Stoic *Pietas* in the *Aeneid*: A Study of the Poem's Ideological Appeal and Reception

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Abstract

Employing a research method informed by *Begriffsgeschichte,* this thesis proposes a re-examining of *pietas* in Virgil's *Aeneid* through a Stoic lens. It aims to show how Stoic philosophy underlines the *Aeneid* and Virgilian *pietas.* It illustrates how the *Aeneid* represents a unique intervention in the virtue's history as a distinctly masculine quality characterised by Stoic submission to fate and suppression of emotion. In the character Aeneas, Virgil shows how philosophical ideas can be transmitted through individuals. Aeneas is characterised by a Stoic *pietas* that manifests in his willing service to fate and his subversion of personal feeling. The *Aeneid* unites social and political ideas of *pietas* with personal ones within a Stoic moral framework. We see the remarkable achievement in Virgil's combination of public and private values in *Aeneid* VI, which serves a didactic function and unveils the benefit of *pietas,* a community-oriented virtue, for the individual. In *Aeneid* VI, the ideological coherence of the epic becomes clear, and we see *pietas* as a unifying behavioural trait for an ideal masculine Roman identity within an Augustan context. In the relationship between Aeneas and the fate of Rome, Virgil urges the reader to accept the overall merit in a Stoic worldview and disposition in relation to the city's foundation narrative. The thesis examines the impact of this ideological coherence on subsequent literature. The reception of Virgilian *pietas* leads to Christian adaptations of the virtue related to religious faith and devotion to God, akin to what we might consider Christian piety. The shift from Virgilian *pietas* to Christian piety denotes a move from a politicised ideological virtue of civic service to a quality underlined by spiritual and religious devotion. This thesis determines that Virgil's Stoic rendering of *pietas* is the ideological lynchpin of the epic, as well as the key to its ideological coherence. Virgil's exceptional and powerful representation of *pietas* and a hero who embodies it completely has contributed to the lasting appeal of the *Aeneid* and its appropriation as a quasi-scriptural text by Christian authors, ensuring its continued preservation.

Contents

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Introduction to the Thesis

This thesis will look to analyse the ideological power and persistence of *pietas* in Virgil's *Aeneid* through a Stoic lens. Applying a research method inspired by *Begriffsgeschichte,* it will argue that the *Aeneid* presents a unique intervention in the semantics of the word *pietas,* exhibiting a new and more focussed engagement with Stoic ideas, and producing a vision of public duty and Roman identity that became characteristic for the Augustan regime and of remarkable influence thereafter. Perhaps the most noteworthy ideological innovation of the *Aeneid* was the suggestion of a faith-based belief system oriented around the performance of *pietas,* which Virgil draws our attention to most overtly in *Aeneid* VI. This thesis will focus on how Virgil's *Aeneid* depicts a symbol of ideal masculine identity in the character of Aeneas through a rendering of *pietas* that draws explicitly on Stoic philosophy and measured behaviour. The most evident aspects of Stoicism in the *Aeneid* are the supremacy of reason over emotion, or, the subversion of personal feeling in favour of public duty, and the representation of fate, *fatum* or *fata* to Virgil depending on the context, as responsible for all things.[1] In several instances in the *Aeneid,* we read of Aeneas' subversion of personal desire in favour of pursuing his mission to reach Latium, which aligns with the overarching fate that precipitates the events of the epic, the prophecy of Jupiter that Aeneas will go on to settle in Latium, the future site of Rome.[2] Aeneas' unfailing commitment to his fated mission over his personal feelings underlines his *pietas* throughout the epic and renders him a model Stoic and Roman citizen for the Augustan regime.

Although many scholars identify the *Aeneid* as a reflection of the period of tremendous social, political and cultural upheaval in Rome in which it was produced, in many ways, the poem looks forward to the relative stability of the Augustan regime and presents a justified vision of Roman imperialism.[3] Commissioned by the emperor Augustus, the *Aeneid* has become a quasi-scriptural, or sacred, text, largely as a result of the central

[1] Shaw, 1985; Meyer, 2009; Baltzly, 2018. I will discuss these aspects of Stoicism in the *Aeneid* in more detail in **2.2** and **2.3**.
[2] We see this in Jupiter's prophecy in the beginning of the *Aeneid* (I.257-279), and in his words to Juno near the conclusion (XII.836-840). This prophecy is also recalled by that of Evander's mother Carmenta, which is briefly referred to by Evander in *Aeneid* VIII (VIII.340-341).
[3] Johnson, 1958; Weinstock, 1971; Gransden, 1984; Fowler, 1990; Harrison, 1990; West, 1990; Williams; 1990b; Ball, 1991; Hainsworth, 1991; Kennedy, 1997b; Tarrant, 1997; Theodorakopoulos, 1997; Bessinger, Tylus and Wofford, 1999; Grebe, 2004; Bell, 2008; Howatson 2011.

ideological role played by *pietas*.[4] The epic offers a mythical history for the city of Rome to rival that of Greece, blending the spheres of mortal and divine, complete with a hero who bridges the gap between past and present, linking the foundation of Rome to the *gens Iulia* and the current emperor Augustus.[5] Aeneas signified a stable character ideal for this new regime, both distinct from and superior to pre-existing Homeric heroes by virtue of his *pietas*.[6] In Aeneas, Virgil gave his readers a man who adhered to the values of *pietas* at all times, and showed loyalty to his destiny to found the Roman race above all things. With respect to Aeneas, this thesis aims to demonstrate that *pietas* underlined by Roman Stoicism is the central motivation behind the character and his epithet *pius,* and that the ideological power of the epic depends on characterising him as an embodiment of this virtue. Within the *Aeneid,* Virgil manufactures a new version of *pietas*, and its novelty emerges largely from a greater emphasis than previously acknowledged on Stoic philosophical values.

By tracing the history of the term before and after the poem, I intend to show that *pietas* in the *Aeneid* is an ideologically loaded concept, and that its nuances become easier to discern when tracked via isolating representations of the virtue in the *Aeneid* and in later texts. In line with a methodology informed by *Begriffsgeschichte*, this process of isolating and analysing brings out the unique nature of Virgilian *pietas* and leads towards a faith-oriented reading of the term. We will see this reading emerge more clearly in receptions and manipulations of *pietas* in later literature. Virgil's *pietas* is different from notions of *pietas* before or after the *Aeneid* in its Stoic signalling. Aeneas' performances of *pietas* may be traced at every juncture to a Stoic thought process, one that elevates his pursuit of his fate to settle in Latium above any other course of action. Virgil has appropriately chosen Stoicism to underline his epic in order to provide a recognisable but not fully naturalised system of values, and he brings this system to life through the character Aeneas and his *pietas*. In this, Virgil shows how philosophy can function within a historical foundation narrative. To a significant extent, the central drama of the poem consists of watching Aeneas struggle to integrate Stoic ideals with *pietas* under challenging circumstances, while simultaneously, Virgil impresses on the reader the importance of

[4] See Sanders (1987) and Barton (1997) for more on the history of sacred stories and sacred texts. Weinstock (1971), Fowler (1990), West (1990), Williams (1990), Tarant (1997), Theodorakopooulos (1997), Grebe (2004) Thomas (2004), Bell (2008) and Moore (2017) address Augustus' role in commissioning the *Aeneid.*
[5] Ahl, 1976, p. 65.
[6] Ball, 1991.

being able to do just that.[7] The hero's actions indicate that there is a circularity between *pietas* and Stoicism, as when aspects of Aeneas' *pietas* are brought into conflict with one another, the outcome is always attributable to Stoic motivations.

This thesis will be divided into six subsequent chapters and a conclusion. Chapter **2** will look at the function of philosophy in the *Aeneid,* and how Virgil unites moral, theological and philosophical ideas into a narrative of enormous cultural authority and ideological coherence within a Stoic framework. It will provide a foundation for a closer interrogation of Virgilian *pietas* as a Stoic virtue and Aeneas as a Stoic hero. This chapter will also assess Virgil's engagement with Stoic philosophy as an alternative to Lucretian Epicureanism. It will demonstrate how Stoic principles may be found throughout the *Aeneid* as a whole, introducing an interpretative framework by which we may evaluate the *Aeneid* as a Stoic text and Aeneas as a Stoic hero. This framework relies on ideas of Stoic fate, free will and assent, the divine and mastery of emotion in the *Aeneid* and with respect to Aeneas. In looking closely at Stoicism in the *Aeneid* in relation to *pietas* and Aeneas, I will show that *pietas* forms the ideological lynchpin of the epic, and is arguably responsible for its quasi-scriptural quality and its appeal to Christianity, which ensured the enduring legacy of the poem.[8] This will become clear in chapter **7,** where I will discuss the reception of *pietas* in later authors and the tradition of reading the *Aeneid* as moral allegory, drawing attention to the overlap between Stoic and Christian ideas of struggle and dedication and obedience to a higher power.

Chapters **3** and **4** will discuss the function of *pietas* in Augustan Rome and in the *Aeneid*. Chapter **3** will focus on the concept of *pietas* as a value in Virgil's Rome. It will first establish a working understanding of Virgilian *pietas* for the purpose of the thesis by drawing on ancient sources, principally Cicero. Cicero's work shows experimentation with ways of combining history and philosophy, and engagement with Stoic philosophy, offering a relatively recent reference point for readers of Virgil's philosophically motivated historical epic. In addition, the subtle variations between representations of *pietas* in Cicero's works show the flexibility of *pietas* with respect to cultural circumstances.

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[7] As Williams (1990, p. 27) expands, this 'seems to be a major purpose of the *Aeneid,* to explore the relationship of the stern, strong, political, intellectual, organizational world of Roman life and the private, emotional, sensitive, vulnerable, frail world of the individual'.

[8] Many scholars over the last century have noted the resonance between certain principles in the *Aeneid,* such as *pietas,* and Christian values. See Highet (1949), Eliot (1953), Solmsen (1972), Currie (1975), Habinek (1989), Fowler (1990), Braund (1997), Ferguson (1998 and 2003), Scourfield (2007), Zagzebski (2007) and Gransden and Harrison (2010). Additionally, Scholars such as Eliot (1953), Harrison (1990), Braund (1997), Burrow (1997) and Tarrant (1997) have regarded Virgil as a 'Christian poet'.

Chapter **3** will conclude by looking at the relationship of *pietas* to the emperor Augustus, Roman religion and social class.

Chapter **4** will turn to the text of the *Aeneid*, concentrating on *pietas* as it relates to Aeneas. It will investigate pre-Virgilian associations of this virtue with Virgil's hero, the recognition of Aeneas' *pietas* by other characters and the epithet *pius* and its significance for the character as a moral centre of the poem. This chapter will also look at associations of *pietas* with additional persons, paying particular attention to the Etruscan prince Lausus, and what his connection with *pietas,* as an enemy of Aeneas and of Rome, might imply for this virtue in the Augustan regime. These two chapters will highlight the strength and effectiveness of Virgil's vision for establishing a coherent ideology of a moral and imperial virtue in *pietas,* while emphasising the relationship between Virgilian *pietas* and Stoic philosophy. By examining the history of *pietas* in accordance with a methodology inspired by *Begriffsgeschichte,* we are able to more effectively analyse Virgilian *pietas* in the *Aeneid* in the context of its time period, as well as its nuances and flexibilities throughout the epic.

In chapter **5**, I will look at conflicts of *pietas* within the *Aeneid* and continue to advocate that the text is promulgating a particular kind of Stoic message underlining the virtue. This chapter will examine three prominent conflicts of *pietas* in the epic*,* and how they demonstrate the problematic nature of the virtue as well as the immense personal sacrifices it demands. I will focus on Aeneas' departure from Troy at the end of *Aeneid* II, his exit from Carthage at the end of *Aeneid* IV, and his final act of killing Turnus at the conclusion of *Aeneid* XII. This chapter will also include a discussion of *pietas* as it relates to romantic love, *amor,* marriage and female characters. It will bring to light the male exclusivity of *pietas,* and the differences of importance placed on *pietas* towards male family members and direct bloodlines as opposed to female spouses. Within these episodes, I will investigate the hierarchical nature of the duties governed by *pietas,* and how this adds further turmoil to situations that are already challenging for Aeneas. I will also identify how Stoicism in the form of allegiance to his fate to reach and settle in Latium, as outlined in Jupiter's prophecy in *Aeneid* I (I.257-279), plays a principal role in the outcome of these three main conflicts of *pietas*.

Chapter **6** will turn to *Aeneid* VI and use it as a case study to examine the overall importance of *pietas* and Stoicism to the ideological appeal of the epic, as well as the relationship of both to the poem's legacy. In an analysis of Virgil's inimitable underworld

presentation and geography, I will discuss the moral and philosophical forces at work, and how they act as signposts for the poet's image of Roman male identity in the Augustan regime. In *Aeneid* VI, Virgil reveals the incentive for Roman readers to act in accordance with *pietas.* By depicting an afterlife contingent on lives lived in relation, or not, to *pietas*, Virgil introduces an element of faith into the practice of *pietas* by showing that reward in the afterlife depends on performance of *pietas* in life.[9] Those who abided by *pietas* in life reside in Elysium in the afterlife whereas those who have not are condemned to Tartarus. Looking specifically at the speech of Anchises to Aeneas in *Aeneid* VI, chapter **6** will look to establish the importance of *pietas* for the Augustan regime, and consider how the *Aeneid* both legitimises the reign of Augustus and reflects Virgil's Stoic vision for Augustan values.

Chapter **7** will look at the reception of *pietas* in later authors. Continuing with an approach motivated by *Begriffsgeschichte,* I will isolate, categorise and analyse these later interpretations of *pietas.* I will begin by examining *pietas* in the *Odes* of Horace and the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid, both considered Augustan poets.[10] I will identify how these authors offer a contemporary commentary on Virgilian *pietas,* and give the reader an idea of how the virtue was received by Virgil's initial audience. I will then look at Lucan's *De bello civili* and discuss how this text contributed to the distortion of Virgilian notions of *pietas*. These three texts show an alternative *pietas* to that of the *Aeneid,* one that can be warped, manipulated and easily overcome as opposed to a virtue that functions within a fixed Stoic moral framework. Then, I will turn to Lactantius' *Divine Institutes* and Augustine's *Civitas Dei* to demonstrate how early Christian authors led Virgilian notions of *pietas* from duty to the state to duty towards God. Following this, I will assess the tradition of reading the *Aeneid* as moral allegory, looking at Fulgentius' *Exposition* and Bernardus Silvestris' *Commentum* in the Middle Ages, before addressing Renaissance texts, Dante's *Divina commedia* and Milton's *Paradise Lost.* Here, I aim to show that the Stoic content of Virgilian *pietas* is responsible for Christian scholars' interest in the *Aeneid*. The objective of this chapter is to trace the development of Virgilian *pietas* into Christian 'piety', and to demonstrate that by its attractiveness to Christian scholars, the ideological appeal of Virgilian *pietas* is responsible for the *Aeneid*'s continued preservation, fame and intrigue over the last two millennia.

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[9] It is important to clarify exactly what I mean by 'faith' for the purpose of this thesis. As I will be discussing *pietas* with respect to faith and Christianity, it is appropriate to draw on the Bible. I believe Hebrews 11 best defines faith: Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen (Hebrews, 11.1). In line with this passage, in this thesis, I interpret faith as 'hope without evidence'.

[10] Citroni, 2009.

Overall, this thesis will look to illustrate the importance of *pietas* and Stoicism to Virgil's *Aeneid,* Roman identity and the ideological coherence and legacy of the epic. It will emphasize how the *Aeneid* put forth an identity for the Augustan regime through its own unique Stoic, masculine, rendition of *pietas.* Ultimately, a Stoic reading of *pietas* in the *Aeneid* invites an alternative perspective on the virtue and the epic. Reading Virgilian *pietas* through a Stoic lens provides a system for consistently and uniformly understanding a quality that appears to have many distinct and sometimes oppositional facets. It also adds an additional dimension for interpreting how *pietas* was received by contemporary and later authors, allowing us to fully grasp how Virgilian *pietas* has been manipulated and distorted into Christian piety. Thus, in *pietas,* we can appreciate the magnitude of the ideological impact of the *Aeneid* and its legacy.

1.2. Methodology and Literature Review

Post-nineteenth century research on Virgil is now so vast that a proper survey is not possible within the constraints of this thesis.[11] However, three common trends emerge for interpreting the *Aeneid* in context. The first is that the poem is supportive of the Augustan regime, the second that it is a troubled reflection on the time period of its composition and the third that it is a more subversive text that is meant to be critical of the regime in which it was produced.[12] While these interpretations appear at a glance to be mutually exclusive, each is equally plausible and applicable to the *Aeneid*. This diversity of interpretation adds to the ideological intrigue of the poem, which I maintain stems from Virgil's Stoic rendering of *pietas*. In this vein, I will argue for an interpretation of the *Aeneid* as a product

[11] For further reference, beginning with Issue 10 in 1964, the scholarly journal *Vergilius (1959-)* publishes an annual survey of Virgilian bibliography. Holzberg (2014) has also provides a comprehensive account of bibliography on Virgil's *Aeneid.*

[12] There is continuing disagreement among scholars as to whether the *Aeneid* is supportive or critical of the emperor Augustus and the Augustan regime. On the one hand, Weinstock (1971), Stocker (1980), Fowler (1990), West (1990), Williams (1990), Tarrant (1997), Theodorakopoulos (1997), Zetzel (1997), Grebe (2004), Thomas (2004), Bell (2008) and Luke (2014) suggest Virgil's intention to praise the emperor Augustus and his regime. On the other hand, Johnson (1958), Gransden (1984), Harrison (1990), Hainsworth (1991), Tarrant (1997), Bessinger, Tylus and Wofford (1999), Grebe (2004), Howatson (2011) and Moore (2017) recognise Virgil's tendencies to be critical of that same regime. These outlooks are not mutually exclusive. Thomas (2004) attempts to reconcile both points of view, looking at Virgilian pessimism through the lens of an Augustan reader, and scholars have identified Virgil's ability to be critical of the Augustan regime while also representing it positively overall. Additionally, Martindale (1993, pp. 35-54) elaborates on methods of interpreting Virgil's *Aeneid* in context. This list is by no means exhaustive.

of its time that looks forward to the peace and stability of the Augustan regime through the stabilising and civically oriented Stoic virtue of *pietas*. I aim to show that previous methods of interpretation may be reassessed and indeed reconciled by applying a *Begriffsgeschichte* inspired approach to the concept of *pietas* in the epic and in later works. In this, I will demonstrate that *pietas* is the key to comprehending the ideological appeal of the *Aeneid,* as well as understanding later traditions of interpretation that have contributed to the persistent success of the poem.

The methodology of this thesis is informed by *Begriffsgeschichte* in its approach to analysing *pietas.* As a research method, *Begriffsgeschichte* consists of looking at the history of a particular concept or idea, its origins and development, and acknowledging how these things may evolve over time and might be dependent on historical context.[13] This method of looking at a concept over time is particularly useful for an analysis of *pietas* as it enables us to examine how the *Aeneid* represents a unique intervention in the virtue's history. Most researchers applying a historical perspective draw on Koselleck's article, '*Begriffsgeschichte* and Social History', published in 1972, as a cornerstone for the practice of applying *Begriffsgeschichte* to texts in various disciplines within social and historical studies.[14] In this, Koselleck discusses the importance of concept study to understanding society and politics.[15] Further developments of the theory of *Begriffsgeschichte* may be found in Richter, who discusses the application of this approach in philosophy, history and cultural studies, contending that it has evolved from philology.[16] In line with these developments, Van Horn Melton discusses its function and more modern relevance in post-nineteenth century historical research.[17] Others have acknowledged the legitimacy of *Begriffsgeschichte* as a research method for historical study, particularly with regard to social and cultural development, as well as studies of religion.[18]

By examining the history of concepts, *Begriffsgeschichte* allows historians to understand shifts and developments in social and cultural values and practices over time, showing the cultural relevance of this method. In 2015, Preuß, Hönings and Spranger applied *Begriffsgeschichte* to *pietas* in their book, *Facetten der Pietät.* Preuß, Hönings and Spranger acknowledge that there are certain shortcomings in their work with respect to

[13] Veit-Brause, 1981; Van Horn Melton, 1996.
[14] For the full article, please see bibliography entry for Koselleck, 2006.
[15] Koselleck, 2006.
[16] Richter, 1987.
[17] Van Horn Melton, 1996.
[18] Sheehan, 1978; Veit-Brause, 1981; Koselleck, 2006.

Begriffsgeschichte due to the rudimentary nature of existing research on the topic of *pietas* in a post-classical context; their focus on *pietas* relates to philosophy.[19] My research is more specific than that of Preuß, Hönings and Spranger in that I am scrutinising the significance and influence of *pietas* in Virgil's *Aeneid* and Augustan Rome and its reception, rather than its function as an independent value. Overall, the method of *Begriffsgeschichte* is useful for historical research as it facilitates isolating and analysing certain concepts in history whose significance may have been previously ignored or overlooked in more generalised research methods.[20]

My own ambitions in taking an approach inspired by *Begriffsgeschichte* to analysing the concept of *pietas* are to show its significance for Virgil's vision of Roman identity, its close relationship to Stoicism and its ideological appeal to later Christian authors. These later authors responded to Virgil's depiction of Aeneas' faith-like adherence to a philosophical system based on something akin to religious devotion: *pietas.* Previous research has not provided a detailed investigation of *pietas* in the text as it applies to both Roman identity under the Augustan regime and Stoicism. I will look at this correlation by examining the hierarchical structure of various elements associated with *pietas* in order to show that it is governed overall by a Stoic submission to fate and a subversion of personal feeling. Most importantly, I will demonstrate that Virgil infused the *Aeneid* with an enduring ideological quality by epitomising an entirely public-oriented virtue within an individual man, as he does with *pius Aeneas*. In this, I will account for how the ideology of the poem, encapsulated in the virtue of *pietas* and the character of *pius Aeneas,* contributed to the epic's preservation and played a role in the history of the poem's reception, endearing it to a faith-oriented reading and allowing it to be easily assimilated into Christian literature and therefore reproduced and preserved over the following centuries by Christian scholars.[21] Through a *Begriffsgeschichte* inspired approach to analysing *pietas* in the *Aeneid,* I will show that understanding it as a Stoic virtue is the key to appreciating its ideological coherence and significance*,* as well as the impact of Virgilian *pietas* on contemporary and later Christian authors, whom we will see engage with the virtue in order to align it with what we now consider Christian religious piety.

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[19] 'Für eine fundierte neuzeitliche Begriffsgeschichte wären so noch intensive literaturwissenschaftliche, philosophiehistorische und kulturgeschichtliche Forschungen notwendig, die hier nicht geleistet werden können' (Preuß, Hönings and Spranger, 2015, p. 21).
'Daher können die hier skizzierten Beobachtungen nur allererste Annäherungen an eine neuzeitliche Begriffsgeschichte der Pietät sein, zumal sie ihren Schwerpunkt lediglich auf philosophische (und sepulkralkultrürliche) Schriften setzen' (Preuß, Hönings and Spranger, 2015, p. 76).
[20] Koselleck, 2006; Van Horn Melton, 1996.
[21] Ball, 1991; Cullhed, 2015.

Chapter 2. Virgil's *Aeneid* as a Stoic Epic

The Stoic School, founded by Zeno of Citium, was one of the new philosophical movements that originated in Athens from the Hellenistic period (c. 300 B. C.).[22] By the mid first century B. C., Stoicism had moved from Greece to Rome and gained importance and recognition among the Roman elite in the transition period from late Republic to Empire. Stoicism provided a kind of 'philosophical theology' that presented a system of explaining 'the existence and nature of the divine from a philosophical point of view'.[23] It offered a contemporary philosophical framework for Virgil to lend authority to his epic. In this chapter, I aim to make clear the criteria against which we may judge the *Aeneid* as a Stoic text and Aeneas as a Stoic hero with respect to Virgil's representation of fate and his treatment of emotions in the epic.[24] I will first address the *Aeneid* as a Stoic epic of foundation, looking at the poem in relation to Lucretius' Epicurean epic, *De rerum natura* (*DRN*), for contemporary context. I will argue for a reading of the *Aeneid* as a Stoicly motivated text, one that suggests that the reign of Augustus and the Roman Empire is a fated outcome. In this chapter, I will also introduce *pietas* as a virtue that complements Virgil's Stoic outlook before considering the virtue in greater detail in chapter **3**. By its ideological implications and significance, Virgil's Stoic rendering of *pietas* accounts for the broad appeal and enduring legacy of the poem. This becomes clearer by looking at how later authors have incorporated the virtue into their own works, which I will address in chapter **7**.

2.1. Reading Philosophy and Stoicism in Virgil's *Aeneid*

The *Aeneid* presents a moral and philosophical message that is conspicuously absent from earlier epics. For example, it would be difficult to identify an overarching philosophical influence in the works of previous Greek epicists, such as Apollonius and Homer. Scholars have, however, recognised elements of philosophy in Ennius' *Annales*, the existing Roman foundation epic when Virgil began writing the *Aeneid*.[25] Cicero reinforces Ennius'

[22] Meyer, 1999; O'Keefe, 2016; Baltzly, 2018. Inwood (2003, p. 1), however, suggests that the roots of Stoicism lie with Socrates nearly a century earlier.
[23] Algra, 2003, p. 156.
[24] Bowra's (1990) 'Aeneas and the Stoic Ideal' offers a critical view of Aeneas as a Stoic throughout history, drawing on his encounters with Dido and Turnus to discuss challenges that Aeneas faces as a Stoic hero. I will also address these episodes in chapter **5**.
[25] Although the *Annales* has been reduced to a fragmented state (c. 600 lines), Rawson (1985), Reydams-Shills (2005) and Elliot (2013) have identified elements of Stoicism in the remaining text. Dominik (1993), however, notes Ennius' Pythagorean and Epicurean tendencies. As the first to write a Latin epic in hexameter, and a foundation epic, Ennius' influence inevitably extends to Virgil (Skutsch, 1985; Kennedy,

significance with respect to epic and philosophy in the Dream of Scipio (*Rep.,* VI), thus introducing the possibility of a philosophically inflected account of Roman history to Virgil's readers. In the Dream of Scipio, the poet Ennius appears as a character, using philosophical language and relating philosophical elements that also appear in Virgil's *Aeneid*.[26] This appearance of course echoes that of Homer in a dream to Ennius in his own *Annales* (*Ann.,* I, fr. 3ff). Cicero's Ennius concludes his missive to Scipio with a Stoic representation of the cosmos, one that looks forward and impels Scipio to take action on behalf of his homeland (*Rep.,* VI.27-29). In Ennius' philosophically redolent communication to Scipio, the Dream of Scipio invites Virgil's readers to be receptive to the possibility of a philosophically informed historical narrative of Rome's foundation underlined by a Stoic understanding of the universe.

The underlying philosophical message of the *Aeneid* amounts to a faith-oriented belief system around the performance of a Stoicly motivated *pietas,* which has since been distorted by later authors to signify Christian piety. While Virgil's familiarity with various philosophical schools of thought has been extensively documented, many over the last century have suggested that Stoicism is the dominant philosophical influence in the *Aeneid*.[27] In spite of the prevalent scholarly recognition of Stoicism in the *Aeneid,* insufficient attention has been given to the specifically Stoic qualities of *pietas* as the poem's guiding moral principle. The overall moral Stoic message of the *Aeneid* becomes clear through a focused analysis of Virgil's treatment of *pietas,* particularly in *Aeneid* VI. This Stoic interpretation of *pietas* introduces the presence of faith-oriented ideology within the poem, which has had a tangible effect on the reception of the epic by later authors, particularly the early Christians. I will now argue for a Stoic interpretation of the *Aeneid* and its hero Aeneas.

1997b). See Gildenhard (2007) and Goldschmidt (2013) for a comprehensive account of the relationship between Ennius and Virgil, and Skutsch (1985) for the most accepted reproduction of the remaining *Annales.*

[26] For example, Cicero's Ennius writes of the body as a prison (*Rep.,* VI.14-15), a commonly held belief in Platonic and Orphic philosophies (see **6.2.2**), and presents a Stoic vision of the cosmos (*Rep.,* VI.18-19; VI.26-27, (see **2.2**)). Cole (2006), Habinek (2006) and Gildenhard (2007) have detailed Ennius' impact as an authority in the Dream of Scipio. Elliott (2013) and Rossi (2017) document the extent of Cicero's familiarity with the *Annales.*

[27] Noted philosophical influences on the *Aeneid* include Neo-Pythagoreanism, Pythagoreanism, Orphism, Stoicism, Platonism and Epicureanism (Walsh, 1928; Jefferies, 1934; Bailey, 1935; DeWitt, 1942; Solmsen, 1968, 1972; Currie, 1975; Burke, 1979; Knauer, 1990; Williams, 1990b; Cauchi, 1991; Bernstein, 1993; Braund, 1985; Tarrant, 1997; Ferguson, 1998; Zagzebski, 2007). Many scholars acknowledge the overarching presence of Stoicism (Glover, 1912; Walsh, 1928; DeWitt, 1942; Michels, 1944; Sullivan, 1959; Pöschl, 1962; Otis, 1963; Williams, 1967; Quinn, 1968; Wagenvoort, 1978; Heinze, 1982; Tarrant, 1982; Habinek, 1989; Bowra, 1990; West, 1990; Cauchi, 1991; Hainsworth, 1991; Braund, 1997; Horsfall, 2000, 2010; Ross, 2007; Ju, 2009).

2.1.1. Stoic Philosophy in the *Aeneid*

Over the previous century, many have recognised that a particular kind of Roman Stoicism, a popular philosophy in the later republic, underlines Virgil's *Aeneid*.[28] Through his engagement with Stoicism in the epic, Virgil employs philosophy in a non-philosophical context, a work of epic, producing a philosophically inflected ideological history for Augustan Rome and Romans that responds to the traditions of Roman history and ideas about how to be an ideal Roman citizen while being accessible to those uninterested in or unfamiliar with philosophy. He is bringing philosophy into Roman life by putting into the context of historical epic. Even for readers unfamiliar with Stoicism and Stoic doctrine, there is an identifiable philosophical and moral message to the poem. While some readers may clearly see the message as Stoic, the existence of a moral message is evident to all readers. The lynchpin of this philosophically inflected drama is, of course, the virtue of *pietas.* Through *pietas,* we see the moral lessons of the poem most clearly. Virgil's exploration of *pietas* communicates a Stoic ideology through Aeneas and contributes to the reception and legacy of the *Aeneid.*

In the following sections, I will address how certain elements of Roman Stoicism are overtly present in the *Aeneid.* I will be looking at the history of the philosophy, addressing the origins of Stoicism and distinguishing how it differed from a Lucretian Epicureanism, with which Virgil was familiar, and which, to some extent, he was responding to.[29] This will include a discussion of Stoic ideas of fate and obedience to fate, cause and effect, personal agency, divine influence and subversion of emotion within the ideal Stoic. Then, through close examination of *Aeneid* I, I will identify how Virgil's treatment of these facets of the philosophy invites a Stoic reading of the epic. In order to elucidate how Virgil and his readers may have understood Roman Stoicism, in addition to Greek texts on Stoicism from the Hellenistic period, I will draw primarily from Cicero, who played a significant role in popularising philosophy and conveying philosophical messages to the Roman public in his works.[30] From his *De republica* onwards, Cicero's writing tested ways of integrating history and philosophy, and his works set a precedent for the idea of assimilating Stoic philosophy into a vision of Roman history.

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[28] Rawson (1985) and Reydams-Shills (2005) discuss the popularity and appeal of Stoic philosophy in the Roman Republic. Bowra (1990, p. 369) notes the place of 'Stoic morality' in 'the Augustan circle'. Rawson (1985) goes into more detail, looking at the place of Stoic philosophy in Roman culture and intellectual life.
[29] DeWitt, 1942; Michels, 1944; Ju, 2009; Dinter, 2012. Braund (1997) and Gale (2004) detail Virgil's familiarity and engagement with Lucretius throughout his earlier work.
[30] Algra (2003) and Lévy (2010) discuss the significance of Cicero's role in relating philosophical ideas in Latin to audiences of his own time period.

2.1.2. Virgil's Stoicism in Contemporary Philosophical Context

Stoicism and Epicureanism were simultaneously popular philosophical schools in Rome when Virgil wrote the *Aeneid,* and there was considerable overlap in their metaphysical aspects.[31] Looking at the authors and works that may have influenced Virgil's understanding of both Epicureanism and Stoicism, Lucretius' *DRN*, which predated the *Aeneid* by roughly thirty five years, and Cicero's *De natura deorum* (*DND*), begun in 43 B.C. present as immediate sources.[32] For convenience, I have selected *DND* in this instance because it provides a useful framework for comparing and contrasting Epicurean and Stoic philosophies via dialogue, and because it is a work that Virgil and his initial readers would very likely have been aware of. It is clear from his existing work that Cicero was familiar with *DRN* before beginning work on *DND*.[33] In *DRN,* Lucretius offered a contemporary setting for Epicureanism in Rome in a philosophically motivated poem, one in which the author himself is the narrator. Lucretius's *DRN* gives a model of a philosophical epic with an ideological commitment for Virgil to live up to and indeed surpass in his foundation epic. Moreover, *DRN* provides us with an epic model against which Virgil's philosophical inclinations with respect to Epicureanism and Stoicism may be evaluated in the *Aeneid*.[34] In *DND,* Cicero introduces a contrast between Stoic and Epicurean principles through the discussion between the Epicurean, C. Vellius and the Stoic Q. Lucilius Balbus which may act as a guide for Virgil's readers in identifying elements of each philosophy in the *Aeneid.*

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[31] See Long's (2003) chapter, 'Roman Philosophy' for a comprehensive overview of popular philosophies and the development of philosophical writing around the time of the *Aeneid*'s composition. The differences between the two philosophies and worldviews are far too vast to examine in this thesis. For more information on this subject, please see Motto and Clark (1968), Long (1986, 2006) and Sharples (2014).

[32] Scholars broadly agree that *DRN* was composed and circulated in the 50s B.C. For a comprehensive account of the composition and textual transmission of *DRN,* see Butterfield (2013). George (1991, pp. 242ff) discusses the importation of Hellenistic views of Stoicism into the Roman Republic and Stoicism and empire. The date of Lucretius' death and the date of completion for *DRN* are contested by ancient and modern scholars, who have estimated the author's death, and the completion of *DRN,* at either 51 B.C. or 55 B.C. Citing Donatus (*Vit. Virg.,* 6), Hutchinson (2001, p. 150) and Volk (2010, p. 127) date the death of Lucretius to 55 B.C. Krebs (2013) discusses the significance of the dates of Lucretius' *DRN,* engaging with the work of Hutchinson (2001) and Volk (2010).

[33] At the conclusion of a letter to Quintus in February of 54 B.C., Cicero alludes to a poem by Lucretius, writing that *Lucreti poemata ut scribis ita sunt, multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis* (*Q, fr.,* 14 (II.10.3)). This would suggest that Cicero, and indeed Quintus, had read *DRN.*

[34] Epicurean resonance has been well documented in Virgil's earlier work, particularly in his *Eclogues* (See Giesecke (1999), Gale (2004) and Hardie (2006)).

In *DND,* Cicero consistently draws attention to the incompatibility of Epicurean philosophy to Rome's cultural identity.[35] Virgil also highlights this incompatibility, presenting a Stoic replacement for an Epicurean world view, one which leads to the foundation of Rome, and he offers an alternative code of conduct and way of thinking for the Augustan regime that is focused on civic engagement and performance of duty, or, *pietas*. This is evident on a thematic level, namely in Virgil's Stoic representation of fate as responsible to all things, as well as in Virgil's portrayal of certain characters.[36] For example, scholars have made arguments for Dido and Mezentius as embodiments or proponents of Epicurean ideals.[37] Virgil's treatment of these characters, and their eventual respective demises as well as that of their nations, perhaps demonstrates the unsuitability of Epicurean philosophical ideals for the Augustan regime and a Virgilian Stoic worldview. Part of Virgil's ambition is to show the effective integration of Stoicism into a Roman mythological history for the overall benefit and civic success of the Augustan regime. Lucretius' *DRN* provides a model against which to compare Virgil's philosophical and moral epic. As Lucretius uses poetry and metre to sweeten his missive of philosophy for his readers, so Virgil uses dramatic storytelling, mythology and human history to impart a Stoic message to his readers, a one that is encapsulated in the virtue of *pietas*.[38]

It is possible to trace the conflict between Stoicism and Epicureanism through allusions to their respective ideas within the fictional material of the *Aeneid*. In *Aeneid* IV, for example, the relationship between Aeneas and Dido can be interpreted as one of conflicting philosophical ideals.[39] From Dido's first lines in the *Aeneid*, we may recognise a resonance with Epicureanism as she invites the Trojans *solvite corde metum, Teucri, secludite curas* (I.561).[40] This invitation recalls one of many Lucretian ideals for the Epicurean:

> nonne videre
> nil aliud sibi naturam latrare, nisi utqui
> corpore seiunctus dolor absit, mensque fruatur
> iucundo sensu cura semota metuque (*DRN*, II.16-19).

[35] This is also clear in the fragmentary preface to Cicero's *De republica* and becomes clearer in *De natura doerum* and *De finibus.*
[36] The Stoics held that fate was responsible for all things, whereas Lucretius writes of fate as immaterial and mutable to man's desires (*DRN,* II.251-260). I will discuss Stoic fate in greater detail in **2.2**.
[37] Hahn, 1931; Edwards, 1960; Bowra, 1990; Feeney, 1991; Gordon, 1998; Kronenberg, 2005.
[38] Twice in *DRN* Lucretius uses the simile of sweetening the rim of a medicine cup to disguise medicine for children to describe himself using metre and verse to impart philosophy to his reader (*DRN,* I.936-950, IV.11-25).
[39] Zanker's (2017) article, '*Paremvs Ovantes:* Stoicism and Human Responsibility in *Aeneid* 4', offers a comprehensive analysis of the function of Stoic philosophy in *Aeneid* IV, particularly regarding the characters Aeneas and Dido. I will discuss Dido in greater detail in **5.2.2** with respect to *pietas*.
[40] Gordon (1998, pp. 98ff) also details Dido's alignment with Nausikaa, and how this invites and affects Epicurean associations for her.

Dyson contends that 'by echoing Lucretius' words in Dido's first line, Virgil may be hinting already at the impossibility of Epicurean tranquillity in the world of the *Aeneid*'.[41] As readers, we know that Aeneas will end the epic in Latium. These lines of Dido's are a response to the Trojan Ilioneus telling her that the Trojans are seeking Hesperia and then Italy (I.530-534). They will not stay in Carthage; their fate is in Latium (I.545-560). Thus, in her response, Dido is aware that the Trojans are fated to reach Italy, yet she responds with an appeal to an Epicurean way of life, not a Stoic understanding of fate. This Epicurean, specifically Lucretian, language also permeates descriptions of the atmosphere in Carthage.[42] In Dido's words, there is also a Homeric allusion to Odysseus' time spent in Scheria, home of the Phaeacians in the *Odyssey,* his detour as well the result of divine wrath after leaving the island of Calypso (*Od.,* V-X).

Epicurean resonance is likewise evident in *Aeneid* IV, when Anna appeals to Epicurean temptations of *dulcis natos* and *Veneris* [*nec*] *praemia* (IV.33) as she attempts to persuade her sister Dido to pursue a romantic relationship with Aeneas. Dido is initially resistant to such a liaison because of her sworn love for Sychaeus. This evokes *DRN* III, where Lucretius writes of the sadness of a dead man who will not return home (*"Iam iam…insidet una"* (*DRN,* III.894-901)). Both offer a commentary on losses in death. While Lucretius' words are addressed to a man in relation to his own death, Anna's echoes of them pertain to the death of Dido's husband Sychaeus as well as to Dido herself and regrets she may have upon her own death. While Anna's first mentions of *dulcis natos* and *Veneris* [*nec*] *praemia* recall these Lucretian lines, it is the next line, *id cinerem aut Manis credis curare sepultos* (IV.34), that reinforces the connection to *DRN* in its recounting of the tragic possibility of regret after death.

As Zanker recognises of these lines, 'Lucretian phraseology and an Epicurean argument against fear of death are marshalled against the Stoic compliance with Fate, from which Epicureanism said man was free'.[43] From the beginning of the epic, the reader knows that the Stoic Aeneas cannot stay in Carthage, as he is fated to settle in Latium. Dido herself ought to know this too, having heard it from Ilioneus, yet she does not fully comprehend it. Although acting as a result of divine intervention, we see an Epicurean attitude in Dido's pursuit of Aeneas in that she appears to believe that their relationship will alter the fate of

[41] Dyson, 1996, p. 206.
[42] Hardie, 1986; Hamilton, 1993; Lyne, 1994; Dyson, 1996; Gordon, 1998.
[43] Zanker, 2017, p. 593.

the Trojans. This is not possible in Virgil's Stoic epic. Through the character of Dido, we see that an Epicurean worldview is incompatible with, or indeed a hindrance to, the mission of Aeneas and the foundation of Rome. The slow and painful death of Dido at the end of *Aeneid* IV also illustrates to the reader the consequences and the futility of attempting to obstruct the course of fate.[44]

Mezentius, the Etruscan king and enemy of Aeneas, may also be read as a moral lesson on the superiority of Stoicism over Epicureanism in the *Aeneid*. Recently, Kronenberg has argued for an Epicurean characterisation of Mezentius, drawing on representations of *impietas* and *pietas*.[45] Mezentius' introduction in the *Aeneid* as *contemptor divum* (VII.648) perhaps suggests an Epicurean side to the king, given Lucretius' denunciation of *religio* in *DRN,* where he aligns *impietas* with *religio* (*DRN,* I.80ff). Other instances in the *Aeneid* suggest the classification of Mezentius as an Epicurean, such as his use of the words *vivendi [nate] voluptas* (X.846), which may also be found in *DRN* (*DRN,* III.1081). Through Mezentius and Dido, Virgil gives two poignant representations of the incompatibility between Epicureanism and Stoicism, with the Stoic Aeneas surviving while the Epicureans perish. By attributing subtle yet recognisable Epicurean attitudes to these two characters, who are enemies of Rome, unsuccessfully standing in the way of Aeneas' fate to reach Latium, Virgil delicately illustrates that Epicureanism is an unsuitable philosophy and outlook for the Augustan regime, and in his portrayal of the victorious and Stoic Aeneas, he advocates Stoicism as an appropriate alternative.

2.2. Stoicism, Fate, Free Will and the Divine

In this section, I aim to show that Virgil writes about fate in the *Aeneid* in such a way as to articulate a Stoic theme that was recognisable as such to his readers. First, I will argue for fate as a sequence of cause and effect, addressing the relationship of fate to free will and individual conduct, as well as the idea of assent. In this discussion, I will draw on the principles of Stoic compatibilism, an outlook which I believe is relevant for reading the *Aeneid* as a Stoic text and Aeneas as a Stoic hero. Second, I will explore the interconnected nature of fate and the gods within a Stoic worldview, and how this is depicted throughout

[44] Adkins (2019, p. 178, pp. 180-181) discusses the complicated episode of Dido's death with respect to Stoic attitudes towards fate, and suggests that Proserpina's delay in cutting Dido's hair demonstrates that Dido was working against fate.

[45] Kronenberg (2005, p. 406) writes that while Mezentius shifts from being a character characterised by *impietas* because of his hatred of the gods to one who recognises *pietas,* 'so Aeneas pushes the limits of *pietas* by associating *religio* with vicious behaviour' through his murders of Lausus and Mezentius.

the *Aeneid*. These two sections will provide a foundation for the consequent discussions of emotion in the Stoic man and the Stoic aspects of *Aeneid* I. *Aeneid* I establishes at the start of the poem a world in which Stoic versions of obedience to fate and the interweaving of individual and national destiny are central to the poem's fictional world, and indicate that the *Aeneid* as a whole may be read as a Stoicly motivated text. *Aeneid* I introduces the world of the epic, one encompassing both human and divine spheres, and one which forecasts Aeneas' arrival in Latium and the eventual foundation of Rome as a divinely ordained and fated outcome.

2.2.1. Stoicism, Fate, Cause and Effect, Free Will and Assent

Due to a lack of surviving Stoic treatises, we must rely on second or third hand sources for information about Stoic ideas of fate.[46] From these, we are able to ascertain that the Roman Stoics viewed fate as a chain of predetermined, interconnected, dependent and non-linear causes, including human assent, that represented a sacrosanct mandate.[47] This understanding of Stoic fate as a string of such causes has been credited to Chrysippus (c.279-206 B.C.), who was widely regarded as an important figure in the Stoic tradition.[48] Since only fragments of Chrysippus' original work have survived, our knowledge of its content comes largely from later interpretations, namely through Cicero's *De fato* (44 B.C.), a text with which Virgilian audiences would have been familiar.[49] For this reason, I will draw on *De fato* in my analysis of Stoic fate in the *Aeneid*. In *De fato,* Cicero addresses the intricacies of Chrysippus' writing on fate, using Chrysippus' arguments of cause and effect to show that all things occur as the result of fate (*Concludit enim…quaecumque fiant* (*Fat.,* 20-21)). However, Cicero himself does not necessarily agree with this argument, writing *eam plagam potius accipiam quam fato omnia fieri comprobem* (*Fat.,* 21).[50] Later in the text, Cicero returns to the arguments of Chrysippus with respect to fate, cause and effect (*Chrysippus autem…nostra potestate* (*Fat.,* 41)).[51]

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[46] Bobzien (1998, p. 6) enumerates the consequences of this, and discusses how to evaluate Stoic writings on fate following Chrysippus.
[47] Botros (1985), Frede (2003), Meyer (2009) and Zanker (2019) discuss various permutations of this notion in greater detail.
[48] Lapidge, 1979; Bobzien, 1998; Frede, 2003; Hankinson, 2003; Meyer, 2009; O'Keefe, 2016; Zanker, 2019. Lapidge (1979, p. 349) discusses Chrysippean language with respect to fate as a chain of causes.
[49] Lapidge (1979, p. 350) credits Cicero with the transmission of Chrisippean texts to Roman audiences. Bobzien (1998, p. 9) identifies *De fato* 7-9, 11-17I, 20-21, 28-30 and 39-45 as representative of Chrysippean ideas of fate, and Sharples (1981, pp. 84ff) draws on *De fato* to interpret those ideas.
[50] In this context, I understand *plagam* to mean 'bodily injury'.
[51] Cicero also discusses fate as a chain of causes in *DND,* I.39, *De divination,* I.125-126 and *De fato,* 18, 39 and 45. Additionally, he offers a concise definition of fate in *De divinatione* through his brother, Quintus (*div.,* I.125).

These passages from Cicero illustrate the complexity of Stoic fate as a series of cause and effect. *De fato* 41 in particular invites an examination of different types of causes, those which are *perfectae et principales,* and those which are *adiuvantes et proximae,* as well as the allowance for personal agency within this system.[52]

Drawing on Cicero's interpretation of Chrysippus, Zanker argues that these principle causes are located within each individual, who then has agency to act on the cause or discard it, thus, introducing the idea of human assent, or what the Stoics called *sunkathesis*:

> the principal internal cause of the action is our mental disposition (*habitus animi, diathesis*), which, once activated by our assent, expresses itself in pursuit of the action. Our actions or non-actions are thus caused, and, as such, fall within fate, but they are not necessitated by factors external to our assent and impulse; and that is where Chrysippus locates human agency.[53]

The idea of assent is relevant for our interpretation of Aeneas as a Stoic character. At the beginning of his chapter, 'Impressions and Assent', which I believe explains the concept of assent very well for the purpose of this thesis, Brennan includes a modern explanation for Stoic assent to an impression or cause, writing that 'it means to agree with it, or go along with it, or endorse it'.[54] For the Stoics, impressions manifest in different varieties: sensory, such as visual and audial, or non-sensory, such as instinct or memory.[55] By Brennan's account, assent is a 'fundamental psychological activity' and the Stoic man assents to 'impressions, which are alterations or changes in the mind'.[56] We see this pattern of assent to impressions most obviously repeated in the *Aeneid* through divine intervention, where a god will remind Aeneas of his mission, and he will then act in pursuit of fulfilling his fate to reach Latium. For example, in *Aeneid* II (II.594-620), Venus shows Aeneas that he must leave Troy, and in *Aeneid* IV (IV.265-276) Mercury reminds him of his duty to Ascanius. In both cases, Aeneas actively assents to these impressions and continues to pursue his fated mission. In both cases, his actions are deliberate.

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[52] Sharples (1981, pp. 84-85), however, suggests that in *De fato* 41, 'Cicero's account is dependent on Antiochus of Ascalon'. In *De fato* (42-43), Cicero goes on to explain these causes through the metaphor of a spinning top and a cylinder. Both of these things are capable of spinning or rolling, but need an external force, or proximate cause, to set them in motion, and this argument is Chrysippean.
[53] Zanker, 2017, p. 582.
[54] Brennan, 2005, p. 51. Meyer (199) and Lévy (2010) also express this sentiment.
[55] Brennan, 2005. Brennan (2005, p. 51) asserts that this 'is also roughly what the Stoics had in mind when they introduced the term *sunkatathesis*'. According to Lévy (2010, p. 34), Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, introduced the term *sunkathesis* to Greek philosophy, through a metaphor related to the verb *sunkatatithesthai,* to vote, or, to say yes or no to a proposition.
[56] Brennan, 2005, p. 51.

Within the Stoic worldview of the *Aeneid*, where there is a predetermined fated outcome, human assent is a critical component in the chain of causes leading to that outcome. Recently, Meyer, O'Keefe and Zanker have utilised a trope called the 'Lazy Argument' to illustrate the role of human assent with respect to fate. The 'Lazy Argument' asserts that if all things are preordained then no individual action is required.[57] However, O'Keefe and Zanker argue that fulfilment of fate is contingent upon assent to impressions, which is under individual control, as well as causally determined.[58] In the *Aeneid,* Virgil appears determined to show that the 'Lazy Argument' is not an effective way of interpreting events and actions in relation to fate. While Aeneas is fated to reach Latium and found Rome, his mission cannot be completed without certain actions being taken on his part. Aeneas' assent to impressions that he leaves Troy and Carthage are crucial in his reaching his final destination of Latium. In these two episodes in particular (as throughout the *Aeneid*), we see that there is a component of free will in assent to fate, and that Aeneas is consistently an active participant in pursuing this fate, like an ideal Stoic. In this, Virgil is refuting the 'Lazy Argument', showing that in order for Aeneas to fulfil his fate, he must take certain actions and make certain decisions. He must decide to leave Troy and act on that decision; he must decide to leave Carthage, and act on that decision. This active role that Aeneas takes in terms of pursuing his own fate marks him as a dedicated Stoic in that he assents to impressions that lead him towards the fulfilment of his fate at all times.

The incorporation of the idea of Stoic compatibilism adds to the depth of our understanding of the epic, particularly with respect to fate and free will. In short, 'compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism'.[59] O'Keefe writes that 'the Stoics are the first unambiguous compatibilists, in part because they are also one of the first unambiguous proponents of causal determinism', and that the Stoics may be credited with 'devising a sophisticated compatibilist theory of free will, the first clearly compatibilist theory that we know of'.[60] Compatibilism allows us to reconcile a Stoic deterministic outlook, where fate is responsible for all things, with human agency. It leads us to believe that a certain amount of personal responsibility exists within a

[57] Meyer, 1999, p. 253ff; O'Keefe, 2016, pp. 238ff. Zanker (2017, p. 580) sums up the 'Lazy Argument' for the individual concisely: if things are fated they will happen without any effort on my part'. Both O'Keefe and Zanker refute Hippolytus' famed analogy of the 'Lazy Argument' that as a dog tied to a cart will follow the cart willingly or not so will men follow fate. Meyer (1999, p. 254) points out that the 'Lazy Argument' introduces 'a distinction between determinism and fatalism'.
[58] O'Keefe, 2016; Zanker, 2017, 2019.
[59] McKenna and Coates, 2020. Bobzien (1998) and Salles (2016) have written extensively on the subject of compatibilism with regard to determinism and free will, with Salles (2016, p. xix) giving nearly the same definition of compatibilism verbatim.
[60] O'Keefe, 2016, p. 236.

determinist framework.[61] While the fate of Aeneas to reach Latium and thus found the Roman race may be firmly established and made explicit to the reader through Jupiter's prophecy (I.257-279), a Stoic reading of compatibilism offers a framework within which Aeneas also has personal responsibility for completing his mission, and therefore may be credited with its fulfilment. This adds to the drama of the narrative.

Reading the *Aeneid* with compatibilism in mind, we see that all of Aeneas' assents to impressions serve the fulfilment of his fate to reach Latium. Aeneas' continued pursuit of this fate is also 'part of his trademark *pietas*', which I will discuss in greater detail in chapter **3**.[62] Aeneas actively assents to his fate, which is a component in the chain of causes that represents fate, and in this 'we can see Virgil in the *Aeneid* appropriating the Stoic conception of fate and human responsibility'.[63] In *De fato,* Cicero summarises the argument of earlier thinkers with respect to compatibilism (*Si omnia…nec supplicia* (*De fat.,* 40)). This leads into Cicero's next passage on theories of causes as *perfectae et principales,* or *adiuvantes et proximae* (*De fat.,* 41)*,* which I have previously drawn attention to. I would argue that in the case of Aeneas the antecedent causes such as divine promptings are *adiuvantes et proximae,* and that his desire to pursue his mission represents causes *perfectae et principales.* The key to understanding this passage with respect to Aeneas is the message that if desire has been caused, the things that follow the pursuit of that desire are additionally caused, therefore assent is also caused (*et si appetitus…ergo etiam assensiones.* (*Fat.,* 40)). The desire to follow fate must present in order for assent to fall under the remit of fate, and thus, a Stoic compatibilist framework is evident, as is Aeneas' Stoic nature in that he shows the desire to follow fate.

In the *Aeneid,* we see that Aeneas' desire to follow to fate and fulfil his mission to reach Latium governs his assent to that fate and his actions in pursuing it when prompted by external factors. We are aware from the proem and the prophecy of Jupiter (I.257-279) that fate dictates that Aeneas will go on to settle in Latium, the future site of Rome, and this precipitates the events of the narrative. As a Stoic hero, Aeneas actively pursues this fate. He is directly motivated by a series of causes, or impressions, in such a way that his actions may be read as the product of a Stoic compatibilist worldview. The desire to follow fate is within him, however, at times he requires external impressions as a catalyst to action. The fulfilment of Aeneas' mission to reach and settle in Latium is dependent on

[61] Salles, 2016.
[62] Zanker, 2017, p. 588.
[63] Zanker, 2019, p. 153.

Aeneas himself taking a series of actions to reach it, and thus we see in Aeneas' journey that human assent and personal responsibility are essential components of the chain of causes that is Stoic fate. This Stoic framework is crucial if we are to evaluate the role of *pietas* in the poem, in particular, insofar as it is used to signal Aeneas' allegiance to fate.

2.2.2. Stoicism, Fate, the Divine and Jupiter's Prophecy

The intricacies of Stoicism, fate and individual assent become more nuanced and complex with the inclusion of the immortal sphere and the idea of *ratio,* or, divine reason. This relationship between fate, the gods and the individual has been a concern of Stoicism throughout its history.[64] As Meijer notes, there was a place 'in Stoic philosophy for the traditional gods of the usual family of Greek gods', in addition to 'the existence of a cosmic god'.[65] Stoic texts dating back to Chrysippus equate Zeus with fate, for example, as Zanker writes, 'Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* takes the god as an incarnation of the cosmos, its orderly governance in accord with reason, and its providential concern for humans'.[66] From this, we may assume that Zeus, Jupiter, for our purpose, is representative of divine reason, and that the will of Jupiter is the will of fate. In the *Encheiridion* of Epictetus, admittedly falling two centuries behind Vigil's *Aeneid,* we may also see how the concepts of Zeus and destiny relate to personal agency with regard to fate in the case of Cleanthes: Ἐπὶ παντὸς πρόχειρα ἐκτέον ταῦτα· ἄγου δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη, ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος· ὡς ἕψομαί γ' ἄοκνος· ἢν δέ γε μὴ θέλω, κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι (*Ench.,* 53). These lines suggest that Zeus and fate are intertwined in their governance of all things, and that although the individual may choose to follow divine guidance in pursuit of fate, all preordained outcomes remain fixed: Cleanthes will be compelled to follow whether he is willing to or not. These lines help to illustrate how Aeneas at times appears uncompelled to follow fate of his own accord, yet he is persuaded to do so by Jupiter's intervention, or, by divine reason.

As O'Keefe argues, 'according to the Stoic Chrysippus, God *is* the world. His mind pervades and organises all things'.[67] In this way, as Zanker articulates, 'Virgil's conception of fate tends in one way or another to align Jupiter with a Stoic Pronoia-Zeus', a single god

[64] Thornsteinsson, 2010.
[65] Meijer, 2007, p. xi. Meijer's (2007) book, *Stoic Theology,* gives a more comprehensive account of Stoic theological views of the cosmos along with Stoic proofs.
[66] Zanker, 2019, p. 160. Frede (2003), Hankinson (2003), Meyer (2009) and Jeden (2009) also argue that the Stoics identify fate as a chain of causes with Zeus, and all attribute this concept to Chrysippus.
[67] O'Keefe, 2016, p. 237. Sharples (1981, 2014) and Brennan (2005) also echo this sentiment. *DND* I.39 additionally supports this position.

who governs fate, representing divine reason.[68] This is suggestive of a monotheistic or pantheistic world view, and O'Keefe enumerates on the cohesive relationship of Stoicism and pantheism:

> God is the world, with his mind pervading the cosmos, and he orders the world in accordance with his providential plan. This providential plan is enacted through an everlasting series of causes that ensures that things occur as God wills them to. And so, the Stoics usually advance arguments to show that freedom and *fate* are compatible.[69]

As I discussed in the previous section, this is also indicative of a Stoic compatibilist framework. The fulfilment of Aeneas' fate to become Rome's founder coincides with his own desire to reach Latium. In the events of the *Aeneid,* we can see that the overarching fate of Aeneas' mission, the plotline of the narrative, can be traced to the proem and to the prophecy of Jupiter in *Aeneid* I (I.257-279). This prophecy aligns with the Stoic identification of fate as a chain of causes relating to a single God as we see Jupiter's words come to fruition over the course of the epic. Furthermore, the Augustan present that the poem looks forward to implies that Augustus' rule is also the manifestation of divine will.

Looking at Jupiter as a manifestation of divine providence and reason in accordance with Stoic fate, the context of Jupiter's prophecy in *Aeneid* I invites further examination. Jupiter gives the prophecy of Aeneas' future to his daughter, Venus, mother of Aeneas, and to the reader, that Aeneas and his ancestors will reach Latium and through generations become the founders of Rome (I.257-279). This prophecy is Jupiter's response to a beseeching Venus, who is aware of her father's superiority among the gods (I.229), as she seeks mercy for her son and the Trojans. Throughout her speech to her father, however, Venus appears aware of Aeneas' fate to reach Latium and to found the Roman race (I.234ff). Indeed, we see that Aeneas himself also is responsive to the fact that he and his comrades seek Latium in accordance with fate, as we have read his words to his fellow Trojans: *tendimus in Latium, sedes ubi fata quietas / ostendunt* (I.205-206). Jupiter's prophecy then serves as a reassurance, to both Venus and the reader, that Aeneas will ultimately reach Latium and found the Roman race. In his speech to Venus, Jupiter admits that he is acting as a mouthpiece for fate: *et volvens fatorum arcana movebo* (I.262), and that even he cannot alter the decrees of fate. Thus, in this interaction between Venus and Jupiter, we see more than just the reassuring words of a father to his distraught daughter, but Jupiter as an interpreter of fate and a voice of divine reason, reinforcing the connection between fate and

[68] Zanker, 2019, p. 154. Sharples (1981, p. 81; 2014, p. 50) identifies this conflation between fate, providence and a single god, Zeus, drawing on *DND,* I.39.
[69] O'Keefe, 2016, p. 236. Jeden (2009, p. 34) also echoes this point of view.

a single powerful god.[70] Close engagement with Stoic ideas of fate is clearly identifiable here, and this exchange between Jupiter and Venus is an unambiguous sign of Virgil's ambition to implement a Stoic version of Rome's foundation myth as he shows his readers that a Stoic worldview, which the gods themselves show in action, is the historically appropriate way to think about Rome's predestined foundation.

We see this prophecy of Jupiter echoed in *Aeneid* VIII and *Aeneid* XII. In *Aeneid* VIII, the prophecy of Aeneas' greatness is referenced by Evander in relation to his mother, the nymph Carmenta (*Carmentis nymphae* (VIII.336)).[71] As Evander enumerates the history of Latium, he gestures to his mother's shrine, and we learn that Carmenta is:

> vatis fatidicae, cecinit quae prima futuros
> Aeneados magnos et nobile Pallanteum (VIII.340-341).

Evander's tour of Latium goes on to show other things that would become part of Roman history or Virgil's Rome (VIII.342ff), notably the Roman Forum (VIII.361). This suggests that the fate of Aeneas, as well as the long-term implications of it, were known in Latium on his arrival, and that the Latins knew they would eventually become Romans through generations. Although Aeneas was aware that he was seeking Latium in accordance with fate, Evander's tour shows him, and the reader, what his legacy will be there, illuminating for Aeneas the overall significance of his mission. This is another deliberate use of ideas of prophecy and fate in a way that reinforces a Stoic message in the epic.

In *Aeneid* XII, Jupiter's prophecy resurfaces in his reassuring words to his wife and sister Juno that he will allow the Latins to keep their name, language and traditions at the conclusion of the wars in Latium (XII.834-840). These words are in response to Juno's plea to Jupiter that the Latins not be required to change their name for the Trojans in defeat (XII.821-828). Juno is aware that fate has dictated the Trojans' victory in Latium, and she has known it since the opening lines of the poem (I.19-22). However, Juno also knows that fate does not forbid Jupiter from granting what she seeks with respect to preserving the legacy of the Latins (*nulla fati quod lege tenetur* (XII.819)). In Jupiter's words to Juno, then, we see his prophecy from *Aeneid* I realised, and we are given a brief overview of the intervening years between the Latin wars and the Augustan regime (XII.834-840). We already know from *Aeneid* I that Jupiter will grant *imperium sine fine* (I.279) to this race of Latins mixed with Trojan blood. Aeneas also appears aware of Jupiter's endorsement as he

[70] Mackie (1984, p. 127) also draws attention to these aspects of this encounter between Venus and Jupiter.
[71] Pietras (2018) discusses the significance of this incident in greater detail, and the complicated history and reception of Carmenta as a prophet.

commands his men in battle that *Iuppiter hac stat* (XII.565). In reading Jupiter as transmitting decrees of fate, and observing Aeneas knowingly act in accordance with their fulfilment, then seeing that fate come to actualisation from the *Aeneid* to Virgil's own readers, we see divine providence and fate conflated within a Stoic compatibilist outlook on Rome's foundation.

It would appear that not all gods have the same standing as Jupiter when it comes to relaying the decrees of fate. Throughout Aeneas' mission, we see lesser deities try to interfere with the course of events, attempting to thwart, aid or impede Aeneas, with varying degrees of success. The clearest example of this is Juno, who, despite knowing from the beginning of the epic that fate is not on her side, is intent on opposing fate as it comes at the expense of her beloved Carthage (I.19-22). Juno herself knows that her efforts to end Aeneas' mission are futile, as they are forbidden by fate. We see this in her exclamation *quippe vetor fatis* (I.39). Yet, this does not stop her trying, as she uses one of Jupiter's thunderbolts to scatter the Trojan ships and bribes Aeolus to help her bring about the death of Aeneas' fleet (I.34-80). Reading Juno's action with a Stoic outlook, Most notes that 'Juno's storm symbolizes a force for disorder which cannot prevent the ultimate fulfilment of the design of the universal *logos* but can make things difficult along the way, and thus coheres perfectly with the large-scale cosmological plan of the epic'.[72] Juno can bend the chain of causes that constitutes fate, but she cannot break it.

As Jupiter chastises Juno for her actions and rectifies the troubled seas (I.132-156), Virgil introduces the symbol of a good statesman, a man *pietate gravem ac meritis* (I.151). He presents the reader with a simile (I.148-152), an image of how *pietas* can triumph over chaos, or *furor*, and become a stabilising force in maintaining civic order and preserving the edicts of fate. This simile is significant for the *Aeneid* in two ways. The first is its political importance, as it offers a vision of a good statesman that resonates strongly with Augustus. The statesman in the simile is beyond the time frame of the narrative, and is able to successfully put *pietas* to direct political use in stabilising a disenfranchised and rebellious population. This might recall for Virgil's readers how Augustus was able to bring stability to the city of Rome after over a century of civil war and political unrest, and

[72] Most, 2010, p. 37. Juno's attempts to prevent the fate of Aeneas continue throughout the *Aeneid.* In *Aeneid* VII, Juno recognises that her fate is not only against that of the Trojans (*fatis contraria nostris / fata Phrygum* (VII.293-294), but also inferior to it. Although resigned that she cannot alter fate, Juno remains determined to cause chaos in spite of it (VII.297-298; VII.308-312), enlisting Allecto to incite the Latin wars (VII.324ff), and appearing several times on the side of the Rutulians (IX.743-745; IX.764; XII.138-160; XII.229-237; XII.768-772).

implies that he did so by means of *pietas*.[73] The second is the antithesis that Virgil introduces between *pietas* and *furor,* which remain in constant conflict throughout the *Aeneid.*[74]

Towards the end of *Aeneid* I, Venus also attempts to intervene in the affairs of Aeneas by manipulating Queen Dido to make her fall in love with him (*quocirca capere… teneantur amore* (I.673-675)). Venus employs her son Cupid to impersonate Ascanius and infect Dido with an immediate love for Aeneas (I.684-688). Specifically, she instructs Cupid: *occultum inspires ignem fallasque veneno* (I.688). This is interesting, because as the recipient of Jupiter's prophecy (I.257-279), Venus must know that Aeneas will have to leave Carthage at some point. It is not exactly clear what her plan is, as she knows that the relationship cannot last. In Venus' actions, and in Aeneas' remaining in Carthage for as long as he does, we can see that there is individual freedom within the remit of service to fate for both the man and the lesser gods. Juno's and Venus' attempts to alter the course of Aeneas' fated mission to reach Latium only serve to emphasise Aeneas' devotion to fulfilling that fate. Aeneas would not have been able to complete his mission had he remained in Troy or Carthage, however, he would not have felt compelled to remain Carthage (or indeed leave it) without divine intervention. As much as his leaving Carthage was an assent to Mercury's impression, Aeneas' prolonged time in Carthage was the result of an assent to the impression of Dido's divinely motivated love for him. Venus' wish for Aeneas to remain at least briefly in Carthage in *Aeneid* I is not as strong as Jupiter's insistence that he leave it in *Aeneid* IV. She too is unable to break the chain of fate.

It becomes clear in the *Aeneid* that while the gods may interfere in human affairs, and attempt to exercise some form of control over fate, they are not able to action any permanent alterations.[75] Unable to help the Latins defeat the Trojans in *Aeneid* XII, Juno must instead advocate for the preservation of the Latin legacy via Jupiter within the remit of what is permitted by fate. Venus additionally looks to Jupiter to explain Aeneas' fate. Although Juno and Venus are capable of delaying the fulfilment of Aeneas' fate and his mission to settle in Latium, they are powerless to sway the outcome in any meaningful

[73] See **3.2.1** for a discussion of Augustus as a symbol of *pietas*.
[74] Ahl (1976, p. 275) writes of the dynamic between *pietas* and *furor* that '*furor* is the diametric opposite of *pietas.* It is the uncontrolled assertion of self, as irrational and amoral as *pietas* is both rational and moral'. Ahl (1976, pp. 274-259) discusses the relationship between *pietas, virtus* and *furor* in Roman epic.
[75] As Gale (2004, p. 272) writes, 'The *Aeneid,* in contrast, takes it for granted that the gods intervene in human affairs; the existence of a divine plan is a 'given' of the genre, and the notion that history is predetermined by a providential Jupiter has its roots in earlier epic, as much as in Stoic theology or Roman tradition'.

way. In Juno's sustained and unsuccessful efforts to throw Aeneas off his mission, we see that no deity but Jupiter is able to interpret the progress of fate, and we see his prophecy from *Aeneid* I come to fruition. In Aeneas' departure from Carthage, we also see his obedience to Jupiter as synonymous with fate. Throughout the epic, we see that fate, god and man exist in a somewhat symbiotic relationship underlined by a Stoic compatibilist framework where human assent forms a crucial component.

Although the outcome of Aeneas' mission is never in doubt, there is still tension in the story because Juno's and Venus' interventions introduce obstacles for Aeneas that he must overcome. This emphasises the *pietas* of the hero and the subtle complexities of Stoic ideas of fate. By assenting to impressions, Aeneas is able to fulfil his fated destiny to reach Latium, although his journey is arduous and he loses many comrades on the way. Conversely, Juno in particular is able to achieve nothing by trying to work against this fate, despite her divine status. While Aeneas may take some role of ownership over his fate through his assents, Juno can accomplish nothing substantial against fate through her dissents. In this dynamic, and over the course of the epic, we see proof of fate as a non-linear sequence of cause and effect. As Most identified earlier, fate seems to only apply to broad outlines of events, such as the ultimate outcome of Aeneas settling in Latium, while leaving room for negotiation with respect to smaller details, such as how Aeneas will get there and in what timeframe.[76]

2.3. Stoicism, Emotion and *Aeneid* I as the Signal of a Stoic Epic

Having discussed how Aeneas' actions with respect to fate suggest that he is a Stoic hero, I will now look at how the Stoics viewed emotion, and how Aeneas' handling of his emotions shows an additional strategy for integrating Stoic ideas into the *Aeneid*. Through the epic, we routinely see Aeneas elevate service to fate over passion and personal feeling, the hallmark of a measured Stoic character.[77] This sets Aeneas apart from his Homeric predecessors, Achilles and Odysseus, who were prone to emotional reactions and wallowing, and marks him as a new variety of Stoic hero for the Augustan regime. The essence of Aeneas' Stoic nature is captured in his *pietas,* which represents among other things his service to fate and his mastery of his emotions. In *Aeneid* I, Virgil establishes a

[76] See **2.2.2**, n. 72.
[77] Shaw, 1985; Frede, 2003; Meyer, 2009; Baltzly, 2018.

pattern of Stoic behaviour in Aeneas' reactions to adversity, thus inviting the reader to interpret Aeneas as a Stoic hero and the *Aeneid* as a Stoic text.

2.3.1. Emotion and the Stoic Aeneas

Frede writes that 'a Stoic either has no feelings or successfully represses them'.[78] Through the *Aeneid,* we are able to see how Aeneas' pursuit of his fate coincides with his unemotional dedication to completing his mission, and thus marks him as a Stoic hero. It also contributes to the classification of Virgil's Stoic *pietas* as a masculine virtue, as Pietras highlights 'the ancient world's equation of masculinity with reason and self-control' in relation to Virgil's Rome.[79] As I have mentioned before, Stoicism is characterized by an adherence to fate above all things and the supremacy of reason over emotion, which we may additionally interpret as the subversion of personal feeling and passion in favour of fulfilment of duty.[80] In the *Aeneid,* we see that Aeneas' defining characteristic of *pietas* is underlined by a Stoic suppression of emotion and a complete surrender to fate, both of which guide him through the ordeals of Juno's wrath to reach and settle in Latium. Like *pietas,* Stoicism encouraged engagement in public life, elevating collective good over individual feeling, which we see in Aeneas' care for his men after his ships have been scattered in Juno's storm (I.170-171).[81] Reconciling these traits, as Frede suggests, 'if compliance with fate is the bottom line of Stoic philosophy, what could be more reasonable than an unemotional resignation to its ineluctable decrees?'[82] This assessment strengthens the case for a compatibilist interpretation of Stoic fate in the *Aeneid*. For Aeneas, subversion of personal feeling and dedication to following fate coincide with the elevation of his mission to reach Latium above all other things. As Arnold put in quite stark terms over a century ago, Aeneas is 'the man who crushes his desires that he may loyally cooperate with the destiny of his people'.[83]

Although we see Aeneas elevate his mission above his own personal feelings and desires over the course of the *Aeneid*, this does not mean that those feelings and desires do not exist. By focusing on Aeneas' emotions and referring repeatedly to fate, Virgil reinforces his intended Stoic connotations for his hero. Aeneas' acknowledgment of his emotions, and

[78] Frede, 2003, p. 179.
[79] Pietras, 2018, p. 51. Prince (2010, p. 3) supports that '*pietas* in the *Aeneid* is a purely masculine virtue'.
[80] Heinze, 1982; Shaw, 1985; Reydams-Shills, 2005; Baltzly, 2018.
[81] Thorsteinsson, 2010. The idea of Stoic self-sacrifice would have been familiar to Virgil's readers through the character of Cato in Cicero's *De finibus.*
[82] Frede, 2003, p. 179.
[83] Arnold, 1911, p. 199.

his overcoming of them for the sake of his mission, makes him a lot more relatable as a human being, as well as a model Stoic.[84] Brennan identifies emotions as one of 'the three main kinds of impulse' and states that 'there are four main emotions on the Stoic account, usually given the names pleasure, pain, desire, and fear', all of which the Stoics considered to be irrational.[85] In a Stoic context, these emotions are not necessarily analogous to how modern readers may interpret them. Thus, Brennan simplifies them further:

> Desire is the opinion that some future thing is a good of such a sort that we should reach out for it.
> Fear is the opinion that some future thing is an evil of such a sort that we should avoid it.
> Pleasure is the opinion that some present thing is a good of such a sort that we should be elated about it.
> Pain is the opinion that some present thing is an evil of such a sort that we should be so depressed about it.[86]

There is some intersection between these four main emotions. Desire and fear represent future concerns; pleasure and pain exist in the present; desire and pleasure signify good things; fear and pain are about bad things.[87]

During the *Aeneid,* we see Aeneas develop from a man who is led by his emotions to a man who makes selections, or, decisions based on rational judgment.[88] We also see Aeneas wrestle with his emotions more in *Aeneid* I-VI than we do in *Aeneid* VII-XII. In her 1989 essay, 'Aeneas: A Study in Character Development', Fuhrer comprehensively discusses areas in the *Aeneid* where Aeneas is affected by emotion.[89] Fuhrer writes that 'throughout book 1 we see him sighing, crying, or being frightened which suggests a rather unhardened

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[84] Galinsky (1988, p. 325) raises the compelling argument that 'The implicate postulate of modern critics that Aeneas should act without emotion raises similar questions. It would go a long way towards making him precisely into the bloodless Stoic stereotype whose humanity would be less than compelling. Instead, Vergil emphasises the humanity of his hero. It is reinforced by the dilemma into which Vergil plunges him even at the end of the *Aeneid* and conversely, without the humanization of the scene there would be no dilemma'. Fuhrer (1989, p. 69) concludes her essay on such a note, writing of Aeneas that 'we get a picture of a hero who is humane regarding both his weakness and his magnanimity'.

[85] Brennan, 2005, pp. 90-91. Brennan (2005, p. 91) elaborates that fear comes in several forms, 'hesitation, superstition, bashfulness, panic'. In *De finibus* (III.16), Cicero elaborates on the Stoic significance of pleasure and desire.

[86] Brennan, 2005, p. 93. Brennan's (2005) chapter 'Impulses and Emotions' goes into far more detail about Stoic emotions and subsets of emotion than I am able to in this thesis.

[87] Brennan, 2005.

[88] Brennan (2005, p. 99) writes that 'Selections differ from either emotions or *eupatheiai,* because they do not involve our attributing goodness or badness to the objects or actions in question. Instead they involve looking at an indifferent thing in the future, and judging accurately that it is indifferent, but judging also that given the nature of the object and our situation that there is still some reason to go for it or avoid it'.

[89] Fuhrer, 1989, p. 66.

state of mind and a rather emotional character'.[90] These emotions continue to resurface in Aeneas over the course of the epic, however, much less so in *Aeneid* VII-XII than in *Aeneid* I-VI.[91] Throughout Aeneas' emotional passages, there is overlap in his thoughts, with feelings of 'doubting, hesitating, and pondering' recurring.[92] Marking Aeneas' progression from a man governed by his emotions to a logical Stoic hero, Fuhrer notes the caveat that 'in the second half of the poem there are many fewer lines dealing with Aeneas, but still he sheds tears or expresses doubts and uncertainty'.[93]

Aeneas' apparent mastery and subjugation of his emotions also sets him apart from his Homeric predecessors, among whom displays of emotion were not uncommon. The *Iliad,* for example, begins with Achilles withdrawing to the beach and shedding tears over the loss of Briseis to Agamemnon:

αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς
δακρύσας ἑτάρων ἄφαρ ἕζετο νόσφι λιασθείς, (*Il.,* I.348-349)

Achilles also has an immediate emotional reaction to the death of Patroclus (*Il.* XVIII.22-27). Achilles' emotions about Patroclus resurface through the last quarter of the *Iliad*, often accompanied by tears or groaning in sorrow (*Il.,* XVIII.70ff, XXIII.59-61, XXIV.122ff, XXIV.509ff). Achilles appears to make no effort to stifle these emotions, nor is he considered any less heroic for expressing them, or indeed, allowing them to consume him.

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[90] Fuhrer, 1989, p. 66. I will address Aeneas' tears in the next section (**2.3.2**). In *Aeneid* I Fuhrer (1989, p. 70) points to 'Cf. 'ingemere' in 1. 208f. (after landing in Africa): 'suspirare' in 371 and 'queri' in 385 (complaining of his ill fortune and bewailing the loss of his companions); 'timor' in 450 (his fear of the unknown land is soothed); 'lacrimare' in 459 and 'gemitus' in 485 (at the sight of the pictures of the Trojan War on the temple of Juno in Carthage); 'turbati animi' in 515 (worried about the uncertain situation)' to support this assertion.

[91] In *Aeneid* II, Fuhrer (1989, p. 66) identifies that Aeneas is twice 'depicted in fear or sadness' referencing Aeneas' vision of Hector (II.279-288) and the loss of Creüsa (II.735-804). In *Aeneid* III, Fuhrer (1989, p. 66) cites five instances of Aeneas showing emotion: when he leaves Troy (III.10ff), when he sees Polydorus unburied (III.29-42) and at the prophecy given by the Penates in Crete (III.172-179). In *Aeneid* IV, Fuhrer (1989, p. 66) identifies two instances of Aeneas showing emotion, when Mercury tells him he must leave Carthage (IV.279-295), and when Dido begs him to stay (IV.393-396). In *Aeneid* V Aeneas shows emotion when the Trojan women have set fire to the Trojan ships (V.700-720) and at the death of Palinurus. Fuhrer (1989, p. 66) writes that *Aeneid* VI shows that Aeneas 'in Cumae and in the Underworld, he is often frightened or, during the encounter with Dido (450-76), weeping', also drawing our attention to VI.156-158, VI.175ff, VI.185-189, VI.290-294, VI.317-320, VI.331ff, VI.559-561, VI.695-702, VI.710-712 for Aeneas displaying emotion in *Aeneid* VI.

[92] Fuhrer, 1989, p. 60. These passages Fuhrer (1989, p. 70) identifies as '1. 305-9 (deciding to explore the unknown country); 4. 279-95 (cf. n. 29); 5. 700-3 (cf. n. 30); 6. 185-9 (at the sight of the forest where the golden bough is hidden); 331f. (at the sight of the shades gathered by Cocytus' stream)'.

[93] Fuhrer, 1989, p. 66. Fuhrer (1989, p. 70) notes the examples of Aeneas shedding tears in the second half of the poem at '10. 821-4 (after killing Lausus); 11. 2-29, 39-63, 94-99 (at the funeral of Pallas)', and of Aeneas' uncertainty at '8. 18-30 (in fear of the Latins); 67-80 (after the instruction by Tiberinus); 520-3 (after Evander' speech); 10. 217f. (on the way back to the battlefield); 12. 486f. (fighting against Turnus)'.

Odysseus too is not immune from moments of emotional consumption. Our first sighting of him in the *Odyssey* is during such a moment, as he laments his situation as a captive on the shores of Calypso:

> οὐδ᾽ ἄρ᾽ Ὀδυσσῆα μεγαλήτορα ἔνδον ἔτετμεν,
> ἀλλ᾽ ὅ γ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀκτῆς κλαῖε καθήμενος, ἔνθα πάρος περ,
> δάκρυσι καὶ στοναχῇσι καὶ ἄλγεσι θυμὸν ἐρέχθων (*Od*., V.81-83).

Odysseus' emotional state on this island is constant, οὐδέ ποτ᾽ ὄσσε / δακρυόφιν τέρσοντο (Od., V.151-152). Later in the story however, Odysseus attempts to hide his tears from the Phaeacians as the minstrel Demodocus recalls the Trojan war, and we learn that he is ashamed of his crying (*Od.,* VIII.83-93).[94] Despite Odysseus' efforts, the Phaeacian Alcinous notices that he is crying and, without drawing attention to it, tactfully suggests a series of games. Again, however, despite his acknowledged grief (ἀχνύμενός (*Od.,* VIII.478)), Odysseus requests that Demodocus sing once more of the Trojan war (*Od.,* VIII.487-498), this time of the Trojan Horse and the feats of the Greeks.

Hearing of his own deeds, Odysseus is again consumed by emotion, and again he conceals his tears from all but Alcinous (*Od.,* VIII.522-534). In these lines, Homer introduces a simile comparing Odysseus to a woman who is entirely overcome with emotion, weeping over a husband's corpse before an enemy drags her away. It is a powerful image, and the comparison suggests that Odysseus is not the master of his emotions. Again, Alcinous acts with compassion for his visitor and commands Demodocus to cease (*Od.,* VIII.536ff). While Odysseus' tears prompt Alcinous to ask him about the Trojan War, giving Odysseus the opportunity to tell his story therefore filling the role of a plot device, the simile of the weeping woman shows Odysseus to be emotionally undisciplined.[95] Such emotional displays do not seem to detract from the heroism of Homer's heroes, but rather, to humanise them. Aeneas, then, who while humanised by his emotions is also able to master them, represents a break in this heroic model. In Aeneas, we see Virgil's innovation of a hero motivated by a set of Stoic philosophical principles. Through Aeneas' comparative suppression of his emotions in favour of his allegiance to fate, we find him to be a different, more measured and more Stoic hero than his Homeric counterparts.

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[94] Odysseus' tears and his effort to hide them from the Phaeacians is repeated in *Od.* VIII.531. Once again, Alcinous alone notices them and acts kindly.

[95] Odysseus' emotions are also visible when he is finally reunited with his wife, Penelope. However, he must hide them from her at their first meeting as he is in disguise (*Od*., XIX.209-212). In these lines, Odysseus is both physically showing emotion in his tears and feeling emotion in his pity for Penelope on account of what she has endured in his absence.

The lines in which we first meet the character Aeneas are a pointed reminiscence of the Homeric passage in which we first meet Odysseus. Here, Virgil is clearly giving us a Homeric model of emotional reaction, yet we see Aeneas respond differently than Odysseus under similar circumstances. We encounter these men in situations of naval distress, and both Aeneas and Odysseus wish they had perished in Troy. Aeneas laments:

> o terque quaterque beati,
> quis ante ora patrum Troiae sub moenibus altis
> contigit oppetere! O Danaum fortissime gentis
> Tydide! mene Iliacis occumbere campis
> non potuisse tuaque animam hanc effundere dextra (I.94-98)

These words recall the similar complaints of Odysseus:

> τρὶς μάκαρες Δαναοὶ καὶ τετράκις, οἳ τότ᾽ ὄλοντο
> Τροίῃ ἐν εὐρείῃ χάριν Ἀτρεΐδῃσι φέροντες.
> ὡς δὴ ἐγώ γ᾽ ὄφελον θανέειν καὶ πότμον ἐπισπεῖν
> ἤματι τῷ ὅτε μοι πλεῖστοι χαλκήρεα δοῦρα
> Τρῶες ἐπέρριψαν περὶ Πηλεΐωνι θανόντι. 310
> τῷ κ᾽ ἔλαχον κτερέων, καί μευ κλέος ἦγον Ἀχαιοί:
> νῦν δέ λευγαλέῳ θανάτῳ εἵμαρτο ἁλῶναι (*Od.,* V.306-312).[96]

By the obvious parallels in language, it is clear that Virgil had this passage of Homer in mind when writing this part of his epic, the introduction of his hero. Interestingly, Ahl notes of these speeches that 'Odysseus and Aeneas are not afraid of death, but of an *unheroic* death far from the battlefield'.[97]

While the emotional sentiments of the two heroes are similar when we encounter them, we see a marked disparity in their next courses of action. Aeneas tries to save his fleet, and finds shore with seven of the Trojan ships (I.170-171). His actions reflect concern for the collective good of his men and his mission over his own emotional distress. Odysseus, on the other hand, focuses only on his own survival, searching desperately for his raft while appearing unconcerned with the wellbeing of his crew, who are also trapped in the storm (*Od.,* V.315-327). These emotional outbursts and their subsequent actions do much to differentiate the two heroes. Virgil shows Aeneas to be a man who overcomes his emotions and ensures the survival of others, as opposed to Odysseus, who seeks only his own survival. As the epics progress, we see further emotional contrasts. On the one hand, Aeneas proceeds to stifle his emotions and desires, continuously subordinating them for the success of his mission as the *Aeneid* progresses. On the other hand, Odysseus appears unable to overcome his emotional responses, as we see in his unsuccessful attempts to hide

[96] Clausen (1964) reviews further implications of these passages and the parallels between the two heroes.
[97] Ahl, 1976, p. 208.

his crying from the Phaeacians and his poorly concealed pity for his long-suffering wife. As a Stoic hero, Aeneas elevates his dedication to his mission and his fate above any personal feelings he may have.

Returning to Fuhrer's analysis of Aeneas' emotions throughout the poem, which revolves around Brennan's four identified Stoic emotions, desire, fear, pleasure and pain, we see that all of these emotions, and indeed any display of emotion by Aeneas, may be considered irrational in that it distracts him from his mission to reach Latium and set in motion the foundation of the Roman state. Despite clearly experiencing these emotions at various points in the narrative, Aeneas does not indulge in them, and instead pursues the course of action that leads him closer to reaching Latium and thus fulfilling his fate. His behaviour coincides with Frede's earlier assessments of the ideal Stoic and his prioritisation of fate over personal feeling.[98] Looking at these aspects of Stoicism that pertain to fate, free will and emotion, we can see that Aeneas' actions throughout the epic may be considered Stoic, and we can see how Aeneas as a man of *pietas* is also a Stoic role model for the Augustan regime.

2.3.2. *Aeneid* I: Introducing a Stoic Message and a Stoic Hero

In *Aeneid* I, Virgil reveals that the epic contains an underlying Stoic message. In this section, I aim to show that the Stoic message is sufficiently clear in *Aeneid* I that we may interpret it as Virgil laying the groundwork for a Stoic interpretation of the epic as a whole, and of his hero Aeneas. Thus, in Stoicism he offers an answer to Lucretian Epicureanism as an ideology for Rome that responds to the traditions of Roman history and ideas for how to be an ideal Roman in the Augustan regime. Stoic elements additionally manifest in Virgil's representation of *pietas,* the defining characteristic of Aeneas.[99] In the character of Aeneas, and in the story of Aeneas that Virgil tells, we see how it is possible for *pietas,* a value of public good, to become an internalised individual quality, underlined by a Stoic moral framework. In this section, I shall return to Frede's assessment of a Stoic as one who has mastered his feelings and is a willing servant to fate and its sacrosanct order as I discuss how, in *Aeneid* I, Virgil presents the essentials of Aeneas' Stoic behaviour. First, I will look at how Virgil's depiction of fate in *Aeneid* I suggests a Stoic reading of the epic. Second, I will examine our first encounter with Aeneas in the poem, looking at how his

[98] See **2.3.1**.
[99] As Mackie (1984, p. 15), for example, identifies that 'Aeneas' general concern to follow the fates is the cornerstone of his *pietas*'.

pursuit of fate, which aligns with his obligations under *pietas,* accompanies his 'unemotional resignation' to completing his mission, and thus invites an analysis of him as a Stoic hero.[100]

In the proem of the *Aeneid* (I.1-11), Virgil introduces himself up as a sort of Roman prophet, clear from the first-person indicative *cano* (I.1) as opposed to an invocation of a Muse. From these opening lines, we learn that the man Virgil sings of, Aeneas, will survive to reach Latium and found the Roman race, despite obstructionist intervention from the divine wrath of Juno. We also discover that the epic will follow Aeneas geographically from Troy to Latium, with the action taking place in both the human and divine spheres. In the second line of the proem, Virgil introduces an obvious Stoic element to the story as he tells us that Aeneas is *fato profugus* (I.2).[101] This is the first descriptor we have of Virgil's hero, and perhaps gives an element of intrigue to the character at the beginning of the poem as we cannot be immediately be sure whether he is a fugitive fleeing from fate or because of fate, whether *fato* is an ablative of separation, means or agent. I argue the latter, and I believe this is made clear as *Aeneid* I progresses and we see that Aeneas is compelled by fate. From these opening lines, we discover that fate will be significant for Aeneas and his mission, and therefore for the foundation of Rome.

Following the proem, Virgil reinforces the fundamental role of fate, writing that Aeneas and his crew are *acti fatis* (I.32). In both instances, as ablatives of means or agent, fate is the driving force and Aeneas is being driven by it. In addition to dictating the plot of the epic and the direction of Aeneas' mission, over the course of *Aeneid* I we see that fate is also responsible for the entire world order. For example, we learn that Carthage would be the capital of the world if the fates allowed it (I.13-18), and that fate guarantees the Trojans a peaceful home in Latium (I.204-206). We also see that Jupiter, the king of the gods, plays the role of an arbiter or a mouthpiece for fate, although he cannot control or alter it.[102] The clearest example of this is when Jupiter assures Venus that the fate of Aeneas will remain unchanged (I.257-258). In Venus' appeal, she has considered the consequences of opposing fate in fall of Troy (*fatis contraria fata rependens* (I.239)), and she knows that she is powerless over the outcome. We also see in their encounter that while Jupiter may speak the mandate of fate, interpreting it for the other deities (I.262), the course of fate

[100] Frede, 2003, p. 179.
[101] See *TLL,* 10, 2:1736.45 for an explanation of *profugus*. The commentator Servius suggests in this context that it means excluded or driven by necessity, wandering from their own homes.
[102] See **2.2.2**.

cannot be significantly altered, not even by the king of the gods.[103] This collection of references to fate in the first 300 lines of the epic functions as a signal to readers of the presence of a Stoic worldview.

The inability of the gods to obstruct the dictates of fate becomes very clear in *Aeneid* I through Juno's words to herself as she attempts to throw Aeneas off course from reaching Latium (*mene incepto…vetor fatis* (I.37-39)).[104] At this point, Juno knows that her efforts against fate, made as a result of her anger (I.4, I.11), will fail, and she has already acknowledged that Carthage will fall to the Trojans, *sic volvere Parcas* (I.22). All the same, she tries to alter that eventual fated outcome, even though she knows that her actions are futile. Juno's failed interventions in *Aeneid* I serve to reinforce that Aeneas will accomplish his mission to reach Latium despite any divine impediments because Aeneas and his men are *acti fatis* (I.32), thus beyond the reach of human or divine influence, and the mission is fated to succeed. We also see in this a distinctly Stoic representation of fate as a predetermined non-linear series of causes representing a sacrosanct mandate enhanced through Juno's failed attempt to thwart it. She may bend the chain of causes and bring delay, but she cannot break it. We continue to read that while Aeneas may be driven by fate, like a model Stoic in a compatibilist framework, he also shows himself to be a willing servant to it. Thus, the opening ambiguity of *fato profugus* (I.2) diminishes as we read on, and Virgil's Stoic order gains in clarity.

Virgil's representation of Aeneas in *Aeneid* I reveals him to be a man of Stoic temperament and attitude. The first time we encounter Aeneas in person is during the storm that Aeolus has created at the request of Juno to send him off course. At this point, with his fleet in disarray, Aeneas is in an emotional state, specifically a state of terror:

> extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra;
> ingemit et duplicis tendens ad sidera palmas (I.92-93).

His speech lamenting that he wished to have died in Troy follows (I.94-101), the significance of which I have addressed in the previous section (**2.3.1**). Aeneas' emotional reaction to his circumstance is limited as he quickly acts to guide his fleet to Libyan shores, saving seven ships (I.170-171). In this, Aeneas prioritises the safety of his fleet and his mission over his own feelings of fear and self-pity. He addresses his comrades to do the

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[103] As I have discussed (**2.2.2**), this categorisation of Jupiter as an agent of fate situates the *Aeneid* within a monotheistic or pantheistic world view in line with Stoic compatibilism. See **2.2** and O'Keefe, 2016, p. 236 and p. 237.

[104] See **2.2.2** for a further discussion of Juno's efforts to thwart Aeneas' fate.

same, urging them to *revocate animos maestumque timorem / mittite* (I.202-203), and he reassures his men that their fate is to reach Latium and settle there (I.204-206). Virgil also tells us that this speech required Aeneas to hide his emotions from his crew:

> Talia voce refert, curisque ingentibus aeger
> spem vultu simulat, permit altum corde dolorem (I.208-209).[105]

This measured reaction to a crisis and subjugation of emotion for the sake of his mission demonstrate that Aeneas is a man who has control of his emotions and is actively pursuing the course of fate and protecting his fleet. In short, we are left with the impression that he is a Stoic hero.

Our Stoic impressions of Aeneas are reinforced when we learn that Aeneas is most affected by the losses the Trojan fleet has suffered, yet he conceals it from his men (*pracipue pius…fortemque Cloanthum* (I.220-222)).[106] Though he hides them, we see that these cares persist and prevent Aeneas from sleeping, *At pius Aeneas, per noctem plurima volvens* (I.305). Twice in the first half of *Aeneid* I, Virgil links the epithet *pius* to Aeneas regarding his care for his comrades and his mission, and his suppression of his own emotions, suggesting a Stoic quality to the epithet. Despite his sense of loss and sleepless night, Aeneas is determined to explore the land on which the fleet has alighted, setting aside his emotions to further his mission and ensuring that his comrades are protected before venturing out with Achates (I.306-313). As I have discussed in the previous section (**2.3.1**), this successful suppression of emotion and focus on his mission during the storm and its immediate aftermath sets Aeneas apart from his Homeric counterparts, who were not as proficient at disguising and subjugating their own feelings, and marks Aeneas as a Stoic hero.

In *Aeneid* I, we see Aeneas attempt to conceal his emotions on more than one occasion; sometimes he is more successful than others. For example, when Aeneas and Achates view the murals of the Trojan war on the walls of Carthage (I.453-458), Aeneas is described more than once as crying. In his reaction to the murals, he is *lacrimans* (I.459), indicating an emotional response of sorrow at the images of his dead countrymen. Aeneas laments the war to Achates, yet finishes with a plea to Achates to overcome his cares ("*quis iam…fama salutem"* (I.459-463)). In the last line of these words, Aeneas is likely speaking to himself

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[105] Although not naming Aeneas a Stoic out rightly, of these lines, Mackie (1984, p. 126) writes that 'despite his exhortation Aeneas' heart is full of despondency (208f). He stoicly feigns hope in order to lift the spirits of his men. Both men and mission are foremost in his mind'.

[106] Mackie (1984, p. 126) notes the significance of Aeneas' worry in these lines with respect to the epithet *pius,* which I will discuss in chapter **3**.

as much as to Achates to subvert his emotions and to persist in his mission. These lines make a clear reference to the human experience of sorrow, and Aeneas, in true Stoic form, suggests that *fama* (I.463) is the result of putting aside those naturally occurring human experiences, and forging a path undeterred by anxieties about tragic outcomes or personal losses (*metus* (I.463)), in other words, a path without the interference of naturally occurring human feelings. We see that Aeneas is not fully capable of this yet, however, for after this speech his face is still wet with tears (*largoque umectat flumine vultum* (I.465)), and these tears continue as Aeneas is again *lacrimans* (I.470) as he views the scenes from the Trojan war. This sadness is only interrupted by the sight of Queen Dido (I.494-497), who similarly invites the Trojans to *solvite corde metum* (I.562). Aeneas' emotional state is only fully broken, however, when Achates reassures him that *omnia tuta vides, classem sociosque receptos* (I.583). The sight of the safety of his crew and his mission brings him back to his fate motivated pursuit of Latium. Achates is the only one who has witnessed this emotional response of Aeneas, as it occurs while both are in the shroud cast by Venus (I.411), which does not lift until their safety in Carthage is assured (I.586-587). Achates does not remind Aeneas of his emotional episode, nor does it occur again as we see Aeneas become more adept at suppressing any kind of personal feeling in favour of advancing his mission.

Perhaps the greatest indicator of Aeneas' Stoic character in *Aeneid* I is when he introduces himself to a disguised Venus while he and Achates are exploring the Libyan shores. First, he declares *sum pius Aeneas* (I.378), and then he tells her that he is following the dictates of fate, *data fata secutus* (I.382). These lines show both that Aeneas is aware of his epithet, *pius*, which we have already seen used twice in the context of subverting emotion in *Aeneid* I (I.220, I.305), and that he is aware that he is following the edicts of fate. This is also the first time that Aeneas has introduced himself, and the only time in the epic where he uses his own epithet himself.[107] Aeneas' understanding of fate, however, is hazy, demonstrating that Virgil is actively employing Stoic signalling in Aeneas' continued submission to it without full awareness of its overall significance.[108] Aeneas thus becomes an *exemplum* for the extent to which anyone can be a proper Stoic-in-History. These lines between Aeneas and Venus suggest not only that Aeneas is a Stoic, a *pius* man who has mastered his emotions and is a willing servant to fate, but also that he is conscious of and convinced of these qualities within himself. In his presentation of himself to Venus,

[107] I will discuss this incident in greater detail in chapter **3**.
[108] Shapiro, 1989; Ball, 1991.

Aeneas invites us to read him as a self-aware Stoic hero, a man who subverts his emotions and follows fate at all costs, even if he is not entirely sure what that means himself at this point in the story.[109] These characteristics of Aeneas show him to be an ideal Stoic Roman for the Augustan regime.

2.4. Conclusion

Virgil's *Aeneid* was successful in constructing a literary identity for Rome as glorious as that of Greece with an innovative Roman hero to match, a man characterised by his Stoic qualities, encapsulated in a distinctly masculine Augustan *pietas.* In the *Aeneid,* Virgil presents a Stoicly underlined mythical foundation story for Rome, writing Roman history as fulfilling a prophecy of Jupiter leading from Aeneas to Romulus to Augustus, implying that the culmination of Rome lies with Augustus and *imperium sine fine* (I.279).[110] Although its arguably pro-Augustan perspective may have contributed to the immediate success of the *Aeneid* and its popularity at the time of its first circulation, its philosophical and ideological intrigue has ensured its preservation as a whole and its continued recognition through present day. Allusions to Virgil's *Aeneid* are still commonplace in literature, and the influence of the *Aeneid* remains evident in later works, even those not composed in Latin, for example, in Dante's *Divina commedia*, in which Virgil himself appears as a character guiding the poet Dante through the nine concentric circles of Hell, and Milton's *Paradise Lost,* which resonates strongly with the *Aeneid* with respect to style, plot structure and storyline.[111]

I suggest that Virgil's Stoic compatibilist framework in the *Aeneid* and his Stoic representation of *pietas* in particular are the keys for understanding the epic as a whole, its ideological coherence and significance and its continued appeal and preservation. In his foundation epic, Virgil popularises Stoicism, integrating its technicalities into a work of epic mythology in such a way that it becomes appealing for his initial Roman audiences. The *Aeneid'*s Stoic representation *pietas* and its treatment by later authors invites us to read the epic as a quasi-scriptural text. In the *Aeneid* and its reception, we see *pietas* evolving from a Stoicly defined virtue of Aeneas into a Stoicly underlined faith-oriented belief system, under which submission to fate and performance of civic duty become

[109] In *Aeneid* VI, which I will discuss in chapter **6**, the overall significance of Aeneas' fate becomes clear.
[110] Kennedy,1997b; Zetzel, 1997. I have discussed this prophecy in greater detail in **2.3.2**.
[111] I will examine Christian receptions of Virgil's *Aeneid* in greater detail in chapter **7,** looking at Dante and Milton in **7.4.2**.

symbols of Roman identity in the Augustan regime. In *pietas,* Virgil combines ancestor veneration, political dedication, divine observance, submission to fate and community service into a single individual quality that can be embodied by all men who act in accordance with a particular set of values within a Stoic moral framework. Through Aeneas, we see an example of how *pietas,* a virtue of public good, becomes an internalised quality. In the *Aeneid,* men may learn what it means to be an ideal Roman citizen in this time period through Virgil's Stoic rendering of *pietas.*

Chapter 3. *Pietas* as a Roman Value

A Stoicly accentuated *pietas* governs the plot of Virgil's *Aeneid,* motivating Aeneas from the wrecked shores of Troy to those of Latium, the future site of Rome. As Carstairs-McCarthy writes, 'the whole of the *Aeneid,* one might say, is an education in the meaning of *pietas* as Virgil wishes us to conceive it'.[112] In the *Aeneid*, Virgil's rendition of the virtue 'broadens the traditional meanings of *pietas'* and represents an intervention in its history.[113] Virgilian *pietas* comes to signify both a faith-based belief system and the essence of Roman identity in the Augustan regime. As I suggested in the conclusion of chapter **2**, Virgil's Stoic *pietas* accounts for the ideological appeal of the poem, and forms a significant part of its legacy and its preservation from composition to present day. Using an approach consistent with *Begriffsgeschichte*, this chapter will first take on the difficult task of defining Virgilian *pietas* for both ancient and modern readers. It will then examine the origins and legacy of *pietas* as a Roman value and a cornerstone of Roman identity in the Augustan regime. This chapter will look to establish a historically informed definition of *pietas* by drawing on representations and definitions of the virtue that predate Virgil, concentrating on ancient Greek literature and the work of Cicero. It will conclude by surveying on the place of *pietas* in Virgil's Rome and the Augustan regime.

3.1. Defining *Pietas* and Understanding Virgilian *Pietas*

This section will take on the challenging task of determining a historically informed definition of *pietas* as Virgil may have wished his readers to understand it. To give a frame of reference for Virgilian *pietas,* this section will begin by looking at commonly associated Latin words. It will then draw on ancient sources to give further context to Virgilian *pietas*, namely the works of Plato and Cicero, which might have influenced Virgil's interpretation of and intention for his own representation of the virtue. In doing so, it will examine how the various demarcations and associations of *pietas* contribute to an understanding of the virtue that readers may apply when reading the *Aeneid.* In spite of any difficulty in ascertaining a concrete definition of *pietas,* and its variability over time, it is clear that *pietas* forms the ideological lynchpin of the *Aeneid,* elevating the moral register and ambitions of the poem and its protagonist to the status of a sacred text or heroic figure.

[112] Carstairs-McCarthy, 2018, p. 212.
[113] Ball, 1991, p. 24.

3.1.1. Virgilian *Pietas*: Duty, *Iustitia* and *Clementia*

Pietas as Virgil and his readers may have understood it is a challenging concept to capture in modern language. This problem has been recognised by many scholars over the last century, and will most likely remain unresolved as changes in language and meaning continue to alter interpretations of the virtue.[114] Further research into *pietas* shows it to be predominantly author and context dependent, which is something we must consider when trying to understand it from the point of view of Virgil's readers. The *Thesaurus Linguae Latina* (*TLL*) is an obvious starting point for the endeavour of establishing a definition of *pietas*. The entry for *pietas* in *TLL* is unsurprisingly large, and divided into different aspects of the virtue and authors' uses of it.[115] According to *TLL,* the core component of *pietas* is a set of performed duties towards gods, parents, country, family and fellow man.[116] However, *TLL* does not give an indication of the hierarchy of these obligations, which will become important to consider in our analysis of *pietas* in the *Aeneid*. In line with the principles of *TLL,* the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (*OCD*) gives a more concise and digestible definition: *pietas* is the typical Roman attitude of dutiful respect towards gods, fatherland, and parents and other kinsmen.[117] *OCD* additionally identifies *pietas* as a distinctly Roman characteristic, drawing on Ciceronian definitions while also looking to Virgil and Augustus to interpret meaning.[118]

Within the extensive entry for *pietas* in *TLL*, certain Latin words recur as being associated, giving us a clearer idea of what the virtue might entail for Virgil's readers. The recurring words that appear to have the most significance for our understanding of *pietas* in the *Aeneid* are *iustitia* and *clementia.*[119] The association of *pietas,* a personal quality, with words such as *iustitia* and *clementia,* which are more likely to appear in a legal setting than a personal one, suggests that a Roman understanding of *pietas* is more closely linked to what we might consider public institutions. Although Virgil does not necessarily always use these specific words, we see the principles of *iustitia* and *clementia* associated with *pietas* at various points in the *Aeneid*. However, there is a clear distinction between *iustita*

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[114] Glover (1912), Moseley (1925), Austin (1955), Sullivan (1959), Wagenvoort (1978; 1980) and Garrison (1987) account for a small sample of scholars who have recognised this difficulty over the last century.
[115] The full entry for *pietas* in *TLL* can be found in 10, 1:2086ff. Particularly relevant for this thesis are the excerpts concerning Cicero and Virgil.
[116] *TLL,* 10, 1:20877.10-45.
[117] *OCD,* 2012, p. 1148.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Wagenvoort (1980), Garrison (1987) and Gotlieb (1998) also note the association of these qualities with *pietas. Clementia* and *misericordia,* the latter of which I will discuss in greater detail in relation to Dante **(7.4.2**), in particular have been shaped for modern readers by Christian use and connotations.

and *pietas. Pietas,* although also performative, appears to be more of an aspect of character whereas *iustitia* represents a way of acting in certain situations. In short, *pietas* describes a man, *iustitia* describes actions. Moreover, while *iustitia* is by its very nature often strict, as a moral virtue, *pietas* allows for compassion, for *clementia*.[120]

Regarding the quality of *clementia,* Putnam writes that 'for Virgil *clementia* is realized in a context of *pietas*, of visible loyalty between father and son, and of the unspoken respect that operates reciprocally between men and gods'.[121] Of the difference between *clementia* and *pietas,* Garrison writes that 'whereas *clementia* suggests mercy that proceeds from strength, *pietas* has come to convey a sense of vulnerability, of mercy that proceeds from weakness or excessive indulgence'.[122] *Pietas,* then, is an aspect of character that enables men to perform acts of both *iustitia* and *clementia*. The clearest example of this in the *Aeneid* is Anchises crucial comment on Roman imperialism in his advice to Aeneas in *Aeneid* VI: *parcare subiectis et debellare superbos* (VI.853).[123] Aeneas must be just, and subdue the proud, showing *iustitia,* but also merciful, and spare the innocent, showing *clementia*.[124]

Although some scholars link *clementia, iustitia* and *pietas,* in the *Aeneid,* Virgil does not use *iustitia* in proximity to *pietas,* and only mentions *clementia* once, by its antithesis.[125] Compared to *pietas* in the *Aeneid, iustitia* is hardly mentioned, appearing only six times in the epic.[126] Notably, *iustitia* does not appear in association with Aeneas, perhaps implying either that his actions are not those of *iustitia*, or that his *pietas* is a superior and more spiritual quality that also encompasses *iustitia* in a way that does not need to be stated outright. Interestingly, twice acts of *iustitia* are attributed to Dido. Ilioneus appeals to Dido's sense of *iustitia* in her actions (I.523), and Aeneas also recognises this quality in her behaviour (I.604). When Ilioneus and Aeneas recognise Dido's tendency towards acts of *iustitia,* it is in complimentary reference to the way she rules Carthage. The practices

[120] The connection of *pietas* and compassion is particularly strong in literature of the late Middle Ages, such as Dante's *Divina commedia,* which I will discuss in chapter **7**.
[121] Putnam, 1995, p. 202.
[122] Garrison, 1987, pp. 117-118. This weakness becomes clear in the reception of Virgilian *pietas* by later authors, particularly Ovid and Lucan, whom I will discuss in chapter **7**.
[123] This line is significant for the reception of the *Aeneid,* particularly with respect to Augustine (**7.3.2**)
[124] *Clementia* is also a virtue often associated with Julius Caesar, and this connection would not have been lost on readers of Virgil. Whether this supposed *clementia* of Caesar was a façade for his otherwise unhumanitarian conduct is also a consideration (Peer, 2015)
[125] This, of course, is when Venus reveals to Aeneas that the *inclementia* of the gods is responsible for the destruction of Troy (II.602).
[126] *Iustitia* appears in I.523, I.604, II.426, VI.620, VII.536, XI.126. These figures were gained from an electronically conducted search of each individual book.

that are called *iustitia* in Dido are regarded as *pietas* in Aeneas. In this, perhaps Virgil is implying that Dido, as a woman and/or as a foreigner, with Epicurean tendencies, cannot embody *pietas.*[127] No matter how much she adheres to the value system of *pietas*, the closest Dido may come to embodying *pietas* is performing acts that are called *iustitia*.

Following his association of *iustitia* with Dido, Virgil draws attention to *iustitia* in *Aeneid* VI in a way that illustrates the significance of *pietas.*[128] Near the end of the Sibyl's explanation of Tartarus to Aeneas in *Aeneid* VI, *iustitia* appears in the warning of *infelix Theseus* (VI.618) to Phlegyas: "*discite iustitiam moniti et non temnere divos"* (VI.620).[129] As scholars have noted, this invites a comparison between Aeneas and Theseus, the Athenian hero who, along with Hercules, came to the underworld by improper channels and 'with violent intentions.[130] As Zarker notes, this incident shows heroes such as Theseus to be incompatible with the Augustan regime and sets up a further contrast between Aeneas and the ancient Greek heroes where Aeneas shows his superiority over these earlier heroes by means of his *pietas.*[131] Here, I believe that Theseus warns of the importance of *iustitia* and worship of the gods because, as an ancient hero, he is ignorant of Virgilian *pietas*. Although he does not understand *pietas,* Theseus appears to know that acting with *iustitia* and obedience to the gods, qualities that align with *pietas,* will prevent eternal punishment in Tartarus.[132] Virgil is effectively using this underworld encounter to make it clear to his readers that Aeneas is a new kind of hero. Although various associated virtues, like *iustitia,* were available to earlier heroes and other characters, only Aeneas can achieve this new version of *pietas* that signifies devotion to public service in an internal personal quality. *Pietas* marks Aeneas as different from his heroic predecessors, and, with his relative success in subduing his emotions, as a Stoic hero.

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[127] In **5.2.2** I will discuss how Dido acts in a way consistent with *pietas* yet is never considered such.
[128] In addition to *Aeneid* I and VI, *iustitia* appears twice in conjunction with Trojan warriors, Ripheus (II.426) and Galaesus (VII.536), to signify that these men place a high value on justice. It also appears in *Aeneid* XI, implying justice by revenge in war for lost soldiers on the battlefield (XI.122).
[129] Zarker (1967, p. 225, n. 83) makes an argument for Theseus speaking these lines. Zarker (1967, p. 225) explains the identity of the character Phlegyas and his significance in relation to the other denizens of Tartarus, detailing that 'Phlegyas was king of the Lapiths' and of the region Phlegyanthis in Orchomenos; He was a father to Ixion, who was the father to Pirithous, all of whom are mentioned slightly earlier in *Aeneid* VI (VI.601). Thus, Zarker (1967, p. 225) interprets this line as advice of Theseus to Phlegyas, and Phlegyas as the collective of Lapiths, Ixion and Perithous. Interestingly, as Fletcher (2012, p. 865 notes), the inclusion of Phlegyas in the underworld is a distinctly Virgilian innovation. I will also address this episode in **6.2.2**.
[130] Fletcher, 2012, p. 864. Zarker (1967), Brenk (1979), Clark (2001) and Fletcher (2012) expand on the significance of the invited comparisons between Aeneas and Theseus in this episode.
[131] Zarker, 1967, pp. 225-226.
[132] I will discuss the significance of Tartarus in **6.2.2.**

Two millennia of Virgilian criticism, changing tastes and linguistic evolution have caused difficulty for modern scholars in determining a single definition of *pietas*. However, this has not stopped them from trying, and for our understanding of the virtue as modern readers it is helpful and necessary consider some of these modern attempts. A collection of scholars identifies Roman *pietas* as a combination of loyalty to family, tradition, fellow man and the gods in a specified order of importance.[133] The *Aeneid* also supports this definition. Preuß, Hönings and Spranger go into greater detail about the various aspects of duty inherent in *pietas*: 'So ist pietas als Kindesliebe, frommer Sinn, Frömmigkeit, Pflichtbewusstsein, Ehrfurcht, Bruderliebe, Pflichttreue, dankbare Gesinnung, Pflichtgefühl, Anhänglichkeit, Geneigtheit, Hingabe, Dienste usw. zu umschreiben'.[134] From these modern interpretations, we might infer that *pietas* and civic duty are closely related, if not inextricable from one another. One of Virgil's great achievements is that he unites social and political ideas with personal ones through the *pietas* of Aeneas.

Within ancient and modern definitions of *pietas*, duty to god, family and country in various orders of importance appears to be the most universal understanding of the virtue, followed by secondary characteristics of justice, compassion and mercy. The appropriate connotations of *pietas* that we ought to consider in any circumstance depend on the context in which it is used. We see this when we look at how other characters in the *Aeneid* speak about the *pietas* of Aeneas under different conditions.[135] *Pietas,* then, for the Roman reader, most likely represents the fulfilment of duty to family, country and the divine in an unset hierarchy of importance, dependent on context.[136] In Virgil's Stoicly motivated *pietas,* however, we see that allegiance to fate underlines any appearance of the virtue, although at times it may manifest as obedience to parents, gods or country. By incorporating elements of *iustitia* and *clementia* into his representation of *pietas,* Virgil links civic values associated with public institutions with an internal personal quality.

3.1.2. Understanding Virgilian *Pietas* Through Ancient Greek Sources

In the next two sections, I will examine *pietas* in ancient sources chronologically, and discuss how a selection of key concepts may have contributed to Virgilian *pietas.* I will first look at Greek virtues similar to *pietas* and what these virtues entail before turning to

[133] Quinn, 1968; Ahl, 1976; Garrison, 1987; Wiltshire, 1989; Hainsworth, 1991; Carstairs-McCarthy, 2015.
[134] Preuß, Hönings and Spranger, 2015, p. 46.
[135] See **4.1.3**.
[136] Ball (1991, p. 23) confirms that '*pietas* fundamentally denotes the correct hierarchical relationship of a man to his superiors', such as gods, fathers and countries.

Ciceronian notions of *pietas* in the next section, which may arguably have had a more tangible influence not only on Virgil the author but also on his readers, some of whom would have been as familiar with Cicero's work as Virgil himself. Looking to Greek historical sources to help us understand Virgilian *pietas*, nearly a century ago, Moseley suggested that the origins of *pietas* are to be found in the Greek εὐσέβεια, and to a lesser extent, θεοσέβεια, expressing the ideas of pity and piety, both apparently modern derivatives of *pietas.*[137] Recently, Johnston has added the word ὁσιότης, drawing on Plato's *Euthyphro* (*Euth.*12e, 14d-e) and its resonance with Chrysippus' Stoic ideas of duty, which revolve around ὁσιότης instead of εὐσέβεια.[138] According to Johnston, these Greek definitions suggest that *pietas* 'was based on one's relationship to the gods – one's belief in them, and one's demonstration of this belief by the performance of proper rituals, which provide a service to the gods'.[139]

Liddell and Scott define εὐσέβεια as 'reverence towards the gods, piety, religion.'[140] Looking at additional connotations of εὐσέβεια, Liddell and Scott also identify the word with the Latin *pietas*, which they describe as 'reverence towards parents, filial respect,' leaving out any mention of allegiance to the gods.[141] Looking at more modern scholarship, Preuß, Höning and Spranger also identify εὐσέβεια as a root for the Latin *pietas.*[142] In their explanation of εὐσέβεια, Liddell and Scott direct the reader to Plato for examples of its use in literature.[143] The word εὐσέβεια appears in Plato's *Republic* (c.380 B.C.), and Plato uses it in conjunction with duty to both god and parents (*Republic,* X.615c). Here, Plato is narrating the experiences of Er, a man reported to have died in battle, who spent twelve days on a pyre and then returned to earth to describe his experience of the underworld (*Republic*, X.614b). The word εὐσέβεια occurs at the end of Er's tale, when he is recounting the reward for those who are loyal to their parents and the gods, and the punishment for those who are not: εἰς δὲ θεοὺς ἀσεβείας τε καὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ γονέας καὶ αὐτόχειρος φόνου μείζους ἔτι τοὺς μισθοὺς διηγεῖτο (*Republic,* X.615c). In this statement, it is noteworthy that this reverence is due to gods, θεοὺς, before parents, γονέας, perhaps

[137] Moseley, 1925; Ball, 1991. The *TLL* entry for *pietas* (X.1.2786.70) also lists εὐσέβεια, referring to Plato.
[138] Johnston (2004, p. 160) summarises Chrysippus' definition: piety is knowledge/expertise that renders trustworthy precisely those people who preserve what is right toward the gods. Meijer (2007, p. 141) additionally notes a separation between εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης with respect to Stoic ethics, equating εὐσέβεια with 'veneration', which is 'knowledge and service to the gods' and ὁσιότης as 'a personal attitude', or 'avoiding offences against the gods'.
[139] Johnston, 2004, p. 160.
[140] Liddell and Scott, 1889, p. 332.
[141] Ibid.
[142] Preuß, Hönings and Spranger, 2015.
[143] Liddell and Scott, 1889, p. 332.

implying that Plato places a higher value on man's duty towards the gods than towards his family. The Myth of Er carries further significance with regard to Virgilian *pietas* in that scholars have noted parallels and influences between the Myth of Er and Virgil's portrayal of the underworld and the body and soul in death in *Aeneid* VI.[144] Based on the many equivalences between the Myth of Er and *Aeneid* VI*,* it is reasonable to assume that Virgil was familiar with Plato's *Republic* and the author's use of εὐσέβεια, and also that Plato's use of this word may have informed Virglian representations of *pietas* in the *Aeneid*, even if only in a small way.

In addition to Plato, Xenophon, as a writer of popular ethical treatises whose thinking turns out to be surprisingly relevant to Virgil, also employs εὐσέβεια in a way that is germane to our understanding of how ancient sources may have informed considerations of Virgilian *pietas*. The same word εὐσέβεια occurs in Xenophon's *Cynegeticus* (341 B.C.)*,* this time in direct association with Aeneas, the son of a goddess (*Cyn.,* 1.15).[145] Aeneas, somewhat remarkably, appears early on in Xenophon's hunting treatise as a pupil of Cheiron, along with a catalogue of semi-divine Greek heroes, Cephalus, Asclepius, Meilanion, Nestor, Amphiaraus, Peleus, Telamon, Meleager, Theseus, Hyppolytus, Palamedes, Odysseus, Menestheus, Diomedes, Castor, Polydeuces, Machaon, Podaleirius, Antilochus and Achilles, all of whom are honoured by the gods (θεῶν ἐτιμήθη (*Cyn.,* 1.2)). Having introduced them, Xenophon tells of the lives of these men, writing of Aeneas: Αἰνείας δὲ σώσας μὲν τοὺς πατρῴους καὶ μητρῴους θεούς, σώσας δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν πατέρα δόξαν εὐσεβείας ἐξηνέγκατο (*Cyn.,* 1.15). This association of εὐσέβεια with Aeneas appears in conjunction with his departure from Troy with Anchises and his household gods, the Penates, which we find at the end of *Aeneid* II. This is a scene said by many to epitomise the *pietas* of Aeneas.[146] Interestingly, however Xenophon, writes of these household gods as belonging to both Aeneas' father and mother: πατρῴους καὶ μητρῴους θεούς. This might suggest that εὐσέβεια, was not necessarily the exclusively masculine trait that *pietas* would become in Virgil's *Aeneid*, or it could be reinforcing the divine parentage of Aeneas, his mother being the goddess Venus.

[144] West (1990) gives a concise account of the resonance between *Republic* X and *Aeneid* VI. I will discuss this in more detail in **6.2**.
[145] Gabba, 1987; Casali, 2010.
[146] Horsfall, 1986; Gabba, 1987; Casali, 2010. I will revisit this episode later in the thesis (**5.2.1**). Horsfall (1986, p. 8) writes of Xenophon's treatment of this scene as 'concern for both Anchises and his ancestral images […] and his eusebeia towards both'.

Apart from εὐσέβεια, we must at least briefly acknowledge θεοσέβεια and its association with Virgilian *pietas,* although it appears to resonate with *pietas* more loosely than εὐσέβεια or ὁσιότης. Moseley identified θεοσέβεια as another possible source for Virgilian *pietas*, albeit to a lesser extent than εὐσέβεια.[147] Liddell and Scott define θεοσέβεια as 'the service or fear of God, religiousness', and do not associate the term with *pietas* as they did εὐσέβεια, implying that the two are not as closely linked.[148] The association by Moseley of *pietas* with θεοσέβεια does however emphasise the suggestion of duty to the divine in *pietas.* The implication of a shared duty towards parents and the divine in εὐσέβεια is more clearly evident in Virgilian *pietas* than the narrowly focused duty towards the gods in θεοσέβεια. For Aeneas, duty to the divine may also coincide with that towards parents, for his mother is a goddess.

3.1.3. Ciceronian Representations of *Pietas*

I will now address earlier Latin works as foundations of influence for Virgilian *pietas,* which may have in turn been influenced by the aforementioned Greek sources. The work of Cicero is the most obvious, and indeed the most fruitful, place to start in this endeavour. Preuß, Hönings and Spranger ascribe a particular significance to Cicero's contribution to understandings of *pietas,* writing of him as the most prominent theorist of *pietas* for the period of antiquity.[149] In his writing, Cicero appears to feel compelled to explain *pietas* in several of his works*,* perhaps to remind his readers how important this virtue was, as well as how fluid, contextual and adaptable its definition could be, and how he wished them to interpret it specifically for that individual work. Broadly, *pietas* for Cicero may be defined as the duty of the individual to the state, the gods, family and fellow man.[150] However, his individual works show slight variances in representations of the virtue. Recognising the importance of *pietas* to Cicero, Ball writes that 'Cicero held that *pietas* was not merely a social convention, but a law of nature itself, implanted in the soul by an innate power'.[151]

In the fifty eight speeches of Cicero, the word *pietas* occurs fifty six times throughout twenty six of his speeches; only five of these instances imply duty to the gods or the

[147] Moseley, 1925. More modern scholarship echoes this view.
[148] Liddell and Scott, 1889, p. 362.
[149] Preuß, Hönings and Spranger, 2015, p. 21. Gräfe (1998, p. 5) also notes the importance of Cicero in defining *pietas* in antiquity, writing that 'von den antiken Autoren liefert uns Cicero (106-45 v. Chr.) Definitionen des Begriffs *pietas* und Abgrenzungen zu anderen römischen Wertbegriffen (z.B. *religio*)'.
[150] Garrison, 1987; Gräfe, 1998; Preuß, Hönings and Spranger, 2015.
[151] Ball, 1991, p. 22.

divine.[152] In Cicero's philosophical texts, *pietas* occurs twenty nine times; nine times it is mentioned in relation to the gods, and eight of these occurrences can be found in *DND*.[153] In order examine and analyse Ciceronian definitions of *pietas* for the purpose of this thesis, I will be looking at three of Cicero's works, spanning a forty-five year period, *De inventione* (c. 84 B.C.), *De republica* (c. 51 B.C.) and *DND* (c. 45 B.C.).[154] I have selected these texts because of the frequency at which *pietas* occurs within each work as well as the duration of the time period they span. I have chosen to prioritise Cicero's theoretical writing because this is where we can see the most engagement with *pietas*. In these works, we can see Cicero's notions of *pietas* evolving to suit the political climate in which he wrote. The associations of *pietas* with other Latin words recognized as concomitant with *pietas* are also significant in these selected texts. It is possible and likely that Cicero mentioned *pietas* in conjunction with these words in order to clarify which aspect of *pietas* he was referring to at any given time. Looking at these three works, in *De inventione, pietas* occurs four times. One of these times occurs in Cicero's definition of *religio,* and then twice more in concurrence with *religio.* In *De republica,* the word *pietas* occurs only twice, and once in conjunction with *iustitia.* In *DND, pietas* appears twelve times, three of these times in conjunction with *iustitia* and twice with *religio*. From this we may assume that to Cicero these concepts appear related, and he can at times be seen to be advocating for an overlap between *pietas, iustitia* and *religio*.

Looking at the explanations of *pietas* that Cicero gives in these individual works, there are slight but important variances. In *De inventione*, Cicero writes *pietas, per quam sanguine coniunctis patriaeque benivolum officium et diligens tribuitur cultus* (*Inv.*, II.161). In *De republica*, Cicero once again explains his definition of *pietas,* this time in piece of advice from Scipio's grandfather to his grandson: *iustitiam cole et pietatem, quae cum magna in parentibus et propinquis, tum in patria maxima est* (*Rep.*, VI.16). Again, Cicero outlines *pietas* in his later composition, *DND*: *Est enim pietas iustitia adversum deos; cum quibus quid potest nobis esse iuris, cum homini nulla cum deo sit communitas?* (*DND,* I.116). Although these designations are largely similar, there are slight and significant variances. *De inventione* emphasizes duty to spouse and country, *De republica* duty to parents and country with a hint to the divine and *DND* explicitly duty to the gods. In *DND* there is, by modern standards, a religious implication to *pietas* that is conspicuously absent from the

[152] Michels, 1997.
[153] Ibid.
[154] As I have addressed in the previous chapter (**2.1.2**), in *DND* we can see Cicero's sympathies with Stoicism. This builds on his Stoic representation of fate in *De fato,* composed just one year prior to *DND,* which I have also discussed in the previous chapter (**2.2.1**).

previous two texts. This is arguably due to the shifting nature of Roman religion and its conflation with the Roman state rather than any religious inclinations of Cicero.

The small differences in Cicero's definitions of *pietas* in these three works suggest an emerging importance and acceptance of religious or faith-based interpretations of *pietas.* Preuß, Hönings and Spranger note that the gods become objects of *pietas* in Cicero's writing after 45 B.C., after the composition of *De inventione* and *De republica,* at the time of writing *DND.*[155] Gräfe notices this shift as well, writing that before 45 B.C. *pietas* for Cicero encompassed 'die Pflichterfüllung gegenüber dem Vaterland und den Eltern, *religio* die Pflichterfüllung gegenüber den Göttern' and after 45 B.C. that *pietas* for Cicero was '"*iustitia adversus deos*", d. h. als Gerechtigkeit (im Sinne von Pflichterfüllung) gegenüber den Göttern'.[156] However, for Cicero, the state nearly always appears to be the first priority, and any suggestion of religion may be attributed to best serving the interest of the Roman state, which would make sense according to the Roman state religion.[157]

In *De inventione*, *pietas* for Cicero encompasses only duty to *sanguine coniunctis* and *patria* (*Inv.*, II.161). He places family before country, and there is no mention of duty to the divine. While Cicero does discuss duty to the gods in *De inventione,* this conversation falls under his definition of *religio*, which he treats as an entirely separate entity to *pietas* in this text. *Religio* encompasses duty to the gods and divine, and *pietas* to family and country.[158] Despite their different definitions, in *De inventione*, *pietas* is more closely associated with *religio* than it is in the other two works, which would suggest a close relationship between the concepts despite the separate explanations of them. Furthermore, both *religio* and *pietas* are mentioned in Cicero's definition of *Naturae ius,* suggesting that both are associated with the principle of *iustitia*.[159] Moving forward to *De republica*, the language of Cicero's definition of *pietas* has changed slightly, and Garrison suggests that this evolved definition now aligns with the culture of that ruling class.[160] This stands to reason, as in the intervening years Cicero had effectively become a member of the ruling class, holding high ranking political offices, such as praetorship in 66 B.C. and consulship in 63 B.C.[161] It is only natural that his views would reflect his own social class.

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[155] Preuß, Hönings and Spranger, 2015, p. 45.
[156] Gräfe, 1998, p. 5.
[157] An argument that was made by Burriss (1926) nearly a century ago, which still holds true.
[158] *Religio est, quae superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caerimoniamque affert* (*Inv,,* II.161).
[159] *Naturae ius est quod non opinio genuit, sed quaedam in natura vis insevit, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, observantiam, veritatem* (*Inv.,* II.161).
[160] Garrison, 1987.
[161] Garrison, 1987.

As in *De inventione*, in *De republica, pietas* comprises only duty to family and country. However, here Cicero has explained the performance of *pietas* more specifically, and changed the order in which these allegiances are due. In *De republica,* Cicero informs us that *pietas* is due to *parentibus* and *propinquis*, but foremost to the *patria* (*Rep.,* VI.16). Preuß, Hönings and Spranger write that this placement of the country and the Roman people next to family is 'eine für Cicero und seine Zeit charakteristische Entwicklung'.[162] Michels notes this shift of duty and its potential impact on the understanding of *pietas*, writing that '*pietas* to the fatherland is even more important and demanding than *pietas* towards relatives, and can raise conflicts in a man's mind'.[163] By his use of *sanguine coniuncits, parentibus* and *propinquis* (*Rep.,* VI.16), it is clear that Cicero intends the reader to understand the importance of flesh and blood relations as opposed to marital allegiance when it relates to familial *pietas*.

Pietas or so it appears from Cicero's writing, is due to blood-relatives proportionate to their relation. For example, duty to parents, whose untainted blood runs within the subject's veins, comes before duty to children, whose blood is diluted by that of the other parent.[164] Preuß, Hönings and Spranger sum up the duty of men to fellow men under *pietas*, expanding out from the family unit to mankind in general:

> Neben den genannten Göttern, die bei Cicero – wie eben erwähnt – überwiegend nach 45 v. Chr. einbezogen werden, sind es v.a. – gleichfalls von alters her bekannt – die Eltern bzw. Vater oder Mutter, denen die *pietas* gilt. Ebenso kommt sie Blutsverwandten wie Bruder, Onkel, Großvater oder Vetter zu, doch auch dem Schwiegervater ist offensichtlich mit *pietas* zu begegnen. Über den Kreis der Familie hinaus weist die *pietas* gegen Freunde, Wohltäter und/oder Parteikollegen - ggf. einschließlich der politischen Elite. Sogar die Mitmenschen allgemein werden zu Adressaten der *pietas.*[165]

I will examine this order of the hierarchy of *pietas* in the *Aeneid* later in this thesis when I discuss Aeneas' departure from Troy, where he seeks to protect his family in order of their sanguine distance, saving first his father, then his son and lastly his wife.[166] This shift of importance from family to state between *De inventione* and *De republica* may perhaps be attributed at least in part to Cicero's political career in the years between the two works, and therefore the increased importance of the state in his own personal life. Cicero's tenure as praetor, consul and proconsul may have brought about a realization that a sense of

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[162] Preuß, Hönings and Spranger, 2015, p. 46.
[163] Michels, 1997, p. 406. This is also referring to *De republica* VI.16.
[164] Michels (1997) also expresses this sentiment.
[165] Preuß, Hönings and Spranger, 2015, p. 45.
[166] See **5.2.1**.

overall duty towards the state is beneficial for governance and for the overall welfare of the Roman state and the future of that state. This is reflected quite strongly in the *Aeneid,* where it becomes clear through Aeneas' actions that *pietas* towards his mission to found the Roman state is his highest priority, and that every other obligation of *pietas* may be disregarded in service to that fated mission, particularly duty to wives.[167]

Looking further forward to *DND,* Cicero's definition of *pietas* regarding duty to the gods alone appears out of step with his earlier definitions, which focused only on family and country. This is possibly because the character of the text giving the definition is Gaius Velleius, an Epicurean, who is espousing a rather extreme version of the Epicurean view of the relationship between man and the divine. However, it does not seem outlandish that *pietas* in this text would be defined in accordance with the divine, given the title of the work. Instead of directing it towards parents and country as he did in *De republica*, in *DND*, Cicero insists on a religious quality of *pietas* that is due to the gods alone as opposed to any combination of gods, family and country.[168] Again looking at Roman religion, which was very closely intertwined with politics and the Roman state, this shift from the state to the gods is not as radical as it may appear to modern readers.

Identifying contemporary factors that may have influenced Ciceronian definitions of *pietas,* at nearly the exact time of the publication of *DND*, Augustus, then Octavian, was named sole successor to Julius Caesar.[169] The nature of Roman religion at this time was that of a state cult. That Cicero's views evolved to reflect the time makes more sense than the idea that Cicero's views would have changed unprompted. Considering his earlier explanations of *pietas* in *De inventione* and *De republica,* Cicero's evolving definitions of *pietas* reflect not only shifting cultural and political circumstances in Rome, but also how *pietas* may be modified to suit a particular purpose or specific ideal. For instance, Wagenvoort notes that over Cicero's lifetime '*pietas* has changed its content for Cicero, or at least that the emphasis has shifted, and that instead of being applied to one's country, parents and relatives, it is applied, in the first place, to the gods'.[170] That this virtue should change so significantly in one person's lifetime demonstrates just how mutable and adaptable *pietas* really is. Ultimately, we may infer from Cicero's writing that *pietas* is duty towards family, country and gods, although the relative importance of each is

[167] I will discuss this in greater detail in chapters **4** and **5**.
[168] These are not the author Cicero's own words; he is borrowing from Epicurus (*DND,* I.44, II.71, II.153).
[169] Warrior, 2006; Howatson, 2011.
[170] Wagenvoort, 1980, p. 9.

situationally and culturally dependent, making it a layered and nuanced quality and a virtue difficult to consistently uphold at all times.[171]

Otis and Wagenvoort discuss how we might apply Ciceronian notions of *pietas* to our reading of the *Aeneid*.[172] Otis suggests that we should look to Cicero's *De republica* for the most relevant definition of *pietas*, suggesting that '*pietas*, indeed, is the duty of sons to parents and parents to sons but, as Cicero observed, it was pre-eminently the duty of citizens to their city'.[173] Indeed, we see throughout the *Aeneid* that duty to the future Roman state is Aeneas' biggest motivator, and the driving force behind the plot of the epic in the form of his Stoic pursuit of his fate to reach Latium. Wagenvoort echoes these sentiments, although he appears to be drawing on *DND*, writing that 'the *pietas* conception prevalent in the *Aeneid* was derived from Cicero and signifies the obedient devotion to duty of the individual towards the divinity, inducing him to subordinate his own interests to the welfare of the *respublica*'.[174] This is also a requirement of a dedicated Roman Stoic, which we see most clearly in *Aeneid* IV when Aeneas leaves Dido and Carthage in favour of his mission to reach Latium.

When speaking of Ciceronian influences on Virgilian *pietas,* it is important not to base all assumptions about the virtue on a single Ciceronian text. Virgil was likely familiar with a majority of the Ciceronian corpus, which offered many representations of *pietas* that reflected prevailing ideas about the virtue during the time of his writing. As far as identifying a single definition of *pietas* from the works of Cicero*,* all the can be said with assurance is that duty and its fulfilment are essential components of the virtue. There is duty of sons to parents and parents to sons, duty of the individual towards the divine, duty of the individual towards the city and duty of the individual towards his fellow men.[175] One telling commentary on *pietas* with respect to family and fellow man in the Ciceronian corpus is in *De officiis* III*,* where Cicero remarks of Romulus' murder of Remus that Romulus *Omisit hic et pietatem et humanitatem* (*Off.,* III.41). This act is a violation of both *humanitas* and *pietas.* The degree of obligation to these various entities, however, remains in constant flux depending on situation. As we consider the function of *pietas* within the *Aeneid,* familiarity with Cicero's explanations of *pietas* that begin to represent the virtue as an internal quality while still relating to matters of the public sphere will give readers a

[171] I will explore this in chapter **5**.
[172] Otis, 1963; Wagenvoort, 1978.
[173] Otis, 1963, p. 245.
[174] Wagenvoort, 1978, p. 82.
[175] Sullivan, 1959; Otis, 1963; Quinn, 1968; Wagenvoort, 1978; Hainsworth, 1991.

foundation upon which to interpret this virtue in the *Aeneid,* and prepare him or her for the uncertainties and complexities of *pietas* in Virgil's epic.

3.2. *Pietas* in Virgil's Rome

This section will explore the place of *pietas* as it relates to the emperor Augustus and his regime, *pietas* as a Roman value in that regime, the role of *pietas* in contemporary Roman religion and the interesting reciprocal relationship between *pietas* and social class. It will assess how *pietas* may be applied and interpreted at all levels of society from citizens to rulers, as well as briefly alighting on the obligations of the gods towards mortals within the remit of *pietas*. Following on from the legacy of Virgil and Augustus, it will also briefly touch on how representations of *pietas* changed during the reign of the next emperor Tiberius, further reinforcing the uniqueness of masculine Virgilian Stoic *pietas* to its time period. In looking at the function of *pietas* in Virgil's Rome, we may further understand how Virgil's initial readers may have interpreted this virtue in the *Aeneid*.

3.2.1. *Pietas* and the Augustan Regime

The concept of *pietas* and its association with the Aeneas legend seems to have occupied a significant position with respect to Roman identity in the Augustan regime.[176] By looking more closely at the relationship between *pietas* and politics, we may gain a better understanding of how Roman citizens reading the *Aeneid* might have understood this quality and how it applied to Augustus, as well as their comprehension of their own national identity. Considering why the quality of *pietas* developed connotations of vast political importance during the Augustan regime, Wagenvoort writes that representations of *pietas* were 'an attempt to provide a moral justification for the Roman policy of conquest, and at the same time, the philosophical background, the philosophical sanction, of Augustus' principate'.[177] In other words, Augustus's actions in battle may be categorised as acts of *pietas* because all deeds were carried out, as it were, in service to the Roman state.[178] In the *Aeneid,* we may apply the same judgement to Aeneas. Certain acts, however questionable, fall under the remit *of* pietas because they were committed in

[176] Galinsky, 1969; Garrison, 1987. Galinsky (1969, pp. 4, 5-7) cites first and second century A.D. artistic evidence to 'testify to the unprecedented popularity of the *pius* Aeneas theme during that Augustan period,' and discusses the presence of various images of Aeneas on Roman coins and everyday items.
[177] Wagenvoort, 1980, p. 12. Ball (1991, p. 24) and Prince (2010, p. 1) support this interpretation, both writing that Augustus justified the civil wars as *pietas* to Julius Caesar in the form of avenging his murder.
[178] George (1991, p. 238) even goes so far as to call Augustus 'the *exemplum* of *pietas*' for avenging the death of his father at Philippi.

service to the future Roman state.[179] Virgil's historical epic then gives this commission of violent deeds in the pursuit of Roman conquest a name, *pietas,* and represents it as a heroic attribute. In underlining the virtue with Stoic philosophy, he suggests that service to the future Roman state coincides with acting in accordance with the edicts of fate. This association of *pietas* with conquest was not entirely well received by later authors, and this is clear in Lucan's unfortunate representation of and commentary on *militiae pietas* in *De bello civili.*[180]

Augustus promoted a specific image for his own *pietas,* demonstrated in the *Res Gestae,* in which the only mention of *pietas* is in conjunction with *virtus, clementia* and *iustitia* on the *clipeus virtutis*.[181] This single mention of *pietas* is quite powerful, and suggests that Augustus' *pietas* is a combination of the other three virtues, and that all four are dependent on each other. In Rome, Augustus demonstrated *pietas* by showing devotion to the state and the gods in his renovations to the city by building new temples, reconstructing shrines and encouraging rituals and ceremonies for the entire population of the city, thus showing a reciprocal quality to *pietas* between ruler and subject.[182] In the Augustan regime, *pietas* was a quality shared by both emperor and citizen alike, and Virgil's *Aeneid* offers a behavioural code by which any man may be one of *pietas.* It was a recognised virtue of the regime manifest in day to day life for all Romans in their 'behaviour with respect to the gods, the fatherland, the family and the ancestors'.[183] Previously, the prioritization of family and state had constituted an aspect of Roman identity, but in the Augustan regime this behaviour was given the name of *pietas.*[184] This uniquely Augustan characterisation of *pietas* unified Romans under a behavioural code of reciprocal service to the state. If Roman citizens served the state, the state would ensure the wellbeing of its citizens.[185]

Representations of *pietas* before and after Augustus differed significantly from those during the Augustan regime. The idea of *pietas* that we have from this time period comes almost entirely from Virgil, who depicts *pietas* as an exclusively masculine virtue,

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[179] Butler (2006) also reconciles the *pietas* of Aeneas with his actions in this way.
[180] See **7.2.**
[181] These virtues are found together as reasons why Augustus was gifted a shield from the Roman people: *clupeus aureus in curia Iulia positus, quem mihi senatum populumque Romanum dare virtutis clementiaeque et iustitiae et pietatis caussa testatum est per eius clupei inscriptionem* (*Res Gestae* XXXIV).
[182] Gotlieb, 1998; Prince, 2010.
[183] Gotlieb, 1998, p. 21.
[184] Wagenvoort, 1980.
[185] Garrison, 1987; Gotlieb, 1998.

bestowing the trait upon no female character in the *Aeneid*.[186] This masculinisation of *pietas* came in opposition to a background of *pietas* as a goddess. Wagenvoort writes that before the Augustan regime, ancient authors and artists were in the practice of personifying 'the virtue of piety according to the old concept of love for parents and relatives and to venerate her as a goddess'.[187] Historically, this is correct, as there was a temple dedicated to this goddess in 181 B.C., and she was printed onto coins until 41 B.C.[188] This female image of *pietas* was then not portrayed in any form during the reign of the emperor Augustus. The absence of this goddess was perhaps due to the virtue taking on a masculine quality during that regime. After the reign of Augustus, however, the goddess of *pietas* appeared on coinage and alters under the emperor Tiberius, who attributed *pietas* to his mother, Livia Drusilla, re-feminising the virtue.[189] This reinstatement of the goddess of *pietas*, and the endurance of the female image associated with it, may indicate why the term has become imbued with feminine connotations in the intervening years.

3.2.2. *Pietas,* Religion and Reciprocity in the Augustan Regime

Roman religion under Augustus underwent significant developments.[190] Augustus encouraged a religious revival in Rome in his adoptive father's legacy, reconciling Roman with Eastern traditions into a Roman religion oriented around the Roman state and the Roman gods of Mount Olympus.[191] As Rome expanded its empire through the eastern parts of the Mediterranean, Roman religious practices also evolved to accommodate Eastern influences, ensuring the centrality of Rome within existing local traditions.[192] This shift in religious tradition included the conflation of the Roman state with Roman religion, and at the time of the *Aeneid*'s composition, religion and politics in Rome were inextricable from one another.[193] The senate held supreme authority over all religious

[186] This does not mean that we as modern readers cannot recognise qualities of *pietas* in female characters. For example, it is clear that Dido embodies the quality of *pietas* in her devotion to Carthage **5.2.2**.
[187] Wagenvoort, 1980, p. 15.
[188] Wagenvoort, 1980; Preuß, Hönings and Spranger, 2015.
[189] Wagenvoort, 1980; Wallace-Hadrill, 1981; Jenkins, 2009.
[190] For more information on Roman religion, religion in Virgil and religion in the Augustan regime, see: Bailey, 1935; Palmer, 1974; Wagenvoort, 1978; Feeney, 1988; Gotlieb, 1998; North, 2000; Warrior, 2006; Rives, 2007; Galinsky, 2011; Rüpke, 2014; Fox, 2020.
[191] Shelton (1988, p. 362) lists these gods as: 'Jupiter, Juno, Mars, Venus, Apollo, Diana, Ceres, Bacchus, Mercury, Neptune, Minerva, and Vulcan'. In addition to playing a significant role in Roman religious practice, these deities heavily influence the course of the *Aeneid,* and by extension, Rome's foundation.
[192] Shelton, 1988; Feeney, 1991; Warrior, 2006; Garnsey and Saller, 2015. For more specifically about Augustus' treatment of Eastern religious cult practices see Orlin (2008).
[193] This relationship between religion and politics in ancient Rome has been widely acknowledged over the last century. McDermott (1938), Weinstock (1971), Burke (1979), Walsh (1997), Grebe (2004), and Fox (2020), to name just a few scholars, recognise the intertwined nature of the state and religion on Augustan Rome.

matters, presiding over interactions between the gods and the citizens of Rome, reflecting a complete integration of politics and religious practice.[194] The religious system was integral to the function of the Roman state; each protected the other. *Pietas* to the gods was akin to *pietas* to Rome, and vice versa. Wagenvoort attributes this notion that *pietas* towards the divine also meant *pietas* towards the state to Cicero.[195] In this, Wagenvoort is clearly focusing on Cicero's later writing, as Cicero did not ascribe a religious aspect to *pietas* until after 45 B.C. Following on from Ciceronian ideals of *pietas* after 45 B.C., the association of *pietas* with religion would have likely seemed commonplace to Roman citizens, who would have become accustomed to the amalgamation of the two.[196] Within the *Aeneid*, Virgil often shows *pietas* towards the gods as acts of Stoic assents to divine impressions that serve the edicts of fate, which also may be interpreted as *pietas* towards the future Roman state.

Reciprocity between the state and its subjects under the Roman state religion could be felt by citizens of all social classes. In his innovative article of 1935, Charlesworth discusses the connection between *pietas,* citizens and the Roman imperial system, writing that 'in the ruler it is a feeling of duty and love towards the Roman people, their traditions and their religion; in the ruled it is the affectionate loyalty of subjects to one whom they regard as head of the family'.[197] More recently, Garrison and Ball echo Charlesworth, arguing for the presence of *pietas* in both subject and ruler, who fills the role of a symbolic father and head of the family, which includes *clementia* and *iustitia*.[198] If citizens are loyal and dutiful towards the state, fulfilling obligations of *pietas* to the rulers of that state, the state and its rulers will in turn ensure the wellbeing of the citizens, likewise with children to their parents. In order for the state to function optimally, citizens at all levels must behave in accordance with the tenets of *pietas* towards it. Preuß, Hönings and Spranger also identify this reciprocity in *pietas* among those of equal rank or citizens and the state: 'Es finden sich aber auch Hinweise auf ein stärker symmetrisches bzw. reziprokes *pietas*-Verhältnis, wenn etwa Brüder einander mit *pietas* begegnen oder wenn nicht nur die Bürger dem Vaterland verpflichtet sind, sondern auch der Staat seinen Soldaten'.[199]

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[194] Feeney, 1988; Shelton, 1988; Warrior, 2006; Rives, 2007.
[195] Wagenvoort (1978, p. 82) writes that 'the *pietas* conception prevalent in the *Aeneid* was derived from Cicero and signifies the obedient devotion to duty of the individual towards the divinity, inducing him to subordinate his own interests to the welfare of the *respublica*'.
[196] Gräfe, 1998; Preuß, Hönings and Spranger, 2015.
[197] Charlesworth, 1935, pp. 113-114. Modern scholarship, such as Prince (2010), has continued to echo this sentiment.
[198] Garrison, 1987, p. 256; Ball, 1991, p. 23.
[199] Preuß, Hönings and Spranger, 2015, p. 46.

The same reciprocity between citizens and state existed between citizens and the gods: if citizens showed reverence towards the gods, the gods would ensure the welfare of the citizens.[200] Regarding reciprocal *pietas* between gods and mortals in the *Aeneid,* however, we find a strong hint of irony. For all the *pietas* the characters show the gods, the gods in the *Aeneid* show little *pietas* in the form of *clementia* to their subjects.[201] Virgil appears to question this expectation of *pietas* from gods to mortals, for example, in Priam's prayer in *Aeneid* II: *si qua est caelo pietas* (II.536). It would appear that while state leaders, the cornerstones of state religion at a human level for the state and its citizens, have an obligation to their subjects, the gods are bound by no such constraints of *pietas* or even *clementia* towards those who serve and worship them.[202] Carstairs-McCarthy also draws on this reciprocal *pietas* to the divine, and that of parents to children, pointing to an example in *Aeneid* X; he identifies what he calls an 'inverse *pietas'*, and specifies that this is 'the kind that gods display toward dutiful worshippers and parents towards dutiful children', citing that the *pietas* that odious Mezentius shows to his son Lausus in *Aeneid* X represents this 'inverse *pietas'*.[203] Despite the questionable morality of the gods in Virgil's *Aeneid,* this devotion to the gods and the idea of reciprocity between gods and citizens in Rome was not a new or unrecognised development.

In his *Histories,* the Greek historian Polybius (c. 208-125 B.C.) details Roman customs between 220-167 B.C., writing that fear and reverence of the gods holds the entire Roman commonwealth together, more so than any other custom, because it provides an all-seeing check on the common people.[204] This, in his mind, sets the Romans above other nations with respect to their utilisation of religion for political purposes (μεγίστην δέ…πλήθη συνέχειν (*Hist.,* VI.56.6-11)). Looking at how this relates to *pietas* and religion in Virgil's Rome, Gotlieb explains that 'religion in the politics of Augustus served the re-formation of the *populus Romanus* as a cult community and therefore as guarantor community regarding *pietas* and *religio*, which in turn were to ensure the care of the gods for the *res Romana*'.[205] The gods were still all-seeing, and might act as a check on behaviour, however, the role of the gods had also been extended to the state. Because the gods were all-seeing, and by

[200] Fratantuono (2010, p. 49) summarises this relationship nicely, that '*pietas* is ideally a reciprocal relationship; a worshipper of the immortals who exercises *pietas* can aspire to receive divine favour', and he also notes that 'this reciprocity is not always guaranteed'.
[201] Michels, 1997.
[202] Cicero raises the possibility of divine apathy for human affairs early in *DND* (I.3-4).
[203] Carstairs-McCarthy, 2015, p. 710. I will discuss Lausus in greater detail in **4.2.2**.
[204] See Polybius, *Histories,* VI.56.
[205] Gotlieb, 1998, p. 32.

association so was the Roman state, Romans were motivated not to neglect their individual duties to either the gods or the state.

3.3. Conclusion

Virgilian *pietas* represents a decisive intervention within the development of *pietas,* and our examination of it should work towards understanding the virtue in the context of the Augustan regime. In the *Aeneid,* Virgil's Stoic rendering of *pietas* highlights the religious connotations of the virtue. He brings to it an Augustan emphasis on civic service and cultural renewal that focuses on individual conduct. For Virgil's readers, *pietas* revolved around an intricate and nuanced values system of duty and loyalty towards family, the gods and above all the Roman state. This duty towards the gods might suggest a religious aspect of the virtue to modern readers, but this would also include the state to an ancient reader. Looking at Latin words associated with *pietas,* such as *iustitia* and *clementia,* or representations of the virtue in ancient sources with whom Virgil was familiar, is perhaps the best way to inform our understanding of Virgilian *pietas.*

Pietas in the Augustan regime was unique and exceptional compared to any kind of *pietas* that had come before or would come after. For instance, it was entirely and deliberately masculine; Augustus built no temples to the goddess of *pietas,* and this same goddess ceased to appear on coins from 41 B.C. until the reign of Tiberius.[206] Augustus himself placed great importance on *pietas,* applying it to himself and using it as propaganda for his regime.[207] Before and during the Augustan regime, associations also developed between *pietas* and religion. After c. 45 B.C. came the conflation of *pietas* to the gods and *pietas* towards the state, which added what we might now call a religious quality to the virtue in that it began to indicate the emergence of a faith based-belief system. This religious association of *pietas* is also evident in the writing of Cicero from near that year. The specific *pietas* of the Augustan regime served to link not only Augustus with Aeneas, but also Augustus with his citizens, and at a stretch, Roman citizens with Aeneas through a spiritual inheritance.

Two thousand years of changing taste, linguistic evolution and cultural influence have not added clarity to our understanding of Virgilian *pietas*. Perhaps the most unfortunate

[206] Wagenvoort, 1980.
[207] Garrison (1987, p. 67) discusses the significance of *pietas* with respect to Augustan propaganda.

occurrence over the years is the immediate phonetic association of *pietas* with piety, which has not only perhaps had negative consequences for the reception of Virgil's hero, but also has likely meant that modern Western readers will immediately assume Christian religious connotations to Virgilian *pietas*. Over the past two millennia, following the Augustan regime, *pietas* has evolved into a more feminine piety, with connotations of pity, as it had been prior to the reign of Augustus. It is important to remind ourselves as readers that piety and *pietas* are entirely different concepts despite their linguistic similarity. Due to the time period, Virgil's readers were free from this inherent link, but modern Western readers are not, and cannot ever be, entirely free from Christian biases.[208] In the *Aeneid,* Virgil expresses his own unique vision for *pietas* for the Augustan age, and that *pietas* does not have entirely nonreligious connotations; it is representative of a Virgilian Stoic ideology in the epic, one that combines public service and personal devotion. Virgil introduces an element of faith into the behavioural code of *pietas*. In *Aeneid* VI, he gives Romans a reason to act in accordance with this behavioural code, even though it may require extreme personal sacrifice. Virgilian *pietas* is rooted in individual conduct directed towards a greater public good within a Stoic moral framework, and this is evident in the *Aeneid.*

[208] Ogden (1972), Feeney (1988) and Dalferth (2001) acknowledge and address that the prevalence and widespread reception and recognition of Christian theology and Christian assumptions dominate perceptions and understandings of theology and theological discussions around ancient texts, irrespective of the content or time period in which they were produced.

Chapter 4. *Pietas* in the *Aeneid*

It is possible to say that the *Aeneid* projects a kind of idealised future for Augustan readers, advocating for the behavioural codes of *pietas* as a social model for Roman citizens. This establishes a romanticised picture of a community bound by a shared mythical history and connected by a virtue-based legacy and a spiritual inheritance. In addition to occupying a significant position with regard to Roman identity in the Augustan regime, *pietas* represents a core ideological component of Virgil's *Aeneid.* Mentioned twenty-two times within the epic, *pietas* is clearly of great importance to Virgil.[209] This prominence is not coincidental, given the propagandistic nature of the virtue in the Augustan regime.[210] This chapter will discuss the importance of *pietas* for Aeneas, along with his unique epithet *pius,* and Virgil's associations of *pietas* with other characters, considering what this might mean for readers' understanding of this virtue. It will consider specifically the Etruscan prince Lausus, enemy of Aeneas and son of the odious king Mezentius, to whom Virgil applies *pietas*. This chapter will highlight the contextual importance of *pietas,* showing how the virtue may be adapted to suit different circumstances and achieve different outcomes. Virgil's representation of *pietas* as an individual characteristic oriented around a public good invites a new way of understanding Roman identity in the Augustan regime. By his emphasis on *pietas*, we may read the *Aeneid* as an aspirational text for an ideology and an identity in Augustan Rome that revolves around this virtue. Through its behavioural guidelines, *pietas* unites all citizens of the expanding Roman empire, despite discrepancies in religion, language and geography in the conquered provinces. It offers an insight and a vision into the ideological power of the poem and contributes to its quasi-scriptural quality and appeal to later Christian Scholars.

4.1. *Pietas*, Stoicism and *Pius Aeneas*

Reading the *Aeneid,* we see that a Stoic *pietas* governs the plot of the epic, subtly or overtly guiding Aeneas through his mission, and thus underpinning the events that led to the foundation of Rome.[211] When we consider what motivates Aeneas, or what guides him

[209] *Pietas* is mentioned in the *Aeneid* in*:* I.10, I.51, I.253, I.545, II.430, II.536, II.691, III.480, V,688, V.783, VI.403, VI.405, VI.688, VI.769, VI.778, IX.294, IX.493, X.812, X.824, XI.292, XI.787, XII.839. These figures were gained from an electronically conducted search of each individual book.
[210] Garrison, 1987.
[211] For example, obedience to his fate, his family, the gods, and a future *patria* compels Aeneas to leave Troy at the end of *Aeneid* II and Carthage at the end of *Aeneid* IV, when he is initially unsure and unenthusiastic about doing either. While these departures signify *pietas* towards the future Roman State, they also

to make his most consequential decisions within the epic, we can always attribute his actions to a form of *pietas*. Whether it is *pietas* towards his father and his family, *pietas* towards the gods or *pietas* towards his mission and the future state of Rome, *pietas* without exception accounts for (almost) all of Aeneas' actions. All of these actions, however, also fall within the remit of Stoic obedience to fate. The different obligations under *pietas,* between which Aeneas is sometimes forced to choose, reveal the complex and hierarchical nature of this virtue, as well as the personal sacrifices it demands.[212] In his decisions, we see that Stoic principles provide a moral compass for resolving these dilemmas.

The primary association of *pietas* within the *Aeneid* is, of course, with Aeneas. Virgil further strengthens this link by the frequent application of the epithet *pius* to his hero. This section will examine the importance of *pietas* and the epithet *pius* to Aeneas, and the quality Roman Stoicism that is also inherent within this virtue and this epithet. Although this central characteristic of Aeneas may be traced to sources before the *Aeneid,* Virgil emphasizes the *pietas* of Aeneas more than any other author, and he imbues it with a distinctly Stoic appearance and spiritual quality through the hero's submission to fate above all other things and his suppression of his own personal feeling in the process. [213] Virgil also uses *pietas* to link Aeneas to Augustus, and by extension to all Roman men. This strong association of *pietas* with Aeneas, and Aeneas with Augustus, helps Virgil to link the hero and the quality of *pietas* to the Augustan regime. That Aeneas was claimed as an ancestor of the Julian clan only strengthens this connection between him and the Roman leadership.[214] Within Virgil's *pius Aeneas*, the unique manifestation of a Stoic *pietas* offers

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demonstrate a Stoic surrender to fate and a Stoic subjugation of personal feeling, without which Aeneas would not have reached Latium.

[212] I will discuss the consequences of when areas of *pietas* come into conflict with one another in chapter **5**.

[213] Moseley (1925), McLeish (1972), Perkell (1981), Heinze (1982) and Casali (2010), among other scholars, have detailed associations of *pietas* with Aeneas in earlier literature, and how it ensured his survival in the Trojan War. For example, in Book XX of Homer's *Iliad,* after delivering a prophecy that Aeneas and his future sons would survive the Trojan War, Poseidon intervenes to protect Aeneas from Achilles, recognising the genealogical persistence of Aeneas:

> νῦν δὲ δὴ Αἰνείαο βίη Τρώεσσιν ἀνάξει
> καὶ παίδων παῖδες, τοί κεν μετόπισθε γένωνται (*Il.,* XX.307-308).

Poseidon intervenes to protect Aeneas slightly later in the same Book (*Il.,* XX.321-329). Along with Homer, Xenophon suggests in his *de Venatione* that Aeneas' *pietas*, or εὐσέβεια in the form of dedication to his father and household gods, allowed him to escape when the Greeks captured and destroyed Troy. Associations of *pietas* with Aeneas can also be found in the works of earlier notable Latin writers such as Ennius, Cato and Varro.

[214] Palmer, 1974.

a representation of the ideals of Roman governance and citizenry, particularly for the Augustan regime, although it is not without challenges.[215]

4.1.1. *Pietas,* Stoicism, Aeneas and Rome in the *Aeneid*

Pietas is the foremost characteristic that demonstrates the greatness, and also the Romanness, of Aeneas.[216] It is the defining essence of the main character, and it is strengthened by his epithet *pius* and the numerous associations of *pietas* with his actions and his character throughout the *Aeneid*. As Carstairs-McCarthy writes, 'Virgil has shown Aeneas to us as a man who, for his faults, manifests *pietas* of one kind or another throughout'.[217] In this thesis, I aim to show how all of Aeneas' actions may be traced to his *pietas,* which is guided by Stoic philosophical principles. Aeneas' *pietas* is reinforced more than his bravery or his skill in arms, which in some cases also fall under the remit of *pietas*.[218] By associating this core value of the Augustan regime so strongly with his hero, Virgil has created a man who represents the ideology of Augustan Rome.[219] He also presents *pietas* as a virtue that all Roman men can aspire to, a virtue that through a spiritual inheritance unites each Roman man to their founder and ruler regardless of lineage or geographical origin. In his Stoic representation of *pietas,* Virgil has also contributed to a redefinition of the virtue to suit his particular era. In the *Aeneid,* he is almost campaigning for a new definition of *pietas* based on Stoic ideals, intervening in existing debates about how to define the concept.[220]

We know by the initial description of Aeneas as *fato profugus* (I.2) that fate will fill an important role in his mission.[221] In reading the *Aeneid*, it becomes clear that adherence to fate underlines the *pietas* of Aeneas at all times, although occasionally it may masquerade as allegiance to the gods or to his father and son. When the *pietas* of Aeneas is tested, and he must choose between different aspects of the virtue, every decision may be traced to an allegiance to his fate to reach and settle in Latium and fulfil the prophecy of Jupiter (I.257-279). Thus, we may see that Aeneas' *pietas* is a distinctly Stoic quality, underpinned and governed by obedience to fate over any personal feelings or wishes he may have. Service

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[215] Putnam, 1995.
[216] Johnston, 2004; Thomas, 2004. Interestingly, for all we know about Aeneas' character, about his physique and appearance we know only that he is large. This lack of physical description is a difference between Virgil and Homer, who supplies a great deal in the way of physical and visual description of his characters.
[217] Carstairs-McCarthy, 2018, p. 219.
[218] Butler, 2006.
[219] Otis, 1963; Carstairs-McCarthy, 2015.
[220] See **3.1**, particularly **3.1.3** for a discussion of definitions of *pietas* in the decades preceding the *Aeneid*.
[221] See **2.3.2** for a discussion of what *fato profugus* implies for Aeneas.

to the future Roman state and his destiny to be its founder motivate Virgil's hero. These Stoic and masculine connotations of *pietas* represent a Virgilian intervention in the evolution of the virtue.

Virgil associates *pietas* with Aeneas from the outset of the epic, ending the proem by calling Aeneas i*nsignem pietate virum* (I.10). We learn the story of Aeneas in the opening lines (I.1-7), yet this is our introduction to any aspect of his character. Virgil reminds us of the *pietas* of Aeneas twice more in *Aeneid* I, and calls him three times by his epithet *pius* (I.253, I.545; I.220, I.305, I.378), indicating the importance of this quality to his nature and ensuring that the word remains prominent in the opening of the poem. Unlike the quality of *pietas*, which Virgil occasionally associates with other characters in the epic, the epithet *pius* is unique to Aeneas. Following on from this early introduction to *pietas* and *pius* Aeneas, Virgil continues to stress this aspect of Aeneas' character throughout the *Aeneid*.[222] Thus, according to Otis, Aeneas is 'the great exhibit of *pietas,* or of the willing service of destiny', that destiny being his fate to reach Latium and lay the foundation for the future Roman state.[223] Submission to the will of fate at all times, regardless of his own personal suffering or desire, marks Aeneas most clearly as an icon of *pietas,* as well as one of Roman Stoicism.[224] This is reinforced by his epithet *pius.*

During his travels from Troy to Carthage to Latium, however, Aeneas' *pietas* is neither consistent nor reliable, but rather a work in progress, particularly in *Aeneid* I-VI. I would argue, therefore, that these fluctuations indicate that beyond the ascription of a character trait, Virgil intends to use this focus on *pietas* to supplement the drama of his narrative. This drama becomes visible in the unclear extent to which Aeneas is aware of his own fate as Rome's founder. It is entirely possible that Aeneas begins the epic unaware of the consequences of his mission beyond his own lifetime. Aeneas is aware that his fate is to seek Latium, and this clear in his address to his crew:

> Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum
> tendimus in Latium, sedes ubi fata quietas
> ostendunt (I.204-206).

However, Aeneas does not seem cognisant of his overall importance in the mythical history of Rome's foundation. His only aim is to reach Latium, and he has not been privy to the same information that the reader has in Jupiter's prophecy (I.257-279).

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[222] Virgil mentions *pietas* in conjunction with Aeneas in: I.10, I.253, I.545, III.480, VI.403, VI.405, VI.688, VI.769 (VI.878 in reference to Marcellus) and XI.292.
[223] Otis, 1963, p. 222.
[224] Heinze, 1982. See **2.3**.

In *Aeneid* IV, Jupiter essentially rants to Mercury that Aeneas is not aware of the cities he is fated to found, and in this Jupiter mentions Rome (IV.223-237). In his message to Aeneas, Mercury reminds Aeneas of his fate (*heu, regni rerumque oblite tuarum!* IV.267), and also mentions this future Roman state (*cui regnum Italiae Romanaque tellus / debetur* IV.275-276). It is unclear what in Mercury's warning prompts Aeneas to leave Carthage, whether it is duty to Ascanius or towards the Roman state, which Mercury specifically mentions, or if it is merely a Stoic surrender to fate or to the decree of the gods, which is in itself a response to fate. Whichever of these loyalties Aeneas is prioritising is perhaps not as important as the fact that Aeneas makes his decision in faith that it is the correct one according to his fate, which he may or may not be fully aware of. In the character of Aeneas, Virgil presents the spectacle of a man who is *fato profugus* (1.2), who continues to surrender in faith to an at least somewhat unknown fate in an entirely Stoic way, and thus always elevates the future of the Roman state above any of his own personal desires. It is possible as well that Aeneas may not entirely understand his actions to be Stoic in the same way the reader might assess them to be. Stoic *pietas* and Stoic assent to impressions appear to come naturally to Aeneas on account of his respect for the divine, even if he does not fully grasp the consequences of his fate. What Aeneas may think is obedience to the gods, the philosophically informed reader may interpret as a Stoic obedience to fate.

As the poem progresses, it lays ever more emphasis on the duty of Aeneas towards the future Roman state at the behest of fate. At certain points, notably at the end of *Aeneid* II and IV, Aeneas appears to be especially motivated by *pietas* towards the future Roman state, which also coincides with obedience to fate. For instance, at the end of *Aeneid* II, he tells Dido of how he physically carries his father in order that he may demonstrate *pietas* to both Anchises and Rome. This is a particularly difficult situation for Aeneas, because he and his father have different obligations under *pietas.* Anchises' *pietas* is due to Troy, hence his wish to stay, so Aeneas must reconcile *pietas* towards his father by saving his life while also not violating his father's *pietas* towards Troy. By allowing his father to carry the household gods, Aeneas and Anchises reach a compromise where each is able to satisfactorily fulfil his obligations under *pietas.*[225] In *Aeneid* IV*,* Aeneas does not appear to want to leave Carthage of his own volition, but *pietas* towards the future Roman state, Ascanius and the gods compels him. Both of these actions also coincide with a Stoic allegiance to fate although they initially appear as *pietas* towards family. These episodes

[225] I will discuss this episode in greater detail in **5.2.1**.

are clear examples of Virgil using *pietas* to create emotional drama within the narrative. In these situations, we see how *pietas* may present challenges to the individual, and how obedience to fate does not necessarily require a full grasp of its facts. In Aeneas' conduct, Virgil shows us that submission to fate is the correct way to act in situations where aspects of *pietas* conflict with one another.

Despite his noteworthy and unfailing *pietas,* Aeneas is still tormented throughout the *Aeneid*. As predicted at the start of the poem:

> - multum ille et terris iactatus et alto
> vi superum, saevae memorem Iunonis ab iram,
> multa quoque et ballo passus (I.3-5).

This torment endures through the end of the epic. Showing *pietas* as a challenging virtue for Aeneas humanises him and adds to the emotional drama of the narrative for Virgil's readers. What we learn by the representation of *pietas* within the character Aeneas and the *Aeneid,* then, is that *pietas* can demand immense personal sacrifices and pose significant emotional challenges, but that a Stoic moral compass is the appropriate guiding principle for overcoming these obstacles. *Pietas* is expressed in overcoming emotion in favour of reason, and underlined by a Stoic surrender to fate for Aeneas, which is politically motivated by service to the future Roman state in fulfilling his mission. This is supported by the opening lines of the poem (I.1-6), which describe Aeneas as a man driven by fate to Italy, the future site of Rome. As I have previously mentioned, this particularly Stoic and fate-oriented *pietas* represents a uniquely Virgilian intervention in the development of the term. In chapter **5**, I will discuss how every conflict of *pietas* is resolved in such a way that best serves Aeneas' fate to found the future Roman state, and Virgil leaves little doubt about just how much sacrifice is involved.[226]

4.1.2. The Epithet *Pius* and its Significance for Aeneas

Although the association of *pietas* with Aeneas was documented before the composition of the *Aeneid,* Virgil engineers a dramatic reinvention of the word on a linguistic level by making an epithet of the virtue, which he applies exclusively to his hero. This epithet, *pius,* offers a significant development in the character of Aeneas and the Aeneas legend, suggesting both an imitation of and a further separation from traditional existing epic.[227] Unlike his Greek predecessors, who employed epithets quite liberally, Virgil's epithets

[226] Ball (1991, p. 25) also discusses the place of personal sacrifice in the performance of *pietas*.
[227] Moskalew, 1982; Putnam, 1995.

appear deliberately constructed to reflect a greater purpose, and are very well thought out to suit their contexts.[228] In Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey,* and in Apollonius' *Argonautica*, for example, characters have multiple and shared epithets; this is not the case in the *Aeneid*. Virgil uses the epithet *pius* for Aeneas nineteen times in the poem, and it is exclusive to him.[229] After mentioning his hero's *pietas* in the proem (I.10), Virgil does not introduce Aeneas by name until later (I.170), and he does not introduce *pius Aeneas* until even later (I.220). Virgil presents *pius* and *pietas* in different ways in relation to Aeneas. It appears that *pius* is a central and unique facet inherent in Aeneas' character whereas *pietas* is shown in his actions. In short, Aeneas is *pius,* Aeneas does *pietas*. As Ball identifies with respect to the application of the epithet to the hero, 'Virgil calls Aeneas "pius" only when he is in the act of fulfilling or asserting the demands of *pietas,* whether in speech or action'.[230] The numerous uses of the epithet *pius* exclusively for Aeneas demonstrate its significance for the hero and his identity.

At the beginning of the *Aeneid,* Aeneas might not be entirely sure of his obligations under *pietas,* or even be aware he possesses, nay embodies, the quality. However, Aeneas is apparently aware of his epithet. He tells a disguised Venus on the shores of Carthage:

> sum pius Aeneas, raptos qui ex hoste penates
> classe veho mecum, fama super aethera notus;
> Italiam quaero patriam et genus ab Jove summo (1.378-380).

It is evident from this statement that Aeneas knows of his fame, his epithet and his mission. He explains why he deserves the epithet, although his words do not imply that he knows what *pius* signifies about his character and his inner workings. Interestingly, this point in the *Aeneid* is the only time in the epic when Aeneas makes even a para-reference to his own *pietas*. There has been disagreement among scholars regarding the interpretation of Aeneas's declaration, and there is no consensus as to whether this is a statement of arrogance or declaration of alignment with Homeric customs, although it could also be both, or indeed neither.[231] However, by stating *sum pius Aeneas* (I.378), Aeneas makes the reader aware that he understands that this epithet belongs to him, and by connection he must be aware at least in some capacity of his association with *pietas*.

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[228] Moskalew, 1982; Ball, 1991.
[229] Virgil uses the epithet *pius* for Aeneas in *Aeneid* I.220, I.305, I.378, IV.393, V.26, V.286, V.685, VI.9, VI.176, VI.232, VII.5, VIII.84, IX.255, X.591, X.783, X.826, XI.170, XII.175 and XII.311. These figures were gained from an electronically conducted search of each individual book.
[230] Ball, 1991, p. 22.
[231] Moseley (1925), and more recently Pöschl (1962), have noted variations in scholarship on this subject.

The difficulty in defining *pietas* persists in establishing a modern definition of Aeneas' epithet *pius* and its relationship to *pietas* in the *Aeneid*. Moseley and Sullivan write of a quality of personal and religious devoutness and loyalty inherent in the word *pius,* which seems to manifest in the epic in Aeneas' devotion to his father and eventually his servitude to Rome, both of which fall under the remit of a Stoic obedience to fate.[232] This idea of religious devotion in the epithet, however, appears to lend itself more to modern conceptions of pious and piety than to Virgilian notions of duty. Austin offers a more nuanced approach, which seems perhaps more applicable to Virgil's Aeneas: *pius* is a complex word, a sensitive symbol of adherence to a personal idea of devotion, which may nevertheless bring pain and sorrow […] the epithet is eloquent of struggle and bewilderment and submission.[233] This I believe is a more accurate understanding of Aeneas' epithet *pius*, and aligns with Heinze's observation that Aeneas shows his *pius* nature in his willingness to surrender to the will of fate, a Stoic quality, which causes the hero such 'struggle and bewilderment and submission'.[234]

Despite this allegiance to the tenets of fate that the epithet *pius* implies for Aeneas, Michels notes that the qualities of wisdom and forethought appear to be missing from the character, and as such he must be guided by fate or the gods.[235] If we take this to be true, we might infer that Aeneas has gained his epithet by his inherent willingness to be guided by fate at all costs, and as we see in the *Aeneid,* the costs are very high. In order to fulfil his fate to settle in Latium, Aeneas must leave his beloved Troy, accept the death of his wife Creüsa and his father Anchises, leave Dido in Carthage, endure many tribulations at sea, not to mention endure the divine wrath of Juno, lose countless friends and comrades and still be victorious against Turnus. These are all quite extreme challenges, and Aeneas' willingness to continue shows the strength of his allegiance to fate, even though his awareness of that fate is debatable. It also shows the presence of a Stoic compatibilist framework in the *Aeneid*, as Aeneas is required to take a specific set of actions in order to complete his fated mission.

Throughout the epic, it is clear in Aeneas' behaviour that his willingness to actively assent to impressions and pursue his fate at all times is a significant reason behind his epithet *pius,* in addition to his associations with *pietas*. This makes him a problematic 'hero in

[232] Moseley, 1925; Sullivan, 1959.
[233] Austin, 1955, p. 122.
[234] Austin, 1955, p. 122; Heinze, 1982.
[235] Michels, 1997.

arms', for fate is almost entirely unconcerned with human compassion or romantic relationships.[236] Through Aeneas' adherence to fate, Steinberg quite accurately notes that 'Virgil's portrayal of the heroic, then, insistently emphasizes submission, sacrifice, decorum, purity, and passivity—not admission of guilt or responsibility, self-reflection, or remorse'.[237] We see this in Aeneas' reaction to the death of Creüsa and his decision to leave Dido, which I will discuss in chapter **5**. In order to fulfil his fate to settle in Latium, Aeneas must make difficult decisions and navigate unpleasant situations in the course of duty. In this way, *pius Aeneas* represents a new kind of Roman hero from his Homeric counterparts, who were known to act 'in fulfilment of their nature rather than their duty'.[238] This sense of duty is strongly represented in Aeneas, as he is often forced to subordinate his personal wishes to the demand of fate that he reach the future site of Rome. This continuous, and in many cases arduous, submission to fate at all costs differentiates Aeneas from the rest of the characters in the *Aeneid,* or indeed in previous works of epic. It marks him as a Stoic hero, and earns him and only him the epithet *pius*.

4.1.3. Other Characters Recognise the *Pietas* of Aeneas

At various points throughout the *Aeneid,* other characters recognise the *pietas* of Aeneas. This perspective on Aeneas' *pietas* offers the reader greater insight into the extent of the virtue for Aeneas, while also drawing attention to its contextual importance. Other characters' acknowledgement of Aeneas' *pietas* shows the different ways in which Aeneas may be considered an *exemplum* of *pietas* throughout the epic, and the qualities of his *pietas* deemed most important by his contemporaries at any given time. The aspects of *pietas* that other characters choose to bring attention to mostly concern the behaviour and attitude of Aeneas in various situations, without neglecting his military acumen. By having other characters identify values of *pietas* in Aeneas in different circumstances, Virgil demonstrates the versatility of this virtue, and shows the reader how Romans might embody it under diverse conditions.

The first character in the epic to name the *pietas* of Aeneas is his divine mother, Venus. As Venus beseeches her father Jupiter to calm the storm of Juno's ire she asks him *hic pietatis honos*? (I.253), referencing Aeneas' leadership of the Trojans from Troy as a source for this *pietas*, which she recounts to Jupiter earlier in her speech (I.229-253). In this instance,

[236] Garrison, 1987, p. 162. I will discuss *pietas* and romantic relationships in **5.3**.
[237] Steinberg, 2013, p. 484.
[238] Pöschl, 1962, p. 39.

pietas for Venus represents Aeneas' duty towards his countrymen of Troy and his future country of Rome. Also, possibly, filial obligation to his divine mother who is interceding on his behalf. Venus perhaps appeals to Jupiter on the basis of Aeneas' *pietas* as devotion to country because she believes this argument will sway Jupiter to act as she seeks. Venus' argument of duty to a future *patria* aligns with Jupiter's prophecy (I.257-279), which forms his response to her, that Aeneas will arrive at that *patria* and go on to found the Roman race. That this first mention of Aeneas' *pietas* by another character relates to his duty towards country strongly emphasises the importance of *pietas* as duty towards Rome for Virgil's readers.

The other character to reference the *pietas* of Aeneas in *Aeneid* I is Ilioneus, the eldest of the Trojans, as he requests hospitality from Dido in Carthage:

> rex erat Aeneas nobis, quo iustior alter
> nec pietate fuit, nec bello maior et armis (1.544-545).

Ilioneus' description of Aeneas' *pietas* focuses on his sense of justice, *iustitia,* as in the Ciceronian tradition of *pietas.* He also references the *pietas* of Aeneas in conjunction with his military acumen. Perhaps he believes that these qualities will endear Aeneas and the Trojans to Dido, or he is trying to subtly warn her that Aeneas is formidable and not to be challenged by military force. However, the use of the imperfect tense in *erat,* and Ilioneus' qualification that *si vescitur aura / aetheria neque adhuc crudelibus occubat umbris* (I.546-547), tells us that Ilioneus does not know whether Aeneas is still alive at this point, and is therefore describing the Trojans as an extension of Aeneas.[239]

Ilioneus introduces Aeneas as *iustior* before mentioning his *pietas* or his prowess in battle, perhaps because Ilioneus values *iustitia* over *pietas* and military acclaim, or because he thinks Dido will prefer this trait, being a woman of recognised *iustitia* herself.[240] Or, at the mercy of a foreign power, it is plausible that Ilioneus is attempting to make the band of Trojans appear as non-threatening as possible so as to secure peaceful asylum while still displaying pugilistic strength. Ilioneus also introduces Aeneas as a king, which he is not. The proximity of *rex* and *iustior* might suggest that Illioneus believes the most important value for a king, or for any ruler, is *iustitia.* This may additionally be interpreted as a Virgilian comment on the importance of *iustitia* for a ruler in Rome. The image of a *iustior rex* also aligns Aeneas with Dido, who is in her own way just that. It is also possible that

[239] Cairns, 1989 also identifies the significance of this use of the imperfect tense.
[240] See **3.1.1**.

Ileoneus calls Aeneas *rex* in order to make him seem more impressive to Dido, and therefore more deserving of her hospitality. Ilioneus' appeal to Dido is also a Stoic one, for in the next line he mentions the role of fate in Aeneas' life, *quem si fata virum servant* (I.546). Ilioneus knows that with or without Aeneas the Trojans will continue to Italy. We can see by the word *si* that he does not know the fate of Aeneas, yet, he knows that if fate has spared Aeneas that the mission of the Trojans to Latium will be successful.[241]

During Aeneas' tale of his own voyage to Dido in Carthage, Polydorus and Helenus both recognize the quality of *pietas* within him (III.42, III.480). However, as these affirmations of Aeneas' *pietas* are written into the recollections of Aeneas himself, he may have embellished certain things in order to present himself more favourably to the Carthaginian Queen. Regardless, these recollections shed light on Aeneas' understanding of his own *pietas,* and they demonstrate to the reader that Aeneas' contemporaries recognise this virtue in him, if we are to believe Aeneas' own account, that is. Polydorus refers to the *pias … manus* of Aeneas (III.42), warning him not to stain them. Although these words are not specifically *pius* or *pietas,* the implication is one of *pietas.* These words are spoken in regard to sacrifice and burial ritual, and they imply that Aeneas is aware of his own *pietas* in that context. Polydorus' words support what later scholars have noted, that Aeneas is most often *pius* when engaged in religious ritual, indicating that a relationship with the gods is consistent with the epithet and the virtue of *pietas*.[242] Helenus calls Anchises *o felix nati pietate* (III.480), recalling the *pietas* of Aeneas towards his father. This reference to the *pietas* of Aeneas via Anchises specifies the familial aspect of it, specifically, the duty of sons to fathers. Although neither of these references in *Aeneid* III are direct as Aeneas himself is the narrator, they highlight the qualities of Aeneas that would lead a reader to recognise *pietas* within him, and they show in what instances Aeneas is aware of *pietas* in his own behaviour. The many implications of *pietas* in *Aeneid* I-III reinforce the idea that it is a versatile quality, situationally dependent and applicable in any scenario.

In *Aeneid* IV and V*,* the *pietas* of Aeneas goes unmentioned by other characters, perhaps because they are overshadowed by action and plot development as the Trojans leave Carthage, sail through a storm and hold the funeral games in memory of Anchises. Another reason for this might be because in *Aeneid* IV Aeneas temporarily neglects his *pietas* in both his delay of pursuing his future *patria* and his treatment of Dido when he eventually

[241] As Mackie (1984, p. 145) confirms, Ilioneus is aware that if the fates have saved Aeneas then the Trojans will successfully fulfil their mission.
[242] Hahn, 1931; Cairns, 1989; Johnston, 2004.

resolves to resume that pursuit. In *Aeneid* VI, however, Virgil brings the *pietas* of the hero to the forefront of the text more clearly than at any other point in the epic. *Aeneid* VI has been acknowledged by many as the most significant part of the *Aeneid* with respect to the *pietas* of Aeneas, and it is also where we are able to most clearly see the element of faith in Virgilian *pietas* in Virgil's philosophically inflected representation of the underworld.[243]

Similar to the way *pietas* assured Aeneas' escape from the Trojan War, Aeneas is granted safe passage to and through the underworld by virtue of his *pietas* in the form of his distinctly Stoic adherence to the tenets of fate.[244] Aeneas is able to pluck the Golden Bough and thus earn passage to the underworld because he is a man of *pietas* who has additionally been chosen by fate:

> ergo alte vestiga oculis et rite repertum
> carpe manu; namque ipse volens facilisque sequetur,
> si te fata vocant; aliter non viribus ullis
> vincere nec duro poteris convellere ferro (VI.145-148).

Aeneas is summoned by fate (*fata vocant*), although the brief resistance of the bough has been the subject of scholarly debate.[245] Once he is in possession of the Golden Bough, the Sibyl introduces Aeneas to Charon. She attempts to curry favour with the ferryman by emphasising the *pietas* of Aeneas:

> Troïus Aeneas, pietate insignis et armis,
> ad genitorem imas Erebi descendit ad umbras.
> si te nulla movet tantae pietatis imago,
> at ramum hunc" (aperit ramum qui veste latebat)
> "agnoscas" (VI.403-407).

This introduction by the Sibyl is interesting as it appeals to two separate aspects of *pietas* within Aeneas. First, she appeals to Charon on the strength of Aeneas' military prowess. This must not have affected the Ferryman sufficiently, so the Sibyl moves on to emphasise the strength of Aeneas' duty to his father Anchises. This also has no impact on Charon, however, the presentation of the Golden Bough, representative of Aeneas as one chosen by *fata*, moves Charon to grant them passage across the River Styx. This shows a hierarchy of importance within *pietas*, at least for Charon. Military prowess and filial duty both fall below the will of fate. Here, at a crucial moment, Virgil presents the reader with a hierarchy of forms of *pietas,* and gives overall priority to Stoic philosophy.

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[243] Pöschl (1962), Otis (1963) and Heinze (1982) suggest that *Aeneid* VI is where we see the highest point of Aeneas' *pietas* within the *Aeneid*. I will discuss *Aeneid* VI in greater detail in chapter **6**.
[244] Ahl, 1976; Ross, 2007; Putnam, 2009.
[245] In his essay 'The Bough and the Gate', West (1990) comprehensively explores the implications of this hesitancy of the Golden Bough to yield to Aeneas.

Moving further into *Aeneid* VI, Aeneas is reunited with his father Anchises near the river Lethe. The first words Anchises speaks reference the *pietas* of Aeneas:

> "venisti tandem, tuaque exspectata parenti
> vicit iter durum pietas? (VI.687-688)

Primarily, Anchises identifies *pietas* as Aeneas's duty towards him, representative of filial duty of sons to fathers. Aeneas's loyalty to his father is clearly exceptional, and this visit is an example of the strength of his *pietas* towards Anchises. Through Aeneas' devotion to his father, Virgil gives an example of how sons ought to act in accordance with *pietas* toward their fathers. Anchises recognises that *pietas* is responsible for Aeneas' visit, and he asks if Aeneas' *pietas* has allowed him to overcome the journey to the underworld and the usually impossible voyage out of it (*iter durum* (VI.688)). Obviously, Aeneas has been allowed into the underworld, as this is where the conversation is taking place. Whether Aeneas' *pietas* will allow him to complete the *iter durum* towards Latium and set in motion the eventual foundation of Rome remains to be seen at this point in the epic.[246] In surviving the underworld, Aeneas performs a miracle, achieving something only gods should be able to do. This implies that *pietas* has a strong religious or divine overtone, that it can bridge the gap between mortal and immortal. Aeneas is a man of such remarkable *pietas* that mortal rules do not necessarily apply to him, although we cannot ignore that he is also half divine.

Aeneas' *pietas* then goes unrecognized by other characters, but not by Virgil, for a significant portion of the second part of the epic. For example, there is no mention of Aeneas' *pietas* by other characters in *Aeneid* VII as he and the Trojans appeal to King Latinus. Latinus himself does not ask about Aeneas' character, only why the Trojans have come to his shore (VII.195-198). Instead of his *pietas,* Ilioneus, that same herald of *Aeneid* I, appeals this time to the divine ancestry of the Trojans, of Aeneas' in particular, to endear him and his people to Latinus:

> ab Iove principium generis, Iove Dardana pubes
> gaudet avo, rex ipse Iovis de gente suprema:
> Troïus Aeneas tua nos ad limina misit (VII.219-221).

Later in this introduction, Ilioneus draws attention to Aeneas as a man who is favoured by fate: *fata per Aeneae iuro dextramque potentem* (VII.234). Ultimately, however, it is out of concern for the marriage of his daughter Lavinia, and not for any consideration of Aeneas'

[246] We as readers, however, will be aware of the outcome from Jupiter's prophecy (I.257-279). It is also possible that Anchises too is aware of what Aeneas will accomplish. Considering there are six more books of the epic, a reader may also surmise that Aeneas will emerge from the underworld and continue his mission.

pietas, that Latinus welcomes the Trojans (VII.249-258). Latinus' want for Lavinia to marry Aeneas may be read as *pietas* on the part of the Latin King towards Latium in that he seeks to ensure the safety and future of his *patria* through the marriage of his daughter. The text corroborates that Latinus believes a marriage between Aeneas and Lavinia will ensure the future of his kingdom. It will also lead to the foundation of Rome.

In *Aeneid* XI, both King Evander and Diomedes speak of Aeneas *pietas.* Evander recognizes Aeneas as *pius Aeneas* (XI.170) in an address regarding his deceased son Pallas. Although this address comes in the context of battle, Evander does not attribute Aeneas' *pius* quality to any greatness in arms, the epithet stands alone. In *Aeneid* XI, Venelus, a messenger to King Latinus, also acknowledges Aeneas' *pietas* in conjunction with Hector and Diomedes. Venelus recalls the words that Diomedes, one of the Greeks responsible for the destruction of Troy, had spoken to him on a visit to Argyripa. Through Venelus's account, Diomedes had described Aeneas and Hector:

> ambo animis, ambo insignes praestantibus armis,
> hic pietate prior (XI.291-292).

Here, military prowess and bravery are separate from *pietas,* as they were for Ilioneus in *Aeneid* I and the Sibyl in *Aeneid* VI. That *pietas* and military prowess are mentioned together, and the order in which they are discussed, suggests not only that these two are inherently different, but also that *pietas* is an internal quality that sets certain men above others regardless of martial acumen. In this account of Aeneas' *pietas*, Venelus affirms both that Aeneas survived the Trojan War by virtue of his *pietas* while Hector perished, and that Aeneas' *pietas* is widely recognized, even by his former adversaries.

The acknowledgments of the *pietas* of Aeneas by other characters in the *Aeneid* give us an idea of the importance of various aspects of this virtue that are significant at different points in the epic. As the given examples demonstrate, at different times, specific aspects of *pietas* are considered more important than others depending on the situation, and certain characters appear to value certain qualities of *pietas* more than others. For Venus in *Aeneid* I *pietas* relates to Aeneas' perseverance towards the future site of Rome. For Ilioneus in *Aeneid* I, Polydorus in *Aeneid* III and Evander in *Aeneid* XI, it is Aeneas' sense of justice and compassion. For Helenus in *Aeneid* III and Anchises in *Aeneid* VI, it is Aeneas' sense of duty towards his father. For the Sibyl in *Aeneid* VI, for the benefit of Charon, it is Aeneas' devotion and subservience to fate, which also happens to coincide with his obligation toward the future Roman state and marks him as a good Stoic. For Diomedes in

Aeneid XI it is an undefined quality of Aeneas that both differentiates him from and elevates him above Hector.

The many connotations of *pietas* implicit in these characters' testimonials of this virtue with respect to Aeneas demonstrate how difficult it is to provide a uniform definition for *pietas,* or a single quality that signifies *pietas*. They also show that *pietas* may be flexible depending on time and circumstance. By having other characters recognise the *pietas* of Aeneas, Virgil shows that this is a universally understood virtue of his hero, as well as an extremely versatile one. From Carthage, to Greece to the underworld, the *pietas* of Aeneas is known. Even characters who are not Trojan understand and admire the *pietas* of Aeneas, and recognise that it is a trait that sets him above other men. Venus, Ilioneus, Polydorus, Helenus, Anchises, the Sibyl, Charon, Evander and Diomedes all appreciate the *pietas* of Aeneas. In giving *pietas* this scope of universal importance and recognition, Virgil strengthens the ideological quality of the virtue and therefore the ideological coherence of the epic. *Pietas* transcends the geographical boundaries of various nations and the metaphysical boundaries of the underworld and the mortal world, giving the impression that it is somehow a divine or greater-than-human quality.

4.2. *Pietas* and Other Characters in the *Aeneid*

Although the epithet *pius* belongs to Aeneas alone, Virgil also attributes *pietas* to Aeneas Silvius and Marcellus in *Aeneid* VI, to Nisus and Euryalus in *Aeneid* IX, to the Trojan race in *Aeneid* I and to the Roman race in *Aeneid* XII. Arguably the most significant character with respect to *pietas* apart from Aeneas is the Etruscan Prince Lausus, Aeneas' foe in *Aeneid* X. Virgil's ascription of *pietas* to other characters shows that *pietas* is an accessible virtue for all men, representing a behavioural code by which all men may be united with their Emperor and founding ancestors through a spiritual inheritance. Moreover, through these depictions of other men of *pietas,* we may see how different characteristics of *pietas* are valued for various characters throughout the *Aeneid*, and which traits will continue to be valued looking forward in Aeneas' lineage towards the Augustan regime. Crucially, we see that *pietas* is not exclusively hereditary by blood descent. In this section I will examine the significance of Virgil's application of *pietas* to the Trojan and Roman races and to additional characters, devoting a subsection to a discussion of the importance of Virgil's association of *pietas* with Lausus, an enemy of Rome.

4.2.1. *Pietas* and Secondary Characters

Virgil frames the *Aeneid* by linking *pietas* with two races of people, the Trojans in *Aeneid* I (I.526) and the Romans in *Aeneid* XII (XII.839). The placement of these associations within the epic suggests that *pietas* is originally a Trojan quality, one that will be carried forth by Aeneas into Rome and the Augustan regime. Unlike the associations of *pietas* with Aeneas Silvius (VI.769-770) and Marcellus (VI.878-879), which speak of *pietas* in conjunction with military prowess, Virgil's mentions of *pietas* in relation to the Trojan and Roman peoples contain no mention of arms, but rather imply a distinctly Stoic subservience to fate. Ilioneus describes the Trojan race as a *pius genus* when he asks Dido *parce pio generi, et propius res aspice nostras* (I.526). He tells of the Trojan's misfortune as he asks for Dido's hospitality, implying that the virtuousness of the Trojans comes from enduring these misfortunes in the service of fate.

Looking to the end of the *Aeneid*, the final mention of *pietas* in the epic is in relation to the future of the Roman race, where Jupiter agrees to honour a plea from Juno that the subdued Latins may keep their name and customs, as opposed to adopting Trojan ones (XII.821-828). In response to this, Jupiter assures Juno that the Latins will keep their name and language, and that Trojans and Latins will mix to form a new race (XII.834-840).[247] Jupiter's words predict the future of the Roman race, and reinforce his prophecy in *Aeneid* I (I.257-279). The Latins will not be forced to adopt Trojan customs, but *pietas* will endure in Latium. These words from Jupiter also further solidify that *pietas* in the form of obedience to the gods is a defining characteristic of the Roman race, and one that is divinely ordained.[248] Importantly, this compromise and reconciliation between Jupiter and Juno implies that the beginning of the Roman race coincides with an end to the divine anger that Virgil drew the reader's attention to at the end of the proem: *Tantaene animis caelestibus irae?* (I.11). In reference to both the Trojan and Roman races of people at the conclusion of the epic, Virgil links *pietas* with service to country and the divine, in accordance with a fated outcome.

Turning to individual characters, Virgil associates *pietas* with Aeneas Silvius and then Marcellus in *Aeneid* VI. Anchises shows to Aeneas the image of Aeneas Silvius, his son by

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[247] See **2.2.2** for further discussion of the Stoic importance of these lines with respect to fate.
[248] Jupiter describes this upcoming race as *supra homines, supra ire deos pietate* (XII.839). As we have seen from Polybuis *Histories*, this obedience to the gods has been recognised as a unifying factor in Roman culture. See **3.2.2** and Polybius' *Histories,* VI.

Lavinia (VI.760-766). He tells Aeneas that Aeneas Silvius will rule Alba Longa, and that his descendants will go on to found Rome. Anchises describes Aeneas Silvius as *pariter pietate vel armis / egregius* (VI.769-770). This would suggest that for Aeneas Silvius, *pietas* and skill in war are different things, otherwise for what reason would Virgil seek to clarify both aspects of his character. In this, there is the implication that Aeneas Silvius is equal to Aeneas in *pietas* as Aeneas is equal to Anchises in *pietas*, and that filial *pietas* will continue through the family line. This suggestion of the hereditary nature of *pietas* reinforces the message that all Romans are potentially imbued with this quality simply by virtue of being descended from men of such noteworthy *pietas*.

This hereditary implication of *pietas* extends to Augustus, and by association, to all Romans through a spiritual inheritance. However, the notion of *pietas* as a strictly hereditary quality is challenged by Virgil's presentation of Lausus and his odious father Mezentius. Further along in Anchises' reminiscences he laments the death of Marcellus as one of *pietas* lost: *heu pietas, heu prisca fides invictaque bello / dextera!* (VI.878-879). Having said this, Anchises goes on to enumerate Marcellus' skill and fearsomeness on the battlefield (VI.879-881). As with Aeneas Silvius, Anchises mentions the *pietas* of Marcellus before any skill in battle. It is again clear in his mind that *pietas* is separate from prowess in war, perhaps suggesting that it is a more enduring trait, a trait more valued for a new Roman peace under Augustus. Aeneas Silvius and Marcellus may have been men of great valour in war, however, under the new and peaceful regime it is their quality of *pietas* that marks them as exemplary. The same perhaps holds true for Aeneas and Augustus, men of much military acclaim, who also embody the virtue of *pietas,* demonstrating that these two qualities are separate but not irreconcilable.

The other characters who, curiously, merit examination with respect to *pietas* are Euryalus and his companion Nisus, whom we encounter in *Aeneid* V and IX. The relationship between Nisus and Euryalus is complicated, and becomes more so when *pietas* is introduced.[249] In this relationship, we see a conflation of *pietas* and *amor* in the *pius amor* (V.296) of Nisus for Euryalus, which Euryalus returns (IX.182, IX.430). In this dynamic, Carstairs-McCarthy writes that 'clearly Virgil wishes us to think that *pietas* can be manifested in love (*amor*)', and invites a comparison between public and private *pietas.*[250]

[249] See Pavlock (1985) for an interpretation of *pietas* in the conduct of Nisus and Euryalus in this episode, and Fratantuono (2010) and Carstairs-McCarthy (2018) for comprehensive discussions of *pietas* with respect to the relationship between Nisus and Euryalus.
[250] Carstairs-McCarthy, 2018, p. 209.

Carstairs-McCarthy accepts that *pietas* 'is usually a public virtue directed towards objects imposed by convention (gods, country or ancestors)', but suggests that 'it can also be more private, directed towards objects chosen by an individual, such as friends' and acknowledges that 'the essentially private nature of *amor* is likely to interfere with the publicly oriented demands of *pietas*'.[251] This interpretation invites the possibility that there are more levels to *pietas* than previously identified, and that *pietas* can be present in the realm of private devotion to friends and lovers. However, the difficulty of reconciling *amor* and *pietas* persists, which I will address in more detail in the next chapter (**5.3**).

In *Aeneid* IX, Virgil associates *pietas* with Euryalus based on a request by Euryalus in response to Ascanius' offer to share with him all future glory in war (IX.275-280). Having heard Ascanius' proposition, Euryalus replies that his only wish is that Ascanius protect his mother as he would his own (IX.281-292). Regarding this request, Virgil writes Euryalus as *pietatis imago* (IX.294), which moves the Trojans to tears, particularly Ascanius. Ascanius acknowledges and responds to that *pietas,* promising to treat Euryalus' mother as his own, the only difference being the name Creüsa (IX.296-298). Unlike Aeneas, who directs his *pietas* towards his father Anchises, Euryalus directs his *pietas* towards his mother. Within the *Aeneid,* this is the only example of *pietas* in the direction of a female mortal character, and we will see that it has negative consequences.

This situation with Nisus and Euryalus is complicated and fraught with tension. Euryalus as a character is subject to criticism for his behaviour and for his neglect for his mother. In this we may perhaps see a parallel to Aeneas' neglect of Creusa in *Aeneid* II.[252] In this episode, Pavlock accurately observes that Virgil draws our attention to the fact that 'the demands of *pietas* are multiple, applying to conflicting areas of activity'.[253] In pursuing one aspect of *pietas,* duty to country in the form of glory in war, Euryalus leaves his mother bereft of a son, defenceless. Although Virgil applies the word *pietas* to Euryalus in *Aeneid* IX, there are a number of scholars who insist that *pietas* instead belongs to Nisus in this situation.[254] This scenario reinforces the complexities of *pietas,* and the potential consequences of when its values come to oppose one another, as well as the disposability of women in a society that revolves around masculine *pietas*. As I will confirm in chapter

[251] Ibid.
[252] I will examine that in further detail in **5.2.1**.
[253] Pavlock, 1985, p. 221.
[254] Pavlock (1985), Putnam (1995) and Carstairs-McCarthy (2015), to list a few, attribute *pietas* to Nisus in this situation for reminding Euryalus of his mother.

5, when aspects of *pietas* come into conflict with one another, the negative consequences are the most catastrophic for female characters.

4.2.2. *Pietas* and Lausus

In *Aeneid* X*,* we read of an altercation between Aeneas and Lausus. This is a somewhat minor event in the plot of the *Aeneid,* but it is very significant for Virgil's representation of *pietas* within the text. Galinsky proposes that the incident is 'a reflection of the Roman national experience', supporting Anderson's comment that in their altercation 'the exigencies of battle have pitted *pietas* against *pietas*.[255] Lausus, son of the Etruscan King and *contemptor divum* Mezentius (VII.648), represents an interesting challenge to the overall concept of Virgilian *pietas* and to the *pietas* of Aeneas. We first encounter Lausus in *Aeneid* VII*,* and again in *Aeneid* X, as an enemy of Aeneas. The odiousness of Lausus' father Mezentius, however, does not exclude Lausus from characterisation as a man of *pietas,* thus demonstrating that the quality is not entirely hereditary by blood. Lausus' loyalty to his father, and his desire to protect him despite Mezentius' despicable character, lead Virgil to describe Lausus as *pietatis imago* (X.824), a phrase he had also used to describe Aeneas (VI.405) and Euryalus (IX.294). By ascribing *pietas* to Lausus, Virgil shows his readers that any man may embody *pietas* if he performs in ways consistent with the virtue, no matter his ancestry.

In our introduction to Lausus, we learn that none but Turnus is more handsome (VII.648-649), and that Lausus is a tamer of wild animals and a leader of men (VII.651-653). We also discover that Lausus has the calamity of having Mezentius as a father (VII.653-654). Despite the misfortune of being born to Mezentius and the inferred negative effects of such a father on his life, Lausus remains loyal to him. Lausus follows his father into battle (VII.649), where we also learn that he is *pars ingens belli* (X.427). Lausus' *pietas* shows completely in his filial devotion to his father. Seeing Mezentius wounded by Aeneas, Lausus is visibly distraught (X.789-790). Here, Lausus with his visible outburst of emotion presents a contrast to the Stoic Aeneas. Risking his own life to protect his father, Lausus intervenes to confront Aeneas, using his shield to protect Mezentius (as opposed to himself) from death at the hands Aeneas and the Trojans (X.796-802).

[255] Galinsky, 1981, p. 197; Anderson, 1969, p. 85.

Realising that Lausus has protected his father Mezentius from the sword, as opposed to saving himself or attacking Aeneas, Aeneas' reaction to this act of filial *pietas* is one of rage. Although Virgil named Aeneas *pius Aeneas* less than twenty lines earlier (X.783), Lausus' act of *pietas* in protecting his father brings out its antithesis in Aeneas, as Virgil writes, *furit Aeneas* (X.802). It seems as though Aeneas is angry by this act of *pietas* because he perhaps recognises himself in his enemy. Lausus' *pietas* towards his father humanises him to Aeneas. However, instead of praising Lausus for it, or offering some words of compassion, Aeneas rebukes him before taking his life:

> "quo moriture ruis maioraque viribus audes?
> Fallit te incautum pietas tua" (X.811-812).

Aeneas is not moved to spare Lausus on account of his *pietas* towards his father, that same *pietas* which moved the Greeks to spare Aeneas during the Trojan War.[256] Lausus' demonstration of *pietas* evokes no pity from Aeneas, who instead plunges his sword into the Etruscan prince in a fit of rage, and watches as Lausus bleeds out his life (X.812-820).[257] By the words *fallit…pietas* (X.812), Aeneas highlights the fact that *pietas* will not save Lausus' life and it cannot protect against death. This episode is perhaps a preview of the death of Turnus at the end of the epic, where we again see a raging Aeneas murder a respectable enemy. In his murder of Turnus, Aeneas also diverts responsibility for his kill, this time to Pallas instead of to *pietas*.[258] In Lausus, Virgil perhaps shows that there is an element of futility in *pietas* for the individual, as it does not protect Lausus from death.

In killing Lausus, Aeneas shows *pietas* to his *patria* and his mission (although arguably neglecting *pietas* for his fellow man), not to mention adherence to his fate, while Lausus, in the manner of his death, shows *pietas* to his odious father. Dying in service to his father and country, *pater* and *patria*, Stover writes that 'Lausus has achieved the "beautiful death" that Aeneas fleetingly and vainly desired in Troy'.[259] It is possible that Aeneas even envies Lausus for that. Lausus achieves the death Aeneas himself had wished for while Aeneas still must continue on his arduous journey. It is only after Aeneas has ended Lausus' life that he acknowledges his foe's *pietas*, as well as seeing an image of himself in the fallen prince:

> At vero ut vultum vidit morientis et ora,
> ora modis Anchisiades pallentia miris,

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[256] *Iliad,,* XX.293-308. According to Heinze (1982), specifically *Iliad* XX.307-308 (See **4.1.**, n. 213).
[257] Virgil calls Aeneas *demens* in these lines (X.813).
[258] "Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas
immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit" (XII.948-949).
I will discuss this episode in greater detail in **5.4**.
[259] Stover, 2011, p. 353.

ingemuit miserans graviter dextramque tetendit,
et mentem patriae subiit pietatis imago (X.821-824).

By this point it is too late, Aeneas has already destroyed the *pietatis imago* of Lausus before fully recognising Lausus' allegiance to both *pater* and *patria*. This combination of *patriae* […] *pietatis* (X.824) presents here as a combination of familial and national *pietas,* strengthening its impact for both Aeneas and Virgil's readers.

When it finally arrives, Aeneas' sympathy for Lausus comes not from any feeling for Lausus, but rather from seeing himself reflected in the murdered man. As Michels writes, 'now that Aeneas has obeyed his own *pietas*, he can recognize another's and respect it, and returns Lausus' body fully armed to his people instead of stripping it and insulting it, as Achilles had done to Hector's'.[260] This act of kindness to Lausus' people further sets Aeneas apart from his Greek predecessors. Moreover, Aeneas' anguish for Lausus (X.823) mirrors Lausus' sorrow for Mezentius (X.789). In Lausus, Aeneas perhaps sees a reflection of his own loyalty to his father. However, Aeneas' empathy and compassion is at this point worth nothing. He has already killed Lausus in a state of *furor.* It is possible that Aeneas is only able to truly appreciate the *pietas* of Lausus after he has dispersed of the immediate threat Lausus posed to his own life and mission, to his future *patria*. Regardless of how we read Aeneas' actions, through the application of *pietas* to Lausus, Virgil demonstrates that *pietas* is achievable by any man, regardless of the familial situation he is born into. Lausus then becomes an example for Virgil's readers, demonstrating the universal accessibility of *pietas* to any man who embodies the virtue by adhering to its behavioural code. However, he is also a cautionary tale that *pietas* offers no protection against death, or against *furor*.

The tragic irony of the episode between Aeneas and Lausus is not lost on scholars. Putnam highlights that in the conflict between Lausus and Aeneas 'when it comes to the practice of virtue in the heat of war his [Mezentius'] son feels and displays both *amor* and *pietas* while *pius* Aeneas performs the greatest act of *impietas* by killing first the son who protects, then his wounded father'.[261] Reading the encounter in this way, Lausus, and even Mezentius, might garner the reader's sympathy. Harrison notes as much, writing that 'in his last moments Mezentius has the full sympathy of the reader as a berieved father, a remarkable reversal of his earlier unattractive characterisation'.[262] In this moment, Aeneas behaves more like the despicable Mezentius than the *pius Aeneas* that we are accustomed

[260] Michels, 1997, p. 407.
[261] Putnam, 1995, p. 136. Harrison (1991) makes this very same point.
[262] Harrison, 1991, p. xxxi.

to. In this confrontation between Lausus and Aeneas, Putnam writes that 'Virgil reverses our expectations by having Aeneas grimly see himself as an incorporation of *pietas* that destroys in a particularly vicious manner because it kills the embodiment of a *pietas* that saves'.[263] We see Aeneas' *pietas* pitted against that of Lausus. Only having killed him does Aeneas see his own *pietas* reflected in Lausus, and, as Stover submits, 'in killing Lausus, Aeneas kills a young man whose *pietas* aligns him with Virgil's idealizing representation of *Romanitas*'.[264]

This conflict with Lausus is a situation where Aeneas is perhaps unable to show mercy, *clementia,* as it is incompatible with his mission. In this, Aeneas elevates his duty to reach Latium in a distinctively Stoic way, overriding any impulse he might have felt to spare Lausus and instead fully committing to serving his fate by disposing of the threat he poses. It is entirely possible that Virgil's initial readers may not have seen this episode as unfavourable for Aeneas, being one of their own ancestors, and Lausus, being an enemy of that ancestor. Again, this encounter between Aeneas and Lausus may also be a subtle reminder that the peaceful Rome under Augustus was only obtained through bloodshed. This allusion to civil war that Virgil sets up by pitting *pietas* against *pietas* may have had a particular resonance with his readers, who had lived through the civil wars in Rome or had at the very least been affected by them.[265]

An interesting point of comparison for this episode is the final battle between Achilles and Hector in *Iliad* XXII. By looking at these two events together, we can see further differences between Aeneas and the Homeric hero Achilles. Hector, we are well aware, is a man of *pietas* in the *Aeneid,* second only to Aeneas (XI.291-292), and in the *Iliad* he was the most fearsome of the Trojan warriors. Achilles himself concedes this when he reminds his Argives that Hector is a man of great military acclaim: ἠράμεθα μέγα κῦδος (*Il.,* XXII.393). The death of Hector fails to move Achilles the way the death of Lausus affects Aeneas. In this, Virgil shows Aeneas as a hero capable of compassion and empathy, with an overriding Stoic allegiance to serving fate. He is a new kind of hero for the Augustan regime, unlike his Homeric counterpart.

[263] Putnam, 1995, p. 135. Anderson (1969) and Harrison (1991) also espouse this sentiment.
[264] Stover, 2011, p. 358.
[265] Harrison (1991, p. xxv) notes the *pietas* vs. *pietas* conflict between Aeneas and Lausus, suggesting that it foreshadows the war in Latium, which he argues is 'to some degree a civil war', and that this would be the civil war reference that reached Virgil's readers.

After killing Lausus, Aeneas prevents his corpse from being polluted (X.830-832). After the death of Hector on the other hand, Achilles immediately sets to work to defile his corpse in as public and humiliating a way as possible (*Il.,* XXII.395-404). We learn in *Iliad* XXIV that Achilles continues these efforts to destroy Hector's body for eleven days to no avail, as Apollo protects the corpse (*Il.,* XXIV.18-21). Whether there is an exchange between Aeneas and the soldiers of Mezentius over the body of Lausus is not specified, but the body of Lausus is returned to his father on his armour (X.841-842). This is in contrast to *Iliad* XXIV, where Priam must obtain Hector's body from Achilles. While Achilles cannot grieve for Hector, he is able to empathize with Priam's grief by thinking of his own father Peleus and his comrade Patroclus (*Il.,* XXIV.507-512). After he and Priam have shed tears, Achilles behaves in a way that is alien to his character, acting like Aeneas does straightaway at the death of Lausus in preparing Hector' body for an appropriate burial and allowing Priam the father to grieve.[266] Aeneas' gesture of respect for the dead in this case reinforces Virgil's image of him as different, more respectful and more measured than his Greek predecessor. By making sure that Lausus is promptly and properly buried, Aeneas performs an act of ritual *pietas* and shows *pietas* towards the dead and his fellow man.

Shortly after this conflict, Aeneas returns to being *pius Aeneas* (X.826), almost as though this murder was a brief diversion from his *pius* nature, to which he returned after a period of being *demens* (X.813). By his encounter with Lausus, it would appear first that Aeneas is unable to respect the *pietas* of others, and also that he is disinclined to accept responsibility for his own actions. Instead, Aeneas rebukes Lausus for his *pietas*, and points out that this *pietas* did not to save the Etruscan's life. Through the conflict between Aeneas and Lausus, Virgil gives us a prototype of the final encounter between Aeneas and Turnus.[267] In both episodes, Aeneas slays an adversary who may be read in a sympathetic light, who also functions within the value system of *pietas*. Through the confrontation between Aeneas and Lausus, Virgil invites the reader to think about the conflicts of *pietas* that will be relevant in the final meeting between Aeneas and Turnus. The same issue is present in both situations, that we know not what each man would do if spared, but that they pose no threat if dead. So, perhaps these deaths are necessary in order for Aeneas to continue pursuing his destiny without worry of retribution from conquered adversaries. Or,

[266] Drawing on *Aeneid* X.831 and *Iliad* XXIV.589, Harrison (1991, p. xxxi) also brings out this similarity between Aeneas and Achilles, writing that Aeneas, in lifting the dead Lausus from the ground, 'parallels the lifting of the dead Hector by Achilles in the last book of the *Iliad*'.
[267] Stevens (2007, pp. 102-103) details the ways in which the death of Lausus foreshadows that of Turnus.

on the other hand, Virgil could be implying that neither man deserves to perish and that civil wars pit *pietas* against *pietas* in a way that causes unnecessarily additional bloodshed.

4.3. Conclusion

Pietas is not only the ideological centre of the *Aeneid*, but also the driving force behind the plot of the epic. This then gives a quality of ideological significance to the foundation of the Roman state and the Augustan regime. In the *Aeneid,* it is clear that *pietas* is a multifaceted virtue, and this is particularly evident when we see certain aspects of it emphasised at various points. In this, Virgil shows his willingness to stress different properties of *pietas* when it suits the narrative, further demonstrating that the concept itself is consistently open to redefinition and reinterpretation, which, as we have seen, was indeed the case in the years before the composition of the *Aeneid*.[268] While there are many qualities that contribute to the overall virtue*,* reading *pietas* as it applies to Aeneas through a Stoic lens makes the virtue cohesive. On a closer reading of the poem, we see that Aeneas' performance of any given aspect of *pietas* at any given time ultimately serves to advance his fated mission to reach Latium, irrespective of his own wishes, showing that the virtue is underscored by a complete Stoic obedience to fate.

By his association of *pietas* with other characters, Virgil challenges our understanding of the virtue and demonstrates its versatility and its accessibility for all Roman men. The most important of these is the association of *pietas* with Lausus because it raises the possibility of *pietas* in enemies or foreigners, as well as demonstrably stating that *pietas* is not inherited by blood. Lausus proves to Virgil's readers that any man may be one of *pietas* by his conduct, regardless of his origins. While certain parts of the *Aeneid,* such as the Parade of Heroes in *Aeneid* VI (VI.756-859) might suggest that *pietas* may be inherited by tracing lineage from Aeneas to Augustus, this is a spiritual inheritance and not a direct bloodline. In *pietas,* the *Aeneid* gave Virgil's readers something to be proud of in their distant historical past, that they too could embody in the present Augustan regime. The message comes across in the *Aeneid* that *pietas* has the ability to link every Roman man to the founding heroes of the city and the glorious distant past represented in the epic through adherence to a behavioural code.

[268] See **3.1**, particularly **3.1.3**.

Virgil also highlights that *pietas* can be a challenging and at times unrewarding quality to adhere to. As we see in Lausus, *pietas* offers no protection against death. It guarantees nothing tangible and is of no immediate discernible benefit for the individual. The only incentive towards *pietas* for the individual that we can ascertain with any clarity in Virgil's *Aeneid* is the idea of reward in the afterlife, which introduces a religious leaning element of faith to the virtue.[269] It is clear in the *Aeneid* that *pietas* is a virtue of collective as opposed to individual benefit, however, individuals will benefit from the stability inherent in living in a collective citizenry abiding by the behavioural codes of *pietas.* For the correct embodiment of *pietas,* Stoic philosophy becomes a moral compass, a means of guidance for navigating difficult situations where aspects of *pietas* might conflict by using rational thinking and obedience to fate in order to decide how to act appropriately, as we will see in chapter **5**.

[269] I will discuss this in chapter **6**.

Chapter 5. Stoicism and Conflicts of *Pietas* in the *Aeneid*

In this chapter, I will first address the hierarchy of duty inherent in *pietas,* and how this functions in the *Aeneid* to support a Stoic compatibilist reading of the text and the virtue. I will then draw attention to three situations in the *Aeneid* where Aeneas' *pietas* is tested: his departure from Troy, his withdrawal from Carthage and his final act of killing Turnus. In these three instances, Virgil highlights the inner turmoil that adherence to *pietas* causes for Aeneas, as well as the extreme sacrifices required for him to be considered *insignem pietate virum* (I.10). As Aeneas faces these challenges to his *pietas,* it becomes clear that when certain areas of *pietas* clash with one another, the motivation behind Aeneas' course of action may always be traced to his assent to an impression that furthers his destiny as the founder of the future Roman state, which often manifests as a form of *pietas* towards his family, the gods or his country. Thus, we see that Stoic compatibilist principles guide Aeneas through these conflicts of *pietas,* allowing him to fulfil his fate to reach and settle in Latium. However, while it is evident that Stoic elements predict the outcome of these dilemmas, they do not mitigate the inner turmoil that adherence to *pietas* causes for Aeneas, and this is where we see Virgil using *pietas* to add to the drama of the narrative.

5.1. Virgil's Hierarchy of *Pietas*: Family, Fate and Stoicism

As discussed in chapter **3**, the concept of Virgilian *pietas* may be understood at its most basic level as loyalty to one's country, family and gods.[270] The order of obligation in these things, however, appears to remain in constant flux depending on context. As shifting Ciceronian explanations of *pietas* reflect, this order of allegiance may even have been unclear in Virgil's lifetime.[271] However, we see throughout the *Aeneid* that *pietas* is always governed by a Stoic framework. In this section, I will draw attention to how Stoicism is the guiding principle for Aeneas when negotiating this ladder of duties. Where certain aspects of *pietas* oppose one another for Aeneas, we can see upon closer examination that Stoicism, specifically a complete devotion to his fate to reach Latium over his own personal wants, dictates the correct performance of *pietas* in any given situation. In these instances of conflicting values, we will see that Aeneas always acts in accordance with the aspect of *pietas* that allows him to pursue his mission to reach Latium, or rather, he assents to the impressions that guide him in that direction.

[270] A hierarchy of piety is also evident in later Christian writing. The Christian hierarchy of piety, however, calls for the supreme importance of allegiance to God. This is evident in Luke, 9.57-62.
[271] See **3.1.3**.

At times in the *Aeneid*, Aeneas is forced to choose between fulfilling certain criteria of *pietas* at the expense of others. At these times, like a good Stoic, by assenting to various impressions, Aeneas acts in accordance with furthering his fate to reach Latium, which in turn demonstrates *pietas* towards the Roman State. This allegiance to the future Roman State and Aeneas' pursuance of his fate become more pronounced after the death of Anchises at the end of *Aeneid* III, when Aeneas no longer has the obligation of *pietas* towards his father.[272] The hierarchy of Aeneas' duties under *pietas,* and indeed the Stoic nature of the virtue, is most frequently brought to light in instances that reveal the fragility of his character, such as when the gods must remind Aeneas of his *pietas* and his overarching duty towards the future Roman State.

In the first half of the *Aeneid,* Aeneas receives divine prodding towards *pietas* on more than one occasion, and by heeding these divine warnings, or rather, by assenting to these impressions, Aeneas exhibits *pietas* towards the gods and a Stoic obedience to his fate. In *Aeneid* II, for example, Aeneas nearly allows himself to be overcome by emotion when he is overtaken with rage at the sight of Helen (II.575-587). His mother Venus swiftly intercedes to remind Aeneas of his duties under *pietas* (II.594-620). Although Venus' first plea is to Aeneas' love for Anchises, Creüsa and Ascanius (II.597-598), his family, her ultimate message is that Aeneas must flee Troy immediately (II.619), an appeal to Aeneas that echoes his fate to reach Latium and become the founder of the future Roman State. The divine omen of Ascanius' flaming hair (II.861-686) is yet another way in which the gods impress upon Aeneas (and of course Anchises) that he must leave Troy and proceed in the direction of Latium.[273] While this fire is apparently harmless to Ascanius, it is perhaps also a warning that the family will burn if they remain in Troy.

In *Aeneid* IV, when Jupiter decides that Aeneas is getting too comfortable in the arms of Dido, or, too comfortable with the Epicurean lifestyle in Carthage, he sends Mercury to remind Aeneas of his overall mission. Here, we see that romantic love is incompatible with the Roman foundation story. The message that Jupiter asks Mercury to relay appeals first to Aeneas' sense of personal glory, and then to his love for Ascanius (IV.223-236), which

[272] Perkins (2011) writes that after the death of Anchises, arguably, Aeneas' *pietas* manifests as duty toward the future Roman state at all costs. Perkell (1981, p. 204) also confirms that Aeneas 'is absorbed and driven by the political-military goal of founding the Roman empire'.
[273] Coleman (1942, pp. 144-145) offers the perspective that this is a divine and good omen, writing that 'The king of the gods shows by thunder and a comet that the flame about Iulus' head is a good omen'. I will discuss this episode in greater detail in **5.2.1**.

suggests that Aeneas will prioritise his obligations to his son over those to his wife, Dido. As Jupiter communicates his wishes to Mercury, it initially appears that Aeneas has a choice as to whether he leaves or remains in Carthage. However, from the final line of the dictation, *naviget! haec summa est, hic nostri nuntius esto* (IV.237), we learn this is not the case: by order of Jupiter, who as I have discussed earlier also functions as a mouthpiece for fate (**2.2.2**), Aeneas must depart. As in *Aeneid* II, when the gods drew on Aeneas' *pietas* for Anchises, here once again the gods petition Aeneas' love for a family member as a way to urge him towards his destiny of reaching Latium (IV.265-276). With Anchises having died by this point, the gods aim at Aeneas' loyalty to the next generation, Ascanius. Aeneas' next commitment under familial *pietas* after loyalty to his father is of course to his son, so naturally he must oblige Mercury and pursue his mission to reach Latium for the sake of Ascanius. This act of *pietas* towards the gods and his son also coincides with his duty towards the future Roman state and his fate to settle in Latium. Therefore, in leaving Carthage Aeneas is not only fulfilling his requirements of *pietas* towards the Roman State and his son Ascanius, but also acting as a model Stoic by suppressing his emotions in order to fulfil his fated mission. For Virgil, then, this is about joining internal emotional processes, such as love for family, to public external ones, such as service to country.

Aeneas' justification for leaving Dido contains references to visits from his father in dreams and his obligation to Ascanius to continue in his pursuit of Latium. Aeneas' words suggest not only that Anchises and Ascanius are more important to him than Dido, but also that Dido herself might understand and agree with this (IV.351-355). The emotional appeal regarding these male family members that Venus and Mercury make to Aeneas in *Aeneid* II and IV is in fact an instruction that Aeneas continue on his fated mission to found the Roman state. For Aeneas, fulfilling his fated role as the founder of the Roman state is his utmost priority under *pietas,* regardless of his thoughts on the matter. Anything else becomes secondary to that aim, and any entreaty to various aspects of the hero's *pietas* only serve to underscore and support this primary goal. The gods draw on Aeneas' loyalty to his father and son in order to encourage him on his mission to Latium, employing filial *pietas* to motivate him towards this fated outcome. In this case, the personal *pietas* of Aeneas to Anchises and Ascanius may be reconciled with his public *pietas* towards Rome and his Stoic obedience to fate. Aeneas' travels are motivated by his Stoic pursuit of fate above all else, and the divine impressions that direct Aeneas to fulfil obligations under *pietas* towards his family also guide him forward in his destiny to reach Latium.

5.2. Exits, Women and Conflicts of *Pietas* in the *Aeneid*

This section will examine how female characters pose challenges to Aeneas' *pietas* in his departure from Troy in *Aeneid* II and Carthage in *Aeneid* IV. It will also present an interpretation of Dido as a character who embodies the virtue of *pietas*. Each of these episodes presents a similar challenge for Aeneas in that they both involve abandoning a spouse and conflicts of *pietas*, yet the perspectives and circumstances are markedly different. It is important to keep in mind that we learn the events of Aeneas' departure from Troy from Aeneas himself, as he recounts the story to Dido. While this perspective casts doubt on the absolute accuracy of the events, it offers a closer look at the inner turmoil that a complete adherence to Stoic *pietas* brings for Aeneas. We experience Aeneas' departure from Carthage as Virgil narrates it, as impartial and critical an account as we are likely to get. In each situation, Aeneas must distinguish and choose between conflicting obligations under *pietas* and his own wishes. In both cases, he elevates his mission, acting the good Roman Stoic. Aeneas' deliberate actions show that the *Aeneid* does not endorse the 'Lazy Argument', but rather, a Stoic compatibilist framework. Although it may not be immediately obvious, I aim to show that his overall commitment to his fated mission to reach Latium motivates Aeneas' decisions to leave Troy and Carthage.

5.2.1. *Aeneid* II: Aeneas' Departure from Troy

In Aeneas' departure from Troy, we see a masculine hierarchy of *pietas* emerge. We also witness the fragility of Aeneas' *pietas* at this point in the epic and we encounter our first clash of *pietas* in the story. After seeing the slaughter in Priam's palace in *Aeneid* II, Aeneas tells Dido how his thoughts turned first towards his father, then to his wife, then to his destroyed house and then lastly to his son (II.560-563). This train of thought shows not only that Aeneas' concern for Ascanius is not as great as it should be under the remit of *pietas,* in which material goods such as houses do not feature, but also that Aeneas has failed in his duty towards his family as his worry about them suggests that he has not properly ensured their safety. On his way home from Priam's palace, the sight of Helen immediately incenses Aeneas, further testing his *pietas* (II.575-576).[274] Aeneas' frenzied state of mind contravenes both Roman and Stoic ideals of measured behaviour and *pietas,* showing that his *pietas* is not consistent at this stage in the *Aeneid*. Before Aeneas is able to act upon his vengeful desire, however, his mother Venus intervenes and urges him to

[274] This fire rising in the heart of Aeneas mirrors the fires consuming the city of Troy (II.581).

consider his *pietas,* that is, his obligation to ensure the safety of Anchises, Creüsa and Ascanius instead of acting on his *ira* regarding his destroyed homeland (II.594ff). In this, we see Venus' conviction that Aeneas' *pietas* is capable of overcoming his *ira.* Venus also makes Aeneas aware that Troy is crumbling by the *inclementia* of the gods and that he must leave the city if he wishes to live (II.604ff). Here, Venus is also nudging Aeneas towards his fated mission to reach Latium, and by heeding her warning Aeneas is assenting to a divine impression.

This episode illustrates the fragility of Aeneas' *pietas* at the beginning of the epic. At this point in the narrative, Aeneas does not appear to have an awareness of his own *pietas* or a clear idea of the obligations it entails*,* and he requires divine intervention in order to act in accordance with *pietas* over *ira*. When Aeneas returns to his house in Troy, we see a conflict of *pietas* begin to develop between father and son. Anchises is extremely reluctant to leave the house and the city; he is very clear about his wish to remain and die in Troy, although the entire household pleads with him to leave (II.638-653). Aeneas is of course unwilling to allow his father to die (II.657-658), so he readies himself to re-enter the battle. At this point, Creüsa implores him to guard the house, and reminds him of his duty towards her and Ascanius (II.675-678). Aeneas' loyalty to his father is tested against that to his wife and son. Additionally, Aeneas' *pietas* for Anchises and for his mission is tested against Anchises' *pietas* for Troy. Anchises steadfastly refuses to leave because his *pietas* to Troy is stronger than what he feels he owes to his son, and stronger than his want to survive. Anchises' Trojan *pietas* is to Troy whereas Aeneas' Stoic *pietas* is to his father, his fate and Rome. Aeneas' also recognises *pietas* for Troy within himself, however, his *pietas* is now towards the new land that will become Rome, as his fate has dictated.

At this moment, we gain insight into the inner turmoil that *pietas* causes for Aeneas, and we see how the narrative is working to develop our view of *pietas*. This is strengthened through Aeneas' firsthand account of the events. As Aeneas tells his story, we experience his struggles to reconcile his *pietas* towards his mission, and his own survival instinct, with his *pietas* towards his father and his father's *pietas* towards Troy. Although Creüsa implores Aeneas to flee the city with or without Anchises, reminding him of his duties as a good Roman husband (II.675-678), Aeneas remains unmoved by her words if it means his father will stay and undoubtedly die. Aeneas' *pietas* for his father is stronger than his concern for his own and his family's safety, and Anchises' *pietas* for Troy is stronger than his desire to survive and his concern for his family's safety. In his *pietas* for Troy,

Anchises is not showing *pietas* towards his son, daughter-in-law and grandson, and it is clear that he considers their safety to be less important than his wish to stay in his *patria*.

Seeing the divine omen of harmless and inextinguishable flames atop the head of an oblivious Ascanius (II.681-686), Anchises seeks another sign from the heavens before he agrees to depart (II.689-691); a shooting star satisfies him (II.693-694). Only after seeing both divine signals does Anchises finally agree to leave Troy without further argument. Here, there is an evident contrast between Aeneas and Anchises. Aeneas, we have seen, readily assents to divine impressions, whereas Anchises evidently does not. This suggests that Anchises does not share Aeneas' Stoic nature. In finally agreeing to leave Troy, Anchises elevates *pietas* towards the gods above *pietas* to *patria*. Until this moment, however, so strong was the *pietas* of Anchises for Troy that it defied common sense, as well as the *pietas* he owed to his son. Anchises initially did not allow his son to protect him and threatened both Aeneas' fate and his filial *pietas*. In obeying the divine omens, Anchises perhaps begins to understand Aeneas' Stoic motivations, for these omens demonstrate that the family is fated to leave Troy. In this conflict, Virgil also shows the incompatibility of the 'Lazy Argument' in that we see that Aeneas will not leave Troy and reach Latium without deliberate action on his part. Aeneas does not assume that he can allow fate to take its course, he intervenes and actively pursues it.

As the family leaves Troy, Aeneas prioritises Anchises first and foremost, physically carrying him over his shoulder as Anchises clutches the household gods, the Penates. Aeneas then considers Ascanius, leading him by the hand. The image of Aeneas leaving Troy with his father, son and household gods has been said to emblemise the *pietas* of Aeneas, and has become a standard iconic image of *pietas* through present day, placing a lasting importance on the quality of Virgilian *pietas*.[275] Finally, Aeneas orders Creüsa, the only non-blood related family member, and the only female in the group, to follow behind, *et longe servet vestigia coniunx* (II.711). Grillo notes of this that 'it is not immediately clear how far back she is expected to follow' the party, and also that there is no stated reason why she must follow and cannot travel alongside Aeneas.[276] It seems to be implied

[275] Perkell (1981) Horsfall (1986), Gabba (1987), Garrison (1987), Casali (2010), Grillo (2010) and Prince (2010) among many others discuss how the image of Aeneas leaving Troy with Anchises, Ascanius and the household gods has become emblematic of his *pietas*. Fantham (2007, p. xi) notes that this image appears on one side of the silver denarii circulated in 47/46 B.C., and that while Romans may not have known the Aeneas legend or indeed known the name Aeneas, they would have been familiar with this image (See **3.2.1**).
[276] Grillo, 2010, p. 48 & 51, in reference to II.711.

and accepted that she is less important than the male family members. Later we learn that she lags behind the male group, *pone subit coniunx* (II.725).

By having Creüsa suggest leaving Anchises behind, Virgil draws attention to the prospect of having to choose between a spouse, a parent and a child. In Aeneas' choice, Virgil indicates that blood relations and male relations are to be more highly valued than marital female ones. Aeneas protects his father first, his son second and his wife third. To the servants, *famuli* (II.712), he gives directions to a meeting point. One could argue that this comparative lack of concern represents a failure of Aeneas' *pietas.* A reciprocal *pietas* would exist between Aeneas and his servants as between ruler and subject: his servants owe him allegiance and obedience, and he then has an obligation to ensure their safety, which he does not do as he leaves the house.[277] The household gods, gripped in the hand of Anchises as the group leaves, are in a higher position than Aeneas' wife and son.

Arguably, Aeneas' care and attention for his father and son must account for at least some of his lack of it for Creüsa. Shortly after the family leaves their home, Creüsa disappears from the party. Aeneas clearly had not been paying much attention to her, as he did not look back for her or notice her absence until a significant amount of time had passed (II.740-743), how much time and distance we do not know. This neglect of Creüsa shows Aeneas' neglect for the duties of a Roman husband as he fails to protect his wife. As Perkell writes, 'Aeneas allows Creüsa to fall into danger, first by isolating her from the male family members and then by forgetting her altogether'.[278] For Aeneas, as Grillo writes, this episode and the 'loss of Creüsa emphasises his forgetfulness, which is consistently present' in *Aeneid* II, showing that his *pietas* is not fully developed at this point.[279] Aeneas initially holds fate responsible for the death of his wife (II.738). Then, he questions if Creüsa had strayed or stopped (II.739). Aeneas' remark on fate and behaviour in this context raises possibilities about the death of Creüsa that relate to the overall presence of Stoic fate in the epic. It is possible that Creüsa's fate was not to escape Troy alive so that Aeneas could begin a new legacy in Latium, or it is possible that she did not take the right course of action to allow her to survive, as Aeneas did. Or, perhaps, as has been suggested, Aeneas shifts the blame for Creüsa's death to fate and to Creüsa herself to excuse his own negligence and to shift accusations of blame for her death away from

[277] I address this idea of *pietas* and reciprocity in **3.2.2**.
[278] Perkell, 1981, p. 205.
[279] Grillo, 2010, p. 43.

himself.[280] Aeneas' elevation of the safety of his father and son above that of his wife represents behaviour in accordance with a *pietas* that ranks fathers and sons above wives, consistent with his earlier worries for his family (II.560-563).[281] These divided familial loyalties show the extreme challenges that Aeneas must overcome as a man characterised by his *pietas* (*insignem pietate virum* (I.10)).

Aeneas' determination to protect his father conceivably causes him to lose his wife, and yet, following the loss of Creüsa, and his subsequent frantic search for her, Aeneas is similarly neglectful of Anchises and Ascanius. In leaving them as he searches for Creüsa (II.747-748), Aeneas is effectively abandoning his father and son to the same fate as he does his wife. In a very short space of time, Aeneas is therefore guilty of failing in his obligation of *pietas* toward all members of his family. Through his quickly shifting loyalties in trying to ensure the survival of all, his behaviour turns out to be largely irresponsible. This suggests that the *pietas* of Aeneas is not fully formed at this point in the epic, particularly with regard to measured Stoicism. The risks that Aeneas exposes all of his family members to show the inner turmoil of Aeneas as he struggles to adhere to *pietas,* and the potential consequences of trying to reconcile conflicting aspects of *pietas.* In his inability to save both Creüsa and Anchises, we see the extremity of the sacrifices required to embody *pietas* as Aeneas must choose between the survival of his father or his wife.

In his decision to save Anchises in *Aeneid* II, as Perkell notes, we see that 'Virgil shapes the image of Aeneas' *pietas* to comprise of only males: Aeneas, his father and his son', with no spouse and no mother included.[282] However, as Carstairs-McCarthy observes, female characters are instrumental in 'guiding us to the correct understanding of Aeneas' *pietas*', demonstrating that 'Virgil was able to contemplate a world in which female influences compete with male ones on terms which are, if not equal, at any rate not wholly unequal'.[283] Women cannot embody *pietas,* but they are not entirely excluded from its orbit as they are able to pose challenges to it. At the conclusion of *Aeneid* II, Aeneas is able to reconcile *pietas* as filial devotion with *pietas* towards his mission and his fated role as Rome's founder as he leaves his homeland. Unfortunately, Creüsa becomes collateral in the family's escape, and this is not the only time we will see Aeneas abandon a female spouse under the pretence of *pietas* in his overall Stoic pursuit of his fate to reach Latium.

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[280] Perkell, 1981; Grillo, 2010.
[281] Otis (1963) also notes that Creüsa's death shows a *pietas* that prioritises men.
[282] Perkell, 1981, p. 208.
[283] Carstairs-McCarthy, 2018, p. 218.

5.2.2. *Aeneid* IV: An Argument for the *Pietas* of Dido

Through Venus, we learn Dido's history (I.335ff), which suggests that if women in Virgil's Rome were could embody *pietas* by the same standards as men, then Dido is by all accounts a woman of *pietas*. In addition to her sex, Dido's Epicurean associations suggest that she can never fit the Stoic virtue of *pietas* as Virgil conceived of it for the Augustan regime.[284] Before the Trojans catch their first awed glimpse of Dido (I.494-515), Aeneas and the reader learn the story of Carthage (I.338-368). Like Aeneas, Dido was forced to leave her homeland and found a new kingdom.[285] Both have lost their spouses, albeit under different circumstances. Both have had their decisions to leave their respective homelands hastened by visits in dreams from ghosts, Dido by Sychaeus (I.353-354) and Aeneas by Hector (II.270-271). The story of the foundation and subsequent success of Carthage shows that Dido's virtues are*, maeistas, dignitas, iustitia*, and that she matches Aeneas in terms of respect for the gods.[286] *Iustitia* is a known quality of Dido's, as we learn from Ilioneus (I.523), and *iustitia* is a virtue that Virgil applies to Dido and not to Aeneas.[287] The almost peaceful story of Carthage's foundation shows Dido's ingenuity and organisation, especially when compared to Aeneas' essentially hostile takeover of Latium.

Despite her apparently redeeming qualities, McLeish writes that to Virgil's readers, Dido 'was probably nothing more than an unbalanced barbarian queen, a definite encumbrance to Aeneas' way'.[288] While Dido may exhibit qualities of *pietas,* we cannot ignore her ideological significance as a personification of Carthage, an enemy of Rome, as well as arguably of Epicurean lure.[289] She represented a temptation for Aeneas to a life of leisure, fulfilment of personal desire and romantic love.[290] By attributing various qualities associated with *pietas* to Dido, such as *iustitia* and particularly her loyalty to Carthage,

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[284] See **2.1.2** for a discussion of Dido as an Epicurean and their relationship signifying a clash between Epicurean and Stoic values.
[285] Otis (1963) notes the similarities between Dido and Aeneas in this regard as well. However, Otis (1963, p. 265) takes the opposite view to mine, writing that Dido 'is thus the great example of *pietas* worsted by the *furor* of passion. She does what Aeneas finally was saved from; she sacrifices her duty to her love'. I think this is relatively short sighted, in that Dido needed to be beguiled into her love for Aeneas, and convinced by her sister that alignment with Aeneas was the best thing for Carthage. Dido did not act solely out of love for Aeneas, her union was an act of *pietas* towards her beloved *patria*.
[286] Pöschl, 1962, p. 69.
[287] See **3.1.1**.
[288] McLeish, 1972, pp. 127-128. Parry (1963) echoes these sentiments. Status as an enemy of Aeneas does not prohibit Lausus from *pietas*, yet it does Dido.
[289] Benario (1970) and Parry (1963) write of Dido as a representation of Rome's enemy, Carthage.
[290] Note the Epicurean connotations of Dido discussed in **2.1.2**.

Virgil shows that *pietas* is more than just the sum of its parts. While Dido acts in accordance with *iustitia, dignitas* and *maeistas,* she cannot embody *pietas,* no matter how extreme her dedication to her nation.

From our introduction to her in *Aeneid* I, we see that Dido exhibits a devotion to Sychaeus that far exceeds Aeneas' dedication to Creüsa, whom he does not mention in *Aeneid* I. Venus details Dido's lasting devotion to Sychaeus to Aeneas (I.343-344), and it is clear in the opening of *Aeneid* IV that Dido had no intention of taking another lover after Sychaeus (IV.15-16). Dido requires a significant amount of convincing through various avenues before she will consider a romantic relationship with Aeneas. The first of these is the effort required by Cupid to erase thoughts of Sychaeus from her mind (I.719-722). The strength of Dido's commitment to Sychaeus is made more apparent in *Aeneid* IV, when Dido tells her sister Anna of her surprise at her desire for Aeneas (IV.15-30). Even after the divine intervention of Cupid, Dido's promise to Sychaeus holds her back from pursuing Aeneas.[291] Anna encourages Dido towards Aeneas on the basis of her responsibility to protect Carthage, urging Dido *placitone etiam pugnabis amori* (IV.38).

In her full speech (IV.31-53), Anna urges Dido to court Aeneas not out of *amor* for the man himself, but out of an obligation to Carthage, out of *pietas,* although not expressly named. Anna pushes for the courtship as a strategy for the defence, preservation and expansion of Carthage. Her words are evidently quite convincing, for Anna weakens Dido's sense of female chastity, or *pudor* (IV.54-55). It is neither out of love for Aeneas nor on account of Cupid's intervention that Dido pursues the relationship. Instead, devotion to Carthage impels her to seek the partnership. In doing this, Dido demonstrates *pietas* towards her country of Carthage, placing commitment to her *patria* above her own personal sentiment, as well as adhering to filial *pietas* in heeding the advice of her sister Anna. There is of course an evident parallel in this to Aeneas' devotion to Rome, and his own struggle to accept his patriotic destiny over his own personal desires.

Here we see Dido's loyalties conflict. She wishes to keep her promise to Sychaeus, however, she places her duty to Carthage and its success above this desire. Ironically, it is Dido's devotion to her founded country that is responsible for its eventual ruin, leading her pursue a romantic union with Aeneas, who will ultimately abandon her out of this same

[291] Rudd (1990, p. 152-153) discusses Dido's internal dilemma with respect to her love for Sychaeus and her resulting discussion with Anna in greater detail.

loyalty to his own *patria*. In this, as Ahl notes, 'Dido suffers because she belongs neither in the scheme of his [Aeneas'] Trojan identity nor his Roman future'.[292] The dalliance between Dido and Aeneas, and his subsequent departure, foreshadow the coming Punic Wars, leaving Carthage open to Iarbas, which Dido herself well knows (IV.325-326). She laments this in *Aeneid* VI when we encounter her in the underworld (IV.625ff).[293] While we as readers may see Dido as a woman who embodies *pietas*, this is most likely not the case for Roman readers. Romans favoured moderation, and to such a readership Dido may have seemed melodramatic and crazed, even though her irrational behaviour was the direct result of divine interference. In Dido, some scholars attribute her fate to her sex.[294] The low value of the feminine might explain why the quality of *pietas* may never be attributed to Dido, despite her acting in accordance with its associated virtues through her admirable dedication to Carthage. It may also have to do with her Epicurean associations, which directly oppose the Stoicism of Aeneas.[295]

5.2.3. *Aeneid* IV: Aeneas' Departure from Carthage

Unlike his marriage to Creüsa, we are able to observe Aeneas' entire relationship with Dido from courtship to conclusion. In *Aeneid* IV, we see the *pietas* of Aeneas clash with the *amor* of Dido, and we see an inner conflict between *pietas* and *amor* in Aeneas. In this relationship, Dido brings to light 'Aeneas' inability to reconcile his own instincts with the demands of destiny'.[296] Ultimately, however, Aeneas' *pietas* is in the eyes of some readers and scholars strengthened through his dalliance with Dido. Many scholars view Dido as a challenge, a threat, even, to the *pietas* and resolve of Aeneas. Aeneas overcomes this challenge, albeit not easily, which only enhances his *pietas* and his Stoic resolve in the eyes of the reader.[297] Although Aeneas appears content to remain in Carthage, he cannot achieve his political destiny of founding Rome if he does. When forced to make the decision between his own happiness and his foundational destiny, Aeneas pursues the latter. As a Stoic hero, this choice should not be surprising. Despite his apparent happiness in Carthage, Aeneas forsakes his love for Dido in favour of his duty towards the will of the gods and the future Roman state. This sacrifice has often been hailed as an act of *pietas,* and unfortunately for Aeneas, as Wiltshire writes, 'he has a public destiny that does not

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[292] Ahl, 1976, p. 154.
[293] Of these wars, Wagenvoort (1980, p. 17) writes that they 'were a necessary consequence of Rome's obedience to the divine calling'.
[294] Pöschl, 1962; Hughes, 2002.
[295] See **2.2.2**.
[296] Ahl, 1976, p.154.
[297] Otis, 1967; McLeish, 1972; Bowra, 1990; Horsfall, 2000.

include his private happiness'.[298] Put simply, leaving Dido represents an act of *pietas* over one of love or personal desire.[299] Aeneas' departure, however, and the manner of it, is not entirely heroic, and indeed raises concerns about the *humanitas* component of the hero's *pietas,* even if it is entirely Stoic.

In *Aeneid* IV, we learn from Mercury's observations that Aeneas is well looked after in Carthage. He is wearing Carthaginian clothing and contributing to the construction of the city (IV.259-264), indicating a personal investment in the future of the country. Aeneas appears content to remain in Carthage and in this marriage with Dido until Mercury arrives at Jupiter's bidding to remind him of his fate to reach Latium, of his duty to the future Roman race and particularly of his obligations to Ascanius (IV.265-276).[300] Mercury's words have a powerful effect on Aeneas, who immediately resolves to leave Carthage (IV.279-282). Aeneas' resolution to leave Carthage is instant and he blindly follows this divine message, or, assents to this divine impression, despite the intensity of his emotional reaction to it (detailed in IV.279-286). While the decision to depart from Carthage appears to come easily to Aeneas, taking up only one line (IV.281), he spends substantially more time considering how to inform his spouse and gracious host of his imminent departure (IV.283-291). At this point, as McLeish notes, 'Aeneas' obedience to the gods makes him move with an almost ludicrous haste'.[301] This, I would argue, is also indicative of his Stoic obedience to fate in his pursuit of his mission. Even after his brief deliberation, it would seem that Aeneas had planned to leave without telling Dido, as she catches the Trojans preparing their ships for departure (IV.296-304).

It is further evident from the text of *Aeneid* IV, and supported by their meeting in the underworld in *Aeneid* VI, that Aeneas did at one point feel affection and admiration for Dido, yet as a model Stoic he prioritised his fated mission above his personal feelings in leaving her. However, Dido sees that humanity and compassion are missing from Aeneas speeches (IV.337-339, IV.365-367), and she detects no care in his words (IV.368-370). Aeneas' departure from Carthage demonstrates that *pietas* towards the future Roman state and Stoic devotion to his mission is more important to him than any performance of *humanitas,* or any indulgence of personal feeling. Dido's appeal does not work, and Virgil

[298] Wiltshire, 1989, p. 93.
[299] McLeish, 1972; Wagenvoort, 1980; Garrison, 1987; Shen, 2017.
[300] That he refers to Carthage as *dulcis…terras* (IV.281) is a strong indication that Aeneas may indeed have been content living in there. As Schiesaro (2008, p. 60) notes of Aeneas' time in Carthage, 'Dido offers Aeneas a real alternative to the complex business of setting Rome in motion'. Hughes (2002) also details Aeneas' evident happiness in Carthage.
[301] McLeish, 1972, p. 132.

tells us of Aeneas that *mens inmota manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes* (IV.449). This is a testament to Aeneas' Stoic nature; he is elevating his fate and his mission over his emotions, and sticking to his rational and conviction like a true Stoic hero. In Aeneas' departure from Carthage, it is also important to recognise the significance of divine apparition in conjunction with Aeneas' semi divinity. In obeying Mercury, Aeneas is advancing the prophecy of Jupiter (I.275-279), and he is assenting to an impression, Mercury's reminder of his duty to Ascanius and the future kingdom of Italy and Rome (IV.274-276). Jupiter also happens to be Aeneas' grandfather, so in addition to setting aside his emotional desires in order to pursue his fate, like a Stoic hero, Aeneas is acting in accordance with *pietas* towards the gods and towards his family.

Opinions are divided regarding Aeneas' departure from Carthage with respect to the hero's *pietas*. Some suggest that this is an act of extreme *pietas*, of subverting personal feeling for political destiny. These views also indicate that the act shows Stoic principles in that it elevates fate over feelings. Others, however, argue that Aeneas' exit shows a poor, inhumane and cowardly side of Aeneas' character. I believe that there is merit and fault to be found in both arguments. It is clear that Aeneas cannot go on to found the future Roman state if he stays in Carthage. However, as Schiesaro poignantly draws attention to the significance of Dido's death, it 'shows the enormous price there is to pay in terms of human fulfilment and happiness for the sake of empire building'.[302] The death of Dido may indeed be read as representative of the price of happiness and the cost of human life in the pursuit of duty. We also read that Aeneas' departure from Carthage for Italy is not of his own free will, as he concludes his speech to Dido *Italiam non sponte sequor* (IV.361). Regardless of other various considerations about his happiness in Carthage, it is clear that in leaving Dido, Aeneas elevates *pietas* for his mission and his service to fate over any *amor* he may have felt for her. Above all, Aeneas' action shows a Stoic allegiance to his fated mission to reach the site of the future Roman state over anything else, particularly his own desires.

What we as modern readers might have read as cowardice or poor behaviour from Aeneas, Virgil's readers might interpret as both heroic and necessary. Perhaps Virgil's readers would have seen the hero putting his love for his country above his care for this woman to whom he is married, and therefore may be left with the impression that in leaving Dido Aeneas shows his *pietas* and his overall Stoic temperament in his service to fate. Aeneas'

[302] Schiesaro, 2008, p. 60.

departure from Carthage may be seen as an act of Stoicism, as he is leaving in order to serve his fate to reach Latium. This submission to fate, in the form of *pietas* towards Ascanius and Rome, motivates Aeneas to leave a situation in which he otherwise appears content in favour of inevitable war and conflict. While Dido is only a woman who embodies characteristics of *pietas* but cannot be defined by it, Aeneas is a man of extreme Stoic *pietas*, and this quality sets him above all others. This Stoic nature of Aeneas' *pietas*, which shows in his devotion to his mission to reach Latium, perhaps leads Virgil's readers to view this episode as a triumph for Aeneas as he completely submits to his fate to settle in Latium by leaving Carthage and Dido, irrespective of any personal feeling.

5.3. Creüsa, Dido and Lavinia: *Pietas, Amor* and Marriage

Over the course of the *Aeneid,* Aeneas is involved in three relationships with women, each of which we as modern readers would likely consider to be marriages. Each of these women represents something different for Aeneas: Creüsa his Trojan wife, Dido his Epicurean dalliance and Lavinia his Roman future. Virgil uses these relationships to test the *pietas* of Aeneas, and to shed light on the emotional turmoil that adherence to the virtue causes for his hero, illustrating the sacrifices required to uphold it. This adds drama to the narrative, and strengthens Stoic associations of the virtue. In leaving Troy, Aeneas must choose between his father and his wife. In leaving Carthage Aeneas must choose his wife and his destiny. For his union with Lavinia, Aeneas must defeat Turnus and the Rutulians. In the unions with Creüsa and Dido, Aeneas must ultimately make the choice between a marriage bound by mutual love and his own Stoic *pietas* towards his mission. Like a model Stoic, in both cases Aeneas elevates his mission to reach Latium over his wife, and both women, having been abandoned to various degrees, die as a result of his decision. In this, Virgil conveys the human cost of *pietas.* In his exploration of these relationships, Virgil appears to assess whether *pietas* and a romantic connection to a woman, *amor,* can exist within one man, particularly when combined with a Stoic surrender to fate leading up to the foundation of a city.

Creüsa, Dido and Lavinia are entirely separate characters, who fulfil distinct functions within the *Aeneid.* In *Aeneid* II and IV, where Creüsa and Dido feature most heavily, Virgil presents a contrast between *pietas* and *amor,* or, between Stoic duty and romantic love. The dedication that Aeneas displays to his respective spouses is markedly different from that which he expresses towards his male kin, and shows the separation between *amor* and filial *pietas*. The love that Aeneas shows towards Anchises and Ascanius holds far greater

weight than any romantic devotion to a spouse, and aligns with a Stoic *pietas* that is consistent with Aeneas' destiny to reach Latium, whereas love for Creüsa and Dido would prevent him from doing so. In the case of both Creüsa and Dido, Aeneas sacrifices any romantic love, *amor*, he might feel for each woman in order to pursue a higher aspect of *pietas*, following his fate like a model Stoic and continuing his journey to Latium. Regarding Creüsa and Dido, *amor* is depicted as an oppositional force to Aeneas' patriotic endeavour to set in motion the eventual foundation of Rome.[303]

Through Aeneas' marriages in *Aeneid* II and IV we are able to see how *amor* and Stoic *pietas* apparently exist in opposition to one another. The former is based in emotion, the latter in reason, and this is reflected in Virgil's treatment of the two concepts. The word *amor* appears three times in *Aeneid* II, and not in relation to Aeneas' wife Creüsa. First, it is associated with Dido and her desire to hear Aeneas' tale of suffering (II.10). Second, it is a description of Coroebus' excessive love (*insano accensus amore* (II.343)) for Cassandra, which is immediately evident as is antithetical to the measured image of Roman *pietas*. Third, it occurs in the final line of Creüsa's message to Aeneas, when she tells him *iamque vale et nati serva communis amorem* (II.789). It is possible that Creüsa speaks to *Aeneas* of *amor* to convey *pietas* because as a woman she is ignorant of *pietas,* yet it is evident to the reader that this love for Ascanius also falls under the remit of *pietas* and persists throughout the epic.[304] It will even motivate him to abandon his next wife in Carthage.

Looking at Virgil's usage of *amor* in *Aeneid* IV, we can see how this word and all its emotional associations exist in opposition to the acclaimed Stoic *pietas* of Aeneas, which is based on the supremacy of reason over emotion. In *Aeneid* IV, the word *amor* appears fifteen times.[305] Over the course of *Aeneid* IV, however, Dido and Aeneas seem to experience *amor* in very different way. For Dido, *amor* applies to a love for people, for Sychaeus first and then for Aeneas. For Aeneas, *amor* is reserved for country, first for Troy and then Rome. This *amor* for Aeneas, then, appears to also be a manifestation of *pietas.* Looking at Dido and her associations with *amor*, we see her passion shift from Sychaeus to Aeneas. First, Dido speaks of her *primus amor* (IV.17), Sychaeus, and shortly afterwards of how Sychaeus was her only lover (IV.28). Only when Anna uses the word *amor* (IV.38) to describe a union between Dido and Aeneas and infuses the queen's heart

[303] Perkell, 1981.
[304] Virgil describes a father's love in terms of *amor* in *Aeneid* I.643-645 and I.715-716. The strength of a father's love is also mentioned in *Aeneid* XI.549-550 in relation to Metabus and Camilla.
[305] IV.27, 28, 38, 55, 85, 171, 292, 307, 347, 395, 412, 414, 615, 532 and 624. These figures were gained from an electronically conducted search of *Aeneid* IV.

with *amore* (IV.55) does Dido's passion shift from Sychaeus to Aeneas. From this point onwards, Dido speaks of her love for Aeneas in terms of *amor*. However, as discussed earlier (**5.2.2**), this love for Aeneas is largely representative of her devotion to Carthage, and thus more consistent with a form of patriotic dutiful *pietas* than loving *amor*.

In *Aeneid* IV, *amor* takes hold of Aeneas, and he seems content in Carthage until Mercury reminds him of his *pietas* towards Ascanius and his mission (IV.279-295).[306] Following this reminder, Aeneas speaks of his *amor* for Italy (*hic amor haec patria est* (IV.347)). This *amor* for Italy is consistent with *pietas* towards Ascanius and Rome. The differences between the love Aeneas felt for Dido and the devotion he feels for his father, son and destiny are most evident in the language Aeneas uses to dissociate from Dido. Aeneas' speech initially shows no love for Dido (IV.333-339), although his subsequent words show love and devotion for Troy, for Priam and for Italy (IV.340-347). Virgil makes it clear that Aeneas feels no such emotional attachment, *amor,* for Dido as he does for his *patria.* By placing this love for his *patria,* which aligns with his *pietas* and his divinely appointed mission, above his love for Dido (and also Creüsa), Aeneas forgoes the prospect of a loving and romantic relationship with a woman in favour of his destiny to found the Roman race, like the archetypal Stoic he is written to be. Aeneas' devotion to his mission, which manifests in his Stoic nature, is stronger than his love for Dido, who represents Epicurean emotion and temptation. This juxtaposition also illustrates the extent of the emotional sacrifices required in the name of *pietas.*

Aeneas' marriages to Creüsa and Dido and their terminations indicate that romantic love is irreconcilable with *pietas,* or, more appropriately, with Aeneas' destiny of reaching Latium and settling in the future site of Rome. Therefore, it is incompatible with the Stoic ideals of the poem. While Aeneas's unions with Creüsa and Dido serve to highlight the great extent of Aeneas' Stoic *pietas*, they also illuminate the challenges of *pietas* and certain shortcomings of his character. Ultimately, the episodes in the *Aeneid* that involve Creüsa and Dido suggest the 'emotional cost to the Romans of becoming an imperial people', that women are collateral, of little overall importance to the great Roman destiny.[307] We even perhaps see this subordination of feeling to the great Roman destiny in Aeneas' final marriage to Lavinia. There is no courtship period and we do not even know if Aeneas is happy with the marriage arrangement or if he feels any kind of affection for Lavinia

[306] Virgil uses *amor* three times to describe the union between Dido and Aeneas (IV.171, 292, 532).
[307] Perkell, 1981, p. 216. Carstairs-McCarthy (2018, p. 206) also lists Dido as one of the 'casualties of the Trojan and Roman destiny', attributing this to Aeneas' *pietas* to Jupiter.

beyond his *pietas* for the future Roman state. Concerning the women for whom he shows genuine care, as Perkell notes, 'love for Creusa and Dido remains subordinate to this goal' of founding the Roman state.[308] Creüsa and Dido also illustrate that Aeneas is capable of cruelty, which perhaps makes his actions in later books less surprising to the reader.

It is difficult to identify *amor* in Aeneas' marriage to Lavinia in *Aeneid* XII as it is a purely practical and political matter. Unlike Turnus, Lavinia's betrothed, who was emotionally invested in his union to her, Aeneas expresses no desire for the princess.[309] The marriage of Aeneas and Lavinia is entirely one of politics and utility as opposed to mutual love and commitment. It is essentially a union of *pietas* towards Rome, arranged on the basis of politics and prophecy. The impending wedding signifies a political treaty between Aeneas and Latinus and the fulfilment of a prophecy given first by Creüsa in *Aeneid* II (II.776-789) and again to Latinus by the Oracle of Faunus in *Aeneid* VII (VII.96-101).[310] By Virgil's representations of *amor*, and Aeneas' foregoing of *amor* in pursuit of *pietas*, it appears that *amor* and *pietas* are irreconcilable. It would also appear that *pietas* to this new Roman state is of far greater importance than any kind of *amor*. Through Aeneas' temporary loving relationships with Creüsa and Dido, and his final implied marriage to Lavinia, we see the triumph of political *pietas* over *amor* in marital relationships. In Aeneas' relationships with these women, Virgil shows that marriage based on romantic love, *amor,* is of lesser value than marriage rooted in civic duty, or, rather, in *pietas,* and that Stoic allegiance to fate and the sovereignty of reason supersedes *amor* in all ways. Each woman tests the *pietas* of Aeneas, allowing Virgil to showcase the extent of the emotional challenges that *pietas* can pose, and the amount of personal sacrifice required to fully uphold and embody the virtue.

5.4. *Aeneid* XII: *Pietas* at the Conclusion of the *Aeneid*

At the conclusion of the *Aeneid*, Aeneas has triumphed over the Rutulian forces, and he is faced with the decision to kill or to spare Turnus the Rutulian Prince. In his last moments, Turnus accepts Aeneas' victory, and implores Aeneas to have mercy, appealing to Aeneas'

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[308] Perkell, 1981, p. 204.

[309] Virgil writes of Turnus' enthusiasm for a marriage with Lavinia, using the word *amor* to refer to the romantic desires and inclinations of Turnus:

> petit ante alios pulcherrimus omnis
> Turnus, avis atavisque potens, quem regia coniunx
> adiungi generum miro properabat amore (VII.55-57).

[310] In her prophecy, Creüsa is the first to say to Aeneas that his destination is Hesperia, *et terram Hesperiam venies* (II.781).

pietas for Anchises as he tries to bargain for his life, or at the very least, his body (XII.931-938). Aeneas is momentarily affected by these words. He holds his sword and appears to consider Turnus' plea, until he catches sight of Pallas' belt around Turnus' shoulder (XII.939-944). The sight of this baldric induces a change in Aeneas, as Virgil tells us he is *furiis accensus et ira / terribilis* (XII.946-947). Whatever hesitation he may have had is gone, and Aeneas, in a fit of rage (*fervidus* (XII.951)), drives his sword into Turnus' chest. Thus, the epic concludes with an act of *ira.* Since the distribution of the *Aeneid,* scholars have debated how Aeneas' final murder of Turnus impacts the *pietas* of the hero.[311] Some have argued that by this act Aeneas has undone all of his *pietas* from the earlier parts of the epic, while others have maintained that this final slaughter also aligns with, if not strengthens, the *pietas* of the hero. By this ending, Aeneas becomes either the protector of the future Roman state, or an embodiment of criticism for the Roman method of imperial conquest.[312] This section will first consider the character of Turnus and the role he plays in the *Aeneid* with respect to *pietas*. It will then look at arguments in condemnation and in praise of Aeneas' final act, and comment on how it reflects on Virgilian *pietas* in the epic and its legacy. The volume of scholarly arguments on the subject shows how this episode highlights the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of consistently adhering to *pietas,* even for Aeneas.

5.4.1. About Turnus

Turnus is an interesting character in his own right, a uniquely Virgilian creation with no Homeric counterpart. As Pöschl identifies, there is a 'heroic nobility at the core of his nature'.[313] Turnus first appears in *Aeneid* VII, yet the Sibyl alludes to him in her prophecy in *Aeneid* VI.[314] By equating him with Achilles, the Sibyl introduces Turnus to the reader as an enemy to Aeneas and his *patria* as Achilles was an enemy to Troy, as well as a formidable warrior.[315] Burnell notes of this association that 'Turnus is the vicarious object

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[311] Burnell's 1987 article, 'The Death of Turnus and Roman Morality', offers a comprehensive overview of arguments for or against the murder of Turnus, as well as arguments for it as an essentially neutral act. Burnell (1987, p. 198) identifies four main issues in the text: revenge, rage, compassion and practicality. Carstairs-McCarthy (2018, p. 211ff) also discusses recent scholarship regarding the morality of Aeneas' murder of Turnus.

[312] Michels, 1997.

[313] Pöschl, 1962, p. 92.

[314] allius Latio iam partus Achilles,
natus et ipse dea (VI.89-90).

[315] There is an alternative view that Aeneas is the other Achilles, however it makes more sense that this is in reference to Turnus because of Achilles' status as a known enemy to Aeneas and to Troy (See Van Nortwick (1980) for a comprehensive discussion of this allusion).

of a Roman audience's desire for vengeance on Achilles'.[316] In *Aeneid* VII*,* Virgil presents Turnus, the man betrothed to Lavinia (VII.55ff). The first things we learn about Turnus are that he is the most handsome of all Lavinia's suiters, that he comes from a powerful ancestry and that the Queen Amata desires an immediate union between Turnus and Lavinia.[317] Pöschl notes that in Turnus, 'physical and spiritual beauty are inseparable'.[318] Despite this seemingly positive beginning, Turnus's earlier association with Achilles, particularly when compounded with his first appearance in the middle of the night (*mediam nigra … nocte quietem* VII.414), suggests that he is a malevolent force. The Rutulian's noted association with *violentia* strengthens this connection between Turnus and Achilles.[319] Turnus' arrival in the middle of the night recalls the similar arrival of the Greeks upon the sleeping Trojans in *Aeneid* II*, per amica silentia lunae* (II.255).

Turnus shares many qualities with Aeneas. Physically, the two are similarly lauded for their stature, and like Aeneas, Turnus is semi-divine, albeit to a lesser extent: *cui Pilumnus avus, cui diva Venilia mater* (X.75).[320] The two share similar motivations; while Aeneas is driven by *pietas* towards the future city of Rome, Turnus is highly dedicated to his own country of Latium, as well as his betrothal to Lavinia (VII.423). There is, however, one crucial distinction in how we read the two characters: the revelations of *Aeneid* VI. As Farron writes, after what he has learned in *Aeneid* VI, 'Aeneas is functioning on a higher plane' as he 'has been made aware of his world-historical mission' and is 'supposed to be the archetypal and ideal Roman'.[321] Pöschl additionally identifies that 'Turnus is inferior to Aeneas neither in courage nor fighting power, he is inferior in spirit, prudence and luck'.[322] In other words, he is inferior with respect to *pietas*.[323] Although Aeneas and Turnus vie for the same thing, Lavinia's hand in marriage and thus rule of Latium, Turnus is opposing fate, and cannot be successful against Aeneas. For Aeneas, Turnus embodies the discord, anger and chaos that Juno heaped upon him from the beginning of the epic.[324] Turnus presents another contrast to the Stoic Aeneas, as a man who has no control over his

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[316] Burnell, 1987, p. 186.

[317] petit ante alios pulcherrimus omnis
Turnus, avis atavisque potens, quem regia coniunx
adiungi generum miro properabat amore (VII.55-57).

[318] Pöschl, 1962, p. 93.

[319] For more about this association see Hahn (1931), Ahl (1976) and Van Nortwick (1980).

[320] Palmer (1974, p. 50) writes that 'Venilia, his mother, was an obscure goddess, and his grandfather was the deity Pilumnus'. Turnus is not in the same category of semi-divine as Aeneas, the son of a major Roman goddess.

[321] Farron, 1977, p. 207.

[322] Pöschl, 1962, pp. 131-132.

[323] Cairns (1989, pp. 71-72) notes Turnus' specific 'lack of *pietas*'.

[324] Johnson, 1965.

emotions.[325] Although the reader knows the outcome before the first spear is thrown, the conflict between Aeneas and Turnus is still fraught with drama. The last contest between them poses a final and dramatic challenge to the overall *pietas* of Aeneas and his legacy.

5.4.2. Arguments in Condemnation of Aeneas' Last Kill

There are many who condemn Aeneas for his murder of Turnus, some going so far as to say that the *pietas* of Aeneas is forever sullied by this act.[326] These scholars who criticise Aeneas' action draw primarily on two separate things to support their argument: their understanding of *pietas,* and, perhaps to a greater extent, the mental state of Aeneas at the end of the epic. From these, they conclude that Aeneas is a symbol of impending violence, a cruel embodiment of that upon which Rome was founded. As Putnam writes, 'in killing Turnus Aeneas kills a version of himself, brother murdering brother in a prototypical scene that leads not to dreams of harmony and order but to civil war and the constancy of human violence'.[327] If we accept this, we end the epic not with a note of optimism for a peaceful era despite a violent past, but with one of bitterness and unnecessary slaughter, looking forward to civil war. In the murder of Turnus, the *Aeneid* does not end with a note of 'forgiveness, conciliation or mercy'.[328] Instead, it concludes with Aeneas in a state of 'decidedly un-Stoic anger'.[329] He is 'victorious and alone, passionate for conquest and private vengeance'.[330]

Pietas implies a measured judgement between various factors of loyalty in order to determine one's actions based on context. As we have seen throughout the epic, when aspects of *pietas* come into conflict with one another, Aeneas is guided by Stoic principles and always takes the action that will best serve his fate. In facing the subjugated Turnus, Aeneas must choose between *pietas* in the form of *clementia* or *humanitas* towards Turnus and *pietas* towards the future Roman state by eliminating any remaining threat that Turnus

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[325] Virgil further reinforces this lack of emotional control by associating *furor* and *amor* with Turnus. Turnus is *furenti* (IX.691) when he opens his gates and goes on to slay Antiphates; *furor* and love of slaughter motivate Turnus against the Trojans (*furor ardentem caedisque insane cupido / egit in adversos* (IX.760)); Turnus is *furens* as he prepares for battle (XI.486) and as he hears news of the battle (XI.901); love overcomes Turnus (*turbat amor* (XII.70)); in battle, he is *agitur furiis* (XII.101); Turnus is afflicted in his heart by *furiis agitates amor* (XII.668); Turnus recognises his own *furor* (XII.680).

[326] Putnam (1995, p. 46), for one, makes the strong statement that 'at the end of the *Aeneid,* Virgil sharply and profoundly disavows the linkage between Aeneas and *pietas*'. Horsfall (2000, p. 207) additionally speaks quite harshly of Aeneas with respect to *pietas* regarding this incident.

[327] Putnam, 1995, p. 204.

[328] Johnson, 1965, p. 363.

[329] Wilson-Okamura, 2001, p. 114.

[330] Perkell, 1981, p. 219.

might pose if spared. Aeneas' choice, then, is between showing mercy and guaranteeing the completion of his mission. In this case, after little deliberation Aeneas chooses to ensure the safety of his mission, which involves acting on *ira* (XII.946). This lack of respect for human life that Aeneas shows in killing Turnus is a significant reason why scholars condemn the hero for his actions.[331] Farron draws on Virgil's use of the verb *immolo* (XII.949) to show the derision of Aeneas' treatment of Turnus, equating it to human sacrifice.[332]

Perhaps the more compelling argument in condemnation of Aeneas last act rests in an indictment of his mental state at the time, one of anger, *furiis accensus et ira* (XII.946). Many have noted that the decision to kill Turnus was one of rage and lack of measured judgement, the opposite of the Stoic ideal and a man of measured *pietas*.[333] While the sight of Pallas' belt ends Aeneas' hesitation, it is highly unlikely that this is the moment when Aeneas first learns that Turnus has killed Pallas. There is also little evidence to support that Aeneas had an especially close relationship with Pallas, in fact, Michels suggests that Pallas must have annoyed Aeneas with his inane questions (X.159-162).[334] It is also unlikely that the sight of Pallas' belt would have caused such an emotional reaction for Aeneas because of Pallas himself. However, Aeneas' murder of Turnus is an act of *pietas* towards Pallas' father Evander rather than to Pallas himself, and so, Aeneas' feelings about the young Pallas remain unknown and perhaps irrelevant.[335]

The role of Pallas in this kill is worthy of attention. In Aeneas' dedication of this kill to Pallas, he also appears to be trying to evade responsibility for it:

> Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas
> immolate et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit (XII.948-949).

By the nominative *Pallas*, Aeneas is claiming that in fact Pallas has wounded and killed Turnus, perhaps deflecting the potential consequences of his actions elsewhere. Regardless of his relationship to Pallas, the anger of Aeneas on glimpsing the belt of Pallas at the end

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[331] Shen, 2017.
[332] Farron, 1977, p. 208. Farron (1977, p. 208) discusses Virgil's other uses of the verb *immolo* to signify Aeneas' killing another human 'as if he were an animal slaughtered for the dead', drawing attention to *Aeneid* X.519 and X.541. This behaviour, Farron (1977, p. 208) argues, invites the reader to question the *pietas* of *pius Aeneas.*
[333] Shen 2017. Farron (1977) supports this view. Carstairs-McCarthy (2018, p. 219), however, writes that 'Aeneas, even when *furiis accensus,* does not render himself morally indistinguishable from, or even inferior to Turnus'.
[334] Michels, 1997.
[335] Carstairs-McCarthy (2018, p. 2011) argues for Aeneas' murder of Turnus is an act of *pietas* towards Evander.

of the epic resonates with other instances when he has been overcome with anger. For example, we see a parallel between Aeneas' desire to make Turnus pay with his life (XII.948-949) and his wish to exact punishment from Helen in Troy (II.575-576).[336] In his actions at the conclusion of the epic, Aeneas becomes similar to his enemies, to those he previously condemned and despised. He resembles the villain Pyrrhus, who killed a defenceless Priam (II.550-553), and Achilles who defiled the body of Hector (I.272ff).[337] Indeed, Aeneas resembles Turnus himself.[338]

Looking at the parallels between Aeneas and Turnus, and the rage that overtakes Aeneas before the final murder, Shen writes that 'it is difficult not to conclude that Aeneas' better sense of judgment was clouded by violent passion when he took Turnus' life', and that his final act was motivated by despair.[339] With this ending, Virgil ensures that unchecked fury, anger and destruction leave a lasting impression on the mind of the reader, and he indicates that Rome's foundation is based on these qualities, which are not necessarily appealing. Although Turnus himself is a violent character, he has been commandeered by Allecto, and his violent tendencies are exacerbated by divine intervention. Aeneas' violence, conversely, comes from his own character, and is in parts greater and more calamitous than that of Turnus, even without the help of divine intervention. While it might be an exaggeration to say that Aeneas undoes all the *pietas* attached to his name by his final act, this episode allows us to observe the great difficulty of consistently maintaining *pietas,* especially while under the pressures of war.

It may certainly be said that Aeneas' final act was one of anger, rather than compassion or *pietas*. It leaves the reader with a certain revulsion at the conclusion of the epic, and a sense of apprehension for the future state of Rome should its foundation rest on the shoulders of one so readily prone to such vengeful violence. As Putnam notes, 'this unmasking of Aeneas as a symbol makes his tale truly reflect history itself.'[340] It shows that the foundation of Rome lies in violence. In this final murder, perhaps Virgil is attempting to justify or draw attention to the atrocities perpetuated by Augustus in his pursuit of establishing a peaceful regime as he shows *pietas* as an act of revenge.[341] It is

[336] Not to mention his rage in battle (X.510-819), which sets a precedent for *Aeneid* XII.
[337] Perhaps worse, as Farron (1977, p. 208) notes, 'Aeneas is the only character of the *Aeneid* to gloat over a dead body because he will never be properly buried by his parents and his corpse will be mangled terribly by animals'.
[338] Van Nortwick (1980) discusses the similarities between Aeneas and Turnus.
[339] Shen, 2017. Johnson (1965) also echoes these sentiments.
[340] Putnam, 1995, p. 46.
[341] See **3.2.1**, n. 178 for an example of *pietas* as revenge as it applies to Augustus.

the lack of regard for human life, the rashness of the act and the loss of emotional control in Aeneas' last kill that underline arguments in condemnation of Virgil's hero.

5.4.3. Arguments in Praise of Aeneas' Final Act

Those who assert that Aeneas' final act was one of blind vengeance find a foil in the many who believe that Aeneas' brief moment of hesitation shows deliberation and careful thought before ultimately making the correct decision. There are also some who view Aeneas' final act as tragic but necessary. It is possible to consider Aeneas' final killing of Turnus as an act of *pietas* in many different respects, some of which appear more Stoicly motivated than others. By vanquishing the killer of Pallas, Aeneas shows *pietas* not only to Pallas but also to his father Evander, to whom Aeneas has a particular loyalty.[342] By disposing of the most formidable Latin warrior, Aeneas ensures his marriage to Lavinia, granting him sovereignty over the province that will eventually become Rome. As Ahl notes of this, 'with Aeneas' victory, the dream of the Roman future assumes an established basis in reality; Italy and Lavinia have been won'.[343] Aeneas' final act was politically necessary for the future of the Roman state, which adds a Stoic element to it. As Burnell suggests of his deliberation, 'Aeneas bears the ark of *pietas* both because he *considers* sparing Turnus, and then because he actually kills him'.[344] Only in killing Turnus can Aeneas be absolutely certain that he will fulfil his destiny to found the future Roman State. His rational subjugation of his emotions and his resolution to do what is necessary to achieve that destiny align with his development as a Stoic hero.

In Turnus' final speech of supplication, he appeals to Aeneas on the basis of *pietas.* Specifically, he begs Aeneas to spare him for the sake of his father (XII.932-936). In this appeal, Turnus asks Aeneas to recall his relationship to his own father, which has played a significant role in characterising his *pietas* throughout the epic. This appeal to Anchises moves Aeneas, making him hold his sword (XII.938-941). The sight of Pallas' belt quickly sways Aeneas to complete the kill. Perhaps, in seeing the belt Aeneas believed Turnus' appeal to be disingenuous, and the sight led him to the decision that the only action available was to kill Turnus. One could even say that Pallas' belt acted as an impression on

[342] Papaioannou, 2003; Prince, 2010. Papaioannou (2003) has detailed the function of Evander in Virgil's *Aeneid* with respect to the foundation of Rome.
[343] Ahl, 1976, p. 324.
[344] Burnell, 1987, p. 188. Prince (2010) echoes this sentiment.

Aeneas, an invitation to kill Turnus, and in doing so, Aeneas was assenting to that impression, as a model Stoic hero.

While I discussed Aeneas parting words to Turnus as placing responsibility for the murder onto Pallas (**5.4.2**), there is an alternative interpretation of these words as a dedication of the kill to the memory of Pallas. Instead of blaming Pallas, Aeneas is possibly showing his devotion to Pallas, and by extension to Evander, by avenging Pallas' death. Thus, Aeneas' final murder of Turnus may be read as an act of filial *pietas* towards Evander. Drawing on Servius' commentary, Putnam writes that Aeneas' last act represents '*pietas* owed to his father and *pietas* demanded of him by Evander', and that under the guidelines of *pietas* Aeneas owes Evander the death of his son's killer.[345] In disposing of the murderer of Pallas, Aeneas behaves in an admirable way, for, according to Michels, 'to most Romans, vengeance for a wrong done to a relative or a friend was not merely justified, but was an obligation'.[346] Perhaps, as with Dido, Virgil's readers and modern readers may interpret events differently. What might appear coldblooded murder to modern readers may present as necessity and *pietas* to Roman readers, as well as Stoic service to fate.

This murder of Turnus once again highlights conflicting aspects within the hierarchy of duty under the remit of *pietas*, showing the extreme burden of being a man of *pietas*. The act, as Ball states, is one of 'outraged *pietas*'.[347] Early readers of the *Aeneid* perhaps more clearly recognized the difficult position of Aeneas at the end, and the necessity of his action.[348] This was evident to ancient commentators as well as modern ones, as Servius points out the paradoxical nature of *pietas* in this situation, 'from *pietas* he wants to spare him and from *pietas* he has to kill him'.[349] As in earlier situations, Aeneas elevates *pietas* towards the future of his country and his fated mission before *pietas* towards his fellow man. As Putnam conclusively states, 'Turnus' death was a necessary sacrifice for the future of Rome'.[350] This elevation of duty over emotion in service of his fate as Rome's founder makes the murder of Turnus, to some, an admirable act of *pietas*. While his moment of hesitation may show Aeneas' compassion for the vanquished Rutulian Prince, his ultimate decision to kill Turnus represents his elevation of duty towards the future Roman state and his complete obedience to fate above any personal feeling, like an

[345] Putnam, 1995, p. 172.
[346] Michels, 1997, p. 415. Prince (2010) also discusses the idea of *pietas* as revenge.
[347] Ball, 1991, p. 25.
[348] Servius (As found in Garrison, 1987, p. 190) credits the hero 'with *pietas* for personal feeling and political necessity' for the murder of Turnus.
[349] Pöschl, 1962, p. 137.
[350] Putnam, 1995, p. 158.

archetypal Roman Stoic. Aeneas final act may not be compassionate, but it is arguably necessary for the foundation of the future Roman state, and therefore many read it as an act of *pietas* motivated by a Stoic pursuit of fate and submission of personal feeling.

5.5. Conclusion

The conflicts of *pietas* in the *Aeneid* highlight the Stoic essence of Aeneas' *pietas*. This is evident in that when he experiences a clash of values under the remit of *pietas,* he always acts in accordance with the aspect that will allow him to pursue his fate to reach Latium, often subjugating his own feelings in the process. At all times, Aeneas' surrender to fate underlines his decisions with respect to *pietas,* although as we have seen, it may present on the surface as something else such as *pietas* towards Anchises, the gods or Ascanius. It is also clear that Stoic principles offer a guide to resolving situations of conflicting *pietas.* Looking at Aeneas' conduct in certain instances when aspects of *pietas* oppose one another, Virgil highlights wider ideas about heroic behaviour, or the behaviour of a model citizen in the Augustan regime. In these difficult situations, Aeneas uses Stoic principles to guide his overall decisions: submission to fate and subversion of emotion to do so. Every act of *pietas* may be traced to fulfilling his destiny to reach Latium and settle there. Aeneas is a hero who is motivated by Stoic ethics, which are repeatedly tested against his own human desires. This is most evident in his time in Carthage and his departure from there. Each test of Aeneas' *pietas* reveals something different about Aeneas himself, and also about the virtue of Virgilian *pietas*. This is how Virgil makes a compelling narrative and adds drama to a story where the outcome is already known.[351]

In *Aeneid* II and IV, women test the *pietas* of Aeneas. Creüsa tests Aeneas' *pietas* towards his father, and Dido tests Aeneas' *pietas* towards his destiny to reach Latium. In some ways, Aeneas fails both tests, not to mention both women. While searching for the abandoned Creüsa, whom he had forsaken in favour of his father, he then jeopardises the safety of Anchises and Ascanius. Had Aeneas prioritised his mission when he first arrived in Carthage, he would not have formed a bond with Dido. Aeneas fails to protect both of these women, and as a result of his negligence, both women die.[352] Aeneas did not ensure the safety of Creüsa as the family left Troy. He elected instead to prioritise his father, his son and his household gods. Aeneas makes a choice to become romantically involved with

[351] Williams (1990, p. 27) notes this of the Dido episode.
[352] See Perkell, 1981.

Dido, and his 'indecision and neglect of duty results not in his own death but in that of Dido'.[353] However, despite having entered into a union with Dido, Aeneas had no choice but to leave Carthage if he were to continue on his mission to found the Roman state, as fate compelled him to do. We must also concede that Aeneas' treatment of these women may not have seemed as problematic to Virgil's readers as it might to readers today.

At the conclusion of the epic, regardless of his decision to kill or spare Turnus, Aeneas has reached Latium, has established a Trojan presence there and will go on to wed Lavinia. Turnus has accepted defeat, offered himself in supplication, promised his allegiance and begged Aeneas for his life (XII.930-938). Although Aeneas perhaps shows humanity in his hesitation, ultimately, he kills Turnus. The only option that will guarantee that Aeneas is able to settle peacefully in Latium without future resistance is to kill Turnus. We do not know what Aeneas' feelings are in his hesitation, yet we see his complete willingness to do what is necessary for the foundation of the future Roman state. However, the first impression of Aeneas as a ruler is then one of ruthlessness instead of mercy. The conclusion of the epic is perhaps a reminder that the Rome of Virgil's readers was only recently born from violence, war and atrocities, in which the current Emperor Augustus, also Virgil's patron, had actively participated. The end of the epic is then conceivably Virgil's final and lasting reminder that the current era of peace is only possible because of these earlier violent acts. In the last lines of the *Aeneid,* Virgil leaves his readers with a convincing lesson on how difficult it can be to completely and perfectly embody the virtue of *pietas,* but that Stoic philosophical principles will act as an appropriate moral compass. Furthermore, he has made it clear throughout the poem that a Stoic attitude towards natural emotional responses is difficult to uphold, and that even the most dedicated *exemplum* of *pietas* is capable of lapsing from time to time.

[353] Ahl, 1976, p. 185.

Chapter 6. *Aeneid* VI: Overall Importance of *Pietas* and Stoicism

Aeneid VI reinforces the ideological coherence of Virgil's Stoic *pietas* by showing how the virtue links Aeneas to contemporary Romans by way of a spiritual inheritance. *Aeneid* VI is also perhaps the only place in the epic where Virgil shows any demonstrable benefit of *pietas* for individual Roman citizens. In this, we see the integration of a faith-based belief system into the virtue through Virgil's treatment of punishment and reward in the afterlife. In *Aeneid* VI, we see most clearly how Virgil, in his Stoic rendition of *pietas,* has produced a virtue that upholds civic and communal welfare in a personal behavioural characteristic. This chapter will first examine *Aeneid* VI, its place within the epic and its overall significance. It will then discuss how Virgil has expanded on previous representations of the underworld and the afterlife in ancient literature with respect to the moral landscape of his underworld geography and his depiction of a system of punishment and reward that correlates to life on earth. This chapter will focus on Tartarus and Elysium and the philosophical implications behind Virgil's portrayal of purification for the soul versus punishment for the body. Ultimately, it will show that *Aeneid* VI forms the moral centre of the poem, and highlight the significance of Virgil's Stoic *pietas* beyond the epic itself. [354]

6.1. The Significance of *Aeneid* VI

In *Aeneid* VI, Aeneas journeys to the underworld to visit his father, Anchises, who died near the end of *Aeneid* III (III.706-711).[355] This encounter with Anchises occurs close to the end of *Aeneid* VI, after Aeneas has received his tour of the underworld. Guided by the Sibyl of Cumae, Aeneas traverses the underworld, entering through the Halls of Dis and eventually exiting through the Gate of Ivory. During this journey, Aeneas, and by association the reader, learns the machinery of the underworld and the afterlife. Virgil takes this opportunity to demonstrate the benefit of *pietas* for the individual, showing his Roman readers that there is a reward in the afterlife for a life lived in accordance with *pietas.* Anchises reveals to Aeneas what has been dubbed the Parade of Heroes (VI.756-859), detailing Aeneas's future ancestors and illustrating Roman pride and ancestry from Aeneas through to the Julian Clan.[356] In this Parade, we are able to see how the lineage of Aeneas leads directly to the foundation of Rome through a spiritual inheritance. By linking

[354] Stevens (2007, p. 89) calls *Aeneid* VI 'the *locus* of its moral dimension'.
[355] Howatson (2011, p. 12) offers a detailed and concise summary of *Aeneid* VI. For a discussion of the place of Book VI in the *Aeneid,* see Otis (1963), Burke (1979), Williams (1990b), Ross (1997) and Stevens (2007).
[356] Cairns (1989, p. 61) provides a table showing how the men of Virgil's Parade correlate to historical figures in Rome's foundation.

Aeneas to Augustus in this way, Virgil legitimises the rule of Augustus through his ancestors and shows his readers the foundation of their city as a catalogue of human experience in which they can conceive of their own places.

6.1.1. *Aeneid* VI: Moral Lessons and Roman History

Through the Parade of Heroes (VI.756-859), which illustrates Roman pride and focuses on venerable ancestry, readers are presented with a vision of the great Roman destiny, and are able to see themselves and Augustus within the context of a mythical and heroic past.[357] This Parade of Heroes links the mythological history of Troy to the present Augustan Rome via a spiritual inheritance underlined by *pietas*. By showing Aeneas his future ancestors, Virgil connects Aeneas to Romulus and Remus and then to Augustus. Not only does Anchises name specific ancestors, but also he catalogues their illustrious deeds. In this, Virgil affirms the historical merit and importance of the *Aeneid,* as well as further legitimising the Augustan regime by tracing his ancestors and their respective deeds in an ideologically compelling narrative. In this Parade, Aeneas and the reader are able to behold the history of Rome from its mythical Trojan origins to its Augustan future as an episode of human history, seeing their place in it through a spiritual inheritance.

After the Parade of Heroes, Anchises gives Aeneas direct and prophetic moral advice on Roman conduct:

> tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento
> (hae tibi erunt artes), pacique imponere morem,
> parcere subiectis et debellare superbos (VI.851-853).

In addition to Anchises words being moral instruction for Aeneas, this advice directly links the *Aeneid* with the future Roman state as Anchises addresses Aeneas as *Romane*. Virgil's choice of the word *Romane* indicates that this is an address to all Romans. It would also appear that Anchises is advocating for the *artes* that are most akin to the *iustitia* and *clementia* components of *pietas.* This is far from the only moral lesson Aeneas receives in the underworld. By the time Aeneas hears these words, he has already traversed the underworld and seen the effects and consequences that actions on earth have had on its inhabitants. Anchises' advice is a strong closing statement on a chapter full of moral lessons for Aeneas that looks towards the Augustan future. Thus, *Aeneid* VI plays a role of

[357] Scholars such as Otis (1963), Burke (1979), Shelton (1988) and Casey (2009) have suggested that the focal point of *Aeneid* VI is this Parade of Heroes.

great significance in affirming not just the *pietas* of Aeneas but *pietas* as a Roman virtue, bringing this concept out of the *Aeneid* itself and into the context of contemporary Rome.

Aeneid VI shows reward for lives lived in accordance with the Roman values, notably *pietas,* as well as various forms of punishment for those who violate these values or commit certain crimes.[358] In this way, Virgil's representations of life after death serve to illustrate the traits that will be valued or condemned under the Augustan regime. Through this emphasis on Augustan ideology, and the relation of behaviour in life to the afterlife, Virgil's *Aeneid* perhaps appealed to Christian scholars, and thus became integrated into Christian literature, which showed considerable engagement with Stoic philosophy as well as Virgilian *pietas*.[359] This kind of overt moralising was unique to the *Aeneid* in its time period. *Aeneid* VI strengthens the mythico-historic origins by which Virgil has written the foundation of Rome. It represents and drives the ideological power of the epic, and it shows for its readers the purpose of a life lived in accordance with the virtues of *pietas.*

6.1.2. Literary Influences on *Aeneid* VI: *Odyssey* XI

In *Aeneid* VI, Virgil presents a more geographically, morally, philosophically and theologically complex view of life after death and the underworld than his predecessors. Exploiting the existing trope of a *katabasis*, Virgil introduces new ideological dimensions to the afterlife in *Aeneid* VI.[360] Identified influences for *Aeneid* VI notably include Plato's *Republic* X, Aristophanes' *Frogs* and Homer's *Odyssey* XI.[361] The oldest of these Greek accounts is Homer's, significantly predating both Plato's and Aristophanes', although Williams suggests that the concept of an afterlife as a release from death is originally Orphic and Pythagorean, not Homeric.[362] Homer's *nekyia* remains the most recognized analogue to Virgil's account of the underworld in *Aeneid* VI and has received the most

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[358] Habinek (1989, p. 232) identifies that *Aeneid* VI serves a didactic function as 'Virgil uses the underworld as a way of denoting what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate behaviour during human life'.
[359] Long, 1986; Bowen and Garnsey, 2003; Hansen, 2018. I will discuss this in greater detail in chapter **7**.
[360] Prior to the *Aeneid*, a *katabasis,* or a character's descent into the underworld, found precedent in Greek literature, for example in accounts of Orpheus, Hercules and Alcestis, as Shelton (1988), Zagzebski (2007) and Bremmer (2009) note. While Odysseus converses with the dead in *Odyssey* XI*,* I do not consider this a *katabasis* because Odysseus does not physically journey to the realm of the dead. Scholars such as Braund (1997) and Bremmer (2009) discuss in more detail how the accounts of Orpheus and Hercules function as influences within the *Aeneid*.
[361] West, 1990; Williams, 1990b. Zagzebski (2007) notes that the Summerian *Epic of Gilgamesh* (2100 B.C.) and the Egyptian *Book of the Dead* (c.1600 B.C.) also predate the *Aeneid,* and present the idea of an afterlife and a dialogue between the living and the dead. Although these are very likely not direct sources for the *Aeneid,* and so I will not be discussing them in any further detail in this thesis, we cannot discount the possibility of migration of literary ideas.
[362] Williams, 1990b.

scholarly attention.[363] While Homeric symbolism and echoes of the *nekyia* may be identified in *Aeneid* VI, Virgil's underworld is exceptional in its own right.

Homeric parallels and influences are evident throughout *Aeneid* VI. In the differences and embellishments between *Odyssey* XI and *Aeneid* VI, Virgil is not only building a more impressive and comprehensive literary legacy for Rome, but also effectively revolutionizing attitudes towards life after death in the Augustan regime. While the dead in Homer's *nekyia* do not appear to experience punishment or reward in death (with the exception of a few stock examples of punishment), the dead in Virgil's underworld apparently conform to a rigid caste system determined by their deeds in life. This represents a significant development on established ideas about life, death and the afterlife, introducing an element of morality and faith-based belief in divine punishment and reward in death based on deeds in life. Thus, Virgil's underworld significantly expands on previous conceptions of an afterlife with respect to moral, philosophical and theological elements.[364]

Aeneid VI does not reflect Homeric influence so much as a new concept of the afterlife and the underworld that draws on Homeric as well as philosophical influence. Despite the questionable extent of Homer's influence, a general consensus emerges that Virgil has elaborated on Homer's *nekyia* in *Aeneid* VI. [365] In *Aeneid* VI, Virgil's engagement with *Odyssey* XI adds both familiarity and authority to his underworld account while he imposes his own unique moral landscape. This allows Virgil to more easily set out his own vision of the afterlife in Augustan Rome, and to have that vision be accepted by his readers. In *Aeneid* VI, we can see how Virgil uses Homer's *nekyia* as a complement to his own representation of the underworld, adapting certain elements while ignoring others, and elaborating extensively on Homer's elementary account of life after death. Virgil's introduction of a system of punishment and reward after death that corresponds to life as lived indicates a belief system based on faith in good behaviour, adding an element of faith to the quality of *pietas.*

[363] Scholars such as Michels (1944), Segal (2004) and Bremmer (2009) for a lot of Homeric influence on *Aeneid* VI, whereas Eliot (1953) and Knauer (1990) identify that it is not possible to establish the extent of influence. I believe Otis (1963, pp. 221 and 311) accurately describes the extent of Virgil's utilization of Homeric motifs within his own 'Augustan symbol complex', noting that Virgil's 'own subjective style' gives 'the story of Aeneas an epic resonance such as only Homer could call forth'.
[364] Solmsen, 1972.
[365] Slavitt, 1991; Bremmer, 2009.

6.2. Geography and Philosophy in Virgil's Underworld

One of the most significant ways in which Virgil presents a revolutionary version of the afterlife is in his detailed geography of the underworld, which includes not only an intricate physical landscape, but also a moral one that engages with complex philosophical ideas. This moral and philosophical landscape of the underworld is a crucial part of Virgil's wider success in creating a powerful sense of ideological coherence for the epic. Guided by the Sibyl, Aeneas is able to experience and learn about both the physical and moral machinery of the underworld. Through his geography, Virgil meaningfully imparts moral lessons of punishment and reward in the afterlife for deeds committed in life in a way his predecessors did not.[366] This section will discuss the geography of Virgil's underworld and the moral lessons that Aeneas receives on his guided tour. I will look at how Virgil's geography in the underworld reflects the ideology of the epic, as well as the relationship between *pietas,* Stoicism and the afterlife.

6.2.1. Virgil's Underworld Geography and the Importance of Philosophy

Although the underworld is apparently vast in size, Virgil focuses primarily on the dichotomous regions of Tartarus and Elysium, with a brief segment on the *lugentes campi* (VI.441).[367] Only those souls in Tartarus and Elysium appear to be established residents of Virgil's underworld. The other masses of "shades" present in a kind of limbo, eternally waiting for their final resting places. These include those who have not been buried, such as Palinurus, and those who have taken their own lives, such as Dido.[368] In Virgil's geography, the consequences in death of life on earth become evident, as well as the extent of Virgil's engagement with philosophy.[369] Aeneas, and by association the reader, is able to see the penalties for certain deeds, and as well as importance of a proper death and burial, thus receiving a moral lesson. By leading Aeneas through these regions, and allowing him to see the consequences in death as they relate to behaviour in life, Virgil is

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[366] Interestingly, the vast size of the underworld in the *Aeneid* may not be entirely attributable to Virgil expanding on his Greek predecessors, but rather to differences between Roman and Greek thoughts on the size of the underworld. As Bremmer (2009, p. 185) notes that 'the enormous size of the underworld is frequently mentioned in Roman poetry, unlike in Greece'.

[367] Bremmer, 2009.

[368] From the treatment of Palinurus, we may infer that burial is a necessary prerequisite to entry to Elysium. On this subject, Walsh (1928, p. 9) writes that 'the unburied who must wander a hundred years in misery before they are allowed to cross the Styx and reach their final resting place'.

[369] The philosophical significance of *Aeneid* VI been emphasised by scholars in the tradition of Virgilian commentary, for example, Bernardus Silvestris writes in the first lines of his commentary on *Aeneid* VI that it is the centre of the epic's philosophical truth (*et quia profundius philosophicam veritatem in hoc volumine declarant Vergilius*).

able to educate his readers as to which behaviours in life will merit praise or condemnation in Augustan Rome. In short, he is able to define Augustan values. In this, we not only see Virgil introducing a faith-based belief system that revolves around *pietas*, but also the overall importance and benefit of *pietas* to he who embodies it.

Despite the amount of detail in the geography of the underworld, there are certain logistical issues that Virgil does not address.[370] For instance, it is obvious to the reader that not all the dead are destined for Tartarus or Elysium (overcrowding would be quite severe), or even one of the other areas, and this is a quandary that Virgil does not choose to resolve with any great clarity. In line with Roman beliefs about the underworld as 'a vast hollow space with a comparatively narrow opening', Virgil's underworld is accessible via the Halls of Dis, a narrow opening.[371] Aeneas' journey through the underworld proper begins in VI.426, when Aeneas and the Sibyl have crossed the river Acheron (VI.415-416) and mollified the three-headed Cerberus on the other side (VI.419-421); it concludes with his exit through the Gate of Ivory in Elysium (VI.897-901).[372] The Gate of Ivory and the Gate of Horn that we encounter at the end of *Aeneid* VI recall *Odyssey* XIX (*Od.,* XIX.560-567).[373] This final reference and homage to Homer and the particular gate of Aeneas' exit have invited various interpretations of how we should view Aeneas' experience in the underworld.[374]

Awareness of underlying philosophy adds another layer to our understanding of Virgil's account of the underworld in *Aeneid* VI, and allows us to more clearly see how the author uses *pietas* to introduce an element of faith in the form of a moral lesson. Influence from many philosophical schools is clear in *Aeneid* VI, but the most obvious philosophical influences in the underworld come from Platonism and Stoicism, which Virgil reconciles by merging a Platonic separation of the body and the soul with a Stoic view of moral progress and allegiance to fate.[375] Virgil's acceptance of the Platonic view of death

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[370] O'Hara, 2010. O'Hara (2010, p. 101) further notes that 'the Virgilian underworld is simply packed with details that are inconsistent, both with passages elsewhere in the poem, and with other sections of the underworld'. Moreover, Jefferies (1934) and Solmsen (1972) identify ideological inconsistencies in *Aeneid* VI, which Jefferies (1934, p. 35) claims allows Virgil to 'satisfy every school of thought'.

[371] Bremmer, 2009, p. 195.

[372] For a detailed plot and map of Aeneas descent and journey through the underworld see Otis (1963 pp. 282 and 289).

[373] Tarrant (1982), Henderson (1999) and Gransden and Harrison (2010) recognize this Homeric analogue and elaborate on its significance.

[374] Perhaps the most noteworthy of these is West's (1990) 'The Bough and the Gate'.

[375] Bailey (1935), Currie (1975), Braund (1985), Bernstein (1993) and Stevens (2007) note Virgil's familiarity with diverse philosophical schools of thought. Scholars such as Walsh (1928), Williams (1990b), Stevens (2007) and Sharples (2014) have also identified elements of Orphism, Pythagoreanism and Epicureanism in addition to Stoicism in *Aeneid* VI.

becomes evident in the similarities between *Aeneid* VI and Platonic texts, namely *Republic, Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*.[376] Regarding the geography of Virgil's underworld, Bernstein identifies that 'Plato's moral categories are charted on Virgil's underworld landscape'.[377] Segal and Ju suggest that the punishment and reward system of Virgil's underworld reflects a Platonic worldview, although the idea of reward for virtue is also consistent with Stoicism.[378] Drawing on established and familiar Platonic world views and integrating them with Stoicism adds authority to Virgil's account and overall Stoic philosophical outlook.

The most strongly Platonic element of Virgil's underworld, his treatment of bodies and souls, is also the most versatile, reflecting as well the Orphic notion that the body is inferior to the soul.[379] According to both Platonism and Orphism, the body is a hostile environment, a prison, a source of malice, corruption and moral menace for the soul, from which the soul is only free in death.[380] This is also consistent with the overarching Stoic message of the text, as Ju writes, 'the Stoics' conception of the soul's immortality is in no sense a deviation from the language of Platonism, in that they adhered to a Platonic definition of death', a separation of soul and body.[381] Over more than a century, many scholars have suggested that the overall philosophical message of both *Aeneid* VI and the epic as a whole resonates with Roman Stoicism.[382] The philosophical messages of *Aeneid* VI become most clear in Virgil's treatment of the body and soul in the underworld, and his exploration of the topic of reincarnation, which he reconciles with a Stoic outlook.

6.2.2. Tartarus and Elysium

The main focus of Virgil's geography in *Aeneid* VI is on the regions of Tartarus and Elysium. These represent the opposing concepts of punishment and reward, and set up a

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[376] Solmsen, 1972; Bernstein, 1993; Bremmer, 2009.
[377] Bernstein, 1993, p. 73. Furthermore, Bremmer (2009, p. 185) notes in Virgil's geography that 'The fork and the preference for the right are standard elements in Plato's eschatological myths'.
[378] Segal, 2004; Ju, 2009.
[379] Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristobel (2008) and Edmonds (2013) discuss at length Orphic treatment of bodies and souls in the Greek afterlife.
[380] Harrison, 1978; Solmsen, 1968; Tarrant, 1982; Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristobel, 2008; Bockmuehl and Stroumsa, 2010; Edmonds, 2013.
[381] Ju, 2009, p. 119. Jeden (2009, p. 17) offers a relevant definition of death: 'Death is the separation of soul from body. Nothing incorporeal is separated from the corporeal, for nothing incorporeal comes into contact with [or 'is joined to' the corporeal. The soul is joined to and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is corporeal'.
[382] Glover, 1912; Walsh, 1928; DeWitt, 1942; Michels, 1944; McKay, 1955; Sullivan, 1959; Pöschl, 1962; Otis, 1963; Williams, 1967; Quinn, 1968; Wagenvoort, 1978; Heinze, 1982; Tarrant, 1982; Habinek, 1989; Bowra,1990; West, 1990; Cauchi, 1991; Hainsworth, 1991; Braund, 1997; Ross, 2007; Ju, 2009; Horsfall, 2010. See also **2.1**.

contrast between Virgil's treatment of bodies and souls. Tartarus is home to only bodies, Elysium to only souls. There is also an element of the divine and divine justice present in the differentiation between both regions. Of Tartarus and Elysium, Solmson identifies that it 'is not life as lived and experienced by the individuals but as judged by a higher power; crime is punished and merit rewarded'.[383] This idea of a 'higher power' introduces the idea that there is a divine arbitrator who discerns between a sentence of punishment or reward in the afterlife, a novel concept at the time at the time of the *Aeneid*'s composition. Neither Tartarus nor Elysium, however, is uniquely Virgilian, and may have been familiar to his readers from preceding literature. Bremmer notes that 'traditionally, Tartarus was the deepest part of the Greek underworld, and this is also the case for Virgil,' suggesting that Virgil's Tartarus is adapted from existing Greek ideas.[384] Virgil's Elysium also finds an analogue in Greek philosophy, as Habinek notes the similarity between Elysium and Plato's home of the blessed.[385] Bremmer and West also recognize the echoes of Elysium in earlier Greek literature in Plato's *Republic* X, *Phaedrus* and *Gorgias*.[386] Virgil's readers, then, were likely familiar with the ideas of Tartarus and Elysium and the stark contrast between the two regions from their other reading. Because of this existing familiarity, Virgil is freer to expand on their moral significance.

In addition to being traditionally Greek, Tartarus is also distinctly Homeric.[387] As is characteristic of Virgil, he has expanded on the version of Tartarus offered by his Greek predecessor. Unlike the rest of the underworld, Aeneas does not physically experience Tartarus, he learns of it second-hand from the Sibyl (VI.548-628). Much as Aeneas may want to, he cannot enter Tartarus, although he can hear sounds from inside it, and he catches a fleeting glimpse of it (VI.548-556). Virgil's account of Tartarus is just as vivid and moving as if Aeneas had been there himself. Scholarship recognises this, as Solmsen notes that 'the horrors of Tartarus are in no way lessened—in fact they become more concentrated and intense—by being reported in the speech of the Sibyl'.[388] Gowers

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[383] Solmsen, 1972, p. 35. Bremmer (2009, p. 89), however, notes that Rhadamanthys himself is not an invention of Virgil, writing that 'Rhadamanthys (566) and Tisiphone (571) recur in Lucian's *Cataplus* (22-23) in an Elusinian context'.
[384] Bremmer, 2009, p. 188.
[385] Habinek, 1989.
[386] Bremmer (2009, p. 196) writes that 'The upward movement for the elite, pure souls, also occurs in the *Phaedrus* (248-249) and the *Republic* (X, 114de), whereas in the *Gorgias* (525b-526d) they go to the Isles of the Blessed'. West (1990) notes that Er's account of the Underworld in Plato's *Republic* X is similar to Aeneas', and that in *Republic* X.614 the just go to heaven and the unjust go to torture, as in *Aeneid* VI with Elyseum and Tartarus in VI.541-543.
[387] Bremmer (2009, p. 188) goes so far as to argue that Virgil's description of Tartarus in VI.548-628 is 'mostly taken from' the *Odyssey*.
[388] Solmsen, 1972, p. 36.

concurs that 'even a witness who does have a hundred mouths would still be incapable of describing Hell'.[389] Moreover, Tartarus, unlike the rest of the underworld, is a place of eternal confinement, as is made clear in the text (VI.617ff).[390]

Virgil explains in detail what sins will consign a man to Tartarus after death (VI.595-694). One striking commonality between those condemned is that they could all be described as violators of *pietas,* or those who tried to defy fate. In this explanation, Virgil includes stock examples mostly taken from Greek mythology, which would have been familiar to his readers. The sins specifically included in this description are first and foremost impersonating a god, such as Salmoneus (VI.585ff). The next category includes hating a brother, striking a parent, defrauding a client, hoarding money from family (which the Sibyl mentions is the largest group), adultery, or pursuing civil war (VI.608ff). All of these crimes may be considered moral offences, and all contradict the tenets of *pietas,* albeit some more obviously than others. The introduction of Tartarus as *impia Tartara* (VI.543) emphasizes its amoral quality. Tartarus is a region of men without *pietas.* All stock dwellers of Homer's Tartarus are also present in Virgil's: Ixion, Tantalus, Sisyphus and Tityus among others, all moral offenders in their own right.[391]

While it is clear that eternity in Tartarus is the consequence of the actions of the individual in life, there is an implication that one can atone for sinful behaviour in life and thus avoid Tartarus. The Sibyl tells Aeneas that Rhadamanthus, judge of Tartarus:

> castigatque auditque dolos subigitque fateri
> quae quis apud superos furto laetatus inani
> distulit in seram commissa piacula mortem (VI.567-569).

The use of *distulit* (VI.569) implies that Rhadamanthus will only sentence those who have delayed their atonement, suggesting that one may avoid Tartarus by atoning for sins while he is alive. This may have served as an example to Virgil's readers, that it is never too late in life to follow the behavioural code of *pietas* and avoid an indefinite future of torture in death. This theory is perhaps also strengthened by the fact that Anchises is not confined to Tartarus as a result of his adulterous relationship with Venus, even though adulterers are specifically named as Tartarus inhabitants (VI.612). Instead, we encounter Anchises as a permanent resident of Elysium. This either suggests that Anchises earned his place in

[389] Gowers, 2005, p. 182.
[390] Bernstein, 1993.
[391] Walsh, 1928; Solmsen, 1968; 1972; Gowers, 2005.

Elysium by his actions after his affair with Venus, or that Virgil's methodology for the underworld is not entirely uniform.

At the end of the Sibyl's description of Tartarus come two significant lessons. The first is in Theseus' warning to "*discite iustitiam moniti et non temnere divos"* (VI.620), and the second is the Sibyl's closing remarks on the region (VI.625-627).[392] Here, the importance of *iustitia* is emphasised first, and then of loyalty to the gods. By highlighting both these things, Theseus is also stressing the importance of *pietas* by stating the value of its qualities, outlining how one can avoid Tartarus. As I suggested earlier in this thesis, it is possible that Theseus can only speak of *iustitia* because he is ignorant of *pietas* as an ancient hero. The Sibyl's last words on Tartarus, where she is incapable of recounting the various tortures within it, leave a lasting impression on the reader:

> non mihi si linguae centum sint oraque centum,
> ferrea vox, omnis scelerum comprendere formas
> omnia poenarum percurrere nomina possim (VI.625-627).

This suggests that the extent of punishment in Tartarus is so great as to be incomprehensible to Aeneas, and thus to Virgil's readers. It is perhaps the direst warning, that despite the extensive and extensively painful forms of torture in Tartarus, there is still much that cannot be described. It is interesting that forms of crime as well as forms of punishment cannot be explained. By this, Virgil is perhaps being deliberately vague to allow for crimes that he has not specifically mentioned to be factored into what will consign a man to Tartarus. This conclusion, especially when compounded with the previous subject matter, delivers a strong warning to Aeneas about the importance of justice and obedience to the gods, or, *pietas*, the antithesis to the *impia* of Tartarus. A man who lives his life in accordance with the codes of *pietas* need not fear Tartarus.

The antithesis to the punishments of Tartarus, Elysium represents the region of Virgil's underworld dedicated to rewarding those who have lived well, or, who have lived lives in accordance with *pietas*. Unlike Tartarus, where all punishment is exacted from flesh, the inhabitants of Elysium appear not to hold corporeal bodies, as is evidenced by Aeneas' failure to embrace his father (VI.700-703). Again, unlike Tartarus, which Williams has noted is a Homeric model, Elysium is an idea found in Platonic and Orphic eschatology, as well as Pythagorean and Stoic philosophies.[393] This presence of Stoicism in Elysium might

[392] Zarker (1967) identifies Theseus as the speaker of this line. I have also discussed this incident and its significance for Aeneas in **3.1.1**.
[393] Williams, 1990b.

suggest Virgil's elevation and preference for it. Those in Elysium have earned their residency by their deeds in life. However, not all of these achievements appear to immediately correlate to *pietas,* perhaps for political reasons. As Bockmuehl and Stroumsa identify, 'souls are in Elysium by their own merits, which Virgil briefly characterizes as achievements in war politics and the arts'.[394] This implies that Augustus would be granted permanence in Elysium based on his achievements in war and politics, and also his cultural renaissance that involved reviving the arts in Rome, each of these things representing his *pietas* towards the city. In Elysium, Aeneas also learns that there are many souls who must be reincarnated (VI.713-715 (called *has omnis* (VI.748)), and few souls who are able to remain in Elysium indefinitely (*pauci* (VI.744)).[395] We see that *memoria,* or cultural memory, is the deciding factor regarding who remains in Elysium: *quique sui memores aliquos fecere merendo* (VI.664).[396] This is significant for our interpretation of the divide between those who must be reincarnated and those who may avoid another life.

Memoria in Virgil's Rome is a more impactful term than what we would consider memory today. For guidance on what *memoria* may have signified to a reader of Virgil, Varro's (116-27 B.C.) *De Lingua Latina* proves quite insightful:

> ab eodem monere, quod is qui monet, proinde sit ac memoria; sic monimenta quae in sepulcris, et ideo secundum viam, quo praeteruntis admoneant et se fuisse et illos esse mortalis. Ab eo cetera quae scripta ac facta memoriae causa monimenta dicta (*DLL,* VI.49).

These lines suggest an educational function to *memoria.* The monuments of memory may serve as lessons from the past, and may be drawn on to inform decisions about the future. As Langlands identifies, 'Roman *exempla,* too, are designed to communicate a connection with the past: as we have seen, their specific historical settings and their purported historical reality are important aspects of their cultural and ethical status'.[397] Seider supports this position in a way that is relevant for understanding Elysium and *Aeneid* VI, writing that the Romans 'conceived of memory as a central link between past and future, one that was of crucial importance to themselves and their society'.[398] Introducing a further dynamic that aligns with this thesis, Gowing writes that 'the Romans viewed memory as an

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[394] Bockmuehl and Stroumsa, 2010, p. 173

[395] It is interesting that Solmsen (1972, p. 36) notes that 'Anchises' revelation about the fate of the souls includes the sojourn in Elysium but knows nothing of Tartarus. For if the souls too receive "punishments" (*exercentur poemis,* 739), they are utterly different from those in Tartarus'. I will discuss this in greater detail later in this chapter (**6.3.3**, **6.4**)

[396] Many scholars have discussed the significance of *memoria* in ancient Rome. For further information see Gowing (2005), Seider (2013), Galinsky (2014), Langlands (2018) and Roller (2018).

[397] Langlands, 2018, p. 199.

[398] Seider, 2013, p. 17. In short, Seider (2013, p. 17) continues that for the Romans 'memory was a vehicle to preserve both themselves and the state'.

essential means of connecting with the past, and thereby of preserving their sense of self and identity'.[399]

Reading *memoria* in this way for *Aeneid* VI, as an exemplary link between past and future, we might draw the conclusion that those who remain in Elysium by virtue of *memoria* do so because the memory of their deeds in life served as positive examples of service and contribution to the Roman state, or, of *pietas*. These men were *exempla* for living Romans to strive to emulate. As Langlands observes of Roman *exempla* and Augustus' ancestors, 'family heroes become national heroes who are available as *exempla* for all Romans'.[400] The ancestors of Augustus awaiting reincarnation, then, are only waiting because they have not performed their service to the future Roman state. The men who remain in Elysium are men who have exhibited *pietas* in life towards the Roman state, sacrificing their lives in some cases for the foundation of the empire, and are therefore examples enshrined in *memoria*. In this distinction, Roman readers may align themselves with their heroic ancestors by means of *pietas* towards the Roman state.

6.2.3. Bodies and Souls: Punishment Versus Purification

The juxtaposition between Tartarus and Elysium with respect to bodies and souls invites a discussion of the various punishments and purifications that the denizens of each region must undergo. In Virgil's underworld, the dead are organised into a hierarchy based on the degree to which they are separate from their bodies. The dead aspire to become as far estranged as possible from their human bodies. A complete difference between body and soul is reflected in the accounts of Tartarus and Elysium, as well as in the deaths of Dido (IV.704-705) and Turnus (XII.951-952), where Virgil writes of the soul or life escaping the body. While the escape of the soul from the body in death is a commonly held belief of Platonic philosophy, it also finds a place in Stoic ethics.[401] Virgil's treatment of bodies and souls falls in line with the Platonic idea that the body acts as a source of pollution and corruption for the soul, a prison from which the soul is only free in death.[402] We see this reflected in the desire of the underworld inhabitants to permanently and completely shed their bodies, and the imprisonment of the denizens of Tartarus in those bodies. We may

[399] Gowing, 2005, p. 152.
[400] Langlands, 2018, p. 238.
[401] Solmsen, 1968; Schildgen, 2001; Ferguson, 2003; Stevens, 2007; Ju, 2009; Rüpke, 2014. From Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristobel (2008) and Edmonds (2013) we learn that this is also true in Orphic philosophy.
[402] Solmsen, 1968; Harrison, 1978; Habinek, 1989; Tarrant, 1997; Stevens, 2007.

then perhaps conclude a Platonic antipathy towards the body on the part of Virgil, or at least a belief in the separation between the soul and the body in death.[403]

Unlike the rest of the underworld, the residents of Tartarus are still confined to their human bodies and their punishments are described in terms of bodily harm. Those in Tartarus receive *poenas deum* (VI.565), yet the noises of whips and chains that emit from Tartarus would suggest that the mechanisms for punishment are manmade, and that they are constructed of things that would be viscerally familiar to Virgil's readers (VI.557-558). This corporeal punishment, the stretching and flagellation of bodies, would have been more imaginable and odious to Virgil's readers than an abstract wringing of the soul, as described in no great detail by Anchises (VI.724-751), and therefore perhaps a more powerful deterrent against the acts of *impietas* that would lead to such punishments. The notion that there is no escape from Tartarus suggests that the body cannot be purified or cleansed; the body of a sinner who does not repent in life is then eternally contaminated and destined for endless punishment.

On the other hand, the purification of the soul that Anchises describes in Elysium (VI.739-743) tells us that the process is performed by elements, *ventos* (VI.741), *gurgite* (VI.741) and *igni* (VI.742). Additionally, purification of the soul in Elysium appears to have an end, albeit after a very long time (*mille rotam volvere per annos* (VI.748)), whereas Virgil implies that punishment of the body in Tartarus is never ending. The duration of this purification in Elysium is unclear, and perhaps taken on a case by case basis, depending on the life of the individual.[404] Anchises is not able to speak on the process with authority, as he rather vaguely explains it to his son, and by extension, the reader. Virgil leaves unanswered how purification applies to Anchises. However, we see by Aeneas' failure to embrace him that he does not have a tangible body (VI.700-703). As Habinek notes, this incident represents a 'compelling sign that Anchises has indeed been separated from corporeality with all its implicit evil, that his being now more closely resembles ethereal fire than Titanian ash'.[405]

Apart from the separation from his corporeal body, we do not know how the process of purification or has affected Anchises. It may be the case that the purification of the soul in

[403] Bockmuehl and Stroumsa, 2010.
[404] Although Williams (1990b) and Solmsen (1972) estimate this process to take 10,000 years, this would be difficult to reconcile with Virgilian genealogy.
[405] Habinek, 1989, p. 254.

Elysium is so light and painless that the individual is unaware of it. Or, perhaps there is an exemption for social occasions like the visit of his son Aeneas. At a stretch, Anchises was such a perfect soul that he requires no purification, though this is distinctly unlikely. In *Aeneid* VI, the few who may remain permanently in Elysium appear to pursue the same pleasures in death as they enjoyed in life. Virgil describes this, and Aeneas sees it (VI.637ff). While these residents have apparently gone through purification and separated from their human bodies, it is also clear that they are able to enjoy physical activities, such as sitting in the sun, exercising, playing instruments, dancing and caring for horses (VI.642ff). For mortals, all of these things require a body. This is yet another example of how the machinery of Elysium is quite vague and esoteric compared to that of Tartarus, and an additional testament to the enigmatic nature of the *Aeneid*, showing that we cannot expect any particular consistency throughout the epic.

6.2.4. Reincarnation in Virgil's Underworld

Another aspect of the underworld and the afterlife that we encounter in Elysium is the process of reincarnation. Anchises informs Aeneas that many will have to re-enter bodies and begin other lives on earth (VI.722ff). Anchises educates Aeneas on the two types of Elysium residents, *pauci* (VI.744) and *has omnis* (VI.748).[406] Although both must be purified, *pauci* are those who will remain in Elysium for eternity, and *has omnis* are those who must return to earth in another body. What separates them, however, is ambiguous, and perhaps deliberately so. In Elysium, Habinek writes, 'a more traditional concept of virtue as achievement, grand and saving action, differentiates the few from the many'.[407] In other words, a place in Roman *memoria,* as discussed previously (**6.2.2**), will lead to eternity in Elysium.

In addition to Virgil's unique underworld geography and his Platonic attitudes towards the body and soul, other philosophical influences, moralising thoughts and suggestions of a faith-based belief system emerge from *Aeneid* VI. The confluence of philosophy in *Aeneid* VI comes to the forefront in Virgil's nuanced treatment of reincarnation in Elysium, which is a very tricky subject for the author. As with his treatment of bodies in Tartarus and souls in Elysium, Virgil's depiction of reincarnation appears to have been shaped by existing philosophical schools as well as contemporary politics. Reincarnation of the dead was an

[406] *has omnis* in this case is feminine as it refers to the *animae* in Elysium.
[407] Habinek, 1989, p. 234. Braund (1997) echoes this sentiment.

established idea before the composition of the *Aeneid,* and it has roots in other philosophical and religious traditions. Plato's *Phaedo* and Orphic eschatology both espouse the idea of Elysium as a waiting room for reincarnation, as do Pythagorism, Neo-Pythagorism and Stoicism.[408] Virgil is apparently aware of this, as Anchises' description of the cleansing of souls and rebirth aligns with principles of each of these philosophies.

Virgil's depiction of reincarnation in *Aeneid* VI is a delicate subject. He must represent it in such a way that it is true to the ideology of the epic while also showing favourably the ancestors of Augustus who await it. Anchises explains reincarnation to Aeneas in the context of his own descendants waiting for second bodies (VI.713ff), suggesting a waiting period of an uncertain length between death and reincarnation. Although Aeneas displays an ambivalent attitude towards it (VI.719-721), it is unclear whether Virgil's view of reincarnation is positive or negative. Virgil perhaps leaves this deliberately ambiguous in order that being reincarnated cannot be considered a slight on Roman ancestry, thus ensuring that he is not in any way denigrating Augustus by way of his ancestors, or the founders of Rome. However, both Aeneas and Anchises appear to express a negative view of reincarnation (VI.730-735). Within the influential philosophies identified in Virgil's underworld, reincarnation might seem a punishment. Despite this, it also appears that being reborn gave one another opportunity to make an imprint on Roman cultural memory, *memoria,* through service to the Roman state, therefore achieving Elysian permanence.[409]

As Virgil writes of Augustus' ancestors awaiting reincarnation, it would be a fairly insensitive (not to mention dangerous) manoeuvre on his part to imply that they were anything other than remarkable men, men of *pietas*.[410] Virgil must present Aeneas' and Augustus' ancestors as stellar individuals, but also lacking in something that would allow them to remain in Elysium permanently. This discussion of reincarnation invites us to ponder what differentiates *has omnis* (VI.748) who must return to their bodies from *pauci* (VI.744) who are granted permanence in Elysium, and that is of course *memoria,* or, *pietas* towards the Roman state. This suggestion of *memoria* as the necessary factor in one's Elysium citizenship allows Virgil to be complimentary towards Augustus' ancestors while also writing them to be reincarnated. These were exemplary men, this much is evident in

[408] Solmsen, 1968; Williams, 1990b.
[409] See **6.2.2** and **6.2.3** for the significance of *memoria* in relation to Elysium and reincarnation in *Aeneid* VI.
[410] Solmsen (1972, p. 38) shares this observation, writing that 'Virgil has the best of reasons for being discreet about the qualitative differences between souls. Since those about to begin a new life on Earth are to be the noble figures of Rome's history, any intimation that they are second-class souls would have been the height of tactlessness'.

that their names would have been recognisable to Virgil's readers. In this, it is implied that they will earn a place in *memoria* in their next lives through loyalty to the Roman state, and thus reside permanently in Elysium at their next deaths. It also means that Virgil can infer that Augustus will be guaranteed permanence in Elysium by virtue of his fame and his place in cultural memory, and of course, his service to the Roman state.

6.3. *Pietas* in *Aeneid* VI and the Overall Stoic Message

It becomes clear in *Aeneid* VI that Virgil is illuminating the philosophical and behavioural principles that he believes to be, or ought to be, characteristic of the Roman Empire under Augustus. These, of course, are Stoicism and *pietas*. Virgil's *Aeneid* represents an intervention in the epic genre by conveying a philosophically motivated instruction manual on how to be an ideal Roman citizen in this particular time period. This accounts for the poem's remarkable influence over the last two millennia. In the culmination of *Aeneid* VI, the Parade of Heroes (VI.756-886) and the prophetic speech of Anchises (VI.888-892), Virgil brings these two central tenets of Roman and Augustan values, Stoicism and *pietas*, to the forefront of the text. Anchises' words to Aeneas clarify to both his son and the reader which values and philosophical ideals will be valued in the Augustine regime. The Parade of Heroes favourably presents those who have lived in accordance with such values, linking these men to Aeneas, Augustus and all Roman men via a spiritual inheritance. In addition to Stoicism in *Aeneid* VI, the significance of *pietas* to Aeneas, to the narrative and to Rome becomes most evident. This central, Stoic, perhaps semi-divine, characteristic of Aeneas allows him to access the underworld and return from it safely.[411]

6.3.1. *Pietas* in *Aeneid* VI

Otis presents a structural reading of the poem in which *pietas* is the organising standard: 'six books depicting the inner struggle for *pietas*; six books depicting the triumph of *pietas* over the *impii*'.[412] At the end of this struggle for *pietas* against *impii*, Otis continues that 'the sixth book had thus to be the solution to a profound psychological problem: how to establish Aeneas in a firm and *independent pietas*'.[413] This problem is solved by Aeneas'

[411] Ross, 2007.
[412] Otis, 1963, p. 223. Pöschl (1962) echoes this sentiment. Bowra (1990) also notes these tests of *pietas* in *Aeneid* I-VI, and Williams (1990b) that *Aeneid* VI finally sees Aeneas conquer his inner *furor* with *pietas*. The scholarship of Otis (1963) has been exceedingly important in examining the significance of Aeneas' journey through the underworld in *Aeneid* VI.
[413] Otis, 1963, p. 306.

visit to Anchises. By seeing his father in the underworld, Aeneas shows the compatibility of filial *pietas* with *pietas* towards the Roman state and Stoic values. Aeneas would not have been able to traverse the underworld and eventually return to the realm of the living without *pietas,* or, as we see in Charon's reaction to the Golden Bough, being chosen by fate.[414] Anchises corroborates that *pietas* not only compelled Aeneas to visit the underworld, but also ensured his safe passage through and out of it (VI.687-688). *Aeneid* VI shows just how powerful *pietas* is, allowing Aeneas to bridge the gap between the human and the divine, even though he himself is half divine. Moreover, as Ross notes, Aeneas, by way of *pietas,* proves the impossible, 'that words can be exchanged between the living and the dead'.[415] Semantically, Virgil stresses *pietas* more in *Aeneid* VI than he does elsewhere in the epic, mentioning the word five times in relation to Aeneas or his ancestors, and three times applying the epithet *pius* to Aeneas.[416] By his frequent repetition of *pietas* and *pius,* Virgil stresses the importance of this virtue in *Aeneid* VI, and indeed, filial *pietas* guides Aeneas' journey through the underworld.[417]

The climax of *Aeneid* VI is Aeneas' meeting with Anchises, and through this meeting, Aeneas' *pietas* is made most clear. It also becomes clear by the word *Romane* (VI.851) that the poem and the future of the Roman state depends on *pius Aeneas* to act as a Stoic example of *pietas*. In reference to his aforementioned two-part epic structure, Otis argues that Aeneas' meeting with Anchises solidifies his *pietas* for the future'.[418] Of this meeting, Otis writes, 'Anchises unites two *pietates*: a normal human *pietas* toward the past (his own toward Troy and Aeneas, Aeneas' toward him) and an absolutely extraordinary *pietas* toward the future'.[419] This *pietas* towards the future is represented and characterised in the epic by Aeneas' Stoic allegiance to fate. Furthermore, Aeneas' exhibition of *pietas* in his meeting with Anchises, and the lessons he receives from his father, allows the concept of *pietas* to extend beyond *Aeneid* IV, and indeed beyond the *Aeneid* as a whole as the advice Anchises imparts (VI.756ff) is in fact as well addressed to Virgil's readers. Anchises words allow Aeneas to make sense of his fate to found Rome and his *pietas* towards the future Roman State. In this, Aeneas is able to reconcile his *pietas* towards Anchises with

[414] VI.135-148; VI.403-407. See **4.1.3**.
[415] Ross, 2007, p. 21.
[416] Virgil mentions *pietas* in VI.403, VI.405, VI.688, VI.769 and VI.878. Aeneas is *pius Aeneas* in VI.9, VI.176 and VI.232. Incidentally, all mentions of *pietas* come after *pius Aeneas* in *Aeneid* VI.
[417] As Heinze (1982, p. 351) writes, 'the new driving force—for Aeneas, which commands him to face even the terrors of the underworld, is his *pietas*, the wish to speak once more to his beloved father, who has been asking for him'.
[418] Otis, 1963, p. 308.
[419] Otis, 1963, p. 307.

his *pietas* towards Rome.[420] This is reflected in the epic itself, for after *Aeneid* VI, as Burke writes, 'Anchises appears no more; Aeneas himself now becomes the prototypical Roman *paterfamilias*, while Anchises becomes an Ancestor'.[421] After *Aeneid* VI, Aeneas emerges as a more complete Roman hero by virtue of his newly reinforced and enlightened *pietas,* although debate remains about how much he retains from his lessons in the underworld.

6.3.2. Stoicism in *Aeneid* VI

In traversing the underworld and fulfilling his filial duty to Anchises in *Aeneid* VI, Aeneas is given a moral education in modes of behaviour in accordance with *pietas,* which would also serve as a lesson for Virgil's readers as to what constitutes appropriate conduct in this new and stable Augustan age. Aeneas then becomes a vehicle for Virgil's ideological representation of Roman citizens in the Augustan regime. The emphasis on obligation and the importance of its fulfilment is present throughout the first half of the epic, as we see Aeneas almost blindly campaign towards the accomplishment of his divinely foretold foundation of the Roman state. He submits to fate at all costs, subverting his own personal feeling when necessary.[422] In *Aeneid* VI, Aeneas may glimpse the overall magnitude of his mission. Up to this point in the epic, Virgil showcases Aeneas' adherence to his duty towards his future *patria,* the site upon which Rome would rise, in his Stoic allegiance to fate by emphasizing moments where Aeneas has elevated this mission above his own personal feelings. Examples include his escape from Troy in *Aeneid* II and his departure from Carthage in *Aeneid* IV.[423] In *Aeneid* VI, Aeneas is able to see the future result of his perseverance and behaviour motivated by a Stoic *pietas*.

The evidence of Stoicism in *Aeneid* VI is most clearly brought to our attention through the speech of Anchises to Aeneas (VI.724-859).[424] However, more than a hundred years ago, Glover identified that this particular Stoicism has evolved from existing philosophical tradition.[425] More recently, echoing Glover, Habinek goes into more detail on how these opening lines of Anchises speech are a blend of Stoicism and other eschatology, writing that 'in the opening of Anchises' first speech, which proceeds to blend Stoic and Orphic cosmologies, Virgil has already alluded to the mixed nature of human beings – the ethereal

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[420] Otis, 1963.
[421] Burke, 1979, p. 227.
[422] See **2.3.1** for a discussion of emotions with respect to Stoicism and Aeneas.
[423] Bell, 2008. See **5.2**.
[424] As well as several references to the importance of fate such as that regarding the Golden Bough (VI.147).
[425] Glover (1912, p. 268) notes of VI.724-752 that 'the terminology of this passage is Stoic; the matter shows indebtedness to Plato and the Neo-Pythagoreans'.

fire of Stoic cosmology united with the Titanian ash of Orphic creation-myth—as well as to the correspondingly mixed nature of his own account'.[426] Respectively, Williams highlights that *spiritus intus*, *igneus vigor* are specifically Stoic aspects of Anchises' speech, and Braund asserts that 'Anchises' language is strongly redolent of Stoicism'.[427] The content of Anchises' speech, then, like the rest of the work, is predominantly but not exclusively Stoic, and rooted in a Stoicism that draws on pre-existing philosophical schools. Given that Platonism and Pythagoreanism provide a philosophical backdrop for Stoicism, it is perhaps impossible for Virgil to write this speech in an exclusively Stoic format should that have been his intention.

Virgil brings the Stoic qualities of Aeneas' *pietas* to the forefront in *Aeneid* VI as Stoic ideologies become more evident, particularly the reconciliation of fate and human obligation, which suggests a compatibilist framework.[428] Much as the *pietas* of Aeneas extends beyond *Aeneid* VI, Edwards notes that Aeneas' Stoic progression towards acceptance of his fate also becomes a part of the epic.[429] This view aligns the Roman hero with Williams' classification of him as a 'Stoic pilgrim on his journey through life'.[430] While *pietas* motivates Aeneas' journey from Troy to Latium, on closer examination, it reveals a Stoic adherence to fate above all else, even if Aeneas is not entirely sure what that fate is. In *Aeneid* VI, Aeneas comes to fully understand his own fate and its historical significance beyond his lifetime. As I have argued, Stoicism underlines the *pietas* of Aeneas, and all decisions the character makes are made in accordance with a complete surrender to his fate to complete his mission and settle in Latium, sometimes at the expense of his own wishes. This conflation of *pietas* with Stoicism confirms that the two are complementary to one another, and it is reasonable to suggest that Virgil is advocating that Stoicism is an appropriate philosophy to underline the behavioural ethos of *pietas* in Augustan Rome.

6.4. Conclusion

Aeneid VI expands on previous written accounts of the underworld and the afterlife, presenting an underworld that is geographically, philosophically and morally complex. By introducing the idea of punishment and reward in the afterlife that is dependent on life

[426] Habinek, 1989, p. 230.
[427] Williams, 1990b; Braund, 1997, p. 217.
[428] Stevens, 2007. See **2.2**.
[429] Edwards, 1960, p. 155.
[430] Williams, 1967, p. 35.

lived, Virgil is able to provide both a history lesson and a moral philosophical dialogue in Aeneas' journey through the underworld. It becomes clear in and following *Aeneid* VI that various philosophical influences are gently guiding the text in the direction of a new philosophy for Augustan Rome, Stoicism. Virgil has adapted Homer's allegorical Stoicism in order to craft a bespoke philosophy for the Augustan regime.[431] In this, Harrison writes that Virgil has turned Aeneas into 'a Stoic disciple learning to follow the will of destiny'.[432] Ultimately, in *Aeneid* VI, the underworld serves a didactic function in the dichotomous resting places of Elysium and Tartarus.

In these two regions in particular, Virgil informs his readers which behaviours will be rewarded in the afterlife and which will be condemned. In *Aeneid* VI, we see the culmination of Virgil's achievement in uniting social and political ideas of *pietas* with personal ones, contributing to the poem's ideological coherence and staying power. The impact of this is evident in the compulsion that later authors felt to respond to Virgilian *pietas* and rework it in their writing. Through his unique portrayal of the afterlife in *Aeneid* VI, Virgil's ideological principles appear to align with those that resonate with Christian schools of thought, as well as Stoic ones.[433] The extent of the engagement with the *Aeneid* shown by later authors is a testament to the poem's ideological appeal, captured, of course, in a distinctly Stoic *pietas*.

As with Aeneas' *pietas*, Virgil carefully cultivates his Stoic qualities so that they culminate in *Aeneid* VI. As a Stoic hero and a man of tremendous *pietas,* Aeneas is, as Hainsworth states, 'the incarnation of destiny and of Roman and epic values'.[434] Aeneas' *pietas* is evidenced and reinforced by his Stoic behaviour, and Stoic allegiance to fate governs his *pietas*. Virgil dramatises the relationship between the character Aeneas and the fate of the Roman state in such a way that a reader must accept the value of a Stoic outlook and temperament as it leads to the foundation of Rome. *Aeneid* VI is also the place where Virgil shows the importance of *pietas* to the Romans of his time period. As we observe throughout the *Aeneid, pietas* appears to confer no benefit on Aeneas while he is alive, only added responsibility. It brings him no tangible rewards, it compels him to leave a situation in which he appeared happy and content in Carthage and it demands that he risk his life on multiple occasions. This shows the immense sacrifices that may be required to

[431] Knauer, 1990.
[432] Harrison, 1990, p. 1.
[433] Fowler, 1990; Gransden and Harrison, 2010.
[434] Hainsworth, 1991, p. 104.

fully embody *pietas.* However, by showing his readers Tartarus and Elysium as places of punishment for *impia* and reward for *pietas*, Virgil introduces an element of faith that living in accordance with *pietas* will bring reward in the afterlife. In the Parade of Heroes (VI.756-859), Virgil exhibits *pietas* over a wide sweep of human history as it relates to the foundation of Rome, and he shows how everyday Romans can identify with the heroic founders of their city through *pietas*. The enigmatic combination of Stoic philosophy and faith in Aeneas' *pietas,* and in the epic as a whole, has made an invaluable contribution to the preservation and continued appeal of Virgil's *Aeneid,* which we will see in chapter **7**.

Chapter 7. Reception of Virgilian *Pietas* and its Christian Appeal

In this chapter, I will examine how contemporary and later authors' have engaged with Virgil's Stoic representation of *pietas* in the *Aeneid,* and I will discuss the tradition of reading the *Aeneid* as a moral allegory. I will begin by looking at responses to Virgilian *pietas* in the work of Augustan authors, Horace and Ovid, who offer a different perspective on and interpretation of the virtue. In Horace's *Odes* and Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, we can already identify a distortion of Virgilian ideas of *pietas,* demonstrating the malleable nature of the virtue. I will then dedicate a section to an analysis of Lucan's engagement with *pietas* in his Stoicly underlined epic, *De bello civili* (*BC*)*,* before addressing the treatment of Virgilian *pietas* in the writing of later Christian authors, Lactantius and Augustine. This section will show how Lactantius and Augustine have reinterpreted Virgilian *pietas* so that it fits with Christian ideals. In Lactantius' *Divine Institutes* (*Institutes*) and Augustine's *Civitas Dei*, we see that the shift from Virgilian *pietas* towards Christian piety is a move away from a politicised, ideological sense of public duty where values are practiced to a more internal one characterised by individual spirituality and ethical commitment. I will then address the history of reading the *Aeneid* as a moral allegory, looking at texts by Fulgentius and Bernardus Silvestris, before turning to those of Renaissance authors, Dante and Milton. This final section on the tradition of reading the *Aeneid* as a moral allegory will show how later authors have interpreted Virgil's epic in such ways as to make it appealing to their own audiences and eras. Looking at the works of these later authors, I aim to show that the continued ideological appeal and intrigue of the *Aeneid* lies in its Stoic representation of *pietas.*

This is a difficult task for a modern reader, as our interpretation of the *Aeneid* and the values systems within it cannot help but be influenced by the overarching presence of Christian tradition in contemporary Western education and academia.[435] While scholars have identified Christian elements and tendencies in the content of Virgil's *Aeneid*, due to the time period of its composition, Christianity cannot have influenced Virgil.[436] Rather, the *Aeneid* has influenced the development of Christian theological writing, which in turn has prejudiced the way we now read and interpret the *Aeneid,* in particular, the way later readers are likely to misinterpret Virgilian *pietas*. Braund suggests that the *Aeneid*'s Stoic quality is the reason the work has been appropriated by Christian authors, as 'so much

[435] Ogden, 1972; Feeney, 1988; and Dalferth, 2001.
[436] Scourfield (2007) goes into detail about how Virgil's works invite a Christian interpretation. I will discuss the practice of construing Virgil to be a Christian poet in **7.4** (see **7.4**, n. 594 for a list of scholars who have identified Virgil as a poet with Christian leanings).

Stoic ideology feeds into Christian thought'.[437] Dinter echoes this overlap between Christianity and Stoicism, writing that 'the consolations of Stoicism compare to what Christianity has to offer'.[438] Certainly, some aspects of the *Aeneid,* notably, the Stoic virtue of *pietas* and the qualities it represents, resonate with later Christian values.[439]

7.1. Augustan Responses to Virgilian *Pietas*: Horace and Ovid

Looking at how authors nearly contemporary to Virgil represented *pietas* in their respective works allows for another angle of understanding how Virgil's original readers may have interpreted the concept with respect to their own lives. Since the composition and distribution of the *Aeneid,* scholars and critics have identified references and allusions to the epic and its characterisation of *pietas* in many contemporary (and modern) literary works. This is a testament to the success and intrigue of the *Aeneid,* and its ability to withstand the cultural vicissitudes of the past two millennia. Looking at contemporary authors who had most likely read Virgil's *Aeneid* at its distribution, Horace and Ovid emerge as obvious prospects for an analysis of immediate responses to Virgilian *pietas.* I have selected Horace and Ovid over other authors such as Livy and Tacitus on the basis of Citroni's classification of Horace, Ovid and Virgil as the foremost poets of the Augustan regime.[440] In Horace's *Odes* and Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, we can see the influence of the *Aeneid* on Roman literature, culture and identity, and gain a vantage point into how Virgil's original readers may have interpreted *pietas* in the *Aeneid.*

7.1.1. Horace's *Odes*

Horace (65-8 B.C.) and Virgil lived and wrote in the same time period.[441] The two authors had a documented friendship, however, they differed in their political and philosophical outlooks, with Virgil being an earlier supporter of the Augustan regime than Horace.[442] Horace was also a known adherent to the Epicurean school, which, as I have detailed

[437] Braund, 1997, p. 206.
[438] Dinter, 2012, p. 118. Cullhed (2015) also addresses the overlap between Stoicism and Christianity.
[439] Highet, 1949; Eliot, 1953; Solmsen, 1972; Currie, 1975; Habinek, 1989; Fowler, 1990; Braund, 1997; Ferguson 1998 and 2003; Zagzebski, 2007; Gransden and Harrison, 2010; Cullhed, 2015.
[440] See Citroni, 2009, pp. 14-15.
[441] Strodach, 1936; Duckworth, 1956, Benario, 1960.
[442] Many have noted the friendship between Horace and Virgil: Strodach, 1936; Duckworth, 1956; Dyer, 1965; Moritz, 1969; Starr, 1969; Wagenvoort, 1980; Wallace-Hadrill, 1982; Rudd, 2004; Moles, 2007. Lowrie (2007, pp. 77-90) explores the relationship between Horace and Augustus in great detail, and Moles (2007) addresses the contrast between Virgil's Stoicism and Horace's Epicureanism.

earlier in this thesis (**2.1.2**), opposes Virgil's Stoic outlook in the *Aeneid*.[443] This difference in philosophical standpoint perhaps accounts for some of the differences in representations of *pietas* between the two authors. In his *Odes* (*Odes* I-III (23 B.C.), *Odes* IV (13 B.C.)), Horace engages with Virgil's version of the events leading to Rome's foundation, and his hero Aeneas, although the character Aeneas does not appear in until *Odes* IV, after the distribution of the *Aeneid* and the death of Virgil. To a lesser extent than Virgil, Horace engages with *pietas,* and he presents the virtue less favourably.[444]

Horace's treatment of *pietas* is different to that of Virgil in that it is not underlined by Stoicism, but rather, carries Epicurean connotations. While Virgil introduces *pietas* in *Aeneid* I.10, associating it with his hero and looking forward to the foundation of Rome and the Augustan regime, in which he and Horace currently live, Horace first references *pietas* as a quality of his own that pleases the gods (*Odes,* I.17.13-16). Compared to Virgil's twenty-two mentions of *pietas*, the word *pietas* appears only four times in Horace's *Odes,* one time in each book.[445] In *Odes* I, Horace applies *pietas* to himself describing his devotion to the gods (*Odes*, I.17.13-16). In *Odes* II, Horace laments that adhering to *pietas* will not offer any extension of life, and that all men will perish at their allotted point regardless of whether or not they have lived by the tenets of *pietas* (*Odes,* II.14.1-4). In *Odes* III, Horace uses *pietas* in reference to the devotion of Europa to her father, and how it is overtaken by madness, or *furor* (*Odes,* III.27.33-36). In *Odes* IV, Horace again states that *pietas* will do nothing to prolong a man's life (*Odes,* IV.7.13-27). As *Odes* IV was written after the *Aeneid,* it likely reflects Horace's understanding of Virgilian *pietas,* particularly as it applies to Aeneas. In *Odes* IV, Horace mentions *pater Aeneas* (*Odes,* IV.7.15), an invitation to consider Virgil's *Aeneid* and the *pietas* of Aeneas.

In *Odes* III (*Odes,* III.3.18-68), Juno narrates the events leading to Rome's foundation within the same historical time span as the *Aeneid*. She references her *gravis iras* (*Odes,* III.3.30-31), and it is clear in her tale that the goddess is feeling as angry and spiteful as in the *Aeneid.* She foretells the glory of Rome (*Odes,* III.3.37), and she cautions the Romans

[443] Fowler, 2009. Moles (2007, pp. 171-174) details Horace's engagement with Epicureanism in his *Odes* I-III. Moles (2007, p. 172) notes that while 'Stoicism is the dominant philosophical presence in few odes': I.22, I.29, III.2 and III.3, 'Epicureanism is the dominant presence in more than twice as many odes': I.9, I.11, I.31, I.38, II.3, II.11, II.16, III.1, III.8, III.29, and 'another important group juxtaposes Stoic and Epicurean': I.17, I.31, I.32, II.13, III.1, III.16, III.21.

[444] Wagenvoort (1980, p. 19) details this unfavourable treatment, writing that Horace 'disregards the official concept of *pietas*', indicating it once 'with tremendous irony'.

[445] See chapter **4**, n. 209 for uses of *pietas* in the *Aeneid. Pietas* appears in *Odes*: I.XVII.13-16, II.XIV.1-4, III.XXVII.33-36, IV.VII.13-27. These figures were gained from an electronically conducted search of each individual book.

against *nimium pii* (*Odes,* III.3.58), warning them not to consider rebuilding Troy. The delivery of this speech by Juno, and the content of it, is rather at odds with Virgil's account of events in the *Aeneid.* It could almost be considered an Epicurean challenge to Virgil's Stoic representation of Roman history. In the *Aeneid,* we see Juno tirelessly working against fate, attempting to block Aeneas from reaching and settling in Latium, which she is incapable of doing because fate cannot be altered in Virgil's Stoic universe.[446] In *Odes* III*,* however, we see Juno instead of Jupiter as a mouthpiece of fate as she reveals the destiny of the Romans (*Odes,* III.3.57-58). We also see that *fata* is not immutable, and that Juno is capable of altering it, as indeed she threatens to do (*Odes,* III.3.61-68). In these lines, Horace offers an alternative narrative of Rome's foundation with an Epicurean world view, one where fate is not fixed, and where the lineage of the Trojans is not assured. This perspective on the story of Rome's foundation suggests that we should also expect an Epicurean interpretation of *pietas* in the *Odes.*

Horace's treatment of *pietas* in the *Odes* suggests that he views the quality less favourably than Virgil. This is most evident in *Odes* II and IV. In *Odes* II, Horace writes of the inability of *pietas* to delay old age and death, and in *Odes* IV he writes that *pietas* cannot bring a man back from death or assure any comfort in an afterlife, although he does imply that there is an afterlife in his reference to Minos (*Minos fecerit arbitria* (*Odes,* IV.7.21-22)).[447] By including *pater Aeneas* in *Odes* IV (*Odes,* IV.7.15), he is inviting the reader to reflect on the futility of *pietas* for Virgil's hero. These instances in particular recall Lucretius' words about regrets in death in *DRN*.[448] Both passages in the *Odes* intimate that *pietas* is a futile virtue for an individual, and appear contrary to Virgil's message in *Aeneid* VI that *pietas* can assure an afterlife in Elysium.[449] Moreover, Dyer identifies that in his presentation of the deaths of Hippolytus and Pirithous in *Odes* IV, Horace shows the 'implicit arrogance of *pietas,* as seen from the more passive standpoint of Epicureanism'.[450] In these lines, Horace has capitalised on the ineffectiveness of the virtue

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[446] See **2.2.2**.

[447] abuntur anni nec pietas moram
rugis et instanti senectae
adferet indomitaeque morti (*Odes,* II.14.2-4)

cum semel occideris et de te splendida Minos
fecerit arbitria,
non, Torquate, genus, non te facundia, non te
restituet pietas; (*Odes,* IV.7.21-24).

[448] *DRN,* III.894ff, see **2.2.2** for further discussion of these lines with regard to Epicureanism and Virgil.

[449] See **6.2**.

[450] Dyer, 1965, p. 83. Dyer (1965, p, 83) writes of these two that 'once they are dead there is nothing more goddess or hero can do in return for *pietas.* In the examples Horace hints subtly at the arrogance of the two who were pious. Hyppolytus sinned in pride against Venus; Pirithuous aimed at a love above his portion'.

with regard to ensuring a longer and more comfortable life for the individual rather than its inherent benefits for wider society, as emphasised in Virgil's *Aeneid*.

In Horace's *Odes, furor* is able to overcome *pietas,* and *pietas* appears to bring no lasting benefit to whomever lives in accordance with the virtue. Quite the opposite is suggested in Virgil's *Aeneid,* where we see that *pietas* is able to subdue or be reconciled with *furor.*[451] In his representation of *pietas* as futile and susceptible to *furor,* Horace challenges the notion that *pietas* is a virtue worth aspiring to. While Horace focuses on the futility of the virtue for the individual, Virgil emphases its collective benefits for wider society. This also shows a clash between Epicurean and Stoic civic values. The *Odes* lacks a framework within which to see the individual as part of a larger community, which we find in Virgil's *Aeneid* as we see Aeneas' *pietas* as a Stoic, community-oriented, value, one that revolves around his fated mission and his service to the future Roman state. While Horace appears to argue that *pietas* provides no tangible benefits to the individual, Virgil shows us the societal benefit of *pietas,* which translate to individual benefits by virtue of living in that society where individuals adhere to the value system of *pietas.* In the *Aeneid,* we see these benefits in the civic stability that the epic looks forward to, the Augustan regime, a society that values *pietas* as a form of collective obligation to the state.

Fate-orientated ideologies do not align with an Epicurean worldview, and this is reflected in Horace's treatment of *pietas,* which shows an Epicurean reception of what is a Stoic infused and ideologically loaded concept in the *Aeneid*. Horace's negative and polluted interpretation of *pietas* appears to mock Virgil's elevation of the virtue. In this, the *Odes* encourages the reader to question the merit of unflinching adherence to *pietas*. Another thing missing from Horace's *Odes* is the suggestion that *pietas* will bring about reward in the afterlife, as Horace does not specify what will happen in death beyond the judgement of Minos (*Odes,* IV.7.21-24). Virgil infers that *pietas* is the highest virtue that a man may aspire to for its collective value, and that the individual benefits of it will be reaped in the afterlife. Horace directly refutes this idea by insisting on the overall futility of the virtue for the individual. Horace's Epicurean interpretation of *pietas* challenges Virgil's Stoic one. Overall, Horace questions the value of the virtue for the individual Roman, and he reveals the lack of incentive for the everyday Roman to adhere to its tenets.

[451] This is evident in Virgil's simile of the good statesman in *Aeneid* I (I.148-152), who employs *pietas* to subdue *furor* (see **2.2.2**). Scholars have contended that Aeneas' last act of killing Turnus is one of *pietas,* although Aeneas commits it in a state of *furor,* indicating that the two may present simultaneously (see **5.4**).

7.1.2. Ovid's *Metamorphoses*

Unlike Virgil and Horace, Ovid was born into the early period of the Augustan regime, and would have had little to no recollection of anything other than Augustan rule and the relative peace and stability that accompanied it.[452] Scholars have identified the stability of his circumstances in his writing, as Citroni notes, 'all his poetry before going into exile [in 8 A.D.] expresses a serene satisfaction with Augustan Rome'.[453] In his work, Ovid neither endorses nor rejects the Augustan regime, and the ambiguity is apparently deliberate.[454] By virtue of the time period in which he wrote, as Tarrant observes, Ovid was the first poet of the Augustan age 'for whom the poetic career of Virgil is a given rather than a gradual discovery'.[455] Despite the prominence of Virgil's *Aeneid* at the time of Ovid's writing, Ovid does not wish to show the same regard for Virgil's work as that of other poets, including Horace. For example, in his *Tristia* (I-IV, 9-12 B.C.), Ovid names poets who had a particular effect on him, among them Macer, Propertius, Ponticus, Bassus and Horace (*Tr.,* IV.10.41-54). Of Virgil, Ovid claims *Vergilium vidi tantum* (*Tr*., IV.10.51), suggesting that Ovid wished his readers to think that Virgil's work made a lesser impression on him. However, given Ovid's engagement with Virgil's work, it is obvious that Virgil had an impact on him. In his *Metamorphoses,* Ovid clearly engages with Virgil's representation of *pietas* in the *Aeneid,* distorting the meaning of the virtue from its original implications in Virgil's epic.[456]

Ovid's *Metamorphoses* was completed in 8 A. D., and many of his previous compositions were works of elegy.[457] In the *Metamorphoses* we find many analogous qualities to the *Aeneid,* and *Metamorphoses* XII-XV are quite obviously modelled after Virgil's foundation narrative. Both the *Aeneid* and the *Metamorphoses* begin in chaos, and are composed in dactylic hexameter.[458] The themes of the *Aeneid* and the *Metamorphoses* vary considerably, and this is evident from the first lines of each poem. The first line of the

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[452] Knox (2009) dates Ovid's life as from 43 B.C. to the winter of 17-18 A.D.
[453] Citroni, 2009, p. 15. Knox (2009) notes that Ovid's apparent sense of contentment and security within the Augustan regime is reflected in his overall focus on affairs of the heart and of character rather than those of the state. However, for a more problematising analysis of Ovid's writing, see Barchiesi (1997).
[454] See Barchiesi, 1997. Otis (1970), Holleman (1971) and Wallace-Hadrille (1982) discuss the difficulty of assigning an Augustan agenda to Ovid.
[455] Tarrant, 1997, p. 61.
[456] There are also a number of passages in Ovid's *Fasti* in which the author engages with Virgil, however, for the purpose of this thesis I have decided to focus on Ovid's *Metamorphoses* because of the generic similarity and analogous subject matter.
[457] Citroni, 2009; Knox, 2009.
[458] Farrell (2009) notes that Ovid was predominantly a self-proclaimed elegist, and that the *Metamorphoses* is the only work of his surviving ten titles in hexameter. The vast majority of his work is composed in elegiac couplets.

Aeneid, arma virumque cano (I.1), indicates a story of war with a singular hero. The opening of the *Metamorphoses*, *in nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas / corpora* (*Met.,* I.1-2), introduces a story of change as opposed to a narrative of war. As Otis writes, in the *Metamorphoses,* Ovid embraces the same task as Virgil of connecting 'the Fall of Troy with the founding of Rome, [and] Aeneas with Romulus and Caesar'.[459] Although he might wish to shake the influence of Virgil, and declares himself free from it, it is easy for an educated reader to see that there are strong resonances of Virgil's work in Ovid's. Ovid's engagement with the *Aeneid* in the *Metamorphoses* is a complex and large topic, and for the purpose of this thesis, I will only be discussing that engagement with respect to Ovid's treatment of Virgilian *pietas.*[460] Ovid's *Metamorphoses* offers an alternative view of how Virgil's readers may have interpreted *pietas* and *pius Aeneas,* one that seems to align with Horace's comparatively negative and cynical representation of the virtue in his *Odes*.

In the *Metamorphoses,* Ovid uses the word *pietas* twenty three times, once more than Virgil in the *Aeneid.*[461] Although *pietas* appears once more in the *Metamorphoses,* when the lengths of each poem are taken into consideration, the overall frequency is less. Given the prominence of *pietas* in Virgil's *Aeneid,* and the extent of Ovid's engagement with the work, it is possible that Ovid deliberately incorporates *pietas* into the *Metamorphoses* one more time than Virgil in order to impose his version of *pietas* over that of his predecessor while also devaluing it by including it statistically less in terms of the overall word count. At many times in the *Metamorphoses,* Ovid appears to belittle the virtue of *pietas,* or at the very least to subvert the gravitas that Virgil assigned to it, and offer alternative interpretations and connotations. It is also clear from the way he employs *pietas* that Ovid is relying on a reader's understanding of Virgilian *pietas,* and a familiarity with the many connotations of the word as Virgil presented it in the *Aeneid*. Looking at Ovid's *Metamorphoses* as a reaction to *pietas* in Virgil's *Aeneid,* I will focus on moments where the divergence of *pietas* between the two works is particularly striking.

Both Ovid and Virgil introduce *pietas* very early in their respective works. Virgil's first mention of *pietas* following the proem occurs in *Aeneid* I.151 and Ovid's in *Metamorphoses* I.149, only two lines earlier in the poem. I do not believe this placement is

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[459] Otis, 1970, p. 280.
[460] Thomas (2009) details various aspects of Ovid's engagement with Virgil's Aeneas legend.
[461] The word *pietas* appears in the *Metamorphoses* at: I.149, I.204, VI.503, VI.629, VI.635, VII.72, VII.169, VII.336, VIII.508, IX.383, IX.460, IX.679, X.321, X.324, X.333, X.366, XII.29, XIII.663, XIV.109, XIV.443, XV.109, XV.173, XV.549. These figures were gained from an electronically conducted search of each individual book. See **4**, n. 209 for Virgil's use of *pietas* in the *Aeneid.*

insignificant, and is representative of Ovid wanting the primary word in establishing *pietas* in his epic. The initial connotations of *pietas* in the *Aeneid* and the *Metamorphoses* are also markedly different. Virgil presents *pietas* as a force that can calm storms and bring order to chaos, as in the opening simile of the *Aeneid*.[462] In this, Virgil implies that *pietas* is a civilising concept, and that a man of such *pietas* as the statesman of the simile will be able to deploy *pietas* to conquer chaos. It appears at first that this man is Aeneas, but ultimately, it is Augustus. This early example of *pietas* in the *Aeneid* assures Virgil's readers that the story will have a satisfactory conclusion, which they are living under in the regime of that statesman, Augustus, even if the path to that end is beset with obstacles.

Ovid introduces *pietas* very differently in his description of the Iron Age. The Iron Age is the fourth and last Age in Ovid's chronology of mankind, following the Golden Age (*Met.,* I.89-112), the Silver Age (*Met.,* I.113-124) and the Bronze Age (*Met.,* I.125-127). These four Ages can also be found in Hesiod's *Works and Days,* and their inclusion suggests that Ovid is striving for something that is cosmologically greater in his *Metamorphoses* than Virgil in his *Aeneid,* while also highlighting the oddly narrow confines of the Virgilian universe within the Homeric paradigm of gods and man with an element of satire.[463] By recalling and expanding on Hesiod, Ovid emphasises the grandeur of his work compared to Virgil's, perhaps with the intention of humour. Ovid describes his Iron Age in terms of the absence of *pudor* and *fides* (*Met.,* I.129) and the prevalence of *fraudesque dolusque / insidiaeque et vis et amor sceleratus* (*Met.,* I.130-131). Here, Ovid introduces the concept of *pietas* into the *Metamorphoses*:

> vivitur ex rapto: non hospes ab hospite tutus,
> non socer a genero, fratrum quoque gratia rara est;
> inminet exitio vir coniugis, illa mariti,
> lurida terribiles miscent aconita novercae,
> filius ante diem patrios inquirit in annos:
> victa iacet pietas, et virgo caede madentis
> ultima caelestum terras Astraea reliquit (*Met.,* I.144-150).

These aspects of the Iron Age directly correlate to those of Hesiod's Iron Age (*W & D.,* 182-194). In these lines of the *Metamorphoses*, the absence of *pietas* is characterised by the disintegration of aspects inherent in Virgilian *pietas,* such as the breakdown of duty between sons and fathers and the collapse of the relationship between brothers and spouses. At this point in Ovid's chronology of world history, *pietas* does not exist.

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[462] I.148-152. I have discussed this simile in greater detail in **2.2.2.**

[463] Hesiod details the four races of men in *Works and Days* 109-201. Present in Hesiod but absent from Ovid's *Metamorphoses* is the Age of Heroes.

In asking the reader to imagine such a chaotic and dire world without *pietas,* Ovid relies on an understanding among readers of what *pietas* is. The passage also assumes that readers would have a favourable interpretation of *pietas* and its role in sustaining civic stability and the positive effect that it has on their lives, as an era without it is intended to appear negative. The Iron Age is not just a period where *pietas* does not exist*,* it is a period where *pietas* has been defeated. Thus, Ovid is perhaps indicating the fragile appeal of the virtue in comparison to temptations of greed, gold and weapons. While Virgil depicts *pietas* as a virtue that overcomes such enticements through a Stoic mastery of personal desires, Ovid shows how easily individual selfishness and greed may overcome a collectively oriented Virgilian Stoic *pietas*. This notion of *pietas* as a quality that can be defeated continues throughout the *Metamorphoses,* and shows a marked contrast to Virgil's *Aeneid,* where the *pietas* of Aeneas is a central facet of his character that remains unshaken regardless of temptation or difficulty in maintaining it.

The *Metamorphoses* shows an understanding of *pietas* as representative of duty to gods, state, parents and fellow man, similar to the *Aeneid*. Much as Virgil uses *pietas* in relation to family, Ovid also uses *pietas* and *pius* in conjunction with characters to describe the duty of children to parents: Philomela (*Met.,* VI.503), Peleus' daughters (*Met.,* VII.335-338) and Aeneas (*Met.,* XIII.626-628). Ovid also includes the dimension of *pietas* due from parents to children: Cadmus (*Met.,* III.4-5), Aeëtes (*Met.,* V.152-253), Procne (*Met.,* VI.629-630), Althea (*Met.,* VIII.506-508), Anius (*Met,*. XIII.663-664) and Ligdus (*Met.,* IX.679). In Ovid's representations of *pietas* to family, we see him broaden the idea of familial *pietas* in two significant ways. The first is by including women within the idea of family, both as objects of *pietas* and as individuals who must display it. The second is by writing more often of the obligations of parents towards their children under *pietas* than those of children to parents.

In the *Aeneid*, *pietas* is a distinctly masculine virtue, appearing exclusively in conjunction with male characters. This is not the case in the *Metamorphoses,* where Ovid associates *pietas* with female characters on eleven occasions. In *Metamorphoses* VI, Philomela's father Pandion reminds her of her *pietas* to him and to her family (*Met.,* VI.503). Philomela's sister Procne mentions her affection and duty to her son, Itys (*Met*., VI.629-630), and the deplorable aspects of *pietas* for a wife to her own husband Tereus (*Met.,* VI.635). In *Metamorphoses* VII, Medea tells the daughters of Peleus:

> si pietas ulla est nec spes agitates inanis,
> officium praestate patri telisque senectam

exigite, et saniem coniecto emittite ferro (*Met.,* VII.336-338).

Medea, of course, is lying, and these women unwittingly cause the death of their own father at her malicious bidding. In this scene, Ovid showcases how *pietas* may be manipulated to achieve nefarious purposes. In *Metamorphoses* VIII, *pietas* moves Althea not to murder her child, although she begs for the strength to do so (*Met.,* VIII.506-508). Ovid stresses *pietas* leading up to Althea's plea, writing of her resolve that *inpietate pia est* (*Met.,* VIII.477), and she asks herself *ubi sunt pia iura parentum* (Met., VIII.499). In this, it is clear that *pietas* can signify maternal love and duty of parent to child, and Ovid raises the possibility of an overlap between *pietas* and its antithesis, *impietas*. In *Metamorphoses* IX, Dryope makes a plea to her husband and father to protect her as a tree on the basis of her *pietas* (*Met.,* IX.383-384). Myrrha describes struggling with her own *pietas* and filial duty with regard with her incestuous love for her father, Cinyras (*Met.,* X.321-326).[464] Lastly, *pietas* compels Phoebus's sister to turn the grieving Egeria into a series of rivers (*Met.,* XV.549-551). In these representations, Ovid shows how *pietas* functions in complicated family dynamics, so much so that this would appear to be a pattern for Ovid. Moreover, he relates the filial love and devotion inherent in Virgilian *pietas* to less than savoury things such as murder and incest. In this, Ovid shows how *pietas* can be overcome and distorted for the purpose of *scelera.*

Contrary to the *Aeneid,* where *pietas* is represented as a stabilising and insurmountable virtue with even perhaps semi-divine connotations, Ovid suggests that *pietas* is a virtue that can be somewhat easily overcome by temptation and vice. In *Metamorphoses* I*,* Ovid writes that a desire for wealth has supplanted *pietas* in the Iron Age (*Met.,* I.140). In *Metamorphoses* XIII, fear has overcome *pietas*: *victa metu pietas* (*Met.,* XIII.663). In *Metamorphoses* I, Ovid refers to a wider societal problem of the appeal of wealth over *pietas*, but in *Metamorphoses* XIII he is talking about a specific instance of Anius giving up his daughters to Agamemnon. In this case, Anius' fear overcame his duty or his *pietas* towards his daughters. Conversely, in the *Aeneid*, although in different circumstances, Aeneas' Stoic *pietas* allows him to overcome fear, as he trusts entirely in his fate. In the *Metamorphoses,* fear causes characters to set aside or ignore *pietas*. In this way, Ovid is perhaps making a comment on the flimsiness of this principal virtue of the Augustan regime that features so heavily in Virgil's *Aeneid*. The Stoic elements of submission to fate and suppression of emotion also do not underline Ovid's *pietas* as they do Virgil's, which may contribute to the virtue's fragility in the *Metamorphoses*.

[464] Ovid uses *pietas* twice more in this context between Myrrha and Cinyras (*Met.,* X.333, X.366).

Unlike Virgil, who uses the word *pius* almost exclusively as an epithet for Aeneas, Ovid employs this word quite liberally and not always as an epithet.[465] Ovid uses *pius* in conjunction with several characters, and never of the same one twice, thus cheapening Virgil's unique epithet. The only time Ovid uses *pius* as an epithet, it for Anchises (*Met.,* XIII.640), suggesting perhaps that for Ovid it ought to belong to him as opposed to Aeneas. Ovid uses the word *pius* significantly less than Virgil, albeit far more generously. In his eight uses of *pius,* Ovid applies it to eight different characters, and one bird: Cadmus (*Met.,* III.4), Aeëtes (*Met.,* V.152), Tereus (*Met.,* VI.474), Aeneas (*Met.,* XIII.626), Anchises (*Met.,* XIII.640), Alcmaeon (*Met.,* IX.408), Cinyras (*Met.,* X.354) and a phoenix bird (*Met.,* XV.406). The association of *pius* with so many different characters, as well as an animal, denigrates the significance of the epithet for Virgil's Aeneas. While Aeneas' epithet *pius* reinforces his superiority with respect to *pietas,* Ovid, it seems, mocks this in his liberal application of *pius* to those who by their actions are decidedly not *pius* and do not behave in accordance with *pietas*. Furthermore, in the case of Cadmus, Tereus and Alcmaeon, *pius* and *scelera* are used together, and the actions of the characters are seen as both *pius* and *scelera*. The combination of these two words suggests that men who are *pius* are not infallible, and are also capable of malfeasances, sometimes in the name of *pietas*. Thus, Ovid challenges the idea that *pietas,* which of course suggests Virgilian *pietas* and the men who embody it*,* is infallible or beyond reproach.

Additionally, in several places throughout the *Metamorphoses* (twenty one times overall)*,* Ovid uses the feminine *pia* to denote piety or devotion.[466] This challenges the masculine nature of Virgilian *pietas.* Particularly interesting is where we see this in close proximity to the word *inpia,* and used as a justification for acts of *inpia.* For example, in the cases of Peleus' daughters, the more love each has for her father, the quicker she is moved to murder him: *ut quaeque pia est, hortatibus inpia prima est* (*Met.,* VII.339). In his liberal usage of *pia,* and its association with *impia* or *scelera,* Ovid is not only challenging the notion of *pietas* as an inherently masculine quality, but also contending with the idea of *pietas* as a universally good quality, or one that is entirely separate from its antithesis. He is suggesting that acts of *pietas* can also be acts of *impietas* from another perspective*,* and that *pietas* can be used to justify acts of *impietas,* as we have seen earlier with Althea and Medea.

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[465] See **4.1.2** for a discussion of the significance of Aeneas' epithet *pius* in the *Aeneid.*
[466] *Met.,* I.221, I.392, IV.551, VI.161, VI.496, VII.339, VII.482, VIII.477, VIII.499, VIII.520, VIII.631, VIII.767, IX.711, X.366, X.431, XI.420, XI.577, XIII.301, XIII.621, XIV.814. These figures were gained from an electronically conducted search of each individual book.

In the *Metamorphoses,* Ovid engages with Virgilian *pietas* in a way that is both playful and distorting. Ovid warps Virgilian *pietas,* cheapening it, weakening it and rendering it problematic. One clear example of this, as Prince notes, is his redefinition of *pietas* to also include revenge.[467] Ovid encourages the reader to question the overall morality of the virtue by showing how *pietas* can be easily manipulated and overcome, in contrast to Virgil's Stoic and steadfast portrayal of it within Aeneas. In his use of *pia* and *pietas* in the *Metamorphoses,* Ovid shows how easily *pietas* can become interchangeable with acts of *impia* or *scelera,* which have drastic and negative consequences for the individual. This challenges the Virgilian image of *pietas* as a Stoic and civically oriented virtue. Ovid's distortion of Virgilian notions of *pietas* in his *Metamorphoses* sets a precedent for further manipulation of the virtue in later authors, particularly Christian authors, which I will come to shortly.

7.2. Lucan's *De Bello Civili*

Lucan's *BC,* or, *Pharsalia,* represents an interesting intervention in the development and evolution of *pietas,* falling decidedly after Virgil's *Aeneid*, but before its adaptation by early Christian authors. I have chosen to look at Lucan's *BC* because of the Stoic content of the poem and Lucan's engagement with the *Aeneid* and Virgilian *pietas.*[468] While *BC* offers many opportunities for analysis regarding its reception of and response to Virgil's *Aeneid,* I will only be looking at the relationship between the two works with respect to *pietas* and Stoicism.[469] I aim to show how Lucan's Stoic outlook and his treatment of *pietas* have perhaps provided a foundation for further Christian manipulations of Virgilian *pietas* towards what we now understand as Christian piety. I will discuss how Lucan's associations of *pietas,* particularly with *vera* and *fides,* begin to lead the term closer to ideas of Christian piety.

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[467] Prince, 2010. However, scholars such as George (1991) have attributed *pietas* to Augustus for his acts of revenge (see **3.2.1**).

[468] Many scholars have attested to the Stoic quality of Lucan's *BC*, including Lapidge (1979), Bramble (1982), Williams (1990), George (1991), Quint (1993), Gorman (2001), Schildgen (2001), Behr (2007) and Long (2007). Gorman (2001) addresses the counterargument that Lucan was not supportive of the Stoic philosophy, and Ahl (1976, pp. 56-57) advocates an unpresumptuous and nuanced approach for analysing *BC* as a Stoic text.

[469] Bramble (1982) offers a rich analysis of the work, its language, historic importance and engagement with Ennius, Homer and Virgil. Martindale (1993, pp. 48-52) discusses Lucan's reception of Virgil. Behr's (2007, pp. 113-161) Chapter 4, 'Addressing the Emotions: Lucan's Narrator and the Character Cato in the *Bellum Civile',* in *Feeling History: Lucan, Stoicism, and the Poetics of Passion,* offers a comprehensive analysis of Stoicism and engagement with Virgilian philosophical models in *BC*, particularly regarding Lucan's Cato as a Stoic character. George (1991) and Long (2007) also evaluate Lucan's Cato as a Stoic character.

Begun after the distribution of the *Aeneid,* the *Odes* and the *Metamorphoses,* but before the works of Lactantius and Augustine, Lucan's (39 A.D. – 65 A.D.) Stoic epic offers an interesting case study in the development of *pietas* from its representation in the *Aeneid* and in later Augustan poetry. As Horace's Epicurean and pessimistic interpretation of Virgilian *pietas* and Ovid's playful and derogatory treatment of the virtue show different outlooks on Virgilian *pietas*, so *BC* promotes alternative connotations. Commenced in c.61 A.D. and distributed in ten books at the author's death in 65 A.D. (although it is assumed to be incomplete due to the author's suicide in suspicious circumstances related to the Pisonian conspiracy in 65 A. D.), *BC* engages with Virgil's version of events leading to the foundation of Rome, at times drawing on Ovid's *Metamorphoses* to further subvert and challenge the story of the *Aeneid.*[470]

The Stoic message of *BC* manifests in a way that resonates with Virgil's Stoic outlook in the *Aeneid,* for example, in Lucan's continued reinforcement of the overarching responsibility of fate for all things, *Fatum* or *Fortuna* as Lucan uses the terms interchangeably.[471] Lucan makes it clear from the outset of *BC* that fate is responsible for the civil war, and he represents fate unequivocally as a chain of causes (*Fert animus…Roma ferens* (*BC,* I.67-72)). This worldview is reinforced when the Stoic Cato tells Brutus *Sed quo fata trahunt virtus secura sequitur* (*BC*, II.287). However, Cato, who 'exemplified the ideal *pietas* in the devotion of his marital union to the state and of the Roman leaders', is eventually felled by *furor,* showing the comparative weakness of *pietas.*[472] We also see *pietas* associated with fate on a number of occasions, perhaps suggesting that Lucan wishes the reader to consider a connection between the two.[473]

In addition to his Stoic portrayal of fate, Lucan's testimonial to Stoic principles is evident in his treatment of emotions, for example, in the narrator's advice to Pompey in *BC* VII, *Crede deis…luctusque remitte* (*BC,* VII.705-707). This advice aligns with the Stoic ideal of subverting emotion in favour of duty.[474] These selected examples illustrate Lucan's Stoic view of the overarching and inevitable nature of fate and the importance of subjugating emotions, both prominent Stoic characteristics of Virgil's *Aeneid* and his hero

[470] Ahl, 1976; Bramble, 1982; George, 1991; Dinter, 2012; Williams, 2017. Williams (2017) also notes the influence of Ennius on Lucan's *BC.* George (1991) discusses the Pisonian conspiracy and Lucan's death.
[471] Lapidge (1979, p. 345) discusses this in greater detail, tracing the origins of Lucan's Stoic treatment of *Fata* and *Fortuna*. Of this, Quint (1993, p. 93) writes that 'in Stoic vocabulary, Fate and Fortune are notoriously hard to tell apart: Lucan will deliberately confuse the two, in no small part in reaction to Virgilian usage'.
[472] Thompson, 1984, p. 214.
[473] With *fata*: *BC,* VIII.77, VIII.573; with *fortuna*: *BC,* IV.499; with *sors*: *BC,* III.317, IV.565.
[474] See **2.3**.

Aeneas.[475] Lucan's Stoic outlook in *BC* has also invited Christian interpretations of the work. Dinter, for example, attributes the Christianisation of Lucan to his 'Stoic morality', which shows traces of early Christian qualities such as asceticism and martyrdom, which later Christian authors have identified as worthy of explanation and elucidation.[476]

In *BC, pietas* appears twenty two times, the same amount as in Virgil's *Aeneid.*[477] Despite this, the virtue features in far less important circumstances in *BC* than it does in the *Aeneid,* and it appears under markedly different conditions. Virgil reinforces the significance of *pietas* through Aeneas' epithet *pius,* a word conspicuously missing from Lucan's *BC.*[478] Like Horace in the *Odes* and Ovid in the *Metamorphoses*, throughout *BC,* Lucan shows *pietas* as a quality that can be easily destabilised, manipulated and overcome.[479] The only characters in *BC* to whom Lucan applies *pietas* are Cornelia, the second wife of Pompey, and the young Magnus Pompey. Cornelia is characterised by *pietas* for her spousal devotion to Pompey (*BC,* VIII.77), and for this she is called *Exemplum pietas* (*BC,* IX.180). The young Magnus Pompey is also described as possessing *pietas* in his love for his father (IX.147). In both characters, Lucan appears to undermine Virgilian *pietas.* Cornelia, a woman, is the *Exemplum pietas* for Lucan, and she is called such for her *amor,* a trait which we have seen in the *Aeneid* appears irreconcilable with Virgilian *pietas.*[480] The young Magnus is moved to anger, *furur,* by *pietas* (*iustaque furens pietate profatur* (IX.147)), showing that *furor* is more powerful than *pietas.*

While Lucan employs the traditional connotations of *pietas,* such as duty towards parents, the gods and fellow man, like Ovid, he also offers several examples of *pietas* as a virtue

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[475] See **2.3**, particularly **2.3.1**.

[476] Dinter, 2012, p. 116. Dinter (2012, p. 114ff) credits the work of Seckendorf (1695) with respect to Christianising Lucan.

[477] Lucan writes the word *pietas* in *BC*: I.353, II.63, III.317, IV.499, IV.565, V.297, VI.155, VI.495, VI.508, VII.320, VII.468, VIII.77, VIII.127, VIII.573, VIII.718, VIII.785, IX.147, IX.180, IX.1056, X.196, X.363, X.407. These figures were gained from an electronically conducted search of each individual book. See **4**, n. 209 for Virgil's uses of *pietas* in the *Aeneid.*

[478] The word *pius* appears only once in *BC* (*BC,* VIII.494), as a quality akin to *virtus,* which is incompatible with power:

> Exeat aula,
> Qui volt esse pius. Virtus et summa potestas
> Non coeunt (*BC,* VIII.493-495).

This does not carry the same connotations as Virgil's use of *pius.* See **4.1.2** n. 229 for Virgil's uses of the epithet *pius* for Aeneas in the *Aeneid*.

[479] As Ahl (1976, p. 149) writes, In *BC* we see that '*pietas,* the virtue which keeps the individual and the city under control, breaks down in civil war'. Heyke (1970, p. 138) also notes that *pietas* is responsible for the downfall of the Massilians.

[480] See **5.3**.

that can be manipulated and distorted for wicked purposes.[481] The first mention of *pietas* in *BC* recalls Virgilian connotations of the virtue as duty to one's country, specifically Aeneas' devotion to the future Roman state, as Caesar attempts to rouse his troops to civil war by appealing to *pietas patriique penates* (*BC,* I.353). This is quickly subverted, as we find out *sed diro ferri revocantur amore / Ductorisque metu* (*BC,* I.354-356), and it is the only time that Lucan discusses *pietas* in conjunction with a *patria.*[482] Here, we see a different kind of *pietas,* which Lucan names as *militiae pietas* (*BC,* IV.499). This is reinforced later by Scaeva as he successfully attempts to motivate his troops, recognising the power of *ira* over *pietas* and, as Behr notes, 'assigning a positive value to an irrational instinct' (*Non ira saltem, iuvenes, pietate remota / Stabitis?* (*BC,* VI.155-156)).[483]

In a clear echo of Virgil, Lucan employs the phrase *pietatis imago* (*BC,* VII.320). Caesar urges his troops not to be persuaded to mercy by images of *pietas*, encouraging relentless slaughter and equating family and foe in civil war (*BC,* VII.318-325). We encounter this expression twice in the *Aeneid* (IX.294, X.824). Virgil describes Euryalus as *pietatis imago* in his request that the Trojans look after his mother in his death (IX.294).[484] This image of Euraylus moves the Trojans, and Ascanius commits to honour Euryalus' plea (IX.292ff), the opposite of what Caesar is asking of his men in *BC*. Virgil's next usage is, of course, when Aeneas recognises his own *pietatis imago* in Lausus before he kills him (X.824).[485] Aeneas sees a reflection of his own *pietas* in Lausus, and it gives him pause. Caesar, on the other hand, does not appear to consider his troops to be men of *pietas,* and the *pietatis imago* he urges them to ignore is not a reflection, but rather an obstacle in an enemy that can and must be overcome. This suggests that, for Lucan, defeating *pietas* is an essential part of Roman history.

In *BC,* the character Pompey poses a clear and interesting foil and analogue to Virgil's Aeneas with respect to *pietas*.[486] In Pompey, Lucan perhaps gives his readers a case study

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[481] In *BC, pietas* signifies: loyalty in a father-son relationship: *BC,* IV.565, VII.468, IX.147; duty towards the gods: *BC,* III.317, VI.495, X.196; obedience to a leader: *BC,* VI.155, VIII.127, X.407; duty to fellow man and ritual for the dead: *BC,* VIII.718, VIII.785. We see *pietas* overcome, distorted or manipulated in *BC*, I.353, II.63, V.297, VI.156, VI.508, X.407 and X.1056.

[482] He does, however, echo the sentiment of *pietas* as a patriotic virtue (*BC,* II.63).

[483] Behr, 2007, p. 46. Behr (2007, p. 46) writes of these lines that 'For Scaeva, *pietas* is devotion to his generals, not to his *pater* or his *patria.* This feeling has become his motivating force, triggering brutality and blind desire for massacres. In the name of *pietas* Scaeva accuses those who want to abandon the battlefield'. Ahl (1976, p. 201) also discusses this incident.

[484] See **4.2.1.**

[485] See **4.2.2.**

[486] Heyke (1970, pp. 99-119) devotes a chapter to the *pietas* of Pompey, writing 'daß *pietas* für die Gestalt des Pompeius seine zentrale Bedeutung hat. Seine *pietas* ist es, die ihm eine moralische Legitimation gegenüber Caesar, dem *impius*, verleiht' (p. 99).

in the failure of Virgilian *pietas* in relation to *amor.* In Pompey, we see a mix of *pietas, virtus, furor* and *amor*, and Pompey's journey presents as a reflection of Aeneas'.[487] Both men begin with defeat in battle. The Trojans follow Aeneas, guided by his *pietas* and his Stoic allegiance to fate, towards the future Roman State, while Pompey eventually leads his men to defeat by allowing himself to be guided by *furor* and *amor* instead of by *pietas*.[488] Pompey represents a different and unsuccessful version of Aeneas, or rather, a version of Aeneas who is not guided by Stoic principles and instead is ruled by personal feeling, motivated by his love for Cornelia.

This contrast is particularly evident when we look at *Aeneid* IV and *BC* VIII. Aeneas' words of Italy to Dido in *Aeneid* IV (*hic amor, haec patria est* (IV.347)), present a contrast to Pompey's words on Lesbos, where Cornelia was kept safe (*hic sacra domus carique penates / Hic mihi Roma fuit* (*BC,* 132-133)). Here, we may interpret metonymy for Cornelia. In Pompey, we see a man who unsuccessfully attempts to reconcile the conflicting entities of *amor* and *pietas,* as he cannot separate romantic love from duty to country as Aeneas is able to do when leaving Carthage.[489] This ultimately leads to the demise of both Pompey and his men, and shows the danger of elevating romantic love, *amor,* over patriotic duty, *pietas.* In associating Pompey with *amor* and *furor*, Lucan additionally invites a comparison with Virgil's Turnus, who is also associated with *furor* and *amor.*[490] Like Pompey, Turnus acts under the influence of *furor* and *amor,* and it brings about his own death and that of his troops.[491]

For Aeneas, Virgil's Stoicly motivated *pietas* required that his loyalty to his fated mission to reach the site of the future Roman State be elevated over his personal feelings. In Pompey we see the opposite in his relationship with Julia, and then with Cornelia. In this vein, as Thompson writes of Pompey's *pietas,* 'it is a kind of *pietas,* however, which fails to answer for the greater needs of the Republic and to the degree that it places personal considerations above the good of the commonwealth is a kind of *furor* from which Aeneas

[487] Heyke (1970), Ahl (1976, p. 183) and Thompson (1984, p. 207) note the blend of these four qualities in the character of Pompey. As Rossi (2000, p. 573) notes, Pompey's journey 'symmetrically backward, bringing the journey of the *Aeneid* back to its point of departure: from the West back to the East, from Rome back to Troy'. Ahl (1976, p. 183-184) also notes the opposite trajectory of the two men.
[488] Thompson (1984, p. 212) notes the parallel between Pompey's travels after his defeat in Pharsalia (*BC,* VII.60) and Aeneas' journey in *Aeneid* III-V. Rossi (2000, p. 573, n. 6) writes that 'Aeneas proceeds from defeat to triumph, Pompey from triumph to defeat'.
[489] Ahl (1976, pp. 291-293) and Thompson (1984, pp. 210ff) go into more detail about the contrast between *pietas* and *amor* with respect to Pompey's relationships with his wives, Julia and Cornelia, and Aeneas' with Creüsa, Dido and Lavinia.
[490] See **5.4.1** n. 325 for associations of Turnus with *furor* and *amor* in the *Aeneid*.
[491] At the end of the *Aeneid,* however, it is Aeneas who is *furiis accensus et ira / terribilis* (XII.946-947).

is able to free himself'.[492] In Pompey, we see a failure of Virgilian *pietas.* His pursuit and prioritisation of *amor* result in his own death and the failure of his conquest, whereas we see Aeneas' repudiation of *amor* in favour of *pietas* and public service result in the death of his lover Dido and the completion of his mission to reach Latium.[493] Pompey is an unsuccessful version of Aeneas, who cannot master and subjugate his *amor* for Cornelia, whereas when Aeneas left Carthage, 'he deliberately put his personal emotional preference aside in deference to his duty'.[494] Pompey is incapable of elevating duty over emotion, and in Pompey, we see a cautionary tale of what may have happened to Aeneas had he surrendered to *amor* instead of embodying *pietas.*

The Vulteius episode (*BC,* IV.402-581) is perhaps the most widely acknowledged example of Lucan's distortion of Virgilian *pietas* in *BC.*[495] As Ahl notes of it, 'Aeneas' *pietas* is perverted into the *militiae pietas* of Vulteius and Scaeva' (*BC,* IV.499).[496] In *BC,* IV.497-506, Behr identifies how Vulteius warps the meaning of Virgilian *pietas*:

> *Pietas,* the defining virtue of Aeneas, his sense of duty toward his mission and his family, has been dangerously transformed into devotion to war itself. Virtue has become a generic desire to die and to fulfil the desires of one's leader. Yet Vulteius' invitation to his men is particularly convincing because it parasitically appeals to ideas and notions traditionally advertised as constitutive of the Roman nation.[497]

Vulteius attempts to convince his men that committing suicide to avoid capture is an act of *pietas* (*BC,* IV.496-499). For Vulteius' *militiae pietas* (IV.499), he, 'like Scaeva, seems to think that love of death is the very essence of virtue, even though he never questions the moral worth of what he is dying for'.[498] Thus, as Saylor writes, *pietas* becomes 'something more akin to love of death, or *furor*'.[499] In this episode, Heyke analyses the tension between *nefas* and *pietas,* with respect to Civil War.[500]

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[492] Thompson, 1984, pp. 214-215.
[493] See **5.2.** and **5.3**.
[494] Thompson, 1984, p. 209. Thompson (1984, p. 209ff) details the parallels between Aeneas' romantic relationships with Creüsa and Dido and Pompey's with Julia and Cornelia and how they reflect on the overall characterisation of each man.
[495] Much scholarly attention has been paid to this part of *BC,* and it is not possible to expand upon all aspects of its significance in this thesis. See Heyke (1970), Ahl (1976), Saylor (1990), Gorman (2001), Behr (2007) and Dinter (2012).
[496] Ahl, 1976, p. 149.
[497] Behr, 2007, p. 36. Behr (2007, p. 37) also identifies an apostrophe to Virgil's Nisus and Euryalus in these lines. Saylor (1990, p. 291) notes of this incident that 'allusions to Virgil's *Aeneid* lend resonance to the *furor* and mis-directed *virtus*'.
[498] Ahl, 1976, p. 119.
[499] Saylor, 1990, p. 291.
[500] 'Diese verstrickung von virtus und nefas ist typisch für den Bürgerkrieg (und insbesondere für die Caesarianer). Dabei hat sich als ein indirektes Kriterium für das Ausmaß des nefas die Verwendung des Begriffes pietas in ironisch-paradoxem Sinn erwiesen, womit die Grausamkeit und Perversion des gegenseitigen Selbstmords auf seinem Höhepunkt enthüllt wird' (Heyke, 1970, p. 153).

In addition to showing distortions of *pietas,* the Vulteius episode in *BC* is also interesting from a Stoic point of view. Vulteius' appeal to his men to commit suicide may be read through a Stoic lens, 'as a means to avoid immoral or shameful acts'.[501] In suicide, Vulteius' troops can avoid death at the hands of their enemy; their fate is to die, but they have control over how it happens. As Heyke writes of this moment, 'Selbst in seinem heldenhaften Triumph über das Schicksal wird der Mensch schuldig; die Soldaten, die Hervorragendes geleistet haben und noch geleistet hätten (497ff.), entrinnen dem nefas nicht, wenn sie sich gegenseitig töten, vom furor besessen'.[502] Ultimately in the Vulteius episode, Lucan offers a commentary on how easily *pietas* can be distorted by men as a means to manipulate others within a Stoicly underlined version of history. This is not something we see in Virgil's *Aeneid,* where appeals to *pietas* come from the gods, and are directed towards the future Roman State. *Pietas* in Lucan's *BC* appears a tool for manipulation, and we see that it strays quite far from the Virgilian sense of the virtue.

Finally, in *BC,* we begin to see the association of *pietas* with *fides* and the notion of *vera pietas,* which also feature prominently in Lactantius' *Institutions* and Augustine's *Civitas Dei*.[503] These links are important in a discussion of the appropriation and transformation of *pietas* by these early Christian authors, whom I will come to in the next section (**7.3**). In his associations of *pietas* with *fides,* Lucan at times appears to use the two interchangeably, for example, in the collective response of Caesar's troops:

> Sic eat, o superi: quando pietasque fidesque
> Destituunt Moresque malos sperare relictum est,
> Finem civili faciat Discordia bello (*BC,* V.297-299).

Here, *pietas* and *fides* are taken to mean duty and loyalty, and both are ultimately overcome by *discordia*. The interconnected nature of these two qualities is reinforced in the narrator's lament that Roman soldiers lack both: *Nulla fides pietasque viris qui castra secuntur* (*BC,* X.407). Giving reasons for the defeat of Pompey, we see Lucan invoke *fides* and the notion of *vera pietas* (*BC,* VIII.572-576). Here, *fides* means a sense of genuine loyalty (*fides..pura* (*BC,* VIII.572)), and *pietas* signifies true devotion to country (*vera pietate* (*BC,* VIII.573)). This idea of *vera pietas* comes up again in a warped context, as

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[501] Gorman, 2001, p. 281. Gorman (2001, p. 283) writes that 'Lucan's attitude toward the actions of the Vultaeians follows closely the Stoic doctrine on suicide, especially as presented by his uncle, Seneca'.
[502] Heyke, 1970, p. 152.
[503] *Pietas* is associated with *fides* in *BC,* IV.499, V.297, VIII.573 and X.407; the idea of *vera pietas* occurs in *BC,* VIII.573 and IX.1056. The complexities of *fides* and its relationship to *pietas* are too great for me to explore in this thesis (see *TLL,* 6, 1:691.70ff for the entry for *fides*). There is no online entry for *verus* in *TLL*; according to Lewis and Short, *verus, -a, -um,* may be understood to mean 'true, real, actual, genuine'.

Lucan writes how Caesar is *a vera longe pietate* (*BC,* IX.1056) as he feigns respect for Pompey in his death.[504] While *pietas* associated with *fides* and *vera pietas* may still be overcome, these words introduce different connotations to the virtue, which perhaps appealed to later Christian authors. We will see these associations continue in the works of Lactantius and Augustine as *fides* comes to represent faith and loyalty due to a higher leader, and *vera pietas* to signify devotion to the one true God.

7.3. Virgilian *Pietas* in Early Christian Authors

Lactantius' *Institutes* and Augustine's *Civitas Dei* show how early Christian authors engaged with Virgilian *pietas.* In this section, I will examine how these authors responded to the virtue in Virgil's *Aeneid* and shifted implications of Virgilian *pietas* into what we now understand as Christian piety. Falling just over a century apart, both the *Institutes* and the *Civitas Dei* represent Christian apologetic works against paganism, with Virgil's Rome in the background.[505] Both also revolve around ideas of Christian ethics. I have chosen the *Institutes* of Lactantius because of the author's role as an advisor to Constantine I, the first Christian Roman emperor, and because of Lactantius' use of philosophical language to strengthen the appeal of his text. I have selected Augustine's *Civitas Dei* over his other works, such as the *Confessions* and the *Trinity,* because of Augustine's engagement with Virgil in it and because of its analogous nature to the *Aeneid* as a text of mythical history, albeit of a different sort. In this section, I will show that these early attempts at interpreting elements of the *Aeneid* as moral allegory, and Christianising what is ultimately a Pagan text, contribute to the manipulation of Roman *pietas* into Christian piety.

7.3.1. Lactantius' *Divine Institutes*

An African teacher of rhetoric, Lactantius (c.250 A.D. – 325 A.D.) was summoned to Nicomedia by Diocletian near the end of the third century A. D. 'to serve as a Professor of Latin Rhetoric'.[506] Lactantius's *Institutes,* composed 303-310 A.D., is a Christian apologetic work, written in response to the persecutions of the emperor Diocletion, which

[504] Heyke (1970, pp. 141-143) discusses this incident in greater detail, examining the false *pietas* of Caesar as well as *pietas* in the relationship between Caesar and Pompey in *BC,* IX.1094-1095.
[505] See Garnsey (2002, pp. 153-176) for a discussion of the relationship between Lactantius and Augustine.
[506] Garnsey, 2002, p. 156. Digeser (2000) and Bowen and Garnsey (2003) also note the attention paid to Lactantius by Diocletian, and Digeser (1998) and Bowen and Garnsey (2003) recognise Lactantius' role as a professor of rhetoric.

began in 303 A.D.[507] According to Digeser, the work was 'an important influence on the policy of the emperor Constantine, whose court Lactantius joined in 310' A.D., and who converted to Christianity in 312 A.D.[508] Digeser writes that 'Like Augustine's *City of God* a century later, Lactantius's *Institutes* reacted to a crisis in Roman religious politics with a sophisticated proposal for constitutional change'.[509] In the *Institutes*, Lactantius uses the language of classic authors and philosophers to make a case for Christianity and worship of the one true God to a population of educated pagans. The influence of Lactantius on Christian religion and doctrine has been extensively documented, and in this thesis I will only be looking at the *Institutes* and how it engages with the concept of *pietas* in a way that relates to Virgil's *Aeneid* and Stoic ideals.[510] I will focus on *Institutes* I and V, because in *Institutes* I we see Lactantius' first arguments against pagan gods and pagan *pietas,* and in *Institutes* V we see Lactantius engage with Virgil's *Aeneid,* as well as the author's distortion of *pietas* towards what we now understand as Christian piety.

In his attempt to appeal to educated pagans, Lactantius draws on classic poets and authors, with whom his target audience was familiar, largely ignoring the Bible, with which his target audience was unfamiliar.[511] In this way, Lactantius appealed to educated pagans, seeking 'to translate Christian law, founded on the gospel of Matthew, into Roman terms'.[512] Familiar with both Roman *pietas* and Christian piety, Lactantius acts a link between the two concepts and worldviews. Throughout the *Institutes,* Lactantius uses philosophical language and allegorical reading to divert the meaning of *pietas* from filial duty and civic obligation towards obedience to a single God. We see many references to Virgil and to the *Aeneid,* which Lactantius draws on to illustrate the false nature of the pagan gods and to manipulate the meaning of *pietas* towards worship of the one true Christian God. Lactantius' regard for Cicero is also evident as he draws on him by name in

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[507] Barnes, 1973; Gothóni, 1994; Digeser, 2000; Garnsey, 2002; Bowen and Garnsey, 2003. Due to difficulty accessing sources because of the Coronavirus pandemic, I have only been able to access *Institutes* I in Latin. Other references to the *Institutes* in Latin have been taken from secondary literature and will be sited as such. Primarily, I will draw on Bowen and Garnsey's (2003) translation, *Lactantius: Divine Institutes,* available via the University of Glasgow Library. English quotes from the *Institutes* have been taken from this source.

[508] Digeser, 2000, p. x. Barnes (1973) and Nicholson and Nicholson (1989) discuss the relationship between Lactantius, Constantine and contemporary Roman Christian history in greater detail.

[509] Digeser, 2000, p. ix.

[510] As Digeser (2000, p. ix) notes, 'because Lactantius, a Christian scholar, responded to the emperor Diocletian's persecutions with a work that, in turn, influenced Constantine's religious policy, he is an ideal lens through which to study Rome's religious transformation'. Lactantius' engagement with the full Virgilian corpus is too great to discuss in this thesis. However, it is important to note that Lactantius viewed Virgil as a prophet, and interpreted Virgil's *Fourth Eclogue* as foretelling as the second coming of Christ (*Inst.,* VII.24). For more on this subject, please see Digeser (2000) and Garnsey (2002).

[511] Liebeschütz, 1967; Garnsey, 2002; Bowen and Garnsey, 2003.

[512] Digeser, 2000, p. 57. Swift (1968) details where other authors have failed in this task.

several instances throughout the *Institutes,* particularly on *DND* and *De legibus.*[513] Scholars have also noted Lactantius' negative response to Lucretius' *DRN.*[514] In his engagement with Cicero, we see Lactantius develop concepts such as faith and devotion, *fides* and *pietas,* in a way that advocates for the 'historical purity of monotheism'.[515]

In *Institutes* I and II, False Religion and Origin of Error, Lactantius engages with preceding mythology and literature with respect to representations of *pietas.*[516] In *Institutes* I, his aim is 'to bring together human and divine authorities in service of the argument for providence and a single god'.[517] Here, Lactantius condemns false gods in reference to the gods of Virgil's *Aeneid,* and we read his argument that there is only one true God.[518] In *Institutes* I, Lactantius introduces *pietas* by its antithesis *impietas* (*Inst.,* I.10.12), in reference to Jupiter's kidnapping of Ganymede, which he describes as an act of *summae impietatis ac sceleris* (*Inst.,* I.10.12). In associating Jupiter with an act of *summae impietatis,* Lactantius is insinuating that Jupiter, the king of the gods in the Virgilian universe, is a false god, undeserving of worship, or, *pietas*. Lactantius then engages with Roman *pietas* as worship of Jupiter, filial devotion and ancestor worship (*Inst.,* I.15.11), which he considers a grave error and misinterpretation of *pietas*. In this, he draws on the example of Aeneas' request that his comrades offer libations to Jupiter and pray to Anchises (VII.133-134). Using this example of *pietas* corrupted, Lactantius is specifically denigrating Virgilian *pietas* in the *Aeneid,* filial *pietas* and *pietas* towards the Roman gods.[519] Lactantius draws on Virgilian *pietas* in the *Aeneid,* which would have been familiar to his readers, in order to discredit it entirely and offer his own rendering of the virtue as *pietas* towards the one true Christian God.[520]

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[513] Liebeschütz, 1967; Gothóni, 1994; Digeser, 1998 & 2000; Garnsey, 2002; Bowen and Garnsey, 2003; Hansen, 2018.
[514] Liebeschütz (1967, p.562) writes that Lactantius attacks the consistency of the Epicurean school, and Gothóni (1994, p.40) writes that Lactantius spoke negatively of Epicurean interpretations of *religio*.
[515] Swift, 1968, p.148. Gothóni (1994, p. 42) gives a table of how the meaning of *religio* has evolved between Cicero and Lactantius, and in this we see that Lactantius' interpretation of *religio* is *pietas* to the true God. Digeser (1998, p. 142) discusses Lactantius' engagement with respect to *pietas* towards the gods.
[516] Swift (1968, p. 155) notes of Lactantius that 'he accepts the myth as the initial stage in man's history'.
[517] Bowen and Garnsey, 2003, p. 18.
[518] Garnsey, 2002. Interestingly, Digeser (2000, p. 68) writes that 'the God whom the Christians worship is the God already worshiped by Virgil' (*Inst.,* I.5.11).
[519] Or, as Garnsey (2002, p. 170) notes without missing words, 'The pagan virtues are taken apart and found to be hollow. Lactantius explodes the much-vaunted *pietas* of Aeneas and cuffs Virgil's ears along the way'.
[520] As Digeser (2000, p. 57) notes the familiarity of Lactantius' readers of the 'standard corpus', which included the works of Cicero and other classic poets. As opposed to Virgilian *pietas,* which includes loyalty to family, the Christian hierarchy of *piety* emphasises absolute priority of devotion to God, as well as the gospel theme of leaving family for the higher call of God. This elevation of God above all other duties is most clear in Luke, 9.57-62.

In *Institutes* I, Lactantius also engages with Cicero's list of virtues in *De legibus* (*leg.,* II.19): *virtus, pietas, fides* (*Inst.,* I.20.19). Lactantius argues that the only cultivation of these virtues is worshipping the one true God *(Inst.,* I.20.21). Lactantius goes on to say that *virtus, pietas* and *fides* are missing from men who worship in the pagan tradition as they have been overcome by vice and greed (*Inst.,* I.20.25), and he writes that this is because these men are ignorant of the one supreme God (*Inst.,* I.20.26). As with Lucan, we see the association of *pietas* with *fides,* strengthening the connection between *pietas* and faith. While Lactantius also uses *pietas* to refer to the duty of parents to children, which he argues is disregarded in the process of child sacrifice (*Inst.,* I.21.10), we see him shift condemnation to the pagan gods who demand and accept child sacrifice as opposed to the ignorant parents who perform it. In *Institutes* I, it is clear that Lactantius is familiar with the connotations of Virgilian *pietas,* and we see him draw on philosophical language and mythical history in his attempt to bring the meaning of *pietas* to signify worship of the one true God. His association of *pietas* with *fides* serves this aim.

Institutes V and VI, Justice and True Worship, present 'the Christian answer to pagan moral philosophy' by means of engagement with pagan texts.[521] Here, we find Lactantius' greatest commentary on the *Aeneid.* In the beginning of *Institutes* V, Lactantius states his intention to engage with philosophical texts in order to transmit his message to his readers, using a Lucretian metaphor of poetry as honey disguising medicine (*Inst.,* V.1.11-14, *DRN.,* IV.11ff). In *Institutes* V, Lactantius directly interacts with Virgilian *pietas,* with the ambition of 'getting to know their sort of piety, so that from what they do in kindness and piety we can understand the nature of what they do against the rules of piety' (*Inst.,* V.10.1). He offers Aeneas as an example of 'their sort of piety' in order show his readers that pagan *pietas* is misguided as he details Aeneas' various violent exploits, the moral consequences of the wrong sort of piety (*Inst.,* I.10.1-9). Lactantius notes that Aeneas is 'pious' in his love for his father (*Inst.,* V.10.7), but that 'far from being a model pious man (as Virgil, who should have known better, represented him), [he] was a ruthless killer who butchered captive enemies at the altar' (*Inst.,* V.10.9).[522] Lactantius' view of the events leading to Rome's foundation exposes the unjustness of both the pagan gods and Virgil's hero (*Inst.,* I.21, V.10). Subsequently, Lactantius wrests the codes of *pietas* from Virgil and reinterprets the virtue for his readers as Christian piety, devotion to the one true God.

[521] Garnsey, 2002, p. 157.
[522] Bowen and Garnsey, 2003, p. 30.

Throughout *Institutes* V, Lactantius addresses polytheism and the pagan gods. He advocates for justice, or *iustitia,* as a supreme virtue (*Inst.,* V.5.2), which he claims is incompatible with polytheism (*Inst.,* V.8.4).[523] As Hansen notes, this discussion of *iustitia,* 'is held within a particularly Stoic framework'.[524] For Lactantius, polytheism accounts for all the ills in the world, and piety is incompatible with a polytheistic system (*Inst.,* V.8.10-11). To reinforce this assertion, Lactantius draws on Cicero's declaration in *De legibus* that mankind shares one blood as an allegory for mankind being united by God's common fatherhood (*leg.,* fr. 2). According to Lactantius, polytheism correlates with an increase in '*cupiditas, omnium malorum fons',* and 'the role of Jupiter became a tyranny in which he drew men to an idolatrous worship of himself'.[525] In this, Lactantius maintains the falsehood of the Roman pagan gods and the need for worship of the one true God, or, *pietas* and *iustitia,* to his pagan audience by drawing on the familiar language of Cicero.

In *Institutes* V, Lactantius distorts Virgilian *pietas* to denote obedience and service to the one true God. He gives the first two principles of divine law, *pietas* and *aequitas*, 'the twin arteries of justice are piety and fairness' (*Inst.,* V.14.11). Lactantius defines *pietas* in terms familiar to his audience, as 'simply the knowing of God, as it is soundly defined by Trismegistus' (*Inst.,* V.14.11), Trismegistus of course being the ancient Greek philosopher Hermes Trismegisuts, who is mentioned several times throughout the *Institutes*.[526] In drawing on Trismegistus, an unconventional choice among Christian apologists, Lactantius uses philosophical language to explain Christian *pietas* in pagan expressions as he attempts to elucidate a Christian worldview in Roman terms. Digeser highlights the significance of *pietas* and *aequitas* as the 'first two principles of divine law' for Lactantius, writing that they 'express in Roman terms the two commandments on which the whole Christian law is based'.[527] Lactantius takes this quality of *pietas,* the cornerstone of Virgilian ideology in the form of duty to family, the Roman state and the gods, and reinterprets it in familiar

[523] As Swift (1968, p. 150) notes, in this context, '*iustitia* means worship of one true God on which depends all moral perfection'.
[524] Hansen, 2018, p. 549.
[525] Swift, 1968, p. 151. *Nec iam quicquam ex antecedentis saeculi pio atque optimo statu mansit, sed explosa iustitia et veritem secum trahens reliquit hominibus errorem ignorantiam caecitatem* (*Inst.,* V, 6, 10).
[526] Garnesy (2002, p. 161) writes that Trismegistus was 'a popular pagan divinity under whose name circulated, among other things, philosophical books bringing Egyptian and Greek religion together with Hellenistic philosophy'. As Ebeling (2005, p. 63) notes, Trismegistus 'was the founder of a theo-philosophical tradition to which the greatest of the Greek philosophers adhered: Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato were in agreement with Hermes Trismegistus on the essentials'. Ebeling (2005, p. 41) also states that 'the central teachings of Hermes are in agreement with Christian doctrine'. For more about Lactantius' use of Trismegistus see Digeser (2000, pp. 64-68) and Ebeling (2005).
[527] Digeser, 2000, p. 58.

philosophical language to mean only duty to the one true Christian God. To be a Christian, according to Lactantius, was to aspire to Christ-like piety.

In the *Institutes,* we see Lactantius' contribution to the Christianisation of Virgilian *pietas* as well as a rejection of the Stoic values that underline the virtue in the *Aeneid.* As Lactantius manipulates Virgilian *pietas* to be an analogy for Christian piety, he does the same with its underlying Stoic elements, in particular, submission to fate and subversion of emotion. In the *Institutes,* Lactantius 'offers a rebuke and a corrective by a clever re-shaping of both Christian and Stoic expectation'.[528] Although there is considerable overlap between the two, Stoicism represented a challenging worldview to a Christian outlook, and one that would have been familiar to his pagan audience. Lactantius addresses it with the apparent intention of undermining the philosophy to bring the reader to a Christian way of thinking and acting.[529] This is clear from the beginning of *Institutes* I, where Lactantius draws on Cicero's interpretations of Stoicism (*DND,* I.39, 2.64) in order to rebut them and regurgitate them in his own terms (*Inst.,* I.2.2, I.12.4, I.12.10). Lactantius' subsequent damming indictment of Cato as a man 'who modelled himself all his life on Stoic stupidity' (*Inst.,* III.18.5), and his overall repudiation of the tenets of Stoicism that underline *pietas* in the *Aeneid,* suggest that he takes a dim view of the philosophy in comparison to Christianity.

Lactantius condemns the Stoic denial of feelings as unnatural (*Inst.,* VI.14-VI.15), claiming in relation to pity that the Stoics 'have always treated as a vice what is pretty well man's distinctive virtue' (*Inst.,* VI.14.1), and writing that 'the Stoics try to eradicate human emotions as if they were diseases' (*Inst.,* VI.19.1). Lactantius also refutes the idea that fate is responsible for all things in favour of the omnipotence of God (*Inst.,* II.5.19). Here, he explains that what the Stoics believed was an all-encompassing fate is instead the all-powerful God, writing that 'the stars do have a plan for the performance of their movements, but the plan belongs to God who made and governs all things, and not to the stars that move by it' (*Inst.,* II.5.19). Thus, he manipulates the Stoic ideal of service to fate into devotion to God (*Inst.,* II.10.15). As Virgil presented Aeneas as a model Stoic in his service to fate, so 'Lactantius portrays his Christ: the true sage and *exemplum,* wisdom and virtue incarnate', which he expresses in Stoic language reminiscent of Seneca.[530] In the

[528] Hansen, 2018, p. 541. Long (1986) Bowen and Garnsey (2003) and Hansen (2018) note that a number of early Christian writers engaged with Stoic thought, whether in agreement or denunciation.
[529] Scholars such as Bowra (1990) Braund (1997), Thorsteinsson (2010), Dinter (2012) and Cullhed (2015) have identified overlap between Christianity and Stoicism.
[530] Hansen, 2018, p. 541.

same way Lactantius undermines the qualities of Virgilian *pietas,* so he undermines its Stoic undertones, specifically, the subversion of emotions and the blind obedience to fate in favour of loyalty to the one true Christian God.

7.3.2. Augustine's *Civitas Dei*

Written just over 100 years after Lactantius' *Institutes'*, Augustine's (354-430 A. D.) *Civitas Dei* represents another Christian apologetic work written for a pagan audience, with Virgil and Virgil's Rome in the background.[531] In his *Confessions* (397 A.D.), where he draws heavily on both Virgil's *Aeneid* and the Bible to interpret his own life, Augustine charts his path to Christianity following his conversion in 386 A. D.[532] Here, Augustine translates the wanderings of Aeneas to his own wanderings, describing his conversion from a disciple of philosophy to one of Christianity, which he regarded as the 'one true philosophy'.[533] This gives a Christian context to the *Aeneid,* presenting a parallel between Aeneas and the Biblical Adam through the author Augustine.[534] Following the *Institutes* and *Confessions,* Bowen and Garnsey label the *Civitas Dei* (composed c.413-416 A.D.), as 'a more ambitious counterblast to paganism' that draws on the work of Lactantius.[535] Although Augustine attacks the *Aeneid's* pantheistic worldview, he also shows an appreciation for Virgil's artistry.[536]

As Garnsey points out, the challenge facing Augustine in *Civitas Dei* 'was how to salvage something from Roman history, how to say anything positive about a society that lacked virtues as defined in Christian terms'.[537] In order to do this, following on the example set by Lactantius and other early apologists, Augustine drew on classical authors and philosophy, using analogies and allegories to supplement his religious writings with the

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[531] See Markus (1967) for further details of Augustine's bibliography, with respect to the history of Christianity. Wills (2010) details the extent of Virgil's influence on Augustine, Garnsey (2002, pp. 153-176) discusses Augustine's familiarity and engagement with Lactantius and O'Daly (2020) offers a comprehensive guide to reading Augustine within the remit of Christian apologia.
[532] Markus, 1967.
[533] Markus, 1967, p. 344. O'Meara (1988) and Clark (2019) discuss Augustine's allegorical wanderings. Markus (1967, pp. 344-345) clarifies that Augustine's interpretation of philosophy referred to Varro's philosophical guide, and that 'Augustine clearly recognises a fundamental difference between the philosophy pursued by philosophers and the 'philosophy' adhered to by Christian believers'.
[534] O'Meara, 1988; Clark, 2019. Scholars such have also drawn parallels between Aeneas and other biblical figures. For example, Clark and Hatch (1981) illustrate parallels between Aeneas and Jesus Christ, Eliot (1953, p. 10) identifies Aeneas as a Job figure and a prototypical Christian 'man with a mission', Zagzebski (2007) notes alignment in the destinies of Aeneas and Abraham.
[535] Bowen and Garnsey, 2003, p. 5.
[536] Cullhed, 2015.
[537] Garnsey, 2002, p. 170.

aim of appealing to pagan readers.[538] Indeed, his 'journey of return to God' began in reading the philosophical writings of Cicero.[539] I have chosen to focus on the *Civitas Dei* because of Augustine's treatment of both Stoicism and *pietas* with respect to the *Aeneid* in the work. Augustine's direct engagement with Virgil brings the *Aeneid* into a time period characterised by Christianity, demonstrating 'the cultural status of Virgil in late antiquity', and shows a willingness of Christian authors to engage with the epic and philosophical models.[540] I will begin by discussing the implications of philosophical elements in the *Civitas Dei* before moving on to explore Augustine's interaction with Virgilian *pietas.*

As in Lactantius' *Institutes*, in *Civitas Dei* we see Augustine attempt to reconcile religion and philosophy in order to prove to his educated pagan readers that Christianity was the one true religion and philosophy. Christianity was appealing from a philosophical standpoint because it combined '*sapientia* and *religio*', and therefore, 'it was both true *sapientia* and true religion'.[541] It was a religion of reason, combining knowledge and reason into the one true religion. The genesis of Christian theology as a philosophically informed religion occurs between 100 and 200 A.D. with the philosopher Justin Martyr.[542] After cycling through several philosophy teachers and disciplines, Justin was convinced of Platonism, although he remained 'deeply impressed by the courage and integrity of the Christian martyrs'.[543] Justin Martyr argued that Christian theology was the true philosophy, rooted in divine *logos.*[544] According to Chadwick, this concept of divine *logos* means that:

> The Word and Wisdom of God, who is Christ, is also the Reason inherent in all things and especially in the rational creation. All who have thought and acted rationally and rightly have participated in Christ the universal Logos.[545]

We see this sentiment in the beginning of The Gospel According to St John (1.1-14), which equates Word and Light with God and also with man, who is created from God, indicating a symbiotic relationship between knowledge and God. This reinforces how, according to Justin, with knowledge of the one true God, every man shares in the divine

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[538] See Petterson (2020) for an overview of early Christian apologists in the 2nd Century A. D.
[539] Markus, 1967, p.342. This is particularly evident in Augustine's representations of virtue, which Markus (1967, p. 387) notes draws directly from Cicero's *De divinatione*: the disposition of the mind whereby it agrees with the order of nature and reason. Beyers (2013, pp. 63-64) also details Augustine's engagement with Cicero.
[540] Clark, 2019, p. 86.
[541] Garnsey, 2002, p. 164. Cullhed (2015) espouses a similar sentiment.
[542] Chadwick, 1967.
[543] Chadwick, 1967, pp. 160-161.
[544] Garnsey, 2002, p. 163.
[545] Chadwick, 1967, p. 162.

logos by virtue of rationality.[546] Being ignorant of the one true God, the wisdom of early philosophers 'was empty and false'.[547] This knowledge of the one true God serves to unite mankind with one another and with God in a kind of spiritual inheritance, similar to the way Virgil's Parade of Heroes links all Romans to the city's founders.[548] As Garnsey notes of Augustine's adaptation of classical themes, 'the canonical virtues inherited from classical philosophy (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance) are redefined in line with Christian doctrine about the nature of God, his relation to man, and the reality of sin'.[549] Each is translated into service to God, or, brought into the context of a divine *logos*.

Augustine's engagement with philosophy is most clear *Civitas Dei* IX. Similar to his predecessor Justin Martyr, Augustine professes an extreme affinity for the Platonists, whom he calls *praecipui philosophorum ac nobilissimi* (*Civ.,* IX.1). For example, looking at *Civitas Dei* VIII.8, we see Augustine's approval for the Platonic belief that happiness, or, blessedness, the ultimate aim of any religion or philosophy, may be found in devotion to God as opposed to the body or the mind.[550] Given the coherence between Platonic philosophy and Christian beliefs with respect to ethics and human morality, Augustine shows a willingness to accept certain aspects of Platonism that are ethically similar to Christianity, such as the Platonic division of the soul and body.[551] For example, Augustine echoes the Platonic view of the body as a prison from which the soul is free in death: *sed etiam miseriores sunt perpetuo corporis vinculo* (*Civ.,* IX.10). Despite such overlap, however, Platonic polytheism remained irreconcilable with Christianity.[552]

Augustine attacks Platonic religious beliefs using philosophical arguments to undermine and discredit pagan polytheism and lead his reader to Christian monotheism, a fundamental argument for the early apologists. For example, he calls the intermediaries between pagan gods and men *daemones,* and compares them to base humans (*Civ.,* IX.7). Augustine introduces Jesus as a replacement for the *daemones* as a bridge between man and God, setting up a contrast between *medius malos* and *alius bonus* (*Civ.,* IX.15, 17). Interestingly, as O'Daly notes, 'when they are identified with demons, pagan gods may be equated with

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[546] As Chadwick (1967, p. 163) writes, 'Justin is striving to formulate a belief in the unity of all knowledge with faith in god as the linchpin and interpreter of the whole'.
[547] Garnsey, 2002, p. 168.
[548] See chapter **6** for a discussion of the Parade of Heroes (VI.756-859) with respect to spiritual inheritance.
[549] Garnsey, 2002, p. 168.
[550] Markus (1967b, p. 381) discusses what Augustine means by 'blessedness': the life of blessedness and repose for man consists in the harmonious rationality of all his activity.
[551] Markus, 1967b. Markus (1967b) addresses Augustine's reconciliation of certain aspects of Platonism with Christianity on the basis of ethics, referring to *Civitas Dei* VIII.8.
[552] Markus, (1967b) and Chadwick (1967) discuss the overlap between Platonism and Christianity.

natural phenomena, a tendency already developed in Stoicism'.[553] Therefore, the same arguments used to discredit Platonic beliefs to not necessarily apply to Stoic ones, and Augustine's engagement with Stoicism is markedly different. In *Civitas Dei* IX, we see a marriage of Platonic ideals with a Stoic compatibilist framework and cognitivism manipulated into a Christian apologetic text.[554]

In *Civitas Dei* IX, Augustine interacts with aspects of Stoicism, notably, the supremacy of reason over emotion, which manifests as the divine *logos*.[555] Augustine writes of the Stoics: *Stoicos autem, qui summum bonum hominis in animo ponunt, secundum spiritum vivere quia et hominis animus quid est nisi spiritus?* (*Civ.,* IX.2), equating the mind and the spirit. He goes on to suggest a synecdoche for flesh, *carne*, linking it to man, mankind and eventually to Christ. This introduces a way of reading reason in man as representative of divine reason, or divine *logos*. Augustine also engages with Ciceronian and Stoic definitions of passions and emotions, πάθος and *perturbatio* (*Civ.,* VIII.17, IX.4; *Fin.,* III.10.35). He writes of the Stoics as unshaken by emotion, *Ita mens…virtutis exercet* (*Civ.,* IX.4), and draws on Virgil's description of Aeneas as a Stoic example of such a man: *Mens inmota manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes* (*Civ.,* IX.4; *Aen.,* IV.449).[556]

There is more nuance to this example than is immediately evident. As Byers argues, while Augustine appears generally in favour of Stoic passionlessness, 'a close reading of his statements on the matter shows that he accepts Stoic passionlessness in principle while disagreeing with the Stoics about which particular emotions count as "passions" and should be avoided' (these are enumerated in *Civ.,* XIV.8-9).[557] For example, while Augustine appears to accept a Stoic definition of anger (*Civ.,* IX.4), he is critical of the Stoic disallowance for pity (*Civ.* IX.5).[558] Overall, however, feelings themselves are not 'objects of moral assessment', but rather what one 'decides to do: to yield to them, restrain

[553] O'Daly, 2020, p. 47.
[554] Byers' (2013) book, *Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine,* offers a comprehensive account of cognitivism in Augustine's *Civitas Dei.*
[555] Byers (2013, pp. 61-62) comprehensively details Augustine's sources for Stoicism and Stoic thought.
[556] Wiesen's (1989, p. 167) footnote on this line details controversy in its interpretation as to whether the tears belong to Aeneas or to Dido. However, these interpretations fail to account that the tears could be implied to belong to both Aeneas and Dido. I believe it is irrelevant to whom the tears belong, as they do not move Aeneas, showing the steadfastness of his mind in triumph over an emotional response. I have discussed Aeneas as a Stoic character with respect to his mastery of his emotions in **2.4**, and Aeneas' departure from Carthage in **5.2.5**.
[557] Byers, 2013, p. 68. See Byers (2013, pp. 68-69) for a more detailed and nuanced discussion of Augustine's endorsement of Stoic views of passionlessness, and Byers (2013, pp. 63-64) for more about the significance of the invocation of Cicero in this passage with respect to Augustine 'trying to persuade the intellectual elite of the late Roman Empire that Christian ethics is no less conceptually sophisticated than the Stoics', just because its scriptures sometimes use different terminology.
[558] O'Daly, 2020.

them, encourage them'.[559] While throughout the *Civitas Dei* Augustine only refers to Stoicism by name in order to repudiate it, this does not mean that he disagrees with the philosophy as a whole, as it is clear that certain aspects of Stoicism are 'foundational to his own theory'.[560]

We may detect a note of Stoic compatibilism in Augustine's treatment of fate and free will in the *Civitas Dei,* where he puts a Christian slant on the Stoic notion of the supremacy of fate (*Civ.,* V.*pr,* V.1, V.9). Although Augustine argues that fate and free will cannot coexist, this is not necessarily true of the will of God, which we see in his writing on free will with respect to Adam (*Civ.,* XXII.30). As Markus notes, 'Augustine did not think that this freedom of human action was incompatible with God's certain foreknowledge of all actions, of events and their outcome'.[561] As Markus goes on to explain the relationship of God and free will, it becomes clear that the 'Lazy Argument' does not align with an Augustinian world view:

> While it is necessarily true that what God foresees will come about, it does not follow that what he foresees will come about by necessity, i.e. in a manner that excludes free choice. God is able to foresee acts of choice no less than actions performed under the compulsion of necessity.[562]

This resonates with the Stoic compatibilist outlook that fated outcomes also involve an element of human action and assent to impressions.[563] In *Civitas Dei*, Augustine conflates and manipulates the Stoic worldview that man must act in service and obedience to fate with the Christian one that man must act in service and obedience to God. In the *Aeneid,* we see Stoicism and the overarching inevitability of the fate of the foundation of the Roman State underlining the epic. In *Civitas Dei,* we see the Stoic compatibilist framework reconciled with Christianity by God and the eternal law, 'God's sovereign reason considered in its bearing on human behaviour'.[564] This is, of course, the divine *logos,* which also manifests in elements of Augustine's treatment of *pietas* in *Civitas Dei.*

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[559] Markus, 1967b, p. 385.
[560] Byers, 2013, p. 57. Byers (2013, p. 57) also discusses common misconceptions about Augustus' engagement with Stoic philosophy with regard to emotion.
[561] Markus, 1967b, p.384.
[562] Markus, 1967b, p. 384. I have discussed the 'Lazy Argument' in **2.2.1.**
[563] See **2.2.1** for a more detailed discussion of Stoic compatibilism and assenting to impressions. In this Christian context, Markus (1967, p. 348) writes that 'to believe means to give one's assent to what one has learnt'. Markus (1967, pp. 350ff) additionally explores the relationship between belief, sight, assent, understanding and faith.
[564] Markus, 1967b, p. 388.

In *Civitas Dei,* Augustine's presentation of *impietas* and *pietas* offers an insight into the Christian value system in the work.[565] Augustine recognises the difficulty in finding one word in Latin to mean worship of God, and thus he drew on the Greek concepts of εὐσέβεια and θεοσέβεια as analogues to his Christian rendition of *pietas* in order to appeal to his pagan audience (*Civ.,* X.1).[566] Here, as Ball notes, 'Augustine orders the various semantic associations of *pietas* in a new theological harmony, derived hierarchically from the first principle, God the Father'.[567] He deconstructs aspects of εὐσέβεια and θεοσέβεια to mean worship of the one true God, which he then calls *pietas*. Within his representation of *pietas,* as Garnsey notes, Augustine builds on Lactantius' view that 'piety and devoted worship of the Christian God become a necessary condition of justice and the other virtues'.[568] As did Lactantius, Augustine manipulates *pietas* to mean devotion to God. He associates *pietas* with *fides* and advocates for *vera pietas* in order to substantiate this Christian interpretation of a faith-based *pietas* as devotion to the one true God.[569] I will discuss the significance of these associations shortly. In *Civitas Dei,* familiar aspects of Virgilian *pietas* become metonymy for *pietas* towards God as we see Augustine interpret Virgilian *pietas* as an early allegory for Christian piety. Obligations between parents and children become obligations to God, devotion to the *patria* becomes devotion to God and the heavenly city, worship of the pagan gods becomes worship of the one true God.

Augustine's intention to engage with Virgil is clear in the *prefatio* to *Civitas Die* I, and in his continued references to Anchises' words to Aeneas about Roman *artes* found in *Aeneid* VI. In the opening *Civitas Dei,* Augustine suggests that the greatest virtue is humility,

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[565] Both concepts appear numerous times in *Civitas Dei.* Augustine mentions *impietas* forty one times, and *pietas* eighty four times, considerably more than Virgil.
Augustine mentions *impietas* in *Civitas Dei*: I.1, I.8, I.9, II.26, II.28, II.29, III.14, III.15, IV.12, VI.*pr.*, VI.1, VI.6, VII.34, X.5, X.21, XI.6, XII.2, XII.19, XIV.9, XVI.1, XVI.4, XVI.11, XVII.12, XVII.22, XVII.23, XVIII.25, XX.6, XX.7, XX.9, XX.30, XXI.11, XXI.12, XXI.16, XXI.19, XXI.20, XXI.25. These figures were gained from an electronically conducted search of each individual book. A number of these citations contain multiple references to *impietas.*
Augustine mentions *pietas* in *Civitas Dei*: I.6, I.9, I.10, I.13, I.16, I.21, I.22, I.26, I.31, I.36, II.1, II.5, II.7, II.10, II.28, II.29, III.9, III.8, IV.3, IV.23, V.9, V.13, V.14, V.15, V.19, V.20, VII.*pr.*, VII.32, IX.10, X.1, X.3, X.8, X.9, X.12, X.16, X.19, X.22, X.26, X.29, X.32, XI.33, XII.18, XII.21, XIII.6, XIV.28, XVI.1, XVI.10, XVI.8, XVII.6, XVI.20, XVIII.47, XIX.4, XIX.17, XIX.23, XIX.26, XX.3, XX.6, XX.8, XX.24, XXI.23, XXI.26, XXII.30. These figures were gained from an electronically conducted search of each individual book. A number of these citations contain multiple references to *pietas.*
[566] See **3.1.2** for a discussion of εὐσέβεια and θεοσέβεια with respect to Virgilian *pietas*.
[567] Ball, 1991, p. 27.
[568] Garnsey, 2002, p. 176. Garnsey (2002, p. 168) details these other classical virtues as 'prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance'.
[569] See **7.2**, n. 503 for an explanation of *vera* and *fides.*

humilitas, as it endears the individual to the grace of God.[570] *Humilitas* allows men to triumph over the vices of pride, *superbis,* and arrogance, *fastu: Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratium* (*Civ.,* I.*pr.*, XI.33). Augustine correlates these words with the advice of Anchises to Aeneas in *Aeneid* VI: *Parcere subiectis et debellare superbos* (VI.853).[571] Here, however, Augustine claims that only God can distinguish between the proud and the humble, and that it is inappropriate or haughty of man to assume he can do so; only a proud man, a man of *impietas,* would attempt it (*Civ.,* XIV.14). Thus, Augustine opens the *Civitas Dei* by specifically undermining Virgil's Roman *artes* and discrediting Anchises and Aeneas as men of virtue.

Familiar with Aeneas as a man of *pietas* from the *Aeneid,* this introduction would alert the reader to anticipate a contradictory and even perhaps combative interpretation of Virgilian *pietas* in the *Civitas Dei.* Augustine soon recalls this line from the *Aeneid* again, writing that the Romans are known for these very words: *de quorum praecipua laude dictum est* (*Civ.,* I.6). Here, Augustine draws attention to the hypocrisy in Anchises' advice, that the Romans in their history did not show mercy to the meek as they did not spare those who hid in the temples during the Roman conquests. In their actions, the Romans did not pardon men for their *pietas*, which Augustine characterises as proof of religious feeling toward God. Augustine again recalls Anchises' words in relation to the Roman regard for rule and control, but does not mention *pietas* or Roman values (*Civ.,* V.12). In this instance, he is alluding to the fact that to Virgil the Roman *artes* were reigning, commanding and subjugating nations at war: *cum artibus aliarum gentium eas ipsas proprias Romanorum artes regnandi atque imperandi et subiugandi ac debellandi populos anteponeret* (*Civ.,* V.12). Augustine isolates the moment in the *Aeneid* when Virgil reveals what Roman values will be, instructing what conduct of *pietas* ought to look like, and represents it as one of *impietas.* Having sufficiently undermined his reader's confidence in Virgilian *pietas*, Augustine then enlightens his readers to Christian *pietas.*

Augustine's first introduction to *pietas* in *Civitas Dei* comes through *impietas,* when he writes of the error of irreligion, *impietatis errore* (*Civ.,* I.1). According to Augustine, by the practice of true religion, men may be cured of *impietas* and become citizens of the City of God. Here we already see a parallel between Virgilian *pietas* and Augustine *pietas*; men

[570] In *Civitas Dei* II, Augustine links *pietas* with *humilitas*: *ut viam pietatis ab humilitate in superna surgentem* (*Civ.,* II.7).
[571] I have discussed this line of the *Aeneid* in greater detail in **3.1.1** and **6.1.1**.

of Virgilian *pietas* are good Romans, men of Augustine *pietas* are good Christians.[572] Throughout *Civitas Dei,* we see commonly see *impietas* characterised by irreligion, pride and wickedness.[573] Certain aspects of Augustine's *impietas* continue to resonate with *impietas* in Virgil's *Aeneid*. For example, we see that *impietas* can lead to punishment in the afterlife (*Civ.,* II.29). This is reinforced in Augustine's conflation of acts of *impietas* with those of *iniquitas* or *scelus* when discussing punishment for crimes: *vel homicidum vel adulterium vel sacrilegium vel quodlibet aliud scelus non temporis longitudine sed iniquitatis et impietatis magnitudine metiendum* (*Civ.,* XXI.11). These resonate with the moral offenses in *Aeneid* VI that will consign a man to Tartarus (VI.595-694).[574] For Augustine, however, these acts cannot lead to eternal punishment, instead, the length of the punishment depends on the crime (*Civ.,* XXI.20).[575]

The relationship between *pietas* and *impietas* in *Civitas Dei* bears some similarity to that between the two concepts in the *Aeneid.* As in Virgil, *impietas* can be a temporary state, and by acting a certain way, a man may become a man of *pietas.* Augustine writes that men of Christ can bring others from *impietas* to *pietas*: *et in lucem saluberrimae pietatis ab illa perniciosissimae impietatis nocte* (*Civ.,* II.18), and that anyone who partakes of Christ's body and surrenders to Christ may be saved regardless of previous *impietas* (*Civ.,* XXI.19, XXI.25). David represents an example of one who has atoned for sins and was able to overcome *impietas* with *pietas* (*divina multum…sunt peccata* (*Civ.,* XVII.20)). Here again we see *humilitas* with *pietas* as a virtue.[576] This resonates with *Aeneid* VI, when Virgil implies that one can atone for sinful behaviour in life and thus avoid Tartarus (VI.567-569).[577] As *pietas* leads to Elysium in the *Aeneid,* Augustine writes that *vera pietas* leads to *vitam aeternam cum sanctis angelis suis in civitate caelesti* (*Civ.,* V.15). He draws on Plotinus to support this assertion (*Civ.,* IX.10). In *Civitas Dei,* the opposite is true as well, and men may be brought from *pietas* to *impietas*: *non nisi vera pietate purgatur atque perficitur, impietate autem disperditur et punitur* (*Civ.,* II.29). This interaction between *pietas* and *impietas* in *Civitas Dei* shows that the two are perhaps competing internal factions in human nature, Christian and pagan, in constant conflict with one another. In this, Augustine signals that devotion to God must be unflinching and consistent, similar to the ideals of Virgilian Stoic *pietas*.

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[572] See **3.2** for a discussion of *pietas* as a unifying factor of Roman citizenship in Virgil's Rome.
[573] *Civ.,* IV.12, VI.*pr.*, VI.1, VI.6, XI.4, XII.19, XI.4, XII.19, XIV.9, XVI.4, XX.6, XXI.11.
[574] See **6.2.2** for a discussion of these lines in Virgil's *Aeneid*.
[575] Augustine indicates that the time limit for punishment of *impietas* is 1000 years (*Civ.,* XX.9).
[576] This association of *humilitas* and *pietas* also occurs in *Civ.,* I.31, X.19,
[577] See **6.2.2.**

A close reading of *Civitas Dei* highlights that *pietas* manifests as duty to God at all times. Much as Aeneas' *pietas* is underlined by his Stoic submission to fate, so Augustinian *pietas* is underlined by a religious devotion to the one true God, *Deus verus* (*Civ.,* I.36, XIV.28, XVI.8). This association is strengthened by Augustine's association of *pietas* with the word *fides,* and his consistent emphasis on *vera pietas.*[578] This of course recalls Lucan's *BC,* where we see Lucan occasionally use *pietas* and *fides* interchangeably to mean duty and loyalty, and *vera* to indicate true devotion to country.[579] In his alignment of *pietas* with *fides*, Augustine emphasises the element of faith that is only implied in Virgilian *pietas,* which was largely a performative virtue of civic engagement with the promise of reward in the afterlife. Augustine thus effectively navigates *pietas* from a virtue of doing into a virtue of believing.[580] In his Christian *vera pietas,* Augustine implies that Virgilian *pietas* must be a false *pietas* by comparison. He says as much explicitly: *Pietas est enim vera Dei cultus, non cultus falsorum tot deorum quot daemoniorum* (*Civ.,* IV.23); *Hic est Dei cultus, haec vera religio, haec recta pietas, haec tantum Deo debita servitus* (*Civ.,* X.3). By undermining the *pietas* that his pagan readers would have been familiar with as false, Augustine is able to introduce his own version of *vera pietas,* that is, devotion to the one true Christian God, as opposed to its implications in the *Aeneid* and *BC*. This true *pietas* is a combination of true virtue and true religion: *Si enim verae virtutes sunt, quae.nisi in eis quibus vera inest pietas* (*Civ,* XIX.4).[581] This imbues Augustinian *pietas* with an essence of Virgilian *pietas* in that it is also a combination of various virtues and qualities, as well as a way to bridge the gap between human and divine spheres. It is governed by devotion to the true God as Virgil's *pietas* was by submission to fate.

Augustine introduces *pietas* in the context of religion in relation to Job: *ut sibi ipse humanus animus sit probatus et cognitus, quanta virtute pietatis gratis Deum diligat* (*Civ.,* I.IX). Later in *Civitas Dei,* he adds *iustitia* to the *pietas* of Job (XVII.47).[582] In this, Augustine takes *pietas* to mean love for God without the expectation of reward. The idea of *pietas* as love for God and its association with religion continues throughout the *Civitas Dei.*[583] He reinforces it shortly after, recounting the words of the Christians that *Est autem*

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[578] Augustine associates *pietas* with *fides* in *Civ.,* I.10, I.16, II.1, V.8, V.9, X.9, X.32, XX.8. See **1.1,** n.9 for an explanation of faith as it relates to this thesis. Augustine writes of *vera pietas* in *Civ.,* I.36, IV.23, V.14, V.19, V.20, X.3, X.13, X.16, X.22, XVI.10, XVI.13, XX.3, XXI.23.
[579] See **7.2.**, n. 503 for Lucan's associations of *pietas* with *fides* and *vera.*
[580] There is one instance in *Civitas Dei* where *pietas* is associated with ritual in funeral rites (*Civ.,* I.13).
[581] By *virtus* here we may understand the classical virtues of 'prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance', with a particular emphasis on justice (Garnsey, 2002, p. 168).
[582] Augustine also associates *pietas* with *iustitia* (*Civ.,* XII.6).
[583] Augustine aligns *pietas* with religion or devotion to God in. *Civ.,* I.16, I.36, II.1, II.5, II.10, IV.3, VII.32, X.1, X..3, X.19, XII.21, XV.22, XVI.1, XIX.17, XX.24, XXII.24, XXII.30.

quaestus magnus pietas cum sufficientia (*Civ.,* I.10). As he associated *impietas* with irreligion, Augustine continues to link *pietas* with religion, specifically, belief in the Christian God, and he emphasises the strength of *pietas* towards God (*Civ.,* I.26). Augustine manipulates any instances of *pietas* in the *Civitas Dei* that appear to resonate with Virgilian *pietas* to mean *pietas* towards God. For example, Abraham's refusal to slay his son presents at a glance as *pietas* between fathers and sons, a familiar aspect of Virgilian *pietas,* but Augustine translates this instead as *pietas* towards God (*Civ.,* I.21). Augustine consistently undermines Virgilian *pietas* towards the gods to advocate *pietas* towards the one true Christian God. He encourages the Romans not to worship false gods such as Juno and Vesta, telling his readers that these gods must be removed from the remit of their *pietas* in favour of the one true God (*Civ.,* II.29).[584] However, Augustine does acknowledge that God recognised the Romans as possessing *vera pietate* in the sense of true religion (*Civ.* V.19). As Virgil showed his readers that *pietas* was available to all men through their behaviour, Augustine shows his readers that *pietas* is available to all men through their belief and devotion to God, or, their participation in the divine *logos*.

Drawing on philosophical arguments, in Augustine's engagement with *pietas* in *Civitas Dei,* he attacks Virgilian *pietas*, in all cases obfuscating it to mean devotion to the one true Christian God. He does this in such a powerful way that we see later authors associate the term with Christian religious devotion as opposed to its Virgilian Stoic origins. In *Civitas Dei,* Augustine acknowledges the Romans as men of a particular pagan *pietas*, yet he contends that this *pietas* was misguided, and that *vera pietas* is due only to God. As Lactantius in the *Institutes,* Augustine continues to promulgate the idea of Virgilian *pietas* as an allegory for *pietas* towards God, as well as associate it with *vera* and *fides,* thus leading Virgil's Stoic *pietas* closer to what we would understand as Christian piety. He does this in his engagement with Stoic aspects of Virgilian *pietas,* conflating the will of God with Stoic fate. In this, Augustine reconciles what Clark calls 'the masterpiece of the Latin classical canon and the canon of authoritative Christian Scripture'.[585] Through his engagement with Virgilian *pietas,* Augustine made a significant contribution towards establishing lasting Christian associations for the *Aeneid* and preserving its legacy, because it was, in a sense, already scripture.

[584] As I have previously mentioned, Augustine wrote of pagan gods and intermediaries as *daemones,* and men who worship them as *impietas* (*Civ.*,IV.23, VI.*pr.,* IX.7).
[585] Clark, 1993, p. 4. Clark (1993, p. 12) also notes that Augustine 'took from Virgil, and uses in the *Confessions,* images of destructive love, anguished parting, and the journey of an often-bewildered man who seeks to interpret the father's command'.

7.4. The *Aeneid* as a Moral Allegory

The final section of this thesis will examine the tradition of reading the *Aeneid* as a moral allegory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. This practice opened up a new way of generating meaning from the text in times characterised by Christianity and contributed to its continued preservation and intrigue.[586] Identifying the appeal of the *Aeneid* as a text inviting allegorical interpretation, Kallendorf writes that the poem 'served as a particularly appropriate source for heroic characters who could shed light on political and imperial problems'.[587] Additionally, certain concepts, such as Virgilian *pietas,* presented as allegorical sources for Christian values. Schreiber and Maresca's clarify the importance of the *Aeneid* with respect to allegorical interpretation, writing that 'allegory is simply the rhetorical mode which embodies the dialectical mode of analogy; the two are literary and philosophical avatars of each other and are properly fused in a work like the *Aeneid,* which is both literary and philosophical'.[588] Allegorical interpretations are entirely dependent on context, culture and time, and their meanings and implications are ever fluctuating.[589] Garrison marks that 'the allegorical approach to Virgil diminishes the philological attention devoted to Aeneas' distinctive virtue', *pietas,* as it becomes appropriated into a Christian worldview.[590] Moral allegorical interpretations of the *Aeneid* introduce a novel way of reading not only the poem, but also the author, and they highlight the practice of adapting the *Aeneid* to suit any era, religious sentiment and cultural climate.[591]

Christian allegorical interpretations of Virgil's work have existed since the second century, yet these focus predominantly on his *Fourth Eclogue.*[592] According to many, Virgil's initial appeal as a poet with Christian tendencies comes from his *Fourth Eclogue,* which invites a 'Messianic interpretation', and may be read as 'introducing a new Golden, the

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[586] Tambling, 2010; Cullhed, 2015. Cullhed (2015, pp. 240-262) explains the history of allegory.
[587] Kallendorf, 2007, p. 8.
[588] Schreiber and Maresca, 1979, p. xxiii. Schreiber and Maresca (1979, p. xxiii) go on to explain that 'analogy and allegory both offer imagistic shorthands, particulars which stand in relation to other particulars and to universals beyond them'. For a more comprehensive explanation of allegory see Tambling (2010).
[589] Treip, 1994; Jones, 1996; Tambling, 2010; Cullhed, 2015. Tambling (2010, p. 24) identifies four ways the *Aeneid* has been allegorised: (a) the historical, whereby the fictional poem represented real people and events; (b) the physical, where gods represented physical forces in nature; (c) the moral, where gods were identified with abstract qualities, and the text was read for ethical significance; (d) the euhemeristic, where gods were rationalised as being deified heroes, and mythological stories rationalised as historical occurrences. Treip (1994, p. 16) notes that an allegorical work need not fall into one of these categories, but may oscillate between.
[590] Garrison, 1987, p. 24.
[591] As Treip (1994, p. 6) notes 'only fairly recently has it been understood how important a contribution to literary allegory and especially to the later European epic tradition was made in particular by the allegorical interpreters' of Virgil's *Aeneid.*
[592] Garrison, 1987; O'Meara, 1988; Halton et al., 1997; Digeser, 2000; Garnsey, 2002; Schnapp, 2007; Cullhed, 2015.

Christian, Age'.[593] The content of the *Fourth Eclogue* suggests that Virgil had leanings compatible with Christianity, and perhaps helped to endear his other work, such as the *Aeneid*, to Christian scholars responsible for textual preservation.[594] The *Aeneid* transcended its particular time period, and in its prophetic content and human themes, endeared itself to Christianity.[595] Although there are discernible tendencies of allegory in Lactantius' *Institutes* and Augustine's *Civitas Dei,* scholars are largely in agreement that the tradition of reading the *Aeneid* as a moral allegory begins in the late sixth century with Fulgentius' *Expositio Virgilianae Continentiae Secundum Philosophos Moralis* (*Exposition*).[596]

Putnam and Ziolkowski differentiate Fulgentius' *Exposition* from earlier works showing allegorical inclinations, clarifying that it was the first text to go 'beyond mere allegorical moments to unfold instead a sustained allegorical interpretation of the *Aeneid*'.[597] The *Exposition* introduced a model for a moral allegorical interpretation of the *Aeneid* that was emulated by later scholars, markedly by Bernardus Silvestris in the twelfth century, in his *Commentary on the First Six Books of Virgil's Aeneid* (*Commentum*).[598] The practice of allegorising Virgil's *Aeneid* continued through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, notably in Dante's *Divina commedia* (*Commedia*), composed 1306-1321, and in John Milton's *Paradise Lost* (*PL*), released in 10 books in 1667 and 12 books in 1674.[599] Building on the *Exposition* and the *Commentum*, Dante's *Commedia* provided a format for 'the ways in which later Renaissance epic narrative allegory would be written, and the ways in which it was expected that it should be read', setting a precedent for Milton's English epic, *PL*.[600] As Baswell notes, 'The allegorisation of Virgil's *Aeneid* was extremely important for the reception of the epic in the high and later Middle Ages and on

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[593] O'Meara, 1988, p. 30. According to O'Meara (1988, p. 31), 'this impressed later people so much that they invested Virgil with extraordinary religious, philosophic and general wisdom', making his poem a 'bible'. Other scholars such as Eliot (1953), Harrison (1990), Braund (1997), Burrow (1997) and Tarrant (1997) have regarded Virgil as a Christian poet on the basis of the *Fourth Eclogue*. Corbett (2018, p. 72) notes that Dante as well believed that the *Fourth Eclogue* 'had prophesied Christ without the poet's awareness'.

[594] Hannam (2013) details how after the sackings of Rome in 410 A.D. and 455 A.D. monks were largely responsible for the preservation of texts and copied manuscripts and material they believed worthy of saving. More often than not, these where Christian works, which suggests that the *Aeneid* contained subject matter that Christians considered appealing and thus worth preserving, or that the poem had been categorised by early librarians as a Christian text.

[595] Kennedy (1997) details the appeal of the *Aeneid* as a text of a 'new order'.

[596] Schreiber and Maresca, 1979; Garrison, 1987; Jones, 1989; Baswell, 1995; Hays, 2003; Putnam and Ziolkowski, 2008; Wolff, 2008; Cullhed, 2015; Kallendorf, 2015.

[597] Putnam and Ziolkowski, 2008, p. 626.

[598] Garrison (1987), Jones (1989, 1996), Treip (1994), Baswell (1995), Putnam and Ziolkowski (2008), Cullhed (2015) and Kallendorf (2015) note Bernardus Silvestris' association with Fulgentius.

[599] Leonard, 2000; Butler, 2006. Quint (2014) discusses the development of Milton's *Paradise Lost* from 10 books to 12.

[600] Treip, 1994, p. 16.

into the Renaissance'; the *Commedia* and *PL* are proof of this.[601] The existence of these Christian allegorical interpretations demonstrates that later authors discerned elements in the *Aeneid* 'which supported their own religious or cosmological interpretations'.[602] In these four authors, who successively build on existing literature, I will show that the tradition of reading the *Aeneid* as a moral allegory draws on the ideological intrigue of the poem, encapsulated in the virtue of *pietas* and Stoic philosophy, which allows the poem to be read as a Christian or quasi-scriptural text. This continued intrigue is at least to some degree responsible for the *Aeneid*'s preservation from its composition to present day.

7.4.1. Fulgentius' *Exposition* and Bernardus Silvestris' *Commentum*

Although there is debate surrounding the identity of the author, Fabius Planciades Fulgentius, or, 'Fulgentius the mythographer', is widely considered to be the author of the *Exposition*.[603] Thus, in this thesis, I will be drawing on 'Fulgentius the mythographer' as the author of the *Exposition,* whom scholars are able to date to c. 500-600 A.D., and assume 'was clearly a Christian, familiar with the Bible and with apologist attitudes', well educated in Latin and Greek, and well versed in classical scholarship.[604] The first Christian to compose a commentary on Virgil's *Aeneid,* Fulgentius' *Exposition* reveals a 'deeper meaning' behind the text through an allegorical interpretation of the poem as corresponding to stages of human life.[605] In this format, as Borris notes, 'Virgil's heroic narrative thus becomes a coherent morally philosophical figuration of human life, with pedagogical ends'.[606] Several centuries later, Bernardus Silvestris (fl. c. 1150) replicates this model of aligning the *Aeneid* with the ages of man in his *Commentum*.[607] Building on the ideas of Macrobius (*fl.* c. 400 A.D.) and Fulgentius, Bernardus' 'basic proposition is that in the *Aeneid* Virgil not only tells a poetic story, but also teaches a philosophical

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[601] Baswell, 1995, p. 84.
[602] Treip, 1994, p. 5.
[603] Hays, 2003, p. 164. Hays (2003) discusses the controversies surrounding the identification of Fulgentius the mythographer in greater detail, arguing for the existence of two separate men, Fulgentius of Ruspe and Fulgentius the mythographer, a position which is echoed by Putnam and Ziolkowski (2008, p. 660). Conversely, drawing on writing samples, MacCoull (1999) maintains that Fulgentius of Ruspe and Fulgentius the mythographer are one person. Hays (2003) and MacCoull (1999) draw on Helm's (1899) article, 'Der Bischof Fulgentius und der Mythograph', which opens by declaring the existence of three separate authors called Fulgentius active between 500 and 600 A.D.
[604] Whitbread, 1971, p. 3. Putnam and Ziolkowski (2008) and Tambling (2010) also confirm these dates for Fulgentius. Wolff (2008, p. 61) writes that Fulgentius mentions is own devout Christianity in *De Aetatibus Mundi et Hominis*.
[605] Wolff, 2008, p. 66. Wolff (2008, p. 61) notes that earlier authors of Virgilian commentaries, such as Servius and Macrobius, were not Christian.
[606] Borris, 2000, p. 15.
[607] Schreiber and Maresca, 1979; Jones, 1982; Treip, 1994; Baswell, 1995; Putnam and Ziolkowski 2008; Wolff, 2008; Cullhed, 2015.

truth'.[608] As Jones notes, the *Commentum* marks the culmination of the Medieval tradition of reading the *Aeneid* as allegory.[609] Interestingly, historically, there has also been disagreement surrounding the true identity of the author of the *Commentum*.[610] By the similarity of their allegorical interpretations of the *Aeneid*, many scholars have noted a connection between the *Exposition* and the *Commentum,* despite a separation of several centuries.[611]

In the *Exposition* and the *Commentum,* we see a new way of interpreting the *Aeneid* as a moral allegory and a philosophical text, as well as a new way of reading Virgil the author as he appears in character in both accounts. Copeland and Struck note that Fulgentius' interpretation of the *Aeneid* 'elevated Virgil's poetry to philosophical status by extracting latent cosmological truths from the poetic narrative'.[612] In the *Exposition,* it is evident that Fulgentius has understood Virgil as a Stoic philosophical author, as Fulgentius' Virgil appears to interpret his own *Aeneid* as a manual of Stoic philosophy, 'with special attention to the Stoic ideas of virtue, freedom from passions and adjustment to the necessities of fate or providence'.[613] Fulgentius' Virgil confirms that his own epic is a work underlined by Stoic principles, claiming *si, inquit, inter tantas Stoicas ueritates aliquid etiam Epicureum non desipissem, paganus non essem* (*Exposition* 24).[614] The same is true for Bernardus Silvestris' interpretation, which highlights philosophical elements in the *Aeneid.*[615] Jones notes that Bernardus Silvestris has taken two things directly from Fulgentius, 'not only the general notion of the *Aeneid* as a Christian pilgrim's progress, but also specific interpretations and etymologies'.[616] Both texts interpret the *Aeneid* as an allegory for the growth of mankind, with respect to age, education, virtue and wisdom, and Aeneas as an

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[608] Jones and Jones, 1977, p. xii.
[609] Jones, 1996, p. 107.
[610] In his article, 'The So-Called Silvestris Commentary on the Aeneid and Two Other Interpretations', Jones (1989) addresses this dilemma in modern scholarship and the issue of conflating Bernard of Chartres with Bernardus Silvestris of Tours. Putnam and Ziolkowski (2008, p. 726-727) also address the conundrum of the two Bernards, and Jones and Jones (1977) and Whitman (2010) note the difficulty of assigning authorship of the *Commentum*.
[611] Schreiber and Maresca, 1979; Jones, 1982; Baswell, 1995; Wolff, 2008; Cullhed, 2015.
[612] Copeland and Stuck, 2010, p. 3.
[613] Cullhed, 2015, p. 407. Whitbread (1971, p. 110) also writes that Fulgentius' approach 'may be considered as Stoic'. Fulgentius' Virgil confirms that Aeneas is driven by fate, and that fate was responsible for his flight from Troy and his scorning of the gods as opposed to any personal failing (*uide quid…pericula sustentaret* (*Exposition* 8)). However, Fulgentius' request to Virgil that he soften his words with sweetness (*Seponas quaeso…sapore dulciscas* (*Exposition* 3)), recalls the Lucretian *DRN* (*DRN,* IV.11ff).
[614] This sentiment supports my argument in **2.1.2** that Virgil's *Aeneid* demonstrates the superiority of Stoicism over Epicureanism for the philosophically informed reader.
[615] Jones and Jones, 1977; Jones, 1982.
[616] Jones., 1996, p. 127.

allegory for the human spirit, with only a slight variation, showing a new way to interpret the poem to fit their respective eras.[617]

In *Exposition* 6, Fulgentius' Virgil claims that he has written the stages of human life in the twelve books of the *Aeneid,* beginning with *arma* signifying manliness, and *virum* implying wisdom: Fulgentius' Virgil's allegorical *Aeneid* continues:

> *Aeneid* I represents infancy. The shipwreck in which we first encounter Aeneas is 'an allegory of the dangers of childbirth' (*Exposition* 12). Virgil continues that Aeneas' failure to recognise his mother Venus on the shore of Carthage (I.327ff) is an indication of the inability of newborns to immediately recognise their own mothers (*Exposition* 14).
> *Aeneid* II and III denote youth and childhood. In addition to Aeneas' meandering tale to Dido as an example of a 'garrulous child' (*Exposition,* 15), Baswell writes that 'the cyclops shows youth's pride, and the death of Anchises its rejection of parental discipline'.[618]
> *Aeneid* IV corresponds to adolescence, which Fulgentius' Virgil describes as 'on holiday from paternal control', 'inflamed by passion' and 'driven on by storm and cloud, that is, by confusion of the mind' to committing adultery with Dido (*Exposition* 16). Aeneas' love for Dido is symbolic of teenage lust.
> *Aeneid* V signifies Aeneas' maturing into manhood and returning to the values of his father.
> *Aeneid* VI, in *Exposition* 18ff, 'completes the individual's education in the life of the mind'.[619]
> *Aeneid* VII-XII are not discussed in terms of allegory.[620]

Bernardus Silvestris very closely imitates this mode of allegorically interpreting the *Aeneid* as stages of life. Under an *integumentum,* Bernardus Silvestris interprets Aeneas as 'the typical human spirit'.[621] In the *Commentum*, we see that *Aeneid* I represents infancy; *Aeneid* II, boyhood (*pueritia*); *Aeneid* III, adolescence; *Aeneid* IV, youth (*iuventus*); *Aeneid* V, manhood (*virilis aetas*); *Aeneid* VI completing the life of the mind.[622] In *Aeneid*

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[617] Jones and Jones, 1977, p. xii; Schreiber and Maresca, 1979, p. xi; Jones, 1982, p. 51; Treip, 1994, p. 6; Baswell, 1995, p. 96; Putnam and Ziolkowski, 2008, p. 660; Wolff, 2008, p. 68.
[618] Baswell, 1995, p. 96.
[619] Putnam and Ziolkowski, 2008, p. 727. There are additional elements of allegory in Virgil's description of the underworld. For example, regarding the river Acheron, Fulgentius' Virgil claims that comprises 'the seething emotions of youthful acts' and 'is muddy because youths do not have clear-sighted or mature judgment'; Cerberus additionally is 'an allegory of brawling and legal contention' (*Exposition* 22). Jones (1996, p. 126) echoes this position of *Aeneid* VI as the acquisition of 'knowledge by means of study'.
[620] As Whitbread (1971, p. 106) notes of this, 'the *Content* begins formally and elaborately but ends lamely and abruptly, covering the last six books of the *Aeneid* in a sketchy fashion and doing nothing to resolve the situation created by the appearance of Virgil's shade'. In this summary of the moral allegory of the *Exposition,* I have drawn on Whitbread's (1971) translation.
[621] Jones and Jones, 1977, p. xii. Schreiber and Maresca (1979, p. 5) echo this sentiment, and clarify that 'the integument is a type of exposition which wraps the apprehension of truth in a fictional narrative, and thus it is also called an *involucrum*, a cover'.
[622] Whitbread, 1971, p. 113; Jones, 1982, p. 51; Tambling, 2010, p. 24; Kallendorf, 2015, p. 71. As Jones and Jones (1977, p. xiii) note, the *Commentum* only engages with *Aeneid* until VI.636, just before Aeneas reaches Elysium. In the beginning of his commentary on *Aeneid* VI, Bernardus Silvestris recognises this book as the apex of Virgil's philosophical material in the *Aeneid* (see **6.2.1**, n. 369).

VI, according to Bernardus Silvestris, 'the mature individual gains knowledge of right and wrong'.[623] Jones identifies a slight difference between the two allegorical interpretations, writing that 'Fulgentius' thesis is that the *Aeneid* reflects the physical and moral development of man from infancy, but he is not concerned with labelling each stage with a traditional term or with matching ages with particular books'.[624] Bernardus Silvestris, however, is specific in matching the books of the *Aeneid* to clearly defined ages of man.

The *Exposition* takes the form of a dialogue between the teacher Virgil, whom Fulgentius has called upon to explain the content of the *Aeneid,* and the student Fulgentius.[625] From *Exposition* 3 onwards*,* the tension in the dynamic between Fulgentius and Virgil accounts for the drama of the narrative.[626] In this, the *Exposition* suggests not only a new way of reading the *Aeneid,* but also challenges existing assumptions of the poet Virgil.[627] Wolff sees Fulgentius' relationship with Virgil as 'paradoxical'; 'he dedicates one of his works to him and at the same time depicts the character in a rather pejorative way'.[628] Fulgentius engages with Virgil as a pagan and a Stoic, and appears careful not to attribute to him any Christian intent.[629] However, as Cullhed notes, 'Fulgentius moves consistently to place Virgil's interpretation into a Christian context' by explaining to Virgil how the content of his *Aeneid* aligns with Christian beliefs, although Virgil recognises the shortcomings of his knowledge of Christianity.[630] In his allegorical *Exposition,* Fulgentius allows for Virgil's pagan poem to be read as a Christian text, integrating the pagan-mythological world of legend that we find in the *Aeneid* into Christian faith.[631] In the *Exposition* and the

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[623] Kallendorf, 2015, p. 71. Schreiber and Maresca (1979, p. xi) also make this point.
[624] Jones, 1982, p. 53.
[625] This meeting recalls the dialogue technique used by earlier authors such as Cicero. Wolff (2008, p. 62) discusses the function of the dialogue technique in the *Exposition* and the issues it raises.
[626] Whitbread, 1971; Baswell, 1995; Putnam and Ziolkowski, 2008; Wolff, 2008; Cullhed, 2015; Kallendorf, 2015. Scholars have noted the complex and sometimes fiery dynamic between Virgil and the pupil Fulgentius.
[627] Whitbread (1971, p. 111) calls him 'a kind of supernatural sage'; Putnam and Ziolkowski (2008, p. 660, 166) describe him as 'an inspired seer' and 'a pedantic schoolmaster', and note that he 'strikes the pose of an orator in his first appearance'; Wolff (2008, p. 64) acknowledges Fulgentius' 'representation of Virgil as a cold and haughty figure'; Cullhed, 2015 (p. 307 & 404) likens Fulgentius' Virgil to 'a philosopher of the initiated sort', a 'wise seer' and a 'proverbial schoolmaster'; Kallendorf (2015, p. 70) writes that 'Virgil assumes the role of a condescending, indeed patronising schoolmaster'.
[628] Wolff, 2008, p. 67. Wolff (2008, p. 64) additionally notes that Fulgentius' Virgil 'is strikingly inconsistent with the image conveyed by his early biographers, who all tell of his gentle manners and shyness'.
[629] Baswell, 1995.
[630] Cullhed, 2015, p. 70. Cullhed (2015, p. 407) additionally notes that Fulgentius 'does not purport to reinterpret the *Aeneid* anachronistically, in light of Christian faith'. Virgil acknowledges his shortcomings on Christianity in *Exposition* 24: *nullo enim omnia uera nosse contingit nisi uobis, quibus sol ueritatis inluxit* (Helm, 1898, p. 103). The use of the word *uobis* implies that Virgil does not consider himself amongst those who know the truth, and, being ignorant of Christianity, he is not able to name this group as Christians, although it is strongly implied by Fulgentius.
[631] Cullhed, 2015.

Commentum, we see the trope of using Virgil as a moral guide, which we will also find in Dante's *Commedia.*

While both poets interpret the *Aeneid* as an allegory for the stages of human life and draw on Virgil as a moral guide, their treatment of Virgilian *pietas* is rather different. In Fulgentius' *Exposition,* we find no mention of the concept of *pietas,* but rather, one single and powerful usage of *pius* as it applies to Aeneas. In *Exposition* 22, Fulgentius describes Aeneas outside Tartarus as *uir enim pius* (*Exposition* 22). This is the single time that Fulgentius references not only *pius* but also Aeneas by name. This solitary mention of both *pius* and Aeneas strengthens the association of *pius* with Aeneas, recalling of course Virgil's *pius Aeneas,* and adds to its importance in this particular moment.[632] Fulgentius describes how Aeneas rejects pride and fears punishment in the afterlife after seeing Ixion, Salmoneus and Tantalus in Tartarus.[633] Here, Fulgentius implies that Aeneas will be spared from Tartarus by the judge Rhadamanthus because of his *pius* nature, which signifies his rejection of pride, a message we also receive in *Aeneid* VI. This introduces an antithesis between *pius* and *superbus*, which recalls Augustine's words on pride and humility in relation to Anchises' advice in *Aeneid* VI.[634] Fulgentius, however, does not go into detail about why Aeneas is *pius,* other than that he rejects pride. From this single inclusion of the word *pius,* it appears that Fulgentius is attempting to align it with humility and the rejection of pride in favour of devotion and service to God. Bernardus Silvestris, in contrast, shows closer engagement with Virgilian notions of *pietas.*

Near the beginning of *Commentum* I, Bernardus Silvestris shows an understanding of Virgilian *pietas* as it applies to Aeneas (*Verbi gratia…religionem invitamur*). Bernardus Silvestris interprets Aeneas' *pietas* as duty towards Ascanius and Anchises, then worship of the gods and performance of religious ritual. In this, Bernardus Silvestris construes Aeneas' *pietas* in the Virgilian sense as an allegory for *religio,* or rather, he brings the meaning of *pietas* closer to *religio*. As Schreiber and Maresca note, 'we are called to religion by Aeneas' piety towards Anchises and Ascanius, by his veneration of the gods and the oracles which he consults, by the sacrifices which he offers, and by the devotion and prayers which he utters'.[635] In *Commentum* VI, Bernardus Silvestris writes of Aeneas

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[632] See **4.1.2** for a discussion of the significance of the epithet *pius* for Aeneas in Virgil's *Aeneid*.
[633] *superbiae uoces et malorum poenas effugit ac pauescit* (*Exposition* 22). In the earlier lines, Fulgentius' Virgil describes how pride is the unifying factor in those consigned to Tartarus: *considera plenum siperbiae meritum; poena enim superbiae deiectio est* (*Exposition* 22). Ixion, Salmoneus and Tantalus also appear in Virgil's underworld for sins of pride (see **3.1.1**, n. 129 and **6.2.2**).
[634] See **7.3.2**.
[635] Schreiber and Maresca, 1979, p. 4.

that *Pius quia pietas inest ei a natura,* claiming that Aeneas is *pius* because he has had the quality of *pietas* since birth. This supports the assertion that *pius* is an inherent aspect of Aeneas' nature and *pietas* is representative of his behaviour and actions.[636] In *Commentum* VI, *pietas* appears in a list of seven values that pertain to *simplicatem et mansuetudinem: innocentia, amicicia, concordia, pietas, religio, affectus, humanitas.*[637] Bernardus Silvestris then elucidates on *pietas* in a way that echoes Virgilian *pietas* as duty to family and country: *Pietas est per quam sanguine iunctis et patrie benivolum officium et diligens tribuitur cultus* (*Commentum* VI). Here we see a differentiation between *religio* and *pietas*, as Bernardus Silvestris explains that *Religio est que superioris cuiusdam nature quam divinam vocant curam cerimoniamque affert* (*Commentum* VI). This indicates an elevation of *religio* over *pietas,* and perhaps shows that Bernardus Silvestris is trying to supplant the importance of Virgilian *pietas* as duty to man with *religio* as allegiance to God.

Although Fulgentius and Bernardus Silvestris appear hesitant to attribute Christian intent to Virgil, their respective works function as examples of Christian allegorical readings of the *Aeneid* that endeared the epic to Christians in the time they wrote.[638] While Lactantius and Augustine relied on philosophy to impart the Christian message of the *Aeneid,* Fulgentius and Bernardus Silvestris employ moral allegory. The *Exposition* and the *Commentum* show that while Virgil himself is not a Christian, the *Aeneid* contains elements compatible with Christianity, particularly within the quality of *pietas*. In the *Exposition*, however, as Cullhed notes, 'after a detailed analysis of the famous first line of the *Aeneid,* Virgil himself acknowledges his precarious position as a pre-Christian poet'.[639] Schreiber and Maresca comment that, 'Fulgentius several times interjects to draw parallels between Virgil's exegesis of his own poem and some Christian doctrines; in each case, Virgil firmly denies that the specific doctrine was known to him'.[640] This rendering of Virgil is more than 500 years after the circulation *Aeneid,* so he is able to see his place within Christianity in hindsight, but not at the time when he was writing the *Aeneid.*

Kallendorf writes that in the *Commentum,* although 'explicit references to Christianity are relatively sparse, references to pagan religion are often allegorised without reference to specifically Christian practices'.[641] Tambling supports this assertion, writing that 'the

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[636] See **4.1.2** for a discussion on the significance of the epithet *pius*.
[637] These values echo Cicero's *De inventione* (*Inv.,* II.53.161, II.55.166).
[638] Jones, 1982; Baswell, 1995; Putnam and Ziolkowski, 2008; Kallendorf, 2015.
[639] Cullhed, 2015, p. 406.
[640] Schreiber and Maresca, 1979, p. xv.
[641] Kallendorf, 2015, p. 72.

tradition of practicing allegoresis offers Bernard Silvestris a particular freedom: that of being able to interpret non-Christian classical, pagan writings in such a way that they broadly yield Christian meanings'.[642] Building on the work of previous authors Lactantius and Augustine, who manipulated Virgilian *pietas* to signify devotion to the one true God, Fulgentius and Bernardus Silvestris shift connotations of *pietas* closer to what we might understand as Christian piety.[643] These works provide a model for medieval and renaissance commentators to 'invest the poem with theological understanding supported by biblical quotations', resulting in a reading of the *Aeneid* whereby 'the active life of justice ultimately yields to the contemplative life of religion', or, where Virgilian *pietas* based on duty, *iustitia* and *clementia* yields to a Christian religious piety based in service to God.[644]

The *Exposition* and the *Commentum* contribute towards a Christian understanding of the *Aeneid* and an image of Virgil the poet that recommends itself to Christian readers. As Jones aptly theorises, 'we cannot claim that the *Aeneid* would have perished utterly in the Middle Ages without Fulgentius and Bernardus, but we can claim that their interpretations probably made the *Aeneid* acceptable and valuable to many who otherwise would have been hostile or unmindful'.[645] Regarding the position of Fulgentius and Bernardus Silvestris in the tradition of allegorical interpretation, Treip writes that 'these increasingly elaborate allegorical expositions would seem to mark a new departure and to lay the foundations for a designedly allegorical epic literature', for example, Dante's *Commedia* and Milton's *PL.*[646]

7.4.2. Dante's *Divina commedia* and Milton's *Paradise Lost*

Reception of Virgil's *Aeneid* in Dante's *Commedia* and Milton's *PL* continues to be a subject of much scholarly attention. This final section does not aim to examine the engagement between these works and the *Aeneid* in any great detail, but rather to give an idea of how Christian allegorical interpretations of the *Aeneid* within the *Commedia* and *PL* contributed to the enduring legacy of the *Aeneid,* particularly with respect to their treatment of Virgilian *pietas* and Stoic philosophy. Many scholars have agreed that the *Commedia* presents an allegorical interpretation of the *Aeneid,* as well as an allegory for

[642] Tambling, 2010, p. 25.
[643] Garrison, 1987.
[644] Garrison, 1987, p. 24.
[645] Jones, 1996, p. 129.
[646] Treip, 1994, p. 6.

the stages of life, as pioneered in the *Exposition* and the *Commentum.*[647] In the *Commedia,* Dante draws on Virgil's established poetic authority, following the example of Fulgentius and Bernardus Silvestris, bringing in the poet Virgil as a guide. The many Latinisms in the *Commedia* further demonstrate Dante's objective to engage with Virgil, and a significant part of his appeal as a poet may be attributed to his extensive use of the *Aeneid* in the poem.[648] Scholars have also noted that despite Dante's respect for Virgil as a poet, his intention was to surpass the *Aeneid* in the *Commedia.*[649]

As in the *Exposition* and the *Commentum,* in the *Commedia,* we see Dante's complicated and nuanced engagement with Virgil, who fills two roles as both the guide and the ancient author of the *Aeneid*.[650] While Dante's *Commedia* is itself an allegory, one which focuses on Virgil's *Aeneid* as opposed to commentaries on the text, so is Virgil in the poem, who becomes an allegory for Reason in addition to the author of the *Aeneid*.[651] As Shapiro notes, this technique 'enabled Dante to seize upon the psychological significance of the Roman founding myth'.[652] In the *Commedia,* Dante re-reads the *Aeneid* in Christian terms, reconciling Virgil's world of pagan mythology with Christian faith, placing 'the Roman empire within Christian salvation history'.[653] The *Commedia* additionally shows engagement with the work of other ancient authors such as Ovid and Lucan, and early Christian authors such as Lactantius and Augustine.[654]

One of the most apparent ways in which Dante engages with Virgil in the *Commedia* is in his representation of Hell and the afterlife, which, like Virgil's underworld, reveals a moral geography as well as a physical one. Indeed, Dante's 'moral structure of Hell' appears to

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[647] Shapiro, 1989; Treip, 1994; Baswell, 1995; Brownlee, 2007; Ascoli, 2010; Turner, 2010; Pegoretti, 2018; Tavoni, 2018. Boitani (2007, p. 231), however, argues that 'the whole *Commedia* reads as *fabula*'.
[648] Shapiro, 1989; Jacoff, 2010; Tavoni, 2018. There is disagreement among scholars as to just how much the *Commedia* draws from the *Aeneid.* Marchesi (2018, p. 136) claims that the *Commedia* contains 126 'direct citations to the *Aeneid*' among around 'seven hundred Virgilian references' as well as numerous references to Virgil's other works. Hawkins (2007, p. 125), however, counts 192 references to Virgil.
[649] Ascoli, 2007; Gildenhard, 2007; Pertile, 2007; Jacoff, 2010; Cullhed, 2015; Pegoretti, 2018.
[650] Many scholars have remarked on the tensions and complexities of this dynamic, for example: Thompson (1967), Shapiro (1989), Blow (1991), Jacoff and Schnapp (1991), Ascoli (2007), Brownlee (2007), Pertile (2007), Cullhed (2015), Kay (2018), Marchesi (2018) and Pegoretti (2018).
[651] Hollander, 1989; Treip, 1994; Teskey, 1996; Ascoli, 2007; Kallendorf, 2007; Pertile, 2007; Cullhed, 2015; Kriesel, 2018.
[652] Shapiro, 1989, p. 24.
[653] Brownlee, 2007, p. 142. Hawkins, 2007; Pertile, 2007; Cullhed, 2015; Marchesi, 2018.
[654] Many scholars have recognised Dante's engagement with Ovid and Lucan, including Kennedy (1972), Ahl (1976), Jacoff and Schnapp (1991), Schildgen (2001), Brownlee (2007), Pertile (2007), Jacoff (2010) and Marchesi (2018) (certain scholars, such as Ahl (1976, pp. 183, 244, 250) and Brownlee (2007, p. 152), make a case for Dante's Cato as taken directly from Lucan's *BC,* even suggesting that the character of Cato is a 'moral exemplar' or 'Christlike' in the *Commedia*). Garrison (1987) and Cullhed (2015) have noted Dante's incorporation of elements from Lactantius and Augustine.

come directly from Virgil's *Aeneid*.[655] Additionally, as Shapiro identifies, 'the *Aeneid* offered Dante the most significant precedent for the idea of a twofold physical and spiritual journey, and Virgil's account of Aeneas provided Dante with the lineaments of a detailed journey to the other world by a living man'.[656] In many ways, Dante's geography of Hell and his journey through it recalls Aeneas' voyage through the underworld in *Aeneid* VI, 'however, Dante transforms the fables of the classical past into the organic components of the Christian afterlife'.[657] One obvious way in which Dante does this is in his treatment of the rivers, Acheron, Styx and Phlegethon, and the icy lake Cocytus, to signify collections of sinners.[658] Additionally, Dante gives a further moral dimension to the monsters found in Virgil's underworld, for example, in Minos' tail (*Inf.,* V.4-12). As Marchesi suggests, 'the novelty of Dante's classicising the Christian poem lies in its interplay between adoption and adaptation'.[659] This is clear in the *Inferno,* where Dante adopts certain aspects of Virgil's underworld, and adapts them to show a Christian moral outlook. In this, Dante is 'creatively reworking the Virgilian elements in order to highlight the superiority of his Christian vision of the afterlife'.[660]

The beginning of Dante's journey recalls Aeneas' journey in *Aeneid* VI, as Ball identifies the resonance between Dante's *guerra sí del cammino e sé de la pietate* (*Inf.,* II.4-5) and Anchises' *iter durum* (VI.688).[661] We know that Aeneas' *pietas* towards Anchises permits him to make and complete this *iter durum* to visit his father.[662] This then suggests a correlation between the *pietá* of the *Commedia* and the *pietas* of the *Aeneid,* or, between Dante and Aeneas. At this point in the *Commedia*, Dante is about to commence his journey with Virgil as his guide, and he begins it by referencing a moment of noteworthy *pietas* for Virgil's hero in relation to himself, inviting a comparison. While Aeneas' journey is one of *pietas,* Dante implies that his is one of *pietá.* As Adkins notes of *pietas* and the Italian cognate *pietá*, 'there is a large tradition of exegetical writings on the *Aeneid* which sees in

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[655] Corbett, 2018, p. 62. Many scholars have also noted the ways in which Dante's *Inferno* draws explicitly on Virgil's poetic authority and *Aeneid* VI, for example, Ascoli (2007), Brownlee (2007) Pertile (2007), Cachey (2018), Kay (2018) and Marchesi (2018).
[656] Shapiro, 1989, p. 25.
[657] Pertile, 2007, p. 79.
[658] As Corbett (2018, p. 62) notes, 'Acheron divides the 'neutrals' from the rest of the damned sinners (*Inf.* III); Styx contains the wrathful and the sullen (VII); Phlegethon the violent against the others (XII); the icy lake of Cocytus the treacherous (XXXI)'. Cachey (2018) and Marchesi (2018) also address Dante's engagement with Virgil's rivers. Jacoff (2010, p. 151) writes of Dante's adaptation of Virgil's River Lethe, and invention of the River Eunoe, 'in which memory of the good is restored'.
[659] Marchesi, 2018, p. 130.
[660] Marchesi, 2018, p. 137. Pertile (2007, p. 79) supports this assertion, writing that 'Dante transforms the fables of the classical past into organic components of the Christian afterlife'.
[661] Ball, 1991.
[662] See **4.1.3** and chapter **6** for a discussion of *pietas* in relation to the *iter durum.*

the hero's *pietas* the early stages of the semantic shift which was to pull the word towards its Italian derivative *pieta,* and the English "pity"'.[663]

In the *Commedia,* Dante uses the word *pietá* mainly to signify pity, compassion and sorrow, and rarely to mean duty towards family members.[664] Dante also uses the antithesis of *pieta, dispieta* or *spieta* to convey ruthlessness, rash actions or a lack of faith.[665] Through his use of *pieta* in the *Commedia,* Dante appears to bring the meaning closer to pity and compassion, or, *misericordia,* while also acknowledging the Virgilian connotations of the virtue, notably duty towards parents (*Inf.,* XXVI.94, *Par.,* IV.105). Lindheim suggests that *caritas* takes the place of *pietas* in the *Commedia,* while *pietas* becomes pity or *misericordia*.[666] The link between *caritas* and *pietá* in the *Commedia* serves to further Christianise the virtue of *pietá* by assimilating it with duty to God, and *caritas* with duty to parents, therefore separating the two.

In his final mention of *pietá* in the *Commedia,* however, Dante introduces a discrepancy between *misericordia* and *pietá: in te Misericordia, in te pietate* (*Par.,* XXIII.19). This line would recall Dante's earlier work, the *Convivio,* where he calls on Virgil, who differentiates between *misericordia* and *pieta*. Virgil explains that *pietas,* Aeneas' most praiseworthy quality, is a Stoicly measured subset of *misericordia,* signifying compassion, and is 'a noble disposition of the mind, ready to receive love, pity and other emotions arising out of charity'.[667] This shows *pietas* to be an essence of character, rather than a set of behaviours, which we see in the *Aeneid.* It also removes classical objects to which *pietas* is due, such as parents, country and gods, in favour of spirituality. Based on this passage in the *Convivio,* in *Paradiso,* we may understand *pietá* as a higher aspect of *misericordia.*

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[663] Adkins, 2019, p. 171. Ball (1991, p. 19) confirms that for Dante *pietá* signifies 'pity, compassion'.
[664] *Inferno:*
Pieta as pity: II.5, V.72, V.93, V.140, XX.8, XXVI.94, XXIX.44.
Pieta as compassion: IV.21.
Pieta as sorrow or misery: I.21, II.106, VII.97, XIII.36, XIII.84, XVIII.22.
Pieta as both sorrow and pity: VI.2.
Pieta as duty to wife and father: XXVI.94.
Purgatorio:
Pieta as pity: V.87, VI.116, XIII.64, XXX.81.
Pieta as mercy: X.93.
Pieta as compassion: XI.37, XV.114.
Paradiso:
Pieta as filial piety: IV.105
Pieta as pity and compassion: XXIII.19.
These figures were gained from an electronically conducted search of each individual canto.
[665] *Inf.,* XXX.9; *Par.,* IV.105, XVII.47.
[666] Lindheim, 1990. Lindheim (1990, p. 23) draws on *Paradiso,* XIV.64-66 to support this assertion, in which we see *cari* signify duty and care for mothers and fathers.
[667] *Convivio,* II.10.

Thus, in the *Commedia,* we see Dante relegate the values of classical *pietas* to *caritas* and move the connotations of *pietá* towards a measured pity and compassion with the underlying implication of duty to God.

Dante's treatment of the poet Virgil as a character in the *Commedia* further supports his aim to Christianise the *Aeneid*. Although Dante attributes all knowledge to Virgil, calling him *quell savio gentil, che tutto seppe* (*Inf.,* VII.3), Virgil's authority only extends to the 'description of historical events and the fullest vision of the world before the revelation put forward by Christianity'.[668] As in the *Exposition* and the *Commentum,* it is clear in the *Commedia* that Virgil himself is not a Christian, however, the *Aeneid* shows compatibility with Christianity.[669] Additionally, Dante has the poet Virgil repeat Christian truths and attest to the power of God, strengthening the case for a Christian interpretation of the *Aeneid.*[670] Thus, Dante's work offers an 'imaginative recreation of the *Aeneid* for a larger audience' in his own time period, which we will see again in Milton's *PL*.[671] Both Dante and Milton imbue the *Aeneid* with Christian meaning. As Dante's allegorical *Commedia* did in the fourteenth century, Milton's epic *PL* offers a Christianising reading of the *Aeneid* that fits with the worldview and cultural attitudes of its own era in the seventeenth century. Like preceding allegorical interpretations of the *Aeneid, PL* 'is enmeshed inextricably in the religious context and worship practices of its own age'[672]

The opening line of *PL* alludes to the classical epic tradition.[673] In its structure and its beginning in *in medias res, PL* aligns with classic epics, in particular, with Virgil's *Aeneid.*[674] As Lewalski notes, 'almost everyone agrees that *Paradise Lost* is an epic whose closest structural affinities are to Virgil's *Aeneid*, and that it undertakes in some fashion to redefine classical heroism in Christian terms'.[675] These heroic parallels are complicated, and call into question the values of classical epic heroes.[676] Milton's allusions to the

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[668] Shapiro, 1989, p. 22.
[669] Hollander, 1991; Jacoff and Schnapp, 1991; Lansing, 2010; Kallendorf, 2015.
[670] Corbett, 2018. This is supported by *Purgatorio,* XXVI.104-114, where Virgil admits to the supremacy of God, and that God is the reason for human existence.
[671] Kallendorf, 2015, p. 76.
[672] King, 2000, p. 13.
[673] Martindale, 2011; Fallon, 2014; Kilgour, 2014; Stevens, 2014. Like Homer's μῆνιν (*Il.,* I.1) and ἄνδρα (*Od.,* I.1), and Virgil's *arma* (I.1), Milton opens his epic with his main subject matter 'Of man's first disobedience' (*PL,* I.1).
[674] Bush, 1952; King, 2000; Lewis, 2005; Butler, 2006; Kallendorf, 2007; Martindale, 2011; Fallon, 2014; Kilgour, 2014; Quint, 2014; Shoulson, 2014; Stevens, 2014; Corns, 2016.
[675] Lewalski, 2006, p. 113. This ambition to celebrate Christian heroes over the pagan heroes of Homer and Virgil is clear in *PL,* IX.25-41. Martindale (2011) and Corns (2016), however, suggest that the initial 10 book format of *PL* signifies Milton's intention to associate *PL* with Lucan's *BC,* but that the eventual 12 book structure is distinctly Virgilian.
[676] Hollander, 1989; Forsyth, 2014.

Aeneid far surpass those to Homer, and 'the latinate syntax of Milton's English reinforces the impression that the spirit of Roman poetry lives on in Milton's verse'.[677] Milton's *PL* also demonstrates engagement with Dante's *Commedia,* drawing on Virgil's poetic authority while showing the intention to surpass the ancient poet in his own work through his loftier and Christian subject matter.[678] Milton enlists biblical passages for moral support, and, as Shoulson identifies, 'always and everywhere acknowledges his poem's origins in biblical authority'.[679] Milton may utilise the classic epic structure, yet it becomes clear that his intention is to write 'a Christian epic within a classical frame'.[680] In this, there emerges a 'tension between the Christian plot and the classical subtexts'.[681] Ultimately, through his use of Roman forms, Milton applies classical models to contemporary life.[682]

Allegory functions in two distinct ways in *PL.* On the one hand, we see an example of 'the humanist conception of a sustained moral allegory underlying an entire epic poem'.[683] On the other hand, we see intermittent episodes of allegory throughout the epic. Roughly one fifth to one fourth of the lines in *PL* are 'overtly allegorical', 'visions' or 'pure fantasy'.[684] Many passages in *PL* appear to align directly with episodes in the *Aeneid*.[685] There are many levels to this allegorical engagement, as at times Aeneas appears an analogue for Satan (although eventually Satan becomes a clear parallel for Turnus), at times Adam and at times the Son.[686] There is an evident parallel between Aeneas and Satan in their actions in war, however, Aeneas is a man of *pietas* because he acts in service of fate and Rome, while Satan is *impius* because he is acting for his own selfish gain.[687] Aeneas aligns with Adam and the Son in their shared Stoic demeanours. Along with his allegorical allusions to

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[677] Corns, 2016, p. 92. There is also evidence of Milton's engagement with Virgil's earlier works, for example, Kilgour (2014, pp. 58 and 64) avers that the Garden of Eden in *PL* recalls Virgil's *Eclogues* and *Georgics*.
[678] King, 2000; Wallace, 2007; Martindale, 2011; Corns, 2016. As Wallace (2007) notes, 'no other English poet before Milton produces anything that rewards close comparison with the text of the *Commedia*'.
[679] Shoulson, 2014, p. 78.
[680] Corns, 2016, p. 92.
[681] Kilgour, 2014, p. 62. Of this, Kilgour (2014, p. 62) remarks that the *Aeneid* provided Milton with 'alternative myths of fall and redemption, exile and return, and contrasting models for the epic hero'. Shoulson (2014) additionally addresses this tension.
[682] Martindale (2011) and Quint (2014) detail Milton's engagement with classic epic structures.
[683] Treip, 1994, p. 132.
[684] Treip (1994, p. 126). Treip (1994, pp. 126-167) details this more extensively in the chapter 'Debts to Renaissance Allegory in *Paradise Lost* and Allegory and "Idea" in *Paradise Lost*'. Corns (2016, p. 477) expands on the many layers of allegory in Milton's work.
[685] For example, Satan's disbelief at Beelzebub echoes Aeneas' vision of Hector (*PL,* I.75-87; *Aen.,* II.270-295). As Forsyth (2014, p. 20) notes, this 'both establishes a parallel between the heroes of the two epics and invites us to consider differences'. Additional analogous lines include *PL* I.125-126 and *Aeneid* I.208-209.
[686] Forsyth (2014) suggests that this contradiction is deliberate from Milton, and discusses its effect on the reader's interpretation.
[687] Butler, 2006.

the *Aeneid,* Milton incorporates elements of the Bible, supporting the scriptural authority of the poem and perhaps suggesting that the Bible and the *Aeneid* may be interpreted analogously in a single work.[688] *PL* aligns with the classic epics with respect to 'epic form' and 'literary conventions', however, 'nearly all of its central stories, themes, and characters are drawn from biblical materials'.[689] Certain elements from Greek and Roman mythology in *PL* may also be 'seen as a parallel to, analogous with, or an imperfect recollection of, some incident in biblical history, which is true history'.[690] In this, Milton invites an interpretation of the *Aeneid* that aligns with scripture, or, a reading of the *Aeneid* as a quasi-scriptural text.

In addition to the Bible and the classical epics, Milton's scholarly debt to Stoic authors has not gone unnoticed, and this is relevant to his treatment of Virgilian *pietas*. Stoicism reportedly came back into fashion in the Renaissance, and aspects of Stoicism are detectable in *PL*.[691] According to Corns, 'it has been argued with force that Milton owed much to Roman Stoic writers, whose creed […] was precisely an inner fortitude'.[692] These Stoic writers were Virgil and Lucan. This 'inner fortitude' is characteristic of Virgilian *pietas* as well as Dante's *pietá*.[693] In *PL,* Milton attributes this quality of 'inner fortitude' to Adam and the Son. In these characters, piety, or *pietie,* represents a Christian answer to Stoic philosophy that preserves the supremacy of reason. We see this in Adam (*PL,* XI.360-66), as Pallister explains:

> Adam must embrace a Stoic acceptance of his lot, an emotional equilibrium that will reassert the claim of reason, overthrown by the Fall. Its goal, as we shall see, is not the eradication of the emotions but their steady government, a state of mind achieved along the lines of a Christian response to Stoicism, which asserts the propriety of certain emotions, even strong ones, that are conducive to piety.[694]

Here, Adam shows the same Stoic acceptance of fate that is characteristic of Virgil's Aeneas. In *PL,* Milton uses piety, *pietie,* to signify reverence for God.[695] This *pietie* depends on a Stoic inner fortitude and measured state of mind in service to God. Thus,

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[688] Shoulson, 2014; Corns, 2016.
[689] Shoulson, 2014, p. 68. Shoulson (2014, pp. 68-70) reminds us, however, of the ways in which Milton's Bible would have been very different to our modern understandings of the Bible. Shoulson (2014, p. 70) notes that it is likely Milton 'knew the 1539 Great Bible, the 1568 Bishop's Bible, and even the 1610 Catholic Douay-Rheims version' and that 'we can be even more confident that he was familiar with the 1560 Geneva Bible', but that it is well established that 'Milton's English Bible translation of choice was the King James, or Authorised, Version, first published in 1611, when he was just two or three years old'.
[690] Corns, 2016, p. 92.
[691] Schildgen (2001, p. 59) discusses the resurgence of Stoicism in the Renaissance.
[692] Corns, 2016, p. 46.
[693] I have discussed this and how it applies to Aeneas in **2.3.1**.
[694] Pallister, 2008, p. 139.
[695] *PL*: VI.144, XI.452, XI.799, XII.322.

Milton preserves the Stoic implications of Virgilian *pietas* while also representing it as a distinctly Christian virtue. Building on the work of earlier Christian authors such as Lactantius and Augustine, Milton manipulates the obligations under Virgilian *pietas* to represent only duty to the one true Christian God, shifting 'interpersonal allegiance away from earthly political and cultural formations to the mystical church instead, so that the epic ethos of community becomes wholly spiritualized'. [696] The communal essence of Virgilian *pietas* signifies allegiance to God. In this way, Milton has built on the work of his predecessors, significantly contributing to the development of Virgilian *pietas* into modern understandings of Christian piety, or, *pietie,* to God, while preserving the Stoic essence of Virgil's virtue. This testifies to ideological intrigue and perseverance of Virgil's foundation epic, inherent in its unique representation of *pietas*.

7.5 Conclusion

Considering the works of Horace and Ovid, the other two foremost poets of the Augustan age, we are able to see how Virgilian *pietas* was interpreted immediately after the circulation of the *Aeneid*. In Horace's *Odes* and Ovid's *Metamorphoses,* we see engagement with the material of the *Aeneid* and a commentary on Virgilian *pietas* that begins to bring it away from the distinctly Stoic masculine virtue of the *Aeneid.* In the *Odes,* we grasp the futility of *pietas,* and in the *Metamorphoses,* we realise the weakness of it; in both texts we see that *pietas* is susceptible to *furor.* This characterisation of *pietas* as vulnerable to *furor* and open to distortion persists in Lucan's Stoicly motivated *BC.* In *BC,* however, we also begin to glimpse Christian connotations of the virtue as Lucan introduces the notion of *vera pietas* and links *pietas* with *fides.*

Looking forward to Lactantius' *Institutes* and Augustan's *Civitas Dei,* both written for educated pagan audiences, we can appreciate how the association of *pietas* with *fides* and the notion of *vera pietas* developed within Christian apologetic literature. In the *Institutes,* Lactantius uses philosophical language to convey Christian ideals. He engages with Virgilian *pietas* and distorts the meaning to signify obedience to the one true God, rejecting Virgil's Stoicly oriented system of duty towards parents, the state and the gods. Building on the work of Lactantius, in the *Civitas Dei,* Augustine also attempts to reconcile religion and philosophy in order to convince his readers of the superiority of Christianity, the true religion of reason. Augustine continues this manipulation of Virgilian

[696] Borris, 2000, p. 238.

pietas to mean duty towards the one true God at all times, engaging with Virgil directly to correct his misplaced pagan *pietas* for a Christian audience. From reading these works, we may deduce that the underlying message of the *Aeneid* is in fact a combination of theology and philosophy that resonates in some ways with more modern Christian teachings, which were themselves in many ways also a combination of theology and philosophy.

Beginning with Fulgentius, the tradition of reading the *Aeneid* as a moral allegory follows on the works of Lactantius and Augustine, in whose texts we may also identify allegorical elements. In the works of Fulgentius, Bernardus Silvestris, Dante and Milton, we see how moral allegorical interpretations of the *Aeneid* allow for readings of the poem that suit the authors' own time periods and cultural circumstances, as well as revealing new layers of meaning to Virgil's epic. The tradition of reading the *Aeneid* as a moral allegory additionally shows its ideological versatility and appeal over the past two millennia. This enigmatic theological and philosophical flexibility, and its particular appeal to and adaptation by Christianity, has ensured the preservation and enduring legacy of the *Aeneid*.

Pietas forms the ideological centre of the *Aeneid*. These later interpretations demonstrate not just the appeal of Virgil's virtue, but the malleability of *pietas* to suit particular eras and belief systems, emphasising that Virgil's Stoic masculine *pietas* represents an interpolation in the long history of the virtue.[697] The ideological appeal of the *Aeneid* finds its origins in Virgil's Stoic representation of *pietas,* in which the ideological coherence of the epic is manifested. Analysing receptions of Virgilain *pietas* in later authors shows how the ideology represented in it shifts with the arrival of Christianity. Inevitably, any reader of the *Aeneid* will interpret Virgilian *pietas* in the circumstances of his or her own time period. The diversity of later interpretations and renderings of the *Aeneid* shows that there are infinite layers of meaning to be discovered in the poem. As Treip notes, 'many will read *Paradise Lost,* or the *Aeneid,* for its story; but learned men will recognise in both something more'.[698] By employing a research method informed by *Begriffsgeschichte* to follow the treatment of Virgilian *pietas* through later authors, we can identify how connotations of *pietas* have evolved, and how the ideological appeal of the virtue has contributed to the continued impact, preservation and legacy of Virgil's *Aeneid.*

[697] Interestingly, it becomes clear that while definitions of *pietas* have remained flexible, interpretations of its antonym, *impietas*, have stayed comparatively fixed. Garrison (1987, p. 199) identifies that while 'historically, *clemency* and *mercy* displace derivatives of the Latin *pietas* to express political ideals in English', 'such displacement does not occur in the negative, as *impious* and *impiety* do not just survive, but indeed thrive as terms of opprobrium for rebels and tyrants'.

[698] Treip, 1994, p. 165. Shoulson (2014) supports this assertion.

Chapter 8. Conclusion

Virgil's *Aeneid* is a critical text for understanding Roman identity and Roman history in the Augustan regime. Its enduring literary legacy over the last two millennia demonstrates that its narrative is captivating to readers beyond those in Virgil's Rome. In the *Aeneid,* Virgil manages to produce a work of cultural, mythical history for Rome to rival the place of Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in Greece, with a hero distinct from Greek predecessors, who embodies the spirit and ethos of the Augustan regime through his consistent Stoic embodiment of *pietas*.[699] Virgil's coherent and sustained focus on a Stoicly motivated *pietas* marks his intervention in the genre of historical epic and the concept of *pietas. Pietas* forms the nucleus of the *Aeneid*'s ideological coherence. It symbolises Virgil's vision of masculine Roman identity in the Augustan regime.

Virgil represents *pietas* as a Stoic quality, and he introduces a hero whose Stoic allegiance to fate and subversion of personal feelings underline his *pietas*. In the *Aeneid,* a Stoic adherence to his fate to reach Latium and a mastery of his emotions characterises the *pietas* of Aeneas at all times, although occasionally this manifests as *pietas* towards his family or his country. Over the course of his journey, we observe Aeneas develop into a Stoic hero, more measured and less emotional than his Homeric counterparts. Virgil's exploitation of Aeneas' personal drama demonstrates how philosophy and ideology can work together within an individual in the quality of *pietas.* Virgil's vision of *pietas* introduces a moral code of behaviour for its age, offering an example of a man who embodies it fully in Aeneas. Unlike representations of *pietas* before and after the Augustan regime the *Aeneid* presents a unique *pietas* for its particular era by its Stoic and masculine connotations.[700]

In addition to representing *pietas* as the cornerstone of virtue for men in Augustan Rome*,* Virgil also offers us a layered yet coherent representation of the virtue*,* which enhances its Stoic essence. Within the epic, Virgil sets up situations where certain aspects of *pietas* contradict one another, or where the *pietas* of different characters clashes.[701] Upon closer reading of such instances, it is evident that Aeneas' pursuit of his fated mission to reach Latium prevails between any opposing aspects of *pietas,* any conflict of *pietas* between characters and any personal feelings of Aeneas. Aeneas' almost blind devotion to reaching

[699] Clark, 1993; Ferguson, 2003; Bell, 2008. See **2.3.1** for a discussion of how Aeneas differs from his Homeric predecessors with respect to his Stoic nature.
[700] See **2.3.**
[701] Aspects of Aeneas' *pietas* come into conflict most notably in *Aeneid* II, IV and XII (**5.2**, **5.4**). Aeneas' *pietas* opposes that of his father at the end of *Aeneid* II (**5.2.1**), and that of Lausus in *Aeneid* X (**4.2.2**).

Latium, and his willingness to be guided by fate, precipitates the foundation of the future Roman state and drives the plot of the epic. As Ball observes, '*pietas* is both the sign and goal of Aeneas' mission'.[702] In this, Aeneas shows that his Stoic nature is complementary to his *pietas* in that he is entirely driven to fulfil Jupiter's prophecy in *Aeneid* I that he will go on to found the Roman race (I.257-279). Aeneas' *pietas* is a mix of deliberate behaviour and Stoic allegiance to fate, consistent with a philosophical framework of Stoic compatibilism.[703] A Stoic reading of *pietas* gives ideological coherence to both the virtue and the epic.

After showing the demands that *pietas* makes of Aeneas, and the extreme personal sacrifices it requires, in *Aeneid* VI, which according to many shows the superiority of Aeneas' *pietas* and is the apex of *pietas* in the epic*,* Virgil finally reveals to Aeneas and by association his readers a tangible reason to behave in accordance with the tenets of *pietas*.[704] The abstract notion of reward and the visceral threat of punishment in Virgil's underworld reinforces the extent of the consequences for a life lived in accordance with or against *pietas* for the individual. In this, we see an element of faith in the virtue, that there will be a reward for adherence to its codes in the afterlife. *Pietas* is a virtue of civic and communal benefit, which Virgil has managed to package as an individual quality underlined by Stoic values. Through Virgil's engagement with philosophy in *Aeneid* VI, the importance of *pietas* for the Augustan regime becomes clear, and we see the ideological coherence of the epic and its continued appeal.

Contemporary and later authors invert and distort this notion of communal and Stoic Virgilian *pietas*. Horace's *Odes,* Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and Lucan's *BC* show us worlds where Virgilian *pietas* appears futile for the individual, may be manipulated for personal gain or nefarious purposes and can be easily overcome by fear, anger and bloodlust. However, in the work of later authors, such as Lactantius and Augustine, we also see how Virgil's Stoic rendering of *pietas* in the *Aeneid* is inverted to mean *pietas* towards God; *pietas* between father and son becomes *pietas* between man and God, duty to the state becomes duty to God, allegiance to fate becomes allegiance to God. This gives a Christian context to the *Aeneid,* and helps to bring the epic into a time period characterised by Christianity. Augustine's allusions to Virgil 'illustrate the cultural status of Virgil in late

[702] Ball, 1991, p. 24.
[703] See **2.2.1** for a discussion of Stoic compatibilism in the *Aeneid.*
[704] Pöschl, 1962; Otis, 1963; Heinze, 1982.

antiquity', and show a willingness of Christian authors to engage with the text.[705] Building on the texts of Lactantius and Augustine, Fulgentius, Bernardus Silvestris, Dante and Milton offer moral allegorical interpretations of the *Aeneid* that align it with the Christian religious beliefs of their own respective eras. Each author engages with Virgil's Stoicly motivated *pietas,* translating it to signify some sort of Christian piety towards God.

The representations of *pietas* in Christian authors have contributed to the distortion of the virtue from its Stoic and civic Virgilian connotations into what we might now think of as Christian piety. Meanings and implications of the word, the virtue and its associations have shifted with time, circumstance, political regime and evolution of language, as is inevitable with the passage of over two thousand years. As such, the definition of piety or pious that modern readers are most likely familiar with bears little to no resemblance to Virgilian *pietas* or the epithet *pius,* despite phonetic similarities. According to Garrison, 'adoption of the word by Christianity eventually lends it quite different associations with what is private, emotional, humble, meek, feminine', where it had previously been a masculine characteristic.[706] This feminisation of *pietas* brings modern understandings of piety further from Virgilian *pietas*; feminine *pietas* or piety is both erotic and maternal while Virgilian and Augustan *pietas* is distinctly Stoic and masculine.

More than eighty years ago, Strodach identified this incongruity between *pietas* and modern piety:

> *Pietas* in the religious sense never had the connotations of Christian 'piety': disinterested worship or adoration was an act inconceivable to the old Roman. He always expected something in return for his *pietas*, usually the paraphernalia of material prosperity.[707]

Strodach's work shows that concern over this conflation has existed for nearly a century. As Michels notes more recently, this ancient *pietas* refers 'far more often to a code of behaviour between human beings than to an attitude towards the gods', as it has been represented in authors such as Augustine.[708] This inevitable modern association of *pietas* with piety is quite likely to the detriment of Virgil's ascription of this virtue to his hero

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[705] Clark, 2019, p. 86.
[706] Garrison, 1987, p. 255. For example, in his *Confessions, Augustine* opens with a discussion of *pietas* with respect to his mother (*Conf.,* I.11.17).
[707] Strodach, 1936, p. 141. See Tawney's (2017) more current *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, for a greater discussion of the relationship between piety and material wealth, which identifies material well-being as the sign of the godly and the pious in the Protestant tradition. According to Tawney (2017), wealth is portrayed as a sign of piety while lack of resources is analogous to lack of piety.
[708] Michels, 1997, p. 405. This is also the case for Fulgentius, Bernardus Silvestris, Dante and Milton.

because of the connotations of smug self-righteousness that are sometimes associated with the words pious or piety.[709] More than two thousand years of passing time and changing conditions have undoubtedly had an effect on how readers through different ages have understood *pietas* and its function in the *Aeneid* and in their own societies.

Despite the inherent issues in reading *pietas* as analogous to piety, the coherent ideological power of *pietas* in the *Aeneid* is responsible for the preservation of the text because it helped to endear the epic to Christian scholars who were responsible for its preservation. Modifications and cultural nuances inherent in the meaning of *pietas* affect how authors and readers through the ages have interpreted, and will continue to interpret, the concept. The feminisation of *pietas* and its suggestion of both pity and piety in modern languages have altered and perhaps even usurped the masculine associations of Virgilian *pietas* with filial and civic duty. As modern readers of the *Aeneid*, our understanding of *pietas* cannot help but be touched by more than two thousand years of influence on the word between its usage in Virgil's *Aeneid* and its current connotations. In addition to the effect that these various societal changes and upheavals inevitably have on a reader's conceptualization of *pietas*, they will also influence how a reader will perceive Virgil's hero Aeneas, and evaluate his actions with regard to *pietas* throughout the *Aeneid*.

Pietas in Virgil's *Aeneid,* like modern adaptations of it, is specific to its time period. It is civic oriented and distinctly Stoic. Perhaps, then, the *Aeneid* reflects Virgil's vision for a consistent and ideologically coherent political environment in which citizens serve their state above all things, a desirable alternative to the period of turmoil that predated the Augustan regime. Virgil's representation of *pietas* contributes to his vision for the Roman state, and the idea of individual sacrifice in service to that state. In *Aeneid* VI*,* Virgil shows the importance of subsuming the individual to the collective, which is inherent in his Stoic *pietas*. In *Aeneid* VI, Virgil introduces of individual rewards for a life lived in accordance with *pietas.* Thus he introduces a faith element to *pietas,* and imbues the *Aeneid* with an ideological legacy and a hero for Roman citizens to aspire to. This Stoicly coherent ideological message encapsulated in Virgilian *pietas* has endeared the *Aeneid* to later Christian authors, and it has ensured the preservation and continued study of the *Aeneid* as a quasi-scriptural text from its composition to present day.

[709] Michels, 1997, p. 405.

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