnatural and calamitous for

[110] *Memorials*, ii, 119-121.
[111] Hamilton's relationship with the king and many Scottish royalists had remained tenuous since the Incident of 1641. To make matters worse, from 1641 to 1643 Hamilton and his brother, Lanark, had been working closely with Argyll on parliamentary matters. Their accord was fatally undermined when covenanting intervention in England was debated in the winter of 1643, but Hamilton's failure to stop the covenanter invasion of England and his close links with Argyll meant that he was deeply mistrusted by many royalists, none more so than Montrose, Crawford and the circle of nobles who had formed around them. Hamilton was subsequently arrested by order of the king and spent over two years as a prisoner in Pendennis Castle, Cornwall. For more information, see John Scally, 'Hamilton, James, first duke of Hamilton (1606–1649)', *ODNB* (2013).
[112] Murdoch and Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years' War*, 119-144.

both kingdoms, but the petition's focus remained on Scotland. The covenanters' actions were seen as blatantly illegal and seditious, as they had misused 'that traitorous and damnab[l]e Covenant [the Solemn League and Covenant]' and the authority granted unto them by the king to initiate a war against the crown in support of rebels in England. Unlike previous oaths, the band's reference to the rebels' 'false pretence of religion' was the only mention of faith.[113] The motif of Catholicism and Protestant schism being the true threat was dropped in order to focus entirely on the seditiousness of the covenanters and English parliamentarians. The only recourse for loyal subjects was to oppose the rebels, as their honour demanded.

After a quickly aborted effort in April 1644, Montrose and a small band of royalists managed to cross the border into Scotland and on 30 August Montrose raised the king's standard at Truidh Hill, Atholl. Bolstered by the Irish Brigade, under the command of Alasdair MacColla, and local volunteers, the Scottish royalist army inflicted two crushing defeats upon covenanting forces at Tippermuir (1 September) and Aberdeen (13 September). As winter approached, Montrose and MacColla agreed upon a risky winter campaign which would see the royalist army surge deep into Argyllshire, the heartlands of Clan Campbell and the marquis of Argyll. While the campaign was fraught with danger, it was a risk that the royalist commanders needed to take. Deprived of the administrative infrastructure of the kingdom, the army had no way to ensure regular pay for its troops. A winter campaign guaranteed that the army remained active, making it less susceptible to attritive desertion and enabling royalist troops to live off the land within enemy territory.[114] To ensure his army remained ideologically unified, at Kilcumin (modern day Fort Augustus) Montrose and his officers drew up a 'Band of Unione amongst all his Majestie's faithfull and loyall subjects'.[115]

The Kilcumin Band, as it came to be known, was signed by the royalist officers on 30 January 1645. The band declared that the royalists were in arms for 'the vindication of his [Charles I's] owne honor and just authoritie, and the happiness and recoverie of his thralled and oppressed subjects' from 'the horrid course of that rebellious factione'. They called upon all loyal subjects to join and bind themselves to the command of Prince

[113] *Memorials*, ii, 119-121.
[114] For further details on the military aspects of the 1644-1646 royalist campaign, see Cowan, *Montrose*; Reid, *Campaigns of Montrose*.
[115] *Memorials*, ii, 172-173.

Maurice, Captain-General of royal forces in Scotland, and Montrose, his lieutenant general.[116] Ideologically, the essence of the Kilcumin Band was captured in a few lines:

> out of the deip sense of our deutie to God, our Consciences, King, and native Countrie, yea to all Lawes and Justice divyne and humane, by these presents to bind and obleige our selfs, – lykas we ar by God and Nature tyed – with our lyves, fortunes, and estates to stand to the maintenance of the power and authoritie of our sacred and native soverain, contrarie to this perverse and infamous factione of desperatt Rebells now ine furie against him.[117]

Again, the three tenets of royalist ideology can be identified throughout the band. Order had been disrupted by covenanters' unjustified rebellion against the king and enthralment of the Scottish kingdom. Thus, once again, honour and loyalty compelled royalists to take up arms against the rebels.

Cowan has stated that the Kilcumin Band was a 'courageous and intriguing experiment' in which Montrose attempted to 'forge a nation, uniting Highlander and Lowlander, protestant and catholic, in the name of the king'.[118] However, there was nothing especially pioneering about the Kilcumin Band. The royalists' message had remained the same. While vows to uphold the true religion had been, presumably purposefully, exchanged for more generic pledges to God in an attempt to appease the largely Catholic Irish Brigade and draw highland Catholics and Protestants to Montrose's banner, religion remained a secondary concern behind the need to quell the covenanting rebellion. There does not appear to have been any attempt by the royalist officers to enforce widespread subscription to the band, though the list of signatories is revealing.[119] Original supporters of Montrose's expedition, such as the Ogilvies and Drummonds, were joined by new additions to the royalist ranks. Amongst the most notable were Sir Lachlan McLean of Duart and Donald MacDonald of Keppoch. From late 1644, the MacDonalds of Clanranald, MacDonalds of Glengarry, MacDonalds of Keppoch, MacLeans of Duart, MacIans of Glencoe and Stewarts of Appin all pledged allegiance to the royalist flag. These much-needed reinforcements were supplemented by smaller bands of Gordons,

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[116] This refers to Montrose's original commission which stipulated that he would become lieutenant-general and military governor of Scotland under the ultimate command of the king's nephew, Prince Maurice. It was hoped that Maurice would be able to raise English troops and rendezvous with Montrose in Scotland, however, this quickly became impossible due to the decline of royalist fortunes in England. In 1645, Montrose received a new commission from the king naming him as captain-general of royalist forces in Scotland. For the original commission, see NRS, GD220/3/128.

[117] *Memorials*, ii, 172-173.

[118] Cowan, *Montrose*, 181.

[119] The exception to this was the earl of Seaforth, who was compelled to sign the Kilcumin Band after he was seized by Montrose in February 1645. Seaforth then turned his back on the royalists, joining the covenanting force which was defeated at the battle of Auldearn (9 May 1645). Following the defeat, Seaforth once again swore allegiance to the royalist cause. John Spalding, *Memorialls of the Trubles in Scotland and in England A.D.1624-A.D.1645*, 2 vols (Aberdeen, 1850), ii, 450.

MacNabs, Lamonts and MacDougalls who also joined the royalist host.[120] Montrose's eclectic army was made up of individuals and collectives who had pledged themselves to the royalist cause for a number of reasons, as will be discussed below. Loyalty, obligation, pragmatism, self-enrichment, resentment of Clan Campbell and hatred of the covenanters' centralising influence all contributed to the patchwork royalist alliance. Despite this, it is remarkable that the royalist message remained so consistent. Yet, the absence of any anti-Catholic rhetoric stands testament to the flexibility which that message could employ without betraying its core values.

However, the royalist military campaign of 1644-1646 was ultimately a failure. Following its defeat at Philiphaugh (13 September 1645), the royalist army failed to regain the initiative, retreating to the north where it engaged in a sporadic and largely ineffective campaign. During this time the army's leadership became divided and strained, with Montrose and Huntly quarrelling over the direction of the war effort. As the royalist cause lurched towards self-combustion, the earl of Seaforth drew up a written remonstrance and ordered copies dispersed throughout the north in the hope of gathering subscriptions. Like the other royalist bands, it is difficult to assess the success of Seaforth's Remonstrance. However, its existence alone worried both the kirk and estates.[121] Seaforth appears to have taken the task upon himself without much consultation or guidance from Montrose or Huntly. It has previously been suggested that this was Seaforth's attempt to create an 'independent course' which might be used to facilitate peace between the covenanters and the royalist army.[122] However, there is no sense from the document itself, nor any of the covenanter reports on the subject, that the earl was acting in any other capacity than as an envoy of the royalist army. It may be the case that Montrose's exclusion from the remonstrance was a deliberate attempt to best employ Seaforth's influence in the north, especially amongst the northern covenanters.

Written in early 1646, Seaforth's Remonstrance argued that peace could only be achieved through submission to the king. To avoid 'mens jusdgements [being] poysoned by the misinformation of persones indisposed to Peace', the remonstrance sought to proclaim the reality of the kingdom's plight. The remonstrance cited its only intentions as:

> the propagation of the Protestant Religion in puritie, as the same is established by Generall Assemblies and approven by king and Estates of Parliament; The mantenance of the kings

[120] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 142-144.
[121] NLS, Wodrow MSS, Folio. XXV, no.35; NRS, PA11/4, ff.202; 208v-209; 213v-214v.
[122] Stevenson, *Revolution and Counter-revolution*, 41.

> honour and greatnes, and the Subjects freedome and liberties, as the same is insext in our Nationall approven Covenant.

To achieve this, it laid out seven points which had to be addressed in order to save the kingdom from itself. First, it called for the return of Charles I to Scotland so that 'the Cloud of mistakes may be dispeled, Peace and Truth may be settled to our kings honour, the peoples joy, and the kingdomes happines'. Next, the remonstrance decried 'the silienceing of the established judicatories authorized to punish the Rebellion of such as oppresse the People' and called upon their reinstatement to re-establish order.[123] This was followed by warnings that the kingdom was greatly weakened and susceptible to foreign invasion due to the civil war and that 'Wee perceive ane undoubted and unrecoverable ruine for this kingdome if intestinie Warre [continues to] be intertained'. The remonstrance highlighted that the Scottish economy was in tatters, creating debt and destitution which in turn meant that there was no way to pay the standing armies which were growing increasingly restless. The only way to avoid calamity was if 'pryme men who have principle hand in the manageing of effaires should cloud [cover] themselves with a resolution to use all possible means for sheathing the bloodie sword in a happie peace'. Citing the National Covenant in its conclusion, the remonstrance again swore that:

> Our greatest ambition is to have the true Protestant Religion established in puritie, the king mantained in his honour and greatnes, the Subjects settled in their freedome and Liberties, the removeing off mistakes unhappielie arises betwixt king and people, and to bring our untymelies Warre into the calme of peace.[124]

The dilution of royalist rhetoric with acknowledgements of the original covenanting message is clear throughout the remonstrance and is comparable to the Cumbernauld Band, of which Seaforth was a signatory. However, Seaforth's calls for peace should not be mistaken as an attempt to placate the covenanting regime, it was an appeal to disillusioned covenanters. If there was to be peace, it would be a royalist peace. Significantly, the first two points of the remonstrance demanded that Charles I be returned to his position of authority and that judiciaries be established for the punishment of rebels. While the warnings concerning the kingdom's security and the safeguarding of the Protestant religion were undoubtedly attempts to reach out across the divide and open dialogue on shared patriotism, the remonstrance was primarily motivated by the same royalist tenets as the oaths discussed above. It expressed genuine fear that law and order had been subverted,

[123] This is likely a reference to the Scottish privy council whose authority had been usurped by the Committee of Estates since 1643. While there is evidence to suggest that the privy council (which had been mostly occupied by covenanters since 1641) still met between 1643-1647, the king had no influence over its conduct. *RPCS*, viii, v-xiv.
[124] NRS, PA7/24, f.227v.

which could result in the ruin of the kingdom and of the Protestant faith. The remonstrance's acceptance of the National Covenant reveals the blended loyalties of men like Seaforth and Montrose who remained committed to a Calvinist religious settlement. It also highlights the ability of royalists to use the covenant's loyalist discourse to their own advantage by forcing covenanters to confront the reality of their position: that the cause they were fighting for was not the same as it had been in 1638.

It is impossible to assess accurately how successful Seaforth's Remonstrance might have been if the royalist war effort had survived beyond the summer of 1646. The fortunes of the Scottish royalists in the north were mirrored by the royalist party in England, which slowly fell apart following the king's defeat at Naseby (14 June 1645).[125] By 15 June 1646, Charles I had ordered all of his forces still in arms in Scotland to disband. Those who were exempted from any parley with the covenanters, including Montrose, were instructed to flee the country and await further orders in France. Fighting dragged into 1647 with some remnants of the royalist army refusing to disband, but by late spring the Scottish royalist war effort had ceased to exist.[126] While royalist forces were disbanding, the king had been negotiating with moderate nobles within the covenanting regime – namely John Maitland, Earl of Lauderdale; John Campbell, Earl of Loudon; and William Hamilton, Earl of Lanark – in the hope of agreeing terms in Scotland and bringing a royalist-covenanter coalition to bear against his enemies in England. The result of this was the Engagement. Signed on 23 December 1647, the Engagement recognised the Solemn League and Covenant, accepted all legislation passed by the Scottish parliament since 1644 and secured a promise from the king to oversee the establishment of a Presbyterian church settlement in England for a trial period of three years. In return, the pro-engagement majority within parliament – led by the duke of Hamilton who had resumed his pursuit of creating a moderate faction between the covenanters and royalists since being released from prison in 1646 – agreed to support the king in bringing the English parliament to the negotiating table by any means necessary, up to and including the use of a Scottish army to invade England.

Tellingly, the Engagement opened with Charles I's recognition that the covenanters' 'intentions are real for preservation of His Majesty's person and authority

[125] Royle, *Civil War*, 353-363.
[126] The majority of royalists followed the lead of Montrose in 1646 and agreed to lay down their weapons. However, a notable exception was MacColla and the men under his command, who continued to fight and pillage in Argyllshire until June 1647 when they were forced to retreat back to Ireland. Despite originally disbanding his men, Huntly took to the field in December 1646 and occupied the burgh of Banff before disbanding again in March 1647. See Stevenson, *Highland Warrior*, 304-343; Robertson, *Lordship and Power*, 142-143.

according to their allegiance, and [in] no ways [seek] to diminish his just power and greatness'. Despite this dramatic shift in the king's position, the treaty ensured that 'none who is unwilling shall be constrained to take it [the Solemn League and Covenant]', which was hugely significant for royalists. Like earlier royalist bands, the Engagement reminded subscribers that the true enemy was 'Anti-Trinitarians, Anabaptists, Antinomians, Arminians, Familists, Brownists, Separatists, Independents, Libertines, and Seekers'. Only reconciliation with the crown could ensure that 'all blasphemy, heresy, schism, and all such scandalous doctrines' were suppressed. Interestingly, Protestant schismatics, namely English independents and sectaries, were now identified as the unifying enemy, not Catholics. Engagers swore, upon their 'honour, faith and conscience', to defend the king's person and authority, including recognising his ancient rights over the kingdom's militia and the great seal, and his ability to grant honours and offices. In exchange, the king promised not to sign any agreement or treaty with any party in England or Ireland without first consulting the Scottish parliament. This, it was hoped, would ensure that a 'lasting peace' could be found.[127]

The Engagement shattered the unity of the covenanting regime. By using the promise of an English Presbyterian settlement – a core objective of the Solemn League and Covenant – and by easing the consciences of covenanters who had become increasingly uneasy with the war against the king, engagers like Hamilton, Traquair and Callendar had, arguably, been able to do more damage to the covenanting regime than Montrose's military campaign. Nevertheless, the Engagement was not an overtly royalist document. The king's recognition of the Solemn League and Covenant, a document which had been vilified by royalists in 1643, was a major concession to the covenanters and a self-mutilation of the Scottish royalist position. Moreover, the treaty did not mention the royalists involved in the previous military campaigns, nor did it explicitly exonerate them from the covenanters' assertions that they were the true rebels. Yet, the Engagement represented a significant change in fortune for the king and marked the accomplishment of a long-term goal of Scottish royalism: it brought over influential covenanter moderates into the king's party. This had been the aim of the King's Covenant, Cumbernauld Band, Cross Petition and Seaforth's Remonstrance, but it was the Engagement which secured the services of individuals such as Callendar and John Middleton, Earl of Middleton. The simple fact that the king agreed to the Engagement made it royalist policy. Wider royalist acceptance of the Engagement is evidenced by the fact that it was not opposed by any leading royalists,

[127] Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents,* 259-264.

although the majority of leading noble royalists who had been in arms between 1644-1646 were in no position to support it as they were either in exile or held under arrest by the covenanting regime.[128]

Certainly, the Engagement was a compromise rather than an outright victory. Many royalists were left in a state of limbo, as the confirmation of legislation made by parliament since 1644 left them in a precarious situation, and the leaders of the 1644-1646 campaign were to be left in exile and imprisonment, at least for the time being. This has led Barry Robertson to comment that the Engagement 'brought a monarchist army into play rather than a royalist one'.[129] This was certainly true, but the Engagement was a royalist wolf in a covenanting sheep's clothing. The king's vague religious concessions were nothing new; Charles had already demonstrated his willingness to step back from religious policy in order to secure political control. The Engagement had not cost the king anything other than ambiguous promises to better consult the Scottish kingdom in regard to religion and politics. Likewise, royalists only needed to swallow the bitter pill of recognising the legitimacy of the Solemn League and Covenant, as they had been saved from having to subscribe it themselves. Moderate royalists such as Traquair and Seaforth became vocal supporters of the Engagement within parliament.[130] Had the engagers' army been able to free the king from his captivity at the hands of the English independents, Charles would have found himself at the head of a loyal army with a substantial cache of political currency which he could have used to bring about a royalist settlement.

While moderate covenanters largely celebrated the Engagement, more radical covenanters like Argyll mistrusted the king's refusal to subscribe the covenants and were unimpressed by his abstruse promises regarding the establishment of a Presbyterian settlement throughout Britain.[131] When these radicals – who became known as the kirk party – seized power following the Engagement's military defeat, they repealed the treaty and declared that it was unlawful, malignant and a danger to both kirk and state.[132] Alongside this, the general assembly (which had resisted engager control) ordered a national resubscription of the Solemn League and Covenant as a rejection of the

[128] The Engagement did, however, allow moderate royalists who had conformed to the covenanting regime in the aftermath of the Solemn League and Covenant, such as Roxburgh, Home and Dunfermline, to realign themselves to the king's cause.
[129] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 158.
[130] Young, *Scottish Parliament*, 196.
[131] Alan I. Macinnes, *The British Confederate* (Edinburgh, 2011), 231-237.
[132] *RPS*, 1649/1/29.

Engagement's attempt to preserve royalists from signing it.[133] The Act of Classes, passed on 23 January 1649, went further still, barring royalists, engagers and anyone who had not sufficiently resisted either of these groups from holding public office due to their 'malignant principles and practices'.[134] Whether engagers saw themselves as royalists or not, from 1649 they were one and the same in the eyes of the victorious radical regime.

The collapse of the Engagement in 1648 and the subsequent rise of the radical covenanting wing within parliament signalled the beginning of the end for the Scottish royalists. Despite Charles II's initial success in negotiating with the Scottish parliament following the execution of Charles I on 30 January 1649, the likelihood of an overtly royalist victory in Scotland became increasingly remote. The royalists in exile failed to muster enough foreign aid to mount a serious threat to the revived covenanting regime, resulting in the defeat of Montrose's final campaign in 1649-1650.[135] Unbeknown to Montrose, as his army was crushed at Carbisdale (27 April 1650), Charles II agreed to subscribe the Solemn League and Covenant in order to secure an alliance with the covenanting regime through the Treaty of Breda, signed on 1 May 1650.[136] However, when the regime's army was defeated at Dunbar on 3 September 1650 by Oliver Cromwell's forces, the Scottish royalists were granted one final roll of the dice. On 3 October 1650, Charles II and his royalist advisors plotted a *coup d'état*.

Weakened following Dunbar but unrelentingly forceful in its dealings with the king and his royalist supporters, the covenanting radicals had alienated Charles II to the point where he feared that they planned to use him as a puppet and usurp what remained of his royal power. In response, the king began to court royalists about a rising, which became known as the 'Start'. Charles wrote to royalists throughout the north of Scotland, calling on them to raise enough men to seize Perth and Dundee where a royalist powerbase could be established with the ultimate goal of reclaiming the kingdom for the king.[137]

The Declaration and Engagement of the Marquesse of Huntley, the Earle of Atholl, Generall Midletou, and many of the Nobility of Scotland that have lately taken up Arms for the defence of his Majesties Person and just Authority, also known as the Northern Band,

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[133] *The Records of the Commissions of the General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland holden in Edinburgh the Years 1648 and 1649*, eds. Alexander F. Mitchell and James Christie (Edinburgh, 1896), 78-80.
[134] *RPS*, 1649/1/43.
[135] Cowan, *Montrose*, 252-275; Steve Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603-1660* (East Linton, 2003), 145-165.
[136] NRS, PA7/23/2/70.
[137] Stevenson, *Revolution and Counter-revolution*, 150-155; Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 185-187.

was sworn and signed by the leaders of the rising on 20 October 1650.[138] The subscribers of the band painted themselves as the defenders of 'our Native Kingdome of Scotland' against the invading 'Army of Sectaries [Cromwellian forces]' who had 'murthered our Soveraign the late King, and overturned Religion, and Government in our Neighbour Kingdomes of England and Ireland, have invaded this Kingdome, and are in a way … to reduce the whole to a Province'. They declared that this 'Band of Unity' was the only way in which to 'preserve Religion, King and Kingdome'; and 'firmly and faithfully to joyn our selves together, and neither for fear, threatning, allurement, nor advantage to relinquish so good a Cause'. Thus, signatories swore that 'we shall maintain the true Religion as it is established in Scotland, the Covenant, League and Covenant, the Kings Majesties Person, power, Greatnesse, and Authority, the Priviledges of Parliament, and Liberty of the Subject'.[139]

In many ways, the Northern Band is testament to the evolution of the Scottish royalist position. Largely due to the actions of Charles I and Charles II, royalists in 1650 had not only come to recognise the covenants; they joined covenanters in a common definition of 'the true Religion as it is established in Scotland'.[140] While this position may seem incompatible with the royalist rhetoric seen in previous oaths and bands, the three foundations of royalist allegiance can still be identified. Ultimately, the Northern Band maintained absolute loyalty to the king, although it had been reframed with a covenanting emphasis on the interlinked nature of the king's authority and the maintenance of the true religion. Likewise, order and stability had been endangered by the invasion of the kingdom by Cromwell's forces who threatened to reduce the nation to a state of servitude. Finally, illegality was emphasised not in the actions of the covenanters, but in the actions of Cromwell and his allies who had murdered Charles I and waged an unlawful war against all three of the Stuart kingdoms. Undoubtedly the band's rhetoric was calculated to appeal to the widest audience with references to the covenants and the nationalistic call to arms in the face of foreign invasion, reflecting the incorporation of moderate covenanters like Middleton into the royalist fold. Nevertheless, it also shows that the royalists were willing to be whatever the king required them to be and that the Cromwellian invasion had forced

[138] Lewis Gordon, third son of the 2nd marquis of Huntly, succeeded his father to the marquisate following the latter's execution in 1649. John Murray, had likewise succeeded his father to the earldom of Atholl in 1642. Both young men became eager royalists.
[139] *The Declaration and Engagement of the Marquesse of Huntley, the Earle of Atholl, Generall Midletou, and many of the Nobility of Scotland that have lately taken up Arms for the defence of his Majesties Person and just Authority* (The Hague, 1650).
[140] ibid.

a readjustment of political aims. As Robertson has rightly noted, by late 1650 the 'nature of the struggle had changed completely'.[141]

Despite the promise of the Start to ignite a royalist recovery akin to the Engagement, Charles II quickly became indecisive over the rising's planning. By 6 October, the king had already written to the earl of Atholl expressing his doubts over the rising's prospects and his desire to call it off. In the weeks that followed the Northern Band's publication, Charles denounced the rising in order to win back favour with the kirk party regime and scolded those who had remained in arms. Despite his instructions, some had received mixed reports of whether or not the rising was to go ahead.[142] While some royalists like Middleton retained commissions to fight in Charles's final campaign which culminated in his defeat at Worcester (3 September 1651), the royalist cause had largely been superseded by the nationalistic call to arms in the face of a renewed English invasion.

In summary, by examining royalist subscriptional devices, we can clearly see consistencies in Scottish royalism. Perhaps most significant is the almost complete absence of an Episcopalian defence within these bands. While there are various references to the need to maintain the reformed religion, apart from the Atholl Band of 1639, there is no detectable Episcopalian rhetoric. Rather, the reverse is evident, as over the course of the civil wars royalists increasingly adopted moderate covenanting rhetoric in order to broaden their appeal. This contradicts Glen Burgess's view that Scottish royalists might as well be referred to as Episcopalians, and supports Barry Robertson's assertion that Scottish royalists had no desire to 'embark on a pro-Episcopalian crusade against the Covenanters'.[143] In the absence of Episcopalian rhetoric, there are consistent themes of loyalty to the crown, aversion to the unjustified and illegal actions of the covenanters (and latterly the Cromwellians), and the protection of societal order and hierarchy. Additionally, most oaths and bands employed extensive patriotic rhetoric to broaden their appeal and contest covenanting legitimacy. The overriding goal of these oaths and bands was to establish a tangible royalist movement in Scotland in a similar fashion to the coalition created by the covenanters, and to disseminate the royalist message, especially to those within the covenanting faction who might be convinced to switch sides. Royalist nobles and gentry were acutely aware of the need to reach all levels of society and convert those

[141] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 187.
[142] ibid, 186.
[143] Glenn Burgess, *British Political Thought, 1500-1660: The Politics of the Post-Reformation* (Basingstoke, 2009), 204-205; Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 36.

on the other side of the divide, although their limited ability to achieve this until 1647 greatly hampered royalist prospects.

Each of the oaths and bands discussed above reflect the king's position at the time of its conception. The consolatory tone of the King's Covenant contrasts starkly with the warlike character of the Oxford Band, which in turn seems almost irreconcilable with the position advocated in the Northern Band. Within these shifts, the emphasis of the royalist message changed to best suit the circumstances. This is seen in the alternating use of Catholics, Protestant schismatics, English independents and Cromwellians as a unifying enemy. The royalist message also changed in relation to the king's acceptance of the covenants. This reflects the fact that, while royalists disagreed about the 'tactics' which should be pursued in the king's war, they were ultimately submissive to the will of the crown and would support it in the way the king desired.[144] In 1644 that meant a blusterous denunciation of all rebels in arms against the crown, while in 1647 it was a call for moderation and a reassessment of the conflict. Loyalty was and always had been non-negotiable.

1.5 – Royalist Declarations

From the very beginning of the political crisis which accompanied the signing of the National Covenant in 1638, declarations were instrumental in the crafting and dissemination of the royalist message. Royalists followed the lead of the king in this regard. Charles I's response to the unfolding crisis during the first few crucial months proved to be pivotal in the creation of the royalist position in Scotland. As the civil wars unfolded, royalist nobles took up the mantle, chastising the king's enemies and rallying his supporters with declarations. Like subscriptional devices, these declarations act as touchstones in the development of Scottish royalist ideology, allowing for an analysis of the ways in which the royalist position changed and remained consistent. For the purposes of this chapter, what is most important is the way in which the king and his noble supporters articulated their own stance within these declarations. In what follows, the declarations of Charles I and several of his key Scottish followers, including Montrose, Huntly and Spottiswoode, are examined and compared to one another and the findings of the previous section.

[144] Smuts, 'The Court and the Emergence of The Royalist Party', 63-64.

Charles I had initially refused to compromise in any way to the covenanters' demands following the signing of the National Covenant. However, by June 1638, the king was advised that granting concessions to the dissidents would prove to be the most effective means of re-establishing his authority. The king's proclamation on 28 June 1638 ordered the suspension of the 1637 Book of Common Prayer, 1636 Canons and the court of high commission, while also authorising meetings of the general assembly and Scottish parliament. However, the proclamation's language also provides telling details of the king's interpretation of the situation. While Charles offered considerable concessions in an attempt to win back support, he continued to openly question the covenanters' intent. The proclamation claimed that the disorders that had gripped the kingdom were the result of 'pretended' concerns surrounding the prayer book and the misguided fears regarding religious and political innovation. These, the king claimed, were being used to stir up resentment towards the crown by 'dis-affected persons' aiming to 'possesse the hearts of Our good subjects'. If this was allowed to continue, Charles warned that the authors of this discord would seek to have 'royall Authoritie shaken off' under the 'pretext of Religion' which risked plunging the nation 'headlong into ruine'. The king also defended his maintenance of the Protestant faith against allegations of 'Popish superstition' and subtly reminded his subjects of 'that power which God hath endewed [imbued] Us with'.[145] Charles gave with one hand but slapped with the other. While this approach helped to consolidate royalist support, it also alienated the covenanting leadership, making finding a settlement even more difficult.

From the outset of the crisis in Scotland, the royalist position was that religious concerns were being used by the covenanters as a cover for an insidious attack on the crown. Following the royalists' rout at the Glasgow Assembly, Charles reinforced this standpoint in a proclamation published in London on 9 March 1639, on the eve of open conflict, which informed his English subjects of the 'seditious practices of some in Scotland, seeking to overthrow Our Regall Power'. 'The aim of these men', the king claimed, 'is not Religion (as they falsly pretend and publish) but it is to shake off all Monarchicall government, and to vilifie Our Regall power justly descended upon Us over them'. Charles evidenced the 'multitude of their printed pamphlets … stuffed full of calumnies against Our Regall Authority', the 'publike contemning of all Our just Commands', the covenanters' 'rejecting of the Covenant commanded by Our authority [the King's Covenant]' and their 'most hostile preparations in all kinds, as if we were not their

[145] Charles I, [Proclamation, 28 June] (Edinburgh, 1638).

king, but their sworn Enemy'. These affronts, combined with the covenanters' rejection of the king's previous concessions, had 'struck at the very Root of kingly government; for they have now assumed to themselves Regall power'. This led the king to the conclusion that: 'the question is not now, whether a Service Book to be received or not; nor whether Episcopall government shall be continued, or Presbyteriall admitted, but whether We are their king or not'.[146]

Charles's renewed attack on the covenanters in the February proclamation was, at least in part, motivated by a desire to unify English public opinion against the covenanters and obstruct any English sympathy for the covenanting cause as open war became increasingly likely in the early months of 1639.[147] However, the arguments used by the king should not be dismissed as simply propaganda, but viewed as a crucial development in royalist rhetoric. Charles I and his advisors created the royalist counter-position to the covenanters upon the ideological foundation that the crown was in danger and that the covenanters sought to undermine royal authority. This had clear ramifications for individuals across the social spectrum. If the crown was subjugated, or worse still brought down, the balance of power which kept society's hierarchy in check would be irrevocably disrupted, bringing about disorder and anarchy. As in the oaths and bands discussed above, the king spent little to no time discussing his religious policy. Instead, his proclamations painted the covenanters' action as purely politically motivated, confirming a narrative in which the covenanters were dissidents who threatened the monarchy and manipulated loyal subjects into rebellion. Thus, it is telling that in his proclamation from February 1639, Charles argued that the Episcopalian government of the church was the only defensible church settlement not because of any theological reason, but because it was 'established by many Acts of Parliament' and that it was 'known to the Christian world, that the same is most Christian in itself, and most peaceable for the Civill State, and most consonant to Monarchicall Government'.[148]

Following his arrest during the First Bishops' War, the marquis of Huntly composed a written declaration of his loyalty which condemned the actions of the covenanters. Originally written on 20 April 1639, Huntly's Declaration was printed with the crown's authority in 1640. At four pages long, the declaration is perhaps one of the most articulate and insightful statements of Scottish royalist allegiance in existence. Huntly

[146] Charles I, [Proclamation, 9 March] (London, 1639).
[147] This can be seen in other proclamations, especially Charles I, [Proclamation, 7 September] (London, 1640). Also see Waurechen, 'Covenanter Propaganda and Conceptualizations of the Public', 63-86.
[148] Charles I, [Proclamation, 9 March].

proudly professed that 'to be your Prisoner, is by much the lesse displeasing to mee, that my accusation is for nothing else but Loyaltie'. The marquis mocked the covenanters' attempts to persuade him to subscribe the covenant which he refused on the grounds that 'I am not so bad a Merchant as to buy it with the losse of my Conscience, Fidelity and Honour, which in so doing I should make account to be wholly perisht'. Throughout the declaration Huntly employed the same rhetoric identified in the proclamations of Charles I. He scoffed at the covenanters' 'pretence of Religion, which my owne Judgement cannot excuse from Rebellion' and argued that 'it is well knowne, that in the Primitive Church no Armes were held lawfull, being lifted by Subjects against their Lawfull Prince'. Huntly's words also hinted at Charles I's divine right to rule, citing that he had 'already given my Faith to my Prince, upon whose Head this Crowne by all Law of Nature and Nations is justly fallen'. In concluding, Huntly proclaimed that he was 'resolv'd not to leave that foule Title of Traitour as an Inheritance upon my posterity' and that 'You may take my Head from my shoulders, but not my Heart from my Soveraigne'.[149]

Like the subscriptional devices discussed above, consistent themes can be identified from Huntly's Declaration. Clearly honour and reputation were precious to him. The uncompromising terms in which Huntly discussed his loyalty may have been exaggerated to some degree, especially since the declaration was intended to be used as a polemical attack on the covenanters, but given that he expressed similar views regularly within his personal correspondence we must recognise the importance of loyalty within the royalist mentality.[150] Huntly often couched his arguments within discussions of legality, accusing the covenanters of breaching civil and natural law. Like the king, Huntly refused to recognise the religious concerns of the covenanters, instead dismissing them as a front for their seditious schemes. Consequently, Huntly saw the choice between covenant and king as one of 'Conscience, Fidelity and Honour'.[151] Tellingly, upon his release at the end of the First Bishops' War, instead of subscribing the National Covenant, Huntly made a separate oath whereby he made no mention of the covenant, but recognised the legitimacy of the 1581 King's Confession and the legality of the Glasgow Assembly, as they had been 'indicted by the Kings Majesty'. While accepting the peace treaty, he rather ambiguously swore 'I shall w[i]th all my power assist, & concurre in this cause of defending Religion, the Lawes, & Liberties of this Church, & Kingdome'.[152]

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[149] George Gordon, *The Marquesse of Huntley His Reply to certaine Noblemen, Gentlemen, and Ministers, Covenanters of Scotland* (London, 1640).
[150] NRS, GD406/1/751; GD406/1/758.
[151] Gordon, *The Marquesse of Huntley His Reply*, 2.
[152] British Library, Harley MS 4931, f.37r.

Another public declaration from a member of the royalist nobility did not come until 1644. In the direct aftermath of the Solemn League and Covenant, the royalist nobles who had taken up residence at the king's court in exile at Oxford composed the Oxford Band.[153] Alongside the band, the royalists drew up a declaration which they presented to the Oxford parliament. Written by Montrose and his allies (probably Aboyne, Crawford, Nithsdale and Ogilvy) the Oxford Declaration mirrored the sentiments of the accompanying band, claiming to speak on behalf of all Scottish royalists, who 'have great reason above all other to be [ag]grieved'. The declaration lamented the 'undeserved sufferings' of the king and the 'honour and reputation of that our native Countrie that is so deeply rooinded [ruined] by the persidious treachery of some of her unnaturall brood, whose base and disloyall proceedings reflect upon the whole as if all were the like guilty of the same'. Like the band, the declaration condemned the actions of the Committee of Estates which they pledged to resist. The declaration claimed that the covenanters' actions were 'presumptuous and illegal, as called for no other end, but to insite sedition, and rebellion in that kingdom'. Alongside the covenanters and English parliamentarians, the declaration attacked all Scots who 'will not joyne hartily with us in this our declaration and in the courses to be taken for the prosectution thereof for Enemyes both to his Maj[esti]es and us', for 'what Scotishmen soener shall refuse to set his hand to this declaration by us, may not be permitted to live under his Maj[est]ies protection but be chased from among his Ma[jesty's] Loyall subjects'.[154]

The Oxford Declaration maintains a Scottish focus, akin to many of the texts discussed above, but also possesses a sense of national shame. This seems to have been a by-product of the context in which these documents were created – the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant, the imminent invasion of England by a covenanting army and the English audience in Oxford. It corroborates the sentiment expressed in both the king's and Huntly's declarations that the kingdom was being led astray by the false promises and arguments of the covenanters. Like Huntly, the royalists behind the Oxford Declaration referenced the 'doctrine of our allegiance' which demanded that the royalists take a stand against the covenanters and the English parliamentarians in arms against the king.

If the Oxford Declaration was the Scottish royalists' declaration of war against the rebels in arms against the king, Montrose's declaration upon raising the royal standard in

[153] See pp.57-59.
[154] NRS, CH12/12/1952.

Scotland was the opening shot of the military campaign. Presumably read aloud to the newly assembled royalist army on 30 August 1644, the Standard Declaration laid out the reasons behind the royalist rising which 'the miraculous dealings of Almightie God sufficientlie confirme unto us'. The declaration, written by Montrose, stated that:

> the ground and intention of his Majestie's service heir in this Kingdome (according to our owne solemne and national oath and covenant) only is for the defence and maintenance of the trew Protestant religion, his Majestie's just and sacred authoritie, the fundamentall lawes and priveledges of Parliaments, the peace and freedom of the oppressed and thralled subject; and that in thus far, and no more, doeth his Majestie require.

Montrose also attempted to reassure those who mistrusted the king's intent in encouraging war in Scotland, stating 'that knew I not perfectly his Majesties intention … I should never at all [have] embarked myself in this service'. Armed with the king's authority and (presumed) divine support, Montrose claimed that these justifications would 'prove sufficient against all unjust and prejudicial malice, and able to satisfie all trew Christains, and loyall hearted subjects and countrymen who desire to serve their God, honour their Prince and injoy there owne happie peace and quyet'. [155]

Unsurprisingly, the Standard Declaration shares many properties with the Kilcumin Band which was signed five months later. Montrose portrayed the royalist cause as fighting for the true Protestant faith, the defence of monarchical authority and preservation of the rights and liberties of the Scottish kingdom in the face of the covenanting regime which had poisoned the minds of the nation against their king and manipulated them through their illegal seizure of power. Montrose employed the National Covenant as leverage to remind subscribers of their oath to defend the king. This reference to the National Covenant also highlights the fact that officially the covenant had been recognised by Charles as lawful through the Treaty of London (1641). Crucially, this confirms that, by 1644, royalists could accept the National Covenant as lawful but reject the Solemn League and Covenant as it was a breach of the Treaty of London and a violation of the king's will. This rhetoric was almost certainly employed to inform the royalist army that disaffected covenanters who realised the error of their ways would be accepted into the ranks.

Following Montrose's victory at Kilsyth (15 August 1645), Charles I ordered the marquis to issue a proclamation on his behalf ordering new parliamentary elections and summoning parliament to Glasgow to reassert monarchical governance over the kingdom. The Glasgow Proclamation was delivered at Glasgow's mercat cross on 18 August before being disseminated throughout the kingdom. The proclamation celebrated 'the providence

[155] *Memorials*, ii, 146-147.

of the Almighty God' in delivering the royalist army to victory and bringing the 'long continued troubles of Warre and commotion' to an end. While the proclamation's claim that 'turbulent and seditious spirits are now quieted and suppressed' proved to be premature, it was intended to bring the bruised and battered political nation together and cement royalist control over Scotland, marking the achievement of a key objective of the royalist war effort. The proclamation declared an end to the 'horrible effects of wicked Athesnie [Atheism], Barbarous Tiranny, and insolent usurpation & rebellion' with the reinstatement of 'sound Order & solide course taken, for the composing & ordering of our Royall aff[a]ire, and Fatherly care'. Following the same rhetorical lines as previous declarations, the Glasgow Proclamation celebrated the release of the kingdom's 'dis[t]ressed subjects' from the 'oppression of the Rebels'. Continuing efforts to win over the moderate majority, the proclamation authorised an 'Act of Grace' which pardoned those who had acted against the crown so long as they took this opportunity to renew their allegiance to the king. However, Charles I's charity only stretched so far and the 'speciall authors and Principall fomentars of the forsaid Combustion and Rebellion' were excluded from any clemency.[156]

An interesting comparison to the declarations discussed above can be found in the words of Sir Robert Spottiswoode. Spottiswoode had been a loyal servant of the crown since the reign of James VI & I, under whom he had served as a privy councillor and an extraordinary lord of the court of session. He was also the second son of John Spottiswoode, Archbishop of St Andrews. When the covenanting crisis broke out, Sir Robert immediately sided with the king and was rewarded for his loyalty in 1644 with his appointment as secretary of state for Scotland.[157] In this role, he accompanied Montrose on his campaign, but following the royalist defeat at Philiphaugh, he was captured in the rout. Following his capture, Spottiswoode produced three statements of his royalist allegiance: one presented to the judicial proceeding against him, one written to Montrose, and one delivered to the onlooking crowd at his execution for treason on 20 January 1646.

Following Spottiswoode's capture, the Committee of Estates planned to have the secretary of state executed alongside other important royalist captives, including the renowned officer Nathaniel Gordon and the minister Andrew Guthrie, son of John Guthrie, Bishop of Moray. At his trial, Spottiswoode argued that he could not be condemned to death as the 'laws of nations and humanity' prohibited such action as 'when I was taken

[156] NRS, PA7/23/2/34.
[157] David Stevenson, 'Spottiswood [Spottiswoode], Sir Robert, Lord Dunipace (1596–1646)', *ODNB* (2004).

prisoner I had quarters granted to me by an honourable person'. The estates rejected this because Spottiswoode had been captured in rebellion against the state and had thus renounced any legal right to leniency. In response, Spottiswoode stated that 'I have no intention to dispute so high a question as the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the war but only to vindicate myself and to make it appear that the benefit of the law of nations ought not to be denied to me'. Spottiswoode refused to accept that 'I can be said to be taken in an insurrection and not in war' as 'when there is a division between the prince and his people it cannot be said that he or his adherents, who upon probable, possibly erroneous grounds follow their judgement, are in an insurrection'. Throughout Spottiswoode's defence there are sections where he laid out the conflict as he saw it:

> the question being stated as it truly is when a sovereign prince is in terms of difference with his people and both profess that they are for the same ends and that the prince intends nothing but the maintaining of his just right without prejudice of religion or liberties of the subject established by the laws, and on the other part those who are on the other side profess that they intend nothing but the preservation of religion and their liberties without diminution of the king's greatness, power and sovereignty established by so many laws, and none being to interpose themselves to be judges of so high differences, both sides conceive they are necessitated to take arms for these needs respectively.

Here Spottiswoode identified the crux of the civil war in Scotland – it was a clash of priorities, not fundamentals. Whereas royalists prioritised the defence of the crown, covenanters prioritised the defence of the kirk, with neither side believing that the other's priority was genuinely in danger. Royalists were quick to reject any notion that they intended any kind of religious innovation or change. Indeed, Spottiswoode encapsulated this notion when he stated that:

> I cannot be thought to be an enemy to God unless it was shown that I had intended something against the honour of God, purity of religion or the liberty of my country, for in civil combustions the naked difference of opinion anent civil questions and adhering a subject to his prince was never thought to be enmity against God.[158]

Nevertheless, Spottiswoode's arguments fell upon deaf ears and the estates upheld the decision to execute the royalist prisoners for treason. Knowing this, Spottiswoode wrote to Montrose to ease his conscience. Like Huntly's declaration, Spottiswoode stated that the covenanters had 'condemned me to die for my loyalty to his Majesty, and the respect I am known to carry towards your Excellence'. He consoled himself with the honour of martyrdom for the royalist cause, stating that 'I hope, by the assistance of God's grace, to do more good to the King's cause, and to the advancement of the service your Excellence hath in hand, by my death, than perhaps otherwise I could have done being living'. Spottiswoode found solace in his belief in the divine providence of the royalists' inevitable success, noting that 'in the end God will surely set up again his own anointed; and, as I have been confident from the beginning, make your Excellence a prime

[158] *RPS*, 1645/11/113.

instrument of it'. Spottiswoode also urged Montrose to 'gain the people's affection to their Prince, rather than to imitate the barbarous inhumanity of your adversaries, although they give your Excellence too great provocations to follow their example'. By remaining true to the king's cause and reclaiming the hearts of the kingdom, Spottiswoode was confident that victory would come and asked, 'when God shall be pleased to settle his Majesty in peace', that the marquis remember 'the poor service I could do'.[159]

When the day of the execution came, Spottiswoode used the opportunity for one last declaration. The exact wording which Spottiswoode employed was not recorded, but a covenanting account of the execution documented that:

> Sir Robert Spotswood, and Master Andrew Guthry, dyed as they lived, full of malice against the Cause and Covenant, justifying themselves in all that they had done against the Cause. Sir Robert Spotswood inveighed much in his discourse against the Parliament of England stiling [styling] them always Rebels, and said, The Judgement of God was upon this Kingdome for assisting those Rebells against their native King, when he had granted unto us all that we crave concerning the setling of our owne Peace, and desired no more of this Kingdome but that they would be neutrals in the affaires of England; that the excommunicating those holy men of God (meaning the Bishops) was lying as a grievous sinne upon this Land.[160]

Spottiswoode also defended Montrose against the barbs of the covenanters, stating that the 'Lord Marquesse of Montrose, [was] the matchlesse mirror of all true worth and Nobility'. He then turned his attention to the covenanting ministry of whom he said, 'that God had put a lying spirit in the mouthes of our Prophets [the covenanters], whereby the people were deluded'. When asked to repent his sins against the kirk, Spottiswoode replied that 'he would confesse no more sinne, but that he had as other men, *peccata inventutis, & quotidianae incursionis* [sins of his youth and those incurred daily]'.

Once again, it is clear to see the remarkable consistency in royalist rhetoric and ideology. Spottiswoode regularly used legal arguments, a tactic which was widely employed by other royalist nobles. Defending the king's cause within a legal framework made it far easier to pick holes in the covenanters' use of religious pretext. Spottiswoode also showed royalist tendencies in his discussion of his personal honour and his ultimate belief that Charles I had been chosen by God to be king and was thus blessed with divine support. On the latter point, it is worth noting that this should not be confused with absolutism. Spottiswoode, like other royalists, was acutely aware of the legal and constitutional framework which underpinned monarchical governance. Nowhere did

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[159] *Memorials*, ii, 254-255.
[160] As the son of a bishop, Spottiswoode clearly resented the excommunication of the Scottish bishops which had occurred at the 1638 Glasgow Assembly. See pp.123-124.

Spottiswoode suggest that Charles I had the right to rule with absolute power. As long as the king ruled in accordance with the laws of man and nature, he was above the reproach of those who accused him and his supporters of working against the will of God. The covenanters mistook this for delusion and arrogance, recording that Spottiswoode died 'rayling on Christ'.[161]

The final Scottish royalist declaration of the civil wars was made by Montrose in 1649 as a rallying call for royalist supporters to join his renewed attempt to wrestle control of Scotland from the covenanting regime, which culminated in his defeat at Carbisdale. The declaration was printed and shared widely in Scotland and England. Like most other royalist texts, the declaration began by decrying the 'most Horrid, and Infamous faction of Rebells, in the Kingdome of Scotland' who had maintained a 'most groundlesse Rebellion against his Majestie of ever glorious memorie [Charles I]'. As well as their actions in Scotland against the king's supporters, Montrose lambasted the covenanters' support of the parliamentarians in England through the Solemn League and Covenant. Montrose's ire is clearly seen in the following lines:

> They, (not onely contrary to the dutie of Subjects, but also contrary to all Faith, Covenants, Oaths, Attestations, to which they had so often invoked God, his Angells, and all the world to witnesse,) did enter the Kingdom of England with a strong Armie, did persecute their own Prince in a forraigne Countrey, did assist strange Rebells against their native King, and all those who continued in their Loyaltie to his Majestie in that Kingdome; which trayterous proceedings of theirs, the whole world doth know, was the onely cause which stopped the course of his Majesties victories, and of bringing that unnatural warre to such a conclusion, as all good men could have wished.

Moreover, such crimes were, Montrose proclaimed, trivial in comparison to their greatest crime – 'they, contrary to all Faith, and pactions [agreements], Dutie of Subjects, Lawes of Hospitalitie, Nature, Nations, Divine, or Humane, an action so barbarous … sold their Soveraigne to their mercilesse fellow Rebells, and fellow-Traitors'. Montrose found further insult in the covenanters' dealings with Charles II: 'they declare him indeed to be their King, but with such conditions, and provisos, as Robb him of all right and power'. This, and the covenanters' attempts to have the king swear the 'sacrilegious Covenant' have 'laid all Royall power in the Dust'.[162] While it is not specified in the declaration, this refers to the Solemn League and Covenant which, in the aftermath of the Engagement and Charles I's execution, Montrose clearly sought to distance himself and Charles II from.

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[161] *Treason and Rebellion Against their Native Country justly rewarded upon several Traitors and Rebels lately executed in Scotland* (London, 1645).
[162] *The Declaration of His Excellence James Marquis of Montrosse, Earle of Kilcairn, Lord Greme, Baron of Mont-Dieu, Lievtenant Governour of Scotland, and Captaine Generall of all His Majesties Forces by sea or Land, for that Kingdome* (London, 1649).

Despite the declaration's blanket condemnation of the covenanters' actions since 1643, it maintained that 'the greatest part of the People of the Kingdome of Scotland, hath beene hitherto ignorantly misguided'. However, Montrose noted that with the execution of Charles I had '(by Gods mercy) their eyes opened, and their hearts inflamed to returne (at least in their desires) to their due obedience towards their most Gratious Soveraigne'. Embracing this apparent turning point in royalist fortunes, Montrose took time to thank the 'loyall partie of men of all sorts, and conditions, who still gave evident Demonstrations of their unwearied loyallty and fidelity, their sincere duties and affections to their dread Soveraigne', while also extending the hand of reconciliation to all 'who upon the sight or knowledge of this Our Declaration, doe immediately, or with the first possible opportunity, abandon those Rebells, and rise, and joyne with us, and our Forcis, in this present service'. The declaration asked 'what ever true Scotch-man there is, who hath any sence of his duty left him towards God, his King, Countrey, Friends, Wife, Children, or Houses' to join the royalists and help them 'change (now at last) the Tyranny, violence or oppression of those Rebells, with the mild, and innocent Government of their just Prince' and 'revenge the horrid and execrable murther of their sacred King, [to] redeeme their Nation from infamy, and themselves from slavery'. Echoing Huntly's sentiments from 1639, Montrose asserted that the royalist cause was one of 'Conscience, Duty, Honor, and all just interests', reassuring the people of Scotland that they acted as God's instruments in the work of re-establishing monarchical rule.[163]

In Montrose's final declaration all the hallmarks of royalist allegiance can be identified. There is an ever-present affinity with loyalty, duty and honour which is supported by legal, moral and at times divinely ordained justifications. The tyranny and brutality of the covenanting regime's rule which had, according to Montrose, enslaved and reduced the Scottish people is contrasted sharply with the restorative effect of returning to loyal obedience under the moderate patriarchal care offered by Charles II. By placing the blame for these crimes and the covenanting state's complicity in the execution of Charles I at the feet of the covenanting leaders, Montrose attempted to undermine their authority by offering pardons to those who broke free from the supposedly hypnotic control of the regime. Beneath the polemic and propaganda, the foundations of royalist ideology (loyalty, legality and order) are all visible. There are, however, two interesting omissions from the declaration. At no point did the declaration mention the Engagement, though the declaration's many references to those who have repented and joined the king may hint at

[163] ibid.

it.[164] This silence may, alternatively, have been a deliberate attempt to distance royalists from any further treaty which might seek to place restraints or conditions upon Charles II. Conveniently, by avoiding the Engagement, Montrose was also able to largely bypass the issue of religion. Beyond the declaration's addressing of the intended audience as simply Christians and its understated references to divine providence, there was no discussion of religion. Instead, emphasis was placed on the need to rid the kingdom of the covenanters' tyranny and seek revenge for the murder of Charles I.

From the declarations examined in this section it is possible to draw several conclusions. First and foremost, like the subscriptional devices discussed in Section 1.4, the consistent elements of royalist ideology expressed in these declarations are hugely significant. From Charles I's 1638 proclamations to Montrose's last declaration, the underlying royalist message remained largely unchanged – the covenanters had taken power away from the crown under the pretext of religion with the goal of subverting monarchical governance, and it was the duty of all loyal subjects to resist and reverse this in order to re-establish peace and order. Whether the declaration was widely disseminated in print or presented to a likeminded audience, this message remained the same. While this message contains numerous similarities to English royalist ideology, the royalist declarations retained a constant focus on Scotland, like the oaths and bands discussed previously. While Scottish royalists were quick to group the covenanters and parliamentarians together as rebels and enemies of the crown, their primary objective was the recovery of Scotland for the king. This meant that noble royalists were largely accepting of changes in royal policy, including formal recognition of the National Covenant in years after 1641. Indeed, another uniquely Scottish aspect to these declarations was their claim to represent authorised Protestantism without ever discussing what form of worship that would take. While several declarations made appeals to true Christians to recognise that the Charles I had no intention of subverting the reformed religion, there is a scarcity of pro-Episcopal or anti-Presbyterian rhetoric. While covenanters often used the term "true religion" as a byword for Presbyterianism, royalists intentionally capitalised on the term's ambiguity, using it as a common banner of Protestantism which they waved to rally support away from the covenanters. The true religion could be many things to many people while clearly marking the king as a defender of the reformed faith. While covenanting leaders became increasingly divided on whether or not religion took precedence over loyalty to the crown, royalists consistently advocated

[164] ibid, 4.

that religion could only be protected if the monarch was free and able to lead the nation as God's chosen lieutenant.

1.6 – Royalist Literature

While oaths and declarations provided formal statements of royalist ideology, royalist prose and poetry was the literary expression of that ideology. Due to the covenanters' early success in the Bishops' Wars, royalist writers and poets were denied the same access to printers and markets as their English and Irish allies. This undoubtedly contributed to the comparative lack of Scottish royalist prose and poetry. Nevertheless, the few works which we possess show a striking awareness of what royalism was and why it was important to support it. This section examines the works of Archibald Napier, William Drummond of Hawthornden and the marquis of Montrose. By analysing these works and the extent to which they shared the same ideas and beliefs, it is possible to add to the analysis carried out above and provide a more complete picture of how royalist nobles envisaged their own allegiance and the loyalties of others.

Archibald Napier had a long and illustrious record of service to the crown by the time of the troubles. As a young man, Napier had been a gentleman of the king's privy chamber under James VI, accompanying the king to England in 1603. For his loyal service, he was knighted in 1616 and given a seat on the Scottish privy council in August 1617. In 1619, Napier's prestige grew further with his marriage to Lady Margaret Graham, sister of the future marquis of Montrose. However, Napier's growing influence brought him into conflict with the king's other Scottish advisors, namely the earls of Mar and Traquair. Under Charles I, the conflict between Napier and his opponents angered the king, resulting in Napier's forced withdrawal to Scotland in 1630. Following the death of Margaret in 1631, Napier retired from public affairs until the signing of the National Covenant. Despite his dislike of the bishops and initial flirtation with the covenanters, Napier sided resolutely with the king by autumn 1638, signing the King's Covenant, Cumbernauld Band and Cross Petition. From 1640 Napier became a close advisor and confidant to Montrose, and his son, Archibald Napier, served in the royalist army from 1645-1646. [165]

It was in this capacity as an advisor to Montrose that Napier wrote the *Letter about the Soveraigne and Supreme Power* (c.1640). Sometimes erroneously attributed solely to Montrose, the letter was not widely circulated but appears to have been intended as a

[165] David Stevenson, 'Napier, Archibald, first Lord Napier of Merchistoun (*c.* 1575–1645)', *ODNB* (2004).

working draft of a manifesto which encapsulated the thoughts of those within Montrose's circle.[166] Unsurprisingly given the letter's title, Napier's focus was on the nature of sovereignty, which he defined as the 'power over the people … instituted by God for his glory and the temporall and eternall happiness of men'. 'Civil societys', the letter stated, 'soe pleasing to almighty God, cannot subsist without government, nor government without a soveraigne power to force obedience to laws and just command'. According to Napier, sovereignty was 'the trewest image and representation of the power of almighty God upon earth, not to be bounded, disputed, medled with at all by subjects, who can never handle it'. The 'essentiall points of soveraignity' as defined by Napier were the ability to create laws and offices of state, exert control over war and peace, and act as the supreme judiciary to which subjects could appeal.[167] Sovereignty could not be divided nor usurped, naturally residing in the native government of any kingdom. In most cases, the vessel of sovereignty was the prince, who ruled over his kingdom as God's anointed. The authority and sanctity of the prince's power was necessary in order to avoid the usurpation of that power by lesser men, for 'if there wer many kings in one kingdome, there should be none at all'. Sovereign power was strongest when wielded in moderation and within the parameters of 'the lawes of God and nature and the fundamentall lawes of the country'. It was weakest when it was extended beyond these parameters or overly constrained by the 'oppression and tyrrany of subjects', which inevitably 'produce nothing but ruin to prince or people, or rather, to both'. Good governance was supported by good advisors, patience and the 'fear of infamy and the penns of writters'. Parliaments and assemblies acted as the guardians of the rights and liberties of subjects, but while they were encouraged to counsel princes, they were forbidden to shackle the prince with conditional obedience or enforce their will upon him. Due to the divine nature of sovereignty, it was not just illegal and immoral to restrain a prince, but an unnatural breach of subjects' duty to serve and obey their liege lord. Thus, loyalty and obedience to the prince must be complete and unconditional. Even if the prince was despotic or tyrannical, it was God's prerogative to

[166] In *Memorials of Montrose and his Time*, Mark Napier attributed the letter to Montrose because the only surviving copy of the letter (NLS, Wodrow MS. Quarto XL, no.2), dating to the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century, bears his name. However, David Stevenson and David Reid have argued convincingly that the style and language bears too much of a resemblance to Napier's other works to be a coincidence. Thus, the letter was likely the product of Napier's efforts in consultation with Montrose. For further information, see *Memorials*, ii, 43-53; David Stevenson, 'The "Letter on Sovereign Power" and the Influence of Jean Bodin on Political Thought in Scotland', *The Scottish Historical Review*, 61 (1982), 28-30; Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 225-227, 365-366; David Reid (ed), *The Party-Coloured Mind* (Edinburgh, 1982), 70.

[167] For a comparison, see Ronald Asch's discussion of sovereignty within French and English political discourse. Ronald G. Asch, *Sacral Kingship between Disenchantment and Re-enchantment 1587-1688* (Oxford, 2014), esp. 59-103.

punish him, not the responsibility of the subject. Accordingly, the subject 'in wisdom and deuty is obliged to tolerate the vices of his prince as they doe stormes, tempests and other natural evils'.[168]

Napier saw the covenanters' usurpation of the king's sovereignty as the precursor to anarchy and ruin. He argued that 'great men, vailed with plausible and speciouse pretext of religion and the subjects' libertys, seconded with the arguments and false positions of seditiouse preachers' would seek to use conflict as a means to sow the seeds of division between the king and his people and 'separate them quhom God hath conjoyned'. Napier strenuously denied any ground on which subjects could resist their divinely ordained prince, comparing the union of prince and people to a marriage, whereby 'neither the woman or the people [can] free themselves from obedience and subjection to the husband and the prince quhen they please'. This sentiment was echoed in Napier's comment that 'the king and his people are not two but one body politick, quhereof the king is the head'. Any attempt to decapitate the body politic would only result in 'a subversion of government, anarchy and confusion'. Indeed, such an attack on the foundations of sovereignty would lead to a complete breakdown in societal order, for 'if their first act be against kingly power, their nixt will be against you [the nobility]: for if the people be of a fierce nature, they will cut your throats'. In an address to the kingdom, Napier appealed:

> Doe ye not know quhen monarchicall government is shaken, the great ones strive for the garland with your blood and your fortunes, quhereby you gain nothing but instead of a race of kings who have governed you two thousand years with peace and justice and have preserved your libertys against all domineering nations, shall purchase to your selves vulturs and tygres to reign over your posterity and your selves shall endure all these miserys, massacres and proscriptions of the triumvirate of Rome, the kingdome fall again into the hands of one who of necessity must, and for reason of state will, tyrannize over you, for kingdoms acquired by blood and violence are by the same means enterteaned. And you great men, if any such be among you soe blinded with ambition, who aim soe high at the crown, doe you think we are soe farr degenerate from the virtue, valour and fidelity of our treu and lawfull soveraigne, soe constantly enterteaned by our ancestors, as to suffer you with all your policy to reigne over us? Take heed you be not Aesop's dogg and lose the cheese for the shadow in the well.[169] And thou, seditiouse preacher, who studys to put the soveraignty in the people's hands for thy own ambitiouse ends as being able by thy wicked eloquence and hypocrisy to infuse into them quhat thou pleases, know this, that this people is more incapable of soveraignty than any other knowen. Thou art abused like a pedant by the nimbler witted noblemen.[170]

[168] Reid (ed), *The Party-Coloured Mind*, 71-78.
[169] Aesop's dog refers to a Greek proverb about a dog which is carrying food in its mouth (often meat but here cheese) and becomes distracted by his reflection in a pool of water. Mistaking his reflection for another dog with a better morsel of food, Aesop's dog attacks his reflection, dropping his bounty in the process. The moral of the story is to be content with what you have and not to trade substance for greed.
[170] Reid (ed), *The Party-Coloured Mind*, 78.

Napier concluded the letter with an unsettling prophecy that 'a durable peace with England, quhilk is the wish and desire of all honest men' was at risk if Charles I's rule was disrupted, as it was 'the king's majesty's soveraignty over both that unites us in affection'. While the letter does not name the covenanters as the seditious spirits behind the attack on sovereignty, Napier predicted that peace would be the price they would be willing to pay in order to further their aims.[171]

Given Napier's extended service within the upper echelons of royal counsel and his influence amongst leading Scottish royalists, the letter is uniquely revealing. As David Stevenson has noted, the overtones of Jean Bodin's absolutist theory are inescapable within the letter.[172] Like Bodin, Napier advocated for strong monarchical rule, tempered but not restrained by fundamental laws and practices. Absolute loyalty and obedience to the monarch, even if a tyrant, were needed in order to suffocate the flames of dissent which ambitious nobles would fan with the speeches of misguided clergymen. For this reason, both Bodin and Napier advocated a strict separation of religion and politics. While the will of God could be misinterpreted by mortal churchmen, the rule of princes was, and always had been, God's creation and was therefore unquestionable, even if the prince's vices brought difficulties upon his kingdom.[173] At its heart, the ideology of the letter was a conservative defence of the status quo which depended upon the vindication of social hierarchy and its supposedly divinely ordained nature. These sentiments bore many of the same hallmarks as the works of the Marian writers, William Barclay and Adam Blackwood.[174] Writing in response to George Buchanan's *De Jure Regni apud Scotos* (1579), which aimed to justify the forced abdication of Mary I, Barclay and Blackwood accused the so-called monarchomachs of sacrilege and sedition against the law and will of God.[175] Of course, James VI & I had made no secret of his attraction to the concept of divine right, which may have influenced Napier as a younger man.[176] Moreover, James's condemnation of 'seditious preachers' whom he accused of spreading division and trying

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[171] ibid.
[172] Stevenson, 'The "Letter on Sovereign Power"', 38-43.
[173] Jean Bodin, *Bodin: On Sovereignty*, ed. Julian H. Franklin (Cambridge, 1992), 1-45 and 110-126; Stevenson, 'The "Letter on Sovereign Power"', 39-41.
[174] William Barclay, *De Regno et Regali Potestate Adversus Buchananum, Brutum, Boucherium, & Reliquos Monarchomachos* (Chaudière, 1600); Adam Blackwood, *Adversus Georgii Buchanani Dialogum De Jure Regni apud Scotos, Pro Regibus Apologia* (Poitiers, 1581).
[175] The monarchomachs were a group of reformed theologians who supported the position that popular resistance to a monarch was justified if that monarch had been deemed a tyrant, and therefore a danger to the welfare of the entire commonwealth. See Anonymous, *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos* (Basel, 1579); George Buchanan, 'De Jure Regni apud Scotos Dialogus (1579)', in Roger Mason and Martin S. Smith (eds), *George Buchanan's Law of Kingship: De Lure Regini Apud Scotos Dialogus* (Edinburgh, 2006).
[176] James VI & I, *Basilikon Doron* (Edinburgh, 1599); *The True Lawe of Free Monarchies: Or, The Reciprock and Mutuall Dutie Betwixt a Free King, and his Naturall Subiectes* (Edinburgh, 1598).

to ‘stir up rebellion under cloake of religion’ bears an uncanny resemblance to the brand of rhetoric employed by Napier and other royalists, suggesting that they was tapping into a pre-existing loyalist discourse which was wary of the subversive potential which religious protest could possess.[177]

More detail on Napier’s and Montrose’s ideology can be found in the *Remonstrance of Montrose* (1645). Written in the aftermath of the battle of Kilsyth (15 August) but never distributed, the remonstrance was intended to act as a public defence of Montrose’s conduct under the covenanting regime and his subsequent actions under the king’s banner. Written in Napier’s hand, but obviously a collaboration akin to the letter, the document possesses clear links to both the letter and to the Kilcumin Band. The remonstrance commenced with a denunciation of the covenanters’ ‘pretended General Assembly’ and ‘pretended Parliament’, a damning indictment of the fact that they had continued to meet between 1644 and 1645 without royal consent. These unauthorised meetings had, according to Napier and Montrose, been led by ‘the Brownistical faction’ and used to undertake ‘unlawful proceedings against us [royalists]’. This association of the covenanters with Brownists fits the transition within royalist rhetoric mentioned above, which moved away from likening the covenanters with papists and Jesuits, to equating them with schismatic reformed sectaries. The remonstrance sought to defend the royalists’ ‘just revolt from these Usurpers’ and vindicate it from the ‘false aspersions laid upon us’ which it claimed had misled the multitude against them.[178]

To this end, the remonstrance began its defence of Montrose with a venomous attack on the bishops. No doubt a product of Napier and Montrose’s own mistrust of prelates, the remonstrance lamented the ‘irreparable evil’ done by the bishops through their ‘perverse practices’ which ‘abused lawful authority’ through their usurpation of civil and ecclesiastical power.[179] By framing the Scottish bishops as evil councillors to the king, Napier and Montrose appealed to Scottish Presbyterians and exonerated Charles I from any blame over the mishandling of the question of worship. This stance can also explain the lack of vocal support for episcopacy within the oaths and declarations discussed above.

Support for the National Covenant was justified as the ‘safest and fairest way for preservation of Religion and Liberty’ in the face of the prelates’ misuses of authority,

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[177] This pre-existing loyalist discourse also discussed on p.157. *King James VI and I: Political Writing*, 71.
[178] Napier and Montrose’s use of the term revolt in reference to the royalist rising is surprising given the term’s seditious connotations. The authors explain that they see their actions as a ‘revolt from them’, i.e. the covenanting regime. *Memorials*, ii, 215-229, 222.
[179] ibid, 216-217.

again excusing the king from any wrongdoing by blaming his evil councillors. Alongside the bishops, the remonstrance attacked the duke of Hamilton and his use of the King's Covenant.[180] Here, in comparison to the letter, we can see Montrose's views as the remonstrance berated the divisive effect which the King's Covenant had on the people of Scotland, leaving them 'wrestling betwixt [the] extremities' of upholding the true faith or giving satisfaction to their king. This initial fracture between the king and the people allowed 'the prevailing faction' to abuse the National Covenant and wield it in their pursuit of their own ends, 'greatly to the prejudice to our reformed Religion, ruin of lawful authority, and liberty of the subject, contrary to our national Covenant'. By the time the Solemn League and Covenant was signed, the remonstrance explained that the people had become 'obliged to blind obedience, involving the subjects in perjury and disloyalty' and those who remained aware of the gross misconduct of the regime 'were either constrained to subscribe against our conscience – as many were constrained to do, for which God give them repentance – or otherwise to go to perpetual prison, or quit their country and estates'. The remonstrance argued that the aim of the royalists was the same as that of the National Covenant: to 'eschew the extremities, and keep the middle way of our reformed Religion' and ensure 'the maintenance of the King's honour and greatness'. However, due to the actions of the 'unnatural countrymen', the royalists were forced to resist the usurpers for 're-establishing of lawful authority'.[181]

In stark contrast to other royalist sources, the remonstrance discussed the implications of religion at great length. Presumably reflecting Montrose's influence more than Napier's, the remonstrance abandoned the philosophical approach of the letter, embracing the National Covenant and resolutely defining the true religion in accordance to it. However, this stance should not be misunderstood as the extreme Calvinism advocated by some leading covenanters. Testament to this is the remonstrance's defence of the Catholic troops under the command of Alistair MacColla. The remonstrance refuted the label of 'enemies to Religion' with which the covenanters had branded the royalists, and the Irish Brigade. While highlighting the covenanters' hypocrisy in the fact that the covenanting General Robert Monro had employed Catholic troops within his army in Ireland, the remonstrance argued that the religion of MacColla mattered less than the 'manifestation of his loyalty to his Prince and love to his native nation'. Moreover, the

[180] Montrose's long running personal vendetta against Hamilton is evidenced by the former's poem 'Some Lines on the Killing of the Earl of Newcastle's Son's Dog, by the Marquess Hamilton, in the Queen's Garden at York', in Robin Bell (ed.), *Civil Warrior* (Edinburgh, 2002), 32.
[181] *Memorials*, ii, 217-225.

remonstrance claimed that the royalists could not be considered traitors to God because ‘we stand and fall, by God’s assistance, for the reformed religion’. Neither could they be rebels, as they ‘go about his Majesty’s expedition, according to his express mandate’. The true traitors were those ‘deceiving the Country in making them believe that the religion is in hazard, when it is not’. It was this point which caused such bitter division between the royalists and covenanters. Like the Israelites, the remonstrance painted the royalists as God’s true servants, as only God’s support could empower ‘a handful to overthrow multitudes’ as it had the royalists.[182]

While acknowledging the more radical elements of the letter and remonstrance, both documents conform to the royalist ideological framework identified in the sections above. In both, the natural duty of subjects to their monarch is stressed. A return to dutiful obedience was heralded as the cure to most of the kingdom’s ills. Moreover, the justification and authority of the king’s cause is contrasted with the illegal and seditious designs of the covenanters who had poisoned the people against the king with false promises and fears. Central to both documents was the desire to see order returned and anarchy averted.

The extent to which the letter and the remonstrance better represent Montrose or Napier’s political stance matters less than the fact that such ideas were in circulation amongst the leading Scottish royalists. However, given Montrose’s influence in these documents, it is prudent to examine further the marquis’s own works. Alongside his official declarations, Montrose wrote several poems which commented on contemporary events. There is no evidence to suggest that Montrose ever disseminated his poetry; indeed, they seem to represent his personal reflections. Once the literary flair is peeled away from these verses, it is possible to appreciate the political rhetoric which Montrose expressed through this medium.

One such example is ‘My Dear and Only Love' (c.1644). Montrose composed this poem for his estranged wife, Magdelene, at around the same time as he received his marquessate and command in Scotland. Fearing that his wife had courted the covenanting authorities in his absence, the marquis began:

My dear and only love, I pray
This noble world of thee
Be governed by no other sway

[182] ibid, 215-229.

But purest monarchy.
For if confusion have a part,
Which virtous souls abhor,
And hold a Synod in thy heart,
I'll never love thee more.

The political overtones of Montrose's words are clear; he sought to discover whether his wife had remained loyal to him and their king, or whether she had turned her heart to the covenanting kirk. Montrose built upon this by comparing the regal power of his love for her with the 'Committees' which he feared had replaced him in her affections. To this end, Montrose begged his wife that she would not be blinded by their 'oaths' which like 'wild-fire love consume the shrine which I adore'.[183] The malicious conspiracies of the covenanting leaders are a recurring theme within the marquis's poetry. Within the aptly named 'On the Faithlessness and Venality of His Times' (c.1646), Montrose castigated those who 'prove merchants of their faith' and who are 'friends as shadows are ... they never proffer any help'.[184]

While in captivity following his defeat at Carbisdale, Montrose composed two of his most politically revealing poems. His 'On Natural Order' (1650) looked to the natural kingdom for reassurance of the divinely ordained order to life which underpinned royalist ideology:

Can little beasts with lions roar,
And little birds with eagles soar?
Can shallow streams command the seas,
And little ants the humming bees?
No, no, no, it is not meet
The head should stoop unto the feet.[185]

Through metaphor, Montrose expressed the same ideological points as the letter and remonstrance. The king was simply a greater being than mortal man and thus it was unnatural for subjects to equate themselves to him. As head of the body politic, the king should not be brought down to the same level as the rest of society, for it made a mockery of the structure which God had given to all life. Soon after writing 'On Natural Order', Montrose composed his last poem before his execution. His 'Metrical Prayer' (1650)

[183] Bell (ed), *Civil Warrior*, 54-60.
[184] ibid, 72-73.
[185] ibid, 91.

expressed a similar underlying confidence in God's support for the royalist cause despite his own impending death. Montrose declared that he did not fear death, stating that he was 'confident thou'lt [God] raise me with the just'.[186]

The third and final royalist writer discussed here is William Drummond of Hawthornden. As a member of the Drummond family, the writer held strong royalist credentials, being able to trace kinship to the royal Stuarts and the Drummond earldom of Perth. As a court poet, Drummond had accrued popularity under James VI and I, becoming a notable name from 1617. He retained favour under Charles I by composing a praise piece celebrating the king's royal entry into Edinburgh in 1633.[187] However, Drummond courted controversy in 1635 by committing to print a pamphlet in support of lord Balmerino, in his legal battle against accusations of treasonous libel for possessing a petition critical of the king.[188] By the time the troubles erupted in Scotland in 1637, Drummond had withdrawn from public life. It was during this time that he wrote two pamphlets and a poem in support of the king's struggle against the covenanters. While none of these works were ever printed during Drummond's lifetime, there is evidence which suggests that they were circulated within royalist circles in manuscript form.[189]

Written at the beginning of the covenanting rebellion, Drummond's *Irene* (1638) foreshadowed many of the ideological elements which featured in the works of Napier and Montrose. Drummond presented Charles I as the natural leader of the Scottish kingdom: 'that the people are as children and hee their father, they as a flocke hee their Pastour'. Like the letter, *Irene* maintained that 'the preservation of subjectes is the cheif and principall law of God and Nature imposed on Princes' and that the succession of the Scottish crown was the will of God, demonstrating the divine right of the monarch. Thus, 'sedition and Rebellion [is] no good service to a King'. Drummond argued that Charles I was not a 'conditionall Prince' but an 'absolute Souveraigne' who was 'lawfullye invested, anointed and crowned'. As such, it was not the place of subjects to usurp his right to rule; 'good Princes should be obeyed, yea, evill Princes should be tollerated'.

This standpoint left little sympathy for the covenanters' position. Drummond asked 'what conquest can a Subject make against his Souveraigne, where the warre is

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[186] ibid, 92.
[187] William Drummond, *Poems and Prose of William Drummond,* ed. Robert M. MacDonald (Edinburgh, 1976), 133-135.
[188] Michael R. G. Spiller, 'Drummond, William, of Hawthornden (1585–1649)', *ODNB* (2007).
[189] Montrose refers to Drummond's works being in manuscript circulation in his letters contained within *The Works of William, Drummond of Hawthornden: Consisting of them which were formerly printed, and those which were designed for the Press* (Edinburgh, 1711), 157-158.

insurrection, and the Victorie high treasone'? Like Napier, he warned of the total collapse of social hierarchy if the covenanters continued their illegal war against the king. By employing the unstable 'tempeste of Popularitie', the 'State-impostures, Usurperes and Tyrantes' were wielding powers outwith their control, inviting chaos upon the kingdom. In reference to these 'factious and mutinous Men', Drummond warned that 'the Sheepheard and the Butcher have both a care of Sheep, but their endes are farre different'. On this point he reminded his readers that, 'God onlie doth command what is good for you, God will not have anye naturall dutye broken amongst you'; and that 'Religion came not down from heaven, to banish the Virtyues found upon the earth, nor demolish the most admirable worke reasone hath produced and brought forth'. Embracing the common line of attack for royalists, Drummond condemned the 'rhethoricke under pretence of pietie and devotion' which the covenanters had used to 'persuade a populace to cast off that obedience they have sworne to their native Kinges'.[190] In Drummond's eyes, this course had no other outcome except 'undermining closelye the foundationes of States and removing those propes upon which Empyres and Governements stand'. In a plea for peace, he called upon Charles I to forgive his assailants and 'change their troubles in rest, their miseryes in prosperitie, their dissensiones in Concord and Peace'.[191] The similarities in thought between *Irene* and the works of Napier and Montrose suggest that all three were deeply influenced by the Marian and Jacobean loyalist discourse mentioned above. Indeed, many royalist nobles shared Drummond's distaste for the covenanters' misuse of religion and their attack on the order of society.

Following the general assembly's condemnation of the Cross Petition in 1643, Drummond once again took up the quill to voice his opposition to the covenanting regime. *Σkiamaxia* [Fighting Shadows] (1643) blamed the covenanting clergy for undermining the king's peace efforts and inciting war between Scotland and England. Drummond lambasted the 'preachers turning souldeurs' who heralded a time where 'everye thing turneth upside down; divisiones, discordes, tumultes not onlye arise and multiplye in kingdomes but in evrye cittye, nay allmost in evrye familye'. These growing tumults risked turning Scotland into Germany, and Drummond was quick to point out the warning which the Thirty Years War should have provided to the onlooking Scots. However, over-

[190] Drummond's distaste of the misuse of religious pretexts for political change can also be seen in his *A Speech on Toleration*, which was likely composed at some point during the 1630s. See Drummond, *Poems and Prose*, 174-178.
[191] ibid, 179-189; Roger Mason, 'Aristocracy, Episcopacy, and the Revolution of 1638' in Terry Brotherstone (ed), *Covenant, Charter and Party: Traditions of Revolt and Protest in Modern Scottish History* (Aberdeen, 1989), 16-17.

ambitious nobles, power-hungry clergymen and the misguided multitude risked bringing a new war to their own shores. Drummond singled out the covenanting kirk for most of his ire, attacking its assumption of power through the general assembly and its censorship of any who opposed them, especially in print. Understandably, as a writer Drummond took great exception to this, arguing that the kirk's 'power to publish declarationes and to suffer none to replye unto them and answer them is to deprive a commonwealth of her libertye'. In a remarkably modern turn of phrase, Drummond stated that 'libertye of life ceaseth when libertye of speech ceaseth'. He feared that this censorship was intended to silence any who doubted the intent of the Solemn League and Covenant or any who thought that 'this ayme and foundation neither agreeth with faith nor reasone, and if ye preach this doctrine to a good people, wee thinke that yee give them serpentes for fish and stones for bread'.[192]

War against the king and the invasion of England were denounced as the actions of Turks, not fellow Christians, as such a war could never be justified in the eyes of God or man. In contradiction to the absolutist sentiments of *Irene*, Drummond stated that if Charles I had been a tyrant, heretic or traitor, then war against him would have been justified, but since he had done nothing but 'laboured to maintaine the free Protestant relligion' and 'never wronged any man in his estate or persone' the kingdom owed him its loyalty and obedience. Like other royalists, Drummond refused to recognise the covenanters' religious concerns, but upbraided their unwillingness to acknowledge royalist fears over disorder, rebellion and dishonour. As such, Drummond railed against the labelling of the king's supporters as 'incendiarye and malignant', viewing it as slander against those who 'would reestablish the king in his throne and have justice executed upon rebelles'. Similarly, Drummond bemoaned the covenanters' 'vast arbitrarye power of taxing the poore people, spoyleing the country, [and] turning all upside down by new magistracyes and [i]novationes'. If this tide of dissidence could not be halted, he warned that it would 'rend whole kingdomes, distracte people, dissolve societyes, nourish faction and sedition, lay waste the most flourishing kingdomes and turne the richest cittyes to dust and rubbish'. Like a contagion, Drummond's depiction of sedition would reduce all in its path, proving his point that the only fruit born from rebellion was anarchy.[193]

Presumably written at the same time or shortly after *Σkiamaxia*, Drummond composed a satirical poem, 'A Character of the Anti-Covenanter, Or Malignant' (c.1643).

[192] Reid (ed), *The Party-Coloured Mind*, 80-89.
[193] ibid.

The poem furthered much of the rhetoric expressed within *Σkiamaxia*, lamenting that 'free Men would turne us slaves; / Who our Union doe defame / With Rebellions Wicked Name'. Drummond once again picked out the covenanting clergy for vitriolic chastisement. He condemned their threats of God's wrath and their claims that the king had strayed from the true faith, by which they poisoned the minds of the multitude and promoted unnatural rebellion. Such was the level of their sedition that 'Preachers ordinary Theme / Is 'gainst Monarchy to declaim'. Drummond also took time to criticise the 'Ambition of young Lords' and those who had turned from their king because 'hee would not make us Earles'. The corruption of the nobility and clergy had been manifested in this 'bare Rebellione' to which they had sworn the multitude through their covenants which promised that 'fighting is the way to Heaven'.[194]

Following the victory at Kilsyth, Montrose wrote to Drummond, offering his protection to the writer in payment for his previous loyalty to the crown. In response, Drummond informed the marquis that he had intended to publish his tracts against the covenanters 'for perswading his Majesty's Subjects to Obedience' but 'finding his Majesty's Authority so fearfully eclipsed, and the Stream of Rebellion swelled' to the point where 'honest Men, without Danger, dar'd hardly speak' he suppressed the papers for his own safety. However, knowing now that the 'Golden Age is returned, his Majesty's Crown re-established, [and] the many-headed Monster near quell'd' he vowed to return publicly to the king's service. Montrose was pleased to hear this and asked that *Irene* and 'some Pieces vindicating Monarchy from all Aspersions' be brought to him so that he could 'give Order for putting of them to the Press, to the Contentment of all his Majesty's good Subjects'.[195] The defeat at Philiphaugh put an end to such notions, but it is important to note that, had royalist control of Scotland been retained, it would have been Drummond's works that were used to embed royalist rule.

It is clear that ideological elements identified within the royalist oaths and declarations were mirrored in the works of Napier, Montrose and Drummond. While Montrose and Napier were central members of the so-called war party, Drummond's pacifism acts as a counterbalance, highlighting the significant overlap of ideological tenets expressed within these works. All three writers maintained the divine nature of kingship and the providence of natural order and social hierarchy. Moreover, all three agreed that the covenanting leaders were using the misguided beliefs of extremist preachers to blind

[194] Drummond, *Poems and Prose*, 136-140.
[195] *The Works of William Drummond*, 157-158.

and bind the people to a seditious plot against the king. If this was allowed to continue, all three warned that monarchical government would collapse, unleashing ruinous forces and anarchy upon the nation. While the likes of Napier, Montrose and Drummond were undoubtedly familiar with the works of British and European writers such as Bodin, Buchanan and Thomas Hobbes who had taken great pains to detail theoretical concepts of sovereignty and constitutional power, it is significant that royalists tended to avoid such complexities in favour of a more abstract argument.[196] This approach allowed them to sidestep the more difficult questions surrounding the nature of the king's powers while drawing upon traditional and conservative understandings of royal authority and societal hierarchy. The main differences among these works was their treatment of religion. While Drummond refused to admit that the true religion had ever been threatened, Montrose and latterly Napier accepted the legitimacy of the National Covenant due to the inherent danger posed by the Scottish episcopate. However, from 1640 onwards, they agreed with Drummond that religion was safe and that it was used as a vehicle for dissent and rebellion by the covenanters. While many royalists may not have possessed the same sophisticated understanding of sovereignty or the nature of kingship as Napier or Drummond, given the commonality of these findings with the material discussed elsewhere, it is reasonable to assume that many royalists shared these beliefs, especially those noble royalists who were undoubtedly exposed to them in meetings and discussions with their peers.

1.7 – Gaelic Vernacular Poetry

From conspiring in royalist plots to providing fighting men for Montrose's army, Gaelic-speaking Scots were an integral part of the royalist faction. However, few details have survived of how royalism was understood within the *Gàidhealtachd*, and fewer historians have sought them out. The following section analyses the vernacular poetry of John MacDonald (known as Iain Lom) and Hector Maclean (known as Eachann Bacach) to discern how the royalist cause was perceived by the clans loyal to Charles I and to what extent the ideological tenets identified above were shared or disputed. Through these poets it is possible to glean the motives and loyalties of Clan Donald and Clan Maclean, two of the most influential royalist clans during the civil wars, using these as a model for interpreting Gaelic royalism.

[196] Bodin, *Bodin: On Sovereignty*; Buchanan, 'De Jure Regni'; Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive* (Paris, 1642).

Previous scholarship on the motivations of the royalist clans has emphasised hatred for Clan Campbell and the marquis of Argyll. There was certainly a sense from lowland contemporaries that a shared enmity towards the Campbells could unite disaffected clans against the covenanting regime. Hamilton commented to the king in 1638 that if war erupted in Scotland, many of the western clans would flock to the king's banner, not out of love for the crown, but out of hatred to the Campbells.[197] Likewise, following the Solemn League and Covenant, Robert Baillie warned his cousin, William Spang, that if 'Colekittoch's sones [Alasdair MacColla, son of Colla Ciotach or 'Collkitto'] should waken our Isles; that McClaine [Sir Lachlan Maclean] and Gorrum [Sir Domhnall Gorm MacDonald of Sleat], and the other Clanes disaffected to the Campbells, should goe to armes ... so in a trace we should become a field of blood'.[198]

Gaelic evidence for this standpoint comes from Iain Lom's 'Là Inbhir Lochaidh [The Battle of Inverlochy]' (1645). Composed soon after the royalist victory, 'Là Inbhir Lochaidh' appears, at first, to confirm the argument that the royalist clans used the king's war as justification to enact revenge upon their traditional enemy. Iain Lom attributed the victory not to the king or the royalist army, but to Clan Donald, recounting with macabre pleasure the bloodletting that occurred on the banks of the river Lochy. The defeat of the 'Ghallaibh glasa [sallow-skinned Lowlanders]' (an intentional conflation of the Campbells with lowlanders) was retold in gory detail, revelling in how the surrounding landscape had been drenched with the blood of Campbells.[199] From even a cursory reading of the poem, the hatred towards the Campbells and the racial division between the so-called lowland army of the covenant and the Gaelic army of the MacDonalds is clear. The fact that the MacDonalds were only one contingent within the larger royalist army is never discussed, nor the fact that the Campbells who made up the majority of Argyll's forces would never have considered themselves lowlanders. Montrose, who commanded the royalist army at Inverlochy, is not mentioned at all. Instead, praise is piled at the feet of Alasdair MacColla and the men of Clan Donald. The only clear link to the wider events of the civil wars within the poem is a fleeting reference to the absence of the marquis of Huntly from the

[197] NRS, GD406/1/10775.
[198] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, ii, 74. Donald Gorm MacDonald of Sleat and the earl of Antrim, were made joint lieutenants of the Highlands and Islands by Charles I in 1639. Gorm MacDonald played a pivotal role in the construction of a coalition of clans which Antrim intended to bring to bear against the covenanters in the name of the king. The plan never materialised, and Gorm MacDonald's death in 1643 hampered Antrim's later attempts to resuscitate the coalition. Other members of this coalition were John MacLeod of Dunvegan, Lachlan MacLean of Duart, Seaforth, John Macdonald, Captain of Clanranald, Sir James Stewart Sheriff of Bute, Sir Archibald Stewart of Blackhall, and Sir James Lamont. See David Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters and Irish Confederates* (Belfast, 1981), 22-24 and 34-35; Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 65.
[199] *Orain Iain Luim*, 24-25.

field of battle: ‘leagadh leis Coileach Shrath Bhalgaidh [laid low the Cock of Strathbogie]’.[200] This refers to Huntly’s refusal to join the royalist army in 1645, although many of his Gordon kinsmen were present. However, even this is used to emphasise the martial prowess of the MacDonalds rather than make a statement of Huntly’s loyalty or agenda.

While the level of vitriol which Iain Lom aimed at the Campbells within ‘Là Inbhir Lochaidh’ is extreme, hatred of the Campbells is a recurring theme throughout his works and those of Eachann Bacach. In ‘Tilleadh Raghnaill Oig [The Return of Ranald Og]’ (1640), one of Iain Lom’s earliest works, the poet celebrated the return of the clan chief Ranald Og MacDonald of Keppoch and called upon him ‘A cheannsachadh nan Duibhneacha / Gur cuimhne leinn an dòibheairt [To subdue the Campbells, for well we remember their evil deeds]’.[201] Likewise, two of MacDonald’s poems from 1647, ‘Cumha Alasdair Mhic Cholla [A Lament for Alasdair MacColla]’ and Iorram Do Mhac Gille Eathain Dhùbhaird [An Oar-song to Maclean of Duart]’, idolised the deeds of MacColla and Sir Lachlan Maclean of Duart respectively during the 1644-1646 campaign, and the carnage they wrought ‘Gu dùthaich Mhic Cailein’ [to the lands of Argyll]. Neither poem contextualised these actions as part of the royalist war effort, instead focusing on the deeds of the clans and their leaders in traditional panegyric fashion. Similarly, Eachann Bacach’s ‘Is Beag Aobhar mo Shùgraidh [Little Cause have I for Mirth]’ (c.1645) basked in the destruction of the Campbell lands, maliciously quipping: ‘’S mi ri sealltainn Earra-ghàidheal / Is bàrr dearg air a h-aitribh [I am looking upon Argyll, its dwellings topped with red]’.[202] Alongside this anti-Campbell rhetoric, racial distinctions between the true Gaelic royalists and the lowland covenanters can also be found in both poets’ works. Both men portrayed their respective muses (MacColla and Maclean) in the classic Gaelic mould, as indefatigable warriors, leaders of their people and defenders of their clans. In contrast, ‘luchd Beurla [English/Scots-speakers]’ – a term used to describe their covenanting and Cromwellian adversaries – are often portrayed as treacherous, cowardly and inferior.[203]

The poetry of MacDonald and Maclean served two purposes. Firstly, it was used as a means of self-promotion, celebrating the heroic feats of the clan and weaving a cultural identity which clan members could claim as their own. Secondly, it was used to

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[200] ibid.
[201] ibid, 9.
[202] *Eachann Bacach*, 10-11.
[203] ibid, 12-13; *Orain Iain Luim*, 28-29. Similar sentiments in classical Gaelic are expressed in an anonymous contemporary praise piece of Alistair MacColla, where the ‘men of Alba’ are contrasted with the king’s army of Gaels, see William J. Watson, ‘Unpublished Gaelic Poetry – III’, *Scottish Gaelic Studies* 2 (1927), 75-91.

disseminate information and shape attitudes within and beyond the clan.[204] The glorification of the Gaels and celebration of the defeat of the Campbells largely served the first purpose. By painting the Campbells as lowlanders, the poets assimilated them with the lowland covenanting forces which the largely highland royalist army had been able to rout repeatedly. This enabled MacDonald and Maclean to belittle the Campbells' Gaelic credentials and reassert their own clans as leading powers within Gaeldom. Indeed, in 'A' Chnò Shamhna [The Halloween Nut]' (1649), Eachann Bacach equated the Campbells 'Do dh'fhearaibh Dhùn èideann [to men of Edinburgh]' who were to blame for all the kingdom's ills.[205] With this came assertions of the cultural and martial superiority of the Gaels over their lowland counterparts.

However, this ethnic distinction had its limits. In both poets' works from 1650 onwards, a patriotic call to arms in response to the Cromwellian incursions can be found, mirroring the sentiments expressed by lowland royalists at this time.[206] Iain Lom summarises this sentiment by equating the plight of the Scots to that of the Israelites under the rule of the Pharaoh; under English rule, both highlander and lowlander were known only as 'Seoc [Jock]'. Instead of reasserting his Gaelic identity, MacDonald called upon all Scots to unite behind the king and return him to his rightful place.[207] This was not a new reimaging of Scotto-Gaelic identity, but a continuation of deep-rooted societal beliefs whereby Gaels in Scotland were conscious of the differences between themselves and lowlanders, but equally aware that they shared a common king and kingdom.[208] Furthermore, the royalist clans were fully aware that any peace treaty which might see them prosper to the detriment of the Campbells required royal assent. Pure bloodlust and vengeance were worth little if it failed to readdress the balance of power. Even in 1647, following the king's disbandment of royalist forces, MacColla continued to use his commissioned title of 'Sergant Major Generall of his Majesties forces in the highlands of Scotland' and acted to 'conserve the advancement of his Ma[jest]ies service'.[209] MacDonald and Maclean's audiences would have been very conscious of the war raging around them and on which side they were on. Thus, the priority of these poets was the

[204] Coira, *By Poetic Authority*, 42-44.
[205] *Eachann Bacach*, 20-21.
[206] ibid, 44-47; *Orain Iain Luim*, 56-59.
[207] *Orain Iain Luim*, 56-57.
[208] Coira, *By Poetic Authority*, 3; Alexander Grant, 'Aspects of National Consciousness in Medieval Scotland' in Claus Bjorn, Alexander Grant and Keith (eds), *Nations, Nationalism and Patriotism in the European Past* (Copenhagen, 1994), 76-77.
[209] NRS, PA7/23/2/49.

celebration of their clans' contributions to that war, not to elaborate the political discourse which underpinned their royalism.

Yet, closer examination of MacDonald's and Maclean's works sheds light on the interconnectedness of Gaelic identity and Scottish royalism. Loyalty, honour and reputation were all valued virtues within Gaelic poetry.[210] These intertwined with obedience to the Stuart monarch, who ruled as the chiefs' overlord, bestowing titles, rights and privileges upon the chiefs who were tenants-in-chief of the crown. In 'Tilleadh Raghnaill Oig', MacDonald measured Ronald Og's success as a leader by the recognition he had received from the king, stating: 'Tha comharra bhith dìleas ort- / Gun tug an Rìgh dhuit stòras [You bear the credentials of your loyalty (as) the king has given you a bounty]'.[211] As the royalist military campaign of 1644-1646 built momentum, both MacDonald and Maclean came to measure the integrity of their clans and their chiefs by their service to the royalist army. Eachann Bacach recorded how both Lachlan and his brother, Hector Maclean, had won great honour for themselves and their men during the victories over the covenanters.[212] Similarly, in 'A' Chnò Shamhna', Maclean recalled with pride that it had been in Lachlan Maclean's home that the royalist nobles had met and 'Thug iad gealladh d'a chèile / Bhith ro-cheart aig Rìgh Sheurlas 's do'n chòir [promised each other to uphold King Charles and the right]'.[213]

Many of Iain Lom's poems praised not only the MacDonalds, but other leaders within the royalist army. Montrose, who had been excluded from 'Là Inbhir Lochaidh', was the focus of two poems. MacDonald praised Montrose for his heroism and fortitude in leading the royalist clans to victory, describing him as 'An leòmhann fearail treubhach [a heroic valiant lion]'. In contrast to Montrose's bravery, Neil Macleod of Assynt, who betrayed and captured Montrose in 1650, was vilified for his treachery, with MacDonald stating that only Assynt's death could be any conciliation for the damage he had caused through his disloyalty.[214] Despite his belittling of Huntly in 'Là Inbhir Lochaidh', MacDonald latterly praised him as a steadfast ally within the king's army, no doubt in recognition of Huntly's decision to join Montrose in the field during 1646. In 'Cumha

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[210] Indeed, these values were also celebrated within covenanting Gaelic poems: Fionnghal Maclean 'Turas mo chreiche thug mu Chola' (1645), in *Gair Nan Clarsach - The Harps' Cry: Anthology of 17th Century Gaelic Poetry*, ed. Colm Ó Baoill and Meg Bateman (Edinburgh, 1994), 106-117. Also see Allan I. Macinnes, 'Scottish Gaeldom, 1638-1651: The Vernacular Response to the Covenanting Dynamic' in John Dwyer, Roger Mason and Alexander Murdoch (eds) *New Perspectives on the politics and culture of Early Modern Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1982), 59-94.
[211] *Orain Iain Luim*, 8-9.
[212] *Eachann Bacach*, 14-15, 26-27 and 38-39.
[213] ibid, 18-19.
[214] *Orain Iain Luim*, 58-59.

Morair Hunndaidh [A Lament for the Marquis of Huntly]' (1649), MacDonald used Huntly's execution to exemplify his complete commitment to the king's cause, even after his lands had been ravaged and seized by Argyll.[215] When speaking of Montrose and Huntly, MacDonald emphasised their Gaelic identities. Of Huntly, MacDonald claimed that he was 'Ceann-uidhe nan Gàidheal [the goal of all highlanders]', while he often referred to Montrose as *An Ghràmach* [Graham], accentuating the marquis's role as a clan chief.[216] Given the fact that both men were very much lowland Scots courtiers, MacDonald was purposefully revising the royalist nobles in the Gaelic mould for his audience, amalgamating traditional Gaelic motifs with the political overtones of loyalty to the crown, creating new literary heroes in the process. Maclean and MacDonald's praise of fellow royalists was not limited to those in command. In 'Iorram Do Mhac Gille Eathain Dhùbhaird [An Oar-song to Maclean of Duart]' (1651), MacDonald recognised the sacrifice which the Macleans had endured in siding with 'faction an Rìgh [the king's faction]'.[217] Similarly, in 'Soraidh Do'n Ghràmach [A Song of Greeting to Montrose]' (1647), MacDonald listed the royalist clans who had answered Montrose's call to arms. The Macleans, men of Atholl, Clan Chattan, Lamonts, MacLachlans, Stewarts, Macnabs and various branches of the MacDonalds were all singled out for praise.[218]

Within Maclean and MacDonald's poetry, the root of Gaelic loyalty to the crown emanated from a cultural commitment to the defence of hereditary patriarchal hierarchy. This is most clearly explained in Iain Lom's 'Murt Na Ceapaich [The Keppoch Murder]' (1663). In 1663, Alexander MacDonald of Keppoch and his brother, Randal, were murdered by rival claimants to the chieftainship. Horrified by such a betrayal, Iain Lom denounced the murderers' actions as unnatural and abhorrent. Such was the depravity of the murders that MacDonald declared that 'Is gnè Thurcach gun bhàidh sibh / Ach nach d'àicheidh sibh Crìosd [You resemble merciless Turks except that you have not denied Christ]'. Not only was the murder of the clan chief unchristian, it was destabilising, with MacDonald noting that 'Tha sinne corrach as t'aonais / Mar cholainn sgoilte o'n cheann [we are unbalanced without you, like a body separated from the head]'. Furthermore, an attack on the head of the clan was an attack on the will of God who, in his wisdom, had placed the chief at the clan's helm. To avoid invoking God's wrath for such a violation of his will and to repair the honour of the clan, MacDonald demanded that they seek

[215] ibid, 48-51.
[216] ibid, 28-29 and 44-45.
[217] ibid, 68-69.
[218] ibid, 30-31.

immediate vengeance: ‘Tha lagh Dhia agus dhaoine / Ag òrdach’ sgriosadh gun ghrab / Air marbhaich’ an uachdrain / Rìgh, ceann teaghlaich no treab [Human and divine law demands unconditional annihilation of one who murders a superior, a king, the head of a household or clan]’.[219]

While ‘Murt Na Ceapaich’ dates to the Restoration, the same sentiments can be identified in the contemporary works of Maclean and MacDonald. In ‘A’ Chnò Shamhna’ (1649), Eachann Bacach lamented that both his chief (Lachlan Maclean) and his king had been killed in their prime, leaving him to walk alone without guidance.[220] Similarly, MacDonald scolded the young Charles II in ‘Cumha Morair Hunndaidh’ for failing to act quickly enough to avenge his father in the aftermath of Charles I’s execution.[221] MacDonald chastised the new king’s indolence in dealing with those who had conspired to murder his father, reminding him that:

Gur mòr an trian sluaigh dhuit
A bhith ‘n uachdar na còrach,
Gu t’athair a dhìoghailt
Air na h-eucoraich dheòmhnaidh
Ach ma dh’fhaireas iad faoin thu,
Blas gaoith’ air do chòmhradh,
Na biodh do chlaidheamh bog staoine
An truaill chaoin air a h-òradh

[The fact that yours is the true and just cause is worth to you fully as much as the third of an army, to avenge your father upon the devilish evil-doers. But if they should sense that you are vain and find your conversation savouring of frivolity, let not your sword of soft tin be in a smooth gilded sheath].

MacDonald reminded him of the sacrifice his loyal subjects had made ‘Mu sheasamh a' chrùin duit Bha de dhùthchas aig t’aiteam [for the crown which hereditarily belonged to your race]’. If Charles II did not rise to the occasion, MacDonald warned that the covenanters would succeed and set aside his crown.[222]

Despite MacDonald’s agitation at the inaction of Charles II, the poet had always expressed a belief in the providential nature of the royalist cause. In ‘Soraidh Do’n Ghràmach’ (1647), MacDonald marked Montrose as a champion of the king’s cause who

[219] ibid, 82-93.
[220] *Eachann Bacach*, 18-19.
[221] Similar frustration towards the Engagers is palpable in the anonymous ‘An Cobhernandori’ (c.1647). See Allan I. Macinnes, ‘The First Scottish Tories?’, *The Scottish Historical Review* 67 (1988), 56-66.
[222] *Orain Iain Luim*, 48-55.

was destined to lead the royalist army to victory. For MacDonald, the evidence of God's favour was clear in Montrose's victories, remarking that 'Dia dùileach tha làidir: Tha dàil ri bhith 'n uachdar [God the Creator is strong: there is a tryst with victory]'.[223] Long after the royalists had lost such favour on the battlefield, MacDonald remained adamant that 'Tha an roth ri tighinn timcheall [the wheel (of fortune) is turning]'. In 'Cumha Morair Hunndaidh', MacDonald proclaimed that 'Làmh Dhia leinn [God's right hand be with us]' against 'na Banndairibh bréige / Chuir an eucoir an cleachdadh [the lying covenanters who made a practice of injustice]'. MacDonald demonstrated his confidence in the inevitability of a royalist victory in his repeated referencing of a prophecy by Thomas the Rhymer (a prophetic folk figure), in which Montrose was destined to conquer Scotland for the king. In this prophecy, Montrose was said to land on the coast of Ireland with 'fichead long sgòdach 'S buill chòrcaich mar shrèin orr' / Le'm brataichibh sròil Agus òrdugh Rìgh Seurlas [three score rigged ships and hempen ropes as reins upon them, with banners of satin and with King Charles' command]', which he would use to rally the king's loyal servants to his standard. Then, like Moses, 'A Làmh a sgaoileas gach tonn duinn, Cuir dhuinn Crombal a stalcadh [Thou whose hand disperses the wave for us, grant us to trample upon Cromwell]'.[224] While the fickleness of fate prevented an outright royalist victory, MacDonald's faith was rewarded upon the Restoration. To mark the occasion, he composed a celebratory poem, 'Crùnadh An Dara Rìgh Teàrlach [The Crowning of King Charles II]' (1660). MacDonald rejoiced 'Gun do thionnadaidh a' chuibhle mar b' àill leinn [that the wheel (of fortune) has turned propitiously for us]' and that the nation was at peace ''S thu thighinn dhachaidh gu d' rìoghachd / Mar a b'oil led' luchd mìoruin / An coinne ri mìle ceud fàilte [Since you have returned to your kingdom, to the chagrin of your enemies, to be greeted by a hundred thousand welcomes]'. While MacDonald was clearly overjoyed at the king's return, he was also eager to remind him that justice needed to be dealt to the 'mèirlich [thieves]' who had stolen his throne and killed his loyal servants. To this end, MacDonald advised the king to execute Argyll and banish his followers from this new paradise, as God had exiled Lucifer, condemning them to walk the earth as outcasts for their crimes.[225]

The overlap between the royalist beliefs expressed by MacDonald and Maclean with the principles of the royalist documents discussed above are clear. MacDonald and Maclean both expressed reverence for loyalty to the crown and veneration for hereditary

[223] ibid, 30-31.
[224] ibid, 52-55.
[225] ibid, 76-81.

hierarchy. As such, the king was recognised as the head of state to whom loyalty and obedience was owed. MacDonald held a similar stance to Napier, arguing that God had selected the king to rule, as a chief was chosen to lead a clan. Disruption of this divine compact was an abomination, defying both human and divine justice. Nevertheless, due to the divine nature of kingship, a royalist victory was inevitable. The shared hatred of the Campbells was undoubtedly a significant motivating factor underpinning royalism in Gaeldom. The Campbells, first under the cloak of royal authority during the Jacobean period, and then again under the guise of the covenanting regime, had been able to use their prominence to secure lands and power at the expense of neighbouring clans. However, the Campbells had also latterly turned their back on the king by supporting the covenanting rebellion. In doing so, they had usurped royal authority and subverted the natural order.[226] The moral outrage of this, coupled with the legacy of Campbell hegemony over the MacDonalds and Macleans, created a potent cocktail of loyalties. The royalist cause was able to tap into recent wrongs done to the Macdonald and Maclean clans, and many others, and call upon the cultural values that made them receptive to such a cause.

1.8 – Conclusion

What is most striking about the sources discussed in this chapter is the consistency of core elements of royalist ideology across time, genres and languages. These consistencies suggest that the royalist nobility from across Scotland, who were behind these sources, shared the same three fundamental beliefs: that the covenanters' (and later Cromwellians') actions were in breach of human and divine law; that obedience and loyalty was owed to the crown, by the king's subjects; and that the continued assault upon the foundations of social hierarchy risked fracturing the kingdom and unleashing anarchy and strife. While trigger events, such as the invasion of England in 1640, the Solemn League and Covenant in 1643, and the Engagement in 1647, all caused a readjustment of royalist policy and shifted the emphasis of the royalist message, the fundamentals of that message remained the same.

The civil wars were, in many ways, a conflict over the soul of the kingdom, with both sides acutely aware of the need to influence and control the hearts and minds of the populace. In this pursuit, royalists repeatedly tried to paint themselves as politically and religiously moderate, as the defenders of the traditional structures of society. In contrast,

[226] MacGregor, 'Civilising Gaelic Scotland', 44-45.

the covenanters were often portrayed as unnatural, seditious, devious and dangerous. Scottish national identity and consciousness had long been tied to the twin foundations of the crown and the kirk. [227] By damning the covenanters' misuse of religion and attacks on the monarchy, royalists hoped to appeal to the conservatism of Scottish society by depicting the covenanters as extremists and enemies of stability.

There is an almost complete dearth of Episcopalian rhetoric in the sources discussed in this chapter. This confirms the arguments of Robertson that, on the whole, royalist nobles in Scotland showed little enthusiasm for the episcopate. Instead, royalists interpreted the covenanters' attacks on Episcopacy as an assault upon the king's prerogative. The covenanters' refusal to accept Charles's concessions in 1638 and 1639 were seen to confirm royalist fears that political motives were at the heart of the covenanters' ambitions. Thus began a battle for the mantle of true defender of the reformed religion. Royalist oaths, declarations and literature were almost unanimous in asserting, that they stood for the defence of true Protestantism in the face of the covenanters' (and English parliamentarians') extremism. If anything, the sources discussed above show a close alignment to moderate Calvinism. Catholicism (until 1644) and radical Protestant sects were used to highlight the dangers of religious extremism and strife, which royalists hoped would convince others to seek out the middle ground, an area which the royalists claimed to represent. After condemning the National Covenant as seditious between 1638 and 1640, from 1641 royalist nobles increasingly recognised the legitimacy of the covenant following its authorisation by Charles I. It has been suggested above that this helps to explain the lack of pro-Episcopalian royalist rhetoric, as royalists were bound to accept the will of the crown. The sacrificial lamb of the episcopate also enabled royalist nobles like Montrose and Napier to exonerate Charles I from any religious wrongdoing while maintaining his royal authority. This in turn explains why royalists were so quick to point out that it was the covenanters who broke their word with the king in 1643, through the Solemn League and Covenant, confirming their fears that religious pretexts were being used to pursue the erosion of monarchical authority. While this might be a by-product of the growing influence of former covenanters within the royalist nobility, namely Montrose, the fact that early royalists like Aboyne, Crawford and Spottiswoode saw no problem in putting their names to documents in support of accepting the intentions of the National

[227] Michael Lynch, 'A Nation Born Again? Scottish Identity in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', in Dauvit Broun, R. J. Finlay and Michael Lynch (eds), *Image and Identity: The Making and Re-Making of Scotland Through the Ages* (Edinburgh,1998), 82-104.

Covenant underlines the fact that royalists viewed the war as being waged for the crown, not the kirk.

The themes of royalist allegiance identified above overlap with themes identified within the historiography on English and Irish royalism. This suggests that royalists across the British Isles shared some common values and outlooks, especially their conceptualisation of societal order and harmony. While this may superficially seem to confirm the arguments of Edward Cowan and John Morrill that royalism was inherently 'British', the nuances of Scottish royalism, particularly its religious ambiguity and focus on the Scottish crown, warn against any attempt to equate Scottish royalism with that of England or Ireland.[228] While Scottish royalists saw the rebels in England and Ireland as enemies of the crown, their struggle was principally against the covenanters and while they sought the defeat of all rebels, their priority was the restoration of royal power and the ancient Stuart monarchy in Scotland.

[228] Edward Cowan, 'The Solemn League and Covenant', 197; John Morill, 'The English Revolution in British and Irish Context', 568.

Chapter 2 - Royalism and the Clergy

'No man can doe dewtie to god, who rendereth not dewtifull obedience to his king.'

Principal John Strang's arguments against the National Covenant, 1638.[1]

2.1 Introduction

In October 1638, following the publication of the King's Covenant in September, Principal John Strang of the University of Glasgow wrote a detailed rebuttal of the National Covenant and the actions of the covenanters. Strang was alarmed at the divisions which the covenant had caused, especially within the clergy. In his manuscript tract, *The Principal of Glasgow Against the Covenant* (1638), Strang warned that the 'lamentable division of this church' was 'opening a door for the papistes, living amoug us to escaip ther censour'. He called for the ministry to come together under the King's Covenant, to unite the kirk with the king once more and present a united front against the true enemy – popery.[2] However, the 1638 general assembly, which sat in Glasgow from 21 November to 20 December, decisively put an end to any notion of reconciliation within the kirk, formally abjuring episcopacy, abolishing the Five Articles of Perth and enacting legislation which enabled the covenanting leadership to prosecute nonconforming ministers.[3] As a result, the kirk underwent its most severe purge since the Reformation, with at least 222 ministers deposed between November 1638 and October 1651. As explained below, fresh analysis reveals 130 depositions (59%) included accusations of nonconformity, contumacy (refusal of the authority of the general assembly) or royalist allegiance.[4]

Strang's tract and these depositions suggest that there was a significant element within the Scottish clergy which opposed the covenanting regime. This chapter will explore royalist allegiance within the kirk, focusing on the ways in which ministers resisted the covenanting state and the reasons behind their disaffection. After outlining the surrounding scholarship and the methodology employed throughout the chapter, discussion is separated into three sections. Firstly, the nature of royalist resistance within the clergy

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[1] NLS, Wodrow. Fol MSS. Folio. XXXI, no.2, f.21r.
[2] ibid, 23; Cipriano, 'The Scottish Universities and Opposition to the National Covenant, 1638', 25-29.
[3] *Records of the Kirk of Scotland: Containing the Acts and Proceedings of the General Assemblies, from the year 1638 downwards, as authenticated by the clerks of assembly*, ed. Alexander Peterkin (Edinburgh, 1838), 28-32.
[4] These figures come from a systematic examination of Hew Scott's *Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae* (1915-1928). See Appendix 1. Elements of this analysis covering the chronology of 1638 to 1641 can be found in Andrew Lind, 'Royalism, Resistance and the Scottish Clergy, 1638-1641', in Chris R. Langley (ed), *The National Covenant in Scotland, 1638-1689* (Woodbridge, 2020), 125-144.

will be examined. Discussion will concentrate on the ways royalist clergymen enacted resistance and how royalist allegiance survived in a church which, from late 1638, actively sought to repress any and all opponents of the covenanting regime. The role played by ministers' congregations, and their complicity in supporting or resisting their minister's royalism will also be investigated. Secondly, the scale of royalist allegiance within the kirk will be considered, with reference to the role played by ministers' localities and how this affected the geographical reach of royalism in Scotland. Thirdly, royalist clerical literature will be analysed to identify the reasons behind clergymen's royalism, which will provide an important comparator to the conclusions from the previous chapter. This approach will provide the most comprehensive investigation of the Scottish royalist clergy to date, and strengthen this thesis' analysis of Scottish royalism's ideology, development and appeal.

2.2 Scholarship

Despite the central role which the clergy played during the civil wars, relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to the royalist ministry in Scotland. The traditional view of clerical opposition to covenanting rule was best expressed in 1913 by James Hewison: 'here and there throughout Scotland were to be found little islands of nonconformity, small oases in the great expanse of uniformity'. These little islands were believed to be populated by 'sparse gatherings of staunch Episcopalians adhering to their uncovenanted priests and professors'.[5] This notion was reinforced and expanded upon in the 1960s by Gordon Donaldson's 'conservative north' theory, which argued that the north of Scotland (particularly the north-east) was a bastion of political and religious conservatism which naturally baulked at the National Covenant.[6] Donaldson contended that resistance to the National Covenant was firmly Episcopalian, and primarily led by the Scottish bishops, university theologians and devout nobles, such as the marquis of Huntly.[7] Following the Glasgow Assembly, Donaldson argued royalist resistance within the clergy was largely spent. Leaderless and powerless against the covenanting administration, ministers were forced to choose between conformity or deposition.[8] While elements of Donaldson's argument have been criticised in recent years for failing to account for the

[5] Hewison, *The Covenanters*, i, 274. See also David Matthew, *Scotland Under Charles I* (London, 1955), 127 and 247.
[6] Gordon Donaldson, 'Scotland's Conservative North in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 16 (1966), 65; Gordon Donaldson, *Scottish Church History* (Edinburgh, 1985), 191-203.
[7] Donaldson, *Scotland: James V – James VII*, 319-326.
[8] ibid, 326.

complexities of religious and regional identity, the core concept that clerical resistance to the covenant was geographically restricted to the north and deeply Episcopalian, if not crypto-Catholic, has remained largely undisturbed.[9]

This is partially the result of the disproportionate attention which the Aberdeen Doctors have attracted within the historiography. The Aberdeen Doctors were a group of university academics and parish ministers from Aberdeenshire, predominantly based within King's and Marischal Colleges, Aberdeen. They were: William Leslie, Principal of King's College; John Forbes of Corse, Professor of Divinity, King's College; Robert Baron, Professor of Divinity, Marischal College; Alexander Scrogie, minister of St Machars' Church (Presbytery of Aberdeen); Alexander Ross, minister of North Church (Aberdeen); James Sibbald, minister of St Nicholas' Church (Aberdeen), and William Guild, minister of East Church (Aberdeen).[10] As support for the covenant grew, the Doctors vocally opposed what they saw as a dangerous interpretation of the 1581 King's Confession, the 1618 Five Articles of Perth and Episcopalianism in general. The Doctors believed that the covenanters' blatant disregard for the king and the kirk's hierarchy threatened to unleash the plagues of rebellion and anarchy upon the kingdom.[11] Over the summer of 1638, they mounted a public defence of Charles I and the episcopate across two printed pamphlets which sought to discredit the covenanters' authority and question their true intentions.[12] Ultimately, the Doctors' resistance was undermined by the collapse of royal authority at the Glasgow Assembly which allowed the covenanters to pursue them through the kirk's courts, from which only William Guild escaped without being deposed.[13]

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[9] Burgess, *British Political Thought*, 205. For scholarship which challenges the conservative north theory, see Gordon DesBrisay, 'Authority and Discipline in Aberdeen, 1650-1700' (PhD thesis, University of St Andrews, 1989); Miles Kerr-Peterson, 'Politics and Protestant Lordship in North East Scotland' (PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 2016); Catherine Elizabeth McMillan, 'Keeping the Kirk: The Practice and Experience of Faith in North East Scotland, 1560-1610' (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2016); Robertson, 'The Covenanting North of Scotland, 1638-1647', 24-51.

[10] From this point onwards, for each minister mentioned, the presbytery in which their charge was situated is given in brackets. William Guild defected to the covenanting faction following the publication of the Doctors' first printed defence. See p.121.

[11] David George Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism, 1590-1638* (Oxford, 2000), 314-315.

[12] *Generall Demands, Concerning the Late Covenant, Together with the Answers of those Reverend Brethren to the Sayd Demands: As also the Replyes of the foresayd ministers and professors to their Answers* (Aberdeen, 1638); *The Second Answers of Some Brethren of the Ministrie to the Replies of the Ministers and Professours of Divinitie in Aberdene, Concerning the Late Covenant. Also, Duplies* (London, 1638). For the theological context of this debate, see John D. Ford, 'The Lawful Bonds of Scottish Society: the Five Articles of Perth, the Negative Confession and the National Covenant', *The Historical Journal* 37 (1994), 45-64.

[13] Leslie, Forbes, Scrogie, Baron and Sibbald were all deposed between 1639 and 1640. Alexander Ross died in 1639, before he could be brought before a court.

Much of the literature surrounding the Aberdeen Doctors has focused on their theological position, especially their belief in Protestant concord.[14] Of the scholarly work which discusses the Doctors within the context of the civil wars, much of it depicts the Doctors as products of their conservative northerly environment and largely out of touch with many of their colleagues in the kirk. David Stewart has argued that, despite their celebrity, the Doctors failed to unify an oppositional party within the kirk as they were 'isolated by the whole climate of the north east' which resulted in their short-lived opposition forming 'little more than an interesting side-show'.[15] While Allan Macinnes has recognised that the Doctors gave the royalist cause 'intellectual credibility', he too has argued that they 'lacked the political will either to lead or contribute to an episcopal counter-attack'.[16] Similar sentiments have been expressed by scholars such as David Mullan, who noted that the Doctors offered the only real defence of episcopacy against the covenanters, while the rest of the clergy appeared largely ambivalent.[17]

Salvatore Cipriano has recently questioned this interpretation. Through a thorough examination of the actions and accounts of intellectuals within the other Scottish universities (Edinburgh, Glasgow and St Andrews) during 1638, Cipriano has argued that there was 'extensive, if *ad hoc*, opposition to the Covenant among Scotland's professoriate'.[18] While anti-covenanting academics at the University of Edinburgh were dealt with swiftly by the city's pro-covenanting burgh council, Cipriano has noted the continued resistance of royalist intellectuals in Aberdeen, St Andrews and Glasgow. These opponents of the covenant, Cipriano argued, agreed that the National Covenant and the actions of the covenanters were illegal; shared a clear belief in the divine nature of kingship, and disagreed with the covenanters' definition of the 'true religion', instead, promoting Protestant concord in the face of any potential Catholic resurgence.[19] This made

[14] A. C. Delinger, '"Men of Gallio's Naughty Faith?": The Aberdeen Doctors on reformed and Lutheran Concord', *Church History and Religious Culture*, 92 (2012), 57-83; Donald Macmillan, *The Aberdeen Doctors* (London, 1909); Russell Newton, 'United Opposition? The Aberdeen Doctors and the National Covenant', in Langley (ed), *The National Covenant*, 53-70; Steven J. Reid, 'Reformed scholasticism, proto-empiricism and the intellectual "Long Reformation" in Scotland: the philosophy of the "Aberdeen Doctors", c.1619-c.1641, in John McCallum (ed), *Scotland's Long Reformation: New Perspectives on Scottish religion, c.1500-c.1600* (Leiden, 2016), 149-178.
[15] David Stewart, 'The "Aberdeen Doctors" and the covenanters', *Records of the Scottish Church History Society* 22 (1986), 40-43.
[16] Macinnes, *Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement*, 185.
[17] David George Mullan, *Episcopacy in Scotland: The History of an Idea, 1560-1638* (Edinburgh, 1986), 185. Also see G. D. Henderson, *The Burning Bush: Studies in Scottish Church History* (Edinburgh, 1957), 75-93; Hewison, *The Covenanters*, i, 276-279; James D. Ogilvie, *The Aberdeen Doctors and The National Covenant* (Edinburgh, 1921).
[18] Cipriano, 'The Scottish Universities and Opposition to the National Covenant, 1638', 15.
[19] Salvatore Cipriano, *Seminaries of Identity: The Universities of Scotland and Ireland in the Age of British Revolution* (PhD thesis, Fordham University, 2018), 75-80.

the universities 'bastions of Episcopalian royalism'.[20] However, like David Stewart, Cipriano noted the failure of royalist intellectuals to construct a unified opposition as their ultimate undoing.[21]

Traditionally, the eagerness of the Scottish clergy to accept the National Covenant has been traced to the festering of relations between the crown and the kirk in the wake of the Five Articles of Perth (1618), which David Mullan described as an 'unbridgeable rift'.[22] The articles had been imposed upon the Scottish kirk by James VI & I, via his bishops, with the goal of bringing the churches of Scotland and England into closer alignment.[23] The articles established private communion, private baptism, episcopal confirmation, the observance of holy days and the practice of kneeling at communion. However, there was substantial resistance to the articles within the clergy and the wider lay community, especially to kneeling at communion which was seen as ceremonial backsliding. Edinburgh quickly emerged as a centre of resistance, while the north-east experienced little to no dissent.[24] James pressured the kirk, through the bishops, to enforce observance of the articles, which resulted in at least 43 ministers being called before the Episcopalian court of high commission between 1618 and 1625, with more than 30 ministers warded, suspended or deposed.[25] While it should be noted that there were many parishes where observance of the articles went unopposed, the articles remained contentious within the clergy and laity throughout the 1620s and 1630s. Laura Stewart has argued convincingly that 'unity rather than conformity was the watchword' within many presbyteries, allowing ministers and their parishioners to resist the articles as long as they did not draw attention to themselves. This, she suggests, produced 'relatively elastic interpretations of correct observance at all levels of the ecclesiastical hierarchy'. Indeed, Stewart argues that the reason Edinburgh became the focal point of anti-articles resistance

[20] Cipriano, 'The Scottish Universities and Opposition to the National Covenant', 37.
[21] ibid.
[22] Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 62-66. It should be noted that Maurice Lee, Conrad Russell and Jenny Wormald have all argued that resistance to the articles produced short-term issues which were resolved by the time civil war erupted in 1638. See Maurice Lee Jr., *The Road to Revolution: Scotland under Charles I, 1625-37* (Chicago, 1985), 4; Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies*, 34; Jenny Wormald, *Court, Kirk, and Community: Scotland, 1470-1625* (London, 1981), 129.
[23] Jenny Wormald, 'James VI and I: Two Kings or One?', *History* 68 (1983), 196.
[24] Alan R. MacDonald, *The Jacobean Kirk, 1567-1625: Sovereignty, Polity and Liturgy* (Aldershot, 1998), 167; Laura A. M. Stewart, '"Brothers in treuth": propaganda, public opinion and the Perth article debate' in Ralph Houlbrooke (ed), *James VI and I: Ideas, Authority and Government* (Aldershot, 2006), 151-168.
[25] ibid, 164-165; Laura A. M. Stewart, 'The Political Repercussions of the Five Articles of Perth: A Reassessment of James VI and I's Religious Policies in Scotland', *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 38 (2007), 1029-1030.

was because the urban setting facilitated co-operation between disenchanted local elites, ministers and parishioners.[26]

While parallels have been drawn between anti-articles resistance and the origins of the covenanting movement in 1637 and 1638, they can also be seen in resistance to the covenant. David Stevenson's analysis of clerical depositions under the covenanters between 1638 and 1651 has suggested that there was a far greater level of resistance within the clergy towards the covenanting regime than there was towards the Articles of Perth. Stevenson estimated that there were at least 236 depositions between 1638 and 1651.[27] While he warned that deposition could not be automatically taken as evidence of factional persecution, Stevenson did note the prevalence of accusations of royalism within records of deposition.[28] By mapping out the number and locations of depositions, Stevenson identified two distinct phases. The first, between 1638 and 1640, marked the covenanters' attempts to assert their control over the kirk and purge any potentially disruptive elements.[29] The second phase took place after the Engagement when the covenanting leadership became increasingly concerned about the purity of the kirk and the true loyalties of the clergy, resulting in the deposition of any clergymen who had shown sympathy to the king's cause or had given any reason for the kirk to doubt their politics, morality or doctrine.[30] While Stevenson conceded that these findings were not necessarily surprising, the geographical distribution of these depositions was unexpected. Contrary to the historiography's focus on the north-east, Stevenson found that the majority occurred in southern areas where support for the covenant was strongest, with Edinburgh standing out as a centre of purging, particularly during the first few years of covenanting rule. Purging did occur in the north, but the extent and severity was noticeably less than those in the south. Stevenson suggested that this was the result of the popularity of Episcopalianism in the north which granted a level of immunity to nonconformist ministers, as the covenanting authorities largely relied upon local compliance in order to pursue their opponents within the kirk's courts, much like the situation described by Stewart in relation to the enforcement of the Articles of Perth.[31] However, the fact that so many ministers were pursued by the covenanters in the south suggests that clerical royalism was not limited to the traditionally royalist regions of the north.

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[26] Stewart, 'The Political Repercussions of the Five Articles of Perth', 1021 and 1029-1031.
[27] Stevenson, 'Deposition of Ministers', 321-335.
[28] ibid, 325.
[29] ibid, 326.
[30] ibid, 330-332.
[31] ibid, 333.

This complex picture of clerical resistance to the covenant is further supported by regional and localised studies. James Bulloch's studies of East Lothian (1960) and Berwickshire (1962-64) highlighted the prevalence of clerical depositions during the covenanting period within these areas.[32] Bulloch believed that opposition to 'the covenanting theocracy' grew in these regions from 1638 onwards until matters came to a head during the Engagement.[33] Meanwhile, Allan Kennedy's study of the northern highlands under the covenanters suggested that while there was significant royalist support within the region's parishes, the covenanters' employment of parishes and presbyteries as units of administration and discipline meant that this sentiment was supressed, usually forced to lie dormant while half-hearted obedience was given.[34] Laura Stewart has suggested that even the act of signing or swearing the covenant varied from place to place, and importantly, person to person. She has argued that while 'for some people, taking the covenant was a profoundly moving and memorable experience', 'it must simultaneously have placed others under considerable emotional and psychological strain'.[35] Similarly, Chris Langley has stressed how varied the experience of the civil wars was throughout Scotland's parishes. In *Worship, Civil War and Community, 1638-1660* (2016), Langley highlighted local battles over the authority of the pulpit which took place across the kingdom. As the covenanters sought to mobilise and galvanise support, parish ministers took on extra significance, embodying many communities' only source of information and guidance as to the conflict which was raging around them.[36] These findings ask fundamental questions of our understanding of royalism and have clear implications for assessments of the extent of royalist support both within the clergy and within Scotland's parishes. How widespread was royalist ideology within the Scottish clergy as a whole? If clerical resistance was present outwith the traditional royalist hotbeds of the north-east, how did it manifest itself and how far did it spread? Perhaps most important of all, what happened to those clergymen who opposed the covenant, especially in the aftermath of the covenanters' seizure of power in 1639? These questions also challenge the notion of near universal acceptance of the covenanting regime by both the ministry and the laity in the

[32] James Bulloch, 'Conformists and Nonconformists', *Transactions of the East Lothian Antiquarian and Field Naturalists Society* 8 (1960), 70-84; James Bulloch, 'Ecclesiastical Intolerance in Seventeenth Century Berwickshire', *History of the Berwickshire Naturalists' Club* 36 (1962-1964), 148-155.
[33] Bulloch, 'Conformists and Nonconformists', 74.
[34] Allan Kennedy, ''A Heavy Yock Uppon Their Necks': Covenanting Government in the Northern Highlands, 1638-1651', *Journal of Scottish Historical Studies* 30 (2010), 103-105.
[35] Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution*, 111-112.
[36] Langley, *Worship, Civil War and Community*, 65-82. On the covenanters' attempts to harness an English 'public', see Waurechen, 'Covenanter Propaganda and Conceptualizations of the Public', 63-86.

south, a concept which has already been questioned in recent times by Langley, Stewart and Jamie McDougall.[37]

These developments mirror avenues of research taken within the English historiography, where there has been a growing emphasis placed upon the experience of political and religious change at grassroots level, placing parish ministers and their ideological and theological beliefs centre stage. Barbara Donagan has used the sermons and accounts of English ministers to identify the distinct political ideologies which divided parliamentarian and royalist ministers. Royalists, Donagan argues, defended absolute obedience to the king, with their sermons often stressing personal loyalty, the protection of social hierarchy and the dangers of lawlessness and disorder.[38] However, informed by his survey of persecuted 'scandalous' and 'malignant' parish clergy during the English Civil Wars, Ian Green has contended that labelling these ministers as royalists, Laudians or loyalist Episcopalians, hides the heterogeneous nature of the body of clergymen who were pursued by the parliamentarian faction.[39] Green's research has suggested that it was primarily local feuds and animosities, not politics or religion, which resulted in hundreds of parish clergy being removed from office by the English parliament. According to Green, parishioners were primarily concerned with local issues which directly affected them. This was exacerbated by the fact that from 1644 the deprivations of parish clergy were commonly overseen by secular parliamentarian committees composed of local members of the gentry. [40] Yet, Fiona McCall's study of the records for the parliamentary committee for Leicestershire (formed in September 1643) has produced an alternative explanation. McCall agreed with Green that the disruption of the civil wars facilitated the removal of clergymen for historical grievances. However, McCall pointed to the prevalence and detail of accusations of royalist support and sympathy among Leicestershire clergymen to argue that the political allegiances of parish ministers were often the source of local conflict.[41] McCall attributed this to the fact that Leicestershire was an active theatre of war, where 'parishioners pushed clergy to commit' and 'rival armies tried to force allegiance'.[42]

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[37] Langley, *Worship, Civil War and Community*, 175-177; McDougall, 'Covenants and Covenanters', 35-70; Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution*, 107-109.
[38] Barbara Donagan, 'Did Ministers Matter? War and Religion in England, 1642-1649', *Journal of British Studies* 33 (1994), 144-146.
[39] The term 'malignant' meant the same in both the Scottish and English contexts, identifying someone who opposed parliament. Due to the term's politically charged nature, it was often used as a slur for royalists. See Ian Green, 'The Persecution of 'Scandalous' and 'Malignant' Parish Clergy during the English Civil War', *English Historical Review* 94 (1979), 512-513.
[40] ibid, 520-524.
[41] Fiona McCall, 'Scandalous and Malignant? Settling Scores Against the Leicestershire Clergy After the First Civil War', *Midland History* 40 (2015), 220-242.
[42] ibid, 237.

While there were significant differences between the contexts of the civil wars in Scotland and England, and the institutions of the English and Scottish churches (most important being the limited state interference within the Scottish presbyteries and synods), these studies show the value in examining clerical allegiance. Local studies and examples from the English historiography demonstrate the insights which can be gleaned from an examination of local records, personal accounts and official documents. There is an urgent need for a reassessment of both the scale and nature of royalism within the Scottish clergy. This chapter seeks to rectify this and question the assumption that royalism within the Scottish clergy was limited and regionalised.

2.3 Methods and Sources

To answer this chapter's research questions, it is necessary to identify ministers who showed evidence of royalist allegiance, examine their local circumstances, accounts of their royalism, and record their cases with the objective of creating a national map of royalist clerical resistance. Due to the difficulty in identifying royalist ministers within the historical record given the lack of personal documents such as diaries, the principal method of data collection to be employed is a survey of ministers removed, deprived or deposed from their charges by the covenanting kirk, based upon a thorough examination of kirk session, presbytery, synod and general assembly records.

Before going further, it is useful to briefly discuss the various church courts' mechanisms and jurisdictions. The kirk's courts formed the backbone of Scottish Presbyterianism, consisting of a hierarchy of ecclesiastical jurisdictions which covered parish level life to national policy making. At the parish level was the kirk session, chaired by the local minister and attended by church elders. The kirk sessions were primarily charged with monitoring and policing the discipline of the parish's congregation. Each kirk session was meant to send a representative (usually the minister) to the region's presbytery court. Each presbytery oversaw the parishes within its geographical jurisdiction, dealing with more serious matters of discipline and the area's administration. In turn, each presbytery was required to send representatives to the region's provincial synod and the national general assembly. The synod courts met a few times a year and usually dealt with the most serious issues, being directly answerable to the general assembly. The assembly was the most senior court within the Scottish kirk, acting as a final court of appeal and made decisions on kirk policy which would impact the entire kingdom. While the assembly had been neglected and repressed under both James VI and Charles I, under the

covenanters the assembly met each year to coordinate the ministry and enact church legislation. While the assembly did not have a fixed seat, during the 1640s it usually met in Edinburgh but occasionally moved to Aberdeen or St Andrews. Before disbanding at the end of a meeting, the assembly often created judicial commissions which were authorised to act in the assembly's name between formal sittings. These commissions often took a keen interest in the area where the general assembly had last sat, examining local ministers' diligence and observing that area's kirks and presbyteries.[43]

Presbyteries, synods and the general assembly oversaw the deposition of ministers. If accused of wrongdoing by a member of their congregation or by a fellow member of the clergy, the accused minister was required to appear before the court which had received the accusation to answer the allegations against him. After evidence for and against had been heard, the court could declare the minister innocent, find the evidence insufficient, leading to a not proven verdict, or find the minister guilty. After a guilty verdict, the court was given leave to enact a suitable punishment in line with the acts of the general assembly. When reprimanding ministers, the kirk possessed two main means of punishment. The least serious of the two was suspension, where a minister was temporarily barred from performing his duties and collecting his stipend. The second, more serious punishment was deprivation or deposition, which were both used to describe the ejection of a minister from their charge. Unless accompanied by excommunication, the minister remained a member of the church, but was forbidden from performing ministerial duties unless reinstated by the kirk.[44] While the general procedure of deposition and censure was largely uniform across the kingdom, the courts were granted a level of independence when conducting depositions and hearing cases. This led to some courts being more stringent than others.[45] Once deposed, ministers were barred from collecting their stipends and were ordered to forfeit any other benefits of their position, including accommodation. There remained hope for deposed ministers who sought reconciliation, as they could petition the courts to repone (restore) them. Reponement was normally reliant upon the minister publicly confessing his guilt and performing some form of penance. If reponed, the minister was usually readmitted to his former charge if it was still vacant. If the charge had been occupied in his

[43] Laurence A. B. Whitley, *A Great Grievance: Ecclesiastical Lay Patronage in Scotland until 1750* (Eugene, 2013), xi.
[44] At the 1638 general assembly, Alexander Henderson laid out the kirk's powers of censure as 'suspension, deprivation, [and] deposition'. He explained these as: 'suspension for a tyme from exercising the function of the Ministrie; deprivation and deposition we take to be ane, because, when he is depryved of his benefice, so of his office'. From this point onwards, unless specifically discussed, the term deposition is used for all cases where a minister was removed, deprived or deposed from their charge. See *Records of the Kirk*, 38 and 160.
[45] This point is discussed further in Section 2.5.

absence, the minister was free to seek out another charge. However, as punishment was enforced primarily by the presbyteries, some ministers appear to have taken advantage of presbyterial inaction. For example, James Merison, minister of Evie and Rendall (Kirkwall), was deposed in 1644 but continued to preach and collect his stipend until he was reponed in 1646.[46]

As the covenanters were intent on pursuing dissenting clergymen through the ecclesiastical courts, court records contain the richest collection of information on the actions and motivations of royalist ministers. The primary means of identifying royalist ministers was through a complete survey of Hew Scott's *Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae* (1915-23). The *Fasti* is an edited list of all known Scottish ministers and the parishes they occupied from the Reformation to the twentieth century, with some biographical information on each of the ministers from surviving church records and printed material. Surveying the *Fasti* enabled the identification of 222 ministers who were deposed under the covenanters from November 1638 to October 1651 – see Appendix 1.[47] These depositions were recorded and those which contained accusations of royalism, malignancy, Episcopalianism, Arminianism (Dutch reformed theology which was often used as a byword for religious backsliding by Presbyterians) or contumacy were investigated further via surviving synod, presbytery and kirk session records. This holistic approach ensured that the details of individual cases were considered alongside the larger national context.

Only 3-5% of kirk session records and 17-25% of presbytery records survive from the period 1638-1651.[48] Of those that survive, their conditions vary, and some contain chronological gaps. To corroborate the surviving material and fill in some of these gaps, several supplementary sources were drawn upon. The *Fasti* itself contains numerous useful biographical facts, while Alexander Peterkin's printed *Records of the Kirk of Scotland* (1838) provides details from the records of the general assembly.[49] The published letters of Robert Baillie provide valuable information on disaffected ministers and their motives.[50] Alongside this, manuscript material (predominantly personal correspondence) within the

[46] *Fasti*, vii, 215.
[47] David Stevenson recorded 236 depositions between 1638 and 1651. As Stevenson did not include a breakdown of his findings, it is difficult to pinpoint the reason for the discrepancy between our figures. One possibility is that Stevenson included suspensions within his total. I recorded 16 suspensions in this period but did not combine them with formal depositions. If these sums are combined the total is 238, which is comparable with Stevenson's 236. Both sets of figures exclude the deposition of the 14 bishops in 1638, although both include John Guthrie, Bishop of Moray's deposition from his ministerial charge in Elgin in 1639. See Stevenson, 'Deposition of Ministers', 321-323.
[48] McDougall, 'Covenants and Covenanters', 32.
[49] *Records of the Kirk*.
[50] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*.

National Records of Scotland and the National Library of Scotland's Wodrow collection supply fruitful information on the motives of royalist ministers and the individuals with whom they communicated.[51]

By definition, this approach can only identify ministers caught by the covenanting authorities. There could have been more ministers who opposed the covenanters but avoided being reprimanded, like many of the clergymen who refused to observe the Articles of Perth. The general assembly was certainly worried enough about these 'secret dissaffecters' to pass legislation in 1644 which aimed to encourage ministers and elders to report any disaffected persons or risk having their 'diligence' called into question.[52] In some cases, this research will show that some ministers were able to quietly resist the covenanters for years before being brought before a visiting commission, and there were undoubtedly other cases which have not survived within the existing records. Nevertheless, given the extended period during which Scotland was under covenanting rule, it must be assumed that the most vocal royalists within the clergy were identified and brought before the kirk's courts.

In order to provide the fullest and most accurate examination of royalist ministers within the Scottish kirk under the covenanters, both a qualitative and quantitative approach have been taken. A qualitative analysis of deposition records facilitated an examination of the ways in which royalist ministers could resist covenanting rule and the reasons why they did so. A quantitative approach was appropriate for assessing the scale and scope of royalist clerical resistance. Depositions were recorded within a database (Appendix 1), with the details of the minister, parish, presbytery and reason for deposition all being noted. The use of these approaches ensured that local events, such as a royalist minister being deposed, could be placed within their local and national contexts. This in turn allowed for discussions of individuals' actions and how they compared to examples from across the country. This prosopographical approach captured qualitative data on each case within a national database which allowed quantitative tallies and percentages to be calculated.[53] This database also enabled a map of royalist clerical resistance to be created and provided invaluable information on the nature and scale of royalism within the clergy.

Since most of the surviving information pertaining to royalism within the ministry comes from covenanter sources, especially evidence from the kirk's courts, the nature of

[51] Primarily: NLS, Wodrow MSS; Wodrow Folio; NRS, GD220; GD406.
[52] *Records of the Kirk*, 398.
[53] Koenraad Verboven, Myriam Carlier and Jan Dumolyn, *A Short Manual to the Art of Prosopography* (Oxford, 2007), 36-69.

this material has been carefully considered. Much of the evidence presented here was never intended to be used as an accurate representation of royalist ideology or resistance. There is also the risk that material from court proceedings against ministers accused of royalism was exaggerated or even falsified due to the political nature of the offence. Many records of the deposition of ministers accused of royalism were accompanied by accusations of immorality and insufficiency. For instance, William Maxwell, minister of Dunbar (Dunbar), was deposed in January 1639 for 'erroneous doctrine, meddling with the poor's box, tyrannical behaviour to his parishioners, in urging their conformity to the Articles of Perth, declining both the Assembly and Presb[tery], and appealing to His Majesty'.[54] Similar cases have been noted within the scholarship on the clergy during the English Civil War, where accusations of malignancy were often 'tacked on' to other accusations.[55] Due to the lack of corroborating evidence, it is impossible to say for certain that every minister deposed for royalism was a committed supporter of the king; nor is it possible to be certain that depositions for moral offences (such as adultery) were not used as means of pursuing royalist ministers. However, due to the kirk's insistence that sufficient evidence should always be brought before the courts in such proceedings, it is likely that these cases represent the exception, rather than the rule.[56] For example, Robert Baillie noted in 1643 that David Mernes, a minister from the presbytery of St Andrews, had been justly deposed for insufficiency, 'bot a number of other things were put in his sentence, which all were found to be null'.[57] As this case shows, the kirk's courts were not simply kangaroo courts; they took evidence seriously and accusations were regularly disproven if insufficient evidence was presented. While it is certainly possible that parishioners used accusations of royalism to settle old scores with their ministers, without evidence to suggest otherwise we must assume that the accusations were genuine or risk discounting all depositions.

2.4 Royalism, Resistance and Secret Disaffection

This section explores the ways in which royalist ministers resisted the covenanting regime and how that resistance changed over the period 1638-1651. Particular attention will be paid to whether resistance came in phases, as Stevenson has suggested. By conducting this analysis, it is also possible to assess the impact that ministerial resistance had within localities. Indeed, through the accounts of the clergy, grassroots reactions to the conflict

[54] *Fasti*, i, 407.
[55] Green, 'The Persecution of 'Scandalous' and 'Malignant'', 512-513.
[56] Walter R. Foster, *The Church before the Covenants: The Church of Scotland, 1596-1638* (Edinburgh, 1975), 95-100.
[57] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 53.

can be gleaned and the power dynamics of local politics, including the influence of local elites upon individuals' allegiance, can be uncovered.

From the moment the National Covenant was first signed, a civil war erupted within the Scottish kirk. While the covenant was welcomed by many clergymen, it was simultaneously met by others with anger and dread. As the king and his advisors flailed helplessly at the political situation unfolding in front of their eyes, the king's supporters within the clergy were thrust onto the front lines. Immediately after the first signing of the National Covenant at Greyfriars in Edinburgh, the newly formed covenanters mobilised their supporters to oversee a national subscription campaign with the goal of unifying political and religious opposition to Charles I. For those who supported the king, the most obvious means of resistance was to refuse the covenant. However, the success of ministers' defiance was usually dependent on the situation within their parishes and presbyteries. When called upon to swear the covenant and oversee its subscription, John Michaelson, minister of Burntisland (Kirkcaldy), flatly refused. Michaelson refuted the central tenets of the covenanters' message and defended the episcopate and the practice of the 1618 Five Articles of Perth as legal and orthodox. In response to calls from some of his parishioners and colleagues within the presbytery to allow the covenant's subscription, even if he continued to refuse to sign himself, Michaelson attacked the legitimacy of the covenant, publicly denouncing it as a 'blak covenant' and accusing all that signed of 'taking the crowne aff the kings ma[jes]ties head'.[58] His steadfastness drew the ire of covenanting supporters on the local burgh council who began to look for ways to circumnavigate the minister and ensure his parishioners were given the opportunity to subscribe. After six weeks of tense negotiations with Michaelson, the burgh council invited the neighbouring minister of Leslie, John Smith, to the parish to oversee the subscription of the covenant. Michaelson's relationship with his congregation remained fraught until he was finally deposed by the general assembly in February 1639.[59]

Similar events transpired in the presbytery of Lanark. The presbytery had received supplications against the Book of Common Prayer and Canons by 8 February 1638. When a motion supporting the national supplication against the Prayer Book and Canons was brought before the presbytery, the moderator, John Lindsay, minister of Carluke, opposed

[58] NRS, CH2/224/1, 253; McDougall, *Covenants and Covenanters*, 53; Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution*, 103-107.
[59] NRS, CH2/523/1, 149-151; Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution*, 103-106 and 109-110.

it.[60] When it became clear that supporters of the supplication held a majority within the presbytery, Lindsay stormed out of the meeting, allowing his opponents to unseat him as moderator and elect someone more favourable to their position.[61] The situation deteriorated further when news of the signing of the covenant reached Lanark. The presbytery ordered that all kirks within its jurisdiction carry out subscriptions. However, by the end of March, three parishes (Douglas, Carmichael and Carstairs) had not overseen subscriptions. The ministers of all three parishes were questioned by the presbytery as to the reason for their delay. James Douglas, minister of Douglas, claimed on 20 May that he had never seen nor heard of the covenant, having been in the north for family business, and requested that he be given time to consult the document before authorising its subscription.[62] The presbytery granted Douglas an extension, but called upon a further two ministers and two elders (Robert Lindsay, minister of Crawfordjohn; John Wilson, minister of Crawford; George Burnet, and John Currie) to explain why they had not signed the covenant when their congregations had.[63] If they refused to attend the next meeting they were to be considered in contempt and liable to censure.[64] By August, despite Douglas's continued delays, subscriptions had been collected in each of Lanark's parishes. A special commission from the Tables (the covenanting shadow government which served as the heart of the covenanted state until the covenanters' seizure of power in 1639), under the leadership of David Calderwood, had been sent to oversee the subscriptions in Douglas.[65] However, it is clear from the presbytery records that several ministers continued to refuse the covenant and publicly question its legitimacy. On 30 August, Robert Nairn, minister of Carmichael, one of the parishes which had initially resisted subscription, was sent to Edinburgh to stand before the ministry there. While Nairn was in Edinburgh his parish was declared vacant by the presbytery, citing a complaint which alleged that he had not 'behaved himself lyke a minister of the Gospell'.[66] Almost simultaneously, John Lindsay, the former moderator, was condemned for his contempt towards the presbytery and in September it was ruled that the court had 'sufficient ground by the lawes of this Kirk and Kingdome to proceed against

[60] Despite the commotion caused by the supplications, there is no record of the presbytery sending a supplication to the privy council. The *Register of the Privy Council* records that six burghs, five presbyteries and 33 parishes submitted supplications against the Prayer Book. See *RPCS*, vi, 699-716.
[61] NRS, CH2/234/1, 116-117.
[62] ibid, 118.
[63] It is unclear which parishes Burnet and Currie came from.
[64] NRS, CH2/234/1, 119. All four were reported to have subsequently signed the covenant, although Burnet and Currie did not sign until September 1638.
[65] Created by the original supplicants in 1637, the Tables was composed of four elected committees representing the nobility, the clergy, the gentry and the burghs, which were overseen by a fifth executive committee. The Tables was superseded by the Committee of Estates in 1639. See Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 76 and 176-177.
[66] ibid, 122.

the said Mr Jhone'.[67] Meanwhile, James Douglas continued to refuse the covenant, stating on 31 August that his refusal was due to 'the fear he had of the Marquees of Douglas'.[68] The presbytery ordered that he immediately sign the covenant 'to give them [his congregation] gude example' or be punished for his contempt.[69] On 25 September, the marquis of Hamilton tried, unsuccessfully, to mediate in the presbytery, offering to speak with John Lindsay and Robert Hamilton regarding what the presbytery termed their 'pretended fears'.[70] Six ministers and one temporary preacher continued to refuse the covenant, resulting in all seven of them being deposed between 1638 and 1640, leaving six of Lanark's 11 parishes vacant. [71] While their refusal to subscribe was the primary charge laid against them, accusations of irregular 'doctrine, discipline and conversation' also featured in their depositions.[72] The presbytery records show that James Douglas signed the King's Covenant, which he used as another excuse to avoid subscribing the National Covenant; John Lindsay delayed his own deposition by claiming 'infirmitie', and Robert Hamilton was accused of maintaining the Laudian doctrine of 'universall redemption and that infantis once baptisid ar undoubtedlie saved'.[73]

The level of conflict within the presbytery of Lanark and the parish of Burntisland was facilitated by the presence of both covenanting and royalist support as political tensions escalated between 1638 and 1640. Elsewhere, royalists and covenanters could continue to cohabit until the issue of allegiance was thrust upon them. For instance, William Clogie, minister of the first charge of Inverness, and Alexander Fraser, minister of Petty, were noted to have refused the covenant in April 1638 when local covenanters tried to collect subscriptions in Inverness-shire. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, they did so alongside several burgesses and local gentlemen who defended their decision to refuse as 'their toune lay invyroned amidst the Hielands, and named the Laird of Graunt and McIntosh, who had not subscryit; notwithstanding, they wold not be a hinderer to any of

[67] ibid, 124.
[68] William Douglas, Marquis of Douglas, gained the reputation of an eager royalist for his support of the king during the Bishops' Wars (1639-1640). Following the king's defeat, Douglas conformed to the covenanting regime but came out in support of Montrose's rising in 1645. As an open Catholic and head of Clan Douglas, he was an influential and divisive figure. See p.46.
[69] NRS, CH2/234/1, 122 and 126.
[70] ibid, 127.
[71] The preacher, Alexander Forbes, was sent to Carluke to assume the responsibilities of John Lindsay in 1638. However, the presbytery removed Forbes from his post following his continued refusal to subscribe the covenant and for arguing with members of his congregation. See ibid, 156.
[72] ibid, 129-138; *Fasti*, iii, 284, 287, 289, 292, 300, 313.
[73] NRS, CH2/234/1, 130 and 137.

the toune that wer willing to goe on'.[74] This stance allowed Clogie to refuse the covenant until 1640, when the pro-covenanting provost of Inverness, John Ross, petitioned the local presbytery to make an example of the minister for his refusal to swear the covenant.[75] Clogie's refusal to subscribe even in 1640 suggests that his decision was more personal than his original declaration had implied.

A similar series of events occurred in the presbytery of Haddington, where John Trotter, minister of Dirleton, was called before the court to answer several allegations. Trotter had been accused by a group of parishioners of unlawfully gaining admittance to the parish, improperly administering the sacraments, breaking the sabbath, defending the Book of Common Prayer, being 'infected' with Arminianism and 'publiklie traduced the subscriving of the covenant with the odious imputation of rebellion'.[76] Trotter denied any wrongdoing, arguing that his doctrine was lawful and that he had never publicly denounced the covenant. The presbytery ruled that the accusations against Trotter were 'not sufficiently qualified', and given that Trotter had subscribed the covenant, they rejected the allegation that he had publicly denounced it.[77] However, in January 1639, Trotter's disaffected parishioners, supported by local members of the gentry, took the matter to the general assembly which ruled against Trotter, using his supposed unlawful admittance to the parish to remove him from his position and declare the parish vacant.[78] In both examples, the presbytery was compelled by an external force to enact a deposition it was initially unwilling to authorise. The developing political situation in the aftermath of the Glasgow Assembly undoubtedly facilitated such lay interventions.

Clerical resistance was not limited to a refusal of the covenant, especially before December 1638, when subscribing the covenant did not explicitly imply a condemnation of episcopacy. After the covenanters met fierce resistance in Aberdeenshire during the summer of 1638, a handful of ministers were permitted by the covenanting leaders to sign the covenant with reservations, which created a middle ground between covenanting and royalist positions. These reservations allowed individuals to sign the covenant while declaring their ultimate loyalty to Charles I and directing their subscription against religious innovation, not the bishops.[79] The most detailed example of this which survives is

[74] John Leslie, *A Relation of Proceedings Concerning the Affairs of the Kirk of Scotland, from August 1637 to July 1638* (Edinburgh, 1830), 98 and 104-107. For discussion of Inverness in this period, see Chapter 3, Section 3.6.
[75] HAC, CH2/553/1, 69-70.
[76] NRS, CH2/185/4, 111-112.
[77] ibid, 113-114.
[78] ibid, 124-125.
[79] Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 87.

that of William Guild, minister of the second charge of Aberdeen. Guild was a chaplain of Charles I and a member of the Aberdeen Doctors, but was convinced to sign the National Covenant in the summer of 1638 along with another minister, Robert Reid of Banchory-Ternan, with three 'limitations':

> That we acknowledge not, nor yet condemn, the Articles of Perth, to be unlawful or heads of Popery, but only promise (for the peace of the church, and other reasons) to forbear the practice thereof for a time. Secondly, That we condemn not episcopal government, secluding the personal abuse thereof. Thirdly, That we still retain, and shall retain, all loyal and dutiful subjection and obedience, unto our dread Sovereign the King's Majesty.[80]

By agreeing to forsake the observation of the Articles of Perth, Guild and Reid could safeguard their doctrinal position and their loyalty to Charles I. For these ministers, the preservation of peace and loyalty to the crown were of paramount importance. This remarkable agreement shows the middle ground on which moderate covenanters and royalists could parley. However, this practice was exceptional, with only a handful of occurrences noted, all seemingly authorised by the covenanting commission sent to Aberdeen in July 1638.[81] As the political situation developed in the months after Guild's signing of the covenant, his limitations were considered totally incompatible with the acts passed by the Glasgow Assembly, especially the addition of the anti-episcopal Glasgow Declaration.[82] Guild fled to Holland in 1639 when asked to re-sign the covenant without limitations but returned soon after to take up the position of rector in King's College, Aberdeen, at which point he subscribed the covenant in full.[83]

While covenanters could put pressure on royalist ministers in 1638, without support from a presbytery or synod, royalists were normally able to frustrate attempts to remove or silence them. However, a number of royalist accounts convey a shared fear that the covenanters were gaining the upper hand. David Mitchell, minister of the Old Kirk (Edinburgh), wrote to John Leslie, Bishop of Raphoe, in March 1638, lamenting the 'pitifull plunge this Church and Kingdome is in'. He recounted to Raphoe how he had been threatened by men with swords and branded a 'Papist villaine' for rejecting the covenant. According to Mitchell, 'the true Pastors are brought in to Edbr. [Edinburgh], to cry out against vs wolves'. Mitchell also recalled how those who resisted the covenant were tarred as 'papists and adversaries', and that the covenanters declared that 'they are neither good Christians nor good subjects that do not subscribe'. He noted how the covenanters

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[80] James Shirrefs, *An Inquiry into the life, writings, and character, of the reverend doctor William Guild, one of the chaplains in ordinary to his majesty king Charles I; and founder of the Trinity Hospital, Aberdeen* (Aberdeen, 1798), 58-59.
[81] Cowan, *Montrose,* 55; *Extracts*, 128-130; Spalding, *Memorialls*, i, 94.
[82] *Records of the Kirk*, 166-168.
[83] Spalding, *Memorialls*, i, 94; R. P. Wells, 'Guild, William (1586–1657)', *ODNB* (2004).

safeguarded their power through parliament and the kirk's courts, as 'They sit daylie and make new lawes … They depose Moderators of Presbyteries, and chuse new'. Ominously, Mitchell concluded that 'when all s[h]all be discharged, Service Booke, Canons, and High Commission, they will not rest there: there is some other designe in their heads' and that 'nothing [is] expected here but civill warre'.[84] Tensions were particularly apartment in Edinburgh in 1638. David Munro, minister of Kilconquher (St Andrews), was pelted with stones when he visited the capital after word had spread through the city that he had been sent by the bishops to spy on the covenanters.[85] According to the Aberdeen Doctors in their *Generall Demands* (1638), similar incidents occurred across the kingdom. They bemoaned that loyal ministers were 'forced to flee to foraigne countrys, for fear of their lives' and that in some areas they 'scarcely appear in the high wayes, or streets; and are threatened'. They accused the covenanters of spreading division between ministers and their flocks, so much so that royalist clergy were 'hated, maligned, and traduced as enemies of the truth, only because our consciences do not suffer us to subscribe' the National Covenant.[86] Exaggerated or not, these claims show how important the battle for hearts and minds was. In places like Edinburgh, royalists lost that fight. However, it should be remembered that in other areas it was the covenanters, not the royalists, who found themselves in the minority. When William Sanders, minister of Bellie (Strathbogie) attempted to collect signatures for the covenant during a service, he was confronted by an armed contingent within his congregation who barred him from occupying the pulpit until the marquis of Huntly was in attendance to oversee the service.[87]

The clearest expression of anti-covenanting resistance was for ministers and their congregations to sign the King's Covenant, as it gave ministers an authorised means of refuting covenanting demands. During the autumn of 1638, extensive subscription campaigns for the King's Covenant were overseen by the king's supporters, including the marquis of Hamilton, the marquis of Huntly, the earl of Southesk and the earl of Traquair. While the success of these campaigns has been questioned in the past, it is clear from surviving records that a number of ministers signed it.[88] A surviving copy of the King's Covenant from Southesk's subscription campaign in Angus between September and October 1638 contains 1133 subscriptions, nine of which belong to local ministers.[89] In

[84] NLS, Wodrow MSS. Folio. LXVI, no.49.
[85] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 94.
[86] *Generall Demands*, 4 and 28.
[87] *Fasti*, vi, 298. Strathbogie is discussed further on p.149.
[88] See pp.43-48. Macinnes, *Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement*; Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution*, 185-186; Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 110-112.
[89] NLS, Adv.MS.34.5.15.

Glasgow, the King's Covenant was particularly successful amongst the city's clergy, with several ministers who had previously sworn the National Covenant signing it.[90] Nine clergymen from the presbytery of Glasgow, including John Strang, wrote a letter to Hamilton, pledging their support to him and commending the king's use of this covenant to repair the divisions within the kingdom.[91] In Aberdeen, ministers were actively encouraged by the Aberdeen Doctors, the burgh council and the marquis of Huntly to publicly denounce the covenant, repress any attempts to gain subscriptions for it and promote the King's Covenant in their sermons.[92]

Resistance became far more difficult after the Glasgow Assembly (November to December 1638). Following the marquis of Hamilton's departure from the assembly, the covenanters were able to seize control and pass several acts which targeted nonconformist and oppositional ministers. On 6 December, the 1637 Book of Common Prayer and 1636 Canons were declared unlawful innovations and the Scottish bishops were deposed. Two days later, episcopacy within the Scottish kirk was abjured, and on 10 December, the Articles of Perth were declared illegal and removed from the services of the kirk. These acts paved the way for legislation passed on 20 December which called upon every presbytery and synod to 'conveen before them, such as are scandalous and malicious, and will not acknowledge this assembly, nor acquiesce unto the acts thereof'. Those found guilty of these charges were to be punished 'according to their malice and contempt, and acts of this kirk'. Similarly, the King's Covenant was denounced as 'repugnant to the genuine and true meaning of the foresaid Confession'. It was declared that the King's Covenant represented a 'contradictorie oath' and every minister who had sworn it was to come before the assembly 'under paine of all Ecclesiasticall censure'.[93] This placed the royalist clergy in an impossible position. As a concession to the covenanters before the general assembly, Charles had discharged the Articles of Perth and the Book of Common Prayer and Canons. This not only encouraged the covenanters but delegitimised a vital component of royalist resistance: that episcopacy and the Laudian liturgy were lawful and authorised by the crown. Charles's proclamation on 29 November, declaring the general assembly treasonous, did little to reassure royalist ministers.[94] They were now expected to openly resist a vehemently pro-covenanting kirk administration. Clearly worried about this

[90] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 482-483.
[91] NRS, GD406/1/445.
[92] *Extracts from the Council Register of the Burgh of Aberdeen, 1625-1642*, ed. John Stuart *(Edinburgh, 1871)*, 137-138; NRS, GD406/1/757.
[93] *Records of the Kirk*, 26-40.
[94] Charles I, [Proclamation, 29 November] (Edinburgh, 1638).

situation, Walter Balcanquhall (one of the king's senior Scottish advisors) wrote to Charles I in late 1638, asking that, if the king now wished to wage war against the covenanters, 'the Non-covenanters, especiallie the Ministers, must have present and private warnings to provide for their saifties'.[95]

By the end of 1638, 22 ministers had been deposed by church courts and commissions. Of those 22 depositions, 17 included charges of contumacy, practising Episcopalian doctrine, refusing the National Covenant or desertion in order to avoid subscribing the covenant. Further pressure was added by the 1639 general assembly which met in August. Between 28 and 30 August, the assembly condemned Walter Balcanquhall's *A Large Declaration Concerning the Late Tumults in Scotland* (1639), required subscription of the covenant for all ministers, school teachers and university academics, and ordered that ministers deposed under the 1638 acts should only be reponed if they showed 'their true repentance, and submission to the Constitutions of this Kirk'.[96] In essence, these acts banned anti-covenanting resistance within the clergy and ensured that the covenanting position was authorised in the eyes of the kirk's courts. A further 44 ministers were deposed over the course of 1639, most in the immediate aftermath of the 1638 assembly. 15 of those depositions were for contumacy, seven for refusing or opposing the covenant, and seven for deserting their parishes to avoid subscribing the covenant. Andrew Learmouth, minister of Liberton (Edinburgh), was deposed in 1639 for publicly speaking out against the covenanters, calling them perjurers,[97] while Henry Scrimgeour, minister of Forgan (St Andrews), employed almost identical rhetoric to John Michaelson, declaring that 'the nobles were taking the crown off the King's head to set on their own' and calling the National Covenant 'a black Covenant'.[98] This type of language is common within the accounts of royalist ministers investigated by the covenanting authorities in 1639. James Forsyth, minister of Kilpatrick (Dumbarton), repeatedly refused the covenant and preached to his congregation that it was 'seditious, treasonable, [and] Jesuitick'.[99] Similarly, John Gordon, minister of the second charge in Elgin (Elgin), was reported to the presbytery after he was heard calling the covenanters 'rebells and commone traitors'.[100] John Lindsay, minister of Carstairs (Lanark), received a number of complaints

[95] NLS, Wodrow MSS. Folio, LXVI, no. 37. Walter Balcanquhall was the Dean of Durham, a Scots clergyman and senior advisor to Charles I. During the Bishops' Wars, Balcanquhall was Charles I's chief intelligence gatherer in Scotland. The *Large Declaration* is discussed in detail on p.154.
[96] Walter Balcanquhall ['the King'], *A Large Declaration Concerning the Late Tumults in Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1639); *Records of the Kirk*, 205-208.
[97] NRS, CH2/224/1, 253.
[98] *Fasti*, v, 203. The ideology of the royalist clergy will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.6.
[99] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 89 and 162-163.
[100] NRS, CH2/271/1, 107-110.

from a group of 'gentlemen' within his congregation who had taken great exception to the minister's 'malitious railing and speaking disgracefullie against the Covenant and Covenanters'.[101]

While open defiance was seen by the covenanting kirk as an urgent threat, doctrinal nonconformity was equally unsettling. Of the 66 ministers deposed between 1638 and 1639, a third were accused of Arminianism, Episcopalianism or erroneous doctrine. John Crichton, the minister of Paisley (Paisley), received 48 complaints against him between July and December 1638 from members of his congregation for preaching erroneous doctrine and Arminianism.[102] In particular, Crichton's accusers had complained about his administering of the sacraments in private, indicating his adherence to the Articles of Perth. [103] However, the fact that Crichton fled to Ireland after his deposition, where he became the major-chaplain in the royalist army commanded by James Butler, Marquis of Ormond, suggests that his loyalties extended beyond simply upholding the old liturgy.[104] Likewise, William Annand, minister of Ayr (Ayr), was deposed after it came to the general assembly's attention that he was known for 'maintaineing saints days, and many poynts of errouneous doctrine'.[105] While allegations of Arminianism and popery were common, there is very little evidence presented within the kirk records to support these accusations. They mostly appear to be exaggerations directed against ministers maintaining the Articles of Perth or Laudian liturgical practices. As David Mullan has previously pointed out, 'if leading Covenanters had had their utterances pillaged in the same fashion, they too could have been charged with Arminianism'.[106] Nevertheless, in these cases we can clearly see how theological tribalism and genuine fear of counter-reformation characterised how some covenanters interpreted nonconformity.

These examples highlight the two principal ways in which royalist ministers resisted the covenanting regime. Some, like Forsyth and Gordon, publicly denounced the covenant and its adherents from their pulpits, while others, like Crichton, were more passive, opting to ignore covenanting demands and uphold older liturgical practices. In both instances, the success of ministers' noncompliance largely rested with their congregations. Without willing witnesses, the kirk's courts could not identify

[101] NRS, CH2/234/1, 121, 123 and 142.
[102] *Records of the Kirk of Scotland*, 163.
[103] NRS, CH2/294/2, 105-106.
[104] *Fasti*, iii, 163.
[105] *Records of the Kirk*, 180. Annand was one of two ministers who had preached in favour of the Prayer Book at the synod of Glasgow in August 1637. See p.206.
[106] David George Mullan, 'Theology in the Church of Scotland 1618-c.1640: A Calvinist Consensus?', *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 26 (1995), 613.

nonconformist ministers. This meant that ministers could openly flaunt the covenanters so long as they retained the support of their congregations. This can be seen in the deposition of Andrew Goodlad, minister of Symington (Biggar). Goodlad was suspended in January 1648 after a witness came forward to the presbytery questioning his doctrine. After examining Goodlad, the presbytery ruled that his doctrine was 'unsavorie', ordering his suspension. Following his suspension, the presbytery received further accusations against Goodlad, claiming that he had often spoken in favour of the Engagement, a point which Goodlad did not deny. In the end, Goodlad was deposed in August 1648 after he was 'found altogether unprofitable, and a contemner of the acts and constitutions of the Kirk tending to the Reformation and settling of the true religion'.[107] He had been the minister of Symington since 1623. Goodlad had clearly been able to operate as he wished without the interference of the covenanting regime and would have continued to do so if a witness had not come forward.

For many ministers, flight to avoid subscribing the covenant was preferable to taking a stand in their pulpits. Temporary desertion of one's parish protected the minister from having to subscribe the covenant and showed the crown their loyalty and fidelity which would undoubtedly have been rewarded had the king been able to defeat the covenanters during the Bishops' Wars (1639-1640). However, flight allowed church courts to depose these clergymen or declare their parishes vacant. Between 1638 and 1639, 11 ministers were deposed because they fled to either Ireland or England to avoid subscribing the covenant. George Wishart, minister of the second charge in St Andrews (St Andrews) and future supporter and biographer of the marquis of Montrose, was deposed in 1638 for deserting his parish for eight months, having fled to England in the aftermath of the first signings of the covenant. Wishart was also accused of 'rayling against the Covenant and saying that he should never come in his pulpit if the Covenant were red in it'.[108] In many cases, desertion was used to declare the parish vacant rather than enact a potentially lengthy deposition procedure against a minister. Gavin Hamilton, minister of Carnwath (Lanark), fled to England in 1639 in protest against the covenant's subscription. When Hamilton returned to his parish following the Pacification of Berwick (19 June 1639) which brought the First Bishops' War to an end, he found that it had been declared vacant in his absence. With the support of his patron, Robert Dalzell, Lord Dalzell, who was a committed royalist himself, Hamilton petitioned the presbytery to allow him to take up his

[107] NRS, CH2/35/1, 167 and 207-209.
[108] *Records of the Kirk*, 182.

office again.[109] However, the presbytery concluded that 'he had been laitlie in England, and kythed [revealed] himselff opposit to the present work of reformation', and 'having yet given no sufficient proofe of the change of his judgement' Hamilton was refused and denied any support from his benefice.[110] As with refusing the covenant in person, desertion to avoid subscription was a public declaration of where the minister stood politically. In some cases, this declaration was not well received. William Morton, minister of the second charge of South Leith (Edinburgh), fled from his parish to avoid subscription, but in his absence his home and goods were ransacked by local covenanters, forcing him to seek permanent refuge in England.[111] Even if asylum could be found, ministers who had deserted their parishes often became destitute, struggling to support themselves without their stipend. This even applied to the Scottish bishops who were deposed in December 1638. Patrick Lindsay, former Archbishop of Glasgow, wrote several letters to senior royalists at Charles I's court between 1639 and 1641, begging them to petition the king on his behalf for financial aid, reminding them that 'I have suffered verie much for my fidelitie and obedience in his se[r]vice'.[112]

While the general assembly had declared that ministers deposed under their new acts might be reponed if they showed true repentance, only eight of the 66 ministers (12%) deposed between 1638 and 1639 were welcomed back into the kirk by the covenanters.[113] This highlights the significant risk which ministers took in defying the covenant. This risk, combined with the political reality that the royalists had been defeated during the Bishops' Wars, explains why royalist resistance between 1640 and 1643 was far less evident than in the previous two years. The defeat of the royalists in the First Bishops' War left the royalist military infrastructure in chaos, effectively handing over control of the kingdom to the covenanters through the Pacification of Berwick. Matters worsened with the defeat of royalist forces in the Second Bishops' War (1640) and the humiliating Treaty of Ripon (26 October 1640). A more permanent peace agreement was negotiated during 1641, resulting in the Treaty of London (10 August 1641). This treaty had substantial ramifications for the royalist clergy. As part of the king's concessions to the covenanters, Charles agreed to recognise and ratify all acts of the general assembly and the Scottish parliament from 1638

[109] Lord Dalzell was an enthusiastic royalist and avid supporter of Charles I, serving in Bishops' Wars and English Civil Wars alongside his son, Robert Dalzell, the future 2nd Earl of Carnwath. In 1639, Dalzell was elevated to the earldom of Carnwath. For more on his royalist activities, see Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 75 and 139.
[110] NRS, CH2/234/1, 151.
[111] *Fasti*, i, 165-166.
[112] NRS, CH8/101.
[113] Of the 222 deposed ministers deposed between 1638-1651, only 35 (16%) where reponed under the covenanters. See Appendix 1.

to 1641.[114] This left royalist clergymen exposed, stripped of the protective cover of legal legitimacy for their loyalty to the crown. Any minister who continued to oppose the covenanting regime could be pursued by the general assembly with no hope of royal intervention. It also implied that ministers who had publicly denounced the covenant would be considered by parliament as enemies of the state or 'incendiaries', who Charles had conceded were responsible for the conflict during 1638-1641. While there is no evidence to suggest that any minister was pursued by parliament for this offence, the term 'incendiary' was openly associated with those who had resisted the covenant and shown themselves to have acted 'against the state and to the prejudice of the peace of this kingdom'.[115] It is unclear why ministers were not pursued by the secular courts, but it has been suggested by John Coffey that it was due to the covenanters' desire to distance themselves from activities they had criticised the Scottish bishops for, namely the blurring of lines between secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions.[116] Charles's concessions abandoned royalist ministers, leaving them to answer to the covenanting kirk without the crown's support. Conformity was now the safest path available to them until events enabled them to take a stand. This was certainly the case for Andrew Logie, minister of Rayne (Garioch). Logie had been arrested in 1640 by covenanting soldiers for refusing to subscribe the covenant and was subsequently deposed by the synod of Aberdeen. However, in 1641 he was granted the opportunity to repent and reoccupy his charge, which he did. However, Logie was again deposed in 1643 for heresy and his son, Captain John Logie, was beheaded by parliament in 1644 for fighting in the royalist army.[117]

Covenanting success in 1639 and 1640 emboldened the regime's supporters to take action against dissenters in the royalist stronghold of Aberdeen. In June 1640, six Aberdeen ministers were arrested by covenanting soldiers under the command of Major-General Robert Monro for opposing the covenant.[118] In the case of John Gregorie, minister of Drumoak, soldiers arrived at his house in the middle of the night to arrest him and bring him before Monro. He was fined 1000 merks by Monro and his home was plundered by covenanting troops.[119] Five of the six ministers arrested were deposed at some point between 1640 and 1649, while the sixth, William Strachan, minister of Daviot, was

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[114] *Calendar of State Papers Domestic, 1640-1641*, ed. William Douglas Hamilton (London, 1882), 244-245; *RPS*, 1641/7/5.
[115] *RPS*, 1641/8/184.
[116] John Coffey, *Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions: The Mind of Samuel Rutherford* (Cambridge, 1997), 209.
[117] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 370; *Fasti*, vi, 183.
[118] The names of these ministers were: Samuel Walker, William Leith, John Cheyne, John Gregorie, William Strachan and Andrew Logie. See *Fasti*, vi, 50, 156, 162, 164, 168 and 183.
[119] ibid, vi, 50.

suspended in 1649 for conspiring with Montrose.[120] Again, this highlights the fact that royalist ministers were often forced into conformity. Alongside these arrests, Alexander Scrogie and James Sibbald, two of the Aberdeen Doctors, were also deposed and Alexander Anderson, minister of Lhanbryde (Elgin), was found to have actively aided royalist forces during the First Bishops' War (1639), for which he was suspended from his charge. [121] In addition, two ministers were deposed from the synod of Moray for continuing to refuse the covenant.[122] Two more were deposed from the presbytery of Lanark: Alexander Forbes, temporary minister of Carluke, for refusing the covenant and James Douglas, minister of Douglas, who was finally deposed after years of resistance for preaching in favour of deserters from the covenanters' muster at Biggar.[123] The general assembly ordered that a 'sound and zealous minister' be found quickly to replace Forbes in Carluke, as there was 'a great number of men … dissaffected to work of reformation'.[124]

With the completion of the covenanters' seizure of power by 1640, the total number of ministers brought before the kirk's courts between 1640 and 1643 dropped significantly. From 44 ministers deposed in 1639, 12 were deprived in 1640, five in 1641, six in 1642, and only two in 1643. Between 1641 and 1643, only three depositions were clearly ideologically motivated. John Forbes, minister of Auchterless (Turriff), and John Guthrie, minister of Duffus and Unthank (Elgin), were both deposed in 1641 for opposing the covenant, while John Drydale, minister of Slamannan (Linlithgow), was deposed in 1643 after it was brought to the presbytery's attention that he had composed 'ane wyld and ignominious cuckolane [lampoon] and slanderous ryme, ventit and formed agains the brethrein'.[125] While the rate of deposition suggests that the level of resistance within the clergy markedly declined in this period, presbytery records hint that the political tension of the previous years lay dormant in many parishes, awaiting a spark to ignite further conflict. In August 1642, James Bonar, minister of Maybole and Kirkbride (Ayr), was sent to the parish of Stoneykirk (Stranraer) by the general assembly to oversee the reponement of Gilbert Power, who had been deposed from that parish in 1640 on charges of religious nonconformity, adultery and 'sowing sedition among his parishioners'. The assembly was satisfied with Power's repentance and instructed Bonar to repone him. However, when

[120] According to an act of parliament from 26 June 1649, Strachan claimed that he complied with the royalist army under duress, a defence which he used to successfully overturn an unfavourable contract signed by him with the royalist John Leith of Harthill. See *RPS*, 1649/5/144.
[121] *Fasti*, vi, 18, 37 and 400.
[122] William Clogie, minister of Inverness (Inverness), and John Peter, minister of St Andrews (Elgin).
[123] *Fasti*, iii, 284, 300; vi, 399, 455; NRS, CH2/234/1, 156.
[124] NRS, CH2/234/1, 156.
[125] *Fasti*, i, 228; vi, 249 and 385.

Bonar attempted to enter the pulpit to preach to the local congregation, he was barred from doing so by a group of women armed with clubs and stones who refused to hear him. Taken aback by the incident, Bonar fell ill with shock and returned to Edinburgh. The presbytery was ordered to punish the women and oversee their public repentance.[126] Incidents like this were probably the reason why, in August 1643, the general assembly ordered that 'exact account be taken of every Ministers diligence' as it had been noted that some within the clergy had not been sufficiently vigilant in promoting the covenant. Any minister who refused to comply with this act was to be censured.[127]

The most influential factor in the decline of depositions between 1640 and 1643 seems to be the simple fact that, unlike the years before or after, ministers were not actively called upon to choose between the kirk and king. With the crown officially at peace with the covenanters, many royalist ministers chose to conform and keep their heads firmly below the parapet. This truce was strengthened in autumn 1641 following the outbreak of the Catholic confederacy's rebellion in Ireland. Both the king and the covenanting leadership were keen to see the rebellion quelled, relieving the pressure on Scots back home who had found themselves caught between the royalist and covenanting camps. [128] It was not until the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant that the issue of true allegiance was thrust back into local politics, which can clearly be seen in the climbing deposition rates from 1643 onwards. Jamie McDougall has found that many areas were cautious when covenanting leaders required public subscription to the Solemn League and Covenant, and some – such as Badenoch – utterly refused to comply.[129] Unlike the subscription of the National Covenant, not a single minister was deposed for resisting the Solemn League and Covenant. This seemingly deliberate strategy of restraint pursued by the kirk may have been due to covenanting desires to avoid provoking royalists during a sensitive period of time, or perhaps it came from the confidence that the covenanting regime was, from 1640, the de facto government, and thus less fearful over its own stability.

The kirk had shown a similarly restrained approach in the aftermath of the 'Incident' of 1641.[130] When the Committee of Estates investigated the matter they discovered that Montrose had held several meetings with different ministers to discuss the regime's misuse of the covenant and his fears that the covenanters sought to displace the

[126] Bailie, *Letters and Journals*, ii, 51-53; NRS, CH2/341/1, 21-25, 34 and 41-42.
[127] *Records of the Kirk*, 346.
[128] David Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 243-247.
[129] McDougall, 'Covenants and Covenanters', 67-69.
[130] The political context of the Incident is discussed in detail on pp.53-54.

king's authority altogether. When Robert Murray, minister of Methven (Perth), was called before the estates he revealed that he had met with Montrose on two occasions, accompanied by fellow ministers. The first meeting occurred at Perth, where Murray met with Montrose, John Robertson, minister of Perth East (Perth), and John Graham, minister of Auchterarder (Auchterarder). Montrose asked the ministers if they were willing to provide accounts of his good character as he was now 'highly scandilised as a backslider in this [covenanting] cause'.[131] Over the course of the meeting, Montrose and Robertson revealed their fears that a 'few particulere men' within the covenanting movement were plotting to depose the king and install the marquis of Argyll as a 'dictator'. While maintaining his loyalty to the tenets of the National Covenant, Montrose told the ministers that he feared that it was being misused by Argyll and his allies to pursue a new war against the king. The following day, another meeting took place in Scone, which Murray and Montrose attended alongside the earl of Atholl and John Stewart, commissary of Dunkeld. The conspiracy against the king was discussed again, with the group agreeing that through the covenant they had all sworn 'nott to wrange the kings prerogative' and that Argyll's faction sought to disrupt the peace of the realm. Murray's testimony also mentioned that he had been accused of being a co-author of a speech given by John Graham at the presbytery of Auchterarder.[132] The speech, which was simply recorded as 'scandalous' by the general assembly, was linked to four other ministers, all of whom were suspected as co-authors.[133] Those ministers were: David Drummond, minister of Crieff (Auchterarder); George Mushet, minister of Dunning (Auchterarder); John Fyfe, minister of Foulis Wester (Auchterarder), and John Forsyth, minister of Kirkintilloch (Glasgow). While none of the ministers named in Murray's statement were deposed in 1641 as a result of their meetings with Montrose or the circulation of the scandalous speech, all of them were deposed between 1644 and 1651.[134] Indeed, both John Graham and John Robertson were deposed for conspiring with Montrose after he had raised his royalist army in 1644.

This episode clearly shows that there remained hostility towards the covenanting regime from elements within the Scottish clergy and that there were conforming moderate ministers who found themselves increasingly opposed to the line taken by the regime. These ministers had given outward conformity to the regime, but held real concerns over

[131] Here Montrose is referring to the fallout from his involvement in the creation of the Cumbernauld Band (1640). See pp.52-53.
[132] NRS, GD220/3/183. Unfortunately, the presbytery of Auchterarder's records for this period are incomplete, so no detail of this speech has survived. The speech was likely given in late 1640 or early 1641.
[133] *Records of the Kirk*, 367.
[134] *Fasti*, iii, 483; iv, 230, 258, 265, 268 and 271.

the designs of the covenanting leadership and the implications this held for their sworn loyalty to Charles I. Moreover, Murray's testimony gives us a rare insight into communications between ministers. From the line of questioning adopted by the estates in their interrogation of Murray, it is clear that they suspected that Graham's speech was co-authored by several ministers and that it had been passed among them. Evidently, royalist ministers were aware of others within the clergy who shared the same values and exchanged letters and sermons among one another. Due to the dearth of surviving evidence, it is impossible to say much more about this royalist network. However, Jamie Reid Baxter's work on Presbyterian networks during the 1610s shows that it was not uncommon for ministers of similar dispositions to share ideas and materials with each other, sometimes over great distances.[135]

A letter from John Galbraith, minister of Bothkennar and moderator of the presbytery of Stirling, written in February 1643, corroborates Robert Murray's account that there was a growing concern within elements of the ministry over the political implications of covenanting rule. As news spread across the kingdom that the covenanters were considering intervening in the English Civil War on behalf of the English parliamentarians, a royalist petition, known as the Cross Petition, was sent to the Scottish parliament urging neutrality.[136] Upon hearing that the Cross Petition had been formally denounced by the general assembly, Galbraith wrote to the assembly in February 1643, on behalf of the presbytery, to voice its concerns over the decision. In his letter, Galbraith took great exception to the recent acts of the assembly which urged presbyteries to censor royalists. In particular, Galbraith questioned whether such censorship was lawful, arguing that it equated to an innovation in church governance, which was outlawed by the assembly. Throughout the letter Galbraith was critical of the assembly, adopting what can only be described as a royalist position. He stated that 'we think it wrong that to speake against those that are in Government is a mask of malignicie, and yet that is not reisoned for our [us] to speak against the Supreame governor the King'. Galbraith also questioned the assembly's labelling of royalists as the 'Popish & Prelaticall partie'. While he accepted that there were followers of the king who could be described as such, he doubted whether 'they are of such number to give a denomination to the wholl'. Galbraith believed that this rhetoric was driving a wedge between the king and his subjects and encouraging

[135] Jaime Reid Baxter, 'Elizabeth Melville, Lady Culross: New Light from Fife', *The Innes Review* 68 (2017), 71-77.
[136] Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 258-259. The Cross Petition is discussed in detail on pp.55-56.

parishioners to question their loyalty to the king.[137] Robert Baillie noted in letters to his cousin, William Spang, that the Cross Petition had cultivated significant support within the presbytery of Stirling and that Galbraith and another Stirlingshire minister, Henry Guthrie, minister of Stirling East, had been the incendiaries behind this 'great flame'.[138] This was not the first time that Guthrie had voiced opposition to the regime. At the general assembly of 1640, Baillie noted that Guthrie had openly criticised the leaders of the kirk, especially Alexander Henderson, accusing him of introducing innovations 'both in word and wryte'. After the assembly, Guthrie had refused to preach at all in protest. Privately, he was said to have 'solicit the whole northern ministrie and elders, putting them in a great vehemence against all these things he complained of'. In particular, he had conversed with the earl of Seaforth, of whom Baillie complained that his 'honestie in our cause ever has been much suspected'. Guthrie continued to be critical of the regime between 1640 and 1643, becoming especially opposed to the kirk's persecution of nonconformist ministers.[139] Conversely, there is no record of Galbraith voicing opposition to the covenant between 1638 and 1640, and yet, by 1643, he and others within his presbytery had evidently begun to question the implications of continued support for the covenanting regime, especially its impact on their loyalty to Charles I. Both Galbraith and Guthrie were later deposed by the assembly: Guthrie in 1648 for malignancy, and Galbraith in 1649 for 'tippling and other faults'.[140] This example highlights the fine margins which separated outright royalists and moderate covenanters as well as the fluidity of individuals' allegiance in reaction to the everchanging political situation.

Despite this, the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant in September 1643 does not seem to have evoked the same response from royalist clergymen that the National Covenant did in 1638. Even after the covenanter-controlled Scottish parliament enacted legislation which made the subscription of the Solemn League and Covenant mandatory, there does not appear to have been any noticeable reaction from within the ministry.[141] Given the outpouring of support in 1638/9, 1644/5 and 1647/8, this seems to have been due to the lack of a political or military outlet. Despite the king's opposition to the Solemn League and Covenant, there was no tangible royalist party at work in Scotland during the latter months of 1643. Thus, there was little incentive for ministers to risk deposition by voicing dissent. Similarly, the half-hearted royalist rising of 1643 does not appear to have

[137] NLS, Wodrow MSS. Folio, XXV, no. 11.
[138] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, ii, 62-63 and 69.
[139] ibid, i, 247-254.
[140] *Fasti*, iv, 299 and 318.
[141] *RPS*, 1643/6/92.

caused any reaction from royalist clergymen, or at least nothing was reported to the presbyteries or general assembly.[142]

However, the records of the general assembly from the months before Montrose's rising (30 August 1644) hint that there was growing concern over a faction within society, but especially the clergy, who were opposed to the covenants. On 3 June 1644, the assembly passed an act against 'Secret Dissaffectors of the Covenant'. The assembly believed that there were 'divers Persons disaffected to the National Covenant of this Kirk, and to the Solemn League and Covenant' who 'do escape their just censure, either by their private and unconstant abode in any ane Congregation, or, by secret conveyance of their malignant speeches and practices'. Presbyteries and synods were instructed to take special note of the conduct of all ministers, especially in their diligence in rooting out disaffected members of their congregations. The following day, the assembly passed another act, this time 'concerning dissenting voices in Presbyteries and Synods'. The names of all ministers who voiced opposition to the covenant or the regime were to be recorded in court registers, which were then be sent to Edinburgh. The act defined dissent as any action 'contrary to the Word of God, the Acts of Assembly, or to the received order of the Kirk'. [143] In February 1645, further acts were passed specifically targeting those who supported Montrose's royalist army. On 12 February, it was ordered that a declaration denouncing the royalist army be read out in every kirk in the kingdom. The proclamation declared that 'bloody Monsters, the Irish Rebels, together with some degenerate, unnaturall, and perfidious countrymen of our own' had been sent by God to punish them for their lack of faith. In the proclamation, royalist military success was attributed to a rise in covenant-breaking, which the assembly claimed had invited God's wrath upon them.[144] As the war raged on, further acts passed by the assembly suggests that there was sizeable dissent within the parishes. No ministers who had been deposed were to be permitted to return to the parish in which they had formerly resided, for fear that they would return to their old ways. Ministers who had protected 'scandalous' people or had been silent in 'the publike cause, not labouring to cure the disaffection of people', were to be driven out to halt the spread of malignancy. Kirk elders were urged to report their minister if he was suspected of harbouring any sympathy for the royalist party, and greater 'accuracie' was urged from the commissions overseeing the visitation of kirks. From June 1646, any minister who was found to have given supplies, shelter or intelligence to the royalists was to be immediately

[142] Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 291-292. See p.212.
[143] *Records of the Kirk*, 398.
[144] ibid, 422-423.

suspended pending further investigation, as were any ministers who had toasted the success of the royalist army.[145] As a result of these acts, between August 1644 and the signing of the Engagement in December 1647, 36 ministers were deposed. Of that number, 21 were deposed for aiding or conspiring with royalist forces.

While there was a noticeable spike in depositions over the course of 1644-1647, the number of ministers brought before a church court for royalist activities was less than in 1638-1639 and 1648-1651.[146] This can in part be explained by the inability of visitations and commissions to operate freely while large swathes of the country were active war zones between 1644 and 1646. Added to this is the fact that in areas where there were royalist ministers and congregations, there were unlikely to be many witnesses willing to testify against the minister in the kirk's courts. One particularly impressive example of this can be seen when Alexander Case, minister of Polwarth (Kelso), was investigated by the general assembly regarding his conduct during Montrose's campaign. When asked for the parish registers and records, Case told the assembly that they had been lost when Montrose had occupied the area. With no record evidence nor any willing witnesses, the charges against Case were dropped.[147] Again, this highlights the risk in accepting the number of depositions as a true indicator of the scale of resistance.

Nevertheless, the cases which were reported to the kirk's authorities show the different ways in which ministers could oppose the covenanting regime between 1644 and 1646. Some attempted to coordinate royalist military support within their locality. James Wood, minister of Kilpatrick (Dumbarton), was said to have regularly corresponded with Montrose and read proclamations from the marquis to his parishioners, as well as having led a band of supporters to Dumbarton Castle in an attempt to convince the garrison to surrender themselves to the king's forces.[148] Similarly, Gavin Forsyth, minister of Cathcart (Glasgow) was deposed for publicly supporting the royalist cause and calling upon his parishioners not to oppose Montrose's army.[149] Robert Tran, minister of Eaglesham (Glasgow), was deposed in November 1645 for his 'behaviour and carriage during James Grahame excommunicate rebell his abode and residence in this country'. Tran confessed to having received protection for himself and his parishioners from Montrose, as well as having stored 'plunderit goode[s]' in his church and helping Alasdair MacColla transport

[145] ibid, 427, 445 and 447-448.
[146] See Figure 2.1, p.142.
[147] NLS, Wodrow MSS. XXVI, no.114.
[148] NRS, CH2/546/1, 89.
[149] Glasgow City Archives, CH2/171/3/2, 210-211.

those goods elsewhere.[150] Three depositions from the presbytery of Mull were a result of the ministers there aiding the forces of Montrose and MacColla.[151] George Hannay, minister of Alves (Elgin), was deposed in 1647 for his compliance with the marquis of Huntly and viscount Aboyne, having subscribed 'that perfidious and wicked bond by the Marquess of Huntly, ane excommunicate rebel, and that sometym he drank [to] the said Marquess's health'.[152] Additionally, he was accused of preaching to his parishioners that the covenanting leaders were the 'Popes conclave'.[153] Ministers' kinship and patrimonial loyalties can also be identified, as is seen in the case of John MacKenzie, minister of Tarbat (Tain) and brother of Sir John MacKenzie of Tarbat, who refused to condemn the earl of Seaforth's Remonstrance (1646) in his sermons unless he was specifically instructed to do so by the general assembly, as Seaforth was his chief and he owed him his loyalty.[154] Two other Mackenzie ministers were deposed in 1647 for conspiring with Seaforth, signing his remonstrance and preaching to his men.[155]

Lesser acts of royalist dessent also resulted in ministers being brought before the kirk's courts. Robert Boyd, minister of Bothwell (Hamilton), was deposed in 1646 for praying for the success of Montrose, while James Watson, a bursar in theology from the synod of Moray, was suspended in 1646 after the synod learned that he had written verses celebrating Montrose's victories.[156] Suspension seems to have been preferred as a punishment in cases where the clergyman was willing to publicly repent. Repentance in front of a congregation was presumably seen as an effective means of undermining any royalist support which the minister might have galvanised within his parish. David Orme, minister of Monimail (Cupar), was suspended in March 1646 for maintaining that treating with Montrose was lawful. In penance for his actions, Orme was ordered by the presbytery to declare his conscience at the pulpits of the churches of Monimail and Cupar.[157] Similarly, William Fullerton, minister of Rafford and Altyre (Forres) was suspended in 1646 for subscribing bands of loyalty to the marquis of Huntly, and William Lauder,

[150] NLS, Wodrow MSS. XXVIII, no. 24.
[151] *Fasti*, iv, 105, 111 and 119.
[152] *Fasti*, vi, 375; NRS, CH2/271/2, 20-22. It is unclear which bond the record refers to, though it seems likely that it was a bond written during the northern campaign (1646-1647) which has not survived. For more details, see Robertson, *Lordship and Power*, 137-143.
[153] NRS, CH2/271/2, 20-22.
[154] MacKenzie was eventually deposed in 1650 for immorality. See *Fasti*, vii, 75; NLS, Wodrow MSS. XXV, no.14. For analysis of Seaforth's Remonstrance, see pp.61-63.
[155] *Fasti*, vii, 17 and 30.
[156] Watson was the son of William Watson, minister of Duthill (Abernethy) who had been found guilty of giving Montrose shelter in 1646 and ordered to perform pubic repentance. See *Fasti*, iii, 230; vi, 359.
[157] ibid, v, 165.

minister of Avoch (Chanonry), was suspended in 1647 for having signed Seaforth's Remonstrance. Both were instructed to perform public repentance.[158]

Almost as soon as Scottish royalist forces had been defeated or disbanded over the course of 1646 and 1647, royalist ministers were presented with another means of opposing the covenanting regime: supporting the Engagement (1647-1648). The Engagement's widespread support from royalists and disaffected moderate covenanters created an unparalleled crisis for the covenanting state and kirk. Despite the engagers' control of the 1648 parliament, the kirk remained firmly in the hands of hardline covenanters who saw the Engagement as a royalist attempt to undermine the covenant and undo the work of their new reformation. In the eyes of the general assembly, malignancy was a contagion which spread through communities. Once it took hold it 'spoileth and corrupteth the whole lump'.[159] To combat this perceived epidemic, the assembly once again looked to the ministry, authorising a series of acts from July 1648 which strengthened previous anti-royalist legislation. Fearing that royalist and engager ministers had 'put on the people a stamp and impression of Malignancie', no minister was to be reponed without the permission of the assembly and any minister deposed for malignancy (both in relation to pre-1647 royalist offences and support for the Engagement) was forbidden to occupy a charge where a previous incumbent had likewise been deposed for royalism. In addition, the assembly passed an act 'for censuring Ministers for their silence, and not speaking to the corruptions of the time' which instructed presbyteries to investigate any minister who was not sufficiently zealous in his support for the regime.[160] Like the 1644 legislation against 'secret disaffectors', this act targeted those who remained silent on political matters within their sermons. Even silence was taken as an indicator of political loyalty. Certainly, silence had saved some royalist ministers from persecution while preserving their own conscience on political matters. Robert Leighton, minister of Newbattle (Dalkeith), was a noted supporter of the Engagement who, according to Gilbert Burnet, 'came to see into the follies of the Presbyterians, and to hate their Covenant'.[161] Leighton avoided deposition following the Engagement's defeat by having the church precentor read out declarations against the Engagement, rather than doing it himself.[162] By

[158] ibid, vii, 1 and 30.
[159] *Records of the Kirk of Scotland*, 503.
[160] ibid, 496-510.
[161] Gilbert Burnet, *History of My Own Time*, 2 vols (Oxford, 1897), i, 241. Following the Restoration, Leighton became Bishop of Dunblane in 1661 and then the Archbishop of Glasgow in 1670.
[162] Dugald Butler, *Life and Letters of Robert Leighton, Restoration Bishop of Dunblane and Archbishop of Glasgow* (London, 1903), 209.

doing so, Leighton was able to argue that he had complied with the demands of the general assembly while avoiding having to actively celebrate the Engagement's defeat.

Not all ministers were as canny as Leighton. The number of depositions and suspensions between 1648 and 1649 increased exponentially. The *Fasti* records that 63 ministers were deposed during this two-year period, 17 of whom were accused of supporting the Engagement, four for conspiring or associating with known royalists, and one for aiding Montrose during his campaign.[163] When confronted about his public support for the Engagement, David Drummond, minister of Linlithgow (Linlithgow), 'would not say the ingagement was unlawfull' or that 'religion [was] endangered by the ingagement'.[164] Drummond's colleague in Linlithgow, Thomas Inglis, who was also deposed, told the presbytery that after hearing of the engager army's defeat at Preston, Drummond had brought together his parishioners and 'prayed heartily for the scattered army'.[165] John Hamilton, minister of Craigie (Ayr), was likewise deposed after it was brought to the presbytery's attention that he had publicly prayed for the success of the Engagement and preached for 'complyance with the enemye [royalists]'.[166] Both cases clearly show how the loyalty of a minister could influence the entire congregation, justifying the covenanters' fears over the loyalties of those who occupied the pulpit. Indeed, Hamilton's actions in Craigie resulted in the parish being mistrusted by the presbytery, which noted the 'desolate estate of that congregation of Craigie'.[167] At least eight other ministers were suspended for supporting the Engagement but were reponed after they had performed public repentance.[168]

Alongside these clear cases of clerical resistance, there were a number of depositions between 1648 and 1649 for moral offences which appear to have been expedient charges designed to oust ministers who had shown support for the Engagement. The clearest examples of this come from the synod of Angus and Mearns, where 18 ministers were deposed in 1649 for insufficiency.[169] Insufficiency offences normally related to a minister's failure to carry out essential duties, but the number of these depositions and the geographical concentration suggests that this was a purge of local

[163] Of the remaining 41 depositions listed in the *Fasti*, 17 contain no further information. Given the number of depositions for malignancy in this period, it likely that some portion of these were for similar offences.
[164] NRS, CH2/242/3, 303-304.
[165] ibid, 304.
[166] NRS, CH2/532/1, 356-357.
[167] ibid, 353.
[168] *Fasti*, i, 198; ii, 33; iv, 263; v, 206, 396, 406; vi, 156; vii, 30.
[169] The deposition of Galbraith also serves as an example of this, see p.133.

ministers, although the exact nature of their offences is unknown.[170] While the specifics of these depositions have not survived, there is evidence that the earl of Southesk had been very active in the region promoting the Engagement. Indeed, one of the ministers deposed, John Lammie, minister of Brechin, was noted as having preached in the earl's favour and in support of the Engagement.[171] Similarly, the presbytery of Paisley oversaw the deposition of two ministers in 1649: John Law, minister of Neilston, and John Hay, minister of Renfrew, the former for drunkenness and the latter for insufficiency. While these cases do not overtly indicate royalism, both ministers were granted substantial financial compensation from vacant stipends by the Restoration government in 1661 for their 'loyalty and affections to his majesty'. Law was awarded £100, and Hay was granted £200.[172] Law and Hay were just two of 33 ministers noted in the *Fasti* as having been deposed between 1638 and 1651 (ten deposed between 1648 and 1649) who received compensation for their loyalty, courtesy of the Restoration government. Of those 33 ministers, 22 of them are noted to have been deposed for supporting the royalist cause.[173] While the covenanting kirk was less likely than its English parliamentarian counterpart to pursue royalist clergy via the smokescreen of moral offences, these cases suggest that it did happen. It is difficult to fully comprehend why in some cases it was deemed more expedient to accuse ministers of insufficiency rather than malignancy or nonconformity, but it seems likely that it resulted from a lack of evidence to pursue a more serious offence. This certainly seems to have been the case in England, where Fiona McCall has suggested that 'well-established grounds for complaint' were often the most successful means to pursue ministers, even if the complaint was not the true motive behind the attack.[174]

Purging continued throughout 1650, until the kingdom gradually fell into Cromwellian hands during the later months of 1651. The *Fasti* records that 31 ministers were deposed over the course of this two-year period. Systematic purging occurred in Caithness and Orkney following the failure of Montrose's second campaign which lasted from September 1649 until his final defeat at Carbisdale on 27 April 1650. In Caithness, most of the clergy were said to have subscribed a band of loyalty to Montrose and the king, which resulted in six ministers being deposed.[175] This declaration is probably the same one

[170] Stevenson, 'Deposition of Ministers', 331-332.
[171] *Fasti*, v, 406.
[172] ibid, iii, 157 and 185; *RPS*, A1663/6/6.
[173] *Fasti*, i, 64, 70, 392; ii, 61-62, 86, 103, 135, 161, 416; iii, 22, 87, 157, 163, 185, 230, 236, 313, 353, 387, 411; iv, 111, 114, 119, 272, 281, 284; v, 203, 266, 315, 355, 473; vi, 77, 82, 162; vii, 262.
[174] McCall, 'Scandalous and Malignant?', 234-235.
[175] *Fasti*, vii, 119, 122, 129, 132, 136 and 141; John Lamont, *The Diary of Mr. John Lamont of Newton, 1649-1671* (Edinburgh, 1830), 21.

referenced in a letter from Montrose to the gentry of Caithness, in which the marquis called upon them to collect subscriptions for a new oath of fidelity and allegiance to the king.[176] In Orkney, nine ministers were deposed for having signed a loyal address to Montrose upon his landing on the island in March 1650 which condemned the 'unnaturall rebellion ... against his late sacred majestie' and pledged loyalty to Montrose and his army.[177] Alongside these purges, there were six more ministers deposed for either supporting Montrose or the Engagement, including Henry Cockburn, minister of Channelkirk (Earlston), who was deposed from his office for publicly praying for the Engagement's success.[178] Royalists continued to be pursued by the kirk's courts and most were actively barred from contributing to the defence of the kingdom against Cromwell's invasion.[179] Traditionally, the ministry's failure to produce a homogenous response to the Cromwellian invasion has been explained by the resolutioner-protester division which plagued the kirk from December 1650 until the Cromwellian conquest and beyond. [180] The clear existence of an engager-royalist faction within the ministry supports this interpretation and helps to explain why the clergy were so divided during the final years of the civil wars.

Indeed, the debate surrounding loyalty did not cease when Scotland was absorbed into the English Commonwealth. The *Fasti* shows that several ministers were arrested by the Cromwellian authorities throughout the 1650s for showing loyalty to Charles II. By far the most common way in which ministers did this was by praying for Charles II. In one instance, three ministers from St Andrews were arrested in 1653 for naming the king in their public prayers.[181] This not only shows the longevity of royalist allegiance, but also clearly shows that there were ministers who conformed to covenanting and Cromwellian rule, but who privately harboured royalist sympathies.

In summary, the surviving records show that there was a significant and constantly evolving faction within the Scottish clergy which supported the royalist cause. This support varied from individual to individual, with acts of resistance ranging from active support for royalist military forces to privately praying for the king's success. Local conflicts were fought over national politics, with discussions of ultimate loyalty and sovereignty dominating debates within the kirk throughout the 1640s. These conflicts were not fought by homogeneous blocs of covenanters and non-covenanters. Allegiance was

[176] NRS, GD220/3/201.
[177] *Fasti*, vii, 211-277; NRS, GD18/3112.
[178] *Fasti*, ii, 147.
[179] NLS, Wodrow MSS. XXX, no.7; Lamont, *Diary*, 26.
[180] Langley, *Worship, Civil War and Community*, 78; NLS, Wodrow MSS. XXV, no.97; XXX, no.17 and 18.
[181] *Fasti*, v, 213 and 217.

fluid, individualistic and open to influence. Many of the examples discussed above have shown how individuals' loyalties and beliefs were repeatedly tested by the political developments of the civil wars. From 1641 onwards, a number of ministers who had initially supported the covenant found themselves in meetings with ardent royalists discussing the threat the covenanting leaders posed to the king's authority. It is also clear that many royalist ministers conformed to the covenanting kirk for extended periods of time, whether out of fear or the desire for peace, or the hope that new opportunities for change would present themselves. When those opportunities arose through the resurgence of royalist military fortunes, deposition records show that many ministers seized their chance, breaking their bonds with the covenanting regime and supporting the king's cause. As such, there were four distinct phases of royalist resistance within the Scottish clergy. The first phase accompanied the covenanters' seizure of power from 1638 to 1640. Defeated and deflated, overt resistance all but disappeared between 1641 and 1643, although there are indications that this was a product of the political climate rather than any decline in animosity towards the covenanting regime. The resumption of civil war between 1644 and 1647 gave royalist ministers the opportunity and motive to voice their discontent. The Engagement (1647-1648) and its suppression drew moderates over to the royalist camp, reenergising resistance and ensuring that a royalist faction continued to voice dissent until the Cromwellian occupation in 1651. The prevalence of ministers actively involving their congregations in the debate surrounding the covenant, through protest, preaching and prayer, indicates just how powerful a tool the pulpit was. It was bad enough for the covenanters to have dissenting voices amongst the ministry, but far more concerning was the threat of those voices finding purchase within the minds of the kingdom's many congregations, endangering the covenanting regime's very existence. Much of the evidence discussed above arose from local conflict, where ministers were reported by members of their congregations, local elites or colleagues within the ministry. This raises an important question: if these accounts primarily show the cases where royalist ministers were discovered and ousted, how many ministers preached in favour of the royalist cause and were never pursued by the covenanting authorities? The number and content of the cases identified shows that royalism within the clergy has been significantly underplayed within the historiography, especially if these cases are only part of the picture. If nothing else, these accounts of clerical royalism highlight the personal struggles and the moral soul-searching which many ministers experienced during the civil wars, reminding us that the wars forced ministers and their congregations to repeatedly confront the all-important question of the conflict: king or covenant?

Figure 2.1: The Number of Deposition for Offences Relating to Royalism, 1638-1651.



Source: *Fasti*, i-vii.

2.5 The Scale and Distribution of Royalist Resistance

The cornerstone of past studies on royalism within the Scottish clergy has been that it was geographically isolated and numerically limited. Historians have argued that this resistance primarily emerged in areas where Episcopalianism had become entrenched and where ministers were protected by royalist nobles and gentry, principally in the north of the kingdom. Aberdeenshire has often been identified as a royalist stronghold where ministers were able to shelter under the protection of the marquis of Huntly and other royalist lairds.[182] However, David Stevenson's study of depositions under the covenanting kirk found that depositions were far more common in the south of the kingdom, with the north-east seemingly largely resistant to covenanting purges. Stevenson believed that this was probably due to the area's pro-Episcopalian and royalist sentiment which frustrated covenanting attempts to gather evidence and witnesses against ministers they suspected of harbouring royalist sympathies.[183] Nevertheless, the fact that depositions took place across

[182] Donaldson, *Scotland: James V – James VII*, 319-326.
[183] Stevenson, 'Deposition of Ministers', 333.

the kingdom suggests that royalist loyalties amongst the clergy were more common and far more geographically diffuse than previously assumed. This section will build upon Stevenson's work by reassessing the number and distribution of depositions under the covenanters with a focus on depositions for religious nonconformity and royalist offences. Relying upon depositions to trace royalist resistance is not without its issues. As depositions only represent the successful prosecution of royalist ministers, they do not help us identify areas where royalist ministers were shielded by their presbytery, local elites or congregations. To address this, areas with low deposition rates within traditionally royalist areas (such as Aberdeenshire) will be investigated to assess whether local communities could protect ministers from the covenanting kirk. While this will not provide an exact total of the number of ministers who held royalist loyalties, this information alongside the data from deposition cases will, it is hoped, provide us with the most accurate appraisal of both the scale and distribution of royalism within the Scottish clergy undertaken to date.

An initial survey of the geographical distribution of depositions confirms the patterns observed by Stevenson. The two synods with the highest rates of depositions were Glasgow and Ayr (45) and Lothian and Tweeddale (30). These were followed by Perth and Stirling (20) and Merse and Teviotdale (19). At the opposite end of the spectrum were Sutherland and Caithness (8), Argyll (8) and Dumfries (5). These findings seem to support Stevenson's argument that covenanting control over the kirk flowed outward from Edinburgh, with the central lowland synods under far tighter control than more geographically remote regions. While the control of the synods may have varied, the proportion of depositions relating to royalism and anti-covenanting resistance is consistently high across the synods. Indeed, 27 of the 45 depositions from Glasgow and Ayr included allegations of erroneous doctrine and/or royalism, while in Lothian and Tweeddale it was 20 of the 30 depositions. In Sutherland and Caithness, six of the eight depositions were for supporting Montrose's army and in Argyll five of its eight depositions were for aiding royalist forces.[184] Crucially, this shows that ministers were deposed for supporting the royalist faction both within and outwith the active theatres of war.

[184] The information on the depositions from the synod of Dumfries is uneven. Only one deposition is recorded in detail within the *Fasti*, which was for refusing the covenant in 1638. The other 4 depositions date from 1649 and 1650 but no information is given. While it is likely that some, if not all, of these were a result of the purges undertaken following the defeat of the Engagement, I cannot say for certain if this was the case. See *Fasti*, ii, 243, 250, 272, 277 and 291.

Figure 2.2: Depositions from each Synod, 1638-1651.



Source: *Fasti*, i-vii.

Few synods have consistently high levels of depositions across the period 1638-1651. Indeed, Glasgow and Ayr was the only synod which oversaw frequent depositions throughout the 1640s (see Appendix 1). This corroborates the argument made in Chapter 3 that there were royalist and covenanting interest groups active within the Glasgow region, resulting in continuous social conflict represented here in the high rate of depositions. Elsewhere, depositions were usually chronologically concentrated, falling within one of the four phases identified in Section 2.4. These spikes in depositions are consistent with new legislation, local royalist military activity or the arrival of a visitation commission from the general assembly. The ministry of Aberdeenshire first experienced depositions in 1640, when the general assembly sat in Aberdeen and a covenanting force occupied the city. Similarly, Orkney only witnessed two depositions before 1650, when nine ministers were ejected from their charges by a visitation commission for pledging loyalty to Montrose.[185]

[185] The synod of Orkney and Shetland was merged with the synod of Caithness and Sutherland in 1648. However, for the purposes of all tables, graphs and statistics discussed in this chapter, the two synods have been kept separate in order to aid geographical mapping of royalist resistance.

These trigger events had two important implications. In the first instance, local royalist activity provided motive and opportunity for royalist ministers to act upon their loyalties. Secondly, these events brought the kirk's attention to the area. Areas which witnessed royalist or engager activity were usually investigated by the general assembly after the immediate threat had passed. For example, in 1647 a commission was dispatched to the north-east to investigate the local clergy's compliance with royalist forces following Montrose's 1644-1646 campaign.[186] Likewise, presbyteries which had supported or failed to condemn the Engagement, such as Dunblane and Stirling, were promptly investigated following its defeat.[187] Stevenson has argued that these visitations were vital to the covenanters' attempts to root out royalists, especially in areas where the local church courts could not be trusted.[188]

An examination of the deposition rates within each presbytery reveals new patterns. While every synod reported depositions for royalism between 1638 and 1651, not every presbytery did. Unsurprisingly, the capital oversaw the most depositions. Of the 12 depositions there, 11 can be linked to anti-covenanting behaviour: four were for desertion to avoid subscribing the covenant, three were for contumacy, two were for supporting the Engagement, one was for erroneous doctrine and the other was for publicly speaking against the covenanters.[189] As both the traditional seat of power and the birthplace of the covenanting movement, it is clear that purging the capital was an early priority of the covenanting kirk, with ten of the 12 depositions taking place between 1638 and 1640. Kirkwall oversaw the second most depositions (11), and as previously mentioned, nine of these were ordered by the visiting commission which oversaw the deposition of ministers who had signed a royalist declaration in 1650 after Montrose landed in Kirkwall.[190] The other presbyteries which appear in the top half of Figure 2.3 tell us a great deal. Lanark, for example, oversaw eight depositions, all of which included allegations of opposition to the covenant. Seven of these depositions occurred between 1638 and 1640.[191] Similarly, six of the eight depositions from St Andrews included allegations of political or religious nonconformity, four of which occurred between 1638 and 1640. The Hamilton family

[186] *Records of the Kirk*, 480.
[187] ibid, 518.
[188] Stevenson, 'Deposition of Ministers', 329.
[189] The reason for the twelfth deposition is not recorded in the *Fasti*. See *Fasti*, i, 45.
[190] NRS, GD18/3112; *Records of the Kirk*, 558.
[191] These cases are discussed in depth on pp.117-119.

owned large swathes of land in Lanarkshire and St Andrews' university had been identified early on by the covenanting regime as a bastion of royalist sentiment.[192]

This pattern is seen in other presbyteries. For instance, six of the 13 parishes overseen by the presbytery of Auchterarder witnessed their minister being deposed between 1644 and 1651. James Graham, minister of Auchterarder and Aberuthven, was deposed twice, once in 1644 and again in 1649. Graham was also one of the ministers implicated during the investigation into the 'Incident' in 1641.[193] Unfortunately, the presbytery records for Auchterarder do not survive to reveal more information on these depositions. However, it is likely that the reason why this presbytery was such a hotbed of royalist support was the marquis of Montrose himself. The seat of the Graham family was Kincardine Castle, located less than a mile outside Auchterarder. The castle operated as a royalist stronghold from 1644 until it was reduced to a ruin by the earl of Middleton in 1646.[194] Montrose also owned large portions of the surrounding land, much of which was seized by the marquis's creditors once Montrose took up arms for the king.[195] Therefore, the fact that Kincardine Castle hosted royalist troops and that the area was probably influenced by Montrose explains why this relatively small presbytery boasted one of the highest deposition rates in the kingdom. A similar scenario unfolded in Kirkcudbright. All six of the presbytery's depositions occurred between 1638 and 1639, five of which included allegations of contumacy or opposition to the covenant. Within the boundaries of the presbytery of Kirkcudbright lies Threave Castle, which was garrisoned by the royalist earl of Nithsdale's troops from 1638-1640. In 1640, the castle was besieged for 13 weeks by covenanting forces before it surrendered.[196]

Every presbytery which oversaw six or more depositions between 1638 and 1651 (12 presbyteries in total) was part of the theatre of war and/or was home to a prominent royalist noble family, the exceptions being Edinburgh and St Andrews whose universities generated the initial resistance to the covenanters.[197] At least half of the depositions in each of these presbyteries were for religious nonconformity or royalist allegiance. The distribution pattern of these presbyteries again shows that there were royalist ministers active across the kingdom. It also indicates that opportunity and local influence were vital

[192] *Records of the Kirk*, 209.
[193] NRS, GD220/3/183. Also see p.131.
[194] Williams, *Montrose*, 393.
[195] NRS, GD220/1/B/5/4/2.
[196] Christopher J. Tabraham and George L. Good, 'The Artillery Fortification at Threave Castle, Galloway' in David H. Caldwell (ed.), *Scottish Weapons and Fortifications, 1100-1800* (Edinburgh, 1981), 56.
[197] Cipriano, 'The Scottish Universities and Opposition to the National Covenant', 14 and 17-24.

facilitators of royalist resistance. It was simply more feasible for ministers to vocalise their opposition to the regime if there was support for that opposition, such as the presence of royalist troops or the support of a local royalist network.

Figure 2.3: Number of Depositions from each Presbytery, 1638-1651.



Source: Fasti, i-vii.

However, this hypothesis does not explain why other royalist areas, such as Aberdeenshire, do not have such high deposition rates. The answer to that lies in the area's ability to protect its ministers.[198] The presbytery of Ellon was situated in Aberdeenshire, just north of Aberdeen, covering the kirks between Foveran, Methlink and Cruden Bay. Despite experiencing military action and being home to some of the most fervently royalist families in the kingdom (including the lairds of Haddo, Udny and Foveran), not a single minister was deposed from the presbytery between 1638 and 1651. While there were no depositions, it is clear from contemporary records that several clergymen from the presbytery were involved with the royalist faction. On 9 October 1639, the presbytery called upon three ministers to answer for their actions during the First Bishops' War. Thomas Thoirs, minister of Udny, John Patterson, minister of Foveran, and David Leitch, minister of Ellon, were reported to have deserted their parishes and fled to Newcastle to join the king's forces there.[199] From Newcastle, the ministers then accompanied viscount Aboyne and his men on their voyage from Newcastle to Aberdeen, which Aboyne occupied for the king before the battles of Megary Hill (15 June) and Brig O' Dee (18-19 June).[200] Thoirs was also one of the ministers who walked out of the 1638 general assembly alongside the marquis of Hamilton in protest at the covenanters' actions.[201] According to the acts passed by the general assembly in 1638 and 1639, the presbytery would have been justified in deposing the ministers, or at the very least suspending them. However, the minister overseeing their sentencing, William Mushet, minister of Slaines and Forvie, pardoned them.[202] It seems likely that Mushet's leniency was due to his own royalist sympathies, for on 21 September 1640 Mushet was ordered to preach a penitential sermon for his own disaffection to the covenanting regime.[203] Clearly, ministers within the presbytery used their positions to protect one another and to support local royalists. There are numerous references to local ministers continuing to assist royalists throughout the 1640s, for which they appear to have gone completely unpunished. The most brazen of these instances was when the laird of Haddo used Ellon as a staging post for his troops in

[198] It is also important to note that Aberdeenshire was also home to several zealously covenanted clergymen, such as David Lindsay, minister of Belhelvie (Aberdeen). See Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean, *Belhelvie: A Millennium of History* (Belhelvie, 2000), 26-7.
[199] NRS, CH2/146/3, 51.
[200] Thoirs, Patterson, and Leith were accompanied by two other ministers, John Gregorie, minister of Dulmoak (Dumbarton), and Frances Thomson, a preacher, who had similarly fled 'to the King'. See Spalding, *Memorialls*, i, 199. Aboyne's 1639 campaign is discussed in more detail on p.186.
[201] ibid, 81.
[202] NRS, CH2/146/3, 51.
[203] *Fasti*, vi, 201.

1644, during which time he lodged in the home of David Leitch and dined with him.[204] While the presbytery showed no signs of acting against these ministers, John Spalding's contemporary account makes it clear that ministers from the presbytery were known to be royalists. For instance, William Seaton, minister of Logie-Buchan, had his lands pillaged by covenanting troops in 1644 alongside other 'not subscrivers of the covenant'.[205] The reference to Seaton never having subscribed the covenant is supported by the fact that there is no record of the presbytery of Ellon ordering subscriptions. The presbytery records contain receipts of the acts of the general assembly, including the instructions to provide each kirk with a copy of the covenant, but there is no indication that the presbytery ordered subscriptions within its jurisdiction.[206]

Ministers could also protect their parishioners from the prying eyes of the regime. The presbytery of Dingwall forged a reputation for the prevalence of royalists within its boundaries, with five of its ministers being deposed for opposing the covenanters.[207] In 1649, upon instructions from the general assembly, the presbytery oversaw the investigation of hundreds of local parishioners for their involvement in the Engagement and Montrose's campaign. One particularly zealous covenanting minister reported 76 individuals whom he accused of having been supporters of the Engagement.[208] However, the fact that the presbytery was supposedly dominated by royalists does not seem to have been an issue until the general assembly urged the presbytery to take action in 1649. While there were clearly some committed covenanting ministers within the presbytery of Dingwall, most ministers showed little interest in pursuing their parishioners for aiding royalist forces. Apart from hearing the confessions of the accused and publicly declaring them malignants, the presbytery had to rely upon local ministers overseeing the punishment of these individuals.[209] While many parishioners did come before the presbytery to confess, others simply ignored it or made excuses as to why they could not attend.[210] This was particularly evident following Montrose's landing in Caithness in April 1650. The presbytery ordered that all of those previously accused of being royalists were to be warned that if they were found aiding Montrose or his men, they would be 'sentenced with exc[o]munic[ati]on sumarlie'.[211] Despite this, dozens of local people were reported to

[204] *Records of the Parish of Ellon*, ed. Thomas Mair (Edinburgh, 1876), 92-93; Spalding, *Memorialls*, ii, 349-350.
[205] Spalding, *Memorialls*, ii, 321-322.
[206] NRS, CH2/146/3, 43 and 92.
[207] *Fasti*, vii, 30, 33, 36, 41, 49.
[208] HAC, CH2/92/1, 24-25.
[209] ibid, 37-38.
[210] ibid, 36 and 44.
[211] ibid, 61.

have aided Montrose, many of whom were 'poore commones' who were 'pretending impossibilitie throw povertie to repaire to the P[res]b[yt]rie' to answer for their crimes. Once again, the presbytery had to rely upon local ministers to pursue these allegations, which many did not.[212] Another significant factor which played a role in Dingwall was the local gentry and nobility. The church elders from Lochcarron church reported to the presbytery in 1649 that despite the minister calling upon the parishioners to re-subscribe the Solemn League and Covenant, '[t]hey refused the same both tymes for fear of ther Superiors'.[213] This undoubtedly refers to the influence of the earl of Seaforth and the earl's brother, Thomas MacKenzie of Pluscardine, who had encouraged significant royalist resistance in the area between 1648 and 1649.[214] The influence of local gentry and nobility on parishes is difficult to assess in most circumstances, but this example shows that local elites could, and did, impose their will in some areas. This also suggests that royalist conformity could be enforced in a similar fashion to covenanting conformity, highlighting the reality that moderates were caught on both sides of the factional divide.

In other areas, it was the congregation itself which dictated ministers' actions, apparently through the influence of royalist nobles. When the presbytery of Strathbogie was instructed to collect subscriptions for the Solemn League and Covenant in 1643, a number of ministers reported that they had either only found a handful of willing signatories, or that their congregations had outright refused to comply. On 29 November, the ministers James Gordon, Alexander Fraser and William Reid reported to the presbytery that none within their parishes had wished to sign. Gordon even noted that his congregation had come together and 'they all in one voyce refused'.[215] No action was taken against the ministers as they had technically done what they were asked. It was their nameless congregations which were to blame, whose punishment – if there was any – was to be overseen by their minister who was unwilling to pursue the matter further. Strathbogie was also the heartland of the Gordons of Huntly, and it is likely that the unseen influence of local elites was at work here. A similar example comes from Islay following the island's occupation by royalist forces. On 11 October 1648, Archibald McAlister, minister of Kilchoman, was suspended for seven months for conspiring with the 'rebells' during their occupation of the island. McAlister defended himself by arguing that 'he was suddenly suprysed by the enemies comeing to the isle, and was forced to converse with

[212] ibid, 71.
[213] ibid, 14.
[214] See pp.230-231.
[215] NRS, CH2/342/2, 43.

them and with his whole congregation who turned rebells'. The synod heard evidence against McAlister which stated that not only had the minister and his congregation welcomed the royalists, but that they had received supplies from the royalist force under the command of 'the Captaine of Clan Ranald [John Macdonald, Chief of the MacDonalds of Clanranald]'. Despite this, McAlister swore that 'neither did he preach nor pray to them, nor for successe to their army'.[216] In the face of this, the synod of Argyll upheld McAlister's suspension with the warning that 'if any mo[r]e can be qualified against him that he be deposed'.[217] McAlister was reinstated on 9 May 1649 and neither he nor the synod appear to have taken any further action against the congregation of Kilchoman.[218]

The overall picture which emerges from this analysis suggests that clerical opposition to the covenanters was geographically widespread and far more prevalent than previous assessments have acknowledged. Of the 222 depositions recorded between 1638 and 1651, 130 (59%) included allegations of religious nonconformity and/or royalist allegiance. It should be remembered that this figure represents a minimum rather than a total, as there were clearly some depositions for moral offences which hid political motive and the details from several depositions do not survive. An analysis of the rate of deposition from each of the 14 synods conforms to David Stevenson's theory that deposition rates were higher in synods where covenanting support was already strong. However, when these figures are scrutinised and the deposition rates from each presbytery are examined, it is apparent that areas within the covenanting zone of influence (namely the central lowland synods) which experienced warfare or were home to active royalists possessed particularly high deposition rates. This suggests that it was not so much that these areas were more pro-covenanter than others, but that they were home to both royalists and covenanters. In areas where political support was overwhelmingly pro-royalist, royalist ministers could be protected from the kirk, resulting in lower rates of deposition. Presbyteries, local elites and congregations themselves were able to shield ministers from the regime's attempts to remove royalist ministers from their charges. Naturally, this makes it very difficult to produce an accurate map of royalist clerical resistance, as there were undoubtedly ministers who outwardly obeyed the general assembly but harboured royalist sympathies. The court process which the covenanters relied upon to pursue royalist ministers depended upon willing witnesses and local enforcement, both of which were scarce in royalist areas. Perhaps what this evidence

[216] NRS, CH2/557/1, 151-152.
[217] ibid, 152.
[218] ibid, 170.

shows most clearly are the limits of covenanting control over the clergy, and the laity, rather than the extent of clerical resistance.

Nevertheless, it is still possible to draw several important conclusions. If we accept Stevenson's estimate that there were 910 ministers within the Scottish kirk, the 130 ministers who were deposed represent 14%.[219] Given the fact the we know that there were active royalist ministers who were never deposed, and that the reasons for several depositions do not survive, it might be safe to conclude that as much as 15-20% of the clergy between 1638 and 1651 were involved with opposition to the covenanting regime. Royalist allegiance within the ministry was not geographically limited to a few 'small oases in the great expanse of uniformity', but geographically widespread with certain regions – particularly Glasgow, Aberdeenshire, Dingwall, Lanarkshire and Orkney – producing substantial opposition to the covenanting kirk.[220] Regions where there were strong covenanting and royalist groups produced the highest levels of clerical depositions. The importance and agency of royalist lay support in the parishes has also become clear. The support of the congregation was vital to both the covenanting authorities and the royalist resisters. Parishioners were both the biggest threat and most reliable defence for ministers, depending on where their loyalties lay. The evidence presented above further questions the accepted narrative that the covenanting regime was almost universally accepted throughout Scotland and suggests that Charles I could call upon support from every level of society.

2.6 Ideology and Rhetoric

The previous two sections have shown that a significant element within the Scottish clergy supported the royalist cause and that royalist clerical resistance took a number of forms, from the overt to the covert. This section will shift focus onto the question of motive. Why did so many ministers support the king's cause? Previous historiography has tended to emphasise the royalist clergy's attachment to Episcopalianism, which naturally placed them in alliance with the king and his supporters.[221] However, as demonstrated in Section 2.4, the majority of surviving royalist ministers' accounts emphasise their political opposition over any attachment to the episcopate. Of course, religious identity and political allegiance often went together. However, given the extent of political rhetoric seen in the

[219] Stevenson, 'Deposition of Ministers', 335.
[220] Hewison, *The Covenanters*, i, 274.
[221] Burgess, *British Political Thought*, 205; Donaldson, *Scotland: James V – James VII*, 306 and 319.

deposition records, it is necessary to reassess the motivations which led ministers to oppose the covenanting regime. To achieve this, the surviving corpus of royalist clerical literature will be analysed alongside the evidence relating to grassroots royalist ministers discussed in Section 2.4. These findings will also be compared to the conclusions from Chapter 1.

The first and best-known critics of the covenanters were the Aberdeen Doctors. Incensed by the covenanters' subscription campaigns during the summer of 1638, the Doctors published a printed rebuttal of the National Covenant. In the *Generall Demands, Concerning the Late Covenant (1638)* the Doctors constructed a multifaceted attack on the authority and legality of the covenant. The pamphlet opened with a withering assault on the covenanters' credentials, alleging that the National Covenant had no legal justification because it had not been authorised by any judiciary or assembly in the kingdom. This, the Doctors argued, was both illegal and contrary to scripture, stating that ministers were forbidden from exercising pastoral duties (including the collection of subscriptions) for congregations other than their own. This affront was compounded by the fact that the Doctors believed that the new covenant manipulated the original 1581 confession in order to bind the king's subjects in an armed revolt against Charles I's lawful and divinely ordained rule.[222] Repudiating the support which the National Covenant had gathered, the Doctors stated that the number of subscriptions alone could not justify the covenanters' actions, as 'so manie have been threatened to give their consent, as wee are most crediblie informed'.[223] Moreover, the Doctors were quick to point out that any and all bands of mutual defence without the king's express permission and authority were outlawed under legislation from the 1585 parliament.[224] The Doctors rejected any notion that authority was shared between the king and the people, stating that 'it belongeth not to the people, or communitie of the faithful, to contemne Authoritie', nor should it be the kirk's prerogative to constrain the king. Instead, it 'belongeth to those who are cloathed with lawful authoritie' to keep 'Gods house from the pollution of worship'. Crucially, this placed supreme authority in the king who then empowered loyal clergymen with that authority. Throughout the *Generall Demands* the Doctors also questioned the true intent behind the covenanters' actions, arguing that any allegations of religious innovation were unfounded as the king had repealed the 1637 Book of Common Prayer and 1636 Canons. They also refuted allegations that the episcopate or the Articles of Perth were illegal, arguing to the contrary that unlike the National Covenant both were authorised by the king and kirk, and

[222] *Generall Demands*, 3-8.
[223] ibid, 9.
[224] *RPS*, 1585/12/15.

that ‘our lawfull Superioures requir[e] Obedience from us, by practising them’.[225] By coupling the covenant’s support from the ‘multitude’ with its questionable legality, the Doctors portrayed the covenanting leaders as the architects of disorder and disunity.[226] By supporting the creation of anarchy, all those who preached in favour of the covenant were leading the king’s subjects into disobedience with half-truths and false promises.[227]

The Doctors’ rhetoric set the tone for subsequent royalist clerical polemic, focusing on the themes of legality, obedience and order rather than a strictly doctrinal rebuttal of covenanting theology or a diehard defence of episcopacy. John Strang, Principal of the University of Glasgow, focused on the same themes in his manuscript tract, *The Principal of Glasgow Against the Covenant* (1638). Strang had intended to deliver his critique in front of the 1638 general assembly but he was encouraged to withdraw the tract by leading covenanters in the days before the meeting.[228] Strang’s intended message to his fellow clergymen provides an invaluable insight into the reasons why he and other clergy might reject the National Covenant.[229] The maintenance of order and the protection of the king’s authority were at the forefront of Strang’s mind. At the beginning of the tract, Strang revealed his fear that ‘if memberis of our natural bodie be out of there proper joynt or place … the whole bodie must of necessitie com to ruine’. This breakdown of societal order would arise as a result of the usurpation of Charles I’s divine right to rule and the failure of his subjects in their duty to give obedience.[230] To avoid this, Strang urged for a ‘unitie of spirit in the bond of peace’.[231] In Strang’s eyes, the King’s Covenant offered the most expedient means of repairing the division within the kingdom, as it respected the king’s authority and safeguarded the 1581 King’s Confession. However, given the covenanters’ reluctance to sign the King’s Covenant, Strang, like the Doctors, had become suspicious of their true intentions. He believed that the king had satisfied the covenanters’ concerns, but there remained ‘jealusies betwix the King and his subjects’ which the covenanters had exploited with the goal of bringing down the episcopate and subverting the king’s authority. On this point, Strang reminded those who had signed the National Covenant that ‘we ar obliged to obey our superiors in all thaire commandementis’ and that they had ‘sworne to stand to the defence of the Kinges majestie [and] authoritie’. Moreover, Strang defiantly declared that ‘No man can doe dewtie to god, who rendereth

[225] *Generall Demands*, 20.
[226] ibid, 8.
[227] ibid, 40-41.
[228] This episode is discussed in more detail on p.209.
[229] For more information on the events leading up to the 1638 General Assembly, see Chapter 3, Section 3.5.
[230] NLS, Wodrow. Fol MSS. Folio. XXXI, no.2, f.21r.
[231] ibid, f.8r.

not dewtifull obedience to his king'.[232] In concluding, Strang warned that if the covenanters did not cease their divisive actions a 'lamentable division of this church' would occur, 'opening a door for the papists living amoung us to escaip ther censour'.[233]

These arguments were made again, but more explicitly, by Walter Balcanquhall in his *A Large Declaration Concerning the Late Tumults in Scotland* (1639). Balcanquhall was a Scottish clergyman, educated at the universities of Edinburgh and Cambridge, who had risen to become the Dean of Durham by 1639 and an important confidant and advisor to Charles I.[234] As the king's chief intelligence gatherer during the 1638-1639 troubles, Balcanquhall was tasked with composing a comprehensive rejection of the National Covenant and the covenanters. Part propaganda and part official response to the Glasgow Assembly, the *Large Declaration* abandoned the veiled criticisms and concerns found in the tracts from the Doctors and Strang in favour of a fervent denunciation of the covenanters as rebels and traitors. Balcanquhall rebuked the covenanters' actions insofar as 'following the patterne of all other seditions, they did and doe pretend Religion', which they used as a 'cloak to palliate their intended Rebellion'. He accused the covenanters of trying to 'undermine and blow up the Religion Reformed, by the scandal of Rebellion and Disobedience', leaving the kirk exposed to the forces of counter-reformation and a return to 'Roman obedience'. Like the Doctors, he also argued that the covenanters had created this 'undeserved scandal upon that Religion which we professe' in order to pursue secular gains and suppress the king's authority. In support of the established hierarchy and as a warning to the covenanters, Balcanquhall remarked that the 'Prince the Father of his Country' reserved the right to chastise 'his unruly children'.[235] Balcanquhall took care to frame the debate over the National Covenant within the secular realm. He was intent on fighting the covenant politically, not theologically, denouncing the covenanters as rebels and extremists. Part of this can be explained by the fact that the *Large Declaration* was intended to incite a popular response against the covenant. Thus, the use of incendiary political language was more effective than nit-picking theological interpretations.[236] However, the fact that all three of these tracts focused most on the political ramifications of the National Covenant and not the defence of episcopacy or the contested innovations

[232] ibid, f.12v and f.21r.
[233] ibid, f.22r.
[234] John Coffey, 'Balcanquhall, Walter (c. 1586–1645)', *ODNB* (2008).
[235] Balcanquhall, *Large Declaration*, 1-6.
[236] William Kerr, Earl of Lothian, published a detailed rebuttal of the *Large Declaration*, decrying its 'anti-Christian' lies and accusing it of purposefully seeking to divide the Scots while uniting English subjects against the National Covenant. See William Kerr, *A True Representation of the Proceedings of the Kingdome of Scotland; since the late Pacification: by the Estates of the Kingdome: against Mistakings in the late Declaration* (Edinburgh, 1640).

(such as the Articles of Perth), is revealing of the fears which drew supporters to the royalist camp.

Of course, the link between religious radicalism and political sedition was not new. The motif of rebels using religion as a cloak was employed extensively by royalists such as Pierre de L'Estoile during the French Wars of Religion (1562-1598) to contrast their own emphasis on political stability with the religious extremism of their opponents.[237] Indeed, the views of the *politiques* (those who emphasised the need to support the state and monarchy against religious fanaticism in order to safeguard the kingdom from collapse) during the French Wars of Religion resonate with the royalist rhetoric discussed above and in Chapter 1.[238] These ideas can also be found in the Scottish context, most notably in James VI's *The Trew Law of Free Monarchies* (1598), which accused 'seditious preachers' of spreading division and trying to 'stir up rebellion under cloake of religion'.[239] The recycling of these tropes suggests that royalists were attempting to tap into pre-established rhetoric which painted themselves as the guardians of moderation and stability while portraying the covenanters as dangerous extremists. The religious violence taking place on the continent during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) provided a particularly disquieting backdrop for such discourse. This explains royalist clerics' attachment to the notion of order and stability, and their apparently genuine fear that division within the kirk and state kindled the flames of counter-reformation. These arguments also indicate a wider continuity within royalist ideology as seen in secular sources such as Archibald Napier's *Letter about Soveraigne and Supreme Power* (c.1640) which denounced 'the arguments and false positions of seditiouse preachers' who, 'vailed with the plausible and speciouse pretext of religion', spread 'the spirits of division quhilk walk between the King and his people to separate them quhom God hath conjoyned'.[240] This explains the lack of religious rhetoric within royalist polemic. If religion was the weapon of choice of their enemies, royalists would need to force the covenanters to face the reality that they were waging a war against their Protestant king while the forces of the Catholic church fought against the Protestant states of Europe.

[237] Tom Hamilton, *Pierre de L'Estoile and his World in the Wars of Religion* (Oxford, 2017), 13-14.
[238] Edmund Beame, 'The Politiques and the Historians', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 54 (1993), 355-379.
[239] *King James VI and I*, 71. The overlap in rhetoric used by James VI and Balcanquhall has previously been noted by Richard Cust, see Richard Cust, 'Charles I and Popularity' in Thomas Cogswell, Richard Cust and Peter Lake (eds), *Politics, Religion and Popularity in Early Modern Britain* (Cambridge, 2002), 248-252.
[240] Reid (ed), *The Party-Coloured Mind*, 76. Napier and other secular royalist writers are discussed in detail in Chapter 1, Section 1.6.

Royalist parish ministers were not only aware of these arguments but actively wielded them in their efforts to resist and refute the covenant. This was articulately expressed in the pamphlets of John Corbet. Corbet had been the minister of Bonhill (Dumbarton), but fled to Ireland in 1639 to avoid swearing the covenant which he saw as a direct assault upon the king's authority. While in Ireland, Corbet published two pamphlets, both attacking the covenanters' justifications for seizing power and taking up arms against the king. In *The Ungirding of the Scottish Armour* (1639), Corbet accused the 'fiery-zealous Faction' of using the covenant as a 'cloak' in their attempt to subvert royal authority and pursue 'open Rebellion'.[241] Declaring his duty to 'God, my King and Country', Corbet urged his countrymen not to follow the covenant into 'that Warre which is forbidden by God, adventure not a poore soule upon such an hazard, in resisting superior powers, which is to resist the Ordinance of God'.[242] In Corbet's eyes, the covenanters were 'enemies to the Gospell of Christ, to the salvation of peoples soules and to the peace of this Church and Kingdome', who had 'advanced their ungodly and Antichristian course, by lies and persecution, by craft and cruelty'.[243] Corbet condemned the covenanters' actions in enforcing the covenant 'with force and violence' and their suppression of the King's Covenant. He concluded that he could not swear the covenant for it would '1. Sin against God, 2. Contemne Authority, 3. And abjure my Christian Liberty'.[244]

In his second pamphlet, *The Epistle Congratulatorie of Lysimachus Nicanor of the Societie of Jesu to the Covenanters in Scotland* (1640), Corbet took on the persona of a Jesuit priest under the pseudonym of Lysimachus Nicanor.[245] Throughout this satirical pamphlet, Nicanor revelled in the covenanters' attacks on Charles I and their supposed realignment with the Catholic church. Nicanor celebrated the covenanters' denunciation of monarchical authority, defending it as necessary in order to ensure their supremacy over the crown.[246] These actions and the kirk's control over the nobility were seen by Nicanor as essential to defend 'Covenanting without and against Authority' and ensure that the covenanters maintained control over parliament.[247] Without this, he stated, 'you [the covenanters] shall never lawfully resist him [Charles I]'.[248] Nicanor advised that if Charles

[241] John Corbert, *The Ungirding of the Scottish Armour: Or An Answer to the Informations for Defensive Armes against the Kings Majestie, which were drawn up at Edenburgh* (Dublin, 1639), iii-vi and 1.
[242] ibid, 2.
[243] ibid, 3.
[244] ibid, 55.
[245] John Corbet [Lysimachus Nicanor], *The Epistle Congratulatorie of Lysimachus Nicanor of the Societie of Jesu to the Covenanters in Scotland* (Dublin, 1640).
[246] ibid, 3-5.
[247] ibid, 2,6 and 8.
[248] ibid, 8.

would not content himself with 'the name of a King', the covenanters should continue the legacy of their 'puritan' forebearers (John Knox and George Buchanan are named) and look to depose him.[249] No matter the fate of Charles, Nicanor urged the covenanters to continue in their rebellion as 'now a door is opened to let in all Popery, whether the King will or no'.[250] In particular, he counselled the covenanters to continue to force the 'Commons' to swear the covenant while pretending loyalty to the king.[251] Alongside this, Nicanor advocated that they carry on suppressing those who spoke out against the covenant, ignoring their accusations of popery and puritanism and denouncing them as 'antichristian'.[252] On this point, he noted how:

> His Holinesse our Pope, did never laugh more heartily, than when it was told [to] him, that you made the people believe that the book of Common Prayer was penned in Rome, and sent to the King, and that it was nothing but masse turned into English; and that the King was a Papist, and intended to change the Religion. That your Bishops were Pensioners to the Pope, and that all, who would not subscribe y[o]ur covenant are Papists.[253]

Even among those who had signed the covenant, fears over the movement's true intentions can be seen. In his *To the Nobilitie, Gentrei, Burrowes, Ministers, and others of this late Combination in Covenant, A Friendly and Faythfull Advice* (1639), William Guild, a former member of the Aberdeen Doctors, called upon the signatories of the covenant to remember their loyalty to the king.[254] In his pamphlet, Guild reminded his readers that God saw into the hearts of men; if they used the 'pretence of zeale for Religion' for 'your owne private gayne, or other sinistrous respects' they risked invoking his wrath.[255] Guild also cautioned the covenanters that they should 'rememver your owne places, as Subjects, and your dueties accordinglie', as any attempt to subvert the king's authority was contrary to the will of God which had placed him upon the throne.[256] Like his royalist colleagues, Guild warned that the 'Romanists' sought to 'make their most advantageous use of a miscarriage on your partes' and act upon the disunity between the king and his subjects. Guild also condemned the doctrine of lawful resistance expressed by the monarchomachs, whom he described as 'jesuiticall'.[257] Echoing the rhetoric of the Aberdeen Doctors and John Strang, Guild argued that the king had done his duty in

[249] ibid, 12-15, 44 and 46-47.
[250] ibid, 36.
[251] ibid, 46-50.
[252] ibid, 25-26.
[253] ibid, 56.
[254] Special thanks to Russell Newton for sharing this document with me. While it was printed 1639, there is evidence to suggest that Guild had written the piece in 1638 and had circulated copies in manuscript form.
[255] William Guild, *To the Nobilitie, Gentrei, Burrowes, Ministers, and others of this late Combination in Covenant, A Friendly and Faythfull Advice* (Aberdeen, 1639), 3-4.
[256] ibid, 4.
[257] ibid, 5.

listening to the covenanters' demands and that any further attempt by the covenanters to force change would result in 'the rupture between him [the king] and his subjects', much to the delight of their 'Romish Adversaries'.[258]

By 1640, the events of the previous two years seemed to confirm many royalist fears. Thomas Forrester, minister of Melrose (Selkirk), had been deposed in 1638 for refusing the covenant and defending the episcopate. Following his dismissal, Forrester composed a scathing poem, entitled *A Satire, Relating to Public Affairs 1638-39* (c.1640).[259] In his *Satire*, Forrester noted how all loyal subjects lamented as the covenanters seized the king's forts and ports in order to 'shelter rebels and withstand The King's, nay God's revenging hand'. Citing 'treasone books' such as 'Buchannan's Regni Jus' as the covenant's inspiration, Forrester accused the covenanters of 'making pricklows [knaves] and the King Of equal power in [e]very thing'.[260] According to Forrester, the 'parlour preachers' using 'false and forged information Against the King's gracious declarations' had used the covenant to justify their treason and created 'a sanctuary To felons and falsuries [liars]'.[261] These falsehoods and lies had, in Forrester's eyes, transformed the kirk into a 'mutinous maklet [deformed] trouble-feast, A prattie, peevish, monstrous beast' which had become 'the bane of kings'.[262]

The remarkable consistency of ideology throughout these works can also be seen in the writings of John Maxwell, former Bishop of Ross, despite his more pronounced theological focus. Having fled the kingdom to avoid subscribing the covenant, Maxwell took refuge at Charles I's court. While in England, Maxwell penned two pamphlets which attacked the covenanters. The first of these, *Episcopacie Not Abjured in His Majesties Realme of Scotland* (1641), defended the legitimacy of episcopacy as a form of church governance and, like the other royalist texts, accused the covenanters of usurping political power from the king. Maxwell chastised the covenanters for their seditious and treasonous actions, particularly through their subversion of 'Church and Regall Authority' which they used to 'blow the trumpet of Rebellion, both in their Pulpits and private conferences,

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[258] ibid, 7.
[259] Thomas Forrester, 'A Satire, Relating to Public Affairs 1638-39 (c.1640)', in *The Scots Magazine and Edinburgh Literary Miscellany* 69 (1807), 117-122.
[260] George Buchanan's *De Jure Regni apud Scotos Dialogus* (1579) was vital in the development of both Scottish constitutional thought and Scottish divine right theory through the works of James VI, William Barclay and Adam Blackwood. See George Buchanan, 'De Jure Regni apud Scotos Dialogus (1579)', in Roger Mason and Martin S. Smith (eds), *George Buchanan's Law of Kingship: De Lure Regini Apud Scotos Dialogus* (Edinburgh, 2006); James H. Burns, *The True Law of Kingship: Concepts of Monarchy in Early-Modern Scotland* (Oxford, 1996), 222-254.
[261] Forrester, 'A Satire', 119-121.
[262] ibid, 118.

drawing the people after them, and the simplest sort of Ministers also'.[263] 'Out of a blind zeal and Jesuiticall obedience' which came 'from Edinburgh, not heaven', Maxwell lamented how the king's subjects had been led into rebellion through an unauthorised covenant while loyal subjects were excluded, shunned and persecuted.[264] In particular, Maxwell decried the manipulation and abuse of the general assembly by laymen, which he argued revealed the covenanters' true motive.[265] Indeed, Maxwell argued that he and his fellow bishops were deposed unlawfully, excommunicated without being granted the opportunity to defend themselves and suppressed by the covenanters to facilitate their seizure of both ecclesiastical and secular power. Maxwell claimed that all of this was done through a false interpretation of the 1581 King's Confession which had enabled the dismissal of the bishops and the introduction of 'most dangerous [in]Novations' designed to justify the unlawful abolishment of episcopacy.[266] The former bishop disregarded covenanting claims of religious justification, candidly stating that such assertions were false, as 'God is the God of order, and the God of peace, and the author and commander of obedience unto Superiors; and therefore cannot be called without blasphemie, the author of Rebellion, Disobedience, Disorder, and Confusion in Church or Common-wealth'.[267]

Maxwell's second pamphlet, *Sacro-sancta Regum Majestas: Or The Sacred and Royall Prerogative of Christian Kings* (1644), was far more theologically oriented than previous royalist clerical polemic, but similarly focused on the scriptural justification for the king's supremacy over both kirk and state. Dedicated to the marquis of Ormond, commander of royalist forces in Ireland, *Sacro-sancta Regum Majestas* repeatedly made the point that 'Religion teacheth kings how to rule, Subjects how to obey, maketh obedience complete, universall, entire in all things'.[268] Forced to 'put pen to paper to right our gracious Soveraigne, [and] to undeceive his Subjects', Maxwell argued that 'the Jesuite and Puritaine endeavour by no lesse spurious then specious pretexts of Liberty of the people and Subjects, of the reforming Religion … to robbe kings of their Sacred and divine Right and Prerogative'.[269] In the same fashion as other royalist tracts, Maxwell accused these puritans (referencing both the covenanters and the English parliamentarians) of 'pretending such a zeale against Popery' but in reality joining forces with Jesuits so that

[263] John Maxwell, *Episcopacie Not Abjured in His Majesties Realme of Scotland* (London, 1641), 1 and 11.
[264] ibid, 5, 8 and 32.
[265] ibid, 3 and 29.
[266] ibid, 55 and 59.
[267] ibid, 30.
[268] John Maxwell, *Sacro-sancta Regum Majestas: Or The Sacred and Royall Prerogative of Christian Kings* (Oxford, 1644), ii.
[269] ibid, viii and 3.

they may 'unmake Kings at their pleasure'.[270] To make his case that 'the power of Royalty and Soveraignty is primarily, formally, and immediately from God', Maxwell called upon numerous biblical and classical sources to support his claims that monarchy, particularly the rule of Protestant princes, was divinely ordained and ensured peace and justice.[271] Citing Timothy 2: 1-2 (pray for kings, as they ensure peace), Romans 13 (there is no authority except that which God has established), Clement I (kings are ordained by God), Tertullian (kings are of God's making), Optatus (there is none above the king but God), Athanasius (God gives kings to their kingdoms), Plutarch (society without government is unsustainable) and others, Maxwell refuted at length the covenanters' use of defensive arms against the king.[272] Like Corbett, he attacked George Buchanan for teaching that 'God hath fixed all Government, Sovereignty, and Majestie, in the Community', a notion which Maxwell denied wholeheartedly, suggesting that such claims must mean that 'Democracie were the best of Governments'. As such, Maxwell berated the covenanters as treasonous not only against Charles, but against God as they had misused his word for their own gain.[273]

After 1644 Scottish royalist literature from clergymen disappears from the record, most likely as a result of the escalation in the conflicts within England, Ireland and Scotland. However, the homogeneity of themes within the material we possess suggests that royalist ministers supported the king's cause out of an ingrained belief in the divine nature of kingship, the desire to maintain societal order and a fear of the religious extremism of the covenanting regime. Crucially, these themes can be correlated with the conclusions from Chapter 1 and the deposition records discussed in Section 2.4. Whether it be Andrew Learmouth's accusations of perjury against the covenant for raising arms against the king, John Gordon's denunciation of the covenanters as 'rebells and commone traitors', or John Michaelson's cries that the covenanters were 'taking the crowne aff the kings ma[jes]ties head', it is clear that royalist ministers were most concerned by the covenanters' attack on the king's authority which risked eroding the foundations of societal order and stability.

The paucity of Episcopalian rhetoric, both within clerical literature and the accounts of parish ministers, seems to undermine previous arguments which have emphasised the royalist clergy's dogmatic Episcopalianism over their political loyalty to

[270] ibid, 3 and 24.
[271] ibid, 21.
[272] ibid, 32, 74-77 and 92.
[273] ibid, 115.

Charles I. On the contrary, evidence from clerical accounts and polemic suggests that royalist ministers believed that the assault on the episcopate was the first step towards an attack on the monarchy, which in turn risked political and religious schism. Of all the clergymen discussed in this section, the only author who composed a theological defence of Episcopalianism was bishop Maxwell. Even this did not defend the virtues of episcopacy per se, but maintained that it was the only authorised form of worship and that it had been abolished illegally. This might reflect the fact that Maxwell was, from 1638, exiled in England writing for a predominantly English Anglican audience. Thus, it would make sense that Maxwell was eager to reject any attack on the crown's ecclesiastical authority. This is not to say that many royalist clergymen were not firmly Episcopalian, which individuals such as Corbett and Maxwell clearly were. This research instead suggests that the most important religious element of clerical royalism was not the attachment to Episcopalianism, but the fear of radical covenanting and its implications for the stability of the state.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that there was a significant proportion of the Scottish clergy who were disaffected to the covenanting regime and supported the royalist cause. While the royalist clergy remained a minority, the scale of discernible royalist allegiance discussed above far exceeds previous estimates. Using deposition records, it has been argued that there were four phases of resistance. The first wave occurred as a result of the covenanters' initial seizure of power between 1638 and 1640. There was then a lull in open resistance from royalist ministers between 1641 and 1643 before conflict was reignited with the revival of royalist military fortunes between 1644 and 1647. The Engagement (1647-1648) and Montrose's second campaign (1649-1650) created a final political crisis within the clergy, with the number of depositions for resistance to the covenanting regime peaking in this period.

Royalist ministers voiced support for the king's cause in different ways. Indeed, methods of resistance varied between individuals, but included acts of nonconformity such as upholding banned liturgical practices, as well as more outspoken acts of defiance such as signing the King's Covenant, preaching against the covenanting regime, writing anti-covenanting tracts and inciting armed resistance. Clergymen were also prominent in supporting royalist forces in the field, both in voicing support for their campaigns and in providing aid and intelligence. Support could also be very individualistic, with a number of

ministers pursued by the covenanting kirk for declining the covenant or refusing to promote the regime. Much of the success of clerical royalist resistance was determined by the minister's locality, especially his congregation and the attitude of local elites. The kirk's courts required willing witnesses in order to root out royalist sympathisers within the clergy. As seen in several examples above, the political sympathies of a congregation often determined the fate of the local minister.

Geographically, royalist allegiance within the clergy was widespread. Evidence presented in Section 2.5 conclusively shows that ministers from across the kingdom voiced support for the king's cause and that royalism was not solely the preserve of the supposedly conservative regions of the north. Records of deposition show that there was significant royalist sympathy in several areas not traditionally associated with royalism, namely Glasgow, Lanarkshire, Stirlingshire and Orkney. Alongside this, it has been argued that there were areas, like Ellon in Aberdeenshire, where royalist ministers were shielded by their congregations or local elites from the kirk's attempts to force them out. This supports the theory put forward by David Stevenson that the general assembly often relied upon visitation commissions to expose royalist ministers, as seen in the link between the activities of visitation committees and the rate of deposition in certain regions. Trigger events, such as local royalist activity or a national event (the Engagement, for example), have been highlighted as vital facilitators of royalist resistance, providing ministers with both the motive and opportunity to act upon their loyalties. Combining this information with the data collected from deposition records, it has been estimated that perhaps as much as 15-20% of the Scottish clergy acted to support the royalist cause. Therefore, it must be concluded that the scale of royalism within the clergy has been significantly underplayed within the current historiography. This becomes plain when compared to the level of resistance experienced following the implementation of the Five Articles of Perth. The articles, which have often been attributed with causing a schism within the clergy and society at large, resulted in at least 30 ministers being warded, suspended or deposed between 1618 and 1625.[274] The 130 ministers deposed for supporting the king's cause between 1638 and 1651 dwarfs this, and yet, royalism within the clergy in this era has regularly been characterised as marginal. By examining the range of sources highlighted above, we can now conclusively say this was not the case.

Perhaps most important of all, this chapter has shown that there was remarkable consistency in royalist ideology and rhetoric within the clergy. Repeatedly, the importance

[274] MacDonald, *The Jacobean Kirk*, 164.

of the rule of law, the preservation of order, the divine right of Charles I's rule, anxiety over Protestant schism and the fear of covenanting religious extremism appear as themes within royalist ministers' accounts. The royalist clergy's focus on legality, divine right and order are consistent with the conclusions of the previous chapter on the royalist nobility. From the inception of the covenanting movement, royalist clergymen were most concerned with the ramifications of the covenanters' actions on the authority of the king, and argued that their religious motivations were merely a cloak for their political designs. Any attempt to usurp authority from the king risked invoking the wrath of God and inviting schism upon the church and state, leaving the kirk susceptible to counter-reformation. While there were many ministers deposed for continuing to adhere to the pre-1638 liturgy, few royalist ministers argued explicitly for a return to episcopacy, suggesting that the role of Episcopalianism within the royalist clergy has been overemphasised in the past. Given the royalist emphasis on the importance of the preservation of the king's authority, it seems likely that the defence of episcopacy was seen more as the defence of authorised religion, rather than an exoneration of doctrine. This is supported by the fact that only two ministers were deposed for religious nonconformity after 1640. Moreover, this is consistent with the evidence presented in Chapter 1 which argued that the royalist nobility were less concerned with the security of the episcopate than the defence of the crown's authority.

In summary, royalism within the clergy was both far more widespread, and far more ideologically unified and integrated within Scottish royalist ideology than has been previously realised. This is all the more remarkable given the fractured nature of the royalist leadership in Scotland, especially within the clergy, where there was no national attempt to create organised resistance, which therefore depended upon local initiatives. The royalist clergy was not a monolithic bloc, but a loose affiliation of likeminded ministers who shared the same beliefs and fears.

Chapter 3 - Royalism and the Burghs

'Trust ye not in a friend, put no confidence in a guide; keep the door of your lips from her that lieth in thy bosom; for the sone disshonoreth the father, and a mans enemies are those of his own house'

Michah (7:5) from the King James Bible. Quoted in the *Wardlaw Manuscript* to describe the burgh of Inverness and its hinterland in 1644.[1]

3.1 Introduction

From the previous two chapters, it is possible to draw three important conclusions. Firstly, Scottish royalist allegiance was ideologically cohesive and geographically widespread. Secondly, royalist resistance was often organised locally, frequently independent of any overarching royalist infrastructure. Finally, both national and local trigger events could cause political realignment and conflict.

In this final chapter focus shifts from the parishes to the burghs, to assess the extent to which the actions and experiences of royalists in urban centres corroborate these findings. This will aid the comprehensiveness of this thesis and complete its three estates approach. Using the case-studies of Aberdeen, Glasgow and Inverness, this chapter seeks to identify and explore royalism within these burghs. Focusing on the burgh councils, these case-studies provide narratives of royalism within these burghs and allow for an analysis of royalism in real time. While burgesses and burgh town councils are the focus of this chapter, where possible, efforts are made to assess royalism outwith the urban elite, and the influence of local nobility, gentry and clergymen. These studies investigate the power dynamics and local circumstances which characterised these burghs' experiences of the civil wars and uncover the nature and popularity of royalism within them.

3.2 Scholarship

Within his discussion of *Urban Politics in Early Modern Europe* (2000), Christopher Friedrichs noted that in times of great upheaval or stress, European urban centres were 'almost always pragmatic'.[2] Based on a far-reaching study of Europe's towns and cities, he concluded that the priorities of these semi-autonomous entities were the preservation of

[1] James Fraser of Phophacy, *The Chronicles of the Frasers/The Wardlaw Manuscript*, ed. William Mackay (Edinburgh, 1905), 288.
[2] Christopher R. Friedrichs, *Urban Politics in Early Modern Europe* (London, 2000), 21.

their existing rights and the pursuit of new privileges. According to Friedrichs, growing pressure from above (the nobility/gentry) and below (the urban citizenry), led magistrates to jealously control the town or city's institutional infrastructure, while also showing themselves to be the inhabitants' appointed representatives and ambassadors.[3]

Within the historiography on the Scottish burghs during the civil wars, two distinct strands of thought have developed in the last thirty years; one which would agree with Friedrichs's model, emphasising the burghs' pragmatism under the covenanters, and another which stresses the burghs' ideological commitment to the new regime. The former group which has most recently been represented by Alan MacDonald has largely followed in the footsteps of David Stevenson.[4] Stevenson argued that while the burghs had been hesitant at first, once Edinburgh decided to commit to the covenanting cause the others soon followed suit, with the exceptions of Aberdeen, St Andrews and Crail which had to be coerced into submission. Stevenson contended that the financial concerns of the burghs were the main motivators which led to the remarkable solidarity they showed in their support for the covenanting regime, with religious sympathies playing an important but secondary role.[5] He also warned that the perception of unity amongst Scotland's burghs might be somewhat illusory, caused by the growing power of urban elites and the relatively small circle of those who actually wielded any political power. Thus, he encouraged further study, particularly on individual burghs in order to identify whether there was genuine unified support, or whether local feuds and power struggles played a much greater role than had been previously identified. [6] MacDonald's study of the burghs has produced similar conclusions, maintaining that the only occasions where the burghs presented a united front was in defence of existing privileges or in their pursuit of new rights. Compared to the pre-war Stuart state, the covenanting regime offered the burghs better opportunities to pursue new privileges and protect their existing rights through parliament and the convention of royal burghs, both of which the covenanters controlled between 1640 and 1647.[7] In contrast, Allan Macinnes and John Young have proposed that it was an ideological commitment to the 'Covenanting Revolution', not pure pragmatism, that led the burghs to support the new regime. Alongside the gentry and a core of radical nobles,

[3] ibid, 21-22.
[4] Stevenson, *Scottish Revolution,* 308-311; Stevenson, *Revolution and Counter-revolution*; David Stevenson, 'The Burghs and the Scottish Revolution', in Michael Lynch (ed), *The Early Modern Town in Scotland* (London, 1987), 167-191; David Stevenson, 'The Financing of the Cause of the Covenants', *Scottish Historical Review* 51 (1972), 227-247.
[5] Stevenson, 'The Burghs and the Scottish Revolution', 167 and 176-178.
[6] ibid, 186.
[7] Alan R. MacDonald, *The Burghs and Parliament in Scotland, c.1550-1651* (Abington, 2007), 28-30 and 80-82.

the burghs were able to control the political institutions of the kingdom and use them to pursue the constitutional and religious objectives of the covenanters. Macinnes and Young argue that this 'oligarchic centralism' resulted in what Young describes as the closest thing to a 'Scottish Commons' that parliament had ever seen.[8]

The issue with both arguments is that they have worked backwards from a national picture, using parliamentary membership and voting trends to gauge localised support. This top-down approach has several issues, including its tendency to mask conflict experienced at the grassroots, and the level of political engagement in the burghs outwith the elite. As Stevenson noted, without looking at individual burgh's experiences of the civil wars, we cannot accurately assess the extent of factional infighting within Scotland's towns and cities.[9]

Laura Stewart's 2006 study of Edinburgh and Gordon DeBrisay's 2002 reassessment of Aberdeen provide models for the methodology encouraged by Stevenson.[10] Stewart's study illuminated the factionalised nature of Edinburgh's internal politics and highlighted how both covenanting and royalist leaders tried to influence the structures of power within the city. Despite Edinburgh's premier position within the covenanting narrative, Stewart found evidence of divisive power struggles within the burgh council and noted how several prominent Edinburgh burgesses were able to use their positions to both attack and defend the covenant. In the end, popular support for the covenanters was thicker on the ground and the pro-covenanting magistrates were able to dominate the burgh council from 1640 until the Engagement in 1647.[11] Stewart's findings also raise questions as to how much power and influence the Edinburgh-based covenanting regime was able to exert over the other burghs. All the important decision-making and policy was created in the capital, but how was the covenanting leadership able to overrule the other burghs and keep them in check, and to what extent was it successful? We may never be able to answer this question fully, as the records of the convention of royal burghs between 1636 and 1647 are missing, but case-studies can reveal the level of collective enthusiasm or political unity amongst the burghs.[12] DeBrisay has argued that Aberdeen's

[8] Macinnes, *Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement*, 183-206; Young, *The Scottish Parliament,* 46-47; Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and the Covenanting Revolution', 164-184.
[9] Stevenson, 'The Burghs and the Scottish Revolution', 176-178.
[10] Gordon DeBrisay, ''The civill warrs did overrun all': Aberdeen, 1630-1690', in E. Patricia Dennison, David Ditchburn and Michael Lynch (eds), *Aberdeen before 1800: A New History* (East Linton, 2002), 238-266; Stewart, *Urban Politics and the British Civil Wars*.
[11] Stewart, *Urban Politics and the British Civil Wars*, 295.
[12] *Records of the Convention of Royal Burghs, 1555; 1631-1648*, eds. Alan R. MacDonald and Mary Verschuur (Woodbridge, 2013); MacDonald, *The Burghs and Parliament in Scotland*, 80.

reputation as a stalwart royalist burgh within existing scholarship has concealed the extent to which national politics divided the city. Moreover, he has contended that the covenanting faction within Aberdeen has been underestimated and that the allegiance of the burgh remained in flux for the duration of the civil wars, a conclusion which has since been supported by Barry Robertson's investigation into covenanting sympathy in the north-east of Scotland.[13] In addition, Sharon Adams's 2002 PhD thesis on the south-west of Scotland found that burgesses in the region tended to resist the local royalist nobility and gentry in their support for the covenant. [14]

This topic is far more developed in England where studies on popular allegiance in towns and cities have provided invaluable sources for understanding grassroots experiences of the civil wars. The oldest school of thought on the matter is the argument that social status affected political support. Indeed, this theory can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes who claimed that most of the merchant class supported the English parliamentarians as they offered the greatest opportunities for economic expansion.[15] This influenced the interpretation of the wars as a pseudo-class conflict. In a similar vein, the work of David Underdown, Ann Hughes, Christopher Hill and Alan Everitt has argued that allegiance was most influenced by geography, the local economy and influence of the gentry.[16] This resulted in the dissection of England's counties and shires into royalist and parliamentarian camps. In turn, this was refuted by a new wave of thought which argued that the majority of the population was neutral in the conflict. This theory has been best argued by Roger Howell who claimed that most towns attempted to stay neutral for as long as possible before being forced by an external influencer to side with one party or the other. While Howell admitted that there were exceptions to this, he rejected previous attempts to map allegiance as having confused willingness with necessity.[17] The next leap forward came with the research conducted by Mark Stoyle, Jacqueline Eales, Charles

[13] DeBrisay, ''The civill warrs did overrun all': Aberdeen, 1630-1690', 247; Robertson, 'The Covenanting North of Scotland, 1638-1647', 24–51.
[14] Sharon Adams, 'A Regional Road to Revolution: Religion, Politics and Society in South-West Scotland, 1600-50' (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2002). Also see Michelle Brock, 'Plague, Covenants, and Confession: The Strange Case of Ayr, 1647–8', *The Scottish Historical Review* 97 (2018), 129-152.
[15] Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth, or the Long Parliament*, ed. Ferdinand Tonnies (London, 1889), 2.
[16] Alan Everitt, *The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion, 1640-60* (Leicester, 1973); Ann Hughes, *Politics, Society and Civil War in Warwickshire, 1620-1660* (Cambridge, 1987); Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down* (London, 1972); David Underdown, 'The Chalk and the Cheese: Contrasts among the English Clubmen', *Past & Present* 85 (1979), 25-48; David Underdown, 'The Problem of Popular allegiance in the Civil War', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 31 (1981), 69-94.
[17] Roger Howell, 'Neutralism, Conservatism and Political Alignment in the English Revolution: The Case of the Towns, 1642-1649', in John Morrill (ed), *Reactions to the English Civil War 1642–1649* (Basingstoke, 1982), 67-88.

Carlton and David Scott.[18] In particular, Stoyle's comprehensive investigation into popular allegiance in Devon provided truly ground-breaking advancements for our understanding of popular politics in the localities. Stoyle found that while there were regions dominated by one of the warring factions, many areas were deeply divided. The city of Exeter was a prime example of this.[19] Finding widespread social participation in political disputes, Stoyle concluded that 'people from all ranks of society possessed very definite political views'.[20]

Similarly, Micheál Ó Siochrú has found that although Ireland's major cities exercised a policy of 'strategic neutralism', within these urban centres there were ideologically driven factions. For example, in Limerick politically motivated aldermen fought against the neutralist policies of the city council to lend support to the confederate cause. Ó Siochrú noted how the clergy and the presence of a military garrison could influence the nature of internal politics within these cities.[21] Similarly, Robert Armstrong's research on the Irish Protestant communities in Ulster found that local pragmatism and loyalties were vital in determining how areas responded throughout the civil wars. Armstrong argued that while many Irish Protestant communities had come out strongly in support of Charles I at the beginning of the conflict, their support waned as the wars went on, eventually abandoning the king in order to support the English parliamentarians. This was largely due to a growing belief that the king could no longer support the Protestant Irish in their fight against the Catholic confederation.[22]

When comparing studies in England and Ireland to those in Scotland, it is clear that the Scottish historiography has lagged behind the advancements made elsewhere. Scottish local studies have the potential to answer some of the most pressing questions in regard to popular royalist allegiance. How prevalent were royalist sympathies within the burghs? Were local power struggles being fought out across the kingdom which we have simply not recognised up to this point? Did local triggers, like occupations and garrisoning, spark conflict within the burghs? And perhaps most important of all, what did local royalists do when the burghs were brought under covenanting control from 1639 onwards?

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[18] Charles Carlton, *Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars, 1638-1651* (London, 1992); Jaqueline Eales, *Community and Disunity: Kent and the English Civil Wars, 1640-1649* (Faversham, 2001); David Scott, 'Politics and Government in York, 1640-1662', in R. C. Richardson (ed), *Town and Countryside in the English Revolution* (Manchester, 1992), 46-68; Stoyle, *Loyalty and Locality.*
[19] Stoyle, *Loyalty and Locality*, 97-107
[20] ibid, 229.
[21] Micheál Ó Siochrú, 'Civil Autonomy and Military Power in Early Modern Ireland', *Journal of Early Modern History* 15 (2011), 31-57.
[22] Armstrong, *Protestant War*, 221-235.

3.2 Methods and Sources

The aim of this chapter is to answer these questions and investigate royalist support and activity within the royal burghs of Aberdeen, Glasgow and Inverness.[23] These burghs were selected for three reasons. Firstly, there has been limited research on civil war royalism within any of these cities. Secondly, all three burghs found themselves on the frontline of the conflict at one point or the other, which, based upon the findings of the English and Irish historiography, makes it more likely that the inhabitants of these cities were forced at some point to take an ideological stand. Thirdly and finally, the geographic spread of these locations allows for a balanced overview and includes highland and lowland sampling.

The investigation into these burghs has largely taken the form of analysing the composition of the burghs' councils and tracing the activities and political alignments of their members. Particular emphasis has been placed on investigating the attitudes and allegiances of the burghs' provosts and bailies, as they were the key political influencers within burgh life. Efforts have also been made to note instances where royalism was expressed by individuals outwith the burgh elite, including local nobles and gentry, clergy and ordinary male and female inhabitants.

This approach has largely been dictated by the surviving source material. The burghs' uneven representation within recent research partly arises from the varying survival rates of the necessary primary documents, particularly council records, the correspondence of burgh councillors and inhabitants, and external sources which complement the narratives contained within these materials. Unfortunately, we lack the depth of popular or lower-status sources which historians of the civil wars in England have used to good effect, revealing grassroots attitudes to the conflict. To compensate for this, a variety of different sources have been consulted. The primary method of gauging attitudes on the ground is through the burgh council records. These have then been cross-examined with other documents whenever possible. Such supporting materials include personal correspondence, contemporary histories/accounts and official records, such as parliamentary records. This thesis has largely relied on the printed extract copies of burgh council records. The original manuscripts have also been consulted, but the printed extracts have proved themselves to contain the evidence of greatest relevance to this study, and thus have been used as the primary means of referencing, largely for ease and replicability.

[23] The distinction between royal and non-royal burghs is discussed in Section 3.3.

It is hoped that this method can provide a model which can be employed to carry out similar studies into other burghs and in turn better our understanding of Scotland's experiences during the civil wars.

3.3 The Internal Structure of the Scottish Burghs

An understanding of the social and political structure of the Scottish royal burghs is required to understand the intricacies of burgh politics. Most burgh councils in this period comprised of between 12 and 25 burgess councillors, drawn from the merchant and craftsmen classes. At the head of the council was the provost, the burgh's political leader and principal ambassador. The provost was supported on the council by three or four bailies, who helped create and enforce the council's policy, controlled judicial matters through the burgh court and usually oversaw the collection of taxation.[24] Other important offices were the dean of guild (the representative of the merchants on the council), the deacon convener (the craftsmen's representative), the treasurer and the council clerk. The dean of guild was the next most important office after the bailies, as it was the dean's responsibility to oversee the burgh's trade network – through the dean of guild court – and building regulations. It was also common for the dean of guild to oversee the admission of new guild members and burgesses.[25] In contrast to this, the deacon convener held far less responsibility. The convener's main role was to oversee the council of deacons, which represented the burgh's craft groups. Thus, deacon conveners were normally only found in burghs with sizeable craft communities and were expected to be a means by which the town council could regulate the craft deacons.[26] The treasurer oversaw the burgh's finances, while the clerk was responsible for the administration of the council itself, which included providing a written account of council meetings and producing the council's letters. Elections to the council were annual, normally taking place around Michaelmas (29 September), when members from the existing council would vote on their replacements.

While all burghs generally observed this structure, there were variations and exceptions. For example, Inverness burgh council did not receive authorisation from parliament to create the office of the dean of guild until 1648, while Glasgow had been

[24] Stewart, *Urban Politics and the British Civil Wars*, 36.
[25] ibid.
[26] Paul Goatman, *Re-Formed by Kirk and Crown: Urban Politics and Civic Society in Glasgow during the reign of James VI, c.1585-1625* (PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 2017), 27 and 93.

given that right in 1605.[27] Some burghs also had to contend with the influence of external powers who held voting rights. For example, for much of the 1630s the burgh of Glasgow was under the control of the archbishop of Glasgow who reserved the right to nominate candidates for the provostship, as well as use his political muscle to force through his own nominees.[28] However, this was comparatively rare. Increasingly throughout the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the burghs, particularly the royal burghs, were able to become notably independent of external influence.[29] Within the burgh, the council was at the top of a strict urban hierarchy which gave it absolute control over the town or city. This control often extended to the various committees and commissions which councils oversaw, exercising their power through a council-ordered mandate.

All this is not to say that the burghs operated as independent city-states. Councils were acutely aware of the fact they drew their rights and privileges from parliament, and in the case of the royal burghs, the crown.[30] This could be advantageous, especially in warding off the interference of local nobles and gentry. Nonetheless, burghs could still be influenced by powerful nobles, with Aberdeen during the 1610s and 1620s being the epitome of this, having to contend with the rival influences of the Gordon and Keith families.[31] The crown could also force itself upon burgh politics, especially when an undesirable candidate secured an important office, although this was quite rare in the period under investigation.[32] Burgh councils also had to deal with internal pressures, the vast majority of which came from the burgesses (inhabitants who had full citizenship rights). Burgh council records sometimes refer to the 'neighbours' of the burgh, who often tried to advise or influence the council when something important had occurred. While we cannot say for certain who made up this group, there is no reason to disagree with Laura

[27] *Records of Inverness*, ed. William Mackay, Herbert C. Boyd and George S. Laing, 2 vols (Aberdeen, 1911-24), ii, 199; James McGrath, 'The Administration of the Burgh of Glasgow, 1574-1586', 2 vols (PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 1986), i, 4.
[28] William S. Shepard, 'The Politics and Society of Glasgow, 1648-74' (PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 1978), 5.
[29] S. H. Rigby and Elizabeth Swan, 'Government, Power and Authority, 1300-1540', in D. M. Palliser (ed), *The Cambridge Urban History of Britain* (Cambridge, 2008), 295.
[30] Royal burghs differed from other burghs in that their rights and privileges were protected by royal charter, as opposed to burghs of barony and ecclesiastical burghs whose charters had been granted by a local noble or bishop respectively. The burghs admittance to parliament was controlled by the crown. For more information, see MacDonald, *The Burghs and Parliament in Scotland*, 11-30.
[31] Kerr-Peterson, 'Politics and Protestant Lordship in North East Scotland', 289-291.
[32] The election of Patrick Leslie as Aberdeen's provost, and his subsequent removal in 1634 is a good example of this. See Alexander M. Munro, *Memorials of the Aldermen, Provosts, and Lord Provosts of Aberdeen, 1272-1895* (Aberdeen, 1897), 138.

Stewart's assessment that the term was used to identify those burgesses and influential inhabitants who were not on the sitting council.[33]

See Appendices 2-4 for lists of the provosts and bailies of Aberdeen, Glasgow and Inverness councils from 1638-1651.

3.4 Case Study: Aberdeen

Aberdeen's troubled relationship with the National Covenant is well recorded. Indeed, Gordon Donaldson used Aberdeen's resistance to the covenanters to typify the 'conservative north'.[34] While Donaldson's theory has been widely criticised in recent times, the general consensus within the scholarship of the civil wars still follows Donaldson's model. [35] Thus, Aberdeen has retained the title of Scotland's only royalist burgh. However, as mentioned above, this title has come under fire from Gordon DesBrisay and Barry Robertson. DesBrisay has highlighted the significant number of supporters the covenanters had within Aberdeen and the surrounding area, while Robertson has emphasised the important role played by local covenanting lairds in garnering support for the new regime.[36] DesBrisay did not reject Aberdeen's royalist identity, but concluded that the situation on the ground must have been 'a good deal more tangled than is sometimes supposed'.[37] The reality of Aberdeen's political composition during the civil wars is surprisingly uncertain given its reputation. Therefore, it is fitting that Aberdeen is the first case-study to be examined here.

Before 1638, the two burghs of Aberdeen (New and Old Aberdeen) had prospered.[38] Old Aberdeen, an ecclesiastical burgh, boasted two well-established universities in King's and Marischal colleges, cementing its position as the intellectual, financial and cultural centre of the north-east.[39]. New Aberdeen, a royal burgh, was one of the kingdom's most important and lucrative trading hubs thanks to its commanding influence on North Sea trade and fishing. Their combined population is estimated to have

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[33] Stewart, *Urban Politics and the British Civil Wars*, 42-43.
[34] Gordon Donaldson, 'Scotland's Conservative North', 65.
[35] For discussion of Donaldson's influence on the debate surrounding the Aberdeen Doctors, see p.103.
[36] DesBrisay, 'Authority and Discipline in Aberdeen', 8-10; DesBrisay, ''The civill warrs did overrun all', 238-266; Robertson, 'The Covenanting North of Scotland', 24-51.
[37] DesBrisay, 'Authority and Discipline in Aberdeen', 8.
[38] From this point on, all references to a burgh council refer to New Aberdeen unless explicitly stated otherwise. New Aberdeen was larger and politically more important than Old Aberdeen, and thus made many decisions on behalf of both burghs.
[39] David Stevenson, *King's College, Aberdeen, 1560-1641: From Protestant Reformation to Covenanting Revolution* (Aberdeen, 1990), 94-97; Steven J. Reid, *Humanism and Calvinism: Andrew Melville and the Scottish Universities, 1560-1625* (Farnham, 2011), 217-225.

been around 10,000 people, who were supported by the strong foundations of trade and local industry, such as plaiding, which had helped the burghs recover from the economic slump of the early 1630s.[40] Likewise, politics within the burgh were stable. The Menzies family, who had dominated burgh politics between 1623 and 1633, had fallen from favour, being replaced by the Leslie, Johnston and Jaffray families. The Menzieses had acted as agents of the crown for much of their time in office and the family's Catholic sympathies saw them closely associated with George Gordon, 6th Earl and 1st Marquis of Huntly. Huntly's own decline in the later reign of James VI had contributed to the political vacuum which replaced Menzies rule within Aberdeen, as William Keith, 6th Earl Marischal and Huntly's main rival, had failed to fully take advantage of the Gordons' fall from grace.[41] Thus, in the years which preceded the signing of the National Covenant, Aberdeen was largely free of both noble and crown control.

In many ways, Aberdeen's rejection of the National Covenant in 1638 can be attributed to the men who sat on its council. At the council's head was Provost Robert Johnston, supported by Thomas Gray, Matthew Lumsden, George Moreson and Robert Farquhar as the city's bailies. Johnston had already proved himself a loyal servant of the crown by this point, while Gray and Moreson would go on to form the core of royalist support within the burgh during the 1640s.[42] Farquhar was a more mercurial character, shifting his allegiances throughout the civil wars; nevertheless, in 1638 he was one of the richest merchants in the kingdom and seemed to be comfortably within the royalist camp.[43] In the weeks that followed the first signing of the National Covenant in February 1638, copies of the covenant were dispersed throughout the burghs and shires of the kingdom, with the newly formed covenanters actively seeking the oaths and signatures of burgh magistrates. When word reached Aberdeen in March that their own signatures had been sought, the council met with the neighbours of the burgh to discuss the matter. The meeting unanimously agreed to 'plainelie and absolutelie refuisit'. The council declared that it would not 'be led in disobedience, and draw on (infinitlie to his Majesties greiff) their awin ruine'. It also noted that to do so would jeopardise the city's liberties and thus warned all present that all those who signed the covenant did so at their 'awin perrill and

[40] DeBrisay, ''The civill warrs did overrun all'', 239-240; Gordon Jackson, 'The Economy: Aberdeen and the Sea', in Dennison, Ditchburn and Lynch (eds), *Aberdeen before 1800*, 166-170.
[41] Allan White, 'The Menzies Era: Sixteenth-Century Politics', in E. Patricia Dennison, David Ditchburn and Michael Lynch (eds), *Aberdeen before 1800: A New History* (East Linton, 2002), 224-238.
[42] Munro, *Memorials of the Aldermen, Provosts, and Lord Provosts of Aberdeen,* 144-145.
[43] ibid, 151-152.

hazard, as they wilbe answerable to his Majestie'.[44] This won the burgh the gratitude of its king, who wrote to the council on 25 April, thanking it for its support and loyalty.[45]

The council received word in July that the covenanters were intent on dispatching a commission to the city in order to try and win them over. In response, the council, led by Johnston, once again refused to sign. The council defended its actions by pointing out that the covenant had authorisation from neither the king nor his privy council. The king's encouragement of Aberdeen's resistance in a letter was of greater importance than any justification the covenanters could produce. They concluded that:

> they were resolved, Godwilling, according to thair b[o]und duetie and alledgance to their sacred soveraigne, to continew in obedience and loyaltie to his Majestie, and nowayes to do or attempt anything that may give his Majestie just occasion of offence.[46]

This overtly political rhetoric bears a strong resemblance to the arguments discussed in the previous chapters. Johnston and his allies made no attempt to make a theological stand. Instead, they attacked the legitimacy of the covenant which made claims of loyalty but was not sanctioned by the king. Their action of viewing the covenant on purely political terms is telling, especially given the covenanters' insistence that this was a religious protest and not a political one. It is clear that Aberdeen's council recognised the subversive potential of the covenant and wanted nothing to do with it.

Nonetheless, the covenanting commission was not deterred, arriving in the burgh on 20 July. The delegation included three leading covenanting ministers – Alexander Henderson, Andrew Cant and David Dickson – and was headed by the young earl of Montrose.[47] Upon their arrival they found that Johnston and his allies intended to honour their declaration of loyalty. Angered by the council's rejection of the covenant and its refusal to allow the covenanting ministers access to the burgh's churches, the commission declined to take part in the burgh's Bon-Accord ('good agreement') custom, and took their leave to the home of Lady Pitsligo, sister of the earl Marischal, and a well-known 'puritane'.[48] Following their rejection at the city's gates, the covenanting ministers proceeded to preach to a small crowd from Pitsligo's balcony the next day. By the time the commissioners left the burgh they had only managed to accrue around 50 signatures for the covenant, less than 1% of the burgh's population. However, amongst those signatories

[44] *Extracts 1625-1642*, 128-130.
[45] ibid, 124-125.
[46] ibid, 128-130.
[47] DeBrisay, ''The civill warrs did overrun all', 244.
[48] Issuing the Articles of Bon-Accord was a custom of New Aberdeen's burgh council where prominent visitors agreed to conduct themselves respectfully within the burgh in return for accommodation and victuals. Spalding, *Memorialls*, i, 57-58.

were four prominent burgesses (Patrick Leslie, Alexander Jaffray, Andrew Burnet and Alexander Burnet), five local ministers and William Guild, one of the Aberdeen Doctors.[49] Guild's defection was particularly shocking given his involvement in the debate in print against the covenanters.[50] Things were even worse for royalists in Old Aberdeen, where the provost reported to Huntly that on `the [Old Aberdeen] counsell at least many of thaim ar subscryvers of the covenant'.[51] Despite both councils' success in limiting the numbers of inhabitants signing the covenant, the conversion of prominent burgesses and clergymen was a problem. The defection of Patrick Leslie was a particularly devastating blow. The Leslie family had been one of the two dominant powers in burgh politics during the 1630s, normally in opposition to the Menzies family and to the crown's theological stance.[52] With Leslie signing the covenant, in open opposition to Johnston's council, established party politics became infused within the escalating political situation.

Charles I wrote again to the council following the covenanters' return south. The king congratulated the council on its success, 'particularlie in hindering some stranger ministeris frome preaching in any of your churches'.[53] Despite this accomplishment, Johnston and his allies knew that conflict was on the horizon. On 8 August, the council ordered a 'wapinschawing' whereby all fencible men within the burgh were to present themselves to the magistrates 'weill furnished and armed with pickes [pikes], corselettis [armour covering the upper body], muskattis, bandelines, and swords', or be fined £40.[54] The council also received orders from Charles and the marquis of Hamilton to 'avert, and so far as lyes within your power in a fair and peaceable way, to hinder subscripitoune [to the covenant] thairof by anie within your toune'.[55] The king evidently did not want to be seen to fire the first shot nor give the covenanters any ammunition for accusations of a crackdown sanctioned by the crown. Thus, Aberdeen's council quietly opposed local covenanting efforts and prepared for an armed conflict, all with the king's blessing.

As preparations began, the royalist magistrates were also keen to show that they remained firmly loyal to the crown. On 15 August, the council wrote letters to both Huntly

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[49] Spalding, *Memorialls*, i, 93. The ministers were: David Lindsay (Belhelvie); Andrew Melvill (Banchory); Thomas Melvill (Dyce); Walter Anderson (Kinellar), and William Robertson (Footdee). John Lundie, master of the Grammar School and Procurator of King's College, also signed.
[50] R. P. Wells, 'Guild, William (1586–1657)', *ODNB* (2004). See p.121.
[51] NRS, GD406/1/429.
[52] DeBrisay, ''The civill warrs did overrun all', 140-141.
[53] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 133.
[54] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 132. Weaponshowing was a means by which the burgh magistrates could train and maintain a local militia, to be deployed in times of conflict in defence of the burgh. See Laura A. M. Stewart, 'Military Power and the Scottish Burghs, 1625-1651', *Journal of Early Modern History* 15 (2011), 65-70.
[55] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 134-135; NRS, GD406/1/698.

and Hamilton. In both it assured the leading royalists that they would continue to suppress covenanting ministers by barring them from the churches within their jurisdiction. It also made defiant statements of loyalty to the king, 'promeissing godwilling to continew in all duetifull obedience and loyaltie to his sacred majestie'.[56] However, in the letter to Hamilton, the magistrates admitted that some within the burgh have 'fallen from us' and had signed the covenant. Nevertheless, they reassured the marquis that 'we shall stay the rest as far as possiblie'.[57] Despite this, they were obviously anxious enough to write to Huntly on 16 August, voicing their concerns that due to the covenanters' growing influence amongst the city's burgesses they feared that they would not be able to stop covenanters from securing positions on the council in the upcoming elections.[58] Interestingly, every piece of correspondence between the magistrates and leading royalists was only ever signed by the provost, and three of the four bailies: Gray, Moreson and Farquhar. Matthew Lumsden, the missing bailie, was evidently at odds with his more royalist colleagues, suggesting that Johnston's fears over the election were well founded.[59]

In order to protect their dominance over the council, on 26 September the royalist magistrates forced through an act of council which banned all those who had signed the covenant from standing for public office. Johnston, Gray and Moreson defended the ban 'for feare of givinge offence to his Majestie, and breiding alteration in the toune'.[60] This unsurprisingly drew criticism from members of the covenanting leadership, including Montrose.[61] The local reaction within Aberdeen itself almost sparked fighting in the streets. When Johnston wrote to Huntly to inform him of the election, he noted how 'thay [the covenanters] protestit in the c[on]trair that the election shuld be frie without any such Limitation'.[62] When it came to the vote, the voting members of the council ignored the act, electing five known covenanters, including Patrick Leslie as provost. [63] Upon hearing the result, the royalist magistrates stormed out of the tollbooth only to find that a group of the city's inhabitants had rallied at the mercat cross, armed 'with swordis redie to have made a tumult and c[om]motion be reason of the chusing of Covenanteris'.[64] According to the provost's report, only the efforts of Johnston, Gray and Moreson stopped the mob from

[56] *ACL*, ii, 108-110.
[57] ibid, 110; NRS, GD406/1/670 .
[58] NRS, GD406/1/670.
[59] Spalding refers to Lumsden as 'ane knowen covenanter' in 1639. See Spalding, *Memorialls*, i, 147.
[60] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 134-135
[61] NRS, GD406/1/531.
[62] NRS, GD406/1/447.
[63] The other covenanters were William Forbes, Thomas Mortimer, John Leslie (brother of Patrick Leslie) and Andrew Burnet.
[64] NRS, GD406/1/447.

attacking the covenanters. Seeing the crowd assembled in the streets, the newly elected council agreed to withdraw the office of provost from Leslie as a means to quiet the throng, instead giving the provostship to Alexander Jaffray.[65] There is no mention in the letter to Huntly that the action was premeditated or organised by the royalist magistrates, suggesting either that elements within the wider population were intent on resisting any covenanter gains or that Huntly was already privy to those details. However, the real damage had already been done. Through the influence of key local magistrates, the covenanters had managed to undermine royalist control of the council. For the royalists, there were consolation prizes to be had. Jaffray was very much a lukewarm covenanter, a moderate compared to the increasingly zealous Leslie. Leslie, who had quickly become the leading covenanter within the burgh, had ended up outside the council, although it was widely believed that he would try again next year to secure the provostship. Despite this, Huntly does not appear to have been overly worried about the result. He assured Hamilton that throughout the north the king's authority was revered, and the non-covenanting clergy still held a majority.[66] Huntly's lack of concern and the reaction of Aberdeen's inhabitants seem to suggest that despite the covenanters' gains, the consensus on the ground was still firmly royalist despite covenanting gains.

This certainly seems to have been the case when Huntly came to Aberdeen seeking signatories to the King's Covenant on 8 October. Huntly later wrote to Hamilton informing him that he had been able to quell the refusals of some local covenanters by signing the King's Covenant himself in their presence. However, he admitted that some vocal protests had persisted.[67] Despite the resistance that Huntly noted, he was successful in gaining the majority of the city's signatures for the King's Covenant, with the council noting that 'most pairt of the bodie of the toune' had signed.[68] When Andrew Fraser, Lord Fraser, attempted to read out a protestation at the mercat cross against the King's Covenant, Huntly had to intervene to keep the peace after members of the audience tried to rip the paper out of Fraser's hands.[69] Provost Jaffray also ordered Robert Barron and James Sibbald (two of the Aberdeen Doctors) to publicly praise the King's Covenant and defend it against any accusations of popery, 'removeing all scrupill out of the mynds of the

[65] NRS, GD406/1/757.
[66] ibid.
[67] NRS, GD406/1/448.
[68] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 139; NRS, GD406/1/449.
[69] NRS, GD406/1/450; *True Rehearsall: A Little Yet True Rehearsall of Severall Passages of Affairs, Collected by a Friend of Doctor Alexander's at Aberdeen*, ed. Benjamin W. Richardson, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 5 (1877), 361. Lord Fraser became one of the most prominent covenanters in the area. Alongside, Alexander, Master of Forbes, and James Crichton of Frendraught, Fraser coordinated covenanting resistance around Aberdeen between 1638-1639. See Robertson, 'Covenanting North', 27-31.

people'.[70] Jaffray's actions here show the mix of loyalties that many must have experienced at this stage. While he had voluntarily signed the National Covenant, when he was called upon to sign the King's Covenant he had done so. The problem which Jaffray and other moderates faced was that this status quo could not last and eventually they would need to side with one party or the other, or risk angering both.

Throughout October, the council continued training the city's fencible men.[71] At the start of November, a meeting of the general assembly was announced, which was to be held in Glasgow. As a royal burgh, Aberdeen was expected to send one commissioner from the burgh's magistrates and one from the local clergy. However, upon hearing of the assembly, the council received a petition from the neighbours of the city who called for the burgh to withhold from sending any delegates. The petition questioned the legality of sending any delegation, as they had not received any word from the king authorising the meeting.[72] The petitioners demanded that, if it was decided that a commissioner was to be sent, the chosen candidate must have signed the King's Covenant and not the National Covenant, and that he was 'not to voice againes the kingis prerogative, articles of Perth, nor Episcopall government'.[73] These explicitly royalist demands were accepted by the council, which, after consideration and consultation, decided not to send any commissioner to the assembly, stating that they would only send a delegate if they received express permission to do so from either the king himself, the king's commissioner (Hamilton) or the privy council.[74] What is perhaps most surprising about this episode is the fact that the burgh's most devoted royalist magistrates were not sitting on the council, but most likely made up some of the neighbours. This suggests either that the covenanters within the council were moderate in temperament and ultimately unwilling to directly go against the crown, or that the covenanting councillors feared that going against the demands of the city's royalist inhabitants could have serious ramifications.

However, the political situation had soured across the kingdom. Following the events of the Glasgow Assembly and its abjuration of episcopacy, armed conflict increasingly seemed like the only outcome. In and around Aberdeen, the local covenanting

[70] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 137-138.
[71] ibid, 140-141.
[72] ibid, 141-142.
[73] ibid, 142.
[74] ibid, 143. While the burgh council did not send a representative to the assembly, Mr William Lundie represented King's College, and Mr David Lindsay and Dr William Guild represented the Presbytery of Aberdeen. Lundie faced fierce criticism from his colleagues in King's College after he remained at the assembly after Hamilton's attempt to disband it. See *Fasti Aberdonenses – Selections from the records of the University and King's College of Aberdeen, 1494-1854*, ed. C. Innes (Aberdeen, 1854), 412-414; *Records of the Kirk*, 43; Stevenson, *King's College*, 112-115.

and royalist nobility and gentry stockpiled arms and armour in preparation for war.[75] In January 1639, Huntly appeared confident that the lands under his jurisdiction were for the king. He reported to Hamilton that the people of Aberdeen and its surrounding lands were particularly loyal to the crown, claiming that only the Forbes, Fraser and Frendraught families were opponents of the royalist cause. According to Huntly, even Patrick Leslie, the burgh's leading covenanter, had offered his services to him, which he had accepted in the hope that Leslie's acquiescence would continue.[76]

The burgh council was also taking precautionary steps. On 16 January the council ordered that, due to these 'dangerous tymes', the port and city gates were to be closed, a 24-man night watch was to be organised, catbands [Metal chains used to stop mounted attackers gaining access] were to be deployed throughout the city, ordnance was to be stored within the city's perimeter, no strangers were to enter the city unless questioned by the magistrates and every fencible man was to be properly equipped.[77] A council of war was also created, led by Lieutenant-Colonel William Johnston, son of the former provost and a veteran of Swedish service in the Thirty Years War.[78] The council of war elected four captains to oversee mustering and to command those assembled, two of whom were Thomas Gray and George Moreson, the royalist bailies from the previous year.[79] This represented a substantial upturn in fortune for the burgh's royalists. It seems that, given the support for the king's cause within the burgh, the royalist magistrates were able to claim back control of the burgh's infrastructure thanks to the growing apprehension of civil war.

This political shift within Aberdeen was presumably one of the reasons why Huntly wrote to Hamilton in early February, declaring that the covenanters 'doe daylie diminishe'.[80] Despite the fact that the earl Marischal had declared for the covenant, Huntly appeared to be in no doubt that the north-east was a royalist heartland. [81] Indeed, the following month, he asked Hamilton to tell the king that the local covenanters had no hope of victory unless they received help from the south or west, and that he was distributing arms to local 'responsall men'.[82] Some of those responsible men were to be found in

[75] NRS, GD406/1/412; NRS, GD406/1/753.
[76] ibid.
[77] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 145-147.
[78] ibid, 148; Munro, *Memorials of the Aldermen, Provosts, and Lord Provosts of Aberdeen,* 139-140. Also see *SSNE*, SSNE3949.
[79] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 148.
[80] NRS, GD406/1/751.
[81] Huntly had, up until February 1639, been under the impression that the earls Marischal, Sutherland and Seaforth would all declare for the king.
[82] NRS, GD406/1/759.

Aberdeen, where Huntly sent 200 muskets and 100 pikes for the use of the city's militia.[83] The council also took the opportunity to petition the king directly, asking that it might receive the rights to the burgh's customs in order to raise money to pay for the burgh's fortification and the prosecution of the king's war effort.[84] This could be seen as an opportunistic seizure of additional privileges, but it is likely that this was a genuine request to cover the growing cost the burgh was incurring for its loyalty. Either way, the council also ordered that the burgh's registers and records were to be stored away for safe keeping, a sign that they expected trouble imminently.[85]

Despite having raised a substantial force of men from his sphere of influence and having the full support of Aberdeen's council, Huntly abruptly gave the order to disband.[86] He had apparently been convinced to stand down by James Burnet of Craigmyle, a local moderate covenanting laird, who had persuaded the marquis that it was folly to resist the larger covenanting force advancing towards them from the south.[87] The grand multi-pronged royalist offensive which Charles I, Hamilton, Huntly and Antrim had planned evaporated as quickly as Huntly's army, leaving Aberdeen exposed to the covenanters.[88] In response to the deteriorating situation around them, 60 Aberdonians boarded a ship and sailed south to join the king at Berwick, while others simply fled the burgh.[89] On 25 March, faced with the prospect of the covenanters taking the burgh by force, the council sent a commission comprising William Johnston and George Moreson to treat with the covenanting officers. They offered their full compliance and a peaceful entrance to the city on the condition that none of the magistrates, ministers or inhabitants would be 'forced in thair consciences, nor wronged in thair bodies nor gudes'.[90] On 28 March, Alexander Leslie, who commanded the covenanting force, accepted the burgh's conditions, and two days later the covenanting army occupied the city.[91] When the burgh's captains were formally disarmed in the tollbooth, they did not attempt to disguise the situation. Instead, they declared that their decision to disarm was due to the fact that they:

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[83] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 149-150.
[84] *ACL*, ii, 115-117.
[85] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 151.
[86] Reid, *Crown, Covenant and Cromwell,* 19-20; Reid, *The Campaigns of Montrose*, 14-15.
[87] George Burnett, *The Family of Burnett of Leys with Collateral Branches*, ed. James Allardyce (Aberdeen, 1901), 49-50.
[88] Robertson, *Royalists at War,* 49.
[89] Spalding, *Memorialls*, i, 199; *True Rehearsall*, 363.
[90] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 152-153.
[91] ibid, 153-154. Following the surrender of Aberdeen, Leslie went south on 12 April in preparation of the Duns offensive, leaving Montrose and Marischal in charge of consolidating covenanting control of the north. See Aberdeen City Archives, CA/8/12, no. 108.

> wer not abile to doe nor to withstand the great power and armie approaching to this burgh, a great many of the inhabitants having alreddie deserted and left the toune, and thay having no help nor supplie of men from the countrie to resist the invasioun of the said armie.[92]

It is quite remarkable that, even when faced with occupation, the Aberdonian royalists were defiant in defeat. These lines also hint at a sense of betrayal, that they had come out in support of the king and had been abandoned in their hour of need. Not only is this indictive of the commitment of Aberdeen's royalists, but it also shows how isolated royalists became following the collapse of Hamilton's offensive during the spring of 1639.

It became quickly apparent to the burgh's royalists that they would be made to pay for their commitment. The first blow arrived with news that the convention of royal burghs had announced that only those who had sworn the National Covenant would be eligible to stand as a burgh's representative, which was an attempt to exclude outspoken royalists, like those in Aberdeen. [93] However, more pressing issues came with the burden of supporting the victorious covenanting garrison. Following their entry to the city, the bulk of the covenanting army was dispatched with Montrose to the north to bring the rest of the region to heel, leaving 800 men behind to garrison Aberdeen under the command of John Lyon, Earl of Kinghorn.[94] The council was ordered to supply and shelter the occupying force, hand over the city's ordnance, pull down the burgh's defences and fortify the city's blockhouse, or else the city would be sacked.[95] The council agreed, being 'nowayes habill to resist'.[96] Not satisfied, the covenanters pressed the council for payment of 10,000 merks – in addition to the support for the garrison – and demanded that all inhabitants of the burgh sign the National Covenant to join with the rest of the kingdom in supporting the 'common caus'.[97] These measures violated the original terms of surrender that none within the burgh would be forced in their conscience, but the city's royalists were in no fit state to protest. The council begrudgingly agreed to the signing of the covenant but refused to pay the fine, stating that they would rather abandon the city than destitute themselves trying to collect such a sum. This was enough to sate the covenanters and by 10 April, 'the toune for the most pairt subscryvit the nobilities covenant'.[98]

Over the course of the following month, both sides attempted to solidify their control of the city. Following the city's subscription to the covenant, it was ordered that the

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[92] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 154.
[93] *ACL*, ii, 117-125.
[94] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 154-155.
[95] ibid, 154-156.
[96] ibid, 156.
[97] ibid, 156-157.
[98] ibid, 157.

burgh send commissioners to Edinburgh to stand before the Tables. The covenanting leaders in Edinburgh chose John Hay, Robert Farquhar, Thomas Gray and George Moreson, the last three being amongst the most prominent royalists in the burgh at that point.[99] In one move, the covenanters had removed some of the burgh's most influential royalists and increased their own control over the city. On the same day that Gray and his companions were called south, William Erskine, a prominent local covenanter, petitioned the council so that the 'first subscryveris of the covenant' within the burgh might be exempt from any taxations or fines issued by the garrisoning troops. Erskine claimed that since they had not been the reason for the army's journey north, they could not be expected to pay.[100] Under pressure from the garrison, the council agreed to the exemptions. The covenanters also managed to enlist 80 locals to serve in the army forming at Monymusk to counter the laird of Banff and other local royalist lairds who had remained in the field after Huntly's disbandment and subsequent arrest.[101] However, there were limits to the burgh's cooperation, even without the leading royalist magistrates. When the covenanting nobles tried to force a levy of every fourth man onto the burgh, the council refused, arguing that many had fled the burgh already and those that remained were needed for the city's defence.[102] Likewise, when the earl Marischal – who had replaced Kinghorn as the burgh's military overseer – tried to seize what remained of the burgh's ordnance, the council refused, stating that the cannons belonged to the king, and that the council could not part with them without the king's express permission.[103]

Despite the covenanters' efforts, a royalist host under the command of the laird of Banff, the laird of Haddo and Lieutenant-Colonel William Johnston had managed to muster around 800 men in and around Strathbogie.[104] Concerned by the speed at which the royalists had managed to resurrect themselves, local covenanting lairds – Forbes, Fraser and Frendraught – wrote to the council, once again asking for men.[105] When the council failed to reply, Marischal furiously wrote to them, berating them for their lack of compliance, and ominously commented that 'I sei ye ar running to your ane ruine'.[106] The royalist army managed to secure a minor victory, known as the Trot of Turriff, on 14 May, which saw the covenanting garrison withdraw from the city, only to be replaced by the

[99] ibid.
[100] ibid, 158.
[101] ibid, 160.
[102] ibid, 162.
[103] ibid, 163; *ACL*, ii, 127.
[104] Reid, *Campaigns of Montrose*, 16.
[105] *ACL*, ii, 127-128.
[106] ibid, 128.

royalist army.[107] The council agreed to give the royalists free quarter, but when Banff sought more men, the council refused, stating that many had fled the burgh and that 'some ar alreddie employed in his Majesties service with his navie lying in the firth'.[108] The navy in the Firth of Forth was transporting an army under the command of Hamilton, a fact that the council had apparently kept quiet from their previous guests.[109] However, the occupying royalists then had to abandon the city following news that Montrose had once again been dispatched north with an army. This led lord Ogilvy, son of the earl of Airlie, to update the king that while his army had been victorious in the field, they risked losing Aberdeen once again, abandoning the burgh's loyal subjects.[110]

On 27 May the city was reoccupied by Montrose's army. Evidently angered by the events which had led to his return to the burgh, the earl demanded that the council pay the original 10,000 merks fine by the following day, or the city would be sacked.[111] When the next day came and the council could not pay the fine, Montrose seized what remained of the city's ordnance and forcibly disarmed the city's inhabitants.[112] Importantly, the city was not sacked. The council continued their defiance by complaining about the 'unlauchfullness' of the earl's actions, but once again 'since thay wer not habill to resist, it behoved thame to suffer and give obedience'.[113]

This marked the beginning of a much harder stance from the covenanting leadership towards Aberdeen. By 29 May, the council had managed to pay the 10,000 merk fine and the city's cannons had been shipped to Dundee and Montrose, to provide those towns with some protection from any attempt to launch a royalist seaborne invasion.[114] Despite this, on 7 June Gray and his fellow commissioners, who had not been allowed to leave since arriving in Edinburgh, were formally arrested and the council was sent a demand for an additional 40,000 merks to secure their release.[115] Strangely, the arrested commissioners were permitted leave to travel back to Aberdeen to present the Tables' demands to the city. Appalled by such a demand, the neighbours of the burgh petitioned the council to refuse payment, lamenting all that had befallen them since their

[107] Reid, *Crown, Covenant and Cromwell*, 21-24.
[108] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 164-165.
[109] This army was part of the abandoned four-pronged 1639 royalist offensive. See Robertson, *Royalists at War,* 49.
[110] NRS, GD406/1/781.
[111] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 166-167.
[112] ibid, 167-168.
[113] ibid, 168.
[114] ibid, 169.
[115] ibid, 169-171.

signing of the National Covenant.[116] While there is no record of those who made up the neighbours, it is reasonable to assume the ousted royalist magistrates were involved. The rash decision on behalf of the Tables to arrest the commissioners and the burgh council's renewed defiance were probably both a result of the news that James Gordon, Viscount Aboyne, the second eldest son of the marquis of Huntly, had sailed north with a small royalist force. Indeed, the day after the council refused payment, Aboyne arrived at the gates of Aberdeen, bolstered in number by rejuvenated local royalists.[117]

Despite the rather sorry state of Aboyne's army, his presence, alongside that of the returned commissioners, revitalised the burgh's royalists.[118] Robert Johnston, the former provost, used the opportunity to lodge a vote of no confidence against the serving provost, Alexander Jaffray. Johnston called upon his fellow burgesses to come forward if they had any reason to suspect Jaffray of disloyalty to the king or hindrance to his service.[119] However, since taking office, and despite his signing of the covenant and the immense pressure which the covenanting army had levelled against the burgh's council, Jaffray had proven himself to be steadfast in his defiance of the covenanters' more extreme demands, even without the presence of the burgh's more prominent royalist magistrates to support him. Thus, the council voted in Jaffray's favour, describing him as 'ane loyall and gude subject to his Majestie'.[120] United behind Jaffray and bolstered by the returning commissioners, on 14 June the council issued a declaration pledging themselves 'in his Majesties service againes the covenanteris', renouncing the covenant and mustering the burgh to serve under Aboyne.[121]

However, the royalist resurgence was short lived. Following the disastrous defeat at Megary Hill on 15 June, Aboyne returned to Aberdeen with his army in disarray.[122] The council agreed to the viscount's demands for free quarter and 'all in ane voice' agreed to forward the sum of 1000 dollars to Aboyne for the upkeep of his men.[123] However, before any payment could be gathered, the city found itself under siege from Montrose's army. The battle of the Brig O' Dee which unfolded over the course of 18-19 June saw Aboyne's

[116] ibid, 170.
[117] NRS, GD406/1/857.
[118] Aboyne had been joined by many of those who had mustered for Banff and Haddo, including William Johnston. However, Aboyne and Johnston both petitioned Hamilton for supplies, arms and men, suggesting that their position was far from concrete. See NRS, GD406/1/858; NRS, GD406/1/859.
[119] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 171.
[120] ibid, 172.
[121] ibid, 173-174.
[122] Reid, *Crown, Covenant and Cromwell,* 24-26.
[123] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 174-174.

army routed and Aberdeen once again in covenanting hands.[124] All that saved the burgh from being sacked was word arriving by boat on 20 June that a peace treaty had been agreed at Berwick with the king.[125] Nonetheless, upon occupying the city, the burgh was fined 6000 merks, the houses of prominent royalists were plundered and 48 men who were identified as having fought for the royalist army at the Brig O' Dee were arrested and interned within the tollbooth.[126]

Bruised and battered from a year of war and repeated occupation, the burgh council sought compensation from Charles I for their loyal service. The council wrote two separate petitions requesting financial aid and dispatched Thomas Gray and Patrick Chalmer to petition the king in person at Berwick.[127] Upon arriving at Berwick, Gray and Chalmer were received by the king, to whom they retold the city's sufferings. They requested that for the next ten years the burgh might have the rights to customs charged on the import of wine between the rivers Esk and Spey (i.e. between Montrose and Elgin) and that the city be exempt from any taxation for the same period in order for the burgh to recuperate its losses. These were substantial demands, but the commissioners reminded the king that such compensation was necessary in order to restore the losses sustained in his service. Charles agreed that they should be compensated, but because his treasurer (Traquair) was not with him, he could not grant those rights at this time.[128] Satisfied with the king's promises, Gray and Chalmer departed, not knowing that the promises would not be fulfilled.

While the fighting had ceased, a cold war of words was fought between Marischal and the burgh council. In early July, Marischal had written to the council to complain about its actions towards those who had supported him in the war. Particularly, he complained that Andrew Robb and James Geddes, who had served in the covenanting army, had been barred from re-entering the burgh, and that George Keith and Alexander Kempt had been kept in ward by order of the council for their role in guiding covenanting soldiers to the homes of royalists within the city.[129] In order to avoid trouble, the council allowed Robb and Geddes to enter the city unmolested, while Keith and Kempt were to be tried, and if found innocent, would be released without

[124] Reid, *Crown, Covenant and Cromwell,* 26-28.
[125] *ACL*, ii, 129; *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 175; Reid, *Campaigns of Montrose*, 28.
[126] *ACL*, ii, 130-132; Spalding, *Memorialls*, i, 155.
[127] *ACL*, ii, 129-131; *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 177-179.
[128] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 184-186.
[129] ibid, 179.

repercussions.[130] Over the course of the next two months, it is clear from the burgh records that the council was begrudgingly obedient to the covenanting authorities. Two weeks after Marischal's letter of demands, the 'toune in ane voice' refused to pay any taxation related to the payment of debts caused by the garrisoning of troops within the burgh until the commissioners returned from Berwick with word from the king.[131] However, after it became clear that the king would not be sending aid in the immediate future, the council conceded and agreed to pay the 7000 merks taxation imposed by Montrose, Marischal and Kinghorn.[132]

This marked a turning point in tactics employed by the burgh council, and the leading royalist magistrates. In August, Alexander Jaffray was chosen as the burgh's commissioner to the upcoming parliament. Upon arriving in Edinburgh, Jaffray realised that the covenanters meant to make the lives of any commissioners with royalist sympathies very difficult. Jaffray's first obstacle came when some members of parliament tried to stop him and some others from arriving at parliament as part of the main riding, which was a sign of things to come. Jaffray then complained that the officers of the estates, alongside the representatives from the nobility (of whom all but two were covenanters), had nominated the commissioners they wanted to represent the burghs and barons, despite the complaints of some of the burgh commissioners.[133] When Jaffray wrote back to Aberdeen's council, updating them as to the situation in parliament, he emphasised his wish to support the earl of Traquair – Hamilton's replacement as the king's commissioner – but also saw that if the council did not make concessions Marischal would continue to block any attempts made by Jaffray to address the financial predicament of the city.[134] In the end, Jaffray asked that the council do its best to restrain any of the 'youthes' in the burgh that jeopardised his position in parliament, and following the advice of Patrick Leslie, Jaffray agreed that the burgh should give Marischal 'contentment'.[135] Pragmatism and necessity won out over party politics.

The changing political situation helps to explain that year's council elections, which saw Patrick Leslie elected to the provostship and Gray, Lumsden (the absent bailie from the royalist council of 1637/38), Farquhar and William Moir (a known ally of Leslie) chosen as the burgh's bailies. Andrew Burnet, one of the 'auld covenanters', was also able

[130] Unfortunately, there is no mention of what the verdict was in the case of Keith and Kempt.
[131] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 180.
[132] ibid, 182.
[133] *ACL*, ii, 133-137; Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 170-172; Young, *The Scottish Parliament*, 1-15.
[134] *ACL*, ii, 133-140.
[135] ibid, 139.

to secure the position of treasurer.[136] The election of Leslie was a signal to the covenanting regime that the burgh would be more amenable to its demands. However, the re-election of Gray and Farquhar is not insignificant and suggests that diminished as they were, they retained significant support within the burgh.[137]

On 5 February 1640, the council received instructions from the estates for the payment of a general band. This band imposed a compulsory taxation of a tenth of the annual rent of all the city's inhabitants. Those who failed to pay were to be publicly declared 'non-covenanters'.[138] Attached to the band was a missive from the estates which reminded the burgh council how 'ye have beine mislead against the whole kingdome with some particular persones who desserted yow'.[139] The kirk, which by this time was firmly under covenanting control, also took the opportunity to impose upon the burgh David Dalgleish, a minister from Cupar, as a number of the city's clergy had either fled or were under investigation. The council agreed to the general band but refused the imposition of Dalgleish, stating that there were plenty of suitable candidates in the area from whom the magistrates could pick.[140] The estates continued to be suspicious of Aberdeen, leading them to demand an additional levy of men from the burgh.[141] They were right to be sceptical. The council experienced some difficulty in extracting the required payments. Interestingly, they also encountered inhabitants who agreed to pay the tax but refused to formally subscribe to the band itself.[142] In a more public display of resistance, Issobell Davidsone, a servant, was brought before the council for cursing the covenanters as traitors and declaring 'let never the covenanteris have any pairit in the kingdome of heavine'.[143] Davidsone was placed in the jougs and fined. [144] This incident, and the reluctance of the inhabitants to sign the general band, suggests that on the ground there was still significant resentment towards the covenanting regime. In an attempt to soothe relations, James Baird, the burgh's regular advocate in Edinburgh, wrote to the council urging them to comply with the demands of the estates, reassuring them that the covenanters' fight was against the

[136] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 192.
[137] In January 1640, Robert Johnston died in London, which was a considerable a blow to royalist prospects within the burgh. See ibid, 199.
[138] *ACL*, ii, 156; *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 200-205.
[139] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 205.
[140] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 207. This corroborates the argument made in Chapter 2 that royalist local elites could, to a certain extent, protect sympathetic ministers from the covenanting authorities.
[141] ibid, 209-211.
[142] ibid; *ACL*, ii, 168-169.
[143] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 207-208.
[144] A mode of punishment where the prisoner wore an iron collar which was attached to a wall or post. As an act of public humiliation, the prisoner would usually be left there for an extended period of time. See 'Jougs n. pl.1, v.', *DSL* (2004).

bishops, not the king himself.[145] This appears to have done little to reassure the burgh's royalists. Indeed, Patrick Leslie became increasingly frustrated with his bailies for their lack of support. In a letter to them, Leslie berated the bailies for dragging their feet. Fearing that their disobedience could lead to further repercussions, he used the example of Glasgow as a burgh which had been too slow to comply, resulting in it being brought to heel by the marquis of Argyll.[146]

Matters only got worse for those already disenchanted with covenanting rule. In February, sabre-rattling began again in earnest following the reinforcement of the royalist garrison within Edinburgh Castle.[147] This led the estates to remind Aberdeen's council that it was to record the names of all 'refractory' inhabitants and that these lists were to be sent to Edinburgh.[148] In May, a new tax was levied on Scotland's burghs which sought inhabitants' silver and gold goods for the use of the covenanting cause.[149] Aberdeen was also informed that it was to temporarily host a regiment under the command of Major-General Robert Monro. Marischal informed the council that he expected it to muster the city's fencible men to meet the general and warned it that 'I wish ye be better conveened, nor ye wer at your last wappingshawing'.[150] While operating under the mandate of securing the north-east against foreign invasion, Monro's regiment, which an anonymous royalist source called an army of 'adulterers, fornicators, theives, murderers, drunkards, [and] sabbath-breakers', was instructed to 'plant the Covenant through Scotland' to dissuade any potential royalist rising.[151] Due to the doubts which the covenanting leadership possessed over Aberdeen's true intentions, it was decided that a garrison under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel George Forbes would be left in the burgh, to ensure it did not fall back into royalist hands.[152]

When Monro arrived at the gates of Aberdeen on 29 May, his intent was apparent. In mockery of the city's ancient custom of greeting guests with the articles of Bon-Accord, Munro issued the magistrates a ten-point ultimatum in which he demanded the city's submission in order to avoid 'Mal-accord'.[153] First and foremost, Munro demanded that 'the magistrates [were] to give in a roll or list of theise inhabitants, absent or present, that

[145] *ACL*, ii, 189-192.
[146] ibid, 227-228. For more information regarding this incident, see p.211.
[147] Reid, *Campaigns of Montrose*, 29.
[148] *ACL*, ii, 180-181.
[149] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 221.
[150] ibid, 222.
[151] *True Rehearsall*, 371
[152] *ACL,* ii, 201-204
[153] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 222-225.

hath not subscryved the Covenant and Generall Band, that they may be dissarmed as bad and evill patriotts'. Alongside this, Monro required all inhabitants to swear an oath of fidelity and to report on those who had not subscribed the covenant or band. The city was required to support the regiment as long as it was garrisoned within its bounds, and no minister was permitted to preach unless he had signed and sworn the covenant.[154] If the burgh failed to comply, Monro promised to 'tak suche ordour and speidie course with you ... as may strick terror in the hearts of all uther opposites following your example in disobedience'.[155] Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes was given permission to confiscate the property of anyone deemed to be disobedient and Monro ordered the burgh to pay the general band's tax in full, alongside supplying his men with clothes and shoes, or else he would arrest the city's bailies.[156] The estates had obviously lost patience with the magistrates' equivocal support, and with the prospect of a new war, they had decided not to take any risks, effectively putting the city under martial law. While effective, this is also telling of the perceived danger from Aberdeen's inhabitants, and of their royalist leanings.

The pressure to conform appears to have been largely successful and over the next seven months Aberdeen was bled dry via levies, taxation and garrisoning of troops.[157] Apart from dragging their feet, there was little the royalists in the burgh could do except support the council's petition to the estates for relief.[158] In the meantime, the last remnants of resistance were purged from the city. Six burgesses and three craftsmen were arrested for attempting to flee the levy and Doctors William Guild and James Sibbald were removed from their respective offices for their refusal to sign the covenant in full.[159] Alongside this, a number of the city's inhabitants were arrested for being 'contrair minded to the good cause' and were transported to Edinburgh by Marischal and Monro. Amongst them were George Moreson and Richard Johnston, the eldest son of the former provost.[160] The reluctance of Aberdeen's citizenry to fully comply with Marischal's orders led him to conclude that they 'intend nothing but delayes'.[161] The most pressing royalist threat within the city came from John Leith of Harthill, a local laird who had come out strongly for the king. In late 1639, Harthill had been brought before the burgh court for disrupting a church service. When he was informed that he was being tried in the king's name, he reportedly

[154] ibid, 223-224.
[155] ibid, 225; *ACL*, ii, 169-173, 187-189 and 217-219
[156] *ACL*, ii, 211-212.
[157] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 225-226, 233-234, 236-237 and 243-244.
[158] ibid, 245.
[159] ibid, 232, 235-236, 238, 242-243.
[160] *ACL*, ii, 212-214; Spalding, *Memorialls*, i, 212-213.
[161] *ACL*, ii, 220-221.

replied ‘ye ar wrong ye suld fence it [open proceedings] in the devills name’.[162] Nothing more seems to have come from the incident, but Harthill continued to cause trouble within the burgh, resulting in his arrest in May 1640. However, he was soon released after he held the tollbooth to ransom with a brace of smuggled-in pistols. In response, the council ordered that a city watch be established to dissuade any further attack.[163] It is unclear whether Harthill was operating under the orders of Huntly, his feudal superior, or whether his was an independent venture. However, his actions did little to alleviate the estates’ suspicions over the burgh’s true loyalties.

The 1640 general assembly, which was hosted in Aberdeen from 28 July to 5 August, gave the covenanters an opportunity to show the kingdom how they had subdued the north-east. While the location had been chosen by Charles the year before in the hopes of utilising support there, the covenanters’ coercive tactics, combined with the fact that many of the leading local royalists (including Huntly) had fled to England, meant that no effective show of force could be mounted.[164] Nevertheless, the estates were concerned enough to organise a city guard for the duration of the assembly, fearing a ‘throng and multitude of people that wald trubill and disquyet the commissioners’.[165] However, no riot occurred and the assembly was able to operate without issue.

The annual election in September 1640 saw Leslie retain his provostship while Gray and Farquhar lost their seats. Leslie was buffered by the election of his brother John Leslie and Alexander Jaffray as the burgh’s bailies.[166] With the royalists removed from the council, Leslie appears to have had a much easier time enacting the wishes of the estates. By the end of March 1641 both Andrew Cant and George Gillespie, two of the estates’ preferred candidates to occupy the vacant charges in Aberdeen, had taken their respective offices.[167] Indeed, compared to the previous year, the lack of conflict within the burgh is quite remarkable. The city continued to support a garrison, now under the command of John Sinclair, Lord Sinclair, which caused understandable calls for relief by the council to the estates, but there does not appear to have been the same level of subversion which had plagued Leslie the year before.[168] The burgh also received the considerable boon of gaining the rights of admiralty over the waters between the Dee and the Don following their

[162] ibid, 152-154.
[163] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 217-218 and 241.
[164] Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 201.
[165] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 232.
[166] ibid, 240.
[167] ibid, 257; *ACL*, ii, 285.
[168] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 265-266 and 268.

petitioning of the king.[169] These new rights helped the council ease the burgh's now desperate finances as well as enabling it to repay members of the council, namely Robert Farquhar, who had loaned substantial sums of money to the council so that it could afford the garrisoning costs incurred between 1640 and 1641.[170]

Relative peace and stability continued to characterise burgh politics throughout 1642. On 11 February, Lord Sinclair's regiment finally left the city, departing for Ireland.[171] Despite the significant relief this brought to the burgh's coffers and council, which once again included Thomas Gray, the city's mounting debts were estimated at £40,000. Given the dire circumstances, the council ordered a burgh-wide stent to be extracted. The reaction to the stent was the only flashpoint in the entire year, after Patrick Leslie, who had failed to be re-elected, refused to contribute, claiming exemption as one of the 'first covenanters'.[172] Nothing more seems to have come of it, but the episode is a reminder that factional identities clearly continued to colour burgh politics.

The fragile peace which had taken hold began to falter in the summer of 1643. The autumn of 1642 had seen war break out in England and political anxiety descend upon Scotland. Charles wrote directly to Aberdeen's council in June, asking it to disregard the false claims that his enemies spread about him and urging it to keep the laws of the kingdom.[173] However, some local royalist lairds, led by Haddo, were growing increasingly restless and appear to have wanted to force an issue within the burgh. On 3 July, Haddo led a raid on Aberdeen, riding through the streets brandishing 'pistolls and swords'. The raid seems to have targeted the sons of Alexander Jaffray, Alexander and John Jaffray, who were both wounded in the affray.[174] It is not clear whether the Jaffrays were singled out by Haddo for their politics – Jaffray after all had been the one to urge the council to accept the estates' various demands in 1639 – or whether they had tried to intervene, receiving a bloody head and arm respectively for their troubles. Alexander the younger had previously been involved in a legal dispute against a kinsman of Haddo, which could also explain the resentment.[175] If a confrontation was what Haddo had hoped to spark within the burgh, he

[169] ibid, 269 and 274-276.
[170] The rights of admiralty gave the burgh a percentage of the profit from all maritime enterprises within its jurisdiction, from ship licencing to salvage. See Steve Murdoch, *The Terror of the Seas?: Scottish Maritime Warfare, 1513-1713* (Leiden, 2010), 10-20.
[171] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 277.
[172] ibid, 284-288.
[173] *Extracts from the Council Register of the Burgh of Aberdeen, 1643-1747,* ed. John Stuart (Edinburgh, 1872), 7-8.
[174] ibid, 8-9.
[175] Alexander Jaffray, *Diary of Alexander Jaffray*, ed. John Barclay (London, 1833), 21.

was to be disappointed.[176] Following the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant (25 September 1643), the council agreed to levy a company of soldiers for the 'present expedition unto Ingland' in December.[177] The only recorded opposition within the burgh between September and December 1643 came from Richard Alexander, who was charged with speaking against the covenanting minister Andrew Cant and openly condemning covenanting doctrine, accusing Cant of deceiving his congregation.[178]

However, the city was soon accused of dragging its feet again, not completing the levy on time and failing to provide the required amount of men. By 1643 Aberdeen was not the only burgh struggling under the economic strain of covenanting rule.[179] Nevertheless, the city's failure to comply with the levy drew the ire of the estates, who noted its negligence and demanded that it make up the difference with a financial contribution.[180] The opening months of 1644 saw tensions begin to rise once more. In February, Thomas Collison of Auchlownies – a relation of Paul Collison, burgess – was called before the estates for malignancy, and George Menzies, burgess, was arrested for hiding Alexander Lindsay, Lord Spynie, a known royalist, within the burgh.[181] The following month, under orders from Huntly, Haddo led another raid on Aberdeen.[182]

On this raid Haddo and the Gordon lairds led a band of approximately 150 armed men through the streets of Aberdeen, targeting the homes of Patrick Leslie, Alexander Jaffray, John Jaffray and Robert Farquhar.[183] The contemporary account of Patrick Gordon states that these men were targeted as they were the 'most violent for the Covenant (and who had forced the rest of the citizens against there will to give there way)'.[184] If this was true, it gives us a valuable insight into how allegiances had shifted within Aberdeen. Leslie had been, and would continue to be, a dedicated covenanter. However, the inclusion of Jaffray and Farquhar on that list is telling. Jaffray had shown sympathy towards the covenanters but had followed the royalist line and had been a moderate voice in parliament (1640-1641) when that was not a popular option. Alongside Thomas Gray, Farquhar had been one of the primary supporters of the royalist council under Johnston, thus

[176] Haddo was later declared a traitor and his lands made forfeit. See *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 13.
[177] ibid, 11.
[178] *ACL*, iii, 16.
[179] Stewart, 'Military Power and the Scottish Burghs, 1625-1651', 74.
[180] *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 13.
[181] ibid, 14-15.
[182] Gordon, *A Short Abridgement*, 48-49.
[183] ibid; Alexander Jaffray, *Diary of Alexander Jaffray*, 21-22; *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 17.
[184] Gordon, *A Short Abridgement*, 49.

representing a significant shift.[185] As such, different interpretations are possible: either Jaffray and Farquhar had converted and were now firmly in the covenanting camp, or, because Jaffray had been the burgh's main negotiator in Edinburgh and Farquhar had financially supported the council's adherence to the demands of the estates, the two men were regarded as traitors by more radical royalists, regardless of their true allegiance. After the royalists had raided their homes, Leslie, Farquhar and the Jaffrays were taken into Haddo's custody and transported to Auchindoun Castle where they were held captive for five weeks.[186] What remained of the burgh council dispatched commissions to Marischal and George Gordon, Lord Gordon, the eldest son of Huntly, pleading for a peaceful resolution.[187]

Less than a week later, Huntly raised a force of around 500 men and made clear his intent to occupy the burgh. According to Patrick Gordon, Huntly had been urged into action by his lairds and royalist allies to take advantage of the fact that the covenanting army was in the north of England.[188] Thus, by seizing Aberdeen, Huntly could deal a deadly blow to the estates and encourage similar risings throughout the kingdom. A delegation was sent on behalf of the council to treat with Huntly, which included George Moreson. The delegation agreed to allow Huntly into the burgh on the condition that no harm was to befall any of the city's inhabitants and that the marquis would not 'press any of their consciences with oathes or subscriptions'.[189] Huntly agreed and his men were garrisoned within the city's limits. During his occupation, Huntly called upon Thomas Gray and Matthew Lumsden and asked them to beseech the council on his behalf for arms and ammunition.[190] When Gray and Lumsden did so, they were told that the burgh had no arms to give, and even if they did, they would not give 'to any wha ar opposit to the Church and estaitis of this kingdome'.[191]

This raises the question of whether Haddo's kidnapping of the covenanting magistrates had been part of a predetermined plan. Patrick Gordon's account states that the kidnapping had been looked upon poorly by Huntly but this may not have been the case. With the covenanting magistrates removed, Huntly may have hoped to enter the city,

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[185] While Farquhar had suffered financially for his support of the burgh, he had gained important offices within the covenanting infrastructure due to his prominence. Most notably, he had become the commissioner of the north. See *ACL*, ii, 297-299 and 310-311.
[186] Jaffray, *Diary of Alexander Jaffray*, 22.
[187] *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 18-19.
[188] Gordon, *A Short Abridgement*, 48-50.
[189] *Extracts, 1643-1747*, 19.
[190] ibid, 20.
[191] ibid.

supported by the royalist burgesses.[192] Once in position, and bolstered by the local populace, Huntly could wait until relief arrived in the form of the now royalist Montrose and Aboyne, who he believed were making their way north with 500 men. If this was the intent, Huntly must have been disappointed by the reception he received. Apart from the unidentifiable dissenting voices – most likely William Moir and Robert Cruickshank who were the remaining bailies – Aberdeen's council was willing to accommodate the marquis, but it was in no position to give aid, neither in the form of coin nor men.

Huntly held Aberdeen until 2 May, when the burgh received word that the marquis of Argyll had been dispatched with an army to put down Huntly's rising. With no sign of royalist reinforcements, Huntly withdrew and once again disbanded his force.[193] Hardly the result that local royalists would have wanted, the episode also had the adverse effect of shattering any trust that had been cultivated between the burgh council and the estates. When Argyll arrived at the end of May, he immediately occupied the city and announced a fresh batch of taxes. Interestingly, no purge of the council was authorised. As a show of commitment, Aberdeen was to match the contribution of Dundee, 'seeing as this toun hade not in any sort trangrest'.[194] The council also agreed to the transportation of Samuel Rutherford to the burgh in order to take up the vacant post of professor of divinity within Marischal College. If Rutherford could not take up the post, it was to be offered to Robert Baillie, and then to Sir David Dick.[195] This was part of a larger covenanting scheme to ensure that all of northern Scotland was planted with loyal and capable clergymen, with Aberdeenshire being singled out as an area in desperate need of 'weill affected ministeris'.[196] The garrison left behind under the command of David Wemyss, Lord Elcho, made it abundantly clear that the burgh was not trusted.

The burgh's true test of loyalty came in September 1644, when the marquis of Montrose's royalist army marched towards Aberdeen. Upon its approach, the burgh organised its fencible men and awaited word of Montrose's intent. The marquis wrote to the council demanding its immediate surrender in the name of the king and the maintenance of the true religion, or else 'those who stayes expect no quarter', including the women, children and infirm.[197] Montrose's decision to threaten a traditionally sympathetic burgh with no quarter was surprising given the marquis' desperate need for support.

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[192] Spalding, *Memorialls*, ii, 49.
[193] *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 23; Spalding, *Memorialls*, ii, 50-51.
[194] *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 24-25.
[195] ibid.
[196] *ACL*, ii, 374-375.
[197] ibid, 380.

Therefore, the threat was most likely intended to scare Elcho's garrison, which comprised inexperienced levies, and dissuade some of the local lairds who had reluctantly been called into Elcho's service.[198] The effect of his threat would have been heightened by the royalists' recent victory at Tippermuir (1 September 1644) and their subsequent occupation of Perth.[199] A draft of the burgh's response survives and shows repeated scribbling out and scoring through as the council debated which course to take. In the end, the influence of local covenanters and the garrison won out and the burgh responded with a defiant refusal to surrender, swearing to defend the covenant to 'the last drope of our blood'.[200]

The subsequent battle resulted in a crushing victory for the royalists, whereby many were slain following the rout of the covenanting army. John Spalding's contemporary – and perhaps eye-witness – account records that 118 of those killed were from Aberdeen, most of whom 'wes no covenanteris; but harlitt out sore against thair willis to fight against the Kingis lieutenant'. Spalding also recounts how Patrick Leslie and the other 'pryme covenanteris' fled the field on horseback, abandoning the city's levy in the rout.[201] The royalist army then sacked the city, resupplying itself over the course of its three-day occupation of Aberdeen. The horrors which occurred during the sack of Aberdeen have been well recorded, both within contemporary sources and subsequent historiography.[202] Despite this, the events which followed indicate that the burgh retained significant royalist sympathies, testimony to the dedication of the royalists within the city. When Montrose turned back towards Aberdeen the following month, the re-established council sent a committee to negotiate with the royalist army. The committee, which included Thomas Gray and George Moreson, agreed to supply Montrose with adequate supplies in return for the marquis' assurances that the burgh itself would not be reoccupied.[203]

In the immediate aftermath of the battle, Aberdeen had been ruined. Much of the city was ransacked, at least 100 inhabitants had been killed, what little supplies the city had left had been given to the royalist army and many had fled the burgh fearing further repercussions and garrisoning.[204] The situation was so dire that Argyll ordered a memorandum be sent to all forces in pursuit of the royalist army, demanding that none take

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[198] For a breakdown of the covenanting force at the battle of Aberdeen, see Reid, *Crown, Covenant and Cromwell*, 63.
[199] *Memorials*, ii, 159-160; George Wishart, *The Memoirs of James Marquis of Montrose, 1639-1650*, eds. Alexander D. Murdoch and H. F. Morland Simpson (London, 1893), 60-62.
[200] *ACL*, ii, 380.
[201] Spalding, *Memorialls*, ii, 406-407.
[202] ibid, 407.
[203] *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 31-32.
[204] *ACL*, ii, 382-383; *ACL*, iii, 43-47.

free quarter within Aberdeen without explicit instruction.[205] Despite this, by November the city was garrisoned by another covenanting regiment, this time under the command of William Kerr, Earl of Lothian. In January, Thomas Gray was called before the garrison commanders and council to answer for his actions in supplying Montrose. Gray argued that he did so out of concern for the burgh, claiming that he believed that Montrose would have simply taken what was not given; thus, it was best to offer supplies in the hope that no other repercussions would follow. No further action appears to have been taken, apart from the fact that the council was eventually pressured into granting free quarter to Lothian's regiment, fearing that refusal would result in the regiment plundering what remained of the city.[206]

In the months that followed, Aberdeen was occupied repeatedly by covenanting and royalist forces, with both sides trying to extract money, supplies and men from the destitute burgh.[207] By this point, even if the council or the city's inhabitants had wanted to help either side they were in no position to do so. In a letter to the estates, the council lamented that, the 'storme being great and of long continewance', the burgh's trade had been crippled, its people had been pushed into poverty and 25 of its wealthiest and most influential burgesses had fled to the continent.[208] The council's cries for mercy largely fell upon deaf ears. However, in one instance, Montrose wrote to the burgh conveying his regret that the city had been so brutally reduced, but reminded them that 'none hes bene burthenit [burdened] with the kingis service'.[209]

Nonetheless, there is considerable evidence of continued royalist sentiment amongst the city's remaining inhabitants. Perhaps most striking was the publishing of two anonymous pamphlets within the city, which recounted the royalist victories at Alford (2 July 1645) and Kilsyth (15 August 1645).[210] The report of Alford concluded with a declaration that the royalist victories were clear signs of God's providence:

> the Lord hath now the fift tyme given an evedent token of His wrath and anger, for the stryvings of this seditious faction in this Nation, agaynst their Prince ... The kingis Rents hee is robbed of here ... His Royall Prærogative rent from him here.[211]

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[205] *ACL*, ii, 383.
[206] *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 38-39 and 41-43; Spalding, *Memorialls*, ii, 445.
[207] *ACL*, iii, 2-4, 6-23; *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 43-45, 48-49 and 52-54; Spalding, *Memorialls*, ii, 452-453, 456-459, 463 and 465-467.
[208] *ACL*, iii, 23-25.
[209] ibid, 22-23.
[210] Reid, *Campaigns of Montrose*, 120-150.
[211] *The copie of a letter, showing the true relation, of the late and happie victorie receaved by the Marques of Montrose, agaynst Generall Lievetenant Baylie, and others of the rebells, at Alfood, the second of Julie, 1645* (Aberdeen, 1645).

The account of Kilsyth shows an equally confident interpretation of the victories as God's divine judgement, curtailing covenanting tyranny:

> In spight of Force, and Danger, that the sinne of bolder Treason, hence-foorth seems to bee the presage of thy [Montrose's] further Victorie: Whilst thy succesfull Arm sustayns alone the freedom of a kingdom, and a Crown.[212]

Given the diminished state of Aberdeen's population, there can be little doubt that these were printed with the consent of the magistrates. Burgh censorship across the kingdom was lax until the 1650s; thus any censorship that did occur tended to reflect individual councils censoring material according to their own beliefs and sympathies.[213] If they had wanted to suppress it, it is hard to see how the printer could have resisted. The printer himself, Edward Raban, was Aberdeen's first printer, having been granted a patent by James VI in 1622. During his time as the burgh's printer, Raban had worked alongside the loyalist Menzies family and had published the treatises of the Aberdeen Doctors during the opening stages of the conflict.[214] Thus, it is likely that Raban held royalist sympathies.

These publications preceded the election of Thomas Gray as provost in September 1645, supported by George Moreson as a bailie. In the period between the battle of Aberdeen and the printing of these pamphlets, it appears that Gray and Moreson were able to reassert themselves within the power vacuum which had been left behind following the flight of the covenanting magistrates after the battle. When the covenanting magistrates returned in the winter of 1644, the rigour which had characterised their defiance in the face of Montrose's army was gone. Robert Farquhar, provost from September 1644-1645, seems to have entirely focused on the city's finances and how it could repay those who had lent substantial sums, namely himself.[215] Patrick Leslie is curiously absent, although there are references to him being in the south of the kingdom for an extended period of time.[216] Alexander Jaffray, senior, died in January 1645, and his son Alexander seems to have had little impact on burgh politics, apart from when he was captured by John Leith of Harthill – the son of the previously mentioned Harthill – alongside his brother Thomas and Andrew Cant, all of whom had been vocal covenanters. The council interceded on their behalf to secure their release.[217]

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[212] *The true relation of the late happie victorie, obtained by the Marques of Montrose his Excellencie, His Majesties Lieuetenant, and Generall Governour of the kingdom of Scotland against General Lieuetenant Baylie, and others of the rebels, at Kilsyth, 15 August, 1645* (Aberdeen, 1645).
[213] Alastair Mann, *The Scottish Book Trade, 1500-1720* (East Linton, 2000), 26.
[214] John P. Edmond, *The Aberdeen Printers, 1620-1736* (Aberdeen, 1886), 4-32.
[215] *ACL*, iii, 26.
[216] ibid, 55-56.
[217] ibid, 17-18.

The royalist position in Aberdeen was strengthened in September when the burgh was occupied by Aboyne.[218] Upon entering the city, Aboyne drew up a list of those who were to be barred from holding office for the coming year. As shown in Appendix 5, the list included Robert Farquhar, Patrick Leslie (senior), Patrick Leslie (younger), Alexander Jaffray and John Jaffray, as well as eight others. Evidently, Aboyne knew who the prime covenanters within Aberdeen were, and intended to stop them interfering with the operation of the burgh. It would seem that Farquhar, despite his royalist beginnings, had burnt his bridges after the battle of Aberdeen and was thus included alongside the Leslies and Jaffrays as those who were to have 'no voice in counsell'.[219] However, Farquhar would continue to work with Gray and Moreson in the years that followed, but this can perhaps be explained by Farquhar's financial importance, and by the fact that Gray was married to his niece, Isobel Farquhar.[220]

It is clear that Gray and Moreson maintained their links to the royalist war effort, for in 1646, following their election to the council, the other bailies – George Cullen and James Collinson – wrote to them asking that they focus on finding a settlement to the troubles, and required their word that they 'give testimonie of your willingness to keep a sincer harmony amongst neighbours and kinsmen'.[221] Despite this, there is no record of any attempt to remove Gray or Moreson by the estates or local covenanters following the disbandment of royalist forces in June 1646. In September, the estates even asked that Gray's council stay in office for another term, fearing illegal action in any future election.[222] This was not to the liking of John Row, one of the transported covenanting ministers, who complained that the current council was a threat to the kirk and asked the estates to settle the issue. In response, Gray's council collected the signatures of 12 burgesses who refuted Row's allegations, leading Row to clarify that he was not targeting the councillors themselves, but 'the rebellis and enemies of Gods kirk and kingdome'.[223]

The council's primary focus from 1646 to 1651 appears to have been the limiting of damage to the burgh and recouping its losses as best it could. However, in one last act of defiance, Aberdeen was the only burgh to vote in parliament against Montrose's treason

[218] After leaving the main royalist host following a dispute with Montrose, Aboyne ventured north to recruit more men and join with forces under the command of his father, Huntly. Little did the viscount know that as he arrived at Aberdeen, the main royalist army was being routed at Philliphaugh (13 September 1645). See Reid, *Crown, Covenant and Cromwell*, 108.
[219] *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 57-58.
[220] Munro, *Memorials of the Aldermen, Provosts, and Lord Provosts of Aberdeen*, 154.
[221] *ACL*, iii, 55-56.
[222] ibid, 58-59.
[223] *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 70-71.

conviction in January 1646.[224] Both sides continued to force themselves upon Aberdeen during 1646 and 1647, with the covenanting army under John Middleton, the future Earl of Middleton, being the worst culprit.[225] In February 1647, the estates once again intervened, dismissing the current council, stating that their election had taken place whilst the burgh was under the influence of 'rebellis', and calling for a fresh election to take place. The estates produced a list of candidates (Appendix 6) they deemed appropriate replacements. Unsurprisingly, the list was populated by proven covenanters such as the Leslies, Jaffrays and Farquhars, but it also included Thomas Gray, George Cullen and Peter Schirres, the burgh commissioner who had voted in favour of Montrose.[226] In the end, a strong covenanting council was put in place, with Patrick Leslie once again at its head. Thus it may be the case that the estates included Gray's name on the election ticket to avoid giving the royalist party ammunition for complaint, as had transpired in Glasgow the previous year.[227] The only recorded dissent occurred at the hands of Grissell Abercrombie who, in a totally unrelated incident, assaulted Janet Ray for stealing her plaid, but at some point during the attack Grissell was heard calling upon God to curse all the 'roundheids', for which she was sent to the jougs.[228]

The Engagement of 1647-1648 coincided with the arrival of the plague in Aberdeen. First reported in April 1647, the sickness would go on to claim the lives of between 20% and 30% of the remaining population.[229] After almost ten years of finding themselves on opposite sides of the divide, Aberdeen's magistrates appear to have almost unanimously favoured the Engagement, with Patrick Leslie becoming one of its most vocal supporters. In contrast, all three of Aberdeen's remaining ministers – Andrew Cant, John Row and John Menzies – opposed the Engagement.[230] In response to this, the council presented a unified front, withholding their maintenance and berating them for preaching disobedience.[231] The council then supported the levy of a company of men for the engager army, but from this point on, Aberdeen was, for the first time since the start of the conflict, outwith the theatre of war.[232]

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[224] James Balfour, *Historical Works*, ed. James Haig, 4 vols (Edinburgh, 1824), iii, 360-361.
[225] *ACL,* iii, 36-37 and 64-65; *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 72-73.
[226] *ACL*, iii, 76-77; *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 73-74.
[227] See pp.215-217.
[228] *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 76.
[229] ibid, 83-84; DesBrisay, *'The civill warrs did overrun all'*, 161-162.
[230] DesBrisay, *'The civill warrs did overrun all'*, 161.
[231] *ACL*, iii, 104-105.
[232] *Extracts, 1643-1747,* 88-89.

Following the defeat of the engagers at Preston (17 August 1648), the Engagement was outlawed by parliament and through the Act of Classes (23 January 1649) many royalists and engagers were forced out of public office by the resurgent radical covenanting faction, also known as the kirk party.[233] Unlike many other burghs which had supported the Engagement, Aberdeen did not experience the full vengeance of the radical faction, largely due to the fact the city had been forced to quarantine itself due to the plague. The only recorded political casualty of this episode was the council clerk, who was removed from office by order of the estates for his support of the Engagement.[234] Debilitated by debt, plague and destruction, Aberdeen's council failed to hold an election in October 1649, and a commission of magistrates was chosen, with the sanction of the estates, to manage the burgh, with Thomas Gray acting as provost.[235] By the end of 1649, the council estimated that since 1639 the burgh had suffered approximately £1,582,910 in damages and additional taxations.[236]

The execution of Charles I (30 January 1649) and the proclamation of Charles II in Edinburgh on 5 February 1650 appear to have had little impact on the battered shell of Aberdeen. Charles II's ascension brought little ease to the burgh's inhabitants, apart from the fact that some within the city were rewarded for loyal service. Most notable amongst these was Alexander Dalgardno, an ally of Aboyne during his occupation of the burgh, who was granted the command of the new levy commissioned by the king.[237] Promises were also made to repay those who had supplied the armies of Montrose and Aboyne during their occupations of the city, but it is unlikely that these payments were ever actually made.[238] Following the defeats of Dunbar (3 September 1650) and Worcester (3 September 1651), Scotland fell into the hands of Cromwell's forces, and on 5 September 1651, Aberdeen sent a commission to the advancing English army seeking terms of surrender.[239]

Those royalists who survived to see the Restoration of Charles II in 1660 were granted significant compensation for their loyal service. For one, they lived to see Andrew Cant forced out of his charge, specifically for his possession of Samuel Rutherford's *Lex*

[233] In Aberdeen, the Engagement was officially declared illegal on the 11 November 1648. See *Extracts, 1643-1747*, 91; *RPS*, 1649/1/43.
[234] *Extracts, 1643-1747*, 91-92.
[235] ibid, 99-105.
[236] *ACL*, iii, 117-124.
[237] *Extracts, 1643-1747*, 106-107 and 111.
[238] ibid, 106-107.
[239] ibid, 122.

Rex (1660).[240] More significantly, upon his restoration, Charles instructed the earl of Glencairn, his high chancellor, to oversee the election of loyal subjects to positions of power within the burghs. This was an opportunity for the Restoration regime to both repay past loyalty and ensure that the seed of Charles's rule would take root. In Aberdeen, this new royalist council was to be led by none other than Gilbert Gray, son of Thomas Gray.[241]

To conclude, while Aberdeen was clearly politically divided throughout the 1640s, its reputation as a royalist focal point is well deserved. Charles I enjoyed strong support from many of Aberdeen's inhabitants throughout the civil wars. That support amounted to more than the acquiescence of merchants or magistrates under the Gordons' influence. It was committed and deep-rooted, and visible throughout all levels of Aberdeen's society, from Provost Thomas Gray to the servant Issobell Davidsone. This loyalty was not blind, but pragmatic. When the burgh's royalists could assist, they did. When they came under the control of the covenanters, they conformed. Even after the appalling experience of the royalist sack in 1644, royalist sympathy within the burgh was still clearly visible. DesBrisay and Robertson have been quite right to highlight the covenanting element within the burgh, but we should not underestimate royalist support as a result of it. Factional divides fissured everyday life from the very beginning of the conflict, with old animosities and rivalries, namely that of the Leslies, clearly influencing the political situation on the ground. Despite this, there was strong royalist support, even when the covenanting leadership made life increasingly uncomfortable for royalist Aberdonians. Moreover, in the examples of royalist ideology discussed above, the Aberdonian royalists conformed to the substance of royalist rhetoric identified in the previous chapters: they were anxious over the legality of covenanting actions, they held their loyalty to the crown dearly, and they were deeply concerned with protecting order and hierarchy within the burgh. When the situation in Aberdeen became almost unbearable in the years after 1644, pragmatism and survival overrode, but did not entirely replace, political allegiance. There is little doubt that one of the most significant factors in local royalists' failure to produce tangible military support for much of the period was the failure of the overarching royalist military network. Huntly's indecisiveness and Montrose's inability to establish a permanent support structure meant that Aberdeen's royalists were left isolated for the majority of the 1640s and any action they did take part in was sporadic and localised. This inevitably resulted in royalists having to conform to covenanting rule and await an opportunity. Unfortunately for Aberdeen's royalists, the toll of repeated garrisoning, taxes, fines, occupation and the

[240] ibid, 188-192.
[241] Munro, *Memorials of the Aldermen, Provosts, and Lord Provosts of Aberdeen*, 171-172.

plague meant that they were rarely in a position to provide meaningful support to the royalist war effort when those opportunities arose.

3.5 Case Study: Glasgow

Within the current historiography, Glasgow has rarely been connected with royalist activity.[242] In fact, most historians of the city have tended to emphasise the burgh's covenanting commitment. John Mure's *The History of Glasgow* (1830) noted how the Glasgow Assembly (1638) had proved to be a watershed moment for the burgh which had possessed strong links to the crown during the late medieval period.[243] Likewise, George Eyre-Todd's history of the city recorded that Glasgow played a 'decided and vigorous part' within the covenanting rebellion and that even its contribution of supplies to the royalist army in 1645 was a sign of the magistrates' pragmatism in the face of a military threat, rather than an indicator of royalist sympathy.[244] Adopting a similar position as Friedrichs, Andrew Wallace has suggested that the city was not overly committed to either side of the conflict and reluctantly aided both sides when it was forced to do so.[245] More recently, Allan Macinnes argued that the economic expediency and political assertiveness of the burgh's elite led to it becoming 'ideologically, financially and militarily' committed to the covenanting regime.[246]

However, several studies have questioned this reading and have noted that political consensus within the burgh broke down during the civil wars as a result of internal divisions and conflicting agendas. William Shepard's doctoral thesis (1978) which examined Glasgow's society and politics between 1648 and 1674, discussed the divisive impact that the royalist occupation of the city in 1645 had on burgh politics. Shepard argued that the burgh split into two factions following the occupation, with one side favouring the Engagement and the other supporting the radical covenanting faction led by Argyll. While Shepard did not believe that royalism within the city was at the root of the conflict, he found that the resulting infighting plagued Glasgow's city politics for the

[242] Elements of the analysis in this section can also be found in: Andrew Lind, 'Battle in the Burgh: Glasgow during the British Civil Wars, c.1638-1651', *Journal of Northern Renaissance* (2020); Paul Goatman and Andrew Lind, 'Glasgow and the National Covenant in 1638: Revolution, Royalism and Civic Reform' in Langley (ed), *The National Covenant*, 39-52.
[243] John Mure, *The History of Glasgow* (Glasgow, 1830), 86-87.
[244] George Eyre-Todd, *History of Glasgow*, 3 vols (Glasgow, 1931), ii, 255.
[245] Andrew Wallace, *History of Glasgow* (Glasgow, 1882), 30-31.
[246] Allan Macinnes, 'Covenanting Revolution and Municipal Enterprise', *History Today* 40 (May 1990), 10-16.

following decade.[247] Kirsteen MacKenzie has recently supported Shepard's thesis in an article which examined the burgh's council between 1650 and 1653. MacKenzie argued that burgh politics in Glasgow had become polarised by 1650 between a coalition of moderate covenanting and royalist burgesses who supported Charles II and remonstrators led by the covenanting radical Patrick Gillespie who advocated support for Cromwellian forces.[248]

Because we lack a modern, in-depth survey of Glasgow during the civil wars, it is difficult to use the existing scholarship to make any definitive arguments in regard to the political temperament of the city and its occupants, particularly prior to 1647. Thus, this section will re-examine the burgh and its internal politics during the 1640s in order to identify royalism within the city. It will become clear that the story of Glasgow's allegiance is far more complex than has been previously realised.

On the eve of the outbreak of the civil wars, Glasgow was in a similar position to Aberdeen. It had a similarly sized population, it was a growing mercantile centre and was increasingly becoming the nucleus of secular and ecclesiastical politics within its region. However, the political situation in Glasgow was more volatile. During the latter years of James VI's reign, Glasgow had undergone the 'Stuart Revolution' in civic administration, which had seen the burgh brought closer into the crown's centralising control.[249] Most important to this development was the influence which the archbishop of Glasgow could exert over the city. When the city was elevated to royal burgh status in 1611, it was made clear to the council that the archbishop would retain the right of nominating the provost and drawing up the leet (shortlist) of nine magistrates who were eligible for the positions of bailies.[250] This understandably caused a great deal of 'constitutional sparring', as Macinnes termed it, between the magistrates and the archbishop.[251] Matters came to a head in 1636 when the council lodged a complaint against Archbishop Patrick Lindsay following a dispute over the payment of a minister's stipend. The magistrates accused Lindsay of flaunting his rights and overstepping his bounds. However, Charles intervened on behalf of the archbishop, and the magistrates were forced to endure the increasingly unbearable prelate. The king also took the opportunity to reiterate Lindsay's authority and

[247] Shepard, 'The Politics and Society of Glasgow', 32-44.
[248] Kirsteen M. MacKenzie, 'A Contested Space: Demonstrative Action and the Politics of Transitional Authority in Glasgow, 1650-1653', in Katherine Buchanan, Lucinda M. S. Dean and Michael Penman (eds), *Medieval and Early Modern Representations of Authority in Scotland and the British Isles* (London, 2016), 68-82.
[249] Goatman, 'Re-Formed by Kirk and Crown', 127.
[250] Goatman and Lind, 'Glasgow and the National Covenant ', 41-45.
[251] Macinnes, 'Covenanting Revolution and Municipal Enterprise', 11.

jurisdiction over the burgh's elections, thus sending a clear message to the council that the crown would not support it against the archbishop.[252]

It was against this backdrop that the prayer book and new book of canons were introduced. Following the outbreak of rioting in Edinburgh during July 1637 and the groundswell of support for anti-prayer book petitioning which spread across the kingdom, support for the agitators soon made itself visible in Glasgow. In August 1637, Archbishop Lindsay invited William Annand, a minister from Ayr, and John Lindsay, a minister from Carluke, to preach at the opening of the synod of Glasgow.[253] On the first day of the synod, Annand preached in Glasgow Cathedral to the gathered congregation of ministers and inhabitants. He vehemently defended the new liturgy during his sermon, which caused a 'great dinne' amongst the women of the city.[254] The following day, Lindsay was due to preach, but before he could begin his sermon women in the audience warned him that if he used the new prayer book he would be 'rent out of the pulpit'. Lindsay took their advice, but when Annand attempted to leave the cathedral he was set upon by '30 or 40 of our honestest women' who scolded the minister, resulting in two of 'the meanest' being arrested. A few days later Annand was attacked again, this time by 'some hundredths of inraged women' bearing 'neaves [clentched fists], staves and peats'. Annand narrowly managed to escape, albeit bruised and battered. In a letter to his cousin, Robert Baillie noted how the unrest was most likely coordinated by 'numbers of the best qualitie', which probably explains why there is no record of the incidents within the burgh council's records. [255] The prominence of women, the involvement of local burgh elites and the inaction of the burgh council were all the same trademarks exhibited by Edinburgh's burgh council during its prayer book disturbances.[256]

On 20 September 1637, a petition was sent to the privy council, on behalf of the 'burgh and citie of Glasgow', objecting to the prayer book and calling for a general assembly or parliament in order to debate the issue and 'delyver us from our fears'.[257] A month later the council was convinced by Robert Baillie – who originated from Glasgow but was the minister of Kilwinning in Ayr at this time – to send a commissioner to

[252] Goatman, 'Re-Formed by Kirk and Crown', 121 and 181-182.
[253] Both Annand and Lindsay proved to be steadfast in their support for the crown's religious policies, resulting in both of them being deposed following the covenanters' seizure of power. For more information on these ministers, see p.125.
[254] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 20-21.
[255] ibid, 21.
[256] Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution*, 56-62.
[257] Leslie, *A Relation*, 48.

Edinburgh in order to sign a general petition against the prayer book.[258] Unlike other burghs, Glasgow did not send its provost to sign the petition. Instead, the council sent Walter Stirling, a guild member, albeit a senior one.[259] As Paul Goatman has noted, this suggests that even at this early stage there seems to have been a reluctance among some of the burgh's elite towards the unfolding rebellion, with Provost James Stewart younger of Flock seemingly resistant to put his name to such a blatant attack on the archbishop, his political patron.[260] Indeed, Stewart was not the only one to show signs of opposition to the covenant. The following year, Glasgow's commissioner to the convention of royal burghs, Colin Campbell – a wealthy and influential merchant burgess – suddenly resigned his commission and left the convention shortly after arriving. The council was furious with him, fining him for having 'indangerit' the burgh.[261] The burgh records do not tell us why Campbell withdrew himself; given the council's reaction and his involvement in royalist activities during the 1640s, it was probably due to the convention's decision to make the signing of the covenant compulsory for commissioners.[262]

Archbishop Lindsay was certainly concerned with the situation within the city. He wrote to the marquis of Hamilton in spring 1638, alerting the king's commissioner to the disorders which were occurring within his diocese due to the grievances of the kirk. Lindsay called for Hamilton's intervention in order to 'settile the generall combustioune'.[263] However, Hamilton did not intervene, being preoccupied with the deteriorating political situation across the kingdom. It became evident by mid-1638 that Charles I would need to either concede to the covenanters and authorise a general assembly or enact a military operation in order to crush the revolt. Walter Balcanquhall, the king's chief intelligence gatherer for Scotland, advised Charles that, if the king did not want war, he should consider hosting an assembly, as it was likely that the covenanters would host one anyway.[264] Charles reluctantly agreed, and his advisors chose Glasgow as the venue for this assembly. Allan Macinnes has previously argued that this was due to the 'mistaken belief' that the burgh's proximity to the Hamilton estates would allow the marquis to exert

[258] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 21; *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, 1573-1642*, ed. J. D. Marwick (Edinburgh, 1876), 390.
[259] D. Hay Fleming (ed), 'Scotland's supplication and complaint against the Book of Common Prayer (otherwise Laud's Liturgy), the Book of Canons and the Prelates, 18th October 1637', *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland* 60 (1926), 314-383.
[260] Goatman, 'Re-Formed by Kirk and Crown', 182.
[261] *Extracts, 1573-1642*, 390.
[262] Spalding, *Memorialls*, i, 106.
[263] NRS, GD406/1/355.
[264] John Coffey, 'Balcanquhall, Walter (c. 1586–1645), Dean of Rochester', *ODNB* (2004); NLS, Wodrow MSS, LXVI, no. 37.

an influence over proceedings.[265] While this was undoubtedly seen as a boon for the royalist party, it also seems likely that they chose Glasgow in particular because they believed they could mobilise support within the burgh for the king's cause.[266]

The burgh council had put off signing the National Covenant until 8 September, and upon receiving Charles I's proclamation on 22 September, which called for a general assembly and for all subjects to sign the King's Covenant, the council wrote to Hamilton praising the king's wisdom and pledging their support to him.[267] When the King's Covenant was announced at Glasgow's mercat cross, Baillie privately complained that 'it was applauded to by the city, by too many with too much joy, without any number of protesting'.[268] It was also well-received by a group of ministers within Glasgow's presbytery, who similarly wrote to Hamilton thanking him for his support.[269] This group of nine ministers included John Strang, principal of the University of Glasgow, and William Wilkie, a minister in Govan and regent of the University of Glasgow. Wilkie was one of Balcanquhall's 'bussie fleas' – Robert Baillie's unflattering name for Balcanquhall's spies – which indicates that royalist support networks were already at work in Glasgow during 1638. [270] Indeed, Baillie believed that the burgh elections of 1638 had been manipulated by Hamilton and the archbishop to ensure that sympathetic men were at its head. In particular, Baillie was convinced that Provost Patrick Bell and Bailie William Neilson were actively working with Hamilton to further the king's interests.[271]

Hamilton himself went to the Clydesdale area on 26 September to lobby for the king's cause and ensure only suitable commissioners to the assembly were elected.[272] This was part of a larger operation which Hamilton and William Alexander, Earl of Stirling, were organising in order to secure 'moderate and discreet' men from in and around the burghs of Edinburgh and Glasgow to support the royalist party within the assembly.[273] Alongside these efforts, Balcanquhall and his network of informers were hard at work cultivating support in Glasgow. Wilkie had been following Balcanquhall's instructions, encouraging Strang to head vocal opposition to the covenanters so that the king's cause would not be represented by 'faceless men'. Wilkie also reported success in gaining

[265] Macinnes, 'Covenanting Revolution and Municipal Enterprise', 10-11.
[266] David Stevenson believed this to be the case. See Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 108-109.
[267] *Extracts, 1573-1642*, 386, 389 and 391; NRS, GD406/1/442.
[268] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 106.
[269] NRS, GD406/1/445.
[270] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 174.
[271] ibid, 106.
[272] NRS, GD406/1/444.
[273] NRS, GD406/1/596.

signatures for the King's Covenant from those who had previously signed the National Covenant, especially amongst the ministry from whom Wilkie claimed he had secured seven signatures. [274] Meanwhile, Strang tried to secure more votes for the university in the assembly, increasing its voting power from one to four, the same as a presbytery.[275] His scheme was ultimately countered by the covenanters and never bore any fruit. However, local royalists clearly saw the assembly as an opportunity to use their home advantage and outmanoeuvre the covenanters. All of these efforts must have been successful enough to worry the covenanters, as in the weeks before the assembly, Baillie commented that Glasgow was widely regarded as the greatest opponent of the covenant in the west.[276]

However, the best-laid plans of the royalists started to fall apart before the assembly even opened. The Aberdeen Doctors, who were meant to lend their theological muscle to any debates, excused themselves from attending the assembly on the grounds that they feared for their safety.[277] Such fears appeared to be justified after John Strang withdrew his twenty-eight-page objection to the National Covenant just as Hamilton was about to read it aloud. [278] Strang and his wife had, according to Balcanquhall, been threatened by the earls of Loudoun and Lindsay in the days before the assembly. Upon hearing about Strang's objection, Loudoun and Lindsay visited Strang on two occasions, threatening him and his wife that 'he must never looke to live quietly in Glasgow, nor anywhere else in Scotland' if he voiced his opposition at the assembly.[279] Fearing for his safety, Strang withdrew his objection. It was only the friendship which Strang shared with Patrick Bell and Robert Baillie that saved him and the university from further repercussions after Bell and Baillie fought off demands from within the assembly for action to be taken against the university. Nevertheless, the university was stripped of its votes.[280] Loudon also successfully disrupted Bell's attempt to distribute copies of the King's Covenant to his fellow burgesses. After hearing of Bell's plans to disseminate the King's Covenant, Loudoun forced his way into a kirk session meeting which was taking place in the cathedral, warning all who would listen of the dangers of signing the King's Covenant. The target of this outburst was Bell himself who had attended the meeting in his

[274] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 482-483.
[275] H. M. B. Reid, *The Divinity Principals in the University of Glasgow, 1545–1654* (Glasgow, 1817), 275.
[276] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 63.
[277] NRS, GD406/1/446; GD406/1/665; GD406/1/457. Instead of attending themselves, the Doctors nominated James Harvie, minister of New Machar (Aberdeen), to be their representative. See Spalding, *Memorialls*, 115.
[278] NLS, Wodrow MSS, XXXI, no. 2. Strang's opposition to the covenant is discussed in more detail on p.155.
[279] Balcanquhall, *A Large Declaration,* 268.
[280] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 172.

role as provost. Loudoun demanded that Bell publicly promise that he would not distribute the King's Covenant, but luckily for Bell, the session moderator intervened on his behalf and was able to calm Loudoun down. However, since there is no further evidence to suggest that Bell circulated the King's Covenant, it seems that Loudoun was successful in disrupting the provost's plan.[281]

While the royalist party was bullied into submission, the covenanters proved to be far more effective at canvassing support in Glasgow. Correspondence between members of Glasgow's clergy and burgesses and the covenanting nobility shows that they had also been hard at work ensuring they had a body of support within the city's hierarchy, and that any commissioners to the assembly would be properly aligned.[282] If this was not bad enough for royalist prospects, the killing blow was dealt by Glasgow's council. Provost Patrick Bell, having received instructions from his fellow councillors, first voted against Hamilton's attempts to dissolve the assembly. Then, on 6 December, Bell received instructions to vote in favour of the abolition of Episcopacy and deposition of the Scottish bishops.[283] The details of how this shift transpired are not clear within the surviving sources. Indeed, there is no way to tell whether Hamilton's men on the council such as Patrick Bell put up any resistance to this plan. It would seem that this chance to remove Bishop Lindsay, coupled with the demise of royalist prospects, presented too good an opportunity for the council to ignore. This also suggests that there was limited attachment to the episcopal system within the burgh's elite, despite it being an archbishopric.

However, this episode did not ensure Glasgow's submission to the new regime. As the rhetoric of war ushered in the new year, the covenanting leadership remained concerned about the burgh's allegiance. In March 1639, Wilkie wrote to Balcanquhall to update him on the feeling within the city. Wilkie informed him that he had observed the people gather for services administered by covenanting ministers, but that 'the gritter number, partlie out of conscience, pairtlie of fear, groanes and grummils at such poynts, not so Jesuited by ther Covenant as to swallow such pillons [pills]'. Wilkie believed that even those who had accepted the National Covenant would denounce it if the king would only come to them and tell them to do so. According to Wilkie's report, this lack of covenanting zealousness had also been noted by the Tables:

> The Towne of Glasgow (as I lerned of those who seamid to know it weil) was of this number, and therfor had givin such a limited commission to these that came fra them to the

[281] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 481-482.
[282] ibid, 229; NRS, GD3/5/235; Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 9.
[283] *Extracts, 1573-1642*, 394-395.

> meiting at Edr. [Edinburgh] that it did gritlie displease the rest of the burrowes, and gritlie wer they upbraidet as being Aberdein's sister, and of a Laodicean temper.[284]

The equation of Glasgow with Aberdeen is telling. As has been discussed above, Aberdeen exemplified royalist allegiance between 1638 and 1639, thus highlighting the unease which the Tables felt over Glasgow's true allegiance. Indeed, when war broke out in March 1639, Baillie noted that 'the toun of Glasgow was, through the perversness of some few men, much doubted'.[285] While Baillie does not reveal who these men might be, it seems more than likely that he was referring to Patrick Bell and his allies. The risk posed by Glasgow was deemed to be too great by the Tables given the kingdom's slide into open conflict, and at the end of March the marquis of Argyll was dispatched from Perth to go to the burgh in order to 'keip them right' and rectify the burgh's resistance to enforcing a covenanting levy.[286] The burgh council sent Gabriel Cunningham and Colin Campbell to meet the marquis at Dumbarton to discover his intentions.[287] There is no record of the conversation that occurred at this meeting, but it can be no coincidence that nine days later the council confirmed a commission for a levy of 100 men from the city to be raised and sent to join the covenanting army at the border.[288] This company was to be commanded by George Porterfield, the man who would become the burgh's leading covenanter. Porterfield, alongside other leading Glasgow covenanters John Spruele and John Graham, were all recent additions to Glasgow's list of burgesses. In Porterfield's case at least, while he was admitted through marriage to the burgh in 1623, he seems to have been purposefully deployed to the city from Renfrewshire by the covenanting leadership in 1639.[289] It is also interesting that Glasgow's levy was sent to the southern front, and not the northern one: if they were called upon to fight, they would be fighting English levies and not fellow Scotsmen.

In the months that followed Argyll's warning to the council, the burgh's magistrates seem to have toed the party line without any incident. The council continued to authorise the drilling of the burgh's inhabitants, the city paid the general band which had caused such division in Aberdeen, and on 1 October, a new council was elected which was largely sympathetic to the covenanting regime.[290] Led by the moderate Provost Gabriel

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[284] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, i, 487-490.
[285] ibid, 194.
[286] ibid, 487-490; *Extracts, 1573-1642*, 398.
[287] *Extracts, 1573-1642*, 398.
[288] ibid, 398-400.
[289] James R. Anderson and James Gurlay, *The Provosts of Glasgow, 1609-1832* (Glasgow, 1942), 16-18 and 21.
[290] *Extracts, 1573-1642*, 401-402 and 404-406.

Cunningham, the council featured George Porterfield as a bailie and Walter Stirling as the dean of guild, both of whom had clear covenanting sympathies.

Glasgow's inner politics remained quiet and stable from 1639 to 1640. During this time Porterfield was able to solidify his position as the de facto commander of the city's military arm, ordering fresh taxes to cover his soldiers' pay arrears and organising new levies for the 'common service'. Porterfield also oversaw the sequestration of 'non covinenters rentis' for the payment of his men. [291] Despite Porterfield's rapid rise to prominence, Glasgow's council fell into the hands of royalist sympathisers during the 1640 election, with James Stewart securing the provostship and Colin Campbell, Henry Glenn and William Neilson all becoming bailies. All four of these men had been involved in Hamilton's attempt to secure the burgh for the king in 1638, and Patrick Bell's brother, James Bell, secured the position of dean of guild.[292]

By 1641, the royalist leadership once again set its sights on the burgh's council. In a letter to Hamilton, James Stewart, Duke of Lennox, wished him luck in dealing with the tumultuous public affairs and informed him that he should expect 'better success' in Glasgow thanks to 'W. Stuart'.[293] The letter must refer to the election of William Stewart to the provostship in September 1641. Stewart's election in 1641 had caused a stir, as his nomination had been supported by Sir Robert Gordon, a representative of the king. Likewise, Gordon nominated James Bell, John Anderson and Menasses Lyle for the bailie positions, all three of whom would feature prominently in royalist activity in the years to come.[294] Following the archbishop's departure in 1638, the burgh's elections were meant to have been overseen by the duke of Lennox who was supposed to have taken over the archbishop's administrative duties. In reality this did not happen, with the council becoming independent from formal intervention in their elections. To ensure that the crown's influence was restored, Robert Gordon was sent to oversee the elections and fulfil Lennox's duties. The king was clearly trying to fill the void left by archbishop Lindsay and ensure that sympathetic burgesses occupied Glasgow's council. To guarantee that Gordon's nominations would be heeded, Charles wrote to the council just before the election, instructing them to obey Gordon 'as if we were personally present, and yo[u]r obedience as much expected, as it hath bene formerly to any ArchBisshop'.[295] Gordon's assertiveness earned him a formal complaint from some of the burgh's burgesses, but his

[291] ibid, 413-414 and 424.
[292] ibid, 422-423.
[293] NRS, GD406/1/8176.
[294] *Extracts, 1573-1642*, 432-433.
[295] NRS, GD220/1/G/4/3/3.

nominations were accepted and the voting members of the council elected the king's candidates.[296]

It did not take the estates long to counter Gordon's efforts. On 16 November parliament passed legislation which granted Glasgow the right to hold free elections, with the small concession that Lennox would retain the right to nominate a candidate for the provostship due to his assumption of Lindsay's old jurisdiction.[297] However, when the elections came around for the following year, Stewart was re-elected provost and John Anderson secured one of the bailie positions alongside James Hamilton, another royalist.[298] Despite this, Stewart's re-election was evidently contentious enough for the new council to pass legislation which prohibited provosts from holding office for more than two consecutive terms.[299] This appears to have been a blatant anti-Stewart policy, as it was completely ignored in the years that followed. Stewart's second term in office was cut short by his unexpected death in January 1643. However, his work was continued by James Bell and Colin Campbell, with the burgh remaining under the control of this royalist faction until 1645.

Charles wrote to the council in April 1643, thanking it for its loyal service, and asking it to ignore the false divisions which his enemies had sought to spread amongst his subjects.[300] Charles's letter was accompanied by a message from the earl of Lanark, the younger brother of Hamilton. He also thanked the council for its affections towards the king and assured the magistrates that 'I will never so much injure your affections to his Majestie's service, as to believe you, or any in your Toune, will ever question the truth of these his Majestie's gracious expressions toward yow'. Lanark signed off his letter with a call for the burgh to continue in its favour towards the crown.[301] The council appears to have done just that. While they agreed to collect taxations for the covenanting army in Ireland, the royalist magistrates also corresponded with Lanark about the staffing of the university and the appointment of ministers within the burgh.[302] Likewise, they dutifully read out the king's proclamations, and it was made clear that copies of the king's letters were to be sent to the burgh's commissioner to the convention of estates, James Bell.[303]

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[296] *Extracts, 1573-1642*, 433.
[297] *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, 1630-1662*, ed. J. D. Marwick (Glasgow, 1881), 47 and 49; NRS, GD220/1/G/4/3/6; *RPS*, 1641/8/197.
[298] *Extracts, 1630-1662*, 49-51.
[299] ibid, 52.
[300] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, ii, 479-480.
[301] ibid, 480.
[302] *Extracts, 1630-1662*, 57-59.
[303] ibid.

While the council continued to correspond with leading members of the royalist leadership, they accepted covenanting rule to avoid any confrontation or another visit courtesy of the marquis of Argyll. This remained the case until September when an incident occurred involving the mustering of the burgh's fencible men. The kingdom's political temperature had risen throughout the year as it became increasingly clear that Scottish forces would intervene in the unfolding English Civil War. However, it was unclear which side the covenanters would support, as both the parliamentarian and royalist parties lobbied them for an alliance. The Solemn League and Covenant was signed on 25 September, which saw the covenanting regime pledge support for the English parliamentarians. Glasgow mustered its fencible men twice between 25 September and 2 October.[304] On the latter occasion, the council declared that it had received orders from the king to do so, via his proclamation, which called for the 'putting the haill kingdome in ane present postur of war'. Captains were chosen and the king's proclamation was read aloud throughout Glasgow's streets.[305] Predictably, Porterfield and his allies were excluded from the whole process. However, the muster did not last long, and no further action occurred. The decision to muster in the first place may have come from Lanark, who had been ordered to distribute copies of Charles's call to arms to the 'well-affected'.[306] The mustering coincided with the attempted royalist rising of October 1643 which was orchestrated by the Hamilton brothers. However, the rising came to nothing and the small force which the Hamiltons were able to raise in Kelso was promptly dispersed as it became clear that a larger rising was not imminent.[307] We cannot be certain that Lanark intended to raise Glasgow for the royalist cause, but the timing of the mustering and Lanark's involvement does suggest that the Hamiltons not only saw Glasgow as a well-affected area, but also believed the magistrates were willing to raise men for the king.

While the rising came to nothing, the council also appears to have avoided any direct repercussions. The council remained under the control of the royalist faction, with James Bell securing the provostship, Colin Campbell acquiring one of the bailie positions, and Menasses Lyle becoming the deacon convener.[308] Nevertheless, the council retreated into covenanting conformity, authorising Porterfield's new levy from the burgh for the army which was mustering to invade England – with the interesting caveat that within the

[304] ibid, 61.
[305] ibid, 61-62. While the burgh records refer to a proclamation, unfortunately the original does not appear to have survived.
[306] Burnet, *Memoirs of the Lives and Actions of James and William, Dukes of Hamilton*, 309.
[307] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, ii, 105; Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution*, 291-292.
[308] *Extracts, 1630-1662*, 62-63.

burgh, the levy was to come under the direct command of the council. The council also agreed to quarter covenanting troops before their march south, and send supplies to Argyll's army which had been raised to oppose Montrose's royalist rising of 1644.[309] None of this prevented Bell being re-elected in the 1644 election, where he was joined on the council by John Anderson and Menasses Lyle.[310] Despite Bell and his allies' success in retaining power, their triumph was predicated on their willingness to adhere to the covenanting regime. Moreover, covenanting support within the burgh was still substantial. Amongst the most zealous was Zachary Boyd, one of the covenanting ministers from 1638, who was in regular correspondence with John Kennedy, Earl of Cassillis, and Hugh Montgomerie, Earl of Eglinton, regularly updating them as to events within the presbytery of Glasgow.[311]

Following the royalist victory at Kilsyth (15 August 1645), Montrose's army was the only force which remained in the field within Scotland, giving control of the kingdom to the king for the first time since 1638.[312] With the consent of Provost James Bell, Glasgow surrendered to the royalist army the following day. George Wishart, Montrose's biographer, claimed that following the flight of the estates, all throughout the kingdom 'those who had hitherto concealed their favour to the King's cause no longer feared to show themselves openly'. Glasgow is highlighted as showing particular delight at Montrose's victory. As the marquis and his officers entered the city, they were supposedly greeted with 'the joyous acclamations of the people'.[313] The magistrates also made sure that the burgh's ministers bowed as the royalists made their entrance.[314] Montrose ordered that his men be furnished with clothes and supplies, and announced celebrations and bonfires to mark the king's previous victories over the rebels in England. The marquis also instructed that 1000 copies of a report of his victory at Kilsyth – presumably akin to the one published in Aberdeen – were to be printed and dispersed throughout the city.[315] On 18 August, Montrose sent word to all the lords, burgesses and clergy of the kingdom, proclaiming the king's victory in the war and calling a parliament to be held in Glasgow in October.[316] The parliament would never materialise due to Montrose's defeat at

[309] ibid, 64-66, 68-69 and 73.
[310] ibid, 74.
[311] NRS, GD3/5/235; GD3/5/396; GD3/5/402; GD25/5/17B.
[312] NRS, GD3/5/365. For details of Montrose's victory at Kilsyth, see Reid, *Crown, Covenant and Cromwell*, 109-118.
[313] Wishart, *The Memoirs of James Marquis of Montrose*, 127-128.
[314] NRS, PA7/23/2/42; Shepard, 'The Politics and Society of Glasgow, 1648-74', 37.
[315] NRS, PA7/23/2/36; PA7/23/2/42.
[316] NRS, PA7/23/2/36.

Philiphaugh (13 September 1645), but Charles' call for a return to 'sound Order' and 'Fatherly care' must have been a welcome relief for royalists across the kingdom.[317]

Royalist jubilation was short-lived. Following the rout at Philiphaugh, the covenanting army under David Leslie was able to reclaim almost all the land which the royalists had just gained. Just 17 days after Philiphaugh, Lanark returned to Glasgow. Following the Hamiltons' fall from royal favour in the aftermath of the failed Kelso rising, Lanark had abandoned the king and claimed allegiance to the covenanters. Having previously been privy to those within the burgh upon whom the king could rely, Lanark was the ideal candidate to oversee the removal of all sympathetic magistrates from the burgh council. The council initially tried to resist Lanark's demands, but the earl quickly secured the written support of the estates. The city's magistrates were ordered to relinquish their offices, as all were deemed 'accessorie to the sending to and capitulating with James Grahame [Montrose]'. Tellingly, the only individual who gained exemption was George Porterfield.[318] All of those removed from office were barred from holding any position for the coming year. Colin Campbell was also barred from standing for office, despite the fact that he was not actually on the council that year. Lanark took no risks when uprooting any potential royalists, and even the council clerk, Henry Gibson, was removed from his position for having written the city's letter of surrender to Montrose.[319]

When James Bell was called before Lanark's parliamentary committee on 29 September to answer for his council's actions, he denied any wrongdoing. When asked why the burgh did not send men to fight at Kilsyth or resist the royalist advance, Bell replied that such a course was impossible as many had fled the burgh and that if the city had been abandoned, the lives of those who remained would have been endangered. The committee also enquired as to what advice the ministers within the burgh gave the council. Bell told them that the ministers had refused to give the council their opinion. Bell defended the council's supply of Montrose's army and their organisation of celebrations in the king's name as a necessity, claiming that anything which was not voluntarily given was liable to be taken anyway. He also denied that any of the council were accessories to the city's wilful capitulation and informed the committee that if just 40 men had come forward to defend the burgh against the royalists, he would have led them himself, but none did.[320] The line of questioning adopted by the committee suggests that it had reason to believe that

[317] NRS, PA7/23/2/34.
[318] *Extracts, 1630-1662*, 80-81.
[319] ibid, 82-87.
[320] NRS, PA7/23/2/42.

the burgh had at best dragged its feet, or worse still had been in active support of the royalist army.

Unconvinced by Bell's explanations, a committee from Clydesdale – which included Lieutenant-General William Baillie, the covenanting commander at Kilsyth – was sent by the estates to Glasgow to oversee the election of a replacement council. The commission was headed by John Lindsay, Earl of Crawford-Lindsay, who produced a shortlist of names who were deemed acceptable replacements. Unsurprisingly the commission's candidate for the provostship was Porterfield. Porterfield's subsequent election as provost and the success of his supporters (including Ninian Anderson and John Spruele) in gaining important positions within the burgh following Lanark's purge indicates the scale of collusion between Glasgow's covenanters and the estates. The first act of the new covenanting council was to issue a statement to all of the burgh's merchants and craftsmen, ordering that they recognise that the ousted magistrates had performed illegal actions and that they were 'incapable to bear office within the toune, because of ther capitulatione with the rebell [Montrose]'.[321] Even if any of those removed from office genuinely did not possess any royalist sympathy, they were publicly branded as such, creating an intense political divide within the burgh. To ensure that its will was adhered to, the estates also ordered that three royalists soldiers captured at Philphaugh were to be beheaded at Glasgow's mercat cross.[322]

Tensions bubbled away under the surface of day-to-day life in Glasgow for the following year. However, when the time came to elect a new council, the fragile quiet was shattered. Having deemed the risk of allowing a free election too great, the estates ordered that 'for preventing of all disorderlie courses, uther mistackis [mistakes] and prejudices quhatsomever', Porterfield's council would retain their positions for the coming year.[323] This did not sit well with the exiled council, and in defiance of the estates' orders, James Bell summoned the city's burgesses to the tollbooth to elect a new council. Porterfield and his supporters refused to attend. In their absence, the burgesses re-elected Porterfield as their provost, a tip of the hat towards the estates' demands, but also elected Colin Campbell, John Anderson and William Neilson as the city's bailies.[324] All three bailies had longstanding royalist sympathies. The estates immediately declared the election illegal and tasked the presbytery with punishing the agitators for their disobedience. Bell and

[321] *Extracts, 1630-1662*, 83-86.
[322] *Government of Scotland under the Covenanters, 1637-1651*, ed. David Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1982), 7.
[323] *Extracts, 1630-1662*, 97-98.
[324] ibid, 100.

Campbell responded by gathering an 'unordourlie convocatioune of the multitude of the citie of Glasgow' and under the pretence of repenting their culpability in the burgh's submission to Montrose, the crowd stormed the cathedral, berating the meeting members of the presbytery for operating outside the kirk's jurisdiction and scolding them with 'heavy imputations and unjust aspersions'. [325] Plainly, the royalist magistrates blamed the city's clergy for Lanark's purge. Soon after, the presbytery and Porterfield called for the estates to intervene against the 'malignants'. Parliament obliged, branding the ringleaders of the riot 'spiritis long sopped in malignancie' and ordering their arrest and internment within Edinburgh's tollbooth.[326]

Figure 3.1: The Glasgow Royalist Ringleaders

Name	Duration of Internment (Days)
James Bell	50
Colin Campbell	50
James Hamilton	50
Mr. Robert Govan	50
James Colquhoune	24
John Anderson	20
Thomas Morison	20
Daniel Wallace	20
John Wilson	20
Menasses Lyle	6
Walter Neilson	6

Source: *Extracts, 1630-1662*, 110.

The eleven ringleaders who were held within Edinburgh's tollbooth served varying sentences. Unsurprisingly, Bell and Campbell served the longest sentences alongside James Hamilton, who had served as one of the bailies under Stewart, and Robert Govan, of whom little else is known. Following the petitioning of the 'inhabitantis of the toun of Glasgow', the estates agreed that the ringleaders would be released, on the condition that

[325] ibid, 102-107.
[326] ibid, 102-107; *RPS*, 1646/11/44.

they repent their wrongdoings.[327] The varying lengths of internment could, therefore, suggest the degree of militancy of the individuals arrested.

Following their release, Glasgow's royalists were ostracised from the city's council. Porterfield's council was reaffirmed as the only legally elected authority and in January 1647, a snap election was called by the estates which saw Porterfield retain the provostship. The election also saw the duke of Lennox's right to nominate the provost activated for the first time since 1642. Lennox's ambassador was Sir William Cochrane of Coldoun, whose selection is strange given his covenanting credentials, the fact that he nominated Porterfield and that he had served in the covenanting army in Ireland. While Cochrane had served as Lennox's chamberlain in 1641, ever since he had been noted for being close to the faction which surrounded the Hamilton brothers, so it is possible that this was another example of Lanark flexing his political muscle to ensure a favourable outcome.[328] In any case, parliament quartered additional troops within the burgh and ordered the city to pay for the upkeep and supply of two regiments under the command of the earl of Cassillis. In addition, parliament ordered Glasgow to contribute £1530 towards the payment of regiments disbanded after Philiphaugh. It is not clear whether this was an intentional act of retribution given the burgh's actions under Montrose, but as a consequence the city was placed under significant financial pressure, resorting to borrowing large sums of money in order to pay its debts. [329]

Politically, Glasgow was quiet for much of 1647. The council elections took place in October without incident. Sir Ludovic Houston of Houston, another minor noble from Renfrewshire, represented the duke of Lennox despite having no discernible link to him and coming from an area under the influence of the Hamilton family. James Stewart replaced Porterfield as provost and the bailie positions were filled by Robert Mack, John Graham and William Lightbodie, all of whom would become vocal opponents of the Engagement.[330] Porterfield was still very much to the fore. The former provost appears to have reverted to his earlier role of overseeing the supply of the burgh's military contributions to the estates.[331] Despite the gains of Porterfield's covenanting faction, Glasgow was soon after embroiled in a national crisis once again following the signing of the Engagement on 23 December 1647.

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[327] *Extracts, 1630-1662*, 105; *RPS*, 1646/11/55.
[328] Sean Kelsey, 'Cochrane, William, first Earl of Dundonald, 1605-1685', *ODNB* (2004).
[329] *Extracts, 1630-1662*, 110-113.
[330] ibid, 124-125.
[331] ibid, 125.

Led by the duke of Hamilton, who once again took on the mantle of royalist commander, the engagers gained a powerful majority within parliament. A new levy was ordered to provide an army which would cross the border for the king. This mandate reached Glasgow on 16 May 1648. However, the covenanting council ignored the call to arms.[332] The council wrote to the local committee of war, defending their inaction as the result of the 'generall unwillingness to engadge in this warr' within the burgh, but assured the committee that they would follow parliament's commands 'as we can without offence of God'.[333] Parliament evidently did not approve of this rhetoric, ordering that those who refused obedience were to be arrested and sent to Edinburgh's tollbooth. Amongst those arrested were George Porterfield, Robert Mack, John Graham, William Lightbodie, John Spruele and James Stewart – see Appendix 7.[334] As justification for what was essentially a *coup d'état*, parliament cited written assurances which Hamilton had received from those within Glasgow's eight wards that they would willingly support the Engagement and any levy or quartering which it would entail.[335] A new election was called, but in the meantime it was ordered that the deposed council of 1645, led by James Bell, would act as caretakers to oversee the transition of power.[336] As would be expected, with the voting body stacked in favour of the Bell-Campbell faction, the new council was manned exclusively by those who had shown royalist sentiment in the past. At the new council's head was Colin Campbell, with John Anderson, William Neilson and James Tran as bailies, and Menasses Lyle as dean of guild.[337]

Despite the Engagers' success in securing the council, the episode did little to heal the burgh's internal divisions. Sir James Turner, who was sent to command the garrison occupying Glasgow, noted that the populace was split, with the 'honest and loyall men' following 'Coline Campbell, James Bell and Bayliffe James Hamilton', while the 'refactorie' faction was spurred on daily by clergymen who preached 'disobedience of all civil power'.[338] However, following the defeat of the engager army at Preston on 17 August 1648 and the signing of the Treaty of Stirling on 27 September 1648, radical covenanters under the leadership of Argyll seized control of the estates and parliament. Glasgow's council was swiftly expelled, being replaced by Porterfield and his allies once

[332] ibid, 133-135.
[333] ibid, 134.
[334] ibid, 135; *RPS*, 1648/3/182; 1648/3/195.
[335] *RPS*, 1648/3/188.
[336] *Extracts, 1630-1662*, 137-139.
[337] ibid, 141-142.
[338] James Turner, *Memoirs of his Own Life and Times* (Edinburgh, 1829), 53-54.

again.[339] Action was also taken against prominent engagers such as William Wilkie, the royalist informant from the Bishops' Wars, who was finally deposed from Govan for failing to preach against the Engagement.[340] Thus, the burgh was once more firmly in Porterfield's grasp and would remain so until the Cromwellian invasion.

Between 1649 and 1651, the burgh and its council under Porterfield seems to have supported the initiatives of Charles II following his proclamation as king in February 1649.[341] The council oversaw numerous levies and tax collections for the army which Charles was forming. One such levy called upon those within the city 'willinglie to offer thameselfis for defence and saftie of the covenantis, King and kingdoms'.[342] While the crown was in desperate need of ever more financial support, Glasgow's efforts were deemed good enough to earn them a letter of thanks from the new duke of Hamilton (the former earl of Lanark), who praised their 'loyal endeavours to serve him [Charles II] and joy in doeing of it notwithstanding of all the difficulties you can meitt with'.[343] The succession of Charles II seems to have eased tensions between the Porterfield and Bell-Campbell factions, but Porterfield and the presbytery of Glasgow still made sure that they excluded royalists and engagers as much as possible, and many of those still excluded from taking the sacrament in May 1649 were those associated with Bell and Campbell.[344] Elsewhere within the city division was still rife. In particular, the Engagement and its aftermath splintered Glasgow's ministry. Some of the more radical ministers wrote to Robert Douglas in March 1651 complaining that the continuing division within the kirk meant that 'both Malignants & defectaries gain by our differences'. They also warned that the 'Malignant partie' was gaining in strength within the city.[345] Despite these fears, only one incident of royalist protest is recorded between 1650 and 1651. Following Montrose's landing in the north of Scotland in February 1650, he was declared a traitor and a rebel by the estates.[346] When the proclamation was read out in Glasgow, an altercation broke out which was recorded in the diary of John Nicholl:

> Thair wes ane honest man in Glasgow callit Johnne Bryson, quho being at the Mercat Croce of that citie, and heiring a procalamation their, and a declaration aganes that noble erle the

[339] *Extracts, 1630-1662*, 149-150.
[340] *Fasti,* iii, 411; *RPS*, 1649/1/43.
[341] In Glasgow, the town council ordered that the bells were to ring until mid-day in celebration. See *Extracts, 1630-1662*, 158-159.
[342] ibid, 160-161, 180-181, 188-197.
[343] ibid, 202-203.
[344] Shepard, 'The Politics and Society of Glasgow, 1648-74', 52.
[345] NLS, Wodrow MSS, XXV, no. 97.
[346] Cowan, *Montrose,* 276-280.

> Marques of Montrois, quhairin he was stylit traytour and excommunicate ribell, this honest man did cry out, and call it him als honest a noble man as was in this kingdome.[347]

For this outburst, Bryson was quickly arrested by order of the magistrates and sent under guard to the tollbooth in Edinburgh, a plain statement that such sympathies would be dealt with.

Surprisingly, engagers and royalists tended to do well in Glasgow under Cromwell's Protectorate. Many of the radical covenanters, including Porterfield, fled the burgh as General George Munck's army approached the city. The vacuum caused by the flight of Porterfield and his supporters was swiftly filled by moderates from both sides of the conflict. As such, in the first burgh election under the Protectorate, 15 former engagers sat on the council.[348] However, the greatest testament to the dedication of Glasgow's royalists came upon the restoration of Charles II in 1660. Like Aberdeen, Glasgow's council elections were monitored by Glencairn, who had been given strict instructions to make sure only loyal and sympathetic burgesses gained office. In Glasgow, Glencairn approached the now aged Colin Campbell and offered him the provostship, which he accepted.[349]

Glasgow's example is testimony to the dangers of taking conformity as evidence of allegiance. For much of the civil wars, Glasgow submitted itself to covenanting rule. However, there were clearly elements within the burgh and its council who resisted the regime and actively sought ways to limit covenanting influence on the city. The burgh council's early support for the covenant appears to have been based largely on the kind of pragmatism highlighted by Freidrichs, whereby they used the political situation to relinquish themselves of the oppressive rule of Archbishop Lindsay.[350] Despite this, the evidence presented above suggests that Glasgow was never fully converted to the covenanting cause. In contrast, royalist sympathisers within the burgh made an art form out of complying with the demands of the covenanting leadership whilst resisting as best they could. Unlike Aberdeen, the party politics which developed in Glasgow did not grow out of pre-existing disputes within the burgh. Instead, the Porterfield faction grew out of the direct interference of the covenanters in Glasgow's politics. This almost certainly contributed to the feuding between the Porterfield party and the Bell-Campbell faction, which comprised a number of merchants from well-established Glasgow families.

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[347] John Nicholl, *A Diary of Public Transactions and Other Occurrences, Chiefly in Scotland: From January 1650 to June 1667* (Edinburgh, 1836), 7-8.
[348] Shepard, 'The Politics and Society of Glasgow, 1648-74', 48.
[349] *Extracts, 1630-1662*, 450-452.
[350] Friedrichs, *Urban Politics in Early Modern Europe*, 21.

Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that many of these established families were reacting against the "new men" within burgh politics who had the backing of the estates. Thus, conservatism and the defence of Glasgow's traditional hierarchy were interwoven characteristics of royalist resistance. While there were clearly royalist networks at work within Glasgow throughout the 1640s, like Aberdeen, the city's royalists were left largely isolated due to the lack of national royalist coordination. When Glasgow's royalists did openly resist, they always found themselves unsupported and in imminent danger of covenanting retaliation.

3.6 Case Study: Inverness

The "capital of the highlands" was not so different from Glasgow and Aberdeen. Like them, it was a regional market hub and the focal point of both domestic and international trade. From the late sixteenth century, Inverness's status as a trading centre had grown markedly. James VI had granted a 'Golden Charter' to the burgh on 1 January 1592 which confirmed the burgh's rights and privileges, including a monopoly over local fishing and market rights, ordering that all wine, salt, timber and fish trade between the burgh and Tarbatness go through Inverness's market.[351] The burgh's location at the northern mouth of the Great Glen was a commanding position, both in terms of trade and strategic importance. The town sat at the point of convergence of numerous clans' spheres of influence, including the Grants, Mackintoshes, MacKenzies and Gordons. This produced both opportunity and danger, with the town benefitting from the political alliances which were formed with local noble powers, but also living in constant threat of becoming the target of reprisal attacks in the feuds of its neighbours.

Like Aberdeen and Glasgow, Inverness's burgh councils had traditionally been dominated by a handful of powerful local merchant families. During the period under investigation, these families were the Cuthberts, Baillies, Forbeses and Robertsons. The Cuthberts of Castlehill and their various cadet branches – notably the Cuthberts of Drakies – had been benefactors of the secularisation of church lands in the locality following the Reformation, despite their former reputation as avid adherents of the Catholic church. They had also benefitted from loyal service to the Stuarts, resulting in James VI granting the family a royal charter in 1592 which confirmed their extensive landholdings.[352] The Baillie

[351] Charles Fraser-Mackintosh, *Invernessiana: Contributions toward a History of the Town & Parish of Inverness, from 1160 to 1599* (Inverness, 1875), 254-261.
[352] Charles Fraser-Mackintosh, 'Minor Highland Families (No.X) – The Cuthberts of Castlehill', *TGSI* 21 (1899), 12-15.

family had a similar success story, but instead of crown support they had benefitted from the political backing of the Gordons. From the early sixteenth century, the earls of Huntly had offered protection to the Baillies in their bid to exert influence over the burgh and secure Inverness Castle. One member of the Baillie family, Alexander Baillie, had even served as chamberlain to the 1st marquis of Huntly. The Baillies' loyal service was rewarded in 1623 when the marquis granted the family a charter confirming their lands and privileges.[353] The Forbes family owned large swathes of land in and around Inverness, including a large estate in Culloden. Little is known about the family's politics apart from their links to the Frasers of Lovat, whom Duncan Forbes, a provost during the 1640s, had served at some point in his earlier life.[354] The Robertsons had been able to secure large areas of land in the early seventeenth century, including lucrative fishing rights on the River Ness. The family had previously been linked to James Stuart, 3rd Earl of Moray, but had supported Clan Chattan in its dispute against Moray during the 1620s.[355] The earl had formally forgiven the family in 1628, but it is not clear whether the political alliance was ever reformed.[356]

Despite pressure from local nobles and gentry, which was often facilitated by the families mentioned above, Inverness had largely resisted falling under the influence of any one faction for any prolonged period of time. Most likely due to its geographical position at the fulcrum of highland politics, no single noble had been able to completely exert his will over the burgh. However, from the outset of the civil wars, the independence of the burgh was tested.

On 25 April 1638, a meeting was called at Inverness, to which the local nobility, gentry, ministers and burgesses were invited. The meeting had been organised by John Graham, Earl of Sutherland, and George Sinclair, the Master of Berridale (son of the earl of Caithness), on behalf of the covenanting leaders in Edinburgh.[357] The intention behind the gathering was to inform the local elites about the open resistance which had erupted in the south and to convert them to the covenanting cause.[358] Most agreed to attend, or at least

[353] Charles Fraser-Mackintosh, 'Minor Highland Families (No. XI) – The Baillies of Dunain', *TGSI* 22 (1900), 141-143.
[354] Fraser, *Wardlaw MS*, 277.
[355] In this period Clan Chattan was a confederation of clans, rather than a conventional Scottish clan. Mackintoshes and Macphersons were its most prominent members.
[356] Charles Fraser-Mackintosh, 'Minor Highland Families (No. XI) – The Robertsons of Inshes', *TGSI* 21 (1899), 296.
[357] At this point, the principal leaders of the covenanting movement were: John Leslie, 6th Earl of Rothes; John Campbell, 1st Earl of Loudoun; James Graham, 5th Earl of Montrose; John Elphinstone, 2nd Lord Balmerino; John Lindsay, 10th Lord Lindsay; Alexander Henderson; and Archibald Johnston of Wariston.
[358] C. Innes (ed), *A Genealogical Deduction of the Family of Rose of Kilravock* (Edinburgh, 1848), 321-322.

send delegates, with the notable exceptions of James Grant, Laird of Grant, and William Mackintosh, Chief of Clan Mackintosh. After a two-hour lecture from the covenanting minister Andrew Cant – who had been sent from Edinburgh to oversee the theological arguments in any debate that might have arisen – the delegates were invited to voice any concerns, so that these might be publicly dispelled, and then subscribe the National Covenant if they had not already done so. The provost of Inverness, John Ross of Midleys, and two of the burgh's bailies refused to subscribe. The resisting magistrates were joined by William Clogie, the minister of Inverness's first charge, and Alexander Fraser, the minister from the neighbouring parish of Petty.[359] When asked why they would not subscribe, the magistrates replied that: 'their toune lay invyroned amidst the Hielands, and named the Laird of Graunt and McIntosh, who had not subscryit; notwithstanding, they wold not be a hinderer to any of the toune that wer willing to goe on'.[360] At this point, one of the bailies of Inverness, Robert Baillie, stood up and declared 'weil, my Lord Provest, if ye will not goe on, we sall make yow a thinn bak', indicating that the provost would not receive the support of those who wished to sign the covenant. Baillie then called upon the town's drummer and escorted him around Inverness's streets collecting subscriptions and allegedly threatened the property of those who refused to sign.[361] The majority of the town's inhabitants appear to have signed the covenant at this time, with the names of all those who refused recorded by Sutherland, Berridale and Cant.[362]

In the weeks that followed the meeting at Inverness, it became clear that the covenanters held the local advantage. The area's most vocal royalist, Donald MacKay, Lord Reay, was cut off – both physically and politically – from exerting his influence due to the earl of Sutherland siding with the covenanters.[363] Meanwhile, the laird of Grant remained noncommittal to either side, despite the efforts of his grand-uncle, Patrick Murray, 1st Earl of Tullibardine, to encourage him to side with the king.[364] Within the burgh itself the majority of the council had signed the covenant, presumably at the time of the meeting and Robert Baillie's threats. In a letter to Hamilton, Huntly lamented that there

[359] Archibald MacDonald, 'The Presbytery of Inverness, 1632-1644', *TGSI* 38 (1962), 491-492.
[360] Leslie, *A Relation*, 98, and 104-107.
[361] ibid, 107.
[362] Spalding, *Memorialls*, i, 54.
[363] William MacGill (ed), *Old Ross-shire and Scotland, as seen in the Tain and Balnagown Documents* (Inverness, 1909), 217. Lord Reay had initially signed the covenant enthusiastically. However, in the weeks that followed he recoiled from the covenanters, firmly attaching himself to the royalist party. The MacKays posed a real threat to the northern covenanters due to the substantial military resources and experience they had gained through their involvement in the Thirty Years War. See Robert Mackay, *History of the House and Clan of Mackay* (Edinburgh, 1829), 283-284; Steve Murdoch, 'More than just "Mackay's" and Mercenaries: Gaelic Influences in Scandinavia, 1580-1707', *TGSI* 60 (1997), 161-185.
[364] *The Chiefs of Grant*, ii, 64-65.

was little he could do to counter the covenanters within Inverness apart from continuing to urge Mackintosh to declare for the king.[365] Huntly also recommended that Hamilton find a way to strip the sheriffdoms of Caithness, Inverness and Banff from George Sinclair, Earl of Caithness, James Erskine, Earl of Buchan, and Hugh Fraser, Lord Lovat, respectively, as they were 'the greatest promouvers [promoters] of disorder there'.[366] The loss of control over Inverness's council and the sheriffdom was a grievous blow to royalist prospects in the area. Even if many of the councillors had signed out of compliance rather than commitment, their acquiescence sent a distinct message to the rest of the burgh. Likewise, the conversion of the sheriffs meant that the covenanters controlled the local sheriff courts, and thus held jurisdiction over all crown tenants outwith the royal burgh.[367] All around Inverness the covenanters had been able to secure influence over all major regional infrastructures within months of the first signings of the covenant.

Despite this early advantage, there was no local fervour akin to the royalist reaction in Aberdeen or the covenanting response in Edinburgh. Instead, the burgh council's records seem to have purposefully ignored the fact that the kingdom was descending into open conflict. In the weeks before the outbreak of the First Bishops' War (1639), the earl of Seaforth – a lukewarm covenanter at this point – raised a force of MacKenzies and Frasers to occupy Inverness for the covenant.[368] This seems to have had less to do with any concern over local royalist sentiment within the burgh, than Seaforth's attempts to counter Huntly who had planned to occupy Inverness Castle for the king.[369] By denying Huntly Inverness Castle, Seaforth ensured that the local political temperament remained tentatively covenanted, denying local royalists a focal point to rally around. Meanwhile, leading royalists continued to lobby local nobles and gentry who remained withdrawn from the conflict. Grant was the central target in this pursuit due to his influence over Inverness-shire, with the earl of Tullibardine and the king himself appealing to Grant throughout 1639. However, Grant continued to watch from a distance.[370]

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[365] NRS, GD06/1/449.
[366] NRS, GD406/1/455. Huntly's accusations against Caithness and Buchan seem to have been caused by their inaction rather than them actively pursuing a covenanting agenda.
[367] For information on the jurisdictions and rights of the sheriff courts, see Stephen J. Davies, 'Law and Order in Stirlingshire, 1637-1747' (PhD thesis, University of St Andrews, 1984), 69 and 237; Stephen J Davies, 'The Courts and the Scottish Legal System, 1600-1747: The Case of Stirlingshire', in V. A. C. Gatrell, Bruce Lenman, and Geoffrey Parker (eds), *Crime and the Law: The Social History of Crime in Western Europe since 1500* (London, 1980), 120-154.
[368] Edward Furgol, 'MacKenzie, George, second Earl of Seaforth (d. 1651)', *ODNB* (2004). For discussion of Seaforth's politics, see pp.52 and 61-63.
[369] Spalding, *Memorialls*, i, 135-136.
[370] *The Chiefs of Grant*, ii, 67-68.

With the local area either in a state of awkward neutrality or support for the covenant, Inverness was allowed to continue unmolested for much of 1639 and 1640. Seaforth's brief occupation was not even warranted with an entry in the burgh records, suggesting that the burgh was not called upon to supply the covenanting host.[371] However, in March 1640 the burgh council was tasked by Seaforth to contribute to a levy which he was organising for all of the lands north of the Spey. The council agreed, ordering a stent of all the burgh's inhabitants to support Seaforth's levy, 'as uther bruchtis [burghs] in the Kingdome goes on with Generalls in sik caices'.[372] While all looked well on the surface, Inverness itself had become plagued with factional infighting. The origin of the dispute appears to have been the arrest in late 1638 of John Gray, a servant of a local resident, Francis Bishop, after Gray had read out a proclamation against the magistrates outside the house of the then provost, John Ross. The provost responded by arresting Gray, triggering fierce condemnations from Alexander Baillie and Duncan Forbes.[373] The dispute deepened over the course of 1639 until, in June 1640, Thomas MacSween and his three sons attacked James Ross, bailie, in the street with swords. The town's alarm was raised and the MacSweens were arrested, later confessing that they had organised the attack on the orders of David Baillie and John Forbes.[374] The violence had escalated to the point where the estates ordered that a commission be sent to the burgh to oversee the council election in 1640.[375] The quarrel does not appear to have had any link to the wider political situation. However, the factional lines between the Baillie/Forbes party and their Cuthbert/Ross adversaries seem to correspond to the wider political divisions which developed in the burgh during the years that followed.

Inverness's troubles continued into 1641. John Annand, who had been a minister in the burgh during the 1620s, was transported back to the town to take up one of the vacant positions within the ministry. Annand's allegiance is difficult to pin down. The fact that he was transported to the burgh either suggests that the estates were confident of his covenanting credentials or they were assured that the commitment of the burgh's inhabitants would drown out any hint of royalism within the minister. Annand's later letters suggest that he was a committed covenanter. Yet, he was also one of the ministers who walked out of the Glasgow Assembly with Hamilton in 1638 and is noted in the contemporary account of the *Wardlaw Manuscript* as being one of those who consoled

[371] HAC, BI/1/1/4, f.5v.
[372] *Records of Inverness*, ii, 175-176.
[373] *ACL*, ii, 229.
[374] ibid, 229-232.
[375] *Records of Inverness*, ii, 176.

Montrose as he was escorted under guard through the burgh in 1650.[376] Whatever the minister's politics were in 1641, his transportation agitated many within Inverness, and Aberdeen's burgh council noted the experience as an example of the dangers which came with the forced plantation of ministers.[377] Inverness's council, led at this point by Provost John Ross of Merkinch, also had to deal with an attack on its authority. One of the burgh's bailies, George Abraham, was verbally accosted by Donald Fouller and his wife, Janet, following accusations that the Foullers had been using false weights at market. The Fouller family appear to have had a grudge and were later brought before the magistrates for having plotted to bring down the council.[378]

The Foullers were not the only family in Inverness with an axe to grind with the magistrates. In 1642, the Cuthbert family appealed to the council, which was once again led by James Ross, complaining that they were under daily threat from a royalist faction within the burgh for their continued support for the covenanting cause. The Cuthberts claimed that they had:

> sufferit sundrie wrangis incursiounes and prejudice be the malignant perverse and vicked dispositioun of the evill affected of sum within and about the same bruch quha ar iritat and incensitt at hem for maintaineing the said caus, quha for their respectis does by all means possible stryvve daylie to overthrow the Magistracie of the said bruch.[379]

All of those named by the Cuthberts as malignants were members of the Baillie families of Dunzean and Torrbrack, alongside 'the remanet of that kin and allayances'.[380] The Cuthberts claimed that the Baillies' historical grievances against them, and their support for the covenant, had made them the prime focus of the Baillie family's ire. This had all come to a head in August 1642 at the funeral of Christane Paterson, where the Baillies and their kin attacked the Cuthberts in attendance with swords and pistols.[381] Unfortunately, the surviving records do not tell us how the situation was resolved. Nevertheless, the episode provides evidence of how local feuds could become embroiled in civil war politics. While the dispute had originated outwith the civil war period, with the Cuthberts supporting the covenant and the Baillies apparently taking the opposite stance, this would appear to be a prime example of local conditions informing political allegiance. Due to the scant nature of the source material, it is difficult to say with any certainty whether the Baillies were ideologically committed to the royalist cause, but the conversion of Robert Baillie, who

[376] Fraser, *Wardlaw MS*, 354; *More Culloden Papers*, ed. Duncan Warrant, 4 vols (Inverness, 1925), ii, 85-86 and 101-102.
[377] *Extracts from Aberdeen, 1625-1642*, 257.
[378] *Records of Inverness*, ii, 176-178.
[379] ibid, 179-181.
[380] ibid, 179.
[381] ibid, 180.

had been one of the prime covenanters in 1638, reveals how mercurial allegiance could be on the ground.

Between 1642 and 1644, there is no record of any further dispute within the burgh. This may have been due to Duncan Forbes of Culloden's ascension to the provostship in 1643, which he held until October 1645. In both the 1643 and 1644 councils, Robert Baillie sat as a bailie and no Cuthberts were elected.[382] However, this change in management does not appear to have had any impact on the burgh's acceptance of covenanting rule, apart from Provost Forbes' best attempts to avoid the burgh contributing to the war effort at the parliament of 1644.[383] Despite this, Forbes does not seem to have had any issue with enforcing covenanting rule when called upon, with the provost authorising the arrest of Alexander Fraser, a fellow burgess and merchant, for refusing to join the burgh's levy in April 1644.[384]

However, Montrose's rising in 1644 put the town on the frontline of the unfolding conflict. On 19 August, reports of the 'Iriysche rebellis' in the area reached the council. The royalists, most likely under the command of Alasdair MacColla, were believed to be in the area 'to urge and force all manner of persones to joyne with thame in ane black and dolfull covenant'.[385] In response, the council ordered John Cuthbert of Castlehill to raise a body of 80 musketeers from the burgh who were to join forces with troops sent by lord Lovat in order to oppose the royalists. In the end, Cuthbert's men seem to have done little more than shadow the royalists as they meandered in and out of the burgh's jurisdiction. However, the covenanting leaders in Edinburgh had no intention of allowing the burgh to fall into royalist hands. Sir George Buchanan's regiment of foot was ordered to share garrisoning duties of the burgh with Sir Mungo Campbell of Lawers' regiment.[386] This marked the beginning of near-constant garrisoning of Inverness, which would ultimately spark royalist reprisals in 1649.

Almost as soon as the garrison was put in place, issues started to arise within the burgh. The most pressing problem was the upkeep of the soldiers. The burgh had initially been expected to pay for the upkeep of the troops, as well as the defensive works which

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[382] HAC, BI/1/1/4.
[383] *More Culloden Papers*, i, 29.
[384] *Records of Inverness*, ii, 182-183.
[385] ibid, 184. It is impossible to be certain as to which covenant this refers to. If it is the King's Covenant, it shows that the band remained politically active for far longer than has previously been realised. Alternatively, it may simply refer to a royalist band which has not survived. For more on the King's Covenant, see pp.43-48.
[386] Furgol, *A Regimental History,* 205-206.

were being built around the burgh. After the council refused to do so, Argyll sent word to them, urging them to reconsider. Argyll's messenger warned the council that 'it will be very hardly takin be my lord marqueis and otheris of the estat, if this request be not obeyed, and may hapily turn to your prejudice'.[387] The council backed down, agreeing to pay the garrison 5000 merks on the condition that no further demands be made until that sum was repaid.[388] The council would have undoubtedly been aware that the situation in their locality was changing. The laird of Grant was playing both sides, giving information to the covenanters, and men to the royalists.[389] Likewise, Seaforth's allegiance was treated with increasing scepticism by the estates and it was commonly believed that the earl was in communication with Montrose.[390] These developments, coupled with the fact that a militant royalist faction had been identified within the burgh, must have made the council very aware that any false move could have disastrous repercussions. James Fraser, the author of the *Wardlaw Manuscript* and eye-witness to events in Inverness, recorded that 'such apprehensions of intestin wars possest mens spirits' and advised that it was prudent to 'keep the door of your lips from her that lieth in thy bosom; for the sone disshonoreth the father, and a mans enemies are those of his own house'.[391]

The burgh remained under garrison for much of 1645, compelling the council to send two separate commissions to Edinburgh in order to seek some sort of fiscal relief.[392] However, no relief was granted. Meanwhile, following the royalist defeat at Philiphaugh, Montrose had led his army back northwards, where he was bolstered by the open support of Seaforth, and the earl's brother, Thomas MacKenzie of Pluscardine.[393] The revitalised royalist army then laid siege to Inverness, from April to May 1646. The siege was aborted and scattered by the approach of the earl of Middleton with a fresh army from the estates, but the presence of local royalist forces and the continuing pressure of the covenanting garrison seems to have caused some within the burgh to withdraw their support for the regime. In the months after the siege, Colin Campbell, one of the garrison commanders, wrote to the marquis of Argyll to inform him of the worrying conditions within the burgh:

> Some thair ar quho haif proven desertares of us, and wer countenanceris and manteinares of enimye, quhen we wer most threatined, Theis, that your lordship may tak notice of them, and, quhat justlie concernes us, may assist us against them, ar James Cuthbert of Drakies, and Jon Cuthbert, his brother, with his tuo sonee. Theise once seamed to lean only to my

[387] *More Culloden Papers*, i, 29-30.
[388] *Records of Inverness*, ii, 185-186.
[389] *The Chiefs of Grant*, ii, 72-73 and 76-77.
[390] See p.52.
[391] Fraser, *Wardlaw MS*, 288.
[392] *Records of Inverness*, ii, 188-190.
[393] *The Chiefs of Grant*, ii, 79.

> Lord Marques of Argyll, bot now, as they turned thair backes on the caus and on us, so haif they joyned them selfis with his and our enimyes.[394]

The defection of the Cuthberts marks a significant shift in the burgh's politics, especially as it saw the Cuthberts aligned with the Baillies, their sworn enemies from the years before. Unfortunately, as no correspondence from the Cuthberts survives, it is difficult to assess the reasons behind their defection. Their conversion could be related to the publication of Seaforth's Remonstrance, which was widely distributed in the area around Inverness and was said to have 'drawen in some honest men' out of their 'desyre of Peace'.[395]

Another possibility is that the burden of the garrison had become too much for Inverness's inhabitants. Even the garrison commanders themselves had become increasingly uncomfortable with extracting support from a populace which they saw daily descending deeper into poverty.[396] Provost John Forbes and his bailies could do little else except plead their case to parliament and beg for relief from the 'miserable burdin of the garisone'.[397] In the burgh's impoverished condition, a growing resentment of the garrison was festering. In a letter to Forbes, the bailies, Robert Baillie, John Polson and Gilbert Robertson rejected accusations that they were disaffected towards the covenanting cause, but pointed out to the provost that the garrison's supplies were exhausted and the burgh could not go on supporting it. They also noted that there were some within the burgh who were actively conspiring against the garrison commanders and that, in retaliation, the garrison commanders had threatened violence if they were not adequately supplied. The bailies also pleaded with Forbes to write directly to Argyll and explain to the marquis the urgent need for the burgh's relief.[398]

Instead of easing Inverness's burdens, the estates announced an increase in the taxation they expected from the burgh, which the council failed to collect in full. To make up the shortfall, the council ordered that those who had deserted the burgh during the troubles would be arrested, fined and then sent to answer before the estates.[399] Additionally, the estates granted the council a portion of the revenue generated by the sheriffdom of Inverness's committee for war, which had in part been funded by the seizure of assets belonging to 'such persones within the schirrefdom of Invernes as are in actuall

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[394] *More Culloden Papers*, i, 31-32.
[395] NLS, Wodrow MSS, XXV, no. 35. For a discussion of Seaforth's Remonstrance, see pp.61-63.
[396] *More Culloden Papers*, i, 33.
[397] ibid, 35-36.
[398] ibid, 38-43.
[399] *Records of Inverness*, ii, 195-196.

rebellioun'.[400] Clearly worried that they might be associated with those in 'rebellion', the bailies once again wrote to Forbes in January 1647, proclaiming their 'constant adherence to the good cause'.[401] In the face of accumulating internal pressures, Inverness's parish minister John Annand wrote to Forbes, encouraging him to 'goe on as it becomes a good covenanter'.[402]

While the Engagement had little impact upon Inverness, the execution of Charles I in January 1649, and the subsequent proclamation of Charles II as king, caused a royalist reaction in and around the burgh. On 22 February, Thomas MacKenzie of Pluscardine led a royalist force of 700 MacKenzies and MacKays to the gates of Inverness. Their approach threw the burgh into disarray. As the garrison commanders tried to organise a defence of the town, a mutiny spread amongst the soldiers, resulting in the garrison fighting one another in the streets. As the mutineers attempted to escape the burgh, the magistrates opened the town's gates to the oncoming royalist army. The garrisoning troops who remained loyal to the regime fled with their commanders through the town's east gate as Pluscardine's men spilled in through the west gate. After successfully occupying the burgh, the royalists promptly destroyed the town's fortifications.[403] When news of the insurrection reached Edinburgh, the estates wasted no time in declaring all those culpable in the revolt 'wicked and malignant persons intending so far as in them lies, for their own base end, to lay the foundation of a new bloody and unnatural war within the bowls of this thieir native country'.[404] In response, Pluscardine wrote to the general assembly seeking to justify his rising. In the letter, Pluscardine explained his actions as purely against the 'unnecessary and unprofitable garison of Innernes' and that they had been forced to take up arms against the regime to protect their own rights and liberties. Pluscardine also attacked the 'evil willers and envious underminers' who under 'pretences of the publick, [seek] to extermine us with povertie'.[405] It is unlikely that this was really Pluscardine's motivation, having proven himself a dedicated royalist under Montrose.[406] However, as a general call to arms in the area around Inverness it must have been effective, building upon the ingrained hostility towards the Inverness garrison.

[400] *More Culloden Papers*, i, 81.
[401] ibid, 79.
[402] ibid, 85-87.
[403] Fraser, *Wardlaw MS*, 336-338.
[404] *More Culloden Papers*, i, 93; *RPS*, 1649/1/193.
[405] *Records of the Commissions of the General Assembly,* 249-251.
[406] *The Chiefs of Grant*, ii, 79.

To put down the rising, the estates dispatched an army under the command of David Leslie. Pluscardine and his men retreated upon Leslie's approach, with some seeking terms with the general. Leslie was lenient, accepting the surrender of all those within Pluscardine's army who sought it. However, before Leslie could hunt down the remnants of the royalist army, another rising erupted in the central highlands under the command of the earl of Middleton, lord Reay and lord Ogilvy. Realising that he lacked the manpower to put down both uprisings, Leslie retreated south. Pluscardine then regathered his men, reoccupied Inverness and joined forces with the growing royalist host under Middleton, Reay and Ogilvie.[407] Understandably, the estates were furious, accusing the royalists of high treason, declaring them rebels in open opposition to the kirk and authorising 'all good Subjects' to take up arms and oppose them.[408]

On 23 April, the royalist army left Inverness, intent on marching south. However, on 7 May they were ambushed and utterly routed by a covenanting force under the command of Colonels Gilbert Kerr and Archibald Strachan.[409] James Fraser recalled how the defeat 'disp[i]rited all others in the south and west who owned the Kings quarrell'.[410] Despite the active assistance of at least some of Inverness's magistrates with the royalists, the burgh did not suffer a purge akin to Aberdeen or Glasgow. Indeed, the entire episode is strangely absent from the council records.[411] This may have been due to the estates' desire not to sour the ongoing negotiations with Charles II, or simply because no covenanting force could have overseen a purge due to the threat posed by Montrose's landing in Orkney in September 1649. Whatever the reason, Forbes and his council retained their positions and seem to have seamlessly slipped back into everyday life, even sending Forbes to parliament as a commissioner less than a month after the royalists were crushed.[412] Indeed, by December 1649, Forbes was part of the committee of war in Inverness-shire, overseeing the levying of troops for Charles II.[413]

Inverness's council tentatively supported the endeavours of Charles II. New taxes were enforced, a levy was organised, and financial gifts were promised to the new king.[414] However, following Charles's defeat at Worcester (3 September 1651), the burgh sought terms with Cromwell. By April 1652, the burgh had been placed under the protection of

[407] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 179-180.
[408] NRS, RH14/18.
[409] Fraser, *Wardlaw MS*, 338-340; *More Culloden Papers*, i, 94-95.
[410] Fraser, *Wardlaw MS*, 340.
[411] HAC, BI/1/1/4, f.57r.
[412] ibid; *RPS*, 1649/1/293.
[413] *More Culloden Papers*, i, 99-100.
[414] *Records of Inverness*, ii, 204-205.

the English commonwealth.[415] Unfortunately, no records survive for Inverness's council between 1655 and 1662. Therefore, we do not know who Glencairn wanted as provost upon Charles's restoration. However, the prominence of the Ross, Forbes and Cuthbert families under Cromwell and during the mid-1660s suggests that the canny political navigational skills which these families showed during the 1640s continued to serve them well.

Inverness's experience of the civil wars was quite different from those of Aberdeen and Glasgow. Despite the covenanters' early successes in the area around the burgh, a militant royalist faction developed within the town, feeding upon pre-existing feuds within its hierarchy. However, this internal conflict was not enough to dramatically alter the town's compliance to covenanting rule. Montrose's rising in 1644 tested the burgh's commitment for the first time, but it was the various covenanting garrisons which turned some inhabitants against the regime. This gave the royalist faction within the burgh the unifying call to arms that they needed. Pluscardine's rising in 1649 gave them an opportunity to shrug off the burden of garrisoning which they had borne for five years. Thus, while there was a militant royalist party within Inverness, it may have been pragmatism rather than ideology which motivated the burgh to, temporarily, take a stand against the covenanting regime.

3.7 Conclusions

The case-studies of Aberdeen, Glasgow and Inverness all bear similarities to the towns and cities discussed by Stoyle and Ó Siochrú. Each of these burghs was deeply divided and in each there were factions which aligned themselves with the royalist and covenanting causes. Clearly, the popularity and appeal of royalism within the burghs has been seriously underplayed within previous scholarship. In these burghs, royalism was varied and socially diverse, with the burgh magistrates leading factions which included merchants, craftsmen, academics, servants and soldiers. Royalism was not the sole preserve of the burgh elite. As demonstrated above, there were multiple instances where lower-status inhabitants expressed royalist allegiance, such as the crowd actions in Aberdeen and Glasgow.[416] Female royalists are also noted within the sources, especially for committing acts of protest which were clearly politically motivated, as seen in the cases of Issobell Davidsone and

[415] ibid, 205.
[416] See pp.178-179 and 217-218.

Grissell Abercrombie.[417] These examples demonstrate that female protest during the civil wars was not solely a covenanting phenomenon.[418]

The role of local leaders within the burghs was crucial. In all three case-studies, the rival factions were led by enthusiastic and locally influential individuals who were responsible for solidifying the faction's support and pursuing its interests within the burgh council. The clergy also played an important role. The pulpit undoubtedly provided both sides with an invaluable weapon in the war for the hearts and minds of local populaces. As covenanting control tightened from 1640 onwards, some burgh magistrates found themselves competing against the clergy for the population's loyalty. In Glasgow, this resulted in the royalist faction effectively declaring war on the city's clergy, while in Aberdeen, royalist inhabitants tended to show lukewarm support for the covenanting ministers imposed upon them.

Pre-existing local conflicts and politics flavoured political allegiance. In Glasgow, almost universal resentment of Archbishop Patrick Lindsay led many pro-royalist magistrates to side with the covenanters in 1638, only to find themselves in opposition to them from 1639 onwards. In Aberdeen, the power struggle between loyalist burgess families and those who had resisted Charles I's religious innovations during the 1630s provided the baseline from which wartime allegiance grew, resulting in Robert Johnston and Patrick Leslie leading opposing factions in 1638. However, these pre-existing feuds did not solely determine allegiance. In Inverness, the historically loyalist Baillie family were amongst the first supporters of the covenant in 1638, only to be labelled as the town's most militant royalists four years later. Indeed, loyalties could be mercurial, and some individuals were less partisan than others, as seen in the actions of Alexander Jaffray and Robert Farquhar in Aberdeen.

Ideological attachment to the royalist cause has been identified in all three case-studies, from the loyalist rhetoric of Aberdeen's town council in 1639 to the identification of militant royalist burgesses in Inverness in 1646.[419] However, due to the nature of the source material used throughout this chapter, it is impossible to provide as detailed an ideological analysis as in Chapters 1 and 2. Nevertheless, the rhetoric of Aberdeen's royalist council shows similar traits to the ideology expressed by royalist nobles and clergymen identified in the previous chapters, such as reverence for personal loyalty and

[417] See pp.189 and 201.
[418] Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution*, 56-62.
[419] See pp.176 and 228.

the defence of social hierarchy and order. Moreover, the enduring commitment of royalists in all three burghs suggests that they were ideologically invested in the royalist cause.

Once again, there is very little evidence within these case-studies linking royalism to Episcopalianism. It could be argued that the support for the King's Covenant in Aberdeen and Glasgow suggests local support for the crown's religious stance. However, it is undeniable that the religious principles of the National Covenant generated some immediate support amongst the urban populations. Crucially, as Aberdeen's example showed, the inhabitants of the burghs were acutely aware of the political ramifications of the covenant. Indeed, much of the royalist resistance between 1640 and 1647 was based upon countering covenanting political influence or supporting royalist forces in the field. Conflict with local covenanting clergy in Aberdeen and Glasgow was largely the result of royalists combating the kirk's growing influence, rather than opposing the religious arguments put forward by the covenant.

After 1639, royalists within these three burghs were largely isolated from the royalist leadership. The collapse of the military threat posed by the king's forces between 1640 and 1643 meant that royalists had no choice but to conform or flee. Conformity was ruthlessly pursued by the covenanting regime through the continued monitoring of urban populations for those who refused to sign the covenant. In all three case-studies, the compulsory signing of the covenant was enacted at some point between 1638 and 1640. Except in circumstances where local royalist nobles or gentry could affect the political situation within these burghs, these urban royalists had to rely upon their own agency and determination. This supports the argument made in Chapter 2 that the success of royalist resistance often depended upon the acquiescence of the locality. Undoubtedly, this isolationism contributed to the pragmatic and opportunist dimension to royalism within these cities, with most royalists conforming to covenanting rule whilst awaiting an opportunity to enact their own political desires. These opportunities often came in the form of trigger events, normally enacted by external forces. The arrival of armies, the garrisoning of troops, new elections, invasive taxation and wider political developments can all be identified as triggers. The economic demands of the covenanting regime between 1640 and 1647 far exceeded those experienced under the crown in the years before the civil wars. Failure to pay taxes and punitive financial punishments imposed by the covenanters both characterised royalist resistance in all three burghs.

Garrisoning deserves further discussion, having arisen as an important theme throughout all three case-studies. The garrisoning of troops within a burgh radically altered

its political situation. The reactions to garrisoning within the case-studies above correspond to the research of Jane Finucane on civilian-garrison relations during the Thirty Years War. Finucane has argued that whilst sympathetic populations could live in harmony with a garrison, such a military presence within towns and cities often caused considerable social friction.[420] Garrisoning militarised the burghs, producing a political statement with their presence. This presence and the burden of supporting garrisoned troops directly contributed to civilian resistance and resentment. This is best seen in Inverness, where the political temperament of the burgh was largely neutral and non-committal until the period of continued garrisoning between 1644 and 1649. This directly resulted in a shift of political allegiances, leading members of the burgh's council to support the royalist forces within their locality. Thus, royalist allegiance could clearly be pragmatic as well as ideological.

In conclusion, these case-studies show the reality of royalism in differing local contexts, strengths and forms. Allegiance to Charles I appears to have been primarily motivated by personal loyalty, commitment to the existing social hierarchy and concern over the political aims of the covenanters. The financial demands of the 1640s and the effects of continual garrisoning in response to the threat of royalist military actions was enough to turn many moderates over to the king's cause. Religious opposition to the covenanters is less prominent within the surviving source material. Despite growing disillusionment with the covenanting regime, most royalists were forced to conform to covenanting rule. While personal loyalties played a crucial role in the burghs' experiences of the civil wars, the survival and prosperity of the burgh was often the most important factor in determining the actions of urban factions. Indeed, as Aberdeen demonstrates so well, at times even the most proactive urban royalists were forced to prioritise the survival of their burgh above the pursuit of political objectives. However, these case-studies have shown that there were committed royalists throughout Scotland's towns and cities, and their commitment to the king's cause should not be underestimated.

[420] Jane Finucane, 'Before the Storm: Civilians under Siege, 1618-30', in Alex Dowdall and John Horne (eds), *Sieges and Civilians: From Sarajevo to Troy* (London, 2017), 137-162.

Conclusion – Bad and Evil Patriots?

'even in the worst times there never wanted a loyall partie of men of all sorts, and conditions, who still gave evident Demonstrations of their unwearied loyalty and fidelity, their sincere duties and affections to their dread Soveraigne, His Majesty'

Montrose's Final Declaration, 1649.[1]

4.1 Redefining Scottish Royalism

This thesis set out to provide a reassessment of royalism in Scotland during the civil wars, and what it meant to be a Scottish royalist. Over the course of the previous three chapters, royalist sources from across the country and social spectrum have been analysed and found to be far more numerous and ideologically coherent than had been previously realised. Regardless of whether a royalist was a Gael or a lowlander, a noble or a commoner, an Episcopalian or a Presbyterian, when they gave voice to their allegiance, they almost always focused on one or more of the following themes: that loyalty was owed to the crown; that those in rebellion against the king were seditious and acting illegally, and that the actions of those rebels threatened to turn the world upside down, unleashing the anarchic forces of instability and schism.

As discussed in Chapter 1, despite the remarkable commitment which royalist ideology maintained towards these three themes, the particulars of the mainstream royalist position vacillated between 1638 and 1651 in accordance with the changing political landscape. Trigger events, such as the royalist defeats in the Bishops' Wars (1639-1640) and the Engagement (1647-1648), caused political realignment, often hardening or softening individuals' views and facilitating the shift of moderates from one side of the divide to the other. The careers of nobles such as Montrose, Lanark and Middleton, as well as local responses to the conflicts in places like Glasgow, Stirling, Inverness and Orkney, show that individuals' positions on the scale of allegiance were not fixed, but susceptible to fluctuation. Yet, throughout these fluctuations, the royalist position remained based upon its original foundations.

It has been suggested here that this cohesion owed much to the fact that royalists called upon shared values which were prevalent within Scottish society. Common understandings of loyalty, legality and order provided a strong base on which royalist

[1] *The Declaration of His Excellence James Marquis of Montrosse*, 4.

support could be built, though this potential was never fully realised. As shown in Chapters 1 and 2, leading royalists drew upon Marian, Jacobean and European monarchical discourse, such as the allegation that religion could be used to disguise political sedition.[2] However, royalists tended to avoid complex theoretical arguments, like those employed by George Buchanan and Thomas Hobbes. Instead, they favoured traditional and conservative conceptualisations of loyalty, legality and order which enabled polemicists like Napier and Balcanquhall to establish cultural legitimacy and portray the king's supporters as the defenders of hierarchy and stability in the face of the religious extremism of the covenanters.

It was not ideology which separated moderate from radical royalists, but individuals' own views and moral judgements on how the war should be prosecuted and the extent to which the National Covenant and Solemn League and Covenant should be tolerated, adopted or repressed. During the Bishops' Wars, for example, royalism was based upon the near wholescale rejection of the National Covenant, but by 1648 the king had accepted many of the covenant's tenets in order to secure a political victory for the royalist faction. All royalists agreed on the three core values of loyalty, legality and stability, but they often disagreed on the best course by which to re-establish the power and authority of the crown. Despite these disagreements, the adhesive which held royalists together and resisted the kind of factionalism which splintered covenanting unity was the simple fact that royalists accepted that loyalty could not be conditional.

This ideological cohesiveness is perhaps best seen in Chapter 1's discussion of Gaelic royalism. Analysis of the Gaelic poetry of Iain Lom and Eachann Bacach, and the evidence presented from highland examples in Chapters 2 and 3, suggests that there was no significant divergence between lowland and highland royalism. There is little to suggest that Gaelic royalists saw the conflict any differently from their lowland compatriots. Moreover, Gaelic cultural reverence for honour, loyalty, hereditary hierarchy and divine right strongly aligned with royalist values. Therefore, historical differentiation and exclusion of Gaelic royalism is not only unfounded; its future employment serves only to promote an ethnically prejudicial interpretation and hampers our overall understanding of Scottish royalism.

Similarly, there is little to suggest that royalism was strongly regionalised or wholly dependent on the oversight of elites. While there were certainly areas where royalist

[2] See pp.84 and 157.

support was particularly strong, such as Aberdeen and Glasgow, the evidence presented in Chapters 2 and 3 indicates that royalist support could be found across the kingdom. Open royalists were a minority and successful royalist action depended upon local support, but as the deposition records of royalist ministers show, there were few regions which did not harbour royalists.[3]

Thus, royalism in Scotland was a coalition of individuals from throughout society who held similar views and values. It was born out of a conservative reaction to the unauthorised inception of the National Covenant and was maintained by individuals' moral principles and instinctive loyalty towards the crown. While the covenanters saw their covenants as the spiritual rebirth of the Scottish kingdom, royalists saw their seditious potential and recoiled from what they saw as a vehicle for strife. However, by necessity, royalists were often forced to be pragmatic, with many conforming to covenanting rule for extended periods of time. As seen in Chapters 2 and 3, many royalists gave passive obedience to the covenanting regime before enacting resistance when circumstances allowed, usually instigated by an external stimulus. Both national and local trigger events provided royalists with such stimuli, and while the results of their resistance varied, the endurance of royalist sympathy and support is evidence of the lasting appeal which royalism retained within Scottish society.

There was also a more opportunistic aspect to royalism. Wartime factionalism allowed old disputes to be refought under the banners of covenant and crown. Personal, economic, ethnic and religious animosities could, and did, impact individuals' allegiances. No matter individuals' ideological position, their personal priorities could overwrite their political convictions. Loyalty could be fickle. As seen in Iain Lom's 'Là Inbhir Lochaidh' (1645), or the infighting which plagued Inverness from 1644 to 1649, royalist support could be a delivery system for personal objectives.[4] However, the same could be said for covenanting, parliamentarian and confederate allegiance.

While we must remain aware of opportunism, the fact remains that the material consulted in this thesis shows that there was a common royalist ideological position in Scotland which contemporaries from different backgrounds and standings understood and acted upon. While the emphasis of the royalist message changed in alignment with the will of the crown, and some royalists debated its finer points, royalism remained rooted in a

[3] See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.
[4] See pp.94 and 228-231.

cultural commitment to oppose the illegal actions of the covenanters, uphold societal order and maintain the loyalty and obedience which Scottish subjects owed their king.

4.2 Episcopacy Abjured

Royalism was primarily a political and moral position. Royalists tended to avoid engaging in explicitly religious arguments. Instead, they employed overtly political and legal rhetoric which often contained theologically ambiguous statements of support for the true religion, which could be many things to many people. Episcopalian rhetoric is scarce within royalist discourse, especially after 1641 when it almost entirely disappears. As shown in Chapter 2, even within the royalist clergy there was no significant clamour for the return of episcopacy after it was abolished in 1638.[5] While there are limits to which this evidence can be used within the scholarly debates over the success of Jacobean and Caroline episcopacy in Scotland, it seems to support the argument that Episcopalianism had failed to entrench itself within Scottish identity by the time of the civil wars, or at least it was not embedded enough to form a lynchpin of Scottish royalism.[6] When royalists did voice support for the episcopate, they often couched it in legalistic arguments which defended the authorised episcopal church against covenanting religious fervour, which was denounced as extremist and anarchical. This allowed royalists to occupy a moderate Protestant platform and remain open to defecting covenanters. This platform sought to exploit widespread Protestant fears over religious schism and counter-reformation in order to incite a conservative reaction to counter covenanting religious zeal.

Despite this, there were many committed Catholics, such as the earl of Nithsdale and marquis of Douglas, within the royalist ranks. This was undoubtedly due to Catholic fears that the covenanters would pursue religious uniformity far more stringently than the crown ever had. Nevertheless, the lack of Catholic rhetoric within royalist sources suggests that, like Episcopalians, Catholics who supported the king were primarily motivated by the same reasons as their Protestant comrades: loyalty, legality and order. This was certainly the attitude of the marquis of Montrose, who dismissed covenanting fears over the Catholic troops within the royalist army, arguing that they were, first and foremost, loyal subjects.[7]

[5] See Chapter 2, Section 2.6.
[6] This supports arguments made by Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 36; Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution*, 11; Macinnes, *Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement*, 19-20.
[7] *Memorials*, ii, 215-229.

4.3 Crown and Covenant

When Robert Monro called the royalists of Aberdeen 'bad and evill patriotts' he was addressing the fulcrum of the conflict between the Scottish covenanters and royalists.[8] Both factions sought to portray themselves as good patriots, defending the true religion, the king's majesty and societal order against those who threatened to bring all these tumbling down. Monro's word choice also highlights the minute political, theological and moral distinctions which separated the warring parties. This allowed moderate royalists to justify conformity to the covenanting regime and moderate covenanters to reject the regime when questions were raised over the political objectives of the covenanting leaders.

At the root of the division between the royalist and covenanting positions was a question of priority and interpretation. While many covenanters genuinely felt that the king's ecclesiastical policies posed a threat to the kirk and the Scottish kingdom, royalists believed that the covenanters posed more of a danger than the bishops ever could, because covenanters feigned loyalty in order to pursue a radical political and religious agenda. In 1638, royalists by and large did not reject the religious sentiment contained within the National Covenant; they rejected the need for it and its potential constitutional reach. A year later, when the covenanters took up arms in defence of the kirk, royalists saw it as a rebellion against the crown which used exaggerated religious grievances as a cloak for political designs. When the covenanters seized control of the Scottish state, royalists saw their worst fears confirmed and then eclipsed when the covenanting army invaded the north of England in 1644. This contradiction between royalist and covenanting perspectives repeated itself and fuelled royalist fears over rebellion and the covenanters' true intentions. The renewal of civil war in 1644 provided opportunity and means to successfully contest and reverse covenanting rule. When the royalist military campaign faltered, the Engagement in 1647 created a middle ground on which a future royalist settlement could have been built. From 1648 onwards, the conflict in Scotland altered beyond recognition, causing further political realignment which ultimately favoured the royalists' position, although they were never able to successfully act upon it. By 1650, the threat of imminent invasion and occupation at the hands of the English Commonwealth forced both sides to re-evaluate their priorities, resulting in the Scottish kingdom (with the notable exception of the protesting radical covenanters) rallying around Charles II. The king's defeat at the battle of Worcester in 1651 not only crushed any hope of a royalist victory, but crippled the remaining resistance against the Cromwellian occupation.

[8] *Extracts, 1625-1642*, 223-224.

4.4 Scottish and British Royalism

One might assume that royalism was a British identity, as royalists in all three Stuart kingdoms, and Wales, sought the same ultimate goal. Indeed, this thesis has shown that there was substantial overlap between Scottish royalist ideology and English and Irish royalism, such as their attachment to notions of legality and order.[9] Moreover, royalists were acutely aware of the fact that the war they were waging was being fought in three theatres. Rebels in Ireland and England were often denounced in the same breath as the covenanters by Scottish royalists, and there is little doubt that the ultimate royalist objective was the security of royal authority in each of the Stuart kingdoms.

However, Scottish royalists were primarily focused on countering the covenanters, with the rebellions in Ireland and England being pressing but ultimately secondary concerns. Scotland's unique national context shaped royalism there, from its inception as an essentially anti-covenanting opposition, to its redefined mandate from the Engagement onwards. Unlike England and Ireland, confessional loyalties played a far reduced role within Scottish royalism and if anything, royalists in Scotland seem to have shared a more coherent ideology than their allies did elsewhere, perhaps owing to the strength of monarchism within Scotland. While Scottish royalists believed that rebels throughout the king's realms needed to be countered, their focus remained almost exclusively on returning Scotland to royal obedience. Undoubtedly, part of the reason behind this was the ideological contest over Scottish patriotism. Royalists and covenanters used the kirk and crown's safety in their national rallying calls in the hopes of awakening the Scottish kingdom in their favour. Royalists sought to portray themselves as the representatives of the political nation's best interests, and discredit the covenanters' stewardship of the kingdom.

In light of this, future research must do more to understand why some Scots abandoned their homeland to take up arms for the king in England or Ireland. Prominent amongst them were Patrick Ruthven, who rose to become 1st Earl of Forth, 1st Earl of Brentford and Lord General of royalist forces in England; and James King, 1st Lord Eythin and Lieutenant-General in the king's northern army.[10] It is regrettable that there has been no room within this thesis to explore men like Ruthven and King. Did they see the war in

[9] Donagan, 'Varieties of Royalism', 66-88; Scott, 'Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642-9', 36-60; Worden, 'The Royalism of Andrew Marvell', 214-238.
[10] For information on both, see Murdoch and Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals*, 93-144.

England as more important? Did they simply desire to fight alongside their king? Or was it due to more pragmatic reasoning, such as the increased likelihood of being recognised for service in England over service in Scotland? These questions must be addressed in order to truly assess the archipelagic element of royalism in the Stuart kingdoms.

However, from the material consulted in this thesis, it seems that while royalism during the civil wars was an ideology intrinsically attached to the fabric of the Stuarts' three kingdoms outlook, it was not homogeneous across the British Isles. The royalists discussed in the preceding chapters regarded Charles I and Charles II as kings of Scots who happened also to be kings of England and Ireland. There is no sense of British imperialism nor a Scotto-Britannic identity crisis within the material consulted here. Indeed, it seems that by even employing the term 'British royalism' in this period, we risk imposing an ideology and political understanding upon contemporaries who would have found the concept alien. Nonetheless, more research is needed on those who did traverse the theatres of war in the king's name in order to provide a wholly satisfying answer to the question of British royalism.

4.5 Popular Royalism

The British Civil Wars saw an unprecedented level of popular engagement with national affairs. Throughout this thesis it has been argued that royalism possessed just as wide a social appeal as covenanting, and in each of the preceding chapters there is evidence of popular royalism. From mass subscriptions of the King's Covenant to James Wood's march on Dumbarton Castle with his congregation, it is now clear that individuals from across the social spectrum understood and enacted royalism.[11] It can no longer be maintained that popular royalism did not exist in Scotland or that it is undetectable in the surviving material.[12]

Royalist support from outwith the elite could be explicit, as seen in military enlistment and public anti-covenanting resistance, or subtle and opportunistic, as exemplified in actions such as civil disobedience and passing on intelligence to royalist forces. Importantly, royalists throughout the social strata possessed a coherent understanding of royalist beliefs and ideology. The fact that the Aberdonian servant Issobell Davidsone was able to articulate her anger at the illegality and superficial

[11] See pp.46 and 135.
[12] Robertson, *Royalists at War*, 3 and 22.

religiosity of the covenanters in terms similar to royalist intellectuals like Napier and Drummond is significant, especially given the lack of any systematic royalist propaganda campaign or print culture.[13]

The presence of women within several of the examples discussed above, including Davidsone's outburst, shows that royalism could attract female support. While royalist rhetoric used the subservience of women to typify the supposed natural order of life, notably in Napier's work, these examples indicate that royalism was not inherently gendered.[14] Given the deficiencies of the sources and the scarcity of these examples, it is impossible to be certain about the reasons why some women adopted a royalist position, though it seems unlikely that they differed from the motives discussed above. Moreover, their presence demonstrates the reach of Scottish royalism.

From servants to ministers and merchants to nobles, the Scottish royalists discussed in this thesis showed an awareness of and attachment to a creed of loyalty, legality and order, and it was these shared beliefs which united them in their defence of the Stuart crown. It is likely that the evidence of popular royalism discussed above is just the tip of the iceberg. Thus, of all the findings of this thesis, this is perhaps the most exciting and far-reaching in terms of importance and future research.

4.6 The Failure of Royalism

This thesis has argued that Scottish royalism was a coherent and defined ideology upheld by a diverse body of supporters from across the Scottish kingdom. Indeed, throughout the civil wars, there were Scottish royalists who continued to support the Stuart monarchs, even when victory seemed impossible. Why then did Scottish royalism not triumph during the civil wars?

The answer seems to lie in the fact that the royalist movement in Scotland lacked overarching organisation and failed to capitalise upon its support in the way that the covenanters did. Between the defeat of royalist forces in 1639 and Montrose's rising in 1644, there were only a handful of attempts (the Second Bishops' War in 1640, the 'Incident' of 1641, the Cross Petition campaign and failed Kelso rising of 1643) to harness royalist support in Scotland, all of which were largely half-hearted and made all the more difficult due to the control the covenanting regime had been able to consolidate between

[13] See pp.81-92 and 189.
[14] Reid (ed), *The Party-Coloured Mind*, 78.

the years 1638 and 1641. This meant that royalist resistance before 1644 was largely isolated and localised. This was made worse by the absence of many leading royalists from Scotland between 1640 and 1644, as many fled south to the king's court in order to escape the covenanting authorities. The only real exception to this was the marquis of Huntly and his lairds' repeated attempts to counter covenanting influence around Aberdeen, although even this was inconsistent and hampered by indecision.

In many ways, the failure of royalism as a political force between 1640 and 1643 had less to do with the willingness of Scottish royalists than the fact that Charles I became increasingly distracted by events in Ireland and England. To the king, the covenanting regime was a lesser evil than the threat posed by the Catholic confederacy or English parliamentarians. However, during the peace between the crown and the covenanters which lasted from 1640 until the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant in 1643, royalists in Scotland were forced to either recognise covenanting legitimacy or flee to England or Ireland. This undoubtedly undermined the royalist platform in Scotland and stunted its growth. However, as seen in the preceding chapters, tensions between royalists and covenanters remained, and sometimes boiled over into localised social conflict.

Even after Montrose raised the king's banner, the royalist guerrilla campaign which was waged primarily in the north and west between 1644 and 1646 was not able to make the most of royalist support. Despite the unity and widespread appeal of the royalist message, Montrose and his allies were never able to harness royalist support outwith the locality which the army found itself in, until the victory at Kilsyth (15 August 1645). While the royalists' mobile tactics enabled an effective military campaign, their failure to capture the kingdom's administrative mechanisms and establish a physical base of operations greatly limited the extent to which they could draw upon wider royalist support. Likewise, the royalists' failure to create a coordinated propaganda campaign, whether by print, manuscript or oral transmission, resulted in *ad hoc* local responses. The outpouring of support which occurred in the aftermath of Kilsyth and the stability which came with the re-establishment of a tangible royalist presence in Scotland was evident in the days after the royalist victory, and hints at the success which might have been possible if covenanting control had been forcefully challenged earlier. The defeat and decline of the royalist campaign after Philiphaugh enabled the renewed covenanting regime to mete revenge upon any who had shown support for the royalists, including many moderate covenanters who had grown increasingly uneasy with the political direction of the covenanting movement.

Indeed, the success of the Engagement in Scotland can be explained by the fact that the engagers' moderate political platform and the king's subsequent acquiescence was, for the first time since 1639, able to attract Scottish royalist support on a national level. However, as noted in Chapter 1, the Engagement also fundamentally changed the shape of any future peace settlement in Scotland, as moderate covenanters gave their support in return for political admonishment and recognition of the covenants' religious concerns. Exhausted and excluded from national politics, royalists in Scotland were unable to make the most of the widespread uproar following the execution of Charles I, which ensured that royalist prospects once again floundered in the face of strong opposition formed by the radical kirk party. Even when the kirk party itself fractured and split, royalist strength was largely spent, and what remained of it was co-opted into the national call to arms during the Patriotic Accommodation.

Scottish royalism's attachment to loyalty, legality and order undoubtedly contributed to its appeal within Scotland upon the restoration of Charles II in 1660. The widespread popular royalism which was experienced throughout the kingdom was a celebration of the achievement of the royalist objectives of the civil wars, whether the revellers in 1660 recognised that or not.[15] However, royalism remained, as it always had been, bound to the will of the crown. When James VII and II found himself opposed by members of the Scottish political nation in 1688, royalists once again found themselves at war. Indeed, civil war royalism and the Jacobite movement born out of the Williamite Revolution (1688-1689) appear to be intrinsically bound to one another, although further discussion of this topic must be saved for future work.

4.7 Future Research and Wider Implications

It is hoped that the findings of this thesis will cause a re-evaluation of royalism in Scotland during the civil wars and stimulate further research into popular royalism, examination of royalists who fought across the different theatres of war, and analysis of the links between civil war royalism and the development of royalist ideology in the later seventeenth century. Moreover, this thesis corroborates previous studies which have highlighted the importance of monarchist ideology within Scottish intellectual thought.[16] Indeed, loyalism towards the Stuart monarchy appears to have been deeply entrenched within Scottish

[15] Jackson, *Restoration Scotland*, 16-44.
[16] Adams, 'In Search of the Scottish Republic', 97-114; Brown, *Noble Power in Scotland;* Burns, *The True Law of Kingship*.

society by 1640s. More work is needed in order to examine this phenomenon in more detail, but the enduring appeal of the Stuarts during the seventeenth century asks many questions which have relevance for various studies of early modern Scotland.

The research also has broader implications for the study of the civil wars in Scotland. It proves that the civil wars produced considerable political and social conflict throughout Scottish society and that covenanting rule was fiercely contested throughout the 1640s. National affairs were debated across the kingdom, within parishes, burghs and noble estates. Contemporaries possessed clear ideas as to what allegiance, legality and good governance meant, and they were willing to come to blows in defence of their beliefs. These findings also suggest that systematic surveys of noble correspondence, Scottish print publications (using resources such as the *English Short Title Catalogue*) and legal court records (both local and national) could reveal new and important details of contemporaries' ideology and allegiance.[17] Moreover, it is hoped that this research might provide the basis for expanded European comparisons between royalist ideology in Scotland and loyalist discourse from the continent.

For royalism in Scotland, this thesis has shown that previous scholarship has markedly underappreciated its ideological substance, and social and geographical reach. The Stuart kings possessed the committed support of many within their native kingdom, and while Scottish royalists ultimately failed to bring about victory during the civil wars, their actions and beliefs impacted the course of Scottish history and should not be ignored.

[17] *The English Short Title Catalogue* (London, 2020), <www.estc.bl.uk>.

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Appendix 1 – Table of all Ministers Deposed under the Covenanting Regime, 1638-1651

Name	Parish	Presbytery	Synod	Year of Deposition	Reason	Fasti Reference	Reponed under the Covenanters	Future Charge
Brown, Robert	Kirkbean	Dumfries	Dumfries	1638	Refusing the covenant – reponed after agreeing to subscribe.	II - 277	Yes	Yes
Gledstanes, Alexander	St Andrews	St Andrews	Fife	1638	Arminianism and drunkenness	V - 232	No	No
Wishart, George	St Andrews (Second Charge)	St Andrews	Fife	1638	Desertion, doctrine, immorality and discipline	V - 238	No	Yes
McClean, Robert	Kelston, Geston and Kirkcormick	Kirkcudbright	Galloway	1638	Contumacy and insufficiency	II - 414	No	No
Annand, William	Ayr	Ayr	Glasgow and Ayr	1638	Erroneous doctrine	III - 8	No	Yes
Uduard, Robert	Kirkmichael	Ayr	Glasgow and Ayr	1638	Not deposed – fled the parish after disagreeing with the covenanters	III - 44	No	Yes
Corbet, John	Bonhill	Dumbarton	Glasgow and Ayr	1638	Contumacy	III - 331	No	Yes
Forsyth, James	Kilpatrick	Dumbarton	Glasgow and Ayr	1638	Episcopalian teachings and preaching that the covenant was treasonable, and Jesuitical.	III - 353	No	No
Hamilton, Robert	Glasford	Hamilton	Glasgow and Ayr	1638	Desertion and breaking the sabbath	III - 253	No	Yes
Alderston, James	Kilmaurs	Irvine	Glasgow and Ayr	1638	No information	III - 112	No	No
Lindsay, John	Carluke	Lanark	Glasgow and Ayr	1638	‘absence, contempt, and desertion’	III - 284	No	Yes
Hamilton, Robert	Lesmahagow	Lanark	Glasgow and Ayr	1638	‘erroneous doctrine and a scandalous life'	III - 313	No	No
Crichton, John	Paisley	Paisley	Glasgow and Ayr	1638	Arminianism and popery	III - 163	No	Yes
Fairlie, James	Old Greyfriars	Edinburgh	Lothian and Tweeddale	1638	No information	I - 45	No	Yes
Mitchell, David	Old Kirk	Edinburgh	Lothian and Tweeddale	1638	Declining the general assembly and Arminianism	I - 70	No	Yes
Hepburn, Francis	Coldstream	Chirnside	Merse and Teviotdale	1638	No information	II - 40	No	No

MacMath, John	Simprin	Chirnside	Merse and Teviotdale	1638	Declining the authority of the presbytery, deserting his parish and teaching Arminianism	II - 62	No	No
Rollo, Andrew	Duns	Duns	Merse and Teviotdale	1638	'for signing a declinature of their authority from ignorance, he having been brought up in the principles of the Episcopal Church' – reponed after public repentance	II - 9	Yes	Yes
Clapperton, John	Ednam	Kelso	Merse and Teviotdale	1638	No information	II - 68	No	No
Forrester, Thomas	Melrose	Selkirk	Merse and Teviotdale	1638	Support of episcopacy	II - 187	No	No
Guthrie, John	Elgin (Second Charge)	Elgin	Moray	1638	No information	VI - 388	No	No
MacKenzie, Thomas	Killearnan	Chanonry	Ross	1638	Protesting against the general assembly	VII - 11	No	No
Collace, Andrew	St Mary's	Dundee	Angus and Mearns	1639	No information	V - 315	No	No
Rollock, Robert	Murroes	Dundee	Angus and Mearns	1639	'non-residence for three years together, neglect of his charge and maintaining the universality of the benefits of Christ's death'	V - 367	No	No
Strachan, James	Kinneff and Caterline	Fordoun	Angus and Mearns	1639	No information	V - 473	No	No
Michaelson, John	Burntisland	Kirkcaldy	Fife	1639	Contumacy	V - 81	No	No
Lamont, Andrew	Markinch	Kirkcaldy	Fife	1639	Contumacy	V - 112	No	Yes
Meanrs, John	Carnbee	St Andrews	Fife	1639	Doctrine and contumacy	V - 188	No	No
Halyburton, George	Crail	St Andrews	Fife	1639	Not deposed – charge declared vacant after complaint from Lord Lindsay	V - 193	No	No

Scrimgeour, Henry	Forgan	St Andrews	Fife	1639	‘for immorality, breaking the Sabbath, affirming the nobles were taking the crown off the King's head to set on their own, calling it a black Covenant’	V - 203	No	No
Murray, Robert	Balmaclellan	Kirkcudbright	Galloway	1639	a ‘variety of offences'	II - 388	Yes	Yes
Adamson, Patrick	Buittle and Kirkennan	Kirkcudbright	Galloway	1639	Insufficiency	II - 398	No	No
McGill, Thomas	Dalry	Kirkcudbright	Galloway	1639	No information – fled to Ireland	II - 407	No	No
Buchanan, George	Kirkcudbright, Galtway and Dunrod	Kirkcudbright	Galloway	1639	Contumacy	II - 416	No	No
Scott, James	Tongland and Balnacross	Kirkcudbright	Galloway	1639	Refusing the covenant	II - 425	No	Yes
Paterson, William	Glenluce	Stranraer	Galloway	1639	No information	II - 348	No	No
Stewart, Gavin	Dalmellington	Ayr	Glasgow and Ayr	1639	Contumacy	III - 31	No	No
Maxwell, John	St Mungo's	Glasgow	Glasgow and Ayr	1639	Contumacy	III - 134	Yes	Yes
Forbes, Alexander	Campsie and Antermony	Glasgow	Glasgow and Ayr	1639	Heresy	III - 375	Yes	Yes
Hutcheson, James	Carmunnock	Glasgow	Glasgow and Ayr	1639	Contumacy	III - 378	No	No
Hamilton, John	Dalserf	Hamilton	Glasgow and Ayr	1639	Simony	III - 245	No	No
Hamilton, James	Hamilton	Hamilton	Glasgow and Ayr	1639	Contumacy	III - 258	No	No
Nairn, Robert	Carmichael	Lanark	Glasgow and Ayr	1639	For refusing to read the covenant to his congregation	III - 287	No	No
Hamilton, Gavin	Carnwath	Lanark	Glasgow and Ayr	1639	‘having been in England and kythed himself opposite to the present work of Reformation’	III - 289	Yes	Yes

Lindsay, John	Carstairs	Lanark	Glasgow and Ayr	1639	‘prelatic tendancies' and refusing the covenant	III - 292	Yes	Yes
Sydserf, George	Cockburnpath	Dunbar	Lothian and Tweeddale	1639	‘Contempt of Presbytery, Erroneous doctrine, tyrannical conduct in compelling his parishioners to conform to the Articles of Perth and appealing to His Majesty’	I - 403	No	No
Maxwell, William	Dunbar	Dunbar	Lothian and Tweeddale	1639	‘erroneous doctrine, meddling with the poor's box, tyrannical behaviour to his parishioners, in urging their conformity to the Articles of Perth, declining both the Assembly and Presb., and appealing to His Majesty’	I - 407	No	No
Ogston, William	Colinton	Edinburgh	Lothian and Tweeddale	1639	Desertion	I - 2	No	Yes
Watson, John	Cannongate (Second Charge)	Edinburgh	Lothian and Tweeddale	1639	Desertion	I -28	No	No
Hannay, James	St Giles	Edinburgh	Lothian and Tweeddale	1639	Declining the general assembly and defending the service book	I - 57	No	No
Fletcher, David	Old Kirk (Second Charge)	Edinburgh	Lothian and Tweeddale	1639	Declining the general assembly and defending the service book	I - 74	Yes	Yes
Wishart, William	South Leith	Edinburgh	Lothian and Tweeddale	1639	Erroneous doctrine	I - 161	No	No
Morton, William	South Leith (Second Charge)	Edinburgh	Lothian and Tweeddale	1639	Not deposed – fled to England	I - 165	No	Yes
Learmouth, Andrew	Liberton	Edinburgh	Lothian and Tweeddale	1639	Calling the covenanters perjurers	I - 171	No	No

Trotter, John	Dirleton	Haddington	Lothian and Tweeddale	1639	Not deposed – charge declared vacant after he was found to have entered his charge unlawfully, despite receiving the synod's support in 1638	I - 359	No	No
Logan, James	Smailholm	Earlston	Merse and Teviotdale	1639	No information	II - 161	No	No
Campbell, Thomas	Stow	Earlston	Merse and Teviotdale	1639	Contumacy and desertion	II - 163	No	No
Pierson, Henry	Bedrule	Jedburgh	Merse and Teviotdale	1639	No information	II - 103	No	No
Burnet, James	Jedburgh	Jedburgh	Merse and Teviotdale	1639	No information	II - 125	No	No
Foulis, David	Oxnam	Jedburgh	Merse and Teviotdale	1639	Contumacy	II - 135	No	No
Rollock, William	Roxburgh	Kelso	Merse and Teviotdale	1639	No information – had fled to England by 1640	II - 86	No	No
Hervie, Francis	Yetholm	Kelso	Merse and Teviotdale	1639	‘for erecting an altar with rails, beating violently one of his parishioners, contempt of the Presb., and declining the Gen. Assembly 1638’	II - 95	No	No
Lindsay, Patrick	Maxton and Rutherford	Selkirk	Merse and Teviotdale	1639	Heresy	II - 184	No	No
Gordon, John	Elgin (Junior Charge)	Elgin	Moray	1639	Refusing the covenant	VI - 393	No	No
MacKenzie, Murdoch	Dingwall	Dingwall	Ross	1639	Contumacy	VII - 33	No	No
MacKenzie, John	Urray and Tarradale	Dingwall	Ross	1639	Opposition to the covenant	VII - 49	Yes	Yes
Scrogie, Alexander	St Machars'	Aberdeen	Aberdeen	1640	Opposition to the covenant	VI - 18	No	No
Sibbald, James	St Nicholas'	Aberdeen	Aberdeen	1640	Opposition to the covenant	VI - 37	No	Yes
Gregorie, John	Drumoak	Aberdeen	Aberdeen	1640	Desertion and refusing the covenant	VI - 50	Yes	Yes

Logie, Andrew	Rayne	Garioch	Aberdeen	1640	Opposition to the covenant	VI - 183	Yes	Yes
Cunningham, Samuel	Ferryport-on-Craig	St Andrews	Fife	1640	Insufficiency	V - 200	No	No
Power, Gilbert	Stoneykirk, Clayshant and Toskertoun	Stranraer	Galloway	1640	Nonconformity	II - 353	Yes	Yes
Craig, Thomas	Largs	Greenock	Glasgow and Ayr	1640	No information	III - 214	No	No
Forbes, Alexander	Carluke	Lanark	Glasgow and Ayr	1640	Not deposed as he was not technically the minister, only a temporary preacher, but he was removed from his post in 1640 for refusing to sign the covenant	III - 284	No	No
Douglas, James	Douglas	Lanark	Glasgow and Ayr	1640	For defending those who had deserted a muster at Biggar and Lanark Moor - deposed again in 1646	III - 300	Yes	Yes
Elliot, James	Trinity Church (Second Charge)	Edinburgh	Lothian and Tweeddale	1640	Not deposed, fled to England.	I - 131	No	Yes
Peter, John	St Andrews	Elgin	Moray	1640	Refusing the covenant	VI - 399	No	No
Clogie, William	Inverness	Inverness	Moray	1640	Refusing the covenant	VI - 455	Yes	Yes
Forbes, john	Auchterless	Turriff	Aberdeen	1641	Opposition to the covenant	VI - 249	No	No
Cornwall, Alexander	Muiravonside	Linlithgow	Lothian and Tweeddale	1641	For a dispute with a James Muir of Linlithgow	I - 222	No	No
Lamb, Thomas	Kirkurd	Peebles	Lothian and Tweeddale	1641	Murder (following a private dispute)	I -277	No	No
Knowes, Christopher	Coldingham	Chirnside	Merse and Teviotdale	1641	Adultery	II - 37	No	No
Guthrie, John	Duffus and Unthank	Elgin	Moray	1641	Refusing the covenant	VI - 385	No	No

Wedderburn, William	Meldrum	Garioch	Aberdeen	1642	Immorality	VI - 173	Yes	Yes
MacQueen, Archibald	Snizort and Uig	Skye	Argyll	1642	Marrying Macdonald of Clanranald, who had been excommunicated	VII - 179	Yes	Yes
Kincaid, George	Mochrum	Wigtown	Galloway	1642	Insufficiency, overturned by the general assembly	II - 370	Yes	No
Montgomerie, Robert	Symington	Ayr	Glasgow and Ayr	1642	No information	III - 73	No	No
Houston, James	Glasford	Hamilton	Glasgow and Ayr	1642	Immorality	III - 139	Yes	Yes
Macleod, Roderick	Alvie	Abernethy	Moray	1642	Immorality	VI - 355	No	No
Logie, Andrew	Rayne	Garioch	Aberdeen	1643	Heresy	VI - 183	No	Yes
Drydale, John	Slamannan	Linlithgow	Lothian and Tweeddale	1643	For ‘ane wyld and ignominious cuckolane and slanderous ryme, ventit and formed agains the brethrein’	I - 228	No	No
Douglas, William	Aboyne and Glentanar	Kincardine O'Neil	Aberdeen	1644	No information	VI - 77	Yes	Yes
McCalman, Duncan	Ardnmurchan and Eilean Finain	Mull	Argyll	1644	For aiding MacColla	IV - 105	No	Yes
Dewer, George	Anstruther Wester	St Andrews	Fife	1644	For disaffection to the reformed religion	V - 183	No	No
Brown, Richard	Saltoun	Haddington	Lothian and Tweeddale	1644	For speaking against the covenant	I - 391	No	No
Douglas, Ninian	Traquair	Peebles	Lothian and Tweeddale	1644	For falsifying a bond	I - 293	No	No
Morison, James	Evie and Rendall	Kirkwall	Orkney	1644	Ignorance	VII - 215	Yes	Yes
Graham, John	Auchterarder and Aberuthven	Auchterarder	Perth and Stirling	1644	For speaking with Montrose	IV - 258	Yes	Yes

Halyburton, George	Perth (West)	Perth	Perth and Stirling	1644	No information	IV - 234	Yes	Yes
Campbell, Colin	Craignish	Inveraray	Argyll	1645	No information	IV - 2	No	No
Fraser, Farquhar	Tiree	Mull	Argyll	1645	Not formally deposed, but barred from stipend as he served as a chaplain under Montrose	IV - 119	Yes	Yes
Barclay, William	Falkland	Cupar	Fife	1645	Supporting Montrose	V - 153	No	Yes
McQuorne, John	Straiton	Ayr	Glasgow and Ayr	1645	Drunkenness	III - 71	No	No
Wood, James	Kilpatrick	Dumbarton	Glasgow and Ayr	1645	For supporting Montrose, preaching in his favour, demanding Dumbarton Castle surrender to royalist forces and calling Mr Robert Rollock a 'loon minister'	III - 353	No	No
Train, Robert	Eaglesham	Glasgow	Glasgow and Ayr	1645	For supporting Montrose	III - 386	No	No
Forsyth, John	Kirkintilloch	Glasgow	Glasgow and Ayr	1645	No information	III - 483	No	No
Fyfe, John	Foulis Wester	Auchterarder	Perth and Stirling	1645	No information	IV - 271	No	No
Row, James	Muthill	Auchterarder	Perth and Stirling	1645	No information	IV - 284	Yes	Yes
Robertson, John	Perth (East)	Perth	Perth and Stirling	1645	For holding conversations with Montrose	IV - 230	No	Yes
Darroch, John	Jura	Islay and Jura	Argyll	1646	'for preaching to and gross compliance with the rebels'	IV - 70	No	No
Hamilton, Robert	Monkton and Prestwick	Ayr	Glasgow and Ayr	1646	'various misdemeanours'	III - 55	No	No
Forsyth, Gavin	Cathcart	Glasgow	Glasgow and Ayr	1646	For supporting Montrose	III - 381	No	No
Boyd, Robert	Bothwell	Hamilton	Glasgow and Ayr	1646	For praying for the marquis of Montrose	III - 230	No	No

Hamilton, Patrick	Cambuslang	Hamilton	Glasgow and Ayr	1646	Drunkenness	III - 236	No	No
Dunlop, Alexander	Ardrossan	Irvine	Glasgow and Ayr	1646	No information	III - 78	No	No
Douglas, James	Carnwath	Lanark	Glasgow and Ayr	1646	'for malignancy'	III - 289	Yes	Yes
Book, John	Kirkliston	Linlithgow	Lothian and Tweeddale	1646	No information	I - 212	No	No
Thomson, Alexander	Daviot and Dunlichity	Inverness	Moray	1646	No information	VI - 447	No	No
Logie, Andrew	Rathven	Fordyce	Aberdeen	1647	For corresponding with the (excommunicated) marquis of Huntly	VI - 295	Yes	Yes
Maitland, Richard	Inverkeithny	Turriff	Aberdeen	1647	For corresponding with the (excommunicated) marquis of Huntly	VI - 263	No	Yes
Clark, Alexander	Laggan	Abernethy	Moray	1647	No information	VI - 369	No	No
Hannay, George	Alves	Elgin	Moray	1647	'subscribing that persidious and wicked bond by the Marquess of Huntly, ane excommunicate rebel, and that sometym he drank the said Marquess's health'	VI - 375	No	No
Gordon, James	Huntly	Strathbogie	Moray	1647	For corresponding with the (excommunicated) marquis of Huntly	VI - 317	No	Yes
Maitland, Richard	Marnoch	Strathbogie	Moray	1647	For corresponding with the (excommunicated) marquis of Huntly	VI - 322	No	Yes
Forbes, Wiliam	Mortlach	Strathbogie	Moray	1647	For corresponding with the (excommunicated) marquis of Huntly	VI - 326	No	No
MacKenzie, Murdoch	Suddie	Chanonry	Ross	1647	'preaching and praying before the Earl of Seaforth, and eating and drinking with him and	VII - 17	No	No

					saying grace after his excommunication'			
MacKenzie, Colin	Contin and Strathgarve	Dingwall	Ross	1647	For preaching and praying for Seaforth and his men, and signing Seaforth's Remonstrance	VII - 30	Yes	Yes
McIlvra, Martin	Icholumkill	Mull	Argyll	1648	'For complying with the rebels'	IV - 111	Yes	Yes
Barron, John	Kemback	St Andrews	Fife	1648	Suspended by general assembly for supporting the Engagement, but he was never reponed and replaced soon after	V - 206	No	No
McLachlin, Archibald	Luss	Dumbarton	Glasgow and Ayr	1648	For marrying James Colquhoun of Luss [royalist] to Margaret, daughter of Sir Gideon Baillie of Lochend without proclamation of banns	III - 359	No	No
Birsbane, Matthew	Erskine	Greenock	Glasgow and Ayr	1648	No information	III - 192	No	No
Crawford, George	West Kilbride	Irvine	Glasgow and Ayr	1648	Misconduct	III - 128	No	No
Law, Thomas	Inchinnan	Paisley	Glasgow and Ayr	1648	'malignancy and other scandals'	III - 144	No	No
Gudlad, Andrew	Symington	Biggar	Lothian and Tweeddale	1648	'being found altogether unprofitable, and a contemner of the acts and constitutions of the Kirk tending to the Reformation and settling of the true religion'	I - 260	No	Yes
Ramsay, Andrew	Old Kirk	Edinburgh	Lothian and Tweeddale	1648	Supporting the Engagement	I - 70	No	Yes
Drummond, David	Linlithgow	Linlithgow	Lothian and Tweeddale	1648	For failing to preach against the Engagement	I - 215	No	Yes

Inglis, Thomas	Linlithgow (Second Charge)	Linlithgow	Lothian and Tweeddale	1648	For failing to preach against the Engagement	I - 218	No	Yes
Fleming, Robert	Drumelzier	Peebles	Lothian and Tweeddale	1648	No information	I - 268	No	No
Douglas, Samuel	Coldingham	Chirnside	Merse and Teviotdale	1648	No information	II - 37	No	Yes
Elliot, Henry	Bedrule	Jedburgh	Merse and Teviotdale	1648	Not officially deposed, but driven out for publicly supporting the Engagement	II - 103	No	No
Edmonstone, William	Kilmadock	Dunblane	Perth and Stirling	1648	Adultery	IV - 346	No	No
Shaw, Henry	Logie Wallach	Dunblane	Perth and Stirling	1648	No information	IV - 355	No	No
Guthrie, Henry	Stirling (East)	Stirling	Perth and Stirling	1648	Malignancy	IV - 318	No	Yes
Allan, John	Stirling (West)	Stirling	Perth and Stirling	1648	Malignancy	IV - 324	No	No
Ross, Thomas	Alness	Dingwall	Ross	1648	No information	VII - 26	Yes	Yes
Munro, David	Kiltearn	Dingwall	Ross	1648	Malignancy and supporting the Engagement	VII - 41	No	No
Gregorie, John	Drumoak	Aberdeen	Aberdeen	1649	Refusing to preach alongside Andrew Cant	VI - 50	Yes	Yes
Walker, Samuel	Keithhall	Garioch	Aberdeen	1649	Malignancy	VI - 162	No	No
Leith, William	Kinkell	Garioch	Aberdeen	1649	No information	VI - 164	No	No
Rose, John	Birse	Kincardine O'Neil	Aberdeen	1649	Royalist principals	VI - 82	No	Yes
Rutherford, John	Kirkden	Arbroath	Angus and Mearns	1649	Probably one of the 18 ministers deposed for insufficiency in Angus	V - 444	No	No
Lammie, John	Maryton	Brechin	Angus and Mearns	1649	For promoting the views of the earl of Southesk and the Engagement	V - 406	Yes	Yes

Robertson, Alexander	Willison Church	Dundee	Angus and Mearns	1649	Probably one of the 18 ministers deposed for insufficiency in Angus.	V - 342	No	No
Blair, Donald	Lundie and Fowlis Easter	Dundee	Angus and Mearns	1649	For supporting the Engagement	V - 355	No	No
Fithie, Henry	Mains and Strathmartine	Dundee	Angus and Mearns	1649	Insufficiency	V - 358	No	No
Bruce, Alexander	Tealing	Dundee	Angus and Mearns	1649	Probably one of the 18 ministers deposed for insufficiency in Angus	V - 370	No	No
Strachan, James	Bervie	Fordoun	Angus and Mearns	1649	Probably one of the 18 ministers deposed for insufficiency in Angus	V - 457	No	No
Leslie, Patrick	Fetteresso	Fordoun	Angus and Mearns	1649	Insufficiency	V - 463	No	No
Lindsay, John	Aberlemno and Aldbar	Forfar	Angus and Mearns	1649	Immorality	V - 277	No	No
Lamont, James	Kinnettles	Forfar	Angus and Mearns	1649	Insufficiency	V - 294	No	No
Allan, Andrew	Oathlaw	Forfar	Angus and Mearns	1649	Insufficiency	V - 300	No	No
Ogilvy, William	Kingoldrum	Meigle	Angus and Mearns	1649	Probably one of the 18 ministers deposed for insufficiency in Angus.	V - 266	No	No
Knox, John	Kilbride in Arran	Kintyre	Argyll	1649	‘Keeping change in his house, selling drink’	IV - 56	No	No
Chalmer, Thomas	Kirkpatrick-Fleming, KirkConnel and Irving	Annan	Dumfries	1649	No information	II - 250	No	No
Broome, Robert	Dunscore	Dumfries	Dumfries	1649	No information	II - 272	No	No
Carmichael, James	Cleish	Kinross	Fife	1649	Insufficiency	V - 61	No	No
Scott, William	Coylton	Ayr	Glasgow and Ayr	1649	Breaking the sabbath	III - 20	No	No
Hamilton, John	Craigie	Ayr	Glasgow and Ayr	1649	‘for not being hearty in opposing the public enemy'	III - 22	No	No

Hamilton, Gavin	Cadder	Glasgow	Glasgow and Ayr	1649	'Being negligent in pressing family worship'	III - 373	No	No
Wilkie, William	Govan	Glasgow	Glasgow and Ayr	1649	For supporting the Engagement	III - 411	No	No
Brisbane, Robert	Killellan	Paisley	Glasgow and Ayr	1649	No information	III - 142	No	No
Law, John	Neilston	Paisley	Glasgow and Ayr	1649	Insufficiency	III - 157	No	No
Hay, John	Renfrew	Paisley	Glasgow and Ayr	1649	Doctrine and drunkenness	III - 185	No	Yes
Keith, Alexander	Uphall	Biggar	Lothian and Tweeddale	1649	No information	I - 233	No	Yes
Colville, William	Tron Kirk	Edinburgh	Lothian and Tweeddale	1649	Supporting the Engagement	I - 134	No	Yes
Bannatyne, Andrew	Garvald and Bara	Haddington	Lothian and Tweeddale	1649	Negligence, suspicion of fornication and silence during the Engagement	I - 363	No	Yes
Fleming, James	Yester	Haddington	Lothian and Tweeddale	1649	Not deposed – fled to England after fighting with parishioners over his zealousness in executing witches	I - 399	No	Yes
Powrie, Richard	Dawyck	Peebles	Lothian and Tweeddale	1649	Marrying lord Linton (future 2nd earl of Traquir) to Lady Henrietta Seton, an 'excommunicated papist'.	I - 292	No	No
Rollo, Andrew	Duns	Duns	Merse and Teviotdale	1649	No information	II - 9	No	Yes
Grahame, Patrick	Ham and Paplay	Kirkwall	Orkney	1649	No information	VII - 218	No	No
Graham, John	Auchterarder and Aberuthven	Auchterarder	Perth and Stirling	1649	No information	IV - 258	No	No
Graham, James	Auchterarder and Aberuthven	Auchterarder	Perth and Stirling	1649	For subscribing the Engagement	IV - 258	Yes	Yes

Drummond, David	Crieff	Auchterarder	Perth and Stirling	1649	No information	IV - 265	No	Yes
Piersoune, James	Dunblane and Kilbride	Dunblane	Perth and Stirling	1649	No information	IV - 343	No	No
Jaffray, Andrew	Lecropt	Dunblane	Perth and Stirling	1649	No information	IV - 353	No	No
Richardson, Edward	Forteviot	Perth	Perth and Stirling	1649	For drinking to the success of the Engagement	IV - 211	No	Yes
Galbraith, John	Bothkennar	Stirling	Perth and Stirling	1649	'Tippling and other faults'	IV - 299	No	No
Forsyth, James	Larbert and Dunipace	Stirling	Perth and Stirling	1649	No information	IV - 310	No	Yes
Edmonstone, James	St Ninians	Stirling	Perth and Stirling	1649	No information	IV - 313	No	Yes
Munro, David	Latheron and Dunbeath	Caithness	Sutherland and Caithness	1649	Supporting Montrose	VII - 125	No	Yes
Monro, Alexander	Dornoch	Dornoch	Sutherland and Caithness	1649	Intemperance	VII - 84	No	No
McLennan, Farquhar	Strath	Skye	Argyll	1650	Malignancy	VII - 182	No	Yes
Rowatt, Andrew	Cummertrees and Trailtrow	Annan	Dumfries	1650	No information	II - 243	No	No
Train, Alexander	Lochrutton	Dumfries	Dumfries	1650	No information	II - 291	No	No
Bruce, Walter	Inverkeithing and Rosyth	Dunfermline	Fife	1650	'gross neglects in the speciale duties of his ministrie'	V - 43	No	Yes
Lindsay, William	Dreghorn	Irvine	Glasgow and Ayr	1650	For supporting the Engagement	III - 87	No	No
Balcanquhal, Robert	Tranent and Seton	Haddington	Lothian and Tweeddale	1650	'accessorie to the Divisive supplies'	I - 396	No	Yes
Home, George	Ayton	Chirnside	Merse and Teviotdale	1650	No information	II - 31	No	Yes

Cockburn, Henry	Channelkirk	Earlston	Merse and Teviotdale	1650	For publicly praying for the engager army under Hamilton.	II - 147	No	Yes
Fraser, Alexander	Botriphnie	Strathbogie	Moray	1650	For subscribing a paper against the covenant and the 1638 Assembly	VI - 301	No	No
Watson, Robert	Grange	Strathbogie	Moray	1650	Negligence of discipline	VI - 314	Yes	Yes
Haigie, James	St Andrews and Deerness	Kirkwall	Orkney	1650	Subscribing the loyal address to Montrose	VII - 211	No	Yes
Douglas, James	Kirkwall and St Ola	Kirkwall	Orkney	1650	Subscribing the loyal address to Montrose	VII - 221	No	Yes
Peirson, Robert	Firth and Stenness	Kirkwall	Orkney	1650	Subscribing the loyal address to Montrose	VII - 235	No	No
Watson, William	Hoy and Graemsay	Kirkwall	Orkney	1650	Subscribing the loyal address to Montrose	VII - 243	No	Yes
Johnstone, George	Orphir	Kirkwall	Orkney	1650	Subscribing the loyal address to Montrose	VII - 247	No	Yes
Watson, David	Westray	Kirkwall	Orkney	1650	Subscribing the loyal address to Montrose	VII - 276	No	No
Drummond, Edward	Callander	Dunblane	Perth and Stirling	1650	No information	IV - 340	No	No
Maclennan, Farquhar	Fodderty, Kinettas, and Glen Ussie	Dingwall	Ross	1650	Malignancy	VII - 36	Yes	Yes
MacKenzie, John	Tarbat	Tain	Ross	1650	Immorality	VII - 75	No	Yes
Smith, William	Dunnet	Caithness	Sutherland and Caithness	1650	Supporting Montrose	VII - 119	No	No
Cuming, Alexander	Halkirk, Skinnet and Spittal	Caithness	Sutherland and Caithness	1650	Supporting Montrose	VII - 122	No	No
Allardyce, David	Olrig	Caithness	Sutherland and Caithness	1650	Supporting Montrose	VII - 129	No	Yes
Munro, John	Reay	Caithness	Sutherland and Caithness	1650	Supporting Montrose	VII - 132	No	No

Abernethy, William	Thurso	Caithness	Sutherland and Caithness	1650	Supporting Montrose	VII - 136	No	No
Smart, John	Wick	Caithness	Sutherland and Caithness	1650	Supporting Montrose	VII - 141	No	Yes
Darg, Walter	Deskford	Fordyce	Aberdeen	1651	Insufficiency	VI - 284	Yes	Yes
Grahame, George	Sandwick and Stromness	Kirkwall	Orkney	1651	Subscribing the loyal address to Montrose	VII - 251	No	Yes
Balvaird, John	Rousay and Egilsay	Kirkwall	Orkney	1651	Subscribing the loyal address to Montrose	VII - 267	No	Yes
Wemyss, Patrick	Lady	Kirkwall	Orkney	1651	Subscribing the loyal address to Montrose	VII - 262	No	No
Mushet, George	Dunning	Auchterarder	Perth and Stirling	1651	'Subscribing the Divisive Supplication'	IV - 268	No	Yes
Munro, Hector	Kinardine	Tain	Ross	1651	Malignancy	VII - 60	No	No

Appendix 2 – Aberdeen's Provosts and Bailies 1638-1651

Unfortunately, due to the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, I was unable to return to Aberdeen City Archives to identify the missing bailies from 1642 and 1647 before submitting this thesis.

Year	**Provost**	**Bailies**
1638	Alexander Jaffray	William Forbes John Hay John Leslie Thomas Mortimer
1639	Patrick Leslie	Robert Farquhar Thomas Gray Matthew Lumsden William Moir
1640	Patrick Leslie	William Forbes Alexander Jaffray John Leslie Thomas Mortimer
1641	Alexander Jaffray	Thomas Gray Matthew Lumsden William Moir George Moreson
1642	Patrick Leslie	Robert Farquhar Alexander Jaffray (younger) Thomas Mortimer ?
1643	Patrick Leslie	Robert Cruickshank Thomas Gray Matthew Lumsden William Moir

1644	Robert Farquhar	John Hay Alexander Jaffray (younger) Patrick Leslie Thomas Mortimer
1645	Thomas Gray	James Collinson George Cullen William Forbes George Moreson
1646	Thomas Gray	George Cullen John Hay Alexander Jaffray (younger) George Moreson
1647 (February – Michaelmas)	Patrick Leslie	George Cullen William Moir ? ?
1647	Patrick Leslie	Walter Cochrane John Jaffray Alexander Lumsden George Menzies
1648	Thomas Gray	Robert Cruickshank George Cullen Alexander Jaffray (younger) William Moir
1649	Alexander Jaffray (younger)	John Hay John Jaffray William Moir*/George Cullen Thomas Mortimer

		*Moir died during his term in office, replaced by Cullen
1650	Robert Farquhar	Alexander Burnet Walter Cochrane John Leslie Patrick Moir
1651	Alexander Jaffray (younger)	George Cullen John Jaffray Patrick Moir William Petrie
1660 (post-Restoration)	Gilbert Gray	Alexander Alexander William Gray Robert Petrie Alexander Robertson

Appendix 3 – Glasgow's Provost and Bailies 1638-1651

Year	Provost	Bailies
1638	Patrick Bell	Henry Glen Matthew Hamilton William Neilson
1639	George Cunningham	John Anderson Richard Allan George Porterfield
1640	James Stewart	Colin Campbell Henry Glen William Neilson
1641	William Stewart	John Anderson James Bell Menasses Lyle
1642	William Stewart	John Anderson James Hamilton Walter Stirling
1643	James Bell	John Barns Colin Campbell Gavin Nesbit
1644	James Bell	John Anderson Matthew Hamilton William Neilson
1645	George Porterfield	Ninian Anderson Robert Hamilton Peter Johnston
1646	George Porterfield	Ninian Anderson Robert Hamilton Peter Johnston
1647	George Porterfield	William Dunlop

(Held in January)		Ninian Gilhazie James Hamilton
1647	James Stewart	John Graham William Lightbodie Robert Mack
1648 (pre-Engagement)	James Stewart	John Graham William Lightbodie Robert Mack
1648 (Engagement)	Colin Campbell	John Anderson William Neilson James Tran
1648 (post-Engagement)	George Porterfield	Thomas Allan Ninian Anderson Peter Johnston
1649	George Porterfield	William Dunlop Ninian Gilhazie William Home
1650	John Graham	Thomas Brown James Hamilton William Lightbodie
1651	George Porterfield	Thomas Campbell James Kinkaid Robert Mack
1660 (post-Restoration)	Colin Campbell	James Barnes John Ker John Walkinshaw

Appendix 4 – Inverness's Provost and Bailies 1638-1651

Year	Provost	Bailies
1638	Master John Ross of Midleys	Findley Kinnar Alexander Paterson William Paterson Robert Ross
1639	James Cuthbert of Easter Drakies	Robert Baillie William Cuthbert Alexander Paterson Robert Ross
1640	James Ross of Merkinch	Robert Baillie Findley Kinnar John Polson James Ross
1641	James Ross of Merkinch	William Patterson John Polson James Ross Thomas Schereer
1642	James Ross of Merkinch	John Forbes, Fiar of Culloden John Polson James Robertson Mr. Walter Rose
1643	Duncan Forbes of Culloden	George Abraham Robert Baillie Robert Ross Thomas Schereer
1644	Duncan Forbes of Culloden	Robert Baillie John Polson Robert Ross Mr. Walter Ross

1645	James Cuthbert of Easter Drakies	William Baillie Gilbert Robertson James Robertson William Robertson
1646	John Forbes, Fiar of Culloden	Robert Baillie Alexander Dunbar John Polson Gilbert Robertson
1647	John Forbes, Fiar of Culloden	Robert Baillie Alexander Cuthbert Robert Ross John Stewart
1648	John Forbes, Fiar of Culloden	Robert Baillie Alexander Cuthbert Alexander Dunbar Robert Ross
1649	John Forbes, Fiar of Culloden	Robert Baillie Alexander Cuthbert Alexander Dunbar John Polson
1650	John Forbes, Fiar of Culloden	Robert Baillie Alexander Cuthbert Alexander Dunbar Robert Ross

Appendix 5 – List of those barred from office in Aberdeen in 1645

- William Black
- Walter Cochrane
- James Collinson
- Robert Cruickshank
- Robert Farquhar
- Alexander Forbes
- Alexander Jaffray
- John Jaffray
- Patrick Leslie
- Patrick Leslie younger (bailie)
- Alexander Lumsden
- William Moir
- Thomas Mowat

Appendix 6 – List of those supported for election by the Estates in Aberdeen (24 February 1647)

- George Aidie
- Alexander Burnet
- Walter Cochrane
- George Cullen
- Alexander Farquhar
- Robert Farquhar
- Thomas Gray
- John Hay
- Alexander Jaffray
- John Jaffray
- Patrick Leslie
- Patrick Leslie younger
- William Moir
- Thomas Mortimer
- Thomas Mowat
- Charles Robertson
- William Sangister
- Peter Schirres
- David Sinclair

Appendix 7 – List of Glasgow burgesses arrested by the Engager Regime, 1648

- James Stewart (provost) - released into house arrest
- John Graham (bailie)
- William Lightbodie (bailie)
- William Dunlop (dean of guild)
- Mr. John Spruele (clerk)
- Thomas Allan
- Niniane Anderson
- James Armour
- Walter Bryce
- Robert Finlay - released into house arrest
- John Fleming - released into house arrest
- James Hamilton
- Robert Hamilton
- Robert Hoggisyaird
- Peter Johnstone
- Robert Mack
- Robert Wilson

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