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**VOLUNTARY RECRUITMENT IN SCOTLAND, 1914-1916**

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## **SUMMARY**

The belief that Scotland showed undue patriotism by providing a high proportion of volunteers in 1914-16 needs to be looked at in a new light. While the New Armies of 1914-16 may have been volunteer in concept, they were not volunteer in actuality, and, while there was no doubt a proportion of men in Scotland, as elsewhere in the British Empire, who were prepared to come forward for purely altruistic or 'patriotic' ideals, the majority enlisted for more practical or realistic reasons. External forces either pushed or pulled those men and enticed or forced them to enlist. Previous analyses have been primarily top down. We know how many men served, and with what units, but not why. This thesis is an investigation of Scottish recruitment from the bottom up, to determine whether or not those who enlisted came from any particular section of Scottish society. This investigates and explains the driving forces behind voluntary recruitment in Scotland, August 1914 – December 1915, its methods, course taken, and its impact on the country as a whole.

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The recruiting posters on pages 162, 164, 165, 177, 231, and 364 are reproduced by permission of the Imperial War Museum.

### **DECLARATION**

The work here submitted for the degree of Ph.D. is the result of my own investigations and research. It has not already been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being currently submitted in candidature for any other degree.

Candidate .....

Supervisor .....

**Map:1 Scottish Counties in 1914.**



**Map:2 Local Army Recruiting Areas 1914-16.**



## INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Great War historians in Britain have strived, often at great length, to define those factors which create such evocative memories in a population, the vast majority of which was born after the event. Of all the facets of the First World War which have been discussed and poured over, it is still the raising of the mass volunteer armies which prompts the deepest emotions. Almost a century later it is hard to identify with those factors which meant so much to the 'generation of 1914'. J. Winter, in *The Great War and the British People*, writes that 'Thousands joined up in a holiday spirit and with an entirely unfounded conviction that the war would end by Christmas'.<sup>1</sup> In the twenty-first century such a response is abhorrent to generations raised in the aftermath of two world wars, Korea, and Vietnam: witnesses to the ease with which such conflicts become drawn-out and totally destructive. The idea that war could excite a nation and be viewed as a form of desirable adventure is anathema to a generation raised in the shelter of the 'nanny state'.

The mantra that Scotland produced a disproportionate number of recruits during the Great War has, over the last few years, taken on a cult status of its own: often quoted but never qualified. Many historians are quick to point out that Scotland provided a high number of recruits for the New Armies, with I. G. C. Hutchinson, in his paper 'The Nobility and Politics in Scotland 1880 – 1939', stating that 'The Scots, it must be remembered, volunteered in

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<sup>1</sup> J. Winter, *The Great War and the British People*. p. 29.

disproportionately large numbers from the very start of the war.'<sup>2</sup> Niall Ferguson claims that the Scots 'were the keenest to volunteer for war'.<sup>3</sup> Many, like J. Winter, 'The Army and Society: The Demographic Content', attributed this to patriotism, the desire to serve king and country,<sup>4</sup> or, equally vague, Scotland's natural military attributes: once a warrior nation etc. To assume that those who volunteered in 1914 and 1915 left everything behind and enlisted solely out of devotion to their country is as absurd as it is outdated. That is not to say that some, a proportion of the total, did not do so, but to assume that all were driven by such altruistic motives is a belief which is at best ill-judged or at worse deliberately contentious.

Many excellent regimental records detail in great depth the military contribution made by the Scottish soldier. These records range from histories of whole regiments, such as the unattributed *Historical records of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders*, Story's *History of the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)*, 1910-1933, and Wauchope's three volume *History of the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) in the Great War, 1914-1918*, down to those of individual battalions, examples of which are *A Border Battalion: The History of the 7/8<sup>th</sup> (Service) Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers*, MacLeod's *War History of the 6<sup>th</sup> (Service) Battalion Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders*, and *The Seventeenth Highland Light Infantry (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce Battalion): Record of War Service, 1914-1918* written by Arthur and Munro.

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<sup>2</sup> I. G. C. Hutchison, 'The Nobility and Politics in Scotland, c1880 – 1939'. in T. M. Devine, (ed), *Scottish Elites*. p. 144.

<sup>3</sup> N. Ferguson, *The Pity Of War*. p. 199.

<sup>4</sup> J. Winter, 'The Army and Society: The Demographic Content', in I. Beckett and K. Simpson, eds, *A Nation in Arms*. p. 195.

These records are quite naturally dedicated to the 'military' aspect of the war and they tend to focus partly on training, but mostly on the combat record of the battalion, regiment or brigade. In consequence, very little is known about those who came forward: the individuals, their background, status, or culture, and more importantly the motivating factors behind their decision to enlist.

In 'The Scottish Economy' Clive Lee concludes that by the end of the war some 690,235 Scots, both voluntarily enlisted and conscripted, had served in the various branches of the military and 'As a result, the percentage of Scots serving, as a proportion of males aged 15-49, reached 41.4%, compared to 46.2% for England and Wales'.<sup>5</sup> Far from being disproportionately high, Scotland's total contribution was in reality disproportionately low: 4.8 per cent lower than England and Wales. Clive Lee also affirms that 'The conscription rate was much lower for Scotland - 14.6% as compared to 22.1%'. This shows that the introduction of conscription in January 1916 served to slow down the number of Scots entering the services as industrial jobs were now protected, and the drain from Scotland's industry, while not at an end, was at least reduced to a manageable trickle.<sup>6</sup> Scotland's industrial workers were now, at last, seen as of equal importance at home, providing the machinery of war.

Perhaps of greater importance is Scotland's contribution in the early months

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<sup>5</sup> C.H. Lee, 'The Scottish Economy', in C. Macdonald, and E.W. McFarland, eds, *Scotland and the Great War*. p. 20.

<sup>6</sup> E. Spiers, 'The Scottish Soldier at war' in H. Cecil and P. Liddle, *Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced*. p. 315

of the conflict, the period when military expansion was dependent upon the volunteer ethos, the period prior to the introduction of conscription in January 1916 and the period which is perhaps the true reflection of Scotland's military effort. Here there is also a disparity between the various home countries, with Lee writing that 'Volunteers comprised 26.9% of Scottish men aged 15-49 in 1911, slightly higher than the rate for England and Wales at 24.6%'.<sup>7</sup> Edward Spiers, in 'The Scottish Soldier at War', states that 'Martial enthusiasm...gripped just over one in four Scottish males aged between 15 and 49 in the period up to December 1915'.<sup>8</sup> While there is certainly a difference, at only 2.3 per cent it does not justify the mythology which has, over the years, built up around it. However, there is no doubt that the initial voluntary period was Scotland's time and, whatever the reasons, the nation was in a position to provide substantial numbers of volunteers for both the New Armies and the Territorial Force.

Conscription was not introduced until January 1916 and in his book, *The Pity of War*, Niall Ferguson, among others, would have it that 'All those who joined the army before that date therefore did so voluntarily'.<sup>9</sup> Professor Ferguson continues on this theme by asserting that 'Until the Battle of the Somme the British mostly fought because they wanted to, not because they had to'.<sup>10</sup> Ferguson then causes some confusion by attributing voluntary recruitment to five factors or motives: successful recruiting techniques, female pressure,

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<sup>7</sup> C.H. Lee, 'The Scottish Economy', in MacDonald and McFarland, eds. p. 20.

<sup>8</sup> E. Spiers, 'The Scottish Soldier', in Cecil and Liddle, eds. p. 315.

<sup>9</sup> N. Ferguson, *The Pity of War*, p. 198.

<sup>10</sup> N. Ferguson, *The Pity of War*. p. 198-9.

peer-group pressure, economic motives, and impulse.<sup>11</sup> With the first four of these motives involving 'outside agencies' this, in essence, removes the 'voluntary' component from the equation. Enlistment in the army in 1914 and 1915 was on a voluntary basis but only in the sense that there was no form of legal compulsion. Ferguson's 'five motives' constitute, in their own way and with every bit as much weight as legally introduced means, a form of irresistible social or economic compulsion and thereby remove the absolute freedom of choice which symbolises the true 'volunteer'.

Unfortunately there has also been a tendency to overstate Scotland's contribution or to accept inflated figures at face value. This, while unintentionally giving a false impression, also detracts from the real achievements and helps to perpetuate the myth. Trevor Royle, in the book *In Flanders Fields: Scottish Poetry and Prose of the First World War*, claims that Glasgow's Gallowgate recruiting office enlisted some 20,000 men in the first month of the war.<sup>12</sup> Similarly the claim in Bill Kenefick's, 'War Resisters and Anti-Conscription in Scotland: an ILP Perspective', that Glasgow produced 6,000 recruits in the first week of the war is also wide of the mark.<sup>13</sup> While the Scottish press, in the necessity of the time, could view such exaggerated figures as justified, they should, some 80 years after the event, be seen as

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<sup>11</sup> N. Ferguson, *The Pity of War*. p. 204-6.

<sup>12</sup> T. Royle, ed. *In Flanders Fields – Scottish Poetry and Prose of the First World War*. p. 12.

<sup>13</sup> W. Kenefick, 'War Resisters and Anti-Conscription in Scotland: an ILP Perspective', in Macdonald and McFarland, eds. p. 61.

just another means to stimulate recruitment and be viewed, in the light of that necessity, as suspect.

Voluntary recruitment has not been neglected in recent research. John Morton Osborne's thesis *The Voluntary Recruiting Movement in Britain, 1914-1916*, with its emphasis on Bristol, Clive Hughes' *Army Recruitment in Gwynedd, 1914-1916*, and Patrick Callan's *Voluntary Recruitment for the British Army in Ireland During the First World War*, are the three most relevant theses and are important studies in their own right, focusing as they do on recruitment in three specific areas of the United Kingdom. However, while Osborne focuses on the central mechanics of voluntary recruitment, Hughes and Callan focus on the political connotations involved in recruitment in Wales and Ireland. Similarly, while B. C. Croucher's thesis *British Working Class Attitudes to War and National Defence 1902-14* is an exceptionally detailed study, it also focuses, in the main, on the political aspects of recruitment. This has been the prevailing trend when studying voluntary recruitment, with the resulting 'top down' studies concentrating on the mechanism of recruitment rather than on the recruits themselves.

This thesis focuses on the manpower enlisting in the Army and Territorial Force in Scotland and aims to show that economics played a primary role in promoting recruitment, in particular supporting the hypothesis that unemployment, while not the sole motivating factor, was the principal motivation for recruitment among the working classes. Of equal importance are the origins of the manpower and the forces acting upon them. The

inclusion of the commercial classes in this study is intended to confirm that economic factors governed recruitment, at least in the first year of the war, and will show that Scotland's working classes played a disproportionate role in the provision of military manpower. In order to present as comprehensive a viewpoint as possible, within the limits of this thesis, other, secondary, motives will also be investigated.

The study steers away from several points which others have already investigated in great depth. It makes no attempt to investigate any form of university, cadet force or officer recruitment. Neither is it intended to look at any political aspect of recruitment or the central mechanism of recruitment as this too has been covered in great detail. This study is intended to be from the bottom up - a study of Shakespeare's 'everyman' or Lennon's 'working class hero'.

From the outset Scotland was in a unique position in her ability to provide large numbers of recruits at short notice. Within the country at large there was immediate access to a 'pool' of manpower which, if not willing, was at least resigned to enlisting. This pool contained the annual, natural peacetime wastage of Scottish manpower, mainly those who emigrated or migrated, and also those whose livelihoods were immediately affected by the outbreak of war.

This is a study of that all-important volunteer period, and is an examination of Scotland's military effort based in part on official recruitment statistics and in

part on an analysis of the local press. It looks beyond the mythology surrounding Scottish recruitment and, using regional daily, weekly, and monthly recruitment figures, gives a realistic rather than a romantic view of Scotland's voluntary recruitment contribution.

The thesis focuses on several key points:

1. Why did Scotland produce this high number of recruits in the voluntary period?
2. What were the motivating factors behind Scottish recruitment figures?
3. Where did this recruitment take place? Regional patterns.
4. How were these men recruited?

Chapter One gives an overview of pre-war Scotland and tries to determine the feeling in the country at large and the various groups influencing those ideals.

The pre-war relationship between the army and the civilian population is examined in Chapter Two which looks at the changing perception of the military in the light of the Boer War and the consequent reforms in the army. In Gerard DeGroot's *Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War*, and Hew Strachan's *The Politics of the British Army* we find that the generally accepted view of the low social standard of the pre-war recruit prevails. However, with regards to Scotland, this 'standardised' concept needs to be reappraised. The pre-war contribution to the army by the individual home

countries is compared. It looks at pre-war demographic patterns of recruitment to determine whether initial wartime recruitment was a continuation of the pre-war system or a separate entity in its own right.

The direct relationship between economics and recruitment in the early months of the war (Ferguson's economic motives) is investigated in Chapter Three. It examines the claim by J. Winter that 'popular sentiment rather than pecuniary considerations lay behind enlistment in the first phase of the 1914-18 war'.<sup>14</sup> In the light of Peter Dewey's investigation into the link between recruitment and industrial wage levels, 'Military Recruiting and the British Labour Force During the First World War', it studies the initial reaction of Scottish industry in 1914, the economic collapse as it affected Scotland, and the part it played in the stimulation of Scottish recruitment. It studies the reality behind Peter Dewey's claims that economic factors played only 'a subordinate role in determining enlistment rates' and that 'neither activity levels nor wages' could explain recruiting differences between industries, and shows that these conclusions do not apply to Scotland. It investigates, in relation to Scotland, the claims in Gerard DeGroot's *The First World War* that 'At least initially, war's disruption did cause unemployment to rise', and, as Professor DeGroot continues, 'male unemployment explains in part the enthusiasm for military enlistment'.<sup>15</sup> We investigate the link between the upswing of Scottish industry and the fall in recruitment numbers. This supports Peter Simkins' assertion that 'the opportunity to escape from

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<sup>14</sup> J. Winter, *The Great War*. p. 33.

<sup>15</sup> G. DeGroot, *The First World War*. p. 137.

poverty, dreary surroundings or a tedious job played their part in drawing men to the recruiting offices'.<sup>16</sup>

In Tom Devine's *The Scottish Nation* the search by Irish immigrants, in Scotland, for a sense of national identity is seen as a factor in the recruitment of large numbers of Scots-Irish. This is a theme which Devine follows in his *Irish Immigrants and Scottish Society in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Devine is not alone in highlighting this search for identity. Roger Swift's *The Irish in Britain 1815 –1914: Perspectives and Sources*, and Roger Swift's and Sheridan Gilley's *The Irish in the Victorian City* give an insight into the need for Irish immigrants to take advantage of every opportunity to blend into mainstream Scottish society. Jeanette Brock holds the view that both immigration and emigration played important roles in creating, within a section of Scottish society, a readiness, if not a willingness, to enlist, and that, up until now, they have been under-emphasised. The fourth chapter probes these factors which, although secondary in importance, nevertheless played an important role in promoting recruitment in Scotland.

Chapter Four takes a direct look at recruitment for the New Armies in Scotland. It shows how, contrary to Haldane's original concept, the New Armies were to be the means by which the British Expeditionary Force was to be strengthened and increased. It investigates the various aspects of the recruiting campaign and the terms and conditions available to recruits. It looks at the regional variations in recruitment and how those recruits were raised for

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<sup>16</sup> P. Simkins, *Kitchener's Army; The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-16*. p. 185.

the various regiments. The support of the Scottish church, peer pressure and financial pressure are also examined, and also, importantly, the onset of conscription.

The perceived 'boom and bust' theory of the recruitment surge in August and September 1914 is challenged in Chapter Five which takes a fresh look at army recruitment in Scotland. The chapter puts this 'phenomenon' into a simple perspective relative to the recruitment process at the time and the increasing, and, more importantly, fluctuating, manpower requirements of the New Armies.

Of all the myths which have grown up around the mass armies of 1914-15 that of the Civic or Pals battalions generates most interest and, in Scotland, has been subjected to the greatest, unintentional, abuse. In Chapter Six the role of the Pals battalions in Scottish recruitment is presented within the context of Scottish recruitment as a whole. The chapter looks at the influence of public figures involved in civic recruitment and tries to unravel the myths surrounding civic recruitment in Scotland. T. Chalmers in *An Epic of Glasgow: History of the 15<sup>th</sup> Battalion, the Highland Light Infantry*, M. Lynch in *Scotland, A new History*, A.J. Smithers in *The Fighting Nation: Lord Kitchener and his Armies*, and Niall Ferguson in the *Pity of War* are just a small cross section of those who have perpetuated the myth that Scotland's Pals battalions were raised within a short period of time: wild claims of 16 hours in some cases. This chapter shows that the concept of Pals battalions was not applicable to

Scotland in any major form and played a minor role in stimulating Scottish recruitment.

Jeanette Brock's 'The Militia: An Aspect of Highland Temporary Migration 1871-1907' views pre-war territorial enlistment as a core aspect of Scottish society. If this is the case then enlistment for the Territorial Force during the First World War should be a reflection of pre-war commitment. Chapter Seven looks at recruitment in Scotland for the Territorial Force and shows that, in certain areas of the country, the Territorial concept was Scotland's answer to the 'Pals phenomenon' .

Chapter Eight looks at recruiting in Scotland for the Royal Navy and shows that while the manpower requirements differed from those of the army, those who did enlist were serving in an infantry role. The need for men to serve in a primarily maritime role was low due to the pre-war strength carried forward into the early months of the war.

The section on recruitment is rounded off in chapter Nine which combines Army and Territorial Force recruitment and presents it in a single context to give a general overview of Scotland's manpower contribution.

## CHAPTER 1

### PRE-WAR SCOTLAND

When the First World War broke out in August 1914 it came to me, as to most of my contemporaries, as a complete shock.<sup>17</sup>

William Marwick writes that he was not the only one to be taken unawares by the turn of events. In August 1914 the mainstream Scottish press, as well as the people of Scotland, was caught out by the speed of events in Europe. *The Scotsman*, on 1 July gave three columns on the movement of the bodies of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand and his wife from Sarajevo to Vienna on the battleship *Viribus Unitis* on 30 June, but at the same time devoted as much column space to the prospects of the coming grouse season in the various estates and regions of Scotland. On 3 July the paper gave greater prominence to the Henley Regatta than to the introduction of martial law in Bosnia and the escalation of the Balkan crisis. The popular belief that this was just another 'little Balkans squabble' shows that little attention was paid to the rising power struggle between those nations who desired to control the direction of Slav development. Serbia was the aggressive Slav state, Russia was desperate to regain her position as the leader of the burgeoning Pan-Slav movement in the Balkans, and Austria-Hungary needed to control any rising Slav nationalism.

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<sup>17</sup> W. H. Marwick, in I. MacDougall, ed, *Voices From War And Some Labour Struggles: Personal Recollections of War by Scottish Men and Women*. p. 48.

There were two theories circulating in the press at this time. The first tried to put 'spin' on the issue by implying that the crisis was in reality a plot aimed at isolating Britain and ensuring German domination in Europe. This was a blatant attempt to whip up national fervour against Germany and justify British intervention. The second theory was that the failure of the British government to take a decisive hand in Ireland and the constant threat of a civil war in Ulster had reduced the status of Britain in the eyes of the other powers and the government was therefore directly contributing to the escalation of the conflict. This was the line taken by *The Scotsman* in a vitriolic attack on the government on 27 July 1914. On 24 July *The Scotsman* had described the conflict as a purely Pan-Slav struggle and saw no reason for a European war. The newspaper could envisage no gain for any power and stated that Europe had become accustomed to the idea of a conflict along the Danube.<sup>18</sup>

From 28 July *The Scotsman* pursued a twin track approach, giving its support for the British attempts at mediation while continuing to attack the government in alternate articles: the paper continually reiterated that there was no reason for Britain to become involved in any European conflict. In this the paper was only following the line taken by the British government, outlined by Sir Edward Grey in his statement to the House of Commons, that as long as the dispute was between the two countries (Serbia, Austria-Hungary) no one had the right to interfere. It was only if relations between Russia and Austria-Hungary became strained that the other powers should intervene, not to support Serbia but to prevent any conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary, as

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<sup>18</sup> *The Scotsman*, 26 July 1914.

this, it was felt, would be a threat to the peace of Europe. Grey stressed that 'the moment the dispute ceased to be local and became one in which another Great Power was involved, it could but end in the greatest catastrophe that had ever befallen Europe'.<sup>19</sup>

The prevalent attitude of the British government was mediation in order to prevent any escalation of the crisis. It was not aimed at preventing the war but purely at limiting the consequences. *The Scotsman* closely followed this line by declaring that 'it is unnecessary to assume that we must become actively involved in a European struggle from whatever course it may arise or to whatever end it may be directed'.<sup>20</sup>

After the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, *The Scotsman* editorial supported the government line. This was the start of a policy in the paper of attacking Socialists and any who advocated 'peace at any price'. The paper declared that 'while French Socialists discuss the situation rationally, and while German Socialists seem ready to put their pacifist principles aside at the call of their country, British Socialists and the group of Radicals in alliance with them, cut by contrast a sorry figure'.<sup>21</sup>

On 3 August there was the indication of a more pragmatic policy at *The Scotsman* when it proposed that the invasion of Luxembourg did not directly affect Britain's interests and therefore warranted no direct intervention. It did,

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<sup>19</sup> *The Scotsman*, 28 July 1914.

<sup>20</sup> *The Scotsman*, 29 July 1914.

<sup>21</sup> *The Scotsman*, 1 August 1914.

however, accept that 'our interests' in Belgium did warrant intervention and proposed that 'violation of Belgium territory was cause enough for war'.<sup>22</sup> This shows that from the outset the intervention was not seen, by sections of the Scottish press at least, as in the defence of 'little Belgium' but purely in defence of British interests abroad - this is in contrast to the claim that Britain had no axe to grind and 'no selfish interests to serve'.<sup>23</sup>

The feeling among the provincial papers was that Britain should use its naval power to contain the German navy and control the trade lanes but that any fighting on land should be left to her continental allies with their large-scale conscript armies. *The Dundee Advertiser* stated in its first editorial on 29 July 1914 that if there was a direct threat to British interests then 'Britain should not be an onlooker', but the paper continued, just as firmly, that as yet there was no threat to British interests.<sup>24</sup> The paper produced no other editorial on the crisis until 7 August but there were plenty of items about 'little Serbia' and daily photographs showing the conditions of the Serbian soldiers in comparison to those of Austria-Hungary, all aimed at building public support for Serbia. On 7 August an editorial appeared in *The Dundee Advertiser* supporting the government and Sir Edward Grey, launching a scathing attack on what it saw as Liberal and Socialist pacifists, and supporting Asquith's desire to play a strong part in the war.

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<sup>22</sup> *The Scotsman*, 3 August 1914.

<sup>23</sup> *The Times*, 29 July 1914.

<sup>24</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 29 July 1914.

On the industrial west coast of Scotland *The Glasgow Herald* disapproved of the action taken by Austria-Hungary but adopted a decidedly non-interventionist stance. However, once again, when war had been declared the policy changed to one of support for the government and attacks on the radicals who advocated peace or compromise. *The Glasgow Herald* had given over much of its coverage in July to other items closer to home. The deaths of Lord Wemyss and Joseph Chamberlain occupied the first few days of the month while the visit to Scotland by the King and Queen occupied much of the reporting in the second week. In tandem with this was the constant reporting of the situation in Ireland. With upwards of 100,000 Irish living in Glasgow the question of Irish Home Rule was, in that region at least, a very emotive subject, and *The Glasgow Herald* anticipated that the risk of war in Ulster was more immediate, and more important to its readers, than war in Europe. It was not until 24 July that the paper took a stance on the Balkan issue with an editorial backing the alliance system and taking the Serbian point of view.<sup>25</sup> However, four days later this changed to an attack on Serbia in a strong anti-Serbian editorial placing Serbia as the aggressor in Europe. This was a supportive move to bolster the British attempt at mediation. The soft, almost pacifist, line taken by *The Glasgow Herald* continued into August with the declaration on the third of that month that it was our duty to do nothing impetuously 'there is no dishonour in refusing to go further than reason commands, no cowardice in hesitating when the voice of duty does not speak in urgent tones'.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> *The Glasgow Herald*, 24 July 1914.

<sup>26</sup> *The Glasgow Herald*, 3 August 1914.

The editorial also advocated taking the middle road between 'peace at any price' and 'action now', and stressed that Britain should not get involved in what was essentially a European dispute. In line with the majority of the Scottish press this outlook changed when Britain entered the war. The editorial on 5 August strove to justify Britain's entry into the conflict by saying that, although Britain wanted to mediate, she was forced by a deceitful Germany and Austria-Hungary to join in the defence of Belgium and France. By 8 August *The Glasgow Herald* was staking out the high moral ground against Germany, comparing German aggression to 'Napoleonism' and announcing a voluntary code of censorship, suppressing articles which it did not deem to be in the best interest of the country.<sup>27</sup> *The Scotsman* had earlier initiated its own self regulating code of censorship when it announced on 1 August that

we have again received reports from correspondents at home and abroad relating to British naval and military movements. These movements, as stated in the official communications which have been issued from the War Office are in the nature of precautionary and defensive measures, and in view of the very critical nature of the situation we consider it advisable not to give the reports publicly.<sup>28</sup>

One point of note is that by 8 August, the press was already reporting high figures in relation to casualties. The report that Germany had suffered 25,000

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<sup>27</sup> *The Glasgow Herald*, 8 August 1914.

<sup>28</sup> *The Scotsman*, 1 August 1914.

dead in the first few days' conflict in Belgium should at least have prepared the Scottish public for the high casualty figures to come.

Another indication of the public and press interest in the outbreak of war can be seen in the priority given to the announcement of Britain's entry into the conflict. The Scottish press continued to leave the front page for advertising while placing the declaration of war on pages seven or eight. Many papers did not even bother to highlight the event, discussing Britain's entry as if the public were merely spectators at some sporting occasion. Space was given over however to discussions on how the war would affect the various sectors of Scottish society: the cancellation of Perth races, the effect on the grouse season and the cancellation of Hunt Balls. Of much greater importance to the general public was the immediate increase in food prices in the major Scottish towns. These rises quickly prompted the government to introduce official price levels: butter at 1s 6d per lb., bacon at 1s 3d, and sugar at 4½d per lb. Also of more immediate concern was the creation of large numbers of temporary hospitals as schools, county houses, asylums and town halls were commandeered and made ready to receive large numbers of casualties. These factors served to highlight the closeness of the conflict, not in some distant part of the empire but only a few miles from Britain's shores. If war was to come it would be fought in the full view of the British public.

For some, the surge of war novels in the early years of the twentieth century has long been seen as a factor in the growth of anti-German feeling in Britain. Novels like *The Riddle of the Sands* and *The Invasion of 1910* were popular

and are perceived as having heightened the fears of German invasion.<sup>29</sup> Others take a more pragmatic approach and, while acknowledging that this genre of literature was extremely popular, they assert that the contents never gained any credibility among the public. In pre-war Britain they were read purely as exciting novels and did not shape public perceptions of Germany.<sup>30</sup> In Scotland at least, large sections of the population were not in a position, nor inclined, to buy novels. Although some had access to free municipal libraries, such as in Glasgow, they were used by the majority of visitors to read papers and periodicals. The working classes, those who could read, would have had a greater interest in reading the local paper than a novel, not least because of the cost which would be of prime concern to those on low wages. However most provincial newspapers serialised popular novels which meant that the Scottish working classes were not unaware of the genre. This does not imply that the public was impervious to the growing competition between Britain and Germany; it just means that they perceived it in a different light with a different set of priorities and for different reasons. Germany was an industrial competitor and it was in that guise that she was viewed by the working classes as a direct threat.

There was no objective reason for the population of Scotland to carry as great a fear of invasion as in England. This threat of invasion may have been actual or imaginary, fuelled by the popular press and a new genre of inflammatory invasion novels, but in the early years of the twentieth century this was not

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<sup>29</sup> B. Harding, *On Flows the Tay*. p. 39.

<sup>30</sup> De Groot, *Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War*. p. 12.

enough to cause any apprehension within the Scottish community. Certainly in England the threat of invasion had been a recurring theme, in parliament, in public and in the press (the Northcliffe press mainly), although in part this was a recruiting theme for organisations such as the National Service League and as a means to put forward their ideals of compulsory military service.<sup>31</sup> The only direct threat to Scotland was seen as a strike or raid on the east coast but even this was deemed unlikely due to the construction of the new naval bases at Cromarty and Rosyth which guaranteed a permanent heavy naval presence in Scottish waters. The designation of Scapa Flow as a wartime anchorage further heightened the feeling of security in Scotland. The high levels of naval development and construction were seen as part of the new demand for a strong home fleet, able to deter the expanding German navy, and as such these changes did not cause any alarm as they were seen as a natural function of maintaining British naval supremacy. The navy, the bastion of the nation's defence, would protect Scotland.

The working classes in Scotland were not unaware of the so called 'naval race' between Germany and Britain but to the great majority it was seen as just that, a race, with no political implications. There was however, a pride in the nation's industrial ability to maintain its lead in any field; a display of imperial supremacy. The naval race was seen by the working classes not as a direct military race leading to inevitable conflict, but as part of the race for empire: size meant power. Germany's imperial ambitions were seen as the real threat not her ambition in Europe. Germany had, until her desire for

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<sup>31</sup> D. Hayes, *Conscription Conflict*. p. 51-61.

imperial power, rarely been viewed as a competitor: she was a land power not a naval one. The naval race with Germany was conducted mainly at a political level and as such, while it may have caused concern to the government of the day, for that very reason it did not hold the political interest of the man in the street.

What constituted crisis to those in command was often beyond the 'ken' of the man in the street who saw things in a more practical and pragmatic way. What was of more interest to the Scottish worker was the amount of cheap German steel being imported for use in the Clyde shipyards and the need to maintain the high level of coal exports to Germany from the east coast coal fields. The use of German steel had helped to create a shipbuilding boom on the Clyde in 1913 while the export of coal to fuel Germany's expanding industrial might had encouraged the rapid growth of the east coast coal industry. It is somehow ironic that cheap German steel was being used to build British warships in the naval race against Germany. Any enmity felt towards pre-war Germany by those Scottish working classes which were the first to enlist was created as the result of pre-war economic developments and not ideology. Cheap German armour-plate imported to the Clyde and used in the construction of British warships created a pre-war slump in the Scottish steel industry, bringing with it ill feeling towards Germany, while those working in the shipyards were left to believe that if we were building ships to match the German navy then Germany must be viewed as an enemy. The British naval policy of the two-power standard was, to all intents and purposes, unknown to them. Of greater importance was the increase in

warship building on the Clyde in the pre-war years. This helped to create the pre-war boom and in turn propagated the myth of a naval race.

**FIG 1:1 Clyde's Share of Admiralty Warshipbuilding 1900-1914.**<sup>32</sup>

Year	Number ordered	Clydeside share	Percentage of total
1900-01	36	6	16.6
1901-02	23	5	21.7
1902-03	26	3	8.3
1903-04	34	1	2.9
1904-05	18	1	5.5
1905-06	33	2	6
1906-07	24	3	12.5
1907-08	28	3	10.7
1908-09	38	11	28.9
1909-10	48	18	37.5
1910-11	46	18	39.1
1911-12	37	12	32.4
1912-13	45	18	40
1913-14	46	11	23.9

The middle class in pre-war Scotland had developed an interest in the British Empire, its expansion and development, and most importantly as an area of personal advancement. Scotland's middle classes had developed a history of service in India and a 'tradition of imperial service'.<sup>33</sup> They identified closely with the empire, considering themselves to be Imperial: that is, within that section of society entrusted with the safe running and expansion of the empire. They were the administrators and protectors of the empire, taking pride in the power and political status as the largest empire. There was a certain degree of pride within Scotland at being part of the British Empire,

<sup>32</sup> H. B. Peebles, *Warshipbuilding on the Clyde: Naval orders and the Prosperity of the Clyde Shipbuilding Industry, 1889-1939*. p. 169.

<sup>33</sup> B. Lenman. *An Economic History of Modern Scotland 1660-1976*. p. 207.

although, within the working classes, the identity was that of being part of the empire, not imperial. For the Scottish masses, imperialism and imperial expansion meant continuing employment. The concept of national pride gained from imperial rule would be part of the natural desire to feel a part of all that was seen as being 'the best' of society. For the working classes the pride that was felt in being a part of the British empire came from the knowledge that it was their skills that helped to maintain Britain's industrial and economic dominance. Angus Calder asserts that 'the idea that Scotland's destiny lay within the English speaking "Commonwealth of Nations" ...was not confined to people obviously hitched to the imperial establishment'.<sup>34</sup> For the upper classes, the landed and the new industrialists, the idea of being part of the empire was that of a partnership with England: equality in the rule of the empire and equality in the profit from the empire.<sup>35</sup> G. Walker states that,

Before the First World War, therefore, Scotland's overall world-view was, in general, empire-orientated. It fed on notions of international prestige in industry, science and education; it was proud of its regiments and missionaries; it liked the idea of "partnership" with England and it shared with its partner a broad cultural affinity.<sup>36</sup>

Class structure within Scotland was as clearly defined as it was south of the border. The upper class of Scottish society had, over a period of time and

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<sup>34</sup> C. Bambery, *Scotland, Class and Nation*. p. 140.

<sup>35</sup> T. Devine, *The Scottish Nation*. p. 289-90.

<sup>36</sup> G. Walker, 'Protestantism and Political Culture 1890-1990'. in G. Walker, & T. Gallagher, 'Protestantism and Scottish Politics'. in G. Walker & T. Gallagher.(eds) *Sermons and Battle Hymns*. p. 88.

with judicious intermarrying, become almost indistinguishable from its southern counterparts. This was not confined to the pre-war era but continued into the war years; the marriage in April 1915 between Lady Victoria Stanley, the daughter of Lord Derby, and the Hon. Neil Primrose, son of Lord Rosebery, was a case in question. Lord Derby was made Director General of Recruitment in 1915 and was arguably the single person who did more to promote recruitment in England than anyone else, while Lord Rosebery, as we shall see, as well as lending his name to a Scottish Pals Battalion, played a major role in the promotion of recruitment in Scotland.<sup>37</sup>

By 1914 it had become the practice for the Scottish upper class to live the greater part of the year in London while using their Scottish property as a base for the summer months for the shooting season, mirroring their English counterparts. Those Anglo-Scots who had gained social acceptance within English society, the upper social classes in Scotland, had styled themselves on English society, its mannerisms and its culture. This included their automatic response to threats against the Empire. They had developed an attitude which conveniently ignored the reality that Scotland was of the empire but not itself imperial. Typical of this was the Strathmore family who by the beginning of the twentieth century had four houses, of which only one, Glamis Castle, was in Scotland. With the anglicising of the name to Bowes-Lyon and the policy of the family to have its children born in their London house, the family was symptomatic of the culture in Scotland at that time for the upper classes to embrace 'Englishness' in all its myriad ways. The Earl of Wemyss,

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<sup>37</sup> Chapter 5, Army Recruitment. Chapter 6, Civil Recruitment.

despite having 55,000 acres and two houses, Gosford and Amisfield, in Scotland, chose to retain as his main residence Stanway, a 5,000 acre estate in Gloucestershire. The Earl, while displaying his patriotism by forcing his employees to enlist, was 'horrified' when, only a few days after the outbreak of war, his wife suggested that Stanway be turned into a hospital.<sup>38</sup> The war was costly for the Wemyss family. The eldest son Ego died in Egypt while serving with the Gloucestershire Yeomanry, while Yvo the youngest was killed in France serving with the Grenadier Guards. The family, despite their extensive Scottish ties and heritage, had made a conscious decision to identify with its English connection.

Through their embracing of the English public school education system the Scottish upper class had absorbed those attitudes and concepts which the English upper class had adopted as representing their elevated position in society; duty, honour, honesty, self sacrifice, and the self-proclaimed knowledge that they were the guardians of empire. By the absorption of these values the response of the Scottish upper class to the war was an automatic, pre-programmed reaction, rallying to the defence of England and empire. Having set themselves up as the guardians of morality and all that was good in imperial Britain they could do no less than their inclusion in English society had preordained.

Those representing Scotland were not necessarily representative of Scotland. Those in positions of local or regional authority were more often the product

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<sup>38</sup> C. Dakers. *The Countryside at War 1914-1918*. p. 37.

of an English educational background. Family influence, whether political or financial, had, in many cases, been instrumental in acquiring public position. It should be no surprise that old names such as Rosebery, Buccleuch, Atholl, Roxburgh, Lovat and Weymss always acquired local dominance along with new names such as Tennant, Coats and Beardmore; people who had profited out of the empire through trade and commerce. As argued by T.M. Devine 'all in all, the Scottish MPs of this period were undoubtedly committed members of the imperial British establishment'.<sup>39</sup> He concludes that not only the social elite of Scotland's landed class but also prominent business and financial families were keen to be identified with English imperialism, 'even taking the step of serving in elite English regiments like the Life Guards and Coldstream Guards'.<sup>40</sup> With the possible exception of the Scots Guards this would help to promote a more anglicised ethos from that to be found in a Scottish regiment. The English method was seen by those controlling Scotland's wealth and industry as the way forward and the sacrifice of national identity was seen, by those few, as a small but acceptable price to pay.

Youth organisations such as the Boys' Brigade and the Boy Scouts served to promote militarism in sections of Scotland's youth. There are two views as to the intentions of the Boy Scout movement. Some, like J. O. Springhall, propose the view that the movement was, from its conception, an out and out militarist organisation, masquerading under the guise of religion.<sup>41</sup> Others, M.

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<sup>39</sup> T. M. Devine, *The Scottish Nation 1700-2000*. p. 286.

<sup>40</sup> T. M. Devine, *The Scottish Nation*. p. 286.

<sup>41</sup> J. O. Springhall, 'The Boy Scouts, Class and Militarism in Relation to British Youth Movements 1908-1930', in *International Review of Social History*, 16/2 (1971). p. 125-153.

J. Dedman in particular, see no militarist principles in the Scout movement and argue that the refusal by Baden-Powell to commit his organisation to a national youth brigade, controlled by the War Office, show that it was anti-militarist in doctrine and in principle.<sup>42</sup> The Boys' Brigade on the other hand was designed as a religious movement with the secondary objective of using sport and social contact as a means of personal improvement. Drill was an important part of these youth organisations, marching and counter-marching with shouldered arms, rifle drill and firing practice. The implementation of a company system, military rank and titles, parade ground inspections and uniformed church parades, all served to instil a military ethos, intentional or not. The question to be asked of the boys' organisations is not whether they were created with the intention of promoting militarism but whether or not, consciously or unconsciously, they did.

The Boy Scout movement with its emphasis on woodcraft and scouting, was growing in popularity in Scotland as well as England. In 1910, with a British membership of 107,986, Scotland with 14,815 members constituted 13.7 per cent of the total while England with 87,504 members contributed 81 per cent.<sup>43</sup> Although by 1914 the scouting movement had spread to fifty-two other countries, including France, Germany, Austria and Russia, it was viewed by some, in Scotland at least, as an instrument of the English middle classes. Scotland had its own home grown youth organisation in the shape of the Boys' Brigade. Begun in Hillhead, Glasgow, in October 1883 by William

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<sup>42</sup> M. J. Dedman, 'Baden-Powell, Militarism, and the 'Invisible Contributors' to the Boy Scout Scheme, 1904-1920', *Twentieth Century British History*, 4/3 (1993) p 201-23.

<sup>43</sup> Scout Association Archives. *Second Annual Report of the Boy Scouts*, 23 January 1911.

Alexander Smith and the brothers J. R. and J. B. Hill, the movement had spread throughout the country by 1914, with a United Kingdom membership of 6,503 officers and 60,224 boys operating in 1,360 companies.<sup>44</sup> In that year Glasgow, with 158 companies, had a membership of 889 officers and 8,610 NCOs and boys, centred on local drill halls.<sup>45</sup> The members were subjected to a strict military code, with Mr Smith as Captain and the Hill brothers acting as Lieutenants. The constitution of the brigade stated that 'strict discipline shall be enforced, and all members must submit to the authority of the officers and Non-Commissioned Officers placed over them'.<sup>46</sup> It went on to say that the object of the brigade was 'the promotion of habits of reverence, discipline, self-respect, and all that tends towards a true Christian manliness'.<sup>47</sup>

In sharp contrast to this promotion of Christian values, the third annual Drill Inspection and Review, held in Glasgow in 1898, contained a display by ten companies on how to take up a position to receive and fend off a cavalry charge and also how to deliver volley fire at an enemy. These annual reviews were usually attended by units of the regular and territorial forces, serving to establish a link between the brigade and the pre-war army. William Smith himself appeared at times to be confused as to the direction that the Boys' Brigade should take as regards its connection with militarism. Between 1909 and 1911 he had firmly resisted all attempts by the government to incorporate the Boys' Brigade into a National Cadet Force, as intended by the Secretary

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<sup>44</sup> J. Springhall, B. Fraser, M. Hoare, *Sure and Steadfast, A History of the Boy's Brigade 1883-1983*. p. 258.


<sup>45</sup> J. B. Shaw, *Glasgow's Battalion The Boys' Brigade 1883-1983*. p. 6.

<sup>46</sup> J. B. Shaw, *Glasgow's Battalion*. p. 3.

<sup>47</sup> J. B. Shaw, *Glasgow's Battalion*. p. 3.

of State for War, R. B. Haldane, who had, as part of his army reforms, planned to link all youth movements with local Territorial Associations. This contrasts sharply with the practice of the majority of Boys' Brigade officers, who also held commissions in the Volunteers, and, after 1908, in the Territorial Force.

**FIG 1:2 The pre-war Dundee battalion Boys' Brigade showing the eight company system and the carrying of dummy rifles.**



The Boys' Brigade was organised along similar lines to the Territorial Force with battalions divided into eight companies with a similar command structure. Smith saw no conflict of interest in this practice despite the possibility that the brigade members were being taught to look up to and follow the orders of serving military officers. These officers were viewed by the boys as father-

figures and role models, influencing the views of the boys towards the military. Indeed they would have been neglecting their duty to the military if they had not pursued this as a prime source for future recruits. Smith himself at varying times made reference to the military nature of the association. In 1907, in a speech to the United Boys' Brigade of America, he stressed that 'if ever the boys are called on to take a stand for the defence of the country, the State would have good cause to thank the Brigade for the military training the boys had obtained'.<sup>48</sup>

On 16 December 1913, during negotiations aimed at amalgamating the Boys' Brigade and the Boys' Life Brigade, Smith, in a letter to F. P. Gibbon, wrote that 'we frankly accept military organisation and drill as the basis of our training'. The Boys' Life Brigade broke off negotiations, viewing the Boys' Brigade as a military organisation unwilling to forego or temper its military beliefs. Smith went on to declare that 'The Boys' Brigade consenting to give up its "military training", is equivalent to suggesting that the Boy's Brigade should cease to be the Boys' Brigade'.<sup>49</sup> J. Springhall points out that Smith was even caught up in the fashionable concept of the early twentieth century, that of Social Darwinism. In his notes written for a Bible Class Smith stated that 'there can be no progress without stress and conflict', later going further by saying that 'no nation ever yet attained to true greatness or influence in the world without going through the training and discipline of war'.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> J. Springhall, et al, *Sure and Steadfast*. p. 98.

<sup>49</sup> W. A. Smith to F. P. Gibbon in J. Springhall, et al, *Sure and Steadfast*. p. 104.

<sup>50</sup> W. A. Smith, holograph notes, Archives of 1st Glasgow Company, in J. Springhall, et al, *Sure and Steadfast*. p. 107.

These beliefs helped change the ideals and attitudes of a large number of youths and young boys at a susceptible age and helped 'pave the way' for mass recruitment. However, even the Boys' Brigade excluded sections of society, not by the promotion of exclusivity but by the cost of uniforms. The section of Scottish youth attracted to the movement were those from skilled working class or middle class homes. Thus a large proportion of Scottish youth were not under the influence of youth groups or the organised promotion of militarism. They felt no debt or duty to society. The youth movements served to break down the existing barriers between society and militarism only within their membership. Their use of drill and discipline made their members more open to the concept of military service in time of need. Outside their membership the youth movements were viewed with distrust and disdain. While not actively promoting militarism the youth movements created an atmosphere and a philosophy which could be exploited, but only within their limited membership.

There were those within Britain who advocated the introduction of some form of conscriptive service, especially after the fiasco of the Boer War and the increasing dominance of other major powers such as Germany and America, economically, industrially and, most importantly to those advocating conscription, militarily. Although only founded in 1902 the National Service League claimed to have over 91,000 members by 1914, and, although the Army Council gave support to the concept of conscription in 1913, this military support failed to manifest itself in any widespread public adoption. Even advocacy from Lord Roberts, President of the league from 1905, failed to

stimulate general public interest. The National Service League promoted the idea of 'short-service' conscription, four months spent on initial training followed by fifteen days annually. This was not enough to compete with European conscription of one or two years' duration. A part-trained force was the best that could reasonably be expected under this scheme: unable to be fully incorporated into the army in time of need and no better than the existing Territorial Force. In order to promote change in both the British army and the British public, both army and society would have to be incorporated, and both would have to experience change. Compulsory service was seen as the answer. As ever increasing numbers were put through the military 'machine', then both parties would have to adapt and compromise. Military service would have a positive effect on the morality and physique of the young, while mass contact with the public would temper the elitism of the army establishment and make the army more a representation of society rather than merely representing society.

When placed in direct competition with the newly developing industrial might of Germany and America, Britain's ageing industrial infrastructure could not hope to compete. Those who advocated conscription felt that Britain with her small army could not retain her world status in the face of the other European powers with their conscript armies of millions. They failed to see that military might alone could not maintain an empire: industrial might was the new power. It was also felt that the high rejection rate of volunteers for the Boer War was a sign of the increasing degeneration of British society. Standards had to be raised and the introduction of a regime based upon strong militarist

principles was viewed as the way forward. In the growing era of Social Darwinism the idea that the 'imperial race' could be anything other than physically superior was anathema to Britain's social elite. It was feared that the decline in physical standards would bring with it, hand in hand, a corresponding decline in national morality. This is not to say that the high failure rate did not promote in some a genuine concern for the health of the population. It just meant that housing and diet were not seen as the solution. In the culture of the time a physical failure demanded a physical solution.

Professor Devine states that in the immediate pre-war years the Irish communities in Scotland were becoming more and more isolated as the prominence of Irish nationalism grew and the number of mixed religion marriages, at the prompting of the Catholic church, was reduced.<sup>51</sup> J. A. Jackson states that 'more potent than the fact that the immigrant lived in a strange and simple way was the fact that he belonged to a foreign church.'<sup>52</sup> Assimilation into mainstream society had already been achieved to a greater extent in England, where the Irish were 'less and less distinguished in the literature from the native workers'.<sup>53</sup> Jackson expands this view and sees religious differences as one of the main pre-war areas of conflict between the Irish immigrant and the indigenous Scot. He concludes that 'The fact that the Irishman was a Catholic led, especially in Scotland, to violent antagonism on the part of the native population'.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, p. 494.

<sup>52</sup> J. A. Jackson, *The Irish in Britain*. p. 154.

<sup>53</sup> J. A. Jackson, *The Irish in Britain*. p. 94.

<sup>54</sup> J. A. Jackson, *The Irish in Britain*. p. 154.

In 1901 there were 205,000 Irish-born living in Scotland, a figure which was declining annually but which still stood at 174,715 in 1911, some 3.7 per cent of the total Scottish population.<sup>55</sup> These immigrants were concentrated in three main areas of Scotland: Glasgow and the surrounding district, Dundee, and the Lothians. Dundee had a high number of Irish women employed in the jute mills but there was very little opportunity for employment in the city for Irish males: not through any great religious prejudice but primarily due to the lack of male employment in a female dominated industry. Jobs, when available, were given to skilled local men. The unskilled male Irish immigrants stood a better chance of employment elsewhere. 'In Scotland both poor law legislation and practice were more rigorous, and 7,000 paupers were removed to Ireland between 1875 and 1910'.<sup>56</sup>

In the Lothians the Irish found employment in the coal fields, usually in unskilled positions but in large enough numbers to dominate the local miners' unions in West Lothian.<sup>57</sup> Swift points out that 'in Edinburgh, a city of legal, literary and ecclesiastical institutions, the Irish were confined to such menial occupations as general labouring in building, domestic service, portering, street-cleaning and street-lighting'.<sup>58</sup> He continues by pointing out that 'the great majority of Irish, largely illiterate and unskilled, entered the lowliest and least healthy of urban occupations'.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> R. Swift, *The Irish in Britain 1815-1914, Perspectives and Sources*. p. 12.

<sup>56</sup> R. Swift, *The Irish in Britain*. p. 21-2.

<sup>57</sup> G. Walker, 'The Protestant Irish in Scotland' in T. M. Devine, *Irish Immigrants*. p. 61.

<sup>58</sup> R. Swift, *The Irish in Britain*. p. 16.

<sup>59</sup> R. Swift, *The Irish in Britain*. p. 16.

Hard work for low wages was the traditional lot of the Irish immigrant and in the early years of the twentieth century this was nowhere more apparent in Scotland than in Glasgow and the surrounding district, where for generation after generation the Irish became the labouring class. Gallagher states that 'in a city whose prosperity was based on heavy engineering and manufacturing, the sons and grandsons of Irish immigrants were excluded from entering the areas of the local economy which conveyed prestige and acceptability'.<sup>60</sup>

In a Protestant-dominated industrial heartland it was virtually impossible for Catholics to serve an apprenticeship or to attain any managerial position in engineering, shipbuilding, or any major Scottish industry. The majority of Irish Catholics in Scotland were employed as casual labour, especially in the chemical and engineering industries: 'although the Glasgow Irish were able to find employment in mills and mines they were excluded from engineering by virtue of their lack of skill, from shipbuilding by the Orange Order and from skilled trades by the craft unions'.<sup>61</sup>

With Scotland's industrial might focused on the central belt and the west coast this was the area which attracted the majority of Scotland's Irish community. There the Irish found employment but, again, mainly in low paid unskilled jobs within the chemical, engineering and shipbuilding industries, as those with no skills found themselves concentrated in manufacturing trades. In 1911 the census gave as 90,000 males and 15,000 females the number of Irish

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<sup>60</sup> T. Gallagher, 'The Catholic Irish', in T. M. Devine, *Irish Immigrants*. p. 22.

<sup>61</sup> R. Swift, *The Irish in Britain*. p. 16.

employed in Scotland. These were categorised as - manufacturing of iron and metals 24,813, mining 11,909, general labourers 6,019, building 4,963, road transport 3,492, agriculture 3,232, railway transport 3,071, docks 2,985, local government service 2,924.<sup>62</sup> These categories do not include the thousands of Irish who were employed on a casual basis and therefore were not recorded.

In the first decade of the twentieth century (1901-1911), 188,014 males emigrated from Scotland, 8.2 per cent of the total Scots-born male population.

D. Baines explained that

by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries...an increasing percentage of the emigrants had not only decided before they left Europe to return but had also decided to do so after only a few years. Stays of three and four years were common, which is about the shortest period it would take an unskilled worker to save enough to make the trip worthwhile.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Census Report 1911, Vol 3, vi-viii & tables iii and iv. p. 23-42.

<sup>63</sup> D. Baines, *Emigration from Europe 1815-1930*. p. 40.

**FIG 1:3 Male migration and emigration from Scottish counties**  
**1891 - 1911. (Expressed as a percentage of male population)**

County	Male Migration		Male Emigration	
	1891 - 1901	1901 - 1911	1891 - 1901	1901 - 1911
Aberdeen	7.42	4.2	4.8	10.84
Argyll	10.84	7.55	2.84	8.59
Ayr	9.32	7.04	2.97	9
Banff	15.04	4.31	4.89	8.95
Berwick	15.21	8.92	5.79	7.35
Bute	12.37	9.91	4.07	9.73
Caithness	13.81	1.62	4.47	10.45
Clackmannan	19.80	14.42	4.66	7.52
Dumfries	13.67	8.66	5.07	6.27
Dumbarton	13.67	8.64	2.71	8.12
Edinburgh	6.79	6.56	6.32	7.48
Elgin	12.58	9.11	4.13	8.28
Fife	7.56	3.41	1.64	5.55
Forfar	8.43	5.60	6.47	9.62
Haddington	17.39	10.1	5.35	6.01
Inverness	9.41	6.64	4.84	7.31
Kincardine	17.66	21.72	5.38	6.77
Kinross	23.12	10.81	0.72	9.12
Kirkcudbright	13.28	11.81	8.46	8.60
Lanark & Renfrew	3.22	3.8	5.34	8.29
Linlithgow	14.64	10.08	3.53	6.63
Nairn	12.84	13.28	5.59	9.02
Orkney	9.33	2.55	5.65	9.73
Peebles	22.11	10.21	4.32	9.90
Perth	9.17	6.60	6.48	8.44
Ross & Cromarty	7.79	3.70	5.61	8.44
Roxburgh	6.78	7.97	13	8.33
Selkirk	24.32	8.39	4.42	5.36
Shetland	5.75	0.83	4.59	9.62
Stirling	6.14	8.05	6	6.7
Sutherland	8.94	2.96	3.11	9.13
Wigtown	15.65	9.06	6.26	6.13

Figure 1:3 shows the levels of migration and emigration from the various Scottish counties and shows clearly the levels of population movement in the country. Population movement was caused by a variety of reasons but mainly contained three groups; those about to emigrate, those engaged in seasonal work, and an itinerant workforce which for one reason or another was unable, or unwilling, to settle down and maintain a steady home life. Those three

groups should be taken into consideration when trying to understand the initial period of Scottish recruitment. The itinerant group was made up mainly of migratory workers, Irish immigrants and internal migrants, mostly from the Highlands, who gravitated to the industrial central belt during lean spells in their local communities. Brock concludes that 'Between 1861 and 1911 the proportion of the Scottish population resident in the Highlands declined from over 18 per cent to little more than 10 per cent'.<sup>64</sup> Those engaged in seasonal work had become a fixed part of Scottish industrial and agricultural life but with increasing industrialisation in the central belt their numbers had reached a significant level. In the year prior to the war (1913) Scotland's annual rate of emigration stood at 1.43 per cent of population.<sup>65</sup>

**FIG 1:4 Foreign countries of choice of Scottish emigrants 1913.**<sup>66</sup>

<b>1913</b>	<b>Canada</b>	<b>Australia</b>	<b>New Zealand</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>India</b>	<b>United States</b>
<b>January</b>	443	641	220	102	64	496
<b>February</b>	1485	516	188	87	70	880
<b>March</b>	4934	608	89	156	67	1466
<b>April</b>	6447	418	154	127	54	2117
<b>May</b>	9012	725	229	189	57	2174
<b>June</b>	5572	477	239	161	54	1442
<b>July</b>	2677	559	217	141	44	1172
<b>August</b>	3000	345	248	154	72	1452
<b>September</b>	3043	554	139	149	178	1795
<b>October</b>	1655	567	158	131	287	1795
<b>November</b>	916	253	309	148	134	825
<b>December</b>	292	176	135	79	98	332
<b>Total</b>	39861	5839	2325	1624	1179	15946

<sup>64</sup> J. M. Brock, *The Importance of Emigration in Scottish Regional Population Movement, 1861-1911*.

<sup>65</sup> HMSO, Cd 6615. Cd 6701.

<sup>66</sup> HMSO, Cd 6615. Cd 6701.

Figure 1:4 shows that a total number of 68,117 Scots emigrated to foreign countries in 1913 with 23.4 per cent choosing the United States as their final destination. While 82 per cent of those leaving Scotland for a new life abroad were choosing North America as the destination of choice, 73.4 per cent, 51,357 chose a final destination within the British Empire. Of this number 58.5 per cent chose Canada, 8.5 per cent Australia, 3.4 per cent New Zealand, 2.4 per cent South Africa, and 1.7 per cent India,

For ten years prior to the outbreak of war there was a steady stream of migration to the colonies, particularly Canada, and to other countries. The figures for the three years, 1909, 1910, and 1911, were 33,366, 53,384, and 61,321 respectively. Not all these were farm workers, but a very large proportion of the emigrants were drawn from workers on the land.<sup>67</sup>

With the majority of the Scottish population living in the industrial central belt, it is no surprise that emigration from this area was correspondingly high. This is not to say that the emigrants originated in that area. Many had previously migrated from other regions within Scotland. With the high level of internal migration, emigration, especially of the male population, helped to maintain a low level of unemployment in Scotland. In 1913 the level of unemployment in Scotland stood at 1.8 per cent, in comparison to the 8.7 per cent level of London.

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<sup>67</sup> Jones, et al, *Rural Scotland*, p. 198.

Scotland's pre-war population of 4,760,904 was divided among thirty-three counties while the country itself could be sub-divided east-west and north-south, not only in terms of population density but also in terms of industrial growth.<sup>68</sup> The east coast was predominantly fishing, coal, textiles and brewing, and, although it could be seen as an industrial region, with one or two exceptions the east coast industrialisation was primarily light industry. The west coast was the industrial heartland, not only of Scotland but increasingly of Britain as a whole. The term 'Clyde built' was seen to represent imperial Britain at its best. Scotland's heavy industry was centred on the Clyde, with its shipbuilding and heavy engineering sectors. To support these industries there had evolved an infrastructure of coalfields, iron and steel industries, chemical industries, and, as industry expanded and labour migrated to the region in search of work, peripheral and unrelated industries were attracted to the region by the plentiful supply of available manpower. Consequently the western central belt of Scotland was the most densely populated section of the country.

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<sup>68</sup> Census 1911.

**FIG 1:5 Male Population for Scotlands Counties 1911.<sup>69</sup>**

	<b>Total population</b>	<b>% of total</b>	<b>Male population</b>	<b>% of male total</b>	<b>Total males 15-34</b>	<b>% of total</b>	<b>Single males 15-34</b>	<b>% of total</b>
<b>Scotland</b>	4760904		2308839		787436		578213	
<b>Aberdeen</b>	312177	6.55	147357	6.38	46297	5.87	34279	5.92
<b>Argyll</b>	70902	1.48	35426	1.53	12056	1.53	10247	1.77
<b>Ayr</b>	268337	5.63	130196	5.64	43765	5.55	31950	5.52
<b>Banff</b>	61402	1.29	29755	1.29	9201	1.16	7065	1.22
<b>Berwick</b>	29643	0.62	14192	0.61	4618	0.58	3560	0.61
<b>Bute</b>	18186	0.38	8009	0.35	2424	0.3	1927	0.33
<b>Caithness</b>	32010	0.67	15156	0.66	4324	0.55	3504	0.6
<b>Clackmannan</b>	31121	0.65	14657	0.63	4957	0.62	3681	0.63
<b>Dumbarton</b>	139831	2.94	69718	3	24761	3.14	18146	3.13
<b>Dumfries</b>	72825	1.52	35024	1.51	11243	1.42	8553	1.48
<b>Edinburgh</b>	507666	10.6	235427	10.2	81487	10.3	59351	10.2
<b>Elgin</b>	43427	0.91	20493	0.89	6393	0.81	5060	0.87
<b>Fife</b>	267739	5.62	132133	5.72	45893	5.82	31724	5.48
<b>Forfar</b>	281417	5.91	126638	5.48	41059	5.2	29723	5.14
<b>Haddington</b>	43254	0.9	21463	0.93	7274	0.92	5364	0.92
<b>Inverness</b>	87272	1.83	42440	1.84	13547	1.72	11794	2
<b>Kincardine</b>	41008	0.86	19760	0.85	5922	0.75	4536	0.78
<b>Kinross</b>	7527	0.16	3617	0.15	1190	0.15	873	0.15
<b>Kirkcudbright</b>	38367	0.8	18069	0.78	5712	0.72	4445	0.77
<b>Lanark</b>	1447034	30.4	721369	31.2	256567	32.6	183279	31.7
<b>Linlithgow</b>	80155	1.68	42727	1.85	15475	1.96	11039	1.9
<b>Nairn</b>	9319	0.2	4330	0.19	1324	0.17	1083	0.18
<b>Orkney</b>	25897	0.54	12251	0.53	3477	0.44	2777	0.48
<b>Peebles</b>	15258	0.32	7066	0.3	2339	0.3	1767	0.3
<b>Perth</b>	124342	2.61	58364	2.53	18691	2.37	14555	2.5
<b>Renfrew</b>	314552	6.6	151661	6.57	53314	6.77	38610	6.67
<b>Ross &amp; Cromarty</b>	77364	1.62	38763	1.68	13531	1.7	11537	2
<b>Roxburgh</b>	47192	0.99	21583	0.93	7052	0.9	5403	0.93
<b>Selkirk</b>	24601	0.51	11332	0.5	3951	0.5	3018	0.52
<b>Shetland</b>	27911	0.59	12589	0.54	3672	0.46	2800	0.48
<b>Stirling</b>	160991	3.38	82335	3.56	28293	3.6	20412	3.53
<b>Sutherland</b>	20179	0.42	9861	0.43	2863	0.36	2510	0.43
<b>Wigtown</b>	31998	0.67	15078	0.65	4767	0.6	3641	0.62

Figure 1:5 gives an overview of population distribution in Scotland. It shows, for example, that industrial Lanark had the highest figure with 30.4 per cent of the population and 31.7 per cent of the single male 15 - 34 population. The table shows the future available manpower.

<sup>69</sup> Census 1911.

While many were politically or ideologically opposed to the outbreak of war, and in the days leading up to the conflict expressed the opinion that a European war should not involve Scotland, once war had been declared they felt that they had no choice but to support their country.

## CHAPTER 2

### PRE – WAR SCOTTISH RECRUITING

ordinary soldiers tended to be vagabonds who could find no better occupation: recruits from the bars and brothels of urban slums or the human detritus thrown up by the shrinkage of agricultural Britain.<sup>70</sup>

Gerard DeGroot paints a grim picture of the pre – 1914 Edwardian army; professional in concept if not in content, ignored and detested by those it was intended to represent, led by officers who saw militarism as something that no gentleman would subscribe to, and the ranks filled by the people whom society knew existed but did not wish to acknowledge.<sup>71</sup> There are others who follow the same train of thought. Hew Strachan asserts that 'Before 1914 the army recruited from a small segment of the total population, predominantly the urban unskilled worker paid by the day and vulnerable to cyclical unemployment'.<sup>72</sup> Edward Spiers states that 'small in number, the regular army was also unrepresentative of society as a whole',<sup>73</sup> while John Pimlott, following this avenue of thought, agrees that the pre-war regular army was 'ignorant of the country which it was employed to defend'.<sup>74</sup>

The Royal Commission on Physical Training in Scotland, which sat between

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<sup>70</sup> G. DeGroot, *Blighty*. p. 14.

<sup>71</sup> G. DeGroot, *Blighty*. This comes from a general interpretation of his second chapter.

<sup>72</sup> H. F. A. Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army*. p. 208.

<sup>73</sup> E. M. Spiers, 'The Regular Army in 1914' in I. Beckett and K. Simpson, *A Nation in Arms*. p. 39.

<sup>74</sup> J. Pimlott, *The Guinness History of the British Army*. p. 98.

29 April and 3 October 1902, was intended to promote physical training in Scotland's schools but was from the outset used as an indicator of the physical and moral conditions of the nation's youth, touching in passing on the standard of army recruits. J. Winter states that 'The assertion that the army [in contrast to the navy] contained only the outcasts of British society was never seriously challenged in these enquiries'.<sup>75</sup>

While this may have been the picture of the nineteenth century Victorian army, in the new twentieth century changes were taking place. True, the army was still professional mainly by virtue of its voluntary nature. The reluctance of the officer class to adopt what it saw as a 'Junker'-like attitude to military service led to many treating that service as an amateur adventure, and, short of a government-initiated policy of conscription, there would be no change there. Viscount Montgomery, himself a junior officer at this time, points out that 'it was not fashionable to study war and we were not allowed to talk about our profession in the officers mess'.<sup>76</sup> That said, there were, however, important changes in the public perception of the army, the relationship between the civil and military, and in the standard and make-up of recruits.

The humiliation inflicted on the British army in the opening weeks of the Boer War, at Spion Kop and Colenso, struck at the very heart of imperial Britain.

The savagery and tenacity of 'a handful of farmers' destroyed the nation's faith in the capability of the Victorian army to protect the interests of Britain.

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<sup>75</sup> J. Winter, *The Great War and the British People*. p. 16.

<sup>76</sup> Viscount Montgomery, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein*. p. 80.

Suffering over 22,000 deaths and fielding an army of over 450,000 British and imperial troops, it took the British almost three years to defeat an irregular Boer army which never contained more than 50,000 men and boys. This showed that, while the army could deal with native revolts and insurrection along the Indian frontier, it could do very little when faced with an enemy of European stock. The empire had been stripped of its military protection in order to achieve victory, an event which the government was afraid might be exploited if it ever occurred again. The fear was that Russia would use any future British crisis to try to achieve territorial gains on the Indian continent.

Since the end of the Crimean War the Victorian army had been seen, and used primarily as a colonial police force.<sup>77</sup> It fought small scale actions in the various far flung parts of the empire against inferior native forces, while leaving the defence of the homeland in the hands of the navy. It was perhaps natural for a maritime nation, especially an island, to see its navy as its principal defensive arm but this served to place the army in a secondary role, in terms of resources as well as popular opinion. The twentieth century brought changes, not only to the army, in the shape of the Haldane reforms, but also to the relationship between the public and the army, or perhaps more importantly the way that the public viewed the army.

The Boer War showed the army for what it really was; undersized, under-trained, and under-equipped to protect the world's biggest empire. More

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<sup>77</sup> J. Bourne, 'The British Working Man in Arms', in Cecil and Liddle, eds. p. 337. J. Pimlott, *The Guinness History of the British Army*. p. 98.

importantly, the Boer War also brought about the phenomenon of voluntary large-scale civilian involvement, with the call for short-term volunteers and the use of Militia and Yeomanry forces abroad, for the first time in large numbers, to supplement the regular and imperial troops in South Africa. Those volunteers, while technically not civilian when on military service, nevertheless still considered themselves as such, serving in time of crisis only. With large numbers of Scottish Volunteers or Yeomanry undertaking a short-term period of service in South Africa, public interest in Scotland in matters military was heightened.<sup>78</sup> The advent of the telegraph and the increased number of 'war correspondents' ensured that reporting of the war and the actions of local regiments was swiftly published and just as quickly absorbed by an interested nation.

The raising of 35,000 volunteers<sup>79</sup> for the Imperial Yeomanry had several effects. It alerted the public and the government to the deficiencies of the army. At the same time it alerted the establishment to the state of its working class citizens when so many of them failed the rather basic army medical. The failure rate of recruits showed that, contrary to previous belief, the army was not prepared to accept just any standard of recruit. True, the army, faced for the first time with such large numbers of volunteers, could afford to be selective but if, as we have been led to believe, the army was a haven for

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<sup>78</sup> Field Marshal Lord Carver, *The National Army Museum Book of The Boer War*. p. 53. p. 252.

<sup>79</sup> Field Marshal Lord Carver, *The National Army Museum Book of The Boer War*. p. 53. p. 252.

'thieves and rogues' then the rejection rate would have had to be considerably lower to reflect this.

The change which carried with it the greatest consequences for the future defence of the nation was the increase in contact between the army and the civilian population. Adams and Poirier put forward the premise that 'War in the Victorian era had become more Bismarckian and less Napoleonic: that is, it had come to be thought of as brief, glorious and cheap.'<sup>80</sup> This description, although of the Victorian era, could equally be applied to the civilian perception of involvement in the new Edwardian army; brief, short-term service in crisis only; glorious, the feeling of riding to the defence of their homeland would appeal to many; and cheap - the price, not only in financial terms but also in the number of combat casualties, was always low, although not so to Britain's native adversaries.

The call for foreign service volunteers from the Militia and the Yeomanry brought civilians into contact with a war which, although demanding in manpower, did not produce a significantly high number of combat casualties – certainly not among the Yeomanry. While there was a high number of men who died as the result of disease, the number who died in combat or from wounds was relatively small, thus giving short-term military service the perception of being relatively risk free. It also established in the civilian mind the concept of 'short-term' or 'duration only' service. The Yeomanry

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<sup>80</sup> J. Q. Adams, & P. P. Poirier, *The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain 1900-18*. p. 51-2.

volunteered only for one year's service, in many instances serving considerably less, and in most cases were used in support roles, far from combat. It implanted the idea that voluntary service in time of the country's need was socially acceptable – military service was becoming a responsibility of the citizens. W J Reader states that

The raising of non-regular troops for South Africa, though an inadequate foretaste of the events of 1914, represented a major change in British attitudes, at home and in the colonies, to military service overseas. It was no longer eccentric for a civilian, in time of war, to become a temporary soldier. On the contrary, it was admirable. Formerly it had been entirely respectable for an able bodied man to stay at home while the regulars fought overseas. Nothing else indeed, was expected of him. After the Boer War, that was no longer true.<sup>81</sup>

The responsibility for imperial security was falling on the civilian population. Citizenship was seen to bring with it new responsibilities. The precedent was set that Volunteers, later the Territorial Force, were prepared to undertake temporary foreign service. This, in part, helped pave the way for the ready acceptance of foreign service in 1914, although not all were equally keen to sign up. While the Boer War created a new link between the army and the

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<sup>81</sup> W. J. Reader, *At Duty's Call : A Study in Obsolete Patriotism*, p. 15.

civilian it also had its down side in that such temporary service was expected to be of a short-term nature.

## **REGULAR ARMY**

The shortages of manpower and the changing view in the perceived areas of future conflicts prompted R. B. Haldane, War Minister 1905-1912, to initiate changes in both the size and structure of the army, within the limit of his £28 million budget. The army was deemed to be in need of change if it was to be of any value against a European foe and also to re-establish public confidence. Reforms came in three steps. The General Staff was created, but in its final form was mainly an administrative body: although it did participate to some extent in planning it fell short of the original proposals put forward by Lord Esher in 1904, as head of the reform committee. The second step was a direct result of the Boer War. The deployment of so many Imperial troops focused on the need for standardisation of equipment and training. The creation of an Imperial General Staff was intended to harmonise the various military components of the empire in the 'unlikely' event of a recurrence. The third reform was the formation of a British Expeditionary Force and the creation of a National Reserve. The regular army was reorganised into seven 'big' divisions, along continental lines, one cavalry and six infantry, 120,000 men in all. These divisions were designed to 'take account of a strong current of opinion already existing within the War Office to the effect that Britain needed an efficient striking force which might be used anywhere'<sup>82</sup> The

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<sup>82</sup> J. Gooch, 'Haldane and the National Army', in I. Beckett, and J. Gooch, eds, *Politicians and Defence: Studies in the Formation of British Defence Policy 1845-1970*. p. 75-9.

reserve consisted of the Yeomanry and Volunteers renamed the Territorial Force, part-time soldiers recruited for home service only. Haldane's original intention that they would be used as a 'top-up' force for the regular army was watered down. Individuals would not be sent overseas without giving their permission and signing the Imperial Service forms.

The reformed army was prepared for rapid mobilisation and deployment in the defence of British interests world-wide, while the Territorial Force would be mobilised to take over the defence of the homeland. Consolidation was designed to improve the efficiency of the army and at the same time limit expenditure. The reforms were intended to remove the 'amateur' ethos within the officer corps and proper training would produce a truly 'professional' force.<sup>83</sup>

Figure 2:1 shows the Scottish Command at the beginning of August 1914, totalling 5,231 officers and men scattered in twenty-five stations, ranging in size from Glasgow, the largest with 1,056 men, to Crieff, the smallest with a complement of two members of the Army Service Corps.

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<sup>83</sup> DeGroot, *Blighty*, p. 24-8.

**Fig 2:1 Scottish Command August 1914. Regular and Reserve Forces.**<sup>84</sup>

<b>Scottish Depot</b>	<b>Strength</b>
Aberdeen	140
Ayr	125
Barry Buddon	492
Berwick	111
Blackness	41
Broughty Ferry	11
Crieff	2
Dumfries	45
Dunbar	143
Edinburgh	935
Fort George	690
Glasgow	1056
Glencorse	126
Hamilton	317
Inverness	119
Invergordon	178
Irvine	8
Kilcreggan	5
Lanark	2
Montrose	196
Paisley	34
Perth	147
Stirling	194
Stobs	5
Various Stations	109
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5231</b>

Recruiting in pre-war Scotland was under the supervision of the General Officer Commanding the Scottish Command. The Scottish Command, for recruiting purposes, was divided into two separate districts, #1 District (Highland), and #2 District (Lowland). In all there were twelve recruiting districts covering the United Kingdom, two in Scotland, two in Ireland, and eight in England and Wales. The two Scottish districts were further divided into regimental recruiting areas, five in each district, plus the three major Scottish cities which were designated as recruiting areas in their own right. The first (Highland) district contained Perth, Fort George, Inverness, Aberdeen, and Stirling, while the second (Lowland) district consisted of

<sup>84</sup> *General Annual report of the British Army for the year ending 30 September 1914.*

Glencorse, Ayr, Berwick, and Hamilton (Hamilton having two regimental recruiting areas). Of the three major cities, Dundee was in #1 district with Glasgow and Edinburgh in #2 district. This gave Scotland a total of thirteen recruiting areas.<sup>85</sup> The concept of regimental recruiting areas was intended to create an image of local ties between a particular regiment and a specific geographical area, for example - Perth and the Black Watch, Aberdeen and the Gordon Highlanders. Over a period of time, as more of the local males enlisted, it was hoped that the regiments would eventually become representative of the recruiting areas. While the regimental areas were designed to stimulate recruits for the local infantry regiments, the three city recruiting areas were intended to provide recruits for those military units which did not have a regional recruiting base; engineers, artillery, etc.

This concept appears to have worked quite well, with only one or two minor exceptions. By 1911, Fort George, Inverness, Aberdeen, Glencorse, Ayr, and Berwick were producing over 70 per cent of their recruits for the regiment assigned to the local recruiting area, while Dundee, Glasgow and Edinburgh were enlisting between 80 and 90 per cent of their recruits for other units. These cities provided a higher proportion of skilled recruits who were more willing to enter the technical branches of the army, at a higher rate of pay. The exceptions to this policy were Perth, Stirling and Hamilton which provided a lower number of recruits for the local units, between 40 and 60 per cent.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> J.M. Osbourne, *The Voluntary Recruiting Movement in Britain, 1914-1916*, p 3-10.

<sup>86</sup> *General Annual report of the British Army for the year ending 30 September 1911*.

This can be explained by the composition of the towns, which, while not totally industrial, still carried a fair number of skilled men for the local textile and engineering industries.

The pre-war Scottish recruiting records show not only Scotland's position within the United Kingdom but also the position of the various recruiting districts within the country. Within the United Kingdom, Scotland maintained second position in the number of recruits raised annually for the regular army. This said, the trend had been downward in the run-up to 1914, with the numbers fluctuating between 11.5 per cent and 9.3 per cent of the United Kingdom total in the period 1905 to 1911. This downward trend was also mirrored in the levels of Irish, Welsh, and English recruiting during the same period. The slack created by the drop in recruiting figures was more than covered by the reduction in the strength of the regular army over the same period, so much so that the percentage of English recruitment increased from 75.7 per cent in 1905 to 79.7 per cent in 1911.<sup>87</sup>

**Fig 2:2 Number of recruits per country for the British army 1905 – 1911.<sup>88</sup>**

**Shown as number of men raised in each region.**

	<b>1905</b>	<b>1906</b>	<b>1907</b>	<b>1908</b>	<b>1909</b>	<b>1910</b>	<b>1911</b>
<b>English districts</b>	25993	27622	25853	27662	25878	20275	22956
<b>Welsh districts</b>	1321	1125	841	744	603	444	600
<b>Scottish districts</b>	3842	3781	3873	4207	3241	2723	2686
<b>Irish districts</b>	3166	2739	2949	3265	2727	2069	2549
<b>Total</b>	34322	35267	33516	35878	32449	25511	28791

<sup>87</sup> *General Annual Report, 1911.*

<sup>88</sup> *General Annual Report, 1909. 1910. 1911.*

**Fig 2:3 Percentage of recruits per country for the British army 1905 – 1911.<sup>89</sup>**

	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911
<b>English districts</b>	75.73	78.32	77.13	77.10	79.74	79.47	79.73
<b>Welsh districts</b>	3.84	3.18	2.50	2.07	1.85	1.74	2.08
<b>Scottish districts</b>	11.19	10.72	11.55	11.72	9.98	10.67	9.32
<b>Irish districts</b>	9.22	7.76	8.79	9.10	8.40	8.11	8.85

As could be expected the figures showing the various nationalities within the British army in the pre-war years reflect the change in recruitment figures. As recruitment in Scotland had fallen so too had the level of Scottish representation within the British army. The same applied for Ireland and Wales. English representation however was rising despite the falling recruitment numbers in England. This was also due to the reduction in the strength of the regular army. The British army was becoming less representative of Britain and more representative of England. Between 1905 and 1911 the Scottish component fell from 8 per cent (20,388) to 7.8 per cent (18,581), the Irish from 10.9 per cent (27,785) to 9.19 per cent (21,860), while the Welsh contingent fell from 1.78 per cent (4,553) to 1.29 per cent (3,075). In the same period total army strength fell from 254,748 to 237,722.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>89</sup> *General Annual Report, 1909. 1910. 1911.*

<sup>90</sup> *General Annual Report, 1905 – 1911.*

**Fig 2:4 Number and percentage of nationalities in the British army 1905 – 1911.<sup>91</sup>**

	English		Welsh		Scottish		Irish		Total
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	
<b>1905</b>	190192	74.65	4553	1.75	20388	8.0	27785	10.9	254748
<b>1906</b>	187235	76.11	4151	1.68	19766	8.03	25397	10.32	245978
<b>1907</b>	178240	76.77	3588	1.54	18129	7.8	22836	9.83	232154
<b>1908</b>	181496	77.09	3437	1.46	18480	7.85	23158	9.83	235409
<b>1909</b>	183702	77.44	3240	1.36	18530	7.81	22955	9.67	237205
<b>1910</b>	184054	77.82	3061	1.29	18581	7.85	22237	9.4	236496
<b>1911</b>	185666	78.10	3075	1.29	18581	7.81	21860	9.19	237722

The composition of the various Scottish infantry regiments reflected the change in the composition of the British Army . If we take the census year of 1891 as an example, in eight regiments - Royal Scots, Highland Light Infantry, Cameron Highlanders, Gordon Highlanders, Cameronians, Seaforth Highlanders, Black Watch, and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - the proportion of Scots rank and file was only 61.5 per cent, with 32.9 per cent English and 4.3 per cent Irish.<sup>92</sup>

Within Scotland a steady pattern of recruitment emerged. As could be expected, the two major cities, Glasgow and Edinburgh, topped the league table of recruits for the years 1905 – 1911 (fig 2:5). The inclusion of Perth, a predominantly agricultural town, in constant third position can be explained by the presence of the regimental headquarters of the Black Watch, and the prominent position of the regimental barracks, centrally located and next to the local market place. There was also a high proportion of agricultural labour enlisting in the pre-war years, all the more important since agricultural

<sup>91</sup> *General Annual Report, 1905 – 1911.*

<sup>92</sup> A. R. Skelley, *The Victorian Army At Home.* p. 333.

employment in Scotland had reduced to only 10 per cent of the population by 1911. Fort George and Inverness were at the other end of the scale, in terms of recruitment numbers, but this could reasonably be expected for two reasons. The first is the scarcity and widespread distribution of the highland population. The agricultural nature of employment and subsistence crofting meant that there was no discernible surplus of labour available, or willing, to join the regular army. The second reason could be explained by population movement. By the start of the twentieth century it had become the custom in the highlands that any surplus manpower which did emerge would migrate or emigrate in search of employment.<sup>93</sup>

If we use the 1911 census as a reference point we can see that a straight comparison of the recruitment figures alone gives us a false impression as to which areas of Scotland were producing recruits, whereas, a comparison with the population figures shows quite a different picture.

**Fig 2:5 Scottish recruiting areas listed by male population.**

**Regular recruits in relation to regional male population.<sup>94</sup>**

1911	Male population	Regular recruits	% of pop'
<b>Berwick</b>	14192	98	0.69
<b>Inverness</b>	42440	48	0.11
<b>Perth</b>	58364	311	0.53
<b>Stirling</b>	82335	167	0.2
<b>Dundee (Forfar)</b>	126638	298	0.23
<b>Ayr</b>	130196	83	0.06
<b>Aberdeen</b>	147357	187	0.12
<b>Edinburgh</b>	235427	590	0.25
<b>Glasgow (Lanark)</b>	721369	575	0.07

<sup>93</sup> J.M.Brock, *The Mobile Scot: A Study of Emigration and Migration 1861-1911*. p. 23-38.

<sup>94</sup> *General Annual Report, 1911. Census 1911.*

If we compare the number of recruits against male population we see that those areas with a high numerical figure gave a low proportional figure. Inverness, with 48 recruits actually gave a higher proportion of its male population than Glasgow (Lanark) with 575 recruits. Proportionately, Inverness was producing more recruits than the major cities.

As we have already seen there is a popular belief that those who enlisted in the regular army were beyond regard. This was however not the case in reality. The recruiting returns for Scotland in the years immediately prior to 1914 show that, while a fair proportion of new recruits were 'undesirables', they were by no means in the majority. By 1910 some 58 per cent of those recruits being accepted in Scotland were skilled or professional in some capacity, with another 18.5 per cent being classed as industrial or agricultural labourers. The 23 per cent classed by the army as 'general casuals' were without doubt what were seen as the dregs of society, unable even to obtain a labourer's position.<sup>95</sup> In comparison with these figures The numbers for the United Kingdom were, 25 per cent skilled or professional, 24 per cent industrial or agricultural labourers, and 24.6 per cent general casuals. The figures for Ireland were, 13.6 per cent skilled or professional, 36 per cent industrial or agricultural labourers, and 26 per cent general casuals. The figures for England and Wales were, 25.7 per cent skilled or professional, 22.5 per cent industrial or agricultural labourers, and 24.4 per cent general casuals.<sup>96</sup> These figures clearly show the high percentage of skilled or

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<sup>95</sup> *General Annual Report of the British Army for the year ending 30 September 1910.*

<sup>96</sup> *General Annual Report of the British Army for the year ending 30 September 1910.*

professional recruits enlisting in Scotland - more than twice that of the other parts of the United Kingdom.

With such a high percentage of professional, skilled, and semi-skilled recruits, it would seem that, in Scotland at least, the popular image of the British army as the last refuge of the Victorian under-classes was perceived rather than actual. Who then in Scotland were those enlisting in the new post-Haldane army? Figure 2:6 shows that the highest proportion of recruits came from the skilled workforce. Edward Spiers touches on this point in his article 'The regular Army in 1914' which is, in part, an examination of the 1st battalion, Black Watch, in the period post Boer War and pre-1914, finding that the largest proportion of recruits came from 'the ranks of skilled labour'.<sup>97</sup> Miners, who were perhaps among the highest wage earners, the social elite of the working class, were surprisingly the highest group of skilled recruits. In 1911 they accounted for over 12 per cent of the total number of Scottish recruits, while agricultural and industrial labourers in the same year accounted for 9.94 per cent and 12.82 per cent respectively.<sup>98</sup>

One reasonable assumption for the higher numbers of skilled and professional recruits is that they, by virtue of lengthy training periods and apprenticeships, were used to looking at life in the long term while those who lived day to day, the 'casuals', looked upon life only in the short term. Consequently, while needing the stability and relief that the army could

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<sup>97</sup> E. M. Spiers, 'The Regular Army in 1914' in I. Beckett and K. Simpson, *A Nation in Arms*. p. 53.

<sup>98</sup> *General Annual Report, 1909. 1910. 1911.*

provide in times of hardship the 'casuals' were unwilling to commit themselves to a minimum of seven years service with the colours.

**Fig 2:6 Employment numbers and percentages of Scottish recruits for the British army 1909 – 1911.<sup>99</sup>**

	1909		1910		1911	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
<b>Skilled &amp; Professional</b>	1805	56.67	1591	58.32	1591	55.90
<b>Industrial Labourers</b>	315	9.89	216	7.91	365	12.82
<b>Agricultural Labourers</b>	266	8.35	290	10.63	283	9.94
<b>Casuals</b>	799	25.08	631	23.13	607	21.32
<b>Miners</b>	277	9.01	264	9.67	349	12.26
<b>Textile</b>	117	3.67	121	4.43	225	7.9
<b>Total</b>	3185		2728		2846	

The skilled trades were broken down by the army into the following categories. Bricklayers, carpenters, plasterers, plumbers, painters, polishers, masons, slaters, barbers, bakers, butchers, coopers, cabinet makers, coachbuilders, mechanics, printers, sawyers, saddle and harness makers, shoemakers, smiths, riveters and fitters, upholsterers, watchmakers, tailors, engineers, engine drivers, and coal miners.<sup>100</sup> The list of professions was – actors, chemists, dentists, draughtsmen, electricians, engineers, farmers, musicians, photographers, policemen, schoolmasters, students, law, medical, surveyors, seamen, and telegraphists.<sup>101</sup>

<sup>99</sup> *General Annual Report, 1909. 1910. 1911.*

<sup>100</sup> *General Annual Report of the British Army for the year ending 30 September 1910.*

<sup>101</sup> *General Annual Report of the British Army for the year ending 30 September 1910.*

Another high source of recruits was the textile industry, a traditionally female dominated industry which, at first sight, should not have produced a surplus of manpower. In his study of the Dundee jute industry G Oliver states that 'In 1905, about 51 per cent of the persons employed in the Dundee jute industry were women above 20 years of age, 22 per cent were girls under 20, 11 per cent boys under 20, and only 16 per cent were men'.<sup>102</sup>

It was quite common in Dundee, at that time, for the women and children of the house to be the providers while the husbands stayed at home, and this led to the westward migration of young males from the region to find employment in industrial areas such as Lanark. Oliver further asserts that 'Youths of 17 and 18 were thrown out of work and their places given to younger persons. Many of those displaced...found themselves unable to obtain other employment, and had to leave Dundee or develop into loafers'.<sup>103</sup>

The production of this unexpected pool of manpower was a deliberate by-product of the Scottish textile industry. It was normal industry practice for young male employees to be laid off when reaching the age of 18 or 19, an age of considerable wage increase. There was always a plentiful supply of younger, cheaper males eager to take their place, ensuring that Dundee had a higher than average pre-war recruitment level. B Lenman supports this idea asserting that

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<sup>102</sup> G. Oliver, *The Dundee Jute Industry 1828 – 1928*, p 33-4.

<sup>103</sup> G. Oliver, *The Dundee Jute Industry*, p 112-3

In August 1914 Dundee was a city which even by British standards sent an exceptional number of ex-regular reservists to the colours. It was a glowing tribute to the recruiting effect of heavy unemployment and grinding poverty, the more so because the Boer War period had seen a higher percentage of Dundee volunteers rejected on grounds of physical unfitness than was the case in even the worst districts of industrial Lancashire.<sup>104</sup>

A. R. Skelley argues that the age of those enlisting for the army in Scotland had dramatically changed throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1851, although not all were Scottish, some 65.1 per cent of soldiers in Scotland were between the age of seventeen and twenty-five. By 1891 that figure had risen to 85.3 per cent. In 1851 over 47 per cent were in the twenty to twenty-five age group, a figure which dropped to 40.4 per cent in 1891, while the figure of 17.8 per cent for those in the seventeen to nineteen group rose dramatically to 44.9 per cent in 1891.<sup>105</sup> This supports the idea that as industrialisation increased and young males were exploited and displaced in the pursuit of profit, the army was in a position to benefit from this surplus of youth.

The Boer War had shown a high rejection rate among the volunteers. The 1911 rejection rate for Scottish recruits shows that 22.24 per cent were still unfit to serve in the British army. Among the Scottish volunteers, 814 of the

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<sup>104</sup> B. Lenman, *An Economic History*. p. 201.

<sup>105</sup> A. R. Skelley, *The Victorian Army At Home*, p. 324-8.

3,658 who presented themselves for enlistment were rejected. Among the skilled and professional the rejection rate was 21.7 per cent, while among the labourers the rejection rate was 22.9 per cent. The casuals had a rate of 29.9 per cent but this could be broken down into two separate groups; the town casuals had a rate of 30.24 per cent while the country casuals had a slightly lower rate of 24.5 per cent. Miners had a rejection rate of 18.8 per cent, rather high considering the strenuous nature of their occupation. Bakers, who if nothing else would be able to maintain a reasonable diet, had a rate of 23.9 per cent, and higher still were the blacksmiths who had a rate of 26.1 per cent. Both the bakers and the blacksmiths had a rate higher than that of labourers. More important still is the figure of 13.1 per cent for the agricultural labourers, a relatively low level of rejection and a reflection of the healthier work environment.<sup>106</sup>

## **TERRITORIAL FORCE**

Alongside the changes to the regular army, possibly the most severe and far reaching changes in the Haldane reforms involved the creation of the Territorial Force. Created from the existing Volunteer and Yeomanry units, it caused some concern at local association level. From its introduction in 1908 the Territorial Army had great difficulty in maintaining sufficient numbers to fulfil its intended primary role of home defence and its secondary role of 'topping up' the regular battalions in time of conflict.

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<sup>106</sup> *General Annual Report, 1909. 1910. 1911.*

**Fig 2:7 Scottish Territorial Force Battalions 1913.**<sup>107</sup>

<b>Regiment</b>	<b>Territorial battalions</b>
Royal Scots	7
Highland Light Infantry	5
Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders	5
Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)	4
Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)	4
Gordon Highlanders	4
Seaforth Highlanders	3
Royal Scots Fusiliers	2
King's Own Scottish Borderers	2
Cameron Highlanders	1

As we have seen in Chapter One emigration was rising in pre-war years. Of those leaving the Lovat Scouts between May 1911 and July 1914, over 60 per cent gave the reason for leaving as emigration.<sup>108</sup> The Lovat Scouts were not alone in losing men in this fashion. At the same time over 75 per cent of those leaving the Territorial battalions of the Gordon Highlanders were doing so to emigrate.<sup>109</sup> In 1911 the Territorial Force in Scotland had an establishment of 54,619 but was at a strength of only 45,065, a shortfall of 9,554 or 17.5 per cent. The United Kingdom as a whole had an establishment of some 290,161 but was only able to provide a strength of 245,065, a shortfall of some 45,096 men or 15.55 per cent. Scotland with 18.8 per cent of the United Kingdom establishment met only 18.3 per cent of the United Kingdom strength. By 1913 the shortfall in Scotland had increased. With an establishment of 54,707 and a strength of only 41,746 Scotland had a shortfall of 12,961 or 23.7 per

<sup>107</sup> The Annual Return of the Territorial Force for the year 1913. Cd 7254. (1914)

<sup>108</sup> Records of Inverness, Ross & Cromarty, Sutherland County Association Joint Committee, Lovat Scouts, March 1911 – July 1914. Scottish Record Office MD 8/38.

<sup>109</sup> Records of the Territorial Force Association of the County of the City of Aberdeen. November 1913 – October 1917. Scottish Record Office. MD 4/63.

cent, a 26 per cent decrease overall. To illustrate this point, the 5th, 6th and 7th battalions, Gordon Highlanders gained 301 recruits between November 1912 and July 1913, but lost 573 members in the same period, a reduction of 272. This, when added to their previous shortfall, produced a total shortfall of 671. Although this shortfall was gradually reduced over the next year, by 10 August 1914, six days after the outbreak of hostilities, there was still a deficit of 337 within the combined battalions.<sup>110</sup>

Between 1901 and 1911, there were approximately 127,000 male emigrants from Scotland, 5.5 per cent of the male population.<sup>111</sup> This migration was seen as preferable to enlistment. With the speed of passage and the low cost of steerage fares many emigrants were leaving for only two or three years before returning. This short-term 'foreign service' in time of economic hardship was preferable to seven years army service. Any apparent reluctance in Scotland for military service was only displayed towards the regular army since those areas with the lowest recruitment numbers for the regular army had the highest percentage of male population in the Territorial Army. A comparison of figures 2:5 and 2:8 shows that those areas which boasted the highest recruitment numbers for the regular army also had among the lowest percentage rates for the Territorial Army.

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<sup>110</sup> Scottish Record Office, MD 4/63.

<sup>111</sup> J.Brock. *The Mobile Scot*. p. 328. M. Flinn et al, *Scottish Population History from the Seventeenth Century to the 1930s*. p. 441.

**Fig 2:8 Territorial strength in relation to regional male population.**<sup>112</sup>

1911	Male Population	T. F. strength	% of male pop'
Perth	58364	1379	2.36
Inverness	42440	1641	3.86
Aberdeen	147357	4152	2.81
Stirling	82335	669	0.81
Dundee (Forfar)	126638	2588	2.04
Ayr	130196	2339	1.79
Berwick	14192	285	2.0
Glasgow (Lanark)	721369	12047	1.67
Edinburgh	235427	5314	2.25

Figure 2:8 gives a total figure for Scotland of 1.3 per cent of the male population serving in the Territorial force, 30,414 men. The figure for England and Wales was 1.1 per cent of the male population, 199,020 men.<sup>113</sup>

When we look at Scottish membership of the Territorial Army, figure 2:8 shows that Inverness, with 3.86 per cent of its population in the Territorial Force has a higher rate of recruits than the major Scottish cities: Aberdeen had 2.81 per cent of its population in the Territorial Force, Dundee had 2.04 per cent, Edinburgh had 2.25 per cent and Glasgow had the low figure of 1.67 per cent membership. Jeanette Brock argues that by the later part of the nineteenth century in some highland areas part-time military service was seen as a convenient method of seasonal employment which provided a supplementary income.<sup>114</sup> While this refers to the Militia in the period up to 1907, there is no reason to think that, to some extent at least, it would not also apply to service in the new Territorial Force. The thrifty highlander was

<sup>112</sup> *General Annual Report, 1911. Census 1911.* C. Lee, *British Regional Employment Statistics 1841-1971.*

<sup>113</sup> *General Annual Report, 1911. Census 1911*

<sup>114</sup> J. M. Brock, 'The Militia : An Aspect of Highland Temporary Migration 1871 – 1907', in *Northern Scotland*, The journal of the Centre for Scottish Studies, University of Aberdeen.

never slow to spot an opportunity to supplement income. The changes put in place by Haldane, designed to placate county associations and stimulate recruitment to the new Territorial Force, had little or no effect in Scotland. Scotland had a natural level of enlistment and, out-with the fluctuations of employment and population, no great change took place.

By 1914, at the outbreak of war, Scotland had a Territorial Force which included thirty-seven infantry battalions, affiliated to the ten Scottish infantry regiments, and numerous engineer, medical, field artillery, and garrison units. Not every regiment was able to give the same contribution to the Territorial Force but this was, in the main, due to the lack of available local manpower. Those regiments whose recruiting area fell within an urban, or industrial, area provided, individually, a greater number of Territorial battalions. However, Territorial recruitment in Scotland was not simply a matter of available numbers as by far the greater proportion of Territorial battalions came from rural areas. Almost 45 per cent of the Territorial infantry battalions came from rural or agricultural areas, some seventeen battalions out of a total of thirty seven, while twenty battalions recruited in industrial areas.<sup>115</sup> It would appear that Territorial Army recruitment, in Scotland at least, was not solely dependent on population density and distribution but also relied on cultural and social ties still firmly rooted in the old volunteer ethos.

Figure 2:9 shows the shortfall in strength of Scottish Territorial Force units in 1913. It gives the establishment and strength of each county. Scotland with

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<sup>115</sup> The Annual Return of the Territorial Force for the year 1913. Cd 7254. (1914)

an establishment of 54,707 and a strength of 41,746 was suffering a shortfall of 23.7 per cent or 12,961 men.

**Fig 2:9 Territorial Force establishment and strength of each county in October 1913.**<sup>116</sup>

Scottish County	Establishment	Strength	Shortfall	%
Aberdeen	2082	1447	635	30.4
Aberdeen, City of	2973	2163	810	27.2
Argyll	1495	1186	310	20.7
Ayr	3191	2329	862	27
Banff	529	464	65	12.2
Berwick	342	250	92	26.9
Bute	255	264	+9	+3.5
Caithness	479	437	42	8.8
Clackmannan	363	258	105	28.9
Dumbarton	1191	1047	144	12.1
Dumfries	635	557	78	12.3
Dundee, City of	2210	1466	744	33.7
Edinburgh, city of	6096	4496	1600	26.2
Elgin	1139	896	243	21.3
Fife	2070	1696	374	18.1
Forfar	1244	1004	240	19.3
Glasgow, City of	10377	7786	2591	25
Haddington	524	415	109	20.8
Inverness	2017	1603	414	20.5
Kincardine	517	39	478	92.5
Kinross	119	114	5	4.2
Kirkcudbright	507	342	165	32.5
Lanark	2969	2710	259	8.7
Linlithgow	503	504	+1	+0.2
Midlothian	1389	983	406	29.2
Nairn	68	65	3	4.4
Orkney	570	449	121	21.2
Peebles	242	182	60	24.8
Perth	1741	1267	474	27.2
Renfrew	2760	2354	406	14.7
Ross and Cromarty	1553	1086	467	30.1
Roxburgh	480	441	39	8.1
Selkirk	391	224	167	42.7
Stirling	774	590	184	23.8
Sutherland	673	473	200	29.7
Wigtown	239	159	80	33.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>54707</b>	<b>41746</b>	<b>12961</b>	<b>23.7</b>

<sup>116</sup> The Annual Return of the Territorial Force for the year 1913. Cd 7254. (1914)

These figures can be broken down by region. Highland Counties – (Argyll, Caithness, Inverness, Perth, Orkney, Ross & Cromarty, Sutherland) had an establishment of 8,528, a strength of 6,501 and a shortfall of 2,028 (23.8 per cent). Northeast – (Aberdeen, Banff, Elgin, Kincardine, Nairn) had an establishment of 7,308, a strength of 5,074 and a shortfall of 2,234 (30.5 per cent). West Lowlands – (Ayr, Bute, Dumbarton, Lanark, Renfrew) had an establishment of 20,743, a strength of 16,490 and a shortfall of 4,253 (20.5 per cent). East Lowlands – (Forfar (Angus), Clackmannan, Haddington, Fife, Kinross, Edinburgh, Stirling, Linlithgow) had an establishment of 15,292, a strength of 11,526 and a shortfall of 3,766 ( 24.6 per cent). Southern Counties – (Berwick, Dumfries, Kirkcudbright, Peebles, Roxburgh, Selkirk, Wigtown) had an establishment of 2,836, a strength of 2,155 and a shortfall of 681 (24 per cent).<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> The Annual Return of the Territorial Force for the year 1913. Cd 7254. (1914)

**FIG 2:10 Scottish Pre-War Territorial Battalions.<sup>118</sup>**

**Royal Scots**

4 <sup>th</sup> (Queen's Edinburgh Rifles) Bn	8 <sup>th</sup> (Pioneer) Bn
5 <sup>th</sup> (Queen's Edinburgh Rifles) Bn	9 <sup>th</sup> (Highlanders) Bn
6 <sup>th</sup> Bn	10 <sup>th</sup> (Cyclists) Bn
7 <sup>th</sup> Bn	

**Royal Scots Fusiliers**

4 <sup>th</sup> Bn	11 <sup>th</sup> Garrison Bn
5 <sup>th</sup> Bn	12 <sup>th</sup> (Ayr and Lanark Yeomanry) Bn

**Highland Light Infantry**

5 <sup>th</sup> (City of Glasgow) Bn	8 <sup>th</sup> (Lanark) Bn
6 <sup>th</sup> (City of Glasgow) Bn	9 <sup>th</sup> (Glasgow Highland) Bn
7 <sup>th</sup> (Blythswood) Bn	

**Cameron Highlanders**

4<sup>th</sup> Bn  
10<sup>th</sup> (Lovat Scouts) Bn

**Seaforth Highlanders**

4<sup>th</sup> (Ross Highland) Bn  
5<sup>th</sup> (Sutherland and Caithness Highland) Bn  
6<sup>th</sup> (Morayshire) Bn

**Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders**

5 <sup>th</sup> (Renfrewshire) Bn	8 <sup>th</sup> (The Argyllshire) Bn
6 <sup>th</sup> (Renfrewshire) Bn	9 <sup>th</sup> (The Dumbartonshire) Bn
7 <sup>th</sup> Bn	

**The Gordon Highlanders**

4 <sup>th</sup> (City of Aberdeen) Bn	7 <sup>th</sup> (Deeside Highland) Bn
5 <sup>th</sup> (Buchan and Formartin) Bn	The Shetland Companies Lerwick and
6 <sup>th</sup> (Banff and Donside) Bn	Scalloway

**Cameronians**

5 <sup>th</sup> Bn	7 <sup>th</sup> Bn
6 <sup>th</sup> (Lanarkshire) Bn Pioneer	8 <sup>th</sup> Bn

**King's Own Scottish Borderers**

4 <sup>th</sup> Bn	5 <sup>th</sup> Bn
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**The Black Watch**

4 <sup>th</sup> (City of Dundee) Bn	6 <sup>th</sup> (Perthshire) Bn
5 <sup>th</sup> (Angus and Dundee) Bn	7 <sup>th</sup> (Fife) Bn

<sup>118</sup> The Annual Return of the Territorial Force for the year 1913. Cd 7254. (1914)

The Royal Scots, with their recruiting centred on Edinburgh and The Lothians, provided seven Territorial battalions; the highest number for a Scottish regiment. However, the Royal Scots battalions demonstrate that there were clear divisions within the Scottish Territorial system. Four of those battalions were centred in Edinburgh itself, the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 9th, and were seen very much as middle class bastions. The fourth battalion contained companies reflecting the occupations of those in its ranks; civil servants, clerks, teachers, students, post office employees and 'gentlemen of leisure'. The 5th battalion was recognised as the domain of the former pupils of George Heriot's, an independent school, while those former pupils of the school's arch rival, George Watson's, enlisted in the 9th battalion, the only Royal Scots battalion to wear the kilt and earning for itself in the process the nickname 'the dandy ninth'. While Edinburgh had its fair share of working class, particularly in the large scale brewing and printing industries, Ian Wood states that in Edinburgh 'there was a far higher proportion of the population employed in professional, financial and legal services', and that 'territorial recruitment was, in a real sense, an extension of this social structure'.<sup>119</sup> He goes on to explain that

Many of these young enthusiasts were lawyers, accountants or employed in banks and insurance companies and eligible for commissions through their education and often service in their school

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<sup>119</sup> I. Wood, 'The Royal Scots Territorial Battalions', in Macdonald and McFarland. eds. p. 107.

cadet forces. However, there was a limit to the number of officers needed, thus many of them served happily in the ranks or as NCOs.<sup>120</sup>

The seventh battalion was more industrialised, coming as it did from Leith and containing several hundred dock and shipyard workers, as well as a large number of miners from the East Lothian coalfield. The remaining two battalions were raised from the rural Lothians, the tenth based in Linlithgow, and the eighth, based in Haddington, recruiting from East and Mid Lothian. Thus the city battalions were seen as middle class, while the rural, or county, battalions were more representative of the Scottish population as a whole.

The Highland Light Infantry on the other hand provided five territorial battalions, four of which were recruited in Glasgow and based on middle class city professions and one of which was based in industrial Lanark. The four Cameronian territorial battalions were similar in makeup to those of the Highland Light Infantry and recruited in exactly the same places; three in Glasgow and one in Lanark. There were six other Territorial battalions in Scotland which could be defined as industrial or urban-based. The 4th and 5th battalions of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, based in Ayr, and the 4th battalion Black Watch, based in Dundee. The remaining three were the 5th, 6th, and 9th battalions, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The Argylls, while ostensibly a highland regiment, recruited in the industrialised central belt. The fifth and sixth battalions recruited in Renfrew, while the ninth battalion recruited in Dumbarton.

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<sup>120</sup> I. Wood, 'The Royal Scots'. in Macdonald and McFarland. eds. p. 108.

This gives the total number of Territorial battalions in Scotland which could reasonably be classified as industrial or urban related or having industrial or urban roots as twenty, or 55 per cent of a total of thirty seven. The industrial areas from which these battalions recruited contained approximately 46 per cent of the Scottish male population. The remaining seventeen battalions, 45 per cent of the total, were based mainly in rural or agricultural areas containing approximately 54 per cent of the Scottish male population.

**Fig 2:11 The Territorial Strength for Counties 1912 in numerical order.**<sup>121</sup>

<b>1912</b>	
<b>Fife</b>	1796
<b>Aberdeen</b>	2241
<b>Renfrew</b>	2342
<b>Ayr</b>	2454
<b>Lanark</b>	2880
<b>Edinburgh</b>	4832
<b>Glasgow</b>	8701

The number of men in Fife who were in the Territorial Army had increased over the previous years while the numbers for Glasgow, Renfrew, Edinburgh, and Aberdeen had declined. Of the thirty-seven county associations, Fife was in the top seven along with arguably at least five of the most industrialised counties in Scotland.<sup>122</sup>

John Baynes gives valuable reasons why there was a discrepancy between rural and urban rates of recruitment for the Territorial Force and for the

<sup>121</sup> *The Annual Return of the Territorial Army for the year 1912.* HMSO, Cmd 6657.

<sup>122</sup> *The Annual Report of the Territorial Army for the year 1910, 1911, 1912.* HMSO, Cmd 5482, Cmd 6066, Cmd 6657.

Yeomanry in particular. He states that while the Yeomanry was perceived by some as

a comic body: it was also regarded with admiration by those in rural areas who looked up to its members because of their social standing, and with fear and hatred in radical, urban circles where it was remembered for its record in the suppression of political assemblies and riots.<sup>123</sup>

**FIG 2:12 Scottish Pre-War Yeomanry.**

Ayrshire (Earl of Carrick's Own) Yeomanry  
Fife and Forfar Yeomanry  
Lanarkshire Yeomanry  
Lanarkshire (Queen's Own Royal Glasgow) Yeomanry  
Lothian and Border Horse  
Lovat Scouts  
Scottish Horse

Scotland's seven Yeomanry regiments saw action in, or were raised as a direct consequence of, the Boer War. During the Boer War the 17th company of the 16th Imperial Yeomanry was comprised of volunteers from both the Ayrshire and Lanarkshire Yeomanry, while the Lothians and Border Horse contingent formed the 19th company of the Imperial Scottish Yeomanry. While not providing enough volunteers on their own to form a complete company, the Queen's Own Royal Glasgow Yeomanry and the Fife and

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<sup>123</sup> J. Baynes, p. 131.

Forfar Yeomanry nevertheless both provided men for the Imperial Scottish Yeomanry.

The Lovat Scouts, along with the Scottish Horse, were created expressly for service in the Boer War. The regiment was originally formed in 1900 as Lovat's Scouts and consisted primarily of stalkers and gamekeepers in an effort to neutralise the field-craft skills of the Boers. The Scottish Horse was raised in 1900 during the Boer War in South Africa by the Marquis of Tullibardine who, at the request of Lord Kitchener, had agreed to raise the original regiment of Scottish Horse comprised from ex-patriate Scots living in Africa. Tullibardine followed this up by raising a second regiment in 1901, comprised this time of volunteers from the Highland Society of London and the Caledonian Society of Melbourne. At the conclusion of the Boer War the two regiments of Scottish Horse were left in South Africa as local yeomanry, its members being given parcels of land as a reward for their service. In 1903 Tullibardine was asked to raise the Scottish Horse afresh in Scotland and in that year the first regiment was raised in Perthshire, while the following year, 1904, the second regiment was raised from Aberdeenshire, Elgin, Nairn and Argyllshire.

In pre-war Scotland there were several clearly defined reasons for membership of the Territorial Force. In the mainly industrial regions it was seen as a break from a squalid and unhealthy lifestyle; the summer camp was looked upon as a holiday for groups of friends or family members. In the far north it was seen as a subsidiary wage, part of an annual income derived

from a variety of sources.<sup>124</sup> To many, the Territorial Army was seen, as were its predecessors, as a break from the tedium of Edwardian life and a chance for a paid holiday in the summer.

B. C. Croucher, in his thesis, states that once the Territorial Force was established

thousands of workers enlisted, thereby continuing the tradition of part-time soldiering which had helped to sustain the old Volunteer Force. Evidently, these men had no political objection to service in the new home defence army, but it is significant that the motives for enlistment of working class Territorials show that many were inspired not by patriotism but by a desire for recreation, the offer of financial and other rewards and the prospect of a paid holiday in camp.<sup>125</sup>

Some like Hugh McIntyre, a ships caulker at Brown's of Clydebank, 'joined the Terriers simply to get a holiday down at Campbeltown'.<sup>126</sup> Bill Hanlan, a miner from Dalkeith who joined the 8th battalion Royal Scots, explained in greater detail, stating

Well, we joined the Territorials because we never had a holiday, we never could afford a holiday very well, acordin' to the wages at that

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<sup>124</sup> J. Brock, 'The Militia: An Aspect of Highland Temporary Migration 1871-1907' in *Northern Scotland*. Vol 17, 1997.

<sup>125</sup> B.C. Croucher. *British Working Class Attitudes to War and National Defence 1902-14*. Unpublished PhD. University of Swansea, 1992. p 1151.

<sup>126</sup> I. MacDougall, *Voices From War*. p. 99.

time. Aye, men joined the Territorials for that purpose. That was the idea. It wis always in July, when the pit holidays wis on, that we went. We went for two weeks. And if ye had tae stay over and above the two weeks ye got yer pay that ye had at yer work. Ye always got paid full up, ye never lost anything.<sup>127</sup>

In the lowland farming belt such part-time military service was seen as part of rural life. The volunteer associations, forerunners to the Territorial Force, had been raised and led by the local gentry, landowners, or industrialists and consisted to a large extent of their employees. The Territorial Force simply carried on the tradition. Some joined, then as now, because the idea of martial behaviour held an appeal or fascination for them, but they neither wished nor could afford to adopt such a lifestyle permanently. Some joined the Territorial Force in order to experience some elements of the military lifestyle before enlisting in the regular army, while some joined because to do so might be an advantage in their civilian life. But no matter what the reason, they all served to promote a regional loyalty to a particular unit.

The nature of the Territorial Force unconsciously assisted in the development of a localised loyalty in as much as the loyalty of an individual might not be primarily to a regional battalion or regiment but to a local company within a larger unit. The fact that the Territorial Force retained the eight company system, discarded by the regular army in the wake of the Haldane reforms, allowed individual companies to be recruited from smaller villages and areas

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<sup>127</sup> I. MacDougall, *Voices From War*. p. 13

with a low population. Peter Simkins states that 'Many first-line Territorial units and, before them, Volunteer battalions had contained whole companies of men drawn from the same community or work place. Indeed, it can be argued that the Volunteer and Territorial Forces had been built on that very foundation'.<sup>128</sup>

The expanse of Territorial influence in Scotland can be seen in the number of Yeomanry and Territorial stations and drill halls scattered throughout the country (appendix 1). The Yeomanry regiments had 229 drill stations across Scotland: Ayrshire Yeomanry - 4; Fife and Forfar Yeomanry - 17; Lanarkshire Yeomanry - 21; Lanarkshire (Queen's Own Royal Glasgow) Yeomanry - 3; Lothian and Borders - 41; Lovat Scouts - 70; Scottish Horse - 73. The Infantry regiments were represented by 491 drill halls and drill stations. The Royal Scots had 49 drill stations; The Royal Scots Fusiliers 30 drill stations; The King's Own Scottish Borderers 42 stations; The Scottish Rifles (Cameronians) 11 stations The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) 56 stations; The Highland Light Infantry 24 drill stations; The Seaforth Highlanders 71 stations; The Gordon Highlanders 82 stations; plus 2 independent companies. The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders had only one territorial battalion with 37 drill stations; The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had 81 stations; The Highland Cyclist Battalion 8 drill stations. With a total of 720 potential contact points throughout the country there was hardly a village in Scotland that did not have some form of territorial connection. To confirm what has already

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<sup>128</sup> P. Simkins. *Kitchener's Army*. p. 82-3.

been discussed in this chapter we can see that those territorial battalions which are classed as rural had the greater number of drill stations.

**FIG 2:13 Territorial Drill Stations<sup>129</sup>**

Regiment	Rural Battalions	Drill Stations	Urban Battalions	Drill Stations
<b>Royal Scots</b>	8 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	23	4 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	1
	10 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	20	5 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	1
			6 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	1
			7 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	2
			9 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	1
<b>Royal Scots Fusiliers</b>			4 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	15
			5 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	15
<b>Black Watch</b>	5 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	13	4 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	1
	6 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	24		
	7 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	18		
<b>Highland Light Infantry</b>			5 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	1
			6 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	1
			7 <sup>th</sup> battalion	1
			8 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	20
			9 <sup>th</sup> battalion	1
<b>Scottish Rifles</b>			5 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	1
			6 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	8
			7 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	1
			8 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	1
<b>Argyll &amp; Sutherland Highlanders</b>	7 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	18	5 <sup>th</sup> battalion	4
	8 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	41	6 <sup>th</sup> battalion	6
			9 <sup>th</sup> battalion	12
<b>King's Own Scottish Borderers</b>	4 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	19		
	5 <sup>th</sup> battalion	23		
<b>Seaforth Highlanders</b>	4 <sup>th</sup> battalion	29		
	5 <sup>th</sup> battalion	24		
	6 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	18		
<b>Gordon Highlanders</b>	4 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	1		
	5 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	26		
	6 <sup>th</sup> battalion	28		
	7 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	25		
<b>Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders</b>	4 <sup>th</sup> battalion	37		
<b>Highland Cyclist Brigade</b>		8		
		<b>394</b>		<b>94</b>

<sup>129</sup> Appendix 1

With the rural population scattered the need was for large numbers of small drill stations, capable of dealing with half a company or less. Those urban battalions were able to utilise one large drill hall due to the denser concentration of population. It is fair to say that, in pre-war Scotland, urban dwellers had less contact with the Territorial Force than rural dwellers.

Loyalty and rivalry were created between and within the various localised companies; companies who would never meet as a whole battalion except at the annual camp. By this method localisation was able to percolate down to grassroots level, cementing regional loyalty. By this method, intentional or otherwise, the Territorial Force was able to feed off itself, to be self-recruiting. While the regular army, in August and September 1914, struggled to cope with the increase in manpower, the Territorial Associations in Scotland calmly went about the business of raising recruits through local affiliation.

## **THE ROYAL NAVY**

The army was not alone in experiencing far-reaching change in the immediate pre-war years. With the appointment, on 21 October 1904, of Admiral Fisher as First Sea Lord, the Royal Navy underwent overhaul as its focus changed and Fisher introduced reforms designed to counter the threat of German naval expansion. While changes were already taking place prior to Fisher's appointment, notably the decision in 1903 to establish a new naval base at Rosyth, it was Fisher's ruthlessness in carrying forward reform which is most remembered. Fisher consolidated the various British naval fleets, in the process abandoning naval dominance in the far east and the Pacific to Japan and America, and by changing fleet dispositions created five new fleets

designed to provide naval protection for the homeland.<sup>130</sup>

The existing Channel Fleet was reformed and renamed the Atlantic Fleet and in its stead the existing Home Fleet was then renamed the Channel Fleet. This paved the way for the creation of a new Home Fleet based on the most modern ships as they were completed and became available. Thus Fisher hoped to create a powerful Home Fleet capable of countering any German threat. Fisher reduced the Royal Navy's imperial commitments by scrapping some 154 obsolete and outdated cruisers and gunboats which he viewed as a liability whose purpose was to show the flag in the most inhospitable and inaccessible parts of the empire.<sup>131</sup>

Fisher was now able to use those crews made redundant by the cropping of the small ships navy to create 'nucleus crews' for those ships which the navy held in reserve. The Fleet Reserve thus became The Reserve Fleet, ships which held a nucleus crew of specialists and officers, two-fifths of the full complement, which would be reinforced by shore-based personnel on mobilisation. Initially at any rate this reserve fleet was to be the basis of the new Home Fleet.<sup>132</sup> In pre-war Scotland the Royal Navy was represented on

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<sup>130</sup> P. Padfield, *The Great Naval Race. The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1900-1914*. P.116-7.

<sup>131</sup> P. Padfield, *The Great Naval Race*. P. 116-7.

<sup>132</sup> P. Padfield, *The Great Naval Race*. P. 116-7.

the east coast by the stationing of a submarine squadron on the river Tay, at Dundee, and by the rapidly evolving bases at Rosyth and Invergordon.

Between December 1912 and December 1913 the total strength of the Royal Fleet Reserve rose from 25,788 to 27,762, an increase of 7.6 per cent. At the same time the strength of the Royal Naval Reserve stood at 17,519 while the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve stood at 4,417, with the Clyde division standing at 1,243, some 86.6 per cent of its establishment: low when compared to Bristol with 91.2 per cent of establishment and Tyneside with 99.3 per cent. The overall United Kingdom average was 89.9 per cent.<sup>133</sup>

In an effort to increase the strength of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve in Scotland, it was decided, in 1913, to form three new companies based on the Firth of Forth. The strength of these companies had only reached 129 by January 1914, however this was put down to the lack of a drill ship and it was envisaged that once a suitable vessel could be found there would be no shortage of recruits.

It is clear that, in Scotland at least, the standard of recruit for the British Army was far removed from what the perceived wisdom of the twentieth century historian would have us believe. What is apparent is that the preconditioned ideas concerning the physical, social, and educational standard of recruits had little bearing in Scotland. Those ideas were part of the very baggage that the Haldane reforms were intended to leave behind. The changes initiated by

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<sup>133</sup> Navy Estimates 1914-1915. HMSO Cd 7302.

Cardwell and continued by Haldane had served to alter public opinion towards the army. By August 1914, while military service was still not seen as a career option of choice, it had lost a great deal of its social stigma. Service in the military was no longer seen as an evil born of necessity but as a social service to be performed in time of need. Ian Wood suggests that service in the Volunteers 'accustomed many working-class Scots to an acceptable form of military service outside of the corrupting influence of the regular army'.<sup>134</sup>

Scotland, on the eve of war, was as ready to play her part as any other country in the United Kingdom, or indeed within the Empire, but only within the known context of warfare; short, cheap, low risk, and small scale.

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<sup>134</sup> I. S. Wood, 'Protestantism and Scottish Military Tradition', in G. Walker & T. Gallagher (eds) *Sermons and Battle Hymns*. p. 122.

## CHAPTER 3

### SCOTTISH MANPOWER

#### INDUSTRIAL

In the months immediately following the declaration of war, employment fell off in almost all industries except in those then regularly engaged in the manufacture of military material. The curve of unemployment rose with remarkable abruptness, and only declined with the gradual restoration of public confidence.<sup>122</sup>

If the recruitment rush of August and September 1914 caused the immediate short-term slump in Scottish industry this would presuppose that recruitment was led by 'patriotic' ideals. If, on the other hand, recruitment was driven by the demands of industry, then economic needs, not patriotism, would be the main driving force behind the initial high Scottish recruiting figures.

In his article, 'Military Recruiting and the British Labour Force During the First World War', Peter Dewey investigates the relationship between voluntary recruitment and industrial wage levels. However, Dr Dewey follows the mainstream of thought; he believes that recruitment impacted upon industry, and by doing so dismisses the effect that industry had upon recruitment. After an examination of wages and activity rates within various industries Dr Dewey concludes that 'the evidence is such that economic factors played a

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<sup>122</sup> The War Cabinet Report for the year 1917. HMSO. Cd 9005. p. 81.

subordinate role in determining enlistment rates'.<sup>123</sup> He goes on to explain that 'neither activity levels nor wages serve to explain enlistment differences [between industries] to any great extent'.<sup>124</sup>

Dr Dewey's conclusions are based upon Great Britain as a whole and therefore do not accurately reflect the position in Scotland specifically. The numerical advantage held by England ensured that such an investigation would have a bias towards the effect on English industry. Moreover, Dr Dewey's figures are based upon employment levels and not on the more important issue of unemployment.

The Scottish recruitment figures for August and September 1914 have to be viewed within the context of the social and economic conditions prevalent, or imposed, at that time. As well as those conditions at the outbreak of war there were also, more importantly, those created by the outbreak of war itself. This is noted by Gerard DeGroot within the context of Britain as a whole but should be equally applied to Scotland with her disproportionately high dependence on heavy industry. 'Industries, frightened by economic uncertainty, reacted by cutting jobs; nearly 500,000 men were made redundant by the end of August, and many more were forced onto part-time status. These men would not have had any idea how temporary their jobless state would be'.<sup>125</sup> R. Pope agrees

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<sup>123</sup> P.E. Dewey, 'Military Recruiting and the British Labour Force During the First World War', in *The Historical Journal*. 27. 1. 1984. p. 209.

<sup>124</sup> P.E. Dewey, 'Military Recruiting'. p. 218.

<sup>125</sup> G.J. DeGroot, *Blighty*. p. 47

with this view concluding that 'the late summer of 1914 saw a sharp increase in unemployment, even among male skilled engineers, which helped provide the initial volunteers for Kitchener's armies'.<sup>126</sup>

Many of those skilled workers who came forward to enlist would have experienced, directly or indirectly, the 1907-8 unemployment crisis in Scotland, when in Glasgow alone upwards of 7,000 people had been dependent on special relief funds set up to relieve mass poverty. Tom Devine writes that unemployment among Clydeside engineers in this period rose to nearly 20 per cent with unemployment among shipyard workers even higher.<sup>127</sup> In 1914, with long periods of unemployment becoming more frequent as employers introduced new machinery or production varied in the face of foreign, often European, competition, the memories of 1907 would, in some cases, be enough to encourage enlistment: anything would be seen as better than the uncertainty of welfare relief. It is not unreasonable to conclude that those affected by the reaction in 1914 would instinctively act quickly to prevent a recurrence of the hardships of 1907 or that the slump of 1907 left bitter feelings with many, who would this time look out for themselves and quickly do what was necessary to provide for their dependants.

By October 1914, of the thirty major industries surveyed for a Board of Trade Report on the State of Employment in Britain, twenty were shown to have

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<sup>126</sup> R. Pope, *War and Society in Britain 1899-1948*. p. 21.

<sup>127</sup> T. Devine, *The Scottish Nation*. p. 263.

produced a higher percentage of recruits in Scotland.<sup>128</sup> These included the five main industries in Scotland: coal mining, engineering, shipbuilding, iron and steel, and building. The report clearly indicates that the contraction in the building trade was seen as no more than the seasonal norm: more important for the building trade was the level of recovery after the traditional winter slump. The five main industries in Scotland had a combined workforce of 496,300 males, which, by October 1914, had provided 69,308 recruits, 13.96 per cent of their workforce. They constituted over 59 per cent of Scottish recruits for the army and Territorial Force at that time. The chemical, clothing, and printing industries, while on a smaller scale, accounted for a further male workforce of 69,000 which had produced 9,266 recruits, 13.42 per cent of their workforce. The report shows that in the first three months of the war Scottish industry alone had accounted for 109,714 recruits: 13.5 per cent of the United Kingdom total and over 92 per cent of the 118,141 Scottish recruits to this time.<sup>129</sup> More importantly it shows that commerce and agriculture had provided less than 8 per cent of Scotland's recruits in the initial period. They had suffered no contraction in trade and therefore there was no economic 'push' to galvanise the workforce into action. The high initial recruiting record in Scotland appeared to be mainly a grass roots reaction to prevent unemployment and economic hardship. The Board of Trade Report on the State of Employment for October 1914, although not directly linking

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<sup>128</sup> Board of Trade, *Report of the Board of Trade on the State of Employment in the United Kingdom in October 1914*. p 38. Cd 7703.

<sup>129</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...October 1914*. p 38.

enlistment to employment levels, confirmed that 'Scotland's good recruiting record has prevented any degree of unemployment'.<sup>130</sup>

Christopher Harvie goes some way to explain the dilemma of Scottish industry when he points out that there was something ominous about 'an economy in which eight staple industries...produced about 60 per cent of its output'.<sup>131</sup> That output itself was disproportionate since Scotland, having '10.5 per cent of the UK population...produced 12.5 per cent of UK output'.<sup>132</sup> It would therefore be reasonable to expect that a country with a high proportion of industrial output would produce a high number of recruits from its industrial base, if that industrial base suffered an immediate slump in production and a correspondingly high surge of unemployment.

While Scotland played an important part in providing and expanding wartime military production, the change-over from civilian to military production was not instantaneous. There was a period of industrial limbo, after the sudden stoppage of an industrial economy uncertain of the future and before the introduction of a war economy fuelled by the needs of the military rather than popular consumer demand. G D H Cole states that 'in many ... industries in which shortage of labour was soon to become a pressing problem, the War at first seemed likely to create widespread unemployment; and little attention was directed to the necessity of maintaining output'.<sup>133</sup> It was in this period,

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<sup>130</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...October 1914.* p 21.

<sup>131</sup> C. Harvie, *No Gods and Precious Few Heroes.* p. 1.

<sup>132</sup> Harvie, *No Gods.* p. 1.

<sup>133</sup> G.D.H. Cole, *Labour in the Coal-Mining Industry (1914-1921).* p. 16.

when manpower, and more importantly manpower distribution, was left to its own devices, that, proportionally, recruiting in Scotland outperformed the rest of the United Kingdom.<sup>134</sup>

Unemployment in Scotland's heavy industries was by the second week of the war becoming a national problem. The Scottish worker, or employer, had no precedent for the forthcoming industrial demands of the military and had no conception as to the price of an industrialised defensive war. The Board of Trade announced that on '14 August the percentage of unemployment among workmen in the insured trades - i.e. building, engineering, shipbuilding, vehicle making, etc. – was 5% as compared with 4% at the end of the previous week and with 3% at the corresponding period of last year'.<sup>135</sup> The total number of insured workers in these industries was given as 2,250,000, which meant that, with a figure of 112,500 for the second week of August compared to 90,000 for the first week of the month, unemployment in British industry had increased by 22,500 over the seven day period, and had increased by some 45,000 over the figure of 67,500 for the same month in the previous year.<sup>136</sup> While these figures are for Britain as a whole they are still useful to give an overall perception of industrial reaction.

As early as 1970 Cornelli Barnett wrote 'Moved by patriotism, by desire for a bit of adventure, by a desire to escape from poverty and unemployment, the

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<sup>134</sup> Discussed further in chapter 5, 'Boom and Bust'.

<sup>135</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 20 August 1914.

<sup>136</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 20 August 1914.

crowds queued outside the recruiting offices'<sup>137</sup>. Clive Hughes tells us that 'among the earliest to volunteer were those seizing the chance to escape the dull routine of a city office or the wearying labour of the mines and factories'.<sup>138</sup> Nevertheless, while poverty and unemployment are included as viable reasons for enlistment, most historians have still treated them as secondary to patriotism.

Those industries most immediately affected by the outbreak of war produced a higher proportion of recruits in the initial months while those employed elsewhere were more constant, producing recruits over a longer period. To explain such economic pressures we must turn our attention to the reaction of Scottish industry and the immediate consequences of that action. One indication of the driving force behind recruitment in Scotland is the difference between those out of work due to the contraction of Scottish industry and the figures for those joining the armed forces from those industries in the same period. The source used here for those figures is the Quarterly Survey of Employers conducted by the Board of Trade from October 1914. This information was collected in questionnaires sent out to a large number of employers in the various industries in the United Kingdom and which asked, amongst other things, for information as to the number of employees, the reduction in employment and the number known to have joined the forces. The information therefore is based on a sample and has some degree of variance but for the purposes of this paper is still the best available and the

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<sup>137</sup> C. Barnett, *Britain and Her Army 1509-1970: A Military, Political and Social Survey*. p. 377.

<sup>138</sup> C. Hughes, 'The New Armies', in I. F. W. Beckett and K. Simpson, *A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War*. p. 101.

most accurate.<sup>139</sup> The base figure for these reports is the number employed in each industry in July 1914. Therefore July 1914 = 100 per cent. If an industry was suffering a 15 per cent reduction in manpower (contraction) in October 1914 this would mean that the industry in question was employing 15 per cent less than in July 1914.

A comparison with the figures for Britain shows that, although Scotland had a relatively small contraction in industry, due to the country's over-reliance on heavy industry, the country provided a larger proportion of voluntary recruits than most comparable regions and than Britain as a whole. Not only were those who were directly threatened by unemployment enlisting but, more importantly, those who perceived a future threat were also taking the opportunity to enlist. In September 1914 Scottish industry had contracted by 9.0 per cent while at the same time the same industries provided 10.4 per cent of their workforce as recruits. By October 1914 the figures were 10.9 per cent and 13.2 per cent, while in December they stood at 11 per cent and 16 per cent respectively. The figures for the United Kingdom for the same period were: September a contraction of 10.2 per cent with 8.8 per cent industrial recruitment, October had 10.7 per cent and 10.6 per cent, while December had 10.6 per cent and 13.3 per cent. In those three months only Scotland showed a higher number of recruits than job losses every month.<sup>140</sup> By December 1914 the contraction of Scottish industry was slowing down, although the fear of unemployment was still there. Within Scotland the figures

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<sup>139</sup> My thanks to Peter Dewey for locating these documents for me.

<sup>140</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...December 1914*. p 5. Cd 7755. *Report on the State of Employment...October 1914*. p 21.

show that, of the eight main industries, only one, engineering, failed to produce more recruits than job losses. By October 1914 employment in the engineering industry had contracted by 15.3 per cent but military recruitment from that industry stood at 13.9 per cent.<sup>141</sup> The excess manpower released by this industry was either in a position to weather the short term slump or had obtained employment in those industries where recruitment had outstripped contraction.

This disparity between the fall in jobs and the rise in enlistment did manifest itself in an industrial manpower shortage by the end of 1914 as government orders increased, but recruitment was still not driving industry. The uncertainties created within Scottish industry by the cancellation of orders, the loss of raw material sources, and the immediate collapse of overseas markets prompted an industrial workforce already suffering from pre-war cutbacks to opt for the relative security of short-time military service. Continuation of employment was the prime mover to a skilled workforce ill-prepared to withstand large scale unemployment. The labouring classes were used to the fluctuations of employment but for the majority of the skilled artisans unemployment was a new phenomenon.

The rush to enlist by the Scottish miners, especially those on the east coast, has often been given as the reason for the marked reduction in coal production figures and, by some, as the cause of industrial coal shortages. The opposite is the case. It was the pre-war state of the coal industry and the

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<sup>141</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...October 1914.* p 38.

immediate effect of the war which prompted thousands of miners to enlist within the first few weeks of fighting. J. Winter, in his persistence that patriotism was the main provider of voluntary manpower, asserts that the high numbers of Scottish miners who had enlisted by mid 1915, had done so despite 'class consciousness' and a notorious reputation for militancy: all of which he views as an example of how patriotism takes precedence over all. Winter does however concede that 'we should never completely discount the desire of some [Scottish] miners to do anything to get out of the mines'.<sup>142</sup> However, Winter seems compelled to counter this by continuing, 'sentiments about nation and empire, rather than discontent, were behind mass enlistment in this industry'.<sup>143</sup> While it is undoubtedly more romantic to believe that patriotic sentiment rather than economic pragmatism came to the nation's rescue, that concept has by now run its course and can be seen as naively idealistic.

The Scottish coal fields had been suffering from a steady reduction in manpower in the period immediately prior to the war. At the end of 1913 there had been a workforce of 137,098 which by July 1914 had reduced to 133,505 a fall of 3,593 or 2.6 per cent.<sup>144</sup> In 1913 Scottish coal exports had risen to 10,437,000 tons, which was 24.5 per cent of Scotland's output, with the majority of this work being done by the east coast coal ports which exported 8,253,000 tons as against the west coast total of 2,184,000 tons. In the years

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<sup>142</sup> J. Winter, *The Great War*. p. 35.

<sup>143</sup> J. Winter, *The Great War*. p. 35.

<sup>144</sup> *Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Conditions Prevailing in the Coal Mining Industry Due to the War*. HMSO 1915. Cd 7939. p. 29.

immediately prior to 1914 there had been a reduction in the number of miners employed in the west coast coal fields which were nearing exhaustion. As a result there had developed a trend for those unemployed miners to move east in search of work in the Fife or Lothian coalfields. Along with the steady influx of immigrants from the Baltic states this led to an overabundance of men on the east coast. This, coupled with the rapid expansion of the Fife coalfields, regularly led to an overproduction of stock and short-time working, with the result that although the east coast fields were working to a high capacity, especially for export, there was a high percentage of unemployed miners in the area prior to the First World War.

When war came the decline was relatively greater in the east coast coal fields than the west. On 1 August 1914 it was announced that loading operations on the steamer *Ambient* bound for Hamburg were stopped, the first cancellation of supplies to the German market.<sup>145</sup> Two days later, on 3 August, it was disclosed that, while in normal times 20-30 steamers were usually lying in Methil docks loading with coal, on 1 August there had been only seven. At the same time it was announced that the export of coal from Glasgow had also been stopped.<sup>146</sup> By 4 August those collieries operated by the Wemyss Coal Company in Fife had already laid off over 2,000 men due to the closure of the Baltic and German markets, and the Edinburgh Collieries Co Ltd had lost foreign contracts to the same markets with 2,500 men affected. Over 4,500

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<sup>145</sup> *The Scotsman*, 1 August 1914.

<sup>146</sup> *The Scotsman*, 3 August 1914.

miners were directly affected before war had become an actuality.<sup>147</sup>

In tandem with this, a large number of those in employment were in what can only be termed as unreliable jobs, with some pits working only two or three days per week as the export market demanded. Coal was produced as required and not for stockpile. For the first two weeks of the war, shipment of coal from the Fife ports was further hampered by the government requirement of a cash security for double the value of the cargo, as a guarantee that the cargo would not be supplied to a hostile power.<sup>148</sup> At the same time the Admiralty took control of the Forth coal ports (Leith, Methil, Burntisland, etc.) as the new naval base at Rosyth was still a long way from completion. This ended any remaining hope of export from the east coast, forcing coal owners to stop or limit production. The west coast fields had a local industrial and domestic demand to tide them over in the short term. By October 1914 over 21 per cent of the Scottish coal industry, mostly the east coast fields, was working short-time and 13.8 per cent or 18,441 men had enlisted.<sup>149</sup> In August 1914 it was the east coast coal fields which bore the brunt of the production collapse and which produced the highest proportion of recruits.<sup>150</sup>

At the outbreak of the war Scotland's miners were already involved in a dispute with mine owners over wages and conditions. A meeting held in Glasgow on 31 July between the employers and representatives of the

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<sup>147</sup> *The Scotsman*, 4 August 1914.

<sup>148</sup> *The Scotsman*, 14 August 1914.

<sup>149</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...October 1914*. p. 38.

<sup>150</sup> *Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Conditions Prevailing in the Coal Mining Industry Due to the War*. HMSO 1915. Cd 7939. p. 29.

Scottish Miners Federation considered the proposal by coal owners to reduce the wages of miners by 1/- per day.<sup>151</sup> As could be expected no settlement was reached but the proposal served to sow the seeds of discontent among the Scottish mining communities.

The outbreak of war in August 1914 was immediately followed by a widespread dislocation of trade and industry, both at home and abroad. The demand for industrial coal fell off sharply, and the export markets were largely thrown out of gear. Consequently, many miners were thrown out of work, or found their opportunities for employment restricted to considerably less than a full working week.<sup>152</sup>

The outbreak of war devastated the east coast coal fields almost immediately. Large numbers of miners who were already in the Territorial Force were called up at once, while those who had previously been unemployed enlisted for what was seen as steady, if little, pay. More importantly there was no apparent risk for those participating in this 'rush to the colours' as there were to be months of training before the new recruits were committed to combat, and for the Territorials only if they consented to foreign service.<sup>153</sup> Those who were in employment fared no better as foreign markets were at once closed to Scottish exports. Large numbers of miners saw this as the 'status quo' until the war ended - it was meant to be a short war - and enlisted to provide for their families. It was notable that a high percentage of those men were

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<sup>151</sup> *Evening Times*. 6 August 1914.

<sup>152</sup> Cole, *Labour in the Coal-Mining Industry* p. 16.

<sup>153</sup> Chapter 7. Territorial Recruitment.

married with dependants with Cooney and Maxwell stating 'A curious fact which one discovers over practically the whole of West Fife district is that the greater portion of the whole men enlisted are married men who have left behind them families of fairly large dimensions.'<sup>154</sup>

Single men could weather the fluctuating employment market more readily than married men with greater commitments. Older, married miners, could enlist and provide a steady income which could then be supplemented by the younger, single members of the household. The enlistment of miners was further encouraged by the practice of some coal companies in offering cash bounties to any of their employees who enlisted. Some, like the Dysart Mining Company, offered as much as a £10 bonus, free accommodation and coal for their families, half wages, plus the guarantee of a job on their return. Others, like the Fife Coal Company, did not pay a recruitment bonus but agreed that reservists called back to the colours, and those miners enlisting, would be granted free housing and coal for their dependants until their return. Even here there was a social distinction as clerks with dependants had their service pay augmented to bring it up to its pre-war level. The records for the Fife Coal Company show that over 3,700 men, more than one quarter of its 14,880 workforce, had joined the forces by December 1915.<sup>155</sup> The Alloa Coal Company also, from the outbreak of the war, gave free rent and coal to dependants of married men who enlisted. By the end of 1914 the company

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<sup>154</sup> L. Cooney, & A. Maxwell. (eds) *No More Bings in Benarty :- An Account of the Rise and Fall of Coal Mining in the Benarty Area of Fife, and Its Influence on the Lives of the People Who Lived There.* p.25.

<sup>155</sup> A. Muir, *The Fife Coal Company Limited; A Short Story.* p. 25.

announced that 'nearly 650 of its employees were serving; most of them had worked underground.'<sup>156</sup>

Those Scottish coal companies which encouraged their employees to enlist by such inducements were only following the policy of the government which was keen that such companies gave their employees every incentive to enlist for military service.<sup>157</sup> At the outbreak of war the government, with no precedent on which to base future needs, failed to anticipate the importance that would, in a few short months, be placed upon coal production: the demands of an industrial war. The immediate need was for men and the government would take all steps necessary, short of conscription, to fill the ranks. To this end in the early days of the conflict

leading members of the Miners Federation were taken to No. 10 Downing Street to be shown a specially prepared map of the German penetration of the British Front, in order to secure their co-operation in the removal of 50,000 young men from the pits for military service abroad. The manoeuvre was completely successful.<sup>158</sup>

This solved two problems, it provided recruits and at the same time reduced the number of unemployed created by economic uncertainty. As well as

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<sup>156</sup> J.L. Carvell, *One Hundred Years In Coal; The History of the Alloa Coal Company*, p. 104-5.

<sup>157</sup> J. L. Carvell, *One Hundred Years*. P. 105.

<sup>158</sup> J. L. Carvell, *One Hundred Years*. P. 105.

economic need there appears to have been, in the short term at least, an orchestrated effort to encourage the enlistment of miners.

Dr Dewey wonders why highly paid miners enlisted in such large numbers and uses this to demonstrate that economics did not determine recruitment in the mining industry. He concludes that the fact that such large numbers of miners were willing to leave a highly paid industry was evidence that other factors, such as patriotism, were the prime movers. However, reality shows us that, no matter how highly paid the industry was, in Scotland, if miners were thrown out of work, then they clearly had no wages at all. Those who were lucky enough to be placed on short time rather than total unemployment were in reality no better off. Unemployed or on short-time, the miners still had to pay rent and provide food for their families. By 12 August there were some 8,000 Fife miners who were affected by short-time working. It was reported that 'even though the coal companies are giving two days a week, the men can hardly earn more than pay the rents'.<sup>159</sup> Those on short-time and reduced wages, although they were still earning, would end up penniless. As early as 18 August there were 'many cases of distress already reported in the district' and reports of miners' families starving in Kirkcaldy through lack of work. At the same time large numbers of miners from throughout Fife were 'travelling

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<sup>159</sup> *The Scotsman*, 12 August 1914.

to Kirkcaldy and joining the army'.<sup>160</sup> Enlistment, however distasteful, would ensure that, in most cases, accommodation would be free and that wives and families would at least receive the separation allowance. Mine closure equalled unemployment which in turn equalled recruitment.

By early September there were reports from small subsidiary recruiting stations of such recruits. 'Up till mid-day today 181 recruits have been obtained at Dalkieth recruiting station, fully two-thirds of whom have been employed at Midlothian Colliery', while in Musselburgh it was reported that 'over 300 recruits have enlisted in Lord Kitchener's new army at Musselburgh during the past fortnight, the majority of whom are miners'.<sup>161</sup> At the same time in the East Lothian village of Prestonpans over 200 men had enlisted from the local Prestongrange Colliery alone. Scotland's coal industry lost large numbers of men through enlistment but there was a greater loss in the east coast coal fields due to the total collapse of the export market. The loss of the German and Baltic markets was immediate: the German market alone was worth over 2.9 million tons per year.<sup>162</sup> Scottish coal exports to foreign countries in 1913 show the division between the east coast and the west coast coal fields. Exports from the east coast fields in that year were 8,253,000 tons while the west coast exported only 2,184,000 tons.<sup>163</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 19 & 20 August 1914.

<sup>161</sup> *Evening News*, 4 September 1914.

<sup>162</sup> Harvie, *No Gods*. p. 15.

<sup>163</sup> W. R. Scott, & J. Cunnison, *The Industries of the Clyde Valley During the War*. p. 26

The rush to enlist by Scottish miners was clearly based upon economic grounds. Those areas which suffered the most from the restrictions of war provided the higher proportion of miners for the armed services. In the first month of the war 6,032 or 4.48 per cent of Scottish miners enlisted but this figure hides a great disparity in the regional variations. On the east coast, in Fife and Kinross, 2,448 or 7.76 per cent of miners enlisted in August 1914. In the Edinburgh district those figures were 622 and 5.95 per cent respectively. The figures for Stirling, which, although it was more central, exported through the east coast ports, were 680 and 6.73 per cent. In marked contrast to this were those coal fields with direct access to the industrial central belt and the protected west coast shipping ports. Lanark produced 1,108 or 2.04 per cent, Ayr 540 or 3.8 per cent and Linlithgow 105 and 1.62 per cent.<sup>164</sup>

**FIG 3:1 Number and percentage of miners enlisted by district.<sup>165</sup>**

**Figures are cumulative and given as a percentage of July 1914.**

	March 1915		August 1915	
<b>Ayr</b>	2381	16.8%	2962	20.9%
<b>Edinburgh</b>	2852	27.3%	3581	34.3%
<b>Fife &amp; Kinross</b>	7797	24.7%	10126	32.1%
<b>Haddington</b>	1076	31.9%	1231	36.5%
<b>Lanark</b>	10070	18.6%	12815	23.7%
<b>Linlithgow</b>	1199	18.5%	1437	22.2%
<b>Stirling</b>	1930	19.1%	2534	25.1%
<b>Argyll &amp; Renfrew</b>	987	23.6%	1200	28.7%

Figure 3:1 details the number of recruits from the various Scottish districts in

<sup>164</sup> Second General Report of the Departmental Committee on the *Conditions Prevailing in the Coal Mining Industry Due To The War*, Cd 8147.

<sup>165</sup> Second General Report. Cd 8147.

March and August 1915 and shows that the disparity in regional recruiting numbers continued throughout the entire voluntary period. By October 1914 the number of miners enlisting in Scotland had risen to 18,554 or 13.79 per cent as the knock-on effects of economic uncertainty continued to take hold.<sup>166</sup> At a meeting of the Executive committee of the Scottish Miners Federation, held on 9 September 1914 in the Christian Institute, Glasgow, it was agreed that 'immediate action should be taken by the Central Committee of the Relief Fund to provide money to alleviate distress in mining districts through unemployment caused by the war'.<sup>167</sup>

By February 1915, 29,290 Scottish miners, some 20.7 per cent of the workforce had enlisted accounting for 15.3 per cent of the 191,170 British miners who had enlisted at that time.<sup>168</sup> The number rose to 21.8 per cent or 30,847 men by April 1915. This was an increase of 33 per cent since October 1914, while contraction within the Scottish coal industry had increased by 32 per cent to 16.1 per cent overall.<sup>169</sup> Although the number of recruits for the three-month period, February to April 1915, had remained stagnant the Board of Trade reported that that 1.2 per cent of miners were working short time in Scotland.<sup>170</sup> By April 1915 recruiting had risen slightly to 21.8 per cent of the industry's workforce, an increase from February of only 5 per cent, while contraction of the industry had reduced by 3 per cent.<sup>171</sup> Employment for those remaining Scottish miners had stabilised with coal now being shipped in

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<sup>166</sup> Second General Report. Cd 8147.

<sup>167</sup> *The Evening Times*, 9 September 1914.

<sup>168</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...February 1915*. p 29. Cd 7850.

<sup>169</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...April 1915*. p 31.

<sup>170</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...April 1915*. p 31.

<sup>171</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...April 1915*. p 31.

significant quantities by rail to the west coast. The enlistment figures for July 1915 stood at 31,938 or 23.9 per cent,<sup>172</sup> and by August of the same year the number had increased to 26.7 per cent or 35,680, representing 14.2 per cent of the 250,750 miners enlisted in the United Kingdom at the end of the first twelve months of conflict.<sup>173</sup>

**FIG 3:2 Enlistment figures for Scottish miners.**

**Given as a percentage of July 1914 workforce.**

<b>Dates</b>	<b>% Miners Enlisted</b>	<b>Number miners enlisted</b>
<b>October 1914</b>	13.8%	18441
<b>February 1915</b>	20.7%	27662
<b>April 1915</b>	21.8%	29131
<b>July 1915</b>	23.9%	31938
<b>August 1915</b>	26.7%	35680

**FIG 3:3 Comparison of miners recruitment figures August**

**1914 to March 1915 for home countries**

**August 1914 to March 1915**

<b>Scotland</b>	28239	21%
<b>England</b>	126148	17.6%
<b>Wales</b>	28830	18.3%
<b>Ireland</b>	4	0.69%
<b>United Kingdom</b>	183274	18.1%

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<sup>172</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...July 1915.* p 9.

<sup>173</sup> W. R. Scott, & J. Cunnison, *The Industries of the Clyde Valley During the War.* p. 29.

**FIG 3:4 Comparison of miners recruitment figures August 1914 to August 1915 as a percentage of July 1914.**

<b>August 1914 to August 1915</b>		
<b>Scotland</b>	35886	26.7%
<b>England</b>	164036	22.9%
<b>Wales</b>	35395	22.5%
<b>Ireland</b>	15	2.6%
<b>United Kingdom</b>	235332	23.3%

The effect of such large numbers leaving the mines was felt later on when industrial stability returned and the wartime economy kicked in. However, this manpower deficiency in the coal industry was tempered by the influx of new labour, although those entering the industry were unskilled and productivity suffered initially. Britain as a whole lost 191,170 employees from the collieries by February 1915 but there had been, at the same time, an influx of some 50,473 employees from other industries. This reduced the manpower loss in the coal industry to only 14 per cent by February 1915. By August of the same year, twelve months into the war, 250,750 men had left Britain's pits but 74,822 had entered the industry leaving the loss of labour at 16 per cent. By April 1915 recruiting had risen slightly to 21.8 per cent of the industry's workforce, an increase from February of only 5 per cent, while contraction had reduced by 3 per cent. On 6 April 1915 Mr M. Lee, Assistant Secretary of the Fife and Kinross Miners Association, gave evidence to the Departmental Committee appointed to enquire into the Conditions Prevailing in the Coal Mining Industry Due to the War. He stated in his evidence that up until that time (6 April 1915) Lanark had produced 9,000 men; Fifeshire 8,000;

Stirlingshire over 2,000; and the Lothians 3,000. He put the total figure for Scotland at that time as approximately 26,000 miners in the army and Territorial Force.<sup>174</sup>

At the onset of war shipbuilding followed the same pattern as mining, but, although the industry was spread throughout Scotland, the vast majority was centred on the Clyde and the Clyde Valley and consequently this was the area worst hit by the short-term slump.

Figure 3:5 shows the distribution of Scottish shipbuilding. With over 50,000 employed in the industry, Scotland's west coast shipbuilding centres, Dumbarton, Lanark and Renfrew, accounted for over 86 per cent.

**FIG 3:5 Manpower and distribution of Scottish shipbuilding 1911.**<sup>175</sup>

<b>Aberdeen (City)</b>	1433	2.8
<b>Aberdeen (County)</b>	1457	2.8
<b>Dundee</b>	1424	2.8
<b>Dumbarton</b>	9396	18.47
<b>Lanark</b>	19532	38.4
<b>Renfrew</b>	14897	29.3
<b>Forfar</b>	1473	2.9
<b>Edinburgh</b>	1235	2.4

In 1911 over 54,000 men from Lanark, Renfrew, and Dumbartonshire were employed in the shipbuilding and marine engineering industries. In the

<sup>174</sup> Report of the Departmental Committee appointed to enquire into the Conditions Prevailing in the Coal Mining Industry Due to the War, Part II, Minutes of Evidence. HMSO 1915. Cd 8009.

<sup>175</sup> Census 1911.

summer of 1914 the Clyde had been under the threat of a shipbuilding depression. Large numbers of men had joined the industry in the boom period of 1913 but, in the months leading up to the war, production had declined and nightshift working had ceased. Unemployment among shipyard workers was already a reality, the economic reaction in August 1914 merely increasing the pressure on those with dependants. The unemployment which had so quickly devastated the east coast now started to affect the west. On Friday 14 August, at a conference in Glasgow between the representatives of the Clyde Shipbuilders and Engineers and those of the workmen employed in all the districts of the river, the discussion centred around the short-term working due to the war. It was recognised by both management and workers alike that 'there must necessarily be a reduction of employment' and by this time some yards were already experiencing short time.<sup>176</sup> The outbreak of war caused the immediate cancellation of foreign orders and shipowners cancelled orders or halted construction of those ships already on the blocks until they knew what lay ahead.

The immediate short-term effect of this was unemployment, with the numbers of men lost to the industry running so high that fear of depleting the industry led the government to 'request shipbuilding firms as far as possible to refrain from dismissing men.' Early plans to transfer men within the various shipbuilding companies to stave off unemployment came to nought when contraction within the industry became more widespread than originally

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<sup>176</sup> *Daily Record*. 15 August 1914.

anticipated.<sup>177</sup> On Saturday 29 August it was reported that 'The smallest total for August for a quarter of a century in Clyde Shipbuilding is reported. During the month shipbuilders launched only twelve vessels'.<sup>178</sup> Elsewhere it was also reported that 'not since 1886 has the Clyde turned out such small tonnage during August'.<sup>179</sup>

The importance of the shipbuilding industry was recognised from the outset but private shipyards, although requested to do so by the Board of Trade as early as 8 August 1914<sup>180</sup>, were unable, or unwilling, to keep men on the books until stability returned in the shape of government orders, and the men, left to their own devices, could not wait indefinitely for a return to employment. This call was repeated on 19 August when employers were urged in the regional press to 'keep industries going and diminish the field of unemployment as much as possible'.<sup>181</sup>

At the start of the war there were three shipyards which were engaged solely in warship construction; John Brown & Co at Clydebank were constructing the Dreadnought *Tiger* and the battleship *Barham*, Beardmore & Co at Dalmuir were building the battleships *Benbow* and *Ramillies*, and the Fairfield Co at Govan had the battleships *Valiant* and *Renown*. Most of the smaller yards were independent, each specialising in a particular type of vessel and, although the civilian yards tried to hold on to their men as long as possible,

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<sup>177</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 7 August 1914.

<sup>178</sup> *Daily Record*, Saturday 29 August 1914.

<sup>179</sup> *The Evening Times*, 28 August 1914.

<sup>180</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 8 August 1914.

<sup>181</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 19 August 1914.

the uncertainty of war made enlistment the logical choice. The unemployment blow was felt all the harder as many skilled workers had left jobs in engineering for what was seen, in the shipbuilding boom of 1913, as the greater financial security of the shipyards. Harry McShane states that

A large number of men were already prior to the war leaving Weir's, because there was a feeling that unemployment was coming and they wanted to get to places like Brown's, where they were building a big battleship, and to other places where they thought there would be some sort of permanency of employment.<sup>182</sup>

By October 1914 approximately 6,566 Scottish shipbuilding workers had enlisted, accounting for 12.9 per cent of those working in large shipyards and 16.7 per cent for smaller companies.<sup>183</sup> This higher figure for smaller shipyards was to be expected as they were unable to retain staff at a loss indefinitely.<sup>184</sup> On 10 September it was announced that 170 men from Bow McLachlan & Co's shipyard in Paisley had joined the army. While not a significant number on its own it shows that large groups were leaving the smaller yards. By February 1915 approximately 8,144 men, 16 per cent of the shipbuilding industry, had enlisted with this number increasing to 8,805 or 17.3 per cent by April of the same year.<sup>185</sup> Within the engineering sector 23,304 men enlisted by February 1915, 19.6 per cent of the engineering

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<sup>182</sup> H. McShane, in N. MacDougall, *Voices from War and Some Labour Struggles : Personal Recollections of War in our Century by Scottish Men and Women*. p 33-4.

<sup>183</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...October 1914*. p 38.

<sup>184</sup> Scott & Cunnison, *The Industries of the Clyde Valley*. p. 85.

<sup>185</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...February 1915*. p 29. *April 1915*. p 31.

workforce, while by April 1915 the number had increased to 24,969 or 21 per cent.<sup>186</sup>

**FIG 3:6 Clyde's Share of Admiralty Warshipbuilding 1914-18.<sup>187</sup>**

Year	Number ordered	Clydeside share	Percentage of total
<b>1914-15</b>	217	82	37.7
<b>1915-16</b>	130	66	50.7
<b>1916-17</b>	121	37	30.5
<b>1917-18</b>	144	70	48.6

Warship building in 1914-15 was lower than the pre-war boom of 1913 and with shipyards commandeered by the Admiralty there was not the luxury of civilian shipbuilding to fall back on. On the Clyde, along with warship building, there was also repair work to those ships damaged in action but such work was also limited until German and Turkish minefields began to take their toll in early 1915.

At the outbreak of war the three major Scottish shipyards engaged in warship production, Clydebank, Fairfield and Dalmuir, were taken over and came under Admiralty control, while the other three yards which had built warships pre-war, Scotts, Denny's and Yarrow, came under Admiralty control under the 1915 Munitions of War Act<sup>188</sup> Hugh Peebles states that 'these six yards were responsible for virtually all of the conventional warships built on the Clyde during the war'.<sup>189</sup> Not until December 1914, five months after the outbreak of

<sup>186</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...February 1915.* p 29. *April 1915.* p 31.

<sup>187</sup> H. B. Peebles, *Warshipbuilding on the Clyde.* p. 169.

<sup>188</sup> H. B. Peebles, *Warshipbuilding on the Clyde.* p. 89.

<sup>189</sup> H. B. Peebles, *Warshipbuilding on the Clyde.* p. 89.

war, were new ships being laid down on the Clyde, the cruiser *Canterbury* at Clydebank and the monitor *Raglan* at Harland and Wolff's Govan yard.<sup>190</sup> There was, within Scotland's shipbuilding industry, uncertainty until the Admiralty was in a position to determine its future needs. Once Britain's warship needs had been decided 'the entire shipbuilding industry was mobilised progressively from 1915 onwards to meet the insatiable demand'.<sup>191</sup> From the beginning of 1915 the number employed at the three main yards rose as Admiralty orders increased and, more importantly, as those yards undertook munitions work not directly related to shipbuilding, aircraft, airships, field guns, etc. At the same time the number of men employed at the other Clydeside yards was considerably lower than pre-war levels. Those who had not enlisted in the economic slump of 1914 were able to profit from the increased demand in 1915 for warships. While some men continued to leave the major yards, others, displaced from the smaller yards, were able to take their place. In 1914-15 after the outbreak of war approximately eighty-two warships were laid down on Clydeside. Twenty were river gunboats of the type scrapped in Fisher's reforms, thirty-six were destroyers, eighteen submarines, and the rest were a mixture of depot ships, monitors and cruisers. In contrast to later years, when shipyard workers were protected, it was not uncommon in the first few weeks of the war for recruiting rallies to be held outside the shipyards as the workers were leaving at the end of the day, or even on occasion in the works at meal breaks.

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<sup>190</sup> H. B. Peebles, *Warshipbuilding on the Clyde*. p. 181.

<sup>191</sup> H. B. Peebles, *Warshipbuilding on the Clyde*. p. 88.

The year 1913 had also been a boom year for the iron and steel industries but, like shipbuilding, 1914 was the slump which followed. Once again it was Scotland's west coast which was affected. With a total of 28,142 employed in iron and steel manufacturing in Scotland, over 96 per cent was centred on two counties: Ayr with 1782 employed in the industry had a 6.3 per cent share, while Lanark, employing 25,414, had the lion's share of the industry with 90 per cent. There was cut price competition from Germany and the United States, and demand for Scottish products was falling. As early as August 1914 there were reports of 'stagnation' in the iron and steel trades.<sup>192</sup> By October, 16,527 men, accounting for 13.9 per cent of Scotland's engineering workers, had enlisted.<sup>193</sup> In the four-day period between 29 August and 1 September over 400 recruits enlisted at Coatbridge, while at the same time over 500 enlisted at Motherwell, with the latter being 'drawn from the ranks of steelworkers and skilled artisans.' In Kilmarnock over the same period 250 men from 'local public works' enlisted, increasing the town's total to over 500 since the war commenced. On 15 September Mr John Hill, General Secretary of the Boilermakers Society, talked about the 'very sudden and serious effects the war had already had' among his members and said that the figure for those unemployed in August 1914 was 4,676, an increase of 2,797 over the figure of 1,879 for the previous August, an increase he put down solely to industrial reaction to the war.<sup>194</sup> The army was not the only option for many of the Clydeside workers. Harry McShane, himself a shipyard engineer in 1914, tells us that 'Some of Weirs engineers simply went to sea

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<sup>192</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 8 August 1914.

<sup>193</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...February 1915*. p 38.

<sup>194</sup> *Glasgow Citizen*, 15 September 1914.

and that was their war effort.<sup>195</sup> This practice was not confined solely to Weirs and was commonplace among the engineering works along the Clyde. By February 1915 engineering had lost 19.6 per cent of its workforce, an increase from August 1914 of 41 per cent, while overall contraction of the industry, due to the introduction of government orders, had reduced by 6 per cent from the December figure.<sup>196</sup> Again short-time working had, at less than one per cent, all but disappeared from the industry. By April 1915 the percentage of engineering workers who had enlisted stood at 21 per cent overall.<sup>197</sup>

The textile industry in Scotland suffered mixed fortunes. The fighting in Belgium closed off the supplies of raw materials for the border linen and woollen mills, forcing closures, while the east coast jute industry, centred on Dundee and Forfar, continued, and in most cases increased, production. As early as 4 August 1914 Inveresk Mills in Musselburgh reported that 650 workers were already affected by the crisis in Europe.<sup>198</sup> At the outbreak of war the west of Scotland textile industry produced few, if any, products which could be used for military purposes. The sudden collapse of the export market and the lack of raw materials forced many mills to close, at least until they could be altered to produce war material. The cotton industry held 5,000 workers, while the Paisley thread industry employed a further 10,000. By October 1914 some 585 men had enlisted, accounting for 11.7 per cent of the

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<sup>195</sup> McShane & Smith, *No Mean Fighter*. P. 61-2.

<sup>196</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...February 1915*. p 29.

<sup>197</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...April 1915*. p 31.

<sup>198</sup> *The Scotsman*, 4 August 1914.

male workforce.<sup>199</sup> In Paisley the thread industry suffered immediate cutbacks, with Coats Mills providing 270 recruits by the second week in September and Paisley's total to that time standing at some 1,250. With the mills dependent on imported raw material and the need to export the finished product, the closures had no time limit and therefore those males who lost their employment had no option other than to enlist, even if as nothing other than a stop gap. As early as 4 August foreign contracts for the border tweed mills were cancelled and it was expected that all mills would close within three weeks.<sup>200</sup> The following day, 5 August, it was reported that the 'tweed mills will only employ men day to day'.<sup>201</sup> The closure of woollen mills was not confined to the borders. The Grandholm Woollen Mills, Aberdeen, closed at the outset of war and by 14 August the Haddington mills of Messrs Adam Paterson had closed.<sup>202</sup> This atmosphere of uncertainty helped to stimulate recruitment, and by October 1914, of 10,100 males employed in the woollen industry in Scotland 1,212 or 12 per cent had enlisted.<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...October 1914.* p 38.

<sup>200</sup> *The Scotsman*, 4 August 1914.

<sup>201</sup> *The Evening Times*, 5 August 1914.

<sup>202</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 15 August 1914.

<sup>203</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...October 1914.* p 38.

FIG 3:7 As early as 5 August Morton of Darvel were warning of shorter working hours and of the risk of panic. Six days later the factory went on short-time.<sup>204</sup>

## To Meet the New Conditions.

Aug 5<sup>th</sup> 1914

As employers, we shall keep things running as nearly as possible in their normal way, though it will doubtless be necessary to shorten the hours of labour.

May we advise our Workers in the times before us to keep cool and free from any sort of panic, and we can be of most service to our Country by observing a few simple rules at this juncture.

We should continue our life and habits as before, except that we should try to LIVE ON LESS.

On no account should we withdraw any monies we may have in Banks. We should draw out as little <sup>as we can</sup> as we can ~~over~~ do with.

We should not lay in large stores of food and other necessities. This only raises prices immediately against other people who cannot afford it, or who have the courage not to accumulate against their neighbours.

To rush for money and lay in large stores is most unpatriotic and un-neighbourly at this time. What is wanted in the present crisis is a feeling of "National Comradeship," where each will do all in his power to see the other through.

A. MORTON & CO.  
MORTON SUNDUR FABRICS, LTD.  
HUDSON SCOTT & SONS, LTD.

The war was a godsend for the jute industry which was called on to produce everything from horse-feed bags to haversacks, sugar bags to sand bags. The jute industry had its own particular effect on recruitment which differed

<sup>204</sup> Morton of Darvel Papers. SRO GD 326/24/1

from the norm. The industry had always been a heavy employer of women, with males being predominant only in a supervisory or engineering capacity. This left a small hard core body of unemployed males in Dundee who, knowing from experience that there was no prospect of employment, took the opportunity to enlist. This is reflected in the experiences of William Linton Andrews, News Editor of the *Dundee Advertiser*, as he tried to enlist at the outbreak of war, only to be forced to the rear of the line by the unemployed men who felt that they had a greater claim to accept government wages:

The war was a day or two old. The scene was the swarming street outside the recruiting office at Dundee. I struggled in a mob of old militiamen and unemployed to reach the recruiting sergeant. A gaunt man in a muffler towered over me. He looked down, and said, not without sympathy: 'Out o' work, chum?' I was a trifle huffy. Out of work indeed. I was News Editor (and in the Fleet Street sense, Night Editor too) of an important morning paper, the *Dundee Advertiser*. But I could not go into that. I told the big man I had a goodish job. 'Then you make way for us lads wi' out jobs' he said. And forthwith I was hustled to the edge of the crowd. Funny (I thought to myself), I never knew it was so hard to become a soldier.<sup>205</sup>

Those males who were lucky enough to be in employment were not inclined to leave hard-won jobs to serve in what was still at that time seen as a short war. This led to a low level of recruitment in Dundee, especially when

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<sup>205</sup> Andrews, *The Haunting Years*. p. 11.

compared to a male-dominated, agricultural town such as Perth, which, although smaller, produced a greater number of recruits. At one stage the army recruiting targets for Dundee were greatly reduced in acknowledgement of this phenomenon. The local recruiting officer, Major T.M.Cappon, in December 1914 lowered the quota for the city from 3600 recruits for 'K2' to a 'more realistic' 2500.<sup>206</sup> A look at the recruiting figures for Dundee at that time shows that even that target was not achieved. Figure 3:8 is based on the male population (census 1911) and is intended to show the low level of recruitment in Dundee – an industrial town which did not follow the industrial pattern – there was no collapse in the primary industry.

**FIG 3:8 A comparison of the numbers and percentages of New Army recruits for two different but neighbouring districts for the first five months of the war. Perth, a predominately agricultural district, and Dundee, a textile dominated district.**<sup>207</sup>

1914	Perth and District Male Population 58364		Dundee and District (Forfar) Male Population 126638	
	Number of Recruits	% of Male Population	Number of Recruits	% of Male Population
<b>August</b>	1461	2.50%	493	0.38%
<b>September</b>	2749	4.71%	1129	0.89%
<b>October</b>	3191	5.46%	1323	1.04%
<b>November</b>	3673	6.29%	1591	1.25%
<b>December</b>	3953	6.77%	1848	1.45%

The jute industry provided 2,353 recruits by October 1914, 13 per cent of the

<sup>206</sup> *The Scotsman*, December 3 1914.

<sup>207</sup> *Ministry of National Service Papers*, NATS 1/389. Census 1911.

male workforce.<sup>208</sup> The remainder of the textile industry, which employed 38,200 males, lost 4,736 or 12.4 per cent by October 1914.<sup>209</sup> The one exception to the continued prosperity of the east coast textile trade was the Scottish linoleum industry, based primarily in and around Kirkcaldy. The raw materials, especially oil, became increasingly scarce and it was reported that 'Most of the factories and workshops in Kirkcaldy are conducting business under a shorter hours system because of the lack of raw materials'.<sup>210</sup> The major company in this localised industry, Nairns of Kirkcaldy, reported that 'Six hundred men were eventually in one or the other of the services, and the firm made weekly payments both to them and their wives and families.'<sup>211</sup>

Recruitment from the textile industry continued to rise throughout 1915. In the cotton sector the number had increased to 675 or 13.5 per cent by February 1915 and had increased further to 765 or 15.3 per cent by April 1915, while, within the jute industry, the subject of strenuous recruiting campaigns, the number had risen to 3,746 or 20.7 per cent by February 1915 and further still to 4,416 or 24.4 per cent by April of the same year. The figures for the woollen sector show a rise to 1,858 or 18.4 per cent by February 1915, and to 2,161 or 21.4 per cent by April 1915.<sup>212</sup>

While we have seen that Scotland's industrial reaction was the main contributor to the recruitment numbers, the main surprise is the extent to

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<sup>208</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...October 1914.* p 38.

<sup>209</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...October 1914.* p 38.

<sup>210</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 24 August 1914.

<sup>211</sup> A. Muir, *Nairns of Kirkcaldy*, p.106.

<sup>212</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...February 1915.* p 29. April 1915. p 31.

which Scotland's proportion of recruitment led the other industrial regions in the all important opening months of the war. For the first three months of the war there was a difference of 17.3 per cent. It was reported to the House of Lords that 'from August 4 to November 4, the first three months of the war, the southern district of Scotland furnished 237 recruits per 10,000 of the population'.<sup>213</sup> There followed a list detailing recruitment in the various industrial districts of the United Kingdom with Warwickshire and the Midland Counties producing 196 per 10,000 of the population; Lancashire 178 per 10,000; London and the Home Counties 170 per 10,000; Yorkshire, Durham and Northumberland, 150 per 10,000; Cheshire and part of Lancashire and the neighbouring Welsh counties 135 per 10,000; the North of Ireland 127 per 10,000; and finally Notts and Derby with 119 per 10,000 of the population.<sup>214</sup> Proportionally, Scotland's industrial regions were providing over 20 per cent more relative to population numbers.

By the end of 1914 Scottish industry was in recovery and recruitment had reached a relatively low if steady level. The introduction of government contracts had served to stabilise the short term decline in industry and the renewed need for labour to fulfil those contracts stemmed the flow of both skilled and unskilled workers alike into the armed services. Military recruitment was now competing directly with industry for manpower. Unintentionally or not, Scottish industry had played its part in the raising of the New Armies. The second year of the war 1915 was the time for those who

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<sup>213</sup> Parliamentary Debates – Official Reports 1066 – 1918. House of Lords Vol XVIII, 1914 – 15 (Nov 11 – May 19) 351-2.

<sup>214</sup> Parliamentary Debates – Official Reports 1066 – 1918. House of Lords Vol XVIII, 1914 – 15 (Nov 11 – May 19) 351-2.

had held back in the opening months to come forward and make their commitment. As the contribution from industry declined, then the contribution from commerce and the public sector increased as those in replaceable jobs found themselves under mounting pressure to enlist.

Figure 3:9 shows how recruitment from industry reduced after the initial months.

**FIG 3:9 Recruitment from eight main Scottish industries. Figures are cumulative and given as a percentage of the July 1914 workforce.<sup>215</sup>**

Industry	October 1914		February 1915		April 1915	
<b>Mining</b>	18436	13.8%	27662	20.7%	29131	21.8%
<b>Engineering</b>	16527	13.9%	23304	19.6%	24969	21%
<b>Building</b>	16324	15.2%	20835	19.4%	22983	21.4%
<b>Iron &amp; Steel</b>	7563	13.2%	9855	17.2%	10887	19%
<b>Shipbuilding</b>	6566	12.9%	8144	16%	8805	17.3%
<b>Printing</b>	3497	13.1%	5340	20%	6167	23.1%
<b>Clothing</b>	3235	13.1%	3184	12.9%	3482	14.1%
<b>Chemicals</b>	2534	14.4%	3256	18.5%	3696	21%

The building trade had retreated into its annual slump, with contraction in February 1915 standing at 23.2 per cent overall and, with a recruitment rate of 19.5 per cent, an increase of 29 per cent over October 1914.<sup>216</sup> The contraction rate for the building trades was higher than the enlistment rate as many of the workers, skilled or otherwise, were able to obtain employment constructing the new naval base at Rosyth, the demand for which had

<sup>215</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...October 1914 - April 1915.*

<sup>216</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...October 1914 - April 1915.*

increased at the outbreak of war. March 1915 saw renewed efforts to recruit labour for the construction of Rosyth naval base in direct competition with the armed services. The contractors were able to offer long term work and relatively high rates of pay for unskilled men, making civilian employment a more beneficial and tempting prospect than military service.

FIG 3:10 One of a series of advertisements for labour at Rosyth<sup>217</sup>

**ROSYTH NAVAL BASE.**  
**WANTED,**  
**NAVVIERS and GENERAL LABOURERS.**  
**LOWEST RATE, 7<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> AN HOUR.**  
**STEADY EMPLOYMENT at SAME RATE for about TWO YEARS.**  
**Excellent and Cheap Accommodation in Hub Village on Works.**  
**MISSION, CINEMATOGRAPH, and ENTERTAINMENT HALL.**  
**PROVISION STORES, CANTEN, &c.**  
**APPLY ON WORKS.**  
**EASTON GIBB & SON, LTD.,**  
**ROSYTH, DUNFERMLINE, FIFE.**

By April 1915 the percentage of building trade employees who had enlisted stood at 21.4 per cent, while contraction of the industry stood at 22.3 per cent.<sup>218</sup> The number of recruits from the iron and steel industry had, by February 1915, risen to 17.2 per cent of the workforce while contraction

<sup>217</sup> Forfar Herald. 5 March 1915.

<sup>218</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...April 1915.* p 31.

remained at a low figure of 1.6 per cent. By April contraction had risen to 3.2 per cent while recruitment had risen to 19 per cent. Recruitment from shipbuilding rose to 16 per cent in February, with contraction of the industry at 4.6 per cent, and in April stood at 17.3 per cent with an increase in industrial capacity of 1.55 per cent. The figures for the printing industry stood at 20 per cent recruitment and 18.5 per cent contraction for February, and 23.1 per cent recruitment and 17.8 per cent contraction in April. Clothing in February stood at 12.9 per cent recruitment and 10 per cent contraction, and in April 14.4 per cent recruitment and 9.7 per cent contraction. The last of the eight major industrial employers, the chemical industry, stood at 18.5 per cent recruitment and an expansion of 9.8 per cent in February, with 21 per cent recruitment and a 6 per cent expansion in capacity in April 1915.<sup>219</sup>

The figures above show that in seven of the eight major Scottish industries recruitment slowed after October 1914 and that by April 1915 had all but reduced to a trickle. Michael Carver makes the point that by early 1915, as industry recovered and expanded to meet the demands of the military, 'there was no longer a pool of unemployed on which to draw'.<sup>220</sup> The exception was the printing trade, with a 65 per cent unemployment rise in the period from October 1914 until February 1915. As an industry printing was affected by the outbreak of war. Certainly the printing of books was reduced but newspapers continued, with extra editions, and the printing of handbills and posters increased. The printing industry recruitment figure of 13.1 per cent in October

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<sup>219</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...February 1915.* p 29. *April 1915.* p 31.

<sup>220</sup> M. Carver, *Britain's Army in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.* p. 40.

1914 was comparable with the other industries.<sup>221</sup> The recruitment from the printing trade was an example of recruitment in two stages but both stages confirm the idea that recruitment was economically driven. There were two periods of large scale contraction within the printing industry and at both of these times recruitment increased correspondingly. Recruitment did not cause the contraction of industry; the contraction prompted recruitment.

## AGRICULTURE AND FISHING

**FIG 3:11 Scottish counties with a recognisable fishing industry<sup>222</sup>**

	<b>Number employed</b>	<b>% industry total</b>
<b>Aberdeen</b>	3558	12.7
<b>Argyll</b>	1399	5
<b>Banff</b>	3876	14
<b>Elgin</b>	1285	4.6
<b>Fife</b>	1655	6
<b>Inverness</b>	2052	7.3
<b>Kincardine</b>	1167	4.1
<b>Ross &amp; Cromarty</b>	4651	16.6
<b>Orkney</b>	601	2.1
<b>Shetland</b>	2226	8
<b>Sutherland</b>	981	3.5
<b>Caithness</b>	826	3

The Scottish fishing fleet, based almost entirely on the east coast, felt the effects instantly, even before war had become an actuality. On 4 August it was reported that in Aberdeen 'At a meeting of the trawl owners of the port yesterday, it was decided to pay off the crews from skippers downwards. Not only will fully twelve thousand workers be thrown out of employment, but all

<sup>221</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...October 1914.* p 38.

<sup>222</sup> Census 1911.

classes of shopkeepers will also be hard hit.<sup>223</sup> D. T. Jones in his post-war investigation into rural Scotland wrote that 'Fishing operations at once came to a standstill and the large fleet of Scottish steam drifters, motor vessels, and sailing vessels was laid up and the whole fishing community thrown out of employment.'<sup>224</sup> The herring fleet in the middle of its seasonal peak tied up immediately, while the inshore fleet was severely limited due to Admiralty restrictions on sailings in the North Sea and the Firth of Forth. Many of the fishermen were already in the Naval Reserve but their numbers had been in decline over the previous few years, with the majority of those remaining in the reserve coming from the islands: 2,000 from the island of Lewis alone.<sup>225</sup>

A number of the younger men did enlist in the army but this changed almost immediately when the Admiralty started to requisition trawlers and fishing vessels for mine sweeping and inshore transport. Figure 3:12 shows the number of fishermen and shore-based workers on the east and west coasts of Scotland, plus the Orkney and Shetland islands. Shore-based workers included coopers, boxmakers, carters, basketmakers, fishmongers, and all the other support industries associated with the fishing industry, most of which could be incorporated into the Army Service Corps.

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<sup>223</sup> *Daily Record*. 4 August 1914.

<sup>224</sup> D. T. Jones, et al, *Rural Scotland During the War*. p. 32.

<sup>225</sup> Jones, et al, *Rural Scotland*. p. 32.

**FIG 3:12 The numbers of fishermen and shore based workers in  
Scotland 1914 and 1915.<sup>226</sup>**

	1914	1915	% Reduction
East Coast Fishermen	21812	8620	60.49
East Coast Shore Based	33958	13578	60.02
West Coast Fishermen	9401	4341	53.83
West Coast Shore Based	10457	5513	47.28
Orkney & Shetland Fishermen	6381	2283	64.23
Orkney & Shetland Shore Based	5110	1126	77.97
Total	87119	35461	59.3

As could be expected the Orkney and Shetland fishing fleet suffered the greatest drop in numbers, with the majority of the young male islanders engaged with the fishing fleet. Not all those fishermen displaced by the war enlisted in the armed forces: a large number went to work on the land, some on their own crofts and some to replace those agricultural workers who enlisted. This is all the more surprising when account is taken of the number of men in the regional fishing industry thrown out of employment in the days immediately prior to the war. It seems, however, that the bulk of these men were able to withstand the economic hardship of the first two weeks of war, and, by 17 August, when the devastation in the Aberdeen fishing industry had levelled out, 250 trawlers and 550 drifters returned to sea. In the case of those fishermen who, for one reason or another, were unable to return to their normal work, many were able to find alternative employment on the land.<sup>227</sup>

<sup>226</sup> Thirty-third Annual Report of the Fishery Board for Scotland for the year 1914, Cd 7976.  
Thirty-fourth Annual Report of the Fishery Board for Scotland for the year 1915, Cd 8281.

<sup>227</sup> *Report on the State of Employment.....July 1915. Part ii – Agriculture.* p. 7.  
*Report on the State of Employment.....April 1915.* p. 13.

Agriculture was yet another sector of Scottish society with its own peculiarities which affected the recruitment of its workforce. Like the Fife miners, agricultural workers, especially in the north of Scotland, were present in the Territorial Force in large numbers and were called up immediately. Others joined for a variety of reasons, to be with a group of friends, for a chance for adventure (stories of the Boer War), or for an opportunity to break from an industry which traditionally worked long hours for low wages. But, whatever the reason, not all rushed to join at once. A peculiarity of the agricultural industry was the twice-yearly hiring fairs in May and November, and agricultural workers appear to have been held to this six monthly work contract cycle, not only morally but in some cases in the legal sense. A case in question was a farm servant in Errol, Perthshire, who was sued by his employer for breach of contract when he left the farm in order to enlist. Agricultural workers felt that they were not free to enlist until their present work period was up. Indeed the workers were paid at the end of the contract period and any who left before the contract period was up would not be paid. Single men could lose up to six months wages while married men, employed for a longer period, could lose up to twelve months pay. Married men were further discouraged from enlisting by the tradition of tied housing. If a married farmworker left to enlist, then his family would have to vacate the tied cottage which would be required for his replacement. Unlike the coalowners, farmers had no excess of housing stock for the families of serving employees. Similarly, large numbers were held back by the needs of the autumn harvest. The recruitment figures for November 1914 and May and November 1915 show an increase in the number of agricultural recruits for the army and

Territorial force. The Scottish army recruitment numbers from agriculture increased in November 1914 by 1,065 or 10.6 per cent on the figure for October but this was low in comparison to the increase of 32,748 or 42.8 per cent for the United Kingdom as a whole.<sup>228</sup> In the 1841 census over 25 per cent of the Scottish workforce had been employed in agriculture but by 1911 the figure had fallen to just over 10 per cent and the recruiting figures were a reflection of that reduction.<sup>229</sup> Long term pre-war migration from the Highlands and the Central Lowland farming belt had stripped the agricultural industry of excess manpower.

In contrast to the numbers for the New Army, there was a greater increase in recruitment for the Territorial Force during the three periods for which specific figures exist: November 1914 and May and November 1915. November 1914 saw the recruitment figures for the Territorial Force in Scotland increase weekly by as much as 180 per cent over the figure for the last week in October. Numerically this was an increase from 1,429 for the week ending 28 October to 4,412 for the week ending 11 November, quite a significant increase when the recruitment figure for the army for the week ending 11 November was 3,214, some 1,198 less than that for the Territorials. This disparity between recruitment numbers for the army and the Territorial Force is all the more important when we consider that the Territorial Force was restricted in the number of recruits it could absorb: there was no provision to create new battalions other than second-line units of existing battalions and

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<sup>228</sup> NATS 1/398.

<sup>229</sup> T.M. Devine, *Exploring the Scottish Past: Themes in the History of Scottish Society*. p. 239.

this limited the numbers required. The army, with its increasing number of Service battalions, was the preferred method of expansion but it would appear that those from rural backgrounds chose the Territorial Force as the service of choice.<sup>230</sup> Far from rushing to the defence of the country through patriotism, agricultural workers were able to see enlistment as nothing more than a temporary occupation, a change in employers for a limited time only. They saw enlistment not as joining the army but as agreeing to a specific task for a specific time: war service only for the duration of the conflict.

In Scotland, with over 94 per cent of recruits coming from the industrial sector, there appears to have been a low initial response from the agricultural community. This contrasts sharply with J Winters belief that agriculture produced a high number of recruits in the early stages of the war.<sup>231</sup> In the first three months of the war, up until October 1914, Scottish agriculture produced only 3,000 recruits, 2.5 per cent of the Scottish total to that date. This accounted for only 2.8 per cent of the Scottish agricultural workforce and supports the argument that recruitment in Scotland was driven, initially at least, by economic pressures. With no contraction of the agricultural industry and no reduction in output there was therefore no enforced reduction in agricultural employment and consequently no mass recruitment movement. However, when viewed in a wider perspective the contribution from Scottish agriculture in the initial period of the war compares very favourably with that from other regions of the United Kingdom. In a speech to the House of Lords

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<sup>230</sup> This is further examined in Chapter 7, *Territorial Recruitment*.

<sup>231</sup> J. M. Winter 'Britain's "Lost Generation" of the First World War' in *Population Studies*. Vol xxxi. 1977. p. 453.

on Friday 8 January 1915, Viscount Middleton listed the ratio of recruits against the population for the various agricultural regions of the United Kingdom, for the first three months of the war:

In the North of Scotland the number of recruits was 93 per 10,000 of the population; in the West of England, 88 per 10,000, in the East of England, 80 per 10,000, and in the South and West of Ireland, 32 per 10,000 of the population.<sup>232</sup>

With Scotland's low agricultural recruitment level it is a further surprise when Scotland once again led the field, although only with a difference of 5.38 per cent. By April 1915 out of a male workforce in July 1914 of 119,000 permanently engaged in agriculture in Scotland, approximately 18,683 had joined the various branches of the armed forces. This accounted for 15.7 per cent of the male agricultural workforce. This is in comparison to a figure of 20.1 per cent enlistment from Scottish industry over the same period.<sup>233</sup> The initially slow reaction from the agricultural workers, tied as they were to their employers, declined after the November Fleeing (hiring) Fairs. The result was similar after the fairs in May 1915 when those contracted for a twelve month period became available.<sup>234</sup> The enlistment figure for male agricultural workers in England and Wales stood the same at 15.7 per cent, while the

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<sup>232</sup> Parliamentary Debates – Official Reports 1066 – 1918. House of Lords Vol XVIII, 1914 – 15 (Nov 11 – May 19) 351-2.

<sup>233</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...April 1915. Part ii Agriculture.* p 12-14.

<sup>234</sup> This is further examined in Chapter 7, *Territorial Recruitment.*

figure for industrial enlistment was only 17 per cent.<sup>235</sup>

By April 1915 the expansion of war industry in the lowlands and central belt meant that there was competition for labour and consequently agricultural labour was scarcer there than in the rural highlands. Scottish farmers were coping well at this time with no great crisis or labour shortage, other than horsemen. But the main fear was that there would be a shortage of casual Irish labour for the summer harvests. The shortfall in male agricultural labour was only 9,000 as those from other affected industries, such as mining and fishing, were finding temporary employment plentiful on the land. The situation had not altered greatly by July 1915 when the number of agricultural workers enlisted in the armed services stood at 19,278 or 16.2 per cent, an increase over three months of 595 men.<sup>236</sup> The percentage of agricultural workers enlisted in England and Wales had risen to 16.6 per cent over the same period. Enlistment from industry in Scotland was considerably higher, with an increase from 20.1 per cent in April 1915 to 24.2 per cent in July of the same year, 4.1 per cent above the British average.<sup>237</sup> By October 1915, however, there had been a significant increase in the number of agricultural workers enlisting. 4,165 men had enlisted since the previous July, giving a total of 23,443. This was an increase of 17.77 per cent over the three-month period, giving an overall figure for the industry of 19.7 per cent of the male workforce, corresponding favourably with the figure of 19 per cent for England

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<sup>235</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...April 1915. Part ii Agriculture.* p 12-14.

<sup>236</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...July 1915.* p 1-2.

<sup>237</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...July 1915.* p 4.

and Wales.<sup>238</sup> This increase was once again the result of the half yearly employment cycle for single men.<sup>239</sup>

While the enlistment percentage for industry was continually greater than that for agriculture it should be noted that the proportion of men of military age was greater in industry and therefore the percentage of those of military age who enlisted was greater in agriculture than industry. By January 1916, 21.9 per cent of male agricultural workers in Scotland had enlisted, 26,061 men. This accounted for 5.96 per cent of the Scottish total for the voluntary period of 437,035.<sup>240</sup> This contribution is, however, disproportionate when account is taken of the relative age group of agricultural workers. As Dr Dewey has already pointed out, a greater proportion of agricultural workers were out-with military age. To achieve an enlistment figure of over 20 per cent meant that a disproportionately high percentage of young men of military age had enlisted. In this case the true sacrifice of the young is not reflected in the cold figures.

## COMMERCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL WORKERS

In an effort to stimulate recruitment from the commercial or middle classes Lord Curzon toured Scotland in early September 1914. While he was addressing a meeting in St Andrews Hall, Glasgow, on 10 September, accompanied by Mr Mckinnon-Wood, Secretary of State for Scotland, the crowd of 5,000 demonstrated against the Lord Provost, Sir Daniel Stevenson, who was chairing the meeting. The demonstration was against the lack of

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<sup>238</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...October 1915.* p 1-2.

<sup>239</sup> Chapter 5. Chapter 9.

<sup>240</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...January 1916.* p 2.

action being taken by the Lord Provost in support of the war, and in particular the lack of action taken against the professional sector which was seen to be holding back.<sup>241</sup> That evening Lord Curzon addressed an audience in Aberdeen and lambasted the low numbers coming forward in that city. The following day on Friday 11 September there was to be a speech in Dundee by Lord Curzon in support of recruitment. This was during the peak month of Scottish voluntary recruitment but there was trepidation among the civic dignitaries as to the context of Lord Curzon's speech. The fear in Dundee was that he would feel compelled to criticise the city over the low recruitment numbers for the New Armies and the poor response to the raising of a Dundee 'pals' battalion.<sup>242</sup> Excuses were put forward in the local press on the afternoon prior to Lord Curzon's appearance and were direct in apportioning blame regarding low local enlistment: 'the blame must lie with the young professional element. This is the class which has not come up to the expectation, and this is the class which tonight's meeting must touch. The labouring and artisan community have done their share'.<sup>243</sup>

This apathy shown by the commercial classes, of which Dundee is only an example and not an exception, was further highlighted in the city when, in November, Major Cappon, recruiting officer for Dundee and district, was forced to cancel, for the second week running, a recruitment meeting aimed at the commercial classes in the city. 'Last night the amount of interest that is taken by the shop-keeping classes in the greatest crisis through which the

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<sup>241</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 11 September 1914.

<sup>242</sup> Discussed further in chapter 6.

<sup>243</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 11 September 1914.

country has ever passed was reflected in the fact that two men formed the audience'.<sup>244</sup> In Glasgow it was announced on 1 September that 'Clerks - solicitors and stockbrokers clerks especially - have not shown the same readiness to fight their country's battles at this time of stress as others'.<sup>245</sup>

On Wednesday 30 December 1914 the figures for Scottish bank clerks who had enlisted were published: a total of 1,058. These were distributed amongst the various banks as follows...Bank of Scotland 157, Union Bank 144, National Bank 143, Commercial Bank 140, British Linen Bank 134, Royal Bank of Scotland 130, North of Scotland and Town and County 125, and the Clydesdale Bank 85. With approximately 5,942 bank clerks in Scotland this amounted to some 17.8 per cent of the total figure. While not as high as that for miners, the percentage of bank clerks enlisting compared favourably with that of agricultural workers. Both groups of workers were under no financial pressure to enlist with little or no contraction within their field of employment. In truth the reluctance of bank employees to enlist in large numbers, with employers giving enlistment bounties, subsidised wage levels for those who enlisted, and future job security with their positions held open, only helps to reinforce the point that mass recruitment was driven by direct economic necessity. Even all the incentives given were not enough to shift the entrenched middle classes. The recruitment figure for Scottish bank clerks was low in comparison to other United Kingdom regions: in London, for

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<sup>244</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 26 November 1914.

<sup>245</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 1 September 1914.

example, between 20 and 25 per cent of bank clerks had enlisted by February 1915.<sup>246</sup>

By April 1915, 12.8 per cent of Scottish Local Authority male clerical staff had enlisted, a figure of 1,248. This was a low percentage when compared with the other local authority districts in the United Kingdom, with only Ireland producing a lower figure of 8.5 per cent. As is shown by figure 3:13, London and the South Eastern districts led the way with 20.8 per cent and 19.9 per cent respectively.<sup>247</sup>

**FIG 3:13 Local Authority recruitment figures.**<sup>248</sup>

District	Number employed July 1914	% Enlisted April 1915	% Enlisted July 1915	% Enlisted October 1915
London	5200	20.8%	28.4%	29.9%
South Eastern	8600	19.9%	27.3%	31.5%
South Western	4400	14.3%	20.5%	22.2%
West Midlands	5400	15.8%	21.2%	25.9%
East Midlands	2900	12.2%	21.5%	24.8%
Yorkshire	6600	13.9%	22.6%	22%
North Western	11800	14.7%	19.0%	22.5%
Northern	2400	12.1%	27.3%	26.7%
Wales	3100	12.8%	18.6%	20.4%
Scotland	10600	13.9%	19.4%	19.3%
Ireland	1500	8.5%	11.7%	17.2%
United Kingdom	62500	16.4%	21.8%	24.1%

The Scottish figure had increased by July 1915 to 19.4 per cent or 2,056 men, still below the United Kingdom figure of 21.8 per cent, but not significantly so. By October 1915 the number stood at 19.3 per cent or 2,045 recruits, virtually unchanged from the previous July. With an enlistment rate for the first nine

<sup>246</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...February 1915.* Cd 7850.

<sup>247</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...April 1915.* p 2.

<sup>248</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...August 1914 - October 1915.*

months of the war of only 12.8 per cent, a comparison with the industrial figure of 24.2 per cent for the same period shows that at least one section of Scotland's commercial and professional classes was in no hurry to enlist, more so when compared with other groups of Scottish Local Authority employees. As in the case of agricultural workers, the clerical employees had no financial or economic reason to enlist; they were in secure employment. Within other Scottish Local Authority departments there were varying degrees of enlistment rates. By April 1915 the Glasgow Tramways Department had provided 1,958 recruits, 33.1 per cent of its workforce; Aberdeen Tramways had provided 99 recruits, 35 per cent of the workforce; Edinburgh Electricity Department had provided 69 men, 30 per cent of the employees; and Dundee Electricity Department had contributed 62 men, 28.4 per cent of the male employees. However, on the opposite side of the coin Arbroath Burgh Engineers Department lost 21 per cent of its workforce, but only 3 per cent enlisted, the others finding more lucrative employment, while it was also noted that Glasgow Corporation Art Gallery made no contribution to Scottish recruitment.<sup>249</sup> By July 1915 some 2,348 Glasgow Tramways staff had enlisted, with the number rising to 2,480 or 42 per cent by October of the same year. Edinburgh Tramways had produced 392 recruits by October 1915, 33.6 per cent of its male workforce. In the same period, August 1914 to October 1915 some 108 male teachers employed by Edinburgh Education Authority, 30 per cent, had enlisted.<sup>250</sup>

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<sup>249</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...April 1915. Part iii. p 2-4.*

<sup>250</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...August 1914 - October 1915.*

The idea that clerical workers were quick to enlist, served longer, and as a consequence were at greater risk than the working class or industrial recruit does not appear to hold true in Scotland. The claim by J. Winter, that 'The highest enlistment rates among employees in the early months of the conflict were registered by men in commercial and clerical occupations',<sup>251</sup> does not apply to Scotland. The figure used by Winter includes 35 per cent of those employed as stock exchange clerks which inflates the figure and gives a bias towards English totals. The notion that, 'men engaged in commercial or distributive trades were in uniform and at risk for longer periods and in relatively larger numbers than were industrial workers, transport workers or agricultural workers',<sup>252</sup> similarly does not apply to Scotland. As we have seen, Scotland's heavy industry bore the initial burden of national recruitment.

In Scotland it appears that those in 'economically safe' employment were reluctant to come forward and it was to them that the policy of coercion was directed in 1915. There was a policy of denigrating certain jobs as being fit only for women, with the inference that young men in those positions were shirking their duties by hiding behind the skirts of women. Chief among those to be attacked in this manner were shop assistants and those in the commercial sector, positions which could easily be filled by women with little training. In another attempt to stimulate recruitment from the commercial sector, it was argued that it was a woman's duty to do what she could to help recruiting and she could do this by collecting her own supplies from the

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<sup>251</sup> J.M. Winter, 'Britain's Lost Generation of the First World War', in *Population Studies*, Vol. xxi, 1977, p. 454.

<sup>252</sup> J.M. Winter, 'Britain's Lost Generation' p. 454.

grocers thereby freeing the shop delivery staff for military service.<sup>253</sup> At a meeting of the Glasgow Territorial Force Association on 4 May 1915 the Earl of Errol, commanding the Second Line of the Lowland Brigade, announced that 'there were many young men in shops such as drapers, handing out bits of ribbon - work which was really for women. Those men would be better employed serving their country.'<sup>254</sup>

The alternative, that of replacing skilled men, would require a longer training period and, more importantly, could provoke industrial unrest at a time when maximum output was required. Indeed when women were gradually introduced to sectors of Scottish industry, they were fiercely resisted as they meant dilution of traditional skills and were seen by many as a direct attack on the trade union movement itself. There seems to be no basis, in Scotland at least, for the claim by J. Winter that 'No sombre thoughts of trenches and gas masks troubled the clerks and greengrocers, teachers and farmers, manufacturers and publicans who joined up by the thousand in the first months of the war'.<sup>255</sup>

## REGIONAL VARIATIONS

Within Scotland there were regional variations in recruitment, variations between east and west, industrial regions and agricultural counties. The returns from those counties which had a high proportion of agricultural workers reflected the low recruitment from agriculture. The county of

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<sup>253</sup> *The Evening Citizen*, 31 August 1914.

<sup>254</sup> *The Scotsman*, 5 May 1915,

<sup>255</sup> J. Winter, 'Army and Society'. p. 198.

Aberdeen, with a male population of 147,357 of which 21,394 or 14.51 per cent were employed in agriculture, produced in August 1914 only 885 recruits or 3.2 per cent of the Scottish total of 27,398 for that month.<sup>256</sup> This amounted to 0.6 per cent of the 1911 male population of the county. By the end of September the recruitment figure had increased to 1,440 but had fallen to only 2 per cent of the Scottish total to that date. The percentage of the male population of the county was still low, standing at 0.97 per cent. Forfar, with a male population of 54,590, employed 7,995 or 14.64 per cent in agriculture. August 1914 produced 56 recruits for the regular army, 0.2 per cent of the Scottish monthly total and only 0.1 per cent of the male population of the county.<sup>257</sup> While the figures had increased by the end of September they were still among the lowest in the country: 196 recruits representing 0.27 per cent of the Scottish total and only 0.35 per cent of the males in the county. Inverness, with a male population of 42,440 and an agricultural workforce of 8,936 or 21.05 per cent, produced, in August, only 138 recruits. While this was considerably better than Forfar, it was only 0.5 per cent of the Scottish total and only 0.32 of the male population. By the end of September 0.66 per cent of the local male population had enlisted, 282 men, accounting for 0.39 per cent of the Scottish total. By the end of September 1914 the three main agricultural regions in Scotland had produced less than 1 per cent of their male population as recruits. With a combined male population of 244,387, which was 10.58 per cent of the national total, they had contributed only

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<sup>256</sup> Census 1911. NATS 1/398.

<sup>257</sup> Census 1911. NATS 1/398.

1,918 men to the new armies, 0.78 per cent of their male population, or 2.7 per cent of the Scottish recruitment total for the first two months of the war.<sup>258</sup> In sharp contrast to the low recruitment rate of the agricultural regions those areas which were predominantly industrial provided a higher percentage of recruits and contributed a higher percentage of their male population. Michael Carver informs us that 'Recruiting varied considerably across the country [Britain] , the bulk coming from the industrial north. Lancashire, Yorkshire and Scotland produced over a third of the 250 battalions in the first three New Armies'.<sup>259</sup> The industrial counties of Lanark and Ayr produced, in the initial months, over 50 per cent of Scotland's recruits for the New Armies. The two counties, with a combined male population of 851,565 provided, in August, 14,375 recruits, 1.6 per cent of their male population and 52.46 per cent of the Scottish monthly recruiting total. By 30 September the number of recruits had risen to 39,977 or 4.69 per cent of their male population accounting for 56.54 per cent of the Scottish total to that date.<sup>260</sup> This is shown in figure 3:14. Figures 3:14 and 3:15 are intended primarily as a visual indication showing that the three most agricultural counties in Scotland (Aberdeen, Forfar, Inverness) provided only 2.7 per cent of the recruits in the September 1914 'surge' while the two most industrial counties (Lanark, Ayr) provided 56.5 per cent.

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<sup>258</sup> Census 1911. NATS 1/398.

<sup>259</sup> M. Carver, *Britain's Army in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*. p. 40.

<sup>260</sup> Census 1911. NATS 1/398.

Percentage Recruitment 30 September 1914




Fig. 3:14

Percentage of Scottish Male Population 1914




Fig. 3:15

If we compare the total male population of Scotland with the recruitment figures for the same two periods, August and September 1914, we can clearly

see that recruitment figures for the agricultural regions were well below average while the figures for industrial Scotland were well above average (figure 3:15). By 31 August Scotland had contributed 1.18 per cent of her male population to the new armies. The three agricultural counties in question had contributed only 0.04 per cent of their combined male population, while the industrial counties produced 1.6 per cent of their male population. September presented a similar picture. With Scotland having contributed 3.06 per cent of her male population, the contribution from Aberdeen, Forfar and Inverness had increased to 0.78 per cent of their male population, and Lanark and Ayr contributed 4.69 per cent of their male population. The industrial counties of Lanark and Ayr, with over 36 per cent of Scotland's male population, were contributing a disproportionately high number of recruits, over 56 per cent, due mainly to the contraction of industry and the economic needs of its workforce.

**FIG 3:16 August 1914 to April 1915<sup>261</sup>**

<b>Counties</b>	<b># of recruits</b>	<b># of male pop'</b>	<b>% of male pop'</b>
<b>Aberdeen</b>	15974	147357	10.84
<b>Argyll</b>	3556	35426	10.03
<b>Ayr</b>	12409	130196	9.53
<b>Banff</b>	2068	29755	6.95
<b>Berwick</b>	1718	14192	12.10
<b>Bute</b>	608	8009	7.59
<b>Caithness</b>	1765	15156	11.64
<b>Clackmannan</b>	1697	14657	11.57
<b>Dumbarton</b>	6847	69718	9.82
<b>Dumfries</b>	3233	35024	9.23
<b>Elgin</b>	2915	20493	14.22
<b>Fife</b>	15479	132133	11.71
<b>Forfar</b>	12225	126638	9.65
<b>Haddington</b>	2295	21463	10.69
<b>Inverness</b>	5994	42440	14.12
<b>Kincardine</b>	873	19760	4.41
<b>Kinross</b>	224	3617	6.19
<b>Kirkcudbright</b>	1648	18069	9.12
<b>Lanark</b>	90874	721369	12.59
<b>Linlithgow</b>	2810	42727	6.57
<b>Midlothian</b>	38539	235427	16.36
<b>Nairn</b>	351	4330	8.10
<b>Orkney</b>	941	12251	7.68
<b>Peebles</b>	1204	7066	17.03
<b>Perth</b>	10790	58364	18.48
<b>Renfrew</b>	10036	151661	6.61
<b>Ross &amp; Cromarty</b>	4079	38763	10.52
<b>Roxburgh</b>	2386	21583	11.05
<b>Selkirk</b>	1377	11332	12.15
<b>Stirling</b>	8801	82335	10.68
<b>Sutherland</b>	1516	9861	15.37
<b>Wigtown</b>	737	15078	4.88
<b>Zetland</b>	516	12589	4.09
<b>Total</b>	266485	2308839	11.54

Figure 3:16 shows the number of recruits per Scottish county enlisted for the armed forces by 30 April 1915. It also shows the percentage of the male population of those counties enlisted in the period 4 August 1914 to 30 April 1915. This gives a combined figure for the New Armies and the Territorial Force. Of the twelve counties which provided more than the national percentage of 11.54 per cent of the male population, only two, Lanark and

<sup>261</sup> Census 1911. PRO 1/398.

Midlothian, could be termed industrial. The other ten were agricultural counties, ranging from Peebles and Selkirk in the borders to Caithness in the north. The main industrial counties, Lanark, with 90,874 recruits or 12.59 per cent of the male population, and Midlothian, with 38,359 or 16.36 per cent of the male population, provided 48.56 per cent of Scottish recruits in that period, a total of 129,413 men. Indeed, 77.4 per cent of the Scottish total was raised by only eight counties; Aberdeen, Ayr, Fife, Forfar, Lanark, Midlothian, Perth, and Renfrew. What was significant was the difference between the number from each county in all arms of the services and the number raised for the army. As we shall see in later chapters, while the industrial counties provided the majority of the recruits for the New Armies the agricultural counties provided a correspondingly high figure for the Territorial Force.

These figures can be broken down by region. Highland Counties – (Argyll, Caithness, Inverness, Perth, Orkney, Ross & Cromarty, Shetland, Sutherland) had male population of 224,850 and a recruitment figure of 29,157 (13 per cent of the male population). Northeast – (Aberdeen, Banff, Elgin, Kincardine, Nairn) had a male population of 221,695 and a recruitment figure of 22,181 (10 per cent of the male population). West Lowlands – (Ayr, Bute, Dumbarton, Lanark, Renfrew) had a male population of 1,080,953 with 120,774 recruits (11 per cent of the male population). East Lowlands – (Forfar (Angus), Clackmannan, Haddington, Fife, Kinross, Edinburgh, Stirling, Linlithgow) with a male population of 658,997 provided 82,070 recruits (12.5 per cent of the male population). Southern Counties – (Berwick, Dumfries, Kirkcudbright,

Peebles, Roxburgh, Selkirk, Wigtown) with a male population of 122,344 provided 12,303 recruits (10 per cent of the male population).<sup>262</sup>

## Conclusion

In this chapter we have looked at individual sectors containing Scotland's manpower resources, but of equal interest is how they relate to each other in terms of recruitment. Perhaps the most logical approach is to view contributions over time. By October 1914 Scotland had provided 118,141 recruits with 90.8 per cent, 107,276, coming from industry. In the same period Scottish agriculture provided 3,000 recruits, 2.5 per cent of the total, while the commercial sector provided 7865 recruits, 6.65 per cent. The total for Scottish recruitment had increased to 210,409 recruits by April 1915, an increase of 78 per cent from the previous October. Although industry still provided the highest contribution, 163,352 recruits or 77.6 per cent of the total, this was only a 52 per cent increase from October, and proportionally the industrial contribution was in decline. The contribution from agriculture had increased by over 450 per cent, to 16,799 recruits or 8 per cent of the Scottish total, while the number of recruits from the commercial sector had increased to 14.3 per cent of the total, a rise of 284 per cent, or 30,258 recruits.<sup>263</sup>

The total for Scottish recruitment had risen to over a quarter of a million men by July 1915. Twelve months of war had produced 251,534 recruits in Scotland. However, the proportion of industrial recruitment had fallen to 70

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<sup>262</sup> Census 1911. PRO 1/398.

<sup>263</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...various Dates*. NATS 1/398. 1/399.

per cent, 176,970 men. Agriculture, while providing 17,334 recruits, a numerical increase over April, also suffered a reduction in proportional representation; down to 6.9 per cent. The largest change was in the commercial sector which saw its contribution increase to 57,250 recruits, 22.7 per cent of the total.<sup>264</sup>

**FIG 3:17 Recruitment comparison.**<sup>265</sup>




Figure 3:17 clearly shows the pattern of recruitment for the three sections of Scottish manpower. It shows that recruitment from industry increased sharply until April 1915 and thereafter maintained a steady but much reduced level of increase. Agriculture on the other hand began with a relatively low increase and then levelled off after April 1915. Both industry and agriculture provided

<sup>264</sup> *Report on the State of Employment...Various Dates.* NATS 1/399.

<sup>265</sup> NATS 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.

the bulk of their recruits in the first nine months of the war but to vastly different degrees. Commerce maintained a low steady rise throughout, without peaks or troughs, a steady sustained level of recruitment with the same level of rise after twelve months of war as at the start.

This should be seen as further evidence of the part played by economics in stimulating recruitment. The sector of the Scottish workforce which suffered the greatest economic hardship, the industrial sector, was the sector which provided the greatest initial response. That response tapered off once industry began to recover and the threat of economic hardship within industry began to diminish. Agriculture, with no economic push, provided a low recruitment response. Commerce provided a low initial response, despite popular belief to the contrary, but maintained a steady, if uninspiring, rise fuelled by pressure and in some cases financial inducement.

The thousands of workers who enlisted in the early period in an effort to avoid economic hardship paid a heavy and unseen price in support of their families. The repeated calls by the Secretary of State for War, Kitchener, for 100,000 men, for the duration only, with the promise of a long training period, was a godsend to those facing financial hardship. The initial willingness of employers to see their men enlist and the promise that jobs would, in some cases, be held open, encouraged others in menial, dirty, and low-paid employment to take the opportunity of a break. Patriotic ideals had little pull on the middle or working classes and even *less* on those struggling to survive on the fringes of society.

Each sector of Scottish society reacted in a different manner to the manpower needs of Britain. We have seen that Scotland's industrial working classes provided the majority of the initial recruits, and, although recruitment levels from industry reduced over time, contributions throughout the voluntary period continued to be high. Scotland's agricultural workforce, in contrast, provided a more measured response to the crisis, enlisting only when current employment contracts ended. 'Patriotism' or 'war fever' was not enough to compensate for the loss of accrued income or to overcome the threat of hardship for families. Industrial workers enlisted to relieve hardship, while agricultural workers rejected enlistment for the same reasons. Scotland's commercial, or middle, classes were slow in coming forward to enlist, and were the group which needed prompting the most. They provided a steady, if low, level of recruitment as economic stability had to be overcome by outside pressure and appeals to individual conscience. This chapter has shown the validity of Ferguson's economic factors, at least as applied to Scotland, and that in Scotland Peter Dewey's economic theories on recruitment do not apply.

## CHAPTER 4

### RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGN

The announcement in August 1914 of the formation of a New Army, or 'K1' as it became known, brought forth the initial flood of recruits, which in Scotland at least tended to be those who were readily available. In Dundee, on 5 August, the Nethergate recruiting office was 'throughout the day practically invaded by men of all classes offering their services'.<sup>254</sup> While on 8 August it was reported that 'the rush at the Glasgow recruiting office continued, and the police had difficulty in getting hundreds of intending soldiers to wait in the queues till their turn came'.<sup>255</sup>

These statements have to be looked at in the spirit in which they were written, to promote recruitment and at the same time raise public morale. While there may have been large crowds 'outside' the recruiting office in Dundee, only 42 men were tempted to enter the office and enlist in the New Armies in the first five days of the war.<sup>256</sup> In all fairness to Dundee, the city had provided high numbers of pre-war recruits for the British army which had, over time, created within the city a high number of reservists. It was these men who constituted the 'throng' outside the recruiting office as they awaited news of their call up. This phenomenon was not confined to Dundee. Large numbers of reservists reported to recruiting offices nation-wide, creating, in Scotland at least, the

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<sup>254</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 6 August 1914.

<sup>255</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 8 August 1914.

<sup>256</sup> NATS 1/398.

false impression of a patriotic recruitment rush. In sharp contrast to the numbers of recruits coming forward for the New Armies was the large number of French, German and Austrian nationals, reservists mostly, trying to register at their respective embassies for military service.

The call for a Second New Army came at the end of August and a Third New Army in the second week of September. Both of these New Armies coincided with the increase in recruitment numbers, and the ready availability of industrial manpower ensured that many, but not all, of the new service battalions quickly reached their full complement. In Glasgow and Edinburgh recruits were still needed in November to complete service battalions created in September 1914.

From the outset the recruiting offices were inundated with enquires but enlistment rates did not match enquiry rates. It was a gradual process to increase enlistment numbers in the initial few days. The recruiting office in Edinburgh's Cockburn Street opened both day and night in an effort to encourage recruits. Recruitment in Edinburgh seems to have been very select, with a number of the Faculty of Advocates in that city offering to enlist in the opening days of the war, but only for 'clerical duties'.<sup>257</sup> Perhaps this is an example of the lack of reality felt among some recruits in the initial period: the false idea that temporary volunteers would be used only in support roles with the actual fighting being left to the Regular Army.

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<sup>257</sup> *The Scotsman*, 8 August 1914.

## RECRUITING CAMPAIGN

The recruitment campaign, took many forms. Leaflets, billboards, posters, films, route marches, bands and rallies were all part of the machinery of recruitment. On 4 September 1914, Shand's Picture Palace, Forfar, was showing 'two great military films' and running an extended promotional campaign for *The Two Sergeants* and also *The Test*, billed as 'a thrilling story of the Boer War'.<sup>258</sup> Other cinemas across Scotland were showing such films as *The Battle of Gettysburg* and *The Great Naval Mystery*. In George Square, Glasgow, James Dalrymple erected an outdoor cinema with the sole aim of promoting recruitment in the city. Another use of cinema in the propaganda campaign was the showing of cinematographic views of Belgium, in particular Antwerp and its forts, in conjunction with speeches by prominent citizens such as the Marquis of Graham and P. Collins MP urging support for 'little Belgium'. Cinema was also used to show films of local battalions training in an effort to stimulate recruitment: friends and relatives would queue to see well known faces and, it was hoped, feel a duty to enlist.

By November 1914 recruiting posters were being produced as lantern slides and being shown in the picture houses during intervals in the main programme. Within the programme there were patriotic songs, military tableaux and public appeals by local dignitaries in an attempt to stimulate recruitment.

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<sup>258</sup> *The Forfar Dispatch*, 3 September 1914.

**FIG 4:1 Kitchener was depicted on many different posters.**

**Example of early recruiting poster September/October 1914**



Robert Irvine recalls that it was at this time when he was swept up in the feeling of war enthusiasm, often mistaken for patriotism.

When Lord Kitchener's pointing finger was on every hoarding throughout the country – "Your King and Country Needs You" – I was one of the innocents who was enmeshed in the web of patriotism at the First World War. I was only a shop assistant at the time, and on reflection I think it was more that I wanted to escape from the humdrum life behind a grocer's counter and see a bit of the country.<sup>259</sup>

There is no doubt that the psychological effect of Lord Kitchener's personal appeal as portrayed in Alfred Leete's famous poster, depicting Kitchener's face and pointing finger, had a direct effect on some recruits. However, the picture was not published until 5 September, as a front cover for *London Opinion*. The design was then issued in postcard format for sale at 1s 4d per hundred, and the poster, as it became known, was not issued until late September 1914, after the initial numerically high recruiting period was over.<sup>260</sup> Therefore its prime function was to exert pressure on those who remained after the first rush. Prior to this the recruiting posters had consisted of the banner headline, 'YOUR KING AND COUNTRY NEED YOU', and told prospective recruits that 'Full information can be obtained at any Post Office in the Kingdom or at any Military depot'.<sup>261</sup> The initial posters were dull and drab and did little to stimulate recruitment, being mostly of an informative nature rather than attempting to make any social or moral statement.

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<sup>259</sup> R. Irvine in MacDougall, *Voices from War and some Labour Struggles*. p. 28.

<sup>260</sup> P. Simkins, *Kitchener's Army*. p. 122-3.

<sup>261</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 8 August 1914.

**FIG 4:2 One of the earliest posters depicting Scottish soldiers - 1914.**





FIG 4:3 One of the earliest posters depicting a kilted soldier standing in a Belgian village - 1914



The Parliamentary Recruiting Committee came into being on 27 August 1914 and, as the military recruiting mechanism could not cope, from the start, through its General Purposes Committee, attempted to co-ordinate a national recruiting campaign.<sup>262</sup> In Scotland this was directed from joint offices in Glasgow and Edinburgh, and included the co-ordination of a programme of political rallies throughout Scotland. A sub-department dealing with publications was quickly set up on 31 August which as part of its duties arranged for recruiting posters to be printed locally bearing messages aimed at specific districts and specific groups. The poster campaign initiated by the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee was given a distinctly personalised flavour by the use of local printers producing posters with local place names and connotations. Thus a poster which in one part of the country might say 'MEN OF EDINBURGH ENLIST NOW' would be changed to 'MEN OF AYRSHIRE' or whatever name fitted at the time.

Figures 4:2 and 4:3 depict the only two posters issued on a grand scale by the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee which depicted overtly Scottish scenes, but there was no call to rally round Scotland - only a bland statement for 'King and Country' or a call to support the 'British Empire'. However, both of these posters were available in other parts of Britain with the figures clad differently. In all other instances the figures were presented in the same format but wearing normal khaki issue uniforms. It was evidently felt that recruiting in Scotland needed the impetus which could be provided by a play

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<sup>262</sup> R. Douglas, 'Voluntary Enlistment in the First World War and the Work of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee', in *Journal of Modern History*. 1976. p. 568.

on national identity. The committee published nation-wide over two million posters and some twenty million leaflets by March 1915.<sup>263</sup> They co-ordinated speaking tours for local MPs and other local dignitaries as well as placing thousands of recruiting advertisements in local and national newspapers. Recruiting posters with a direct appeal were not limited to the famous Kitchener poster. There were others: 'Your comrades at the front are looking out for you. Do not disappoint them' and 'Why leave all the honour to others? Do your part and claim your share.'<sup>264</sup> Recruiting posters and pamphlets were to be found everywhere – taxis, buses, billboards, pillar boxes, every spare piece of brickwork or hoarding.

Another innovation was recruiting vans touring the outlying districts of rural Scotland in an attempt to enlist those men who had been unable to walk the long distance to regional recruiting offices. For the first time in the history of the Glasgow Tramways Department, James Dalrymple, General Manager, allowed its tramcars to carry advertisements. On the passenger-carrying cars these took the shape of posters or banners, exhorting the young men of Glasgow to join the Highland Light Infantry and promoting the recruiting office set up by Dalrymple at the tramways offices within 46 Bath Street. On the maintenance tramcars however, where there was no need to leave the windows uncovered, huge murals were painted on the sides depicting patriotic or military scenes to promote the war effort. As a more subtle technique of recruitment Dalrymple sent illuminated tramcars on tours of the

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<sup>263</sup> R. Douglas, 'Voluntary Enlistment'. p. 568.

<sup>264</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 12 November, 1915.

streets of Glasgow, with bands concealed inside in an effort to stir the suburbs into action. This may have provided entertainment for the population of Glasgow but must have been torture for those bandsmen trapped in the rising heat of a tramcar, wrapped in tarpaulin and festooned with hundreds of lights, each adding to the heat and discomfort. As a means of raising recruits there is no record of how effective this was, but it was stopped after a short period. As well as advertisements for the 15th battalion Highland Light Infantry the tramcars also carried advertisements for the Cameron Highlanders.

**FIG 4:4 Bayonet charge depicted on the side of tramways maintenance cars.**



Glasgow, at this time, was not alone in using its tramcars to promote recruitment. Not to be outdone, Edinburgh took this concept one stage further by converting one of its tramcars into a mobile recruiting station, complete with recruiting sergeant, doctor, and justice of the peace.

A new method of attracting recruits was put into operation yesterday through the Edinburgh and District Tramway Company. A car, decorated by Sir Robert Maule with the flags of the 'Allies' – Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium and Japan – and pictures of the King and Queen, was run over different routes of the system. In the front of the car were the words conspicuously placed 'To Berlin via France', and at the back 'Take your seats for Berlin'. A piper – one of the company's employees – played music on the top of the car, and inside or on the footboard was the recruiting sergeant who was ready to attend to all who were willing to give their services. A justice of the peace was also in attendance.<sup>265</sup>

This tramcar travelled the various routes of the city and suburbs, stopping at all key points to drum up trade, the objects here being to catch the spontaneous recruits before they had time to reconsider, and to reduce the period between a volunteer announcing his willingness to enlist and his eventual, if ever, arrival at a recruitment office.

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<sup>265</sup> *The Scotsman*, 1 October 1914.

Route marches by local units or those units in training were used as a means of raising public awareness and advertised well in advance to enable the population to come out and see the local battalion. Such marches could last for several days, even weeks, with the men staying in the local drill halls and fed by the communities that they were visiting. Local children were employed to walk the streets ahead of the troops, carrying placards announcing the number of recruits required for the various units engaged in the route march. Regimental musicians were used at mass public gatherings to drum up trade for the recruiters. Football matches were prime targets. At some there were such histrionic scenes as the burning of a 'fiery cross' in a blatant attempt to arouse Celtic nationalism. Route marches and recruiting meetings were designed to be entertainment events, to attract an audience and hold its attention long enough to get the main message across.

FIG 4:5 Details of a route march in July 1915.<sup>266</sup>

### 3rd 5th BLACK WATCH.

Present Headquarters at Forfar.

## Recruiting March

A PARTY of 100 Men with Officers Non-Commissioned Officers and the Pipe Band of the Battalion intend to visit the following Towns and Districts on about the dates annexed for the purpose of enrolling fit men of good character to train for reinforcements for the 1st/5th Battalion in France.

Age 19-40. Height 5 ft 2 ins. and up.

Not under 33 inches chest.

FRIDAY, 9th July,	TANNADICE.
SATURDAY, 10th July,	KIRRIEMUIR
SUNDAY, 11th July,	NEWTYLE.
MONDAY, 12th July,	DUNDEE
TUESDAY, 13th July,	MONIFIETH
WEDNESDAY, 14th July,	CARNOUSTIE.
THURSDAY, 15th July,	ARBROATH.
FRIDAY, 16th July,	FRIOCKHEIM.
SATURDAY, 17th July,	BRECHIN.
SUNDAY, 18th July,	EDZELL,
MONDAY, 19th July,	MONTROSE.
TUESDAY, 20th July,	CHAPELTON
WEDNESDAY, 21st July,	LETHAM.
THURSDAY, 22nd July,	FORFAR.
FRIDAY, 23rd July,	
SATURDAY, 24th July,	
SUNDAY, 25th July,	
MONDAY, 26th July,	
TUESDAY, 27th July,	
WEDNESDAY, 28th July,	

GOD SAVE THE KING.

Poetry, in its popular form, was used as jingoistic symbolism to promote or stimulate recruitment and was much loved by the popular press. Poems in the popular press were intended to create or shape mass public opinion, to embarrass those who were hanging back and to work on the psyche of the undecided.

<sup>266</sup> Forfar Herald, 9 July 1915.

'SCOTS WHA HAE'  
The Shirkers Version

We're Scots wha ne'er for Britain bled,  
Scots wha'm French has never led,  
An' care mair for oor cosy bed,  
Than ony victory.

This is no the day nor hour;  
Wait till winters storms are owre,  
We'll aiblins then smash Wilhelm's power,  
And show our bravery.

It's graund to read o' foemen brave,  
An' glorious fechtin' by the lave,  
But lists o' wounded mak' us grave,  
An sweer to cross the sea.

We're unco prood o' King and law'  
But nothing moves us like fitba',  
Sae ither men the sword may draw,  
And keep us safe and free.

Lay the Prussian Junkers low,  
An' we'll see'd a' in a picter show,  
Hoo oor brave billies struck their blow,  
An' dared to do or die.

Sae let puir Belgium thole her pains,  
An' mourn for murdered wives and weans,  
We dinna care to risk oor banes,  
Or fecht to set her free.<sup>267</sup>

Others were aimed at the middle, or commercial, classes which were seen to be slow in coming forward for military service.

Your King and Country Need You  
Fall In, Scotsmen.

'Buck up, business men, rally to the call.  
Merchants, bankers, tea-room swankers, lawyers' clerks, and all.  
You must fall in, or fall under.  
Do it now, or you will blunder.  
Plug a notice on the door,  
Will be back when war is o'er.  
And join Kitchener's brave little army.

"Scotland for ever!" it's a dandy battle cry.  
"Scotland for ever," our colonial sons reply.  
Our old flag and freedom,  
The tyrant ne'er will sever.  
We'll fight to the finish,  
boys, Scotland for ever."<sup>268</sup>

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<sup>267</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 26 November 1914.

<sup>268</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 7 September 1914.

The majority of poems printed in the newspapers were aimed directly at those who had held back from enlisting, contained no finesse, and were designed to promote embarrassment and a personal sense of shame in an attempt to coerce recruitment. As well as poems there were other literary attempts at encouraging recruitment.

FIG 4:6 As early as 3 September 1914 these vignettes were used to stimulate recruitment.<sup>269</sup>

## CHAMPIONS OF THE KING

(Scene—Forfar Cross)

**JAMES:** "Well, Andy, it seems the post of honour is open to us all to-day."

**ANDREW:** "Yes; and my girl says that I am in danger of disgrace if I delay any longer."

**JAMES:** "Ah! you may be sure of truth and wisdom when Mary speaks. Besides, even Alec is at the front,—and he is a socialist!"

**ANDREW:** "Aye, if ever a fight was just and right, Britain's is to-day!"

**JAMES:** That point being clear, shall we follow David to the Artillery, William to the Cavalry, Charlie to the Gordons, or Robert to the Black Watch?"

**ANDREW:** "I have not decided; but the Recruiting Sergeant will advise us regarding the Regiment which our qualifications suit best."

**JAMES (joined by chorus of fifty more):** "All right! We will meet after tea, and call on

**COL.-SERGT. D. OSLER,**  
(Black Watch),  
**RECRUITING SERGEANT,**  
**DRILL HALL,**  
**FORFAR.**

## GOD SAVE THE KING

<sup>269</sup> Forfar Dispatch, 3 September 1914.

Another facet of the orchestrated recruitment campaign was the publishing in the local press of letters purporting to be from those at the front to relatives and calling for those single men left at home to enlist. In a letter published in *The Scotsman* and headlined 'Leith Soldier's Appeal For Recruits', Private W. Keenan, 2nd Royal Scots, managed to fulfil two roles with the one letter. In the first part he attacked those still to come forward, 'The longer they hang back the longer it will last, but if they had one or two of those shells to burst over their homes which burst over us in dozens every day it would bring them to their senses'.<sup>270</sup>

Not only are they accused of hanging back but they are told that they are responsible for prolonging the war. The burden of guilt is being passed to them in an appeal to their conscience. In the second part of the letter Private Keenan changed target. He attacked those who were taking industrial action to obtain war bonuses, wage increases, a change in work practices, etc. 'Instead of going on strike and trying to bring the country down, as they are doing, for these men who are making these strikes are only pure Germans and nothing else, they should be out in the trenches'.<sup>271</sup>

The implication here was that all who were on strike were traitors (Germans) and only by enlisting would these men be of any service to their country: supporting it instead of bringing it down. Private Keenan seems to have used his letter home to pursue a political agenda rather than converse with his

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<sup>270</sup> *The Scotsman*, 6 April 1915.

<sup>271</sup> *The Scotsman*, 6 April 1915.

family. The letter ends with a stirring call 'they cannot send enough men out to the trenches. All are needed'. This type of letter was churned out for public consumption in an attempt at moral pressure and, in the case of the strikers, social control.

## TERMS AND CONDITIONS

There was from the outset confusion in the clamour to attract recruits. Terms and conditions were often contradictory, causing confusion among those intending to enlist. On 5 August there appeared in *The Scotsman* an advertisement for motor cyclists to enlist for the sum of 35/- per week, with an enlistment bonus of £10, service to be for one year or the duration, and a discharge bounty of £5.<sup>272</sup> A similar appeal appeared in the *Dundee Advertiser* on 6 August with the added news that 'The Dundee Police were yesterday delivering notices to likely recruits'.<sup>273</sup> However, the efforts of the Dundee police were wasted when it was announced that despite the inundation of motor cyclists at the main recruiting offices, Scotland was not a recruiting centre for that branch of the service and that all offers would be declined.<sup>274</sup> Similarly, on 6 August the terms for new recruits 'desirous of serving their country in the present crisis' were no different than before the war: seven years with the colours and five in the reserve. Prospective recruits were directed to the three Scottish recruiting offices at 29 Nethergate,

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<sup>272</sup> *The Scotsman*, 5 August 1914.

<sup>273</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 6 August 1914.

<sup>274</sup> *The Scotsman*, 6 August 1914.

Dundee; 63 Cockburn Street, Edinburgh; 16 Gallowgate, Glasgow, or to any military barracks. The age limit was surprisingly set at 18-25 years.<sup>275</sup>

Army orders, issued on 5 August, and containing the regulations for the enlistment of civilian volunteers for temporary service during the war, were published in the local press to ensure widespread distribution. The order stated that men who were serving in the Territorial Force would not be eligible to enlist in the New Armies for the short-term service period of one year.<sup>276</sup> However, on 10 August 1914 there appeared a circular from Lord Kitchener to the effect that 'Members of the Territorial Force may be enlisted [for the New Army] provided they fulfilled the prescribed conditions as to age and physical fitness'.<sup>277</sup>

On 7 August 1914 there was a call in the *Glasgow Herald* for 100,000 volunteers 'for a period of three years or until the war is over'.<sup>278</sup> However there was confusion over another part of the appeal which said that those enlisting in the 100,000 were 'to take the place of such part of the army as may have to go abroad'.<sup>279</sup> The implication was clear. Enlistment was to be for home service only: a form of service comparable with the Territorial Force. This encouraged enlistment but also brought about ill feeling among those who enlisted in this belief only to find that they were doing so for general service.

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<sup>275</sup> *The Scotsman*, 6 August 1914.

<sup>276</sup> *The Scotsman*, 5 August 1914.

<sup>277</sup> *The Scotsman*, 10 August 1914.

<sup>278</sup> *Herald*, 7 August 1914.

<sup>279</sup> *Herald*, 7 August 1914.

FIG 4:7 August/September 1914. Poster depicting terms of service.



Confusion was not limited to the conditions in different recruiting offices. It was apparent within the individual locations as recruits were being enrolled within the same office and by the same recruiting personnel for either seven years service or one year short-term. Recruiting officers in Edinburgh reported on 8 August that 'Many of the applicants are being enlisted for the ordinary period of seven years with the colours and five with the reserve, but the majority are being taken on for one year or the duration of the war'.<sup>280</sup>

The Army Council announced, on 15 August 1914, that the term of service was three years and that 'Should the war last over three years, the man's continuance of service will be optional'.<sup>281</sup> In an effort to allay public fears of deception, clarification was rapidly published in the national press on 16 August spelling out clearly the terms of military service. Recruits for Kitchener's New Armies would be returned home as soon as possible if the war lasted for less than three years. However, the statement went on to compound this confusion by announcing that at the end of three years continuation of service 'will be optional'.<sup>282</sup> This set the limit for service at three years or less. The following day, 17 August, a statement was issued refuting the various claims which had appeared in the press over the previous few days that New Army recruitment was for home defence only<sup>283</sup> and reiterating that 'It has been freely stated in the press during the last few days

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<sup>280</sup> *The Scotsman*, 8 August 1914.

<sup>281</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 15 August 1914.

<sup>282</sup> *Daily Record*, 16 August 1914.

<sup>283</sup> *Daily Record*, 17 August 1914.

that Lord Kitchener's new army of 100,000 men is to be trained as a regular army for home defence. This is totally incorrect'.<sup>284</sup>

There was further change on 20 August when it was announced that 'General Service (is) for a period of three years or until the war is over'.<sup>285</sup> On 26 August there was an appeal for recruits by Lochiel, for the Cameron Highlanders, which once again put the length of service at 'the duration of the war, with a maximum engagement of three years'.<sup>286</sup> On the same date, in a further attempt at clearing up the confusion over recruitment terms, Captain J. C. Scott, Assistant-Inspector of Recruiting, Scottish Command, announced that 'recruits are only required to serve for three years, or the duration of the war, or less if the war terminates earlier'.<sup>287</sup> This coincided with the publication of a quotation from Lord Kitchener, which said that 'after three years of war there will be others fresh and ready to take over'.<sup>288</sup> However this served only to fuel the atmosphere of confusion since it implied that those enlisting would be replaced at the end of a three year period. This changed again on 28 August when all reference to a numerical time span was removed and service was 'for the period of the war only. Any men enlisting will be discharged with all convenient speed as soon as the war is over'.<sup>289</sup> Such confusion did little to stimulate recruitment. Those who were enlisting were keen to know what they were signing up for.

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<sup>284</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 17 August 1914.

<sup>285</sup> *Evening Times*, 20 August 1914.

<sup>286</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 26 August 1914.

<sup>287</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 26 August 1914.

<sup>288</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 26 August 1914.

<sup>289</sup> *Evening Times*, 28 August 1914.

FIG 4:8 August/September 1914. Locally printed poster, in this case Kirriemuir, designed to clear up some of the confusion over conditions and length of service.<sup>290</sup>

**ANY ONE WHO IS OVER 19 AND  
NOT OVER 35 CAN ENLIST.  
SO CAN ALL EX-SOLDIERS UP TO 45.**

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**Men will naturally ask:**

1. "For how long shall I have to serve?"

*Answer:* Till the end of the War and no longer.  
The men of the Second Army will be first  
to be discharged when Peace comes.

2. "What will happen to my Wife and Children?"

*Answer:* Your wife will get 1s 1d a day separation  
allowance for herself and 2d for each child.  
If that is not enough to keep the home  
together, she can look with perfect con-  
fidence to the Village or the Town, the  
County, and the Nation to do what is  
needful.

3. "What pay shall I get for myself?"

*Answer:* You will get, to begin with, 1s 3d a day  
and all found and well found.

4. "What will happen to me if I am maimed by the  
loss of a limb?"

*Answer:* You will receive a pension, as every  
regular soldier does in similar circum-  
stances.

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**A trained soldier is what Britain wants, and you  
will be well trained before you are sent abroad.**

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**Apply at the nearest Recruiting Office or any  
Post Office.**

Printed by J. Nox, "Free Press" Office, Kirriemuir.

<sup>290</sup> Airlie Muniments, SRO GD 16/52/60.

Similar uncertainty was apparent over the physical standards required for enlistment. The decrease in recruitment experienced in the second half of September 1914 was partly attributable to the increase in height on 11 September from 5' 3" to 5'6" and in chest measurements from 34" to 35½". It was reported that, in Glasgow 'there has been a considerable drop in the average experienced during the past few weeks, and this is no doubt the effect derived from increasing the standard of height and chest measurements'.<sup>291</sup>

However, as enlistment numbers fell a series of recruiting meetings was held in early October to coincide with the reduction in height and chest requirements to stimulate recruitment. On 14 October the height was once again reduced from 5' 6" to 5' 5" in an effort to stimulate a response, with a return to the normal limit of 5' 4" on 23 October once the backlog, created by the initial high number of recruits, had dissipated and recruiting depots were once again in a position to process large numbers of recruits. The height requirement was further reduced on 5 November to 5' 3".

Age limits were also confusing and varied between regiment and recruiting office. As early as 8 August 1914 the prevailing age of recruits in Edinburgh was twenty years.<sup>292</sup> On 29 August the Cameronians were looking for recruits between the ages of 17 and 35, while at the same time the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were restricting recruits to the age span 19 to 30.<sup>293</sup>

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<sup>291</sup> *Evening Times*, 21 September 1914.

<sup>292</sup> *The Scotsman*, 8 August 1914.

<sup>293</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 29 August 1914.

On 2 September 1914 it was announced in the *Evening Citizen* that 'the advancement in the age limit has given a decided fillip to recruiting'. The article went on to say that 'Up until last night [1 September] between 8,000 and 9,000 men had been secured for the army through the political offices'.<sup>294</sup> On 23 October the age limit was set at 19-38 years, with chest measurements of 34" for those under 22 years of age and half an inch greater for those above that age. On 11 August it was reported that the percentages of those unfit who were being rejected for service had fallen from 'about 30 per cent to well under 20 per cent'.<sup>295</sup> By 11 November 1914, when the call came for another 100,000 for the fourth New Army, the age limit was set at 19-38, with ex-soldiers eligible up to 45, and the chest measurement was fixed at 34½". There was no mention of time limit: service was now for the duration only and separation allowances were issuable immediately.<sup>296</sup>

In the early days of recruitment many held back, not from a reluctance to serve but from an unwillingness to subject their families to hardship in the name of national pride. On 11 September the *Forfar Herald and Kirriemuir Advertiser* announced that as to 'the reasons of men who were willing to join the army but who were holding back...the chief deterrent was the uncertainty as to the provision for their wives and families'.<sup>297</sup> Reports in the press about delays in separation payments and about families existing on the welfare of religious organisations slowed recruitment and forced the government to

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<sup>294</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 2 September 1914.

<sup>295</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 11 August 1914,

<sup>296</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 11 November 1914.

<sup>297</sup> *Forfar Herald and Kirriemuir Advertiser*, 11 September 1914.

initiate changes in the payment system. Many who planned to enlist for economic reasons then held back in the face of insecure financial relief. The separation allowance payable at the outset of war in 1914 was set at 7s 7d per week for the wife of an infantry private and an additional 7d for each child, plus the soldier was expected to contribute another 3s 6d per week to his wife. His wife would also receive an additional allowance of 1s 2d for each girl under sixteen and each boy under fourteen. The most worrying factor for the working class was the monthly payment system, anathema to a population used to the weekly wage. Recruits were concerned as to how their dependants were expected to survive for the first month. Recruitment suffered setbacks when the local press ran large-scale articles on the non-payment of soldiers allowances and the destitution of some of the families of local men who had already enlisted.<sup>298</sup> Regimental relief funds sprang up almost from the outset to provide support and food for those families caught up in the bureaucracy of the army payment system. This image would deter those who were in employment as it implied future hardship for their families, while on the other hand it would encourage those in dire need, with the implication that their families would at least receive the basic necessities from the regimental association. In an effort to allay fears, new rates of army separation allowance were announced on 1 October 1914. They were 9s per week for the wife of a private, plus 1s 11d per child.<sup>299</sup>

As early as 5 August there was a national call for skilled tradesmen. *The*

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<sup>298</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 24 August 1914.

<sup>299</sup> *The Scotsman*, 2 October 1914.

*Glasgow Herald* reported that 'In view of a general mobilisation having been proclaimed a certain number of men of the following trades are required immediately for service in His Majesty's Army'.<sup>300</sup> There was then printed a list of jobs and wage scales: 'Foremen Artificers, 70s. Coppersmiths, electricians, patternmakers, 52s 6d. Blacksmiths, dispensers, drivers of motor lorries, farriers, fitters, moulders, painters, saddlers, turners, wheelers, 42s. Bakers, butchers, clerks, cooks, hospital subordinates, tailors, 28s. Labourers and loaders (packers) 21s'.<sup>301</sup>

*The Scotsman*, on the same day, carried a similar advertisement but with the age limits for clerks, labourers and drivers set at 20-45 and for all others at 20-40.<sup>302</sup> This was all the encouragement that those faced with unemployment, or at the very least uncertain employment, required. The wages offered were comparable with the average wages at the time. J Benson, in the *Working Class in Britain 1850-1939*, tells us that in 1914 'the normal full-time income of the average working person' was only 28s per week.<sup>303</sup> With a single labourer being offered 21s plus food and board, for many there was little financial hardship: a married labourer with the separation allowance could earn the national average wage while other skilled tradesmen could earn more than when working in industry.

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<sup>300</sup> *Herald*, 5 August 1914.

<sup>301</sup> *Herald*, 5 August 1914.

<sup>302</sup> *The Scotsman*, 5 August 1914.

<sup>303</sup> J. Benson, *The Working Class in Britain 1850-1939*, p. 52-3.

In Glasgow there was disappointment for those who sought to take this route. For the first three weeks of the war, until the political offices were utilised as recruiting stations, there were signs at the Gallowgate recruiting offices turning away all tradesmen, or to be more accurate they were turning those away who were trying to enlist as tradesmen, following their own profession in the armed forces and earning higher rates of pay. Harry McShane states that, in the confusion and rush to fulfil the needs of the army, many who enlisted for technical units such as the Royal Engineers found that they had in fact been signed up for the infantry by the recruiting officer and were not informed until they reached the barracks: a shock introduction to army life.<sup>304</sup> The initial high demand was for infantry and only those who were prepared to enlist for the basic wage and commit themselves to active service were being signed up. The *Evening Citizen* of 10 August 1914 reported that 'The recruiting offices in the Gallowgate were open all day yesterday enlisting men for the regular army. Today, notices are posted in the windows that tradesmen are meanwhile not required and that only recruits for the army can now be accepted'.<sup>305</sup> The following day, on 11 August, the *Evening Citizen* reported that 'Those offering themselves now are men willing to go to the front for active service'.<sup>306</sup> This restriction in recruitment was not confined to August and September 1914. Early 1915 saw restrictions reintroduced to limit individual choice and direct recruits to Scottish infantry regiments. Thomas Williamson was confronted with this when enlisting in March 1915.

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<sup>304</sup> H. McShane, & J. Smith, *Harry McShane; No Mean Fighter*. p. 67-8. T. Williamson, *This is War*. P. 10.

<sup>305</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 8 August 1914.

<sup>306</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 11 August 1914.

The first man to greet us when we went further into the recruiting office was a burly sergeant. "Well,! He said, in a deep bass voice, "Are you two chaps going to join up?" We replied, "Yes." I began to ply him with questions such as, could we join the Army Service Corps, or the Royal Field Artillery, or the Royal Engineers? The sergeant said with a smile, "no lads, what we are requiring urgently is infantrymen."<sup>307</sup>

By 14 August there appeared an interesting letter showing this selective recruiting policy in a different light.

There is no encouragement to offer one's services under the treatment given. Hours and hours unnecessarily wasted which surely, by a more suitable arrangement, could in some measure, be saved. Is this, the usual War Office red tape, permitted to rule even in a time like the present? These are my impressions after a six hour stand in the rain and sun.<sup>308</sup>

The disgusted correspondent signed himself off with the signature `Off The Notion` and was not alone in his views. In the same issue there was another letter from a potential recruit from Airdrie who, after presenting himself at five recruiting offices in one week and still unable to enlist, signed himself as 'Fed

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<sup>307</sup> T. Williamson, *This is War*. P. 10.

<sup>308</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 14 August 1914.

Up'. This in some way accounts for the upturn in Glasgow recruiting numbers as those turned away in the early days were able to enlist in September once the pre-war inflexible military attitude towards recruitment had changed.

However, there was another boost to recruitment from the outset when it was announced that,

A bounty of £5 will be paid to each man approved, and a further £5 on discharge for any reason other than misconduct in addition to any war gratuity issued to the troops. Such men as are discharged except for misconduct within a year of the date of enlistment will also receive two months pay in lieu of notice, provided this would not involve their drawing more than twelve months pay in all. Men will be required to enlist for one year or for as long as war continues. In the event of war being over in less than one year they may be discharged at once.<sup>309</sup>

As we have already seen this was not the only mention of one-year enlistment. *The Scotsman* carried a slightly different advertisement which nevertheless conveyed the same meaning: 'Enlistments will be for one year, or if the war lasts longer, for the duration of the war'.<sup>310</sup> The paper continues that 'All men will be enlisted as privates'. With the popular thought that the war would not last very long,<sup>311</sup> the promise of steady wages, a signing-on bonus, and the possibility of leaving the army to return to civilian employment

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<sup>309</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 5 August 1914.

<sup>310</sup> *The Scotsman*, 5 August 1914.

<sup>311</sup> G. DeGroot, *The First World War*. p. 135.

with two months wages plus discharge bonus, was too much to resist. In the sudden climate of economic uncertainty there was no shortage of takers.

## LOYALTY

A large number of volunteers, especially the young and disenchanted, enlisted in search of adventure or excitement. Stories of temporary service in the Boer War were still fresh enough in recent memory to stimulate interest among the young. Duty was a motive for some, or a misplaced motive for those who thought that duty necessitated enlistment - a sense of duty to one's country or friends or a sense of regional loyalty. From the very beginning the War Office, through the direct intervention of Kitchener, appealed to those in positions of responsibility, authority, and localised power for assistance in raising the new battalions. Lord Rosebery's call of 'Lothian men for Lothian regiments' was one such call to regional loyalty.<sup>312</sup>

At a recruiting meeting held in Stonehaven Town Hall, Sir Alexander Baird, Lord-Lieutenant of Kincardineshire, read out a letter from Lord Kitchener which was a direct appeal for Scottish recruits:

My Dear Baird – I am glad to know that you are going up to Scotland to do your best to raise recruits for the army in Kincardineshire. I feel certain that Scotsmen have only to know that the country urgently needs their services to offer them with the same splendid patriotism as they have always shown in the past. Tell them from me please, that

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<sup>312</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 7 January 1915.

their services were never more needed than they are today, and that I rely confidently on a splendid response to the national appeal.

Yours Sincerely.

Kitchener.<sup>313</sup>

Although this was an appeal for Scotsmen to support their country there was no direct mention of Scotland or any other country. It was left to the individual to fill in the blank spaces. At a recruiting meeting in Inverness on 1 September 1914, addressed by Lord Lovat and The Mackintosh, Lochiel remarked that 'just as in the old days...Highlanders responded to the call of their chiefs.'<sup>314</sup> Residual loyalty to a clan chieftain was a major factor in recruiting for highland regiments. Such feelings of loyalty to perceived social superiors were in fact nothing more than a misplaced sense of duty dating from an age when clansmen were expected to fight for their clan in return for the protection and patronage of their chief.

In the early winter of 1914 reservists were joining one of the Highland regiments. The men trickled in at most of the stations in Caithness, and they became more numerous as the train entered Sutherlandshire. As the short winter day closed in, snow began to fall; and, as the train wound through the valleys, all the houses were lit up, and the people stood at the doors waving torches and chanting a high-pitched battle song. Except for the railway, nothing was changed. It was thus all

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<sup>313</sup> *The Scotsman*, 12 August 1914.

<sup>314</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 2 September 1914.

through the ages that the clans had mustered, and it was thus that the women, the grandfathers, and the children had sent their men to war.<sup>315</sup>

Cameron of Lochiel, asked by Kitchener to raise new battalions for the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, swiftly started a recruiting campaign, placing advertisements in the Scottish press.

I give my personal guarantee that at the end of the war the battalion will be brought back to Inverness, where it will be disbanded with all convenient dispatch. Companies and platoons will be organised according to local districts, so that men from each district of the highlands will always be kept together in their own section, platoon, or company.<sup>316</sup>

To counter manpower depletion in the Highlands Lochiel expanded his search world wide and began advertising in the press for recruits of highland descent to come forward from every part of the empire to defend their country in its hour of need.

I want to raise a thousand Highlanders for my own battalion and I have no doubt I shall have little difficulty in doing so; but, having regard to the fact that Highlanders are now scattered all over the face of the earth, I must specially appeal to the officials and committees of the

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<sup>315</sup> D.T. Jones, *Rural Scotland During the War*. p. 20.

different Highland county and clan societies in Glasgow, Edinburgh and elsewhere to assist me in my endeavours by becoming my recruiting agents.<sup>317</sup>

Lochiel was aiming his campaign not only country-wide but world-wide, emphasising the inability of the Highlands to provide manpower in any large numbers. After the depletion of the previous decades and the mass migrations there was, for the first time, no surplus manpower to rally to the call of the chief. The first service battalion to be raised for the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, the 5th, serves as an early example of the shortage of men in the traditional recruiting area of the regiment. "A" was the Gaelic-speaking company, formed of men from North Uist, Harris, Lochaber, and Strathspey; "B" was made up of men from Inverness and the North, Skye, South Uist, and Benbecula; "C" company consisted of Highlanders from the rest of Scotland; and "D" ...was the Glasgow Stock Exchange Company.'<sup>318</sup> Two companies of the Fifth Battalion, some fifty per cent, were from outside the traditional recruiting area.

The Cameron Highlanders, with their recruiting area in the North of Scotland, the Orkney Islands, and the Western Isles, suffered most when it came to recruitment. The 'natural' recruiting area of the regiment had, over the

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<sup>316</sup> *Glasgow Herald*. 26 August 1914.

<sup>317</sup> *Oban Times*. 5 December 1914.

<sup>318</sup> *Historical Records of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders*. vol. iv. p. 47.

previous decades, suffered more than any other part of Scotland in terms of the out-migration of its males. The available manpower had been depleted to

a level that allowed for no surplus or excess. This is seen in the poor recruiting in the regimental recruiting area. Inverness produced low numbers in the first few crucial months of the war. In August 1914, only 138 men were recruited in Inverness, 0.5 per cent of the national total. In September the figures were 144 or 0.33 per cent. This was followed by October with 21 or 0.2 per cent of the total, November with 23 or 0.2 per cent, and December with 85 or 1 per cent of the Scottish total.<sup>319</sup>

Glasgow was, by 1914, seen as the unofficial capital of the highlands due to the number of highlanders who had migrated to the industrial central belt. Almost immediately a recruiting office was opened in the old Victoria Hotel at 19 West George Street in Glasgow, solely for the purpose of enlisting men for the new battalions of the Camerons. This office was opened and run by Colonel Macleod and Major Gow, President of the Glasgow Inverness-shire Association.

A constant flow of recruits went on from ten in the morning to ten at night. There were generally two and sometimes three doctors in the old billiard room, hard at it putting them through the medical examination. Each night the men who had been passed the day before were

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<sup>319</sup> NATS 1/398.

marched up to the train for Inverness, headed by a piper, amidst great enthusiasm.<sup>320</sup>

The regimental records tell us that 'none but the very best men were passed for the Camerons, and those only who could show some Highland descent'.

By 22 September 1914 the Cameron recruiting office was also enlisting recruits directly for the Fourth Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, a territorial battalion based in Dingwall. In view of the recruitment standard claims made by the Camerons and the lack of recruits in Dingwall, it appears that those unable to meet Lochiel's high standard were sent to the Seaforths. The advertising campaign for the Camerons was constant. Lochiel persuaded Glasgow Corporation to bedeck the front of its trams with banners extolling the young men of Glasgow to 'join Lochiel's Camerons'. In November the regiment marched through Glasgow and raised approximately one hundred recruits after it was paraded at Ibrox, as the home team, Rangers, played Queen's Park.<sup>321</sup> However, it seems that the excitement and spontaneity of enlisting at a football match soon wore off all but a few. Despite the best efforts of his recruiters, by the end of 1914 even Lochiel could not overcome the recruiting difficulties experienced throughout the country and the 8th battalion, the fourth service battalion to be raised by the Camerons, was, through lack of recruits, designated a 'reserve' battalion: a feeder battalion for the rest of the regiment. While it must be said that a high proportion of those

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<sup>320</sup> *Q.O.C.H.* vol. iv. p.46 & 271.

<sup>321</sup> E.A. Cameron, and I.J.M. Robertson, 'Fighting and Bleeding for the Land'. in Macdonald and McFarland. p. 84-5.

recruited for the service battalions of the Camerons were not from the traditional regimental recruiting area and a fair number were Highland, or indeed Scottish, by name only, this should not detract from the achievement of Lochiel in raising four battalions before the end of 1914.

Lochiel was not alone in using the ties of heritage and clan loyalty in an effort to raise recruits. He was joined in this by Lord Lovat who was requested by the War Office to use his position of influence to raise recruits, especially for the Lovat Scouts.<sup>322</sup> In January 1915 Lord Rosebery headed an appeal to the men of the Lothians on behalf of 'their noble and historic regiment, the Royal Scots'. He pointed out that lowlanders should be as proud of their regiments as highlanders.<sup>323</sup> Two days later, while addressing a recruiting rally in the Corn Exchange, Dalkeith, Lord Rosebery announced that 'Scotland had not done badly in recruiting. The Southern Counties of Scotland had contributed 237 men per 1,000 of the population. The only doubt he had was whether their patriotism had always taken the right direction, which was towards the Royal Scots'.<sup>324</sup> Rosebery was implying that recruits in the Lothians should enlist in their local infantry regiment rather than other branches of the army. He was calling for regional rather than national loyalty. Lothian men for Lothian regiments.

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<sup>322</sup> Discussed in chapter 7, *Territorial Recruitment*.

<sup>323</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 7 January 1915.

<sup>324</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 11 January 1915.

## POPULATION MOVEMENT

Emigration and migration were major factors in providing an excess of manpower, a pool of spare bodies, mobile and in a position to enlist immediately, and served to create mobility within a sector of the population: a willingness for change. Scottish emigration figures had been increasing rapidly from the turn of the century, culminating in the period 1910-14 when the country lost 331,353 people to emigration.<sup>325</sup> Michael Flinn calculated that with approximately 50 per cent of those emigrating being male, and 26 per cent under the age of eighteen, this gave a figure of roughly 127,000 males of military age leaving Scotland in the four years immediately prior to the war.<sup>326</sup> This annual exodus produced in August and September 1914 a number of men who were on the point of leaving Scotland but instead were immediately available for military service. All ties having been severed, they were seeking the kind of excitement that the war offered; a few months in the army before going to a new life overseas. Those who were contemplating emigration in the next few years also saw this as an opportunity and brought their plans forward, seeing in war-time military service a chance for adventure in Europe prior to settling in a strange land.

The delicate balance between emigration and unemployment in Scotland was upset by the onset of war and provided an immediate excess of manpower. In the first seven months of 1914, a total of 23,463 emigrants of all groups left Scotland while for the same period in 1915 the figure fell to 6,044. In the first

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<sup>325</sup> M. Flynn, *Scottish Population History : from the 17<sup>th</sup> Century to the 1930's*. p. 447-453.

<sup>326</sup> M. Flynn, *Scottish Population History : from the 17<sup>th</sup> Century to the 1930's*. p. 447.

five months of the war, August-December 1914, the number of emigrants leaving Scotland was 10,870 while in the corresponding period for 1913 the number had been 20,450. Allowing that the number wishing to emigrate remained reasonably static this represented a shortfall of approximately 10,000, most of whom, it is reasonable to assume, would be in an ideal position to enlist immediately. As we can see from fig 4:1, August 1914 produced a reduction of 35 per cent over August 1913, down from 5,089 to 3,320. The figure for September 1914 was down by 56.5 per cent over the previous September, from 6,865 to 2,987, while for October the reduction was 54.5 per cent, a figure of 5,389 dropping to 2,450.<sup>327</sup>

**FIG 4:9 Emigration from Scotland 1913-1915.**<sup>328</sup>

**All categories and ages of emigrants.**

	<b>1913</b>	<b>1914</b>	<b>1915</b>
<b>January</b>	2086	1704	654
<b>February</b>	3336	1841	694
<b>March</b>	7400	3448	822
<b>April</b>	9021	4659	1043
<b>May</b>	9801	5418	932
<b>June</b>	8115	3552	951
<b>July</b>	5222	2842	948
<b>August</b>	5089	3320	730
<b>September</b>	6865	2987	1114
<b>October</b>	5389	2450	1087
<b>November</b>	3613	1159	779
<b>December</b>	2180	954	415
<b>Total</b>	68117	34333	10169

Along with those who had intended to emigrate in the Autumn of 1914 there

<sup>327</sup> Passenger Movement From And To The United Kingdom, 1913, Cd 6615. 1914, 1915, Cd 7808.

<sup>328</sup> Cd 6615. Cd 7808.

was also, within Scotland, another large group which the war placed in an untenable position. The first seven months of 1914 produced a dramatic drop in emigrants compared to 1913, a drop of 50 per cent, a reduction, in numerical terms, from 47,658 to 23,463 (fig 4:9). The industrial and engineering boom of 1913 had served to slow the flow of Scottish emigration. For the first time since the start of the twentieth century there was now enough opportunity at home for those who had previously seen emigration as the only way forward. But after August 1914 those who had taken the opportunity to remain in Scotland to take advantage of the economic upswing found that they were worse off than before. They now found themselves caught up in economic collapse without the safety net of emigration. The presence of such a large number of available workers allowed any shortfall in the workforce caused by recruiting to be filled quickly, thus, while some embraced short-term enlistment as the means of economic survival others were able to take advantage of the large numbers enlisting and gain employment in those sectors of Scottish industry still active. Employers were able actively to encourage their workers to enlist, secure in the knowledge that they could swiftly get replacements, often at a lower cost. The men recruited from the Glasgow Tramways Department by James Dalrymple, for the 15th Highland Light Infantry, were replaced within a month by the unemployed, the old, the young, and others who had not previously met the requirements.

**FIG 4:10 Immigration to Scotland 1913-1915.**<sup>329</sup>

**All categories and ages of emigrants.**

	<b>1913</b>	<b>1914</b>	<b>1915</b>
<b>January</b>	461	643	773
<b>February</b>	495	655	851
<b>March</b>	782	852	988
<b>April</b>	1063	1512	1241
<b>May</b>	1445	2002	1516
<b>June</b>	1588	2027	1267
<b>July</b>	1286	1523	1359
<b>August</b>	1155	1351	1759
<b>September</b>	1221	935	881
<b>October</b>	1372	1506	1255
<b>November</b>	1587	1846	1281
<b>December</b>	1557	1640	1002
<b>Total</b>	14030	16492	14173

Fig 4:10 also shows that allied to this there was, in the same seven-month period, January-July 1914, a rise in the number of immigrants arriving in Scotland, of 29 per cent over the same period in the previous year. The increase in immigration was partly in response to the change in economic climate, the collapse of the building trades in Canada and the United States, causing the return of earlier emigrants. The main point to be taken from fig 4:10 is that contrary to expectation there was no significant rise in immigration to Scotland after the outbreak of war. Popular opinion would have it that large numbers returned in order to enlist. On the contrary it would appear that only limited numbers returned to Scotland to enlist. Numbers as low as eight were high enough to attract attention in the press. The *Glasgow Citizen* prominently announcing on 10 November 1914 that 'among those enlisting today were eight British subjects who had just arrived in the Clyde from New York'.<sup>330</sup>

<sup>329</sup> Cd 6615. Cd 7808.

<sup>330</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 10 November 1914.

Those arriving in Scotland to do so would, it is reasonable to assume, have to declare Scotland as their future country of residence and would therefore be included within the monthly passenger movement figures.

## **SOCIAL PRESSURES**

The desire for integration was one reason for minority groups, particularly Catholics and Irish, to enlist, thereby gaining social acceptance at the end of the war. For the Irish to gain acceptability in Scotland they had to disappear into the background, become invisible by joining in the mainstream of Scottish society. The war presented an ideal opportunity.

The declaration of support given by John Redmond, the Irish Nationalist leader, in early August 1914 was a major contributing factor in recruiting the Irish in Scotland. Redmond linked support for Britain to the passage of the Home Rule Bill. Thus many an Irish Nationalist in Scotland would be all the more willing to enlist in the belief that in so doing he was furthering the cause of Irish Nationalism. The Home Rule Bill became an act of parliament in September 1914 but was immediately suspended with no steps to be taken to implement the bill until after the war.<sup>331</sup>

Pre-war Scotland, especially the industrial central belt, had been a hotbed of Irish paramilitary groups. These groups, some numbering thousands, would meet at night on a deserted stretch of road and practise military drill and tactics. This 'drilling' was seen by many Irishmen as preparation for the

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<sup>331</sup> J.E. Handley, *The Modern Irish in Scotland*. p. 295.

forthcoming struggle to gain Ireland's independence. Large numbers of men would be only too willing to comply with Redmond. This was demonstrated at a mass meeting in Glasgow organised in November 1914 by the Scottish branches of the United Irish League when those present passed a vote of confidence in, and support for, the policy of supporting the war. For an Irishman, recruiting in Scotland would also lessen the religious divides prevalent in recruiting in Ireland. Political friction and religious bigotry between the 16th (Irish) Division and the 36th (Ulster) Division was rife. The 16th (Irish) Division was particularly renowned for the obstacles placed in the path of Catholics applying for officer status; very few Catholics were commissioned. In Scotland, while there were still some religious divides within regiments, they were, more often than not, a reference to the regiment's earlier formation as Protestant volunteers rather than a reference to contemporary bigotry. With the Catholic church and press firmly behind Redmond, the Irish enlisted in large numbers. Some, like I. G. C. Hutchison, conclude that with the Irish Nationalists supporting the war effort 'enlistments were as high as among native Scots',<sup>332</sup> while J. Winter assures us that 'many Irishmen living and working in Britain were probably incorporated in English, Welsh and Scottish enlistment statistics'.<sup>333</sup>

A meeting was held on 8 November in St Andrew's Hall, Glasgow, for the purpose of 'furthering recruiting for the Irish Brigade', at which figures were presented showing that in the first two months of the war some 7,271

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<sup>332</sup> I. G. C. Hutchison, 'The Impact of the First World War on Scottish Politics', in Macdonald and McFarland. eds. p. 45.

<sup>333</sup> J. M. Winter, *The Great War and the British People*. p. 27.

Irishmen had enlisted in Glasgow alone. Edinburgh, with a smaller number of resident Irish had provided 780 in the same period. A survey of thirty-one districts in Scotland had given a figure of 13,654 Irishmen enlisting in Scotland and it was estimated that, if the other 151 districts provided the same quantity of recruits, there would be approximately 30,000 Irishmen enlisted in Scotland.<sup>334</sup> In a speech to the House of Lords on 6 January 1915, Lord Macdonnell of Swinford set out figures detailing the number of Irish enlisted in Britain. Although the figures were being used in a political context – gaining support for the Irish question – they are still reliable enough to give a general overview of the level of support for recruitment among the Catholic Irish in Britain and Scotland. In round figures he announced that the total number of Irishmen enlisted in Great Britain stood at 115,000; Scotland having provided 25,000; Lancashire, Cheshire and North Wales with 45,000; Yorkshire with 20,000; North of England with 15,000; South Wales and Midlands with 5,000, and London with 5,000.<sup>335</sup> By 20 January 1915 *The Morning Post* was claiming that 8,041 Irishmen had enlisted in Glasgow; 1,648 in Edinburgh; 2,000 from Coatbridge, and 681 from Paisley.<sup>336</sup> Alongside this figures were also give for some of the smaller towns:

Port Glasgow, 250; Duntocher and Old Kilpatrick, 125; Blantyre, 405; Croy, 47; Hamilton, 400; Dumbarton, 300; Kilsyth, 163; Uddingston, 87; Grangemouth, 20; Rothesay, 50; Tarbrax, 16; Irvine, 37;

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<sup>334</sup> *Evening Times*, 9 November 1914.

<sup>335</sup> Parliamentary Debates – Official Reports 1066 – 1918. House of Lords Vol XVIII, 1914 – 15 (Nov 11 – May 19) 383.

<sup>336</sup> *Morning Post*, 20 January 1915.

Shieldmuir, 80; Cadzow, 73; Larkhall, 67; Greenock, 700; Vale of Leven, 200; Dumfries, 281; Largs, Skelmorlie and Millport, 17; East Calder, 10; Shotts, 70; Penicuik, 16; Lennoxtown, 69; Tranent, 84; Musselburgh, 120; Kelty, 72; Methil and Leven, 84; Linlithgow, 56; Stirling and district, 300; Kirkcaldy and district, 130; Dunfermline and district, 300; Neilston, 71; Galston, 27; Renfrew, 92; Helensburgh, 90; Barrhead and Nitshill, 152; Falkirk and Camelon, 219; Perth, 140; Motherwell, 304; Cardowan and Stepps, 36; Leith, 450; Burnbank, 130; Kilmarnock, 150; Wishaw, 51.<sup>337</sup>

Further information came from a statement issued on 15 February 1915 by Mr J. O'D. Derrick, United Irish League Organiser for Scotland, which was the result of an investigation by the one hundred branches of the league in Scotland and was a list of Irishmen who had gone to serve in the Navy, Army and Territorial Force since the outbreak of war. The returns showed that, by February 1915, some 25,747 Irishmen had enlisted in Scotland, 'not counting the thousands of Scottish Catholics, who have been equally patriotic'.<sup>338</sup>

That such a large number of Irishmen had enlisted was a reflection of the position that the Irish held in Scottish society. This inability of the Irish to achieve any form of stable social base in Scotland, working in low paid, dangerous, dirty, and unsecured jobs, left them vulnerable to the opportunities seemingly offered by temporary enlistment. Recruitment offered

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<sup>337</sup> *Morning Post*, 20 January 1915.

<sup>338</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 15 February 1915.

them a period of stability, with a long training period and the prospect of the war being over before they were ready for active service. It also offered them the opportunity to merge into part of Scottish society. They hoped that when the war ended their sacrifice would adhere them to the Scottish population and that at least they would be accepted as a contributing part of that society.

Whether the sacrifice of Scotland's Irish immigrant population achieved all that was hoped for is a matter for wider debate, but the 1918 Education (Scotland) Act brought Scotland's Catholic schools into the mainstream state system. This reduced the financial burden of school support on the immigrant community and began a process of closer integration within Scotland. The Catholic church in Scotland was keen to publicise the recruitment of Catholics into the New Armies, with the Catholic newspaper, the *Glasgow Observer*, prominent in publishing stories about Catholic soldiers in action and publishing lists of recruits from congregations. The *Glasgow Observer* was not the only paper to publish congregation lists, from any denomination. The *Dundee Advertiser* announced that 'St Mary's Roman Catholic Church, Lochee, has...no fewer than 261 of its members...at present on active service, including 127 with the Black Watch'.<sup>339</sup>

Tom Devine states that 'large numbers of Scots Irish enlisted even before conscription in 1916, and six members of the community were decorated with the Victoria Cross'.<sup>340</sup> As a result of the willingness of the Irish to enlist in

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<sup>339</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 11 April 1915.

<sup>340</sup> Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, p. 496.

Scotland Devine concludes that 'Any doubts about the loyalty of the Irish in Scotland to the British state were conclusively removed'.<sup>341</sup> Tom Gallagher also states that

Even before the introduction of conscription in 1916, the immigrant community had yielded up a disproportionately large number of recruits. Shared war comradeship held out the promise that religious barriers would be far less relevant in a post-war world where ordinary citizens were encouraged to think that the stress would be on reconstruction and the banishment of old injustices.<sup>342</sup>

When the number of Irish recruits is taken into consideration the Scottish contribution, in the first crucial period at least, must be viewed in a different light. With an estimated 25,000 Irishmen enlisting in Scotland up until December 1914, out of a total recruitment figure for Scotland in that period of 161,882, that figure represents some 15.4 per cent of recruits in Scotland. If that figure is extrapolated for the entire voluntary period then it is not inconceivable that anything up to 46,500 Irishmen enlisted in Scotland, representing 15.4 per cent of the total recruitment figure of 301,754 for the voluntary period. Certainly the contribution from 'Scotland the country' remains the same, because, whatever else, they did enlist in Scotland. The change comes in the contribution from 'Scotland the nation', and in the

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<sup>341</sup> Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, p. 496.

<sup>342</sup> T. Gallagher, 'The Catholic Irish', in T. M. Devine, *Irish Immigrants*, p. 29.

perception of Scottish recruitment: whether it loses any of its 'Scottishness' as a result of such large numbers of Irish recruits. In truth when these figures are expanded for the whole voluntary period, then it is conceivable that Scotland's contribution was considerably less than previously believed and her claim to disproportionately high representation undermined, although such an extrapolation should be seen as a guideline and not a definitive conclusion.

### **CHURCH SUPPORT**

At a recruiting rally in Pollokshaws town hall, Mr William Hutchison, Unionist candidate for Bridgeton, told the audience that 'all the people of Germany, not only the war lords, entertained the idea that might was right. It was to kill that idea that we had entered the struggle. The war was, therefore, a holy war, waged in the sacred cause of freedom.'<sup>343</sup>

There were two different periods in the relationship between the church and voluntary recruiting in Scotland and differing ideals within those times. For some the outbreak of war meant a dilution of the power of the church and the moral corruption of the nation's youth. While for others there was the belief that the war could provide an expansion of the church as the population turned towards it for guidance and spiritual support. The war was, from the outset, given widespread support from all sides of Scotland's religious community with both the Catholic and Protestant churches enthusiastic in promoting the concept of a 'just' war from the pulpit or altar. Dr R. T. Drummond, minister of Lothian Road United Free Church in Edinburgh, was

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<sup>343</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 15 October, 1914.

one such who saw the war as such a cause, declaring 'our cause is a righteous one, the cause of international truth and honesty, the cause of the weak and oppressed'.<sup>344</sup>

Drummond sought to justify his support of the war by going on to say that 'I hope this war will be the death blow of militarism'.<sup>345</sup> Eugene Annesley points out that there were many in the Scottish clergy who viewed the war as an opportunity for 'national purification'.<sup>346</sup> As early as September 1914 the magazine of the Church of Scotland, *Life and Work*, took the view that 'This is a solemn crisis which could lead to purify the nation. The nation could return the people to simplicity of life with the discipline, honour and courage'.<sup>347</sup> At the same time the United Free Church magazine, *The Record*, stressed that the war was for 'the ultimate good of humanity'.<sup>348</sup>

In contrast to this unequivocal support for conflict, there were others within the Scottish churches who were keen to promote a balanced view and attempted to restore calm to those suffering from 'war fever'. Congregations were reminded that Germany shared Scotland's Protestant heritage and that the reports of atrocities in Belgium were untrue. The Rev' A. J. Gossip went on a tour of hospitals checking out the rumours of Belgian children, the victims of atrocities, which he determined were unfounded.<sup>349</sup> In tandem with

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<sup>344</sup> *The Record*. January 1915.

<sup>345</sup> *The Record*. January 1915.

<sup>346</sup> E. Annesley *The Response of the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church of Scotland to the First World War*. Unpublished M Th. thesis. University of Glasgow. 1991. p.

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<sup>347</sup> *Life and Work*. September 1914. p. 257-8.

<sup>348</sup> *The Record*. September 1914.

<sup>349</sup> *Glasgow Herald*. 8 October 1914.

this was the statement by Christopher Sands, lawyer and Procurator of the Church of Scotland, that the war 'was not so much a great thing of national honour as had often been reported'. It was, he said, 'more a matter of trade'.<sup>350</sup>

To some within the church the war was an opportunity for religious revival, with large numbers of recruits coming forward to take communion prior to departure and many families taking a last opportunity to attend church as a group. The *Life and Work* took the opportunity to affirm that 'one was cheered by the thought that so many took advantage of the opportunity given to them of pledging themselves anew to be soldiers of Christ'.<sup>351</sup>

Battalion church parades prior to departure overseas also served to convey to churchmen that religion was undergoing a revival. However, such church parades owed more to military regulation than to large scale religious conversion. When the 2/9th battalion Royal Scots attended a private service in the New North Church in Edinburgh some nineteen officers and 217 men took communion with some 600 adherents in attendance. Eugene Annesley puts this in perspective when telling us that 'all were in uniform, and...all the elders were officers'. Annesley saw such military involvement as a reflection 'on the leadership of the Scottish churches at that time'.<sup>352</sup> Interestingly Annesley equates this with 'the old Covenanter tradition, indeed a custom

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<sup>350</sup> *Glasgow Herald*. 12 October 1914.

<sup>351</sup> *Life and Work*. December 1914. p. 363.

<sup>352</sup> E. Annesley, *The Response of the Church*. p. 41-2.

which went back to Bannockburn, of soldiers of Scotland worshipping before battle'.<sup>353</sup>

For the first months of the war the clergy in Scotland took a major role in promoting recruitment but as casualties mounted attitudes within the church changed as the role of the clergy adapted to a new demand: the consolation of grieving relatives. At the 1915 General Assembly of the Church of Scotland Dr Wallace Williamson pronounced that 'we have entered into the war fully conscious as a nation that if we did not enter into it we would stand as criminals before God'.<sup>354</sup> At the same time the Rev J. D. Robertson of Leith, at the 1915 General Assembly of the United Free Church reported to the assembly that 'we are witnessing a great spiritual revival in Scotland. It has not come yet: war has not brought it so far. But our confidence is, that as a result of this tide of sorrow and tears and blood, there shall be greater consecration of the people of God'.<sup>355</sup>

With the rising casualties the church had to find greater justification for the suffering and death. The answer was to portray the war as a 'crusade' or a religious calling. Annesley tells us that 'those who lost their lives were seen as continuing their work after death and their death in action was a form of

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<sup>353</sup> E. Annesley, *The Response of the Church*. p. 42.

<sup>354</sup> T. M. Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, p. 385.

<sup>355</sup> Papers of the General Assembly of the United Free Church of Scotland. 1915 p. 204.

purification'.<sup>356</sup> The response of the church to the casualty figures was that the war was the fault of man and God could not be held responsible.

There were many who saw the war as a holy conflict but this is not new: God always fights on both sides. The promotion of war from the pulpit, the pointed accusation of slackness in coming forward, the unnecessary sense of personal shame in front of a congregation, the use of the pulpit for matters other than religion, are all reminiscent of the Protestant zeal of John Knox.

Unfortunately there was, within the Scottish clergy, a radical fringe who lost no opportunity to lay the blame for the war firmly at the feet of the Catholic church. The Reverend John Mackay of Inverness was one of the more radical examples who published a pamphlet in 1914, priced at 3d, in which he viewed the war as heavenly retribution for the rise of Catholicism, saying 'I cannot but think that the true and direct objective of the wrath of heaven is the Papacy and the powers that give it their strength'.<sup>357</sup> He argued that the war was mankind's opportunity to return to the true Protestant faith and called on the Church of England to 'join against Papacy and return true Protestant principles'.<sup>358</sup> Thankfully such radical opinions were few and far between.

## HANGING BACK

By 1 September 1914 it was being reported that of the 150,000 men of the right age in Glasgow only 7,666 had enlisted 'Our "splendid" contribution,

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<sup>356</sup> E. Annesley, *The Response of the Church*, p. 46.

<sup>357</sup> J. R. Mackay, *Armageddon - Two Discourses on the Great European War*, p. 30.

<sup>358</sup> J. R. Mackay, *Armageddon*, p. 37.

therefore, means that only 1 in 20 of these men have been moved to come forward'.<sup>359</sup> On 11 September there was a letter berating Aberdeen and Dundee over the level of recruitment in those cities. Although each of the two cities had one fifth the population of Glasgow neither had produced recruits in the same proportion. It is important, however, to put these in context: until that time recruitment in Glasgow had been proportionally two and a half times better than London.<sup>360</sup>

There was now a growing feeling that football teams and individual players were not doing enough towards recruitment. There was soon a proposal that football games be stopped in the meantime in face of mounting criticism. There was a call for professional footballers to enlist and show an example to the community 'Let Rangers and Celtic directors forget all about their dividends at present, stop their football playing, and encourage their players to enlist, thus ensuring a spontaneous rush of football enthusiasts to join the colours'.<sup>361</sup>

On 12 September it was argued that, although recruiting had started at football matches the results were poor due to the 'inadequacy of the arrangements made'. Pledges of recruitment made at such large gatherings were often given in the heat of the moment, often under the influence of alcohol and often in the spirit of bravado, the intended recruits failing to turn up at the recruiting office to honour their pledge. In October 1914 it was

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<sup>359</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 1 September 1914.

<sup>360</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 11 September 1914.

<sup>361</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 1 September 1914.

reported that 'recruiting efforts at city football matches have met with little success.' It was common practice for those giving their names and addresses at such recruiting rallies to ignore the postcards sent notifying them of the time and place of recruitment and for only a small percentage to follow through with their initial promise.<sup>362</sup> This was quickly followed by the proposal that a football company be raised and attached to one of the Glasgow battalions.<sup>363</sup> However, when Major Cappon, recruiting officer in Dundee, enquired as to the possibility of addressing the professional footballers in that city he was denied the opportunity and informed that there was already one football player in the army.<sup>364</sup> By mid-December 1914 the committee appointed to stimulate recruitment among Scottish professional footballers tried to initiate a scheme to promote recruitment among the various clubs but this fell by the wayside, in part due to the hostility of the clubs and in part due to the endless bureaucracy of committees and sub-committees raised to deal with the matter.<sup>365</sup>

## PEER PRESSURE

Peer pressure played an important role, especially within the workplace, where direct contact promoted compliance. The psychological pressure which could be brought to bear, intentionally or otherwise, by family, workmates and others within a social grouping was enough to tip the balance in many instances of indecision. It is not surprising therefore that peer pressure

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<sup>362</sup> *Glasgow Citizen*, 5 October 1914.

<sup>363</sup> *Evening Times*, 12 September 1914.

<sup>364</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 14 November 1914.

<sup>365</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 15 December 1914.

became a factor in raising recruits for the New Armies. Such pressure took on a variety of forms ranging from direct physical pressure to a sense of personal obligation. The sight of colleagues, workmates, friends, and family being mobilised for the Special Reserve and Territorial Force created, in some, a feeling of being left out, a sense of social exclusion. Colleagues and friends would return with stories and shared adventures while those who remained behind would resent a lost opportunity. The Boer War had shown that temporary military service could be adventurous but relatively safe. Casualties from combat in South Africa had been deceptively low while disease, which had claimed the vast majority of casualties, was viewed as an ever present but acceptable risk. Colleagues deciding to enlist as a group could always persuade others to come with them. The motivating factor in peer pressure was the need for group approval or social inclusion. For those who were confident in their own abilities or were not seeking peer approval the concept of peer pressure did not serve to promote recruitment. In the initial months of the war peer pressure played a minor role in stimulating recruitment as large numbers of men were readily available. However, in the later stages of the voluntary period peer pressure filled an ever increasing role in the provision of recruits.

As the war progressed and the numbers of available men reduced, renewed calls were made for recruits with young men facing ever more public pressure. Women handing out white feathers to those who had not enlisted were not confined to England: such sights were commonplace in Scotland,

McShane's 'daft middle-class women'.<sup>366</sup> Many took a more direct approach, accosting young men on the street and on public transport and asking why they had not enlisted, why they were not in uniform, and why they were not defending their homeland.<sup>367</sup> Women and children were targeted as a means of exerting pressure on the individual to recruit. Posters were distributed asking women if they could bring themselves to love a man who was not in uniform, encouraging them to exert pressure on loved ones to enlist. Such posters were not only aimed at girlfriends but were also aimed at wives and, more disturbingly, mothers: the need of the country was promoted as being of greater importance than the need of the family.

Pressure within families came in two different ways. Those with one or two family members in the Regular Army or the Territorial Force enlisted in the spirit of shared adventure, the instinct to share the hardship of a brother, father, or son. In some cases this produced a snowball effect. It was not uncommon that, once two or three close family members had enlisted, it became a matter of perverse family pride that all brothers should join. Instances of four or five brothers enlisting in this fashion were not unusual at a time where large families were the norm.<sup>368</sup> A family with a few of its members in the armed services, each receiving the separation allowance due, would be, in an atmosphere of economic uncertainty, sure of survival. Unfortunately the second form of family pressure would come as a direct result of the first. Family members would feel duty bound to enlist in order to

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<sup>366</sup> McShane, H. & Smith, J. *No Mean Fighter*. p. 62. B. Harding. *On Flows the Tay*. p. 58.

<sup>367</sup> B. Harding. *On Flows the Tay*. p. 58.

<sup>368</sup> B. Harding. *On Flows the Tay*. p. 57.

avenge those who had been wounded or killed. The high casualty rate suffered by those Scottish battalions in the British Expeditionary Force would prompt many to enlist in the early months in a misplaced desire to seek redress. Family anguish and pride, coupled with the desire for revenge, should not be overlooked as a forceful push to recruitment.

On a larger scale the pressure to enlist as part of a nation-wide social or age group held no pull for the youth of Scotland. Culturally and socially Scotland was a segmented nation. The recruitment of specific age-related groups was dictated by the requirements of the military, changing as age limits were extended, and not by any conscious social group tie. Military necessity, economics, and employment played the major roles in age and group selection, not a desire for nation-wide social inclusion. The age limits imposed on recruitment determined, to an extent, the composition of the army. As the age limits were extended the composition of the group changed and recruits came from a wider age base. The group itself did not determine the age of recruitment. While the majority of recruits were between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five it is wrong to say that this age group was any more predisposed to enlist than any other: at least on a national basis. Older age groups, while not entirely prevented from enlisting by circumventing the age limits as many would give artificially low ages in order to enlist, would take from the age limits the false impression that only the young were required. Thus the age group which fought the war was an artificial creation, based on the needs of the military machine. Indeed, in Scotland the most vociferous recruiters, men such as James Dalrymple and Lord Rosebery, were beyond

the age of military service, while the most enthusiastic sabre rattlers were usually women whose sex precluded them from active military service.

FIG 4: 11 Anti-war poster by Robins Millar.<sup>369</sup>



'Working men are being hounded on to sacrifice their lives by men who have no intention of doing any such thing themselves. Meanwhile, owing to the miserable pittance they are offered, the spectre of Famine menaces the families they leave behind.'

<sup>369</sup> University of Dundee Archive, RU 2891S4.

## FINANCIAL PRESSURE

For some there was the extra financial pressure brought about by bounty payments. As we have seen, the War Office was willing to pay enlistment bonuses from the outset in order to acquire those men that it needed most. This aside, the concept of an enlistment bonus was taken up mostly by employers but was occasionally offered by individuals. At the end of August 1914 a notice was posted at the offices of the Wemyss Coal Company in Fife announcing that 'a gentleman had given £1,000 to be distributed in £5 notes among the first 200 men from Wemyss who joined the colours'.<sup>370</sup> There was also the concept that individuals, too old to fight and rich enough to afford it, could fight by proxy, employing others to take their place. One such example was the proposal by Mr Wilkinson of Broughty Ferry, who urged that 'men of substance' should provide £52 per year to those men who were earning £2 per week and who could not afford to enlist due to the difference between their wages and the separation allowances. As a further incentive he proposed to invest £200 for such a volunteer's family should that volunteer be killed or disabled in action. He was looking for a further forty-nine men willing to sponsor a recruit after his example. The financial responsibility was clinically expressed, 'assuming that a soldier served two years in the army and was killed or permanently disabled, the total liability would be about £300 or less according to circumstances'.<sup>371</sup> Mr Wilkinson went further by stating that 'many men who cannot join themselves and have no sons to send to the army would be willing to undertake this special form of service'.<sup>372</sup>

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<sup>370</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 29 August 1914.

<sup>371</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 12 March 1915.

<sup>372</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 12 March 1915.

While this may have been one of the more outlandish ideas put forward, it shows the extremes to which some people were prepared to go. Pressure was applied by both companies and individuals, directly and indirectly. It took the form of coercion, persuasion and outright threats. It promised immediate reward or rewards to come, immediate sanctions or future retribution. It also worked both ways, with companies which had lost a high percentage of their workforce to the army actively encouraging their remaining employees not to enlist or using enlistment to their advantage.

Messrs R McAlpine & Sons offered £5 to each of their employees who were willing to enlist for 'active service', and 5/- per week to the wives and 1/- 6d for each child, with no limit being placed on the number of employees that they were willing to sponsor in this way.<sup>373</sup> At the same time, September 1914, the directors of the Sheepbridge Coal and Iron Company offered a slightly lower bonus of £2 to every man in their employ enlisting within a week. Even with this low bonus the response was excellent.<sup>374</sup> The majority of employers were not in a position to offer a bonus to those enlisting but many, like the Clyde Trust, were able to hold open jobs for all who enlisted and make up the wages of those employees who enlisted. Some, like Arbroath Town Council, were willing to continue paying their employees on 'active service' but deducted the standard infantry rate of 1/- per day, while others, like Dundee Council, which had agreed at the outset to continue the wages of any of their employees who enlisted, soon reneged from the agreement

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<sup>373</sup> *East of Fife Record*, 4 September 1914.

<sup>374</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 1 September 1915.

when the numbers, and consequently the financial burden, increased. Others, like the Great Central Railway, announced that all single men joining the colours would be treated as being on leave without pay. However the company did agree to pay the employee contributions to the superannuation fund. As we have seen in Chapter Three the funding of recruitment bonuses was a prime mover in the contracting coal industry, with both companies and wealthy individuals putting forward thousands of pounds to promote recruiting. The concept of retaining employment for those employees who enlisted was confined to the commercial sector, service industries, and local government. Heavy industry, Scotland's economic heart, made no such promises. With jobs gone due to economic collapse there was nothing to hold open. The majority of Scotland's working class, recruiting in such large numbers, did so without the need for enticement or the benefit of a safety-net. The exception to this was the coal industry which was quick to make promises which, although providing some relief to miners' families (in the case of free coal and rent free housing), was not an economic drain on the industry.

After the initial outpouring of corporate enthusiasm companies began to restrict the recruitment of their work force, more so once industry began to recover, government contracts were issued, and war production commenced. There were claims in July 1915 that textile workers in Forfar and Dundee were being prevented from enlisting by employers with government contracts. This contrasts greatly with the initial reaction of the textile industry in the opening months of the war, especially in Dundee where a recruitment office

had been installed in the town's largest mill. Railway companies, once the demand on rail transport grew, made every effort to retain their employees in the face of increasing demands for renewed recruiting efforts.<sup>375</sup> As early 10 September 1914 *The Dundee Advertiser* published a statement, issued on 8 September by the Central Recruiting Office for widespread distribution, stating that 'men employed on the railways, in the manufacture of armaments, or with food-producing companies are not to be accepted unless they have certificates from their employers that they can be spared'.<sup>376</sup>

As the war-time economy strengthened there was increasing competition for manpower. By 1915 industry, especially any connected with government contracts, could offer higher wages than the military. As early as 18 November 1914, Robert Thornburn & Sons, Ardeer Works, Stevenston, were advertising for navvies at the rate of over 7d per hour: an opportunity to earn more in a day than an infantryman could earn in a week.<sup>377</sup> By March 1915 there was indirect competition for the diminishing manpower reserves between the navy and the army. The army needed recruits for military service while the navy, in the shape of Easton Gibb and Son Ltd, were desperate for navvies and labourers to speed up the construction of the Rosyth Naval Base. Gibb's were offering 7½d per hour with guaranteed 'Steady employment at the same rate for two years'.<sup>378</sup>

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<sup>375</sup> P. Dewey, 'Military Recruiting'. p. 213.

<sup>376</sup> *The Dundee Advertiser*, 10 September 1914.

<sup>377</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 18 November 1914.

<sup>378</sup> *Forfar Herald*, 5 March 1915.

With the excess manpower already in uniform, the numbers coming forward to enlist were not enough to compensate for the high number of casualties suffered in the first few months of static warfare. To combat this competition and increase recruitment numbers a more direct and personal approach had to be taken to stimulate recruitment. Those willing to enlist would do so of their own volition: therefore, pressure had to be brought to bear on those who were seen to be hanging back. March 1915 brought a renewed appeal directed at those with easily replaceable jobs under the heading '4 Questions to Clerks and Shop Assistants'. The questions were purely a means of bringing pressure to bear upon one particular group which had been seen to hold back.

1. If you are between 19 and 38 years of age are you really satisfied with what you are doing to-day?
2. Do you feel happy as you walk along the streets and see brave men in khaki who are going to fight for the Empire while you stay at home in comfort?
3. Do you realise that our gallant soldiers are risking everything on the Continent to save you, your children, and your womenfolk?
4. Will you tell your employer to-day that you are going to enlist? Ask him to keep your position open for you – tell him that you are going to fight for the Empire. He'll do the right thing by you – all the patriotic employers are helping their men to join.<sup>379</sup>

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<sup>379</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 24 March 1915.

This continual battle to stimulate recruitment was to be the dominating feature of 1915. That year was to be one of endless recruitment drives in the struggle to maintain the number of recruits at a realistic level. As economic stability returned to Scottish industry and the flow of workers enlisting dried up, the focus moved to those in employment other than industry or agriculture: those in easily replaceable or dispensable employment, workers who could easily be replaced by those ineligible for military service, the young, the elderly, and, more importantly, women.

On 2 September 1915 recruiting for the technical units was expanded and there were advertisements for wheelwrights for the Army Ordnance Corps to be paid at the rate of 5/- per day all found, while later in the same month there was a call for clerks and shorthand typists for the Army Service Corps.<sup>380</sup> This was closely followed on 2 October with one last effort to stimulate recruitment by holding a National Recruiting Rally throughout the United Kingdom. At the same time, on 6 October recruiting authorities announced that the Mechanical Transport was open for 'drivers, fitters, turners, and blacksmiths at 6/- a day'.<sup>381</sup> However this last minute attempt to stimulate recruitment failed. On 17 October 1915 it was announced that,

The last of the Rosebery recruiting meetings at Leith for the present was held on Saturday afternoon. Keenly as Provost Smith, the

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<sup>380</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 28 September 1915.

<sup>381</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 6 October 1915.

Convenor of the (Rosebery Recruiting) Committee, felt the need of filling up the ranks, he realised that the meetings had, at least for the present, done all the service they were capable of doing. The committee had held fully 170 meetings.<sup>382</sup>

This was the beginning of the end for voluntary recruitment in Scotland.

## COMPULSION

There were other methods used to exert pressure on individuals. As already mentioned the Scottish upper class was the group with the greatest ideological tie with imperial defence. Unfortunately, since they were in a position of influence, this tended to manifest itself in the sacrifice of others as well as themselves. As emphasised by T. M. Devine, while the upper class and aristocracy of Scotland did, no doubt, suffer large scale personal loss, 'the majority of the sons of landowners survived the conflict'.<sup>383</sup> Devine places the number of the Scottish aristocracy who died in the war at forty-two. Taken from a total number of 225 relatives of Scottish peers who served in the war this is a high percentage, some 18.6 per cent.<sup>384</sup> Sir Ralph Anstruther arrived at the recruiting office in Cupar with his chauffeur, four of his gardeners, and one of his footmen. The six unfortunates were then enlisted in the Black Watch. There was no choice; failure to enlist would be taken as termination of employment whereas military service would guarantee the recruit's future employment within the Anstruther household. Captain Stewart, the recruiting

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<sup>382</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 17 October 1915.

<sup>383</sup> T.M. Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, p. 455.

<sup>384</sup> T.M. Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, p. 455.

officer for Cupar, remarked that 'if all the landed proprietors would follow the lead of Sir Ralph, Lord Kitchener's second army would soon be full'.<sup>385</sup> The opinions of Captain Stewart were not shared by all recruiting officers. Major Ross, another Fife-based recruiting officer remarked that 'It did not do to use coercion in joining the ranks. The man who came in willingly was three times better than the other who was forced to come'.<sup>386</sup>

Sir Ralph was not alone in his desire to encourage recruitment from his domestic employees. The new Earl of Weymss went so far as to threaten to dismiss any of his estate workers, between the ages of eighteen and thirty, who did not take the opportunity to enlist. Those who did would have their places kept open for them and would be paid half wages while 'away with the colours', while those who did not enlist would be 'compelled' to leave their employment.<sup>387</sup> Lord Rosebery drove round his estates collecting his young employees for recruitment. In all cases the future livelihood of the men involved and the welfare of their families were at stake and they, in all reality, had no choice but to enlist. By no stretch of the imagination could these men be called volunteers. Meanwhile it was reported that, in Glasgow, the owners of motor cars were patrolling the streets advertising for recruits, 'shanghaiing' those that they found lounging around and transporting them to the nearest recruiting office.<sup>388</sup> It was announced in the *Daily Record* that, 'The Duke of Atholl and the Earl of Haddington have been interesting themselves in the

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<sup>385</sup> *East of Fife Record*, 4 September 1914.

<sup>386</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 15 December 1914.

<sup>387</sup> C. Dakers, *The Countryside at War 1914-1918*. p. 26. T. Royle, *In Flanders Fields*. p. 12.

<sup>388</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 1 September 1914.

raising of Lord Kitchener's army'.<sup>389</sup> Whether the syntax of the article was intentional or not, and at this early stage of the war it would probably be not, the impression given was that the aristocracy viewed the raising of the New Armies as nothing more than a pleasant past-time, an interlude in their dull existence.

In Perthshire, as in other areas of Scotland, the entire police force had been authorised to act as recruiting agents. This in itself restricted individual freedom of choice since to most people the police represented the recognisable face of authority and it would be in the nature of many to follow the 'advice' given by the local police officer. Faced with this pressure many who were undecided or wavering would succumb and enlist. At the sheriff court in Forfar the local Chief Constable, as early as 20 August 1914, suggested that those brought before the court on charges such as drunkenness be 'persuaded' to enlist. One such luckless individual was Robert McIntosh, a drover who was charged with drunkenness, and whose reply to the suggestion of the court was that 'at thirty one he was too old for military service'.<sup>390</sup> The option of military service for those appearing before the courts was not isolated to Forfar.

The number of convicted persons sent to prison in Scotland's four main cities in September 1914 shows a marked drop over the figures for the same month in 1913.<sup>391</sup>

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<sup>389</sup> *Daily Record*, 1 September 1914.

<sup>390</sup> *The Forfar and Kirriemuir Advertiser*, 21 August 1914.

<sup>391</sup> *The Scotsman*, 6 October, 1914.

FIG 4:12 Number sent to prison from four main cities.<sup>392</sup>

	Edinburgh	Glasgow	Dundee	Aberdeen
<b>1913</b>	308	1946	150	184
<b>1914</b>	202	1497	155	115
<b># Change</b>	- 106	- 449	+ 5	- 69
<b>% Change</b>	- 34.4	- 23.1	+ 3.2	- 37.5

The exception to this was Dundee which showed an increase in the number of men imprisoned. The apparent reluctance of Dundonians to enlist was endemic, with prison seemingly preferred over military service. As we have seen already, with economic stability in Dundee there was no need to enlist. A short term in prison would be followed by a return to employment.

The looming spectre of conscription was used as a stick to encourage recruitment, not only in 1915 but right from the start; politically as well as morally. As early as 1 September 1914, in an article addressed to 'The young men', Mr Neil Morrison of the National Reserve, declared that 'a choice must be made between voluntary and compulsory military service'.<sup>393</sup> He concluded his appeal to the youth of Scotland by calling on them to take up arms in defence of their country. 'Do not be a shirker, but pick up one of our rifles and prove yourself a man'.<sup>394</sup>

<sup>392</sup> *The Scotsman*, 6 October 1914.

<sup>393</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 1 September 1914.

<sup>394</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 1 September 1914.

On 9 January 1915, at a recruiting rally in the Corn Exchange, Dalkeith, Lord Rosebery, in his capacity as Lord Lieutenant of Mid-Lothian, praised Scotland's response to the recruitment question. He went on however to say

I think that if sufficient recruits are not got by the voluntary system you will very soon see some system of compulsion inaugurated. I think that that would not be unwelcome to a great many of my fellow-countrymen, who would be willing to go under some Imperial mandate of that kind, but who do not think that it is fair that they should be singled out for active service while others remain at home.<sup>395</sup>

This method of compulsion was followed immediately by a different form of economic pressure for enlistment than that experienced so far: intensified pressure on the individual rather than on the group. No enlistment in the war - no jobs after it. One such attempt at economic pressure came from the National Patriotic Association, which urged employers to issue a statement to the effect that 'when filling up positions after the war we intend to give preference to those who have served their country under arms or in making munitions of war.'<sup>396</sup> This was a proposal endorsed by The King, Lord Kitchener, Sir Edward Grey, and Lloyd George, and was an overt threat based on future employment.

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<sup>395</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 11 January 1915.

<sup>396</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 23 April 1915.

There were also threats based on present employment prospects. On 10 December 1914, at a meeting of the Eastern District Committee of Stirlingshire County Council at Falkirk, held to discuss relief work for the unemployed, it was suggested by Mr Andrew Hunter that 'if some men got work they would, perhaps, shirk their duty to their country. It was agreed to instruct the Road Surveyor that men able to join the army should not be employed.'<sup>397</sup> This practice was not confined solely to Stirlingshire but was quite commonplace throughout Scotland. Lord Hamilton of Dalzell took a similar view early in August 1914, when he suggested that no relief should be given to unmarried men of suitable age, thereby forcing them to enlist. He went on to say that 'This is so clearly the right course, both from an economic and a patriotic point of view'.<sup>398</sup> His rather oblique concept of patriotism was to force those less fortunate into military service. In Dundee the local tramways department took the decision not to take on any replacement staff unless they were certified unfit for military service.<sup>399</sup>

By early October 1914 the Glasgow Night Asylum was reported empty of those young unemployed men who were normally resident there: 'These had all disappeared; they had gone to serve their country'.<sup>400</sup> Those young men who were now left in residence were unfit for military service. The number of vagrants in the city was also greatly reduced. By the end of December 1914

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<sup>397</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 11 December 1914.

<sup>398</sup> *Evening Times*, 19 August 1914.

<sup>399</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 29 October 1914,

<sup>400</sup> Annual Meeting of the Glasgow Night Asylum, reported in *The Scotsman*, 6 October, 1914.

they had reduced to less than 50 per cent of the figure for June 1914, and 51 per cent of December the previous year.<sup>401</sup>

In mid-December 1914 the work began of sending out the circulars for the Householders Survey, issued in Edinburgh by the Scottish Section of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, which invited all men between the ages of 19 and 38 who were willing to serve in the army to register their names. Within Scotland, Dundee, Glasgow and Edinburgh, by virtue of their status as the three main Scottish cities, were set apart as special areas for the purpose of estimating the remaining Scottish recruitment potential. In December 1914 Dundee Trades Council refused to help in, or support, the recruiting campaign. They had taken the decision that 'while their members preserve perfect freedom of action, the council, as a corporate body, should not assist in the recruiting campaign in the city'.<sup>402</sup> The Trades Council viewed the low rates of pay awarded to soldiers as slave labour and could not condone any form of support. Once again this can be seen as psychological pressure aimed at reducing personal choice.

On 17 December Dundee began issuing the circulars and immediately received a reply from one man marked 'see Luke 14-23' which reads 'Go out into the highways and hedges and compel them to come in'.<sup>403</sup>

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<sup>401</sup> *The Scotsman*, 1 January 1915.

<sup>402</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 10 December 1914.

<sup>403</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 18 December 1914.

By mid-1915 there was, in the face of competition from a recovered and buoyant industry, a serious shortfall in the monthly numbers of recruits coming forward. In the second half of 1915 two different schemes were initiated to stimulate voluntary recruitment. The first was the National Register under which every British subject between the ages of 16 and 65 was

required to register with the government. The National Register Act came into force on 15 July. Drafted by Walter Long, it was designed to provide a record of the number of men in the country and so make it easier to calculate the available manpower. A register was compiled of all men and women between fifteen and sixty-five, The register recorded details of occupation, family and birth. This register was intended to be used to sharpen the focus of the recruitment campaigns.<sup>404</sup> On 1 September the *Dundee Advertiser* reported that there was a return of 37,622 men in the city for the National Register.<sup>405</sup> Later, in a memorandum on 29 September 1915, Walter Long put the number of men still available in Scotland for military service as 100,000 'allowing for men reserved for essential war, domestic and export industries'.<sup>406</sup>

On 5 October Lord Derby, who had proved invaluable in promoting voluntary recruitment in England, was appointed Director of Recruitment. Although an advocate of conscription as the means to alleviate Britain's manpower shortage, he was willing to undertake one further effort to stimulate recruitment on a purely voluntary basis. However, he had extracted from

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<sup>404</sup> P. Simkins, *Kitchener's Army*. p. 144-5.

<sup>405</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 1 September 1915.

<sup>406</sup> PRO. CAB 37/134/32.

Asquith agreement that, if this effort failed to produce the required number of recruits to maintain the manpower level required by the army, then compulsion would immediately be introduced. The result was the Derby Scheme, by which men between the ages of 18 and 41 were to be encouraged to attest their willingness, or otherwise, to volunteer. This would be done on the understanding that all single men would be called before any married men would be taken. This could only work if all single men attested a willingness to serve. However, it was implicit that if not enough single men volunteered, then conscription would quickly follow. It was portrayed as the last chance to serve by choice rather than face the stigma of compulsion. Nationally (Britain), of the 2.2 million single men who it was believed were still available for service, only some 840,000 were prepared to attest. Of this figure 300,000 were rejected for a variety of medical reasons.<sup>407</sup>

In Great Britain approximately 1.35 million married men attested, trusting the government to hold to its pledge that all single men would be called first. Unfortunately this was now unfeasible, with a higher number of married men attesting than single. Over one million single men had, for whatever reason, failed to attest and the Derby Scheme was deemed to have fallen short of its objective, although it was not adjudged to have been a failure since it did prompt a last surge in voluntary recruitment. Conscription was to be the next step. Scotland was no exception to this pattern. The Derby scheme was yet another example of civilians taking control of the recruiting campaign.

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<sup>407</sup> De Groot, *Blighty*. p. 94-7.

FIG 4:13 Poster depicting the group system. October/November 1915.

# SINGLE MEN FIRST

## HOW THE GROUP SYSTEM WORKS

THE GROUPS	
SINGLE	MARRIED
1st GROUP Single Men of 18	24th GROUP Married Men of 18
2nd GROUP Single Men of 19	25th GROUP Married Men of 19
3rd GROUP Single Men of 20	26th GROUP Married Men of 20
4th GROUP Single Men of 21	27th GROUP Married Men of 21
5th GROUP Single Men of 22	28th GROUP Married Men of 22
6th GROUP Single Men of 23	29th GROUP Married Men of 23
7th GROUP Single Men of 24	30th GROUP Married Men of 24
8th GROUP Single Men of 25	31st GROUP Married Men of 25
9th GROUP Single Men of 26	32nd GROUP Married Men of 26
10th GROUP Single Men of 27	33rd GROUP Married Men of 27
11th GROUP Single Men of 28	34th GROUP Married Men of 28
12th GROUP Single Men of 29	35th GROUP Married Men of 29
13th GROUP Single Men of 30	36th GROUP Married Men of 30
14th GROUP Single Men of 31	37th GROUP Married Men of 31
15th GROUP Single Men of 32	38th GROUP Married Men of 32
16th GROUP Single Men of 33	39th GROUP Married Men of 33
17th GROUP Single Men of 34	40th GROUP Married Men of 34
18th GROUP Single Men of 35	41st GROUP Married Men of 35
19th GROUP Single Men of 36	42nd GROUP Married Men of 36
20th GROUP Single Men of 37	43rd GROUP Married Men of 37
21st GROUP Single Men of 38	44th GROUP Married Men of 38
22nd GROUP Single Men of 39	45th GROUP Married Men of 39
23rd GROUP Single Men of 40	46th GROUP Married Men of 40

## YOU CAN ENLIST NOW

and become at once a Soldier in training

OR

## YOU CAN ENLIST UNDER THE GROUP SYSTEM

Under this system you will be enlisted for one day, and at your own request you will be transferred at once to Section B Army Reserve, and allowed to return to your home until the Group in which you are placed is called up for service.

You will be given an Armist bearing the Royal Crown. Opportunities will be given you of voluntary preliminary drill. You will be given a fortnight's notice before you need actually join your unit.

You will, therefore, be able to continue your usual work until you receive this call, which will allow you time to give notice to your employer, or arrange your affairs.

There are 46 Groups, which are set out at side. The Single Men will be put into the first 23 Groups according to age, and the men entered upon the National Register as Married Men will be put into the following 23 Groups, also according to age.

The Groups will be called up in the order of their numbers (but in no case will anyone be called up until he has attained the age of 19 years).

In short,

## SINGLE MEN WILL BE CALLED FIRST

Men who have married since their Registration, and Widowers without children, will be regarded as Single Men.

When a Group is called up by Proclamation, any man in that Group will be able, if he so desires, and if there are very special circumstances in his case, to make an appeal to be placed in a later Group.

The canvass of homes was organised and conducted by local recruiting committees, utilising the local political offices and political agents: local knowledge to promote local recruitment. Malcolm MacFarlane was one political worker who undertook to work on the scheme in Paisley, through the organisation of the West Renfrewshire Central Committee of the Liberal Club. His notes show that 50 per cent of those canvassed were unwilling to enlist or felt that they were unfit for military service, while 4 per cent stated that they were not prepared to join as there were 'too many slackers', and a further 4 per cent had no confidence in the government. Of those who declared themselves unwilling or unfit 50 per cent were single and 50 per cent married.<sup>408</sup>

There does however appear to have been some misinterpretation of the design of the Derby Scheme and ambiguity as to the original intention. On 5 December 1915 Lord Richard-Frederick Cavendish, Supervisor and Organiser of Recruiting in Lancashire, explained to the Blackburn Recruiting Committee that 'married men will not be called up for service until the single men have gone. If compulsion should not be brought into force for single men, married men who have been attested will be released from their pledge'.<sup>409</sup>

This was given as an official explanation and appears to indicate that compulsion was intended from the outset. If married men were only to be

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<sup>408</sup> Scottish National Library Acc 9736 No 55.

<sup>409</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 6 December 1915.

called up after all single men had gone, then in order to enlist all single men, attested or not, compulsion would be necessary. Since those initiating, and those administering, the Derby Scheme went to the trouble of attesting married men it would appear that compulsion, of the single men at least, was the aim of the scheme from its inception, and not, as has been thought, the continuance of voluntary recruitment. There were other indicators that the voluntary pretext of the Derby Scheme was nothing other than a sophism for public consumption. Appeal tribunals were convened in order that men could appeal against the category or group to which they had been allocated. Individuals were allocated to these groups depending on age, marital status, dependants, employment, etc. If the Derby Scheme was a serious attempt to continue the voluntary ethos, then there would be no reason to institute a tribunal system which was only necessary in a conscriptive society. Only the first eight groups at any time were able to appeal against their category. Those were the groups which contained the single men under the age of twenty six. As groups were called up then the tribunal would deal with the next eight in line.

At the very least it must be said that Derby and Asquith followed a twin track approach towards recruitment which casts a shadow on the commitment, or lack of it, to the continuation of the voluntary system of recruitment. By mid-December the mechanism for the tribunals was in place and appeal forms had been distributed: form R 9 if an employer was appealing on behalf of an individual and form R 11 if the individual was appealing on his own behalf. Both forms were to be returned within seven days. Those attesting under the

Derby Scheme were issued with khaki armbands and by January 1916 those who had been rejected on medical grounds were also to be issued armbands to signify their willingness, but inability, to enlist. The tribunals were also charged with reviewing the status of those who were in 'starred' occupations, exempt from military service, deciding whether an individual should retain or lose this status. Such powers were only required in a compulsory system. To put such safeguards in place before the Derby Scheme had been completed shows that the scheme was never considered to be a viable prospect. That these measures were put in place while the scheme was being conducted shows the true direction of government policy. The use of Lord Derby, and his scheme, assured that Asquith was seen to be one step removed from the policy of compulsion. Peter Simkins states that

The choice of Derby demonstrated Asquith's political adroitness, for Derby was a well known supporter of conscription, and if the scheme failed to produce the necessary number of recruits Asquith could justly claim that voluntary recruiting had failed and thereby provide himself with a sort line of tactical withdrawal.<sup>410</sup>

There was an advertisement in the *Glasgow Herald* on 15 November 1915, 'enlist before 30 November. If you do not, the Prime Minister has pledged himself and his Government that compulsory means will be taken'.<sup>411</sup> The original intention was to complete the canvass by 30 November 1915 but the

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<sup>410</sup> P. Simkins, *Kitchener's Army*, p. 150.

<sup>411</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 15 November 1915.

last minute rush forced the register to remain open until 4 December, later extended further to 11 December, and finally closing on 15 December.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **ARMY RECRUITMENT.**

Although the army was aware of the crisis in Europe and the potential consequences, it, like the government and the population, was overwhelmed by the speed and escalation of events. On 6 August 1914, the newly appointed Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, gained parliamentary approval to raise 500,000 men for what was seen as, initially at any rate, a 'new expeditionary force'. On the following day, 7 August 1914, he issued his initial appeal in the national and regional press for the first hundred thousand recruits for his New Army, a temporary addition to the regular army and recruited for the duration only. Lord Kitchener had decided that, instead of utilising the existing Town and County Associations of the Territorial Force as a recruiting organisation, as envisaged by Haldane as the natural expansion of the army, he would create new 'service' battalions within the existing regimental system. Each regiment would raise men for a series of battalions which would be numbered in succession after the existing regular, territorial, and reserve battalions. Each of these service battalions would have an extended period of training, envisaged at nine months, before being committed to the front line.

Much has been written about the reasons for Kitchener's decision to bypass the territorial recruiting system, ranging from his experiences with poorly trained militia while serving with the French Army to his dislike for a 'town

clerks army'. It was more likely that he was merely planning on the long term. Gerard DeGroot states that he 'preferred to start from scratch with a new army unencumbered by tradition, trained according to the demands of this war, enlisted for the duration, and able to be sent wherever necessity dictated'.<sup>406</sup>

This New Army would be recruited for service overseas, unlike the Territorial Force whose members had to agree to service abroad. It was better to start with a clean slate than to have an army whose soldiers were at varying degrees of competence and ability. The New Army at least offered a consolidated training period and set a common training standard for all. However, as we shall see in the following chapters, Kitchener did not totally disregard the Territorial system. On 10 August 1914 he called on the chairmen of the Territorial Force County Associations to co-operate in 'raising the additional number of recruits required at once for the army'.<sup>407</sup> On the following day Lord Inverclyde, the Lord-Lieutenant of Dumbartonshire, issued an appeal for support to Lord Kitchener's effort to augment the strength of the Regular Army.

Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, has written to me to do all I can by myself, and through the Territorial Force Association of the County, to raise an additional 100,000 men to the regular army. I appeal with confidence to the men of the county, to respond to the

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<sup>406</sup> G.J. DeGroot, *Blighty*. p. 43.

<sup>407</sup> *Daily Record*, 10 August 1914.

invitation, which is not an ordinary appeal for recruits, but the formation of a Second Army.<sup>408</sup>

Kitchener was not alone in his belief that the war would be a long protracted affair consuming millions of men. He was supported in this by Douglas Haig and Sir Henry Rawlinson. In the 1906 army reforms Major-General Haig, Director of Military Training, had championed a scheme which, using the Territorial Force, was 'aimed at placing an army of 900,000 in the field after twelve months and keeping it there for five years'.<sup>409</sup> Peter Simkins points out that 'Where Kitchener differed from most of his political and military colleagues was in his estimate that the war would last at least three years and that British military strength could not be fully deployed until 1917'.<sup>410</sup> John Pollock states that at his first cabinet meeting Kitchener announced that the war would last three years.<sup>411</sup> In his book *Proud Heritage* L B Oatts is also keen to point out that Kitchener was convinced that the war would involve millions of men and that fighting would continue for several years.<sup>412</sup> Clive Hughes also puts forward the point that Kitchener 'anticipated' a three year conflict.<sup>413</sup>

Kitchener was relying on France to withhold the German onslaught until Britain had time to raise and train a new army capable of defeating a depleted

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<sup>408</sup> *The Evening Citizen*, 11 August 1914.

<sup>409</sup> J. Gooch, 'Haldane and the National Army'. in Beckett & Gooch. *Politicians and Defence*. p. 79.

<sup>410</sup> P. Simkins. 'Kitchener and the Expansion of the Army'. in Beckett & Gooch, *Politicians and Defence*. p. 96.

<sup>411</sup> J. Pollock, *Kitchener*. p. 384.

<sup>412</sup> L. B. Oatts, *Proud Heritage; the Story of the Highland Light Infantry*. Vol 3. p. 146.

<sup>413</sup> C. Hughes, 'The New Armies', in Beckett and Simpson. p. 100.

enemy. Britain's initial contribution was to be the strength of her navy and the sacrifice of her regular soldiers; the new armies were not intended to be ready or committed until 1917. Kitchener's intention was to create a series of complete new armies, envisaging initially a total of thirty divisions. This number rose rapidly and by mid-1915 stood at a target of seventy divisions.<sup>414</sup> As we have described in Chapter Three, the response to this call for volunteers was widespread and varied, and depended firmly on regional employment and population conditions.

However, the formation of New Army battalions was not left to the dictates of local recruiting but was directed, initially at least, by the War Office. Each Scottish regiment was directed to raise a battalion for each of the First, Second and Third New Armies in August and September. The exceptions to this were the Royal Scots and the Highland Light Infantry, which were required to provide an extra battalion for the First New Army.<sup>415</sup> These were the only two Scottish regiments to raise two battalions for K1, and was a reflection of the size of their pre-war contribution to the army and of the regional population. By the end of October 1914 Scotland had thirty-two battalions complete or nearing completion. There were a further five battalions, in various stages of recruitment, being raised by individuals or local civil bodies.<sup>416</sup>

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<sup>414</sup> J. Gooch, 'Kitchener', in Beckett & Gooch *Politicians and Defence*. p. 97.

<sup>415</sup> Oatts, *Proud Heritage*. p. 147.

<sup>416</sup> Chapter 6.

The outbreak of war found Britain with a recruiting system totally inadequate for the situation and unable, or unwilling, to adapt. Chaotic scenes were played out throughout the country as men attempted to enlist. Streets were filled with eager volunteers while recruiting staff, ignoring the urgency of the moment, went through the slow regulation process of enlistment. In London, crowds thronged the streets outside the recruiting office at Great Scotland Yard, while in Glasgow smaller but no less enthusiastic groups gathered outside the Gallowgate recruiting office. On 8 August it was reported that 'The rush at the Glasgow recruiting office continued, and the police had difficulty in getting hundreds of intending soldiers to wait in the queues till their turn came'.<sup>417</sup>

Some men, faced with the bureaucracy and delay, left in disgust, no doubt lost to the army until conscription in 1916. Those who did manage to enlist were to find that the chaos was not limited to the recruiting system but was present in all aspects of army life. The pre-war recruiting system was geared towards an annual recruitment rate of 30,000 men, 'less than 100 per day over the entire United Kingdom'.<sup>418</sup> The rush of recruits in August and September 1914 found this peacetime system unable to cope. The army could not feed, clothe, arm, or train its new recruits.

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<sup>417</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 8 August 1914.

<sup>418</sup> P. Simkins, *Kitchener's Army*, p. 52.

As we have seen in Chapter Two, Scotland was divided into two military districts, the First or Highland district with six recruiting areas and the Second or Lowland District, with seven.

**Fig 5:1 Scottish recruiting districts.**

<b>First or Highland Division</b>	
Regiment and Recruiting Area	Counties Included
Dundee Recruiting area. Black Watch.	City of Dundee.
42 <sup>nd</sup> regimental recruiting area, Perth. Black Watch	Perth, Forfar, Fife.
72 <sup>nd</sup> Regimental recruiting area, Fort George. Seaforth Highlanders	Orkney, Shetland, Caithness, Sutherland, Ross and Cromarty, Nairn and Elgin.
79 <sup>th</sup> Regimental recruiting area, Inverness. Cameron Highlanders	Inverness.
75 <sup>th</sup> Regimental recruiting area, Aberdeen. Gordon Highlanders	Aberdeen, Banff and Kincardine.
91 <sup>st</sup> Regimental Recruiting area, Stirling. Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders	Stirling, Clackmannan, Kinross, Dumbarton, Renfrew, Argyll and Bute.

<b>Second or Lowland Division</b>	
Regiment and Recruiting Area	Counties Included
1 <sup>st</sup> Regimental Recruiting area, Glencorse. Royal Scots	Edinburgh, (County) Linlithgow, Haddington and Peebles.
21 <sup>st</sup> Regimental Recruiting area, Ayr. Royal Scots Fusiliers	Ayr and Wigtown.
25 <sup>th</sup> Regimental Recruiting area, Berwick. Kings Own Scottish Borderers	Berwick, Roxburgh, Selkirk, Dumfries and Kirkcudbright.
26 <sup>th</sup> and 71st Regimental Recruiting area, Hamilton. Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)	Lanark.
Glasgow Recruiting area. Highland Light Infantry	Glasgow, Govan and Partick.
Edinburgh recruiting area. Royal Scots	City of Edinburgh, Leith.

With the outbreak of war recruiting for the army was no longer centred solely on the twelve regimental depots and their attached recruiting offices. For recruiting purposes the United Kingdom was divided into areas which

corresponded roughly to the existing counties, with the large towns being treated separately. Within each of these areas there was an organisation which consisted of recruiting officers and recruiters, who were charged with obtaining men for enlistment from within their area. The recruits were then dispatched to the central recruiting depot for their area and from there forwarded in groups to the regiment or corps of their choice. The rash of recruiting offices which sprang up were varied but they were still regulated from a central group of main recruiting centres. There were, initially at least, thirty of these centres spread around Scotland, many of them the existing pre-war recruiting offices and depots. These offices collected the recruiting data for their area and nightly telephoned London with the daily recruitment figures. In most cases the recruitment numbers for the outlying or auxiliary offices were lost as they were included in the returns for the main centres but there are enough of them to give an overall picture of Scottish recruitment for the New Armies.

One example of this amalgamation of figures is the daily returns for Glasgow which, in late August 1914, had as many as thirty recruiting offices, both military and political, but whose figures were sent each evening as one number attributed to the Gallowgate recruiting office. While this gives a number for Glasgow as a whole it limits the availability of recruitment statistics for the various districts within the city. However, as a counter to this negative aspect of the official records, there are figures, limited in some areas, available in the local press which, initially at any rate, took pride in announcing to its readers the sacrifices made by the local populace in the

name of recruitment; as recruitment slowed so did the enthusiasm of the press to publish recruitment numbers. Much has been made of the high numbers of recruits provided by the various areas but these numbers should be viewed in the context that they were given; as an encouragement to stimulate recruitment. Trevor Royle assures us that by the end of August 1914 '20,000 men had enlisted at the Glasgow recruiting office in the Gallowgate.'<sup>419</sup> On the other hand the official recruiting returns show that Glasgow produced just 8,357 recruits in August 1914, and not all of them in the Gallowgate recruiting office. Similarly expanded claims were made for other areas, such as 900 from Clydebank – officially 123, and 940 from Dumbarton - which was officially 437.<sup>420</sup>

## **BOOM OR BUST**

The rise in recruitment numbers from mid August to early September 1914 has been seen as a recruitment boom in its own right but, in Scotland at least, it was only an escalation of the original recruiting surge, an increase in scale as the numbers became available, or, if you like, a phase two. The initial rush to enlist at the outbreak of war, phase one, was fuelled by a variety of factors. It can be seen as a direct reaction to the onset of war by those people enlisting: the immediate enthusiasm of the upper class, the euphoria of the occasion, and the rush of the unemployed.

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<sup>419</sup> T. Royle, *In Flanders Field*, p. 12. NATS 1/398.

<sup>420</sup> T. Royle, *In Flanders Field*. p. 12. NATS 1/398.

The H.L.I. Depot at Hamilton, already worked off its feet dealing with the reservists, was thrown into a complete state of chaos lasting four days, by “a howling rabble arriving from Glasgow to enlist.” These stout hearts declined to leave, and the majority slept in the open in and around the barracks until they could be dealt with-when two of them were found to have only one leg apiece, one tried to get away with “a wooden foot”, and several others had glass eyes.<sup>421</sup>

One part of Scottish society was driven by emotion and social conditioning while another was concerned with the immediate relief from poverty, deprivation, and the stigma of poor relief. William Linton Andrews, a journalist in Dundee, used his literary skills to explain the sight that greeted his arrival at the local drill hall.

Men were pouring in, overwhelming the ordinary staffs. Men were ready to sign anything, and say anything. They gave false names, false addresses, false ages. They suppressed their previous military service, or exaggerated it, just as seemed to promise them best. Recruits had to sign as fast as they could. They did not trouble to read their papers. Most of them were more eager in those early days about getting their food than their commitments to King and country.<sup>422</sup>

This was not only a Scottish phenomenon; it could be seen in other parts of

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<sup>421</sup> Oatts. *Proud Heritage*. p. 146-7.

<sup>422</sup> W. L. Andrews, *The Haunting Years*. p. 13.

the United Kingdom, especially among those with a low standard of living and low expectations. P Callan, in his thesis on recruiting in Ireland, states that 'The seductive quality of steady pay was more than many an unemployed man with a family could bear'<sup>423</sup>

In the Scottish cities this recruitment surge in the first few days certainly contained those often referred to as the *detritus* of society. Those who were unemployed, unemployable or on poor relief were only too willing to take advantage of the umbrella of short-term military service which, in time of national crisis, would not carry the normal pre-war social stigma. Those who enlisted later for the second and third New Armies, in late August and September 1914, were acknowledged to be of a higher standard although they were still mostly industrial workers, in this case skilled. Clive Hughes asserts that 'many waited until they were convinced of the need to join, and enlisted only after their affairs were properly settled'.<sup>424</sup> Hughes fails to point out that it was personal, or family, needs which governed their desire, not national needs. However Hughes is correct in claiming that 'these skilled artisans were responsible for September's boom figures: Germains' "superior type of citizen" of the Second and Third New Armies'.<sup>425</sup> The initial recruiting period in Scotland is slightly more complex than the 'boom and bust' theorists would have us believe. While recruitment did rise dramatically in early September 1914, and did fall away just as quickly, the increase was not a 'spontaneous outpouring of emotion' but, as we have seen in chapter three,

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<sup>423</sup> P. Callan, *Voluntary Recruitment for the British Army in Ireland during the First World War*. Unpublished PhD, University College Dublin, 1984, p. 54.

<sup>424</sup> C. Hughes, 'The New Armies', in Beckett and Simpson. p. 101.

<sup>425</sup> C. Hughes, *The New Armies*, in Beckett and Simpson. p. 101.

merely the result of human economic necessity coupled with the inadequacies of the army recruiting mechanism.

For the first few days tradesmen were required but, following on the heels of Lord Kitchener's first public appeal for his New Armies, recruiting offices enrolled men for general service in the infantry only, turning away those who sought to bring their skills into military service. The difference in pay was enough to limit the initial recruiting response. While an infantry private earned one shilling per day, a blacksmith or engineer could earn six times as much.

By Saturday 8 August Scotland had raised 920 recruits for the army, representing 11.23 per cent of the British total for the first week of the war. These numbers increased when, on Monday 10 August, Scotland produced 872 recruits or 18 per cent of the British daily total of 4,831 men. By the following day, when notices turning away skilled artisans were displayed at recruiting stations, the British daily total had increased by 68.8 per cent to 7,020 while the Scottish daily total had decreased by 24.1 per cent to 662. For the first twelve days of the war recruiting in Scotland remained fairly constant, higher proportionally than pre-war but lower than the available levels of manpower - the result of rapid industrial collapse as described in Chapter Three. In the second week Scotland contributed 5,663 recruits or 12.94 per cent of the British total of 43,764.<sup>426</sup>

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<sup>426</sup> NATS 1/398.

The first major change in Scottish recruitment occurred on 15 August when it was announced that 'The local Political Associations, Liberal and Unionist, throughout Scotland, have constituted themselves collecting centres of recruits, to aid in the enlistment of the 100,000 men called for by Lord Kitchener.'<sup>427</sup> The effect was immediate, with Scotland's proportion of national recruiting rising overnight to 33.59 per cent on 16 August: the highest proportion recorded throughout the entire voluntary period.<sup>428</sup> The rise in recruitment came about because the political recruiting offices, as well as bringing enlistment to the outlying industrial districts, were not restrictive in terms of enlistment. Those recruits who had been unable to travel, sometimes long distances, to the main recruiting offices could now enlist locally, and, more importantly, for any branch of the service. Skilled men were not restricted to the infantry and could enlist for the higher wages available in the technical arms of the service. The importance of this could be seen in Glasgow where, with a large, predominantly skilled, workforce, twenty-eight new recruiting offices were available. In the third week of recruitment, which was the first week of the political recruiting offices, 9,657 men enlisted in Scotland, 19.32 per cent of the British total for the week of 49,982.<sup>429</sup>

The figures could have been higher but the political offices were closed for recruitment on 22 August, seven days after opening. They were found to be too effective. The local military depots were overrun and overcrowded with new recruits. Steps had to be taken to relieve the strain on the regimental

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<sup>427</sup> *Daily Record*, 15 August 1914.

<sup>428</sup> NATS 1/398.

<sup>429</sup> NATS 1/398.

depots. Kitchener was forced to rely on the Territorial Associations for help in this area. Concentration camps (in 1914 there was as yet no stigma attached to the name) were to be created to hold the excess recruits from the regimental recruiting depots until the military machine could process them and in this Lord Kitchener was obliged to seek help from the Territorial Associations.

It is understood that with a view to relieving the congestion at a number of recruiting depots a concentration camp is to be formed at Dunfermline for the training of recruits. A letter has been received by the Fife County Territorial Force Association from Lord Kitchener intimating that they will be held responsible for the organisation of the camp, and for accommodating, clothing, and feeding the men.<sup>430</sup>

This was a long term solution. Measures had to be taken to relieve the pressure in the short-term. In Glasgow as early 20 August 1914, General Sir Spencer Ewart asked for the assistance of the Corporation of Glasgow in dealing with the overflow of recruits and various public halls (St Andrews Hall, City Hall, Parkhead Hall, Kingston Hall, Langside Hall, Dixon Hall, Pollokshaws Hall, Whiteinch Hall, Springburn Hall, and the hall attached to Whitevale Baths) were provided to accommodate 1,170 men. Not only was shelter provided but the men were also fed by the Corporation.<sup>431</sup> As a direct result of instructions issued on 2 September 1914 to the General Officer

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<sup>430</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 12 September 1914.

<sup>431</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 21 August 1914.

Commanding Scottish Command, concerning the transfer of surplus manpower between regiments, on 4 September the War Office issued further instructions to recruiting officers authorising them, in an effort to reduce overcrowding, to recruit men for three years or the duration, with initially one day only to be served with the colours and then in the Army Reserve until called up. The recruits would be paid 1s 9d for their day's service with the colours and then sent home on 6d per day or 3s 6d per week until required. This produced hardship for those who had already left employment but recruiting officers were allowed to 'exercise discretion as regards men who have already left civil employment and may enlist them under old conditions sending them at once to depots'.<sup>432</sup>

Those sent home were expected to be given ten days notice to resume service with the colours. This was seen as a last resort and given a higher priority on 6 September when the General Officer, Commanding Scottish Command, was instructed by the War Office that

In filling up new service battalions and completing reserve battalions I am relying on your diverting as far as you can within your own command men who are surplus in one Infantry regiment to another which is still deficient so as to complete all service and reserve battalions of each regiment before instructions are issued to recruiting

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<sup>432</sup> PRO. WO 162/24.

officers to transfer recruits enlisted for that regiment temporarily to the Army Reserve.<sup>433</sup>

Overcrowding at recruiting depots was proving hard to manage. By 8 September it was further announced that

Since the war commenced 803 recruits from Aberdeen, Banff, and Kincardine, the regimental district of the Gordon Highlanders have joined the army at Castlehill Barracks, Aberdeen. At present there are over 1,000 recruits at the Barracks, while a similar number, who have arrived in Aberdeen from the West of Scotland, have been sent South after having been provided with their equipment.<sup>434</sup>

Restriction of recruitment was used, for the first time, to remove the backlog. Once again skilled men were prevented from enlisting and numbers dropped. The reduction in recruits was immediate. On the day following the closure of the Scottish political offices, recruitment in Scotland was down by over 40 per cent on the previous day, a reduction of 510 men. In Glasgow the result was more dramatic, with recruitment in the city dropping by over 78 per cent.<sup>435</sup> Glasgow's displaced industrial labour was not only bearing the brunt of the city's recruitment but also taking the lion's share nationally. Any restriction placed upon them immediately manifested itself in the level of Scottish recruitment. The recruiting setback meant that, due to the overcrowding in the

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<sup>433</sup> PRO. WO 162/24.

<sup>434</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 8 September 1914.

<sup>435</sup> NATS 1/398.

military depots, some of those men who had just enlisted were sent home for the weekend. This gave the wrong impression to those who were still contemplating, and were undecided about, enlisting. The impression was given, unintentionally, that the need for recruits was not as urgent as had been previously stated and that the ranks of the army were now full.

The seven-day surge was over and recruiting had returned to the early levels of the first few days of the war. The closure was short-lived however, and by 25 August the recruiting depots had cleared the backlog of recruits and the political recruiting offices re-opened. The events of 16 August were quickly repeated, when large numbers of recruits once more flocked to the political offices. Numbers again rose sharply with 1,205 men or 11.75 per cent of the British total enlisting on 26 August and 1,623 or 14.4 per cent on the following day.<sup>436</sup> Recruitment was given a further boost on 28 August when the upper age limit was increased from 30 to 35 years for those without previous military experience. The combination of the relaxed recruitment policy in the political offices and the new upper age limit created a second wave of recruitment in Scotland. What has been seen up until now by Peter Simkins as a single large scale recruitment boom was, in Scotland at least, not the case.<sup>437</sup> Figure 5:2 shows that Scotland had two periods of increased recruitment in the first two months of the war and clearly shows the effects when recruitment was restricted on 22 August and 8 September.

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<sup>436</sup> PRO. NATS 1/398.

<sup>437</sup> P. Simkins, *Kitchener's Army*. p. 49-75.

Scottish Recruitment : 9 August 1914 to 3 October 1914  
Scottish Weekly Total & Scottish Percent of British Recruitment




Fig. 5:2<sup>438</sup>

The second recruitment rise lasted only slightly longer than the first and, as we have seen, began with the re-opening of the political offices on 25 August 1914. This re-opening coincided with the first news reports of the Battle of Mons and up until now the upsurge of recruitment on this date has been attributed, in part, by Simkins, to public reaction to such news.<sup>439</sup> However, as we have seen, the upsurge was only the renewed enrolment of those who had previously been prevented from recruiting. The number of recruits increased in early September but Scotland's overall contribution declined as British daily recruiting figures climbed to a peak of 33,204 on Thursday 3 September. The figure for Scotland on that day was 3,556 recruits or 10.71

<sup>438</sup> PRO. NATS 1/398.

<sup>439</sup> P. Simkins, *Kitchener's Army*. p. 58-9.

per cent of the British total. While not yet at its peak this was still the second highest daily number for Scotland.<sup>440</sup> Figure 5:2 demonstrates that, although the recruitment figure for Scotland increased dramatically between 31 August and 8 September, the higher recruitment elsewhere, especially in England, reduced Scotland's proportional contribution.

Figure 5:3 demonstrates the sharp rise in recruitment in England and Wales which reduced Scotland's proportional contribution and shows that while Scotland had two distinct recruiting periods England and Wales had only one. Even on 8 September Scotland's highest daily figure of 3,937 recruits only produced a total of 13.06 per cent. While Scotland was producing high numbers of recruits in September, the disparity between those and the previous month was not so great as the rest of Britain. Therefore, although the Scottish daily numbers increased, the percentage contribution reduced. On 16 August Scotland raised 1,063 recruits, or 33 per cent, of the British total of 3,215. By 3 September the British total daily figure had increased tenfold to 33,204 while the Scottish figure had merely trebled to 3,556.<sup>441</sup> The proportion of British recruitment however had reduced to 10.71 per cent.

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<sup>440</sup> NATS 1/398.

<sup>441</sup> NATS 1/398.




Fig. 5:3<sup>442</sup>

By 3 September it was being reported that 'The increased facilities for recruiting afforded by the political parties have proved of the utmost advantage in speeding up the process of enlistment'.<sup>443</sup> Between 15 August, when the political offices in Glasgow first opened their doors to recruits, and 2 September, when a count was taken, 10,000 men had used these facilities to enlist in the various branches of the army. Following the reopening of the political offices over 3,000 men had come forward in the first seven days. On 2 September 1,001 men had enlisted in Glasgow. However, within this number 412 had enrolled at the Gallowgate recruiting office, while 589 had come forward at the political offices.<sup>444</sup>

<sup>442</sup> PRO. NATS 1/398.

<sup>443</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 3 September 1914.

<sup>444</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 3 September 1914.

While Scotland reached a numerical peak in the second week of September her major contribution was in the weeks of August when she produced a higher proportion of recruits. The most important week for Scottish recruitment was in the third week of the war, 16 – 22 August, with 9,657 recruits or 19.32 per cent of the weekly British total of 49,982 (figure 5:2).<sup>445</sup>

It would therefore appear that, as we have seen in Chapter Three, in Scotland there was a higher proportion of the male population in a position, or prepared, to enlist immediately. The numbers rose due to the change in age limit but the end result was the same as the first recruiting surge. The military depots and reception centres were again unable to cope with the influx of recruits and restrictions were once again placed on recruitment.

Until now the view stated by Peter Simkins has been that the increase in height and chest requirements brought in on 11 September 1914 was responsible for the sudden decrease in recruitment numbers.<sup>446</sup> Certainly this was the intention of the authorities and was in part the case but, in Scotland, recruiting was already on the decline. The authorities in Scotland had several days earlier, on 8 September, in an attempt to slow down the number of men coming forward to enlist, returned the recruiting restrictions to the level of the first few days of the war. Scottish Military Headquarters had issued instructions on that date to the Central Recruiting Committee of the Joint

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<sup>445</sup> NATS 1/398.

<sup>446</sup> P. Simkins, *Kitchener's Army*. p. 74-5.

Party Organisations to the effect that 'The political recruiting agencies have been advised to attest only for the infantry of the New General Service Army'.<sup>447</sup> This instruction coincided with the highest daily recruitment figure for Scotland and was the start of the decline in Scottish recruitment. The changes brought in by the government three days later merely served to accelerate the process (figure 5:4).




Fig. 5:4<sup>448</sup>

Figure 5:4 shows that Scotland produced both a high number of recruits and a high percentage of the British total almost immediately. With the vagaries of industry and the fluctuating recruiting standards, the country was unable to maintain this high contribution. The numerical increase in September 1914, phase two, can be viewed as the result of changes in recruitment restrictions

<sup>447</sup> *Daily Record*, 8 September 1914.

<sup>448</sup> PRO. NATS 1/398.

and also of indirect action, economic in nature, and was created not by the recruits themselves but by the knee-jerk reaction of Scottish industry. It was no coincidence that a high number of the men recruited in this period were skilled workers. The period after the September high, or phase three, was a levelling out of the recruiting numbers. Numbers were kept relatively constant by the recruitment of those with easily replaceable jobs (bank clerks, shop assistants, etc.) and those who succumbed to peer pressure or the pressure of the ever increasing recruitment drives.

As early as the sixth week of the conflict Scotland was providing a proportionally higher number of recruits than any of the other home countries: over 14 per cent higher. For the first six weeks of the war, 4 August – 15 September, England provided 396,761 recruits or 2.4 per cent of the male population, Scotland provided 64,444 men, or 2.8 per cent of the male population, Ireland provided 20,419 men, 0.93 per cent, and Wales gave 19,966, or 1.94 per cent of the male population.<sup>449</sup>

Once the excess manpower had gone the country could only maintain recruiting levels by applying an ever increasing pressure on the remaining male population and by the coming of age of its young men. Once Scotlands industry had been mobilised for war production, and the threat of unemployment had receded, the economic pressure to enlist had gone. The manpower shortage in industry which followed was a direct result of phase two. Without the severe short-term reaction of Scottish industry the recruiting

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<sup>449</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 23 September, 1914.

'boom' would have been over by late August. The increase in recruitment was artificial. The boom was nothing more complex than economic need fuelled by the short-term industrial collapse at the outbreak of war. The September increase was not caused by a sudden desire to enlist, a spontaneous burst of patriotism, but by a series of explicable events. It took more than an increase in numbers to create a recruiting 'boom'. Those involved needed to have been previously unavailable for recruitment, or not available but prevented. In the main the Scottish increase was nothing more than a backlog created, in part, by the inefficiency, inadequacy, and inflexibility of the military recruiting system in the opening period of the war. The Scottish contribution in 1914 was not 'all or nothing' but a sustained effort over a period of some seven weeks followed by a steady maintenance level as Scottish industry and economy relaxed and adapted to war-time demands.

## **REGIMENTS**

While there appears to have been an ample supply of manpower there appears to have been a marked reluctance on the part of many to join the infantry. An approximation of the number of men recruited into Scottish regiments by the end of October 1914 would be 37,000. However, in this same period Scotland produced some 81,278 recruits for the New Armies. This would indicate that approximately 44,278 or 54 per cent of Scottish recruits chose to join regiments that were not overtly Scottish.<sup>450</sup> By the end of December 1914 Scottish regiments contained approximately 47,000 men in their various service and reserve battalions. Scotland had however produced

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<sup>450</sup> PRO, NATS 1/398. 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.

104,392 recruits in the same five month period; 55 per cent or 57,392 in regiments without a direct Scottish link.<sup>451</sup> In Dundee for example, only 33 per cent of council employees enlisting were doing so in Scottish regiments; 66 per cent were choosing to enlist in regiments without a direct Scottish connection.<sup>452</sup> Recruits for the New Armies, at this time, were, in many instances, able to stipulate the regiment or unit they wished to join and a great many did so. Tradesmen and those with transferable skills applied for engineering or technical units. When the transport companies in Leith had their heavy horses requisitioned by the army, leaving 100 carters unemployed, many simply enlisted in the army as carters<sup>453</sup>. Similarly those blacksmiths and saddlers whose livelihood was threatened by the commandeering of horses found that they could continue their trade in the army for five times the rate of an infantryman. Advertisements in the national and regional press announced 'Tradesmen required. Saddlers and Smiths, 5s per day and separation allowance.'

This pattern of going to the more technical arms is most evident in Glasgow and Hamilton, the two most industrialised recruiting centres. The two regiments within the recruiting areas, the Scottish Rifles and the Highland Light Infantry, provided twelve service and reserve battalions by the end of 1914; approximately 13,000 men. In the same period there was raised 50311 recruits, providing a regional surplus of 37,311. It would appear therefore that Glasgow and Hamilton alone provided enough men to fulfil the needs of

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<sup>451</sup> PRO, NATS 1/398. 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.

<sup>452</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 21 August 1914.

<sup>453</sup> S. Mowat, *The Port of Leith ; its History and its People*. p. 381.

Scotland's contribution to the New Armies in 1914. As we have seen in Chapter Three, a high proportion of those recruiting in this area were skilled men taking temporary economic refuge in the army and using their skills to enlist in higher paying technical units. Captain Ross, the recruiting officer at the Gallowgate recruiting office, reported that 'In normal times our recruits are chiefly from 18 to 20 years of age, but the men obtained during the rush [September 1914] were older and of a better physique. They were for the most part mature men, from 22 years of age upwards. Mechanics and clerks, engineers and tradesmen of all kinds were among them.'<sup>454</sup>

Army recruitment in Scotland stood at 104,392 by 31 December 1914, rising to 186,218 by December 1915, the end of the voluntary period.<sup>455</sup> This was some 61.7 per cent of all Scottish recruits raised in the voluntary period. In all Scotland raised a total of sixty-three New Army battalions directly affiliated to Scottish regiments, although not all were raised for active service and this figure includes the various reserve, pioneer, labour, and garrison battalions raised.

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<sup>454</sup> *Evening Citizen*. 22 October 1914.

<sup>455</sup> NATS 1/398. 1/399.

## FIG 5:5 Scottish New Army Battalions<sup>456</sup>

### Royal Scots

11 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	17 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Rosebery (Bantam) Bn
12 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	18 <sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Bn
13 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	19 <sup>th</sup> (Labour) Bn
14 <sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Bn	1 <sup>st</sup> Garrison Bn
15 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn. – 1 <sup>st</sup> Edinburgh	2 <sup>nd</sup> (Home Service) Garrison Bn
16 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn – 2 <sup>nd</sup> Edinburgh	

### Royal Scots Fusiliers

6 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	9 <sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Bn
7 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	10 <sup>th</sup> (Works) Bn
8 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	11 <sup>th</sup> Bn

### Highland Light Infantry

10 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	15 <sup>th</sup> (Service) 1 <sup>st</sup> Glasgow Bn
11 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	16 <sup>th</sup> (Service) 2 <sup>nd</sup> Glasgow Bn
12 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	17 <sup>th</sup> (Service) 3 <sup>rd</sup> Glasgow Bn
13 <sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Bn	18 <sup>th</sup> (Service) 4 <sup>th</sup> Glasgow Bantam Bn
14 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bantam Bn	

### Cameron Highlanders

5 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	8 <sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Bn
6 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	9 <sup>th</sup> (Labour) Bn
7 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	11 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn

### Seaforth Highlanders

7 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	9 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn (Pioneers)
8 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	

### Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders

10 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	11 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn
11 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	14 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn

### Gordon Highlanders

8 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn
9 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn Pioneers
10 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn

### Cameronians

9 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	14 <sup>th</sup> (Labour) Bn
10 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	16 <sup>th</sup> (Transport Workers) Bn
11 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	17 <sup>th</sup> (Transport Workers) Bn
12 (Reserve) Bn	18 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn
13th (Service) Bn	

### King's Own Scottish Borderers

6 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	9 <sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Bn
7 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	10 <sup>th</sup> (Reserve) Bn
8 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	

### The Black Watch

8 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	12 <sup>th</sup> (Labour) Bn
9 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	13 <sup>th</sup> (Scottish Horse) Bn
10 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	14 <sup>th</sup> (Fife and Forfar Yeomanry) Bn
11 <sup>th</sup> (Service) Bn	

<sup>456</sup> <http://www-Saw.arts.ed.ac/army/regiments.html>. This site records the battalions for the various Scottish regiments.

In 1915, although Scotland provided 81,826 recruits for the army, there was a low rate of enlistment in the local infantry regiments. While 75 per cent of Scottish infantry recruits enlisted in Scotland only 35.7 per cent of Scottish recruits enlisted in Scottish infantry regiments. Furthermore only 29 per cent of Scottish infantry recruits enlisted in their local regiment, which meant that only 10.46 per cent of all Scottish army recruits in 1915 were for the local regiments.<sup>457</sup>

Figure 5:6 shows the number of recruits for the Scottish infantry regiments recruited in Scotland and compares them with the number of recruits for the same regiments recruited throughout the United Kingdom.

**Fig 5:6 Recruits for Scottish infantry regiments January – October 1915.**<sup>458</sup>

<b>Regiment</b>	<b>Scotland</b>	<b>U. K.</b>	<b>% recruited in Scotland</b>
<b>Royal Scots</b>	3361	4100	82%
<b>Royal Scots Fusiliers</b>	1809	2407	75%
<b>King's Own Scottish Borderers</b>	1144	2905	39.40%
<b>Royal Highlanders (Black Watch)</b>	2011	2697	74.50%
<b>Gordon Highlanders</b>	2215	2912	76%
<b>Seaforth Highlanders</b>	1818	3345	54.30%
<b>Cameron Highlanders</b>	2612	3058	85.40%
<b>Argyll &amp; Sutherland Highlanders</b>	3186	3705	86%
<b>Highland Light Infantry</b>	5482	5990	91.50%
<b>Scottish Rifles (Cameronians)</b>	1361	2189	62.20%
<b>TOTAL</b>	24999	33308	75%

Within each Scottish recruiting area recruiting varied for each individual infantry regiment. It would be expected that the Scottish infantry regiments

<sup>457</sup> NATS 1/399.

<sup>458</sup> PRO. Nats 1/400. 1/401. Infantry recruitment returns, various dates.

would, as a matter of course, draw their recruits from the local recruiting area. However the amount of local recruitment varied greatly. The records available allow us to view, in great detail, a nine month period in Scottish regimental recruitment; the period 23 January 1915 to 23 October 1915. While the figures for army recruitment in Scotland are available for the whole voluntary period the period of greatest individual regimental detail falls on this nine month period.

**Fig 5:7 Number and percentage of recruits for each regiment enlisting in Scotland and number and percentage of recruits enlisting in the local recruiting areas.<sup>459</sup>**

Regiment	Enlisting in Scotland			Enlisting in Local Area	
	Total	%	#	%	#
Highland Light Infantry	5990	91.5	5480	58.4	3498
Royal Scots	4100	82	3361	41.5	1701
Black Watch	2697	74.5	2011	32	864
Scottish Rifles	2189	62	1361	22.3	489
K O S B	2905	39.5	1144	12.5	362
Royal Scots Fusiliers	2407	75	1809	21.3	512
A & S H	3705	86	3186	19	705
Seaforth Highlanders	3345	54.3	1818	6	197
Gordon Highlanders	2912	76	2215	6	173
Cameron Highlanders	3058	85.4	2612	2.5	78

Figure 5:7 shows that between 23 January and 23 October 1915, 5,990 men enlisted in the Highland Light Infantry with 91.5 per cent, 5,480 enlisting in Scotland and 3,498, or 58.4 per cent, in the regimental recruiting area. The Royal Scots, with two recruiting areas centred on Glencorse and Edinburgh

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<sup>459</sup> NATS 1/400. 1/401.

received 4,100 recruits in the period with 3,361 or 82 per cent enlisting in Scotland and only 1,701 men, 41.5 per cent, coming from the regimental recruiting areas. The Royal Highlanders (Black Watch) attracted 2,697 recruits with 74.5 per cent, 2,011 men, enlisting in Scotland and 32 per cent 864 enlisting in the regimental recruiting area. The Scottish Rifles (Cameronians) enlisted 2,189 men with 1,361 or 62 per cent enlisting in Scotland and 22.3 per cent, 489 enlisting in the local recruiting area. The King's Own Scottish Borderers recruited 2,905 with 1,144 men, 39.4 per cent enlisting in Scotland and 362 or 12.5 per cent enlisting in the local recruiting area. The Royal Scots Fusiliers enlisted 2,407 men with 1,809 men, 75 per cent enlisting in Scotland and 512 recruits, 21.3 per cent, enlisting in the local regimental recruiting area. Centred on Stirling the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders recruited 3,705 men with 3,186 or 86 per cent enlisting in Scotland and 705 or 19 per cent enlisting in the local area. The Seaforth Highlanders raised 3,345 recruits with 1,818 or 54.3 per cent enlisting in Scotland and 197 or 6 per cent enlisting in the local recruiting area. The Gordon Highlanders enlisted 2,912 men with 2,215 or 76 per cent doing so in Scotland and 173 or 6 per cent in the local recruiting area. The Cameron Highlanders enlisted 3,058 men, 2,612 or 85.4 per cent in Scotland but only 78 men, 2.5 per cent, in the local recruiting area.<sup>460</sup>

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<sup>460</sup> NATS 1/400. 1/401.

**Fig 5:8 Number and percentage of recruits for the infantry and the number and percentage of recruits for the local infantry regiment.<sup>461</sup>**

Area	Total	Infantry		Local Regiment	
		%	#	%	#
Perth	5940	38	2261	13	781
Fort George	622	42.4	264	31.7	197
Inverness	295	45	133	26.4	78
Aberdeen	2146	15	324	8	173
Stirling	5077	58.4	2967	14	705
Dundee	3154	21	665	2	65
Ayr	2158	54.6	1178	0.3	7
Berwick	1904	47.2	900	19	362
Hamilton	6513	71	4620	7.5	489
Glasgow	17783	60	10630	19.7	3498
Edinburgh	11686	28	3267	4	466

If we look at the regimental recruiting areas for the period 23 January 1915 to 23 October 1915 the figures show the proportion of regional infantry recruitment. Perth recruiting area provided 5,940 recruits for the army, with 38 per cent, 2,261 recruits for the infantry but only 13 per cent, 781 for the local regiment. Fort George provided 622 men for the army but only 42.4 per cent, 264 recruits for the infantry, and 31.7 per cent, 197 for the local regiment. Inverness, with 295 army recruits, raised 133 or 45 per cent for the infantry but only 78 recruits, 26.4 per cent, for the local regiment. Aberdeen provided 2,146 recruits for the army but of these only 15 per cent, 324 recruits, enlisted for the infantry with 8 per cent or 173 recruits for the local regiment, 53.4 per cent. Stirling gave 5,077 recruits for the army with 2,967 or 58.4 per cent

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<sup>461</sup> NATS 1/400. 1/400.

choosing the infantry, and 14 per cent, 705 recruits for the local regiment. Dundee, with 3,154 men for the army, gave 665 recruits to the infantry, 21 per cent, with 65 choosing the local regiment, 2 per cent. Ayr provided 2,158 recruits for the army with 54.6 per cent, 1,178 enlisting in the infantry and only 7 for the local regiment, 0.3 per cent. Berwick, with 1,904 army recruits, provided 900 for the infantry, 47.2 per cent and 19 per cent, 362 recruits, for the local regiment. Hamilton, with two recruiting areas, raised 6,513 men for the army, providing 4,620 recruits, 71 per cent, for the infantry and 7.5 per cent, 489 for the local regiment. Glasgow, with a figure of 17,783 army recruits, provided 10,630 recruits for the infantry, 60 per cent and 3,498 for the local regiment, 19.7 per cent. Edinburgh, while providing 11,686 recruits for the army, enlisted 3,267 of those recruits for the infantry, 28 per cent, and 4 per cent, 466 recruits, for the local regiment.<sup>462</sup>

Of the 58,411 men enlisting in Scotland for the army in this period, 29,192 (50 per cent) chose to do so in the infantry with 24,999 (42.7 per cent) enlisting in Scottish regiments. Only 14.6 per cent of all army recruits in Scotland for the nine month period 23 January to 23 October 1915 went to local regiments.<sup>463</sup>

It would appear that after the initial increase in Scottish battalions, which consumed the recruitment surge of August and September 1914, and once Scottish recruitment fell to a maintenance level, a conscious decision was

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<sup>462</sup> NATS 1/400. 1/400.

<sup>463</sup> NATS 1/400. 1/401.

taken not to increase further the number of Scottish battalions but to disperse Scottish recruits throughout the British Army. The year 1915 was a period of consolidation and training for the Scottish regiments, not a period of mass recruitment.

## REGIONAL VARIATIONS

There were two overlapping areas of recruiting in Scotland. For administration purposes thirty 'local' recruiting areas were created at the outbreak of war, areas which roughly corresponded to pre-war Scottish counties. At the same time, and operating in tandem with these local recruiting areas, there remained the pre-war Regimental Recruiting Areas. In several cases the areas were identical and in the past this has led to confusion in the interpretation of recruitment figures. One area, which will serve as an example, is Perth. The local recruiting returns give a figure of 1,324 recruits in the month of August 1914: this is for the city of Perth and surrounding area. The returns for the Perth Regimental Recruiting Area for August 1914 give a figure of 2,737 recruits for the New Army, a difference of 1,413. Both figures are correct as the Perth Regimental Recruiting Area was not confined to the city of Perth but included Cupar, Dunblane, Forfar and, more importantly, the industrial areas of Dumfermline and Kirkcaldy, both of which supplied large numbers of recruits.<sup>464</sup>

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<sup>464</sup> NATS 1/398. 1/399.

## Local Recruiting Centres

The four main Scottish cities, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee, and Aberdeen had, by the end of August 1914, produced between them 13,017 recruits for the New Armies which represented 47.5 per cent of the Scottish total to that date. These figures hide the differences between the four cities and the different priorities of the male population. As we have seen, Glasgow, once the political recruiting offices had opened, was the scene of large scale industrial recruitment raising 8,357 recruits in August or 30.5 per cent of the Scottish total, while Edinburgh, which was industrialised to a lesser extent, had no major engineering or textile industries raised only 3,338 recruits or 12.1 per cent in the same period.<sup>465</sup>

As we can see from Figure 5:9 below, over 90 per cent of Scottish New Army recruits for August 1914 were attributable to only ten local recruiting centres; Glasgow, Hamilton, Edinburgh, Stirling, Ayr, Perth, Kirkcaldy, Paisley, Glencorse, and Aberdeen. Those ten recruiting centres provided 24,695 recruits out of the monthly Scottish total of 27,398. These were arguably the ten most populated areas of Scotland but not all of them were industrial. Glasgow, as would be expected, with its large industrial hinterland produced 8,357 recruits in August, which accounted for 30.5 per cent of the Scottish

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<sup>465</sup> NATS 1/398.

total, while Aberdeen with its agricultural base produced only 885 or 3.23 per cent of the total.<sup>466</sup>

**Fig 5:9 Local Recruitment Figures for Army Recruitment in Scotland August 1914.**<sup>467</sup>

		<b>Number of Recruits August 1914</b>	<b>Percentage of Scottish Total</b>	<b>Percentage of British Total</b>
<b>Britain</b>		195851		
<b>Scotland</b>		27398		13.9
<b>Aberdeen</b>	<b>10</b>	885	3.23	0.45
<b>Alloa</b>		179	0.65	0.09
<b>Ayr</b>	<b>5</b>	1414	5.16	0.72
<b>Berwick</b>		558	2.04	0.28
<b>Cupar</b>		56	0.20	0.03
<b>Clydebank</b>		123	0.45	0.06
<b>Dumbarton</b>		437	1.60	0.22
<b>Dunbar</b>		1	0.00	0.00
<b>Dunblane</b>		137	0.50	0.07
<b>Dundee</b>		437	1.60	0.22
<b>Dunfermline</b>		27	0.10	0.01
<b>Edinburgh</b>	<b>3</b>	3338	12.18	1.70
<b>Falkirk</b>		266	0.97	0.14
<b>Forfar</b>		56	0.20	0.03
<b>Fort George</b>		171	0.62	0.09
<b>Glasgow</b>	<b>1</b>	8357	30.50	4.27
<b>Glencorse</b>	<b>9</b>	899	3.28	0.46
<b>Hamilton</b>	<b>2</b>	4604	16.80	2.35
<b>Inverness</b>		138	0.50	0.07
<b>Kirkcaldy</b>	<b>7</b>	1107	4.04	0.57
<b>Kirkintilloch</b>		52	0.19	0.03
<b>Leith</b>		32	0.12	0.02
<b>Oban</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>Paisley</b>	<b>8</b>	922	3.37	0.47
<b>Perth</b>	<b>6</b>	1324	4.83	0.68
<b>Rothesay</b>		33	0.12	0.02
<b>Stirling</b>	<b>4</b>	1845	6.73	0.94
<b>Dunoon</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>Inverary</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>Kilmartin</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>27398</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>13.99</b>

<sup>466</sup> NATS 1/398.

<sup>467</sup> P.R.O. Nats 1/398.

In the first week of recruitment, 4-10 August 1914, Scotland provided 2,011 recruits. Of this number, Edinburgh raised 607 or 30.18 per cent, Glasgow raised 548 or 27.25 per cent, while Hamilton raised 153 or 7.6 per cent. By 14 August, the day prior to the opening of the political recruiting offices, Scotland had produced 5,656 recruits. Glasgow had contributed 1,295 or 22.89 per cent, Edinburgh had raised 1,051 or 18.58 per cent, while Hamilton raised 663 or 11.72 per cent.<sup>468</sup>

For the first eight days of the war recruiting in Edinburgh kept pace with that in Glasgow but, once both cities used up their readily available manpower and the effects of the economic downturn began to be felt in industry, recruiting in Glasgow trebled while in Edinburgh it stayed at a low level. On 11 August Edinburgh provided 132 recruits while Glasgow provided 128, but by 16 August, just five days later, Edinburgh raised only 23 recruits while Glasgow had leapt ahead to 680. This was the day after the political offices in Glasgow started to recruit those tradesmen affected by the war and shows that only the recruiting restrictions imposed in Glasgow by the military recruiting office in the Gallowgate had prevented a greater number of tradesmen enlisting earlier for economic reasons. The other main industrial recruiting centre at Hamilton showed the same pattern as Glasgow, with recruitment increasing dramatically after the initial few days once the contraction of industry had commenced. On the day that the political offices

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<sup>468</sup> NATS 1/398.

opened their doors to recruits the daily figure for Hamilton trebled from 101 men on 14 August to 304 on 15 August.<sup>469</sup>

Stirling and Perth raised substantial numbers in August, since, although they were perceived as agricultural towns, they both had a well established large scale woollen industry, both spinning and weaving, which was hit immediately by the loss of foreign markets and raw material. This was only part of the reason. They were also quickly designated as 'War Stations' and troops were deployed there in their thousands, in some cases tens of thousands, which served to promote recruitment in the area. Local barracks were enlarged to accommodate the influx and local parks were utilised as training grounds, with trenches being dug on every spare piece of ground. In Perth the army took over the local swimming baths and commandeered 'horses, horse collars, furniture vans, motor cars, pit props, blankets, field glasses, bloodhounds and Perth's only motor boat'.<sup>470</sup> The families of regular soldiers quartered in the barracks at Perth had to find alternative accommodation as the barracks were rapidly extended for the new recruits.<sup>471</sup> Only the three main industrial centres raised more than Stirling, which was in fourth place with 1,845, or 6.7 per cent of the Scottish total, while Perth lay in sixth place with 1,324, or 4.8 per cent of the total.<sup>472</sup>

Kirkcaldy, in August 1914, with its linoleum factories and the surrounding coal fields, produced 1,107 recruits or 4 per cent of the national total. However this

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<sup>469</sup> NATS 1/398.

<sup>470</sup> B. Harding, *On Flows the Tay*. p. 42.

<sup>471</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 25 September 1914.

<sup>472</sup> NATS 1/398.

is raised to the exceptionally high figure of 2.79 per cent of the local population which can be explained when one takes into account the collapse of the two main local industries, linoleum and coal. There was also in the first week of the war a strike of over 400 pottery workers in the town, joining others who had already been on strike for eight weeks, and a number took the opportunity to enlist as a refuge for the winter months. At the same time all the employees of the Kinghorn Leather Works were laid off and the employees of Gibson and Co, the local golf club manufacturer, were placed on short-time. The strike began on 10 August and the leather works closed on the following day. The local press on 11 August reported that, 'Recruiting offices in Kirkcaldy have been overwhelmed with volunteers. Throughout yesterday the crowd in front of the principal recruiting station at High Street was so large that tramway and other traffic was interrupted'.<sup>473</sup>

The smaller towns in Scotland provided varying numbers of recruits in the early days. From 4 August up until 3 September 1914, Cowdenbeath provided 1,000, Kilmarnock and Dumbarton 600 each, Cambuslang 531, Clydebank, Falkirk and Inverkeithing 500 each, Selkirk 400, Renton 275, Kirkintilloch 150, Shotts 100 and Dalry 50.<sup>474</sup> From 4 August to 11 September Motherwell had provided 1,100 recruits, Dumbarton 960, Cambuslang 950, Musselburgh 370, Barrhead 330, Johnstone 260, Kilsyth 250, Prestonpans and Kelso 200 each, Castle Douglas 170, West Calder 140, Fauldhouse 100, Tarbrax 90, and Langholm 50.<sup>475</sup>

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<sup>473</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 11 August 1914.

<sup>474</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 3 September 1914.

<sup>475</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 11 September 1914.

By September recruiting in Edinburgh had taken up the slack in the industrial section and this was commented upon by the local recruiting officer, Captain Robertson, V.C., who was reported as saying that 'the class of men who are now joining are much better samples of the type of men wanted for the Kitchener army than he passed in the earlier stages of special recruiting'.<sup>476</sup> This contradicts the belief that those early recruits were a 'better class of men', but highlights the point that those who did enlist in the early days were of the lower classes who allegedly populated the pre-war Victorian army. In early September some of the smaller towns in Scotland were providing large numbers of recruits. At the same time it was reported that most of those recruits from Clydebank were drawn largely from the shipyards and the Singer Manufacturing Company.

In September 88.8 per cent of Scottish recruits, 38,456 men, enlisted in the top ten recruiting areas. The one change from August was Aberdeen, which was one of three main recruiting centres which reported a reduction in numbers in September, even though recruits were imported from central Scotland in large numbers. Recruitment in Aberdeen fell by 37 per cent, from 885 in August to 555 in September. Aberdeen's place went to Berwick, whose figures increased in September from 558 to 1,032 or 2.03 per cent of the national total. The other centres recording a reduction in recruits in September were Perth and Stirling. While still producing large numbers of recruits proportionally, there was a limit to the number of available men within that section of the two towns which could be classified as industrial and from

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<sup>476</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 2 September 1914.

which the majority of recruits were drawn.<sup>477</sup> Figure 5:10 shows that while the overall recruitment numbers increased in September, nine of the top ten recruiting centres from August were still in the top ten.

**FIG 5:10 Local Recruitment Figures for Army**

**Recruitment in Scotland September 1914.**<sup>478</sup>

		Number of Recruits September 1914	Percentage of Scottish Total	Percentage of British Total
Britain		369456		
Scotland		43302		11.7
Aberdeen		555	1.28	0.15
Alloa		391	0.90	0.11
Ayr	5	2534	5.85	0.69
Berwick	9	1032	2.38	0.28
Cupar		208	0.48	0.06
Clydebank		622	1.44	0.17
Dumbarton		570	1.32	0.15
Dunbar		0	0.00	0.00
Dunblane		107	0.25	0.03
Dundee		496	1.15	0.13
Dunfermline		710	1.64	0.19
Edinburgh	3	4793	11.07	1.30
Falkirk		411	0.95	0.11
Forfar		140	0.32	0.04
Fort George		378	0.87	0.10
Glasgow	1	14517	33.53	3.93
Glencorse	4	3206	7.40	0.868
Hamilton	2	7137	16.48	1.93
Inverness		144	0.33	0.04
Kirkcaldy		1327	3.06	0.36
Kirkintilloch		0	0.00	0.00
Leith		0	0.00	0.00
Oban		32	0.07	0.01
Paisley	10	974	2.25	0.26
Perth	8	1181	2.73	0.32
Rothsay		53	0.12	0.01
Stirling	6	1755	4.05	0.48
Dunoon		22	0.05	0.01
Inverary		2	0.005	0.001
Kilmartin		5	0.01	0.001
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>43302</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>11.72</b>

<sup>477</sup> NATS 1/398.

<sup>478</sup> PRO. Nats 1/398.

The main change from August was the increase in recruitment numbers due to the September 'boom' period. Overall Scotland's contribution to the New Armies rose 58 per cent from the previous month; from a figure of 27,398 in August to 43,302 in September, an increase of 15,904 men. The increase was not uniform. The ten most prolific recruiting centres in September accounted for 88.8 per cent of the Scottish total, down 1.3 per cent from the previous month. This small reduction in overall percentage of the top ten areas can be accounted for by the increase in number, small though it was, from the smaller rural recruiting areas. It is perhaps worthwhile looking at the increase in recruitment numbers in September for the top areas as this will give an appreciation of the 'boom' period in national recruitment. Glasgow saw an increase of 6,160 men or 73.71 per cent over the previous month's total, giving a figure for September of 14,517 or 33.52 per cent of the Scottish total. Hamilton, with an increase of 2,533 or 55 per cent gave a total of 7,137 or 16.48 per cent, while Edinburgh showed an increase of 1,455 or 43.58 per cent, a total of 4,793 or 11 per cent of the Scottish total. The largest increase was in Glencorse which recorded an increase of 256.61 per cent or 2,307 men, giving a total of 3,206 or 7.4 per cent of the Scottish total. At the other end of the scale Paisley, with an increase of 52 men or 5.63 per cent over August, produced 974 men or 2.24 per cent of the national total.<sup>479</sup>

By 14 September 1914 Stirling Castle was seen as 'easily the best recruiting centre in the Highland Division of the Scottish Command', with 'many of the

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<sup>479</sup> NATS 1/398.

men joining having come from Canada.'<sup>480</sup> The week ending 12 September 1914 produced 677 recruits in Stirling, 23 for the regular army, 139 for the special reserve, and 515 for general service. This was almost double the 344 raised in Perth over the same period, and over three and a half times the 189 raised by Dundee. On 8 October it was reported that 'Slackness is again being experienced in some of the Stirlingshire colliery districts. Yesterday the miners employed in three pits at Dumbreck, belonging to Messrs W Baird & Co. Ltd, were all thrown idle. Several hundreds of men are involved in the stoppage'.<sup>481</sup>

Although the highs of September were not to be repeated, the top ten areas remained, with one or two exceptions, the same, their overall contribution reduced with the percentage of the overall Scottish number dropping from slightly over 88 per cent (8,901) in October, and 86 per cent (9,533) in November, to 84 per cent (7,061) in December.

October, with its monthly total of 10,016 recruits, set the trend for the remainder of 1914. The excess manpower of the first few weeks had been expended and the slack created by Scottish industry had been tightened up. The figure would have been lower were it not for the inclusion of the Glasgow 'Pals' Battalions' in the figure of 2,860 for the eighteenth of the month.

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<sup>480</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 14 September 1914.

<sup>481</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 8 October 1914.

**FIG 5:11 Local recruitment Figures for Army Recruitment in Scotland October 1914**

		<b>Number of Recruits October 1914</b>	<b>Percentage of Scottish Total</b>	<b>Percentage of British Total</b>
<b>Britain</b>		<b>76386</b>		
<b>Scotland</b>		<b>10016</b>		
<b>Aberdeen</b>		157	1.57	0.21
<b>Alloa</b>		45	0.45	0.06
<b>Ayr</b>		157	1.57	0.21
<b>Berwick</b>	<b>7</b>	284	2.84	0.37
<b>Cupar</b>		41	0.41	0.05
<b>Clydebank</b>		170	1.70	0.22
<b>Dumbarton</b>		79	0.79	0.10
<b>Dunbar</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>Dunblane</b>		39	0.39	0.05
<b>Dundee</b>		166	1.66	0.22
<b>Dunfermline</b>	<b>4</b>	482	4.81	0.63
<b>Edinburgh</b>	<b>2</b>	1515	15.13	1.98
<b>Falkirk</b>		84	0.84	0.11
<b>Forfar</b>		28	0.28	0.04
<b>Ft-George</b>		103	1.03	0.13
<b>Glasgow</b>	<b>1</b>	4718	47.10	6.18
<b>Glencorse</b>	<b>8</b>	225	2.25	0.29
<b>Hamilton</b>	<b>3</b>	552	5.51	0.72
<b>Inverness</b>		21	0.21	0.03
<b>Kirkcaldy</b>	<b>6</b>	317	3.16	0.41
<b>Kirkintiloch</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>Leith</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>Oban</b>		8	0.08	0.01
<b>Paisley</b>	<b>10</b>	199	1.99	0.26
<b>Perth</b>	<b>5</b>	403	4.02	0.53
<b>Rothsay</b>		17	0.17	0.02
<b>Stirling</b>	<b>9</b>	206	2.06	0.27
<b>Dunoon</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>Inverary</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>Kilmartin</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>10016</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>13.11</b>

November had no artificially high or low daily figures and produced 11,081 recruits over the month. The first day of the month produced the lowest daily figure, some 93 recruits, with a high of 749 on the 10th.

**FIG 5:12 Local recruitment Figures for Army Recruitment in Scotland November 1914.**

		<b>Number of recruits November 1914</b>	<b>Percentage of Scottish Total</b>	<b>Percentage of British Total</b>
<b>Britain</b>		109134		
<b>Scotland</b>		11081		
<b>Aberdeen</b>		180	1.62	0.16
<b>Alloa</b>		101	0.91	0.09
<b>Ayr</b>		272	2.45	0.25
<b>Berwick</b>	<b>7</b>	430	3.88	0.39
<b>Cupar</b>		39	0.35	0.04
<b>Clydebank</b>		147	1.33	0.13
<b>Dumbarton</b>		143	1.29	0.13
<b>Dunbar</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>Dunblane</b>		50	0.45	0.05
<b>Dundee</b>		244	2.20	0.22
<b>Dunfermline</b>	<b>4</b>	446	4.02	0.41
<b>Edinburgh</b>	<b>2</b>	1665	15.03	1.53
<b>Falkirk</b>		153	1.38	0.14
<b>Forfar</b>		24	0.22	0.02
<b>Ft-George</b>		139	1.25	0.13
<b>Glasgow</b>	<b>1</b>	3818	34.46	3.50
<b>Glencorse</b>	<b>6</b>	431	3.89	0.39
<b>Hamilton</b>	<b>3</b>	1247	11.25	1.14
<b>Inverness</b>		23	0.21	0.02
<b>Kirkcaldy</b>	<b>9</b>	361	3.26	0.33
<b>Kirkintiloch</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>Leith</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>Oban</b>		21	0.19	0.02
<b>Paisley</b>	<b>10</b>	284	2.56	0.26
<b>Perth</b>	<b>5</b>	432	3.90	0.40
<b>Rothesay</b>		13	0.12	0.01
<b>Stirling</b>	<b>8</b>	418	3.77	0.38
<b>Dunoon</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>Inverary</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>Kilmartin</b>		0	0.00	0.00
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>11081</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>10.15</b>

As we have seen from the figures, recruitment in Scotland was not uniform throughout the country. December showed an unsurprising reduction in numbers towards the end of the month, with the lowest daily figure of 71 on Christmas day itself. Once again the inclusion of a 'Pals' Battalion', this time in Edinburgh, gave an inflated daily high of 1,572 on the twenty-third of the month. The highest natural daily figure was on the first with 497 recruits, the tail-end of the November agricultural recruitment. From then on the numbers steadily declined, producing a total for the month of 8,405. It was natural that December would provide a low number of recruits as many would hold off from enlistment until after the national holiday. The choice of many would be to enjoy Hogmanay with friends and family before leaving home for the rigours of army life. By November and December 1914 reserve battalions in some areas were struggling to recruit enough men to bring them up to strength. All in all in 1914 Scotland provided some 104,392 recruits for Lord Kitchener's New Armies. Recruitment in Scotland was never again to reach the levels of 1914.<sup>482</sup>

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<sup>482</sup> NATS 1/398.

**FIG 5:13 Local Recruitment Figures for Army Recruitment in  
Scotland December 1914.**<sup>483</sup>

		<b>Number of Recruits December 1914</b>	<b>Percentage of Scottish Total</b>	<b>Percentage of British Total</b>
Britain		70548		
Scotland		8405		
Aberdeen		184	2.19	0.26
Alloa		85	1.01	0.12
Ayr		182	2.17	0.26
Berwick	5	319	3.80	0.45
Cupar		39	0.46	0.06
Clydebank		83	0.99	0.12
Dumbarton		126	1.50	0.18
Dunbar		58	0.69	0.08
Dunblane		29	0.35	0.04
Dundee		191	2.27	0.27
Dunfermline	7	243	2.89	0.34
Edinburgh	1	2400	28.55	3.40
Falkirk		88	1.05	0.12
Forfar		66	0.79	0.09
Ft-George		89	1.06	0.13
Glasgow	2	1927	22.93	2.73
Glencorse	4	470	5.59	0.67
Hamilton	3	782	9.30	1.11
Inverness		85	1.01	0.12
Kirkcaldy	9	219	2.61	0.31
Kirkintiloch		0	0.00	0.00
Leith		0	0.00	0.00
Oban		6	0.07	0.01
Paisley	10	218	2.59	0.31
Perth	6	251	2.99	0.36
Rothesay		33	0.39	0.05
Stirling	8	232	2.76	0.33
Dunoon		0	0.00	0.00
Inverary		0	0.00	0.00
Kilmartin		0	0.00	0.00
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>8405</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>11.91</b>

In January 1915, the new year brought a renewed rise in recruiting levels as those who had held back in December began to come forward. The high of

<sup>483</sup> P.R.O. Nats 1/398.

the month occurred on 5 January with some 598 recruits but was followed closely by 6 January with 595 recruits and 7 January with 559, all of which contributed greatly to the monthly figure of 11,062. The low point was, as could reasonably be expected, New Year's Day, but 65 souls nevertheless chose that day to enlist. The figures for the first few days reflect another reason for enlistment. Alcohol and the euphoria that it brings were contributing factors. The outbreak of war found Scotland in the throes of a bank holiday weekend, with some areas in the middle of the annual local summer holiday period. Also the Christmas celebrations and New Year holiday affected recruitment numbers. As we have already seen both Glasgow and Edinburgh utilised late night recruiting trams to capture the unwary reveller at the point of least resistance. Only after the New Year celebrations had subsided did recruitment return to pre-holiday levels, although to be fair not everyone held back over the holiday period. On Christmas day 1914 there were 71 recruits in Scotland, 62 per cent of the British total of 113. On New Year's Day Scotland produced 65 recruits, only 0.47 per cent of the remarkable British total of 13,803, more so with 8,798 recruits coming from Newcastle alone: the Tyneside Pals' battalions coming on the strength. By February numbers were indicative of the level that was maintained until the introduction of conscription. On 14 February the memorandum of October 1914, which had restricted the recruitment of railway company employees and those employed in food or armament production to those who could produce a certificate showing that their

services could be spared, was rescinded. Recruitment rose slightly in March but just as quickly dropped again.<sup>484</sup>

There was some concern within the War Office at the low rate of recruitment in Dunfermline at the beginning of the war, so much so that they sent Major C.W.L. Ross to stimulate recruitment in the district. His recruiting district included the whole of West Fife and, as recruitment in the area gathered pace, predominant among his recruits were the miners of Cowdenbeath. At the same time a renewed recruiting campaign started in Kinross-shire. The Earl of Wemyss, in an address at a local recruiting rally, told the assembled crowd that 'They were fighting, not for aggrandisement, but for the maintenance of their empire and for the maintenance of the political privileges and liberties which their ancestors had won for them'.<sup>485</sup>

As to the other recruiting centres, Dunbar is recorded as producing only one recruit for the New Armies in the first four months of the war; those wishing to join the infantry who had gravitated towards Dunbar were directed towards Berwick, which maintained a disproportionately high recruitment number. Dunbar, Scotland's only pre-war regular cavalry depot outside Edinburgh, was used primarily as the main cavalry recruiting depot and for the rapidly expanding Scottish Horse.<sup>486</sup> Not until December 1914 did Dunbar register any more army recruits, although territorial recruitment was high.<sup>487</sup> Similarly Leith with its strong ties to the Royal Scots, through the 7<sup>th</sup> Territorial

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<sup>484</sup> NATS 1/398.

<sup>485</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 3 September 1914.

<sup>486</sup> Chapter 7.

<sup>487</sup> Chapter 7.

Battalion, was seen as a prime recruiting area and by 22 August some 700 dockers had left to rejoin Reserve and Territorial battalions. Not all the dockers were in the Territorial Force and some 300 left to engage in autumn harvesting operations. However, Leith records thirty two recruits on 10 August 1914 and from then on the figures for Leith would appear, for official purposes at least, to be included in those for Edinburgh. Of the truly rural areas Inverness produced 138 recruits in August, 0.5 per cent of the Scottish total, while Fort George produced 171 or 0.62 per cent. Forfar 56 or 0.2 per cent, Dunblane 137 or 0.5 per cent, Alloa 179 or 0.65 per cent, Cupar 56 or 0.2 per cent, Rothesay 33 or 0.12 per cent and Kirkintilloch 52 or 0.18 per cent of the Scottish total. Oban, Dunoon, Inverary and Kilmartin produced no recruits in August.<sup>488</sup>

The manpower surplus in Glasgow was such that various other regiments, unable to complete battalions in their home area, sent recruiters to the city and in some instances opened alternative recruiting offices. The Black Watch held recruiting rallies, the Cameron Highlanders opened a recruiting office, and even the Sportsman's Battalion sent Captain Westhead to recruit in Glasgow and Edinburgh, successfully it would appear.<sup>489</sup>

### **Regimental Recruiting Areas**

In some respects army recruitment in Scotland during the voluntary period, when compared to the regional male population, reflected the pre-war pattern

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<sup>488</sup> NATS 1/398.

<sup>489</sup> *Evening Citizen*. 28 October 1914.

described in Chapter Two. Berwick recruiting area, which produced the highest percentage of pre-war recruits in relation to regional male population, provided 2,857 recruits, 20 per cent of her male population in 1914, the first five months of the war, and 5,829 recruits, 41 per cent of the male population for the army in the seventeen month voluntary recruiting period, maintaining her leading role. Perth, which was second highest in pre-war years, continued to be so in the voluntary period with 18.5 per cent of the male population, 10,823 men, in the first five months, with a seventeen month figure of 33 per cent of the local male population, 19,319 men, enlisting in the army. Stirling, another pre-war high achiever, continued with 9,789 recruits, 11.8 per cent in 1914 and a total figure of 17,398 recruits, 21 per cent of the male population enlisting in the army. Edinburgh provided 13,623 recruits, 5.8 per cent of the male population in 1914, with a final figure for the period of 29,119 recruits, 12.3 per cent of the local male population, while Glasgow contributed 4.86 per cent of males, 35,130 in the first five months, and 59,288 recruits, 8.2 per cent of the male population in the whole period. Ayr contributed 4,905 recruits or 3.76 per cent in 1914, and with 8,072 recruits for the whole period gave 6.2 per cent of her male population; Dundee with 1.4 per cent or 1,764 men in 1914 raised 6,505 recruits, 5.1 per cent of the male population overall; Aberdeen recruited 3,581 men, 2.4 per cent, in 1914 and provided 6,540 recruits, 4.4 per cent of the male population, in total. Inverness with 411 recruits, 1 per cent, in 1914 provided 821 recruits, 2 per cent of the regional male population overall.<sup>490</sup>

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<sup>490</sup> NATS 1/399.

	Perth	Ft George	Inverness	Aberdeen	Stirling	Dundee	Glencorse	Ayr	Berwick	Hamilton	Glasgow	Edinburgh	Total
Aug-14	2737	171	138	880	3701	437	899	1445	558	4604	8632	3390	27592
Sep-14	3788	333	144	525	4350	496	3106	2634	1032	7237	15233	4393	43271
Oct-14	1411	103	21	157	665	266	225	157	284	552	4999	1575	10415
Nov-14	2040	223	23	1835	285	376	718	429	696	2016	4065	1665	14371
Dec-14	847	80	85	184	788	189	470	240	287	772	2201	2600	8743
Total 1914	10823	910	411	3581	9789	1764	5418	4905	2857	15181	35130	13623	104392
Jan-15	1477	185	27	276	1639	625	643	569	497	1605	3199	1592	12334
Feb-15	686	92	28	346	568	219	154	317	261	480	1304	1007	5462
Mar-15	547	47	29	467	701	345	170	215	180	605	3098	1827	8231
Apr-15	630	62	44	369	648	433	145	233	171	665	1999	1366	6765
May-15	1118	73	34	212	899	466	136	302	332	956	2391	1767	8686
Jun-15	796	58	41	136	675	318	156	352	269	1086	2498	1615	8000
Jul-15	504	56	21	124	535	184	127	164	205	971	1766	945	5602
Aug-15	571	57	32	245	631	456	102	210	189	1000	2314	926	6733
Sep-15	465	36	32	96	315	243	55	101	132	381	944	832	3632
Oct-15	623	141	34	151	105	490	88	264	165	369	1469	1401	5300
Nov-15	878	150	49	398	639	869	170	360	445	451	2340	1650	8399
Dec-15	201	79	39	139	254	93	59	80	126	208	836	568	2682
Total 1915	8496	1036	410	2959	7609	4741	2005	3167	2972	8777	24158	15496	81826
TOTAL	19319	1946	821	6540	17398	6505	7423	8072	5829	23958	59288	29119	186218


FIG 5:14 Scottish army recruitment August 1914 - December 1915 Regimental Recruiting Areas.

By the end of 1914 52 per cent of those enlisting in the Perth recruiting area had done so in the army, a number which by December 1915 had remained relatively constant at 51 per cent of regional recruitment. Fort George had raised 18.8 per cent of its volunteers for the army in 1914, a figure which rose slightly to an overall figure of 19.5 per cent by December 1915. Inverness produced 21 per cent of her 1914 recruits for the army, a number which had fallen to 16.7 per cent by the end of the volunteer period. The Aberdeen recruiting area provided 37 per cent of its 1914 recruits for the army, falling to 33.6 per cent by December 1915. Several recruiting areas showed remarkable consistency, Stirling with 61.4 per cent in 1914 and 61 per cent in 1915; Ayr with 62 per cent in 1914 and 62 per cent in 1915; Hamilton with 85.5 in 1914 and 83.7 per cent in 1915; Edinburgh with 62.2 per cent in 1914 and 65.3 per cent in 1915; Glencorse with 82.8 per cent in 1914 and 78 per cent in 1915. Glasgow with 78.3 per cent in 1914 suffered a slight drop ending with a total for the voluntary period of 71 per cent; Berwick had a slight increase, 58.8 per cent in 1914 to 64.2 per cent in 1915. Dundee had the largest increase, from 36.7 per cent in 1914 to 49.3 per cent at the end of 1915.<sup>491</sup>

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<sup>491</sup> NATS 1/399.

**FIG 5:15 Cumulative monthly increase in army recruitment in Scotland**



Figures 5:13 and 5:14 show the slowdown in the rate of army recruitment over time. Figure 5:13 clearly demonstrates the initial high recruitment level in Scotland and shows that after the high of September 1914 recruitment in Scotland continued at a relatively low maintenance level with cumulative recruitment reducing over time.

In figure 5:14 we can see that September 1914 showed an increase over August 1914 of 156.8 per cent, while December 1915 showed only an increase of 1.46 per cent over November 1915. This clearly shows the rate of decline in the number of recruits coming forward monthly in Scotland.

**FIG 5:16 Monthly percentage increase in army recruitment in Scotland**

**August 1914 - December 1915.<sup>492</sup>**

	<b>Cumulative monthly increase</b>	<b>Monthly percentage increase</b>
<b>August</b>	27592	
<b>September</b>	70863	156.82
<b>October</b>	81278	14.69
<b>November</b>	95649	17.68
<b>December</b>	104392	9.14
<b>January</b>	116726	11.81
<b>February</b>	122188	4.67
<b>March</b>	130419	6.73
<b>April</b>	137184	5.18
<b>May</b>	145870	6.33
<b>June</b>	153870	5.48
<b>July</b>	159472	3.64
<b>August</b>	166205	4.22
<b>September</b>	169837	2.18
<b>October</b>	175137	3.12
<b>November</b>	183536	4.79
<b>December</b>	186218	1.46

This chapter has shown that the perceived ideas of a 'boom and bust' period have to be adjusted and that the period was only the result of an inadequate recruiting mechanism. It has further shown that the peak period of Scotland's recruitment was in the initial few months of the war, the five months of 1914. Thereafter, although Scotland maintained a respectable level of recruitment in 1915, in relative terms it was only a fraction of what was achieved in 1914.

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<sup>492</sup> NATS 1/399.

## CHAPTER 6

### CIVIC RECRUITMENT.

#### (PALS BATTALIONS)

There was nothing essentially new in the Pals concept as it emerged in 1914...The chief difference in 1914 was that, with the appearance of the Pals battalions, the concept was applied on a significant scale for the first time to the raising of units for active service abroad rather than home defence.<sup>483</sup>

The influence of public and industrial figures in the raising and recruiting of volunteers, both through the normal methods and by the raising of civic battalions (Pals battalions), is one facet of the voluntary recruiting system which, although mainly English in concept, did take place in Scotland. However in Scotland it did not produce the same results. As can be seen from fig 6:1, the response to such locally raised battalions in Scotland was low, with Scotland producing only 5.3 per cent of the infantry battalions and 4.5 per cent of the reserve battalions, a mere 5 per cent of the total number of such battalions raised in Britain. Wales did better with 12.8 per cent, 13.6 per cent, and 13 per cent respectively, but this performance can, to a certain extent, be discounted as, with the formation of the Welsh Army Corps, all battalions raised in Wales came under the umbrella heading of locally raised. England on the other hand produced 81.8 per cent in all categories. In total only 3.8 per cent of those men recruited in Scotland by the end of 1914 had

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<sup>483</sup> P. Simkins. *Kitchener's Army*. p. 82-3.

joined a Pals battalion, while by the end of 1915 that figure had reduced to 3.1 per cent. If we include all Scottish locally raised units, artillery and engineer, then the figure for the whole voluntary period sits at only 4.1 per cent.<sup>484</sup>

In Scotland there were seven Locally Raised Infantry Battalions raised in the period 2 September 1914 – 26 February 1915, although in reality it took longer since by February 1915 recruitment was in decline. Those infantry battalions were raised in the two major Scottish cities, four in Glasgow and three in Edinburgh.

**Fig 6:1 Numbers of Locally Raised Infantry Battalions 1914-15.**<sup>485</sup>

	SCOTLAND	ENGLAND	WALES
Infantry	7	108	17
Reserve	3	54	9
Total	10	162	26

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<sup>484</sup> *Kitchener Papers*, PRO. 30/57/73.

<sup>485</sup> *Kitchener Papers*, PRO. 30/57/73.

**Fig 6:2 Scottish Locally Raised Infantry Battalions 1914-15.**<sup>486</sup>

**Edinburgh**

15th (s) Battalion, Royal Scots. (1<sup>st</sup> Edinburgh)  
16th (s) Battalion, Royal Scots. (2<sup>nd</sup> Edinburgh)  
17th (b) Battalion, Royal Scots. (Rosebery)

**Glasgow**

15th (s) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry. (1<sup>st</sup> Glasgow)  
16th (s) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry. (2<sup>nd</sup> Glasgow)  
17th (s) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry. (3<sup>rd</sup> Glasgow)  
18th (b) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry. (4<sup>th</sup> Glasgow)

As early as 5 August 1914 there was a call in the *Glasgow Evening Citizen* for volunteers to join the Glasgow Squadron of The Legion of Frontiersmen. The only requirements were the ability to sit astride a horse and use a rifle. The recruiter was a Mr Alexander Shaughnessi of Hope Street, Glasgow, and, since this was a call by an individual on behalf of a civilian organisation and not a call by the War Office, it must be seen as one of the first recruiting calls in Scotland, if not Britain, for a locally raised unit.<sup>487</sup>

By 1 September, in Glasgow, there was an increasing number of calls in the local press for some form of local 'Glasgow' battalion, but, as elsewhere in Scotland, those calls focused on the middle class content of any such battalion: 'It is well known that a new battalion of the Scottish Rifles has to be formed. For that, 1100 men will be wanted. Why not let all the clerks and tennis and golf players come forward *en bloc* and form that battalion?'<sup>488</sup> At the same time there was a call for the formation of a Glasgow Commercial

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<sup>486</sup> *Kitchener Papers*, PRO. 30/57/73.

<sup>487</sup> *Evening Citizen*. 5 August 1914.

<sup>488</sup> *Evening Citizen*. 1 September 1914.

Unit: 'Glasgow's business men and clerks are only too eager to fall in for their country's sake. From among those interested a small committee might be formed for the purpose of making immediate representations in the right quarter for the forming of a Glasgow commercial unit.'<sup>489</sup> There was also, in the *Evening Citizen*, a rebuke aimed at the Lord Provost which criticised the 'small mindedness of our civil head' and affirmed that 'if he were a man and a patriot he would be sending round the fiery cross to the youth of the city'.<sup>490</sup>

At a meeting of the Glasgow Corporation on 3 September 1914 it was decided that 'The Magistrates recommend...that steps be forthwith taken...for the raising of the necessary recruits to form at least two battalions and that the expense of raising and equipping such battalions be borne by the Corporation out of the Common Good.'<sup>491</sup> The decision taken by the magistrates was in reply to mounting criticism in the local press and the numerous individual calls to recruit companies or battalions of like-minded people. Only four days previously there had been a scathing attack in the local press aimed at the corporation and its employees.

Sir – I am an employee in one of the Glasgow Corporation departments, and although we have furnished not a few Territorials and Reserve men, I confess that up until now I have not heard of a single enlistment from our midst for Kitchener's first or second

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<sup>489</sup> *Evening Citizen*. 1 September 1914.

<sup>490</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 1 September 1914.

<sup>491</sup> Glasgow Corporation Minutes, 3 September 1914.

100,000. And I am afraid this is true of all Corporation departments.

There is a feeling abroad that any one enlisting will forfeit his job.<sup>492</sup>

This letter to the editor, signed only as 'Blue Flame', was one of many criticising the corporation and in particular the Lord Provost for their singular lack of action and their inability to take the lead in the recruitment of the citizens of Glasgow. Another critic in the same issue asked whether the Lord Provost was indeed a 'man and a patriot', and urged him to 'send round the fiery cross to the youth of the city to join a regiment of Glasgow's own, such a regiment as Birmingham has equipped.'

The following day there appeared an article announcing that enlistment was being carried out at Glasgow University in one of the committee rooms at 20 Gibson Street in an effort to raise some seven hundred or so recruits to attach to one of the Glasgow regiments. This effort to raise such a large number of recruits from within the university was not an act of spontaneity or patriotism but was in reply to adverse comments made by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge that university students were holding back. Sir Cyprian had made the claim that 'the more well-to do sections of the community, particularly University students, had not responded to Britain's appeal in a degree commensurate with their social advantages and consequent obligations'.<sup>493</sup>

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<sup>492</sup> *Evening Citizen*. 31 August 1914.

<sup>493</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 2 September 1914.

In the same issue there was also a call for a 'battalion of clerks' or a 'corporation battalion'.<sup>494</sup> Colonel R. C. Mackenzie attempted to stimulate recruiting for a proposed battalion created from former pupils of Glasgow's secondary schools.<sup>495</sup> In the face of such public demands there was little else that the Corporation could do. The common factor about all these calls was that they were aimed solidly at the middle class. This appeared to be the last prompt needed to encourage the corporation to take the lead in Glasgow recruitment.

In Glasgow the dominating figure of James Dalrymple, General Manager of the Glasgow Corporation Tramways Department, reacted immediately. He was in a position to exert great influence and pressure over a large number of corporation employees and their families. If an employee was seen to be reluctant to share Dalrymple's enthusiasm for military service, the loss of favour, or patronage, could be disastrous for the future well-being of that person's family; dismissal from the corporation would be a barrier to any future employment. T Chalmers points out that 'He was probably the greatest recruiting agent that Scotland produced in the war. For resource, energy, enthusiasm, and organising ability, in the self-imposed task of raising recruits he had no peer.'<sup>496</sup>

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<sup>494</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 2 September 1914.

<sup>495</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 3 September 1914.

<sup>496</sup> T. Chalmers, *An Epic of Glasgow: History of the 15<sup>th</sup> Battalion the Highland Light Infantry (City of Glasgow Regiment)*.

Dalrymple was no stranger to the military or its needs. He had served for twenty years in the 1<sup>st</sup> Lanark Rifle Volunteers, later to become the 5<sup>th</sup> Scottish Rifles, and for a considerable time had acted on the headquarters staff of the Volunteer camps at Gales, which accounted for the speed at which the Glasgow Pals battalions were given access to these training camps.

The success of James Dalrymple's recruiting efforts can be seen in his involvement with the raising of the 15th (s) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry, (1st Glasgow), recruited predominantly from the staff of the Tramways Department. After the Corporation meeting on 3 September Dalrymple contacted his department that evening and had a list of 1,100 names by 9 a.m. the following morning, drawn entirely from among the conductors, drivers, mechanics and labourers. Not all the recruits came from the tramways department, some hailing from as far away as Forfar.<sup>497</sup> By the end of 1914 some 1,756 men had enlisted from the tramways department out of a total staff of approximately 6,000, a figure of approximately 29 per cent.<sup>498</sup> Chalmers tells us that when recruiting for the 15<sup>th</sup> battalion started,

Hundreds of young men in their early twenties and older, moustached men about the thirties or more, were gathered under the high iron-girded roof. Some were in the bothies, some seated in the ranked

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<sup>497</sup> *Forfar Herald*. 25 December 1914.

<sup>498</sup> Scott, *The Industries of the Clyde Valley*. p. 176-7.

tramcars. Many of them formed jocular groups around the walls. The building rang with bustle and laughter. At one end were a table and weighing machine. Beside them stood the attesting officer, two doctors, and a man who turned out to be a justice of the peace, a presence necessary for proper enlistment.<sup>499</sup>

The employees of the Tramways Department did not limit their military service to the Tramways Battalion. On 5 August some 600 Territorials and Reservists within the department handed in their uniforms and reported for duty.<sup>500</sup> The Tramways Battalion itself was used as an instrument of recruitment when, along with the other local units, it was periodically paraded in George Square, Glasgow and routinely sent on recruitment marches throughout the surrounding district. The use of the local camp at Gailies was also a boost for recruitment for the locally raised battalions. The close proximity of the training ground meant that local men could get weekend leave or their families could visit at the weekends. Other service battalions were usually sent to training camps in England, giving no chance for such frequent leave opportunities. Dalrymple's involvement with recruiting was not solely confined to the 15th Highland Light Infantry. He was involved in raising recruits for the various other locally raised units recruited by the Glasgow Corporation. He arranged physical exercise classes for those men whose chest measurements failed to come up to the requirement of the recruiting medical and even went so far as to establish an open-air cinema to help

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<sup>499</sup> T. Chalmers, *An Epic of Glasgow*. P. 2. This was the scene when recruitment started on Sunday 13 September at the Coplawhill tram depot.

<sup>500</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 6 August, 1914.

promote the war effort. In all, Dalrymple was seen to be the driving force behind the creation of one brigade of artillery, two infantry battalions and five companies of engineers.

Even Dalrymple, however, found it extremely hard to raise a 'Bantam' battalion in Glasgow in February 1915. Recruiting for this battalion, the 18th Highland Light Infantry, eventually got underway on 24 March 1915 but, as can be seen from FIG 6:3, by Monday 5 April, of the 1,966 men who had previously put their names on the list, only 192 had enlisted. Dalrymple was able to vent his anger on the local Rotary Club which had undertaken to procure the necessary manpower but he was not in a position to exert any authority over the men required to fill the ranks. Recruitment drives had to be extended over the entire country in order to raise the required number of men, and his authority did not extend beyond the Tramways Department.

**Fig 6:3 Status on 5 April 1915 of those men who had attested  
to enlist in the 18th H.L.I.<sup>501</sup>**

Names on list supplied by Rotary Club	1966
Men approved	192
Men rejected	317
Men failed to appear	1186
Men not found	71
Men enlisted elsewhere	22

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<sup>501</sup> *Glasgow City Archives, D-TC 19.*

Even as late as August 1915, at a recruiting meeting in Forfar, there was a call for recruits for the Bantam Battalion by Lieutenant McLean of the Highland Light Infantry.<sup>502</sup> It is interesting to note that the military recruiters were by this time involved in raising recruits to complete a civic battalion whereas previously there had been definite lines of demarcation in recruitment for such locally raised units.

There were two other civic battalions raised in Glasgow at that time, the 16th and 17th Battalions Highland Light Infantry. The 16th(s) Battalion Highland Light Infantry (2nd Glasgow), was the second of the two battalions raised by the Corporation of Glasgow and was made up almost entirely from serving and past officers and men of the Boys' Brigade with its recruiting office in St Andrews Halls. There had been previous attempts to create a Boys' Brigade Battalion early in August 1914. The *Glasgow Evening Citizen*, on the tenth of that month, had reported that the Boys' Brigade Executive Committee had offered the services of the Glasgow Battalion of the Boys' Brigade for military service, stating that, although there was already a number serving with the Territorial Force, there were still some four or five hundred officers available and nearly nine thousand boys.<sup>503</sup> The 17th(s) Battalion Highland Light Infantry (3rd Glasgow) was raised and funded by the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce and contained within its four companies two from the commercial sector, one from former pupils of the Glasgow Academy, and one from the Royal Technical College. The company from the technical college was the

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<sup>502</sup> *Forfar Herald and Kirriemuir Advertiser*, 27 August, 1915.

<sup>503</sup> *Evening Citizen*. 10 August, 1914.

result of an earlier failed attempt by the college to raise its own battalion for the Royal Scots or the Scottish Rifles. There had been an announcement in the local press on 1 September for the recruiting of such a battalion:

The reported battalion in connection with the Glasgow Royal Technical College is now open to receive recruits from the University, St Mungo's College, Anderson's College, and other affiliated bodies. The ranks are also open to chartered accountants, the Faculty of Procurators, and students of these bodies. This part of Lord Kitchener's Army will afford an opportunity for friends going out to the war keeping in touch and working alongside each other.<sup>504</sup>

Like all Pals' battalions the incentive being touted was that groups of friends enlisting together would be kept together and would serve with others of the same social class.

By 7 September some 340 men had come forward for the Royal Technical College Battalion but on 8 September it was announced that the battalion was to become part of the commercial battalion being raised by the Chamber of Commerce. In early September in Glasgow, with its established Jewish community, there was the offer of a Jewish company to be included in one of the City Battalions but this was refused given the perceived commissariat difficulties.

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<sup>504</sup> *Evening Citizen*. 1 September, 1914.

In Edinburgh recruiting for local battalions was also under way, but with widely differing degrees of success. The 15th Battalion, Royal Scots was raised and funded by the Lord Provost and City of Edinburgh and, although recruiting commenced unofficially on 19 September 1914, the concept of a 'City Battalion' had been voiced as early as 6 August 1914 when, eighteen days before Lord Derby is accredited with initiating the Pals movement and six days before Sir Henry Rawlinson is alleged to have voiced the notion, the Lord Provost of Edinburgh approached the General Officer Commanding in Scotland, on behalf of the Corporation, with the offer that they should 'raise a battalion for service in His Majesty's Forces'.<sup>505</sup> In the early days of the war the War Office was not anticipating the creation of any special battalions being raised outwith the established military recruiting system and this offer to recruit a local battalion was declined. The Corporation decided, however, to take matters into its own hands and, on 14 August, ten days after the outbreak of war, it was announced in the local press that,

#### THE CITY OF EDINBURGH'S OWN

A City of Edinburgh's Regiment, on the lines of the famous I.V. regiment in the Boer War is here being organised. The sanction of the War Office has not yet been received, but pending its reception very complete preparations have been made in Parliament House for recruiting purposes, and already a number of names have been taken. When the War Office sanction arrives the Lord Provost will issue a

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<sup>505</sup> Town Council of Edinburgh. Minutes of meeting, 9 February, 1915. p. 128-130.

proclamation to the young men of the city to rally to the new regiment.<sup>506</sup>

The formation of an Edinburgh battalion took a further step forward when, on 2 September, in their offices at 95 Princes Street, a meeting of the General Political Committee agreed to 'endeavour to form an Edinburgh Battalion, composed chiefly of members of Rugby football, cricket, golf, bowling, swimming, and other athletic clubs, such bodies as the Scottish Clerks Association, those employed with legal firms, Chartered Accountants, and others who may be classed as non-manual workers.'<sup>507</sup> This announcement by the General Political Committee set the tone for recruitment to the Scottish Pals' Battalions. The working classes were deliberately excluded from the civic battalions, not just in Edinburgh but throughout Scotland.

Following the acceptance, by the War Office, of offers of locally raised battalions from Glasgow, London, Birmingham and Liverpool, Edinburgh once again offered to provide such a battalion but in this instance the Lord Provost did not receive official consent until 17 September. On 24 September it was publicly announced that the War Office had given its approval for the raising of an Edinburgh battalion and that recruiting would now commence on 26 September. However recruiting for the 15th battalion Royal Scots was slow and by early October the battalion began to accept large groups of recruits from Manchester, where that city was unable to recruit enough men to create

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<sup>506</sup> *Edinburgh Evening News*. 14 August 1914.

<sup>507</sup> *Edinburgh Evening News*. 3 September 1914.

a Manchester Scottish battalion. On Saturday 3 October 1914, under the headline 'Manchester Scots for Edinburgh Battalion', *The Scotsman* reported that a detachment of 67 men had arrived from Manchester the previous evening to join the 15th battalion, Royal Scots.<sup>508</sup> Another detachment of 54 was reported as arriving on 7 October.<sup>509</sup> The use of Manchester recruits caused bitter acrimony, not only in Edinburgh but, more importantly, in Manchester itself. There were reports that over five hundred Manchester recruits had been tricked into joining the 15th battalion on the understanding that they were joining a Manchester Scottish battalion; only finding out that they had joined the 15th battalion Royal Scots after they had enlisted.<sup>510</sup> Recruiting for the 15th battalion was, in this way, completed by 9 October, officially fourteen days but unofficially almost two months in total. However, reduced recruiting continued until 14 January 1915 to raise Depot and Reserve Companies.

In stark contrast to this, Edinburgh's second Pals' battalion demonstrates how individual popularity could stimulate recruitment. Sir George McCrae, Edinburgh City Treasurer, announced on 26 November, that not only had he volunteered for active service, but he had also decided to raise a new battalion of Royal Scots to serve under his command.<sup>511</sup> This was not surprising considering McCrae's background. He had for eight years (1905-1913) commanded the 6th battalion, Royal Scots, an Edinburgh Territorial

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<sup>508</sup> *The Scotsman*, 3 October 1914.

<sup>509</sup> *The Scotsman*, 6 October 1914.

<sup>510</sup> *Edinburgh Evening News*, 15 October 1914.

<sup>511</sup> *Edinburgh Evening News*, 26 November 1914.

battalion, and was an Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel in the regular army. He also served as M.P. for East Edinburgh from 1899 until 1919 and had taken an active and leading part in the debate leading to the passing of the Territorial Forces Act 1907. At the outbreak of the war he was responsible, at the request of the Admiralty, for the construction of a new town at the Rosyth Naval Base to house the naval personnel and their families. With his political, civic, and military ties, his call for recruits met with an unprecedented response, in Scotland at least.

By Tuesday 2 December, five days recruiting had provided 700 men for the new battalion and by 9 December the battalion was complete: a total of 1,550 men in twelve days.<sup>512</sup> McCrae did not stop there; he went on to raise a further two reserve companies of 250 men each. The speed with which these recruits came forward is all the more surprising since by November 1914 recruitment in Scotland in general was in decline. The recruiting for McCrae's 16th Battalion got off to a flying start when on 26 November 1914, after a home match at Tynecastle, the entire Heart of Midlothian football team enlisted at the Haymarket Recruitment Office. This prompted large numbers of shareholders and supporters to join up. With the majority of the players enlisting in the 16th battalion, they and a number of their followers formed 'C' company. The presence of these players, their supporters, and a contingent from Watsonians Rugby Club gained for the battalion, in some quarters, the title Edinburgh Sportsmen's Battalion, although the battalion was always known simply as McCrae's Battalion. Interestingly, despite the severe

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<sup>512</sup> *Edinburgh Evening News*. 10 December 1914.

criticism of the Football League and its tardy record of recruitment, the Heart of Midlothian team was the only football team in Britain to enlist *en masse*. McCrae went on to lead his battalion in action, being twice mentioned in dispatches and awarded the DSO.

Meanwhile, also in Edinburgh, Lord Rosebery was also encountering difficulty in recruiting the 17th(s) battalion, Royal Scots (coincidentally the second of Scotland's three bantam battalions). Although Lord Rosebery was unrelenting in encouraging, in some instances forcing, his workers and servants to enlist for military service, his role in the creation of the 17th battalion, Royal Scots was, as Honorary Colonel, primarily that of a figurehead. While he did attend recruitment rallies and meetings throughout Scotland, the bulk of the day to day administration was conducted by the Rosebery Royal Scots Recruiting Committee. Members of the Rosebery Recruiting Committee toured the east coast towns in an effort to raise recruitment numbers using various methods of persuasion. Speakers at these recruiting rallies focused on the positive side of being a bantam. At a recruiting rally in Forfar on 16 April 1915, aimed at stimulating recruitment for the 17th battalion, Royal Scots, the crowd was addressed by Mr J. C. Haig, representing the Rosebery Recruiting Committee. Mr Haig extolled the benefits of being a bantam by saying that they made smaller targets for the enemy, did not have to dig such deep trenches, and were following in the footsteps of such famous small men as Napoleon and Lord Roberts, as well as implying that 'special advantages

accrued to those joining this particular unit, for Lord Rosebery, who was Honorary Colonel of the Battalion, had been taking a special interest'.<sup>513</sup>

This veiled promise of patronage by Lord Rosebery might have worked in the Lothians, where Rosebery had influence, and was a major employer, but was not enough to draw in recruits from further afield where local considerations outweighed any promises made or implied on behalf of Lord Rosebery.

Glasgow and Edinburgh were not the only Scottish cities which aspired to raise their own 'City Battalion'. Lord Provost Sir James Urquhart, Lord-Lieutenant of the County and President of the Dundee Territorial Association since its inception in 1908, was determined that whatever Edinburgh or Glasgow could achieve Dundee, though considerably smaller, could also do. On Thursday, 3 September a letter appeared in the *Dundee Advertiser*, written under the pseudonym 'a potential recruit', and calling for the raising of a local pals battalion, pointing out that 'there are many young men in the town who, like myself, are ready to join the colours, but are at the same time anxious to be placed in association with whom they can regard as real comrades, and with whom they may live on terms of intellectual and moral sympathy and equality'.<sup>514</sup>

In tandem with this letter, suspiciously so, Lord Provost Urquhart was attending a meeting in London with the War Office discussing this very

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<sup>513</sup> *Forfar Herald and Kirriemuir Advertiser*, 16 April 1915.

<sup>514</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 3 September 1914.

possibility and offering to raise and equip a full battalion in Dundee. On 4 September the local Dundee press announced a letter from Mr H. J. Tennant, Under-Secretary of State for War, giving War Office approval, dated 2 September, to raise a Dundee City Battalion. The Lord Provost, in his capacity as Lord Lieutenant, took the opportunity to issue a call for a 'special battalion of businessmen and artisans'.<sup>515</sup> Recruiting for the City Battalion was opened at the Town House but from the start recruiting was slow. So sluggish was the response that recruitment efforts were increased on 8 September with a renewed campaign and calls for 'skilled artisans and young men of the middle class'. By 11 September, some seven days after recruitment had opened for the Dundee City Battalion, there were less than two hundred names on the role. At a meeting in the city on the evening of 10 September, Lord Provost Urquhart addressed the Municipal Officers Guild and 'passed some severe strictures on the tardiness of recruiting in Dundee'. He asked 'Was Dundee in such a condition that we could not raise 1000 men amongst all our merchant's employees, bankers, lawyers, shop assistants, municipal workers, and artisans who had not yet given any indication that they were to join the colours at all?'<sup>516</sup> He went on to say, with regards to recruiting for the city battalion, that 'They had not 200 names, though every facility and every opportunity that they and others had asked for had now been granted by the War Office'.<sup>517</sup>

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<sup>515</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 4 September 1914.

<sup>516</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 11 September 1914.

<sup>517</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 11 September 1914.

Despite the best efforts of the Lord Provost and the battalion organiser Mr (later Major) T. M. Cappon, recruitment remained slow and in an effort to retain some semblance of local unity the War Office was asked if it was willing to accept a half battalion from the city. This request met with refusal since it was the stated policy of the War Office to accept only complete battalions, raised and equipped. In the *Dundee Advertiser* of Monday 28 September there was an acknowledgement of the unsuccessful attempt to raise a local infantry battalion: an admission of defeat. There was a call for those who had put forward their names as potential recruits to join instead the Naval Brigade which was at that time attempting to raise a company of men in Dundee. The men were told that if they joined in a significantly large number they would form one company of 250 men which would train together and fight together. Of the 404 names on the list thirty-eight had tired of waiting and had enlisted in alternative units. Seventy-two were corporation employees; seventy-nine were clerks, insurance agents, and professional assistants; thirty came from the building trade and thirty-seven from engineering; while 'the remainder represented almost every industry in the country'. At the meeting of the men, in the local Masonic Temple, 150 joined the Naval Brigade.<sup>518</sup>

The Dundee Council's admission of early defeat in recruiting a City Battalion would seem to have been not only premature but also ill advised. The Dundee Battalion was, without doubt, the first of Scotland's 'Pals' battalions' to be sanctioned by the War Office. True, as we have seen, the Corporation of Glasgow had declared, at a meeting on 3 September, its intention to form

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<sup>518</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 28 September 1914.

civic battalions, but official War Office sanction had already been given for the Dundee Battalion the previous day, while the first of the Edinburgh battalions, the 15th battalion, Royal Scots, was initiated on 19 September, seventeen days after the Dundee battalion. As long as the Glasgow and Edinburgh battalions were prepared to take up to three months to recruit, and, in the case of Edinburgh, accept large numbers of men from Manchester, there appeared to be no logical reason for Dundee to call such a halt. Unfortunately, the council, and more importantly Lord Provost Urquhart, felt that the low recruitment for the City Battalion, coupled with the low state of recruitment for Dundee as a whole, meant that a considerable period of time would be required and that with the sense of urgency coming from the War Office completion would be too late. The Dundee City Battalion was not the only attempt to fail. As we have seen in Glasgow, there were other calls for 'Pals' battalions', some of which never passed the planning stage while others, like Dundee, fell by the wayside due to the lack of recruits.

To take the concept of the Pals battalion one step further, the War Office, in May 1915, came up with a twist to the theme. Under the headline 'SCOTTISH BATTALION FOR PROFESSIONAL MEN' new steps were detailed to stimulate recruitment. 'An interesting War Office experiment is being made in connection with the raising of the 14th Battalion of the Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders. It has been decided that this new battalion shall be exclusively recruited from the professional and commercial classes in Scotland.'<sup>519</sup> While this did not fall into the original category of a Pals battalion in that the War

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<sup>519</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*. 24 May 1915.

Office was raising and funding the unit, it still could be considered as such since it was a call to a distinctive social group - the very same group at which the original Scottish Pals battalions were aimed.

The raising of local units was not confined solely to infantry battalions. Nine other units were raised in Scotland by the Lord Provosts and Cities of Aberdeen, Dundee, and Glasgow. There was a request by the Army Council in late January 1915 for the raising of small local units of artillery or engineers.<sup>520</sup> In mid-March 1915 the War Office approached those who had previously raised local battalions or who had attempted such but had failed to attain the necessary numbers, and asked if they would raise support units for an army which, it was envisaged, would be comprised solely of those Pals battalions. In order to maintain the ethos of the Pals concept the supporting engineer and artillery units should also be locally raised.

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<sup>520</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 22 January, 1915. p. 9.

**Fig 6:4 Scottish locally Raised Support Units.**<sup>521</sup>

**Aberdeen**

157th (Aberdeen City) Brigade, Royal Field Artillery. 03-02-1915

**Dundee**

205th (Field) Company, Royal Engineers. (Dundee) 02-02-1915

**Glasgow**

159th (Glasgow) Brigade, Royal Field Artillery. 04-02-1915

206th (Field) Company, Royal Engineers. 04-02-1915

Headquarters, Divisional Royal Engineers. 05-04-1915

218th (Field) Company, Royal Engineers. (Glasgow) 05-04-1915

219th (Field) Company, Royal Engineers. (Glasgow) 05-04-1915

41st Divisional Signal Company, Royal Engineers. (Glasgow) 05-04-1915

217th (Army Troops) Company, Royal Engineers. (Glasgow) 05-04-1915

Glasgow raised a further seven units, six of those attributable to James Dalrymple, while Aberdeen and Dundee raised one each. The main difference between these units and the infantry battalions raised earlier in Scotland was their composition, and the background, of the men serving in them. The recruits needed for these 'technical' units were skilled artisans, not the middle class. 'The new company presents its demands to a wide variety of trades, and offers to recruits rates of pay considerably higher than those of the ordinary services.'<sup>522</sup> Tradesmen were required for their skills, and were being paid accordingly. 'Tradesmen specially appealed to are masons, bricklayers, plumbers, electricians, blacksmiths, plasterers, slaters, carpenters, clerks, coopers, architectural draughtsmen, engine drivers, fitters and turners, harnessmakers, painters, shoemakers, surveyors, tailors, wheelwrights, drivers, and batmen.'<sup>523</sup>

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<sup>521</sup> *Kitchener Papers*, PRO. 30/57/73.

<sup>522</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*. 24 March, 1915.

<sup>523</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*. 24 March 1915.

By the end of December 1914 approximately 8,000 men had enlisted in the five Scottish Pals battalions formed at that time. With a total Scottish recruitment figure for that date of 161,882 for the Regular Army and Territorial Force the Scottish Pals battalions were providing only 4.9 per cent of the manpower. When Territorial recruitment totals are excluded and the figure is compared only to the Scottish recruits for the New Army the percentage increases to 7.6 per cent. By the end of 1915, when the voluntary period was coming to an end, locally raised units in Scotland, including engineering and artillery companies and reserve battalions, amounted to approximately 15,000 men or 5 per cent of the total Scottish recruitment and 8 per cent of the Scottish army recruitment total.<sup>524</sup> With such a limited total strength the value of such locally raised units in Scotland was not so much in numbers as in the type of recruit. As we have seen in chapters three and four, the greater majority of those who enlisted in Scotland in the first year of the war came from the industrial or working class; the middle or professional classes were underrepresented.

The men who joined such units may have enlisted individually in the New Armies without the inducement of the 'Pals concept' but this would have been over a longer period of time. The locally raised concept nudged them into enlisting *en masse* at a time when large numbers were needed. More importantly, in terms of recruitment numbers, it was imperative to be seen to maintain the momentum of the September peak period. In many cases the locally raised concept exposed the individual to pressure from peers or family.

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<sup>524</sup> PRO. Nats 1/398. Statistics of the Military Effort.

In the case of the 15th Highland Light Infantry there was a large number of tramways employees who would, in all probability, not have enlisted on that particular day had there not been tacit encouragement for them to do so.

Those Pals battalions which were raised in Scotland served a specific purpose. The 16th battalion Highland Light Infantry, with its officers and men from the Boys Brigade, and the 17th battalion, with its recruits coming from the commercial section, were aimed at the middle class of Glasgow society. Those who may have looked upon the more traditionally formed local battalions as beneath their station were willing to enlist in a battalion of their peers. Unfortunately the idea that traditional social barriers were at once removed was seen in its true light when the 17th battalion Highland Light Infantry advertised in the Glasgow press for ex-soldiers to act as 'storemen and batmen', positions which were obviously beneath the middle class recruits.<sup>525</sup> The 16th battalion, Royal Scots, although containing a large number of football and rugby players and their supporters, also contained large numbers of Heart of Midlothian shareholders, and former pupils of the capital's two most prestigious public schools, which set the social level of the battalion. The middle class in Scotland was perhaps the group which had the most to lose and the greatest incentive to enlist but this loss was only in the long term, unlike that of the working class who suffered an immediate financial hardship. The formation of intentionally middle class battalions was designed to ease their dilemma and provided a medium through which they could defend their way of life. However, within Scotland those members of the

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<sup>525</sup> *Glasgow Citizen*, 5 October 1914.

middle classes who were inclined to accept military service already had an outlet in the middle class Territorial battalions scattered throughout Scotland.<sup>526</sup>

The 15th battalion, Highland Light Infantry was an altogether different matter. This was a working class battalion, raised by James Dalrymple from within his domain, and, while showing the best of the men, at the same time it showed the worst of the Pals concept: pressure. Whether intentional or not Dalrymple was placing his employees in an impossible position.

Recent historians have considered the recruitment of these locally raised battalions in the same way as have historians over the last eighty years. This brings with it the danger that myth may, over time, be accepted as reality. Niall Ferguson asserts that the 15th battalion, Highland Light Infantry was raised 'in a matter of hours'.<sup>527</sup> Ferguson's source is Edward Spiers who in turn claims that the battalion 'was raised in 16 hours'.<sup>528</sup> In turn Spiers's reference is to T. Chalmers's 1934 publication, *An Epic of Glasgow: History of the 15th Battalion Highland Light Infantry (City of Glasgow Regiment)* in which Chalmers, writing from a partisan, and poetic, point of view, creates the myth. Trevor Royle also followed Chalmers when he claims that 'it took just 16 hours to enlist the new battalion'.<sup>529</sup> M Lynch also concludes that 'Pals

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<sup>526</sup> Discussed further in chapter 7, Territorial recruitment.

<sup>527</sup> N. Ferguson, *The Pity of War*. p. 207.

<sup>528</sup> E. Spiers, *The Scottish Soldier at War*. p. 315.

<sup>529</sup> T. Royle, *In Flanders Fields*. p. 14.

battalions, such as those of the Highland Light Infantry which recruited mainly from Glasgow's slums, were formed almost overnight from particular localities or the workplace: another battalion in the same regiment was entirely made up, in the space of sixteen hours, of the employees of Glasgow Corporation Tramways.<sup>530</sup>

The Pals battalions of the Highland Light Infantry were never formed from the slums of Glasgow and were never formed overnight, far less in sixteen hours. The 16th and 17th battalions were predominantly middle class, while the 15th was intended to consist of those employed by the corporation, itself a bastion of working class elitism. Recruiting for the 16th and 17th battalions did not close until 13 November, some seventy days after it started, while the 15th battalion was still recruiting at this time. The ability to produce a list of names within sixteen hours does not mean that the battalion was raised in that period. Recruiting for the 15th battalion, Highland Light Infantry did not in fact commence until 13 September 1914, nine days after Dalrymple received his 'list of names' and, instead of having enough men to produce a ready battalion, recruitment was less than expected. By the end of September James Dalrymple had to resort to the unusual step of issuing a call for friends and relatives of tramways employees, and any other interested person, to come forward and enlist in the battalion, while on 5 October the combined city battalions still required 1,000 recruits to bring them up to strength.<sup>531</sup> The 15th battalion Highland Light Infantry, with a strength of 755, was 345 short of its

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<sup>530</sup> M. Lynch, *Scotland: A New History*.

<sup>531</sup> *Glasgow Citizen*, 21 September 1914.

full complement, while the 16th battalion was at the same level, with the 17th battalion nearing completion with 900 men, a shortfall of only 200.<sup>532</sup>

The belief that large numbers of volunteers rushed to enlist in the Scottish Pals' battalions is not only confined to the Glasgow battalions, but also extends to those raised in Edinburgh for the Royal Scots. We are assured by A.J. Smithers that Scotland's capital city raised two battalions, the 15th and 16th Royal Scots, in twenty-four hours.<sup>533</sup> However, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, the 15th battalion, Royal Scots was still receiving large numbers of recruits from Manchester in October, while the 16th battalion took twelve days to come up to strength - a truly remarkable feat but still not accomplished in twenty-four hours. Indeed, while the 15th battalion was raised and funded by a public body, by accepting large contingents of men from Manchester, it departed from the accepted definition of a 'Pals battalion'. Those men had no direct local or social ties with the people of Edinburgh and were not joining a band of 'like minded people', coming as they did from another country. While some of them had family ties with Scotland, they had primarily enlisted as the Manchester Scottish and were sent to the 15th battalion, Royal Scots, when Manchester could not raise enough recruits for its own battalion. They had come forward to enlist in their own 'English' pals battalion and a large proportion of them had no connection at all with Scotland, save the desire to serve in a regiment with a Scottish name and

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<sup>532</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 5 October 1914.

<sup>533</sup> A.J. Smithers, *The Fighting Nation: Lord Kitchener and his Armies*.

wear a uniform bearing Scottish tartan. While the battalion strived to ensure that those men arriving from Manchester had some form of Scottish connection, however tenuous, this was ignored in most cases in an effort to obtain recruits. As well as demonstrating the inability of a city like Manchester to form a battalion of men with Scottish connections, the use of those Manchester recruits shows that in Edinburgh itself there was a weak response from the middle classes to recruiting for the 15th battalion.

There is a strong case for those service battalions raised by Lochiel for the Cameron Highlanders to be viewed not as New Army but as locally raised or Pals' battalions.<sup>534</sup> While the recruits were drawn from a world-wide pool and not from a clearly defined and socially mutual locality, and while the men did not come from a common workplace, profession, or social class, the fact that they were primarily raised in answer to the call of one man, relying on age-old ties of clan loyalty, gives them as much credibility as any other Scottish 'Pals' battalion. Certainly they were funded by the War Office and not by Lochiel, but the recruitment was aimed at a residual loyalty to Lochiel, not the War Office.

The concept of Pals Battalions was more a phenomenon of English recruitment, where men came from a single work place or a group of workplaces operated by a single employer. In Scotland, with the exception of the Glasgow Tramways Department, those battalions which were raised came from a wide variety of employers, professions, and districts. The only

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<sup>534</sup> Chapter 4.

commonality was their middle class background. In Scotland this was not enough to ensure the rapid formation of the civic battalions; middle class recruitment in Scotland was tardy and patchy.

There were companies of men formed from the same professions, such as students and clerical workers, but such links did not provide enough of a draw; these men were colleagues in name only and had no links through a common workplace. In the case of the 16th battalion, Highland Light Infantry the linking factor of the Boys' Brigade was not sufficient to ensure enough recruits and as we have seen it took almost two and a half months to raise enough men to fill the battalion, and not all through connections with the Boys' Brigade. This was in stark contrast to the claims of the Executive Committee of the Boys' Brigade who, on 10 September 1914, offered the services of the Glasgow Battalion of the Boys' Brigade and intimated that there were 'some four or five hundred officers and close upon nine thousand boys' available for service.<sup>535</sup> The use of past or present service in the Boys' Brigade served to define the social standard of recruit required in the battalion, since, in Glasgow at least, it was predominantly a middle class pastime, the cost of the uniform and the weekly subscription excluding all but the better off.

Those battalions, usually territorial, which had an affiliation with a particular area would appeal to a large section of those who enlisted almost immediately for economic reasons. The unemployed, unemployable and the unskilled would quickly fill the ranks. The security of six or nine months

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<sup>535</sup> *Glasgow Citizen*, 10 October 1914.

employment, over the winter period, was a large incentive. These men, because of their lack of skills, were infantry material. By the same standard the Pals battalions formed in Scotland, with the exception of the 15th Highland Light Infantry, fell into the same category, men whose lack of transferable skills made them infantry material, men also in many instances whose lack of dependence on army pay could be seen as a factor in encouraging them to join an infantry battalion of their peers. Men with transferable skills would, by choice, enlist within a unit in which their skills would earn them extra pay and allowances. On the other hand in the case of the 15th Highland Light Infantry, while it was certainly a working class unit comprised mainly of men with some degree of transferable skills, the domineering manner of James Dalrymple ensured that, if for no other reason than future employment, they joined the battalion representing his department. While the army, in the early stages of the war, suffered from a shortage of engineers, mechanics and drivers, those from the tramways department stayed 'in house'.

Those in the regional or territorial battalions enlisted almost immediately while those in the Pals battalions enlisted at a later date. Money and security were motivating factors for both groups but in different ways. To the unemployed, or low paid, the army offered relief and shelter and drew in those recruits for whom this was a priority. The army was seen as long-term poor relief. In the middle class Pals' battalions there was no direct financial pull but certainly a delay, for some, until stability was guaranteed at home before enlisting. The middle classes in Scotland in September 1914 had less reason to 'rush to the

colours' when all that they had worked for, built up, etc., could not be abandoned at a moment's notice, especially for a war which many thought would be over before the training period was complete. This poses the idea that with the promise of a short war and a long training period, enlistment, for the middle classes in Scotland, was merely a gesture. With the raising and training of the Pals battalions being the responsibility of a civilian authority or individual, it was perfectly feasible that the war would be over before the battalion could be handed over to the War Office, thus negating any need to serve in the army. Until battalions were taken over by the War Office they could still be viewed, by the individual, as civilian. Those with arguably the greatest incentive to support the war, the responsibility of position, also had the greatest incentive to remain at home. By mid-September when the recruiting 'boom' was over the Pals battalions were starting to recruit. The initial rush had failed to entice them and, as we have already seen, in some instances the completion of the Pals battalions was a long drawn-out process.

As we have seen, it was one month into the war (3 September) before the 15th battalion, Highland Light Infantry was a proposition, and even longer before recruitment got under way on 13 September. Those of the working class with secure jobs had not rushed to enlist, at least not in this instance. Similarly, recruits for the Pals battalions in Scotland did not rush to enlist; they had to be prompted by a psychological boost or threat. As long as military service remained voluntary it promoted a 'Pals' concept; groups of men could always enlist together. The doctrine of locally raised units which emerged in the first three months of the war was only taking this concept one step further.

There appears to be a degree of national, or regional, pride at stake as to where the first Pals battalion originated or who originally devised the concept. Lord Derby is usually credited with initiating the movement, while others credit Sir Henry Rawlinson with conceiving the idea as early as 19 August. In Scotland, however, as we have seen, the idea of a 'City Battalion' had been proposed in Edinburgh by Lord Provost Inches and the Council as early as 14 August, and recruiting announcements had been published in the press on the same day. While it is true that other battalions were sanctioned by the War Office earlier than the Scottish battalions, the fact still remains that Scotland, or at least a section of Scottish society, was well to the fore in originating those ideas. That Scotland's Pals battalions never achieved their full potential, as those in England did, can be attributed in the main to the lethargy displayed by the middle classes in Scotland and the insular conception that such battalions were for the middle class only, thereby shutting the door to the greater part of Scottish manpower.

## CHAPTER 7

### TERRITORIAL RECRUITMENT.

For the present it is not deemed expedient to recruit Territorials.<sup>536</sup>

As part of the army reforms introduced by R. B. Haldane, and as a result of his Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill of 1907, the Territorial Force came into being on 1 April 1908. A volunteer force, it was to be raised and administered by local county associations. Service in the new force was for an initial period of four years with a fortnight's annual camp paid at regular army rates. Seen as a direct replacement for the Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, the new force was designed, in Haldane's eyes at least, to fulfil two functions. The Territorial Force was intended to take over the defence of the homeland in event of war - an anti-invasion force if you like, thus enabling the regular army to be deployed abroad as an Expeditionary Force. However, Haldane envisaged a wider role for the new force. He intended that the Territorial Force should support and expand the regular army in time of crisis. Upon mobilisation, and after six months training, the Territorial Force would be ready to serve alongside the regular army on active service abroad. However, those serving in the Territorial Force signed on for home service only and agreement had to be reached on an individual basis before foreign service could take place. The inadequacy of the system could be seen in the need for a six month training period prior to active service to bring Territorials up to

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<sup>536</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 10 August, 1914. Part of Lord Kitchener's appeal for men.

strength and a standard which could be easily assimilated into the Regular Army. The military mind still thought in terms of a slow build-up and singular decisive action. Haldane's attempt to professionalise the irregular reserve forces failed in the face of distrust, contempt and criticism from those in the regular army and resistance from the local associations which saw such attempts as anathema to their way of life.

Chapter Two showed that the Territorial Force, and its predecessor, was seen as a lifestyle by many and any attempt to 'militarise' it would have had an adverse affect on recruiting, and, more importantly, on the retention of those already serving. On 1 July 1914 the Territorial Force stood at 268,777 officers and other ranks UK wide, with some 18,683 or 6.95 per cent having signed up for foreign service.<sup>537</sup> Much has been made of Kitchener's failure to utilise the Territorial Force in the manner envisaged by Haldane, as a reserve of semi-trained personnel. In truth Kitchener had no experience of the Territorial Force and was unable to form any realistic opinion as to its proficiency and ability. The need for a six-month training period reflected the mixed level of ability that the Territorial Force was deemed to represent. He took what was probably the only logical option open to him at the time and, thinking in the long term, opted to start from scratch, to work with a known rather than an unknown quantity.

Peter Simkins takes the view that any large scale influx of raw and untrained recruits would have diluted the ability of the Territorial Force, even in its home

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<sup>537</sup> I. Becket, 'The Territorial Force' in Becket and Simpson. p. 130.

defence role, and would have had a negative effect on the ability of that force to reinforce the Expeditionary Force. Indeed, 'If they were swamped by masses of raw recruits it was reasonable to assume that they might be rendered temporarily incapable of carrying out any function at all'.<sup>538</sup> By ensuring that second-line units could only be raised once a front-line battalion had volunteered for foreign service, Kitchener ensured that the dilution of standards would be kept to a minimum for those units which were partially trained. By 25 August 1914 over seventy Territorial battalions had volunteered for foreign service.

In August 1914 the Territorial Force in Scotland was in the process of completing its annual camp and was ideally positioned to respond to the mobilisation.<sup>539</sup> There was a feeling at large that the army would soon be in action, although it was envisaged that Ireland, rather than Europe, would be the battleground. To this extent the army was prepared for combat but only as an extension to its normal imperial peacekeeping duties. As the reality of a European conflict took hold the army began deploying throughout Scotland to guard what were considered to be strategic positions. The army was aided in this by detachments of the Territorial Force, which were dispatched to their war stations to protect bridges, aqueducts, railway lines and reservoirs. Now, for the first time, the general population, through its direct involvement with the Territorial Force, became aware of the extent of the crisis in Europe and

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<sup>538</sup> P. Simkins, 'Kitchener', in Beckett & Gooch, *Politicians and Defence*, p. 98.

<sup>539</sup> *The Scotsman*, 7 July, 1914.

how deeply it could involve the United Kingdom. The need to mobilise for home defence was a shock to those who had been brought up to believe in the invincibility of imperial Britain. For the mother country to be under direct threat created within the population a sense of trepidation never felt before. Max Beloff goes some way to explaining this when he tells us that 'When Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914, it was the first time she had fought against a European power since the end of the Crimean War in 1856, and the first time she had been involved in a war threatening the home islands since the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815'.<sup>540</sup>

Although during the war Scotland boasted few locally raised or Pals battalions, it is fair to say that, in its own peculiar way, the 'pals' concept was a strong part of Scottish society. The need to create an artificial group loyalty in order to stimulate recruitment was not necessary in a country which had its own particular group and regional loyalties. J. Winter reminds us that 'There were probably as many reasons for volunteering as there were volunteers. But one of the most striking features of enlistment in the first year of the war was the extent to which the recruiting drive tapped powerful sentiments of loyalty felt by men, whatever their occupation, to town, county, or community'.<sup>541</sup>

This could be seen in Scotland, as elsewhere, by the linking of regiments with

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<sup>540</sup> M. Beloff, *Wars and Welfare: Britain 1914-1939*. p. 15.

<sup>541</sup> J. Winter, *The Great War*. p. 30.

geographical regions which gave clearly defined allegiances to specific regiments. Scotland had a well defined social structure, with regiments clearly labelled as east coast (Black Watch or Royal Scots), or west coast (Highland Light Infantry or Cameronians). Within this context there was also a tendency for individual counties, towns, or districts to align themselves with a particular Territorial battalion within a regimental recruiting district. When war broke out and those territorial forces were mobilised, family, friends, workmates etc. would, by preference, enlist in the local territorial unit, reinforcing such allegiances as were already there, especially in the highland regiments with their old clan loyalties.

Far from suffering at the hands of Kitchener, his disregard for the Territorial Force helped it to perform the one function for which it was ideally suited. With its call for localised defence and home service the Territorial Force provided Scotland with those recruits who, in all probability, would not have enlisted so readily in the regular army; it gave an extra incentive. In certain ways the Territorial Force was the natural vehicle for the raising of extra manpower. The Yeomanry and Volunteer Associations had provided the temporary increase required for the Boer War, thus setting a precedent for temporary military service. To some the regular army held an air of permanence, even with a wartime-only commitment. On the other hand the Territorial Force gave the illusion of a temporary commitment, it represented the civilian in war - an important psychological point and a major factor in stimulating Territorial recruiting.

The use of separate recruiting organisations for the Territorial Force and the regular army served in some areas to promote the Territorial Force as the main arm of choice. For a great number of the population the only contact with the military was through the local drill hall and it was there that they automatically went to enlist. While the regular army had been limiting the number of recruiting offices to the larger towns, the Territorial Force had been increasing its network of drill halls throughout the country.<sup>542</sup> In the first few weeks of the war the Territorial Force was able to capitalise on this lack of foresight and its separate recruiting system was vigorously defended by the Territorial Associations in the face of regular army requests that there should be a common recruiting programme. It was seen as a sign of their individuality and their civilian ties, and became another major reason for the mistrust between the Territorial Associations and the War Office.

There is no doubt that the use of two different and distinct recruiting bodies did cause confusion among recruits and thus recruiting for both bodies suffered. But they were also a means by which the Territorial Force could circumvent the rules of recruiting, especially those dictating the policy of no recruiting outwith the district. One of the associations most closely linked with recruiting 'irregularities' was that of the 6th Battalion Black Watch. On 25 January 1915 the association received a letter from Headquarters Scottish Command, regarding recruiting for the battalion in the North of Ireland, and enclosing a copy of a advertisement stating that a recruiting office had been

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<sup>542</sup> Appendix 1.

opened in the Grand Hotel, Belfast.<sup>543</sup> A reply was sent on 27 January 1915 stating that 'although the association knew that recruits were coming from North of Ireland they had no knowledge of the publication or recruiting literature or establishment of an office in Ireland and had not authorised same'.<sup>544</sup>

This seemed to satisfy Scottish Command for nothing further was heard about the matter. However, on 19 March 1915 the association agreed to pay an expenses claim forwarded by the officer commanding 2/6th battalion in connection with running a recruiting office in Belfast.<sup>545</sup> That the association saw no wrong in this matter is explained by the presence, in the pre-war battalion, of an 'Irish' company, raised and based in Ireland. These Irishmen formed a self-contained company and journeyed over to attend the annual training camps in Scotland. The company managed to assemble, make the journey from Ireland, and present itself at the Perth Barracks only two days after war was declared. This unauthorised recruiting in Ireland was a part of the localisation concept; the battalion was only recruiting in its 'home territory', relying on regimental loyalty to bring in recruits, recruits which it felt were its own, regardless of nationality.

The 6th battalion, Black Watch was not the only Scottish Territorial battalion to try to recruit outwith its home regimental recruiting area. By April 1915, preparations were in hand allowing the Recruiting Committee of the Territorial

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<sup>543</sup> *Minute Book of Forfar County Association*, #1, 1908-1915. 25 January 1915.

<sup>544</sup> *Minute Book of Forfar County Association*, #1, 1908-1915. 27 January 1915.

<sup>545</sup> *Minute Book of Forfar County Association*, #1, 1908-1915. 19 March 1915.

Force Association of the County of Aberdeen to recruit men of Scottish descent in Middlesex for the 5th, 6th and 7th Gordon Highlanders. Approval had been given by the chairman of the County of Middlesex Territorial Force Association for the Rev Thomas Scott, Laurencekirk, chaplain to 7th battalion, Gordon Highlanders, to open a recruiting office in Middlesex. However before the scheme was fully up and running the 5th and 7th Gordon Highlanders, with the Rev T. Scott, were posted overseas.<sup>546</sup> The project was shelved in the meantime but not scrapped; it was occasionally dusted off and reviewed but conscription rendered the scheme redundant.

Throughout Scotland the Territorial Force was using the local drill halls as recruiting centres while the regular army was forced to go elsewhere for premises, usually in out of the way offices on loan. Local units thereby developed the greater profile. Far from being sidelined as Kitchener had intended, the Territorial Force in Scotland fulfilled a major role, recruiting 57,490 men between August and December 1914, quite an achievement when the army in Scotland recruited only 104,392 in the same period and 35.5 per cent of the total number of recruits in Scotland for the first five months of the war. It was also an increase of 137 per cent over the immediate pre-war Scottish territorial strength of 41,746. In the twelve months of 1915 the Territorial Force in Scotland recruited 58,046 men, 41.5 per cent of a Scottish total for the period of 139,872.<sup>547</sup> The difference in Scottish Territorial recruitment between the five month period in 1914 and the twelve month

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<sup>546</sup> Minutes of the Recruiting Committee of the Territorial Force for the County of Aberdeen. Scottish Record Office MD 4/63.

<sup>547</sup> NATS 1/399.

period of 1915 was not so wide as that of the army. There was less than 1 per cent difference in the number of recruits raised: a mere 556 recruits, representing 0.96 per cent of an increase in 1915. The total number of recruits for the Territorial Force in Scotland during the seventeen month voluntary period was 115,536. This represented a 276.7 per cent increase in the strength of the Territorial Force in Scotland.<sup>548</sup> With the exemplary war record of Scottish Territorial battalions it also casts a new light on Simkins's assertion that any wholesale increase in Territorial strength would be detrimental to efficiency. With such large numbers coming forward recruitment in the Territorial Force would appear to have been limited only by demand.

Initially at any rate the Territorial Associations could only, officially, recruit some 12,961 men, the pre-war Territorial shortfall in Scotland. However, Ian Beckett states that on 15 August 1914, Territorial Associations were authorised to raise new units as replacements for those volunteering for foreign service. On 21 August the order to raise 'second line' units regardless of first line status was issued, repeated on 31 August and 21 September 1914. By November 1914 authorisation was given for the raising of a 'third line' when first line units were sent overseas. By March 1915 the order had been extended to cover all units regardless of status.<sup>549</sup>

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<sup>548</sup> NATS 1/399.

<sup>549</sup> I. Becket, 'The Territorial Force' in Becket and Simpson. p. 132.

Individual choice as to foreign service was always going to be a barrier to effective use of Territorial manpower. On 10 August 1914 it was announced that the War Office was willing to accept complete units for Imperial Service, to relieve regular garrison units overseas and free them for active service in Europe. By 21 August 1914 the War Office guidelines had been changed to include units in which at least 80 per cent of the personnel had volunteered. These units were then allowed to recruit the necessary extra men for foreign service to bring them up to war establishment. More realistically units with less than the required number could merge to produce foreign service units. The order of 31 August 1914 allowed second line units to be raised where at least 60 per cent of a unit had volunteered for foreign service. This allowed those men who had opted for home service to form the basis of the second line unit while the first line came up to strength for foreign service. Unfortunately the competition between home and foreign service units for men tended to slow down recruitment for foreign service. Second line units were up to strength while first line units were still trying to attract recruits. The ability to enlist in the Territorial Force for home service rather than foreign service continued until March 1915, when all new Territorial recruits were enlisted for general service.<sup>550</sup>

As we have shown in Chapter Two, the various pre-war regional recruiting figures bear out the idea that in Scotland the Territorial Force was the localised unit of choice, when choice could be given. It is no surprise therefore that wartime recruitment followed the same pattern. In rural areas

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<sup>550</sup> J. Becket, 'The Territorial Force' in Becket and Simpson. p. 135.

such as Aberdeen, Forfar, and Inverness the figures show that recruitment for the Territorial Force was higher than that for the regular army while in urban or industrial areas with a high population density such as Glasgow the regular army took the leading role in recruitment. The Territorial Force was a finite body, expanded within tightly controlled parameters and limited in the number of recruits it could absorb. This worked well in rural areas with relatively low population densities and therefore relatively low recruitment numbers. In the densely populated urban areas this inability to absorb large scale recruiting, while not detracting from the primary importance of the Territorial Force, led to the higher recruiting rates for the service battalions and for units other than infantry.

In the County of Forfar, those enlisting for the local regiment, the Black Watch, were joining the 5th battalion which was the local Territorial unit, while those enlisting in the regular army (Kitchener) were joining regiments outwith the local area. A high proportion of those from Forfar enlisting in the regular army were enlisting in the higher paid technical branches such as the Royal Engineers. This was due to Forfar being a one-industry town (textiles), where a high number of men were skilled and suffering from short-time working due to the war. In contrast, those from the surrounding county were mostly agricultural workers who joined the lower paid infantry or yeomanry regiments. Those who enlisted in regiments such as the Royal Engineers did so mainly in the first few weeks of the war, before the local textile companies secured lucrative army contracts which guaranteed employment for skilled textile workers. Regular army recruiting offices enlisted men for other regional

regiments to make up the shortfall in recruitment in other areas and Forfar was a popular recruiting office for the Royal Scots, with small numbers of recruits occasionally going to the Highland Light Infantry. This is an example of how the regional Territorial battalion took on the mantle of the locally raised unit, instilling regional loyalty, and to a certain extent explains why the 'Pals' concept never really took off in Scotland; in another guise it was already there. This 'localisation' had the same consequences that materialised with the more popularised Pals battalions: casualty figures could devastate local communities. Localised recruitment magnified the effects of battalion casualties and highlighted the need for a centralised recruiting programme which was not available until conscription.

By the end of December 1914 Forfar had provided 314 recruits for the regular army while at the same time providing 673 recruits for the local Territorial Force.<sup>551</sup> Meanwhile, between August 1914 and May 1915, the City of Aberdeen had produced 4,982 recruits for the local Territorial Force but only 3,452 for the regular army, eventually producing some 6,502 recruits for the Territorial Force by December 1915.<sup>552</sup> From October 1914 to April 1915 there were 883 recruits for the Lovat Scouts but only 244 regular army recruits in the same recruiting district.<sup>553</sup> On the other hand, over the same period, the City of Glasgow produced 20,649 recruits for the regular army but only 6,595 recruits for the Territorial Force.<sup>554</sup> By September 1915, prior to the

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<sup>551</sup> *Minute Book of Forfar County Association*. #1, 1908-1915. Nats 1/398.

<sup>552</sup> City of Aberdeen. *Territorial Force Minutes*, November 1913-October 1917. PRO. Nats 1/398.

<sup>553</sup> *Minutes of the Territorial Force Association of the Counties of Inverness, Ross & Cromarty, and Nairn*, 16 March 1915. Nats 1/398

<sup>554</sup> *Minutes of the Glasgow Territorial Force Association*, 1915-1918. Nats 1/398.

end of direct Territorial recruitment, the City of Glasgow, with a male population of 366,535, had produced 9,619 recruits for the Territorial Force, a figure of 2.62 per cent of the male population.<sup>555</sup> Lanark with a male population of 354,834 had produced 4,262 recruits or 1.2 per cent.<sup>556</sup> Inverness on the other hand with 1,411 had provided 3.3 per cent of the local male population of 42,440 for the Lovat Scouts Yeomanry.<sup>557</sup> Aberdeen provided 6,274 recruits, some 4.25 per cent of her 147,357 male population.<sup>558</sup> Glasgow and Lanark, the two most industrialised areas in Scotland and the most densely populated, continued their pre-war trend and provided proportionally low numbers of recruits for the Territorial Force.<sup>559</sup>

Without the wholesale creation of new battalions, and in the process a dilution of the Territorial ethos, the Territorial Associations would never have been able to produce the numbers that the army required. It is reasonable to assume that the ability of the new 'Service Battalions' to absorb recruits in such large numbers would have been no different had those new battalions been designated 'Territorial' rather than 'Service'. Territorial battalions which were not raised as specific Pals units nonetheless became so with groups of like-minded individuals enlisting en masse: the 7th battalion Black Watch, recruited from the miners of Fife, is one such example. The recruiting was still

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<sup>555</sup> Minutes of the Glasgow Territorial Force Association. Scottish Record Office. MD 10/8.

<sup>556</sup> Minute Book of the County Association of Lanark. Book #2. Scottish Record Office. MD 2/2.

<sup>557</sup> Minutes of meetings of the Joint Committee of the Counties of Inverness, Ross & Cromarty, and Sutherland, for the purpose of administering Lovat Scouts Yeomanry, various dates 16 March – 21 December 1915. Scottish Record Office. MD 8/38.

<sup>558</sup> Records of the Territorial Force Association of the County of the City of Aberdeen. November 1913 – October 1917. Scottish Record Office. MD 4/2

<sup>559</sup> Nats 1/398.

based on regional loyalty, although manifested in this instance through regimental ties rather than the more localised company or battalion ties. In this way the Pals concept was always present. The Territorial Force, as it stood in August 1914, restricted by its inability to expand beyond its existing perimeters, could never have coped with the initial flood of recruits, but it had served its purpose of creating, and cementing regional loyalty.

On 4 August Dundee saw a crowd of men at the Bell Street Drill Hall but recruiting was restricted, initially at any rate, to those men who had seen previous service.<sup>560</sup> Edinburgh was no different, with enlistment in the local territorial battalions also limited to those with previous service. As well as fulfilling the requirements of previous service recruits were expected to enlist for the normal pre-war period of four years. In Edinburgh large numbers of recruits were being turned away due to lack of previous service: on 6 and 7 August the 6th battalion, Royal Scots accepted just twenty-five recruits while turning away eighty others for that reason.<sup>561</sup> The requirement to sign up for four years was a hindrance to initial territorial recruitment: the extent of new manpower demands was not anticipated by local associations, at least in the initial weeks. The Territorial Associations, while endeavouring to recruit up to establishment, had no precedent as to the numbers required, or as to the speed with which they would be needed: 'a difficulty which presented itself to others, otherwise suitable, was the fact that enlistment for the full period of four years was insisted upon'.<sup>562</sup>

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<sup>560</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 4 August 1914.

<sup>561</sup> *The Scotsman*, 8 August 1914.

<sup>562</sup> *The Scotsman*, 8 August 1914.

In Cupar, Fife, it was reported, as early as 7 August, that 'During the day recruiting could have gone on briskly, but acting on orders from St Andrews, the numbers were restricted, as it was not desired that the strength of the company be exceeded.'<sup>563</sup> Elsewhere in the same county other units were not so restrictive. As early as 10 August there were calls for employers to encourage their workers to enlist in the Territorial Force:

The Territorial Force Association of the County of Perth have asked us to appeal to all loyal subjects of King George to assist in filling the ranks of the Perthshire Territorial units. Landed proprietors, employers of labour, and others can render great service by making it easy for those in their employment to volunteer for service.<sup>564</sup>

The 7th (Territorial) battalion, The Black Watch, which was based and recruited in Fife, had, by 7 August, when it reached its war station, gained some 332 recruits. 'Recruiting was extremely brisk. Men flocked from all parts of the county to join their local battalion, with the result that while the marching-out state, on breaking camp at Monzie, showed a total strength of 570, the corresponding state on the morning after arrival at the war station was 902.'<sup>565</sup>

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<sup>563</sup> *East of Fife Record*, 7 August 1914.

<sup>564</sup> *Dundee advertiser*, 10 August 1914.

<sup>565</sup> A.G. Wauchope, *A History of the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) in the Great War 1914-1918*, Volume Two: *Territorial Force*, p. 241.

Throughout Fife large numbers of recruits were reporting to the drill halls. Mostly from the East Wemyss and Denbeath districts, the recruits were mainly young miners.<sup>566</sup> On 13 September it was reported that in the previous ten days 600 men had enlisted in the local Territorial battalion. However, there was still a call for 400 men for foreign service.<sup>567</sup> By the second week of war the stipulation for full time enrolment and previous service was rescinded, and enlistment was open to all who were physically fit and under the maximum age limit. Scenes at the recruiting stations were chaotic as men were in some instances pressed into joining Territorial battalions under the impression they had enlisted in the New Armies for short-term service.<sup>568</sup>

As late as 8 September only 60 per cent of the 6th battalion, Black Watch had volunteered for foreign service. There seemed to be no difficulty in recruiting for the various home service battalions but there were repeated calls for the corresponding foreign service battalions. That the Territorial Force was seen by many as a short term financial refuge is apparent in this reluctance by many to sign up for foreign service. By 25 August the 4th and 5th battalions, Royal Scots, were recruiting for foreign service only and this was followed on 29 August by the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry and on 4 September by the 6th Battalion, Black Watch. By the end of September in Dundee it was noted that recruits for the 2/4th Black Watch were coming in at approximately twenty-five per day, while recruitment for the New Armies at the same time was approximately four per day.<sup>569</sup> On 10 October the *Dundee Advertiser* noted

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<sup>566</sup> *East of Fife Record*, 14 August 1914.

<sup>567</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 13 September 1914.

<sup>568</sup> W. L. Andrews, *The Haunting Years: The Commentaries of a War Territorial*. p. 12-13.

<sup>569</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 29 September 1914. PRO. Nats 1/398.

that 'No branch of the army has proved a greater attraction to the young men of Dundee and District than the 2nd Highland Brigade of the Royal Field Artillery, and so great has been the response that for the present at any rate recruiting has been suspended, both the ordinary and reserve brigades being full up'.<sup>570</sup>

In Glasgow the call on 7 September was for the 5th battalion, Highland Light Infantry who required 'young men, between 19 and 35', but it was stressed that 'only those willing to go on foreign service will be accepted'. Recruits were advised to attend the Drill Hall, 24 Hill Street, Garnethill.<sup>571</sup> The same newspaper also carried an advertisement for the 9th battalion, but gave a differing age band for the recruits, 19 – 45, and stated the period of service as one year or the duration of the war.<sup>572</sup> Although the Territorial Force did have different criteria from the army as to the height, age and standard of recruits, there was at times confusion between the various Territorial units as to what was acceptable. This led to selectivity among the recruits, with the units offering the most advantageous service conditions finding it relatively easy to recruit up to establishment. On 10 September there was a call from the Territorial Force Association of Glasgow for 2,000 recruits to make up the numbers for foreign service, plus 240 officers and 7,400 men for reserve units (second line).<sup>573</sup> By 10 October, Glasgow was in the throes of a renewed recruitment campaign for the Territorial Force. This was being orchestrated by the Magistrates and the Territorial Force Association, especially in Govan and

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<sup>570</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 10 October 1914.

<sup>571</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 7 September 1914.

<sup>572</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 7 September 1914.

<sup>573</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 10 September 1914.

Partick. Meetings addressed by Lord Strathclyde were arranged nightly for every district in the city, in an effort to raise the thousands required to bring the Glasgow Territorial Force up to the required strength. The recruiting drive did have a positive effect:

There was a quiet day in the city yesterday at the general recruiting offices, the numbers enlisting being 35. At the Territorial Headquarters in the city, however, several hundreds have enrolled as a result of the city recruiting meetings. To complete foreign service units about 650 men are required, while between five and six thousand men are wanted for home service.<sup>574</sup>

Recruits were still needed for foreign service in –

5th Cameronians(Scottish rifles) 251, Hill Street.  
7th Cameronians, Coplaw Street.  
8th Cameronians, 149 Cathedral Street.  
5th H.L.I. 24 Hill Street, Garnethill.  
6th H.L.I. 172 Yorkhill Street, Overnewton.  
7th H.L.I. 69 Main Street, Bridgeton.<sup>575</sup>

By 4 November recruiting for the Territorial Force had slowed and the *Evening Citizen* announced that 'with the prospect of immediate foreign service in the Glasgow Territorial Battalions, officers are at a loss to account for the slow rate of recruiting'.<sup>576</sup> Hindsight suggests that the reason was self-

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<sup>574</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 16 October 1914.

<sup>575</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 20 October 1914.

<sup>576</sup> *Evening Times*, 4 November 1914.

evident. It was probably just as transparent in 1914, but in the climate of the time it was seen as prudent not to acknowledge it.

By 16 October the total strength of the combined foreign and home service units of the Glasgow Territorial Force was 14,467, but this still left a deficit of some 4,663 places to be filled to complete the combined establishment.<sup>577</sup> By 19 November the strength had increased to 14,911, while the deficit had fallen to 4,209.<sup>578</sup> In the same edition there was a renewed call to the young men of Glasgow to enlist in the Territorial Force 'for the honour of Glasgow'. In conjunction with this, the political offices in Glasgow now for the first time agreed to recruit for the Territorial Force as well as the other armed services; hitherto the political offices had recruited for the service battalions only. By 14 November Glasgow had provided some 5,804 Territorials since mobilisation and by mid-November 1914 approximately 450 recruits per week were coming forward for the Territorial Force in Glasgow. Elsewhere, when the 10th battalion, Royal Scots, based in Linlithgow, commenced recruiting for home service at the beginning of October 1914, it was reported that 600 men were raised in only two days.<sup>579</sup>

Kitchener's alleged disregard of territorial troops, if it existed at all, went only as far as practicality allowed and should be viewed purely as a tool of expediency. The new Secretary of State for War, realising that Britain would have to place millions of men in the field, used the best methods at hand;

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<sup>577</sup> *Evening Times*, 13 October 1914.

<sup>578</sup> *Evening Times*, 19 November 1914.

<sup>579</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 12 October 1914.

whatever means would provide the best results. For the infantry, that meant creating the service battalions and limiting the expansion of Territorial battalions. For the cavalry however, Kitchener was quite prepared to utilise the territorial movement by immediately expanding the Scottish Horse to brigade strength. On 7 August, three days after the outbreak of war and only one day after Kitchener's installation in the War Office, he sent for the Marquis of Tullibardine ( the future 8<sup>th</sup> Duke of Atholl). The Marquis, Chairman of the Territorial Association of Perthshire, had served with Kitchener in South Africa, and, after announcing Tullibardine's promotion to Brigadier-General, Kitchener informed him that under his command 'The Scottish Horse was to be expanded to form a full brigade and recruiting was to begin immediately'.<sup>580</sup>

This involved raising two new first line regiments of Scottish Horse to train at Blair Atholl with the nucleus of these two new regiments formed by volunteers from the existing first and second regiments. There would also be, in tandem with this, recruiting for second line regiments, four in all, raising the strength of the Scottish Horse to eight regiments. This reliance on one individual to raise six new regiments was not an ill-judged act by Kitchener. He was placing his faith on a proven entity and not for the first time. As we have seen in Chapter Two, this was the third time that Tullibardine had been asked to raise regiments for the Scottish Horse, and it was on this record that Kitchener was relying. Recruiting for the Scottish Horse before the war had been confined primarily to the Highland District but it was now extended

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<sup>580</sup> Hetherington, S. *Katherine Atholl 1874-1960, Against the Tide*. p 71.

nation-wide. Recruiting for the Yeomanry was primarily rural following the pre-war pattern.

In a series of advertisements the Marquis of Tullibardine announced the type of recruits he required for the new Scottish Horse Brigade: 'I want only good men, strong and healthy countrymen, who can ride a horse if possible, and if they can both ride and shoot, so much the better.'<sup>581</sup> He went on to say that only men 'who have lived a hard country life' were suitable material for the Scottish Horse.<sup>582</sup> Such men, he felt, would be willing to enlist for the duration only. In Dundee, where recruitment for the New Armies had been relatively slow, it was found that 'Since it became known that Lord Tullibardine was forming another regiment of the Scottish Horse a large percentage of the recruits have evinced a desire to attach themselves to this popular corps, but so great has been the rush on the Scottish Horse that general recruiting has been stopped meantime'.<sup>583</sup>

This may have been the only true response to national pride. The rush to enlist in the Scottish Horse could be seen as a call to nationalism and may have been one of the reasons that this particular regiment was chosen over the others with more locally orientated names: a response to country rather than county. Traditionally the Scottish Horse recruited in Aberdeen, Argyll, Elgin, and Perth; the Lothians and Border Horse in Edinburgh, Roxburgh and Berwick; the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry in Dundee, Fife, and Forfarshire; while

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<sup>581</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 11 August 1914.

<sup>582</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 13 August 1914.

<sup>583</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 22 August 1914.

the Lovat Scouts recruited in Inverness, Ross and Cromarty and Sutherland. The noticeable difference in this recruiting pattern was the Lanarkshire Yeomanry (including the Glasgow Yeomanry) which recruited in the industrial heartland of Glasgow and Lanark. Dunbar, Scotland's only cavalry depot, was inundated with recruits for the Scottish Horse in answer to Tullibardine's call for men.

*The Evening Times* of 5 September 1914 tells us that,

In the course of the past week over 1000 recruits drawn from all quarters have presented themselves at the Cavalry Depot at Dunbar, and still there is no indication of diminution in the numbers. Indeed, if anything, they are on the increase. For some days the daily arrivals have averaged about 200. Amongst the local men there has been a very hearty response, and between 30 and 40 have enlisted during the last day or two. Farm servants are also answering the call in large numbers.<sup>584</sup>

This is reflected in the various reports on the State of Employment in the United Kingdom which highlight the reduction of ploughmen in the various agricultural regions. These ploughmen, by nature trained horsemen, were enlisting in the new regiments of the Scottish Horse in large numbers. The rapid response to the call by Tullibardine led, in some areas, to a large-scale shortage of such men. Recruiting was so brisk that the 3rd Scottish Horse

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<sup>584</sup> *Evening Times*, 5 September 1914.

was raised in only one week.<sup>585</sup> Tullibardine was quick to point out that 'the service abroad will not be immediate, and adequate time will be given to afford the men the fullest training'.<sup>586</sup> Tullibardine took assistance wherever he could find it and on 25 September in an advertisement in the Scottish press he announced that he would like to 'take this opportunity of thanking the Freemasons of Scotland for the assistance they have given me in many directions'.<sup>587</sup> If, as we have seen in previous chapters, those Cameron Highlander battalions raised in 1914 by Lochiel could be viewed as locally raised and might conceivably fall under the umbrella of Pals' battalions, then so too could those regiments of the Scottish Horse raised by Tullibardine.

By April 1915, when the third-line Yeomanry units were being formed advertisements for recruits were announcing that no knowledge of riding was now needed: the supply of trained horsemen was limited and slowing down. The State of Employment report of April 1915 states that, within agriculture, 'the chief difficulty up to the present has been the supply of horsemen'. Those counties which suffered most from this shortage were Inverness, Nairn, Kincardine, Fife, Stirling, Edinburgh, Dumfries, and Ayr. In tandem with this shortage of men, areas such as Roxburgh, Selkirk, and Peebles also experienced a shortage of horses due to the War Office commandeering them. This in turn led to the enlistment of those horsemen thrown out of work. By July 1915 the shortage of horsemen had spread to Perth, Lanark, Elgin, Banff, and Berwick, and by October 1915 was so severe that in many areas,

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<sup>585</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 2 September 1914.

<sup>586</sup> *Evening Times*, 11 August 1914.

<sup>587</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 25 September 1914.

including Aberdeen, Elgin, and Nairn, farmers were unable to plough sufficient land.

With the continuing manpower demands from the army, the reduced enlistment rate after the highs of 1914, and the advent of static warfare, it was decided that yeomanry regiments should be utilised for other roles. In 1915 the Ayrshire Yeomanry was dismounted and formed, along with the Lanarkshire Yeomanry, into the 12th (Ayr & Lanark Yeomanry) battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers. At the same time the Lothians and Border Horse Yeomanry were also dismounted and joined the 17th Royal Scots (this was a Pals' bantam battalion) as infantry. The Queen's Own Royal Glasgow Yeomanry assumed an infantry role as part of the Scottish Rifles (Cameronians). In 1916 the first and second regiments of the Scottish Horse dismounted and became 13th (Scottish Horse) battalion, The Black Watch, while the third regiment of the Scottish Horse became two companies in the Lovat Scouts battalion of the Cameron highlanders. At the same time the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry converted to infantry as the 14th (Fife and Forfar Yeomanry) battalion, The Black Watch and the Lovat Scouts were employed in an infantry role as snipers and observers.

**Fig 7:1 Weekly Territorial Force recruitment in Scotland,  
October 1914 –December 1915.**




Figure 7:1 shows the pattern of Territorial Force recruitment in Scotland from the end of October 1914 until the end of December 1915, when direct recruitment into the Territorial Force ended. It shows the distinctive recruitment pattern of the agricultural hiring cycle. The week ending 11 November 1914, the period of the Scottish regional hiring fairs, shows a 60 per cent increase in Territorial recruitment over the previous week; 4,412 compared to 1,794. This was the highest weekly figure recorded for Scottish Territorial recruitment. The week ending 2 June 1915, the next period when agricultural contracts were up for renewal, produced the second highest Scottish recruiting figure of 3,046 for the Territorial Force. By the week ending 3 November 1915 the figure was once again at a six month high of 2,218. The figures were reduced each time for the simple reason that, with no economic encouragement to recruit, it was only those agricultural workers who chose to serve that came forward. With a finite number of workers within the military

age group the pool of available, and more importantly, willing, agricultural recruits continually reduced. This number would naturally decrease over time as those replacement workers who entered agriculture were obviously not inclined to enlist. The pattern of recruitment clearly shows that, for agricultural workers at least, the unit of choice was the Territorial Force, and more specifically the mounted Yeomanry. In support of the idea that the three peaks of Territorial recruitment coincide with the agricultural cycle, the lowest periods of recruitment come in the months prior to the hiring fairs; March and September 1915.

We have seen in Chapter Two that the Territorial Force was the military arm of choice in pre-war Scotland, and that rural Scotland produced a high proportion of recruits. It should be no surprise therefore that Territorial recruitment in Scotland in the voluntary period followed the same pattern. Ninety-nine Territorial battalions were raised in Scotland from the outbreak of war until direct recruitment for the Territorial Force was stopped in December 1915. Coupled with the pre-war Scottish Territorial short-fall of 12,961 men, who were the Territorial Force's initial recruits, and the increase in the Scottish Horse and the various Territorial support units, this gives a figure of some 115,536 Territorial Force recruits for the seventeen-month period, or some 38.2 per cent of all Scottish recruitment in this period and 15.9 per cent of all United Kingdom Territorial recruitment.<sup>588</sup> By 31 March 1915, Scotland's Territorial Forces had enrolled 69,247 men out of a United Kingdom total of 421,207, 16.4 per cent. These figures rose by 30 June 1915 to 87,214

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<sup>588</sup> NATS 1/399.

Scottish recruits, 15.6 per cent of the national figure of 557,462. By 4 August 1915, after one year of war, with a United Kingdom total of 585,957 recruits, the Territorial Force in Scotland, with 91,960 recruits accounted for 15.6 percent of the national total.<sup>589</sup>

**FIG 7:2 2nd and 3rd line Territorial battalions raised in Scotland during the war.**<sup>590</sup>

Royal Scots – 14

Royal Scots Fusiliers – 6

Highland Light Infantry – 15

Cameron Highlanders – 3

Seaforth Highlanders – 9

Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders – 14

Gordon Highlanders – 13

Cameronians – 10

King's Own Scottish Borderers – 4

The Black Watch – 11

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<sup>589</sup> NATS 1/399.

<sup>590</sup> NATS 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.

**FIG 7:3 Scottish monthly Territorial Recruitment August  
1914 - December 1915.<sup>591</sup>**




Figure 7:3 displays the trend in monthly Territorial recruitment in Scotland for the seventeen month voluntary period. It clearly shows the drop in recruitment in late February and March 1915 when the terms of enlistment for the Territorial Force were changed to reduce the number of men enlisting for home service. From March 1915 all recruits for the Territorial Force were enrolled for 'General Service' only. The chart also clearly shows the increase in numbers in November 1914 and May 1915 when Scotland's agricultural workers enlisted.

<sup>591</sup> NATS 1/398. 1/399.

	Perth	Ft George	Inverness	Aberdeen	Stirling	Dundee	GlencorseAyr	Berwick	Hamilton	Glasgow	Edinburgh	Total
Aug-14	1875	829	298	1632	1597	824	203	869	209	421	2098	1691
Sep-14	2019	1132	475	1879	1795	1198	310	921	359	656	2657	1583
Oct-14	1786	573	243	938	894	495	189	373	412	397	1561	1472
Nov-14	2625	632	284	829	932	243	219	442	521	598	1679	1731
Dec-14	1732	765	232	831	927	282	204	396	497	510	1732	1784
Total 1914	10037	3931	1532	6109	6145	3042	1125	3001	1998	2582	9727	8261
Jan-15	702	344	144	570	424	303	84	328	322	242	1083	973
Feb-15	425	219	139	436	360	335	33	109	18	87	497	372
Mar-15	398	230	135	511	381	351	45	127	27	91	523	389
Apr-15	720	269	161	601	399	345	65	126	34	129	610	514
May-15	1081	494	189	1239	544	379	142	158	160	227	1401	1079
Jun-15	927	347	176	1097	528	358	112	142	147	235	1327	991
Jul-15	810	342	199	424	429	319	82	193	133	158	1533	735
Aug-15	601	345	187	583	401	319	86	219	44	156	1875	471
Sep-15	557	251	201	524	368	297	69	187	61	142	1621	308
Oct-15	558	301	194	313	337	291	80	197	72	135	1706	425
Nov-15	769	542	486	246	387	184	83	84	124	264	1104	418
Dec-15	724	401	339	287	351	171	74	101	110	221	1023	504
Total 1915	8272	4085	2550	6831	4909	3652	955	1971	1252	2087	14303	7179
TOTAL	18309	8016	4082	12940	11054	6694	2080	4972	3250	4669	24030	115536

FIG 7:4 Scottish territorial recruitment August 1914 - December 1915 Regimental Recruiting Areas<sup>592</sup>

<sup>592</sup> NATS 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.

## Regimental Recruiting Areas

The Regimental Recruiting Areas corresponded to the thirteen pre-war recruiting areas which comprised Scottish Command, as described in Chapters Two and Five.

By the end of December 1914, 48 per cent of those enlisting in the Perth recruiting area, 10,037, had done so in the Territorial Force. The figure remained relatively steady for 1915 and by the end of the voluntary period 48.6 per cent of recruits in the area, 18,309 in all, had opted for the Territorials. Fort George and Inverness had exceptionally high Territorial figures for both 1914 and 1915. In 1914, 81 per cent of those enlisting in Fort George, a total of 3,931, did so for the Territorial force and 78.8 per cent of those enlisting in Inverness, 1,532, did so. The percentage figure for Fort George stayed pretty much the same for 1915 with 8,016 recruits, representing 80.4 per cent enlisting for the Territorials. Inverness increased to 83.2 per cent, 4,082 Territorial recruits for the entire voluntary period. Aberdeen remained relatively constant with 6,109 recruits enlisting in the Territorials in 1914, 63 per cent of those enlisting in the area. This increased only slightly to 66.4 per cent by the end of the voluntary period, although the number of Territorial recruits for the area had increased to 12,940. The percentage of recruits in the Stirling recruiting area opting for the Territorial Force remained constant throughout the voluntary period.<sup>593</sup>

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<sup>593</sup> NATS 1/399.

In 1914 there were 6,145 recruits, 38.5 per cent of total regional recruitment, and by the end of the voluntary period the proportion choosing the Territorials stood at 38.8 per cent, 11,054 men in all. Dundee saw a reduction in the percentage of recruits choosing the Territorial Force. In 1914 63.2 per cent of regional recruits, 3,042 men, had chosen that branch but the proportion had dropped to 50.7 per cent, 6,694 recruits, by December 1915. In 1914 17.2 per cent of those enlisting in Glencorse, 1,125, chose to do so for the Territorials. By December 1915 the figures stood at 2,080 recruits, 22 per cent. The figures for Ayr stood at 3,001 recruits, 38 per cent in 1914 and 4,972 recruits, 38 per cent by the end of 1915. Berwick stood at 1,998 recruits, 41 per cent, by December 1914 and 3,250 recruits, 35.8 per cent, by December 1915. 14.5 per cent of those enlisting in Hamilton in 1914 chose to do so in the Territorials. By December 1915 the figures for Hamilton stood at 4,669 recruits, 16.3 per cent. Glasgow provided 9,727 recruits for the Territorial Force in 1914, 21.7 per cent of those enlisting in the area. By December 1915 the figures stood at 24,030 recruits, 28.8 per cent of the total recruitment figure for the area. Edinburgh provided 8,261 recruits for the Territorials in 1914, 37.7 per cent of those who enlisted in the area. By the end of the voluntary period the figures stood at 15,440 recruits, 34.6 per cent. In total 35.5 per cent of Scotland's recruits in 1914, 57,490 men, enlisted in the Territorial Force. By December 1915 the figures for the Territorial Force stood at 115,536 recruits, 38.2 per cent of the total who came forward to enlist in Scotland.<sup>594</sup>

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<sup>594</sup> NATS 1/399.

The Perth recruiting area had, by December 1915, contributed 18,309 recruits, 31.3 per cent of the recruiting area male population, for the Territorial force. Berwick contributed 3,250 which, although considerably lower than Perth, was, never the less, 23 per cent of the male population. Stirling contributed 11,054 recruits, 13.4 per cent of males; Inverness provided 4,082 recruits, 9.6 per cent; Aberdeen raised 12,940 recruits, 8.8 per cent; Edinburgh contributed 15,440 recruits, 6.5 per cent; Dundee provided 6,694 men, 5.3 per cent; Ayr provided 4,972 recruits, 3.8 per cent, and Glasgow, with the highest number of recruits for the Territorial Force 24,030 gave the lowest proportion of the recruiting area male population, 3.3 per cent. This followed the pre-war trend in Territorial recruitment as discussed in Chapter Two. Proportionally the densely populated cities gave less than the manpower-denuded rural hinterland. In the rural areas the Territorial Force was still, despite the urgency of war, the military arm of choice.<sup>595</sup>

Figure 7:5 shows the cumulative monthly increase in recruitment from Scotland while at the same time showing the reduction in the percentage increase in monthly recruitment. It shows that recruitment dropped over time. There was an increase of over 119 per cent between August and September 1914 but this had dropped to 3.87 per cent between November and December 1915.

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<sup>595</sup> NATS 1/399.

**Fig 7:5 Decreasing monthly recruitment rate for Territorial Force in Scotland August 1914 - December 1915.<sup>596</sup>**

	<b>Cumulative monthly increase</b>	<b>Monthly percentage increase</b>
<b>August</b>	12546	
<b>September</b>	27530	119.43
<b>October</b>	36863	33.9
<b>November</b>	47598	29.12
<b>December</b>	57490	20.78
<b>January</b>	63009	9.59
<b>February</b>	66039	4.8
<b>March</b>	69247	4.85
<b>April</b>	73220	5.73
<b>May</b>	80313	9.68
<b>June</b>	86700	7.95
<b>July</b>	92057	6.17
<b>August</b>	97344	5.74
<b>September</b>	101930	4.71
<b>October</b>	106539	4.52
<b>November</b>	111230	4.4
<b>December</b>	115536	3.87

Despite Kitcheners much publicised reluctance to use the Territorial Force for the purpose intended by Haldane, to support and reinforce the Regular Army, the Territorial Force nevertheless fulfilled a vital role in attracting those who, for one reason or another, felt unable to enlist in the New Armies. It was able to draw on the pre-war trend and provide an avenue for rural recruitment. By focusing on regional and local loyalties, it was in its own way as much a 'Pals' system as the civic raised units. The Territorial Force in Scotland, more than any other branch of the armed services, truly represented the civilian in war.

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<sup>596</sup> NATS 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.

## CHAPTER 8

### NAVAL RECRUITMENT

In 1914 Britain was the prime naval power, a position reflected in the test mobilisation of the Home Fleet in the early days of July and the Royal Review at Spithead. The trust placed in the strength of the Home Fleet was evident in its size, some 493 ships of all classes. The list included 55 battleships, 20 armoured cruisers, 45 cruisers, 187 destroyers and 59 submarines. The object of this test mobilisation was to determine the readiness of the fleet for war and to this end every crew had been brought up to full strength. However there was no sense of urgency in the exercise and no sense that the fleet was expecting war with Germany in the immediate future. Indeed, sections of the British fleet had left Kiel only on 30 June, while at the same time a British squadron, led by Rear-Admiral Sir David Beatty, was visiting St Petersburg. In July it was also reported that the Mediterranean Fleet was sailing for Alexandretta, while by contrast German naval units were visiting the naval base at Scapa Flow. However, despite the lack of apparent urgency, the navy was still preparing for imminent war.

In 1913 there were some 17,968 recruits for the Royal Navy, 15,844 naval ratings and 2,124 marines. The Royal Navy had not suffered from the downturn in recruitment affecting the pre-war army, on the contrary recruiting for the Royal Navy had increased by 27 per cent over the previous year.<sup>590</sup> To

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<sup>590</sup> Navy estimates, 1914-1915. HMSO Cd 7302.

some the thought of service in the navy was still more socially acceptable than service in the army. The calling out of the Naval Reserve affected nowhere as much as the islands of Scotland, with reports of 'much commotion in Lewis' where approximately 2,000 fishermen, 'practically the entire manhood of the island', was in the reserve.<sup>591</sup> In addition to those islanders in the reserve, there were several hundred employed building the new Rosyth Naval Base.<sup>592</sup>

As early as 5 August 1914 maps of the North Sea were printed in the regional press in the expectation of a great naval battle which, it was confidently predicted, would quickly end the war. Indeed, readers were told that 'There is every likelihood that the North Sea will soon witness great naval battles'.<sup>593</sup> It was anticipated that the full might of the British Home Fleet would be the decisive factor in bringing Germany to heel. The *Dundee Advertiser* on 4 August had declared 'Let us hasten to meet the fleet of the Emperor William and pulverise it. If we manage to destroy the much vaunted battleships of the Fatherland we shall have a chance of enjoying security and peace for the next 50 years'.<sup>594</sup>

T. J. Macnamary, Secretary to the Admiralty, announced on 5 August 1914, in the Navy Supplementary Estimate for 1914-15, that the navy would require an additional 67,000 officers and men for the year ending 31 March 1915, giving

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<sup>591</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 3 August 1914.

<sup>592</sup> *Glasgow Herald*, 3 August 1914.

<sup>593</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 5 August 1914.

<sup>594</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 4 August 1914.

a revised total for the navy of 218,000. There was a call on 7 August for additional men and on 8 August the supplementary naval estimates were confirmed, placing the required number of officers and men at 218,000.<sup>595</sup> The upper age limit for enlistment into the navy was changed on 12 August when it was announced that re-enlistment would be open for those up to the age of 55 if they had not been out of the service for more than five years and if they were thought to be of 'good character'.<sup>596</sup>

On Monday 17 August, there appeared a list of the Royal Naval Offices in Scotland which were open to receive recruits. These were at 392 Argyle Street, Glasgow; 13 Watt Street, Greenock; 8 Johnston Terrace, Edinburgh; 25 Morgan Street, Dundee; 46 Marshall Street, Aberdeen; 15 Young Street, Inverness; and 121 Queen Street, Dumfries. However, the following day, 18 August, the Royal Navy was turning away recruits, declaring that they were only enlisting for the Royal Naval Light Infantry. As with recruiting for the New Armies there appeared to be a certain amount of confusion regarding the manpower needs of the service.

Scotland's fishermen were quick to enlist in the navy and stay as crew on their own vessels and every vessel which was in an efficient and seaworthy condition was taken over, in many cases with the whole of the crew. As early as 4 August it was reported that no fewer than 65 trawlers from Aberdeen had transferred fully manned to minesweeping or mine laying duties.<sup>597</sup>

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<sup>595</sup> *The Scotsman*, 8 August 1914.

<sup>596</sup> *The Scotsman*, 12 August 1914. p. 6.

<sup>597</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 24 August 1914.

The navy, unlike the army, was limited in the number of men that it could absorb. It required men only as new ships entered service and those men were already available in large numbers in the reserve forces. If a vessel was sunk or damaged, in most cases the crew, those who remained or were rescued, became surplus bodies, adding to the navy's pool of reserves. The use of trawlers, on the other hand, utilised both the vessels and the crews. This allowed the navy to gain experienced crews and the men to gain employment, again not through choice but through economic necessity.<sup>598</sup> The allowances for those choosing this course of action were greater than for service in the army. Skippers would be paid 9/- per day plus a clothing allowance, secondhands and enginemen would receive 6/- per day, and deckhands would be paid 3/- 6d per day.<sup>599</sup> The collapse of the fishing industry had a knock-on effect on recruitment. In Buckie, with the early restrictions on fishing, Petty Officer Harper, by 19 October, secured 333 recruits for the navy, practically all the eligible young men in the town.<sup>600</sup> Hundreds of shore-based support workers were also now unemployed (net makers, fish curers, etc.) but as 'landlubbers' they were more inclined to enlist in the army and Territorial Force. It is estimated that by mid-November 1914 around 8,500 fishermen were serving aboard converted steam trawlers on minesweeping duty, or in the navy itself.<sup>601</sup>

On 21 August 1914, Sir Ralph Anstruther published an article in the *East of*

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<sup>598</sup> D. Jones, *Rural Scotland*. p. 32-7.

<sup>599</sup> *The Evening Times*, 21 August 1914.

<sup>600</sup> *Evening Citizen*, 20 October 1914.

<sup>601</sup> D. Jones, *Rural Scotland*. p. 5.

*Fife Record* describing the benefits that fishermen could gain from this period of enforced unemployment and reminding them that this was an ideal opportunity to enlist in the Naval Reserve. 'It is very gratifying to learn that at meetings of fishermen that were held on Monday, following those of Saturday, quite a large number of lads and young men in Cellerdyke and St Monans expressed their willingness to volunteer for the Royal Naval Reserve, so as to get their period of training carried through during the present dislocation of the fishing industry.'

Sir Ralph went on to explain that, 'Apart from the patriotic aspect of their action, which is highly to be praised, there is the practical advantage of their securing occupation, livelihood, and experience during this Autumn'. This was a direct call to the practicalities of economic necessity. Sir Ralph continued,

Hitherto, the obstacle to our young fishermen joining the Royal Naval Reserve has been the difficulty of giving up a period of three and a half months on end for their first training. The present crisis seems to have provided the opportunity for them to do this, as, whatever may be the restrictions for the time being upon the operations of our fishing fleet, it is quite clear that only a small proportion of the boats will be able to get to the fishing regularly for at least several months.<sup>602</sup>

Sir Ralph was keen to stress that enlistment in the reserve would ease their financial problems over the winter months, especially as the wages, at 1/5d

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<sup>602</sup> *East of Fife Record*. 21 August 1914.

per day, were higher than those being offered for the infantry. His article went on to explain that their future commitment would be for only twenty-eight days every second year at a season to be chosen by the recruits themselves. Sir Ralph was taking this opportunity to look to the long-term, beyond the war. Service now would give fishermen a supplementary income in the future. The war, he was implying, was an opportunity to take advantage of the initial training period.

From 18 June to 8 July 1913, a battalion of Royal Marines underwent training at Aldershot, attached to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade, while in the same year a combined force of army and Royal Marines took part in the naval manoeuvres. The experience was seen to be of 'great value' and offered the potential of future cross service co-operation.<sup>603</sup>

There was in existence a pre-war plan, prepared at the insistence of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which called for the formation, on the outbreak of war, of a force of Royal Marines to operate under the direction of the Admiralty. This force was to be known as the Advanced Base Force, with the objective being the 'seizure, fortification, or protection of any temporary Naval Bases which might be necessary to the employment of the fleet, or the provision of an army in the field'.<sup>604</sup> The force was to consist of a Royal

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<sup>603</sup> Navy Estimates, 1914-1915. HMSO Cd 7302.

<sup>604</sup> *Royal Naval Division*. p. 2.

Marine Brigade of four battalions, one from each of the existing Royal Marine Light Infantry divisions and one from the depot of the Royal Marine Artillery.

On 16 August the Admiralty decided to strengthen the existing Advanced Base Force by adding two brigades of Naval Reservists. To this effect it was announced that 'In order to make the best possible use of the surplus naval reservists of different classes, it is proposed to constitute permanent cadres of one marine and two naval brigades'.<sup>605</sup> It was intended as a stopgap, to utilise the surplus reservists, but only as long as 'the needs arising out of the military situation were more urgent than the requirements of the Fleet'.<sup>606</sup> The two naval brigades were to comprise four battalions each, 880 men per battalion, organised into double companies of 220 men. It was decided that the composition of each battalion should be 375 Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve; 315 Royal Fleet Reserve; 190 Royal Naval Reserve (under thirty years of age). The total numbers required for the two naval brigades would therefore be 3,000 Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve; 2,500 Royal Fleet Reserve; 1,300 Royal Naval Reserve. By late August the War Office was 'pressing the Admiralty to accept for service (in the Naval Brigades) some thousands of the recruits whom the army could neither train or equip'.<sup>607</sup> With the army recruiting offices overrun and unable to cope with the number of recruits for Kitchener's New Armies the recruiting needs of the naval brigades were seen as one way to reduce the overflow of army recruits. The make-up

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<sup>605</sup> Extracts from minutes of First Lord of the Admiralty, 16 August 1914, governing the formation of the Royal Naval Division.

<sup>606</sup> *Royal Naval Division*. p. 2.

<sup>607</sup> *Royal Naval Division*. P. 3.

of the naval division changed after the debacle of Antwerp, when only five of the eight naval battalions remained in various states. The depot at Crystal Palace was expected to reinforce those battalions and at the same time provide three new battalions and three reserve battalions. While the original battalions had comprised, in the main, serving personnel of one type or another, the new replacements were wartime volunteers.

On Thursday 24 September advertisements for the Royal Naval Brigade were published, with the Scottish regional press announcing that 'Recruits are wanted for the Naval Brigade which has been formed for service on the continent in conjunction with Kitchener's army. No Sea Experience is Necessary'.<sup>608</sup>

A meeting in Dundee at the end of September 1914 was addressed by the Marquis of Graham, Commander RNVR, in his capacity as the Officer Commanding, the Scottish Division of the Royal Naval Reserve, at which he stated that 'so far as the navy was concerned, their men-of-war were fully commissioned, while in their naval dockyards and naval barracks there were thousands of seamen and gunners who had been trained as reserves to make good any loss or wastage of men in battle groups. There was therefore no necessity for more men to serve in the fleet'.<sup>609</sup> He went on to say that a Naval Brigade should be raised for service in Europe. Lieutenant Godfrey P. Collins, M.P. appealed at the same meeting for a company of men to be

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<sup>608</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 24 September 1914.

<sup>609</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 28 September 1914.

raised for the Naval Brigade. Six new district companies, one each in Aberdeen, Dundee, Clyde and Edinburgh and two in the Moray Firth, the latter designed to capitalise on the slackness of the fishing industry in that region, were to be formed.<sup>610</sup> On 30 September 174 men left Dundee for the Crystal Palace and the Naval Brigade, with another 48 following on 8 October.<sup>611</sup>

On 19 October a request for recruits for the Naval Brigade placed the age limit as 18-40, thereby taking recruits who were too young and too old for the New Armies. The chest measurement was placed at 34" , pretty much in line with army requirements, while the height limit was set at 5' 3", taking advantage of the fluctuating army height limits. Thus the Naval Brigade widened the scope for potential recruits and to a certain extent avoided encroaching on military territory by taking those recruits unsuitable for the army. It is conceivable that this low height requirement served to restrict the number of recruits available for the bantam battalions in Scotland in 1915. At the same time it was also announced that 'during the past 18 days hundreds of recruits have left Scotland to join the Naval Brigade at the Crystal Palace depot'.<sup>612</sup> In tandem with this *The Scotsman* announced that '700 recruits, of whom several hundreds are from the north, have been dispatched from Scotland to join the Naval Brigade'.<sup>613</sup> It was subsequently decided to

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<sup>610</sup> *The Scotsman*, 6 October 1914.

<sup>611</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 1 October 1914. 8 October 1914.

<sup>612</sup> *Evening Times*, 19 October 1914.

<sup>613</sup> *The Scotsman*, 19 October 1914.

increase the recruiting effort for the brigade, and to try and 'raise fully 2,000 recruits in Glasgow and district'.<sup>614</sup>

In an effort to provide these recruits Lieutenant Collins M.P. addressed a lunchtime meeting in the Singer Factory at Clydebank. He reminded the employees that 'They had lived together and had worked together, and why not join together and serve together'.<sup>615</sup> There was an attempt in the following week to raise over 2,000 men in the Glasgow district alone and it was a nightly sight to see small groups of men leaving for the Crystal Palace.

The Naval Brigade continued its direct approach to recruitment when Lieutenant Collins MP, held recruiting rallies outside the Clydeside shipyards as the workers finished their shift, or, if that was not enough, inside the shipyards during meal breaks. As part of his recruitment drive the Marquis of Graham spoke in Glasgow at the end of October and told the assembled crowd that the war would last for one or two years, and would 'certainly go on longer than some people thought'.<sup>616</sup> Recruits for the brigade were coming in fast, and in the third week of October some 200 joined in Glasgow and 150 from the Moray Firth and the East Coast towns. By 24 October 1,500 men had enlisted in Glasgow for the Naval Brigade but more were required to reach the proposed level of 2,100

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<sup>614</sup> *The Scotsman*, 19 October 1914.

<sup>615</sup> *Evening Times*, 21 October 1914.

<sup>616</sup> *Evening Times*, 21 October 1914.

FIG 8:1 1915 recruiting poster for the Royal Naval Division, outlining the terms and conditions..

# ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION

## HANDYMEN TO FIGHT ON LAND & SEA

### 1<sup>ST</sup> BRIGADE

BATTALIONS:

**"BENBOW"**  
**"COLLINGWOOD"**  
**"HAWKE"**  
**"DRAKE"**

### RECRUITS WANTED



### 2<sup>ND</sup> BRIGADE

BATTALIONS:

**"HOWE"**  
**"HOOD"**  
**"ANSON"**  
**"NELSON"**

### RECRUITS WANTED

VACANCIES FOR RECRUITS BETWEEN THE AGES OF **18** AND **38**  
 CHEST MEASUREMENT, 34 · HEIGHT, 5 FT. 3 ½ IN.  
 PAYMENT From 1/3 per day. · **FAMILY ALLOWANCES**  
 Besides serving in the above Battalions and for the Transport and Engineer Sections attached.

## MEN WANTED

who are suitable for Training as Wireless Operators, Signalmen and other Service with the Fleet.

Apply to The Recruiting Office, 112 Strand, London, W.C.

J. MILES & CO. Printers, 6092, Wandsworth Street, London, W.

The Glasgow Joint Political Recruiting Committee organised a series of meetings and rallies to increase recruiting and the last in the series was held on 31 October 1914. By this time Scotland as a whole had provided over 2,000 recruits for the Naval Brigade. Recruits for the Naval Brigade were also for the first time being enrolled in Glasgow at the political offices, previously the sole domain of the army.<sup>617</sup> By 4 November recruitment had widened to all Scottish political offices, not just those in Glasgow. On 17 November a detachment of recruits for the Naval Brigade left Aberdeen for London, bringing the total from that city to date to 600 from the start of recruitment. These men were accompanied by another 45 from the Moray Firth ports, with the local press announcing that 'much of the strength of Mr Churchill's Naval Brigade has been drawn from the ranks of the sturdy fishermen on the Moray Firth.'<sup>618</sup>

In early January 1915 the majority of the recruits from Aberdeen were choosing the Naval Brigade. For the first six days of 1915, Aberdeen produced 150 men for the brigade, thirty-five for the army and only thirty for the Territorial Force.<sup>619</sup> By May 1915, recruitment for the Naval Brigade was highly organised and aimed at Scotland's smaller towns and rural communities: areas with no direct connection with the sea and where recruits might be enticed by the adventure of the unknown. Scotland's Music Halls showed a selection of films on Royal Naval Division training, accompanied with speeches and music. By this time (May 1915) over 5,000 men had been

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<sup>617</sup> *Evening Times*, 31 October 1914.

<sup>618</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 17 November 1914.

<sup>619</sup> *Dundee Advertiser*, 7 January 1915.

sent from Scotland. The rates of pay were higher than the infantry, for what was essentially an infantry job, and this was incentive enough for many. Recruits were paid 1s 3d per day on enlistment, 1s 8d after three months training, and 6d extra field money. Wives received 6s per week, 4s for the first child, 3s for the second, and 2s for the third.<sup>620</sup>

Figures for naval recruitment for the duration of the war :-

England	58,643
Scotland	5,653
Ireland`	1,152
Wales	3,654
Total	68,643 <sup>621</sup>

Of those recruited into the Royal Navy during the war, 8.2 per cent enlisted in Scotland, 5,653 men out of a total of 68,643. The Royal Navy did not suffer, and was not hampered by, the type of manpower shortages affecting the army. The Royal Navy entered the war with a manpower surplus and the only need for recruits was for the newly created Naval Brigade, an extension of the pre-war Naval Light Infantry. In August 1914 the navy was at full strength with full reserves and, more importantly, once engaged in wartime service did not suffer the same scale of manpower losses as the army, it did not have a high rate of manpower wastage, and consequently recruitment rates reflect this.

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<sup>620</sup> *Forfar Herald and Kirriemuir Advertiser*, 7 May 1915.

<sup>621</sup> Nats 1/401.

## **CHAPTER 9**

### **RECRUITMENT (Overview)**

In chapters five, six, and seven we have looked at recruiting as it relates to individual groups or branches of the military: New Armies, Territorial Force, and Pals' Battalions. This section brings them together and presents recruitment in Scotland as a total package; combining and comparing Territorial and Army recruitment in order to give a general overview.

In the seventeen month voluntary period the manpower contributions from the thirteen Scottish regimental recruiting areas varied widely. As could be expected Glasgow, with its high reserves of industrial manpower, provided the highest percentage of Scottish recruitment, 83,318 recruits, 26.6 per cent of the national total. Edinburgh, providing 44,559 recruits, 14.76 per cent, was closely followed by Perth with 37,628 recruits, 12.47 per cent of the Scottish total. Hamilton, with two regimental recruiting areas, provided 28,627 recruits, 9.48 per cent; Stirling 28,452 recruits, 9.42 per cent; Aberdeen 19,480 recruits, 6.45 per cent; Dundee 13,199 recruits, 4.37 per cent. Ayr provided 13,044 recruits, 4.32 per cent; Fort George 9,962 recruits, 3.3 per cent; Glencorse 9,503 recruits, 3.15 per cent; Berwick 9,079 recruits, 3 per cent; and Inverness with 4,903 recruits, 1.62 per cent of the Scottish total.

	Perth	Ft George	Inverness	Aberdeen	Stirling	Dundee	Glencorse	Ayr	Berwick	Hamilton	Glasgow	Edinburgh	TOTAL
Aug-14	4612	1000	436	2512	5298	1261	1102	2314	767	5025	10730	5081	40138
Sep-14	5807	1465	619	2404	6145	1694	3416	3555	1391	7893	17890	5976	58255
Oct-14	3197	676	264	1095	1559	761	414	530	696	949	6560	3047	19748
Nov-14	4665	855	307	2664	1217	619	937	871	1217	2614	5744	3396	25106
Dec-14	2579	845	317	1015	1715	471	674	636	784	1282	3933	4384	18635
Total 1914	20860	4841	1943	9690	15934	4806	6543	7906	4855	17763	44857	21884	161882
Jan-15	2179	529	171	846	2063	928	727	897	819	1847	4282	2565	17853
Feb-15	1111	311	167	782	928	554	187	426	279	567	1801	1379	8492
Mar-15	945	277	164	978	1082	696	215	342	207	696	3621	2216	11439
Apr-15	1350	331	205	970	1047	778	210	359	205	794	2609	1880	10738
May-15	2199	567	223	1451	1443	845	278	460	492	1183	3792	2846	15779
Jun-15	1723	405	217	1233	1203	676	268	494	416	1321	3825	2606	14387
Jul-15	1314	398	220	548	964	503	209	357	338	1129	3299	1680	10959
Aug-15	1172	402	219	828	1032	775	188	429	233	1156	4189	1397	12020
Sep-15	1022	287	233	620	683	540	124	288	193	523	2565	1140	8218
Oct-15	1181	442	228	464	442	781	168	461	237	504	3175	1826	9909
Nov-15	1647	692	535	644	1026	1053	253	444	569	715	3444	2068	13090
Dec-15	925	480	378	426	605	264	133	181	236	429	1859	1072	6988
Total 1915	16768	5121	2960	9790	12518	8393	2960	5138	4224	10864	38461	22675	139872
TOTAL	37628	9962	4903	19480	28452	13199	9503	13044	9079	28627	83318	44559	301754

Fig 9:1 Total recruitment in Scotland August 1914 -December 1915 Scottish Regimental Recruiting Areas.<sup>622</sup>

<sup>622</sup> NATS 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.

With a total recruitment figure of 301,754 recruits in Scotland in the seventeen months of the voluntary period, table 9:1 shows us that there were 22,010 more recruits in the five months of 1914 than in the twelve months of 1915, 15.73 per cent higher. This higher level of recruitment in the relatively shorter period of war in 1914 serves to confirm the opinion in Chapter Five ( boom and bust) that Scotland's manpower contribution was significantly greater in the initial months than in the longer term.

**FIG 9:2 Industrial and agricultural recruitment,<sup>623</sup>**

<b>Industrial Areas</b>	<b>Recruits</b>	<b>Rural Areas</b>	<b>Recruits</b>
<b>Glasgow</b>	83318	<b>Berwick</b>	9079
<b>Edinburgh</b>	44559	<b>Fort George</b>	9962
<b>Hamilton</b>	28627	<b>Inverness</b>	4903
<b>Total</b>	156504	<b>Total</b>	23944
	<b>51.8%</b>		<b>7.93%</b>

Table 9:2 is a comparison of the different recruitment levels between the three Regimental Recruiting Areas which constituted the main Scottish industrial regions and the three recruiting areas which comprise those Scottish regions which are most recognised as primarily agricultural. The figures support the conclusions in Chapter Three that Scotland's industrial workforce provided a disproportionate level of manpower for the armed forces which in turn supports the conclusion that economic factors, while not the only

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<sup>623</sup> NATS 1/399.

motivating factor, were still the principal incentive for Scotland's working classes. Table 9:2 shows that only three industrial regions provided over 50 per cent of Scotland's recruits while the three regions most closely associated with agriculture provided less than 8 per cent.

**FIG 9:3 East / West comparison.**<sup>624</sup>

<b>East Coast</b>	<b>Recruits</b>	<b>West Coast</b>	<b>Recruits</b>
Perth	37628	Glasgow	83318
Edinburgh	44559	Stirling	22452
Aberdeen	19480	Fort George	9962
Dundee	13199	Ayr	13044
Inverness	4903	Hamilton	28627
Berwick	9079	Total	163403
Glencorse	9503		<b>54.1%</b>
Total	138351		
	<b>45.8%</b>		

The geographical divide between east and west produced a difference of 8.3 per cent to overall recruitment levels over the seventeen month period and this is shown in table 9:3. Those recruiting areas which could be described as west coast provided 54.1 per cent of the total, while the east coast areas provided 45.8 per cent. This disparity in recruitment is to be expected with the west coast areas, due to their industrial base, having the greater male population. Again this is an indication that Scotland's industrial base was responsible for the majority of Scotland's manpower contribution. What arguably is of greater interest and, by definition, importance, is the differing

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<sup>624</sup> NATS 1/399.

levels of recruitment for the Army and the Territorial Force from each Regimental Recruiting Area (table 9:4).

Table 9:4 shows the numbers of recruits for each Regimental Recruiting Area and the percentage of recruits for each service. It clearly demonstrates which areas gave priority to the Army or the Territorial Force.

**FIG 9:4 The percentage of Army and Territorial recruits for each Regimental Recruiting Area: August 1914 - December 1915.<sup>625</sup>**


	<b>Territorial</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Army</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Perth</b>	18309	48.65	19319	51.35	37628
<b>Fort George</b>	8016	80.5	1946	19.5	9962
<b>Inverness</b>	4082	83.3	821	16.7	4903
<b>Aberdeen</b>	12940	66.42	6540	33.58	19480
<b>Stirling</b>	11054	38.9	17398	61.1	28452
<b>Dundee</b>	6694	50.7	6505	49.3	13199
<b>Glencorse</b>	2080	21.9	7423	78.1	9503
<b>Ayr</b>	4972	38.1	8072	61.9	13044
<b>Berwick</b>	3250	35.8	9079	64.2	9079
<b>Hamilton</b>	4669	16.3	23958	83.7	28627
<b>Glasgow</b>	24030	28.8	59288	71.2	83318
<b>Edinburgh</b>	15440	34.65	29119	65.35	44559
	115536		186218		301754

War-time recruitment clearly followed the pre-war pattern with agricultural areas giving a greater proportion of their recruits to the Territorial Force. Inverness raised 83.3 per cent of recruits for the Territorial Force with the remainder, 16.7 per cent, going to the army. Fort George provided 80.5 per cent for the Territorial Force with 19.5 for the army, and Aberdeen gave 66.42 and 33.58 per cent respectively. In common with the pre-war pattern the

<sup>625</sup> NATS 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.

industrialised urban areas followed the opposite tack. While 83.7 per cent of the recruits from Hamilton were for the army only 16.3 per cent were for the Territorial Force. In Glasgow, 71.2 per cent chose the army, leaving 28.8 per cent for the Territorial Force. In Edinburgh, 65.3 per cent enlisted in the army with 34.6 per cent choosing the Territorial Force. Those areas with the highest available manpower reserves constantly chose the army as the preferred military arm, to the extent that Territorial units within those areas suffered continually from a shortage of manpower. In urban areas the Territorial Force did not have the same pull on the population. As we have already seen the rural areas had greater contact with the Territorial Force due to the composition of the Associations and larger number of drill stations.

**FIG 9:5 Total Scottish monthly recruitment<sup>626</sup>**



<sup>626</sup> NATS 1/399.

Chart 9:5 displays the four main peaks affecting recruitment in Scotland. The first was the initial peak of August/September 1914, the second was in November 1914 with the enlistment of agricultural workers. The third and fourth, May and November 1915, as we have already seen, were also a direct result of agricultural enlistment. Also shown is the gradual but steady reduction in recruitment levels over time after the initial peak period of August - September 1914: once again emphasising that Scotland's greatest manpower contribution in the voluntary period was in the five month period of 1914.

**FIG 9:6 Comparison of Scottish monthly Army and Territorial recruitment August 1914 - December 1915.<sup>627</sup>**





Chart 9:6 shows that, outwith the obvious difference in numerical terms, Army and Territorial Force recruitment in Scotland followed much the same path,

<sup>627</sup> NATS 1/399.

both suffering from a gradual reduction in recruits with the obvious difference being the army's ability to absorb greater numbers of recruits.

Figures 9:7 and 9:8 support the findings that recruitment patterns in the voluntary period closely followed those of pre-war Scotland. They show the patterns of recruitment for the Army and Territorial Force in both industrial and agricultural areas. We can see from figure 9:7 the difference between the recruitment rate for both branches from those recruiting areas which can be claimed as industrial. It is apparent that the army was the military arm of choice for Scotland's industrial workforce. It clearly shows that while the army was inundated with recruits in the peak August - September period, the Territorial Force, with recruiting restrictions in place, made very little impact in this period. Only later, as army recruitment levelled out, did the percentage of Territorial recruitment reach significant levels. Territorial recruitment from industrial recruiting areas was always lower than recruitment for the army.

FIG 9:7 Monthly recruitment for Scottish industrial areas.<sup>628</sup>




Scotland's agricultural regions also clearly followed the pre-war recruitment pattern. It can clearly be seen from figure 9:8 that the Territorial Force was the organisation of choice for Scotland's agricultural workforce. What is clear is that, although relatively small in number, there was a discernible recruitment surge in Territorial recruitment in August and September 1914, mainly from agriculture which brought the strength up to its pre-war complement. However, with the restrictions on Territorial recruitment, the vast majority of those agricultural workers enlisting in November 1914, at the end of the hiring cycle, were forced to do so in the army. We can see that at the end of the next hiring cycle, May 1915, with recruits needed for second and third line units, Scotland's agricultural workforce was able to enlist in the Territorial Force. By November 1915 recruitment was shared between both

<sup>628</sup> NATS 1/399.

military arms. With Territorial recruitment for general service only and direct recruitment to the Territorial Force ending in December 1915, Territorial recruitment was not so attractive to some.

FIG 9:8 Monthly recruitment for Scottish agricultural areas.<sup>629</sup>



<sup>629</sup> NATS 1/399.

**FIG 9:9 Comparison of Scottish recruitment August 1914 - December 1915<sup>630</sup>**





Figure 9:9 compares in relatively simplistic terms the monthly recruitment levels of the army and Territorial Force in relation to total Scottish recruitment for each month and allows for direct comparison. Figure 9:10 shows, in numerical terms, the cumulative monthly increase of recruits in Scotland alongside the monthly increase presented as a percentage. It shows the steady decrease in monthly recruitment after January 1915. In tandem with this, figure 9:11 clearly shows that the speed of recruitment slowed down over time; after January 1915 recruitment maintained a steadily reducing level until the end of the voluntary recruiting period.

<sup>630</sup> NATS 1/398. 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.

**Fig 9:10 Cumulative monthly increase of recruits in Scotland.**

	Cumulative monthly recruitment	Monthly percentage increase
August	40138	
September	98393	145.13
October	118141	20.07
November	143247	21.25
December	161882	13
January	179735	11.02
February	188232	4.72
March	199671	6.07
April	210409	5.37
May	226188	7.49
June	240575	6.36
July	251534	4.55
August	263554	4.77
September	271772	3.11
October	281681	3.64
November	294771	4.64
December	301754	2.36

**Fig 9:11 Slowdown of recruitment over time.**



The graph shows that there were three distinctly different periods of recruitment: the period to mid September 1914 provided the highest concentration of recruits, while the period from mid September until January 1915, although a reduced level, was still high enough to cope with the demands of military expansion. The third period, from January 1915 until the end of the voluntary period (December 1915), was a period which displayed a steady decline in the rate at which the recruits came forward.

## CONCLUSION

We have investigated the role played by economics and industry in the raising of recruits. It would, however, be irresponsible to assume that those were the only factors which influenced or promoted recruitment in Scotland. There were other motives leading to enlistment, which, although secondary in terms of numbers, were nevertheless important in their own right. Any issue which provided recruits had its own relative importance.

A peculiarity of voluntary enlistment is that the recruit is, in most cases, the one who decides which branch or unit of the armed services he will join. The army is therefore, in most instances, unable to channel manpower where it is needed. This is not an efficient method of military expansion but, without the wholesale introduction of conscription, the army must work within this constraint.

In 1914 the manpower needs of the army coincided with the immediate short-term needs of those workers affected by the contraction of Scottish industry. The stigma of military service was cancelled out by the needs of the country. Direct appeals allowed the men to believe that they were wanted as individuals and it was only by approaching them as individuals, albeit on a mass scale, that any aversion to military service was overcome.

Recruitment in the pre-war British army was governed by the prevailing social conditions, often localised and often linked to the fluctuating fortunes of industry. As industrial unemployment rose or fell so too did the number, and more importantly the quality, of volunteers. This was well known at the time and investigated by the army in an effort to counter the reduction in recruitment numbers. The pre-war Scottish recruit was just as likely to come from the skilled artisan class as the lower unskilled casual labourers. These were men who were influenced in their decisions by economics and employment issues. It was the skilled worker, used to thinking in, and planning for, the long-term, who was willing to enlist for a minimum of four years regular service when faced with the spectre of unemployment. The unskilled and casual worker, accustomed to frequent bouts of unemployment, was not prepared for such a commitment, thinking only in the short-term, only a few weeks, or at most a few months, ahead. In pre-war Scotland recruitment was driven in the main by economic necessity.

Scotland's contribution to the pre-war British army had been gradually declining in the years running up to the First World War. While the overall annual recruitment numbers steadily reduced, Scotland's percentage within that number was also on the decline, falling from 11 per cent in 1905 to 9 per cent in 1911. While the total number of recruits for the British army fell from 34,322 in 1905 to 28,791 in 1911, giving a reduction of some 5,531 or 16 per cent, the number of Scots enlisting in the period fell from 3,842 in 1905 to 2,686 in 1911, a drop of over thirty per cent.

There was a reduction in recruits from the four home countries but there was a wide spread between the countries. Recruitment from Wales dropped by 55 per cent, Scotland as we have seen by 30 per cent, Ireland by 20 per cent and the English contribution had reduced by only 12 per cent. The pre-war British army was becoming more representative of England and less of the United Kingdom. In the pre-war years Scotland had a clearly defined pattern of recruitment. While the cities produced the highest number of recruits for the regular army, it was the rural areas which produced the highest proportion of recruits relative to male population.

While the Victorian army might have been viewed as a last desperate refuge, the Boer War served to initiate a change in the public's perception of temporary military service. It created a precedent which made short-term voluntary service, in time of national crisis, socially acceptable. There was, however, still within the country at large, the social and moral stigma attached to service in the regular army. Regular soldiers were still shunned in public, they were refused access to theatres and public houses, could not travel on trains other than in third class compartments, and were frequently refused access to other forms of public transport. The link which was formed by the Boer War extended only to the Volunteer and Yeomanry regiments, the units which had provided the extra manpower for foreign service in South Africa. The perception was that of the 'civilian soldier' entering into short-term service 'with' but not 'in' the army. For the average citizen there was something romantic, if not

Arthurian, in the image of the citizenry rising to the defence of the nation. The Territorial Force, successor to the Volunteer movement, was embraced in rural Scotland as a social entity as much as a military force.

The concept of a 'Generation of 1914', the spontaneous rallying of a nation's youth and the laying down of their lives for King and country, was, in Scotland at least, a myth. We have seen that Scottish recruitment was driven by tertiary reasons and that group parameters, such as height and age, were decided by the military establishment. The sudden collapse of Scottish industry provided the major prompt for the majority of recruits in the first few months of the war. The initial short-term collapse of Scotland's heavy engineering industries was caused by economic uncertainty, while the contraction of the coal industry was created by the loss of crucial foreign export markets. Those industries provided high numbers of recruits in the initial period. Industrial contraction in Scotland was not a product of popular recruitment as has often been portrayed. The reverse was the case, with recruitment being driven by the initial economic uncertainties of industry.

Scottish industry provided the majority of recruits in the first year of the war, with an initially low response from Scottish agriculture. Early recruitment in Scotland was dependent on wages and employment conditions but not in the way proposed by Peter Dewey. His conclusion that economics played only a secondary role in the promotion of recruitment cannot be substantiated in the light of Scottish employment

and recruitment figures. Similarly, his further conclusion, that 'neither activity levels nor wages' explained the recruiting differences between industries is questionable, at least in relation to Scotland. Those industries most immediately effected by the outbreak of war produced a higher proportion of recruits in the initial months while those employed elsewhere were more constant, producing smaller numbers over longer periods.

The east coast coalfields suffered an immediate collapse due to the loss of their export markets in Germany and the Baltic, and at the same time the Admiralty assumed control of the Forth coal ports. This in effect ended any remaining hope of export and forced owners to stop production and lay off their workers, in many instances before war was declared. By October 1914 some 18,441 miners, 14 per cent of the industry, had enlisted, rising to 35,680 or 27 per cent by August 1915. Peter Dewey concluded that, since highly paid miners were willing to leave a highly paid industry, this was evidence that factors other than economics were the prime movers in enlistment from this industry. However, reality shows us that no matter how highly paid the industry was, in Scotland, if miners were thrown out of work by the closure of the mines then they clearly had no wages at all. Those who were lucky enough to be placed on short-time rather than total unemployment, some 20 per cent at the outset, were in reality no better off. Unemployed or on short-time, miners still had to pay rent and provide for their families. Those on short-time and reduced wages, although still earning, would

end up penniless. Enlistment, however distasteful, would ensure that, in most cases, accommodation would be free and that wives and families would at least receive separation allowances. Miners who were not in receipt of wages were making no financial sacrifice in enlisting.

Unemployment alone was, in many cases, not a strong enough push to enlist but, when coupled with other, secondary, motives became the catalyst which served to stimulate recruitment in Scotland. With no precedent as to how long the industrial contraction would last, the working class had to seek some other form of support. The call for recruits emphasised that they would be discharged as soon as possible at the end of the war, which it was hoped would coincide with the regeneration of Scottish industry.

In 1914 Scotland had an economy in which the eight main staple industries produced 60 per cent of its output. By September 1914 Scottish industry had contracted by 9 per cent, by October that contraction stood at 11 per cent, and steadied off at that level by December of that year. In the first three months of the war Scottish industry alone accounted for 109,714 recruits, 13.5 per cent of the United Kingdom total and over 94 per cent of Scottish recruits to that time. We can see that J. Winter's supposition that 'the higher up in the social scale a man was, the greater were the chances that he would serve from early

in the war and be fit enough to be placed in a combat unit',<sup>630</sup> does not stand up as regards voluntary recruitment in Scotland

Large numbers of Irish immigrants living in Scotland took the opportunity to enlist. They did so for a variety of reasons. Political – in support of John Redmond's appeal to aid the British Government in the belief that such aid would ease the transition into Home Rule in Ireland. Social – many believed that by contributing to Scottish society in this way, the Irish immigrant would be more readily accepted into a post-war Scottish society. Economic – the Irish, used to unskilled and temporary employment, viewed short-term enlistment as just another means of employment when faced with the economic uncertainties caused by such large-scale unemployment.

The rise in recruitment numbers from mid-August to early September 1914 has been seen as a recruitment boom in its own right, a surge of patriotism. However, in Scotland it was only an escalation of the original recruiting surge, an increase in scale as the numbers became available. This period can be split into two distinct periods. The first is the initial period, lasting from 4 August until 22 August 1914. Initial recruiting was relatively low, due in part to the inability of the recruiting offices to cope and the restrictions placed on the recruits. On 10 August recruiting offices began turning away skilled men, accepting recruits for the infantry only. Scottish recruitment dropped by 24 per cent as a result. On 15 August

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<sup>630</sup> J. M. Winter, *The Great War and the British People*. p. 25.

the political offices opened as auxiliary recruiting offices. These political offices placed no restrictions on recruits and recruitment numbers soared. On 22 August the political offices were closed and recruitment was restricted to clear the backlog of recruits at regimental depots across the country. The backlog was cleared within three days and the political offices reopened on 25 August. This was the beginning of the second period in recruitment. On 28 August the upper age limit for recruits was raised from 30 to 35 years of age. The combination of the relaxed recruitment policy in the political offices, the need of those who had been made unemployed, and the new upper age limit created a second wave of recruitment in Scotland. However, the problems associated with the first period soon reappeared, and on 8 September Scottish Military Headquarters issued instructions that recruits were to be engaged for the infantry only. Scotland had two periods of increased recruitment in the first two months of the war and these were clearly influenced by the ability of the recruiting mechanism to absorb such large numbers, and specifically by the recruiting restrictions of 22 August and 8 September 1914. The rush to enlist which created the recruitment 'boom' of late August – early September 1914 was not the result of 'spontaneous patriotism'. The deficiencies of the overworked and overwhelmed recruitment system held recruitment rates in check until civilian agencies came to the fore and took over the burden of recruitment, so soaking up the excess manpower.

On 7 August 1914 the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, issued his appeal for the first 100,000 recruits for his new army. In Scotland this meant that each of the existing regiments would have to raise a new 'service' battalion of approximately 1,000 men. The call for a second new army came at the end of August 1914 and a third new army in the second week of September. By the end of October, when the manpower surplus had been absorbed, the number of men recruited into Scottish regiments had reached 37,000, and by the end of December 1914 had risen to 47,000. However in the same period Scotland produced some 104,392 recruits for the New Armies. This meant that some 45 per cent of Scottish recruits enlisted in units that had no direct Scottish link, in the technical branches, artillery or service corps. To put this in context, Glasgow and Hamilton, the two most industrialised recruiting areas in Scotland, with the Highland Light Infantry and the Cameronians, provided approximately 12 service battalions in 1914, some 12,000 men. In the same period they raised 48,000 recruits, providing a regional surplus of 35,000 men. It would appear that Glasgow and Hamilton alone provided enough men to fulfil the needs of Scotland's contribution to the new armies of 1914.

Locally raised battalions, or Pals battalions as they became known, were a predominantly English phenomenon. Scotland raised only 5 per cent of the total number of such battalions raised. Of the seven first line infantry battalions raised in this manner in Scotland, three were raised in Edinburgh and four in Glasgow. In Glasgow there was the 15th Highland Light Infantry, raised in the main from the employees of the Glasgow

Tramways Department, the 16th Highland Light Infantry which was to a large extent made up from serving and past officers and men from the Boys' Brigade, and the 17th Highland Light Infantry which was raised and funded by the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce. In Edinburgh, the 15th Royal Scots was raised by the City Council but contained large groups of men from Manchester, while the 16th Royal Scots was raised by Sir George McCrae, the City Treasurer. The battalion of 1,550 men was raised in only twelve days. Pals battalions were not a part of Scottish society. Indeed, with the exception of the 16th battalion Royal Scots, Scotland's locally raised battalions struggled to attract enough recruits to fill their needs. Unfortunately, in Scotland, the concept of the Pals battalions has reached mythological proportions. Wild claims have been constantly made as to the recruiting response to these battalions and their position within Scottish society. Over the years public expectation has been allowed to become the perceived reality. It has become more acceptable to perpetuate the myth than to pursue reality.

It is not the purpose nor is it the intention of this thesis to imply that patriotism did not exist. In truth the concept of patriotism fulfilled a function in providing recruits, although they were mainly for the officer class. There can be no doubt that for a specific social group patriotism, as they understood it, was the sole motivating factor in their 'rush' to enlist. Peter Simkins supports the belief that there were some volunteers who 'were motivated by straightforward patriotic ideals'.<sup>631</sup> But those few

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<sup>631</sup> P. Simkins, *Kitchener's Army*. p. 165-8.

were the ones who understood or accepted the true concept of patriotism. For the majority of men who alluded to enlisting for such reasons the term 'patriotism' should be taken to mean 'enthusiasm'. Enthusiasm for war, enthusiasm to support their country, enthusiasm for change, albeit short term, but not the unconscious willingness for self-sacrifice which distinguishes patriotism from other similar emotions. In truth a working class man with little or no higher education could not have the same concept of 'patriotism' as the educated, landed, or moneyed classes.

Major John Ewing, in his history of the war-time Royal Scots, contended that there were two distinct groups of Scottish recruits, and two distinct reasons for enlistment. 'The heady wine of youth scorns sober caution and young men in thousands flocked to the Colours. To them the war was mainly an adventure'.<sup>632</sup> He saw the younger men as motivated by a desire for change and the opportunity for a period of excitement. However, this would not have been, on its own, enough of a stimulus, but, when combined with the loss of employment or the uncertainty of continuing wages, it served in many instances to tip the scales in favour of enlistment. The second group envisaged by Ewing was the older men with responsibilities to families:

There were many, too, of more mature age who, stirred by a profound sense of duty, offered themselves for service. Their

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<sup>632</sup> J. Ewing, *The Royal Scots 1914-1919*. p. 6.

sacrifice was great; for they were detaching themselves from the anchorage of what had promised to be a settled and contented life, to drift deliberately into unknown and turbulent waters. To such the war was an ordeal rather than an adventure.<sup>633</sup>

Major Ewing was correct in his appraisal of the sense of 'duty' felt by the older family men, but he was wrong in believing that the sense of duty was directed to Scotland or in a wider sense to Britain. The sense of duty evident in these men was focused firmly on the need to support a family or dependants at a time of economic uncertainty. It was not an easy decision, on the part of the men, to commit themselves to military service and it is clear that for many 'duty smothered every personal and selfish consideration'.<sup>634</sup> It is to be expected that Major Ewing, a member of that part of Scottish society which had aligned itself with Imperial England, should relate duty to empire, while the working classes of Scotland, in a more insular fashion, saw their first duty to family and self.

A direct comparison can be made between Army recruitment and Territorial Force enlistment. Voluntary recruitment for both services covered the same period: from the outbreak of war until December 1915, when voluntary service and direct enlistment into the Territorial Force ended. In this period some 204,147 men enlisted in the army while 116,446 chose the Territorial Force as the service of choice. With a total

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<sup>633</sup> J. Ewing, *The Royal Scots*. p. 7.

<sup>634</sup> J. Ewing, *The Royal Scots*. p. 7.

figure for Scotland of 320,589 voluntary recruits some 63.6 per cent enlisted in the army, while 36.3 per cent enrolled in the Territorial Force. The New Armies raised sixty-three battalions in Scotland while the number of Territorial battalions increased from the pre-war figure of thirty-seven to a figure of ninety-nine. Some 61 per cent of all Scottish battalions raised in the voluntary period were Territorial, leaving 38.8 per cent for the New Armies. With the high number of Scottish army recruits and the low number of New Army battalions, at least 50 per cent of those joining the army were doing so in units that were not Scottish, and were not infantry.

Scotland was only able to provide a large, disproportionate number of recruits in the early months because there was in place a 'pool' of readily available spare bodies which could provide the necessary manpower without undue stress to the country as a whole. This pool contained the annual, natural wastage of Scottish manpower, mainly through emigration and migration, and those caught up in the collapse of Scottish industry at the outbreak of war. As such the effect on the country was not as severe as might at first be thought. There are various figures for Scotland's war dead, ranging from a low of 80,000 to a high of 147,000, which includes all those Scotsmen who were resident abroad and who fought in Commonwealth units; Australian, South African, Canadian and New Zealand.<sup>635</sup> However, Scotland lost more men in the years 1910-14 through emigration and disease than to the First World War and while the

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<sup>635</sup> Spiers, E. M. *The Scottish Soldier*. p. 314.

suffering caused to individual families was immense the loss to Scotland the country was minimal.

During the voluntary period there was a higher percentage of recruits from Scotland than any of the other three home countries. This was not fuelled by patriotism but, initially at least, by the economic needs of Scotland's working classes, followed later by the pressure brought to bear on the middle class and those in commerce. Recruits fell into two main categories, those who were directly affected by the onset of war and those who were able to maintain 'business as usual'. Many, although deeply supportive of their country and proud of Britain's imperial power, were not prepared to enlist leaving all behind; there had to be other external pressures at work. Unemployment, short-term working, economic hardship, peer pressure, political identity, whatever the reason there were many forces pushing the new recruits. For the ordinary man the concept of 'voluntary' enlistment in the period August 1914 - December 1915 did not exist except in a very few rare cases. There was always some form of external force exerting an influence on the individual recruit.

## APPENDIX i<sup>1</sup>

### SCOTTISH YEOMANRY AND TERRITORIAL INFANTRY BATTALIONS HEADQUARTERS AND DRILL STATIONS

#### **Ayrshire (Earl of Carrick's Own) Yeomanry.**

H. Q. and A Squadron - Ayr; B Squadron - Cumnock; C Squadron - Kilmarnock; D Squadron - Beith.

#### **Fife and Forfar Yeomanry.**

H. Q. - Kirkcaldy; A Squadron - Cupar, with drill stations at Kirkcaldy, Ladybank and St Andrews; B Squadron - Dumfermline, with drill stations at Balfron, Stirling, Kippen, Kelty, Kinross and Alloa; C Squadron - Dundee; D Squadron - Forfar, with drill stations at Arbroath, Edzell, Montrose and Laurencekirk.

#### **Lanarkshire Yeomanry.**

H. Q. - Lanark; A Squadron - Douglas, with drill stations at Auchinheath, Lesmahagow, Douglas Water and Coalburn; B Squadron - Lanark, and drill stations at Carluke, Carstairs, Wishaw, Peebles and Biggar; C Squadron - Coatbridge, with a drill station at Glasgow; D Squadron - Dumfries, with drill stations at Lockerbie, Langholm, Annan, Moffat, Thornhill and Sanquhar.

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<sup>1</sup> R. Westlake, *The Territorial Force 1914*. p. 1-138. These details were collated from locations throughout this book which is a detailed record of drill stations throughout the United Kingdom.

### **Lanarkshire (Queen's Own Royal Glasgow) Yeomanry.**

H. Q., A and B Squadron - Glasgow; C Squadron - Paisley, with a drill station at Greenock; D Squadron - Glasgow.

### **Lothian and Borders Horse.**

H. Q. - Edinburgh; A Squadron - Dunbar with drill stations at Earlston, Greenlaw, North Berwick, Musselburgh, Lauder, Kelso, Berwick, Haddington, Tranent, East Linton, Duns and Coldstream; B Squadron - Edinburgh, with drill stations at Musselburgh, Dalkeith or Eskbank, Penicuik, Gorebridge, Lasswade and Loanhead; C Squadron - Hawick, with drill stations at Galashiels, Jedburgh, Innerleithen, Kelso, Melrose, Newcastleton, Peebles, Selkirk, Stow, Yetholm and St Boswells; D Squadron - Edinburgh, with drill stations at Linlithgow, Bathgate, Broxburn, Hopetown, Mid - Calder, South Queensferry, Ratho and Winchburgh.

### **1<sup>st</sup> Lovat Scouts.**

H. Q. - Beaully; A Squadron - Roy Bridge, with drill stations at Fort Augustus, Lock Laggan, Spean Bridge, Glenfinnan, Sheil Bridge and Fort William; B Squadron - Lochmaddy (North Uist), with drill stations at Bayhead, Sollas, Craeagorry, Clachan, Torlam and Daliburgh; C Squadron - Skeabost (Skye), with drill stations at Uig, Portree, Duntulm, Staffin, Glendale, Waternish, Dunvegan and Braes; D squadron - Beaully, with drill stations at Stuy, Convinth, Cluness, Beaufort, Doress, Errogie, Whitebridge and Glenurquhart.

## **2<sup>nd</sup> Lovat Scouts.**

H. Q. - Beaully; E Squadron - Kyle of Lochalsh, with drill stations at Armadale, Aultbea, Gleseig, Strathcarron, Dundonnell, Strathcannaird, Ullapool, Achiltibuie and Achnasheen; F Squadron - Dornoch, with drill stations at Brora, Helmsdale, Scourie, Tongue, Melness, Bettyhill, Dunbeath, Latheron, and Berniedale; G Squadron - Alness, with drill stations at Bonar Bridge, Lairg, Ardgay, Rosehall, Fearn, Edderton, Tain and Contin; H Squadron - Inverness, with drill stations at Nairn, Laggan Bridge, Aviemore, Nethy Bridge, Munloch, Cawdor, Glenferness and Tomatin.

## **1<sup>st</sup> Scottish Horse.**

H. Q. - Dunkeld; A Squadron - Blair Atholl, with drill stations at Ballinluig, Pitlochrie, Kirkmichael and Kinloch Rannoch; B Squadron - Dunkeld, with drill stations at Murthly, Bankfoot, Dupplin, Perth, Cluny and Aberfeldy; C Squadron - Coupar Angus, with drill stations at Blairgowrie, Alyth and Invergowrie; D Squadron - Dunblane, with drill stations at Crieff, Comrie, Lochearnhead, Auchterarder, Muthill, Dunning and Methven.

## **2<sup>nd</sup> Scottish Horse.**

H. Q. - Aberdeen; E Squadron - Elgin, with drill stations at Pluscarden, Craigellachie, Cullen, Dallas, Dufftown, Forres, Keith and Archiestown; F Squadron - Kintore, with drill stations at Peterhead, Fraserburgh, Ellon, Huntly, Inch, Inverurie, Monymusk, Cluny, Alford, Turriff, Fyvie, Rothie - Norman, Maud, Mintlaw, Newmacher and Bucksburn; G Squadron -

Aberdeen, with drill stations at Torphins, Aboyne, Tarland, Ballater and Braemar; H squadron - Connell (Argyll), with drill stations at Kilchrenan, Appin, Easdale, Ardishaig, Taynuilt, Calgary, Tiree, Craginure, Campbeltown, Burnessan, Torloisk, Port Ellen, Port Charlotte, Bowmore and Bridgend.

### **Royal Scots.**

4<sup>th</sup> Royal Scots - Edinburgh (Forrest Hill)

5<sup>th</sup> Royal Scots - Edinburgh (Forrest Hill)

6<sup>th</sup> Royal Scots - Edinburgh (Gilmore Place)

7<sup>th</sup> Royal Scots - A -G companies - Dalmeny Street Leith; H - company Musselburgh

8<sup>th</sup> Royal Scots - H. Q. - Haddington; A company - Haddington, with drill stations at Aberlady, Gifford and Pencaitland; B company - Tranent, with drill stations at Ormiston, Elphinstone and Macmerry; C company - Prestonpans and Cockenzie; D company - North Berwick, with drill stations at East Linton, Dunbar and Gullane; E company - Dalkeith, with drill stations at Bonnyrigg, Pathhead and Gorebridge; F company - Loanhead, with a drill station at Penicuik; G company - Peebles; H company - Innerleithen, with a drill station at Walkerburn

9<sup>th</sup> Royal Scots - Edinburgh (East Claremont Street)

10<sup>th</sup> Royal Scots - H. Q. and A company - Linlithgow, with a drill station at Philipstown; B company - Bo'ness, with a drill station at Carriden; C company - Armadale, with drill stations at Whitburn, Pumpherston and Blackridge; D company - Bathgate; E company - Uphall, with drill stations at Broxburn and Livingstone; F company - Fauldhouse, with a drill station at Harthill; G

company - West Calder, with a drill station at Addiewell; H company - Kirkliston, with drill stations at Dalmeny, Winchburgh and Newbridge

### **Royal Scots Fusiliers.**

4<sup>th</sup> Royal Scots Fusiliers - H. Q. and A company - Kilmarnock; B company - Irvine, with a drill station at Kilwinning; C company - Stewarton, with a drill station at Kilmaurs; D company - Beith, with drill stations at Glengarnock and Lochwinnoch; E company - Saltcoats; F company - Dalry, with a drill station at Kilbirnie; G company - Darvel, with drill stations at Galston and Newmilns; H company - Kilmarnock

5<sup>th</sup> Royal Scots fusiliers - H. Q. and A company - Ayr; B company - Catrine, with a drill station at Darnconner; C company - Maybole, with a drill station at Girvan; D company - Stranraer, with drill stations at Portpatrick and Castle Kennedy; E company - Cumnock, with a drill station at New Cumnock; F company - Troon; G company - Muirkirk, with a drill station at Glenbuck; H company - Dalmellington, with a drill station at Rankinston

The Ardeer Company - H. Q. - Ardeer (Attached to 4<sup>th</sup> royal Scots Fusiliers)

### **King's Own Scottish Borderers.**

4<sup>th</sup> King's Own Scottish Borderers - H. Q. - Galashiels; A company - Kelso, with a drill station at Jedburgh; B company - Hawick; C company - Hawick, with a drill station at Newcastleton; D company - Duns, with drill stations at Greenlaw, Lauder and Earlston; E company - Coldstream, with drill stations at Ayton, Eyemouth, Chirnside, Swinton and Coldingham; F and G companies - Galashiels; H company - Selkirk, with drill stations at Melrose and St Boswells

5<sup>th</sup> King's Own Scottish Borderers - H. Q. - Dumfries; A company - Dumfries, with a drill station at Moniaive; B company - Annan, with drill stations at Langholm and Canonbie; C company - Lockerbie, with drill stations at Ecclefechan and Moffat; D company - Sanquhar, with drill stations at Thornhill and Kirkconnel; E company - Maxwell Town; F company - Dalbeattie; G company - Castle Douglas, with drill stations at Corsock, Gatehouse and Kirkcudbright; H company - Newton Stewart, with drill stations at Wigtown, Creetown, Kirkcowan, Whithorn and Garlieston

### **Scottish Rifles.**

5<sup>th</sup> Scottish Rifles - Glasgow (Princes Street)

6<sup>th</sup> Scottish Rifles - H. Q., A and B companies - Hamilton; C company - Uddingston; D company - Larkhall, with a drill station at Strathaven; E company - Bothwell, with a drill station at Palace Colliery; F company - Blantyre; G and H company - Motherwell

7<sup>th</sup> Scottish Rifles - Glasgow (Victoria Road)

8<sup>th</sup> Scottish Rifles - Glasgow (Cathedral Street)

### **Black Watch (Royal Highlanders).**

4<sup>th</sup> Black Watch - Dundee

5<sup>th</sup> Black Watch - H. Q. Arbroath; A company - Kirriemuir, with drill stations at Glamis and Newtyle; B company - Forfar; C company - Montrose, with a drill station at Craigo; D company - Brechin, with a drill station at Edzell; E company - Arbroath, with a drill station at Friockheiss; F company - Arbroath, with drill stations at Carnoustie and Monifieth; G and H companies - Dundee

6<sup>th</sup> Black Watch - H. Q. , A and B companies - Perth; C company - Dunblane, with drill stations at Bridge of Allan, Doune and Callander; D company - Crieff, with a drill station at Comrie; E company - Blairgowrie, with drill stations at Coupar Angus and Alyth; F company - Auchterarder, with drill stations at Blackford and Dunning; G company - Birnam, with drill stations at Pitlochry, Ballinluig, Stanley, Luncarty and Blair Atholl; H company - Aberfeldy, with drill stations at Kenmore, Fortingall, Grandtully and Killin

7<sup>th</sup> Black Watch - H. Q. - St Andrews; A company - Dunfermline; B company - Lochgelly; C company - Kirkcaldy; D company - Cowdenbeath; E company - Cupar, with drill stations at Newburgh, Auchtermuchty and Abernethy; F company - Leven, with drill stations at Colinsburgh and Largoward; G company - St Andrews, with drill stations at Guardbridge, Anstruther and Crail; H company - Leslie, with drill stations at Markinch and Thornton

### **Highland Light Infantry.**

5<sup>th</sup> Highland Light Infantry - Glasgow (Hill Street)

6<sup>th</sup> Highland Light Infantry - Glasgow (Yorkhill Street)

7<sup>th</sup> Highland Light Infantry - Glasgow (Main Street, Bridgeton)

8<sup>th</sup> Highland Light Infantry - H. Q. - Lanark; A company - Lesmahagow, with drill stations at Stonehouse, Coalburn and Blackwood; B company - Lanark, with drill stations at Biggar, Ponfeigh and Douglas; C company - Shotts, with drill stations at Cleland, Salisbury and Harthill; D company - Carluke; E company - Forth, with a drill station at Tarbrax; F company - Law, with a drill station at Overtown; G company - Newmains; H company - Wishaw

9<sup>th</sup> Highland Light Infantry - Glasgow (Greendyke Street)

### **Seaforth Highlanders.**

4<sup>th</sup> Seaforth Highlanders - H. Q. - Dingwall; A company - Tain, with drill stations at Nigg, Fearn, Edderton and Portmahomack; B company - Dingwall; C company - Munlochy, with drill stations at Avoch, Rosemarkie, Culbokie, Muir of Ord and Fortrose; D company - Gairloch, with drill stations at Opisan, Poolewe, Kinlochewe and Torridon; E company - Ullapool, with drill stations at Ciogach and Braemore; F company - Invergordon, with a drill station at Kildary; G company - Alness, with a drill station at Evanton; H company - Maryburgh, with drill stations at Strathpeffer, Garve, Strathconon and Fairburn

5<sup>th</sup> Seaforth Highlanders - H. Q. - Golspie; A company - Golspie, with drill stations at Melvich and Bettyhill; B company - Dornoch, with a drill station at Rogart; C company - Bonar Bridge, with drill stations at Lairg, Lochinver and Elphine; D company - Brora, with drill stations at Helmsdale, Kildonan and Kinbrace; E company - Thurso, with a drill station at Reay; F company - Wick, with a drill station at Lybster; G company - Halkirk, with drill stations at Watten and Westfield; H company - Castletown, with drill stations at Dunnet, May and Bower Madden

6<sup>th</sup> Seaforth Highlanders - H. Q. - Elgin; A company - Forres, with a drill station at Altyre; B company - Elgin, with drill stations at Lossiemouth and Pluscarden; C company - Elgin, with a drill station at Lossiemouth; D company - Rothes, with a drill station at Archiestown; E company - Fochabers, with a drill station at Bogmuir; F company - Grantown, with drill stations at Nethy Bridge and Carr Bridge; G company - Garmouth, with a drill station at Lhanbryde; H company - Lossiemouth, with drill stations at Hopeman and Burghead

## **Gordon Highlanders.**

4<sup>th</sup> Gordon Highlanders - Aberdeen

5<sup>th</sup> Gordon Highlanders - H. Q. Peterhead; A company - Strichen, with drill stations at New Pitsligo, New Aberdour, New Dear and Maud; B company - Peterhead, with drill stations at Longside and St Fergus; C company - Peterhead, with drill stations at Bodden and Hatton; D company - Turriff, with drill stations at Fyvie and Cuminestown; E company - Ellon, with drill stations at Auchnagatt, Methlick, Skilmafilly and Newburgh; F company - Old Meldrum, with drill stations at Tarves, Newmacher and Pitmedden; G company - Fraserburgh, with a drill station at Rosehearty; F company - Fraserburgh, with a drill station at Lonmay

6<sup>th</sup> Gordon Highlanders - H. Q. - Keith; A company - Banff, with drill stations at Aberchirder, Cornhill and Portsoy; B company - Dufftown, with drill stations at Aberlour, Chapelton, Glenrinnies and Minmore; C company - Keith, with a drill station at Grange; D company - Buckie, with drill stations at Findochty and Cullen; E company - Inverurie, with a drill station at Pitcaple; F company - Alford, with drill stations at Cushnie, Lumsden, Glenbuckat, Strathdon, Corgarff and Towie; G company - Bucksburn, with a drill station at Dyce; H company - Huntly, with drill stations at Insch and Rhynie

7<sup>th</sup> Gordon Highlanders - H. Q. - Banchory; A company - Banchory, with drill stations at Durris and Torphins; B company - Portlethen; C company - Stonehaven; C company - Stonehaven; D company - Laurencekirk, with drill stations at Auchenblae, Bervie, Fetterecairn, Fordown and Marykirk; E company - Ballater, with drill stations at Crathie and Braemar; F company - Aboyne, with drill stations at Tarland, Finzean and Logie Coldstone; G

company - Kemney, with drill stations at Skene, Blackburn, Monymusk and Echt; H company - Peterculter, with a drill station at Countesswells

The Shetland Companies - H. Q. and A company - Lerwick; B company - Lerwick and Scallowag. Affiliated to Gordon Highlanders.

#### **Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders.**

4<sup>th</sup> Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders - H. Q. and A company - Inverness; B company - Nairn, with drill stations at Cawdor, Ardersier, Auldearn, Croy and Petty; C company - Inverness, with a drill station at Moy; D company - Broadford, with drill stations at Torrin, Elgol and Raasay; E company - Fort William, with drill stations at Corpach, Fort Augustus and Invergarry; F company - Kingussie, with drill stations at Dalwhinnie, Newtonmore, Kincaig or Insch, Aviemore and Ardverikie; G company - Beaully, with drill stations at Struy, Kiltarlity, Balnain, Inchmore and Drumnadrochit; H company - Portree, with drill stations at Glenmore, Bernisdale, Edinbane, Sconser, Tarbert, Kilmuir and Lochmaddy

#### **Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.**

5<sup>th</sup> Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - H. Q. , A, B, C and D companies - Greenock; E company - Port Glasgow; F and G companies - Greenock; Gourock, with a drill station at Inverkip

6<sup>th</sup> Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - H. Q., A, B and C companies - Paisley; D company - Renfrew; E company - Johnstone; F company - Thornliebank; G company - Barrhead; H company - Pollockshaws

7<sup>th</sup> Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - H. Q. - Stirling; A company - Stirling, with a drill station at Bridge of Allan; B company - Stenhousemuir, with a drill station at Denny; C company - Falkirk, with a drill station at Bonnybridge; D company - Lennoxtown, with a drill station at Kilsyth; E company - Alloa; F company - Alva, with drill stations at Dollar, Tillicoultry and Menstrie; G company - Kinross, with a drill station at Kelty; H company - Alloa, with drill stations at Sauchie and Clackmannan

8<sup>th</sup> Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - H. Q. - Dunoon; A company - Inveraray, with drill stations at Lochgoilhead, Auchnagoul, Dalmally, Furnace, Cairndow, Strachur and Kilchrenan; B company - Campbeltown; C company - Southend, with drill stations at Campbeltown, Kelkenzie, Glenbarr, Tayinloan, Stewarton and Drumlemble; D company - Dunoon, with a drill station at Sandbank; E company - Lochgilphead, with drill stations at Kilmartin, Tighnabruaich, Glendarvel, Ardrishaig and Tayvallich; F company - Ballachulish, with drill stations at Ardgour, Kinlochleven and Duror; G company - Bowmore, with drill stations at Jura, Port Ellen, Bridgend and Ballygrant; H company - Easdale, with drill stations at Clachan, Oban, Cullipool, Toberonochy, Benderloch and Ardchattan

9<sup>th</sup> Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - H. Q. - Dumbarton; A company - Helensburgh, with a drill station at Cardross; B company - Kirkintilloch with drill stations at Cumbernauld and Lenzie; C company - Dumbarton; D company - Milngavie; E company - Jamestown, with a drill station at Bonhill; F company - Alexandria, with a drill station at Renton; G and H company - Clydebank

**Highland Cyclist Battalion** (unattached in Scottish command).

Highland Cyclist Battalion - H. Q. and A company - Kirkcaldy; B company - Cowie; C company - Tayport; D company - Forfar; E company - Dunfermline; F company - New Scone; G company - East Wemyss; H company - Bannockburn

**APPENDIX ii<sup>1</sup>**

**1914 : AUGUST - DECEMBER**

**RECRUITING OFFICE**

**WEEKLY TOTALS**

**PERCENT SCOTTISH AND BRITISH TOTALS**

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<sup>1</sup> PRO NATS 1/398. 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.

ABERDEEN						ALLOA					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	20	920	2.17	8193	0.24	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	426	5663	7.52	43764	0.97	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	30	5663	0.53	43764	0.07
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	257	9657	2.66	49982	0.51	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	59	9657	0.61	49982	0.12
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	141	8417	1.68	66310	0.21	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	65	8417	0.77	66310	0.10
September						September					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	219	19179	1.14	174901	0.13	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	222	19179	1.16	174901	0.13
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	205	18134	1.13	136160	0.15	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	143	18134	0.79	136160	0.11
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	63	5277	1.19	44679	0.14	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	19	5277	0.36	44679	0.04
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	51	2277	2.24	27589	0.18	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	21	2277	0.92	27589	0.08
October						October					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	81	1946	4.16	20812	0.39	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	14	1946	0.72	20812	0.07
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	42	1568	2.68	16952	0.25	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	9	1568	0.57	16952	0.05
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	38	1450	2.62	15852	0.24	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	12	1450	0.83	15852	0.08
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	29	4399	0.66	19099	0.15	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	8	4399	0.18	19099	0.04
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	25	1829	1.37	17400	0.14	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	13	1829	0.71	17400	0.07
November						November					
01/11/14-07/11/14	32	2241	1.43	20947	0.15	01/11/14-07/11/14	16	2241	0.71	20947	0.08
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	56	3636	1.54	36293	0.15	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	39	3636	1.07	36293	0.11
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	45	2725	1.65	27339	0.16	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	21	2725	0.77	27339	0.08
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	27	1964	1.37	19305	0.14	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	18	1964	0.92	19305	0.09
December						December					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	68	2172	3.13	19333	0.35	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	24	2172	1.10	19333	0.12
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	39	1610	2.42	15975	0.24	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	19	1610	1.18	15975	0.12
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	32	1629	1.96	14284	0.22	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	30	1629	1.84	14284	0.21
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	39	2760	1.41	10307	0.38	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	15	2760	0.54	10307	0.15
Total	1935	99453		805476		Total	797	99453		805476	

AYR						BERWICK					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	33	920	3.59	8193	0.40	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	157	5663	2.77	43764	0.36	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	75	5663	1.32	43764	0.17
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	434	9657	4.49	49982	0.87	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	182	9657	1.88	49982	0.36
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	617	8417	7.33	66310	0.93	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	212	8417	2.52	66310	0.32
<b>September</b>						<b>September</b>					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	1139	19179	5.94	174901	0.65	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	382	19179	1.99	174901	0.22
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	1174	18134	6.47	136160	0.86	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	361	18134	1.99	136160	0.27
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	249	5277	4.72	44679	0.56	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	174	5277	3.30	44679	0.39
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	109	2277	4.79	27589	0.40	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	158	2277	6.94	27589	0.57
<b>October</b>						<b>October</b>					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	59	1946	3.03	20812	0.28	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	73	1946	3.75	20812	0.35
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	27	1568	1.72	16952	0.16	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	71	1568	4.53	16952	0.42
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	27	1450	1.86	15852	0.17	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	45	1450	3.10	15852	0.28
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	47	4399	1.07	19099	0.25	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	40	4399	0.91	19099	0.21
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	33	1829	1.80	17400	0.19	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	101	1829	5.52	17400	0.58
<b>November</b>						<b>November</b>					
01/11/14-07/11/14	54	2241	2.41	20947	0.26	01/11/14-07/11/14	99	2241	4.42	20947	0.47
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	73	3636	2.01	36293	0.20	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	144	3636	3.96	36293	0.40
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	79	2725	2.90	27339	0.29	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	119	2725	4.37	27339	0.44
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	43	1964	2.19	19305	0.22	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	52	1964	2.65	19305	0.27
<b>December</b>						<b>December</b>					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	65	2172	2.99	19333	0.34	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	83	2172	3.82	19333	0.43
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	37	1610	2.30	15975	0.23	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	55	1610	3.42	15975	0.34
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	43	1629	2.64	14284	0.30	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	66	1629	4.05	14284	0.46
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	26	2760	0.94	10307	0.25	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	90	2760	3.26	10307	0.87
<b>Total</b>	<b>4525</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>2582</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>	

CUPAR						CLYDEBANK					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	0	5663	0.00	43764	0.00	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	0	5663	0.00	43764	0.00
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	0	9657	0.00	49982	0.00	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	32	9657	0.33	49982	0.06
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	32	8417	0.38	66310	0.0005	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	74	8417	0.88	66310	0.11
September						September					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	108	19179	0.56	174901	0.06	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	215	19179	1.12	174901	0.12
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	73	18134	0.40	136160	0.05	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	269	18134	1.48	136160	0.20
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	24	5277	0.45	44679	0.05	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	98	5277	1.86	44679	0.22
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	20	2277	0.88	27589	0.07	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	42	2277	1.84	27589	0.15
October						October					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	9	1946	0.46	20812	0.04	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	32	1946	1.64	20812	0.15
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	9	1568	0.57	16952	0.05	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	34	1568	2.17	16952	0.20
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	16	1450	1.10	15852	0.10	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	48	1450	3.31	15852	0.30
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	5	4399	0.11	19099	0.03	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	29	4399	0.66	19099	0.15
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	9	1829	0.49	17400	0.05	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	42	1829	2.30	17400	0.24
November						November					
01/11/14-07/11/14	15	2241	0.67	20947	0.07	01/11/14-07/11/14	29	2241	1.29	20947	0.14
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	10	3636	0.28	36293	0.03	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	41	3636	1.13	36293	0.11
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	8	2725	0.29	27339	0.03	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	38	2725	1.39	27339	0.14
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	5	1964	0.25	19305	0.03	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	27	1964	1.37	19305	0.14
December						December					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	12	2172	0.55	19333	0.06	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	37	2172	1.70	19333	0.19
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	14	1610	0.87	15975	0.09	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	17	1610	1.06	15975	0.11
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	3	1629	0.18	14284	0.02	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	12	1629	0.74	14284	0.08
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	5	2760	0.18	10307	0.05	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	19	2760	0.69	10307	0.18
Total	377	99453		805476		Total	1135	99453		805476	

DUMBARTON						DUNBAR					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	50	5663	0.88	43764	0.11	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	1	5663	0.02	43764	0.00
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	171	9657	1.77	49982	0.34	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	0	9657	0.00	49982	0.00
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	153	8417	1.82	66310	0.23	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	0	8417	0.00	66310	0.00
<b>September</b>						<b>September</b>					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	340	19179	1.77	174901	0.19	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	0	19179	0.00	174901	0.00
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	233	18134	1.28	136160	0.17	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	0	18134	0.00	136160	0.00
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	34	5277	0.64	44679	0.08	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	0	5277	0.00	44679	0.00
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	16	2277	0.70	27589	0.06	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	0	2277	0.00	27589	0.00
<b>October</b>						<b>October</b>					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	18	1946	0.92	20812	0.09	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	0	1946	0.00	20812	0.00
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	22	1568	1.40	16952	0.13	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	0	1568	0.00	16952	0.00
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	19	1450	1.31	15852	0.12	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	0	1450	0.00	15852	0.00
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	16	4399	0.36	19099	0.08	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	0	4399	0.00	19099	0.00
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	14	1829	0.77	17400	0.08	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	0	1829	0.00	17400	0.00
<b>November</b>						<b>November</b>					
01/11/14-07/11/14	18	2241	0.80	20947	0.09	01/11/14-07/11/14	0	2241	0.00	20947	0.00
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	43	3636	1.18	36293	0.12	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	0	3636	0.00	36293	0.00
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	34	2725	1.25	27339	0.12	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	0	2725	0.00	27339	0.00
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	36	1964	1.83	19305	0.19	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	0	1964	0.00	19305	0.00
<b>December</b>						<b>December</b>					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	43	2172	1.98	19333	0.22	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	0	2172	0.00	19333	0.00
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	18	1610	1.12	15975	0.11	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	0	1610	0.00	15975	0.00
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	26	1629	1.60	14284	0.18	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	56	1629	3.44	14284	0.39
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	37	2760	1.34	10307	0.36	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	1	2760	0.04	10307	0.01
<b>Total</b>	<b>1341</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>	

DUNBLANE						DUNDEE					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	42	920	4.57	8193	0.51
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	19	5663	0.34	43764	0.04	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	82	5663	1.45	43764	0.19
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	60	9657	0.62	49982	0.12	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	107	9657	1.11	49982	0.21
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	46	8417	0.55	66310	0.07	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	154	8417	1.83	66310	0.23
<b>September</b>						<b>September</b>					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	53	19179	0.28	174901	0.03	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	234	19179	1.22	174901	0.13
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	37	18134	0.20	136160	0.03	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	179	18134	0.99	136160	0.13
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	19	5277	0.36	44679	0.04	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	67	5277	1.27	44679	0.15
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	10	2277	0.44	27589	0.04	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	52	2277	2.28	27589	0.19
<b>October</b>						<b>October</b>					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	3	1946	0.15	20812	0.01	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	26	1946	1.34	20812	0.12
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	10	1568	0.64	16952	0.06	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	35	1568	2.23	16952	0.21
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	8	1450	0.55	15852	0.05	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	33	1450	2.28	15852	0.21
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	5	4399	0.11	19099	0.03	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	42	4399	0.95	19099	0.22
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	13	1829	0.71	17400	0.07	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	46	1829	2.52	17400	0.26
<b>November</b>						<b>November</b>					
01/11/14-07/11/14	12	2241	0.54	20947	0.06	01/11/14-07/11/14	58	2241	2.59	20947	0.28
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	18	3636	0.50	36293	0.05	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	67	3636	1.84	36293	0.18
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	10	2725	0.37	27339	0.04	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	69	2725	2.53	27339	0.25
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	6	1964	0.31	19305	0.03	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	45	1964	2.29	19305	0.23
<b>December</b>						<b>December</b>					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	13	2172	0.60	19333	0.07	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	35	2172	1.61	19333	0.18
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	2	1610	0.12	15975	0.01	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	56	1610	3.48	15975	0.35
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	4	1629	0.25	14284	0.03	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	41	1629	2.52	14284	0.29
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	10	2760	0.36	10307	0.10	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	36	2760	1.30	10307	0.35
<b>Total</b>	<b>358</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>1506</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>	

DUNFERMLINE						EDINBURGH					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	144	920	15.65	8193	1.76
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	0	5663	0.00	43764	0.00	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	1004	5663	17.73	43764	2.29
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	0	9657	0.00	49982	0.00	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	649	9657	6.72	49982	1.30
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	0	8417	0.00	66310	0.00	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	1034	8417	12.28	66310	1.56
<b>September</b>						<b>September</b>					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	265	19179	1.38	174901	0.15	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	2595	19179	13.53	174901	1.48
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	272	18134	1.50	136160	0.20	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	1624	18134	8.96	136160	1.19
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	85	5277	1.61	44679	0.19	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	430	5277	8.15	44679	0.96
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	60	2277	2.64	27589	0.22	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	430	2277	18.88	27589	1.56
<b>October</b>						<b>October</b>					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	90	1946	4.62	20812	0.43	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	454	1946	23.33	20812	2.18
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	91	1568	5.80	16952	0.54	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	443	1568	28.25	16952	2.61
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	117	1450	8.07	15852	0.74	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	282	1450	19.45	15852	1.78
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	121	4399	2.75	19099	0.63	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	260	4399	5.91	19099	1.36
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	118	1829	6.45	17400	0.68	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	297	1829	16.24	17400	1.71
<b>November</b>						<b>November</b>					
01/11/14-07/11/14	127	2241	5.67	20947	0.61	01/11/14-07/11/14	381	2241	17.00	20947	1.82
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	136	3636	3.74	36293	0.37	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	522	3636	14.36	36293	1.44
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	93	2725	3.41	27339	0.34	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	334	2725	12.26	27339	1.22
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	66	1964	3.36	19305	0.34	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	329	1964	16.75	19305	1.70
<b>December</b>						<b>December</b>					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	82	2172	3.78	19333	0.42	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	341	2172	15.70	19333	1.76
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	38	1610	2.36	15975	0.24	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	264	1610	16.40	15975	1.65
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	54	1629	3.31	14284	0.38	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	253	1629	15.53	14284	1.77
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	63	2760	2.28	10307	0.61	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	1541	2760	55.83	10307	14.95
<b>Total</b>	<b>1878</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>13611</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>	

FALKIRK						FORFAR					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	44	5663	0.78	43764	0.10	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	5	5663	0.09	43764	0.01
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	87	9657	0.90	49982	0.17	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	27	9657	0.28	49982	0.05
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	83	8417	0.99	66310	0.13	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	20	8417	0.24	66310	0.03
September						September					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	227	19179	1.18	174901	0.13	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	27	19179	0.14	174901	0.02
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	174	18134	0.96	136160	0.13	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	64	18134	0.35	136160	0.05
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	37	5277	0.70	44679	0.08	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	27	5277	0.51	44679	0.06
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	16	2277	0.70	27589	0.06	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	20	2277	0.88	27589	0.07
October						October					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	19	1946	0.98	20812	0.09	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	14	1946	0.72	20812	0.07
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	19	1568	1.21	16952	0.11	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	7	1568	0.45	16952	0.04
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	23	1450	1.59	15852	0.15	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	11	1450	0.76	15852	0.07
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	14	4399	0.32	19099	0.07	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	2	4399	0.05	19099	0.01
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	18	1829	0.98	17400	0.10	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	0	1829	0.00	17400	0.00
November						November					
01/11/14-07/11/14	27	2241	1.20	20947	0.13	01/11/14-07/11/14	0	2241	0.00	20947	0.00
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	44	3636	1.21	36293	0.12	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	5	3636	0.14	36293	0.01
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	44	2725	1.61	27339	0.16	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	11	2725	0.40	27339	0.04
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	30	1964	1.53	19305	0.16	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	5	1964	0.25	19305	0.03
December						December					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	30	2172	1.38	19333	0.16	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	24	2172	1.10	19333	0.12
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	17	1610	1.06	15975	0.11	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	14	1610	0.87	15975	0.09
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	29	1629	1.78	14284	0.20	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	14	1629	0.86	14284	0.10
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	16	2760	0.58	10307	0.16	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	17	2760	0.62	10307	0.16
Total	998	99453		805476		Total	314	99453		805476	

FORT-GEORGE						GLASGOW					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	342	920	37.17	8193	4.17
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	69	5663	1.22	43764	0.16	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	1107	5663	19.55	43764	2.53
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	36	9657	0.37	49982	0.07	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	4232	9657	43.82	49982	8.47
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	40	8417	0.48	66310	0.06	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	2220	8417	26.38	66310	3.35
September						September					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	91	19179	0.47	174901	0.05	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	4995	19179	26.04	174901	2.86
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	131	18134	0.72	136160	0.10	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	7015	18134	38.68	136160	5.15
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	43	5277	0.81	44679	0.10	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	2178	5277	41.27	44679	4.87
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	76	2277	3.34	27589	0.28	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	517	2277	22.71	27589	1.87
October						October					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	87	1946	4.47	20812	0.42	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	439	1946	22.56	20812	2.11
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	25	1568	1.59	16952	0.15	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	345	1568	22.00	16952	2.04
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	23	1450	1.59	15852	0.15	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	350	1450	24.14	15852	2.21
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	10	4399	0.23	19099	0.05	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	3284	4399	74.65	19099	17.19
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	21	1829	1.15	17400	0.12	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	568	1829	31.06	17400	3.26
November						November					
01/11/14-07/11/14	9	2241	0.40	20947	0.04	01/11/14-07/11/14	718	2241	32.04	20947	3.43
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	13	3636	0.36	36293	0.04	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	1413	3636	38.86	36293	3.89
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	52	2725	1.91	27339	0.19	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	914	2725	33.54	27339	3.34
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	55	1964	2.80	19305	0.28	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	622	1964	31.67	19305	3.22
December						December					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	31	2172	1.43	19333	0.16	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	604	2172	27.81	19333	3.12
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	26	1610	1.61	15975	0.16	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	477	1610	29.63	15975	2.99
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	24	1629	1.47	14284	0.17	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	429	1629	26.34	14284	3.00
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	11	2760	0.40	10307	0.11	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	368	2760	13.33	10307	3.57
Total	873	99453		805476		Total	33137	99453		805476	

GLENCORSE						HAMILTON					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	8	920	0.87	8193	11.23	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	41	920	4.46	8193	0.50
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	106	5663	1.87	43764	12.94	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	926	5663	16.35	43764	2.12
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	210	9657	2.17	49982	19.32	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	1696	9657	17.56	49982	3.39
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	450	8417	5.35	66310	12.69	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	1420	8417	16.87	66310	2.14
September						September					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	1276	19179	6.65	174901	10.97	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	3742	19179	19.51	174901	2.14
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	1601	18134	8.83	136160	13.32	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	2727	18134	15.04	136160	2.00
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	249	5277	4.72	44679	11.81	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	851	5277	16.13	44679	1.90
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	168	2277	7.38	27589	8.25	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	261	2277	11.46	27589	0.95
October						October					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	66	1946	3.39	20812	9.35	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	123	1946	6.32	20812	0.59
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	53	1568	3.38	16952	9.25	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	88	1568	5.61	16952	0.52
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	49	1450	3.38	15852	9.15	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	101	1450	6.97	15852	0.64
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	46	4399	1.05	19099	23.03	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	155	4399	3.52	19099	0.81
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	48	1829	2.62	17400	10.51	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	162	1829	8.86	17400	0.93
November						November					
01/11/14-07/11/14	79	2241	3.53	20947	10.70	01/11/14-07/11/14	231	2241	10.31	20947	1.10
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	168	3636	4.62	36293	10.02	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	380	3636	10.45	36293	1.05
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	111	2725	4.07	27339	9.97	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	358	2725	13.14	27339	1.31
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	68	1964	3.46	19305	10.17	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	245	1964	12.47	19305	1.27
December						December					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	102	2172	4.70	19333	11.23	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	213	2172	9.81	19333	1.10
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	109	1610	6.77	15975	10.08	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	190	1610	11.80	15975	1.19
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	92	1629	5.65	14284	11.40	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	157	1629	9.64	14284	1.10
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	123	2760	4.46	10307	26.78	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	159	2760	5.76	10307	1.54
Total	5182	99453		805476		Total	14226	99453		805476	

INVERNESS						KIRKCALDY					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	16	920	1.74	8193	0.20	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	52	5663	0.92	43764	0.12	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	315	5663	5.56	43764	0.72
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	37	9657	0.38	49982	0.07	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	328	9657	3.40	49982	0.66
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	28	8417	0.33	66310	0.04	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	350	8417	4.16	66310	0.53
<b>September</b>						<b>September</b>					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	65	19179	0.34	174901	0.04	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	699	19179	3.64	174901	0.40
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	45	18134	0.25	136160	0.03	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	487	18134	2.69	136160	0.36
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	21	5277	0.40	44679	0.05	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	164	5277	3.11	44679	0.37
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	8	2277	0.35	27589	0.03	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	56	2277	2.46	27589	0.20
<b>October</b>						<b>October</b>					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	10	1946	0.51	20812	0.05	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	63	1946	3.24	20812	0.30
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	5	1568	0.32	16952	0.03	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	70	1568	4.46	16952	0.41
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	1	1450	0.07	15852	0.01	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	71	1450	4.90	15852	0.45
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	5	4399	0.11	19099	0.03	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	81	4399	1.84	19099	0.42
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	10	1829	0.55	17400	0.06	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	67	1829	3.66	17400	0.39
<b>November</b>						<b>November</b>					
01/11/14-07/11/14	3	2241	0.13	20947	0.01	01/11/14-07/11/14	115	2241	5.13	20947	0.55
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	6	3636	0.17	36293	0.02	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	109	3636	3.00	36293	0.30
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	6	2725	0.22	27339	0.02	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	77	2725	2.83	27339	0.28
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	5	1964	0.25	19305	0.03	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	38	1964	1.93	19305	0.20
<b>December</b>						<b>December</b>					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	22	2172	1.01	19333	0.11	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	87	2172	4.01	19333	0.45
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	8	1610	0.50	15975	0.05	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	43	1610	2.67	15975	0.27
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	45	1629	2.76	14284	0.32	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	65	1629	3.99	14284	0.46
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	9	2760	0.33	10307	0.09	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	29	2760	1.05	10307	0.28
<b>Total</b>	<b>407</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>3314</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>	

KIRKINTILOCH						LEITH					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	0	5663	0.00	43764	0.00	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	32	5663	0.57	43764	0.07
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	52	9657	0.54	49982	0.10	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	0	9657	0.00	49982	0.00
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	0	8417	0.00	66310	0.00	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	0	8417	0.00	66310	0.00
<b>September</b>						<b>September</b>					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	0	19179	0.00	174901	0.00	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	0	19179	0.00	174901	0.00
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	0	18134	0.00	136160	0.00	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	0	18134	0.00	136160	0.00
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	0	5277	0.00	44679	0.00	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	0	5277	0.00	44679	0.00
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	0	2277	0.00	27589	0.00	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	0	2277	0.00	27589	0.00
<b>October</b>						<b>October</b>					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	0	1946	0.00	20812	0.00	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	0	1946	0.00	20812	0.00
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	0	1568	0.00	16952	0.00	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	0	1568	0.00	16952	0.00
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	0	1450	0.00	15852	0.00	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	0	1450	0.00	15852	0.00
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	0	4399	0.00	19099	0.00	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	0	4399	0.00	19099	0.00
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	0	1829	0.00	17400	0.00	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	0	1829	0.00	17400	0.00
<b>November</b>						<b>November</b>					
01/11/14-07/11/14	0	2241	0.00	20947	0.00	01/11/14-07/11/14	0	2241	0.00	20947	0.00
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	0	3636	0.00	36293	0.00	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	0	3636	0.00	36293	0.00
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	0	2725	0.00	27339	0.00	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	0	2725	0.00	27339	0.00
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	0	1964	0.00	19305	0.00	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	0	1964	0.00	19305	0.00
<b>December</b>						<b>December</b>					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	0	2172	0.00	19333	0.00	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	0	2172	0.00	19333	0.00
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	0	1610	0.00	15975	0.00	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	0	1610	0.00	15975	0.00
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	0	1629	0.00	14284	0.00	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	0	1629	0.00	14284	0.00
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	0	2760	0.00	10307	0.00	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	0	2760	0.00	10307	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>	

OBAN						PAISLEY					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	70	920	7.61	8193	0.85
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	0	5663	0.00	43764	0.00	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	184	5663	3.25	43764	0.42
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	0	9657	0.00	49982	0.00	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	208	9657	2.15	49982	0.42
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	0	8417	0.00	66310	0.00	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	316	8417	3.75	66310	0.48
<b>September</b>						<b>September</b>					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	0	19179	0.00	174901	0.00	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	623	19179	3.25	174901	0.36
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	21	18134	0.12	136160	0.02	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	372	18134	2.05	136160	0.27
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	9	5277	0.17	44679	0.02	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	53	5277	1.00	44679	0.12
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	2	2277	0.09	27589	0.01	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	26	2277	1.14	27589	0.09
<b>October</b>						<b>October</b>					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	0	1946	0.00	20812	0.00	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	59	1946	3.03	20812	0.28
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	1	1568	0.06	16952	0.01	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	43	1568	2.74	16952	0.25
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	4	1450	0.28	15852	0.03	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	52	1450	3.59	15852	0.33
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	1	4399	0.02	19099	0.01	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	43	4399	0.98	19099	0.23
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	2	1829	0.11	17400	0.01	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	46	1829	2.52	17400	0.26
<b>November</b>						<b>November</b>					
01/11/14-07/11/14	3	2241	0.13	20947	0.01	01/11/14-07/11/14	66	2241	2.95	20947	0.32
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	4	3636	0.11	36293	0.01	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	81	3636	2.23	36293	0.22
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	5	2725	0.18	27339	0.02	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	76	2725	2.79	27339	0.28
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	7	1964	0.36	19305	0.04	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	40	1964	2.04	19305	0.21
<b>December</b>						<b>December</b>					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	3	2172	0.14	19333	0.02	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	73	2172	3.36	19333	0.38
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	0	1610	0.00	15975	0.00	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	46	1610	2.86	15975	0.29
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	3	1629	0.18	14284	0.02	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	48	1629	2.95	14284	0.34
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	1	2760	0.04	10307	0.01	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	36	2760	1.30	10307	0.35
<b>Total</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>2561</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>	

PERTH						ROTHESAY					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	71	920	7.72	8193	0.87	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	507	5663	8.95	43764	1.16	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	0	5663	0.00	43764	0.00
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	395	9657	4.09	49982	0.79	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	0	9657	0.00	49982	0.00
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	299	8417	3.55	66310	0.45	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	29	8417	0.34	66310	0.04
September						September					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	671	19179	3.50	174901	0.38	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	12	19179	0.06	174901	0.01
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	351	18134	1.94	136160	0.26	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	22	18134	0.12	136160	0.02
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	111	5277	2.10	44679	0.25	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	14	5277	0.27	44679	0.03
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	48	2277	2.11	27589	0.17	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	5	2277	0.22	27589	0.02
October						October					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	72	1946	3.70	20812	0.35	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	8	1946	0.41	20812	0.04
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	57	1568	3.64	16952	0.34	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	4	1568	0.26	16952	0.02
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	79	1450	5.45	15852	0.50	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	8	1450	0.55	15852	0.05
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	119	4399	2.71	19099	0.62	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	1	4399	0.02	19099	0.01
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	128	1829	7.00	17400	0.74	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	0	1829	0.00	17400	0.00
November						November					
01/11/14-07/11/14	94	2241	4.19	20947	0.45	01/11/14-07/11/14	0	2241	0.00	20947	0.00
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	151	3636	4.15	36293	0.42	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	9	3636	0.25	36293	0.02
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	85	2725	3.12	27339	0.31	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	3	2725	0.11	27339	0.01
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	82	1964	4.18	19305	0.42	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	1	1964	0.05	19305	0.01
December						December					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	102	2172	4.70	19333	0.53	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	4	2172	0.18	19333	0.02
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	69	1610	4.29	15975	0.43	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	4	1610	0.25	15975	0.03
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	53	1629	3.25	14284	0.37	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	2	1629	0.12	14284	0.01
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	26	2760	0.94	10307	0.25	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	19	2760	0.69	10307	0.18
Total	3570	99453		805476		Total	145	99453		805476	

STIRLING						DUNNOON					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	133	920	14.46	8193	1.62	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	472	5663	8.33	43764	1.08	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	0	5663	0.00	43764	0.00
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	398	9657	4.12	49982	0.80	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	0	9657	0.00	49982	0.00
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	634	8417	7.53	66310	0.96	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	0	8417	0.00	66310	0.00
<b>September</b>						<b>September</b>					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	955	19179	4.98	174901	0.55	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	22	19179	0.11	174901	0.01
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	549	18134	3.03	136160	0.40	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	0	18134	0.00	136160	0.00
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	258	5277	4.89	44679	0.58	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	0	5277	0.00	44679	0.00
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	105	2277	4.61	27589	0.38	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	0	2277	0.00	27589	0.00
<b>October</b>						<b>October</b>					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	127	1946	6.53	20812	0.61	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	0	1946	0.00	20812	0.00
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	58	1568	3.70	16952	0.34	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	0	1568	0.00	16952	0.00
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	33	1450	2.28	15852	0.21	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	0	1450	0.00	15852	0.00
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	36	4399	0.82	19099	0.19	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	0	4399	0.00	19099	0.00
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	48	1829	2.62	17400	0.28	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	0	1829	0.00	17400	0.00
<b>November</b>						<b>November</b>					
01/11/14-07/11/14	55	2241	2.45	20947	0.26	01/11/14-07/11/14	0	2241	0.00	20947	0.00
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	104	3636	2.86	36293	0.29	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	0	3636	0.00	36293	0.00
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	133	2725	4.88	27339	0.49	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	0	2725	0.00	27339	0.00
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	112	1964	5.70	19305	0.58	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	0	1964	0.00	19305	0.00
<b>December</b>						<b>December</b>					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	74	2172	3.41	19333	0.38	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	0	2172	0.00	19333	0.00
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	48	1610	2.98	15975	0.30	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	0	1610	0.00	15975	0.00
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	48	1629	2.95	14284	0.34	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	0	1629	0.00	14284	0.00
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	64	2760	2.32	10307	0.62	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	0	2760	0.00	10307	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>4444</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>	

INVERARY						KILMARTIN					
August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	August	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00	02/08/14 - 08/08/14	0	920	0.00	8193	0.00
09/08/14 - 15/08/14	0	5663	0.00	43764	0.00	09/08/14 - 15/08/14	0	5663	0.00	43764	0.00
16/08/14 - 22/08/14	0	9657	0.00	49982	0.00	16/08/14 - 22/08/14	0	9657	0.00	49982	0.00
23/08/14 - 29/08/14	0	8417	0.00	66310	0.00	23/08/14 - 29/08/14	0	8417	0.00	66310	0.00
<b>September</b>						<b>September</b>					
30/08/14 - 05/09/14	2	19179	0.01	174901	0.001	30/08/14 - 05/09/14	0	19179	0.00	174901	0.00
06/09/14 - 12/09/14	0	18134	0.00	136160	0.00	06/09/14 - 12/09/14	5	18134	0.03	136160	0.00
13/09/14 - 19/09/14	0	5277	0.00	44679	0.00	13/09/14 - 19/09/14	0	5277	0.00	44679	0.00
20/09/14 - 26/09/14	0	2277	0.00	27589	0.00	20/09/14 - 26/09/14	0	2277	0.00	27589	0.00
<b>October</b>						<b>October</b>					
27/09/14 - 03/10/14	0	1946	0.00	20812	0.00	27/09/14 - 03/10/14	0	1946	0.00	20812	0.00
04/10/14 - 10/10/14	0	1568	0.00	16952	0.00	04/10/14 - 10/10/14	0	1568	0.00	16952	0.00
11/10/14 - 17/10/14	0	1450	0.00	15852	0.00	11/10/14 - 17/10/14	0	1450	0.00	15852	0.00
18/10/14 - 24/10/14	0	4399	0.00	19099	0.00	18/10/14 - 24/10/14	0	4399	0.00	19099	0.00
25/10/14 - 31/10/14	0	1829	0.00	17400	0.00	25/10/14 - 31/10/14	0	1829	0.00	17400	0.00
<b>November</b>						<b>November</b>					
01/11/14-07/11/14	0	2241	0.00	20947	0.00	01/11/14-07/11/14	0	2241	0.00	20947	0.00
08/11/14 - 14/11/14	0	3636	0.00	36293	0.00	08/11/14 - 14/11/14	0	3636	0.00	36293	0.00
15/11/14 - 21/11/14	0	2725	0.00	27339	0.00	15/11/14 - 21/11/14	0	2725	0.00	27339	0.00
22/11/14 - 28/11/14	0	1964	0.00	19305	0.00	22/11/14 - 28/11/14	0	1964	0.00	19305	0.00
<b>December</b>						<b>December</b>					
29/11/14 - 05/12/14	0	2172	0.00	19333	0.00	29/11/14 - 05/12/14	0	2172	0.00	19333	0.00
06/12/14 - 12/12/14	0	1610	0.00	15975	0.00	06/12/14 - 12/12/14	0	1610	0.00	15975	0.00
13/12/14 - 19/12/14	0	1629	0.00	14284	0.00	13/12/14 - 19/12/14	0	1629	0.00	14284	0.00
20/12/14 - 26/12/14	0	2760	0.00	10307	0.00	20/12/14 - 26/12/14	0	2760	0.00	10307	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>99453</b>		<b>805476</b>	

**APPENDIX iii<sup>1</sup>**

**1915 : JANUARY - APRIL**

**RECRUITING OFFICE**

**WEEKLY TOTALS**

**PERCENT SCOTTISH AND BRITISH TOTALS**

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<sup>1</sup> PRO NATS 1/398. 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.

ABERDEEN						ALLOA					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	32	1013	3.16	32895	0.10	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	7	1013	0.69	32895	0.02
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	58	3161	1.83	34151	0.17	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	62	3161	1.96	34151	0.18
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	67	2775	2.41	30143	0.22	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	50	2775	1.80	30143	0.17
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	57	2455	2.32	24645	0.23	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	80	2455	3.26	24645	0.32
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	83	2325	3.57	19505	0.43	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	39	2325	1.68	19505	0.20
<b>February</b>						<b>February</b>					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	148	1704	8.69	16903	0.88	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	14	1704	0.82	16903	0.08
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	54	1378	3.92	15774	0.34	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	17	1378	1.23	15774	0.11
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	58	1178	4.92	14897	0.39	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	11	1178	0.93	14897	0.07
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	81	1143	7.09	14112	0.57	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	8	1143	0.70	14112	0.06
<b>March</b>						<b>March</b>					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	67	1474	4.55	16740	0.40	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	8	1474	0.54	16740	0.05
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	85	2345	3.62	16648	0.51	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	5	2345	0.21	16648	0.03
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	117	1839	6.36	15747	0.74	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	15	1839	0.82	15747	0.10
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	129	1538	8.39	16115	0.80	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	17	1538	1.11	16115	0.11
<b>April</b>						<b>April</b>					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	145	1734	8.36	12265	1.18	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	12	1734	0.69	12265	0.10
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	150	2027	7.40	18808	0.80	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	9	2027	0.44	18808	0.05
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	81	1438	5.63	21124	0.38	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	12	1438	0.83	21124	0.06
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	54	1371	3.94	23786	0.23	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	25	1371	1.82	23786	0.11
<b>Total</b>	<b>1466</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>391</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	

AYR						BERWICK					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	34	1013	3.36	32895	0.10	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	50	1013	4.94	32895	0.15
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	147	3161	4.65	34151	0.43	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	125	3161	3.95	34151	0.37
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	141	2775	5.08	30143	0.47	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	124	2775	4.47	30143	0.41
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	82	2455	3.34	24645	0.33	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	145	2455	5.91	24645	0.59
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	181	2325	7.78	19505	0.93	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	94	2325	4.04	19505	0.48
<b>February</b>						<b>February</b>					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	117	1704	6.87	16903	0.69	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	65	1704	3.81	16903	0.38
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	76	1378	5.52	15774	0.48	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	94	1378	6.82	15774	0.60
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	59	1178	5.01	14897	0.40	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	65	1178	5.52	14897	0.44
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	51	1143	4.46	14112	0.36	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	37	1143	3.24	14112	0.26
<b>March</b>						<b>March</b>					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	36	1474	2.44	16740	0.22	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	25	1474	1.70	16740	0.15
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	61	2345	2.60	16648	0.37	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	45	2345	1.92	16648	0.27
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	45	1839	2.45	15747	0.29	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	46	1839	2.50	15747	0.29
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	71	1538	4.62	16115	0.44	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	28	1538	1.82	16115	0.17
<b>April</b>						<b>April</b>					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	38	1734	2.19	12265	0.31	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	48	1734	2.77	12265	0.39
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	58	2027	2.86	18808	0.31	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	43	2027	2.12	18808	0.23
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	42	1438	2.92	21124	0.20	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	34	1438	2.36	21124	0.16
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	53	1371	3.87	23786	0.22	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	37	1371	2.70	23786	0.16
<b>Total</b>	<b>1292</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>1105</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	

CUPAR						CLYDEBANK					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	8	1013	0.79	32895	0.02	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	13	1013	1.28	32895	0.04
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	10	3161	0.32	34151	0.03	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	55	3161	1.74	34151	0.16
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	11	2775	0.40	30143	0.04	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	28	2775	1.01	30143	0.09
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	21	2455	0.86	24645	0.09	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	14	2455	0.57	24645	0.06
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	50	2325	2.15	19505	0.26	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	20	2325	0.86	19505	0.10
<b>February</b>						<b>February</b>					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	35	1704	2.05	16903	0.21	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	22	1704	1.29	16903	0.13
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	21	1378	1.52	15774	0.13	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	10	1378	0.73	15774	0.06
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	20	1178	1.70	14897	0.13	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	15	1178	1.27	14897	0.10
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	19	1143	1.66	14112	0.13	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	12	1143	1.05	14112	0.09
<b>March</b>						<b>March</b>					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	3	1474	0.20	16740	0.02	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	10	1474	0.68	16740	0.06
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	10	2345	0.43	16648	0.06	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	16	2345	0.68	16648	0.10
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	5	1839	0.27	15747	0.03	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	17	1839	0.92	15747	0.11
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	7	1538	0.46	16115	0.04	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	14	1538	0.91	16115	0.09
<b>April</b>						<b>April</b>					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	14	1734	0.81	12265	0.11	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	13	1734	0.75	12265	0.11
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	14	2027	0.69	18808	0.07	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	25	2027	1.23	18808	0.13
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	5	1438	0.35	21124	0.02	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	13	1438	0.90	21124	0.06
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	24	1371	1.75	23786	0.10	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	24	1371	1.75	23786	0.10
<b>Total</b>	<b>277</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>321</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	

DUMBARTON						DUNBAR					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	24	1013	2.37	32895	0.07	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	1	1013	0.10	32895	0.00
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	78	3161	2.47	34151	0.23	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	11	3161	0.35	34151	0.03
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	29	2775	1.05	30143	0.10	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	5	2775	0.18	30143	0.02
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	19	2455	0.77	24645	0.08	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	4	2455	0.16	24645	0.02
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	17	2325	0.73	19505	0.09	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	0	2325	0.00	19505	0.00
<b>February</b>						<b>February</b>					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	4	1704	0.23	16903	0.02	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	1	1704	0.06	16903	0.01
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	34	1378	2.47	15774	0.22	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	2	1378	0.15	15774	0.01
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	29	1178	2.46	14897	0.19	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	0	1178	0.00	14897	0.00
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	16	1143	1.40	14112	0.11	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	1	1143	0.09	14112	0.01
<b>March</b>						<b>March</b>					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	6	1474	0.41	16740	0.04	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	3	1474	0.20	16740	0.02
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	22	2345	0.94	16648	0.13	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	0	2345	0.00	16648	0.00
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	32	1839	1.74	15747	0.20	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	1	1839	0.05	15747	0.01
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	33	1538	2.15	16115	0.20	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	0	1538	0.00	16115	0.00
<b>April</b>						<b>April</b>					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	6	1734	0.35	12265	0.05	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	2	1734	0.12	12265	0.02
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	56	2027	2.76	18808	0.30	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	2	2027	0.10	18808	0.01
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	14	1438	0.97	21124	0.07	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	0	1438	0.00	21124	0.00
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	11	1371	0.80	23786	0.05	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	0	1371	0.00	23786	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>430</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	

DUNBLANE						DUNDEE					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	6	1013	0.59	32895	0.02	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	46	1013	4.54	32895	0.14
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	9	3161	0.28	34151	0.03	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	192	3161	6.07	34151	0.56
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	15	2775	0.54	30143	0.05	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	215	2775	7.75	30143	0.71
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	9	2455	0.37	24645	0.04	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	101	2455	4.11	24645	0.41
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	3	2325	0.13	19505	0.02	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	96	2325	4.13	19505	0.49
<b>February</b>						<b>February</b>					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	5	1704	0.29	16903	0.03	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	36	1704	2.11	16903	0.21
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	5	1378	0.36	15774	0.03	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	120	1378	8.71	15774	0.76
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	2	1178	0.17	14897	0.01	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	33	1178	2.80	14897	0.22
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	3	1143	0.26	14112	0.02	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	26	1143	2.27	14112	0.18
<b>March</b>						<b>March</b>					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	3	1474	0.20	16740	0.02	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	56	1474	3.80	16740	0.33
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	2	2345	0.09	16648	0.01	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	113	2345	4.82	16648	0.68
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	3	1839	0.16	15747	0.02	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	70	1839	3.81	15747	0.44
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	4	1538	0.26	16115	0.02	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	48	1538	3.12	16115	0.30
<b>April</b>						<b>April</b>					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	0	1734	0.00	12265	0.00	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	112	1734	6.46	12265	0.91
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	0	2027	0.00	18808	0.00	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	155	2027	7.65	18808	0.82
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	0	1438	0.00	21124	0.00	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	93	1438	6.47	21124	0.44
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	0	1371	0.00	23786	0.00	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	78	1371	5.69	23786	0.33
<b>Total</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>1590</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	

DUNFERMLINE						EDINBURGH					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	37	1013	3.65	32895	0.11	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	192	1013	18.95	32895	0.58
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	121	3161	3.83	34151	0.35	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	565	3161	17.87	34151	1.65
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	117	2775	4.22	30143	0.39	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	297	2775	10.70	30143	0.99
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	59	2455	2.40	24645	0.24	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	312	2455	12.71	24645	1.27
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	60	2325	2.58	19505	0.31	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	301	2325	12.95	19505	1.54
February						February					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	32	1704	1.88	16903	0.19	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	314	1704	18.43	16903	1.86
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	33	1378	2.39	15774	0.21	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	209	1378	15.17	15774	1.32
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	27	1178	2.29	14897	0.18	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	225	1178	19.10	14897	1.51
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	19	1143	1.66	14112	0.13	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	181	1143	15.84	14112	1.28
March						March					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	25	1474	1.70	16740	0.15	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	190	1474	12.89	16740	1.14
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	56	2345	2.39	16648	0.34	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	655	2345	27.93	16648	3.93
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	30	1839	1.63	15747	0.19	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	440	1839	23.93	15747	2.79
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	30	1538	1.95	16115	0.19	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	307	1538	19.96	16115	1.91
April						April					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	31	1734	1.79	12265	0.25	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	440	1734	25.37	12265	3.59
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	36	2027	1.78	18808	0.19	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	390	2027	19.24	18808	2.07
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	36	1438	2.50	21124	0.17	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	279	1438	19.40	21124	1.32
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	45	1371	3.28	23786	0.19	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	278	1371	20.28	23786	1.17
Total	794	30898		344258		Total	5575	30898		344258	

FALKIRK						FORFAR					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	7	1013	0.69	32895	0.02	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	0	1013	0.00	32895	0.00
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	45	3161	1.42	34151	0.13	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	0	3161	0.00	34151	0.00
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	24	2775	0.86	30143	0.08	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	0	2775	0.00	30143	0.00
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	30	2455	1.22	24645	0.12	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	0	2455	0.00	24645	0.00
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	11	2325	0.47	19505	0.06	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	0	2325	0.00	19505	0.00
<b>February</b>						<b>February</b>					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	21	1704	1.23	16903	0.12	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	0	1704	0.00	16903	0.00
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	9	1378	0.65	15774	0.06	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	0	1378	0.00	15774	0.00
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	3	1178	0.25	14897	0.02	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	0	1178	0.00	14897	0.00
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	8	1143	0.70	14112	0.06	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	0	1143	0.00	14112	0.00
<b>March</b>						<b>March</b>					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	9	1474	0.61	16740	0.05	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	0	1474	0.00	16740	0.00
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	10	2345	0.43	16648	0.06	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	0	2345	0.00	16648	0.00
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	11	1839	0.60	15747	0.07	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	0	1839	0.00	15747	0.00
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	22	1538	1.43	16115	0.14	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	0	1538	0.00	16115	0.00
<b>April</b>						<b>April</b>					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	8	1734	0.46	12265	0.07	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	0	1734	0.00	12265	0.00
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	14	2027	0.69	18808	0.07	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	0	2027	0.00	18808	0.00
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	21	1438	1.46	21124	0.10	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	0	1438	0.00	21124	0.00
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	14	1371	1.02	23786	0.06	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	0	1371	0.00	23786	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>267</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	

FORT-GEORGE						GLASGOW					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	12	1013	1.18	32895	0.04	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	247	1013	24.38	32895	0.75
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	39	3161	1.23	34151	0.11	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	828	3161	26.19	34151	2.42
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	46	2775	1.66	30143	0.15	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	864	2775	31.14	30143	2.87
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	38	2455	1.55	24645	0.15	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	744	2455	30.31	24645	3.02
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	57	2325	2.45	19505	0.29	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	580	2325	24.95	19505	2.97
<b>February</b>						<b>February</b>					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	42	1704	2.46	16903	0.25	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	383	1704	22.48	16903	2.27
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	16	1378	1.16	15774	0.10	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	349	1378	25.33	15774	2.21
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	16	1178	1.36	14897	0.11	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	250	1178	21.22	14897	1.68
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	18	1143	1.57	14112	0.13	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	351	1143	30.71	14112	2.49
<b>March</b>						<b>March</b>					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	11	1474	0.75	16740	0.07	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	584	1474	39.62	16740	3.49
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	15	2345	0.64	16648	0.09	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	895	2345	38.17	16648	5.38
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	13	1839	0.71	15747	0.08	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	696	1839	37.85	15747	4.42
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	7	1538	0.46	16115	0.04	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	516	1538	33.55	16115	3.20
<b>April</b>						<b>April</b>					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	15	1734	0.87	12265	0.12	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	531	1734	30.62	12265	4.33
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	11	2027	0.54	18808	0.06	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	620	2027	30.59	18808	3.30
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	12	1438	0.83	21124	0.06	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	426	1438	29.62	21124	2.02
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	20	1371	1.46	23786	0.08	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	376	1371	27.43	23786	1.58
<b>Total</b>	<b>388</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>9240</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	

Glencorse						HAMILTON					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	55	1013	5.43	32895	3.08	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	123	1013	12.14	32895	0.37
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	188	3161	5.95	34151	9.26	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	0	3161	0.00	34151	0.00
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	193	2775	6.95	30143	9.21	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	0	2775	0.00	30143	0.00
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	173	2455	7.05	24645	9.96	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	64	2455	2.61	24645	0.26
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	88	2325	3.78	19505	11.92	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	253	2325	10.88	19505	1.30
February						February					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	42	1704	2.46	16903	10.08	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	145	1704	8.51	16903	0.86
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	39	1378	2.83	15774	8.74	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	121	1378	8.78	15774	0.77
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	34	1178	2.89	14897	7.91	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	95	1178	8.06	14897	0.64
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	39	1143	3.41	14112	8.10	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	117	1143	10.24	14112	0.83
March						March					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	60	1474	4.07	16740	8.81	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	217	1474	14.72	16740	1.30
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	43	2345	1.83	16648	14.09	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	120	2345	5.12	16648	0.72
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	36	1839	1.96	15747	11.68	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	104	1839	5.66	15747	0.66
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	20	1538	1.30	16115	9.54	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	103	1538	6.70	16115	0.64
April						April					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	21	1734	1.21	12265	14.14	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	104	1734	6.00	12265	0.85
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	35	2027	1.73	18808	10.78	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	191	2027	9.42	18808	1.02
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	34	1438	2.36	21124	6.81	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	163	1438	11.34	21124	0.77
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	34	1371	2.48	23786	5.76	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	110	1371	8.02	23786	0.46
Total	1134	30898		344258		Total	2030	30898		344258	

INVERNESS						KIRKCALDY					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	5	1013	0.49	32895	0.02	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	19	1013	1.88	32895	0.06
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	0	3161	0.00	34151	0.00	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	102	3161	3.23	34151	0.30
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	0	2775	0.00	30143	0.00	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	64	2775	2.31	30143	0.21
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	2	2455	0.08	24645	0.01	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	59	2455	2.40	24645	0.24
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	7	2325	0.30	19505	0.04	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	34	2325	1.46	19505	0.17
<b>February</b>						<b>February</b>					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	8	1704	0.47	16903	0.05	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	28	1704	1.64	16903	0.17
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	3	1378	0.22	15774	0.02	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	20	1378	1.45	15774	0.13
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	3	1178	0.25	14897	0.02	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	30	1178	2.55	14897	0.20
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	14	1143	1.22	14112	0.10	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	23	1143	2.01	14112	0.16
<b>March</b>						<b>March</b>					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	4	1474	0.27	16740	0.02	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	22	1474	1.49	16740	0.13
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	15	2345	0.64	16648	0.09	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	28	2345	1.19	16648	0.17
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	6	1839	0.33	15747	0.04	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	25	1839	1.36	15747	0.16
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	3	1538	0.20	16115	0.02	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	17	1538	1.11	16115	0.11
<b>April</b>						<b>April</b>					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	7	1734	0.40	12265	0.06	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	23	1734	1.33	12265	0.19
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	8	2027	0.39	18808	0.04	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	34	2027	1.68	18808	0.18
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	19	1438	1.32	21124	0.09	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	31	1438	2.16	21124	0.15
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	10	1371	0.73	23786	0.04	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	28	1371	2.04	23786	0.12
<b>Total</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>587</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	

KIRKINTILOCH						LEITH					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	0	1013	0.00	32895	0.00	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	0	1013	0.00	32895	0.00
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	0	3161	0.00	34151	0.00	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	0	3161	0.00	34151	0.00
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	0	2775	0.00	30143	0.00	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	0	2775	0.00	30143	0.00
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	0	2455	0.00	24645	0.00	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	0	2455	0.00	24645	0.00
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	0	2325	0.00	19505	0.00	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	0	2325	0.00	19505	0.00
<b>February</b>						<b>February</b>					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	0	1704	0.00	16903	0.00	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	0	1704	0.00	16903	0.00
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	0	1378	0.00	15774	0.00	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	0	1378	0.00	15774	0.00
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	0	1178	0.00	14897	0.00	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	0	1178	0.00	14897	0.00
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	0	1143	0.00	14112	0.00	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	0	1143	0.00	14112	0.00
<b>March</b>						<b>March</b>					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	0	1474	0.00	16740	0.00	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	0	1474	0.00	16740	0.00
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	0	2345	0.00	16648	0.00	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	0	2345	0.00	16648	0.00
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	0	1839	0.00	15747	0.00	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	0	1839	0.00	15747	0.00
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	0	1538	0.00	16115	0.00	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	0	1538	0.00	16115	0.00
<b>April</b>						<b>April</b>					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	0	1734	0.00	12265	0.00	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	0	1734	0.00	12265	0.00
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	0	2027	0.00	18808	0.00	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	0	2027	0.00	18808	0.00
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	0	1438	0.00	21124	0.00	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	0	1438	0.00	21124	0.00
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	0	1371	0.00	23786	0.00	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	0	1371	0.00	23786	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	

OBAN						PAISLEY					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	1	1013	0.10	32895	0.00	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	45	1013	4.44	32895	0.14
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	8	3161	0.25	34151	0.02	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	133	3161	4.21	34151	0.39
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	1	2775	0.04	30143	0.00	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	133	2775	4.79	30143	0.44
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	1	2455	0.04	24645	0.00	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	147	2455	5.99	24645	0.60
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	3	2325	0.13	19505	0.02	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	97	2325	4.17	19505	0.50
<b>February</b>						<b>February</b>					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	1	1704	0.06	16903	0.01	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	88	1704	5.16	16903	0.52
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	1	1378	0.07	15774	0.01	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	56	1378	4.06	15774	0.36
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	2	1178	0.17	14897	0.01	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	40	1178	3.40	14897	0.27
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	1	1143	0.09	14112	0.01	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	32	1143	2.80	14112	0.23
<b>March</b>						<b>March</b>					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	0	1474	0.00	16740	0.00	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	49	1474	3.32	16740	0.29
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	2	2345	0.09	16648	0.01	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	45	2345	1.92	16648	0.27
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	1	1839	0.05	15747	0.01	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	52	1839	2.83	15747	0.33
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	0	1538	0.00	16115	0.00	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	70	1538	4.55	16115	0.43
<b>April</b>						<b>April</b>					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	1	1734	0.06	12265	0.01	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	40	1734	2.31	12265	0.33
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	1	2027	0.05	18808	0.01	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	64	2027	3.16	18808	0.34
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	3	1438	0.21	21124	0.01	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	42	1438	2.92	21124	0.20
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	0	1371	0.00	23786	0.00	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	39	1371	2.84	23786	0.16
<b>Total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>1172</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	

PERTH						ROTHESAY					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	24	1013	2.37	32895	0.07	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	6	1013	0.59	32895	0.02
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	157	3161	4.97	34151	0.46	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	7	3161	0.22	34151	0.02
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	180	2775	6.49	30143	0.60	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	6	2775	0.22	30143	0.02
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	194	2455	7.90	24645	0.79	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	11	2455	0.45	24645	0.04
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	171	2325	7.35	19505	0.88	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	8	2325	0.34	19505	0.04
<b>February</b>						<b>February</b>					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	117	1704	6.87	16903	0.69	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	2	1704	0.12	16903	0.01
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	54	1378	3.92	15774	0.34	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	5	1378	0.36	15774	0.03
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	120	1178	10.19	14897	0.81	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	11	1178	0.93	14897	0.07
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	46	1143	4.02	14112	0.33	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	10	1143	0.87	14112	0.07
<b>March</b>						<b>March</b>					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	53	1474	3.60	16740	0.32	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	3	1474	0.20	16740	0.02
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	56	2345	2.39	16648	0.34	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	1	2345	0.04	16648	0.01
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	37	1839	2.01	15747	0.23	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	2	1839	0.11	15747	0.01
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	54	1538	3.51	16115	0.34	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	5	1538	0.33	16115	0.03
<b>April</b>						<b>April</b>					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	43	1734	2.48	12265	0.35	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	4	1734	0.23	12265	0.03
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	44	2027	2.17	18808	0.23	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	2	2027	0.10	18808	0.01
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	49	1438	3.41	21124	0.23	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	4	1438	0.28	21124	0.02
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	75	1371	5.47	23786	0.32	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	4	1371	0.29	23786	0.02
<b>Total</b>	<b>1474</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	

STIRLING						DUNOON					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	15	1013	1.48	32895	0.05	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	0	1013	0.00	32895	0.00
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	221	3161	6.99	34151	0.65	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	0	3161	0.00	34151	0.00
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	165	2775	5.95	30143	0.55	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	0	2775	0.00	30143	0.00
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	89	2455	3.63	24645	0.36	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	0	2455	0.00	24645	0.00
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	72	2325	3.10	19505	0.37	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	0	2325	0.00	19505	0.00
<b>February</b>						<b>February</b>					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	34	1704	2.00	16903	0.20	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	0	1704	0.00	16903	0.00
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	30	1378	2.18	15774	0.19	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	0	1378	0.00	15774	0.00
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	30	1178	2.55	14897	0.20	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	0	1178	0.00	14897	0.00
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	30	1143	2.62	14112	0.21	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	0	1143	0.00	14112	0.00
<b>March</b>						<b>March</b>					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	30	1474	2.04	16740	0.18	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	0	1474	0.00	16740	0.00
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	45	2345	1.92	16648	0.27	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	0	2345	0.00	16648	0.00
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	35	1839	1.90	15747	0.22	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	0	1839	0.00	15747	0.00
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	33	1538	2.15	16115	0.20	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	0	1538	0.00	16115	0.00
<b>April</b>						<b>April</b>					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	76	1734	4.38	12265	0.62	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	0	1734	0.00	12265	0.00
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	65	2027	3.21	18808	0.35	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	0	2027	0.00	18808	0.00
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	25	1438	1.74	21124	0.12	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	0	1438	0.00	21124	0.00
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	32	1371	2.33	23786	0.13	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	0	1371	0.00	23786	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>1027</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	

INVERARY						KILMARTIN					
January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total	January	# of Recruits	Total Scotland	Percent of Total	Total Britain	Percent of Total
27/12/14 – 02/01/15	0	1013	0.00	32895	0.00	27/12/14 – 02/01/15	0	1013	0.00	32895	0.00
03/01/15 – 09/01/15	0	3161	0.00	34151	0.00	03/01/15 – 09/01/15	0	3161	0.00	34151	0.00
10/01/15 – 16/01/15	0	2775	0.00	30143	0.00	10/01/15 – 16/01/15	0	2775	0.00	30143	0.00
17/01/15 – 23/01/15	0	2455	0.00	24645	0.00	17/01/15 – 23/01/15	0	2455	0.00	24645	0.00
24/01/15 – 30/01/15	0	2325	0.00	19505	0.00	24/01/15 – 30/01/15	0	2325	0.00	19505	0.00
<b>February</b>						<b>February</b>					
31/01/15 – 06/02/15	0	1704	0.00	16903	0.00	31/01/15 – 06/02/15	0	1704	0.00	16903	0.00
07/02/15 – 13/02/15	0	1378	0.00	15774	0.00	07/02/15 – 13/02/15	0	1378	0.00	15774	0.00
14/02/15 – 20/02/15	0	1178	0.00	14897	0.00	14/02/15 – 20/02/15	0	1178	0.00	14897	0.00
21/02/15 – 27/02/15	0	1143	0.00	14112	0.00	21/02/15 – 27/02/15	0	1143	0.00	14112	0.00
<b>March</b>						<b>March</b>					
28/02/15 – 06/03/15	0	1474	0.00	16740	0.00	28/02/15 – 06/03/15	0	1474	0.00	16740	0.00
07/03/15 – 13/03/15	0	2345	0.00	16648	0.00	07/03/15 – 13/03/15	0	2345	0.00	16648	0.00
14/03/15 – 20/03/15	0	1839	0.00	15747	0.00	14/03/15 – 20/03/15	0	1839	0.00	15747	0.00
21/03/15 – 27/03/15	0	1538	0.00	16115	0.00	21/03/15 – 27/03/15	0	1538	0.00	16115	0.00
<b>April</b>						<b>April</b>					
28/03/15 – 03/04/15	0	1734	0.00	12265	0.00	28/03/15 – 03/04/15	0	1734	0.00	12265	0.00
04/04/15 – 10/04/15	0	2027	0.00	18808	0.00	04/04/15 – 10/04/15	0	2027	0.00	18808	0.00
11/04/15 – 17/04/15	0	1438	0.00	21124	0.00	11/04/15 – 17/04/15	0	1438	0.00	21124	0.00
18/04/15 – 24/04/15	0	1371	0.00	23786	0.00	18/04/15 – 24/04/15	0	1371	0.00	23786	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>30898</b>		<b>344258</b>	

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