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Culture and strategy in the North American middle powers during the neoliberal era.
The politics of strategic policy in Mexico and Canada, 1988-2015.

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in War Studies
December 2019

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Abstract

This is a study of the evolution of the strategic policy of Mexico and Canada during the advent and consolidation of neoliberalism in North America. The thesis examines the interaction between the various strategic approaches rooted in policy elites in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In the case of Mexico, the struggle between the historical nationalist doctrine and emerging continentalist practices is analysed. In the case of Canada, tensions between the liberal internationalist tradition, the Atlanticist strategic approach, and the renewed continentalist notion are evaluated. This dissertation pays special attention to the socio-political context in which foreign, trade, and security policies were formulated; as well as the cultural dynamics of the strategic decision-making process. The study reconsiders the responses of Mexican and Canadian policy elites to domestic and external pressures that occurred from 1988 to 2015. Based on a structuralist-constructivist approach focused on practice, this work provides a new interpretation of continuity and change in strategic policy before and after the political transitions of Mexico and Canada in 2000 and 2006, respectively. This thesis shows why and how the major strategic traditions of Canada and Mexico were gradually replaced by continentalist ideas, which were much more influential throughout this period than is commonly recognised. The result is a comprehensive reassessment of the foreign policy and security strategies of the middle powers of North America from an emerging perspective in the discipline of international history and international relations during a pivotal period in contemporary history: the neoliberal era.

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Acknowledgements

I want to thank the invaluable financial assistance provided by the Secretariat of National Defence, the Secretariat of Public Education, and the National Council of Science and Technology, agencies of the Mexican government that, in their role as sponsors, made this project a reality. I am also grateful to the Mexican Army and Air Force for allowing me to serve my country and be part of its institutional greatness. Without their support, this project would have not been possible.

I acknowledge the University of Glasgow for allowing me to contribute to its academic excellence through this humble research effort. I also appreciate the Scottish Centre for War Studies for the valuable opportunity it has given me to grow personally and mature professionally. I especially praise my research supervisors Prof Peter Jackson and Dr Mathilde von Bülow, whose expert advice and wise guidance were essential throughout the doctoral programme. Likewise, I make a distinguished recognition for the unconditional and selfless assistance provided by Prof Michael Williams of the University of Ottawa and Dr María Celia Toro of El Colegio de México, who in their capacity as external advisors during my research stays in Canada and Mexico were always willing to contribute to the progress of this study.

In the context of my research stay at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs of the University of Ottawa, I emphasise that the conversations held with professors Thomas Juneau, Srdjan Vucetic, Justin Massie, Kim Nossal, Adam Chapnick, and Philippé Lagasse during the authors' workshop for the book *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice* were crucial to developing my understanding of the theoretical and practical bedrock of Canadian security and defence. Similarly, the talks that were held with several Honorary Senior Fellows of the University of Ottawa greatly enhanced my understanding of the internal dynamics that govern the formulation of Canadian strategic policy. I also give special recognition to the opportunity offered by the Canadian Parliament, Department of National Defence, and Canadian Forces College to explore the institutional sources that govern their operation. The collaboration of Dr Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard and Prof Robert Lummack was vital to expanding the scope of the empirical research carried out in Canada. I am eternally grateful to them.

In the context of the research stay at the Centre for International Studies of El Colegio de México, I stress that the academic events organised by Prof Sergio Aguayo and Dr Mónica Serrano increased my knowledge of the scope and limits of national security in Mexico. I also appreciate the discussions with the distinguished professors Raúl Benítez, Ricardo Sodi,

Javier Oliva, and Francisco Franco, whose comments on the orientation of this project were highly influential in its development. Likewise, I want to express my eternal gratitude to the officers of the federal bodies that make up the national security system. Their attention and availability allowed me to learn first-hand about the institutional machinery of the national security of Mexico. In the military sphere, I stress that the assistance provided by the commanders at the General Staff, the National Defence College and the University of the Mexican Army and Air Force was essential for the development of the field study. In the bureaucratic sphere, I highlight that the assistance provided by officials of the National Security Council was crucial to access the Mexican strategic community and expand the scope of the empirical research developed in Mexico.

My final and most important thanks go to the retired Generals of the Association of Graduates of the National Defence College, as well as by General Salvador Cienfuegos, General Ángel Prior, General Agustin Vallejo, Colonel Luis Guerrero, Lieutenant Colonel Blas Camarena, Dr Héctor Robles, Dr Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard, and Dr Tomasa Diego. Without their support and trust, this project would not have achieved its objectives. Likewise, I want to express my infinite thanks and greatest debt to Dr Monica O'Brien, who always offered her sincere companionship and unconditional support to conclude this thesis. I also want to express gratitude to Dr Sam Klein, whose immeasurable friendship was a determining factor to overcome each of the obstacles presented during the last four years. I also offer the effort that this work represents in gratitude and correspondence to the love given by my family. Finally, I want to dedicate this work to Berenice and to Paolo for being the new engine that drives me day by day.

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Introduction

‘What is History?’ asked E.H. Carr some thirty years ago. The answer now seems obvious. ‘History’, with apologies to the venerable Carr, ‘is the conceptual space, the time of human experience, in which social scientific knowledge – and, most of all, prediction – is proven wrong’. Or, if you prefer, ‘any succession of rupturing events which together bring to light our misunderstandings and misrecognitions of the present’ In the past few years, pace Francis Fukuyama’s prognosis of the ‘end of history’, there has been an awful lot of it about. Indeed, if History is Dead, its rigour mortis appears unusually vigorous.¹

John Comaroff (South African anthropologist), 1995.

¹ John Comaroff and Stern Paul, ‘New Perspectives on Nationalism and War’, in *Perspectives on Nationalism and War*, ed. by John Comaroff and Stern Paul (Abingdon: Routledge, 1995) p.1.

The period from 1988 to 2015 represented more than a change of the millennium. A series of political, economic, and social transformations worldwide had profound repercussions on states' strategic behaviour and the dynamics of the international system. The origins of these changes occurred years before. One of the most critical facts, which is rarely given the importance it deserves in the discipline of international history and international relations, was the effect that the exhaustion of the Keynesian post-war consensus had globally, having lasted from 1945 to 1980.² On the eve of the so-called 'Second Cold War', the world experienced severe socio-economic problems that generated political spaces for a new political-economic paradigm to be adopted by the policy elites of most of the western world.³ Throughout the 1980s, neoliberalism was presented as a novel and winning formula, as it would allow states to adapt to emerging structural conditions, overcome socio-economic difficulties, and benefit from new global dynamics during the final stage of the Cold War. Private property without limits, freedom as the absolute value, market dominance, state reduction, and the primacy of individualism were some of the principles of the *Washington Consensus* from which the new liberalism or technocratic liberalism shaped strategic thinking and political practice in the west.⁴ The end of the Cold War meant not only the cessation of world political tensions but also the advent of an American-built neoliberal international order. From the 1990s onwards, the structural position of superpower held by the United States and the pervasive influence of neoliberalism on the strategic culture of the states significantly redefined their external identity, strategic behaviour, and interaction with the outside world, especially with the superpower. The case studies on Mexico and Canada test this opening assumption.

Research Topic

This thesis presents a comparative analysis of the evolution of the strategic culture of the middle powers of North America during the advent and consolidation of neoliberalism. In particular, it examines the impact of the post-Cold War structural environment and the neoliberal doctrine on the politics of strategic politics in Mexico and Canada. Through a

² David Dutton, *British Politics Since 1945: The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Consensus* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Dennis Kavanagh, 'The Postwar Consensus', *Twentieth Century British History*, 3.2 (1992), 175–90; Paul Addison, *The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War* (London: Cape, 1975).

³ John Diggins, *Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, And the Making of History* (NY: Norton, 2007) p.267; Michael Cox, *Beyond the Cold War: Superpowers at the Crossroads* (NY: UPA, 1990) p.18; Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso, 1983) p.2.

⁴ Taylor Boas and Jordan Gans-Morse, 'Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 44.2 (2009), 137–61; Campbell Jones, Martin Parker, and René Ten Bos, *For Business Ethics* (London: Routledge, 2005) p.100; John Williamson, 'What Washington Means by Policy Reform', in *Latin American Readjustment: How Much Has Happened* (Washington: PIIE, 1989); John Williamson, *A Guide To John Williamson's Writing* (Washington: PIIE, 1989).

structuralist-culturalist approach focused on practice, this dissertation follows the interaction between the various strategic approaches that prevailed within the policy elites in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries: nationalism and continentalism in Mexico; and internationalism, Atlanticism and continentalism in Canada. This study pays special attention to the social and cultural context in which the strategic policy was created and the cultural dynamics of the decision-making process on diplomatic, commercial, and security matters. It also provides an alternative interpretation of how and why Mexican and Canadian policy actors responded in the manner in which they did to domestic and external pressures that took place between 1988 and 2015.

One of the most relevant effects of the end of the Cold War was the emergence and consolidation of a new political-economic paradigm promoted by the United States and the United Kingdom. The adoption of neoliberalism in much of the western world had significant effects on states' international identity and strategic behaviour, as well as on the norms and rules that governed the dynamics of international relations. This dissertation argues that neoliberalism had profound effects on the institutional and ideological sources from which decision-makers formulated foreign policy and designed security strategies. The social pressures generated by the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the changes in the structural environment in the 1990s and 2000s weakened traditional strategic conceptions and created political spaces for new continentalist doctrines on diplomacy, trade, and security to play a role every more dominant in policy-making. Neoliberalism was one of the most pervasive. In the case of Mexico, the adoption of this doctrine played a crucial role in the dismantling of the nationalist defensive approach and the construction of a soft-bandwagoning continentalist notion. In the case of Canada, the establishment of neoliberal policies deepened the weakening of the tradition of liberal internationalism and led to the reconstruction of a soft-bandwagoning continentalist approach. Beyond the realist explanations that argue that the states' strategic behaviour derived from the structural changes produced by the end of the Cold War, this dissertation offers an alternative and complementary interpretation focused on how the change in states' strategic behaviour was the product of the effects of emerging ideas on cultural reflexes and institutional culture from which policy actors responded to structural environment conditions.⁵

⁵ Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security*, 18.2 (1993), 44–79; Edward Kolodziej, 'Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!', *International Studies Quarterly*, 36.4 (1992), 421–38; Stephen Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, 35.2 (1991), 211–39; John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, 15.1 (1990), 5–56.

This study considers that the strategic policy formulated by policy elites in response to changes in the structural environment in the final years of the Cold War must be understood within the broad socio-cultural context that housed the articulations on foreign policy and debates on national security. In this way, it is possible to identify the interactions among the contending strategic approaches that aspired to position themselves as the best source to meet the strategic challenges. The thesis' methodology is explained in greater detail in the next chapter. To give an overview; this work recovers the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's conceptualisation of 'culture' as a set of historically forged predispositions that interact with the broad structural environment to form a basis for everyday practices. This process generates what Bourdieu defines as 'practical logic', which conditions the production of strategies by social actors.⁶ Under these considerations, the central argument of this thesis is that a practical logic based on a strategic continentalist conception gradually dominated the cultural reflexes of political, diplomatic, bureaucratic, and military leaders in the final years and immediately after the Cold War. Traditional strategic notions that were widely accepted by Mexican and Canadian policy actors came under pressure from the early 1980s, as neoliberal precepts gained popularity among right-wing policy actors and business sectors of the public sphere. It is possible to identify the influence of neoliberal ideas on the policy prescriptions of prominent policy-makers in the Mexican and Canadian governments of the 1990s. However, the Mexican nationalist and Canadian internationalist strategic approaches did not lose their category of practical logic until the coming to power of right-wing political parties in 2000 and 2006.

The general question that guides the development of this research is: what role did culture play in the evolution of strategic policy in Canada and Mexico during the neoliberal era? This attempt to systematically examine the role of ideational factors in strategic policy-making processes focuses attention on secondary questions such as: where do ideas come from? How do they affect decision-making? These questions put the theme of culture at the centre, specifically the role of the sociocultural context in which ideas arise and policies are developed. The objective of this dissertation is to understand how strategic culture evolved and the factors that guided the development of the strategic policy of Canada and Mexico

⁶ Rebecca Adler-Nissen, *Bourdieu in International Relations*, ed. by Rebecca Adler-Nissen (London: Routledge, 2013); Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy* (NY: CUP, 2010); Peter Jackson, 'Pierre Bourdieu', in *Critical Theorists and International Relations*, ed. by Jenny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams (London: Routledge, 2009) pp.89–101; Peter Jackson, 'Pierre Bourdieu, the "Cultural Turn" and the Practice of International History', *Review of International Studies*, 34.1 (2008), 155–81; Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot, 'The World of Pierre Bourdieu', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 41.3 (2008), 603–25; Michael Williams, *Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security* (London: Routledge, 2007).

throughout the advent and consolidation of neoliberalism. Achieving this objective will allow this study to provide a reinterpretation of the continuity and change in the international identity and strategic behaviour of the middle powers that share a neighbourhood with the United States since the end of the Cold War onwards. Through both case studies, this thesis seeks to understand how the interaction between the subjective understandings of policy actors and the power structures established the parameters for the formulation of foreign policy and the design of national security strategies.

Avenues of research

There are four lines of research that guide the development of this thesis. First, this dissertation focuses on the study of strategic culture based on a conception centred on practice. This study is inserted in the efforts of the fourth generation of culturalists in strategic studies, which seeks to identify strategic cultures that compete within states to occupy a dominant position in the processes that shape states' international identity and strategic behaviour. This generation does not consider states to have a permanent, unique, static, and immutable strategic culture. This current argues that, within each state, several strategic cultures are interacting with each other and with the structural environment simultaneously and permanently. From this approach, the central issue is to identify which strategic culture dominates over others and to explain why and how it prevails. The fourth generation of strategic studies suggests that, although a strategic culture can remain static for several decades, it can change entirely due to disruptive events generated by intense internal or external pressures. Also, and this is something significant for this work, this generation recognises that there is a direct and robust interaction between systemic structural pressures and the predominant strategic culture.⁷ It should be noted that the importation of Bourdieu's theoretical approach is fundamental in this thesis, as it allows it to overcome the theoretical biases and methodological problems involved in the use of the concept of strategic culture.

⁷ Francois Vreÿ, 'From Theory to Culture: Emergent South African Strategic Culture', *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 9.3 (2007), 1–28; Alan Bloomfield and Kim Nossal, 'Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 28.2 (2007), 286–307; Darryl Howlett, *The Future of Strategic Culture* (Virginia, 2006); Iver Neumann and Henrikki Heikka, 'Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defence', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 40.1 (2005), 5–23; Mikkel Rasmussen, "'What's the Use of It?': Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of Armed Force", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 40.1 (2005), 67–89; Nina Græger and Harvard Leira, 'Norwegian Strategic Culture after World War II: From a Local to a Global Perspective', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 40.1 (2005), 45–66; Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, 'The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive Strikes', *Security Dialogue*, 36.3 (2005), 339–59.

The second line of research is aimed at studying the interactions between strategic approaches and their role in the reorientation of strategic policy. This thesis draws on the concept of *strategic approach*, which is conceived as a central element of the strategic culture. Academics like Jack Snyder argue that strategic culture allows us to explain the persistence of distinctive strategic approaches in the face of ‘changes in the circumstances that gave rise to it, through processes of socialisation and institutionalisation and through the role of strategic concepts in legitimating these social arrangements’.⁸ It is also possible to conceive ‘strategic approaches as historically specific regimes of knowledge’ that integrate visions of national security.⁹ In this sense, a strategic approach is identified as the central component of the strategic culture. It harbours the cultural predispositions that persist within a state’s policy elite on the use of available resources to achieve strategic objectives, taking into account the role that force or threat of force plays in the international system.¹⁰ The second element that makes up this research avenue is that of *strategic policy*. As in the case of strategic approach, strategic policy is established as the central element of what is known as grand strategy. According to John Ferris in his case study on the United Kingdom, the strategic policy is the policy prescriptions that ‘seek to coordinate in a rational fashion the diplomatic, financial, and military elements of British strength in order to support its aims as a great power’.¹¹ The relevance of this concept, that has rarely received the attention it deserves in the literature, is that it allows a systematic analysis of the politics of its formulation, tracking of its evolution, and identifying its reorientation.¹² It should be noted that this concept has been used in combination with that of strategic culture and sometimes under the term of national security policy or strategic foreign policy.¹³ The last element of

⁸ Jack Snyder, ‘The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor’, in *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, ed. by Carl Jacobsen (London: Palgrave, 1990), pp. 3–9 pp.4,7.

⁹ Peter Jackson, *Beyond the Balance of Power. France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War* (Cambridge: CUP, 2013) p.47; Michael Foucault, ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’, in *Michel Foucault: Essential Works, 1954-1984. Volume 3: Power*, ed. by Michel Foucault, James Faubion, and Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 2015) pp.11–9.

¹⁰ Lawrence Freedman, ‘Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power’, in *Strategic Studies. A Reader*, ed. by Thomas Mahnken and Joseph Maiolo (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008) pp.22–32; Lawrence Sondhaus, *Strategic Culture and Ways of War* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) pp.6–7; Bradley Klein, ‘After Strategy: The Search for a PostModern Politics of Peace’, *Alternatives*, 13.3 (1988), 293–318 pp.297–300; Michael Howard, ‘The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal’, in *The Causes of Wars and Other Essays*, ed. by Michael Howard (London: Harvard University Press, 1984) pp.36–48; Michael Howard, ‘The Strategic Approach to International Relations’, *Review of International Studies*, 2.1 (1976), 67–75.

¹¹ John Ferris, *The Evoution of British Strategic Policy, 1919-26* (London: Macmillan, 1989) p.xii.

¹² Peter Layton, ‘The Idea of Grand Strategy’, *The RUSI Journal*, 157.4 (2012), 56–61; Robert Ayson, ‘The “Arc of Instability” and Australia’s Strategic Policy’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 61.2 (2007), 215–31; Brock Millman, ‘Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy 1934–42’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 31.3 (2006), 483–508; John Ferris, ‘The Politics of Strategic Policy, 1919-26’, in *The Evoution of British Strategic Policy, 1919-26* (London: Macmillan, 1989) pp.1–14.

¹³ Peter Jackson, *Beyond the Balance of Power. France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War*; David McDonough, ‘Grand Strategy, Culture, and Strategic Choice: A Review’, *Journal of*

this second line of research is the assessment of the *reorientation* of the strategic policy as a result of the complex internal and external dynamics during its formulation and evolution. The reorientation of strategic policy is understood as the changes experienced by foreign, commercial, and security policy prescriptions as a result of the political conditions created by transformations in domestic and external contexts.¹⁴ This conception validates that the strategic culture is dynamic, that its strategic approaches interact permanently with the structural environment, and that this interaction defines the orientation of the strategic policy.

The third line of research is focused on examining the effects of *neoliberalism* on the cultural roots and dynamics of the strategic policy-making. This dissertation does not address the issue of neoliberalism from a technical and economic perspective but a culturalist perspective. Publications abound in the literature on how the neoliberal model drove deep structural reforms in many Western countries intending to increase their economic performance and solve social problems in the late 1970s and early 1980s.¹⁵ However, few studies have examined the effects of neoliberal doctrine in the political, social, and cultural context in which policy actors have made strategic decisions over the past 40 years. This thesis does not focus exclusively on the structural changes that arose after the end of the Cold War. This work pays much greater attention to the parallel process of adopting neoliberal political-economic precepts and the role they played in shaping how policy-makers understood and responded to the broad environment of international politics. In other words, this research takes neoliberalism as a penetrating ideological force that reconfigured not only the structural environment and international relations but also the socio-political

Military and Strategic Studies, 13.4 (2011), 2–33; Jeffrey Lantis, ‘Strategic Culture and National Security Policy’, *International Studies Review*, 4.3 (2002), 87–113.

¹⁴ Peter Jackson, *Beyond the Balance of Power. France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War* p.428; Peter Jackson, ‘Pierre Bourdieu, the “Cultural Turn” and the Practice of International History’ p.177; Peter Jackson, ‘France and the Problems of Security and International Disarmament after the First World War’, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29.2 (2006), 247–80; Nicole Jordan, ‘The Reorientation of French Diplomacy in the 1920s: The Role of Jacques Seydoux’, *English Historical Review*, 117.473 (2002), 867–88; Clemens Wurm, ‘Britain and European Integration 1945–63’, *Contemporary European History*, 7.2 (1998), 249–61; Clemens Wurm, *Die Französische Sicherheitspolitik in Der Phase Der Umorientierung, 1924–1926* (Frankfurt: Verlag, 1979).

¹⁵ Jonathan Swarts, ‘The Strategic Construction of the Neoliberal Political-Economic Imaginary’, in *Constructing Neoliberalism: Economic Transformation in Anglo-American Democracies*, ed. by Jonathan Swarts (Toronto: UTP, 2013); Jonathan Swarts, ‘The Neoliberal Revolution of the 1980s and Beyond’, in *Constructing Neoliberalism: Economic Transformation in Anglo-American Democracies*, ed. by Jonathan Swarts (Toronto: UTP, 2013); Robert Jervis, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism and Co-Operation: Understanding the Debate’, *International Security*, 24.1 (1999), 42–61; Benjamin Gochman, *Networks, Neoliberalism, and NAFTA: Economic Technocrats and Policy Change in Mexico, 1982–1997* (Denver: UDP, 1998); David Baldwin, ‘Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics’, in *Debate, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary*, ed. by David Baldwin, 1st Ed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 3–25; Andrea Revueltas, ‘Las Reformas Del Estado En México: Del Estado Benefactor Al Estado Neoliberal’, *Política y Cultura*, 3.Winter (1993), 215–29.

context in which the international identity and strategic behaviour of Mexico and Canada were defined.

Considering that the United States was one of the leading promoters of this political-economic paradigm, it is relevant to re-examine from a structuralist-constructivist perspective how the middle powers of North America responded to the new conditions of the American-built neoliberal international order that emerged after the end of the Cold War. In this sense, the concept of *medium power* establishes the fourth line of research. This thesis examines how the post-Cold War unipolar world order redefined the normative standards of state behaviour and the rules for international relations.¹⁶ Beyond assessing the change in the structural position of Mexico and Canada, this study investigates the ideas and beliefs that fed the formulation of foreign policy and the design of national security strategies. In this sense, elements of the theoretical current of structural realism are retaken to identify the character of the strategic movements defined by policy elites. The concepts of balancing and bandwagoning, both belonging to the theory of the balance of power, are fundamental in the development of this research.¹⁷ The consideration of the structural position and the study of cultural factors will develop an understanding of the similarities and differences in the reactions of both countries to events that produced external pressures such as the end of the Cold War, the 9/11 attacks, the financial crisis global, the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. This line of research tests the arguments of academics such as Eduard Jordaan, Laura Neack, Fenton Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal, who in different ways argue that traditional and emerging middle powers, such as Canada and Mexico, have obtained that status based on compliance and agreement with the global status quo established by the United States, as the ‘states that deviate from hegemonic orthodoxy cannot be conceived of as middle powers’.¹⁸ The systemic pressures that arose after the end of the Cold War and

¹⁶ Laura Neack, ‘Pathways to Power: A Comparative Study of the Foreign Policy Ambitions of Turkey, Brazil, Canada, and Australia’, *Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, 14.11 (2013), 53–73 p.59; Ronald Behringer, ‘The Dynamics of Middlepowermanship’, *Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, 14.11 (2013), 9–22 p.21; Charalampos Efstathopoulos, ‘Reinterpreting India’s Rise through the Middle Power Prism’, *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 19.1 (2011), 74–95 p.77; Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (Vancouver: UBCP, 1993) p.21–4; Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict’, *Political Science Quarterly*, 106.3 (1991), 391–410; Carsten Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics* (London: Palgrave, 1984) p.206.

¹⁷ John Mearsheimer, ‘Structural Realism’, in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, ed. by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: OUP, 2013) pp.79–86,139; Campbell Craig, ‘American Power Preponderance and the Nuclear Revolution’, *Review of International Studies*, 35.1 (2009), 27–44 pp.28–9; Thomas Mowle and David Sacko, *The Unipolar World: An Unbalanced Future* (NY: Macmillan, 2007) pp.147–58; Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformation* (Boston: Wadsworth, 2005) p.503; Randall Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In’, *International Security*, 19.1 (1994), 72–107; Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: CUP, 1987).

¹⁸ Eduard Jordaan, ‘The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations’, *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, 30.2 (2003), 165–81 pp.167–78.

during the neoliberal period favoured the tying of the position and disposition of Western middle powers to the political position and strategic vision of the United States.¹⁹ These interpretations nurtured the debate about whether some middle powers had gone from aspiring to be major powers to become satellites of the United States to preserve the benefits that were granted through being an ally of the superpower in the new neoliberal and unipolar world order.²⁰ From the culturalist perspective proposed by this research, it is possible to understand that neoliberalism shaped a context that conditioned the strategic behaviour of the middle powers, especially in Mexico and Canada.

Relevance and Contribution

The relevance of this thesis lies in three elements that distinguish it from other academic works. The first aspect is that this dissertation pays special attention to the relationship between cultural predispositions of policy elites and the broad structural environment in which strategic policy was formulated. This study overcomes the theoretical and methodological problems presented by the research programme on strategic culture by incorporating conceptual and analytical elements of Bourdieu's theory of practice. The study of strategic culture from a practice-centred approach is a trend that arose just a few years ago. This research is located within this cultural current. The second significant element of this study is that it integrates theoretical perspectives and research areas that have usually been addressed in isolation. Firstly, the structuralist-constructivist approach inspired by Bourdieu's thinking allows the creation of a bridge between realist and constructivist theoretical traditions oriented to the analysis of international relations. This linkage increases the chances of obtaining a comprehensive analysis of the effects of power and the importance of ideas in the practices of world politics. Secondly, this work draws on elements of the disciplines of social sciences, international history, international relations, and strategic studies. The development of the case studies on Mexico and Canada incorporates the examination of issues such as the composition of power elites, the characteristics of foreign policy, and the evolution of national security. The third aspect that distinguishes this thesis is the period it addresses and how it examines it. In the literature, the study of the final years

¹⁹ Neack, 'Pathways to Power: A Comparative Study of the Foreign Policy Ambitions of Turkey, Brazil, Canada, and Australia' p.59; Laura Neack, 'UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?', *Journal of Peace Research*, 32.3 (1995), 181–96 p.193; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 'Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict'.

²⁰ John Holmes, 'Most Safely in the Middle', *International Journal*, 39.2 (1984), 366–88; Michael Hawes, *Principal Power, Middle Power or Satellite? Competing Perspectives in the Study of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: YCISS, 1984); David Dewitt and John Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations* (Toronto: Wiley, 1983).

of the Cold War and the consequences generated by the structural change in state behaviour and international relations is recurrent. However, this work does not consider that the strategic change of the states had begun in the late 1980s. Further, the existing literature has only considered that strategic change was the product of only structural factors. This thesis recognises that the change in strategic policy in middle powers such as Mexico and Canada originated in the late 1970s due to political spaces generated by international tensions and economic crises that favoured the adoption of neoliberal doctrine. Also, this work recognises that the effects of the advent and consolidation of neoliberalism in the socio-political context and cultural roots of policy-making have had repercussions until today.

From these distinctive elements comes is the modest contribution of this research. One of the main contributions of this work is that it provides two case studies that test the relationship between power and ideas in world politics. When inserted in one of the primary theoretical debates of international relations, this study validates the complementarity relationship between realism and constructivism. Another contribution derives from the fact that this thesis recovers arguments from Mexican and Canadian historians that have been gradually overlooked in the literature. Reflections on the role of beliefs and narratives related to the identity of Canada and Mexico make it possible to elucidate more clearly the causes and motives of specific policy choices. The third contribution of this work is the product of its systematic analysis of how the interaction between the subjective understandings of policy elites and power structures established the parameters for the formulation of foreign policy and the design of strategies for national security. Finally, it should be noted that to date, no work analyses the evolution of the strategic policy of Mexico and Canada during the neoliberal era from a structuralist-constructivist perspective. In the Canadian case, the contribution of this thesis is limited because there is currently a strong academic tradition dedicated to the study of Canada's strategic culture from various perspectives. In the Mexican case, the contribution is substantial because, in the literature, few publications address the strategic issues of Mexico from a perspective that values the relationship between material and ideational factors.

Chapter outline

This thesis is organised into seven chapters. With the exception of the first, each of them is organised chronologically. Chapter one presents the theoretical foundations from which the politics of strategic policy of Mexico and Canada is examined. In it, the theoretical implications of this research topic are discussed, a review of the literature of the strategic culture research programme is made, and the framework of Bourdieu's theory of practice is

reviewed. The analytical framework designed is also outlined and the methodology deployed in this project is presented.

The case study on Mexico is developed from chapter two to four. Chapter two examines the institutional and ideological sources of Mexico's strategic policy in two sections. First, the socio-cultural context in which the formulation of foreign policy and the design of national security strategies took place is described. It then investigates the origin and development of the nationalist and continentalist strategic approaches. Chapter three addresses the process of dismantling defensive nationalism in Mexico from 1988 to 2000. The first section discusses the nationalist construction of international identity, the habitus of the political elite, and the field of strategic policy-making. In the second part, the evolution of the strategic policy is traced from the relations between the nationalist and continentalist strategic approaches, as well as their interaction with the post-Cold War structural environment. Chapter four describes the process of building soft-bandwagoning continentalism in Mexico from 2000 to 2012. It examines the role of continentalism in the construction of external identity, the dispositional logic of policy actors, and the positional logic of the social space in which strategic decisions were made. The reorientation of the Mexican strategic policy is also tracked through considering the ways in which the policy elite responded to events such as the 9/11 attacks, the global financial crisis, and the War on Drugs.

Chapters five, six and seven make up the case study on Canada. Chapter five studies the institutional and ideological sources that fuelled Canada's foreign policy and security strategies. It reviews the social and cultural context that housed the strategic policy formulation process, as well as the foundations that sustained the internationalist, Atlanticist, and continentalist strategic approaches. Chapter six focuses on the process of weakening defensive internationalism in Canada from 1993 to 2006. The first part investigates the role of internationalism in the definition of external identity, the predispositions that shape the habitus of the political elite, and the positions that constitute the field of strategic policy formulation. In the second part, changes in foreign, commercial, and security policy are traced, as well as internal and external dynamics that involved the predominant strategic approaches to respond to new structural conditions after the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks. Chapter seven examines the process of rebuilding soft-bandwagoning continentalism in Canada from 2006 to 2015. It addresses the continentalist construction of Canada's international identity, the habitus of policy-makers, and the field where decisions on strategic issues were made. Subsequently, the evolution of the Canadian strategic policy

is traced, examining how the policy elite sought to adapt Canada to the structural environment after 9/11 and generate effective responses to the global financial crisis and the War on Terror.

Finally, the conclusion of this thesis condenses the results of each chapter to identify the causes of the similarities and differences in the strategic responses of Mexico and Canada to the domestic and external pressures that took place throughout the neoliberal era.

Chapter one. Theoretical foundations

Strategy will never be an exact science, but that is no reason why it should remain a primitive art.²¹

Ken Booth (British academic), 1979.

²¹ Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979) p.151.

Introduction

This chapter lays out the theoretical and methodological framework deployed to analyse the politics of strategic policy of Mexico and Canada. The study of this topic takes as its starting point the premise that external structural and domestic ideational factors influence the policy-making process and lead the evolution of the strategic policy. This dissertation engages with one of the central debates in the discipline of international relations: the theoretical divide between realism and constructivism. This chapter argues that the contrasts between both schools of thought offer an opportunity to develop a comprehensive understanding of world politics. Notably, the strategic culture research programme enables us to examine how ideas influence decision-makers' interpretations of the international system and how this affects state strategic behaviour. However, the existing literature contains theoretical limitations and has overlooked the crucial role of domestic politics in shaping global affairs.

The main contribution of this chapter lies in the importation of elements of the theory of practice of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to the study of strategic culture. His theory allows us to overcome the biases generated by the dichotomy between structural objectivism and constructivist subjectivism. This work contributes to the efforts of the academic current that contends that Bourdieu provides conceptual resources to combine the realist focus on the effects of power with constructivist attention to the importance of beliefs and practices.²² Based on the reconceptualisation of the relationship between culture and strategy, the practice-centred analytical framework proposed in this chapter enables us to examine the dynamic relationship among the conditions of the structural environment and the cultural predispositions of the policy elites during the strategic policy-making process.

This chapter sets out the theoretical-methodological framework in five sections. The first introduces the theoretical debate in which this dissertation intervenes. It presents the realist and constructivist approaches through which academics have explained the role of power and ideas in international politics. The second section reviews the literature on strategic culture. It evaluates the various ways in which the concept has been applied to explain the impact of ideational factors on state strategic behaviour. Part 1.3 shows the central aspects of the theory of practice. It elucidates the concepts through which this thesis articulates realism and constructivism to overcome the biases that have predominated in the study of

²² Peter Jackson, *Beyond the Balance of Power. France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War*; Adler-Nissen, *Bourdieu in International Relations*; Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, *International Practices* (Cambridge: CUP, 2011); Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*; Peter Jackson, 'Pierre Bourdieu'; Mérand and Pouliot; Michael Williams.

strategic culture. The fourth section outlines the analytical framework used in this project. It articulates theoretical elements to examine the evolution of strategic policy systematically. Finally, part 1.5 introduces the research methodology and the types of sources consulted.

1.1. Theoretical debate: rationality versus interpretivism

This work assesses the role of culture in the strategic policy-making process of Mexico and Canada. This theme is located within one of the most relevant theoretical debates in the study of international relations. The dichotomy between realism and constructivism confronts two ways of conceiving world politics. While the former lies on the examination of material capabilities and systemic variables to explain it, in the latter ideational factors and domestic variables are investigated to understand it.²³ Beyond the ontological and epistemological divergences between both schools of thought, this dissertation takes them as complementary. Despite the theoretical challenges involved in combining these approaches, the realist and constructivist precepts allow us to consider the state strategic behaviour as a product of the interaction of ideas, beliefs, and identities with the broad structural environment of the international system.

The roots of political *realism* go back to the thinking of historians and philosophers, most importantly Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. The realist tradition was born from their dissertations on the importance of power, the criticism of the moral tradition, and the anarchic nature of the state.²⁴ Throughout the twentieth century, academics such as Edward Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz developed the realist theoretical spectrum. Their works challenged utopian idealism, established realist principles based on human nature, and aspired to raise the rigour of the study of international politics through a scientific approach.²⁵ Realism is characterised by founding its study of world reality on objective laws that identify states as the key actors and power as the primary attribute in their relationships. The realists argue that the fundamental nature of international relations is conflictive and competitive since the states are unitary and rational entities with fixed and uniform preferences, whose objectives are opposed to those of the other actors. Therefore, states interact in an anarchic international system, in whose structure material capacities are

²³ Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, *The Origins of National Interests* (London: FCP, 1999) pp.349–51; Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons?: Critical International Relations Theory and Constructivism', *European Journal of International Relations*, 4.3 (1998), 259–94 pp.262–4.

²⁴ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: OUP, 1994); Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Chicago: UCP, 1985); Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972).

²⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (NY: AAKnopf, 1948); Edward Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (NY: Palgrave, 1939).

vital assets.²⁶ The various theoretical strands that have emerged within realism distinguish by the perspective from which they examine state behaviour in the international system.²⁷ The classical realists have done so from human nature, the neorealists from the anarchism of the international system, and the neoclassical ones from the importance of domestic factors.²⁸

Particularly, neoclassical or structural realism recognises that state behaviour is a result of pressures exerted and uncertainty produced by the anarchy of the international system.²⁹ This condition motivates states to seek their security at the expense of those of the other actors. Material capabilities play a central role since they determine the distribution of economic and military power that drive world politics.³⁰ Neoclassical realism examines international relations considering the distribution of power as an independent variable, domestic perceptions and incentives as an intervening variable, and policy-making process as a dependent variable. This theoretical current explains state behaviour based on foreign and security policy because it emphasises the role of alliances as a cooperative means to maximise their security. Also, it takes into consideration the structural changes in the balance of power of the international system since they condition the strategic decisions of states.³¹ Neoclassical realism has been criticised for ontological and epistemological inconsistencies, incorporating theoretical elements outside of realism, and its ad hoc addressing of domestic variables.³² In recent years, representatives of this current have focused on the policy-making process to understand the interpretations of decision-makers on the situation of the international system.³³

²⁶ Morgenthau pp.4–16.

²⁷ Mearsheimer, 'Structural Realism' pp.71–88; Randall Schweller, 'The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism', in *Progress in International Relations Theory*, ed. by Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003) pp.331–47; Andrew Moravcsik and Jeffrey Legro, 'Is Anybody Still a Realist?', *International Security*, 24.2 (1999), 5–55.

²⁸ Stephen Walt, 'International Relations: One World, Many Theories', *Foreign Policy*, 110.Spring (1998), 29–46 pp.31–2.

²⁹ Gideon Rose, 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', *World Politics*, 51.1 (1998), 144–72 p.152.

³⁰ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (NY: Norton, 2001) pp.32–6; Jervis, 'Realism, Neoliberalism and Co-Operation: Understanding the Debate'; Robert Jervis, 'Co-Operation under the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, 30.2 (1978), 167–214.

³¹ Jack Levy and William Thompson, 'Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally Against the Leading Global Power?', *International Security*, 35.1 (2010), 7–43; Schweller, 'The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism'; Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.

³² Nicholas Smith, 'Can Neoclassical Realism Become a Genuine Theory of International Relations?', *The Journal of Politics*, 80.2 (2018), 742–49; Stephen Walt, *The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition* (NY: Norton, 2002); Moravcsik and Legro pp.6,19,27–28.

³³ *The Challenge of Grand Strategy*, ed. by Jeffrey Taliaferro, Norrin Ripsman, and Steven Lobell (Cambridge: CUP, 2012) pp.35–6; *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. by Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro (Cambridge: CUP, 2009) pp.29–31.

In contrast, *constructivism* emerges from the theory developed in the 1960s by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann on the sociology of knowledge. They return to the ideas of philosophers like Émile Durkheim and George Mead to affirm that the social order base on the premises: ‘Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product’.³⁴ In other words, constructivism emphasises the socially created nature of social life. The study of international reality from a constructivist perspective gained strength in the 1970s through the so-called ‘cultural turn’. During the 1990s, academics such as Nicholas Onuf, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein pointed out the relevance of examining ideas, norms, and culture as sources of policy choices. Their studies developed understandings of how states are configured and limited by the conceptions rooted by the social actors that constitute them.³⁵ The application of the sociological theory of constructivism in the discipline of international relations takes as its starting point the argument that the identity, interests, and values of states are historically and socially constructed, and are not determined solely by geopolitical situations or human nature.³⁶

Constructivism arises as a critique of determinism produced by scientific approaches applied to the study of social reality. From a reflectivist perspective, constructivism contends that social facts are the result of human action and distinguish from the natural facts in which the latter are phenomena of the human condition.³⁷ In this divergence lies the gap between constructivist and realist stances in the study of international relations. Constructivism denies the existence of objective laws about structural forces and material conditions that determine state behaviour. On the contrary, the constructivists argue that the distribution of power in the international structure is subjective because it is a product of the interpretation of decision-makers immersed in specific historical, social, and cultural contexts.³⁸ Taking as a reference the phrase coined by Wendt of ‘anarchy is what states make of it’, the distribution

³⁴ Thomas Berger and Robin Luckham, *The Social Construction of Reality* (London: PRH, 1966) pp.77–9.

³⁵ Emanuel Adler, ‘Constructivism and International Relations’, in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London: SAGE, 2002); Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: CUP, 1999); John Ruggie, ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neoliberalism and the Social Constructivist Challenger’, *International Organization*, 52.4 (1998), 855–85; *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. by Peter Katzenstein (NY: CUP, 1996); Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, *International Organization*, 46.2 (1992), 391–425; Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: USCP, 1989); Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1977).

³⁶ Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon, ‘Whence Causal Mechanisms? A Comment on Legro’, *Dialogue IO*, 1.1 (2002), 81–101; Jeffrey Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, *World Politics*, 50.2 (1998), 324–48.

³⁷ John Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (London: Allen Lane, 1995).

³⁸ Peter Jackson, *Beyond the Balance of Power. France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War* p.12.

of power has no inherent meaning.³⁹ Its sense depends on the interpretation of policy elites. The main criticisms of constructivism point to its lack of systematisation to understand the role of culture as a source of policy-making, dismissal of the conditioning produced by structural conditions in decision-making, and inability to identify the relationship between power and ideas.⁴⁰

This dissertation argues that realism and constructivism can work in tandem to enrich the analysis of world politics. Their complementary nature derives from the fact that neither of them manages to address the diversity of factors that shape state behaviour. The case studies on the strategic policy of Mexico and Canada test the scope of both theoretical approaches. The political-economic order that emerged after the crisis of the 1980s and the unipolar system developed in the early 1990s consolidated the hegemonic role of the United States. The reconfiguration of the international structure was a fact interpreted in different ways by the Mexican and Canadian policy elites. The new flow of systemic forces influenced the formulation of foreign and security policy in Mexico and Canada. The new power relationship in the North American region represented a challenge for decision-makers. This situation generated external and internal pressures on the policies that Mexico and Canada should implement to adapt to the new scenario. The socio-cultural background of the policy-makers was fundamental to guide their responses to changes in the structural environment. One of the main obstacles facing this thesis is to understand how the interaction among the subjective understanding of policy elites and objective power structures established the parameters for policy-making. To overcoming this challenge, elements of the strategic culture research programme are employed to examine how decision-makers' interpretations of the international system in specific socio-political contexts drive state behaviour.

1.2. Strategic culture: an evolving idea

The concept of *strategic culture* emerged in the 1970s as a proposal to overcome the limitations of rationalism in the analysis of states' strategies during the Cold War. The development of constructivism in the field of social sciences since the 1950s motivated historians, internationalists, and political scientists adopting culturalist approaches to counteract the structuralist bias that had prevailed in the study of world reality. The cultural

³⁹ Theo Farrell, 'Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Programme', *International Studies Review*, 4.1 (2002), 49–72; Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics'.

⁴⁰ Fred Chernoff, *Theory and Metatheory in International Relations. Concepts and Contending Accounts* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008) p.68; Jack Snyder, 'Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War', *International Organization*, 56.1 (2002), 7–45; Walt, 'International Relations: One World, Many Theories' pp.40–2.

turn provided a new framework of interpretation to understand human behaviour. This academic movement positioned the concept of culture at the centre of the theoretical debate.⁴¹ The strategic culture research programme appeared as an alternative focused on examining state strategic responses based on how policy-makers interpret their structural environment. According to Alastair Johnston, the evolution of the notion of strategic culture comprise the work of three generations.⁴² Various academics agree that each of these generations diverges concerning the concept and methodology used to analyse the role of cultural factors in strategic behaviour.⁴³ Beyond the firsts academic efforts, this dissertation is inserted in a fourth generation that emerged in recent decades.⁴⁴

The *first generation* is orientated to identify national cultural environments to understand the formulation of the nuclear strategy in the context of the Cold War. The academic works of Jack Snyder, Colin Gray, Carnes Lord, and David Jones adopts a holistic conception of strategic culture.⁴⁵ In his seminal work of 1977, Snyder employed for the first time the culturalist approach to explain the differences between American and Soviet strategies regarding the use of their nuclear weapons. He defines strategic culture as

the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy.⁴⁶

Snyder focuses his analysis on the set of attitudes and beliefs that guide and circumscribe the strategic thinking of the members of the national strategic community. He contends that these attitudes and beliefs influence the definition of a conceptual and methodological

⁴¹ Peter Jackson, 'Pierre Bourdieu, the "Cultural Turn" and the Practice of International History' pp.157; Patrick Porter, 'Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War', *Parameters*, 37.2 (2007), 45–58.

⁴² Alastair Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', *International Security*, 19.4 (1995), 32–64 pp.36–43.

⁴³ Jeffrey Lantis and Darryl Howlett, 'Strategic Culture', in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, ed. by John Baylis, James Wirtz, and Colin Gray (Oxford: OUP, 2007); Vreĵ; Howlett; Sondhaus; Michael Desch, 'Culture Versus Structure in Post-9/11 Security Studies', *Strategic Insights*, IV.10 (2005); Neumann and Heikka; Henrikki Heikka, *Strategic Culture and the English School: Conceptualising Strategic Adjustment in the Nordic Region*, UPI Working Papers No.33 (Helsinki, 2002); Lantis; Rajesh Basrur, 'Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture', *Journal of Peace Research*, 38.2 (2001), 181–98; Colin Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back', *Review of International Studies*, 25.1 (1999), 49–69.

⁴⁴ Asle Toje, 'Strategic Culture as an Analytic Tool. History, Capabilities, Geopolitics and Values: The EU Example', *Journal of the Belgrade School of Security Studies*, 4.14 (2009), 3–23 p.7; Howlett p.17.

⁴⁵ David Jones, 'Soviet Strategic Culture', in *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, ed. by Carl Jacobsen (London: Palgrave, 1990); Carnes Lord, 'American Strategic Culture', *Comparative Strategy*, 5.3 (1985), 269–93; Colin Gray, 'National Style in Strategy: The American Example', *International Security*, 6.2 (1981), 21–47; Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*.

⁴⁶ Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* p.8.

framework that governs the debate and formulation of strategic issues. Also, he argues that government elites articulate a unique strategic culture, which reflects the values socialised by public opinion and translates into specific strategic thinking. This generation recognises that organisations play an essential role in the transmission and perpetuation of strategic attitudes and beliefs.

Snyder's conceptual proposal was endorsed in 1981 by Gray, who argues that strategic culture makes it possible to identify a national style about the use of force for political purposes. In his case study on the United States, Gray argues that strategic culture refers

to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derives from perception of the national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterisation [...], and from all of the many distinctively American experiences [...] that characterise an American citizen.⁴⁷

He asserts that national styles explain the particular way in which states address their strategic issues, as they are the product of geographical conditions and historical experiences specific to each country. The works of Snyder and Gray illustrate how the first generation uses a broad conception of strategic culture to understand the strategy-making process. Despite the valuable theoretical contribution, their analyses generated criticism due to the limitations of the approach. Johnston and Darryl Howlett contend that their definition of strategic culture is so broad that it makes it unintelligible and simplifies the intricate relationship between foreign policy and domestic factors. Both point out that the approach fails in recognising the instrumentality factor, specifying the dependent and independent variables, as well as distinguishing between the concepts of strategic culture and strategic behaviour.⁴⁸

The *second generation* is characterised by more rigorously addressing the instrumentality of culture in strategic matters. Academics such as Bradley Klein and Robin Luckman agree with the first-generation conception that each nation has a distinctive strategic culture, but stress that its relevance lies in its function as a socialising tool for government elites.⁴⁹ They contend that strategic choices are a result of the self-interest of decision-makers and not of the national strategic culture. Klein's work on the nuclear doctrine of the United States

⁴⁷ Gray, 'National Style in Strategy: The American Example' p.22.

⁴⁸ Howlett pp.12–3; Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture' pp.36–9.

⁴⁹ Bradley Klein, 'Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics', *Review of International Studies*, 14.2 (1988), 133–48; Robin Luckham, 'Armament Culture', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 10.1 (1984), 1–44.

illustrates this approach. In his 1988 publication, he highlights the difference between the conception of strategic culture and the notion of strategic behaviour. His study aims to identify the differences among doctrines publicly declared by government elites and hidden agendas that explain their behaviours more accurately. This analytical framework is used to examine manipulation mechanisms used by decision-making elites to impose certain positions on strategic issues in public opinion and official discourse.⁵⁰ His work also reveals that the challenge of the second generation is to distinguish and understand how cultural ideas reflect on strategic behaviour.

Klein's work of 1989 extends the analysis of the instrumentality of culture. In his second publication, he studies 'the way strategy, in the form of strategic discourse, manifests itself as a set of power relations governing both domestic and international politics'.⁵¹ From this perspective, he inquires about how decision-making elites instrumentalise culture. Klein examines the process through which political and military representations are produced and circulated to be adopted and become part of cultural life. He argues that it is possible to identify hidden strategies behind the official strategic discourse. His approach is also characterised by assessing how ordinary ideas convert to material behaviour. Klein's works were significant, as they promoted the use of ethnographic methods to assess the techniques employed by military institutions to translate strategic culture into strategic behaviour. Despite his methodological contribution, Johnston's criticisms of the second-generation approach indicated the lack of clarity in the definition of the causal link among its variables.⁵²

The *third generation* derives from the ideas of Johnston's cultural realism, who broke with the neorealist theoretical tradition. Integrated by academics such as Elizabeth Kier, Jeffrey Legro, and Johnston, this current maintains that the conception of strategic culture must be much narrower than in previous proposals and must establish logical elements to be verifiable.⁵³ For them, it is critical to distinguish between ideas and behaviour, as well as to omit the behavioural factor of the independent variable. Otherwise, the definition becomes tautological and loses all meaning. These inaccuracies were attributed to the mechanical determinism of the first generation's approach, strand accused of being unable to distinguish

⁵⁰ Klein, 'Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics'.

⁵¹ Bradley Klein, 'The Textual Strategies of the Military: Or, Have You Read Any Good Defence Manuals Lately', in *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, ed. by James Derian and Michael Shapiro (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989) pp.97–9.

⁵² Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture' pp.39–41.

⁵³ Alastair Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (New Jersey: PUP, 1995); Elizabeth Kier, 'Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars', *International Security*, 19.4 (1995), 65–93; Jeffrey Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II* (NY: CUP, 1995).

between the strategic culture and the effects it produces. Taking this criticism as a starting point, Johnston presented his conceptual and methodological proposal in 1995. In his first publication, he conceptualises strategic culture as

an integrated system of symbols [...] which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.⁵⁴

Additionally, the work of this generation emphasises that identity formation is the result of organisational, historical, and cultural processes.

In a second publication, Johnston exposes his methodological proposal and tests it by developing a case study on Chinese policy. He argues that his definition of strategic culture enables the verification of its existence using a positivist approach. His proposal supports the need to establish a clear causal link between cultural factors and strategic behaviour. To avoid tautological reasoning and solipsism, Johnston suggests treating strategic culture as an independent variable and the behaviour derived from culture as a dependent variable.⁵⁵ Despite the refined approach of the third generation, it did not go unchallenged. Johnson's proposal unleashed criticism from Gray, who rejected the existence of the dichotomy between realism and constructivism. Gray contended that 'anyone who seeks a falsifiable theory of strategic culture (as does Johnston) commits the same error as the doctor who sees people as having entirely separable bodies and minds'. Also, he claimed that 'a definition driven by the needs of theory-building rather than by the nature of the subject is unusually likely to lead scholars astray'.⁵⁶ Johnston replied by arguing that Gray's conception reduces strategic culture to 'ethnonational' terms, as it prevents recognition of the existence of 'contested strategic cultures or [...] cross-national or transnational strategic cultures'.⁵⁷ In terms of the theoretical debate between realism and constructivism, this generation promoted the counter position of explanations derived from strategic culture against others based on objectivist approaches, especially those that emerge from neorealism and institutionalism.

⁵⁴ Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture' p.46,64.

⁵⁵ Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* pp.8–10.

⁵⁶ Colin Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: OUP, 1999) pp.132–3,135–6.

⁵⁷ Alastair Johnston, 'Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray', *Review of International Studies*, 25.03 (1999), 519–23 pp.522–3.

The *fourth generation* maintains that several strategic cultures interact within each state. Academics such as Mikkel Rasmussen, Iver Neumann, Henrikki Heikka, Alan Bloomfield, Kim Nossal, and David Haglund analyse how various narratives shape strategic behaviour. They reject the idea that countries have a unique and immutable strategic culture. Their purpose is to identify contending strategic cultures within the states and recognise which of them predominates over the others. They also try to explain why and how strategic cultures prevail.⁵⁸ This generation is particularly critical of the third-generation approach. For example, Bloomfield and Nossal disagree with Johnson's positivist proposal. Both consider it problematic because it is not consistent with its definition and seeks to separate ideational factors from behaviour. They concur to a greater extent with Gray's contextual and interpretative conception. Bloomfield and Nossal maintain that the strategic culture is

the habits of ideas, attitudes, and norms toward strategic issues, and patterns of strategic behaviour, which are relatively stable over time. Put another way, if norms and behaviour are both stable, this period of stability can be characterised as a particular strategic culture.⁵⁹

Another example of a fourth-generation writer is Haglund, who states that the scientific rigour of Johnson's proposal resembles the neoclassical realists' approach. He points out that the third generation shares the structural realists' conviction that it is possible to reach a causal explanation, a situation that moves them away from other approaches that emphasise cultural variables. For Haglund, the relevance of the ideational variables is that they not only seek to produce an explanation but also offer an understanding of the strategic reality causally. He emphasises that in this last aspect lies the main contribution of the strategic culture as a research programme, as it provides tools for an 'explanatory understanding' of state's security policy.⁶⁰ Neumann and Heikka synthesise the fourth-generation approach properly. Both reject the idea that strategic culture is immutable and static, or that it is immune to material elements or structural factors. They recognise that strategic beliefs are deeply rooted in political culture, so they tend to change slowly and to constrict the effects that changes in a state's environment have on its security policy. Both also maintain that,

⁵⁸ Bloomfield and Nossal, 'Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada'; Vreij; Dalgaard-Nielsen; Græger and Leira; Neumann and Heikka; Rasmussen.

⁵⁹ Bloomfield and Nossal, 'Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada' p.287.

⁶⁰ David Haglund, 'What Good Is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept', *International Journal*, 59.3 (2004), 479–502 p.485,489,502; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (NY: OUP, 1990).

although a strategic culture can remain static for an extended period, it can change entirely in the face of critical situations derived from very intense internal or external pressures.⁶¹ The approach of the fourth generation is highly relevant for this thesis, as it facilitates the examination of the dynamics that describe the interaction among various national strategic cultures, as well as among the predominant strategic culture and systemic structural pressures.

The literature regarding strategic culture exhibits a series of theoretical troubles. A first problem feeds the epistemological debate about strategic culture. The discussion has focused on whether its study should address scientific rigour or encourage a holistic approach.⁶² Johnson argues that culture is an independent variable of strategy and can be proven through behaviour. For this reason, he proposes a conceptualisation of strategic culture that allows us to verify its existence and make falsifiable predictions about its effects on strategic behaviour.⁶³ In contrast, Gray criticises Johnson's scientific vision because it undermines the holistic character of strategic culture. He argues that 'all strategic behaviour is cultural behaviour'.⁶⁴ Therefore, culture is not an independent variable from behaviour and its impact cannot be measured. Bloomfield, Nossal, and Haglund also argue that Johnston's positivist proposal is inconsistent. They contend that trying to explain behaviour as a product of strategic culture ignores the fact that both are mutually constitutive.⁶⁵ For Stuart Poore, this theoretical problem is far from being solved. However, he points out that the debate has delimited the scope of the study of strategic culture and has opened the door to address it from an empirical approach.⁶⁶

The relevance of culture is a second problem. Jeffrey Lantis and Howlett point out that in the literature, the importance attributed to culture as an explanatory factor of behaviour often varies.⁶⁷ They identify a first academic current that employs strategic culture as a complement to rationalist or structuralist explanations about state behaviour. Academics like Michael Desch believe that culturalist theory can complement realism to explain the delays

⁶¹ Neumann and Heikka pp.7,19.

⁶² Colin Gray, *Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture* (Virginia, 2006); Colin Gray, 'In Praise of Strategy', *Review of International Studies*, 29.2 (2003), 285–95; Stuart Poore, 'What Is the Context? A Reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture', *Review of International Studies*, 29.2 (2003), 279–84; Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back'; Gray, *Modern Strategy*; Johnston, 'Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray'; Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture'.

⁶³ Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture'.

⁶⁴ Gray, *Modern Strategy* pp.129,132–3.

⁶⁵ Bloomfield and Nossal, 'Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada' p.287; Haglund, 'What Good Is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept' p.485.

⁶⁶ Poore.

⁶⁷ Lantis and Howlett.

among structural changes and state responses, irrational behaviour and the state inability to adapt, as well as state preferences in undefined structural conditions. A second current has positioned strategic culture as the central resource to explain strategic behaviour. In this strand, the academics have created scientific research frameworks that seek to verify the impact of culture as an independent variable. The third current conceptualises strategic culture as the sum of expressions of human behaviour that cannot be measured scientifically. The complexity of this notion considers that some cultural traits can only be understood by being immersed in the culture under study and, therefore, its falsification is futile.⁶⁸ In general terms, the relevance of culture as an explanatory element of strategic behaviour depends on how culture is conceptualised, the practical difficulties posed by its operationalisation, and the implications of the concept in the elaboration of specific policies.

The identification of change in strategic culture is the third problem. Most scholars recognise that culture is not immutable, even though it is constituted by ideas and norms firmly rooted in a social group. However, Gray warns that culture is not a set of fashionable attitudes or opinions, nor ephemeral patterns of behaviour.⁶⁹ Academics accept that both structural and domestic factors can produce cultural changes. On the one hand, Neumann and Heikka point out that strategic beliefs are likely to change progressively due to the intermediary role they play between the structural environment and policy decisions. Like the constructivists who recognise the influence of structural factors, both argue that culture must be studied considering its dynamic interaction with its specific environment.⁷⁰ On the other hand, Howlett and Lantis assert that the change can also be disruptive in the face of unforeseen structural phenomena that they define as ‘strategic shocks’. They argue that these events trigger ‘strategic cultural dilemmas’ in which the prevailing strategic preferences are reassessed to respond to the new structural environment.⁷¹ The crisis conditions can accentuate domestic competition among social groups with different identities and accelerate the process of cultural change.

Beyond the difficulties in the application of the concept of strategic culture, academics like Ken Booth point out that the study of culture lies mainly in discerning trends and not

⁶⁸ Desch, ‘Culture Versus Structure in Post-9/11 Security Studies’ pp.3–4; John Duffield and others, ‘Correspondence – Isms and Schisms: Culturalist versus Realism in Security Studies’, *International Security*, 24.1 (1999), 156–80; Michael Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, *International Security*, 23.1 (1998), 141–70.

⁶⁹ Gray, *Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture* pp.10–1.

⁷⁰ Neumann and Heikka pp.7,19; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

⁷¹ Howlett p.5; Lantis.

determining conditions.⁷² Haglund defends its usefulness because it favours the understanding of strategic behaviour even when culture is not established as an independent variable.⁷³ For these reasons and given the intellectual challenge it represents, this thesis considers strategic culture as the appropriate means to examine the evolution of the foreign and security policy of Mexico and Canada in a period of structural change. However, problems related to the causality of behaviour, function and relevance of culture, as well as the identification of the interaction between ideas and structure, demand an adaption of the concept of strategic culture. The importation of elements of Bourdieu's theory of practice allows us to recognise the cultural contexts through which agents interact with the systemic structure during the policy-making process. This approach provides elements to overcome the realist-constructivist dichotomy and to understand the dynamic relationship between agents and structures.

1.3. Theory of practice: culture in action

The critical and reflective study of human practice gained relevance in the discipline of international relations in the late 1980s. Bourdieu's sociological thinking established as a reference in the theoretical debate between rationalists and post-positivists. His ideas inspired a new academic current to challenge the determinism that predominated in the academy.⁷⁴ The so-called 'practical turn' provided elements to question the prevailing thinking about human life and social reality. This movement maintains that the mind, rationality, and knowledge are constituted through individual action and social practices. In this way, social life is organised, reproduced, and transformed.⁷⁵ In the last decade, several scholars have agreed that Bourdieu's theoretical proposal favours the integration of structuralist and constructivist elements to assess the effects of power and the role of ideas in world politics. They recognise that his theory makes it possible to overcome theoretical divisions and provides an analytical framework to examine the practices that constitute

⁷² Ken Booth, 'Strategic Culture: Validity and Validation', *Oxford Journal on Good Governance*, 2.1 (2005), 25–28 p.27; Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* pp.13–4.

⁷³ Haglund, 'What Good Is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept' p.501.

⁷⁴ Didier Bigo and Rob Walker, 'Political Sociology and the Problem of the International', *Millennium*, 35.3 (2007), 725–39 p.728; Steve Smith, 'Introduction', in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, ed. by Steve Smith, Tim Dunne, and Milja Kurki (Oxford: OUP, 2007) pp.5,10; Yosef Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33.3 (1989), 235–54.

⁷⁵ Jérémie Cornut, 'The Practice Turn in International Relations Theory', in *The International Studies Association Compendium*, ed. by Robert Denemark (Blackwell, 2015); *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*, ed. by Theodore Schatzki, Karin Cetina, and Eike Von Savigny (London: Routledge, 2001).

international relations.⁷⁶ The starting point to understand the relevance of the theory of practice is situated in the ontological debate about causality.

The causes and effects of human behaviour and social structure are the focus of the *structure-agency debate*. This discussion has been a source of divergences in the discipline of international relations and has influenced the relevance given to culture in the study of strategic behaviour.⁷⁷ One of the most notable efforts to overcome this dichotomy is attributed to the sociologist Anthony Giddens. Through the structuration theory, he argues that the interaction between agents and structures allows us to understand causation. Giddens states that ‘social structures are both constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution’.⁷⁸ He also argues that ‘to examine the structuration of a social system is to examine the modes whereby that system [...] is produced and reproduced in social interaction’.⁷⁹ However, William Sewell places human practice at the centre of the study of culture from an anthropological perspective. He challenges Giddens’ rigid notion of structuration. Sewell contends that ‘the simplest way of conceptualising structures would be [...] to assert that structure refers only to rules or schema, not to resources and that resources should be thought of as an effect of structures’. He also emphasises that the ‘agency is the actor’s capacity to reinterpret and mobilise an array of resources in terms of cultural schemas’ and, therefore, the ‘human practice [...] is structured simultaneously both by meanings and by other aspects of the environment in which they occur’.⁸⁰ The structure-agency debate is overcome by placing human practice as a starting

⁷⁶ Adler-Nissen, *Bourdieu in International Relations*; Adler and Pouliot; Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*; Peter Jackson, ‘Pierre Bourdieu’; Vincent Pouliot, ‘The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities’, *International Organization*, 62.2 (2008), 257–88; Mérand and Pouliot; Michael Williams; Iver Neumann, ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy’, *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 2003, 627–51.

⁷⁷ Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology* (Cambridge: CUP, 2006) pp.2–3, 26–7; Vivienne Jabri and Stephen Chan, ‘The Ontologist Always Rings Twice: Two More Stones about Structure and Agency in Reply to Hollis and Smith’, *Review of International Studies*, 22.1 (1996), 107–10; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, ‘A Response: Why Epistemology Matters in International Theory’, *Review of International Studies*, 22.1 (1996), 111–16; Alexander Wendt, ‘Bridging the Theory/Meta-Theory Gap in International Relations’, *Review of International Studies*, 17.04 (1991), 383–92; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, ‘Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations’, *Review of International Studies*, 17.04 (1991), 393–410; Alexander Wendt, ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’, *International Organization*, 41.3 (1987), 335–70.

⁷⁸ Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity, 1984) p.376; Anthony Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies* (London: Hutchinson, 1976) p.121.

⁷⁹ Anthony Giddens, *Studies in Social and Political Theory* (NY: Routledge, 1977) pp.118.

⁸⁰ William Sewell, ‘The Concept(s) of Culture’, in *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Direction in the Study of Society and Culture*, ed. by Bonnell Victoria and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: UCP, 1999) pp.47–8; William Sewell, ‘A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation’, *American Journal of Sociology*, 98.1 (1992), 1–29 pp.6, 10–1, 19.

point to study social reality. This approach has allowed us to understand the relevance of culture in the interaction of ideational factors with the structural environment.

In the context of the above debate, Bourdieu's conceptual framework about how to conceive the nature of culture and how it shapes social interaction is hugely influential. His conception of social reality sought to overcome the false dichotomies that confronted structural objectivism and constructivist subjectivism. For him, this gap limits the possibility of achieving genuine knowledge of social reality. Bourdieu describes his theoretical project as *constructivist structuralism* or *structuralist constructivism*:

By structuralism or structuralist, I mean that there exist, in the social world itself, and not merely in symbolic systems, language, myth, etc., objective structures which are independent of the consciousness and desires of agents and are capable of guiding or constraining their practices or their representations. By constructivism, I mean that there is a social genesis on the one hand of the patterns of perception, thought and action which are constitutive of what I call the habitus, and on the other hand of social structures, and in particular of what I call fields and groups, especially of what are usually called social groups.⁸¹

At the centre of his theoretical proposal, he argues that social interaction simultaneously produces social structures and schemes of perception, thought, and action. In other words, Bourdieu provides elements to understand how the agents' practices reflect their mental structure, which is the product of the social structure.⁸²

Bourdieu's theory of *practice* connects the subjectivist agency-centred and objectivist structure-centred approaches. His proposal synthesises the dialectical relationship among the processes of internalisation of the external and externalisation of the internal. Moreover, his theoretical work delves into the cultural context of human practice. The theory of practice founds on an assemblage of concepts that explain the dynamics that constitute the social world. The formula '[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice' is the axis through which Bourdieu examines what he calls practical logic.⁸³ His theoretical project based on this

⁸¹ Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Toward a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford: SUP, 1990) p.147; Pierre Bourdieu, 'Social Space and Symbolic Power', *Sociological Theory*, 7.1 (1989), 14–25 p.14.

⁸² Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge: HUP, 1984) p.56; Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: CUP, 1977) pp.82–3.

⁸³ Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* pp.101–2.

conceptual framework and an empirical methodology focused on studying the cultural dynamics of domination. For Bourdieu, cultural practices and representations legitimise and reproduce social hierarchies and power relations.⁸⁴ His work is recognised by studying the material and symbolic character of power, as well as its daily manifestations in social life. The adoption of his work in the discipline of international relations has promoted the study of social practices, considering them as an expression of political ideas of social groups that interact from different cultural contexts. This academic trend asserts that through the theory of practice ‘it is possible to map political units as spaces of practical knowledge on which diverse and often “unconventional” agencies position themselves and therefore shape international politics’.⁸⁵ From this perspective, the analysis of international relations is deconstructed and reformulated as the study of the political and cultural sociology in the world arena.

One of the key concepts that make up the theory of practice is *habitus*. Bourdieu defines it as

systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in anyway being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends, or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them, and being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.⁸⁶

Through the concept of *habitus*, Bourdieu identifies the cultural origins of social action and synthesises the cultural sources of the social agents’ subjectivity. *Habitus* is a cluster of predispositions that agents internalise from their cultural environment, consciously through experiences learned, and unconsciously through exposure to everyday practices.⁸⁷ The socio-cultural background, the historical trajectory, and the socio-economic position are factors that shape *habitus*. It should be noted that *habitus* is not only individual but also collective.

⁸⁴ Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* pp.177–9.

⁸⁵ Adler-Nissen, *Bourdieu in International Relations* pp.2–3.

⁸⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford: SUP, 1990) p.53; Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* p.72.

⁸⁷ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* pp.56,135; Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Toward a Reflexive Sociology* p.63; Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* pp.72.

This feature means that actors in similar social positions and cultural environments develop analogous dispositions that will guide their practices in a parallel way. In this sense, academics describe habitus as the engine of cultural action, as it provides social actors with an orientation towards the external world that forms a basis for practice.⁸⁸

Durability and transposability are the main features of habitus. On the one hand, it is durable because it is forged during extended periods through socialisation processes. Bourdieu argues that it is ‘embodied history, internalised as second nature’, the result of ‘the permanent internalisation of the social order in the human body’.⁸⁹ In this sense, habitus is the core of practical knowledge. It is the ‘bodily knowledge’ that precedes the reflection and intention of human practice.⁹⁰ On the other hand, it is transposable because it is ‘an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted’.⁹¹ The habitus’ dynamic nature is the result of its permanent evolution according to the prevailing conditions in external structures. This aspect emphasises the agents’ improvisation capacity and allows them to adapt to different social environments in a semi-conscious manner. Habitus is also structured and structuring, it is ‘a structuring structure, which organises practices and the perception of practices’. It is structured because it is the result of the individual’s position in the social structure. It is structuring because it moulds the practices through which the actor interacts with the social structure. For Bourdieu, habitus is ‘the product of structure, producer of practice, and the reproducer of structure’.⁹² This triple attribute explains the role of habitus in the perpetuation of hierarchical structures in society. The dispositions that constitute the habitus can be studied through the mapping of the proclivities acquired by experience or exposure in specific cultural settings. The application of this concept to the study of world politics makes it possible to know the cultural dispositions that condition the responses of political actors or social groups to changes in their structural environment.

⁸⁸ Peter Jackson, ‘Pierre Bourdieu, the “Cultural Turn” and the Practice of International History’ p.164; Michael Williams p.25.

⁸⁹ Thomas Eriksen and Finn Nielsen, *A History of Anthropology* (London: Pluto, 2001) p.130; Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago: UCP, 1992) p.126; Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* pp.56–7.

⁹⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000) pp.128–31, 148–9.

⁹¹ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* pp.88–9; Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* p.18; Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* pp.82–3, 95.

⁹² Pouliot, ‘The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities’; Loïc Wacquant, ‘Pierre Bourdieu’, in *Key Sociological Thinkers*, ed. by Rob Stones (London: Macmillan, 1998) p.221; David Swartz, *Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: UCP, 1997) pp.111–3; Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* p.170.

The understanding of culture and how it shapes social interaction is only possible by articulating the concept of habitus with that of *field*. Bourdieu conceptualises it as

a network, or a configuration of objective relations between positions. These positions are defined objectively in their existence and in the determinations that they impose on their occupants, agents or institutions, by their current and potential situations (*situs*) in the [wider] structure of the distribution of different currencies of power (or of capital), possession of which provides access to specific profits that are up for grabs in the field, at the same time, by their objective relations to other positions (domination, subordination, equivalents etc.). In highly differentiated societies, the social cosmos is constituted by the sum of these relatively autonomous social microcosms, spaces of objective relations which have a logic and a necessity that is specific and irreducible to those that govern other fields.⁹³

Field is a space of social organisation constituted by power relations, objective positions, objects of struggle, valuable resources, and rules taken for granted.⁹⁴ Its relevance lies in the fact that the field and the overlap of several of them make up the social world. The field shapes how social actors are conceived and determines the susceptible positions to be occupied. The agents' position results from the interaction among their habitus, their resources, and the rules inherent in the field. However, the field does not determine how social actors get involved or the way they evolve. It only exerts enough force to influence the formation of their habitus and the conditioning of their actions.

Field is also a network of objective social relations, a social sphere in which the actors involved compete for tangible and intangible resources that provide power. It is defined by the distribution of sources and assets of power, as well as by a specific logic understood as 'the sum of the structural constraints on the action of its members'.⁹⁵ Although the logic of each field is unique, the social actors in all of them aspire to a differentiation that gives them symbolic power. The asymmetries among the statuses acquired by the actors produce hierarchies of power relations. For Bourdieu, the struggle for distinction is a fundamental

⁹³ Bourdieu and Wacquant pp.94–5.

⁹⁴ Pierre Bourdieu, *Sociology in Question* (London: SAGE, 1993) pp.72–7.

⁹⁵ Pierre Bourdieu, 'Legitimation and Structured Interests in Weber's Sociology of Religion', in *Max Weber, Rationality and Irrationality*, ed. by Scott Lash and Sam Whimster (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987) p.86.

feature of social life.⁹⁶ The field is semi-autonomous because it is ‘constantly in the process of progressive differentiation’.⁹⁷ It is permanently moulded by internal struggles among its members and by external changes in correlated fields. The study of the field is possible through a topographic analysis that examines its population, the position of the actors involved, the social relations it harbours, and the scope of its effects. For the discipline of international relations, this concept provides a relational approach that enables the identification of a level of analysis different from conventional ones since it focuses on the totality of relationships beyond the predominance of state structures. It is for this reason that the concept of field has direct implications in rethinking the idea of sovereignty, the specificity of the international, and the constitution of world politics.⁹⁸

Capital is the catalyst of the relation between habitus and field because it is the resource that drives actors to get involved in the social space. Bourdieu argues that

the system of dispositions people acquire depends on the position(s) they occupy in society, that is, on their particular endowment in capital. [...] Capital is any resource effective in a given social arena that enables one to appropriate the specific profits arising out of participation and contest in it.⁹⁹

Capital is distributed within the field as power currencies and is accumulated by the participating actors to improve their position. It also represents the stake by which the agents involved in a field compete. Upon obtaining it, the participants mobilise it in the form of power and influence to achieve their objectives.¹⁰⁰ Bourdieu points out that in the social game in which the actors participate by being immersed in a field, the aim is to accumulate the highest volume of capital to guarantee to obtain more capital and to have the capacity to modify the structure of the field in their favour. Likewise, the accumulation of a considerable volume of capital allows the actor to preserve a dominant position in the field and the related privileges.¹⁰¹ It is important to note that the value attributed to capital depends on the logic

⁹⁶ Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Culture and Society* (London: SAGE, 2000) pp.64–8; Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Toward a Reflexive Sociology* pp.123–39.

⁹⁷ Bourdieu, ‘Legitimation and Structured Interests in Weber’s Sociology of Religion’ p.134.

⁹⁸ Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘Opting Out of an Ever Closer Union: The Integration Doxa and the Management of Sovereignty’, *West European Politics*, 34.5 (2011), 1092–1113; Tim Dunne, ‘The English School’, in *International Relations Theory. Discipline and Diversity*, ed. by Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: OUP, 2010) p.148; Bigo and Walker.

⁹⁹ Loïc Wacquant, *Key Contemporary Thinkers* (London: Macmillan, 2006) p.7; Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. by John Richardson (Westport: Greenwood, 1986) p.15.

¹⁰⁰ Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’ p.242–4.

¹⁰¹ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* pp.80–98.

prevailing in the field so that only the actors immersed in it have full knowledge of its significance. This understanding is possible because of the permanent interaction between the objective structure of the field and the subjective dispositions of the habitus.¹⁰²

According to Bourdieu,

capital comes in three principal species: economic (material and financial assets), cultural (scarce symbolic goods, skills, and titles), and social (resources accrued by virtue of membership in a group). A fourth species, symbolic capital, designates the effects of any form of capital when people do not perceive them as such (as when we attribute moral qualities to members of the upper class as a result of their 'donating' time and money to charities).¹⁰³

The forms of capital are historically constructed and determined by the logic of the field. This logic determines the power structure of the hierarchy of social domination. Despite the relative exclusivity of capital to the specific logic of a field, it may be exchanged and used in other fields. Like habitus, capital is transposable and can be invested in different fields to achieve several objectives. The process of exchanging capital from one field to another may involve the degradation of the effectiveness of its effects because it is subject to different rules and regulations. It should be noted that the logic of the field defines the distribution of capital, as well as the type and volume of capital required to access the field and to aspire to dominant positions. The importation of capital from one field to another can modify the structure and logic of the receiving field. This effect leads the habitus to adjust and the participants to adapt to the new conditions of the social game.¹⁰⁴ The study of capital is possible through examining the habitus-field correlation. While the topographic analysis of the field reveals the sources and distribution of capital, the evaluation of socio-cultural backgrounds and personal trajectories exposes the methods of capital acquisition. For the discipline of international relations, capital is a pivotal concept in the redefinition of the state as a meta-field and its sovereignty as a meta-capital.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Swartz pp.73–82,122–9.

¹⁰³ Wacquant, *Key Contemporary Thinkers* p.7; Bourdieu, 'The Forms of Capital' p.15.

¹⁰⁴ Swartz pp.211–7.

¹⁰⁵ Rebecca Adler-Nissen, 'Sovereignty. The State's Symbolic Power and Transnational Fields', in *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, ed. by Rebecca Adler-Nissen (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) pp.179–80.

In short, *human practice* is the product of the dialectical interaction between habitus and field. Bourdieu argues that

the relationship between the habitus and the field is foremost one of conditioning: the field structures the habitus which is the product of the incorporation of the immanent demands of the field [...] but it is also a relationship of knowledge and of constructive cognition: the habitus contributes to the constitution of the field as a world of meaning, endowed with sense and value, worthy of the necessary investment of energy.¹⁰⁶

Bourdieu's theoretical proposal grounds on the premise that practice is the result of the dynamic interrelation of ideas and beliefs with the structural environment that hosts social action. It is for this reason that the logic that governs practice is simultaneously dispositional and positional. By placing itself in the midpoint between agency and structure, the logic of practice overcomes the biases of instrumental rationality and structural determinism. For this thesis, it is essential to underline that the theory of practice is also a cultural theory of action.¹⁰⁷ It is from this perspective that this dissertation employs a specific analytical framework to reformulate the understanding of the relationship between culture and strategy.

1.4. Analytical framework: strategic culture from a practice-centred approach

The theory of practice provides a bedrock that allows us to reconstruct the notion of strategic culture and overcome the troubles that its use implies. The reformulation proposed in this dissertation lies on two fundamental conceptual elements. The first is Peter Jackson's translation of the concept of *culture*. Based on Bourdieu's ideas, Jackson points out that culture is the set of historically forged predispositions that are embodied by social actors to interact with the broad structural environment. This dynamic interrelation forms a basis for everyday practices, a practical logic that conditions the strategies generated by social actors.¹⁰⁸ The second element is the redefinition of the concept of *strategy* provided by Michael Williams. He argues that strategy refers to how social actors pursue their interests, as it highlights the individual capacity of agency, choice, and action. The strategy takes place

¹⁰⁶ Bourdieu and Wacquant p.119.

¹⁰⁷ Peter Jackson, 'Pierre Bourdieu' p.111; Peter Jackson, 'Pierre Bourdieu, the "Cultural Turn" and the Practice of International History' pp.163,170.

¹⁰⁸ Peter Jackson, *Beyond the Balance of Power. France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War* pp.9–10,16; Peter Jackson, 'Pierre Bourdieu' p.106; Peter Jackson, 'Pierre Bourdieu, the "Cultural Turn" and the Practice of International History' p.156,164,172; Michael Williams p.25.

in the context of habitus, field, and capital. Therefore, the strategy must be conceived within the structure from which it arises and operates.¹⁰⁹ Both conceptual proposals uncover the limitations of the traditional notion of strategic culture, which has focused on the unidirectional impact of ideas on behaviour. Instead, the practice-centred conception of strategic culture focuses on the causes and consequences of the dynamic process of interaction between ideational and structural factors that originate human practice. The new notion of strategic culture arises from the identification of culture as the context that frames social relationships and provides social actors with a range of tools and resources to build strategies for action.¹¹⁰ Inspired by Jackson's work on France's national security policy during the Great War, the next paragraphs describe the analytical framework employed to understand and explain the way policy-makers 'responded in the way that they did to profound transformations in both the internal and external environment'.¹¹¹

The starting point of this thesis is the identification of the context of the formulation of the strategic policy of Mexico and Canada from 1988 to 2015. Firstly, the interaction between external pressures and the domestic environment in which the policy-making processes take place is reviewed. The relevance of this examination lies on the premise that the internal reality determines how the outside world is understood.¹¹² For this analytical framework, the *policy-making context* is defined as the cultural, social, and political circumstances that condition how policy elites interpret their environment and make decisions. The context in which policy-makers operate is shaped by structural conditions derived from internal and external ideational and material phenomena. The context is important because it delimits the practices of decision-makers. It also frames the tensions and consensus that constitute the policy-making processes. This dissertation pays special attention to the role played by the articulations on foreign and security policy in the context configuration. Through the examination of the context, it is possible to trace the sources of the strategic policy. For this revision, culture plays a central role because strategic notions have their origin in specific

¹⁰⁹ Michael Williams pp.36–7.

¹¹⁰ Frédéric Mérand and Amélie Forget, 'Strategy. Strategizing about Strategy', in *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, ed. by Rebecca Adler-Nissen (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) p.100; Neumann and Heikka; Ann Swidler, 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies', *American Sociological Review*, 51.2 (1986), 273–86 p.273.

¹¹¹ Peter Jackson, *Beyond the Balance of Power. France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War* p.16.

¹¹² Peter Jackson, 'Pierre Bourdieu, the "Cultural Turn" and the Practice of International History' p.162; Zara Steiner, 'On Writing International History: Chaps, Maps and Much More', *International Affairs*, 73.3 (1997), 531–46.

socio-historical contexts.¹¹³ The understanding of ideas is reduced without assessing the context in which they emerge and evolve. The conceptualisation of culture offered by Bourdieu and translated by Jackson allows us to reconstruct the socio-cultural dimension of the context that hosts the strategic policy-making process.

This analytical framework employs two elements to examine the sources of strategic policy. First, the *social dynamics of policy-making*. Its analysis enables the identification of institutional sources. The theory of practice provides elements to understand the nature and function of culture in this process. Through the concept of habitus, it is possible to recognise the origins and evolution of the predispositions that condition the institutional responses. Through the notion of field, it is feasible to identify the relationships, ends, resources, and rules to which policy-makers are subject. In this sense, the social dynamics of policy-making establish as the process of interaction between the dispositions of the decision-makers' habitus and the positions of the strategic policy-making field within a specific context. The continuous interrelation is crucial for this study, as it allows us to know the institutional sources of the strategies that constitute foreign and security policy. This approach examines the anatomy of the intricate relationship between the cultural predispositions of policy-makers and the external structures that condition their strategies and limit their policy options. In this way, this conceptual tool enables us to evaluate the evolution of the strategic policy of Mexico and Canada in the context of the end of the Cold War and the consolidation of global neoliberalism.

The second element used to identify the sources of strategic policy is *strategic approaches*. Their analysis enables the elucidation of ideational sources. For this dissertation, strategic approaches are the doctrinal corpus that produces visions of national security to respond to strategic issues. They are also conceptions, beliefs, and assumptions based on long-standing practices that play an essential role in decision-making. Strategic approaches provide the conceptual and methodological framework employed in the policy-making processes. It should be noted that strategic approaches are not static or isolated knowledge regimes. They are continuously interacting and adapting according to the conditions of the internal and external context.¹¹⁴ The emergence, evolution, and predominance of the conventions of the approaches within the policy elites depend on the circumstances of the domestic politics and

¹¹³ Peter Jackson, 'Pierre Bourdieu, the "Cultural Turn" and the Practice of International History' p.157; Andrew Rotter, 'Culture', in *Palgrave Advances in International History*, ed. by Patrick Finney (NY: Palgrave, 2005) pp.267–99.

¹¹⁴ Foucault pp.11–9; Peter Jackson, *Beyond the Balance of Power. France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War* p.47.

the conditions of the structural environment to which the policy-makers are forced to react. The prescriptions that constitute the strategic visions delineate the parameters and relatively influence the proclivity of the policy elites to use of force in the face of security incidents. Strategic approaches are a fundamental piece of policy machinery because they catalyse the consensus and trigger struggles within the policy elite in search of dominance and preservation of their status as practical logic. They manifest themselves through speeches and practices, expressions of belief systems, and cultural reflections embodied by politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, and generals. In this sense, strategic approaches support the basis of practical logic in the field of strategic policy-making.


Practical logic is the core of the analytical framework. Also known as practicality, it is embedded in the field of strategic policy-making and incorporated by decision-makers. It is the result of institutional and ideational sources of strategic policy within a specific context. Practical logic is the rooted orientations of policy-makers towards their external environment. It is the prevailing logic in the field that conditions the thoughts, perceptions, and actions of social actors. It is also a basis for dispositions that guide how decision-makers understand their environment and get involved in it through everyday practices.¹¹⁵ Practical logic shapes the strategic choices of policy elites as it produces schemes of understanding about how to proceed and an ideal vision of how the world should be. Practicality is the result of long-standing traditions, is based on lasting predispositions, and evolves according to the challenges presented by the structural environment. Practical logic is formally acquired through experience and is reinforced informally through daily practice. It is through this concept that it is possible to understand how policy-makers respond to changes in the structural environment. The fact that the strategy shaped by human practice is at the same time a constitutive element and a consequence of culture portrays the enduring condition of strategic culture.

In summary, the analytical framework employed in this dissertation to examine the strategic culture that has governed the strategic policy-making in Mexico and Canada consists of four main elements: context, social dynamics, strategic approaches, and practical logic. As shown in Figure 1-1, the context frames the institutional and ideational sources of strategic policy. Social dynamics and strategic approaches shape the practical logic embodied in decision-makers and embedded in the policy-making process. Practical logic evolves as a result of its interaction with the internal and external environment, as well as its adaptation to profound

¹¹⁵ Michael Williams p.25.

structural transformations. This analytical framework allows us to understand and explain why policy-makers acted as they acted.

Figure 1-1. Analytical framework



Own elaboration.

1.5. Methodology and sources: identifying practices, reconstructing habitus, and constructing fields

One of the main challenges in the application of the analytical framework is the configuration of a consistent strategy and viable methodology. This thesis takes as reference the *subjective methodology* developed by Vincent Pouliot for ‘putting practice theory into practice’.¹¹⁶ The proposal outlines that the study of practicality must meet the double interest of examining the social structures and intersubjective composition of the social world.¹¹⁷ His approach allows us to overcome theoretical dichotomies and avoid the reification of culture that has predominated in much of the literature on strategic culture. Pouliot describes his approach as a methodological consideration in which the researcher ‘begins with the

¹¹⁶ Vincent Pouliot, ‘Methodology. Putting Practice Theory into Practice’, in *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, ed. by Rebecca Adler-Nissen (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) p.45.

¹¹⁷ Vincent Pouliot and Frédéric Mérand, ‘Bourdieu’s Concepts. Political Sociology in International Relations’, in *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, ed. by Rebecca Adler-Nissen (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) pp.25–6; Vincent Pouliot, ‘A “Subjective” Methodology for the Study of Practicality’, in *International Security in Practice. The Politics NATO-Russia Diplomacy* (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) p.52; Vincent Pouliot, ‘“Subjectivism”: Toward a Constructivist Methodology’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 51.2 (2007), 359–84.

inductive recovery of agents' realities and practical logics, then objectifies them through the interpretation of intersubjective contexts and thereafter pursues further objectification through historicisation'.¹¹⁸ This argument delineates the three phases of the methodological strategy employed in this dissertation.

The first phase focuses on *access to the daily practices* that constitute the policy-making process. The objective is to collect data directly from decision-makers in the strategic policy-making field. This information enables the generation of a projection of the local space that circumscribes the practice of policy-makers. The second phase of the methodology involves the *reconstruction of the dispositional logic* of the policy elites' habitus. This phase is aimed at recovering the meanings and beliefs of policy-makers about their reality, which give sense to their practices. The purpose is to generate an image of practical knowledge that makes politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, and generals competent to participate in decision-making. The third methodological phase is the *construction of the positional logic* of the strategic policy-making field. The goal is to generate a topographic map of the social space in which the policy-making takes place. This phase bases on the interpretation of the rules of the political game, the recognition of the distribution and volume of capital, and the tracking of the historical trajectory of the disputes that shape the field.

The implementation of this strategy is carried out through a mixed methodology. Ethnographic methods are used to access the practices, such as participant observation in the spaces where policy-making takes place and semi-structured interviews applied to decision-makers. For the reconstruction of the dispositional logic, quantitative and qualitative methods are employed. The statistical analysis examines the composition of the policy elite and the trends that describe its evolutionary trajectory. Prospographic study explores the socio-cultural context and educational background that shapes policy-makers' habitus. For the construction of positional logic, ethnographic methods such as participant observation and semi-structured interviews are also used. Through them, it is intended to inspect the intersubjective dimension of the structure to reconstruct what Bourdieu calls *doxa*, common sense prevailing in the field. In all three phases of the methodology, the study of various records is fundamental to recovering the articulations emitted by decision-makers. The enunciations portray their strategic dispositions, the dominant positions in the field, and their interpretations of the context that harbours their practices.

¹¹⁸ Pouliot, 'Methodology. Putting Practice Theory into Practice' p.50.

This dissertation focuses on a comparative analysis of two case studies, which were developed through the analysis of three types of primary sources. First, speeches and debates that expose the articulations of decision-makers on foreign and security policy. The expressions contained in these sources are not only valued for their narrative content, but also for the context in which the discursive act takes place. Second, diaries and memoirs in which the policy-makers externalise their reflections on their socio-cultural backgrounds, educational trajectories, and daily practices. Documents published by Mexican presidents, Canadian prime ministers, and members of their cabinets provide meaningful information to understand the logic from which they made strategic policy choices. Third, conversations and interviews with politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, and generals who participated directly or indirectly in the strategic policy-making process. It should be noted that most of the interviews were conducted anonymously to motivate genuine responses and obtain more meetings. The off-the-record conversations encouraged the interviewee to make judgments without jeopardising their professional situation. Due to this and the many meetings held, only the most significant are referred directly.

This study has also consulted three types of secondary sources. First, documents and publications that disseminate information about prevailing codes, procedures, ideas, and beliefs in government departments and agencies. Second, newspaper articles that report events related to strategic issues. Media sources are carefully assessed with an awareness of the political biases of the issuing media outlet. For this reason, the content is corroborated in more than one journalistic source or with interviewed actors. Third, leaks revealed by non-profit organisations and bibliography produced by academics who were linked to the institutions that make up the field of strategic policy-making. Finally, the integration of qualitative and quantitative data collected in the three phases of the methodological strategy aims to provide a synthesis of the evolution of the practical logic that shaped the policy elites' strategic choices.

Conclusion

This chapter has set out the theoretical foundations from which this thesis studies the politics of strategic policy of Mexico and Canada. The configuration of the analytical framework deployed in this dissertation takes as its starting point two key considerations. The first refers to the implications of the research topic's position in one of the central debates in the discipline of international relations. The discussion between realism and constructivism confronts two ways to tackle the analysis of world politics. Realism bases its explanation on objective laws that determine the distribution of economic and military power in the structure

of an anarchic international system. In contrast, constructivism grounds its understanding on the role of identities, ideas, and norms as sources of political decisions. The second consideration is the relevance of the strategic culture research programme as a framework to understand the impact of ideational factors on state strategic behaviour. The debate among the four academic generations of the strategic culture research programme exposes a series of difficulties attributed to the scientific or holistic nature of the concept, the relevance given to culture as an explanatory variable, and the identification of continuity and change in culture. Furthermore, the literature reveals a set of analytical limitations that prevent us from understanding how strategy and culture interact and evolve.

This chapter has demonstrated that Bourdieu's sociological theory makes it possible to bridge the structural objectivism of realism and ideational subjectivism of constructivism for the study of strategic culture. This theoretical link permits us to assess the effects of power and the relevance of beliefs in the formulation of strategic policy. The reinterpretation of the concepts of culture and strategy provided by Jackson and Williams sustains the redefinition of the study of strategic culture proposed in this chapter from a practical perspective. They offer a useful translation of Bourdieu's thinking to generate an analytical framework aimed at examining strategic culture through the interrelation of policy-making contexts, socio-cultural dynamics, strategic approaches, and practical logics. Given the challenges involved in this analytical framework, the methodological strategy proposed by Pouliot allows the organisation of methods and systematisation of sources to put the theory of practice into practice. In this sense, the modest contribution of this chapter enables the examination in the following chapters of how the interaction between the subjective perceptions of policy elites and the objective power structures shaped the national security strategies of Mexico and Canada in the neoliberal era.

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Chapter two. The sources of Mexican strategic policy

Mexico is an extraordinarily easy country to dominate, as it is necessary to control only one man; the president. We must abandon the idea of installing an American citizen in the Mexican presidency, as that would only lead us, once again, to war. The solution requires more time: we must open the doors of our universities to young, ambitious Mexicans and make the effort to educate them in the American way of life, in our values, and in respect for the leadership of the United States. Mexico will need competent administrators, and over time, these young people will come to occupy important positions and will eventually take possession of the presidency itself. And without the United States having to spend a single cent or fire a single shot, they will do what we want, and do it better and more radically than we ourselves would have done.¹¹⁹

Richard Lansing (United States Secretary of State, 1915-1920), 1924.

¹¹⁹ James Cockcroft, *Mexico's Revolution Then and Now* (NY: MR, 2012) p.77.

Introduction

The study of strategy from a cultural approach requires the analysis of the specific socio-historical contexts from which the ideas that shape it emerge. Otherwise, it is not possible to properly understand the effects of the social imaginary of policy actors on the strategic decisions that guide state behaviour. Based on this premise, this chapter describes the social and cultural context in which Mexico's foreign and security policy was formulated from 1988 to 2012. It also examines the origins, development, and interplay of the predominant strategic conceptions within the Mexican policy elite: nationalism and continentalism. Considering the analytical framework presented in the previous chapter, the following paragraphs pay special attention to the institutional and ideological sources of Mexican strategic policy. The review of the institutional culture of government departments and the cultural reflexes of decision-makers allows us to elucidate where ideas come from and how they affect the formulation and evolution of strategic policy. This chapter provides the necessary elements to comprehend in the two subsequent chapters how and why Mexican policy-makers responded in the way they did to the transformations of the domestic and international environment during the neoliberal era.

The central argument of this chapter contends that the Latin American debt crisis that originated in the late 1970s triggered a deep change in the cultural roots of policy-making in Mexico. The need to adapt the country to the emerging international order in the 1980s generated political spaces for a practical logic based on a continentalist strategic conception which would gradually dominate the cultural reflexes of politicians, bureaucrats, and generals. During this period, neoliberalism was established as a pervasive ideological force that reformed the nationalist cultural predispositions of the policy elite and conditioned their strategic decisions until the 2010s. This chapter contributes to the literature with a comprehensive analysis of the role of the two contending strategic conceptions in the formulation of Mexico's foreign and security policy. Most of the works published to date have examined in isolation issues such as the composition of power elites, the characteristics of foreign policy, and the evolution of national security. Prominent studies by academics such as Roderic Camp, Ana Covarrubias, Olga Pellicer, and Leonardo Curzio have provided valuable findings and reflections on how Mexican strategic behaviour has evolved.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Olga Pellicer, 'Principios Constitucionales de Política Exterior. Mito y Realidad', in *Cien Ensayos Para El Centenario*, ed. by Gerardo Esquivel, Francisco Ibarra, and Pedro Salazar (Mexico: UNAM, 2017); Ana Covarrubias, 'El Reacomodo de México En Una América Latina Cambiante: De La Euforia Democrática a La Introversión', *Pensamiento Propio*, 21.44 (2017), 325–50; Ana Covarrubias, 'Mexico's Foreign Policy under the Partido Acción Nacional: Promoting Democracy, Human Rights, and Interests', in *Latin American Foreign*

However, their analyses have been the product of approaches that have overlooked the role of cultural roots and dynamics in strategic decision-making. Considering this gap in the literature, the small contribution of this chapter lies in the description of the sociocultural context in which the subjective understandings of the Mexican policy elite that shaped their institutional responses to national security issues emerged.

This chapter is made up of two sections. The first reviews the social background, formal education, and daily practices of members of the political, bureaucratic, and military elite. It delineates the cultural and institutional framework that harboured the evolution of ideas on foreign affairs and national security. The social dynamics of the policy-making process during the period of consolidation of the neoliberal model are also identified. The second section sets out the two main strategic approaches that shaped the official articulations on foreign and security policy. It shows the origins and evolution of the nationalist and continentalist strategic conceptions. The prevalence of both visions within the policy elite before and after the political transition of 2000 is also evaluated. The review of institutional and ideological sources provides an overview of the socio-cultural context in which the strategic policy evolved. This analysis will allow us to understand in the subsequent two chapters how Mexican policy-makers responded to the profound changes in the national and international contexts.

2.1. Social dynamics of strategic policy-making

During the last quarter of the twentieth century, politicians, bureaucrats, and generals began to discuss strategic policy jointly. Internal divisions distinguished each of these constituencies. Their members occupied different positions of power and had distinctive predispositions that shaped their everyday practices and institutional responses on foreign policy and national security. The following paragraphs portray the socio-cultural background of the political, bureaucratic, and military elites, as well as the architecture of the policy-making machinery. The central argument is that the social, cultural, and institutional change that began in the 1970s was consolidated after the political transition of

Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism, ed. by Gian Gardini and Peter Lambert (NY: Palgrave, 2011); Leonardo Curzio, *La Seguridad Nacional de México y La Relación Con Estados Unidos* (Mexico: UNAM, 2007); Leonardo Curzio, *La Seguridad México-Estados Unidos: Una Oportunidad Para Coincidir* (Mexico: UNAM, 2006); Olga Pellicer, *Mexico: A Reluctant Middle Power?*, 2006; Roderic Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century* (Berkeley: UCP, 2002); Roderic Camp, *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico* (Oxford: OUP, 1992).

2000. The trend was consistent throughout the implementation of neoliberalism, a model that profoundly influenced the evolution of the contemporary strategic policy of Mexico.¹²¹

2.1.1. Politicians

In hyper-presidential political systems such as in Mexico, presidents are the main actors in strategic policy-making. The role of the congresspeople has been secondary since usually the legislative majorities have belonged to the party in power and aligned to the presidential dispositions. After the creation of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in 1929, this party governed each of the 32 federal entities without interruption until 1989, retained the majority in the Congress until 1997, and the Presidency of the Republic until 2000. The period from 1988 to 2012 housed the birth of an apparent political opposition that failed to exert a counterweight to the presidential power due to their socio-cultural affinities and common political-economic interests.

In the last decades of the twentieth century, the Institutional Revolutionary Party undertook a process of dismantling its revolutionary nationalist ideology to move to the centre-right of the political spectrum. The economic crisis of the 1970s triggered this transformation, which deepened from 1982 onwards. The Miguel de la Madrid administration (1982-1988) promoted the advent of a new political elite. It was the product of the gradual rise of the middle class in partisan structures. From 1970 to 2000, three-quarters of Institutional Revolutionary Party politicians came from this social stratum.¹²² About 60 per cent were descendants of professionals, businesspeople, or bureaucrats; and about 30 per cent were children of peasants, workers, or military, influential social sectors in post-revolutionary politics.¹²³ The electoral victory of the National Action Party in 2000 intensified this trend. The Vicente Fox administration (2000-2006) hosted the highest number of politicians from the middle class and consolidated a select group of the upper-middle class that had been in power since 1988. National Action Party politicians were distinguished by belonging to family circles of medium and small entrepreneurs of the services and commerce sectors.¹²⁴ The social background shared by the members of the Institutional Revolutionary Party and

¹²¹ For a more detailed review of the composition of the Mexican policy elite, see *Appendix A: Mexican Policy Elite, 1988-2000*; and *Appendix C: Mexican Policy Elite, 2000-2012*.

¹²² Roderic Camp, *Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation* (NY: OUP, 2007) p.119.

¹²³ Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century* pp.72-83, 107, 234-8; Roderic Camp, 'Generales y Políticos En México', *Nexos*, 82.October (1984), 17-29 pp.17-29; Lucio Mendieta and José Gómez, *Problemas de La Universidad* (Mexico: UNAM, 1948).

¹²⁴ Roderic Camp, *Metamorfosis Del Liderazgo En El México Democrático* (Mexico: FCE, 2010) p.18; Tania Hernández, 'La Elite de La Alternancia: El Caso Del Partido de Accion Popular Nacional', *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 68.4 (2006), 617-66 pp.646-8.

National Action Party contributed to the development of common interests and ideological affinity. The result was the appearance of neoliberal technocracy.

One factor that contributed to the birth of a new ruling elite was the concentration of political power in Mexico City. During the first half of the twentieth century, the political class was representative of most regions of the country. However, being born in an urban area from the 1950s was a factor that dramatically increased the chances of being part of power groups.¹²⁵ Like the middle class, the citizens of the capital city gained representativity in the political arena. This situation was a consistent trend as the number of politicians from Mexico City increased from 23 per cent in 1970 to 65 per cent in 2006.¹²⁶ The concentration of political power in the capital city is not only attributed to the fact that it harbours the headquarters of the political parties and governmental institutions. The quality of education in the capital was a crucial factor for the self-selection of the members of the political elite. At least half of the partisan cliques were incubated at university campuses in Mexico City between 1970 and 2000. This dynamic was possible because about 90 per cent of the politicians of this period settled permanently in the capital city during and after their career.¹²⁷ This situation allowed influential politicians to co-opt select student groups through which they intended to extend their political activity.

Another reason that explains the consolidation of the neoliberal technocracy was the gradual sophistication of professional education of politicians. During the nationalist socio-political context from 1930 to 1970, public schools such as the National Preparatory School and the National Autonomous University of Mexico trained the majority of politicians in law, political science, and social sciences.¹²⁸ From 1988 to 2000, more than half of the politicians had baccalaureate degrees and just over a third had postgraduate studies. Almost two-thirds completed their higher education solely in Mexico.¹²⁹ The establishment of neoliberalism in the 1980s and the beginning of the democratic transition in the 1990s influenced the instauration of a meritocratic logic that redefined the value of cultural and symbolic capital

¹²⁵ Peter Smith, *Labyrinths of Power. Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (Princeton: PUP, 1979) pp.69,71–2.

¹²⁶ Camp, 'Generales y Políticos En México'; Camp, *Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation* pp.117–9.

¹²⁷ Roderic Camp, *Las Elites Del Poder En Mexico: Perfil De Una Elite De Poder Para El Siglo XXI* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 2006) p.87; Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century* p.23,29,68.

¹²⁸ Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century* pp.163–4; Camp, 'Generales y Políticos En México'; Roderic Camp, *Los Líderes Políticos de México: Su Educación y Reclutamiento* (Mexico: FCE, 1983) pp.91–122; Peter Smith, *Los Laberintos Del Poder: El Reclutamiento de Las Élités Políticas En México, 1900-1971* (Mexico: COLMEX, 1981) pp.95–102.

¹²⁹ Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century* pp.126,154.

within the political elite.¹³⁰ Private academies such as the Mexico Autonomous Institute of Technology and Ibero-American University gained significance since their graduates in economics, finance, and administration occupied salient political positions. Furthermore, at least three-quarters of the political leaders who were born after the 1950s studied abroad, especially in the United States.¹³¹ Harvard University, Yale University, Princeton University, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology become the foremost educators of the leaders of the new ruling elite. During the period of consolidation of neoliberalism from 1988 to 2012, graduating from a private and American university became an essential resource to gain political influence and reach power positions. The change in the professional education of politicians describes how Institutional Revolutionary Party and National Action Party members adopted common ideas and practices that, beyond their partisan ideologies, distinguished the new profile of the Mexican *técnico*-politician.

Although members of the neoliberal technocracy shared socio-cultural backgrounds, the process of political training shaped their distinctive reflexes. In the case of the Institutional Revolutionary Party politicians, indoctrination took place at the Institute for Political Training since the 1930s. Its courses were oriented mainly to the effective use of political power since it was the hegemonic party. Complementarily, its affiliates were instructed on partisan principles, dynamics of the political system, and economic-administrative theories.¹³² Those militants with the best skills and linked to power elites were promoted to the Institute of Political, Economic, and Social Studies, the ideological heart and intellectual core where they engaged with ‘eminent professionals, intellectuals, scientists, technicians, and artists’.¹³³ This body was vital because it was responsible for the formulation of political platforms, a process that contributed to some coreligionists being summoned to be part of the policy elite. In contrast, political education in the National Action Party was institutionalised until the 1950s as a mechanism to overcome internal crises. The Institute of Studies and Political Training distinguished itself by teaching humanist doctrine to reinforce partisan conservative ideology.¹³⁴ Unlike the Institutional Revolutionary Party, ideological production and indoctrination were diversified. The National Action Party leaders established organisations such as the Carlos Castillo Peraza Foundation, Rafael Preciado

¹³⁰ Manuel Quijano, *Los Gabinetes En México: 1821-2012. Tomo III* (Mexico: INAP, 2012) pp.126–31; Roderic Camp, ‘El Tecnócrata En México’, *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 45.2 (1983), 579–99 pp.584–6.

¹³¹ Camp, Mexico’s Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century pp.86–7,132–4,160,163–4,178–9,182.

¹³² ICAP, *Historia Documental Del Partido de La Revolución* (Mexico: PRI, 1981) p.28.

¹³³ Larissa Adler, Rodrigo Salazar, and Ilya Adler, *Symbolism and Ritual in a One-Party Regime: Unveiling Mexico’s Political Culture* (Arizona: UAP, 2010) pp.82,99.

¹³⁴ Javier Brown, *La Evolución de La Doctrina de Acción Nacional En El Contexto Histórico Nacional e Internacional 1939, 1964, 2002* (Mexico: FRPH, 2017) pp.84–5,289–90.

Hernández Foundation, and Miguel Estrada Iturbide Foundation. These bodies generated and taught the partisan doctrine. While political education was a mechanism to reproduce its hegemony in the Institutional Revolutionary Party, it was a mechanism of political survival in the National Action Party.

The origins, structures, and partisan dynamics also shaped the distinctive practices of the Institutional Revolutionary Party and National Action Party politicians. In the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the military background was the source of its organisational and functional logic. Plutarco Calles, Lázaro Cárdenas, and Manuel Ávila were the military that forged the Institutional Revolutionary Party from 1929 to 1946. The arrival of Miguel Alemán to power in 1946 as the first president of civil origin brought an end to the institutionalisation of the revolutionary movement in the political structure.¹³⁵ The military heritage of the Institutional Revolutionary Party mirrored itself in a rigid hierarchical structure, a strict regime of authority and discipline, as well as absolute respect and institutional loyalty. These factors produced reflexes as the unquestionable respect for superiors, the concentration of power in the party apex, and the centralisation of functions such as indoctrination and ideologisation. In political practice, these factors gave rise to hyper-presidential and authoritarian governments that characterised the hegemonic regime of the Institutional Revolutionary Party.¹³⁶ In contrast, the National Action Party emerged in reaction to the loss of power of the clergy during the Calles' government in the 1920s and opposition to the nationalist policies of President Cárdenas in the 1930s.¹³⁷ The National Action Party politicians responded predominantly to business and ecclesiastical interests, a situation that was projected in their managerial reflexes and humanist doctrine.¹³⁸ Although the National Action Party also had a vertical structure, its internal processes were characterised by being decentralised and relatively democratic. These features caused internal crisis and divisionism in the 1950s. In practice, conservative politicians aspired to decentralise presidential power, to promote the human rights agenda, and to protect the interests of the economic elite.

The hegemony exercised by the Institutional Revolutionary Party for more than 70 years led to some of its practices being replicated by other parties and becoming cultural practices of the Mexican political system. One of the most representative practices is the self-

¹³⁵ Raúl Benítez, 'Las Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas a Fin de Siglo: Su Relación Con El Estado, El Sistema Político y La Sociedad', in XII International Congress (Miami: LASA, 2000) pp.2–3.

¹³⁶ Redacción, 'El Origen de La "Disciplina" En El PRI', *Proceso* (Mexico, January 1978) pp.21–3.

¹³⁷ Javier Brown p.43; Camp, *Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation* pp.89–93; Vicente Fuentes, *Los Partidos Políticos En México* (Mexico: Porrúa, 1996) p.334.

¹³⁸ PAN, 'Proyección de Principios de Doctrina Del Partido Acción Nacional' (Mexico: PAN, 2002).

reproduction of the political elite through the so-called *camarillas* (cliques).¹³⁹ Through them, influential politicians establish informal relationships to co-opt coreligionists with political potential.¹⁴⁰ Under a mentor-disciple logic called *padrinazgo* (patronage), the progress of the members of the clique depends on the political capacity of the *padrino* (godfather).¹⁴¹ This mechanism of social and political mobility based on trust, loyalty, and discipline allows the ascent of militants in the party structure and perpetuate the interests of the political leader.¹⁴² This dynamic is also replicated within the government. The perpetuation of power groups is sought through the so-called *grupos compactos* (compact groups). These intimate circles are made up of politicians from the same clique or with common interests.¹⁴³ This practice of power concentration deranged the formal decision-making process, as the compact groups gradually displaced the deliberative role of the cabinets. One of the most illustrative cases was the clique of the Bank of Mexico led by Miguel Mancera, ‘a monetarist-orthodox and anti-statist who had been head of the Bank of Mexico until 1982’.¹⁴⁴ These practices explain the birth of a generation of *técnico*-politicians with similar socio-cultural backgrounds and close ties with the financial sector, which remained in power for more than thirty years.

The presidents are representatives of the generation of politicians that emerged since 1982. Carlos Salinas, Ernesto Zedillo, Vicente Fox, and Felipe Calderón exemplify the arrival of the upper-middle class to power from 1994 to 2012. As de la Madrid, the four leaders studied their baccalaureate in Mexico City and completed their postgraduate studies at elite universities in the United States in economic-administrative disciplines. The institutional differences between the Institutional Revolutionary Party and National Action Party shaped their distinctive reflexes in the exercise of power. In the case of Salinas and Zedillo, their membership in the Bank of Mexico clique defined the homogeneity of their cabinets and compact groups. The strict discipline of the Institutional Revolutionary Party explains their power concentration and orthodox attachment to the neoliberal vision undertaken by de la

¹³⁹ Roderic Camp, ‘Reclutamiento Político y Cambio En El México de Los Setentas’, *Foro Internacional*, XX.3 (1980), 463–83 pp.467–70.

¹⁴⁰ Merilee Grindle, *Bureaucrats, Politicians and Peasants in Mexico: A Case Study in Public Policy* (California: UCP, 1977) p.44; Lester Seligman, *Recruiting Political Elites* (Indianapolis: GLP, 1971) p.17.

¹⁴¹ Camp, *Mexico’s Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century* pp.27–8.

¹⁴² Joy Langston, ‘An Empirical View of the Political Groups in México: The Camarillas’, *Documentos de Trabajo Del CIDE*, 1997 pp.3–4; Roderic Camp, ‘Camarillas in Mexican Politics: The Case of the Salinas Cabinet’, *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos*, 6.1 (1990), 85–107 pp.86–7; Guerrero Díaz, *Psychology of the Mexican: Culture and Personality* (Austin: UTP, 1975) p.26.

¹⁴³ Jorge Gil and Samuel Schmidt, *Estudios Sobre La Red Política de México* (Mexico: UNAM, 2005) pp.108–10.

¹⁴⁴ Redacción, ‘Cuando Los Tecnócratas Alcanzaron El Poder: El Primer Gabinete’, *Proceso* (Mexico, April 1999).

Madrid. In the case of Fox and Calderón, their cliques forged between National Action Party factions and business groups delineated the heterogeneity of their cabinets and compact groups. Their inexperience in the exercise of power and desire to differentiate themselves from the Institutional Revolutionary Party regime explain their political heterodoxy and intention to decentralise power. Despite these partisan discrepancies, the political elite agreed that neoliberalism and globalisation were the right way to develop the country. However, these preferences jeopardised the sovereignty that defended nationalism for decades. The period from 1988 to 2012 exposes how the new political-economic model shaped the strategic choices of neoliberal technocracy.

2.1.2. Bureaucrats

The bureaucratic elite is the second most powerful group in strategic policy-making. The ideological affinity of secretaries and directors with the president has positioned them as highly influential actors. Historically, the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, the Secretariat of the Interior, the Secretariat of Finance, and the Centre for Investigation and National Security have been the pillars of bureaucratic machinery. However, the location of the nucleus of bureaucratic power has changed according to presidential preferences. As of 1982, secretaries of the economic portfolio gained significant influence in decision-making. After the political change of 2000, the restructuring of the national security system shifted power to the secretariats of the domestic policy portfolio. The period from 1988 to 2012 describes the consolidation of influence of Mexican technocracy in strategic decision-making.

The crisis of the 1970s not only triggered the ideological metamorphosis in the political elite but also aroused the interest of President José López in adopting new ways of organising the federal government. The technocratic revolution he envisioned required the adoption of novel public administration theories and methods to improve decision-making.¹⁴⁵ As of 1982, this process empowered the nascent figure of the *técnico*-politician, ‘the *técnicos* who also have political skills who are increasingly important in policy-making functions, and it is this type of actor who is increasingly found in positions of power and influence’.¹⁴⁶ The technocrats distinguished themselves by their apoliticism and underestimation of politics, as well as by basing their decisions on instrumental rationality. The *técnico*-politicians’ logic was based on their belief ‘that specialised knowledge can be successfully applied to solving

¹⁴⁵ John Bailey, ‘Presidency, Bureaucracy, and Administrative Reform in Mexico: The Secretariat of Programming and Budget’, *Journal of Inter-American Economic Affairs*, 34, Summer (1980), 27–59 p.42.

¹⁴⁶ Merilee Grindle, ‘Power, Expertise and the “Tecnico”: Suggestions from a Mexican Case Study’, *Journal of Politics*, 39.2 (1977), 399–426 pp.402,412.

specific problems. [...] the identification of problems, and the formulation of policies to solve these problems, may be more important than their execution'.¹⁴⁷ The political change of 2000 consolidated the technocracy, 'a cohesive elite with specialised training, who claims to be able to maximise collective well-being by applying a set of rational instrumental techniques and success criteria'.¹⁴⁸ The members of this new elite were characterised by 'their unity and control of the policy process also led to a special air of arrogance, labelled technocratic elitism [...], an attitude reflected in their view that they actually had the right to rule, and that they alone could determine the course of social change'.¹⁴⁹

The social background of politicians and bureaucrats were very different at the beginning of the twentieth century, but from the 1970s their profiles began to converge. Since the 1940s, bureaucracy and military distinguished themselves by providing opportunities for social mobility to individuals of humble origin.¹⁵⁰ The post-revolutionary bureaucrat came from the modest urban middle sector and, like soldiers, believed that 'social mobility was possible through conformity, hard work, and education'. By then, the bureaucrat 'was insulated from all forms of political activity and association: worker unions were portrayed as discouraging individual initiative and talent'.¹⁵¹ As of 1950, the integral administrative reform of the federal government redefined the profile of the bureaucrat.¹⁵² For three decades, the middle class of Mexico City began to gain representation in the bureaucracy. This situation is attributed to the fact that the reform centralised the entire government structure in the capital. After the demographic explosion that Mexico City experienced during the second third of the twentieth century, the capital concentrated on average more than 65 per cent of the country's middle class.¹⁵³ It was from the 1960s that the bureaucracy multiplied significantly and began to strengthen close ties with the political elite. The number of bureaucrats quadrupled between 1962 and 1972, and the number of high-level officials grew from 134 to 257 between 1970 and 2012.¹⁵⁴ The networks created within the federal government

¹⁴⁷ Camp, 'El Tecnócrata En México' pp.585,589–90.

¹⁴⁸ Miguel Centeno and Leandro Wolfson, 'Redefiniendo La Tecnocracia', *Desarrollo Económico*, 37.146 (1997), 215–40 p.222.

¹⁴⁹ Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century* p.215.

¹⁵⁰ Camp, 'Generales y Políticos En México'.

¹⁵¹ Mary Vaughan, *Cultural Politics in Revolution: Teachers, Peasants, and Schools in Mexico, 1930-1940* (Arizona: UAP, 1997) pp.40–1.

¹⁵² Alejandro Carrillo, 'Reforma Administrativa Para El Desarrollo Económico y Social (1976-1982)', *Revista de Administración Pública*, 31/32.July-December (1977), 11–26 pp.12–8.

¹⁵³ Emilio Coral, 'The Mexico City Middle Class, 1940–1970: Between Tradition, the State, and the United States' (GU, 2011) pp.23–8; Sergio Aguayo, *El Almanaque Mexicano: Un Compendio Exhaustivo Sobre México En Un Lenguaje Accesible y Claro* (Mexico: Grijalbo, 2000) p.64; Soledad Loaeza and Claudio Stern, *Las Clases Medias En La Coyuntura Actual* (Mexico: COLMEX, 1987) p.24.

¹⁵⁴ Carlos Sirvent, 'La Burocracia En México. El Caso de La FSTSE', *Estudios Políticos*, 1.April-June (1975), 5–31 p.16.

allowed politicians to hold positions in the bureaucracy and bureaucrats to occupy political positions.

The parallelism in the evolution of the professional education of politicians and bureaucrats is another factor that illustrates the emergence of technocracy.¹⁵⁵ During the nationalist period, it was popularly known that if someone wanted to start their career in the public sector, they had to go to the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Beyond its academic quality, this institution was described as

an excellent place to make contacts, alliances and friendships; where teachers and students could observe each other's talents where they used to meet informally, introduce themselves to friends and acquaintances in government; and where they provided each other with levers for subsequent use.¹⁵⁶

Bureaucrats who studied law and graduated from a public university predominated from 1970 to 1982. The first technocrats were distinguished because 'were younger, had more training in the quantitative techniques required for economic planning, and were more willing to accept a powerful public role in economic development'.¹⁵⁷ The implementation of neoliberalism from 1982 established a new logic in which the most valuable cultural and symbolic capital was provided by private universities, postgraduate degrees in the United States, and degrees in economic-administrative disciplines. From 1982 to 2012, the trend changed dramatically, as officials with postgraduate degrees in economics graduated from private universities began to predominate.¹⁵⁸ The increasing number of private education institutions from the 1940s onwards, the integral administrative reform, and the economic opening of the country were some factors that explain the evolution of the bureaucrat's education. As in the political elite, the pattern was similar. The crisis of the 1970s triggered the rupture with an old model, while the political change of 2000 only intensified the trend started in 1982.

¹⁵⁵ Sebastian Garrido, 'La Educación de Los Mandarines Mexicanos, 1970-2014', *Revista Mexicana de Investigación Educativa*, 22.72 (2017), 295–324 p.300; Eduardo Torres, 'Bureaucracy Ann Politics in Mexico, 1976-1992: The Rise and Fall of the SPP' (UL, 1997) p.14; Alfonso Galindo, 'Educational Backgrounds of High-Level Government Officials, 1972-89', in *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, ed. by James Wilkie, Carlos Contreras, and Christof Weber (California: UCLA, 1993) pp.570–98.

¹⁵⁶ Peter Smith, *Labyrinths of Power. Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico* pp.249–50.

¹⁵⁷ Miguel Centeno, *Democracy Within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico* (Pennsylvania: PSUP, 1994) pp.90–1.

¹⁵⁸ Sebastian Garrido pp.301–2; Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century* p.184; Eduardo Torres p.14; Galindo pp.570–98; Camp, 'El Tecnócrata En México' p.583.

Just as the indoctrination centres of the political parties moulded the distinctive reflexes of politicians, four institutions shaped the characteristic responses of bureaucrats. The first is the National Institute of Public Administration. Since 1955, this civil association positioned itself as a pioneer in the formation of officials in administrative sciences. It has also been the leading promoter of the logic under which contemporary bureaucracy operates, especially the political-bureaucratic ties. The influence of this institute was illustrated in the 1950s when its founders advised President Adolfo López to undertake an integral administrative reform and generate a new regulatory framework to reorganise the federal public administration.¹⁵⁹ The second centre is the National Institute of Criminal Sciences. Since 1976, this body of the Attorney General's Office has trained officials who administer and enforce justice. The role of this institute has been fundamental for the professionalisation of the agents involved in criminal justice and public safety systems. In these two training centres, the teaching of the national strategic doctrine has been a secondary subject in their curricula. This situation has generated a disarticulation between the small strategic community and the rest of the federal public administration.

The third training centre is the Matías Romero Institute. Since 1974, this diplomatic academy of the Secretariat of Foreign Relations has focused on the professionalisation of members of the Mexican foreign service. Its function has been the development of diplomatic-consular and technical-administrative competences in the diplomatic and consular bodies. Its doctrine is made up of subjects in international law, diplomatic history, international politics, and diplomatic method.¹⁶⁰ The fourth is the Intelligence School for National Security. Since 2009, this decentralised body of the Secretariat of the Interior has been responsible for training the agents of the Centre for Investigation and National Security. This school also did not escape the technocratic current, since its courses favoured the teaching of marketing techniques and training in operational intelligence.¹⁶¹ Unlike the previous institutes, these last two schools participate directly in the national security plan-making process.¹⁶² It should be noted that the National Defence College and the Centre for Naval Higher Studies began

¹⁵⁹ Alejandro Carrillo, *Génesis y Evolución de La Administración Pública Centralizada* (Mexico: INAP, 2011) pp.139–40.

¹⁶⁰ Guillermo Gutierrez, *El Modelo Burocrático Del Servicio Exterior Mexicano* (Mexico: INAP, 2016) pp.91–6; DOF-17-10-1979 SRE, 'Reglamento Interior de La Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores' (Mexico: DOF, 1979) pp.52–3.

¹⁶¹ Zósimo Camacho, 'La Escuelita Del CISEN', *Contralínea* (Mexico, May 2016) pp.12–3; Tomás Borges, *Diario de Un Agente Encubierto* (Mexico: Planeta, 2013) pp.61–6; Sebastián Barragán, 'La Escuela Del Cisen: Su Plan de Estudios y Plantilla Secreta', *El Universal*, 2013 <<http://archivo.unionguajuato.mx/articulo/2013/04/09/seguridad/la-escuela-del-cisen-su-plan-de-estudios-y-plantilla-secreta>> [accessed 15 June 2017].

¹⁶² Presidencia, 'Programa Para La Seguridad Nacional 2014-2018' (Mexico: DOF, 2014) pp.9,38.

admitting civil servants in their academic programmes in 1989. These academies provided a select group of officials with a unique cultural, symbolic, and social capital that positioned them as experts on strategic issues within the bureaucratic machinery.

The socio-cultural convergence between politicians and bureaucrats enabled the development of shared cultural practices. After the integral administrative reform in the 1950s, the bureaucracy ceased to be an appendix compliant to the regime and instead became into a useful platform of political mobility. The cliques reproduced the *técnico*-politician, as they facilitated their movement between political and bureaucratic structures.¹⁶³ These dynamics encouraged informality in government and generated discretionary practices that resulted in opacity and corruption. The cliques served as an instrument to cover up practices that deviated from legality, while the symbolism of institutionality allowed them to simulate compliance with the law.¹⁶⁴ The arrival of the *técnico*-politician to power displaced the political negotiation for technocratic rationality as the primary method for policy-making. President de la Madrid eradicated the traditional practice of appointing secretaries with political experience and knowledge of the sector that they would lead.¹⁶⁵ Financial experts began to occupy the leading positions of the cabinet, such as the position of secretary of foreign relations. One of the mechanisms they used to strengthen their privileged position was the instrumental legitimization of their profession. The role that the technocrats assumed in the decision-making process underpinned the figure of the expert. The government fostered confidence in specialised knowledge and the real usefulness of the economics profession through official speech. After the crisis of the 1970s, this discourse displaced of nationalist bureaucrats with Keynesian preferences for technocrats attached to the neoliberal doctrine.¹⁶⁶

The cabinets illustrate the technocracy that led to strategic policy-making since 1982. Compact groups exemplify the technocratic symbiosis in which '*políticos* monopolise political skills as a foundation of their power positions while *técnicos* derive influence from

¹⁶³ David Arellano, 'La Burocracia Mexicana Como Actor: Construyendo Las Bases Para Su Análisis Empírico', *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos*, XIX.December (2009) pp.2–3; Ben Schneider, 'The Career Connection: A Comparative Analysis of Bureaucratic Preferences and Insulation', *Comparative Politics*, 25.3 (1993), 331–50 pp.336–8.

¹⁶⁴ Rik Peters and others, 'Burocracia de Baja Confianza', *Documentos de Trabajo Del CIDE*, 2018 pp.19–21; José Estrada, 'La Corrupción Administrativa En México', *Polis*, 9.2 (2013), 179–84; Stephen Morris, *Corruption & Politics in Contemporary Mexico* (London: UAP, 1991) pp.37–41.

¹⁶⁵ Rogelio Hernández, 'Entre La Racionalidad Tecnocrática y La Gobernabilidad La Importancia Del Consenso Político En México', *Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales*, LIX.22 (2014), 353–68 pp.357–8; Sarah Babb, *Proyecto: México. Los Economistas Del Nacionalismo Al Neoliberalismo* (Mexico: FCE, 2003) pp.249–52.

¹⁶⁶ Sarah Babb, 'Los Profesionistas En El Gobierno y El Problema de La Tecnocracia: El Caso de Los Economistas En México', *Estudios Sociológicos*, 16.48 (1998), 661–88 pp.665–8.

their control over technical information'.¹⁶⁷ Salinas and Zedillo established the centre of their governments at homogeneous circles made up of inexperienced actors in politics. José Córdoba, Manuel Camacho, Jaime Serra, Pedro Aspe, Luis Téllez, José Gurría, and Guillermo Ortiz were some of the orthodox technocrats who headed the secretariats of the economic portfolio. They distinguished themselves by their preferences for the neoliberal doctrine acquired during their postgraduate studies at elite universities in the United States. The predominance of actors belonging to the clique of the Bank of Mexico was the product of a tendency forged since the 1970s by highly influential mentors and intellectuals such as Mancera, Leopoldo Solís, and Gustavo Petricoli. Fox and Calderón replicated the practice of generating power cores. However, they distinguished themselves by being heterogeneous and heterodox, the result of bringing together businesspeople and far-right politicians. In the case of Fox, actors such as Carlos Rojas, Ramón Muñoz, Marta Sahagún, Juan Castro, and Eduardo Sojo concentrated power at the Office of the Presidency of the Republic. In the case of Calderón, actors such as Juan Mouriño, Francisco Ramírez, Juan Molinar, Ernesto Cordero, and Gerardo Ruiz headed secretariats of the domestic policy portfolio. The political change of 2000 managed to diminish the influence of the clique of the Bank of Mexico in strategic decision-making, but it did not alter the predominance of economic power over political power because the interests of the neoliberal technocracy prevailed.

2.1.3. Generals

The military elite is the third most influential group in strategic policy-making in Mexico. Historically, the Secretariat of National Defence has been the leading player in the military sphere. Its political power is the product of the role played by generals in the founding of the Institutional Revolutionary Party and the military presence in the Presidency of the Republic during the first half of the twentieth century. The military elite is made up of the officers of the general staff at Secretariat of National Defence, which simultaneously serves as a state department and headquarters of the army and air force. The following analysis demonstrates how, during the period 1988 to 2012, a process of generational change in the military elite redefined its role in the strategic policy-making process.

Before 1988, the military elite was made up of generals called *troperos* (mustangs), who had been conscripted and ascended in the hierarchical scale from the rank of soldier. The members of this generation came from illiterate peasant families, belonged to a low socio-economic stratum, and proceeded from rural regions throughout the country. Many had not

¹⁶⁷ Grindle, 'Power, Expertise and the "Tecnico": Suggestions from a Mexican Case Study' p.402.

completed their high school studies and saw in the army an opportunity to improve their social position.¹⁶⁸ The professionalisation process undertaken in the armed forces restricted the access of *troperos* to the Heroic Military College since 1944. This situation dramatically reduced the possibility of reaching generalship for conscripts born after 1930.¹⁶⁹ The impact of this reform was not visible until 1994, the year in which the new generation of generals began to occupy positions in the military leadership. Before the gradual disappearance of *troperos*, the military elite began to be led by orthodox professionals graduated from the Heroic Military College.¹⁷⁰ The professionalisation process also modified the socio-economic profile of those who aspired to a military career. Since the 1950s, the cadets began to come from working families of the middle class, from urban areas of the central-Western region of the country, and generally with high school studies.¹⁷¹ The professionalisation process made the internal filters sophisticated and undermined the social mobility that had historically distinguished the military institution.

The *troperos* and orthodox generals came from contrasting socio-cultural backgrounds. The four generations of the military elite that evolved during the twentieth century portray this divergence: the revolutionaries, those trained during the Second World War, the Higher War College graduates, and the National Defence College graduates.¹⁷² The first two generations were mostly made up of *troperos* and the last two of orthodox officers. The period of the late 1980s and early 1990s harboured the generational transition between the Higher War College graduates and the National Defence College graduates. The generals of this last generation are distinguished by their middle-class background, coming from urban areas of the central region of the country, as well as having started their career in the Heroic Military College during the second half of the twentieth century.¹⁷³ In this academy, the cadets are taught a 'high sense of honour, discipline, and morals'. After four years, they graduate as infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineer, or armoured officers.¹⁷⁴ The reform of the military

¹⁶⁸ Thomas Weil, *The Armed Forces. Area Handbook for Mexico* (Washington: GPO, 1975) p.351; Morris Janowitz, *Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis* (Chicago: UCP, 1964) p.60.

¹⁶⁹ EFAM, 'Editorial', *Revista Del Ejército y La Fuerza Aérea* (Mexico, September 1955) p.3; Raúl León, 'Bienvenidos Los Sargentos Primeros Al H. Colegio Militar', *Revista Del Ejército y La Fuerza Aérea* (Mexico, August 1955) pp.64–5; Rangel Medina, 'El Nuevo Curso de Formación de Oficiales En El H. Colegio Militar', *Revista Del Ejército y La Fuerza Aérea* (Mexico, June 1955) pp.3–5.

¹⁷⁰ Camp, *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico* p.25.

¹⁷¹ Lyle MacAlister, *The Military in Latin American Socio-Political Evolution: Four Case Studies* (Washington: AIR, 1970) p.221; Edwin Lieuwen, *Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910-1940* (Albuquerque: UNMP, 1968) p.147; Javier Romero, *Aspectos Psicobiométricos y Sociales de Una Muestra de La Juventud Mexicana* (Mexico: DIA, 1956) pp.49,52.

¹⁷² Camp, *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico* pp.109–19.

¹⁷³ Camp, 'Generales y Políticos En México'.

¹⁷⁴ DOF-15-11-1949 SEDENA, 'Reglamento Del Heroico Colegio Militar' (Mexico: DOF, 1949) art.3.

education system progressively raised the minimum levels of schooling required to access this institution, as well as the academic degrees granted upon graduation.¹⁷⁵ The trend of professionalisation gradually reduced the possibility of promotion to the military leadership to a small sector of society. The fact that the middle class of Mexico City positioned itself as the primary social source of the military elite allowed the strengthening of its link with the political-bureaucratic elite.

At the apex of the military structure is the general staff. Passing the courses of the two most senior academies in the military education system is essential to occupy a leadership position on the general staff. One of these is the course of command and general staff taught at the Higher War College. There captains and majors acquire the tactical-strategic doctrine required for the conduct of military operations and to advise the commanders of large units.¹⁷⁶ Upon graduation, officers receive the general staff diploma and academic degree of military administration.¹⁷⁷ The second course taught by this academy is the master's degree in strategic management. In this programme, lieutenant colonels of the general staff acquire the skills required to participate in the strategic planning process.¹⁷⁸ This academic degree serves as an important differentiator among the general staff officers. From 1932 until the early 1980s, graduating from the Higher War College was an essential factor in aspiring to the generalship, since it was then the highest step in military training.¹⁷⁹ The generation of generals graduated from this academy embodied a cultural paradigm forged by memorisation techniques, technocratic approaches, and an unconditional subordination to authority.¹⁸⁰ These aspects defined the limited role that the military elite assumed in the strategic policy-making process until the 1980s.

By 1981, the National Defence College was established as the most relevant source of symbolic and cultural capital in the armed forces. Its creation responded to the interest of the military elite in improving the intellectual formation of generals and colonels. Its main objectives have been to develop strategic knowledge and generate political-strategic doctrine.¹⁸¹ The master's degree in military administration for internal security and national

¹⁷⁵ Benito Jiménez, 'Presumen Educación de Colegio Militar', *Reforma* (Mexico, 22 September 2016); UDEFA, 'Convocatoria Admisión General' (Mexico: SEDENA, 1993); Otto Granados, 'Ejército: ¿Regreso a Las Armas?', *Nexos*, 50, February (1982), 25–29 pp.25–9.

¹⁷⁶ SEDENA, 'Reglamento de La Escuela Superior de Guerra' (Mexico: DOF, 1959) art.1.

¹⁷⁷ SEDENA, 'Plan de Estudios Del Curso de Mando y Estado Mayor General' (Mexico: ESG, 2016) p.2.

¹⁷⁸ SEDENA, 'Plan de Estudios de La Maestría En Dirección Estratégica' (Mexico: ESG, 2016) p.2.

¹⁷⁹ SEDENA, Escuela Superior de Guerra. LX Aniversario (Mexico: ESG, 1992) pp.43–5; SEDENA, Genesis de La Escuela Superior de Guerra (Mexico: DGEM, 1933) pp.5–7.

¹⁸⁰ Camp, *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico* pp.154–62.

¹⁸¹ SEDENA, Creación Del Colegio de Defensa Nacional (Mexico: CODENAL, 2008) pp.1–3,5.

defence has been the course through which officers are trained for analysis and planning in strategic issues.¹⁸² As of 1989, the academy established itself as a fundamental provider of social capital for military and bureaucrats, as officials were authorised to be part of the programme. This situation allowed members of the secretariats involved in the strategic policy-making process to socialise and share knowledge and skills. The networks generated inside the college laid the foundations for the advent of a strategic community. This academy has been set at the core of the military elite's self-selection and self-reproduction system, since graduating from it is the prelude to occupy a position of influence within the general staff. The generals belonging to this generation acquired enough symbolic, cultural, and social capital to assume with greater confidence a leadership role in the strategic policy-making since the 1990s.¹⁸³

Additionally, two informal practices have characterised the rise of officers to the elite. The first replicates the political-bureaucratic cliques. Along the military trajectory, mentor-disciple relationships are generated in which senior officers support the promotion of *protégés*, either because of their desire to preserve common interests or under the argument of institutional benefit. This dynamic has produced the concentration of power among infantry and artillery generals.¹⁸⁴ The second practice refers to the trajectories that facilitate access to the general staff. Various positions provide vast social capital to be supported by a sponsor or symbolic capital to acquire influence power. In the academic field, the post of director of the Heroic Military College expands the network of links with members of the political, bureaucratic, military, and cultural elites. In the diplomatic domain, the position of military *attaché* in the United States, called 'the cream of the officer corps', provides the opportunity to develop idiomatic and diplomatic skills, as well as socialise with the American military elite.¹⁸⁵ In the political level, the position of region commander allows 'officers who aspire to such a degree to be politically astute and establish relations with politicians or other officers who could influence the civilians who make the decisions'.¹⁸⁶ Although the president appoints the members of the general staff, the secretary of defence proposes senior officers based on personal relationships, leadership capacity, ideological

¹⁸² SEDENA, 'Plan de Estudios de La Maestría En Administración Militar Para La Seguridad Interior y Defensa Nacional' (Mexico: CODENAL, 2016) pp.3–4; SEDENA, 'Programa de Actividades Extracurriculares de La Maestría En Administración Militar Para La Seguridad Interior y Defensa Nacional' (Mexico: CODENAL, 2016) pp.1–5.

¹⁸³ Camp, *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico* pp.162–5.

¹⁸⁴ Camp, *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico* pp.25,138–9.

¹⁸⁵ Camp, *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico* pp.193–205.

¹⁸⁶ Camp, 'Generales y Políticos En México'.

affinity, institutional loyalty, professional career, and their membership of the same academic generations or power groups.

It should be noted that generational relays usually produce tensions within the military elite. During the 1960s, young officers called *pencilinos* were very critical of the lack of effectiveness of government policies. In the 1970s, zone commanders expressed their frustration over the meagre defence budget and the resource waste by politicians and bureaucrats. Throughout the 1980s, young officers opposed the limited role assigned to the military in aid efforts after the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City. In this last case, the decision responded to the fear of civil leadership that the military could acquire higher political power and a prominent position in the public arena.¹⁸⁷ However, strict obedience to authority and rigid self-discipline have allowed such disagreements to be overcome. The military elite has distinguished itself by the homogeneity and self-reproduction of its values, beliefs, and attitudes. These attributes are a result of effective indoctrination processes and endogenous socialisation. They also have been vital for military leaders to be recognised as

a unified and well-disciplined corps. Indeed, while factional divisiveness has sometimes appeared publicly within three major institutions responsible for Mexico's historical political stability (namely, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the executive administration, and the Catholic Church), the one national institution in which elite integration has consistently appeared to persist is the military.¹⁸⁸

In practice, discipline and loyalty translate into the 'right attitude'. The exercise of subordination and submission to authority is essential to rise through positions in the military structure, sometimes at the expense of initiative and leadership.¹⁸⁹

The secretaries of defence who took office from 1988 to 2012 embodied the tense generational transition within the military elite. The first was Antonio Riviello (1988-1994). He undertook cultural change within the military elite despite being the son of a revolutionary general and a graduate of the Higher War College. The fact that two-thirds of

¹⁸⁷ Jorge Castañeda, 'Mexico at the Brink', *Foreign Affairs*, 64, Winter (1985), 287–303 p.293; MacAlister p.245.

¹⁸⁸ David Ronfeld, 'The Mexican Army and Political Order since 1940', in *Armies and Politics in Latin America*, ed. by Abraham Lowenthal (NY: HM, 1976) p.301.

¹⁸⁹ Camp, *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico* pp.43–4; José Piñeyro, *Ejército y Sociedad En México: Pasado y Presente* (Puebla: UAP, 1985) p.118; Oscar Hinojosa, 'Cualquier Regimen de Gobierno, Con Apoyo Popular, Sera Respetado Por El Ejército', *Proceso* (Mexico, March 1982) pp.6–8.

the general staff under his tenure belonged to the same generation did not diminish his efforts to encourage the involvement of the military elite in the strategic policy-making process. The second was Enrique Cervantes (1994-2000). He was also a graduate of the Higher War College. His commitment to the process of change was conditioned, as he was *protégé* of former Secretaries of Defence Felix Galvan (1976-1982) and Marcelino Garcia (1964-1970). They, like Cervantes, belonged to an orthodox current of generals who ‘subordinate themselves, without bargaining, to the civil power’ and defend the benefits granted by being complicit in the regime of the Institutional Revolutionary Party.¹⁹⁰ The third was Clemente Vega (2000-2006), who supported Riviello to generate the new doctrine for the military elite.¹⁹¹ The distinction of having been the first secretary graduated from the National Defence College gave him enough symbolic capital for the new political elite of the National Action Party to identify him as an intellectual talent. Finally, Guillermo Galván (2006-2012) concluded the generational shift. He was the second secretary graduated from the National Defence College. His support for the change process was limited. Like Vega, Galván had to deal with the resistance of the orthodox current related to Cervantes and the interests of the Institutional Revolutionary Party. The clashes between the power groups from 2000 onwards were a sign that the interests of an old generation of senior officers were being replaced by those of an emerging stream of young and intellectual generals disposed to adapt the armed forces to the conditions of the new domestic and international order.

2.1.4. Policy-making

The strategic policy-making machinery underwent a process of expansion and professionalisation from the late 1980s onwards. Inside the government structure, exclusive spaces were created for politicians, bureaucrats, and generals to discuss strategic affairs jointly. The Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy and Specialised Cabinet in National Security were the most important.¹⁹² These presidential bodies were created to define the government agenda and coordinate the formulation of the strategic policy. The following analysis of the period from 1988 to 2012 exposes the construction of a robust bureaucratic system that symbolically aspired to democratise and decentralise decision-making, but in practice strengthened the authority of technocrats on strategic matters.¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ Presidencia, ‘Comunicado No.699’ (Mexico: Presidencia, 1998).

¹⁹¹ Gerardo Vega, *Seguridad Nacional: Concepto, Organización, Método* (Mexico: SEDENA, 1988).

¹⁹² DOF-06-12-1988 Presidencia, ‘Acuerdo Por El Que Se Crea La Oficina de Coordinación de La Presidencia de La República’ (Mexico: DOF, 1988) arts.3–4.

¹⁹³ For a more detailed review of the architecture of the Mexican bureaucratic machinery, see *Appendix B: Mexican Policy-Making Structure, 1988-2000*; and *Appendix D: Mexican Policy-Making Structure, 2000-2012*.

Throughout the twentieth century, the Institutional Revolutionary Party led a hegemonic regime in which the direction of the party, the government, and the country depended on the will of one person: the president. Hyper-presidentialism was the product of the excessive concentration of power in the president, her/his legitimate control of the executive branch, the dominance of her/his party in Congress, and her/his influence over the Supreme Court.¹⁹⁴ From the 1980s, the aspiration to sophisticate government capabilities and technify policy-making led to the institutionalisation of technocracy.¹⁹⁵ In the strategic policy realm, the creation of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic and its specialised cabinets exemplify this process. The *Constitution of 1917* established the president as head of state, head of government, head of the federal executive, and supreme commander of the armed forces. These roles position the president as the most important actor in decision-making.¹⁹⁶ One of her/his responsibilities was to convene the specialised cabinets to analyse high priority issues and make decisions on matters on the strategic agenda.¹⁹⁷ The president was empowered to convene cabinet members and chair the sessions in which the strategic policy was made. Informal rules of the Mexican political system gave prerogatives to the president to discretionally establish power groups within the presidential cabinet and legislative chambers to underpin her/his authority.¹⁹⁸

The configuration of the hegemonic and hyper-presidential regime undermined Congress's ability to act as a counterweight to presidential decisions. The power held by lawmakers was restricted to the ratification of government plans and programmes, international treaties and agreements, as well as cabinet members appointments.¹⁹⁹ The legislative authority on the strategic agenda was exercised indirectly through three bodies: the Foreign Relations Commission, National Defence Commission, and National Security Bicameral Commission. The members of the cabinet were obliged to appear before these commissions to report on the status of the country's foreign and security policy.²⁰⁰ The overwhelming legislative majorities that prevailed in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate were mirrored within the commissions. The commissions were made up by coreligionists to the president, who

¹⁹⁴ Roderic Camp, *La Política En México: ¿Consolidación Democrática o Deterioro?* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 2000) pp.30,228,234.

¹⁹⁵ Centeno p.88.

¹⁹⁶ DOF-15-09-2017 Congreso, *Constitución Política de Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos* (Mexico: DOF, 1917) art.89.

¹⁹⁷ Alejandro Martínez, 'Tres Momentos Para Entender La Seguridad Nacional de México', *Revista de El Colegio de San Luis*, IV.7 (2014), 236–55 pp.245–6.

¹⁹⁸ Adler, Salazar, and Adler pp.40–50.

¹⁹⁹ DOF-16-02-2018 Congreso, *Ley de Planeación* (Mexico: DOF, 1983) art.5; DOF-15-09-2017 Congreso, *Constitución Política de Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos* art.26.

²⁰⁰ DOF-26-12-2005 Congreso, *Ley de Seguridad Nacional* (Mexico: DOF, 2005) arts.56–7; DOF-28-12-2017 Congreso, *Ley Orgánica Del Congreso General* (Mexico: DOF, 1999) arts.39,90.

usually lacked knowledge on strategic issues. The *Diaries of the Debates* reveal the absence of legislative disposition to question the presidential decisions and the proceeding of her/his secretaries. This situation diluted the legislative oversight function and congressional authority.

In contrast, the presidential cabinet exercised direct control over strategic policy. The function of its members was to advise the president in decision-making, participate in policy-making, and coordinate the implementation of programmes. Three actors of the bureaucratic elite were dominant within the Specialised Cabinet in National Security. First, the secretary of the interior. Her/his role as executive secretary of the cabinet and responsible for ensuring the country's governance provided her/him with the ability to guide the policy-making. Her/his political capital and control over the national police force and civil intelligence services fed her/his influence on decision-making. Second, the director of the Centre for Investigation and National Security. Her/his power was the product of her/his close ties with the president and the operational capacity of the intelligence agency. Furthermore, he/she was responsible for providing the cabinet with the *National Risk Agenda*, an essential input for the strategic policy-making process. Third, the head of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic. Despite not being a formal cabinet member, the chief of the presidential staff controlled the technical secretaries of the specialised cabinets. The absolute ideological affinity and the close friendship with the president positioned her/him as her/his first confidant and most persuasive advisor.²⁰¹

The Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy was the second space for deliberation on strategic issues. Its structure was characterised by excluding the military elite and bringing together three members of the Specialised Cabinet in National Security. The secretary of finance was highly influential because he/she was responsible for administrative planning and public finances. In 1992, the Secretariat of Finance incorporated functions of the mighty Secretariat of Planning and Budget, which was head of the cabinet. Also, the Secretariat of Finance acted as a platform for political promotion of the Bank of Mexico's clique. The secretary of foreign relations was less influential. However, her/his refined socio-cultural capital allowed her/him to serve as a companion to the most prominent cabinet members. Because of her/his mastery of the legal framework of Mexican foreign policy and broad knowledge of international law, it was vital to consult her/him before every deliberation relating to

²⁰¹ Omar Guerrero, *Historia de La Secretaría de Gobernación* (Mexico: Porrúa, 2011) pp.452–8; Sergio Aguayo, *La Charola. Una Historia de Los Servicios de Inteligencia En México* (Mexico: Grijalbo, 2001) pp.261–4; Mark Williams, *Market Reforms in Mexico: Coalitions, Institutions, and the Politics of Policy Change* (Maryland: R&LP, 2001) pp.117–9.

strategic affairs. The case of the attorney general was similar. Her/his participation in the policy-making process was confined to oversee the adherence of policies to the rule of law. The power of influence came from the symbolic and political capital of the person who held the position, which was usually occupied by renowned lawyers and academics.²⁰²

The participation of the military in policy-making was restricted since the 1940s. The Latin American military dictatorships of the twentieth century discouraged the political elite from involving generals in decision-making publicly.²⁰³ However, presidential discretion allowed to the head of state summons politicians and bureaucrats with military backgrounds to the cabinet. The symbolic and cultural capital of the secretaries of defence was an essential factor, so the presidents usually did not make crucial decisions on without first having heard their opinion. The influential role played by the military elite on issues such as Mexico's position on Central American conflicts and the nationalisation of banking in the 1980s illustrate the relevance that they gradually gained in decision-making.²⁰⁴ The creation of the Specialised Cabinet in National Security in 1989 formalised the participation of the defence and navy secretaries in the strategic policy-making process. The general staff officers were responsible for providing technical advice on military planning, departmental operation, budgetary management, personnel deployment, and programmes implementation. In the cabinet, both secretaries distinguished themselves by proposing policy guidelines following the diagnosis set out in the *National Risk Agenda* and validating the strategic relevance and operational feasibility of the roles assigned to the armed forces.²⁰⁵

There was no exclusive coordination space for the strategic policy-making process until 1989. The specialised cabinets were distinguished by being configured and convened at the discretion of the president. Due to presidential agreements were the only legal instrument that backed the operation of the cabinets, they were continuously modified and adjusted ad

²⁰² María Casar, *Sistema Político Mexicano* (Mexico: OUP, 2015) pp.146–7; Jorge Carpizo, *El Presidencialismo Mexicano* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 2002) pp.152–3; Omar Guerrero, *Historia de La Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores* (Mexico: SRE, 1993) pp.362–5.

²⁰³ Arturo Sánchez, 'El Estado y Los Militares En Los Años Ochenta', in *El Nuevo Estado Mexicano*, ed. by Jorge Alonso, Alberto Aziz, and Jaime Tamayo (Mexico: CIESAS, 1992) pp.95–7; Adolfo Aguilar, 'Las Relaciones Cívico-Militares En México', in *Los Militares y La Democracia: El Futuro de Las Relaciones Cívico-Militares En América Latina*, ed. by Louis Goodman, Johanna Mendelson, and Juan Rial (Montevideo: SAP, 1990) pp.192–3,320.

²⁰⁴ Camp, *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico* pp.32–3; Caesar Sereseres, 'The Mexican Military Looks South', in *The Modern Mexican Military: A Reassessment*, ed. by David Ronfeld (California: UCP, 1984) p.212; Edward Williams, 'Mexico's Central American Policy: National Security Considerations', in *Rift and Revolution: The Central American Imbroglia*, ed. by Howard Wiarda (Washington: AEI, 1984) pp.303–28; Stephen Wager, 'Basic Characteristics of the Modern Mexican Military', in *The Modern Mexican Military: A Reassessment*, ed. by David Ronfeld (California: UCP, 1984) p.89.

²⁰⁵ DOF-31-12-2012 Congreso, *Ley Orgánica de La Armada de México* (Mexico: DOF, 2002) art.7; DOF-26-12-1986 Congreso, *Ley Orgánica Del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos* (Mexico: DOF, 1986) art.17.

hoc to the presidential preferences. After the political change of 2000, the reformist impetus of the government of the National Action Party motivated the replacement of both cabinets with the Commission of Order and Respect. The bureaucratic restructuring produced functional ambiguities and power vacuums. Due to the high ineffectiveness y frequent struggles, so the original structure of the specialised cabinets was restored in 2002. It was not until 2005 that the balance between the political forces within the congress allowed the enactment of the *National Security Law*. This act created the National Security Council, but it did not replace the cabinets. The council resembled the structure and functions of the specialised cabinets but did not depend on the president's discretion. The law prevented the council from being modified without congressional approval and forced the president to accountability to the legislators every six months. It also established that the council must meet twice a year and its membership must be permanent. The law granted Congress higher authority in the strategic policy-making process and laid the foundations for integrating a national security system.²⁰⁶ However, as the following chapters will demonstrate, despite the robust bureaucratic framework, strategic decisions continued to depend on the preferences and interests of the president and her/his compact group.

2.2. Strategic approaches

The 1970s were not only marked by the climax of the Cold War, but also by a severe economic crisis. This scenario created the conditions for a nascent elite to come to power. Technocracy drove a change on strategic priorities. In the 1980s, there was be a confrontation within the policy elite between two currents that disagreed on how to approach foreign policy and national security. On the one hand, the nationalist approach prioritised the defence of sovereignty. This isolationist conception was based on neutral and reactive diplomacy, a statist and protectionist economic model, as well as a traditional notion of security. In contrast, the emerging continental vision championed the promotion of economic development. This approach aspired to develop an interdependence relationship with the United States. It was fostered through critical and participatory diplomacy, an open market economy, and a broad concept of security. The following paragraphs examine the origins and foundations of both approaches, as well as their influence in Mexican strategic policy-making. The central argument is that despite the growing predominance of the continentalist

²⁰⁶DOF-26-12-2005 Congreso, Ley de Seguridad Nacional art.12; DOF-11-12-1995 Congreso, Ley General Que Establece Las Bases de Coordinación Del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (Mexico: DOF, 1995) art.12.

vision since the 1980s, the historical nationalism continued to rule cultural reflexes of policy-makers in the background.

2.2.1. Nationalism

Mexican nationalism was founded as powerful symbolic engineering based on Novohispano Creole patriotism aimed at building the idea of a nation independent of Spanish rule and American influence.²⁰⁷ This representation fed the legal, nationalist, and defensive nature of the strategic policy that prevailed from the revolution. Although it is possible to affirm that the origins of this form of nationalism date to the independence text of the *Feelings of the Nation* of 1813, the Carranza doctrine of 1915 can be established as its cornerstone. The principles of international neutrality and non-intervention promoted by President Venustiano Carranza defined Mexico's position after the Great War and the spirit of the *Constitution of 1917*.²⁰⁸ Its ideological validity was extended through the Isidro Fabela doctrine of 1920, the Estrada doctrine of 1930, the Cardenas doctrine of 1938, and the Díaz Ordaz doctrine of 1969.²⁰⁹ After the crisis of the 1970s, the nationalist approach was diluted due to the rise of a new international insertion model. From then on, a tension arose within the policy elite between the historical desire to defend the sovereignty and the growing aspiration to integrate into the global economy.²¹⁰

Diplomat Genaro Estrada promoted nationalist foreign policy since 1930. He fostered a sovereign vision based on the principles of non-intervention and self-determination of peoples. His thesis was influenced by the refusal of the United States to recognise post-revolutionary governments until the repealing of the constitutional articles that affected American interests in Mexico.²¹¹ International law, peaceful conflict resolution, and a close relationship with Latin America were established as the drivers of the nationalism-based Mexican diplomacy.²¹² This policy was an essential strategic instrument. On the diplomatic level, it granted Mexico enough symbolic capital to dissent from the United States in

²⁰⁷ Héctor Aguilar, *La Invención de México Historia y Cultura Política de México 1810-1910* (Mexico: Planeta, 2008) pp.22–3.

²⁰⁸ Josefina Moguel, *Carranza y La Constitución de 1917. Antología Documental* (Mexico: INEHRM, 2016) p.27; Lorenzo Meyer, 'La Marca Del Nacionalismo', in *México y El Mundo*, ed. by Blanca Torres (Mexico: Senado, 2000) p.38.

²⁰⁹ Fernando Carmona and others, *El Milagro Mexicano* (Mexico: Nuestro Tiempo, 1970) pp.156–7.

²¹⁰ Michael Snarr, 'Mexico: Balancing Sovereignty and Interdependence', in *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective. Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior*, ed. by Ryan Beasley and others (Washington: SAGE, 2001) p.308.

²¹¹ Manuel González, *Los Llamados Tratados de Bucareli: México y Los Estados Unidos En Las Convenciones Internacionales de 1923* (Mexico: Fabula, 1939); Genaro Estrada, 'Ley Estrada' (Mexico: SRE, 1930); José Soler, 'La Doctrina Estrada', *Universidad de México*, 1.2 (1930), 41–49.

²¹² Claudia Gamboa and Sandra Valdés, *Lineamientos Constitucionales de La Política Exterior En México* (Mexico: Senado, 2005) pp.29,34.

multilateral forums. On the political level, it allowed the Institutional Revolutionary Party regime to avoid criticism and foreign intervention in the face of the authoritarian and undemocratic character of its governments.²¹³ The Estrada doctrine was not incorporated into the *Constitution of 1917* until 1988, due to fears generated by the change in the country's political-economic model.²¹⁴ Article 89 held the president responsible for

directing foreign policy and agreeing on international treaties, subjecting them to the approval of the Senate. In conducting such policy, the head of the executive branch shall observe the following normative principles: the self-determination of the peoples; non-intervention; the peaceful resolution of disputes; the proscription of the threat or the use of force in international relations; the legal equality of the States; international cooperation for development; and the fight for international peace and security.²¹⁵

The national security policy was the other side of the coin. In the context of the Cold War, security policy was exclusively influenced by a select group of military personnel trained in the United States and officials of the Secretariat of the Interior assigned to the civil intelligence services. The creation of the Federal Security Directorate in 1947, under the tutelage of the Central Intelligence Agency, was part of the Truman doctrine of Soviet containment. Its objective was 'preserving the internal stability of Mexico against all forms of subversion and terrorist threats'.²¹⁶ The American strategy to face the communist threat in Mexico was to incubate a new political category. The implementation of the traditional concept of national security was possible through the creation of the Federal Security Directorate, the infiltration of American agents into the Mexican government, and the indoctrination of the strategic community.²¹⁷ The national security doctrine promoted defence through military counterinsurgency techniques to deal with internal enemies that supported threats such as revolution, anti-capitalism, and nuclear weapons.²¹⁸ The traditional concept of national security privileged the use of force outside the law to meet the demands of the United States. The official discourse was based on the preservation of internal order,

²¹³ Mario Ojeda, *Alcances y Límites de La Política Exterior de México* (Mexico: COLMEX, 2011) 112–22.

²¹⁴ Pellicer, 'Principios Constitucionales de Política Exterior. Mito y Realidad' p.234,238.

²¹⁵ DOF-11-05-1988 Congreso, Constitución Política de Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos art.89.

²¹⁶ DFS, 'Security Reports 1970-1977', *Texas Archival Resources Online*, 2006 <<https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/taro/utlac/00200/lac-00200.html>> [accessed 29 August 2018].

²¹⁷ John Lewis, 'Introducción: La Evolución de La Contención', in *La Contención. Concepto y Política*, ed. by Terry Deibel and John Lewis (Buenos Aires: GEL, 1992) pp.9,17.

²¹⁸ Marcus Raskin, *The Politics of National Security* (New Brunswick: TP, 1979) pp.31–4; DOF-27-07-1973 SEGOB, *Reglamento Interior de La Secretaría de Gobernación* (Mexico: DOF, 1973).

but the political practice was founded in the protection of the Institutional Revolutionary Party regime.²¹⁹

The nationalist strategic policy was the backbone of post-revolutionary governments and the political-economic model of 'shared development' promoted during the 1970s. On the political level, the nationalisation of strategic industries was meant to strengthen the state and drive it towards national self-sufficiency. The concentration of decision-making power in the president and the absence of internal counterweights were crucial to its operation. This condition motivated and facilitated the United States to infiltrate the core of the Mexican policy elite to influence strategic decisions.²²⁰ In the bureaucratic field, a double discourse prevailed. The moments of crisis reflected that Mexico and the United States were formal or informal allies, but only for convenience. While the sovereigntist ideology distinguished the official discourse domestically, the discretion of decision-making allowed the Mexican government to cede to American pressure without high political costs.²²¹ In the military domain, the influence of generals in decision-making reinforced the authoritarian reflexes of the Institutional Revolutionary Party politicians.²²² The adoption of the national security doctrine based on the American mentality of the Cold War promoted an anti-communist sentiment that encouraged the practice of political persecution.²²³ The use of force became a recurring resource to preserve internal order, a situation that normalised the deployment of soldiers to perform police tasks.²²⁴

This section has demonstrated that the nationalist strategic policy was based on a defensive approach and oriented to soft-balancing strategies. It reflected the desire of the policy elite to counteract the influence of the United States to preserve its relative independence in political and economic matters.²²⁵ After the revolution, the nationalist project aspired to reaffirm the identity and sovereignty of Mexico through a foreign policy that endowed it

²¹⁹ Jorge Sierra, *El Enemigo Interno: Contrainsurgencia y Fuerzas Armadas En México* (Mexico: PyV, 2003) pp.244–5; Sergio Aguayo, 1968. *Los Archivos de La Violencia* (Mexico: Grijalbo, 1998) pp.95–9; US Army, *Mexico: A Country Study*, ed. by Tim Merrill and Ramón Miró (Washington: GPO, 1997) p.281.

²²⁰ Jefferson Morley and Michael Scott, *Our Man in Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA* (KC: UPK, 2008) pp.106-10; Jefferson Morley, 'The National Security Archive', *LITEMPO: The CIA's Eyes on Tlatelolco. CIA Spy Operations in Mexico*, 2006 <<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB204/index.htm#documents>> [accessed 29 August 2018].

²²¹ Lorenzo Meyer, 'Estados Unidos y La Evolución Del Nacionalismo Defensivo Mexicano', *Foro Internacional*, 46.3 (2006), 421–64 pp.463–4.

²²² Camp, *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico* pp.86–93; Phyllis Walker, 'The Modern Mexican Military: Political Influence and Institutional Interests in the 1980s' (American University, 1987) p.76; Olga Pellicer, 'National Security Concerns in Mexico', in *U.S.-Mexico Relations: Economic and Social Aspects*, ed. by Clark Reynolds and Carlos Tello (Stanford: SUP, 1983) p.187.

²²³ Martin Needier, *Politics and Society in Mexico* (Albuquerque: UNMP, 1971) p.66; SEDENA, 'Manual de Operaciones En Campaña' (Mexico: EMDN, 1969) pp.5–7.

²²⁴ Guillermo Boils, 'Fuerzas Armadas y Armamentismo En México', *Nueva Política*, 2.Apr-Sep (1977) p.357.

²²⁵ Ojeda, *Alcances y Límites de La Política Exterior de México* p.121.

with enough symbolic capital to dissent from the United States. However, the context of the Cold War drove the policy elite to adopt a traditional national security approach, since Mexico's political stability was linked to the American security system.²²⁶ The pressure of the United States on Mexico increased progressively during the second half of the twentieth century. The Mexican elite gave in to American demands in the face of the need for an understanding that diminished the impact of the economic slowdown and restored the political confidence lost after diplomatic disagreements on Cuban and Central American issues in the 1970s.²²⁷ Defensive nationalism privileged an isolationist strategy of self-denial to preserve relative independence. This strategic position allowed Mexico to diversify its supply of weapons and equipment for the development of military capabilities. It also enabled the Mexican elite to have autonomy in deciding on cooperation with the American government on international security.²²⁸ The geographical proximity to the United States, the power asymmetry in the bilateral relationship, the emergence of shared political-economic interests, and the limited strategic options of Mexico were some factors that diluted the nationalist approach and facilitated the rise of a continentalist vision since the 1980s.

2.2.2. Continentalism

Continentalism is conceived as the Mexican policy elite's aspiration to adopt Western values and integrate the country into the political-economic project of North America. Its main aim is to enjoy the benefits of being a partner of the American superpower in the unipolar international system.²²⁹ The roots of this approach date to the *Porfiriato* (1876-1911), a period dominated by the precepts of the positivist philosophical doctrine of order and progress promoted by an influential political-bureaucratic elite called 'the scientists'.²³⁰ President Porfirio Díaz distinguished himself by his 'harsh nationalism [...] of plebeian and anti-American dye', which 'was diluted in the waters of diplomatic pragmatism and the [...]

²²⁶ Meyer, 'Estados Unidos y La Evolución Del Nacionalismo Defensivo Mexicano' pp.421–2,460–4; Guadalupe González, 'Foreign Policy Strategies in a Globalized World: The Case of Mexico', in *Latin America in the New International System*, ed. by Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach (Boulder: LRP, 2001) pp.153–4; Josefina Vázquez and Lorenzo Meyer, *The United States and Mexico* (Chicago: UCP, 1995) pp.197–8.

²²⁷ Pellicer, 'Principios Constitucionales de Política Exterior. Mito y Realidad' pp.238–9; Snarr p.207.

²²⁸ Gavin O'Toole, *The Reinvention of Mexico: National Ideology in a Neoliberal Era* (Liverpool: LUP, 2010) pp.65–7,111–3; Jorge Domínguez and Rafael Fernández, *The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict* (NY: Routledge, 2001) pp.35–6.

²²⁹ Michael Brescia and John Super, *North America: An Introduction* (Toronto: UTP, 2009) pp.107–8; Eliezer Morales and Consuelo Dávila, *La Nueva Relación de México Con América Del Norte* (Mexico: UNAM, 1994) pp.84–5.

²³⁰ Miguel Frías, 'La Transformación Porfirista Del País Bajo El Estantarte Del Positivismo', *Actas: Revista de Historia*, 2013, 4–15 pp.4–5; César Velázquez, 'Intelectuales y Poder En El Porfiriato : Una Aproximación Al Grupo de Los Científicos, 1892-1911', *Fuentes Humanísticas*, 9.41 (2010), 7–23 pp.12–4; Luis González, *El Liberalismo Triunfante. 1867-1911* (Mexico: SEP, 1977) p.660.

diversification of foreign investments'.²³¹ So that the United States recognised his government, Díaz yielded to American pressures and modified laws to facilitate the flow of foreign capital and the appropriation of national resources. Similar actions were taken under the administration of President Álvaro Obregón. He sought that the United States recognised his government through the signing of the *Bucareli Treaty* in 1923. Intending to preserve American endorsement and keep the foreign investment, Obregón made concessions in agricultural and oil sectors, since the nationalist character of the *Constitution of 1917* affected foreign interests. The *Bucareli Treaty* condensed the ideas of the Obregón doctrine, which boosted economic development at the expense of national sovereignty.²³²

Continentalist foreign policy emerged after the exhaustion of the shared development model.²³³ Since the 1980s, technocratic cabinets adopted the principles of the *Washington Consensus* as a measure to overcome the crisis. The new policy elite broke with the pattern of strategic confrontation with the United States. Within the Mexican elite, the prevailing belief was that economic interdependence would guarantee that the American government would not throw Mexico off the 'cliff'.²³⁴ In other words, the close and deep ties with the United States would be Mexico's economic life insurance. After the political transition of 2000, Secretary of Foreign Relations Jorge Castañeda formalised this policy. He pointed out that the Estrada doctrine was 'the result of the altruistic and noble desire to achieve the constant application of international law', but for the new democratic times, it was obsolete. The Castañeda doctrine aimed to bring Mexico to assume an active role in the defence of democracy. Mexico would be open to external criticism and taking a partial position vis-à-vis other governments based on national values and interests.²³⁵ The opposition accused that this policy responded to American interests and was 'dominated by fear and cowardice. The Castañeda doctrine is very clear: attack the weak and obey the strong'.²³⁶ Whereas Mexico began to become distanced from Latin America, the *North American Free Trade Agreement*

²³¹ Frías pp.10–1; Héctor Aguilar, *La Invención de México Historia y Cultura Política de México 1810-1910* p.20.

²³² Pablo Serrano, *Los Tratados de Bucareli y La Rebelión Delahuertista* (Mexico: INEHRM, 2012); General Claims Commission, 'Collection Relating to the General Claims Commission', *Texas Archival Resources Online*, 1917 <<https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/taro/utlac/00024/lac-00024.html#series2>> [accessed 30 August 2018].

²³³ Héctor Aguilar, *La Invención de México Historia y Cultura Política de México 1810-1910* pp.23–4.

²³⁴ Carlos Rico, *Fundamentos y Prioridades de La Política Exterior de México* (Mexico: COLMEX, 1986) pp.59–73.

²³⁵ Jorge Castañeda, 'Introducción', in *México y La Revolución Cubana*, ed. by Olga Pellicer (Mexico: COLMEX, 1972) p.8.

²³⁶ Redacción, 'Vence La "Doctrina Castañeda": Batres', *Proceso* (Mexico, April 2002).

of 1994 and the *Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America* of 2005 confirmed that the new direction of the Mexican foreign policy pointed towards regional integration.²³⁷

The ideas of collective security date back to the Pan American doctrine of President Manuel Ávila in 1940 and the Continental doctrine of his Secretary of Foreign Relations Ezequiel Padilla in 1941. Both backed the adoption of the Monroe doctrine in Latin America, supported hemispheric defence, and encouraged cooperation with the United States within the framework of the Good Neighbour policy.²³⁸ It was not until after the 2000 political change that regional security ideas from a broad approach gained importance within Mexican policy elite. The multidimensional concept of national security promoted in the Organisation of American States was adopted in 2003 as a platform to reform the national security framework inherited by the Institutional Revolutionary Party regime. This approach established

that the threats, concerns and other security challenges of the hemisphere are of diverse nature and multidimensional scope and that the traditional concept and approaches should be widened to encompass new and non-traditional threats that include political, economic, social, health and environmental aspects.²³⁹

The process of transition from the traditional to the multidimensional concept produced inconsistencies in the strategic positioning of Mexico. The policy elite was willing to make international commitments symbolically to be considered as a credible player in multilateral forums. However, the elite shunned responsibilities that they interpreted as a violation of the relative independence that Mexico had forged through discourse based on international law.²⁴⁰

The continentalist strategic policy was the axis of the neoliberal model. The neoliberal doctrine, also referred to as ‘neoporfism’ in the nationalist conception, recovered the positivist precepts that guided the Díaz government to establish an ‘elite and surrendered

²³⁷ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, ‘Power and Interdependence Revisited’, *International Organization*, 4, Autumn.41 (1987), 725–53.

²³⁸ SRE, *Cancilleres de México* (Mexico: SRE, 2009) pp.301–10; Ezequiel Padilla, *El Hombre Libre de América: Un Augurio Para La Postguerra* (Mexico: Nuevo Mundo, 1943) pp.45–6.

²³⁹ AG/DEC.27(XXXII-O/02) OAS, ‘Declaración de Bridgetown: Enfoque Multidimensional de La Seguridad Hemisférica’ (Bridgetown: OAS, 2002); OEA/Ser.K/XXXVIII OAS, ‘Declaración Sobre Seguridad En Las Américas’ (Mexico: OAS, 2003).

²⁴⁰ Juan Soriano, *Cultura Estratégica y Relaciones Internacionales: Brasil y México En La Seguridad Interamericana* (Madrid: UNED, 2012) pp.244–6.

economic policy'.²⁴¹ In the political sphere, the practice of privatisation was the mechanism to minimise state participation in an economy that was beginning to open up. The weakening of the state allowed political power to gradually be subject to the interests of economic agents, mainly foreigners.²⁴² In the bureaucratic domain, the process of dismantling the nationalist regime required the reconstruction of a technocratic machine that aspired to maximise administrative efficiency. The decentralisation of power, the adoption of managerial methods, and the creation of institutions inspired by American models were recurring practices that reflected the reformist impulses of the policy elite. The *National Security Law* that gave rise to the robust national security system was the means to institutionalise the broad concept of national security.²⁴³ On the military level, the hyper-securitisation process allowed a wide range of public administration actors to be involved in the formulation and implementation of strategic policy. However, contrary to the aspiration to limit the use of force, the incorporation of new threats to the national security agenda diversified the intervention of the military and legitimised their participation in public safety activities.²⁴⁴

This section has demonstrated that the continentalist strategic policy was based on a cooperative approach oriented to soft-bandwagoning strategies.²⁴⁵ Since 1982, the policy elite broke with the traditional conception of sovereignty. The policy-makers conceived it as a differentiator and fragmentary element of national communities. Sovereignty was an obstacle to development. In their attempts to project Mexico as a modern country and ally of the Western powers, the technocratic elite began to adopt doctrines and articulate speeches that symbolically reflected their commitment to democracy, free market, human rights, and international security.²⁴⁶ Soft-bandwagoning continentalism gained strength since the 1990s. It was characterised by the role of subordination that Mexico played in its asymmetrical bilateral relationship with the United States. To develop an interdependence relationship with the United States, Mexico gave its strategic industries and services to foreign corporations, attached the development of military capabilities to the regional security agenda, privileged the acquisition of American military weapons and equipment, cooperated

²⁴¹ Andrés López, *Neoporfirismo. Hoy Como Ayer* (Mexico: PRH, 2014) chap.Introducción.

²⁴² Gerardo Otero, 'Globalismo Neoliberal, Estatismo y Sociedad Civil: Dos Ciclos Del Doble Movimiento Polanyiano En México', in *Mexico En Transición: Globalismo Neoliberal, Estado y Sociedad Civil*, ed. by Gerardo Otero (Mexico: Porrúa, 2006) pp.13–5.

²⁴³ DOF-31-01-2005 Congreso, Ley de Seguridad Nacional.

²⁴⁴ Marcos Moloeznik and María Suárez, 'El Proceso de Militarización de La Seguridad Pública En México. 2006–2010', *Frontera Norte*, 24.48 (2012), 121–44.

²⁴⁵ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* pp.139,162–3; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* p.126–7; Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago: UCP, 1942) p.136.

²⁴⁶ Curzio, *La Seguridad Nacional de México y La Relación Con Estados Unidos* pp.60–1.

in matters of regional security, and tolerated unilateral actions in the bilateral relationship.²⁴⁷ Both in the approach of defensive nationalism and soft-bandwagoning continentalism, Mexico's strategic policy was restricted to building alliances with American rivals, to establishing a foreign policy that undermined regional security, and it could not develop military capabilities that could threaten the United States' stability. The Mexican strategic policy of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries describes the process of transition from a soft-balancing strategy of self-denial that distinguished defensive nationalism, to a soft-bandwagoning strategy of subordination that characterised continentalism.

Conclusion

This description of the social and cultural context in which Mexico's foreign and security policy was formulated from 1988 to 2012 makes it possible to elucidate its origins and evolution, especially since the economic crisis of the late 1970s. First, the institutional source of Mexican strategic policy underwent a deep transformation. The pervasive force exerted by the growing neoliberal ideology modified the social background, formal education, and daily practices of politicians, bureaucrats, and generals, as well as their subjective understandings about the conditions of the international environment. Knowledge in economics, managerial skills, and technocratic impulses became the primary inputs of the new institutional culture and cultural reflexes developed by the policy elite. Second, the core ideological source of Mexico's strategic policy entered a phase of decline. The need to adapt the country to the emerging American-built neoliberal international order motivated decision-makers to modify the parameters for all strategies of national security. Nationalism gradually lost its status as practical logic within the policy elite to be replaced by the continentalist strategic approach, which provided more convenient resources to interact with the nascent unipolar structural environment, particularly with the United States. The review of the sources of Mexico's strategic policy validates the argument that the sociocultural context was a fundamental factor in shaping how Mexican policy-makers responded to the profound transformations of the domestic and international environments during the period of the adoption and consolidation of neoliberalism in Mexico.

The contribution of this chapter rests in the description of the sociocultural context in which the Mexican strategic policy was formulated between the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. The review of the institutional and ideational sources that nurtured foreign and security policy has been the guiding thread of this text. This work has validated that much

²⁴⁷ Domínguez and Fernández pp.35–7.

of the existing literature has addressed the composition of power elites, the characteristics of foreign policy, and the evolution of national security in Mexico as isolated topics and from a structuralist perspective. In the integration of these elements that compose the Mexican strategic culture and in their comprehensive study from a constructivist-structuralist approach lies the contribution of this chapter to the valuable findings and reflections provided by academics such as Roderic Camp, Ana Covarrubias, Olga Pellicer, and Leonardo Curzio.²⁴⁸ The results of this chapter are essential to reconstruct the dispositional logic of the political elite and construct the positional logic of the strategic policy-making field in the next two chapters. These aspects are vital to understanding the practical logic that guided the evolution of foreign and security policy. Finally, it should be noted that this analysis of the specific socio-historical context in which the ideas that fuelled the strategic policy emerged allows us, in chapters three and four, to properly understand the effects of the social imaginary of the policy actors on the strategic decisions that guided Mexico's behaviour throughout the neoliberal era.

²⁴⁸ Pellicer, 'Principios Constitucionales de Política Exterior. Mito y Realidad'; Covarrubias, 'El Reacomodo de México En Una América Latina Cambiante: De La Euforia Democrática a La Introversión'; Covarrubias, 'Mexico's Foreign Policy under the Partido Acción Nacional: Promoting Democracy, Human Rights, and Interests'; Curzio, *La Seguridad Nacional de México y La Relación Con Estados Unidos*; Curzio, *La Seguridad México-Estados Unidos: Una Oportunidad Para Coincidir*; Pellicer, *Mexico: A Reluctant Middle Power?*; Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century*; Camp, *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico*.

Chapter three. The politics of strategic policy in Mexico, 1988-2000: dismantling defensive nationalism

Born-winners [neoliberal technocrats] lack collective views and cannot have them because they see in the reality a succession of *video-clips*, the fragments linked by minimum units. What do they care, for example, of the millions of Mexicans thrown into the economic vacuum if the macroeconomy is saved? In their code, the macro is the only susceptible to be taken care of and the micro only exists as a point of comparison. And, also, “The Mexican”, as a rule, they find it boring. At times that repertoire is useful (in conversations with foreigners as *local colour*, at parties, at moments where you have to show sensitivity and tenderness), but usually it seems to them a nuisance. Salinas declaims nationalism, but he never finds in it a useful function on the way to the [North American] Free Trade Agreement. If nationalism does not tell them anything, it is because a financial politician sees the small homeland in the nation, and locates the major homeland in the Global Villa, without their cosmopolitanism going very far, for them there is only one other nationality conceivable: the American. And if they are bothered by a cultural origin weighed down by the devotion of the singular, it is because of the question that leads: Who wants to be different?; that is, who wants to be pre-modern?.²⁴⁹

Carlos Monsiváis (Mexican writer), 1995.

²⁴⁹ Carlos Monsiváis, ‘Ya No Un Semidios, Sino Un Funcionario. El Ocaso Del Presidencialismo’, *Revista de La Universidad de México*, July.534–535 (1995), 15–21 pp.15–6.

Introduction

The decade before 1982 was distinguished by the dramatic increase in political tensions and economic instability worldwide. The effects of the Cold War globally and the ravages of the debt crisis in Latin America amplified the issue of national security in the official discourse and public discussion. From the 1980s, two currents of thought were established as the main ideological inputs of the political conceptions advocated addressing diplomatic, economic, and security issues in Mexico. Nationalism and continentalism provided contrasting visions of national security and influenced the strategic policy-making process to differing extents. From the sociocultural context described in the previous chapter, the following paragraphs examine the role played by these two historically specific regimes of knowledge in the evolution of Mexican strategic policy from 1988 to 2000. This study pays special attention to the habitus of the policy elite, which was dominated by the orthodox technocracy of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, and to the international, domestic, and bureaucratic spheres that constituted the field of formulation of Mexico's strategic policy. How politicians, bureaucrats, and military interacted with the broad structural environment throughout the 1990s demonstrates that the nationalist approach underwent a deep process of dismantling in which the design of soft-balancing strategies to the hegemony of the United States lost relevance, as they were incompatible with the norms and rules of the nascent American-built neoliberal international order.

The central argument of this chapter is that the practical logic based on the nationalist strategic conception had less and less dominance over the construction of Mexico's international identity, the institutional culture of the Mexican government, and the cultural reflexes of the policy elite during the period of adoption of neoliberalism. This logic came under pressure at the late 1970s, as continentalist notions and neoliberal precepts gained popularity, especially in the political and bureaucratic spheres. It is possible to detect the influence of these ideas on the political prescriptions of several key actors since the Miguel de la Madrid government began in 1982. However, the nationalist approach did not lose its status as practical logic until the National Action Party came to power in December 2000. The main conclusion is that only the nationalist approach could claim the status of practical logic of the Mexican policy elite in the decade before the first political change by democratic means in the history of Mexico. This work makes two main contributions. The first is that it provides an analysis from a different perspective to the structuralist approach that

predominates in the literature.²⁵⁰ The practice-centred approach deployed in this study allows us to understand how the interaction between the subjective understandings of the policy elite and the structures of power modified the parameters for the design of national security strategies. The second contribution is that it develops an argument rarely recognised in the literature on the Mexican case.²⁵¹ This work shows that the decline of nationalism generated political spaces that allowed continentalist security doctrines to play an increasingly influential role in the definition of international identity and the formulation of strategic policy. Within the framework of this dissertation, this chapter fulfils the function of evaluating the effects of the social imaginary of the political actors on the strategic decisions that shaped the behaviour of Mexico during the advent of neoliberalism.

The following chapter reviews in four sections the cultural dynamics that constituted the strategic policy-making process of Mexico during the governments of the Institutional Revolutionary Party before the political transition of 2000. The first presents a brief review of the central aspects of the nationalist construction of Mexico's international identity that prevailed during the first half of the twentieth century and in the 1970s. This section also approaches the process of dismantling defensive nationalism that began a decade later. Part 3.2 examines the predispositions that shaped the habitus of the policy elite to understand the role played by the various views on Mexico's international identity in the formulation of foreign and security policy. It also evaluates the role of institutional culture and cultural reflexes of the most influential constituencies in decision-making. The third section maps the configuration of the strategic policy-making field to identify the forces that conditioned the choices of the policy-makers. This section pays special attention to the superposition of the fields that made up the structural environment in which the strategic policy was made. Finally, part 3.4 tracks the interaction between different strategic approaches throughout the administrations of Carlos Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo. This section focuses on the evolution of the dynamic relationship between the objective power structures and the subjective

²⁵⁰ Martínez; César Martínez and Humberto Garza, 'La Geopolítica de México y Sus Efectos En La Seguridad Nacional, 1820-2012', *Foro Internacional*, 53.1 (2013), 57–106; COLMEX, *Los Grandes Problemas de México. (16 Volúmenes)* (Mexico: COLMEX, 2010); Abelardo Rodríguez, 'Vicisitudes de La Política Exterior y La Seguridad Nacional En México y La Relación Con Estados Unidos Al Inicio Del Siglo XXI', *Revista Enfoques*, VI.8 (2008), 147–72; Juan Sandoval, 'Militarización, Seguridad Nacional, Seguridad Pública En México', *Espiral*, VI.18 (2000), 183–222; Pellicer, 'National Security Concerns in Mexico'.

²⁵¹ Héctor Aguilar, *La Invención de México Historia y Cultura Política de México 1810-1910*; Meyer, 'Estados Unidos y La Evolución Del Nacionalismo Defensivo Mexicano'; Sarah Babb, 'Del Nacionalismo Al Neoliberalismo: El Ascenso de Los Nuevos Money Doctors En México', in *Políticas de Economía, Ambiente y Sociedad En Tiempos de Globalización*, ed. by Daniel Mato (Caracas: UCV, 2005); Babb, *Proyecto: México. Los Economistas Del Nacionalismo Al Neoliberalismo*; Héctor Aguilar, 'La Invención de México. Notas Sobre Nacionalismo e Identidad Nacional', *Estudios Públicos*, 55.Winter (1994), 5–29; Roger Bartra, 'La Crisis Del Nacionalismo En México', *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 51.3 (1989), 191–220.

understandings of the decision-makers that established the parameters for national security strategies since the administration of President Miguel de la Madrid.

3.1. Construction of Mexico's international identity: nationalism

For much of the twentieth century, the conviction to consolidate Mexico as a sovereign nation free of the former Spanish dominance and independent of the growing American influence prevailed in the Mexican security establishment. The defensive nationalism that emerged from the Mexican revolution and fed the *Constitution of 1917* positioned itself as the core element that shaped the social imagination of policy-makers. The potent symbolic engineering inherited by the Creole patriotism of the early nineteenth century established the ideological foundations that defined what was possible and what was unthinkable in matters of foreign policy and national security.²⁵² Until 1946, the nationalist vision promoted by the presidents of military origin of the Institutional Revolutionary Party had the preservation of sovereignty, safeguarding of independence, and defence of the territory as strategic objectives. These priorities justified the diplomatic confrontation with the United States in international forums, the political closeness with Latin America, and the implementation of a protectionist economic policy.²⁵³ Nevertheless, it also set the limits of the strategic choices of decision-makers. The policy elite was aware of Mexico's weakness to exercise a hard-balancing to American power, so it was unthinkable that diplomatic tensions would escalate to the military domain. The attachment of Mexican diplomacy to international law gave Mexico the 'right to dissent' from the superpower without the risk of conflict.²⁵⁴ The legal, nationalist, and defensive nature of the Mexican strategic policy provided room for Mexico to manoeuvre in the international arena. This trend reflected the construction of Mexico's international identity as that of a sovereign nation attached to the principles of international law, but one that did not wish to make significant commitments to preserving the world order. It also revealed that Mexico assumed the structural position of emerging middle power with limited interests abroad, inclined to a soft-balancing strategy, and aimed at isolationism

²⁵² Meyer, 'Estados Unidos y La Evolución Del Nacionalismo Defensivo Mexicano' pp.422–7; Héctor Aguilar, 'La Invención de México. Notas Sobre Nacionalismo e Identidad Nacional' pp.6–9.

²⁵³ Miguel Wionczek, *El Nacionalismo Mexicano y La Inversión Extranjera* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1977) pp.85–8; Bernardo Sepúlveda and Antonio Chumacero, *La Inversión Extranjera En México* (Mexico: FCE, 1973) pp.51–65.

²⁵⁴ Pellicer, 'Principios Constitucionales de Política Exterior. Mito y Realidad' p.234; Ojeda, *Alcances y Límites de La Política Exterior de México* pp.112–22.

and self-denial to preserve its relative independence from the only credible source of threat to its security: United States.²⁵⁵

The dismantling of defensive nationalism is understood as the gradual weakening and replacement of the dominant approach on Mexican strategic policy. This process occurred in parallel to the decline of the political-economic model of ‘shared development’ promoted by Presidents Luis Echeverría and José López in the 1970s.²⁵⁶ This model was distinguished by its sovereigntist and populist nature, as well as by recovering distinctive features of the nationalist government of President Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s. The political alliance with labour sectors, the nationalisation of the banking system, the strategic relevance of the national oil industry, and the diplomatic differences with the United States over the Central American conflict were some signs that defensive nationalism had regained its status as practical logic in the policy elite.²⁵⁷ The fundamental purpose was to return to the revolutionary principles of progressive and nationalist policy rescinded since the 1940s. Their nullification was a result of the support provided by President Miguel Alemán, the first of civilian origin, to a vision of economic developmentalism based on capitalist liberalism and the assimilation of American hegemony.²⁵⁸ However, the depletion of the shared development model became evident between 1976 and 1982. Domestic conditions generated by the drastic decline in oil prices, the failure of the economic model based on the internal market, and the aggressive foreign policy of the American President Ronald Reagan influenced the emergence of a new policy elite willing to build a development-based strategic approach oriented to the cooperation with the United States, the open free-market economy, and a broad security completion.²⁵⁹ Despite the gradual dominance of the soft-bandwagoning continental strategic vision in the 1990s, ideas and practices of defensive nationalism remained in the background within the policy elite.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁵ For a more detailed review of the defensive nationalism strategic approach, see section 2.2.1. *Nationalism* of chapter two of this thesis: *The Sources of Mexican Strategic Policy*.

²⁵⁶ Monserrat Huerta and María Chávez, ‘Tres Modelos de Política Económica En México Durante Los Últimos Sesenta Años’, *Análisis Económico*, XVIII.37 (2003), 55–80 pp.63–5; IILSEN, *Principios Históricos de La Política Exterior Mexicana* (Mexico: Senado, 2002) pp.43–50.

²⁵⁷ René Herrera and Mario Ojeda, *La Política de México Hacia Centroamérica, 1979-1982* (Mexico: COLMEX, 1983) pp.65,94,111; Antonio Yunez-Naude, ‘Los Dilemas Del Desarrollo Compartido. La Política Económica de 1971 a 1976’, *Trimestre Económico*, 48.190 (1981), 273–302 pp.282–6.

²⁵⁸ Tzvi Mediv, ‘La Mexicanidad Política y Filosófica En El Sexenio de Miguel Alemán, 1946-1952’, *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y El Caribe*, 1.January-June (1999), 5–22 pp.6–9; Luis Medina, *Historia de La Revolución Mexicana: Periodo 1940-1952. Del Cardenismo Al Avilacamachismo* (Mexico: COLMEX, 1978) pp.134,359,398.

²⁵⁹ Otero pp.9–27; Constantine Menges, ‘Los Estados Unidos y América Latina En Los Ochentas’, *Foro Internacional*, 22.4 (1982), 425–46 pp.441–5.

²⁶⁰ For a more detailed review of the building process of soft-bandwagoning continentalism, see section 4.1. *Construction of Mexico’s International Identity: Continentalism* in chapter four of this thesis: *The Politics of the Strategic Policy-Making in México, 2000-2012: Building Soft- Bandwagoning Continentalism*.

3.2. Habitus of policy elite: the homogeneous orthodox technocracy

The concept of habitus allows us to examine the role played by the various constructions on the international identity of Mexico during the strategic policy-making process. It also helps us to understand the relevance of institutional culture during the dismantling stage of nationalism and the technical reflexes of the most influential politicians and bureaucrats in strategic decision-making. The policy elite of the Institutional Revolutionary Party of the 1980s and 1990s distinguished themselves by being relatively homogeneous in political and ideological terms. The technocrats were the guild that possessed the most appropriate cultural sense to adapt to the structural environment of the final years of the Cold War. The distinctive formal training and shared cultural practices among the new generation of politicians and bureaucrats explain their preponderance. The core of the cabinets of Salinas and Zedillo illustrate the primacy of neoliberal technocracy that emerged from 1982. In the Salinas cabinet, the ‘compact group’ was made up of bureaucrats inexperienced in politics. The influence of its members is attributed to the fact that they were orthodox adepts of the neoliberal economic doctrine acquired during their postgraduate studies at elite American universities. The incorporation of actors with this profile was the product of a tendency forged since the 1960s by an influential clique of intellectuals and economists from the Bank of Mexico led by Miguel Mancera, Leopoldo Solís, and Gustavo Petricioli.²⁶¹ The Zedillo cabinet gave continuity to this type of officials but from a more moderate stance. The ‘economic group’ was also forged by the elite of the Bank of Mexico. Its influence was the result of the formative, professional, and ideological affinities of its members with the president. This first circle was a derivation of the Salinas cabinet, as its most relevant members were *protégées* of former Secretaries of Finance Pedro Aspe and David Ibarra.²⁶² Throughout these two administrations, military and diplomatic elites lost relevance in strategic decision-making. The predominance acquired by politicians and bureaucrats who were members of the neoliberal technocracy is attributed to two main factors.²⁶³

The first reason is that, in the political-economic environment produced by the crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s, it became less and less feasible to prolong the validity of

²⁶¹ Jenaro Villamil and Alejandro Ramos, *Sucesión Pactada: La Ingeniería Política Del Salinismo* (Mexico: PyV, 1993) pp.6–16; Camp, ‘Camarillas in Mexican Politics: The Case of the Salinas Cabinet’ pp.97–102.

²⁶² Roderic Camp, ‘The Zedillo Legacy in Mexico’, *Policy Paper on the Americas*, VII.6 (1996), 1–15 pp.7–10; Roderic Camp, ‘El Gabinete de Zedillo: ¿Continuidad, Cambios o Revolución?’, *Este País* (Mexico, June 1995) pp.48–50.

²⁶³ For a more detailed review of the composition of the Mexican policy elite, see *Appendix A: Mexican Policy Elite, 1988-2000*; and section 2.1. *Social Dynamics of Strategic Policy-Making* of chapter two of this thesis: *The Sources of Mexican Strategic Policy*.

nationalist policies that put the country's stability at risk and hindered its insertion to the emerging global order. A distinctive skill of the new generation of politicians and bureaucrats was to support their policy choices with positivist arguments and specialised knowledge. The technical capacity, academic orthodoxy, and apolitical disposition of technocrats influenced their ability to solve economic difficulties, political problems, and undertake diplomatic negotiations, maximising benefits and avoiding confrontations.²⁶⁴ The influence of diplomats and military, groups historically identified with defensive nationalism, diminished as the Central American crisis and tensions with the United States eased in the late 1970s, and matters relating to macroeconomics and public finances took precedence in the early 1980s. In the case of diplomats, the gradual marginalisation of Mexican foreign service personnel in decision-making progressed since the 1970s. This situation weakened the pillars of Mexican diplomacy based on the principles of the Estrada doctrine. The position of secretary of foreign relations began to be occupied by politicians with limited diplomatic training or by technicians with extensive knowledge in economics. By the end of the 1980s, foreign policy priorities were in the process of change, since the reconfiguration of the world system in the last years of the Cold War positioned the economy as the primary medium of interaction with the world.²⁶⁵ In the case of the military, despite the formalisation of their participation in the formulation of foreign and security policy, they were gradually relegated to address domestic matters. Notwithstanding the growing military presence in the cabinets, resistance prevailed within the military elite regarding their involvement and commitment in the formulation of national security policy. The military elite was the least trained guild to contribute to policy-making in a context where military force was increasingly discarded as a legitimate foreign policy instrument.²⁶⁶ This practical perspective explains the rise of technocrats to a position of dominance in the establishment of a new political-economic paradigm and the weakening of the influence of diplomats and military in the formulation of strategic policy in the 1990s.

The second reason for the rise of the members of the neoliberal technocracy refers to the ability of the *técnico*-politician to adapt to the emerging global order of the post-Cold War. Their adaptability is attributed to the fact that they received privileged training in economics

²⁶⁴ Daniel Levy and Kathleen Bruhn, *Mexico. The Struggle for Democratic Development* (California: UCP, 2006) pp.128–31; Roderic Camp, 'The Political Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the Political System', *Latin American Research Review*, 20.1 (1985), 97–118 pp.97–9.

²⁶⁵ Carlos Levy, 'Crisis y Retos de La Política Exterior de México: 2006-2012', *Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales*, LI.205 (2009), 119–41 pp.121–2; Lucero Saldaña, 'La Crisis de La Política Exterior', *Proceso* (Mexico, 2005) pp.7-8.

²⁶⁶ Gochman pp.246–8; Martin Andersen, 'Civil- Military Relations and Internal Security in Mexico: The Undone Reform', in *The Challenge of Institutional Reform in Mexico*, ed. by Riordan Roett (London: LRP, 1995) pp.165–8.

as part of their intellectual training. This situation reflected that instrumental rationality was the central component of the political culture that would predominate during the neoliberal period and configure a new hierarchical, administrative, and technocratic logic in the policy elite. While the number of officials educated in law began to decline since 1970, the presence and influence of economists in the federal government reached its highest point in 1994.²⁶⁷ The proportion of renowned Mexican politicians who belonged to the financial sphere is significant. More than a third of the actors who held a cabinet position from 1988 to 2000 had training or experience in some economic discipline, including the two presidents and three out of five foreign relations secretaries.²⁶⁸ Specialised training and professional practice in economic matters was a trend that began in 1982, especially in the bureaucratic elite. Postgraduates in macroeconomics and financial economics became the distinctive element of the curricula of officials graduated from American Ivy-League universities, which had incubated the neoliberal doctrine promoted by academics such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. Also having professional experience in economic agencies such as the Secretariat of Finance, Bank of Mexico, World Bank, or International Monetary Fund was an essential aspect of belonging to the nascent political elite.²⁶⁹ The socio-cultural background of the bureaucratic leaders who emigrated to the political domain facilitated their adaptation to the national and international political-economic crisis scenario to place commercial diplomacy, collective security, and regional multilateralism at the centre of Mexican strategic policy.

The crisis of 1982 generated favourable conditions for technocrats to assume power with their discourse of rescuing what nationalist politicians could not save. The result was the beginning of a process of dismantling defensive nationalism through the profound reorientation of the Mexican political-economic model. The strategic policy went from prioritising the defence of sovereignty through strategic confrontation with the United States and diplomacy attached to international law, towards the promotion of development through a relationship of dependence with the superpower and diplomacy based on free trade. The international identity of Mexico was in transformation: the country moved from defensive, self-denying, and legal nationalism based on the oil industry to open, subordinate, and

²⁶⁷ Sebastian Garrido pp.313–6; Camp, *Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation* pp.125–7.

²⁶⁸ Gochman pp.207–8; Merilee Grindle and Edward Mason, *Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa* (NY: CUP, 1996)113–20.

²⁶⁹ Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century* pp.133–6; Eduardo Torres pp.70–3.

economist continentalism based on a close relationship with the United States.²⁷⁰ Significantly, this transition altered the distribution of decision-making power and influence in the strategic policy-making process. The secretaries of defence, navy, and foreign relations gradually lost sway due to their historical affinity with the nationalist strategic approach distinguished by their reactive assessment of the international environment. On the other hand, the secretaries of the economic portfolio improved their position because of their socio-cultural background and formal training allowed them to adapt to the reconfiguration of national and international environment structures. These attributes enabled them to establish a new strategic conception that combined some elements of legal diplomacy attached to international law with a greater emphasis on free trade and regional cooperation.²⁷¹


Coupling and accommodating on the side of American hegemony in the nascent unipolar order was established as the main objective of the new strategic policy. This aim was achieved by integrating Mexico into the emerging system of global neoliberalism to reflect its adherence to the new rules established by the United States. The cultural reflexes of the diplomatic and military establishments generated opposition to this process. However, the resistance of both elites was limited. In the diplomatic elite, their understanding of the conditions of the structural environment, their knowledge about the legitimising power required to get involved in global economic dynamics, and their institutional reflexes towards mediation facilitated their alignment with the new policy. In the military elite, despite constant frictions with the civil leadership, the ongoing process of cultural change within the armed forces and the predominance of institutional reflexes tending towards the abnegation to presidential decisions diminished their refusal of the change of strategic vision. 1982 marked the end of a period in which the nationalist influence of generals and diplomats was significant in strategic decision-making. 1988 consolidated a new generation of politicians and bureaucrats specialised in economics in power that led Mexico's strategic policy to develop a dependency relationship with the United States, based primarily on regional trade. This change occurred because the habitus of the *técnico*-politician allowed the conception of a strategic approach that was more aligned with the emerging international

²⁷⁰ Juan Olmedo and others, *México: Crisis y Oportunidad. Lecturas Acerca de La Estructura Política, Económica y Social Contemporánea* (Mexico: Pearson, 2006) pp.147–9; Guadalupe González, 'Foreign Policy Strategies in a Globalized World: The Case of Mexico' pp.162–5.

²⁷¹ Guadalupe González, 'México En América Latina. El Dificil Juego Del Equilibrista', *Foreign Affairs En Español*, 7.4 (2007), 31–37 pp.31–7; Pellicer, *Mexico: A Reluctant Middle Power?* pp.2–3.

norms that governed the new unipolar order of the post-Cold War, a central element of the field in which the policy was made.

Figure 3-1. Habitus of the Mexican policy elite, 1988-2000
(Reconstruction of the dispositional logic)



Own elaboration based on Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action* (Stanford: SUP, 1998), p.5. Note: the dotted line indicates probable orientation toward the nationalist or continentalist approaches.

As portrayed in Figure 3-1, the concept of habitus allows us to generate an image about the space of social positions and cultural predispositions that shaped how policy-makers interacted with the broad structural environment to respond to international challenges. The reflexes acquired in the institutions in which the decision-makers operated were decisive in the production of new policy practices and a new strategy to preserve national security.

3.3. Fields of strategic policy-making: international conflict and domestic crisis

The concept of field and the identification of the superposition of several fields allows the evaluation of the external forces that conditioned the decisions of the Mexican policy elite. The structural environment in which Mexican strategic policy was formulated after 1988 was made up of three fields. The first was the field of international relations; the second was Mexico's political, cultural, and social environment; and the third was the inter-institutional context in which the policy-making process was carried out. These three spheres were severely affected by the political-economic crisis of the 1980s and the end of the Cold War.²⁷² Considering the superposition of these three domains allows us to assess the interrelation between them. Although each of these fields operated under its own internal logic, they were not isolated or immune to external pressures. The relevant changes in one field had repercussions in the other two. The strategic policy was formulated as a response to the prevailing conditions in these three fields and simultaneously shaped their continuous reconfiguration. This way of organising and analysing the environment in which the policy evolved provides a framework to integrate the main strategic dilemmas with less understood issues within the policy elite. On the one hand, the bilateral relationship with the United States, the policies of the superpower towards Latin America, the rise of global neoliberalism, and the political-economic crisis of the 1980s. On the other hand, the impact of new practices and discourses in world politics on democratic values, human rights, and a broad concept of security.²⁷³ These practices and speeches had repercussions in the international and domestic fields.

²⁷² Jaime Ros, 'La Crisis Económica: Un Análisis General', in *México Ante La Crisis. El Contexto Internacional y La Crisis Económica*, ed. by Pablo González and Héctor Aguilar (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 2003) pp.135–54; Ilán Bizberg, 'Introducción: Las Relaciones Internacionales Ante El Fin de La Guerra Fría y La Crisis Del Estado-Nación', in *México Ante El Fin de La Guerra Fría*, ed. by Ilán Bizberg (Mexico: COLMEX, 1998) pp.11–8.

²⁷³ Rafael Velázquez, 'Política Exterior y Derechos Humanos En México: Tendencias a Finales Del Siglo XX y Prioridades a Inicios Del XXI', *Revista Del Instituto de Ciencias Jurídicas de Puebla*, 11.40 (2017), 137–57 pp.144–8; Ariadna Estévez, 'Transición a La Democracia y Derechos Humanos En México: La Perdida de Integridad En El Discurso', *Andamios*, 3.6 (2007), 7–32 pp.8–27.

The international relations field was the space for interaction of state and non-state actors. The conditions of this realm in the final years of the Cold War were defined by the redistribution of military power in the international system, the strategic policy of the participating actors, and the norms that redefined the nature of foreign affairs. The first two factors have been extensively addressed in the literature on the strategic behaviour of the middle powers. A decade after the Carsten Holbraad study, a current emerged focused on examining the international norms that shaped the foreign policy practices of the middlepowerhood in the post-Cold War era.²⁷⁴ Traditional security practices based on the use of large-scale military force and alliance politics were discredited, especially those of systemic balancing and revisionism against the order imposed by the American hegemony.²⁷⁵ In contrast, the bandwagoning strategy and multilateralist practices for global governance gained popularity through international organisations that emerged in the 1990s, such as the G-20 and the World Trade Organisation.²⁷⁶ The new approaches to international relations adopted by the middle powers focused issues of the so-called ‘low politics’ such as human rights and environmental protection, elements of niche diplomacy that reinforced the American-built neoliberal international order.²⁷⁷ As a result, new regulatory standards for state behaviour emerged that changed the character of international relations after the end of the Cold War. The core of these new practices of world politics was a greater emphasis on the power of multilateralism to solve international problems and collective responsibility in the preservation of the global order.²⁷⁸ Speeches about multilateralism, democratic values, human rights, economic liberalisation, and collective security created pressure on policy elites, who hardly ignored the new approach to international relations.²⁷⁹

The political, cultural, and social field of Mexico was dominated by the impact of the political-economic crises of 1976 and 1982. The geographical location of Mexico, the position it assumed during the Cold War, and the representation of the crisis and conflict to society reflected that the Mexican strategic vision was different from that of other middle

²⁷⁴ Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*; Holbraad.

²⁷⁵ Efsthopoulos p.77; Holbraad p.206.

²⁷⁶ David Cooper, ‘Somewhere between Great and Small: Disentangling the Conceptual Jumble of Middle, Regional, and “Niche” Powers’, *Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, 14.11 (2013), 23–35 pp.24,971; Neack, ‘Pathways to Power: A Comparative Study of the Foreign Policy Ambitions of Turkey, Brazil, Canada, and Australia’ p.59.

²⁷⁷ Behringer, ‘The Dynamics of Middlepowermanship’ p.21; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* p.21.

²⁷⁸ Laura Neack, *The New Foreign Policy. Complex Interactions, Competing Interests* (Plymouth: R&LP, 2014) pp.183–4; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* pp.19,24.

²⁷⁹ Pellicer, ‘Principios Constitucionales de Política Exterior. Mito y Realidad’ pp.251–2; Andrew Hurrell and others, *Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States*, 1999 pp.5–6.

powers. The result was a series of apparent contradictions within popular opinion and the policy elite. On the one hand, the oil boom and populist governments of the 1970s fuelled a robust patriotic feeling of self-reliance oriented to the conviction that Mexico should exercise its sovereignty by assuming a leadership role in Central America and confronting the United States politically to counteract its influence.²⁸⁰ On the other hand, the economic and social consequences brought about by the gradual deterioration of the import substitution industrialisation model led to businesspeople and political actors to the centre of the Mexican political spectrum. They rejected old diplomatic practices and nationalist policies to replace them with new methods and institutions to avoid the worsening of the crisis and adapt the country to the emerging world order.²⁸¹ This situation was part of a broad trend in international relations, mainly in small and medium powers. Evidence of these contradictions was the rise of the National Action Party in national politics and the rupture in the leadership of the Institutional Revolutionary Party between the new generation of centre-right technocrats and the old centre-left wing of politicians. The political-economic crises exacerbated the tensions that already existed between the nationalism of the liberals and the neoliberalism of the conservatives.²⁸² These contradictions shaped the domestic context in which the strategic policy was made. They combined internal historical trends with external emerging currents to complicate the task of decision-makers to formulate a strategic policy that would guarantee national security and economic development in the country.

The inter-institutional field includes the bureaucratic context in which the strategic policy was formulated. The characteristics of this sphere were the centralisation of power in the president, the influence of the economic team, and the public management reform promoted by international financial organisations.²⁸³ Of the 46 substitutions that took place in the cabinet from 1988 to 2000, two of them stood out. Firstly, the dismissal of the secretary of the navy in 1990 was the first change in leadership in the armed forces in the middle of an

²⁸⁰ José López, 'Nacionalistas vs. Neoliberales', *Nexos*, 260.December (1999), 59–72 pp.59–63; Mónica Toussaint, 'La Política Exterior de México Hacia Centroamerica En La Década de Los Ochenta: Un Balance Ex-Post-Facto', *Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales*, 161.July-September (1995), 109–34 pp.109–11.

²⁸¹ Jeffrey Bortz and Salvador Mendiola, 'El Impacto Social de La Crisis Económica de México', *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 53.1 (1991), 43–69 pp.59–63; Soledad Loaeza, 'Conservar Es Hacer Patria. La Derecha y El Conservadurismo Mexicano En El Siglo XX', *Nexos*, 6.64 (1983), 29–39.

²⁸² Luis Méndez, 'Neoliberalismo y Derechización En México. 1983-2008', *El Cotidiano*, 149.Mayo-June (2008), 5–15; Soledad Loaeza, 'Derecha y Democracia En El Cambio Político Mexicano: 1982-1988', *Foro Internacional*, 30.4 (1990), 631–58.

²⁸³ Alejandro Carrillo and Gildardo Campero, 'La Reforma de La Administración Pública En México', in *Perfil Contemporáneo de La Administración Pública*, ed. by Ricardo Uvalle (Mexico: IAPEM, 2005) pp.123–55; Roderic Camp, *Politics in Mexico: The Decline of Authoritarianism* (London: OUP, 1999) pp.160–2,238.

administration since 1955. Secondly, as of 1988, the position of secretary of foreign relations passed from professional diplomats to be occupied by bureaucrats specialised in economics. It should be noted that in the late 1980s, there were two bureaucratic changes aimed at professionalising the strategic decision-making. The first was the creation of Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy and Specialised Cabinet in National Security. The second was the creation of the Centre for Research and National Security. During the same period, hierarchies within the Mexican foreign service and the armed forces changed gradually. The relative instability generated in the bureaucracy sector in charge of national security was the product of a clash of currents within the secretariats. While nationalist attitudes prevailed among experienced diplomats and orthodox military officers, newly appointed officials aligned themselves with the president's neoliberal vision to preserve privileges.²⁸⁴ This situation contributed to the reorientation of the strategic policy. Since 1982, the secretaries of finance, communications, energy, and commerce; the directors of the Bank of Mexico and Mexican Petroleum; as well as the chief of the presidential staff, were predominant actors in strategic decision-making. The power of the homogeneous economic team derived from the fact that they shared socio-cultural backgrounds, formal training, professional careers, social relations, and ideological preferences with the president. In the case of the national security team, the influence of diplomats is attributed to the fact that they mobilised their cultural capital more effectively than the generals. The expertise of the members of the Mexican foreign service in diplomatic negotiation and international law were fundamental cultural assets that complemented the political practice of technocrats. In contrast, the military's experience in strategic planning and the growing American pressure on the anti-drug campaign relegated them to take care of internal security issues. Also, the symbolic capital of the military was a constant concern that motivated the political elite to limit their participation in emergencies caused by natural disasters, as they felt threatened by their deep nationalism and political potential.²⁸⁵ The symbolic capital of the military was subject to constant wear and tear due to the recurring deployment of troops to carry out public safety tasks that ended in human rights violations. In the late 1980s and during the 1990s, the

²⁸⁴ Raúl Zepeda, 'Democracia, Militares y Política Exterior En México: El Caso de La Ausencia de México Con Efectivos Militares En Operaciones de Mantenimiento de Paz de La ONU', *Foro Internacional*, LVI.225 (2016), 633–56 pp.640–3; José Gallardo, *Always near, Always Far: The Armed Forces in Mexico* (California: Global Exchange, 2000) pp.14–6.

²⁸⁵ Camp, *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico* p.33; Castañeda, 'Mexico at the Brink' p.293.

influence of military and diplomats on strategic policy gradually diminished, while the power of politicians and bureaucrats in decision-making increased.²⁸⁶

Mexico's strategic policy evolved as the cultural practices of the policy elite adapted to the structural conditions prevailing in the three fields. Increasingly, policy choices ceased to favour the defence of sovereignty through traditional strategies such as soft-balancing to American influence. This situation implied the abandonment of policies such as economic protectionism, diplomatic confrontation, and adherence to international law. Since the mid-1980s, the strategic policy aimed at development through a soft-bandwagoning approach founded on economic openness and multilateralism. Various scholars agree that defensive nationalism entered a period of crisis from 1982, but few recognise that it was gradually replaced by a soft-bandwagoning continentalist approach that emerged after the end of the Cold War.²⁸⁷ Although American pressures were crucial in this process, these forces do not fully explain the reasons behind the reaction of the policy-makers. This thesis' practice-centred perspective allows us to assess how the policy elite understood their situation and to recognise that their policy decisions were conditioned by the cultural context in which policy actors were immersed. This consideration reveals that decision-makers were responding to national and international conditions, several of which are not addressed in depth in the literature. The review of the habitus of the policy elite and the fields in which they operated shows that the problem with the nationalist strategic policy was not how the policy-makers adapted to the structural environment of the Cold War. The issue was their inability to adapt to the changes that took place in that environment from the late 1980s and early 1990s. The next section examines the dynamics of Mexican strategic policy before the political change that took place in 2000 taking into consideration the habitus of the policy elite and the field of strategic policy-making illustrated in Figure 3-2.


3.4. Evolution of the strategic policy: from confrontation in Central America to dependency in North America

This exploration of the evolution of Mexico's strategic policy in the 1980s and 1990s reveals a struggle between two contending conceptions: the historical nationalism aspired to preserve its status as practical logic in the policy elite while the nascent continentalism aimed to establish itself as the new predominant approach.

²⁸⁶ For a more detailed review of the architecture of the Mexican bureaucratic machinery, see *Appendix B: Mexican Policy-Making Structure, 1988-2000*; and section 2.1.4. *Policy-Making* of chapter two of this thesis: *The Sources of Mexican Strategic Policy*.

²⁸⁷ Domínguez and Fernández pp.35–7; Bartra pp.195–9.

Figure 3-2. Field of the Mexican strategic policy-making, 1988-2000
(Construction of the positional logic)



Own elaboration based on Bourdieu, Pierre, *The Field of Cultural Production. Essays on Art and Literature* (NY: CUP, 1993), p.49. Note: + = positive pole, implying a dominant position, - = negative pole, implying a dominated position.

The domestic political and cultural context, as well as the global political environment, were equally important in the decisions made about economic, foreign, and security policy. The interaction between the subjective understandings of the new policy elite and the regional power structures established parameters to produce strategies. The central argument is that the development of strategic policy from 1988 to 2000 was founded in a process of dismantling defensive nationalism undertaken by the emerging neoliberal technocracy from 1982. Tracking the interaction between nationalist and continentalist approaches illustrates the rupture of the pattern of strategic confrontation with the United States, the integration into North America, and the consolidation of a regional dependence. The following analysis of the configuration of the national and international political contexts allows us to understand the complex relationship between endogenous and exogenous dynamics that drove the evolution of strategic policy.

3.4.1. Breaking the strategic confrontation pattern, 1982-1988

After the end of the Second World War, Mexico assumed a low-profile isolationist stance in world politics in order to avoid involvement in conflicts during the Cold War. For this reason, the Mexican government abandoned the idea of aspiring for a place in the United Nations Security Council in 1947. Mexico exercised a strategy of defensive soft-balancing to American influence through the practice of diplomacy aligned with international law. Until the late 1970s, foreign policy played a marginal, secondary, and merely defensive role in the internal project; it was a retaining wall against global dynamics. However, the beginning of the Central American conflict in 1979 made evident the mutual geostrategic relevance between Mexico and the region. This situation forced the Mexican government to take a stand and get directly involved.²⁸⁸ The emergence of what some academics define as a proxy war in Central America during the so-called ‘Second Cold War’ configured the geopolitical scenario for Mexico. The regional context produced interests in the south and pressures in the north, which conditioned Mexican strategic behaviour.²⁸⁹ Internally, the 1982 crisis exposed the exhaustion of the shared development model promoted by the most traditionalist faction of the Institutional Revolutionary Party. The newly elected president de la Madrid said: ‘We live in an emergency. [...] We will not abandon ourselves to inertia; the

²⁸⁸ Blanca Torres, ‘De La Guerra Al Mundo Bipolar’, in *México y El Mundo. Historia de Sus Relaciones Exteriores. VII*, ed. by Blanca Torres (Mexico: COLMEX, 2000) p.9; Carlos Rico, ‘Hacia La Globalización’, in *México y El Mundo. Historia de Sus Relaciones Exteriores. VIII*, ed. by Blanca Torres (Mexico: COLMEX, 2000) p.10.

²⁸⁹ Halliday p.7; Olga Pellicer, ‘El Difícil Ejercicio Del Poder Regional’, in *Centroamérica, Futuro y Opciones*, ed. by Olga Pellicer and Richard Fajen (Mexico: FCE, 1983) pp.97–113.

situation is intolerable'.²⁹⁰ The debt crisis and the Central American conflict generated conditions for the arrival of neoliberal technocracy to power and the fundamental reorientation of strategic policy. During the 1980s, three situations reflected the breaking of the pattern of strategic confrontation with the United States, a distinctive practice of defensive nationalism.

The first milestone was the change of focus on Mexico's relations with the United States and Central America. After assuming power in 1982, de la Madrid modified nationalist practices and speeches that fuelled his predecessor's activism in favour of the Central American revolution.²⁹¹ Progressive activism was replaced by a traditional and regional multilateralism that recovered some normative precepts of the old Mexican diplomacy. The purpose was to position Mexico as a mediator, justify disagreements with the United States, and mend the worn ties with the superpower. By 1983, Secretary of Foreign Relations Bernardo Sepúlveda declared that

Mexico has joined its efforts to those of other countries in the region to more effectively achieve the objectives of its foreign policy [...] Mexico's position in relation to the Central American conflict and its active and supportive participation in the Contadora Group derives from the traditional postulates of its foreign policy.²⁹²

The *Contadora Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America of 1984* was the most meaningful initiative through which Mexico promoted diplomatic agreements, retained its regional influence, exercised an active soft-balancing strategy to aggressive American policy, and avoided confrontations with the superpower.²⁹³ By 1985, the stagnation of the peace negotiations in the south and the increase in pressures from the north motivated

²⁹⁰ Miguel Basáñez, *El Pulso de Los Sexenios. 20 Año de Crisis En México* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1999) pp.69–93; Miguel De la Madrid, 'Discurso de Toma de Posesión Como Presidente de México' (Mexico: Presidencia, 1982).

²⁹¹ Raúl Benítez and Ricardo Córdova, 'México-Centroamérica: Percepciones Mutuas y Trayectoria de Las Relaciones (1976-1986)', in *México En Centroamérica. Expediente de Documento Fundamentales (1979-1986)*, ed. by Raúl Benítez and Ricardo Córdova (Mexico: UNAM, 1989) pp.12-8; Mario Ojeda, *El Surgimiento de Una Política Exterior Activa* (Mexico: SEP, 1986) pp.111–23; Herrera and Ojeda pp.31–45.

²⁹² Bernardo Sepúlveda, 'Reflexiones Sobre La Política Exterior de México', in *Política Exterior de México, 1983. Discursos y Documentos*, ed. by SRE (Mexico: SRE, 1984); Bernardo Sepúlveda, 'Comparecencia Ante La H. Cámara de Senadores. Discurso Del Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores Bernardo Sepúlveda', in *Política Exterior de México, 1983. Discursos y Documentos*, ed. by SRE (Mexico: SRE, 1984) p.223.

²⁹³ Carlos Rico, *México y El Mundo: Historia de Sus Relaciones Exteriores. Hacia La Globalización. Tomo IX* (Mexico: Senado, 2000) pp.147–51; Miguel De la Madrid, 'Segundo Informe Del C. Presidente Miguel de la Madrid Al Congreso de La Unión Rendido El 1º de Septiembre de 1984', in *Archivo Histórico Diplomático Mexicano. 20 Años de Política Exterior a Través de Los Informes Presidenciales 1970-1990* (Mexico: SRE, 1990) pp.107–8.

Mexico to move the Central American issue from its strategic agenda.²⁹⁴ World peace, nuclear disarmament, and economic cooperation were issues that allowed the Mexican government to extend its multilateralism without risk of disturbing the relationship with the United States or generating internal problems.²⁹⁵ In this way, a new strategic behaviour was shaped based on an active counterweight and pragmatic diplomacy that sought to reduce confrontations with the United States and claim the regional leadership of Mexico in its role of medium power. Mexico's interests had begun to migrate from Central America to North America.

The disputes with the United States since 1979 were the product of the divergent perceptions of the American and Mexican policy elites on the regional conflict. The American government perceived the presence of the communist threat in Central America, while the Mexican government saw an opportunity to support a revolution against oppression and project itself as a regional leader. The change in foreign policy since 1982 was the response of the new policy elite to a complicated situation. Its objective was to break with the inertia that hindered the country's adaptation to emerging structural conditions. The domestic scenario was defined by the electoral period and the economic crisis. This last factor was especially relevant, as it encouraged conservative, religious, and business groups to attribute the sanctions imposed by the United States to the progressive activism of the 1970s. Fears that this policy would negatively influence the renegotiation of the external debt pressured the new government to abandon nationalist practices and speeches.²⁹⁶ In the external environment, progressive activism lost support from Costa Rica and Venezuela, and a smear campaign was launched in the United States against the Mexican government. Activist policy toward Central America had worn out the bilateral relationship and the crisis had weakened Mexican negotiating capacity. Moreover, the aggressive measures of American President Reagan increased the risk of the conflict spreading to the southern region of Mexico.²⁹⁷ In this context, the formulation of the strategic policy from 1982 to 1988 was

²⁹⁴ Bernardo Sepúlveda, 'México y Centroamérica', *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, 10, January-March (1986), 7-9 p.8; Lorenzo Meyer, '1985: Un Mal Año En Una Época Difícil', in *México-Estados Unidos: 1985*, ed. by Gabriel Székely (Mexico: COLMEX, 1985) pp.15-8.

²⁹⁵ Miguel De la Madrid, 'Tercer Informe Del C. Presidente Miguel de La Madrid Al Congreso de La Unión Rendido El 1º de Septiembre de 1985', in *Archivo Histórico Diplomático Mexicano. 20 Años de Política Exterior a Través de Los Informes Presidenciales 1970-1990*, ed. by SRE (Mexico: SRE, 1990) p.111; Miguel De la Madrid, 'Cuarto Informe Del C. Presidente Miguel de La Madrid Al Congreso de La Unión Rendido El 1º de Septiembre de 1986', in *Archivo Histórico Diplomático Mexicano. 20 Años de Política Exterior a Través de Los Informes Presidenciales 1970-1990*, ed. by SRE (Mexico: SRE, 1990) pp.113-4.

²⁹⁶ Toussaint, 'La Política Exterior de México Hacia Centroamerica En La Década de Los Ochenta: Un Balance Ex-Post-Facto' pp.111-28; Jorge Castañeda, '¿Qué Hacemos En Centroamérica?', in *México: El Futuro En Juego*, ed. by Joaquín Mortiz (Mexico: Planeta, 1987) pp.55-73.

²⁹⁷ Jorge Castañeda and Robert Pastor, *Limits to Friendship. The United States and Mexico* (Mexico: Vintage, 1989) pp.232-6; Pellicer, 'El Difícil Ejercicio Del Poder Regional' pp.97-113.

distinguished by adopting two central elements that were intended to stop exercising a defensive counterweight to the United States. The return to the normative principles of foreign policy was the proven formula that had projected Mexico as a neutral state in the face of international conflicts. Regional, bounded, legal, selective, and active multilateralism in matters of niche diplomacy would allow the rebuilding of the relationship with the United States and position Mexico as a trustworthy and impartial interlocutor.²⁹⁸ These changes impacted the Mexican strategic objective. It shifted from the defence of national sovereignty and identity to the avoidance of actions that would lead to a confrontation with the United States since that could have a high political and economic costs for Mexico.

The second situation was the establishment of a new political-economic model. Parallel to the Central American conflict, the crisis caused by falling oil prices and rising interest rates undermined the Keynesian project of shared development.²⁹⁹ The background, training, and preferences of the new policy elite influenced the turn the country would take towards neoliberalism. By 1982, Mexico declared itself insolvent before the international financial community, which considered it an economic pariah. The Mexican government was forced to request a loan from the International Monetary Fund, which would condition the redesign of the political-economic model. The letters of intent issued to that body in 1982, 1984, and 1985 specified the policies that Mexican decision-makers were willing to apply. Public management reform, trade liberalisation, and openness to foreign investment were just some of the measures that generated a break with nationalist strategic thinking.³⁰⁰ These changes allowed the admission of Mexico to the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* in 1986. For de la Madrid, it was a fundamental step to enter the international market, since Mexico's alignment with neoliberal orthodoxy would project it as a reliable ally of the West. He asserted that

we assumed a firm and energetic negotiation stance, refusing [...] to rhetorical and sterile confrontations [...] If we had followed the path of the conflict, we would have prevented the access of our exports to

²⁹⁸ Guadalupe González, 'México Ante América Latina: Mirando de Reojo a Estados Unidos', *Documentos de Trabajo Del CIDE*, 2005 pp.6–8; Mario Ojeda, 'México: Su Ascenso a Protagonista Regional', in *Las Relaciones de México Con Los Países de América Central*, ed. by Mario Ojeda (Mexico: COLMEX, 1985) pp.25–38.

²⁹⁹ Matilde Luna, 'Las Transformaciones Del Régimen Político Mexicano En La Década de 1970', *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 45.2 (1983), 453–72; Leopoldo Solís, 'Desarrollo Estabilizador y Desarrollo Compartido', *Vuelta*, 3.31 (1979), 27–31.

³⁰⁰ BANXICO and SHCP, 'Carta de Intención Con El FMI', *Comercio Exterior*, 35.4 (1985); BANXICO and SHCP, 'La Carta de Intención Con El FMI', *Comercio Exterior*, 34.1 (1984); BANXICO and SHCP, 'México y El FMI: La Carta de Intención', *Comercio Exterior*, 32.1 (1982).

external markets, the international financial markets would have closed us.³⁰¹

His words confirmed that the objective of breaking with the pattern of strategic confrontation with the United States involved eradicating nationalist discourses and practices that prevented Mexico from enjoying the benefits of being a partner of the superpower in the nascent global neoliberal system.

These events were in line with the new multilateralist discourse that aspired to develop a kind of internationalism. However, the practices of the policy elite led to the building of a continentalist approach. This inconsistency revealed a gap between the economic and diplomatic dimensions of strategic policy. On the one hand, the need to solve the debt problem and attract investors motivated the policy elite to prioritise issues such as negotiation with international financial organisations, especially with private banks and American economic authorities. Mexico ruled out the option of coordinating with other debtor countries to demand a reform of the norms of the global financial game. The Mexican government preferred to take advantage of its position as a neighbour of the United States, considering that the development of an interdependence relationship would prevent Americans from abandoning Mexico into crisis scenarios.³⁰² On the other hand, in order not to affect negotiations with financial institutions, the Mexican government opted for segmented management of its strategic agenda. While in economic matters Mexico sought a rapprochement with the United States, in diplomacy and security issues it followed a policy of relative independence. The participation of Mexico in multilateral initiatives pointed to counterbalance American policies actively. The active counterweight strategy is interpreted as a residual practice of defensive nationalism, as the growing financial dependence and geographical proximity established parameters for the policy elite to continue developing strategies aimed at protecting their political autonomy.³⁰³ The inconsistency in the strategic policy of the 1980s was that foreign policy based on multilateralism was aimed at diversifying international relations to avoid complete alignment with the American stance.

³⁰¹ Miguel De la Madrid, *Cambio de Rumbo: Testimonio de Una Presidencia, 1982-1988* (Mexico: FCE, 2004) p.502; Miguel De la Madrid, 'Sexto Informe Del C. Presidente Miguel de La Madrid Al Congreso de La Unión Rendido El 1º de Septiembre de 1988', in *Los Presidentes de México: Discursos Políticos, 1910-1988, Volume 5*, ed. by Presidencia (Mexico: COLMEX, 1988) p.783.

³⁰² Carlos Rico, *Carlos Rico Ferrat: Aportaciones de Un Internacionalista Mexicano*, ed. by Guadalupe González and Isabel Studer-Noguez (Mexico: COLMEX, 2012) pp.409–13; Rico, *Fundamentos y Prioridades de La Política Exterior de México* pp.59–73.

³⁰³ Ojeda, *Alcances y Límites de La Política Exterior de México* p.121; Olga Pellicer, 'Política Hacia Centroamérica e Interés Nacional En México', in *Centroamérica : Crisis y Política Internacional*, ed. by CIDE (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1982) pp.227–52.

However, simultaneously, the economic policy based on neoliberalism sought to deepen financial dependence with the United States in order to have a lifesaver in cases of crisis. The weight that economic policy gained on the strategic agenda influenced the areas of foreign policy and national security. In this way, neoliberalism built the foundations of what would later become the continentalist strategic approach.

The third milestone was constitutional reform and political schism. The reorientation of the strategic policy in 1982 had consequences for domestic politics. Towards the end of the 1980s, tensions within the federal government and the Institutional Revolutionary Party exposed the clash of ideological currents that struggled to control the hegemonic party and the country's direction. In 1985, a group of left-wing legislators and nationalist lawyers promoted a reform initiative to incorporate the normative principles of foreign policy into the *Constitution*, because until then they were not a state policy that forced the president to abide by them. The initiative was intended to ensure that the principles had a legal basis and their compliance would not be subject to presidential subjectivity or the 'swings of internal politics'.³⁰⁴ In 1986, the initiative was promoted before the Senate by Secretary of Foreign Relations Sepúlveda, whose influence on the strategic policy-making was in decline. The education of the secretary in international law and the nationalist attitudes that prevailed in the chancery still allowed him to exercise a limited counterweight to the growing predominance of continentalist preferences of bureaucrats, experts in economics.³⁰⁵ In 1987, during the legislative process and on the eve of the electoral period, the Institutional Revolutionary Party experienced a deep fracture. The faction so-called Democratic Current formed by the more traditionalist left-wing politicians demanded that the partisan leadership return to nationalist and social-democratic principles that had been replaced by the neoliberal ideology promoted by the new generation of *técnico*-politicians. The displacement of the party to the centre-right of the political spectrum and irregularities in the selection of the presidential candidate motivated the separation of this current.³⁰⁶ By 1988, the *Constitution* was reformed to introduce the normative principles of foreign policy and the emancipated group from the hegemonic party institutionalised itself as the nucleus of the left-wing

³⁰⁴ Ricardo Méndez, 'Bases Constitucionales de La Política Exterior', *Revista de La Asociación Internacional de Derecho Administrativo*, Jul-Dec.16 (2014), 253–76 pp.271–3; Ana Covarrubias, *En Busca de Una Nación Soberana: Relaciones Internacionales de México, Siglos XIX y XX*, ed. by Jorge Schiavon, Daniela Spenser, and Mario Vázquez (Mexico: CIDE, 2006) pp.387–423.

³⁰⁵ Pellicer, 'Principios Constitucionales de Política Exterior. Mito y Realidad' pp.235,241; Ricardo Méndez and Fausto Kubli, 'Entrevista a Bernardo Sepúlveda', *Revista de Relaciones Internacionales de La UNAM*, 87.September-December (2001), 121–27 pp.121,125–6.

³⁰⁶ Luis Garrido, *La Ruptura: La Corriente Democrática Del PRI* (Mexico: Grijalbo, 1993) pp.63–7; Juan Lindau, 'Schisms in the Mexican Political Elite and the Technocrat/Politician Typology', *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos*, 8.2 (1992), 217–35 pp.219–22,230.

opposition. The newly formed Party of the Democratic Revolution aimed to defend the validity of defensive nationalism by political means.

The constitutional reform and political schism were an attempt by the more traditionalist sector of the policy elite to rescue the status of defensive nationalism as practical logic of the strategic policy-making. The motivations of internal and external order reflected that the struggle in domestic politics and the growing ideological gap fuelled the strategic policy inconsistencies. In the domestic order, the nationalists sustained the constitutional reform with the argument that the foreign policy principles were a product of the historical experience of Mexico and an expression of the struggles during their independent life to survive as a nation, resist foreign interventions, and materialise revolutionary ideals. This sector saw the reform as a way to limit presidential power since the changes in the political field awoke the anticipation of the arrival of a president who was not rooted in the nationalist traditions of the Institutional Revolutionary Party. In contrast, de la Madrid's decision to incorporate some principles into his foreign policy and not to interfere in the legislative process was a signal of the pragmatism that distinguished neoliberal technocracy. The president sought to compensate nationalist groups who complained about changes in strategic policy to avoid further internal divisions in the federal government and the hegemonic party.³⁰⁷ In the external order, the nationalists considered it necessary to strengthen the legal bases and the nationalist tradition of foreign policy to deal with exogenous pressures, since diplomatic moderation since 1982 did not reduce tensions with the United States. Instead, the pragmatism of de la Madrid motivated him to allow reform in the face of the American President Reagan's disenchantment and concern for Mexican politics. De la Madrid objective was to use the constitutional reform as a symbol to make the American government feel the depth of the values that inspired Mexican diplomacy in Central America.³⁰⁸ The relevance of this first phase of the process of dismantling defensive nationalism lies in the weakening of the prevailing practical logic, in the resistance of a sector of the political elite, and in the reflexes that shaped the responses of the emerging neoliberal technocracy. The result of this period of change was the beginning of a new reorientation of Mexico's strategic policy.

³⁰⁷ Rafael Velázquez, "Pragmatismo Principista": La Política Exterior de México', *Revista de Relaciones Internacionales de La UNAM*, 120–121, September (2015), 151–64 pp.158–9; DOF-11-05-1988 Presidencia, 'Exposición de Motivos' (Mexico: DOF, 1988).

³⁰⁸ Claude Heller, 'Tendencias Generales de La Política Exterior Del Gobierno de Miguel de La Madrid', *Foro Internacional*, 30.3 (1990), 380–97 pp.382–3; Jorge Chabat, 'Los Instrumentos de La Política Exterior de Miguel de La Madrid', *Foro Internacional*, 30.3 (1990), 398–418 pp.406–7.

3.4.2. Opening and integration to the north, 1988-1994

During the final years of the Cold War, the Mexican policy established the bases to develop a strategy of coupling to the hegemony of the United States and thus enjoying the benefits of being an ally of the superpower in the new unipolar order. The nationalist strategy of soft-balancing to counterweigh the American influence lost force due to the arrival of the neoliberal technocracy to power and the intensification of economic globalisation. In the 1980s, Mexican strategic policy was characterised by the disconnection between financial objectives and the relationship with the United States. However, the new geopolitical scenario of the early 1990s allowed Mexico to rebuild its link with the superpower. In the international environment, the end of the Cold War favoured the resolution of the Central American conflict. For Mexico, that situation represented the significant reduction of American pressures and an opportunity to redefine its strategic objectives. Economic openness and close association with North America became the priorities of the new government.³⁰⁹ In the domestic context, political-economic change gained strength. In the political sphere, the rupture in the Institutional Revolutionary Party caused a legitimacy crisis, the consolidation of technocrats, and the strengthening of the opposition. In the economic field, neoliberal policies deepened the privatisation of state enterprises, economic liberalisation, and deregulation of foreign investment.³¹⁰ The end of the Cold War and internal political-economic change created conditions for the rupture of the pattern of strategic confrontation with the United States in the 1980s to evolve towards the opening and integration into North America in the 1990s. Three parallel periods during the administration of Salinas portray this trend in the reorientation of strategic policy.

The first period exposed the revalidation of continentalist strategic priorities incubated in the de la Madrid government and the persistence of cultural predispositions of defensive nationalism. Firstly, the continentalist priority of the economic association with the United States. By 1988, the elected presidents of Mexico and the United States held a meeting in Houston to find commonalities in their agendas. While President Salinas put issues such as external debt and bilateral trade on the table, American President George H. W. Bush proposed to discuss the Mexican policy in Central America and the fight against drug trafficking. The affinity, empathy, and willingness of both to establish a new relationship

³⁰⁹ Mario Ojeda, 'Nuevas Prioridades de La Diplomacia Mexicana', in *México Ante El Fin de La Guerra Fría*, ed. by Ilán Bizberg (Mexico: COLMEX, 1998) pp.28–9; José Gurría, 'México Ante El Fin de La Guerra Fría', in *México Ante El Fin de La Guerra Fría*, ed. by Ilán Bizberg (Mexico: COLMEX, 1998) pp.21–2.

³¹⁰ Babb, 'Del Nacionalismo Al Neoliberalismo: El Ascenso de Los Nuevos Money Doctors En México' pp.167–8; Miguel Centeno and Sylvia Maxfield, 'The Marriage of Finance and Order: Changes in the Mexican Political Elite', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 24.1 (1992), 57–85 pp.70–4.

were labelled as the ‘Spirit of Houston’.³¹¹ By 1990, the symbolism of the renewed link would be the basis for starting talks towards a free trade agreement. Secondly, the nationalist predisposition to defend political autonomy. One of the implications of Mexico’s economic opening in the 1980s was the acquisition of commitments with international organisations. However, the discourse of neoliberal technocracy on multilateralism had its practical limits. In the early 1990s, Mexico consistently opposed foreign interference in internal policy matters, especially the adoption of mechanisms promoting democracy and human rights. The Mexican government maintained strong reservations against initiatives to incorporate democratic clauses of the Organisation of American States such as the *1991 Santiago Commitment and Resolution 1080*, the *1992 Protocol of Washington*, and the *1993 Protocol of Managua*.³¹² In this way, the Mexican strategic behaviour of active counterweight evolved into a nascent continentalist stance that sought regional economic integration without sacrificing its political autonomy.

These economic and political dimensions that fed the strategic policy of Salinas simultaneously produced a growing connection with North America and a distancing from Latin America. In South America, the Mexican position in multilateral forums generated criticism, especially from Argentina and Brazil. These regional middle powers indicated Mexico’s breach of ‘the most favoured nation’ principle of the *Latin American Integration Association Treaty* since it did not consider the extension of the possible trade agreement to other member countries in the negotiations with the United States. In response to criticism, the Salinas government undertook selective diplomacy in the southern hemisphere. By 1992, the *Economic Complementation Agreement* with Chile was intended to send signals that Mexico’s interest in establishing strategic alliances in the region remained in force, especially in economic matters.³¹³ In Central America, Mexican activism reoriented towards a new agenda of economic cooperation and trade liberalisation. Mexico promoted the Mexican Commission for Cooperation with Central America in 1990 and Tuxtla Mechanism for Dialogue and Coordination between Mexico and the Central American Countries in

³¹¹ Fuensanta Medina, ‘Del “Espíritu de Houston” a La Incertidumbre Total: Actual Relación México-Estados Unidos’, *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 79.3 (2017), 665–71 pp.665–6; Jorge Carrillo, *México En Riesgo: Una Visión Personal Sobre Un Estado a La Defensiva* (Mexico: PRH, 2012) ch. V.El Sexenio de Carlos Salinas de Gortari.

³¹² Guadalupe González, ‘México Ante América Latina: Mirando de Reojo a Estados Unidos’ pp.22–3; Ana Covarrubias, ‘El Problema de Los Derechos Humanos y Los Cambios En La Política Exterior’, *Foro Internacional*, 39.4 (1999), 429–52.

³¹³ Antonio Ortiz, ‘Mexico’s Trade Policy: Improvisation and Vision’, in *The Strategic Dynamics of Latin American Trade*, ed. by Vinod Aggarwal, Ralph Espach, and Joseph Tulchin (Washington: SUP, 2004) pp.213–31; ALI, ‘Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración. Proyecto de Tratado’, *Economía Mexicana*, 14.4 (1980), 59–72 arts.5,44,48.

1991. From 1989 to 1994, Mexico encouraged the creation of the *G-3 Free Trade Agreement* with Colombia and Venezuela, members of the Contadora Group.³¹⁴ Mexico's policy toward Latin America aspired to counteract the unpopular image generated by the rapprochement with the United States, promote positions compatible with the northern agenda, and link with potential allies in multilateral negotiations. Diplomatic pragmatism and selective multilateralism allowed Mexico to exert a relative regional influence through ad hoc mechanisms that were outside of inter-American institutions and did not jeopardise its political autonomy.

The second period redefined the Mexico-United States relationship. De la Madrid aspired to diversify Mexican relations in an increasingly globalised world. However, that objective evolved towards economic openness and regional integration during the administration of Salinas. The simultaneous arrival of Bush and Salinas to power in 1988 allowed them to redefine the direction of the bilateral relationship. The Spirit of Houston was the beginning of a new linking scheme that would gain strength in 1989, the year in which two official meetings and the Seventh Meeting of the Binational Commission among secretaries of state took place.³¹⁵ The affable relationship motivated Salinas to propose the negotiation of a commercial agreement to Bush, who received it positively. The Mexican president supported his proposal stating: 'We want to trade, not help'.³¹⁶ By 1990, Salinas and Bush announced the agreement to establish a commercial link. During this period, the incorporation of Canada was a strategic necessity for Mexico, as it would enable to balance the American weight in negotiations. The trilateral negotiation rounds formally began in 1991 and concluded in 1992 with the signing of the treaty. William Clinton's arrival in the White House in 1993 would imply a delay in legislative ratification, as he conditioned it to the inclusion of labour and environmental agreements. In contrast, the Salinas government avoided including the sensitive immigration issue so as not to contaminate the negotiation. In 1994, the *North American Free Trade Agreement* entered into force after receiving legislative ratification.³¹⁷ This process not only revealed the disposition and interest of the Mexican government but

³¹⁴ Mónica Toussaint, 'México En Centroamérica: Del Activismo de Los Años Ochenta a La Nueva Agenda Del Siglo XXI', *Cuadernos de Intercambio Sobre Centroamérica y El Caribe*, 11.1 (2014), 173–203 pp.185–7; Fernando Solana, *Cinco Años de Política Exterior* (Mexico: Porrúa, 1994) p.417.

³¹⁵ Octavio Herrera and Arturo Santa, *Historia de Las Relaciones Internacionales de México, 1821-2010. América Del Norte*, ed. by Mercedes De Vega (Mexico: SRE, 2011) p.326; Rafael Fernández, 'Una Forma de Explicar La Cooperación', in *Nueva Agenda Bilateral En La Relación México-Estados Unidos*, ed. by Mónica Vereá, Rafael Fernández, and Sydney Weintraub (Mexico: FCE, 1998) p.63.

³¹⁶ Carlos Salinas, *México, Un Paso Difícil a La Modernidad* (Mexico: PRH, 2013) p.69; Peter Truell, 'US and Mexico Agree to Seek Free-Trade Pact', *Wall Street Journal* (NY, 27 March 1990) p.3.

³¹⁷ Juan Mendoza, *Cien Años de Política Exterior Mexicana* (Mexico: SEP-INEHRM, 2014) pp.157–60; Jorge Castañeda, *ExMex from Migrants to Immigrants* (NY: TNP, 2007) p.53.

also exhibited that behind the trade agreement there was an accumulation of complex issues that in the medium term would condition the course of the bilateral relationship.

The free trade agreement marked the breaking of the pattern of confrontation with the United States and the integration of Mexico into North America. Its negotiation was the product of the Mexican policy elite's ability to displace nationalist reflexes to adapt to the post-Cold War unipolar system. In the external context, the rules of the new neoliberal order generated a favourable scenario for the agreement. One factor was the image that Mexico projected after sticking to the orthodoxy of the *Washington Consensus*.³¹⁸ Another factor was Bush's arrival in power because, during his tenure as vice president, he valued the importance of the bilateral relationship with Mexico.³¹⁹ Furthermore, the *Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement* set a precedent that indicated the potential of the regional economy. In contrast, in the domestic environment, the continentalism of the policy elite and the nationalism of Mexican society generated frictions. During the election campaign period, Salinas rejected the option of seeking an agreement with the United States, as he was aware of the unpopularity of that idea. Even, Secretary of Foreign Relations Fernando Solana affirmed categorically at the beginning of the administration that 'the common market with the United States and Canada, as these two countries have resolved and raised, is not for Mexico'.³²⁰ However, after achieving the renegotiation of the external debt in 1989, the trade agreement with the United States became the new strategic objective. The ethos of neoliberal technocracy allowed the government to simultaneously maintain the discourse of denial and the practice of discretion. For Secretary of Commerce Jaime Serra, it was absurd to submit a referendum on the idea of negotiating the treaty because of the passions it would awaken among Mexicans.³²¹ The presidential decision had no political counterweight, as the cabinet and most legislators approved it. Although official rhetoric projected the trade agreement as an opportunity to bring Mexico to the first world, the roots of nationalism in society triggered the armed uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in 1994. Defensive nationalism counterattacked, now from the social trench through paramilitary means.

³¹⁸ Moisés Naím, 'Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?', *Foreign Policy*, Spring, 118 (2000), 86–103 p.89; Nora Lustig, 'Mexico in Crises, the US to the Rescue: The Financial Assistance Packages of 1982 and 1995', *UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs*, 25.Spring/Summer (1997), 25–67 p.62.

³¹⁹ Robert Pastor, 'The Bush Administration and Latin America: The Pragmatic Style and the Regionalist Option', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 33.3 (1991), 1–34 pp.15–6; Mónica Vereá, 'Posibles Tendencias En Las Relaciones México - Estados Unidos', *Estudios Políticos*, 7.4 (1988), 40–46 p.45.

³²⁰ Mendoza pp.156–8; Solana p.49.

³²¹ Herrera and Santa p.325; Jaime Serra, 'TLC. Responde Serra', *Este País* (Mexico, May 1991), pp. 15–30 p.28.

The third period exhibited a new inconsistency in Mexican strategic policy. The opening project undertaken in the 1980s positioned economic diplomacy as the preferred foreign policy instrument in Mexico. The objective was to attract foreign investment and expand international trade to boost national development. Mechanisms such as the Pacific Basin Economic Council of 1988 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum of 1993 made it possible to meet these goals without jeopardising political autonomy. However, the logic under which the economist-led policy elite operated was based on an erroneous premise. The Mexican decision-makers assumed that economic and commercial openness was possible without opening up to interaction in political and security matters.³²² The pressures that arose in 1994 put that belief to the test. On the one hand, joining the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development represented an improvement in Mexico's position in the international structure. However, its acceptance was conditioned on its resignation from the G-77. The Mexican government yielded to the condition stating that: 'Mexico will cease to participate in any coordination of positions of developing countries versus industrialised countries'.³²³ This position belied the policy elite and reflected the predominance of economic interests over political convictions. On the other hand, the *Association Agreement with the European Union* of 1991 represented a relevant international diversification opportunity to balance the weight that the regional association was acquiring. In this case, the renewal of the agreement in 1994 was conditioned on the acceptance of a democratic clause, which would be adopted during the Zedillo government.³²⁴ The disconnection that had prevailed in the 1980s between economic and diplomatic aspects of the strategic policy was resolved. However, a new disconnect arose between economic openness and political openness in the 1990s.

The year 1994 highlighted the weakness of Salinas' strategy of opening the country at two speeds. This inconsistency was the product of the interaction between continentalist priorities and nationalist predispositions. In the economic sphere, the continentalist predominance influenced the adaptation of the diversification promoted by de la Madrid to the geographical and economic conditions of the country. The economic facts could not be overcome by the diplomatic narrative that aspired to position Mexico as a hinge of multiple

³²² Guadalupe González, 'México Ante América Latina: Mirando de Rejojo a Estados Unidos' p.23; Ricardo Macouzet, 'Política Económica Externa y Diplomacia Multilateral En El Gobierno de Carlos Salinas de Gortari', *Foro Internacional*, XXXIV.4 (1994), 700–728 pp.700–1,725–7.

³²³ Leandro Arellano, 'El Ingreso a La OCDE', *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, 44.6 (1994), 190–98 p.197; Víctor Flores, 'El Ingreso de México a La OCDE', *Comercio Exterior*, 44.6 (1994), 517–23 p.523.

³²⁴ Marcela Szymanski and Michael Smith, 'Coherence and Conditionality in European Foreign Policy: Negotiating the EU-Mexico Global Agreement', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 43.1 (2005), 171–92 pp.184–7; María Novoa and Alejandro De la Paz, 'El Tratado Unión Europea-México En El Marco de La Mundialización', *Comercio Exterior*, 51.6 (2001), 514–20 pp.517.

belongings, the bridge between North and South America. The confrontation generated after the entry into force of the *North American Free Trade Agreement* was caused by the policy elite's inclination towards continental economic association and the opposition of Mexican society to the erosion of its Latin American sovereignty and identity. For the Mexican foreign service, this ideological clash led the country to 'an identity crisis' that inhibited its 'traditional summoning capacity inside and outside Latin America'.³²⁵ In the political sphere, nationalist predispositions that fuelled the resistance of social sectors also prevailed in neoliberal technocracy, but conveniently. The signs of political instability in 1988 and 1994 increased internal and external pressures for the government to adopt measures on democracy and human rights. The residual nationalist reflexes in the policy elite founded their institutional response of aversion to the intervention and monitoring of international organisations on issues that had historically been marginalised in Mexican political culture. Pragmatism and authoritarianism manifested through the deployment of troops in response to the political crisis and American pressures on the issue of drug trafficking, a situation that resulted in human rights violations and repression of political opponents.³²⁶ These practices were far from the vision of modernity that Salinas projected in his political rhetoric. The reading of strategic decisions during this period reveals two central aspects. First, nationalist predispositions motivated the slowdown of political openness in defence of the decadent regime. Second, continentalist priorities influenced the acceleration of economic openness in favour of the consolidation of the neoliberal model. The result was a strategic policy aimed at regional economic openness and the preservation of political autonomy.

3.4.3. Between dependence and diversification, 1994 -2000

The conclusion of the renegotiation of the external debt in 1989 meant the end of the debt decade, while the signing of the *North American Free Trade Agreement* in 1992 marked the beginning of the decade of trade in Mexico. During the Zedillo administration, the latter milestone significantly influenced the reorientation of the coupling strategy undertaken by Salinas towards an accommodation strategy within the American hegemony. The strategic policy of the early 1990s was distinguished by accelerating economic openness and curbing political openness, as well as by approaching North America and moving away from Latin America. However, the forces that emerged from 1994 conditioned decisions on foreign

³²⁵ Soriano pp.132–3; Jorge Montaña, 'Alianzas Indispensables', *El Universal* (Mexico, 13 December 2006) pp.8–9.

³²⁶ Wayne Cornelius, 'Mexico's Delayed Democratization', *Foreign Policy*, 95.Summer (1994), 53–71 pp.61–3; Adolfo Aguilar, 'Authoritarianism and North American Free Trade: The Debate in Mexico', in *The Political Economy of North American Free Trade*, ed. by Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell Cameron (London: Macmillan, 1993) pp.205–16.

policy and national security. In that year, the regional context was defined by the political change in the United States, the exodus of Cuban migrants to Florida, and the American-led military intervention in Haiti. This last event revealed the limits of the association with the United States and the coexistence of continentalist priorities and nationalist predispositions within the Mexican policy elite. At that year's United Nations General Assembly, Salinas criticised American President Clinton's intervention by stating that 'the use and threat of force, when world peace is not in danger, are no longer valid frames of reference for achieving the ends sought today by sovereign nations'.³²⁷ In the domestic environment, the Zapatista uprising and the murders of the presidential candidate and the secretary-general of the Institutional Revolutionary Party generated social and political pressures that increased demands on the government for a clean and peaceful electoral process. Political instability and government financial attrition resulted in the steep decline in international reserves during the period of administrative transition.³²⁸ This scenario generated conditions for economic openness and trade integration in North America to evolve rapidly towards financial dependence and political conditioning with the United States. Three vectors of strategic policy reflected the tensions between the inertia of the consolidation of the continental bloc and the need to diversify Mexico's international relations.

The national security vector pointed to conditioning, as it was one of the most sensitive to the pressures produced by the 1994 political-economic crisis. The *North American Free Trade Agreement* addressed the economic interests of Mexico in the north, but also the security priorities of the United States in the south. Continentalist predispositions of decision-makers and the role played by the American government during the crisis were fundamental in the redefinition of the security agenda. The ideas that prevailed during the 1980s among the Mexican policy elite about the importance of generating an interdependence relationship with the United States paid off in 1994. The severity of the Mexican crisis motivated the American Department of Treasury to alert Clinton that the 'collapse of Mexico could have severe consequences for the United States'.³²⁹ Given the high possibility that the 'economic meltdown' would harm American companies, intensify illegal immigration, and increase drug trafficking at the border, Clinton decided to resort to

³²⁷ Douglas Jehl, 'Clinton Presses UN to Increase Its Force at Sarajevo If Necessary', *The New York Times* (NY, 27 September 1994) p.1; Víctor Arriaga, 'El Manejo de La Relación Con Estados Unidos, 1990-1994', *Foro Internacional*, XXXIV.4 (1994), 572-91 pp.573-5.

³²⁸ Humberto Banda and Susana Chacón, 'La Crisis Financiera Mexicana de 1994: Una Visión Política-Económica', *Foro Internacional*, XLV.3 (2005), 445-65 pp.450-4; Gary Springer and Jorge Molina, 'The Mexican Financial Crisis: Genesis, Impact, and Implications', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 37.2 (1995), 57-81 pp.58-63.

³²⁹ Bill Clinton, *My Life* (NY: AAKnopf, 2004) pp.641-2.

the *Exchange Stabilisation Fund* to rescue Mexico. In addition to being a threat to the national security of the United States, two reasons justified the unilateral decision of the American government despite the refusal of the American Congress, cabinet members, and 79% of American citizens.³³⁰ One was the confidence generated by the leader of the Mexican policy elite. Clinton saw in Zedillo ‘an economist with a doctorate from Yale who had stepped into the breach when his party’s original candidate for president, Luis Colosio, was assassinated. If anybody could bring Mexico back, Zedillo could’. The other motivation was disclosed in 1997, the year in which Mexico would pay off its debt. Clinton said that ‘Zedillo had also instituted the reforms he had promised [...] the loan turned out to be not only good policy but also a good investment’.³³¹ The idea of interdependence proved counterproductive for Mexico, as the financial rescue undermined its political autonomy. The pattern of strategic confrontation with the United States was in the process of becoming a pattern of financial dependence and political conditioning.

The interaction between the continentalist predispositions of neoliberal technocracy and the pressures generated by the 1994 crisis influenced the redefinition of national security policy. The American financial rescue resulted in the establishment of the fight against drug trafficking as a priority in the Mexican security agenda and the institutionalisation of the binational security alliance. The anti-drug campaign was one of the priorities promoted by the American government since the 1970s. However, the frictions generated by the Central American conflict and the nationalist predispositions of the Mexican policy elite hindered any attempt at cooperation. Until the 1980s, the United States undertook unilateral offensives and resorted to political and economic blackmail to force Mexico’s involvement, primarily through the drug certification process.³³² By the 1990s, the coercion exerted by the United States was discordant with the new logic of the bilateral relationship. The 1994 crisis created an opportunity for the American government to exercise conditioning through financial aid, which the Mexican policy elite did not reject. In 1995, the historic visit of the United States secretary of defence to Mexico to establish a ‘third link’ marked the beginning of a long process of institutionalisation of the binational drug fight.³³³ The Plenary Group on Law Enforcement, High-Level Contact Group for Drug Control, *United States-Mexico Bilateral*

³³⁰ Jim Mann, ‘Isolationist Trend Imperils Activist US Foreign Policy’, *LA Times* (California, 14 February 1995); Donald Schulz, ‘Mexico in Crisis’, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 6.2 (1995), 224–68 pp.254–6.

³³¹ Clinton pp.527–30; Ana Covarrubias, ‘México: Crisis y Política Exterior’, *Foro Internacional*, 36.3 (1996), 477–97 pp.480–1.

³³² George Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on the National Drug Control Strategy’, in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the US* (Washington: GPO, 1989) pp.1136–40; NSC, ‘National Security Decision Directive 221’ (Washington: GOP, 1986).

³³³ Carlos Fazio, *El Tercer Vínculo* (Mexico: Joaquín Mortiz, 1996) p.177; Mark Fineman, ‘Perry Visit Opens Ties With Mexico’s Isolationist Military’, *LA Times* (California, 25 October 1995).

Drug Threat Assessment, Declaration of the United States-Mexico Alliance Against Drugs, and the *United States-Mexico Bi-National Drug Strategy* were just some mechanisms created from 1994 to 1998. This new cooperation framework redirected the efforts of the Mexican government towards the fight against drug trafficking. This situation was confirmed by the Drug Czar of the United States Barry McCaffrey. He justified before the American Congress that the questionable certification of 1997 was granted because Mexico had met six conditions:

the arrest of Amado Carrillo and the Arellano Félix brothers within six months; the extradition of 12 Mexican drug traffickers [...]; diplomatic immunity for the 39 Drug Enforcement Administration agents officially assigned to Mexico; permission for Drug Enforcement Administration personnel to carry arms in Mexican territory; authorisation for American Coast Guard ships to enter Mexican waters to carry out interdiction; full participation of the Mexican armed forces in an American ‘multinational force’ to combat drug trafficking.³³⁴

The American pressures and continentalist strategic approach shaped a soft-bandwagoning strategy that gained strength in the successive administrations. Mexico was conditioned.

The commercial policy vector was redirected towards diversification, as it was reactive to the effects of the growing influence of the United States on Mexican political autonomy. Amid the convoluted situation of 1994, the policy elite was forced to adjust trade policy to give credibility to their neoliberal economic reforms. Zedillo gave continuity to negotiation processes initiated during the Salinas government, despite their political and ideological differences. The Mexican government succeeded in ratifying the *Association Agreement with the European Union* in 1994 and joining the World Trade Organisation in 1995. However, the pressures generated by the crisis motivated the policy elite to diversify Mexican relations to counteract the weight that the link with the United States was acquiring. The policy-makers raised the desirability of extending trade liberalisation to other countries through a network of free trade agreements, especially in Latin America. Mexican economic diplomacy signed agreements with Costa Rica, Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela in 1995; Nicaragua in 1998; Chile in 1999; and Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras in 2000. The

³³⁴ Larry Storrs, ‘Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts Under Zedillo, December 1994 to March 1998’ (Washington: CRS, 1998); Barry McCaffrey, ‘Anti Narcotic Cooperation Between the US and Mexico’ (Washington: GPO, 1997).

Economic Complementation Agreements were also established within the framework of the Latin American Integration Association, although these negotiations were only successful with Peru in 1995 and Uruguay in 1999. Furthermore, the Zedillo administration gave a new impulse to the Tuxtla Mechanism for Dialogue and Coordination between Mexico and the Central American Countries in 1996.³³⁵ These agreements showed that nationalist predispositions inclined towards diversification prevailed in the policy elite since it allowed them to limit American pressure, protect political autonomy, and exert influence in Latin America.

The commercial diversification undertaken by the Zedillo government was a response to the growing dependence and conditioning with the United States. The means to generate a counterweight to the high concentration of relations with North America was based on a defensive formula tested in the 1970s and 1980s. The strategy of developing a network of trade agreements resorted to active economic diplomacy with a selective nature and a subregional approach to Central and South America. Foreign trade policy tried to consolidate Mexico as an actor with a double international role: it would serve as a 'radio' in agreements with more developed countries and assume the role of a 'node' in relations with less industrialised states. The absence of deals with analogous middle powers such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, or South Korea reflected the intention of not opening the Mexican market to competing economies.³³⁶ Two internal factors were significant for the formulation of this strategic response. One of them was the rejection of progressive politicians, labour unions, peasant associations, and indigenous groups to the *North American Free Trade Agreement*. Another more important factor was the traits of the policy elite. The fracture of the neoliberal technocracy in 1994 revealed the political and ideological differences within. Salinas was an orthodox neoliberal with medium liberal preferences, while Zedillo was a moderate neoliberal with more a progressist inclination. The break between the two called into question the continuity of Salinas' strategic policy. In contrast to the predominance of strong continentalist preferences in the Salinas cabinet, the plurality of the Zedillo cabinet gave room to the subsistence and operation of nationalist reflexes. The weight that the diplomatic elite acquired in policy-making from 1997 influenced the redefinition of

³³⁵ Guadalupe González, 'México Ante América Latina: Mirando de Reojo a Estados Unidos' pp.23–5; Humberto Garza, 'La Política Exterior de México: Entre La Dependencia y La Diversificación', *Foro Internacional*, 36.4 (1996), 641–66 pp.650–3.

³³⁶ Alicia Puyana and José Romero, 'La Estrategia Comercial Mexicana: ¿Superando La Fuerza Centrípetas Estadounidense?', *Foro Internacional*, 44.3 (2004), 392–429 p.411; Guadalupe González, 'Las Estrategias de Política Exterior de México En La Era de La Globalización', *Foro Internacional*, XLI.4 (2001), 619–71 pp.645,656.

commercial policy. Secretary of Foreign Relations Rosario Green, who unlike her technocratic predecessors had a diplomatic career, recognised that

the geographical location of Mexico, precisely in the middle part of the Americas, would theoretically place it in an ideal position to develop useful links with both North as with the South. However, the type of ties that the country has built with both parts of the continent has been very different.³³⁷

The strategic objective was to find a balance that would position Mexico as a bridge between the north and the south, a hinge between the first and third world.

The foreign policy vector was redirected towards political openness. Like trade policy, foreign policy ranged between bilateralism and multilateralism, between the United States and the rest of the world. During the 1994 crisis a pattern of active and selective diplomacy emerged. This approach implied accelerating political openness and adhering to transnational norms on democracy, international security, and human rights. One of the first milestones was the decision of the government to resort to the United Nations Electoral Assistance Office for the observation of presidential elections and the professionalisation of the Mexican electoral body. It also gave continuity to the participation of Mexico in the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador until its conclusion in 1995. By 1997, criticisms of the government's actions during the Zapatista conflict and the massacres of Aguas Blancas and Acteal forced the policy elite to tolerate the increase of foreign observers and modify their position regarding external conditioning.³³⁸ For example, the Zedillo government had to agree to a democratic clause before negotiations of the *Free Trade Agreement between Mexico and the European Union* could begin.³³⁹ By 1998, the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the support for the establishment of the International Criminal Court, and the criticism of the human rights situation in Cuba validated the change of attitude towards the political issues of the international agenda. In 1999, Zedillo expressed his disagreement on the use of force without

³³⁷ Raúl Benítez, 'México. La Trampa Diplomática Entre Estados Unidos y América Latina: Soft Power Sin Hard Power', *Pensamiento Propio*, 20.43 (2015), 79–106 pp.82–3; Rosario Green, 'México En Las Américas. Entre Un Norte Económico y Un Sur Político', *Foreign Affairs En Español*, 4.3 (2004), 28–41.

³³⁸ Alejandro Anaya, 'Transnational and Domestic Processes in the Definition of Human Rights Policies in Mexico', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 31.1 (2009), 35–58 pp.37–9; Chris Gilbreth and Gerardo Otero, 'Democratization in Mexico: The Zapatista Uprising and Civil Society', *Latin American Perspectives*, 28.7 (2001), 7–29 pp.14–7.

³³⁹ Gerhard Niedrist, 'Las Cláusulas de Derechos Humanos En Los Tratados de Libre Comercio de La Unión Europea', *Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional*, 11 (2011), 463–85 p.472; Szymanski and Smith pp.179–81.

the explicit consent of the United Nations Security Council to the Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien. Also, he expressed the need to overcome the narrow conception of security based on military instruments and coercive measures before the Organisation of American States.³⁴⁰ This tendency of political openness derived started to project Mexico as a middle power aligned to the norms of the neoliberal global order. However, this image simultaneously eroded the political autonomy and hegemony of the Institutional Revolutionary Party.

Mexico continued to open up to the world at two speeds during the Zedillo government. In economic terms, 12 trade agreements were signed with 32 countries. In the political sphere, defensive practices based on the principle of non-intervention were diluted. The acceleration of political openness is understood as the reaction of the Zedillo government to pressures inherited from the Salinas administration that impacted other areas of strategic policy. In the external context, criticisms from non-governmental organisations, civil society, and the United Nations about human rights violations and anti-democratic practices compromised Mexico's image as a reliable actor. The link between political and commercial matters in the neoliberal global order was evident in the uncertainty that was generated by the 1994 crisis in the economic sectors of the United States and Canada; as well as in the European demands to negotiate a commercial agreement. The policy elite saw the need to adopt a more open attitude towards currents in favour of higher responsibility in the international community in defence of human rights and the promotion of democracy. In the domestic environment, the 1994 crisis undermined the legitimacy of the political regime, so Zedillo took steps to rebuild the image of the government. The political diversity in his cabinet and the loss of the legislative majority of his party in 1997 generated political spaces for the opposition to pressure the government. The Salinas orthodox group's gradual loss of influence gave rise to new actors that promoted a moderate approach that fluctuated between nationalism and continentalism. The most representative example was the appointment of Green as chancellor in 1998, who dismissed the discretionary practices of technocracy and saw in the institutionalisation of the diplomatic relationship with the United States as 'the key to handling what are, unquestionably, the most complex and singular bilateral relations in the world'.³⁴¹ As portrayed in the following figure, the strategic policy from 1994 to 2000 was

³⁴⁰ OAS, 'OEA/Ser.G CP/CSH-276/00 Resumen Temático de Las Posiciones de Los Estados Miembros Presentadas En La Reunión Especial de La Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica Sobre Conceptos de Seguridad Celebrada Los Días 20 y 21 de Abril de 1999' (Washington: OAS, 1999); CBC, 'Mexico Disagrees with Chretien's Kosovo Stand', *CBC News, Canada* (Toronto, 9 April 1999), pp. 2–3.


³⁴¹ Guadalupe González, 'Las Estrategias de Política Exterior de México En La Era de La Globalización', in *Entre La Globalización y La Dependencia: La Política Exterior de México 1994-2000*, ed. by Humberto Garza

erratic and ambivalent as a result of the pragmatism of the decision-makers, the fragmentation of the policy-making process, and the defensive reflexes that remained within the policy elite. The most significant features were the primacy of the economic agenda, the alignment to the continental bloc at the United Nations, the institutionalisation of the bilateral relationship with the United States, and the selective commitment to international actors. The direction of the long and unequal evolution of the strategic policy pointed towards greater openness abroad to obtain elements to manage its rapprochement with the United States. The strategic policy of this period left two lessons, which will be further evidenced in the following chapter: the political openness generated the conditions for the political change of 2000 and the historical defence of political autonomy was simultaneously the defence of the hegemonic regime. As a synthesis, Figure 3-3 shows the gradual predominance that the continentalist strategic approach acquired within the Mexican political elite, as well as the effects generated by the dismantling of nationalism from 1982 onwards.

Conclusion

The analysis presented in this chapter has oriented systematically towards the understanding of the complex interplay of internal and external dynamics that drove to the evolution of Mexico's foreign and security policy from 1988 to 2000. Until before the 1970s, the consolidation of Mexico as a sovereign nation independent of the former Spanish domain and the growing American influence was one of the most entrenched convictions within the Mexican security establishment. The nationalist construction of Mexico's external identity was a crucial element in the definition of the legalist, sovereigntist, and defensive character of foreign policy, as well as in the design of soft-balancing security strategies to the American hegemony for much of the twentieth century. However, the gradual change in the cultural dispositions of the policy actors and the positions occupied by the decision-makers in the field of strategic policy-making triggered a process of dismantling nationalism from the 1980s onwards. On the one hand, the reconstruction of the dispositional logic of the policy elite led by the orthodox technocracy of the Institutional Revolutionary Party reveals that institutional culture and cultural reflexes were shaped by intense instrumental rationality induced by the adoption of neoliberal doctrine.

Figure 3-3. Evolution of the Mexican strategic policy, 1988-2000
(Change and continuity of the nationalist practical logic)



Own elaboration.

On the other hand, the construction of the positional logic of the strategic policy-making field demonstrates that the dominant role assumed by politicians and bureaucrats in decision-making influenced the eradication of nationalist speeches and practices, as well as the modification of parameters for the formulation of national security strategies. These changes in the components that shaped the practical logic make it possible to elucidate the pervasive effect of neoliberalism on Mexican strategic thinking and practice from which policy actors responded to situations such as the Central American conflict in the 1980s and the economic crisis of the 1990s.

The findings in tracking the evolution of Mexico's strategic policy during the period of adoption of neoliberalism validate the argument that the practical logic founded on a nationalist strategic notion gradually lost its influence on Mexico's international identity, government institutional culture, and cultural reflexes of policy actors. The process of dismantling nationalism was a product of the political and economic pressures of the late 1970s, as well as the effect that the orthodox adoption of neoliberal precepts had on the cultural roots and dynamics of policy-making since the early 1980s. The weakening of nationalist predispositions in the policy elite and the dominant role assumed by politicians and bureaucrats specialised in economics in the field of strategic policy-making were fundamental factors in the reorientation of Mexico's foreign and security policy throughout from the 1990s. The main conclusion is that, despite the effects of this dismantling process, the deep roots of the nationalist approach within the policy elite allowed it to preserve its status as a practical logic until the disruptive political-ideological change produced by the arrival of the National Action Party to power in December 2000. This chapter has contributed to the existing literature by providing an alternative explanation on how the subjective understandings of the policy elite and the structures of the international environment gradually modified the parameters for the design of national security strategies in Mexico. The comprehensive analysis provided by this study complements the theses that predominate in the literature, many of them from a structuralist perspective.³⁴² Likewise, this work has reinforced the arguments of historians, anthropologists, and sociologists such as Héctor Aguilar, Sarah Babb, Roger Bartra, and Lorenzo Meyer about the decline of Mexican nationalism and its effects on the strategic vision of the policy elite.³⁴³ From the reflections

³⁴² Martínez; Martínez and Garza; COLMEX; Rodríguez; Sandoval; Pellicer, 'National Security Concerns in Mexico'.

³⁴³ Héctor Aguilar, *La Invención de México Historia y Cultura Política de México 1810-1910*; Meyer, 'Estados Unidos y La Evolución Del Nacionalismo Defensivo Mexicano'; Babb, 'Del Nacionalismo Al Neoliberalismo: El Ascenso de Los Nuevos Money Doctors En México'; Babb, *Proyecto: México. Los Economistas Del Nacionalismo Al Neoliberalismo*; Héctor Aguilar, 'La Invención de México. Notas Sobre Nacionalismo e Identidad Nacional'; Bartra.

expressed in the previous pages, it is possible to understand in the next chapter how the decline of nationalism generated political spaces that allowed continentalist doctrines of national security to play an increasingly influential role in shaping the strategic behaviour of Mexico to throughout consolidation period of neoliberalism.

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Chapter four. The politics of strategic policy in Mexico, 2000-2012: building soft-bandwagoning continentalism

Neoliberalism abandoned the principle of national sovereignty. The weakening of sovereignty took place in full force since 1995, when the neoliberals in the government submitted the country to a project that gave foreigners strategic areas for sovereign development. [...] It was an internal strategy that favoured the great international interests [...] the neoliberals handed over the country's payment system to foreigners and weakened the national oil industry [...] the neoliberals hindered the defence of sovereignty and, according to the maxim that "he who pays the piper, calls the tune", the Mexican government accepted foreign resources for the fight against drugs.³⁴⁴

Carlos Salinas (Mexican President, 1988-1994), 2008.

³⁴⁴ Carlos Salinas, *La Década Perdida* (Mexico: Debate, 2008) pp.39,161.

Introduction

The 1990s were marked by the consolidation of rules and norms that established the unipolar and neoliberal character of the post-Cold War international order. The new structural conditions had profound implications in the normative standards of state behaviour and the character of international relations. For example, transnational discourses and practices on the defence of democracy, the protection of human rights, and the promotion of free trade generated pressures for political regimes such as Mexico's to modify their ways of interacting abroad, especially with the United States. As of 2000, the reconfiguration of the domestic political scenario and the abrupt change in the international security environment generated conditions that intensified the struggle between the two major currents of strategic thinking in the Mexican policy elite. The weakening of nationalism years before created political spaces that were progressively filled by new continentalist doctrines that reoriented the evolution of strategic policy. Taking into account the socio-historical context portrayed in chapter two and the analysis of the strategic policy of the late twentieth century developed in the previous pages, this study focuses on the cultural dynamics that drove the evolution of Mexico's foreign and security policy between 2000 and 2012. This work focuses on the habitus of the policy actors that integrated the business technocracy of the National Action Party and on the dimensions that comprised the field of strategic policy-making. Tracking the interaction between the predispositions of policy-makers with the broad structural environment during the 2000s demonstrates that the continentalist conception was subject to a process of building in which the design of soft-bandwagoning strategies with the United States increasingly gained more acceptance because they allowed the country to adapt to the post-9/11 structural conditions.

This chapter argues that the logic that governed the practices of the Mexican policy elite was increasingly based on a conception of continentalist security as a result of the dismantling of the nationalist strategic approach and the changes in the conditions of the broad structural environment. Continentalism gradually established itself as the most prominent ideological source in shaping the construction of international identity, the institutional culture of government, and the cultural reflexes of decision-makers in Mexico during the consolidation period of neoliberalism. This logic was widely promoted since the 1980s, as nationalist notions and sovereign principles lost appeal among politicians and bureaucrats. It is possible to identify the relevance that these ideas acquired in the political directives of key officials since the government of Carlos Salinas in 1988. However, it should be noted that nationalism did not lose its category of practical logic until the electoral defeat of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in 2000. The central conclusion is that only the continentalist strategic

conception could obtain the status of practical logic of the political elite after the political transition, despite the hard resistance that diplomats and generals rooted in the nationalist tradition exerted. One of the contributions of this study is that it offers a different interpretation of how Mexico's foreign and security policy was formulated in the post-9/11 international environment. Unlike the works that assess the impact of structural factors, this analysis focuses on the socio-political context and the institutional and ideational sources that fuelled the strategic decisions of policy actors to respond to endogenous and exogenous pressures.³⁴⁵ A second contribution lies in the highlighting of continuity and change in the parameters under which national security strategies were designed. Few works in the literature recognise the cultural factors that led to the reorientation of strategic policy and the development of soft-bandwagoning strategies that allowed Mexico to forge a cooperative alliance with a limited scope with the United States from the 2000s.³⁴⁶ In the framework of this thesis, this chapter meets the objective of assessing how the political imagination of the political elite shaped the strategic decisions that redefined the state behaviour of Mexico throughout the consolidation of neoliberalism.

This chapter examines the cultural dynamics that shaped the Mexican strategic policy-making process in the administrations of the National Action Party after the political change in 2000. The first section reviews the central elements of the continentalist construction of the Mexican international identity that emerged early in the Cold War and gained relevance in the 1990s. It also examines the building process of soft-bandwagoning continentalism that prevailed in the early twenty-first century. Part 4.2 inspects the dispositional logic that governed within the policy elite to understand the function of different conceptions of Mexican international identity in the formulation of strategic policy. It also investigates the role of the institutional culture and cultural reflexes of the dominant groups in decision-making on foreign policy and national security. In the third section, the positional logic of

³⁴⁵ Yetzy Villaroel, 'Modelos de Política Exterior Desde La Perspectiva Estructuralista Latinoamericana En Relaciones Internacionales', *Politeia*, 39.56 (2016), 139–78; Laura Randall, *Changing Structure of Mexico: Political, Social and Economic Prospects*, ed. by Laura Randall (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015); Nicole McGee, 'Mexico, Drug Trafficking Organizations, Realism, and Human Security', *PSU McNair Scholars Online Journal*, 7.15 (2013), 1–10; Richard Kilroy, Abelardo Rodríguez, and Todd Hataey, 'Toward a New Trilateral Strategic Security Relationship: United States, Canada, and Mexico', *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3.1 (2010), 51–64; Roberto Russell and Juan Tokatlian, 'Modelos de Política Exterior y Opciones Estratégicas: El Caso de América Latina Frente a Estados Unidos', *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, May.85/86 (2009), 211–49; Richard Kilroy, 'Perimeter Defense and Regional Security Cooperation in North America: United States, Canada, and Mexico', *Homeland Security Affairs*, 1.1 (2007), 1–13; Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach, *Latin America in the New International System*, ed. by Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach (Boulder: LRP, 2001).

³⁴⁶ Clare Ribando and Kistin Finklea, 'U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond' (Washington: CRS, 2017); Jonathan Paquin and Patrick James, *Game Changer: The Impact of 9/11 on North American Security*, ed. by Patrick James Jonathan Paquin (Vancouver: UBCP, 2014); Jimena Jimenez, *Canada, the United States and Mexico: Asymmetrical Integration in North America* (Ottawa: CUP, 2005); Richmond Lloyd and Timothy Castle, *Strategy and Force Planning* (Newport: NWC, 2004); Domínguez and Fernández.

the field of strategic policy-making is investigated to distinguish the pressures that delimited the strategic choices of the policy elite. The identification of the overlapping of the fields that constituted the broad structural context in which the strategic decisions took place is fundamental in this mapping. Part 4.4 tracks the interplay between various strategic conceptions during the governments of Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón. This last section tracks the evolution of the dynamic link between the subjective interpretations of the policy elite and the objective power structures that set the framework for decision-making on strategic policy.

4.1. Construction of Mexico's international identity: continentalism

From the 1980s, a tense dynamic emerged in the Mexican policy elite between the historical desire to defend national sovereignty and the growing aspiration to integrate into the global economy. Soft-bandwagoning continentalism, promoted by the neoliberal technocracy, was established as the cornerstone in the political imagination of decision-makers. As in the periods of the *Porfiriato* and the 'stabilising development', the philosophical positivism, technical pragmatism, and economic liberalism set the ideological pillars that shaped what was feasible and unthinkable in security matters national.³⁴⁷ From 1946 until the 1970s, the continentalist approach backed by the first civilian presidents of the Institutional Revolutionary Party aimed at building a modern nation, economically stable, and open to foreign investment. This priority justified the stabilisation of the relationship with the United States, the formulation of economic policies based on capitalist liberalism, and the implementation of coupling and accommodation strategies within American hegemony.³⁴⁸ Nevertheless, simultaneously, it limited the strategic options of the decision-makers. They knew the risks of violating the normative principles of Mexican foreign policy on the self-determination of peoples and non-intervention. Therefore, a hard-bandwagoning strategy to the United States based on an open military alliance was unimaginable. The adherence to international law, the diversification of international relations, and the exercise of limited opposition in multilateral forums allowed Mexico to manage its distance from the United States and to preserve its relative independence.³⁴⁹ The strategic policy acquired an

³⁴⁷ Stuart Day, *Staging Politics in Mexico: The Road to Neoliberalism* (NJ: LBUP, 2004) pp.77–81; Snarr p.308.

³⁴⁸ Domínguez and Fernández pp.38–9; Olga Pellicer and Esteban Mancilla, *Historia de La Revolución Mexicana. Periodo 1952-1960. El Entendimiento Con Los Estados Unidos y La Gestación Del Desarrollo Estabilizador* (Mexico: COLMEX, 1978) pp.15–28.

³⁴⁹ Arturo Santa, 'Security in Parts: The Evolution of the Mexico-United States Security Agenda', *Estudios Internacionales*, 46.178 (2014), 83–109 pp.93–5; Russell and Tokatlian pp.229–33.

economistic, continentalist, and multilateralist character, aspects that ensured access to the benefits of the American-built neoliberal international order. This trend illustrated the construction of a new international identity for Mexico as that of an actor aligned to global norms, promoter of Western values, and open to regional cooperation, but not willing to assume international responsibilities that compromised its political autonomy. This approach also reflected Mexico as a nation with specific regional interests and aspirations to consolidate itself as a middle power inclined to a soft-bandwagoning strategy and tending towards subordination to preserve the alliance with its new partner: The United States.³⁵⁰

The building of soft-bandwagoning continentalism was a process of articulation of a new predominant approach in strategic policy, which displaced defensive nationalism as the practical logic of the policy elite. The implementation of the neoliberal political-economic model in the 1980s required the formulation of a new strategic vision, as nationalism was not compatible and represented an obstacle.³⁵¹ A developmental character, modernist aspirations, and pragmatic style characterised the neoliberal model. Economic opening, privatisation of public companies, dependence on foreign capital, regional integration, and assimilation of the hegemony of the United States were some signs of the reorientation of Mexican strategic policy.³⁵² The objective was to generate conditions that would boost the self-sustained growth of the economy and project Mexico as a consolidated, Western, reliable, competitive, and modern middle power. To achieve these aims, it was essential to improve relations with the United States and adhere to the Western norms that would govern the post-Cold War unipolar order. The consolidation of the neoliberal model during the 1990s expanded the intentions of the policy elite to diversify Mexico's international relations. However, the limited Mexican interests abroad and the weight acquired by the ties with the United States generated a deep relationship based on conditioning and dependence with the superpower.³⁵³ In addition to the internal conditions produced by the crises of 1976 and 1982, the socio-cultural background of neoliberal technocracy encouraged the construction of a developmental strategic approach focused on cooperation with the United States, an open-market free economy, and a broad vision of regional security. Despite the preponderance that soft-bandwagoning continentalism acquired, the resistance within the

³⁵⁰ For a more detailed review of the soft-bandwagoning continentalism strategic approach, see section 2.2.2. *Continentalism* of chapter two of this thesis: *The Sources of Mexican Strategic Policy*.

³⁵¹ Arturo Ortiz, *Política Económica de México 1982-2000. El Fracaso Neoliberal* (Mexico: Nuestro Tiempo, 1998) pp.41–8; Revueltas pp.217–28.

³⁵² Rafael Velázquez, “Pragmatismo Principista”: La Política Exterior de México’ pp.158–9; Martínez and Garza pp.87–93.

³⁵³ Garza; Rico, *Fundamentos y Prioridades de La Política Exterior de México* pp.59–73.

policy elite allowed nationalist ideas and practices to persist and manifest themselves along the strategic policy-making process.³⁵⁴

4.2. Habitus of policy elite: the heterogeneous business technocracy

The habitus of the political elite allows us to understand how the various constructions of Mexican international identity influenced decision-making. It also illustrates the role of the institutional culture that drove the new government in the building of continentalism and the managerial reflexes of politicians and executives with significant power in the strategic policy-making process. The policy elite of the National Action Party characterised itself by a relative ideological pluralism, as well as its heterodoxy and political pragmatism. This renewed version of technocracy was the most capable of adapting to the norms prevailing in the neoliberal order. The privileged formal education and similar daily practices between politicians and businesspeople equipped them in a cultural sense. Fox and Calderón's closest circles expose the dominance of a heterogeneous business technocracy. In Fox's cabinet, the select group summoned to the 'darkroom' was made up of leaders linked to ultraconservative politicians and northern entrepreneurs who occupied important bureaucratic positions. The influence of the so-called 'Pinos group' is attributed to the personal relationships that Fox developed during his executive career in Coca-Cola Mexico and his administration in Guanajuato.³⁵⁵ Calderón's cabinet did not change significantly even though his socio-cultural background contrasted with that of Fox. Within it, the influence of ultraconservative and business groups prevailed. The group of decision-makers convoked to 'the bunker' was made up of politicians linked to the right-wing of the National Action Party, businessmen who shared interests with the president, and moderated bureaucrats who came from the Fox administration. The power of the so-called 'Calderonist group' was the product of formative, professional, and ideological affinities of its members with the president.³⁵⁶ It should be noted that members of the Bank of Mexico clique linked to the Institutional Revolutionary Party continued to lead the most prominent secretariats of the economic portfolio during the two administrations.³⁵⁷ After the political change of 2000, the military elite played a

³⁵⁴ For a more detailed review of the dismantling process of defensive nationalism, see section 3.1. *Construction of Mexico's International Identity: Nationalism* in chapter three of this thesis: *The Politics of the Strategic Policy-Making in México, 1988-2000: Dismantling Defensive Nationalism*.

³⁵⁵ Olga Wornat, *La Jefa* (Grijalbo, 2003) pp.151–9; Leonardo Méndez, 'La Presidencia Del Señor Vicente Fox', *Revista Análisis Plural*, 01.2 (2001), 29–63 pp.43–7.

³⁵⁶ José Méndez, 'El Liderazgo Político En La Presidencia de Felipe Calderón. 2006-2012', *Foro Internacional*, LV.1 (2015), 116–70 pp.131–8; Pedro Jaimez, *Los Elegidos* (Mexico: UPN, 2011) pp.9–13.

³⁵⁷ Rogelio Hernández, 'Entre La Racionalidad Tecnocrática y La Gobernabilidad La Importancia Del Consenso Político En México' p.358; Rogelio Hernández, '¿Aprende a Gobernar La Oposición? Los Gabinetes Presidenciales Del PAN, 2000-2010', *Foro Internacional*, LI.1 (2011), 68–103 pp.87–92.

secondary role in the cabinet and the diplomatic elite managed to reposition itself in strategic decision-making. There were two main reasons for the predominance of business technocracy between 2000 and 2006.³⁵⁸

First, the failed nationalist project. In the political-economic context of the 1990s, it was unattractive to return to the nationalist policies of the 1970s. The consolidation of neoliberalism required that Mexico commit itself to Western values and American hegemony. The democratic change of 2000 strengthened technocracy, neoliberalism, and conservatism despite the growth of the liberal and nationalist left-wing that emancipated from the Institutional Revolutionary Party in the late 1980s. A distinctive skill of the members of the new business technocracy was their praxis based on principles and methods of management. Marketing thinking, pragmatic style, and political heterodoxy influenced their ability to reconfigure the bureaucratic machinery and reorient the strategic policy to protect economic interests that would guarantee the country's economic development.³⁵⁹ The influence of diplomats and military personnel were affected in different ways as a new foreign policy was promoted and the internal security situation worsened. In the case of diplomats, the federal government's trust in intellectual talent markedly improved the position of Mexican foreign service personnel in strategic decision-making. The intention of the new administration to differentiate itself from the regime of the Institutional Revolutionary Party required experienced diplomats to reformulate the foreign policy. Academics in economics and international relations with diplomatic experience were appointed to the position of secretary of foreign relations. Furthermore, in the early 2000s, the Castañeda doctrine pointed to an open, critical, proactive, pragmatic, democratic, and globalist foreign policy, compatible with the American post-Cold War vision.³⁶⁰ In the case of the military elite, the historical ties of the orthodox current of the armed forces with the Institutional Revolutionary Party generated distrust in the new government. The political background of the military, the nationalist profile of their doctrine, and the increase in crime rates were factors that relegated military officers from strategic decision-making. In addition to the fact that the use of the armed forces abroad was unthinkable in the imaginary of the

³⁵⁸ For a more detailed review of the composition of the Mexican policy elite, see *Appendix C: Mexican Policy Elite, 2000-2012*; and section 2.1. *Social Dynamics of Strategic Policy-Making* of chapter two of this thesis: *The Sources of Mexican Strategic Policy*.

³⁵⁹ María Pardo, 'La Modernización Administrativa Del Gobierno de Felipe Calderón: Entre La Austeridad y La Reforma', *Foro Internacional*, LV.1 (2015), 83–115 pp.83–92; Miguel Sánchez, 'El PAN Con Fox En La Presidencia de La República: Gobierno Gerencial vs Política', *Espacios Públicos*, 11.22 (2008), 80–96 pp.84–90.

³⁶⁰ Jorge Castañeda, 'El Nuevo Activismo Internacional Mexicano', *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, 64.October (2001), 43–53; Carlos Ramírez, 'Doctrina Estrada: Doctrina Castañeda', *Indicador Político*, 20.September (2001), 45–50.

policy elite, the specialised training of the military elite contributed to their assignment to the development and implementation of internal security and public safety policies.³⁶¹ Thinking in practical terms, managerial skills and continental vision explain the rise of a new generation of politicians, bureaucrats, and diplomats to a dominant position in the strategic policy-making process, as well as the generals' loss of influence in the 2000s.

The second factor that led to the rise of the business technocracy was the ability of the new generation of technocrats to understand the role of Mexico within the American hegemony and to adapt to the norms of the neoliberal international order. This adaptability was the product of their intellectual training in economic and administrative sciences, as well as their business experience. These attributes revealed that managerial rationality was the backbone of the political and bureaucratic culture that governed the dynamics of the policy-making process. While the presence and influence of officials with studies in economics began to decrease since 1994, the number of officials trained in engineering and business administration reached its peak in 2000. After the political change, the number of lawyers increased steadily. By 2012, it was the profession with the most significant presence in the federal government. These trends were mirrored in the composition of the cabinets. From 2000 to 2006, more than half of the secretaries lacked a political or bureaucratic trajectory and, like Fox, had business administration training or experience in the private sector. From 2006 to 2012, three-quarters of the secretaries had governmental expertise and, like Calderón, had education in law or public administration.³⁶² In both cases, links with the business sector and training in private national and foreign universities were distinctive elements of the policy elite. Although the influence of orthodox technocrats declined, postgraduate degrees in economics and experience in international economic organisations remained valued.³⁶³ The social and cultural backgrounds of the new business technocracy was a significant factor that enabled their adaptation to the neoliberal logic that governed the dynamics of national and international politics. Their backgrounds also influenced the reorientation of strategic policy priorities, leading to the focus on the bilateral relationship with the United States and a broad national security approach.

³⁶¹ Moloeznik and Suárez pp.131–8; Marcos Moloeznik, 'Militarización de La Seguridad Pública, Autonomía de Las Fuerzas Armadas e Imperativo de La Reforma Militar En México', *El Cotidiano*, 22.146 (2007), 99–107 pp.101–3.

³⁶² Sebastian Garrido pp.313–9; Quijano pp.99–111.

³⁶³ Tania Hernández, 'La Elite de La Alternancia: El Caso Del Partido de Accion Popular Nacional' pp.626–38; Yemile Mizrahi, 'La Nueva Relación Entre Los Empresarios y El Gobierno: El Surgimiento de Los Empresarios Panistas', *Estudios Sociológicos*, 14.41 (1996), 493–515.

The strengthening of the neoliberal model during the 1990s produced the ideal scenario for the economic elite to position themselves above the political establishment. The result was the dismantling of defensive nationalism and the building of soft-bandwagoning continentalism, an approach that gained the status of practical logic in the policy elite. This transition explains the reorientation of the strategic policy towards a foreign policy focused on regional cooperation, economic policy based on free trade, and security policy founded on a broad conception. The political change of 2000 had an impact on the external identity of Mexico, as it projected itself as a modern state attached to the norms of the neoliberal global order headed by the United States. The new international image of Mexico as a democratic country was secured and extended its margins of manoeuvre in the international arena.³⁶⁴ The development of continentalism not only modified the status quo of Mexican politics but also reconfigured the decision-making space. The power of the military establishment was affected by the resistance of the most orthodox current of generals to the change promoted by the new government. In contrast, the political, bureaucratic, and diplomatic elites played a central role in policy-making. Their sociocultural background, formal training, and link with businesspeople and intellectuals facilitated their adaptation to the rules of the domestic and international environment. These factors equipped them in a cultural sense to build a new strategic approach that recovered traditional principles of Mexican diplomacy with a greater emphasis on multilateral activism, regional integration, and economic development.³⁶⁵ The conditions generated by the post-Cold War unipolar order limited Mexico's strategic options. The domestic political change was the ideal situation to establish an open alliance with the United States and position it as a development lever. The tactic was the insertion of several issues to the bilateral agenda, many of which Mexico was at a disadvantage when negotiating. The asymmetry drove Mexico towards a relationship of dependence and submission to American preferences. The cultural reflexes of the generals and the traditionalist currents of bureaucracy and diplomacy motivated them to oppose this vision since they considered that it threatened national sovereignty. The resistance only generated frictions, divisions, and ineffectiveness within the federal government. In the diplomatic and bureaucratic sectors, structural and leadership changes

³⁶⁴ Natalia Saltalamacchia, 'Entre Liberales y Estadistas, México En La Gobernanza Global de Los Derechos Humanos', in *México y El Multilateralismo Del Siglo XXI*, ed. by Guadalupe González (Mexico: Senado, 2015) pp.232–4; Jaime Preciado, 'El Acuerdo de Libre Comercio de Las Américas y América Latina: Los Dilemas Del Estado y La Sociedad En México', in *El Estado Mexicano: Globalización, Poderes y Seguridad Nacional*, ed. by Alberto Aziz and Jorge Sánchez (Mexico: CIESAS, 2005) pp.77–84.

³⁶⁵ Covarrubias, 'Mexico's Foreign Policy under the Partido Acción Nacional: Promoting Democracy, Human Rights, and Interests' pp.213–34; Riordan Roett, 'Mexico and the Western Hemisphere', in *Mexico's Democracy at Work: Political and Economic Dynamics*, ed. by Russell Crandall, Guadalupe Paz, and Riordan Roett (London: LRP, 2005) pp.153–72.

facilitated the reduction of internal tensions. Furthermore, both groups were aware that there were few strategic options and that the new policy was the one that best suited the conditions of the structural environment. In contrast, in the military, leadership produced a fracture. While the secretary of the navy supported the alliance with the United States, the secretary of national defence limited himself to comply with presidential orders despite his disagreement. The political change of 2000 represented the bifurcation of neoliberal technocracy that emerged in the early 1980s. Business technocracy was the new policy elite led by politicians and bureaucrats, experts in administration and with business experience. At the same time, military, diplomatic, and bureaucratic orthodoxy related to nationalism lost influence, since their vision was not compatible with that of the dominant groups in the policy elite or with the conditions of the international environment. This new distribution of influence occurred because the habitus of politicians and businesspeople allowed them to cooperate in devising a new approach that conformed to the global rules of the neoliberal order, a fundamental aspect of the field in which the strategic policy was formulated. In summary, Figure 4-1 describes the source of the cultural reflexes of the decision-makers in Mexico since 2000. It also portrays how decision-makers responded to changes in the broader structures according to their reflexes to generate distinctive policy practices and a new strategy to ensure national development.


4.3. Fields of strategic policy-making: domestic political democratisation and regional security crisis

The analysis of the endogenous and exogenous pressures that constrained decision-making is possible through the dissection of the fields that constituted the environment in which the strategic policy was made. Three overlapping fields formed the broad structural environment in which Mexico's policy elite operated from 2000. The fields that framed strategic decision-making were the realm of foreign affairs; the political and socio-cultural situation of Mexico; and the bureaucratic context. The political change of 2000 and the 9/11 attacks impacted significantly on the prevailing condition in these three social spaces.³⁶⁶ Through the concept of field, it is not only possible to examine how their internal logics were affected by those events. We can also evaluate how the three spheres interrelated with each other. Through this approach, it is possible to assess strategic decision-making as a reaction to the

³⁶⁶ Pamela Starr, 'Mexican Foreign Policy', in *Changing Structure of Mexico: Political, Social and Economic Prospects*, ed. by Laura Randall (NY: Routledge, 2015) pp.49–57; Charles Doran, 'Was 9/11 a Watershed?', in *Game Changer: The Impact of 9/11 on North American Security*, ed. by Jonathan Paquin and Patrick James (BC: UBCP, 2014) pp.11–30.

circumstances of the structural environment and, simultaneously, as one of the engines that trigger the constant structural updating.

Figure 4-1. Habitus of the Mexican policy elite, 2000-2012
(Reconstruction of the dispositional logic)



Own elaboration based on Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action* (Stanford: SUP, 1998), p.5. Note: the dotted line indicates probable orientation toward the nationalist or continentalist approaches.

This arrangement of the elements that constituted the environment in which policy was developed permits the amalgamation of the best-understood issues and the least known subjects within the policy elite. On the one hand, the rules of global neoliberalism, the strategic balance with the United States, and the relevance of the free market in the stability of the international system. On the other hand, the significance of putting into practice the discourse of democracy and human rights, as well as the impact of practices linked to multilateral activism and the broad conception of security.³⁶⁷ These speeches and practices resonated significantly in the national and international fields.

The field of international relations was configured by the distribution of economic power, the foreign policy of the actors of the neoliberal global system, and the consolidation of norms in world politics after the end of the Cold War. The literature extensively addresses these last two aspects. As of the 2000s, academics examined the structural impact of global neoliberalism and the 9/11 attacks on the strategic behaviour and international identity of middle powers.³⁶⁸ Traditional practices attributed to weak and non-Western states such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, sponsorship of terrorism, economic heterodoxy, and anti-democratic regimes were openly pointed as threats to international stability.³⁶⁹ In contrast, transnational discourses and practices based on the niche diplomacy agenda such as democracy, environment, nuclear disarmament, and human rights consolidated among the middle powers aligned to the world order.³⁷⁰ In the context of the American-led Global War on Terror, the roles of middle powers evolved in several directions. Those considered classic, traditional, or consolidated medium powers such as Canada, Australia, and the Nordic countries were inclined to a soft-bandwagoning strategy with the United States to preserve their status and benefits. In contrast, emerging, regional, or pivotal middle powers such as India, Brazil, and South Africa undertook a soft-balancing

³⁶⁷ Rafael Velázquez, 'Tendencias de La Política Exterior de México Hacia América Del Norte: El Debate de La Identidad Nacional', in *Integración En América Del Norte (1994-2016): Reflexiones Desde El Pieran*, ed. by Marta Tawil and others (Mexico: COLMEX, 2017) pp.67–74; Sergio Aguayo and Javier Treviño, 'El "Piadoso Olvido": El PAN y Los Derechos Humanos', in *Los Grandes Problemas de México. XV. Seguridad Nacional y Seguridad Interior*, ed. by Arturo Alvarado and Mónica Serrano (Mexico: COLMEX, 2010) pp.332–6.

³⁶⁸ Joshua Spero, *Bridging the European Divide: Middle Power Politics and Regional Security Dilemmas* (Lanham: R&LP, 2004) pp.1–4; Janine Brodie, 'Globalization and the Social Question', in *Governing Under Stress: Middle Powers and the Challenge of Globalization*, ed. by Marjorie Griffin and Stephen Clarkson (London: Zed Books, 2004) pp.14–6.

³⁶⁹ Patrick Stewart, 'Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?', *The Washington Quarterly*, 29.2 (2006), 27–53 pp.27–9; Jordaan pp.167.

³⁷⁰ Ronald Behringer, 'Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda', *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 40.3 (2005), 305–42 pp.307–10; Andrew Cooper, 'Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview', in *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*, ed. by Andrew Cooper (London: Macmillan, 1997) pp.1–24.

strategy to counter American influence in their regions.³⁷¹ The result was the progressive transition from the unipolar system to a multipolar order. The process eroded the normative standards that governed international relations in the post-Cold War era. At the centre of these world policy practices, the power of global governance persisted through multilateral forums such as the World Trade Organisation or the G-7/8, through which it was possible to pressure non-aligned states and legitimise the world order.³⁷² Democracy, environment, human rights, multilateralism, and human security were just some of the issues on the international agenda adopted by the new Mexican policy elite.³⁷³

The Mexican political and socio-cultural field was defined by the effects of the entry into force of the *North American Free Trade Agreement* in 1994 and the political change of 2000. The influence of the economic crisis, the discrediting of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, and how the opposition parties projected the situation of the country in the 1990s to society combined the desire and need for a change in strategic policy. Political pluralism and democratic transition resulted in a relative polarisation in Mexican society and the policy elite regarding the direction the country should take. On the one hand, the left-wing politicians of the Democratic Revolution Party revived the nationalist discourse aimed at revalidating the right of Mexicans to make decisions without outside interference or pressure. The preservation of sovereignty founded the demand for reviewing international agreements to bring them under the constitutional principles of foreign policy inspired by the Estrada doctrine.³⁷⁴ In contrast, the right-wing politicians of the National Action Party abandoned the old sovereigntist conception, as they considered it an obstacle to the country's development. Businesspeople and conservatives adopted the discourse on the protection of human rights and the promotion of democratic values as a platform. The aim was to formulate a new foreign policy doctrine aligned with international standards to project

³⁷¹ Matthew Stephen, 'The Concept and Role of Middle Powers during Global Rebalancing', *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, 14.2 (2013), 37–53 pp.47-50; Mehmet Özkan, 'A New Approach to Global Security: Pivotal Middle Powers and Global Politics', *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 11.1 (2006), 77–95 pp.80–4.

³⁷² Andrew Cooper, 'Squeezed or Revitalized? Middle Powers, the G20 and the Evolution of Global Governance', *Third World Quarterly*, 34.6 (2013), 963–84 pp.971; Chris Alden and Marco Vieira, 'The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism', *Third World Quarterly*, 26.7 (2005), 1077–95 pp.1079–92.

³⁷³ Rut Diamint, 'Security Challenges in Latin America', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 23.1 (2004), 43–62; Rut Diamint, *Democracia y Seguridad En América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Nuevo Hacer, 2001).

³⁷⁴ Andrés Ruiz, 'Los Factores Internos de La Política Exterior Mexicana: Los Sexenios de Carlos Salinas y Vicente Fox', *Foro Internacional*, LI.2 (2011), 304–35 pp.317–21; Guy Poitras and Raymond Robinson, 'The Politics of NAFTA in Mexico', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 36.1 (1994), 1–35 pp.18–22.

Mexico as a reliable partner for the West.³⁷⁵ Despite the victory of the National Action Party in 2000, polarisation within the political elite persisted and resulted in contradictions. The struggle between nationalists and globalists generated conflicts within the government, inefficiency in the cabinet, diplomatic tensions, and inconsistencies in the new foreign policy. Mexico's limited interests abroad and the strategic relevance of the relationship with the United States reduced the discourse of international activism to the implementation of a soft-bandwagoning continentalist approach.³⁷⁶ These conditions reflected that defensive nationalism still operated in the background, even though continentalism had obtained the status of practical logic within the new policy elite. The process of political change confronted historic internal currents with emerging external trends. This scenario hindered strategic decision-making from guaranteeing national security.

The bureaucratic field was defined by the reorganisation of the policy-making structure, the adoption of managerial methods, the encouraging of inter-institutional competition, and the ineffectiveness of the cabinet.³⁷⁷ Of the 44 substitutions that were in the cabinet from 2000 to 2012, two of them had direct implications for strategic policy. The first was the removal of the presidential adviser on national security and the elimination of the position in 2002. The second was the change of the secretary of foreign affairs in 2003. Also, it should be noted that the National Security Council was created in 2005 and its head was replaced six times until 2012. A similar situation occurred with the director of the Centre for Research and National Security. In this context, hierarchies in the Mexican foreign service and the armed forces changed in a contrasting way. The instability that prevailed in the strategic policy-making structure was the result of the change promoted by the new government and the ideological clashes within the bureaucracy. While the internal generational struggles continued in the military elite, diplomats, and marines saw the redistribution of power in the cabinet as an opportunity to improve their position and influence.³⁷⁸ Since 2000, the secretaries of the interior, economy, finance, and foreign relations; the director of the Centre

³⁷⁵ Rafael Velázquez, 'Balance General de La Política Exterior de México, 2000-2006', *Foro Internacional*, XLVIII.1-2 (2008), 81-122 pp.82-8; Rubén Aguilar and Jorge Castañeda, *La Diferencia: Radiografía de Un Sexenio* (Mexico: Grijalbo, 2007) pp.151-5.

³⁷⁶ Laura De Olden, 'La Vecindad Con Estados Unidos: Interés Nacional y Opinión Pública', *Foro Internacional*, LV.3 (2015), 737-71 pp.755-7; Guadalupe González, 'Las Estrategias de Política Exterior de México En La Era de La Globalización' pp.663-6.

³⁷⁷ Reynaldo Ortega and María Somuano, 'El Periodo Presidencial de Felipe Calderón Hinojosa', *Foro Internacional*, LV.1 (2015), 5-15 pp.5-8; Soledad Loaeza, 'Vicente Fox's Presidential Style and the New Mexican Presidency', *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos*, 22.1 (2006), 1-32 pp.13-7.

³⁷⁸ Rafael Velázquez, 'El Proyecto de Política Exterior de Felipe Calderón: ¿Golpe de Timón?', *Revista de Relaciones Internacionales de La UNAM*, Sep-Dec.108 (2010), 121-55 pp.123-5, 134-41; Javier Ibarrola, *El Ejército y El Poder: Impacto e Influencia Política En El México Moderno* (Mexico: Océano, 2003) pp.179-96, 381-6.

for Research and National Security; the chief of staff; and the Mexican ambassador to the United Nations, were relevant actors in the formulation of strategic policy. The power of the members of this heterogeneous circle was the product of their privileged intellectual formation, membership of the cultural elite, and close ties with business leaders. In the case of the members of the Mexican foreign service, their influence improved as a result of the appointment of chancellors with diplomatic experience and the relevance that the president gave to cultural capital. The professional training of diplomats was essential to formulate and execute the new foreign policy doctrine that would redefine Mexico's strategic behaviour and external identity. In contrast, the growing domestic security crisis confined the military elite to planning strategies and executing programmes to combat drug trafficking. This trend substantially reduced the symbolic capital of the military. The appointment of generals to head public safety institutions, the incorporation of soldiers to police corps, and the extensive deployment of troops in the anti-drug campaign resulted in a notable increase in the rates of violence and violation of human rights.³⁷⁹ Although both the army and the navy were involved in this scenario, the admirals significantly improved their position in the bureaucratic structure. Unlike the military elite, the marines showed greater acceptance and adaptation to cooperation initiatives with the United States on regional security and defence. During the 2000s and early 2010s, the influence of the military elite gradually diminished, while the power of politicians and bureaucrats prevailed in decision-making.³⁸⁰

The evolution of Mexican strategic policy took place as the cultural practices of decision-makers adapted to the conditions of the structural environment. It is for this reason that policy choices favoured economic development through alternative strategies such as soft-bandwagoning to American hegemony. This approach involved the consolidation of free-market policies, regional cooperation, and a broad conception of security. Due to the dismantling of defensive nationalism from the 1980s, the policy elite abandoned traditional tactics of soft-balancing as economic protectionism and diplomatic confrontation. Few scholars recognise that in the late 1990s and early 2000s soft-bandwagoning continentalism displaced defensive nationalism as the prevailing practical logic within the policy elite.

³⁷⁹ Marcos Moloeznik, 'Organized Crime, the Militarization of Public Security, and the Debate on the "New" Police Model in Mexico', *Trends in Organized Crime*, 16.2 (2013), 177–94 pp.177–85; Roderic Camp, 'Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges', in *Shared Responsibility. US-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime*, ed. by Eric Olson, David Shirk, and Andrew Selee (California: USDP, 2010) pp.291–325.

³⁸⁰ For a more detailed review of the architecture of the Mexican bureaucratic machinery, see *Appendix D: Mexican Policy-Making Structure, 2000-2012*; and section 2.1.4. *Policy-Making* of chapter two of this thesis: *The Sources of Mexican Strategic Policy*.


Scholars have also overlooked how the nationalist roots of an orthodox sector allowed defensive nationalism to continue operating in the background to generate resistance and opposition to change.³⁸¹ Although the structural forces were critical in the process, these pressures do not fully expose the motives that drove the responses of the decision-makers. From this practice-centred approach, it is possible to understand how policy-makers conceived the scenario in which they were immersed and how their strategic choices were limited by the cultural context that surrounded them. This assessment is key to understanding that the policy elite was interacting with the changing endogenous and exogenous structural conditions, several of which are neglected in the academy. The examination of the habitus of the policy elite and the field of strategic policy-making supports the argument that the inconsistencies of the continentalist strategic policy were not the result of how decision-makers adapted to the post-Cold War structural environment. The reason was their inability to effectively adjust their habitus to the structural changes that took place during the 2000s. The next section evaluates the evolution of Mexico's strategic policy after the 2000 political change taking as a base this review of the habitus of the policy elite and the field of strategic policy-making illustrated in Figure 4-2.

4.4. Evolution of the strategic policy: from the international activism project to the new continental cooperation framework

The development of Mexican strategic policy after the 2000 political change again illustrates the confrontation between two dominant strategic approaches. The continentalism that emerged in the 1990s aimed to consolidate itself as the only approach to strategic policy, while the nationalism dismantled since the 1980s sought to subsist in the renewed establishment of Mexican security. Endogenous and exogenous factors conditioned strategic decisions on economy, diplomacy, and security. The dynamic link between the broad structural environment and the subjectivity of decision-makers led the strategic policy-making process. This section argues that the evolution of the strategic policy from 2000 to 2012 was significantly influenced by the building of soft-bandwagoning continentalism advocated by the renewed business technocracy founded in the 1990s.

³⁸¹ Imtiaz Hussain, Satya Pattnayak, and Anil Hira, *North American Homeland Security: Back to Bilateralism?* (Westport: Praeger, 2008) pp.111–3; Domínguez and Fernández pp.35–7.

Figure 4-2. Field of the Mexican strategic policy-making, 2000-2012
(Construction of the positional logic)



Own elaboration based on Bourdieu, Pierre, *The Field of Cultural Production. Essays on Art and Literature* (NY: CUP, 1993), p.49. Note: + = positive pole, implying a dominant position, - = negative pole, implying a dominated position.

The subsequent analysis of the interaction between the continentalist and nationalist visions allows us to understand the international identity crisis of Mexico, the limits of integration in North America, the instability of the link with Latin America, and the scope of Mexican relations with the rest of the world. The following examination of the conformation of the domestic and global environments provides elements to understand the intricate relationship between internal and external dynamics that redirected the Mexican strategic policy from a project of international activism towards a new pattern of continental cooperation.

4.4.1. From the project of change to strategic indefiniteness, 2000-2006

After the end of the Cold War, Mexico aspired to redefine its relationship with the United States to ally with the superpower. For this reason, the policy elite dropped counterweight practices that fed the nationalist pattern of strategic confrontation. Instead, Mexico undertook strategies for coupling and accommodating itself within the American hegemony through an economic, selective, and pragmatic diplomacy. In the 1990s, Mexico's strategic objective was the trade association with the United States and to assume the role of the bridge between North and South America. However, the evolutionary trajectory of Mexican strategic policy was disrupted by the domestic socio-political context and the international security environment of the early twenty-first century. On the one hand, the 2000 elections represented the first political alternation by democratic means in Mexico. The arrival of the National Action Party to the Presidency of the Republic generated spaces for new actors that gradually weakened the traditional presidential power. Vicente Fox began his government with a significant social and political capital that allowed him to undertake a bureaucratic restructuring and the articulation of a new strategic approach. His purpose was to eradicate the defensive ideas and practices of the Institutional Revolutionary Party culture.³⁸² However, on the other hand, the 9/11 attacks affected Fox's strategic project. The change in the policy of the United States towards Latin America generated pressures and limited options for Mexico. The reconfiguration of the international security environment not only altered the bilateral agenda but also divided the Mexican policy elite.³⁸³ The political alternation and the 9/11 attacks generated conditions that tested the scope of continentalism, the validity of nationalism, and the viability of a new internationalist strategic plan. During

³⁸² José Woldenberg, *La Transición Democrática En México* (Mexico: COLMEX, 2012) pp.123–36; Chappell Lawson, 'Mexico's Unfinished Transition: Democratization and Authoritarian Enclaves in Mexico', *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos*, 16.2 (2000), 267–87 pp.274–80.

³⁸³ Peter Hakim, 'Is Washington Losing Latin America?', *Foreign Affairs*, 85.1 (2006), 39–53 pp.39,42–3; Jorge Castañeda, 'The Forgotten Relationship', *Foreign Affairs*, 82.3 (2003), 67–81 pp.69–70.

the first half of the 2000s, the evolution of strategic policy shifted in three phases from the project of change to strategic indefiniteness.

The first stage took place during the first year of government. Fox promoted the articulation of a new strategic vision that would position Mexico as an emerging power. He diagnosed that the country's structural position did not correspond to its geographical, political, and economic weight.³⁸⁴ The 'new Mexican international activism' discourse aimed to deepen integration in North America and expand ties with the globalised world to maximise the benefits of neoliberal reforms. In practice, Fox continued Mexico's political opening. The international pressures on democracy and human rights that led to domestic conditions for his electoral victory influenced the new policy elite to adopt this agenda. With the United Nations, the government managed the establishment of a human rights office in Mexico. The government also proposed the incorporation of the defence of human rights into the constitutional principles of foreign policy.³⁸⁵ Further, Fox privileged the diplomacy of rapprochement with the United States. After being elected, one of his first actions was to meet with the American political elite. By 2001, the visit of the new American President George W. Bush to Guanajuato raised expectations about a possible immigration agreement, which had been a Mexican aspiration for years. The Mexican policy elite considered that the 'Spirit of San Cristobal' would be the beginning of the integration of the 'North American Community'.³⁸⁶ That same year, the Mexican government unilaterally ratified its rejection of the traditional security approach that predominated in the Organisation of American States. Aligned with the ideas that prevailed in the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Fox announced the departure of Mexico from the *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance*. He argued that the defence instrument 'not only represents [...] a serious case of obsolescence and worthlessness but has prevented, against its purposes, the generation of an idea of security appropriate to the scope and needs of the hemisphere'.³⁸⁷ Beyond the discourse of change, the events of the first year of government revealed that the policy elite was willing to continue with practices that had allowed the democratisation of the country

³⁸⁴ Soriano p.120; Presidencia, 'Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2001-2006' (Mexico: DOF, 2001) pp.59–60.

³⁸⁵ Pellicer, 'Principios Constitucionales de Política Exterior. Mito y Realidad' pp.244–5; Saltalamacchia, 'Entre Liberales y Estadistas, México En La Gobernanza Global de Los Derechos Humanos'; Jorge Chabat, 'La Política Exterior Mexicana Durante Elgobierno de Fox: Una Transición En Espera', *Documentos de Trabajo Del CIDE*, 18.November (2009), 1–30 pp.6–9.

³⁸⁶ Vicente Fox and Allyn Robin, *Revolution of Hope: The Life, Faith, and Dreams of a Mexican President* (NY: PRH, 2007) ch. 12.The Spirit of San Cristobal; Delal Baer, 'Mexico at an Impasse', *Foreign Affairs*, 83.1 (2004), 101–13 pp.109–10.

³⁸⁷ Jorge Castañeda, 'Fox y Derbez Priístas En Política Exterior', *Reforma* (Mexico, 19 February 2006) Suplemento Enfoque 622; Luis Bitencourt, 'Security Issues and Challenges to Regional Security Cooperation: A Brazilian Perspective', in *Perspectives from Argentina, Brazil and Colombia*, ed. by Pedro Villagra, Luis Bitencourt, and Henry Medina (Carlisle: SSI, 2003) p.26.

and the rapprochement with the United States. They also demonstrated that the new elite would resort to a partial, open, and critical diplomacy to protect and exercise their relative political autonomy.

The new Mexican international activism was the core of Fox's strategic project. Secretary of Foreign Relations Jorge Castañeda, principal ideologist and promoter, maintained that the new approach recovered the activism practised during the formation of the multilateral order at the end of the Second World War. The objective was to position Mexico as an active agent of global change with enough weight to influence the 'new international agenda'. Promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, combating transnational crime, environmental protection, conventional disarmament, and gender issues were the topics proposed for the renewed Mexican diplomacy. For the chancellor, democracy and international participation were opposed to authoritarianism and isolationism. Therefore, the end of the authoritarian regime meant entering democracy and leaving isolationism. This new strategic approach was the instrument to reformulate the identity of the country and project it as a modern actor engaged with the defence of democracy and human rights. Mexico's international commitment to these issues would also serve to consolidate internal change.³⁸⁸ In the political elite, the prevailing idea was that by taking the initiative in the construction of the new international system, Mexico could exert a more significant influence than that provided by geopolitical and geoeconomic variables. This vision was supported by the president, whose project had two axes: to deploy strong multilateralism and deepen integration in North America.³⁸⁹ The idea of generating a new strategic approach is interpreted as a response of the policy elite to the nascent internal political environment and the social expectations of change. The challenge was to eliminate nationalist practices such as isolationism based on the principle of non-intervention and the multilateralism used as a defence mechanism.³⁹⁰ The proposal was also a reaction to the international context derived from the American policy of approaching Latin America. The stance of the United States created conditions for

³⁸⁸ Jorge Castañeda, "La Influencia de Las Relaciones Internacionales En El Fortalecimiento de La Democracia", Palabras Pronunciadas Ante El Consejo Español de Estados Unidos, Washington, 21 de Febrero de 2002', in *Discursos Del Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Jorge Castañeda (Enero-Junio de 2002)*, ed. by SRE (Mexico: SRE, 2003) pp.50–1; Jorge Castañeda, 'Política Exterior y Cambio Democrático a Dos Años Del 2 de Julio', *Reforma* (Mexico, 12 July 2002), p. Nacional; Jorge Castañeda, "Palabras Del Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Jorge Castañeda, Durante Su Reunión Con La Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores de La Cámara de Diputados", 26 de Septiembre de 2001', in *Discursos Del Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Jorge Castañeda (Julio-Diciembre de 2001)*, ed. by SRE (Mexico: SRE, 2002) p.73; Jorge Castañeda, 'Los Ejes de La Política Exterior de México', *Nexos*, 23.88 (2001), 66–74 p.67.

³⁸⁹ Vicente Fox, 'La Política Exterior de México En El Siglo XXI', *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, 66.June (2002), 11–21 pp.14–9; Castañeda, 'El Nuevo Activismo Internacional Mexicano' pp.46–50.

³⁹⁰ Aguilar and Castañeda pp.149–51; Redacción, 'Castañeda Propuesta Derbéz', *El Universal* (Mexico, 13 May 2004), pp. 4–5.

Mexico to play a more active role and position itself as a political-economic bridge between the north and south of the continent. For Castañeda, the consolidation of a democratic regime and an active foreign policy adjusted to the rules-based system were the best means of containing external pressures. He also argued that the conditions of the internal and international context represented an opportunity to demystify the historical strategic vision of the Institutional Revolutionary Party regime based on two premises: 'Mexico's identity is defined by nationalism; [...] Mexican nationalism must be characterised by its systematic opposition to the United States'.³⁹¹ This analysis of the new approach demonstrates that Fox and Castañeda's policy aspired to internationalism. However, its logic was continentalism, its tool multilateralism, and its antagonist nationalism.

The second phase encompasses the years 2001 to 2003, a period that undermined the viability of the change project. Days before the 9/11 attacks, the Mexico-United States relationship reached its peak. During Fox's visit to Washington, Bush acknowledged that 'the United States has no more important relationship in the world than the one we have with Mexico'.³⁹² However, two Fox speeches marked a turning point, as the American government did not receive them well. One was before the United States Congress, where he urged the elimination of the drug certification and the establishment of a migration agreement. Another speech was in the Organisation of American States where Fox announced the departure of Mexico from the only collective defence treaty in force in the continent. Four days later, the 9/11 attacks abruptly changed the conditions of the national and international environment. Without internal consensus, the Mexican secretary of foreign relations defined the attacks as a direct attack on Mexico and proclaimed total support for the United States. Castañeda added: 'The United States will seek reprisals; it is its right to do so'. After Fox supported these statements, legislators accused them of surrendering the country, involving it in foreign conflicts, and imposing a pro-American doctrine based on the logic of 'attacking the weak and obeying the strong'.³⁹³ The secretary of the interior said that Mexico 'cannot be pushed to subordination under the American government'. Amid internal tensions, Fox's support was limited to a cold call to Bush and a late trip to the United

³⁹¹ Jorge Castañeda, 'Política Exterior y Democracia', *Nexos*, 43.312 (2003), 85–92; Castañeda, 'Los Ejes de La Política Exterior de México'.

³⁹² George Bush, *Public Papers Of The Presidents Of The United States, 2001: Book, 2, George W. Bush, July 1 to December 31, 2001* (Washington: GPO, 2003) p.1074; Ginger Thompson and Clifford Krauss, 'Theats and Responses: Security Council; Antiwar Fever Puts Mexico In Quandary On Iraq Vote', *The New York Times* (NY, 28 February 2003) p.12.

³⁹³ Redacción, 'Vence La "Doctrina Castañeda": Batres'; Daniel Millán and Ernesto Núñez, 'Rechaza Cancillería Obedecer a Presiones', *Reforma* (Mexico, 4 October 2001).

States.³⁹⁴ By 2002, the failure of the bureaucratic restructuring resulted in the appointment of Adolfo Aguilar as the Mexican Ambassador to the United Nations. The designation bothered Castañeda because he considered that it would cause disconnection with the positions of the Mexican chancellery. During that year, Mexico assumed the presidency of the United Nations Security Council at a critical moment. Castañeda's predictions materialised when Aguilar voted against the invasion of Iraq, even though the chancellor's position was to respond favourably to the support requested by the United States. During this conjuncture, Fox's reaction was characterised by his lack of definition and evasion of the dialogue convened by Bush and Spanish President José Aznar.³⁹⁵ The response to the 9/11 attacks and the posture against the Iraq War generated severe divisions within the Mexican government and intense pressures from the United States that conditioned the strategic decision-making throughout the rest of the administration.

The inconsistent attitude of Mexico is understood as the response of an inexperienced and divided government in the process of change within the context of international crisis. Resistance to bureaucratic restructuring, opposition to the formulation of the new strategic approach, the fragmentation of the decision-making process, inter-secretarial rivalry, and the plurality of the cabinet had consequences at this juncture. Continentalist and nationalist predispositions coexisted in the heterogeneous policy elite that fought to control the official response to the emergency. On the one hand, Castañeda had positioned himself as the pillar of continentalist policy based on globalist discourse. Such was his influence that he marked his ideological preferences and personality traits through the so-called Castañeda doctrine. His heterodox practices motivated Aguilar, once Castañeda's main ally, to distance himself. On the other hand, the secretaries of the interior and economy headed the cabinet group attached to the nationalist tradition. They opposed the change in the strategic vision and denounced that the roles of the chancellor and the presidential adviser on national security were outside the law.³⁹⁶ Three factors added to this tension between change and continuity. One was the anti-Americanism that prevailed in Mexican society. The government did not call for public demonstrations of support for the United States after the 9/11 attacks for fear of violent protests. Another factor was the nationalism that prevailed in Congress, in which

³⁹⁴ López Mayolo, 'Niega Cancillería Desunión Con SEGOB', *Reforma* (Mexico, 27 September 2001); Alonso Urrutia, 'No Puede Orillarse Al País a Una Subordinación Ante Washington Por La Actual Coyuntura: Creel', *La Jornada* (Mexico, 27 September 2001).

³⁹⁵ George Bush, *Decision Points* (NY: CPG, 2010) pp.225–6,246,302; Jorge Castañeda, 'Apuntes de Política Exterior Para El Gobierno de Vicente Fox: 2000-2006', in *Chile-México: Dos Transiciones Frente a Frente*, ed. by Carlos Elizondo and Luis Maira (Mexico: Grijalbo, 2000).

³⁹⁶ Jakub Klepal, 'Transformación de La Política Exterior Debajo Del Gobierno de Vicente Fox', *Association for International Affairs*, 11.30 (2016), 17–26 pp.20; Francisco Hernández, 'Los Cinco Gobiernos The Fox', *Cambio* (Mexico, October 2001) p.11.

the government lacked the legislative majority. The historical normative principles that had dominated Mexican foreign policy influenced Aguilar, representing Mexico, to vote against the invasion of Iraq. The third factor was Fox's lack of leadership. His inability to take control of the government to generate a consensus and articulate a consistent response reflected what Bourdieu defines as 'hysteresis'. The president was unable to interpret the facts, readjust his dispositions, and react to the sudden reconfiguration of the environment.³⁹⁷ The ambivalent Mexican response to the crisis had immediate consequences. Internally, the Fox government obtained social and political capital after opposing the Iraq War despite pressure from the United States and Spain. However, the sharpening of the division inside the cabinet resulted in the resignation of Castañeda and Aguilar in 2003.³⁹⁸ Externally, Mexican diplomacy faced hostility from the Bush government and its allies. Mexico went from being the most relevant partner for the United States to leading the uncomfortable 'undecided group' of the United Nations Security Council. Additionally, the change in American priorities altered the bilateral relation and undermined the negotiations of the migratory agreement.³⁹⁹ Mexico's response to the new context reflected the limits of the alliance it sought with the United States and the persistence of defensive nationalism in the Mexican policy elite. In less than a year, the Fox government realised that it had a poorly compatible policy for the domestic context and the new conditions of the strategic environment.

The third stage took place during the second half of the administration. Secretary of Foreign Relations Luis Derbez, who came from the Secretariat of Economy, tried to reformulate the approach designed by Castañeda to adapt the strategic policy to the new scenario. The process was based on Aguilar and Fox's ideas that Mexico should have an independent foreign policy that would allow it to claim its role of middle power and avoid confrontations with the United States.⁴⁰⁰ However, in practice, the evolution of the strategic policy from 2003 to 2006 was inconsistent and contradictory. It fluctuated between internationalist multilateralism, continentalist bilateralism, and nationalist unilateralism. For example, the globalist character of the strategic policy was oriented towards keeping practices such as multilateral activism and international diversification. Despite Castañeda's resignation,

³⁹⁷ Soriano p.124; Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* p.62.

³⁹⁸ Antonio Ortega, 'Fox Confirma La Renuncia de Castañeda y Afronta La Primera Crisis de Su Gobierno', *El País* (Mexico, 10 January 2003); Georgina Saldierna, 'Renuncia Aguilar Zinser y Reclama a Fox Críticas', *La Jornada* (Mexico, 21 November 2003).

³⁹⁹ Ernesto Ekaizer, 'El Último Combate de Adolfo Aguilar Zinser', *El País* (Mexico, 8 July 2005) p.8; Rafael Fernández, 'Tres Años de Política Exterior', *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, 70.Oct-Feb (2003), 75–84 pp.76–7.

⁴⁰⁰ Soriano p.131; Redacción, 'México Presidirá El Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas', *La Red 21* (Montevideo, 1 April 2003) p.37.

within the Secretariat of Foreign Relations the idea prevailed that ‘the only way in which our country can really balance its foreign policy agenda and its interests abroad is to develop a more intense activity in the multilateral scenario’.⁴⁰¹ Derbez’s period heading the Secretariat of Foreign Relations began with intense diplomacy, based on the organisation of international summits. Mexico hosted the World Trade Organisation Ministerial Conference of 2003 and the Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union Summit of 2004. In 2003, the Mexican government expressed interest in being part of the G-7/8 based on its position of the ninth world economy. Fox said that the international mechanism should evolve to provide a further presence to emerging powers.⁴⁰² Mexico also organised the Special Conference on Security of the Organisation of American States in which it promoted the adoption of a broad and multidimensional concept of hemispheric security. By 2004, Secretary Derbez presented his intention to chair the general secretariat of the continental body.⁴⁰³ A year later, the Mexican government again presented its candidature to be part of the United Nations Security Council for the period 2009-2010.⁴⁰⁴ Fox’s ambitious multilateral agenda had little success. Mexico did not obtain permanent membership in the G-7/8 and United Nations Security Council, nor did it receive support to chair the Organisation of American States. There were a few achievements from 2005 onwards after the appointment of the former Chancellor Bernardo Sepúlveda as judge of the International Court of Justice and former Chancellor José Gurría as secretary-general of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The globalist character that strategic policy partially acquired failed to reposition Mexico in the international structure. The presence of Mexico in multilateral forums and the hosting of international summits only provided value to its symbolic capital.

From 2003 to 2006, the strategic policy also adopted a continentalist character based on a reactive diplomacy and accommodation strategy to the American hegemony. Its implementation resorted to practices of selective endorsement of the issues from the Washington agenda. The Mexican policy elite sought the gradual achievement of objectives through a pragmatic soft-bandwagoning strategy. The main driver was the integration project

⁴⁰¹ Guadalupe González, ‘México Ante América Latina: Mirando de Reojo a Estados Unidos’ p.26; Castañeda, ‘Los Ejes de La Política Exterior de México’ p.67.

⁴⁰² AFP, ‘Quiere Fox Silla Permanente Para México En El G8’, *La Crónica* (Mexico, 28 May 2003) p.14; Redacción, ‘Abogarán Fox y Lula Por Mayor Presencia En El G8’, *Proceso* (Mexico, May 2003).

⁴⁰³ OAS, ‘Declaración Sobre Seguridad En Las Américas’ OEA/Ser.K/XXXVIII; OAS, ‘Declaración de Bridgetown: Enfoque Multidimensional de La Seguridad Hemsférica’ AG/DEC.27(XXXII-O/02).

⁴⁰⁴ Guadalupe Vautravers and Agenor González, ‘La Membresía de México En El Consejo de Seguridad de Las Naciones Unidas’, *Convergencia. Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, 58.January-April (2012), 111–31 p.124; Claude Héller, ‘Continuidad y Cambio En La Participación de México En La Organización de Las Naciones Unidas’, in *Temas de Política Exterior*, ed. by Ana Covarrubias (Mexico: COLMEX, 2008) pp.433,465.

promoted by influential political-intellectual-business circles of Canada, the United States, and Mexico. The objective was to increase regional competitiveness and face the growing economic power of China and India. Inspired by the European Union model, the project aspired to a common market through the *North American Free Trade Agreement Plus*, a political association through the North American Union, and a monetary unification based on the Amero.⁴⁰⁵ In this context, the decisions of the Mexican policy-makers aimed to avoid confrontations in the face of increased pressure from 2001 and to restore the bilateral relationship after the tensions of 2003. After Castañeda's resignation, Mexico abandoned the aggressive strategy labelled 'the whole enchilada' that, under a logic of 'all or nothing', sought a migratory reform with the United States. The 9/11 attacks undermined the negotiations due to the abrupt change in American priorities that redirected the bilateral agenda from migration and trade issues towards security and defence affairs.⁴⁰⁶ Mexico partially aligned itself with the American interest in protecting its internal security, since the policy elite interpreted that this attitude would help to return to the talks on the migratory agreement. By 2002, Mexico corresponded to the American Smart Borders Programme through the Sentinel Plan, whose objective was to prevent the 'transit of interests or people who jeopardise the United States'.⁴⁰⁷ The departure of the *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance* in 2001, the opposition to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the refusal to participate in the North American Aerospace Defence Command and the United States Northern Command in 2004 exposed the limits of the Mexican alignment to the United States.⁴⁰⁸ Despite this, the integration process strengthened through the *Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America* of 2005. This inter-governmental mechanism aimed to expand tri-national cooperation through a broad reference framework. Its objective

⁴⁰⁵ Angeles Villarreal and Jennifer Lake, 'Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: An Overview and Selected Issues' (Washington: CRS, 2009) p.5; MEXUS, *A Compact for North American Competitiveness. A Strategy for Building Competitiveness Within North America* (Washington: Council of the Americas, 2005) pp.1–2; CSIS, 'New Horizons in US-Mexico Relations. Recommendations for Policymakers' (Washington: CSIS, 2001) pp.IX–XV; Robert Pastor, 'Redesigning NAFTA for the 21st Century', in *Toward a North American Community. Lessons from the Old World for the New*, ed. by Robert Pastor (Washington: IIE, 2001) pp.2–3; Herbert Grubel, *The Case for the Amero: The Economics and Politics of a North American Monetary Union* (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1999) p.5.

⁴⁰⁶ Alejandro Anaya, 'La Política Exterior de México Durante El Sexenio de Vicente Fox', *Sexenio En Perspectiva*, 2006, 31–36 pp.33–4; Francisco Alba, 'Del Diálogo de Zedillo y Clinton Al Entendimiento de Fox y Bush Sobre Migración', in *México-Estados Unidos-Canadá, 1999-2000*, ed. by Bernardo Mabire (Mexico: COLMEX, 2003) p.146; Castañeda, 'Los Ejes de La Política Exterior de México' p.69.

⁴⁰⁷ Susana Chacón, 'México y El Escenario de América Del Norte: 2000-2006', in *Paradigmas y Paradojas de La Política Exterior de México: 2000-2006*, ed. by Humberto Garza (Mexico: COLMEX, 2010) p.275; José Ramos, 'La Política de Seguridad Fronteriza de Estados Unidos: Estrategias e Impactos Binacionales', *Foro Internacional*, XLIV.178 (2004), 613–34 pp.618–619; Oxford Analytica, 'Mexico: Foreign Policy Ambitions Mar Fox Presidency', *Daily Brief* (Oxford, 17 June 2003).

⁴⁰⁸ Kilroy pp.6–8; Gerardo Vega, 'Comparecencia Ante La Comisión de Defensa Nacional de La LIX Legislatura', *Diario de Los Debates*, LIX–I.1 (2004); Oxford Analytica, 'Mexico/US: Northcom to Prompt Defence Cooperation', *Daily Brief* (Oxford, 1 May 2002).

was to establish the foundations of regional security.⁴⁰⁹ The continentalist strategy of the Fox government also failed to achieve the expected success, as it had a high internal political cost and received little support in Washington to return to the migration dialogue. Conversely, the United States took unilateral measures such as the implementation of an anti-immigrant policy that considered the construction of a border wall which, it argued, would prevent the entry of terrorists and illegals into its territory. Despite this, the development of the new continental cooperation framework was under construction.

The third character of strategic policy during the second half of the administration was rooted in defensive nationalism. Ironically, the practices of the strategic confrontation pattern were not directed towards the United States but to Latin America. This position contrasted with the 'multilateral bilateralism' that Mexico aspired towards to balance American influence.⁴¹⁰ In economic matters, the policy elite again took up aspects of Central American activism and the 'node and radio' strategy implemented in the 1980s and 1990s. In this case, decision-makers were not aiming to develop a counterweight to the United States. It was a reaction to the socio-economic problems on the southern border. By 2004, Mexico entered the Central American Integration System as an observer and promoted regional development through the *Puebla-Panama Plan*. Mexico also signed a free trade agreement with Uruguay and economic complementation agreements with Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. However, those initiatives gave poor results due to the weak leadership and low credibility of Mexico in the region.⁴¹¹ In political matters, the disagreements with Latin America were constant. Since 2002, Fox's meeting with Cuban dissidents, his request to Cuban President Fidel Castro to leave Mexico after the conclusion of an international summit, and the Mexican government's support for the United Nations condemnation of the human rights situation on the island, generated frictions. By 2004, Fox broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba as a reprisal to the Castro's remarks about Mexico's submissiveness to the United States.⁴¹² Tensions spread south after Latin American countries rejected Mexico's requests to chair

⁴⁰⁹ Dainzú López, *La Politique Étrangère Du Mexique Sous Le Gouvernement de Vicente Fox (2000-2006). Entre Tradition et Changement* (Paris: USN, 2011); Raúl Benítez and Carlos Rodríguez, 'Seguridad y Fronteras En Norteamérica: Del TLCAN a La ASPAN', in *Seguridad y Defensa En América Del Norte: Nuevos Dilemas Geopolíticos*, ed. by Raúl Benítez (San Salvador: WWC, 2010) pp.239–40; Villarreal and Lake pp.1–6; USDOS, 'Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America', *Archive*, 2005 <<https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2005/69843.htm>> [accessed 23 November 2018].

⁴¹⁰ Guadalupe González, 'México Ante América Latina: Mirando de Reojo a Estados Unidos' pp.24–6; Castañeda, 'Los Ejes de La Política Exterior de México' p.66.

⁴¹¹ Robert Scollay, 'Globalización e Integración: Una Perspectiva Multilateral', in *Regionalismo Global: Los Dilemas Para América Latina*, ed. by Antoni Estevadeordal and Ramon Torrent (Barcelona: CIDOB, 2005) pp.301–4; Puyana and Romero p.411.

⁴¹² Mario Ojeda, 'Vicente Fox: El Rompimiento de Facto Con Cuba', *Foro Internacional*, XLVII.4 (2007), 868–94; Ana Covarrubias, 'La Política Mexicana Hacia Cuba a Principios de Siglo: De La No Intervención a La Protección de Los Derechos Humanos', *Foro Internacional*, XLIII.3 (2003), 627–44.

the Organisation of American States and join the Southern Common Market. These tensions influenced the failure of Mexico's attempt to play the role of mediator in the guerrilla conflict in Colombia and the territorial dispute between Bolivia and Chile. The regional discrediting of Mexico was exacerbated after the diplomatic confrontation with Bolivia over a gas trading issue and its refusal to participate in the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti.⁴¹³ By 2005, tensions deepened with Argentina and Venezuela. During the Summit of the Americas, Fox confronted Presidents Hugo Chávez and Néstor Kirchner in defence of the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas. This event marked Mexico as the leading defender of the commercial integration project promoted by the United States. By 2006, the crisis with Venezuela escalated to the mutual breakdown of diplomatic relations and the Venezuelan resignation from the *G-3 Free Trade Agreement*.⁴¹⁴ Chile was the only country with which Mexico maintained a stable link. This situation is attributed to the role played by the Mexican Ambassador Raúl Villanueva, the chief promoter of Mexican activism in Latin America since 2004. He argued that Mexico, in its role of 'geopolitical bridge' between the south and north of the Western hemisphere, was called to transform ancient cultural and economic relations with the United States to create a unique community by integrating the north and south of America.⁴¹⁵ However, the multilateral activism attempted by Mexico clashed with the anti-American positions prevailing in Latin America. Within the Mexican political elite, continentalist predispositions significantly influenced the erosion of Latin American confidence in Mexico and nationalist predispositions shaped Mexico's responses to Latin American rejection.

The lack of definition that prevailed from 2003 to 2006 was the result of a failed process of reorientation of the strategic policy. The objective was to overcome the incompatibility that arose between the approach formulated by Castañeda and the new structural conditions. The external changes and internal pressures derived from 9/11 attacks and the Iraq War conditioned that process. One of the main exogenous factors that motivated policy-makers to try to recover the international diversification model was the abrupt modification of the bilateral agenda with the United States. The change in American priorities led Mexico to seek new links. In this context, domestic factors played a significant role in formulating the

⁴¹³ Rafael Velázquez, 'Balance General de La Política Exterior de México, 2000-2006' pp.96-9; Érika Ruiz, 'La Política Exterior de México Durante El Sexenio de Vicente Fox: Mucho Discurso y Pocas Nueces', *Foro Internacional*, XLVIII.Ene-Jun (2008), 66-80 p.78.

⁴¹⁴ Ana Covarrubias, 'La Política de México Hacia América Latina En El Siglo XXI: ¿congruencia y Legitimidad?', *Estudios Internacionales*, 2017, 193-223 pp.203,2014; Guillermo Guajardo, 'Viejos Puentes y Nuevos Acervos: La Relación de México Con América Latina y El Caribe Durante El Sexenio de Vicente Fox', *Foro Internacional*, XLVIII.1-2 (2008), 268-96 p.293.

⁴¹⁵ Vladímir Súdarev, 'México y América Latina: Nueva Etapa de Relaciones', *Латинская Америка*, 6 (2013), 5-20 pp.10-4; Érika Ruiz pp.71-2,8.

inconsistent responses of the policy elite. One was the misunderstanding of changes in American policy and regional balances in Latin America. The policy choices also reflected a limited understanding of the scope of Mexico's capabilities, the international role that the country could play, and the conditions of social consensus to promote a globalist approach.⁴¹⁶ A second factor was the division between continentalists and nationalists. While politicians and bureaucrats encouraged regional integration and Mexico's involvement in global affairs; military and lawmakers resisted international cooperation, especially with the United States. Also, the rivalry that arose between officials of the economic portfolio and the Secretariat of Foreign Relations fragmented the decision-making process.⁴¹⁷ A third factor was the reconfiguration of Congress and the cabinet in 2003. The legislative dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party and the Party of the Democratic Revolution allowed them to exercise a nationalist counterweight to the continentalist preferences of the National Action Party government. Furthermore, the progressive decomposition of the cabinet and Fox's inability to take control of internal dynamics prevented the articulation of a coherent policy.⁴¹⁸ The result of these three factors was strategic indefiniteness. Mexico went from the policy of 'the whole enchilada' to that of 'partial enchiladas'. Derbez's speeches revealed that the approach to which he aspired was a diluted version of Castañeda's vision. The rhetorical axis remained international activism, while integration into North America continued to be the primary objective.⁴¹⁹ At the end of the administration, Castañeda criticised that the policy elite had returned to the old diplomacy of the Institutional Revolutionary Party. He claimed that 'what changed was the concept, not the policies. [...] They cared more about anti-war and anti-American discourse than efficiency'.⁴²⁰ The evolution of the Mexican strategic policy from 2000 to 2006 portrays tensions and contradictions between continentalist aspirations to integrate into North America and nationalist desires to preserve relative political autonomy. Multilateral internationalism failed to consolidate itself as a consistent strategic approach with the potential to become the practical logic of the policy elite. It was only a tool to lessen internal pressures and counteract American influence. This period also reveals that the limits of integration to North America were not only defined by the United States, but also by the nationalist predispositions that prevailed in the Mexican policy elite. Mexico's lack of

⁴¹⁶ Soriano pp.121,131; Érika Ruiz p.78.

⁴¹⁷ Raúl Benítez, 'La Seguridad Nacional En La Indefinida Transición: Mitos y Realidades Del Sexenio de Vicente Fox', *Foro Internacional*, XLVIII.1–2 (2008), 184–208 p.190; María Rosas, 'Agenda de Política Exterior Para El Nuevo Gobierno', *Comercio Exterior*, 57.7 (2007), 562–73 pp.564–5.

⁴¹⁸ Andrés Ruiz pp.318–9,323; Poitras and Robinson pp.18–22.

⁴¹⁹ Guadalupe González, 'México Ante América Latina: Mirando de Reojo a Estados Unidos' p.26; Pamela Starr, 'US-Mexico Relations', *Hemisphere Focus*, XII.2 (2004) p.7.

⁴²⁰ Soriano p.129; Castañeda, 'Fox y Derbez Priístas En Política Exterior' Suplemento Enfoque 622.

willingness and commitment to using its material capabilities for the preservation of the American-built international order hindered its ambition to integrate into North America and access the global elite.

4.4.2. Towards a new pattern of cooperation, 2006-2012

The political change of 2000 generated conditions that allowed the policy elite to articulate a new strategic approach. In their speech, international activism pointed to the deployment of intensive multilateralism; but in practice, the priority was to deepen integration into North America. The change in strategic policy was superficial because a continentalist practical logic based on a strategy of accommodation to American hegemony prevailed in the background. The pressures that arose after the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq War undermined the viability of the globalist project and revealed the limits of integration in North America. As of 2003, the fragmentation of the decision-making process, the lack of leadership in the policy elite, and its inability to interpret the context to redesign strategies were just some of the factors that led Mexico to indefiniteness. By 2006, conditions opposed to those of 2000 framed the strategic policy-making process. Three factors defined the tense calm of the external context. One was the distancing between Mexico and Latin America. Another was the real estate bubble that preceded the 2008 global financial crisis. The third was the incorporation of the so-called Bush doctrine into the *United States National Security Strategy*. This scenario gave the new government relative freedom to aspire to ‘reposition Mexico in its rightful place on the global and regional stage’.⁴²¹ In contrast, the domestic environment was defined by instability. The rejection and challenge of the results of the presidential elections in 2006 generated a scenario of political polarisation that undermined the legitimacy of the new government. Also, the increase in crime rates produced a public safety crisis. These situations that threatened presidential authority and the governability of the country motivated the policy elite to prioritise domestic issues on the strategic agenda.⁴²² The contrasts between the contexts in 2000 and 2006 made it possible to assume that there would be a disruptive reorientation of the strategic policy. The new government expressed its intention to give a ‘ship’s wheel blow’ to amend the mistakes of the Fox administration.⁴²³

⁴²¹ Guadalupe González, ‘México En América Latina. El Difícil Juego Del Equilibrista’ pp.35–7; SRE, ‘Primer Informe de Labores de La Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores’ (Mexico: SRE, 2007) pp.7,82–3; Robert Singh, ‘The Bush Doctrine’, in *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, ed. by Mary Buckley and Robert Singh (NY: Routledge, 2006) p.20.

⁴²² Andreas Schedler, ‘Inconsistencias Contaminantes: Gobernación Electoral y Conflicto Poselectoral En Las Elecciones Presidenciales Del 2006 En México’, *América Latina Hoy*, 51.April (2009), 41–59 pp.45–8; Raúl Benítez, ‘La Crisis de Seguridad En México’, *Nueva Sociedad*, 220.Match-April (2009), 173–89 pp.179–81.

⁴²³ Humberto Garza, Jorge Schiavon, and Rafael Velázquez, ‘Introducción: La Política Exterior En El Sexenio de Felipe Calderón’, *Foro Internacional*, LIII.213–214 (2013), 447–54 pp.448–9; Rafael Velázquez, ‘El

However, Mexico's interactions abroad reflected that its strategic policy remained subordinated to economic interests and oriented towards the United States, leaving a very narrow margin to exercise its limited political leadership capabilities in the rest of the world. The price of commercial ties with the United States and regional integration with North America was the adoption of a new pattern of continental cooperation, now in security affairs. The strategic policy of the Calderón government was defined by three asymmetric vectors that did not represent a profound break concerning the policy implemented by Fox.

The first was oriented towards Latin America. The restoration of relations with the region was a priority for the policy elite. On the economic level, Mexico played an active and pragmatic role in promoting free trade. In 2007, Mexico reasserted its commitment to Central American development through the relaunch of the *Puebla-Panama Plan*. Calderón also fostered the integration of Latin American markets in the Southern Common Market and the Organisation of American States to increase regional trade and competitiveness. By 2009, Mexico signed commercial deals with Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay. In 2011, Mexico formalised its participation in the Pacific Alliance and deepened free trade agreements with Colombia, Peru, and Central America.⁴²⁴ In contrast, at the political level, Mexico maintained a low profile, assumed a prudent stance, and exercised modest activism. The intention was to regain regional influence through the restoration of bilateral relations and the promotion of Latin American integration. In 2006, Calderón's official visits to Latin America, meetings with the presidents of Argentina and Brazil, as well as the appointment of Mexican ambassadors for Cuba and Venezuela, were the first steps to fix the damages of the diplomatic crisis. The relationship with Cuba improved significantly. In 2007, Mexico reproached the United States' economic sanctions against the island, while Cuba condemned the construction of the wall on the United States-Mexico border. The Mexican government also supported the inclusion of Cuba in the Rio Group in 2008. The diplomatic meetings in 2008, 2009, and 2012 sealed the restoration of the bilateral relation. Diplomatic relations were also restored with Venezuela, despite its predispositions. Calderón avoided confrontation despite the besiege and hostility of the Venezuelan government to Mexican companies. Mexico also assumed the role of mediator in the tensions between Colombia and

Proyecto de Política Exterior de Felipe Calderón: ¿Golpe de Timón? pp.134,154; Claudia Herrera, 'Calderón No Repetirá La Política Exterior de Fox', *La Jornada* (Mexico, 23 November 2006), p. Política; Natalia Guzmán, 'Equipo de Calderón Critica La Política Exterior Foxista', *El Universal* (Mexico, 21 October 2006), p. Nacional; Natalia Guzmán, 'Calderón Corregirá La Política Exterior', *El Universal* (Mexico, 21 October 2006), p. Nacional.

⁴²⁴ Myrna Rodríguez and Juan Prado, 'La Política Exterior de México Hacia América Latina y El Caribe Durante La Presidencia de Felipe Calderón (2006-2012)', *Miríada*, 6.11 (2015), 11–34 pp.18–20; Marco Alcázar, 'México y Centroamérica, La Difícil Confluencia', in *Los Retos Internacionales de México; Urgencia de Una Nueva Mirada*, ed. by Guadalupe González and Olga Pellicer (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 2011) pp.96–107.

Venezuela in the Rio Group in 2010.⁴²⁵ In this context, Mexico aspired to recover its influence through regional forums. By leading the Rio Group from 2008 to 2010, the Mexican government insisted on the need to integrate subregional processes. By 2010, Mexico hosted the Latin American and Caribbean Unity Summit. There, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States was established, a regional coordination mechanism promoted by Mexico. However, the parallel consolidation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas headed by Venezuela was a sign of the growing geopolitical polarisation and geoeconomic fragmentation. This situation called into question the viability of regional integration.⁴²⁶ These events also demonstrated that Calderón's policy towards Latin America oscillated between economic pragmatism and political prudence. The balance was mixed, as Mexico managed to restore its commercial and diplomatic ties, but its search for regional influence proved mostly fruitless.

Calderón's policy towards Latin America did not represent a significant reorientation of the agenda promoted by Fox. Multilateral activism remained the means to try to retrieve regional presence and influence. The main change took place in the practices used to interact with the outside world. Mexico went from the democratic euphoria of Fox to the diplomatic introversion of Calderón. The regional context in which Calderón assumed power was complex. The absence of almost all Latin American leaders at his inauguration was a sign that relations with the region were at their lowest point. Moreover, contrary to the trend of the growing number of Latin American countries led by left-wing politicians, Calderón's arrival to power further displaced the Mexican government to the right-wing of the political spectrum. This environment anticipated the deepening of tensions with Latin America.⁴²⁷ However, three domestic factors make it possible to elucidate why the Calderón administration preferred reconciliation. The first was the configuration of the policy-making process. As a result of the centralisation of decision-making in Calderón, his orthodox profile and legalistic reflexes influenced the formulation and implementation of policies. Centralisation is attributed to the fact that the government's leadership depended highly on his political capacity. Also, Calderón formed a relatively homogeneous cabinet with low-

⁴²⁵ Rodríguez and Prado pp.20–2,27–8; Olga Pellicer, 'México Como Potencia Media En La Política Multilateral, 2006-2012', *Foro Internacional*, LIII.3–4 (2013), 873–96 pp.875–80.

⁴²⁶ Francisco Rojas, 'La Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños', *Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica*, 10.3 (2010) pp.24–31; Olga Pellicer, 'La Seguridad Regional: Los Caminos Divergentes de Latinoamérica', *Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica*, 10.3 (2010) pp.45–50.

⁴²⁷ Octavio Amorin and Andrés Malamud, 'What Determines Foreign Policy in Latin America? Systemic versus Domestic Factors in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, 1946–2008', *Latin American Politics and Society*, 57.4 (2015), 1–27 pp.9,21–2; Natalia Saltalamacchia, 'México y América Latina: La Vía Multilateral', in *Los Retos Internacionales de México; Urgencia de Una Nueva Mirada*, ed. by Guadalupe González and Olga Pellicer (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 2011) pp.61–75.

profile actors, moderate predispositions, and aligned with his strategic vision oriented towards the centre of the ideological spectrum. This factor explains why foreign policy acquired a personalist style based on the practice of presidential diplomacy.⁴²⁸ The second factor was the prevailing ideas within the policy elite, especially among bureaucrats and diplomats. Diplomat Gerónimo Gutiérrez acknowledged that ‘Mexico has lost a certain presence in the region’. Similarly, Diplomat Jorge Montaña asserted that the relationship with Latin America had gone from ‘the disinterested neighborship of the 1990s to the belligerence that led us to isolation through the confrontation’. Both concurred that the goal remained to make Mexico ‘an equilibrium factor’ and ‘a bridge’ between the north and south.⁴²⁹ Diplomats Miguel Ruiz and Carlos Rico also perceived this construction of Mexico as a country of divided identity and ‘multiple belongings’. Both agreed that Mexico is ‘a nation located in North America, with Latin American identity, and with the opportunity to influence the hemisphere’.⁴³⁰ The third factor that prompted reconciliation was the conditions of the domestic environment. Calderón had no incentive to continue the confrontation. On the contrary, the rapprochement was valued as an internal policy strategy. Calderón saw in the reconstruction of the link with the regimes of Cuba and Venezuela a means to obtain external recognition, lessen the internal pressures exerted by the left-wing political forces, and replenish the legitimacy of his government.⁴³¹ In contrast to the confrontational practices of the Fox government, as of 2006, Mexico’s multilateral activism in Latin America was defined by modest positions and lukewarm attitudes. Calderón’s policy towards Latin America revealed that economic diplomacy remained the favourite tool of the policy elite and that the political affairs of the region were far from being a priority in the strategic agenda.

The second vector of the strategic policy was oriented towards the rest of the world. The international activism through which Mexico sought to vindicate its role as middle power

⁴²⁸ José Méndez p.127–34; Rodríguez and Prado pp.17–8; Patricia Espinosa, ‘La Política Exterior Del México Democrático; Análisis de La Renovada Presencia Mexicana En América Latina y El Caribe’, in *Los Grandes Problemas de México. XII. Relaciones Internacionales*, ed. by Blanca Torres and Vega Gustavo (Mexico: COLMEX, 2010) pp.405–6; Rafael Velázquez, ‘El Proyecto de Política Exterior de Felipe Calderón: ¿Golpe de Timón?’ pp.123–4.

⁴²⁹ Gerónimo Gutiérrez, ‘Los Primeros Pasos Del Nuevo Acercamiento de México a América Latina y El Caribe’, in *Las Relaciones Internacionales de México* (Mexico: IMRED, 2007); Jorge Montaña, ‘Doce Meses En El Exterior’, *El Universal* (Mexico, 30 November 2007), p. Nacional.

⁴³⁰ Carlos Rico, ‘Las Relaciones Internacionales de México’, in *Las Relaciones Internacionales de México* (Mexico: IMRED, 2007); Redacción, ‘Reforzaran Embajadores Postura de México Ante La Situación En Irak’, *NOTIMEX* (Mexico, 7 January 2003), p. Nacional.

⁴³¹ Rodríguez and Prado pp.22,28; Guadalupe González and Rafael Velázquez, ‘La Política Exterior de México Hacia América Latina En El Sexenio de Felipe Calderón (2006-2012): Entre La Prudencia Política y El Pragmatismo Económico’, in *Balance y Perspectivas de La Política Exterior de México 2006-2012*, ed. by Humberto Garza, Jorge Schiavon, and Rafael Velázquez (Mexico: COLMEX, 2014) p.151.

was based on ideas promoted by the Fox administration. However, the main difference was again in the orthodox diplomatic practices employed to implement foreign policy. Multilateralism was the means through which the policy elite aspired to diversify international alliances and project Mexico's leadership. In parallel and in tune with the implementation of the policy towards Latin America, Mexico actively participated in global forums. For example, from 2006 to 2007, Mexico chaired the United Nations Human Rights Council, where it proposed to exclude Cuba from the special observation mechanism.⁴³² By 2009, Mexico and Brazil managed to work together in the G-5 meeting, even though regional rivalry influenced their bilateral relationship to move forward with caution and distrust.⁴³³ As an inheritance from the Fox government, Mexico once again held a place in the United Nations Security Council from 2009 to 2010. The Mexican delegation distinguished itself by its professionalism, prudence, and seriousness. That profile contrasted with the heterodox, challenging, and protagonistic style of the representatives of the previous administration. The policy towards Latin America was paying off because this time, the Mexican participation received full support from the Latin American countries.⁴³⁴ Mexico also established ties with the European Union, especially in economic matters. By 2008, both parties completed a strategic partnership to strengthen the free trade agreement signed in 2000. In addition to economic diplomacy, another practice that prevailed was diplomacy based in the organisation of international summits. Mexico hosted important international events such as the Latin American and Caribbean Unity Summit and the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 2010, as well as the G-20 meetings in 2012.⁴³⁵ The organisation of these types of events served as a platform for the Mexican government to show its interest in the affairs of the global agenda and establish diplomatic ties that could potentially lead to trade agreements. The policy elite had managed to rearticulate a relatively congruent foreign policy that surpassed personal agendas. The method was effective thanks to the orthodox exercise of multilateralism and adherence to international law. However, the lack of commitment on issues of world politics and niche diplomacy such as the promotion of democracy, the protection of human rights, and peacekeeping operations reveal that the

⁴³² Rodríguez and Prado pp.20–2; ITAM, 'Relaciones Bilaterales y Multilaterales', *México En El Mundo*, 4.3 (2007), 3–7 pp.4–5,7.

⁴³³ Rodríguez and Prado pp.24–7; Pellicer, 'México Como Potencia Media En La Política Multilateral, 2006–2012' pp.877; Soriano p.135.

⁴³⁴ Vautravers and González pp.124–6; Olga Pellicer, 'El Consejo de Seguridad Cuestionado; El Papel de México', in *Los Grandes Problemas de México. XII. Relaciones Internacionales*, ed. by Blanca Torres and Gerardo Vega (Mexico: COLMEX, 2010) pp.629–50.

⁴³⁵ Érika Ruiz p.78; Rosas p.572.

Calderón government was repeating the same error as its predecessor: the lack of clarity in the objectives of the strategic policy.⁴³⁶

Calderón's policy towards the rest of the world also did not mean a disruptive change in the evolution of strategic policy. Multilateral activism remained the mechanism to generate international ties to make the neoliberal reforms profitable and neutralise American influence. The economic pragmatism and political prudence that characterised the policy towards Latin America replicated itself in Mexico's relations with the rest of the world. On the one hand, economic-material interests gained weight in decision-making, since the consolidation of the neoliberal model generated much of the country's development and stability depended on foreign trade. The attraction of foreign investment, strengthening of commercial alliances, and economic diversification constituted one of the axes that guided the strategic policy-making process. On the other hand, the policy elite abandoned confrontational practices fuelled by political-ideological factors, since they reduced the effectiveness of economic diplomacy. Mexico assumed a position that fluctuated between impartiality and indifference in international debates about the effects of globalisation, the revenues of democracy, and the defence of human rights.⁴³⁷ Economic pragmatism is interpreted as the response of the policy elite to overcome the external conditions of economic uncertainty that prevailed during much of the administration. The 2008 global financial crisis not only impacted oil prices, an industry on which Mexico depended less and less. It also influenced the increase in trade protectionism and the stagnation of Mexico's main trading partners, especially the United States. Additionally, the growing political-ideological polarisation in Latin America and the consolidation of Brazil's leadership in the region led the Mexican policy elite to recover traits of the selective and differentiated economic diplomacy implemented by Fox.⁴³⁸ On the other hand, political prudence was not only a product of Calderón's orthodox legalist reflexes nor the lessons left by the diplomatic heterodoxy of the Fox government. It was a result of ideas rooted in the political elite, much of them anchored to the precepts of the Estrada doctrine on the determination of peoples and non-intervention. For example, Diplomat Gustavo Iruegas affirms that within the policy elite

⁴³⁶ Ana Covarrubias, 'La Política Exterior de Calderón: Objetivos y Acciones', *Foro Internacional*, LIII.213–214 (2013), 455–82 pp.478–9; Levy p.128; Editorial, 'Presidente Calderón, Decídase a Ser Líder de Latinoamérica', *Siempre*, 2898.December (2008) p.28.

⁴³⁷ Covarrubias, 'El Reacomodo de México En Una América Latina Cambiante: De La Euforia Democrática a La Introversión' pp.337–8; González and Velázquez p.573; Alejandro Anaya, 'Política Exterior y Derechos Humanos Durante El Gobierno de Felipe Calderón', *Foro Internacional*, LIII.2013–2014 (2013), 771–93 pp.788–91.

⁴³⁸ Ana Covarrubias, 'La Política Exterior "Activa"... Una Vez Más', *Foro Internacional*, XLVIII.1–2 (2008), 13–34 pp.18–9,23–4; Vicente Fox, 'La Diplomacia Económica de México', *Foreign Affairs En Español*, 16.December (2000), 8–16.

the perception prevailed that ‘there is no consensus on whether the country should promote and defend regional leadership in Latin America, [...] sometimes it was even anti-diplomatic to talk about a Mexican leadership in the region’.⁴³⁹ This type of nationalist predispositions that were displaced by the continentalist inclinations of Fox and Castañeda gradually reacquired presence in the policy-making process during the Calderón government. This resulted from the low profile of the secretaries, the professionalisation of the policy elite, and the repositioning of the traditionalist sector of the diplomatic establishment in decision-making. The clearest example was the role of the Secretary of Foreign Relations Patricia Espinosa. She came from the Mexican foreign service, was little known, and had extensive experience in multilateral diplomacy and international cooperation. Her moderate predispositions and negotiation skills were vital to avoid conflicts in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Her alignment with Calderón’s vision allowed her to remain in her position throughout the administration. From the beginning of the government, the chancellor revealed that Mexico would implement a foreign policy ‘without stridence, without protagonism, nor personal promotion, and would primarily boost the economic and commercial issues’. Also, she made it clear that the Calderón administration would adhere to the traditional principles of Mexican foreign policy.⁴⁴⁰ At the same time, diplomats like Montaña recognised that

the formulation and execution of the foreign policy of a country that boasts of acting seriously on the international scene require the respect of certain basic rules. [...] The complexity of the subject advises to entrust a body of professionals [...] We have seen that in five months the current government has made an effort to rectify, with the support of the Mexican foreign service, the aimless work that characterised the predecessor.⁴⁴¹

Calderón’s policy abandoned democratic euphoria and adherence to niche diplomacy to give continuity to what in practice had become a state policy: the promotion of free trade through economic diplomacy.

⁴³⁹ Soriano p.134; Gustavo Iruegas, ‘Un Mito Derechista’, *Reforma* (Mexico, 19 August 2007) Suplemento Enfoque 4.

⁴⁴⁰ Rafael Velázquez, ‘El Proyecto de Política Exterior de Felipe Calderón: ¿Golpe de Timón?’ pp.136–7; José Román, ‘La Diplomacia Será Sin Promoción Personal Ni Estridencias: Espinosa’, *La Jornada* (Mexico, 9 January 2007), p. Nacional.

⁴⁴¹ Levy p.125; Jorge Montaña, ‘Fox: Excesos Internacionales’, *El Universal* (Mexico, 4 May 2007), p. Editorial.

The third vector of strategic policy attracted the most interest and efforts from the policy elite. It addressed two priorities: the relation with the United States and the security issues. The starting point of the Mexico-United States relationship during the Calderón government was the agendas of the *Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America* of 2005. On the one hand, the prosperity agenda continued. It focused on promoting economic growth, competitiveness, and quality of life in the region. On the other hand, the security agenda intensified. It centred on protecting the region from internal and external threats.⁴⁴² Within this renewed framework of cooperation, the bilateral relationship gradually reoriented from the migration issue to security affairs. Regarding migration, the Mexican government adopted an inconsistent speech after the 2006 elections, even though the topic continued to predominate in the debates of the policy elite. After the first working trips to Latin America, Calderón visited North America. In Ottawa, he criticised the American border wall. In Washington, he proposed to Bush that they should ‘demigratise’ the bilateral agenda.⁴⁴³ Calderón’s speech not only contradicted his campaign proposals related to promoting a new migratory policy but also distanced him from the approach developed by Fox. The migration issue lost relevance to the policy elite throughout the administration. The position of the Mexican government on the topic of migration was dispassionate, while the United States unilaterally continued its anti-immigration policy.⁴⁴⁴ In contrast, security affairs were quickly positioned as a priority on the bilateral agenda. In 2006, the increase in crime rates motivated Calderón to meet with his closest circle and agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration in Mexico to plan a security strategy. The result was the Joint Operation Michoacán which sought to combat drug trafficking by military means.⁴⁴⁵ By 2007, Calderón took advantage of Bush’s visit to Mérida to express to him that the issue of drug trafficking was a shared problem and the fight required the strengthening of binational cooperation. The Mérida Initiative of 2008 established itself as the institutional mechanism

⁴⁴² Alfonso Sánchez, ‘Gaceta Del Senado: LX/2SPO-203/15442. Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores, América Del Norte. 4 March 20018’ (Mexico: Senado, 2008); Elma Trejo, ‘Alianza Para La Seguridad y La Prosperidad de América Del Norte (ASPAN)’ (Mexico: Senado, 2006) pp.8–10.

⁴⁴³ Jorge Durand, ‘La “Desmigratización” de La Relación Bilateral: Balance Del Sexenio de Felipe Calderón’, *Foro Internacional*, LIII.3–4 (2013), 750–70 pp.750–5; Redacción, ‘Viaja Calderón Por Legitimidad’, *Reforma* (Mexico, 13 November 2006), p. Opinión; Claudia Herrera and David Brooks, ‘En Estados Unidos, Calderón Se Desmarca de La Política Migratoria Del Actual Gobierno’, *La Jornada* (Mexico, 10 November 2006), p. Nacional.

⁴⁴⁴ Jorge Durand, ‘Política Migratoria: Balance Sexenal’, *La Jornada* (Mexico, 2 December 2012), p. Opinión; Rafael Velázquez, ‘El Proyecto de Política Exterior de Felipe Calderón: ¿Golpe de Timón?’ pp.131–3,137; Sergio Jiménez and Natalia Quintero, ‘Calderón Pide Aplicar Política Exterior de Respeto Sin Rencor’, *El Universal* (Mexico, 10 January 2007), p. Nacional; Ernesto Núñez, ‘Pide FCH Respeto En Política Exterior’, *Reforma* (Mexico, 10 January 2007), p. Nacional.

⁴⁴⁵ Carmen Boullosa and Mike Wallace, *A Narco History: How the United States and Mexico Jointly Created the ‘Mexican Drug War’* (London: OR Books, 2016) pp.86–7; Wilbert Torre, *Narcoleaks: La Alianza México-Estados Unidos En La Guerra Contra El Crimen Organizado* (Mexico: PRH, 2013) chap. Martes 13.

through which the United States would finance Mexico's security strategy.⁴⁴⁶ The importance of security in the bilateral relation extended to the administration of American President Barack Obama. By 2009, both governments sought the creation of a Bilateral Implementation Office to work together in the fight against organised crime. Between 2009 and 2010, the diplomatic tensions produced by the statements of American officials about that Mexico was a 'weak and failing state' on the verge of collapse, did not hamper security cooperation.⁴⁴⁷ The economic link with the United States and the security situation in Mexico led the progressive change in the priorities of the Mexican policy elite. Mexico's interest in the region passed from the migration agreement to security cooperation.

The transition from the failed 'whole enchilada' of 2002 to the promising Mérida Initiative of 2008 depicts the emergence of a new pattern of continental cooperation. The prevailing commercial link with the United States was complemented by an unprecedented security cooperation mechanism. This process was aligned with the integrationist aspirations and continentalist predispositions of the Mexican political elite, as well as with the American interest of protecting its domestic security and regional perimeter. The reorientation of the bilateral relationship was the Calderón government's response to the complicated conditions of the internal context and the regional environment, especially in the United States. In the domestic sphere, four factors undermined the relevance of the migratory topic. One was the impact that the contesting of the electoral results had on the legitimacy of the government. The second was the effect of the increase of criminality on the governability of the country. Another was the prevailing perception in the policy elite that migratory and political issues contaminated the bilateral agenda and hindered economic diplomacy. Indeed, Secretary Espinosa agreed with Calderón's position that 'the immigration issue does not dominate the agenda'.⁴⁴⁸ The fourth factor was the null counterweight of actors with nationalist predispositions. Despite the historical aversion to collaborating with the United States, the military establishment saw security cooperation as an opportunity to encourage the

⁴⁴⁶ Clare Ribando, 'Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2020' (Washington: CRS, 2019); Ribando and Finklea p.11; USDOS, 'Merida Initiative' (Washington: BPA, 2009) <<https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/merida/index.htm>>.

⁴⁴⁷ Carlos Fazio, 'Barack Obama y Los Mensajes Apocalípticos Sobre México', *Clave Digital* (Mexico, 6 February 2009); Barry McCaffrey, 'After Action Report - General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret) Visit Mexico - 5-7 December 2008' (Washington: BMA, 2008) <http://www.mccaffreyassociates.com/pdfs/Mexico_AAR_%0A_December_2008.pdf>; USDOD, 'The Joint Operating Environment 2008', 2008 pp.33-6.

⁴⁴⁸ Rafael Velázquez and Roberto Domínguez, 'Balance de La Política Exterior de México En El Sexenio de Felipe Calderón Bajo Los Tres Niveles de Análisis: Límites y Alcances', *Foro Internacional*, LIII.213-214 (2013), 483-516 p.490; Rafael Velázquez, 'El Proyecto de Política Exterior de Felipe Calderón: ¿Golpe de Timón?' p.135; Carlos Benavides, 'Se Hará Política Exterior de Estado: Patricia Espinosa', *El Universal* (Mexico, 29 November 2006).

modernisation of the armed forces.⁴⁴⁹ In the external environment, three aspects channelled the agenda towards security issues. The first was the securitisation of the bilateral relationship as of 2001. The change in the United States' priorities generated incompatibility with Mexican demands on migration. Also, Mexico lacked elements to negotiate or influence the definition of the bilateral agenda. Another aspect was the publication of the *United States National Security Strategy* in 2002 and its update in 2006. Under the vision of the Bush doctrine, the principles of unilateralism and the use of preventive war endowed American foreign policy with a threatening character.⁴⁵⁰ The third factor was the role that Mexico's stability continued playing as a security issue for the United States. By 2010, American agents claimed that 'Mexico is losing the drug war [...] the Mexican government's anti-crime strategy has failed'. Similarly, to the 1994 political-economic crisis, the instability in Mexico still represented 'a homeland security problem of immense proportions to the United States'.⁴⁵¹ The Mérida Initiative marked an unparalleled milestone in the binational relationship. It entered into force despite the criticisms and pressures exerted by nationalist groups in Mexico that compared it with *Plan Colombia* and conservative sectors in the United States that opposed providing support to a corrupt government and violator of human rights. The point of convergence in the bilateral agenda that gave rise to the new pattern of continental cooperation was the issue of security, although both nations approached it from different perspectives. While it was an issue linked to border control and illegal migration for the United States, it was an issue related to the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking for Mexico. Both governments recognised the importance of cooperation and the shared responsibility to address those threats to their internal safety and regional security. The strategic policy from 2006 to 2012 did not represent a disruptive reorientation in its evolutionary trajectory. However, the character of Calderón's government policy was less conflictive and more cautious than that which prevailed in the Fox administration. The reasons for this contrast were the predominance of orthodox legalistic reflexes, the centralisation of decision-making, and the moderate predispositions of policy-makers.

⁴⁴⁹ John Feeley, 'Cable from Oct. 28, 2009 (Mexico 003101)', *WikiLeaks. The Global Intelligence Files*, 2012 <https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/15/152825_-latam-wikileaks-update-mexico-.html> [accessed 15 December 2018]; Gustavo Delgado, 'Cable from Nov. 10, 2009 (Mexico 003195)', *WikiLeaks. The Global Intelligence Files*, 2012 <https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/15/152825_-latam-wikileaks-update-mexico-.html> [accessed 13 December 2018].

⁴⁵⁰ Singh p.20; The White House, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America' (Washington: BPA, 2006) pp.18,23; The White House, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America' (Washington: BPA, 2002) pp.6,15–6; Charles Krauthammer, 'The Bush Doctrine: In American Foreign Policy, a New Motto: Don't Ask, Tell', *Time* (Washington, 5 March 2001) p.42.

⁴⁵¹ John Feeley, 'Cable from Jan. 29, 2010 (Mexico 00000083)', *WikiLeaks. The Global Intelligence Files*, 2010 <https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/87/8777816_us-embassy-cables-mexico-is-losing-drug-war-says-us-.html> [accessed 15 December 2018]; USDOD pp.33–6.


Although the dispute between nationalist and continentalist continued within the political elite, the low profile of cabinet members nullified counterweights and allowed consensus aligned to the president's continentalist predispositions. The most significant features of Calderón's government policy were the exercise of presidential diplomacy, the persistence of diplomacy based on summits, the pragmatism of economic diplomacy, and diplomatic prudence in political-ideological matters. The character of the strategic policy allowed the restoration of ties with Latin America and the extension of Mexico's diversification efforts around the world. However, Mexico failed to position itself as a bridge between the north and south of the continent, as well as to consolidate its role as a relevant middle power. International activism and multilateralism were once again the formulae to try to balance the weight of the relationship with the United States. The strategic policy of this period left two central lessons. First, economic diplomacy had become a state policy as a result of the effects of the implementation of the neoliberal model in the 1980s. Second, the dismantling of defensive nationalism in the 1990s generated the conditions for the building of a new practical logic in the Mexican policy elite: soft-bandwagoning continentalism. To summarise, Figure 4-3 portrays the consolidation of the continentalist strategic approach between 2000 and 2012 as a result of the dismantling process experienced by nationalism in the 1990s.

Conclusion

This chapter has employed a structuralist-constructivist approach to analyse the complex link that entwined the endogenous and exogenous dynamics that reoriented the development of Mexican strategic policy from 2000 to 2012. Since the 1980s, within the Mexican security establishment, a tense relationship emerged between the historical desire to defend national sovereignty and the growing aspiration to integrate the country into the global economy. The continentalist construction of Mexico's external identity was gradually established as the cornerstone from which the economicist, pragmatic, and selective character of foreign policy were defined. Likewise, this identity construction influenced the formulation of soft-bandwagoning security strategies with the United States during the early twenty-first century. Two factors were decisive so that, in parallel to the dismantling of nationalism during the 1990s, the construction of a strategic continentalist approach was undertaken that would allow the country to adapt to the conditions of the American-built neoliberal international order. The first factor was the role that policy predispositions played in shaping institutional responses to national security issues. The reconstruction of the dispositional logic of the political elite headed by the business technocracy of the National Action Party

demonstrates that their policy practices were based on cultural reflexes fuelled by managerial rationality and forged during the adoption of neoliberalism.

Figure 4-3. Evolution of the Mexican strategic policy, 2000-2012
(Change and continuity of the continentalist practical logic)



The second factor was how the space of the social relations was reorganised in which decisions were made on diplomatic, economic, and military matters. The construction of the positional logic of the strategic policy-making field reveals that the dominant role that politicians and bureaucrats held not only allowed them to eradicate nationalist speeches and practices, but also to establish new standards for the design of national security strategies. These changes in the habitus of the policy elite and the field of strategic policy-making illustrate the profound impact that the adoption of neoliberalism had on the institutional and ideological sources that shaped the responses of Mexican policy actors to events like the attacks of 9/11 and the financial crisis of 2008.

The examination of the evolution of Mexico's foreign and security policy throughout the consolidation of the neoliberal political-economic model reinforces the argument that practical logic based on a continentalist conception of security gradually dominated the cultural reflexes of political and bureaucratic elites, as well as of emerging sectors within the diplomatic corps and the armed forces. The process of building the continentalist strategic approach was the result of the rules and norms that redefined international relations in the late 1980s, as well as the effect that neoliberal structural reforms had on the cultural roots and social dynamics of policy-making since the 1990s. The undermining of nationalist dispositions within the establishment of security and the preponderant role held by politicians and bureaucrats with business ties and managerial experience in the field of strategic policy-making were fundamental factors that explain the reorientation of Mexican foreign and security policy during the 2000s. This study concludes that, despite the resistance exerted by policy actors rooted in the nationalist strategic tradition like diplomats and generals, the strength that the continentalist approach gained among politicians and bureaucrats enabled it to claim the category of practical logic after Mexico's first political change in 2000. One of the contributions of this study lies in the systematic attention given to the relationship between the cultural predispositions of policy-makers and the broad structural context in which the policy was formulated after the 9/11 attacks. This practice-centred analysis complements the structural explanations that predominate in the literature.⁴⁵² Likewise, the approach deployed in this work contributes to highlighting the continuity and change in the cultural factors from which the strategies based on alliance politics and cooperation practices with the United States were designed. This chapter underpins the thesis that the reorientation of strategic policy involved the formulation of

⁴⁵² Villaroel; Randall; McGee; Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataey; Russell and Tokatlian; Kilroy; Tulchin and Espach.

soft-bandwagoning strategies that allowed Mexico to strengthen its link and dependence with the United States from the 2000s onwards.⁴⁵³

The arguments, evidence, and reflections articulated in chapters two, three, and four develop a big picture that allows us to understand how the pervasive ideological force imprinted by neoliberalism triggered the decline of nationalism and created political spaces that facilitated a continentalist strategic notion to play an increasingly crucial role in the formulation of foreign policy and the design of national security strategies in Mexico. This case study on the politics of Mexican strategic policy from 1988 to 2012 confirms that the advent and consolidation of neoliberalism had profound effects in the socio-historical context and socio-political imaginary from which the policy actors made strategic decisions that defined Mexico's strategic behaviour. Mexico went from aspiring to full independence and sovereignty to seeking regional integration and depending on the United States because this guaranteed its security and development. The facts of recent years corroborate it.

⁴⁵³ Ribando and Finklea; Paquin and James; Jimenez; Lloyd and Castle; Domínguez and Fernández.

Chapter five. The sources of Canadian strategic policy

If our centenary celebration is to mean anything, it must be about what we are, rather than about what we are not. And this problem of our identity we have yet to solve. [...] However, I do not believe that Canada is a variant of the United States. [...] A nation, like an individual, can achieve integrity and identity only out of its own experience and not derivatively from a parent. [...] Our identity cannot emerge clear and dominant until sovereignty, both real and symbolic, is brought to rest in ourselves. [...] Only in this way will the problem of Canadian identity be resolved.⁴⁵⁴

John Conway (British historian), 1964.

⁴⁵⁴ John Conway, 'What Is Canada?', *The Atlantic*, 214:5.November (1964) p.12.

Introduction

As the first case study addressed in this dissertation has shown, the understanding of the political imagination of policy elites and the assessment of its effects on decisions that delineate the state strategic behaviour depends largely on knowledge about the socio-historical contexts in which the most influential ideas have germinated. Considering the importance of the culturalist approach in strategic studies, this chapter examines the sociocultural context in which Canada's foreign and security policy was formulated from 1993 to 2015. This work also reviews the origins and evolution of the foremost strategic approaches that have shaped government thinking and practice: internationalism, Atlanticism, and continentalism. Based on the analytical framework outlined in chapter one, this study focuses on the institutional and ideological sources that feed Canadian policy. The evaluation of the cultural reflexes of policy-makers and the institutional culture of the departments in which they operated provide elements to identify the origin and effects of ideas on the evolution of strategic policy. The description provided by this study is useful to understand in the next chapters why and how the policy elite reacted to the abrupt changes of the wide structural environment in a period marked by the end of the Cold War, the consolidation of neoliberalism, and the beginning of the War on Terror.

This analysis supports the argument that the cultural roots of policy formulation and decision-making in Canada underwent a process of change from the effects produced by the national economic stagnation during the 1970s. Canada's adaptation to the rules and norms of the nascent American-centric unipolar international system in the 1980s created political spaces for continentalist doctrines to play an increasingly important role in the design of national security strategies. During this period, neoliberalism acquired enough strength inside and outside Canada to reorient the cultural predispositions of policy actors and condition their strategic decisions. Based on this argument, this chapter contributes to the literature through a comprehensive study of the predominant strategic notions within the Canadian policy elite. It should be noted that to date, there is a wide range of documents that examine Canada's foreign and security policy, several of them from structuralist perspectives. Outstanding publications by academics such as Kim Nossal, John Kirton, Tom Keating, Andrew Cooper, and Stéphane Roussel have significantly expanded the understanding of Canadian strategic behaviour.⁴⁵⁵ However, this work joins an emerging

⁴⁵⁵ Kim Nossal, Stéphane Roussel, and Stéphane Pacquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: McGill-QUP, 2015); John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Toronto: Nelson, 2007); Kim Nossal, Stéphane Roussel, and Stéphane Pacquin, *Politique Internationale et Défense Au Canada et Au*

stream of academics who complement these studies through a constructivist approach in which more considerable attention is paid to the role of cultural roots and dynamics in strategic decision-making.⁴⁵⁶ Considering the gap between these structuralist and constructivist approaches, the contribution of this chapter lies in the examination of the social and cultural context in which the subjective understandings of Canadian policy actors were forged and shaped their institutional responses to issues of foreign policy, international trade, and national security.

Below is a review of the institutional and ideological sources of Canadian strategic policy. The first section examines the social background, professional career, and usual practices of politicians, diplomats, and military. It exposes the cultural and institutional environment in which the development of the dominant ideas on foreign policy and national security took place. It also identifies the socio-cultural dynamics that governed the policy-making process since the 1980s. Part 5.2 addresses the main approaches that fuelled official articulations on strategic policy. It shows the fundamentals and evolution of the internationalist, Atlanticist, and continentalist conceptions. It also assesses the influence of these ideas in shaping the cultural practices of the policy elite before and after the 2006 political change. The review of institutional and ideological sources provides an overview of the socio-cultural context in which foreign and security policy evolved. This analysis will make it easier to understand, in the following chapters, how Canadian decision-makers reacted to the disruptive changes generated by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of neoliberalism.

5.1. Social dynamics of strategic policy-making

The formulation of Canadian strategic policy is the product of interactions between the political, diplomatic, and military elites. A diversity of actors constitutes each of these exclusive social groups. Also, each guild has a different capacity to influence and distinctive predispositions that condition their strategic choices. The following paragraphs review the social and cultural backgrounds of the most relevant constituencies that made up the policy

Québec (Montreal: PUQ, 2007); Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateral Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: OUP, 2002); Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*; Dewitt and Kirton.

⁴⁵⁶ Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic (Ottawa: Palgrave, 2020); Justin Massie and Srdjan Vucetic, 'Canadian Strategic Culture from Confederation to Trump', in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic (Ottawa: Palgrave, 2020); Justin Massie, *Franco-sphère: L'importance de La France Dans La Culture Stratégique Du Canada* (Québec: PUQ, 2013); Srdjan Vucetic, *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations* (Stanford: SUP, 2011); Mark Salter, *Mapping Transatlantic Security Relations: The EU, Canada and the War on Terror* (London: Routledge, 2010); Justin Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures', *International Journal*, 64.3 (2009), 625–45.

elite. It also examines the design of the policy-making machinery. The first section argues that the trend of socio-cultural and institutional change that began since the mid-1970s consolidated itself after the 2006 political transition. This pattern prevailed during the period of the exhaustion of the welfare state and the establishment of neoliberalism, a paradigm that has framed the evolution of Canadian strategic policy to date.⁴⁵⁷

5.1.1. Politicians

Canada's form of government is based on the Westminster system. It positions the members of Parliament as the main actors in the formulation of strategic policy, especially those belonging to the two dominant parties in Canadian politics: Liberal Party and Conservative Party. The core of the policy elite is located in the executive branch of the federal government. This is where actors who are directly involved in decision-making operate: the prime minister and the cabinet ministers. An aspect of utmost relevance is the composition of the Parliament since the counterweight of the opposition depends on the distribution of political forces. Historically, parliaments have been formed by majority governments. From 1867 to 2019, Canada has only had 14 minority governments throughout 43 parliamentary sessions. Two of these governments occurred between 1972 and 1980 and three between 2004 and 2011. During the period from 1993 to 2015, there was a relevant process of political transition that drove the evolution of the Canadian political elite.

Canada experienced a profound change during the last three decades of the twentieth century. The divisions within the Liberal Party moved it to the centre-right of the Canadian political spectrum. The crisis of the Keynesian model of the welfare state in the mid-1970s catalysed this fracture. The return of the Progressive Conservative Party to power in the 1980s and the influence acquired by business liberals in the 1990s triggered a transition to a new political-economic order. During this period of change, the social class produced by the welfare state since the 1920s consolidated itself into power. From the 1960s to the 1980s, about three-quarters of the members of the political elite belonged to the middle class.⁴⁵⁸ From the 1990s to the 2010s, there was a slight increase in politicians from the upper-middle

⁴⁵⁷ For a more detailed review of the composition of the Canadian policy elite, see *Appendix E: Canadian Policy Elite, 1993-2006*; and *Appendix G: Canadian Policy Elite, 2006-2015*.

⁴⁵⁸ *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, ed. by James Marsh (Toronto: M&S, 2000) p.756; Leo Pantich, 'Elites, Classes, and Power in Canada', in *Canadian Politics in the 1990s*, ed. by Michael Whittington and Glen Williams (Toronto: Nelson, 1998) p.187; Paul Williams, 'Social Origins and Elite Politics in Canada: The Impact of Background Differences on Attitudes toward the Welfare State', *The Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 14.1 (1989), 67–87 pp.73–4.

class and involved in business activities.⁴⁵⁹ Various academics argue that the overrepresentation of this social stratum in the political elite is attributed to the fact that political recruitment processes have not been designed to give opportunities to the working class. On the contrary, these processes have focused on the preservation of the status quo, consolidation of the ruling class, and satisfaction of their aspirations for social mobility.⁴⁶⁰ These factors have favoured the development of a relative cohesion and rough consensus within the so-called ‘confraternity of power’ in which the various institutional leaders share attitudes and values.⁴⁶¹ The similarities in the socio-economic background and the gradual ideological affinity between liberals and progressive conservatives allowed a common understanding of the need to reduce the welfare state and adopt the neoliberal model.

One aspect that has allowed the generation and reproduction of attitudes and shared values among the institutional leaders of the Canadian political establishment has been their common socio-cultural origins. In addition to coming from the middle and upper-middle classes, most politicians came from urban areas during the second half of the twentieth century.⁴⁶² Although the perception prevails that conservatives usually come from the west and liberals from the east, studies reveal that most politicians originated in central Canada, especially in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec.⁴⁶³ The overrepresentation of this region is attributed to the fact that it houses the poles of the political, economic, and cultural power of Canada. A similar pattern is observed regarding the ethnic profile of the political elite. During the second half of the twentieth century, about 80 per cent of politicians were British descendants and more than half grew up in the context of the Second World War.⁴⁶⁴ It should be noted that since the 1990s, the profile of Canadian politicians began to diversify slightly in terms of gender, occupation, and ethnicity; while homogeneity prevailed in attributes such as age, educational qualifications, social class, and political experience.⁴⁶⁵ Although the

⁴⁵⁹ Michael Ornstein and Michael Stevenson, *Politics and Ideology in Canada: Elite and Public Opinion in the Transformation of a Welfare State* (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2014) pp.399–401; Donley Studlar and others, ‘A Social and Political Profile of Canadian Legislators, 1996’, *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 6.2 (2000), 93–103 pp.95–6.

⁴⁶⁰ Michael Ornstein, ‘Three Decades of Elite Research in Canada: John Porter’s Unfulfilled Legacy’, in *The Vertical Mosaic Revisited*, ed. by James Curtis and Rick Helmes-Hayes (Toronto: UTP, 2016) pp.164–7,170; Dennis Olsen, *The State Elite* (Toronto: M&S, 1980) p.30.

⁴⁶¹ Robert Presthus, *Elites in the Policy Process* (Cambridge: CUP, 2010); John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: UTP, 1965) pp.522–3,532,607.

⁴⁶² Olsen pp.30–3; Allan Kornberg and Norman Thomas, ‘Representative Democracy and Political Elites in Canada and the United States’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 19.1 (1965), 91–102 p.98.

⁴⁶³ Kai Chan, ‘Canada’s Governing Class: Who Rules the Country?’, *Canadian Electronic Library*, Independen.September (2014), 1–50 pp.10–2; John Demont, Dale Eisler, and Luke Fisher, ‘Chrétien’s New Cabinet’, *Maclean’s* (Toronto, June 1997) pp.24–5.

⁴⁶⁴ Marsh p.756; Rick Ogmundson and John McLaughlin, ‘Trends in the Ethnic Origins of Canadian Elites: The Decline of the Brits?’, *Canadian Review of Sociology*, 29.2 (1992), 227–42 pp.230–1; Paul Williams p.75.

⁴⁶⁵ Chan pp.1–4; Studlar and others pp.95–6,100–1.

political elite gave more representation to minority groups since the 2000s, the positions of higher political power continued to be occupied by politicians who were male, white, middle-class, middle-aged, Christian, Canadian-born, English speakers, and from central Canada.⁴⁶⁶ The origins of the political elite have not only contributed to the generation of a close bond with the corporate elite. They have also influenced the predominance of values and interests linked to British over Francophone heritage in the definition of Canadian state identity and strategic behaviour.⁴⁶⁷

An investigation of formal training also explains the causes of relative understanding within the political elite and the evolution of the distinctive reflexes of its members. As in many Western countries, the legal profession has historically been one of the pillars of Canadian political culture. Since the 1960s, about one-third of the members of Parliament have had a legal education.⁴⁶⁸ 17 of the 23 Canadian prime ministers since the Confederation of 1867 had legal training. This fact is interpreted as an inheritance of the role that lawyers played in the British political elite since the seventeenth century.⁴⁶⁹ Also, a belief has prevailed in Canadian political culture that

the lawyer will not be forgotten by the party when it becomes necessary for the government to select individuals to handle the enormous amount of its legal business. The position of the legal profession in and out of Parliament provides great opportunities for the distribution of patronage.⁴⁷⁰

Thus, the legal profession established itself as a means of social and political mobility in Canada. Currently, politicians educated in law play fundamental roles within the national board of the Liberal Party and the national council of the Conservative Party.⁴⁷¹ The change

⁴⁶⁶ Brenda O'Neill and David Stewart, 'Gender and Political Party Leadership in Canada', *Party Politics*, 15.6 (2009), 737–57 pp.744–5; Caroline Andrew and others, 'Introduction', in *Electing a Diverse Canada: The Representation of Immigrants, Minorities, and Women*, ed. by Caroline Andrew and others (Toronto: UBCP, 2008) pp.18–9.

⁴⁶⁷ Ornstein and Stevenson p.392; Massie, *Francosphère: L'importance de La France Dans La Culture Stratégique Du Canada* p.24; Vucetic, *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations* p.7; Wallace Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power* (Québec: McGill-QUP, 1975) p.255.

⁴⁶⁸ David Podmore, 'Lawyers and Politics', *British Journal of Law and Society*, 4.2 (1977), 155–85 pp.155,162–3,177; Kornberg and Thomas p.94.

⁴⁶⁹ Willi Guttsman, 'The British Political Elite and the Class Structure', in *Elites and Power in British Society*, ed. by Philip Stanworth and Anthony Giddens (Cambridge: CUP, 1974) pp.28–31; Mogens Pedersen, 'Lawyers in Politics: The Danish Folketing and United States Legislatures', in *Comparative Legislative Behaviour: Frontiers of Research*, ed. by Samuel Patterson and John Wahlke (NY: Wiley, 1972) p.28.

⁴⁷⁰ Podmore p.177; Harold Innis, *Essays in Canadian Economic History* (Toronto: UTP, 1956) p.400.

⁴⁷¹ Conservative Party, 'Constitution' (Ottawa: Conservative Party, 2018) art.19.9, p.19; Liberal Party, 'Constitution' (Ottawa: Liberal Party, 2016) art.15–6,35,48, pp.2–3,6,10.

in the Canadian political-economic model in the 1980s altered this trend. Between 1980 and 2005, although politicians with academic degrees and professional experience in law continued to predominate, there is a consistent increase in the number of politicians with training or occupations in business and economics.⁴⁷² It should be noted that the quality of academic credentials has not been highly relevant within the political elite. Usually, its members have not stood out for having high educational qualifications or graduating from elite foreign universities.⁴⁷³ The change in the formal education of politicians partially explains the transition from legalistic reflexes to managerial pragmatism in the decision-making of the Canadian political elite.

The political formation of institutional leaders has been linked to their formal training. The fact that colleges such as McGill University, University of Toronto, University of Alberta, Dalhousie University, University of Montreal, University of Ottawa, University of Western Ontario, and Queen's University are considered as political hotbeds, is not only attributed to their academic prestige or that most of them are located in the region of central Canada.⁴⁷⁴ Their relevance also derives from the fact that they facilitate access to partisan clubs such as the Young Liberals of Canada and the Progressive Conservative Youth Federation. These groups capture students with political potential under the argument of 'encouraging the participation and recruitment of youth'.⁴⁷⁵ The objective is to involve them in electoral mobilisation, policy promotion, and organisation of conventions to develop political skills in the future cadres of the party. Only young people with leadership, negotiation, organisational, discursive, and social abilities tend to ascend in the partisan structure. Family and professional ties inside the political sphere play a key role in accelerating the mobility process. Although the Canadian political training system has been based on practice, most parliamentarians have little political experience or knowledge on the affairs of their elected office. This situation is attributed to the lack of a system of seniority, hierarchies, and rewards that encourages professionalisation and specialisation.⁴⁷⁶ By the 2010s, this trend

⁴⁷² Chan pp.20–31; O'Neill and Stewart pp.744–5; John Courtney, *Do Conventions Matter? Choosing National Party Leaders in Canada* (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 1995) p.169,183.

⁴⁷³ Kilian Crawford, 'Can't Call Canada's Conservatives Overeducated', *The Tyee* (BC, December 2012), p. Opinion <<https://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2012/12/13/Canadian-Conservatives-Education/>>; Studlar and others pp.94–6; Pantich p.75; Kornberg and Thomas p.94.

⁴⁷⁴ Chan pp.27–31,37; Studlar and others pp.96–7.

⁴⁷⁵ Conservative Party, 'Constitution' art.8.7.4, p.9; Liberal Party, 'Constitution' art.55, p.11; William Cross, 'Representation and Political Parties', in *Canadian Politics*, ed. by James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon (Toronto: UTP, 2009) pp.252–3.

⁴⁷⁶ Studlar and others pp.95–9; Michael Atkinson and Paul Thomas, 'Studying the Canadian Parliament', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 18.3 (1993), 423–51 p.445; Michael Atkinson and Kim Nossal, 'Executive Power and Committee Autonomy in the Canadian House of Commons: Leadership Selection, 1968-1979', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 13.2 (1980), 287–308; Harold Clarke and Richard Price, 'A Note on

began to reverse with the emergence of the ‘career politician’ profile, especially in the Liberal Party.⁴⁷⁷ Amateurism in a large sector of the political elite has limited their understanding of the profound changes in the structural environment and their influence that they can exercise from parliamentary committees. This aspect has also reduced the credibility of legislators in the formulation of strategic policy and given greater relevance to technical advice provided by diplomats and military.

The informality that has prevailed in the Canadian political training system has also given birth to practices that reproduce along the political trajectory and upset the policy-making process. One of the most relevant is that of political patronage. Institutional conditions in political parties have positioned this activity as an efficient resource to ascend to the political elite. This practice is conceived as a type of social transaction in which a political actor with power (employer) dispenses favours, rewards, and benefits, sometimes outside the law, to a political actor with less power (client) in exchange for loyalty and reciprocity.⁴⁷⁸ This dynamic has turned the positions of political aide and political staffer into privileged positions since they allow their occupants to acquire practical knowledge, generate patronage relationships, and socialise with interest groups.⁴⁷⁹ Since the origins of the Canadian political system, this practice has influenced the conformation of what David Savoie defines as ‘court government’:

I mean that the effective political power now rests with the prime minister and a small group of carefully selected courtiers. I also mean a shift from formal decision-making processes in cabinet and, as a consequence, in the civil service, to informal processes involving only handful of key actors.⁴⁸⁰

the Prenomination Role Socialization of Freshman Members of Parliament’, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 10.2 (1977), 391–406.

⁴⁷⁷ Donald Savoie, ‘The Perils of the Career Politician’, *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 6 October 2014); Éric Grenier, ‘Which Federal Party Has the Most ‘career Politicians’?’, *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 4 July 2011).

⁴⁷⁸ Marsh p.1629; Vincent Lemieux, ‘Public Sector Ethics’, in *Political Ethics: A Canadian Perspective. Volume 12*, ed. by Janet Hiebert (Toronto: Dundurn, 1992) pp.79–81.

⁴⁷⁹ Ian Brodie, *The Tansley Lecture. In Defence of Political Staff* (Regina: USP, 2012) pp.4–9; Allan Blakeney and Borins Sandford, *Political Management in Canada: Conversations on Statecraft* (Toronto: UTP, 1998) pp.67–8.

⁴⁸⁰ David Johnson, *Thinking Government: Public Administration and Politics in Canada* (Toronto: UTP, 2016) p.151; Donald Savoie, *Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability in Canada and the United Kingdom* (Toronto: UTP, 2008) p.16.

This dynamic is not exclusive to liberals or conservatives. It is a norm rooted in Canadian political ethics since the Confederation of 1867.⁴⁸¹ The establishment of court governments and the importation of administrative practices from the private sector became a trend that gained strength since the 1980s. Although this dynamic made policy-making more efficient, the informal structure that operates under the logic and interests imposed by the prime minister has produced centralisation of power, displacement of other actors, undermining of counterweights, dilution of bureaucratic roles, and reduction of accountability. The result is a policy-making process that runs at two speeds. When an issue satisfies the interests of the prime minister and her/his courtiers, the process secures funds and runs fast. When a topic is of little importance, the decision-making process becomes slow, porous, bureaucratic, and consultative.⁴⁸²

An analysis of the governments from 1993 to 2015 illustrates the background, education, and distinctive practices of the generation of Canadian politicians that emerged since the 1980s. For example, Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, and Stephen Harper came from the middle class, belonged to the Young Liberals Club, held positions as political aides, and were *protégées* of prominent politicians. In Martin's case, his father's background in the Liberal Party provided him with significant symbolic and social capital.⁴⁸³ The three prime ministers also illustrate the progressive change in formal education, professional vocation, and cultural reflexes that dominated the political elite. Chrétien and Martin were the last prime ministers trained in law. However, Chrétien did not perceive himself as a lawyer and Martin developed in the business field. The arrival to power of Harper, who was trained in economics, consolidated the managerial, economicist, and corporative reflexes of the political elite.⁴⁸⁴ The socio-cultural background of the prime ministers also influenced how they configured their cabinets. The values and interests they embodied were projected and reproduced through 'elected Cabinet colleagues' they convened for their court governments.

⁴⁸¹ Gordon Stewart, 'Political Patronage under Macdonald and Laurier 1878-1911', *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 10.1 (1980), 3-26 pp.3-4; William Morton, 'The Cabinet of 1867: The General Circumstances', in *Cabinet Formation and Bicultural Relations: Seven Case Studies*, ed. by Frederick Gibson (Ottawa: QPC, 1970) p.3.

⁴⁸² David Johnson, *Think. Gov. Public Adm. Polit. Canada* pp.151; Savoie, *Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability in Canada and the United Kingdom* pp.16-7; Donald Savoie, 'The Rise of Court Government in Canada', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 32.4 (1999), 635-64 pp.635-6.

⁴⁸³ Paul Martin, *Hell or High Water: My Life in and out of Politics* (Toronto: M&S, 2009) pp.66-7; Thomas Joseph, *8 Days of Crisis on the Hill; Political Blip...or Stephen Harper's Revolution Derailed?* (NY: iUniverse, 2009) p.137; Lawrence Martin, *Chrétien: The Will to Win* (Toronto: Lester, 1995) p.94.

⁴⁸⁴ Arthur Wolak, *The Development of Managerial Culture: A Comparative Study of Australia and Canada* (London: Palgrave, 2014) p.287; Brooke Jeffrey, *Divided Loyalties: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1984-2008* (Toronto: UTP, 2010) p.200; Lawrence Martin, *Iron Man: The Defiant Reign of Jean Chrétien* (Toronto, 2003) p.31; Robert Chodos, Rae Murphy, and Eric Hamovitch, *Paul Martin: A Political Biography* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1998) pp.19,31,34-8.

Through the practice of political patronage, college friends, business partners, related politicians, and even family members were appointed to occupy crucial positions for the formulation and implementation of the foreign and security policy such as chief of staff, policy advisor, cabinet minister, and ambassador to States United or United Nations.⁴⁸⁵ As will be analysed in detail in the next chapters, the main ethnocultural and ideological differences among the three prime ministers and their teams drove the metamorphosis of Canada's external identity and redirection of the strategic policy.

5.1.2. Diplomats

Diplomats are the second most important group in the policy elite. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development is the institutional core of Canadian diplomacy. At the top of the hierarchy are the ministers of foreign affairs, international trade, and international development. Their membership of the cabinet allows them to participate directly in decision-making. The diplomatic advisors of the Prime Minister's Office and Privy Council Office occupy a second level. Their close relationship with the prime minister allows them to influence foreign policy deliberations. On a third level are the members of the foreign service deployed in the diplomatic representations of the Canadian government in other countries and international organisations. Their relevance lies in the linking of Canada with external actors and the interpretation they provide to policy-makers on the conditions of the structural environment. Due to the features of the court government, the influence of diplomats depends on their political-ideological affinity with the prime minister. The exploration of the period from 1993 to 2015 reveals the erosion of diplomatic power in decision-making and the parallel weakening of the internationalist tradition in Canadian strategic policy.

The relationship between politicians and diplomats has not been the best, especially in recent decades. The differences in their socio-cultural backgrounds and their dispute over symbolic capital have fuelled tensions between the two elites. Historically, the Canadian diplomat has come from a privileged socio-economic stratum. In addition to belonging to the upper-middle class, this guild has positioned itself as a 'legion of superbly educated, urbane, multilingual career diplomats'.⁴⁸⁶ The remarkable work of the foreign service during the so-called 'golden ages' of Canadian diplomacy (1947-1957 and 1967-1977) produced 'a certain

⁴⁸⁵ Postmedia News, 'Is Patronage the Oil That Keeps Our Democracy Turning?', *National Post* (Toronto, 1 June 2012); Savoie, 'The Rise of Court Government in Canada' p.636.

⁴⁸⁶ Paul Wells and John Geddes, 'What You Don't Know about Stephen Harper', *Maclean's* (Toronto, January 2011) p.14.

amount of prestige in the popular imagination'.⁴⁸⁷ The officers earned respect and pride of the Canadians, who trusted the diplomatic elite to serve their interests and demand little in return.⁴⁸⁸ The reputation acquired by the diplomatic corps became an obstacle for the political elite in formulating policies and implementing austerity measures. In the 1970s, to justify budget cuts in the foreign service, a negative image of the diplomat was promoted: 'the idea of the "professional diplomat" has for many conjured up visions of "dithering dandies" in pearls or pinstripes [...] lost in a haze of irrelevance somewhere between protocol and alcohol'.⁴⁸⁹ During the 1990s, something similar happened. Politicians and bureaucrats pointed out that the

Foreign Affairs personnel had become pampered fat cats who enjoyed a lifestyle abroad that other Canadians could only dream about. The reality that the majority of staff worked most of their careers in unhealthy, difficult, and often dangerous environments was overlooked in the rush to condemn the handful who abused the system.⁴⁹⁰

The socio-cultural and symbolic distinction of diplomats has catalysed the constant friction with politicians and bureaucrats in search of influence and resources.

How the diplomatic elite is constituted and reproduced is another aspect that distinguishes it significantly. The foreign service is a select group that is not representative of Canadian social and cultural diversity. Historically it has been dominated by English-speaking white men. In 1946, the diplomatic corps was made up of 67 officers, all of them men.⁴⁹¹ By 1970, the foreign service expanded to 725 diplomats. During the golden era, more than 90 per cent

⁴⁸⁷ Catherine Tsalikis, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For', *OpenCanada*, 2017 <<https://www.opencanada.org/features/foreign-service-worth-fighting/>> [accessed 24 September 2018]; Colin Robertson, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For', *Foreign Service*, 2017 <<http://www.colinrobertson.ca/?p=1960>> [accessed 24 September 2018].

⁴⁸⁸ Adam Chapnick, 'The Golden Age: A Canadian Foreign Policy Paradox', *International Journal*, 64.1 (2009), 205–21 p.217; John English, "'A Fine Romance': Canada and the United Nations, 1943-1957", in *Canada and the Early Cold War, 1943-1957*, ed. by Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1998) p.81; Robert Bothwell and John Englis, 'The View from inside out: Canadian Diplomats and Their Public', *International Journal*, 39.1 (1984), 47–67 p.65.

⁴⁸⁹ Tsalikis, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'; Robertson, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'; Jay Walz, 'Canada Shrinks Diplomatic Corps', *The New York Times* (NY, 8 March 1970) p.27.

⁴⁹⁰ Danford Middlemiss and Denis Stairs, 'Is the Defence Establishment Driving Canada's Foreign Policy?', in *Canada Among Nations 2007. What Room for Manoeuvre?*, ed. by Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen (Québec: McGill-QUP, 2008) pp.55,61; James Bartleman, *Rollercoaster: My Hectic Years as Jean Chretien's Diplomatic Advisor, 1994-1998* (Toronto: M&S, 2005) p.27.

⁴⁹¹ Catherine Tsalikis, 'The Making of a Gender-Balanced Foreign Service', *OpenCanada*, 2018; Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, *Polit. Can. Foreign Policy* p.266.

of the officers were men and only 5 per cent were Francophone at the time of admission.⁴⁹² Reforms to the recruitment process in the 1970s and 1980s gradually reversed this trend. Women went from 20 per cent in 1990 to 44 per cent in 2017. By the early 2000s, the Francophones of the province of Quebec established themselves as the most important minority, representing a quarter of the foreign service.⁴⁹³ Another impact of these reforms took place towards the end of the 2000s. Although the foreign service extended to 1,174 officers, the chances of entry significantly reduced. For example, only 120 of 8,500 applicants (1.4 per cent) successfully gained admission to succeeded to enter the diplomatic corps in 2008.⁴⁹⁴ Academics argue that the diplomatic elite has evolved much faster than the bureaucracy to abandon a pattern characterised by a 'market persistence of both social class and ethnic preferences in recruitment'.⁴⁹⁵ Attributes such as selectivity, homogeneity, and meritocracy have been inherent to the diplomatic corps.

The dynamics of recruitment and professionalisation of the foreign service have consolidated it as a social group genuinely governed by the rules of meritocracy in which symbolic and cultural capital plays a central role. Retired Ambassador Abbie Dann says the diplomatic guild 'it is not an elite, it is a profession first. Does it have some elitist aspects to it? Yeah [...] You have to be really qualified to do it. That is not elitist; that is just being qualified'.⁴⁹⁶ Similarly to socio-economic background, formal education is one of the differentiating factors of this constituency of the policy elite. During the golden era, most of the officers had studied abroad. A large percentage graduated from the University of Oxford, Harvard University, and Sorbonne University in programmes in economics, history, and politics. The prestige and power of diplomats motivated academics to label them as 'a kind of Oxbridge-Harvard-Sorbonne cabal'.⁴⁹⁷ This trend gradually reversed towards the 1990s and 2000s. In this period, more than 75 per cent of the officers in an ambassadorial position had studied in Canada, especially in colleges of the central region such as Carleton University, University of Ottawa, University of Toronto, McGill University, University of Montreal, Laval

⁴⁹² Jeff Davis, 'Where Do Many Canadian Ambassadors Get Their Start?', *Embassy* (Ottawa, September 2008) p.25; Maxime Crener and Alfred Kahl, 'Personal Attributes and Attitudes of Canadian Diplomatic Officers: A Research Report', *Journal of Public and International Affairs*, 1.2 (1981), 34–43 p.37.

⁴⁹³ Tsalikis, 'The Making of a Gender-Balanced Foreign Service'; Robertson, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'; David Jones, 'Doing Diplomacy Differently: The Canadian Foreign Service', *Foreign Service Journal*, 82.3 (2005), 43–50 p.46.

⁴⁹⁴ Tsalikis, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'; Robertson, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'; Zach Lewsen, 'So, You Want to Be a Diplomat?', *NATO Association of Canada*, 2014, p. Global Horizons <<http://natoassociation.ca/so-you-want-to-be-a-diplomat/>> [accessed 21 November 2018].

⁴⁹⁵ Kenneth Kernaghan, 'Representative and Responsive Bureaucracy: Implications for Canadian Regionalism', in *Regional Responsiveness and the National Administrative State*, ed. by Peter Aucoin (Ottawa: UTP, 1985) p.13; Olsen p.82.

⁴⁹⁶ Tsalikis, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'; Robertson, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'.

⁴⁹⁷ Davis p.25.

University, and Queen's University. However, the pattern that prevailed was that of educational qualification. About two-thirds of the officers had postgraduate studies, mainly in politics, economics and history. By the early 2010s, the recruitment process became even more selective as it demanded high school studies as a minimum qualification.⁴⁹⁸ How the diplomat's formal education evolved reveals the value given to cultural capital and the predominance of training in the humanities in the configuration of their institutional reflexes.

A second factor that consolidates the distinction of diplomats in the policy elite is their institutional training. Canadian diplomats are part of the senior civil service, members of the permanent administration of the government.⁴⁹⁹ Studies by scholars John Porter and Dennis Olsen reveal that the Canadian bureaucratic system underwent a slow process of professionalisation and specialisation between the 1950s and 1970s. During that period, the bureaucracy became 'more open, more heterogeneous, and probably more meritocratic'.⁵⁰⁰ This trend had more significant effects within the diplomatic field due to the features of its small population. Politician and diplomat Barbara McDougall argues that 'there is no question in my mind that the foreign service is the most professional of all the public service'.⁵⁰¹ In addition to the high educational qualifications, this perception is based on the fact that the Canadian Foreign Service Institute has trained members of the foreign service since 1992. This academy has the mandate to train officers in 'international affairs, professional and management development, corporate accountability, foreign languages, and intercultural effectiveness'.⁵⁰² Further, Canadian universities have established training programmes focused on the development of skills in political communication, public engagement, mission management, and 'niche diplomacy'.⁵⁰³ According to diplomats Daryl Copeland and Colin Robertson, the core competencies that distinguish the Canadian diplomat are 'languages, local knowledge and history, analysis and reporting, negotiation, and effective networking'.⁵⁰⁴ In this way, the process of professionalisation and

⁴⁹⁸ Lewsen; Davis p.25.

⁴⁹⁹ Alex Marland, Andrea Lawlor, and Thierry Giasson, 'Political Elites in the Age of Digital Media', in *Political Elites in Canada: Power and Influence in Instantaneous Times*, ed. by Alex Marland, Andrea Lawlor, and Thierry Giasson (Vancouver: UBCP, 2018) pp.12–3.

⁵⁰⁰ Kernaghan p.13; Olsen p.82.

⁵⁰¹ Tsalikis, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'; Robertson, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'.

⁵⁰² Tsalikis, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'; Robertson, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'.

⁵⁰³ Carleton University, 'Diplomat & Foreign Service Training', *Norman Paterson School of International Affairs*, 2018 <<https://carleton.ca/npsia-ptd/diplomat-foreign-service-training/>> [accessed 22 December 2018]; University of Ottawa, 'English for Diplomacy', *Centre for Continuing Education*, 2018 <<https://pdinstitute.uottawa.ca/en/course-category/english-diplomacy>> [accessed 23 December 2018].

⁵⁰⁴ Daryl Copeland and Colin Robertson, 'Rebuilding Canada's International Capacity: Diplomatic Reform in the Age of Globalization', *Canadian Government Executive* (Ottawa, April 2015) p.15; Francis Clermont, 'The Art of Being a Soldier-Diplomat. From an Implicit Role to an Explicit Function', *Canadian Military Journal*, 15.2 (2015), 25–35 pp.26,33–4.

specialisation has endowed officers with a select cultural capital and shaped the distinctive habitus of the diplomatic elite.

The education and training of diplomats have been fundamental in the configuration of their institutional reflexes and ideological predispositions. The academic tradition of liberal arts played a central role in founding the principles of liberal internationalism that dominated the golden ages of Canadian diplomacy. Academics agree that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has not only been the home of many of the brightest members of Canadian society. They also agree that it has concentrated the most prominent free thinkers of the government.⁵⁰⁵ Terry MacDermot describes the educated mind of the Canadian diplomat as ‘a mind armed with the weapons of expression and trained in their use, well stocked with the knowledge appropriate to its age and educational opportunity, possessed of some critical sense, and above all, still curious to learn’.⁵⁰⁶ The intellectual sophistication and the ‘soft’ skills of diplomats have enabled them to translate their idealistic thinking into practical recommendations. A clear example has been their ability to interpret and embody the external identity of middle power that Canada aims to project. Through the practice of acting as ‘middlemen’ in international forums, Canadian diplomats have gained support for multilateral resolutions, avoided political confrontations, and reduced international tensions.⁵⁰⁷ These attributes not only distinguish the diplomats from politicians, but also from bureaucrats. Retired diplomat Tim Hodges observed this distinction when bureaucrats occupied positions in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He argues that the bureaucrats were ‘non-risk takers, centrists, [...] promoted up through the organisation [...] talented personalities, yes, but that is not the kind of people who would naturally think out of the box or think about new initiatives’.⁵⁰⁸

Despite the features of the diplomatic corps, the dominance of politicians in the field of strategic policy-making has influenced the dissemination of patronage practices. This dynamic has devalued the symbolic and cultural capital of the professional diplomat. The

⁵⁰⁵ Chapnick, ‘The Golden Age: A Canadian Foreign Policy Paradox’ pp.217–8; Hector Mackenzie, ‘Recruiting Tomorrow’s Ambassadors: Examination and Selection for the Foreign Service of Canada, 1925–1998’, in *Diplomatic Missions: The Ambassador in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. by Robert Wolfe (Kingston: QUSPS, 1998) pp.97–122; Terence Keenleyside, ‘Lament for a Foreign Service: The Decline of Canadian Idealism’, *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 15.4 (1981), 75–84 p.75.

⁵⁰⁶ Chapnick, ‘The Golden Age: A Canadian Foreign Policy Paradox’ p.218; Thomas Axworthy, ‘New Bottles for Old Wine: Implementing the International Policy Statement’, in *Canada Among Nations, 2005: Splitting Images*, ed. by Andrew Cooper and Dane Rowlands (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2005) p.276; Terry MacDermot, ‘Training for the Foreign Service’, *International Journal*, 4.1 (1949), 24–32 p.29.

⁵⁰⁷ Erika Simpson, ‘The Principles of Liberal Internationalism According to Lester Pearson’, *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 34.1 (1999), 75–92 pp.77–8; John Holmes, *Canada: A Middle-Aged Power* (Toronto: M&S, 1976) p.vi.

⁵⁰⁸ Tsalikis, ‘A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For’; Robertson, ‘A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For’.

nature of the court government has allowed the prime minister and her/his closest circle to privilege social capital and political-ideological affinity in the appointment of ministers, advisors, and ambassadors. Furthermore, this dynamic has opened the possibility for politicians and bureaucrats without training or experience to occupy diplomatic positions. Patronage has not been exclusive to liberals or conservatives and has intensified since the 1980s. During the government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, 17 political appointments took place in the diplomatic establishment.⁵⁰⁹ Between 1984 and 1993, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney increased the problem by appointing friends and supporters to 36 diplomatic positions. This situation motivated the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers to accuse Mulroney of using the diplomatic corps as his ‘personal Senate’.⁵¹⁰ Despite the complaints, the trend prevailed. During the governments of Prime Ministers Chrétien, Martin, and Harper, family and friends held prominent positions such as the foreign minister, ambassador to Washington, and ambassador to the United Nations.⁵¹¹ In 2013, the persistence of patronage, severe budget cuts, and the guild’s distinctive esprit de corps motivated the foreign service to perform an unprecedented strike.⁵¹² The effects of this dynamic are significant in the morale of the diplomatic corps. Journalists claim that in the 1990s, ‘the Liberals inherited a shrunken, dispirited ministry, uncertain of its mandate or its mission’.⁵¹³ These cases reveal that patronage within the diplomatic field is driven by interests and distrust, mainly after a change of government.

The period from 1993 to 2015 illustrates the complicated relationship between politicians and diplomats. The return of the Liberal Party to power represented the beginning of the weakening of the diplomatic structure and the marginalisation of professional diplomats from decision-making.⁵¹⁴ Some of the most iconic cases took place during the Chrétien government. The prime minister appointed André Ouellet and John Manley as his ministers

⁵⁰⁹ Conrad Black, *Rise to Greatness: The History of Canada From the Vikings to the Present* (Toronto: M&S, 2014) pp.922–4; Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World* (Toronto: M&S, 2003) pp.136–7.

⁵¹⁰ Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, *Polit. Can. Foreign Policy* p.274; James Gow and Onkar Dwivedi, *From Bureaucracy to Public Management: The Administrative Culture of the Government of Canada* (Toronto: Broadview, 1999) p.107.

⁵¹¹ Robert Fife, ‘Dion Shuffles Diplomatic Ranks, Replaces Controversial Tory Appointees’, *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 19 July 2016); Black pp.969–7. Postmedia News, ‘Is Patronage the Oil That Keeps Our Democracy Turning?’; Editorial, ‘All in the Family’, *Maclean’s* (Toronto, May 1994) p.16.

⁵¹² Colin Robertson, ‘Rising Power: Stephen Harper’s Makeover of Canadian International Policy and Its Institutions’, in *The Harper Factor: Assessing a Prime Minister’s Policy Legacy*, ed. by Jennifer Ditchburn and Graham Fox (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2016) pp.103–4; Kim Mackrael, ‘Canadian Diplomats in 12 Countries Walk off the Job’, *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 6 June 2013).

⁵¹³ Jamey Essex, Lauren Stokes, and Ilkin Yusibov, ‘Geographies of Diplomatic Labor: Institutional Culture, State Work, and Canada’s Foreign Service’, *Political Geography*, 72.June (2019), 10–19 p.14; Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World* p.136.

⁵¹⁴ Essex, Stokes, and Yusibov p.14; Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, *Polit. Can. Foreign Policy* p.275.

of foreign affairs based on their relationship of friendship, ideological affinity, and political interests. These attributes were much more significant than the symbolic and cultural capital of Lloyd Axworthy, who was considered the natural candidate to occupy that position throughout the government.⁵¹⁵ In Martin's government, it was no different. Bill Graham's appointment as minister of foreign affairs not only responded to his refined cultural and symbolic capital. His role as a liaison between the political groups of Chrétien and Martin, as well as the friendship he developed with Martin since their studies at law school, were significant factors for his nomination.⁵¹⁶ The arrival of conservatives to power in 2006 led the diplomatic sector to an even lower point. Harper did not appoint any member of the diplomatic corps to the position of minister of foreign affairs. He designated politicians such as Peter MacKay, John Baird, and Rob Nicholson; as well as by entrepreneurs like Maxime Bernier, David Emerson, and Lawrence Cannon. A diplomatic officer argues that

it was clear to me that the Harper government had created a noticeable climate of fear within the then Department of Foreign Affairs. Seasoned diplomats were particularly exercised about giving counsel that did not align with the government's political or electoral agenda. [...] they were expressly told that their advice and policy ideas were not welcome. Their main task was to simply implement the government's wishes — however ill-conceived. [...] We were told to shut up and do it [...] just implement it.⁵¹⁷

Tensions between diplomatic meritocracy and political patronage, budgetary disputes, and political distrust drove to this problematic relationship. The period from 1993 to 2015 witnessed the progressive erosion of the influence of professional diplomats in decision-making and, with it, the weakening of the internationalist tradition in Canadian strategic policy.

⁵¹⁵ Tom Keating, 'A Passive Internationalist: Jean Chrétien and Canadian Foreign Policy', in *The Chrétien Legacy: Politics and Public Policy in Canada*, ed. by Lois Harder and Steve Patten (Québec: McGill-QUP, 2006) p.128; Edward Greenspon and Anthony Wilson-Smith, *Double Vision: The inside Story of the Liberals in Power* (Toronto: DCL, 1996) p.45.

⁵¹⁶ Bill Graham, *Call of the World: A Political Memoir* (Toronto: OPP, 2016) p.112; Jeffrey, *Divided Loyalties: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1984-2008* p.359.

⁵¹⁷ Peter McKenna, 'Bullying Diplomats: Trudeau Picks up Where Harper Left Off', *The Chronicle Herald* (Nova Scotia, 10 August 2019), p. Opinion; Peter McKenna, 'Muzzling Diplomats Prevents Speaking Truth to Power', *Winnipeg Free Press* (Winnipeg, 15 August 2019), p. Opinion.

5.1.3. Military

The military elite is the third most influential group in the strategic policy-making process. The Department of National Defence is the institution that hosts the Canadian military establishment. Its operation is the result of the interaction of bureaucrats and military personnel that make up the administrative wing of the department and the operative wing of the armed forces. The actor with the highest decision-making power is the minister of national defence, who is a civilian appointed by the prime minister. Her/his position as a cabinet minister allows her/him to influence the strategic policy-making directly. In a second level, there are two actors whose influence is the product of their direct interaction with the defence minister. Firstly, the deputy minister of national defence, the senior civil servant who leads the bureaucratic apparatus. She/he is in charge of policy advice, departmental management, accounting officer, inter-departmental coordination, international defence relations, public service renewal, federal-provincial relations, and portfolio management. Secondly, the chief of the defence staff, the senior serving officer who leads the armed forces. She/he is responsible for the command, control, and administration of the forces, as well for the military strategy, plans, and requirements. Like the diplomatic elite, the influence of the leaders of the defence establishment depends on their alignment with the visions of the political class and the relationship they develop with the prime minister. An exploration of the period from 1993 to 2015 demonstrates the simultaneous weakening of Canada's military capabilities and the increase in international commitments that required the intense involvement of Canadian Forces.

The socio-cultural background of the military elite has been directly linked to the process of institutionalisation of the armed forces and the configuration of Canadian society. During the First World War, the hierarchical structure of the Canadian Expeditionary Force responded to British regimental traditions in which leadership was based on social class. While the bulk of the field force was made up of middle and middle-lower-class peasants, students, labourers, and office workers; most of the senior officers were middle and upper-middle-class lawyers, engineers, businessmen, farmers, dentists, and military officers.⁵¹⁸ After the Second World War, a dispute between two factions emerged within the military establishment. On the one hand, traditionalist officers defended the model in which leadership was granted based on personal qualities and social class. On the other hand,

⁵¹⁸ Tim Cook, 'Canadian Command during the Great War', *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, 2014 <<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/canadian-command-during-the-great-war>> [accessed 12 January 2019]; Jack Hyatt, 'Canadian Generals of the First World War and the Popular View of Military Leadership', *Social History*, 12.24 (1979), 418–30 pp.425–6.

modernist generals promoted a system based on technical and academic merits that would allow officers to integrate with civilian elites to influence national security policy-making.⁵¹⁹ Despite the reforms promoted in the 1950s to professionalise the officer corps, the attempt to attract and retain talent failed in the 1960s and 1970s. Scholars argue that the army 'was becoming a last-resort employment option and earning a reputation as a social daycare for misfits and reprobates'. Officers acknowledged that 'the majority of recruits are persons who are pushed toward application after marginal employment experiences'.⁵²⁰ By the 1970s and 1980s, most of the military were marginal worker-citizens from small towns and rural areas. These data alerted a sector of the military elite, as the trend observed in other Western countries was the recruitment of educated citizens from urban areas.⁵²¹ Also, the gradual blurring of socio-cultural distinctions among applicants increased the difficulty of discriminating between non-commissioned members and officer cohorts. This differentiation was essential, as the objective was to assign junior command functions to non-commissioned members to restrict the size of the base of the elite officers' body.⁵²² Thus, even though the Canadian Forces evolved from a traditionalist and aristocratic model to a modernising system that valued cultural capital, the complexity of Canadian social class shaped the predominant socio-cultural profile among the officers.

The military elite has been defined as a small and homogeneous social group. The socio-cultural background of its members has been subject to a slow process of change. During the Great War, of the 126 generals and admirals who were part of the Canadian Expeditionary Forces, more than three quarters were white Canadians from Ontario and Quebec. Their average age was 47 years and a third had university studies.⁵²³ That profile did not change significantly during and after the Second World War even though the Canadian Forces began a professionalisation process. A white man from central Canada, moderately educated, and

⁵¹⁹ Peter Kasurak, 'Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform', *Armed Forces & Society*, 37.1 (2011), 95-118 pp.95-9; Merwyn Sprung, *The Soldier in Our Time: An Essay* (Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1960) p.99.

⁵²⁰ Kasurak, 'Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform' p.104; Deborah Cowen, *Military Workfare: The Soldier and Social Citizenship in Canada* (Toronto: UTP, 2008) pp.136,151-3; Charles Cotton and Franklin Pinch, 'The Winds of Change: Manning the Canadian Enlisted Force', in *Life in the Rank and File: Enlisted Men and Women in the Armed Forces of the United States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom*, ed. by David Segal and Wallace Sinaiko (NY: Pergamon, 1986) pp.236-40,245; Franklin Pinch, 'Military Manpower and Social Change: Assessing the Institutional Fit', *Armed Forces & Society*, 8.4 (1982), 575-600 pp.579-80.

⁵²¹ Cowen pp.153-4; Charles Cotton and Franklin Pinch, 'An Overview of Findings from the CFPARU Applicant Survey, Summer 1975' (Willowdale: CFPARU, 1975) p.12.

⁵²² Kasurak, 'Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform' p.102; Cowen p.142,153-4; Robert Chevrier and Richard Parker, 'Canadian Forces Applicant Profile: Phase 1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics' (Willowdale: CFPARU, 1989) p.31; Pinch p.580; Franklin Pinch and Charles Cotton, 'Expanding the Recruit Market for Other Rank Personnel, Report 76-5' (Willowdale: CFPARU, 1976) pp.6-11.

⁵²³ Hyatt pp.419-24.

with British roots remained the predominant profile.⁵²⁴ Between the 1990s and 2010s, the number of generals and admirals increased from 80 to 130. During that period, half came from central Canada and were between 25 and 39 years old. Moreover, more than 88 per cent had post-secondary degrees and less than 5 per cent represented social minorities.⁵²⁵ The evolution of the socio-cultural background of the members of the military elite has responded to two main factors. The first is the impact of the professionalisation process. Modernist reforms influenced the production of younger and better prepared senior officers. However, they also caused the overrepresentation of the central region in the military elite. The second factor is the effect of endogenous socialisation. The applicants' personal and family connections with the military started to play a significant role in the continuity of the officer's profile. In the 1980s, about 60 per cent of the recruits had had some social contact with the military and 15 per cent came from families with a military background.⁵²⁶ Both factors contributed significantly to the preservation of values, beliefs, and attitudes within the military elite.

The limited influence of generals and admirals in the strategic policy-making process is not only attributed to the fact that they do not have a direct representation in the cabinet. Despite professionalisation efforts, the cultural capital of senior officers has been insufficient to occupy a competitive position within the policy elite. During the Second World War, Canadian Forces were considered an army of citizens. They had little in common with the professional armies of the superpowers, even though they depended on the doctrine and staff training of the British Army. It was not until the conclusion of the conflict that Canadian Forces began to develop their standards regarding who should be officers and how they should be trained.⁵²⁷ Modernist current argued that officers should have 'a serious study of the science of warfare [...] detailed knowledge of economics, political science, commerce

⁵²⁴ Kasurak, 'Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform' pp.95-6; Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English Canadian Historical Writing: 1900-1970* (Toronto: OUP, 1976) p.171; Jack Granatstein, *Conscription in the Second World War 1939-1945* (Toronto: Ryerson, 1969) p.1.

⁵²⁵ David Pugliese, 'A 60 per Cent Increase in Canada's Generals- Vance Says More to Come', *Ottawa Citizen* (Ottawa, 5 May 2018), p. national; Jungwee Park, 'A Profile of the Canadian Forces', *Perspectives. Statistics Canada*, July.75-001-X (2018), 17-30 pp.18-21.

⁵²⁶ Kasurak, 'Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform' p.104; Cowen pp.147,153.

⁵²⁷ Kasurak, 'Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform' pp.95-6,98; Colin Gray, 'Defence Policy and the Military Profession: What Are Canada's Soldiers to Do?', in *Canadian Military Professionalism: The Search for Identity*, ed. by Colin Gray and Rob Byers (Toronto: CIIA, 1973) pp.75-84; Adrian Preston, 'The Profession of Arms in Postwar Canada, 1945-1970: Political Authority as a Military Problem', *World Politics*, 23.2 (1971), 189-214.

and business administration'.⁵²⁸ By the early 1950s, the modernist reforms established the entry standard as high school graduation with a two-year service college programme for general service officers and four-year for technical support and Royal Canadian Air Force officers. However, problems began to arise in attracting competent applicants, especially for the Royal Military College and Canadian Army Staff College. Admission exams were removed, as less than 20 per cent of applicants passed. These problems demoralised and exhausted the officers, especially those who entered with university studies. By the 1960s, the officer corps lost prestige and influence in the government, a situation that reduced the attractiveness of the military career considerably.⁵²⁹ The cultural and intellectual deficiencies of the officers influenced the movement of real power within the Department of National Defence to the civil bureaucrats after the unification of the armed services in 1968.⁵³⁰

The professionalisation process led to the replacement of the regimental system of managing careers with a centralised personnel management model based on formal military education and merit-based promotion.⁵³¹ Despite these advances, the problems persisted. Hidden structures emerged to influence promotions and appointments. Scholars argue that these practices produced severe failures in military planning and operations in the last decades.⁵³² Furthermore, academic problems continued. By the late 1980s, less than 20 per cent of personnel had a post-secondary degree or diploma and a quarter had less than high school graduation.⁵³³ By the 1990s, the problems extended to the Command and Staff College and

⁵²⁸ Peter Kasurak, *A National Force: The Evolution of Canada's Army, 1950-2000* (Vancouver: UBCP, 2013) p.48; Kasurak, 'Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform' p.98.

⁵²⁹ Kasurak, 'Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform' pp.99-100,111-2; Frederic Thompson, 'The Profession of Arms in Canada, 1945-1970. Paper Prepared for Chief of the Defence Staff' (Kingston: RMC, 1970).

⁵³⁰ Kasurak, 'Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform' p.96; Stephen Harris, 'Tracking Development of Canadian Leadership and Practice', in *Conference on Leadership in the Armies of Tomorrow and the Future. Fort Frontenac. February 6-7* (Kingston, 2002); Stephen Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: UTP, 1988).

⁵³¹ Government, 'Military Universities, Schools and Training Establishments', *National Security and Defence. Canadian Armed Forces*, 2019 <<https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/services/militarycolleges.html>> [accessed 22 January 2019]; Alberta Alis, 'Canadian Armed Forces Personnel - Commissioned Officer', *Occupations in Alberta*, 2018 <<https://alis.alberta.ca/occinfo/occupations-in-alberta/occupation-profiles/canadian-armed-forces-personnel-commissioned-officer/>> [accessed 15 January 2019]; RMC, 'Your Goal - An Officer in the Canadian Armed Forces', *Military Training*, 2018 <<https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/en/training-wing/your-goal-officer-canadian-armed-forces>> [accessed 15 January 2019].

⁵³² Kasurak, 'Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform' p.100; David Bercuson, *The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental History from New France to Afghanistan* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2012) p.11; John Joly, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. Vol 1* (Ottawa: PWDSC, 1997) pp.164-5.

⁵³³ Park p.22.

the National Defence College. These academies had a limited number of majors, the candidates were ‘not always the best’, and only produced ‘competent, solid, but conventional staff officers’. Less than half of the graduates were promoted.⁵³⁴ Until then, the academic qualifications of senior officers were defined by their knowledge in science, technical reflexes, and English language skills. By 1997, reports sent to the prime minister indicated that Canadian Forces had ‘a remarkably ill-educated officer corps, surely one of the worst in the Western world’.⁵³⁵ In response, the Royal Military College reformed its curriculum incorporating subjects oriented to arts, humanities, and social sciences, as well as the development of bilingual skills. The Canadian Forces College increased its emphasis on strategic studies and national security. This academy gained accreditation to offer a master’s of defence studies degree. These troubles had already been glimpsed by members of the Officer Professional Development Board since the 1960s. They argued that ‘gradually we find the professional Canadian officer isolating himself from his own society and viewing his military role in terms of Imperial defence and strategy, with little or no concern for the study of the strategic problems likely to face his own country’.⁵³⁶ The board maintained that officers needed extensive knowledge, beyond their branches and specialisations, to develop expertise on their primary function: the preservation of national security. The high command required a ‘broad understanding of the humanistic aspects of warfare’, including aspects of the social sciences and liberal arts. However, the board’s comprehensive assessment was overlooked during the second half of the twentieth century.⁵³⁷ In this way, the limited cultural profile of the officers has prevented them from competently integrating into the dynamics of the strategic policy-making process in which politicians and diplomats played a dominant role.

Finally, it is essential to point out some practices that shape how the military interacts with the political elite. One of these is the internal dynamics of the National Defence Headquarters. The frequent tensions between the deputy minister of national defence and the

⁵³⁴ Kasurak, ‘Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform’ pp.111–2; Ronald Haycock, ‘The Labours of Athena and the Muses: Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian Military Education’, *Canadian Military Journal*, 2.2 (2001), 5–22 pp.13–4.

⁵³⁵ Kasurak, ‘Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform’ p.111; Jack Granatstein, ‘For Efficient and Effective Military Forces. Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence’ (Toronto: DND, 1997) p.19.

⁵³⁶ Kasurak, *A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950-2000* p.155; Kasurak, ‘Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform’ pp.101,112; OPDB, ‘The Officer Corps in Canada to the End of the Second World War’, in *Report of the Officer Development Board, March 1969, DHH, RG82/140*, ed. by Jean Allard (Toronto: DND, 1969).

⁵³⁷ Kasurak, ‘Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform’ p.101; OPDB, ‘Economic, Sociological, Political and Military Change’, in *Report of the Officer Development Board, March 1969, DHH, RG82/140*, ed. by Jean Allard (Toronto: DND, 1969).

chief of the defence staff have their origin in the ambiguous assignment of roles. According to the *National Defence Act* and the *Interpretations Act*, the minister is responsible, through the deputy minister, for the ‘management and direction’ of the Canadian Forces; while the chief of the defence staff is in charge of its ‘control and administration’.⁵³⁸ In practice, the logic that governs this ministerial diarchy is driven by the interest of each actor to occupy a dominant position and influence the minister. This dispute is reflected in the bureaucratic wing’s attempts to institutionalise the subordination of the chief of the defence staff to the deputy minister since the 1970s. The differential between the cultural and social capital of bureaucrats and officers has inclined the balance of power towards the civilian side. This situation has generated resentment in the military, who have contended that the attitude of civil servants is as though like ‘if they were imperial proconsuls sent to administer occupied areas’.⁵³⁹ Also, members of the military elite argue that the ‘influence of civilian management philosophy and techniques’ has grown in the unified staff system. Officers claim that the bureaucratic preponderance has caused the ‘civilianisation’ of the headquarters and has influenced military personnel to perceive themselves as uniformed civilians, with a nine-to-five attitude towards work, and seeking pay parity with the public service. The result has been the gradual ‘downgraded of the military ethic’, as well as the erosion of the authority and control of unit commanding officers, including that of the chief of the defence staff.⁵⁴⁰

Another aspect that drives how generals and admirals interact with the political elite is their political and ideological inclinations. According to the *Queen’s Regulations and Orders*, officers are restricted from engaging in political activities that aim to ‘maintain or change public policy at the federal, provincial or municipal level’.⁵⁴¹ However, this rule does not prevent officers from having political-ideological preferences that condition their participation in the policy-making process. According to officer Tony Keene, it is ‘widely accepted by many in the military [...] that the Conservatives are the party of the Canadian Armed Forces’. He affirms that the officers’ inclination has been influenced by military

⁵³⁸ Canada, *National Defence Act R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5* (Ottawa, 2018) pp.4,12–3 art.4,18(1); Canada, *Interpretation Act R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21* (Ottawa, 2015) pp.11–2 art.24(2).

⁵³⁹ Kasurak, ‘Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946–2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform’ p.104; Douglas Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947–1985* (Kingston: Ronald, 1987) pp.70–85.

⁵⁴⁰ Kasurak, ‘Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946–2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform’ p.107; DND, ‘Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces. Final Report’ (Ottawa: DND, 1980) pp.39–41,52.

⁵⁴¹ Government, *Queen’s Regulations and Orders. Volume I. Administration* (Ottawa, 2019) p.11 art.19.41(M); DND, ‘Political Activities Guidance’, *The Maple Leaf. Defence Stories*, 2019 <<https://ml-fd.caf-fac.ca/en/2019/07/31587>> [accessed 25 February 2019].

spending and support for veterans. Keene also asserts that, unlike conservatives, liberal governments have, since the 1990s, been characterised by budget cuts and increased military commitments, the ‘decade of darkness’ for Canadian Forces. He states that in the 2000s, the officers ‘were absolutely certain: Conservatives good, Liberals bad. End of story’.⁵⁴² As will be analysed below, the relationships that the military elite developed with officers from the United States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation at the National Defence College and Canadian Forces College have shaped their Atlanticist and continentalist predispositions. The period from 1993 to 2015 not only portrays the dominance of these ideas within the military elite, but also the aversion that arose to the internationalist strategic approach due to the implications it had for the stability of the armed forces.

5.1.4. Policy-making

During the 1960s, Prime Minister Lester Pearson undertook a profound reform of the governmental structure to systematise the policy-making process, increase the decision-making power of elected ministers, and lessen the political-administrative influence of unelected senior officials. The departmentalised cabinet system that had operated until then was replaced by an institutionalised model that was intended to bring political, diplomatic, and military elites into cabinet committees to discuss government policy.⁵⁴³ The Foreign and Defence Policy Cabinet Committee, and Security and Intelligence Cabinet Committee were the most relevant to the formulation of strategic policy. Both committees congregated ministers whose departments shared policy interests. The objective was to have a more rational, centralised, systematic, and vertical structure in which decision-making was the product of better planning, prioritisation, and programming. The reforms also aimed to

⁵⁴² Tony Keene, ‘The Myth of One-Party Support for the Canadian Armed Forces’, *CBC News, Opinion* (Toronto, 11 January 2017); Martin Shadwick, ‘The Harper Legacy’, *Canadian Military Journal*, 16.2 (2016), 75–81.

⁵⁴³ Dunn Christopher, ‘The Central Executive in Canadian Government: Searching for the Holy Grail’, in *The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration*, ed. by Dunn Christopher (Toronto: OUP, 2002) pp.318–21; Paul Thomas, ‘The Role of Central Agencies: Making a Mesh of Things’, in *Canada Politics*, ed. by James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon (Peterborough: Broadview, 1999) pp.132–8; Herman Bakvis and David MacDonald, ‘The Canadian Cabinet: Organization, Decision-Rules, and Policy Impact’, in *Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy*, ed. by Michael Atkinson (Toronto: Harcourt, 1993) pp.54–7; Stephan Dupré, ‘The Workability of Executive Federalism in Canada’, in *Federalism and the Role of the State*, ed. by William Chandler and Herman Bakvis (Toronto: UTP, 1987) pp.236–58; Richard Van Loon and Michael Whittington, *The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure and Process* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1987) p.473.

ensure that consensus resulted from the plurality of cabinet committees and the specialised advice of central agencies.⁵⁴⁴

The starting point of the formal process of policy-making in the institutionalised cabinet system is the Priorities and Planning Committee or ‘inner cabinet’. This core body coordinates, supervises, and directs the rest of the cabinet committees. Its relevance lies in the fact that it is chaired by the prime minister and integrated by the chairs of the other cabinet committees to establish the general agenda of government policy. The role of central agencies is essential, as they provide specialised information, intelligence, and advice. For example, with the support of the Privy Council Office and the Department of Finance on budgetary matters, the Priorities and Planning Committee establishes a broad agenda that sets out the issues and objectives for the period of government. Likewise, the senior advisers of the Prime Minister’s Office support the prime minister throughout the process. Once the agenda is agreed, the Privy Council Office distributes it to cabinet committees, central agencies, and departments to initiate the policy-making process.⁵⁴⁵

The second part of the formal process begins with the development of policy initiatives within each department. In this phase, communication between senior officials is vital to achieving coordination with the central agencies and among departments of the same cabinet committee. Once a policy proposal is generated, senior officials issue a ‘memorandum to cabinet’ to the Privy Council Office, which in turn distributes ‘briefing notes’ to the cabinet committee members, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the prime minister. These notes provide an assessment of the Privy Council Office, Department of Finances, and Treasury Board Secretariat on the strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. With this information, the cabinet committee members discuss the theoretical, practical, administrative, and political value of the project. In practice, the role played by the minister of the issuing department of the policy initiative is to defend and promote it. Likewise, support or rejection of the proposal usually depends on how it affects the interests of other departments. Finally, the Privy Council Office issues the ‘committee report’, which informs on the resolution of the cabinet committee. In case of approval, the policy initiative is promoted to the ‘full cabinet’ to be discussed and ratified by all cabinet ministers and the prime minister. At this

⁵⁴⁴ For a more detailed review of the architecture of the Canadian bureaucratic machinery, see *Appendix F: Canadian Policy-Making Structure, 1993-2006*; and *Appendix H: Canadian Policy-Making Structure, 2006-2015*. David Johnson, *Think. Gov. Public Adm. Polit. Canada* pp.131–3; David Johnson, *Thinking Government: Public Sector Management in Canada* (Toronto: UTP, 2006) pp.206–8,238–9; Donald Savoie, *Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics* (Toronto: UTP, 1999) pp.124,137.

⁵⁴⁵ David Johnson, *Think. Gov. Public Adm. Polit. Canada* pp.133–4,140; Van Loon and Whittington pp.472–81.

final stage, the duty of the ‘collective ministerial responsibility’ demands ministers to support all decisions and actions of the cabinet ministers, as well as defend the consensus on the direction of strategic policy.⁵⁴⁶

During the second half of the twentieth century, the institutionalised cabinet system was the structural and operative framework of policy-making. However, each government has adjusted it based on the values and interests of the prime minister. These modifications are founded on the ‘prime prerogative ministerial’. This convention allows the prime minister to generate a shadow decision-making process that operates in parallel with the formal procedure.⁵⁴⁷ Moreover, it enables the prime minister to exercise full control over the government agenda that dictates the formulation of policies. The so-called ‘strategic prime ministership’ is the practice through which the prime minister defines the priority issues for her/his term of government.⁵⁴⁸ These dynamics not only give rise to an alternative policy-making process but have also produced informal spaces and structures for decision-making. The creation and removal of cabinet committees according to the prime minister’s priorities are usually the most visible alterations. However, the most relevant structure is what academics refer to as ‘court government’. According to Savoie, this entity is composed of the prime minister, a few select ministers, and a cadre of senior advisors. This assembly monopolises decision-making in strategic matters.⁵⁴⁹ They operate from what is defined as ‘the centre’, a space of power that houses the dominant forces of the Canadian government. Savoie illustrates this by stating that

there is one individual, however, who can at any time upset the collective versus individual responsibilities and, with no advance notice, take an issue that would properly belong to a minister and her department and bring it to the centre. The Prime Minister can intervene in any issue—big or small—if he feels that his judgement is

⁵⁴⁶ David Johnson, *Thinking Government: Public Sector Management in Canada* pp.150–7,183,220; Robert Jackson and Doreen Jackson, *Politics in Canada: Culture, Institutions, Behaviour and Public Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 2008) pp.276–7; Rand Dyck, *Provincial Politics in Canada: Towards the Turn of the Century* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1996) p.498.

⁵⁴⁷ David Johnson, *Think. Gov. Public Adm. Polit. Canada* pp.143–4; Kim Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1985) p.75.

⁵⁴⁸ Savoie, *Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics* p.321; Bakvis and MacDonald pp.64–5; Thomas Axworthy, ‘Of Secretaries to Princes’, *Canadian Public Administration*, 31.2 (1988), 247–64 p.247.

⁵⁴⁹ David Johnson, *Think. Gov. Public Adm. Polit. Canada* p.151; Savoie, *Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability in Canada and the United Kingdom* p.16; David Johnson, *Thinking Government: Public Sector Management in Canada* p.232; Savoie, ‘The Rise of Court Government in Canada’ p.635.

required [...] The important point here [...] is that the Prime Minister can intervene in a departmental matter when and where he pleases.⁵⁵⁰

These dynamics have undermined the influence of the inner cabinet and full cabinet, reducing them to a 'kind of focus group for the prime minister' or a 'mini-sounding board, a slimmed-down caucus'.⁵⁵¹

Under a logic that oscillates between formality and informality; the configuration of the strategic policy-making field locates the prime minister as the most powerful participant in decision-making. On a second level are her/his political and administrative advisors. On the one hand, the Prime Minister's Office establishes as a 'partisan, politically oriented, yet operationally sensitive' body.⁵⁵² Within its organisation, the positions of chief of staff, principal secretary, and policy advisor tend to be the most influential, especially that of foreign and defence policy advisor. This capacity to influence is primarily determined by social capital and confidence granted by the prime minister. On the other hand, the Privy Council Office is 'non-partisan, operationally oriented yet politically sensitive'.⁵⁵³ Within its structure, the positions of the clerk of the privy council and national security and intelligence advisor are the ones that provide the most relevant information for strategic decision-making. The degree of influence of these actors depends on their cultural capital and their political affinity with the prime minister. The Treasury Board Secretariat, Department of Finance, and Public Services and Procurement Canada, agencies directly linked to the management of government finances, are on a third level. Their ministers are responsible for advising the prime minister and cabinet ministers on the economic viability and budgetary impact of policy initiatives.⁵⁵⁴

In that same third level, there are two departments whose portfolio has a direct impact on strategic policy choices. Their ministers occupy a central position within the Foreign and Defence Policy Cabinet Committee, and Security and Intelligence Cabinet Committee.

⁵⁵⁰ Savoie, *Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics* pp.3,57,85.

⁵⁵¹ Donald Savoie, *Whatever Happened to the Music Teacher?: How Government Decides and Why* (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2013) p.74; Jeffrey Simpson, *The Friendly Dictatorship* (Toronto: M&S, 2002) pp.41,71.

⁵⁵² Alex Smith, *The Roles and Responsibilities of Central Agencies*. PRB 09-01E (Ottawa, 2009) p.1; Robertson Gordon, 'The Changing Role of the Privy Council Office', *Canadian Public Administration*, 14.Fall (1971), 487–508 p.506.

⁵⁵³ PCO, 'The Role and Structure of the Privy Council Office' (Ottawa: Government, 2007) pp.1,8–10; Gordon p.506.

⁵⁵⁴ David Johnson, *Think. Gov. Public Adm. Polit. Canada* pp.134–9; Michael Whittington, 'The Prime Minister, Cabinet, and the Executive Power in Canada', in *Canadian Politics in the 21st Century*, ed. by Michael Whittington and Glen Williams (Toronto: Nelson, 2007) pp.41–2; Elizabeth Riddell, *Canada and the International Seabed: Domestic Determinants and External Constraints* (Kingston: McGill-QUP, 1989) pp.167–8.

Firstly, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. The minister of foreign affairs is one of the most important actors in the definition of foreign policy. She/he occupies a leading position vis-à-vis the minister of international trade and the minister of international development. Usually, these three ministers jointly promote foreign policy initiatives in the cabinet ministers. It should be noted that the actors who occupy these positions do not always come from the diplomatic corps. Sometimes they are politicians that belong to the prime minister's closest team. Therefore, the influence of these ministers depends on their social and cultural capital, as well as their relationship with the prime minister.⁵⁵⁵ The second department on this level is the Department of National Defence. The minister of national defence is one of the leading players in the definition of security and defence policy. The development of policy proposals inside the headquarters is the result of interactions between the bureaucratic and military departmental wings. In the bureaucratic side, the deputy minister of national defence is directly responsible for policy advice, internal management, and inter-departmental coordination. In the military sector, the chief of the defence staff usually has a limited role in policy-making, since its primary function is the command, control, and administration of the Canadian Forces and their military strategy, plans, and requirements.⁵⁵⁶ Coordination between these two departments is essential for the formulation of a consistent strategic policy.

Finally, it should be noted that the power of bureaucrats and legislators does not usually exceed the influence exerted by diplomats and military. In the case of civil servants, the institutionalised cabinet system reduced the weight of deputy ministers of the departments and enhanced the power of senior officials of the central agencies. Historically, the former's influence has been 'checked and balanced' by the latter, considered the 'guardians' and 'superbureaucrats' of the permanent administration of the government. The relevance of senior public servants has depended heavily on the trust granted by the prime minister and her/his cabinet ministers. The fact that career civil servants remain in the bureaucratic structure for long periods creates distrust in the political elite, especially when a different party comes to power. In recent decades, wariness has been one of the reasons for the reduction of the bureaucratic apparatus.⁵⁵⁷ In the case of parliamentarians, their limited capacity for influence is attributed to other factors. Within the Canadian Parliament, the

⁵⁵⁵ David Johnson, *Thinking Government: Ideas, Policies, Institutions, and Public-Sector Management in Canada* (Toronto: Broadview, 2002) pp.184–5; Jackson and Jackson p.598.

⁵⁵⁶ DND, 'Organisation and Accountability. Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence' (Ottawa: Government, 1999) pp.9–10,12–4.

⁵⁵⁷ Whittington pp.42–3,48–50; David Johnson, *Thinking Government: Public Sector Management in Canada* p.230; Van Loon and Whittington pp.494–5; Colin Campbell and George Szablowski, *The Superbureaucrats: Structure and Behaviour in Central Agencies* (Toronto: Gage, 1979) pp.52–4.

Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, and the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence are the permanent spaces through which members of the Parliament discuss government decisions on strategic policy. Eventually, special joint committees are created to review foreign and defence policies or to conduct investigations as part of the parliamentary oversight function on ministerial responsibility and military command. However, legislators are usually poorly equipped in a cultural sense to understand the dynamics of the structural environment and exert a real influence on strategic choices. Moreover, during the policy-making process, the role of parliamentarians is restricted to organising forums and consultations to issue recommendations to the government.⁵⁵⁸ As will be examined in the next chapters, the modifications to the policy-making machinery had implications for the evolution of Canadian strategic policy.

5.2. Strategic approaches

During the first half of the twentieth century, Canada initiated a process that would gradually turn it into a formally sovereign state. Even during the two World Wars, much of Canadian state behaviour was based on an imperialist strategic culture of British heritage which aimed to define how to consolidate and defend the new nation. At the same time, since the 1930s, new constructions emerged of the identity that should found the international security policy of an independent and sovereign Canada. The values and interests developed in the policy elite shaped new strategic approaches that replaced imperialism and started a dispute to reach the status of practical logic. Internationalism, Atlanticism, and continentalism established the parameters for the formulation of foreign policy and security strategies that would satisfy ‘the necessity of maintaining unity at home, especially between the two founding nations; and living distinct from but in harmony with the world’s most powerful and dynamic nation – the United States’.⁵⁵⁹ As of 1945, these visions based on different state identities established the rules that would govern Canadian strategic behaviour. Internationalism sought the consolidation of Canada as a middle power through an active contribution in the construction and defence of the new international order. Atlanticism allowed Canada to promote Western values and generate a counterweight to American influence through its membership in the transatlantic alliance. Continentalism enabled Canada to develop a

⁵⁵⁸ Philippe Lagassé, ‘Accountability for National Defence: Ministerial Responsibility, Military Command and Parliamentary Oversight’, *IRPP Study*, 4.March (2010), 1–60 pp.18–24; Denis Stairs, ‘The Public Politics of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews’, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, III.1 (1995), 91–116 pp.91–4.

⁵⁵⁹ George Ignatieff, ‘Canadian Aims and Perspectives in the Negotiation of International Agreements on Arms Control and Disarmament’, in *Canadian Perspectives on International Law and Organization*, ed. by Ronald Macdonald, Gerald Morris, and Douglas Johnston (Toronto: UTP, 1974) p.696.

strategic link with the United States to underpin its sovereignty through the contribution to continental defence.⁵⁶⁰ The relevance of these strategic approaches lies in their intangible force that has shaped the understandings and practices of the policy elite to date. These visions have been much more influential than other ideological corpora such as nationalism, isolationism, or neoconservatism.⁵⁶¹ In the following sections, the enablers and drivers of the most dominant approaches in the strategic policy-making process are examined. The central argument is that the apparent irrationality of the Canadian strategic policy from the 1980s to the 2010s was the product of an intricate process of transition from internationalism to continentalism as policy elite's practical logic.

5.2.1. Internationalism

Internationalism is one of the most deeply rooted strategic conceptions within the political elite, especially in the diplomatic corps. This approach competed with Atlanticism and continentalism for the status of the practical logic of the strategic policy-making process during the second half of the twentieth century. The emergence of this notion is attributed to the ideas of Prime Minister Mackenzie King about the special status that should be granted to Canada in the post-1945 global order for its contributions to the Allied side during the Second World War. In 1944, King objected to the great allied powers about the exclusion of Canada from the central council of the new world organisation that was under construction:

We would wish to have our own right of representation, [...] at least as one of the medium powers that would be brought into the World Organisation in some relation which would recognise that power and responsibility went together and (would) recognise our individual position.⁵⁶²

Before Parliament, King defined the role of 'medium power' that Canada was forced to assume in the face of structural restrictions:

In determining what states should be represented on the Council with the great powers, it is [...] necessary to apply the functional idea.

⁵⁶⁰Bloomfield and Nossal, 'Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada' p.299.

⁵⁶¹ Massie and Vucetic p.30; Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, *Polit. Can. Foreign Policy* pp.169–70; Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' pp.636–7; Hector Mackenzie, 'Canada's Nationalist Internationalism: From the League of Nations to the United Nations', in *Canadas of the Mind: The Making and Unmaking of Canadian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, ed. by Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2007) pp.89–109.

⁵⁶² Robert MacKay, 'The Canadian Doctrine of the Middle Powers', in *Empire and Nations*, ed. by Harvey Dyck and Peter Krosby (Toronto: UTP, 1969) p.133.

Those countries which have most to contribute to the maintenance of the peace of the world should be most frequently selected. The military contribution actually made during this war by the members of the United Nations provides one good working basis for a selective principle of choice.⁵⁶³

In addition to functional justification, Canada's aspiration was linked to a moral imperative based on the fact that the middle powers 'could be entrusted to use their power responsibly in the interest of the world community'.⁵⁶⁴ The backing of diplomats and politicians, especially liberals, to King's vision placed 'middlepowermanship' as the conceptual construction that guided the development of internationalism during the golden ages of Canadian diplomacy between the 1940s and 1970s.⁵⁶⁵

Factors related to the international identity and internal character of Canada enabled this approach in the policy elite. The first factor was the external identity of medium power assumed by Canada. It should be noted that this identity did not respond to the position assigned or occupied in the international structure, but to the posture or 'stature' that it adopted. Various scholars agree that the middle power status self-assigned by Canada was the product of a strategy to generate an identity based on moral superiority. The purpose was to consolidate a distinctive identity that gave Canada privileges and legitimacy. In this way, the 'Canadian insistence' supported the middlepowermanship to place Canada as a leading actor in the international arena.⁵⁶⁶ The second enabler is the postmodern internal character that configures Canada's role as 'world citizen'. Values such as multiculturalism, the rule of law, pacifism, and liberal democracy have allowed Canada to distinguish itself from the United States and gain relevance beyond North America. This character has influenced the orientation of its foreign policy towards the promotion and defence of universal moral principles and the protection of common Western values, including through the collective and humanitarian use of military force. The international activism and voluntarism that

⁵⁶³ George Glazebrook, 'The Middle Powers in the United Nations System', *International Organization*, 1.2 (1947), 307–15 p.308.

⁵⁶⁴ Laura Neack, 'Searching for Middle Powers', *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, July (2017) pp.3–6; MacKay pp.137,142.

⁵⁶⁵ Behringer, 'The Dynamics of Middlepowermanship' pp.9–22; Chapnick, 'The Golden Age: A Canadian Foreign Policy Paradox' pp.206–14; Escott Reid, 'Canadian Foreign Policy, 1967-1977: A Second Golden Decade', in *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?*, ed. by Jack Granatstein (Toronto: CCP, 1973) pp.185–9.

⁵⁶⁶ Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' p.637; Adam Chapnick, 'The Canadian Middle Power Myth', *International Journal*, Spring.2 (2000), 188–206 p.200; Lionel Gelber, 'Canada's New Stature', *Foreign Affairs*, 2.24 (1945), 277–89 pp.280–1.

drives Canada's actions project it as a distinct actor in the global system.⁵⁶⁷ Despite the conceptual gap between the two identity perspectives, their normative similarity has simultaneously fuelled the predispositions that constitute the internationalist strategic approach.

Internationalism orients towards two main objectives. The first is political. The origins of internationalism illustrate that the status claimed by Canada responded to political issues, as it wanted representation in the global elite and recognition according to its external identity. The functional principle set forth by King reveals that the role of middle power assumed by Canada aimed to exert its influence in international affairs and to differentiate itself from other states. The addition of the moral imperative would allow the medium power status assigned to Canada by functional parameters to be more durable.⁵⁶⁸ Following the failure of Canadian representation efforts in the 1940s, the middlepowerhood was the means through which Canada managed to consolidate an external identity that would reposition it in the international structure and give it a place at the table of the superpowers. The inclusion of Canada in the G-7/8 in 1976 is just one example. The second objective is related to security. One of the underlying ideas of internationalism is that Canada can ensure its security through the construction and defence of an international order based on 'functional, multilateralist, and institutionalist principles'.⁵⁶⁹ From this perspective, how Canada interacts abroad is mainly conditioned by economic and security interests. The 'forward security' thesis holds that the preservation of world trade and the prevention of global conflict are drivers of Canadian strategic behaviour.⁵⁷⁰ To achieve these goals, Canada has adjusted to the standards of behaviour that distinguish the 'good international citizen'. The middlepowerhood has oriented internationalist predispositions towards multilateral cooperation, peaceful conflict resolution, international assistance, and niche diplomacy. This is why the Canadian internationalist diplomacy has distinguished itself by its responsible

⁵⁶⁷ Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' pp.636–7; Stéphane Roussel and Chantal Robichaud, 'L'Etat Postmoderne Par Excellence? Internationalisme et Promotion de l'identité Internationale Du Canada', *Revue Etudes Internationales*, 35 (2004), 149–70; Kim Nossal, 'Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of "good International Citizenship" in Canadian Foreign Policy', *International Journal*, 54.1 (1998), 88–105.

⁵⁶⁸ Adam Chapnick, 'The Middle Power', *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 7.2 (1999), 73–82 p.74; John Holmes, 'Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?', in *Canada's Role as a Middle Power*, ed. by King Gordon (Toronto: CIIA, 1966) pp.13–28.

⁵⁶⁹ Bloomfield and Nossal, 'Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada' p.229; Stéphane Roussel, Charles Théorêt, and Susan Murphy, 'A "Distinct Strategy"? The Use of Canadian Strategic Culture by the Sovereigntist Movement in Québec, 1968–1996', *International Journal*, 59.3 (2004), 557–77 p.561.

⁵⁷⁰ Sean Maloney, 'In The Service Of Forward Security: Peacekeeping, Stabilization, And The Canadian Way Of War', in *The Canadian Way Of War: Serving The National Interest*, ed. by Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dundurn, 2006) pp.297–8; Sean Maloney, 'Helpful Fixer or Hired Gun? Why Canada Goes Overseas', *Policy Options*, 2001, 59–65 p.65.

leadership, collective commitment, moderate style, negotiating capacity, and humanitarian character.⁵⁷¹

Within this framework, United Nations peacekeeping operations are located as the pillar of the internationalist approach, since it satisfies the functional and moral principles that constitute the external identity of middle power that Canada wishes to project. The guidelines of liberal and defensive internationalism promoted by Pearson and Trudeau were fundamental so that, from the 1950s, the predisposition to get involved in all humanitarian missions was consolidated in the policy elite.⁵⁷² Internationalism acquired the status of the Canadian strategic norm when Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts to create a United Nations Peacekeeping Force during the Suez crisis. The symbolic impact of that milestone positioned peacekeeping as the 'Canada's *métier*', a hallmark of foreign policy that would shape the self-perception of Canadians and the international identity of Canada as a 'helpful fixer'.⁵⁷³ The humanitarian commitment of internationalism went beyond rhetoric, as Canada contributed significantly to all missions from 1948 to 1988. During the second half of the twentieth century, the leadership exercised in the United Nations' humanitarian efforts provided Canada with a distinctive symbolic capital that strengthened its moral superiority and repositioned it in the international structure. The relevance acquired by the paradigm of human security after the end of the Cold War was the underpinning of peacekeeping as the axis of Canadian internationalism. However, the significant decrease in Canada's participation since the 1990s portrays the emergence of selective internationalism due to the relevance acquired by domestic affairs, regional interests, and political, economic, and moral commitments with Western allies.⁵⁷⁴ This decline illustrates the interaction of internationalism with another of the most relevant approaches within the policy elite: Atlanticism.

⁵⁷¹ Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' p.637; Evan Potter, 'Niche Diplomacy as Canadian Foreign Policy', *International Journal*, 52.1 (1997), 25–38 pp.25–6; David Lenarcic and Dean Oliver, 'Quiet Diplomacy Is Ottawa's Best Tactic', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 7 August 1997); Evan Potter, 'Canada Must Become Expert in Niche Diplomacy', *Ottawa Citizen* (Ottawa, 15 April 1996).

⁵⁷² Andrew Cohen, *Lester B. Pearson* (Toronto: Penguin, 2008) pp.114–6; Erika Simpson p.85.

⁵⁷³ Fred Gaffen, *In The Eye of The Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping* (Toronto: D&W, 1987) p.43; Akira Ichikawa, 'The "Helpful Fixer": Canada's Persistent International Image', *Behind the Headlines*, 37.3 (1979), 1–25.

⁵⁷⁴ United Nations, 'Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations' (NY: UN, 2017); United Nations, 'Troop and Police Contributors Archive (1990–2011)' (NY: UN, 2010); Paul Heinbecker, 'The Concept of Human Security: A Canadian View', *The RUSI Journal*, 145.6 (2000), 27–31.

5.2.2. Atlanticism

Atlanticism is the second of the main approaches in the Canadian strategic policy-making since the 1940s. This vision replaced the imperialist strategic culture and acquired the status of practical logic within the political elite during much of the second half of the twentieth century. Its origins date back to the ideas expressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Louis St. Laurent in 1948. He claimed that

the best guarantee of peace today is the creation and preservation by the nations of the Free World, under the leadership of Great Britain, the United States and France, of an overwhelming preponderance of force over any adversary or possible combination of adversaries. This force must not be only military, it must be economic, it must be moral.⁵⁷⁵

By 1951, Prime Minister Pearson ratified that Canada's North Atlantic policy pursued three strategic objectives: to promote liberal democracy, strengthen political-economic ties with its most reliable allies, and counterbalance the Anglo-American unilateralism through bolstering relations with France.⁵⁷⁶ St. Laurent's vision and Pearson's aims reveal that the ideological foundation of Atlanticism lies in Canada's desire to vindicate its sense of transatlantic belonging and preserve its security through a close link with Europe.

Canada's North Atlantic external identity has been one of the foremost enablers of the Atlanticist approach. That notion is grounded in two domestic identity elements: liberal democracy and biculturalism. On the one hand, Canada's strategic behaviour is interpreted as a projection of liberal-democratic norms, values, and principles prevailing in its political system. The predisposition towards multilateral cooperation and the promotion of liberal ideals arises from the federalist impulse and cosmopolitan values that constitute its political culture. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation plays a central role in Atlanticism, the vision of St. Laurent unveils that Canada not only conceives it as a military alliance but also as a mechanism to promote liberal democracy and economic cooperation. This conception is illustrated by the so-called 'Canadian article' of the *North Atlantic Treaty* of

⁵⁷⁵ Louis St. Laurent, *Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents*, ed. by Robert MacKay (Toronto: M&S, 1971) pp.184–5.

⁵⁷⁶ Lester Pearson, 'The Development of Canadian Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, 30.1 (1951), 17–30 pp.24–6; Lester Pearson, 'Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance', *Foreign Affairs*, 27.3 (1949), 369–78 p.374.

1949.⁵⁷⁷ On the other hand, the scepticism and aversion of the French-Canadian community towards militarism have played an important role in orienting Canada's involvement in the military association towards the economic and moral spheres. French identity, rooted primarily in the Quebec community, has also influenced the strengthening and institutionalisation of relations with France. This link is significant because it reinforces Canadian socio-cultural roots and helps compensate for American and British influence.⁵⁷⁸ Both identity factors allow us to understand the Canadian conception of the transatlantic coalition and the strategic relevance of the connections within it.

Geostrategic interests and concerns are the drivers of the Atlanticist approach. The objectives of the foreign policy in the North Atlantic enunciated by Pearson justify the Canadian commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The involvement in the military alliance is the means through which Canada aspires to strengthen its multilateralism, display its solidarity to its Western allies, enhance its international status, and to access the global elite. These goals explain the priority of participating in all the expeditionary missions of the transatlantic coalition since its creation, even over the United Nations peacekeeping operations.⁵⁷⁹ Canada's Atlantic predisposition to actively participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation responds to its intention to mitigate the risk that Anglo-American unilateralism poses to its political independence and territorial integrity. The soft-balancing strategy against American influence is the backbone of this approach. Soft-balancing Atlanticism aims at reinforcing the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and positioning Canada as a relevant player to avoid its marginalisation of international 'high politics' and to counter the pressures of the United States.⁵⁸⁰ Identity and geopolitics elucidate the relevance of the 'North Atlantic quadrangle', to which Canada has aspired within the transatlantic coalition.⁵⁸¹ The effectiveness of this strategic notion depends

⁵⁷⁷ Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' pp.640–1; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 'The North Atlantic Treaty' (Washington: NATO, 1949) art.2, p.829.

⁵⁷⁸ Massie, *Francosphère: L'importance de La France Dans La Culture Stratégique Du Canada* pp.237–8; Robin Gendron, *Towards a Francophone Community: Canada's Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968* (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2006) pp.145–6; John Holmes, 'Le Canada Dans Le Monde', *Politique Étrangère*, 33.4 (1968) pp.300–2.

⁵⁷⁹ Massie and Vucetic pp.38–9.

⁵⁸⁰ Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* p.21.

⁵⁸¹ Justin Massie, *North Atlantic Quadrangle. The Importance of France in Canadian Strategic Culture, 1760-1949* (Kingston: QUP, 2010) pp.109–111, 228–9; Justin Massie, 'Quadrilatère Transatlantique: Sources de Légitimité Politique de l'usage de La Force Au Canada', *Revue Internationale d'études Canadiennes*, 37 (2008), 83–114 p.94.

primarily on cooperation and solidarity with its natural allies within the alliance: United States, Great Britain and, especially, France.

Soft-balancing Atlanticism is established as the belief of the Canadian policy elite that the close relationship with Europe allows Canada to strengthen its identity and preserve its security. The historical socio-cultural values shared with the United Kingdom and France, the common political-economic interests in the West, the geopolitical situation in the North Atlantic, and the threat posed by Anglo-American unilateralism underpin Canada's involvement in the transatlantic alliance. One of the features of Atlanticism is the role that multilateralism plays as a fundamental diplomatic practice. The exercise of 'multilateralism in action' through mechanisms such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is 'central to protecting Canada's interests'.⁵⁸² A second trait is the status of the historical norm that it has acquired within the policy elite. The evolution of strategic policy reveals an implicit consensus between liberal and conservative decision-makers. Atlanticism has served as a 'third way' to compensate for the limitations and excesses of internationalism and continentalism.⁵⁸³ A third characteristic is how it interacts with other strategic cultures. On the one hand, Atlanticism tends to feed internationalist policies, since Atlanticism is considered one of its components. In contrast, the differences between the strategies embedded in Atlanticism and continentalism generate tensions and reduce their compatibility.⁵⁸⁴ As will be analysed in the following chapters, the Atlanticist strategic policy orients towards the preservation and improvement of Canada's regional reputation and international status. The predispositions that constitute this approach will allow us to understand why the objective of positioning Canada as a relevant member in the transatlantic coalition has motivated the policy elite to contribute beyond what many Canadians considered necessary.

5.2.3. Continentalism

Continentalism is the third prominent strategic approach in the policy elite. This notion is based on the security and defence cooperation commitment that arose between Canada and the United States to address the threat posed by German national socialism in the 1930s. The

⁵⁸² Srdjan Vucetic, 'Bound to Follow? The Anglosphere and U.S.-Led Coalitions of the Willing, 1950-2001', *European Journal of International Relations*, 17.1 (2011), 27-49; Tobias Bunde and Timo Noetzel, 'Unavoidable Tensions: The Liberal Path to Global NATO', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 31.2 (2010), 295-318.

⁵⁸³ DND, 'Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's New Defence Policy' (Ottawa: GOC, 2017) p.91; CBC, 'Canada Committed to Afghan Mission, Harper Tells Troops', *CBC News, World* (Toronto, 13 March 2006).

⁵⁸⁴ Massie and Vucetic pp.38-9; Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' pp.641-4.

so-called 'Kingston Dispensation' of 1938 was the discursive act established the normative core of the continental alliance.⁵⁸⁵ During the historic meeting held at Queen's University, American President Franklin Roosevelt said: 'I give you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if the domination of Canadian soil is threatened by another Empire'.⁵⁸⁶ Correspondingly, Prime Minister King declared:

We, too, have our obligations as a good and friendly neighbour, and one of these is to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air, to the United States across Canadian territory.⁵⁸⁷

The 'neighbourly' obligations recognised by both political leaders in the preservation of continental security were institutionalised during the Second World War. The *Ogdensburg Agreement* of 1940 gave rise to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the Joint Declaration on North American Defence Cooperation took place in 1947. The collaboration with the United States during the Cold War reflected a profound change in Canada's strategic vision that did not respond solely to its intention to contribute to the *Pax Americana*. The Canadian policy elite shifted from the concerns that American annexationism produced to the perception that Canada's security was inexorably tied to the superpower.⁵⁸⁸

The roots of continentalism are located in internal and external identity factors. The domestic context, shaped by Canada's geopolitical situation in North America, has produced two divergent external identities. On the one hand, the character of sovereign Canada. This is grounded in the preservation of its independence and political autonomy. Safeguarding these elements implies maintaining full control and authority over its foreign policy and national security. In contrast, the identity of allied Canada comes from the need to assure the United States that Canadians are not a threat and will not become a burden for its security.⁵⁸⁹ This identity dichotomy has led the policy elite to a double strategic dilemma. The first is whether

⁵⁸⁵ Michel Fortmann and David Haglund, 'Canada and the Issue of Homeland Security: Does the "Kingston Dispensation" Still Hold?', *Canadian Military Journal*, 3.1 (2002), 17–22 pp.17–8.

⁵⁸⁶ James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament* (Toronto: UTP, 1967) p.183.

⁵⁸⁷ Mackenzie King, 'Debates in the House of Commons 3. 30 March 1939' (Ottawa: Parliament, 1939) p.2459.

⁵⁸⁸ Donald Barry and Duane Bratt, 'Defense against Help: Explaining Canada-US Security Relations', *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 38.1 (2009), 63–89 p.65; Howard Coombs and Richard Goette, 'Supporting the Pax Americana: Canada's Military and the Cold War', in *The Canadian Way Of War: Serving The National Interest*, ed. by Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dundurn, 2006) pp.265–96.

⁵⁸⁹ Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' p.632.

to cooperate or not to cooperate. Canada guarantees its reliability to the United States by contributing to its security and defence policy; otherwise, Canada exposes itself to American unilateralism. The second dilemma arises from the indivisibility of continental security and the impact of cooperation or non-cooperation on Canadian sovereignty. That dilemma leads decision-makers to assess how to contribute to continental defence in a way that meets American demands and prevents the erosion of Canadian sovereignty.⁵⁹⁰ The Cold War made it clear to Canada that ‘the Soviet Union was the ultimate threat, but the United States was the imminent danger’.⁵⁹¹ Canadian experience during that period limited the policy elite’s willingness to modify the status of the continental alliance, as the risks of not adhering to American expectations were high.⁵⁹² The identity enablers and strategic drivers of continentalism elucidate why the United States went from being perceived as a foe to obtaining the status of guardian and why the bilateral relationship evolved into the formation of a regional security community.⁵⁹³

Two mechanisms are the institutional pillars of continentalism. Both portray the interaction between the two external identities of Canada and the strategic dilemmas facing its policy elite. First, the 1958 North American Aerospace Defence Command. Canada’s involvement is interpreted from two perspectives. One holds that Canada has managed to cooperate with the United States and safeguard its sovereignty through this structure, as it is Canadian units that patrol Canada’s airspace. This interpretation illustrates the ‘defence against help’ policy response. It argues that Canada needs to guarantee security throughout its territory; otherwise, it will have to bear the consequences of American unilateral aid.⁵⁹⁴ The other perspective recognises that this mechanism institutionalised the asymmetry of binational cooperation because Canada put its troops under American operational command in peacetime. Furthermore, academics agree that continental defence has been based primarily on American definitions and requirements. These two aspects erode Canadian

⁵⁹⁰ Massie and Vucetic p.35.

⁵⁹¹ Desmond Morton, ‘Defending the Indefensible: Some Historical Perspectives on Canadian Defence, 1867-1987’, *International Journal*, 42.4 (1987), 627–44 p.639.

⁵⁹² Alex Macleod, Stéphane Roussel, and Andri Van Mens, ‘Hobson’s Choice? Does Canada Have Any Options in Its Defence and Security Relations with the United States?’, *International Journal*, 55.3 (2000), 341–54 p.342.

⁵⁹³ Justin Massie, ‘Canada’s (In)Dependence in the North American Security Community: The Asymmetrical Norm of Common Fate’, *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 37.4 (2007), 493–516 pp.495–7.

⁵⁹⁴ Andrea Charron and James Fergusson, ‘Canada and Defence Against Help: The Wrong Theory for the Wrong Country at the Wrong Time’, in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic (Ottawa: Palgrave, 2019) pp.99–103; Nils Ørvik, ‘Canadian Security and “Defence against Help”’, *International Perspectives*, 12.3 (1983), 3–7 pp.3–7; Nils Ørvik, ‘Defence against Help—a Strategy for Small States?’, *Survival*, 15.5 (1973), 228–31 p.228.

sovereignty.⁵⁹⁵ The second mechanism is the American-promoted Ballistic Missile Defence System. The direct or indirect involvement of Canada has also lacked consensus within the policy elite. On the one hand, decision-makers argue that Canadian participation prevents the United States from taking unilateral actions and gives Canada a voice in defending its territory. On the other hand, policy-makers believe that the contribution to the programme significantly corrodes Canada's 'soft-power', morality-based external identity, and international room for manoeuvre, especially in matters of niche diplomacy. Given this dilemma, the Canadian government's position has oscillated between supporting American nuclear strategies and promoting strategic arms control, depending on the support or rejection expressed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the United Nations. Also, this situation is to some extent manageable because Canada's participation in North American Aerospace Defence Command gives it a de facto role in the Ballistic Missile Defence System. In other words, Canada has an underlying operational role, but the policy elite does not wish to assume the political cost of expressing openly full support to the programme.⁵⁹⁶ These two cases not only portray the dichotomous relationship that continentalism has with internationalist and Atlanticist approaches. They also illustrate the complex scenario in which Canada chooses to deploy a soft-bandwagoning strategy to preserve its national sovereignty and contribute to regional security.

Soft-bandwagoning is the backbone of continentalism.⁵⁹⁷ The policy elite's willingness to adopt this strategy is attributed to factors that guided the Canadian position during the Cold War. First, it allowed Canada to secure its image of a sovereign state before the pressures from the United States. It also revealed that Canada's modest cooperation in the binational alliance maximised its national security. Third, it reassured the United States by contributing to continental security. Moreover, it enabled the Canadian government to manage the political costs derived from allying with the superpower. Finally, in terms of cost-benefit, soft-bandwagoning offered better returns than exerting direct balancing to American hegemony.⁵⁹⁸ The end of the Cold War and the emergence of neoliberalism strengthened the

⁵⁹⁵ Joseph Jockel, *Canada in NORAD, 1957-2007: A History* (Kingston: McGill-QUP, 2007) p.4; Ann Denholm, 'A Middle-Power Military in Alliance: Canada and NORAD', *Journal of Peace Research*, 34.1 (1997), 37–52 p.49.

⁵⁹⁶ Eugene Lang, 'Why Canada Misfired on Ballistic Missile Defence', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 26 September 2017); Philippe Lagassé, 'Canada, Strategic Defence, and Strategic Stability: A Retrospective and Look Ahead', *International Journal*, 63.4 (2008), 917–37 p.918.

⁵⁹⁷ Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' pp.632–3; Anders Wivel, 'Explaining European Behaviour in the Unipolar World Order: The Role of Institutions, Strategy and Military Action', in *Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, 28 February-3 March* (Chicago, 2007).

⁵⁹⁸ Frank Harvey, 'The Homeland Security Dilemma: Imagination, Failure and the Escalating Costs of Perfecting Security', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 40.2 (2007), 283–316 p.310.

soft-bandwagoning strategy and reoriented the binational alliance towards the economic sphere. The *Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement* of 1987, the *North American Free Trade Agreement* of 1992, and the *Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America* of 2005 describe the deepening of regional integration. Scholars argue that the American fears about border security after 2001 and the relevance of border trade to the Canadian policy elite reoriented the continentalism from a strategy focused to ‘defence against help’ toward a one aimed to ‘defence against the lock-down’.⁵⁹⁹ In short, soft-bandwagoning has allowed the policy elite to cope with the identity and strategic dilemmas, as well as with internal and external pressures. Although Canada plays a marginal role in the framework of continental security and defence, its policy elite gains the psychological benefits generated by the recognition of Canadian sovereignty and the management of American pressures. In both the Atlanticist and continentalist approaches, Canada’s strategic policy was restricted to building alliances with American rivals, establishing a foreign policy that undermined regional security, and not developing military capabilities that threatened the stability of the United States. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the Canadian strategic policy from 1993 to 2015 underwent an intricate transition from internationalism to continentalism, in which Atlanticism played the role of the strategic wildcard of the Canadian policy elite.

Conclusion

The big picture generated throughout this chapter on the sociocultural context in which Canadian strategic policy was formulated from 1993 to 2015 allows us to understand its origin and development, particularly after the complicated economic environment of the 1970s. Firstly, the institutional source of Canada’s strategic policy began a long process of change. The gradual adoption of neoliberal precepts that would allow the country to adapt to the emerging structural environment modified the social background, formal education, and daily practices of policy-makers. These changes had profound implications in the interpretations of politicians, diplomats, and soldiers on the conditions of the international system. Corporate links, administrative capacities, business skills, and pragmatic impulses were established as the basis of the renewed institutional culture and cultural reflexes of the policy elite from the 1980s onwards. Secondly, the traditional ideological source of the Canadian political elite lost its status as practical logic. The new rules and norms that defined

⁵⁹⁹ Adam Chapnick, at the authors’ workshop for the book *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice* at the University of Ottawa, 8 December 2017; Massie and Vucetic pp.36–7; Srdjan Vucetic, ‘American Images of Canada: Canadian Muslims in U.S. Newspapers, 1999–2014’, *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 46.1 (2016), 16–32 p.16.

the dynamics of the nascent American-built neoliberal international order influenced the gradual modification of the parameters that governed the formulation of the strategic policy. Internationalism entered a phase of decline and generated political spaces for Atlanticist and continentalist notions to establish themselves as the leading providers of resources for the design of national security strategies. The review of the sources of Canadian strategic policy demonstrates that the social and cultural context played a crucial role in redirecting the Canadian policy elite's responses to the disruptive changes in the broad structural environment during the consolidation of neoliberalism and unipolarity in the post-Cold War world order.

The contribution of this study lies in its evaluation of the socio-historical context that housed the formulation of Canada's strategic policy during the turn of the century. Likewise, the examination of the institutional and ideational sources that fuelled foreign and security policy makes a modest contribution to the disciplines of international relations and international history. The making of this culturalist analysis has resorted to the most relevant works in the academy on Canadian foreign policy, many of which have been developed from a structuralist perspective.⁶⁰⁰ The reflections and findings of this chapter contribute to the work of the emerging stream of academics such as Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, Srdjan Vucetic, and Justin Massie who have addressed the Canadian case from a constructivist-structuralist approach.⁶⁰¹ The results of this study provide the necessary understandings to construct the positional logic of the strategic policy-making field and to reconstruct the dispositional logic of the policy elite in the following chapters. These two elements are fundamental to comprehend the configuration of the practical logic that led to the evolution of foreign and security policy. Finally, it is essential to highlight that this analysis of the sociocultural context in which the ideas that nurtured the strategic policy were incubated allows us, in chapters six and seven, to elucidate how the social imagination of the policy actors influenced the strategic decisions that defined the behaviour of Canada in the international arena from 1993 to 2015.

⁶⁰⁰ Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, *Polit. Can. Foreign Policy*; John Kirton, 'The 10 Most Important Books on Canadian Foreign Policy', *International Journal*, 64.2 (2009), 553–64; Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*; Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, *Politique Internationale et Défense Au Canada et Au Québec*; Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateral Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*; Dewitt and Kirton.

⁶⁰¹ Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, *Polit. Can. Foreign Policy*; Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*; Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, *Politique Internationale et Défense Au Canada et Au Québec*; Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateral Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*; Dewitt and Kirton.

Chapter six. The politics of strategic policy in Canada, 1993-2006: weakening defensive internationalism

Of all our dreams today, there is none more important – or so hard to realise – than that of peace in the world. May we never lose our faith in it or our resolve to do everything that can be done to convert it one day into reality.⁶⁰²

Lester Pearson (Canadian Prime Minister, 1963-1968), 1957.

⁶⁰² Lester Pearson, 'Lester Bowles Pearson. Acceptance Speech', in *Lester Bowles Pearson's Acceptance Speech, on the Occasion of the Award of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, December 10, 1957* (Oslo: The Nobel Prize, 1957).

Introduction

The 1980s were characterised by a significant increase in economic uncertainty and political tensions internationally. The beginning of the so-called ‘Second Cold War’ and the effects of the global recession put matters of national security at the centre of government speeches and public-sphere discourse. Since 1972, three currents of strategic thinking entered into conflict to establish themselves as the primary ideological source of the policy conceptions advocated to reorient the Canadian foreign and security policy. Internationalism, Atlanticism, and continentalism provided divergent strategic guidelines on how to address Canada’s security challenges. Each of these approaches influenced the decision-making process on diplomatic, commercial, and military matters in different ways. Taking into consideration the socio-historical context examined in the previous pages, this chapter focuses its analysis on the role of these three strategic conceptions within the policy elite and the effect of their interactions on the evolution of Canada’s strategic policy from 1993 to 2006. In order to develop this study, particular attention is paid to the dispositional logic of the policy elite headed by the Liberal Party’s business liberals, as well as to the bureaucratic, national, and global dimensions that defined the dispositional logic in which Canadian strategic policy was formulated. How Canada’s policy elite responded to changes in structural conditions during the 1990s gives evidence that the internationalist strategic tradition underwent a process of weakening, in which the formulation of defensive strategies to consolidate its role as a salient middle power, distinguish itself from the United States, and gain relevance beyond North America lost importance. After the end of the Cold War, the unipolar and neoliberal international order was governed by new rules and norms that modified the way states interacted abroad, especially with the superpower.

This chapter argues that practical logic based on an internationalist strategic notion gradually lost its influence on the definition of Canada’s external identity, the institutional culture of its government, and the cultural reflexes of its policy elite over a period marked by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of neoliberalism. This practical logic was subject to intense pressures since the early 1970s, as Atlanticist and continentalist strategic conceptions and neoliberal practices gained acceptance in the policy elite, especially in the political class. Since the beginning of Brian Mulroney’s government in 1984, it is possible to identify the influence of these ideological sources. However, it should be noted that internationalism did not lose its category of practical logic until the coming to power of the most right-wing faction of the Conservative Party in 2006. The primary conclusion is that, although the internationalist tradition managed to preserve the condition of practical logic in the 1990s, the political spaces that produced its weakening gave opportunities for Atlanticism and

continentalism to gain relevance in the formulation of strategic policy. One of the main contributions of this study is that it complements the vision provided by the realist analyses that predominate in the literature on the effects of the end of the Cold War on the state strategic behaviour.⁶⁰³ The culturalist approach deployed in this chapter facilitates interpretation of how the subjective understandings of the policy elite and changes in the systemic power structure redefined the parameters for the formulation of foreign policy and security strategies. A second contribution is that it reinforces a thesis that has recently gained acceptance about the Canadian case.⁶⁰⁴ This study shows that the weakening of the internationalist approach allowed Atlanticist and continentalist strategic notions to acquire more considerable influence in the definition of external identity and strategic policy. Within the framework of this thesis, this chapter fulfils the function of assessing the effects of the political imaginary of decision-makers on policy choices that delineated Canadian strategic behaviour during the advent of neoliberalism and the end of the Cold War.

This chapter examines the cultural dynamics of Canada's strategic policy-making process that distinguished the liberal governments that preceded the 2006 political transition. Part 6.1 reviews the main features of the internationalist construction of Canada's external identity that prevailed during the second half of the twentieth century. Furthermore, it briefly introduces the process of weakening defensive internationalism that created spaces for the resurgence of Atlanticism and continentalism since the 1980s. The second section reconstructs the dispositional logic of the policy elite to understand the role of the various notions of Canadian international identity in the formulation of strategic policy. Additionally, this section reviews the relationship between the institutional culture and the cultural reflexes of the circles with the most significant power in decision-making on foreign policy and national security. Part 6.3 constructs the positional logic of the field of strategic policy-making. It also conceptualises the external pressures that circumscribed the strategic choices of decision-makers. Likewise, it identifies the convergence of the various fields that comprised the structural context in which the strategic policy-making process took place. The last section analyses the interaction between the competing strategic visions that prevailed in the governments of Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin. Mainly, it examines how the

⁶⁰³ David Haglund, 'The Paradigm That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Canadian Foreign Policy's Uneasy Relationship with Realist IR Theory', *International Journal*, 72.2 (2017), 230–42; Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics'; Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies'; Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War'.

⁶⁰⁴ Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures'; Keating, 'A Passive Internationalist: Jean Chrétien and Canadian Foreign Policy'; Don Munton and Tom Keating, 'Internationalism and the Canadian Public', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 34.3 (2001), 517–49; Jean-François Rioux and Robin Hay, 'Canadian Foreign Policy: From Internationalism to Isolationism?', *International Journal*, 54.1 (1998), 57–75.

dynamic relationship between the subjective understandings of the decision-makers and the objective power structures defined the parameters of Canada's strategic behaviour.

6.1. Constructions of Canada's international identity: internationalism

The conviction of consolidating Canada as a sovereign nation was pervasive within the Canadian security establishment throughout the twentieth century. The end of the Second World War provided Canada with the opportunity to strengthen its political independence before the United Kingdom and its territorial autonomy before the United States. Because these ideas were central in the political imagination of the Canadian policy elite, they played a crucial role in defining what was feasible in strategic terms. The 'middlepowerhood' that Canada assumed was used to justify a range of policies encompassing from the promotion of international order through diplomatic means to continental defence through a military alliance with the United States. Simultaneously, it also set limits on policy choices. For example, it was unimaginable that Canada would act outside international norms or pose a threat to the United States. This is why the Canadian policy elite made a considerable effort during the second half of the twentieth century to ensure that strategic policy was based on an unquestionable legal position and an image of a reliable ally. This trend reflected various constructions of Canada's international identity, as well as that of a middle power that respects international law. Nevertheless, it also raised questions about whether Canada had gone from aspiring to be a major power in the post-1945 international order to becoming a United States satellite in the post-Cold War unipolar system.⁶⁰⁵

After the end of the Second World War, internationalism acquired the status of practical logic within the Canadian policy elite. This allowed Canada to abandon the imperialist strategic culture and build its own external identity of 'good international citizen'. Internationalism emerged inspired by social liberalism promoted during the government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King from 1921 to 1948. This ideology also laid the foundations of the welfare state, a political-economic model that influenced government thinking and practice. Equality, freedom, and tolerance formed the conceptual bedrock on which Lester Pearson articulated the normative guidelines for the Canadian defence of the international

⁶⁰⁵ Massie and Vucetic pp.29–40; Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures'; Chapnick, 'The Canadian Middle Power Myth'; Hawes; Holmes, 'Most Safely in the Middle'; Dewitt and Kirton; MacKay pp.133–42.

order.⁶⁰⁶ By the 1980s, the depletion of the welfare state, the effects of the global recession, and the return of conservatives to power triggered a process of weakening internationalism. This context allowed two other strategic approaches to gain relevance and dispute the status of practical logic. On the one hand, the Atlanticism, outlined by Louis St. Laurent in 1948, aimed to claim the Euro-Atlantic identity of Canada. The liberalism and biculturalism of Canadian society were its foundations. Atlanticism permitted Canada to promote Western values and multilateral cooperation. Through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Canada managed to ally with those Western nations it considers its natural allies. The strength of this political, economic, and moral link enabled Canada to design soft-balancing strategies to counter American and British pressures, as well as to improve its structural position.⁶⁰⁷ On the other hand, continentalism was forged in the ‘Kingston Dispensation’ of 1938 and consolidated itself during the Cold War. The identity of Canada as a North American country was its primary enabler. The projection of Canada as a sovereign nation and as a reliable neighbour were its main drivers. While one construction aimed at the preservation of political autonomy and territorial integrity, the other looked to provide confidence and calmness to the United States. This dichotomy moved the policy elite from being concerned about American annexationism to recognising that Canadian security was tied to the superpower. Continentalism established a framework for the development of soft-balancing strategies.⁶⁰⁸ Taking into consideration these three constructions of Canada’s international identity, the weakening of internationalism is best understood in the light of the habitus of the Canadian policy elite, the review of which allows us to grasp the role of each construction in the strategic policy-making process from 1993 to 2006.

⁶⁰⁶ For a more detailed review of the defensive internationalism strategic approach, see section 5.2.1. *Internationalism* of chapter five of this thesis: *The Sources of Canadian Strategic Policy*. Erika Simpson pp.84–6; Nossal, ‘Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of “good International Citizenship” in Canadian Foreign Policy’; Lester Pearson, *Mike: 1948-1957* (Toronto: UTP, 1972) pp.45,278; Lester Pearson, *Words and Occasions* (Toronto: HUP, 1970) pp.62,91,219,257,278; Frank Underhill, ‘Some Reflections on the Liberal Tradition in North America’, in *Search of Canadian Liberalism* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1960) p.5.

⁶⁰⁷ For a more detailed review of the soft-balancing atlanticism strategic approach, see section 5.2.2. *Atlanticism* of chapter five of this thesis: *The Sources of Canadian Strategic Policy*. Massie, *North Atlantic Quadrangle. The Importance of France in Canadian Strategic Culture, 1760-1949* pp.109–111,228–9; Laurent pp.184–5; Pearson, ‘The Development of Canadian Foreign Policy’ pp.24–6; Pearson, ‘Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance’ p.374.

⁶⁰⁸ For a more detailed review of the soft-bandwagoning continentalism strategic approach, see section 5.2.3. *Continentalism* of chapter five of this thesis: *The Sources of Canadian Strategic Policy*. For a more detailed review of the building process of soft-bandwagoning continentalism, see section 7.1. *Construction of Canada’s International Identity: Continentalism* in chapter seven of this thesis: *The Politics of the Strategic Policy-Making in Canada, 2006-2015: Building Soft-bandwagoning Continentalism*. Barry and Bratt p.65; Ørvik, ‘Canadian Security and “Defence against Help”’; Ørvik, ‘Defence against Help-a Strategy for Small States?’; Eayrs p.183; King p.2459.

6.2. Habitus of policy elite: the business liberals

The social liberalism that prevailed in the Canadian government since the 1950s entered a phase of exhaustion following the global recession from 1973 to 1975. The tensions among the cabinet ministers of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and the electoral defeat of the liberal John Turner in 1984 echoed the decline of social liberalism. The return of conservatives to power undermined two symbols of social liberalism: the political-economic model of the welfare state and the foreign policy of liberal internationalism. During the 1980s, the traditional philosophical division within the Liberal Party deepened and caused its shift from centre-left social liberalism to centre-right business liberalism.⁶⁰⁹ Considering this context; the review of the habitus of the policy elite that came to power from 1993 is useful to understand the role played by the renewed institutional culture and legalist-business reflexes in the weakening of internationalism. Of the three main constituencies responsible for the formulation of strategic policy, the political elite was the one with the best resources to adapt to the rules and norms of the post-Cold War international system. Three aspects were fundamental for the progressive marginalisation of diplomats and military of the decision-making process. These factors were the result of the socio-cultural background, formal education, and daily practices of the members of the policy elite.⁶¹⁰

First, in the political-economic environment of the 1980s, it was less and less convenient to preserve Keynesian models and undertake balancing strategies against the growing American hegemony. A central skill that politicians and diplomats shared was the ability to negotiate, build consensus, and avoid conflicts. Their training in humanities and the influence of social liberalism made them aware of the relevance of international law to overcome challenges during the Cold War. However, as economic and continental issues gained importance on the government agenda in the 1990s, the political elite took control of decision-making and relegated diplomats and military. The political class was the guild best equipped to undertake a change in the political-economic model and its strategic policy. Their training in law and their growing business experience gave them enough socio-cultural capital to make decisions aimed at adapting Canada to the nascent American-built neoliberal

⁶⁰⁹ Jeffrey, *Divided Loyalties: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1984-2008* pp.ix-x; Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal* (Abingdon: Pearson, 2010) pp.63-5; Lawrence Martin, *Chrétien: The Will to Win* pp.331-2; Gad Horowitz, 'Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation', *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 32.2 (1966), 143-71 pp.162-6.

⁶¹⁰ For a more detailed review of the composition of the Canadian policy elite, see *Appendix E: Canadian Policy Elite, 1993-2006*; and section 5.1. *Social Dynamics of Strategic Policy-Making* of chapter five of this thesis: *The Sources of Canadian Strategic Policy*.

international order.⁶¹¹ In contrast, the symbolic and operative degradation of the diplomatic corps influenced its progressive marginalisation of decision-making. Also, although officers had a sophisticated cultural capital, their deep roots in liberal internationalism slowed their ability to adapt to new structural conditions.⁶¹² In the case of the military elite, the professionalisation process had improved their intellectual capabilities. However, social and cultural capital was not enough to project generals and admirals as competent actors. The military was the group with the least compatible socio-cultural equipment to contribute to policy-making.⁶¹³ These traits of the policy elite are usually overlooked in the literature. Examining Canadian strategic culture from a practical perspective helps to understand the centralisation of power by the political elite and the loss of influence of diplomats and soldiers.

The second reason politicians proved better able to adapt to post-Cold War structural conditions was their professional profile, especially that of business liberals. The intellectual formation of the members of this faction was a product of their legal training and business experience. These socio-cultural backgrounds reflected the convergence between a growing corporatist current and the historic legalist tradition of Canadian political culture. The data on the composition of the political elite between the 1980s and 2000s reveal a consistent increase in the number of politicians with legal training and business occupation.⁶¹⁴ Although they were a small group, the power acquired by business liberals is attributed to the fact that they occupied the most relevant positions in the field of strategic policy-making. From 1993 to 2006, a prime minister, two foreign ministers, two defence ministers, and two finance ministers were politicians with legal and entrepreneurial backgrounds. Moreover, a select group of ministers and senior advisors with that profile constituted the court governments of Prime Ministers Chrétien and Martin.⁶¹⁵ The dual equipment that business

⁶¹¹ Bruce Smardon, *Asleep at the Switch: The Political Economy of Federal Research and Development Policy since 1960* (Québec: McGill-QUP, 2014) p.159; Swarts, 'The Strategic Construction of the Neoliberal Political-Economic Imaginary' pp.107–9; Françoise Boucek, *Factional Politics: How Dominant Parties Implode or Stabilize* (NY: Palgrave, 2012) pp.121–2.

⁶¹² Chapnick, 'The Golden Age: A Canadian Foreign Policy Paradox' pp.211–2; Erika Simpson pp.87–8; Potter, 'Canada Must Become Expert in Niche Diplomacy' p.A9; Keenleyside p.75.

⁶¹³ Kasurak, 'Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform' pp.111–2; Haycock pp.13–4; Granatstein, 'For Efficient and Effective Military Forces. Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence' p.19.

⁶¹⁴ Chan pp.20–31; O'Neill and Stewart pp.169,183; David Johnson, *Thinking Government: Public Sector Management in Canada* p.128.

⁶¹⁵ House of Commons, 'Members of Parliament', *Ministry (Cabinet)*, 2019 <<https://www.ourcommons.ca/Members/en/ministries?ministry=26&province=all&gender=all&lastName=al>> [accessed 15 July 2019]; David Last and Glen Milne, 'National Security Decision-Making', in *Choice of Force: Special Operations for Canada*, ed. by David Last and Bernd Horn (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2005) pp.139–42; Murray Dobbin, *The Myth of the Good Corporate Citizen: Canada and Democracy in the Age of*

liberals possessed allowed them to continue prioritising respect for international law and be aware of the direction the global economy was taking. Since legal knowledge and business expertise were the comparative and competitive advantages of politicians, these attributes had an impact on the diplomatic and military spheres. For example, in the renewed Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, areas dedicated to international trade issues such as Team Canada gained great relevance. Also, the newly created Canadian Foreign Service Institute promoted the development of diplomatic skills in economic matters.⁶¹⁶ In contrast, the Royal Military College and Canadian Forces College reinforced their curriculums with subjects in social sciences, liberal arts, and strategic studies to complement the technical skills possessed by the officers.⁶¹⁷ The socio-cultural background and professional profile of political leaders allowed them to adapt much more quickly to internal and external pressures than diplomats and military. They also influenced the positioning of international trade and ‘niche diplomacy’ as pillars of strategic policy.

The third factor that allowed the political elite to consolidate its dominant position in the field of strategic policy-making was the role played by the prime ministers’ distinctive reflexes in the configuration of the decision-making process. The conception of federalism and the way to exercise political power were some issues that divided the Liberal Party. Social liberals such as Trudeau and Chrétien favoured to a hard-federalism in which the federation should operate highly centralised in a mighty government to secure national unity. In contrast, business liberals like Turner and Martin opted for a soft-federalism in which the power of the federation should be decentralised to optimise government operation and discourage the alienation of the provinces, mainly Quebec.⁶¹⁸ Both perspectives on the exercise of political power mirrored themselves in the design of the shadow decision-making process. In the case of Chrétien, his legalist and political reflexes influenced the pragmatic character of his ‘command mode’ of decision-making. Its compact cabinet system was only

Globalization (Toronto: Lorimer, 2003) pp.176–7; Murray Dobbin, *Paul Martin: CEO for Canada?* (Toronto: Lorimer, 2003) pp.74–7; Hugh Thorburn and Alan Whitehorn, *Party Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 2001) p.244.

⁶¹⁶ Evan Potter, ‘Branding Canada: The Renaissance of Canada’s Commercial Diplomacy’, *International Studies Perspectives*, 5.1 (2004), 55–60 pp.55–6; Terrence Clifford, ‘Young Canadian Leaders in a New World of Opportunities’, in *Leading in an Upside-Down World: New Canadian Perspectives on Leadership*, ed. by Patrick Boyer (Toronto: Dundurn, 2003) pp.143–5; Carin Holroyd, *Government, International Trade, and Laissez-Faire Capitalism: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand’s Relations with Japan* (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2002) pp.88–94.

⁶¹⁷ Kasurak, ‘Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform’ pp.111–2; David Bercuson, ‘Up from the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces after the Somalia Affair’, *Canadian Military Journal*, 9.3 (2009), 31–39; John Cowan, ‘RMC and the Profession of Arms: Looking Ahead at Canada’s Military University’, *Canadian Military Journal*, 2.3 (2001), 5–12 pp.6,11.

⁶¹⁸ Jeffrey, *Divided Loyalties: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1984-2008* p.x; Lawrence Martin, *Iron Man: The Defiant Reign of Jean Chrétien* p.59.

made up of five committees. Chrétien eliminated the Priorities and Planning Committee, the Foreign and Defence Policy Committee, and the Security and Intelligence Committee. This structure allowed him to monopolise decision-making. His government worked as a ‘friendly dictatorship’, in a centralised and highly efficient manner, but with little tolerance for dissent and with a silenced debate.⁶¹⁹ In contrast, Martin’s legalist and managerial reflexes shaped his light version of command mode of decision-making. His leadership style was a middle ground of those exercised by Brian Mulroney and Chrétien. Martin partially decentralised decision-making through seven committees. He re-established structures to discuss strategic issues such as the Canada-United States Relations Committee, the Global Affairs Committee, and the Security and Intelligence Committee. The fact that his exercise of power was ‘flat, lacking in hierarchical discipline’, created spaces for ministers to have greater participation in decision-making.⁶²⁰ The contrasts between Chrétien and Martin governments are relevant since they elucidate how their distinctive reflexes influenced the distribution of the power in policy-making in favour of political actors, many of them with a business background and corporate links.

The result was the progressive erosion of defensive internationalism and the reorientation of strategic policy. Canadian policy shifted from the search for security through the defence of the international order (United Nations) towards security through regional alliances (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and North American Aerospace Defence Command).⁶²¹ The noteworthy thing about this process is how members of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, most of them inclined to internationalism, adapted to the structures of the internal and external environment to implement selective and conditional policies aimed at niche diplomacy and international trade. Respect for international law and the stability of the global system remained a strategic commitment for Canada, as it guaranteed its security and underpinned its structural position as a medium power. However, the tactic used to keep that commitment alive was no longer the intensive deployment of troops in

⁶¹⁹ David Johnson, *Think. Gov. Public Adm. Polit. Canada* pp.145–6,392; David Johnson, *Thinking Government: Public Sector Management in Canada* pp.231–4; Lawrence Martin, *Iron Man: The Defiant Reign of Jean Chrétien* pp.56,59,198–9,283–4; Philip Gass, *Silenced Debate: The Centralized Nature of Chrétien Foreign Policy* (BC: UBCP, 2003) pp.1–4; Jeffrey Simpson pp.41,71; Bruce Wallace, ‘For the Love of Power’, *Maclean’s* (Toronto, October 1998) pp.16–20.

⁶²⁰ David Zussman, *Off and Running: The Prospects and Pitfalls of Government Transitions in Canada* (Toronto: UTP, 2013) pp.28–9; Lawrence Martin, *Harperland: The Politics Of Control* (Toronto: Penguin, 2010) p.28; David Johnson, *Thinking Government: Public Sector Management in Canada* pp.234–8; Lindquist Evert, Ian Clark, and James Mitchell, ‘Reshaping Ottawa’s Centre of Government: Martin’s Reforms in Historical Perspective’, in *How Ottawa Spends 2004-2005: Mandate Change in the Paul Martin Era*, ed. by Bruce Doern (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2004) pp.339–40.

⁶²¹ Massie and Vucetic p.38; Linda McQuaig, *Holding the Bully’s Coat: Canada and the U.S. Empire* (Toronto: Doubleday, 2007) p.50; Rioux and Hay p.69; Gaffen p.43.

peacekeeping operations but was the promotion of the concept of human security based on the principle of ‘responsibility to protect’ from the United Nations.⁶²² In contrast, the reflexes of the military elite influenced them to oppose that proposal due to the implications it had for the stability of Canadian Forces. The limited training of officers in social sciences and liberal arts restricted their understanding of the legitimating power of ‘soft power and international law. The military elite was sceptical about that approach and reluctantly accepted policy change.⁶²³ 1988 marked the end of a long period in which liberal and defensive internationalism occupied the status of practical logic of the policy elite and set the parameters for the design of national security strategies. 1993 marked the beginning of a period in which the political elite took the lead in defining a political-economic model and a strategic approach that would provide security to Canada in a nascent American-built neoliberal international order. This situation occurred because of the slight compatibility between the habitus of politicians and some diplomats allowed them to cooperate to define an approach that was more in tune with post-Cold War global norms. As seen in Figure 6-1, the examination of habitus has revealed the source of cultural reflexes of policy-makers and how they interact with broader structures to produce new policy practices and strategies to preserve national security.


6.3. Fields of strategic policy-making: new strategic approaches for a new world order

Three different fields constituted the structural environment in which Canadian strategic policy was formulated during the 1990s. The evaluation of each of them and their overlaps elucidates the exogenous forces that conditioned the strategic choices of the policy-makers. The field of international relations, the domestic socio-political field, and the bureaucratic field were the spaces in which the strategic policy was forged.

⁶²² Prosper Bernard, ‘Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism’, *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 36.2 (2006), 233–61; Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World* (Toronto: Vintage, 2003) pp.4,133; Heinbecker; Lloyd Axworthy, ‘Why Soft Power Is the Right Policy for Canada’, *Ottawa Citizen* (Ottawa, 25 April 1998) p.B6.

⁶²³ Gloria Galloway, ‘Hillier Decries Military’s “Decade of Darkness”’, *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 16 February 2007) p.24; Jack Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2004) p.163; Brian Tomlin, ‘On a Fast Track to a Ban’, in *To Walk Without Fear*, ed. by Maxwell Cameron, Robert Lawson, and Brian Tomlin (Toronto: OUP, 1998) pp.185,191; Valerie Warmington and Celina Tuttle, ‘The Canadian Campaign’, in *To Walk Without Fear*, ed. by Maxwell Cameron, Robert Lawson, and Brian Tomlin (Toronto: OUP, 1998) p.50.

Figure 6-1. Habitus of the Canadian policy elite, 1993-2006
(Reconstruction of the dispositional logic)



Own elaboration based on Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action* (Stanford: SUP, 1998), p.5. Note: the dotted line indicates probable orientation toward the internationalist, Atlanticist, or continentalist approaches.

The end of the Cold War, economic crises, and political changes profoundly disrupted these three social spheres.⁶²⁴ Although each of these fields had its internal rules of operation, the changes experienced in one of them had repercussions in the other two. That systemic relationship allows us to consider that the character of the strategic policy was the response of the Canadian policy elite to the conditions of the three domains. It also enables us to examine the role that their reply played in the permanent reconfiguration of the three fields. This organisation of the structural environment provides a framework to track the evolution of strategic policy and amalgamates the most recurrent dilemmas and issues less understood by the Canadian policy elite. The speeches and practices that accompanied the birth of the American-centred global neoliberal order had repercussions both in the international and national realms.

The field of international relations was the space for interaction between state and non-state actors. Its structure and dynamics were defined by the distribution of material power, the strategic policies of the participating actors, and the rules that outlined the character of the post-Cold War world order. The first two elements have been predominant themes in the literature. However, in recent decades, academics have returned to the foundations of classical realism and constructivism to focus again on the role of international norms in the configuration of foreign policy and national security practices.⁶²⁵ The impact of norms on state strategic behaviour allows us to understand the relationship of the medium powers such as Canada with the international order. The progressive easing of geopolitical tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union degraded practices based on nuclear threat, the use of military force, and strategies to balance American hegemony. This context gave rise to new approaches based on the niche diplomacy of 'low politics' issues.⁶²⁶ The result was the emergence of new regulatory standards for state behaviour and international relations. For example, the role attributed to the middle powers was that of facilitators, catalysts, and managers of the nascent global order. A central aspect of the new world politics practices was the emphasis on the power of global governance and the relevance of middle powers to generate consensus orientated to underpin the American-built neoliberal

⁶²⁴ Kim Nossal, 'The Imperatives of Canada's Strategic Geography', in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic (Ottawa: Palgrave, 2020) pp.16–7; Thomas Wilson, Peter Dungan, and Steve Murphy, 'The Sources of the Recession in Canada: 1989-1992', *Canadian Business Economics*, 2.2 (1994), 3–15; David Johnson, *Think. Gov. Public Adm. Polit. Canada* pp.58–9.

⁶²⁵ Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. by Peter Katzenstein (NY: CUP, 1996) pp.54–9; Carr.

⁶²⁶ Behringer, 'The Dynamics of Middlepowermanship' p.21; David Cooper; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* p.21.

international order.⁶²⁷ The old paradigm of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations was gradually overshadowed by forums such as the World Trade Organisation, G-7/8, and G-20. Moreover, the advent of speeches on nuclear disarmament, environmental protection, promotion of democracy, and defence of human rights generated pressure for the adoption of approaches that policy elites could hardly ignore. Otherwise, acting outside the normative orthodoxy of the Western community raised the chances of being singled out as a 'pariah state' or 'rogue state', a threat to the stability of the global order.⁶²⁸

The domestic field was defined by the economic, political, and social conditions of Canada. This sphere was dominated by the effects of recessions, political changes, and the end of the Cold War. The recessions of the 1970s and 1980s did not only responded to the economic cycle. They were also a symptom of the exhaustion of the Keynesian political-economic model of the welfare state promoted by the social liberals since the 1950s. The return of the conservatives to power in 1984 and the electoral victory of the business liberals in 1993 gradually shifted the Canadian government to the centre-right of the political spectrum. That turn set the domestic order of the 1990s. One of its main features was the adoption of neoliberal principles, which influenced the thinking and practice of the policy elite. The emphasis on monetary policy in the early 1980s, the *Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement* of 1989, the *North American Free Trade Agreement* of 1994, and the growing dependence on the extraction and export of natural resources in the 2000s reflected a profound change in the orientation of Canadian politics.⁶²⁹ A second attribute was the reinforcement of Atlanticist and continentalist predispositions. The underpinning of the historical link with the United Kingdom and the strategic rapprochement with the United States was a priority for Canada to be in a position to protect the sovereignty of its Arctic waters during the final years of the Cold War.⁶³⁰ A third characteristic was the change of priorities in the Canadian government. After the recession of the early 1990s and the end of the Cold War, the reduction of the federal deficit, the promotion of free trade, the tax reform,

⁶²⁷ Behringer, 'The Dynamics of Middlepowermanship' p.21; Andrew Cooper, 'Squeezed or Revitalized? Middle Powers, the G20 and the Evolution of Global Governance' p.971; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* pp.21–4.

⁶²⁸ Jordaan p.168; Robert Litwak, 'US Strategy toward Rogue States: Origins and Development', in *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War* (Washington: WWC, 2000) pp.47–56.

⁶²⁹ Swarts, 'The Neoliberal Revolution of the 1980s and Beyond' pp.106–8; Steve Patten, 'The Triumph of Neoliberalism within Partisan Conservatism in Canada', in *Conservatism in Canada*, ed. by James Farney and David Rayside (Toronto: UTP, 2013) pp.59–73.

⁶³⁰ Adam Lajeunesse and Whitney Lackenbauer, 'Defence Policy in the Canadian Arctic: From Jean Chrétien to Justin Trudeau', in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic (Ottawa: Palgrave, 2020) pp.367–8; DND, 'Challenge and Commitment. A Defence Policy for Canada' (Ottawa: MSSC, 1987) pp.9–13.

and the preservation of national unity were the most relevant issues for the government.⁶³¹ The economic, political, and social environment in which the strategic policy was formulated was the product of a trend originating in the 1980s that extended to the 2000s. The shift of the Canadian centre of power to the right of the political spectrum had severe implications for strategic policy, especially for the internationalist tradition and the diplomatic elite.

The third field is the interdepartmental context in which strategic policy was formulated. The bureaucratic realm was defined by the centralisation of power in the court government, the shrinking of the influence of cabinet ministers in decision-making, and the erosion of the capabilities of the diplomatic corps and the armed forces. The political change of 1993 had a profound impact on the stability of the Canadian bureaucracy. The monopolisation of decision-making by prime ministers is attributed to the distrust they had for bureaucrats who came from conservative governments. That feeling unleashed a gradual bureaucratic politicisation, especially in the central agencies. The appointment of deputy ministers and diplomatic officers aligned to the vision of the prime ministers and without consulting the ministers became a regular practice.⁶³² In the 1990s, the ‘strategic prime ministership’ marginalised the cabinet ministers from the policy-making process. Their functions were limited to attend administrative matters of their departments. The prime minister’s preferences and government agenda priorities substantially increased the influence of officials and senior advisors to the Prime Minister’s Office and the Department of Finance.⁶³³ In parallel, the diplomatic and military spheres entered a severe crisis. One factor was the recurrent change of foreign affairs and national defence ministers. Although both ministers belonged to the court government on some occasions, their limited knowledge and expertise on strategic issues affected their performance. This situation disrupted the continuity and consistency of the strategic policy. Another factor was the draconian budget cuts and increased responsibilities assigned to the diplomatic corps and armed forces. In tune with the idea of the ‘peace dividend’ promoted by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and American President Ronald Reagan, the fiscal objectives of the Canadian government responded to the internal economic situation and the new conditions of the post-Cold War international environment. The renewed context devalued symbolic capital and eroded the

⁶³¹ Roy Rempel, ‘Achieving Consensus and Effectiveness in Canadian Defence Policy’, in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic (Ottawa: Palgrave, 2020) pp.254–6; David Johnson, *Think. Gov. Public Adm. Polit. Canada* pp.57–60; Steve Patten, ‘Jean Chrétien and a Decade of Party System Change’, in *The Chrétien Legacy: Politics and Public Policy in Canada*, ed. by Lois Harder and Steve Patten (Québec: McGill-QUP, 2006) pp.327–9.

⁶³² Jeffrey, *Divided Loyalties: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1984–2008* p.244; Whittington pp.42–4; Savoie, *Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics* pp.258–9, 283.

⁶³³ Savoie, ‘The Rise of Court Government in Canada’ pp.635–6; Thomas Axworthy, ‘Of Secretaries to Princes’ pp.251–2.

capabilities of diplomats and soldiers. Although both spheres were affected, the divergence between their cultural predispositions generated friction and hindered consensus. These discords produced interdepartmental tensions and inconsistencies in strategic policy.⁶³⁴ During the 1990s, the influence of the military on strategic policy declined, while that of the diplomatic corps slightly increased thanks to the effective mobilisation of their socio-cultural capital.⁶³⁵


Canada's foreign and security policy evolved as the cultural practices of the policy elite adapted to the structural conditions of the three fields. The approaches that fuelled strategic policy moved away from the search for security through traditional methods based on broad multilateralism and a deep commitment in defence of the international order. The new approaches focused on the search for security through Atlanticist and continentalist predispositions based on selective and conditional multilateralism in favour of free trade, foreign investment, and regional alliances. Academics broadly agree that the end of the Cold War produced changes in the strategic behaviour of middle powers as Canada.⁶³⁶ However, this thesis requires expansion and deepening. While the cessation of the geopolitical confrontation between the Americans and Soviets was crucial for the easing of exogenous pressures on Canada, it does not fully explain why the policy elite responded in the way it did. A more comprehensive analysis should consider that the cultural context of the Canadian policy elite conditioned how they perceived their environment and made strategic choices. From that perspective, it is possible to interpret that Canadian politicians, diplomats, and generals were reacting simultaneously to the internal and external conditions of Canada. This aspect is often overlooked in the literature. Likewise, it is possible to affirm that the main problems that arose about Canadian strategic policy after the Cold War were the product of the inconsistencies of the political elite to adapt to changes in the broad structural environment.

⁶³⁴ Essex, Stokes, and Yusibov p.14; Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, *Polit. Can. Foreign Policy* p.275; Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* p.163; Margaret Thatcher, 'Speech at Hoover Institution Lunch' (Washington: Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 1991).

⁶³⁵ For a more detailed review of the architecture of the Canadian bureaucratic machinery, see *Appendix F: Canadian Policy-Making Structure, 1993-2006*; and section 5.1.4. *Policy-Making* of chapter five of this thesis: *The Sources of Canadian Strategic Policy*.

⁶³⁶ Neack, *The New Foreign Policy. Complex Interactions, Competing Interests* p.184; Matthew Trudgen, 'A Canadian Approach: Canada's Cold War Grand Strategy, 1945 to 1989', *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 14.3 (2012) pp.26-7; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 'Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict' pp.19-21, 406-8; Fen Hampson and Christopher Maule, 'After the Cold War', in *Canada Among Nations, 1990-91: After the Cold War*, ed. by Fen Hampson and Christopher Maule (Ottawa: CUP, 1991) pp.22-3.

Figure 6-2. Field of the Canadian strategic policy-making, 1993-2006
(Construction of the positional logic)



Own elaboration based on Bourdieu, Pierre, *The Field of Cultural Production. Essays on Art and Literature* (NY: CUP, 1993), p.49. Note: + = positive pole, implying a dominant position, - = negative pole, implying a dominated position.

As a synthesis, Figure 6-2 illustrates the construction of the positional logic of the field of strategic policy-making. The image is the product of the interpretation of the field rules, the mapping of the resources distribution, and the historicisation of social disputes. The review of the policy elite's habitus and the strategic policy-making field provide the basis for examining the origins and evolution of Canadian strategic policy from 1993 to 2006 in the next section.

6.4. Evolution of the strategic policy: in search of a new identity for the post-Cold War structural environment

The evolution of Canadian strategic policy in the last two decades of the twentieth century shows the gradual erosion of defensive internationalism. This strategic approach aspired to preserve its status as the practical logic of the policy elite. Parallely, the decline of the social liberals generated spaces for centre-right politicians to promote Atlanticist and continentalist ideas in order to establish a new dominant focus on the Canadian strategic policy. The global environment and national context were equally significant in making decisions on economics, foreign policy, and national security. The interaction between international power structures and the subjective understandings of the policy elite established parameters to produce strategies. The central argument of this chapter is that the evolution of the strategic policy from 1993 to 2006 described a process of weakening of defensive internationalism caused by the growing influence of the cultural predispositions of red Tories and business liberals since the 1980s. Tracking the interplay among the internationalist, Atlanticist, and continentalist notions allows us to identify three phases of this process: advent of a selective strategic approach, shrinking of internationalism, and search for a new identity. The following paragraphs examine the conditions of the domestic and international environment to understand the complex relationship between inner and outer dynamics that guided the evolution of Canadian strategic policy.

6.4.1. Advent of a selective strategic approach, 1984-1993

One of the theses that predominate in the literature is that the end of the Cold War was a determining factor in the change of Canadian strategic behaviour. However, this dissertation argues that the evolution of Canadian strategic policy in the 1990s was the product of a trend of a social, cultural, and political shift in Canada originated since the mid-1970s. The rupture within the Liberal Party and the effects of economic recessions were signs of the deterioration of the political project of the social liberals based on the welfare state and liberal internationalism. In the *1970 White Paper on Foreign Policy* and the *1972 Third Option Policy*, The Trudeau government recognised that Canada had limited capabilities to

meet all its international commitments, so it was necessary to reorient foreign policy.⁶³⁷ The electoral victory of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1984 marked the beginning of a long process of political, economic, and military transformation in Canada. The arrival of Mulroney to power catalysed the displacement of the Canadian government towards the centre-right of the political spectrum. Mulroney's strategic vision was oriented towards a 'constructive Canadian internationalism' in which free trade and Western defence played a central role.⁶³⁸ It is essential to point out that the political change of 1984 did not generate an abrupt break with the liberal internationalist tradition because the moderate predispositions of the so-called red Tories, who constituted the left-wing of the Progressive Conservative Party, were located in a middle ground between the two factions of the Liberal Party that came into conflict: social liberals and business liberals.⁶³⁹ In this context, it is possible to affirm that the Mulroney government represented the beginning of a process of change in the institutional culture and cultural reflexes of the policy elite. The result was the progressive establishment of neoliberalism and weakening of defensive internationalism.

Mulroney catalysed the reorientation of the strategic policy promoted by Trudeau in the 1970s, which analysts already categorised as a constructive internationalism.⁶⁴⁰ Two pillars sustained Canadian foreign policy since the beginning of the Mulroney government. One of the most evident was the premises under which the idea of constructive internationalism was promoted. Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark argued: 'we must trade if we are to prosper [...] our security interests demand that we play our part in Western defence and arms control and disarmament [...] our values dictate that we help the poor, the hungry and the politically abused'.⁶⁴¹ The second pillar, less recognised in the literature, was the cultural predispositions of the political elite. Red Toryism is an ideological variation of Canadian conservatism in which the historical link with the United Kingdom plays a central role. For the red Tories, the Canadian collective national identity, the belief in the common good, the maintenance of the social order, and the traditional institutions such as religion and the

⁶³⁷ Mitchell Sharp, 'Canada-US Relations: Options for the Future', *International Perspectives*, Autumn.Special (1972), 1–24; DEA, 'Foreign Policy for Canadians' (Ottawa: MSSC, 1970) pp.5–9.

⁶³⁸ Joe Clark, *Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations* (Ottawa: DEA, 1985) p.43; House of Commons, '33rd Parliament, 1st Session', *Debates*, November.5 (1984) p.7.

⁶³⁹ David Johnson, 'Ideologies of Government and Public Service', in *Thinking Government: Public Administration and Politics in Canada*, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: UTP, 2016) pp.49–57; James Farney and David Rayside, 'Introduction, The Meanings of Conservatism', in *Conservatism in Canada*, ed. by James Farn and David Rayside (Toronto: UTP, 2013) pp.6–7; Michael Behiels, 'Mulroney and a Nationalist Quebec: Key Political Realignment in Canada?', in *Transforming the Nation: Canada and Brian Mulroney*, ed. by Raymond Blake (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2007) pp.250–1.

⁶⁴⁰ Munton and Keating pp.521–4; Bruce Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy* (Toronto: OUP, 1972) p.174; Peyton Lyon, 'Behind the Headlines', 29.7 (1970) p.14.

⁶⁴¹ Joe Clark p.43.

monarchy are fundamental for the active protection of the state.⁶⁴² The ideological splices between the red Tories and the social liberals prevented the 1984 political change from leading to the radical redefinition of strategic policy. Their coincidences were also manifested in Mulroney's decision to preserve aspects of the welfare state and internationalist policy at the beginning of his tenure. However, both projects were gradually eroded by the evolution of the policy elite's predispositions, the increasing pressures of the corporate elite, and the change in the structural environment throughout the 1980s.

In trade matters, the strategic policy developed an internationalist character at the beginning of the Mulroney government. This feature is attributed to the weight acquired by commercial affairs within the Department of External Affairs and International Trade after the bureaucratic reorganisation of 1982.⁶⁴³ It also influenced the persistence of ideas about the need to diversify Canadian relations to lessen the vulnerability generated by the growing relationship with the United States.⁶⁴⁴ A more significant factor was the influence exerted by an internationalist current led by Secretary Clark and the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations Stephen Lewis. They argued that Canada should assume humanitarian obligations and establish unique relationships with less fortunate nations.⁶⁴⁵ The enactment of the *Act to Create the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada* in 1985 and the establishment of the *Caribbean-Canada Trade Agreement* in 1986 were the first decisions aimed at expanding Canada's ties with the economies of the Pacific Rim and the Commonwealth-Caribbean. However, trade policy began to shift towards a continental approach at the end of Mulroney's first term. The threats of American protectionism and the influence acquired by right-wing policy-makers disrupted the internationalist orientation of Canadian trade policy. Policy actors such as the Minister of Regional Economic Expansion Sinclair Stevens and the Minister of Finance Michael Wilson promoted the use of foreign aid as a means to develop new markets and link Canadian corporations with foreign companies. Also, they endorsed the idea of strengthening the commercial link with the United States.⁶⁴⁶ Although Mulroney had expressed his opposition to establishing a free trade agreement with the United States since the 1984 election campaign, the growing influence of right-wing policy actors, the pressures of the corporate elite, and the emerging neoliberal economic dynamics were

⁶⁴² Colin Campbell and William Christian, *Parties, Leaders, and Ideologies in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1996) pp.25–30; Horowitz pp.149–54.

⁶⁴³ Gordon Osbaldeston, *Organizing to Govern. Vol.II* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1992) pp.230,449–51.

⁶⁴⁴ Gordon Mace and Gérard Hervouet, 'Canada's Third Option: A Complete Failure?', *Canadian Public Policy*, 15.4 (1989), 387–404 pp.388–9.

⁶⁴⁵ David Taras, 'Brian Mulroney's Foreign Policy: Something for Everyone', *The Round Table*, 74.293 (1985), 35–46 pp.43–4.

⁶⁴⁶ Taras pp.43–4.

factors that motivated him to sign the *Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement* in 1988 and negotiate the *North American Free Trade Agreement* in 1992.⁶⁴⁷ The evolution of trade policy in the 1980s reveals that the legalist cultural reflexes of internationalists were much more influential in decision-making during Mulroney's first term. However, as the new American-built neoliberal international order emerged in the late 1980s, the corporatist current occupied an influential role in the field of strategic policy-making.

In security issues, the strategic policy also developed an internationalist character at the beginning of the Mulroney government. One of the priorities was international disarmament. This objective was considered one of the few elements that prevailed from the internationalist 'voluntarism' and 'idealism' promoted by Trudeau.⁶⁴⁸ The liberal internationalism inertia and influence of the internationalist current explains the decision to remove the last American nuclear weapon from Canadian soil and the opposition to American intervention in Nicaragua in 1984. However, internationalist predispositions diluted throughout Mulroney's first term. This situation caused Canada to cease its uninterrupted participation in the United Nations peacekeeping operations in 1988. The priority of disarmament allowed Mulroney to lessen the criticisms generated by the role of Canadian Forces in foreign policy, to manage the internal pressures exerted by the internationalist current, to compensate for the weight that the transatlantic alliance acquired, and to justify disagreements with the United States.⁶⁴⁹ Secretary Clark and Ambassador Lewis were the leading promoters of this cause that opposed aspects of American foreign policy. Mulroney defended his support to disarmament by arguing that it was a means to 'reduce the threat of war and enhanced the promise of peace'.⁶⁵⁰ Such was the relevance of the symbolism of this aim that Mulroney named Trudeau as his unofficial adviser on peace issues. As internationalism lost influence, Atlanticism established itself as the primary source of defence policy. The defence of the West was the second priority. The policy elite gave continuity to the categorisation of the Soviet Union as an 'ideological, political, and economic adversary whose explicit long-term aim is to mould the world in its own image'.⁶⁵¹ As in 1964 and 1971, the *White Papers on Defence* of 1987, 1989, and 1992 revalidated the

⁶⁴⁷ CBC, 'Bringing Down the Barriers', *CBC New Economic Realities* (Toronto, 13 March 2001); Gordon Donaldson, *The Prime Ministers of Canada* (Toronto: Doubleday, 1997) p.334.

⁶⁴⁸ Massie and Vucetic p.38; Thomas Hockin, 'Other Dimensions of Canadian Foreign Policy: The Decline of Voluntarism beyond North America', in *The Canadian Condominium*, ed. by Thomas Hockin (Toronto: M&S, 1972) p.19; Louis Sabourin, 'L'influence Des Facteurs Internes Sur La Politique Étrangère Canadienne', *Études Internationales*, 1.2 (1970), 41–63.

⁶⁴⁹ Dean Oliver, 'Peace, Disarmament Priority for Canada, Clark Declares at UN', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 26 September 1984) p.1.

⁶⁵⁰ Dean Oliver, 'Prevention of War PM's Top Challenge', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 1 October 1984).

⁶⁵¹ DND, 'Challenge and Commitment. A Defence Policy for Canada' p.5.

Canadian commitment to defend the West.⁶⁵² Upon assuming office, Mulroney made clear the direction of his policy:

We in the Western alliance are prepared to defend ourselves against attempts to impose alien and odious systems. [...] Soviet policy in Europe has been animated by two clear aims: the preservation of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe; and the weakening of the Western alliance, especially the links between the United States and Europe. Political leadership must be ever vigilant to avoid becoming a pawn in this Soviet strategy.⁶⁵³

Mulroney's posture implied an increase in military spending in a way not seen since the Korean War.⁶⁵⁴ This vision was supported by the Minister of Defence Robert Coates, who was considered the most right-wing party and cabinet member.⁶⁵⁵ Canada's involvement in all missions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation from 1984 to 1993, its active role in the meetings of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1985, and the signature of the *Agreement on Arctic Cooperation* of 1988 reflected the predominance of Atlanticist predispositions in the policy elite. In this way, the ambivalent security and defence policy of the 1980s evolved in a similar direction to trade policy. Canadian strategic policy moved from away from internationalism towards Atlanticist and continentalist approaches.

This brief review of the evolution of strategic policy during Mulroney's government provides elements to understand the origins of the weakening of defensive internationalism in the 1990s. The gradual transformation of the institutional culture and cultural reflexes of the policy elite in the early 1980s had repercussions on the policy choices in the final years of the Cold War. The persistence of legalist reflexes in the policy elite and the relative ideological affinity between social liberals and red Tories allowed the preservation of traditional internationalist practices such as the promotion of peace and multilateral diplomacy. The role of Canada in the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,

⁶⁵² DND, 'Canadian Defence Policy' (Ottawa: MSSC, 1992) p.1; DND, 'Defence Update: 1988-89' (Ottawa: MSSC, 1989) p.1; DND, 'Challenge and Commitment. A Defence Policy for Canada' p.5; DND, 'White Paper on Defence: Defence in the 70s' (Ottawa: IC, 1971) p.1; DND, 'White Paper on Defence' (Ottawa: QPCS, 1964) p.10.

⁶⁵³ Richard Brennan, 'Mulroney Attacks Soviets for "Brutal Measures"', *Toronto Star* (Toronto, 13 July 1984) p.A14; Peter Smith, 'We Can't Neglect Loyalty to Allies, Mulroney Says', *Toronto Star* (Toronto, 10 February 1984) p.A16.

⁶⁵⁴ Richard Johnson, 'Financing Canada's Armed Forces', *National Post* (Toronto, 8 June 2012).

⁶⁵⁵ Taras p.36.

and Commonwealth; its leadership in the *Montreal Protocol* in 1987; and its joining of the Organisation of American States in 1990 were proof of this. However, the change in the conditions of the international environment and the power acquired by right-wing policy actors with business reflexes influenced the strategic policy to turn towards a selective approach. That is to say; constructive internationalism became a reduced version of liberal internationalism. This selective approach generated spaces for continentalism to gain relevance in trade policy and for Atlanticism to predominate in defence policy. Analysts pointed out that the approach promoted by Mulroney reflected that structural reality had set limits on Canada's 'ability to act'. Critics designated Mulroney's foreign policy as 'a low point for Canadian internationalism unmatched in the last forty years of Canadian foreign policy'.⁶⁵⁶ It is not possible to deny that the end of the Cold War impacted on security dynamics in the North Atlantic and on Canadian strategic behaviour. From 1989, Canada began a decade of budgetary cuts to the defence sector, halted its military modernisation process, cancelled the increase in troops in West Germany, and began withdrawing its soldiers deployed in Europe.⁶⁵⁷ The economic recession and the growing government deficits in the early 1990s also played a significant role in the redefinition of strategic policy.⁶⁵⁸ However, as this section has shown, the change in cultural reflexes and predispositions of the policy elite in the 1980s significantly influenced how the policy elite interpreted the reconfiguration of the structural environment and responded with changing strategic priorities. The weakening of defensive internationalism was underway.

6.4.2. Shrinking of internationalism, 1993-2003

The 1980s marked the beginning of a process of cultural change within the Canadian policy elite that redirected the evolution of strategic policy. Chrétien's arrival to power in 1993 elicited anticipation that the principles of liberal internationalism would be restored in foreign policy. His political bond with Trudeau, his affinity with social liberalism, and his education in law gave sense to the policy guidelines of his political platform and government plan. In the context of the end of the Cold War and the economic recession, his government aspired to generate a contrast with Mulroney's policy. Its main objectives were to reduce the budget burden generated by the defence sector, lessen the influence of the corporate elite in decision-making, and strengthen Canada's international leadership through peacekeeping

⁶⁵⁶ Cranford Pratt, 'Canadian Foreign Policy: Comments on the Green Papers', *Behind the Headlines*, 43.6 (1985) p.4.

⁶⁵⁷ NATO, 'Canada and NATO', *NATO Declassified*, 2018 <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_161511.htm?selectedLocale=en> [accessed 15 March 2019].

⁶⁵⁸ Philip Cross and Philippe Bergevin, 'Turning Points: Business Cycles in Canada since 1926', *Commentary. C.D. Howe Institute*, October.366 (2012), 1–24.

operations.⁶⁵⁹ Chrétien also sought to distance himself from the Atlanticist and continentalist character that strategic policy acquired at the end of the Mulroney government. Chrétien said his government would adopt ‘a broader definition of national and international security’ and reject ‘a camp-follower approach in favour of pursuing a partnership with the United States’.⁶⁶⁰ The Prime Minister said that ‘the Government will ensure that Canada plays an active, internationalist role in the global arena’.⁶⁶¹ However, this internationalist construction of Canada’s external identity was far from becoming a reality. The change in the predispositions of the policy elite, the dynamics of decision-making, and the new conditions of the post-Cold War structural environment undermined the restoration of liberal internationalism. The following analysis shows that, despite the attempts of the diplomatic elite and the social liberals to restore the internationalist tradition as the practical logic, the growing influence of business liberals and the pressures generated in the emerging neoliberal system prolonged the weakening of internationalism. Three periods portray the implementation of a reduced internationalism and the growing influence of the Atlanticist and continentalist approaches in strategic policy-making.

An examination of the first months of Chrétien’s government reveals that the internationalist predispositions of the policy elite were weak and in the process of transformation. The liberal social vision and Keynesian reflexes that Chrétien embodied during the Trudeau government were diluted due to domestic pressures and external conditions.⁶⁶² The *North American Free Trade Agreement* illustrates the most representative case. Trudeau’s ideas on commercial diversification as a strategy to reduce the vulnerability generated by the growing economic dependence on the United States fuelled Chrétien’s campaign proposals.⁶⁶³ He promised to renegotiate or renounce the tri-national agreement, arguing that Canada had given up too much in the negotiations. However, Chrétien’s attempt to promote renegotiation failed in his first month of government. One of the causes was external. The United States refused to renegotiate the treaty because the legislative ratification had been extremely complicated. Renegotiating the treaty involved restarting the problematic process. Also, Canada had few resources to impose its conditions on a hypothetical renegotiation.⁶⁶⁴ Another factor was domestic. Chrétien inherited a historic debt from the Trudeau and Mulroney governments. The magnitude of the federal debt influenced Chrétien to maintain the agreement because,

⁶⁵⁹ Liberal Party, ‘Creating Opportunity’ (Ottawa: Liberal Party, 1993) pp.20,55,94.

⁶⁶⁰ Liberal Party, ‘Creating Opportunity’ p.106.

⁶⁶¹ Government, ‘Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session Thirty-Fifth Parliament’ (Ottawa: Parliament, 1994).

⁶⁶² Lawrence Martin, *Iron Man: The Defiant Reign of Jean Chrétien* p.65.

⁶⁶³ Lawrence Martin, *Chrétien: The Will to Win* pp.238–47.

⁶⁶⁴ Lawrence Martin, *Iron Man: The Defiant Reign of Jean Chrétien* p.79.

despite its inconveniences, it would help Canada recover from the crisis and settle its debt.⁶⁶⁵ This scenario also conditioned the cabinet configuration, the definition of priorities, and the orientation of foreign policy. First, Chrétien empowered business liberals like Martin and Roy MacLaren. Moreover, the Prime Minister limited the influence of social liberals with strong anti-free trade and anti-American predispositions such as Lloyd Axworthy who, within the Liberal Party, was considered the natural candidate to occupy the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs. André Ouellet's surprise appointment in that position responded to Chrétien's perception that Ouellet, unlike Axworthy, was a policy actor who was 'unlikely to rock the boat'.⁶⁶⁶ Second, inspired by the *Maastricht Treaty* of 1991, Chrétien and Martin agreed to establish as a priority the reduction of the federal deficit to 3 per cent of gross domestic product.⁶⁶⁷ This objective involved the removal of the governor of the Bank of Canada and the implementation of severe budget cuts.⁶⁶⁸ Third, free trade acquired high relevance in foreign policy. While budget cuts deeply affected the diplomatic and military sectors, Chrétien created the First Team Canada Mission in 1994.⁶⁶⁹ This agency had the function of promoting Canadian business interests abroad to increase trade and investment.⁶⁷⁰ The efforts to create the Free Trade Area of the Americas from 1994 to 2003; the negotiations to reach the *Canada-Central American Four Free Trade Agreement* between 2001 and 2003; the free trade agreements signed with Israel, Chile, and Costa Rica between 1997 and 2002; the foreign investment promotion and protection agreements reached with 17 countries; and the 27 trade missions performed internationally demonstrate that global trade was a top priority in Chrétien's foreign policy.⁶⁷¹ Analysts agreed that 'the government does not have the political energy to deal with anything else on the foreign policy agenda except trade'.⁶⁷² The first years of the Chrétien government demonstrate that

⁶⁶⁵ Charles Lammam and Hugh MacIntyre, 'An Analysis of Federal Debt in Canada by Prime Ministers Since Confederation', *Fraser Research Bulletin*, October (2017), 1–14 pp.5–11.

⁶⁶⁶ Greenspon and Wilson-Smith p.45.

⁶⁶⁷ Patrick Grady, 'The Liberal Red Book: The Economist's Perspective', *Global Economics Commentaries*, September.10 (2007) <<http://global-economics.ca/redbook.htm>>.

⁶⁶⁸ Jeffrey, *Divided Loyalties: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1984-2008* pp.265–6; Lawrence Martin, *Iron Man: The Defiant Reign of Jean Chrétien* p.81.

⁶⁶⁹ Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, *Polit. Can. Foreign Policy* p.275; Richard Johnson; Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* p.163.

⁶⁷⁰ The Canadian Trade Commissioner Service, 'What Is a Canada Trade Mission?', *Canada Trade Missions*, 2012 <<https://web.archive.org/web/20120820145955/http://www.tradecommissioner.gc.ca/eng/trade-missions/previous-missions.jsp>> [accessed 16 July 2018].

⁶⁷¹ Government, 'Map of Canada's Trade and Investment Agreements', *Trade and Investment Agreements*, 2019 <<https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/index.aspx?lang=eng>> [accessed 21 July 2019]; ITC, 'Canada Trade Missions. Team Canada Missions', *Previous Missions*, 2008 <https://web.archive.org/web/20050822103841/http://www.tcm-mec.gc.ca/previous_missions-en.asp> [accessed 11 June 2019].

⁶⁷² Rioux and Hay p.67; Claire Sjolander, 'International Trade as Foreign Policy: "Anything for a Buck"', in *How Ottawa Spends, 1997-1998: Seeing Red: A Liberal Report Card*, ed. by Gene Swimmer (Ottawa: CUP,

the internationalist predispositions of the policy elite were faint and were in the process of redefinition.

The evolution of security and defence policy during Chrétien's first term also gives evidence of how the change in predispositions of the policy elite influenced the shrinking of internationalism. In 1993, Canada continued its involvement in United Nations peacekeeping missions in Western Sahara, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. However, the *1994 White Paper on Defence* and *1995 White Paper on Foreign Policy* revealed that Canada was in the process of implementing a selective, conditional, bounded, and passive foreign policy.⁶⁷³ This narrow approach was far from the broad, active, and humanitarian character that distinguished liberal internationalism.⁶⁷⁴ Foreign Minister Ouellet justified before the House of Commons that the new foreign policy was a response to the conditions of the post-Cold War world, in which power had dispersed and was defined by economic and non-military capabilities.⁶⁷⁵ This vision was in line with Chrétien's 'strong anti-military bias', the aversion of his senior advisors to the use of force, and the austerity policy promoted by Martin.⁶⁷⁶ For Chrétien, 'the greatest and most immediate threats facing Canada as the millennium came to a close were economic and psychological'.⁶⁷⁷ These ideas allow us to understand the origin of the character of the foreign policy, the budget cuts to the defence sector, and the reorientation of security policy. One of the most significant effects of this strategic policy took place between 1995 and 1997. During this period, Canada's contribution to United Nations-sanctioned peacekeeping operations decreased considerably and was exceeded by commitments made in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-led peacemaking missions.⁶⁷⁸ One of the causes of this strategic turn was the erosion of the symbolic capital of the military after the human rights abuse scandals in Kuwait in 1991 and Somalia in 1993. Both events generated harsh criticism and sharp questions from liberal

1997) pp.120–1; Jeff Sallot, 'Emphasize Trade in Foreign Policy, Ottawa Urged; Cut in Defence Spending Proposed', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 12 November 1994) A4.

⁶⁷³ DFAIT, 'Canada in the World: Government Statement' (Ottawa: CCIC, 1995) p.ii; DND, '1994 White Paper on Defence' (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1994) pp.4–5.

⁶⁷⁴ Keating, 'A Passive Internationalist: Jean Chrétien and Canadian Foreign Policy' pp.115–9; Rioux and Hay p.57.

⁶⁷⁵ André Ouellet, 'Notes for an Address ... on the Government's Foreign Policy Statement. Statement 95/7. 7 February 1995' (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1995) p.1.

⁶⁷⁶ Tanya Neima and Christopher Stoney, 'The Maritime Helicopter Project', in *How Ottawa Spends, 2006–2007*, ed. by Doern Bruce (Montreal: MQUP, 2006) pp.169–70; Neil Reynolds, 'Chrétien's Machiavelli', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 30 September 2006) p.3; Lawrence Martin, *Iron Man: The Defiant Reign of Jean Chrétien* p.34; Lawrence Martin, *Chrétien: The Will to Win* pp.25,44.

⁶⁷⁷ Jeffrey, *Divided Loyalties: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1984–2008* p.245–6.

⁶⁷⁸ Joseph Fiorino, 'Canada's Historical Shift from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking', *NATO Association of Canada*, 2014 <<http://natoassociation.ca/canadas-historical-shift-from-peacekeeping-to-peacemaking/>> [accessed 16 June 2018]; McQuaig p.50; Donna Winslow, 'Canadian Warriors in Peacekeeping', in *Warriors in Peacekeeping. Points of Tension in Complex Cultural Encounters. A Comparative Study Based on Experiences in Bosnia*, ed. by Jean Callaghan and Mathias Schönbörn (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004) pp.51–9.

parliamentarians about the preparation of Canadian troops and the relevance of their deployment abroad.⁶⁷⁹ However, the evolution of the predispositions and interests of the policy elite was a more influential factor. The weakening of internationalism as the practical logic generated spaces that were filled by ideas inspired by Atlanticism and continentalism. While internationalism represented a budgetary burden, the relationship with the United States was profitable and the link with Europe allowed balancing the weight acquired by the relation with the superpower. Although academics argue that Chrétien's selective and passive version of internationalism tended towards isolationism, the relevance acquired by the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the commitments made in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the weight of regional trade in North America show that Atlanticism and continentalism were much more influential approaches in decision-making.⁶⁸⁰

The character that the strategic policy acquired during Chrétien's first term was the product of a process of adjustment in the predispositions of the policy actors to the structural conditions. The weakening of internationalism had zero counterweights, as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Defence aligned themselves with the vision of Chrétien, the Prime Minister centralised decision-making, and the liberal government had a strong parliamentary majority.⁶⁸¹ From 1993 to 1996, few decisions were made to recover the tradition of liberal internationalism. One was the creation of the Global and Human Issues Bureau within the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. Its purpose was to 'recast the department's thinking on emerging issues such as the environment, crime, and terrorism'.⁶⁸² Another was the promotion of the ban on anti-personnel landmines. During the second term, this initiative became the primary means of preserving the internationalist spirit in foreign policy, as it was symbolically more effective and economically more affordable than United Nations peacekeeping operations. In this context, the appointment of Axworthy as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1996 is interpreted as Chrétien's symbolic movement to balance the turn of foreign policy and to counter the criticisms generated by the reorientation of strategic policy. Scholars argued that the policy promoted by Chrétien had been 'the most marked retreat from Pearsonian internationalism since the inception of the doctrine', leaving

⁶⁷⁹ Sherene Razack, 'Introduction: "Savage Wars of Peace"', in *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism*, ed. by Sherene Razack (Toronto: UTP, 2004) p.4; Atlanta Journal, 'War Photos Being Probed in Canada', *World in Brief* (Atlanta, 11 October 1996) p.A8.

⁶⁸⁰ Keating, 'A Passive Internationalist: Jean Chrétien and Canadian Foreign Policy' pp.118–9; Rioux and Hay pp.73–5.

⁶⁸¹ Jeffrey, *Divided Loyalties: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1984-2008* p.244; Lawrence Martin, *Iron Man: The Defiant Reign of Jean Chrétien* pp.86–7; Savoie, *Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics* p.171.

⁶⁸² Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World* p.47.

Canada ‘bereft of its internationalist focus’ and ‘only a short hop from [...] isolationism’.⁶⁸³ From 1996 to 2000, foreign policy reincorporated aspects of liberal internationalism through the so-called Axworthy doctrine.⁶⁸⁴ This doctrine held that Canada’s leadership in the post-Cold War context depended on the use of its soft or cooptive power. Axworthy considered Canada a ‘value-added nation’ with the talent for ‘drawing upon its skills in negotiating, building coalitions, and presenting diplomatic initiatives’.⁶⁸⁵ These ideas promoted the reformulation of the strategic approach based on the concept of human security and the principle of responsibility to protect. In this framework, the initiative to ban landmines became relevant in foreign policy, despite the discomfort it generated within the Canadian Forces.⁶⁸⁶ Chrétien’s confidence in Axworthy allowed the Minister to have greater control over foreign policy than his predecessors. Axworthy’s leadership during the so-called ‘Ottawa Process’ also allowed the Minister to personally promote the initiative until the signing of the *Mine Ban Treaty* in 1997.⁶⁸⁷ In this way, the foreign policy during Chrétien’s second term recovered elements of liberal internationalism. However, the priorities and interests of the policy elite went beyond the symbolic capital and soft power it provided to Canada. The political, economic, military, and moral link of Canada with Europe positioned Atlanticism as one of the key inputs to strategic policy in the final years of the twentieth century.

Atlanticism was the second most influential ideological source in the establishment of Canadian security during Chrétien’s second term. Internationalism allowed Canada to expose its commitment to matters of niche diplomacy to preserve its structural position as a medium power and its external identity as a good international citizen.⁶⁸⁸ On the other hand, Atlanticism allowed Canada to express its solidarity with its main allies and for this to be taken into account by the superpowers in matters of ‘high politics’ of international security.⁶⁸⁹ The mixed nature that the strategic policy acquired generated contradictions,

⁶⁸³ Munton and Keating pp.519–20; Edna Keeble and Heather Smith, *(Re) Defining Traditions: Gender and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Halifax: Fernwood, 1999) chap.3; Rioux and Hay p.24; Andrew Cohen, ‘Canada in the World: The Return of the National Interest’, *Behind the Headlines*, 52 (1995), 1–16.

⁶⁸⁴ Government, ‘Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session Thirty-Sixth Parliament’ (Ottawa: Parliament, 1997); Liberal Party, ‘Securing Our Future Together’ (Ottawa: Liberal Party, 1997) pp.80–6.

⁶⁸⁵ Lloyd Axworthy, ‘Why Soft Power Is the Right Policy for Canada’ p.B6.

⁶⁸⁶ Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World* pp.4,133; Tomlin pp.185–91; Warmington and Tuttle p.50.

⁶⁸⁷ Gass pp.70–86; Maxwell Cameron, ‘Democratization of Foreign Policy: The Ottawa Process as a Model’, in *To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*, ed. by Maxwell Cameron, Robert Lawson, and Brian Tomlin (Toronto: OUP, 1998) p.444; Robert Lawson and others, ‘The Ottawa Process and the International Movement to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines’, in *To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*, ed. by Maxwell Cameron, Robert Lawson, and Brian Tomlin (Toronto: OUP, 1998) p.181.

⁶⁸⁸ Behringer, ‘The Dynamics of Middlepowermanship’ p.21.

⁶⁸⁹ Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* p.21.

inconsistencies, and criticisms. An example was Canada's support for the installation of missile defence capabilities in Eastern Europe and the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, although both cases contravened the spirit of the *Ottawa Treaty* symbolically and generated conditions for the resurgence of the Cold War.⁶⁹⁰ Another example was the role that Canada assumed in the transatlantic alliance since 1998. In that year, the number of Canadian troops deployed in peacemaking missions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation exceeded Canada's military contribution in United Nations peacekeeping operations.⁶⁹¹ The third example confirmed that Chrétien's Atlanticist and continentalist predispositions were well above the internationalist principles promoted by Axworthy. In 1999, in the context of the Kosovo War, Canada's involvement in the transatlantic alliance's bombing in Yugoslavia was strongly questioned because the operation lacked the approval of the United Nations Security Council. For Chrétien, Canada's involvement responded to the interests of preserving the good relationship it had developed with the United States and of expressing its support for its European allies. For Axworthy, Canadian participation was based on the legitimate use of force for humanitarian purposes to stop ethnic cleansing undertaken against Albanian citizens in Kosovo.⁶⁹² These dichotomic reasons that justified the Canadian response to the international security environment portray the contrasting reflexes and predispositions that coexisted within the Canadian policy elite in the 1990s. Chrétien's position revealed that he had abandoned his legalistic reflexes and liberal social predispositions. The Prime Minister developed pragmatic reflexes and adopted distinctive neoliberal preferences of business liberals that prioritised the profitability of Canada's foreign relations, especially with the United States and Europe. In contrast, Axworthy's justification presented his diplomatic and legalistic reflexes in which respect for international law played a central role. Among the cabinet ministers, Axworthy was one of the few actors whose predispositions were still firmly rooted in the principles of social liberalism and liberal internationalism.⁶⁹³ The increasing dominance of business liberals in decision-making and the gradual shift of Chrétien's predispositions towards the centre-right of the political spectrum prevented internationalism from regaining its status as the practical logic of the policy elite.

⁶⁹⁰ James Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954-2009: Déjà Vu All Over Again* (BC: UBCP, 2010) pp.179; Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' p.641.

⁶⁹¹ Fiorino; Keating, 'A Passive Internationalist: Jean Chrétien and Canadian Foreign Policy' p.128; Louis Delvoie, 'Curious Ambiguities: Canada's International Security Policy', *Policy Options*, 22 (2001), 36-42 p.36.

⁶⁹² Lawrence Martin, *Iron Man: The Defiant Reign of Jean Chrétien* p.217.

⁶⁹³ Jeffrey, *Divided Loyalties: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1984-2008* pp.56,198,323; Dobbin, *Paul Martin: CEO for Canada?* p.77.

The influence of Axworthy's internationalism came to an end during the last years of Chrétien's second term. Events such as the nomination of Axworthy for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997, Canadian support for the creation of the International Criminal Court in 1998, the entry into force of the *Ottawa Treaty* in 1999, and the hosting of the general assembly of the Organisation of American States in 2000 projected the idea that internationalism was in the process of regaining its hierarchy within the policy elite. Even the appointment of Canada as president of the United Nations Security Council in 1999 and 2000 allowed Axworthy to promote the reduction of sanctions imposed on Iraq. Despite the tension that the proposal generated with the United States, the Minister maintained that it was necessary 'to avoid making ordinary citizens pay for the actions of their leaders'.⁶⁹⁴ However, efforts to restore the activist and humanist dimension of internationalism were interrupted by Axworthy's decision to withdraw from politics in 2000. This situation generated a power vacuum in the policy elite that was capitalised by Chrétien to promote John Manley, whom he considered his successor for the 2003 general election.⁶⁹⁵ Manley's appointment as Foreign Minister was pivotal in the reorientation of strategic policy, as his continentalist predispositions and interests in economic policy were highly influential and contrasted with Axworthy's internationalism and human security agenda. Moreover, his political bond with Chrétien conditioned him to prioritise the expansion of free trade and the improvement of the relationship with the United States.⁶⁹⁶ Like the prime minister, Manley had positioned himself in the centre-right of the Liberal Party because, as Lawrence Martin points out, 'seven years in big business circles have moved him from his more activist ways of old'.⁶⁹⁷ This substitution had profound effects on the ideological balance of the cabinet. Atlanticism and continentalism were established as the most prominent ideological sources that shaped how Canadian decision-makers responded to the 9/11 attacks and the new conditions of the international security environment.

The dominant Atlanticist and continentalist predispositions within the policy elite and the effects of the abrupt reconfiguration of the structural environment delineated the foreign and security policy during Chrétien's third term. The strategic choices in 2001 demonstrate the reorientation of the strategic policy. The Canadian response to the 9/11 attacks consisted of

⁶⁹⁴ William Walker, 'MPs Urge Lifting Sanctions to Halt Iraq "Tragedy"', *Toronto Star* (Ottawa, 14 April 2000) p.29.

⁶⁹⁵ Jeffrey, *Divided Loyalties: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1984-2008* p.399; Allison Dunfield, 'Manley Quitting Politics', *The Globe and Mail* (Ottawa, 28 November 2003).

⁶⁹⁶ Stephen Clarkson, *Uncle Sam and Us: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State* (Toronto: UTP, 2002) pp.400-1; William Orme, 'Chretien Shuffles Canadian Cabinet', *Los Angeles Times* (Ottawa, 16 January 2002) p.13.

⁶⁹⁷ Lawrence Martin, *Iron Man: The Defiant Reign of Jean Chrétien* p.288.

four main decisions. First, Operation Yellow Ribbon was intended to support the United States in controlling the emergency.⁶⁹⁸ Second, the invocation of *Article 5* of the *North Atlantic Treaty* was oriented to enforce the collective defence clause.⁶⁹⁹ Third, the creation of the *Canada-United States Smart Border Accord* was aimed at ensuring the safe flow of people and goods at the border.⁷⁰⁰ Fourth, the sending of Joint Task Force 2 troops to Afghanistan secretly aimed to support the first anti-terrorist operations undertaken by the United States.⁷⁰¹ Manley's leadership in the Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism, the Minister's close ties with the American policy elite, the centralisation of decision-making in Chrétien, and the absence of internationalist counterweights were internal factors that significantly shaped the Canadian response. The decisions of the policy elite allowed them not only to provide unconditional and expeditious support to the United States but also to express their solidarity through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In addition to gaining political capital in the relationship with the United States and generating balance through the transatlantic alliance, one of the main objectives that the policy elite sought to address was to lessen the effects of the American reaction on border dynamics, especially in commercial matters. The 1988 and 1994 trade agreements significantly increased the Canadian economy's dependence on trade with the United States, so closing borders was a serious threat to Canada's national security. The interaction between these factors allows us to understand why the Canadian response did not fall within the logic of the 'defence against help' thesis, but instead on the premise 'defence against the lock-down'.⁷⁰² The ideological configuration of the cabinet, the dependence on regional trade, and the post-9/11 international security environment were equally relevant in the reorientation of Canadian strategic policy towards an Atlanticist-continentalist approach.

The evolution of Canadian strategic policy at the end of the Chrétien government reflected a series of apparent inconsistencies attributed to several factors. The proximity of the electoral period, the reorientation of foreign policy, the changes in the cabinet, the external tensions produced by the American declaration of War on Terror, and the internal pressures

⁶⁹⁸ Vahabph Aghai, *Terrorism, an Unconventional Crime: Do We Have the Wisdom and Capability to Defeat Terrorism?* (Washington: Xlibris, 2011) pp.46–7.

⁶⁹⁹ Jerome Klassen, *Joining Empire: The Political Economy of the New Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: UTP, 2014) pp.201–2.

⁷⁰⁰ Victor Konrad and Heather Nicol, *Beyond Walls: Re-Inventing the Canada-United States Borderlands* (Cornwall: Ashgate, 2008) pp.150–1.

⁷⁰¹ Jean-Christophe Boucher and Kim Nossal, *The Politics of War: Canada's Afghanistan Mission, 2001-14* (Vancouver: UBCP, 2017) pp.2,16,45.

⁷⁰² Adam Chapnick, at the authors' workshop for the book *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice* at the University of Ottawa, 8 December 2017; Massie and Vucetic pp.36–7; Vucetic, 'American Images of Canada: Canadian Muslims in U.S. Newspapers, 1999-2014' p.16.

generated by the social rejection of Canadian involvement resulted in what some realist academics identify as ‘anomalous’ policy decisions.⁷⁰³ By 2002, the dismissal of Martin, the appointment of Manley as Deputy Prime Minister, and the appointment of William Graham as Minister of Foreign Affairs meant a new reconfiguration in the balance of the predispositions of the policy elite. On the one hand, Graham represented the return of a political actor with moderate liberal internationalist preferences in favour of foreign policy based on values, the rule of law, multilateral cooperation, and respect for diversity.⁷⁰⁴ However, on the other hand, the Atlanticist and continentalist predispositions of Manley, Chrétien, and his senior advisors retained the dominant position in decision-making.⁷⁰⁵ In this scenario, Canada’s refusal to participate in the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 presumed the existence of an internationalist consensus within the policy elite, since the justification for not participating was that the operation lacked the approval of the United Nations Security Council.⁷⁰⁶ However, that decision was not inspired by internationalist ideas promoted by Graham or inherited by Axworthy. Like the Canadian unwillingness to participate in the American Ballistic Missile Defence System, the refusal to support the intervention in Iraq revealed that the willingness to cooperate with the United States had its limits. In order to lessen the tensions that this decision would generate in the bilateral relationship and despite its limited military capabilities, Canada chose to increase its commitment in Afghanistan by agreeing to lead the International Security Assistance Force in 2003.⁷⁰⁷ Superficially, both decisions seemed contradictory and irrational. However, from a constructivist analysis in the light of the dominant predispositions in the policy elite, it is possible to understand them.⁷⁰⁸ On the one hand, the rejection of intervention in Iraq was part of the soft-bandwagoning strategy that fuelled continental policy. On the other hand, the increase in participation in the Afghanistan War was part of the soft-balancing strategy that constituted the Atlanticist policy. Eddie Goldenberg, the senior policy advisor of

⁷⁰³ Joel Sokolsky, ‘Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy’, *Policy Matters*, 5.2 (2004) p.3; Frank Harvey, *Smoke and Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism and the Illusion of Multilateral Security* (Toronto: UTP, 2004) p.200; Julian Beltrame, ‘Washington Is Watching’, *Maclean’s* (Toronto, March 2003) pp.36–7.

⁷⁰⁴ Kevin Brushett, ‘The Call of the World: A Political Memoir, by Bill Graham’, *British Journal of Canadian Studies*, 30.2 (2017), 256–57 p.256.

⁷⁰⁵ Douglas Goold, ‘Bill Graham, Pierre Pettigrew, Jim Peterson’, *International Journal*, 59.4 (2004), 929–42 pp.933–4.

⁷⁰⁶ Mark Gollom, ‘Our Own Voice on Iraq?’, *CBC News, Canada* (Toronto, 9 October 2008); CBC, ‘PM Says Canada Won’t Fight in Iraq’, *CBC News, Canada* (Toronto, 18 March 2003); Julian Beltrame, ‘Canada to Stay out of Iraq War’, *Maclean’s*, 2003.

⁷⁰⁷ Norman Spector, ‘Jean Chrétien’s War’, *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 16 July 2009); Janice Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (London: PRH, 2007) pp.285–6.

⁷⁰⁸ Massie, ‘Making Sense of Canada’s “irrational” International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures’ pp.641–3; Srdjan Vucetic, ‘Why Did Canada Sit Out the Iraq War? One Constructivist Analysis’, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 13.1 (2006), 133–53.

Chrétien, reveals that these decisions were based on the fact that within the policy elite it was considered that the invasion of Iraq was fed by a unilateral attitude of the United States, while the coalition in Afghanistan had the multilateral endorsement of the transatlantic alliance.⁷⁰⁹ In terms of cost-benefit, this combination was the one that gave the best returns to Canada in strategic terms, since it did not compromise it excessively with the United States and maintained the support of its European allies. Furthermore, Canada expressed its solidarity with its Western allies in both cases. This last period of government confirmed that internationalism had been reduced to a rhetorical discourse and the practice of commercial globalism. It also affirmed that Canadian strategic priorities had been redirected towards commercial interests with the United States and political priorities with European allies, especially France. This ‘anomalous’ strategic policy was only the beginning of a period of readjustment of Canada’s international identity to the new conditions of the post-9/11 international environment.

6.4.3. Search for a new international identity, 2003-2006

The strategic policy of the Martin government prolonged the consolidation of a hybrid approach that emerged in Chrétien’s third term. Continentalism and Atlanticism continued to provide the best-valued ideas for the design of strategies aimed at adapting Canada to the post-9/11 structural environment. Axworthy’s efforts were insufficient to preserve the status of internationalism as the practical logic of the policy elite. For many foreign service officers, the period from 1996 to 2000 had been the last ‘high point’ of Canadian internationalist diplomacy.⁷¹⁰ As of 2003, internationalism was reduced to two main functions. First, internationalism was used as a symbolic instrument that fuelled political rhetoric. The role played by this approach after the end of the Second World War and during the Chrétien government confirmed the popularity and usefulness of internationalist discourse.⁷¹¹ Martin’s political platform and government agenda set out the objective that Canada would strengthen its leadership in peacekeeping operations and its commitment to the principle of responsibility to protect.⁷¹² However, the facts reveal otherwise. Strategic

⁷⁰⁹ Eddie Goldenberg, *The Way It Works. Inside Ottawa* (Toronto: McClelland, 2006) p.296.

⁷¹⁰ Tsalikis, ‘A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For’; Robertson, ‘A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For’; Government, ‘Minister Carroll Sends off First Canada Corps Mission’ (Ottawa: CIDA, 2004) <<https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2004/12/minister-carroll-sends-off-first-canada-corps-mission.html>>.

⁷¹¹ Munton and Keating pp.517–4; Keeble and Smith p.58; John Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, Volume 2* (Toronto: UTP, 1982) p.119; Paul Painchaud, ‘Middlepowermanship as an Ideology’, in *Canada’s Role as a Middle Power*, ed. by Gordon King (Toronto: CIIA, 1966) pp.29–35.

⁷¹² Government, ‘Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session Thirty-Eighth Parliament’ (Ottawa: Parliament, 2004); Liberal Party, ‘Moving Canada Forward’ (Ottawa: Liberal Party, 2004) pp.11,47–9,56.

priorities were not focused on the humanitarian agenda and Canadian participation in United Nations missions dramatically decreased.⁷¹³ As in the 1970s and 1990s, Martin acknowledged that Canada had limited material capabilities to fulfil all its international commitments, especially in military matters.⁷¹⁴ The second function that internationalism played was the development of new markets globally to boost free trade and foreign investment. Martin's government complemented the activities of Team Canada Mission through the Canada Corps.⁷¹⁵ This agency, which was administered by the Canadian International Development Agency, aimed to promote good governance and the building of institutions in 'failed and fragile states'.⁷¹⁶ Beyond good intentions, this initiative resembled the ideas promoted in the 1980s about using foreign aid as a means to achieve economic goals.⁷¹⁷ This similarity can be understood in the light of the business and mercantilist reflexes shared by the right-wing red Tories and the business liberals. The few achievements of internationalism outside the economic sphere were the support of the extension of the G-8 to a G-20 and the diplomatic rapprochement with China.⁷¹⁸ The shrinking of internationalism generated an identity vacuum within the political elite, which was filled by continentalist and Atlanticist constructions. That is, the predispositions of decision-makers ranged between two types of positions. The bilateral was in favour of cooperation with the United States on regional defence and international security to preserve the benefits and stability granted by free trade. The multilateral position was in favour of strengthening ties with the transatlantic alliance to manage the political cost and strategic weight generated by the collaboration with the superpower. Between 2003 and 2006, two cases demonstrate that the interaction between continentalist and Atlanticist predispositions with the structural environment drove the evolution of strategic policy and the search for a new international identity.

⁷¹³ United Nations, 'Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations'.

⁷¹⁴ Jean-Christophe Boucher, 'Public Opinion and Canadian Defence Policy', in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic (Ottawa: Palgrave, 2020) p.167.

⁷¹⁵ The Canadian Trade Commissioner Service.

⁷¹⁶ Stephen Brown, 'From Ottawa to Kandahar and Back: The Securitization of Canadian Foreign Aid', in *The Securitization of Foreign Aid*, ed. by Stephen Brown and Jörn Grävingholt (London: Palgrave, 2016) p.118; Thomas Axworthy, 'The World Needs More Canada', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 4 October 2004) p.21.

⁷¹⁷ Andrew Cohen, 'Martin's First Year on Foreign Policy – the Rhetoric of Good Intentions', *Policy Options*, 1 February (2005) p.47; Taras pp.43–4.

⁷¹⁸ Embassy of China in Canada, 'China, Canada Agree on Building Strategic Partnership', *China-Canada Events*, 2005 <<http://ca.chineseembassy.org/eng/zjwl/t211490.htm>> [accessed 15 July 2019]; G8 Research Group, *G8 Reform: Expanding the Dialogue. An Overview of the G8's Ongoing Relationship with the Emerging Economic Countries and Prospects for G8 Reform*, ed. by Vanessa Corlazzoli and Janel Smith (Toronto: UTP, 2005) pp.7–12.

One of the issues that defined the character of the strategic policy was Canada's stance towards the American Ballistic Missile Defence System. As mentioned earlier, the limits of the continentalist predispositions of the policy elite influenced the development of soft-bandwagoning strategies. The implications for diplomatic freedom, incompatibility with arms control, rejection of Canadian society, impact on external identity, and political costs were factors that motivated the Canadian government's refusal to get involved. Although during the Chrétien government it was claimed that Martin was one of the business liberals who supported Canada's participation in the programme because of the economic benefits that it could generate, his position was moderated by assuming power.⁷¹⁹ By 2005, Prime Minister Martin, Defence Minister Graham, and Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew openly expressed their rejection of Canada being part of the programme.⁷²⁰ However, this fact is interpreted as a political statement aligned with internationalist rhetoric because, in practice, Canada already played a role in the continental system. In 2004, the renewal of the North American Aerospace Defence Command was part of the Canadian strategy to restore the relationship with the United States following tensions caused by the Canadian refusal to participate in the intervention in Iraq in 2003. The renewal of the agreement implied authorisation for the North American Aerospace Defence Command to transmit missile warning information to the American command.⁷²¹ Modest Canadian participation in the programme is interpreted as the measure through which the policy elite sought to project Canada, with limited political costs, as a reliable American ally and committed to continental defence. Likewise, the decision to allow the United States to monitor Canadian airspace responded to the logic of the 'defence against help' thesis, as it would allow Canada to expand its capabilities to monitor its territory and be taken into account in joint decision-making. This decision would avoid unilateral measures by the United States in the face of a hypothetical threat.⁷²² In this way, the Canadian position was defined by having one foot in and one foot out of the programme. The Canadian strategic stance reflected its simultaneous

⁷¹⁹ Kim Nossal, 'New Wineskin, Old Wine: The Future of Canadian Contributions to North American Security', in *North American Strategic Defense in the 21st Century: Security and Sovereignty in an Uncertain World*, ed. by Christian Leuprecht and Joel Sokolsky (Cham: Springer, 2018) p.105; Christina Gabriel and Laura Macdonald, 'Chrétien and North America: Between Integration and Autonomy', in *The Chrétien Legacy: Politics and Public Policy in Canada*, ed. by Lois Harder and Steve Patten (Québec: McGill-QUP, 2006) p.90; Alexander Panetta, 'PM Gets Thumbs-up on Missile Defence', *The Chronicle Herald* (NS, 23 March 2005).

⁷²⁰ CBC, 'Martin Will Reject Missile Defence: Report', *CBC News, Canada* (Toronto, 22 February 2005); David Pugliese, 'Missile Defense: No Thanks, Neighbor', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 61.4 (2005), 14–16.

⁷²¹ NORAD, *A Brief History of NORAD* (Colorado: NORAD, 2013) p.29; Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' p.635.

⁷²² Barry and Bratt pp.82–1; Ørvik, 'Canadian Security and "Defence against Help"' pp.26–31.

support for the American nuclear strategy and the control of strategic nuclear weapons.⁷²³ This apparent inconsistency demonstrates that the policy elite did not fully assume internationalist or continentalist predispositions. Canada was in the process of redefining its international identity.

The second issue that guided the evolution of strategic policy was the role Canada played in the Global War on Terror. Atlanticism was the approach that predominantly fed the decision-making process. In the case of the intervention in Iraq, the Governor General-in-Council ordered the deployment of the Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf to support American and British troops, despite the initial refusal of the federal government in 2003.⁷²⁴ The lack of approval by the United Nations for the intervention and the incompatible positions of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France influenced Canadian deliberation. Academics and practitioners argue that in the negotiation process of *Resolution 1441*, Canada aligned itself with French opposition to the war. However, as soon as French preferences changed in favour of the war, Canada had few elements to oppose the position of its 'natural' allies.⁷²⁵ In contrast to the reluctant Canadian involvement in the American-led intervention in Iraq, Canada gradually increased its involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-led operations in Afghanistan. According to Manley, the growing role assumed by Canadian troops in Kabul since 2003 and in Kandahar since 2005 was based on the Canadian search for influence, national security, international legitimacy, and stature.⁷²⁶ However, the fact that Canada's roles in the Afghanistan War lay mainly in the symbolic effect of its presence and not in the material impact of its participation allows us to interpret that the search for stature was the main reason for the policy elite to extend and intensify Canadian involvement. Before Parliament, Manley said that Canada's 'good fortune and standing impose on us both authority and obligations in global affairs', so withdrawing from the theatre could 'affect Canada's reputation in the world'.⁷²⁷ In the context of both conflicts and considering the role of internationalist symbolism and economic interests, Iraq and Afghanistan became the primary recipients of Canadian assistance to promote the

⁷²³ Lang; Lagassé, 'Canada, Strategic Defence, and Strategic Stability: A Retrospective and Look Ahead' p.918.

⁷²⁴ Gollom; The Ottawa Citizen, 'Canadian Pilots Flew Missions in Iraq', *The Ottawa Citizen* (Ottawa, 22 April 2008); Beltrame, 'Canada to Stay out of Iraq War'.

⁷²⁵ Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' pp.641–2; Goldenberg p.296; David Haglund, 'Canada and the Sempiternal NATO Question', *McGill International Review*, Spring.5 (2005), 15–23 p.19; Alex Macleod, 'De La Raison à La Reconnaissance: Comprendre l'opposition de La France à l'intervention En Irak', in *Diplomaties En Guerre: Sept États Face à La Crise Irakienne*, ed. by Alex Macleod and Morin David (Outremont: Athéna, 2005) p.161.

⁷²⁶ IPCFRA, 'Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan: Final Report' (Ottawa: Parliament, 2008).


⁷²⁷ IPCFRA p.37.

development of security institutions and industrial infrastructure.⁷²⁸ The nature of the decisions that defined the Canadian role in the Global War on Terror shows that the policy elite aspired to underpin Canada's reputation and stature as a relevant partner in the transatlantic alliance. Canadian involvement was considered more a gesture of transatlantic solidarity than a decision based on moral principles or continental cooperation.

This review of the evolution of the strategic policy during Martin's government makes it possible to understand the logic that prevailed in the decision-making process and the role played by the Atlanticist and continentalist approaches. The background, trajectory, and profiles of Martin, Graham, and Pettigrew allow us to elucidate that the dominant predispositions in the political elite were oriented towards strengthening political ties with Europe and improving the commercial relationship with the United States. External pressures generated by the international security environment and internal forces produced by the rejection of Canadian militarism conditioned the policy elite to have to balance between the two strategic priorities. On the one hand, the continentalist predispositions allowed Canada to make decisions aimed at projecting an image of a reliable neighbour committed to continental defence. The potential social rejection and political costs related to Canada's open and full participation in the American Ballistic Missile Defence System were grounds for moderating and limiting Canadian involvement. On the other hand, Atlanticist preferences were fundamental to balance the strategic weight that cooperation and commerce with the United States acquired. The demonstration of Canadian solidarity with the United Kingdom and France through the transatlantic alliance explains why the Canadian policy elite preferred to participate in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-led missions than in operations convened by the United Nations or the United States. Finally, it should be noted that the pragmatic and mercantilist reflexes that distinguished the policy elite led by business liberals explain why liberal internationalism was reduced to the implementation of commercial globalism to lessen the vulnerability generated by growing economic dependence on the United States. The period from 2003 to 2006 demonstrates that the shrinking of internationalism in the 1990s created spaces for the Atlanticist and continentalist strategic approaches to work in tandem to adapt Canada to the post-9/11 structural environment. However, the policy elite failed to consolidate a consistent and sustainable construction of international identity for Canada.

⁷²⁸ Stephen Brown, 'From Ottawa to Kandahar and Back: The Securitization of Canadian Foreign Aid' pp.118–9; Jerry Spiegel and Robert Huish, 'Canadian Foreign Aid for Global Health: Human Security Opportunity Lost', *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 15.3 (2009), 60–84.

Figure 6-3. Evolution of the Canadian strategic policy, 1993-2006
(Change and continuity of the continentalist practical logic)



Own elaboration.

To summarise, Figure 6-3 portrays the progressive consolidation of the continentalist strategic approach from 1984 onwards as a result of the weakening process experienced by liberal internationalism. As is reviewed in the next chapter, the revamped version of continentalism promoted by the conservative government of Stephen Harper allowed Canada to develop a solid external identity that would prevail until the mid-2010s.

Conclusion

The study undertaken in this chapter provides elements that allow a better understanding of the complex relationship between international and domestic dynamics that guided the evolution of Canadian strategic policy from 1993 to 2006. Since the end of the Second World War, the desire to consolidate Canada as a sovereign nation and a protagonist in the construction of the new international order was pervasive within the Canadian security establishment. For much of the second half of the twentieth century, Canada's internationalist construction of external identity was a central element in the definition of the multilateralist, legalist, and humanitarian nature of its foreign policy, as well as in the design of defensive security strategies in favour of the preservation and promotion of universal moral values such as human rights and democracy. However, the changes in the conditions of the structural environment, the cultural dispositions of policy actors, and the positions they occupied in the social field in which the strategic policy was formulated prompted a process of weakening internationalism from the 1980s. The last two factors have usually been overlooked in the literature, although they are fundamental to understanding the origin and development of this process. Firstly, the positional logic of the policy elite led by the Liberal Party's business liberals suggests that its institutional culture and cultural reflexes were the product of growing mercantilist rationality, which was promoted after the adoption of neoliberal economic policies. Secondly, the positional logic of the strategic policy-making field gives evidence that the preponderant role of the political class in decision-making was a crucial factor in the weakening of diplomatic and military capabilities, as well as in the redefinition of the guidelines under which national security strategies were designed. The changes in both components of practical logic allow us to understand the profound effects of neoliberalism on Canadian strategic thinking and practice from which decision-makers articulated official responses to changes in structural conditions after the end of the Cold War.

The results of this tracking of the evolution of foreign, commercial, and security policies during the rise of neoliberalism support the argument that the practical logic based on an internationalist strategic conception gradually lost its dominion over Canada's external

identity, the institutional culture of government, and the cultural reflexes of policy-makers. The weakening of liberal internationalism is identified as a multifactorial process in which political-economic pressures since the 1970s, the adoption of neoliberal measures in the 1980s, and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s redefined the cultural roots and dynamics of the strategic policy-making. The undermining of internationalist predispositions in the policy elite and the preponderant role of the political class with a business background in the field of strategic policy-making were decisive aspects in the redefinition of Canada's strategic behaviour throughout the 1990s. The primary conclusion is that, despite the effects of this weakening process, the solid foundations of internationalism in a large sector of the policy elite, especially in the diplomatic corps and social liberal politicians, allowed this strategic approach to preserve its status as practical logic until the 2006 political transition. This work has contributed to reinforcing an argument that has recently gained acceptance about the Canadian case. This study has shown that the weakening of the internationalist approach allowed Atlanticist and continentalist ideas to acquire greater relevance in the definition of Canada's external identity and strategic policy.⁷²⁹ Likewise, this chapter has provided an alternative analysis of how the subjective interpretation of decision-makers on the structural conditions of the international system gradually altered the parameters for the formulation of security strategies in Canada. The structuralist-constructivist approach deployed in this study complements the realist theses that prevails in the literature on the change in state behaviour after the end of the Cold War.⁷³⁰ From the arguments presented in the previous pages, it is possible to understand in chapter seven how the erosion of internationalist predispositions created political spaces within the policy elite that allowed continentalist doctrines to play a more and more dominant role in shaping the Canadian strategic behaviour during the consolidation of neoliberalism and the Global War on Terror.

⁷²⁹ Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures'; Keating, 'A Passive Internationalist: Jean Chrétien and Canadian Foreign Policy'; Munton and Keating; Rioux and Hay.

⁷³⁰ Haglund, 'The Paradigm That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Canadian Foreign Policy's Uneasy Relationship with Realist IR Theory'; Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics'; Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies'; Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War'.

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Chapter seven. The politics of strategic policy in Canada, 2006-2015: rebuilding soft-bandwagoning continentalism

‘My long-term goal is to make Conservatives the natural governing party of the country. And I am a realist. You do that two ways [...] One thing you do is you pull conservatives, to pull the party, to the centre of the political spectrum. But what you also have to do, if you are really serious about making transformations, is you have to pull the centre of the political spectrum toward conservatism’.⁷³¹

Stephen Harper (Canadian Prime Minister, 2006-2015), 2008.

⁷³¹ Michael Behiels, ‘Stephen Harper’s Rise to Power: Will His “New” Conservative Party Become Canada’s “Natural Governing Party” of the Twenty-First Century?’, *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 40.1 (2010), 118–45 p.118.

Introduction

The 1990s were characterised by the emergence of a system of rules and norms that endowed the post-Cold War global order with a unipolar and neoliberal character. The new structural conditions had profound implications on the normative standards of state behaviour and the dynamics of international relations, especially those with the United States. The clearest example illustrates how international speeches and practices on the defence of democracy, the protection of human rights, and the promotion of free trade produced pressures on states to adopt modern doctrines that would allow them to adapt to the renewed international scene. The abrupt redefinition of the global security environment in 2001 and the disruptive change in Canadian politics in 2006 produced conditions that tempered the dispute between the main currents of strategic thinking to acquire the dominant role within the Canadian policy elite. The weakening of liberal internationalism in previous decades created political spaces that were gradually filled by continentalist notions, which redirected the evolution of Canada's strategic policy. Based on the analyses of the socio-political context presented in chapter two and on the development of the strategic policy of the late twentieth century in the preceding paragraphs, this study focuses on assessing the cultural roots and dynamics that led the evolution of the Canadian foreign, commercial, and security policies from 2006 to 2015. This work puts attention on the habitus of the political elite, headed by the blue Tory faction of the Conservative Party, and on the domains that constituted the social field in which the strategic policy was created. The assessment of the interaction between the predispositions of the policy actors with the structural context from the 2000s onwards elucidates a process of rebuilding of the continentalist strategic notion in which the design of soft-bandwagoning strategies with the United States won more relevance every time. From the perspective of the conservative government, this was the best way to adapt Canada to the structural environment derived from the attacks of 9/11 and the economic crisis of 2008.

The argument in this chapter is that the logic that shaped the practices of Canadian policy actors was increasingly based on a continentalist strategic approach due to political spaces created by the weakening of liberal internationalism and structural changes in the world system during the 1990s. After the political transition of 2006, continentalism became the foremost strategic knowledge regime in shaping the external identity, institutional culture, and cultural reflexes of Canada throughout consolidation of neoliberalism. This practical logic based on continentalist prescriptions was gradually promoted since the 1980s, as discourses and practices inspired by social liberalism lost importance for the political class. It is possible to identify the relevance that the continentalist ideological source obtained in the predispositions of a sector of the policy elite since the conservative government of Brian

Mulroney in 1984. However, liberal internationalism did not abandon its status as practical logic until the electoral defeat of the Liberal Party in 2006. The central conclusion is that only the continentalist strategic notion managed to acquire the category of practical logic of the policy elite after the political change, despite the internationalist resistance that prevailed within the Liberal Party and the diplomatic corps. One of the contributions of this work is that it provides a different assessment of how Canadian strategic policy was formulated to respond to the post-9/11 structural environment. In contrast to publications focused on structural factors, this analysis has deployed a culturalist approach to pay more attention to the role played by the sociopolitical context and ideological sources in the formulation of strategic responses to domestic and external pressures.⁷³² The second contribution of this work lies in the tracking of continuity and the change in the cultural factors that delineated the parameters for the design of foreign policy and national security strategies. In the literature, few papers recognise and examine in depth the cultural factors that guided the evolution of the strategic policy towards a continentalist approach and promoted the design of soft-bandwagoning strategies with the United States.⁷³³ Within the framework of this dissertation, this chapter serves the purpose of evaluating the effect of the sociopolitical imagination of conservative policy-makers on the articulation of strategic responses and the definition of Canadian state behaviour during a period defined by the consolidation of neoliberalism, the global financial crisis, and the intensification of the War on Terror.

This chapter presents a study in four sections on the cultural dynamics that predominated in the Canadian strategic policy-making process in the conservative governments after the 2006 political change. The first section provides a brief review of the continentalist construction of Canadian international identity that regained strength within the policy elite in the late

⁷³² David McDonough, *Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and Threats*, ed. by David McDonough (Toronto: UTP, 2012); Don Macnamara, 'Canada's National and International Security Interests', in *Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests and Threats*, ed. by David McDonough (Toronto: UTP, 2012); Alexander Moens, 'NATO and the EU: Canada's Security Interests in Europe and Beyond', in *Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests and Threats*, ed. by David McDonough (Toronto: UTP, 2012); Andrew Lui, 'Part One. "Interests All the Way Down"', in *Why Canada Cares: Human Rights and Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice* (Québec: McGill-QUP, 2012); Dan O'Meara and Alex Macleod, 'Part 1: American Power and the Location of Global Order', in *Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security after 9/11*, ed. by Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne Cox (Vancouver: UBCP, 2010); Hussain, Pattanyak, and Hira.

⁷³³ Massie and Vucetic; Wilhelm Mirow, *Strategic Culture, Securitisation and the Use of Force: Post-9/11 Security Practices of Liberal Democracies* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016); Kim Nossal, Stéphane Roussel, and Jonathan Paquin, 'Dominant Ideas in Foreign Policy', in *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: McGill-QUP, 2015); Joël Plouffe, 'Stephen Harper's Arctic Paradox', *Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute*, December (2014), 1–15; Justin Massie and Stéphane Roussel, 'The Twilight of Internationalism? Neocontinentalism as an Emerging Dominant Idea in Canadian Foreign Policy', in *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. by Heather Smith and Claire Sjolander (Oxford: OUP, 2013); Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures'.

twentieth century. It also provides an introduction to the process of rebuilding soft-bandwagoning continentalism that developed in parallel to the weakening of defensive internationalism since the 1980s. Part 7.2 evaluates the predispositions that made up the habitus of policy-makers to identify the role played by the different constructions of Canada's international identity in the formulation of foreign and security policy. It pays special attention to the institutional culture and cultural reflexes of the more influential groups in decision-making. The third section maps the social spaces that hosted the policy-making process to identify the endogenous and exogenous pressures that conditioned the design of strategies. Also, it identifies the overlapping fields that comprised the structural environment of the formulation of the strategic policy. Finally, part 7.4 analyses chronologically the interactions between the strategic approaches that contended to achieve the status of practical logic throughout the three terms of Prime Minister Stephen Harper. At the same time, it examines how the dynamic link between objective power structures and the subjective perceptions of policy-makers established the parameters that conditioned policy choices on national security.

7.1. Constructions of Canada's international identity: continentalism

Canada managed to consolidate itself as a sovereign state after the end of the Second World War. The internationalism promoted by the social liberals was fundamental to position Canada as a middle power committed to the construction and defence of the world order. Assuming an identity as a 'good international citizen' allowed Canada to underpin its political independence from the United Kingdom and its territorial autonomy from the United States. However, the Cold War revived old ideas in the political imagination of the Canadian policy elite that played a pivotal role in redefining what was strategically possible. The internal identity of Canada as a North American country generated two dichotomous external identities that influenced Canadian strategic behaviour at the end of the twentieth century. On the one hand, the idea of projecting Canada as a sovereign state was used to justify a series of policies ranging from intense multilateralism in international institutions to the development of strategies to balance the growing American hegemony. However, Canadian strategic choices were constrained by geographical, political, and economic imperatives. For example, the need to show Canada as a reliable neighbour made it unthinkable to develop an external identity, international relations, and material capabilities that threatened American security. The strategic dilemma that arose due to the identification of the United States as an ally and threat demanded from a considerable effort from the

policy elite during the Cold War. They had to formulate policies that simultaneously ensured Canadian sovereignty and American tranquillity. The trend that originated after the end of the Cold War reflected the repositioning of the various constructions of Canada's international identity. While internationalism entered a phase of weakening, continentalism gradually acquired the status of practical logic of the policy elite. This transition raised doubts about whether Canada had gone from aspiring to be a major power in the post-1945 international order to becoming a United States satellite in the post-Cold War unipolar system.⁷³⁴

The international identity that Canada adopted from 2006 is identified as a rebuilding of continentalism forged in the 'Kingston Dispensation' of 1938.⁷³⁵ The weakening of liberal internationalism in the 1990s and the return of conservatives to power in the 2000s generated conditions to develop an international identity based on values and interests that would allow Canada to adapt to the post-9/11 structural environment.⁷³⁶ The so-called Harper doctrine, fed ideologically by neoconservatism and neoliberalism, laid the foundations for the new Canadian continentalist identity. This conservative doctrine held that Canada should assume a moral position with its allies in favour of values such as democracy, free enterprise, individual freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.⁷³⁷ Harper argued that 'foreign affairs should be fought on moral grounds', attached to 'social order', custom, and religious traditions. For Canada, the preservation of historical values and moral ideas about right and wrong were vital to face the challenges posed by terrorism and its sponsors.⁷³⁸ Continentalism aspired to provide Canada with an external identity of 'rising power' with the potential to become one of the 'top global performers'. Under the premise 'Canada first' and an 'entrepreneurial spirit', Canada's new interests aimed at asserting its sovereignty in the Arctic, renovate its armed forces, and repositioning itself in the world economically and

⁷³⁴ Massie and Vucetic pp.29–40; Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures'; Chapnick, 'The Canadian Middle Power Myth'; Hawes; Holmes, 'Most Safely in the Middle'; Dewitt and Kirton; MacKay pp.133–42.

⁷³⁵ For a more detailed review of the soft-bandwagoning continentalism strategic approach, see section 5.2.3. *Continentalism* of chapter five of this thesis: *The Sources of Canadian Strategic Policy*. Petra Dolata, 'A New Canada in the Arctic? Arctic Policies under Harper', *Canadian Studies*, 78 (2015), 131–54; Plouffe; Massie and Roussel pp.41–8.

⁷³⁶ For a more detailed review of the weakening process of defensive internationalism, see section 6.1. *Construction of Canada's International Identity: Internationalism* in chapter six of this thesis: *The Politics of the Strategic Policy-Making in Canada, 1993-2006: Weakening Defensive Internationalism*.

⁷³⁷ Brooke Jeffrey, 'Taking a Stand: The Foreign-Policy Agenda', in *Dismantling Canada: Stephen Harper's New Conservative Agenda* (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2015) pp.240–1; Stephen Harper, 'Prime Minister Stephen Harper's Speech on Reviving Canadian Leadership in the World' (Ottawa: PMO, 2006).

⁷³⁸ Joseph Brean, 'After Half a Century of Liberal Internationalism, Tories Have Forged a New Foreign Policy Myth', *National Post* (Toronto, 2 January 2015); Postmedia News, 'Stephen Harper's Rigid Support for Israel Based on Idea "Foreign Affairs Should Be Fought on Moral Grounds"', *National Post* (Toronto, 4 August 2014) <<https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/stephen-harpers-rigid-support-for-israel-based-on-idea-foreign-affairs-should-be-fought-on-moral-grounds>>.

geopolitically. The military presence, an aggressive trade agenda, and moral clarity were essential to Canada being recognised as a ‘major player’ in a ‘shrinking, changing, dangerous world’.⁷³⁹ The reconstruction of material capabilities and bilateral relations were the means for Canada to preserve its sovereignty, protect its interests, and project its principles. The role of the United States as the ‘most important ally, customer, and neighbour’ of Canada was a significant factor in the configuration of continental identity.⁷⁴⁰ Restoring the special link with the superpower was crucial to guarantee binational trade and face the challenges of regional security, both fundamental issues to ensure Canadian national security. It should be noted that, as continentalism acquired the status of practical logic of the policy elite, internationalist practices were eradicated and Atlanticism continued to serve as an auxiliary approach to manage the relationship with the United States.⁷⁴¹ Taking into consideration the three constructions of Canada’s international identity, the rebuilding of continentalism can be better elucidated in the light of the habitus of the Canadian policy elite. This following analysis allows us to grasp the role of each construction in the formulation of the foreign and security policy from 2006 to 2015.

7.2. Habitus of policy elite: the neoconservative blue Tories

During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the Canadian government gradually shifted towards the centre-right of the political spectrum. The 1980s marked the beginning of a long period of political transformation in Canada. The change of party in power, the renewal of the political-economic model, and the ideological reconfiguration of the two dominant political parties had profound implications in strategic policy. Just as the predominance of business liberals over social liberals impacted on the reduction of the welfare state and the weakening of internationalism in the 1990s; the preponderance of the blue Tories over the red Tories influenced the underpinning of neoliberalism and the rebuilding of continentalism in the 2000s. The rebirth of the Conservative Party in 2003 and its electoral victory three years later consolidated the tendency of change that originated in the 1980s. The result was the fading of liberal internationalism and the advent of

⁷³⁹ Robertson, ‘Rising Power: Stephen Harper’s Makeover of Canadian International Policy and Its Institutions’ pp.98–9.

⁷⁴⁰ Harper, ‘Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Speech on Reviving Canadian Leadership in the World’; Kim Nossal, ‘Defense Policy, Canadian-American Relations, and “Canada’s New Government”’, in *American Review of Canadian Studies-Enders Edition Authors’ Conference* (Washington: WWC, 2006) pp.8–14.

⁷⁴¹ For a more detailed review of the defensive internationalism and soft-balancing Atlanticism strategic approaches, see sections 5.2.1. *Internationalism* and 5.2.2. *Atlanticism* from chapter five of this thesis: *The Sources of Canadian Strategic Policy*.

neoconservative continentalism in Canadian politics.⁷⁴² Taking this background into consideration, the examination of the habitus of the policy elite that came to power in 2006 enables us to understand the role played by institutional culture and cultural reflexes in the rebuilding of the continentalist strategic approach. Of the three groups responsible for strategic decision-making, the political elite was once again the best equipped in social, cultural, and symbolic terms to adapt to the conditions of the post-9/11 structural environment. Three factors explain the predominance of politicians, the repositioning of the military elite, and the marginalisation of the diplomatic corps in the policy-making process.⁷⁴³

The first factor was the socio-cultural background of the political elite, mainly the right-wing of the renovated Conservative Party. The international environment of the 2000s was defined by the bloom of neoliberalism and the challenge to American hegemony. Since the late 1980s, the attributes that gradually positioned politicians as the dominant actors in the policy-making process were their ability to interpret the political-economic changes, their exercise of political power to centralise decision-making, and their relationships with the corporate elite. Concerns about the national debt, the weight of trade with the United States, and the effects of the 9/11 attacks placed economic and continental affairs as priorities on the government's agenda. In this context, conservative politicians had the best resources to respond to structural conditions. The blue Tories' experience in business, training in economics, and corporative ties provided them with the socio-cultural capital required to make decisions that allowed Canada to monetise neoliberal reforms, stabilise its finances, and adapt to the new global environment.⁷⁴⁴ The so-called Harper doctrine redistributed the power of influence in decision-making between generals and diplomats. On the one hand, the change in priorities in the strategic agenda, the role assigned to Canadian Forces in foreign policy, and the tensions experienced with liberal governments were factors that improved the position of the military elite. Military officers established themselves as useful players in cultural and symbolic terms, able to advise politicians and implement strategic

⁷⁴² Peter Woolstencroft, 'The Conservatives: Rebuilding and Rebranding, Yet Again', in *Canadian Parties in Transition*, ed. by Alain Gagnon and Brian Tanguay (Toronto: UTP, 2017) pp.120–3,153–64; Farney and Rayside pp.6–7; Patten, 'The Triumph of Neoliberalism within Partisan Conservatism in Canada' pp.65–6; Horowitz pp.159–9.

⁷⁴³ For a more detailed review of the composition of the Canadian policy elite, see *Appendix G: Canadian Policy Elite, 2006-2015*; and section 5.1. *Social Dynamics of Strategic Policy-Making* of chapter five of this thesis: *The Sources of Canadian Strategic Policy*.

⁷⁴⁴ James Farney and Royce Koop, 'The Conservative Party in Opposition and Government', in *The Blueprint: Conservative Parties and Their Impact on Canadian Politics*, ed. by John Lewis and Joanna Everitt (Toronto: UTP, 2017) pp.26–9,157; Patten, 'The Triumph of Neoliberalism within Partisan Conservatism in Canada' pp.62–73; Bob Plamondon, 'Mackay and Harper: New Leadership Brings Results', in *Blue Thunder: The Truth About Conservatives from Macdonald to Harper*, ed. by Bob Plamondon (Toronto: GRM, 2013) pp.391–2.

policy.⁷⁴⁵ In contrast, the symbolic and operational erosion of the diplomatic corps that started in the 1990s persisted into the 2010s. The roots of liberal internationalism hindered diplomats' adaptation to the new conditions of internal politics, regional security, and global economy.⁷⁴⁶ It should be noted that the role played by the socio-cultural background of the political elite in policy-making is usually an issue that is taken for granted in much of the literature. Its examination allows us to understand the reasons why politicians monopolised decision-making and selectively managed the involvement of military and diplomats.

The second factor that clarifies the predominance of politicians in the policy-making process was their professional profile. The intellectual formation of the blue Tories was a product of their experience in business and studies in law, economics, or administration.⁷⁴⁷ However, the relevance that politicians acquired is not attributed solely to their cultural capital, as less than three-quarters of the cabinet ministers and ministers of state completed their undergraduate studies and less than a quarter were postgraduates.⁷⁴⁸ The power of the blue Tories was also a result of their managerial knowledge, business skills, and corporate ties. From 2006 to 2015, a prime minister, four foreign ministers, two defence ministers, and two finance ministers had business experience and training in law, economics, or administration. It should be noted that cultural capital was gradually eclipsed by socio-political capital during Harper's mandates. The members of his inner circle were increasingly younger and less experienced. Young supporters with limited academic credentials became the base of Harper's cadre of advisers.⁷⁴⁹ The cultural, social, and political equipment of the blue Tories allowed them to align with Harper's strategic vision and understand the conditions of internal politics, regional security, and global economy. The monopolisation of power in the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's Office positioned conservative politicians as the predominant actors in decision-making, while the military and diplomats were gradually relegated to the implementation of strategic policy. Despite the reforms undertaken in the 1990s within the diplomatic corps and armed forces to update the professional profile of their members, both elites had limited resources to take the lead in the policy-making process

⁷⁴⁵ Andrew Richter, 'A Defense Renaissance? The Canadian Conservative Government and the Military', *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 43.3 (2013), 424–50 pp.426–7; Philippe Lagassé and Joel Sokolsky, 'A Larger "Footprint" in Ottawa: General Hillier and Canada's Shifting Civil–Military Relationship, 2005–2008', *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 15.2 (2009), 16–40 pp.16–7,26.

⁷⁴⁶ Peter McKenna, 'Muzzling Diplomats Prevents Speaking Truth to Power'; Peter McKenna, 'Bullying Diplomats: Trudeau Picks up Where Harper Left Off'; Robertson, 'Rising Power: Stephen Harper's Makeover of Canadian International Policy and Its Institutions' pp.98–108.

⁷⁴⁷ Chan pp.20–31; O'Neill and Stewart pp.169,183.

⁷⁴⁸ Crawford.

⁷⁴⁹ Leslie MacKinnon, 'How Stephen Harper's Inner Circle Has Changed', *CBC News, Politics* (Toronto, 24 May 2014).

developed under Harper. The professional profile of politicians allows us to understand their adaptation to internal conditions and external pressures. The professional profile of the military and diplomats did not match to the rules established by the prime minister for the operation of his policy-making machinery.

The third factor that explains the dominant position of the political elite was the role played by their institutional culture and cultural reflexes. Neoconservatism and neoliberalism were the ideological sources that shaped government thinking and practice. The neoconservatism embodied by the blue Tories was aimed at promoting free trade, returning federal power to the provinces, and limiting the role of government in the economy.⁷⁵⁰ In contrast to the British roots of the red Tories, the blue Tories' origins in the business elites of Montreal and Toronto influenced them to identify with the neoliberal precepts promoted by the republican and libertarian movements in the United States during the 1970s.⁷⁵¹ This neoconservative vision combined with the neoliberal doctrine that drove economic openness, free trade, balanced budgets, and the reducing of the state.⁷⁵² The product of this ideological amalgam was a set of pragmatic and managerial reflexes, as well as individualistic and mercantilist values. The decision-makers adopted pre-existing institutional trends in Canadian political culture, such as strong partisan discipline and the concentration of power in the prime minister. They also developed new practices that emerged with the Conservative Party, such as the rigid management of communication, the permanent campaigning, and neoliberal pragmatism.⁷⁵³ These aspects influenced the character acquired by the government organisation and strategic policy. Harper promoted an 'individualised executive federalism' in which he negotiated in a personalised way with the provincial premiers. The objective was to limit the size and scope of the federal government for the provinces to deal with their affairs.⁷⁵⁴ This model was replicated inside the cabinet. Under the logic of 'divide and rule',

⁷⁵⁰ Nelson Wiseman, 'Ideological Competition in the Canadian Party System', in *Canadian Parties in Transition*, ed. by André Gagnon and Brian Tanguay (Toronto: UTP, 2017) pp.112,122.

⁷⁵¹ Raymond Blake and others, 'Compromise and Negotiation in Crisis, 1984-1993', in *Conflict and Compromise: Post-Confederation Canada, Volume 2* (Toronto: UTP, 2017) pp.275-6; Ronald Dart, *The Red Tory Tradition: Ancient Roots, New Routes* (Montreal: Synaxis, 1999) p.20.

⁷⁵² Andrew Jackson, 'The Economy: Whose Interests Are Being Served?', in *Canada after Harper*, ed. by Ed Finn (Toronto: Lorimer, 2015) pp.93-4; Colleen Fuller, 'Health Care: A Public Right or a Private Option', in *Canada after Harper*, ed. by Ed Finn (Toronto: Lorimer, 2015) pp.177-9; Farney and Rayside pp.3-8.

⁷⁵³ John Lewis and Joanna Everitt, 'Introduction', in *The Blueprint: Conservative Parties and Their Impact on Canadian Politics*, ed. by John Lewis and Joanna Everitt (Toronto: UTP, 2017) pp.3-5.

⁷⁵⁴ Lewis and Everitt p.20; Kate Puddister and James Kelly, 'With or without You: Quebec, the Conservative Movement, and the Pursuit of Majority Government', in *The Blueprint: Conservative Parties and Their Impact on Canadian Politics*, ed. by John Lewis and Joanna Everitt (Toronto: UTP, 2017) p.157; Anna Esselment, 'Federal Feet and Provincial Pools: The Conservatives and Federalism in Canada', in *The Blueprint: Conservative Parties and Their Impact on Canadian Politics*, ed. by John Lewis and Joanna Everitt (Toronto: UTP, 2017) pp.291,303-8; Barbara Cameron, 'Harper, Québec and Canadian Federalism', in *The Harper Record*, ed. by Teresa Healy (Toronto: CCPA, 2008) pp.421-31.

Harper assumed control of the strategic decisions and relegated the ministers to deal with their departmental affairs. On rare occasions, the cabinet committees had significance in decision-making, as they usually operated as a focus group to plan the Question Period.⁷⁵⁵ Furthermore, strategic policy moved away from internationalist multilateralism and adopted bilateralism in favour of the continental defence. Selectivity and conditioning were practical features of the new Canadian diplomacy. Neoconservatism and neoliberalism were the cultural inputs that shaped the reflexes that allowed politicians to adapt to the conditions of the post-9/11 structural environment.

The predispositions that shaped the habitus of the political elite drove the profound reorientation of Canadian strategic policy towards a continentalist approach. The Harper government culminated the process of weakening internationalism that originated in the 1980s. Canada abandoned multilateral policies, moved away from liberal internationalism, and significantly reduced its participation in the United Nations. In contrast, Canada saw in the selective strengthening of its links within its regional alliances a means to underpin its security and defence preparedness.⁷⁵⁶ The significant thing about this process of strategic change was how the policy elite, most of whom inclined towards continentalism, adapted to the structural environment to implement selective and conditional policies oriented to continental defence and free trade. The improvement of the relationship with the United States and the preservation of the links with Europe continued to be a strategic commitment for the Canadian political elite since they contributed much more than internationalism to enhancing Canada's structural position and ensuring its security, mainly in the Arctic. To keep this commitment alive, the Harper government resorted to the renewal of Canada's membership in the North American Aerospace Defence Command and the extension of the Canadian involvement in operations sanctioned by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, especially in Afghanistan.⁷⁵⁷ In this context, the compatibility that arose between Harper's *realpolitik* and the cultural and symbolic capital of the military elite improved the position of generals and admirals in the policy-making process. In contrast, the ideological links of

⁷⁵⁵ Savoie, *Whatever Happened to the Music Teacher?: How Government Decides and Why* pp.75–6; Jackson and Jackson p.287.

⁷⁵⁶ Walter Dorn, 'Unprepared for Peace: A Decade of Decline in Canadian Peacekeeping', in *The United Nations and Canada: What Canada Has Done and Should Be Doing at the United Nations*, ed. by John Trent (Ottawa: WFM, 2014); Jordan Smith, 'Reinventing Canada: Stephen Harper's Conservative Revolution', *World Affairs*, 174.6 (2012), 21–28 pp.23–5.

⁷⁵⁷ Christian Leuprecht, Joel Sokolsky, and Thomas Hughes, 'The Strategic Defence of North America in the 21st Century', in *North American Strategic Defense in the 21st Century: Security and Sovereignty in an Uncertain World*, ed. by Christian Leuprecht, Joel Sokolsky, and Thomas Hughes (Cham: Springer, 2018) pp.183–5; Plouffe oo,5,10; Justin Massie, 'Canada's War for Prestige in Afghanistan: A Realist Paradox?', *International Journal*, 68.2 (2013), 274–88 pp.274–5,280.

the diplomatic corps with liberal internationalism led the political elite to relegate diplomats from decision-making. The idealist roots within the Canadian foreign service limited their understanding of the relevance of ‘hard power’ and free trade in the structural environment of the 2000s.⁷⁵⁸ 1993 marked the beginning of a period in which the political elite undertook the implementation of a new political-economic model and the search for a compatible strategic approach that would provide security to Canada. 2006 began a decade in which continentalism occupied the status of practical logic of the policy elite and established the parameters for the design of security strategies. The compatibility between the habitus of politicians and the military elite allowed them to rebuild an approach that adapted Canada to the conditions of the post-9/11 structural environment. By way of synthesis, Figure 7-1 portrays the sources of the predispositions that shaped the habitus of the policy elite and how the cultural reflexes of the decision-makers interacted with the broader structures to design new security and defence strategies.


7.3. Fields of strategic policy-making: Adapting strategic approaches to the twenty-first-century structural environment

Three different fields made up the broad structural environment in which Canada’s foreign and security policy was formulated between the 2000s and 2010s: the field of world politics, the domestic socio-political field, and the interdepartmental field. The examination of these three social spaces and the identification of their intersections allows the conceptualisation of the internal and external pressures that conditioned the strategic decisions of the policy-makers. The War on Terror triggered by the 9/11 attacks and the global financial crisis of 2008 had severe repercussions in all fields.⁷⁵⁹ It should be noted that, although each social sphere operated under its own rules, the changes experienced in one of them affected the other two. This interrelation makes it possible to interpret that the character and orientation of the strategic policy was a reaction of the policy elite to the structural changes of the three fields.

⁷⁵⁸ Peter McKenna, ‘Bullying Diplomats: Trudeau Picks up Where Harper Left Off’; Peter McKenna, ‘Muzzling Diplomats Prevents Speaking Truth to Power’; Daryl Copeland, ‘Rebuilding Canada’s Foreign Service after Its “Decade of Darkness”’, *CBC Sunday Edition* (Toronto, 1 July 2016); Robertson, ‘Rising Power: Stephen Harper’s Makeover of Canadian International Policy and Its Institutions’ pp.97–9; Massie, ‘Canada’s War for Prestige in Afghanistan: A Realist Paradox?’ pp.283–4.

⁷⁵⁹ Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, *Polit. Can. Foreign Policy* pp.31–4; Mark Paradis and Patrick James, ‘Canada, the United States, and Continental Security after 9/11’, in *Game Changer: The Impact of 9/11 on North American Security*, ed. by Jonathan Paquin and Patrick James (BC: UBCP, 2014) pp.65–9; Andrew Cooper and Colin Bradford, ‘The G20 and the Post-Crisis Economic Order’, *Centre for International Governance Innovation*, 3.June (2010), 1–15 p.10.

Figure 7-1. Habitus of the Canadian policy elite, 2006-2015
(Reconstruction of the dispositional logic)



Own elaboration based on Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action* (Stanford: SUP, 1998), p.5. Note: the dotted line indicates probable orientation towards internationalism, Atlanticism, or continentalism.

This approach also demonstrates how the policy response affected the continuous reconfiguration of social spaces. The following paragraphs provide an overview that traces the evolution of strategic policy and considers the recurring debates within the policy elite. This section argues that the speeches and practices that accompanied the defence of the American-built neoliberal global order had consequences in the national and international context.

The field of world politics was the arena of interaction among state and non-state actors. This social space was defined by the norms of the global neoliberal system, the foreign policy of the actors involved, and the distribution of material power. The international normative framework that emerged after the end of the Cold War had implications on the states' external identity and strategic behaviour, especially on the middle powers. Traditional practices attributed to weak and non-Western states such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, sponsorship of terrorism, economic heterodoxy, and antidemocratic regimes were identified as threats to international stability.⁷⁶⁰ Transnational discourses and practices based on the 'niche diplomacy' of 'low politics' issues, such as democracy, environment, nuclear disarmament, and human rights, gained acceptance among the middle powers aligned to the world order.⁷⁶¹ The 9/11 attacks put the post-Cold War normative framework to the test. In the context of the American-led Global War on Terror, the roles of the middle powers evolved in opposite directions. The consolidated medium powers such as Canada and Australia developed bandwagoning strategies towards the United States, with the dual purpose of defending the international order and preserving or improving their structural position. Meanwhile, the emerging middle powers such as Brazil, India, and South Africa undertook balancing strategies to counteract the influence exerted by the United States in their regions.⁷⁶² These two types of strategic behaviour were a response to the erosion of the normative standards that governed international relations in the 1990s and the debate that arose in the American policy elite 'between primacy and selective engagement; between a nationalist, unilateralist version of hegemony, and a liberal, multilateral version of hegemony'.⁷⁶³ The 9/11 attacks marked the beginning of a long transition from the unipolar order to a multipolar system. The gradual devaluation of institutions such as the United Nations positioned multilateral forums such as the World Trade Organisation, G-7/8,

⁷⁶⁰ Patrick Stewart pp.27–9; Jordaan pp.167.

⁷⁶¹ Behringer, 'Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda' pp.307–10; Andrew Cooper, 'Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview' pp.1–24.

⁷⁶² Stephen pp.47–50; Özkan pp.80–4.

⁷⁶³ Barry Posen, 'Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony', *International Security*, 28.1 (2003), 5–46 p.44.

and G-20 as the primary mechanisms to exercise the power of global governance and defend the neoliberal international order.⁷⁶⁴ In the case of Canada, the relationship with the United States, regional defence, and international trade were some priority issues in its strategic agenda.

The economic, political, and social conditions of Canada delimited the domestic field. The effects of the attacks on the United States in 2001, the global financial crisis of 2008, and the Canadian political reconfiguration in the 2000s defined this domain. First, the 9/11 attacks had repercussions in several sectors in the medium term. On the one hand, the 'American paranoia about the border' generated pressures on Canada to strengthen its internal security; otherwise, it ran the risk of the United States taking unilateral measures that violated Canadian sovereignty and affected bilateral trade, especially at the border.⁷⁶⁵ On the other hand, Canada's interest in reaffirming its solidarity with its main allies motivated it to extend its military mission in Afghanistan. This decision resulted in an increase in military spending, the polarisation of public opinion, the division of parliamentary support, and the reconsideration of Canada's role in the continental defence institutional framework.⁷⁶⁶ The second important factor in shaping the domestic field was the global financial crisis of 2008, which revived concerns about the deficit, caused cuts to the federal budget, affected foreign trade, and impacted the oil industry. The global recession halted increases in the defence sector budget which had restarted in 2002. This hindered the implementation of strategic agenda issues, such as the update of the military capabilities of Canadian Forces. The measures taken in the 1990s limited the impact of the recession on Canada to such a degree that it was considered the member of the G-7/8 that was most resilient to the crisis.⁷⁶⁷ Third, the Canadian political reconfiguration manifested itself in the domestic field in various ways throughout the 2000s. The renewal of the Conservative Party in 2003, the change of the party in power in 2006, the minority governments from 2004 to 2011, and the electoral decline of the Liberal Party in 2008 portrayed the continuity of the trend that emerged in the early 1980s of a shift of Canadian power centre towards the right of the political spectrum. Beyond the tensions generated by this turn, the political context

⁷⁶⁴ Andrew Cooper, 'Squeezed or Revitalized? Middle Powers, the G20 and the Evolution of Global Governance' pp.971; Alden and Vieira pp.1079–92.

⁷⁶⁵ Massie and Vucetic p.36; Vucetic, 'American Images of Canada: Canadian Muslims in U.S. Newspapers, 1999-2014' p.16.

⁷⁶⁶ Adam Chapnick and Craig Stone, 'From Policy and Strategy to Outcomes', in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic (Ottawa: Palgrave, 2020) pp.81–2; Campbell Clark and Steven Chase, 'Canada Is "Willing to Act" against ISIS, but What That Means Is Unclear', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 4 September 2014) p.A6.

⁷⁶⁷ Boucher, 'Public Opinion and Canadian Defence Policy' pp.168–9; Louise Egan and Randall Palmer, 'The Lesson from Canada on Cutting Deficits', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 21 November 2011).

opened spaces for the opposition to influence the strategic agenda.⁷⁶⁸ In summary, the conditions of the domestic field illustrate the change in values and interests that constituted Canada's revamped international identity.

The third field was the interdepartmental context in which the strategic policy was formulated. The bureaucratic framework was defined by the embrace of court government practices, the irrelevance of the cabinet ministers, the rehabilitation of the armed forces, and the worsening of the diplomatic corps crisis. The political change of 2006 did not alter the dynamics of the decision-making culture that emerged since the 1980s. The centralisation of power in the prime minister was again the result of distrust of bureaucrats affined to previous governments. Bureaucratic politicisation also prevailed, especially in central agencies, Crown corporations, and diplomatic posts.⁷⁶⁹ The strong prime ministerial-centred decision-making undermined the influence of ministers, limited their roles in policy-making, and confined them to addressing departmental issues. The result was the excessive centralisation of power in the prime minister, the Prime Minister's Office, and the Department of Finance. This setting made it easier for Harper to take full control over strategic policy.⁷⁷⁰ In parallel, relations between the military and diplomats with the centre of political power changed in contrasting ways. On the one hand, Harper's relationship with the military elite improved dramatically. Beyond the mutual sympathy between military officers and conservative politicians, the roles assigned to Canadian Forces generated spaces for military advice to be considered.⁷⁷¹ On the other hand, the crisis of the diplomatic corps of the 1990s was accentuated. In addition to the extension of budget cuts, the ideological incompatibility between the diplomatic tradition and the political vision relegated the diplomats from decision-making. Diplomats argue that 'there was a dramatic change under the Harper

⁷⁶⁸ Stephen Saideman, 'Canadian Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: It Could Be Worse?', in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic (Ottawa: Palgrave, 2020) pp.126–7; Lagassé, 'Accountability for National Defence: Ministerial Responsibility, Military Command and Parliamentary Oversight' pp.46–49.

⁷⁶⁹ David Johnson, *Think. Gov. Public Adm. Polit. Canada* pp.xvii–xviii,64–5,146–9; Howard Cody and Jamie Gillies, 'The Canadian Party System and the Leadership of Stephen Harper', *New England Journal of Political Science*, 8.1 (2015), 2–49 pp.2–4; John Lewis, 'Elite Attitudes on the Centralization of Power in Canadian Political Executives: A Survey of Former Canadian Provincial and Federal Cabinet Ministers, 2000-2010', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 46.4 (2013), 799–819 pp.802–3; Postmedia News, 'Is Patronage the Oil That Keeps Our Democracy Turning?'; Christopher Dunn, 'Premiers and Cabinets', in *Provinces: Canadian Provincial Politics*, ed. by Christopher Dunn (Toronto: UTP, 2008) pp.232–5.

⁷⁷⁰ Donald Savoie, *What Is Government Good At?: A Canadian Answer* (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2015); Bob Rae, *What's Happened to Politics?* (Toronto: Simon and Schuster, 2015) p.110; Michael Harris, *Party of One: Stephen Harper And Canada's Radical Makeover* (Toronto: Penguin, 2014); MacKinnon; Lawrence Martin, *Harperland: The Politics Of Control*; Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* pp.206,221.

⁷⁷¹ Keene; Shadwick; Richter p.146; Robert Fife, 'PM Hints Canada May Stay in Afghanistan Past 2009', *CTV News* (Toronto, 21 May 2007).

government, with a pivot towards a projection of militarism [...] If you were a soldier, you could speak to the press, but we could not'.⁷⁷² They also noted that

the Harper government had created a noticeable climate of fear within the then Department of Foreign Affairs. Seasoned diplomats were particularly exercised about giving counsel that did not align with the government's political or electoral agenda. [...] they were expressly told their advice and policy ideas were not welcome. Their main task was to simply implement the government's wishes – however ill-conceived [...] We were told to shut up and do it [...] just implement it.⁷⁷³

From 2006 to 2015, the influence of diplomats on strategic policy decreased considerably, while that of the military establishment increased thanks to the relevance acquired by its symbolic and cultural capital.⁷⁷⁴

This review demonstrates that the evolution of Canadian strategic policy was driven by the adaptation of the cultural practices of policy-makers to the structural conditions of the three fields. As of 2006, the policy elite abandoned strategic conceptions based on the idea that Canada could guarantee its security and preserve its international status through the defence of international order and broad multilateralism. The new values and interests of conservative decision-makers redefined the external identity and strategic behaviour of Canada. The new strategic approach was directed towards the preservation of Canadian security through practices that underpinned free trade and continental defence. One of the theses that predominate in the literature is that the change in Canadian foreign and security policy in the 2000s was a consequence of the structural effects of the 9/11 attacks and the War on Terror. However, the role of domestic factors has not been addressed in depth in the academy. While the so-called 'strategic shock' that the attacks represented was a milestone that reconfigured the international security environment and increased external pressures on Canada, that argument does not provide elements to understand the reasons why the Harper

⁷⁷² Robertson, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'; Tsalikis, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'.

⁷⁷³ Peter McKenna, 'Bullying Diplomats: Trudeau Picks up Where Harper Left Off'; Peter McKenna, 'Muzzling Diplomats Prevents Speaking Truth to Power'.

⁷⁷⁴ For a more detailed review of the architecture of the Canadian bureaucratic machinery, see *Appendix H: Canadian Policy-Making Structure, 2006-2015*; and section 5.1.4. *Policy-Making* of chapter five of this thesis: *The Sources of Canadian Strategic Policy*.


government reacted the way it did during the 2000s and 2010s.⁷⁷⁵ A much more comprehensive and nuanced assessment must recognise that the broad structural environment in which the Canadian policy-makers operated conditioned their context interpretation and strategic choices. This amalgamation of factors elucidates two aspects. First, the decisions of the policy elite were a response to endogenous and exogenous conditions. Second, the central dilemmas of the policy elite arose from its inaccurate reading or weak adaptation to changes in the structural environment. In summary, Figure 7-2 shows the radiography of the positional logic embedded in the field of Canadian strategic policy-making from 2006 to 2015. This construction synthesises an analysis of the prevailing rules, the distribution of resources, and the critical linkages. Based on this review of the policy elite's habitus and the strategic policy-making field, the following section chronologically tracks the Canadian policy elite's interactions with the broad structural environment.

7.4. Evolution of the strategic policy: a renewed continental commitment for a new structural environment

The evolution of Canada's strategic policy following the 2006 political change demonstrates the rebuilding of soft-bandwagoning continentalism. After two decades of weakening liberal internationalism, a new version of continentalism based on neoconservative and neoliberal precepts positioned itself as the core approach in strategic policy. The eradication of internationalist thinking and practice led to Atlanticism being established as an auxiliary resource for Canada to interact beyond North America. Atlanticism played a role of reduced internationalism intending to manage the Canadian link with Washington in the post-9/11 structural environment. In this framework, policy decisions on economic, diplomatic, and military matters were conditioned by domestic forces and external pressures. The dynamic relationship between the subjective interpretations of policy-makers and the objective distribution of power in the international arena delineated the course of the strategic policy-making process. The central argument of this chapter is that the evolution of foreign and security policy from 2006 to 2015 portrays a process of rebuilding soft-bandwagoning continentalism driven by the renewed institutional culture and cultural reflexes of the conservative-led policy elite since 2003.

⁷⁷⁵ Nathan Freier, *Known Unknowns: Unconventional 'Strategic Shocks' in Defense Strategy Development* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008) p.5; Peter Schwartz and Dough Randall, 'Ahead of the Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise', in *Blindside. How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards in Global Politics*, ed. by Francis Fukuyama (Washington: BIP, 2007) pp.93–4; Peter Sherman, 'Reconceptualizing Security after 9/11', in *European Security After 9/11*, ed. by Peter Sherman and Matthew Sussez (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004) pp.3,18.

Figure 7-2. Field of the Canadian strategic policy-making, 2006-2015
(Construction of the positional logic)



Own elaboration based on Bourdieu, Pierre, *The Field of Cultural Production. Essays on Art and Literature* (NY: CUP, 1993), p.49. Note: + = positive pole, implying a dominant position, - = negative pole, implying a dominated position.

The tracking of the interaction between the different strategic notions within the policy elite makes it possible to elucidate the break with the tradition of liberal internationalism, the redefinition of Canada's external identity, and the scope of the Canadian relationship with the United States. The following examination of the conformation of the national and global environments provides elements to understand the intricate correlation between endogenous and exogenous dynamics that redirected the Canadian strategic policy from the international activism towards a new pattern of continental cooperation.

7.4.1. Breaking the internationalist strategic pattern, 2006-2008

During the final years of the Cold War, Canada aspired to redefine its international identity to adapt to the emerging norms that would govern international relations in the new unipolar order. For this reason, the policy elite abandoned defensive practices that fed the internationalist strategic pattern. The 'something for everyone' policy formula employed since the 1980s to preserve internationalist symbolism and satisfy continental interests was pointed out as inconsistent, anomalous, and irrational.⁷⁷⁶ The erratic strategic behaviour of Canada lasted to the 1990s due to slow changes in the predispositions of the policy elite. The social liberals' gradual loss of political power and the decreasing influence of the diplomatic elite in decision-making triggered the erosion of the welfare state model and the policy of liberal internationalism. The post-Cold War structural conditions and the role played by the cultural reflexes of business liberals led Canada to develop strategies for coupling with the growing American hegemony based on commercial, selective, pragmatic, and conditional diplomacy.⁷⁷⁷ For the 2000s, the electoral victory of the Conservative Party consolidated the tendency of change that had begun in the 1980s. The displacement of the Canadian government to the right of the political spectrum and the growing predominance of continentalist predispositions and business reflexes within the political elite defined this trend. The reconfiguration of the structural environment following the attacks of 9/11 and the consolidation of the neoliberal political-economic model were factors that conditioned the evolution of the strategic policy throughout the Harper government.

⁷⁷⁶ Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' pp.625–6,644–5; Harvey, *Smoke and Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism and the Illusion of Multilateral Security* p.200; Sokolsky p.3; Beltrame, 'Washington Is Watching' p.36; Taras pp.35,45.

⁷⁷⁷ Rioux and Hay; Rudyard Griffiths, 'The Day of Pearson Internationalism Is Past', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 12 April 1997) p.D3; Andrew Cooper, 'In Search of Niches: Saying "Yes" and Saying "No" in Canada's International Relations', *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 3.3 (1995), 1–13 p.2.

The foreign and security policy promoted since Harper's first term reflected a transformative character aimed at breaking with the tradition of liberal internationalism and the inertia of the strategic undefinition that prevailed since the 1980s.⁷⁷⁸ The ideological pillars that fed the values and interests of the new policy elite integrated by the blue Tories shaped Harper's purpose to break with the internationalist strategic pattern. Neoconservatism was one of the pillars. This ideology influenced the Canadian foreign policy to renounce the 'moral neutrality' of liberals and base it on 'the notion that moral rules form a chain of right and duty'.⁷⁷⁹ The conservative ideas of philosopher Edmund Burke oriented to the valuation of social order, moral customs, and religious traditions, especially those related to the evangelical Christianity, played a central role in Harper's political imaginary.⁷⁸⁰ The Prime Minister agreed with Burke's vision that conservatism was 'a disposition to preserve and an ability to improve'.⁷⁸¹ Neoliberalism was the second pillar. This ideology was compatible with Harper's neoconservative vision, as the precepts of economist Friedrich Hayek would allow his government to 'preserve' the social hierarchy and 'improve' the Canadian structural position.⁷⁸² Preston Manning, who was Harper's political godfather, argued that his *protégé's* strategic thinking was founded on the vision that 'a more pure conservative grouping in the Thatcher-Reagan mould [...] would project Albertan values into the urban middle classes'.⁷⁸³ Harper's neoliberal affinity and sociocultural background explain the relevance acquired by the mining and oil industry, especially of Alberta, in his strategic project.⁷⁸⁴ There were two effects of these pillars that constituted the ideological core of the so-called Harper doctrine: the definition of a solid neoconservative identity and the

⁷⁷⁸ John Ibbitson, 'How Harper Transformed Canada's Foreign Policy', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 31 January 2014); Scott Staring, 'Harper's History', *Policy Options*, 32.2 (2013), 42–8; Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, 'War and Peace and Paper Cranes', in *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety*, ed. by Ian McKay and Jamie Swift (NY: Between the Lines, 2012).

⁷⁷⁹ Postmedia News, 'Stephen Harper's Rigid Support for Israel Based on Idea "Foreign Affairs Should Be Fought on Moral Grounds"', Massie and Roussel pp.36–52.

⁷⁸⁰ Andrew Nikiforuk, 'Stephen Harper's Covert Evangelicalism', *The Tyee* (BC, 14 September 2015), p. Opinion; Douglas Todd, 'Why Stephen Harper Keeps His Evangelical Faith Very Private', *Vancouver Sun* (Vancouver, 10 September 2008).

⁷⁸¹ Lloyd Mackey, 'Rebuilding Consensus', in *The Pilgrimage of Stephen Harper*, ed. by Lloyd Mackey (Toronto: ECWP, 2005) pp.100–1; Mark Kennedy, 'The Harper Doctrine: Why Canada's Prime Minister Supports Israel', *Ottawa Citizen* (Ottawa, 25 April 2003).

⁷⁸² Donald Gutstein, 'How Stephen Harper Used God and Neoliberalism to Construct the Radical Environmentalist Frame', *The Narwhal* (BC, 29 May 2015), p. In-depth; Donald Gutstein, 'Meet the People Who Made Possible Stephen Harper's Reign', *The Tyee* (BC, 6 October 2014), p. Opinion.

⁷⁸³ Edward Greenspon, 'Stephen Harper: A Neo-Con in a Land of Liberals', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 23 March 2002).

⁷⁸⁴ Chris Sorensen, 'Stephen Harper: Oil's Worst Enemy', *Maclean's* (Toronto, January 2015); Lorna Stefanick, 'Alberta's Energy Paradigm. Prosperity, Security, and the Environment', in *Alberta Oil and the Decline of Democracy in Canada*, ed. by Meenal Shrivastava and Lorna Stefanick (Alberta: AUP, 2015) pp.13–6.

predominance of moral and business reflexes in strategic decision-making.⁷⁸⁵ These two aspects drove the evolution of the strategic policy from 2006 to 2008.

Continentalism was the axis of Harper's strategic policy. This approach provided the best resources to achieve the main objective of positioning Canada as a 'rising power', one of the 'top global performers'.⁷⁸⁶ The practical logic incubated in the policy elite laid in the idea that the strategic rapprochement with the United States would facilitate Canada to link its economic, security, and defence priorities with those of Washington. This alignment would allow Canada to enhance its structural position and increase its global influence.⁷⁸⁷ The continentalist strategic policy focused most of its efforts to two priority issues: 'nurture its special relationship with the United States outside its traditional continental setting' and 'defend Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic'.⁷⁸⁸ During Harper's first term, several examples portray the process of aligning Canadian strategic priorities with those of the United States. Regarding security and defence, the most representative cases between 2006 and 2008 were the renewal of the North American Aerospace Defence Command agreement and the change in Canada's position regarding its participation in the American Ballistic Missile Defence System. Like Martin in 2004, Harper avoided expressing his full commitment to the programme by claiming that Canada was 'not yet ready' to reopen the debate.⁷⁸⁹ However, both decisions were linked again, as the renewal of the agreement expanded the air warning capabilities to the maritime domain, particularly in the Arctic region.⁷⁹⁰ Paradoxically, the disruptive reorientation of Canadian strategic policy towards the United States was not without friction, especially in border matters. Harper's sovereigntist reflexes and the character of post-9/11 American security policies generated tensions in three affairs between 2006 and 2008. The claim of Canadian lands and waters in the Arctic, the softwood lumber dispute, and the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative were issues that revealed that Canada

⁷⁸⁵ Robertson, 'Rising Power: Stephen Harper's Makeover of Canadian International Policy and Its Institutions' pp.98–9; John Ibbitson, 'The Harper Doctrine: Conservative Foreign Policy in Black and White', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 12 June 2011).

⁷⁸⁶ Robertson, 'Rising Power: Stephen Harper's Makeover of Canadian International Policy and Its Institutions' p.98.

⁷⁸⁷ Plouffe pp.1–2.

⁷⁸⁸ Massie and Roussel p.47; DND, 'Canada First Defence Strategy' (Ottawa: DND, 2008) pp.1,8.

⁷⁸⁹ Barry and Bratt p.80; Sheldon Alberts, 'Bush Launches Missile Scare', *Calgary Herald* (Calgary, 1 July 2006).

⁷⁹⁰ NORAD pp.9–10,29–30; DFAIT, 'Canada and the United States Strengthen North American Aerospace Defence Command. News Release 51. May 12, 2006' (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2006); Joseph Jockei and Joel Sokolsky, 'Renewing NORAD - Now If Not Forever', *Policy Options*, 27.6 (2006), 53–58; Sokolsky pp.29–30.

should resort to auxiliary mechanisms that would allow it to manage the bilateral relationship and deal with the historic threat to its sovereignty: American unilateralism.⁷⁹¹

One of the few attributes that prevailed in Canada's foreign and security policy following the 2006 political change was the role played by the Atlanticist predispositions. Although they played a secondary role, transatlantic cooperation and solidarity remained fundamental practices for policy actors. However, under the conservatives, the Atlanticist approach was valued and mobilised from a different perspective than the liberals. Under the new continentalist practical logic, the role of Atlanticism for Canada was not to generate a 'countervailing force' to Washington but to acquire stature, reputation, and influence by showing its support for its 'natural' allies in the transatlantic alliance.⁷⁹² Moreover, unlike the liberal conception, the foremost European ally for the blue Tories was not France, but the United Kingdom.⁷⁹³ Acquiring the status of salient member and major player within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation involved abandoning liberal practices based on a minimal contribution. Conservatives renewed and expanded Canada's commitment to the alliance, even more than many Canadians deemed necessary.⁷⁹⁴ The most unequivocal evidence on this strategic conception was the decisions of the Harper government concerning Canada's involvement in the Afghanistan War. In 2006 and 2007, visits by Harper and members of his cabinet to Kabul and Kandahar marked a milestone in the evolution of strategic policy. The symbolism of the visits was twofold; not only was this Harper's first trip as Prime Minister and this was also the first time a Prime Minister visited the front lines of a combat operation. Harper's speeches during his visits expressed the significance of Canada's participation in Afghanistan for the new policy elite. The Prime Minister told the troops that:

Your work is about more than just defending Canada's national interest. Your work is also about demonstrating an international leadership role for our country. Not carping from the sidelines, but taking a stand on the big issues that matter in the world. You cannot

⁷⁹¹ Dolata; James Marlow, 'The Anticipated Impacts of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative on Coast Salish Communities', *Border Policy Research Institute Publications*, 59 (2009), 5–21; Chi Carmody, 'Softwood Lumber Dispute (2001–2006)', *The American Journal of International Law*, 100.3 (2006), 664–74.

⁷⁹² Chapnick and Stone p.86; Stephen Saideman, *Adapting in the Dust: Lessons Learned from Canada's War in Afghanistan* (Toronto: UTP, 2016) p.40.

⁷⁹³ John Stackhouse, 'Editor's Letter: Why Stephen Harper and Other Canadians Are the New Darlings of London', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 1 March 2013); Doug Sounders, 'Is Canada-Britain Diplomatic Resource-Sharing a Return to Colonial Past?', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 24 September 2012); Rick Salutin, 'The Mystery of Stephen Harper's Anglophilia', *The Star* (Toronto, 27 September 2012).

⁷⁹⁴ Boucher, 'Public Opinion and Canadian Defence Policy' pp.162–6; Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' pp.643–4.

lead from the bleachers. I want Canada to be a leader. [...] There will be some who want to cut and run, but cutting and running is not my way and it is not the Canadian way [...] We do not make a commitment and then run away at the first sign of trouble. We do not and we will not, as long as I am leading this country.⁷⁹⁵

The importance acquired by Canada's participation in Afghanistan to achieve the strategic objectives set by Harper allows us to understand the repositioning of the military elite, the sustained increase in military spending, and the motion issued to Parliament in 2006 to extend the mission of Canadian forces from 2009 to 2011.⁷⁹⁶ These elements established Atlanticism as the second most relevant approach in the formulation of foreign and security policy. Due to the incompatibility that arose between liberal internationalism and Harper's continentalist project, it is possible to affirm that Atlanticism played the role of reduced internationalism.

The strategic policy proposed by Harper during his first term represented a break with the symbols and practices of liberal internationalism that gave Canada an external identity of medium power and good international citizen since the end of the Second World War. Harper argued that he was not willing to replicate the approach through which liberal governments had 'compromised democratic principles to appease dictators'.⁷⁹⁷ The ambitious strategic objectives of his government required a profound change in the narrative on the structural position and international role that Canada should assume. The pragmatic, realist, and entrepreneurial reflexes of Harper were crucial factors for the disruptive change in the Canadian strategic vision.⁷⁹⁸ The reconstruction of continentalism had several implications for the international identity of Canada. One of them was to give up the assumed position of middle power to aspire to be a major player. Another impact was to abandon idealism aimed at strengthening its pride and adopting realism oriented at increasing its influence. The third

⁷⁹⁵ Government, 'Address by the Prime Minister To the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan', *News*, 2006 <<https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2006/03/address-prime-minister-canadian-armed-forces-afghanistan.html>> [accessed 12 May 2019]; CBC, 'Canada Committed to Afghan Mission, Harper Tells Troops'.

⁷⁹⁶ Ian Brodie, 'Inside Stephen Harper's Efforts to Extend Canada's Afghanistan Mission', *Maclean's* (Toronto, May 2018); Ian Brodie, *At the Centre of Government: The Prime Minister and the Limits on Political Power* (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2018) pp.48–51; Richter; Richard Johnson; Government, 'Speech from the Throne to Open the Second Session Thirty-Ninth Parliament Of' (Ottawa: Parliament, 2007).

⁷⁹⁷ Conservative Party, 'Stand up for Canada: Federal Election Platform 2006' (Ottawa: Conservative Party, 2006) p.44.

⁷⁹⁸ Susan Delacourt, 'Permanent Marketing and the Conduct of Politics', in *The Harper Factor: Assessing a Prime Minister's Policy Legacy*, ed. by Jennifer Ditchburn and Graham Fox (Québec: McGill-QUP, 2016) pp.82–3; Brean; Michael Hart, 'Legacies from the Past', in *From Pride to Influence: Towards a New Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. by Michael Hart (BC: UBCP, 2008) p.97.

implication was to abandon the ‘peacekeeper’ and ‘helpful fixer’ profile to project itself as a ‘valiant fighter’ and ‘courageous warrior’.⁷⁹⁹ Within this renewed framework, few elements endured from the internationalist strategic approach. The prevailing practices focused on the promotion of economic interests and the defence of moral values, many of them aligned with those of the United States.⁸⁰⁰ Between 2006 and 2008, the *Canada-Central American Four Free Trade Agreement* negotiations; the signing of foreign investment promotion and protection agreements with Peru, Thailand, and Madagascar; and the formulation of the *China Strategy* were some of the commercial policy actions aimed at promoting free trade and expanding the presence of Canadian companies abroad. Likewise, the change in Canadian position in favour of Israel in the context of the Middle East conflicts, the condemnation of nuclear tests carried out by North Korea, the criticism of the human rights situation in China, and the economic support offered to combat AIDS and overcome humanitarian crises in Africa were some foreign policy decisions pointed at promoting moral values and political positions in countries where Canada could develop potential economic interests. The case of China was the most illustrative.⁸⁰¹ The role that internationalism played in foreign policy showed that diplomatic policy, broad multilateralism, and the United Nations would be unnecessary policy elements of the conservative government’s agenda. The strategic policy of Harper’s first term also anticipated that throughout his government unilateralism and bilateralism would be implemented when possible, while multilateralism only when necessary.⁸⁰² The simultaneous processes of breaking with the internationalist strategic pattern and building a new continentalist identity established the guidelines that drove the evolution of Canadian strategic policy for the rest of the Harper government.

⁷⁹⁹ Roland Paris, ‘Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era’, *International Journal*, 69.3 (2014), 274–307 pp.275,303; Stephen Harper, ‘Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Convention Speech. 16 June 2011’ (Ottawa: Conservative Party, 2011); Lewis MacKenzie, ‘Canada’s Army - Post Peacekeeping’, *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 12.1 (2009), 1–17 p.3; James Travers, ‘A Military at War with Peacekeeping’, *Toronto Star* (Toronto, 24 February 2007); Maloney, ‘Helpful Fixer or Hired Gun? Why Canada Goes Overseas’ pp.59,62–5.

⁸⁰⁰ Paris, ‘Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era’ p.275.

⁸⁰¹ Charles Burton, ‘Canada’s China Policy under the Harper Government’, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 21.1 (2015), 45–63; DFAIT, ‘Minister Fast Highlights Successes of Prime Minister Harper-Led Trade Mission to China’, *News*, 2012 <https://www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/comm/news-communiques/2012/02/22a.aspx?lang=eng> [accessed 15 May 2019]; News Staff, ‘Trade Won’t Suffer from Dalai Lama Meeting: Ottawa’, *CTV News* (Ottawa, 30 October 2007).

⁸⁰² Robertson, ‘Rising Power: Stephen Harper’s Makeover of Canadian International Policy and Its Institutions’ pp.98–9.

7.4.2. Strategic reorientation towards North America, 2008-2011

Continentalist predispositions of the policy elite fuelled by neoconservative values and neoliberal interests gained strength during Harper's second term. The *Canada First Defence Strategy* of 2008, *Canada's Northern Strategy* of 2009, and *Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy Statement* of 2010 confirmed the break with the internationalist strategic pattern and the reorientation of the strategic policy towards North America.⁸⁰³ The domestic context in which foreign, commercial, and security policy evolved between 2008 and 2011 was similar to the environment that prevailed during the first term. Decision-making within the federal government was highly centralised by Harper and his minority government faced the parliamentary opposition led by the Liberal Party. Since 2006, the distribution of parliamentary forces had implications for the approval of federal budgets, the extension of the mission in Afghanistan, and the *Softwood Lumber Deal*; as well as in the rejection to the expansion of the measures established in the *Anti-terrorism Act*.⁸⁰⁴ However, the international environment had significant effects on decision-making. The rising tensions in the Arctic, the global financial crisis, the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan, the consequences of the invasion of Iraq, the political change in the United States, and Israel's conflicts with Palestine and Lebanon were some events that conditioned the decisions of the policy actors and tested the scope of continentalism.⁸⁰⁵ The policy decisions made between 2008 and 2011 demonstrate that the strategic vision of the Harper government continued to develop continentalist and Atlanticist strategies in which hard power was a fundamental element in raising the status and improving Canada's structural position. Instead, internationalism was reduced to playing the role of a policy instrument aimed at diversifying commercial interests and promoting the moral values of the conservative elite.

⁸⁰³ DFAIT, 'Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy Statement' (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2010); DIAND, 'Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future' (Ottawa: DIAND, 2009); DND, 'Canada First Defence Strategy'.

⁸⁰⁴ House of Commons, '39th Parliament, 2nd Session', *Journals*, 66 (2008); CBC, 'MPs Vote against Extending Anti-Terrorism Measures', *CBC News, Canada* (Toronto, 27 February 2007); House of Commons, '39th Parliament, 1st Session', *Journals*, 25 (2006); CBC, 'Canada's Stay in Afghanistan Extended by 2 Years', *CBC News, Canada* (Toronto, 17 May 2006); Canada, *Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41* (Ottawa, 2001).

⁸⁰⁵ CBC, 'PM, Obama Talk Trade, Afghanistan, Pledge "Clean Energy Dialogue"', *CBC News, Canada* (Toronto, 19 February 2009); Mario Canseco, 'Most Canadians Would Grant Permanent Residence to U.S. Military Deserters', *Angus Reid Poll* (Vancouver: ARS, 2008) <<http://www.angusreidstrategies.com/polls-analysis/opinion-polls/angus-reid-poll-most-canadians-would-grant-permanent-residence-us-milit>> [accessed 15 January 2018]; Julian Beltrame, 'Canada "entering a Recession," Central Bank Slashes Key Rate to 1.5 per Cent', *Truro Daily News* (Ottawa, 10 December 2008); CBC, 'House Votes in Favour of Extending Afghan Mission', *CBC News, Canada* (Toronto, 13 March 2008); CBC, 'Russia Plants Flag Staking Claim to Arctic Region', *CBC News, World* (Toronto, 2 August 2007); News Staff, 'MacKay Discusses Peace Process with Israeli PM', *CTV News* (Toronto, 22 January 2007) <2007>.

The foreign policy implemented during the second term illustrates the continuation of Canada's alignment with the dominant values and interests in Washington. Harper's objective to improve the bilateral relationship, his friendship with American President George W. Bush, and the monopolisation of Canadian diplomacy by the Prime Minister delineated the continental nature of the foreign policy.⁸⁰⁶ An example was the change in Canada's policy towards the Middle East between 2006 and 2012. The loss of influence of the diplomatic elite rooted in liberal internationalism undermined Canadian neutrality over conflicts in the region.⁸⁰⁷ The new continentalist vision implied assuming a partial position compatible with conservative values and American priorities. These factors explain why the Harper government declared Canada as an allied state of Israel willing to contribute to the establishment of the Jewish nation-state.⁸⁰⁸ Reducing the support provided to Palestine and designating Hamas as a terrorist organisation were some of the actions aimed at reaffirming Canada's 'courageous stand' with the values of the Jewish community and American interests in the Middle East.⁸⁰⁹ Another case that simultaneously portrays the alignment with the United States and solidarity with European allies was the controversial recognition of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. In 2008, Foreign Minister Maxime Bernier declared that Canada joined the position of its 'natural' allies expressed in the United Nations Security Council on the recognition of Kosovo's independence.⁸¹⁰ Despite the tensions that this decision generated with the Serbian representatives in Canada, Harper said his decision was based on the terrible suffering of the Kosovars and the recognition of the declaration by the majority of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.⁸¹¹ It should be noted that the establishment of continentalism as the practical logic of the policy elite not only involved the development of policies aimed at reaffirming Canada's external identity as a

⁸⁰⁶ CBC, 'Bush Can Call Me "Steve": Harper', *CBC News, Canada* (Toronto, 12 July 2006); Nossal, 'Defense Policy, Canadian-American Relations, and "Canada's New Government"'; Denis Stairs, 'The Menace of General Ideas in the Making and Conduct of Canadian Foreign Policy. 25 October 2006', in *The O. D. Skelton Memorial Lecture* (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2006).

⁸⁰⁷ Robertson, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'; Tsalikis, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'; David Goldberg, *Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and Canadian Jews Lobby for Israel* (NY: Greenwood, 1990) p.150.

⁸⁰⁸ Zachariah Kay, *The Diplomacy of Impartiality: Canada and Israel, 1958-1968* (Waterloo: WLUP, 2010) pp.108-9; Ron Csillag, 'Presidents Conference to Honour Harper. 6 December, 2008', *Jewish Telegraphic Agency* (Toronto, 4 December 2008).

⁸⁰⁹ Csillag; DPSEP, 'Currently Listed Entities', *National Security*, 2007 <<https://web.archive.org/web/20070724003250/http://ps-sp.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp#hhi18>> [accessed 11 August 2019]; News Staff, 'MacKay Discusses Peace Process with Israeli PM'.

⁸¹⁰ United Nations, 'SC/9252. 18 February 2008. Security Council Meets in Emergency Session Following Kosovo's Declaration of Independence, With Memmbebrs Sharply Divided on Issue. 5839th Meeting (PM)' (NY: United Nations, 2008); Matthew Jay, 'Canada Recognizes Independent Kosovo', *National Post* (Toronto, 19 March 2008).

⁸¹¹ News Staff, 'Serbia to Protest Ottawa's Recognition of Kosovo', *CTV News* (Toronto, 18 March 2008); The Canadian Press, 'Recognition of Kosovo Has No Bearing on Quebec: PM', *CTV News* (Toronto, 20 March 2008).

North American state, but also renouncing internationalist symbols and practices that defined Canada as a middle power and good international citizen. Under the idea that internationalist diplomacy was unprofitable in political terms and limited Canadian industrial performance, the Harper government resigned from retaining its seat in the United Nations Security Council in 2010 for the first time in 50 years and abandoned the Kyoto Protocol in 2011 after 14 years of environmental commitment.⁸¹² Canada's priorities were no longer in matters of global governance and niche diplomacy. Canadian interests were now in the North American continent and global trade.

The trade policy that prevailed from 2008 to 2011 demonstrates the reduction of broad internationalist multilateralism to selective economic diplomacy. The weakening of the capabilities of the diplomatic corps through its exclusion from decision-making and severe budget cuts changed Canada's approach to the world. The growing influence of policy actors with close ties to the corporate elite and solid entrepreneurial reflexes had a profound effect on redefining the way Canada interacted abroad.⁸¹³ In the context of the growing globalisation driven by neoliberalism and the ravages of the global financial crisis, Canada launched an intense campaign to promote free trade between 2008 and 2011. During this period, Canada signed free trade agreements with the European Union, Peru, Colombia, Jordan, and Panama.⁸¹⁴ In addition to the promotion of free trade in countries with a structural position lower than that of Canada, the expansion and consolidation of overseas markets were vital for Harper's strategic project. The expansion of the extractive industry of northern Alberta and the sustained increase in Canadian oil exports to the United States and the European Union show that commercial diplomacy was one of the pillars of the Harper government's strategic agenda.⁸¹⁵ As in foreign and security policy, the contraction of internationalism generated spaces that were filled by continental initiatives. After twenty

⁸¹² Andrew Mitrovica, 'True North', *University of Toronto Magazine* (Toronto, March 2011), p. Culture & Society; DEC, 'Canada's Emissions Trends' (Ottawa: DEC, 2011); Bill Curry and Shawn McCarthy, 'Canada Formally Abandons Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 12 December 2011); Joanna Slater, 'Canada Abandons UN Bid in Embarrassing Turn for Harper', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 12 October 2010).

⁸¹³ Jeffrey Jones, 'The Oil Patch May Have Lost a Big Opportunity with the Harper Era', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 19 October 2015); Colin Robertson, 'Diplomats Feel as Though They Are Emerging from a Decade of Darkness', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 7 June 2016); John Ibbitson, 'Tories' New Foreign-Affairs Vision Shifts Focus to "Economic Diplomacy"', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 27 November 2013); Campbell Clark, 'Foreign Aid, Diplomacy Targeted for Deep Cuts in Federal Budget', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 29 March 2012).

⁸¹⁴ Government, 'Map of Canada's Trade and Investment Agreements'; Asa McKercher and Leah Sarson, 'Dollars and Sense? The Harper Government, Economic Diplomacy, and Canadian Foreign Policy', *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, 71.3 (2016), 354–70 p.356.

⁸¹⁵ Kyla Mandel, 'Canada's Oil Exports Up 65 Per Cent Over Last Decade', *The Narwhal* (Victoria, 22 February 2016); Bill Curry, 'Harper Says There's More to the Canadian Economy than Oil', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 22 January 2015); James Wilt, 'Has Stephen Harper Helped or Hindered The Oil Industry?', *The Narwhal* (Victoria, 4 May 2015).

years of free trade with the United States, Canada became the leading trading partner of the superpower. The dividends provided by the free trade agreements of 1988 and 1994 justified Harper's intention to expand and deepen the commercial relationship with its neighbour.⁸¹⁶ Following the interruption of regional integration efforts between Canada, the United States, and Mexico through the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America in 2009, the Harper government reactivated negotiations with the United States for the renewal of a mechanism aimed at 'pursue a perimeter approach to security in ways that support economic competitiveness, job creation, and prosperity'.⁸¹⁷ Under this spirit inclined to promote regional integration in commercial and security affairs, in 2011, Harper and American President Barack Obama signed the *Declaration on a Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness*; and announced the creation of the Canada-United States Regulatory Cooperation Council.⁸¹⁸ The evolution of trade policy from 2008 to 2011 demonstrates that internationalism was reduced to the exercise of selective economic diplomacy in which the maximisation of yields was the core purpose.

The evolution of security policy during the second term followed the same reorientation trend towards North America. The policy documents published between 2008 and 2010 confirmed that Harper's government security priorities focused on two main issues.⁸¹⁹ One was the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. The extension of military involvement in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011 allowed Canada to revalidate its commitment and solidarity with the United States and the transatlantic alliance in the War on Terror.⁸²⁰ Several academics agree that this decision was unwise in strategic terms, as there was a significant disconnect between the means employed and the ends to be achieved.⁸²¹ Taking into

⁸¹⁶ Greg Weston, 'Secret Document Details New Canadian Foreign Policy', *CBC News, Politics* (Toronto, 19 November 2012); USCB, 'Top Trading Partners', *Foreign Trade*, 2008 <<https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/index.html>> [accessed 20 January 2019]; WITS, 'Overall Exports and Imports for United States 2008', *Trade Summary of United States*, 2008 <<https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/USA/Year/2008/Summarytext>> [accessed 15 January 2019].

⁸¹⁷ DPSEP, 'What Canadians Told Us: A Summary on Consultations on Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness', *Beyond the Border*, 2016 <<https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/brdr-strts/bynd-th-brdr/wht-cndns-en.aspx>> [accessed 15 May 2019]; Villarreal and Lake pp.1–6; USDOS, 'Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America'.

⁸¹⁸ TBSC, 'Joint Action Plan for the Canada-United States Regulatory Cooperation Council', *Acts and Regulations*, 2016 <<https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/corporate/transparency/acts-regulations/canada-us-regulatory-cooperation-council/joint-action-plan.html>> [accessed 11 March 2019]; DFAIT, 'Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness: Action Plan in Brief' (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2011).

⁸¹⁹ DFAIT, 'Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy Statement'; DIAND; DND, 'Canada First Defence Strategy'.

⁸²⁰ News Staff, 'Canada's Afghan Focus Changes as U.S. Readies Troop Influx', *Financial Post* (Toronto, 19 February 2011); CBC, 'House Votes in Favour of Extending Afghan Mission'.

⁸²¹ Kim Nossal, 'No Exit: Canada and the "War without End" in Afghanistan', in *The Afghanistan Challenge: Hard Realities and Strategic Choices*, ed. by Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Charles Pentland (Montreal: McGill-QUEBEC, 2009) pp.157–73; Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale

consideration the predispositions of the policy elite and the ambitions exposed during the first term, it is possible to interpret that the objective of the mission's extension was to strengthen Canada's stature as a major player with global interests. However, the extension of the Canadian commitment proved counterproductive, as it generated unexpected costs, overstretched the military capabilities, and granted marginal political and symbolic benefits. The second priority was the defence of sovereignty in the Arctic. Like the mission in Afghanistan, the interests of the Harper government in this region went beyond rhetoric.⁸²² However, in this case, there was greater coherence between the objective of defending the sovereignty of external threats and the military and diplomatic means mobilised to achieve it.⁸²³ For example, military capabilities deployed in the Arctic were strengthened, and an alliance was sought with the United States and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to ensure the stability and security of the region in the face of actions undertaken by Russia since 2007. The *Ilulissat Declaration* of 2008 was one of the most representative policy decisions that sought to redefine the political order in the region.⁸²⁴ Canadian policy in the Arctic was fuelled by a broad range of factors ranging from the potential natural and energy resources of the region to the neoconservative values that inspired the defence of Canadian sovereignty. These two strategic priorities demonstrate that the practical logic of the policy elite shaped by the Harper doctrine was aimed at consolidating Canada's new international identity construction as a North American state willing to defend hemispheric territory and continental interests abroad.

This review of the evolution of diplomatic, commercial, and security affairs during Harper's second term reveals that Canadian strategic policy was in the process of reorientation towards North America. The breaking of the internationalist strategic pattern from 2006 to 2008 generated political spaces and conditions to establish a new practical logic that would allow the political elite to respond in a better way to the conditions of the post-9/11 international environment. In the context of the War on Terror and the global financial crisis, the Harper government saw in the extension of the military mission in Afghanistan and in

of Three Strategic Cultures' p.626; Bill Dymond and Michael Hart, 'Canada and the Global Challenge: Finding a Place to Stand', *Commentary. C.D. Howe Institute. The Border Papers*, 180.March (2003), 1–23 p.2.

⁸²² Whitney Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, *Canada's Northern Strategy under the Harper Government: Key Speeches and Documents on Sovereignty, Security, and Governance, 2005-15*, ed. by Whitney Lackenbauer and Adam Lajeunesse (Calgary: DCASS, 2016); Jean-Christophe Boucher, 'Selling Afghanistan. A Discourse Analysis of Canada's Military Intervention, 2001-08', *International Journal*, 64.3 (2009), 717–33.

⁸²³ Lajeunesse and Lackenbauer pp.371–5; Plouffe.

⁸²⁴ Elizabeth Riddell, *Breaking the Ice: Canada, Sovereignty, and the Arctic Extended Continental Shelf* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2017) pp.222–34; Klaus Dodds, 'The Ilulissat Declaration (2008): The Arctic States, "Law of the Sea," and Arctic Ocean', *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 33.2 (2013), 45–55; Arctic Ocean Conference, 'Ilulissat Declaration' (Ilulissat: AOC, 2008).

the intense promotion of free trade the most appropriate means to adapt Canada to international conditions and, mainly, improve its structural position. While these two priorities endowed strategic policy with neocontinental and neoliberal character, the defence of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic reaffirmed the neoconservative spirit of Harper's policy. The so-called 'Arctic card' contributed to the break with the internationalist pattern as it represented a disruptive change in the strategic discourse and practice, as well as to the strategic reorientation towards North America since it aspired to consolidate the commitment with the United States in the continental defence.⁸²⁵ As discussed in the next section, the consolidation of continentalism as the practical logic of the policy elite shaped the pragmatic, selective, and conditional way in which decision-makers responded to the international environment during Harper's last term. The defence of continental values and interests beyond North America drove the evolution of Canada's strategic policy from 2011 to 2015.

7.4.3. Defence of continental values and interests abroad, 2011-2015

Harper's last term gave continuity to the trend of evolution of the strategic policy that began in 2006. The neoconservative values and neoliberal interests delineated since the beginning of the government continued to feed Canada's new continentalist identity. Several domestic factors favoured this trend to gain strength between 2011 and 2015. The parliamentary majority of the Conservative Party, the electoral debacle of the Liberal Party, the incorporation of inexperienced advisers into the Prime Minister's inner circle, and social unawareness about Canada's situation abroad were factors that allowed Harper to erode the few existing counterweights, concentrate further the power of decision, and more freely implement his strategic policy.⁸²⁶ These factors influenced the responses formulated by the policy elite to events that shaped the structural environment, such as the effects of the financial crisis, the intensification of the War on Terror, the political crises in Ukraine and Libya, the conflicts of Israel in the Middle East, and the diplomatic tensions with Iran and Russia. In this context, the evolution of foreign, trade, and security policy during the third

⁸²⁵ Kim Nossal, 'The Liberal Past in the Conservative Present: Internationalism in the Harper Era', in *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Contemporary Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. by Heather Smith and Claire Sjolander (Toronto: OUP, 2013) pp.21–35; Kim Nossal, 'Defense Policy and the Atmospherics of Canada-US Relations', *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 37.1 (2007), 23–34 pp.23–34.

⁸²⁶ Jonathan Craft, *Backrooms and Beyond: Partisan Advisers and the Politics of Policy Work in Canada* (Toronto: UTP, 2016) pp.4,21,249; Michael Blanchfield, 'Odd Man Out: How Stephen Harper Changed Canada's Relations with the United Nations' (Carleton University, 2015) pp.48–9; MacKinnon; Gerald Caplan, 'Stephen Harper and the Tyranny of Majority Government', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 15 June 2012); Patrick Brethour, 'Harper Finally Wins Majority as NDP Surges into Opposition', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 2 May 2011); Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures' pp.637–8.

term of the Harper government demonstrates that the continental identity that Canada developed was strong enough to encourage it to defend abroad the values and interests shared with the United States.

The foreign policy of Harper's last term was distinguished by further deepening its distancing from the internationalist strategic approach. Members of the diplomatic corps claimed that Canada had 'abandoned the liberal internationalism that had so often characterised Ottawa's approach to world affairs, replacing it with a new emphasis on realist notions of national interest, enhanced capabilities, and Western democratic values'.⁸²⁷ They also claimed that foreign policy had changed dramatically, 'with a pivot towards a projection of militarism. We were not peacekeepers; we were warrior wannabes'.⁸²⁸ In addition to these realist and militaristic reflexes pointed out by diplomats, the underlying Manichaeism in the Prime Minister's articulations explains many of his policy decisions.⁸²⁹ Harper's strategic vision that shaped continentalist practical logic was based on the idea that Canada needed an appropriate foreign policy for a 'dangerous world', whose dynamics were the product of 'a struggle between good and bad'. For Harper, 'the real defining moments for the country and for the world are those big conflicts where everything's at stake and where you take a side and show you can contribute to the right side'.⁸³⁰ The Prime Minister maintained that Canada required 'strong, principled positions in our dealings with other nations', as the purpose was not 'just to go along to go along and get along with everyone else's agenda. It is no longer to please every dictator with a vote at the United Nations'.⁸³¹ This set of reflexes and beliefs shaped the foreign policy decisions between 2011 and 2015, many of which coincided with the position of the United States. The rupture of diplomatic relations with Iran, the opposition to the recognition of the Palestinian state, the support given to Israel in the Gaza War, the imposition of sanctions to Russia after the Crimean referendum, and the campaign to exclude Russia from the G-7/8 were just a few decisions who exposed the Canadian commitment to the defence of continental values and interests beyond North America.

⁸²⁷ Greg Donaghy, 'Canada and Conflict (Patrick James)', *H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews*, XV.37 (2014), 1–27 p.2.

⁸²⁸ Robertson, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'; Tsalikis, 'A Foreign Service Worth Fighting For'.

⁸²⁹ Colin Robertson, 'Harper's World View', *Policy Options*, October (2011) <<https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/the-new-normal-majority-government/harpers-world-view/>>; Roland Paris, 'What Is Stephen Harper Afraid Of?', *OpenCanada.Org*, July (2011) <<https://www.opencanada.org/features/what-is-stephen-harper-afraid-of/>>.

⁸³⁰ Kenneth Whyte, 'In Conversation: Stephen Harper. How He Sees Canada's Role in the World and Where He Wants to Take the Country', *Maclean's* (Toronto, July 2011) pp.16–7.

⁸³¹ Harper, 'Prime Minister Stephen Harper's Convention Speech. 16 June 2011'.

The last years of the Harper government also reaffirmed the new role that internationalism played in strategic policy. Since 2006, the conservative government demonstrated that commercial bilateralism and economic diplomacy were fundamental practices to improve Canada's material capabilities and structural position. Three policy elements guided the efforts of the Harper government to satisfy Canadian self-interest and abandon liberal idealism. One was the *Global Commerce Strategy* of 2007, which aimed to expand Canada's commercial network in emerging markets to strengthen its competitive position worldwide.⁸³² The second element was the *Canadian Foreign Policy Plan* of 2012, in which the government recognised that Canada's 'influence and credibility with some of these new and emerging powers are not as strong as it needs to be and could be', so it was necessary to redirect trade and diplomatic efforts towards Asia.⁸³³ The third was the *Global Markets Action Plan* of 2013, which renewed the interest in expanding Canadian businesses and investments abroad, especially in China.⁸³⁴ It should be noted that during the third term, the relevance of the appointment of Edward Fast as Minister of International Trade was based on the mandate ordered by the Prime Minister to prioritise trade affairs in foreign policy.⁸³⁵ The redefinition of the relationship between foreign policy and international trade issues as of 2011 is interpreted as a response of the policy elite to address the effects of the global financial crisis, which had produced a dramatic reduction in the trade balance.⁸³⁶ Between 2011 and 2015, Canada signed foreign investment promotion and protection agreements with ten countries, as well as free trade agreements with Honduras and Korea.⁸³⁷ In this context, the dominance of business reflexes and neoliberal impulses in the policy elite influenced the instrumentalisation of international assistance to achieve economic objectives.⁸³⁸ The growing disinterest in the agenda of the 'failed and fragile states' and the

⁸³² Julian Beltrame and Michael Blanchfield, 'Government Unveils "Economic Diplomacy" Initiative for Foreign Service', *Maclean's* (Toronto, November 2013); DFAIT, 'Seizing Global Advantage. A Global Commerce Strategy for Securing Canada's Growth & Prosperity' (Ottawa: PWDSC, 2008).

⁸³³ Weston; Daryl Copeland, 'Harper's Underwhelming "Secret" Foreign Policy Plan', *IPolitics*, 2012 <<https://ipolitics.ca/2012/11/23/harpers-underwhelming-secret-foreign-policy-plan/>> [accessed 12 May 2019].

⁸³⁴ DFAIT, 'Global Market Action Plan' (Ottawa: PWDSC, 2013); Roland Paris, 'There Is More to Foreign Policy Than Trade', *Centre for International Policy Studies*, November (2013) <<https://www.cips-cepi.ca/2013/11/28/there-is-more-to-foreign-policy-than-trade/>>.

⁸³⁵ DFAIT, 'Harper Government Launches New International Trade Plan', *News*, 2013 <<https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2013/11/harper-government-launches-new-international-trade-plan.html>> [accessed 15 March 2019]; Ibbitson, 'Tories' New Foreign-Affairs Vision Shifts Focus to "Economic Diplomacy"'.

⁸³⁶ Statistics Canada, 'Imports and Exports', *International Trade Statistics*, 2019 <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/subjects/international_trade> [accessed 22 April 2019]; Daniel Workman, 'Stephen Harper's International Trade Record', *World's Top Exports*, 2015 <<http://www.worldstopexports.com/stephen-harpers-international-trade-record/>> [accessed 12 April 2019].

⁸³⁷ Government, 'Map of Canada's Trade and Investment Agreements'; McKercher and Sarson p.356.

⁸³⁸ Stephen Brown, 'The Instrumentalization of Foreign Aid under the Harper Government', *Studies in Political Economy*, 97.1 (2016), 18–36.

reallocation of the budget for development projects to security and trade initiatives demonstrate the selective and conditional nature acquired by foreign aid.⁸³⁹ The premise of the action plan released in 2013 to develop a foreign policy based ‘on an equal footing with trade and diplomacy’ was far from reality.⁸⁴⁰ In practice, economic interests gradually positioned themselves as the central priority in the foreign policy of the Harper government.

The predominance of continentalism in the strategic policy-making during the third term not only had an impact on the confinement of internationalism to the promotion of free trade and the development of new markets. The consolidation of continentalism also influenced the progressive contraction of Atlanticist predispositions that fuelled security policy. The continentalist and Atlanticist preferences of the policy elite allow us to understand the symbolic and material reasons of the 2010 announcement on the acquisition of 65 American F-35s military aircraft, a project promoted by the United States Department of Defence and backed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.⁸⁴¹ These same strategic preferences also explain the Canadian participation in military intervention in Libya in 2011, which was led by the transatlantic alliance, supported by the United States, and approved by the United Nations.⁸⁴² However, this year marked a breaking point in the role played by Atlanticism in security policy. In 2011, the Harper government decided to withdraw from two iconic programmes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Airborne Warning and Control System and Alliance Ground Surveillance. The conservative government said the decision responded to economic interests, as it would generate savings to the Department of National Defence and allow the Canadian defence industry to develop its aerospace systems and surveillance capabilities.⁸⁴³ However, economic factors were not the only reason. The

⁸³⁹ Stephen Brown, ‘From Ottawa to Kandahar and Back: The Securitization of Canadian Foreign Aid’ pp.113–37.

⁸⁴⁰ DFAIT, ‘Global Markets Action Plan. The Blueprint for Creating Jobs and Opportunities for Canadians Though Trade’ (Ottawa: PWDSC, 2013) p.14.

⁸⁴¹ Daniel LeBlanc, ‘Critics Set to Launch New Attacks on Untendered Deal to Buy Fighter Jets’, *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 24 August 2010); The Canadian Press, ‘Report: Ottawa Set to Spend \$9B on New US Fighter Jets from Single Source’, *The Guardian* (Ottawa, 8 June 2010) <<https://archive.ph/20121206024317/http://www.theguardian.pe.ca/index.cfm?sid=342657&sc=101>>; Daniel LeBlanc, ‘Harper Bending to U.S. on Sole-Source Fighter Purchase, Documents Reveal’, *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, 11 June 2010).

⁸⁴² United Nations Security Council, ‘SC/10200. 17 March 2011. Security Council Approves “No-Fly Zone” over Libya, Authorizing “All Necessary Measures” to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions’, *Meetings Coverage*, 2011 <<https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>> [accessed 13 July 2019]; United Nations, ‘Security Council Authorizes “all Necessary Measures” to Protect Civilians in Libya’, *News*, 2011 <<https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/03/369382-security-council-authorizes-all-necessary-measures-protect-civilians-libya>> [accessed 11 June 2019]; BBC, ‘Libya: UN Backs Action against Colonel Gaddafi’, *Africa* (London, 18 March 2011) <<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12781009>>.


⁸⁴³ Christopher Kelly, ‘The Harper Government and Canada’s Contribution to NATO: A Fact Sheet’, *NATO Association of Canada*, 2013 <<http://natoassociation.ca/the-harper-government-and-canadas-contribution-to-nato-a-fact-sheet/>> [accessed 28 May 2019].

resignation also responded to the contraction of the scope of Canadian participation in international affairs, including transatlantic ones. The shrinking internationalism that occurred as a result of Harper's strategic vision and the dramatic budget cuts following the global financial crisis also had implications for reducing Canada's involvement in the transatlantic alliance. The Harper government said that 'in difficult economic times, this government believes in making tough, action-oriented decisions that are more essential to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation member-states' security than any other initiative'.⁸⁴⁴ The causes of this decision validate the argument about the role of reduced internationalism that Atlanticism played within the security policy. By 2014, the Canadian involvement in the United States-led international military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant confirmed that Canada's strategic priorities were firmly anchored in North America. How the security policy evolved from 2011 to 2015 makes it possible to clarify that the structural environment derived from the global financial crisis in the context of the War on Terror conditioned the policy elite to develop strategies in which Canada would assume a highly selective approach, even within the transatlantic alliance.

The evolution of strategic policy during Harper's third term portrays the culmination of a nine-year process in which Canada abandoned symbols and practices of liberal internationalism to adopt a continentalist construction of international identity. The consolidation of continentalism as the practical logic of the policy elite between 2011 and 2015 was a product of the trend generated by the breaking with the internationalist strategic pattern. The force acquired by neoconservative values, neoliberal interests, business reflexes, pragmatic impulses, and realist conceptions allows us to understand why strategic policy intensified its reorientation towards an approach that allowed Canada to consolidate its alliance with the United States in favour of the continental defence. The last mandate also illustrates how the cultural reflexes of the blue Tories and the institutional culture of the Conservative Party shaped the responses of the policy elite to the structural environment produced by the global financial crisis and the intensification of the War on Terror. It should be noted that the final years of the Harper government exhibited a much more consistent, stable, and coherent strategic policy than those formulated and implemented by the red Tories, social liberals, and business liberals since the 1980s.

⁸⁴⁴ The Canadian Press, 'Harper Tories Knew Aerospace Firms Would Lose Millions When Canada Pulled out of Two NATO Programs', *National Post* (Toronto, 6 August 2013); David Pugliese, 'Canada Pulls out of NATO Airborne Surveillance Programs to Save \$90M', *National Post* (Toronto, 17 March 2012).

Figure 7-3. Evolution of the Canadian strategic policy, 2006-2015
(Change and continuity of the continentalist practical logic)



Own elaboration.

The consensus generated through the renewal of Canadian conservatism and the monopolisation of decision-making was undoubtedly a critical factor in the continuity of continentalist strategic policy. Likewise, Harper's political ambitions explain the strengths of the ideological base that redefined Canadian strategic policy. The Prime Minister held:

My long-term goal is to make Conservatives the natural governing party of the country. And I am a realist. You do that two ways [...] One thing you do is you pull conservatives, to pull the party, to the centre of the political spectrum. But what you also have to do, if you are really serious about making transformations, is you have to pull the centre of the political spectrum toward conservatism.⁸⁴⁵

As a synthesis, Figure 7-3 shows the gradual predominance that continentalism acquired within the political elite, as well as the effects it generated in the internationalist and Atlanticist strategic approaches.

⁸⁴⁵ Alan Bloomfield and Kim Nossal, 'A Conservative Foreign Policy? Canada and Australia Compared', in *Conservatism in Canada*, ed. by James Farney and David Rayside (Toronto: UTP, 2013) p.154; Behiels, 'Stephen Harper's Rise to Power: Will His "New" Conservative Party Become Canada's "Natural Governing Party" of the Twenty-First Century?' p.118.

Conclusion

This chapter has deployed a structuralist-constructivist approach centred on practice to examine the complicated interactions between endogenous and exogenous dynamics that redefined the character of Canadian strategic policy from 2006 to 2015. Since the 1980s, a double strategic interest was revived within the Canadian policy elite: to protect Canadian sovereignty from potential American unilateralism and project Canada as a reliable ally of the United States. Continentalist construction of Canada's international identity gradually established itself as the backbone from which the bilateral, realist, and selective nature of foreign policy was defined. Likewise, the dichotomous strategic objectives influenced so that the parameters of the design of national security strategies went from favouring an Atlanticist soft-balancing approach towards prioritising continentalist soft-bandwagoning with the United States in the context of the War on Terror. This study identifies two decisive factors that, simultaneously with the weakening of internationalism throughout the 1990s, triggered the rebuilding of a strategic continentalist approach that allowed Canada to adapt to the conditions of the American-built neoliberal international order. The first factor was policy predispositions and their role in shaping the policy elite's responses to strategic affairs. From the reconstruction of the dispositional logic of the policy elite led by the blue Tories of the Conservative Party, it is possible to elucidate that the origin of their strategic thought and political practice was in cultural reflexes fuelled by moral values and mercantilist rationale forged during the adoption of neoliberalism. The second factor was the reorganisation of the social space in which strategic decisions were made. Through the construction of the positional logic of the field of strategic policy-making, it is possible to recognise that the dominant role that politicians held and their affinity with the military elite not only allowed them to eradicate speeches and practices of internationalist diplomacy but also to establish new standards for the design of national security strategies. How the habitus of the policy elite and the field of strategic policy-making changed portrays the pervasive effect generated by the adoption of neoliberalism on the cultural roots and dynamics that founded the reactions of Canadian policy-makers to events such as the financial crisis and the War on Terror in the 2000s.

The analysis of the evolution of Canadian foreign, trade, and security policy throughout consolidation of the neoliberal political-economic model strengthens the argument that the practical logic founded on a continentalist strategic notion gradually dominated the cultural reflexes of the political class, military elite, and an emerging generation of the foreign service. The process of rebuilding continentalism was the product of the norms and rules that redefined the interactions in the international system in the late 1980s, as well as the

effect that the adoption of neoliberal precepts had on institutional and ideological sources of strategic policy-making since the 1990s. The erosion of internationalism within the establishment of security and the dominant position occupied by politicians with conservative values and business interests in the field of strategic policy-making were factors that allow us to understand the causes of the considerable reorientation of Canadian foreign and security policy between 2006 and 2015. This study concludes that, despite the decreasing resistance exerted by liberal politicians and diplomats rooted in the internationalist strategic tradition, the force that the continentalist ideas gained among conservative politicians and soldiers enabled it to assume the status of practical logic after the 2006 political transition. One of the contributions of this work is that it provides a different interpretation of how the strategic policy was formulated to adapt Canada to the conditions of the post-9/11 structural environment. This practice-centred analysis complements the realist explanations that predominate in the literature on how the Canadian policy elite responded to structural pressures.⁸⁴⁶ Likewise, the structuralist-constructivist approach deployed in this work helps to identify the continuity and change in the cultural factors from which strategies based on alliance politics and cooperation practices with the United States were formulated. This chapter confirms the thesis that cultural factors led to the reorientation of strategic policy and promoted the design of soft-bandwagoning strategies that allowed Canada to strengthen its link and dependence with the United States from the 2000s onwards.⁸⁴⁷ The evidence, arguments, and reflections presented in chapters five, six, and seven provide a panoptic perspective that allows us to elucidate how the pervasive influence of neoliberalism was a critical factor that triggered the decline of internationalism and created political spaces that allowed a renewed continentalist strategic notion to play an increasingly dominant role in the formulation of foreign policy and the design of security strategies in Canada. This case study on the politics of Canadian strategic policy from 1993 to 2015 confirms that the emergence and consolidation of neoliberalism had profound repercussions on cultural elements such as the socio-historical context, socio-political imaginary, and institutional-ideological sources from which the policy-makers made decisions that configured the Canadian strategic behaviour. Canada went from being an aspiring major player with broad global interests towards deepening its economic dependence and diplomatic cooperation with the United States because that guaranteed its own security.

⁸⁴⁶ McDonough, *Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and Threats*; Macnamara; Moens; Lui; O'Meara and Macleod; Hussain, Pattnayak, and Hira.

⁸⁴⁷ Massie and Vucetic; Mirow; Nossal, Roussel, and Paquin; Plouffe; Massie and Roussel; Massie, 'Making Sense of Canada's "irrational" International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures'.

Conclusion

Observing how our past appeared when it was the future can help us understand why events occurred as they did, how individuals became prisoners of their experiences and missed what was blindingly obvious to later generations, and occasionally saw with Cassandra-like clarity what was coming only to be ignored by their contemporaries. In short, the future of war has a distinctive and revealing past.⁸⁴⁸

Sir Lawrence Freedman (British historian), 1995.

⁸⁴⁸ Lawrence Freedman, *The Future of War* (London: Penguin, 2017) p.xvii.

Since the mid-2010s, a plethora of distinguished journalists, commentators, academics, and practitioners have agreed that the neoliberal era, Western politics, the process of globalisation, and American hegemony are in a phase of decline.⁸⁴⁹ One of the most prominent articulations comes from the winner of the Nobel Prize for economics Joseph Stiglitz, who argues that ‘decades of free-market orthodoxy have taken a toll on democracy’.⁸⁵⁰ These types of arguments explain, to some extent, the changes in strategic policy that several countries have experienced in recent years, including Mexico and Canada. These changes in a ‘decade of inflexion’ are interpreted as a reaction of policy elites to respond to abrupt structural changes and adapt their states to the growing multipolarity of the world order. The current strategic change process mirrors what was happening in the late 1970s, during the Cold War when the world was also on the verge of global economic collapse.

This dissertation has addressed the politics of strategic policy of Mexico and Canada during the advent and consolidation of the neoliberal era. Tracking and analysing the evolution of strategic policy over three decades allows us to elucidate the role that culture played, where the ideas that fed it came from, and how they affected decision-making on strategic issues. One of the main conclusions of this research is that strategic culture was a fundamental factor in the reorientation of foreign policy and national security strategies since the late 1970s. Economic crises and social problems generated political spaces for the adoption of neoliberal precepts, which would trigger a profound change in the strategic thinking and political practice of decision-makers, as well as in the sociocultural context in which the strategic policy was formulated. The process of adopting neoliberalism developed parallel to the structural changes generated by the end of the Cold War. As geopolitical tensions between the superpowers subsided, the American-built neoliberal and unipolar international order acquired strength. The subsequent establishment of domestic neoliberal reforms and the redefinition of international relations, especially with the United States, generated a social, political, and cultural context that profoundly modified the predispositions of the policy

⁸⁴⁹ Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents Revisited Anti-Globalization in the Era of Trump* (NY: Norton, 2018); Daniel Ziblatt Steven Levitsky, *How Democracies Die* (NY: Crown, 2018); Amitav Acharya, *The End of American World Order* (London: Wiley, 2018); Martin Jacques, ‘The Death of Neoliberalism and the Crisis in Western Politics’, *The Guardian* (London, 21 August 2016); Richard Lachmann, ‘Crisis of Neoliberalism, Crisis of the World?’, *American Sociological Association*, 45.1 (2016), 1–5; Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Neoliberalism Must Be Pronounced Dead and Buried. Where Next?’, *The Guardian* (London, 30 May 2016); Henk Overbeek and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, *Neoliberalism in Crisis* (London: Palgrave, 2012); Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, *The Crisis of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge: HUP, 2011); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (NY: Knopf, 2010); Alfredo Jalife-Rahme, *Towards of Des-Globalization* (Mexico: PyV, 2007).

⁸⁵⁰ Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Decades of Free-Market Orthodoxy Have Taken a Toll on Democracy’, *The Guardian* (London, 5 November 2019).

elites and the positions of the strategic policy-making field. In other words, beyond the structural changes produced by the end of the Cold War, the neoliberal political-economic paradigm incubated in the United States had a pervasive effect on the configuration of the context where Canadian and Mexican strategic policies were formulated and the sources that nurtured them from the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

The case study of Mexico confirms this first conclusion. Amid the Central American conflict generated by the tensions of the Cold War and during the Latin American debt crisis, the Keynesian model of shared development promoted by Presidents Luis Echeverría and José López Portillo in the 1970s entered a phase of decline. Likewise, nationalist foreign policy and defensive security strategies underwent a process of decay, as these were increasingly less suitable options for interacting abroad, particularly with the United States. The context of social instability and economic uncertainty generated political spaces that allowed, from the government of Miguel de la Madrid in 1984, the Mexican political elite to adhere to the precepts of the *Washington Consensus* and the neoliberal directives of the International Monetary Fund. The structural reforms promoted dramatically transformed the sociocultural context in which the strategic policy was formulated from the mid-1980s onwards. One of the most relevant changes was the adoption of continentalist predispositions and the development of orthodox technocratic cultural reflexes. The institutional culture also changed since it adopted methods of organisation and operation based on technical and instrumental rationality. This situation favoured the positioning of political and bureaucratic actors, related to the neoliberal doctrine and linked to institutions of the economic portfolio, as the dominant actors in decision-making on strategic issues. Miguel de la Madrid, Carlos Salinas, Ernesto Zedillo, Jaime Serra, Pedro Aspe, José Gurría, among others, exemplify the policy elite that embodied these reflexes and operated from institutions such as the Bank of Mexico and the Secretariat of Finance. This series of cultural factors triggered the progressive dismantling of the strategic approach of defensive nationalism. However, nationalism promoted by the left-wing current of the Institutional Revolutionary Party did not lose its status of practical logic until the electoral victory of the conservatives of the National Action Party in 2000.

The evolution of Mexico's strategic policy from 2000 to 2012 also supports the first conclusion. The consolidation of rules and norms that defined the unipolar and neoliberal nature of the post-Cold War international order, as well as the effect of the structural reforms of the 1990s on the institutional and ideological sources of strategic policy, were factors that consolidated the neoliberal economic-political model in Mexico from the 2000s onwards.

Likewise, foreign, trade, and security policy began to be increasingly dominated by a continentalist strategic approach because this notion was perceived as the most compatible to interact abroad and make the relationship with the superpower profitable. The process of dismantling defensive nationalism, the effects produced by the *North American Free Trade Agreement* of 1994, and the reconfiguration of the international security environment after the 9/11 attacks favoured that, from the administration of Vicente Fox in 2000 onwards, Mexican policy actors were even more willing to expand the bilateral agenda, regional trade, and security cooperation with the United States, and even consider the political-economic integration of North America; something unimaginable in the social imaginary of diplomats and military, leading exponents of Mexican nationalism. The dynamics governed by the neoliberal doctrine deepened the changes in the social and cultural context that housed strategic decision-making since the mid-1990s. For example, the habitus of the political elite consolidated their continentalist predispositions and gradually replaced orthodox technocratic reflexes with heterodox managerial reflexes. Likewise, the conservative government promoted an extensive reform in the bureaucratic machinery of policy-making in order to eradicate nationalist ideas and practices of the institutional culture. These changes consolidated politicians and bureaucrats with training and experience in business, as well as officials of the economic and commercial portfolio, as the most influential strategic decision-makers. Vicente Fox, Felipe Calderón, Jorge Castañeda, Francisco Gil, Luis Derbez, among others, embodied these cultural reflections and operated from organisations such as the Secretariat of Finance, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat of Energy. The cultural factors that produced the dismantling of the nationalist approach simultaneously produced a process of building a strategic continentalist vision. The arrival of right-wing political actors of the National Action Party in 2000 created conditions for continentalism to acquire the category of practical logic of the policy elite because, apart from generating a distinction with the thinking and practice of the Institutional Revolutionary Party regime, it would allow the neoliberal reforms and the relationship with the United States to be profitable.

The case of Mexico allows us to conclude that both external and domestic factors, as well as structural and ideational factors, reoriented Mexican strategic policy from 1988 to 2012. The tracking of the evolution of Mexico's strategic policy reveals a great variety of changes in the socio-political context in which the strategic policy was formulated. One of them was the exhaustion of the Keynesian model of shared development and the establishment of neoliberalism. In parallel, foreign policy went from being based on a nationalist approach to being fuelled by continentalist doctrines. Likewise, the parameters of national security

strategies from which policy actors responded to changes in the structural environment went from being defensive against the American hegemony to soft-bandwagoning with the United States. Throughout this period, the dominant political culture in Mexico shifted from the centre-left to the right-centre of the political spectrum. The economic benefits promised by neoliberalism and the alliance with the United States in the post-Cold War unipolar system were some of the most relevant assumptions that prompted political actors to abandon the idea of defending the sovereignty of the old Spanish domain and the growing American hegemony. However, one of the few elements that prevailed played a crucial role in the scope of continentalist strategic policy. The nationalist ideas and practices that prevailed in the institutional culture and cultural reflexes in left-wing politicians, traditional diplomats, and in the military elite, was a sufficient factor to counteract the continentalist impulses of the technocratic elite. This fact, little recognised in the literature, explains the origin of the limits and scope of cooperation with the United States. In conclusion, the effect of neoliberalism on the cultural roots and dynamics of policy-making and decision-making was a crucial factor in the change of Mexico's international identity and strategic behaviour between the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The case study on Canada also validates the conclusion that cultural factors were decisive in the reorientation of Canadian strategic policy since the 1970s onwards. In the context of the Cold War and the global recession of 1975, the Keynesian model of the welfare state promoted by the political faction of the social liberals since the end of the Second World War experienced a phase of exhaustion. In parallel, the internationalist diplomatic tradition and defensive security strategies lost appeal within the policy elite, as they were less and less profitable and their effectiveness was limited in the dynamics of the new American-centric international system. Similar to the Mexican case, social, political, and economic instability during the last term of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1980, generated political spaces that were quickly capitalised by right-wing political actors such as red Tories and business liberals. The adoption of neoliberal policies such as monetarism, free trade, and the intensive exploitation and export of natural resources gradually generated a change in the social and cultural context that housed the strategic decision-making processes from the mid-1980s onwards. For example, the predispositions that constituted the habitus of the policy elite gradually reoriented from internationalism to continentalism, and the cultural reflexes of the policy actors gradually changed from legalistic to entrepreneurial. The field of strategic policy-making also underwent severe changes in the 1990s, as the armed forces and the diplomatic corps were less and less relevant actors in strategic decision-making. Also, the institutional culture intensified the trend of centralisation of power in the Prime Minister that

originated since the 1960s. This environment favoured the establishment of politicians with corporative links and business experience and officers of the departments of the economic portfolio as the most influential actors in the formulation of strategic policy. Policy actors such as Brian Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, Robert Coates Sinclair Stevens, Michael Wilson, Roy MacLaren, John Manley, among others, embodied these cultural reflexes and operated from federal bodies such as the Prime Minister's Office, Department of Finances, Treasury Board Secretariat, and Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. This set of aspects shaped the cultural context that intensified the weakening of the strategic approach of defensive internationalism in the 1990s. However, due to the deep roots of this strategic notion in the left-wing faction of the Liberal Party, in the diplomatic corps, and Canadian society in general, liberal internationalism did not lose its status as practical logic until the renewed Conservative Party came to power in 2006.

How Canadian foreign and security policy evolved from 2006 to 2015, also supports the first conclusion of this thesis. After the end of the Cold War, the new structural conditions had profound implications on the normative standards of state behaviour and the nature of international relations, especially those with the United States. These conditions gave neoliberalism an appeal that political elites could not ignore. The configuration of the post-9/11 structural environment and the profitability of neoliberal practices further consolidated this political-economic model as of the 2000s. At the same time, diplomatic, commercial, and security practices began to be increasingly based on a continentalist notion, since this strategic approach would allow Canada to improve its structural position, influence issues on the international agenda, and make effective neoliberal reforms. The process of weakening defensive internationalism, the effects produced by the *Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement* of 1988 and the *North American Free Trade Agreement* of 1994, as well as the pressures generated after the 9/11 attacks produced conditions where Canadian policy-makers were increasingly willing to deepen their bilateral trade and military cooperation with the United States, even beyond North America; an inconceivable situation for social liberals and traditionalist diplomats, leading promoters of liberal internationalism. Systemic dynamics caused by neoliberalism after the end of the Cold War intensified the changes in the sociocultural context in which the strategic policy was formulated since the mid-2000s. One of these changes occurred in the habitus of policy actors, as they strengthened their continentalist predispositions and their cultural reflexes acquired a moralistic, realist, pragmatic, selective and entrepreneurial character. Likewise, the weakening of the capacities of the diplomatic corps was extended, while the armed forces were rehabilitated and had a more significant role in decision-making and the


implementation of strategic policy. Also, the intensification of the trend of centralisation of decision-making power in the Prime Minister claimed the central role for politicians and bureaucrats with conservative values and business interests in the field of strategic policy-making. Policy actors such as Stephen Harper, Joe Oliver, Peter MacKay, Maxime Bernier, David Emerson, and Gordon O'Connor, among others, embodied these cultural reflexes and operated from agencies such as the Prime Minister's Office, Department of Finances, Department of National Defence, and Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. Cultural factors that triggered the weakening of liberal internationalism in parallel opened up political spaces to promote the reconstruction of a more realist version of the continentalist approach. Similar to how it happened in Mexico, the arrival of right-wing political actors from the Conservative Party in 2006 established conditions for a renewed version of continentalism to assume the status of practical logic of the policy elite, as it simultaneously allowed the breaking of the distinctive strategic pattern of the Liberal Party and the improvement of the structural position of Canada.

The case study on Canada's politics of strategic policy demonstrates that beyond the external pressures generated by the reconfiguration of the structural environment after the end of the Cold War and after the 9/11 attacks, domestic factors of an ideational nature were crucial in the redefinition of Canadian external identity and strategic behaviour from 1993 to 2015. Similar to the case of Mexico, the evolution of Canadian foreign and security policy portrays various changes in the social and political context that hosted the creation of the strategic policy. One of them was the erosion of the Keynesian model of the welfare state and the adoption of the neoliberal paradigm. Simultaneously, foreign policy ceased to be fuelled by internationalist ideas to be delineated by a continentalist approach. The parameters under which security strategies were designed also changed, as they abandoned their defensiveness and soft-balancing to the American hegemony to be soft-bandwagoning with the United States. During the advent and consolidation of neoliberalism, Canadian politics shifted from the left-centre to the centre-right of the political spectrum. The profitability provided by the neoliberal model and the alliance with the United States was a central aspect that prompted the Canadian security establishment to abandon the doctrine of middlepowermanship, multilateral practices, and humanist ideals, which had provided Canada with a special symbolic capital after the end of the Second World War. Nevertheless, the resistance exerted by internationalist and Atlanticist predispositions in the background, as well as the role of permanent fears about American unilateralism, set the limits of conservative continentalism. The internationalist and Atlanticist beliefs and dynamics that persisted in Canadian society, left-wing of the Liberal Party, and diplomatic officers, were aspects that lessened the effects

of the realist reflexes and continentalist predispositions of the conservative elite. This fact validates the argument that predominates in the literature that the role of internationalism, and especially Atlanticism, has been to manage the strategic rapprochement in the bilateral relationship with the United States. In conclusion, it is possible to argue that the pervasive influence of neoliberalism on the institutional and ideological sources of the strategic policy was a crucial aspect in redefining how the subjective understandings of the Canadian policy elite interacted with the structures of global power.

The central conclusion of this dissertation contends that neoliberalism had a profound impact on the ideas, beliefs, values, norms, rules, and practices that had defined the solid international identity and the firm strategic behaviour of Mexico and Canada until the early 1970s. Towards the 1990s, the consolidation of neoliberalism, through domestic structural reforms and new standards of behaviour internationally, eroded the most deeply rooted strategic traditions in both countries and established the basis for the construction of a strategic approach compatible with the neoliberal paradigm in the unipolar international system: soft-bandwagoning continentalism. Following the findings of this study, it is possible to affirm that the strategic policies of Mexico and Canada were reoriented in a similar way, but in opposite directions. That is, while Canada had to shrink its international interaction to limit it to the regional level; Mexico had to open up to abandon its isolationism and aspire to integrate into North America. Likewise, it is possible to confirm that the residual reflexes of the traditional strategic approaches of Canada and Mexico continued to operate in the background since in both cases internationalism and nationalism established the limits of the alliance with the United States and the scope of regional integration. As portrayed in Figure C-1, the parallels between Canada and Mexico were not only in the direction of the reorientation of their strategic policies towards North America but also in the changes in the internal political culture from the left-centre towards the right-centre of the political spectrum. It should be noted that between 2006 and 2009, a period that marked the climax of the neoliberal period, North America was in the hands of conservative governments with deep continentalist predispositions. This political alignment limited frictions, facilitated understandings, coordinated agendas, and favoured cooperation in the region, mainly in commercial and security matters.

Figure C-1. Dispositional distribution of policy actors in the political spectrum



Own elaboration.

Finally, it is important to highlight three aspects that this dissertation has validated. First, the thesis held by various academics about the behaviour of the middle powers has been proven, especially after the end of the Cold War.⁸⁵¹ Both case studies validate that the hegemony exercised by the United States influenced Canadian and Mexican policy actors to seek strategic resources to adapt and align their states to American orthodoxy, which centred around neoliberalism and globalisation. Partially, Mexico and Canada recognised that their economic stability and national security depended on their relationship with the superpower so that their strategic positioning was tied inexorably to the political position and strategic vision of the United States. Second, the alignment of Canada and Mexico to the strategic objectives of the United States in the north and south, respectively, validates the idea that both middle powers assumed a satellite role of the superpower, as that guaranteed them to preserve their status as ‘medium power’ and enjoy the economic benefits of being a supplier of raw materials and manufactured products to the largest market in the world. By the 2000s, Canada and Mexico became the largest trading partners of the United States. This fact, a product of the neoliberal reforms, conditioned the middle powers to a greater extent,

⁸⁵¹ Neack, ‘Pathways to Power: A Comparative Study of the Foreign Policy Ambitions of Turkey, Brazil, Canada, and Australia’; Jordaan; Neack, ‘UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?’ p.193; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict’.

increased their dependence on the superpower and made it increasingly unthinkable that they designed defensive or balancing strategies to American power. This thesis confirms the argument that Mexico and Canada contributed to the construction and preservation of American hegemony during the neoliberal era.⁸⁵² Third, this project has proven the relevance and usefulness of Bourdieu's theoretical thinking in the discipline of international history and international relations. The identification of the components that governed the practical logic of the policy actors facilitated the understanding of the strategic decisions through which they responded to external events that reconfigured the structural environment. The framework of structuralist-constructivist analysis allows us to overcome the biases derived from the theoretical division between realism and constructivism. Furthermore, the practice-centred approach also manages to overcome the structure-agency debate, because by focusing on practice, it considers integrally the various levels that condition and drive social action.

⁸⁵² Stephen Clarkson and Matto Mildenerger, *Dependent America?: How Canada and Mexico Construct US Power* (Toronto: UTP, 2011); O'Toole; Daniel Drache, *Big Picture Realities: Canada and Mexico at the Crossroads* (Waterloo: WLUP, 2008); Holmes, 'Most Safely in the Middle'; Hawes; Dewitt and Kirton.

Appendix A. Mexican policy elite, 1988-2000

A1. Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 1988-1994

Table A-1. Evolution of the Canadian strategic policy, 2006-2015

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Carlos Salinas de Gortari	Presidency	PRI	1988 1994	Mexico	Academia	PhD	Harvard University
José María Córdoba Montoya	Staff	PRI	1988 1994	France	Economics	PhD	Stanford University
Santiago Oñate Laborde	Staff	PRI	1994 1994	Mexico	Law	LLB	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios	Interior	PRI	1988 1993	Veracruz	Military	HSC	Heroic Military College
José Patrocinio González Blanco Garrido	Interior	PRI	1993 1994	Chiapas	Law	MA	Cambridge University
Jorge Carpizo McGregor	Interior	Independent	1994 1994	Campeche	Law	LLD	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Fernando Solana Morales	Foreign Affairs	PRI	1988 1993	Mexico	Bureaucracy	BA	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Víctor Manuel Camacho Solís	Foreign Affairs	PRI	1993 1994	Mexico	Economics	MA	Princeton University
Manuel Tello Macías	Foreign Affairs	PRI	1994 1994	Mexico	Diplomacy	MA	University of Geneva
Antonio Riviello Bazán	Defence	Independent	1988 1994	Mexico	Military	BA	Higher War College
Mauricio Scheleske Sánchez	Navy	PRI	1988 1990	Veracruz	Navy	BA	Heroic Naval College
Luis Carlos Ruano Angulo	Navy	Independent	1990 1994	Veracruz	Navy	BA	Heroic Naval College
Enrique Álvarez del Castillo	Attorney General	PRI	1988 1991	Jalisco	Politics	LLD	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Ignacio Morales Lechuga	Attorney General	PRI	1991 1993	Veracruz	Law	LLB	Free Law School
Jorge Carpizo McGregor	Attorney General	Independent	1993 1994	Campeche	Law	LLD	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Diego Valadés Ríos	Attorney General	Independent	1994 1994	Sinaloa	Law	LLD	Complutense University of Madrid
Víctor Humberto Benítez Treviño	Attorney General	PRI	1994 1994	Mexico	Politics	LLD	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Jorge Carrillo Olea	Intelligence	PRI	1989 1990	Morelo	Military	BA	Higher War College
Fernando del Villar Moreno	Intelligence	PRI	1990 1993	Mexico	Politics	BA	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Eduardo Pontones Chico	Intelligence	Independent	1993 1994	Mexico	Economics	BA	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Jorge Enrique Tello Peón	Intelligence	Independent	1994 1999	Yucatan	Intelligence	BA	Centre for Research and Teaching in Economics

Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009* (Texas: UTP, 2011); Presidencia, *Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano* (Mexico: FCE, 1994); Presidencia, 'Sistema Internet de La Presidencia', *Internet Archive Wayback Machine*, 1994 <<http://web.archive.org/web/19961221171544/http://www.presidencia.gob.mx>> [accessed 15 January 2018].

A2. Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 1988-1994

Table A-2. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 1988-1994

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Carlos Salinas de Gortari	Presidency	PRI	1988-1994	Mexico 1948	Academia	PhD	Harvard University
José María Córdoba Montoya	Staff	PRI	1988-1994	France 1950	Economics	PhD	Stanford University
Santiago Oñate Laborde	Staff	PRI	1994-1994	Mexico 1943	Law	LLB	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios	Interior	PRI	1988-1993	Vernacruz 1927	Military	HSC	Heroic Military College
José Patrocinio González Blanco Garrido	Interior	PRI	1993-1994	Chiapas 1934	Law	MA	Cambridge University
Jorge Carpizo McGregor	Interior	Independent	1994-1994	Campeche 1944	Law	LLD	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Fernando Solana Morales	Foreign Affairs	PRI	1988-1993	Mexico 1931	Bureaucracy	BA	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Víctor Manuel Camacho Solís	Foreign Affairs	PRI	1993-1994	Mexico 1946	Economics	MA	Princeton University
Manuel Tello Macías	Foreign Affairs	PRI	1994-1994	Mexico 1935	Diplomacy	MA	University of Geneva
Pedro Aspe Armella	Finance	PRI	1988-1994	Mexico 1950	Economics	PhD	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Jaime Serra Puche	Economy	PRI	1988-1994	Mexico 1955	Economics	PhD	Yale University
Enrique Álvarez del Castillo	Attorney General	PRI	1988-1991	Jalisco 1923	Politics	LLD	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Ignacio Morales Lechuga	Attorney General	PRI	1991-1993	Vernacruz 1947	Law	LLB	Free Law School
Jorge Carpizo McGregor	Attorney General	Independent	1993-1994	Campeche 1944	Law	LLD	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Diego Valadés Ríos	Attorney General	Independent	1994-1994	Sinaloa 1945	Law	LLD	Complutense University of Madrid
Víctor Humberto Benítez Treviño	Attorney General	PRI	1994-1994	Mexico 1945	Politics	LLD	National Autonomous University of Mexico

Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009* (Texas: UTP, 2011); Presidencia, *Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano* (Mexico: FCE, 1994); Presidencia, 'Sistema Internet de La Presidencia', *Internet Archive Wayback Machine*, 1994 <<http://web.archive.org/web/19961221171544/http://www.presidencia.gob.mx>> [accessed 15 January 2018].

A3. Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 1994-2000

Table A-3. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 1994-2000

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León	Presidency	PRI	1994 2000	Mexico	Economics	PhD	Yale University
Luis Manuel Téllez Kuenzler	Staff	PRI	1994 1997	Mexico	Economics	PhD	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
José Luis Barros Horcasitas	Staff	PRI	1997 2000	Mexico	Academia	PhD	University of Oxford
Esteban Moctezuma Barragán	Interior	PRI	1994 1995	Mexico	Economics	MA	University of Cambridge
Emilio Chuayffet Chemor	Interior	PRI	1995 1998	Mexico	Law	LLB	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Francisco Labastida Ochoa	Interior	PRI	1998 1999	Sinaloa	Politics	BA	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Diódoro Humberto Carrasco Altamirano	Interior	PRI	1999 2000	Oaxaca	Politics	BA	Mexico Autonomous Institute of Technology
José Ángel Gurriá Treviño	Foreign Affairs	PRI	1994 1998	Tamaulipas	Economics	MA	University of Leeds
Rosario Green Macías	Foreign Affairs	PRI	1998 2000	Mexico	Academia	MA	The College of Mexico / Columbia University
Enrique Cervantes Aguirre	Defence	Independent	1994 2000	Puebla	Military	BA	Higher War College
José Ramón Lorenzo Franco	Navy	Independent	1994 2000	Tlaxcala	Navy	PhD	Centre for Higher Naval Studies
Fernando Antonio Lozano Gracia	Attorney General	PAN	1994 1996	Mexico	Law	LLB	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Jorge Madrazo Cuéllar	Attorney General	Independent	1996 2000	Mexico	Law	LLD	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Jorge Enrique Tello Peón	Intelligence	Independent	1994 1999	Yucatan	Intelligence	BA	Centre for Research and Teaching in Economics

Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009* (Texas: UTP, 2011); Presidencia, *Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano* (Mexico: FCE, 2000); Presidencia, 'Sistema Internet de La Presidencia', *Internet Archive Wayback Machine*, 2000 <<http://web.archive.org/web/20000302140915/http://www.presidencia.gob.mx:80/>> [accessed 16 March 2018].

A4. Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 1994-2000

Table A-4. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 1994-2000


	Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University	
1	Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León	Presidency	PRI	1994/2000	Mexico	1951	Economics	PhD	Yale University
2	Luis Manuel Téllez Kuenzler	Staff	PRI	1994/1997	Mexico	1958	Economics	PhD	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
3	José Luis Barros Horcasitas	Staff	PRI	1997/2000	Mexico	1953	Academia	PhD	University of Oxford
4	Esteban Moctezuma Barragán	Interior	PRI	1994/1995	Mexico	1954	Economics	MA	University of Cambridge
5	Emilio Chuayffet Chemor	Interior	PRI	1995/1998	Mexico	1951	Law	LLB	National Autonomous University of Mexico
6	Francisco Labastida Ochoa	Interior	PRI	1998/1999	Sinaloa	1942	Politics	BA	National Autonomous University of Mexico
7	Díodoro Humberto Carrasco Altamirano	Interior	PRI	1999/2000	Oaxaca	1954	Politics	BA	Mexico Autonomous Institute of Technology
8	José Ángel Gurría Treviño	Foreign Affairs	PRI	1994/1998	Tamaulipas	1950	Economics	MA	University of Leeds
9	Rosario Green Macías	Foreign Affairs	PRI	1998/2000	Mexico	1941	Academia	MA	The College of Mexico / Columbia University
10	Jaime Serra Puche	Finance	PRI	1994/1994	Mexico	1955	Economics	PhD	Yale University
11	Guillermo Ortiz Martínez	Finance	Independent	1994/1998	Mexico	1948	Economics	PhD	Stanford University
12	José Ángel Gurría Treviño	Finance	PRI	1998/2000	Tamaulipas	1950	Economics	MA	University of Leeds
13	Herrnino Blanco Mendoza	Economy	PRI	1994/2000	Chihuahua	1950	Economics	PhD	University of Chicago
14	Fernando Antonio Lozano Gracia	Attorney General	PAN	1994/1996	Mexico	1953	Law	LLB	National Autonomous University of Mexico
15	Jorge Madrazo Cuéllar	Attorney General	Independent	1996/2000	Mexico	1953	Law	LLD	National Autonomous University of Mexico

Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009* (Texas: UTP, 2011); Presidencia, *Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano* (Mexico: FCE, 2000); Presidencia, 'Sistema Internet de La Presidencia', *Internet Archive Wayback Machine*, 2000 <<http://web.archive.org/web/20000302140915/http://www.presidencia.gob.mx:80/>> [accessed 16 March 2018].

Appendix B. Mexican policy-making structure, 1988-2000

B1. Cabinet system, 1988-1997


Chart B-1. Organisational chart of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, 1988-1997



Own elaboration based on DOF 07-12-1988 Presidencia de la República, 'Acuerdo Por El Que Se Crea La Oficina de Coordinación de La Presidencia de La República' (Mexico: DOF, 1988).

B2. Cabinet system, 1997-2000

Chart B-2. Organisational chart of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, 1997-2000



Own elaboration based on DOF 19-12-1997 Presidencia de la República, ‘Acuerdo Por El Que Se Reestructuran Los Gabinetes Especializados Del Ejecutivo Federal Y Se Abroga El Diverso Que Creó La Oficina de La Presidencia de La República’ (Mexico: DOF, 1997).

Appendix C. Mexican policy elite, 2000-2012

C1. Commission of Order and Respect, 2000-2003

Table C-1. Members of the Commission of Order and Respect, 2000-2003

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Vicente Fox Quesada	Presidency	PAN	2000/2006	Guanajuato	Business	BA	Ibero-American University
Juan de Dios Castro Lozano	Staff	PAN	2000/2006	Coahuila	Law	MA	Autonomous University of Coahuila
Marta María Sahagún Jiménez	Staff	PAN	2000/2002	Michoacan	Management	BA	La Salle Benavente University
Rodolfo Elizondo Torres	Staff	PAN	2002/2003	Durango	Politics	BA	Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education
Adolfo Miguel Aguilar Zinser	Staff	PRI/PRD	2001/2002	Mexico	Politics	MA	Harvard University
Santiago Creel Miranda	Interior	PAN	2000/2005	Mexico	Politics	MA	University of Michigan
Gerardo Clemente Vega García	Defence	Independent	2000/2006	Puebla	Military	MA	National Defence College
Marco Antonio Peyrot González	Navy	Independent	2000/2006	Mexico	Military	MA	National Defence College
Rafael Marcial Macedo de la Concha	Attorney General	Independent	2000/2005	Mexico	Military	BA	Heroic Military College
Alejandro Gertz Manero	Public Safety	Convergencia	2000/2004	Mexico	Law	PhD	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Francisco Barrio Terrazas	Civil Service	PAN	2000/2003	Chihuahua	Business	MA	Autonomous University of Chihuahua

Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009* (Texas: UTP, 2011); Presidencia, *Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano* (Mexico: FCE, 2006); Presidencia, 'Gabinete', *Orden y Respeto*, 2006 <<http://fox.presidencia.gob.mx/gabinete/orden/>> [accessed 20 March 2018].

C2. Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 2003-2006

Table C-2. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 2003-2006

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Vicente Fox Quesada	Presidency	PAN	2000/2006	Guajuato 1942	Business	BA	Ibero-American University
Ramón Muñoz Gutiérrez	Staff	PAN	2000/2006	Jalisco 1960	Business	BA	University of Guanajuato
Santiago Creel Miranda	Interior	PAN	2000/2005	Mexico 1954	Politics	MA	University of Michigan
José Carlos María Abascal Carranza	Interior	PAN	2005/2006	Mexico 1949	Management	PhD	Ibero-American University
Gerardo Clemente Ricardo Vega García	Defence	IND	2000/2006	Puebla 1940	Military	MA	National Defence College
Marco Antonio Peyrot González	Navy	IND	2000/2006	Mexico 1940	Military	MA	National Defence College
Alejandro Gertz Manero	Public Safety	Convergencia	2000/2004	Mexico 1939	Law	PhD	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Ramón Martín Huerta	Public Safety	PAN	2004/2005	Jalisco 1957	Business	MA	Bajío University
Eduardo Tomás Medina-Mora Icaza	Public Safety	PAN	2005/2006	Mexico 1957	Law	BA	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Francisco Gil Díaz	Finance	PRJ	2000/2006	Mexico 1943	Business	PhD	University of Chicago
Eduardo Romero Ramos	Civil Service	PAN	2003/2006	Chihuahua 1955	Law	MA	Panamerican University
Eduardo Tomás Medina-Mora Icaza	Intelligence	PAN	2000/2005	Mexico 1957	Law	BA	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Jaime Domingo López Butián	Intelligence	Independent	2005/2006	Mexico 1961	Bureaucracy	PhD	Ibero-American University
Rafael Marcial Macedo de la Concha	Attorney General	Independent	2000/2005	Mexico 1950	Military	BA	Heroic Military College
Daniel Francisco Cabeza de Vaca	Attorney General	PAN	2005/2006	Guajuato 1959	Law	BA	University of Guanajuato

Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009* (Texas: UTP, 2011); Presidencia, *Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano* (Mexico: FCE, 2006); Presidencia, 'Gabinete', *Orden y Respeto*, 2006 <<http://fox.presidencia.gob.mx/gabinete/orden/>> [accessed 20 March 2018].

C3. Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 2003-2006

Table C-3. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 2003-2006

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Vicente Fox Quesada	Presidency	PAN	2000-2006	Guanajuato	Business	BA	Ibero-American University
Ramón Muñoz Gutiérrez	Staff	PAN	2000-2006	Jalisco	Business	BA	University of Guanajuato
Santiago Creel Miranda	Interior	PAN	2000-2005	Mexico	Politics	MA	University of Michigan
José Carlos María Abascal Carranza	Interior	PAN	2005-2006	Mexico	Management	PhD	Ibero-American University
Jorge Castañeda	Foreign Affairs	Independent	2000-2003	Mexico	Academia	PhD	University of Paris
Luis Ernesto Derbez	Foreign Affairs	PAN	2003-2006	Mexico	Economics	PhD	Iowa State University
Francisco Gil Díaz	Finance	PRI	2000-2006	Mexico	Business	PhD	University of Chicago
Luis Ernesto Derbez	Economy	PAN	2000-2003	Mexico	Economics	PhD	Iowa State University
Fernando Canales Clariond	Economy	PAN	2003-2005	Nuevo Leon	Business	MBA	Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education
Sergio García de Alba	Economy	Independent	2005-2006	Jalisco	Business	MBA	PanAmerican Institute for High Business Management
Rafael Marcial Macedo de la Concha	Attorney General	Independent	2000-2005	Mexico	Military	BA	Heroic Military College
Daniel Francisco Cabeza de Vaca	Attorney General	PAN	2005-2006	Guanajuato	Law	BA	University of Guanajuato

Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009* (Texas: UTP, 2011); Presidencia, *Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano* (Mexico: FCE, 2006); Presidencia, 'Gabinete', *Orden y Respeto*, 2006 <<http://fox.presidencia.gob.mx/gabinete/orden/>> [accessed 20 March 2018].

C4. Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 2006-2012

Table C-4. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 2006-2012

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Felipe Calderón Hinojosa	Presidency	PAN	2006/2012	Michoacán 1962	Politics	MA	Harvard University
Juan Camilo Mourino	Staff	PAN	2006/2008	Spain 1971	Politics	MA	University of Campeche
Patricia Flores Elizondo	Staff	PAN	2008/2010	Durango 1968	Technician	BA	University of Monterrey
Gerardo Ruiz Mateos	Staff	PAN	2010/2012	Mexico 1965	Business	MBA	PanAmerican Institute for High Business Management
Francisco Javier Ramírez Acuña	Interior	PAN	2006/2008	Jalisco 1952	Politics	LLB	University of Guadalajara
Juan Camilo Mourino Terrazo	Interior	PAN	2008/2008	Spain 1971	Politics	MA	University of Campeche
Fernando Gómez Mont	Interior	PAN	2008/2010	Mexico 1963	Politics	LLB	Free Law School
Francisco Blake Mora	Interior	PAN	2010/2011	California 1966	Politics	LLB	Autonomous University of Baja California
Alejandro Poiré Romero	Interior	PAN	2011/2012	Mexico 1971	Academia	PhD	Harvard University
Guillermo Galván Galván	Defence	Independent	2006/2012	Mexico 1943	Military	MA	National Defence College
Mariano Francisco Saynez Mendoza	Navy	Independent	2006/2012	Veracruz 1942	Military	MA	Inter-American Defence College
Genaro García Luna	Public Safety	PAN	2006/2012	Mexico 1968	Intelligence	MA	University of Miami
Agustín Guillermo Carstens Carstens	Finance	Independent	2006/2009	Mexico 1958	Economics	PhD	University of Chicago
Ernesto Cordero Arroyo	Finance	PAN	2009/2011	Mexico 1968	Bureaucracy	PhD	University of Pennsylvania
José Antonio Meade Kuribreña	Finance	Independent	2011/2012	Mexico 1969	Economics	PhD	Yale University
Germán Martínez Cázares	Civil Service	PAN	2006/2007	Michoacán 1967	Politics	LLD	Complutense University of Madrid
Salvador Vega Castillas	Civil Service	PAN	2007/2011	Michoacán 1967	Politics	MA	Charles III University of Madrid
Rafael Morgan Ríos	Civil Service	Independent	2011/2012	Sinaloa 1970	Accountancy	MA	Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education
Guillermo Valdés Castellanos	Intelligence	Independent	2006/2011	Mexico 1968	Consultancy	BA	Mexico Autonomous Institute of Technology
Alejandro Poiré Romero	Intelligence	PAN	2011/2011	Mexico 1971	Academia	PhD	Harvard University
Jaime Domingo López Buitrón	Intelligence	Independent	2011/2012	Mexico 1961	Bureaucracy	PhD	Ibero-American University
Eduardo Tomás Medina-Mora Icaza	Attorney General	PAN	2006/2009	Mexico 1957	Law	LLB	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Arturo Chávez Chávez	Attorney General	PAN	2009/2011	Chihuahua 1960	Law	LLB	Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education
Marisela Morales Ibáñez	Attorney General	Independent	2011/2012	Mexico 1970	Law	LLM	National Institute of Criminal Sciences

Own elaboration based on Presidencia, *Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano* (Mexico: FCE, 2012); Presidencia, 'Presidencia', *Gabinete*, 2012 <<http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/gabinete/>> [accessed 25 March 2018]; Roderic Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009* (Texas: UTP, 2011).

C5. Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 2006-2012

Table C-5. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 2006-2012

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Felipe Calderón Hinojosa	Presidency	PAN	2006-2012	Michoacan 1962	Politics	MA	Harvard University
Juan Camilo Mouríño	Staff	PAN	2006-2008	Spain 1971	Politics	MA	University of Campeche
Patricia Flores Elizondo	Staff	PAN	2008-2010	Durango 1968	Technician	BA	University of Monterrey
Gerardo Ruiz Mateos	Staff	PAN	2010-2012	Mexico 1965	Business	MBA	PanAmerican Institute for High Business Management
Francisco Javier Ramírez Acuña	Interior	PAN	2006-2008	Jalisco 1952	Politics	LLB	University of Guadalajara
Juan Camilo Mouríño Terrazo	Interior	PAN	2008-2008	Spain 1971	Politics	MA	University of Campeche
Fernando Gómez Mont	Interior	PAN	2008-2010	Mexico 1963	Politics	LLB	Free Law School
Francisco Blake Mora	Interior	PAN	2010-2011	California 1966	Politics	LLB	Autonomous University of Baja California
Alejandro Poiré Romero	Interior	PAN	2011-2012	Mexico 1971	Academia	PhD	Harvard University
Patricia Espinosa Cantellano	Foreign Affairs	PAN	2006-2012	Mexico 1958	Diplomacy	MA	Institute of International Higher Studies Geneva
Agustín Guillermo Carstens Carstens	Finance	Independent	2006-2009	Mexico 1958	Economics	PhD	University of Chicago
Ernesto Cordero Arroyo	Finance	PAN	2009-2011	Mexico 1968	Bureaucracy	PhD	University of Pennsylvania
José Antonio Meade Kuribreña	Finance	Independent	2011-2012	Mexico 1969	Economics	PhD	Yale University
Eduardo Sojo Garza-Aldape	Economy	PAN	2006-2008	Guanajuato 1955	Economics	PhD	University of Pennsylvania
Gerardo Ruiz Mateos	Economy	PAN	2008-2010	Mexico 1965	Business	MBA	PanAmerican Institute for High Business Management
Bruno Francisco Ferrari García	Economy	Independent	2010-2012	Mexico 1961	Business	LLB	Free Law School
Eduardo Tomás Medina-Mora Icaza	Attorney General	PAN	2006-2009	Mexico 1957	Law	LLB	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Arturo Chávez Chávez	Attorney General	PAN	2009-2011	Chihuahua 1960	Law	LLB	Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education
Marisela Morales Ibáñez	Attorney General	Independent	2011-2012	Mexico 1970	Law	LLM	National Institute of Criminal Sciences

Own elaboration based on Presidencia, *Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano* (Mexico: FCE, 2012); Presidencia, 'Presidencia', *Gabinete*, 2012 <<http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/gabinete/>> [accessed 25 March 2018]; Roderic Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009* (Texas: UTP, 2011).

C6. Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 2006-2012

Table C-6. Members of the National Security Council, 2006-2012 (first part)

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Felipe Calderón Hinojosa	Presidency	PAN	2006 2012	Michoacan 1962	Politics	MA	Harvard University
Sigrid Wanda Arzú Collunga	Staff	Independent	2006 2009	Mexico 1955	Consultancy	PhD	University of Miami
Monte Alejandro Rubido García	Staff	Independent	2009 2009	Mexico 1954	Bureaucracy	MA	Sorbonne
Jorge Enrique Tello Peón	Staff	Independent	2009 2010	Yucatan 1956	Intelligence	BA	Centre for Research and Teaching in Economics
Alejandro Poiré Romero	Staff	PAN	2010 2011	Mexico 1971	Academia	PhD	Harvard University
Jéssica Dugue Romero	Staff	Independent	2011 2012	Mexico 1975	Bureaucracy	BA	Anahuac University
Francisco Javier Ramírez Acuña	Interior	PAN	2006 2008	Jalisco 1952	Politics	LLB	University of Guadalajara
Juan Camilo Mourão Terrazo	Interior	PAN	2008 2008	Spain 1971	Politics	MA	University of Campeche
Fernando Gómez Mont	Interior	PAN	2008 2010	Mexico 1963	Politics	LLB	Free Law School
Francisco Blake Mora	Interior	PAN	2010 2011	California 1966	Politics	LLB	Autonomous University of Baja California
Alejandro Poiré Romero	Interior	PAN	2011 2012	Mexico 1971	Academia	PhD	Harvard University
Guillermo Galván Galván	Defence	Independent	2006 2012	Mexico 1943	Military	MA	National Defence College
Mariano Francisco Saynez Mendoza	Navy	Independent	2006 2012	Veracruz 1942	Military	MA	Inter-American Defence College
Genaro García Luna	Public Safety	PAN	2006 2012	Mexico 1968	Intelligence	MA	University of Miami

Own elaboration based on Presidencia, *Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano* (Mexico: FCE, 2012); Presidencia, 'Presidencia', *Gabinete*, 2012 <<http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/gabinete/>> [accessed 25 March 2018]; Roderic Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009* (Texas: UTP, 2011).

Table C-7. Members of the National Security Council, 2006-2012 (second part)

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Agustín Guillermo Carstens Carstens	Finance	Independent	2006-2009	Mexico	1958 Economics	PhD	University of Chicago
Ernesto Cordero Arroyo	Finance	PAN	2009-2011	Mexico	1968 Bureaucracy	PhD	University of Pennsylvania
José Antonio Meade Kuribreña	Finance	Independent	2011-2012	Mexico	1969 Economics	PhD	Yale University
Germán Martínez Cázares	Civil Service	PAN	2006-2007	Michoacán	1967 Politics	LLD	Complutense University of Madrid
Salvador Vega Casillas	Civil Service	PAN	2007-2011	Michoacán	1967 Politics	MA	Charles III University of Madrid
Rafael Morgan Ríos	Civil Service	Independent	2011-2012	Sinaloa	1970 Accountancy	MA	Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education
Patricia Espinosa Cantellano	Foreign Affairs	PAN	2006-2012	Mexico	1958 Diplomacy	MA	Institute of International Higher Studies Geneva
Luis Manuel Enrique Téllez Kuenzler	Communications	PRI	2006-2009	Mexico	1958 Economics	PhD	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Juan Francisco Molinar Horecasitas	Communications	PAN	2009-2011	Chihuahua	1955 Academia	PhD	University of California
Dionisio Pérez-Jácome Friscione	Communications	Independent	2011-2012	Veracruz	1967 Economics	MA	Harvard University
Eduardo Tomás Medina-Mora Icaza	Attorney General	PAN	2006-2009	Mexico	1957 Law	LLB	National Autonomous University of Mexico
Arturo Chávez Chávez	Attorney General	PAN	2009-2011	Chihuahua	1960 Law	LLB	Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education
Marisela Morales Ibáñez	Attorney General	Independent	2011-2012	Mexico	1970 Law	LLM	National Institute of Criminal Sciences
Guillermo Valdés Castellanos	Intelligence	Independent	2006-2011	Mexico	1968 Consultancy	BA	Mexico Autonomous Institute of Technology
Alejandro Poiré Romero	Intelligence	PAN	2011-2011	Mexico	1971 Academia	PhD	Harvard University
Jaime Domingo López Buitrón	Intelligence	Independent	2011-2012	Mexico	1961 Bureaucracy	PhD	Ibero-American University


Own elaboration based on Presidencia, *Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano* (Mexico: FCE, 2012); Presidencia, 'Presidencia', *Gabinete*, 2012 <<http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/gabinete/>> [accessed 25 March 2018]; Roderic Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009* (Texas: UTP, 2011).

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Appendix D. Mexican policy-making structure, 2000-2012

D1. Cabinet system, 2000-2004


Chart D-1. Organisational chart of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, 2000-2004



Own elaboration based on DOF 04-12-2000 Presidencia de la República, 'Acuerdo Mediante El Cual Se Crea La Oficina Ejecutiva de La Presidencia de La República' (Mexico: DOF, 2000).

D2. Cabinet system, 2004-2006


Chart D-2. Organisational chart of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, 2004-2006



Own elaboration based on DOF 13-12-2004 Presidencia de la República, 'Acuerdo Por El Que Se Establecen Las Unidades Administrativas de La Presidencia de La República' (Mexico: DOF, 2004).

D3. Cabinet system, 2006-2012


Chart D-3. Organisational chart of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, 2006-2012



Own elaboration based on DOF 04-12-2006 Presidencia de la República, 'Acuerdo Por El Que Se Crea La Oficina de La Presidencia de La República' (Mexico: DOF, 2006); DOF 21-01-2008 Presidencia de la República, 'Acuerdo Por El Que Se Reestructuran Las Unidades Administrativas de La Presidencia de La República' (Mexico: DOF, 2008).

D4. National security system, 2006-2012

Chart D-4. Organisational chart of the National Security Council, 2006-2012



Own elaboration based on DOF 31-01-2005 Congreso, ‘Ley de Seguridad Nacional’ (Mexico: DOF, 2005).

Appendix E. Canadian policy elite, 1993-2006

E1. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 1993-1997

Table E-1. Policy elite during the first mandate of the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, 1993-1997

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Jean Chrétien	Prime Minister	Liberal	1993 2003	Quebec	1937	Law	BA/LLB
Jean Pelletier	PMO	Liberal	1993 2001	Quebec	1935	Journalism	BSocSci
Jocelyne Bourgon	PCO	Independent	1994 1999	Quebec	1950	Government	MBA
Glen Shortliffe	PCO	Independent	1992 1994	Ontario	1937	Government	BA
Douglas Young	Defence	Liberal	1996 1997	New Brunswick	1940	Law	LLB
David Collenette	Defence	Liberal	1993 1996	United Kingdom	1946	Politics	LLD
Marcel Massé	Treasure	Liberal	1996 1999	Quebec	1940	Government	BA/LLB/BPhil
Arthur Eggleton	Treasure	Liberal	1993 1996	Ontario	1943	Politics	None
Paul Martin	Finance	Liberal	1993 2002	Ontario	1938	Business	BA/LLB
Lloyd Axworthy	Foreign Affairs	Liberal	1996 2000	Saskatchewan	1939	Academia	PhD
André Ouellet	Foreign Affairs	Liberal	1993 1996	Quebec	1939	Politics	LLB
Diane Marleau	Public Service	Liberal	1996 1997	Ontario	1943	Accounting	BA
David Dingwall	Public Service	Liberal	1993 1993	Nova Scotia	1952	Law	LLB

Own elaboration based on Kenny William, 'Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; Mutimer David, *Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 1997* (Toronto: UTP, 2003); Lumley Elizabeth, *Canadian Who's Who 1997, Volume 32* (Toronto: UTP, 1997). Note: Until 2001, the Chrétien government did not have exclusive cabinet committees for matters of foreign policy and national security.

E2. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 1997-2000

Table E-2. Policy elite during the second mandate of the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, 1997-2000

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Jean Chrétien	Prime Minister	Liberal	1993-2003	Quebec	1937	Law	BA/LLB Séminaire Sainte-Marie / Laval University
Jean Pelletier	PMO	Liberal	1993-2001	Quebec	1935	Journalism	BSocSci Laval University
Mel Cappe	PCO	Independent	1999-2002	Ontario	1948	Government	MA University of Western Ontario
Jocelyne Bourgon	PCO	Independent	1994-1999	Quebec	1950	Government	MBA University of Ottawa
Arthur Eggleton	Defence	Liberal	1997-2002	Ontario	1943	Politics	None
Lucienne Robillard	Treasure	Liberal	1999-2003	Quebec	1945	Social work	MSW/MBA University of Montreal /Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales
Marcel Massé	Treasure	Liberal	1996-1999	Quebec	1940	Government	BA/LLB/BPhil University Montreal / McGill University / Oxford University
Paul Martin	Finance	Liberal	1993-2002	Ontario	1938	Business	BA/LLB University of Toronto
Lloyd Axworthy	Foreign Affairs	Liberal	1996-2000	Saskatchewan	1939	Academia	PhD Princeton University
Alfonso Gagliano	Public Service	Liberal	1997-2002	Quebec	1942	Accountant	APA/CGA Sir George Williams University / Concordia University

Own elaboration based on Kenny William, 'Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; Mutimer David, *Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 2000* (Toronto: UTP, 2006); Lumley Elizabeth, *Canadian Who's Who 2000, Volume 35* (Toronto: UTP, 2000). Note: Until 2001, the Chrétien government did not have exclusive cabinet committees for matters of foreign policy and national security.

E3. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 2000-2003

Table E-3. Policy elite during the third mandate of the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, 2000-2003

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Jean Chrétien	Prime Minister	Liberal	1993-2003	Quebec	Law	BA/LLB	Séminaire Sainte-Marie / Laval University
Edward Goldenberg	PMO	Liberal	2003-2003	Quebec	Law	MA	McGill University
Percy Downe	PMO	Liberal	2001-2003	Prince Edward	Government	BA	University of Prince Edward Island
Jean Pelletier	PMO	Liberal	1993-2001	Quebec	Journalism	BSocSci	Laval University
Alexander Himelfarb	PCO	Independent	2002-2006	Germany	Government	PhD	University of Toronto
Mel Cappe	PCO	Independent	1999-2002	Ontario	Government	MA	University of Western Ontario
John McCallum	Defence	Liberal	2002-2003	Quebec	Economics	PhD	McGill University
Arthur Eggleton	Defence	Liberal	1997-2002	Ontario	Politics	None	None
Lucienne Robillard	Treasure	Liberal	1999-2003	Quebec	Social work	MSW / MBA	University of Montreal / Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales
John Manley	Finance	Liberal	2002-2003	Ontario	Law	BA/LLB	Carleton University / University of Ottawa
Paul Martin	Finance	Liberal	1993-2002	Ontario	Business	BA / LLB	University of Toronto
William Graham	Foreign Affairs	Liberal	2002-2003	Ontario	Politics	LLD	University of Paris
John Manley	Foreign Affairs	Liberal	2000-2002	Ontario	Law	BA/LLB	Carleton University / University of Ottawa
Lloyd Axworthy	Foreign Affairs	Liberal	1996-2000	Saskatchewan	Academia	PhD	Princeton University
Ralph Goodale	Public Service	Liberal	2002-2003	Saskatchewan	Politics	BA/LLB	University of Regina / University of Saskatchewan
Donald Boudria	Public Service	Liberal	2002-2002	Quebec	Politics	MA	University of Ottawa
Alfonso Gagliano	Public Service	Liberal	1997-2002	Quebec	Accountant	APA/CGA	Sir George Williams University / Concordia University

Own elaboration based on Kenny William, 'Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466-86; Mutimer David, *Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 2003* (Toronto: UTP, 2009); Lumley Elizabeth, *Canadian Who's Who 2003, Volume 37* (Toronto: UTP, 2003). Note: These policy actors were members of the ad hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism, and ad hoc Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence from 2001 to 2003.

E4. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 2003-2006

Table E-4. Policy elite during the mandate of the Prime Minister Paul Martin, 2003-2006


Name	Office	Party	Term	Born		Background	Degree	University
Paul Martin	Prime Minister	Liberal	2003-2006	Ontario	1938	Business	BA / LLB	University of Toronto
Timothy Murphy	PMO	Liberal	2003-2006	Ontario	1959	Law	LLM	York University
Alexander Himelfarb	PCO	Independent	2002-2006	Germany	1947	Government	PhD	University of Toronto
William Graham	Defence	Liberal	2004-2006	Ontario	1939	Politics	LLD	University of Paris
David Pratt	Defence	Liberal	2003-2004	Ontario	1955	Politics	BA	Carleton University
Reg Alcock	Treasure	Liberal	2003-2006	Manitoba	1948	Politics	MPA	Harvard University
Ralph Goodale	Finance	Liberal	2003-2006	Saskatchewan	1949	Politics	BA / LLB	University of Regina / University of Saskatchewan
Pierre Pettigrew	Foreign Affairs	Liberal	2004-2006	Quebec	1951	Business	MPhil	Oxford University
William Graham	Foreign Affairs	Liberal	2002-2003	Ontario	1939	Politics	LLD	University of Paris
Scott Brison	Public Service	Liberal	2004-2006	Nova Scotia	1967	Business	BA	Dalhousie University
Stephen Owen	Public Service	Liberal	2003-2004	British Columbia	1948	Law	LLD	University of British Columbia

Own elaboration based on Kenny William, 'Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466-86; Mutimer David, *Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 2006* (Toronto: UTP, 2013); Lumley Elizabeth, *Canadian Who's Who 2006, Volume 41* (Toronto: UTP, 2006). Note: These policy actors were members of the Cabinet Committee on Global Affairs; Cabinet Committee for Canada-United States Affairs; and Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies from 2003 to 2006.

Appendix F. Canadian policy-making structure, 1993-2006


F1. Cabinet system, 1993-1997

Chart F-1. Cabinet system during the first mandate of the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, 1993-1997



Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019’, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; David Johnson, ‘Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems’, in *Thinking Government: Public Sector Management in Canada*, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: Broadview, 2006) pp.231–4.


F2. Cabinet system, 1997-2000



Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019’, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; David Johnson, ‘Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems’, in *Thinking Government: Public Sector Management in Canada*, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: Broadview, 2006) pp.231–4.

F3. Cabinet system, 2000-2003


Chart F-3. Cabinet system during the third mandate of the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, 2000-2003



Own elaboration based on Kenny William, 'Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466-86; David Johnson, 'Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems', in *Thinking Government: Public Sector Management in Canada*, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: Broadview, 2006) pp.231-4.

F4. Cabinet system, 2003-2006

Chart F-4. Cabinet system during the mandate of the Prime Minister Paul Martin, 2003-2006



Own elaboration based on Kenny William, 'Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466-86; David Johnson, 'Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems', in *Thinking Government: Public Sector Management in Canada*, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: Broadview, 2006) pp.234-7.

Appendix G. Canadian policy elite, 2006-2015

G1. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 2006-2008

Table G-1. Policy elite during the first mandate of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2006-2008

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born	Background	Degree	University
Stephen Harper	Prime Minister	Conservative	2006/2015	Alberta	Business	MA	University of Calgary
Ian Brodie	PMO	Conservative	2006/2008	Ontario	Education	PhD	University of Calgary
Kevin Lynch	PCO	Independent	2006/2009	Nova Scotia	Economics	PhD	McMaster University
Alexander Himelfarb	PCO	Independent	2002/2006	Germany	Government	PhD	University of Toronto
Peter MacKay	Defence	Conservative	2007/2013	Nova Scotia	Law	BA / LLB	Carleton University / Dalhousie University
Gordon O'Connor	Defence	Conservative	2006/2007	Ontario	Lobbyist	BSc / BA	Concordia University / York University
Victor Toews	Treasure	Conservative	2007/2010	Manitoba	Law	BA / LLB	University of Winnipeg / University of Manitoba
John Baird	Treasure	Conservative	2006/2007	Ontario	Business	BA	Queen's University
Jim Flaherty	Finance	Conservative	2006/2014	Quebec	Law	BA / LLB	Princeton University / York University
David Emerson	Foreign Affairs	Conservative	2008/2008	British Columbia	Economics	PhD	Queen's University
Maxime Bernier	Foreign Affairs	Conservative	2007/2008	Quebec	Economics	BA / LLB	Université du Québec à Montréal / University of Ottawa
Peter MacKay	Foreign Affairs	Conservative	2006/2007	Nova Scotia	Law	BA / LLB	Carleton University / Dalhousie University
Michael Fortier	Public Service	Conservative	2006/2008	Quebec	Banking	LLB	Laval University

Own elaboration based on Kenny William, 'Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; Mutimer David, *Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 2008* (Toronto: UTP, 2015); Lumley Elizabeth, *Canadian Who's Who 2008, Volume 43* (Toronto: UTP, 2008). Note: These policy actors were members of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security, Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs, Cabinet Committee on Environment and Energy Security.

G2. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 2008-2011

Table G-2. Policy elite during the second mandate of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2008-2011

Name	Office	Party	Term	Born		Background	Degree	University
Stephen Harper	Prime Minister	Conservative	2006-2015	Alberta	1959	Business	MA	University of Calgary
Guy Giorno	PMO	Conservative	2008-2011	Ontario	1965	Law	LLB	University of Toronto
Wayne Wouters	PCO	Independent	2009-2014	Saskatchewan	1951	Government	MA	Queen's University
Kevin Lynch	PCO	Independent	2006-2009	Nova Scotia	1951	Economics	PhD	McMaster University
Peter MacKay	Defence	Conservative	2007-2013	Nova Scotia	1965	Law	BA / LLB	Carleton University / Dalhousie University
Stockwell Day	Treasure	Conservative	2010-2011	Alberta	1950	Religion	None	None
Victor Toews	Treasure	Conservative	2007-2010	Manitoba	1952	Law	BA / LLB	University of Winnipeg / University of Manitoba
Jim Flaherty	Finance	Conservative	2006-2014	Quebec	1949	Law	BA / LLB	Princeton University / York University
Lawrence Cannon	Foreign Affairs	Conservative	2008-2011	Quebec	1947	Business	MBA	Laval University
David Emerson	Foreign Affairs	Conservative	2008-2008	British Columbia	1945	Economics	PhD	Queen's University
Maxime Bernier	Foreign Affairs	Conservative	2007-2008	Quebec	1963	Economics	BA / LLB	Université du Québec à Montréal / University of Ottawa
Rona Ambrose	Public Service	Conservative	2010-2013	Alberta	1969	Activism	MA	University of Alberta
Christian Paradis	Public Service	Conservative	2008-2010	Quebec	1974	Law	LLM	Laval University

Own elaboration based on Kenny William, 'Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466-86; Benner Bryan, *Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 2011* (Toronto: ARPC, 2014); Browne, Lynn and Peroni Gwen, *Canadian Who's Who 2011, Volume 46* (Toronto: UTP, 2013). Note: These policy actors were members of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Growth and Long-Term Prosperity, Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, Cabinet Committee on Environment and Energy Security, and Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan.

G3. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 2011-2015

Table G-3. Policy elite during the third mandate of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2011--2015

Name	Office	Party	Term		Born	Background	Degree	University
Stephen Harper	Prime Minister	Conservative	2006	2015	Alberta	Business	MA	University of Calgary
Raymond Novak	PMO	Conservative	2013	2015	Ontario	Assistant	MA	University of Calgary
Nigel Wright	PMO	Conservative	2011	2014	Ontario	Business	LLM	Harvard University
Janice Charette	PCO	Conservative	2014	2016	Ontario	Government	BA	Carleton University
Wayne Wouters	PCO	Independent	2009	2014	Saskatchewan	Government	MA	Queen's University
Jason Kenney	Defence	Conservative	2015	2015	Alberta	Politics	BA	University of San Francisco
Robert Nicholson	Defence	Conservative	2013	2015	Ontario	Law	BA / LLB	Queen's University / University of Windsor
Peter MacKay	Defence	Conservative	2007	2013	Nova Scotia	Law	BA / LLB	Carleton University / Dalhousie University
Tony Clement	Treasure	Conservative	2011	2015	United Kingdom	Politics	BA / LLB	University of Toronto
Joe Oliver	Finance	Conservative	2014	2015	Ontario	Business	MBA	Harvard University
Jim Flaherty	Finance	Conservative	2006	2014	Quebec	Law	BA / LLB	Princeton University / York University
Robert Nicholson	Foreign Affairs	Conservative	2015	2015	Ontario	Law	BA / LLB	Queen's University / University of Windsor
John Baird	Foreign Affairs	Conservative	2011	2015	Ontario	Business	BA	Queen's University
Diane Finley	Public Service	Conservative	2013	2015	Ontario	Management	MBA	University of Western Ontario
Rona Ambrose	Public Service	Conservative	2010	2013	Alberta	Activism	MA	University of Alberta


Own elaboration based on Kenny William, 'Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; Benner Bryan, *Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 2015* (Toronto: ARPC, 2018); Lumley Elizabeth, *Canadian Who's Who 2015, Volume 48* (Toronto: UTP, 2015). Note: These policy actors were members of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Prosperity and Sustainable Growth, Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, and Cabinet Committee on National Security.

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Appendix H. Canadian policy-making structure, 2006-2015

H1. Cabinet system, 2006-2008


Chart H-1. Cabinet system during the first mandate of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2006-2008



Own elaboration based on Kenny William, 'Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; David Johnson, 'Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems', in *Thinking Government: Public Administration and Politics in Canada*, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: Broadview, 2016) pp.146–9.

H2. Cabinet system, 2008-2011


Chart H-2. Cabinet system during the second mandate of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2008-2011



Own elaboration based on Kenny William, 'Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; David Johnson, 'Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems', in *Thinking Government: Public Administration and Politics in Canada*, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: Broadview, 2016) pp.146–9.

H3. Cabinet system, 2011-2015

Chart H-3. Cabinet system during the third mandate of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2011-2015



Own elaboration based on Kenny William, 'Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership in Canada, 2003-2019', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 57.4 (2019), 466-86; David Johnson, 'Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems', in *Thinking Government: Public Administration and Politics in Canada*, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: Broadview, 2016) pp.146-9.

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