Relations of Mutual Recognition:
Transforming the Political Aspect of Autonomy

María Pía Méndez Mateluna

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities
College of Arts
University of Glasgow

September 2020

Abstract

Being autonomous depends on the kind of relations we enjoy in the different domains of our lives, but the impact of decision-making and the power exercise that takes place in the political sphere, makes political relations crucial to our development and enjoyment of autonomy. This dissertation develops a novel view of political participation by interrogating its connection to our personal autonomy. According to this view, our political relations are partially constitutive of our personal autonomy, which in other words means there is a political aspect of our autonomy. The kind of political relations we should hold to fully enjoy our autonomy is what I call Relations of Mutual Recognition. It is the mutual recognition of each agent's autonomous standing—translated into a proper distribution of political power—that will face dominating political relations. The basis for that domination comes from our democracies' power imbalances that condition influence over political decision-making to each individual's economic, social or cultural standing. Consequently, there are political conditions for our autonomy to thrive. Relations of Mutual Recognition require two main conditions: non-domination and control. I take these two neo-republican ideals and redefine them to shape what a proper distribution of political power amounts to.

Political participation comes in precisely to identify a way to challenge power imbalances. Therefore, my definition of political participation, which I call Collective Self-Government, requires a particular sort of implementation. Accordingly, I suggest a deliberative and inclusive arrangement that involves direct and innovative forms of decision-making, and more importantly, grants relevant shares of authority to all actors, i.e., common citizens, legislators, technocrats, etcetera.

This project could rightly belong to both a relational approach to autonomy and be labelled as a version of deliberative democracy. However, relational accounts focus on our *social* relations, whilst I claim that we cannot be "less" or non-autonomous in the political sphere and still enjoy an autonomous life. Likewise, the participatory focus—in the sense of inclusion of all actors—of this proposal more accurately turn it into either a participatory version of deliberative democracy or a deliberative version of participatory democracy.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

This project is inspired by the conviction that we are all relational beings, and as such, I am in debt to a big group of fantastic people. First, I would like to thank my supervisors, Ben Colburn and Mona Simion, for their constant support, always on point suggestions and comments, but most of all, for pushing me to do my best and trust my original contributions, especially through difficult times.

To my family, my most heartfelt thank you, for their unwavering love and confidence in my decisions. This research would not be the same if you had not been there for me like always, regardless of the (big) distance. I would also like to thank my friends, old and new, for staying with me through all the good and really bad moments, cheering me on and helping this proposal become better in the process. I owe a special debt to all the permanent and visiting denizens of our shared office (208) in the philosophy department of the University of Glasgow, who were always incredibly generous in sharing thoughts and support.

Finally, my most sincere thank you to my amazing husband, for inspiring me to work hard, motivating me to hold on to my ideas and passion for the project, but more importantly, for sharing the process with me.

Introduction: A diagnosis of problematic political relations and a proposal to transform them

I. Identifying the problem

Most democracies reduce the involvement of common citizens—generally labelled political participation—to an exercise through which citizens elect representatives every few years, or in rare occasions, vote about specific policies through referenda or plebiscites. Both forms of involvement do not tend to be accompanied by more regular, let alone legally binding, forms of involvement. Accordingly, political participation becomes a set of "one off" instances (they do have some regularity) because they are meant to provide legitimacy to the political activity and decision-making done by others, i.e., professional politicians or representatives, rather than to include the broader public in the process. Electing representatives, which is the most common form of participation, turns into transferring citizens' authority to make decisions to a specific group of people deemed better qualified and available for the job. Plebiscites and referenda, on the other hand, come so rarely that even though they do constitute a direct and sometimes legally binding form of participation, in many occasions lack campaigns that spread reliable information about the alternatives, as well as fail to provide instances of open discussions of issues to support the process of decision-making, which distorts their potential to represent a crucial and valid form of participation. This limited involvement of common citizens has led to a disconnection between them and their representatives, as well as with consulting experts and other institutions.

In 2003 the *yougov* online polling organisation with a representative sample of 2.273 UK citizens showed that 72% of the sample felt disconnected from Parliament, and almost half of them (46%) reported feeling *very* disconnected from Parliament (Coleman, 2005: 201). This lack of connection is, therefore, not new and becomes quite clear when we look at how much citizens trust their representatives.[1] The *Encuesta CEP* is a monthly opinion poll developed in Chile by a private and independent organisation called *Centro de Estudios Públicos*. In its December (2019) edition, from a representative sample of 1.496 Chilean citizens, the poll reported that when asked about how much trust citizens have on various

[1] See Norris, (1999), and Nye, Zelikow & King, (1997).

institutions, the two lowest scores correspond to political parties and congress, with 2% and 3% respectively—where the higher the percentage, the higher the trust.

In the last two years we have seen multiple examples of people's intention to make their voices heard through a series of protests and rallies all over the world. From people objecting to the austerity measures implemented by Jair Bolsonaro in Brasil, as well as in Ecuador, to those opposing violence against women in Turkey, Chile, and various other countries, and the most current demonstrations against racism and police brutality in the United States through the Black Lives Matter movement. Another demonstrative example is what people called the "estallido social" (social unrest) in Chile. In October 2019 people took to the streets in numbers never seen before all over Chile to ask for a complete reform of the social and political order in the country, which led to a historical plebiscite to decide whether to re-write the constitution (which will take place in October 2020). These examples of citizens' involvement show that what seems to be happening in our democracies is not a lack of interest and disaffection from common citizens regarding political issues, but dissatisfaction with the way that political officials conduct matters and set the agenda, and with how little impact is available to common citizens. Protesting becomes the best way to have an influence and to make common citizens' voices heard, because there is either a lack of formal channels of participation or the existent ones appear insufficient and inadequate.

The main problem with this limited formal involvement of common citizens is that it both restricts their capacity to be self-governing by exercising authority over relevant matters affecting their lives, and it promotes relations of domination. The basis for that domination comes from power imbalances that condition influence over political decision-making to each individual's economic, social or cultural standing, making them more or less capable of putting pressure over those in charge of making decisions in accordance with the standing they enjoy. Thus, power imbalances, lack of accountability and restricted communication between members of the political sphere—common citizens, representatives, experts, and institutions—are some of the expressions of these dominating relations.

The scene is clearly especially problematic for minorities—not in the trivial sense but in the sense of marginalised groups, i.e., racial, ethnical, sexual minorities—since their influence over decision-making processes is severely reduced compared to other more privileged groups. Minorities have little to no agenda setting capacities and usually end up depending

on the good will of their representatives to see their interests and concerns somehow reflected in policies. Restricting our self-government and experiencing domination in the political sphere in this way, greatly harms our personal autonomy.

Relational accounts of autonomy have argued that the relations we hold in the different domains of our lives shape our personal autonomy. In other words, that the capacity to direct our lives, and for them to reflect our values and commitments, relies on standing in social relations of a certain kind. In this research, I will argue that our relations in the political sphere also need to be of a particular sort if they are to enhance and not harm our personal autonomy.

Some accounts of autonomy, including relational accounts, agree that autonomy is a matter of degrees, i.e., enjoying little economic autonomy does not necessarily amount to a non-autonomous life if the person enjoys it in other domains. Nonetheless, my intention is to emphasise that the kind of standing and influence we experience in the political sphere has such a strong impact over our lives, that we cannot be "less" or non-autonomous in the political sphere and still enjoy a fully autonomous life. The latter should lead us to rethink the nature and character of our political relations in terms of the effect they have over the development and enjoyment of our personal autonomy. Redefining political participation is central to this goal because it dictates the role that each of us plays in the political sphere.

Accordingly, the thesis I want to advance is that autonomy has a political aspect. I will contend there are necessary political conditions for personal autonomy. I describe these conditions as non-domination and control, which enable autonomy enhancing political relations that I call Relations of Mutual Recognition. Both conditions, in turn, require political participation, so they do not become merely formal for citizens. My characterisation of political participation to enable Relations of Mutual Recognition is what I call Collective Self-government.

II. The diversity of available approaches

The problem I have just introduced connects two concerns, namely, a concern for our personal autonomy, and a concern for the kind of political interactions we experience. I will

briefly describe how these two concerns have usually been addressed and what my proposal intends to do to connect both concerns.

Although the diagnosis of the crisis of our democracies is transversally shared amongst theorists of democracy, searching for the roots of the crisis and the related best way to respond to it separates views into sometimes contrasting approaches, especially regarding political participation. We can divide accounts concerned with political participation into two broad groups.

The first group of views focuses on examining the electorate's capacities, which is where it locates the cause of the crisis and offers restricted forms of common citizens' involvement in response. These rich academic discussions analyse both the electorate's abilities and interest to be involved in political decision-making, and the experts' role in decision-making processes. Such debates, address ideas like technocracy, and epistocracy. [2] The former refers to being governed by experts (scientific and other specialist bureaucrats), and the latter, to form an electorate that is constituted by the most competent citizens—which in some versions means either granting them more power than the one given to those determined incompetent or simply restricting the incompetent citizens' vote completely.

Conversely, the second group is inspired by deliberative democracy and thus directs its attention towards improving deliberation. One of the main features of deliberative democracy is the intention to reach well-reasoned and well-informed decisions by involving the relevant actors that will be affected by them. In order to do so, deliberative democrats tend to consider new ways of conducting discussions for political decision-making. Some of these involve instances that use citizen sortition to select members for a deliberating group, from minipublics to citizen assemblies. Sortition refers to nothing other than selection via randomised methods of common citizens as deliberators, sometimes taking a sample that follows specific criteria to ensure representativeness, such as socioeconomic status or gender. Minipublics are instances of deliberation that can use sortition to select its members, but most importantly, they are supposed to showcase a microcosm of how society looks like

[2] Estlund (2008), Fuerstein (2008), Landmore (2013) and Viehoff (2016) address the electorate's capacities from different perspectives. The clearest focus on this topic, nonetheless, can be found in Brennan (2009, 2012, 2014). Regarding technocracy, Bickerton & Accetti (2017), and Dargent (2014) develop views that also consider populism as the opposed phenomenon. Finally, epistocracy has its strongest contemporary exponent in Brennan (2011, 2016, 2018). Gun (2019), examines the concept, Mulligan (2015) supports epistocracy, whilst Jeffrey (201) and Moraro (2018) respond by opposing to the notion.

in the context that they take place, so they are to include in discussions, as much as possible, all the relevant social groups. Citizen assemblies on the other hand, can also involve sortition or have open participation of all those citizens who want to join, but they tend to happen in order to make decisions about specific matters, which makes them not so regularly held (see a more detailed characterisation in Chapter 4).

Deliberative democrats vary in how they understand citizen involvement, and how central they take it to be. Joshua Cohen (1998) for example, understands deliberative democracy as a deliberation procedure through which members provide reasons that can be considered acceptable by other reasonable members (Cohen, 1998:193). In this case, the emphasis is placed on finding a proper way to justify the exercise of power in our democracies.

My proposal moves away from both the diagnosis and responses of the first group. I do not share the view that the crisis of our democracies can be explained by the lack of knowledge or appropriate deliberating capacities or four citizens, nor that the solution involves restricting political participation to those who have demonstrated some particular level of competence. Similarly, my project is not entirely part of the second group—amongst deliberative democrats. More accurately, I should say that my proposal can be labelled as a form of deliberative democracy with the crucial caveat that it is a *participatory* project. My view portrays improving deliberation—in terms of inclusion of *all* actors—as a means to secure the equal standing of citizens, whilst granting them more authority over their lives. The participatory emphasis plays a central role in my proposal and therefore turns it into either a participatory form of deliberative democracy, or a deliberative form of participatory democracy. I expand on my differences and connections to deliberative democracy in Chapter 5.

I now move on to discuss personal autonomy. This can be defined in a number of ways, such as, leading a life that is authentic to our values and commitments (Westlund, 2009), as an ideal of self-authorship over our lives (Raz, 1988), or as exercising self-government over our desires and goals (Dworkin, 2015). Nonetheless, these varied approaches to personal autonomy seem to share a tendency to separate their concerns about oppressive circumstances in the political sphere from the conditions required for personal autonomy. Most accounts consider the political aspect of autonomy as part of a separate concept, namely, political autonomy. Even though political conditions are relevant to most views, and

that political oppression is accordingly also defined as opposed to self-authorship, self-government and authenticity, those political conditions are not understood as part of the autonomous life itself, and their relevance is often contingent or indirect.

Relational accounts of autonomy have been able to establish the importance of our social relations for our autonomy, as well as the crucial role that oppressive political contexts play for our development of autonomy. I take these two considerations a step further to examine our political relations. In order to do so, I follow and adapt Catriona Mackenzie's relational account of autonomy.

Mackenzie is especially forceful regarding the centrality of enjoying structural conditions that recognise our equal standing as authoritative agents, because of their role in our development of autonomy. She holds that autonomy is both a *status* and a *capacity*, and that oppressive contexts thus affect both an agent's social status as an autonomous agent, and her development and exercise of the capacity for autonomy.[3] However, Mackenzie does not focus on the relations we want to promote in the political sphere. Therefore, even though she points out specific conditions to guarantee rights and liberties, her view seems unable to identify political conditions directed at improving the kind of *political relations* we experience. My proposal seeks to offer an alternative reading that defines our political interactions as relations and elucidates their necessary conditions to constitute autonomy enhancing relations.

To summarise, my proposal suggests connecting a relational approach to autonomy to a participatory arrangement by identifying the centrality of our political interactions to our enjoyment of autonomy. Including the political aspect to our understanding of the concept, offers a novel approach to autonomy that shows the potential of political relations to become autonomy enhancing. This could help us focus on identifying the problematic elements of our political relations and how to improve them. Likewise, having a clearer notion of the kind of political relations required for our autonomy can illuminate many of the issues regarding the justification of political authority, and the relevance of a democratic division of labour in the political sphere, which are part of my broader project.

[3] See Mackenzie (2018) "Feminist Innovation in Philosophy: Relational Autonomy and Social Justice. *Women's Studies International Forum.*

III. Assumptions and clarifications

The proposal that I develop here rests on some important assumptions that I would like to clarify before moving on to describe the general content and structure of the project.

The first assumption involves two key concepts for my view: autonomy and democracy. I do not devote time to motivate the value of autonomy, nor of democracy. Thus, my view will appeal to those readers with a previous interest in both notions. Relatedly, I take the importance of the relations we hold for our autonomy as granted in a broad sense. The reader does not have to be committed to a relational account in advance to be persuaded by my project, but she needs to place *some* value to our social relations for our autonomy. This assumption only restricts the reach of my view by excluding readers that understand autonomy as a purely individual enterprise. Likewise, although the view that I offer indeed states that political relations are partially *constitutive* of our autonomy, the reader need not be committed to this particular understanding either. The main idea that I want the reader to take home corresponds to a weaker claim: just like our social relations do, political relations *play a role* for our autonomy—this is what I will characterise as the political aspect of autonomy. The reader can interpret that role as either causal or constitutive and still be moved by the overall project.

In line with this broad approach, I follow a relational view that wants to move pass the distinction between procedural and substantive accounts. Thus, my project assumes that both procedural and substantive views—as well as not necessarily relational but relationally minded views—could endorse the idea of Relations of Mutual Recognition. My view does not aim at vindicating a constitutive view of autonomy over other versions—such as causal relational approaches—because I have a different aim. As explained above, my goal is to argue that there are political relations, and they form the political aspect of our autonomy. I hold that if we want those political relations to be autonomy-enhancing they need to be of a certain sort: Relations of Mutual Recognition. My claim that there is a political aspect of autonomy allows us to leave open the debate between specific relationally minded versions of autonomy that could be incorporated into the project.

Another key clarification concerns my understanding of autonomy with respect to recognition. It could seem that my project is asking for political relations that recognise our equal standing as autonomous agents, despite the fact that an aspect of the very autonomy we seek to recognise includes those political relations. So, how can we recognise something

that is not already there? And if it is already there, what is it that we want to recognise? I assume that autonomy is not an all or nothing affair but something we can enjoy in different degrees. Accordingly, I acknowledge a distinction between being *partially* and *fully* autonomous, which refers to degrees of enjoyment of autonomy. I will argue that standing in Relations of Mutual Recognition is what would make us *fully* autonomous. However, there is another partial/full distinction that I identify. This concerns how autonomy is constituted. Political relations are *partially* constitutive of autonomy because the political aspect does no exhaust what autonomy amounts to. Therefore, one can lead a partially autonomous life in the absence of Relations of Mutual Recognition, but I will argue that these are required for a *fully* autonomous life. Throughout this thesis, whenever I say that we cannot be less autonomous in the political sphere and still be autonomous, what I mean is that we cannot be *fully* autonomous.

Finally, the implementation of my version of political participation; Collective Self-Government, involves a particular design. However, two clarifications are important with respect to the flexibility of the design. First, Relations of Mutual Recognition require a particular kind of approach to political participation, which is expressed by a set of desiderata. But as I mention there, different contexts will need adjustments so that we select the best forms for each scenario—which does not mean disregarding the desiderata. Second, my proposal does not depend on the likely success of implementing Collective Self-government in the way that I present it. The main goal of this research is not to identify the ideal implementation of Collective Self-government, but to show that personal autonomy has a political aspect with its related political conditions; the conditions to establish Relations of Mutual Recognition. Hence, my proposal is open for more expert analysts to contribute with considerations that can improve my envisaged implementation of Collective Self-Government.

IV. An overview of the structure

The project is constituted by seven chapters. I will briefly describe the central ideas presented in each of the chapters.

Chapter 1: The Political Aspect of a Relational Approach to Autonomy

This chapter advances the view that personal autonomy has a political aspect. To support this claim, it investigates the value we grant to our social relations. I argue that if we acknowledge the impact of our social relations over our autonomy, our political interactions should be no different. I explore relational accounts, Catriona Mackenzie's in particular, to show that this perspective can make the connection between our political standing and our social relations for the enjoyment of our autonomy. Their analysis proves that we should indeed pay more attention to the importance of our political interactions for our autonomy. However, I suggest taking things a step further and defining our political interactions as relations, so that we can grant them the role they indeed play as the political aspect of autonomy.

The chapter also includes a methodological suggestion to move towards a network analysis when considering autonomy (beyond identifying necessary and sufficient conditions). This chapter shows that such a shift would help our approaches, especially Mackenzie's, to better include political conditions for autonomy.

Chapter 2: Non-domination and Control as Political Conditions for Autonomy

Having identified our political interactions as relations, Chapter 2 focuses on discussing the political conditions required to establish autonomy enhancing political relations, which I call Relations of Mutual Recognition. The political conditions to establish these relations are the political conditions for autonomy, and I identify them as non-domination and control. Analysing non-domination and control serves to introduce the main features of what Relations of Mutual Recognition amount to.

Chapter 3: Relations of Mutual Recognition

Chapter 3 discusses in further detail the political aspect of autonomy by examining and redefining a group of concepts: political power, recognition and political participation. The aim of the chapter is twofold; first, to complete the characterisation of what I call Relations of Mutual Recognition and second, to develop the theoretical background of the version of political participation that will enable them.

Chapter 4: Collective Self-government

Collective Self-government is the definition of political participation that the previous chapter introduced. Here I focus on thinking of the implementation of the idea. The analysis

begins by presenting the desiderata that should guide such implementation, according to the discussion developed in Chapter 3, namely, inclusion, equality, deliberation and accountability. Then, the chapter examines three alternatives of political participation regarding their capacity to fulfil the desiderata. In light of the analysis of the alternatives, I conclude with my proposed implementation.

Chapter 5: Locating my proposal: participatory and deliberative

The participatory and deliberative character of my view situates it between participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. In this chapter I explain in more detail how both labels apply. I stress the relevance that inclusion has for my project in the form of 'giving voice' to citizens, and my differences and similarities with some versions of deliberative democracy. Iris Marion Young's (2010) inclusive deliberative proposal and Carole Pateman's (2012) participatory project are the inspiration of my view, which wants to promote more just outcomes in our democracies via open and deliberative participation of all actors involved in the political sphere—especially those usually marginalised from decision-making processes.

Chapter 6: Democratic Autonomy

Henry Richardson (2002) developed a very interesting account that connects two of the key elements of my proposal, namely, non-domination and autonomy. In this chapter I analyse Richardson's proposal not only to discuss its similarities and differences with my own but to show that thinking of political processes as part of the political aspect of autonomy, as well as from a relational perspective, has important consequences for my overall proposal and for any project interested in securing our autonomy. I conclude that without a relational approach that allows us to re-think our political relations, the defence of our autonomy in the political that motivates views like Richardson's, fails to properly challenge the status quo, and thus ultimately also fails at defending our autonomy.

Chapter 7: Epistocracy: A Different View of Participation

This final chapter discusses a prominent and contrasting approach to political participation. Epistocracy belongs to a group of views that make their contribution to improve our democracies from a completely different diagnosis than the one supporting this research. Accordingly, exploring their approach will show that even if the root of the problems of our democracies lies—as epistocrats argue—within the electorate, a participatory approach like mine is more appropriate as a response.

I analyse epistocracy's understanding of competence and hold that although it seems to focus on information, it fails to include an important kind of information: common citizen's preferences. I show how this shortcoming ultimately questions the project's capacity to improve democracies' outcomes.

Chapter 1: The political aspect of a relational approach to autonomy

I. Political relations

Researchers interested in the value of personal autonomy have usually explored the effect of oppressive political contexts and our enjoyment of autonomy as separate issues.
This lack of attention to the connection between personal autonomy and the relations we hold in the political sphere has two problematic consequences. First, it obscures the effect over our lives of the limited involvement we experience in current democracies, especially for minorities. Second, it reduces the political sphere's capacity to foster our personal autonomy—the space where some of the most important collective decisions are made. Hence, I suggest we shift the focus of our debates to analyse the value and impact of the relations we hold in the political sphere over our personal autonomy.

The thesis I want to put forward in this chapter is that personal autonomy has a political aspect. I will argue that the relations we hold in the political sphere are partially constitutive of our personal autonomy. Furthermore, even if we identify them as causal instead of constitutive, we should still conclude that the political sphere is a domain in which we should enjoy autonomy-enhancing relations which I call *Relations of Mutual Recognition*. In order to support this claim, I will show that if we acknowledge that social relations are important to our autonomy; our interactions within the political sphere can be no exception.

Relational theories of autonomy have been able to justify the idea that our personal autonomy cannot be conceived as an individual matter. Since we are shaped by the relations we hold, our personal autonomy is also necessarily connected to the kind of relations we engage in. This consideration has also permeated accounts of autonomy that are not labelled as relational. By looking into relational views, especially Catriona Mackenzie's (2008; 2014), I will argue that relational accounts of autonomy—inspired by feminist critiques—allow us to identify the political aspect of personal autonomy precisely due to their capacity to make the connection between the importance of our political standing, and our social relations. My goal will be to stress the point that we should move even further so that we can conceive the political as an area where we actually hold *relations*.

Mackenzie argues that enjoying structural conditions that recognise our equal standing as authoritative agents is central to our development of autonomy. This key notion explains why I identify her view as ideally suited to explore the political aspect of autonomy. She

points out specific conditions to guarantee political rights and liberties, but her view seems unable to identify political conditions directed at improving the kind of *political relations* we experience. My proposal seeks to address this shortcoming.

Additionally, this chapter will include a methodological suggestion to approach the concept of autonomy. Most accounts of autonomy share a methodological approach, which identifies necessary and sufficient conditions that vary in accordance with each view's particularities. I hold that this traditional analysis is ill-suited to identify political conditions for autonomy. Therefore, I propose we follow a network analysis instead.

I rely on Catriona Mackenzie's relational account of autonomy, among other reasons, because of its unique capacity to explicitly identify political conditions for autonomy (see chapter 1). The resistance of autonomy to traditional analysis is not missed by Mackenzie. She claims that autonomy should not be treated as a unitary concept for which there is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but as a multidimensional concept. However, her multidimensional account does not seem to offer an alternative methodological approach. Even though she does intend to highlight that autonomy is constituted by interconnected elements, her view appears to require a different methodology. I will argue that we should push further and understand her dimensions as pieces of a network of mutually dependant elements. If we do not think of autonomy's dimensions in this way, central elements get neglected. This is the case of the political aspect, that under a traditional analysis, becomes a separate concern rather than a definitional component. Hence, in this chapter I will argue for the political aspect of autonomy by looking into Mackenzie's account in particular, as well as, offer a different methodological analysis for personal autonomy.

The chapter structure is as follows: Part II introduces some of the most relevant accounts of autonomy. Part III explores feminist critiques to those versions, which motivate adopting a relational account of autonomy (Part IV). Part V then presents Mackenzie's relational view and analyses its strengths and shortcomings to address our political relations. Part VI discusses my methodological worry regarding Mackenzie's view and my suggested approach to overcome it.

II. The autonomous agent

In this chapter, I want to show that the relational approach to autonomy[4] allows me to argue for the political aspect of personal autonomy. Hence, I need to introduce the relational perspective, but the analysis would be incomplete if I do not offer a general description of the main accounts of autonomy first. Although I do not intend to contrast their merits, an overview provides the background notions to which relational theories of autonomy want to respond. This part describes three conceptions of autonomy.

1. Three conceptions of autonomy

Ben Colburn (2010) identifies three general conceptions of autonomy: rational self-legislation, hierarchy of motivations, and individuality. I will briefly present each of these conceptions following Colburn's characterisation, since it provides a clear overview of the diverse approaches to the notion.

Autonomy understood as rational self-legislation corresponds to views that define it as exercising self-control and acting according to reason at specific times. Thus, these views characterise it as a property of a person's will. Colburn (2010) divides this kind of approach into two categories: Kantian and non-Kantian rationalism. Kantian rationalism relies on an autonomous will, which only follows its own laws and no alien causes. By alien causes, it refers not only to those coming from other agents, but also to a person's own desires and impulses. It tracks morality's demanded behaviour: The Categorical Imperative (Kant, 2002:30-38). Therefore, the less strict versions that, for example, allow some desires to not be considered alien, would fall into the category of non-Kantian rationalism (Colburn, 2010: 5-6).

Harry Frankfurt (1971) and Gerald Dworkin (1988) inspire a focus on the hierarchy of motivations. Their central argument is that there are different types of attitudes and desires, which should be ordered in a hierarchical manner for the realisation of self-governance. First-order attitudes are those concerning particular actions, and higher-order attitudes define which first-order attitudes we want to follow. Some higher-order attitudes can give rise to first-order attitudes, but also, first-order attitudes need not derive from any higher-order

[4] From here onwards I will refer to autonomy and personal autonomy interchangeably, but every mention always points at personal autonomy rather than moral or what some authors call political autonomy.

attitude and can even conflict with them. Thus, attitudes are arranged in a hierarchy of motivations with first-order and higher-order motivations, where they can be in tension with each other, or higher-order motivations generate first-order motivations (Colburn, 2010:9).

Dworkin defines autonomy as a second-order capacity to exercise critical reflection over our first-order attitudes. For Dworkin, the autonomous agent should also have her attitudes so aligned. This means that, although our motivations do not have to be rational in order to add to our autonomy—like Kantians hold—to be considered autonomous persons, there needs to be identified with our first-order attitudes, which we critically revise in light of our higher-order motivations (Colburn, 2010:10).

The last group defines autonomy as self-authorship or individuality. Joseph Raz (1988) describes the autonomous person as being in part author of her own life. It is an ideal of self-creation that involves a number of decisions to shape and exercise some control over our lives. Colburn (2010) claims it is different from the other two conceptions because it does not involve constraint; the person herself defines the conditions to determine whether she is being autonomous or not. Instead, the mentioned hierarchical and rational versions of autonomy include a sense of constraint, either by a specific maxim one must follow for the latter or the hierarchy in which motivations have to be ordered for the former (Colburn, 2010:13).

Setting aside the important differences between each, all three conceptions of autonomy seem to share a similar characterisation of the ideal autonomous agent of which feminists are sceptical. The latter involves notions such as self-transparency, self-sufficiency, individuality, and self-control. In what follows, I take Mackenzie and Stoljar's (2000) sketch of some of the main objections from feminist approaches to these and other features of the most common conceptions of autonomy.

III. Feminist critiques of autonomy

Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (2000) describe five feminist critiques of autonomy to argue that none of them should lead feminists to abandon autonomy as a relevant concept for their views. Mackenzie and Stoljar's overview of these critiques will introduce us to the main issues that the relational perspective seeks to respond to, in order to keep using

autonomy as an important concept for a feminist approach. Mackenzie and Stoljar call these critiques 'symbolic critiques', 'metaphysical critiques', 'care critiques', 'postmodernist critiques', and 'diversity critiques'. I will broadly present each of them. These feminist critiques express concerns, particularly about the characterization of the autonomous agent present in many theories of autonomy, which has problematic political consequences. Hence, although I will not analyze the merit of each group of critiques, if moved by them we should acknowledge how they render 'classic'—that is belonging to the three groups mentioned above—theories of autonomy unsuitable to think of the political conditions for autonomy.

1. Symbolic critiques

Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) hold that symbolic critiques are those against the idea of the 'autonomous man' and that this view was most clearly developed by Lorraine Code (1991). Code claims the ideal of the autonomous man informs mainstream epistemology and moral theory, and leads to an 'autonomy obsession' in contemporary Western cultures. Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) add that:

> The descriptive premise on which the character ideal is based is the notion that human beings are capable of leading self-sufficient, isolated, independent lives. From this premise is drawn the prescriptive conclusion that the goal of human life is the realization of self-sufficiency and individuality (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:6).

According to Mackenzie and Stoljar, although it is acknowledged by theorists that the character ideal is an abstraction that is unlikely to be attained, it leads to various problems. Some of the problems include valuing substantive independence over other values, especially over ones connected to relations of interdependence, such as trust and caring. Relatedly, it suggests that the relations of interdependence actually compromise autonomy, since they are based on cooperation. Thus, the most problematic consequence is the resulting conception of atomistic subjectivity that conceives agents as mere bearers of rights (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:6). This last critique about understanding the autonomous agent as a mere bearer of rights represents an important problematic political consequence. Code

does not talk of political relations, but this character ideal promotes a sort of interactions that are deeply problematic in the political sphere. By focusing on defending rights and escaping or denying interdependence, our political relations get reduced to the necessary exchange that can secure those rights, which affects the capacity of autonomy to connect with our experiences of interdependence and relations of trust also in the political sphere.

2. Metaphysical critiques

Metaphysical critiques (Baier, 1985; Jaggar, 1983; Antony, 1995) claim that attributing autonomy to agents actually presupposes individualism, which goes against the idea that individuals are, at least partially, constituted by the social relations they enjoy. However, Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) state that there are four different ways of understanding individualism in these critiques, namely, as causally isolated agents, as agents that are independent of the family and community relations they experience, as agents comprised of essential properties that are only intrinsic, or as metaphysically separate individuals (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:7). For example, Annette Baier (1985) argues against the first kind of individualism by proposing that agents are 'second-persons', which means that there is a causal relation between the development of persons and their relations with others who cared for them and formed them. Mackenzie and Stoljar do not agree with every type of individualism critique but conclude that what they are right to warn about, is the distinction between individual autonomy and individualistic conceptions of personal autonomy (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:8).

3. Care critiques

The third kind of critiques focus on the masculinist character of the different conceptions of autonomy, which they justify in the primacy that is given to independence and self-sufficiency. However, they are different from symbolic critiques because they do not hold that the concept of autonomy is tainted by the masculinist conceptions of autonomy. Instead, they point out the manner in which those views are normatively flawed. Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) argue that from these critiques perspective "traditional conceptions of autonomy not only devalue women's experiences and those values arising from it, such as love, loyalty, friendship, and care but also are defined in opposition to femininity" (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:9). The latter, since relations of care, have historically been

central to women and associated with femininity. Therefore, their emphasis is on the value of relations of dependency for agents (Held, 1993).

The political importance of devaluing women's experience has been historically argued by feminists. When values connected to women's experiences are absent from political discussions but also from what is considered suitable for our political interactions, the political sphere becomes an area where neither the issues nor the agents get recognised as relevant and equally valuable. Care critiques raise this issue in connection to autonomy and thus press on an issue that again directly pertains to our standing in the political sphere.

4. Postmodernist critiques

Postmodernist critiques (Butler, 1990; Flax, 1987; Benhabib, 1992) come from different theoretical perspectives, namely, Foucauldian theories of agency and power, psychoanalytic theory, and feminist views on otherness and sexual difference. Their shared view about common definitions of autonomy, according to Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000), is that the ideal wrongly assumes self-transparency, psychical unity and the capacity to exercise self-mastery from agents. Drawing from psychoanalysis, critics claim that it has been shown by this tradition that the psyche of agents instead shows them as "conflict-ridden, often self-deluded, fundamentally opaque to themselves, and driven by archaic drives and desires of which they may not even be aware" (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:10).

From the Foucauldian perspective, on the other hand, the critiques are directed at the assumption of a pure Kantian free will, or true self, because it "ignores the fact that subjects are constituted within and by regimes, discourses, and micropractices of power" (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:10). Lastly, feminist theories of difference focus on the idea that autonomy seems to imply a sort of universality that suppresses the internal differentiation of agents and, in so doing, coercively suppresses different others (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:11).

5. Diversity critiques

Finally, in agreement with postmodernist critiques, Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) hold that diversity critiques (Lugones, 1987) also point at the alleged unified and cohesive agent portrayed by common conceptions of autonomy. These critiques argue that individuals have multiple identities and that this reflects in the multiple groups to which they belong. Therefore, they advance the view that, for example, individual women's identities are intersectional because they combine group affiliations that are unique to that woman (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:11). They add,

> The idea of intersectionality may seem incompatible with the presuppositions of theories of autonomy. It implies that because different and sometimes conflicting group identities intersect in the formation of individual identity, many individuals do not have a unified or integrated sense of self (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:12).

The characterisation of the major feminist critiques elaborated by Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) is helpful to motivate the following overview of relational accounts of autonomy that I will introduce. It will become clear that the relational perspective intends to address most of the concerns raised by these diverse origins. Furthermore, the main reason why it is important to begin by looking at these critiques is that most of the issues they raise are especially relevant for the political aspect of autonomy. I did not discuss how decisive these critiques of the classic theories of autonomy are, precisely because I am more interested in discovering these issues and their consequences. Nonetheless, if one is moved by the problematics they identify, one should also find the shift towards a relational approach persuasive. The following part of the chapter will discuss the relational approach in more detail with the aim not of persuading such shift, but to analyse the merits of this perspective to identify the political conditions for autonomy.

IV. A relational approach

Having introduced the main conceptions of autonomy and feminist critiques to some of their features, I will move on to describe the relational theories of autonomy that have been developed to include the feminist concerns in accounts of personal autonomy. As with the overview of broad conceptions of autonomy, I will not compare the virtues of each account. Instead, I want to show that relational approaches, Mackenzie's in particular, is capable of addressing the importance of relations in the political sphere for our autonomy. Their understanding of autonomy's connection to the relations we hold makes them able of unravelling the problems associated with oppressive political structures, even if they do not describe agents as engaging in political relations. Describing their central features will also allow me to situate Mackenzie's account in the broader group, which is the relational definition of personal autonomy I rely on. I will present and analyse Mackenzie's account in more detail in Part V.

1. Features, distinctions, and feminist concerns

As expressed by Natalie Stoljar (2018) "Feminist or 'relational' theories of autonomy attempt to answer the question of how internalized oppression and oppressive social conditions undermine or erode agents' autonomy" (Stoljar, 2018: n.p). Nonetheless, Mackenzie & Stoljar (2000) rightly clarify that relational autonomy does not refer to a unified view or definition of autonomy, but to shared perspectives. These perspectives are connected by a shared central view that characterises agents as socially embedded, and whose identities are shaped by the intersection of diverse and complex social determinants like gender, class, and race. Therefore, the diversity of accounts of relational autonomy focus on the implications that the social dimension of our identity has for our autonomy and our political and moral agency (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:4).

Although joined by these shared convictions, relational accounts diverge about the connection they grant between our social relations and our autonomy, and the characteristics of the content of autonomy. The former consideration separates accounts between causal and constitutive.[5] Causal conceptions believe that appropriate social relationships and historical contexts cause autonomy. Thus, oppressive conditions can impede the

[5] Marilyn Friedman (2003) develops an account that includes both causal and constitute conditions for autonomy. She acknowledges that there are causal conditions that must obtain for "choices and actions to manifest the constitutive conditions in virtue of which they are autonomous" (Friedman, 2003: 4).

development of autonomy. Contrastingly, constitutive versions hold that social and interpersonal relations are conditions that define autonomy. External oppressive conditions, in this case, are incompatible with autonomy because, they do away with the *de facto* power necessary to exercise the authority over significant actions an autonomous person must have (Stoljar, 2018).

> Those approaches focusing on the social constitution of the agent or the social nature of the capacity of autonomy itself, are constitutive conceptions, whereas those focusing on the ways in which socialization and social relationships impede or enhance autonomy are causal conceptions (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:22).

Another relevant distinction amongst accounts is whether they consider autonomy as a local or global property. Marilyn Friedman (2003), for example, develops a local account. She defines autonomy as self-determination regarding decisions and actions. She wants to consider what makes them autonomous. Therefore, it is firstly concerned with the autonomous person and her local decisions. Accounts that understand autonomy as a global property, on the other hand, focus on what makes a person's life, autonomous.

Regarding content, accounts either agree or disagree with content-neutrality; that is, with the idea that autonomy should not be defined in terms of pre-determined values or specific preferences but corresponds to an ideal that remains neutral for each agent to determine their own. Procedural theories claim that autonomy requires a content-neutral process where the person reflects on her motivations, values, and beliefs to revise her preferences guided by such reflection. Substantive theories, instead, believe autonomy is a value-laden notion and thus set normative constraints to the agent's preferences.

> Autonomy, for the substantivist, is not a matter of being free to act as one pleases, but a matter of living in a particular way. Autonomy is a notion primarily driven by a conception of the good, by some traits of character rather than others, and by the nondiscretionary presence of substantively specified relations, social roles, and natural circumstances (Oshana, 2006:73)

Consequently, a strong substantive account like Marina Oshana's (1998), would consider subservient or enslaving preferences incompatible with autonomy, merely in virtue of the content of those preferences. According to her, we might mistakenly want to call a subservient person autonomous because "(…) we think of autonomy as a condition relativized to the satisfaction of a person's desires or decided entirely by the stance a person adopts toward her affective states" (Oshana, 2006: 61). She holds that our mistake is that we confuse autonomy's potential advantages, such as self-contentment, with actually enjoying autonomy.

Conversely, weak substantive approaches would avoid placing direct normative constraints on the content of the person's preferences (Stoljar, 2018: n.p). Catriona Mackenzie initially described her view as a "weak substantive, relational approach to autonomy that grounds an agent's normative authority over decisions of import to her life in her practical identity and in relations of intersubjective recognition" (Mackenzie, 2008: 512). On a similar note, Andrea Westlund (2009) wants to develop an account that is constitutively relational, but content-neutral, because she argues that only considering a particular set of idealised relations as autonomous can lead to perfectionism and a patronising view of certain choices. She claims, "We should not assume individuals who willingly embrace subordinate roles will be psychologically similar to one another" (Westlund, 2009: 29). Diane Meyers (2000) points out that both overly restrictive substantive accounts and value-neutral accounts, risk oversimplifying self-alienation and what individualised autonomous living entails (Meyers, 2000: 480).

Finally, if we consider the feminist critiques I presented in the previous section, regardless of the differences between the kinds of approaches, the relational perspective seems to address them. If we remember all five critiques, we can see that they focused on the characterisation of the autonomous agent developed by most common conceptions of personal autonomy. Symbolic critiques argue against the character ideal portrayed as self-sufficient agents living isolated lives. Similarly, care critiques raise the issue of the masculinist character most salient views develop, which devaluates women's experience and the values traditionally associated to them (like loyalty, love, and care). Postmodernist critiques challenge the notion that autonomy involves self-transparency and a capacity for

self-mastery, because it neglects micro practices of power and the conflict-ridden character of most agents. Diversity critiques question defining autonomous agents as unified and cohesive, as it obscures people's multiple identities and sense of belonging to diverse groups. Lastly, metaphysical critiques generally opposed defining autonomy as attributable to agents in the first place, since it denies how they are socially constituted.

What Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) identify as the shared conviction of relational accounts, emphasises precisely how they defy the characterisation of the autonomous agent as separate, self-sufficient, and cohesive. Understanding agents as socially embedded amounts to acknowledging that they rely on others because their identities are formed in the context of those social relations. The complexity and social character of our identities and the formation of our sense of self is presented by relational accounts as central to our autonomy. Instead of requiring self-mastery and self-transparency, relational views understand the impact of oppression and, in so doing, they develop a characterisation of the autonomous agent that challenges masculinist views and re-signifies social connections, dependency and values like care and loyalty. All the above, allows for accounts of autonomy that are responsive to the feminist critiques and can, therefore, inform feminist arguments.

2. Relational accounts and the political

Relational approaches to autonomy highlight the importance of our social standing and the kind of social relations we engage in for our autonomy. The latter provides strong foundations to justify the relevance of our political relations. I will continue by outlining some of the elements that these perspectives put forward in their connection to the political aspect of our personal autonomy.

First, it is important to begin by pointing out that, although there are relevant differences between a causal and a constitutive approach to autonomy, both situate our social relations at the centre of our enjoyment and development of autonomy. This centrality provides sufficient grounds to argue that other kind of oppressive relations are also harmful for our autonomy. Accordingly, the political oppression that we experience is incompatible with our personal autonomy, regardless of whether we consider our political relations as constitutive of our personal identities, and hence of autonomy, or if we identify their instrumental role for our development of autonomy.

Likewise, it is clear that gender oppression, when supported by public policies, has a special kind of impact over our lives. Political decisions enforce restrictions and benefits that can perpetuate harmful stereotypes about expected behaviour and identity traits assigned to each gender, or even worse, persecute those who do not adjust to them. A common example of the former are maternity leaves that do not allow men taking the role of carers, and a grave expression of the latter are laws that target LGBTI. The same concern applies to equally oppressive policies directed at ethnical and other minorities. Hence, the standing that policies reflect for diverse members of the political sphere instantiate a particular kind of relation between them and acknowledging the centrality of our social relations for developing autonomy seems an appropriate way of facing this challenge. If we grant our social relations the capacity to shape our identities, the way in which we relate to the exercise of political power surely has the capacity to, at the very least, affirm or oppose part of our identities. Thus, relational views provide the ideal conceptual elements to consider this kind of political relations' impact on our personal autonomy, in a similar way than when we evaluate our socialisation and interpersonal relations' impact. As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, one can have either a constitutive or causal characterisation of our political relations, but both approaches should acknowledge their importance for our autonomy as well as lead us to want to foster autonomy-enhancing political relations.

On the other hand, debates between substantive and content-neutral relational accounts of autonomy indeed tend to lead to considerations about the kind of political structures we should uphold to secure our personal autonomy. Just like the liberal debate regarding the legitimacy of promoting value-laden policies, relational accounts disagree, and tackle worries about paternalism and perfectionism in different ways. John Christman (2004) raises these worries about substantive accounts of autonomy. According to him, claiming that being autonomous amounts to standing in appropriate social relations that include particular institutions and practices "turns the concept of autonomy into an unacceptably perfectionist idea that carries with it the danger of exclusion and overarching paternalism that attention to autonomy should well protect against" (Christman, 2004:158). Westlund (2009) agrees with Christman's critique and as mentioned, supports the need for content-neutrality in relational approaches. On a difference with Westlund, Mackenzie (2008) answers Christman's critique by pointing out that what appears as problematic to him, is actually a strength that these accounts have, because of their capacity to explain unjust political contexts:

> (…) Although Christman is right to alert us to the danger that the more robust, stringent conditions necessary for personal autonomy could be used to undermine citizens' *de jure* rights to political autonomy and to justify unwarranted paternalism, I think such conditions can also play the reverse political role. For they can be used to explain how abusive or oppressive interpersonal relationships and exclusionary social and political institutions are unjust; namely, because they impair and restrict agents' capacities to develop and exercise *de facto* personal autonomy, even if they possess *de jure* rights to political autonomy (Mackenzie, 2008: 524).

Mackenzie's view on this concern helps show how relational accounts are particularly capable of contributing to identifying the oppressive circumstances we experience in the political sphere. It is precisely their focus on the impact that oppressive circumstances, relations, and contexts have over our development of autonomy that makes relational accounts especially suited to explore the nature of our political relations, and related political conditions. Nevertheless, even strong substantive accounts like Oshana's do not usually characterize institutional decisions and our diverse standing as members of the political sphere as *political relations*. Instead, they signal "external circumstances" (Oshana, 1998: 82) that would foster, or at least make possible, our development of autonomy. Oshana refers to a broad range of choices and non-manipulative or coercive environment (Oshana, 1998: 93-94). Mackenzie's account is unique in straightforwardly including political conditions when addressing the characteristics of an autonomy-enhancing context. The next part of the chapter will present her view in further detail and, in the following part: I specifically discuss the political component of her view.

V. Explicit political concerns: Mackenzie's account of autonomy

Mackenzie's definition of autonomy includes explicit characteristics to signal the kind of political structures necessary to safeguard our autonomy. Furthermore, she acknowledges the centrality of exercising *de facto* power, which I connect to the political attributes that we should be able to exercise to enjoy our autonomy. However, she does not establish the connection between structural political conditions and people's exercise of political power.

My aim here is to argue that ultimately it is insufficient to think of oppressive contexts as a structure that requires readjustment. I suggest instead to re-think the kind of relations we want the political structure to enable. Hence, the following sections will examine Mackenzie's strengths and shortcomings to elaborate a clear set of political conditions for personal autonomy, capable of ruling our political relations.

1. Mackenzie's multidimensional analysis

Catriona Mackenzie initially described her account as global and weak substantive (Mackenzie, 2008: 512). However, in a later version of her view, she does not label it in this way. Mackenzie (2019) states that her proposal seeks to move beyond what she calls the 'current impasse' in the literature between procedural and substantive versions. According to her, procedural and substantive views have engaged on an exchange of examples and counterexamples that has led to an impasse "since different examples pull our philosophical intuitions in different directions" (Mackenzie, 2019:523). In order to overcome this impasse[6], she suggests identifying different dimensions or axes of autonomy that can explain how oppression can "impair an agent's autonomy in one domain but not in others" (Mackenzie, 2019:523).

Mackenzie (2014) holds it is inadequate to treat autonomy as a unitary concept, i.e. "for which there is a single set of necessary and sufficient conditions" (Mackenzie, 2014: 16) because it does not capture its multidimensional nature. Therefore, her definition involves three causally interdependent dimensions: self-determination, self-governance, and self-authorization.

Self-determination amounts to having the freedom and opportunities to make and enact relevant choices to one's life (what to do, what to value). Thus, this dimension refers to structural conditions for autonomy, which she calls freedom conditions and opportunity conditions. Mackenzie describes freedom according to the ideal of non-domination developed by Philip Pettit (2010). I will later address Pettit's idea of non-domination in more detail, but roughly, this approach to freedom states that we should not be subject to arbitrary

[6] I shall remain neutral as to whether or not she is capable of moving on beyond the procedural/substantive discussion since it does not affect the interesting features and capacity of her view to emphasise the political aspect of personal autonomy.

forms of interference or power, where the arbitrariness is granted by the lack of control of the interfered person, and the interferer's capacity to uphold his will.

Hence, to prevent domination, Mackenzie's proposal holds we should enjoy "substantive socio-relational equality of status" (Mackenzie, 2018:5). In order to enjoy this status, freedom conditions are composed of basic political and personal liberties that have to be equally accessible and legally secured. Some of these liberties are freedom of association and thought, freedom of expression and religious exercise, freedom to engage in political participation, and personal liberties like freedom of sexual expression, and from all forms of violence and manipulation (Mackenzie, 2014: 25-26). Additionally, for these liberties to be not merely formal, they require opportunity conditions in the shape of actual goods and choices.

> (…) adequate nutrition, sanitation, and personal safety; social goods such as quality education, affordable health care, decent housing, social support, and opportunities for cultural engagement; genuine opportunities for political participation and paid or unpaid employment; and some degree of mobility (Mackenzie, 2018:5).

Mackenzie (2018) argues that lacking these options impairs our capacity to make autonomous choices, and therefore, to lead self-determining lives. She provides the example of a lack of healthy food choices in poor communities, where factors like sugary foods being cheaper and more readily available, added to insufficient education about nutrition, shape their food choices and can lead to significant health issues (Mackenzie, 2018: 5). Thus, the political and personal liberties she identifies, intend to signal what interferes with and what enables our exercise of self-determination. The opportunity conditions, in turn, specify the variety of opportunities that should be available for agents to choose what to value, what to do, who to be (Mackenzie, 2014:17).

The self-government dimension alludes to the idea of authenticity. A self-governing life consists of enacting choices that are in line with our identities and values. Therefore, it demands a set of complex skills since it requires having the necessary capacities that will allow us to make and enact those choices. As this dimension refers to internal conditions for

autonomy, she identifies them as competence and authenticity conditions. Nonetheless, Mackenzie states that, since self-governance is a socially constituted capacity, it does not refer to an exercise of control over our psychology, which is how it is usually described in the literature. Instead, from a relational perspective, the wide range of capacities involved in self-government, like imagination to consider alternative ways of acting and challenging social norms, "can only be developed and exercised with extensive interpersonal, social and institutional scaffolding" (Mackenzie, 2018:6).

Authenticity, according to Mackenzie (2014) should be understood as reflective self-acceptance. She favours Christman's view[7], which defines authenticity as non-alienation upon self-reflection of our practical identities and position in the world. Regarding her definition of practical identity, Mackenzie states: "I understand practical identity as a normative self-conception, which embodies a person's sense of self-identity and her commitments, values, and beliefs" (Mackenzie, 2014:18). She argues that we need not reject the authenticity condition but consider this not as a competing condition of self-governance over others like normative competence conditions. She believes other relational authors have been right to criticise conditions like endorsement for self-governance, because they do not account for ambivalence and internalised oppression. However, as her view does not think of sufficient and necessary conditions, she claims her multidimensional approach is able to avoid such problems. Moreover, she believes that understanding self-government in this way makes relational theories able to distinguish the conditions in the social environment that enable or constrain the development of our capacity for self-government. The latter is very important because it allows them to address psychological mechanisms of oppression like implicit bias and adaptive preference formation. Nonetheless, she adds that acknowledging psychological oppression cannot amount to characterising women as "dupes of the patriarchy", because psychological oppression does not constitute global oppression (Mackenzie, 2014:18).

> Rather, its effects are typically partial, resulting in degrees of internal conflict, struggle and resistance, and fractured self-concepts. For example, as the empirical literature on implicit bias shows, one can reject sexist or racist

[7] For more details of his view see Christman; J (2009) "The Politics of Persons: individual Autonomy and Socio-historical Selves". Cambridge University Press.

> stereotypes about oneself or others, but still find oneself reacting or behaving in ways that reinforce these stereotypes (Mackenzie, 2018:6).

Finally, by self-authorization Mackenzie (2014) means to recognise ourselves as holding normative authority over our lives. She defines normative authority as regarding oneself as authorised to exercise control over one's life and to determine what will constitute reasons for acting. The conditions involved in this dimension are accountability, self-evaluative attitudes, and social recognition.

The accountability condition means to regard oneself as responsible for the values, beliefs, and commitments we hold, which makes us answerable to others for them. We should be willing to provide reasons to others and to revise our beliefs when questioned, just as we should consider ourselves able to request the same accountability from others. Self-evaluative attitudes, on the other hand, include self-esteem, self-respect, and self-trust. Self-esteem refers to evaluating one's attitudes and commitments as worthwhile, whereas self-respect relates to our position with respect to others. Having self-respect is to recognise oneself as the moral equal of others. Self-trust amounts to having the capacity to trust our judgements, which leads to being able to involve ourselves in a self-interpretative exercise, where we can deliberate between our desires, commitments and emotional responses to determine which we should attend to (Mackenzie, 2014: 36-37).

Mackenzie argues that self-evaluative notions depend on intersubjective social relations that recognise others as autonomous agents. Thus, the condition of social recognition identifies this need to be regarded as a person worthy of respect, regardless of the possible resilient people who are capable of holding appropriate self-evaluating attitudes even under humiliating circumstances. The idea is that even if there are cases of resilience, self-evaluative attitudes are "constituted within normative structures and practices of *social recognition*" (Mackenzie, 2014:37).

2. Characterising the dimensions further

It is important to conclude this overview of Mackenzie's account by noting some key characteristics of her multidimensional view. Firstly, even though the different dimensions

of autonomy seem to include internal and external conditions, she does not like making this a clear cut distinction given that the view relies on the notion of a socially constituted agent, also due to her intention to move beyond the procedural versus substantive discussion.

> (…) From a relational perspective, the distinction between internal and external conditions is complicated. If persons are socially constituted, then external conditions, including our social relations with others, shape the process of practical identity formation—the self of selfgovernance—and the development of the skills and competences required for governing the self (Mackenzie, 2014:31).

Mackenzie is not arguing that social and political conditions affect important parts of our autonomy—such as our self-affective attitudes—but that our practical identities are developed by our social interactions.

Additionally, the causal interdependence of the dimensions makes it difficult to order them by some kind of standard level of importance or priority. Instead, Mackenzie acknowledges, "we may find that in different contexts certain dimensions of autonomy, and the conditions that fall under them, may be more salient than others" (Mackenzie, 2014: 40). This, in her view, means two things. First, that depending on the domain into consideration, some dimensions can be more significant than others. For example, in the medical decision-making context, the most relevant dimensions are self-authorization and self-governance. Second, that we should establish different thresholds to meet the conditions also in accordance with the context. To support this idea, she exemplifies with democratic citizenship. She states that it would be appropriate to set high thresholds of self-determination for democratic citizenship, by requiring extensive liberties and opportunities to enable it, but at the same time, a very low threshold to consider someone as self-governing.[8] Nonetheless, she clarifies that every axis or dimension depends on the other to

[8] There is a risk of inconsistency for Mackenzie by phrasing thresholds for democratic citizenship like this. It appears as though she is characterising self-governance as a pre-condition for democratic citizenship, rather than a dimension of autonomy that requires the appropriate standing that democratic citizenship affords, in order to develop our capacity to be self-governing. It is the difference between thinking of autonomy as an end-state or as a precondition, where the former amounts to acknowledging that we require particular conditions to develop our autonomy. A charitable interpretation is to consider that what Mackenzie intends to express by this statement is precisely that the agent's capacities to be

be fulfilled, so identifying different thresholds and salience of one dimension for a specific context, does not amount to neglecting the other dimensions and conditions (Mackenzie, 2014: 40).

Remember that what she intends her view to achieve is explain our contrasting philosophical intuitions when confronted with examples that explore the different effects of oppression over our autonomy:

> Each of these dimensions can and should be understood as a matter of degree and domain. A person can be self-determining, self-governing and self-authorising to differing degrees, both at a time and over the course of her life. This explains how it is possible for a person such as King (Martin Luther), whose freedom and opportunities have been severely curtailed, nevertheless to exhibit high degrees of self-governance and have a strong sense of himself as a self-authorising agent (Mackenzie, 2019: 523).

Mackenzie's multidimensional view includes a number of concerns that seem to support my project of considering the manner in which our practical identities are shaped, not only by our social relations but also by our political relations. Freedom conditions, opportunity conditions, social recognition and accountability are only some of them, and their impact when applied to the political intuitively shows that we cannot overlook the importance that the relations we experience within the political sphere have for our development of personal autonomy.

A multidimensional analysis of personal autonomy helps unravel the complexities of the concept and the importance of the relations each person experiences for her development of autonomy. By distinguishing separate dimensions, Mackenzie (2014) draws attention to gender-based structural inequalities and other forms of oppression. She shows how they impair our abilities to be self-determining by restricting our freedom and opportunities, and

self-governing should not condition her access to democratic citizenship. However, this phrasing also shows her difficulty to see the relational aspect of our political sphere. It is as if our self-governance relies on our social relations and then is evaluated when we want to be part of the political sphere. I take the distinction between end-state and precondition from an interesting discussion for the context of upbringing developed by Clayton, M; (2006).

how they are internalised constraining the agent's psychological freedom and agency. However, her view seems to characterise the political sphere as a domain that can harm or contribute to the development of our autonomy, but not as an area where we actually experience relations. I claim the political sphere does not only constitute the formal background for our social relations. We are part of relations in the political sphere established under a particular set of rules, and these are the ones with the potential to either harm or enhance our personal autonomy. The next two sections aim at discussing these strengths and shortcomings in more detail.

3. Dimensions and the political aspect

In what follows, I will discuss the features of Mackenzie's account that contribute to an analysis of our political relations. I want to emphasise Mackenzie's concern for our political standing in the various components of her view. Looking at each dimension will show the unique capacity of Mackenzie's multidimensional account to address the political aspect of autonomy.

The dimension Mackenzie refers to as self-determination, directly engages with the need for structural political conditions to develop autonomy. Through the political and personal liberties condition, she identifies the things that enable, and the things that interfere with our ability to make and enact relevant choices for our lives. In doing so, she explicitly characterizes the political sphere as an area where our autonomy can be either seriously harmed or greatly enhanced by legal provisions. A life where there are no guaranteed personal freedoms like freedom of sexual expression, and freedom from violence can hardly be described as self-determining, but it is a novel characteristic of Mackenzie's view that she includes *political liberties* like freedom to engage in political participation as part of the liberties that are necessary for our autonomy. Political participation and freedom of association signal our right to relate to others and to exercise our role as citizens, which denotes a specific standing that she is acknowledging we have to enjoy. Hence, even if she is not explicitly stating it, we can infer they are meant to order the relations of people involved in those interactions *within* the political sphere.

Mackenzie also establishes opportunity conditions to set the options that should be made available for people to choose from. This acknowledges an important concern regarding the need for material conditions, or in other words, a relevant level of welfare in order to become

autonomous. A person who does not enjoy a standard of living that allows her to enact choices beyond mere survival cannot be considered enjoying an autonomous life. This aspect, nevertheless, is not unique to Mackenzie's view. Many accounts[9] hold that there can be no self-governance or self-direction when our lives are plagued by worries of survival. Nonetheless, since in her view freedom is defined as non-domination, her concern regarding opportunities not only aims at making liberties be more than merely formal but at securing an equal standing that can prevent dominating relations. When each person enjoys liberties, relevant material conditions, and a substantial range of available choices for their lives, they relate to one another from an equal standing that allows avoiding the need to use persuasion or any other strategy to prevent arbitrary interferences. Thus, Mackenzie's self-determination dimension sets important formal conditions that recognise the role the political sphere plays for our personal autonomy.

On the other hand, Mackenzie's self-authorization dimension discusses the role of our social and political standing for our autonomy and analyses its centrality for our identity formation and self-perception. It is our capacity to develop autonomy, and the effective authority that autonomy implies, that are harmed by oppressive contexts. Although she is not only referring to political contexts, her analysis discusses conditions required for normative authority, which are also applicable to the political sphere. She argues that oppressive contexts take away the agent's *de facto* power to be authoritative over her life decisions. Thus, a context that does not properly acknowledge such authority harms her self-esteem and effective capacity to exercise it.

> To lead a self-determining life requires not just having the capacities and opportunities to do so but also regarding oneself, and being recognized by others, as having the social *status* of an autonomous agent. Because this *status* dimension of autonomy is constituted intersubjectively in social relations of recognition, it is vulnerable to others' failures, or refusals, to grant us appropriate recognition in a range of different spheres (Mackenzie, Rogers & Dodds, 2013: 44).

[9] Mackenzie (2014) mentions: Gerald Dworkin, *The Theory and Practice of Autonomy,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Marina Oshana, *Personal Autonomy in Society* (Aldershot, UK:Ashgate, 2006) as accounts that also include freedom and opportunity conditions.

In other words, Mackenzie disputes the idea that having normative authority amounts to enjoying an authority made possible by the non-interference of others. Instead, she claims it involves being aware of having authority over our lives, being granted opportunities to exercise that authority, and being acknowledged by others as authoritative. Accordingly, the conditions she identifies for achieving self-authority, i.e., accountability, self-evaluative attitudes, and social recognition, are especially relevant in the political sphere where authority is connected to an exercise of political power. The idea of "one person one vote" that drives democratic elections is supported by the notion that acknowledging equal moral status to people should be translated into an equal measure of political authority. In the case of autonomy, we also commit ourselves to recognise that being autonomous, if considered valuable, should be available to everyone in equal measure, because it expresses a desirable and relevant aspect of our lives. There is, therefore, no reason to restrict people's autonomy in the political sphere. Moreover, it can be argued that valuing autonomy should also commit us to foster a political sphere that allows the right to enjoy our autonomy in an egalitarian manner.

4. The missing 'active' component

Even though Mackenzie includes some important liberties and opportunities as political conditions, her view neglects the active character that is implied by her definition of self-determination, which has some important consequences. Freedom and opportunities are supposed to be made available to enact and make authentic choices. However, being free, especially if defined as freedom from domination, has a positive aspect, even if Philip Pettit himself does not grant this aspect to the notion. I will briefly discuss this missing positive or active component from Mackenzie's view in connection to the potential I identify in Pettit's idea of non-domination, which inspires her approach to freedom.

Benjamin Constant (1989) started a very rich debate about freedom by developing the distinction between freedom of the ancient and the modern, which Isaiah Berlin (1996) continued by introducing two types of freedom, namely, negative and positive. Negative freedom amounts to being free from interference, and positive freedom is rooted in the concept of self-government. This idea implies that citizens should have an active

involvement in public affairs in order to define by themselves the parameters of their freedom (Berlin, 1996:220-231).

Based on Berlin's definition, liberals have been commonly associated with negative freedom and republicans with positive freedom. However, Pettit (2010) intends to separate the republican tradition from the ideal of positive freedom by developing his ideal of "freedom as non-domination". He states the latter also has a negative character but in the shape of a defence against domination instead of the absence of interference. Accordingly, Pettit (2010) only grants that "The conception is positive to the extent that, at least in one respect, it needs something more than the absence of interference; it requires security against interference" (Pettit, 2010:51). Nevertheless, we are not just free *from* (a lack of uncontrolled interference), non-domination amounts to being free *to.*

Pettit (2012) talks about control understood as exercising effective influence, and Mackenzie (2014) adds opportunity conditions to ensure freedoms are not merely formal. Both proposals appear to assume non-domination requires more than a formal structure that grants legally-established rights and liberties. Self-determination involves having freedom and opportunities to make and enact our choices, and it indeed includes political conditions (political liberties and political opportunities), however, acknowledging the need for freedom and opportunities cannot suffice to claim that we can effectively enact relevant choices in the political sphere. If there is no explicit condition that aims at adding deliberation among every actor involved in decision-making processes, our capacity to *actually* make and enact those choices is still merely formal. Thus, it seems there is a third element missing in Mackenzie's political conditions; one that could allow people in the political sphere to *actively* take part of decision-making processes, which again, connects with my critique of her neglect for the character of our relations in the political sphere and how they unfold. This could be achieved by re-shaping our relations in the political sphere and focusing on political participation to include additional means of direct involvement of common citizens, among other considerations.

5. Holding effective authority: beyond having the right self-evaluative attitudes

In this section, I would like to consider Mackenzie's understanding of the importance of our self-evaluative attitudes in connection with the relevance of holding *de facto* power to

exercise effective authority over our lives. Perceiving ourselves as being authoritative and actually holding authority to enact relevant choices in the political sphere, have a strong impact over our capacity to become autonomous. Each of the conditions considered by Mackenzie is amplified in the political sphere due to the reach that decisions made in it have over our lives. Mackenzie rightly argues that perceiving ourselves as holding normative authority over our lives is crucial for our autonomy, but she does not place conditions to guide our political relations so that we can not only see ourselves as authoritative but can also have the according authority in decision-making to enjoy the standing of co-legislators.

Mackenzie's (2014) self-evaluative attitudes condition follows Aderson's and Honneth's (2009) ideas of self-esteem, self-respect, and self-trust. They state that: "(…) Self-respect can be seen as the affectively laden self-conception that underwrites a view of oneself as the legitimate source of reasons for acting" (Anderson & Honneth, 2009: 132). Thus, self-respect amounts to acknowledging ourselves as competent authors and rightful deliberators over our practical reasoning. Having less power, or influence over decision-making in our private lives affects our identity formation and self-perception, so arguing that being margined from political decision-making can have a similar effect does not seem controversial. Not being acknowledged as rightful decision-makers communicates the idea that we are less capable of decision-making than those who get to participate. Exclusion from the political sphere, where important decisions affecting our lives are made, clearly does not take that status seriously and can diminish people's sense of personal authority. According to them, denying the standing of "legitimate co-legislators" (Anderson & Honneth, 2009: 132) implies that people are not competent decision-makers, which makes it a very difficult to overcome message that damages our perception of being equal and free (Anderson & Honneth, 2009: 132).

Our self-esteem does not solely rely on being recognised authoritative in the political, however, Anderson and Honneth rightly warn us that it is our status as autonomous agents that is at stake when we are not recognised as capable decision-makers in the political sphere. The political certainly is not the only relevant area where we require recognition to promote appropriate affective attitudes, but the weight and impact of the decisions made in the political sphere make denying the co-legislators status a grave obstacle to consider ourselves competent deliberators, as Anderson and Honneth (2009) describe.

Enjoying little or no accountability in the political sphere, on the other hand, i.e., reason-giving from each party involved, harms our identity formation because those reasons, and our right to ask others for the reasons supporting their choices, becomes irrelevant. It is clear that the latter does not imply the need to implement constant reason-giving in the political sphere, but it supports the importance of re-thinking deliberations as they currently take place in the political sphere, in order to include common citizens and establish connections between every agent involved in decision-making. Similarly, that our commitments and values are not recognised by others, also hinders our self-perception in terms of how we deem them valuable and worth respecting, which again supports the idea of identifying political conditions for autonomy that can focus on the nature of the relations we engage in the political sphere.

All the above considerations show that our political standing matters to our self-perception in terms of our authority. It shapes our identities but also, it allows for effective exercises of authority and demands for accountability. The latter cannot happen if we are not granted the power to be authoritative in political decision-making.

6. Contributions and shortcomings

Mackenzie's self-determination axis establishes the need for structural political conditions for the development of autonomy. She includes a political and personal liberties condition, which is a novel element of her project, given that it explicitly considers things like freedom to engage in political participation. Similarly, her opportunities condition alludes to material conditions that connect to, not only securing a threshold of welfare, but also to guarantee an equal standing. This notion comes from her reliance on freedom as non-domination as a background ideal of freedom. However, her approach to the freedom conditions and opportunities conditions neglects the active or positive character of non-domination. Although Pettit himself is reluctant to agree with the need for more direct involvement of common citizens in deliberation processes, both Mackenzie and Pettit consider the importance of holding *de facto* power, or some kind of effective control, which implies an active component is indeed needed to guarantee our equal standing in the political sphere. Mackenzie's self-authorization dimension, in turn, highlights the centrality of being regarded by others as authoritative. Our normative authority, according to her, involves being aware of our authority but at the same time being recognised as authoritative and

granted the opportunities to exercise this authority. Self-evaluative attitudes like self-respect, self-trust and self-esteem shape our normative authority, and an oppressive context conveys the message of being less capable to those it excludes, which can greatly harm their development of these attitudes.

Experiencing little accountability, on the other hand, translates into undervaluing reason-giving as a relevant exercise we should engage in, and more importantly, are entitled to also request from others. This worry clearly connects with the political sphere, even if Mackenzie does not directly include it as one of her political conditions. In conclusion, this analysis of Mackenzie's multidimensional view provided sufficient arguments to justify the suitability and capacity of her account to identify the political conditions that will allow for autonomy-enhancing political relations. Her definition of autonomy offers key concepts to identify those political conditions for autonomy beyond establishing institutional safeguards in the shape of liberties and opportunities. Nonetheless, in order to do so, we need an approach that includes political participation as an expression of our personal authority, and more broadly, describes the political as a domain where we hold relations, just as a different methodology to approach autonomy in a novel way that does not lead to a reductive analysis of the concept.

VI. A methodological difference: Dismantling model and network model

Finally, changing the model of analysis we usually apply to autonomy, seems promising as a way to identify political conditions for autonomy. In this final part, I will briefly suggest that a network model is more appropriate than a dismantling model for autonomy. This shift would allow for an approach that is more suited to interrogate the political as part of the network that constitutes autonomy, instead of as a separate sphere that interacts externally with it.

Peter Strawson (1992) develops two models for philosophical analysis, namely, the dismantling model and the network model. The former corresponds to an analysis that breaks down complex phenomena into simpler, independently understood elements. These elements enjoy explanatory priority over the complex phenomenon, and therefore cannot be circular since the explanatory priority would not be satisfied in a circular analysis. Conversely, the network model does not require the explanatory priority of the elements and is not contrary to circularity. Each element of the network actually relies on the other for

explanatory purposes. I claim that personal autonomy, as pointed out by Mackenzie, also resists a dismantling analysis. Therefore, a network model is promising to identify the political conditions for autonomy, whilst not falling into a reductive analysis[10].

A good way to explain how a network analysis can be more suitable is to consider cases that seem to resist a dismantling model. The game of chess provides a very clear example[11]. In order to define chess, we could say something like 'a game with the goal to check mate the opponent'. Nonetheless, such a definition compels us to refer to what 'check mate' is. Likewise, our definition of check mate will require explaining what a 'king' is. This example shows that some cases do appear to resist a model that identifies independently understood components. My intention is to suggest that autonomy does the same. Mackenzie's view defines autonomy as constituted by interdependent dimensions, which is compatible with this shift of model. I will explain this in more detail in the following section.

1. Dimensions of autonomy in a network

In order to show the compatibility of the multidimensional approach developed by Mackenzie and a network model, I will begin by briefly reminding her view. Exploring these dimensions will provide clarity as to the motivation for her approach and allow me to explain how her view benefits from a network analysis to better address the political element.

Let us recall that Mackenzie's account of autonomy identifies three causally interdependent dimensions: self-determination, self-governance, and self-authorization. Enjoying freedom and opportunities to make and enact relevant choices to one's life is what she calls Self-determination. Therefore, this dimension alludes to structural conditions for autonomy that she refers to as freedom conditions and opportunity conditions. These include for instance, political and personal liberties to signal what interferes with and what enables our exercise of self-determination. Likewise, it considers opportunity conditions specifying what should be available for agents to choose what to value, what to do, who to be (Mackenzie, 2014:17).

[10] Kelp (2019), based on Strawson's model, develops an account of knowledge that seeks to overcome the reductive character of common approaches, which establish necessary and sufficient conditions. He argues that traditional understandings provide a set of non-circular conditions that do not seem appropriate for knowledge. Instead, he proposes to approach knowledge as being part of a network of phenomena that includes inquiry, belief and knowledge, where they cannot be properly understood unless with regards to each other. My suggestion to apply a network analysis in the case of autonomy is inspired by his use of the model for knowledge - Kelp, C. (2019). *Understanding Knowledge*. Unpublished manuscript

[11] This example is presented in more detail, in Kelp (2019)

The self-governance dimension in turn, is connected to authenticity. A self-governing life means to enact choices that are true to our values and identities. This requires complex skills and so this dimension refers to those internal conditions for autonomy, which she calls competence and authenticity conditions. However, Mackenzie characterises self-governance as a socially constituted capacity.

Finally, self-authorization amounts to recognising ourselves as holding normative authority over our lives. Crucially though, she understands normative authority in a specific and uncommon way. In her view, it is to regard oneself as authorised to exercise control over one's life and to determine what constitutes reasons for acting. The conditions she envisages for this dimension are accountability, self-evaluative attitudes, and social recognition.

This brief overview of Mackenzie's multidimensional approach shows that each dimension seems to point to a specific feature of autonomy. In turn, every dimension is constituted by what look like necessary and sufficient conditions. Every dimension appears to act as a necessary condition for autonomy, with a related set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Nevertheless, there is also a relevant difference with other accounts of autonomy. Identifying these causally *interdependent* dimensions shows that her motivation comes from a resistance of the concept of autonomy to be analysed in the traditional way.

There is something about the constitutive parts of autonomy that leads us to look for novel manners to analyse the notion. This difficulty lies in the explanatory dependence of each element. As Mackenzie explicitly states, self-determination refers to external conditions, i.e., freedom and opportunity conditions, and self-authorization and self-governance are closer to our internal capacities. However, since her account is a relational account, the distinction between external and internal capacities and conditions is not straightforward. Our identities, values and commitments are developed because of the social relations we establish.

Hence, her view exposes the resistance of autonomy to a dismantling analysis. To be autonomous we need to be authentic to our values and commitments, but to develop them we need to stand in relations of recognition, and to define what those relations should be like, we need to refer to the capacity to see ourselves as authoritative over our lives, which again depends on our relations of recognition. The problem is that in order to explain what

being authentic means, we need to refer to each dimension, and this inevitably leads to a circular analysis.

The multidimensional nature of the concept that Mackenzie rightly puts forward is therefore compatible and could benefit from a network analysis. Moreover, thinking of her view in terms of a network model provides an approach to autonomy that seems the best suited to discuss and identify the political conditions for autonomy.

VII. Conclusions

Throughout this chapter, I explored relational accounts of autonomy and focused on Mackenzie's specific proposal. The latter showed that relational accounts, particularly Mackenzie's provide the background to focus on the character of our relations within the political sphere because they are able to identify the importance for our autonomy of both the social relations we hold and the political standing we enjoy. These two concerns allow us to acknowledge not just how our political relations can become dominating and harmful, but how we can transform them into relations of recognition. However, in order to elucidate the political conditions for personal autonomy, more is required. As long as we do not identify the political sphere as a central domain of our lives in which we do establish relations, we will be incapable of determining the political conditions that should rule them.

Finally, I devoted the last part of the chapter to suggest a methodological approach that differs from classic analysis of autonomy, namely, introducing a network analysis to autonomy. At the same time, I argued that Mackenzie's account, which supports my overall project, actually points in this direction and would greatly benefit from this approach.

Chapter 2: Non-domination and control as political conditions for autonomy

I. Neo-republican inspired political conditions

The kind of political relations we hold will be determined by the way in which we approach our political interactions. If we begin by granting that our political exchanges indeed constitute relations—which I have argued for in chapter 1—then we can move on to try to identify the necessary requirements for them to be autonomy-enhancing. I mentioned in the previous chapter that the political relations we should hold for enjoying our autonomy are what I call Relations of Mutual Recognition. The goal of chapter 1 was first to show that there are such political relations and that they prove there is a political aspect of autonomy. Thus, I did not define what I mean by Relations of Mutual Recognition. In this chapter, I will again move beyond providing a definition for Relations of Mutual Recognition and instead focus on the conditions for them to take place. The idea is to analyse the political conditions for autonomy, which are none other than the conditions for Relations of Mutual Recognition. Discussing these conditions will at the same time, serve as a clear introduction to the central features of what Relations of Mutual Recognition amount to.

Accordingly, the focus of this chapter will be on discussing what I identify as two central conditions for Relations of Mutual Recognition, namely, non-domination and control. I will analyse the meaning of each notion, as found in Philip Pettit (2010; 2012). My intention is to build upon them and re-define both concepts to overcome some of the shortcomings that I claim weaken both ideas.

The chapter begins by analysing Pettit's definition of both non-domination and control. Part II and III continue by considering critiques—other authors and my own—to both concepts and by elaborating my version of each..

II. Non-domination

Philip Pettit holds that dominating relations occur when there is "exposure to another's power of uncontrolled interference" (Pettit, 2012:28). He claims that not only should we not be arbitrarily interfered with, but also never reduced to use persuasion or any strategy to prevent that interference. Thus, non-domination in the political sphere requires equal treatment and equal share in power.

I will briefly address what I identify as two important critiques to non-domination: (1) the need for a connection between non-domination and autonomy, and (2) the importance of political participation for non-domination. I want to show that they rightly identify weaknesses in Pettit's concept. Based on these concerns, I discuss the neglect of a more active or positive aspect to non-domination that motivates the different approach to non-domination that I develop. Likewise, I will show there is a connection between my understanding of non-domination and the relational approach that guides my view. Considering subtler and also structural cases of domination, makes this connection very clear and justifies non-domination's capacity to address them.

I begin by presenting the main features of Pettit's non-domination and continue by discussing objections to his view. I conclude by emphasising that part of the importance of being *free from* domination is to be *free to* pursue our own goals or hold our personal commitments.[12] My intention is to add this positive aspect to non-domination in my proposal by defining control as a separate political condition for autonomy.

1. An overview: beyond interferences

Freedom as non-domination amounts to a life without subjection to another agent's will. It does not only refer to interference but also to the ability not to depend on deference or any other attitude to secure freedom. The main feature of non-domination is that it seeks to prevent the status of domination that results from arbitrary interference. Thus, it is important to note that, according to Pettit (2012), not every interference is dominating, and determining what makes an interference arbitrary is key to his view.

[12] Rainer Forst (2005) in "Political Liberty: Integrating Five Conceptions of Autonomy" holds a very similar view. He states that every "freedom from" is indeed a "freedom to", hence the differences amongst conceptions of freedom are connected to the notion of autonomy they are based on.

> Domination is defined by reference to interference but is distinct from it. Someone, A, will be dominated in a certain choice by another agent or agency, B, to the extent that B has a power of interfering in the choice that is not itself controlled by A. When I say that B has a power of interference I mean that B has the unvitiated and uninvaded capacity to interfere or not to interfere. And when I say that that power of interfering is not controlled by A, I mean that it is not exercised on terms imposed by A: it is not exercised in a direction or according to a pattern that A has the influence to determine (Pettit, 2012: 50).

The arbitrariness of an interference, or what he later prefers to call *uncontrolled interference* (Pettit, 2012), hinges on whether we are given the opportunity to direct or influence the terms that will rule it. Pettit (2012) claims that what characterises an interference as uncontrolled is the discretion that the interferer exercises; in other words, the manner in which the interference is exercised at the interferer's will, and as the word expresses, the receiver's lack of control over it (Pettit, 2012:58). This imposition of the interferer's will can take different forms. It can entail a direct restriction of options, manipulation of the characteristics of each available option, or imposition of what the interferer interprets as the receiver's interests (paternalism). However, an uncontrolled interference need not be active. It suffices that the interferer has "an uncontrolled power of interfering with the choice of any option" (Pettit, 2012:59) to attribute the label. This means that the mere *capacity* to exercise uncontrolled interference constitutes domination, even if the interferer chooses not to exercise that power out of some favourable disposition towards the receiver. Such power to interfere is dominating, because the receiver's choices are not what they would be if the power did not exist, but more importantly, since the subject depends on the interferer's good will to remain such, if she is to have the possibility to choose as she wishes (Pettit, 2012:59).

Pettit's definition of domination, therefore, shows that we can be subject to the mastery of a third party, even if not expressed by active interferences. To support this idea, he describes two broad types of domination without interference: invigilation and intimidation. Invigilation means the third party stands guard over what you do, and even if he is not currently disposed to interfere, he remains in a position where he can interfere in case his

disposition changes.[13] This invigilation will lead to a change in your choices' cognitive and objective character, due to your dependency on the third party's goodwill to keep your chance to choose. Furthermore, this means that you will be free to choose but only with the third party's permission (Pettit, 2012:61).

Intimidation, as the common use of the word suggests, amounts to threats or any direct forms of pressure. Intimidation does not necessarily come together with invigilation, but it can certainly enhance the effect of the invigilation and provide incentives to caution and deferential treatment on your part (Pettit, 2012:61). Thus, our equal standing should amount to removing not only evident instances of abuses of power, but also chances for any third party to curtail or distort a person's choices by subjecting her to his will. This regardless of whether that third party is an institution or an individual "My power of interference in your choice, and my domination over you, can only be contained by external checks that remove or replace the interference option or put it cognitively off the menu" (Pettit, 2012:63).

Non-domination, according to Pettit, is a self-sufficient ideal capable of supporting a republican project; therefore, it should be understood as the goal of the state to foster non-domination. The idea is that by promoting the relations that non-domination entails, other desirable outcomes will follow. This is one of the aspects of his view that has been strongly criticised (See Boyer, 2001; McMahon 2005). Similarly, the distinctly republican character of his proposal has also given rise to critiques that, nonetheless, seem to contend the label but not the content of the notion (Carter, 2000; Dagger, 2000).[14]

Finally, Pettit (2012) states that non-domination requires an individualized, unconditioned, and efficacious form of popular control (Pettit, 2012:168). I will explain this condition in more detail when I examine the concept of control that I include in my view, and how it differs from Pettit's version. For now, it is important to mention that this last consideration regarding control shows that non-domination acknowledges the importance of addressing our power relations within the political sphere. He understands that part of enjoying an equal standing is to "enjoy an equally accessible form of suitably unconditioned and efficacious

[13] Following other authors example, I use the masculine form to refer to cases of exercise of domination, to point out the usual status of our current relations.
[14] I will address neither of these critiques, since non-domination does not occupy this self-sufficient role in my proposal, nor do I engage further with the debate about differences between his view and other liberal approaches to freedom.

influence" (Pettit, 2012:303). This condition for non-domination seems to address the issue of having an appropriate capacity to affect outcomes to effectively enjoy an equal standing.

Non-domination, as described by Pettit, seems suited to capture the kind of political relations we should experience to develop and enjoy our autonomy. It points out the different ways in which others can exercise a dominating role even if not intentionally. Thus, thinking of non-domination as a condition for autonomy serves to establish structures and relations capable of avoiding those different kinds of dominating scenarios. I will continue by emphasising what I take to be the connection between non-domination and relational autonomy, namely, their capacity to address oppressive contexts beyond concerns for basic rights and liberties. This connection is important because it provides additional evidence to support non-domination's suitability to be a political condition for my relational proposal.

2. Power imbalances and domination

Distinguishing different kinds of dominating relations as Pettit does, allows for a more nuanced analysis of circumstances that impose imbalances of power and subjection to another person's will. By doing so, non-domination becomes an ideal that can address very common, but also subtler examples of oppression. In this section, I want to put forward the idea that additionally, non-domination has two relevant features that easily connect the concept to a relational approach to autonomy like Catriona Mackenzie's. The latter supports its place as a condition for establishing relations of mutual recognition. The first characteristic is that it focuses on relations, i.e., it signals the way in which we can develop non-dominating relations by avoiding subjection to another person's will. At the same time, it acknowledges the risks of political structures becoming dominating. These two characteristics justify thinking of non-domination as a constitutive part of our political relations, because through it, Pettit intends to rethink our role and standing within the political sphere, which accommodates the key relational concern regarding gender and other minority-related oppression.

Non-domination's relational approach is communicated by Pettit's "eyeball test" (Pettit, 2012:84). The eyeball test, to be able to look someone in the eye as an equal, means that every person should be independent of someone's good opinion or favour to decide the manner in which to live her life (Pettit: 2012:82). Accordingly, it is not just a matter of

securing basic rights or guaranteeing some level of welfare. Non-domination refers to a *status* of freedom that allows for the absence of deference or any similar strategy to relate to others. "(…) Satisfying the test requires full freedom as non-domination and not just the absence of poverty. Escaping the shame of poverty is only a first step towards the enjoyment of interpersonal status and achievement of freedom" (Pettit, 2012:87). Although Pettit does not use the word relational, his concern about dominating relations, in terms of interpersonal status, supports the inference that his view is indeed relational.

Furthermore, this relational character of non-domination shows its connection to concerns raised by relational accounts of autonomy, regarding the dominated agent's self-evaluative attitudes, and their related tendency to adjust their behaviour and preferences. As mentioned, when characterising invigilation, Pettit (2012) states that this kind of domination changes our choices' cognitive and objective character due to the dependency on the dominating agent's goodwill.

> (…) Relations of domination shape the psychology of members of dominant groups so that they are extremely likely to become haughty and arrogant. A particularly pernicious consequence of this state of affairs is that haughty and arrogant behaviour is most likely to be exhibited in interactions with members of subordinated groups, since they are more likely to be judged as intellectually inferior and are less likely to have the power required to put a stop to the inappropriate behaviour. Since such behaviour is often intimidating and humiliating, when it is encountered on a daily basis it is likely to affect profoundly the psychology of those who are on its receiving end. More specifically, it makes it more likely that they will develop the twin intellectual vices of intellectual timidity (as a result of intimidation) and servility (as a result of humiliation) (Tanesini, 2016: 87).

If we apply this analysis to the relations we hold in the political sphere, the concern that domination leads to deference or servility from the dominated agent, seems very straightforwardly related to the feminist view on the impact that oppressive relations have over a person's self-perception.

The risk of political structures themselves becoming dominating is the second aspect of Pettit's non-domination that connects it to relational accounts of autonomy. By addressing cases of indirect or even involuntary domination, the notion reflects the way in which, even an allegedly democratic and egalitarian context, can be susceptible to domination. Think of the case of a student's representative within a university structure. The university designs a council constituted by representatives of the different members of the university. The university assures her that she has the same standing than the staff's representative, for example, for every case of internal decision-making or dispute. Formally, she has a seat in the council, and the university's constitution states she should be treated equally to every other member, by giving her the right to a vote that has the same weight than the one given to every representative. Nonetheless, in practice, the staff representative has access to and participates in informal discussions over lunch and coffee breaks involving the rest of the council, where most of the decision-making actually takes place, and to which the student representative has no access. Even if there are formal faculties in place, in order to prevent domination, it seems clear that each actor's capacity to exercise influence does not solely depend on their formally secured equal standing.

Imagine if we extrapolate this case to lobbying before a law is passed, where the staff's representative is now a citizen that owns a company affected by the future legislation, and the student's representative corresponds to another citizen who has no particular sort of economic or social power. The company owner can negotiate the terms of the future law with the rest of decision-makers by offering monetary incentives, whilst the common citizen cannot even take part in those private discussions. Moreover, if the common citizen happens to belong to a perceived minority, she stands at an even higher disadvantage; because her views and interests have even less visibility and related chance to be included in legislation[15]. As Pettit puts it:

> It is usually because of the ways a society is organized, culturally, economically or legally, that some people have such power in relation to others that they

[15] Schmidt; A (2018) develops an interesting view where he claims that domination can happen even when there is an equal distribution of power. Using the example of gun control, he refers to what he calls cases of *mutual domination*. However, he does not seem able to address the relevance of our initial unequal standing, especially in the case of minorities.

> dominate them directly, and dominate them without necessarily wishing for domination or even approving of it (…) but they can indirectly facilitate the worst forms of invasion and domination in a society. (Pettit, 2012:63).

It could be argued that, for example, establishing clearer and more stringent regulations on lobby and campaign funding, in this case, can address or prevent such power imbalances and the related abuse of power. However, as with the first case, the informal instances or social encounters that will normally exclude common citizens, or the student representative, reveal a deeper problem. These examples show how equal rights do not necessarily amount to equal treatment in practice. The language of non-domination expresses precisely how power imbalances are extremely susceptible to become dominating. If we believe that no person should have uncontrolled interference over our lives, it is clear that our relations require more than a formal acknowledgement of our equal standing. Hence, equal rights and liberties constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition for non-dominating relations, because the problem with subtler cases like these, seems to be connected to the differences in the exercise of some kind of influence that actors have. Therefore, non-dominating relations need clear boundaries and regulations, but also, attributions to have some impact over outcomes. This necessity for attributions explains why Pettit includes control, understood as an exercise of influence, as a condition for non-domination.

Given that these two features of non-domination—a focus on relations, and acknowledgement of the potential dominating character of institutions— prove the suitability of non-domination to support a relational approach, it seems appropriate to move on to examine the active aspect implied by the notion. A central part of the second feature's weigh depends on making sense of the attributions that non-domination entails each person to have. If control is required for non-domination, that it involves a positive character is a reasonable assumption. Nonetheless, Pettit separates his ideal from the need for political participation and from a possible connection to personal autonomy. In the next section, I will engage with these two objections, i.e., a disconnection to autonomy, and a restricted view of political participation, in order to show that the ideal can constitute a political condition for personal autonomy.

3. The positive aspect: autonomy and political participation

Richard Dagger (2000) objects to Pettit's approach to non-domination as being disconnected from autonomy and provides three arguments to support his view. I will focus on two of them to stress, as Dagger does, that non-domination implies a concern for our personal autonomy. Likewise, Nadia Urbinati (2011, 2012) objects to Pettit's attempt to separate non-domination from the importance of political participation. I present their critiques and join their conclusions regarding non-domination's inherent connection to autonomy, and political participation's centrality to achieve non-domination. My intention is to take Pettit's non-domination to imply the value of both self-governance and political participation. With this in mind, I conclude that if paired with a more demanding view of control, non-domination expresses the necessary active aspect of Relations of Mutual Recognition, and thus constitutes one of the key political conditions for our personal autonomy.

Dagger (2000) claims the republican tradition, in which Pettit wants to situate his project, is committed to the value of autonomy. Being independent from other people's arbitrary power over us is rooted on the value we grant to our self-government. Therefore, his first objection to Pettit's non-domination is that he is wrong to label non-domination as merely expressing a form of freedom, disconnected from the value of autonomy.

> As the traditional republican opposition of dependence to independence indicates, the desire to be free from domination is rooted in the desire to be in some sense self-governing. That does not mean that one can or should even want to be the complete master of his or her domain, for we must depend upon the impersonal force of the rule of law to secure our independence from the arbitrary power of others. But it does mean that we can, as interdependent citizens, stand on an equal footing with others in making the laws that secure us from arbitrary power, and in that sense we can be self-governing. We want to be free from domination, then, so that we can enjoy autonomy (Dagger, 2000:52).

His approach to the justification of non-domination is surely implied in Pettit's own understanding of the ideal of freedom as non-domination. Our desire to be free from

domination clearly comes from our previous acknowledgement of the authority we have over our lives; in other words, to the right we must be the authors of our lives. Self-government here amounts to exercising that authoritative role and seems like the only plausible base for our concern for non-domination.

The second reason Dagger offers to support the connection between non-domination and autonomy is that, although taxation and legal coercion in general take away the agent's freedom, they do not harm our autonomy. By basing non-domination in a concern for autonomy, one can argue that if they issue in some way from citizens as self-governing agents, those coercive means do not take away our autonomy (Dagger, 2000:52). The latter provides a more straightforward way of arguing, as Pettit does, that laws are not necessarily dominating. Pettit's view certainly suggests that the reason why some interferences do not constitute uncontrolled interference is that I have the right to grant the capacity to interfere to a third party (if it happens under my own terms). I hold authoritative agency over my choices, or rather; I am the legitimate source of the authority over decisions affecting my life. Hence, it implies some kind of right to be self-governing, even if he does not establish this connection to his ideal of non-domination.

Pettit's (2000) response to Dagger (2000) states that he would be happy to describe as "autonomy", his conception of an ideal of freedom that is not merely political. However, he argues that his concept is more feasible to represent the state's goal. "(…) it may be dangerous to charge the state with advancing any richer ideal, in particular any ideal that touches people's souls in the manner of an ideal of personal self-rule" (Pettit, 2000: 57). Elsewhere, Pettit (2010) similarly argues that non-domination is not connected to the idea of self-mastery. He appeals to an ideal of self-rule that alludes to an internal process, separate from our desire to enjoy non-domination.

> Freedom as personal autonomy may be a very attractive value (…) Freedom as personal self-mastery, however, is a richer ideal than that of freedom as non-domination; there can certainly be non-domination without personal self-mastery, but there can hardly be any meaningful form of self-mastery without non-domination. Moreover, freedom as personal self-mastery ought to be facilitated, if not actively promoted, under a state that assures freedom as non-

> domination; it is bound to be easier for people to achieve autonomy once they are assured of not being dominated by others (…) People can be trusted to look after their own autonomy, given that they live under a dispensation where they are protected from domination by others (Pettit, 2010:81-82).

Since he does not provide any further details to explain how a person can enjoy "non-domination without personal self-mastery", we can only infer that he characterises personal autonomy as some kind of internal self-government. His comments regarding personal autonomy indicate that his understanding of the concept does not grant an important role to the relations we hold. Thus, although he is concerned with *relations* of domination, his characterisation of autonomy is not relational. That we can "look after" our own autonomy is because he deems it mostly as an individual concern or process, and if there can be non-domination without self-mastery, is because the latter depends on the single subject's capacity to "govern her inner self", which varies in accordance to the personal features of every agent.

Dagger's objections are on point to highlight that Pettit's proposal would benefit from acknowledging its connection to personal autonomy, which given the relational character of his view, would have to be equally relational. Thinking of non-domination as a political condition for personal autonomy expresses this connection clearly, by understanding both notions as dependant on each other.

Nadia Urbinati (2011), on the other hand, develops a strong objection towards freedom as non-domination. She argues that Pettit's project did not only intend to dispute the negative conception of freedom, but the ideal of "liberty as active participation or political autonomy" (Urbinati, 2011:165). Urbinati (2012) claims that freedom as non-domination is equally suspicious of the "democratic principle of taking part in imperium" (Urbinati, 2012:608) than of freedom as non-interference. She believes that neo-republicanism, in its Roman version, historically rests in their opposition to democracy and disbelief in equal political power. According to her, freedom cannot be secure only by legal constraints which people are not even involved in creating but requires their participation. Thus, liberty should involve a direct connection to popular control, instead of being presented as a means to fostering it.

> Equality in respect to political power is an essential condition for the enjoyment of liberty: this principle is democracy's contribution to the theory of political liberty, the meaning of isonomia (…) If anything, it can be regarded as a precondition for the pursuit of an autonomous moral life (Urbinati, 2012:608).

Not only does she claim that republicans do not commit to political participation, but that the ideal of non-domination developed by Pettit actually requires reshaping our power relations, and that this cannot happen without the citizen's active involvement. "Without an equal relationship of power among citizens (the principles of reciprocity and autonomy) (…) legal liberty and due process of law are not secure acquisitions" (Urbinati, 2012:619). Her critique, contrary to Dagger (2000), begins by aiming at the republican tradition more broadly. She claims that the republican credentials do not help Pettit's proposal to include the value of political participation—and of democracy—because it was never truly part of their historical background worries. Still, she acknowledges that non-domination indeed seeks to address the power imbalances, and consequent need for re-shaping our power relations. Thus, non-domination is capable of expressing the importance of establishing appropriate conditions that guarantee and secure our equal standing but requires political participation to achieve that goal. As she argues, without proper involvement of citizens, we are left with laws and constraints that can be completely disconnected from them and their interests, which is insufficient to secure freedom, and even more so, to secure our autonomy.

To conclude, Dagger's (2000) and Urbinati's objection support the need for an active aspect to non-domination. Moreover, they can show that non-domination, both needs and indeed implies, the value of personal autonomy and the importance of political participation to achieve its aim. The reason why we want not to be dominated rests on our interest in leading a self-governing life and preventing dominating relations involves a kind of control that cannot merely amount to legal constraints that do not seriously include the affected citizens on their development. Non-domination comprises the considerations relevant to relations of mutual recognition, and those relations require control. Moreover, non-domination cannot be analysed without appealing to the positive aspect represented by control. The following section will address the understanding of control that follows from valuing non-domination in our relations.

III. Control

If successful, the previous analysis of non-domination established that our relations of mutual recognition should be non-dominating, because only by securing our equal standing in the political sphere can we develop autonomy enhancing political relations. However, the analysis also led us to affirm the relevant active character of non-domination, which requires some level of control over decision-making processes within the political sphere. The problem is that although, as mentioned, Pettit (2012) develops his own approach to control as a condition for non-domination, his view fails to convey the active character of non-domination. Pettit allows for indirect influence over outcomes, and mere dispositions to interfere are capable of satisfying the "control condition". This part of the chapter will address Pettit's view of control and my approach to overcome the shortcomings I identify in his proposal.

Naturally, approaches to control are vast and varied, which prevents me from examining the relevant debates on the notion here. Instead, I will base my own definition of control in an approach that I deem able to overcome the problems with Pettit's understanding of control. I will not just question the capacity of Pettit's definition to secure non-domination but argue that even though its central components are appropriate, we require a different approach to popular control to guarantee political relations that secure our personal autonomy. Accordingly, I begin by describing and analysing Pettit's definitions of control, influence, and popular control. I present my objections to Pettit's version of control and introduce my definition.

When examining non-domination as an appropriate way of establishing autonomy-enhancing political relations, it became clear that power imbalances are one of the main problems to tackle to prevent dominating relations. This suggests that the version of control that non-domination should be paired with, must include the concept of political agency. My definition of control intends to do so.

1. Control and influence in Pettit

According to Pettit (2012), to control is to exercise influence over the process leading to a result, to impose a direction in accordance to a previously designed pattern (Pettit, 2012:153 - 154). In addition, he states that control can be either intentional or non-intentional. The

first kind amounts to producing a desired outcome by exercising influence. Thus, changes in the agent's beliefs and desires will also change the resulting actions and effects in response. He describes this kind of control as the paradigm case.
Nonetheless, he argues there can also be "purely mechanical nonintentional mechanisms" (Pettit, 2012:155) that we would be happy to call control, such as a cooling-heating system or a homeostatic system. These have an influence over a process that makes a designed difference and imposes an identifiable direction.

Moreover, Pettit (2012) holds that "even the control exercised by intentional agents may be non-intentional" (Pettit, 2012:155). To explain this idea further, he provides an example he attributes to Amartya Sen[16] in which a comatose patient's wishes control the treatment she receives, thanks to her family or friends. If her wishes had been other, her treatment would have also been different. Hence, Pettit argues that even though the patient did nothing intentionally to communicate those desires or to implement them, they are effective via other people's effort.

In order to explain what he refers to by influence, Pettit (2012) makes a distinction between active, virtual, or reserve influence. The former requires "a positive input on the part of the controller" (Pettit, 2012:156). He compares this kind of influence to actively pulling on a horse's rein to steer it in a desired direction. Virtual influence, on the other hand, means that the agent only intervenes when she believes it is necessary to maintain the direction of the outcome in accordance with her intention. In this case, the rider of the horse does not intervene because the horse is going in her desired direction but is willing to do so in case the situation changes. Lastly, reserve influence, amounts to accepting the current direction of matters, and only holding the disposition to interfere, in case our desires change. Following the same example, the idea is that I as an agent give the horse free rein "given that I am happy for it to go wherever it wishes" (Pettit, 2012:156).

It is puzzling that Pettit (2012) does not explicitly provide a definition of influence. Instead, he describes these three possible forms of influence, in order to argue that not only active influence can count as the kind exercised in control. However, we can infer what the concept amounts to from two allusions. First, Pettit explains that influence is an obvious component of control, since we could not claim controlling a result if we have "no capacity to make an

[16] Sen, A (1983) "Liberty and Social Choice". *Journal of Philosophy* 80:18-20

input" (Pettit, 2012:154). On a similar note, he states that "Active, virtual and reserve forms of influence all serve to put a factor in place that raises the probability of a certain result" (Pettit, 2012:156). Thus, according to Pettit, influence appears to be the capacity to make the input that will impose a direction over the process leading to a result.

Lastly, popular control corresponds to an individualized and unconditioned system of directed influence that citizens can exercise over the government to avoid domination (Pettit, 2012:167). His definition of popular control includes three main requirements: that it is individualized, unconditioned, and efficacious. An individualized system is one where people have equal access to popular influence, hence, it will be individualized "insofar as it gives a comparable role to each of the individuals involved in the exercise of control" (Pettit, 2012:168). He holds that the latter means to have an equal share both in exercising influence and in determining the direction of outcomes. Nevertheless, having an equal share should not amount to a requirement to participate equally in the system, instead, it should mean "equal access to the system of popular influence: an opportunity for participation in that system that is available with equal ease to each citizen" (Pettit, 2012:169).

The second requirement intends to stress the necessary correspondence between the controlling agent's inputs and the controlled agent's outputs. There should be a correlation between the exercised influence of the controller and the variations on the controlled agent's behaviour. He claims, "One agent will count as controlling another only insofar as the influence exercised leads to the required result independently of the will of the controlled agent, or indeed of any third party" (Pettit, 2012:170-171).

All these definitions contribute to characterise Pettit's version of control and its connection to his view of non-domination. I will develop three objections to his approach to control, so that I can show how my version of control, by adding political agency, can overcome the problems I identify in his definition.

2. A critical analysis of Pettit's control

Before introducing my approach to control, I will present my analysis of Pettit's idea of control. In doing so, the capacity of my version of control to overcome these shortcomings will easily become apparent. At the same time, taking Pettit's perspective as a starting point

will allow me to situate my concern for control within a definition that focuses on *political* control, rather than control over our beliefs[17], or other very relevant considerations, which can prevent misconceptions of the kind of conception of control I want to establish for our autonomy.

2.1. The good-will objection

My first objection to Pettit's (2012) idea of control is connected to his willingness to characterise as an example of control a case that strongly relies on a third party for its achievement. I call this the good-will objection.

The case of the comatose patient counts as control because it indeed shows every necessary element to identify it as control. It constitutes an example of exercising influence over a process, (in this case selecting an appropriate treatment), to impose a direction (the implementation of a specific medical treatment), in accordance with a previously designed pattern, (the patient's wishes). Nonetheless, what would have happened if the family or friends of the patient had decided to ignore, or had no clear idea of her wishes? The exercise of influence to impose the desired direction in this case, not only depends on other people's effort, but relies on another agent's goodwill to succeed.

Having to rely on another agent's goodwill goes precisely against what Pettit seeks to accomplish by introducing control as a requirement for non-dominating relations. Holding control for Pettit should lead to avoiding the subjection to another party's will, in order to achieve a desired outcome. It is not problematic that we consider situations of dependency on other agents as control, because there are many agents who depend on others on a daily basis,[18] what makes this case problematic is how susceptible the agent is to domination. Pettit (2012) defines domination as exposure to uncontrolled interferences, therefore, it is contradictory that the control which prevents this domination can be defined as non-intentional in the sense expressed by the comatose patient example, namely, as relying on a third party's good will. The fact that such indirect cases as the comatose patient can count

[17] Levy (2011) develops a compelling approach to control in order to address his worry regarding individual responsibility over our actions. He examines how, to count as responsible for the actions that are partially caused by our beliefs, the agent should have some level of control over them.

[18] Relational theories of autonomy intend to address this issue. Since all of us hold relations of dependency of some kind, or at some point in our lives, being autonomous should not amount to an individualistic ideal that does not take into account how we rely on others in many domains.

as expressions of control, suggests that the concept can accommodate circumstances we would probably not want to call control and is therefore in this respect too inclusive.

2.2. The agency objection

Pettit's (2012) approach to non-intentional control also shows there seems to be something lacking in his general definition of control. The two key elements of his definition of control are influence and direction, however, non-intentional control implies there can be control without agential involvement, in other words, without the agent's *active* contribution to the result. The latter leads to a definition of control that does not include agency as a requirement, because directing an outcome without intending for this to happen does not express any particular capacity to impose such change. This is what I refer to as the agency objection. Surely, there are many definitions of power, and not all of them refer to *agential power* as the central or proper kind.[19] However, exercising agency does not only describe a capacity or an ability to impose some change but include a willingness behind it (Gilabert, 2018).

It is important to clarify that I do not want to argue control has to be exercised directly by the agent. Rather, since the comatose patient does *nothing* to communicate or implement her wishes, her influence over the outcome can be merely lucky if it is not connected to some kind of agency exercise. Qualifying a lack of control as an experience of being subject to luck has been greatly discussed (See for example Lackey, 2008 and Coffman, 2009) and, as expected, there is no agreed position regarding this relation. Nonetheless, the importance of considering a level of intentionality in the agent's capacity to impose changes on an outcome hails from the connection between control and non-domination. Pettit's control is supposed to be securing non-dominating relations, but at the same time, accepts lacking the intention to make changes on results affecting our lives; not because he does not intend to impose burdensome conditions of self-knowledge on the agent, but because the mere change of circumstance appears sufficient. This lack of intention could end up qualifying changes on the direction of outcomes that were merely lucky, as an expression of agent's equal standing, which does nothing to address her vulnerability or capacity to be non-dominated.

[19] Fricker (2007) makes the distinction between agential and structural power without implying any primacy of one over the other when referring to social power.

Furthermore, controlling without intention also means that there is no need to grant appropriate means to exercise power as influence, or in other relevant sense, to the agents in the political sphere. Non-domination is directed at securing our relations and the vices that come from power imbalances but including non-intentional control and indirect influence as cases of control, takes away the focus from addressing those power imbalances by making sure that each agent has an *equal share in political power* as his own view holds.

2.3. The visibility objection

Finally, Pettit's negative approach seems appropriate to secure the formal aspect of equal treatment required by relations of recognition. Nonetheless, he is sceptical of political participation, particularly in electoral terms, as a means for exercising influence by common citizens. His distrust of majorities is reasonable but dilutes his intention to uphold a system of influence for citizens because it even leads him to suggest that some issues should not involve popular deliberation. It is not particularly contentious to affirm that some central matters should not be subject to the popular vote and be secured by constitutional means instead. However, his focus on contestation seems insufficient and inadequate to set a direction over the course of decision-making processes.

> Control of the people over the state can be grounded in a disposition of people to rise up in the face of a government abuse of legitimacy and a disposition of government to back down in response to the fact or prospect of such opposition (…) To the extent that the possibility of popular, successful resistance is on the cards- to the extent even that it is on the cards as a matter of common belief- the influence of the people over government can be established on a robust basis and can constitute a real form of power (Pettit, 2012:173).

The problem with his idea of control lies precisely in his definition of influence. The mere disposition of the people to contest, and of the state to prevent the need for that contestation, constitute a very weak form of control to be characterised as a system of *directed*, *unconditioned* and *efficacious* influence. Surely, a system that relies on the state's disposition to back down cannot be unconditioned, and similarly depending on the people's

disposition to contest, and even just the possibility of resistance, does not express an efficacious sort of influence.

It is unclear how an agent's disposition to interfere can increase the probability of a result without any manifestation that can prove this disposition. Additionally, this definition would need to include some way of communicating that disposition for it to hold any effect on third parties involved, which should be central to secure non-domination. According to Pettit (2012), the exercise of influence is constitutive of control, and control provides the agent with the capacity to prevent domination. Thus, defining influence as the manifestation of a disposition, or the capacity to make an input expressed as a disposition, would require some means of communicating it to others to fulfil the role of granting the equal standing non-domination needs.

These concerns are pressing for the kind of political relations I want control to uphold. In my view, control, and its related exercise of influence, should not only guarantee relations of mutual respect for each person's authority over their lives, but also translate that authority into effective impact over outcomes. The latter seems unlikely to happen through a mere disposition that need not be manifest or communicated to others. It should be made *visible*.

In summary, Pettit's definition of control and influence shows some problematic features, which are connected to a certain reliance on a third party to realise the active component that non-domination suggests, and that is crucial to my view. Non-intentional control seems problematic because it exposes the agent to rely on the third party's goodwill to carry out her wishes. Virtual and reserve influence in turn, are not active in a different way, namely, by reducing the agent's exercise of influence to a mere disposition to interfere. By separating our negative and positive influence over outcomes, my view of control seeks to address these problems.

3. The active control view

Having control expresses the acknowledgement of our equal standing as autonomous agents, but more importantly, it provides us with effective capacities to influence those decisions affecting our lives. Pettit's (2012) approach to control as a condition for non-domination fails to convey the active character of non-domination, because indirect influence over

outcomes, and mere dispositions to interfere can satisfy the "control condition". In other words, the analysis of Pettit's definition of control showed that if it does not include a strong positive aspect, we are forced to rely on third parties, and our input is reduced to a passive expression of intention. My view of control addresses this problem.

Identifying non-domination as an appropriate way of establishing political relations of recognition showed that power imbalances are one of the main problems to tackle. The latter necessarily suggests that control has to include a positive aspect. I will briefly outline, in what follows, my view of an *active* kind of control. I base my view on an account of control that explicitly includes the positive aspect, and I show that my approach is not vulnerable to any of the three objections I posed to Pettit's definition.

Most mainstream views in the philosophy of control accept that it has both a negative and a positive dimension. For instance, according to Nicholas Rescher (1969) control is the *capacity* to produce the occurrence of an event—what Rescher calls *positive control*—and the capacity to prevent it—what he calls *negative control* (Rescher, 1969: 329). Likewise, in response to views that define luck as lack of control, particularly to Jennifer Lackey's (2008), Coffman (2009) develops what he calls a Clear Lack of Control Requirement. "Clear LCR: E is lucky for S only if S isn't both free to do something that would help produce E and free to do something that would help prevent E" (Coffman, 2009:500). Although he focuses on luck, his Clear LCR also offers the chance to think of control as composed by both a negative and a positive aspect.

Rescher's definition of control is especially appropriate for thinking about political control. What we are looking for is a definition that helps us determine the kind of standing and attributions we should experience in our political relations. By considering that a definition of political control should include the capacity to both bring about and to prevent the occurrence of an event, we can take Pettit's definition of control—both in general and of popular control in particular—but add an active character to it. Accordingly, my definition of active control amounts to enjoying *political influence.* This notion follows from Pettit's definition in the sense of having influence over events. However, it places equal emphasis on the negative and the positive aspect of such influence. In other words, I understand active control as being determined by our capacity to both provoke and prevent events. Therefore, the main requirement for having active control is holding political power. I will present my definition of political power in detail in the following chapter, but for now, think of political

power as the *kind of political influence* that would allow for that negative and positive aspect of active control, i.e., preventing and provoking.

More needs to be said to describe the characteristics of our self-rule within *political* relations. I call these the *agency condition*, and the *epistemic condition*.

The capacity to influence an event, either to produce or to prevent its occurrence, implies agency to not qualify the lucky occurrence of our desired outcome as an exercise of control. Consequently, being in control cannot solely amount to *having* the capacity to influence an outcome; it requires the *exercise* of that capacity. This is where political participation comes in. The clearest expression of our negative and positive capacity over events has to do with the role that we play within the political sphere.[20]

Two clarifications are important here. First, the requirement to exercise the capacity, does not imply that we only count as having control when we achieve our desired outcome. Since our political relations include other agents with equal rights and standing, each person's exercise of their control will influence the outcomes in different ways. What our political control requires are the conditions for us to exercise the capacity to produce and prevent events. Therefore, we need substantive attributions over decision-making. The exercise of our capacity will, hence, require compromises to accommodate to our equal right as autonomous agents. Inclusive and well-established deliberation processes are the best way to address the need for compromises without suffocating the different "voices" or perspectives.

The second clarification refers to agency. It would seem that, since I hold that agency is necessary for control, I am arguing for direct involvement as the only way to have political control. Nevertheless, for example, there is still agency when we appoint a representative for decision-making purposes. For political participation to accommodate the definition of control I have provided, it clearly needs something more than granting most decision-making attributions to representatives, which is what we experience in our current democracies. However, it is important to note that political control can also involve representatives, and does not imply forcing constant deliberation upon agents, which would be very costly and

[20] I will develop my view of political participation in detail in the next chapter.

unfeasible at a large scale. I will say more about this when I focus on my approach to political participation in Chapter 3.

The epistemic condition, on the other hand, addresses the vulnerability of agents to domination. As the analysis of non-domination showed both at an individual and collective level we are exposed to uncontrolled interferences by others. This means that, if we are to have political control, our decisions need to be neither manipulated, tricked, or coerced by others. Most of this is already included in the requirements for non-dominating relations but is also actually related to what Catriona Mackenzie described as authenticity conditions. Our capacity to affect events must come from desires and beliefs that are truly our own, which means they cannot be forced or designed by others.

3.1. Active control: visible, agential, and power centred

I presented three objections to Philip Pettit's definition of control, namely, the *good-will objection*, the *agency objection*, and the *visibility objection*. I will briefly show how my approach to control does not fall prey to any of them.

The objection I described as the good-will objection pointed out that Pettit's approach subjects the exercise of influence that control entails to another agent's good will. In order to stress this idea, I looked into his use of the example of the comatose patient, whose exercise of influence relied on her family and friend's willingness to carry out her desires. The active control view involves a positive aspect; consequently, it implies an effective exercise of influence. This amounts to providing genuine *de facto* power in the form of decision-making capacities, so that we can actually produce the occurrence of events. Since it includes proper means to instantiate our desired direction, my approach does not rely on a third party's goodwill.

Pettit (2012) holds there can be non-intentional control, which implies there can be control without the agent's active contribution to the result. I called my objection to this idea 'the agency objection'. Removing intentionality impoverishes the idea of exercising influence and amounts to claim there can be control where there is no agential power to impose a change. My view has at its centre the notion of active involvement of agents. The idea is to

secure our standing and related attributes in order to exercise a role that can guarantee our influence.

My final objection to Pettit's view on control was the visibility objection. Pettit argues that what is required for the influence of the people over government to constitute real power is the mere possibility of successful resistance. However, it is unclear how an agent's disposition to interfere, and the government's disposition to back down, can suffice to grant the former control over the latter. This is especially concerning since their dispositions do not seem to involve any expression or visible exchange to communicate them in some way to one another. Active control instead, makes visible the equal standing of the agents by reinforcing the need for appropriate means to express our equal share in political power. The exercise of influence over outcomes is meant to be effective; visible.

To conclude, a definition inspired by this understanding, allows for a stronger version of control than the one offered by Pettit (2012). Having control, therefore, does involve influencing an outcome in some way but such influence is to include the capacity to *produce* an event and to *prevent* an event. Imposing a pre-determined direction on the outcome is an adequate way of describing the kind of control required by non-domination. Nevertheless, if it does not include a positive aspect, or in other words a chance for substantive involvement in political decision-making, it leads to affirm mere means of contestability as sufficient to secure those non-dominating relations.

Additionally, control is understood here as a capacity and the central requirement to exercise this capacity is to hold political power, in other words, the right sort of influence that comes with related faculties that allow imposing negative and positive changes. Producing an event implies having the power to play an active role, which is precisely what Pettit's version neglects.

IV. Conclusions

The goal of this chapter was to think about the political conditions for autonomy. Having already established that what takes place within the political sphere are indeed political relations, I set out to identify the political conditions for those relations to be autonomy-enhancing, or what I call Relations of Mutual Recognition. I argued that the two main conditions to establish that sort of relations—which is the same as saying the political

conditions for autonomy—are non-domination and control. Both concepts are based on Philip Pettit's definitions. Thus, I began by analysing each of these concepts. In light of other authors and my own critiques, I reformulated both non-domination and control.

Chapter 3: Relations of mutual recognition

I. Political power, recognition, and political participation

I have argued that there is a political aspect to personal autonomy. Our relations in the political sphere are central to personal autonomy, in the sense that they partly constitute the autonomous life. Recall, however, that throughout this research, I have held that even a causal approach should be moved by my argument regarding the political aspect of autonomy.

There is an important assumption behind the idea that we should investigate the *political* aspect of autonomy and *political* relations that I have not discussed in detail. I refer to the 'political sphere' instead of 'public' or 'social' intentionally. This choice relies on the notion that there is something particular and relevant about the political that requires a different approach. In this chapter, I will analyse and introduce my understanding of political power, recognition, and political participation. These set of concepts will help make the distinct character of the political, and the relations we hold in it, come to the front. Thus, the aim of the chapter is twofold; first to provide the final elements that complete the characterisation of the political relations required for our autonomy; what I have called Relations of Mutual Recognition (political power and recognition). Second, to set the theoretical background for the kind of political participation that I sketched in the last chapter, and which I will argue (in Chapter 4) should be implemented to achieve Relations of Mutual Recognition.

I begin by arguing that the differentiating elements of the political sphere are both the kind of decision-making processes that take place in it, and the power that rules them: *political power*. My view regarding the kind of decision-making that takes place in the political sphere constitutes a descriptive argument to characterise some features of our democracies. Contrastingly, the approach to political power that I will present is both descriptive and normative. My intention is to provide a characterisation of political power that makes sense of our intuitive understanding of how power works in the political sphere, whilst also offering a novel approach that could transform how we relate to one another with respect to political decision-making. Political power is presented as what we require to enjoy what I defined as active control in Chapter 2.

Thinking of recognition, on the other hand, sets the basis to understand how and why we need to re-think political power and our political participation if they are to promote our autonomy.

The chapter has three main parts. Part II presents the elements that I claim distinguish the political sphere and thus justify developing a separate approach for our political relations. Part III analyses power and my preferred model to understand the notion. Part IV characterises my view of power, and Part V will introduce my approach to recognition and discuss the role of political participation for our political relations.

II. Delineating the political sphere

Acknowledging that there is a political aspect of autonomy amounts to recognise that there is something particular about our political relations that merits a distinct approach. Accordingly, it says something about the political sphere. I identify two differentiating elements of the political sphere, which I claim justify analysing our political relations and the conditions that would enable them as distinct from those required for our social interactions. The kind of political decision-making that takes place within the political sphere and the power that rules over these decisions (and that shapes our interactions) are what I recognise as the two differentiating elements of the political sphere.

1. Political decision-making processes

This section will briefly explain what makes *political decision-making processes* distinct enough to require a separate analysis.

Democracies' rule via decision-making over important and many times, controversial issues—think of assisted suicide and euthanasia, for example. Public policies and legislation at the same time set boundaries, rights, and the general conditions for most of our daily lives' interactions—think of wearing a seat belt in cars and working only a set number of hours each day. This is also true regarding non-democratic regimes where decision-making might involve little to no collective deliberation, but still pertains to issues related to most aspects of people's lives—one could say that the scope of decision-making is even wider in non-

democratic regimes. Likewise, decisions are usually directed at most of the citizens (of course the focus is sometimes placed on specific groups) of a determined territory. Additionally, the impact of those decisions is undeniably evident, not only due to its broad reach, but because they tend to be enforced by law.

Political decision-making processes have thus, two main features:

(i) *Wide-ranging scope*: they concern issues from most aspects of people's lives (from working conditions and education, to religion and sexual relations);
(ii) *Far-reaching impact*: they usually affect most citizen's lives and are generally enforced by law.

It is important to clarify that there are obviously various other important kinds of collective decision-making instances, such as those that happen at the workplace, in education (schools, universities) and within a household. These are also sometimes both impactful and of a relatively ample range. However, the two features, when describing political decision-making speak of consequences or effects that are not comparable to the ones produced by any other sort of decision-making. The scope of political decision-making processes is certainly wider than that of workplace decisions, for example, but more importantly, even if the scope of decision-making that takes place in the household might compare, the impact in terms of the numbers that political decision-making reaches, next to the capacity to enforce them by law are sufficient to separate political decision-making from other forms of decision-making.

2. Political power

Arguing that political decision-making has a wide-ranging scope and far-reaching impact also says something about the power that rules and shapes those processes. Power has been commonly defined by political theorists as the main concern of politics (Laswell, 1950; Morgenthau, 1968; Dahl, 1957). Political studies are many times described as focusing on power, which is believed to foster inquiry about other central political notions such as authority, freedom, and democracy. This characterisation makes speaking of *political* power seem redundant. Nonetheless, as we saw in the previous section, political decision-making has features that make it unique, and the same applies to the power that rules them. In other

words, just as political decision-making requires a distinct approach, the power that is expressed in them and that shapes the interactions between those involved—to a higher or lesser degree—in decision-making processes equally necessitates its own approach. Analysing the model and perspectives of power that inspire my view of political power will provide enough evidence to justify taking this distinct approach.

Hence, before moving on to Part III where I start discussing the model of power that shapes my view, i.e., the master/slave model, I would like to begin by situating my approach to political power amongst the feminist perspectives of power that inspire it. I will not be developing a complete overview of the different feminist versions of power but instead, I will follow Amy Allen's (2016) useful description of the most relevant groups of feminist approaches to power.

Allen (2016) identifies three main groups of feminist approaches to power. She refers to the first group as liberal feminist approaches that view *power as a resource* (see Okin, 1989). These accounts criticise the unequal and unjust distribution of power between men and women that gender-structured societies grant. Allen claims that we can understand Okin, for example, as implying that feminism should aim at the redistribution of the critical social good that power is.

Allen calls the second group views that conceptualise power as domination. This approach thinks of power as an illegitimate power-over relation, in other words, as a relation of domination. Thus, power is not considered a resource like in the first group, but a relation of oppression or subjection. Allen explains that domination has been differently conceptualised in accordance to how each approach has been influenced by analytic philosophy (see Cudd, 2006; Haslanger, 2012), radical feminism (Mackinnon, 1987; Pateman, 1988), phenomenology (Beauvoir, 1974; Young 1990b, Oksala, 2016), socialist feminism (Young, 1992; Hartsock 1983), intersectional feminism (Crenshaw 1991; Collins *et al*. 2002; Nash, 2008; Garry, 2011) and post-structuralism (Foucault 1977; Allen 1999; Bordo 2003; Butler 1990; Fraser 1989). Although these group of views use remarkably diverse theoretical tools, what some of them share is that they use the analogy of the master/slave relationship to describe their understanding of domination.

The final group views power as empowerment (Miller, 1992; Held, 1993; Hoagland, 1988). Allen holds that empowerment views also come from a variety of theoretical backgrounds but that what they have in common is the intention to re-conceptualise power as a capacity. These accounts argue that the common characterisation of power as power-over is implicitly masculinist. Hence, their aim is to instead understand power as the ability to transform oneself and others, or in other words, as power-to. Some have also referred to power-with to express this notion of transformative power (see Follett, 1942).

My view belongs to the second group of approaches that understand power as domination, but there is an important difference: I do not define power as domination, but our *political relations* as relations of domination. Thus, although I also take the master/slave model as the analogy to develop my characterisation, I understand political power as a *shared capacity*, and in this sense, my view comes closer to the third group. I draw from empowerment views to propose an approach that even though takes a power-over approach as its starting point, can move beyond towards a power-to (or power-with) understanding.

III. The master/slave model

The master/slave model looks at the relation between a master and slave in order to illustrate the relation of oppression in the evident as well as more subtle ways in which the former subjects the latter. As we saw in the previous section, there are a variety of accounts that take this model to develop their view. My approach takes inspiration from the master/slave model—albeit critically—that Philip Pettit (2010-2012) elaborates for his account of freedom as non-domination. Sections 1 to 3 will analyse the master/slave model, which introduces the neo-republican character of my proposal.

Robert Dahl (1957) provided an influential definition of power. According to Dahl, an agent has power over another agent if he can get the latter to do something she would not otherwise do (Dahl, 1957:202-203). Another similar classic understanding of power is developed by Max Weber (1978), who states that power amounts to: "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (Weber, 1978:53). This idea of power is still present in recent approaches to the notion such as Rainer Forst's (2015) *Noumenal Power*. Forst defines power as "the capacity of A to motivate B to think or do something that B would otherwise not have thought or done" (Forst, 2015:115).

Forst (2015) claims that power is the capacity of agent A to influence agent B's 'space of reasons'. As mentioned above, this view of power also strongly resonated with feminist accounts of gender oppression, and as such, featured in the logic of master/slave (see MacKinnon, 1987; Pateman, 1988) all through what has been called the second-wave feminist movement between the 1960's, 1970's and beyond (Oksala, 2019: 679). The master slave model amounts to nothing more than taking the paradigmatic case of a master and a slave relation to show the subordination of the slave to the master's will.

This part will discuss the master/slave model's problems and strengths to address power relations by looking briefly into the neo-republican version of the model. There is of course an ample variety of ways to define power[21] which are not going to be mentioned here. Likewise, I do not intend either to outline the various feminist views on the master/slave model debate. Instead, I would like to consider two objections to the model. In light of both objections, I will argue that especially to define political power; it is indeed necessary to re-think the master/slave model. Still, I will stress that this approach does hold the potential to develop a definition of political power able to address both feminist critiques and to provide a novel view of political power as an enabling condition for Relations of Mutual Recognition.

1. The Power-over Objection

Although the master/slave model has been extremely relevant to approach power, Oksala (2019) identifies two main critiques. The first critique addresses the problem of theorising, in particular, women's subordination without allowing for agency and the positive aspect of resisting. The model appears to narrowly define the subordinated as victims, which leaves no room to analyse the latter's own role in terms of resistance and action. I call this the *Power-over Objection*. The second critique raises the concern that power-over tends to restrict the analysis to an individual level, which I call the *Structural Constraints Objection*. This is problematic because it neglects social structures and systemic constraints in their connection to power (see Honig, 1995; Held, 1993; Okin, 1989; Young, 1990a; Allen, 1996).

[21] A central critique to this common approach to power, for example, was raised by poststructuralist views such as Michel Foucault's (1978) 'microphysics of power' as well as by Steven Lukes (2005) who argued that conceptions of power are ultimately an outcome of political struggle. Both critiques have been and are still very relevant to feminist approaches to power.

In what follows, I analyse both objections when considered within the framework of a neo-republican version of the master/slave model.

The master/slave model has been particularly central to one tradition, namely, republicanism. Neo-republicans during the late 1990's did an impressive historical and theoretical analysis to search for the key elements that made republicanism a separate tradition. One of the agreements between the different neo-republican versions was precisely that the master/slave model played a definitional role in republicanism, since the whole motivation of the republican project was to oppose and prevent domination (Pettit, 2010). I have argued (see Chapter 2) that the rich interpretation of non-domination developed by Philip Pettit (2010) provides a solid and appropriate base to think of the political conditions required to enjoy our personal autonomy from a feminist perspective. I identified and re-defined those conditions as non-domination and control.

One of the most important contributions of Pettit's non-domination is his view about different sort of interferences, which relies on the master/slave model. Examining the figure of the benevolent master led Pettit (2012) to argue that a relation of domination need not be expressed in obvious or visible ways. The benevolent master still holds the slave to his will, even if he decides to not interfere with the slave's life. The subjection of the slave to the master's will, thus, does not depend on whether or not she's interfered with and constrained by the master, but on the very nature of their relation. It is about the capacity of the master to arbitrarily interfere or his ability to exercise uncontrolled interference (Pettit, 2012:59) to the slave's life *if he wants to*.

Through this portrayal of the master/slave relation, Pettit allows us to think of power relations beyond the classic liberal concern for non-interference. We can extrapolate this master-slave model to the subtler ways in which we can be subject to the arbitrary interference of others. Moreover, we can use the master-slave model and Pettit's non-domination, to identify systematic forms of domination of women and minorities—I will return to this later when I address the structural constraints objection. Pettit himself describes the compatibility of his reading of non-domination to feminism.

> [I]f the main problem for women is that cultural, legal, and institutional pressures combine to put them in a position akin to that of slavery—combine to place them

> under the thumb of men—then the ideal for women is precisely that of being secured against arbitrary interference: being given freedom in the sense in which this connotes, not just an absence of interference, but an absence of domination (Pettit, 2010:139).

However, the idea of power that is implied by Pettit's (2010) non-domination comes from his focus on the arbitrary imposition exercised by the dominating party over the dominated agent; in other words, it is a notion of power-over. Due to this focus, it is indeed vulnerable to the power-over objection, i.e., viewing agents as mere victims. One of the reasons why non-domination is vulnerable to the objection is because it corresponds to a negative—in the sense of representing an absence—version of freedom. In this case, it is not the absence of interference as it is for classic liberals, but the absence of *arbitrary* or *uncontrolled* interference that makes a person free from domination; where the arbitrariness is determined precisely by the level of control that the dominated agent has over the interference. Hence, there is no domination when the agent has control. The latter means that the dominated is in some way stripped of her agency and that her enjoyment of non-domination depends on her exercise of that agency in the form of control.

The idea of somehow regaining control can seem to bring the positive aspect into the account since although the dominated is the victim, power is portrayed as mobile; it depends on the control exercised by the agent over interferences. If such control is not fully dependant on external structures being in place, or other agents granting it, then there is space for resistance and challenging agency by the dominated. Nonetheless, this rendering of the master/slave model faces an additional problem. As my detailed examination showed (Chapter 2, Part III), according to Pettit (2012), to control is to influence an outcome. However, Pettit includes in his definition both an *indirect* kind of influence, as well as a type of *non-intentional* control. Approaching control in this manner prevents it from adding the active character that non-domination needs to go beyond describing the dominated as a mere victim. If control does not represent a way to regain at least some of the agency that was stripped from her by the domination, then the use of the master/slave model only plays a descriptive function. I will not go into further details here about other problematic

consequences of this passive understanding of control,[22] but move on to consider the Structural Constraints Objection before making some concluding remarks.

2. The Structural Constraints Objection

Let us recall that the Structural Constraints Objection states that the master/slave model prevents an analysis of power that takes into consideration the systemic oppression and structural constraints connected to power. This is due to it being an approach that deals with individuals, the oppressed and the oppressor. It could be argued that the master/slave model can be applied to collectives or institutions and in that way address structural constraints, but it does seem apparent that following versions of the model like Dahl's can make it harder to explore the systemic constraints involved in power. The problem does not solely lie on the collective versus individual character of power, what seems problematic is that having power depends on the specific characteristics of the dominating party.

That the master indeed plays that role clearly does not depend on him alone but on the social structures that allow this to be the case, as well as on legal and political constraints that are in place to perpetuate set roles and oppressive relations. Hence, this use of the model does not consider how power works in different domains and the differences in standing of each agent as contributing or limiting factors to exercise any form of power—even if it is power-over.

Although the Structural Constraints Objection makes a strong case against the master/slave model, Pettit's use of it has one important feature that can overcome it. Non-domination uses the master/slave model in a different way because it concerns relations. My analysis of Pettit's non-domination (Part II, chapter 2) showed that it is not just about an agent having the capacity to make another person do things she would not otherwise do; it has to do with the oppression that another person, institution, or any sort of agent can exercise even if they do not want to, and even if they do not realise, they are oppressing you. The latter means that it considers the different standing that structural injustices grant to different agents. We can easily imagine that different standing in the case of a well-intended, but unaware, man that establishes dominating relations with women due to his privileged social standing. Pettit

[22] I have already analysed in detail the problems with the lack of a positive aspect in Pettit's non-domination, especially regarding his definition of control in the form of an objection I called the agency *objection* (the detailed analysis can be found in chapter 2)

does not go as far as providing this sort of example, but he refers to the interpersonal status of equal dignity and freedom we should enjoy to avoid domination (Pettit, 2012). Likewise, as we saw in the previous chapter, he even claims that domination can change the cognitive and objective character of our choices because of the dependency on the good will of the dominating agent it creates. Therefore, we could interpret his view as actually acknowledging the manner in which relations of domination perpetuate oppression, which is another way of recognising systematic forms of oppression as connected to power.

There are a few important things to conclude on how Pettit's interpretation of the master/slave model fairs when faced to both the Power-over Objection and the Structural Constraints Objection. First, it allows us to understand why power imbalances are so pernicious: because they strip the individual's full agency over her life. The problem is that thinking of power over someone in this sense does make the approach vulnerable to two problems; portraying the oppressed as victims that merely experience the power that is exercised over them, and oversimplifying power. If power involves the holder and the dominated in terms of an agent having a straightforward capacity to impose his will over another agent's, it can disguise or not attend to the structural and systemic background that perpetuates domination. However, non-domination does have the theoretical tools to avoid the oversimplification and the victimising of the oppressed.

Including control as a central element to secure non-domination, as Pettit (2012) does, considers the agency of the dominated, and the relational aspect of the proposal can introduce systemic oppression into the analysis.

I described how Pettit's idea of control is insufficient to face the Power-over Objection and the importance of its relational aspect. In the following sections, I will introduce my version of political power and how it relates to the definition of control I already explored in Chapter 2. The idea is to show that the master/slave model, in the non-domination reading, can set the basis for a definition of political power if it becomes a power-to approach. My definition of political power takes into account the analysis of Pettit's reading I presented here and introduces other considerations which make it a novel approach able to include the strong elements of Pettit's master/slave model.

3. Non-domination and power-to

Based on the previous discussion about the master/slave model, in this section, I will briefly explain how my view is inspired by non-domination but takes a power-to stand. As we saw previously, a way to address the first feminist critique to the master/slave model (the Power-over Objection) was by adding some strong element of agency to avoid presenting dominated people as mere victims. I will discuss here how non-domination can be related to a power-to definition by including what I have called active control (Chapter 2).

Domination in Pettit's reading is the capacity to interfere with another agent's life, without the latter having any control over those interferences. It is about having power over another person's life. Does that mean that non-domination is the reverse? Securing that we have power over another's life? This is one of the concerns that feminists have voiced in terms of how we describe power (Oksala, 2019:680). Why would we want to have more power if it is defined by this kind of domination? But this not what the notion implies.

Since non-domination has to do with power relations, to not be dominated what we need is to avoid the imbalances in power. This does not translate into who has more power over another person's life, but how we can manage to remain authoritative over our own lives. What we need for non-domination is *power to* pursue our own goals. What non-domination requires is regaining control; not just to oppose the interferences or struggle for dominion over others, but to regain or retain our own agency. This is why (as I argued in the previous section and in Chapter 2) non-domination is connected to a definition of control that should be active. The capacity for uncontrolled interference depends on the faculties—not in an internal sense but as those that are granted to an agent—that each person has, and how we secure control is what will allow for non-domination. My view of political power focuses precisely on those faculties or attributes.

IV. Power as authoritative influence: between power as domination and empowerment

By now I have situated my view amongst feminist approaches to power, and argued it belongs to the group of accounts that think of power as domination—with the key caveat that I take political relations to be relations of domination and not *power itself* as defined in

these terms. Likewise, my analysis of the master/slave model allowed me to elaborate on how useful this analogy is to characterise our political relations. On the other hand, in Part II, I claimed that I take inspiration from the group of views that characterise power as empowerment. Accordingly, I mentioned that I think of political power as a *shared capacity*. In this part, I will explain what I mean when I describe political power as a shared capacity by introducing what I call political power as *authoritative influence.*

Section 1 describes the notion of authoritative influence and its connection to my idea of active control. Section 2 explains how I think of political power as a shared capacity, and Section 3 discusses some final elements of my version of power and its scope.

1. Active control and political power: a matter of influence

In my discussion in Chapter 2, I characterised political control as one of the political conditions of autonomy and defined it as active control. The latter amounts to the capacity to both bring about and prevent the occurrence of an event. Thus, I defined active control as enjoying *political influence*. I did not provide further details regarding the features of that influence. However, I claimed that the central requirement to exercise this influence is holding the related faculties that will allow imposing negative and positive changes over decision-making. In this section, I will describe the characteristics of the political influence that allows for active control, which is what I call authoritative influence and corresponds to nothing other than *political power*.

I define political power as holding authoritative influence over political decision-making, which we grant each other in the political sphere. This influence is authoritative in two ways, first in the sense that it is perceived by others as legitimate, and second in the sense that it has an effective impact. These two aspects, namely, perceived legitimacy and the effective impact, are interrelated. Perceived legitimacy has to do with the standing that we have as agents in our political relations. We are perceived as having legitimate authority over decision-making depending on the social and cultural recognition we receive from others—which I will discuss in detail in Part V—but also, with respect to the actual impact that our input has in the political sphere. The roles that each agent plays in the political sphere, inform others of the kind of involvement they have regarding decision-making, which elicits an according recognition of that standing. That impact, therefore, depends on the formal

attributes or faculties that the agent has over political decision-making. By attributes, I mean the agent's formal faculties over political decision-making, which are granted to her in accordance with a role (citizen, legislator). [23] In our democracies, formal attributes granted to common citizens are usually restricted to voting for representatives, where every individual vote has very little impact over the final result and does not have a *direct* impact over decision-making. Accordingly, it is clear that the kind of political power that I am characterising requires something more than the sole faculty to regularly elect representatives. There is a key feature that some formal faculties have: *binding force*. The latter means that their effects can be enforced upon others. The formal faculties required to allow for effective impact have to include some that involve this binding force, in order for them to have effective impact. My approach to political participation will discuss this in more detail in Part V.

It is important to clarify that my definition of political power implies that it is not a *sum cero* matter. It is not the case that some agents have political power—authoritative influence over decision-making—and others do not. Influence is shared in different degrees in the political sphere, in accordance with the role that each agent plays. As I said at the beginning of this chapter, my definition of power is both descriptive and normative. Throughout this research, I have argued that our current standing and attributes in the political sphere do not allow us to be authoritative over our lives as our autonomy requires. Therefore, what I am arguing here is that having sufficient authoritative influence is what *would* allow us to have active control, and thus, would foster the relations of mutual recognition we currently do not enjoy. Recall that control and non-domination are what I have identified as the two political conditions for autonomy. Therefore, political power as I define it here is nothing other than the required form of influence to have active control: the capacity to bring about or prevent political outcomes (or events, as I called them).

2. Authoritative influence as a shared capacity

As I mentioned, some formal attributes are especially significant, because their impact is secured by the mandatory character of the decisions and measures that emanate from them.

[23] There are informal expressions that I am not including in this definition. Contestation in the shape of protests, rallies and others are indeed impactful and could therefore be conceived as political power. However, their informal character means that they can be ignored or require numbers and many times violence to put enough pressure on the formal structures in order to achieve results.

But where do the attributes come from? Who grants them? I understand the origin and granting of political power in a very similar way to what Rainer Forst (2005) describes as the origin and granting of political liberty:

> (…) Political liberty is the form of liberty that persons as citizens grant each other reciprocally and generally. It is not "the state" or "the community" that "distributes" rights and liberties to citizens; rather, the citizens themselves are at the same time the authors and the addressees of claims to liberties (usually in the form of rights claims). As citizens, persons are both *freedom-claimers* (or *freedom-users*) and *freedom-grantors* (Forst, 2005:227).

Forst's definition of political liberty applied to my view of political power amounts to think of our attributes as mutually granted. This understanding of political power—as something we grant each other—justifies a democratic division of labour where different roles involve different faculties, but do not imply different treatment. As such, the definition of power I offer both describes the kind of power that currently rules over our political relations, expressed mostly in the form of unequal formal attributes, and at the same time identifies a central consideration that should lead to structural changes in our democracies. If political power is something that we share in measures that only vary depending on the practical roles we play, then there is no such thing as a power transfer from 'the people' to representatives for example.

The way in which we organise our democracies seems to mix a contractual inspiration with democratic concerns. What appears to motivate our democratic arrangements is the idea that 'we the people' somehow transfer our political power—and are thus stripped from it—so that our representatives can have the monopoly of political power (which can only be contested under specific circumstances). The latter shows in the way that the attributes of common citizens, especially formal ones, are strongly restricted. We are not meant to have further faculties because we 'agreed' to transfer them to others in charge of political decision-making. Therefore, the striking feature of a definition of political power that re-thinks the dynamic of shared influence is that it allows for a crucial re-structure of our political relations.

Having sufficient political power is an enabling condition for establishing Relations of Mutual recognition because it helps to guarantee that power imbalances (having more attributes) are only connected to the characteristics of a role, and do not equal to experiencing either special treatment or abuses of power. For example, it is the case that a legislator will have more formal faculties than a common citizen, but we should make sure that the common citizen will not be left with so little attributes that her standing with regards to others prevents her to remain authoritative over her life and avoid domination. She should enjoy active control.

My definition of political power justifies thinking of the political sphere as an area with a separate kind of relations. I have developed this idea to some extent in my discussion about the political aspect of personal autonomy. However, my aim here was to explore in more detail how relations ruled by a certain kind of power—political power—require not only a different analysis, but new ways of challenging oppression, domination, or subordination. The ambition so far has not been to present an overview or a critical analysis of existing approaches to the concept of power, but to discuss one particular approach, the master/slave model, in its weaknesses and strengths to later apply it to a definition of political power. I wanted to stress the importance of having political power to experience Relations of Mutual Recognition.

3. Power imbalances and other types of power

There are two important things to add about political power as I defined it here before saying more about the political relations that are ruled by it. The first has to do with what I referred to as power imbalances. I have only hinted at ways in which we can challenge the power imbalances, or differences in attributes as I defined them. I stressed that thinking of political power as something we grant each other means securing equal treatment, but I will say more in terms of how we should address power imbalances when I discuss recognition and political participation in Part V. Furthermore, political participation will be introduced precisely to address the sort of attributions we should secure.

Also, it is important to clarify that my definition of political power aims at finding the best way to describe, but more importantly, to challenge the manner in which our political

relations work in our current democracies. The latter does not mean that it extends to or that I intend to solve other non-political imbalances of power and spaces of domination. Neither do I envisage a scenario where addressing political power imbalances and abuses will solve those other areas where we experience oppression. My focus on political power and on our political relations has to do with the elements that I identified as differentiating the political from other spheres. This confers both the relations and power that rules them a special character that could indeed help improve the conditions of our relations in other areas of our lives. Re-thinking political power in this way will not grant more power or change the abuses of power within households, or in our society—at least not in the short term—but it would surely improve the kind of relations we establish in the political and the sort of decision-making that will affect those other areas of our lives.

V. Recognition and political participation

Analysing political power helped to elucidate what makes our political relations different and particularly important. Likewise, it showed that we should conceive of our political relations as ruled by a kind of power that we grant each other, instead of something like transferring the sovereignty of the people to representatives. In what follows, I will introduce more components to my view of how our political relations should be for our enjoyment of autonomy.

In Chapter 2, I identified and discussed two constitutive elements of the kind of political relations I argue are necessary for our enjoyment of autonomy: non-domination and control. This part of the chapter will explain two additional key components of what I call Relations of Mutual Recognition: recognition and political participation. Recognition is what supports the idea of granting each other political power. Political participation, on the other hand, will shed light over how to challenge power imbalances in the political sphere.

The literature on recognition, like the literature on power, is also vast and very diverse, so it is not my ambition to either discuss the state of the art of the concept, or to develop my own novel account. I will base my approach to recognition on Nancy Fraser's (2000) understanding of the notion and argue that, although recognition features in Mackenzie's relational view, our political relations are better characterised by a definition with a stronger focus on securing our equal status like Fraser's.

Having discussed the definition of recognition that is behind the ideal of mutual recognition I argue for, I will move on to define political participation. I conclude by connecting the conceptual analysis presented throughout the chapter between political power, recognition, and political participation. The latter will provide a clear overview of how our political relations should be for our enjoyment of autonomy.

1. Two different approaches to recognition

Mackenzie (2008, 2014) has characterised recognition in different ways, both as intersubjective recognition and as social recognition. These definitions share a focus on the agent's self-perception. In this section, I will present each version and show this common thread between them. The idea is to discuss the issues that may arise by focusing on the agent's self-perceived authority instead of the conditions that can make agents effectively authoritative in the political sphere.

Intersubjective recognition signals two important considerations to develop our capacity for autonomy. According to Mackenzie, recognition allows for the attitudes towards ourselves that affirm our normative authority; in other words, it is required for conceiving ourselves as a legitimate source of authority.

> [T]o claim oneself as able and authorized to speak for oneself is also to situate oneself as answerable and accountable to others. It is thus to situate oneself in a complex network of intersubjective discursive norms and practices involving mutual expectations and governed by social standards (Mackenzie, 2008:527).

The affective attitudes that are necessary to think of ourselves in this way (self-esteem, self-respect, and self-trust) depend on us standing in relations of intersubjective recognition. Secondly, in order to claim authority, the agent needs to "have a sense of what matters to her. And to have such a sense of herself she must engage, to some degree, in activities of self-understanding and self-interpretation" (Mackenzie, 2008:527). The latter is inevitably bound to the relations and interactions we experience. Thus, establishing relations of

intersubjective recognition is how we can acquire sufficient self-understanding to determine what counts as desires and reasons for actions for us.

In Mackenzie's second approach to recognition, she argues that social recognition amounts to be regarded by others as having the social standing of an autonomous person (Mackenzie, 2014: 35). In this second way of approaching recognition, Mackenzie (2014) identifies (social) recognition as one of the conditions involved in the dimension of autonomy she calls self-authorisation—to recognise ourselves as holding normative authority. Let us recall that by normative authority, Mackenzie means to regard oneself as being authorised to exercise control over one's life, as well as to determine what will constitute reasons for acting. Accordingly, she argues that social recognition, accountability and certain self-evaluative attitudes—the same set included in the previous definition of recognition, i.e. self-esteem, self-trust and self-respect—are the conditions that make an agent capable of perceiving herself as authorised and in control of her own life.

Both versions seem to focus on the same idea: that our self-evaluative attitudes are constituted by practices of intersubjective/social recognition. Mackenzie does consider recognition as a matter of experiencing an equal standing in both versions. Nonetheless, the justification of the importance of recognition in each of them relies more on the impact that an equal standing has over our self-perception regarding our authority, than on the effective capacity to be authoritative that standing on an equal footing can provide. Our self-evaluative attitudes certainly depend on social recognition, but there are some problems with Mackenzie's approach if it is to inform the kind of recognition required for our political relations.

Mackenzie herself acknowledges one of them, which is resilience. Cases of resilience are those where people are capable of developing appropriate self-evaluative attitudes that provide them with a sense of normative authority, even though they are continuously exposed to misrecognition and dominating contexts. According to Mackenzie, resilience cases do not oppose the idea that self-evaluative attitudes are indeed constituted within social recognition practices (Mackenzie, 2014:37). However, resilience cases take away some of the strength of the idea of social recognition.

Mackenzie has a reply to this problem at the basis of her multidimensional definition of autonomy. As I pointed out when presenting her view (see Chapter 1, Part II), part of her motivation to employ a multidimensional approach was to attend to cases that pull our philosophical intuitions in opposite directions, such as examples of resilience. Recall that she takes Martin Luther King as a case that proves how a person can be self-authorising and self-governing in different degrees. The impact of oppressive circumstances affects each dimension in different levels, which justifies how Martin Luther King can express high self-governance even though his freedom and opportunities were curtailed (Mackenzie, 2019: 523).

However, it is not entirely clear whether this reply can account for all sort of cases of resilience. We do not need to look far to find numerous cases of resilient groups—women, sexual dissident groups, ethnical minorities, people with disabilities—that although faced with lacks in *all* dimensions, still manage to develop the self-evaluative attitudes that allow them to perceive themselves as having normative authority over their lives. It appears that, although Mackenzie's view of recognition sheds light over the impact that a lack of social recognition can have over our normative authority, there is some other consideration or focus that escapes her definition. Cases of resilience show that there is something central to being recognised as authoritative that goes beyond our self-evaluative attitudes.

Nancy Fraser (2000), by contrast with Mackenzie, defines recognition according to what she calls the *status model*. Recognition is enjoying the status of peers that make us capable of participating in social life on a par with each other. Fraser adds that to think of recognition as a matter of status entails "examining institutionalized patterns of cultural value for their effects on the relative standing of social actors" (Fraser, 2000:113). Under this definition, misrecognition happens when we are denied that status because, as a consequence of the institutionalised patterns of cultural value, we are deemed less worthy of respect. According to Fraser, the patterns are perpetuated by what she calls "social institutions that regulate interaction" (Fraser, 2000:114) such as marriage laws and social welfare policies.

Fraser's definition of recognition as a matter of status allows us to think of our effective capacity to be authoritative. Instead of focusing on the impact that recognition has over our self-perception, Fraser's view emphasises the importance of relating to one another on an equal footing; in other words, on the capacity of each person to participate in equal

conditions. Differences in status lead to subordination, which is why Fraser argues that the claim for recognition aims at overcoming subordination. In order to address misrecognition, we need to replace the institutionalised value patterns that prevent equal participation with ones that can enable participation instead (Fraser, 2000:115).

Fraser refers to 'institutionalised' value patterns, and in doing so, her view provides the perfect framework to think about ways of challenging those patterns, whilst at the same time acknowledging that they do not depend on individual's traits or some kind of broad cultural tendency to disrespect some individuals or groups. Her emphasis on the institutionalised character amounts to 'point the finger' at unequal structural ways of regulating our social interaction (Fraser, 2000:114). "Misrecognition is neither a psychic deformation nor a free-standing cultural harm but an institutionalized relation of social subordination" (Fraser, 2000:113).

Although Fraser (2000) is considering our social interactions, her definition of recognition can easily set the basis of the kind of mutual recognition necessary for our political relations. Furthermore, even the examples that Fraser gives of social institutions that perpetuate patterns could be (and should be) understood as political more than social. Public policies for welfare and marriage laws are the result of political decision-making processes.

Fraser does consider what she calls a "political kind of obstacle to participatory parity" which she names "political marginalization or exclusion" (Fraser, 2000:116), but she clarifies that she will not focus on this kind. Nonetheless, Fraser's definition of recognition provides the perfect approach to understand and justify political relations with an equal share of political power. What I called 'imbalances of power' amounts to the subordination that misrecognition—as Fraser understands it—provokes because of our unequal standing to participate in political decision-making processes.

Finally, Fraser's status model includes another analytically distinct dimension besides recognition as a matter of social justice, namely, distribution (Fraser, 2000:116). Whilst recognition has to do with the effects of institutionalised norms on the social standing of agents, distribution "involves the allocation of disposable resources to social actors" (Fraser, 2000:116). Each dimension is also connected to a distinct kind of injustice; for recognition,

the injustice is misrecognition, and for distribution, the injustice is maldistribution. They both correspond to forms of subordination.

> [T]he recognition dimension corresponds, as we saw, to status subordination, rooted in institutionalized patterns of cultural value; the distributive dimension, in contrast, corresponds to economic subordination, rooted in structural features of the economic system (Fraser, 2000:117).

Fraser holds that these two dimensions are not reducible to the other, especially in capitalist societies, because cultural value patterns do not necessarily determine the distribution of resources. This is important since, according to Fraser, it entails that a politics of redistribution is necessary given that not all maldistribution can be addressed by recognition (Fraser, 2000:118).

Fraser's concern for distribution addresses an important issue for political recognition. An unequal distribution of resources prevents equal participation in the political, since we cannot be peers in our political interactions if some agents lack the appropriate economic conditions that allow engaging in an equal standing. Recognising each other as full partners in our political relations amounts to guaranteeing an equal standing, and that can only be accomplished by making sure that economic inequalities will not prevent or distort that peer relation. Therefore, distribution connects with the conditions that should be in place for being acknowledged as full peers in the political sphere, in other words, it seems clear that distribution will be a very relevant concern to take into account when we discuss how to implement political participation (see Chapter 4).

The two approaches to recognition that I analysed here share one central element, which is the concern for an equal standing. We cannot characterise a relation as being one of recognition if we are not acknowledged and treated as equals by others. Mackenzie focuses on each person's normative authority, more precisely, on the importance of social recognition to develop the self-evaluative attitudes that will allow us to perceive ourselves as having normative authority over our lives. This view puts our self-perception in the centre and in so doing allows us to analyse the strong impact that a lack of social recognition can

have over a person's notion of self-worth—and eventually over her capacity to determine the things that constitute reasons for acting. However, that same emphasis proves problematic due to various cases of resilience that seem to indicate there is something about lacking recognition that goes beyond the impact on our self-evaluative attitudes.

Fraser's view instead, emphasises the idea of equal status. Her account intends to show that what happens in cases of misrecognition is that we are denied the status of equal partners to participate in social interactions. There are patterns of cultural value that have been institutionalised and characterise some as less worthy than others. This is what recognition should challenge: the relations of subordination that result from such misrecognition. I argued that most of the elements of Fraser's view are ideal to understand the kind of recognition we should enjoy in our political relations and hinted at some adjustments that a version of political recognition would require.

In the following section, I will describe my view of mutual recognition. I will show how my approach takes Fraser's view as a starting point, whilst adjusting some elements to the political context. The next and final section will introduce my definition of political participation, especially in terms of its role to foster mutual recognition.

2. Political mutual recognition

I began this chapter by arguing that the political sphere has a particular kind of decision-making processes. Political decision making has not only a wide-ranging scope but also far-reaching impact. These two conditions make our interactions within the political sphere unique. Unfortunately, the relations we hold in our democracies are dominating because they do not guarantee the equal status of its members. The character of the relations we hold in the political sphere is not inherently dominating; our political relations are currently dominating precisely because they are not based on recognition of each agent's equal status as autonomous agents. Recall that at the beginning of this research, I made some important clarifications, regarding two partial/full distinctions. One concerns the idea that our political relations are *partially* constitutive of our autonomy, and the other the degrees of autonomy that we can enjoy. That our political relations are partially constitutive of our autonomy means that they are not all there is to our autonomy. Therefore, standing in relations of

recognition makes us *fully* autonomous (in the sense of the second partial/full distinction) because it acknowledges and enables the exercise of our autonomy in crucial ways.
Accordingly, mutual recognition amounts to acknowledging each other as equally entitled to enjoy the standing of an autonomous agent in the political, and consequently, to affirm each agent's authority over their lives. Thus, I understand mutual recognition in our political relations, or political recognition, as having the status of a peer in the political sphere. My analysis of misrecognition in the political sphere, consequently, follows the same approach that Fraser (2000) identifies for social relations. Applied to our political interactions, misrecognition means to be deprived of the status of a full partner in *political* interactions due to institutionalised patterns of cultural value that label one as less worthy of respect.

Unlike Fraser, I understand political misrecognition, which she calls political marginalization, not merely as a kind of political obstacle to full participation, but as an additional dimension to her status model. Fraser relates recognition to social interaction and the distribution dimension to the economic structure, but we should think of political recognition as the dimension related to our interactions within the political sphere; which is to say, in terms of our standing as peers in political decision-making processes.

Someone could argue at this point that we are already treated equally in our democracies, so that there is no need to think of political recognition as a separate dimension, especially because that is the very idea behind notions such as being 'equals when facing the law' and 'one person one vote'.[24] Nonetheless, this objection would deny how minorities and marginalised groups are neither treated equally nor have an equal authoritative status over their lives in practice. Looking into marriage laws and policies of social welfare—Fraser's example of social institutions—proves there is no equal treatment and no equal status in practice. Sexual minorities, women, people with disabilities and racial minorities (among others) are commonly not treated equally by these institutions, and this certainly puts them in a status that is not one of peers with respect to others.

> Consider again the case of marriage laws that deny participatory parity to gays and lesbians. As we saw, the root of the injustice is the institutionalization in law

[24] For a classic discussion regarding our equal right to participation see Waldron (1998).

> of a heterosexist pattern of cultural value that constitutes heterosexuals as normal and homosexuals as perverse (Fraser, 2000:115).

My point, as mentioned in the previous section, is that the institutions that perpetuate the cultural patterns by which some are deemed less worthy of respect, like marriage laws, are not social but political. It is by acknowledging their political character that we can challenge the patterns, and as Fraser argues, replace them with ones that foster parity (Fraser, 2000:115) in our political interactions. But more importantly, it seems like the kind of decision-making that takes place in the political sphere calls for additional measures.

Political subordination means that there are imbalances in power that need measures beyond changes in terms of the cultural values that guide political decision-making. The latter is what makes the political sphere especially susceptible to failures of recognition, and in turn, instantiating mutual *political* recognition an urgent matter. Defining mutual recognition as the recognition of a separate political dimension allows us to think of those additional measures. If we want mutual recognition (relating like peers in the political sphere), we need to address the power imbalances, or the differences in attributes to have authoritative influence—as I defined political power—over political decision-making. Therefore having sufficient political power is an enabling condition of Relations of Mutual Recognition, because it allows for the active control that makes them possible.

My definition of mutual recognition also includes Mackenzie's concern for upholding our normative authority, however, my view follows Fraser's focus on status because what recognition does to our normative authority is to acknowledge that being authoritative requires being guaranteed the status of peers in our political interactions. Being recognised as holding normative authority over one's life is key to actually holding that authority in the political sphere.

3. Political Participation

This section will introduce my definition of political participation and its role for enjoying Relations of Mutual Recognition The kind of involvement that people have in political decision-making, in terms of the role they play in the overall structure of the division of

labour in our democracies, is what I identify as political participation. It concerns the exercise and share of political power that agents experience in a democratic context. For our political relations to be ones of mutual recognition, we should think of political participation as collective self-government.

Previously I have argued (see Chapter 2) that our relations of mutual recognition should be non-dominating and allow certain control over political outcomes; both to prevent and to provoke them. Exploring recognition provided more elements to identify what goes wrong in our relations that turns them into relations of subordination, and analysing political power proved that we need sufficient formal faculties to avoid that subordination. Looking into what political participation entails will, in turn, describe how we should think of our standing and attributes in order to have control.

Current democratic arrangements rest on a set of liberal premises intuitively easy to identify. First, they rely on the need to find a way to coordinate and secure rights and liberties for all, whilst also acknowledging that no particular agent has an inherent right to rule over others. The latter entails that we must find a collective way of ruling ourselves that considers some practical constraints: not everyone has the time and resources to take part in decision-making; not everyone will want to, and we would anyways be unable to include everyone due to the high number of citizens in most territories. An option that attends to those practical constraints is electing representatives to play the active role of political decision-making, whose authority is justified by being elected by the majority of citizens. Additionally, since decision-making will affect everyone's lives, another premise is that we have to implement an accountability system that keeps things on track, one that also conveys the notion that we are indeed 'ruling ourselves'. This accountability is then accomplished by the same system that elects representatives because it allows those who are not directly involved in decision-making processes to 'punish' or 'reward' the performance of those who are.[25]

The problem is that differences in status prevent us from relating to one another as peers, and the political sphere with its focus on political power creates a setting that makes this liberal accountability system insufficient to prevent subordination. Our division of labour has proven unable to address abuses of power, and secure equal treatment in practice.

[25] For a detailed critical analysis of liberal democracies, what he calls Thin Democracy, see: Barber; B (2003) "Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age", University of California Press

Moreover, in this chapter, I have advanced the idea that the problem with our democracies lies in the little consideration given to the relational character of our political interactions. Feminists have challenged the individualist nature of liberal arrangements, as well as the importance of using political power to face the subordination of women and minorities. These critiques point out precisely two great weaknesses of the liberal framework as I briefly described it here, namely, its individual centred character and its failure to acknowledge the impact of political power over our effective capacity to be authoritative over our lives.

The liberal framework that shapes our democracies focuses on autonomy and its related need for justification of political authority, whilst looking to secure rights and liberties for all. These are some of the main elements that have earned it its place as a desirable model. Nevertheless, that focus has at the same time prevented us from understanding the political sphere in terms of relations; both as *constituted* by relations and as the *ideal space to challenge subordinating relations* in every domain of our lives. This dual relational character of the political sphere should be reflected in how we understand political participation—the role of agents in democratic contexts—and that should be as a form of *collective* self-government.

Whether or not we enjoy an equal standing to participate in political interactions—in Fraser's words whether there is misrecognition—depends on the patterns of cultural value that get institutionalised and typify some as less worthy of respect. However, my interpretation showed that the political sphere has a particular kind of power ruling over agent's interactions. Therefore, political misrecognition also depends on the share of political power, the kind of influence expressed in attributes, we enjoy in the political sphere. Those who have more formal faculties are usually more capable of impacting most people's lives and their own; they enjoy more control (positive and negative as defined in Chapter 2). Hence, finding new ways to foster and secure relations of mutual recognition within the political sphere necessarily involves re-arranging the kind of attributes each role has so that we not only address subordination in the political but grant every agent with capacities to be authoritative over their lives.

Governing ourselves whilst acknowledging our equal standing as autonomous agents is what collective self-government is about. Political participation as collective self-government emphasises the relational character of our interactions in the political, which amounts to

focus not on the justification of authority of someone ruling over another agent, but on the kind of attributes and standing each agent should have in order to remain authoritative over her life, whilst also being authoritative over political decisions that affect all agents.

Recall that I characterised political power as something we grant each other. When we identify each other as co-rulers of the political sphere, imbalances of power become incompatible with the equal status—or recognition—that is due to each agent, regardless of their specific role in the political division of labour. Relatedly, when the political sphere becomes an area where we are to challenge all other relations of subordination (the second part of its dual relational character), there are no limitations to the content of the issues that are appropriate to discuss in political decision-making processes, for example.

The role that political participation plays for our political relations is therefore crucial. It challenges political misrecognition and allows for us having the authoritative influence (political power) that not only prevents domination but grants the attributes that make us truly authoritative over our lives.

VI. Conclusions

I devoted this chapter to two goals. The first one was to provide a more detailed analysis and description of what I mean by Relations of Mutual Recognition, which involved examining political power and recognition. I followed by exploring the notion of political power, which I framed in terms of the master-slave model (exploring its strengths and weaknesses) that is behind the neo-republican approach that inspires my definition. Additionally, I discussed the special character of political decision-making—of wide-ranging scope and far-reaching impact—and moved on to provide a definition of political power, namely, as the authoritative influence over political decision-making that we grant each other.

Then I moved on to explore recognition. I argued that Nancy Fraser's (2000) status model of recognition was ideal to think of political recognition because, unlike Mackenzie's (2014), it does not emphasise our self-perceived normative authority but whether we enjoy the status of peers in our interactions with others. Accordingly, I defined political recognition as being equally entitled to enjoy the standing of an autonomous agent, which means to relate as peers in our political interactions. My view differed somewhat to Fraser's because I understand

political recognition as a fully distinguished dimension in her model, instead of merely as an obstacle for (social) recognition.

Finally, I addressed the second aim of the chapter, which was to introduce my view of political participation and its role in establishing relations of mutual recognition. Political participation as collective self-government takes the definition of political power and my view of recognition to offer an approach that connects with the other constitutive parts of our relations of mutual recognition, non-domination and control. The definition of political participation that I analysed here provides key desiderata for its implementation, which will be the aim of the following chapter.

Chapter 4: Collective Self-government

I. Implementing collective self-government

In the previous chapter (see Chapter 3) I defined political power as the authoritative influence we grant each other to govern ourselves. Looking into recognition showed that those attributes must reflect an equal respect for every agent, but more importantly, they have to allow them to relate as peers in our participation within the political sphere. Additionally, I defined political participation as the kind of role we play, and the share of political power we hold, with respect to political decision-making. These background concerns amount to some important requirements when considering the implementation of the definition of political participation that I called collective self-government. Based on this previous conceptual analysis of political power, recognition, and political participation itself, this chapter will discuss the desiderata that should guide such implementation, which I identify as: inclusion, equality, deliberation and accountability.

The aim of this chapter is not to circumscribe my project of collective self-government to a specific implementation but to look at different alternatives of political participation in order to evaluate their suitability with my proposal, which I do by contrasting their capacity to meet all four desiderata, i.e., inclusion, equality, deliberation, accountability. Therefore, my focus is set more on showcasing the key components that a form of implementation should include, than on prescribing the ideal formula. I do suggest a specific model to implement collective self-government, as the conclusion of an analysis of three alternatives of political participation in terms of how they fare with respect to my desiderata. Nonetheless, I wish to remain open to the possibility that other similar arrangements can be even more suitable for the project.

I use the labels that John Gastil and Erik Olin Wright (2018) use to group what they call "democratic alternatives" when they discuss sortition to refer to these three alternatives, namely, electoral representation, citizen sortition, and direct participation. Since each of them portray a different implementation and approach to political participation, I call the same three labels democratic alternatives *of political participation*.

Part II of the chapter introduces the desiderata. Part III describes and analyses how each alternative fare in terms of the desiderata. Part IV presents my preferred model to implement collective self-government, and some challenges it could face with respect to my desiderata.

II. Four desiderata for collective self-government

I identify inclusion as my first desideratum because, part of what being autonomous means is having normative authority over our lives, which in turn requires being included and treated as a peer in political decision-making. The analysis of recognition showed how central it is to be acknowledged as a peer in our political relations. Being seen and treated as a peer means to be recognised as equally entitled to exercise that normative authority over our lives. In the political sphere, the latter should translate into inclusion. We require inclusion because "(…) inclusion embodies a norm of moral respect" (Young, 2010:23). For the autonomy minded, this is respect for each person's autonomy. Iris Marion Young (2010) claims that people are treated as means if they are asked to adjust their behaviour and abide by norms from which their interests and voice were excluded. Precisely because we respect people's autonomy, we should include agents in decision-making processes as much as possible, so that we do not fail to express that respect. Moreover, the analysis of political power showed that not only should we show respect by including, but that this inclusion should bring with it the formal faculties granted to those who are part of decision-making processes, which is an essential part of securing control and non-domination.

Equality is closely connected to inclusion since the same reasons that support being included, justify that the inclusion involves equal treatment. Nonetheless, I describe it as a separate desideratum because I understand it as signalling the *terms* of inclusion. Enjoying an equal standing was one of the requirements that we saw for mutual recognition, which is to say that as Young states it "Not only should all those affected de nominally included in decision-making, by they should be included in equal terms" (Young, 2010:23). Thinking of political power as something that we grant each other also justifies that those are attributes that secure an equal treatment. Hence, equality is identified here to stress the importance of the equal terms of inclusion, especially regarding political power, or authoritative legitimacy with its related formal faculties over political decision-making.

With regards to deliberation, I identify it as a desideratum for the implementation of collective self-government, given that another vital kind of inclusion and expression of

equality is the one that refers to people's diverse views, concerns and interests. Deliberation is important because it is a way to include not just agents but their many times contrasting views in a fair manner. What deliberation allows for is an exchange of those various views with the aim of finding the best way to accommodate that diversity. Additionally, deliberation also involves taking into account the testimony and opinions of experts. Thus, deliberation amounts to consider issues in a well-informed manner that includes other people's preferences, technical information, and the likely consequences of choosing one response over another.

Finally, accountability is paramount in any democratic arrangement due to its connection to self-government. Provided that not every citizen will be capable of being involved in political decision-making, those who are directly involved have to be accountable if what we want is to really portray some kind of 'rule of the people'. Even more so if, like my analysis suggests, what we are looking for is the collective self-government that fosters Relations of Mutual Recognition. One of the conditions for those relations is non-domination, and accountability plays a crucial role in achieving it by preventing abuses and keeping the focus on the idea of political power as shared and mutuality granted.

III. Democratic alternatives of political participation

Political participation is usually understood as the way in which we organise common citizen's involvement in the political sphere. From my earlier definition (see Chapter 3) I understand the notion in a broader way. Political participation includes every member of the political sphere since what the term represents is the set of roles and division of labour that we define to govern ourselves. This different approach, and the more citizen-focused definitions, assume a democratic context; therefore, I will not discuss non-democratic options.

I will examine three democratic alternatives of political participation that include diverse implementations: electoral representation, citizen sortition and direct participation. Although all three of them can be combined, and in many cases, they are, my intention is to discover the potential of each alternative to meet the desiderata so that if combined we can also determine the centrality that should be granted to one over the other. This goal merits a separate analysis of each alternative.

1. Electoral representation

The kind of political participation that Western cultures are most familiar with is electoral representation. Although it takes different forms—including more or less number of representatives—this alternative has a central feature, namely, the mediated involvement of common citizens in political decision making by agents that are solely devoted to that task (Urbinati, 2000: 766). These representatives are elected by popular vote open to all citizens, and the elections take place on a regular basis. Each country establishes different norms regarding the length of the period for which a legislator, a primer minister, president (and various other elected roles) will be in her position, and whether the system implemented to elect them is proportional, majoritarian, or other.

The implementation of this central feature also varies in terms of the capacity that common citizens have, to communicate with their representatives. A usual channel of communication is individual letters that any citizen can send to their representatives, as well as collective petitions for specific issues. However, in most cases, the communication of common citizens to their representatives is limited to the expression that the former do via the elections. The latter means that the main accountability system is the same election that determines who will become a representative. By choosing to re-elect a representative or to vote for her main competitor on the following election, common citizens have a way to show their support or disapproval of the performance of a representative.

The function that representatives are supposed to fulfil in general is to take part in decision-making processes about various issues, which will result in laws and policies that apply to most or all citizens. In order to allow the citizenry to elect representatives for this function, democracies hold political campaigns presenting candidates for the available seats. Accordingly, electoral representation usually relies on political parties, or at least on the notion of identifying a set of ideals, values, and concerns that each candidate to a representative post showcases for elections. Since common citizens will not be directly involved in decision-making processes, the idea is that they should be able to choose a representative that either proposes measures that they approve of, focuses on topics they deem relevant or supports ideals they share. This logic is nonetheless not the only one that motivates votes. Many times, people strongly rely on the personal characteristics of a candidate to make their choice, and as a result, candidates themselves have become used to

focusing more on making people aware of their personal features than their political views. On the other hand, historically common citizens also vote out of alignment with a political party without paying much attention to the specific candidate and her proposals.

All of the above-mentioned considerations connect to another important aspect of electoral representation, which pertains to the kind of role that representatives *should* play. This is a contentious issue that opposes two main views; either representatives should merely express the interests of their constituency in political deliberations—setting aside their particular views—or they should be entitled to put their own views first when deliberating. Hanna Pitkin (1967) expresses this distinction by contrasting the figure of representatives as *delegates* and *trustees*. The former view rests on the idea that to represent means to 'give voice' to the elector's concerns, whilst the latter understands representatives as being entrusted by the citizenry to deliberate according to their own judgement.

There are as well, those who support something like an in-between version. Nadia Urbinati (2000), for example, claims that representatives are supposed to act as advocates.

> The representative takes the claims and ideas of the people to the assembly so debate there expands and is enriched. Yet, for this to happen, society cannot be a silent place. Advocacy in parliament both requires and stimulates advocacy in society. (Urbinati, 2000: 766-767).

The role of representatives for Urbinati is to take the citizen's concerns into political decision-making where they deliberate in accordance with their own judgement. She claims that what made Athenian democracy exceptional was simultaneity; standing and acting in the assembly, so that what representative democracies need is to overcome the lack of simultaneity with an active sort of public sphere. Thus, what makes possible the communication of the citizens' interests to representatives is their own public involvement.

I have briefly described some of the main features of electoral representation. Based on these characteristics, I will move on to analyse how it upholds inclusion, equality, deliberation, and accountability.

2. Inclusion, equality, deliberation, and accountability via representatives

> [R]epresention has been associated with the weakening of self-government. For democrats in particular, it has held little appeal, first because it is seen as justifying a vertical relation between the citizens and the state, and second because it is seen as promoting a passive citizenry (Urbinati, 2000: 759).

Urbinati (2000) rightly points out that electoral representation tends to provoke distrust for democrats because of what I identified as its main feature; the mediated involvement of common citizens. The lack of direct involvement can seem to compromise some of the desiderata I have presented. But let us begin by considering inclusion.

Electoral representation does imply inclusion in a significant way because it involves every citizen in the election of representatives. As we saw above, candidates even cater to voters in particular ways because they depend on their vote to get appointed. Since we are thinking of democratic contexts, these elections would be in general open to all citizens that are eligible to vote, which usually amounts to all "adults" (depending on the age restriction set for this purpose in each country), or at least to most (keeping in mind countries that disenfranchise past criminal offenders or those who are in prison). What we need to consider now is whether this seems like appropriate inclusion for instantiating relations of recognition.

For common citizens, although voting is inclusive of most, in electoral representation, it becomes the ultimate means of inclusion they have. There can be other, usually informal, means to become included, but elections are still the main tool to achieve inclusion for this alternative. Being included in the form of choosing representatives constitutes a mediated and at the same time, a highly ambitious form of inclusion. It is mediated because, as expressed by Urbinati, we are not directly involved in decision-making processes, and it is ambitious in the sense that we are expected to choose in a single act a person that is to signify the inclusion either of ourselves as agents in discussions, or of our interests or concerns. Thus, electoral representation creates a mechanism that is inclusive in two ways, first by allowing all citizens to take part and second, by giving them the chance to choose the representative who is going to act in their staid in decision-making, or in other words, who will include them as citizens (or their interests) in those instances.

It is very problematic that the degree to which citizens will be included in political decision-making depends on whether they were capable to identify in *an instance* that takes place every few years, the most suitable person for this purpose. Likewise, this kind of inclusion heavily relies on representatives to, in fact, enact the inclusion of citizens' interests when they engage in decision-making. In Chapter 2, I discussed the pressures that representatives are subject to (from their party, powerful donors, etcetera) when analysing non-domination. My worry that in many cases (or most) they are unable to surpass those pressures, clearly justifies thinking that entrusting inclusion like this to them, is probably the main problem regarding inclusion for electoral representation.

Technocrats and social movements, on the other hand, do get included in many countries by being granted consultative faculties during decision-making processes. However, such inclusion could be improved to guarantee that all the relevant actors are included and that their information and expertise has a wider reach and impact. Currently, bigger, and more visible professionals and social movements can tend to have the upper hand in terms of being called upon to take part in decision-making processes, which can leave out other key actors.

The problems that I identify for inclusion also reveal the weakness of electoral representation with regards to equality. When considering equality, Barber argues that the mere legal and electoral equality that representation allows for, creates a fictional sense of a mass society composed of indistinguishable agents, and so it omits the economic and social determinants that should be considered for its fulfilment (Barber, 2003:146). Although electoral representation does enable effective equality by implementing the idea of "one person, one vote" it is also incapable of securing any other more substantive sense of equality. Besides weighing every vote equally, electoral representation does not offer any additional guarantee of our equal standing in the political sphere.

There are two types of deliberation that take place thanks to electoral representation; the process by which each citizen decides who will be their preferred choice of candidate (or policy in rare cases), and the decision-making process for legislation that involves representatives. Some cases include deliberating faculties for prime ministers and the president as well. In the introduction, I pointed out that one of the key benefits of deliberation depends on its capacity to promote discussions that include the plurality of views of the citizenry. We could in some sense, find a variety of views included in deliberation in a context where some quotas to secure minorities' voices will be considered, for example. Nonetheless, deliberation has to do with the whole process of discussion and weighing of

options that do require direct involvement. Electoral representation, hence, fosters full deliberation mostly for legislators. It offers a restricted sort of deliberation or at least offers a rich kind of deliberation for legislators and scarce chances of deliberating (mostly to elect representatives) to common citizens.

Finally, as described above, accountability takes the form of "punishing" or "rewarding" the performance of representatives that citizens express on elections. If a representative gets re-elected, we can assume that people approved of her performance. Representatives themselves then intend to show to their constituents that they have been doing a good job, in order to get an encouraging response during the next elections. Of course, there are other ways in which electoral representation offers accountability. Transparency of deliberations amongst legislators and the use of public funds has been implemented in many democracies, in order to ensure that representatives hold themselves accountable to the citizenry. The problem is that accountability mostly functions as a contestation method in electoral representation. We hold representatives accountable (usually only legislators and no other actors) in an after the fact manner. The citizenry is unable to put any strong pressure on their representatives because their main accountability instrument is only elections, whereas it opens the way to pressures that other actors with economic power can exercise *during* decision-making. On a similar note, Barber argues that representation impairs the ability of citizens to act as "a regulating instrument of justice", given that it prevents the public participation that would permit the notion of justice to take hold in the community (Barber, 2003:145).

To conclude, electoral representation offers some level of inclusion, equality, deliberation, and accountability, but always mediated by representatives. The latter means that it can only partially meet the desiderata because it provides limited chances for common citizens to be involved in a more substantive manner, which seems insufficient to call the arrangement self-government. The problem with electoral representation is that it relies on elections to provide inclusion, equality, deliberation, and accountability all at once, which in practice is clearly inadequate to secure the standing of peers amongst agents in the political sphere.

3. Citizen sortition

Citizen sortition roughly amounts to a method of appointing common citizens for a political role by lottery. The inspiration for this alternative of political participation comes from ancient Athens. Athenians used lottery to include citizens in assemblies where they were able to take part in political decision-making. Accordingly, citizen sortition amounts to randomly select—although in many occasions the selection is stratified by demographic criteria—a sample of people to exercise a deliberative function that can be either binding or non-binding. There are different ways to implement this method. Ben Saunders (2010) for example, proposes replacing majority rule by lottery, which amounts to after conducting elections as usual, rather than deciding the outcome in accordance with the majority of the votes, choosing one random vote to determine the outcome. Claudio López-Guerra (2011), argues for another use of sortition. He suggests replacing universal suffrage with a randomly selected sample of the population to act as the electorate. Another way to implement sortition is a sortition legislature:

> The defining feature of a sortition legislature is the method of selecting its participants. Three factors go into our selection method: identifying a target population and then drawing a sample; specifying qualifications and disqualifications for service; and creating incentives for those invited to become legislators (Gastil & Wright, 2018:312)

A sortition legislature is a legislative body fully composed of citizens appointed by lottery (see Callenbach and Phillips, 2008). They can have binding faculties like an elected legislature, as well as the same capacity to deliberate and put motions forward, or they can have some difference in attributions depending on the model. Gastil and Wright (2018) suggest that a sortition legislature should have the same faculties than an elected legislature, including the same pay. In their proposal, the sortition body serves a two-year term with the possibility to extend it to another term. Additionally, the sortition body can block party-generated policy, which according to Gastil and Wright means that "the elected chamber has to craft policy that not only meets its political objectives but also has a good prospect of passing muster under citizen scrutiny" (Gastil & Wright, 2018:324). David Owen and Graham Smith (2018) disagree with the idea of implementing such broad agenda-setting powers for the sortition body and instead support a more restricted mandate (Owen & Smith,

2018:420). Fishkin (2018) suggests institutionalised instances of deliberation that act as a prefilter or post-filter for the agenda instead of establishing a permanent sortition legislature "In either case, the deliberative body does not do the actual lawmaking but rather filters the agenda (in the prefilter cases), or it provides final approval (in the postfilter cases)" (Fishkin, 2018:360).

Another example of citizen sortition are minipublics. These can be implemented in the shape of a citizen's assembly, Deliberative Polling (Fishkin, 2018), citizen juries and others. The main characteristic shared by all minipublics is that they are intended to constitute a microcosm of voters, in other words, a group as representative as possible of diverse views and demographics present in the citizenry, via random sampling. Minipublics vary in sizes and roles, but another common characteristic is that they are supposed to create an instance of deliberation for lay citizens.

> Deliberative mini-publics are groups of 20 to 200 or more citizens tasked with learning, deliberating and advising or deciding on a policy or issue. Participants are selected through random or stratified sampling in such a way that they are descriptively representative of the public affected by the issue (Beauvais & Warren, 2019: 893)

Mark Brown (2006) identifies four central features of what he calls citizen panels and that I have included under the notion of minipublics. First, they enable opportunities for dialogue among common citizens and experts, and they restrict the participation of members of interest groups to the role of expert witnesses instead of being included in the panel. Additionally, citizen panels have no capacity to make legally binding decisions, and they address the general public as well as public officials (Brown, 2006:204). As Brown points out, minipublics tend to have an advisory character. Regardless of the specific type of minipublic considered, all of them constitute spaces for deliberation amongst common citizens whilst incorporating experts' input, but decisions resulting from such process are not binding, their outcomes are usually communicated to other deliberating bodies that do have binding faculties as advices and suggestions.

Minipublics have been implemented in various countries. Some examples are the British Columbia Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform (BCCA), Vancouver's Grandview-

Woodland Citizens' Assembly (GWCA), and the Citizen Parliament in Ireland. The BCCA took place in 2005 and was the first of its kind (a citizen's assembly). The province of British Columbia called upon its citizens to deliberate and ultimately propose a reform to the electoral system, with no involvement from elected representatives (Beauvais, 2018: 345). The GWCA instead, had a much broader mandate. Officials from the planning department in Vancouver suggested to develop a deliberative minipublic to outline a 30-year plan for the neighbourhood of Grandview-Woodland, which included issues from housing to transportation and arts.

> The GWCA took place between September 2014 and May 2015. Assembly members met as a group 11 times in this period, and additionally met with members of the public at three open, roundtable meetings. In June 2015, the GWCA's final report, the "Citizens' Assembly on the Grandview-Woodland Community Plan," was presented to City Council. In July 2016, the report was ratified by City Council (Beauvais, 2018: 345).

The Irish self-denominated Citizen Parliament began by following the initiative of a Non-Governmental Organisation movement. 100 citizens gathered in June 2011 in a citizens' assembly seeking to come up with suggestions for constitutional reform. It received such good response from the media that the incoming government accepted and supported the initiative—so did most political parties—which led to the organisation of a constitutional convention. The latter was composed by 100 participants 67 of which were common citizens (the rest of them were politicians to avoid political parties' pushback), and from it came proposals like legalising same-sex marriages, later validated by a referendum in 2015 (Sintomer, 2018: 345).

Deliberative Polling is another type of minipublic developed by James Fishkin. It originated in the context of presidential primaries in the United States. The idea behind it is to generate a representative sample of the public, which is to deliberate extensively about the merits of the candidates, in order to make recommendations to the wider electorate according to the results of this deliberation. Those recommendations are then communicated by national television to act as cues for voting (Fishkin, 2018:51). This was first implemented in 1996 for presidential primaries but given that the deliberation considered topics and not the merits

of the candidates, its conclusions did not offer clear cues for voting. Nonetheless, this kind of model can and has been replicated for ballot propositions and other policy issues.

An example is the case of the projects that took place in Uganda in the region of Mount Elgon. Two districts were involved: Bududa and Butuleja by conducting focus groups in the local language, as well as interviews with informants and the creation of an advisory group involving academics and government officials. Part of the project involved the advisory group identifying policy options to be implemented in both districts, which were then included in pre-deliberation and post-deliberation questionnaires completed by the participating citizens (Fishkin, 2018:100-110). Europolis is another example of Deliberative Polling, which was a Europe-wide Deliberative Poll that took place before the European parliamentary elections in 2009 (Fishkin, 2018: 117-126).

One characteristic that separates Deliberative Polling from other minipublics is that it includes another representativeness consideration, namely, attitudinal representativeness. This amounts to ensuring that the sample includes the various viewpoints or attitudes present in the general public.

> For random samples of ordinary citizens the recruitment of the microcosm should provide a basis for empirical assessment of how attitudes of participants compare to the attitudes of the rest of the public. One simple approach is to ask potential participants to complete the questionnaire before recruitment, allowing comparison of participants and non-participants in attitudes as well as demographics. In addition, having another comparison group who are never asked to deliberate is useful and can also be used for matching in case there is any sampling bias (Fishkin, 2018:74).

Fishkin does not provide a clear number for the size of the sample for Deliberative Polling, but states that the important thing to keep in mind is that the sample should be large enough to allow us to make a statistically significant evaluation of changes in opinions. The cases he introduces usually consider around 300 or 400 people in total.

In terms of how to engage participants in discussion, or to promote the weighing of arguments during the deliberation (usually through the course of one or two days), Deliberative Polling uses three methods: balanced briefing materials made by policy community experts from "both sides" of a discussion, small group discussion where people can share their reasons to object or support proposals, and "access to competing experts who can answer questions arising from the small group discussions" (Fishkin, 2018:75). In order to avoid distortions such as domination of the process by men, the most educated or in some way more advantaged, and group polarisation, Fishkin argues there should be good moderators, balanced materials and various opportunities for everyone to express their views suffice. According to Fishkin, Deliberative Polling results support these measures because they show that there is no pattern of movement of the positions of small groups towards the positions of the more advantaged, nor are they dominating the discussions by imposing their views (Fishkin, 2018:77). He adds that the same can be held against the risk of group polarisation.

I have described some of the main forms of citizen sortition present in the literature; sortition legislature, minipublics and in more detail a specific kind of minipublic (Deliberative Polling). Although I identified some of their shared central features, there is an important clarification to be made. There is a significant difference between two of the forms of citizen sortition that I included here, which will be important when we analyse citizen sortition's capacity to meet the desiderata as a whole. Sortition legislature, by contrast with minipublics, is a permanent instance of citizens' deliberation. As such, it fares differently in terms of inclusion, deliberation, equality, and accountability. I will thus continue to analyse both forms—minipublics and sortition legislature—as a part of the same group but keeping in mind this key caveat.

4. Evaluating Sortition

Although some may think that random sampling is not an effective way of inclusion, Fishkin states that citizens are included since they can see that their viewpoints and interests are expressed in dialogue with all competing perspectives. Citizen sortition indeed has the inclusion of common citizens as one if its main motivations. This alternative of political participation seeks to replicate in some way the Athenian sortition system to include lay people in political deliberation. However, in line with the caveat I mentioned above, there

seem to be important variations in the way that citizen sortition is implemented, which accordingly fare better or worse in terms of their capacity for inclusion.

Minipublics provide a valuable instance of direct involvement of common citizens in political decision-making. Citizens get to discuss relevant issues and receive sound information to support their deliberation process. This kind of inclusion certainly constitutes an expression of recognition of their standing as autonomous agents. Random selection of those who will be part of the minipublic also contributes to inclusion since it does not condition citizens' involvement to any specific requirement. Nonetheless, there are a few important shortcomings that reduce the capacity of minipublics to be more inclusive. Yves Sintomer (2018) identifies eight features of minipublics (and other similar forms of sortition). Three of them help explain the shortcomings of minipublics in terms of inclusion.

Most minipublics are organised by public authorities and are not in any way related to social movements. According to Sintomer (2018), they are even sometimes opposed to grassroots democracy. This top-down design takes away some of its inclusiveness because it leaves out important political agents such as community organisations and small foundations that in many cases advocate for minorities' interests, which should be one of the key concerns of an alternative of political participation that is compatible with autonomy. Relatedly, Sintomer points out that most minipublics are one-off events, and that they are generally only consultative. Many have not been organised more than a couple of times and, as mentioned above, they do not result in legally binding outcomes. The latter amounts to a type of inclusion that is not really substantive due to the limited impact of the decision-making that takes place in them, as well as the lack of regularity "The aim is not to make decisions but to improve the decision-making process with a sophisticated deliberation of lay citizens" (Sintomer, 2018:341). If minipublics only take place non-consecutively or with very little regularity, it is very unlikely that an important number of citizens get the chance to become involved in this instance of public deliberation.

A sortition legislature instead, seems shielded from most of the problems described. The sortition legislature does not share two of the three features identified by Sintomer: being merely consultative and a one-off event. Although it would probably be organised in a top-down fashion, its regularity and the binding character of its outcomes contribute to its effective capacity to include common citizens and their views, as well as experts and social

movements in decision-making processes. However, we have to consider that the design of the sortition legislature, as is the case of minipublics, is intentionally restricted to a relatively small number of participants, because of the emphasis on achieving real deliberation. Hence, the format is unavoidably restrictive in some sense and less inclusive than other forms of participation that involve all citizens.

Considering how sortition fares in terms of equality, citizen sortition appears to be capable to express the agent's equal standing. Not only do the members of the sortition body participate in deliberation, but their decisions have the same weight as those of elected legislators. There is an exercise of political power that expresses in practice an effective equality to relate as peers in the political sphere for common citizens and representatives alike. Additionally, the fact that this is a permanent institution, increases the chance of playing this role for most citizens. Therefore, one of the major contributions of this alternative lies on the faculties it grants common citizens to stand on an equal ground with elected representatives.

I will move on now to analyse how sortition fares regarding deliberation. Citizen sortition (in its different forms) promotes a particular kind of deliberation because it uniquely connects common citizens, experts and elected representatives in the same discussion. Depending on the form of citizen sortition, common citizens come in direct contact with experts and elected representatives, whilst they also weigh the arguments of their fellow citizens. At the same time, sortition intends to include the diversity of views present in the citizenry by usually considering demographic criteria for the sampling process. Taking into consideration demographic characteristics can secure that the microcosm is indeed as close a representation of the citizenry as possible, which also secures the inclusion of marginalised groups in the deliberation process. Moreover, it supports the notion that discussions are enriched by including diverse interests, concerns and points of view:

> A representative sample or a fair cross-section of the people has epistemological advantages over representative government and committees of wise men: good deliberation must include diverse points of view, so that the range of arguments considered will be broader and discussion will be more inclusive (Sintomer, 2018: 353).

Thus, citizen sortition seems to foster an ideal kind of deliberation by not only supporting a relevant sort of inclusion but providing the conditions that can lead to real exchanges among its participants. Nonetheless, there are two important considerations that can affect the capacity of citizen sortition to promote good deliberation. First, the lack of expertise of the members of any form of citizen sortition body could have an important effect over their capacity to discuss diverse issues, even in terms of their self-confidence to actively engage in discussions (especially for those who belong to already marginalised groups). The professionalisation of the political career can in this respect provide an advantage that new and inexperienced legislators or participants in minipublics do not have. The way to counter these issues can be by establishing well defined and equally distributed spaces for open discussion, as well as by allowing some form of professionalisation through set periods of a couple of years to exercise the role, like the one suggested for sortition legislatures.

Second, citizen sortition's capacity to truly promote inclusive deliberation that can be impactful over political decision-making, strongly depends on the form of citizen sortition we are thinking about. Clearly, those forms that are one-off events do not allow for impactful deliberation, nor inclusion of different views at a larger scale given that the little chance of rotation (since it is not regularly held) will leave out a significant number of people. It seems insufficient to hold a non-permanent or regular deliberative space for common citizens and label it self-government. It appears that if not regularly held and complemented by other direct and open to all citizens means; citizen sortition can come to merely express "a counterfactual opinion that is representative of what the larger public opinion *could think*" (Sintomer, 2018: 343-344, original emphasis).

Finally, the accountability of citizen sortition also seems to depend significantly on the form we examine. Minipublics do not provide much accountability from participant citizens to the rest of the citizenry. However, some argue that even if there are no explicit or formal means for the accountability of the members of a minipublic towards the rest of the citizenry, the members themselves report to feel accountable. This was the case of the members of the GWCA, who reported feeling accountable to the neighbourhood (Beauvais & Warren, 2019: 902). Additionally, it is important to consider that a space of deliberation that only plays a consultative role does not require as high accountability as the one we would expect from something like a sortition legislature with its binding force. It would be key to secure some kind of accountability if outcomes from a sortition body are in any way going to prove their

responsiveness to the overall citizenry. The fact that members from the sortition legislature are not elected by universal suffrage but selected via random sampling makes achieving accountability challenging. As suggested by Gastil & Wright (2018), we would require establishing an ethics committee—whilst assuming its limitations—that sanctions and has the ability to even remove members in serious cases of breach or failure to abide by the characteristics of their role.

Overall, citizen sortition offers a high level of common citizens' involvement in decision-making. Likewise, it introduces well-thought instances of deliberation that include common citizens, experts, and elected representatives. Although these spaces are not inclusive of all citizens, they are open to all of them by using random sampling. The method of random sampling has its difficulties and could require additional measures to guarantee the inclusion of marginalised groups. Nonetheless, citizen sortition does provide equal treatment, and in some cases, equal authority to common citizens, like no other method seems to achieve.

5. Direct Participation

All the forms of citizen sortition mentioned above include the direct involvement of common citizens in deliberation processes. However, by direct participation, I will be referring to forms that stress the importance of the involvement of common citizens in political decision-making by making it available to every citizen. The main feature of this alternative of political participation is the focus on the notion of granting common citizens the authority to make binding political decisions. Accordingly, I will focus on two forms of direct participation: voting with universal suffrage—mostly referenda—and participatory budget.

One of the things that diverse democracies have in common is the implementation of universal suffrage for regular elections of various kinds of representatives, as well as for other purposes. In fact, unconditioned (to something other than the citizenship status) voting has become the main marker of a democracy. If there are no regular (and free) elections, a system cannot be labelled a democracy[26]. We have already discussed elections when examining electoral representation, which is why I will focus here on voting as a form that

[26] This idea became key to the literature on democracy partly due to contributions connected to the notion of procedural democracy such as Robert Dahl's. See "Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition" (1972) and "Procedural Democracy" (2005).

is not always connected to the election of representatives, but that is always motivated by the idea that common citizens should have a direct capacity to make binding decisions.

Some democracies have instances that allow common citizens to vote for especially weighty new laws or public policies. The latter usually takes the form of a referendum, which is nothing more than a ballot that offers two choices: accepting or rejecting. Referenda has been used to decide matters from same-sex marriage laws to independence (Scotland, Catalonia and Puerto Rico are well-known examples). Another kind of referendum has been implemented to ratify constitutional changes or even full new constitutions. Countries that have established constitutional assemblies or conventions to re-draft their constitution, use referenda as a way to sanction the outcomes. In Chile, a recent agreement between all legislators and the government establishes two referenda, one to determine whether a new constitution will be elaborated (to take place in October 2020), and an additional referendum to ratify the final draft of the constitution in case the first one dictates that such a process occurs.

A central characteristic of referenda is, therefore, that they seek to guarantee the legitimacy of an initiative or outcome. The idea is that popular support provides such legitimacy, which again proves direct participation's focus on common citizens.

It is important to note, as mentioned above, that what makes this kind of direct participation distinct from other forms of common citizen's involvement is the kind of authority that is granted to common citizens. In the case of many, but not all referenda, the results are legally binding. An example of a non-legally binding referendumthat has been extremely controversial is the case of the referendum to decide the permanence of the United Kingdom in the European Union, better known as Brexit. Many have argued that the result of the referendum—leaving the European Union—will bring undesirable consequences for the UK[27], which also led the media to cover some speculation on repeating the referendum, [28] at least to accept or reject the Brexit deal. Repeating referenda is not unheard of (Ireland for

[27] See Rudolf. G Adam (2019) "Brexit: Causes and Consequences" and Martill and Staiger (eds) (2018). "Brexit and beyond: rethinking the futures of Europe",

[28] See the BBC news: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-46591250 ; The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/11/second-brexit-referendum-ireland-lisbon-polls ; The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/12/could-there-be-second-brexit-referendum/

the Lisbon treaty is an example), but much of the weight of the process does seem to rely on the seriousness of outcomes that command subsequent action.

Participatory Budget (PB), on the other hand, offers an additional component compared to referenda. It not only allows for the direct participation of all citizens but involves deliberation. Essentially, PB amounts to involving common citizens in the allocation of public resources.

> The basic idea is to permit non-elected citizens to have a role in the allocation of public money, with direct decision-making power at the local level, the power of co-decision at the city level, and oversight capacity at all levels. The participatory pyramid has three levels: assemblies open to all in the neighborhoods, assemblies, and a participatory council of delegates in the districts, and a general participatory council at the city level (Sintomer et.al, 2012: 5).

To this simple definition Sintomer et al. (2012), add five criteria: (1) Discussion of the use of a limited budget; (2) Involvement of the city level, district or similar (beyond the neighbourhood level); (3) Repetition over the years (a one-off event is not a PB); (4) Deliberation at specific and separate meetings/forums (citizens invited to deliberate on budget issues to existing local councils is not enough); (5) Accountability about the results of the process (Sintomer et.al, 2012: 3). These criteria serve to specify some elements that separate PB from other instances designed for common citizens' involvement, such as minipublics, which as we saw many times are not repeated through the years. Note that although PB offers deliberation unlike referenda, not every PB nor the full process is totally binding. The decisions made by citizens at the local and city level do have an impact and are to be included on the final budget, but unlike referenda, outcomes do not directly reflect in policy. The municipal level has the capacity to object to citizens' proposals, which would therefore not be adopted for the final Budget. Much relies on the citizens and grassroots' organisations to exercise strong oversite and demand for accountability of the results—as included in the criteria mentioned above.

PB first took place in Porto Alegre in Brasil as the result of a mix of favourable circumstances, one of which was the electoral victory of the Workers' Party (PT) in 1988.

The initiative, nonetheless, was promoted not only by the newly elected left-wing local government, but also by community associations. In this sense, PB began as both a bottom-up and top-down initiative. The peak of participation was in 2002 with 17.200 people for main district meetings and many more for the neighbourhood level. In terms of the characteristics of those who seem to participate more, Sintomer et.al hold that "lower income people tend to be more involved than others, women have become a majority in the assemblies" (Sintomer et.al, 2012: 6). Since this first case PB have been expanding, from initially spreading around Latin America in the 1990's to close to 200 cases in Europe in 2010, between 40-120 experiments in Asia, and the constant development of participatory procedures for budgeting in Africa (Sintomer et.al, 2012: 3).

Direct participation as an alternative of political participation offers un-mediated involvement of all citizens and grants them either binding decision-making attributions, or the chance to contribute to shaping the budget for their local communities.

6. Direct participation: examining a classic form of inclusion

Let us evaluate how direct participation fares with regards to inclusion, equality, deliberation, and accountability.

If we consider inclusion, the two forms of direct participation that I included in the characterisation of this alternative, do very well. One of the main advantages of forms of direct participation lies on its capacity to include all citizens. There is, of course, a smaller number of participants in PB for practical reasons. Just like in the case of citizen sortition, when a process requires more time invested, motivation, as well as practical considerations, come into place. People who are unable to set time aside because of their jobs will be less able to take part of a PB even if they are actually interested. Similarly, those who usually are politically more active will surely be more motivated to participate. Referenda and voting, in general, have the capacity to be more inclusive because they represent a one-off event, but then again, we already discussed the disadvantages that one-off events have for all the desiderata.

Regarding equality, voting with universal suffrage allows us to effectively stand on the same footing with other citizens. It permits having a say that will have the same weight than that

of any other citizen, regardless of their social or economic position and power. However, it is key to make some clarifications regarding the differences between the sort of voting we discussed in electoral representation—electing representatives—and referenda as included in the previous section. I have already stated one of the main differences between voting for representatives and participating on referenda, namely, the authority to make a binding decision that reflects into the implementation of a law, a policy, a new constitution, versus the authority to contribute to the election of a political representative. These kinds of authority differ because the capacity of choosing something that will be directly implemented is surely weightier than a vote to support one candidate over the other. But more importantly, I have not yet addressed a key difference in terms of the equality that is expressed in both forms.

Voting for representatives is unfortunately vulnerable to a number of technical (and not so technical) matters that can have a strong impact on the initially equal standing of citizens and the equal weight of their votes. Gerrymandering—shaping the boundaries of a constituency in order to provide an unfair advantage for a specific party—is one of them; non-proportional seats for each district is another. If the area you live is in fact bigger but gets less representatives appointed, one could argue that the weight of your vote is not the same than the vote of a person who lives in an over-represented area (too many seats for a small population). This and other problems (lack of transparency and regulation of campaign funding, for example) distort the ideal of equality that voting for elections wants to represent; "one person one vote". Referenda, conversely, is not exposed to these problems and as such does seem to fair better on guaranteeing the equal weight of votes, which in turn means, the equal standing of each citizen when they vote.

PB offers the equal chance to participate to common citizens, as well as instances of discussion that also involve representatives and local authorities. At the same time, it connects citizens to community organisations, and allows the former not only the chance to choose from already settled alternatives but to suggest and help shape the priorities for the budget. In this sense, it grants citizens capacities for agenda-setting that expresses the equal standing between common citizens and political authorities in a way that is rarely seen. Although I defined equality in terms of standing more than equal distribution of (or access to) resources, opportunities, or capabilities, I included distribution as an important element

for political participation, precisely because of what it does to our standing. Thus, it is worth mentioning that PB (out of all the forms we have examined) promotes re-distribution:

> PB has led to a reorientation of public investments towards the most disadvantaged districts, at least those investments decided within the participatory process (…) primary health care was set up in the living areas of the poor, the number of schools and nursery schools was extended, many streets in the slums were asphalted and most households now have access to water supply and waste water systems (Sintomer et.al, 2012: 6).

The forms of direct participation that I examined have the most noticeable departure when we think of their ability to promote deliberation. Referenda offer the chance for deliberating in private, which one could argue grants each person more time to consider issues separated from external pressures. Nonetheless, the only way in which this can actually be an advantage of referenda is by securing transparent and well-informed campaigns before the voting takes place. Deliberation could be highly improved if it is supported by access to good information regarding the issue at hand. But this kind of individual deliberation is not ideal, namely, because it is very vulnerable to manipulations and does not allow for discussions between contrasting arguments in more appropriate setting. Again, citizens with better access to good information, or who are better trained at distinguishing manipulated contents from veridical material, will have the chance to deliberate in much better conditions. Hence, this unequal setting for deliberation makes referenda weaker in this respect.

PB instead, fosters deliberation between different actors as well as one that is supported by good access to information. As with citizen sortition, deliberation includes representatives, local organisations, common citizens, and experts. Although experts and community organisations do not directly take part in discussions, they are playing an enabling role for them to happen under good conditions. Additionally, the fact that PB includes different settings for deliberation (separate assemblies at the different levels) makes those instances better suited to promote more detailed discussions. Hence, the great departure between referenda and PB has to do with on the one hand a form that does not necessarily involve open discussions between competing arguments, but private reasoning of the options; versus

another, that enables contact with experts, representatives, and a floor for common citizens to discuss amongst themselves the competing arguments.

Finally, even though one could think that accountability is one of the strong features of direct participation, it appears that both forms do not fare equally well in this regard. PB, in this case, does less well than referenda. Since the outcomes of the discussions are not necessarily binding, the authorities in charge of making the final decisions can exercise their higher authority to not take into consideration the citizens' recommendations, which is why ensuring accountability of the results in how they will be included at the end of the process is key to avoid distortions and manipulations.

> Although there are accountability problems because leaders may not follow their supporters' interests, PB councillors should in principle ensure that the priorities of the districts are taken up in the budget to the largest extent possible. Independent NGOs train the representatives of the participatory budget to enable them to co-plan with the administration. The process has a one year cycle (Sintomer et.al, 2012: 5).

Conversely, referenda theoretically guarantee that, if the process follows the appropriate conditions established for any election, the results will reflect what citizens themselves chose. In this case, direct involvement appears to abide by its classical commitment to grant accountability. Being a direct actor in the decision-making process should be the best way to ensure accountability because it implies more control and transparency, but we have to keep in mind that as PB, even direct participation needs to include mechanisms to ensure accountability of results and of people's roles.

I have now examined the three democratic alternatives of political participation I introduced at the beginning of this chapter: electoral representation, citizen sortition and direct participation. We looked into different forms to implement each of them and how these forms allowed for inclusion, equality, deliberation and accountability.

7. Contrasting the alternatives

Before moving on to describe what I take to be the best way to implement collective self-government, I would like to conclude the analysis by briefly presenting my conclusions by contrasting the alternatives. The previous section described and analysed in some detail each of the alternatives by mostly attending to the forms in which they are implemented. The latter helped us consider their potential in practice in terms of strengths and weaknesses when confronted with each desideratum. However, each alternative has a clear focus that, in turn, tends to reflect into the capacity to promote one or two of the desiderata. In what follows, I will discuss this consideration and summarise how the alternatives foster the desiderata.

Table 1. Comparing alternatives of political participation

Alternative	Inclusion		Equality	Deliberation	Accountability
Electoral representation	Method: all citizens	Decision making: only representatives (or other authorities)	Equal weight of every citizen's vote but most decision-making is restricted to representatives	Personal deliberation for voting and discussions between representatives only	Mainly via elections and spaces to make outcomes available to the public
Citizen sortition	Method: citizens elected by sortition from a sample that includes all citizens	Decision making: elected citizens, representatives, experts and other authorities	Creates instances of deliberation that promote discussion on an equal footing between all actors. It also grants authority to make binding decisions to citizens in some cases	Creates instances of deliberation that promote informed discussions between all actors (with binding and non-binding outcomes)	Through voting, by including diverse actors in discussions and making outcomes public.
Direct participation	Method: all citizens	Decision making: open to all citizens	Votes with equal weight lead to (mostly) binding decisions	Fosters either personal deliberation and informal public ones (referenda) or discussions between all actors (PB)	Via voting and making outcomes public

Source: Author's elaboration

Electoral representation focuses on the *deliberation* that takes place *between representatives*. The idea is to provide a space where authorities chosen by universal suffrage—thus, by the people—can discuss matters of public importance, which should mean that representatives themselves bring people's concerns into those discussions in some way. Such focus on the representatives' deliberation surely shows this alternative's potential to do well precisely in terms of allowing for deliberation. Although even that aspect can be tainted by party pressures, and by protecting the interests of campaign funders over those of the people. But suppose that we can improve those spaces for deliberation—some countries do better at keeping those distortions under control—electoral representation's focus on deliberation also means that it seems to fall short on the other three desiderata.

As we can see in table 1, inclusion and equality usually go hand in hand, and electoral representation with its focus on mediated involvement does not express much equality nor grant inclusion. Electoral representation does involve a relevant expression of equality and inclusion by conducting elections that are open to all and binding in character, but there is no substantive inclusion of common citizens in decision-making nor clear opportunities for them to relate to authorities and experts as equals. Accountability, on the other hand, gets reduced to the same method that is used to express equality and inclusion. Voters reward or punish the performance of authorities by supporting them with their vote, or choosing to elect another candidate, and they also get it by having some access to outcomes. But this is a very limited way to get accountability, especially given that the vote does not "say" much; it can be read as expressing various things which makes interpreting them quite difficult and granted that looking for those outcomes usually requires personal effort (they are not made easily available in many cases).

Citizen sortition also focuses on *deliberation*, but this time it offers instances where *common citizens, experts and political authorities* can *discuss*. Accordingly, we could say that it also focuses on a sort of inclusion that, even if it does not ultimately include all citizens, it does reach all of them by giving them the chance to be elected via lottery to take part in decision-making processes directly. This, as shown on the table, amounts to citizen sortition's capacity to meet the desiderata that escape its focus much better than electoral representation did. It is important to recall that citizen sortition also has its weaknesses as discussed above—its accountability could be improved—but overall, sortition provides instances of shared decision-making that promote most of the desiderata.

Finally, direct participation focuses on *inclusion.* As I mentioned before, inclusion and equality go together, since access usually implies "levelling the field". Nevertheless, we know that access is not sufficient to guarantee being granted the status of peers in political discussions. Direct participation is not always capable to secure something beyond open access, which makes it less able to foster collective deliberation. Accountability is better guaranteed by taking direct part of decision-making, be it via forms like referenda or Participatory Budgeting, although we also found some weaknesses on this respect for PB.

To conclude, every alternative of political participation examined here seems to have a focus feature that makes it desirable, whilst at the same time failing at important desideratum, overall, the "weak spot" of all of them is accountability. Some, of course, do better than others—citizen sortition with a permanent deliberative body would help for this—they tend to share the mechanisms they use in order to guarantee some level of accountability. Taking all these elements into account, I will now continue by presenting what I suggest is the best model of political participation to truly implement Collective self-government.

IV. Collective self-government: a model of political participation

> Each of these has a place in an ideal democratic system. Whenever feasible, a direct participatory process might prove effective at tackling a wide range of local public problems. At larger social scales, however, a trade-off emerges. Elections embody the ideal of government *by* the people (i.e., the full electorate), whereas sortition advances the goal of government *of* the people (i.e., the sortition assembly). Pairing those together, as we suggest, helps ensure a good measure of both in legislative bodies (Gastil & Wright, 2018:307)

Relating as peers requires spaces where there can be communication and a "flow of information" between all agents in the political sphere—which we normally lack in our democracies. In light of the analysis of the three alternatives I presented above, I will devote the final part of this chapter to introduce my model of political participation, which connects all three alternatives. The central and novel feature of what would be the implementation of my collective self-government is a sortition legislature. I take Gastil & Wright's (2018)

proposal, as well as their suggestion of complementing the sortition legislature with the other two alternatives. Accordingly, I include Deliberative Polling (DP), Participatory Budgeting (PB) and electoral representation. I will explain how they all interact in more detail in what follows.

1. Connecting Sortition legislature, Participatory Budgeting and Deliberative Polling

The previous analysis of the alternatives of political participation showed some of the strengths of citizen sortition. Its focus on inclusive and well-informed deliberation is probably the most important one, but I would like to point out another key benefit from establishing a sortition legislature, which I believe greatly justifies its implementation—before moving on to the practical aspects. All three alternatives proved to be badly equipped to guarantee accountability. However, a closer look into sortition legislature shows its potential to foster a very high level of accountability.

> (…) The sortition body forces its elected counterpart to consider whether prospective bills will pass muster in a relatively deliberative assembly. Since the citizen sortition assembly can block party-generated policy, the elected chamber has to craft policy that not only meets its political objectives but also has a good prospect of passing muster under citizen scrutiny (Gastil & Wright, 2018:324).

The accountability that comes from having a legislature constituted by common citizens is unprecedented. A sortition legislature would promote an agenda-setting that has to be connected to common citizen's concerns, which is precisely one of the weakest aspects of our democracies. The pressure that the sortition legislature would put on elected representatives would certainly make them want to improve how their proposals reflect citizens' concerns, which would basically amount to better policies.

Regarding the practical aspect of implementing a sortition legislature, the main transformation would be changing democracies into a bicameral system—like many of them already have—that consists of one elected legislature and one sortition legislature. My model keeps representatives on their role as we know it, but with important re-arranging of the

division of labour in political decision-making, by including the sortition chamber and other participatory means for common citizens and experts. The reason to keep the elected legislature is very well presented by Gastil and Wright; we need the negotiation that takes place within the elected legislature.

> (…) Given the nature of power and inequality in contemporary societies, there are conflicts of interest in society that cannot be resolved simply through disinterested deliberation. Thus, bargaining and compromise will remain an important part of politics (Gastil & Wright, 2018:322).

The members of the sortition legislature would be selected by lottery from a sample that includes all citizens, but that is stratified by the following criteria: gender, ethnicity/indigeneity, disability, socio-economic status, and geography. This would prevent exclusions of already marginalised groups by securing their inclusion in decision-making processes. The criteria should be flexible to adjust to the social, cultural, and economic reality of each context, but it would always be crucial to apply sortition by stratification of the sample to guarantee seats for minorities.

In terms of the more detailed characteristics of the sortition legislature in practice, as stated by Gastil and Wright (2018), what works for the elected legislature would also work for the sortition body. They explain in more detail that clearly an important consideration to establish a sortition legislature is to set incentives for participation. People do not usually have the resources to devote their time to legislate without compensation, and a lack of it would amount to limiting the plurality of the group. Thus, the sortition legislature would be payed the same salary than the one received by members of the elected legislature. Formal faculties would also be the same between both chambers. The main difference would be not just that it is composed of common citizens chosen by lot, but the duration of their terms. Following Gastil and Wright's proposal, the sortition body would serve for a two-year period and would be given a chance to serve for an additional term. Each selected member for the sortition legislature could decline for creditable circumstances that prevent them from serving, as well as postpone their role for one period to accommodate to their existing responsibilities (Gastil & Wright, 2018:314).

In order to provide an inclusive space that keeps the connection with local organisations and thus, with grassroots democracy, my model also includes regular PB. As mentioned, PB would also help tackle re-distribution and better use of resources on matters that really are salient in people's communities. Following Gastil and Wright´s (2018) suggestion, my model gives the PB the capacity to raise issues directly to the sortition legislature. At the end of the deliberation for a set period (semester, trimester or year) budget, the PB would be able to meet the sortition legislature and present their conclusions with respect to both local and higher-level budget priorities. This not only offers an additional mode of accountability for the members of the sortition body but allows for an agenda-setting capacity that would be key to grant real impact and authority to local communities.

> Participatory budgeting processes could be tethered to the sortition legislature to influence some of their budgetary priorities, at every level of government (…) The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly also provides a model, now used in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, to craft legislative proposals that could come to the sortition legislature for review" (Gastil & Wright, 2018:321).

The third form of citizen's involvement included in this collective self-government model is DP. This form of minipublic would provide an additional instance of informed deliberation as a one-off event for those who cannot commit to more time-consuming roles. Collective deliberation and a connection to experts would both ratify the experts' capacity to contribute to political decision-making and educate common citizens on exercising the role of deliberators. At the same time, DP would serve as an additional measure to help increase accountability by making proposals more salient—candidates would have to focus on making a clear statement of what they support—and by making the results of discussions regarding the potential of each candidate's suggestions available via national television. Universal vote to elect representatives would remain the same, whilst the use of referenda would be suggested for some relevant decisions. Ideally, prior to the referenda, a DP could take place to secure access to information and a safe space for open discussion of the issues at stake.

This model would make substantial changes to our democracies by opening regular spaces of informed discussion that connect all actors, which would especially foster an appropriate

flow of information between experts and the people that is so difficult to find in our democracies. Introducing various instances of direct involvement of common citizens would become educational and transform people's notion of their own authority. Seeing the impact that they can have beyond being one vote amongst many, would help address the problem of disaffection. Democracies have been struggling with low turnout for voting for years, many have explained this lack of motivation by suggesting that people just do not see any point in voting; they realise their individual vote has very little impact over the overall result.

It is relevant to conclude by mentioning that local involvement and discussion would still be key to this model. Not everyone would be able to join the new instances of deliberation. Hence, strengthening existing grassroots democracy organisations should be part of the overall project.

2. Challenges for the proposal

Like all models, implementing collective self-government as I suggest, has strengths and shortcomings. In this section, I would like to briefly address the challenges to the proposal in light of the desiderata. Although there are difficult challenges that my model would have to face, overall, it still offers what I deem the most suitable implementation—even though as I said at the beginning of the chapter, I am open to other options.

The kind of mixed implementation that I offer, fares very well in terms of inclusion. It takes the good elements from each alternative to try to secure open participation and universal suffrage, whilst adding the special kind of inclusion that a sortition legislature would embody. Nonetheless, making sure that the sample is indeed representative, and that the criteria correctly track the groups that should be included could be two very pressing challenges. The best way to calibrate whether the model does generate the right group for the sortition chamber will, unfortunately be trial and error. However, there is enough evidence from other minipublics and experiences that have been very successful at sampling that could certainly make this process easier. Women and all marginalised groups were at the centre of the concerns I discussed throughout the analysis of political participation. Stratified sampling would work like quotas, which we know are insufficient to face subordination, but opening spaces of deliberation that involve binding authority and agenda

setting capacities could amount to substantive changes. It could bring issues and concerns into decision-making processes that would otherwise probably not be there.

Regarding equality, although the model again intends to combine the alternatives to foster equal treatment, I do not hold a naïve idea of the impact and scope that institutional and formal political changes can have over persistent unequal treatment. I followed Fraser's (2000) view of recognition and placed it at the centre of what I suggest are Relations of Mutual Recognition. The main goal to face misrecognition from that perspective was to change the patterns of cultural value that have been institutionalised and label some as less worthy of respect. My model of collective self-government wants to aid that transformation, but I acknowledge that there is a lot more than rearranging our political division of labour that needs to be done to accomplish cultural changes. However, this different way of relating to one another in the political sphere could promote long term changes. By providing instances where we truly relate to one another as equals in discussions, we could reclaim the political as an area where Relations of Mutual Recognition can and should take place.

About deliberation, most of the challenges I identified in the discussion regarding citizen sortition would also apply for my model. Since I include as a key part of the model, three different forms of citizen sortition, my proposal also faces the issues regarding making deliberation truly informed by all views, taking especial care to include those voices that are usually not an active part of political decision-making, i.e., from members of minorities. With respect to accountability, preventing sortition legislature becoming another space open to manipulations and bribes by private interests could be an additional difficulty. As we saw with citizen sortition in general, there must be a way to make deliberators accountable to each other and to the broader public. The best way to do this is something that would have to be sorted with time. Again, successful participatory experiences would be helpful for this process.

All practical challenges aside, the main difficulty I foresee to implement this model would be resistance to change. The political sphere is filled with those who have played the same role for a long time, and who are thus very used to one way of conducting political decision-making. Moreover, there are still a number of democratic theorists who wonder about both the capacity and entitlement of common citizens to become deliberators in a more substantive way (as we will see in Chapter 5). Therefore, resistance could come from all

flanks; researchers, politicians, and common citizens themselves. Those working on sortition models and radical democracy have surely encountered this kind of opposition. Nonetheless, the experiences of success that are growingly being implemented for minipublics and PB could provide a strong evidential foundation to support my model.

V. Conclusions

Throughout this chapter, I examined three democratic alternatives of political participation, namely, electoral representation, citizen sortition and direct participation. The idea was to analyse how each of them promoted or failed to fully meet four desiderata I identified as the result of the discussion on political participation from the previous chapter: inclusion, equality, deliberation, and accountability. I described each of the alternatives of participation and gave some detail of their most relevant forms of implementation, such as Participatory Budgeting and Deliberative Polling. I continued by contrasting each alternative in order to discover their focus and key contributions. I concluded by presenting my model, based on Gastil and Wright's (2018) sortition legislature proposal, whilst also including the forms that the analysis showed would contribute to the desiderata. The analysis was concluded by mentioning some of the challenges and difficulties that could come up for my suggested model to implement collective Self-government.

Chapter 5: Locating my proposal: participatory and deliberative

I. A participatory form of deliberative democracy

Collective self-government involves implementing forms that belong to all three of the alternatives of political participation that I explored: electoral representation, citizen sortition and direct participation (See Chapter 4). The analysis of each alternative and their forms of implementation showed that deliberation, participation, and representation are not incompatible. I describe my proposal as a *participatory* version of deliberative democracy, or as a form of participatory democracy that requires deliberation[29]—with participatory understood here as implying the inclusion of common citizens in political decision-making. This strong connection between participation and deliberation distinguishes my view of relations of mutual recognition from most accounts of deliberative democracy, as well as from representative government or electoral democracy.

In this chapter, I will identify the differences my view has with some versions of deliberative democracy. I want to focus on showing how there seems to be a problem in the conceptual background of proceduralist, and proceduralist-minded versions of deliberative democracy.

I will argue that the lack of emphasis on involving common citizens (directly) in political decision-making puts proceduralist deliberative accounts at risk of failing to adequately challenge the *status quo* of our democracies. One of the main features of deliberative democracy is its intention to include those affected by decision-making, but a too marked attention to the importance of procedures and epistemically improved outcomes makes these accounts lose sight of this central component. This translates into them reducing deliberative democracy to a project that only has something to say about the legitimacy of the use of political power.

My view intends to promote the transforming potential of deliberative accounts that is expressed precisely by the relevance of *inclusion* in the form of 'giving voice' to those affected by political decision-making—especially to marginalized groups. I claim that this

[29] My proposal could also be labelled as a form of radical democracy. I do not use this label only for clarity purposes given that what radical democracy implies is fairly under-defined, or sometimes used to refer to different things; connected to Marxist inspirations (see Mouffe & Holdengräber, 1989), or radical in terms of implying structural transformations (Sintomer, 2018; Cohen & Fung, 2004).

should be the driving force of deliberative accounts of democracy if they are to exercise their capacity to promote structural changes to the way that our democracies work. I hold, following Iris Marion Young's (2010) inclusive deliberative democracy, that in order to do this we have to present a justification of deliberative democracy that relies on its capacity to promote more *just* outcomes, by way of collective and inclusive deliberation. At the same time, the participatory emphasis of my view takes inspiration from Carole Pateman's (2012) participatory democracy, which I argue is completely compatible with a deliberative model like Young's.

In what follows I begin by discussing Jon Elster's (1998) and Joshua Cohen's (1998) versions of deliberative democracy. Elster provides a characterisation of deliberative democracy that supports my claim about the risk of not challenging the status quo that some versions of deliberative democracy face, due to distancing the project from common citizens' involvement. I continue by analysing Cohen's proceduralist account of deliberative democracy, not only because of its relevance for the literature but because it allows me to show the problems that an excessive attention to the legitimate use of political power can bring for deliberative democracy. The final part briefly discusses the kind of deliberative project that my view supports and its connection to Young's (2010) understanding of just outcomes from political decision-making, as well as the inspiration I take from Pateman's (2012) participatory democracy.

II. Proceduralist deliberative democracy: reasoned arguments for political legitimacy

One of the main features of deliberative democracy is the intention to reach well-reasoned and well-informed decisions by involving the relevant actors that will be affected by them in collective deliberation. However, the commitment to involve every reasonable citizen that will be impacted by the decision is not equally central, nor defined in the same terms in all versions of deliberative democracy. As in most cases, there is an ample variety of interpretations of the view, which make a sometime contrasting emphasis. In this part, I will look into one general description of the main features of deliberative democracy, and I will analyse a proceduralist version of deliberative democracy. The idea is to show that what is problematic and can sometimes even extend to other—not just proceduralist and epistemic—

accounts of deliberative democracy is how they justify what I just identified as one of the main features of deliberative democracy:

> Reaching well-reasoned and well-informed decisions by involving the relevant actors that will be affected by them in collective deliberation.

I will show here that proceduralist accounts in particular hold that the reason why we should engage in this sort of deliberation is to *improve the legitimacy* of our outcomes. Accordingly, inclusion is reduced to a necessary component of a procedure that can make results more legitimate. If common citizens can consider that they are *in some way* part of decision-making processes, then the resulting outcomes of such process have the 'seal of legitimacy' required.[30] I will conclude that this makes these approaches unable to challenge the current dominating political relations we experience in our democracies. In order to do so, I will begin by presenting Jon Elster's (1998) overview of what deliberative democracy entails, followed by an analysis of Cohen's (1998) proceduralist view.

1. Jon Elster: Types of decision making and the representatives in deliberation

In order to provide a definition for deliberative democracy Elster (1998) describes the meaning of both the democratic and deliberative component:

> (…) The notion includes collective decision making with the participation of all who will be affected by the decision or their representatives: this is the democratic part. Also, all agree that it includes decision making by means of arguments offered *by* and *to* participants who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality: this is the deliberative part (Elster, 1998:8).

He wants to show that even though there are differences amongst people who support the notion of deliberative democracy, the concept has these two basic requirements, namely, the

[30] The intention to improve the quality of the outcomes is a separate matter that affects epistemic accounts more directly and that I will also address here in more detail

participation of the relevant parties for the decision-making, and a commitment to the use of reason and impartial arguments.

To track the historical background of the idea of deliberation in its connection to democracy, Elster (1998) quotes writers from Thucydides to Edmund Burke. The latter gives a speech that Elster qualifies as "probably, the most famous statement of the case for deliberative democracy" (Elster, 1998:3). The passage of the speech he focuses on expresses the incompatibility of voter's control over their representatives with the "deliberative nature of democracy". Accordingly, representatives are not supposed to be an advocate of people's interests but to participate in a deliberative assembly where there is only the common interest, or general good, in mind. Hence, it is implied by Elster's emphasis that the deliberative component does not refer to a scenario where common citizens should be involved, but to the manner in which their representatives should behave. Furthermore, representatives are to be entrusted with the responsibility to promote the common good beyond the particular interests of the people they represent. Recall Pitkin's (1967) distinction between representatives as advocates versus trustees. Elster's analysis suggests that deliberative democracy is based on the second kind since deliberation—here undertaken by representatives—portrays them as trustees guided by a concern for the common good.

In order to emphasise the benefits of deliberation as a form of collective decision-making, Elster describes three types of collective decision making, other than deliberation. These are: arguing, bargaining and voting (Elster, 1998:5). According to Elster, the first two constitute speech acts, unlike voting, and all three of them are at the same time related to three ways of considering subject's preferences: aggregation, transformation, and misrepresentation. Aggregation equals to voting, transformation is the aim of arguing, and every type of decision making is susceptible to misrepresentation. Another trichotomy can be found in the member's motives, which he describes can come from reason, interest, or passion. Arguing is "intrinsically connected" (Elster, 1998:6) to reason, for it requires the provision of arguments based on "impartial values" (Elster, 1998:6), but the other two, voting and bargaining, can come from any of the mentioned motives. Hence, Elster holds that deliberation is the most appropriate type of collective decision making since it provides reasonable arguments that can transform preferences.

There are some important things to say about Elster's characterisation of deliberative democracy. Going beyond particular interests is one of the strengths of the idea of deliberation, still, it is very important to consider the risks of giving too much centrality to the representative's role like Elster's characterisation suggests. Setting aside concerns regarding the common good as something that can or *should* be what guides deliberations, as the analysis of non-domination showed (Chapter 2, Part II), representatives can be very susceptible to both internal (from their political party) and external (economic and other interests of powerful affected parties) pressures. Relatedly, granting representatives the whole weight of the responsibility of decision-making processes, as most contemporary democracies do, can jeopardise the inclusion of ordinary citizen's interests, given that too much depends on the latter's capacity to know or interpret those interests (see Chapter 4).

On the other hand, if what deliberative democracy offers as a project has only to do with setting a standard and conditions for the deliberation amongst representatives, its capacity to challenge the status quo in terms of improving the inclusion of those affected by decision-making gets restricted, which seemed to be one of its main goals. According to Elster, deliberative democracy contributes something novel to debates around democracy because it implies arguments being offered 'by and to' participants in political decision-making, which should include those affected by the decision. Nonetheless, Elster adds to this last element of deliberative democracy—which he calls the democratic component—that deliberative democracy can include all *or* their representatives. This final caveat is the one that puts the project in danger of restricting common citizens' inclusion.

The last consideration has to do with the risk of elitism that deliberative democracy can face. Elster includes a concern that is also present in Cohen's (1998) view, as I will discuss in the following sections, namely, regarding the epistemic quality of the outcomes from collective deliberation. Elster leaves the issue of differences in knowledge and how to secure a well-informed deliberation whilst preventing elitism as an open question:

> Does the unequal distribution of education, information, and commitment pose a threat to deliberative democracy? Will deliberation produce all its good effects if it takes place mainly within an elite that is self-selected because it knows more

than others about public issues and is more concerned about them? (Elster, 1998:16).

The problem is that Elster's characterisation of deliberative democracy claims that deliberation is supposed to be a means to transform people's preferences. According to most accounts of deliberative democracy, people's preferences are not fixed but susceptible to transformation by our interactions with others. This is one of the alleged strengths of deliberation, that it allows for outcomes to really represent the best alternative because it involves an exchange of reasons to support each view, which both leads to transform some people's perspective because they are persuaded by the reasons offered and opens the space to include various perspectives—which also plays a role in the transformation. This aspect of deliberative democracy emphasises precisely how crucial it is to have an inclusive and not elitist sort of deliberation process. The risk of elitism, thus, threatens to prevent that deliberation, as Elster puts it: 'produce all its good effects'.

2. Joshua Cohen: an idealised deliberation procedure

Having discussed some elements of deliberative democracy as described by Elster and having also sketched some of the challenges the project can face, I will move on to consider Cohen's account of deliberative democracy. This section will present my analysis of the shortcomings I identify in his view, but more broadly what is problematic about proceduralist and other legitimacy-based accounts of deliberative democracy. The idea is to show that proceduralist (and proceduralist-minded) views build a theoretical background that restricts what is one of the fundamental elements of deliberative democracy accounts as a whole: inclusion. Regardless of the differences, deliberative accounts share a similar starting point, as we saw in Elster's characterisation, which is wanting to include those affected by decision-making. The main difference is the reason why they want this to happen, or the motivation behind each project, which has an important impact over proposals. In the case of Cohen, and proceduralist accounts, they are motivated by the search for legitimacy. This section will show the issues that come from that concern. Since my project can be labelled as a deliberative account, the ultimate aim of this analysis is to emphasise the different motivation behind my participatory version, which will prove how it is better capable of challenging the status quo and offering a transforming project of our current dominating political relations.

Cohen (1998) holds that the "fundamental democratic idea" (Cohen, 1998:222) is that "decisions about the exercise of state power are *collective*" (Cohen, 1998:222). To develop the idea further, he separates versions of democracy into two types, both collectively binding: aggregative and deliberative. For the first conception, democracy complies with being collective only if decisions come from a procedure that gives: "*equal consideration to* - more generically, are *positively responsive to*" (Cohen, 1998:186) the interest of each person affected by the decision. Conversely, a deliberative conception is collective when it: "emerges from arrangements of binding collective choice that establish conditions of *free public reasoning among equals who are governed by the decisions*" (Cohen, 1998:186).

Deliberative democracy, in particular, is understood by Cohen (1998) as a procedure of deliberation where members provide reasons that can be acceptable to other reasonable members (Cohen, 1998:193).

> The deliberative conception of democracy is organized around an ideal of political justification. According to this ideal, justification of the exercise of collective political power is to proceed on the basis of a free public reasoning among equals. A deliberative democracy institutionalizes this ideal (Cohen, 2009: 160).

Both Cohen's (1998) general idea of democracy and his deliberative conception emphasise the centrality of the justification of power through collective decision-making. What matters most is not that citizens have a right to be involved in the process that will result in the policies governing their lives, but that those outcomes are reached by a reasonable process that shows an equal regard for *people* instead of their interests. Thus, this view of deliberative democracy seems to be neither about improving the fairness of the outcomes nor about the exercise of authority that our equal standing should grant all citizens for political decision-making.

Additionally, Cohen (1998) states that his definition of deliberative democracy is able to foster a form of political autonomy and constitutes a kind of political community. He holds

that to achieve the former, deliberative democracy asks for the bases of decisions that will govern other lives to be acceptable to them "even when they disagree with the details of the decision" (Cohen, 1998:222).

> [I]n this assurance of political autonomy, deliberative democracy achieves one important element of the ideal of community (…) because providing acceptable reasons for the exercise of political power to those who are governed by it—a requirement absent from the aggregative view—expresses the equal membership of all in the sovereign body responsible for authorizing the exercise of that power (Cohen, 2009: 163-164).

Cohen appears to understand deliberation as the best-suited procedure to express respect for every citizen's autonomy. However, as I argued above, respect for autonomy is insufficient as a justification for deliberative democracy, and even more so for the participatory form that I promote.

Knowing that others deliberated in an informed and reasonable way, whilst also being presented with acceptable reasons that justify a particular outcome, certainly contribute to accountability, and can even represent a form of inclusion. Nonetheless, mediated involvement can only take our so far. As we saw in the discussion regarding non-domination and control (Chapter 2), we need to have real authority in the form of political power that can be exercised in decision-making. The inequalities that put us in different positions to influence political outcomes—cultural, economic—cannot be countered by mere formal respect for our autonomy. Hence, thinking of deliberation in terms of a procedure that allows for a legitimate exercise of political power—done by others—is problematic because it reduces the goal of deliberative democracy to just this, the search for a legitimate procedure of power exercise. What I described at the beginning of this part of the chapter as a central feature of deliberative democracy, namely, reaching well-reasoned and well-informed decisions by involving the relevant actors that will be affected by them in collective deliberation, becomes instrumental to this goal.

The second issue that I identified as problematic in proceduralist views is one that I also claimed belongs to some epistemic versions of deliberative democracy. Focusing on the

epistemic quality of the outcomes from our political decision-making leads these accounts to introduce something that I call the *Knowledge Requirement*. Deliberation turns into an instance that should only produce high-quality outcomes, which requires that those involved in the process are actually capable of such a feat.

> Deliberation depends on participants with sufficient knowledge and interest about the substantive issues under consideration. But on any issue, the number of individuals with such knowledge and interest is bound to be relatively small, and so the quality of deliberation will decline with the scope of participation (Cohen, 2009: 342-343).

Wanting to improve the epistemic quality of outcomes is certainly not problematic and even desirable. The problem is that exaggerating the kind of knowledge required this sort of argument leads to questioning the importance of open participation and its compatibility with 'good quality' deliberation. In line with this kind of argument, Cohen, and Archon Fung (2004) describe ways in which deliberation and participation can clash. They also discuss possible ways of facing the apparent conflict between increasing participation and improving deliberation by exploring strategies that radical democrats could take to overcome the tension. Nonetheless, their conclusions are sceptical of the possibility to properly balance the trade-offs implied:

> 1. Improving the quality of deliberation may come at a cost to public participation. 2. Conversely, expanding participation – either numbers of people, or the range of issues under direct popular control – may diminish the quality of deliberation. 3. More fundamentally, social complexity and scale limit the extent to which modern politics can be both deliberative and participatory (Cohen & Fung, 2004: 27).

Along with these three assertions, the authors claim that broader participation could lead to forms of manipulation and confrontation between previously fixed postures (Cohen & Fung, 2004: 27). It is puzzling that Cohen distrusts the capabilities of common citizens to be part

of deliberation when in other articles (Cohen, 2009) he accepts that it does not seem to be the case that the necessary skills are absent from, or too demanding to comply with:

> (…) Deliberative capacities seem reasonably widely shared, even when issues are more abstract and less locally focused. Critics of deliberation, it seems, were too quick to conclude that deliberative decision-making empowers the verbally agile (Cohen, 2009:337).

In conclusion, proceduralist views such as Cohen, as well as those too focused on the importance of improving the epistemic quality of outcomes take these emphases at the expense of what seemed to be a central feature of deliberative democracy: including those affected by decision-making. This goal should make deliberative democracy a project with the capacity to challenge the status quo of our democracies by contributing with a novel and proposal to respond to current dominating relations. The latter is impeded by on the one hand, making the legitimate use of power the goal of deliberative democracy, and by introducing something like the knowledge requirement with the related risk of elitist consequences as Elster wondered could happen.

III. A participatory form of deliberative democracy (or the other way round)

Discussing Elster's (1998) and Cohen's (1998) approach to deliberative democracy already showed some of the main concerns that guide my intention to promote what I call a participatory form of deliberative democracy. In this final part I will say more about the kind of approach to both deliberative democracy and participation that make my project able to fall under two labels: either as a participatory deliberative democracy, or a deliberative participatory democracy. The emphasis in both options serves to argue that not only do I think participation and deliberation are compatible, but that they are inseparable. Sometimes (collective) deliberation will take place in open assemblies, other times it will happen amongst representatives and in informal forums, but behind all decision making there should be clear and mostly formal channels for deliberation. The same is true about participation. The involvement of common citizens (what we are referring to when saying participation here) should always be part of decision-making processes. As I have argued along this

research project, the only considerations that should lead the decision to restrict the number of participants or to design different means to involve them are practical considerations. Adjusting to time, context and people's restrictions to participate (work responsibilities, care responsibilities, inequalities in access, and different motivations, among others).

There are two approaches to both deliberative democracy and participatory democracy that I take inspiration from and that therefore, model my understanding of this double label alternative: Iris Marion Young's (2010) inclusive democracy and Carole Pateman's (2012) participatory democracy.

Young (2010) addresses and has a particular understanding of three important concepts in her proposal of deliberative democracy, which are crucial to portray the sort of participatory form that I support: inclusion, self-determination, and justice. Young defines inclusion in a way that seems to be at the core of deliberative democracy as an overall project (as we have seen throughout this chapter); the idea that decision-making processes should include everyone affected by the decisions being made. In order to narrow down or better explain who we should consider as being affected by decisions, Young adds that they are those that will see their options for action significantly conditioned by them. The particularity of her definition though, lies on her understanding of the ideal an its inevitable connection to political equality.

> As an ideal, inclusion embodies a norm of political respect. Persons (and perhaps other creatures) are being treated as means if they are expected to abide by rules or adjust their actions according to decisions from where determination their voice and interests have been excluded. When coupled with norms of political equality, inclusion allows for maximum expression of interests, opinions, and perspectives relevant to the problems or issues for which a public seeks solutions (Young, 2010:23).

According to Young, people should not only be included in decision-making nominally, but given equal rights and "effective opportunity to express their interests and concerns" (Young, 2010:23). This norm of equality is for Young entailed by the norm of inclusion. This understanding of inclusion is notably different from what we saw in Cohen's (1998) account.

The proceduralist approach conditions inclusion to legitimacy in the sense that what matters most is that we find a collective way of legitimately exercising political power, but the inclusive character of that collective is not at the centre of its concerns. Moreover, Young's ideal of inclusion speaks of having an effective opportunity. To go beyond what she calls nominal inclusion, Young sets requirements that have to do with having the actual capacity to influence outcomes, to express one's interests, and this is precisely the sort of authority that I argue is required to secure inclusion that is not merely nominal (see Chapter 3 Part II on political power).

Self-determination and justice are also connected ideals. Young claims that deepening democracy does not require a comprehensive theory of justice because appeals to principles of justice in political decision-making have a more practical function. Principles of justice are appealed to as part of the arguments provided to support an alternative regarding what should be done. People do not need to agree "on a general conception of justice in order to argue productively about their problems and come to morally legitimate resolutions" (Young, 2010:29). Thus, Young defines social justice as an ideal that she believes is even more abstract than a set of principles. Social justice is for Young the institutional conditions that promote two ideals: self-development and self-determination (Young, 2010:33). Self-development follows Amartya Sen's (1992) definition of equality as capabilities, which importantly goes beyond the importance of access and distribution of goods for people's development. I will not say more about this component of Young's definition of justice because it is in her approach to self-determination that I find the strongest connection to my concern for autonomy and how it should shape our understanding of deliberation.

Self-determination is defined by Young as the capacity to be part of determining our actions and the conditions for our actions. The opposite to self-determination is domination. Young follows Pettit's (2010) definition of domination, especially in terms of how it identifies institutionalised power relations that prevent us from living truly free lives:

> The ability to follow one's own pursuits in one's own way is often restricted not only by direct interference by other agents, but more importantly by institutional relations, including those that award differential power to some agents to constrain the choices and actions of others. These are institutional relations of

> domination. Real freedom means the absence of such relations of domination (Young, 2010:32).

My proposal of relations of mutual recognition aims precisely at preventing and confronting relations of domination in the political sphere. Young's definition of social justice involves a conception of autonomy, i.e. self-determination, that considers the impact of dominating relations as well as their structural and institutionalised character. Furthermore, social justice is defined by Young in a way that does not commit her project to a comprehensive theory of justice, whilst still being able to inform her view on the value of deliberation. My approach to deliberation is inspired by this more pragmatic approach to justice, and specially by the central role that autonomy plays in the justification of deliberation. Deliberation improves the justice of the outcomes in our democracies because via inclusive and effective decision-making we allow for the exercise of authority and expression of our interests that our equal autonomous standing requires. The justice of outcomes depends on how they promote our self-determination or personal autonomy, and it responds more to local deliberation of the best mode of action under specific circumstances than to a comprehensive theory of justice.

Pateman (2012) separates her participatory democracy from deliberative democracy under the conviction that, although deliberation is central to democracy, it is not sufficient. In other words, she objects to the idea that deliberation on its own is synonymous with democracy (Pateman, 2012:8). According to Pateman, participatory democracy is different from other alternatives because it argues for the democratisation of both the social and political sphere in order to allow individuals to take part in important decision-making that affects their everyday lives. But I would stress that what makes her view particularly different is her relational emphasis. Pateman's approach to participation is an important inspiration for my proposed Relations of Mutual Recognition in the way that it connects to our social and political interactions. I found in Pateman a theory that added the more explicit political component that I felt missing in relational accounts of autonomy, which is implicit in her definition of how political participation shapes the authority we have over our lives. This is what justifies challenging the structures and political interactions that Young qualified as dominating:

> The capacities, skills, and characteristics of individuals are interrelated with forms of authority structures. Individuals learn to participate by participating (…) Thus, individuals need to interact within democratic authority structures that make participation possible. Participatory democratic theory is an argument about democratization. That is, the argument is about changes that will make our own social and political life more democratic, that will provide opportunities for individuals to participate in decision-making in their everyday lives as well as in the wider political system. It is about democratizing democracy. What I called a participatory society (in Participation and Democratic Theory) needs to be created. The changes required are structural; they necessitate reform of undemocratic authority structures" (Pateman, 2012:10).

As I have argued in this chapter as well as throughout this project, respect for autonomy is insufficient to challenge the dominating relations we experience in our democracies and accordingly to support and justify the needed structural changes for our enjoyment of autonomy—not just in the political sphere but in general. Pateman's view of participation as the way to democratise our shared spaces, directly connects with the elements that I have highlighted in Young's inclusive deliberative model. Both accounts inspired the deliberative and participatory component in my proposal, which ultimately tries to make justice to the centrality of both deliberation and participation. My proposal holds that these two components should not be separated or one of them take a more relevant role than the other, because deliberation without participation of common citizens does not advance but harm our autonomy. Likewise, participation without a deliberation that ensures all relevant interests are properly considered, and that we have the chance to make our voices heard, does not serve our autonomy either.

IV. Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to discuss some of the theoretical assumptions of proceduralist and other accounts of deliberative democracy (I discussed epistemic ones) that render them incapable of challenging the status quo and its dominating political relations. This problem is caused by a too marked attention to the legitimacy of the exercise of political power and the epistemic quality of outcomes. Both reduce deliberation and inclusion, which are definitional components of deliberative democracy accounts in general, to an instrumental

role instead of promoting them as the way to improve the justice of political outcomes. I looked into two accounts in particular to support these claims, namely, Cohen's (1998) and Elster's (1998). The former evidenced the shortcomings that come from valuing deliberation merely in terms of its capacity to constitute a legitimate way to exercise political power, and the latter exposed the problems with restricting deliberation to our representatives.

Finally, I presented two accounts that inspire my own proposal and the way in which deliberation and participation interact in it. These are Young's (2010) and Pateman's (2012) approaches. I concluded by stating that both participation and deliberation are crucial to promote our autonomy and to challenge the dominating relations we experience in our democracies.

Chapter 6: Democratic Autonomy

I. Exploring Richardson's Democratic Autonomy

Both Richardson's and my proposal connect non-domination and autonomy by arguing that acknowledging each agent's autonomy should lead to non-domination in political processes. Nonetheless, one of the key differences between Democratic Autonomy and my Relations of Mutual Recognition is that the former considers the political process as a relevant space where our autonomy should be respected, whilst the latter thinks of political processes as part of the political aspect of autonomy. I will devote this chapter to describe Richardson's view in some detail, in order to analyse Democratic Autonomy's main features, as well as its shared concerns with my Relations of Mutual Recognition. This analysis aims at showing that a democratic project that rests on a concern for people's personal autonomy should be relational when approaching political processes if it is to challenge the status quo.

As I argued in Chapter 5, some deliberative democracy projects—Richardson's is one of them—need to move past their concern for providing good reasons to legitimise power exercises, towards emphasising the inclusive aspect of deliberative democracy. In this chapter, I will describe the similarities between my view and Richardson's proposal. But more importantly, I will analyse the differences in the conceptual framework between his Democratic Autonomy and my Relations of Mutual Recognition. This analysis will provide support for my claim about the importance of the relational perspective of my project, as well as for thinking of our political interactions as the political aspect of our autonomy (instead of as external to it).

I will begin by presenting a general description of Richardson's (2002) Democratic Autonomy, followed by an analysis of three of its features: non-domination, popular rule, and deliberation. Part III develops a more detailed analysis of the deliberative component. Part IV will discuss the consequences and the importance of thinking of our political relations as a constitutive part of autonomy.

II. Democratic autonomy: Government action, the public and the representative's deliberation

Henry Richardson's (2002) "Democratic Autonomy" is an approach to democracy motivated by the impact that bureaucratic domination can have over our autonomy. This project uniquely intends to connect various ideas that have been considered competing. Richardson calls his project republican, liberal, populist and rationalist (Richardson, 2002:84). Three features included in his account also play a central role in my proposal, namely, securing non-domination, deliberation, and autonomy. Furthermore, what makes his view especially relevant to explore for my research is that his proposal is based on the value of autonomy. Democratic Autonomy wants to show how our political processes should look like if they were organized around respect for our autonomy. Richardson argues that non-domination—among other—is a necessary requirement to express respect for our autonomy. I now explain how Richardson reaches the position that I have just sketched.

1. An overview

Richardson (2002) wants to address what he calls the "threat of bureaucratic domination" (Richardson, 2002:17). His aim is to develop an idea of public reasoning able to reconcile administrative power and discretion with democratic control so that we avoid arbitrary exercises of bureaucratic power (Richardson, 2002:17). The motivation for his project comes from what he identifies as a shared concern between liberals and republicans, namely, that even democratic government actions need to be justified, due to the risk to individual freedom they can represent.

> Government action comes under a burden of legitimation because it impinges on freedom. It does so in two ways. The liberal is rightly concerned about government action because it can undercut or violate fundamental rights. The republican is rightly concerned about government action because it can put us under new duties and may do so arbitrarily (Richardson, 2002:23).

In order to face this risk to our freedom, what we need is focusing on respect for citizens' autonomy in political processes. Richardson holds that individual autonomy consists of self-

rule expressed by the reasons each person believes there to be to behave in a specific way. In turn, reasoned self-rule by collective democratic procedures constitutes what he calls "democratic autonomy" (Richardson, 2002:18). The idea is that "the liberal demand that the political process treat individuals as autonomous persons" (Richardson, 2002:63) leads to three requirements: that citizens are addressed as being capable of joining in public discussions by the political process; that accordingly, each citizen is asked to participate as a potential decision-maker; that individuals are treated by the political process as "self-originating sources of claims" (Richardson, 2002:63).

These three requirements are what justify a democratic political process that is deliberative and inclusive. "The requirement that the political process respect the autonomy of citizens demands that the process invite them to take a role in deciding, together, what ought to be done" (Richardson, 2002:65). Richardson argues that acknowledging every person's autonomy amounts to having to reason together. Respect for autonomy requires providing each other with reasons for what ought to be done. Accordingly, political participation or what he calls the populist strand of his theory is the idea that voting and allowing public discussion means to treat people as equals and to respect their personal autonomy.

> The only realistic way to engage citizens as autonomous agents in the political process is to invite them to vote and express their opinions in public discussion. The real attraction of populism, therefore, is that it is a necessary aspect of politically respecting individual autonomy (Richardson, 2002:63).

As mentioned above, Richardson describes his argument as republican, liberal, populist and rationalist. He claims that his project includes the republican concern for domination, the liberal advocacy for individual rights and liberties, the populist idea of rule by the people, and the centrality of providing rationally reasoned arguments held in a deliberative fashion.

> As I see it, our ideal of democracy commits us to reasoning together, within the institutions of a liberal republic, about what we ought to do in such a way that it is plausible to say that we, the people, rule ourselves (Richardson, 2002:17).

In summary, Richardson (2002) combines views that initially seem distant from each other in a way that entwines every concern with the need for an account of democracy with autonomy at its centre. Respecting agent's freedom and autonomy in his argument appears to naturally lead to the need for populist democratic processes, which likewise require the provision of reasons through deliberation to prevent domination. My proposal shares both the general aim of protecting our autonomy from domination in political processes and the intention to do so through democratic, open deliberation. Nonetheless, there are relevant differences regarding the conceptual framework that supports each project—much like what I explained with respect to deliberative democracy in Chapter 5.

The following sections (2 to 4) will analyse three elements from Richardson's proposal that show these differences in our conceptual framework. First, I will address his approach to non-domination, which explains the centrality of his concern for the legitimacy of the exercise of political power. Second, his definition of populism and the public, to show his understanding of popular political participation; and third, the deliberative feature of his proposal, especially in terms of who should deliberate.

2. Non-domination: a concern for the legitimacy of government action

In what follows, I will address Richardson's approach to non-domination, which explains the centrality of his concern for the legitimacy of the exercise of political power. As mentioned above, according to Richardson there are two ways in which government action can encroach freedom; by undercutting our fundamental rights or by arbitrarily imposing new duties. Democracies should not curtail freedom in the first way but even if they meet "basic requirements of legality and justice" (Richardson, 2002:26) they will have to impose new duties, which will inevitably affect freedom in the second way. This risk to freedom is what Richardson characterises as domination. Here I will discuss some consequences of this reading, in particular, with respect to the emphasis on the legitimacy of government action.

Richardson bases his approach to domination on a slightly different interpretation of Pettit's (2010) definition of domination:

> [M]astery, or domination is a normatively richer notion than the idea of a capacity to interfere. Domination is the capacity to make people's lives or situations worse by arbitrarily imposing duties on them, or by arbitrarily purporting to impose duties on them (Richardson, 2002:34).

This interpretation comes from Richardson's scepticism with the sort of "potential" to dominate that is part of Pettit's definition of non-domination (see Chapter 2 part II). Recall that Pettit (2010) defines domination as an agent's capacity for arbitrary interfere with another's life, and later (2012) as the exposure to another's power of uncontrolled interference. Richardson holds that defining domination as the capacity to arbitrarily interfere as Pettit does is too broad. According to Richardson, kidnappers, for example, have the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with people's lives, but we would not want to say that kidnappers dominate their potential victims, given that this could include everyone (Richardson, 2002:34). Instead, Richardson claims that his re-definition is able to stress the normative aspect of domination by focusing on what it is that is harmful about the interference. It is not the capacity of arbitrary interference that is problematic but arbitrarily *imposing duties* that can make people's lives worse off. This interpretation allows Richardson to show why government action is under such a heavy burden of legitimacy, but at the same time, it takes away an important aspect that was captured by Pettit's broader definition.

Thinking of domination as the capacity to arbitrarily interfere lets Pettit's view emphasise the centrality of experiencing an equal standing with others. It is the power relations that put some in a position where they cannot look others in the eye that need to be challenged. Having the capacity to arbitrarily interfere does not necessarily amount to being able to impose duties, what it does imply is a difference in standing that translates into *relations* of domination. What Pettit calls the "eyeball test" refers to being able to look each other in the eye and not having to rely on deference to avoid these interferences by others. Thus, the broadness of Pettit's definition helps to characterise subtler forms of domination. Being dominated according to Pettit's definition does not depend on whether new duties are in fact imposed—or could be imposed—upon us. What Pettit's approach does is track the pernicious character of relations that put some in a position where they can subject others to their will. This broader and relational character of Pettit's view gets lost in Richardson's

interpretation. My view takes the relational character of Pettit's approach as one of the key elements of non-domination, which makes my view more capable of addressing dominating relations also in its subtler forms.

The burden of legitimacy that government action is under is central to Richardson's project, because domination amounts to nothing other than an illegitimate exercise of political power. Since government action will surely lead to impose new duties, it is crucial that it is not arbitrary, and the way to prevent this is by showing respect for people's autonomy.

> My simple proposal is that political power is nonarbitrarily used when it is constrained to operate within fair procedures that respect persons as free and equals and provide adequate protection for their fundamental rights and liberties. This is obviously a distinctively liberal proposal (Richardson, 2002:47).

Richardson marries liberal ideas of respect for basic liberties and securing basic rights to his interpretation of neo-republican domination, in order to, justify the relevance of legitimacy in the exercise of political power for our autonomy. This move is not problematic in itself, due to the similarities between both (broadly conceived) traditions with respect to government action. Pettit himself also wants to argue for similarities rather than contrast between his neo-republicanism and liberal views. However, republicans do not share the premise that *any* governmental action will amount to hindering freedom in some level; instead, they actually hold that some initiatives will aid non-domination: "If there is interference, but no domination, as in the case of the non-mastering interferer, only the ideal of non-interference will see anything to criticize" (Pettit, 2010:23). The non-mastering interferer is described by Pettit (2010) as "the law and government that obtains in a well-ordered republic" (Pettit, 2010:31).

Therefore, even though republicans share the liberal distrust in government action and its impact on personal liberties, they address their lack of trust by describing specific means to avoid domination by the government (separation of powers, the law, and channels for popular contestation), which is not initially conceived as dominating, but able to fall into domination. Governmental action is supposed to aid freedom as non-domination.

Accordingly, whether a governmental action will impinge on freedom will heavily depend on the arbitrariness of the initiative.

The problem is that Richardson shifts the focus from Pettit's intention to secure non-dominating relations by challenging our power relations, towards guaranteeing non-dominating exercise of power by respecting autonomy. The latter makes his view's capacity to challenge the status quo heavily rely on what "respecting autonomy" means.

It is important to note that throughout this research, I have been very critical of Pettit's approach to non-domination precisely because it falls short of offering ways to effectively challenge the status quo. I have argued that Pettit also seems to focus more on the legitimacy of the exercise of power than on the importance of standing on an equal footing within the political sphere (Chapter 3). However, what I have taken as the inspiration for my own project is the potential contained in Pettit's definition of non-domination to elaborate a proposal that *does* stress how crucial it is to enjoy an equal standing—which is one of the main aims of my Relations of Mutual Recognition. Thus, Richardson's push towards an even more marked concern for legitimacy falls prey to the same issues I have identified in Pettit's view, whilst also risking losing the transformative potential contained in Pettit's definition of non-domination: the importance of enjoying an equal standing.

3. Populism and popular rule

In this section, I will introduce Richardson's (2002) perspective on populism. In order to do so, I will look into both his idea of popular rule and his understanding of the "will of the people". My intention is to highlight two issues present in his view: the lack of impact of popular rule at the individual level, and the formation of the will of the people understood as distributed across the constitutional structure.

Richardson identifies Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1997) as the precursor of populism, and at the same time, as the one to be blamed for the ideal of populism being labelled dangerous. Richardson wants to show that one can nonetheless have a populist project without holding on to the Rousseauvian version. In order to do so, he explores what is usually identified as the danger of populism in the Rousseauvian version, namely, that the will of the people can do no wrong. According to Richardson, there can be two reasons why we could think the will of the people can do no wrong, either because obeying the will of the people equals to

perfect freedom, or because the will of the people is unfailing. Richardson states that if we bracket Rousseau's dislike for democracy and thus take "the will of the people" to mean "the general will", we can find ideas like compelling people to be free if they do not obey the general will, as well as claims about the infallibility of the general will. Hence, Rousseau's perspective seems to include these two ways of justifying the notion that the will of the people can do no wrong, which invites to majoritarian tyranny and the mentioned sinister thought of forcing people to be free (Richardson, 2002:58).

Richardson argues that a populist project should therefore reject the claim that the will of the people can do no wrong, and accordingly, move away from Rousseauvian interpretations. Populism without the dangers Richardson identifies in Rousseau, is "the view that voting is a method for citizens to participate in making law and that the law thus made is the will of the people" (Richardson, 2002:58). Such version, Richardson holds, is committed neither to the idea that following the will of the people guarantees freedom nor to state that the people are never wrong about what should be done.

Richardson argues there is another problematic issue that results from following the Rousseauvian version, which is allowing an inherently collective idea like popular rule to be deemed as having a straightforward individual impact.

> Popular rule is a way that we rule ourselves. As such, it may fairly be taken to ground a sense in which *we* are free (…) This kind of claim about the freedom conferred by popular self-mastery applies only at the collective level, however, and does not factor down to the individual level (Richardson, 2002:59).

Even if rule by the people involves *some* form of collective freedom, what Richardson wants to avoid is endorsing the idea that rule by the people entails "that each citizen experiences or enjoys a kind of freedom when he or she obeys the law" (Richardson, 2002:59). Richardson argues that such reading of positive freedom or self-mastery excludes two central elements that his view proves are necessary requirements for freedom: not being placed under new duties without good reasons and being free from domination. According to Richardson, the idea that obeying the will of the people makes us in some way free is

incapable of guaranteeing "elemental and republican freedom" (Richardson, 2002:59). Thus, a populist should reject the idea that obeying the will of the people is a form of freedom because, on the one hand, the claim excludes other important aspects of freedom and on the other, it ignores the "conceptual gap between collective self-rule and the wills of individuals" (Richardson, 2002:60).

Obeying the will of the people surely cannot guarantee a more substantive sort of freedom like the one Richardson wants to advance. Basic rights and liberties as well as non-domination require much more than obeying the will of the people, which he equates to obedience to the law. But before reaching further conclusions, we need to investigate his interpretation of the will of the people in more detail. According to Richardson, there is no coherent definition of the people's will aside from the deliberative institutions that aid in its construction (Richardson, 2002:181). Hence, the people's will is constituted by the set of procedures through which the people reach their decisions (Richardson, 2002:67).

> [T]he normative importance for democracy of the idea of the will of the people is not that it is an object to be discovered. Rather, the requirement that the political process respect the autonomy of citizens demands that the process invite them to take a role in deciding, together, what ought to be done. What they then decide is their will (…) It demands only that the political process be constructed so that what emerges from it can fairly be counted as constituting the people's will (Richardson, 2002:65-66).

We can see more clearly here why Richardson thinks of obeying the will of the people and obeying the law as the same thing. If the law-making process succeeds at inviting citizens in some capacity to decide together what ought to be done, then the law that emerges can be considered the will of the people. Additionally, Richardson points out that there is no single government institution that can be considered to validly speak for the people. Congress, for example, does not by itself, speak for the people. Therefore, we should look for a way to distribute the formation of the popular will across different parts of the constitutional structure. This is what he calls "institutionally distributed systems for forming the will of the people— 'institutionally distributed popular sovereignty', for short" (Richardson, 2002:70).

The latter amounts to hold that democratic self-rule will depend on how adequately the different stages of the political process align to form the will of the people. Richardson claims that rule by the people requires that they do so generally and not by mere accident and that these various stages go from "public discussion and voting to debate and voting in an assembly, due ratification (if needed) by a chief executive, refinement and implementation by administrative agencies, and reflective public acceptance in the end" (Richardson, 2002:72).

The idea is that a political process that is structured in a way that respects the autonomy of each agent can be regarded as producing decisions that reflect the will of the people (Richardson, 2002:72). This description, nevertheless, tells us very little about what is implied by the alignment of each stage, especially in terms of the role that common citizens play within the structure. We need to know more about the implementation requirements of this "institutionally distributed popular sovereignty" to understand the implications of his view of popular rule and the formation of the will of the people.

4. Inclusion and the rule of the people

Richardson's understanding of popular rule and the will of the people show the remarkable differences between his Democratic Autonomy and my Relations of Mutual Recognition, especially in terms of the way in which he characterizes the role of common citizens. Both popular rule and Richardson's understanding of the formation of the will of the people, speak of a project that is far less participatory than mine. I will discuss this in more detail in what follows.

First, I would like to point out two important considerations and how they show a relevant contrast between his project and mine. First, although I do not refer to the will of the people in my proposal, both Richardson's and my understanding of the political process claim that political decisions should *include* citizens if they are to really respect their autonomy and reflect their interests and concerns—in his words, reflect the will of the people. Nonetheless, the participatory aspect (to achieve the concern for inclusion) of his distributed popular sovereignty is not clear. As I said, so far, we have not explored the implementation of the project, which could grant more details about its participatory aspect, but Richardson's

institutionally distributed popular sovereignty seems to imply a more limited direct involvement of common citizens than what my project deems necessary.

Richardson stresses that to secure the active participation of autonomous citizens would be impossible if it had to go all the way back to the origins of the constitution, as well as if it had to be expressed in a single moment of the political process (Richardson, 2002:72). The latter, he claims, justifies thinking of a popular will formation that is distributed across the political process as something more feasible. Richardson's objection to going all the way back to the origins of the constitution is understandable, given what he defines as the will of the people. Surely, as he argues, a will of the people that depends on constitutional institutions cannot be the one to elaborate the constitution since it does not exist prior to its creation. Nonetheless, it appears that thinking of the formation of the will of the people as distributed across the political process responds more to practical than theoretical concerns.

Richardson's project, like mine, require the involvement of the people in political decision-making processes if they are to respect people's autonomy. Therefore, distributing the formation of the people's will across institutions has to do with making that involvement more feasible rather than effective. It also seems to connect with his intention to move away from Rousseauvian populism by making sure that the law indeed reflects the will of the people, but that distributing its formation across different stages guarantees it is not seen as infallible or an example of true freedom. If the will of the people is formed through political decision-making of different sorts, then it depends on the constitution and constitutional structures that shape it, which leaves way for the other components of his definition of freedom and non-domination. In other words, it helps to reduce the risk of equating obeying the will of the people with true freedom.

The second consideration relates to his approach to popular rule, more specifically, to its alleged lack of impact at the individual level. We can find reasons for Richardson's reluctance to confer any impact of popular rule at the individual level in his understanding of autonomy. Since he does not define autonomy as dependent upon the relations, we enjoy, but as reasoned self-rule, popular rule and the collective form of freedom it represents are unable to directly impact our autonomy. The "conceptual gap" between collective self-rule and the individual will of every agent, refers to this distance between an individual ideal like autonomy and what he calls collective self-rule.

Both considerations show an important distance from the conceptual background that motivates my concern for autonomy. In my proposal, democracy with a high level of political participation from common citizens not only contributes to our enjoyment of personal autonomy, but our autonomy depends on it. Political participation—which I define more broadly as the role each agent plays in the political sphere—should allow for a particular kind of relations amongst people: of recognition. Those Relations of Mutual Recognition are required for political autonomy, without which personal autonomy cannot be enjoyed. This does not mean I want to support what Richardson calls the "dangerous Rousseuvian claim that each citizen experiences or enjoys a kind of freedom whenever he or she obeys the law" (Richardson, 2002: 59). But that, contrary to what he argues (Richardson, 2002:59), popular rule does have an impact at the individual level. Popular rule, when it really involves binding participation from every agent, has a double function; respecting each agent's capacity for autonomy and putting them in a position that allows their self-government to be effective in the political sphere. I will say more about this double function in Part IV.

III. Representative government: the deliberative component

Richardson's definition of popular rule and of the will of the people show, as I have suggested above, some of the conceptual differences between his Democratic Autonomy and my Relations of Mutual Recognition. However, the main differences and similarities will become more clearly apparent when looking into another aspect of his view; the deliberative component or the rationalist label he gives to his proposal. This part will discuss this final feature.

For Richardson, acknowledging the fact that every person is capable of autonomy amounts to having to reason together, providing each other with reasons for what ought to be done. However, he acknowledges that respect for each other's autonomy in itself does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that we need collective reasoning (Richardson, 2002:78). Another way to show respect for people's autonomy would be to leave space for independence, trusting their capacity to make their own decisions. According to Richardson, this is precisely why both liberals and republicans insist on protecting fundamental freedoms. What helps to make the connection between respect for autonomy and the requirement of reasoning together is the responsibility that each agent has to achieve democratic self-rule.

Every citizen has an individual role to play if the political process is to respect people's autonomy. Thus, it is the populist idea that we should rule ourselves in a democracy, that proves crucial to this argument about reasoning together.

The importance of self-rule also discards the idea of "standing back and letting citizens exercise their right to vote" (Richardson, 2002:80) because ruling ourselves requires the capacity to frame alternatives for the political agenda, which should not be left to lobbyist and bureaucrats. This capacity, instead, should be integrated into the democratic process by which we rule ourselves, and it requires deliberation to discuss the merits of the alternatives (Richardson, 2002:80). However, Richardson claims there is a tension between reasoning together and equality. Based on this tension he identifies; he looks into the requirements that are necessary for democratic deliberation and the difficulties in thinking of the right way to implement them.

In this part of the chapter, I will discuss the deliberative or rationalist component—as he calls it—by considering two important elements present in Richardson's view: the challenges that reasoning together raises, and the role that representation plays for his overall project. I will conclude that, although he intends to go beyond the checks and balances proposed by neo-republicans like Pettit, his deliberative component does not push the status quo enough to qualify as succeeding at that task.

1. Deliberation and equality

According to Richardson, the tension between reasoning together and equality hails from the fact that people have different reasoning skills and different abilities of persuasion. Thus, even if we have a system that follows the principle of 'one person one vote', this fact about differences in abilities gives rise to political inequality (Richardson, 2002:85). To explain this idea further, he takes Thomas Christiano's (1996) distinction between quantitative and qualitative equality. Christiano states that we can secure quantitative equality following the principle of 'one person one vote', but that more is needed for qualitative equality. Christiano holds that democratic deliberation requires a fair or equal chance to influence debates in legislature and in the public sphere.

Although the tension between reasoning together and equality identified by Richardson seemed initially to focus on people's different reasoning skills, he frames his concern for qualitative equality more broadly, in line with Christiano's definition. Qualitative equality, Richardson claims, is threatened by power inequalities, inequality of resources or unequal persuasive ability (Richardson, 2002:85). To face these challenges to qualitative equality one can, take either a direct or an indirect approach. Richardson holds that direct approaches either idealise politics or presume a precision they cannot achieve. Thus, he suggests taking an indirect approach instead.

Richardson illustrates the idealisation by looking into Habermas (1990) and his idea that the force of the better argument can neutralize all motives other than the search for truth. Richardson argues that views inspired by Habermas tend to make it difficult to set the conditions for deliberation, because they aim at an invariance of the distributions of power and resources that is unrealistic.

> The very freedoms that, as I argued in the previous chapter, are necessary to nurture the existence of a public will also have latitude for some individuals or groups to gain more influence than others over the effective channels of communication (Richardson, 2002:86).

The problem of illusory precision, on the other hand, tracks views that intend to define equality in a precise way, even though Richardson believes that if we took a definition like James Bohman's (1996), we can see this does not work. According to Bohman we should define communicative equality in terms of a person's capacity to initiate public debate on a certain topic. However, Richardson points out, this definition is also inadequate, since it intends to 'pin point' things we are unable to identify, such as which issues are those required to establish that a person indeed has that capacity? Which are the issues that require inclusion? These questions become even harder to answer when we consider pluralism and the fact that there is thus no way of ranking issues.

To avoid these problems, Richardson introduces his indirect strategy to achieve qualitative equality in deliberation, which involves "developing an account of the institutions needed to

preserve the background justice of democratic deliberation" (Richardson, 2002:88). Richardson identifies four conditions for this purpose: (1) protecting equal political liberties in the constitution; (2) securing that citizens are equals before the law; (3) implementing effective measures to mitigate the concentration of economic power in the few (4) allowing the chance of participating to every person so they can counteract to some extent, the influence of economic and political power disparities (Richardson, 2002:88-89).

The first condition refers to protect liberties such as freedom of speech, of assembly and of taking part in public affairs. The second condition implies that fundamental rights are afforded to all citizens regardless of any differences in birth or class. About the third condition, on the other hand, Richardson does not provide many details of what it entails, but he mentions some examples such as progressive income tax, inheritance taxes and the idea that property ownership should be sufficiently dispersed so that no one can easily buy votes or participation from others. Finally, the fourth condition is again not really specified, but some examples given are measures within legislatures to assure that majority rule does not silence minorities, such as equal time allocation in debates for members of each party. These four conditions are meant to tackle the first two threats to qualitative equality identified by Richardson, namely, inequalities of power and of resources, but there was a third threat he referred to as unequal persuasive ability.

Richardson argues that the best way to diffuse and mitigate the impact of citizen's different persuasive abilities is to safeguard a diversity of fora, so that each person can find a forum where they can indeed be persuasive. Modern democracies already offer these fora, which means that what is required according to Richardson is protecting freedom of association and of expression. He adds that another possibility to promote giving voice to those that may not be otherwise heard is by creating an instance where people can share their experiences to government officials.

> [F]or officials to organize a forum, not around a pre-defined issue (…) but rather around listening to people's life stories so that their perspectives might indirectly inform policy making. Such for a would help put on the public agenda issues that might not otherwise surface (Richardson, 2002:92).

An additional novel requirement of Richardson's view of deliberation is his suggestion that: "In addition to being open to the public, the legislature ought also to hold hearings at which interested member of the public are invited to comment on draft legislation" (Richardson, 2002:196). However, both instances would have no legally binding character. It is a matter of trying to influence legislation in an indirect way.

There are several important things to note from Richardson's approach to deliberation. First, although he justifies the importance of reasoning together by appealing to his idea of self-rule, his characterisation of what reasoning together should amount to, is from the beginning, connected to a key tension. The idea that reasoning together is in tension with what he latter calls qualitative equality (borrowing from Christiano) is not problematic in itself. What Richardson wants to show is that there are relevant threats to qualitative equality in practice, because a realistic picture of our democracies should acknowledge that there are indeed differences in resources that usually translate in later differences in influence. One could be critical of Richardson's view by claiming that acknowledging the all too real differences in resources in our democracies should not lead us to acceptance, rather to working on direct approaches—instead of his preferred indirect strategy—to prevent them from translating into differences in influence, differences in political power. But setting this worry aside, what seems problematic is how he suggests we address the tension.

The four conditions for qualitative equality in deliberation correspond to institutions and measures that are already in place in most democracies. Hence, it seems strange that Richardson does not offer clear measures beyond existing ways to counterbalance these differences, especially when by *indirect* he meant an approach that looks into the institutions that will preserve the necessary background justice for deliberation. Clearly, since he shares my diagnosis of the problematic relations that we currently experience within the political sphere, something must change, and if the focus is on the institutions, then that is where he should be suggesting the changes to happen. However, Richardson fails to suggest major—or small—effective additions to current institutions and formal channels of deliberation. There are only two new instances proposed by Richardson to try to work towards inclusion of those that may be excluded precisely due to differences in resources, both of which would have no effective impact over decision-making because they do not involve any legally binding capacity.

On the other hand, his worry about differences in persuasive abilities—although not directly—tells us something about what Richardson thinks deliberators should be like. A concern for the persuasive abilities of deliberators reveals that although respect for autonomy dictates that people should be treated and offered inclusion in deliberation, there are some requirements for deliberators. Thus, that Richardson includes differences in persuasive abilities as a threat to qualitative equality in deliberations, shows that there are additional concerns that do not have to do with illusionary precision or the idealisation of deliberation, but with the sort of deliberators that our democracies need. I will move on now to discuss Richardson's view on the representative's role, which will be illuminating to continue exploring this final point further.

2. Representation

Richardson argues that we should conceive democracy as a form of government in which all of us actively partake in deciding what ought to be done. This should involve a fair process that treats citizens as equals and respects their autonomy, which in turn, should be reflected in "inviting them to rule by reasoning with one another" (Richardson, 2002:195). With this definition in the background, Richardson explores representative government's compatibility with Democratic Autonomy. He is interested in discovering whether Democratic Autonomy is realizable in a representative government. In order to do so, he considers (a) how we should structure elections; (b) with respect to what should legislators represent the public; (c) if legislative decision-making can be considered as articulating the will of the people (Richardson, 2002:193). Here I would like to focus on the last two issues.

Describing Richardson's take on what legislators should represent with respect to the public, as well as what we should take their decisions to embody, will show what Democratic Autonomy amounts to in practice. Moreover, it will prove that the apprehension I mentioned above about his concern for differences in persuasive abilities, does transpire into what he describes as the characteristics of deliberators. But more importantly, it adds crucial elements to understand what the role of common citizens is in Richardson's project. Ultimately, the common citizen's role assigned by Richardson does not seem to follow from his inclusive definition of democracy.

Richardson begins by stating his agreement with Bernard Manin's (1997) idea that representative government is not inherent to democracy, because western democracies were founded on an idea of democracy connected to the ancient Greek tradition of electing legislators by lot, whilst representative government belonged to aristocracy. Selecting people for representative government by imposing property-holding and other qualifications reinforced the idea that these were to some respect wiser than average citizens. According to Richardson, "while this specific claim of distinction may no longer be credible, its residue is our general lack of any assumption that legislatures should look, in all respects, like microcosms" (Richardson, 2002:194). Richardson argues that this is one way in which representative government is different from direct democracy; namely, we do not expect legislatures to represent the specific reality of a constituency. Another difference between direct democracy and a representative government has to do with the independence of legislators to rely on their own judgement for decision-making, as I discussed in Chapter 4.

Richardson believes there are good reasons why our representatives are no longer elected by lot. One of these is that in ancient Greece, decision-makers did not have to deal with complex issues like the ones our legislators do need to figure out nowadays. Hence, it would be very demanding on citizens if we elected legislators by lot like some countries do for juries. Similarly, he argues that legislators learn how to build coalitions and navigate through pressures, as well as develop expertise whilst they exercise their role, which would not be available for citizens elected by lot.

> Elected legislators have time during political campaigns to build alliances with citizen's groups. While this opens opportunities for corruption and undue influence, it also gives the legislators the ability to work effectively on building coalitions. To thrust ordinary citizens into the position of making laws, today, would be to subject them to a maelstrom of pressures with which they would not be able adequately to cope (Richardson, 2002:195).

The reasons he presents against electing legislators by lot, also show us his view on the characteristics of legislators. The importance of electing legislators seems connected to the requirements that the role of decision-maker imposes, i.e., the complexity of issues, the

capacity to resist pressures, develop coalitions and possessing expertise. Moreover, he returns to this point later on to straightforwardly claim that it is not desirable to have common people legislating.

> If average people were wanted, they could be selected by lot, as in ancient Greece. It is in effect, because we recognize the importance of the governing done by legislatures that we seek and accept above-average political excellences in our legislators (Richardson, 2002:197).

Thus, Richardson's characterization also explains why he believes independence from the will of the people for legislators to rely on their own judgement is so important; "necessary in order for them to carry democratic deliberation to the next stage" (Richardson, 2002:194). Since their expertise and capacities are above average, we should rely on their judgement for decision-making. Independence is not problematic for Richardson also because, even if we grant independence to legislators, we would still be capable of influencing them in two ways; by the electoral process and via public suasion (Richardson, 2002:196).

Let us now return to one of the questions that Richardson wanted to answer about legislators: (b) with respect to what should legislators represent the public? His reply to this question is that the object of representation should be citizen's views. As he explained when justifying his indirect approach, thinking of representing people's interests implies that these are in some way static, and that we can actually determine which issues should be included and which we should discard. Richardson also argued that pluralism prevents us from making a sort of ranking of issues. Likewise, his approach on selection by lot provided his reasons against thinking that what we should represent are people in the way of a microcosm of a constituency. Representing views instead, according to Richardson, allows legislators to use their judgement for political decision-making which is framed by the people's perspective.

> Having, with luck, elected legislators who fairly represent the range of the public's views and perspectives, and keeping open this possibility for direct communication, legislators should then be allowed to frame their deep

> compromises and to vote on the basis of their best judgment about what it is that we ought to do. Within such a context, they thereby can help frame the will of the people (Richardson, 2002:202).

This claim also answers (c) whether legislative decision-making can be considered as articulating the will of the people. Richardson claims that given that legislators should include citizen's views in their decision-making, the process can be considered as helping to articulate the will of the people.

3. Inclusiveness

Richardson constantly argues that decision-making should not be concentrated in one part of the constitutional structure like the legislature, but that it has to be distributed across diverse political institutions. Richardson adds that:

> Institutions that make laws that put citizens under new duties must be regarded as part of this distributed process of political will-formation: It is not enough that they be subject to the contestatory checks that republicans would recommend (Richardson, 2002:179).

Furthermore, his definition of democracy seems to portray an ideal with a strong participatory requirement. Recall that he described democracy as a form of government that includes every citizen's involvement in deciding what ought to be done, which should include a fair process that treats people as equals and respects their autonomy, precisely by inviting them to rule by reasoning amongst each other (Richardson, 2002:195).

However, we can see from his approach to deliberation and the representative's role, that the participatory element is much less of a protagonist than what one would expect from his definition of democracy. In terms of inclusion, if the formation of the will of the people articulates itself across different political institutions, citizens would have to be in some way part of those institutions or been given an effective way of communicating with them in order to really count as being included. Still, Richardson only suggests a very modest open space for citizens to propose some inputs to legislators, and the creation of a kind of forum where they can share their experiences as way of communication. Additional means

mentioned by Richardson are those already present in our democracies, such as transparency and openness of political decision-making by offering some kind of open record of legislative discussions. Regarding the profile of deliberators, it seems clear by the previous analysis that he thinks of decision-makers as people who should be wiser than the average citizen, and moreover, that it is not desirable to think of common citizens as capable of legislating—why is why he objects election by lot. My view instead, emphasizes the importance of making common citizens' part of deliberation processes by suggesting a sortition legislature as a permanent body (Chapter 4).

But then again, in practice, our democracies entrust the technical and more complex matters not to above-average legislators, but to ad hoc experts especially called upon to provide adequate information on diverse subjects. Expertise about legislating is something that is usually acquired in time whilst exercising the task, as Richardson himself acknowledges, which means that common citizens exercising this role would be equally capable of developing this expertise. Therefore, his view on the requirements for legislators appears to be founded more on his apprehensions over citizen's expressive voting (Richardson, 2002:198-199).

On the other hand, the idea that what should be represented are citizens' political views and not their preferences, next to the importance Richardson gives to the legislator's independence to rely on their judgement, show that most of the weight of the deliberation process is to be done by legislators and other government officials. Thus, although Richardson does not want the formation of the will of the people to be concentrated in one segment or body, his own approach to deliberation and representation show otherwise. It is puzzling how representatives are expected to take seriously or share the citizen's political views when the mechanisms offered cannot assure communication or connection between them, and so much relies on the elections that appoint legislators to their roles.

4. Democratic autonomy and participation

From the previous analysis we can conclude that Richardson conceives political participation as informal deliberation within the public sphere, where people should reflect over decisions being made, or having already been made by our representatives. At the same time, those decisions should express citizens' political views—mostly via voting for candidates. Political participation seems reduced to what we already have in our democracies, and to what Richardson seemed to have been opposing from the beginning of his proposal, i.e., the idea of sitting back and letting people vote. Stating that "reasons, arguments, views and

proposals need to be developed in the informal public sphere" (Richardson, 2002: 179), whilst also neglecting to suggest formal and binding instances for those views to be shared, is problematic.

In the long run, his proposal does not appear to be doing more than the republican contestatory system, which is nothing other than offering formal channels for after the fact contestation of political decisions. Moreover, although such contestation is indeed insufficient (both for securing republican non-domination and Democratic Autonomy), Richardson's project falls short of even securing that right. The republican concern for domination from the government seems forgotten from Richardson´s project due to this restricted notion of political participation, where too much of the formation of the will of the people depends on the goodwill of our representatives.

IV. The political aspect of autonomy vs respect for autonomy

Richardson develops an interesting proposal that puts autonomy at the centre, whilst arguing for deliberation and for securing non-domination. I am in principle more than sympathetic to all of these elements that feature in his project—they are also very relevant for my project—but as the analysis has by now shown, there are important conceptual differences between his Democratic Autonomy and my Relations of Mutual Recognition. These differences can be summarised in an idea that is crucial for my project, namely, that our political interactions are partially constitutive of our autonomy, instead of understanding them as relations that should reflect respect for our autonomy. This main difference explains why we can find all of the above contrasts between Richardson's and my account, even though both are based on the value of autonomy. Furthermore, thinking of securing respect for autonomy rather than addressing the political aspect of autonomy, neglects the impact of dominating political relations for our autonomy and makes the project incapable of challenging the *status quo* as it should. I would like to discuss this difference and present my reasons for preferring the political aspect approach in what follows.

1. A limited sort of influence and popular rule

Richardson's Democratic autonomy starts from the premise that if we value autonomy, then our democratic systems should be organized in a way that shows respect for our autonomy. One of the requirements for respecting our autonomy is inviting us to rule. This amounts to being able to have some say in the process where we decide what ought to be done. Thus, influence seems to play an important role in the project. According to Richardson citizens should have the capacity to frame alternatives for the political agenda, and for what we saw, voting for representatives, participating in informal public fora for discussions, and having access to our legislators' debates, is sufficient for this purpose. The problem is that the kind of influence he deems appropriate and these related requirements to implement it, seem inadequate to connect autonomy with the need to reason together set by his project. Respect for autonomy does not require us to push for being included or having more influence than indirectly giving inputs to our legislators. Richardson, as mentioned, acknowledges that respect for autonomy on its own cannot justify having to reason together; in other words, it does not imply a stronger sort of inclusion. In order to argue for the centrality of reasoning together, Richardson invokes popular rule or the populist vein of his project.

Richardson argues that our decision-making processes should be designed in a way that allows us to state that we rule ourselves. Recall that laws are supposed to express the will of the people, because decision-making processes in turn are supposed to involve legislators that represent the views of the people. Thus, popular rule should be achieved by following the will of the people that is being articulated within political institutions and their decision-making.

Let us assume that Richardson's approach to the formation of the will of the people is right. This would mean that having legislators that represent the views of the people, in addition to an active informal public sphere, is sufficient for stating that we indeed rule ourselves. Should we not ask ourselves still how is it that legislators get to represent our views in the first place? Law-making does not include common citizens, and as we saw, Richardson thinks doing so would be undesirable. But if people's influence in the shape of inputs should be able to frame alternatives for the political agenda, we surely require something other than voting—as Richardson himself acknowledged. Qualitative equality is supposed to track people's capacity to influence legislative debates, beyond being treated as equals by the principle of 'one person one vote'. Furthermore, Richardson identified inequalities of power and resources as threats to qualitative equality, which would justify securing means of

communicating citizens' views—especially for minorities—beyond existing legal measures and voting for representatives.

Hence, the fact that Richardson does not consider crucial to include some additional mechanism to communicate people's views shows that respecting our autonomy ultimately was not about being invited to rule but about *indirectly* influencing political decision-making. Thus, respect for autonomy and this understanding of the rule of the people seem incapable of presenting a convincing argument that connects autonomy to the importance of inclusive political deliberation.

2. A challenge to the *status quo*

Finally, the mentioned approach to respect for autonomy and the kind of deliberation it requires seems unable to address the impact of dominating political relations for our autonomy. Although Richardson's project is motivated by his concern for bureaucratic abuses of power and the domination they represent, respecting our autonomy in the political sphere via such a weak form of inclusion of common citizens in decision-making processes, does not suffice to prevent domination. As I discussed in Chapter 2, non-domination requires participation in the form of an effective, active capacity to have an impact over decision-making, and this capacity, or political power, should take into account the inequalities of power that will affect its exercise.

As I briefly mentioned above at the end of Part II, granting binding participation for all agents in the political sphere has a double function; on the one hand, it shows respect for every agent's capacity for autonomous decision-making (and their equal standing as autonomous agents), and on the other, puts people in a position that provides effective self-government in the political sphere. Accordingly, the sole aim of reflecting respect for autonomy in the political sphere is not able to play this double function, and without the second function, dominating relations fail to be addressed. In other words, not envisaging novel ways of challenging the power relations that exist in our democracies will surely fail at addressing the domination both Richardson and I agree is present.

When instead, we think of our political interactions as being part of our autonomy, we not only want them to reflect our equal standing as autonomous agents—to be treated as such by the law and institutions—but to enjoy relations that *allow* our autonomous capacities to be exercised in important decision-making. We require political power, which I define as authoritative influence (Chapter 3), and *direct* involvement. To be fair, Richardson does

acknowledge that his ambition is not to establish or develop a novel form of government or anything of the sort but to defend a way of reasoning that is already in place.

> I do not take my task to be that of peddling a radical new invention, a hitherto untried mode of public reasoning, but rather to be articulating and providing a philosophical defense for a mode of reasoning that our best public servants actually use (Richardson, 2002: 76).

Thus, it appears that although some of his claims indicate that more inclusion and participation of common citizens is required for respecting our autonomy, the goal is to promote a sort of decision-making that some legislators and institutions already instantiate. That being the case, it seems that the similarities between his project and mine come apart at the very beginning, because his diagnosis implies that some deliberation in our democracies is indeed autonomy-respecting, whilst my diagnosis is much less optimistic. Setting that aside, his proposal does allow for a more ambitious autonomy-minded project, but as I have said, it would require thinking of our political interactions as crucial for our autonomy (because they constitute it), and therefore, challenging the way that they happen nowadays.

V. Conclusions

In this chapter, I aimed at analysing the differences between Richardson's Democratic Autonomy and my project. I began by presenting an overview of Richardson's Democratic Autonomy; then I moved on to analyse three of its main features: non-domination, popular rule and deliberation. The last part discussed the advantages of thinking of our political relations as a constitutive part of our autonomy.

The idea was to show that a proposal focused on autonomy should be relational and participatory in its approach to political processes if it is to be capable of challenging the status quo. Thus, although I share the same general concerns and the central focus on autonomy, I showed that my project is better qualified to address the problematic political interactions we experience in our current democracies. I argued that thinking of our political

interactions as the political aspect of autonomy promotes a more ambitious project than what respect for autonomy allows.

Chapter 7: Epistocracy: a different view of participation

I. Epistocracy and the search for competent voters

The proposal I have been discussing comes from a concern for the problematic power imbalances, with its related relations of subordination, that I identify in our democracies. But not all theorists interested in improving our democracies take this concern as their starting point. A series of unexpected outcomes from decision-making such as Brexit, the election of Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro has revived debates regarding our democracy's electorate and its behaviour. More specifically, discussions seem to focus on the capacity of electors to make competent high stakes political decisions. This has fostered interesting discussions around ideas like technocracy (rule of experts), and epistocracy (restricted electorate based on competence). Of these, epistocracy is the most significant contemporary manifestation, and so it is what I focus my attention on here.

Roughly, epistocracy amounts to distributing political power in accordance with each citizen's competence for political decision-making (Brennan, 2016a). There are different forms of epistocracy distinguished by their preferred way to implement a competence-led distribution of political power. Most of them include some means to assess political competence like a voter qualification exam that tests citizen's level of information on politically relevant issues. The problem, epistocrats hold, is that most voters in democracies are *incompetent* to vote, which makes them support suboptimal or bad policies and candidates (Brennan, 2018:58). On the basis of this diagnosis, epistocrats propose focusing on competence to improve outcomes.

This represents a clear departure from the diagnosis that I have made about our democracies. Throughout this research, I have argued that one of the key problems with our democracies is the kind of political relations we hold in them. What makes our democracies incapable of fulfilling their full potential are the dominating political relations we stand in, which harm our autonomy. The main difference between each diagnosis is that, in order to address the central issue that I identify, we need (among other things) more involvement of common citizens in political decision-making—or political participation as is commonly defined. Instead, epistocrats' focus on competence looks for the exact opposite; the problem of incompetence would not be addressed but worsened by increasing citizen participation. This

contrast poses an interesting challenge to my proposal since, if epistocrats are right, my project would be mistaken both about the diagnosis and consequently about the best way to face the problems identified by it.

For the sake of argument, I will assume that the epistocrats' diagnosis is right and direct my attention to challenge their approach instead. I will argue that epistocrats have not paid sufficient attention to the way in which they define competence. I will try to elucidate their definition of competence and show that their focus is on information. However, I will argue that there is an important kind of information missing, namely, common citizen's preferences. This neglect has problematic consequences because it prevents them from addressing an important issue included in their very diagnosis. A central element of epistocrats' diagnosis is that the cause of bad outcomes is largely attributable to lay citizens' incapacity to choose the right means to foster their preferences (Brennan, 2016; Ahlstrom-Vij, 2019). I call this the Preferences/Means Problem. However, an elite restricted electorate would fail precisely at being competent in terms of having sufficient information about common citizens' preferences. I call this lack of access of the restricted electorate, the Information Gap. I will hold that the Information Gap makes epistocrats unable to properly address the Preferences/Means Problem.

My analysis will show that we would be better equipped to address the Preferences/Means Problem by focusing on improving the flow of information between all actors instead, as my proposal of collective self-government suggests.

The chapter has three other parts. Part II begins by introducing epistocracy's main features as a general system and continues by considering their approach to competence. Part III moves on to provide two interpretations of competence. Part IV continues by describing the Information Gap and showing that epistocracy's approach to competence is unable to overcome it.

II. The epistocratic system

Epistocracy is a system that challenges universal suffrage[31]. More precisely, 'A system is said to be epistocratic to the extent that the system formally allocates political power on the basis of knowledge or political competence' (Brennan, 2016a, n.p). I will begin by introducing some of the main features of epistocracy. An important part of this introduction will be to explore Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij's comments on social deliberation. His view presents key concerns that motivate epistocratic projects such as what I name the Preferences/Means Problem. Section 4 will examine the epistocrats' understanding of competence in more detail. I will focus on Jason Brennan's account given its relevance for the literature on epistocracy.

1. A brief overview

Although there are different accounts of epistocracy, most views share a general argument. This argument begins by claiming that voters in democracies are ignorant, misinformed or irrational concerning politics. Such an ignorant electorate tends to support suboptimal or bad policies and candidates, hence, epistocrats believe knowledge and wisdom are not salient features of this group. This is problematic because politicians cater to the ignorant electorate, which means there is a high risk that they will indeed implement the bad policies preferred by the electorate (Brennan, 2018:58).

Additionally, epistocrats deny the intrinsically just character of democracy, and object to deontological reasons supporting universal suffrage. Finally, epistocrats claim that regardless of the problematic circumstances that may come from implementing epistocracy in the real world, the results it would produce would still be more just than the ones democracy brings about (Brennan, 2018:58).

In order to address the problem of the incompetent electorate, epistocracy suggests identifying competent and incompetent citizens, usually by enacting some kind of voter qualification exam. The latter involves presenting citizens with a set of questions on politically relevant matters, so that those who prove their qualifications by passing the exam

[31] Epistocracy has its strongest contemporary exponent in Brennan (2011, 2016, 2018). See also Mulligan (2018), Caplan (2007), López-Guerra (2014) and Jeffrey (2018). For some interesting objections to epistocracy, see: Estlund (2008), Moraro (2018), Gunn (2019), Reiss (2019), Umbers (2019).

can vote or have additional political powers to the ones offered to the unqualified citizens. Epistocrats hold this and other ways of testing the citizens would secure a politically competent electorate and thus prevent undesirable outcomes such as passing racist laws[32].

2. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij: concerns about social deliberation

Starting from what he calls the "fact of widespread incompetence" (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2012:199); Ahlstrom-Vij is a sceptic of the aggregate competence of a deliberating group. Ahlstrom-Vij develops a critical analysis of deliberation and suggests that the epistemic defence of democracy fails. His concerns provide relevant support to an epistocratic system and therefore contribute to describing the motivations behind epistocratic projects. I will present them in what follows.

Ahlstrom-Vij (2012) argues that the widespread incompetence of the electorate has problematic consequences. Evidence from social psychology shows that social deliberation only favours the view of the majority. According to Ahlstrom-Vij, people are not moved by the arguments of an informed minority, which leads to two relevant consequences; it questions the epistemic benefits that come from social deliberation, as well as the capacity of a deliberating system to include epistemically important perspectives.

In order to argue that the fact of widespread incompetence poses a problem for deliberative democrats—especially to those who hold the role of deliberation goes beyond basic justice issues (Ahlstom-Vij, 2012:200)—Ahlstrom-Vij (2012) considers social deliberation in times of election. He claims that the relevant issues we need to think about in times of elections—such as economic trends, moral issues, and policy consequences—will only be accessible to an informed minority. However, social psychology's evidence shows that group judgements are driven by the majority and not by the informed minorities. Ahlstrom-Vij states that this suggests quantity is more relevant than quality to have an impact over group judgements. What matters is having a good number of well-informed people instead of the quality of the judgements that some minority of well-informed people can have, because most of the times, people are not moved by the better judgements (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2012: 203-205). Accordingly,

[32] Additionally, different forms of epistocracy result from each view's implementation of the distribution of political power guided by competence concerns. These include from voter qualification exams, to lottery systems and veto power over passed legislation. For some examples of these see: Caplan, 2007; Mulligan, 2018; López-Guerra, 2014; Brennan, 2016

he claims this evidence questions both the alleged learning effect from deliberation and the idea that aggregate competence is more remarkable, which amounts to questioning the overall epistemic benefits of social deliberation.

Likewise, this shortcoming of social deliberation also "runs the risk of depriving the practice of epistemically important perspectives every time those perspectives are represented by a minority" (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2012:214). Thus, Ahlstrom-Vij holds, not only does social deliberation not lead to outcomes that reflect the impact of well-informed people but can also deprive us of relevant perspectives if they belong to minorities.

According to Ahlstrom-Vij, deliberative democrats might argue there are some instances of deliberation that are not susceptible to the worries raised by empirical evidence from social psychology. But he argues that this is not a satisfactory answer because it places the burden of proof in the wrong place, since it is they who should show the particular cases where this information does not apply.

> (…) In light of the empirical evidence and the importance that the deliberative democrat places on social deliberation, it is incumbent on her to show that some *particular* kind of social deliberation that she has in mind is *not* susceptible to the relevant problem (2012:205).

Nonetheless, he adds one could take the data but deny the implications. Ahlstrom-Vij claims this is the case Robert Talisse (2009) wants to make by taking Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin's (2002) research on *Deliberative Polling.* Talisse (2009) argues that people lack the resources for deliberation, but they are able to muster those resources with some help. Research proves that in smaller groups, which are provided with appropriate information (minipublics), results are promising.

However, Ahlstrom-Vij points out that these successful experiences show we would require a complete re-design of deliberation as we know it, which would be very costly because it implies to mirror those conditions of highly monitored and controlled settings for everyday deliberations. Ahlstrom-Vij holds this costly effort seems inadequate, considering that the

initial argument in favour of deliberation was based on the alleged epistemic benefits it carries.

To summarise, Ahlstrom-Vij argues that widespread ignorance has two crucial problematic consequences over social deliberation. Namely, it turns it incapable of securing informed outcomes from decision-making and, at the same time, offers fewer chances to minority voices to be heard.

3. The Preferences/Means Problem

In addition to its inability to secure informed outcomes, and to include the views of informed minorities, connecting widespread incompetence to social deliberation amounts to opposing people's preferences to what they mistakenly see as the best means to achieve them. Ahlstrom-Vij (2019) claims that the problem with having a majority of incompetent voters is that, although they know what their preferences are, they are ignorant regarding the best means to foster them. Furthermore, they can even choose means that go against their preferences. But he is not alone in this assessment, Brennan (2016) also supports this view and states that "We sometimes mistakenly believe a policy will promote our favored outcomes, when that policy will, in fact, undermine those outcomes" (Brennan, 2016: 50-51). This is what I refer to as the Preferences/Means Problem.

In this section, I will describe the problem in more detail and show how it seems to be at the heart of the epistocratic proposal. In order to do so, I will introduce Brennan's version of the problem, followed by a more detailed description of Ahlstrom-Vij's analysis. Ahlstrom-Vij not only identifies the Preferences/Means Problem, but in light of it, he argues against views that offer epistemic arguments in favour of democracy.

To start, let us then look at Brennan's understanding of what I called the Preferences/Means Problem. Brennan identifies two kinds of preferences that people have when they vote; he calls them policy preferences and outcome preferences. The former are those policies that people want their candidate to support; the latter are the consequences they want their candidate to produce (Brennan, 2016:50). The idea he wants to put forward is that voters actually do have the common good in mind when they vote, but that what happens is that they do not always succeed at promoting it. What prevents voters from succeeding at promoting the common good is that they are mistaken about the policies that would indeed

foster it. Thus, the problem does not lie on people's selfishness when they are casting their vote, instead, they are incapable of identifying the right means to promote their preferences.

> So, for example, in 2008, Republicans sincerely believed cutting taxes and government spending would stimulate economic growth. Democrats sincerely believed increasing taxes and spending would stimulate economic growth. They can't both be right (Brennan, 2016: 51).

People can have good outcome preferences, but that does not mean that they are competent enough to have good policy preferences (Brennan, 2016: 51). This characterisation of citizens' preferences puts the Preferences/Means Problem at the centre of epistocracy, because it has a crucial explanatory purpose; it shows the effects of incompetence over voting. Furthermore, it seems to give us relevant information about what it means to be incompetent.

I will move on to explore Ahlstrom-Vij's version of the Preferences/Means problem. Looking at the effect of public ignorance over voting serves Ahlstrom-Vij (2019) to argue that whatever view of voting one holds, public ignorance has a negative impact over the outcomes. Much like Brennan, Ahlstrom-Vij's analysis shows that a key part of his justification for the negative impact of public ignorance relies on the Preferences/Means Problem. Ahlstrom-Vij argues that whatever version of what voting represents that one has, public ignorance will have a detrimental effect over the outcomes (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2018:9). This leads him to suggest that some form of expert rule like epistocracy might be the most appropriate option.

Ahlstrom-Vij (2019) contends there are two central views on the nature of voting, one of them holds that voting amounts to making a statement about the policies that reflect the general will or common interests of the people. According to Rousseau (1997), if voters are adequately informed, their deliberation would lead to a decision that reflects the general will. The Condorcet Jury Theorem advances a similar idea. Condorcet (1976) suggested that when voters are competent and vote independently, increasing the size of the group also increases the possibility that they vote correctly. However, Ahlstrom-Vij (2019) argues that Condorcet conjectured voters were, in fact not generally competent. Still, both Rousseau and Condorcet

presuppose that voters are competent, which means that public ignorance makes voting an unlikely expression of the popular will.

The 'miracle of aggregation' (Converse, 1990) can also be invoked to rebut the worry for the impact of public ignorance. The latter states that under appropriate conditions, individual errors are random and tend to cancel each other out. Ahlstrom-Vij takes Caplan's (2007) argument for public ignorance about economics to object to the miracle of aggregation. According to Caplan (2007) public ignorance regarding economics is systematic. People's mistaken beliefs do not tend to point randomly in different directions but in one direction. This would be very problematic if it generalises to other domains that are relevant for the political. Ahlstrom-Vij claims this information is sufficient to question the miracle of aggregation and put the burden of proof on the defender of the former.

The second view of voting defines it as expressing preferences (Caplan, 2007). Because preferences cannot be understood as true or false, one could say voter ignorance is not a concern to those supportive of this view. However, Ahlstrom-Vij (2019) argues that preferences can be either badly or well informed, which affects their likelihood to come about or be frustrated:

> For example, if we prefer a society where no one lives in economic destitution to one where some do, but have wildly inaccurate views about what political candidates or policies will realize the kind of society we thereby prefer, then our preference might end up frustrated (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2019:4).

Hence, voter ignorance is relevant even if we think of voting as expressing preferences because choosing the wrong means to foster those preferences due to ignorance affects the quality of democratic decision-making. This is what I call the Preferences/Means Problem and, according to Ahlstrom-Vij, what suggests considering forms of expert rule:

> Assuming that there are at least some people able to make decisions that are in the real interest of the people at least some of the time—an assumption that is necessary for there to be any form of legitimate government, be it democratic

> or not—then we might still be left with some form of expert rule (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2018:11).

Finally, the Preferences/Means Problem provides additional evidence to question the capacity that democracy to abide by the promise of equal inclusion, as mentioned in the previous section. Granted that electors do not know which are the best means to foster their preferences, having an inclusive deliberating system like democracy would not report outcomes that reflect the diverse preferences of its electors,

> It is not clear why including those not currently represented should be expected to make for greater equality (…) if people do not know how to vote in a way that advances their real interests, why will further inclusion improve matters? (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2018:7).

The Preferences/Means Problem seems to be a crucial part of the argument that proves both democracy's epistemic shortcomings, and the impact of voter incompetence. It helps epistocrats to make the case that a form of expert rule like epistocracy could allow a better approach to improve the quality of public decision-making outcomes.

Before moving on to discuss epistocracy's understanding of competence, I would like to point out that looking at both the introduction of the main arguments for epistocracy, and the Preferences/Means Problem shows that epistocracy seems to include various concerns under the idea of competence. Epistocrats appear to want to face the problem of irrationality, lack of information, lack of knowledge and lack of wisdom all at the same time. Without conducting an exhaustive search for definitions of competence in the literature on epistocracy—which would require a lot more space than I can grant here—we can see that the competent electorate means something like a politically qualified group of people, where qualified can involve either, or all, of the above characteristics, i.e., well-informed, rational, knowledgeable, wise.

4. Epistocracy's understanding of competence

This section will focus on identifying Brennan's view on competence, in order to discuss the apparent unspecific way of approaching competence in epistocratic projects.

Much has been said regarding both benefits and shortcomings of epistocracy, however, both supporters and detractors of the view seem to take for granted that there is some tacit understanding of competence underlying epistocratic proposals, but a brief look into the most popular accounts shows something different. Instead of providing a clear definition of competence, accounts of epistocracy either appeal to ignorance, irrationality, lack of information and incompetence interchangeably, or focus on offering features of an incompetent electorate.

Brennan (2011), for example, uses 'epistemic competence' to describe one of the requirements for a citizen to be granted the right to vote. However, Brennan (2009) only characterises what he calls *bad voters* without defining what he means by epistemic competence. Others like Kristofer Ahlstrom-Vij appear to use 'widespread incompetence' and 'widespread ignorance' interchangeably. Ahlstrom-Vij (2012) claims "(…) The majority of the public is likely to be incompetent with respect to the issues of relevance to governance (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2012:199)" but to support this claim; he refers to evidence regarding political *ignorance*. In recent work (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2019), he uses "widespread ignorance" instead, and again refers to the same findings that supported his previous claim on incompetence.

Additional examples are Jeffrey (2018), who uses political expertise, Caplan's (2007) focus on rationality, and how Umbers (2019) objects to Brennan's competence principle by identifying two different kinds of competence (individual and collective), which nonetheless do not add or question Brennan's understanding. In this section, I will focus on Brennan's approach to competence, due to his view's relevance for the epistocracy literature.

Jason Brennan (2009) develops an argument in favour of epistocracy by pointing out what he believes is democracy's main flaw: including incompetent voters. In what follows, I will present the central elements of his proposal to describe his use of the idea of competence for voters.

A bad voter, according to Brennan, is one who votes *without sufficient reason* for unjust and harmful policies, or for candidates who might advance them. Thus, Brennan characterises bad voting as biased, irrational or uninformed attitudes when voting. It is to act upon *unjustified political beliefs* (Brennan, 2009: 535- 538).

The point Brennan wants to make is that biased, uninformed, and irrationally made decisions can lead to implement lower levels of welfare and other problems, which are imposed on the rest of the citizens by bad voters. Brennan's proposal to address the problem of bad voters is to disenfranchise those who are proven to not be qualified to vote.[33] "In contemporary democracies, citizens should have to possess sufficient moral and epistemic competence in order to have the right to vote" (Brennan, 2011: 701). We can formulate this proposal as follows: citizen C can vote if and only if C is (i) sufficiently morally competent and (ii) sufficiently epistemically competent. In the following sections my analysis will focus on the second requirement.

Brennan claims that the justification for excluding bad voters—a citizen that fails (i) or (ii) in the above formulation—is based on what he calls the *competence principle*. He argues that every citizen has the right to have a competent electorate making decisions, which trumps every citizen's right to vote. Therefore, the competence principle—our right to have a competent electorate—would be violated in our democracies due to the enactment of universal suffrage (Brennan, 2011:704).

Brennan (2011) suggests that one way to determine competence (he acknowledges there are other ways) could be subjecting every citizen to a *voter qualification exam*[34].

> [This would be] akin to a driver exam, which tests generally relevant basic social science and basic knowledge about the candidates. The purpose of the exam

[33] Brennan's (2009) initial claim is that although every citizen has the right to vote, if voting, she has a moral obligation not to vote badly (Brennan, 2009: 545), because voting badly is to take part in a collectively harming activity, and each individual has a moral obligation not to participate in such activities. He concludes bad voters should refrain from exercising their right to vote, especially, since doing so does not amount to high personal costs (Brennan, 2009: 535- 538). However, later papers show and explain his transition towards this stronger view that requires forceful disenfranchisement.

[34] In later work, Brennan's preferred form of epistocracy, is what he calls *Government by Simulated Oracle* (Brennan, 2016).

> would be to exclude badly incompetent citizens from voting, by screening out citizens who are badly misinformed or ignorant about the election, or who lack the social scientific expertise to evaluate a candidate's proposed policies (Brennan, 2011:714).

Brennan's competence principle alludes to what he called the need for voters' *epistemic* competence. Nonetheless, when describing the object of voter qualification exams, he refers to excluding misinformation and *ignorance.*

In a more recent rendition of his account, Brennan (2016) claims that in order to advance his view of epistocracy he does not require more than "relatively uncontroversial platitudes about competence" (Brennan, 2016: 162). According to Brennan, what is required instead of a precise theory of political competence that draws a clear line between competent and incompetent voters, is to show that most voters are on the wrong side of that line (Brennan, 2016: 162).

To support this claim, he takes four criteria used in medical ethics to determine a patient's competence to decide for herself, and applies them to voters. These criteria are defined by Jillian Craigie (2011) as the "standard criteria for competence".

> Patients must be aware of the relevant facts; they must understand the relevant facts; patients must appreciate the relevance of those facts for their own particular case; patients must be able to reason about those facts in an appropriate way (Brennan, 2016: 162).

If we apply these criteria to voters, Brennan (2016) states that they are ignorant of the relevant facts, as well as lacking in knowledge about basic recent history, civics, the power of diverse offices and social science, which are required to evaluate a candidate's proposals or performance. Likewise, voters ignore what the challengers want and who they are, and what would happen if they succeed. All the above, according to Brennan, makes voters decide in an irrational way (Brennan, 2016: 164). Consequently, Brennan outline what could be basic requirements for political competence:

> A moderate position on democratic competence might hold that voters should do the following: Voters should act on widely available, good information, if not always the best information available anywhere. They should avoid mass superstition and systematic error. They should evaluate information in a moderately rational, unbiased way (…) at least with the degree of rationality a first- year college student brings to thinking about introductory organic chemistry. Voters should be aware of their limits, and thus always look for more and better information on any high- stakes decision (Brennan, 2016: 165).

Looking at the general characteristics of epistocracy and Brennan's approach to the notion of competence showed that there are various ideas surrounding epistocrats' understanding of competence, but no straightforward definition (apparently, intentionally in Brennan's case). Brennan's approach to competence nonetheless includes two elements that seem to follow from the epistocratic project's concerns—as presented in sections 1 to 3. These are: epistemic virtues, and information. Having epistemic virtues to be considered competent would point at a very well-defined notion of competence, whilst possessing sufficient or relevant information seems to lead on the direction of a broader definition in the direction of what Brennan qualified as "uncontroversial platitudes".

III. Competence for better outcomes

This part of the chapter will elucidate epistocrats' understanding of competence following both the epistemic virtues more defined approach, and what could be considered an intuitive version focused on information. The goal will be to determine which kind of approach seems to portray better what epistocrats mean when they refer to competence, so that we can then analyse whether it is indeed able to play the role it should play in epistocratic projects, namely, improve outcomes.

1. Two versions of competence

In what follows, I will offer two possible interpretations of competence for epistocratic projects: as a *reliable epistemic disposition*, and as possessing *sufficient information*. The first definition follows from the use of 'epistemic competence' we find in Brennan's proposal, and the second intends to capture both a less stringent approach to competence, as well as, a definition that could appeal to epistocrats. I conclude that the sufficient information version is more compatible with the epistocratic project and does not lead to the costly implementation that the reliable epistemic disposition suggests.

1.1. Competence as a reliable epistemic disposition

Brennan's reference to *epistemic* competence tracks the intuition that there is something like epistemic virtues involved in our notion of what it is to be a competent person. Here, I will examine an epistemic version of competence, as a reliable epistemic disposition.

The importance of competences for epistemology has been the subject of significant debates in contemporary virtue epistemology[35]. These approaches focus on the intellectual virtues and vices of individuals and communities (Turri, et. al., 2019). So, we could think of an epistemically competent agent as intellectually virtuous in some way, because she holds characteristics, virtues, 'which make for an excellent cognizer' (Turri, et.al, 2019: n.p.). There are different ways of characterising epistemic virtues, they can include faculties like perception, memory, and intuition—faculty virtues—or character traits—trait virtues—such as open-mindedness and conscientiousness (Turri, et.al, 2019: n.p.). Setting aside the debates on this matter, the important thing to note is that epistemic virtues are different from epistemic states like knowledge; they are the means to acquire them.

We can analyse in more detail how the understanding of epistemic competence as having epistemic virtues would fit Brennan's or any epistocratic proposal by looking at an approach from virtue epistemology such as Ernest Sosa's (2010) impactful view. Sosa describes competences as 'dispositions of an agent to perform well' (Sosa, 2010:465). As such, they have three components: constitution, condition, and situation. Applied to archery competence, for example, constitution is the seat of the archer's skill, the condition is to be awake and sober, and the situation would be normal winds and enough light.

[35] See Sosa, (2010); Pritchard, (2009); Miracchi, (2014); Carter, Jarvis & Rubin, (2015).

If the requirement for competence of an epistocracy is of the kind described by Sosa, as having the disposition to perform well, voters would require proving that they can choose the most optimal candidate, which Brennan stated is not what a citizen needs to do to be a good voter. Additionally, it is clear that a voter qualification exam is insufficient and inadequate to test the voters' competences under this definition. In order to test the disposition of voters to perform well, what would be required would be something like voting exercises evaluated through a period of time to make sure it is not due to a lucky occurrence but to a *reliable* disposition to vote well. Agents would be unable to show their epistemic competence only by answering general questions about civic issues or economics, because these would assess their level of information on those areas, not their capacity to skillfully 'hit the target', in this case, to reach an appropriate result. Hélène Landemore (2012) makes this point by stressing that possessing raw data about political facts is different from showing competence.

Furthermore, Landemore argues that the difficulty to establish the causal link between holding information of a certain kind measured by surveys and being competent lies on the fact that it is hard to think of a 'good empirical benchmark for political competence that would be distinct from a good benchmark for information level' (Landemore, 2012:276). Additionally, since electing representatives constitutes most of the voting instances in our democracies, it would be very difficult to establish what counts as performing well.

In light of the discussion presented in this section where I showed the problems of defining competence as a reliable epistemic disposition—too difficult and costly to measure among other considerations—this version should be discarded as an option available to epistocrats.

1.2. Competence as possessing sufficient information

By looking at the two proposals that I focused on to characterise epistocracy, we can identify a concern for information. Although as I pointed out there is some inconsistency in the way that epistocrats refer to what counts as being competent, they do tend to stress that ignorance, as a lack of relevant information, is at the root of incompetent voting. Ahlstrom Vij (2019) analysed the impact of ignorance over voting as well as Brennan (2016) mentioned a lack of information when applying the criteria used in medical ethics to voters.

Brennan (2011) also identified three kinds of bad electorate that he qualifies as the *ignorant* electorate, the *irrational* electorate, and the morally unreasonable electorate. This suggests that, setting aside the moral considerations, even his idea of epistemic competence addresses mostly ignorance, understood as a lack of appropriate information.

> The voters who put the national Socialists in power in Germany in 1933 cannot be held responsible for everything their government did. But much of what their government did was foreseeable by any reasonably well informed person (Brennan, 2011: 707).

Additionally, the idea of a voter qualification exam is connected to the notion of assessing levels of information, because they test the citizen's capacity to answer information-related questions on economics and political information, rather than skills. In this sense, competence seems best understood as possessing information instead of virtues.

Finally, the Preferences/Means Problem identifies precisely an issue with regards to information. What electors do not have is the right kind of information about the appropriate means to foster their preferences. Voters are ill-informed in terms of policies and ways to promote their goals, which makes them sometimes even choose those that are detrimental for them.

Let us assume then that what Brennan and others mean by requiring competence, is something like possessing sufficient information. What we need to elucidate now is the kind of information required, assuming that "sufficient" refers not to amounts but relevancy of the information possessed. Consider that, as mentioned, one of the proposed methods by epistocrats to measure competence is a voter qualification exam, which should assess a defined set of contents. Thus, one of the difficulties with this notion of competence in practice is actually determining which are the contents deemed relevant. Identifying the sort of information that makes a voter politically competent is at the base of the complexity of defining competence in the first place—as acknowledged by Brennan (2016). In addition, as pointed out by Ilya Somin (2019) we would have to determine *who* would define the content, which could make the test open to manipulations to serve the interests of a group—from the State to a non-profit organisation. However, determining the relevant content as well as

devising ways to avoid manipulation are not unsurmountable problems, so these considerations do not put epistocrats under too much pressure.

Brennan (2011) has hinted at the content of a qualification exam as mentioned above and referred to "basic social science" and "knowledge of candidates" (Brennan, 2011:714). When sketching what he called a "moderate position on democratic competence", Brennan appears to lower the requirement by suggesting voters should "act on widely available, good information" (Brennan, 2016: 165) and not follow superstitions.

On the other hand, Ahlstrom-Vij discussed what the evidence shows about people's ignorance with respect to economics (Caplan, 2007), to object to the 'miracle of aggregation' (Converse, 1990). His intention was to show that lay people's uninformed views about economics could be generalisable to other domains such as politics. This analysis implies that the sort of information that voters should have can be compared to information on economics.

Civics, social science, or simply information regarding the specific candidate and "widely available" information represent a very broad set of possible content that could be considered relevant. Social science information is certainly more demanding than acting on good available information, but what all of them have in common is that they refer to some kind of formal information. Competence as having sufficient information does not appear to consider citizens' preferences as a relevant part of the information we need for good outcomes. And this is exactly what the problem with thinking of competence in this way is. Competence as sufficient information is focused on describing what being a competent voter amounts to, more than the necessary competences to achieve good outcomes. The difference between these two notions is slight, but the consequence of taking the first option as epistocrats do is problematic.

If what matters is identifying what a competent voter is, we clearly do not consider information that common citizens already possess, information about their own preferences. By preferences here I mean what Brennan called "outcome preferences". It is not the information about their preferred policies that I identify as important information for good outcomes—these are the ones that epistocrats show are usually mistaken—but their preferences regarding their own goals.

IV. The competence of the restricted electorate

I will devote this last part of the chapter to suggest that what seems to be the main problem with the epistocrats approach to competence is that it fails to include something that a restricted electorate would not have and that is information about lay citizens' preferences. I will explain in more detail what I mean by the lack of access of the restricted electorate, or the Information Gap, to common citizens' preferences, which I claim constitute an important kind of information to secure good outcomes. After doing so, I will discuss two ways of dealing with the Information Gap, one that follows the epistocratic logic of the restricted electorate with some improvements to include lay people's preferences, and a second one that focuses on the direct inclusion of common citizens. The first option I call Improved Epistocracy and the second corresponds to the proposal I have already discussed in detail in this research; collective self-government. Finally, I discuss some relevant thoughts on competence and present my conclusions of the chapter in part V.

1. The Information Gap

It has already been pointed out, especially by David Estlund (2008), that due to current persisting inequalities, a restricted electorate of the kind envisaged by an epistocratic system, would be constituted by an elite sharing particular demographic and socio-economic features. The latter, Estlund claims, faces the risk of reproducing the shared implicit biases of the restricted electorate's members. But a related negative aspect arises by considering Estlund's concern about biases in some detail. Acknowledging the likelihood of biases within an elite also implies that for the same reasons its members will have limited access to lay people's preferences.

A group of well-informed or highly qualified people would certainly be better at determining which means correspond to promote *their* preferences, but it seems unlikely that they would be capable of having access to the disenfranchised people's preferences. Standpoint theories in epistemology argue something along these lines. They hold that people of specific social standing, have either epistemic privilege in accessing some truths or that they at least have practical advantages to discover truths. 'The scope of the claimed privilege includes the

character, causes, and consequences of the social inequalities that define the groups in question' (Anderson, 2019: n.p.).

The argument from standpoint theories—either in the classic version about epistemic privilege in access, or the weaker notion of practical advantages to discover truths—supports the concern for the limited access of the epistocracy elite to the rest of the citizen's preferences. Our social standing does play a central role in the way we can access information. The restricted electorate will have an also *restricted* access to the disenfranchised people's preferences, because they are in this case the unprivileged group. It is therefore questionable that establishing the distinction between well-informed and ill-informed and restrict our electorate accordingly would lead to better outcomes.

The restricted electorate could be well-informed about the best means to foster preferences in general, but it would certainly be ill-informed about lay people's preferences. There is a gap of relevant information that the elite electorate cannot fill, which could result in outcomes disconnected and inadequate to promote most people's preferences. Recall the Preferences/means Problem and its centrality for the epistocratic project. This Information Gap I have just described makes epistocracy unable to overcome it, because it only manages to shift the focus of the problem from lack of information regarding what Brennan (2016) called policy preferences, to lack of information about outcome preferences.

2. Two ways to face the Information Gap

In what follows, I will consider two possible ways to face the Information Gap. The Information Gap questions epistocracy's ability to improve outcomes because the idea of competence that motivates the project neglects to include an important kind of information in the shape of people common citizen's preferences. I suggest thinking of two options as potential ways to solve the Information Gap: *Improved Epistocracy*, and *Collective Self-government*. This analysis will show that instead of focusing on having a competent electorate as epistocracy does, a focus on improving the *flow of information* between different agents (legislators, common citizens, specialists) like Collective Self-government offers, would include all the relevant information with less risks of manipulation and more accountability, which makes it better qualified to improve the outcomes of our democracies.

Imagine we had a restricted electorate constituted by an elite of highly well-informed people that, in order to have access to lay people's preferences, communicates with a council conformed of representatives from diverse groups and identifications—considering important matters such as sexual orientation, ethnic identification, socio-economic characteristics, religious beliefs, disability, and others. The latter regularly provides the restricted electorate with the preferences information they gather from each of their 'constituents'. This is Improved Epistocracy.

On Collective Self-government we have universal suffrage combined with a sortition legislature, Participatory Budgeting and Deliberative Polling. Advisory committees of specialists in areas as diverse as economics, psychology and art are part of all three instances of deliberation. They provide both legislators and the electorate with sound information on their subjects, to 'fill the gap' regarding adequate methodologies to implement their preferences before the electorate votes. At the same time, common citizens in Improved Universal Suffrage have these formal and regularly available channels to inform legislators of their preferences, and can become legislators themselves, which gives them agenda setting powers. In other words, the people have their lay representatives which raise issues that will have to be part of legislative discussion.

Both Improved Epistocracy and Collective Self-government would have to face the common problems that all representative arrangements have about real inclusiveness of every relevant group. But in the case of Improved Epistocracy, disenfranchised people would have to rely on the good will of the restricted electorate to include their preferences when voting. Unselfish behaviour and trustworthiness would thus be central issues that seem unlikely to be solved in such scenario. Even if you are not persuaded by the standpoint theories' argument presented above, the lack of accountability from the elite electorate towards the disenfranchised, motivates a related objection. The elite will not have to respond to or be sanctioned by the disenfranchised, so there are no incentives for unselfish behaviour (See Anderson, 2008). The latter would be the case even in our Improved Epistocracy because a necessary part of the epistocratic project has to do with granting extra powers of decision-making to the restricted electorate whilst also limiting the decision-making power of the incompetent. Therefore, competent versus incompetent is a distinction that implies little or no accountability of the former to the latter. If we go back to the four desiderata that I discussed in Chapter 4, namely, inclusion, equality, deliberation, and accountability,

Improved Epistocracy does not seem to fare well in any of them. As I explained, inclusion will depend on the goodwill of representatives, equality is compromised by the mere fact that we are as citizens not treated equally from the beginning, deliberation is not improved in any special way to our current democracies, and accountability is surely not achievable under this arrangement.

Collective Self-government does not seem subject to the issue of limited accountability, since it basically introduces direct communication with technocrats to our current democratic system, as well as a straightforward channel of communication between common citizens and legislators. This participatory democracy would become educational in time, by improving the common elector's capacity to choose between means and at the same time, communicate information about preferences to legislators. Such a model seems to elicit more promising results by focusing on the importance of having an appropriate flow of information between the members of a democratic system. Furthermore, this option would deal with the Preferences/Means Problem, since it would make citizens better informed about the means to foster their goals.

3. What the improved versions tell us about competence

One of the main conclusions that this exercise of improved versions shows is that there is something amiss in the epistocrats' approach to competence if what they look for is to improve the outcomes of our democracies. If epistocrats believe that the problem lies in the lack of information, as I argued throughout this chapter, then securing a better flow of information is a better option than restricting the electorate. The idea of restricting the electorate does not intend to improve the pool of electors but to choose a better one, hence, it does not provide a long-term solution like the focus on improving the flow of information does. Surely a long-term solution should be a preferable approach to improve outcomes.

Someone could argue that I have not engaged with another central concern for epistocrats: rational ignorance (Downs, 1957). Maybe the whole point of having a restricted electorate is to address the issue that in our democracies common citizens prefer to remain badly informed, because it is too costly and time consuming to do otherwise given the little impact that their vote can have. This lack of incentives keeps our electorate incompetent; therefore,

the best approach is to focus on choosing a pool of electors that although faced with the same lack of incentives are not incompetent.

However, there are two important things to point out if this is the case. First, if rational ignorance is indeed one of the main problems for epistocrats, implementing a restricted electorate would, again, not solve the problem. Limiting the vote does not give any sort of incentive for electors to be better informed but actually makes things worse. Disenfranchised people would certainly lack incentives to become better informed. Second, what rational ignorance helps prove is that there is a problem with the little impact that voting has in our democracies. Facing the lack of incentives to be better informed should lead us to rethink the ways in which common citizens participate, in order to, address the little capacity they have to make a strong impact. Deciding to restrict the electorate to face the problem of rational ignorance does not seem to do this.

Finally, an epistocracy that gives more power to an elite could, as we saw above, result in distorted outcomes that are disconnected from the disenfranchised citizens' preferences, which would be largely worse than finding other ways of providing appropriate information for all parties in our democracies. Imagining two cases with advisory committees, and participatory instances is a good exercise to foresee that improving our democracies through educational means and better flow of information amongst its members—as would occur in a participatory democracy—provides a safer, long term and more just approach to the problem of lack of information that has been framed as 'voter incompetence'.

V. Conclusions

The idea of competence that epistocratic projects rely on has rarely been questioned or analysed in depth. Throughout this chapter, I examined what epistocrats mean by a competent electorate. I argued that their idea of competence relies on information. However, I showed how their approach to competence leaves out an important kind of information: common citizen's preferences. This Information Gap makes epistocrats unable to respond to the Preferences/Means Problem; citizen's incapacity to choose the right means to promote their preferences, which is at the centre of epistocratic concerns in the first place. Collective Self-government which focuses on improving the flow of information amongst specialists, and common citizens proves a much better option, even when confronted to an

improved version of epistocracy, to improve outcomes in our democracies and face the Preferences/Means Problem, especially when considering the four desiderata I introduced in Chapter 4.

Conclusions and Further Work

I began this project by pointing out that one of the central problems of our democracies is the kind of political relations we hold. As our political interactions currently stand, they promote power imbalances that lead to dominating relations amongst all actors—common citizens, representatives, social organisations, and experts—in the political sphere, which greatly harms our personal autonomy. Standing in relations of domination reduces our effective capacity to be authoritative over decisions of strong impact over our lives, which are determined in the political sphere. I suggested starting by interrogating the value and place we grant our political interactions for the enjoyment of autonomy. Looking at relational accounts for autonomy in Chapter 1, I claimed that their ability to show the relevant impact of our social relations for our autonomy, as well as their focus on the effects that oppressive political contexts can have over our autonomy, proves that we need to equally acknowledge the relevance of our political interactions. The first step to do so is labelling them *relations,* so that we can interrogate what kind of relations are the ones that would enhance and not harm our autonomy.

Chapter 2 and 3 focused on characterising the political relations that would help us enjoy our autonomy, which I called Relations of Mutual Recognition. In order to do this, they identified the conditions to establish these relations; non-domination and control, and the approach to political participation—Collective Self-government—that would enable implementing appropriate means to uphold them. Chapter 4 analysed three democratic alternatives of political participation, namely, electoral representation, citizen sortition and direct participation. The idea was to consider each alternative's potential to fulfil the desiderata that resulted from the prior theoretical analysis of political participation. These are: inclusion, equality, deliberation, and accountability. According to the benefits and shortcomings of each alternative of participation, I elaborated my preferred implementation of political participation.

Chapter 5 located my proposal amongst deliberative democracy accounts by identifying my connections and differences with proceduralist accounts. Additionally, I briefly presented two views that my project takes inspiration from, namely, Young's (2010) and Pateman's (2012). Accordingly, I defined my view as a version of either participatory deliberative democracy or deliberative participatory democracy. Relatedly, Chapter 6 looked to distinguish my view from Richardson's (2002) Democratic Autonomy, which also locates

my view, this time within the broader literature on democracy. His view like mine focuses on autonomy and non-domination. However, in this chapter I explained how my Relations of Mutual Recognition are better capable to challenge our current dominating political relations due to the relational character of my view, and its capacity to create adequate political conditions for the enjoyment of our autonomy. The latter, because Relations of Mutual Recognition argue for the political aspect of autonomy which requires securing non-domination and active control, instead of relying on upholding mere respect for autonomy as an external matter like Richardson does.

Chapter 7 offered an analysis of epistocracy, as a view that suggests a different diagnosis of where our democracies' failure lies: within the characteristics, more specifically the (in)competence, of the electorate. This analysis aimed at elucidating the epistocrats' approach to competence to show that there seems to be something lacking. I concluded that a participatory approach like mine does not have the shortcoming of excluding common citizens' preferences that epistocracy does, whilst it also implies a longer-term approach solution to the problem their diagnosis focuses on.

The conclusions I have summarised here connect to other worries and could lead to related explorations that merit further work. I will briefly outline them in what follows.

Exploring different approaches to autonomy

In order to privilege the attention to our relation's role for our autonomy, my research relied on a basic general concern for social relations, which led me to focus on the relational perspective. It would be interesting to contrast different approaches to autonomy, as well as different relational accounts in terms of their capacity to accommodate to my view of Relations of Mutual Recognition. Moreover, confronting various approaches to autonomy regarding their ability to include the political aspect of autonomy could elicit fruitful findings. Similarly, further work on how my project would change if the relational view supporting it were procedural, mixed or strongly substantive might help to better delineate the scope of my research, as well as maybe unravel other necessary elements to complete my Relations of Mutual Recognition. Likewise, it would represent a separate, but very interesting project, to discuss whether or not Mackenzie's attempt to move beyond the procedural/substantive division indeed accomplishes this goal.

Including intersectionality

My proposal constitutes a feminist approach to autonomy with a focus on the political aspect of autonomy. One of the crucial motivations to analyse our political relations comes from the experience of marginalisation that already marginalised groups (in other domains) endure in our democracies. My concern for dominating relations, thus, is also deeply connected to worries regarding intersectionality—how belonging to various groups (race, gender, and various others) shape our identities. Our political standing and the means I envisage to improve it will surely depend on these other aspects of our identities. Challenging and changing the patterns of cultural value identified by Fraser (2000) is part of what I also described should make us transform our political relations. However, much more work needs to be done in terms of an analysis that takes intersectionality as the framework to devise strategies to reclaim the political for minorities. Further exploration of the approach to political power that I developed here seems like a promising avenue to pursue these concerns.

Egalitarian views: material equality

Further work on the material requirements to enjoy an effectively equal standing in the political sphere is crucial. This research only tangentially included recommendations to address redistribution of resources to guarantee relating as peers in the political sphere. A theory of specific ways to tackle the inequalities that perpetuate dominating relations would contribute to complete a model of implementation that not only reaches political participation (our political roles), but our relations in all other domains as well.

Epistemic arguments regarding democracy's value

Finally, there is an abundant and absolutely relevant literature on the epistemic value of democracy that I did not include in this research. The scope of my arguments did not require an examination of diverse views regarding the value of democracy. Nonetheless, a project that takes the shortcoming of the epistocratic notion I briefly discussed here and expands it to see its full potential, could contribute to arguments about the epistemic benefits of democracy.

Bibliography

Ackerman, B and Fishkin, J. (2002) 'Deliberation Day', *The Journal of Political Philosophy,*10(2), pp129-152.

Adam, R. (2019) *Brexit: Causes and Consequences*. Springer

Ahlstrom-Vij, K. (2012) 'Why Deliberative Democracy is (still) Untenable', *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 26(3), Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43575579

Ahlstrom-Vij, K. (2018) 'Is Democracy an Option for the Realist?', *Critical Review*, 30(1-2), Available at: 1-12, DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2018.1448510

Ahlstrom-Vij, K. (2019) 'The Epistemic Benefits of Democracy: A Critical Assessment' in Fricker, M, Graham, P, Henderson, D, Pedersen, N (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology*. Routledge

Allen, A. (1996) 'Foucault on Power: A Theory for Feminists' in Hekman, S (ed.) *Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault.* The Pennsylvania State University Press

Allen, A. (1999) *The Power of Feminist Theory: Domination, Resistance, Solidarity*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Allen, A. (2016) 'Feminist Perspectives on Power', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/feminist-power/

Anderson, E. (2008) 'An Epistemic Defense of Democracy: David Estlund's Democratic Authority', *Episteme*, 5(1), pp.129-139, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1353/epi.0.00.25

Anderson, J and Honneth, A. (2009), 'Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice' in Christman J; & Anderson, J; (eds) *Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays*. Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, E. (2019) 'Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/feminism-epistemology/

Antony, L. (1995) 'Is Psychological Individualism a Piece of Ideology', *Hypatia,* 10(3), Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1995.tb00742.x

Baier, A. (1985) *Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals*. University of Minnesota Press.

Barber, B. (2003) *Strong Democracy Participatory Politics for a New Age*. University of California Press

BBC news. (2018) 'Brexit: How Europe does second referendums', Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-46591250

Beauvais, E. (2018) 'The Grandview-Woodland Citizens' Assembly: An experiment in municipal planning', *Canadian Public Administration,* 61(3), Available at: file:///C:/Users/mpiam/AppData/Local/Temp/The_GrandviewWoodland_Citizens.pdf

Beauvais, E and Warren, M. (2019) 'What can deliberative mini-publics contribute to democratic systems?', *European Journal of Political Research,* 58, pp893–914, Available at: doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12303

Beauvoir, S. (1974) *The Second Sex*. New York. Vintage Books.

Benhabib, S. (1992) *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*. Routledge Ltd.

Berlin, I. (1996) *Dos conceptos de libertad y otros escritos*. Madrid. Alianza Editorial.

Bickerton, C and Accetti, C.I. .(2017) 'Populism and technocracy: opposites or complements?', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy,* 20(2), pp186-206, Available at: DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2014.995504

Bohman, J. (1996) *Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy*. MIT Press.

Bordo, S. (1993) *Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body*. Berkeley. CA: University of California Press.

Boyer, A. (2001) 'On the Modern Relevance of Old Republicanism', *The Monist*, 84(1), Civic Republicanism and Political Philosophy (JANUARY2001), pp22-44, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27903711

Brennan, J. (2009) 'Polluting the polls: when citizens should not vote', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 87(4), pp535-549, Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400802587309

Brennan, J. (2011) 'The Right to a Competent Electorate', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, .61(245), Available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.699.x/epdf

Brennan, J. (2012) 'Political Liberty: who needs it?', *Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation*, Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052511000045

Brennan, J. (2014) 'How Smart is Democracy? You Can't Answer that Question a Priori', *Critical Review*, 26(1-2), pp33-58, Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2014.907040

Brennan, J. (2016) *Against Democracy*. Princeton University Press

Brennan, J. (2016a) 'The Ethics and Rationality of Voting', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/voting/

Brennan, J. (2018) 'Does the Demographic Objection to Epistocracy Succeed?', *Res Publica*, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-017-9385-y

Brown, M. (2006) 'Survey Article: Citizen Panels and the Concept of Representation', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 14(2), pp203–225, Available at: https://cspo.org/legacy/library/110215F7ST_lib_BrownSurveyArtic.pdf

Butler, J. (1990) *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. Routledge Ltd.

Callenbach, E and Phillips, M. (2008) *The Citizen Legislature*. Exeter: Imprint Academic.

Caplan, B. (2007) *The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies*. NJ: Princeton University Press.

Carter, I. (2000) 'A Critique of Freedom as Non-Domination Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government by Philip Pettit', *The Good Society*, 9(3), pp43-46, Penn State University Press, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20710980

Carter, J.A; Jarvis, B.W and Rubin, K. (2015) 'Varieties of cognitive achievement', *Philosophical Studies*. 172, pp1603-1623, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0367-z

Centro de Estudios Públicos. (2019) *Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública N84*, Available at: https://www.cepchile.cl/cep/site/docs/20200116/20200116081636/encuestacep_diciembre2019.pdf

Christiano, T. (1996) *The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory*. Westview Press.

Christman, J. (2004) 'Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves', *Philosophical Studies*, 117, pp143–164, Available at: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1023%2FB%3APHIL.0000014532.56866.5c.pdf

Clayton, M. (2006) *Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing*. Oxford University Press

Code, L. (1991) *What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge*. Cornell University Press.

Coffman, E. J. (2009) 'Does Luck Exclude Control?', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 87(3), pp 499-504, Available at: DOI: 10.1080/00048400802674677

Cohen, J. (1998) 'Democracy and Liberty' in Elster, J *Deliberative Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, J and Fung, A. (2004) 'The Radical Democracy Project', *Déliberatión et Action Publique*, pp23-24.

Cohen, J. (2009) *Philosophy, Politics, Democracy*. Harvard University Press.

Colburn, B. (2010) *Autonomy and liberalism*. Routledge Ltd.

Coleman, S. (2005) 'The Lonely Citizen: Indirect Representation in an Age of Networks', *Political Communication*, 22(2), pp197-214, Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584600590933197

Collin, K. (2019) 'Could there be a second Brexit referendum?', *The Washington Post*, Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/12/could-there-be-second-brexit-referendum/

Collins, P.H; Maldonado, L; Takagi, D; Thorne, B; Weber, L and Winant, H. (2002) 'Symposium on West and Fenstermaker's 'Doing Difference'', in Sarah Fenstermaker and Candace West (eds.) *Doing Gender, Doing Difference*. New York: Routledge.

Condorcet, J.A.N. (1976) *Condorcet Selected Writings*. Bobbs-Merrill

Constant, B. (1989) *Escritos políticos*. Madrid. Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.

Converse, P. (1990) 'Popular Representation and the Distribution of Information', in John Ferejohn and James Kuklinski, (eds) *Information and Democratic Processes*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, pp383

Crenshaw, K. (1991) 'Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color', *Stanford Law Review*, 43(6), pp1241–1299.

Cudd, A. (2006) *Analyzing Oppression*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Dagger, R. (2000) 'Republicanism Refashioned: Comments on Pettit's Theory of Freedom and Government Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government by Philip Pettit', *Penn State University Press,* Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20710982

Dahl, R. (1957) 'The Concept of Power', *Behavioral Science,* 2, pp201-215.

Dahl, R. (1972) *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. Yale University Press

Dahl, R. (2005) 'Procedural Democracy' in Goodin, R, & Pettit, P (eds), *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*. Blackwell Publishing.

Dargent, E. (2014) *Technocracy and Democracy in Latin America: The Experts Running Government*. Cambridge University Press.

Downs, A. (1957) 'An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy'. *Journal of Political Economy,* 65(2), pp135-50, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1827369.

Dworkin, G. (1988) *The Theory and Practice of Autonomy*. Cambridge University Press.

Dworkin, G. (2015) 'The nature of autonomy', *Nordic Journal of Studies in Educational Policy,* Available at: https://doi.org/10.3402/nstep.v1.28479

Elster, J. (1998) *Deliberative Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

Estlund, D. (2008) *Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework*. Princeton University Press

Fishkin, J. (2018) *Democracy When the People Are Thinking: Revitalizing Our politics Through Public Deliberation*. Oxford University Press

Flax, J. (1987) 'Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory', *Signs*, 12(4), *Within and Without: Women, Gender, and Theory* (Summer, 1987), pp621-643, Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3174206

Follett, M.P. (1942) 'Power' *in* Henry C. Metcalf and L. Urwick (eds.), *Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett*. New York: Harper.

Forst, R. (2005) 'Political Liberty: Integrating Five Conceptions of Autonomy' in Christman J and Anderson, J, (eds), *Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays*. Cambridge University Press.

Forst, R. (2015) 'Noumenal Power', *The Journal of Political Philosophy,* 23(2), pp111–127.

Foucault, M. (1977) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage.

Foucault, M. (1978) *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction*, Penguin

Frankfurt, H. (1971) 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 68(1), (Jan. 14, 1971), pp5-20, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024717

Fraser, N. (1989) *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory*. Minneapolis. MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Fraser, N. (2000) 'Rethinking Recognition', *New Left Review*; 1(3), (ProQuest), pp. 107.

Fricker, M. (2007) *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. Oxford University Press.

Friedman, M. (2003) *Autonomy, gender, politics*. Oxford University Press.

Fuerstein, M. (2008) 'Epistemic democracy and the social character of knowledge', *Episteme*, Available at: DOI: 10.3366/E1742360008000245

Garry, A. (2011) 'Intersectionality, Metaphors, and the Multiplicity of Gender'. *Hypatia*, 26(4), pp826-850.

Gastil, J and Wright, E.O. (2018) 'Legislature by Lot: Envisioning Sortition within a Bicameral System', *Politics & Society,* 46(3), pp303–330, Available at: DOI: 10.1177/0032329218789886

Gilabert, P. (2018) 'A Broad Definition of Agential Power', *Journal of Political Power*, 11(1), pp79-92, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2018.1433758

Gunn, P. (2019) 'Against Epistocracy', *Critical Review*, 31(1), pp26-82, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1609842

Habermas, J. (1990) *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*. MIT Press.

Hartsock, N. (1983) *Money, Sex, and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism.* Boston. Northeastern University Press.

Haslanger, S. (2012) *Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Held, V. (1993) *Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society and Politics*. University of Chicago Press.

Hoagland, S.L. (1988) *Lesbian Ethics: Toward a New Value*. Palo Alto. Institute of Lesbian Studies.

Honig, B. (1995) *Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt*. Penn State University Press

Jaggar, A. (1983) *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Jeffrey, A. (2018) 'Limited Epistocracy and Political Inclusion'. *Episteme*, pp.1-21, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2017.8

Kant, I. (2002) *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Edited and Translated by Allen W. Wood. Yale University Press.

Kelp, C. (2019) 'Understanding Knowledge', Unpublished Manuscript

Lackey, J. (2008) 'What Luck is Not', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400801886207

Laffan, B. (2018) ' A second Brexit referendum could be for the best: look at Ireland and Lisbon', *The Guardian*, Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/11/second-brexit-referendum-ireland-lisbon-polls

Landmore, H. (2012) 'Democratic Reason: The Mechanisms of Collective Intelligence in Politics', in Landemore, H; & Elster, J; (eds) *Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms*. Cambridge University Press.

Landmore, H. (2013) *Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many*. Princeton University Press

Lasswell, H. (1950) *Politics : who gets what, when, how*. Peter Smith

López-Guerra, C. (2011) 'The enfranchisement lottery', *Politics, Philosophy & Economics*, pp1-23.

López-Guerra, C. (2014) *Democracy and Disenfranchisement*. Oxford. Oxford University Press.

Lugones, M. (1987) 'Playfulness, 'World'-Travelling, and Loving Perception', *Hypatia*. 2(2), (Summer, 1987), pp3-19, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810013

Lukes, S. (2005) *Power: A Radical View*. Macmillan

Mackenzie, C and Stoljar, N. (2000) 'Introduction: Autonomy Refigured' in Mackenzie, C and Stoljar, N; (eds), *Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self*. Oxford University Press.

Mackenzie, C. (2008) 'Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism', *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 39(4), (Winter 2008), pp512–533, Available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2008.00440.x/epdf

Mackenzie, C; Rogers, W and Dodds, S (eds.). (2013) *Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy*. New York: Oup Usa. pp33.

Mackenzie, C. (2014) 'Three Dimensions of Autonomy: A Relational Analysis' in Veltman, A; and Piper, M; (eds), *Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender*. Oxford University Press.

Mackenzie, C. (2018) 'Feminist Innovation in Philosophy: Relational Autonomy and Social Justice'. *Women's Studies International Forum*, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2018.05.003

Mackenzie, C. (2019) 'Feminist Conceptions of Autonomy', in Garry, A; Khader, S, et.al (eds) *The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy*. Routledge

MacKinnon, C. (1987) *Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law*. Harvard University Press

Manin, B. (1997) *The Principles of Representative Government*. Cambridge University Press.

Martill, B and Staiger, U (eds). (2018) *Brexit and beyond: rethinking the futures of Europe*. UCL Press

McMahon, C. (2005) 'The Indeterminacy of Republican Policy', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 33(1), (Winter, 2005), pp67-9, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557943

Meyers, D. (2000) 'Feminism and women's autonomy: the challenge of female genital cutting'. *Metaphilosophy*, 31(5), Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-9973.00164

Miller, J.B. (1992) 'Women and Power' in Wartenberg, T (ed.), *Rethinking Power*, Albany. NY: SUNY Press.

Miracchi, L. (2014) 'Competence to Know', *Philosophical Studies*, pp172:29-56, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s1 1098-014-0325-9

Moraro, P. (2018) 'Against Epistocracy', *Social Theory and Practice*, 44(2), pp199-216, Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract20185835

Morgenthau, H. (1968) *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Alfred. A. Knopf.

Mouffe, C and Holdengräber, P. (1989) 'Radical Democracy: Modern or Postmodern?', *Social Text*, 21, Universal Abandon? The Politics of Postmodernism, pp31-45, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/827807

Mulligan, T. (2015) 'On the Compatibility of Epistocracy and Public Reason', *Social Theory and Practice*, 41(3), (July 2015), pp458-476, Available at: DOI: 10.5840/soctheorpract201541324

Mulligan, T. (2018) 'Plural Voting for the Twenty-First Century'. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 68(271), (April 2018), pp286–306, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx046

Nash, J. (2008) 'Re-thinking Intersectionality', *Feminist Review*, 89, pp1-15.

Norris, P. (1999) *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nye, J. S., Zelikow, P., and King, D. C. (1997) *Why people don't trust government*. Cambridge. MA: London. Harvard University Press.

Okin, S.M. (1989) *Justice, Gender and the Family*. Basic Books

Oksala, J. (2016) *Feminist Experiences: Foucauldian and Phenomenological Investigations*. Evanston, IL. Northwestern University Press.

Oksala, J. (2019) 'Feminism and Power', in Garry, A; Khader, S, et.al (eds) (2019) *The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy*. Routledge

Oshana, M. (1998) 'Personal Autonomy and Society'. *Journal of Social Philosophy***,** 29(1), (Spring 1998), pp81-102, Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1998.tb00098.x

Oshana, M. (2006) *Personal Autonomy in Society*. Routledge Ltd.

Owen, D and Smith, G. (2018) 'Sortition, Rotation, and Mandate: Conditions for Political Equality and Deliberative Reasoning', *Politics & Society*, 46(3), pp419–434, Available at: DOI: 10.1177/0032329218789892

Pateman, C. (1988) *The Sexual Contract*. Stanford University Press

Pateman, C. (2012) 'APSA Presidential Address: Participatory democracy revisited', *Perspectives on Politics*, 10(1), (March 2012), pp7-19, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23327060

Pettit, P. (2000) 'On "Republicanism": Reply to Carter, Christman and Dagger Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government by Philip Pettit', *The Good Society*, 9(3), pp54-57, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20710983

Pettit, P. (2010) *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*. Oxford University Press.

Pettit, P. (2012) *On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

Pitkin, H. (1967) *The Concept of Representation*. Los Angeles. University of Press.

Pritchard, D. (2009) 'Apt performance and epistemic value', *Philosophical Studies*, 143, pp407-416, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s1 1098-009-9340-7

Raz, J. (1988) *The Morality of Freedom*. Oxford. Oxford University Press.

Reiss, J. (2019) 'Expertise, Agreement, and the Nature of Social Scientific Facts or: Against Epistocracy', *Social Epistemology*, 33(2), pp183-192, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2019.1577513

Richardson, H. (2002) *Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy*. Oxford University Press

Rousseau, J. (1997) *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, Victor Gourevitch (ed. and trans.). Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

Saunders, B. (2010) 'Democracy, political equality, and majority rule'. *Ethics* ,121, pp148-77.

Schmidt, A. (2018) 'Domination without Inequality? Mutual Domination, Republicanism, and Gun Control', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 46(2).

Sen, A. (1992) *Inequality Reexamined*. Oxford. Clarendon Press.

Sintomer, Y; Herzberg, C; Röcke, A; and Allegretti, G. (2012) 'Transnational Models of Citizen Participation: The Case of Participatory Budgeting', *Journal of Public Deliberation*, 8(2),(Article 9), Available at: https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/art9

Sintomer, Y. (2018) 'From Deliberative to Radical Democracy? Sortition and Politics in the Twenty-First Century', *Politics & Society*, 46(3), pp337–357, Available at: DOI: 10.1177/0032329218789888

Somin, I. (2019) 'The promise and peril of epistocracy', *Inquiry*, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1663019

Sosa, E. (2010) 'How Competence Matters in Epistemology', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 24, Epistemology, pp465-475. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41329454

Stoljar, N. (2018) 'Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Available at: URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/feminism-autonomy

Strawson, P. (1992) *Analysis and Metaphysics: An Introduction to Philosophy*. Oxford University Press.

Talisse, R. (2009) *Democracy and Moral Conflict*. Cambridge University Press.

Tanesini, A. (2016) 'I—'Calm Down, Dear': Intellectual Arrogance, Silencing and Ignorance', *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, 90(1), (June 2016), pp71–92, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akw011

Turri, J; Alfano, M and Greco, J. (2019) 'Virtue Epistemology', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/epistemology-virtue/

Umbers, L. (2019) 'Democratic Legitimacy and the Competence Objection', *Res Publica*, 25, pp283–293, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-018-9395-4

Urbinati, N. (2000) 'Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 28, pp 258–786.

Urbinati. N. (2011) ‘Republicanism: Democratic or Popular?’,*The Good Society*, 20(2), pp 157-169, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/goodsociety.20.2.0157

Urbinati, N. (2012) ‘Competing for Liberty: the Republican Critique of Democracy’, *The American Political Science Review*, 106(3), (August 2012), pp607-621, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23275436

Viehoff, D. (2016) ‘Authority and Expertise’, *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 24(4), pp 406–426, Available at: doi: 10.1111/jopp.12100

Waldron, J. (1998) ‘Participation: The Right of Rights’, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, 98, pp307-37, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545289

Weber, M. (1978) *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, trans. Ephraim Fischoff et al. Berkeley. CA: University of California Press.

Westlund, A. (2009) ‘Rethinking relational autonomy’. *Hypatia*, 24(4), Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01056.x

Young, I.M. (1990a) *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton University Press

Young, I.M. (1990b) *Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory*. Bloomington. IN: Indiana University Press.

Young, I.M. (1992) ‘Five Faces of Oppression’ in Thomas Wartenberg (ed.) *Rethinking Power*, Albany. NY: SUNY Press.

Young; I.M. (2010) *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford University Press