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# **The role of historical experiences in determining cultural preferences for domestic military deployments in Britain and France**

**Jack Harding**

Supervised by: Professor Beatrice Heuser and Professor Peter Jackson

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in  
Politics and International Relations

School of Social and Political Sciences, College of Social Sciences

**University of Glasgow**

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## Abstract

*This thesis examines the role of historical experiences in guiding cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces for maintaining domestic security in Britain and France. It finds that in recent years the level of threat from Islamist terrorism faced by both states has been comparable and yet two distinct sets of strategic preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically have emerged. To understand these differences this thesis poses three core questions: first, do Britain and France's cultural preferences for acceptance or rejection of domestic military deployments derive from the perception of the national historical experience? Second, do these cultural preferences have a constraining effect on strategic behaviour? And third, if evidence of historically-derived cultural constraint can be found, what accounts for episodes of change in strategy over time?*

*It hypothesises that these preferences stem from their respective strategic cultures. These strategic cultures have been cultivated through a series of 'formative moments' in their past which constrain their behaviour in the present. Changes in strategy will occur in the event of a receptive cultural environment and a strong leader and institutions who are capable of enacting change. However, enduring cultural preferences will always be evident in strategic behaviour. This thesis addresses the subject through a unique methodology that combines qualitative and quantitative techniques. First by charting all significant domestic deployments between 1800 and 2019 and coding each deployment according to its purpose, it seeks to identify the 'formative moments' in Britain and France's past that may be guiding their cultural preferences. Then, over a thousand speeches and statements from British and French policymakers at each formative moment are analysed and compared in order to trace enduring cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically over time.*

*Ultimately, the purpose of this thesis is to understand the nexus between history, culture, and behaviour and its constancy or temporality over time. After all, if the trend in the modern era towards deploying the military on the national territory to fulfil a wide variety of tasks continues, it will be essential to understand the cultural sensitivities attached to domestic deployments and the conditions under which they may be deemed acceptable.*

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

BAC	<i>Brigade Anti-criminalité</i>
BRI	<i>Recherche et d'Intervention</i>
CENTAC	<i>le Centre d'Entraînement au Combat</i>
CENZUB	<i>le Centre d'Entraînement aux Actions en Zone Urbaine</i>
COBR(A)	<i>Cabinet Office Briefing Room (A)</i>
CONTEST	<i>Counter-terrorism Strategy</i>
CRS	<i>Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité</i>
CRW	<i>Counter Revolutionary Warfare</i>
DCDC	<i>Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre</i>
DCRI	<i>Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur</i>
DGSE	<i>Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure</i>
DICoD	<i>Defense Information and Communication Delegation</i>
DIT	<i>Défense Intérieure du Territoire</i>
DOT	<i>Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire</i>
DST	<i>Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire</i>
DSTL	<i>Defence Science and Technology Laboratory</i>
FARL	<i>Fractions Armées Révolutionnaires Libanaises</i>
FLN	<i>Front de Libération Nationale</i>
GIA	<i>Groupe Islamique Armé</i>
GIGN	<i>Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale</i>
GMR	<i>Groupes Mobiles de Reserve</i>
GSG9	<i>Grenzschutzgruppe 9</i>
IS	<i>Islamic State</i>
JTAC	<i>Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre</i>
MACA	<i>Military Aid to the Civil Authority</i>

MACC	<i>Military Aid to the Civil Community</i>
MACP	<i>Military Aid to the Civil Power</i>
MAGD	<i>Military Aid to other Government Departments</i>
MISSINT	<i>Missions Intérieure (Internal Missions)</i>
MPA	<i>Metropolitan Police Authority</i>
NSCR	<i>National Security Capability Review</i>
OAS	<i>Organisation Armée Secrete</i>
OPEX	<i>Opérations Extérieure (External Operations)</i>
OTIAD	<i>Organisation Territoriale Interarmées de Défense</i>
PCF	<i>Parti communiste français</i>
PLO	<i>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</i>
PSIG	<i>Pelotons de Surveillance et d'intervention de la Gendarmerie</i>
RAID	<i>Recherche, Assistance, Intervention, Dissuassion</i>
RAF	<i>Rote Armee Fraktion</i>
RG	<i>Renseignements Générau</i>
RPF	<i>Rassemblement du Peuple Français</i>
SAS	<i>Special Air Service</i>
SDAT	<i>Sous-direction anti-terroriste</i>
TA	<i>Territorial Army</i>
TLACP	<i>Training and Logistic Assistance to the Civil Power</i>
WRAC	<i>Women's Royal Army Corps</i>

*For Ayan,*

*«Тайна человеческого существования  
заключается не в том, чтобы  
остаться в живых, а в том, чтобы  
найти то, ради чего можно жить»*

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## **Declaration**

“I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.”

Printed Name: Jack Andrew Harding

Signature:

# Chapter 1 - Introduction

*'The past is never dead. It's not even past.'*

William Faulkner, *Requiem for a Nun*, 1951

In June 2016, the French politicians Olivier Audibert-Troin and Christophe Léonard argued in a parliamentary report that 'in terms of the employment of the armed forces on the national territory, Western democracies have adopted different systems, largely determined by their history.'<sup>1</sup> These 'different systems' for the use of the armed forces internally have been particularly evident in Britain and France's respective responses to the perceived threat of Islamist terrorism post-2015. In France, a 'long-lasting'<sup>2</sup> mass deployment of the army under *Opération Sentinelle* has been implemented, while in 2017 in Britain there was an 'absolutely temporary',<sup>3</sup> *ad hoc* engagement of the armed forces under Operation Temperer.

This goes to the heart of what this thesis intends to explore: first, as Audibert-Troin and Léonard's report suggests, whether Britain and France's cultural preferences for acceptance or rejection of domestic military deployments do indeed derive from the perception of the national historical experience? Second, whether these cultural preferences have a constraining effect on strategic behaviour? And third, if evidence of historically-derived cultural constraint can be found, what accounts for episodes of change in strategy over time?

This thesis adopts a novel approach in answer to these questions. First, it will chart hundreds of significant domestic military deployments in Britain and France since 1800 in order to identify a series of 'formative moments'<sup>4</sup> in each state's past. At each of these formative moments, based on the assumption that language is a mode of cultural expression and will therefore reflect the norms and values of the state, the rhetoric of key policymakers concerning the use of the armed forces is analysed to ascertain what the preferences for the

---

<sup>1</sup> Audibert Troin, Olivier & Léonard, Christophe. 'Sur la présence et l'emploi des forces armées sur le territoire national'. Assemblée Nationale. Rapport d'Information, N° 3864. Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, 22 June 2016, p. 58

<sup>2</sup> Drian, Jean-Yves le. 'Rapport au Parlement relatif aux conditions d'emploi des forces armées lorsqu'elles interviennent sur le territoire national pour protéger la population.' *Sénat*, Séance du 15 mars 2016.

<sup>3</sup> Operation Temperer: Everything you need to know, *ITV Report*, 24 May 2017. See: <https://www.itv.com/news/2017-05-24/operation-temperer-will-see-armed-forces-deployed-on-streets/> (accessed 25/05/2017)

<sup>4</sup> This thesis defines a formative moment as an incident involving the domestic deployment of the armed forces that led to either a dramatic increase, or a dramatic decrease in the number of deployments for that particular purpose thereafter. It can be thought of a branch point that has led to either a continuation or shift in strategy.

use of the armed forces were at the time; in total over five hundred speeches and statements are analysed for each state. The cultural preferences expressed in the language at each formative moment are then compared to derive evidence of enduring cultural themes and historical influences over time. Further evidence of cultural preferences for the army's role is then found in the representations of the military through a series of recruitment campaigns. Finally, the extent to which evidence of historically derived cultural constraint can be found in the strategic behaviour of Britain and France is examined by investigating the integration of the military into each state's counter-terrorism architecture from the 1970s culminating in operations *Temperer* and *Sentinelle*.

That historical experiences are important in guiding preferences for the use of force domestically is reflected in the large body of literature on strategic culture, particularly the work of the Anglo-American scholar Colin S. Gray. He argued that strategy, or particular strategies, are not selected willingly by a polity from a menu of strategic choices,<sup>5</sup> but rather will derive from that state's perception of the past, the interpretation of the meaning of particular historical experiences, and a subconscious sense of what constitutes the most appropriate course of action.<sup>6</sup> This implies that culture sits at the centre of the nexus between historical experience and behaviour, serving as the 'perceptual lens'<sup>7</sup> through which we view and interpret the world; not only will it colour our behavioural preferences in the present and for the future, but it will also influence the lessons we choose to learn from the past.

It is this perspective that will be adopted in this thesis. Clearly, the study of culture is fraught with difficulties, not least those of definition and causality and this thesis does not set out to wade into the long-standing debate between cultural and historical determinism. Rather, it will argue that the divergent cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces post-2015 that can be observed in Britain and France may well be a function of different perceptions of the national historical experience. For the purpose of this thesis, these dissimilar approaches will be referred to as their strategic cultures, defined here as *the set of actions*,

---

<sup>5</sup> See also: Porter, Patrick. *Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2009) - Here he also uses the analogy of a menu of strategic choices within the specific realm of warfighting to argue that strategic choices are not immutable but will change over time.

<sup>6</sup> Gray, Colin S. 'British and American Strategic Cultures', paper prepared for Jamestown symposium 2007: 'Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years of Transatlantic Engagement', 18-19 April 2007, p. 37; Gray, Colin S. 'National Style in Strategy, The American Example', *International Security*, Fall 1981, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 22

<sup>7</sup> Snyder, Jack L. 'The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations', *RAND Corporation*, September 1977, p.v. See also the anthropologist Franz Boas' assertion that we wear 'Kulturbrille', 'cultural lenses' which influence the way we see the world. Boas, Franz. *The History of Anthropology*. *Science*, October 1904, vol. 20, no. 512, p. 517

*habits, preferences and expectations concerning the use of force resulting from the collective perception of the national historical experience.*

Clearly, strategic culture cannot be considered the only factor at play in guiding state responses. For example, some studies such as that of Jeremy Shapiro and Daniel Byman contend that cultural arguments reduce the problem of why states respond differently to ‘unhelpful stereotypes’ and instead the different capabilities and resources of a state account for divergent responses.<sup>8</sup> Other studies, such as that of Xinsheng Liu *et al.*, insist that policy preferences depend on social-economic-political characteristics and threat perceptions.<sup>9</sup>

Given the claims outlined by Shapiro, Byman, and Liu, what follows is a brief discussion of Britain and France’s use of the armed forces on the national territory post-2015, the responses by certain policymakers in justification of their responses, and the overarching opinions of the general population. It intends to explore whether arguments for divergent behaviour based on factors such as capabilities, resources and threat perceptions are more valid or whether each state seems to have instead adopted their own idiosyncratic responses that run contrary to assumptions that behaviour may be a function of rational, goal-oriented, and largely acultural action.

### **1.1. Similar threat, different responses**

In the wake of the terrorist attack in Paris on 13 November 2015, the Modern Left senator Jean-Marie Bockel, stated that there had been ‘a substantial change in the nature and scale of the threat targeting [the] national territory’<sup>10</sup> On the nature and severity of the threat presented by Islamist extremism, Britain and France agree. Between 2001 and 2018 they have experienced seventy attacks at the hands of groups inspired by the Salafist tradition (twenty-two in Britain, forty-eight in France).<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, according to data available on the Global Terrorism Database, both the targets of the attacks and the means used by

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<sup>8</sup> Shapiro, Jeremy and Byman, Daniel. ‘Bridging the transatlantic counterterrorism gap’, *Washington Quarterly*, 29:4, Autumn 2006, pp. 33-50

<sup>9</sup> Liu, Xinsheng; Mumpower, Jeryl L.; Portney, Kent E.; Vedlitz, Arnold. ‘Perceived Risk of Terrorism and Policy Preferences for Government Counterterrorism Spending: Evidence From a U.S. National Panel Survey’, *Risks, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy*, March 2019, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 102-135

<sup>10</sup> Bockel, Jean-Marie. 10 - Rapport au Parlement relatif aux conditions d’emploi des forces armées lorsqu’elles interviennent sur le territoire national pour protéger la population’, *Sénat*, Séance du 15 mars 2016. See: [https://www.senat.fr/seances/s201603/s20160315/s20160315\\_mono.html](https://www.senat.fr/seances/s201603/s20160315/s20160315_mono.html) (accessed 07/06/2018)

<sup>11</sup> Author’s calculations based on data gathered from the Global Terrorism Database. See: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/> (accessed 07/06/2018)



terrorists have overlapped: the government, the military, the police, private citizens and property, religious figures and institutions, and transportation have all been targeted since 2001 in both of these states with vehicles, knives, firearms, and bombs (including suicide) all being used at some stage and often in combination.<sup>12</sup>

This convergence in the nature of the threat is also reflected clearly in each state's threat perception. The Pew Research Center found that, in Britain and France, Islamic State ranked as the greatest threat in 2016 and 2017.<sup>13</sup> In addition to these comparable threat perceptions, the capabilities of each state also compare: each is a liberal democracy with comparable GDPs, army sizes, and police and intelligence capabilities (see table 1).

Table 1. French and British resources and capabilities, compared.

	<b>France</b>	<b>Britain</b>
GDP per Capita – US \$ (2019) <sup>14</sup>	49.4 thousand	48.7 thousand
Population (2020) <sup>15</sup>	65.3 million	67.9 million
Active Service Personnel (2016) <sup>16</sup>	203,000	153,000
Defence Expenditure (2019) <sup>17</sup>	\$ 52.3 billion	\$ 54.8 billion
Police per 100,000 people <sup>18</sup>	340	267 <sup>19</sup> (2017)

For Byman, Shapiro or Liu, the overlap between these preconditions should imply similar responses. Yet distinct approaches by the two countries to the threat have emerged,

<sup>12</sup> Firearms have been used in Britain post-2001, although not successfully. The only occasion when use of a firearm in a terrorist attack was attempted was in 2013 after Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebawale killed Lee Rigby. When the police arrived on the scene, Adebawale aimed and fired a non-functioning revolver at the police, which exploded in his hand. The police subsequently opened fire at Adebawale, injuring him.

<sup>13</sup> PEW Survey, July 2016. See: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/13/europeans-see-isis-climate-change-as-most-serious-threats/>  
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/01/globally-people-point-to-isis-and-climate-change-as-leading-security-threats/> (accessed 02/08/2017)

<sup>14</sup> World Bank. 'GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$) - France, United Kingdom'. See: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=FR-GB> (accessed 12/08/2020)

<sup>15</sup> Countries in the World by Population. See: <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/> (accessed September 2017)

<sup>16</sup> Chalmers, Malcolm. Decision Time: The National Security and Defence Capability Review 2017 – 2018, *Whitehall Report 1 – 18, RUSI*, p. 8

<sup>17</sup> *International Institute for Strategic Studies*. The Military Balance 2020, Top 15 Defence Budgets 2019. See: <https://bit.ly/3kDaR1x> (accessed 12/08/2020)

<sup>18</sup> Key Figures on Europe, 2015 edition, Eurostat Statistical Books. (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015), p. 43

<sup>19</sup> Hargreaves, Jodie; Husband, Hannah; Linehan, Chris. *Police Workforce, England and Wales*, 31 March 2017, Statistical Bulletin 10/17, Home Office. See: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/630471/hosb1017-police-workforce.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/630471/hosb1017-police-workforce.pdf) (accessed 13 July 2017)

particularly in terms of the use the armed forces on the national territory. This is in spite of a convergence in the nature and severity of the threat from radical Islamist groups, comparable threat perceptions from the general public, and similar capabilities and resources; then President François Hollande's response to the November attacks epitomises this:

France is at war. The acts committed Friday evening in Paris and near the Stade de France, are acts of war... They constitute an aggression against our country, against its values, against its youth, against its way of life... We want to invest the Republic with all the necessary force that this new context of war calls for...<sup>20</sup>

In fact, Hollande used the term 'war' fifteen times during this speech in an unequivocal militarisation of the threat. His use of the term 'necessary force' hinted at the government's intention to broaden of the scope of *Opération Sentinelle*, which had first been implemented in January 2015 after the Kouachi brothers attacked the offices of *Charlie Hebdo*. Initially, *Sentinelle* had involved the deployment of 10,000 soldiers in static guarding positions at 830 'sensitive sites' across the country. However, in accordance with the operational contract of December 2013, this number of troops could only be maintained on the national territory for a month.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, the number of service personnel deployed under *Sentinelle* was steadily reduced over the summer.

The attacks in November saw a return to the figure of 10,000 troops, supplemented by thousands of police and *gendarmes*, as well as service personnel from the Air Force and Navy. The troops would no longer be employed in relatively static guarding positions but would take part in dynamic patrols that were similar in character to those carried out on operations abroad. With thousands of heavily armed troops in full battle dress patrolling the streets of France, Hollande's notion of a 'new context of war' and the explicit militarisation of the threat was evident.

In contrast, following the attack on *Charlie Hebdo*, British policymakers had devised a contingency plan in the event of a similar 'marauding' attack on British soil. It would be called Operation Temperer and would allow for the deployment of up to 5,100 troops across the country in order to 'augment armed police officers engaged in protective security

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<sup>20</sup> Hollande, François. Les messages du Président de la République au Parlement, *Sénat*, 16 November 2015. See: <https://www.senat.fr/evenement/archives/D46/hollande.html> (accessed 03/04/2017)

<sup>21</sup> LOI n° 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à 2019 et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense et la sécurité nationale. 1.3.2

duties’.<sup>22</sup> The first time that Operation Temperer was enacted was on 23 May 2017, on the day following the suicide bombing at the MEN Arena in Manchester. In a carefully-worded statement prior to the operation’s implementation, prime minister Theresa May announced that ‘[t]he police have asked for authorisation from the Secretary of State for Defence to deploy a number of military personnel in support of their armed officers’. Clarifying the terms of the operation she stated that

...armed police officers responsible for duties such as guarding key sites will be replaced by members of the armed forces, which will allow the police to significantly increase the number of armed officers on patrol in key locations. You might also see military personnel deployed at certain events, such as concerts and sports matches, helping the police to keep the public safe. In all circumstances, members of the armed forces who are deployed in this way will be under the command of police officers.<sup>23</sup>

Unlike *Sentinelle*, which involves the constant patrolling presence of troops on the national territory, Britain’s approach to the use of the armed forces is more *ad hoc*. Temperer can only be enacted when the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) raises the threat level to ‘Critical’ prompting a COBR(A) (Cabinet Office Briefing Room (A)) briefing where the decision to deploy the military may be taken.<sup>24</sup> Even then, the troops will be subordinate to the civil power on operational matters and their duties remain short term and ‘static’.<sup>25</sup>

Clearly there are significant differences in terms of the practical aspects of *Sentinelle* and Temperer and also in the rhetoric used by policymakers in each state. These differences are also reflected in public preferences on whether or not to use the armed forces for counter-terrorism purposes. In France, according to a 2017 survey that was made public in 2018 by the Defense Information and Communication Delegation (DICO), 83% of those questioned approved of *Sentinelle*.<sup>26</sup> In Britain there seems to be far less public support for the army to play a role in domestic security; a poll conducted by the author in January 2020 found that

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<sup>22</sup> This is a widely-quoted excerpt from the leaked minutes of a meeting of the National Police Chiefs Council in 2015. First released by the Mail on Sunday: Beckford, Martin. ‘Revealed: Secret plan to put 5,000 heavily-armed troops on streets of Britain to fight jihadis in event of a terror attack’, *Mail on Sunday*, 25 July 2015. See: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3174590/Secret-plan-5-000-heavily-armed-troops-streets-Britain-fight-jihadis-event-terror-attack.html?ito=social-facebook> (accessed 21/09/2016)

<sup>23</sup> ‘PM statement following second COBR meeting on Manchester attack’: 23 May 2017, Prime Minister’s Office. See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-following-second-cobr-meeting-on-manchester-attack-23-may-2017> (accessed 24/05/2017)

<sup>24</sup> CONTEST – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, June 2018, HM Government, p. 67

<sup>25</sup> Operation Temperer: Everything you need to know, *ITV Report*, 24 May 2017. See: <https://www.itv.com/news/2017-05-24/operation-temperer-will-see-armed-forces-deployed-on-streets/> (accessed 25/05/2017)

<sup>26</sup> IFOP-DICO, mars 2018. ‘Les chiffres clés de sondages de la Défense’, 14 juillet 2018

among the British public just 39% approve of the use of the armed forces in the event of a terrorist attack.<sup>27</sup>

Evidently there are clear differences not only in the rhetorical responses from key policymakers, but also the practical steps taken for the purposes of countering terrorism and public preferences for the use of the armed forces internally. The reason for these divergences does not seem to be differing resources, capabilities or threat perceptions. The inescapable conclusion is that preferences for the use of the armed forces on the national territory are instead determined by other factors such as the perception of historical experiences and the influence this has on cultural preferences.

## **1.2. The role of history**

Britain and France's historical experiences with the armed forces on the national territory have been very different. France has relied on the armed forces for domestic security to a far greater extent than Britain and for different reasons. For example, while both states have seen episodes of serious civil unrest, in Britain this has usually amounted to large gatherings that were perceived to have become unruly or riots that have been quelled by force, usually at the hands of localised militia or yeomanry units. Arguably the most infamous of these is the massacre at St. Peter's Field (Peterloo massacre) in 1819 which saw eighteen deaths at the hands of the Manchester yeomanry.

Britain's experience with civil unrest stands in stark contrast to the French case. As well as several riots and protests, many of which were far bloodier than Peterloo, France has also experienced several revolutions (in 1789, 1830, 1848 and 1871) that have altered the nation's political landscape. The precedent for the people rising up and toppling the established political order has meant that the suppression of civil disorder or perceived insurrection and revolution in France's history has been particularly harsh. Rather than just localised units such as the *Gendarmerie*, the French state has also felt compelled to deploy thousands of regular troops against the people on dozens of occasions throughout its history and, if the

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<sup>27</sup> A poll conducted by the author while working for Coriolis Technologies on a project on perceptions of national security. Results used with their permission. A representative sample of 1000 participants were surveyed. Survey conducted in January 2020.

highest death toll estimates are taken, then the casualties from France's revolutions are in the hundreds of thousands.<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, unlike Britain, France's armed forces have been required to engage in a number of conflicts on the national territory in its modern history – defined here as post-1800. Since 1800, France has been engaged in six wars that have been fought, at least in part, on the French mainland and have been occupied by enemy forces on five of these occasions.<sup>29</sup> France has also experienced two *coups d'état* since 1800: the first in 1851 and the second in 1958. The latter incident led to an enduring suspicion among French policymakers that the armed forces could act as potential kingmakers due to the army's role in forming the fifth republic. Britain of course experienced something similar during the English Civil War, however, within the time frame of this thesis, Britain has not seen the military play such a direct role in domestic politics – even concerns that the Heathrow deployment in Britain in 1974 was an imminent coup were shown before parliament to be false by Viscount Colville of Culross.<sup>30</sup>

Britain and France have also taken vastly different approaches to the threat of terrorism. In Northern Ireland, Britain initially deployed 21,000 troops under Operation Banner, but then transitioned to an approach that gave more authority to the police and intelligence agencies. In Algeria, in contrast, France's strategy had 'barely any non-military element.'<sup>31</sup> There were further differences in their counter-terror strategies developed in the wake of the attack at the 1972 Munich. Britain and France both formed dedicated counter-terrorist forces that were able to operate domestically; in Britain, the response was to alter the focus of operations of the (now renowned) Special Air Service (SAS) as well as introducing conditions for *ad hoc* military engagement under Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP). In France, it prompted the formation of the military unit known as the *Groupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale* (GIGN) and the creation of a framework for more long-lasting and overt military engagement under the *plan vigipirate*, which was enacted in France following the *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA) bombing campaign in the summer of 1995 in France.

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<sup>28</sup> Forrest, Alan and Middell, Matthias eds. *The Routledge Companion to the French Revolution in World History*. (Oxon: Routledge, 2016), p. 180

<sup>29</sup> N.B. This excludes the war in Algeria. France has been occupied on six occasions if Italy's occupation during the Second World War is also counted.

<sup>30</sup> Viscount Colville of Culross. 'Heathrow Exercise: Use Of Armed Forces', *Hansard Archives*, 16 January 1974, vol. 348, col. 1049

<sup>31</sup> Heuser, Beatrice and Shamir, Eitan eds. *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 366

These historical experiences serve to illustrate a broader pattern of divergent strategic behaviour in relation to preferences for the use of the military on the national territory. Rather than making objective, cost-benefit analyses of the threat environment in order to determine the most appropriate course of action, it seems that formative moments in each state's past have cultivated entrenched, culturally guided preferences regarding whether or not to use the armed forces domestically.

The relevance of historical experience in determining cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces has been reflected in the vast body of literature on civil-military relations and counter-terrorism in Britain and France. For example, Keith Jeffrey writes that negative historical experiences have meant that British policymakers have been 'hesitant to cross' the boundary between minimum force through the police and maximum force through the army.<sup>32</sup> Similarly, the British historian Anthony Babington writes that military deployments on the British mainland have typically been seen as 'odious' and only ever as a 'last resort' and 'in aid of the civil power.'<sup>33</sup> This is reflected in the recent counter-terrorism literature. For example, Emma Murray and Paul Taylor's 2019 article on the role of the army for countering-terrorism post-2015 refers to 'soldiering by consent'<sup>34</sup> in clear reference to the historical principle of 'policing by consent' that was established in 1829.

On the subject of the French approach, the historian Laurent Henniger examines how France has typically maintained order on its national territory since the French Revolution arguing that the army has played a major role throughout its history. However, the *coup d'état* in 1958 led to a reduction in the army's internal duties with the *gendarmerie* ending up the 'real winners' in terms of maintaining domestic security.<sup>35</sup> The French academic Elie Tenenbaum argues similarly that there is a 'long and complex history which links the [French] Army to its national territory and whose legacy is still felt today.'<sup>36</sup> Tenenbaum's focus on *Sentinelle* illustrates that France may well have recovered from the suspicion of the army that existed among policymakers during the Cold War, but that a philosophy of

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<sup>32</sup> Jeffrey, Keith in Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan eds.; *Military Intervention in Democratic Societies; Chapter 2; Military aid to the Civil Power in the United Kingdom – an historical perspective*. (Kent: Croon Helm, 1985), p. 51

<sup>33</sup> Babington, Anthony. *Military Intervention in Britain, From the Gordon Riots to the Gibraltar Incident*. (London: Routledge, 1990) p. 1

<sup>34</sup> Murray, Emma and Taylor, Paul. "'Soldiering By Consent' and Military–Civil Relations: Military Transition Into the Public Space of Policing', *Illness, Crisis, and Loss*, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 235-254

<sup>35</sup> Henniger, Laurent. 'Le maintien de l'ordre en France depuis le XVIIIe siècle', *Revue Défense Nationale*, January 2016, no. 786, pp. 57-64

<sup>36</sup> Tenenbaum, Élie. 'La Sentinelle Égarée? L'armée de Terre face au terrorisme', *IFRI*, June 2016, vol. 68, p. 10

‘complementarity’ between the civil and military forces has become an important part of the French approach to internal security and counter-terrorism.<sup>37</sup>

Other literature attempts to draw direct comparisons between the approaches of different states either to explain or to understand why divergent behaviour can be observed. In the counter-terrorism literature, Richard Aldrich and Wyn Rees argue that the different ‘strategic cultures’ of the US and European states such as Spain and the UK mean they are ‘predisposed to deal with security issues in a particular way.’<sup>38</sup> Of course, one could make the argument that in this case the different capabilities, resources, and threat perceptions *are* playing more of a role. Further, the extent to which a European strategic culture exists is hotly debated.<sup>39</sup> Instead, it is more appropriate to compare, as Frank Foley does, states with similar precondition, but different responses. Indeed, Foley’s argument has a great deal of merit in the context of this thesis. He contends that divergent ‘historical legacies’ have generated ‘distinctive norms, institutions, and routines’ with respect to their responses to a similar threat.<sup>40</sup> His overarching argument uses the metaphor of a ‘shadow of the past’ that seems to have guided the respective approaches of Britain and France; the metaphor is apt since a shadow is eternal and inescapable. You may not always be aware of its presence, yet it is always there.

In summary, it would seem that cultural preferences deriving from the perception of the national historical experience, or their ‘strategic cultures’, are constraining behaviour. However, to simply invoke ‘strategic culture’ as the answer to why Britain and France’s preferences for whether or not to use the armed forces domestically differ would be to dismiss the nuances of each state’s historical experiences, the relationship between these experiences and their respective cultures, as well as the potential for their cultures to change over time. Accordingly, the following sections outline the overarching research question and hypotheses that guide the thinking in this thesis, followed by the aims and objectives for the study.

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid. p. 37

<sup>38</sup> Rees, Wyn and Aldrich, Richard; ‘contending cultures of counterterrorism; transatlantic convergence or divergence?’ *International Affairs*, September 2005, vol. 81, no. 5, pp. 906-916

<sup>39</sup> Meyer, Christoph O. ‘Convergence towards a European strategic culture? A constructivist framework for explaining changing norms’, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 11, no. 4, 2005, pp. 523-549; Rynning, Sten, ‘The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?’ *Security Dialogue*, 2003, vol. 34, no. 4, p. 481; Lindley-French, Julian ‘In the Shade of Locarno: Why European Defence is Failing’, *International Affairs*, 2002, vol. 78, no. 4, pp. 789-811.

<sup>40</sup> Foley, Frank. *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 316

### 1.3. Research question and hypotheses

Given the discussion above, the primary research question that this thesis seeks to address is: *what accounts for such marked differences in preferences for domestic military deployments in Britain and France?*

To this research question the following hypothesis is posited: *formative moments in each state's past cultivate entrenched, culturally-guided preferences ("strategic cultures") regarding whether or not to use the armed forces domestically that will be traceable over a longue durée in modern history.*<sup>41</sup>

While clearly not the *only* factor that guides state behaviour, the notion that different strategic cultures may lead to different state responses seems to be a sensible conclusion to draw. However, it still lacks specificity. After all, the superficial acceptance of the idea that the broad notions of historical experience and cultural preferences influence behaviour is arguably overly deterministic and implies a certain immutability in strategy. In reality, this is not the case; for example, Britain went from using the armed forces quite extensively on the national territory for the purposes of quelling riot and protest in the nineteenth century, to using them just five times for that purpose in the twentieth century and none so far in the twenty-first. Furthermore, both *Sentinelle* and *Temperer* seemed to constitute a strategic shift. France's approach was, by the admission of multiple French policymakers, 'unprecedented'<sup>42</sup> and, in Britain, in July 2005, the London bombings did not prompt a response that involved the overt deployment of regular troops on the streets.

Given these apparent anomalies, this thesis is secondarily concerned with the following, related, question: *if formative moments in the past do indeed lead to general strategic continuity across the longue durée, what accounts for episodes of change in strategy?*

To this question, the following is hypothesised:

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<sup>41</sup> The *longue durée*, meaning a long period of time, is a concept that derives from the French *Annales* school of historiography. It will be discussed further in the literature review and methodology.

<sup>42</sup> Valls, Manuel cited in Marc de Boni. 'Manuel Valls: 'La menace terroriste est d'une ampleur inégalée'', Le Figaro, 23 April 2016: <https://bit.ly/32vdICD> (accessed 15/10/2017); Drian, Jean-Yves le. '10 - Rapport au Parlement relatif aux conditions d'emploi des forces armées lorsqu'elles interviennent sur le territoire national pour protéger la population.' *Sénat*. Séance du 15 mars 2016. See: [https://www.senat.fr/seances/s201603/s20160315/s20160315\\_mono.html](https://www.senat.fr/seances/s201603/s20160315/s20160315_mono.html) (accessed 20/09/2018)



1. Strategy, just like culture, of which it is a part, will evolve over time as a result of the emergence of different threats, the availability of new technology, and gradual normative progression. Thus, different periods of time will exhibit slightly different cultural preferences for the use of force.
2. The occurrence of rapid changes is usually contingent on the presence of certain conditions, namely: a serious exogenous shock; social institutions that are capable of inciting change; a leader or government that is willing to push the changes through; and a cultural climate that is receptive to a shift.
3. Nevertheless, and in keeping with the primary hypothesis that formative moments in each state's past cultivate entrenched, culturally-guided preferences, even in the event of a rapid shift in approach, a state's response will still exhibit certain enduring and traceable cultural themes.

#### **1.4. Aims, objectives, and scope of project**

The overarching aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive and original insight into the relationship between historical experience, culture and strategic behaviour regarding the use of the armed forces domestically in Britain and France. There are myriad studies on the role of historical experience as a guide to behaviour, including many studies on strategic culture which use the concept as a convenient shorthand to argue that culture and historical experience matter in a general sense. However, the literature has often either been stymied by definitional disagreement, assumptions that culture is too nebulous a concept to be used in empirical analysis, or has focused on too narrow a period of time to draw any serious empirical conclusions about enduring cultural characteristics.

This thesis moves towards rectifying many of these issues. Instead of a narrow time timeframe that may neglect the potential for continuity and change in strategy, it will examine the *longue durée*; a concept derived from the French *Annales* school and subsequent studies on collective mentalities, with the objective of tracing over two hundred years of domestic military deployments in Britain and France. This will facilitate the identification of a series of formative moments in Britain and France's past that may have given rise to the current preferences regarding whether or not to use the armed forces on the national territory.

As noted previously, this thesis views culture as the lens of perception through which more tangible historical experiences are viewed and through which state-specific notions of appropriate strategic behaviour are decided. Thus, while culture itself cannot be used as a variable, we can make assumptions about other modes of cultural expression that will reflect cultural values. For the purposes of this thesis, language is used as a proxy for culture in order to compare and contrast the themes that emerge at various eras, and subsequently trace the transmission of certain norms across time. This is due to the fact that, as Gray argues, something must be ‘sufficiently established and enduring to merit description as cultural.’<sup>43</sup> Thus, if enduring themes are identified in the rhetoric, it will be possible to conclude with reasonable certainty that cultural preferences which derive from historical experience are constraining the approaches of Britain and France.

It then aims to connect the dots between a theoretical assumption of cultural constraint and tangible policy examples. Consequently, it will assess: first, how cultural preferences have filtered into how the armed forces are represented through recruitment campaigns over time (i.e. is maintaining national security portrayed as an internal or an external duty); and second, how cultural preferences have affected modern internal deployment patterns for the purposes of countering terrorism through the development of counter-terrorist units in the 1970s, the formation of legislation that integrated the armed forces into each state’s counter-terror response (e.g. MACP in Britain, or *plan vigipirate* in France) and finally through operations such as *Temperer* and *Sentinelle*. Thus, the conclusion of the thesis is that not only do formative moments in the past foment certain entrenched cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces, but that these cultural preferences are constraining the approaches of Britain and France.

A secondary aim of the thesis is to fill a significant gap in the literature related to studies on domestic security. The majority of studies on strategic culture are ‘outward looking’ in that they analyse strategic culture in the context of the use of force as a component of a state’s foreign policy.<sup>44</sup> While an outward focus is clearly also correct, it is argued here that through the exclusion of a crucial domain of strategy, this approach risks losing the full picture. The contention is that this is a gap to address urgently given the trend towards deploying the

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<sup>43</sup> Gray, Colin S. ‘British and American Strategic Cultures’, paper prepared for Jamestown symposium 2007: ‘Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years of Transatlantic Engagement’, 18-19 April 2007, p. 37

<sup>44</sup> Meyer, Christoph O. *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture; Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)

armed forces domestically more often in the modern era even in states such as Britain that have for a long time been assumed to be averse to the idea.

Despite this need for more studies in this area, at the time of writing, a Google scholar search for articles on Operation Temperer returns just one serious result and even this is in a medical journal.<sup>45</sup> This is despite the fact it has been five years since details of the contingency plan became public knowledge as well as its unprecedented nature and the implications it has for the future of Britain's counter-terrorism efforts. The same could be said for the French case, while there are immeasurably more articles on the subject of *Sentinelle*, there are few direct comparisons with the British case. A study such as this that compares the approaches of Britain and France, will add significantly to the literature.

A tertiary aim of this thesis is practical, rather than academic. It is hoped that by enhancing our understanding of why Britain and France have assumed their respective strategic positions and the historical events that seem to have exerted the most influence on current behaviour, it will facilitate better (or more nuanced) policy decisions in the future. Much of the evidence that this thesis will present indicates a growing role for the military in Britain and France in matters of domestic security in both an active and passive capacity. If the military is going to be expected to fulfil a variety of internal roles in the future, perhaps armed and among the people it is charged with protecting, then understanding the sensitivities, preferences, and expectations surrounding the domestic use of the armed forces will be of paramount importance.

Previous studies have tended to take a limited approach to the subject of either strategic culture or preferences for the internal role of the armed forces. It is hoped that the combination of conceptual originality, academic and theoretical rigour and practical utility will make this thesis a worthwhile contribution to the literature as well as laying the analytical foundations for future research projects on homeland defence and the role of culture in the future.

### **1.5. Relevance of topic**

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<sup>45</sup> Murray, Emma and Taylor, Paul. "Soldiering By Consent" and Military–Civil Relations: Military Transition Into the Public Space of Policing', *Illness, Crisis, and Loss*, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 235-254

The topic of domestic military deployments has increased in relevance dramatically over the years since work on this thesis began in late 2016; its central theme of exploring the differing strategic approaches of Britain and France had been prompted by the tragic events that had affected France in 2015. At this point in time, in France, the mass deployment of the military under *Opération Sentinelle* had been in full force for over a year and, in Britain, high-ranking policymakers had devised covert plans for the implementation of Operation Temperer. Expectations in France were that *Sentinelle* would be scaled back once the state of emergency was lifted, while in Britain, policymakers undoubtedly hoped that the Temperer contingency plan would never have to be used – particularly given the general public aversion to the idea of domestic military deployments.

Despite these expectations, during the course of this research, there have been a number of developments that have challenged prevailing assumptions about cultural preferences for domestic military deployment and afforded the thesis even greater relevance. In 2017, Operation Temperer was activated twice following the tragic events in Manchester and Parsons Green leading to hundreds of troops being deployed across the country, an action deemed ‘provocative’ by Baroness Jenny Jones.<sup>46</sup> At the time of writing, *Sentinelle* is not only still in full force, but its remit even seems to have shifted from a specific counter-terror operation to a more general, permanent presence on France’s streets. This was exemplified in 2019 when the *Gilets Jaunes* movement, which began in 2018 as a protest against the imposition of an increase in fuel tax, escalated into episodes of sporadic violence in a number of French cities. This led then government spokesperson Benjamin Griveaux to announce on 20 March 2019 that troops deployed as part of *Sentinelle* would supplement the French police in their efforts against the protestors.<sup>47</sup> The Military governor of Paris, Bruno Le Ray then raised eyebrows during an interview with *franceinfo* when he stated that the soldiers involved in Operation *Sentinelle* would also be used in an operational capacity.<sup>48</sup> This prompted a fierce debate in France about the appropriateness of using force against one’s own population.

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<sup>46</sup> Austin, Henry. ‘Secret plans to deploy soldiers on UK streets in the aftermath of a terror attack are ‘shocking’ and ‘provocative’, says peer’, *The Independent*, 26 July 2015. See: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/secret-plans-to-deploy-soldiers-on-uk-streets-in-the-aftermath-of-a-terror-attack-are-shocking-and-10417364.html> (accessed 22/09/2017)

<sup>47</sup> Griveaux, Benjamin. ‘Benjamin Griveaux: le Président de la République a indiqué que ‘le dispositif Sentinelle’ allait être ‘renforcé’, *BFM TV*, 20 March 2020. See: <https://bit.ly/311qWq1> (accessed 24/03/2020)

<sup>48</sup> Le Ray, Bruno. ‘Des soldats de Sentinelle mobilisés samedi pour la manifestation des ‘gilets jaunes’: ‘les ordres seront suffisamment clairs pour qu’ils n’aient pas d’inquiétude à avoir’, *Franceinfo*, 22 March 2020. See: <https://bit.ly/3iNCRhb> (accessed 24/03/2020)

Similar debates emerged in the British media in 2019 following the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) announcement of Operation Redfold which placed 3,500 troops in a state of 'readiness' in order to deal with any disruption that may occur in the event of a no-deal Brexit and 'support any Government department on any contingencies they may need.' These troops would be deployed in addition to those already on standby as part of Operation Temperer. Junior Defence Minister Tobias Ellwood was even quoted as stating that as many as 50,000 troops would be placed on standby 'in case of civil unrest' and that scenarios for the imposition of martial law had been proposed<sup>49</sup> as such indicating a potential transition in the strategic thinking of Britain's policy makers: the notion of domestic military deployments was no longer considered taboo or a 'last resort', but rather a 'first resort' in the event of internal crises.<sup>50</sup>

The Covid -19 pandemic in early 2020 emphasised this notion of 'first resort' in both Britain and France and underscored the notion that the military should be expected to engage across a wide spectrum of threats. By March in Britain, 250 military personnel were deployed in aid of the Civil Power in their response to the crisis, with a further 20,000 troops on standby.<sup>51</sup> In France, *Opération Résilience* was launched on 25 March 2020 and was described as an 'unprecedented' military operation. Its purpose was to aid in the 'decongestion of the areas most heavily affected by the coronavirus' as well as to 'ensure the protection of sensitive military and civilian sites, as well as surveillance and deterrent presence missions in support of the internal security forces.'<sup>52</sup> This differed from Britain's objectives for the military; according to an MoD press release, '[t]he armed forces stand ready to assist civilian authorities if required, but there are no current plans for the military to participate in the enforcement of public order.'<sup>53</sup> Thus, although the last few years have certainly revealed a greater appetite for the use of the armed forces in a domestic context, the character of any potential deployment still differs from that of France.

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<sup>49</sup> Coates, Sam. 'Troops must be ready for Brexit chaos, says defence minister Tobias Ellwood', *The Times*, 5 January 2019. See:

<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/troops-must-be-ready-for-brexit-chaos-says-defence-minister-tobias-ellwood-s8sppbrsr> (accessed 09/07/2020)

<sup>50</sup> 'First resort' was a phrase that was used during a discussion between the author and Major Drew Houston of the Ministry of Defence's Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre.

<sup>51</sup> COVID Support Force: the MOD's contribution to the coronavirus response, *Ministry of Defence*, 23 March 2020. See:

<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/covid-support-force-the-mods-contribution-to-the-coronavirus-response> (accessed 23/03/2020)

<sup>52</sup> Ministère des Armées. Dossier de Presse — Opération RÉSILIENCE — 29 mars 2020, pp. 3-4

<sup>53</sup> COVID Support Force: the MOD's contribution to the coronavirus response, Ministry of Defence. 23 March 2020. See: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/covid-support-force-the-mods-contribution-to-the-coronavirus-response> (accessed 23/03/2020)

As debate globally on the subject of the utility of domestic force evolves and questions over the legitimacy or appropriateness of using the armed forces domestically are raised,<sup>54</sup> there has never been a better time for a thesis that addresses this subject matter. It is hoped that this thesis will go some way to illuminating the formative moments in Britain and France's past that have led to their current policy outlook and, through greater understanding of the cultural norms and values of each state and their effect on behaviour, may help inform decision making in the future.

## **1.6. Research structure**

**Chapter 2 – Literature Review.** This chapter provides an in-depth examination of the theory of strategic culture and related fields. Its aim is not only to critically evaluate the literature, but also to fill a perceived gap related to enduring disagreements on continuity and change in strategic cultures. It first looks at the early works of Homer, Thucydides, and Herodotus to argue that the notion of national styles has existed for millennia. It then examines some of the literature from sociology and anthropology, which can be seen as the academic ancestors of strategic culture. It will then analyse critically the existing body of literature on strategic culture across the so-called 'three generations'. It is argued that a number of serious deficiencies still exist in the literature, particularly relating to what accounts for both continuity and change in strategic culture, which is something this thesis intends to address.

**Chapter 3 – Methodology.** Building on the lessons from the literature, this chapter argues that culture is the context to behaviour and thus cannot be used as a variable in its own right. Instead, it must be viewed as the lens of perception through which we view the world. Based on this argument, this chapter introduces a methodological framework for understanding the relationship between historical experience, culture and behaviour, taking into account the potential for both continuity and change. It then proposes the analysis of rhetoric, which is a mode of cultural action, in order to assess the potentially constraining effect that culture has on behaviour. It presents a unique methodology that charts two hundred years of domestic military deployments in Britain and France in order to identify specific eras of

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<sup>54</sup> See the debates in the US media following Trump's federalization of the National Guard and his statement on the need for 'overwhelming force' against and 'domination' of the protestors. See also Defense Secretary Mark Esper's prompt for the military to 'dominate the battlespace' in order to restore order; an astonishing turn of phrase implying the protestors were akin to enemy soldiers and the national territory, a field of battle.

deployment and the formative moments that created shifts in approach. It then explains how the language used by policymakers at each of these branch points is analysed in order to identify instances of cultural continuity and change and how this is then matched to tangible policy decisions such as *Temperer* or *Sentinelle*.

**Chapter 4 – The historical origins of Britain’s preferences for domestic military deployments.** This chapter begins by looking at the increased level of threat from Islamist terrorism post-2015 and the policy responses that this provoked. It examines the typical reaction of discomfort exhibited by the British regarding the armed forces domestically, raising the question why this is. It then introduces the data used for the remainder of the chapter. It traces over two hundred years of domestic deployments in Britain to identify a series of formative moments that have influenced policy and ushered in a new era of domestic deployment. These formative moments are identified as the St. Peter’s Field (Peterloo) massacre, the General Strike of 1926, the Heathrow exercises of 1974, the Iranian embassy siege of 1980 and Operation *Temperer* of 2015 to 2017. It argues that Britain’s responses can be better understood when placed in a historical context. Therefore, the aftermath of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms and the *Interregnum* are examined as the context to current attitudes for the use of force domestically.

It then looks at the use of the armed forces for quelling episodes of civil unrest over time making the argument that the Peterloo massacre was one of the most formative moments in Britain’s history in terms of its effect on modern preferences for the maintenance of internal security. It analyses the responses to the Peterloo by policymakers at the time and then looks at the impact it had through the formation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829. A comparison of the responses to Peterloo, the General Strike and the Tottenham riots is then made to argue that an entrenched cultural aversion to the use of the armed forces for quelling civil unrest has developed over time; an aversion which has been fortified by the perception of the army as an expeditionary force.

**Chapter 5 – The British army and domestic counter-terrorism operations.** This chapter begins by arguing that although the British typically exhibit a distaste for domestic military deployments, the threat from terrorism constituted a different type of threat that challenged policymakers’ assumptions about appropriate strategies regarding the use of the armed forces. It examines the institutional development of Britain’s counter-terrorism response from the 1972 Munich Olympics attack, to Operation NIMROD during the Iranian Embassy siege. Again, it analyses the responses of policymakers to this operation to argue that despite

a different threat, the same enduring norms of subordination to the civil power, last resort, and proportionality are evident.

Finally, it examines the post-2001 counter-terrorism era. IT briefly examines the impact of the 9/11 attacks and the July 2005 bombing in London before examining the development and subsequent rhetorical responses to Operation Temperer. It argues that although it appeared to represent a shift in strategy, the enduring norms listed above are still evident in the rhetoric. Furthermore, through an examination of modern army recruitment campaigns, it is argued that the British *still* see the army as a force that fights abroad, not at home lending weight to the argument that historical experiences and cultural preferences constrain behaviour.

**Chapter 6 – The historical origins of France’s preferences for domestic military deployments.** This chapter begins by looking at the tragic events of 13 November 2015 in Paris and the response the attacks from the civil forces and the military through the implementation of *Opération Sentinelle*. It argues that, unlike the British case, there is general acceptance of the military in a domestic role. Once again, it asks why this is the case and suggests that France’s long historical precedent for deploying the military on the national territory has given rise to these preferences. Like the British case, the chapter then traces over two hundred years of domestic deployments finding a significant historical precedent in France for the use of the armed forces on the national territory for the purposes of quelling riot, protest and revolution, defending from invasion, carrying out *coups d’état*, countering-terrorism as well as more passive duties such as providing personnel during times of national crisis and providing disaster relief. It identifies France’s formative moments as: (1871), the Languedoc revolt (1907), the First World War (1914 – 1918), *Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire* (1950s) and *Opération Sentinelle* (2015 – present). It then argues that the French Revolution represents an important point in France’s history, which, although outside the scope of the data analysis for this thesis, must still be discussed given its effect on modern France.

It then examines France’s use of the armed forces for countering riot and protest. It begins by examining some of the context in the 1800s before analysing the responses of policymakers to the use of the armed forces during the Commune. It compares these responses to those during the Languedoc winegrowers strike in 1907 to argue that a marked shift in France’s cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically occurred from general acceptance in 1871 to general rejection in 1907.



**Chapter 7 – The French army and the *ennemi de l'intérieur*.** The first section of this chapter deals with France's use of the armed forces for the purpose of defending against invasion. It argues that the First World War was a rare moment of national unity and, following on from the events of Languedoc in 1907, entrenched France's preference for the armed forces not to be used against the people. It then briefly examines the post-Second World War environment and the perceived return of the *ennemi de l'intérieur* through the resurgent PCF in the 1940s and the resultant formation of Cold War doctrine such as *Défense intérieure du territoire* (DIT) and *Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire* (DOT).

It links this concept of the *ennemi de l'intérieur* to the French response to the growing terrorist threat in the 1970s and focuses on the idea that the army's counter-terrorism role has largely reflected the principles for protection (rather than intervention) outlined in DOT. It then examines *Sentinelle* and argues that while it certainly represented a shift in France's approach, analysis of the language, the fundamental protective remit of the operation, and the modern recruitment campaigns which illustrate a simultaneous internal and external role, in fact *Sentinelle* is broadly consistent with nearly two hundred years of French history.

**Chapter 8 – Conclusions and further research.** This chapter summarises the approach taken in the thesis as well as the findings from the two cases. It then compares convergences and divergences in Britain and France's respective approaches. It links the findings to the literature on strategic culture in order to fulfil the thesis' aim of clarifying the debate. Finally, some suggestions for future research projects are made.

## Chapter 2 - Literature Review

This chapter aims to shed some light on the debate on strategic culture, a concept which has been accused of being ‘immodest’,<sup>55</sup> ‘incomprehensible’,<sup>56</sup> ‘deeply contested’,<sup>57</sup> lacking a ‘unitary definition’<sup>58</sup> and therefore of being ‘of limited utility.’<sup>59</sup> The criticisms are not, for the most part, unfair. Part of the problem is with the concept of culture itself which, as the novelist and Marxist theorist Raymond Williams once wrote, is ‘one of two or three of the most complicated words in the English language.’<sup>60</sup> The complexity of the concept is due to the fact that culture cannot necessarily be considered a variable in its own right. Instead it is a system of meaning that comprises a variety of interdependent variables. The difficulty in researching and operationalising culture has led some scholars to suggest that we jump ship and abandon the concept entirely.<sup>61</sup>

This would perhaps be too defeatist since, as Jeremy Black writes, despite being ‘frustratingly malleable,’ culture is still essential to understanding state behaviour.<sup>62</sup> Indeed, some scholars such as the influential German anthropologist Franz Boas even contended that, as a determinant of behaviour, culture exceeds biology in importance.<sup>63</sup> Whether this is the case or not, culture is clearly too pervasive and vitally important to strategy to be ignored, regardless of the pitfalls and potential methodological tensions that inevitably arise with its inclusion.

Relatedly, this chapter does not intend to get bogged down in definitions of strategic culture and follows Colin Gray in suggesting that definitional disagreement on the term is ‘rather foolish since there is general agreement on the content of the subject and, roughly, on how

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<sup>55</sup> Haglund, David G. ‘What Good Is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept’, *International Journal*, Summer 2004, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 479-502

<sup>56</sup> Lock, Edward. ‘Refining strategic culture; Return of the Second Generation’, *Review of International Studies*, 2010, vol. 36, no. 3, p. 686

<sup>57</sup> Bloomfield, Alan and Nossal, Kim Richard. ‘Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 28, no. 2, p. 286

<sup>58</sup> Biehl, Heiko; Giegerich, Bastian; Jones, Alexandra eds. *Strategic Cultures in Europe – Security and Defence Policies across the Continent*. (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2013), p. 11

<sup>59</sup> Lock, Edward. ‘Refining strategic culture; Return of the Second Generation’, *Review of International Studies*, 2010, vol.36, no.3, p. 687

<sup>60</sup> Williams, Raymond. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 49

<sup>61</sup> Abu-Lughod, Lila. ‘Writing against culture’ in Richard G. Fox, *Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present*. (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1991), pp. 137-54

<sup>62</sup> Black, Jeremy. *War and the Cultural Turn*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), p. 43

<sup>63</sup> Degler, Carl N. *Culture versus Biology in the Thought of Franz Boas and Alfred L. Kroeber*. (New York, Munich: Berg Publishers, 1989)

it functions.<sup>64</sup> Rather, it aims to clarify the debate by distilling the literature into a workable framework for understanding the nexus between historical experience, culture, and behaviour. This chapter, and indeed the thesis, treats culture, and by extension strategic culture, as something responsive and dynamic, as something that actuates and is actuated by both behaviour and the perception of the national historical experience.

The central contention is that strategic culture is fluid in nature. This has implications for the ongoing debate as to what accounts for shifts in strategy if historically-derived cultural norms are meant to constrain behaviour.<sup>65</sup> It will argue that while the literature is broadly correct in the argument that a serious exogenous shock will generate rapid and long-lasting shifts in strategy, a change will still not occur if any one of the following three conditions are absent: 1) strong institutions capable of catalysing change; 2) a bold leader willing to enact a change; and 3) a cultural climate that is receptive to a shift. It is hoped that the perspective introduced in chapter will help elucidate how certain norms may shift, remain constant, and be transmitted across time.

It first examines the early works of ancient scholars such as Homer, Thucydides, and Herodotus to argue that the notion that different states may exhibit different characteristics has been evident in the literature for millennia. It will then discuss the development of the discipline by examining some of the early works in sociology and anthropology focusing on the importance of perception. It will then examine the literature on strategic culture, drawing a distinction between the different ‘generations’<sup>66</sup> of thought and critically evaluating its weaknesses. The lessons from the literature will then help inform the methodological approach that is adopted in this thesis.

## **2.1. National Styles**

The basic point that states may adopt different national styles towards the use of force as a result of their unique ‘character’, ‘culture’, or ‘way’ is evident in texts written millennia ago;

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<sup>64</sup> Gray, Colin S. Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture. Paper prepared for: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, 31 October 2006, p. ii

<sup>65</sup> See Jeffrey Lantis’ interesting article which addresses precisely this point: Lantis, Jeffrey and & Charlton, Andrew A. ‘Continuity or Change? The Strategic Culture of Australia’, *Comparative Strategy*, 2011, 30:4, pp. 291-315

<sup>66</sup> A phrase coined by Alastair Iain Johnson in his essay ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, *International Security*, Spring 1995, vol. 19, no. 4

circa 8<sup>th</sup> Century B.C. Homer's epic poem *The Iliad* reveals a number of examples that refer to a particular national way of war or culture. For example, in a direct comparison of Trojan and Greek fighting styles; he writes that '...the Trojans advanced with shrieks and cries like cranes ... But the Greeks moved forward in silence, breathing courage, filled with determination to stand by one another'.<sup>67</sup>

We see similar arguments, in *The Histories*, written by 'the father of history', Herodotus, in 5<sup>th</sup> century B.C. The Histories provides a detailed account not just of the Greco-Persian wars, but also of the different geographies, customs, and cultures of the states involved; for example, in describing a conversation between the king of Sparta, Cleomenes, and the leader of Miletus, Aristagoras. Aristagoras states his belief that victory over the Persians '...will be an easy task, for these foreigners have little taste for war, and you [the Greeks] are the finest soldiers in the world. The Persian weapons are bows and short spears; they fight in trousers and turbans – that will show you how easy they are to beat!'<sup>68</sup> Here, Herodotus is not just contrasting approaches to battle, but is also introducing the notion that the Greeks would likely emerge victorious as war was a part of their culture.

Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* is most frequently cited as the earliest in-depth account of national styles in strategy.<sup>69</sup> It is an account of the conflict fought between 431 and 404 BC between the powerful city-states of Sparta and Athens in which he notes that Athenians were driven by the lust for victory and glory, compared with the more reserved approach to war taken by the Spartans. In the speech of the Corinthians, it is written that if the Athenians 'win a victory, they follow it up at once, and if they suffer a defeat, they scarcely fall back at all.' Meanwhile, Spartans are characterised as a far more timid people whose aim it is 'to avoid harming others, and then to avoid being harmed.'<sup>70</sup>

The classic texts on military strategy contain similar observations. Sun Tsu's *The Art of War*, written in the 5<sup>th</sup> century B.C., urged dedicated planning when preparing for war by examining the political leadership of warring nations. Sun Tsu wrote that national styles will differ based on each country's unique political context, in particular whether one

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<sup>67</sup> Homer, E.V. Rieu trans (2003 edition) *The Iliad*, (Penguin Group, London), p. 45

<sup>68</sup> Herodotus; *The Histories* (1996 edition), (London: Penguin Group, 1954), book 5, verse 49, p. 296

<sup>69</sup> Heuser, Beatrice and Shamir, Eitan eds. *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 8; Lantis, Jeffrey S. 'Strategic Culture and National Security Policy', *International Studies Review*, Autumn, 2002, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 87-113;

<sup>70</sup> Thucydides; Rex Warner trans. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. (London: Penguin Group, revised edition 1974) p. 76, book 1: 70-71; Zaman, Rashed Uz. 'Strategic Culture: A 'Cultural' Understanding of War', *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 70-71

government may be 'cruel', the other 'humane' - this philosophy is summed up by his well-known and often-quoted maxim: 'know your enemy'.<sup>71</sup>

At the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, the celebrated military theorist Carl von Clausewitz demonstrated the same acuity of thought. He argued that war, as a contest of wills, was 'a part of man's social existence'. The will, according to Clausewitz comprised moral factors among which were 'the warlike virtue of the army and its popular spirit';<sup>72</sup> categories that can be thought of as essentially cultural. Further, in book eight of his *magnum opus*, *On War*, he compares the ways of war and the strategic aims adopted by various peoples throughout history. 'The semibarbarous Tartars' he writes, pursued the aim of 'subduing' or 'expelling' their enemies. While 'the republics of antiquity, Rome excepted' possessed small armies and thus pursued the limited aim of plundering local towns.<sup>73</sup> Even his classic definition of war as 'the continuation of policy by other means'<sup>74</sup> embodies the notion that state policies may vary and, thus, so too will their approaches to the conduct of war.

## 2.2. Sociology, anthropology and the role of historical experience

Of course, none of these early works explicitly used the term 'culture' in the sense that we understand it today. Indeed, culture was not considered to be something specific to a nation, as a distinct set of ideals, symbols, meanings, and practices, until the 18<sup>th</sup> Century when, according to Williams, 'its occasional use as an independent noun' can be found.<sup>75</sup> It is the disciplines of sociology and anthropology that can be credited with a specific focus on society, culture, and their effects on behaviour.

There is clearly a recognition of the merits of these early works to strategic studies literature since, in 1973, the celebrated nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie wrote that '[g]ood strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology'<sup>76</sup>; a statement referred to by Gray as 'one of the wisest observations in the entire history of strategic thought.'<sup>77</sup> It is therefore prudent to

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<sup>71</sup> Sun Tsu; Cleary trans. (1998 edition) *The Art of War*, p. 8

<sup>72</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von. *Vom Kriege*, Book III ch. 3-5 quoted in Heuser, Beatrice. *Reading Clausewitz*. (London: Pimlico, 2002), p. 81

<sup>73</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von; Howard, Paret trans. *On War*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 230-232

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. p. 28

<sup>75</sup> Williams, Raymond. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 51

<sup>76</sup> Brodie, Bernard. *War and Politics*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973), p. 332

<sup>77</sup> Gray, Colin S. *Modern Strategy*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 131

briefly examine some of the key arguments from these disciplines, which are often omitted from the strategic culture literature, but which still have great utility even today.

### **A sociological perspective**

As its name suggests, sociology is primarily concerned with the study of society, rather than culture *per se*. Society comprises myriad cultural elements such as norms, values, customs, institutions and, of course, language and, by developing ‘a sociology of culture’,<sup>78</sup> it was these variables that were analysed by early sociologists such as Émile Durkheim, Georg Simmel and Max Weber.

In 1895, Durkheim introduced the concept of the ‘social fact’ in order to distinguish between sociological phenomena that *do* and those that *do not* merit academic attention. He defined it as consisting ‘of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, external to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion...’<sup>79</sup> This implies that a set of social rules exist prior to the existence of the individual and that we, as members of a society, are subconsciously compelled to abide by its norms. As the British sociologist David J. Lee puts it, ‘social constraint operates by establishing moral and cognitive boundaries [to behaviour].’<sup>80</sup> Thus, just as gravity exerts an influence on the behaviour of objects without us being cognisant of its presence, so too do ‘social currents’ compel certain culturally-guided modes of thought and action. Given its inherently cultural nature, we might consider strategy as a ‘social fact’ since strategy makers will be constrained by the cultural forces under which they operate.

Like Durkheim, the influential German sociologist, Georg Simmel also believed that the normative environment, which is formed through past experiences, exerted a degree of control over the behaviour of the individual. His thinking on culture was heavily influenced by the concept of ‘cultivation’<sup>81</sup> and how ‘forms’ may influence the individual. These concepts are evident in his definition of culture which he saw as ‘the cultivation of

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<sup>78</sup> Alexander, Jeffrey C. *The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 3-10

<sup>79</sup> Durkheim, Emile. *The Rules of the Sociological Method*. (New York, The Free Press, 1895/1964), p. 3

<sup>80</sup> Lee, David J. ‘Class as a Social Fact’, *Sociology*, May 1994, vol. 28, no. 2, p. 402

<sup>81</sup> An idea that derives from Cicero’s *Tusculanae Disputationes* where he writes of the *cultura animi*; meaning the cultivation of the soul. See: Cicero, Marcus Tullius. *Tusculan Disputations II*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966) V.

individuals through the agency of external forms which have been objectified in the course of history.<sup>82</sup>

Simmel's main theory contended that humans will challenge the social world in which they find themselves, questioning its rules and attempting to overcome its norms. However, at the same time that humankind is attempting to incite change, society pushes back limiting (although not eliminating) the potential for change. Simmel referred to this phenomenon as '*Wechselwirkung*' or 'reciprocity'.<sup>83</sup> It was this eternal and interdependent relationship that Simmel saw as the essence of culture. In short, if we adopt a Simmelian view of strategic culture, then we understand that it will naturally evolve over time. There is nothing immutable about it given that individuals will constantly attempt to exert their own influence on the external forms of, in this case, strategy. Of course, with Simmel's framework, change will occur slowly and there is less scope for rapid shifts.

Simmel's contemporary, Max Weber also wrote about the constraining effect of culture through what he referred to as the *stahlhartes Gehäuse* ('Iron cage')<sup>84</sup> of society that we are born into, that constrains our thoughts and actions, and which we eventually perpetuate. However, Weber's theories were more focused on the idea that norms will change over time. Indeed, he addressed a problem that is familiar to us today, asking why given similar capitalist values, modern societies have exhibited such different characteristics. Specifically, he asked why 'the Occident has developed ... a very different form of capitalism which has appeared nowhere else.'<sup>85</sup> In order to explain this phenomenon, Weber devised a typology of social action which he divided into four categories: Value Rational, Rational goal-oriented, Affective, and Traditional. Rational goal-oriented can be best understood as acultural 'means to an end' thinking which is a key component of modern realist and neorealist thinking.<sup>86</sup> While traditional behaviour is action 'carried out under the influence of custom or habit' and is 'a virtually automatic reaction in unconscious obedience to

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<sup>82</sup> Simmel, Georg; Donald N. Levine ed. *On Individuality and Social Forms*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. xix

<sup>83</sup> This idea of the dialectic between structure and agency is particularly pertinent to France which has often been described as a country characterized by division. See Robert Elgie's assertion that the France 'has always been internally divided.'. This point will be developed later in the thesis. See: Elgie, Robert. *Political Institutions in Contemporary France*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 80

<sup>84</sup> Weber's original term translates as 'casing as hard as steel', iron cage is the term that was popularized by Talcott Parsons in his translation of Weber's work: 'But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage.' See: Weber, Max; Talcott Parsons trans. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. (London: Unwin University Books, 1905/1967), p. 181

<sup>85</sup> Weber, Max; Talcott Parsons trans. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. (London: Unwin University Books, 1905/1967), p. 21

<sup>86</sup> Waltz, Kenneth N. Structural Realism after the Cold War, *International Security*, Summer, 2000, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 5-41

tradition.’<sup>87</sup> In the context of strategic behaviour, Beatrice Heuser writes similarly that ‘what scholars ... may identify as strategic concepts may just be traditions, passed on almost as if by osmosis rather than articulated principle.’<sup>88</sup>

Weber argued that behaviour (either individual or societal) is likely to be a combination of two or more of these forms. Thus, while some societies may be more guided by history and tradition, others may be more goal oriented, but all will exhibit some characteristics of all four forms. As a result, it is abundantly clear if we follow Weber’s argument, that although culture, history, and tradition are not the sole explanations for behaviour, they will always play some kind of role.

### **An anthropological perspective**

Much of the strategic culture literature, although cursorily aware of its academic roots in sociology, have tended instead to derive most of their lessons from anthropology. The influential anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, defined the purpose of the discipline as aimed at capturing ‘the native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realize *his* vision of *his* world.’<sup>89</sup> In this sense, anthropologists will often view culture as ‘a kind of perception’.<sup>90</sup> For example, Matthew Engelke explains that culture is an inherited or learned set of ideas about the world that shapes the way we interact with it.<sup>91</sup> Similarly, the German anthropologist Franz Boas, put it simply, but eloquently when he referred to the *Kulturbrille* (the cultural glasses) through which we view and interpret the world.<sup>92</sup> This is central to understanding where culture sits in the relationship between historical experience and behaviour; not only does it suggest that our views of appropriate or necessary behaviour will be refracted through these lenses, but it also implies that there is no objective meaning to historical events as each will be tinted by our perception.

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<sup>87</sup> Lee, David and Newby, Howard. *The Problem of Sociology*. (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1983), p. 176

<sup>88</sup> Heuser, Beatrice. *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 490

<sup>89</sup> Malinowski, Bronislaw. *Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An account of native enterprise and adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea, 1961 edition*. (New York: Dutton, 1922), p. 25

<sup>90</sup> Engelke, Matthew. *Think Like an Anthropologist*. (London: Penguin, Random House, 2017), p. 33

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Although the phrase is readily attributed to Boas, in fact, as Boas himself writes, he borrowed the ‘apt term’ from one of his students, Von den Steinen. See: Boas, Franz. The History of Anthropology, *Science*, October 1904, vol. 20, no. 512, p. 517



The idea that culture is constructed was adopted by one of Boas' students, Clifford Geertz. In his seminal 1973 book, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, he explores the concept of culture as a social construct through a series of empirical studies in order to try and identify the effect that culture has on the so-called 'real world'. Like this thesis, he does not treat culture as a variable *per se*, arguing that the study of culture's effects is 'not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.' Geertz stated, rather poetically, that 'man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun.'<sup>93</sup> In other words, not only is culture is a social construct, but also action is constrained by the webs of culture, which comprises myriad connected threads. Thus, like Boas' *Kulturbrille*, it is impossible to disentangle behaviour from the influences of culture.

These works illustrate how one is shaped by one's environment, how culture is both learned and passively received, how it is shared across a group and, crucially, how culture may affect how we perceive and interact with both the material world and the past. In the context of this thesis, this would certainly suggest that cultural preferences should be exacting a constraining influence on Britain and France's use of the armed forces domestically. Furthermore, the receipt of norms through factors such as 'word of mouth' or 'observation' implies that these preferences may not necessarily be overtly articulated, but rather transmitted across time *passively*, generating an ambient sense of how things should be done with respect to the use of force.

The question, then, is where do these received sets of ideas originate? For the nineteenth century anthropologist Edward Tylor, the answer was historical experience. Tylor provided one of the more famous definitions of culture which he described as 'that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.'<sup>94</sup> Here we see once more the idea of 'acquisition' of certain ideas about the world. Crucially, for Tylor, one could only understand current features of culture by examining the past and the survival or expiration of norms. The lesson from Tylor's work in the context of this thesis was his argument that by examining past experiences one could trace the received ideas and patterned responses of a given group facilitating the analysis of the relationship between history, culture, and behaviour. In short, the past holds the answers to present behaviour.

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<sup>93</sup> Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. (New York: Basic Books, 1973) p.5

<sup>94</sup> Tylor, Edward. *Primitive Culture: Research into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom*. (London: John Murray, 1871), vol. 1, p. 1

### 2.3. Anthropology meets ‘national styles’

The above point on the relevance of understanding the past and the potential significance of culture as one of the determinants of behaviour was picked up by American strategists after their experiences fighting the Japanese in the Pacific theatre during the Second World War. The US encountered a shocking Japanese approach to conflict that was characterised by *kamikaze* attacks on their ships, and a will to fight to the last man. As the historian James B. Wood writes, the *Shimpu* (Japanese programme of suicide missions) was born of ‘incorrigible elements of the higher command who were willing to bring their country to utter ruin rather than concede defeat’.<sup>95</sup> Wood writes that the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) concluded that the Japanese approach was ‘macabre, effective, supremely practical under the circumstances...’<sup>96</sup>.

The US recognised that its understanding of the *Kamikaze* attacks and, indeed, the Japanese mindset in general terms, was limited. Thus, in order to occupy the country effectively after the Japanese surrender, there was a recognition that the US would have to take steps to improve their understanding of ‘the most alien enemy the United States had ever fought.’<sup>97</sup> In consequence, the US Office of War Information commissioned the anthropologist Ruth Benedict to research Japanese culture so that might be better able to predict its behaviour in the future. Benedict’s resultant 1946 book *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* analysed historical patterns of behaviour in Japanese culture from the feudal clans and the domination of the *Samurai* caste to the Japanese mentality since VJ Day. She identified ‘deeply entrenched attitudes of thought and behaviour’ characterised by dialectical relationships such as simultaneous aggression (‘the sword’) and timidity (‘the chrysanthemum’).<sup>98</sup> The focus was not explicitly focused on the Japanese ‘way of war’ or its strategy, but more broadly on how past experiences shape cultural norms which, in turn, influence or constrain shape behaviour. Nevertheless, it was one of the first works that connected the domain of culture with politics and strategy.

The book was accused of perpetuating stereotypes and for being overly deterministic, however, the notion of distinct political cultures was influential. In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba assessed the distinct political cultures of five nations arguing that ‘the

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<sup>95</sup> James B. Wood. *Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?* (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), p. 96

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Benedict, Ruth. *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 2005 edition, 1946) p.1

<sup>98</sup> Ibid. p.16

force of shared social values and attitudes... permeate all aspects of society.’<sup>99</sup> In a similar vein, in 1986, Ann Swidler referred to the ‘symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well as informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories, and rituals of daily life.’ Although Swidler’s definition is broad, she also argued that ‘interest-driven, cultural ‘strategies of action’ were important mediating conditions on state behaviour.<sup>100</sup> It is these political culture and anthropological concepts that were adapted into frameworks in the 1970s by scholars of an emerging school of thought that became known as strategic culture.

## 2.4. Strategic Culture

### 2.4.1. First Generation

The academic attention that strategic culture now receives can be attributed to the American political scientist Jack L. Snyder who coined the phrase in a 1977 essay for the RAND corporation. Snyder rejected the assumption made by the US strategic community that there was such a thing as a ‘generic rational man’ that could be integrated into mathematical game theory models for predicting Soviet nuclear strategy.<sup>101</sup> Instead, Snyder posited that ‘Soviet strategy has been influenced by a number of factors unique to the Soviet historical experience.’ These unique experiences formed equally unique strategic cultures, which he defined as ‘the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation’.<sup>102</sup>

Before Snyder’s essay, strategic thinking in the West had almost entirely neglected the potential for national styles.<sup>103</sup> However, his idea that ‘individuals are socialized into a [distinct] [...] mode of strategic thinking’<sup>104</sup> as a result of formative past experiences proved

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<sup>99</sup> Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 243

<sup>100</sup> Swidler, Ann. ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, *American Sociological Review*, April 1986, vol. 51, no. 2, p. 273

<sup>101</sup> See discussion of game theory in Harding, Rebecca and Harding, Jack. *Gaming Trade, Win-Win Strategies for the Digital Era*, London: London Publishing Partnership, 2019, pp.41 – 65. See also: Flood, Merrill M. ‘Some Experimental Games’, Research Memorandum RM-789, Santa Monica: *The RAND Corporation*, 1952; Schelling, Thomas C. ‘The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack, Santa Monica: *The RAND Corporation*, 1958

<sup>102</sup> Snyder, Jack L. ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, *RAND Corporation*, September 1977, p. 8

<sup>103</sup> Poore, Stuart. ‘What is the context? A reply to the Gray-Johnston debate on strategic culture’. *Review of International Studies*, 2003, vol. 29, no. 2, p. 280

<sup>104</sup> Snyder, Jack L. ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, *RAND Corporation*, September 1977, p. v

to be highly influential. In 1979 Ken Booth contributed to the ‘cultural turn’ arguing that ‘men ... create the social universe in their own images’ leading to ‘the problem of ethnocentrism’ in strategy making.<sup>105</sup> Accordingly, Booth advocated for an approach that embraced ‘cultural relativism’<sup>106</sup> in order to substitute the idea of the ‘rational’ man with that of the ‘national’ man.<sup>107</sup> While Anglo-American scholar, Colin S. Gray, focused on the US national style in strategy arguing that culture ‘referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derives from perception of the national historical experience.’<sup>108</sup> Further, Gray wrote that ‘the significantly unique American historical experience’ had influenced its strategic preferences despite the national security community having ‘a poor sense of the value of history.’<sup>109</sup>

This idea of perception is key to understanding the first generation’s approach; it pertains not just to how we address certain strategic challenges, but also how we construct lessons based on our interpretation of the meaning of past events. This is important as it suggests that there are no objective lessons to be drawn from the past,<sup>110</sup> only the lessons that we, as ‘encultured’<sup>111</sup> individuals, choose to learn based on our ‘perceptual lens provided by the strategic culture.’<sup>112</sup> Furthermore, it suggests as John Shy wrote, that a ‘long historical experience’ of carrying out actions in a particular way has a ‘conditioning effect’<sup>113</sup> over time. Consequently, just like the US policymakers in Gray’s analysis who are constrained by history while also being ignorant of it, we may find that specific historical events are not explicitly articulated in strategic, political, or even public discourse. Instead, certain preferences may be received passively, becoming embedded in the national psyche through repetition. Accordingly, in the context of this thesis, it may be possible for a state to exhibit residual acceptance or rejection of the idea of deploying the armed forces domestically, without being fully cognisant of from where these attitudes originate.

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<sup>105</sup> Booth, Ken. *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*. (London: Croon Helm ltd., 1979), p.13, p. 21

<sup>106</sup> Ibid. p. 16

<sup>107</sup> Booth, Ken quoted in Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood eds. *Strategic Culture in the Asian-Pacific Region*. (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), p. 5

<sup>108</sup> Gray, Colin S. ‘National Style in Strategy, The American Example’, *International Security*, Fall 1981, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 22

<sup>109</sup> Ibid. p.45

<sup>110</sup> See” Beatrice Heuser’s discussion of the ‘selective reading and interpretation of history’ in ‘Historical Lessons and Discourse on Defence in France and Germany, 1945-90’, *Rethinking History*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 199-237

<sup>111</sup> Gray, Colin S. ‘Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back’, *Review of International Studies*, 1999, vol. 25, p. 52

<sup>112</sup> Snyder, Jack L. ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, *RAND Corporation*, September 1977, p. v

<sup>113</sup> Shy, John. ‘The American Military Experience: History and Learning’, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 1971, vol. 1, p. 220

#### 2.4.2. Second Generation

Towards the end of the Cold War, a ‘second generation’ of thought emerged in the literature, beginning with the American scholar Bradley Klein. Its primary purpose was less about exploring the relationships between history, culture and behaviour and more related to ‘critically unmasking the manipulation of strategic cultures by élites’.<sup>114</sup> Klein’s framework attempted to examine the relationship between policymakers and the general public arguing that ‘if the modern state is to secure and reproduce its way of life it will have to find some means of legitimizing its military activities’.<sup>115</sup> This approach could be classified as critical in nature as he argued that the language used by policymakers will not always reflect their intentions. Although Klein’s work is useful in terms of challenging the assumption that policymakers will always tell the truth, it fails to take into account that policy decisions do not occur in a cultural vacuum;<sup>116</sup> that strategy may differ between nations;<sup>117</sup> and that historical experience is a crucial determinant of state behaviour.

The latter point on the role of history is something that was rectified by other scholars in the 1990s. For example, Beatrice Heuser’s 1998, book *Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG* argues that the three case studies exhibited ‘remarkable differences’ in their nuclear strategies in spite of comparable resources. She concluded that the differences in approach to nuclear issues were a function of their distinct ‘political cultures’ and ‘collective mentalities’.<sup>118</sup> The concept of the ‘mentality’ in this context derives from the works of French scholars of the *Annales* school of thought writing at the turn of the nineteenth century such as Lucien Lefebvre and Marc Bloch.<sup>119</sup> They presented an anti-positivist view of history arguing that studies should examine the *longue durée*; a longer-term perspective, usually encompassing several centuries. This allows for a more nuanced understanding of continuity and change in the way phenomena are represented, as well as any shifts in mindsets, traditions and values. This notion was adopted by scholars such as Robert Mandrou, Michel Vovelle and Georges Duby in their later studies

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<sup>114</sup> Poore, Stuart ‘What is the context? A reply to the Gray-Johnston debate on strategic culture’, *Review of International Studies*, 2003, vol.29, no. 2, p. 284

<sup>115</sup> Klein, Bradley S. “Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American power projection and alliance defence politics”, *Review of International Studies*, 1988, vol.14, issue 2, p. 135

<sup>116</sup> Stone, Elizabeth. ‘Comparative Strategic Cultures Literature Review, (Part 1)’, Prepared for: *Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office*, 2006, p. 1

<sup>117</sup> Johnston, Alastair Iain. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p.40

<sup>118</sup> Heuser, Beatrice. *Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Limited, 1998), pp. 2-4

<sup>119</sup> Bloch, Marc. *Les caractères originaux de l'histoire rurale française*. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1931)

on the ‘history of mentalities’.<sup>120</sup> Heuser’s historical approach to the study of mentalities effectively illustrates how historically-received norms provoke divergent strategic behaviour. As the methodology chapter discusses, this theory of the *mentalité* partially informs the approach taken in this thesis.

### 2.4.3. Third Generation

In the mid-1990s, a so-called third generation of strategic culture emerged with the work of Alastair Iain Johnston. If the first generation could be seen as exploratory, and the second as critical (with the exception of Heuser’s work), then the third generation could be termed methodological.<sup>121</sup> Like previous generations, Johnston argued that strategic preferences are rooted ‘in history and culture’ rather than ‘system structure.’<sup>122</sup> Arguably, this is where the similarities end. He began by critiquing the broad and cumbersome definitions of the works of the first two generations which he felt left little ‘conceptual space for a non-strategic culture explanation of strategic choice.’<sup>123</sup> He argued that the ‘kitchen sink’ approach that previous generations had adopted had resulted in a concept that has little utility as an analytical tool.

Johnston attempted to demonstrate a causal relationship between culture and behaviour by defining strategic culture as ‘a limited, ranked set of grand-strategic preferences that is consistent across the objects of analysis ... and persistent across time.’<sup>124</sup> His definition-*cum*-framework saw strategic culture as ‘an independent variable that determines a specific actor’s foreign and security behaviour.’<sup>125</sup>

The merit in Johnston’s work lies in his empirical process through: 1) identifying of objects of analysis that are representative of a formative period in a state’s past (such as texts, doctrine, or even discourse); 2) demonstrating that a significant proportion of policymakers held similar views at the time; 3) tracing consistency of thought over time. Indeed, this thesis

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<sup>120</sup> Vovelle, Michel. *Idéologies et mentalités*. (Paris: Maspéro, 1982); Duby, Georges and Mandrou, Robert. *A History of French Civilization* (New York: Random House, 1964)

<sup>121</sup> A similar point is made by Colin Gray in *Modern Strategy*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 129 (footnote 1)

<sup>122</sup> Johnston, Alastair Iain. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p. 3

<sup>123</sup> Johnston, Alastair Iain. ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, *International Security*, vol. 19, no.4. (Spring 1995) p. 37

<sup>124</sup> Ibid. p. 48

<sup>125</sup> Biehl, Heiko; Bastian Giegerich; Alexandra Jones, eds. *Strategic Cultures in Europe – Security and Defence Policies across the Continent*. (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2013), p. 10

draws some inspiration from Johnson's approach in that it analyses political speeches over time. Nevertheless, there are limitations to his approach related to assumptions of demonstrable causality, such as:

First, Johnston's definition of strategic culture assumes that it is 'persistent across time'. In fact, Johnston needs it to be persistent as he treats it as an independent variable that influences his dependent variable: behaviour. However, there is strong evidence to suggest that strategic culture evolves slowly over time and, in certain cases, may even undergo rapid and long-lasting shifts.<sup>126</sup> Instead, as first-generation theorists argue, strategic culture should perhaps be viewed either as dynamic or semi-permanent. This, of course, may undermine its explanatory power and, if we accept first generation thinking and the lessons from sociology and anthropology, culture perhaps cannot be considered as a variable at all. It varies by context (e.g. political culture, work culture, industrial culture, strategic culture, organisational culture) and is intrinsically normative.

Second, culture both constitutes behaviour and is also 'a constituent of that behaviour.'<sup>127</sup> In other words, culture and behaviour are symbiotic leading to what we might term 'the variable problem'. It seems that Johnston's study adheres to a Humean idea of causality in that if we can show that the cause and effect are 'contiguous in space and time'; that the cause precedes the effect; and that there is a 'constant union' between the two, then cause can be demonstrated.<sup>128</sup> However, this falls apart somewhat if the study variables are inter-dependent. Most crucially, it prevents us from establishing whether the cause precedes the effect meaning we can no longer conclude with any degree of certainty that a condition (X) has caused an outcome (Y).

Third, Johnston does not address the potential for norms to be received informally. In other words, rather than being evident in the texts or debates of a particular era and consistent across time, certain norms may not be articulated at all, but rather unconsciously transmitted through passive socialisation such as observation or word of mouth. Any study on strategic culture must take into account the potential for individuals to have an innate sense of what is appropriate behaviour, without necessarily being conscious of the source for that

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<sup>126</sup> See the rapid change in Germany's strategic culture from an expansionist power pre-Second World War, to a pacific power post-War.

<sup>127</sup> Gray, Colin S. 'Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back', *Review of International Studies*, 1999, vol. 25, p. 50

<sup>128</sup> Hume, David. *Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, The Understanding*, online resource published 2004, part iii, pp. 89-90. See: <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/hume1739book1.pdf>

behaviour. That is, culture can be used to *understand* even if it is intuitively limited in its explanatory powers.

#### 2.4.4. Towards a Fourth Generation?

The ‘three generations’ debates are arguably still ongoing, but the literature has shifted towards establishing more normative frameworks for understanding the effects of strategic culture and improving its research utility as a mechanism for understanding differences that arise. European security scholar Christoph Meyer advanced the idea of distinguishing between contextual and tangible aspects of strategic culture. He argued that in contemporary literature, strategic culture is ‘increasingly invoked as shorthand to highlight that national security and defence policies rest on deep-seated norms, beliefs and ideas about the appropriate use of force’. His conceptual framework is based on ‘four main scalable norms’<sup>129</sup> which allow assessments of how ‘normative components’ translate into policy. These four dimensions are: 1) goals for the use of force; 2) the way in which coercive means are used; 3) preferred mode of co-operation; and 4) international/domestic authorisation requirements.<sup>130</sup> Meyer’s scale ranges from low to high activism in each of these categories.

The framework is useful for identifying the manner in which states are likely to behave and similar, more recent frameworks have echoed his approach. For example, Biehl et al. in their work on European strategic cultures, outlined four similar policy areas that are attributable to strategic culture: 1) level of ambition in international security policy; 2) scope of action for the executive in decision-making; 3) foreign policy orientation; 4) willingness to use force.<sup>131</sup>

These frameworks have added a layer of specificity that was previously lacking from the debate. However, the analysis on the historical roots of states’ strategic cultures is a little superficial. Indeed, Meyer’s analysis tends to be largely forward looking, asking if there is a trend towards a convergence in European strategic cultures and ‘what kind of European

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<sup>129</sup> Meyer, Christoph O. *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture; Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 22

<sup>130</sup> For the full framework see Meyer, Christoph O. *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture; Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 23

<sup>131</sup> Biehl, Heiko; Giegerich, Bastian; Jones, Alexandra eds. *Strategic Cultures in Europe – Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*. (Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2013), pp. 13-16



defence policy is possible'.<sup>132</sup> Furthermore, they not only tend to assume absolute continuity in strategic culture through fairly rigid frameworks, but they are also largely concerned with foreign policy. This, of course, leaves little room for an analysis of strategic culture in the context of domestic security.

#### **2.4.5. Deficiencies and enduring questions in the literature**

Although a great deal of progress has been made in clarifying the debate, in spite of over forty years of academic contributions to the subject, numerous questions still surround the theory; there is still no consensus on what it is, whether behaviour can be separated from culture, who 'carries' it, and how to 'operationalise' it.<sup>133</sup> This raises a number of conceptual issues; for example, even if we accept that strategic culture is an important determinant of behaviour, if it varies so substantially from country to country then how can it be operationalised in any practical sense? Further, if we accept the notion that a strategic culture creates entrenched modes of thought and action, does this not also assume continuity in behaviour? If so, what accounts for obvious episodes of change in behaviour? What are the factors that affect rates of change? Are these changes permanent?

There are a number of studies that have attempted to tackle many of these questions related to continuity and change. Snyder originated the debate by arguing that strategy would 'evolve only marginally over time',<sup>134</sup> while Johnston also assumes that strategic culture is broadly constant, changing only incrementally with the passage of time.<sup>135</sup> Other works such as political scientist John S. Duffield's study on German foreign policy, argued that culture had a deterministic effect by predisposing 'societies in general and political elites in particular toward certain actions'.<sup>136</sup> Indeed, there are a number of studies that examine the apparently consistent 'culture of restraint' that emerged in Germany following the Second World War.<sup>137</sup> More recent works such as that of Dmitry Adamsky have analysed Russian

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<sup>132</sup> Meyer, Christoph O. *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture; Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 13

<sup>133</sup> Biehl, Heiko; Giegerich, Bastian; Jones, Alexandra eds. *Strategic Cultures in Europe – Security and Defence Policies across the Continent*. (Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2013), p. 11

<sup>134</sup> Snyder, Jack L. 'The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations', *RAND Corporation, R-2154-AF*. (Santa Monica, September 1977), p. 9

<sup>135</sup> Johnston, Alastair Iain. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 1

<sup>136</sup> Duffield, John S. 'Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism,' *International Organization*, Autumn 1999, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 765-803.

<sup>137</sup> Baumann, Rainer and Hellman, Gunther in Douglas Webber ed. *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?: German Foreign Policy Since Unification* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013 edition); Malici, Akan 'Germans

strategic culture in the context of the war in Syria arguing that while change is evident, this is largely on the tactical and operational level, while the strategic level has remained generally consistent over time.<sup>138</sup>

Conversely, other scholars have argued for the potential for change in strategic culture. Darryl Howlett argues, 'strategic cultures can and do change, sometimes radically.'<sup>139</sup> Other scholars such as Alister Miskimmon have argued that changes occur when elites exploit or manipulate culture to serve their own objectives.<sup>140</sup> US scholar Harry Eckstein wrote that changes occur when the state harnesses military power to incite specific shifts. He uses the example of the French Revolution as evidence of this.<sup>141</sup> More recently, in 2011, the political scientist Jeffrey Lantis wrote in an article specifically addressing continuity and change that structural shifts and the rise of new threats have created a corresponding change in Australia's strategic culture that he expects to have a degree of permanence.<sup>142</sup>

It is apparent, therefore, that the literature has failed to reach a consensus on whether strategic culture remains continuous across time or whether it may change. Indeed, even among those who suggest change is possible, there is clear disagreement as to what causes these shifts. Part of the problem is that much of the literature assumes mutual exclusivity. In other words that our choice must be either continuity *or* change, but not both. After all, if historical experiences guide cultural preferences which, in turn, constrain behaviour then this assumes general continuity in strategic behaviour. However, history is replete with examples of events that have generated strategic shifts: for example, the end of the Second World War, the end of the Cold War, the attack on 11 September 2001, even the attack in Paris in November 2015. In cases such as these, many scholars have argued that rapid and radical change can occur if a state (or group of states) is 'battered by traumatic shock.'<sup>143</sup>

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as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy Behavior,' *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 37-62

<sup>138</sup> Adamsky, Dmitry. 'Russian campaign in Syria – change and continuity in strategic culture', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 104-125

<sup>139</sup> Howlett, Darryl. 'The Future of Strategic Culture,' *Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum*, 31 October 2006, p. 5

See: <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/stratcult-future.pdf> (accessed 13/09/2018)

<sup>140</sup> Miskimmon, Alister. 'Continuity in the Face of Upheaval—British Strategic Culture and the Impact of the Blair Government', *European Security*, vol. 13, no. 2, 2004, pp. 273-299.

<sup>141</sup> Eckstein, Harry. 'On the Etiology of Internal Wars', *History and Theory*, vol. 4, no. 2, 1965, pp. 133-163

<sup>142</sup> Lantis, Jeffrey and & Charlton, Andrew A. 'Continuity or Change? The Strategic Culture of Australia', *Comparative Strategy*, 30:4, 2011, pp. 291-315

<sup>143</sup> Gray, Colin S. Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture. Paper prepared for: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, 31 October 2006

While this view is ostensibly correct, it does rather suggest that change occurs naturally and unconsciously following a shock. In reality is slightly more nuanced and requires an active, conscious effort to incite change. Adapting a framework introduced by Max Weber, this thesis suggests that change can occur as a function of powerful social structures, the presence of a bold leader that is willing to implement a change, and a cultural climate that is receptive to a shift.<sup>144</sup> However, the speed and permanence of a shift depends on the presence of all three of these factors.

A powerful example of this in the context of this thesis would be a political institution (say, the police) who deem it necessary to involve the military on the national territory, the leader of the country is bold enough to push through the decision to mobilise the armed forces, despite a lack of precedent. Despite the lack of precedent, the public's perception of a putative threat is sufficiently high (*because of a traumatic shock*) to be receptive to such an action. It is important to note that a state does not stop being an inherently cultural entity even in the event of a shift. Hence, core cultural values will likely be evident even in an environment that appears on the surface to have changed drastically. It is this understanding of continuity and change in strategic culture that is adopted in this thesis.

## 2.6. Summary of the literature

The literature on strategic culture has developed over the years from a general awareness that different states will adopt national styles to a keener focus on the role that culture plays in determining or, at least, influencing, behaviour. This was evident in the classical texts of Homer, Herodotus, and Thucydides as well as the great military philosophers Sun Tsu and Clausewitz.

A number of sociological works were among the first to use culture as a framework, in their studies. Durkheim advanced the idea of culture as an externally constraining force, while Simmel argued that behaviour and culture are inseparable due to *Wechselwirkung* (reciprocity); a concept that Gray adopted (intentionally or otherwise) in his first generation thinking on strategic culture when he argued that culture both shapes behaviour and is shaped

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<sup>144</sup> Weber, Max.; G. Roth & G. Wittich trans. *Economy and Society – an Outline of Interpretative sociology*. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968/1922) pp.240 – 245; Weber, Max; Talcott Parsons trans. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. (London: Unwin University Books, 1905/1967); Weber, Max. *Politics as a Vocation*.

by it. Weber also wrote about the 'iron cage' which constrains action, but built the potential for change into his thinking by outlining four forms of social action: Value Rational, Rational goal-oriented, Affective, and Traditional.

Anthropological works in the twentieth century also established frameworks for understanding culture's constraining effect on behaviour. Much of this literature argued that culture is a social construct that tethers the individual to a set of norms making it difficult, if not impossible, to behave *aculturally*. Crucially, many anthropologists advanced the idea that culture is a lens of perception that will influence how one views and interprets the world.

It argued that this concept was developed in the early studies on strategic culture by Snyder, Booth and Gray, which attempted to challenge assumptions over the existence of a 'generic rational man'. Instead, they argued, 'encultured' individuals would interpret the material realm culturally, again through a perceptual lens. From this first generation of thought, a series of debates emerged: from Klein's second generation assertion that states may not do what they say, to Johnston's third generation attempt to provide a falsifiable model for strategic culture by separating culture from behaviour; an impossible feat according to Gray given the symbiotic nature of the two variables.

It was argued that some progress has been made on the subject of strategic culture, particularly regarding the introduction of useful normative frameworks, but that a number of enduring questions remain in the literature – particularly regarding the notion of continuity and change. Some studies argue strategic behaviour is more or less constant, others argue that it changes over time. Further, even among scholars who adopt a position that strategy will shift, there is still disagreement as to what causes shifts, how permanent they are, and what accounts for rates of change.

To this enduring conundrum, it was suggested that we need not consider continuity and change as mutually exclusive. Instead, general continuity is afforded by the influence of historical experience and cultural preferences. Rapid and substantial shifts in strategy may occur, but only in the event of three essential criteria: powerful institutions; a bold political leader; and a ripe cultural climate. Crucially, even if a change does occur, it was argued that core cultural characteristics that are unique to that state will still be evident in their response.

Ultimately, Michael Howard once wrote that ‘an understanding of the past is prerequisite to an understanding of the present.’<sup>145</sup> This is absolutely correct; however, this thesis would also contend that any individual’s understanding of historical events will always be refracted through the cultural glasses they are wearing - whether they feel they need those glasses or not.

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<sup>145</sup> Howard, Michael. *The Lessons of History*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 9

## Chapter 3 – Methodology

The previous chapters raise three core research questions: first, are Britain and France's cultural preferences for acceptance or rejection of domestic military forces domestically derived from the perception of the national historical experience? Second, do these cultural preferences have a constraining effect on strategic behaviour? And third, if evidence of historically-derived cultural constraint can be found, what accounts for episodes of change in strategy over time? These are complex questions and developing a methodology around them relies on how culture itself is treated in any analysis. For Johnson, cited previously, culture is an explanatory variable in its own right. It is measurable and finite and therefore should be causally linked to behaviours. However, as Gray argues, culture itself depends on historical as well as behavioural context and should be considered as both the *cause* and the *effect*.

This thesis subscribes to the latter view. Culture should not, and arguably even cannot, be used as a variable as it is an amalgamation of myriad related, dynamic, and inter-dependent variables. As Simmel and Gray argued, this variable symbiosis is evident in the permanent dialectic between the individual and the objects of culture. If the two are inextricably linked, then we are confronted with a serious methodological hurdle: how can we disentangle the concept of culture to such an extent as to draw valid causal conclusions? Some studies have argued that this challenge is insurmountable,<sup>146</sup> which of course seriously undermines any attempt to take the 'explaining'<sup>147</sup> approach to strategic culture.

This was emphasised by Jeffrey S. Lantis and Darryl Howlett who argued that the 'search for falsifiable theories' when examining strategic culture is 'unachievable'.<sup>148</sup> As a result, the study of strategic culture should arguably be considered as the art of understanding, rather than the science of explaining.<sup>149</sup> Gray argued similarly that '[s]trategy does not yield

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<sup>146</sup> Wagner, Wolfgang & Yamori, Katsuya. *Can culture be a variable? Dispositional Explanation and Cultural Metrics*. In T. Sugiman, et al. *Progress in Asian Social Psychology*. Vol. 2. (Seoul: Kyoyook-Kwahak-Sa Publishers, 1999)

<sup>147</sup> See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith's excellent and comprehensive discussion on the appropriate methods to use when conducting research, in particular their analysis on the respective approaches of positivist and interpretivist methodologies, of which this thesis is the latter. Hollis, Martin & Smith, Steve. *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990)


<sup>148</sup> Lantis, Jeffrey S. and Howlett, Darryl in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray eds. (2006) *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, 5<sup>th</sup> Edition 2016. (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 87-88

<sup>149</sup> Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve. *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990), ch. 5, pp. 92-118

to the scientific method, and nor does the study of culture.’<sup>150</sup> With this in mind, this thesis adopts a more inductive, interpretivist methodology based on a small number of case studies (small-n approach) and historical analysis.

The challenge is to construct a methodological approach that elevates our understanding of historical and cultural constraint through precise analysis while still recognising the limitations of using ‘history’ and ‘culture’ as a central framework. This requires a framework around which to build the analysis; drawing on the lessons from Boas, Snyder, and Gray, this thesis considers culture as the lens of perception through which we view and interpret the world and our past experiences. In this sense, cultural preferences must be placed in the centre of the framework. Yet, although culture certainly influences the lessons we learn from the past as well as the behaviour that we deem appropriate, it can also be influenced by both of these factors. For Gray, a traumatic shock will usually lead to a change in approach while for Simmel, structure and agency are in a state of eternal tension as individuals attempt to overcome social and cultural norms. With this in mind, this thesis uses a framework which encompasses the potential for strategic continuity *and* change, as a guide to understanding the specific historical experience, cultural preference, behaviour nexus:<sup>151</sup>

#### **Framework 1: Historical experience, cultural preference, behaviour nexus**



There are three central elements to this framework. First, in order to identify the relevant *historical experiences*, over five hundred examples of military deployments on the national territory in Britain and France are charted and coded each according to their purpose. This reveals a series of formative moments in each state’s past that may have resulted either in an increase or a decrease in the number of deployments or in a shift in strategy.

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<sup>150</sup> Gray, Colin S. Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture. Paper prepared for: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, 31 October 2006, p. 1

<sup>151</sup> To be clear, this is not a separation of culture and behaviour since the two are inextricably bound together. Rather it is an exploration of the constraining effect (rather than deterministic effect) that culture may exercise over behaviour.

Second, in order to identify a set of *cultural preferences*, at each of these formative moments the language used by policymakers in relation to the use of the armed forces is analysed. This enables an understand what British or French policymakers were thinking at the time.

Third, the cultural preferences of policymakers at each formative moment will be compared in order to find evidence of enduring themes and *behaviours*. This is because something must be ‘sufficiently established and enduring to merit description as cultural.’<sup>152</sup> It applies the results of the linguistic analysis to tangible strategic decisions regarding domestic military deployments. It analyses how cultural preferences have affected representations of the military through recruitment campaigns before examining how enduring historically derived cultural norms have constrained the approaches of Britain and France in terms of the military’s role in counter-terrorism operations in the present.

This approach enables the identification of any enduring patterns in the themes of the speeches and statements and combines with the evidence of historical constraint in the rhetoric through direct references to historical events. It expects to find limited recognition in the rhetoric as to the source of specific cultural preferences. In short, there will be residual acceptance or rejection of domestic military deployments, but not necessarily an awareness, readily apparent in the rhetoric, as to where this came from. It is to this that the discussion now turns.

### **3.1. Case Selection**

This study charts over two hundred years of domestic military deployments in Britain and France and intends to go into some depth in terms of the historical analysis. Consequently, the desire to do justice to the historical analysis led to the decision to focus on two states: Britain and France. As the introduction indicated, these states were selected due to the similar preconditions such as budgets, GDPs, military sizes, and actual and perceived threats, but divergent responses to the threat of Islamist terrorism.<sup>153</sup> Of course, other states would have been equally valid for inclusion. Germany would have been an obvious third choice

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<sup>152</sup> Gray, Colin S. ‘British and American Strategic Cultures’, paper prepared for Jamestown symposium 2007: ‘Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years of Transatlantic Engagement’, 18-19 April 2007), p. 37

<sup>153</sup> It should be noted that Islamist terrorism is not the focus of this thesis as this would have necessitated a different approach that examined respective attitudes to Islam, citizenship, immigration etc. Instead it simply uses the fact that the extraordinary threat presented by Islamist terrorism led to extraordinary responses.



given similar preconditions (see table 2), but different response. However, it was felt that the inclusion of a third case would restrict the depth of the analysis.

Germany was excluded rather than France or Britain as there are more similarities in terms of relative size and strength between France and Britain than with Germany (See table 2). Furthermore, post-2001, Britain and France have experienced more ‘significant’ attacks (defined here as more than five fatalities) than Germany with seven attacks in both Britain and France compared with one in Germany. Lastly, both Britain and France view their militaries with a degree of national pride. The German people, by contrast, are generally resistant to the *Bundeswehr* in general terms, let alone in a domestic capacity. Thus, in keeping with the need for cases with as many similar preconditions as possible, Germany was selected for exclusion. However, although it was omitted on this occasion, it will be included in future research projects (see discussion in conclusion) and, where relevant, occasional comparisons with Britain and France are included in this thesis.

**Table 2 – France, Britain and Germany, compared**

	France	United Kingdom	Germany
GDP per Capita – US \$ (2019) <sup>154</sup>	49.4 thousand	48.7 thousand	56.1 thousand
Population (2020) <sup>155</sup>	65.3 million	67.9 million	82.3 million
Active Service Personnel (2016) <sup>156</sup>	203,000	153,000	183,000 <sup>157</sup>
Defence Expenditure (2019) <sup>158</sup>	\$ 52.3 billion	\$ 54.8 billion	\$ 48.5 billion
Police per 100,000 people <sup>159</sup>	340	267 <sup>160</sup> (2017)	296
Threat perception: ranking of Islamist terrorism in 2017	1st	1st	1st
Number of significant attacks (2001 – 2018)	7	7	1

<sup>154</sup> World Bank. ‘GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$) - France, United Kingdom, Germany’. See: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=FR-GB-DE> (accessed 12/08/2020)

<sup>155</sup> Countries in the World by Population: <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/> (accessed 01 September 2020)

<sup>156</sup> Malcolm Chalmers, Decision Time: The National Security and Defence Capability Review 2017 – 2018, *Whitehall Report 1 – 18*, RUSI, p. 8

<sup>157</sup> Personalzahlen der Bundeswehr. Aktuelle Personalzahlen der Bundeswehr. *Bundeswehr.de* See: <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ueber-die-bundeswehr/zahlen-daten-fakten/personalzahlen-bundeswehr> (accessed 21/07/2020)

<sup>158</sup> *International Institute for Strategic Studies*. The Military Balance 2020, Top 15 Defence Budgets 2019. See: <https://bit.ly/3kDaR1x> (accessed 12/08/2020)

<sup>159</sup> Key Figures on Europe, 2015 edition, Eurostat Statistical Books. (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015), p. 43

<sup>160</sup> Hargreaves, Jodie; Husband, Hannah; Linehan, Chris. *Police Workforce, England and Wales*, 31 March 2017, Statistical Bulletin 10/17, Home Office. See: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/630471/hosb1017-police-workforce.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/630471/hosb1017-police-workforce.pdf) (accessed 13 July 2017)

Equally, Spain, or Italy could have been analysed. In 2004 until 2005, Spain deployed around 20,000 troops and 3,000 military vehicles in response to the threat under Operation Romeo-Mike. This would have been interesting to compare with the military response from France and the *ad hoc* civil-military response from Britain.<sup>161</sup> Equally, Italy would have made for an interesting comparison due to the similarities between the French and Italian responses. Italy deployed 5,000 troops in February 2015, the month following the attacks on the *Charlie Hebdo* offices in Paris, to guard synagogues, Jewish schools, and tourist attractions.<sup>162</sup> They also maintain a similar rural police force, the *carabinieri* that was modelled on the French *gendarmerie* and which also falls under the jurisdiction of the military. However, with the exception of the Madrid attack in 2004, neither Spain nor Italy have experienced significant attacks to the same degree as Britain or France in recent years and therefore would not have adhered to the necessary preconditions.

### 3.3. Data gathering

With the cases selected, it was then necessary to gather the relevant data that would allow us to answer the research question: do cultural preferences derived from the perception of the national historical experience constrain behaviour and, if so, what accounts for episodes of change in strategy? Framework 1, outlined above, provided the three inter-related dimensions that this thesis seeks to explore: 1) Historical experience; 2) Cultural preferences; and 3) Behaviour. Each of these aspects required a distinct methodological approach; consequently, the following sections will explain each dimension and the methods used in turn.

#### (1) Historical experience

Based on framework 1, the first step was to uncover the specific formative moments in each state's past that may have affected their current policy outlook. The logical solution to this

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<sup>161</sup> Reinares, Fernando. 'After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 2009, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 367-388

<sup>162</sup> Italy deploys soldiers to guard against terror attacks, *The Guardian*, 18 February 2015. See: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/18/italy-deploys-soldiers-to-guard-against-terror-attacks> (accessed 22/07/2019)

was to chart domestic military deployments in Britain and France across time. These deployments could be coded according to their purpose (e.g. riot and protest, counterterrorism, defence from invasion) allowing for an effective visualisation of the army's domestic role over time. This approach would reveal different eras of deployment and, by focusing on the moment of change (for example a transition from an era of containing riot and protest to one of counterterrorism), would indicate a potential attitudinal shift.

The French *Annales* literature on *mentalités* was used to structure the framework. Mandrou wrote that memory creates a 'prison' of history which restricts thought and action. As such, he argued that it was necessary to analyse the *longue durée* – that is, as long a period of time as possible in order to demonstrate the fixed nature of collective mentalities. Michel Vovelle, in contrast, argued this assertion was too deterministic and risked slipping into what he referred to as '*histoire immobile*;<sup>163</sup> it ignored the fact that changes can, and will, still occur, particularly following 'revolutionary events.'<sup>164</sup> As a result, he advocated for an approach which still included as long a period of time as possible, but that also factored in the boom and bust nature of social life.<sup>165</sup>

Both Mandrou and Vovelle's arguments have validity; examining a concept such as continuity and change in strategic culture necessitates a broad scope. As a result, 1800 was selected as the starting point for the project. Baldwin sees 1800 as the start of the era he calls 'old globalization', when states began to experience rapid growth in industry, exports, and national incomes. He writes that France and Britain (along with Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan) were particular beneficiaries to this emergent globalisation as evidenced through their rapid colonial expansion. Thus, the nineteenth century marked the point at which Britain and France started to become global powers. From a domestic perspective, as philosopher Ernest Gellner argues, the 1800s marked the transition from agrarian societies to industrial ones. As a result of a more centralised economic and political system, populations became more culturally homogenous and, thus, this period can be considered as the birth of the nation state.<sup>166</sup> 2019 was selected as the end point to ensure the findings were as up to date as possible (for example, by allowing an analysis of the *gilets jaunes* protests) while still ensuring the accuracy of the data.

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<sup>163</sup> 'static history'

<sup>164</sup> Vovelle, Michel. 'Histoire des mentalités — Histoire des résistances ou les prisons de longue durée', *Le Monde alpin et rhodanien. Revue régionale d'ethnologie*, 1980, no. 8-1-2, pp. 139-156

<sup>165</sup> Ibid, p. 141

<sup>166</sup> Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1983/2006), pp. 3 – 7

With the time period selected, the next step was to trace historical domestic deployments of the military in each state. Incidents were drawn from extensive research using a number of both primary and secondary sources. For example, the *Archives Nationales* in Paris, the National Archives at Kew, both historical and recent debates in the *Assemblée Nationale* and the *Sénat* for France and on Hansard for Britain as well as speeches and statements by policymakers and military personnel, the correspondence of certain influential political or military figures, the media, and, of course, from a wealth of secondary sources such as books and journal articles. In total, across the two cases, over 500 incidents were found (see table 3).

This thesis does not claim to represent an exhaustive list of domestic military deployments in Britain and France, but rather examines what are termed ‘significant’ deployments. In other words, deployments that have fulfilled some or all of the following criteria: it involved a substantial number of service personnel; it led to loss of life; it has been debated or mentioned in parliament; it has been mentioned in the correspondence of political or military personnel, it has had lasting historical impact through continued discussion in the media, academia, or military and political establishments.

Each of the deployments was first coded according to whether it constituted either an ‘active’ or a ‘passive’ engagement. Here, active is understood as a significant, overt deployment with the aim of defusing a dangerous situation or imminent threat including riots, protests, terrorism, foreign invasion, or other disruptive political turmoil. Passive is understood as a significant, overt deployment with the aim of aiding the general public in their daily lives through disaster relief or the provision of service personnel in cases of civil service strikes.

Here it is important to note the exclusion of two cases from the data on domestic deployments. For Britain, deployments to Northern Ireland under Operation Banner were not included and, equally, neither were France’s deployments to Algeria. This is not to say that these cases have not been formative to each state’s respective approach to domestic deployments, but rather because they do not reflect the same normative standards that were set for the homeland.

For example, in spite of its proximity to the British mainland, Ireland has historically been treated as a colony. Principles of minimum force were not freely applied to Ireland to the extent that they were in England and, in the nineteenth century, when mainland Britain was wrestling with the ethical conundrum of using troops against the people, British

policymakers were exhibiting a certain ‘reluctance’ to withdraw troops from Ireland.<sup>167</sup> Instead, the standard approach by the British has been ‘imposition by force’.<sup>168</sup> There were examples of absentee landlords, who often lived in England, calling in the local army units to enforce the eviction of the local impoverished Irish Catholic tenants at the point of a bayonet. A Lieutenant Colonel of the MoD interviewed for this thesis stated that ‘I doubt whether this use of the Army in civil land dispute would been considered acceptable within England, Scotland or Wales at this time.’<sup>169</sup> Furthermore, the Irish were often dehumanised by the British state through ‘negative ethnic stereotypes’ and ‘openly hostile or ... condescending’ rhetoric.<sup>170</sup> This notion was emphasised by a British officer who served in Northern Ireland in the 1990s who was interviewed for this thesis. On the subject of how operations were conducted he stated: ‘Northern Ireland was run in an entirely different way. It was run like in the colonies. People [in England] turned a blind eye. It was like a game. Everyone knew what was going on.’<sup>171</sup> In short, as S.J. Connolly argues, colonisation created modern Ireland.<sup>172</sup>

The French invasion of Algeria began in July 1830. The British historian David Fieldhouse wrote that this provided the impetus for ‘a complete colonization’ which lasted until the country’s independence in 1962.<sup>173</sup> Algeria’s treatment by the French state differed to that of their other colonies in that in 1841 it was annexed and, in 1848, it was formally integrated into the French state; the territories of Algiers, Constantine, and Oran were classified as *départements* and inhabitants of Algeria were all referred to as French citizens. However, although the French state claimed that the same laws applied in mainland France as Algeria, the reality was very different. As Sung Choi argues, ‘the legal framework in fact privileged

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<sup>167</sup> Spiers, Edward M. ‘THE BRITISH ARMY 1856-1914: recent writing reviewed’, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Winter 1985, vol. 63, no. 256, p. 198

<sup>168</sup> Connolly, S.J. *Settler colonialism in Ireland from the English conquest to the nineteenth century*. In Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini eds. *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*. (Oxon: Routledge, 2017), p. 49

<sup>169</sup> Simpson, Lieutenant Colonel Harold (UK Ministry of Defence), Semi-structured interview by Jack Harding, London, 15 December 2017

<sup>170</sup> Connolly, S.J. *Settler colonialism in Ireland from the English conquest to the nineteenth century*. In Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini eds. *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*. (Oxon: Routledge, 2017), p.61

<sup>171</sup> Keil., Captain Duncan Former British army and NATO liaison officer, Semi-structured interview by Jack Harding, London, 1 August 2019

<sup>172</sup> In Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini eds. *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism* (Oxon: Routledge, 2017) ; N.B. The British government’s recent Internal Market Bill could be interpreted as ignoring the will of the Northern Ireland Assembly (who voted to reject the Bill) in favour of treating Northern Ireland as an integral part of Britain. Recent post-Brexit developments, including an increased threat from dissident Republicans mean that my future research will prioritise integrating the Northern Irish case with a view to understanding how attitudes to the use of force have converged or diverged compared with the British mainland. See conclusion for further details.

<sup>173</sup> Fieldhouse, David K. *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century*. (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 182

European rights over those of the majority Muslim population.’<sup>174</sup> Algerian political and social structures were uprooted as a matter of policy and the indigenous people were seen as ‘French subjects’ rather than citizens.<sup>175</sup> Like the British case, this was exemplified by the use of pejorative terms such as ‘lazy, savage, and worthless.’<sup>176</sup> Furthermore, rule in Algeria was maintained militarily rather than through a civil system like that seen in mainland France. Following the initial invasion, Algeria was controlled by ‘largely autonomous generals, who waged brutal warfare against the local Arab and Berber populations’<sup>177</sup> and, further, a military officer served as Algeria’s *gouverneur général* until the 1880s.

Uniformity was important for this study and, given that different rules seem to have been applied to both Northern Ireland and Algeria, they were omitted from the analysis here. Both cases are discussed as context in this thesis, but are excluded from the data analysis due to concerns that they would skew the findings. As discussed in the concluding chapter, further research will compare the cultural preferences for the use of force on mainland Britain and France with their respective approaches to Northern Ireland and Algeria.

The following table provides a summary of the domestic military deployments that were found in the primary and secondary literature (table 3). It shows how France has deployed the army on the national territory four times as often as Britain over the same period and for a wider range of operations.

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<sup>174</sup> Choi, Sung. *French Algeria, 1830 – 1962* in In Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini eds. *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*. (Oxon: Routledge, 2017), p. 201

<sup>175</sup> Gulley, Paige N. French Land, Algerian People: Nineteenth-Century French Discourse on Algeria and Its Consequences’, *Voces Novae: Chapman University Historical Review*, 2018, vol. 10, no. 1, p. 1

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

<sup>177</sup> Davis, Stacey Renee. ‘Turning French Convicts into Colonists: The Second Empire’s Prisoners in Algeria, 1852-1858,’ in *French Colonial History, Volume 2*. (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2002), p. 95

**Table 3: Summary of ‘significant’ domestic deployments in Britain and France, 1800 - 2019**

Deployment Type	Active / Passive	Britain (number of deployments)	France (number of deployments)
Riot & Protest	Active	53	151
Defence from Invasion	Active	0	160 <sup>178</sup>
Counterterrorism	Active	11	44
Coup d’état	Active	0	2
Striking civil service / personnel provision	Passive	35	23
Disaster relief	Passive	6	40
<b>TOTAL</b>	-	<b>105</b>	<b>420</b>

From these deployments, a number of formative moments were identified that seemed to usher in a new era of deployment. Table 4 provides a list of these deployments that will be analysed in this thesis. The charts presenting the findings for each state can be found in their respective chapters and a full list of the deployments is found in appendix 1 (Britain) and appendix 2 (France).

**Table 4: Summary of formative moments in Britain and France, 1800 – 2019**

BRITISH CASE	FRENCH CASE
1819 – St. Peter’s Field Massacre (‘Peterloo’)	1871 – The Commune
1926 - General Strike	1907 – Languedoc revolt
1974 – Heathrow exercises	1914 – First World War
1980 – Iranian Embassy siege	1950 – Défense en surface (DIT and DOT)
2015 – 2017 – Operation Temperer	2015- 2019 – Operation Sentinelle

<sup>178</sup> N.B. This includes deployments on the national territory during the Cold War under the DOT doctrine. Thus, defence from invasion pre-1945 entails battles and war fought. Post-1945 deployments, while still for the purposes of defence, did not involve fighting.

From the formative moments that are identified in table 4, three areas arise that require further clarification. First, it is important to offer a brief explanation for the selection of one of the formative moments; namely, the First World War in the French case. This was selected for two reasons. First: the defence from invasion era can be split into two sub-categories; 1) battles and wars and 2) deterrence and protection. Given this distinction, it was important to include an example from both based on the assumption that the responses they foment may differ. Second, based purely on the domestic deployments data, the Second World War should be the formative moment for this section as it was the last war on French soil. However, as the former French ambassador to the US, Gérard Araud once stated, this period of time is ‘the black hole of French history’. The lack of data for speeches is evidence of this: for obvious reasons, between 1941 and 1947 there are no available records of debates in French parliament or the senate. Thus, while the impact of this period is discussed, the rhetoric could not be analysed. However, the First World War was also extremely formative and for similar reasons. There is a wealth of available source material for this period, thus this case is analysed instead.

Second, it should also be noted that although the data used in this thesis begins in 1800, the respective British and French chapters also include a discussion of the War of the Three Kingdoms and French Revolution. These two moments in British and French history were enormously formative in terms of the development of modern preferences for the use of the armed forces on the national territory. However, if these moments were included in the core thesis, it would have necessitated tracing nearly four hundred years of deployments. This is far too broad a scope for a comparative project and would have diluted the findings too significantly. As a result, the War of the Three Kingdoms and the French Revolution are simply discussed in their respective chapters as essential historical context.

The third area for clarification relates to the question of how do we know that the moments identified here were formative? And additionally, how can we tell that these incidents were of long-term significance? To the first question, this thesis adopted a two-pronged approach: first, given that this thesis is concerned with the question of continuity and also episodes of change, the data was examined to identify areas of transition in the nature of domestic deployments. In other words, moments that seemed to lead to a dramatic reduction or a dramatic increase in deployments for a particular purpose. An example of this is the selection of the 1871 Commune. Although subjective knowledge about France’s history indicated the importance of the 1848 revolution in France, this incident did not lead to an increase or reduction in the number of deployments. However, after the Commune, the number of



deployments for the purposes of quelling civil unrest decreases dramatically. Equally, for the British case, the siege of Sidney Street in 1911 was arguably the first military deployment for the purposes of countering terrorism. However, there was not another deployment for this purpose for another sixty years and therefore it could not be classified as formative. To be clear, this thesis is not making the argument that the events identified here have been the *most* important in each state's history. For example, the 1974 Heathrow incident was likely nothing but a flash in the pan. Instead, each of these incidents seemed to mark either the beginning or the end of a particular era of domestic deployment.

This relates to the second question on how can we tell that these incidents were of long-term significance? Based on the deployment data alone, we will not be able to determine the long-term significance of each formative moment or whether its impact entered into the collective conscience. As a result, it is necessary to analyse the language used by policymakers at each of these moments in order to try and identify themes that are common across all eras regardless of the nature of the deployment.

## **(2) Cultural preferences**

With the formative historical moments identified for each state, the question now arises over how to examine the impact of these events on cultural preferences? As was noted previously, culture is a system of meaning that constitutes myriad interdependent variables rather than existing as a variable in its own right. Thus, while most reasonable people would probably agree that culture exerts a degree of influence on behaviour, this idea has been notoriously difficult to prove.

This is an issue that has dogged the strategic culture literature for years; in 2000, the political scientist Kerry Longhurst suggested an 'anatomy' of strategic culture due to her conviction that breaking the notion down into its constituent parts would afford greater academic utility. Longhurst drew a distinction between the 'unobservable' and 'observable' components of strategic culture. She argued that the 'unobservable' components are the 'core values' that are based on historical experiences and the 'observable' are the 'self-regulating practices and policies.'<sup>179</sup> However, Longhurst also suggested that the relationship between these components could be illustrated by evaluating 'official documentation [...] elite level

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<sup>179</sup> Longhurst, Kerry in Gerhard Kümmel and Andreas D. Prüfert eds. (2000) *Military Sociology, the Richness of a Discipline*. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), p. 307

debates and media representations’.<sup>180</sup> Colin Gray argued similarly that ‘I look for culture in a community’s ideals, in its ideas as revealed by its documents and other artefacts, and in its behaviour.’<sup>181</sup> Johnston, too, outlined four steps for analysing strategic culture that can be summarised as follows:

- 1 – find an object of analysis that is representative of a formative period;
- 2 – demonstrate consistency of thought across a wide variety of policymakers;
- 3 – Link these preferences to that state’s strategic culture;
- 4 – examine impact on behaviour.<sup>182</sup>

As a result of this overview, the language that is used by the policymakers of a given state in relation to particular strategic concepts has been chosen as a proxy to shed light on cultural preferences. The argument that language can be used to bridge the gaps between historical experience, culture, and behaviour has a great deal of merit. Indeed, a number of prominent scholars have explored the role of language as both a modifier and determinant of our perceptions about the world around us.<sup>183</sup> In 1935, the linguist John Rupert Firth wrote about language in terms of social action. He described it as ‘a way of doing things, of getting things done, a way of behaving and getting others to behave’.<sup>184</sup> The celebrated philosopher Michael Foucault also explored language’s practical effects by examining the relationship between language and knowledge production and, subsequently, how it relates to power.<sup>185</sup> Taking a hermeneutical perspective, the philosopher Jens Zimmermann wrote that ‘language guides our perception intrinsically.’<sup>186</sup> Furthermore, the sociologist Anthony Cohen argued one must ‘learn to be social’ and that part of this process is learning language. This will include ‘what’ to say to communicate with others, but not ‘what’ to communicate.<sup>187</sup> Thus, there is an inexorable connection between language, ideas and how we, as culturally bound animals, interpret the material world.

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<sup>180</sup> Longhurst, Kerry in Kümmel, Gerhard and Prüfert, Andreas D. eds. (2000) *Military Sociology, the Richness of a Discipline*. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), p. 308

<sup>181</sup> Gray, Colin S. Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture. Paper prepared for: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, 31 October 2006, p. 11

<sup>182</sup> Johnston, Alastair Iain. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p. x - xi

<sup>183</sup> Schleiermacher, Friedrich D.E. quoted in the introduction to *The Hermeneutics Reader*, ed. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer (New York: Continuum, 1997), p. 11

<sup>184</sup> Firth, John Rupert. *Papers in Linguistics 1934-1951*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 35

<sup>185</sup> Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), pp. 29-30

<sup>186</sup> Zimmermann, Jens. *Hermeneutics: A Very Short Introduction*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 15

<sup>187</sup> Cohen, Anthony P. *Symbolic Construction of Community*. (London: Ellis Horwood Ltd., 1985), p. 15

To give a practical example, in a video recorded by Amedy Coulibaly, one of the *île-de-France* attackers in January 2015 and an associate of brothers Saïd and Chérif Kouachi who attacked the Charlie Hebdo offices, he is heard saying that he would '*sortir contre*' his enemies ('I went out a little against the police') – this directly translates as 'go out against', but does not convey his intended meaning in French. In fact, Coulibaly was referencing a Salafist expression '*kharaja 'ala*' (meaning to attack) which he had translated literally into French. As the French counter-terrorism scholar Gilles Kepel writes, this linguistic quirk alone unveiled his allegiance to Islamic State.<sup>188</sup>

Furthermore, the absence, or lack of usage, of a particular word, phrase or idiom from a language can be equally important as it may imply it has no purpose for that culture. To give a brief example, on the subject of Germany taking a more active role internationally the former German ambassador to the UK, Thomas Matussek stated '[w]e don't like the word leadership. We had a Führer and don't want that again.'<sup>189</sup> The German reluctance to use the word *Führen* in an overtly political context is a clear reflection of their historical experiences.<sup>190</sup> Of course, there is no inherent meaning to words, just the meaning that we ascribe to those words. We see, then, how cultural norms are reflected in the language and, thus, rhetorical and discourse analysis should be at the forefront of any study of strategic culture.

### 3.4. Content and Discourse Analysis

This thesis blends both content and discourse analysis in order to not just examine what was said and with what frequency, but also to interpret the meaning behind what was said when placed within its cultural and historical context. This is a similar approach to the systemic-functional method advocated by the British linguist Michael Halliday. Halliday's approach focused on examining language in its socio-political context to discern the meaning that is encoded in language by the writer or speaker. The 'systemic' component refers to the forms that language takes. This is interpreted in this thesis as the different themes related to domestic military deployments that are identified in the rhetoric. 'Functional' is related to

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<sup>188</sup> Kepel, Gilles. *Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), p. 164

<sup>189</sup> Matussek, Thomas cited in Harding, Rebecca and Harding, Jack. *The Weaponization of Trade: The Great Unbalancing of Politics and Economics*. (London: London Publishing Partnership, 2017), p. 25

<sup>190</sup> Führen being the German verb, to lead

the assumption that language is cultural behaviour designed to serve an idiosyncratic function and will therefore reflect the cultural preferences of the state.<sup>191</sup> For this thesis, this relates more to the discourse analysis component, by interpreting the meaning of a speech and trying to determine its effect on behaviour.

This thesis will focus on elite-level statements and speeches, official documentation, and, where relevant, media articles in order to determine the impact of historical experiences on cultural preferences for domestic military deployments. The rhetoric used by policymakers is the primary focus of the analysis of this thesis; this is because policy elites are usually considered to be the carriers of strategic culture. Or, as Durkheim more eloquently put it, ‘the state is the organ of social thought’. Hence it is among policymakers that ‘deliberation and reflection’ takes place in an organised manner in order to ‘prevent changes being made without due consideration.’<sup>192</sup>

Data for this analysis was gathered from parliamentary archives such as Hansard for the British case and the *Sénat* and *Assemblée Nationale* for France. Historical archives were also used; predominantly the National Archives at Kew and *Les Archives Nationales* in Paris. Official correspondence, media articles and, very occasionally, secondary literature were also used. Identifying relevant speeches involved using knowledge of when the specific formative moment occurred coupled with a keyword search. In some instances, this was obvious such as in the cases of operations *Temperer* and *Sentinelle*. Other search terms included specific events (e.g. ‘*La Commune*’, Peterloo / St Peter’s Field) or generic terms such as army, soldiers, troops, military. In some cases it was also possible to use country-specific terms such as Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA), Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) and Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) for the British case or *Vigipirate*, *Défense intérieure du territoire* (DIT), or *Défense opérationnelle du territoire* (DOT) for France. Where no electronic version of a speech was available, it was necessary to read the whole document to obtain the relevant information. For the British case, 536 speeches and statements were analysed and 556 for France. Tables 5 and 6 provide a more specific breakdown of the number of speeches for each formative moment (presented in chronological order):

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<sup>191</sup> Halliday, Michael A.K. *Language as Social Semiotic* (1975) in Janet Maybin ed. *Language and Literacy*. (Clevedon, Open University Press, 1993), pp. 23-43

<sup>192</sup> Durkheim, Emile. *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*. (London: Routledge, 1957), pp. 79-80

**Table 5 – British case: formative moments and number of speeches analysed**

<b>BRITISH CASE</b>	Number of speeches & statements
1819 – St. Peter’s Field Massacre (‘Peterloo’)	146
1926 - General Strike	129
1974 – Heathrow exercises	53
1980 – Iranian Embassy siege	32
2011 – Tottenham riots <sup>193</sup>	50
2015 – 2017 – Operation Temperer	126
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>536</b>

**Table 6 – French case: formative moments and number of speeches analysed**

<b>FRENCH CASE</b>	Number of speeches & statements <sup>194</sup>
1871 – The Commune	119
1907 – Languedoc revolt	109
1914 – The First World War	51
2015- 2019 – Operation Sentinelle	217
2019 – Gilets Jaunes	60
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>556</b>

First, each speech was coded according to whether it strikes a negative, positive, or neutral tone (i.e. reporting a fact without a value judgement). This step was necessary to illustrate whether prevailing opinions about the appropriateness of domestic military deployments change over time. The next step was to classify each speech according to its central theme. It is important to note that categories for the speeches and statements were not predefined. Instead each was read thoroughly before a category was ascribed. To give a hypothetical example, after reading a speech it may have been apparent that it represented a positive statement regarding the use of the military. Next, it may have been felt that the content of the speech indicated the speaker believed the nature of the threat made it necessary to deploy the military; thus, a category for ‘*necessary given threat*’ was created. These categories were kept as generic as possible without losing the original meaning of the statement so that a

<sup>193</sup> N.B. The Tottenham riots were not a formative moment as the military were never deployed. However, the severity of the rioting prompted fierce debate in parliament as to whether the armed forces should have been called in, or should be called in if similar rioting were to occur in the future. It is included in this study as it provides an interesting comparison with the rhetoric used during Peterloo in the nineteenth century and the General strike in the twentieth.

<sup>194</sup> N.B. Défense en surface represents a formative moment for France. Unfortunately, due to insufficient source material on the subject through parliamentary debates it was decided that a forceful conclusion on the meaning of the rhetoric could not be reached. However, the transition in strategic thinking post -WW2 is still analysed as are key pieces of legislation relating to DIT and DOT.

more effective comparison could be made between eras and, as a result, continuity or change in cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces for domestic security could be traced.

### **(3) Behaviour**

With historical experiences identified through the data on domestic deployments and cultural preferences determined by an analysis of the common themes that occur in the rhetoric, the final step is to examine the potential effect this has had on behaviour. Specifically, whether events of the past seem to have cultivated an acceptance or aversion to the notion of deploying the army on the national territory and how this has informed deployment patterns.

Consequently, the second half of each case is concerned with behaviour. In other words: 1) the effect that culture has had on modern representations of the military's role through recruitment campaigns (i.e. do advertisements convey a certain expectation that the army should play an internal or external role in order to achieve the defence of the state?); and 2) how historical experiences and the resultant cultural preferences have affected deployment patterns in the modern era. This entails an analysis of the gradual integration of the military into Britain and France's counter-terrorism architecture post Munich attack. First through, the development of dedicated counter-terrorist units such as the SAS and the GIGN, then through specific doctrine such as MACP for Britain or DOT and *Vigipirate* for France and finally through their respective approaches to the threat of Islamist terrorism in the modern era with Operations *Temperer* and *Sentinelle*.

### **Summary of methodology**

The aim of this research is to shed light on the relationship between historical experience, cultural preferences and behaviours in the deployment of the armed forces for domestic purposes. The methodological framework reflects the fact that culture cannot be used as an explanatory variable in itself. Rather, culture is the lens through which we view the world. As a consequence, this thesis charts over two hundred years of domestic military deployments in order to identify the historical events that left Britain and France either reluctant or in favour of seeing the armed forces used at home. It analyses the rhetoric of policymakers in relation to each of these deployments to ascertain how each event affected debates at the time. Brief examples from army recruitment campaigns will also be given to

reinforce the point that cultural preferences are also evident in how Britain and France's militaries have represented themselves over time.

The purpose of this thesis is also to illuminate how these historical experiences and concurrent cultural preferences have impacted current events, particularly regarding unprecedented responses to a threat of terrorism that is also relatively new in terms of its scale. The different nature of the threat necessitates a brief excursion through the institutional development of Britain and France's counter-terrorism architecture from the 1970s with a particular focus on the role played by the army and the creation of special forces units that were developed, not necessarily due to cultural preferences, but as a direct response to the perception of a growing threat. Following this essential contextual deviation, the thesis will return to the debates on *Temperer* and *Sentinelle* in order to trace enduring cultural preferences for the military's use, and, through examples of modern recruitment campaigns, to assess how the lessons of the past have affected more recent policies.

### 3.5. Limitations to the study

This thesis does not attempt to identify a causal link between culture and behaviours. Such an approach is fraught with methodological challenges and represents the first limitation of the research presented here. Rather, culture is used as part of a methodological framework that aids an understanding of the link between historical experiences which *seem* to influence cultural preferences and accordingly *may* constrain behaviour. Nevertheless, the evidence gathered in this thesis provides a unique perspective on the relationship between Britain and France's respective strategic cultures and their behaviour.

Second, the concept of strategic culture is itself a limitation of this research therefore. It can be accused of attempting to explain too much and therefore oversimplifying reality. This is acknowledged here and thus, no claim is made that strategic culture alone can explain why Britain and France have followed their own distinctive strategic paths. It is simply the case that it is one important factor. As, Heiko Biehl et al. argued in 2013, there is 'no blueprint for the analysis of strategic culture.'<sup>195</sup> As highlighted in the literature review there are stark methodological divides among proponents of the strategic culture theory. However, in this

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<sup>195</sup> Biehl, Heiko; Giegerich, Bastian; Jones, Alexandra eds. (2013) *Strategic Cultures in Europe – Security and Defence Policies across the Continent*. (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien), p. 11

case the lack of a formal ‘blueprint’ on how to assess strategic culture works in favour of this thesis. In essence, it can be considered *tabula rasa* with how best to approach the subject left to the researcher’s discretion, albeit guided by decades of in-depth academic discourse drawing on expertise from myriad disciplines. In this respect, the lack of methodological confines allows the thesis to plough a fresh furrow in terms of its approach while acknowledging that the results are confined to Britain and France.

Third, the ‘plurality or uniqueness’ of history<sup>196</sup> suggests that historical events are one of a kind and the way they are interpreted and the reaction they provoke may also be unique. Furthermore, historical memory is constructed and policymakers often select the events which are deemed to be most formative. In other words, a polity ‘chooses to learn’ particular lessons from the past.<sup>197</sup>

In short, norms may not be overtly articulated, but rather received passively. In consequence, many of the themes are expected to appear in certain eras, but not in others, particularly given that the domestic duty of the troops in both Britain and France seems to have changed significantly over the years. This is mitigated by including a large number of speeches and statements from a wide range of policymakers. This means the odds of finding common themes are increased. Overall, this thesis expects to find episodes of both practical and rhetorical change. However, it also expects to find evidence of continuity; if a number of themes are evident in the rhetoric across the whole time period, it will be possible to conclude that these represent the ‘core values’ of the state (i.e. should the military be used? If so, under what conditions and with what restrictions?). This will allow us to determine whether strategic culture is constraining behaviour.

Fourth this thesis will examine just two case studies and, therefore, any conclusions that are drawn will only be applicable to Britain and France. While the thesis should provide strong evidence of the role that history *could* play in determining or influencing cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically in any given state, it will not be possible to state with any certainty that this is the case. As a consequence, any attempt to generalise beyond these two case studies will remain in the realm of speculation. This also means that the study tends to focus on differences rather than similarities. The inclusion of additional cases would

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<sup>196</sup> Vovelle. *Histoire des mentalités*, p. 155

<sup>197</sup> Heuser, Beatrice and Shamir, Eitan eds. *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 1



represent a useful extension to the research and is discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter.

A fifth limitation is with using language as a proxy for culture. As argued previously, language channels cultural preferences to such an extent that it must be considered as a core element of culture, but is not the sum total of culture itself. For example, an analysis of symbols or rituals over time would also have been a valid approach. In order to mitigate this potential weakness, both the British and French cases include a section on military recruitment campaigns over time; media representations are akin to cultural symbols in that they will also reflect certain preferences or expectations for how the armed forces should be deployed. While these recruitment campaigns are not the focus of this thesis, they add essential context to the hypothesis.

At first glance, a final limitation may appear to be the apparently broad scope of this project. As detailed earlier, it takes over two hundred years of domestic deployments into account in both Britain and France. The risk, therefore, would be that the thesis becomes overly descriptive or, equally, far too vague. However, in reality this thesis is not assessing two hundred years of history in totality, but only the formative moments which seem to have had the greatest tangible effect on how each state has approached the domestic use of the armed forces and the effect that this has had on *modern* deployment preferences.

Despite the limitations highlighted above, the weakness in many other studies on strategic culture is their failure empirically to examine or trace continuity and change in historical cases across a longer period of time, opting instead to simply declare that ‘history and culture matter’. It is hoped that this thesis rectifies this gap and contributes significantly to the literature through an original and comprehensive study that analyses the nature of the relationship between historical experience, culture, and behaviour with respect to preferences on whether or not to use the armed forces domestically.

## Chapter 4 – The historical origins of Britain’s preferences for domestic military deployments.

*‘The trouble with eternal truths is that they keep on changing’*

Dick Green

Comment to the author at the Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance Conference, King’s College London,  
14 February, 2018

### 4.1. Introduction

After Al-Qaeda’s shocking attack in the United States on 11 September 2001, the western world was forced to completely re-evaluate their approach to terrorism. In Britain, Tony Blair’s government took steps to recalibrate the military’s mandate on the national territory to allow for a more direct counter-terrorism role.<sup>198</sup> In spite of a recognition among Britain’s security and defence experts of the specialist capabilities that the military possessed and the potential contribution to national security that they could make, in July 2002 a Select Committee on Defence argued that, in Britain, ‘the use of the Armed Forces for domestic purposes is potentially controversial, and strict limitations are placed on their domestic employment.’<sup>199</sup>

The comment made in the Select Committee is a typical British reaction when the thorny issue of domestic military deployments is raised with most people exhibiting a certain squeamishness towards the idea. This almost innate resistance to the use of the military on the national territory is not a function of any inherent, deeply-engrained anti-military sentiment. As Richard Dannatt, author of *Boots on the Ground*, argues, in the modern era, ‘the Armed Forces enjoy unprecedented public approval’.<sup>200</sup> The validity of his statement is supported by an annual poll conducted in 2017 by the MoD which found that 88% of respondents hold a ‘very favourable’ or ‘mainly favourable’ view of the armed forces while just 4% hold a negative view.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> Stevenson, Jonathan. ‘The Role of the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom in Securing the State Against Terrorism’ *Connections*, Fall 2005, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 122

<sup>199</sup> The New Chapter of the Strategic Defence Review, Select Committee on Defence, Second Report, July 2002, par. 121

<sup>200</sup> Dannatt, Richard. *Boots on the Ground: Britain and Her Army since 1945*. (London: Profile Books Ltd., 2016), p. 5

<sup>201</sup> MOD and Armed Forces Reputational Polling, Summer 2017 Survey Topline Findings (27-07-17), ICM Unlimited on behalf of the Ministry of Defence, Q.2, p. 3. See: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/684573/Public\\_Opinon\\_Survey\\_-\\_Summer\\_2017.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/684573/Public_Opinon_Survey_-_Summer_2017.pdf) (accessed 06 May 2018)

Instead, as the British scholar Geraint Hughes argues, the aversion to the use of armed forces in an active capacity on the national territory is because in Britain '[t]he sight of troops on the streets is instinctively unsettling.'<sup>202</sup> Hughes' reference to instinct is apt in this context; it implies that the British tend to have a knee-jerk reaction to the idea of boots on *British* ground that is not so much born of rational thought as it is of deeply affective and traditional action.

Nevertheless, a growing threat from Islamist terrorism post-2015 again forced British policymakers to put aside their cultural reservations and consider the role that the armed forces may be able to play in national resilience. As highlighted in earlier chapters, after the attack on the *Charlie Hebdo* offices in Paris, British policymakers had put in place a contingency plan known as Operation Temperer that would be implemented in the event of an elevation of the threat level to 'Critical'. Amid acute awareness of the rising threat from Islamist terrorism, on 22 April 2015, members of the National Police Chief's Council (NPCC) met at the Marriott hotel in Leicester to discuss contingency plans. The 'roaming' or 'marauding' attack method the Kouachi brothers had used had been of particular concern to the British security services since the group *Lashkar-e-Taiba* attacked a hotel and shopping complex in Mumbai using grenades and assault rifles in 2008.<sup>203</sup> The group was able to carry out twelve separate, co-ordinated strikes across four days with limited resistance from the Indian security forces who had been unprepared for such an attack.<sup>204</sup> However, western states were also forced to admit that if a similar incident had occurred in one of their cities, they too would have been ill-equipped to nullify the threat.<sup>205</sup> Several years later in Paris this proved to be the case. The British government was forced to conclude that '[r]ecent attacks in Paris and Orlando have indicated that this type of marauding firearms attack is the new normal, particularly for attacks inspired by the so-called Islamic State.'<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> Hughes, Geraint. *The Military's Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies*. (Carlisle, PA: The Letort Papers, U.S. Army War College, May 2011), p.90

<sup>203</sup> Finseraas, Henning and Listhaug, Ola. 'It can happen here: the impact of the Mumbai terror attacks on public opinion in Western Europe', *Public Choice*, July 2013, vol. 156, no. 1/2, pp. 213-228

<sup>204</sup> Machold, Rhys. 'Militarising Mumbai? The 'Politics' of Response', *Contexto Internacional*, vol. 39, no. 3, Sep/Dec 2017, pp. 477-498

<sup>205</sup> Harris, Toby. 'An Independent review of London's Preparedness to Respond to a Major Terrorist Incident', October 2016, pp. 9-10; See also the discussion in the US senate on lessons from Mumbai. 'Lessons From The Mumbai Terrorist Attacks—Parts I and II', Hearings before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate of the One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, January 8 and 28, 2009

<sup>206</sup> Harris, Toby. 'An Independent review of London's Preparedness to Respond to a Major Terrorist Incident', October 2016, p. 6

Policy makers in Britain were aware of the level of public scrutiny that would be attached to an extended domestic military operation, and in particular any comparison that might be drawn with ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. After all, Operation Banner, which at its height had seen 21,000 troops on the streets of Northern Ireland, had only formally ended in July 2007; a reason that former prime minister, David Cameron had been reluctant to give his approval to suggestions for a greater domestic military role. Further, in 2005 the British public had shown themselves to be uneasy with the excessive use of force by armed police during the ill-fated Operation Kratos – often described as the Metropolitan police’s ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy – which led to the tragic death of Jean Charles de Menezes, a Brazilian national living in London. Thus, the purpose of the meeting in Leicester was to discuss and explore the potential domestic role that the military could play in dealing with a terrorist attack given their specialist capabilities, while also ensuring any measures that were adopted would adhere to British norms and values.

In attendance at the meeting were police representatives from all of the home counties as well as Brigadier Bill Warren of the Royal Military Police, Phil Gormley of the National Crime Agency (NCA), Alfred Hitchcock of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Paul Crowther of the British Transport Police, along with four representatives of the Home Office.<sup>207</sup> Item nine on the agenda was entitled ‘COUNTER TERRORISM POST PARIS LARGE SCALE MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE POLICE’ (sic).<sup>208</sup> At the time of writing, the full minutes of this closed session have still not been released for reasons of sensitivity, but it was during this meeting that Operation Temperer was devised.<sup>209</sup> This fact was confirmed when, owing to an accidental leak of the document in July 2015, the Daily Mail published a story on the subject under the headline: ‘Revealed: Secret plan to put 5,000 heavily-armed troops on streets of Britain to fight Jihadis in a terror attack’. The leak stated that ‘Chiefs recognised that the army played an important role in national resilience and supported the work going forward.’<sup>210</sup> It also emphasised that the military ‘*could* be used’,<sup>211</sup> the conditional tense here is indicative of the strategic thinking at the time; that Temperer constituted a contingency

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<sup>207</sup> Chief Constables’ Council Minutes, National Police Chief’s Council, 22 April 2015 (minutes published on 25/04/2015), pp. 1-2

<sup>208</sup> Chief Constables’ Council Minutes, National Police Chief’s Council, 22 April 2015 (minutes published on 25/04/2015), p. 5

<sup>209</sup> Although heavily redacted minutes are available. See Ministry of Defence’s response to a Freedom of Information request, 21 January 2019, Ref: FOI2018/15238

<sup>210</sup> Beckford, Martin. ‘Revealed: Secret plan to put 5,000 heavily-armed troops on streets of Britain to fight jihadis in event of a terror attack’, *Daily Mail*, 25 July 2015. See: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3174590/Secret-plan-5-000-heavily-armed-troops-streets-Britain-fight-jihadis-event-terror-attack.html> (accessed 03/09/2017)

<sup>211</sup> Ibid. Italics added for emphasis.

plan that, given public sensitivities over the use of the armed forces in a domestic context, would hopefully never be necessary.

Unfortunately, this was not the case. On 22 May 2017, a British national by the name of Salman Ramadan Abedi detonated a suicide vest in the lobby of the Manchester Arena at the end of an Ariana Grande concert, killing twenty-two people.<sup>212</sup> The sophistication of the device (and other graphic evidence discovered at scene)<sup>213</sup> led counter-terrorism investigators to conclude that Abedi may not be operating alone, but as part of a cell. Based on the recommendation of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), an independent research and analysis body established in 2003 and responsible for determining and classifying the severity of the threat faced by the UK, the national threat level was raised to 'Critical'; this is JTAC's highest ranking and indicates that another attack should be expected 'Imminently'.<sup>214</sup>

Following the attack and JTAC's elevation of the threat level to critical, *Temperer* was implemented for the first time. Around 950 troops were drawn from various regiments such as the Foot Guards, the Parachute Regiment, and the Royal Artillery (with support from the Royal Marines), in order to 'replace police officers on guard at certain protected sites which are not accessible to the public'.<sup>215</sup> These troops were deployed for around a week, but, by 27 May, JTAC had reduced the threat level from Critical to Severe and, on 29 May, the troops were withdrawn. This was in keeping with Amber Rudd's statement that any deployment would be 'absolutely temporary'.<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> "Manchester Arena attack: How events unfolded", *BBC*, 23 May 2017. See: [https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/video\\_and\\_audio/headlines/40021882/manchester-arena-attack-how-events-unfolded](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/video_and_audio/headlines/40021882/manchester-arena-attack-how-events-unfolded) (accessed 17/10/2017)

<sup>213</sup> The severed head of Abedi was discovered – a gory detail that is commonly seen among suicide bombers. A capable bomb-maker will direct most of the force of the blast outwards, inwards, but not upwards. This has the effect of destroying the body, but preserving the head. This is a sign of respect to the perpetrator for their sacrifice. This discovery led investigators to consider that Abedi had not made the bomb himself and multiple persons were involved. Thus, the terror threat was raised to critical. Blair, Anthony. 'Manchester bomb so powerful Salman Abedi's head found '100s of feet from body'', *Daily Star*, 4 February 2020. See: <https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/manchester-bomb-powerful-salman-abedis-21431887> (accessed 06/07/2020)

<sup>214</sup> Threat rankings are as follows: Low (an attack is unlikely), Moderate (an attack is possible, but not likely), Substantial (an attack is strong possibility), Severe (an attack is highly likely), Critical (an attack is expected imminently)

<sup>215</sup> Press release, PM statement following London terror attack: 15 September 2017. See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-statement-following-london-terror-attack-15-september-2017> (accessed 06/07/2019)

<sup>216</sup> Operation *Temperer*: Everything you need to know, *ITV Report*, 24 May 2017. See: <https://www.itv.com/news/2017-05-24/operation-temperer-will-see-armed-forces-deployed-on-streets/> (accessed 25/05/2017)

Temperer would be implemented again just four months later when, on 15 September 2017, an eighteen-year old Iraqi refugee named Ahmed Hassan detonated a crude, homemade bomb on the District Line at Parsons Green station. The device only partially exploded, leaving 27 people requiring treatment for burns, but JTAC deemed it necessary to increase the threat level to ‘critical’ once again amid fears that Hassan may belong to a cell. The threat level was reduced to ‘severe’ again on 17 September and the troops were withdrawn.

Since these incidents, the potential future scope of the operation has been expanded; the most recent iteration (June 2018) of Britain’s counter-terror strategy (CONTEST) states that 10,000 troops could be deployed ‘within 12 to 96 hours’ of an incident.<sup>217</sup> The National Security Capability Review (NSCR) in March 2018 similarly states that ‘up to 10,000 service personnel remain at staggered readiness for Operation Temperer’ and ‘[f]urther forces are available to augment armed police with a large strategic reserve of service personnel.’<sup>218</sup> Further, the NSCR’s statement that the objective of Temperer is ‘detering, disrupting and preventing terrorist activity and providing public reassurance’ indicates that future military involvement may involve more than the relatively static guarding role that was seen during 2017.

This presents something of a conundrum for policy makers who have been wrestling with the trade-off between the military’s specialist capabilities and the general public’s aversion to the use of the military for domestic security. In a 2007 report on ‘Operations in the UK, the MoD’s Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) characterised the issue of domestic deployments as follows: ‘The use of Service personnel in aid of the Civil Power is a particularly sensitive subject’.<sup>219</sup> Typically, the British exhibit a squeamishness towards the merits of using the armed forces in an active domestic capacity that is not just limited to the general public, but also permeates the political and military establishments.

The most recent examples of this were seen in the responses to Operation Temperer: in July 2015, after the details of the contingency plan were leaked to the public by the Daily Mail, the Guardian released an article on the subject which cited a feeling of ‘reluctance’ in the British army to the idea of committing troops to Britain’s streets in the event of a terrorist attack. Listed as reasons for the military’s trepidation were potential morale problems, fears

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<sup>217</sup> CONTEST – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, June 2018, HM Government, p. 67

<sup>218</sup> National Security Capability Review, March 2018, Cabinet office, p. 17

<sup>219</sup> Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience, Joint Doctrine Publication 02, Second Edition, September 2007, ch. 4, sec. 1, par. 405. See:

<http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/jdp02ed2.pdf> (accessed 22/08/2017)

of overstretch, and concerns that once the army have been deployed it is difficult withdraw them.<sup>220</sup> Temperer also prompted Baroness Jenny Jones, a member of the Police and Crime Committee at the time, to call the contingency operation ‘provocative’ and ‘absolutely shocking.’<sup>221</sup> Furthermore, in May 2017, after the Manchester Arena bombing and the first occasion that Temperer had been activated, a Sky News reporter, standing in front of Downing Street and watching a patrol of eight troops in full battle dress march past, commented that it was ‘not a scene we expected to see ... in this country.’<sup>222</sup>

There also evidence that the general public exhibit a residual resistance to domestic military deployments despite a perception of an elevated threat from Islamist terrorism and the implementation of Operation Temperer. For example, a survey of a thousand people carried out by the author in January 2020 to gauge perceptions of what national security means to the general public found that 73.6% considered national security to mean ‘defence against terrorism’. In spite of this, just 39.6% answered that they would like to see ‘Greater involvement by the military in protecting against terror threats.’<sup>223</sup> This distaste for the idea of using the army in a domestic role is also interesting given the views of some experts that, from a rational perspective, the army would be ‘the most obvious port of call’ in the event of an attack.<sup>224</sup> This chapter’s purpose is to examine the origins of this aversion on the basis of an analysis of domestic deployments in Britain from 1800 to 2019. In line with the core research questions of this thesis, it concludes that the perception of the national historical experience has cultivated an enduring set of preferences for internal military operations which combines with the expectation that the army is an expeditionary force. This illustrates a significant degree of continuity in Britain’s strategic culture.

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<sup>220</sup> MacAskill, Ewen. ‘British army reluctant to post troops on UK streets after terror attack’, *The Guardian*, 26 July 2015. See: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/26/british-army-reluctant-post-troops-uk-terror-attack> (accessed 22/09/2017)

<sup>221</sup> Austin, Henry. ‘Secret plans to deploy soldiers on UK streets in the aftermath of a terror attack are ‘shocking’ and ‘provocative’, says peer’, *The Independent*, 26 July 2015. See: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/secret-plans-to-deploy-soldiers-on-uk-streets-in-the-aftermath-of-a-terror-attack-are-shocking-and-10417364.html> (accessed 22/09/2017)

<sup>222</sup> Sky News report embedded into Daily Express article. Campbell, Chris. ‘Soldiers deployed to Downing Street and Buckingham Palace amid ‘critical’ terror threat.’ *Daily Express*, 24 May 2017. See: <https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/808744/Manchester-bombing-Operation-Temperer-Westminster-Downing-Street-Buckingham-Palace-Ariana> (accessed 24/05/2017)

<sup>223</sup> A poll carried out by the author while working for Coriolis Technologies. Results used with their permission. 1000 people were surveyed using a representative sample of age, income, location, and gender.

<sup>224</sup> Austin, Henry. ‘Secret plans to deploy soldiers on UK streets in the aftermath of a terror attack are ‘shocking’ and ‘provocative’, says peer’, *The Independent*, 26 July 2015. See: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/secret-plans-to-deploy-soldiers-on-uk-streets-in-the-aftermath-of-a-terror-attack-are-shocking-and-10417364.html> (accessed 22/09/2017)

#### 4.1.1 Historical experience: Three eras of domestic deployments

Despite the assumption that the British military have seldom been used on British soil, there is strong evidence to suggest an enduring historical precedent for the (relatively frequent) use of the armed forces internally. During the eighteenth century, and a significant portion of the nineteenth, law and order was maintained by the military, principally through localised yeomanry cavalry units. Although the army was frequently engaged in wars abroad, as late as 1891, the Secretary of State for War, Edward Stanhope, still listed ‘the effective support of the civil power in all parts of the United Kingdom’ as ‘the principal duty of the British army’.<sup>225</sup>

The data on domestic deployments in Britain reflects Stanhope’s assertion. Chart 1 lists ‘significant’ deployments of the army on the national territory between 1800 and 2019 finding at least 105 examples.<sup>226</sup>


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<sup>225</sup> Stanhope, Edward. ‘Mr. Stanhope's Statement (1891) of the General Objects of the Army Establishment.’ HC Debate, 23 July 1901, vol. 97 cc. 1326-7

<sup>226</sup> The author does not claim that this is an exhaustive list. For example, A parliamentary select committee in 1908 was told that during the previous 30 years, the military had been called out on 24 separate occasions in England and Wales. However, many of these deployments do not seem to have been mentioned in debates or correspondence of the time. The author found evidence of nine significant deployments during this period. See methodology for how this thesis defines a significant deployment.



**Chart 1: Significant domestic military deployments, 1800 – 2019**



*Source: Author's analysis based on primary and secondary literature research. See Appendix 1 for the detailed list of deployments. See Appendix 1 for the detailed list of deployments.*

In order better to visualise the data, the time period 1800-2019 has been divided into blocks of twenty-five years (with the exception of the final period which looks at twenty years). The data is drawn from Hansard, the National Archives, the Home Office Disturbances Papers and extensive secondary literature research. It should also be noted that the chart excludes four types of deployment:

- 1) The periods 1800-1824 and 1825-1849 exclude nearly ninety deployments of regional yeomanry units to quell unrest in lieu of a rural police force that were found in the secondary literature. Data for these deployments is often sparse as the yeomanry were called out so frequently that they ceased to be a subject of interest for debate in parliament. Thus, there is little available information about them in order to fact check. However, significant instances of yeomanry deployments are still included (for example the 1819 'Peterloo' massacre). These 'miscellaneous'

yeomanry deployments have been included in the Riot and Protest chapter which examines the impact of Peterloo.

- 2) Instances when the military has been called upon for their specific expertise in bomb disposal, for example (under Military Aid to other Government Departments – MAGD) this is due to the fact that, according to the MoD, the military were called out on 180 occasions during 2017/18 alone.<sup>227</sup> These did not meet the criteria for significant deployments and would skew the findings. Furthermore, many of these incidents are impossible to find evidence for.
- 3) Training exercises that have involved both civilian and military personnel (Training and Logistic Assistance to the Civil Power – TLACP). These were excluded for the same reason as MAGD.
- 4) Cases involving Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland will be discussed in later sections, however there is strong evidence to suggest that it was not governed according to the same laws as mainland Britain and was instead treated as a *de facto* colony, thus English authorities were far less squeamish about deploying the military. This is not to argue that the British experience in Northern Ireland against the IRA has not had an effect on Britain's approach, but rather that significant cultural, religious, and political differences coupled with long-term violent resistance to the idea of a 'united' kingdom have meant that, in the eyes of policymakers on mainland Britain, different rules seem to have been applied regarding military deployment.

Each individual deployment that was discovered was then classified according to its purpose. It was discovered that deployments can be grouped into four distinct categories. 1) Riot and Protest – this entails the use of troops to quell civil unrest, for example during the Peterloo massacre. 2) Counter-terrorism – i.e. troops called either out to deal with an active situation (e.g. the Iranian Embassy siege), or for the purposes of deterrence or assurance (Operation Temperer). 3) Disaster relief – this includes the use of the armed forces to help alleviate the pressure on the emergency services, such as during the foot and mouth epidemic in 2001. 4) Striking civil service (for example when the troops manned the Green Goddesses under operation Fresco in 2002) and Personnel Provision, for example the deployment of 12,000

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<sup>227</sup> Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2017-2018, HC 21, July 2018, p. 11

troops to help with security during the 2012 London Olympics. Of these four categories, Riot and Protest and Counter-terrorism can be considered 'active' duties in that they involved containing or countering a human threat and are coded in red and orange, respectively. Disaster relief and Striking Civil Service / Personnel Provision are considered as 'passive' duties in that they involved assistance and are coded in light blue and dark blue, respectively.

Chart 1 highlights the fact that during the nineteenth century and into the early stages of the twentieth century, the military's primary domestic role was the pacification of riots and protests. However, since 1819 (when the Peterloo massacre occurred) a notable decline in quantity of deployments occurred. Although there were still instances of the army being used to quell protests in the early twentieth century, the last time that the army was called for a direct confrontation with a mob of civilians was in 1919 for the so-called 'forty-hours strike' and the Battle of George Square in Glasgow. Since then, there have not been any instances of the army being deployed to counter protests. The events of Peterloo seem to have led to a gradual erosion of political will to deploy the military against the country's own citizens, coupled with growing public backlash, improved literacy and modes of communication that led to greater public outrage, and, from 1829, a civil police force that was steadily proving itself to be capable of dealing with threats of this nature.

The effectiveness of the civil power became particularly evident during the General Strike in of 1926 and from that point until the 1970s there were no active military deployments on mainland Britain.<sup>228</sup> Instead, under MACC, the army took up duties as firemen, bin men, lorry drivers and dock workers. For example, under Clement Atlee's post-Second World War Labour government, he deployed the army on at least five occasions to replace dock workers, striking lorry drivers and during the Power Stations Crisis of 1950. During the Cold War, the army's active commitments were seen as external with the threat of Soviet invasion only a 'subsidiary concern.'<sup>229</sup> With an army that was operating almost exclusively abroad, the idea of turning the armed forces on civilians came to be considered as barbaric and, as a result of an effective police force, quite unnecessary.

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<sup>228</sup> N.B. the 1974 Heathrow exercises have been included in the chart as an active deployment. Most of the literature, including Keith Jeffrey's work, argues that the 1980 Iranian Embassy Siege was the first active deployment. Certainly, it was the most publicised invocation of MACP. However, intelligence reports had suggested that an airliner may be downed at Heathrow and thus 150 troops were deployed for two weeks to Heathrow. The evidence suggests that assistance in this matter was *covertly* requested by the police. Thus, this thesis considers 1974 to be the first active deployment since the General Strike, rather than 1980.

<sup>229</sup> Stevenson, Jonathan. 'The Role of the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom in Securing the State Against Terrorism' *Connections*, vol. 4, no. 3 (Fall 2005), p. 122

A growing threat from terrorism in the 1970s, particularly following the attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics, forced a recalibration of the army's role in matters of internal security. The elite unit known as the Special Air Service (SAS) began shifting the focus of their training towards counter-terrorism under the Special Projects Team and were deployed for the first time on the national territory under MACP for the 1980 Iranian embassy siege. British Special Forces have since remained an integral part of counter-terrorism contingency plans and were even deployed in 2017 to deal with the London Bridge attack. 1972 marked the point at which the army's role in countering terrorism became apparent and when the British altered their security strategy to incorporate the armed forces under MACP.

Of course, maintaining the *ad hoc* availability of the Special Forces is a very different concept to deploying the military in a prolonged and overt capacity. After the 9/11 attack, the existing security architecture in western states needed an almost total revision and, in February 2003, Tony Blair took the unpopular step of deploying 450 troops to Heathrow Airport after intelligence suggested an imminent attack on an airliner. Subsequent governments proved reluctant to follow Blair's lead, but from that point the army's potential utility as guards in key strategic locations, either for deterrence and assurance purposes or to free up police to carry out other duties, became a perennial part of counter-terrorism contingency discussions.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the chart (other than the evidence it presents to contradict assumptions over the rarity of domestic deployments in Britain) is that it clearly shows how the domestic role of the army has changed over the years to the extent that three distinct eras are identifiable:

- 1) Riot and protest that stretched between 1800 and 1919
- 2) Personnel Provision that began in 1911 with the National Rail Strike but became entrenched by the 1926 General Strike and has continued to the present day,
- 3) Counter-terrorism which formally began with the Heathrow exercises in 1974 and became engrained by the SAS's resolution of the Iranian Embassy Siege in 1980 and has also continued this day, culminating with the implementation of Operation Temperer.

The fact that three eras of domestic military deployments exist raises an interesting question concerning the nature of continuity in Britain's strategic culture.

To return to our research question, if culture acts as an externally constraining force to the actions undertaken by policymakers, what accounts for such different domestic roles for the military over time? Has the perception of the national historical experience influenced cultural preferences for the use of armed forces on the national territory? And have these cultural preferences constrained expectations for the role of the British army and, by extension, modern domestic deployment patterns?

#### **4.1.2. Structure of the case**

The remainder of this chapter will be structured as follows:

**Section 4.2** examines the essential historical context related to the War of the Three Kingdoms and the *interregnum*. Although the rhetoric during this period is not analysed, this period had a significant and enduring effect on Britain's attitudes towards the armed forces and the modern army even traces its origins to the seventeenth century. It is argued that many of the modern principles of civil control and the view that army is an external force, rather than one for internal duties, can be traced to this period of time.

**Section 4.3** looks at the first era of domestic deployments for the purposes of quelling riots and protests. It analyses the responses of British policymakers towards the use of the army at Peterloo arguing that the trauma of this incident created an enduring aversion to the use of the armed forces internally. It reviews the formation of the Metropolitan Police force in 1829 and the birth of the British ethos of 'minimum force'. It compares and contrasts the rhetoric following Peterloo with that of policymakers after the General Strike in 1926 and the Tottenham riots in 2011 to argue that the responses highlight an enduring reluctance to use the armed forces domestically. Finally it looks at some army recruitment campaigns from 1919 (the last time the army was used against the people) comparing this with advertisements from the 1950s, 60s and 70s to argue that negative perceptions of incidents such as Peterloo have cultivated an entrenched sense of the army as an expeditionary force.

Chapter 5 continues with the British case with a specific focus on counter-terrorism. It will be structured as follows:

**Chapter 5.1** focuses on the counter-terrorism era that began in the 1970s. It argues that despite a cultural aversion to use the military internally and an expectation that the army is an expeditionary force, the rising threat of transnational terrorism challenged these assumptions. Due to a recognition of the armed forces' specialist capabilities, this led to their gradual integration into Britain's counter-terrorism architecture MACP and the formation of the Special Projects Team (the counter-terrorist wing of the SAS). It examines the rhetoric used in parliament in the aftermath of the SAS's raid on the embassy to demonstrate that there was general acceptance of the use of armed force in this context since it was deemed to be a last resort, proportionate to the threat, and subordinate to the civil power. It draws a brief comparison with the uproar that was caused as a result of the 1974 Heathrow exercises (Operation MARMION) when due process was not seen to have been followed.

**Chapter 5.2** examines the use of the armed forces for the purposes of counter-terrorism in an overt capacity under Operation Temperer. It will provide some context by examining the effect of the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks on the Britain's 'minimum force' policing ethos before analysing the escalating nature of the threat post-2015. It will assess the specifics of Operation Temperer before focusing on the rhetoric used by policy makers either as justification for the operation in speeches or statements to the public or during parliamentary debates. It compares the tone of the responses to Temperer to those seen during and after the Peterloo massacre and the Iranian Embassy Siege to argue: first, that there is remarkable continuity in Britain's response to perceived threats that transcends the idea of reactive strategy and instead belongs in the realm of an historically derived and culturally-guided response. Principally, there is only acceptance of the use of the armed forces provided it meets all of the following criteria: it is short term, proportionate to the threat, a last resort, and *always* subordinate to the civil power. Second, it argues that Temperer represented a strategic shift in certain regards. Finally, by examining the tone of some modern recruitment campaigns which seem to have omitted any potential domestic counter-terrorism duty, it concludes that despite apparent shifts in approach there is still cultural continuity in Britain's preferences for the army to serve as an external, rather than an internal force.

## 4.2. Historical Context – The War of the Three Kingdoms, 1640-1660 and its impact on modern Britain

‘The organisational culture of the MoD is that of a civil service, not a military one. And deliberately so. This might look odd next to the French or the US, but it is consistent with over 300 years of British history.’

**Lieutenant Colonel Harold Simpson of the Ministry of Defence to the author,  
London, 15 December 2017**

Any analysis of modern British preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically must necessarily begin with an examination of the events during the English Civil Wars (1640 – 1660). It is not the intention of this thesis to dwell on this period, nor is its purpose to argue that events of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century frequently enter into the thinking of modern-day politicians.<sup>230</sup> However, any omission of the subject would be a serious error since, as the noted historian of Cromwellian England, Blair Worden, writes: no period of upheaval in British history ‘has been so far-reaching, or has disrupted so many lives for so long, or has so imprinted itself on the nation’s memory’.<sup>231</sup>

According to Charles Charlton, an historian who has examined the impact of the fighting, 635 separate violent incidents occurred; from small skirmishes or assassinations to large pitched battles such as the war’s deadliest clash at Marston Moor. Charlton provides an estimated total of 185,538 casualties during the war; this was roughly 3.6% of England’s population at the time. In contrast, he writes, 2.6% of the population died as a result of the First World War.<sup>232</sup> However, it was not just the scale of the destruction that left an indelible mark on Britain; arguably it was the events immediately after the war which had an even more profound impact on the political orientation of the country. This was a period that saw the creation of the country’s first professional fighting force (the New Model Army), years of unprecedented political engagement from the military following the imposition of a *de facto* dictatorship and, ultimately, regicide. Further, through the Putney Debates in 1647 the

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<sup>230</sup> Having said this, a recent debate (March 2018) took place in the House of Lords on the subject of the Armed Forces Act 2006. Lords Menzies Campbell, Denis Tunnicliffe, and Digby Jones all made reference to the role of the New Model Army either under Cromwell, during the Civil War, or the impact of the events on the creation of the 1689 Bill of Rights. See: Hansard Archives: Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2018, 20 March 2018, vol. 790, columns 14GC – 17GC

<sup>231</sup> Worden, Blair. *The English Civil Wars, 1640-1660*. (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2009), p. 1

<sup>232</sup> Charlton, Charles in John Morrill ed. *The Impact of the English Civil War*. (London: Collins & Brown Ltd., 1991), p. 20

army played a defining role in laying the foundations for the Britain's modern democratic system.

Finally, after the restoration of the monarchy, Charles II founded a professional standing army to which many modern regiments trace their existence. This period of history also saw a dramatic shift in public attitudes towards the military and, arguably, was the point at which the English aversion to the use of force domestically was forged. Before and during the First Civil War, the military were largely seen as representatives of the will of the people. However, in the aftermath of the conflict, military interference in politics bled into the daily lives of ordinary citizens, for example through the occupation of London in 1647 or the restriction of daily social activities under the deeply unpopular rule of the Major-Generals, and the soldiers quickly became pariahs in the eyes of the public. What follows is a brief discussion of the role played by the army during this period.

#### **4.2.1. The Formation of the New Model Army**

The causes and outcome of the conflict are well-known and well-documented and a narrative of events will not be provided here. Suffice it to say that although the Parliamentary forces eventually emerged victorious from the conflict, they faced some serious challenges during the campaign that could have resulted in them losing the war. The Parliamentary victory at Marston Moor in the summer of 1644 had been a decisive victory and a turning point for their fortunes. However, their forces had suffered serious defeats elsewhere at the hands of the Royalists and the mood was beginning to turn. Just weeks before Marston Moor, Sir William Walter had suffered a heavy defeat at the Battle of Cropredy Bridge, his second major defeat of the war after his forces were crushed at Roundway Down just one year earlier. Ultimately, one month after Marston Moor, the Earl of Essex's army was all but destroyed at the battle of Lostwithiel.

There were also deep divisions both among the commanders and the soldiers. There were rumours that many of the Parliamentary generals, most notably the Earl of Manchester – William Montagu, had lost the taste for war and were more inclined to push for peace with Charles. Meanwhile, many of the foot soldiers were refusing to join campaigns that were too far away from their homes meaning the army had lost the dynamism and manoeuvrability necessary to fight effectively. Sir William Waller, a Major-General in the Parliamentary



army, had been frustrated by this when in 1644 he commanded the London Trained Bands.<sup>233</sup> The troops had refused to move too far outside of London leading Waller to write the following:

An army compounded of these men will never go through with your service, and till you have an army merely your own that you may command, it is in a manner impossible to do anything of importance.<sup>234</sup>

Something clearly had to change if they were to be victorious and the solution was to follow through on what had been suggested by Waller: the creation of an army with a more centralised command structure that was free of any influence from both houses of parliament until after the war. Oliver Cromwell and Zouch Tate championed the proposal in parliament and introduced the Self-Denying Ordinance; an agreement that ‘during the time of this war, no member of either House shall have or execute any office or command, military or civil, granted or conferred by both or either of the Houses of Parliament.’<sup>235</sup> Despite fierce resistance, particularly in the House of Lords where the Earls of Essex and Manchester had been accused of failing to prosecute the war, were strongly opposed to the idea of being excluded from the campaign. However, on 3 April 1645, four months after it had been introduced into Parliament, the Self-Denying Ordinance was passed triggering the creation of what became known as the New Model Army.<sup>236</sup>

Table 7 provides a breakdown of how the main army was structured, although by 1648 its size had doubled. Two additional armies, the Western and Northern, were also attached to it. Sir Thomas Fairfax, who had distinguished himself during campaigns in the north of England, was named the commander-in-chief and held sole authority for the campaign. Importantly, the New Model Army was the foundation of the concept of a professional military. The rank and file would be willing recruits, not serfs dragged from their towns and villages by a feudal lord. Promotion would be based on merit, not social standing and the troops would be provided with a wage and would reside in barracks. According to the Select

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<sup>233</sup> Trained Bands were militia forces who fought part-time. They numbered roughly 18,000 men in total. See: Ian Gentles in John Morrill ed. *The Impact of the English Civil War*. (London, Collins & Brown Ltd., 1991), p. 86

<sup>234</sup> Marshall, Alan. *Oliver Cromwell, Soldier: The Military Life of a Revolutionary at War*. (London: Brassey's, 2004), p. 289

<sup>235</sup> Wheeler, James Scott. *The Irish and British Wars, 1637-1654: Triumph, Tragedy, and Failure*. (London, Routledge, 2002), p. 127

<sup>236</sup> The earliest references to a ‘New Model Army’ are actually found in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. The Scottish historian, Thomas Carlyle is thought to have been the first to use the term in 1845. 17<sup>th</sup> Century records show that the term most frequently used was ‘new-modelled’ (as in, ‘an army new-modelled’) which, according to the editor of the Oxford English Dictionary, was an idiom used at the time to refer to novel concepts.

Committee on Defence's eight report from 1998, the initial assessment of existing force structures, followed by a proposal for change and the subsequent creation of a new body of troops, is the first 'identifiable review' in Britain's history and inspired a new approach to military doctrine where the strategic priorities of the armed forces would be determined by the civil power.<sup>237</sup>

**Table 7: Structure of the New Model Army**

Cavalry	Dragoons	Infantry	TOTAL
6,600	1,000	14,400	22,000

#### **4.2.2. From *Interregnum* to Restoration**

Following the First Civil war, the army's role in England's domestic political scene began to grow. James Reece writes that the incidents over the summer of 1647 were particularly tumultuous and 'crystallized within the army a sense of itself as a separate institution, governed by its own laws, with its own honour and unity to preserve.'<sup>238</sup> This was particularly evident during the Putney Debates from late October to November 1647. Through 'The case of the armie truly stated', it was members of the *military*, rather than politicians, that argued over the settlement of the country and introduced many of the values that Britain cherishes today.

The army's interference in almost all areas of public and political life continued following the Second English Civil War. This war was the result of a last desperate attempt by Charles to re-gain control, but was quickly crushed by the Army. As a result, Charles' only remaining option was to try negotiating again. Parliament held a vote on whether they should continue negotiating on 5 December and the motion was passed by a majority of 129 to 83. However, Cromwell and the Army were deeply sceptical of Charles' intentions and viewed him as 'a man of blood'.<sup>239</sup> As such, the New Model Army once again marched on Westminster with

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<sup>237</sup> Select Committee on Defence, Eight Report, 3 September 1998, 'The Historical Context: The Prehistory of Reviews', par. 15

<sup>238</sup> Reece, Henry. *The Army in Cromwellian England, 1649-1660*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 48

<sup>239</sup> A phrase that derives from the bible: '...behold, thou art taken in thy mischief, because thou art a bloody man.' King James Bible, 2 Samuel, 16:7,8

an army headed by Colonel Thomas Pride and arrested or expelled MPs who were unsympathetic to their cause. The incident, known as Pride's Purge, was essentially a *coup d'état*, and following Charles I's execution in Whitehall on 30 January 1649, paved the way for military rule under Cromwell's protectorate.

Cromwell consolidated his control in 1653 when he used the military to dissolve the Rump Parliament and shortly thereafter imposed the Rule of the Major Generals. During this time, England was divided into eleven districts each controlled by close allies of Cromwell. Troops were used as enforcers to counter perceived domestic and foreign threats to his regime and a number of strict, religiously-derived rules were imposed such as banning or censoring stage plays, limiting the consumption of alcohol and, famously, outlawing Christmas. Troops were garrisoned in or close to city centres, for example, in London, they were based in locations such as Saffron Walden, Newmarket, St. Albans, Reading, Triploe, Heath, Ware, and Putney. Not only did this allow the army to respond rapidly to any threats, political or public, but also served as a permanent and visible signal of the military's presence and power to the disaffected or rebellious members of society.<sup>240</sup>

The level of the military's political interference coupled with regular episodes of public repression led to widespread resentment to the extent that soldiers on the street were often 'hooted with derision'.<sup>241</sup> One direct confrontation between troops and the public was documented in the diary of Thomas Rugg, a local barber. Civilians were increasingly disaffected by the military rule of Colonel John Hewson and turned their frustrations on his troops who were marching towards the Old Exchange. Hewson had been employed as a cobbler before he was a soldier and, as Rugg writes, the crowd '...did throw ould shewes and old slippers and turnapes topes, brick battes and stones and tiles att him and his souldiers'.<sup>242</sup> Growing frustrated, the troops fired on the crowd killing a number (between four and seven according to different reports) of civilians. Civil dissatisfaction with military rule reached such a point that after Cromwell's death the monarchy was, in effect, invited back.

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<sup>240</sup> Reece. *The Army in Cromwellian England*, p. 51

<sup>241</sup> Worden. *The English Civil Wars*, p. 149

<sup>242</sup> The Diurnall of Thomas Rugg, 1659–1661, ed. William Sachse, Camden Third Series, XCI. (London, 1961), pp.13-14

#### 4.2.3. The Army reconfigured: the impact on modern force structure

Charles II's reign began on the 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1661 and he sought immediately to disentangle the military's influence from politics by disbanding the Cromwellian army which had been responsible for the execution of his father. He imposed the militia acts of 1661 and 1662 to prevent local leaders from raising forces of their own and ordered the creation of a small number of regiments (four infantry and four cavalry regiments) commanded by trusted and loyal friends of his. Each commander would only be allowed to raise one regiment to avoid the possibility of a coup; these became known as 'Household Divisions'. The infantry divisions were John Russel's Regiment of Guards and Lord Wentworth's Regiment which became the Grenadier Guards in 1665, the Coldstream Guards, the Royal Scots, and the Second Queen's Regiment. All of these units exist in some form today and trace their existence back to the 17<sup>th</sup> Century. Table 8 provides a list of some of the oldest British regiments all of which date their foundation to the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century.

**Table 8: Oldest British Regiments**

<b>Original Regiment</b>	<b>Modern Name</b>	<b>Date Founded</b>
Marquis of Argyll's Royal Regiment	Scots Guards	1642
Monck's Regiment of Foot	Coldstream Guards	1650
Lord Wentworth's Regiment	Grenadier Guards	1656
Monck's Life Guards	Life Guards	1659
Lord John Russel's Regiment of Guards	Grenadier Guards	1660
Duke of York and Albany's Maritime Regiment of Foot	Royal Marines	1665

Of particular note in Table 8 is the modern name of the Duke of York and Albany's Maritime Regiment of Foot: The *Royal* Marines. In fact, the titles of various military bodies have a direct association with the events of the 17<sup>th</sup> century; the Royal Air Force, which of course did not exist at the time, has retained its 'Royal' title as has the Royal Navy as it played no

role in the war. However, the national army's role in repressing ordinary civilians, dictating politics and executing a king led to deep-seated scepticism over sovereign control of an armed body and thus has no royal association in its title. These grievances coupled with the will to prevent further civil conflict in the future led to a disbandment, albeit short lived, of the army via the imposition of the Bill of Rights in 1689. The relevant clause reads: 'the raising or keeping a standing Army within the Kingdome in time of Peace unlesse it be with Consent of Parlyament is against Law'.<sup>243</sup> In essence, parliament wanted to remove centralised control over the military and transition to a system based on civil control and oversight of the army.

It is within the context of the unprecedented political upheaval of the twenty years between 1640 and 1660 that modern British preferences for the use of force must be seen. Indeed, in the British Defence Doctrine of 2001, the MoD wrote that

The relationship between the Armed Forces and civil authorities in the U.K. is the subject of aspects of constitutional and administrative law and there has developed, over three hundred years, a legal doctrine governing the domestic use of military personnel.<sup>244</sup>

Clearly, the struggle between the Monarchy, Parliament, and the people for control over the military during this era marks the point at which Britain's expectation and preference for external operations and military subordination to the civil power was formed.<sup>245</sup> The following section will build on the historical context by examining the military's role in dealing with civil unrest. It will focus on what is arguably one of the most important formative moments in Britain's modern history: the Peterloo massacre of 1819. It will analyse the reactions of policymakers to this incident before examining the enduring impact it has had on Britain's cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces at home.

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<sup>243</sup> Bill of Rights [1688], 1688 CHAPTER 2 1 Will and Mar Sess 2

<sup>244</sup> UK Ministry of Defence, British Defence Doctrine, 2nd edition, October 2001, pp.6-9.

<sup>245</sup> Select Committee on Defence, Eight Report, 3 September 1998, 'The Historical Context: The Prehistory of Reviews', par. 16

#### 4.3. Protests, Pariahs and Police – The impact of ‘Peterloo’

*Though enrag'd by the strokes from the radical sticks,  
And the thick-flying missiles, the stones and the bricks,  
The Soldiers and Yeomen set bounds to their wrath,  
And only kept onwards in stern Duty's path!  
And 'tis wonder, no more, in the scene of confusion,  
Then found their life's day brought to sudden conclusion;  
For though Opposition cried 'Murder!' from hearsay,  
The work of dispersion was done quite in mercy.*

Extract of poem on the ‘Peterloo’ massacre published in Aston’s Exchange Herald,  
17<sup>th</sup> September 1822

The Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw rapid technological advancements in key industries across the country. Innovations in the textile and iron industries in the late eighteenth century established Britain as one of the most powerful global economies through major innovations that reduced the need for manual skilled labour.<sup>246</sup> For example, the rapid industrialisation of the craft and textile industries meant that skilled weavers found themselves unable to compete with machines such as the power loom; these required relatively little training to operate and, as a result, companies began laying off their employees.

The result was to provoke resentment among the manual labouring classes which culminated in violent backlash. In Nottingham, lace and hosiery workers vented their fury at the loss of their jobs by smashing machines and factories. The sporadic episodes of violence gained momentum until it became a political movement with the folklore figure Ned Ludd as the leader. Ned Ludd’s followers became known as Luddites and their movement quickly spread across the country. The Home Secretary, Richard Ryder spoke to Parliament about the severity of the problem on 14 February 1812 stating:

Nottingham, where near 1,000 frames had been broken, and an immense quantity of property had been destroyed, were actually subversive of the public peace, and constituted that state of things which called for legislative interference.<sup>247</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> In 1788, Britain had roughly 50,000 mule spindles in operation. By 1821 this number had increased to over seven million. See: Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (2014, Penguin Random House LLC, New York), p. 67

<sup>247</sup> Mr. Secretary Ryder, Frame Breaking and Nottingham Peace Bills, 14 February 1812, vol. 21

In the eyes of the Tory government of the time, there was an urgent need to protect the new machines and factories that had become so essential to Britain's economy. Therefore, their response was to sanction the deployment of troops and militia units to areas of the country that were seen to be the most vulnerable to Luddite attacks. The perceived severity of the threat posed by the Luddite movement was so great that the early nineteenth century saw thousands of British soldiers committed to countering the Luddites and, at one stage, in May 1812, 14,400 troops were dispatched from London.<sup>248</sup> At the time, the forces used were six times larger than any used to quell previous incidences of unrest. Just seven years later, economic grievances were once more the cause of unrest at a gathering in St. Peter's Field in Manchester; the conduct of the Yeomanry cavalry in dispersing those gathered would permanently alter how the British would approach domestic security and the maintenance of order on the national territory.

#### **4.3.1. 1819: The Peterloo Massacre**

The year 1819 was marked by serious political and social tensions across Britain. Discontent was mounting over the perceived persecution of the working classes by politicians and wealthy business owners. Wages for agricultural workers had fallen to a ten-year low and the introduction of the Corn Laws in 1815 prevented the import of cheap grains from abroad thereby dramatically increasing the price of basic foodstuffs such as bread. Anger among the public grew at the imposition of the Corn Laws which were seen to be 'in opposition to the express will of the people'.<sup>249</sup> Meanwhile, the imposition of duties on foreign wool in spite of the poor state of the wool industry were seen as evidence that the ruling classes did not have the interests of the workers at heart.<sup>250</sup> This was particularly the case in the north of the country where firebrand speakers questioning the authority of the House of Commons would draw crowds in the thousands. In Birmingham, one such crowd was estimated to consist of around 10,000 people by Lord Ayelesford and Isaac Spooner, who, as a result of growing

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<sup>248</sup> An often-quoted 'fact' is that more troops were deployed to counter the threat from the Luddites than were deployed to the Iberian Peninsula to fight Napoleon I. For example, in Perry Anderson's book *English Questions*, he writes 'more troops [were] mobilized to suppress the Luddites than to fight the concurrent Peninsular War'. See: Perry Anderson, *English Questions*, (London: Verso: 1992), p. 22; Eric Hobsbawm, *Labouring Men*, p. 8. However, this is simply false. According to Kevin Linch, in 1812, at the height of the Luddite movement, there were roughly 12,000 troops deployed domestically compared with around 50,000 committed to fighting Napoleon. See: Kevin Linch, *Britain and Wellington's Army: Recruitment Society and Tradition, 1807-15*. (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1988), p. 4

<sup>249</sup> No. 8 Resolution passed at the Meeting on Hunslet Moor, near Leeds, 19 July 1819

<sup>250</sup> RESOLUTIONS passed at the Meeting held on Hunslet Moor, near Leeds, 19 July 1819.

nervousness in Parliament, had been charged with conducting reconnaissance on the gathering.<sup>251</sup>

During a gathering on Hunslet Moor, near Leeds, those pushing for reform introduced a series of resolutions that summed up the grievances of the people and outlined their vision of the future. Among these were listed: universal suffrage, an end to the 'alienation of the rich from the poor' and 'radical reform in the system of representation'.<sup>252</sup> The extent of the anger led five magistrates of Lancashire to write to the Home Secretary Lord Sidmouth to express their concern that a failure to respond to the growing sense of anger could lead to serious unrest. They wrote:

Although we cannot but applaud the hitherto peaceable demeanour of many of the labouring classes, yet we do not calculate upon their remaining unmoved. Urged on by the harangues of a few desperate demagogues, we anticipate at no distant period, a general rising; and possessing no power to prevent the meetings which are weekly held, we, as magistrates, are at a loss how to stem the influence of the dangerous and seditious doctrines which are continually disseminated.<sup>253</sup>

The Manchester Patriotic Union had been responsible for the publication and dissemination of many of these doctrines; it was a group of agitators that had formed in March 1819 with the principal objective of pushing for parliamentary reform – an objective that did not sit well with the policymakers in London who saw the working class movement as a serious threat to their position. Since its formation the Union had managed to develop a considerable amount of public support and arranged for a gathering in St. Peter's Field in Manchester on 16 August 1819 which they believed would be the most effective way of getting the attention of parliament. In the words of Samuel Bamford, a radical writer who led a group from Middleton to Manchester for the gathering, it was to be 'the most important meeting that had ever been held for Parliamentary reform'.<sup>254</sup>

Sources for the size of the crowd at Manchester differ wildly; the Manchester Observer claimed that 153,000 people had turned up, the estimation of the renowned speaker Henry Hunt, who was scheduled to speak at the gathering, was similar at 150,000; however,

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<sup>251</sup> LETTER from Mr. Spooner to Lord Sidmouth; dated Birmingham, 13 July 1819

<sup>252</sup> RESOLUTIONS passed at the Meeting held on Hunslet Moor, near Leeds, 19 July 1819

<sup>253</sup> EXTRACT of a Letter from five Magistrates of Lancashire to Lord Sidmouth; dated, New Bailey Court House, Salford, 1st July 1819. Signed J. Silvester, R. Wright, W. Marriot, C. W. Ethelston, J. Norris.

<sup>254</sup> Bamford, Samuel. *Passages in the Life of a Radical, Volume I*. (London: Simkin, Marshall & co., 1844), p. 198



magistrates for Manchester such as Tatton put the number at a far more conservative 30,000.<sup>255</sup> Whatever its actual size, it was enough to concern the local magistrates that the meeting could end in a riot or act as the start for a full rebellion or revolution. Their letter, cited above, went on: 'we anticipate at no distant period, a general rising.' Indeed, the tone of the whole letter betrays more than a hint of desperation, almost imploring parliament to take extraordinary steps to prevent the meeting. Further fuel was added to the fire by several reports that had reached Parliament that agitators were conducting military drills. Magistrate Norris wrote to the Home Secretary, Lord Sidmouth on 15 August to express his concerns:

We have been much occupied in taking depositions from various parts of the country; and although the magistrates, as at present advised, do not think of preventing the meeting, yet all the accounts tend to show that the worst possible spirit pervades the country; and that considerable numbers have been drilling to-day at distances of four, six and ten miles from Manchester; and that considerable numbers are expected to attend the meeting.<sup>256</sup>

Colonel Thomas Horton wrote his own letter to Lord Sidmouth and was far more blunt in his assessment; he wrote, 'It is quite certain the object is absolute revolution'.<sup>257</sup> The so-called 'White Moss' incident may have been the final straw for the magistrates; two government spies, John Shawcross and James Murray infiltrated what the latter would describe in the trial of Henry Hunt in 1820 as a military 'camp' in White Moss. Murray describes how they were discovered and set upon by the radicals.<sup>258</sup> News of this attack was seen by the magistrates as further confirmation of the violent intent of the gathering.

Despite the burgeoning fears of the magistrates and politicians of imminent rebellion, in fact the object of the gathering was entirely peaceful; Samuel Bamford, a radical writer and witness to the massacre in Manchester, wrote that coverage in the press had described the movement as disorganised and aggressive. Thus, they had settled on the idea of the Manchester gathering adhering to the values of 'SOBRIETY', 'CLEANLINESS', 'ORDER', and 'PEACE'. In Bamford's words 'order in our movements was obtained by drilling; and peace, on our parts, was secured by a prohibition of all weapons of offence or

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<sup>255</sup> See: The Peterloo Massacre, 1819, National Archives, MPI 1/134, no. 18, 1819, Manchester Observer, 21 August 1819

<sup>256</sup> No. 32.—LETTER from Mr. Norris to Lord Sidmouth; dated Manchester, 15 August 1819. Papers Relative to the Internal State of the Country

<sup>257</sup> Hansard Archives, No. 53.—LETTER from Colonel Horton inclosed therein; Halifax, 27 August 1819.

<sup>258</sup> Giving evidence at the trial of Henry Hunt in 1820, James Murray would declare that a column of '5,000 and 6,000 men' armed with sticks and marching in line made up the core of the gathering. See: *The Annual Register, or a view of the History, Politics, and Literature, of the Year 1820, Part II.* (London: T.C. Hansard: 1822), p. 854

defence.<sup>259</sup> In fact, even one of parliament's most trusted spies, William Chippendale of Oldham, reported that the purpose of the meeting was peaceful. On the morning of 16 August, the day of the massacre, he wrote that 'They [the radicals] are enjoined not to bring any Weapons of any Kind whatever, and to keep their Flags furled till they receive orders from the Committee to display them.'<sup>260</sup>

As a result of the sheer number of people that were gathering, coupled with the reports of military drills being conducted, and the assault of Shawcross and Murray only served to confirm to the increasingly agitated magistrates that something more sinister was afoot. As such, they arranged for troops to be stationed in Manchester. These troops included 600 members of the 15<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Dragoons (Hussars), 400 soldiers of the Cheshire Yeomanry, 120 soldiers of the Manchester and Salford Yeomanry, a unit of the Royal Horse Artillery, as well as around 400 members of the local militia. According to the historian Donald Read, it was not the fact that the troops were there on standby that caused the problem as the troops were still under the guidance of the civil power through local law officers. It was once the meeting had begun that 'the magistrates were left to their own discretion rather than bound by the advice of the Law Officers, and the restraint hitherto forced upon them by the Home Office quickly disappeared.'<sup>261</sup>

The magistrates began by gathering local inhabitants who were opposed to the meeting to sign a document declaring that they believed Manchester to be in imminent danger. One of the signatories was Richard Owen and the document read: 'Richard Owen hath this day made oath before us, His Majesty's Justices of the Peace ... that an immense mob is collected, and that he considers the town to be in danger.'<sup>262</sup> It was this disingenuous declaration that provided the justification for the magistrates to try to arrest Hunt and his colleagues.

As the police force, headed by Jonathan Andrews, the Deputy Constable of Manchester, attempted to arrest Hunt the crowd began to lock arms to prevent them from getting through. Andrews realised that arresting Hunt would be impossible and requested that magistrate

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<sup>259</sup> Bamford, Samuel. *Passages in the Life of a Radical, Volume I*. (London: Simkin, Marshall & co., 1844), pp. 176-177

<sup>260</sup> HO 42/192 f. 343. William Chippendale, Oldham, to John Byng, Pontefract 16 Aug. 1819. Endorsed: 'In Sir J. Byng's 18 Aug. 1819'

<sup>261</sup> Read, Donald. *Peterloo: The 'Massacre' and its Background*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), p. 132

<sup>262</sup> *Manchester Observer*, 28 August 1819

Hulton contact the heads of the military units that in the vicinity.<sup>263</sup> Hulton sent two letters, one to Major Thomas Trafford commander of the Manchester and Salford Yeomanry, the other to Lieutenant Colonel Guy L'Estrange, the commander of the military forces in Manchester. His letter to L'Estrange read: 'Sir, as chairman of the select committee of magistrates, I request you to proceed immediately to no. 6 Mount Street, where the magistrates are assembled. They consider the Civil Power wholly inadequate to preserve the peace.'<sup>264</sup> Trafford's Manchester Yeomanry were the first to arrive and charged at the crowd with their sabres drawn. In total eighteen people were killed, including women and children, and over 400 were injured.<sup>265</sup> Manchester was gripped by a sense of profound shock and anger and rioting broke out over the next few days in Manchester and surrounding towns. The local newspaper, the *Manchester Observer*, coined the phrase the 'Peterloo Massacre' to describe the event in ironic reference to the Battle of Waterloo in 1815<sup>266</sup>:

#### PETERLOO MASSACRE

Just published – No. 1 – price twopence – of PETERLOO MASSACRE containing a full, true and faithful account of the inhuman murders, woundings and other monstrous Cruelties exercised by a set of INFERNALS (miscalled Soldiers) upon unarmed and distressed People.<sup>267</sup>

What followed over the coming months was something of a battle for influence between newspapers loyal to the radicals and the government who tried desperately to suppress the contrarian version of events. The Home Office's response to the article in the *Observer* was: 'As the "Peterloo Massacre" cannot be other than grossly libellous, you will probably deem it right to proceed by arresting the publishers.'<sup>268</sup> The version presented in Parliament was similar; magistrates wrote to the Home Secretary to argue that the actions of the troops had prevented the onset of great upheaval. For example, Mr. Hay, a Magistrate of Lancashire, sent a letter to the Home Secretary, Lord Sidmouth stating:

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<sup>263</sup> Dowling, J.A. *The Whole Proceedings before the Coroner's inquest at Oldham, on the body of John Lees*, 1820, p. 459

<sup>264</sup> Reid, Robert. *The Peterloo Massacre*. (Portsmouth: William Heinemann, 1989), p. 167

<sup>265</sup> Trevelyan, G. M. 'The Number of Casualties at Peterloo', *History*, Vol. VII, 1922-23

<sup>266</sup> One of the victims, John Lees, is said to have remarked on his deathbed that 'At Waterloo it was man to man, but there [in Manchester] it was murder'. The *Manchester Observer* used this idea in their headline and the name stuck.

<sup>267</sup> *Manchester Observer*, 28 August 1819

<sup>268</sup> Letter from the Home Office to Magistrate Norris, 25 August 1819, cited in Joyce Marlow. *The Peterloo Massacre*. (London: Rapp & Whiting, 1969), p. 6

We cannot but deeply regret all this serious attendant on this transaction; but we have the satisfaction of witnessing the very grateful and cheering countenances of the whole town; infact (sic), they consider themselves as saved by our exertions.<sup>269</sup>

However, ultimately in the case of Peterloo, it was the people that prevailed. The so-called ‘Radical Press’ won the battle for the hearts and minds through some innovative strategies for conveying their version of the events. John Wroe, who was the editor of the *Observer*, published an in-depth report of the incident entitled *Peterloo Massacre: A Faithful Narrative of the Events* – the pamphlet was circulated across the country (an unprecedented occurrence at the time) and was made available for just twopence in order to be affordable for as many people as possible.<sup>270</sup> It sold out on every print run for fourteen weeks. The event was also commemorated on plates, medals and jugs through the newly-developed process of printwear. These items could be mass-produced and sold incredibly cheaply so that even the poorer members of society could afford them. By exploiting these avenues of communication, the radicals managed to ensure that Peterloo would not be suppressed by the government or forgotten by history. It was arguably these communication strategies that have given Peterloo such an enduring cultural legacy; for example, although the episodes of military interference after the War of the Three Kingdoms were immeasurably worse, literacy levels were low, and the print press was very under-developed. Hence, Peterloo marked the point that the will of the people began to exert more influence over policy and from this moment that the concepts of proportionality, last resort, and civil control over the use of force became mandatory facets of Britain’s internal strategic culture.

#### 4.3.2. Peterloo in the political rhetoric


Chart 2 provides a summary of around 150 speeches, statements and pieces of correspondence from politicians and members of the military regarding the Peterloo massacre and the use of the armed forces. Each statement was read, analysed, and categorised according to its central theme. Using a traffic light system, the positive responses are presented in green on the left of the chart, the neutral responses in orange in the middle, and the negative responses in red on the right.

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<sup>269</sup> Letter from Mr. Hay, a Magistrate of Lancashire, to the Home Secretary, Lord Sidmouth; dated Manchester, 16 August 1819; (quarter past nine).

<sup>270</sup> Anon. *Peterloo Massacre, containing A Faithful Narrative of the Events which preceded, accompanied, and followed the fatal Sixteenth August, 1819*. (Manchester: John Wroe, Observer Office, 1819), p. 146

**Chart 2 – The tone of the responses to the use of the military at Peterloo**



*Sources: Home Office Disturbance Papers, The National Archives, Hansard.*<sup>271</sup>

The first most striking aspect of the chart is the number of justifications for the use of the armed forces due to the perceived severity of the threat ('necessary given threat'). This was the most frequently referenced theme with 36 mentions. Some members of parliament referenced the 'violent speeches' that were being delivered on Hunslet moor;<sup>272</sup> or the 'evil', 'wicked', or 'disturbed' individuals that were gathering in Manchester. This kind of religiously coloured rhetoric sought to construct a divide between the righteous politicians who would call in the military in defence of British values and the criminally-minded radicals who, by virtue of their actions, had forfeited their right to protection under the law. One of the clearest examples of this was in a letter sent by five magistrates of Lancashire to Lord Sidmouth. They referred to the 'evil' radicals before mentioning that they, the

<sup>271</sup> Full sources listed in bibliography

<sup>272</sup> No. 60.—LETTER from the Mayor of Leeds, inclosed therein; dated Leeds, 20 September 1819.

magistrates, are 'unarmed'.<sup>273</sup> This was an implicit request for military assistance over a month before the Peterloo massacre was to occur.

Indeed, much of the rhetoric cited the illegal, insurrectionary, or revolutionary character of the radicals' movement. Both insurrection and revolution are directly mentioned in ten separate speeches; for example, Lord Norris's statement that '[T]he magistrates had felt a decided conviction that the whole bore the appearance of insurrection; that the array was such as to terrify all the king's subjects, and was such as no legitimate purpose could justify.'<sup>274</sup> Many others hint at the general threat the radicals posed to the security of the nation. For example, the Earl of Derby wrote to Lord Sidmouth: 'I am sorry to add, there is still too much cause to believe, that in some parts of this county, there are assemblies of men, who meet in considerable numbers, with the object of training and exercising themselves for illegal and seditious purposes.'<sup>275</sup>

Indeed, the apparent military drills that were occurring were the subject of more than a dozen reports from informants.<sup>276</sup> One policymaker, J. Norris, even went so far as to state that 'The drilling parties increase very extensively, and unless some mode be devised of putting this system down, it promises to become a most formidable engine of rebellion.'<sup>277</sup> Norris' reference to an 'engine' implies that Manchester could become the driving force for a nationwide revolution if immediate steps were not taken. Thomas Horton echoed this sentiment when he stated that 'it is quite certain the object is absolute revolution' and it would be 'necessary to society' to quell the unrest with force.<sup>278</sup> This is an interesting turn of phrase, like other comments that made a clear delineation between the 'bad' radicals and the 'good' politicians, Horton is implicitly calling for all radicals to be considered outside of society. It is a putative dismissal of their political objectives in favour of treating them like the enemy.

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<sup>273</sup> No. 1.—EXTRACT of a Letter from five Magistrates of Lancashire to Lord Sidmouth; dated, New Bailey Court House, Salford, 1 July 1819.

<sup>274</sup> No. 34.—LETTER from Mr. Hay, a Magistrate of Lancashire, to lord Sidmouth; dated Manchester, 16 August 1819

<sup>275</sup> No. 30.—LETTER from the Earl of Derby to Lord Sidmouth; dated Knowsley, August 15, 1819

<sup>276</sup> See: 'Papers Relative To The Internal State Of The Country', *Hansard Archives*, 24 November 1819, vol. 41

<sup>277</sup> Norris, J. No. 13.—EXTRACT of a Letter from Mr. Norris, a Magistrate of Lancashire, to Lord Sidmouth, dated Manchester, 5 August 1819

<sup>278</sup> No. 53.—LETTER from Colonel Horton inclosed therein; Halifax, 27 August 1819. Papers relative. *Hansard*, col. 274

Many of the fears of a revolution derived from observations of what had occurred in France just twenty years earlier when the disaffected and alienated working classes had overthrown the *ancien régime*. Indeed, in reference to the French Revolution, one peer, the Tory politician George Canning, implored his colleagues to consider that there were ‘lessons to be learned’ from the French.<sup>279</sup> The point being that although France’s revolution had been political rather than industrial, there was a similar underlying class conflict in both countries. This gave rise to a perception that the power of the ruling classes was under threat. The solution, according to dozens of magistrates, policymakers, and military officers, was to deploy the troops.

The correspondence between northern English magistrates and the Home Secretary Lord Sidmouth prior to the events at Manchester almost unanimously declared that there was a serious and imminent threat to the country. However, there is significant evidence to suggest that this correspondence was managed by policymakers as a *post hoc* justification for the use of force. An examination of some of the correspondence between the permanent undersecretary to the Home Office, Henry Hobhouse and the magistrate James Norris found in the Home Office disturbance papers, an excellent resource for information related to Peterloo, illustrates that the use of force may have been premeditated. While Norris writes of the ‘the inexpediency of attempting forcibly to prevent the meeting’, and that ‘it will be the wisest course to abstain from any endeavour to disperse the mob, unless they should proceed to acts of felony or riot’, it also states that they have ‘the strongest reason to believe that Hunt means to preside and to deprecate disorder.’<sup>280</sup>

The obvious paradox here is that they state force will absolutely *not* be used unless there acts of criminality, acts which they *fully* expect to occur. In a previous letter, Hobhouse had all but told Norris to seek out evidence of illegality in order to justify the use of the troops:

The power to disperse the men by force will depend on the legality or illegality of their meeting.... The magistrates must not ascribe to it that character which he suspects to belong to it, but that which he can establish by evidence.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>279</sup> Canning. Address On The Prince Regent's Speech At The Opening Of The Session, *Hansard Archives*, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 215

<sup>280</sup> HO 41/4 f.434

<sup>281</sup> HO 79/3, pp. 457-459

This incongruity was also highlighted by the historian E.P. Thompson who writes that ‘the Manchester authorities certainly intended to employ force, and ... Sidmouth knew.’<sup>282</sup> This gives an interesting, but concerning character to the ‘reports’ of military drilling sent by Manchester’s magistrates to the Home Office; were they fabricated or exaggerated in order to justify the eventual use of force? This may be the case given some statements delivered in parliament after Peterloo that stated the yeomanry cavalry units had all had their swords sharpened days prior to the meeting.<sup>283</sup>

Unsurprisingly, once the troops had been deployed, much of the rhetoric spoke of the excellent conduct of the troops. Statements referred to duties carried out with ‘great moderation’,<sup>284</sup> as the ‘saviours’<sup>285</sup> of Manchester, as acting with the ‘greatest alacrity’;<sup>286</sup> one of the most cynical statements came from Colonel Thomas Horton who declared, ‘I have great reason to believe, that the lower orders in this part of the country are very much irritated by the laudable conduct of the civil and military authorities at Manchester,’<sup>287</sup>. This is a particularly divisive statement as, like the comments examined earlier which attempted to draw a rhetorical distinction between the radicals and the law abiders with terms such as evil or wicked, here Horton is also constructing a divide between the working classes and ‘the rest’. This is in spite of the evidence that the military’s conduct was far from ‘laudable’.

In fact, the poor conduct of the troops is the most commonly referenced negative theme (eight mentions). It is now known that eighteen people died, but at the time these reports were just filtering in. One such report found that eight people had died with ‘three individuals ... cut down by the yeomanry as they advanced. A woman with a child in her arms was also wounded.’<sup>288</sup> Parliament also heard statements that up to 400 people had been charged and trampled by horses while troops also ‘rode into the yard of the Quakers meeting house, cutting and hacking the people, whose blood now lay on the stones and rails.’<sup>289</sup>

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<sup>282</sup> Thompson, Edward Palmer. *The Making of the English Working Class*. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1963), p. 683

<sup>283</sup> Brougham. Address on the Prince Regent's Speech At The Opening Of The Session, *Hansard Archives*, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 218

<sup>284</sup> Reddie, James. No. 57.—LETTER; from the Sheriff Depute of Renfrewshire, inclosed therein; dated Paisley, Tuesday 14 September 1819

<sup>285</sup> Hay, William. No. 34.—LETTER from Mr. Hay, a Magistrate of Lancashire, to lord Sidmouth; dated Manchester, 16 August 1819

<sup>286</sup> Byng, Major General John. No. 35—LETTER from Major-General Sir John Byng to Lord Sidmouth, dated, Head Quarters. Pontefract, 17 August 1819

<sup>287</sup> No. 53.—LETTER from Colonel Horton inclosed therein; Halifax, 27 August 1819

<sup>288</sup> Bennet, Henry. Address on the Prince Regent's Speech at the Opening of the Session, *Hansard Archives*, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 144

<sup>289</sup> Bennet, Henry. Address on the Prince Regent's Speech at the Opening of the Session, *Hansard Archives*, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 146



The poor conduct of the troops was exacerbated by claims from several reputable sources that the people gathered in Manchester did not in fact constitute the severe threat to national security that had been assumed. For example, Wentworth Fitzwilliam wrote that ‘the peace, tranquillity, and good order of the realm will not be disturbed by these people’.<sup>290</sup> Instead, he argued, that they were simply poor, hungry, and politically alienated and were simply expressing their right to protest. Lord George Nugent, a prominent and extreme Whig voice, stated that the people were ‘legally assembled to discuss those objects [i.e. their grievances]’ but that the meeting ‘was dispersed by the sword [with] helpless men, women, and children mixed in indiscriminate carnage.’<sup>291</sup> The fact that the victims were innocent, also prompted angry criticisms that the deployment of the yeomanry was provocative, dangerous, repressive or despotic and even contravened Britain’s values: ‘To what a situation had such a policy reduced the kingdom!’ declared the radical Scottish MP Joseph Hume, ‘military recruitings were to be seen every where, as if the government were preparing for an arduous contest! And against whom? Against our fellow-subjects! (sic)’<sup>292</sup> Here we see the crux of the issue; the government had called on the military, comprised, of course, of British citizens, to use force to disperse a gathering of their compatriots.

The British government was well aware of this ethical conundrum. As Thompson writes, ‘[i]f any ‘Peterloo decision’ was reached by Sidmouth [the Home Secretary] and the magistrates it is likely to have been reached privately in the week before the meeting.’ Furthermore, the sensitivity of the subject would mean that it is ‘highly unlikely that any record would have been left in the official Home Office papers for subsequent inspection.’<sup>293</sup> In spite of this, the analysis in chart 2 clearly shows the attempt by the British state to follow, or create the illusion of having followed, protocol.

The second most frequently referenced theme was that of subordination to the civil power with thirty-two mentions. For example, Major-General John Byng wrote ‘I most sincerely regret that the employment of military in aid of the civil power should have been necessary’.<sup>294</sup> Here, Byng is careful to include the phrase ‘in aid of the civil power’ to record

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<sup>290</sup> Fitzwilliam, Wentworth. No. 10.—LETTER from Earl Fitzwilliam, Lord Lieutenant of the West Riding of Yorkshire, to Lord Sidmouth; dated Wentworth, 21 July 1819

<sup>291</sup> Nugent, George. Address On The Prince Regent's Speech At The Opening Of The Session, *Hansard Archives*, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 154

<sup>292</sup> Hume, Joseph. Address On The Prince Regent's Speech At The Opening Of The Session, *Hansard Archives*, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 138

<sup>293</sup> Thompson. *The Making of the English Working Class*, p. 683

<sup>294</sup> No. 35—LETTER from Major-General Sir John Byng to Lord Sidmouth, dated, Head Quarters. Pontefract, 17 August 1819, nine, A. M.

the fact that the military were not acting unilaterally, but in accordance with their duty and due process as defined by the state. Lord Castlereagh argued similarly in his statement that ‘The 15th dragoons and the Cheshire Cavalry advanced to the rescue of the Manchester yeomanry; and in so doing, *acted distinctly under the authority of the magistrate*, who, on a fair view of the case, felt himself bound to give the necessary order.’<sup>295</sup>

One particularly interesting speech was delivered by Lieutenant Colonel George l'Estrange. His statement is worth quoting in full:

The magistrates assembled here in consequence of the disturbed state of the district, directed me to have the troops in readiness to assist the civil power in case of necessity, at the time of the meeting proposed for this day. In concurrence with their wishes, and after consultation with them, the military were prepared and arrangements made, such as then seemed calculated to meet any occasion, in which the aid of the troops might be required to assist the civil power.<sup>296</sup>

The rhetoric here is worth noting; L'Estrange states that the magistrates directed him, to ‘assist the civil power’ if necessary. Thus, ‘in concurrence with *their* wishes’ and only after consulting with them, he agreed. He even mentions later in the speech that he kept a magistrate with the troops to provide a degree of civil oversight. This is redolent of Theresa May’s speech following the first implementation of Operation Temperer where she stated that ‘*[t]he police have asked for authorisation from the Secretary of State for Defence to deploy a number of military personnel in support of their armed officers*’.<sup>297</sup>

In fact, there are a lot of commonalities in the themes of the rhetoric in 1819 and the modern day. One of the most striking was the statement by the Marquis of Lansdowne, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice. He first noted his objection to the use of force at Manchester before listing the three criteria that he believed should have been adhered to before the decision to use force was taken. In his words, if violence was to be employed:

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<sup>295</sup> Italics added for emphasis. Lord Castlereagh. Address on the Prince Regent's Speech at the Opening of the Session, *Hansard Archives*, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 142

<sup>296</sup> No. 36.—REPORT from Lieutenant Colonel l'Estrange, inclosed in the foregoing. Dated Manchester, 16 August 1819.

<sup>297</sup> Italics added for emphasis. PM statement following second COBR meeting on Manchester attack, Prime Minister’s Office, 23 May 2017. See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-following-second-cobr-meeting-on-manchester-attack-23-may-2017> (accessed 24th May 2017)

- 1) it should commence on the part of the populace, and not on the part of the constituted authorities.
- 2) notice of such intention should have been given before hand, that the people might have been aware of their danger.
- 3) that punishment should have fallen on the leaders of the meeting, and not on those who were aware of no offence, and who perhaps attended out of curiosity, and from no participation in the views or objects of those leaders.<sup>298</sup>

These three points made by Petty-Fitzmaurice are essential to understanding the element of continuity in Britain's strategic culture across time. They established three crucial criteria of proportionality (point 1), last resort and restraint (point 2) and targeted action (point 3) which have also become cornerstones of Britain's internal strategic culture and which became enshrined in Britain's 'minimum force' approach to internal security.

It is fascinating to note that even two hundred years ago, these were still prominent themes in the ethics of using armed force domestically. For example, for last resort John Norris remarked that 'Soldiers are placed [in position], and bodies of special constables, with orders in the first instance for the constables to act, and afterwards, in case of need, the military to disperse the mob.'<sup>299</sup> L'Estrange had also commented that 'the committee, now sitting, consider it necessary to keep all the troops ready, though every means will be adopted to prevent the necessity of their acting.'<sup>300</sup> Further, the Solicitor General, Lord Mansfield noted that 'the civil power was called out, and a military force stationed to aid them if necessary' but that the magistrates had 'acted with a caution approaching to timidity.'<sup>301</sup>

There was still a great deal of tension in the country two months after Peterloo, particularly in the north. In Newcastle, the Earl of Darlington, a moderate, received news that the mayor had been attacked and wrote to Lord Sidmouth that 'I have judged it expedient to order out the South Tyne yeomanry cavalry'. However, he explains that they have been placed 'under

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<sup>298</sup> Marquis of Lansdowne, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice. State of the Country, *Hansard Archives*, 30 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 431

<sup>299</sup> Norris, John. No. 37.—EXTRACT of a letter from Mr. Norris to Lord Sidmouth; dated Manchester, 17 August 1819

<sup>300</sup> Papers Relative to the Internal State of the Country, *Hansard Archives*, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 263

<sup>301</sup> Solicitor General, Lord Mansfield. Address on the Prince Regent's Speech at the Opening of the Session, *Hansard Archives*, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 172

the authority of the magistrates, who must be responsible if they order the military to act, and I have urged them strongly not to do so unless the civil power is overcome or incompetent.’<sup>302</sup>

It is interesting to see that there are fairly frequent references, even in 1819, to many of the norms that Britain applies today before the use of force is sanctioned, most notably the primacy of the civil power and the idea that deploying the military is a last resort if the civil power finds it is unable to deal with the threat. Even in the case of Peterloo, we find some evidence that the Deputy Police Constable Jonathan Andrews had first attempted to arrest Hunt without the assistance of the military. According to his testimony, it was only when he assessed the situation and found that neither he, nor his constables could achieve the task allocated to them that he requested the aid of the yeomanry.

Clearly one could question whether all of the possible avenues had been exhausted before resorting to such an extreme measure and, as Robert Reid writes, it may have been magistrate Hulton who was under pressure and over-zealous.<sup>303</sup> However, initially the military were only in Manchester as a contingency and were only deployed once the civil power had granted them the authority.

Nevertheless, it is still the case that although the military should *in theory* have only been deployed as a last resort, *in reality* it does not appear to be the case that other avenues were explored first. Indeed, in a powerful statement, Joseph Hume lamented ‘the light and trifling manner’ in which the decision to deploy the troops had been taken.<sup>304</sup> This is perhaps the most significant point in terms of the impact of Peterloo. As chart 1 indicated, there were dozens of domestic deployments that occurred in Britain post-1819. The difference is that the decision to deploy them was rarely taken in a ‘light and trifling manner’ again. In fact, the core values of subordination to the civil power, proportionality and last resort, which the authorities appear to have only paid lip service to in the case of Peterloo, became enshrined in Britain’s internal strategic culture.

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<sup>302</sup> No. 64.—LETTER from the Earl of Darlington to Lord Sidmouth; dated Raby Castle, 15 October 1819.

<sup>303</sup> Reid, Robert. *The Peterloo Massacre*, (Portsmouth: William Heinemann, 1989), p. 167

<sup>304</sup> Hume, Joseph. Address on the Prince Regent's Speech at the Opening Of The Session, 24 November 1819, *Hansard Archives*, vol. 41, col. 138

#### 4.3.3. The Impact of Peterloo on Britain's approach to civil unrest

The Peterloo massacre had a profound impact on how Britain approached the concept of domestic security.<sup>305</sup> As chart three shows, there were at least twenty-two yeomanry deployments in 1819 alone and only slightly fewer (nineteen) the following year. However, the extreme public backlash and the growing sense of shock over the incident in parliamentary circles meant the military were never relied upon for the quelling of public unrest to quite the same extent. Of course there were still active military deployments; for example the Newport Rising of 1839 saw twenty two deaths as a result of a cavalry charge.<sup>306</sup> Nevertheless, Peterloo had the effect of putting Britain on the road towards developing the world's first modern police force when, in 1829, Sir Robert Peel pushed through the Metropolitan Police Act.

The use of the yeomanry after the establishment of the Metropolitan Police Force in 1829 remained the standard practice in the un-urbanised areas of Britain where cavalry units were 'well suited to controlling an un-policed and hierarchical rural society'.<sup>307</sup> However, their heavy-handed responses to certain public disturbances coupled with criticisms of slow response times and failure to respond in manner that may be expected of a military unit led to questions over their suitability for maintaining public order. Even General Sir Charles James Napier, captain of the Yeomanry cavalry, voiced his reluctance to deploy his troops to quell the Chartist uprising. He famously stated 'If the Chartists want a fight, they can be indulged without Yeoman, who are over-zealous for cutting and slashing'.<sup>308</sup> In fact, in 1819, the politician and former member of the 1<sup>st</sup> Foot Guards, Henry Bennet had argued similarly after Peterloo. He stated that the Yeomanry had entered a house where they began 'cutting and hacking the people'.<sup>309</sup> Napier's point, it seems, was not just hyperbole.

Mr. H. Berkeley also called the efficiency and character of the yeomanry into question in Parliament on 26 July 1850 further undermining the role they had hitherto played:

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<sup>305</sup> 'There are historical precedents after incidents such as the Peterloo riots for the House deciding to change public policy because of what has happened.' Mr Simon Hughes, Commons Debate on firearms, 12 November 1996, vol. 285

<sup>306</sup> Chase, Malcolm. *Chartism: A New History*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 110-117

<sup>307</sup> Hay, George. *The Yeomanry Cavalry and Military Identities in Rural Britain, 1815-1914*. (London: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 155

<sup>308</sup> Napier, William Francis Patrick. *The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier*, 2. (London: Woodfall & Kinder Printers, 1857), p. 73

<sup>309</sup> Bennet, Henry. Address On The Prince Regent's Speech At The Opening Of The Session, *Hansard Archives*, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 146

unless certain public measures were carried, the yeomanry meant, to use their own expression, to fight for it; and that they would draw their swords when they pleased, and upon whom they placed, and when ordered to draw their swords they would keep them in their scabbards as long as they pleased.

He concluded that they were ‘...insubordinate and useless. At the present moment they claimed for themselves the distinction of being disobedient and dangerous.’<sup>310</sup> While Fox Maule stated similarly that ‘he had shown that this force (Yeomanry) had for a long series of years been insubordinate and unamenable to discipline, and that it possessed every quality which would make it unfit and inefficient as a military force.’<sup>311</sup> The feeling at the time was that the yeomanry were increasingly unsuited to a duty of maintaining internal order and, following the implementation of (non-mandatory) 1839 the Rural Borough Police Act which allowed Justices of the Peace in counties outside of London to establish their own police forces, another decline in the number of yeomanry deployments is apparent (see chart 3).


By 1856, the County and Borough Police Act, which *was* mandatory, had been established. This made it compulsory for any county which had not created a police force since 1839 to do so thereby negating the need for the yeomanry cavalry units as tools of law and order. This effectively laid the foundations for separating out the role of the maintenance of law and order from the role of defence. This is reflected in chart 3 which shows no military deployments between 1856 and 1865. Clearly, the creation of a permanent police force in 1829 and the legislation for rural policing that followed fundamentally altered how Britain approached matters of internal security.

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<sup>310</sup> Mr. H. Berkeley, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 26 July 1850, vol. 113, par. 379

<sup>311</sup> Mr. Fox Maule, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 26 July 1850, vol. 113, par. 380

**Chart 3: The impact of ‘Peterloo’ – number of yeomanry deployments: 1815-1865**



Sources: *The National Archives, Hansard, Secondary Literature.*<sup>312</sup>

The idea of establishing a permanent civil police force had first been proposed in 1785 when the Solicitor-General, Sir Archibald Macdonald, placed the London and Westminster Police Bill before Parliament in an effort to curb rampant criminality and avoid ‘that dangerous refuge of the weak’ – the use of the armed forces.<sup>313</sup> The bill was withdrawn after condemnation from magistrates who termed the idea ‘inexpedient and unnecessary’.<sup>314</sup> However, in the febrile atmosphere post-Peterloo, it was readily apparent to the more rationally-minded and progressive members of the government that it was in fact the use of the bayonet and the musket for crowd control that was inexpedient.

<sup>312</sup> Full sources listed in bibliography

<sup>313</sup> Babington, Anthony. *Military Intervention in Britain, From the Gordon Riots to the Gibraltar Incident*. (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 32

<sup>314</sup> Ibid.

Sir Robert Peel had assumed the position of Home Secretary in 1822, one year after another fatal incident involving the use of excessive force during Queen Caroline's funeral. Crowds had gathered to watch the funeral procession, but the presence of the military (Oxford Blues under the command of Captain Bouverie) nearby agitated the crowd and they began to shout at the troops and hurl stones. A magistrate, alarmed at the prospect of riot, then sanctioned the troops 'in firing their pistols and carbines at the unarmed crowd.' As the *Manchester Guardian* reported at the time, 'The number of shots fired was not less than forty or fifty. So completely did the soldiery appear at this period to have lost the good temper and forbearance they previously evinced, that they fired shots in the direction in which the procession was moving.'<sup>315</sup> For Peel, these incidents of reactive violence against unarmed crowds were becoming far too frequent and so he took the initiative to establish a new kind of police force that would control crime, not the public. This was epitomised by his famous quote: 'The police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.'<sup>316</sup>

Crucially, Peel wanted to avoid any association with the military and therefore insisted that his recruits wore a blue uniform rather than the vibrant red of the military. They would also be unarmed, carrying a truncheon, a rattle (which was soon replaced with a whistle), and a pair of handcuffs. There was initial resistance from the public to the idea who were still sceptical about the idea of an organised body; The British army had been given the derogatory nickname 'the lobsters' as a result of their red uniforms and the Peelers were initially given the (additional) nickname 'the *raw* lobsters'.<sup>317</sup> Indeed, the police were not an immediate success and the impact on controlling crime was minimal in the early years of the Metropolitan police. Despite these early setbacks, Peel had created a force for the maintenance of domestic security that was distinct from the military and would dictate Britain's approach to internal security for the next two hundred years. The notion of 'policing by consent' that Britain operates by today derived from what became known as Peel's nine principles of policing.<sup>318</sup> The British government still references Peel in its

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<sup>315</sup> *Manchester Guardian*, 'The Funeral Procession', 14 August 1821, Guardian Archive

<sup>316</sup> Sir Robert Peel's Principles of Law Enforcement 1829, point seven

<sup>317</sup> 'Peel's Police, Raw Lobsters, Blue Devils, Or by whatever other appropriate Name they may be known.' HO 44/21, f. 326, Anti-police handbill, 1830.

<sup>318</sup> In fact, there is limited evidence that Peel devised these principals. It is more likely that the first Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis, Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne were responsible for creating these core tenets.



discussion of the subject and defines it as ‘the power of the police coming from the common consent of the public, as opposed to the power of the state’.<sup>319</sup>

The Metropolitan Police Act also introduced a core tenet of British policing that permeated the approach taken by the civil power in all matters regarding internal security; the application of *minimum force*. The sixth point of Peel’s ‘nine principles’ illustrates this fact, it states:

The police should use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of *persuasion, advice and warning* is found to insufficient to achieve police objectives; and police should use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.<sup>320</sup>

Modern British police forces are still instructed to apply this standard of minimum force. The College of Policing’s guidelines for new recruits asks police officers to consider three ‘core questions’ before resorting to the use of force:

- 1) ‘Would the use of force have a lawful objective (...) and, if so, how immediate and grave is the threat posed?
- 2) Are there any means, short of the use of force, capable of attaining the lawful objective identified?
- 3) ...what is the minimum level of force required to attain the objective identified, and would the use of that level of force be proportionate or excessive?’<sup>321</sup>

Here, we clearly see the principle of restraint that has guided Britain’s approach to internal threats for so long. However, Keith Jeffrey questioned the efficacy of this approach in face of more unconventional threats such as terrorism. He wrote that Britain will often find itself caught between ‘Scylla and Charybdis’; thus, while Britain’s principle of minimum force may be more in line with the norms and values of the state, it may also be insufficient for dealing with more insidious threats. Meanwhile, maximum force (i.e. the use of the military) is deemed to be too far in the other direction by almost all echelons of society. It is seen to

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<sup>319</sup> Home Office, FOI release, 10 December 2012, Definition of policing by consent. See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent/definition-of-policing-by-consent> (accessed 30/01/2019)

<sup>320</sup> Italics in original, underlined by author for added emphasis. See: Sir Robert Peel 's Principles of Law Enforcement 1829, point six

<sup>321</sup> College of Policing, Public Order, Police use of force, sec. 2, ‘Core Questions’

be provocative and, given the national historical experience, contrary to Britain's abidance by the public's right to freedom from repression.

In 2005, it was this strategic paradox that led to trouble for the Metropolitan Police. In the wake of the 9/11 attack, Britain had decided that a contingency strategy for dealing with suicide bombers needed to be devised. Sir David Veness, Head of Scotland Yard's Special Operations branch, and Barbara Wilding, Deputy Assistant Commissioner of Specialist Operations, visited Israel and Sri Lanka to gather some advice on how best to respond when confronted with a threat of that nature. The outcome was the creation of new armed police tactics in 2002, codenamed (somewhat ironically given the earlier reference to Scylla and Charybdis) Operation Kratos – Kratos being a Greek demi-god and the personification of strength. One of the most controversial aspects of Kratos was the authorisation of the use of deadly force. Report 13 of the 27 October 2002 meeting of the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) served as an update to members on the Metropolitan police's new tactical response to suicide terrorism. Although it denies that it is a 'shoot-to-kill' policy, it recognises that 'the extreme nature of the risk to the public' may necessitate using 'such force as is reasonable in the circumstances' and that there is 'no legal requirement for an officer to give a verbal challenge before firing.'<sup>322</sup>

After the London bombings of 7 July 2005, the firearms officers of the Metropolitan police were reminded of the guidelines under Kratos. The atmosphere in the country was tense and Report 13 states that 'from 12 midday on the 21 July 2005 to midnight on the 4 August 2005' 763 calls were made by members of the public about suspected suicide bombers. Six of these resulted in the use of the Armed Response Unit.<sup>323</sup> Tragically, one of these occasions resulted in the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes, a Brazilian national living in London. At the inquest following the shooting, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) heard that a man identified only as 'Colin', who was acting as the night duty surveillance officer for SO12,<sup>324</sup> had informed armed units that 'unusual tactics' may be required 'because of the environment they were in'.<sup>325</sup> Colin clarified this remark by stating if 'the subject was not-compliant a critical shot could be taken.'<sup>326</sup> The level of public scrutiny that

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<sup>322</sup> Detective Superintendent Steve Swain, Report 13 of the 27 October meeting of the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), 'Suicide Terrorism'. See sections 10 and 11, respectively.

<sup>323</sup> Ibid. sec. 14

<sup>324</sup> SO12 was known as Special Branch, it merged with SO13, the 'Anti-Terrorism Branch' to form Counter-Terrorism Command in October 2006

<sup>325</sup> Independent Police Complaints Commission. 'Stockwell One, Investigation into the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell underground station on 22 July 2005', sec. 11, 'Briefings', par. 11.9, p. 51

<sup>326</sup> Ibid.

the Metropolitan police faced after this incident emphasised the strength of feeling among members of the public that the use of force domestically is deemed to be extremely sensitive and, furthermore, that proportionality is of paramount importance. Thus, even with the use of force by the civil forces, the same enduring principles apply.

#### **4.3.4. Cultural preferences compared: Peterloo, The General Strike, and the Tottenham Riots**

The evidence presented suggests the negative perception of Peterloo certainly influenced Britain's cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically. It catalysed a shift in how Britain dealt with riot and protest. If we recall the criteria for strategic change discussed previously, it requires strong institutions, a bold leader and a receptive normative climate. In terms of the climate, the public backlash to the heavy-handed approach of the military was so severe that abiding by that method of maintaining civil order was out of the question. Several years later, this prompted a 'bold leader', in Robert Peel to create the Metropolitan police force, a 'strong institution' which would serve as the country's populace and reflect the will of the people. Although relatively ineffective at first, over time it became highly efficient at controlling crime and ensuring internal security to the extent that the military were rarely called upon to deal with incidents of civil unrest with 1919 being the last time it occurred.

In 1926 there were concerns that the military may once again be needed when the General Council of the Trades Union Congress declared a general strike. The strike was in opposition to wage cuts and the poor conditions that miners were forced to work under and lasted for nine days. During this time the government implemented the Emergency Powers Act 1920 which outlined that it is incumbent on the government to ensure that 'essentials of life to the community' are provided.<sup>327</sup>

The strike did lead to the deployment of the army, but in a passive, rather than active capacity. As a report by the Security Service (MI5) noted, the regular army's role was limited to escorting flour trucks.<sup>328</sup> Meanwhile, the government formed the Civil Constabulary Reserve, which comprised mostly members of the Territorial Army (TA) and veterans of the military to carry out 'emergency work' such as 'the maintenance of order' and 'the

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<sup>327</sup> Emergency Powers Act 1920, 29/10/1920. 10 & 11 Geo 5, ch. 55

<sup>328</sup> WO 30/143, War Office intelligence summary no. 12, 11 May 1926

protection of essential services.’<sup>329</sup> This was important as, in lieu of ‘middle tranche’ forces such as the French *gendarmerie*, the British government did not have a strategic option that would avoid the Scylla and Charybdis problem of *too much* versus *not enough* force. The TA, by virtue of its civilian contingent, effectively bridged the gap between the police, the troops, and the people in this context.<sup>330</sup>

In a debate in the House of Commons a year on from the strikes, Labour politician, George Hall stated, ‘the experience of last year proved conclusively that the civil authorities are quite competent to deal with any matter arising in the course of an industrial dispute.’ He continued that ‘last year we had eight months of industrial strife, and on no single occasion was it necessary for the civil authorities to apply-to the War Office to send troops to engage or interfere in the trouble at all.’<sup>331</sup> Indeed, Hall’s statement was reflective of a wider trend in the rhetoric that rejected the need for any military involvement in domestic affairs. For example, the Labour MP Ellen Wilkinson stated at the time that ‘when the average man joins the Army, he does so in order to fight the foreign enemies of his country’ and that although a soldier is cognisant of a potential domestic duty, including possibly ‘firing on his fellow workmen’, this is not the reason that they signed up.<sup>332</sup> F.A. Broad argued similarly by stating that he was ‘sure none of these young men ever contemplated that they would be used to fire on their fellow workers, possibly their fathers, or their brothers, or their friends’.<sup>333</sup> Labour MP Phillip Snowden struck a similar note stating

The police are a civil force, and for their efficiency it is necessary that they should have the confidence of the public, that they should have the confidence of all law-abiding citizens. It is important that the police and the public should co-operate. Now in the Army it is quite different. The Army is something apart from the public. The functions of the Army are to exercise effective force which I might describe as violence.<sup>334</sup>

Simply put, the prevailing opinion among British policymakers at the time was that the belligerent mindset of the soldier is simply incompatible with the internal duties related to riot and protest. In almost all cases it will be provocative, dangerous, and if the soldiers refuse to fire against their countrymen, potentially totally ineffective.

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<sup>329</sup> J 86/37. Emergency arrangements for Civil Constabulary Reserve during the General Strike, 10 May 1926

<sup>330</sup> Thank you to the staff at DCDC for their helpful comments on this point.

<sup>331</sup> Hall, George. Commons Chamber, *Hansard Archives*, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1140


<sup>332</sup> Wilkinson, Ellen. Commons Chamber, *Hansard Archives*, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1140

<sup>333</sup> Broad, Frank.A. New Clause—(Use Of Military In Connection With Trade Disputes) Commons Chamber, *Hansard*, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1137

<sup>334</sup> Snowden, Phillip. Police, England And Wales. *Hansard Archives*, 11 July 1928, vol. 219, col. 2265

These examples typify the rhetorical reaction to the presence of army at the General Strike. The almost universal rejection of the use of the military to counter riots and protests is clearly reflected in chart 4. It compares the rhetorical response of policymakers during the time of Peterloo to more modern examples of the 1926 General Strike and, for interest rather than as a formative moment, the 2011 Tottenham riots in order to demonstrate the clear attitudinal shift over time. The methodology is the same as was outlined in the section dedicated to Peterloo.

**Chart 4: Preferences for the use of force compared: Peterloo, The General Strike, and the Tottenham Riots**



Sources: *The National Archives, Hansard*.<sup>335</sup>

Clearly, there is a marked change in the attitudes of the policymakers towards the use of the armed forces between 1819 and 1926 from general acceptance, to almost total rejection. This is all the more interesting given that the causes of the two incidents were similar; i.e.

<sup>335</sup> Full sources listed in bibliography

disaffected workers, job losses, and economic hardships perceived to have come about through the policies of the ruling classes. While there were a significant number of positive statements related to Peterloo, by the time of the General Strike there are just three statements that extoll the benefits of using the army against the people. Instead, the majority of the statements are negative. We might speculate that the reason for this is likely due to the deep-seated tension between the working and ruling classes in Britain that boiled over at Peterloo. This ‘us versus them’ mentality would become further entrenched through the employment of the armed forces against the people by the ruling class. Consequently, a desire for national unity meant that, post-Peterloo, the use of armed forces internally for the purposes of quelling civil disorder came to be perceived as entirely unacceptable in Britain.

Given that the General Strike did not see an active deployment of the troops, the negative statements are limited to what an active deployment *would have been* rather than *was*. In consequence, there are no references to protocols not being followed or other options not being explored. Instead, statements overwhelmingly refer to the provocative or dangerous nature of a putative deployment, how it would be repressive, inappropriate given that the ‘enemy’ in this context would be the British public, and in opposition to a soldier’s principle duties. Clearly, there had been a cultural shift away from the idea that the army should be used as a tool for maintaining order.

Further evidence of this notion is found through a brief comparison with the Tottenham riots in 2011. Although the military were not called upon, the idea was debated heavily in Parliament as the suggestion had been circulating that perhaps the army could play a limited role in resolving the situation. The patterns in the rhetoric reflect the debates and statements from 1926 in that they are overwhelmingly negative. For example, the Liberal Democrat politician, and former minister for the armed forces, Nick Harvey, stated ‘Those who are trained in the use of lethal force ... should not be regularly used as an instrument of force against the citizens of that same country.’<sup>336</sup> Then Labour leader Ed Miliband stated ‘this is a job for the police’,<sup>337</sup> his colleague Diane Abbott argued that ‘the further militarisation of the situation we face will not help and might bring things to an even worse level.’<sup>338</sup> Overall, what the responses to the General Strike and the Tottenham riots indicate is that there has

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<sup>336</sup> Harvey, Nick. Supporting civilian authority: what role for the Military? *Ministry of Defence*, 14 October 2011. See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2011-10-14-supporting-civilian-authority-what-role-for-the-military--2> (accessed 04/01/2018)

<sup>337</sup> HC Debate. Public Disorder, 11 August 2011, vol. 531, col. 1056

<sup>338</sup> HC Debate. Public Disorder, 11 August 2011, vol. 531, col. 1069

been a clear shift in cultural preferences, from approval of the use of the armed forces at home in 1819 to an almost unanimous rejection in 1926 which has endured to this day.

Despite this shift, there is also remarkable continuity in the rhetoric across nearly two hundred years of British history. The middle column of chart 4 relates to more ‘neutral’ language. That is to say, statements that indicate caveated acceptance of the use of the military. For example, that if the military must be used, they should always be either subordinate or accountable to the Civil Power; that all other options must have been exhausted; that a deployment was necessary given the high level of threat, but it was still unfortunate that such measures had to be resorted to and that any deployment, if and when it occurs, should be short term and proportionate to the threat. We see that regardless of the century, the rhetorical response of policy makers has adhered to these core, seemingly immutable principles.

For example, reflecting the idea of subordination to the civil power, in 1926, Labour MP Frank Broad stated that ‘if ever, the forces are to be used in aid of the civil authority, the Minister who will be responsible will be the Home Secretary.’<sup>339</sup> And discussing the issue of proportionality he continued that only ‘a great emergency’ should lead the government to resort to the armed forces. His colleague Mr. Rhys referred to last resort when he commented that ‘there never could be any question, of using troops in any industrial disturbance of any sort or kind unless the situation became such that there was grave danger, not only to life, but to the very property.’<sup>340</sup>

The same principles of subordination to the civil power and last resort are apparent in the rhetoric in 2011. For example, then prime minister David Cameron stated

Some people have raised the issue of the Army. The acting Commissioner of the Metropolitan police said to me that he would be the last man left in Scotland Yard with all his management team out on the streets before he asked for Army support.<sup>341</sup>

He continued that his cabinet’s discussions for using the military in this context ‘is not for today, or even for tomorrow; it is just so that there are contingency plans should they become

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<sup>339</sup> Broad, Frank. A. New Clause—(Use Of Military In Connection With Trade Disputes) Commons Chamber, *Hansard*, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1134

<sup>340</sup> Rhys. Commons Chamber, *Hansard Archives*, volume 204, 29 March 1927, Column 1145

<sup>341</sup> Riots: David Cameron's Commons statement in full. *BBC*, 11 August 2011. See: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14492789> (accessed 09/04/2018)

necessary.’<sup>342</sup> Nick Harvey also directly referred to the fact the deployment of the troops ‘should only happen as a last resort.’<sup>343</sup> These common themes provide strong evidence of a guiding cultural thread that seems to constrain the behaviour and strategic orientation of Britain. In summary, it seems from this analysis that Britain is opposed to the use of the army in the case of dealing with riot and protest due to the negative perception of historical experience (although necessarily a fixed point in time). However, if the decision is taken that the military must be deployed, the guiding normative principles of subordination to the civil power, last resort, and proportionality *must* be abided by.

Continuity *and* change are therefore evident in the responses of British policymakers to the idea of deploying the military on the national territory for the purposes of maintaining civil order. A significant change in cultural preferences occurred post-Peterloo, but all three examples illustrated in chart 4 also indicate a great deal of continuity through a series of abiding norms. This is highly suggestive of the fact that historical experiences do indeed cultivate entrenched normative preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically. The question that arises is whether the *same* historical experiences are referred to in the rhetoric (which would indicate objective points in time have a constraining effect), or, if different points in history are mentioned, it would suggest that policymakers are constrained by history in a general sense, but are perhaps less aware of precisely from where their preferences originate.

In 1926 there were six references to negative historical experiences; a fairly low number which may imply constraint has occurred passively over time. In terms of the specific examples, Peterloo was mentioned just three times: First, Frank Broad referred to ‘the time of Peterloo’;<sup>344</sup> Second, Scottish MP James Barr, in reference to the expansion of the powers of the state to prevent public meetings, spoke of ‘acts of repression’ during the ‘Peterloo massacre’;<sup>345</sup> third, discussing precedents for MACP, Viscount Haldane spoke of ‘the occasion of the Peterloo riots.’<sup>346</sup> Other historical experiences that were invoked included George Hall’s reference to industrial disputes in 1898 in Wales when ‘two cavalry regiments

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<sup>342</sup> Ibid.

<sup>343</sup> Harvey, Nick. Supporting civilian authority: what role for the Military? *Ministry of Defence*, 14 October 2011. See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2011-10-14-supporting-civilian-authority-what-role-for-the-military--2> (accessed 04/01/2018)

<sup>344</sup> Broad, Frank. A. New Clause—(Use Of Military In Connection With Trade Disputes) Commons Chamber, *Hansard*, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1135

<sup>345</sup> Barr, James. Emergency Powers, Commons Chamber, *Hansard*, 6 May 1926, vol. 195, col. 521

<sup>346</sup> Haldane, Viscount, Army And Air Force (Annual) Bill, Lords Chamber, *Hansard*, 27 April 1926, vol. 63, col. 954



were sent to that area.’<sup>347</sup> Interestingly, in 2011 there are seven references to historical experiences, but Peterloo is not mentioned at all. Instead, the historical references are to Northern Ireland and Tonypandy.<sup>348</sup>

It is interesting that Peterloo was not the only experience that was mentioned. As the evidence presented in this chapter thus far suggests, Peterloo was *the* most formative moment for Britain’s preferences for the use of the armed forces. So why were there not more references to it? And why were some arguably less formative moments mentioned instead? As the previous chapters implied, norms may be transmitted passively across time without clear articulation. This may lead to an entrenched, in this case, rejection of the armed forces domestically without a clear idea as to the origin of this belief. A comparison of Peterloo, the General Strike, and the Tottenham riot certainly seems to indicate that this is the case; negative historical experiences are invoked as a reason not to use the troops, but there is not a fixed, objective point in the past that policymakers will always refer back to, if indeed they refer back to historical experiences at all. In short, historical experiences lead to enduring cultural preferences, but the specific causes of these enduring values seem to have been partially forgotten.

#### **4.3.5. At home or abroad? The impact of cultural preferences on representations of the army’s role**

The analysis above suggested that negative historical experience of Peterloo led to significant public backlash against the army’s use for quelling episodes of public disorder. This resulted in a new institution, the Metropolitan police force who would maintain primacy for maintaining order on the national territory. Consequently, the rhetoric of policymakers in 1926 reflects the idea that facing protesters is not the duty of the armed forces. Instead, post-Peterloo, the notion that the British army was an expeditionary force began to develop.

For example, Frank Broad mentioned in 1926 that it was ‘unfair’<sup>349</sup> to expect a soldier to carry out internal duties, Lieutenant Commander Kennworthy stated that the guarding duties

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
<sup>347</sup> Hall, George. Commons Chamber, *Hansard*, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1139

<sup>348</sup> ‘when the troops were sent into Tonypandy by a Liberal Home Secretary 100 years ago to try to deal with the riots there they made the situation worse rather than better.’ Bryant, Chris. HC Debate. Public Disorder, 11 August 2011, vol. 531, col. 1095; ‘the Prime Minister will be aware that Sir Hugh Orde, who has ordered the firing of baton rounds and the use of water cannon in Northern Ireland, is against the use of such things in the current situation.’ Abbott, Diane. HC Debate. Public Disorder, 11 August 2011, vol. 531, col. 1069

<sup>349</sup> Broad, Frank. A. Commons Chamber, *Hansard Archives*, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1138

that were required of soldiers during the General Strike were out of sync with the expectations of action and adventure that many young recruits would sign up for. He stated that these recruits ‘may not know what they are landing themselves in for,’<sup>350</sup> and Lord Henry Horne, an experienced military officer who had fought during World War One, stated that ‘History will tell us that we never have defended and never will defend the British Isles by fighting on our own soil. Our defence lies in fighting elsewhere.’<sup>351</sup>

There is clear evidence of the perception of the British army as a predominantly external force, not just among policymakers, but also from the military itself through the recruitment campaigns post-First World War. During the Great War, the Military Service Act, introduced in January 1916, had ensured a steady stream of recruits in support of the war effort. However, by mid-1919, conscription had been abandoned and, after taking control of various former Ottoman and German colonies under the League of Nations mandates, the British Empire had reached its territorial peak. Recruitment campaigns thus attempted to appeal to the public’s sense of adventure and yearning for foreign travel. It was in 1919 that variations on the often-quoted phrase ‘join the army, see the world’ began to emerge. (see posters one and two). In fact, of ten inter-war recruitment posters examined, eight explicitly referenced travel abroad and one referenced it implicitly by showing a drawing of two soldiers leaning over the side of a boat as they pass a sunny mountain range (according to the Imperial War Museum, possibly in India or the Middle East).



(Posters One and Two: c. 1919, *The Advertising Archives*)

<sup>350</sup> Kennworthy, Lieutenant Colonel. Commons Chamber, *Hansard Archives*, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1147

<sup>351</sup> Lord Horne, House of Lords Debate, The Territorial Army, 24 March 1927, vol. 66, col. 784

The trinity of travel, action, and adventure has remained the core of Britain's approach to recruitment for over a century. Of course, during the Second World War the approach was dominated by the threat from Nazi Germany and recruitment campaigns focused on the idea of the country's duty to 'do their bit'. But after 1945 adverts struck the tone of recruitment campaigns reverted to that seen during the inter-war period. Recruitment posters from the 1950s offered the chance to 'travel gratis and for nothing to glamorous names on the map. Hamburg. Singapore. The sunny Caribbean.' While campaigns targeting more female recruits through the Women's Royal Army Corps offered 'the opportunity to travel' or the fact that there are 'few other jobs that offer a girl the chance of foreign travel.' The 1950s also saw the rise of mass-market visual technology and in an early recruitment film entitled *They Stand Ready*, the narrator states that it is 'no new thing for Britain this sending of men to the far corners of the earth' before referencing Britain's military commitments in Malaya, Malta, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, North Africa 'and a host of others which must be guarded for the defence of Britain and the Commonwealth.'<sup>352</sup> Here we see one of the clearest examples of the British notion that the defence of the realm is achieved through external engagements.



'I can afford to go abroad all right!' – WRAC advert, c. 1950  
(Poster Three: *The Advertising Archives*)

<sup>352</sup> National Archives, *They Stand Ready*, 1955, Film available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U3aerP7GyWE>, Transcript available at: <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/fifties-britain/stand-ready/> n.b. transcript differs from the speech in the film.

This theme continued in the 1960s with campaigns boasting that the army offers ‘a varied and exciting life’ and will ‘help you see more of the world’.<sup>353</sup> A short recruitment film from 1964 follows the soldier ‘Bill Dowling’ and states that by the age of twenty-one he has already been to ‘the Middle East, Berlin, and Kenya with the army. “Ah”, you’ll say, “that was when the army was travelling!” – they’ve never stopped.’<sup>354</sup> By the 1970s, as one would expect, the threat emanating from Northern Ireland also began to factor into the recruitment campaigns. Operation Banner had been in force since 14 August 1969 and reached its peak in the seventies with roughly 21,000 troops deployed. One particular poster featured a street in Belfast with the caption ‘Northern Ireland can be tough, tiring and dangerous. You need backbone, patience and eyes in the back of your head.’<sup>355</sup> One recruitment video referenced the ‘massive task of internal security in Northern Ireland’.<sup>356</sup> Nevertheless, even during this period, operations further abroad were still heavily emphasised. For example, a poster for the Women’s Royal Army Corps (WRAC) stated categorically that ‘You’ll have to travel.’ While one advert for the regular army stated ‘there’s not much of the world the army doesn’t reach in one way or another; it could be India, Canada, the Andes, Central America, or the Arctic’. In fact, out of nine recruitment adverts seen from the 1970s, seven referenced travel abroad and only one mentioned a possible domestic (i.e. English) duty. In short, historical experiences had forged an ingrained cultural preference for the army to act as an external force, rather than one for dealing with perceived threats to British security emanating from British soil.

## Concluding remarks

In the context of the research questions for this thesis, the discussion thus far has highlighted the interdependency between historical experiences and cultural preferences in the British case, demonstrating that there seems to be an enduring rejection of the idea of deploying the military for the purposes of maintaining public order. However, these attitudes have to be seen against the backdrop of changing threats in the modern era if we are to understand fully modern British preferences for the acceptance or rejection of the armed forces on the national territory.

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<sup>353</sup> ‘New Army Pay Rise!’, C.1960, Advertising Archives

<sup>354</sup> Public Information Films 1964 to 1979 Army Recruitment. See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SUlxl40W6v8> (accessed 21/07/2017)

<sup>355</sup> ‘If you’ve got it in you, the Army will bring it out’, recruitment poster, c.1970, *The Advertising Archives*

<sup>356</sup> ‘The Army Role’, Army Department. c.1975. See: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HYoZXlnK-y4&ab\\_channel=smp220700](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HYoZXlnK-y4&ab_channel=smp220700) (accessed 15/06/2018)

This shift dates back to the 1970s when the perception of a new type of threat began to emerge, challenging British policymakers' assumptions that army is, or should be, an external force. Fears of transnational terrorism, through external groups potentially carrying out hijackings or taking hostages on British soil, forced a strategic rethink about the army's internal role. The crux of the issue was that terrorism was a very different threat to that posed by unruly citizens. Thus, in the face of a militarised threat from foreign terrorist organisations operating within Britain, was the cultural aversion to the military acting internally still applicable?

The next chapter is focused on the British response to the threat from terrorism in order to examine this interplay between cultural preferences and strategic behaviours in more detail. It examines the institutional development of Britain's approach to counter-terrorism through the use of the special forces and the formalisation of the army's role under MACP. As noted, terrorism constitutes a very different threat to riot and protest and has led to the creation of different structures. The chapter examines this by looking at rhetorical responses to significant events such as Operation Marmion at Heathrow in 1974 and the Iranian embassy siege in 1980. This approach helps ascertain whether a new and substantively different threat has prompted a new response that was less guided by Britain's historically received cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces internally. Finally, Islamist terrorism post-2001 constituted a different type of threat that was more destructive and larger in scale. The British approach, between 2001 and 2005 is reviewed before turning to the responses of policymakers to Operation Temperer. The core question: is there still evidence of enduring cultural constraint, or does Temperer seem to represent a fundamental strategic shift in the face of a substantively different threat? It then analyses modern army recruitment campaigns to reinforce the findings in the rhetoric.

## **Chapter 5 – The British Army and domestic counter-terrorism operations**

*‘Yes, go in.’*

The words spoken by Margaret Thatcher to William Whitelaw authorising the use of the SAS in the Iranian Embassy Siege, 5<sup>th</sup> May 1980

### **5.1. The impact of the 1972 Munich Olympics attack**

The British preference for the army to fulfil predominantly external duties was a reflection of the fact that for most of the twentieth century, the army was engaged in operations and conflicts abroad rather than on active duty at home. Indeed, as chart 1 illustrated, there were no active domestic duties for the British army for fifty-five years between 1919 and 1974 while, over the same period, the British army fought abroad in around thirty-five conflicts and wars of varying scales and intensities.<sup>357</sup> This, coupled with the absence of serious domestic threats and the extreme reluctance, derived from past experiences such as Peterloo, to use the military against rioters and protesters entrenched the expectation that the army is an external force.

However, during the 1970s, a serious threat from transnational terrorism began to develop. In Munich, on 5 September 1972, members of the terrorist organisation Black September, a faction associated with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, broke into the athlete’s village armed with assault rifles, pistols, and grenades. They entered the Israeli apartments and, after some resistance during which two of the Israeli team were shot and killed, exited the apartment with nine hostages. During negotiations, Black September demanded the release of 234 Palestinians who were being held captive in Israel as well as the release of the founders of the far-left German terrorist organisation the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF), Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhoff.

Authorities were quickly alerted to the hostage situation as several Israeli athletes had managed to escape the apartments (one by jumping from the second-story balcony). Hours of tense negotiations between the German authorities and the hostage takers began, but it

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<sup>357</sup> Operation Banner in Northern Ireland is included in this total.

quickly became apparent that the German police were woefully inexperienced in dealing with a terrorist threat of this nature. The first armed response unit to attend the scene were members of the border police rather than regular police. They took up positions on the roof after devising a plan to descend through the ventilation shaft. However, an ineffective cordon around the building with the hostages inside meant that television crews had been filming the whole incident and the team on the roof was exposed immediately. Eventually, negotiators were pressured into moving the hostage takers to the airport where a Boeing 727 was waiting to fly them to Cairo. The police had devised a plan to plant sixteen of their men on the aircraft dressed as stewards, however, just a few minutes before the hostage takers were due to arrive, undercover police decided to abandon what they believed would be a suicide mission and left the plane without informing their central command. It was at the airport that chaos ensued after another botched attempt to rescue the hostages; five snipers had been positioned at the airport; they had been selected for this duty based on the fact that they shot competitively at weekends and, at the inquest after the event, one of the snipers identified as No.2, stated that 'In my opinion, I am not a sharpshooter.'<sup>358</sup> Furthermore, their rifles were not even fixed with scopes or night sights and the lighting on the tarmac was poor. As firing broke out, a German police officer and two of the kidnappers were killed. Less than an hour later, with the arrival of armoured vehicles, the hostage-takers opened fire on the hostages. In total seventeen people lost their lives as a result of the attack: six of the Israeli coaches, five of the athletes, one policeman, and five Black September members.

The 1960s had seen a rise in the number of hijackings of commercial flights, but most of these were for monetary gain. According to J. Paul de B. Tailon, the hijacking of El Al flight 426 from London to Tel Aviv by three armed pro-Palestinians marked the point at which 'the character of the hijacking phenomenon took a dramatic and qualitative change'. According to Tailon this is when politically-motivated hijackings became the norm.<sup>359</sup> Similar incidents such as the Dawson's Fields hijackings in 1970 when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked four flights bound for London and New York on the same day should have been a warning sign as to the potential nature of the threat. Nevertheless, the audacity of carrying out such an attack on western soil and the debacle that was the attempted rescue mission exposed a serious weakness in the western approach to terrorism. Former Munich police chief Manfred Schreiber summarised the German

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<sup>358</sup> Gracie, Francie. Munich Massacre Remembered, *CBS News*, 5 September 2002. See: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/munich-massacre-remembered/> (accessed 01/09/2018)

<sup>359</sup> Tailon, J. Paul de B.. *Hijacking and Hostages, Government Responses to Terrorism*. (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), pp. 17-18

authorities' unpreparedness in an interview in 1996, stating that '[w]e were trained for everyday offenses, to be close to the people, unarmed - but not for an action against paramilitary-trained terrorists.'<sup>360</sup> After the massacre, the complacency of this passive approach was exposed and policy makers were awakened, not just in Germany, but also in Britain and France, to the need for dedicated counter-terrorist units that were able to operate domestically and respond effectively to any attacks of this nature that may occur on their soil.

### 5.1.2. Western Responses

In Germany, the response was the formation of Europe's first counter-terrorist unit *Grenzschutzgruppe 9*, commonly referred to as GSG9, by Colonel Ulrich Wegener.<sup>361</sup> Wegener had been the *Bundesgrenzschutz*'s liaison officer to the German Interior Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, at the time. He had witnessed first-hand the events of Munich and had expressed his extreme dissatisfaction with the planning and execution of the failed rescue operation.<sup>362</sup> Wegener began by visiting the West German archives to research Germany's historical experience of special operations during the Second World War and drew his inspiration from raids such as the capture of fort Eben Emael in May 1940 and the rescue of Benito Mussolini in September 1943.<sup>363</sup> The lack of security at the games was a choice made by German authorities based on historical experience, but the massacre exposed quite clearly the weakness in the Germany's culture of restraint. GSG9's formation was a response to that, however, the fact that control is federal and police-based is illustrative of Germany's strategic culture: if force is to be used domestically, it should not be military force and must be under the control of the civil power; thus, GSG9 operate under the jurisdiction of the *Bundespolizei* (Federal police). Perhaps their most famous operation occurred in Somalia in October 1977 when they freed 86 passengers that had been held hostage by four Palestinians on Lufthansa flight 181.

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<sup>360</sup> 1972 Munich Olympics massacre - an avoidable catastrophe? *Deutsche Welle*, 7 September 2017. See: <https://www.dw.com/en/1972-munich-olympics-massacre-an-avoidable-catastrophe/a-40405813> (accessed 04/01/2018)

<sup>361</sup> Germany already had eight *Grenzschutzgruppen*, Wegener decided that GSG "9" would be the logical continuation.

<sup>362</sup> Reeve, Simon. *One Day in September*. (New York: Faber & Faber, 2000), p. 112

<sup>363</sup> Tailon, J. Paul de B. *Hijacking and Hostages, Government Responses to Terrorism* (Westport, Connecticut; Praeger, 2002), p. 118



In 1973, France followed suit by creating the *Groupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale*, or GIGN. It was initially named Équipe commando régionale d'intervention, the 'regional' component of the original name was intended to reflect its domestic counter-terrorist duties. Lieutenant Christian Prouteau, the hardened commando who at that stage was employed as an instructor for *Gendarmes*, was selected as the leader of this new unit. It became fully operational in March 1974 and carried out its first mission on French soil just ten days later when they were called to a flat to deal with an armed man who had shot and killed his family. Unlike their German counterparts, the GIGN were placed under the control of the military meaning they could be used in external as well as internal operations. In fact, other than their liberation of over two hundred passengers onboard an Air France aircraft in 1995, some of the GIGN's most famous missions have been abroad rather than on the national territory; for example, in Somalia in 1976, in Saudi Arabia in 1979, and several missions that were carried out in Bosnia during the 1990s. The GIGN are particularly specialised in missions relating to aircraft or ship hijacking, chemical, biological, or nuclear attack, or the hostage-taking of French nationals abroad. They will also be called in for instances of domestic terrorism that occur in rural areas (RAID are their urban counterparts and will deal with attacks in cities). Most recently, the GIGN were involved in the operation to raid a printing house where the brothers responsible for the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks had barricaded themselves.

In Britain, the response was to formalise the state's response to a potential attack and order a shift in the training and operational focus of the Special Air Service (SAS), the country's elite forces, towards counter-terrorism.<sup>364</sup> Prior to 1972, a potential role in contributing to domestic counter-terrorism operations was not on the radar of the special forces; the Land Operations Manual of 1969 outlines the duties that were expected of the SAS, but none mention supporting the civil power in dealing with terrorist incidents. Instead, its focus is external duties given that 'SAS squadrons are particularly suited, trained and equipped for counter-revolutionary operations'.<sup>365</sup> Security strategies in the 1960s also reflect the emphasis on more conventional threats while terrorism barely features as even a peripheral concern. For example, the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966 (also known as the Healey Review) states that it is a priority to 'decide in broad terms what sort of role Britain

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<sup>364</sup> The Special Boat Service (SBS) were also requested to adapt their training. The SBS shot to international fame after the Iranian Embassy Siege and therefore there is volumes of material on their history and operational procedures. By contrast, the SBS has remained largely in the shadows. Due to a lack of source material, this section focuses on the role of the SAS.

<sup>365</sup> British Army Field Manuals and Doctrine Publications, GB 0099 KCLMA British Army Field Manuals, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London, 1969, Part 2: internal security'

should play in the world in ten years' time, and what part its military forces should play in supporting that role.' It envisages that Britain's long-term military strategy will encompass strengthening Britain's contribution to the United Nations and its peacekeeping operations in countries such as Cyprus, building military cooperation with allies through NATO for the defence of Europe, and potential overseas operations in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Far East and South East Asia. However, it makes no mention of terrorism and states 'Outside Europe a direct threat to our survival at first sight seems less likely.'<sup>366</sup> Thus, it recommended directing resources towards countering conventional threats such as the USSR and developing nuclear deterrence capabilities through NATO.

In the early 1970s, but before the attack on Munich, some of the more astute members of government began to make suggestions that terrorism should be, if not prioritised, then certainly mentioned in the government's security strategy. Lieutenant Colonel Colin Mitchell, who briefly served as a Member of Parliament for Aberdeenshire, stated that he was 'surprised, and disquieted, that the subject of urban terrorism is not even mentioned in the White Paper. Nor is it included in the list of higher defence studies to which the White Paper draws attention in its penultimate chapter.'<sup>367</sup> However, it was not until the next major national security assessment, the Statement on the Defence Estimates in March 1975 (also referred to as the Mason Review of 1974-75) that a clear shift in emphasis is evident. Terrorism is listed here for the first time as a key strategic concern and, furthermore, the Defence Estimates refer to the growing role that the army is playing in the maintenance of internal security. It states: 'Army units have been deployed from time to time to Heathrow Airport, to support the Metropolitan Police in counter-terrorist preventive operations. In November 1974, the Army practised similar procedures for Gatwick Airport, with the Surrey and Sussex Police Forces.'<sup>368</sup> The Mason Review indicates that by the mid-1970s an overt military contribution to counter-terrorism had been built into the British security architecture. These developments were all in public eye, however, behind the scenes on Whitehall, the attack in Munich had kick-started the process of devising a strategy that would incorporate covert forces into the nation's response to an act of terrorism.

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<sup>366</sup> Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966: Part I The Defence Review, Cm 2901, February 1966

<sup>367</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Colin Mitchell, Hansard Archives, "Defence", 01 March 1971, Volume 812, Column 1276

<sup>368</sup> Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, Cm 5976, March 1975, BRITISH FORCES: OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATIONS, Chapter III, p.19 ; N.B. the incidents mentioned here are not coded in chart 1 as they were for training purposes rather than active CT deployments.

### 5.1.3. The SAS and Counter-terrorism

The SAS are an elite unit of the British armed forces that was formed during the Second World War by ‘the Phantom Major’,<sup>369</sup> David Stirling. Stirling believed there could be great utility in deploying a small, highly-skilled unit behind enemy lines to conduct covert operations such as intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, assassination, and sabotage. The SAS distinguished itself on multiple occasions during campaigns in North Africa and in Europe, famously executing sabotage raids on seven airfields simultaneously from Benghazi to Crete destroying dozens of *Luftwaffe* fighters and bombers.<sup>370</sup> After the war, the relevant military authorities decided there was no longer a role for a unit of this nature and it was disbanded on 8 October 1945. However, the unit’s absence from Britain’s formal military roster was short-lived and by 1 January 1947 the SAS had been reinstated as part of Britain’s Territorial Army. The elite group known as the Artists (sic) Rifles (formed in 1890) were re-branded as 21 SAS Squadron and went on to play a major role in the Malayan Emergency the following year.

Before the attack at the Munich Olympics, the SAS’s role was solely external; they were active in operations in Malaya, Borneo, Aden, and the ongoing campaign in Northern Ireland.<sup>371</sup> Although they had a great deal of experience in dealing with counter-insurgency, there was no formal counter-terrorism wing of the regiment as policymakers and military personnel perceived the threat posed to mainland Britain by terrorists to be minimal.<sup>372</sup> However, members of the regiment had watched the attack in Munich unfold with a more critical eye; Lt. Colonel Peter de la Billière, the Commanding Officer of the SAS, had commissioned one of his trusted colleagues, Captain Andrew Massey to draft a proposal for the establishment of a counter-terrorist unit within the SAS.<sup>373</sup> It therefore came as no surprise when, on 8 September 1972, he received a phone call from the Director of Military Operations, Major-General Bill Scotter who had been asked by Edward Heath whether there

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<sup>369</sup> A nickname given to Stirling by Erwin Rommel

<sup>370</sup> Macintyre, Ben. *SAS: Rogue Heroes, the authorized wartime history*. (London: Penguin Random House, 2016), pp. 116-129

<sup>371</sup> Their role in ‘The Troubles’ continues to this day to be a great source of controversy. See the ‘Stakeknife’ scandal: Stakeknife: Top British spy 'helped SAS kill IRA men', BBC, 01/10/2019. See: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-49895529> (accessed 01/10/2019)

<sup>372</sup> Stevenson, Jonathan. ‘The Role of the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom in Securing the State Against Terrorism’ *Connections*, Fall 2005, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 122

<sup>373</sup> GEN129(73)7, *Counter-Terrorist Tactics*, 20 Feb. 1973, CAB130/636(NAUK). Massey, *Munich Massacre*, CAB130/616(NAUK).

was any room for a counter-terrorist unit with the SAS. De la Billière replied that he could have the unit up and running in just five weeks.<sup>374</sup>

In 1971 a member of parliament Lt. Colonel Colin Mitchell had pressed in Parliament for the creation of ‘permanent forces for counter-revolutionary warfare within the United Kingdom.’<sup>375</sup> As a former military man, he may have had insider knowledge of the fact that the SAS had already set up such a unit which, by strange coincidence, it named the Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) wing. It was the CRW that was to form the foundation of the SAS’s counter-terrorist unit. Under the codename *Pagoda*, the Special Projects Team was formed. Massey selected twenty suitable candidates who were to be garrisoned in a separate wing on Bradbury Lines and would be kept on a constant state of alert. The focus of this team would be on honing their ability to deal with hostage-taking, hijacking, and other unconventional threats. One of the key focuses of training would be forceful entry into a building (grimly referred to as the ‘Killing House’) during a hostage situation using live ammunition. In De la Billière’s words, the idea was to ‘instil so much precision and drill into them that in emergencies the chances of emotion and fear influencing their judgement was reduced to a minimum.’<sup>376</sup>

It was essential to policy makers in Whitehall that Britain would not be caught unawares to the same extent that Germany had been. They provided the Special Projects team with an open-ended budget for training and commissioned scientists and researchers at Porton Down (The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory – DSTL) to develop the technology to give the SAS the edge in a fight. DSTL set to work on developing a special calibre of ammunition that would provide the same stopping power as a regular round, but would not compromise the safety of any hostages. They also created the famous ‘flashbang’, a mainstay of the arsenal of the SAS and many other special forces units around the world. It combines magnesium or aluminium filings with potassium nitrate to create a non-lethal, but blindingly bright blast to temporarily disorient the enemy.<sup>377</sup>

The unit was ready and in Whitehall policy makers were busy formalising the doctrine for control mechanisms that would allow for the use of the SAS in the event of an act of terrorism on British soil. In October 1972, one month after the attack in Munich, the British

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<sup>374</sup> Asher, Michael. *The Regiment: The real story of the SAS*. (London: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 420-421

<sup>375</sup> Mitchell, Lieutenant Colonel Colin. ‘Defence’, *Hansard Archives*, 1 March 1971, vol. 812, col. 1276

<sup>376</sup> Asher, Michael. *The Regiment: The real story of the SAS*. (London: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 420-421

<sup>377</sup> Semi-structured interview with Nicholas Taylor, Principal Analyst at the MoD’s DSTL. London: 18 February 2017

government formed the Cabinet Working Group on Terrorist Activities. The Home Office chaired the Working Group which included representatives from government departments such as MI5, the MoD, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Metropolitan Police force. Its purpose was to

assess the threat of terrorist activities in Great Britain; indicate the precautions that can be taken; describe existing contingency plans and the ways in which they might be expanded; and make suggestions on the machinery for consultation in the event of a terrorist incident.<sup>378</sup>

The Working Group formalised what the British government considered to be an appropriate procedural response to a potential attack. First, a Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) meeting would be convened. A specific room of the Cabinet Office was converted into a dedicated control centre to allow senior civil and military authorities to communicate and plan during a time of national emergency.<sup>379</sup> During a COBR meeting, if requested by the relevant civil authority (Police Commissioner, Home Secretary) Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) could be invoked allowing for the deployment of the armed forces including, if necessary, the use of the special forces.

#### **5.1.4. Precedents for MACP**

##### **Military Aid to the Civil Authority**

Since 1829 and the implementation of Robert Peel's Metropolitan Police Act, the police have held prime jurisdiction for matters of internal security. The concept of minimum force is a cornerstone of the Britain's internal strategic culture in order to prevent the recurrence of incidents such as the Peterloo massacre. However, throughout history there have been times when the civil power has been unable to contain or manage a threat; this is not necessarily just violent threats (such as terrorism), but also encompasses the threat of natural disaster, strikes or assistance in 'maintaining supplies and services essential to the life, health and safety of the community'.<sup>380</sup> In cases such as these, the civil authority may

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<sup>378</sup> Draft report by the Cabinet Working Group on Terrorist Activities, CAB 130/616, Public Records Office (PRO), London, p.17

<sup>379</sup> The 2015 film *Eye in the Sky* is an interesting example of the nature of interoperability and civil control in Britain's emergency decision making. It takes place during a COBR meeting where a Lieutenant General, the District Attorney, two MPs and an under-secretary discuss the legality of carrying out a drone strike in Kenya.

<sup>380</sup> Defence Contribution to UK National Security and Resilience. House of Commons. Defence Committee. Sixth Report of Session 2008-09, p.11

request assistance from the military. In Britain, requests of this nature fall under the blanket term Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA). In all instances, in order for the use of the military to be approved, all of the following four criteria *must* be met:

1. 'There is a definite need to act and the tasks the armed forces are being asked to perform are clear.
2. other options, including mutual aid and commercial alternatives, have been discounted; and either
3. the civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or
4. the civil authority has all or some capability, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from MOD.'<sup>381</sup>

MACA is then subdivided into four categories: 1) Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD); this includes the use of the military in the event of striking civil service personnel or stretched resources that may endanger the lives of people in the community. 2) Training and Logistic Assistance to the Civil Power (TLAC); this encompasses joint exercises between police and military or, given the specialist capabilities of the military, specific training or support. 3) Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC); this is an unarmed duty that often involves military assistance in disaster relief. 4) Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP); this is by far the most 'active' of the provisions under MACA and involves the use of the military to restore law and order or public safety. It was defined in 2005 by the Ministry of Defence as 'the provision of military assistance (armed if appropriate) to the Civil Power in its maintenance of law, order and public safety, using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations beyond the capability of the Civil Power.'<sup>382</sup> It is MACP that was invoked prior to the Iranian Embassy Siege by the SAS in 1980.

It should be noted that although MACP was formally developed in the 1970s, there is considerable historical precedent for the use of the military in aid of the civil power arguably

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<sup>381</sup> 2015 to 2020 government policy: Military Aid to the Civil Authorities for activities in the UK, *Ministry of Defence*, Policy Paper, 4 August 2016, Section entitled "Military Aid to the Civil Authorities"

<sup>382</sup> Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience, Joint Doctrine Publication 02, Second Edition, September 2007. See: <http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/jdp02ed2.pdf> (accessed 22/08/2017)

since the events of the English Civil War.<sup>383</sup> However, the concept can be more formally traced to the nineteenth century. A parliamentary select committee in 1908 believed its origins to be from 13 June 1867 when the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Colonel the Earl of Longford, issued Volunteer Circular 31. This stipulated that ‘the Civil Power may require His Majesty’s ‘subjects generally, including members of the Volunteers (Territorial Force) to arm themselves with and use other weapons suitable to the occasion’.<sup>384</sup> However, there is evidence of a system of subordination to the civil power before this point as demonstrated during the riot and protest chapter. To give a brief example, Fox Maule stated in 1850 that ‘If the Yeomanry are wanted in aid of the civil power, the Secretary of State is the sole judge by whom they should be called out.’<sup>385</sup>

Arguably the first time it was invoked in a counter-terrorist context was in 1911 during the Siege of Sidney Street. Here, two members of a Latvian anarchist gang had barricaded themselves inside a room at 100 Sidney Street in Stepney armed with two 1896 (C96) Mauser pistols and a 7.65mm Browning pistol.<sup>386</sup> By contrast, the police force that had gathered outside were armed with Webley .450 revolvers that had been supplied to the force in 1884. Mike Waldren of the Police Firearms Officers Association writes that ‘By 1911 there were two revolvers kept at each police station although reports in 1909 and again in 1910 had suggested that they were no longer fit for purpose’.<sup>387</sup> This meant that the police found themselves totally outgunned and resorted to requesting the assistance of the Scots Guards who were stationed at the Tower of London. The Home Secretary at the time was Winston Churchill and, in a remarkable video of the event captured by British Pathé, can be seen watching the events unfold.<sup>388</sup> It was not to be the first time that Churchill would be involved in the use of military force domestically and in August of 1911 he was questioned in Parliament on the subject of the employment of the military. His response was in keeping with the principal of MACP: ‘the rule undoubtedly which we have usually followed has been that soldiers should be sent in aid of the civil power when they have been advised by the local authority.’<sup>389</sup>

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<sup>383</sup> Wigg, George. ‘Heathrow Exercise: Use Of Armed Forces’, *Hansard Archives*, 16 January 1974, vol. 348, col. 1037

<sup>384</sup> (EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES: Aid to Civil Power (Code 53(B)): Use of Territorial Force in aid of civil power – 1908), National Archives at Kew

<sup>385</sup> Saville, John. *1848: The British States and the Chartist Movement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 239

<sup>386</sup> Waldren, Mike. ‘The Siege of Sidney Street’, *Police Firearms Officers Association*, July 2013, p. 9

<sup>387</sup> Ibid. p. 4

<sup>388</sup> London – Sidney Street Siege (1911), British Pathé, See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0wPKpAVDGE> (accessed 14/01/2018)

<sup>389</sup> Churchill, Winston. Employment Of Military, *Hansard Archives*, 22 August 1911, vol. 29, col. 2285

MACP was also invoked for the campaign in Northern Ireland for the use of the armed forces in support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Operation Banner). However, the attack in Munich was a different beast to the insurgency campaigns that Britain was used to. Hostage taking was not the *modus operandi* of the IRA and sieges or hostage situations were usually the result of a last act of desperation rather than an intentional strategy by the perpetrators. For example, the Balcombe street siege involving members of the Provisional IRA in 1975 (which was effectively dealt with by the civil power) came about as the result of a chase through London.<sup>390</sup>

The potential nature of an act of transnational terrorism on British soil necessitated a slightly unconventional approach and, as a result, from the early 1970s, the British special forces were integrated into the provisions of MACP. However, the crucial aspect of MACP is to retain ultimate civil control over the military so as not to contravene Britain's norms and values. As the ex-SAS trooper Michael Asher writes, 'the police would retain primacy in any terrorist situation, and the SAS couldn't be called in unless the chief police officer on the ground requested their assistance directly from the Home Secretary.'<sup>391</sup>

These mechanisms still form the basis of Britain's contemporary response to an emergency situation and would be followed on 5 May 1980 when terrorists inside the Iranian Embassy executed one of the hostages, Abbas Lavasani. The Police Commissioner at the time, David McNee was resigned to the fact that was no longer a peaceable solution to the situation and, recognising that his police officers did not possess the requisite capabilities to resolve the siege, requested military assistance from the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw.

#### **5.1.5. The rhetorical response to the Iranian Embassy Siege**

Whitelaw had been chairing a COBR meeting when the message from McNee came through and he immediately telephoned the prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. Whitelaw outlined the situation and that the assistance of the SAS had been requested; Thatcher's response was simply, 'Yes, go in.' An initial scenario plan presented by the Cabinet Minister Robert

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<sup>390</sup> The Balcombe Street Siege was the first time that the COBR command control system was used. See: Omand, David. *Securing the State*. (London: Hurst & Co., 2010), p. 61

<sup>391</sup> Asher, Michael. *The Regiment: The real story of the SAS*. (London: Penguin Books, 2008), p. 423



Wade-Grey had estimated that ‘casualties may be very heavy’<sup>392</sup> if the SAS were to assault the Embassy while the SAS’s own estimates presented on 2 May indicated a 60% chance of getting the hostages out alive.<sup>393</sup> Despite these pessimistic assessments, the operation (codenamed Operation NIMROD) was a resounding success; just one hostage was killed during the assault and five of the six terrorists were killed.

The success of the assault on the Iranian Embassy propelled the once-shadowy SAS to international fame. Over the coming weeks, debriefs and debates in the Houses of Parliament saw myriad jingoistic declarations that the assault had restored the pride in being British again. Margaret Thatcher’s aim was to send a strong signal to the world that Britain’s response to acts of terrorism would be decisive and forceful. It was imperative that a situation like that seen in Munich did not occur on British soil. However, it was seen to be equally important that British values were not contravened. This is reflected in the language used by those politicians involved in organising the assault. For example, extracts from William Whitelaw’s statement post-SAS assault revealed the primacy of the civil power in the initial stages of the operation and in authorising the eventual use of the special forces. He stated that:

From the start of the siege, the gunmen regularly threatened to kill hostages if demands were not met. As soon as it became clear that they had begun to carry out those threats, I authorised, at the [Police] Commissioner's request, the commitment of the SAS ... What pleases me about this operation is that we brought it to a successful conclusion while, at the same time, preserving the highest standards of the British police service and demonstrating that we have a community police service in this country.<sup>394</sup>

Whitelaw’s statement illustrates how important the norms and values of the state are even when resorting to the use of force. He also reveals in his statement another core component of Britain’s approach to the use of the armed forces domestically: that it should only be employed as a last resort. He states: ‘I regret that it proved necessary to resort to the use of force, but there was in the end no alternative.’ This adherence to civil control was lauded in Parliament. In a rare cross-party agreement, Merlyn Rees of the Labour Party declared ‘we [the Labour Party] believe that he was right to bring in the SAS at an early stage, just in case

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
<sup>392</sup> SECURITY. Seizure of Iranian Embassy in South Kensington and the taking of hostages, ‘Incident at the Iranian Embassy’, *National Archives*, Ref. PREM 19/1137

<sup>393</sup> SECURITY. Seizure of Iranian Embassy in South Kensington and the taking of hostages, ‘Home Secretary’, *National Archives*, Ref. PREM 19/1137, BO5946

<sup>394</sup> Home Secretary William Whitelaw, *Hansard Archives*, Iranian Embassy, London, 6 May 1980, vol. 984, col. 28

they needed to be used.’<sup>395</sup> Indeed, evidence from the National Archives even reveals that the British government took every measure to try and prevent the use of force. Their ‘best outcome’ to the situation was ‘terrorists surrender’ while ‘emergency shoot-out’ involving the SAS was listed as the worst outcome. Furthermore, there was the suggestion in a secret memo, dated 2 May 1980, that two hostage fatalities could be the threshold for the use of the SAS rather than one.<sup>396</sup>

**Chart 5: Reactions to the use of the SAS during the Iranian Embassy Siege**



Sources: *National Archives, Hansard*<sup>397</sup>

Chart 5 is a collation of the responses to the assault from 6 May 1980 to the same date in 1981 in order to allow twelve months for the dust to settle. It shows that the overwhelming response to Operation NIMROD was positive with most people declaring that the operation was necessary given the nature of the threat and the specialist capabilities that the SAS possess. No references to positive historical precedent were found, but neither were any expected to be since this was the first overt invocation of MACP in the era since the First World War and had involved a unit that most policymakers had no prior knowledge of.

<sup>395</sup> Rees, Merlyn. *Hansard Archives*, Iranian Embassy, London, 6 May 1980, vol. 984, col. 29

<sup>396</sup> SECURITY. Seizure of Iranian Embassy in South Kensington and the taking of hostages, ‘Incident at the Iranian Embassy’, *National Archives*, Ref. PREM 19/1137

<sup>397</sup> Full sources listed in bibliography.

Neither were any references to a reassuring presence found. Again, this is unsurprising. The SAS had in fact been preparing for an assault since the first day of the siege, but no members of the public were aware of their presence. Thus, no-one could be re-assured. Just one negative response was found that seemed to indicate it constituted an inappropriate use of force: this was the Labour politician Dennis Canavan's question to the Attorney-General asking if 'immunity from prosecution, or any order for summary execution, [was] approved by either the Attorney-General or the Home Secretary in the case of the SAS raid on the Iranian embassy.'<sup>398</sup> This question was answered by Sir Hugh Fraser, a former member of the SAS who was decorated for his role in the Second World War. Fraser's response extolled the conduct of the civil power in these matters declaring that the government 'shows amazing scrupulosity in the discharge of the function of the State investigating all events pertaining to disaster or tragedy such as that which occurred at the Iranian embassy.'<sup>399</sup>

Here it is worth investigating why there seemed to be such widespread approval for the use of the army, despite the fact that it was the first time an active operation had taken place on the British mainland for over sixty years and what the rhetoric from the riot and protest revealed about general cultural aversion to the idea. Peterloo created a sense that the army should not be used on the national territory to counter a perceived threat posed by British citizens. The rhetoric post-General Strike and into the modern era with the Tottenham riots indicated how entrenched that view has become. However, post-Munich attack there emerged a new type of threat from foreign terrorist groups operating within Britain's territory. In a sense, it abrogated Lord Henry Horne's statement (quoted earlier) that 'we... never will defend the British Isles by fighting on our own soil.' The use of the armed forces was met with approval, and even pride, as it constituted an extension of the traditional role of the army: fighting external enemies.

Despite the widespread approval of Operation NIMROD, there are the same recurring themes in the 'neutral' columns in the middle that were seen in the riot and protest era and which indicate continuity in cultural preferences and also that any acceptance of the military on the national territory will usually come with caveats; notably the idea of subordination to the civil power and contingency or last resort. The SAS understood that they were not to interfere with developments and to allow the police negotiators to try and find a peaceful

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<sup>398</sup> Canavan, Dennis. Armed Forces (Criminal Proceedings), *Hansard Archives*, 9 February 1981, vol. 998, col. 599

<sup>399</sup> Hugh Fraser, Armed Forces (Criminal Proceedings), *Hansard Archives*, 09 February 1981, vol. 998, col. 599

solution. Their role would only commence upon approval from the relevant civil authorities (see the extracts from Whitelaw's statement above). Frequent references were made to the fact that the use of force was unfortunate, but necessary. For example, the British Conservative John Ganzoni expressed his belief that the operation had been an unfortunate necessity. He said to his peers in the House of Lords:

I should like from these Benches to express our congratulations to Her Majesty's Government and to all who have been concerned in this incident. Obviously we deplore—as do all Members of your Lordships' House—the fact that lives had to be lost. Nevertheless, that was a price which had to be paid.<sup>400</sup>

One of the most common themes in the statements was that of the use of force being last resort. As was explained in the explanation of MACP, this is one of the essential criteria for the approval for the deployment of the military. During a discussion in the House of Lords on the role of the army over six weeks after the siege, Lord Hayhoe stated:

It was the first time that troops had been used in that way, and the decision to deploy them was taken only after one of the hostages had been murdered in cold blood and his body thrown out of the embassy. Once that had happened, it was regrettably clear that the hoped-for peaceful resolution of the siege was not possible. The SAS had to be used as the only means of bringing the incident to an end with the minimum loss of life.<sup>401</sup>

Unsurprisingly, given the astonishing and unexpected success of the mission, praise for the courage and skill of the SAS was also commonly seen in the rhetoric and there were frequent references to the fact that the operation had restored a sense of pride in being British. For example, John Chilcot, then Under-Secretary for the Police Department, wrote to the Home Secretary declaring 'This is a proud moment for the country'<sup>402</sup> and Lord Chalfont wrote to the prime minister to say that 'it again means something to be a British citizen.'<sup>403</sup> Overwhelmingly, then, the response to the SAS's mission was positive.

One could make the argument that the role of the SAS is evidence of the fact that states respond according to the nature of the threat; the rising threat from pro-Palestinian terrorists

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<sup>400</sup> Ganzoni, John (Lord Belstead). 'The Iranian Embassy: Conclusion Of Incident', *Hansard Archives*, 06 May 1980, vol. 408, col. 1536

<sup>401</sup> Lord Hayhoe. 'The Army', *Hansard Archives*, 26 June 1980, vol. 987, col. 798

<sup>402</sup> Chilcot, John. Iranian Embassy Siege, *National Archives*, PREM 19/1137

<sup>403</sup> Lord Chalfont LETTER to prime minister Margaret Thatcher, 6 May 1980, National Archive PREM 19/1137

necessitated the creation of a dedicated counter terrorist organisation which was then used in a military operation on British soil. However, although a stimulus did indeed provoke a response, the nature of the response was determined by historically-derived cultural factors; the use of force is always as a last resort, proportionate to the threat and subordinate to the civil power (see the columns in the middle section of the chart). These values were even evident in the responses to Peterloo, an incident that happened 161 years before the embassy siege and for a completely different purpose. Thus, cultural preferences seem to have endured over time regardless of the threat faced with general acceptance of a putative deployment predicated on the adherence to the values of subordination to the civil power, last resort, and proportionality.

To illustrate this point, a comparison can be made between the response to Operation NIMROD and the rhetoric used by members of the House of Lords during a debate relating to a military deployment that had taken place at Heathrow airport in 1974 known as Operation MARMION. On 5 January 1974, 150 heavily-armed troops were deployed to Heathrow airport for a period of two weeks.<sup>404</sup> The event came as a shock to both members of the public and a number of people in government who had not been warned that a deployment was imminent. The operation led to some rather alarmist reporting in the national press. For example, the Daily Telegraph reported that ‘An Army machinegunner, lying concealed in a position on the western side, was asked what would happen if cars did not stop at the control point he was overlooking. The soldier, a veteran of Northern Ireland, replied grimly, “They'd stop”’.<sup>405</sup> The incident was even the subject of speculation that there was an imminent coup; this was the focus of a BBC documentary released in 2006 entitled *The Plot Against Harold Wilson*.<sup>406</sup>

The truth was that the British government had growing concerns over a number of attacks at airports such as the Pan AM Boeing flight 707 at Rome which left thirty people dead. Thus, they had covertly devised a contingency plan codenamed Operation MARMION for the use of the armed forces at airports. On this occasion, there were reports circulating in NATO intelligence that a number of SA-7 surface-to-air missiles had been stolen from Soviet stocks and might be used to take down a commercial airliner in a western country. This was

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<sup>404</sup> They were also deployed on three other occasions in 1974: in June, July and September. See: Hughes, Geraint. *The Military's Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies*. (Carlisle, PA: The Letort Papers, U.S. Army War College, May 2011), p. 91

<sup>405</sup> Daily Telegraph cited in House of Lords during debate on HEATHROW EXERCISE: USE OF ARMED FORCES, HL Deb 16 January 1974, vol. 348, col. 1039

<sup>406</sup> *The Plot Against Harold Wilson*. BBC Two England, 16 March 2006


obliquely confirmed in 1974 in the House of Lords when Viscount Mark Colville of Culross, a former Grenadier Guard, stated ‘the Government obtained some general information which ... indicated an increased threat to Heathrow which could not be ignored.’<sup>407</sup>

At the time, the information on the nature of this threat was deemed to be ‘on a need to know basis.’ The public and many politicians were in the dark over what was occurring. The British public were unaccustomed to the idea of seeing fully armed military forces deployed internally (see the lack of active deployments for over 50 years previously illustrated in chart 1) and so the presence of troops at Heathrow sparked a great deal of justifiable confusion and concern. Most of the alarm stemmed from the fact that the process of civil control over the use of the military appeared to have been bypassed since no public proclamation of a transfer of control to the military had occurred. This sense of unease is reflected in chart 5. It shows how the majority of the statements regarding the use of the armed forces at Heathrow are negative with peers raising their concerns that the act was provocative, in opposition to the values held dear by the state, an inappropriate use of force, and that lessons should have been learned from past experiences. Most of the responses related to the British system of military subordination to the civil power and that these protocols should have been followed.

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<sup>407</sup> Viscount Colville of Culross. ‘Heathrow Exercise: Use Of Armed Forces’, *Hansard Archives*, 16 January 1974, vol. 348, col. 1049

**Chart 6: Iranian Embassy Siege (1980) and Heathrow Deployment (1974), rhetoric compared**



*Sources: National Archives, Hansard*

It transpired that police had in fact requested assistance from the military. Viscount Colville stated:

...the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis...sought the Government's authority to put into operation the contingency plan for the use of police and troops to defend Heathrow against terrorist attack. This plan, which is one of a number of contingency plans against terrorism and which was drawn up by the police and the military with the Government's approval, has been in existence for some time.<sup>408</sup>

The question which presents itself based on the evidence in the chart is why is there such a difference in response given that both were military deployments under MACP for the

<sup>408</sup> Viscount Colville of Culross. 'Heathrow Exercise: Use Of Armed Forces', *Hansard Archives*, 16 January 1974, vol. 348, col. 1049

purposes of countering a threat from terrorism? The answer lies in the very first column of the chart; the Iranian Embassy Siege was deemed to be a justifiable and proportionate use of force, the use of troops at Heathrow was not. Furthermore, covert operations involving special forces are usually temporary or one-off. Therefore, as long as the civil control criteria are met, the general public are less averse to the idea.

The strength of feeling that the 1974 episode invoked was a clear indication of the deep-seated cultural aversion to the deployment of the military if the terms are not well established. In 2003, Tony Blair was to incur the wrath of the public in similar circumstances when, acting on intelligence provided by Sir David Omand, head of GCHQ at the time, that a surface-to-air missile could be used imminently against an airliner,<sup>409</sup> he took the decision to deploy 450 troops and several armoured vehicles to Heathrow. The Telegraph reported that ‘the decision to surround Heathrow with tanks was less to do with an imminent threat, and more about encouraging the growing number who are opposed to war with Iraq to support the Government's line.’<sup>410</sup>

Arguably, the events of 1974 laid the foundations for this kind of role for the military. I.e. in static guarding positions in order to free-up the police such as that seen during Operation Temperer. However, the lesson to be learned is to inform the public first if an operation of this nature is deemed necessary. The strength of feeling among the general public in opposition to the use of the armed forces *en masse* if cultural values are seemingly circumvented makes this a necessity.

### 5.1.6. Summary

This chapter has demonstrated how formative the growing threat of foreign terrorist organisations penetrating Britain's borders was to changing Britain's approach to the use of the armed forces internally. The attack in Munich demonstrated how under-prepared the west was for a brand of transnational terrorism that involved hijacking and hostage taking. As a result, terrorism began to feature more frequently in the security strategies of Britain and the SAS was tasked with creation of a dedicated counter-terrorist unit, the Special

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<sup>409</sup> Semi-structured interview with Sir David Omand (Former Director of GCHQ, 1996-1997) London, 12 December 2016

<sup>410</sup> Bamber, David; Craig, Olga; Elliott, Francis. ‘Blair sent in tanks after 'chilling' threat’, *The Telegraph*, 16 February 2003. See: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1422243/Blair-sent-in-tanks-after-chilling-threat.html> (accessed 13/09/2018)



Projects Team which would train extensively in dealing with acts of terrorism. Interestingly, the responses of Germany, France and Britain all appear to have derived from their cultural preferences for the use of force; Germany's creation of GSG9, a police unit under the exclusive control of the civil power reflects its aversion to the use of the military domestically - a legacy of the Second World War; France's creation of GIGN, a military unit, reflects its historically flexible distinction between external and internal security and the use of the armed forces. Meanwhile, the British decision to maintain a military special forces unit that would be available on an *ad hoc* basis provided the civil power authorises its involvement reflects the British cultural preference for last resort and civil control. Although each state did respond to the nature of the threat (in keeping with the realist perspective that states will behave rationally when faced with a threat), the nature of their response was directed by their strategic preferences for the use of force and this derives from their respective strategic cultures.

It was also during this era that the mechanisms for civil control over the armed forces were formalised through the creation of the COBR meeting and clarification of the terms of MACP. This era also saw the creation of contingency plans for the use of the armed forces in an overt, guarding capacity at key strategic locations; a plan that would be form the basis of Operation Temperer in 2015.

The chapter also examined the attitudes of policy makers to two key counter-terrorist operations; the Iranian Embassy Siege by the SAS (and the first formal invocation of MACP) in 1980 and the 1974 troop deployment to Heathrow. It found that the rhetoric demonstrated a general approval of the SAS mission in 1980 as a result of the strict adherence to Britain's concept of subordination to the civil power, proportionality, and last resort. Although there were no mentions of the short-term nature of the mission, this is another factor that is crucial to Britain's strategic culture; covert, counter-terrorist operations are usually temporary affairs (Operation NIMROD lasted just seventeen minutes), thus the potential to infringe upon the general public's civil liberties – a concern that is a legacy of the English Civil War that was also expressed in the responses to Peterloo, the General Strike, and the Tottenham riots – is limited.

It then drew a comparison with the rhetoric used during and after an operation to deter potential terrorists at Heathrow in 1974. It found that the response to this operation was overwhelmingly negative due to the fact that the process of subordination to the civil power and proportionality seemed to have been circumvented. The fears of fear of the public could

have been allayed through the provision of a little information and, as is argued in the following chapter, speeches prior to the implementation of Operation Temperer were carefully crafted to avoid any apprehension or misunderstanding from the public.

The rhetoric provides further evidence (following on from the findings from the riot and protest chapter) that British strategic culture displays both continuity and change. Subordination to the civil power, last resort and proportionality continue to be the cornerstone of the country's strategic response in spite of the fact that the threat of terrorism is entirely different to that of popular unrest. Here, historical experiences and cultural preferences regarding the use of force seem to be guiding the response rather than a more rational cost-benefit analysis approach. This is firmly in line with the hypothesis that Britain's strategic culture constrains its behaviour.

However, there is also change; cultural proclivities derived from the riot and protest era are certainly transferred to the counter-terrorism era, but they are not identical. 1980 saw the first active deployment of a military unit under MACP since the early twentieth century. If we refer back to the criteria for change, all of the conditions for lasting strategic change are met: there were strong institutions to implement a change (SAS), a leader willing to make the change (Thatcher), and through a growing threat of transnational terrorism and a type of operation that adhered to enduring cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces, a climate that was receptive to the shift. Once again, then, we observe the inter-related nature of the relationship between historical experiences, culture, and behaviour.

The next section is a continuation of the counter-terrorism era, but arguably represents a different phase in that it has seen overt deployments of regular troops *en masse* to counter a threat that is not just transnational in nature, but is also larger and more destructive in scale compared with the limited hijackings and hostage situations of the 1970s and into the 80s. Furthermore, the modern threat of Islamist terrorism includes a homegrown element. Thus, in a sense it is a hybrid of the riot and protest and 1970s counterterrorism eras; it connects the dots between the rejection of the use of the armed forces against British citizens that developed after Peterloo and the caveated acceptance of the use of specialist troops to counter a transnational terrorist threat from foreign groups. It builds on the arguments that have been presented in previous chapters by arguing that both continuity and change are still observable in Britain's response to the threat of radical Islamist terrorism post-2001. It will provide some of the context relating to effect of the 9/11 attack and 7/7 London bombings on Britain's security strategy, particularly the impact it had on the principle of minimum

force within the Police community. It will then move on to the escalating threat post-2015 and the decision to deploy troops under Operation Temperer. It will focus on the rhetoric used by policy makers and politicians to try and ascertain whether Temperer has adhered to same historically-received cultural values that have been examined in previous chapters, or whether the severity and nature of the threat has forced a more aberrant response. It will conclude by analysing modern British army recruitment campaigns to establish whether the broad cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces in Britain have also filtered into how the army represents itself to the public.

## 5.2. Britain's response to the threat of terrorism post-2001

*'Let no-one be in any doubt. The rules of the game are changing'*

**Tony Blair, "Prime minister's statement on anti-terror measures" delivered after 7/7**

**bombings 5th August 2005**

After the collapse of the USSR, there seemed to be a shift in how policymakers within states perceived threats; globalisation facilitated the free movement of people, capital, technology and ideas. Through the development of cross-border technology such as the internet and aerial networks traditional 'spheres of influence', and therefore threats, were completely restructured. There was a sense that 'old' large-scale wars, which were a function of the military-industrial complex of the Cold War era and before, had given way to 'new' or 'fourth-generation' conflicts characterized by small-scale local conflicts, war among the people, insurgency and counter-insurgency. Crucially, the prevailing belief was that states had lost their 'monopoly on the use of armed violence'<sup>411</sup> as non-state actors operating among the people began to dominate conflicts and concerns grew that threats emanating from abroad could infiltrate a state's borders and disrupt the internal security of the state.<sup>412</sup>

For example, in March 1996 during a debate in the House of Commons on the prevention and suppression of terrorism, the Conservative MP Sir Ivan Lawrence voiced his concern that '[a]s new nation states emerge and states become unstable, international terrorism may grow.'<sup>413</sup> Further, in eerily prescient fashion, his colleague, Andrew Hunter, spoke of how 'the jumbo jet is the most vulnerable element in modern society' and that 'international terrorism will be a permanent affliction.'<sup>414</sup> Thus, the idea of a transnational threat began to permeate political debate and security agendas.

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<sup>411</sup> Weber, Max. *Politics as a Vocation* in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Translated and edited) *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 77

<sup>412</sup> See for example: Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars*. (Polity Press, 1999); Ignatieff, Michael. *Virtual War. Kosovo and Beyond*. (London: Random House, 2000); Creveld, Martin van. *The Transformation of War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); Smith, Rupert. *The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World*. (London: Penguin Books, 2006)

<sup>413</sup> Lawrence, Ivan. 'Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism', *House of Commons, Hansard*, 14 March 1996, col. 1153

<sup>414</sup> Hunter, Andrew. 'Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism', *House of Commons, Hansard*, 14 March 1996, col. 1154

The fears of policymakers generally (and Andrew Hunter specifically) were realised on 11 September 2001 ('9/11') when nineteen hijackers took control of four American Airlines flights; two were flown into the two towers of the World Trade Centre, one into the Pentagon (headquarters of the CIA), and one (which was presumed to be intended for the White House) into a field in Pennsylvania after passengers managed to overpower the hijackers. Of the nineteen hijackers involved in the attack, fifteen were Saudi Arabian, two were Emirati, one was Lebanese, and one was Egyptian. Three of them had operated as part of the so-called Hamburg Cell in Germany and conspired, successfully, to attack the United States. The attacks created a sense among security experts and policymakers alike that a new threat was emerging – that of transnational radical Islam.<sup>415</sup> It was perceived to be substantively different to the waves of terrorism that had been endured in the past which wanted 'a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.'<sup>416</sup> However, Islamist terrorism was apparently fanatical, irrational, even suicidal in nature.<sup>417</sup>

In the United Kingdom, former Prime Minister Tony Blair gave a speech to the House of Commons which reflected this perception. He stated: 'Terrorism has taken on a new and frightening aspect. The people perpetrating it wear the ultimate badge of the fanatic: they are prepared to commit suicide in pursuit of their beliefs.'<sup>418</sup> Across the Atlantic, in the US, then President, George Bush Jr. outlined a similar message in his speech to Congress that would be a prelude to the militarisation of the threat via the infamous 'war on terror':

There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.<sup>419</sup>

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<sup>415</sup> Chin, Warren. *Britain and the War on Terror: Policy, Strategy, and Operations*. (Oxon: Routledge, 2016), p. 26

<sup>416</sup> Jenkins, Brian. 'Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?' (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1975), p. 4

<sup>417</sup> Here we should draw a distinction between rationality and reason. Suicide terrorism is arguably rational from the perspective of the collective terrorist organization attempting to achieve their overall strategic aim. Rational too if the individual believes wholeheartedly in their cause and the promise of paradise in the afterlife. Instead, it is unreasonable in that those on the receiving end of the attack are less likely to understand the perspective of the terrorist and are unable to deter them. See Robert Pape's excellent discussion on this issue in: Pape, Robert A. 'The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism', *American Political Science Review*, August 2003, vol. 97, no. 3, pp. 343-361

<sup>418</sup> Blair, Tony. *Full text of Blair's speech to the Commons*, 14 September 2001. See: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/sep/14/houseofcommons.uk1> (accessed 23/10/2017)

<sup>419</sup> Text of George Bush's Speech, State of the Union Address, *The Guardian*, 21 September 2001. See: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13> (accessed 4/11/2016)

### 5.2.1. Terrorism: Crime or Conflict? 2001-2005

Sir David Omand, the ex-Director of GCHQ, writes that despite the justified criticism of the term ‘war on terror’, its use did bring substantial gains through ‘disrupting terrorist training and infrastructure, capturing or killing leading AQ [Al Qaeda] figures, and gaining significant intelligence on AQ’s terrorist networks.’<sup>420</sup> The militarisation of the threat created a concerted western response that involved the coordination of both civil and military resources as well as unprecedented intelligence cooperation.<sup>421</sup>

Despite rallying around the term ‘war on terror’, from Britain’s perspective, terrorism was still firmly seen as a crime and therefore a problem for the police and intelligence services rather than the military. This was outlined in the Britain’s first counter-terrorism strategy after 9/11; in 2003, the Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) was implemented.<sup>422</sup> It outlined the severity of the threat as ‘serious and sustained’ and ‘not likely to diminish significantly for some years.’ It also introduced the four pillars that have remained central to the country’s approach to terrorism for the last fifteen years: ‘Pursue’ (reducing the terrorist threat to Britain and to Britain interests overseas by disrupting terrorists and their operations.); ‘Prevent’ (tackling the radicalisation of individuals); ‘Protect’ (reducing the vulnerability of Britain and British interests overseas.); ‘Prepare’ (ensuring that Britain is as ready as it can be for the consequences of a terrorist attack). It also outlined the primacy of the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS / MI6), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and the Police in matters related to countering the threat of terrorism.<sup>423</sup>

As was outlined in the previous section, through MACP, Britain maintains the capability to deploy the armed forces in an active capacity for the purposes of counter-terrorism and this early iteration of CONTEST does make a minor reference to this fact. It states: ‘The British Armed Forces contribute to UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, predominantly in PREVENT and PURSUE activities overseas and in specialised elements of PROTECT at home, in particular hostage recovery, maritime counter-terrorism, bomb disposal and the interception

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<sup>420</sup> Omand, David. *Securing the State*. (London: Hurst & co., 2010), p. 90

<sup>421</sup> See Snowden’s leaks. Particularly his assessment that NSA was ‘in bed with’ the German BND.

<sup>422</sup> The first publicly available version of CONTEST was released in 2006. It is therefore the 2006 version that will be referred to in this section.

<sup>423</sup> HM Government, *Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy*, July 2006, Cm 6888, pp. 1-16

of renegade aircraft.<sup>424</sup> At this stage, the military's role in domestic counter-terrorism could be classified as minimal and *ad hoc*.; for example, 'hostage recovery' is a role reserved for the SAS or Special Boat Service (SBS) who would be deployed only when the situation required it, rather than the round-the-clock police and intelligence-led PURSUE operations.

Despite the army's limited role in domestic operations, in February 2003, Blair received intelligence from the National Intelligence and Security Coordinator, Sir David Omand, that there was an imminent threat at Heathrow.<sup>425</sup> A captured Al Qaeda operative had revealed a plot to bring down an airliner with a surface-to-air missile. Omand told Blair that they had three options: do nothing, close Heathrow or 'trigger a full-scale security alert';<sup>426</sup> they both agreed that the only feasible option was the latter and, following a COBR meeting, Blair sanctioned the deployment of 450 troops of the Grenadier Guards and a number of Scimitar reconnaissance vehicles mounted with 30-mm cannons and 7.62-mm machine-guns to the airport. For some, it conjured up memories of the similar 1974 deployment and the backlash was equally as intense.

Geraint Hughes, a military historian and former member of the Territorial Army, makes the astute point that deterrence is the absence of an event and it is therefore often impossible to measure whether it works. At Heathrow, the public only saw heavily armed soldiers and no attack took place. It was therefore impossible to know if the would-be attackers had been deterred or whether the measures taken were disproportionate.<sup>427</sup> Thus, Blair faced fierce criticism for unnecessary scare-mongering and attempting to justify the decision to go to war in Iraq.<sup>428</sup> The militarisation of the threat was seen to be disproportionate and out of step with the principles of minimum force and last resort and, as such, unacceptable for a liberal democracy such as Britain. The backlash faced by Blair is strong evidence of the constraining effect that can be exerted by culture. Britain's norms of proportionality and last

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<sup>424</sup> HM Government, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy, July 2006, Cm 6888, p. 28

<sup>425</sup> Omand, David. Semi-structured interview by Jack Harding, London, 1 July 2017

<sup>426</sup> Gardner, Frank. *Blood and Sand: Life, Death and Survival in an Age of Global Terror*. (London: Bantam Books, 2006), pp. 303-304

<sup>427</sup> Geraint Hughes, *The Military's Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies* (Carlisle: US Army War College, The LeTort Papers, 2011) p.90 See also: Michael Howard's assertion that 'we have become rather expert at deterrence': Michael Howard, "Lessons of the Cold War", *Survival*, 36, no. 4, (Winter 1994-95) p. 161 and Colin Gray's response to that 'unprovable assertion' in Gray, Colin S. Maintaining Effective Deterrence, *Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College*, August 2003, p.2

<sup>428</sup> See: 'I think probably the authorities feel that they should build up emotions – what I call the 'war spirit'', Dr. Zaki Badawi, The Muslim College

resort have been ingrained through the interpretation of past experiences and attempts to contravene those norms are soon corrected by the strength of public feeling.<sup>429</sup>

This is not to say that Blair or Omand were incorrect about the severity of the threat; tragically, events the following year underscored how serious the threat from radical Islam truly was. In 2004, Madrid was rocked by a series of explosions on four commuter trains killing 192 individuals for which Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility. Then, in July 2005, Britain experienced the deadliest terrorist attack on its soil to date.<sup>430</sup> Four British nationals loyal to Al-Qaeda (Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Jermaine Lindsay, and Hasib Hussain) carried out a series of suicide bombings in central London. Their intended targets were civilians using the London underground during the morning rush hour. At 08:50 Khan, Tanweer and Lindsay detonated their bombs within sixty seconds of each other on three separate trains on the London Underground. Hussain's train was delayed and he decided instead to exit the Underground and find a double-decker bus. At 09:47 he boarded a bus in Tavistock Square and detonated his bomb on the top deck. As well as the suicide bombers, fifty-six people were killed and around 700 more were injured.<sup>431</sup>

After the attack, the former Prime Minister Tony Blair stated of the threat from terrorism: 'Let no-one be in any doubt. The rules of the game are changing'.<sup>432</sup> Yet, Blair stopped short of making comparisons with overt military conflict as his American counterpart George Bush Jr. had done and, ten years later after the November 2001 Paris attacks, as Valls and Hollande would do (*'nous sommes en guerre'*). Public discussions for the deployment of the military did not take place, although the possibility of putting armed marshals on trains was mooted. Instead, following a COBR briefing, it was decided that the civil power, specifically the police and intelligence services, had the capabilities to deal with the aftermath. The military did contribute through Training and Logistic Assistance to the Civil Power

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<sup>429</sup> See Durkheim's argument about the externally constraining force of culture that 'corrects' deviations from a norm. Durkheim, Emile. *The Rules of the Sociological Method*. (New York, The Free Press, 1895/1964), p. 3

<sup>430</sup> Technically, 9/11 was the deadliest attack in terms of the number of British lives lost.

<sup>431</sup> Hewitt, Steven. *The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-terrorism on the Home Front Since 9/11*. (London: Continuum Books, 2008), p. 50

<sup>432</sup> Tony Blair, "Full text: Prime minister's statement on anti-terror measures", 5<sup>th</sup> August 2005: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/aug/05/uksecurity.terrorism1> Blair's full statement was the precursor to the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 which introduced a number of measures for countering the threat such as 'new grounds for deportation and exclusion' including control orders for the deportation of British citizens. The following year, the Terrorism Act 2006 was implemented; this introduced a number of new offences that constituted terrorism such as Acts Preparatory to Terrorism, Encouragement to Terrorism, Dissemination of Terrorist Publications, and Terrorist training offences. It also extended the stop and search powers available to the police.



(TLACP), but no overt deployment such as that seen in 2003 occurred.<sup>433</sup> As was discussed in the riot and protest section, the nature of the threat prompted a shift in tactics in Britain's police force towards a more 'forceful set of operational tactics'.<sup>434</sup> Suicide terrorism had revealed itself to be the preferred means for transnational radical Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda and Detective Superintendent Swain concluded in a 2005 report that

The most prevalent type of explosive used by suicide terrorists in the Middle East is extremely sensitive to impact, shock and electrostatic discharge. HM Government scientists state that the use of baton guns, Taser, or firearms that impact on this material will cause it to detonate. These materials are so sensitive that the heat from a camera flash bulb or torch bulb will cause them to detonate. Therefore, tactics have to be available that will not impact on the explosive.<sup>435</sup>

It was thus deemed expedient to pursue a policy where the potential use of lethal force was authorised (Operation Kratos). However, the fatal shooting of de Menezes exposed the operational weakness of the policy; according to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, may have created a mindset whereby the police 'are always going to be dealing with a suicide bomber'.<sup>436</sup> Meanwhile, for members of the public it conjured up memories of the alleged SAS shoot-to-kill policy that had been authorised in Northern Ireland. While Kratos had been a police, rather than a military operation, civil society deemed it to be out of sync with their preferences regarding the use of force. The following year, in 2006, likely as a legacy of the Menezes shooting, a survey of over 47,000 members of the Metropolitan Police Federation were surveyed on their preferences for carrying firearms; 82% were against the idea in spite of the fact that most also responded that their lives were often at risk.<sup>437</sup> As Frank Foley writes, 'the government's strong defence of the police's actions, when set against the high level of scrutiny of the police ... provided a further indication of norm competition in the UK between the concepts of security and individual rights.'<sup>438</sup>

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<sup>433</sup> Brooke-Holland, Louisa. House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, Number 08074, 18 August 2017, 'Military aid to the civil authorities', p. 2

<sup>434</sup> Deborah Glass, cited in Casiani, 'Shoot-to-kill policy under debate' in Frank Foley, *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 264

<sup>435</sup> Detective Superintendent Steve Swain, Report 13 of the 27 October meeting of the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), "Suicide Terrorism". See sections 10 and 11, respectively.

<sup>436</sup> Foley, Frank. *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 264

<sup>437</sup> Kelley, Jon. 'Why British Police don't have guns', *BBC*, 19 September 2012. See: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19641398> (accessed 07/04/2017)

<sup>438</sup> Foley, Frank. *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 265

Fundamentally, this episode demonstrated the power that the people of Britain hold over the strategic orientation of the state and the constraint that cultural preferences can exact over strategic behaviour.

Behind the scenes, one of the operational changes that the de Menezes shooting fomented was closer cooperation between the police and the special forces who are more experienced in the use of force than their police counterparts.<sup>439</sup> On 21 July, just two weeks after the London Bridge attack and the day before de Menezes was killed, three radical Islamist terrorists, Ramzi Mohammed, Yassin Omar and Muktar Said Ibrahim, attempted to replicate the 7/7 attack by planting bombs on a bus and three London Underground trains. Fortunately, all four homemade bombs failed to detonate properly and all of the perpetrators were arrested. Acting on intelligence, at the end of the month, the police carried out a series of raids to arrest associates of the 7/7 bombers and the failed 21/7 bombings. It was reported in the *Telegraph* that the SAS had taken part in these raids. Their role in these raids was to blast small holes in the walls or doors of the flats so that the Special Firearms Officers (SFOs) of SO19 (Specialist Firearms Command) could storm the flats. The SAS did not actively take part in entering the flats since according to the report, this would have required ‘a ‘transfer of authority’ signed by the police officer in charge of the operation to put the SAS in control’<sup>440</sup> – again highlighting the importance of Britain’s adherence to last resort and subordination to the civil power. Nevertheless, the closer cooperation was indicative of the growing role that the military was beginning to play in the fight against terrorism.<sup>441</sup>

In fact, since 2005, the special forces have maintained a close relationship with their civil SFO counterparts and interoperability is still seen as the linchpin of Britain’s resilience strategy.<sup>442</sup> Most recently, on 3 June 2017 after two attackers rammed a van into a crowd of people on London Bridge before attacking others with knives, the SAS were deployed in the

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<sup>439</sup> For example, Special Firearms Officers (SFOs) are not routinely trained in the use of explosives or explosive entry.

<sup>440</sup> Rayment, Sean. ‘SAS joined police for terror raids’, *Daily Telegraph*, 31 July 2005. See: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1495164/SAS-joined-police-for-terror-raids.html> (accessed 04/01/2019)

<sup>441</sup> See for example Operation Wooden Pride in 2008. This was a live-fire exercise carried out between SFOs, the SAS and the SBS to improve their ability to respond effectively in the event of a similar attack. See: Frank Gardner, ‘Nairobi attack: Could it happen in Britain?’ *BBC*, 26 September 2013; HMIC Review into MPS Implementation of Stockwell 1B, Recommendation 8: ‘Evidence’

<sup>442</sup> Ministry of Defence. *UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience and Security*, Joint Doctrine Publication 02, (JDP 02) (3rd Edition), Defence, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, February 2017, pp. 19-21

so-called ‘Blue Thunder’ helicopters.<sup>443</sup> SFOs managed to resolve the situation in just eight minutes and therefore the SAS had little to do. The specialist capabilities of the elite forces necessitates their involvement in counter-terrorism operations in some capacity, however, compared with the unilateral SAS mission in 1980, there seems to be a trend towards civil control through greater interoperability. This combination of civil and military units in the fight against terrorism is emblematic of the general approach taken by Britain regarding matters of security. For example, even within the MoD, at least half of the staff are civilian personnel, compared with France which has around a 9:1 ratio in favour of military staff.<sup>444</sup>

In the years following the 7/7 bombings there was a lull in the level of the threat; just four attacks took place with two deaths between 2006 and 2014.<sup>445</sup> Meanwhile, JTAC only raised the threat level to critical on two occasions – once in 2006 following the plot to detonate liquid explosives on an airborne flight and once following the attack on Glasgow airport on 30 June 2007.<sup>446</sup> However, the perception of a low to moderate threat from Islamist terrorism changed on 13 November 2015 with the attacks in Paris.

### **5.2.2. Operation Temperer – the end of history?**

In June 2018, in the foreword to the June 2018 iteration of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), then British Home Secretary Sajid Javid stated that the threat faced from terrorism ‘is multifaceted, diverse and evolving.’<sup>447</sup> Indeed, the CONTEST document is replete with references to a shift in the nature of the threat, often linking the domestic threat to external factors such as territorial gains by IS in Syria and Iraq or overseas training camps for British extremists.<sup>448</sup> CONTEST also highlights the number of foiled attacks and arrests for terror-related offences: declaring that 25 attacks have been foiled since June 2013, with almost half (12) of these plots occurring since March 2017. In fact, since 2010, 2,029

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<sup>443</sup> A reference to film from the 1980s of the same name about a shadowy special forces unit that uses a similar model of helicopter. The nickname was attributed to the unit by the Red Banner press.

<sup>444</sup> Ministère des Armées, Secrétariat général pour l’administration. See: <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/sga> (accessed 06/07/2017)

<sup>445</sup> Source: Global Terrorism Database

<sup>446</sup> MI5, ‘Threat Levels’, ‘Threat Level History’. See: <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels> (accessed 22/12/2018)

<sup>447</sup> Javid, Sajid. Foreword by the Home Secretary, CONTEST – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, June 2018, HM Government, p. 5

<sup>448</sup> CONTEST – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, June 2018, HM Government, p. 19

terrorism-related arrests have been made with 412 arrests made between January and December 2017 – ‘the highest annual number since data collection began’.<sup>449</sup>

Evidence from the Global Terrorism Database, an international organisation dedicated to the collection of detailed terrorism data, supports the claim that, in Britain, the level of threat is higher than in previous years (see table 9). In the years 2001 to 2005, Britain experienced just two Islamist terrorist attacks; the first, the 7 July bombings on London’s transport network at the hands of the *Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe*, the second two weeks later on 21 July when *Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades* attempted, unsuccessfully, to once again attack London’s transportation system.<sup>450</sup> In the ten years after, between 2006 and 2015, six attacks occurred. However, all were either low casualty (zero to one death) or unsuccessful (no deaths, no injuries). More recently, in just three years (2016 to 2018) Britain one more attack than the fifteen years combined at the hands of jihadi-inspired extremists with 36 people losing their lives.<sup>451</sup>

**Table 9: Islamist attacks in Britain, 2001-2018<sup>452</sup>**

Year	Total Number of Attacks, Britain
2001-2005	2
2006-2010	3
2011-2015	3
2016-2018	9

In May 2017, days after Salman Ramadan Abedi carried out a suicide attack at the Ariana Grande concert in Manchester, it was reported by a number of prominent British news agencies that as many as 23,000 individuals have, at some stage, been on the radar of the

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<sup>449</sup> National Counter-Terrorism Police Operations Centre (NCTPOC) and Crown Prosecution Service Counter-Terrorism Division cited in CONTEST – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, June 2018, HM Government, p. 19

<sup>450</sup> N.B. The 07/07/2005 attack in London perpetrated by the Secret organization of al-Qaida in Europe has been classified as one attack rather than separate incidents as it was intended as a coordinated attack. The same is true for the failed plot in London by the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades on 21/07/2005.

<sup>451</sup> Global Terrorism Database’s terminology, N.B. these statistics exclude right-wing terrorist incidents such as the van attack outside Finsbury mosque.

<sup>452</sup> Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. See: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/access/>

United Kingdom's security services.<sup>453</sup> Of this estimated number, roughly 3,000 are 'worrying' for MI5 and 500 are 'under constant and special attention'.<sup>454</sup> This has been part of wider trend across Europe; Gilles de Kerchove, the EU's Counter-terrorism Coordinator, stated in September 2017 that around 50,000 extremists were active in Europe and many states have declared the level of threat to be unprecedented.<sup>455</sup> As discussed previously, in Britain, it was from 2015 that the severity of the threat was deemed to be so great that contingency plans were put in place for the mass deployment of the armed forces under Temperer. It was also the point at which the armed forces became more deeply integrated into the security architecture of the state through strategic doctrine. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stated:

Our Armed Forces are also ready to provide support, if needed, in the event of a terrorist attack. We have 10,000 military personnel available on standby to assist the civil authorities for significant terrorist incidents at short notice, supported by a wide range of niche military experts and equipment, such as bomb disposal specialists.<sup>456</sup>

The former prime minister, David Cameron, fielded questions on the SDSR in the House of Commons and, in response to a comment that the British general public would be sympathetic to the idea of thousands of troops patrolling the streets, stated '...until now there have been some rather arcane and old-fashioned barriers to stop this [domestic troop deployments] happening, for all sorts of very good historical reasons, but I think we are rather over that now.'<sup>457</sup> Shockingly, throughout the entire debate no-one, regardless of political allegiance, questioned the idea. Had the perceived severity of the threat from Islamist terrorism reached such a stage that historical experience and culturally-derived

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<sup>453</sup> 23,000 people have been 'subjects of interest' as scale of terror threat emerges after Manchester attack, *The Telegraph*, 27 May 2017. See: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/27/23000-people-have-subjects-interest-scale-terror-threat-emerges/> (accessed 15/10/2015)

<sup>454</sup> Kerchove, Gilles de quoted in 'Britain is 'home to 35,000 Islamist fanatics', more than any other country in Europe, top official warns', *The Telegraph*, 31 August 2017. See: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/31/britain-home-35000-islamist-fanatics-country-europe-top-official/> (accessed 01/09/2017)

<sup>455</sup> Boni, Marc de, 'Manuel Valls: 'La menace terroriste est d'une ampleur inégalee'', *Le Figaro*, 23 March 2016. See: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/citations/2016/03/23/25002-20160323ARTFIG00088-manuel-valls-la-menace-terroriste-est-d-une-ampleur-inegalee.php> (accessed 15/10/2017)  
Alex Younger (MI6 chief) quoted by Emily Tamkin in Foreign Policy: 8 December 2016, *New MI6 Chief: Terrorism Threat to U.K. 'Unprecedented'*. See: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/08/new-mi6-chief-terrorism-threat-to-u-k-unprecedented/> (accessed 15/10/2017)

<sup>456</sup> National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, Cm 9161, November 2015, ch. III, sec. 4.98, p. 39

<sup>457</sup> Cameron, David. National Security and Defence, *Hansard Archives*, 23 November 2015, vol.602, col. 1065

modes of thought and action were no longer relevant? To appropriate Francis Fukuyama's term, was this 'the end of history'?

In fact, it was reported in a number of newspapers that Cameron was extremely reluctant to resort to the use of troops precisely because of those 'good historical reasons'; specifically during 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland. Although on British mainland, Northern Ireland has historically been treated as a colony; troops were often called upon to impose civil order and in 1880s were tasked with the eviction of peasants who could not afford to pay rent. The Catholic Irish in particular felt as though they were under occupation and the rebellion in 1916 was a reaction against what was perceived as a foreign enemy. This sentiment had not changed drastically by the 1960s; Operation Banner began in 1969 and lasted until 2007. At its height in the 1970s, 25,000 troops were sent to Northern Ireland to assist the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the fight against dissident Republicans. One former British army officer interviewed for this thesis who had been stationed in Northern Ireland highlighted the 'shoot first, ask questions later' nature of the campaign:

We didn't have too much trouble with it [the use of force] in Northern Ireland. We knew who the players were, but didn't have the intel that we knew we could push through in the courts, so we tended to just go for it.<sup>458</sup>

He continued by stating that while the operations were technically conducted under the auspices of MACP and the principle of subordination to the civil power, this often became muted by necessity. He stated that instead

A military leader would just carry out the job and won't be too interested in confirming with the police or some politician. There is absolutely subordination in terms of some kind of pecking order. But once [the troops] are let off the leash, they'll ignore that.<sup>459</sup>

This approach was made abundantly clear on Bogside in Derry on 30 January 1972. Here, members of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion Parachute Regiment opened fire on a group of protestors who were marching against internment under Operation Demetrius. The Paras had barricaded themselves behind concrete barriers and, as protestors began to throw stones, they fired at

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<sup>458</sup> Keil, Captain Duncan. Former British army and NATO liaison officer, Semi-structured interview by Jack Harding, London, 1 August 2019

<sup>459</sup> Ibid.

the crowd killing 14. After what became known as ‘Bloody Sunday’, the British government began to reduce the number of troops and transition authority away from the military (which was proving to be counter-productive) and towards the police and intelligence services.

The nature of the threat posed by radical Islamist terrorists is vastly different to that of the IRA and its derivatives, however. Peter Clarke, the former head of Counter Terrorism Command addressed these differences in a speech in April 2007. One particular extract is worth quoting in full:

Colleagues from around the world often say to me that the long experience that we have in the United Kingdom of combating a terrorist threat must have stood us in good stead. That the experience gained during some thirty years of an Irish terrorist campaign would have equipped us for the new challenges presented by al-Qaeda and its associated groups. To an extent that is true – but only to an extent. The fact is that the Irish campaign actually operated within a set of parameters that helped shape our response to it.

It was essentially a domestic campaign using conventional weaponry, carried out by terrorists in tightly knit networks who were desperate to avoid capture and certainly had no wish to die. The use of warnings restricted the scale of the carnage, dreadful though it was. The warnings were cynical and often misleading, but by restricting casualties, were a factor in enabling the political process to move forward, however haltingly. I believe that if you take the reverse of many of these characteristics, you are not far away from describing the threat we face today.<sup>460</sup>

The ‘new’ threat of Islamist terrorism seemed to warrant an alternative response and, in the wake of the attacks in Manchester in 2017, Operation Temperer was implemented for the first time. In total, 950 troops were deployed for period of around one week; despite the seemingly low number of troops deployed, it still marked the largest deployment of the armed forces in an active capacity for domestic security for over a century. However, if the government and the opposing parties were all in agreement that there was the need for measures like this to be taken, was the press also in agreement?

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<sup>460</sup> Clarke, Peter. ‘Learning from experience Counter Terrorism in the UK since 9/11’, The Inaugural Colin. Cramphorn Memorial Lecture, Policy Exchange

While the views of the press are not the focus of this thesis, it is nevertheless important to provide a brief account of how Operation Temperer was represented. This will simply provide a more complete view of norm transmission and cultural constraint. Thus, the following section presents the findings from a collection of every article that has mentioned Operation Temperer for the top fifteen British newspapers by circulation. It looks at the articles that were published on four separate events:

1) the leak of the plans for Operation Temperer in July 2015; 2) the attack in Manchester; 3) the attack at London Bridge; 4) the bombing at Parsons Green. It follows the frequency of the articles for two weeks after that event and codes each article according to tone: positive (i.e. most of the article is in favour of Operation Temperer), negative (most of the article is opposed to Operation Temperer) and Neutral (it is impossible to tell or it relies on quoting third parties rather than original opinion).<sup>461</sup>

The first aspect of note is the relatively low number of articles that mention Operation Temperer. Apart from one day after the attack in Manchester which saw 75 articles dedicated to the operation, the subject struggles to get into double figures. Perhaps the most shocking example of this is in July 2015 when the Daily Mail leaked the plans. The next day, five news agencies picked up on the story, but after that there were no mentions for a fortnight when the Daily Mail published two articles in the same day. Furthermore, in terms of tone, only one was obviously negative (*the Guardian*), the others were all coded as neutral. Even post-Manchester, of the 75 articles that were published, a staggering 62 were coded as neutral. This was largely due to the fact that they simply reported the details of Operation Temperer and quoted members of government rather than making judgments themselves. What accounts for this apparent apathy to the idea of deploying the military? Was Cameron correct in his assessment in Parliament that ‘we are rather over’ the significance of historical experience in determining the response to a threat? The next section examines the political rhetoric surrounding Operation Temperer in greater depth with a view to assessing whether this is indeed the case or, instead, whether there is a set of abiding cultural preferences across time that have constrained the approach taken by policymakers today.

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<sup>461</sup> ‘Reassuring’, ‘free-up’, ‘contingency’, and ‘unprecedented’ were the most commonly referenced words.



### 5.2.3. Operation Temperer rhetoric: continuity or change?

Chart 10 employs the same methodology as for the analysis in previous sections. It finds that the response to Operation Temperer from politicians was overwhelmingly positive with most statements conveying the belief that it was necessary given the nature of the threat. For example, Mark Rowley referred to the ‘significant step up in pace’ in the threat of terrorism that led to the development of ‘plans for large-scale mobilisation of the military to help boost our armed policing capacity in the event of an ongoing imminent threat to the UK’<sup>462</sup> The Conservative peer, Lord Selkirk of Douglas also highlighted the ‘urgent need to build up and modernise the Armed Forces who protect our national security.’<sup>463</sup>

As well as generally praising the conduct of the military, there were also frequent references to the reassuring presence that army would afford to the public. For example, Theresa May called Temperer ‘a proportionate and sensible step which will provide extra reassurance and protection while the investigation progresses.’<sup>464</sup> Then Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations, Mark Rowley stated that its purpose was ‘to free up more armed police on the streets to reassure the public and deter further attacks.’<sup>465</sup> While Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, Cressida Dick stated her belief that ‘the vast majority of the public will be utterly reassured to know that we ... have the ability to call upon and have called upon the military in this way.’<sup>466</sup>

Interestingly, there were only eleven negative statements in total. Negative historical experiences such as Northern Ireland were the reason for scepticism while some policymakers such as the Green MP Baroness Jenny Jones argued that deploying the military

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<sup>462</sup> ACSO Mark Rowley speaks to the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, National Police Chief’s Council, 11 September 2017. See: <https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/acso-mark-rowley-speaks-to-the-international-institute-for-counter-terrorism> (accessed 06/07/2018)

<sup>463</sup> Douglas-Hamilton, James Alexander. UK Defence Forces, vol. 787, Hansard Archives, 23 November 2017, col. 298

<sup>464</sup> Press release, PM statement following London terror attack, 15 September 2017. See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-statement-following-london-terror-attack-15-september-2017> (accessed 07/07/2018)

<sup>465</sup> ACSO Mark Rowley speaks to the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, National Police Chief’s Council, 11 September 2017. See: <https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/acso-mark-rowley-speaks-to-the-international-institute-for-counter-terrorism> (accessed 06/07/2018)

<sup>466</sup> Morrison, Sean. ‘Manchester attack: ‘London remains open’ as terror threat raised to critical after bombing, Met chief says’, *Metro*, 24 May 2017. See: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/manchester-attack-london-remains-open-as-terror-threat-raised-to-critical-after-bombing-met-chief-a3547921.html> (accessed 06/07/2018)

would be ‘absolutely shocking ... Putting troops on the streets would be very controversial... I think it would be very provocative and cause more problems than it would solve.’<sup>467</sup>

The most interesting responses can be found in the ‘neutral’ category. Here there are a plethora of examples of statements that outline Britain’s core normative principles of subordination to the civil power, last resort, and proportionality. For example, Chief Constable Martin Evans stated that *Temperer* constituted ‘the deployment of military personnel alongside and in support of police firearms officers... and, where they are deployed, military personnel will remain under the command and control of the police service.’<sup>468</sup> Earl Howe, speaking on behalf of the MoD stated that ‘well-established procedures for providing military assistance to civil authorities, with the military working in support of the police.’<sup>469</sup> Even the NSCR writes that ‘We have 10,000 military personnel available on standby to assist the civil authorities for significant terrorist incidents at short notice’<sup>470</sup> However, deploying the troops would only occur ‘if needed’<sup>471</sup> by the civil power and would always be ‘proportionate’<sup>472</sup> to threat.

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<sup>467</sup> Austin, Henry. ‘Secret plans to deploy soldiers on UK streets in the aftermath of a terror attack are ‘shocking’ and ‘provocative’, says peer’, *The Independent*, 26 July 2015. See: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/secret-plans-to-deploy-soldiers-on-uk-streets-in-the-aftermath-of-a-terror-attack-are-shocking-and-10417364.html> (accessed 22/09/2017)

<sup>468</sup> UPDATE: Warwickshire man arrested in connection with Manchester terrorist attack, 25 May 2017. See: <https://www.stratford-herald.com/70986-update-warwickshire-man-arrested-in-connection-with-manchester-terrorist-attack.html> (accessed 06/07/2018)


<sup>469</sup> Howe, Earl. ‘Strategic Defence and Security Review’, vol. 767. Hansard, 3 December 2015, col. 1294

<sup>470</sup> National Security Capability Review, March 2018, Cabinet office, p. 17

<sup>471</sup> Ibid.

<sup>472</sup> Press release, PM statement following London terror attack, 15 September 2017. See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-statement-following-london-terror-attack-15-september-2017> (accessed 07/07/2018)

**Chart 7: Rhetorical response to Operation Temperer**



Sources: *Hansard, Government Press Releases, Media Articles*<sup>473</sup>


The high level of threat has arguably altered the character of Britain's strategic response. Given the military's specialist capabilities and experience in warfighting they are the obvious choice to undertake operations that may require the use of armed force. It is even likely that Britain will see the military deployed on the streets more frequently in the future if the threat increases to a sufficient level. However, as the neutral statements indicate, the nature of the response remains enduring. Any deployment that takes place will always be proportionate to the threat, subordinate to the civil power and as a last resort - not an extended and largely autonomous military operation such as *Sentinelle* in France.

The fact that Operation Temperer was carefully messaged by Theresa May and her colleagues, for example by emphasising the point that *the police* had asked for the assistance, that the troops would not be patrolling, but would be in static guarding positions and that the

<sup>473</sup> Full list of sources included in bibliography

operation would be short-term, meant that the level of public backlash was minimised – as exemplified by the high level of neutral media articles and the overwhelmingly positive responses by policymakers. It did not mean, as Cameron seemed to suggest, that the British have broken free from the historical fetters that had constrained cultural preferences to that point. For example, if we compare the positive responses to domestic military deployments throughout history (see chart 8, figures converted to a percentage to allow for easier comparison), we are able to see very clearly the strategic norms and values that have guided Britain's approach to domestic deployments over time. Fundamentally, these are 1) the troops are subordinate to the civil power; 2) used as a last resort; 3) proportionate to the threat and; 4) if possible, short term. There is even a recognition that using the military is often necessary when facing a serious threat and that the military possess specialist capabilities that make them suitable for certain internal roles.

**Chart 8: Domestic military deployments - Summary of positive reactions**




*Sources: National Archives, Hansard, Government Press Releases, Media Articles*<sup>474</sup>

<sup>474</sup> Full list of sources listed in bibliography

Of course, as well as remarkable continuity in Britain's cultural preferences across time, there has also clearly been an evolution in Britain's internal strategic culture. As this section demonstrated, by analysing the nature of Britain's military deployments on the mainland, a series of formative moments were identified that demonstrate this gradual evolution: 1819-1919 was the era of countering riot and protest. However, the ramifications of the Peterloo massacre were so far-reaching that there was a steep decline in the use of the military against rioting mobs thereafter and in 1919 in Glasgow and Liverpool, the army was used in an active capacity against rioters for the last time.

Post-1926 saw an era of MACC when the army provided personnel in cases of strikes and, for nearly fifty years thereafter, there were no active military deployments. Across this period, the notion that the army was fundamentally an expeditionary force became entrenched as the analysis of recruitment campaigns illustrated. However, the rise of transnational terrorism and the perception of a higher threat of foreign terrorist organisations operating on the British mainland challenged assumptions that a strict delineation between internal and external security should be maintained. Accordingly, in 1980, MACP was formally invoked for the first time leading to the SAS assault of the Iranian embassy. This marked the beginning of the counter-terrorism era which has arguably culminated with the implementation of Operation Temperer in 2017.

**Chart 9: Domestic military deployments – summary of negative reactions**



*Sources: National Archives, Hansard, Government Press Releases, Media Articles<sup>475</sup>*

As well as strategic shifts, an assessment of the negative reactions to domestic deployments reveals how attitudes have changed slowly over time as well. This is in keeping with the hypothesis that strategic shifts are incremental. Peterloo had a tangible effect on how Britain conceives of the use of force on the national territory and this perpetuated a sense that the armed forces should be used as an external, rather than an internal force. Since Peterloo, the military has been used sparingly on mainland Britain and always with assurances that a putative deployment would adhere to the core principles listed above lending a significant amount of weight to the hypothesis that ‘culture constrains.’ Indeed, if we also examine the effect that historically derived cultural constraint has on the army’s behaviour through how

<sup>475</sup> Full list of sources listed in bibliography

it has represented its role via modern army recruitment campaigns, we see further compelling evidence of continuity across time despite changing threats and, perhaps more surprisingly, even changing policy.

#### **5.2.4. Modern recruitment campaigns**

The collapse of the bipolar world order in the 1990s meant the strategic rationale that previously necessitated the maintenance of large standing armies seemed to be outdated. Small-scale local conflicts, insurgency and counter-insurgency seemed to be the new norm. This thinking permeated not only the academic literature at the time, but was also reflected in recruitment trends across a number of western states which realised unwieldy Cold War force structures would be ineffective against growing asymmetric threats. Trends in British army recruitment show that Britain maintained an average regular force of 162,000 troops.<sup>476</sup> However, by 2000 this number had dropped to 110,100 and by 2016 to 78,000; the lowest number of troops since 1800.<sup>477</sup>

Despite the trend towards insurgency warfare abroad, Britain was still wrestling with a severe threat from Irish Republican terrorism. During the 1990s, there was a growing threat to the British mainland from the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Throughout the 1990s, the IRA carried out at least 138 attacks (both successful and unsuccessful) on British mainland, compared with 37 in the 1980s.<sup>478</sup> One may have expected this growing threat to be reflected in the army's recruitment campaigns, and yet most still tend to focus on the far abroad, neglecting operations in Northern Ireland.

Campaigns in the 1990s focused on the idea of fulfilling your potential and adopted the famous slogan 'Be the Best' in 1994. There was an emphasis on the idea of excitement and adventure that was also evident in the posters from the inter-war period,<sup>479</sup> as demonstrated

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
<sup>476</sup> Author's calculation based on data drawn from *Statista*. 'Number of personnel in the armed forces of the United Kingdom (UK) from 1900 to 2020'. See: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/579773/number-of-personnel-in-uk-armed-forces/> (accessed 07/01/2017)

<sup>477</sup> Summers, Chris. The time when the British army was really stretched. *BBC*, 23 July 2011. See: <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-14218909> (accessed 07/01/2017); *Statista*. 'Number of personnel in the armed forces of the United Kingdom (UK) from 1900 to 2020'. See: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/579773/number-of-personnel-in-uk-armed-forces/> (accessed 07/01/2017)

<sup>478</sup> Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. See: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/access/>

<sup>479</sup> See section 4.3.5

by Poster Four which shows two soldiers armed with the standard SA80 assault rifle during a night operation. As the National Army Museum states, the advert ‘focuses on drama and tension.’<sup>480</sup> One famous television advert from 1992 showed two bored-looking people sitting in a drab café. One states, ‘I see Frank joined the army then’, the other states ‘I don’t know why he did it.’ The scene then cuts to ‘Frank’ skiing, sailing, walking on sunny beaches, mountain climbing, and taking part in military exercises.<sup>481</sup> The emphasis, which is highly reminiscent of inter-war recruitment adverts, is clearly on the idea of adventure and travel, while domestic duties (and even duties in Northern Ireland) do not feature.



(Poster Four, 1996, *National Army Museum*)

### 5.2.5 Recruitment post-2001 – continuity and change

After the attacks of 2001, there was a growing sense that the traditional distinction between internal and external security had become less relevant. In 2015 Baroness Angela Smith pointed out this blurring of the lines when she stated in the House of Lords:

Here [with the threat of Islamist terrorism] we see the nexus between the domestic and the global. ... The source might be predominantly from the Middle East, but much of it

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<sup>480</sup> National Army Museum, British Army Recruitment Poster, 1996. See: <https://collection.nam.ac.uk/detail.php?acc=1996-08-291-1> (accessed 23/01/2019)

<sup>481</sup> Army Advert, 1992, ‘Frank’. See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g479wtPBCW0> (accessed 23/01/2019)



potentially will feed back to the United Kingdom as well, and therefore the global nature of terrorism links back strongly to the threats we are dealing with.<sup>482</sup>

In 2008, British parliament had suggested it was considering restructuring the British armed forces to adapt to this perception of a changing threat environment and, in 2010, Army 2020 Refine was adopted. This is an ongoing project (at the time of writing) to re-configure the army by reducing it to 23 units. Speaking at a review of Army 2020 before a Commons Defence Committee in June 2016, The UK's Chief of Defence General Nick Carter reiterated this notion of a closer relationship between internal and external security when he stated

Army 2020 foresaw a character of conflict that would be significantly different to the one we had about ten years ago. And it highlighted that the connection between home and away, what happens abroad and what happens at home, would be much more networked than perhaps it was in the past.<sup>483</sup>

Devising appropriate responses to the a threat environment characterised by a closer internal-external security nexus has been a strategic priority for the British military since 9/11; the 1998 Strategic Defence Review was deemed to be defunct in the face of a transnational terrorists threat and therefore a new review, known as the New Chapter, was commissioned in 2002 to investigate the potential role that the British armed forces could play in countering terrorism. The New Chapter concluded:

Whilst the 1998 Strategic Defence Review recognised the existence of asymmetric threats, it did not fully cater for threats on the scale which materialised on 11 September... The Armed Forces can play a role as part of a cross-Government and international effort to counter the threat from international terrorism at home and to engage it overseas.<sup>484</sup>

Given this obvious transition in the thinking of key policymakers, one may have expected to see a change in the recruitment campaigns to reflect this perception of a continuum between internal and external security and the potential for a greater role for the military in domestic counter-terrorism operations. Yet, this was not the case; instead, as John Gearson

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<sup>482</sup> Baroness Smith of Newnham, House of Lords debate, Role and Capabilities of the UK Armed Forces, in the Light of Global and Domestic Threats to Stability and Security, 15 September 2015, vol. 764, col. 208

<sup>483</sup> Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 and the Army

<sup>484</sup> The Strategic Defence review (SDR): A New Chapter, July 2002, sec. 7, par. 95

writes, at this point in time ‘the focus was on what MoD termed “away” tasks, with “home” missions left to others.’<sup>485</sup>

This notion of ‘away tasks’ was clearly reflected in the recruitment campaigns. Unsurprisingly, after 2001 advertisements were dominated by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, in 2007 the MoD targeted the Black Country where recruitment figures were low. The campaign used the tagline ‘I was born in Dudley, but I grew up in Iraq’.<sup>486</sup> Indeed, most of the taglines used in the recruitment adverts have tended to emphasise the enduring idea of action, adventure and travel. For example, the campaign in 2006 saw four separate adverts which outlined the reasons one should enlist; one advert states ‘For the teamwork. For the training. For the challenge. Against enemies. Against the elements. Against the odds. For the travel. For the action. For adventure.’<sup>487</sup> While another, states ‘For your mates. For your family. For each other. To train. To learn. To better yourself. To travel. *(It then transitions to a combat situation in a dusty town that appears to be in the Middle East)*. For the action. For adventure.’<sup>488</sup> All four adverts that were broadcast in 2006 referenced combat situations with weaponry visible and shots being fired in three. Further, each advert clearly illustrates that travelling and fighting abroad is part of the duty of the soldier. Any scenes that reference Britain in these adverts are only in relation to training on the base or spending time with friends at the pub. There is no indication that ‘active’ domestic duties are part of the job.

The 2011 campaign referenced ‘extensive travel’ and showed troops fighting in an Afghan village, while a series of adverts in 2013 took the interesting approach of broadcasting live from bases in Afghanistan with soldiers giving viewers a virtual tour of the base. Adverts in 2014 and 2015 also showed combat situations, visible weaponry and shots being fired with the tagline in 2015 of ‘restoring normal days from Africa, to Europe, to Asia.’ In all cases, the adverts showed that anyone joining the army should expect to fight or, more specifically, fight abroad.

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<sup>485</sup> Gearson, John & Rosemont, Hugo. ‘CONTEST as Strategy: Reassessing Britain's Counterterrorism Approach’, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 38, no. 12, p. 1046

<sup>486</sup> “I was born in Dudley, I grew up in Iraq”, *BBC*, 6 November 2007. See: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/blackcountry/content/articles/2007/11/06/army\\_poster\\_feature.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/blackcountry/content/articles/2007/11/06/army_poster_feature.shtml) (accessed 22/07/2017)

<sup>487</sup> British Army Advert - Light Infantry, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BvgZU6UwoWY&ab\\_channel=strongmike](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BvgZU6UwoWY&ab_channel=strongmike) (accessed 22/07/2017)

<sup>488</sup> British Army Advert - Mechanised Infantry. See: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUxYXX7pFp4&ab\\_channel=strongmike](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUxYXX7pFp4&ab_channel=strongmike) (accessed 22/07/2017)

The tone that the adverts struck in from 2016 was very different; a highly unpopular war in Iraq had been followed by a protracted campaign in Afghanistan that saw 455 service personnel lose their lives.<sup>489</sup> In 2015 the dust was beginning to settle after the last combat troops under Operation Herrick were withdrawn in October 2014. However, the public will for military interventions overseas had been seriously undermined leaving the army with something of a recruitment crisis. While some academics, such as Hew Strachan, have argued that the British Army has always struggled to attract enough recruits,<sup>490</sup> the personnel deficit in the army hit a worrying 7.5% in December 2018.<sup>491</sup> The lower-than-expected numbers of new recruits prompted the MoD to take a slightly different tact. Sir Nicholas Carter, the former Chief of the General Staff, stated before the House of Commons Defence Select Committee stated that

Our traditional recruiting grounds, here I am talking about white Caucasian 16 to 25-year-olds, have shrunk by about 25% over the past 10 years. We are therefore having to adjust our recruiting to get after a different recruiting base from the one that traditionally we went to.<sup>492</sup>

There is clear evidence of this shift in approach in the recruitment campaigns post-2016. For the purposes of this analysis, nine adverts were analysed. Out of this nine, only one showed a potential combat situation and none showed shots being fired (although weaponry was visible in six of the nine). The tagline of ‘This is belonging’<sup>493</sup> stresses the bonds of friendship that are forged in the military rather than the more aggressive taglines used in

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<sup>489</sup> icasualties, Charts, Afghanistan Fatalities by Country. See: <http://icasualties.org/chart/Chart> (accessed 23/01/2019)

<sup>490</sup> Strachan, Hew. Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence. Examination of Witnesses, 25 March 2008. Questions 1-19

<sup>491</sup> Cree, Alice. ‘The Current Recruitment Crisis in the British Armed Forces’, *Military Research at Newcastle*, 11 December 2018. See: <https://blogs.ncl.ac.uk/militaryresearchatnewcastle/2018/12/11/the-current-recruitment-crisis-in-the-british-armed-forces/> (retrieved 26/01/2019)

<sup>492</sup> Carter, Gen. Sir Nicholas in Alice Cree, ‘The Current Recruitment Crisis in the British Armed Forces’, *Military Research at Newcastle*, 11 December 2018. See: <https://blogs.ncl.ac.uk/militaryresearchatnewcastle/2018/12/11/the-current-recruitment-crisis-in-the-british-armed-forces/> (retrieved 26/01/2019)

<sup>493</sup> ‘Army TV advert 2017 - This Is Belonging Part 1’, *ARMYJobs*, 7 January 2017. See: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IMd4RrT7SS4&ab\\_channel=ARMYjobs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IMd4RrT7SS4&ab_channel=ARMYjobs) (accessed 08 August 2018)  
‘Army TV advert 2017 - This Is Belonging Part 2’, *ARMYJobs*, 7 January 2017. See: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cpPzYFIJXI&ab\\_channel=ARMYjobs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cpPzYFIJXI&ab_channel=ARMYjobs) (accessed 08 August 2018)  
‘Army TV advert 2017 - This Is Belonging Part 2’, *ARMYJobs*, 7 January 2017. See: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WeuFCHIvutI&ab\\_channel=ARMYjobs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WeuFCHIvutI&ab_channel=ARMYjobs) (accessed 08 August 2018)

earlier adverts such as ‘For the action. For the excitement. For the adventure.’ Or the mobile infantry’s tagline of ‘Forward as one’.<sup>494</sup>

The shift in tone is indicative of the army trying to cast a wider net; adverts from 2018 and 2019 have followed this theme with taglines such as ‘Find where you belong’ which aims at promoting diversity and dispelling myths about the army that may be preventing potential female, LGBT, or Muslim candidates from joining.<sup>495</sup> While the pre-2016 adverts still emphasise the idea of camaraderie, the combat element is given a far heavier emphasis; something which has mostly disappeared in the adverts in 2017(see table 10 which compares the tone of thirty-nine adverts pre and post-2016). The transition away from displaying actual or potential combat and, as a result, possibly glorifying the idea fighting is interesting. It may be indicative of a shift in attitudes among the general population towards questioning the role that Britain should play in managing global threats. The army, in order to stay relevant to a younger generation, has had to adapt its approach.

**Table 10: A shift in tone**

Theme	Actual / potential combat	Visible weapons	Shots being fired	Uniforms	References abroad	References domestic duty
2009 – 2015 (%)	91.7	100	75	100	91.7	0
2016 – 2019 (%)	6	63	0	75	44	0

Despite this shift in tone, analysis of all the modern (i.e. 2009 – 2019) advertisements shows that the abroad is always a prevalent theme with twenty-five references out of the thirty-nine advertisements that were analysed. The foreign locations include deserts, savannahs, jungles, tropical coastlines, mountain ranges, woodland, and urban settings in the Middle East. Thus, in spite of the less belligerent tone of the recent adverts, the common theme that the British army is an expeditionary force is still apparent. By comparison, out of thirty-nine

<sup>494</sup> British Army Infantry “Forward as One”. See: <https://vimeo.com/143242541> (accessed 06/07/2018)

<sup>495</sup> See for example: Keeping my Faith - This is Belonging - Army Jobs, *ARMYJobs*, 13 January 2018. See: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQ4OoPNY\\_YM&ab\\_channel=ARMYjobs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQ4OoPNY_YM&ab_channel=ARMYjobs) (accessed 06/07/2018); Expressing my Emotions- This is Belonging - Army Jobs. *ARMYJobs*, 13 January 2018. See: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTqqS5OrLGu&ab\\_channel=ARMYjobs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTqqS5OrLGu&ab_channel=ARMYjobs) (accessed 06/07/2018)

advertisements, *none* illustrate internal duties other than to show training or obstacle courses. This is despite the fact that after 2001, the army was called out on dozens of occasions under Military Aid to the Civil Authority; a well-established component of Britain's political and military strategy with roots that can be formally traced back to the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>496</sup> More surprisingly perhaps, despite Operation Temperer having been implemented twice in 2015 marking the largest overt deployment of troops in an active capacity in peacetime on the British mainland for a hundred years, none of the adverts from 2016 onwards reference a possible domestic counter-terror duty. Instead, cultural preferences for the armed forces as a force that fights abroad are still emphasised as they have been since the inter-war period.

**Table 11. Summary of Modern Adverts, 2009 - 2019**

Theme	Actual / potential combat	Visible weapons	Shots being fired	Uniforms	References abroad	References domestic duty
%	48	72	36	80	72	0

*Analysis of 39 British recruitment adverts, 2009 - 2019*

In order to demonstrate that cultural preferences and expectations are playing a defining role in the British army's approach to recruitment, it is helpful at this stage to draw a brief comparison with army adverts in France and Germany.<sup>497</sup> France's more active strategic culture translates in its adverts which adopt a similar tone to those in Britain between 2009 and 2015. There are frequent references to combat abroad, particularly in African states and Afghanistan. However, a crucial difference is that France has traditionally seen its defence in terms of a nexus between internal and external security.<sup>498</sup> Thus, adverts also regularly reference domestic duties; this will be explored in depth in the French chapter.

Germany's strategic culture borders on pacifism; epitomised by Willy Brandt's assertion that war 'can never again spring from German soil'<sup>499</sup> and historically the German public's

<sup>496</sup> EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES: Aid to Civil Power (Code 53(B)): Use of Territorial Force in aid of civil power – 1908), National Archives at Kew

<sup>497</sup> France's approach to recruitment will be discussed in greater detail in the French chapter.

<sup>498</sup> Publicité armée Avril 2015. See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uQyzYbBzxHM> (accessed 08 August 2018)

<sup>499</sup> Cooper, Alice Holmes. *Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements since 1945*. (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1996), p. 154

relationship with its army has been troubled. This was exemplified by the approach taken in a recent poster: it read '*Wir kämpfen auch dafür, dass du gegen uns sein kannst*' – we are also fighting for your right to oppose us. However, a photo online of this poster that had been put up in a bus stop showed how someone had spray-painted over the top: '*Wir bleiben Feinde*' – We're still enemies. Thus, *Bundeswehr* advertisements have tended to adopt a tone that aligns with the preferences of the public. In 2010, the *Bundeswehr's* main recruitment campaign showed a series of quick cuts between eight different scenarios outlining what to expect from a career in the military. Out of the eight short scenes, a military uniform is visible in two (one of the uniforms being a medic). None of the scenes show visible weaponry or references to a potential combat situation and one even shows the potential domestic duty of escorting a motorcade. There is no indication in the advert that combat will be part of the job. This is in spite of Germany's role in Afghanistan at the time, losing eight soldiers in 2010 and seven in 2009.

Ultimately, we see both continuity and change in the approach the army has taken to recruitment. As the hypothesis suggested, strategic culture will evolve incrementally over time as both internal and external factors alter the normative environment. Change is certainly evident in the campaigns: one of the most recent examples is the growth of social media, which has led to the rise of a theory of a distinct 'cyberculture' that exists outside of national normative constraints. In the context of military recruitment, adverts have been adapted to take these shifts in attitude or the relevant threat of the time into account. We also see adverts adapting to the nature of the threat faced at the time; for example, Northern Ireland in campaigns of the 1970s or, more recently, scenes of troops in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Despite these changes, across nearly one hundred years of army recruitment drives, there is still remarkable continuity in the approach adopted by the British military insofar as they reflect the idea of the army as an *external* rather than *internal* force with defence of the state achieved by fighting abroad. This is all the more interesting when placed within the context of the modern counter-terrorist era when potential domestic duties for the armed forces have been a formal part of national security strategies for nearly twenty years. To return to the responses to Operation Temperer, it appears as though despite a general recognition that the army can, and perhaps even should, play a role in countering the threat from Islamist terrorism, there is still a residual reluctance to see boots on the national territory.

Fundamentally, the British still view the army as an expeditionary force; an entrenched cultural preference that has derived from over two hundred years of history.

Contrary to Cameron's assertion that the British are 'rather over' history, as this chapter has illustrated, in fact historical experiences cannot be disentangled from Britain's cultural preferences or its strategic behaviour. Although, Cameron's perceptual lens may have regarded certain experiences as less relevant in the modern day (for example there were no references to Peterloo in the responses to Operation Temperer), this does not negate the fact that the past has still undeniably shaped the present.

### 5.3. Conclusions

*I went into a public 'ouse to get a pint o' beer,  
The publican 'e up an' sez, "We serve no red-coats here."  
The girls be'ind the bar they laughed an' giggled fit to die,  
I outs into the street again an' to myself sez I:  
O it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Tommy, go away";  
But it's "Thank you, Mister Atkins", when the band begins to play'*

#### **'Tommy' – Rudyard Kipling, 1890**

Rudyard Kipling's 1890 poem 'Tommy' provides an important insight into the British public's attitudes towards the military, not just in the nineteenth century, but also today. The poem is written from the perspective of a low-ranking member of the army, 'Tommy Atkins',<sup>500</sup> who laments the treatment he receives from the general public. He unsuccessfully attempts to purchase a pint of beer at a pub, is laughed at by ladies and, later in the poem, is refused entry to a theatre. However, when he and his comrades are called away to war, he finds that he has the full support of the public: 'But it's "Thank you, Mr. Atkins", when the band begins to play'. While one suspects that Kipling is attempting to expose the hypocrisy of the British general public in relation to their attitude towards, and treatment of, soldiers, it is nevertheless indicative of the prevailing attitudes held by the public: first: extreme resistance to the presence of troops on the national territory, particularly in times of (relative) peace. Second, acceptance, even pride, of the British military's role in managing global threats.

While the nature of the British public's dichotomous relationship with the army may seem counterintuitive, even paradoxical, at first, in fact the roots of Britain's attitudes lie in the national historical experience. As the previous chapters highlighted, these attitudes developed during the Civil War and became entrenched through the use of Yeomanry cavalry units to quell riots and protests in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and culminated with the 1819 massacre at St Peter's Field or 'Peterloo'. The use of excessive force at Peterloo transformed the image of the army for the worse; ordinary soldiers became pariahs in the eyes of the public and paved the way for the introduction of the Metropolitan Police Act by the Home

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<sup>500</sup> 'Tommy' being the nickname for British troops. The term was frequently used in World War One and is less prevalent today, but members of the Parachute Regiment are still known as 'Toms'.



Secretary Sir Robert Peel in 1829 which institutionalised the civil power as the first responders on matters of internal unrest.

By 1926 (post-General Strike) the prevailing opinion was that the army should no longer be the first port of call in matters of domestic security. Thus, over time, the need to maintain an armed force to deal with domestic threats gradually diminished and the British public became accustomed to this fact. In short, the sense grew in the minds of British policymakers that ‘the growth of civil society negates the need for a strong military. A strong civil police force will help you deal with domestic threats while the army can be more outward.’<sup>501</sup>

Again, historical experience plays a defining role in determining this prevailing belief in the military as an external force and is largely a function of the nature of the threats that Britain has faced in its recent history. The last major pitched battle on British soil was the Battle of Culloden in 1746 when Jacobite forces led by Charles Edward Stuart (funded and equipped by the French) were crushed by the forces of the Duke of Cumberland, William Augustus. Since then, there have been only three substantial threats of foreign invasion on the British mainland: the first and second emanated from France under the *Ancien Régime*, initially in 1759 when the French foreign minister, the *Duc de Choiseul* devised a plan to transport 100,000 French troops across the Channel. The second came decades later when forces led by Napoleon began to gather on the French coast in 1796. Napoleon’s focus on his Egyptian and Austrian campaigns spared Britain from invasion on that occasion and by 1805 the plans had been shelved. The third threat occurred in 1940 when the armies of Nazi Germany, having rapidly swept across France and the low countries and gained control of the Channel coast, began plans for invasion under *Unternehmen Seelöwe* (Operation Sea Lion). The German High Command were eventually deterred by the increasing losses suffered by the *Luftwaffe* at the hands of the Royal Air Force. Furthermore, the country’s geographical position has meant the fear of encirclement has never been a strategic priority to the same extent as seen in France, for example in the run up to the Franco-Prussian war, or Germany, for example under Kaiser Wilhelm II who was famously ‘paranoid’ about encirclement.<sup>502</sup>

Fundamentally, the British people view the army as an expeditionary force, not one that deals with threats domestically. As Keith Jeffrey writes, in eyes of the public and the political

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<sup>501</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Harold Simpson (UK Ministry of Defence), Semi-structured interview by Jack Harding, London, 15 December 2017

<sup>502</sup> Hull, Isabel V. *The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1888-1918*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 129

and military establishments, the responsibilities of the British army 'are quite evidently not domestic'.<sup>503</sup> The passage of time does not seem to have eroded this sentiment within the military; on 25 May 2017, soon after the initial implementation of Operation Temperer, General Sir Richard Barrons, who served as Joint Forces Command between April 2013 and April 2016 and as a Brigadier during the Troubles, stated 'we [the British] see our armed forces as being essential for our security from threats emanating from abroad, not at home.'<sup>504</sup>

Furthermore, between 14 June and 26 July, the MoD conducted their annual poll for charting public attitudes towards the British armed forces. The results showed that 68% of respondents believe the army's role is defending the state. However, just 11% responded that their duties include supporting the police in the event of a national emergency and only 6% believe that the army plays a role in countering terrorism.<sup>505</sup> This is interesting given that the poll was conducted just two months after the Manchester Bombing and the first time that Operation Temperer was employed. Thus, the British public's perception of the appropriate role of the British army, even in the face of a serious terrorist threat, was summarised succinctly by the British historian Keith Jeffrey, who wrote in 1985 that 'the British army, when it fights, fights abroad'.<sup>506</sup>

The evidence of Operation Temperer and the provisions now enshrined in CONTEST for large-scale domestic deployments of the military in the event of serious crises indicate that in the future the British army may well be required to fight at home. However, as the evidence for Britain's cultural preferences for domestic military deployments uncovered in this thesis indicates, we might extend Jeffrey's assertion to 'the British army, if it fights at home, must adhere to proportionality, last resort, and most crucially, subordination to the civil power.'

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<sup>503</sup> Keith Jeffrey in Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan eds.; *Military Intervention in Democratic Societies; Chapter 2; Military aid to the Civil Power in the United Kingdom – an historical perspective* (Kent: Croon Helm, 1985), p. 51

<sup>504</sup> General Sir Richard Barrons, *The Evening Standard*, 'It's right to have soldiers on the streets but not in the long term', 25 May 2017

<sup>505</sup> MOD and Armed Forces Reputational Polling, Summer 2017 Survey Topline Findings (27-07-17), ICM Unlimited on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. Q.3a, 'What do you think the armed forces actually do?' p.4 [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/684573/Public\\_Opinon\\_Survey\\_-\\_Summer\\_2017.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/684573/Public_Opinon_Survey_-_Summer_2017.pdf) (accessed 02 September 2018)

<sup>506</sup> Keith Jeffrey in Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan eds.; *Military Intervention in Democratic Societies; Chapter 2; Military aid to the Civil Power in the United Kingdom – an historical perspective* (Kent: Croon Helm, 1985), p. 51

The evidence presented in this chapter certainly seems to confirm the hypothesis that historical experiences have influenced cultural preferences for the use of the army in a domestic context, which has constrained the behaviour of policymakers. Changes in attitudes have occurred slowly over time as evidenced by the praise for the military at Peterloo, and the rejection of a military role against protesters thereafter. Further, where more rapid shifts have occurred, they have been as a result of strong institutions, bold leaders and usually a sufficiently high threat perception that creates a climate that is receptive to a change being made; for example in 1980 with the Embassy siege and, most recently, with Operation Temperer.

Overall, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the findings is that regardless of the era, the nature of the deployment, and even the nature of the threat all of the responses indicate that any use of the military on the national territory must always remain in line with Britain's core cultural preferences, and any attempts to contravene these preferences leads to the societal rejection of a putative deployment. While the evidence presented in this chapter has provided compelling evidence of the veracity of the hypothesis, a comparative case will strengthen the argument. Accordingly, we turn now to France's experiences with domestic military deployments.

## Chapter 6 – The historical origins of France’s preferences for domestic military deployments.

*‘La justice sans la force est impuissante ; la force sans la justice est tyrannique.’*

Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, 1670<sup>507</sup>

### 6.1.: The November attacks and a strategic shift

On 13 November 2015 in Paris, at 21:00 in the evening, a televised international football match between France and Germany took place at the *Stade de France*. Seventy-nine thousand people, including the then President of France, François Hollande, and German *Bundestkanzlerin*, Angela Merkel, were in attendance. During the first half, at the sixteen and nineteen-minute mark, two explosions, audible on the live footage, were heard around the stadium.<sup>508</sup> The crowd, at that stage oblivious to what was happening, can even be heard to cheer the second explosion, perhaps mistaking it for a flare or firework. The game was played to its conclusion with the players and French commentators unaware of what had happened just outside the stadium, the football on display providing an eerie juxtaposition to the events that were unfolding across Paris; a sophisticated, coordinated attack perpetrated by individuals loyal to the Salafist extremist organisation that calls itself Islamic State (IS).

The first explosion heard at the stadium had been a suicide bombing carried out by a man known as Ahmad al-Mohammad.<sup>509</sup> He detonated his vest at 21:17 outside Gate D of the stadium killing himself and the first innocent victim of the night, the Portuguese chauffeur Manuel Colaço Dias.<sup>510</sup> The second explosion occurred three minutes later when a man who remains unidentified detonated his vest outside Gate H.<sup>511</sup> The intention of the attackers had been to enter the stadium to detonate their vests, but both had been blocked from entering

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<sup>507</sup> Pascal, Blaise. *Pensées de Blaise Pascal, Tome Premier*. (Paris: Ant. Aug. Renouard, 1812/1670), p. 241

<sup>508</sup> *France Allemagne avec l’explosions au Stade de France*, Explosions are audible at 26:02 and 29:14 of the video. See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nVleyG9ocVg> (accessed 15/10/2016)

<sup>509</sup> A Syrian passport with the name “Ahmad al-Mohammad” was found with his body. However, the document was later proved to be a forgery. His true identity is yet to be revealed to the public.

<sup>510</sup> Dominic Fifiield, Euro 2016 and the forgotten victims of Saint-Denis, *The Guardian*, 3 June 2016. See: <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/jun/03/france-forgotten-victims-traumas-security-euro-2016-paris-attacks> (accessed 21/10/2016)

<sup>511</sup> Unravelling the Connections between the Paris Attackers, *New York Times*, 18 March 2016. See: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/15/world/europe/manhunt-for-paris-attackers.html> (accessed 21/10/2016)

by security guards who discovered the explosives during routine security checks. A third explosion, not audible on the footage of the game, occurred just before 22:00 at a McDonald's restaurant in the vicinity of the stadium when a twenty-year old French national named Bilal Hadfi detonated his vest.<sup>512</sup>

At almost exactly the same time as the attacks at the *Stade de France*, at 21:24, a second group of two individuals (Ibrahim Abdeslam and Chakib Akrouh) armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles carried out a series of shootings at several restaurants and bars in the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> arrondissements before Ibrahim Abdeslam walked into the *Comptoir Voltaire* café and detonated his suicide vest.<sup>513</sup> A soldier of the rank Chief Marshal of Lodgings (*Maréchal des logis-chef*), referred to only by the initials G.A., revealed how he happened to be out for a drink with colleagues on *Rue de Charonne*, just a two-minute walk from the bar *La Belle Équipe* where one of the shootings took place. He spoke of how a crowd came running past in a panic and he picked out the word '*attentat*'.<sup>514</sup> According to G.A., he immediately picked up the phone to his commanding officer and offered to mobilise a number of soldiers whom he knew to be nearby.<sup>515</sup>

His commander, identified only as Capitaine P-M. A., who was also giving his account of events in this session, stated that he gave his agreement 'immediately' since the nature of the situation meant 'we should not ask too many questions'. Shortly after Capitaine P-M. A. had given his approval for the use of the armed forces, a 'group of eight soldiers arrived at a run, equipped with bullet-proof vests, helmets and long guns' and secured the area.<sup>516</sup> Their presence, according to Capitaine P-M. A. had 'the immediate effect of reassuring those

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<sup>512</sup> It transpired that Hadfi had also attempted to enter the stadium, but had been turned away as he did not have a ticket. See: Fournier, Catherine. 'Attentats de Paris : Bilal Hadfi, le jeune jihadiste du Stade de France, amateur de jeux vidéo et de taekwondo', *Franceinfo*, 21 December 2015. See: <https://bit.ly/2xfkr6H> (accessed 28/04/2017)

<sup>513</sup> Miraculously, in spite of the proximity of those in the café to the explosion, no-one other than Abdeslam was killed in the explosion. Akrouh escaped the area on that night, but was killed in a counter-terror operation in *Saint-Denis* on 18 November.

<sup>514</sup> 'attack'

<sup>515</sup> G.A., *Maréchal des logis-chef* cited in 'Rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enquête, relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l'État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015', tome 2: COMPTES RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, *Assemblée Nationale*, no. 3922, p. 250

<sup>516</sup> "Long weapons" or "long guns" is a term often used to refer to sniper and assault rifles. In this case, it refers to the standard issue FAMAS rifle which has been used by the French armed forces since 1970. For quote see: 'Rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enquête, relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l'État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015', tome 2 : COMPTES RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, *Assemblée Nationale*, no. 3922, p. 250

present, including the police, [who were] poorly equipped to deal with a situation of this nature.’<sup>517</sup>

At around 21:25, the Commissioner of the police unit *Brigade anti-criminalité* (BAC), which usually deals with serious crimes such as gang violence and drug trafficking, received a call from the information and command centre that an explosion had occurred at the *Stade de France*.<sup>518</sup> He ordered one of his colleagues to gather his equipment and drive him to the stadium immediately. While they were on their way, a general alert about an incident at the Bataclan theatre came through on the radio. At 21:40, the same time that Abdeslam had detonated his vest in the *Comptoir Voltaire*, a third group of assailants comprising three French nationals (Ismaël Omar Mostefaï, Samy Amimour, and Foued Mohamed-Aggad) had entered the Bataclan theatre in the 11<sup>th</sup> arrondissement where the American rock group *The Eagles of Death Metal* were performing. They opened fire with assault rifles and threw grenades before taking hostages.<sup>519</sup>

Coincidentally, when the radio alert came through, the commissioner of the BAC and his driver were just 500 metres away from the Bataclan. They pulled up outside and exited their vehicle. Upon hearing bursts of fire from inside they switched off their radios and entered the building with their sidearms drawn. Progressing slowly through the lobby and into the main hall they found themselves in close proximity to Samy Amimour who, unaware of their presence, was threatening a man with his weapon. Fearing for the safety of the individual, the commissioner and his colleague opened fire, wounding Amimour, who then detonated his vest. According to the commissioner, they were unaware that it was a suicide vest and had assumed someone had thrown a grenade towards them. He therefore decided that they had too little firepower and a lack of information to deal with the remaining threat effectively and so he and his colleague then exited the theatre where his BAC colleagues had begun to

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<sup>517</sup> G.A., *Maréchal des logis-chef* cited in ‘Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête, relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015’, tome 2 : COMPTES RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, *Assemblée Nationale*, no. 3922, p. 250

<sup>518</sup> See pages 246 -247 for a full discussion of BAC’s role.

<sup>519</sup> ‘Unravelling the Connections Between the Paris Attackers’, *New York Times*, 18 March 2016. See: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/15/world/europe/manhunt-for-paris-attackers.html> (accessed 21/10/2016); *What we know about the Paris attacks and the hunt for the attackers*, *Washington Post*, 18 March 2016. See: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/paris-attacks/> (accessed 21<sup>st</sup> October 2016); Martinez, Michael. *Timeline: What happened in Paris Attacks*, *CNN Online*, 15 November 2015. See: <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/14/world/what-happened-in-paris-attacks-timeline/index.html> (accessed 21/10/2016)

gather along with a few military personnel who had been on patrol as part of *Vigipirate*.<sup>520</sup> In an attempt to take advantage of the firepower these troops had at their disposal, one of the BAC personnel radioed to his superior to request the assistance of the armed forces that were on the scene. However, the response was ‘Negative. Do not engage the military. We are not in a war zone.’ According to the BAC officer, one of the soldiers echoed this sentiment by stating that he did not have orders to engage and would therefore be unable to offer his support.<sup>521</sup>

At 22:20, members of the *Brigade de Recherche et d’Intervention* (BRI), a judicial police unit operating in Paris, and *Recherche, Assistance, Intervention, Dissuasion* (RAID), a national police unit specialised in counter-terrorism, also arrived at the scene and the elite counter-terrorist military unit, the *Groupe d’intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale* (GIGN) had been placed on standby at the nearby *Célestins* barracks. After spending some time devising a plan, they formed a joint assault column and stormed the *Bataclan* at 00:18.<sup>522</sup> Members of RAID swept through the downstairs of the concert hall and BRI took the upstairs. In an assault lasting just three minutes, the two remaining terrorists, who had barricaded themselves in a room upstairs with a small group of hostages, were killed and the hostages were evacuated.<sup>523</sup>

The events of that night were the single deadliest terrorist attack in France’s history claiming the lives of 130 people and injuring more than 400.<sup>524</sup> Less than twenty-four hours later, France’s then Prime Minister Manuel Valls appeared on the popular French television channel, TF1, to announce the imposition of an *État d’urgence*; the first time such a state had been used since the 2005 riots and for only the sixth time since 1955. The language Valls

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<sup>520</sup> Vigipirate is France’s national security alert system. It was created in 1978 and takes its name from the following:

**v**igilance et **p**rotection des **i**nstallations contre les **r**isques d’**a**ttentats **t**erroristes à l’**e**xplosif. It will be discussed in depth in later chapters.

<sup>521</sup> Testimony of ‘M. T. P., brigadier-chef.’ Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête, relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015.’ TOME 2 : COMPTES RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, *Assemblée Nationale*, no. 3922, p. 358

<sup>522</sup> Various accounts are given in the hearing in the *Assemblée Nationale*. Times for the final assault carried out by BRI vary, but the most common time given is 00:18.

See: Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête, relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015. Tome 2: COMPTES RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, *Assemblée Nationale*, no. 3922, pp. 25-27

<sup>523</sup> Piel, Simon. ‘Au Bataclan, deux heures d’intervention policière sans négociation’, *Le Monde*, 16 November 2015. See: [https://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/16/au-bataclan-deux-heures-d-intervention-policiere-dans-l-enfer-de-dante\\_4811065\\_4809495.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/16/au-bataclan-deux-heures-d-intervention-policiere-dans-l-enfer-de-dante_4811065_4809495.html) (accessed 07/06/2017)

<sup>524</sup> Closed session. Testimony of Maréchal des logis R. D., p. 252. See: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-enq/r3922-t2.pdf>

used during the interview seemed to be a departure from the typical French view of terrorism as a crime.<sup>525</sup> For example, he stated: ‘What I want to say to the French people is that we are at war. Yes, we are at war. What happened was an act of war methodically organised by a terrorist army.’<sup>526</sup> In fact, Valls used the word ‘*guerre*’ thirteen times in a twelve-minute interview leading the French newspaper *Libération* to report that he had ‘but one word on his mind’.<sup>527</sup> This more belligerent rhetoric was echoed by President Hollande a few days later who declared before French parliament – ‘*La France est en guerre*’. This was not a formal declaration of war, which under Article 35 of the French constitution requires parliamentary approval and also only concerns ‘interven[ing] abroad’, not on the national territory.<sup>528</sup> Instead, this was a figurative militarisation of the threat by France’s top policymakers and a way of preparing the citizens of France for the sight of increased numbers of heavily armed troops on their streets.<sup>529</sup>

Interestingly, and in keeping with this rhetorical militarisation of the threat, in the wake of the attacks much of the scrutiny into existing security arrangements among policy-makers and in the media was not focused on how to expand the powers of, or better equip the civil forces, but rather whether the military should have played a greater role in the events. For example, why had the civil forces of intervention, RAID and BRI been deployed rather than the GIGN despite the latter’s counter-terrorist expertise and the fact they were stationed at barracks just a six-minute drive from the *Bataclan*?<sup>530</sup> Should requests for assistance from the military have been granted? What is the point of the military’s presence if they cannot

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<sup>525</sup> Foley, Frank. *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 44: ‘Both British and French policy makers perceive terrorism as a crime.’

<sup>526</sup> Manuel Valls, “Il n’y aura un moment de répit pour ceux qui s’attaquent aux valeurs de la République”, 14 November 2015. See: <http://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/5846-manuel-valls-au-20h-de-tf1> (accessed 19 October /2016) : “*Ce que je veux dire aux Français, c’est que nous sommes en guerre ... Oui nous sommes en guerre. Ce qui s’est passé était un acte de guerre organisé méthodiquement par une armée terroriste*”.

<sup>527</sup> ‘*qu’un mot à la bouche*’ - Lilian Alemagna, Laure Bretton; Manuel Valls: ‘Nous sommes en guerre’, *Libération*, 14 November 2015. See: <http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/11/14/manuel-valls-nous-sommes-en-guerre-1413503> (accessed 17/05/2017)

<sup>528</sup> Constitution de la République française. Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 35: ‘La déclaration de guerre est autorisée par le Parlement.’ ; ‘Le Gouvernement informe le Parlement de sa décision de faire intervenir les forces armées à l’étranger, au plus tard trois jours après le début de l’intervention.’

<sup>529</sup> Manuel Valls had made a similar impassioned speech to the *Assemblée nationale* on 13 January 2015 after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. He stated: ‘Sommes-nous en guerre ? La question a en réalité peu d’importance, car les terroristes djihadistes, en nous frappant trois jours consécutifs, y ont apporté une nouvelle fois la plus cruelle des réponses. Il faut toujours dire les choses clairement : oui, la France est en guerre contre le terrorisme, le djihadisme, et l’islamisme radical.’ See: Assemblée nationale. XIVe législature. Session ordinaire de 2014-2015. Compte rendu Integral. Première séance du mardi 13 janvier 2015. See: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr/2014-2015/20150106.asp#P409364> (accessed 02/02/2017)

<sup>530</sup> Le Parisien, ‘Attentats de Paris : des gendarmes du GIGN s’en prennent à leur chef’, 13/07/2016. See: <http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/attentats-de-paris-des-gendarmes-du-gign-s-en-prennent-a-leur-chef-dans-une-lettre-anonyme-13-07-2016-5962707.php> (accessed 02/02/2017)



engage threats?<sup>531</sup> Should the rules of engagement on the national territory be adapted to allow more autonomous and spontaneous military decision-making when facing threats in the future?<sup>532</sup>

The shift in the tone of the language from policy-makers and the calls for a greater role for the military on the national territory quickly led to an expansion of the remit of *Opération Sentinelle*, an operation that had first been implemented in January 2015 after two brothers, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, inspired by Al-Qaeda, had attacked the offices of the controversial satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* killing twelve individuals - ten journalists and two policemen. At that stage, the *Ministère des Armées*, the French Ministry of Defence (MoD), integrated into their 'operational contract' the need 'to deploy up to 10,000 soldiers' on the national territory in order to augment 'the permanent posture of security and deterrence.'<sup>533</sup>

In practical terms, *Sentinelle* provides for the mass deployment of the army on the French national territory in order, as the French MoD, explains, to 'defend and protect the French.'<sup>534</sup> It allows for up to 10,500 troops (10% of the French army's total effective force) to be stationed across the country at any one point in time at locations deemed to be at high risk of attack – this includes 'airports, train stations, Jewish schools, kosher restaurants, and

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<sup>531</sup> See for example: Le Point. 'Attaque du Bataclan: l'échange sidérant entre un militaire et un policier', 24 March 2016. See: [https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/attaque-du-bataclan-l-echange-siderant-entre-un-militaire-et-un-policier-24-03-2016-2027759\\_23.php](https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/attaque-du-bataclan-l-echange-siderant-entre-un-militaire-et-un-policier-24-03-2016-2027759_23.php) (accessed 02/02/2017); RTL, 'Attentats à Paris : l'armée n'a pas pu aider la police lors de l'attaque du Bataclan', 9 May 2016. See: <https://www.rtl.fr/actu/debats-societe/attentats-a-paris-l-armee-n-a-pas-pu-aider-la-police-lors-de-l-attaque-du-bataclan-7783159761> (accessed 02/02/2017); BFM.TV. 'Attaque du Bataclan: l'incroyable conversation entre un policier et un militaire', 24 March 2016. See: <https://www.bfmtv.com/societe/attaque-du-bataclan-l-incroyable-conversation-entre-un-policier-et-un-militaire-961689.html#xtor=AL-68> (accessed 02/02/2017); Thomasset, Flore. 'Attentats du 13 novembre : une nouvelle plainte sur l'intervention au Bataclan.' *La Croix*. 04/07/2018. See: <https://www.la-croix.com/France/Securite/Attentats-13-novembre-nouvelle-plainte-lintervention-Bataclan-2018-06-08-1200945562> (accessed 21/02/2019)

<sup>532</sup> See question from Georges Fenech to Lieutenant-Colonel D.D.: considérez-vous qu'une attaque terroriste d'une intensité supérieure à celles que nous avons connues l'année dernière pourrait justifier que vous soyez sollicités pour intervenir prioritairement, en mettant à profit votre expérience militaire, et non comme force d'appui ? Rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enquête, relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l'État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015.' Tome 2: COMPTES RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, *Assemblée Nationale*, no. 3922, p. 257

<sup>533</sup> Conégéro, Col, and Facchin, Lt. Ministère des Armées. 'Contrat opérationnel - Trois hypothèses d'engagement des forces terrestres'. 09/03/2015. See: <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/communaute-defense/trois-hypotheses-d-engagement-des-forces-terrestres> (accessed 02/02/2017)

<sup>534</sup> '...pour défendre et protéger les Français.' - Ministère des Armées. *Opération Sentinelle*. See: <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/france/operation-sentinelle?page=4> (accessed 17/05/2017)

synagogues.’<sup>535</sup> In addition to the permanent deployment of these troops, the army also maintains a strategic reserve of 3,000 troops for cases of an ‘exceptionally urgent nature.’<sup>536</sup>

Despite the unprecedented scope of *Sentinelle*,<sup>537</sup> there was almost no resistance from policy-makers across the political spectrum, the media or from the general public to the idea of a mass deployment of the armed forces.<sup>538</sup> Indeed, in 2015, ‘*rassurantes*’ (‘reassuring’) was the adjective that the public believed best described the army.<sup>539</sup> Furthermore, in 2018, the Public Opinion Research Institute (*Institut français d'opinion publique* – IFOP) found that *Sentinelle* was supported by 78% of French people and, furthermore, that 81% of French people trust the armies to intervene on national territory in the event of a terrorist attack.<sup>540</sup>

Viewed in a certain light, France’s recent response to the threat of Islamist terrorism could be considered a departure from previous approaches; an unprecedented threat from Islamist terrorism necessitated an unprecedented response. Indeed, the scale of *Sentinelle* has certainly represented a conceptual and operational shift for the French armed forces, while the public perception of a serious threat may have rendered people more amenable to the need for extreme measures. However, the high level of support in France may still come as a surprise due to an extensive and historically turbulent relationship with the army in a domestic context which seems incongruous with the French people’s inherent spirit of *résistance* and the cherished value of *liberté*.

Some significant examples of France’s negative experiences with domestic deployments include the uprisings in Lyon and Paris in 1831 and 1832, the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, the Commune in 1871, in *Fourmies* in 1891, the Languedoc revolt in 1907 and the PCF strikes in 1947/48. Furthermore, throughout the centuries the army has played a direct role in shaping the political landscape of the country. For example, Napoléon Bonaparte’s

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<sup>535</sup> Shurkin, Michael. “The Abilities of the British, French, and German Armies to Generate and Sustain Armored Brigades in the Baltics”, *RAND Corporation*, 2017, p. 5

<sup>536</sup> Bollier, Séverine. ‘Sentinelle: Un dispositif optimisé’, *Armées d’aujourd’hui*, November 2017, no. 420, p. 37

<sup>537</sup> Valls, Manuel speech before Assemblée nationale. XVe legislature. Session ordinaire de 2014-2015. Compte rendu Integral. Première séance du mardi 13 janvier 2015. See: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr/2014-2015/20150106.asp#P409364> (accessed 02/02/2017): ‘Les renforts de soldats affectés – en tout près de 10 000, c’est sans précédent et j’en remercie M. le ministre de la défense.’

<sup>538</sup> Chéron, Bénédicte. *Le soldat méconnu: Les Français et leurs armées : état des lieux*. (Paris: Armand Colin, 2018), p. 15

<sup>539</sup> DICOd. ‘Les chiffres clés des sondages de la Défense 2015’. 07/01/2016. See: <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/les-chiffres-cles-des-sondages-de-la-defense-2015> (accessed 27/09/2018)

<sup>540</sup> IFOP-DICOd, mars 2018. ‘Les chiffres clés de sondages de la Défense’, 14 juillet 2018

accession to power following the Coup of 18 Brumaire in 1799 when Napoleon entered the chambers of the Council of the Five Hundred with his Grenadier guards in ‘a massive show of military strength.’<sup>541</sup> The coup was a powerful representation of the politico-military nexus and the role that the army has played in influencing political order in France.<sup>542</sup>

This is something that would raise its head once again during the May 1958 crisis that saw the collapse of the Fourth Republic and pushed the country to the brink of civil war.<sup>543</sup> The military’s loyalty to de Gaulle led dissenting officers to devise a secret plan (*Opération Résurrection*) which would see them deploy 1,500 paratroopers in Paris and march down the *Champs-Élysée* to the *Assemblée Nationale*. Despite de Gaulle’s protestations to the journalist Maurice Duverger (‘Do you think that at sixty-seven I am going to begin a career as a dictator!?’),<sup>544</sup> the military’s deep involvement in shaping the Fifth Republic was plain for all to see – de Gaulle even arranged to meet Pierre Pflimlin, the short-lived Prime Minister of the Fourth Republic, at the *Chateau Saint Cloud* where the Coup of 18 Brumaire had taken place to discuss a handover of power.<sup>545</sup> However, the army’s influence over French politics at the time was perhaps best summarised by the French general Jacques Massu’s ominously succinct statement in an interview in 1960: ‘The Army has the power.’<sup>546</sup>

Given experiences such as these, what, then, accounts for the French acceptance of the widespread domestic military deployments under *Sentinelle*? In relation to the research question of this thesis, does it represent a significant attitudinal shift? Or, perhaps closer analysis of *Sentinelle* and patterns in the rhetoric relating to past military deployments will unveil evidence of common and enduring themes?

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<sup>541</sup> Doyle, William. *The Oxford History of the French Revolution*, 2 ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 375

<sup>542</sup> This event was depicted in François Bouchot’s famous 1840 painting which shows a chaotic scene in *Orangerie of the Chateau Saint Cloud* with members of the *Directorate* gesturing and shouting towards Napoléon who stands calmly in the foreground in full military dress. In the background are the bayonets and distinctive *Bonnet à poils* of the Grenadiers with whom Napoléon would later storm the Council of the Five Hundred.

<sup>543</sup> Fenby, Jonathan. *The History of Modern France: From the Revolution to the War with Terror*. (London: Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 349

<sup>544</sup> Jackson, Julian T. *A Certain Idea of France: The Life of Charles de Gaulle* (London: Penguin Books, 2018), p. 214

<sup>545</sup> A number of comparisons have been drawn between de Gaulle and Napoleon. See, for example, the French historian Patrice Gueniffey who writes: ‘Les deux histoires de l’Empereur et du Général se rejoignent à un moment et à un seul de leurs carrières respectives: le 18 brumaire et le 13 mai et les quelques années qui suivirent.’ Gueniffey, Patrice. *Napoléon et De Gaulle, deux héros français*.

<sup>546</sup> Massu, Jacques interview with Hans Ulrich Kempfski. ‘MASSU-INTERVIEW, Die letzte Kugel.’ *Der Spiegel*. 03/02/1960. See: <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-43063185.html> (accessed 18/02/2017)

### 6.1.1 Historical experience: Three eras of deployment

The first step in determining continuity and/or change in France's preferences for the use of the armed forces must begin with an examination of historical precedents for the army's usage internally. Chart 10 traces and then charts these precedents between 1800 and 2019. The data for this section of the thesis is drawn from extensive research using a number of sources. For example, the *Archives Nationales*, both historical and recent debates in the *Assemblée Nationale* and the *Sénat*, speeches and statements by policymakers and military personnel, the correspondence or memoirs of certain influential political or military figures, the media, and, of course, from a wealth of secondary sources such as books and journal articles. As with the British case, it is not necessarily an exhaustive list, but examines what are termed 'significant' deployments.

The chart predominantly displays *armée de terre* engagements. However, an exception is made for the *gendarmerie* deployments in the early nineteenth century under the reign of Napoleon I. Like the yeomanry units that were used during the same period in Britain, the *Gendarmerie* were originally heavy cavalry units,<sup>547</sup> thus a direct comparison is possible. They were also included due to the crucial role that Napoleon saw them playing in the maintenance of France's security. He described the *gendarmerie* as an 'exceptional' unit and deploying them as 'the most effective way to maintain the tranquillity of a country...'<sup>548</sup> Furthermore, although their role was predominantly to preserve internal order, Napoleon often deployed them to supplement regular troops in campaigns abroad or to guard the rear of advancing armies. In fact, it was arguably not until 1921 and the formation of the *Gendarmerie Mobile* that the unit began to fulfil more of a civil, rather than military, duty. Hence the exclusion of the *Gendarmerie* from the data beyond 1921.

Using the same method as in the British case, each deployment that was identified was coded according to its purpose: first, was it 'active' (i.e. involving armed troops to counter a specific threat)? or 'passive' (i.e. unarmed troops deployed to assist the civil power in some capacity)? Within these broad categorisations, each deployment was then grouped according to its specific purpose; for example, to counter a terrorist threat, to quell civil disorder, or to provide disaster relief. In France, six different types of domestic deployment were identified (compared with four in Britain): 1) Riot, protest, and insurrection; 2) Defence from


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<sup>547</sup> Britt, Albert Sidney III. *The Wars of Napoleon*. (New York: Square One Publishers, 1972), p.174

<sup>548</sup> Napoleon. Correspondance. XII, No. 10 243. *Lettre au roi de Naples*, 16 May 1806

Invasion.<sup>549</sup> 3) Coup d'état.<sup>550</sup> 4) Striking Civil Service / Personnel Provision; 5) Disaster relief. 6) Counter-terrorism.<sup>551</sup>

**Chart 10: 'Significant' domestic military deployments in France: 1800 – 2019**



*Source: author's calculation based on evidence from Archives Nationales, Assemblée Nationale, Sénat, and secondary literature. See Appendix 2 for full list of deployments.*

<sup>549</sup> This category only includes examples where French troops have taken part (rather than battles in the First or Second World Wars that occurred on French territory, but only involved American or British troops, for example). It includes the major battles fought by the *Forces françaises libres* (Free French Forces) army led by Charles de Gaulle in the Second World War.

<sup>550</sup> Although only two examples of a coup d'état were identified, it was important to include them due to their impact on France's political environment as well as the impact these events have had on the French psyche.

<sup>551</sup> Generally, this category focuses on the use of the *armée de terre* rather than other divisions such as *l'armée de l'air* or the *marine nationale*. However, the list does include special forces operations conducted domestically by the GIGN for counter-terror purposes. It was important to include GIGN deployments in the examples since: 1) the unit was created in 1973 as a direct response to the Munich Olympics attack and therefore marked the beginning of the integration of the armed forces into France's counter-terrorism strategy; and 2) its inclusion facilitates a direct comparison with the British equivalent, the SAS, in order to contrast the conditions under which they can be called out and what the general rhetorical response to their operations is.

The first, and most striking, aspect of chart 10 is the sheer number of domestic military deployments that have taken place on French national territory over the last two hundred years.<sup>552</sup> It was hypothesised that historical experiences influence cultural acceptance or rejection of the use of military forces internally; chart 10 certainly demonstrates a strong historical precedent that may be guiding France's general acceptance of the army's use on the national territory. After all, the consistent reliance on the armed forces domestically over time implies, to repeat Gray's quote, that an action that is 'sufficiently established and enduring'<sup>553</sup> can be described as a cultural preference. For comparison, in the British case 102 'significant' instances were identified – itself not a small number by any stretch of the imagination. However, in France there have been at least 420 occasions when the armed forces have conducted significant internal operations. This averages nearly two deployment every year over the study.

The second aspect to note from chart 10 is that, unlike the British case, which exhibited a clear delineation between the different eras of domestic deployment, in France there is significant overlap between the purpose of each deployment. For example, the 1851 – 1875 column shows that troops were deployed to fulfil three distinct objectives: to quell civil unrest, to defend against foreign invasion, and to carry out a *coup d'état*. Further, one hundred years later in the 1976 – 2000 column, the army was called on to counter-terrorism, defend against invasion, to provide cover for striking civil service personnel and to provide disaster relief. This is demonstrative of the reliance that the French state has historically had on the armed forces to fulfil a multitude of domestic duties. It is also further evidence of the connection the French make between internal and external security since, on many occasions, the threat of invasion by a foreign power was complemented by an internal threat of subversion through fifth columns or other groups that were perceived to be a threat to stability. For example, in the wake of the Second World Wars, when the threat posed by Nazi Germany had dissipated, the USSR began to present itself as a new threat. France structured its armed forces based on the potential for another massive inter-state conflict but, in terms of domestic politics, the French Communist party became a serious cause for concern and the term '*ennemi de l'intérieur*' entered into political discourse again for the

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<sup>552</sup> See appendix two for the full list of these deployments.

<sup>553</sup> Gray, Colin S. 'British and American Strategic Cultures', paper prepared for Jamestown symposium 2007: 'Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years of Transatlantic Engagement', 18-19 April 2007, p. 37

first time since the French Revolution.<sup>554</sup> It was for this reason that the armed forces were called to deal with the *Parti communiste français* (PCF) strikes in 1947/48 which had taken on an ‘insurrectional character’.<sup>555</sup>

With such a long history of domestic deployments and at least 420 significant incidents, the question arises as to which specific experiences seem to have cultivated modern French preferences for the use of the armed forces on the national territory? Here it is helpful to refer to the changes in the nature of each deployment. Chart 10 clearly demonstrates not only continuity in terms of a reliance on the army domestically, but also change through how the role of the *armée* has shifted over the years. We could even use the same example as that highlighted above; in the column 1851 – 1875, the army was required to quell civil unrest, to defend against foreign invasion, and to carry out a *coup d’état*. Just over a hundred years later, between 1976 and 2000, the only consistent domestic duty is that of defence against invasion and even this category is slightly different in that during the Cold War the duty was one of protection and deterrence while between 1851 and 1875 it involved active conflict against an enemy.

In fact, what chart 10 tells us is that three clear eras of domestic deployment are identifiable:

**Riot, protest and insurrection: 1800 - 1921.** This has been the most common purpose for deploying the military in France’s history with 151 separate events over the time period. Indeed, from the French Revolution until the early twentieth century, the army were the first resort for the maintenance of public order.<sup>556</sup> However, there is a sharp downward trend in the number of deployments that begins in the 1870s following the events of *la semaine sanglante* which saw as many as 25,000 deaths in a bloody confrontation between troops of the Third Republic and the rebellious communist government of the Commune of Paris.

Of course, there were still some serious instances of the armed forces being used after that event. For example, the *Fusillade de Fourmies* in 1891 that saw soldiers open fire on textile

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<sup>554</sup> This term has been used throughout France’s history to describe revolutionaries, perceived traitors, heretics, communists; in effect any individuals or groups who were seen to be a threat to the stability of the government of the time and has often been the justification for the use of force against these groups.

<sup>555</sup> Vivens, Jean-Louis. ‘Conflit social ou affrontement politique ? La grève des mineurs en France en 1948 sous les angles de la solidarité et de la répression’ *Histoire*. 2015. ffdumas-01256750f. p.7

<sup>556</sup> Brown, Howard. ‘Domestic State Violence: Repression From The Croquants To The Commune’, *The Historical Journal*, 42:3 (1999), pp. 597-62

workers killing nine and injuring 35. It was perhaps this event that marked the beginning of the end for troop deployments conducted against the people. For example, in 1906 Georges Clémenceau called in around 40,000 troops during the Miner's strike, the decision was not a popular one and, the following year, during the so-called Revolt of the Languedoc Winegrowers, there was the almost unprecedented event of an army mutiny when the 17<sup>th</sup> line infantry regiment refused to follow orders to open fire on a crowd. It was the growing distaste for using the armed forces in this capacity that eventually led to the formation of the *Gendarmerie Mobile* in 1921 and, despite the aberration of the 1947/48 PCF strike, the end of the era of using regular troops for the maintenance of public order.

**Defence against Invasion: 1800 - 1984.** Unlike Britain, whose historically powerful navy and favourable geographical location has ensured it has remained largely immune from invasion, France has faced multiple threats from foreign adversaries. Indeed, over the time period, France has fought in six wars that have involved at least 132 battles on their national territory and have been occupied on five of those occasions: under the Sixth Coalition in 1814, under the Seventh Coalition between 1815 and 1818, by the Prussians in the North of the country between 1870 and 1871, by Imperial Germany in the North-East of the country between 1914 and 1918 and, of course, by Nazi Germany and Italy in the Second World War between 1940 and 1944. This persistent threat of invasion has necessitated the maintenance of large standing armies through conscription and fomented an inescapable internal component to France's defence mentality.

Although no battles or wars have occurred on French national territory since the end of the Second World War the French government still took very seriously the threat posed by state actors (notably the USSR). September 1950 saw the creation of the *organisation territoriale interarmées de défense* (OTIAD) which established a strategy of national defence across four areas: national, defence zone, military region and department. This was updated to *défense intérieure du territoire* (DIT) in December 1956 and *Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire* (DOT) in 1959 which had the objective of 'annihilating the enemy elements which would succeed in establishing themselves on the national territory.'<sup>557</sup> Under DOT, the military maintained a presence on the national territory to protect France's strategic nuclear

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<sup>557</sup> Messmer, Pierre. 'Notre politique militaire', *Revue de Défense Nationale*, May 1963, p. 761



forces and deter both internal and external enemies until 1984 when responsibility for these functions was ceded to the *Gendarmerie*.

**3) Counter terrorism: 1972 - present.** In some senses, this era can be seen as a continuation of the defence from invasion era. The need to respond to the perceived threat from subversive elements has been a recurring theme in France's domestic security strategy against both conventional and unconventional threats across time. For example, France's war in Algeria between 1954 and 1962 brought with it the threat of terrorism on the mainland and, in 1958, three *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) attackers opened fire on the French Information Minister, Jacques Soustelle's car, who escaped unharmed. The country also suffered a series of attacks throughout the 1960s perpetrated by the pro-colonialism, right-wing group the *Organisation Armée Secrète*. However, none of these incidents prompted a military response. In fact, it was not until the high-profile attack at the Munich Olympics in 1972 that the French policymakers felt it necessary to create a dedicated counter-terrorist unit. The attack led to the formation of the GIGN in 1973 and, gradually, the *armée de terre* became closer integrated into France's domestic security architecture through the *plan Vigipirate* (originally named *Pirate*).

With the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s, the threat of large-scale industrial war dissipated. As the size of France's standing army was cut back in response to the new threat environment, the army also began to play a much greater role in countering a growing threat from terrorism in the 1990s. A series of bombings in the 1990s led to the deployment of a small number of troops in static guarding positions at vulnerable locations such as train stations and it is this model which paved the way for the eventual implementation of *Sentinelle* in 2015.

For France, then, we are presented with evidence of significant change in how the armed forces have been used domestically over time. The next step is to assess whether these shifts in strategy have also led to shifts in attitudes. Of course, it is not the purpose of this thesis to provide a narrative of two hundred years of French history. Instead, the objective is to try and trace the cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically as expressed through rhetoric and discourse at formative moments in France's history. As such, the remainder of this thesis will examine formative moments in each of the three eras identified above and then analyse the language used by policymakers and military personnel before

during and after each event to try and identify continuity or change in attitudes in order to establish what impact, if any, historical experience and culture have on France's strategic approach.

### **6.1.2. Structure of the French case**

The remainder of this chapter will focus on historical precedents for using the army to quell civil unrest. It will proceed as follows:

**Section 6.2.** This section will examine the essential historical context through the French Revolution. It will argue that it was during this time that many enduring norms were forged such as the French view of the inseparability of internal and external theatres and the close bond between the nation and the army through the *levée en masse*. It will briefly discuss Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert's distinction between a *force de dedans* and a *force du dehors* before examining the early days of the *Gendarmerie*.

**Section 6.3.** This section will analyse the deployments associated with riot and protest. It will focus on the events of the Commune of Paris in 1871, which according to the data marked the most formative moment for France given the steady decline in the use of the armed forces domestically thereafter. It will examine parliamentary debates related to the use of the army against the Commune drawing out themes such as the internal-external security nexus and the rhetorical dehumanisation of the adversary (in this case the *Communards*). It will compare these responses to those of policymakers after Clemenceau's use of the troops during the Revolt of the Languedoc Winegrowers in 1907; given the mutiny of the 17<sup>th</sup> line infantry regiment this appeared to be the final nail in the coffin for active military deployments against the people and led, like 1829 in Britain, to a fundamental institutional shift in how France approaches public disorder.

**Chapter 7, Section 7.1** focuses on the defence against invasion era. It starts with an analysis of the First World War when the deaths of over a million Frenchmen on French soil forged a closer bond between the army, the nation, and its people. Following on from the events of Languedoc, it no longer seemed appropriate to use soldiers against one's own compatriots and, in 1921 the *gendarmerie mobile* was formed. It will examine some inter-war recruitment campaigns to highlight the point that while a domestic duty was still portrayed

as being an essential component of life in the army, the nature of domestic deployments seemed to be depicted as far more passive.

It will then focus on the post-Second World War environment, the PCF strikes, and the return of the concept of the *ennemi de l'intérieur*. It will argue that the perception of a high threat from subversive elements led to a closer integration of the military into Cold War domestic security architecture through doctrine such as DIT and DOT in the 1950s. It examines the *coup d'état* in 1958 and the suspicion of the army this generated from policymakers resulting in a predominantly protective internal duty for the army, rather than one of intervention which would be left to civil forces.

**Section 7.2** examines the counter-terrorism era. It argues that the growing threat from transnational terrorism in the 1970s was an extension of the previous era and the notion of an *ennemi de l'intérieur*. It will discuss the gradual integration of the army into France's counter-terrorism responses with the formation of the GIGN in 1973 and the development of the *Pirate* plan, which became *vigipirate* in 1991. It will then analyse the responses to *Sentinelle* from 2015 arguing that although *Sentinelle* appears on the surface to represent a significant strategic shift, a comparison of the cultural preferences across time indicates that the character of the operation is in keeping with at least a hundred and fifty years of French historical precedents for the use of the army domestically lending weight to the hypothesis that historically-derived cultural preferences have constrained France's strategic culture.

**Section 7.3** concludes by summarising the findings in the context of the French mindset, focusing on how dialectical perspectives form an essential part of the French psyche by valuing equally psychological *and* practical dimensions of strategy, internal *and* external security, and, crucially, continuity *and* change.

## 6.2. Historical context. The French Revolution

Of all the events in France's past, none has arguably been more impactful or created more significant political, social or economic reverberations than the French Revolution of 1789 - 1798. Indeed, it was even during the French Revolution that the term *idéologie*, a concept so important to the French psyche, was coined.<sup>558</sup> While it is not the purpose of this thesis to dwell on this already well-documented period of France's history, it is necessary to mention briefly the enduring impact of the Revolution as it is often seen as the bookmark in France's story that divides the ancient from the modern. For example, for theorists such as Michel Vovelle, it is the most significant moment in terms of the formation of the French *mentalité* and constitutes the birth of the nation's enduring dialectic between left and right politics, religion and secularism, ideology and reason, internal and external security, the nation and its army.<sup>559</sup>

The immediate cause of the Revolution had its root in the Great Fear of 1789. The Third Estate (the peasantry), which comprised roughly 90% of France's population at the time had endured years of poor harvests and, in July, rumours began circulating in rural France about a plot by the aristocracy to starve them to death. In Paris, these fears were exacerbated by Louis XVI's decision to dismiss the minister for Finance, Jacques Necker and deploy around 25,000 troops around the city. For the Parisians, this was seen as the start of the plot against them. One man, the journalist and close friend of Georges Danton, Camille Desmoulins is said to have delivered an impassioned speech at the news of Necker's dismissal, exclaiming: 'one resource is left; to take arms!'<sup>560</sup>

A spirit of popular resistance was typical of the period and Revolutionary France was marked by 'an almost continuous succession of conflicts'<sup>561</sup> as the various factions vying for control recognised that power lay at the point of the bayonet. 1792 proved to be a year of particular

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<sup>558</sup> De Tracy, Destutt. *Projet d'éléments d'idéologie: A l'usage des écoles' centraux de la republique française* (Paris: Pierre Didot, Year IX). 'ideology (idéologie) can be divided into normative standards, cognitive beliefs, and moral judgements. The political and social context to de Tracy's theory of ideology lends it greater significance and helps further elucidate the tension between what *should* be done (ideology) and what *can* be done (pragmatism) that characterises the French *mentalité*.

<sup>559</sup> Vovelle, Michel. *La Révolution française: 1789-1799, 3eme ed.* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2015/1992)

<sup>560</sup> Mignet, François-Auguste. *History of the French Revolution from 1789 to 1814.* (Library of Alexandria, 1856), p. 14

<sup>561</sup> Rothenberg, Gunther E. 'Soldiers and the Revolution: The French Army, Society, and the State, 1788-99' *The Historical Journal*. 32:4 (1989), p. 981

turmoil; Louis XVI had been allowed to continue to rule, but under a constitutional monarchy established by the first constitution of 1791. Yet his continued vetoes of decrees issued by the Legislative Assembly coupled with fears of an Austrian and Prussian invasion in defence of the monarchy, increased tensions between Republicans and Royalists. These tensions came to a head in August when armed revolutionaries clashed with Swiss Guards on the streets of Paris. The August insurrection culminated with an assault on the Tuileries Palace, the arrest of Louis XVI and the ultimate abolition of the Monarchy.

This was a ‘sink or swim’ moment for the Revolution. The Legislative Assembly had declared war with Austria on 20 April 1792 after troops of the Habsburg monarchy began to amass on France’s border. Later in the Spring, war was also declared with Prussia. As well as external threats on France’s borders, there were also significant fears of internal counter-revolutionary movements leading to the emergence of the term *l’ennemi de l’intérieur*. These fears provoked the Jacobin leader, Maximilien de Robespierre, to state that the ‘French people must now rise up and arm themselves completely, whether to fight abroad, or to keep a lookout for despotism at home.’<sup>562</sup> As Robespierre’s statement demonstrates, at this crucial moment in time, security in France was seen as a simultaneously internal and external endeavour.

The trouble was that France was in no shape to wage war. If they failed to defeat the Austrian and Prussian coalition the monarchy would be restored, but in 1791 the French army totalled around 130,000 men compared with around 500,000 troops that the Austrians were capable of fielding and around 200,000 that Prussians had at their disposal. The notion that France faced multiple threats, both internal and external, but lacked the means to overcome them, was reflected in the Legislative Assembly’s famous declaration on 11 July 1792 that ‘*la Patrie est en danger*’.<sup>563</sup> The text makes direct reference to the ‘internal agitation’ that had disrupted the security of the nation and appeals to them to ‘keep watch with untiring activity over the enemies within’. It also makes clear appeals to the revolutionary ideals of liberty, security, justice, and courage as well the more practical sense of duty to defend the nation. Thus, the declaration encouraged the people to fight ‘with the general enthusiasm of freedom

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<sup>562</sup> Robespierre cited in Davidson, Ian. *The French Revolution: From Enlightenment to Tyranny*. (Profile Books Ltd, 2016), p. 86

<sup>563</sup> *Citoyens. Le Patrie est en danger. Proclamations et lois rendus a cette occasion*. (Paris: Journal Vedette, 1792)

and the deep feeling of the duties of citizen-soldiers'.<sup>564</sup> This crucial point connected the duty of defence to each citizen, harnessing their martial spirit and forging an enduring association between the nation, the people, and the military.<sup>565</sup>

The survival not just of the Revolution, but France herself was dependent on her ability to mobilise all of the nation's resources. Thus, militarily this period also created significant changes in France's approach to warfare and defence. The *levée en masse*, which attempted to capitalise on the French people's revolutionary spirit, mobilised all of France's 'industry, all her building works, all her engineering works'<sup>566</sup> and also placed French citizens in 'permanent requisition for army service'.<sup>567</sup> It was formally implemented in 1793 due to a dire need for a greater number of troops to fight in the French Revolutionary Wars. In 1792, the standing army stood at around 220,000 troops, but by 1794 the French ranks had swelled to an enormous 750,000 troops.<sup>568</sup> To paraphrase Robert Peel, in France the army were the public, and the public were the army.<sup>569</sup>

The idea of a citizen army arguably derived from the influential writing of the French general and military philosopher, Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert who published his celebrated work *Essai général de tactique* in 1770.<sup>570</sup> Much of *Essai* is concerned with the tactical side of warfare, addressing, for example, marching formations or the benefits of doubling ranks to deal with cavalry attacks, however, it is his more philosophical musings on the concept of a citizen army that catch the attention. In one passage that demonstrates an uncanny level of foresight, Guibert warned that 'weak' or 'poorly-constituted' states would forever be victims of circumstance fearing 'agitation from within, and attack from without'.<sup>571</sup>

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<sup>564</sup> *Citoyens. Le Patrie est en danger. Proclamations et loix rendus a cette occasion*. (Paris: Journal Vedette, 1792), pp. 1-5

<sup>565</sup> It is this connection between the army and the people that will create fierce debate in the future when armed forces are used against the people; how can an army comprising French citizens be turned against those citizens in times of unrest?

<sup>566</sup> Deputy Barère, 23 August 1793, cited in Serman, William and Bertaud, Jean-Paul. *Nouvelle Histoire militaire de la France, 1789 – 1919*. (Paris: Fayard, 1998), p. 79

<sup>567</sup> Galisset, Charles Michel. *Corps du droit français*, vol. 1 Issue. 2, Paris, 1843, p. 1043

<sup>568</sup> Corvisier, Andre. *Histoire Militaire de La France de 1715 à 1871*, tome II. (Paris, France: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), pp. 238-244

<sup>569</sup> Robert Peel had originally stated that, in Britain, 'the police are the public and the public are the police.'

<sup>570</sup> See Beatrice Heuser's discussion of Guibert's legacy in Heuser, Beatrice. *Guibert: prophet of total war?* In: Förster, Stig and Chickering, Roger, eds. *War in an age of revolution, 1775–1815*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 46-67.

<sup>571</sup> Guibert, Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de. *Essai Général de Tactique. Tome Premier*. (London: Libraires Associés, 1772), p. li

Consequently, he advocated the formation of a *milice* – an army comprising the citizens of the state, rather than a professional body of troops. These conscripts would fight to defend the nation when called upon, cutting army maintenance costs. Further, the size of a *milice*, motivated by the desire to defend their way of life, their livelihoods and family, would be nearly ‘invincible’. Of equal importance to Guibert was that such an army could serve a purely defensive purpose. The nation’s formidable force coupled with domestic prosperity would mean the country would have ‘nothing to fear from its neighbours’ and nor would it ‘want to initiate anything with them.’<sup>572</sup> Thus, internal stability would provide the foundation for external harmony.

Guibert’s *Essai* provided the French state with the perfect model for the *levée en masse*. Guibert would not live to see it realised, however. He died in 1790, the same year that his lesser known, but equally important work, *De la Force Publique* (On Public Force) was published. In some ways, this latter work can be seen as a rejection of *Essai*. Whereas *Essai* had advocated for a defensive citizen army, in *De la Force* Guibert found himself troubled by the dangers presented to civil liberties by arming citizens. He came to consider that there was a crucial distinction between the internal and external theatres and therefore suggested that professional military forces should be removed from duties of domestic security since they do not possess the requisite mentality. In the words of Guibert, the military mindset is ‘by its nature in opposition with all the principles of citizenship. Soldiers must have a thirst for war, and citizens a love of peace.’<sup>573</sup> As such, he argues that the military should be separated into a *force du dehors* and a *force de dedans* – an external, and an internal force.

Guibert’s idea of forming two distinct forces, one internal and one external, was as progressive as it was influential. It seems that *De la Force* inspired the reform of the Parisian police system,<sup>574</sup> indeed, many of the post-revolution policing reforms seem to follow his advice almost to the letter. For example, shortly after the fall of the Bastille, not only was the regular army pushed out of Paris, but the Lieutenantcy-General, a ‘tyrannical’ and militarised police institution that had lasted for 120 years under the *ancien regime*, was also

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<sup>572</sup> Guibert, Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de. *Essai Général de Tactique. Tome Premier*. (London: Libraires Associés, 1772), p. liii

<sup>573</sup> Guibert, Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de. *De la Force Publique*. (Paris: Economica, 1790/2005), p. 9

<sup>574</sup> Tenenbaum, Élie; “La Sentinelle Égarée? L’armée de Terre face au terrorisme”; *IFRI*, June 2016, vol. 68 p. 12

dissolved.<sup>575</sup> In its stead, a *milice* – *La Garde Nationale*, was formed under the jurisdiction of the legislature. A condition of joining the Lieutenancy-General had been tours of duty in the army,<sup>576</sup> however the *Garde Nationale* was recruited from the citizenry with its officials chosen by public vote. In a speech in 1791, Robespierre proposed ten conditions that would be essential for the *Garde Nationale* to adhere to. Conditions III and IV directly reflect Guibert's writing on the distinction between internal and external forces:

III – Line troops will remain responsible for fighting the external enemies; they can never be used against citizens.

IV – The *Garde Nationale* alone will be employed, either to defend from attacks on liberty, or to restore internal public tranquillity if disturbed.<sup>577</sup>

Despite the high hopes in the early days of the revolution for a progressive system for maintaining order and a strict delineation between internal and external force, the military steadily began to play a greater role across the country. Napoleon himself was the embodiment of France's flexible distinction between internal and external security, returning from his campaign in Egypt in 1799 to carry out a military coup on 18 Brumaire. After the coup, Napoleon was seen as the man who could restore order to France and the military were considered the most effective tool to achieve this.<sup>578</sup>

Provincial France was particularly vulnerable to episodes of disorder. Before the revolution, the *Maréchaussée* had been France's military rural peacekeeping force. It had existed since the middle ages as an independent military unit. In 1763, Sir William Mildmay, the head of the Anglo-French Commission in Paris, saw the *Maréchaussée* in action and remarked that they were engaged in 'a kind of perpetual war, not against a foreign enemy, but against such of the native subjects as disturb the peace and violate the laws of their country.'<sup>579</sup> In 1791, this force was transformed into the *Gendarmerie nationale*; a 'troop specially intended for

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<sup>575</sup> Stead, Philip John. *The Police of Paris*. (London: Staples Press Limited, 1957), pp. 63-64; Denis, Vincent. *Une Histoire de l'identité. France 1715-1815*. (Paris: Champs Vallon, 2008), p. 145

<sup>576</sup> Denis, Vincent. *Une Histoire de l'identité. France 1715-1815*. (Paris: Champs Vallon, 2008), p. 144

<sup>577</sup> Robespierre, Maximilien de. '*Œuvres complètes de Maximilien de Robespierre*', tome 6. (Paris: Bureaux de la Revue historiques de la révolution française, 1950), p. 642

<sup>578</sup> Emsley, Clive. *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 56-57

<sup>579</sup> Interestingly, Mildmay also wrote that while such a force would be beneficial to the UK, it would have to operate not as an independent military unit, but be 'subservient wholly to the civil power.' See: Mildmay, William. *The Police of France: Or, an Account of the Laws and Regulations Established in that Kingdom, for the Preservation of Peace and the Preventing of Robbers*. (London: E. Owen & T. Harrison, 1763), p. 31



internal service.<sup>580</sup> The *Gendarmerie* retained the *Maréchaussée*'s military status and the fact that it operated under the control of the Minister for War.

Napoleon was a great admirer of the *Gendarmerie* and, as his correspondence demonstrates, he was highly reliant on their ability to deal with provincial disturbances, make arrests, and counter the growing threat from brigands.<sup>581</sup> He also frequently requisitioned *Gendarmes* to supplement his ranks when on campaign. For example, the *Gendarmes* played a role during the Peninsular War and the repression of Madrid, during Napoleon's ill-fated Russia campaign at the battle of Borodino and during the War of the Sixth Coalition during the battle of Leipzig. Even in the modern era, the *Gendarmerie*, by virtue of its military status, is deployed both at home and abroad. For example, the continuing threat of insurrection in the early twentieth century led to the formation of the *Gendarmerie Mobile* in 1921 as a unit for maintaining or restoring public order – a function it still serves to this day. The *Gendarmerie Mobile* have also frequently been deployed overseas; for example, during wars in Indochina (1946 – 1954), Algeria (1954 – 1962) and even in Afghanistan (2001 – 2012).<sup>582</sup>

Of course, it is not just what we might term France's 'middle tranche' or paramilitary forces that have been deployed domestically, but conventional forces as well. The army's role transitioned from defence of the revolution from internal threats, to defence of the nation from external threats and, finally, to expansion of the empire. However, historically, the army have always been on hand to play a role in quelling public unrest. In addition to the army's role in domestic pacification, France has also faced significant threats to its territorial integrity over the years. Unlike Britain, which has only seen one large-scale pitched battle on its territory in nearly three hundred years (Culloden, 1746), France has had to fight foreign invaders on its soil in at least 159 major battles over the same period.<sup>583</sup> Also unlike Britain, which, due to its geography, has remained relatively safe from foreign invasion, France experienced enemy occupation as recently as 1940. This has necessitated a different and

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<sup>580</sup> 'Troupe spécialement destinée au service intérieur' – Loi du 14 septembre 1791 portant institution, composition, droits et devoirs de la force publique

<sup>581</sup> 'The confidential correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte with his brother Joseph, sometime king of Spain : selected and translated, with explanatory notes, from the "Mémoires du roi Joseph"'. (London: J. Murray, 1855)

<sup>582</sup> Le Parisien. 'Les gendarmes mobiles visés en Afghanistan', 8 January 2010. See: <http://www.leparisien.fr/oise-60/les-gendarmes-mobiles-vises-en-afghanistan-08-01-2010-769519.php> (accessed 10/05/2019)

<sup>583</sup> Author's calculation based on pitched battles fought on land during the War of the First Coalition, the Peninsular War, the War of the Sixth Coalition, the Hundred Days War, the Franco-Prussian War, the First World War, and the Second World War.

flexible strategic approach to defence that encompasses both internal and external operations. Thus, while the presence of troops on the streets in Britain may provoke a reaction of surprise from the public, from the French perspective it is *plus ça change...*

### 6.3. Countering Riot, Protest, and Insurrection in France

Sur une barricade, au milieu des pavés  
Souillés d'un sang coupable et d'un sang pur lavés,  
Un enfant de douze ans est pris avec des hommes.  
- Es-tu de ceux-là, toi ? - L'enfant dit : Nous en sommes.  
- C'est bon, dit l'officier, on va te fusiller.  
Attends ton tour. - L'enfant voit des éclairs briller,  
Et tous ses compagnons tomber sous la muraille.

Victor Hugo, *Sur une Barricade*, 1872

#### 6.3.1. France: left, right, everything all at once

In 1947, the French economist Jean Labasse published his book *Hommes de droit, hommes de gauche*; for Labasse, political divisions in France were so entrenched and irreconcilable that he attempted to explore the particular 'spiritual structures' of those who find themselves on opposing sides of the political spectrum in order better to understand the reasons for these divergent views. Labasse believed he noted significant differences in the character of those on 'the left' in France and those on 'the right'. He wrote that 'the spirit of the left is about protest and demands against what is established' while, by contrast, the right is about 'certainty, dogmatic assurance, anonymous constancy, respect.'<sup>584</sup> Furthermore, according to Labasse, not only is there little to no overlap between the respective mindsets or practical characteristics of 'the left' and 'the right', but he also viewed protest firmly as a characteristic of the left.<sup>585</sup>

A number of prominent French academics and policymakers have argued to the contrary of this view; not least Charles de Gaulle who, as was noted previously, stated that France is neither left nor right wing, but 'everything all at once.'<sup>586</sup> De Gaulle's then Minister for Justice, Alain Peyrefitte, argued similarly in his 1976 book *Le Mal Français*. Here he wrote that '[a]ll French people, deep down, remain ready to stand up against the state.'<sup>587</sup> He argued that within each French citizen there exists a deeply-ingrained spirit of rebellion

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<sup>584</sup> Labasse, Jean. *Hommes de droit, hommes de gauche*. (Paris: Économie et humanism, 1947), p. 13

<sup>585</sup> Ibid.

<sup>586</sup> de Gaulle, Charles. Entretien avec Michel Droit, troisième Partie, 15 December 1965. See: <https://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaulle00112/entretien-avec-michel-droit-troisieme-partie.html> (accessed 20/12/2017)

<sup>587</sup> 'Chaque français, au fond de lui-même, reste prêt à se dresser contre l'état.' Peyrefitte, Alain. *Le Mal Français*. (Paris: Plon, 1976), p. 56

which encompasses a feeling of ‘nostalgia’ for revolutions, a glorification of the ‘anarchist mythology’, a tendency to recoil at the notion of state-imposed order and a hatred of ‘*les flics*’ or ‘*les poulets*’.<sup>588</sup> Thus, for de Gaulle and Peyrefitte the notion that protest, or at least a desire to challenge the *status quo*, is a characteristic of ‘the left’ is clearly mistaken; instead the power of the state and its perceived intrusion on national life render protest a characteristic of the French in more general terms.

De Gaulle, of course, was famous for wanting to carve France in his own image, and the embracing of contradictions is typical of ‘Gaullism’.<sup>589</sup> Nevertheless, the notion that protest and dissent are defining and ubiquitous national characteristics seems to be a widely-held view in France. This is due, in no small part, to the fact that some of the most important social changes in France have occurred as a result of popular protest rather than through protracted political reform.<sup>590</sup> Most notably, of course, in 1789 when popular revolution based on the (then) radical principles of universal liberty, equality, and fraternity sowed the seeds for the modern French system that we recognise today. Indeed, the historian Jonathan Fenby writes that the lasting impact of the Revolution created a desire for radical political and social overhaul that is unique to France.<sup>591</sup>

This could be seen clearly during the 2005 *banlieue* riots,<sup>592</sup> when disaffected young French citizens of predominantly Middle Eastern, African and North African heritage rioted in the suburbs for three weeks resulting in the imposition of a state of emergency. Despite the widespread violence and destruction,<sup>593</sup> many French citizens understood the anger of the rioters who had let their rage at poor housing conditions, police brutality, and general racial discrimination boil over. Indeed, British-born author and French citizen Lucy Wadham

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<sup>588</sup> “Flics” and “Poulets” are both slang terms for the police. The English equivalent of “Flic” would be “cop” while “pig” would be the British equivalent of “Poulet”. The term “poulet” to describe the French police force originated in 1871 following the construction of the new police headquarters on the site of an old Parisian poultry market.

<sup>589</sup> Berstein, Serge. *Gaullism*. The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. Second edition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 307-308

<sup>590</sup> Wadham, Lucy. *The Secret Life of France*. (London: Faber & Faber, 2009), p. 210

<sup>591</sup> Fenby, Jonathan. *The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror*. (London: Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 3

<sup>592</sup> ‘*Les banlieues*’ refer to the outskirts or suburbs of a city. As in most cities around the world, the suburbs comprise people of all ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds. Indeed, in Paris, around 75% of the city’s population technically live in a *banlieue*. However, in the French language, *les banlieues* refers to areas of low-income housing and the individuals of predominantly non-French heritage who reside there.

<sup>593</sup> Riots occurred in 300 French cities. Around 8,000 cars were burned during the riots and 2,760 people were arrested. See: Gross, Oren & Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala. *Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 200

contends that protest (or at least dissent) is almost considered a rite of passage in France and it was the 2005 riots that marked the point at which the second and third-generation immigrants who were participating in the riots became ‘truly French.’<sup>594</sup>

Thus, dissent, resistance, and protest should be considered as accepted, essential, and formative components of France’s national character. Interestingly, there is also a clear dialectical aspect to the French psyche that is reminiscent of Simmel’s arguments on the tension between structure and agency; while the French will recoil at, and even react violently to, the idea of restrictions to public liberties, Peyrefitte also argued that they simultaneously yearn for the ‘expeditious’ and ‘merciless’ imposition of order.<sup>595</sup> The result is individual and societal division due to the tension that exists between the belief in the need for systemic overhaul and the acknowledgment that forcibly implementing changes would threaten France’s republican values in the present.

Evidence of this dialectic can be found in a circular issued to various French *départements* in November 1793 by a temporary administrative commission that had been established in Lyon. This circular offered instructions on post-Revolution governance; the pertinent passage read: ‘...to be truly Republican, each citizen must experience and bring about in himself a revolution equal to the one which has changed France.’<sup>596</sup> This statement is a recognition that a disconnect may exist between individual beliefs and the general will; it actively encourages each citizen to challenge, even change, their own views in order to better adhere to the principles expected of a French citizen. This ‘character versus self’<sup>597</sup> dichotomy further elucidates what de Gaulle meant when he spoke of the ‘currents’<sup>598</sup> that move within the French people; this tension manifests in a populace that simultaneously craves radical change (or, as Labasse wrote, ‘protest and demands against what is established’) and demands social and political ‘constancy [and] respect’.

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<sup>594</sup> Wadham, Lucy. *The Secret Life of France*. (London: Faber & Faber, 2009), p. 210

<sup>595</sup> Peyrefitte, Alain. *Le Mal Français*. (Paris: Plon, 1976), p. 56

<sup>596</sup> 'Instruction adressée aux autorités constituées des départements de Rhône et de Loire, par la Commission temporaire de Lyon (16 November 1793), reprinted in Walter Markov and Albert Soboul, ed., *Die Sansculotten von Paris: Dokumente zur Geschichte der Volksbewegung, 1793-1794*, Berlin, 1957, p. 224.

<sup>597</sup> The ‘character versus self’ dichotomy is a concept from fiction writing. It represents the idea that a person can be torn between their own ideas about how things should be (the self) and the normative expectations that are transmitted by wider society that constrain one’s actions (the character). The result is often some form of internal or external confrontation. We could refer to Winston, the protagonist from George Orwell’s 1984, as an example of this. Externally, Winston, supports the party; internally, he rejects it. This tension ends up destroying him.

<sup>598</sup> Charles de Gaulle, Entretien avec Michel Droit, troisième Partie, 15 December 1965. See: <https://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaulle00112/entretien-avec-michel-droit-troisieme-partie.html> (accessed 20/12/2017)


Typically, throughout history, the French polity has maintained constancy by obliging the calls for ‘expeditious’ and ‘merciless’ action through the use of the military. Indeed, prior to the twentieth century, the army was used extensively as a tool of repression by the French state. This is reflected in chart eleven which illustrates 151 significant instances of the French army being deployed against the people since 1800. The majority of these (83%) occurred between the years 1800 and 1871.<sup>599</sup> There were, of course, a number of significant incidents post-1871. For example, in 1891, the military’s killing of nine workers who were peacefully protesting against a twelve-hour working day in the industrial town of *Fourmies*; the mass deployment of the military under Georges Clemenceau during the Miner’s strike of 1906 and again in 1907 during the revolt of the Languedoc winegrowers; and the deployment of army to counter PCF strikes that were perceived to have taken an insurrectionary character in 1947 and 1948.

In spite of these aberrations, as chart eleven clearly illustrates, incidences of domestic military deployment for the purpose of countering civil disorder have been on a downward trajectory since 1871 and the events of the Commune. While the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, even the rural revolts of 1851 were undoubtedly significant episodes in France’s history, the inescapable conclusion based on the data is that the Commune represents the clearest formative moment for France.

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<sup>599</sup> N.B. this excludes an incident in Sevins in 2014 when a 21-year-old protester by the name of Rémi Fraisse was killed by an OF-F1 stun grenade thrown by a Gendarme. Protests had escalated over plans to construct a dam in the area. Fraisse’s death resulted in further violent protests across France and the cancellation of the dam project. This clearly was a ‘significant’ incident and provoked much debate among policymakers and in the French media over the appropriate use of force. However, it was excluded as it did not involve the deployment of regular troops, but the *Gendarmerie Nationale* who were acting in their capacity as *forces de l’ordre*; forces under the control of the civil power for the purpose of maintaining order.

**Chart 11: Riots, Protests, Insurrection. Domestic deployments, 1800 - 2019**



Source: *Archives Nationales, Secondary Literature*<sup>600</sup>

With this in mind, this chapter will first explore some of the essential historical context such as Napoleon's efforts at restoring order to the country through the Gendarmerie during the early nineteenth century. This section will focus on the language used by officials to refer to the rural population arguing that dehumanising references to the 'savagery' of the inhabitants facilitated the use of force. It will then analyse in depth the events of the Commune and the rhetoric used by French policymakers at the time. Again, it draws out from the rhetoric the idea of detachment from the adversary in order to justify the extreme measures that are taken. It will compare this to the language used during the events of the Languedoc winegrowers' revolt of 1907 – another significant formative moment in France's past due to the mutiny of a regiment who refused to fire on their compatriots. It will compare the themes in the examples to argue that by 1907 there has been a clear shift in cultural preferences away from the idea of using the armed forces as a tool for maintaining internal security.

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<sup>600</sup> List of sources in bibliography

### 6.3.2. 'The restoration of the country'

In his study of domestic state violence in France from the Croquant revolt of 1594 to the events of the Commune in 1871, the British historian Howard Brown explores the phases of popular revolt and the repressive responses by the French state. Using Max Weber's theory of the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, Brown argues that French policymakers have historically oscillated between employing reasonable, but coercive force against their citizenry in order to quell simmering civil unrest on the one hand, and using unreasonable, excessive and repressive domestic state violence through the use of the armed forces on the other. According to Brown, it is these cycles of popular unrest and military repression that have given modern France its character; for example, not only was military repression seen as an essential part of the 'civilizing process' of rural France,<sup>601</sup> but episodes of repression also made the general population more likely to resist the polity, thus embedding a sense of resistance into the general psyche.<sup>602</sup>

As noted at the start of the chapter, the majority of the domestic military deployments to counter episodes of civil unrest that were identified in the data occurred in the nineteenth century. Of course, France's tendency to rely on the military was not something that began in 1800. During the eighteenth century there were frequent examples of soldiers being used in a domestic capacity; not least during and after the French Revolution when military force became the first resort in the polity's attempts to control the parts of the country that were still experiencing political instability as a result of the chaos of factionalism, rampant criminality and general civil unrest.

The nature of the threat was encapsulated in an inaugural address by General Calvin who was appointed by Napoleon as commander of the army stationed in the Vaucluse on 6 March 1800. He stated: 'The reign of factions is over; that of order is beginning. The Government detests the wicked, and I declare in its name that I will make open war on the brigands who are devastating the countryside.'<sup>603</sup> This is an interesting early example of militarising a threat. Brigandage, which was essentially a criminal act, was treated as a state of war in

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<sup>601</sup> Brown, Howard. 'Domestic State Violence: Repression from the Croquants to the Commune.' *The Historical Journal*, 42:3 (1999), p. 660

<sup>602</sup> Ibid. pp. 597-662

<sup>603</sup> Brown, Howard. *Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon*. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), p. 302



order to justify a military response. Indeed, typically in rural France it has always been military, rather than civil, units that have dealt with unrest and maintaining order and the origins of the military unit *Gendarmerie Nationale* can be traced back to the *sergents* hired by Philippe Augustus during the crusades of 1190.<sup>604</sup> This not only makes the *Gendarmerie* France's oldest institution, but also illustrates over eight hundred years of using the military to maintain order on the national territory.<sup>605</sup>

The *Gendarmerie* had subsumed the *Maréchaussée* of the *Ancien Régime* following the events of the Revolution.<sup>606</sup> However, Napoleon, suspicious of the *Gendarmerie*'s '*esprit vaurien*'<sup>607</sup> endeavoured to reform the unit into one that would eventually become 'the first soldiers of the republic'. Its purpose, according to the law of 1798 would be 'to ensure within the Republic, the maintenance of order and the execution of the laws. A constant, ever-watchful surveillance constitutes the essence of its service.'<sup>608</sup> Although this law placed law placed the *Gendarmerie* partly under the jurisdiction of the ministry for war and partly under the ministry of the interior, its fundamental military status could not be ignored: in July 1801 by the decree of 12 Thermidor (Year IX) recruitment was expanded in order better to deal with the threat of brigands. The decree increased its capacity to 26 legions comprising 1,750 cavalry brigades and 750 infantry brigades.<sup>609</sup> Men who joined the *Gendarmerie* were required to have extensive military experience, to have served in at least three of the four campaigns that had been waged since the outbreak of the Revolution and, furthermore, to have served at least four years in the cavalry. Furthermore, on the buttons of their uniforms the words '*force à la loi*' were engraved and the symbol of the *fleur de lys* that had been previously been visible on the uniforms had been replaced by the image of a grenade.<sup>610</sup> It was to the *Gendarmerie*, through their campaigns in rural France, that Napoleon attributed 'the restoration of the country.'<sup>611</sup>

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<sup>604</sup> Diamant-Berger, Marcel. *Huit siècles de la gendarmerie*. (Paris: J.F. Editions, 1967)

<sup>605</sup> Emsley, Clive. *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 13

<sup>606</sup> The English equivalent of the *Maréchaussée* would be constabulary; a word associated with the civil police force. However, the *Maréchaussée* were a military unit and would later be reorganised into the *Gendarmerie*.

<sup>607</sup> 'Villainous spirit' – Luc, Jean-Noël. *Gendarmerie, état et société au XIXe siècle*. Histoire de la France aux XIXe et XXe siècles – 59. (Paris: Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2002), p.38

<sup>608</sup> LOI DU 28 GERMINAL AN VI, Loi relative à l'organisation de la gendarmerie nationale. No. 1807, Donnée à Paris le 28 germinal an VI, 17 avril 1798

<sup>609</sup> AF/IV/1707-AF/IV/1718 - p. 25, Organisation de l'armée de la République. 18 thermidor an IX

<sup>610</sup> Emsley, Clive. *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 42

<sup>611</sup> Letter from Napoleon to Joseph Fouché, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, Vol. 10, No. 8,375, 10 ventôse, Year XIII, 1 March 1805

### 6.3.3. Detachment, dehumanisation and the use of force

Eugen Weber's book *Peasants into Frenchmen* examines the use of force in rural France by tracking the French polity's attempt at socially and politically integrating France's provincial population into the nation as a whole. He argues that there was the prevailing assumption that two versions of France existed: the cultured France that one found in the cities along with fine art, literature, music, theatre and politics; and the savage France of the provinces where only 'officials' and 'soldiers' would dare to venture.<sup>612</sup>

Indeed, Weber dedicates some time to detailing some of the references to the savagery of rural dwellers in the language of the gentry in the nineteenth century. For example, a guidebook from 1857 wrote that the country's villages were 'hardly touched by civilization.'<sup>613</sup> Following the rural revolts of 1851, officials and military personnel would refer to the 'savagery' and 'barbarism' of the locals. One particularly astonishing passage from the memoirs of a landowner from Limousin in 1867 refers to the French peasants who worked for him as follows:

'animals with two feet, hardly resembling a man. [The peasant's] clothes are filthy; under his thick skin one cannot see the blood flow. The wild, dull gaze betrays no flicker of thought in the brain of this being, morally and physically atrophied.'<sup>614</sup>

By treating the rural populations as less than human, the soldiery was able to detach from them which, in turn, facilitated the use of extreme measures. These measures included the mass employment of military tribunals, arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force to quell dissent, even the formation of *corps d'éclaireurs* ('flying columns') of between 200 and 400 men charged with hunting those accused of brigandage and immediately trying them often without evidence. Indeed, a trial was not allowed to occur more than twenty-four hours after the capture of a brigand, thus due process and defence for those accused was entirely lacking

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<sup>612</sup> Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France, 1870-1914*. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1976)

<sup>613</sup> Chevalier, Elisa. *Guide pittoresque de la Nièvre*. (Paris: 1857) p. 274 cited in Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen. the modernization of rural France, 1870-1914*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), p. 5

<sup>614</sup> Romieu, Marie Sincère. *Des paysans et de l'agriculture en France au XIXe siècle*. (Paris: Intérêts, mœurs, institutions, 1865), p. 319

leading to the accusation that the *éclaireurs* brought ‘the Terror to the provinces.’<sup>615</sup> However, by virtue of the ‘savagery’ of the rural population, these actions did not incur much ire from French policymakers as repression was seen as the path to civilisation.

Rural France seems to have borne the brunt of the more long-lasting and repressive military policies throughout the nineteenth century. However, there are of course significant examples in France’s history where the armed forces have also been used in an urban setting. It was Paris that was the epicentre of the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, for example. While Lyon and Paris were also blighted by revolts and military repression in 1831 and 1832, respectively. Paris was again the subject of a mass mobilisation of troops in 1871 when a radical socialist government ruled Paris. The question this raises is why, if these cities were ‘civilised’, was the use of military force deemed acceptable? The following section will examine in depth the events of the Commune with a particular focus on the rhetoric that was used by French policymakers and their reactions to the use of the armed forces against the *Communards*.

#### **6.3.4. The Commune, 1871: the ‘enemies of civilisation’<sup>616</sup>**

The French Third Republic was formed against a backdrop of both extreme internal and external instability. Its predecessor, the Second Republic, had been the masters of their own downfall following the ill-advised declaration of war against Prussia. There had been concerns among the French government that German unification would shift the balance of power on the continent irrevocably away from France and, thus, parliament declared war on 16 July 1870. France had no allies and was not ready for a war against such a well-resourced and well-trained adversary and initial French advances into Prussia in early August were beaten back with relative ease. One month later the war was all but over. On 1 September, at the battle of Sedan, France lost 17,000 troops and had another 21,000 captured. By contrast, Prussia lost just 2,000. The next day, Napoleon III surrendered along with 100,000 of his troops. France had lost its leader and the path to Paris was now clear for the Prussian army.

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<sup>615</sup> Brown, Howard G. *Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon*. Charlottesville. (Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 2006), p. 318

<sup>616</sup> Chaurand, M. le baron. *Annales de l’assemblée nationale. Compte-rendu in extenso des séances*, tome VI, 4 Décembre 1871 au 13 Janvier 1872, p. 47

The Third Republic, along with a government for continuing the war known as the Government of National Defence, was proclaimed by Leon Gambetta at the Hotel de Ville in Paris just two days after the capture of Napoleon III. However, with the Prussian armies rapidly advancing, the French government relocated its capital to Tours. The siege of Paris would last from 19 September to 28 January during which time 400,000 Prussian soldiers, under the command of Helmuth von Moltke, surrounded the city, bombarded it with heavy artillery, and gradually starved the Parisians. Desperation led the Third Republic to sign an armistice agreement and, following an indemnity agreement that involved the French ceding control of Alsace-Lorraine, the Prussians allowed food to flow back into Paris. Their final humiliation would be the brief, symbolic victory parade held on the Champs-Élysées before the Prussian army departed Paris.

Some Parisians felt let down by the government's capitulation and wanted France to continue the fight; on 12 February 1871, the famous poet and author Victor Hugo returned from political exile to address the National Assembly and, in typically poetic fashion, implored the French 'to strengthen, to reaffirm, to regenerate, to become again the great France, the France of [17]92, the France of the idea, the France of the sword.'<sup>617</sup> Hugo's reference to the 'France of 1792' was also one of the reasons for growing radicalisation. Many people, including the radical Louis Auguste Blanqui, had been ashamed of the government's failure to invoke this spirit of resistance in the struggle against the Prussian siege.<sup>618</sup>

In consequence, radicals began staging demonstrations calling for '*la république démocratique et sociale*'.<sup>619</sup> Many of these demonstrations were attended by members of the increasingly politicised National Guard which, due to the exodus of the middle and upper classes during the siege, had come to be dominated by the working classes. These demonstrations would often result in violent clashes with regular troops. The most serious of these occurred on 18 March when troops attempted to remove 170 cannons from Montmartre. The National Guard attempted to prevent the regular troops from removing the cannons, capturing and executing two Generals of the French army in the process. In an

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<sup>617</sup> Hugo, Victor. *Oeuvres complètes de Victor Hugo. Actes et paroles 3*. (Paris: J. Hetzel, 1880), p.103

<sup>618</sup> Blanqui, Louis Auguste in Le Goff, Phillipe ed. *The Blanqui Reader: Political Writings, 1830-1880*. (London: Verso, 2018), pp. 271-280

<sup>619</sup> Claretie, Jules. *Histoire de la Révolution de 1870-1871, Volume 2*. (Paris: L'Éclipse, 1872), p.77

address to the National Assembly, President Adolphe Thiers declared it to be ‘an open revolt against the national sovereignty’ perpetrated by ‘[c]riminals, fools... [who] disorder and ruin’ Paris.<sup>620</sup>

After the execution of the Generals, the radicals marched towards the Hôtel de Ville, capturing it and raising their solid red flag while other National Guardsmen raided local gunpowder stores. The Commune was declared and, for seventy-two days it ruled according to revolutionary principles including the separation of church and state, the abolition of the death penalty, and secular education. The government of the Third Republic could not stand for an independent government within its borders and took swift action to crush the rebellion; during April and May they laid siege to Paris with the army pushing into the city on 21 May.

What followed was the so-called *semaine sanglante* (‘bloody week’) where an extended period of brutal repression took place at the hands of the French army. No quarter was given to the *Communards* as unarmed men and women, prisoners, innocent bystanders and even, on 24 May, the archbishop of Paris, were summarily executed. There were reports of beatings, rapes and even corpse mutilations. The savagery of the soldiers prompted the American minister to France, Elihu Washburne to declare his shock. He wrote in his memoirs that

The rage of the soldiers and the people knows no bounds. No punishment is too great, or too speedy, for the guilty, but there is no discrimination. Let a person utter a word of sympathy, or even let a man be pointed out to a crowd as a sympathizer and his life is gone. ... A well-dressed respectable looking man was torn into a hundred pieces ... for expressing a word of sympathy for a man who was a prisoner and being beaten almost to death.<sup>621</sup>

At the end of the week, in a letter entitled ‘Paris burns’, the French author Émile Zola described Paris as ‘a cemetery full of corpses and smoking debris, a field cursed and

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
<sup>620</sup> Thiers, Adolphe. *Jurisprudence générale du royaume en matière civile, commerciale et criminelle : ou Journal des audiences de la Cour de cassation et des Cours royales*. (Paris: Bureau de la Jurisprudence Générale, 1871), p. 29

<sup>621</sup> Hill, Michael. *Elihu Washburne: The Diary and Letters of America’s Minister to France during the Siege and Commune of Paris*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), pp. 203-204

deserted, like the fields of Babylon and Thebes.<sup>622</sup> Some of the highest estimates place the death toll at 30,000 people.<sup>623</sup>

This was a war (albeit a limited war in terms of time and geography) between working class revolutionaries and the state and it left an indelible mark on France. But how did the policymakers of the time react to the events? Chart twelve provides a summary of 119 statements that were analysed during the early stages of the Commune and during the ‘bloody week’. Like the British case, statements supporting the use of the armed forces are coded in green and are to the left of the chart. Neutral statements that state facts without any discernible tone are coded in orange in the centre and negative statements that condemn the use of the armed forces are in red on the right of the chart.

**Chart 12: Reactions to the use of the army against the Commune – 1871**



Sources: *Archives Nationales, l'Assemblée nationale, Sénat*

<sup>622</sup> Zola, Émile. Le 25 mai 1871 - 4<sup>ème</sup> letter – ‘Paris brûle’

<sup>623</sup> Fenby, Jonathan. *The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror*. (London: Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 172

First, it is worth noting the extreme political division in the tone of the debate. This supports de Gaulle's claim that France is a country of 'everything all at once'. There is an interesting spread between the positive statements, which comprise 51% of the total, and the negative statements, which make up 37%. This is a tangible piece of evidence which illustrates France's tendency to see polarised views on certain issues. This is compared with the British charts, which generally convey consensus.

The most frequently referenced positive themes from the speeches and statements are that the use of the army was necessary given the threat and that the army conducted itself admirably. For example, according to the Minister for the Interior, Ernest Picard, France had been 'struck by an insurrection which has no equal in history' but the 'army has fulfilled its duty ... and defends the cause of France with intrepidity and patriotism unequal measure.'<sup>624</sup> Picard's reference to patriotism is interesting given that the army was fighting French citizens. However, it relates to another frequently mentioned theme, which is that the situation constituted a state of war. Again, Picard stated: 'The state of war is blatant. The declaration of a state of siege is therefore not dictated by political considerations, but by defence needs.'<sup>625</sup> This is an interesting statement in that it conveys a sense of rational necessity; Picard is not suggesting a military response for emotive or moral reasons, but rather it is a calculated assessment based on the perceived level of the threat and the requirements of the state at that time.

The centre-right politician Antonin Lefèvre-Pontalis argued similarly with the succinct statement that '[i]t's necessary to use force against violence.'<sup>626</sup> Again, this is a matter-of-fact statement that is removed from moral argument. Pontalis is simply stating that as soon as the National Guard and the *Communards* took up arms, they constituted a threat to the stability of Paris and, through Revolutionary ideas that spread to other Communes across the country, to France as well. As a result, in his view, the only recourse was the use of the armed forces in order to meet and quell the threat.

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<sup>624</sup> Picard, Ernest. *Journal officiel de la République française*, 4 April 1871, no.94. p. 392

<sup>625</sup> Picard, Ernest. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, 20 March 1871, Annexe no. 59

<sup>626</sup> Lefèvre-Pontalis, Antonin. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, 20 March 1871, p. 10

There are numerous other examples of individuals who argued along similar, rational lines. For example, Centrist Étienne Vacherot stated ‘In such a situation, [of a municipal Paris] I declare to you that, on my own account, I see no other guarantee of order than a state of permanent siege.’<sup>627</sup>; another minister declared that ‘Society will not be possible if such attacks cannot be suppressed by force...for there can be no freedom when violence prevails in any form.’<sup>628</sup> The irony of the latter statement is, of course, that extreme violence was used in order to suppress the Commune. Nevertheless, the speeches and statements are replete with fairly unemotive references to the rather biblical notion of violence begetting violence.

There are of course more emotive references in the statements. One of the most prevalent relates to the concept that, upon taking up arms against the state or even by rejecting the values that were perceived to represent France, members of the Commune had forfeited their rights as citizens. For example, the vice-President of the Senate, René Béranger stated ‘they threatened Paris, and by that very fact they prevented Paris from being free.’<sup>629</sup> This is a less rational statement that falls broadly within the concept of an appeal to emotion. He implies that the actions of the *Communards* contravened the vague, undefined notion of Parisian values thereby undermining the city’s freedom.

Interestingly, Béranger refers simply to ‘they’, perhaps in an attempt to delineate between the two sides and detach himself from the adversary. In fact, this idea of detachment is one of the most glaring themes that comes across in the speeches. All of the members of the Commune were French citizens. Although they had rejected the authority of the Third Republic, their disdain was not based on any anti-French sentiment, but rather a different version of France that respected what they felt were true Republican values (*la république démocratique et sociale*). Nevertheless, the French policymakers refer almost exclusively to ‘brigands’, ‘bandits’, ‘criminals’, ‘insurgents’, and ‘enemies’. The implication is that their criminal status puts them in opposition to France’s values, forfeiting their rights as citizens and transforming them into legitimate targets. For example, Joseph de Carayon-Latour, a politician and colonel in the French army at the time, declared that ‘[w]e should consider

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<sup>627</sup> Vacherot, Étienne. *Journal officiel de la République française*, 8 September 1871, no. 250, p. 3296

<sup>628</sup> Picard, Ernest. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, 20 March 1871, p. 41

<sup>629</sup> Béranger, René. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome II, 20 March 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 35



them as they deserve, as bandits and enemies’.<sup>630</sup> While one statement quite explicitly declared that those who had killed the two generals at Montmartre could no longer be considered French. A witness to the incident stated that one of the generals ‘had the misfortune... to receive two new wounds.’ And that [u]nfortunately these wounds had been made by French hands.’ Jules Favre, Minister for Foreign Affairs, immediately asserted that ‘Those hands are not French!’<sup>631</sup> There are also references to battles between the ‘soldiers of France’ and the ‘insurgents’,<sup>632</sup> the ‘bandits of Paris’,<sup>633</sup> of a ‘fight against the enemies of France’,<sup>634</sup> against ‘our internal enemies’<sup>635</sup> and against ‘the enemies of civilisation.’<sup>636</sup>

This brings us back to the notion of dehumanisation and detachment that was discussed earlier. It is a basic psychological fact that humans have an innate ability to form attachments. Indeed, modern attachment theory posits that it is not so much an ability as a need.<sup>637</sup> In other words, it is constitutive to our humanity. To take this a step further, we are more likely to form attachments to things to which we can identify and empathise. In short, humans will naturally identify with other humans. Samuel L.A. Marshall addressed a similar point in his book *Men Against Fire* where he noted that around 75% of the US soldiers in the Second World War would intentionally miss their targets.<sup>638</sup> With this in mind, when faced with a conflict situation it is necessary to employ methods that sever, or at least limit, attachment. One such method is to appeal to the sense of duty; to return to the rhetoric of policymakers during the Commune, one statement argued that ‘one would fail all one’s duties towards the State and the fatherland if one were not to shoot [at the crowds]’.<sup>639</sup> A second method is to rhetorically distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This is what the French state did when referring to the ‘savages’ of rural France and again here by implying that the

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<sup>630</sup> Carayon-Latour, Joseph de. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome II, 20 March 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 62

<sup>631</sup> Favre, Jules. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome II, 20 March 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 15

<sup>632</sup> Ibid.

<sup>633</sup> Carayon-Latour, Joseph de. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome II, 20 March – 12 May 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 62

<sup>634</sup> *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome V, 19 August – 16 September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 417

<sup>635</sup> *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome V, 19 August – 16 September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 415

<sup>636</sup> Chaurand, M. le baron. *Annales de l'assemblée nationale. Compte-rendu in extenso des séances*, tome VI, 4 Décembre 1871 au 13 Janvier 1872, p. 47

<sup>637</sup> Johnson, Sue. *Attachment Theory in Practice: Emotionally Focused Therapy (EFT) with Individuals, Couples and Families*. (New York: The Guildford Press, 2019), p. 5

<sup>638</sup> Marshall’s book is controversial and the sources for his statistics are highly questionable. Marshall, Samuel L. A. *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command* (Infantry Journal, 1947)

<sup>639</sup> Lasteyrie, M. de. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale: compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome V, 19 August – 16 September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 482

*Communards* were ‘uncivilised enemies’ thus justifying the use of force. There is a clear, and shocking, example of this in one particular statement taken from a period during the ‘bloody week’. Here, Adolphe Thiers is recounting the actions of the troops to the assembly:

in the midst of the waves of a population that surrounds them on all sides, they see in front of them men, women who are not armed with rifles. They, who did not hesitate before the Prussians, hesitated before this multitude.... we had to bring them back from the left bank of the Seine, that there, they would be safe from any dangerous contact, that there, they could use their weapons.<sup>640</sup>

Thiers laments the fact that the soldiers would not fire at the unarmed men and women who they were facing. Clearly, their proximity meant that they could see the faces and the genders of their opposition. The troops would automatically have formed attachments; they would have viewed the masses as compatriots, not targets. Thus, it was necessary to withdraw his troops to a position where the crowd was amorphous or, at least, where the crowd’s faces became silhouettes, in order to shoot more effectively.

Unlike the British Hansard archives, the French sources annotate many of the speeches with the reactions of the crowds (e.g. ‘assent on the left benches’, or ‘applause from the right and centre benches’). There are also annotations that indicate widespread approval throughout the *assemblée nationale* and many of the descriptive anecdotes (such as that quoted above) incite praise from all benches of parliament regardless of political affiliation. It is often as if the officials are revelling in the brutal conduct of the military when a member recounts the actions taken against the insurgents. For example, when the Minister of the Interior spoke of the bravery of the troops in their actions defending France from insurrection, the annotations indicated ‘renewed and very lively applause’ and when one individual referred to the actions of the National Guard, the annotation indicated that members from ‘all sides’ shouted ‘insurgents!’.<sup>641</sup> This implies that there was a degree of unity and consensus, regardless of political affiliation, when it comes to those who are perceived to have forsaken the norms and values of the state and risen ‘in open revolt’ against it.

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<sup>640</sup> Carayon-Latour, Joseph de. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale: compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome II, 20 March – 12 May 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 36

<sup>641</sup> Journault, M. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale: compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome II, 20 March -12 May 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p.218

Having said this, as the chart demonstrates, there are still a significant number of voices who opposed the actions of the state during the Commune. Here it is worth drawing a brief comparison with the British case following the Peterloo massacre. In that instance, the rhetoric demonstrated that there was general approval of the actions of the troops with comparatively fewer negative reactions. However, here, there is a greater degree of dissent. The most frequently referenced theme is that the actions of the state were dangerous and provocative. Given the scale of the killing that occurred at the hands of the army, this is unsurprising. One of the most vocal opponents to the events was Louis Blanc. In one particularly emotional outburst he argued that the repressive use of force may inspire new revolutions. He stated: 'my God! Sirs, if I were convinced that the politics of force could save my country, would I speak as I speak?'.<sup>642</sup> Blanc's position is ironically similar to the one made by his colleagues to justify the use of force in the first place, in short that violence begets violence. However, Blanc's argument is that this creates a cycle of violence that is difficult to break.

Blanc's is not the only emotional response to the events. Indeed, most of the objections to use of force are moral rather than practical. For example, references to the 'tyranny' or 'despotism' of the state, rejections of the repression as anti-French or anti-Republican, references to the unjustified suppression of civil liberties, to the 'savagery' and 'brutality' of the army. Again, Blanc reminded the assembly that they should not think that in Paris there are only insurgents, only people who want blood and destruction. 'Don't believe it' he states, 'I am talking about this population which is made up of men who, like you, are interested in order.'<sup>643</sup> However, one of the most poignant was perhaps by M. Brunet who referred to the 'fratricidal struggle in Paris'<sup>644</sup>. Fraternity was of course one of the pillars of the French Republican system and Brunet's statement would thus have been a striking reminder that the bodies lying dead on the streets of Paris were not foreign enemies, but French citizens.

A further category that bears mentioning is the references to history in the speeches and statements. After all, it is these references to past experiences that arguably provide some of the strongest evidence for the influence that history exerts on cultural preferences. There are

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<sup>642</sup> Blanc, Louis. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome II, 20 March -12 May 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 10

<sup>643</sup> Ibid.

<sup>644</sup> Brunet, M. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale: compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome II, 20 March -12 May 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 627

unsurprising references to the French Revolution and often the 1848 revolution (which is mentioned 130 times in one parliamentary session).<sup>645</sup> The military's interfering role in politics is raised in the context of the coup d'état on 18 Brumaire in 1799. There are also references to events that occurred in the seventeenth century and even one statement that even mentions Oliver Cromwell's questionable use of the army following the first English Civil War ('In England, the key to Parliament [i.e. the troops], that key which Cromwell put in his pocket, remained there').<sup>646</sup> Interestingly, the events of history are interpreted in very different ways. For example, the revolution of 1848 is invoked in both a sense that supports the use of the armed forces and also in a context that rejects it. This 'war of memory'<sup>647</sup> reflects the dialectical nature of French politics and the constant debate over the implications and interpretations of certain historical events.

The analysis shows that there is an interesting balance between the positive and negative opinions on the use of military force. There are relatively few neutral statements which is an indication of the strength of feeling in French politics. Sitting on the fence is rare and most comments are made not to state a fact, but to convey a broader moral or practical point. Having said this, chart 12 does clearly illustrate the connection that the French state draws between internal and external security and the fact that the war with Prussia had directly led to the event of the Commune comes across very clearly in the statements. It is also worth noting that very few of the dissenting voices actually had a problem with the concept of deploying the army against the enemy in the first place – many even declared that the threat to Paris and France as a whole was undeniable. Instead, most of the opposition came from the prolonged state of siege and the military repression that stemmed from it. Some noted the 'hunting' of Republican journalists, arbitrary arrests, and unjustified use of force; these, it was argued, are not French values.

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<sup>645</sup> *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome V, 19 August – 16 September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871)

<sup>646</sup> Blanc, Louis. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome V, 19 August – 16 September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 433

<sup>647</sup> 'In France, the past is never fixed. There is a constant war of memory among politicians on how to harness it.' Florian Gallieri comments to author, 22 September 2018

### 6.3.5. The impact of the Commune

The aftermath of the Commune illustrates a fascinating cultural difference between Britain and France. In Britain, following the events of the Peterloo massacre, which had resulted in the deaths of eighteen civilians, Robert Peel founded the metropolitan police force in order to limit the military's role in domestic affairs. In France, following the 1848 revolution, the state devised a piece of legislation that presented the military with more authority in times of crisis. This law is known as the 'state of siege' and was introduced on August 9, 1849. Article one of this law declared that a state of siege could be called 'in the event of imminent danger to internal or external security'.<sup>648</sup> The events of the Commune, as noted earlier, resulted in as many as 30,000 deaths at the hands of the military. However, again, rather than retract the state of siege law or take legislative steps to redefine the military's role on the national territory, the French state instead cemented their faith in the military as an internal force by simply adapting the phrasing of article one to make it less ambiguous. With the law of 3 April, 1878 the working of article 1 of the state of siege law was modified from 'imminent danger' to 'imminent peril' resulting 'from a foreign war or an armed insurrection'.<sup>649</sup>

It also added a temporal dimension to the terms of the state of siege declaring that prior to its implementation, its duration should be announced. Following the expiration of this period, the state of siege was automatically lifted, unless a new law extended it. In the wake of the Commune, in some municipalities, it was maintained until 1876 and, in the legislative elections of 1876, there were still four departments subject to a state of siege: Seine, Seine-et-Oise, Rhône and Bouches-du-Rhône. One can only assume that it is France's historical precedents for deploying the armed forces on the national territory (see chart 10) and a general civic tolerance of a permanent and visible military presence among them, that led to the decision to grant *more* power to the military following an episode of severe repression, rather than less as was the case in Britain.

While the military's role on the national territory for the purposes of quelling civil unrest was reduced during the Third Republic, there were still a number of tragic incidents resulting from their use – often under a state of siege. For example, in 1891 a conscript army that was poorly trained at dealing with civil unrest, was called to Fourmies in the Nord department.

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<sup>648</sup> Projet de loi du 28 juillet 1849 sur l'état de siege. Chapitre III : Des effets de l'état de siege. Article 1.

<sup>649</sup> Loi du 3 avril 1878 relative à l'état de siege. Article 1.

Here peaceful demonstrations by industrial workers were taking place against a twelve-hour day. The mantra of the demonstrators was ‘*C’est les huit heures qu’il nous faut !*’<sup>650</sup>. However, the 145<sup>th</sup> infantry felt threatened by the gathering crowds and opened fire killing nine men and women, one girl was just eleven years old. This event certainly marred the image of the army as an internal force and it would be sullied even further in the early twentieth century under Georges Clemenceau’s tenure as Minister for the Interior.

### 6.3.6. The Languedoc Revolt (1907)

In the first few months of the Third Republic, Georges Clemenceau had been appointed as the mayor of the 18<sup>th</sup> arrondissement of Paris and was also elected to the national assembly. He had tried, unsuccessfully, to mediate between the government and the Commune; the government’s position was intransigent, and the radical *Commune* refused to recognise his authority as mayor. Clemenceau’s frustrations at the impasse led him to declare that he was ‘caught between two bands of crazy people, those sitting in Versailles and those in Paris.’<sup>651</sup>

Clemenceau’s direct manner of speaking and his uncompromising manner led him to be given the nickname of ‘tiger’. On several occasions throughout his career, he would demonstrate that this moniker was well-earned; in March 1906 he was appointed as the Minister of the Interior, that same month he ordered the mobilisation of 20,000 soldiers to deal with a large-scale miner’s strike that resulted from a mine collapse in *Courrières*. The presence of the troops did nothing to calm the miners, but, following mass arrests, they eventually backed down.

However, the following year Clemenceau was again confronted with a major crisis when winegrowers in the Languedoc region went on tax strike. Demonstrations grew almost exponentially in size over the weeks with protests held on each Sunday. The first on 31 March saw around 500 protestors in attendance. A week later there were 1,000; a week after that 5,000. By 9 June around 600,000 people had turned out to protest and concerns were

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<sup>650</sup> Cherat, Didier. *Les petites histoires de l’Histoire de France*. (Paris: Larousse, 2018), p. 44

<sup>651</sup> Clemenceau, Georges in Fenby, Jonathan. *The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror*. (London: Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 167

growing in government over a potential insurrectionary movement.<sup>652</sup> Clemenceau felt a show of force was necessary and ordered around 25,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry troops to the region to supplement the *Gendarmerie* who were already there. However, the military's presence just exacerbated the situation leading to clashes and several deaths when the troops opened fire.<sup>653</sup>

### **6.3.7. Responses to the use of the army during the Languedoc Revolt**


Chart 13 provides a summary of 109 statements that were analysed during the revolt of the Languedoc winegrowers. Like chart 12 which outlined the rhetoric around the use of the armed forces against the Commune, we also see the clear divided opinions that seems to be an enduring character of French politics. Indeed, in this case, the division appears to be even more marked: 61% of the statements oppose the idea of deploying the armed forces, 34% approve, and just 5% could be classified as neutral statements.

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<sup>652</sup> Maurin, Jules and Pech, Rémy. *1907, les mutins de la République: la révolte du Midi viticole*, (Toulouse: Privat, 2007), ; Smith, Andrew W. M. *Terror and terroir: The winegrowers of the Languedoc and modern France*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016)

<sup>653</sup> Grossin et Bancel, Chefs de bataillon. 'Emploi de la force armée sur le territoire métropolitain de 1791 à nos jours', *Prix Fondation Maréchal Leclerc de Hautescloque*, 2016. See: <https://www.fondation-marechal-leclerc.fr/cba-grossin-et-bancel-prix-fondation-2016/> (accessed 09/01/2018)

**Chart 13: Reactions to the use of the army during the Languedoc Revolt - 1907**



Sourcess: *L'Assemblée nationale, Sénat*

In terms of the positive statements, once again the notion that the level of the threat necessitated the military response is the most mentioned. There were references to the ‘revolutionary state’<sup>654</sup> or the ‘forces of revolution’<sup>655</sup> that were operating in the region. There were also numerous anecdotes about ‘suspicious men with big clubs’ or the ‘hostile crowd’ that pelted the troops with stones. In eyes of the those on the side of justifying the use of the army, this lack of respect for the law meant that the citizens had forfeited their rights. For example, Clemenceau himself delivered this stark warning:

<sup>654</sup> Jaurès, Jean cited in *Journal officiel de la République*, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : compte rendu in-extenso, 28 Juin 1907, p. 1564

<sup>655</sup> Benoist, Charles cited in *Journal officiel de la République*, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : compte rendu in-extenso, 21 Juin 1907, p. 1473



They disrupted the public services, they forced us ... to make the troops march to enforce respect for the law. They revolted against the troops, they riddled [the troops] with stones, revolver shots. They burned down the Perpignan prefecture, they burned down a police station in Béziers, they tried to burn down the Narbonne sub-prefecture. All these are actions, like mutinies, that come with a price.<sup>656</sup>

It is interesting that Clemenceau lays the blame entirely at the doorstep of the protesters. It was their actions that ‘forced’ the state to take action in order to ‘make them pay.’ Having said this, compared with the rhetoric used during the Commune, there are no references to ‘enemies’, ‘insurgents’, or even ‘criminals’. Instead, they are simply referred to as protesters who have disrespected the law. Thus, it is by virtue of their abandonment of the state’s legal norms that their rights to peaceful treatment have been forfeited. There is a sense in the positive rhetoric, however, that the policymakers are trying desperately to justify their use of force. The problem is that the presence of ‘suspicious men with big clubs’ in no way justifies a deadly response by French infantry and cavalry units and this is frequently pointed out by the opposition voices.

Félix Aldy, for example stated that ‘there is a great danger in sending the army against the people. In the present circumstances, it has been done with absolutely incomprehensible lightness.’ He mentions that when he arrived in Narbonne he observed ‘the occupation by armed force, the occupation most painful for French hearts, that of our own troops having invaded part of our territory like a conquered country.’ Aldy opined that the deployment had gone ‘beyond the limits of legality’.<sup>657</sup> His colleague Jean Jaurès stated that the government has ‘brutalize[d]’<sup>658</sup> the locals while Allard Betoulle stated that he reproves of the ‘policy of provocation and bloodshed.’<sup>659</sup>

Some of the harshest criticisms referred to Clemenceau’s actions as tyrannical or despotic. Several even invoked historical experience to compare him to a glory-hunting Napoleon. In a verbal confrontation with Clemenceau, Albert Bedouce stated that ‘Without doubt, with

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<sup>656</sup> Jaurès, Jean cited in *Journal officiel de la République*, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : compte rendu in-extenso, 28 Juin 1907, p. 1567

<sup>657</sup> Aldy, Félix cited in *Journal officiel de la République*, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : compte rendu in-extenso, 28 Juin 1907, p. 1561

<sup>658</sup> Jaurès, Jean cited in *Journal officiel de la République*, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : compte rendu in-extenso, 28 Juin 1907, p. 1564

<sup>659</sup> cited in *Journal officiel de la République*, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : compte rendu in-extenso, 28 Juin 1907, p. 1579

your occupying armies you are strong, strong like Bonaparte at the Pont d'Arcôle...'<sup>660</sup>  
While, following a comment by Clemenceau, Paul Constans simply responded by stating  
'Ave, Caesar!'.<sup>661</sup>

It is perhaps telling that on the positive statements, there is only one reference to positive historical precedent. This was the simple statement by Clemenceau 'that we are in a situation which has no equivalent, at least not after the Revolution' and that this unprecedented moment meant the use of the army was appropriate. However, in France, conviction on a particular issue is often accompanied by historical evidence to emphasise the point. History is not just 'a thing of the past' in France, it is also a blueprint for the present and the future. See, for example, the case of the Commune where historical experience was frequently invoked on both sides of the argument. The fact that Clemenceau and the other pro-military deployment voices have not referenced the past makes their argument far harder to accept for the chamber as, to draw a comparison with a courtroom, they have not demonstrated precedent that would make their actions permissible.

However, one interesting area of convergence between the two sides is on the issue of the mutiny of the 17<sup>th</sup> regiment. This unit primarily comprised people from the Languedoc region and had been stationed at nearby Agde during the demonstrations. They had heard the bursts of fire by other army units and, as a result, they took the decision to mutiny instead of facing their fellow citizens. They looted the armoury of their barracks while refusing to march. The mutiny forced a vote of no confidence in Clemenceau as fellow politicians grew concerned that it could result in a revolution or a military *coup d'état*. However, the situation was resolved when Clemenceau agreed that the mutineers would not be punished for their actions.

The local residents were incredibly grateful for the actions of the 17<sup>th</sup> and they were treated like heroes for putting their morals ahead of their duty. However, the incident had emphasised the sensitive nature of using the armed forces on the domestic territory; the 17<sup>th</sup> were a local regiment – they knew the land; they may have even known many of the people they would have been ordered to shoot. The situation was elegantly summarised by Raoul Montéhus's 1910 song *Gloire au XVII<sup>e</sup>*. Its first stanza is as follows:

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<sup>660</sup> Bedouce, Albert cited in *Journal officiel de la République*, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : compte rendu in-extenso, 28 Juin 1907, p. 1555

<sup>661</sup> Ibid.

### **Gloire au XVII<sup>e</sup>**

Légitim' était votre colère  
Le refus était un grand devoir  
On ne doit pas tuer ses pères et mères  
Pour les grands qui sont au pouvoir  
Soldats votre conscience est nette  
On n'se tue pas entre Français  
Refusant d' rougir vos baïonnettes  
Petits soldats, oui, vous avez bien fait!<sup>662</sup>

Although the chart shows that there are significant examples of negative statements being made against the idea of using the armed forces, interestingly many of those opposition voices also refer to the actions of the 17<sup>th</sup> in a negative manner. There are several mentions of it being a 'deplorable' act, for example. The conclusion we can draw from this is inescapably paradoxical; there is a simultaneous rejection of the notion of *using* the armed forces against the people and also of the armed forces for refusing to be *used* against the people. In other words, regardless of the moral aspects of the situation, as the 'duty' column on chart 13 illustrates, obligations to the state and respect for duty are still essential.

#### **6.3.8. Comparison of the Commune and the Languedoc revolt**

To summarise, this chapter has shown how the French state has a long history of deploying the military on its national territory for the purposes of quelling civil unrest. Rural France was subjected to some of the most regular occurrences of military repression, particularly through the use of the *Gendarmerie*, as part of the apparent 'civilising process'. The rural population were seen as barbarous and less than human and this therefore legitimised the use of force against them.

Equally, episodes of unrest in larger cities were accompanied by rhetoric that emphasised the lack of civility of the rioters, rebels, or insurgents. This was in full view during the

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<sup>662</sup> Doubis, Montéhus Raoul Chantegrel-Pierre. 'Gloire au dix-septième', 1910

Commune where French citizens were referred to as ‘enemies of civilisation’ prior to a brutal military repression. Nevertheless, the data also show division in the rhetoric between those in favour of the use of the military and those against it. There were even starker divisions in the responses to the mobilisation of the army to counter the revolt in Languedoc. There were hardly any neutral statements (just nine in total); instead the bloody and heavy-handed nature of the deployment meant most statements were guided by emotion.


Following the Languedoc revolt, the mutiny of the 17<sup>th</sup> regiment drove home the sensitivity of deploying the troops on the national territory. It acted as a powerful reminder that the ‘enemy’ the military are required to face in such circumstances are friends, families, and compatriots. At a national level, the mutiny also highlighted the inexorable bond between the army and the nation. This relationship was subsequently cemented during the First World War with the deaths of over one million Frenchmen on French soil.

Many of the themes observed in the rhetoric around the Commune and the Languedoc revolt are unique to that era highlighting the gradual change in the cultural preferences of the French over time and evidencing Vovelle’s statement concerning the ‘plurality or uniqueness’ of history.<sup>663</sup> Like the British case, by comparing the two deployments and removing the themes that are not found in both, it will be possible to shed some light on what may be the core values of the French state in terms of preferences for domestic military deployments.

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<sup>663</sup> Vovelle. *Histoire des mentalités*, p. 155

**Chart 14: Comparison of reactions to the use of the military during the Commune and the Languedoc revolt**



Sourcess: *Archives Nationales, l'Assemblée nationale, Sénat*

Chart 14 reveals a number of areas of continuity in the responses to the use of the armed forces. This suggests, in line with the hypothesis, that cultural preferences deriving from the interpretation of past events are constraining behaviour. There are relatively few mentions of themes in the neutral category, which, as alluded to earlier, is due to the divided nature of France's political scene; everyone tends to have an opinion and unemotive statements of fact such as those frequently seen in the British rhetoric, are extremely rare. Nevertheless, there is a hint that domestic deployments should be supplementary to the civil forces, possibly with a degree of autonomy from the civil power and that, if deployed, it is regrettable.

Stronger themes emerge in the positive and negative categories. First, unlike the British case, there is a sense that an internal duty is something that will be expected of a French soldier (patriotism / duty), both the responses to the army's role against the Commune and the Languedoc revolt see ten references to this category. There is also broad acceptance of domestic deployments by praising the conduct of the military once they are deployed – although there are fewer references to this during Languedoc coupled with far more references to their poor conduct, hinting at a shift in preferences.

Perhaps the strongest themes to emerge here are not just the notion that using the army is appropriate in certain circumstances, but also that it should be considered necessary if the threat is sufficiently high. There were thirty references to this during the Commune and a similarly high nineteen mentions in 1907 – although again, the lower number of references to necessity given the threat coupled with a far greater number of negative statements suggests that the prevailing view at the time was that the Languedoc winegrowers did not constitute a serious threat to national security. This is an important point as it indicates a cultural acceptance of the army's use on the national territory provided there is a serious threat, but a rejection if there is not.

Furthermore, across both formative moments there is the common theme that one may forfeit one's rights as a French citizen if rebelling against the state. This hints at the dialectical, even paradoxical nature of the French people's relationship with the state that was referred to at the start of this section; although dissent and resistance are seen as important facets of the French national psyche, the structures of the state through its norms, laws, and institutions are also seen as being beyond reproach. Like Simmel's theory of reciprocity, we see clearly how in France the individual will attempt to overcome the *status quo* through individual agency (or even collective agency through protests), which is met with resistance from state structures. Importantly, however, there are far fewer references in 1907 to the role that army should play in protecting these structures highlighting a likely shift in preferences.

Indeed, the negative themes indicate that the Commune and the Languedoc revolt constituted such powerful formative moments that the French state may now completely reject the idea of deploying the army for the purposes of countering riot or protest. The themes show how there is a negative historical precedent for such actions, how it is tyrannical, despotic, repressive, dangerous, and provocative. However, the strongest evidence is that: 1) a total of

thirty-four statements refer to how using armed force against the people does not adhere to France's values. There were twelve references to this category in 1871, compared with twenty-two in 1907; and 2) how the army should not be used against French citizens with nine references in 1871 increasing to seventeen in 1907. This is also despite the identification of fewer speeches and statements for the latter case.

Crucially, there seems to have been a normative evolution in France's approach to the use of the armed forces for maintaining order on the national territory; in 1871 there were frequent attempts by certain French policymakers to rhetorically detach dissenters from the state via words such as 'savages', 'insurgents', or even 'evil'. By 1907, this language is absent and has been replaced by a clear recognition that the victims of the military's use of force were French citizens.

The notion that excessive military force is unacceptable when dealing with one's own citizens was conveyed powerfully in both examples, but particularly during the Languedoc revolt following the mutiny of the 17<sup>th</sup> Line infantry. Between the two examples there seemed to be a change in cultural preferences away from using the armed forces for maintaining internal order. Crucially, the responses conveyed a recognition that political *résistance* is a central component of France's value system and, in consequence, demonstrators are not, and should never be, considered as *ennemis de l'intérieur*.

## Summary

Pascal's famous axiom that 'justice without force is powerless; force without justice is tyrannical'<sup>664</sup> is fundamental to understanding French attitudes regarding the use of force on the national territory, particularly in the context of maintaining order. In the last two hundred years, there have been few, if any, other western societies that have been as willing as France to use the armed forces against their own citizens. Indeed, as this section has shown, there have been at least 151 significant instances when troops have been used against the people. The reflex to mobilise the army is largely due to the inextricable link that the French state draws between force, order and justice.<sup>665</sup> Indeed, throughout history Pascal's axiom has

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<sup>664</sup> Pascal, Blaise. *Pensées de Blaise Pascal, Tome Premier*. (Paris: Ant. Aug. Renouard, 1812/1670), p. 241

<sup>665</sup> Peter Jackson has examined this theme in its international manifestations with a particular focus on French conceptions of international organisation before and after the First World War. See: Jackson, Peter. *Beyond*

frequently been invoked by French policymakers seeking to present the image of a strong state that is willing and able to guarantee public order and the security of its citizens,<sup>666</sup> based on the principle that ‘what is right is strong and what is strong is just.’<sup>667</sup>

This nexus between law, order, and justice is central to French political culture and, when understood in combination with Peyrefitte’s assertion regarding the French public’s desire for the swift and ‘merciless’ imposition of order, explains why the army has often been the first port of call for internal tasks compared with their British counterparts who have typically turned to the civil forces.

We might posit, however, that following the events of the Commune, French conceptions of what was ‘just’ began to change and a gradual rejection of the idea of using the troops against French citizens developed. This rejection was exemplified by the negative reactions to the use of the army against the winegrowers at Languedoc. This does not mean that the fundamental belief in the appropriateness of using force to ensure order had changed, simply that the army were no longer considered to be the most suitable instrument to fulfil the task of maintaining order. As the following section will explore, the events of the First World War, which saw a rare moment of national unity in France, seem to have entrenched the nation, people, army nexus and fundamentally recalibrated France’s approach to the use of the military internally.

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*the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)

<sup>666</sup> See: ‘*La Vertu, sans laquelle la Terreur est funeste ; la Terreur, sans laquelle la Vertu, est impuissante.*’ – **Robespierre, Maximilien.** ‘*Rapport sur les principes de morale politique qui doivent guider la Convention Nationale dans l’administration intérieure de la République*’, Convention Nationale, comité de salut public, le 18 pluviôse, l’an 2<sup>e</sup>. de la République, (De l’imprimerie des 86 départements, 1794) p. 13 ; **Barrès, Maurice.** *Mes Cahiers*, Tome XI: Juin 1914- Décembre 1918, (Paris: Plon, 1938), p.331 cited in Virtanen, Reino. ‘Barrès and Pascal’, *PMLA*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (September 1947), p. 809 ; **Édouard Herriot** cited in Jackson, Peter. *Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 461 ‘Notre nation est singulière : elle ne peut pas concevoir la force sans la Justice. L’un de nos grands génies, Blaise Pascal, l’a formulé de façon lumineuse : « la justice sans la force est impuissante. La force sans la justice est tyrannique ». Nous ferons tout pour que notre pays soit fort et juste.’ Valls, Manuel. ‘Déclaration de politique générale de **M. Manuel Valls**, Premier ministre’, 8 April 2014. See:

<https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/190876-declaration-de-politique-generale-de-m-manuel-valls-premier-ministre> (accessed 21/09/2020)

<sup>667</sup> Pascal, Blaise. *Pensées de Blaise Pascal, Tome Premier.* (Paris: Ant. Aug. Renouard, 1812/1670), p. 241



## Chapter 7 - The French Army and the *ennemi de l'intérieur*

### 7.1. Introduction

In France, as chart 10 illustrated, the army has been required to fulfil a variety of internal duties over time and, while quelling civil disorder has been a prominent role, the country has historically faced a serious threat of invasion from numerous foreign adversaries. In fact, over the last two hundred years, France has been involved in six wars that have taken place, at least in part, on French soil. These wars have involved 132 significant battles and occupation by enemy forces on five of those occasions.<sup>668</sup> The common theme from all of these examples of enemy occupation is that France, even faced with invading forces, has still often found itself divided.

For example, during the war of the Sixth Coalition an alliance comprising Austria, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK invaded France. They found that discontent among French locals at the dire economic situation, coupled with growing pro-Bourbon sentiment had resulted in limited resistance to their invasion. In fact, when British troops marched towards Toulouse, the French Marshal Soult is said to have remarked that 'practically the whole city is against being defended'.<sup>669</sup> As was discussed in the previous section, the events of the Commune also highlighted ingrained ideological divisions. France again faced a Prussian invasion during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 to 1871 leading to their defeat, the occupation of Paris, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and the creation of the Commune where political grievances led to the establishment of a *de facto* independent state in Paris.

Despite these frequent and surprising examples of division, France saw a rare moment of national unity in 1914 when German forces once again threatened to invade. On 3 August, German ambassadors accused France of attacking their forces at the border with Luxembourg and declared war.<sup>670</sup> France had been prepared for this; as René Viviani stated

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<sup>668</sup> Author's calculation. See chart 10, p. 179

<sup>669</sup> Tombs, Robert and Tombs, Isabelle. *That Sweet Enemy: The British and the French from the Sun King to the Present*. (London, Pimlico: Random House, 2007), p. 286

<sup>670</sup> The German ambassador's letter to the French president read as follows: 'The German administrative and military authorities have noted a number of acts of marked hostility committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of the latter clearly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of

to parliament, 'we no longer allowed ourselves to believe in the sincerity of the peaceful declarations which the German representative continued to lavish upon us. We knew that Germany was mobilising.'<sup>671</sup>

As well as providing France with a possible opportunity to reclaim their lost territory of Alsace-Lorraine, the existential threat presented by Germany led to political consensus. Even the Socialists agreed that mass mobilisation and military force was necessary to avoid 'economic and moral subjugation.'<sup>672</sup> This national unity was exemplified by the temporary truce between the usually divided political forces within France known as the *union sacrée*. The sombre declaration read: 'France [...] will be heroically defended by all her sons, whose sacred union will not break before the enemy.'<sup>673</sup>

This point is worth dwelling on; the wars of the previous century had seen the French population typically divided in their loyalties: between republicanism and monarchism or, in the case of the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war, republicanism and communism. National unity, even in the face of a serious external threat, was never guaranteed. However, during the First World War these political divisions were put aside with hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen sacrificing their lives in defence of the French way of life. As Fenby notes, these instances of national unity are 'rare and bred by shock'<sup>674</sup> Given the apparent infrequency of these unifying events, it is therefore worth analysing the rhetoric around the First World War as not only will it clarify the nature of the people, nation, army nexus, but it will elucidate the culturally determined conditions for widespread support for a concept such as the use of the armed forces, particularly in the face of a serious threat.

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this country... in the presence of these aggressions, the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France.' See: Viviani, René. Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. *Chambre des Députés*, Séance du 4 Aout 1914, p. 3111

<sup>671</sup> Viviani, René. Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. *Chambre des Députés*, Séance du 4 Aout 1914, p. 3111

<sup>672</sup> 'La subordination définitive de la France. Son asservissement économique et moral, sa décadence inévitable.' See: Poincaré, Raymond. *Au service de la France, Tome I, Le lendemain d'Agadir*. (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1926), p.146

<sup>673</sup> 'la France [...] sera héroïquement défendue par tous ses fils, dont rien ne brisera devant l'ennemi l'union sacrée.' 4 août 1914 : la naissance de l'Union sacrée. Assemblée nationale

<sup>674</sup> Fenby, Jonathan. *The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror*. (London: Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 2

### 7.1.1. National Unity: responses to and impact of the First World War

Faced with imminent invasion by German forces, on 2 August 1914, the President of the Republic, Raymond Poincaré declared a state of siege throughout the country. All eighty-six *départements* on mainland France were included in this decree as were the three *départements* in Algeria (Algiers, Constantine, and Oran).<sup>675</sup> This state of siege would last for the duration of the war. Two days after its imposition, Poincaré summoned parliament for an extraordinary session. Solidarity would be essential if the enemy were to be defeated; thus, eighteen separate bills were introduced in this session that would transition the country to a state of war. As the *Assemblée Nationale*'s account of this session states, these bills are adopted 'without debate, unanimously in the House and the Senate.'<sup>676</sup>

Chart 15 reflects this unanimity; it shows just seven clear themes all of which are classified as statements in favour of the deployment of the military. The necessity to mobilise given the level of the threat is directly referenced thirty-one times and the fact that the state of war justified the extraordinary measures that were taken by the government twenty-four times. According to Albert Métin these 'extraordinary resources' were absolutely 'necessary'.<sup>677</sup> Marcel Sembat stated similarly that 'the needs of national defence' required 'additional and extraordinary' measures.<sup>678</sup> This was echoed by the secretary of state for foreign affairs, René Viviani who declared that 'the salvation of civilisation' was dependent on the decision to fight and that the government had 'begun to take all the measures necessary for the [continued] existence of the nation.'<sup>679</sup> Thus, any potential moral objections to the extraordinary measures were deemed to be subordinate to the existential threat that France was facing.

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<sup>675</sup> Kamga, Gerard E. K. The State of Siege: Origin and History. *Global Emergency and Counterterrorism Institute*, p. 3


<sup>676</sup> Assemblée nationale, '4 août 1914: la naissance de l'Union sacrée'. See: <http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/decouvrir-l-assemblee/histoire/1914-1918/l-exposition-du-centenaire/le-parlement-s-ajourne-1914/4-aout-1914-la-naissance-de-l-union-sacree> (accessed 06/07/2019)

<sup>677</sup> Métin, Albert cited in *Journal officiel de la République française*. Débats parlementaires. *Chambre des Députés*, Séance du 4 Aout 1914.

<sup>678</sup> Sembat, Marcel cited in *Journal officiel de la République française*. Débats parlementaires. *Chambre des Députés*, Séance du 4 Aout 1914.

<sup>679</sup> Viviani, René cited in *Journal officiel de la République française*. Débats parlementaires. *Chambre des Députés*, Séance du 22 Décembre 1914, p. 3125

**Chart 15: Policymakers' reactions on the need for mobilisation for First World, 1914 - 1918**



Sourcess: *L'Assemblée nationale, Sénat*

The uniformity in the rhetoric is perhaps less surprising given the nature of the threat. Nevertheless, the discursive strategies used by policymakers to promote national unity are interesting. For example, one of the more forceful themes in the rhetoric was the need to protect France's values. Viviani stated that France comprised 'A free and strong people who uphold a secular ideal and unite in their entirety for the protection of their existence; ... an armed nation fighting for its own life and for the independence of Europe.'<sup>680</sup> There were also several references to core French principles of *liberté*, *égalité*, and *fraternité*; for example, Poincaré led the call for 'brotherly affection for those of our colleagues who gave to the motherland what they held most dear',<sup>681</sup> while Viviani again emphasised the need for the 'restoration of liberty', and 'vigorous action' in defence of 'the ideal of freedom and equality'.<sup>682</sup>

<sup>680</sup> Viviani, René cited in *Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des Députés*, Séance du 4 Aout 1914, p. 3111

<sup>681</sup> Poincaré, Raymond and Viviani, René cited in *Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des Députés*, Séance du 22 Décembre 1914, p. 3124

<sup>682</sup> Viviani, René cited in *Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des Députés*, Séance du 22 Décembre 1914, p. 3125

As noted previously, the invocation of history is usually seen as a prerequisite for legitimate argumentation in French political debate; as such there are, unsurprisingly, several references to events of the past. There are appeals to the spirit of the revolution and the Franco-Prussian war is mentioned quite frequently. For example, Viviani referenced ‘the glorious memories of our history’ in a general sense, while Poincaré offered some specific examples stating that ‘it seems that in this divine hour, the Fatherland united all the greatness of its history; the bravery of *Jeanne la Lorraine* and the enthusiasm of the liberating wars of the Revolution; the modesty of the generals of the First Republic and the unwavering confidence of Gambetta.’<sup>683</sup> He concluded by exclaiming ‘May the vanquished of 1870 be the vanquishers of 1915!’ which, according to the annotation, was met with ‘lively applause’.<sup>684</sup>

One statement by Ferdinand Bougère, at that point an independent French politician who played a key role in devising French conscription laws during the First World War, typified the need to learn lessons from the past in order to overcome the threat in the present. He called on his colleagues ‘to remember that, several centuries ago, internal division nearly cost France.’<sup>685</sup> This brings us back to the initial point; victory over an enemy is only perceived to be attainable through national unity. A lack of consensus through political factionalism will undermine the state’s ability to persevere. As the Socialist politician Abel Lefevre stated, it is not just the army ‘which pushes back the invader. It is all of France.’<sup>686</sup> In short, consensus is key.

Emerging from the conflict in 1918, the idea of a nation united seems to have persevered; an estimated 1.3 million French citizens had lost their lives in the conflict, with most losing their lives on French soil. The idea of using the military against one’s own population in the event of civil unrest suddenly seemed futile, counterproductive, even reprehensible. In 2016, two Battalion Chiefs of the French army emphasised precisely this point in an article on the evolution of the use of the army on the national territory. They wrote: ‘The Great War was

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<sup>683</sup> *Journal officiel de la République française*. Débats parlementaires. *Chambre des Députés*, Séance du 23 Decembre 1914, p. 3122

<sup>684</sup> Poincaré, Raymond cited in *Journal officiel de la République française*. Débats parlementaires. *Chambre des Députés*, Séance du 22 Decembre 1914, p.3123

<sup>685</sup> Bougère, Ferdinand cited in *Journal officiel de la République française*. Débats parlementaires. *Chambre des Députés*, Séance du 8 Aout 1918, p. 2262

<sup>686</sup> Lefevre, Abel cited in *Journal officiel de la République française*. Débats parlementaires. *Chambre des Députés*, Séance du 8 Aout 1918, p. 2253

the fulcrum of a notable upheaval: the common blood spilled over four years in the trenches now prevented the use of military force against fellow citizens.’<sup>687</sup>

As a result, three years after the end of the First World War, policymakers of the so-called *Chambre bleu horizon*, (so named due to sheer number of former First World War servicemen who sat there, comprising roughly 44% of the total number of deputies) voted unanimously to form France’s first force that would be solely dedicated to maintaining public order. The implementation of the so-called *Loi Organique* of July 1921 created 100 squadrons of what was named the *Gendarmerie mobile*.<sup>688</sup> It would still adhere to military laws; however, the difference is that it would be the civil power through the *Préfets* that would hold the authority to call upon the unit. Thus, France began to develop a system of subordination to the civil power that was broadly comparable to that of Britain. Crucially, this unit was no longer to treat protesters as an enemy, but instead, as a ‘momentarily angry citizen.’<sup>689</sup> The *Gendarmerie Mobile* grew rapidly in size over the years reaching a total of 20,000 men in 1939. Today it consists of 109 squadrons across France divided across seven ‘Zonal Gendarmerie Regions’. Instead of directly facing against protesters, its primary role is to channel protesters in as peaceful a manner as possible in order to avoid casualties. It was arguably the events of Languedoc that set France along this path and from 1921 onwards, the use of there has been a steady ‘demilitarisation’<sup>690</sup> of maintaining public order. The more passive internal role of the French armed forces is heavily emphasised in inter-war recruitment campaigns.

### 7.1.2. Inter-war recruitment

After the First World War, Imperial Germany and the Ottoman Empire’s former colonies were mandated to the allied forces. As a result, on top of her existent colonial empire, France

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<sup>687</sup> Grossin et Bancel, Chefs de bataillon. ‘Emploi de la force armée sur le territoire métropolitain de 1791 à nos jours’, *Prix Fondation Maréchal Leclerc de Hauteclouque*, 2016. See: <https://www.fondation-marechal-leclerc.fr/cba-grossin-et-bancel-prix-fondation-2016/> (accessed 09/01/2018)

<sup>688</sup> Loi du 22 Juillet 1921, ‘Loi portant augmentation des effectifs de la gendarmerie et créant un état-major particulier de la gendarmerie’, Paris le 22 juillet 1921 (J. off. du 24 juillet 1921)

<sup>689</sup> Denis, Vincent. Manifestations: la police est-elle de plus en plus violente? *Le Point*, 17 December 2018. See: [https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/manifestations-la-police-est-elle-de-plus-en-plus-violente-17-12-2018-2279793\\_23.php](https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/manifestations-la-police-est-elle-de-plus-en-plus-violente-17-12-2018-2279793_23.php) (accessed 03/03/2019)

<sup>690</sup> Audibert Troin, Olivier & Léonard, Christophe. ‘sur la présence et l’emploi des forces armées sur le territoire national’. Assemblée Nationale. Rapport d’Information, N° 3864. Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, p. 125

gained new territories under the Sykes-Picot agreement in what is now Syria and Lebanon as well as adopting temporary ruling authority in Togo and Cameroon. More territory meant more manpower was needed in the *Troupes Coloniales*. This was a professional body of soldiers that had been formed in 1900 and its corps comprised regular troops rather than conscripts. However, following the serious losses that France incurred during the war as well as budgetary constraints as result of the post-war reconstruction effort, the *Coloniales* faced something of a recruitment crisis. Thus, in the inter-war years, the French *office de recrutement* ramped up its efforts to attract new recruits.



Posters 1 and 2: (Left) *Troupes Coloniales* (1939); (Right) *Troupes Métropolitaines* (c. 1935)<sup>691</sup>

Interestingly, the French recruitment drives in this period are similar to the British inter-war campaigns, which attempted to draw recruits in to ‘see the world’. The French also promote the idea of travel and adventure. For example, a poster from 1926 for the *Troupes Coloniales* published by the *Ministère de la Guerre* stated that the Colonial Army offers recruits ‘the chance to satisfy their taste for long voyages and adventure.’<sup>692</sup> Others show soldiers standing proudly in foreign lands: on beaches, in deserts or travelling around tropical islands, or along rivers in the jungle. Most of the scenes they present are serene, conveying the idea not of combat, but exploration and adventure. For the Frenchmen who would have experienced the horrors of the First World War, these idealised depictions of life in *la coloniale* would probably have been quite appealing. One particular poster from 1939,

<sup>691</sup> DE 2013 PA 58 5. Affiche de recrutement : "Engagez-vous, rengagez-vous dans les troupes métropolitaines". c.1935

<sup>692</sup> DE 2015 PA 39 26. Service Historique de la Défense. Affiche de recrutement pour les troupes coloniales.

presented above (poster 1), shows three members of the colonial army standing in a field as cavalry troops, armoured vehicles and planes move towards them. In the sky, a setting sun is depicted as a globe highlighting France's colonies; the sepia tone as the sun sets gives the impression of romance and glory that is attached to military service overseas.

However, unlike the British posters of the same period, the French also emphasise a domestic role through the *Coloniale's* terrestrial counterpart the *Troupes Métropolitaines*. Poster two, which was also released in the 1930s, shows a radio operator at the centre of the picture with the Eiffel tower in the background, the French *tricolore* emanating from the centre like radio waves. In the bottom left is an armoured vehicle and the bottom right shows a man on a motorcycle.<sup>693</sup> The scene is far less dynamic than its *Coloniale* equivalent instead showing routine, functional duties.

The inter-war recruitment campaigns highlight the simultaneous aspect of continuity and change that is typical of the French approach. Change is evident through France's transition towards a preference for a less active military approach to issues of internal security, while continuity can be observed through the simple fact that an internal duty is still portrayed as essential. Unlike Britain, which has typically never portrayed the army as an internal force, the threat that France has faced from external enemies has necessitated treating internal and external security as a continuum. This view of security was justified when Germany again threatened, invaded and occupied France's during the Second World War.

### **7.1.3. The Second World War: disunity and resistance**

During the early stages of the Second World War, but prior to the German invasion of France, the French state seemed to have reverted to its traditional model of dissent and political division. The country was split between those that felt war was necessary and those that did not. For example, Socialist politician Marcel Déat famously published an article entitled '*Mourir pour Danzig?*' that argued France should not risk its security for the sake

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<sup>693</sup> The slogan: 'engagez vous, rengagez vous' which can be seen at the top of the poster is still used to this day.



of Poland.<sup>694</sup> Even the then foreign minister Georges Bonnet remarked that France should 'not be heroic... We are not up to it.'<sup>695</sup>

When war seemed unavoidable, the publication of communist newspapers and pamphlets was banned in order to mitigate the potential for disunity. Paul Reynaud was appointed as prime minister, but was approved for this position by only one vote. Even many members of his own party abstained from the vote. As Talbot Imlay notes, following Reynaud's appointment many right-wing politicians even urged his government to declare war on the Soviet Union rather than Nazi Germany.<sup>696</sup> However, Reynaud's tenure as prime minister of France was short lived and after a campaign that lasted just six weeks the German forces had conquered France. On 4 June 1940, France held its last parliamentary session before the country was subsumed into the Third Reich. The session is a rather sombre affair; it is a by the numbers question and answer session relating to measures regarding prisoners of war, families of the dead, as well as the state of the country's agriculture, infrastructure, and public health sectors.<sup>697</sup> There is an air of resignation to the proceedings with attendant policymakers acutely aware of France's rapidly crumbling military resistance. Just ten days later, Paris surrendered to the Germans.

Divisions became further entrenched during Nazi occupation with the formation of so-called Vichy France. The Nazis allowed the French to maintain the *Armée de l'Armistice*, which was a limited force comprising French nationals that had the task of defending France in the unoccupied zone and, alongside the police force of the *Groupes mobiles de reserve* (GMR), maintaining internal order. Meanwhile, the brutal paramilitary group known as the Vichy *Milice*, which was largely composed of pre-war, far-right Frenchmen, had the role of hunting down and fighting French resistance fighters. The resistance, meanwhile, were mostly left-wing Socialists and Communists. Thus, the battle for France's liberty took on the character of pre-war ideological divisions.

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<sup>694</sup> 'Die for Danzig?' - Danzig being the German name for the Polish city of Gdansk. See: Déat, Marcel. La marche à la guerre, "mourir pour Dantzig ?" Ministère des Armées. See: <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/162436/1676072/file/1919-1939-008.pdf> (accessed 08/09/2018)

<sup>695</sup> Fenby, Jonathan. *The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror*. (London: Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 271

<sup>696</sup> Imlay, Talbot C. 'Paul Reynaud and France's Response to Nazi Germany, 1938–1940', *French Historical Studies*, 2003, vol. 26, no. 3

<sup>697</sup> Chambre des Députés, 16e Législature, Session Ordinaire de 1940. 4 Juin 1940. Journal officiel de la République française

At the forefront of the resistance movement was Charles de Gaulle who saw himself as France's only hope; he wrote in his memoirs that 'it was for me to take the country's fate upon myself.'<sup>698</sup> From his base in London he established the Free French Army, famously addressing his compatriots in July 1940 he declared that 'Whatever happens, the flame of the French resistance must not be extinguished and will not be extinguished.'<sup>699</sup> De Gaulle was arguably the progenitor of 'alternative facts',<sup>700</sup> famously massaging historical events to promote national unity. For example, in a speech in Paris on 25 August 1944 following the liberation of the city he declared that it was the resistance movement and the French people, rather than the allied forces, that should be credited with pushing the Nazi occupiers out:

Paris! Paris outraged! Paris broken! Paris martyred! But Paris liberated! Liberated by itself, liberated by its people with the help of the French armies, with the support and the help of all France, of the France that fights, of the only France, of the real France, of the eternal France!<sup>701</sup>

#### **7.1.4. The return of the *ennemi de l'intérieur***

Following the Second World War, a new threat emerged that had the potential to undermine the 'eternity' of the French nation. Although Germany had been fully subdued and its territory carved up among the Allied powers, in its place, the threat of the USSR began to loom even larger. The perception of this threat was exacerbated by the first post-war general elections held in France in November 1946. Here, the French Communist Party (PCF) won 182 seats. This represented the largest share of the vote at twenty-seven per cent.<sup>702</sup> Here, the French view of security as both an internal and external phenomenon raised its head once more; the danger was not just invasion by conventional forces or the awesome power of the nuclear bomb, but also the threat from subversive elements. During the war, France's

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<sup>698</sup> Fenby, Jonathan. *The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror*. (London: Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 271

<sup>699</sup> Gaulle, Charles de. To All Free Frenchmen (1940) *British Pathé*, 4 July 1940. See: <https://www.britishpathe.com/video/to-all-free-frenchmen> (accessed 08/08/2018)

<sup>700</sup> This being the term used by Presidential counselor, Kellyanne Conway regarding Press Secretary Sean Spicer's factually incorrect statement about the number of attendees at Donald Trump's inauguration.

<sup>701</sup> Gaulle, Charles de. Paris Liberated speech, delivered at City Hall, Paris, France – 25 August, 1944. See: [http://www.emersonkent.com/speeches/paris\\_libere.htm](http://www.emersonkent.com/speeches/paris_libere.htm) (accessed 08/08/2018)

<sup>702</sup> Élections législatives novembre 1946, 10 novembre 1946. Assemblée nationale élue en 1946. See: <https://www.france-politique.fr/assemblee-nationale-1946.htm> (accessed 09/01/2019)

successful, and ideologically Communist, resistance movement had illustrated how effective a relatively small number of troops employing guerrilla style hit-and-run tactics could be. Furthermore, when combined with conventional forces they had proven its ability to topple governments.<sup>703</sup> Consequently, although the post-First World War environment saw the demilitarisation of the country's approach to internal security, fears of a resurgent threat from *ennemis de l'intérieur* challenged the transition in France's strategic thinking.

The historical memory of the resistance and fears a Soviet fifth column was in the minds of French policymakers when dealing with the PCF. The radical politician and former French prime minister Henri Queuille had quipped that 'politics is not the art of settling problems, but of shutting up those who pose them';<sup>704</sup> de Gaulle's government demonstrated total adherence to this principle by ejecting the PCF from parliament. The PCF's reaction was to increase their strike efforts, launching a series of nationwide demonstrations at coal mines and on railways.

Tragically, on 3 December 1947 a postal train travelling from Paris to Tourcoing was derailed when the tracks were sabotaged. Railway sabotage had been a cornerstone of the French resistance's strategy in the Second World War and this led the newspaper *L'Epoque* to run the, inflammatory and factually baseless, headline 'Premeditation by Communist saboteurs.'<sup>705</sup> The PCF's case had not been aided by violent incidents in Grenoble and Marseille where rolling street battles had taken place between Communists and Gaullist Rally of the French People (RPF) members. According to Jules Moch, the strikes had taken on an 'insurrectionary' character which necessitated a strong response. He deemed the *Gendarmerie Mobile* and the *Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité* (CRS)<sup>706</sup> to be insufficient to deal with the threat and thus mobilised the armed forces to quell the unrest and several people lost their lives when the army opened fire on the crowds.

As argued previously, France conceives of its national defence as simultaneously comprising an internal and an external element. While this is traceable to the French Revolution, it is

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<sup>703</sup> Tenenbaum, Élie. 'La Sentinelle Égarée? L'armée de Terre face au terrorisme', *IFRI*, June 2016, vol. 68, p.14

<sup>704</sup> Fenby, Jonathan. *The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror*. (London: Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 327

<sup>705</sup> Desanti, Dominique. *L'Année où le monde a tremblé, 1947*. (Paris: Albin-Michel, 1976), p. 352

<sup>706</sup> The CRS are a civil force that subsumed the pro-Nazi *Groupes mobiles de réserve* (GMR) after the Second World War. They still exist to this day often working in tandem with the *Gendarmerie mobile* for the purpose of riot control.

arguably the post-Second World War threat environment that entrenched this strategic philosophy and bred the notion of ‘*guerre sans front*’ (war without [a] frontline). French experiences with fighting Communist guerrilla fighters in Indochina coupled with the overarching spectre of Communism presented by both the USSR and China meant that France had become particularly sensitive to the idea of insurrection and subversion at home. As a result, for the first time since the French Revolution the term *ennemi de l’intérieur* emerged in political discourse once again and a re-evaluation of the country’s existing conception of defence occurred.<sup>707</sup>

### 7.1.5. Practical Response – DIT to DOT

In his famed 1961 work *Modern Warfare*, Colonel Roger Trinquier wrote that ‘The defence of national territory is the *raison d’être* of an army; it should always be capable of accomplishing this objective.’<sup>708</sup> However, during the Cold War the potential for subversive domestic threats reframed France’s understanding of what defence of the national territory entailed.<sup>709</sup> The idea that battle-hardened French Communist sympathisers could use the experience they had gained in the Second World War in coordination with conventional Soviet forces meant that the perception developed that defence of the French territory ‘must no longer be conceived on its periphery, on its borders, but on its entire surface.’<sup>710</sup>

The practical implication of this was the introduction on 29 September 1950 of a decree for ‘*Défense en surface du territoire métropolitain*’. Article one of this decree stated that defence of the national territory was to be achieved by ‘Ensuring the security of communications, fighting against external elements ..., opposing any attempt at sabotage, ensuring the maintenance of order.’<sup>711</sup> This encapsulates France’s ‘full spectrum’ strategic

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<sup>707</sup> Büttner, Olivier and Martin, Annie. ‘Imaginaires de guerre : l’ennemi intérieur en Guerre froide. France années 1950’, *La Guerre froide vue d’en bas*, CNRS Editions, 2014, p. 21-39

<sup>708</sup> Trinquier, Roger. *Modern Warfare, A French View on Counterinsurgency*. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Ltd, 2006/1964), p. 3

<sup>709</sup> N.B. The perceived Bolshevik threat was just as prominent during the 1920s and 1930s. The difference in Cold War was the fear that the insurgency model had been honed by the predominantly Communist resistance movement in the Second World War. This combined with conventional Soviet forces and rapidly improving technology meant the threat felt substantively different to the French state.

<sup>710</sup> ‘Doit se concevoir non plus à sa périphérie, à ses frontières, mais sur toute sa surface’ – de Tassigny, Général Jean de Lattre. ‘Essai d’adaptation de l’organisation militaire aux conditions futures de la guerre’, *Revue de Défense Nationale*, Avril 1947, vol. 3, no. 35, p. 431

<sup>711</sup> Art. 1. Décret No. 50-1189 du 29 Septembre 1950 relatif à l’organisation de la défense en surface du territoire métropolitain. Journal officiel de la République française, 30 Septembre, 1950, 10162

thinking at the time where the perceived severity of the threat led to a shift in approach. The introduction of *Défense en surface* was crucial in framing France's post-war strategic thinking. Given the perception of a new, even unprecedented, threat environment, the armed forces would be expected to fulfil a variety of functions in order to counter both internal and external threats.

Furthermore, through the reintroduction of conscription in 1954 (principally for the war in Algeria based on the claim that it was part of Metropolitan France), following its abandonment during the Indo-China war of 1947-54, the government of the fourth republic attempted to forge a renewed sense of national unity based on the closer integration of the ordinary citizen with matters of defence and security.

On 27 December 1956, *Défense en surface* was updated and renamed to '*Défense intérieure du territoire*' (DIT). Its purpose was similar to that of its predecessor; however, unlike article one of *Défense en surface*, which listed maintaining order as last in the list of responsibilities for the army, article one of DIT places it first.<sup>712</sup> DIT saw the army operating in tandem with the civil power across four principle areas: the metropolitan area, the defence zone,<sup>713</sup> the military region, and the *département*.<sup>714</sup> These *départements* included those overseas in Algeria and, in fact, it was in Algeria in the fight against the National Liberation Front (FLN) that DIT was first implemented.<sup>715</sup> Interoperability between the civil and military powers was a cornerstone of this strategy and responsibility for maintaining public order was determined by the implementation of a state of siege as defined by the respective laws of 1849 and 1878. Simply put, prior to a state of siege being declared the civil power held responsibility. After it was declared authority was transferred to the military.<sup>716</sup>

However, as the decorated French general Alain Bizard wrote, under the conditions of DIT 'Civil authorities then soldiers [found] themselves successively on missions for which they

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<sup>712</sup> Art. 1. Décret No. 56-1313 du 27 Décembre 1956 relatif à l'organisation de la défense intérieure du territoire métropolitain. Journal officiel de la République française, 28 Décembre, 1956, 12578

<sup>713</sup> This comprised seven principle zones: 1) Paris; 2) Zone Nord (siège à Lille) ; Zone Ouest (siège à Rennes) ; Zone Sud-Ouest (siège à Bordeaux) ; Zone Sud (siège à Marseille) ; Zone Sud-Est (siège à Lyon) ; Zone Est (siège à Metz), Ministère de la Défense. L'organisation territoriale interarmées de défense, 20 February 2020. See: <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/organismes-interarmees/l-organisation-territoriale-interarmees-de-defense/l-organisation-territoriale-interarmees-de-defense> (accessed 09/06/2020)

<sup>714</sup> Art. 3. Décret No. 56-1313 du 27 Décembre 1956 relatif à l'organisation de la défense intérieure du territoire métropolitain. Journal officiel de la République française, 28 Décembre, 1956, 12578

<sup>715</sup> Tenenbaum, Élie. 'La Sentinelle Égarée? L'armée de Terre face au terrorisme', *IFRI*, June 2016, vol. 68, pp. 15 – 16

<sup>716</sup> Bizard, Alain. 'La Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire (DOT)' *Pouvoirs*. No. 38 revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques, n°38, 38 - L'armée, Septembre 1986, p. 87

[were] not prepared'.<sup>717</sup> A clearer delineation of expectations was required, particularly given the souring relations between de Gaulle and NATO and the need to preserve their nuclear deterrent. Thus, *Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire* (DOT) was introduced, abrogating its predecessor. Crucially, DOT did not provide the military with such authority that it negated the role of the civil forces. In fact, civil defence still remained under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of the Republic. Thus, the army would not *substitute* the civil power as had been mandated in previous doctrine, but would *supplement* it.<sup>718</sup> This essentially formalised France's domestic strategic principles of interoperability with civil forces that can be observed even today through operations such as *Sentinelles*.

Arguably, the principle of interoperability and supplementing the civil forces arose from the May 1958 crisis. During the war in Algeria, the fourth republic had become increasingly unpopular, particularly in nationalist and military circles, for its concessionary approach to Algeria. After anti-French riots erupted in Algiers, General Jacques Massu issued the French government with an ultimatum: reinstate de Gaulle or the army would revolt. Behind the scenes, Massu and his generals devised a plan entitled *Opération Résurrection*. First, paratroopers landed on Corsica as part of *Opération Corse* then, if the French government would not give in to their demands, the army planned to launch part two of the plan which would see around 1,500 French paratroopers drop into Paris at key strategic locations, bolstered by the support of the Air Force.

A snap vote taken at the senate resulted in a massive majority of 102-3 against offering de Gaulle support if he formed a new government. However, the President at that time, Pierre Pflimlin was forced to conclude that the fourth republic had very little power at that time. He is said to have exclaimed that 'we claim to exercise power, but we do not have it.'<sup>719</sup> Pflimlin met de Gaulle at the *Chateau Saint Cloud*, where Napoleon's Coup of 18 Brumaire had taken place, to discuss the handover of power.

Given de Gaulle's instatement as first president of the French Fifth Republic, only the first part of *Opération Résurrection* was enacted. The army had played a direct role in the collapse of the fourth republic, using the threat of violence on the French mainland to ensure

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<sup>717</sup> Ibid.

<sup>718</sup> Bizard, Alain. 'La Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire (DOT)' *Pouvoirs*. No. 38 revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques, n°38, 38 - L'armée, Septembre 1986, p. 88

<sup>719</sup> Fenby, Jonathan. *The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror*. (London: Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 351

they got their way. Ironically, the army's assumption that de Gaulle would protect their French colonial and anti-Algerian independence interests quickly backfired when a referendum on the self-determination of Algeria saw 75.3% of voters on the French mainland in favour of Algerian independence – a higher proportion than in Algeria itself (69.5%).<sup>720</sup> In April 1961, the army once again attempted to carry out a *coup d'état*, this time in Algeria in what became known as the Algiers (or Generals') Putsch. The Putsch failed, but it once again demonstrated the danger of an ideologically-motivated army. This was exemplified by the interview of General Jacques Massu who declared that the army 'has not yet shown [its power], because the opportunity has not arisen. But the Army would use its power in a certain situation.'<sup>721</sup>

Due to fears of a repeat of the episodes of 1958, Article 1 of DOT, which would be a mainstay of France's Cold War national defence strategy, outlined a remit based on interoperability:

The operational defence of the territory, *in conjunction with other forms of military defence and with civil defence*, contributes to the maintenance of the freedom and the continuity of action of the Government as well as to the protection of the organs essential to the defence of the nation.<sup>722</sup>

Article 1 continued by outlining how the army should contribute to national resilience in both times of war and peace:

- 1) to participate in the protection of military installations and, as a priority, of those of the strategic nuclear force;
- 2) Ensure general coverage of the national territory on the ground and to oppose actions taken by the enemy within this territory;

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<sup>720</sup> Loi no. 61-44 du 14 janvier 1961. Constitution de la Ve République, Référendum sur l'autodétermination en Algérie, 8 janvier 1961.

<sup>721</sup> Interview in original German: "Die Armee hat die Macht. Sie hat sie bisher nicht gezeigt, weil die Gelegenheit hierzu noch nicht gegeben war. Die Armee würde aber in einer bestimmten Situation ihre Macht einsetzen." Massu, Jacques interview with Hans Ulrich Kempfski. 'MASSU-INTERVIEW, Die letzte Kugel', *Der Spiegel*, 3 February 1960. See: <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-43063185.html> (accessed 18/02/2017)

<sup>722</sup> Décret n°73-235 du 1 mars 1973 relatif à la défense opérationnelle du territoire. Article 1. Italics added for emphasis.

3) In the event of an invasion, to carry out military resistance operations<sup>723</sup>

In simple terms, DOT's three core domestic roles for the army can be understood as *protect*, *deter*, and *resist*. This remit is a reflection of the French strategic culture which embraces both tangible and psychological dimensions.<sup>724</sup> In practical terms, DOT provided the army with a guarding role and, of course, a combative role in the event of invasion; from a psychological perspective, it also implied that the army had a major role to play in deterrence. In the event that nuclear deterrence failed, a protection mission coupled with the 'general coverage' of troops on French soil would persuade France's enemies that an attack would not be worth it.<sup>725</sup> In essence, DOT was the doctrinal embodiment of France's dualistic strategic culture; an approach that bridged the gap between the internal and the external, the physical and the psychic.

DOT gradually fell out of usage towards the end of the Cold War as it became clear that Communist insurrection or invasion was not going to happen and instead the responsibilities for the maintenance of internal order fell predominantly on the *Gendarmerie* and the CRS. However, the *Défense en surface*, DIT, and DOT doctrines had set a precedent; the army would now never find itself too far away from discussions on domestic security. Thus, when the threat of transnational terrorism began to grow in the 1970s, France took steps to integrate the armed forces into their security architecture through the terrorist response strategy known as *Vigipirate*.<sup>726</sup>

#### 7.1.6. Summary

This section has examined France's historical experience with threats from invasion. Wars of the nineteenth century were often marked by ideological division and, by extension, disagreements over who constituted the real enemy. However, the First World War saw a rare moment of national unity and, as the rhetoric illustrated, there were no contrarian views in the assertions of policymakers. The sacrifices of the French people during the war meant

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<sup>723</sup> Ibid.

<sup>724</sup> Heuser, Beatrice. *Nuclear Mentalities?: Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 75

<sup>725</sup> Tenenbaum, Elie. 'The Strategic Role of Land Forces', *Études de l'Ifri, Focus stratégique*, 78 bis. July 2019, p. 42

<sup>726</sup> This is discussed in depth in the following chapter.



that it no longer seemed prudent to use the troops in an active capacity against dissenting citizens. This was illustrated by the inter-war recruitment campaigns which convey active duty abroad and relatively passive duties at home.

Although the First World War provided a rare moment of national unity, stark ideological cleavages developed once again both pre and post-Second World War and the government of the Fourth Republic attempted to preserve a sense of unity through the reintroduction of conscription in 1954. This move coincided with the development of a new framework for national defence based on the perceived re-emergence of the *ennemi de l'intérieur* and the fear of Communist insurrection.

DIT and then DOT would form the French approach to national security and although it fell into disuse towards the end of the Cold War, it resulted in the closer integration of the armed forces into matters of internal security for purposes other than quelling civil unrest. It also led to greater interoperability between civil and military forces and, thus, the rise of the principle of supplementing the civil forces. Overall, resistance to the idea of deploying the armed forces on the national territory was fairly limited during the Cold War period. Most military-oriented objections that were raised focused instead on the war in Algeria or the more passionate resistance to France's nuclear programme and weapons testing in the Pacific.<sup>727</sup> However, given the threat from the USSR and the possibility (if not probability) of subversive Communist elements, it seems that there was a degree of consensus that maintaining a large standing army based on the national territory was an eminently sensible thing to do. This epitomises the importance of the physical and moral spheres in French strategic thought; practically, deploying the troops was a rational response to the perceived threat; culturally, it was deemed acceptable due to the long historical precedent for deploying troops domestically.

We might summarise by quoting the French foreign minister during the First World War, René Viviani, who stated that 'to be victorious, heroism at the border is insufficient; there must be unity within.'<sup>728</sup> This epitomises the French perception that if a putative threat is to be overcome, it requires national consensus. If we compare the positive rhetoric from the


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<sup>727</sup> Kitschelt, Herbert P. 'Political Opportunity and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies', *British Journal of Political Science*, 1984, vol. 16, p. 71

<sup>728</sup> Viviani, René. Journal officiel de la République française, Débats parlementaires, *Chambre des Députés*, Séance du 23 Decembre 1914. p. 3125

Commune, Languedoc, and the First World War we see a pattern begin to emerge that hints at what this consensus (i.e. in terms of acceptance of deploying the military domestically) may be.

**Chart 16: La Commune, Languedoc, and First World War. Positive rhetoric compared**



Sourcess: *Archives Nationales, l'Assemblée nationale, Sénat*

Chart 16 shows an interesting level of continuity in the rhetoric. As well as praising the conduct of the troops and drawing positively on historical precedents, all three cases also refer to the fact that domestic duties are expected of the military, that a high level of threat necessitated the use of the army, and that there was a need to protect French values. These concepts can be understood as the foundation for the criteria under which the armed forces' usage on the national territory is deemed acceptable.

However, as noted previously, the reaction to the government's heavy-handed response in Languedoc was overwhelmingly negative and it is this incident that holds the key to

understanding the criteria for cultural acceptance of the deployment of the military. The final column, ‘state of war’ shows eighteen and twenty-four mentions for the Commune and the First World War, respectively. However, the fact that the situation constitutes a state of war it is not mentioned at all during the Languedoc revolt and, as a result, policymakers did not deem the use of the armed forces to be acceptable. Related to this is the fact that policymakers during Languedoc rejected the use of the armed forces as it: a) contravened France’s core values (twenty-two references) and b) involved French citizens (seventeen references).

Combining these themes, it becomes clear that acceptance for the use of the armed forces can be found in France if the following conditions are met:

- 1) The situation constitutes, or is perceived to constitute, a state of war.
- 2) The adversary represents, or is perceived to represent, an existential threat
- 3) The adversary is either not comprised of French citizens or holds views that are perceived to be diametrically opposed to French values.

This is certainly indicative that historical experiences have enacted a degree of influence on France’s cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically. Indeed, historical experiences are constitutive to the unity of a nation. However, the question that now arises is whether the same logic holds for domestic deployments for the purposes of countering terrorism? After all, terrorism is a very different beast to countering domestic threats of riots, insurrection, or invasion. The following chapter will examine the gradual integration of the armed forces into the counter-terrorist architecture through *Vigipirate* before analysing policymakers’ response to the use of the armed forces under *Sentinelle*.

## 7.2. The French army and counter-terrorism

In 2016, a French parliamentary report stated that, compared with the responses of other Western states, in its history, France has been the ‘exception in the definition and the implementation of a permanent government plan for the prevention and protection against the terrorist threat involving the armies on the national territory.’<sup>729</sup> Few western states have militarised the threat to quite the same extent as France; but then few western states also have such a long historical precedent for using military units domestically or even to counter the threat from terrorism in the modern era.

This chapter examines the evolution of France’s response to the threat of terrorism. It argues that its long historical precedent for the use of the military on the national territory has embedded a sense that ‘protection’, either of the organs of state or of the population, is the basis of any domestic duty. With the rise of transnational terrorism, the understanding of protection was expanded to encompass these new threats. Protection is still the primary duty of the army; however, if the state perceives terrorism as a crime, rather than as an act of war, what should the military’s role be? Furthermore, if the state believes the military can be effective in countering terrorism, but has typically played a supplementary role to the civil forces, how can an expanded domestic military mandate be justified to the populace? And what implications does this have for the concepts of continuity and change in strategic behaviour?

To address these questions, this chapter first looks at how France has typically viewed terrorism from the war in Algeria to the present day. It then examines the tangible effect this has had on France’s response by looking at the various police, intelligence, and military agencies tasked with countering terrorism on the national terrorism under the banners of prevent, intervene, and protect. It then examines the evolution of the threat from transnational terrorism and the creation of the *vigipirate* system in 1978 arguing that this set a precedent for the gradual integration of the military into France’s counter-terrorism security architecture. It discusses some of the first overt military deployments on the streets of France for the purposes of countering-terrorism following a series of bombings in the 1990s before turning to an examination of the rhetoric regarding *Sentinelle*. Finally, it

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<sup>729</sup> Rapport au Parlement. ‘Conditions d’emploi des armées lorsqu’elles interviennent sur le territoire national pour protéger la population’, p. 13

compares the responses to *Sentinelle* with those gathered from previous eras of domestic deployment in order to argue that the French approach to domestic deployments is characterised by both strategic continuity *and* change.

### 7.2.1. Counter-terrorism: what role for the army?

As the previous sections have illustrated, a core facet of France's strategic culture is the notion of a perceived continuum between internal and external security and, while the *armée de terre* certainly fulfils an active external duty, as a French parliamentary report noted, it has also 'always' played a domestic role.<sup>730</sup> Maintaining public order and quelling civil unrest has historically been one of its most recurrent domestic duties, but has all but disappeared in the modern era due to the negative perception of past experiences such as the Commune and Languedoc. Thus, the perception has developed that requiring French soldiers to face French citizens is a violation of the nation's core norms and values. After all, how can one talk of *liberté, égalité* and *fraternité* if the inherent right to protest is suppressed by military force? This aversion resulted in a demilitarisation of the response to unrest and the gradual enhancement of the civil forces' capabilities in dealing with public disorder post-First World War with the creation of the *Gendarmerie Mobile*.

The army has also fulfilled an essential internal function in terms of defence from invasion by facing external enemies, with varying degrees of success, in five wars on the national territory since 1800. However, the army also maintains a 'strategic protection function'.<sup>731</sup> This can be understood as a domestic role in countering a range of threats: from conventional forces, to subversive internal actors, and even protection of the population from natural disasters such as avalanches or forest fires. This full-spectrum protective function was exemplified by the development of DOT doctrine during the Cold War where 'protection' was outlined in article 1 as the army's primary duty. There has been significant continuity in France's strategic thinking on this point, illustrated by the fact that every White Paper since the first in 1972 has reiterated the essential protective domestic duties of the armed forces.

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<sup>730</sup> Audibert Troin, Olivier and Léonard, Christophe. 'Sur la présence et l'emploi des forces armées sur le territoire national'. Assemblée Nationale. Rapport d'Information, N° 3864. Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, p. 125

<sup>731</sup> Livre Blanc. Défense et Sécurité Nationale – 2013, p. 91

Terrorism, however, poses something of a conundrum; it is disruptive, destructive, and coercive. Further, despite using violence to compel their enemy, it is neither as sustained nor as overt as an enemy invasion. It can involve foreign actors crossing the border into France (*ennemi à l'intérieur*) to carry out an attack, and, recently a more homegrown threat of French citizens attacking the national territory (*ennemi de l'intérieur*). Clearly, the state and its citizens require and desire protection from its effects. But who holds the responsibility as first responders to a hypothetical attack, the army or the civil forces? The answer to the question depends on the state's cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces and whether it considers terrorism to be a crime or an act of war. If the former then, arguably, responsibility for protecting the populace should lie with the police and intelligence services. If the latter, to what extent should the army be involved? And what form should military protection take?

Since the Second World War, France has had extensive experience with dealing with acts of terrorism both abroad and at home. These experiences have been formative to the nation's conception of the threat both as a crime and as an act of war. France had faced asymmetrical threats during the Indo-China war of 1946 and, of course, during the war in Algeria between 1954 and 1962 where the FLN had such success. These *petites guerres*,<sup>732</sup> particularly in Algeria, were characterised by hit-and-run style attacks, bombings, assassinations, and even kidnappings. This led Trinquier to write that '[q]uite clearly, terrorism is a weapon of warfare, and it is important to stress it.'<sup>733</sup>

In the late 1950s, the FLN brought their brand of resistance to the streets of France. Jacques Soustelle, then France's minister for information, had clashed with de Gaulle over the latter's increasing support for Algerian independence. Soustelle's view of an *Algérie française* made him a target and, in September 1959 three members of the FLN opened fire on his car when it was stopped at a red light. Soustelle was unharmed, but one of the attackers, being pursued by the police, tried to cover his escape by shooting four members of the public at a metro stop, one of whom died. In contrast to Trinquier's assessment of the terrorist threat, an article published in *Le Monde* declared that France 'condemn[s] this criminal act.'<sup>734</sup>

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<sup>732</sup> *Petite guerre* is nineteenth century term used to describe the first Algerian war. It stood in contrast to the *Grande guerres* that occurred between Europe's major powers during the same period.

<sup>733</sup> Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, p. 20

<sup>734</sup> Viansson-Ponté, Pierre. 'L'attentat dirigé contre M. Soustelle est utilisé contre l'idée de négociation', *Le Monde*, 17 September 1958

One cannot help but wonder if the Soustelle incident had occurred in Algeria rather than Paris whether it would have prompted a different response; Trinquier's statement refers to terrorism as an effective means of resisting and repelling an adversary in the context of a broader insurgency campaign. Thus, terrorism was simply considered as the employment of alternative means of military resistance. The key point here is that, in France's view, if an isolated violent incident with political motivations occurs within the context of a war, it is considered to be an extension of that state of war. If it occurs in a state during peacetime, it is a crime.

This is the rationale that has guided France's approach to terrorism until very recently. For example, the 1994 White Book states that 'Terrorist action is arguably the main *non-military* threat that can affect our security.'<sup>735</sup> While the 2008 iteration of the white book places transnational terrorism in the same bracket as cross border organised crime, claiming that the strengthening of intelligence capabilities will help 'prevent its occurrence and limit its effects.'<sup>736</sup> This view of terrorism as a crime has meant primacy for operations has typically been held by the police and intelligence services.<sup>737</sup>

### **7.2.2. Counter-terrorism agencies up to 2015**

Before 2015, the fight against terrorism in France had typically been conducted via a combination of intelligence gathering, police work, and limited military efforts in the rural areas of France through the *Gendarmerie*. When necessary, these efforts have been supplemented with small numbers of regular troops deployed at strategic locations under the *Vigipirate* system and occasionally through the use of elite civil and military counter-terrorist units in order to deal with hostage situations. The French approach generally adheres to the principles of Prevent, Intervene, and Protect. The following section will outline the forces that are involved at each of these stages.

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<sup>735</sup> Italics added for emphasis. Livre Blanc sur la Défense, 1994, p.17 See:

<http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/le-livre-blanc-sur-la-defense-1994.pdf>

<sup>736</sup> Défense et Sécurité nationale. Le Livre Blanc, 2008. (Paris: Odile Jacob, La Documentation Française, June 2008), pp. 50-57

<sup>737</sup> See Frank Foley's analysis on the predominantly civil responses to terrorism through intelligence and police efforts in France. Foley, Frank. *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)

### 7.2.3. Prevent: Intelligence and police

In terms of intelligence, France's domestic agency the *Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur* (DCRI) holds most of the responsibility. The DCRI was formed in 2008 via a merger of the two previous agencies known as the *Renseignements Généraux* (RG) and the *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (DST) in order to centralise the response to terrorism.<sup>738</sup> The DCRI coordinates with French police services such as the *sous-direction anti-terroriste* (SDAT) which also has a national remit under the direction of the *Police Judiciaire* (Judicial Police). The DCRI's foreign intelligence counterpart is the *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure* (DGSE). Coordination between the two agencies has been increasingly important in the post-2001 threat environment given the rise of transnational terrorism.

### 7.2.4. Intervene: Forces d'intervention


In the event that the 'prevent' element of the strategy fails and an attack occurs, France has a series of both civil and military *forces d'intervention* on operational standby to resolve the situation. There are five principle agencies: BRI, RAID, the GIGN, BAC and the *pelotons de surveillance et d'intervention de la Gendarmerie* (PSIG). Each of these units holds a different area of jurisdiction and specialism. In fact, the *Ministère des Armées' schema nationale d'intervention* (national intervention scheme) categorises France's internal security forces in terms of their ability to deal with specific threats (see figure 1). According to this schematic, there are three levels of intervention: 1) Specialised, 2) Intermediary, and 3) Elementary.

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<sup>738</sup> Projet de loi de finances pour 2008: Sécurité, D. LA CRÉATION DE LA DIRECTION CENTRALE DU RENSEIGNEMENT INTÉRIEUR (DCRI). See: <https://www.senat.fr/rap/107-091-328/107-091-3286.html> (accessed 01/02/2019)



**Figure 1: France's National Intervention Spectrum**



Specialised intervention requires personnel to be at ‘an extremely high level of expertise’ in order to carry out a ‘final assault’. These forces will be called upon when there is the need to ‘to neutralize the terrorists or the hostage-takers definitively, while thwarting or bypassing any obstacles.’<sup>739</sup> In France the three units seen as capable of carrying out this mission are: 1) the GIGN. This is France’s dedicated military counter-terrorism unit formed in 1973 in the aftermath of the Munich attack. It usually operates in rural areas and in Paris, but given its military status it also has the authority to operate overseas. 2) RAID. Formed in 1985, this is the civil counterpart to the GIGN with national jurisdiction. 3) BRI. This is the civil counter-terrorist and special operations unit that operates in Paris. It is the oldest of the three units having been formed in 1964. All three of these units were active in Paris during 2015; RAID and BRI at the Bataclan in November and all three at the *Hypercacher* supermarket siege in Paris in January following the attacks on the *Charlie Hebdo* offices.

The intermediary category involves ‘first intervention’ when there is a need for a resolution to a situation as quickly as possible. The two principle units involved at this level are BAC and the PSIG. The BAC is a police unit founded in 1971 that predominantly operates in Paris

<sup>739</sup> Bpubl, Sirpa. ‘Présentation du Schéma national d'intervention’, *Ministère des Armées*, 20 April 2016

and other provincial towns. Their role is to combat serious offences that often involve violence such as armed robbery, carjacking, gang violence as well as other crimes such as drug trafficking and production. The PSIG is a military unit that was formed in 1975. In the past they have been required to supplement the regular army for missions related to DOT as well as carrying surveillance operations and countering serious crime. A month before the attacks in Paris in November 2015, the BAC and PSIG had announced a strategy entitled BAC-PSIG 2016 which would enhance inter-agency cooperation, coordination and training.

At the lowest echelon there are the ‘elementary’ intervention forces. These are the ordinary police and *Gendarmerie* personnel who do not necessarily have any specific counter-terrorist expertise, but will usually be ‘the first to arrive immediately on the scene and to face the terrorists.’<sup>740</sup> Through these *forces d’intervention* it becomes clear that a blend of civil and military responses has been a mainstay of France’s counter-terrorist approach since the formation of many of these units in the 1970s.

#### **7.2.5. Protect: Police, *Gendarmerie* and the *armée de terre***

In the 2013 iteration of the white book on security and national defence, ‘protection of the French territory and its people’ is listed as the number one strategic priority. While the police and *Gendarmerie* will always play a major role in fulfilling this task, it argues that there are seven core threats to the state which require a strategy based on protection and to which the armed forces *must* contribute. In order of perceived severity, these are:

- 1) attacks by another state against national territory;
- 2) terrorist attacks;
- 3) cyber attacks;
- 4) damage to scientific and technical potential;
- 5) organized crime;
- 6) natural, health and technological crises;
- 7) attacks against our nationals abroad<sup>741</sup>

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<sup>740</sup> Ibid.

<sup>741</sup> Livre Blanc. Défense et Sécurité Nationale – 2013, pp. 47-48

Even in 2013, two years before France would face a wave of devastating attacks, terrorism is listed as the second most serious threat facing the nation and, unlike their British counterparts, the French have not shied away from integrating the army into their response to the threat. One of the main reasons for this is the historical precedent for the army in a domestic role that has been explored in this thesis. French strategic thinking on terrorism has arguably been guided less by the repressive aspects of quelling civil disorder (although this certainly contributed to the learning of lessons) and more in terms of countering both conventional and unconventional threats through defence against invasion or the significant protective role that the army played during the Cold War under the DOT doctrine. Consequently, the French army has arguably been fully integrated into France's national defence model since the end of the Second World War.<sup>742</sup>

Of course, during the early stages of the Cold War, military protection from terrorism on the national territory did not factor into French strategic thinking. Indeed, France's first White Book on defence, published in 1972 within the strategic context of the Cold War, makes no mention of terrorism as a threat at all.<sup>743</sup> However, throughout the 1970s the threat of transnational terrorism began to increase dramatically leading to the gradual integration of the army not just into general national defence, but also into a more specific counter-terrorist function.

#### **7.2.6. 1945 – 1978: The evolution of the threat and the introduction of vigipirate**

In the years following the Second World War, terrorism was largely seen as something that happened abroad as one of the tools in the insurgency toolbox. It was essentially viewed as something that was perpetrated by fighters who felt it necessary to level the playing field against militarily superior foes. At that point in time, that rationale was not necessarily incorrect; between 1945 and December 1973, France had only experienced two significant terrorist attacks. The first, the Soustelle incident discussed above. The second, a devastating bomb that was detonated in 1961 on a Strasbourg to Paris fast train killing twenty-eight. The attack was carried out by the far-right terrorist group, the *Organisation armée secrete* (OAS)

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<sup>742</sup> Audibert Troin, Olivier and Léonard, Christophe. 'Sur la présence et l'emploi des forces armées sur le territoire national'. Assemblée Nationale. Rapport d'Information, N° 3864. Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, p. 125

<sup>743</sup> Livre Blanc sur la Défense Nationale, 1973. See: <http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/le-livre-blanc-sur-la-defense-1972.pdf>

whose ideology was based on the prevention of Algerian independence and whose membership comprised former military and political personnel, including Soustelle.

The OAS had its roots in the political crisis of May 1958 that saw the collapse of the Fourth Republic and Charles de Gaulle reinstated as president. The perception that the army had given de Gaulle his power, who had subsequently abandoned them by speaking in favour of Algerian independence led to the formation of the OAS and a prolonged and deadly assassination and bombing campaign carried out in Algeria. The OAS would also successfully carry out two more bombings on mainland France in 1962 and 1963. While an associate of theirs, Jean Bastien-Thiry, a former Gaullist, would also attempt to assassinate de Gaulle in Paris by spraying his car with machine gun bullets.<sup>744</sup>

The attacks by the OAS, were further evidence of the internal-external security connection in France. However, in spite of their impact they still represented fairly isolated incidents compared with the prolonged terrorist threat on French mainland during the 1970s. Table 12 shows the dramatic increase in the number of significant attacks perpetrated in France during the Cold War.

**Table 12: Significant terrorist attacks in France, 1950 - 1989<sup>745</sup>**

Date	Attacks
1950s	1
1960s	3
1970s	16
1980s	38

The Munich attacks in 1972 of course marked the moment that the nature of the threat shifted. Not only did the attack force a re-evaluation of the security architecture in the west, but it also demonstrated to potential terrorists how they could effectively hurt western states who at that stage were almost entirely unprepared to deal with such unconventional methods. In France, the 1970s saw a series of bombings and shootings by various organisations such

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<sup>744</sup> An interesting connection is that Bastien-Thiry's attempt to assassinate de Gaulle provided the inspiration for Frederick Forsyth's novel *The Day of the Jackal*. This is the book that was spotted among the belongs of Ilich Ramírez Sánchez while he was on the run in the 1970s and is how he got the nickname *Carlos the Jackal*.

<sup>745</sup> Global Terrorism Database. University of Maryland. See: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>

as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Black September, the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF), and perhaps most infamously, by Ilich Ramírez Sánchez also known as Carlos the Jackal.

From the French perspective, and in spite of the recent formation of the GIGN, the response to most of these incidents was carried out by the civil forces. For example, in 1975 when members of the PLO took hostages at the Iraqi embassy in Paris, it was BAC who responded. While another hostage crisis in 1981, this time at the Turkish embassy carried out by the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, saw the Parisian police negotiate with the terrorists. As noted earlier, the limited direct role of the military in terms of countering terrorism was likely a function of the perception of terrorism as a crime.

This is not to say that behind the scenes French policymakers had not devised plans for a more active role for the army. Indeed, as a French parliamentary report notes, It had ‘been planned for a long time that they [the army] can be deployed [on the national territory], in support of the civilian authorities and under the authority of the latter.’<sup>746</sup> Again, here it is important to note the reference to supplementing the civil forces and subordination to the civil power. In short, at this point in time, civil forces were still firmly considered by policymakers as the first responders to terrorism with the army only available if absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, with the threat from transnational terrorism seemingly expanding by the day, the French government did deem it necessary to devise a contingency plan to allow for the troops to engage on the national territory outside of the confines of DOT.

The contingency plan that had been devised to allow for such a full-spectrum national response to terrorism was given the name *plan ‘pirate’* by an interministerial message issued in 1978.<sup>747</sup> *Pirate* stood for *Protection des Innstallations contre les Risques d'Attentats Terroristes à l'Explosif*. (Protection of Installations against the Risks of Terrorist Explosive Attacks). Here we see once more the common theme of protection. In this context it was defined as ‘reduc[ing] vulnerabilities without inducing disproportionate constraints on the economic and social life of the Nation.’<sup>748</sup> The units responsible for this task would be a

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<sup>746</sup> Le plan Vigipirate. *Ministère de l'intérieur*, 1 September 2016. See: <https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-des-dossiers/2016-Dossiers/Securite-les-grands-plans-d-action/Le-plan-Vigipirate> (accessed 05/09/2019)

<sup>747</sup> It was not legally codified until 2005.

<sup>748</sup> Le plan Vigipirate. *Ministère de l'intérieur*, 1 September 2016. See:

combination of the *Gendarmerie Mobile*, the CRS, judicial police and, of course, regular military forces.

### 7.2.7. ‘Sommes nous en guerre?’

Towards the end of the 1980s, there was an interesting rhetorical shift in how French policymakers began to discuss the threat of terrorism. France experienced a series of attacks in 1986 perpetrated by members of the *Fractions armées révolutionnaires libanaises* (FARL) and Hezbollah. This led then prime minister Jacques Chirac to describe terrorism as ‘a form of war’.<sup>749</sup> Of course, the September 1986 law on the fight against terrorism indicated that France still treated terrorism as a crime in a legal sense. It even established a circuit of judges known as *le service central de lutte antiterroriste* which was tasked with formally trying terrorists before a court of law.<sup>750</sup>

Nevertheless, Chirac’s use of the term ‘war’ still constituted a clear rhetorical lurch away from the traditional view of terrorism as a crime. Furthermore, it was not just hyperbole as it also led to tangible shift in policy. First, in 1986 Chirac deployed two thousand troops for border control tasks and in order to secure a number of sensitive sites.<sup>751</sup> Second, it forced a revision to existing terms of *pirate*. In 1991, it was renamed to *vigipirate* in order to encompass the need for **VIG**ilance. The newly formed *vigipirate* now adhered to two more core principles in addition to protection:

- 1) Vigilance: improving ‘knowledge of the terrorist threat and its proper consideration in order to adjust individual behaviour and protection measures’.
- 2) Prevention: ‘raising the awareness among state agents, operators and citizens of the terrorist threat’<sup>752</sup>

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<https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-des-dossiers/2016-Dossiers/Securite-les-grands-plans-d-action/Le-plan-Vigipirate> (accessed 05/09/2019)

<sup>749</sup> Tenenbaum, Elie. ‘The Strategic Role of Land Forces.’ *Études de l’Ifri, Focus stratégique*, 78 bis. July 2019, p. 19

<sup>750</sup> JO numéro 0210 du 10/09/1986, Loi n° 86-1020 du 9 septembre 1986 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et aux atteintes à la sûreté de l’Etat. p. 10956

<sup>751</sup> These measures remained in place until March 1987. Tenenbaum, Élie. ‘La Sentinelle Égarée? L’armée de Terre face au terrorisme’, *IFRI*, June 2016, vol. 68, p. 19

<sup>752</sup> Le plan Vigipirate. *Ministère de l’intérieur*, 1 September 2016. See: <https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-des-dossiers/2016-Dossiers/Securite-les-grands-plans-d-action/Le-plan-Vigipirate> (accessed 05/09/2019)

It also introduced an alert system for categorising the severity of the terrorist threat with each level, much like JTAC's system in the British case, triggering specific responses. These categories are colour coded as: Yellow (increase vigilance); Orange (adopt measures to prevent a small-scale terrorist action); Red (adopt measures to prevent a serious terrorist attack); and Scarlet (adopt measures to prevent a major terrorist incident).<sup>753</sup> At the highest levels it allows the government to halt commercial flights and even the distribution of tap water if deemed necessary. It also prompts the deployment of the armed forces to patrol the streets for the purposes of fulfilling a protection and deterrence function.

It was this function that was implemented in 1995 following a high-profile hijacking of Air France flight 8969 followed by a series of bombings carried out by the *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA) in Paris and Lyon and, since then, troops have been permanently deployed on France's streets in some capacity. This overt militarisation of the threat, despite the codified legal view of terrorism as a crime, paved the way for the unprecedented measures that were adopted by the French state following a shocking series of attacks perpetrated by IS in Paris throughout 2015.

#### **7.2.8. 'Oui, nous sommes en guerre'**<sup>754</sup>

A French parliamentary report released the year after the attacks in November stated that 'the militarisation of the threat ... has rendered it necessary to redefine the operational contract.'<sup>755</sup> The report was referring to a perceived shift in the character of terrorism; it no longer seemed to be the case that attacks would be carried out by political activists with little or no military training. Instead, Islamist terrorism seemed to be characterised by a sustained and coordinated campaign of violence perpetrated by individuals with military experience who were not only ready, but also willing, to die for their cause.

The first warning signs of an imminent escalation in the scale and nature of the threat occurred in December 2014 when three separate terrorist incidents took place in France.

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<sup>753</sup> Ibid.

<sup>754</sup> Extract from a speech given by Manuel Valls the day after the Paris attacks in November 2015. 'Il n'y aura un moment de répit pour ceux qui s'attaquent aux valeurs de la République', 14 November 2015. See : <http://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/5846-manuel-valls-au-20h-de-tf1> (accessed 19/10/2016)

<sup>755</sup> Rapport au Parlement. 'Conditions d'emploi des armées lorsqu'elles interviennent sur le territoire national pour protéger la population', p. 38

First, in Joué-lès-Tours when a man armed with a knife attacked a police station injuring three officers before he was shot and killed. The second took place in Dijon when a man drove his car into crowds of pedestrians at five different locations injuring eleven. The third occurred the next day in very similar circumstances: in Nantes, a man driving a van deliberately crashed into a Christmas market killing one and injuring ten. As a precautionary measure, the government responded by increasing the threat level under *vigipirate* and deploying 300 troops across the country.

Then, between 7 and 9 January 2015, France endured a series of deadly Islamist terrorist attacks across the *île-de-France* area of Paris that awoke French policy makers to the fact the limited military role under *vigipirate* may be insufficient to counter the threat. The first attack of 2015 was carried out by brothers Saïd and Chérif Kouachi who attacked the offices of satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*. Armed with assault rifles, pistols, shotguns and grenades they entered the offices and shot and killed twelve workers, injuring eleven. The magazine had drawn condemnation from many Muslims over its depictions of the Muslim prophet Mohammed and the editor, Stéphane Charbonnier – who was killed in the attack – had even been added to Al-Qaeda's 'most wanted' list in 2013.<sup>756</sup> After the attack, the brothers exited the offices and can be heard on an amateur video shouting 'we have avenged the prophet Mohammed! We have killed Charlie Hebdo!'<sup>757</sup>

Just hours later, Amedy Coulibaly, an associate of the Kouachi brothers, shot and wounded a jogger in the Fontenay-aux-Roses area and the next day shot and killed a police officer and wounded a bystander. Coulibaly allegedly declared allegiance to the terrorist organisation Islamist State after the second shooting. On 9 January, Coulibaly killed four more individuals before taking hostages in a Kosher supermarket, while the Kouachi brothers barricaded themselves in the offices of a signage production company. After a tense standoff at both locations, members of the GIGN, BRI and RAID shot and killed all three assailants,

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<sup>756</sup> Bennett, Dashiell. 'Look Who's on Al Qaeda's Most-Wanted List', *The Atlantic*, 1 March 2013. See: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/al-qaeda-most-wanted-list/317829/> (accessed 02/06/2018)

<sup>757</sup> 'On a vengé le prophète Mohammed! On a tué Charlie Hebdo!' – Edouard de Mareschal and Stéphane Kovacs, 'À Charlie Hebdo, les terroristes ont crié : « Allah akbar ! Nous avons vengé le Prophète!', *Le Figaro*, 7 January 2015. See: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/01/07/01016-20150107ARTFIG00483-les-terroristes-ont-crie-allah-akbar-nous-avons-venge-le-prophete.php> (accessed 27/03/17)



firing 1,300 rounds of ammunition in the process.<sup>758</sup> According to the French newspaper *le Figaro*, the streets of Paris had been ‘transformed into a war zone.’<sup>759</sup>

Indeed, in the aftermath the comparisons with a state war were hard to avoid. Both civil and military forces had been engaged in firefights and, across the *île-de-France* area over the three days, a total of seventeen civilians lost their lives and twenty-two were wounded. In response to the attacks, Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared, ‘we must do everything possible to ensure security’ before announcing the implementation of *Opération Sentinelle* for the first time.

*Sentinelle* was initially intended to be a temporary operation to supplement the civil forces in a similar manner to that which already existed under the *vigipirate* system. However, as the military governor of Paris, Général Bruno Le Ray, stated ‘the November attacks took us to the next level.’<sup>760</sup> The number of troops on active deployment was increased by thousands and, following criticisms of inaction at the Bataclan, the operation evolved into a more ‘permanent’, ‘reactive’, and ‘flexible’ operation compared with the relatively static guarding role that it had entailed in the past.<sup>761</sup> For example, in 2016 a parliamentary report found that roughly 75% of the troops involved in *Sentinelle* before the November attacks were employed in static guarding roles.<sup>762</sup> This, the report argues, is ineffective for countering marauding threats and a preferable ratio would be 80:20 in favour of dynamic patrols (i.e. patrolling along a pre-determined, but ‘unpredictable’ route).<sup>763</sup> These recommendations were implemented in 2016 and military patrols then became more akin to those the troops were used to conducting in overseas operations.

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<sup>758</sup> It was widely reported in the French media (see footnote below) that 5,000 rounds of ammunition were spent. This was incorrect. According to a parliamentary inquiry into the incident, 5,000 was the number of rounds that had been requisitioned from the munitions stores. Of this number, 1,300 were fired. See: ‘Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l’état pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015’, tome 2: Comptes rendus des auditions, *Assemblée nationale*, no. 3922, p. 149

<sup>759</sup> Cornevin, Christophe. ‘Sept heures d’assaut et 5000 munitions: le récit d’une opération d’une violence rare’, *Le Figaro*, 18 November 2015. See: <https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/11/18/01016-20151118ARTFIG00345-le-commando-neutralise-a-saint-denis-etait-pret-a-passer-a-l-acte.php> (accessed 27/03/2017)

<sup>760</sup> Général Bruno Le Ray. p. 402

<sup>761</sup> Bollier, Séverine. ‘Sentinelle: Un dispositif optimisé’. *Armées d’aujourd’hui*. No. 420. November 2017. p.36

<sup>762</sup> ‘Points fixes’ is the term used by French policy makers. It is equivalent to the ‘static guarding’ role referred to by British policy makers to describe the role of soldiers deployed under Operation Temperer.

<sup>763</sup> Audibert Troin, Olivier and Léonard, Christophe. ‘Sur la présence et l’emploi des forces armées sur le territoire national’. *Assemblée Nationale*. Rapport d’Information, N° 3864. Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, p. 190

In fact, taking into account the various tours of duty, throughout the course of 2015 a total of 70,000 troops were deployed on the French national territory and, at the time of writing, *Sentinelle* has constituted the largest deployment of troops on French territory since Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>764</sup> Furthermore, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, the number of troops deployed domestically has exceeded that of those deployed on operations abroad: Thirteen thousand troops are currently (2020) stationed on internal operations (*missions intérieure* – MISSINT), compared with just 6,100 on external operations (*opérations extérieure* – OPEX).<sup>765</sup>

### 7.2.9. Operation Sentinelle rhetoric: continuity or change?


Consequently, *Sentinelle* appeared to represent a fundamental change in France's strategic culture; an unprecedented pivot away from external operations towards defence of the territory. Clearly, there are a number of aspects of *Sentinelle* that do indeed represent change, but to what extent can the operation be seen as a total deviation from France's historically-received cultural preferences for the use of force internally? This section will examine the rhetoric from 220 speeches and statements by high ranking policymakers and military personnel on both the nature and character of *Sentinelle* (Chart 17). It aims to explore the extent to which it truly represented a shift and whether a set of core cultural preferences can be traced across time.

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<sup>764</sup> Talbott, John E. *The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962*. (London: Faber & Faber, 1980), p. 48

<sup>765</sup> 7,150 troops are stationed in former colonies such as the Antilles, Guyana, Mayotte/ La Réunion, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia. The 6,100 troops deployed externally are part of two major operations. 1) Opération Barkhane in Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Chad. 2) Opération Chammal in Syria and Iraq. See: 'Carte des opérations et missions militaires', Ministère des Armées. Opérations. 10/03/2020. See: [https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/rubriques\\_complementaires/carte-des-operations-et-missions-militaires](https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/rubriques_complementaires/carte-des-operations-et-missions-militaires) (accessed 04/04/20)

**Chart 17: Policymakers' reactions to *Opération Sentinelle* - 2015 -2017**



Sources: L'assemblée nationale, Sénat

## Change...

The theory of change in strategic culture advanced in this thesis argues that shifts may occur if there are the appropriate institutions to enact change, a leader who is bold enough to push changes through, and, crucially, a normative environment that is receptive to a change being made. *Sentinelle* certainly adheres to these criteria for change given 1) the strong historical precedent for military operations on the national territory as well as institutions that are capable and willing to amend their approach; 2) A leader who had sufficient charisma to push such a strategy through. 3) A threat perception that was so high that, as Chief of Staff

of the Army Jean-Pierre Bosser declared, '[t]he public would not understand if the army remained in its barracks during a terrorist attack.'<sup>766</sup>

The notion that *Sentinelle* was unprecedented or a fundamental strategic shift was conveyed quite forcefully in the speeches and statements. In fact, in the neutral category it was the second most frequently referenced theme. For example, the Socialist party senator Gilbert Rodger stated that 'the national territory 'has become the first theatre of engagement.'<sup>767</sup> The Communist party member, Michelle Demessine argued that the severe threat had meant that national defense has taken on 'a new dimension'.<sup>768</sup> Yvon Colin, the representative of the *département of Tarn-et-Garonne* in the senate, stated that the 'exceptional mobilisation of forces on the national territory has led to significant [strategic] adjustments.'<sup>769</sup> And the foreign minister Yves le Drian explicitly stated that *Sentinelle* 'marks a major shift in the positioning of our armies... Due to the very nature of the threat.'<sup>770</sup>

Related to the idea of an unprecedented response from the French state was the idea that it was proportionate to the unprecedented threat posed by radical Islam. In fact, the 'necessary given threat category' was by far the most commonly referenced theme with thirty speeches and statements. Policymakers referred to the 'particularly strong terrorist threat', an 'evolved' threat that involved 'militarized and professionalized modes of action, of the commando type',<sup>771</sup> another speech by the Paris representative in the senate, Layla Aïchi, directly referred to how 'such a deployment, following the terrible attacks which struck our country, was necessary.'<sup>772</sup>

There were also multiple references to the more forceful concept of a state of war. Le Drian spoke of 'the war at home',<sup>773</sup> Manuel Valls (as quoted earlier in the thesis) declared that

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<sup>766</sup> Bosser, Jean-Pierre. 'L'Armée de terre, le territoire national et l'année 2015', *Revue Défense Nationale*, January 2016, No. 786, p. 11

<sup>767</sup> Rodger, Gilbert cited in *Sénat, Journal officiel de la république française*, session ordinaire de 2015-2016, Année 2016. – No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016, p. 4140

<sup>768</sup> Demessine, Michelle cited in *Sénat, Journal officiel de la république française*, session ordinaire de 2015-2016, Année 2016. – No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016, p. 4139

<sup>769</sup> Colin, Yvon cited in *Sénat, Journal officiel de la république française*, session ordinaire de 2015-2016, Année 2016. – No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016, p. 4136

<sup>770</sup> Drian, Jean-Yves le cited in *Sénat, Journal officiel de la république française*, session ordinaire de 2015-2016, Année 2016. – No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016

<sup>771</sup> Ibid.

<sup>772</sup> Aïchi, Layla cited in *Comptes rendus de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées* Mardi 17 novembre 2015.

<sup>773</sup> Drian, Jean-Yves le. *Sénat, Journal officiel de la république française*, session ordinaire de 2015-2016, année 2016. – No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016, p. 4132

France was ‘at war (...) yes, we are at war.’<sup>774</sup> Yvon Colin even referred to how ‘a terrorist army ... is a threat of unprecedented danger, which requires ... an appropriate response.’<sup>775</sup> Thus, if *Sentinelle* constituted a shift in French strategy, then this was the rhetoric used by policymakers to justify the change.

Another aspect of the rhetoric that seemed to indicate change is the number of neutral statements. To draw a brief comparison with the British case, most of the rhetoric across each of the formative moments fell into the neutral category in that it generally represented unemotive statements of fact and did not prompt any debate. As Heuser writes, [d]elving into deep thoughts or reconsidering basic assumptions and the ethical principles underlying them usually ‘makes Britons turn pink and twiddle their toes.’<sup>776</sup> The rhetorical analysis for the British case certainly supports this notion of consensus for fear of causing offence. By contrast, debate and division has long been a fundamental component of France’s national political culture. For most French citizens, it would be unconscionable not to have an opinion on a matter as important as domestic military deployments. Again, the rhetorical analysis in this thesis has supported this idea with just around thirty of the speeches on the Commune, Languedoc, The First World War, and the *Gilets Jaunes* being coded as neutral out of over three hundred that were analysed for these four cases. By contrast, *Sentinelle* does seem to have led to a shift in the tone of debate in France; as the middle column of chart 17 illustrates, there are many more unemotive statements compared with previous examples.

Many of these neutral statements refer to how the operation, while neither inherently a good or a bad thing, must adhere to France’s norms and values and must balance the nation’s capabilities and resources. However, two of the most frequently-referenced neutral statements relate to the interoperability of the civil and military forces and how the military is supplementary, but not necessarily subordinate, to the civil power. This stands in contrast to the British case where there is a clear theme of subordination. However, for France, the army serves the purpose of enhancing the civil power through its specialist capabilities, but, while close cooperation and even coordination with civil forces is maintained, the armed forces retain a significant degree of autonomy on operational matters.

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<sup>774</sup> Extract from a speech given by Manuel Valls the day after the Paris attacks in November 2015, ‘Il n’y aura un moment de répit pour ceux qui s’attaquent aux valeurs de la République’, 14 November 2015. See : <http://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/5846-manuel-valls-au-20h-de-tf1> (accessed 19th October 2016)

<sup>775</sup> Colin, Yvon. *Sénat, Journal officiel de la république française*, session ordinaire de 2015-2016, année 2016. – No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016, p. 4135

<sup>776</sup> Heuser, Beatrice. *Nuclear Mentalities?: Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 5

## Continuity...

Despite the fact that *Sentinelle* appears on the surface, in terms of its scale and remit, to be such a shift in approach, the responses also reveal a great deal of continuity in terms of France's preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically. As noted during the defence against invasion section, interoperability and supplementing the civil forces are two key concepts of France's approach to national defence which emerged under the DOT framework that was discussed in the previous chapter. Further, through the *pirate* and *vigipirate* system devised during the Cold War, the army has been expected to play a supplementary role alongside the civil forces on matters of national defence.

Tangible examples of this have been joint police and military patrols at Metro stations in the 1990s and even joint counter-terrorist intervention missions carried out by BRI, the GIGN, and RAID. We can even trace references to interoperability in the rhetoric of the Commune. For example, one comment referred to how the national guard 'was to share, with the army, the title, the honours and the obligations of the public force.'<sup>777</sup> Further, Louis de Saint-Pierre remarked that the national guard and the army were 'both indispensable to the maintenance of the capital and obliged to replace each other for the guard of all the important points.'<sup>778</sup> Thus, there is at least 150 years of historical precedent for these concepts. This notion of historical precedent bears dwelling on as it holds the key to understanding both the constraining effect of culture on France's strategic approach and the conditions under which the deployment of the armed forces is deemed acceptable.

Historical continuity in strategy in relation to *Sentinelle* can be understood according to two main principles: 1) the Internal – external security nexus; and 2) the 'Protection' mandate of the armed forces.

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<sup>777</sup> Chanzy, M. Le Général. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, tome V, 19 August – 16 September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 6

<sup>778</sup> The National Guard is, of course, a military unit. However, it was still seen as distinct from the regular army with more of a civil defence function. Thus, the principles of interoperability on the national territory still apply.

For quote see: Chanzy, M. Le Général. *Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes*, Tome V, 19 August – 16 September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 122

## 1) Internal – External Security

First, despite the idea that *Sentinelle* represented a change in France's strategic culture, the reality is that reflects the connection between the external and internal theatres of action that France has made throughout its history. In fact, the internal-external security nexus was one of the most prominent themes in the rhetoric with twenty-two references. However, as this thesis has demonstrated, the internal-external security distinction, or rather the lack of it, is an enduring facet of France's strategic culture. Past experiences with internal and external enemies meant it was counterproductive to the security of the state to draw such a division; the Commune saw twelve references to the nexus and the contextual chapter illustrated that the idea of an *ennemi de l'intérieur* in conjunction with external forces emerged during the French Revolution. This was also illustrated through the analysis of the recruitment campaigns after the First World War. Thus, despite the rhetoric on *Sentinelle* conveying a sense that this blurring of the lines is a modern phenomenon, it in fact derives from a long historical precedent.

## 2) Protection

The second clear strategically continuous theme relates to the idea of protection. As noted earlier in the thesis, protection of the state, its values, and its citizens has been a pillar of France's strategic culture since the French Revolution. It became formalised through the DOT framework, but even under *Sentinelle* this core idea has not disappeared. Indeed, as the case with the lack of intervention during the attack at the Bataclan illustrated, the remit of the armed forces as part of *Sentinelle* is absolutely not one of intervention. This was encapsulated by a series of comments made by policy makers and military personnel. For example, a Colonel identified as 'D.D.' stated that the army would 'have faced the difficulty of distinguishing the enemies from the civilians to be protected. We are not trained to discriminate under the conditions of an urban terrorist attack.'<sup>779</sup> This was emphasised by Georges Fenech who, addressing Colonel D.D., said 'you are a protection and security force, but not a force of intervention.'<sup>780</sup>

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<sup>779</sup> Rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enquête, relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l'État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015. Tome 2: COMPTES RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, *Assemblée Nationale*, no. 3922, p. 250

<sup>780</sup> Ibid.

Ultimately, the decision to deploy the troops was based on the powers available to the state and practical considerations such as the nature of the threat. However, its mandate was clearly one of protection rather than intervention. It was discussed earlier how France often sees strategic issues in terms of tangible and moral factors and *Sentinelle* is no different; indeed, the French academic Élie Tenenbaum wrote that *Sentinelle* can be understood as a combination of ‘resources’ and ‘posture’.<sup>781</sup> Resources refer to what can be done in a rational and tangible sense, based on the tools that the state has available. ‘Posture’, meanwhile, is more of a moral consideration. Posturing, of course is a gesture intended to foment some kind of reaction from an actor; the military in this case are posturing to the enemy in order to dissuade them from attacking while simultaneously providing the general population with passive protection through their presence on the street. Seen in these terms, while the enemy may have changed, the military’s domestic role has not since the post-Second World War and the protective duties under DOT. Again, historical experiences have influenced cultural preferences, which are constraining France’s strategic approach. An analysis of France modern recruitment campaigns clearly illustrates these two enduring principles of an internal-external security continuum and a predominantly protective internal duty for the army.

#### 7.2.10. Modern recruitment

In 2008, in a white paper issued by the *Présidence de la République*, the French government stated that the ‘traditional distinction between foreign and domestic policy has lost its relevance.’<sup>782</sup> This is of course a reference to the impact that transnational terrorism had on, not just French, but global security architecture through attacks such as 9/11 in the USA, the Madrid train bombing in 2004, and the 7/7 bombing in London in 2005. France too had suffered a number of attacks from the Algerian group the GIA in the mid-90s, but post-2015 the scale and intensity of the threat increased dramatically.

The impact of transnational terrorism is clearly reflected in recruitment trends. After the attacks in November 2015, it was widely reported in the French media that the army had experienced a ‘bounce’ in recruitment, dealing with roughly 1,500 applications per day

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<sup>781</sup> Tenenbaum, Élie. ‘La Sentinelle Égarée? L’armée de Terre face au terrorisme’, *IFRI*, June 2016, vol. 68, pp. 1-60

<sup>782</sup> ‘The French White Paper on defence and national security’, *Présidence de la République*, 2008. ch. 5, p. 4



compared to roughly 100 per day in ‘normal times’.<sup>783</sup> One recruit, identified as Eliot in an interview conducted by the *Le Monde* signed up to the army just a few days after the attack. According to *Le Monde*, he stated ‘*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*. These three words are under threat.’<sup>784</sup>

The elevated threat from what French political scientist Gilles Kepel calls ‘third generation Jihadism’<sup>785</sup> also influenced the tone of recruitment campaigns. One clip from on the *Armée de Terre*’s official YouTube page even directly references the 9/11 attack before declaring ‘faced with the current threats - a new strategy.’<sup>786</sup> The advert goes on to show scenes of soldiers patrolling in train stations in France, fighting in wooded and desert environments and then dealing with civil unrest in an African nation. The clip clearly does not distinguish between the importance of the internal and external theatres, giving equal time to both and implying that, under this ‘new strategy’, the defence of France will be achieved across the globe and also on the national territory.

Unsurprisingly, many of the advertisements also reference combat abroad in environments which often reflect the reality of the operations the armed forces are involved in at the time. For example, many of the advertisements show the army operating in woodland, among mountains ranges, in the desert, and on tropical islands. This matches operations in countries such as Afghanistan, Mali, the Antilles or Guyana. One modern recruitment poster even used the tagline ‘I want to push my limits beyond borders’; another declares ‘I have a thirst for adventure, [in aid of] those who are hungry for liberty’ (see posters five and six).<sup>787</sup> Both of these posters imply that travel and action will be part of the job.<sup>788</sup> There are also direct references to operations in Africa in at least seven of the twenty-two advertisements

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<sup>783</sup> Floch, Benoît. ‘Attentats du 13-Novembre, Au centre de recrutement des armées : << Ce coup-là, je m’engage >>’, *Le Monde*, 19 November 2015. See : [http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/19/au-centre-de-recrutement-des-armees-ce-coup-la-c-est-bon-je-m-engage\\_4813846\\_4809495.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/19/au-centre-de-recrutement-des-armees-ce-coup-la-c-est-bon-je-m-engage_4813846_4809495.html) (accessed 21 September 2018)

<sup>784</sup> Ibid.

<sup>785</sup> Kepel, Gilles. *Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), p. 155

<sup>786</sup> L’armée de Terre. ‘Clip de l’armée de Terre 2009’, 4 March 2009. See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WVWfO9F5vCw> (accessed 02/02/2020)

<sup>787</sup> Armée de Terre – ‘J’ai soif d’aventure, pour ceux qui ont faim de liberté’. See: <https://www.adforum.com/creative-work/ad/player/34522814/jai-soif-daventure/armee-de-terre> (accessed 13/12/2019)

<sup>788</sup> Armée de Terre. ‘Je veux repousser mes limites’. See: <https://fr.adforum.com/creative-work/ad/player/34522817/je-veux-repousser-mes-limites/armee-de-terre> (Accessed 13/12/2019); Armée de Terre. ‘J’ai soif d’aventure’. See: <https://fr.adforum.com/creative-work/ad/player/34522814/jai-soif-daventure/armee-de-terre> (accessed 13/12/2019)

examined. There is a significant degree of continuity in how the modern forces are portrayed in the adverts and how they were portrayed in the inter-war years; there is still clearly the theme of traveling abroad and adventure. One striking difference, however, is that the serenity of the inter-war recruitment posters has been replaced in the modern era by clear references to potential combat situations. An incredible 86.4% of the advertisements either directly depict combat or imply that combat may take place imminently. Further, 63.6% show shots being fired and 100% show visible weapons (the standard issue FAMAS assault rifle) and military uniforms.



Posters 5 and 6: (Left, '*J'ai soif d'aventure*', 2018); (Right, '*Je veux repousser mes limites*', 2018)

**Table 13: Analysis of 22 French recruitment adverts, 2009 – 2019**

Theme	Actual / potential combat	Visible weapons	Shots being fired	Uniforms	References abroad	References domestic duty
%	86.4	100.0	63.6	100.0	81.8	72.7

Here it is worth drawing a direct comparison with the British case. Despite the fact that both Britain and France have comparable strategic cultures in that they both actively engage in operations involving combat, sometimes even unilaterally or through coalitions of the willing, Britain's adverts show a softer version of the armed forces. Just 48% imply combat in Britain, while 36% show shots being fired. One might expect weaponry and military

uniforms to be present in every advert, but here as well the figure is just 72% and 80%, respectively. This discrepancy can perhaps be explained by the recruitment crisis and the shift in tone that occurred in Britain's adverts post-2016. As a result, many of the adverts ceased referencing adventure and action and instead focused on the bonds of friendship that can be forged in the military.<sup>789</sup> Some of the adverts in France also highlight camaraderie between recruits (one of the adverts is even given the title '*fraternité*'),<sup>790</sup> however the core message that, if you join, you may be required to fight is rarely absent.

The greatest similarities in the adverts of the two countries are in their references to operating abroad. In Britain 72% clearly depict external operations and, in France, this is only slightly higher at 81.8%. It was argued in the British chapter that when the army fights, it fights abroad. Clearly this is also the case for the French forces. However, as argued above, the crucial difference is that France has traditionally seen its defence in terms of a continuum between internal and external security. One advert broadcast in April 2015, states that '*Protection du population*' is one of the primary duties of the *armée de terre*; it then shows a soldier in full battle dress guarding the Eiffel Tower before cutting to a scene of soldiers patrolling on the streets of an African state. In fact, many of the taglines used in the adverts also reflect this combination of both an internal and external role. For example:

- A l'étranger comme en France. (*Both abroad, and in France* - 2012)<sup>791</sup>
- Au sol. Au cœur des populations. Au service des français, pour résoudre les crises. (*On the ground. At the heart of the population. In service to the French, to resolve crises.* - 2013)<sup>792</sup>
- Armée de Terre 2014: Protéger les Français en métropole et outre-mer. (*French Army 2014: Protecting the French on mainland France and overseas* – 2014)<sup>793</sup>

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<sup>789</sup> See British case

<sup>790</sup> Armée de Terre – 'Fraternité', 2016.

See: <https://fr.adforum.com/creative-work/ad/player/34523050/fraternite/armee-de-terre> (accessed 13/12/2019)

<sup>791</sup> Armée de Terre. 'Clip de l'armée de Terre 2012', 2 April 2012. See:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dsms9DbfIE0> (accessed 13/12/2019)

<sup>792</sup> Armée de Terre. 'Clip de l'armée de Terre 2013 - Mars 2013', 19 March 2013. See:

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q5vOD\\_DI0C0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q5vOD_DI0C0) (accessed 13/12/2019)

<sup>793</sup> Armée de Terre. 'Rétrospective 2014 : Le territoire national'. See:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dU55CfoUWWo> (accessed 13/12/2019)

- Protection du population - opérations extérieures (*Protection of the population - external operations* - 2015)<sup>794</sup>
- Ici, ailleurs. Je défends mon pays. (*Here, elsewhere. I defend my country* - 2016).<sup>795</sup>

This is where the most striking difference between the two countries' approach occurs. In France, 72.7% of the adverts show the *armée de terre* operating on the national territory for example in train stations, shopping malls or on the streets. This is compared with zero adverts in Britain that show a domestic duty. In fact, in the French case, eight of the adverts even show a domestic duty in the first scene perhaps indicating that operations such as *Sentinelles* are now the primary duty of the army. In fact, this would reflect the rhetoric of at least four different policymakers who all declared in one debate in the *Sénat* that the national territory has become 'the first theatre of engagement.'<sup>796</sup>

Overall, comparing the campaigns of the inter-war years with the more modern examples we can see a significant degree of continuity. There is very consistent messaging that the army is both an internal and external force. However, simultaneously we also see change. Conscription no longer exists in France and *l'armée de terre* is now a fully professional force. As a result, there has perhaps been a shift away from the concept of the citizen-soldier. Indeed, some of the earlier adverts from the modern era still show the blend between civilian and military life. One, which documents the experiences of 'Martin' shows him in civilian clothes as he signs up to the army, he then takes part in training exercises in military uniform. He is then shown on a rooftop, in civilian clothes with his partner before taking part in an operation that appears to be in Africa. Finally, he is shown with his partner in the delivery room of a hospital, again in civilian clothes.<sup>797</sup> In this clip, Martin is clearly presented as part citizen, part soldier.

<sup>794</sup> TBWA Corporate. 'L'armée de Terre recrute', 13 July 2015. See:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHGUiTe3ncY> (accessed 13/12/2019)

<sup>795</sup> Insign. 'Armée de Terre Recrutement – Campagne', 2 January 2016. See:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kiUdiNSu9cA> (accessed 13/12/2019)

<sup>796</sup> Colin, Yvon; Le Drian, Jean-Yves; Gilbert Roger; Leila Aïchi *Sénat, Journal officiel de la république française*, session ordinaire de 2015-2016, Année 2016. – No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016, pp. 4135 - 4142

<sup>797</sup> Armée de Terre. 'Armée de Terre recrute SPOT Martin', 24 August 2008. See:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YRBLXWzZ0oE> (accessed 13/12/2019)

In more recent adverts there are far fewer instances where the recruits are shown in civilian clothing. Instead they are shown as among the population, but not part of that population. They are guardians, stoic and courageous. For example, the narration in the background of one advert from 2016 states: ‘I am the guardian of priceless values, I stay alert so that you sleep in peace. Always standing tall, I advance to reduce fear. Here, Elsewhere, I defend my country and all its colours.’<sup>798</sup> It is no coincidence that this transition occurred around 2015 – precisely when *Sentinelle*, (which can be translated as sentinel or guardian) was implemented. This is a crucial point as it signals to the general population that the troops on the streets of France are not a threat to them or their public liberties. In the past, domestic military deployments were met with more scepticism as the nature of the deployment was often targeted towards to the population. However, the messaging from the *Ministère des armées* and the *Armée de terre* itself is that they are there to fulfil a duty of public protection, reassurance and the deterrence of potential terrorists. This is a duty that has been consistent for the French army across time.



*Screenshot of a televised advert from 2016. It clearly depicts the domestic duties of l’armée de terre by showing a group of four soldiers, in full battle dress and carrying their assault rifles, on what looks like a Parisian street.*

Unlike the British perception of the army as a predominantly external force, in France the perception is that it serves the dual purpose of defending the national territory both abroad and at home – this idea is clearly reinforced through the recruitment campaigns which also illustrate the core protective duty that the army plays on the national territory. In short, to

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<sup>798</sup> Armée de Terre. ‘Armée de Terre Recrutement – Campagne.’ 22 Jan 2018. See: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kiUdiNSu9cA&ab\\_channel=Insign](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kiUdiNSu9cA&ab_channel=Insign) (accessed 13/12/2019)


paraphrase Guibert, in modern France (i.e. post 1800) the *armée de terre* is, and always was, a force for *dedans et dehors*.

#### **7.2.11. National consensus and conditions for acceptance**

Further continuity in France's preferences for the use of the armed forces internally can be traced by comparing the rhetoric from all of the cases to try and uncover the values that have been the most enduring over time. This will also allow us to identify the conditions under which the deployment of the military accepted in France. With this in mind, Chart 19 compares the rhetoric from the Commune, Languedoc, the First World War, and *Sentinelle* to illustrate that despite assumptions of a change in strategy, there is notable consistency in France's cultural preferences over time.

As well as generally praising the conduct of the military, the rhetoric shows a number of other common themes regardless of the purpose of the initial deployments (riot and protest, defence from invasion, or counter-terrorism). In all cases, the most prominent criterion for cultural acceptance of a deployment seems to be a sufficiently high level of threat to justify the use of the armed forces. In other words, if the perception of the threat is low, then the use of the armed forces may be deemed unjustified. This adheres to the notion of a 'ripe climate'; i.e. if the normative environment is unreceptive to a shift then it may be rejected. As an extension of this, if the situation constitutes, or is perceived to constitute, a state of war then there is more likely to be acceptance. This may explain why Valls and Hollande both referred to a state of war prior to the expansion of *Sentinelle*. The general opposition to the use of the army at Languedoc may be due to consensus that the situation in no way amounted to a state of war (see the third column of chart 18).

**Chart 18: formative moments and the conditions for acceptance of domestic military deployment**




Source: *Archives Nationales, Assemblée Nationale, Sénat*

It was argued previously that France often sees division in its political debates with each issue seeing a range of both positive and negative statements. The analysis of the language for the formative moments in France's past seem to support this idea of division and, on the surface, it appears that *Sentinelle* does as well with chart 18 showing a typical range of positive and negative statements. However, it was also argued previously that France often finds itself caught between practical and moral forces; the practical side arguing for what *can* be done and the moral side arguing for what *should* be done. If the language used in relation to episodes of domestic military deployments such as the Commune and Languedoc is analysed, one finds that there are a plethora of moral objections to the use of the armed forces. Thus, the counter argument is a normative one in that a significant number of policymakers are stating that the armed forces *should not be used in that situation*.

This stands in contrast to the negative arguments made in relation to *Sentinelle*; in this case the moral counter arguments are all but absent while most of the negative statements are practical. For example, that *Sentinelle* will cause force overstretch, undermine OPEX, or is

too costly. In other words, the opposition argument to *Sentinelle* is not that it should not be done, but that it *should be done in a more efficient way*. Chart 19 illustrates this fact; it is the same as chart 18 except all of the non-moral objections have been removed.

**Chart 19: *Opération Sentinelle*, practical objections removed**



Source: *Assemblée Nationale, Sénat*

With all of the practical objection removed, chart 19 shows the remarkable level of agreement on the need for *Sentinelle*. Fenby notes that in spite of France's tendency for political and ideological division, there are occasions when the French people have come together in one mind. His book, *The History of Modern France*, published after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, but before the attacks in Paris in November of the same year, argues that the severe threat of terrorism has been one of these national rallying points. It represented a chance for the whole country to unite against something as horrendous and categorically indefensible as the murder of innocent civilians. Given the findings in the rhetoric from the



First World War, we might also add that and the November attacks as two more of France's rallying points.

The common themes that led to these moments of consensus are those that were outlined in chart 19. To summarise, if we combine all of the findings from the rhetoric, we see that the main historically enduring conditions for acceptance of a domestic military deployment that:

- 1) a sufficiently high threat level to justify the use of force;
- 2) the declaration of a state of war (or at least the perception that the situation amounts to a state of war);
- 3) the army serves a protective function for the state, its people and its values;
- 4) the enemy are not French citizens or are seen to uphold an ideology that is in opposition to French values;
- 5) the civil and military forces act in tandem;
- 6) Historical precedent for the use of the armed forces can be demonstrated.

Crucially, in all of these cases, the threat is perceived to emanate from outside the French national community, if not physically then certainly spiritually. As the cases of Languedoc illustrates, if a deployment is made where any of these normative criteria are circumvented, then a putative deployment is usually met with disapproval. Here it is appropriate to return to the primary hypothesis which suggested that cultural preferences derived from the perception of the national historical experience would constrain behaviour and, the secondary research question which asked what accounts for episodes of change in strategy? In France, there is strong evidence to suggest that the long precedent for deploying the military domestically have cultivated a general acceptance of its occasional necessity. Negative perception of certain events such the Commune and Languedoc have cultivated a preference for more passive military deployments on the national territory and a rejection of the use of the armed forces against the French people. Even during the Cold War under DOT, the 1970s – 1990s under *plan vigipirate*, and 2015 to the present day with *Opération Sentinelle* military deployments on the national territory seem to adhere to the core normative principles outlined above. Thus, we might suggest that historical experiences have indeed guided cultural preferences, which have then altered the character of France's domestic deployments over time.

In terms what accounts for change in strategy, France's approach to the use of the military has also certainly changed over the years as evidenced by the six different categories of domestic deployment illustrated in chart 10 and the clear strategic and operational shift of *Sentinelle*. Thus, we can conclude that France's approach exhibits general historically derived cultural continuity, while also displaying shifts that are congruent with the secondary hypothesis regarding rapid and long-lasting change.

### 7.3. Conclusions – Continuity *and* change

‘France, country of contradictions, is both boldly innovative and stubbornly conservative, revolutionary and traditional, utopian and routine. There is no country where things die faster, there is no country where memories live longer.’<sup>799</sup>

Émile Montégut, ‘Du Génie Français’ in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1857

As the French essayist Émile Montégut suggests, to the impartial observer, France’s political outlook can often appear contradictory, even chaotic. This point was highlighted in the eighteenth century by the king of Prussia, Frederick II, who famously wrote that ‘your nation, of all those in Europe, is the most inconsistent.’<sup>800</sup> Often, France finds itself caught between the real and the ideal; the need for continuity and the yearning for change. This dialectic is something that is instilled in French students at an early age through a programme of civic education that promotes and encourages debate on historical and political issues. In 1881, the French statesman and then-minister of public education, Jules Ferry stated before the Senate that this programme develops in ‘the heart and the mind of the child true ideas about the society in which he must live.’<sup>801</sup> Ferry’s reference to both the heart and the mind hints at this inherent dialectic: the heart providing the philosophical argument about what *should* be done, the mind providing the rational argument about what *can* be done.

In a sense, the French mindset is the quintessence of Simmel’s theory of reciprocity; a constant battle between structure and agency, between individualism and collectivism and it is this tension forms the foundation of the French strategic culture. In the early twentieth century, the French polymath Gustave Le Bon addressed precisely the concept of France’s tendency to embrace both continuity and change. He wrote:

To consider for example only the narratives of history, it would seem that the French *mentalité* has changed tremendously for a century. In a few years, she went from Revolution

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<sup>799</sup> Montégut, Jean-Baptiste Joseph Émile. ‘Du Génie français’, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1857, 2e période, tome 9, p. 108

<sup>800</sup> Frederick II. ‘*Oeuvres complètes de Frédéric II, roi de Prusse: Tome Onzième.*’ (Berlin: Berlin, 1790), p. 337

<sup>801</sup> Ferry, Jules cited in Marchand, Philippe. ‘L’instruction civique en France: Quelques éléments d’histoire.’ *SPIRALE - Revue de Recherches en Éducation*, 1992, no. 7, p. 12

to Caesarism, returned to the monarchy, had another revolution, then called a new Caesar. In reality, only the façades of things had changed.<sup>802</sup>

Le Bon's argument could equally be applied to *Sentinelle* which has arguably represented one of these 'façades' – for policymakers and the military it has certainly represented a shift in operational and even strategic terms. However, from a cultural perspective, the core French *mentalité* remains constant; acceptance of change, provided core values derived from the national historical experience are not contravened. It is through this dialectic that we observe the French approach caught between, as historian Beatrice Heuser writes, the 'psychic and the tangible physical dimensions...'<sup>803</sup> This dialectic is something of great appeal to a nation which is often considered 'daring' in its vision, but 'routine' in its behaviour.<sup>804</sup> This notion was perfectly encapsulated by Charles de Gaulle in a televised interview in 1965:

France is everything all at once. It's all of the French people. France is not left wing, it's not right wing. Naturally, the French feel, as they always have, currents within them. There is the eternal current of motion which moves towards reform, which moves towards change, which is, of course, necessary. And then there is also a current of order, of rules, of tradition, which, too is necessary. It is all of this that represents France.<sup>805</sup>

This tension between continuity and change is in full view with the case of *Sentinelle*. As the previous sections have suggested, France has a long history of repression and political interference at the hands of the army and yet this does not seem to have adversely affected collective attitudes towards domestic military deployments. Indeed, general support for the armed forces in a domestic role is exceptionally high and, as the French historian Bénédicte Chéron argues in her 2017 book *Le soldat méconnu*, in the modern era, French antimilitarism that emerged after the Second World War and gathered pace throughout the 1960s and 1970s seems to be a 'distant memory.'<sup>806</sup> On the surface, this may seem counter-intuitive, even paradoxical. After all, in Britain events such as the Peterloo massacre in 1819 forged an

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<sup>802</sup> le Bon, Gustave. *La Révolution française et la psychologie des révolutions*. (Paris: Les Amis de Gustave Le Bon, 1901), p. 63

<sup>803</sup> Heuser, Beatrice. *Nuclear Mentalities?: Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 75

<sup>804</sup> Siegfried, André. *L'âme des peuples*. (New York: Hachette, 1950), p. 50

<sup>805</sup> Gaulle, Charles de Entretien avec Michel Droit, troisième Partie, 15 December 1965. See: <https://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaulle00112/entretien-avec-michel-droit-troisieme-partie.html> (accessed 20/12/2017)

<sup>806</sup> Chéron, Bénédicte. *Le soldat méconnu: Les Français et leurs armées : état des lieux*. (Paris: Armand Colin, 2018), p. 15

enduring aversion, to the notion of deploying the armed forces *en masse* domestically in any 'active' context. What, then, accounts for this apparent change in France's strategic and attitudinal approach? If, indeed, it is even a change at all.

One argument would be that France's threat perception led to a shift. The theory of strategic culture advanced in this thesis holds that strategy will evolve incrementally over time with rapid and long-lasting shifts only occurring if certain conditions for change are met; a receptive cultural climate is of paramount importance to this and a high threat perception due to a serious exogenous shock can certainly alter norms. For France, 2015 certainly represented one of these shocks. Thus, from the perspective of France's policy makers, the rational response at that stage was to turn to the expertise of the army.

From an operational perspective this constituted a significant change for *l'armée de terre*. The 70,000 troops that were deployed throughout the course of 2015 represented 105% of the country's effective land forces. As such, it was necessary to recall 3,000 troops from external operations in the Antilles, Guyana, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific to meet the requirements of *Sentinelle*. Furthermore, training programmes at the 'training centre for urban operations' (*le centre d'entraînement aux actions en zone urbaine* - CENZUB) and the 'combat training centre' (*le centre d'entraînement au combat* - CENTAC) saw 70% of rotations cancelled.<sup>807</sup> The demands placed on the French army to maintain such a large-scale operation effectively created debate as to whether it would lead to 'burnout' and bring the military 'to its knees.'<sup>808</sup>

Nevertheless, in the eyes of the French policymakers who devised *Sentinelle*, the practical reality of the threat made the deployment of the armed forces a strategic necessity. However, this does not fully explain why public acceptance would be so high given the often negative national historical experience with domestic military deployments, nor does it offer a satisfactory explanation as to why deploying the military, rather than enhancing the capabilities of the civil forces was considered to be the appropriate strategic response. After all, as this chapter argued, France faced a similar threat from Islamist terrorism in the mid-1990s with the GIA. However, these attacks led to different rhetorical responses to those

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<sup>807</sup> Tenenbaum, Élie. 'La Sentinelle Égarée? L'armée de Terre face au terrorisme', *IFRI*, June 2016, vol. 68, p. 27

<sup>808</sup> 'L'armée française risque la surchauffe, met en garde la Cour des comptes', *L'Express*. 14/11/2016. See: [https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/la-cour-des-comptes-s-inquiete-d-un-risque-de-surchauffe-des-armees\\_1850377.html](https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/la-cour-des-comptes-s-inquiete-d-un-risque-de-surchauffe-des-armees_1850377.html) (accessed 03/02/2017)

seen in 2015 and, while soldiers were deployed nationally under *Vigipirate* in the 1990s, the scale of the deployment paled in comparison to *Sentinelle*.<sup>809</sup>

In fact, the 1995 case offers some insight into why the events of 2015 resulted in recourse to a primarily military, rather than civil, response. Here, historical experience of deploying the armed forces in a counter-terrorist context, albeit on a much smaller scale, created a precedent for public acceptance. Many citizens on their way to work in the mid-90s, particularly in Paris or Lyon will have seen heavily-armed troops in static guarding roles at metro stations, for example. The French army finds itself in a similar role under the remit of *Sentinelle*, which, putting aside budgetary and operational challenges, differs from previous deployments only in its scale. Protection, deterrence and reassurance, which have been long-standing pillars of France's internal strategic culture, are still the objectives of the operation while intervention is still firmly the role of civil security forces.

We are still confronted with something of a conundrum relating to the widespread approval of *Sentinelle* in spite of the historical experience of military repression, massacres, and coups (some recent) which live long in the memories of the French people and form such an enduring aspect of the national consciousness.<sup>810</sup> For example, a parliamentary report by the French politicians Olivier Audibert-Troin and Christophe Léonard expressed general support for *Sentinelle* but also made the astute point on the subtle linguistic distinction between the terms '*ennemi à l'intérieur*' and '*ennemi de l'intérieur*'. Audibert-Troin and Léonard warned of the danger of using the first term, which appropriately describes a transnational threat (i.e. that of an external enemy who has penetrated France's borders), interchangeably with the second, which, as this thesis has demonstrated, has significant 'historical resonance.'<sup>811</sup>

This nuanced point on the importance of the past was expressed passionately in the French media after Benjamin Griveaux announced on 20 March 2019 that soldiers operating as part

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<sup>809</sup> Hajdenberg, Michaël. 'En 1986 et 1995, d'autres attentats, d'autres réponses politiques', *MediaPart*, 20 November 2015. See: <https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/201115/en-1986-et-1995-dautres-attentats-dautres-reponses-politiques> (accessed 03/02/2017)

<sup>810</sup> Montégut, Jean-Baptiste Joseph Émile. 'Du Génie français', *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1857, 2e période, tome 9, p. 108

<sup>811</sup> Audibert Troin, Olivier and Léonard, Christophe. 'Sur la présence et l'emploi des forces armées sur le territoire national'. Assemblée Nationale. Rapport d'Information, N° 3864. Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, p. 217

of *Sentinelle* would contribute to the effort against *les gilets jaunes* protesters in 2019.<sup>812</sup> Following Griveaux's announcement, the military governor of Paris, Bruno Le Ray gave an interview with *France Info* where he suggested that the troops would be used in an operational capacity and could 'open fire (...) if their life is threatened or that of the people they defend'.<sup>813</sup> Immediately, French news agencies published articles declaring it to be a departure from the original remit of *Sentinelle*, and a 'disastrous' and 'risky' decision.<sup>814</sup>

One of the more aggressive responses came from the founder of the left-wing party *La France Insoumise*, Jean-Luc Mélenchon. In a televised debate on BFMTV between six politicians from opposing parties, Mélenchon shouted at François Bayrou, president of the centrist *Mouvement Démocratique* party and supporter of the government's plan to use the troops, 'You have gone mad! A soldier is not a police officer!'<sup>815</sup> On a separate occasion, Mélenchon wrote a letter to the Prime Minister of France, Édouard Philippe, declaring that the responsibility of the army is to defend the nation against threats, but '[i]n no circumstances can demonstrators be considered *ennemis de l'intérieur*.'<sup>816</sup>

Historical lessons have therefore clearly not been forgotten; to paraphrase de Gaulle, they still form a powerful 'current' below the surface. The change in attitude in the form of widespread acceptance of *Sentinelle* is in fact not a change at all, but an idiosyncratically French philosophical acknowledgement of the severity of the threat and the resources and capabilities of the military.<sup>817</sup> Thus, the mass deployment of the military is endured, even

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<sup>812</sup> 'Gilets jaunes': les militaires de Sentinelle mobilisés samedi, annonce Griveaux | AFP Extrait. See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2VM4jHA3C20> (accessed 02/01/2020)

<sup>813</sup> Le Ray, Bruno. Des soldats de Sentinelle mobilisés samedi pour la manifestation des 'gilets jaunes' : 'les ordres seront suffisamment clairs pour qu'ils n'aient pas d'inquiétude à avoir', interview with *FranceTVInfo*, 22 March 2019. See: [https://www.francetvinfo.fr/economie/transports/gilets-jaunes/si-leur-vie-ou-celle-des-personnes-qu-ils-defendent-est-menacee-les-militaires-pourront-aller-jusqu-a-l-ouverture-du-feu\\_3244961.html](https://www.francetvinfo.fr/economie/transports/gilets-jaunes/si-leur-vie-ou-celle-des-personnes-qu-ils-defendent-est-menacee-les-militaires-pourront-aller-jusqu-a-l-ouverture-du-feu_3244961.html) (accessed 02/01/2020)

<sup>814</sup> 'Funeste', 'risqué': 'AFP. 'Gilets jaunes': Sentinelle mobilisé samedi, Philippe annule son déplacement en Guyane', *Le Point*, 20 March 2019. See: [https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/gilets-jaunes-les-militaires-de-sentinelle-mobilises-samedi-annonce-griveaux-20-03-2019-2302697\\_20.php](https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/gilets-jaunes-les-militaires-de-sentinelle-mobilises-samedi-annonce-griveaux-20-03-2019-2302697_20.php) (accessed 02/01/2020); Godignon, Lucas. 'Déployer Sentinelle contre les gilets jaunes, une décision risqué', *L'Express*, 21 March 2019. See: [https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/deployer-sentinelle-contre-les-gilets-jaunes-une-decision-risquee\\_2068566.html](https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/deployer-sentinelle-contre-les-gilets-jaunes-une-decision-risquee_2068566.html) (accessed 02/01/2020)

<sup>815</sup> Godignon, Lucas. 'Déployer Sentinelle contre les gilets jaunes, une décision risqué', *L'Express*, 21 March 2019. See: [https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/deployer-sentinelle-contre-les-gilets-jaunes-une-decision-risquee\\_2068566.html](https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/deployer-sentinelle-contre-les-gilets-jaunes-une-decision-risquee_2068566.html) (accessed 02/01/2020)

<sup>816</sup> *Ennemis de l'intérieur* left untranslated to illustrate the importance of the phrase in the context. See: 'Mobilisation de Sentinelle: Mélenchon veut que Philippe s'explique devant l'Assemblée', *Le Figaro*, 22 March 2019. See: <https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/mobilisation-de-sentinelle-melenchon-veut-que-philippe-s-explique-devant-l-assemblee-20190322> (accessed 02/01/2020)

<sup>817</sup> See Elie Tenenbaum's argument in his article 'La Sentinelle Égarée?' where he argues that Sentinelle connects practicality through available 'resources' with more philosophical dimensions such as deterrence and

praised, due to the deterrent effect of a military presence and the utopian possibility of eradicating terrorist threats in the future.<sup>818</sup> These more rational assessments are overridden by historical memory if the armed forces are directed towards the people due to negative perceptions of the historical experience during formative moments such as the Commune and Languedoc. The outcome is that we see a version of France that both embraces the need for change if the situation demands it, but equally one that insists on the importance of continuity through tradition and historical lessons.

These two versions of France, that place equal weight on the importance of both revolution and convention, exist simultaneously creating the appearance of contradiction or dramatic shifts in approach. Thus, while change is certainly evident in France's approach, historical experience and the cultural norms that derive from the perception of that experience lend the character of France's strategic culture a significant degree of continuity as this thesis has demonstrated. In summary, historical experiences and cultural preferences constitute the prism through which all of France's practical defence needs are viewed and interpreted. This means that while on the surface certain strategic decisions may appear to be a deviation from a norm, there is a continuous historical and cultural thread that guides their approach. Consequently, in answer to the question of whether continuity or change is the more enduring characteristic of France's strategic culture, the answer is *les deux, mon général!*<sup>819</sup>

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reassurance through 'posture': Tenenbaum, Élie; 'La Sentinelle Égarée? L'armée de Terre face au terrorisme', *IFRI*, June 2016, vol. 68, pp. 1-60

<sup>818</sup> Beatrice Heuser makes a similar point in her book *Nuclear Mentalities* where she writes that France's philosophical outlook meant they could accept the deterrent effect provided by the unrivalled and terrible destructive power of nuclear weaponry due to the noble objective of limiting, perhaps even eradicating all major war. See: Heuser, Beatrice. *Nuclear Mentalities?: Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG*. p. 76

<sup>819</sup> 'Both, General!' A phrase that derives from the French military. It is usually an ironic response to a question with two answers that are both equally possible.



## Chapter 8 – Conclusions and future research

### 8.1. Summary of findings

This thesis has examined the role of historical experiences in guiding cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces for maintaining domestic security in Britain and France. Contrary to the realist school of thought that promotes a theory of rational, goal-oriented, and largely acultural action, this thesis found that since 2001, the level of threat from Islamist terrorism faced by Britain and France has been comparable, they have similar threat perceptions, similar capabilities and resources and yet two distinct sets of strategic preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically have emerged.

It set out to answer three questions: first, are Britain and France's cultural preferences for acceptance or rejection of military forces domestically derived from the perception of the national historical experience? Second, do these cultural preferences have a constraining effect on strategic behaviour? And third, if evidence of historically-derived cultural constraint can be found, what accounts for episodes of change in strategy over time?

The central finding, of the thesis addresses all three questions: differences in the perception of the national historical experience have influenced each state's cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically. In turn, this has constrained their behaviour. These divergent responses are a function of the strategic cultures in the two countries, defined as *the set of actions, habits, preferences and expectations concerning the use of force resulting from the collective perception of the national historical experience*. However, a theory based purely on the constraining influence of culture on behaviour would neglect the evidence of change in Britain and France's use of the armed forces on the national territory over time. Operations *Temperer* and *Sentinelle*, for example, represented clear strategic shifts; the deployment of 950 troops in Britain as part of Operation *Temperer* was the largest active engagement of military personnel in peacetime for nearly a hundred years, while the mobilisation of over 10,000 troops as part of *Opération Sentinelle* is the largest number of troops on France's territory since the war in Algeria.

As a result, the thesis asked: what accounts for episodes of change in strategy? In response to these research questions a four-part hypothesis was presented that argued that states have

the potential to behave according to both continuity *and* change. The first part of the hypothesis posited that the perception of the national historical experience would indeed cultivate normative preferences which constrain behaviour. Part two argued that strategy is cultural and thus, like culture, it will evolve slowly over time as different threats emerge, new technology develops, and societal norms advance. However, the rate of change is usually slow due the externally constraining force of culture. Part three of the hypothesis suggested that the constraints of culture do not preclude the possibility for rapid and long-lasting strategic shifts. However, a shift of this nature will only occur if there are social institutions that are capable of inciting change; a leader or government that is willing to push the changes through and a cultural climate that is receptive to a shift. Part four of the hypothesis argued that even if a significant change occurs in a state's strategic culture, there will still be observable cultural values, deriving from the perception of the national historical experience, that permeate their approach.

The strategic culture literature, it was argued, has two main gaps: first, there are relatively few studies that focus on strategic culture in a domestic context; and second, there is ongoing debate in the field as to what accounts for changes in strategic culture if strategy is constrained by historical experiences and cultural preferences. Consequently, the literature review aimed to construct a framework for understanding the historical experience, cultural preference, behaviour nexus and treats the three concepts as inter-dependent rather than mutually exclusive. In this, it avoids a potential criticism that it is using culture alone as an explanatory variable.

For example, drawing on the lessons from the sociological and anthropological literature as well as the so-called 'first generation' of thought on strategic culture, it argued that culture *cannot* be used as variable, but instead must be considered as the lens through which we perceive and interpret the world. It affects and is affected by behaviour, just as it is guided by the past while also influencing the lessons we choose to learn from our experiences. As a result of this symbiosis, the thesis introduced a framework that took this potential for reciprocity into account. from the literature, the study then set out to tackle the research question by breaking it down into its component parts: 1) historical experience; 2) cultural preferences; and 3) behaviour with different approaches being applied to each stage to provide as comprehensive a picture as possible.

The first step was to identify the moments in each state's past that have been the most formative to current approaches. To do this, all significant domestic military deployments in Britain and France between the years 1800 to 2019 were traced and charted. In Britain, 102 deployments were identified and 420 in France. Each deployment was then coded according to its purpose. In Britain four types of deployment were identified (two active and two passive): 1) Quelling riot and protest (active); 2) Countering terrorism (active); 3) Providing personnel for striking civil service (passive); 4) Providing disaster relief (passive). In France, six types of deployment were identified (four active, two passive): 1) Quelling riot and protest (active); 2) Countering terrorism (active); 3) Defence against invasion (active); 4) *Coup d'état* (active); 5) Providing personnel for striking civil service (passive); 6) Providing disaster relief (passive). From the data that were gathered a series of formative moments (i.e. moments that led to a change in the era of domestic military deployments, or to a significant increase or decrease in the number of deployments) were identified.

The next step was to gather the data on the language used by policymakers during each formative moment. Language was chosen as a proxy for preferences because of its role as a mode of social action and cultural expression that guides, and is guided by, our perception of the material world. Thus, it arguably reflects the norms and values of the time allowing us to trace continuity and change in cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces for domestic security across time. In total, 536 speeches and statements were analysed for the British case and 556 for France. The following section will summarise the core findings in each case.

### **8.1.1. Britain**

In Britain there appears to be a general cultural aversion to the idea of deploying the military on national territory. Opinion polls and statements from political and military figures illustrate the sense that the British are uncomfortable with the idea. Despite this assumed rejection of the idea of using the military internally, at least 102 examples of significant military deployments on the national territory between 1800 and 2019 were found. This raised the question: if the army has been involved on the national territory with relative frequency, then where does the aversion to domestic deployments come from?

It was argued that traumatic historical experiences fomented a normative shift away from a reliance on the military as a force of maintaining order. Based on the data on domestic deployments, the Peterloo massacre of 1819 was the moment that fundamentally altered Britain's cultural preferences. The fallout led to the creation of the world's first police force just ten years later and, consequently, a dramatic reduction in the number of times the military were deployed against the people. The last time the military were used in an active capacity to quell civil unrest was 1919 in Liverpool and Glasgow. This essentially marked the end of the 'riot and protest' era of domestic deployments and the beginning of an era characterised by passive deployments for personnel provision or disaster relief under the Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) banner.

However, this is not to say that there were no active deployments that occurred post-1919. From the 1970s the military became increasingly integrated into the domestic security architecture. The elevated threat from transnational terrorism in 1972 led to a reconfiguration of the elite troops of the SAS. The new Special Projects Team would now be given a role in countering terrorism. It also led to the formalisation of Britain's MACP principle that ensures the armed forces can only be deployed under certain specific circumstances, not least in a capacity that is subordinate to the civil power. It was MACP that was invoked in 1980 during the Iranian embassy siege, which saw widespread approval from policymakers.

The general approval of the SAS's role was due to the adherence to Britain's enduring principles of subordination to the civil power, last resort, proportionality, and temporary action. A comparison of the responses to 1980 with those of Operation MARMION at Heathrow in 1974 yields a conclusion that the British people will likely reject a domestic deployment if it fails to adhere to those core principles.

In the modern counter-terrorism era (post-2015), Operation Temperer received widespread acceptance from policymakers despite an assumption that the British are averse to the idea. David Cameron's suggestion was that 'we are rather over' our past and that the public would be amenable to the armed forces being used for the maintenance of domestic security. However, the analysis of the language by policymakers at each formative moment in Britain's past conducted for this thesis suggested that, quite to the contrary of Cameron's assertion, the past is still very much Britain's guide.

Interestingly, although *Temperer* had been implemented twice in 2017, Britain's CONTEST outlined the potential for around 10,000 troops to be deployed in the event of a serious terrorist incident, and a formal recognition from military personnel that the lines between internal and external security had become blurred, modern recruitment campaigns still reflected the idea that the army is an external force. This was consistent with nearly one hundred years of recruit campaigns that portray the army as fighting abroad, not at home.

Despite a change in the nature of domestic military deployments over time and the limited opposition to *Temperer*, further analysis of the language demonstrated remarkable continuity in Britain's cultural preferences. By comparing the speeches and statements of policymakers during each formative moment, this thesis found that the British people are likely to be acceptant of domestic military engagements on the national territory if the perception of the threat is sufficiently high, but *only* if the following normative conditions are met: 1) the military are subordinate to the civil power; 2) the deployment is proportionate to the threat; and 3) the deployment was made as a last resort. These three core principles are the abiding and cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically in Britain and any attempts to circumvent them will likely be met with widespread disapproval.

### **8.1.2. France**

In France, it was argued that there is a general acceptance of the use of the armed forces for the maintenance of domestic security. Opinion polls suggested widespread support for *Opération Sentinelle* while some media debates following the tragic attacks in Paris in November 2015 even questioned why the army did not play *more* of a role. The data on domestic military deployments reflected a long historical precedent for domestic deployments with at least 420 significant internal operations found between 1800 and 2019. It was argued that this precedent for deploying the armed forces on the national territory has led to a general acceptance of the role that the army can play in maintaining domestic security.

Despite such continuity afforded by historical precedents, an analysis of the language used at various formative moments in France's past also revealed a clear shift in cultural preferences. For example, an analysis of the reactions to use of the armed forces against the Commune of Paris in 1871 found that policymakers at the time were generally in favour of

the use of the troops against the *Communards*. There were frequent references to the fact that the Commune constituted a serious threat to the state, that those involved were no longer French citizens, and that the situation was a state of war. By 1907 and the Languedoc revolt there was a general rejection of Clemenceau's decision to deploy the troops. The reasons for this rejection were essentially the opposite of the views during the Commune; namely that the protesters were not a serious threat, that they were French citizens and thus the use of armed force against them was unjustified; that is, the situation in no way was akin to a state of war. Instead, the use of the armed forces against the people was seen as despotic, provocative, and dangerous.

As a consequence, French people formed a closer bond with the nation and the army following the First World War leading to the formation of the *Gendarmerie Mobile*. This has held primacy for dealing with episodes of civil unrest from 1921 to the present day.

During the Cold War perceptions of an *ennemi de l'intérieur* grew. As a result, the army once more became closer integrated into France internal security architecture albeit restricted to a protective role, rather than direct intervention. This preference has endured into the modern counter-terrorism era meaning that there is general acceptance for *Sentinelle* as it essentially serves as an extension of this protection function, and not as a force of intervention. Intervention on the national territory is still seen as the primary duty of the civil forces, particularly through elite civil forces such RAID or BRI. The GIGN will often supplement these civil forces of intervention just as the regular troops of the *armée de terre* will supplement the *Gendarmerie* or the CRS.

However, it was also argued that the French people are rarely of one mind with ideological division featuring as an enduring aspect of France's political culture. Analysis of the language used by policymakers at a series of formative moments also illustrated this division with each formative moment, with the exception of the First World War, showing multiple positive and negative statements. *Sentinelle*, too, displayed a spread of positive and negative statements although interestingly most of the objections to *Sentinelle* were not moral, but practical (i.e. it is too costly, or it undermines operational capacity overseas). Instead, in moral terms, there has been fairly widespread approval of *Sentinelle*.

This approval, it was argued, was due to the fact that the operation adhered to a series of normative principles that have endured across time. Based on the analysis of the rhetoric at each formative moment, a notable degree of continuity in preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically was uncovered. These principles were: 1) the level of threat is high enough to justify the use of the armed forces; 2) the situation amounts to a state of war, either through a formal declaration or a rhetorical militarisation of the threat; 3) the army is deployed in a primarily protective role in order to preserve the state, its people and its values; 4) the enemy are either not French citizens or, by virtue of their actions, are no longer considered to be French citizens; 5) any operations that are carried out will be in coordination with the civil forces; and 6) Some historical precedent for the use of the armed forces can be demonstrated. It was concluded that any domestic deployment on the French national territory that does not meet all of these criteria will likely encounter significant public resistance.

It was argued that *Sentinelle* has certainly represented a strategic shift in terms of its scope and the recalibration of France's defence priorities away from the external theatre towards the internal. Here it was argued that France's strategic culture tends to embrace both continuity and change, which, as this thesis argued, are not necessarily mutually exclusive; France is a bright example of a country that holds both as essential components of its strategic culture. It was argued, however, that cultural preferences deriving from the national historical experience are still likely to guide the character of any response that France may make.

### **8.1.3. Expected versus actual finding: homegrown terrorism**

This thesis has charted over six hundred domestic deployments in Britain and France and analysed over a thousand speeches as well as supplemented the core analysis with an examination of dozens of army recruitment campaigns and media articles. Given the sheer quantity of data that was analysed it might have been expected that the rhetoric in both countries, particularly in the modern era would address the issue of attacks that had been perpetrated by British and French citizens. One of the points of analysis in this thesis was the issue of the cognitive barrier of using troops against their own people, howsoever controversial.

For example, many of the threats in France (at present from Islamist terrorism) are indeed from French citizens. It is a painful fact for many of the French people that their own citizens have been responsible for many of the mass-casualty attacks in recent years. For example, Mohammed Merah, the gunman at the 2012 Toulouse and Montauban shooting which left seven dead was a French citizen of Algerian descent. Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, the brothers who carried out the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks were both French Nationals. Amedy Coulibaly, the third gunman who held hostages at a Kosher supermarket was also a French national. Of the nine suspected perpetrators who carried out the November 2015 attacks in Paris, six were French nationals.<sup>820</sup> Mohamed Salmene Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, the driver of the truck which killed 86 on Bastille Day in Nice was of Tunisian nationality, but had a French residency permit. Larossi Abballa, the man who killed a police officer and his wife in their home in Magnanville was a French citizen of Moroccan descent.

Despite this long list of French citizens carrying out attacks, there are strangely few references to the fact many of the perpetrators were French citizens. In fact, based on the sample of 236 speeches and statements on *Sentinelle*, only two referenced the fact that the attackers were French. Table 14 displays the dearth of speeches and statements in the modern era that either refer to how the enemy, as French citizens, have forfeited their rights to civil treatment due to their actions or to how troops should not be used as the enemy are French citizens. All of the other incidents show how the issue of nationality and citizenship has typically been at the heart of debates on the use of the armed forces; the modern era and *Sentinelle* stands out clearly due to the lack of discussions on this topic. Clearly, this is an issue of sensitivity in France and while it would have been beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the issue of nationality, citizenship and Islamist terrorism, we might speculate by arguing that the lack of speeches on this subject is due to the large Muslim population of France and a desire to avoid alienating or scapegoating them.

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<sup>820</sup> New York Times, 'Unravelling the Connections Among the Paris Attackers', 18 March 2015. See: [https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/15/world/europe/manhunt-for-paris-attackers.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/15/world/europe/manhunt-for-paris-attackers.html?_r=0) (accessed 28/03/17)



**Table 14: Analysis of French speeches and statements on *Sentinelle***

	Enemy have forfeited rights (Positive statement)	'Enemy' are French citizens (Negative statement)
Commune	25	9
Languedoc	13	17
Gilets Jaunes	-	6
Sentinelle	2	0

## 8.2. Britain and France compared, differences in approach

There were of course a number of similarities in Britain and France's approaches. Both seem to have moved away from the idea of using the armed forces to quell episodes of civil unrest. This is not to say that neither would reconsider the military's role if disturbances escalated into insurrection or revolution, but for general dissent, or even rioting, both states seem to have developed a sense that the use of the military against one's own citizens is abhorrent.

There were also similarities in terms of the integration of the armed forces into counter-terror responses. Both Britain and France reacted to the attack in Munich in 1972 by developing dedicated counter-terrorist units (the SAS and the GIGN) and by gradually building a foundation for a greater role for the regular military in a protective capacity through MACP in Britain and *Vigipirate* in France. Indeed, as the minutes from the meeting where Operation Temperer was first devised indicate, Britain's decision to develop the capacity to deploy the troops was a direct reaction to France's *Opération Sentinelle*. Consequently, we cannot avoid the idea of transnational norm diffusion.<sup>821</sup> However, while a stimulus may provoke a response, the nature of that response will still differ due to divergent strategic cultures which derive from very different historical experiences and, crucially, how those experiences are perceived. The following section outlines the two clearest differences in nature of the debates in Britain and France.

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<sup>821</sup> Transnational diffusion, a theory first espoused by Francis Galton in 1889. See: Gilardi, Fabrizio. 'Transnational diffusion: Norms, ideas, and policies' in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (eds), *Handbook of International Relations*, (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012), pp. 453-477

### 8.2.1. Division versus consensus

The differences between Britain and France also relate to the nature of the language used by their respective policymakers. As has been suggested throughout, France is characterised by division, this extended to episodes of both continuity and change in their strategies for domestic security as well as to the distribution of themes in the rhetoric that was analysed. Britain meanwhile saw general continuity in attitudes and far more consensus at particular formative moments – either totally supporting a deployment, or totally opposing it. At this point it is worth giving two brief examples, one positive and one negative. Chart 21 shows the reactions to *Sentinelle* and *Temperer*, respectively. we can see from the following pie charts which look at just the positive to negative statements in both Britain and France regarding Operation *Temperer* and Operation *Sentinelle*, respectively.





Chart 20 – the reactions to Opération Sentinelle and Operation Temperer


Chart 20 shows a fascinating paradox: in Britain there is an overwhelming acceptance of *Temperer* despite the general aversion to the idea of deploying the military. In France, there is more of a division despite acceptance of deploying the military. The reason for this can be understood as being a function of their cultures of political debate. Britain seems to shirk debate, while France embraces it. One of the most surprising examples of this found in this thesis was David Cameron’s assertion that ‘we are rather over’ our history and therefore the use of the armed forces domestically was the sensible thing to do. Despite an ingrained aversion to the use of the armed forces, there was no dissent on any of the benches in parliament regardless of their political leaning.

Chart 21 emphasises these differences by examining a case where there was general opposition to the use of the military. Again, in France during the Languedoc winegrowers' revolt, just over a quarter of the speeches were still generally supportive of the idea of using the army. This is compared with the British case during the General strike of 1926 where just five percent of the statements were supportive.

Languedoc Revolt, 1907



General Strike, 1926



**Chart 21 – the reactions to the Languedoc revolt and the General Strike**

Britain's lack of serious debate on topics such as Temperer is emblematic of a wider culture of political disengagement. For example, since 2001 the average voter turnout for general elections in the UK has been 63.7 percent. Even the Brexit vote, arguably one of the most important political moments in modern British history, saw a turnout of 72.2 percent with a staggering 12.9 million people on the electoral register not casting a vote. This is compared with France where Presidential elections since 2001 have maintained an average turnout of around 84 percent.


These levels of political engagement may account for the general continuity in attitudes in Britain over time; the ambient sense of how things are done is not transmitted in an active sense as they arguably are in France through programmes of civic education or even frequent debate, but rather through more passive means such as word of mouth. By contrast, France's tendency to challenge and debate concepts makes long-lasting strategic change difficult to implement. In France norms are actively transmitted and political debate is encouraged from a young age. As a result, there is a strong sense of *what should be done*. This may account for why there have been a series of short-term shifts in approach over time, which, in keeping with Durkheim's arguments about external constraint, have all eventually been 'corrected'

by a series of normative checks informed by factors such as the public's perception of the national historical experience.

### 8.2.2. The role of history

The above point is also illustrated by Britain and France's respective invocations of history in either a positive or a negative sense. The notion that harnessing past events can provide the impetus for present actions is undoubtedly a guiding principle of the French political ethos. Across the formative moments studied in this thesis, historical experience is invoked in some manner in forty-five separate speeches in France. The formal importance attributed to history can be traced to the French Third Republic's mandating of compulsory primary education and, through the introduction of *roman national*, an attempt to instil a degree of national unity around the lessons of the past. Political debate in France is conducted much like proceedings in courtroom; a statement or suggested policy is deemed far more acceptable if the speaker can demonstrate an historical precedent.

**Chart 22: References to history (both positive and negative)**



By contrast, in Britain twenty-five references to the past were found. This is not an insignificant number, but is still far fewer than in France despite a similar number of speeches that were analysed. Although the case of Northern Ireland was largely omitted from the analysis in this thesis, it has still been influential in shaping British policy. As such, in the more contemporary examples (such as Heathrow, the Iranian Embassy siege and Operation Temperer) this thesis expected to find multiple references to Northern Ireland. However, there were only a small handful of mentions of the Irish campaign with most historical references being to Peterloo or Tonyandy. Again, this supports the idea that norms in Britain are understood implicitly, but rarely voiced.

In short, as posited in the second research question, historical experience constrains cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically in both Britain and France. The difference is that constraint occurs rather passively in Britain, but in a more overt and active manner in France. Despite these differences, the significance of history's effect on behaviour cannot be overstated; George Orwell once wrote that 'those who control the past, control the future'. Orwell, of course, was referring to the rather dystopian idea of altering the facts of the past to suit one's present agenda ('Oceania has always been at war with Eastasia'). Neither Britain nor France could be accused of massaging history quite to this extent. Nevertheless, Orwell's point about the constructed nature of historical experience is apt. Norms and values are transmitted across time, often subconsciously. As a result, individuals may have a general sense that 'this isn't the done thing' without being able to trace formally the origin of that thought to arrive at an understanding of 'why I think the way I do.'

Often, the past is invoked in an ambiguous sense, such as David Cameron's assertion about the 'good historical reasons' for Britain's aversion to the use of the armed forces domestically. Further, many of the historical examples selected by policymakers in their speeches reflect episodes that happened in the recent past rather than objective, fixed points in time. For example, in France speeches on the Commune referred to the 1848 revolution; Languedoc referred to the Commune; the First World War referred to the Franco-Prussian war; and *Sentinelle* referred to several events, but most frequently the precedents set during the Cold War. Similarly, during the general strike in Britain, Peterloo was referenced several

times. In 2011 during the Tottenham riots, there were no references to Peterloo, instead, a similarly unpopular incident that occurred in Tonypandy, Wales in 1910 was mentioned.

In short, although historical experiences are undeniably crucial in determining cultural preferences, historical memory itself is constructed; policymakers are able to pick and choose the moments in time that they believe are the most formative, just as they are able to pick and choose the lessons that are drawn from those experiences. Consequently, there is an element of irony to the idea that historical experiences lead to generally consistent strategic behaviour due to the fact that the interpretations of history itself are far from consistent. Nevertheless, the effect of history on culture is always formative and culture's effect on behaviour is always constraining. Thus, any attempts to alter policy significantly and without an understanding of the past and the cultural sensitivities attached to it will likely be doomed to failure.

### **8.3. Scope for future research**

The scope of this project has been necessarily broad in order to account for continuity and change across time. It is hoped its findings are robust and will provide a strong platform upon which to build future projects. With the bulk of the historical legwork already outlined in this thesis, it will now be possible to focus on more contemporary attitudes. With this in mind, there are two intended research projects for the near future. The first project aims to integrate the cases of Northern Ireland and Algeria in order to analyse empirically whether there are significant differences between the normative preferences for military deployments on the mainland and on overseas territories. This project will focus on continuity and change in the language during the Cold War period when troops deployments in Algeria and in Northern Ireland under Operation Banner were at their highest.

The second intended research project is to integrate the German case which, as outlined previously, would make for an interesting comparison. What follows is some of the initial research and how it would fit within the findings of this thesis.

Over the course of 2016, Germany experienced a wave of attacks at the hands of Islamist extremists. Fifteen lives were lost in nine separate successful attacks and a further three significant plots were foiled in Düsseldorf, Ludwigshafen, and Chemnitz. The most deadly

of these occurred on 19 December when the Tunisian national Anis Amri drove a hijacked articulated lorry into a Christmas market in Berlin. The elevated threat from Islamist terrorism led German news agencies to wonder what could be done; *Der Spiegel* led with a headline “*A Country on Tenterhooks: Germans Wonder If Terror Can Be Prevented*”<sup>822</sup> while the *Handelsblatt* published the simple, but hard hitting headline ‘*Airtight borders, Bundeswehr on our streets*’.<sup>823</sup> There was also widespread criticism of Merkel’s immigration policy.<sup>824</sup> However, in spite of this pressure, responsibility for countering the threat remained with the Civil power; Merkel defiantly stated to the *Bundestag* that ‘Germany will remain Germany, with everything that is dear and precious to us’.<sup>825</sup> This echoed the statement she had made six months earlier that in spite of the elevated threat, ‘security measures will remain as they are at present’ and ‘sovereign tasks in Germany will be achieved through the Federal police.’<sup>826</sup>

However, in keeping with the theme of continuity and change, as a reaction to the increased threat of Islamist terrorism, discussions were held in Germany for the deployment of the Bundeswehr domestically. These discussions were justified on the grounds of ‘the character and dynamic of current and future security-political threats.’<sup>827</sup> Horst Seehofer, a German politician of the CSU and former Minister President of Bavaria, was perhaps the most vocal proponent of deploying the *Bundeswehr*. He stated that ‘we owe it to the victims, the affected, and the entire population that we review and re-adjust our entire immigration and

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<sup>822</sup> ‘*A Country on Tenterhooks: Germans Wonder If Terror Can Be Prevented*’, *Spiegel Online*, 1 September 2016. See: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-searches-for-answers-after-recent-wave-of-attacks-a-1105616.html> (accessed 03 September 2020)

<sup>823</sup> ‘CSU-Reaktion auf Anschlag: Grenzen dicht, Bundeswehr ins Inland’, *Handelsblatt*, 21 December 2016. See: <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/csu-reaktion-auf-anschlag-grenzen-dicht-bundeswehr-ins-inland/19160570.html> (accessed 03 September 2020)

<sup>824</sup> ‘Thanks Angela for letting these terrorists go’ (trans.) Monika Pilath, ‘Danke Angela fürs Reinlassen dieser Terroristen’, *Die Zeit*, 27 July 2016. See: <http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-07/angela-merkel-fluechtlingspolitik-attentate-verbundung-internationaler-blick> (accessed 03 September 2020)

An article summarizing the views of predominantly right-wing voices, domestically and abroad, in the wake of the terror attacks. The quote is attributed to Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders. The author of the article itself does not hold the same view.

<sup>825</sup> Lauter, Rita. ‘Deutschland wird Deutschland bleiben’, *Die Zeit*, 7 September 2016. See: <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-09/angela-merkel-generaldebatte-bundestag-haushalt> (accessed 03 September 2020)

<sup>826</sup> ‘Die Sicherheitsmaßnahmen bleiben so, wie sie jetzt sind’ and ‘Hoheitliche Aufgaben werden durch die Bundespolizei in Deutschland geleistet’, *Die Bundeskanzlerin, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, 5 December 2015. See: <https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2015/12/2015-12-05-videopodcast.html> (accessed 03 September 2020)

<sup>827</sup> Baker, Alex and Wagstyl, Stefan. ‘Germany to push for progress towards european army’, *Financial Times*, 2 May 2016. See: <https://www.ft.com/content/e90a080e-107b-11e6-91da-096d89bd2173> (accessed 03 September 2020)

security policy’<sup>828</sup> and therefore, ‘[w]hen it comes to property protection, to ensure safety in crowded places, then the well-trained *Bundeswehr* soldiers should take over so that the police can perform their actual tasks’.<sup>829</sup>

In fact, recently the German police and military conducted joint counter-terror operations for the first time.<sup>830</sup> This was an unprecedented moment for Germany that perhaps was not afforded the level of domestic (or even international) coverage that it deserved; Germany has severe restrictions on the deployment of the *Bundeswehr* for domestic purposes and civil control over domestic matters is a crucial component of the German political system. Even the *Bundeswehr*’s website notes that attacks in Paris and Germany have led to more debate, but that the legal hurdles are ‘high’.<sup>831</sup>

Germany’s restrictions on the use of the armed forces domestically are a legacy of its experiences before and during the Second World War. Article 48 of the now obsolete Weimar Constitution related to the circumstances for the imposition of a state of emergency and allowed for the use of armed force if a) the President of the Republic deemed the state to be failing in its duties, and b) to restore public order or preserve public safety. Originally it was intended to be used to deal with rebellions and was often invoked in the 14 years of the Republic (between 1918 and 1933) to allow politicians to pass laws when there was no clear majority in parliament. However, most famously, Adolf Hitler invoked Article 48 after the 27 February Reichstag fire. Hitler made Hindenburg sign the Reichstag Fire Decree which suspended the Weimar constitution for the entirety of the Third Reich. During the Second World War, the Nazi party then used the military to consolidate their power and repress dissidents, contributing to the systematic killing of the country’s Jewish population.

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<sup>828</sup> ‘CSU-Reaktion auf Anschlag: Grenzen dicht, Bundeswehr ins Inland’, *Handelsblatt*, 21 December 2016. See: <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/csu-reaktion-auf-anschlag-grenzen-dicht-bundeswehr-ins-inland/19160570.html> (accessed 03 September 2020)

<sup>829</sup> Horst Seehofer quoted in Adrian Arab, ‘CSU-Chef fordert bundesweiten Objektschutz durch die Bundeswehr’, *Die Welt*, 19 August 2017. See: <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article167826714/CSU-Chef-fordert-bundesweiten-Objektschutz-durch-die-Bundeswehr.html> (accessed 03 September 2020)

<sup>830</sup> Hein, Matthias von. ‘German soldiers as a domestic security force?’, *Deutsche Welle*, 10/03/2017, <http://www.dw.com/en/german-soldiers-as-a-domestic-security-force/a-37881989> (accessed May 14th 2017) Knight, Ben. ‘Bundeswehr joins police for anti-terror exercises’, *Deutsche Welle*, 7 March 2017. See: <http://www.dw.com/en/bundeswehr-joins-police-for-anti-terror-exercises/a-37843161> (accessed 14/05/2017)

<sup>831</sup> Trettenback, Marc. ‘Einsatz im Inneren: Rechtliche Möglichkeiten und Grenzen’, 10 March 2017. See: <https://bit.ly/35gKBo7> (accessed 03 September 2020)



Hegel famously wrote that ‘The German spirit is the spirit of freedom’; deploying the *Bundeswehr* would be considered a step along the way to limiting the individual freedoms of Germany’s own people in a manner consistent with that seen during Nazi rule. However, the ‘spirit of freedom’ is also an abiding notion that stretches beyond domestic considerations. Even for modern-day Germans, it is a philosophy that extends to all people and nations and the notion of interference in another state’s sovereignty is considered to be an unconscionable and abhorrent concept. This philosophy is enshrined in Germany’s constitution and, consequently, through the attitudes of its citizens towards the use of force.

State	France	Britain	Germany
<b>Response</b>	‘Posture’ Long-lasting, primarily military response for protective purposes	‘ <i>Ad hoc</i> ’ Civil response with military on standby	‘Restraint’ Civil response. Overwhelming reluctance to use military

The above table illustrates how France, Britain and Germany’s respective approaches to domestic military deployments for the purposes of maintaining domestic security could be categorised in a future research project. As this thesis has shown, France is more comfortable with long-term deployments of the army for the purposes of protection. However, their response cannot be considered a total militarisation of the threat as the protective duty of the army is largely just for show. They ‘posture’ in order to deter potential attackers and reassure the population but intervention is still seen as the domain of the civil forces. Britain meanwhile is more uncomfortable with deploying the armed forces on the national territory. However, as this thesis demonstrated, there is still significant precedent for the use of the armed forces internally throughout history. The principle of subordination to civil power means that the army is often on standby, to be used only as a last resort and usually on a short-term basis. In this sense, the British approach to domestic deployments is *ad hoc*. In Germany, there is widespread aversion to the use of the armed forces on the national territory in any active sense, this is in spite of a threat perception that is comparable to both Britain and France and similar military capabilities. In each case, behaviour is constrained by the cultural preferences of each state rather than an objective, rational assessment of the situation.

Post-2001, the armed forces have been required to operate across the full spectrum of scenarios as new threats emerge and the lines between internal and external security become blurred. In addition to traditional operations overseas, in the modern era troops have increasingly been expected to contribute to a number of domestic duties ranging from disaster relief, providing security at events, supplementing vital public services during strikes or, most recently, during health crises and, crucially, defending against the threat of terrorism. Excluding developments in 2020 and the Covid-19 outbreak, in France sixty-five significant domestic military deployments were counted for four different purposes. This is the most in the last 150 years. While in Britain, there have been seventeen significant deployments for three different purposes, the most in Britain's history. If the trend is moving towards using the military as more than just a last resort, it will be of great importance to understand the formative historical experiences that have shaped current preferences and, of course, the conditions under which a deployment may be deemed acceptable. The findings from this thesis go some way towards that end.

#### **8.4 Methodological, empirical, and theoretical implications and contributions**

In 2004, R. Burke Johnson and Anthony J. Onwuegbuzi published their widely-cited article on how mixed methods research's 'time has come' by generating 'eclectic' and 'superior' research.<sup>832</sup> It is hoped that the approach taken in this thesis is a worthy contribution to the growing body of studies in the social sciences that use mixed methods techniques. Although certainly inspired by the works of strategic culture theorists such as Gray and Johnston and the conceptual approach adopted by the French *Annales* school, as far as the author is aware, there have been no previous studies that have taken an approach quite like this. Its broad scope across two hundred years and the need to combine empirical data on domestic troop deployments with in-depth content and discourse analysis necessitated a blend of both qualitative and quantitative techniques; it is this combination that lends it its flexibility and power as a methodological approach.

Indeed, one of the major contributions of this thesis is its methodology, which could be applied to myriad studies across the field of International Relations. A researcher could use

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<sup>832</sup> Johnson, R. Burke and Onwuegbuzi, Anthony J. *Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come*, Educational Researcher, Vol. 33, No. 7 (Oct. 2004), p. 14

this approach to analyse trends across a long period of time in their subject of interest. For example, attitudes towards immigration, climate change, international integration through the European Union to name but a few. In essence, the approach used in this thesis is a form of thematic indexing which would allow any researcher to group attitudes according to common themes thereby facilitating comparative analysis.

One particular direction that the methodology of this thesis could be taken in relates to the second generation of strategic culture proffered by Klein. As mentioned in the literature review, the crux of Klein's argument is that a disconnect may exist between what a state says and what it does. In essence, the state requires the means to legitimise its activities. This is the basis of securitisation theory, which examines the politicisation of certain threats that do not necessarily represent an existential risk to the survival of a given state. Using the methodology applied in this thesis, it would be possible to take a broad concept (for example, terrorism), and examine how the threat of terrorism is presented (or 'securitised') by political elites across time. This could be combined with a statistical analysis of actual terrorism attack data to ascertain whether the messaging presented by elites reflects the reality of the threat.

This thesis has also made a significant theoretical contribution to the literature. Studies on strategic culture will make the broad assumption that history and culture matter as shaping or guiding influences to behaviour, but provide little empirical evidence as to *how* they matter, or focus on too narrow a time frame to capture normative and strategic evolution. Consequently, this thesis attempted to rectify this gap by assessing Britain and France's preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically across the *longue durée*. It provided compelling empirical evidence, through extensive analysis of primary sources, of the historical sensitivities attached to domestic military deployments and the cultural preferences for the use of force internally that seem to have emerged as a result.

This has implications for the ongoing debates on how we explain differences in state behaviour. Although of course it is not possible to generalise given the two-state focus of this study and the specific subject matter of domestic military deployments, it still constitutes a significant empirical contribution to the field of Strategic Studies and, more generally, International Relations, as it clearly demonstrates the importance of culture and the perception of historical experience in strategy making. Importantly, the empirical findings

in this thesis seem to contradict the realist and neo-realist assumptions about largely a-cultural and a-historical action, such as those mentioned in the introduction by Shapiro, Byman, and Liu which argued that capabilities, resources, and threat perceptions are a more appropriate explanation for divergent preferences. This was shown not to be the case by the comparative approach adopted in this thesis; Britain and France's overlapping capabilities, resources, and threat perceptions still generated divergent preferences leaving an explanatory gap that could be filled by an analysis of culturally-guided perceptions of the national historical experience.

We should be cautious about dismissing the realist perspective out of hand, however. As the domestic deployment data in this thesis illustrated, there is also evidence of Britain and France altering their respective strategic approaches according to the threat environment at the time; for example, the transition in both states towards the use of the armed forces for counterterrorism purposes in the 1970s. Nevertheless, as one of the key findings in this thesis illustrates, and in keeping with the hypothesis, even in the event of a rapid shift in approach, a state's response to a threat still seems to exhibit certain enduring and traceable cultural characteristics.<sup>833</sup> The different responses of Britain and France to the Munich attacks in 1972 is persuasive evidence of this fact.

As a result, rather than arguing that a constructivist perspective is the most convincing, or indeed the realist perspective, perhaps the appropriate conclusion is not to view competing theories of state behaviour in terms of 'either/or'. As the findings in this thesis highlight, it may be more appropriate to consider behaviour with reference to limited, or subjective, rationality. As Foley writes, building a more accurate and nuanced picture of state behaviour may require a transition away from 'theory wars and towards complementary theory-building.'<sup>834</sup> Nevertheless, the exclusion of the role of historical experience and culture from any study in this field would always be guilty of committing an egregious sin of omission.

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<sup>833</sup> See page 24 of this thesis.

<sup>834</sup> Foley, Frank. *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 326

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## APPENDIX 1 – DOMESTIC MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN BRITAIN

	Active	Passive	Description	Purpose
1800				
1801				
1802				
1803				
1804				
1805				
1806				
1807				
1808				
1809				
1810				
1811				
1812	6	0	Burton's Mill, Westhoughton Mill, Rochdale, Bolton (Luddite movement), at least two deployments to nottingham	Riots/Protests
1813				
1814				
1815	1	0	Swing Riots	
1816	2	0	Spa Fields Riots, Ely and Littleport riots	Riots/Protests
1817	1	0	The Pentrich Rising	Riots/Protests
1818	7	0	Misc Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1819	22	0	Peterloo Massacre, Misc. Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1820	19	0	Radical War, Greenock Incident, Misc. Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1821	3	0	Queen Caroline's Funeral, Misc. Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1822	9	0	Misc Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1823	7	0	Misc Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1824	2	0	Misc Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1825	3	0	Misc Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1826	8	0	Misc Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1827	4	0	Misc Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1828				
1829				
1830				
1831	3	0	Reform Riots (e.g. Queen Square, Penrice Incident, Glamorgan)	Riots/Protests
1832				

1833				
1834				
1835	2	0	Poor Law Riots, Wolverhampton Disturbances	Riots/Protests
1836				
1837	2	0	Poor Law Riots / Worcestershire corps in Birmingham election disturbances	Riots/Protests
1838	2	0	"Battle of Bossenden Wood", Poor Law Riots	Riots/Protests
1839	1	0	Newport Rising	Riots/Protests
1840				
1841	3	0	Misc Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1842	2	0	Plug Plot Riots, Coventry Colliers' riots, misc. Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1843	2	0	Rebecca Riots, Misc Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1844				
1845				
1846				
1847				
1848	1	0	Scottish Chartists clash with Regulars	Riots/Protests
1849				
1850				
1851	1	0	Barham Warehouse	Riots/Protests
1852				
1853				
1854	1	0	Exeter Food Riots	
1855	6	0	Misc Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1856				
1857				
1858				
1859				
1860				
1861				
1862				
1863				
1864				
1865				
1866	1	0	Hyde Park demonstration (Reform League)	Riots/Protests
1867	1	0	Birmingham "Murphy" Riots	Riots/Protests
1868				

1869				
1870				
1871				
1872				
1873				
1874				
1875				
1876				
1877				
1878				
1879				
1880				
1881				
1882	1	0	Tredegar Riots	Riots/Protests
1883				
1884	1	0	Skye/Crofters Riots	Riots/Protests
1885	2	0	Misc Yeomanry Deployments	Riots/Protests
1886				
1887	1	0	SDF Trafalgar Square Riot (‘Bloody Sunday’)	Riots/Protests
1888	1	0	Tithe Disturbances	Riots/Protests
1889				
1890				
1891				
1892				
1893	1	0	Featherstone Colliery Riots	Riots/Protests
1894				
1895				
1896				
1897				
1898	1	0	South Wales Coalfield	Riots/Protests
1899				
1900				
1901	1	0	Great Penrhyn Quarry Strike	Riots/Protests
1902				
1903				
1904				
1905				
1906				
1907				
1908				
1909				
1910	1	0	Tonypany Riots	Riots/Protests

1911	3	1	Siege of Sidney Street, National Rail Strike, Llanelli Riots, Chesterfield	Counterterrorism, Riots/Protests, Striking Civil Service
1912				
1913				
1914				
1915				
1916				
1917				
1918				
1919	2	0	Liverpool Police Strike, "Forty Hours strike"	Riots/Protests
1920				
1921	0	1	Mining Crisis	Striking Civil Service
1922				
1923				
1924				
1925				
1926	0	1	General Strike	Striking Civil Service
1927				
1928				
1929				
1930				
1931				
1932				
1933				
1934				
1935				
1936				
1937				
1938				
1939				
1940				
1941				
1942				
1943				
1944				
1945	0	1	Atlee	Striking Civil Service
1946	0	1	Atlee - dock workers' strike	Striking Civil Service

1947	0	2	Atlee - Haulage Driver's Strike, Coal transport crisis	Striking Civil Service
1948	0	2	Atlee - dock workers' strike, Porters' strike	Striking Civil Service
1949	0	3	Atlee - dock workers' strike (twice), Power Stations Strike	Striking Civil Service
1950	0	3	Atlee - dock workers' strike, Porters' strike, Gas industry strike	Striking Civil Service
1951				
1952				
1953	0	1	Oil Distributors' Strike	Striking Civil Service
1954				
1955				
1956				
1957				
1958				
1959				
1960	0	1	Seaman's Strike	Striking Civil Service
1961				
1962				
1963				
1964				
1965				
1966	0	1	Seaman's Strike	Striking Civil Service
1967				
1968				
1969				
1970	0	2	Dock strike, Refuse worker's strike	Striking Civil Service
1971				
1972	0	1	Fisherman's Strike (Removal of rotting fish)	Striking Civil Service
1973	0	2	Glasgow Firebrigade Strike	Striking Civil Service
1974	1	1	On standby following State of Emergency; two week deployment at Heathrow (MACP invoked)	
1975	0	1	Glasgow Dustmen's strike	Striking Civil Service
1976				
1977	0	1	Fireman's Strike (Green Goddesses)	Striking Civil Service
1978		1	Fireman's Strike (Green Goddesses)	Striking Civil Service

1979	0	1	Winter of Discontent	Striking Civil Service
1980	1	0	Iranian Embassy Siege	Counterterrorism
1981	0	2	Prison Officers' Dispute, Ambulancemen's Strike	Striking Civil Service
1982				
1983				
1984				
1985				
1986				
1987				
1988				
1989				
1990				
1991				
1992				
1993				
1994	1		Army posted to Heathrow following IRA mortar attack	Counterterrorism
1995				
1996				
1997				
1998				
1999				
2000		1	Fuel Strike	Striking Civil Service
2001	0	1	Foot-and-Mouth Epidemic	Disaster relief
2002	0	1	Operation Fresco (Firefighters dispute)	Striking Civil Service
2003	1	1	Heathrow CT deployment; firefighter's strike	Counterterrorism; Striking civil service
2004				
2005	1		SAS during raids post attempted bombing	
2006				
2007				
2008				
2009	0	1	Cumbria Floods	Disaster relief
2010	0	1	"The Big Freeze"	Disaster relief
2011				
2012	0	1	London Olympics (18,000 troops deployed)	Personnel Provision
2013				
2014	0	4	Southern England Flooding (Operation Pitchpole), Hospital Strike (Operation Prismed);	Disaster relief, Striking Civil



			Commonwealth Games (Glasgow); NATO Summit (South Wales)	Service; Personnel Provision
<b>2015</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	Operation Shaku (Northern England Flooding)	Disaster relief
<b>2016</b>		<b>1</b>	Operation Tiddling (Flood relief)	
<b>2017</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	Operation Temperer (twice), SAS London Bridge Attack; SAS, SBS raids in Manchester	Counterterrorism

## APPENDIX 2 – DOMESTIC MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN FRANCE

	Active	Passive	Description	Purpose
1800	1		Chouannerie (conclusion)	Insurrection
1801	2		Misc Gendarmerie Deployments (Lyon, Liamone / Golo,	Insurrection
1802	7		Misc Gendarmerie (Morbihan, Pontivy, Ploermel, Lorient, Vannes, Côtes-du-Nord) Sète is placed under a state of siege (see Brown ref)	Insurrection
1803	7		Misc Gendarmerie deployments (Nantes, Palluau, Montaigu, Macbecoul, Challans, Deux-Sèvres, Alaines-et-Loire and surroundings)	Insurrection
1804	1		Misc Gendarmerie deployments (Paris)	Insurrection
1805	5		National Guard and Guard de Ligne sent to Paris (Napoleon's letters) ; Gendarms sent to Puy de dome; misc gendarm to prevention of desertion at Etaples, un à Ambleteuse et un à Boulogne.	Insurrection
1806	2		Misc Gendarmerie deployment (Bressuire, Segré)	
1807	3		Misc Gendarmerie deployments (Saigne, Dordogne, Calvados)	
1808	2		Misc Gendarmerie deployments (Paris, Bayonne)	
1809				
1810	1		Misc Gendarmerie deployments	
1811	1		Misc Gendarmerie deployments	
1812	1		Caen Food Riots (4,000 troops deployed)	Riot / Protest
1813	4		PENINSULAR WAR (Battle of Nivelle; Battle of Nive; Battle of the Bidassoa); 1,200 troops stationed for six months in the Sarthe (to pursue just thirty three chouans)	Riot / Protest; Defence from Invasion
1814	23		WAR OF THE SIXTH COALITION (Battle of Brienne; Battle of La Rothière; Battle of the Mincio River; Battle of Champaubert; Battle of Montmirail; Battle of Château-Thierry; Battle of Vauchamps; Battle of Mormans; Battle of Montereau; Battle of Bar-sur-	Defence from Invasion

			Aube; Battle of Gué-à-Tresmes; Capture of Fort l'Écluse; Battle of Craonne; Battle of Laon; Battle of Reims; Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube; Battle of Fère-Champenoise; Battle of Saint-Dizier; Battle of Montmartre; Battle of Paris) PENINSULAR WAR (Battle of Garris; Battle of Orthez; Battle of Toulouse; Battle of Bayonne)	
1815	4		HUNDRED DAYS WAR (Battle of La Suffel; Battle of Rocquencourt; Battle of Issy); Morbihan Fair	Riot / Protest; Defence from Invasion
1816	1		Jean-Paul Didier and several rebels attempt to enter city via la porte de Bonne. General Donnadieu's men kill five of the insurgents	Insurrection
1817	5		Lyon Insurrection (troops sent to various location outside of Lyon), Peasant disorder in Brie & Champagne	Insurrection
1818				
1819				
1820	2		Nicolas Lallemand shot dead, French Bazaar insurrection	Riot / Protest
1821				
1822	4		Charbonnerie insurrections in Belfort (January and July), Thouars, Saumur are met with force	Insurrection
1823				
1824				
1825				
1826				
1827	2		François Alexandre Frédéric de La Rochefoucauld's funeral - military charge the crowd ; Repression in Paris after barricades are erected	Riot / Protest / Revolution
1828				
1829				
1830	4		July revolution (Three Glorious Days) ; July-November Luddite strikes ; Disorder in Paris (October) ; violent student + worker demonstrations (December)	Riot / Protest / Revolution
1831	2		First Canut revolt Lyon ; Troops and National Guard maintain order in Paris	Riot / Protest / Revolution

<b>1832</b>	<b>3</b>		Général Maximin Lamarque's funeral sees clashes between Troops and mourners. June revolution. Grenoble demonstrations met by troops.	Riot / Protest / Revolution
<b>1833</b>				
<b>1834</b>	<b>8</b>		Second Canut revolt (Violence met by troops in Lyon, la Croix-Rousse, la Guillotière, Vaise, Saint-Clair, St. Etienne) ; Massacre de la rue Transnonain ; Paris Insurrection (Several days of violence)	Riot / Protest / Revolution
<b>1835</b>				
<b>1836</b>				
<b>1837</b>				
<b>1838</b>				
<b>1839</b>	<b>1</b>		Paris Uprising led by Louis Auguste Blanqui (Society of the Seasons) suppressed by troops + national guard	Riot / Protest
<b>1840</b>	<b>1</b>		Paris tailors revolt	Riot / Protest
<b>1841</b>	<b>4</b>		Fierce fighting in Clermont-Ferrand between troops and insurgents; Toulouse riots - troops despatched; Protestors in Auch erect barricades to block troops from reaching Toulouse; Census Riots in Paris (State of Siege enacted)	Riot / Protest
<b>1842</b>	<b>1</b>		Roubaix	Riot / Protest
<b>1843</b>				
<b>1844</b>				
<b>1845</b>	<b>4</b>		Roubaix; Troops stationed in August + Sept after fears of Tax riots; Parisian carpenters strike (troops placed at disposal of employers!)	Riot / Protest
<b>1846</b>	<b>3</b>		Food riots in Paris (State of Siege enacted) ; Military precautions taken in winter ; Saint-Étienne (troops intervene)	Riot / Protest
<b>1847</b>	<b>4</b>		Bread riots in Mulhouse ; Lyons ; Military precautions taken in winter ; Clash between the population and troops in Indre. Four of those who took part were executed	Riot / Protest

1848	4		February Revolution; Rouen riots; March - May various uprisings ; June Days uprising	Riot / Protest / Revolution
1849	2		Street battles in Lyon - State of siege in 1st and 6th Military districts; Alexandre-Auguste Ledru-Rollin calls for protest in Paris which are dealt with quickly by the military	Riot / Protest / Revolution
1850				
1851	29		Coup d'état (Paris - overthrow of French Second Republic) ; Widescale provincial rebellions	Riot / Protest / Revolution
1852	1			
1853				
1854				
1855				
1856				
1857				
1858				
1859				
1860				
1861				
1862				
1863				
1864				
1865				
1866				
1867				
1868	1		Toulouse (Republican demonstrators against conscription quickly dealt with by troops)	
1869	2		La fusillade d'Aubin ; La Ricamarie	Riot / Protest
1870	27		FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR (Battle of Bellevue; Battle of Châteaudun; Battle of Dijon; Siege of Belfort; Battle of Coulmiers; Battle of Amiens; Battle of Beaune-la-Rolande; Battle of Villepion; Battle of Loigny-Poupry; Second Battle of Orléans; Battle of Beaugency; Battle of Hallue; Battle of Wörth; Battle of Borny-Colombey; Siege of Toul; Battle of Mars-la-Tour; Battle of Gravelotte; Siege of Metz; Siege of Strasbourg; Battle of Beaumont; Battle of Noiseville; Battle of	Defence from Invasion; Riot / Protest

			Sedan; Battle of Wissembourg); Troops disperse crowds at Victor Noir's funeral ; Miner strikes at Carmaux, Le Creusot.	
1871	9		FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR (Battle of Bapaume; Battle of Villersexel; Battle of Le Mans; Battle of the Lisaine; Battle of St. Quentin; Battle of Buzenval; Siege of Paris); March (Army remove cannon in Paris) ; May (150,000 soldiers run riot) La Commune de Paris (Communard Uprising)	Riot / Protest / Revolution
1872	1		Anzin (Troops kill two)	Riot / Protest
1873				
1874				
1875				
1876				
1877				
1878				
1879				
1880	2		Roubaix and Tourcoing strikes - regulars dispatched	Riot / Protest
1881	3		Troops called to strikes in Grand'Combe, Molières and Bessèges	Riot / Protest
1882				
1883				
1884				
1885				
1886	1		Decazeville, Saint Quentin	Riot / Protest
1887				
1888	1		Amiens Weavers' strike	Riot / Protest
1889				
1890				
1891	5		Fourmies (nine killed); Paris ; Lyon ; Marseilles; Charleville	Riot / Protest
1892	1		Grèves de Carmaux	
1893				
1894				
1895				
1896				
1897				
1898		1	Chantier protégé par la troupe, suite aux grèves dans la bâtiment	Protection detail
1899				

1900	2		Draveil (shots are fired) ; chalon-sur-saône strikes	Riot / Protest
1901				
1902	1		Valenciennes Miner's strike (18 Cavalry Squadrons are deployed)	
1903	1		Expulsion des chartreux de leur monastère 1903	Riot / Protest
1904				
1905				
1906	1		Miner's Strikes (40,000 mobilized by Clemenceau - fighting in Paris)	Riot / Protest
1907	1	1	Revolt of the Languedoc winegrowers (shots fired) ; Soldiers replace striking Parisian electricians (March)	Riot / Protest
1908	1		Villeneuve-saint-georges (Shots fired)	Riot / Protest
1909		1	Postmen's strike	Striking Civil Service
1910	2	1	Champagne Riots ; Railway strikes (la grève des cheminots sur le réseau nord en 1910); Soldiers replace striking Parisian electricians (March)	Riot / Protest
1911	1	1	Champagne Riots ; General Strike (guarding of buildings)	Riot / Protest
1912				
1913				
1914	13		WW1 (Battle of Mulhouse; Siege of Maubeuge; Battle of Le Cateau; Battle of St. Quentin; Battle of Grand Couronné; First Battle of the Marne; First Battle of the Aisne; Battle of Flirey; First Battle of Albert; First Battle of Arras; Battle of the Yser; First Battle of Champagne; Battle of the Frontiers)	
1915	4		WW1 (First Battle of Champagne; Second Battle of Artois; Third Battle of Artois; Second Battle of Champagne)	
1916	3		WW1 (Battle of Verdun; Second Battle of Albert; Battle of the Somme)	
1917	4		WW1 (Second Battle of the Aisne; Battle of the Hills; Second battle of Verdun; Battle of Malmaison)	
1918	12		WW1 (Spring Offensive; Third Battle of the Aisne; Second Battle of the Marne; Battle of Cantigny; Battle of Belleau Wood; Second Battle of the Marne; Battle of Château-Thierry; Battle of Amiens; Hundred Days Offensive; Battle of Épehy; Meuse-Argonne Offensive; Battle of the Sambre)	
1919		1	Transport strike (military replace personnel)	Striking Civil Service
1920				

1921				
1922				
1923				
1924		1	Le conflit des boulangers (replaced by troops)	Striking Civil Service
1925				
1926				
1927				
1928				
1929		1	Postal workers' strike - army replace workers	Striking Civil Service
1930				
1931				
1932				
1933				
1934				
1935				
1936				
1937				
1938				
1939				
1940	16		WW2 (Battle of France; Battle of Sedan; Battle of La Horgne; Battle of Montcornet; Battle of Arras; Siege of Calais; Battle of the Lys; Siege of Lille; Battle of Abbeville; Battle of Dunkirk; Operation Paula; Battle of Pont-de-l'Arche; Italian invasion of France; Battle of Saumur) VICHY FRANCE, Abbeville massacre	Defence from Invasion
1941	1		WW2 - VICHY FRANCE	Defence from Invasion
1942	2		WW2 - VICHY FRANCE, (Dieppe Raid)	Defence from Invasion
1943	1		WW2 - VICHY FRANCE	Defence from Invasion
1944	12		WW2 (Operation Dingson; Invasion of Normandy; Normandy landings; Sword Beach; Operation Dragoon; Liberation of Paris; Saint-Nazaire Pocket; Allied advance from Paris to the Rhine; Liberation of Nice; Siege of La Rochelle; Siege of Dunkirk) VICHY FRANCE	Defence from Invasion
1945	5		WW2 (Saint-Nazaire Pocket; Allied advance from Paris to the	Defence from Invasion



			Rhine; Siege of Dunkirk; Operation Nordwind; Colmar Pocket)	
<b>1946</b>				
<b>1947</b>	<b>1</b>		PCF General Strike	Riot / Protest
<b>1948</b>	<b>1</b>		PCF General Strike	Riot / Protest
<b>1949</b>				
<b>1950</b>				
<b>1951</b>				
<b>1952</b>				
<b>1953</b>				
<b>1954</b>	<b>1</b>		Static guarding role in Paris during Algerian war	Personnel Provision
<b>1955</b>	<b>1</b>		Static guarding role in Paris during Algerian war	Personnel Provision
<b>1956</b>	<b>1</b>		Static guarding role in Paris during Algerian war	Personnel Provision
<b>1957</b>	<b>1</b>		Static guarding role in Paris during Algerian war	Personnel Provision
<b>1958</b>	<b>2</b>		Coup d'etat - paratroopers land in Corsica	Coup D'etat
<b>1959</b>	<b>1</b>		Static guarding role in Paris during Algerian war	Personnel Provision
<b>1960</b>	<b>1</b>		Static guarding role in Paris during Algerian war	Personnel Provision
<b>1961</b>	<b>1</b>		Static guarding role in Paris during Algerian war	Personnel Provision
<b>1962</b>	<b>1</b>		DOT	Defence from Invasion
<b>1963</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	DOT; Large-scale miner strike (army replace)	Defence from Invasion ; Striking Civil Service
<b>1964</b>	<b>1</b>		DOT	Defence from Invasion
<b>1965</b>	<b>1</b>		DOT	Defence from Invasion
<b>1966</b>	<b>1</b>		DOT	Defence from Invasion
<b>1967</b>	<b>1</b>		DOT	Defence from Invasion
<b>1968</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	DOT; May Revolution (Army on Standby)	Riot / Protest / Revolution ; Defence from invasion
<b>1969</b>	<b>1</b>		DOT	Defence from Invasion
<b>1970</b>	<b>1</b>		DOT	Defence from Invasion
<b>1971</b>	<b>1</b>		DOT	Defence from Invasion

1972	1		DOT	
1973	1		DOT	
1974	2		DOT; GIGN operation in Ecquevilly	Counterterrorism
1975	1		DOT	
1976	1		DOT	
1977	1		DOT	
1978	1		DOT	
1979	1		DOT	
1980	1		DOT	
1981	2		DOT; Aer Lingus Flight 164 (Lands at Touquet and is stormed by GIGN)	Counterterrorism; Defence
1982	2		DOT; Affaire des Irlandais de Vincennes (GIGN task force)	Counterterrorism; Defence
1983	2		DOT; Hostage rescue at Orly airport	Counterterrorism; Defence
1984	1		GIGN hostage rescue in Marseille (Marignane)	Counterterrorism; Defence
1985				
1986	1	1	2,000 troops stationed for border security and securing sensitive sites; Opération Hephaistos	Counterterrorism; Disaster Relief
1987	1	1	2,000 troops stationed for border security and securing sensitive sites; Opération Hephaistos	Counterterrorism; Disaster Relief
1988		1	Opération Hephaistos	Disaster Relief
1989		1	Opération Hephaistos	Disaster Relief
1990		1	Opération Hephaistos	Disaster Relief
1991		1	Opération Hephaistos	Disaster Relief
1992		1	Opération Hephaistos	Disaster Relief
1993		1	Opération Hephaistos	Disaster Relief
1994	1	1	GIGN hostage rescue in Marseille (Marignane), Opération Hephaistos	Counterterrorism
1995	1	2	Troops reinforce gendarms after terrorist attacks; Opération Hephaistos; GIGN participate in minor role in search for Khaled Kelkal.	Disaster Relief; Personnel Provision; Counterterrorism
1996	1	1	Port-Royal RER station attack, 400 troops deployed under Vigipirate; Opération Hephaistos	Disaster Relief; Counterterrorism
1997	2	1	Vigipirate 400 troops deployed in Paris; GIGN deployed against gunman in Valaurie; Opération Hephaistos	Counter-Terrorism; Disaster Relief

<b>1998</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	Vigipirate; Opération Hephaistos; World Cup guarding role	Counterterrorism; Disaster Relief; Personnel Provision
<b>1999</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	Vigipirate; Opération Hephaistos	Counter-Terrorism; Disaster Relief
<b>2000</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	Vigipirate; Opération Hephaistos	Counter-Terrorism; Disaster Relief
<b>2001</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	Vigipirate troop reinforcement after 9/11 attacks; Opération Hephaistos	Disaster Relief; Counterterrorism
<b>2002</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	Vigipirate - 800 troops stationed over the holiday period; Opération Hephaistos	Disaster Relief
<b>2003</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	Vigipirate - 800 troops stationed over the holiday period 15 Dec - 15 Jan 2003; Vigipirate - expanded from 800 - 1,000 after Iraq war starts; G7 guarding role at Evian; Opération Hephaistos	Personnel Provision; Disaster Relief
<b>2004</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	Vigipirate; Opération Hephaistos	Disaster Relief
<b>2005</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	Vigipirate; 1,000 troops deployed after attacks in London; GIGN storm the SNCM ferry in Corsica; Opération Hephaistos	Counterterrorism ; Disaster relief
<b>2006</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	Vigipirate; Opération Hephaistos	Disaster Relief
<b>2007</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	Misc vigipirate deployment (Paris); GIGN deployed against gunman in Gensac-sur-Garonne; Opération Hephaistos; Inondations (Sud-Ouest); Missing person search in Cavayère (40 militaires du 3e RPIMa)	Counterterrorism; Disaster Relief; Personnel Provision
<b>2008</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	Vigipirate; Opération Hephaistos; opérations de déblaiement et de remise en état dans la commune d'Hautmont et les villages avoisinants; 350 men of the 3e RPIMa to find a missing girl in L'Aude.	Disaster Relief; Personnel Provision
<b>2009</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	Vigipirate; Flood Relief; Opération Hephaistos	Disaster Relief
<b>2010</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	Misc vigipirate deployments in Paris; Flood Relief; Opération Hephaistos; Heavy Snow relief; Security for le 25e sommet Afrique-France	Disaster Relief; Personnel Provision
<b>2011</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	3,400 troops stationed at 27 strategic sites following death of Bin Laden; Opération Hephaistos; Cannes G20 security	Disaster Relief; Personnel Provision; Counterterrorism

<b>2012</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	Vigipirate - Joint police-Military patrols in Midi-Pyrénées; 1200 troops deployed nationally for December period; Opération Hephaistos	Diaster Relief; Counterterrorism
<b>2013</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	700 troops in Paris after Boston bombing; troops reinforce train stations after Mali intervention (Vigipirate); Opération Hephaistos; Flood Relief	Diaster Relief; Counterterrorism
<b>2014</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	Terrorist attacks in Dijon and Nantes trigger deployment of 300 troops; 28/2 squadron of the Réole mobile gendarmerie kill activist Rémi Fraisse with H/E grenade; Opération Hephaistos; Operation Dragoon anniversary security; COP 21 security provision, 600 troops mobilised.	Riot / Protest; Disaster Relief; Personnel Provision; counter-terrorism
<b>2015</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	Vigipirate in Jan after Hebdo; Opération Sentinelle post-Bataclan ; GIGN participate in search for Kouachi brothers ; GIGN placed on standby during Bataclan attacks ; Legionnaires help find Lucas Tronche; Opération Hephaistos	Counterterrorism ; Disaster relief; Personnel provision
<b>2016</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	Opération Sentinelle; May Flood ; Guarding fan areas during Euro 2016; Opération Hephaistos	Counterterrorism; Disaster relief
<b>2017</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	Opération Sentinelle; Opération Hephaistos; Avian Flu relief	Counterterrorism; Disaster relief; Personnel Provision
<b>2018</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	Opération Sentinelle	Counter-Terrorism; Diaster Relief
<b>2019</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	Opération Sentinelle; Gilets Jaunes	Counter-Terrorism; Riot & Protest; Disaster relief