Understanding how the Czech Republic and Hungary behave in the European Union: policy engagement and the politics of migration before and after 2015

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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September 28, 2021

Abstract

EU enlargement rounds in 2004, 2007 and 2013 increased the number of national interests represented during the EU policy formation process. The literature on how 'newer' Member States, particularly the post-2004 countries are engaging at the EU level is still developing, with research tending to focus on the decision-making stage of the policy-making process. Consequently, gaps remain in understanding how national representatives from post-2004 Member States engage in the initial stages of the policy formation process including agenda setting and policy formation. These initial stages are largely informal, making examination more complex than later stages such as decision making or policy implementation.

The policy area of migration has been selected due to the complex combination of national and supranational migration interests, in which the themes of international human rights protection norms, security concerns, sovereignty and EU solidarity merge. Due to this overlap of themes, migration policy provides the possibility of empirical depth. Particularly since 2015, the development of EU migration policy has made limited progress due to a lack of consensus between Member States, in part due to the opposition from some post-2004 Member States such as the selected cases of the Czech Republic and Hungary. Based on the qualitative data from interviews, media reports, primary sources, and secondary sources this thesis examines how and the extent to which post-2004 Member States are engaging in the EU policy-making process.

This thesis highlights the differences between the Czech Republic and Hungary in terms of the forms and actions used during EU migration policy engagement. It addresses the limited understanding of post-2004 Member States. The unique implications for the EU policy-making process, the development of EU migration policy and the limitations within the Visegrád Group are highlighted. This thesis offers an analytical framework tailored to better understand newer Member States attempts to engage in EU level policy-making.

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I dedicate my thesis to my Grandma Lilli. Your complex migration journey, courage and faith have always been an inspiration to me. Thank you for all your sacrifices.

Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Printed name: Jolan Nisbet

Signature:

Abbreviations

CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CE	Central Europe
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
DG	Directorate-General
DG HOME	Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
DG INTPA	Directorate-General for International Partnerships
EU	European Union
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EUAA	European Union Asylum Agency
EURODAC	European dactylographic system
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
LIBE	European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
MEP(s)	Member(s) of the European Parliament
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Czech Political Parties

ANO	Akce nespokojených občanů (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens)
ČSSD	Česká strana sociálně demokratická (Czech Social Democratic Party)
KDU-ČSL	Křesťanská a demokratická unie-Československá strana lidová Christian (Christian Democrats)
KSČM	Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)
ODS	Občanská Demokratická Strana (Civic Democratic Party)
Piráti	Piráti (Czech Pirates Party)
SPD[1]	Svoboda a přímá demokracie (Freedom and Direct Democracy)
SPO	Strana Práv Občanů (Party of Civic Rights)
STAN	Starostové a nezávislí (Mayors and Independents)
SZ	Strana zelených (Green Party)
TOP 09	Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita (Tradtional Responsibility Prosperity)

Hungarian Political Parties

DK	Demokratikus Koalíció (Democratic Coalition)
Együtt	Együtt (Together)
FIDESZ	Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Hungarian Civic Alliance)
Jobbik	Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary)
KDNP	Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (Christian Democratic People's Party)
LMP	Magyarország Zöld Pártja (Hungary's Green Party)
Momentum	Momentum Mozgalom (Movement Momentum)
MLP	Magyar Liberális Párt (Hungarian Liberal Party)
MSZP	Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party)
Összefogás	Összefogás (Unity)
PM	Párbeszéd Magyarországért (Dialogue for Hungary)

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[1] The party's name changed frequently, formerly Úsvit, then Svobodní and now SPD.

Chapter One
Introduction

1.1 Research aims

Asylum seekers who arrived at the European Union (EU) borders in 2015 recounted a range of emotions and experiences: *fear*, "we ran"; financial *hardships* "the help was always more expensive than we anticipated"; *insecurity* "the boats were inflatable, crowded and unsafe," and *uncertainty* "we heard we would not be allowed in."[2]

This situation is widely referred to as the "migrant crisis", yet a more accurate description of the crisis is a "failure" of EU policy (UNHCR, 2015b) largely due to the lack of solidarity between EU Member States (Trauner, 2016) and their limited policy response (BBC, 2015b; Ceccorulli, 2019). Instead of policy cooperation and coordination at the EU level, several Member States reinstated internal Schengen borders (BBC, 2015c) with some Member States emphasising the necessity of national policy solutions rather than collaboration at the EU level (Juhász, 2017). The European Commission tabled a legislative proposal entitled the *European Agenda on Migration[3]* in May of 2015, which outlined both an immediate policy response and four pillars to allow the better management of migration within the EU. One element of this policy proposal was the "mandatory and automatically triggered relocation system to distribute those in clear need of international protection within the EU when a mass influx emerges" (European Commission, 2015b:4). The relocation in an event of a crisis was based on the principle of solidarity, through which asylum seekers who are deemed in clear need of international protection could be moved from one Member State to another where the individual's asylum claim would be processed[4].

The mandatory and automatic criteria of this proposed policy faced a degree of harsh criticism, particularly from the Visegrád Group, which is a "subregional organisation" in central Europe which operates through intergovernmental cooperation without supranational

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[2] The quotations are based on an interview with a representative from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (Budapest. June 5, 2015).

[3] The Agenda on Migration consists of pillars including, the reduction of incentives related to irregular migration, border management, the coherent implementation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and new policy approaches for legal migration.

[4] It is important to note that with *relocation* asylum seekers are simply not sent from one Member State to another, rather the receiving Member State processes the asylum claim. Before a relocation occurs, a Member State has the possibility to block the transfer if there are any national security concerns based on Directive 2011/95/EU (the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless individuals).

structures (Dangerfield, 2014: 74). The Visegrád leaders of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary spoke with "one voice" stating that "the EU should abandon any idea of a compulsory mechanism for refugee relocation" (Zachová et al., 2018). This stance of a unified policy voice (Weintzek, 2017; Cabada and Waisová, 2018; Górka, 2018[5]) has been promulgated by some national leaders within the Visegrád Group (MTI, 2021). The unified policy position of "one voice" was puzzling for several reasons. Firstly, up to 2015, EU migration policy was an area of marginal interest for these post-2004 countries (Zaun, 2020). Secondly, since accession, post-2004 Member States rarely engaged as a bloc in EU policy-making (Arregui and Thomson, 2009: 673; Schweiger and Visvizi, 2018). Thirdly, the Visegrád Group is based on flexible cooperation and lacks any formal institutions (Dangerfield, 2014) making it unclear how the group could coordinate a unified policy stance at the EU level.

Consequently, the 2015 crisis raised a number of questions about how Member States, particularly post-2004 states, are engaging in EU policy formation process. To further our understanding, this thesis poses the following research question: To what extent do post-2004 Member States engage in the EU policy-making process, and why do they do so?

This question is significant because there remains a limited understanding on how post-2004 Member States are representing national interests across all EU policy areas, particularly migration policy is salient due to the humanitarian element of international protection. There remains a limited understanding of why national representatives from post-2004 Member States engage with certain forms and actions at the EU level. Additionally, Member States are compelled to consider migration vis-à-vis existing policy, such as the Schengen Agreement.

To address this question, I focus on national representatives' attempts to influence EU policy-making. This thesis defines national representatives as officials, either elected or appointed of the national government. I acknowledge that the national representatives of the government or governing coalition are not the only actors involved in the policy process; however, I assert

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[5] For instance, Górka (2018: 125) argued, "currently, the V4 group is an active regional alliance that allows its four member countries to speak with a single voice both within the group and in their dealings with other states and entities."

that the national representatives remain influential actors within the policy process (Buonanno and Zahariadis, 2017).

This research takes a qualitative approach that aims to understand how national representatives from two post-2004 Member States, the Czech Republic and Hungary are attempting to represent national interests during the EU policy- making process and considers why national representatives are using precise forms and actions during EU policy engagement. This research includes interviews, case studies, primary and secondary literature.

1.2 Arguments

This thesis aims to make three contributions to the literature. Firstly, I aim to contribute to the literature on the EU policy-making process, with a particular focus on the initial stages of agenda-setting and policy formation and the notion of policy engagement. Secondly, I further the literature on post-2004 Member State engagement at the EU level and the "stigma of newness" due to the "late entry" of these countries (Krasnodębska, 2018).[6] Thirdly, given the recent vocal opposition to EU migration policy which came from the Visegrád Group, I seek to provide a greater understanding how this group is behaving during EU policy engagement and why national representatives are engaging in this manner.

1.2.1 Policy engagement in the EU

The term policy engagement is an integral component of this thesis. Policy engagement can be defined as the broad interactions and discussions of national representatives, who aim to develop specific legislative proposals (Young et al., 2014). The process of policy engagement refers to the means used by national representatives to attempt to cause influence, which I define as forms of engagement and actions of engagement. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two, my focus is upon the initial stages of the policy-making process, agenda-setting and policy formation, which are comprised of both formal and informal elements. It tends to be the informal interactions that are the most significant but left off the public record (Edwards-Baldwin, 1997; Aus, 2008). This means that our understanding of how national representatives engage during the first and informal stages of the EU policy-making process

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[6] The term 'stigma of newness' was developed in relation to Poland's engagement in EU security policy and security crises by Krasnodębska (2018).

can be limited. Consequently, a deeper analysis of engagement which cross-references with the more commonly documented formal processes such as speeches and official statements is a way to further our understanding of how a Member State can attempt to influence the EU policy process in order to align with its national goals.

1.2.2 Post-2004 Member States' EU policy engagement

Post-2004 Member States have sought to pursue effective policy engagement at the EU level (Kažoka, 2014a) and can be influential if the representatives are motivated and have developed the required skillset (Bailer, 2010; Gulbrandsen, 2010; Panke, 2010; Golub, 2012; Micallef-Grimaud, 2018). The grouping of all Member States from 2004 onwards as newer is widely accepted in the literature (Andonova and Tutu, 2014; Balcerzak, 2015). However, it is worth noting that Kažoka (2014a:8) does question if the classification of post-2004 is a relevant grouping for investigation and considers the alternative groupings of small/large, rich/poor and northern/southern, before she claims that there are important differences between the Member States pre and post 2004. In this thesis, the terminology of post-2004 is used to examine the 'stigma of newness' (Krasnodębska, 2018) during EU policy engagement. For example, some previous academic research has concluded that post-2004 Member States continue to be classified as "junior partners" despite the assumed parity due to struggles with the complexities of negotiations (Copeland, 2013:467). This suggests that the representation of interests at the EU level is a learning process and that national representatives may develop skill sets at different rates.

It is worth considering the potential challenges faced by post-2004 Member States such as a possibility of an insufficient understanding of procedural nuances, difficulty in obtaining the correct contacts and national issues impacting EU afairs coordination (Kažoka, 2014a:13). Perception may also be a challenge for post-2004 national representatives. For instance, if a representative from a post-2004 Member State perceives their Member State to be new, then policy engagement attempts may be minimised by this perception (Miklin, 2009). Mišík (2015: 199) takes this argument further, as he argues that representatives are influenced by their own "subjective perceptions" of their state's attributes; therefore, if representatives feel that their country is still new, it will affect their confidence during engagement.

Aside from national representatives' self-perception of their ability to engage, research has also indicated important differences between Member States which have joined since 2004. For example, Balcerzak (2015: 203) claims that there remain differences in policy strategy and diversity between post-2004 and pre-2004 Member States. With regards to engagement, post-2004 Member States have been classified as more reactive than proactive during policy formation (Malová and Lisoňová, 2010: 167). After the 2004 accession Copsey and Haughton (2009: 284) anticipated that "the impact of new Member States' policy preferences on the EU will rise considerably over the next decade; however, we still know too little about the nature of these preferences and how they are formed." Consequently, an understanding of the nature of post-2004 Member State's policy preferences and formation are important elements to appreciate the EU's wider policy formation process. Even though a significant amount of time has elapsed since Copsey and Haughton's article, I contend there remains a gap in our understanding of the nature of post-2004 Member States' preferences and how these preferences are formed across some policy areas.

Based on previous rounds of EU accession, there are certain expectations of how post-2004 Member States would engage. The first expectation, which is comparable to previous EU accession rounds in 1986 and 1995[7], is that states joining the EU at the same time have similar 'heritages', meaning similar histories and political-economic contexts (Krasnodębska, 2018). Based on sharing similar heritages these states are anticipated to engage similarly during policy formation. Secondly, due to marginal policy engagement during the accession process, post-2004 Member States are largely anticipated to continue in the same manner and to remain passive policy takers during the early membership (Grabbe, 2001, Hertier, 2005). During the initial engagement with the European Commission, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries had little to offer in terms of political structures or advancing policy development. Héritier (2005:207) further articulates the differences from previous accession rounds, stating that "Europeanisation West was a two-way street when it comes to shaping EU policy measures, whereas Europeanisation East, at this stage seems to be more of a one-way street." Héritier (2005:204) is referring to the previous accessions such as in 1995, in which the

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[7] In 1986, Portugal and Spain became Member States, later in 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden acceded to the EU.

"Scandinavian Member States significantly spurred debate about democratic transparency and access to information in the EU decision-making process" which illustrates the nature of some past membership negotiations. This indicates a difference in power dynamics between 1995 and 2004 accessional countries. Thirdly, many post-2004 Member States, with the exception of Poland[8], were argued to have limited bargaining leverage (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003). This limited leverage impacted negotiations because CEE national representatives had a clear mandate to pursue EU accession while having limited resources to offer. Grabbe (2003: 318) expresses this clearly:

> The CEE countries, by contrast, have little to offer the European Union, given their tiny economic size, and little to bargain with, because the desire of their political elites to join is generally much greater than that of the member states to let them in. This asymmetry of interdependence allows the European Union to set the rules of the game in the accession conditionality.

The asymmetrical relationship between the CEE countries and the EU is attributed namely to the transitional process of adopting the acquis and the change from a state economy to a democratic liberal market economy (Agh, 1999) in which CEE national representatives were seeking to rapidly develop and implement new legislative structures. For post-communist states in Central Europe, the possibility to be included in western entities largely became a "synonym for modernisation, democratisation and market reform" (Hanley, 2004a:692). The transition in CEE was unique in the sense that new systems were required to replace previous outdated models from the communist regimes. Grabbe (2001:1014) refers to these CEE countries as being 'more receptive' than previous accessional countries due to the intense process of forming or replacing institutional structures which resulted in the openness of national representatives to explore EU models.

Notably, the limited leverage of CEE countries led the European Commission to be portrayed by some scholars as "hegemonic" (Rudolph, 2005) during the transition. These unequal power dynamics resulted in early interactions between the European Commission and CEE countries occurring in a top-down manner, in which the power structure greatly favoured the European Commission. Kuus (2004: 478) stresses the unease in the initial relationship between CEE countries and the EU.

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[8] Arguably, geo-politically and economically, Poland is the most significant of the post-communist 2004 Member States.

> [The EU is] conceived as a disciplining power, operative in the minds of East Europeans….East Europeans are framed as victims of the 'father-state' – naïve, immature, in need of overcoming the 'mental straightjacket' of communist society, and the relationship between the West and East-Central Europe is construed in terms of the viewing (Western) subject and the monitored (Eastern-Central) object.

However, Kuus does not address the positive influence of the EU to advance the transition of democracy and economy (Vachudova, 2001; 2003; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005) and the expansion of democracy and human rights in the region (Rollo et al., 1990). Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003: 49) state, "the applicants are forced into concessions precisely because the basic benefit offered to them—membership—is of such great value. This benefit so outweighs the costs—particularly those of exclusion—that applicants make concessions even when no coercion is threatened."

More specifically, the Copenhagen Criteria[9] guided the transition process by requiring the incorporation of the *acquis communautaire* of EU treaties, laws, directives and decisions to the national systems. The onus was placed on the candidate countries to ensure the legislation was transposed and implemented. The relationship between the European Commission and the candidate countries was largely hierarchical, with the candidate countries required to make major changes with limited national input. Ladrech (2010:69) highlights the pressure that these countries experienced during the legal transposition and implementation, while "being scrutinized by the [European] Commission to an unprecedented degree." Grabbe (2001:1016-7) continues "due to the sheer volume of the *acquis*, much of the adaptation became largely administrative in nature without space for political or legal debate." The long-term impact of CEE countries accepting such large amounts of legislation with limited political and sociological debate has been considered in the academic literature, specifically, the degree to which the legislative elements are being effectively enacted and enforced (Grabbe 2006).

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[9] The Copenhagen criteria (European Council Doc 93/3, June 1993) which sets out new standards for enlargement and is based on the respect and promotion of democratic values. The Copenhagen Criteria is a roadmap for the European Community's position on potential candidate countries. The main aims are to ensure the conditions for membership include: 1) complying with all the EU's standards and rules, having the consent of the EU institutions and EU member states, and having the consent of their citizens 2) stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities 3) a functioning market economy 4) the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership.

Grabbe (2001) argues that due to the way the *acquis* was incorporated into national legislation the actual transposition and adherence widely varies. The initial relationship between the European Commission and the CEE Member States may have limited the development of skills and reputation of post-2004 national representatives to engage at the EU level. I am interested in the extent to which this past limitation may continue to influence current policy engagement.

There remains a debate within the literature as to the extent to which previous passive policy engagement remains. Krasnodębska (2018:33) argues that "despite active attempts of overcoming this [passive] classification the newer member states have internalized a sense of 'conditional belonging' to Europe attributed to their relative 'latecomer' status in Western institutions." Meka (2016: 1470) agrees stating that the "top-down" nature has hindered participation by post-2004 Member States, which includes policy engagement. Accession to the EU in 2004 meant that areas of policy development were already in a process of active development.[10] Entering the policy process as a post-2004 Member State has been compared to joining a play during the third act because it can be difficult to catch up on the processes, developments, and positions (Kažoka, 2014a:10). On the other hand, the concept of 'passive policy taker' of post-2004 Member States has been challenged (Schweiger, 2015) particularly in following policy areas: foreign policy (Bilčík, 2007; Weiss, 2017), eastern policy (Copsey and Pomorska, 2010) and energy policy (Butler, 2011, 2013; Mišík, 2010, 2015). This indicates that the extent of post-2004 Member States' policy engagement may be changing and that these national representatives are attempting to find new ways to engage and represent their national interests within the wider EU level policy-making.

One key aspect of the literature that highlights the advancement of post-2004 Member State engagement is serving as the rotational EU Council Presidency. Weiss (2017:6) and Panke (2010: 813) argue that the subtleties of policy negotiations can only be fully understood by chairing the Presidency. The experience of running a Presidency is argued to allow further development of appropriate links between national and EU interests (Kažoka 2014b:19; Romsics 2010:12). The Presidency is "the main catalyst of the learning process" and provides

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[10] For example, the development of the CEAS began in 1999.

the opportunity to set the agenda, which is to "define, prioritize and frame the issues to be discussed and legislated upon" (Láštic 2010: 151, also see Princen, 2007). Running an EU Presidency opens the possibility of new contacts and skills; however, representatives in post-2004 Member States are all anticipated to respond differently. Each six-month Presidency has different outcomes in terms of policy advancement and some Member States are more effective than others in furthering these aims (Svetličič and Cerjak, 2015).

Wider challenges may remain for post-2004 Member States in dispelling the passive policy label. Post-2004 representatives may have felt a limited ability to engage. This limited leverage may have created a sense of being voiceless and contributes to fostering a "deepening dissatisfaction with the democratic process in the CEE region" (Schwieger, 2018: 17). Agh (1997, 1999, 2011, 2014) has actively researched the post-communist transition process and highlights dissatisfaction in the CEE region, which he calls an "illiberal turn" (Agh, 2014) meaning that populist discourse is used by some national representatives to create a narrative that EU is not as beneficial as post-2004 Member States once envisioned. For instance, populist domestic discourses may frame the EU as a scapegoat for a plethora of issues in society such as economic issues. Schwieger (2018: 17) furthers this argument, stressing the risks of disillusionment from the return to Europe may trigger democratic backsliding. This means that if post-2004 Member States are not able to fully represent national interest in the wider EU policy-making process further issues may develop.

1.2.3 The challenges of the Visegrád Group's EU policy engagement
Analysis of policy engagement in an enlarged EU would be incomplete without considering the dynamics of post-2004 cooperation at the EU level. One example of such cooperation is the Visegrád Group[11] which was formed in 1991, with the belief that cooperation would strengthen the membership bids for the EU and NATO membership and provide the possibility to coordinate policies (Cottey, 1999: 70). The Visegrád Group was also seen to promote a "return to Europe" within the Central European region (Arato and Koller, 2018:90). However, the group dynamics did not always function overly well, particularly the

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[11] Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish Prime Ministers met in the town of Visegrád, Hungary in an attempt to replicate a meeting which occurred there in 1335 between the Kings of Bohemia, Hungary and Poland.

relationship between Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Hungary due to historical tensions over the controversial Beneš decrees[12] (Dangerfield, 2012: 961). After accession, the purpose of the group was revaluated, and the organisation of meetings became more intentional and coordinated (Rošteková and Rouet, 2014) particularly in the area of EU affairs (Dangerfield, 2014: 73). At the end of the accession process, the Visegrád Group (2004) stated that it will, "continue to focus on regional activities and initiatives aimed at strengthening the identity of the Central European region." EU membership did not result in any additional commitments or institutional structures to the Visegrád Group.

The Visegrád Group is a good example of variable geometry which is a flexible, issue-based coalition. Variable geometry may be important for post-2004 Member States as this informal cooperation allows the Member States the ability to unite and push their common interests more effectively without requiring complex commitments between members (Copsey and Pomorska, 2014: 440; Schweiger, 2014). There is also a regional element that Buerova (2018: 163) presents as a "unifying entity in which Member States make use of shared interests stemming from their geographic location and cultural proximity to more easily promote their interests on an EU level." My research focuses on only two members of the Visegrád Group, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and in doing so it offers insight into the group's dynamics.

For instance, the migration crisis of 2015[13] created many rifts between EU Member States. One of the most significant divisions within the EU was the stance taken by the Visegrád Group, which has been referred to as 'rebellious' and engaged in a 'battle' with Brussels (Thorpe, 2015; Karnitschnig, 2018). This suggests that these national leaders may be attempting to show strength in unity through a coalition. This indicates a possible lack of confidence from post-2004 Member States to represent views individually at the EU level and a coalition offers the opportunity to present views as a group which may increase the sense of strength. Bauerová (2018: 189) concurs stating that Visegrád Group "helped states to defend their national interests at the EU level during the migration crisis in 2015." However, the

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[12] The decrees were made from 1940 to 1946 by the Czechoslovak President, Beneš while in exile during WWII. The aim was to "restore the Czechoslovak State", but due to elevated national security concerns it stripped Czechoslovak citizenship from approximately 3 million ethnic Germans and Hungarians, and confiscated land from these individuals (Naegele, 2002).

[13] Chapter Four is devoted to an in-depth discussion of migration and migration policy.

extent of cooperation can be questioned; for example, Dostál (2018) asserts that there have been attempts at a gradual "Hungarianization" which may have limited group cooperation. The Visegrád Group may not be as unified as some members of the group attempt to assert. Thus, in order to understand more about post-2004 Member State engagement, I suggest that it is necessary to consider regional cooperation, such as the Visegrád Group's dynamics. Particularly, this thesis is an opportunity to observe two members of the Visegrád Group's attempts to engage as EU "agenda setters" which according to Schweiger and Visvizi (2018:4) has been "largely neglected in the literature."

1.3 Structure of this thesis

This thesis aims to contribute to the literature on post-2004 Member State engagement within the EU policy-making process. It is anticipated that this research will provide a better understanding of the methods of engagement during the initial stages of the policy-making process, specifically in relation to EU migration policy development and the extent of policy cooperation between post-2004 Member States.

Following this Introduction, Chapter Two focuses on the EU-policy making process. It firstly unpacks the notion of policy engagement and then moves to consider EU specific policy-making dynamics between national and EU levels. The importance of consensus during the early stages of the policy-making process are highlighted. Next, I consider the extent to which the factors of capacity, self-perception and domestic dynamics can impact policy engagement. I set out to understand more about how post-2004 Member States are engaging in policy-making at the EU level, and to do so I discuss the forms of engagement including: pace-setting, foot-dragging and fence-sitting. The chapter concludes by considering the actions of engagement which may be used including: expert opinion, persuasion, hard bargaining, coalition building, moral appeals, speeches, and written appeals.

Methodological considerations are the focus of Chapter Three. The chapter starts with the ontological and epistemological considerations which underpin my research. Then, I discuss the research design, the six steps of the research process, case study justification and the case study selection process through which the Czech Republic and Hungary were selected.

In Chapter Four, I discuss the complexities of the intersection of migration policy between national and supranational levels, as well as the key discussions related to migration, including human rights, security, and national sovereignty. In this chapter, I provide an analytical evolution of the policy area from the early 1990s to 2020. Attention is placed on the period from 2015-2020, [14] which challenged the normal EU policy-making process. Finally, key elements are considered including the concept of 'genuine' asylum seekers, the unease of migration and securitisation.

Chapter Five covers the early EU policy engagement by the Czech Republic and Hungary from the mid-1990s to 2014. This chapter provides empirical evidence of how Czech and Hungarian Governments, specifically the Prime Ministers framed EU membership. It shows how these initial engagement experiences contributed to the formation of the reputation of these post-2004 Member States at the EU level. This chapter also considers early migration policy engagement after EU membership, showing that there were important initial distinctions between these countries.

In Chapter Six, the national dynamics within EU migration policy formation are considered. The dynamics include the degree to which political power has been consolidated at the national level. Based on the extent of national power I go on to consider how Czech and Hungarian representatives have framed Schengen border protection and migration as a 'threat' to society. This chapter highlights national variations between the Czech Republic and Hungary.

Chapter Seven delves into the EU dimension of Czech and Hungarian migration engagement. This chapter argues that there are differences in the self-perceptions of Czech and Hungarian representatives. These self-perceptions may influence how EU policy engagement occurs. Moreover, the self-perceptions of these representatives are considered in the wider EU context, specifically, the reputation of Czech and Hungarian representatives in the EU policy-making process. Self-perceptions and reputation are used to consider the possible impact on

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[14] The starting point is the 2015 migration crisis and the European Agenda on Migration (May 2015) to the New Pact on Migration and Asylum (September 2020).

the forms and actions which are selected by Czech and Hungarian representatives in migration policy engagement at the EU level.

Chapter Eight explains the variation between Czech and Hungarian migration engagement. I analyse the differing Czech and Hungarian policy engagement from three time periods: pre-accession, early membership and 2015 to understand more about the forms and actions of engagement during these different stages. Then I examine the national factors of border security, subjective perspectives, populism, and ethnicity to provide a link between these national factors and the extent of EU policy engagement.

Chapters Nine summarises the key contributions and implications of the thesis. It also highlights the possibilities of future research.

Chapter Two
Analytical framework: policy-making and Member State engagement in the EU

2.1 Introduction

Societal issues can be addressed through policy-making. Public policy-making can be defined as "a long series of actions carried out to solve societal problems" (Newton and van Deth, 2005: 263; also see Knill and Tosun, 2009). As stated in Chapter One, policy engagement can be defined as the broad interactions and discussions of national representatives, with the aim to develop into specific legislative proposals (Young et al., 2014). Engagement is a term frequently used in this dissertation; consequently, I would like to elaborate on how I use this term. Engagement in this thesis combines work by Kažoka (2013), she uses engagement to signify Member States participation in the legislative process, Ladrech (2010), who focuses on the interactions between Member States and the European Commission and Simmons (2015), who suggests that engagement goes beyond discussion, and is an action which can increase the level of relationship[15] between the European Commission and a Member State. I have drawn and adapted this work to define engagement as the interactions, specifically the actions and forms, used by national representatives from a Member State's government to represent interest at both the domestic and EU levels. The engagement between these levels is a key consideration in my research. However, I would like to emphasize that the term engagement is wide, thus, it is useful to unpack how this term is used in the wider literature. Policy engagement is often applied to the systematic level, meaning governments or political systems, but it can also be used at the individual or organisational level, such as the work by Peters (2015). Policy engagement can refer to how various interest groups attempt to influence policy by "involvement, access and prominence" (Halpin and Fraussen, 2017: 724). The term engagement may also refer to civic participation (Kelders et al., 2020) particularly the extent of participation and the overall subjective experience (Perski et al., 2017). However, my use of the term engagement aligns more closely with the work of Ladrech (2010), Kažoka (2013; 2014b) and Simmons (2015).

The concept of engagement, as applied in this thesis, is examined through three sections including: the policy-making process, factors of engagement and expectations of how post-2004 Member States are engaging in the policy-making process.

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[15] Simmons (2015) focused on potential new Member States, I have adapted his definition.

Section 2.2 considers the policy-making process which has five distinct phases. This thesis focuses on the early stages of the policy-making process: agenda-setting and policy-formation. The decision to concentrate on these initial stages in the policy process is due to previous research focusing on the decision-making stage (Weiss, 2017; Micallef-Grimaud, 2018). Section 2.2 depicts the policy-making process as an interplay between the EU supranational institutions and Member States, meaning policy can be proposed and shaped from either the supranational or national levels (Ladrech, 2010). The dynamics between these two levels is anticipated to have an impact upon the policy engagement process.

Section 2.3 focuses on the factors of engagement including capacity, domestic dynamics and national representatives' perceptions. These factors are expected to overlap and differ according to the case examined.

In Section 2.4, I consider the possible forms of engagement that national representatives may use at the EU level adapted from Liefferink and Skou-Andersen (1998) and Börzel (2002) including the various forms of pace-setting, foot-dragging and fence-sitting.

Based on the forms of engagement, Section 2.5 considers the actions which may be utilised by national representatives to achieve policy objectives such as expert opinion, persuasion, hard bargaining, coalition building, moral appeals, speeches and written appeals.

2.2. Reconsidering the EU policy-making process

As issues arise or transform, there may be a need for policy development. When attention increases for an issue, it is more likely that the issue will be considered for inclusion in the policy-making process (Kingdon, 1984). Princen (2013) illustrates the complexity of modern policy- making which can be either quick and direct or gradual and indirect depending on the issue. For instance, he argues the 9/11 attacks were quick and direct due to the risk of further terrorism and swiftly added to the global agenda. Conversely, the impact of the disaster at Chernobyl was gradual and indirect. Chernobyl's influence on the environment, was an issue gradually and continually added to policy debates over decades. This was due to the impact of Chernobyl unexpectedly turning up in unanticipated ways.

Given the vast array of issues, there may be attempts to politicise or securitise various policy issues within the policy-making process to elevate the status of an issue. The terms politicise and securitise are routinely used but definitions may vary. This thesis draws on the work by Karyotis (2007: 276) who unpicks the nuance between the terms of politicisation and securitisation, he states that:

> securitisation clearly signifies heightened anxiety and attention to a perceived existential threat, politicisation is too broad a term to describe the importance of an issue in public policy and debate. The term 'latent politicisation' is thus introduced to indicate the process when an issue has become part of public debate and policy, which nevertheless is not yet developed and remains peripheral to political discourse and deliberation. Latent politicisation is distinguished here from politicisation, which indicates not only that an issue is put at the heart of politics but also that an actor manipulates it for political ends.

In this research the focus is on how elected or appointed national representatives may attempt to politicise, securitise or de-securitise various issues. In certain cases, both national representatives the wider public represented by civil society[16] may begin to consider and create a dialogue around a specific issue. This process is depicted by Kingdon (1984) as gaining attention.

There are several different policy models which can help better understand the policy-making process. Each model provides a unique perspective including the: rational model, the incremental model and the garbage can model. I expand upon these three most relevant models in greater detail.[17]

Rational policy-making models assume that policy is made according to a linear process in which logical choices are made (Bulmer, 1986; Huberman, 1994). Within the rational model, options are selected, followed by intensive research and a process of evaluation before conducting an in-depth comparison to select the best option. The ability to research each option is of pivotal importance in this model. The rational model assumes an "optimal" solution can be found (Bonchek and Shepsle, 1997: 25). However, a completely rational

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[16] I use the terms civil society and NGOs interchangeably.
[17] Due to a lack of applicability to the question, the Institutional Model (March and Olsen, 1987), Group Model (Dye, 2005) and Elite Model (Mills, 1965) have been omitted, although these models may be of interest when considering other questions.

approach may not be possible. This model has been criticised due to being simplistic and not fitting the everyday realities of policy-making (Simon, 1957). According to Simon, policymaking is more pragmatic. He argues that policymakers cannot fully deal with such complex matters rationally due to inherent gaps in knowledge. The lack of information prohibits the ability of policymakers to be fully rational. Simon sees policymaking as a practical process in which slight alterations can be made to issues or new issues can be advanced in a very gradual manner. Despite these criticisms, the rational element of this model does have advantages, mainly the comparison of various policy options.

Simon's basic idea of the rational model was adopted by Lindblom who developed the incremental policy model and criticised a fully rational model due to its impracticalities and difficulties in achieving a fully rational perspective (Nutley, 2007:94). Lindblom suggested that policymakers should focus on incremental changes to existing policy due to the knowledge the policymakers already possess in an area. According to the incremental model, there is a range of policymakers that create a "pluralist process" that can slow down policy development (Lindbolm, 1968: 127). The concept of the pluralist process slowing down policy-making is anticipated to assist during the empirical analysis of EU level policy engagement.

The work on conceptual models of policymaking took a turn with the "garbage can" model which can be described as an attempt to mirror real policy development including a degree of difficulty to predict chaos and being irrational (March and Olsen, 1976). According to this model problems and solutions can be 'dumped' together and mixed which is meant to portray the actual policymaking process in which neat, ordered steps cannot always be followed. Policy development is moving towards responses in real-time as the issue unfolds. Which Nutley (2007: 123) identifies as the new norm, as she states, "traditional linear and rational models have been rejected in favour of more interactive approaches." It appears policy-making is moving in the direction of being adaptable to the issue and having a greater degree of collaboration.

2.2.1 Models and phases of the policy cycle

The policy-making process, or policy cycle according to Lasswell (1956), is comprised of seven steps. The original cycle has been simplified within the policy-making literature to include five steps: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation and policy evaluation (Knill and Tosun, 2020). Within the normal policy-making process, the first step is agenda-setting and each stage progresses as shown in Figure 2a below. The final stage is normally evaluation which can end the process, or if the evaluation has not reached the desired policy outcome, the same policy issue can be placed on the agenda for a second round through the policy cycle.

Figure 2a: Simplified depiction of the policy cycle

Source: Knill and Tosun (2020).

It is worth noting these steps of the policy cycle normally occur in the order specified above; however, at times the stages do not always follow the pattern or flow listed above (Kingdon, 2003: 205-6). This can make the stages more complex to analyse. In practice, these stages are not as clear cut as suggested, at times there is overlap and issues may stall or advance irregularly due to the political nature of the issue. Versluis et al. (2011: 236) argue that is possible to see the policy cycle stages being "reversed, skipped, or evidence of stalling, braking, and standstill, due to resistance or disagreement." The policy process will differ depending on the issue and specific timeframe.

Agenda-setting, or the positioning of issues for discussion within the policy process, is an inherently political process, as issues are either included or excluded, and only the included items receive attention (Kingdon, 2003). Howlett (2007:3) argues that aside from the normal factors of agenda-setting including politics and economics that the cultural context can also contribute to which items are placed on the agenda. This range of factors can impact agenda-setting as well as the policy actors involved. The main agenda-setting actors normally include public officials, bureaucrats, mass media and various interest groups (Gerston, 2004: 52).

At the policy formation stage, items which have been placed on the agenda are defined, discussed, accepted, or rejected (Knill and Tosun, 2020). The definition of the issue or the creation of a linkage to an existing policy area is the main goal of this stage. It is anticipated that during the policy formation process there will be modifications to the original issue, which was added during the agenda-setting stage. Policy formation is very technical and can involve a wide range of specialised actors including experts in the field, legislators and legislative policy advisors (Knill and Tosun, 2020). This stage of the policy process could be defined as 'creative' due to an array of suggestions and solutions which are put forward. Kingdon (1984: 128) summarises the process well:

> Many people have proposals they would like to see considered seriously, alternatives they would like to see become part of the set from which choices are eventually made. They try out their ideas on others in the policy community. Some proposals are rapidly discarded as somehow kooky; others are taken more seriously and survive, perhaps in some altered form. But in the policy primaeval soup, quite a wide range of ideas is possible and is considered to some extent. The range at this stage is considerably more inclusive than the set of alternatives that are actually weighed during a shorter period of final decision-making. Many, many things are possible here.

Kingdon illustrates the process as quite creative and abstract because very different ideas can be put forward, changed or dropped. Arguably, policy formation could be defined as having the widest and most diversified range within the policy process.

Policy adoption occurs when decisions are made at the governmental level "resulting in a decision that favours one or more approaches to addressing a given problem" (Benoit, 2013: 2). Therefore, a decision may not be supported by all members of the Parliament or legislature, making this stage inherently political due to certain interests favouring the policy.

Implementation is the stage in which the policy becomes more tangible because the adopted policy is translated into law. For the new policy to be effective it is necessary that the key objective is clear and adequately translated into practical terms (Gerston, 2004:98). How a policy is implemented is at the discretion of the responsible agency or bureaucracy. The implementation stage has been a focus in much of the previous literature particularly on the extent to which the *acquis communautaire* has been adopted into post-2004 Member State's legislation (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).

After the policy is implemented, the responsible bureaucrats evaluate the degree of effectiveness. Evaluation can be done in four different ways including: formal evaluation, an evaluation of satisfaction, outcomes, or an analysis on the cost-benefit breakdown (Munger, 2000:20). A formal evaluation may include the monitoring of how well the law is functioning. An evaluation of satisfaction is more difficult to understand as it is assumed there the degree of approval will differ depending on the group evaluated. The evaluation based on outcomes and cost-benefit analyses is more objective due to the analysis of data. The evaluation may result in further changes to a policy or placing the policy on the agenda again, which depicts the cyclical nature of the policy process (Lasswell, 1956).

2.2.2 EU policy-making process

EU policy-making is a complex process that continues to evolve. At the heart of the policy-making process is Member States' concern that their preferred, "policy preferences and interests are recognised and not easily overridden and that policies devised at the EU level will advance their national goals" (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013: 86). This drive stems from Member States' desire to protect national interests and avoid costs, both political and financial of adapting their legislation (Héritier, 1995; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Borzel, 2002; Haverland, 2009; Golub 2012). In other words, the Member State aims to shape EU legislation to reflect a nation's existing legislation, to avoid the costs of implementing new legislative practices. To specify, the term national interest within this thesis is defined as the preferences which are most widely supported by the elected national officials. National interests do not represent the interests of all of society, but it reflects the interests selected by the most dominant elected governing national representatives.

EU policy-making follows the same pattern as the general policy-making presented above. Young and Roederer-Rynning (2020) summarise the EU policy cycle's five-stages: agenda-setting, policy formation, policy decision, implementation and feedback. Richardson (2006:6) condenses the EU policy process into four stages: agenda setting, policy formation, policy decision and policy implementation. Richardson omits the final step of feedback. This highlights that the literature agrees on the first four steps of the policy cycle. This thesis will use the five-stage process as defined by Wallace et al., 2020[18] in Table 2a.

Table 2a: Main components of the five stages of EU policy-making

Stages	Main components
Agenda-setting	Issues must gain attention and credibility to be handled by the EU. The Commission sets agendas (but usually engages closely with the decision-makers i.e., Council and European Parliament). Competition for what gets placed on the agenda, and *where* on the agenda.
Preference-formation	Ideas on ways to address the issues on the agenda (solutions/proposals). Importance of national agendas (Commission- DG; EP-Committees of a partisan nature; Council-working group, COREPER).
Decision-taking	Agreement or disagreement by Member State (Council).
Policy-Implementation	Policy adopted into national legislation across Member States.
Policy-Evaluation	Question/evaluate if the policy has been enacted and is functioning in the same manner across all Member States.

Source: Compiled by the author based on the book by Wallace et al., (2020).

These five steps closely mirror the wider policy-making literature. The literature on the EU policy-making process has been drawn from the wider body of literature discussed in the chapter introduction. It is important to highlight the link between the general policy-making literature and EU policy-making literature with the former influencing the latter. The general public policy-making literature and EU policy-making literature follow similar stages, despite the main actors differing.

The EU policy-making process is argued to be moving towards a "crisification" more specifically changes to the "nature of the process by which collective decisions are made"

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[18] As shown above, the five-stage model is more accepted within the public policy making literature (Knill and Tosun, 2020).

(Rhinard, 2019:2). The increase in security-based logic may further impact the EU policy process. For instance, Buonanno (2017) argues that the migration crisis is one example of the extent of supranational influence increasing.

2.2.2.1 EU Agenda Setting[19]

According to Princen (2011:927), the agenda-setting stage is significant for politicians, officials, and interest groups because "getting an issue considered is a precondition for decision-making" because only when an issue is being considered is there a chance that a decision can be made on an issue. The literature widely suggests that the European Commission plays a crucial role in the early stages of the policy-making process (Anderson and Eliassen, 2001; Kaunert, 2009; Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014: 22-23); for instance, the European Commission has the possibility to act as a "norm entrepreneur" (Kaunert, 2009: 149-50). This is due to the role the European Commission plays during the agenda-setting stage in which new ideas are put forth and consulted with Member States. The early agenda-setting phase can have an impact on the tone and focus of subsequent developments (Sheafer, 2007).

Firstly, the European Commission normally dialogues with the Council to ascertain national preferences. Conversely, Member States must also make efforts to vocalise concerns to the European Commission (Majone, 2005: 231). At this stage, it should be stressed that the issue not only needs to be added to the agenda, but it must also be received by the appropriate decision-makers (Princen, 2013: 30). This means that if a Member State is pushing forward an issue, it is not enough to simply have it added to the agenda; rather, the Member State must continue to represent and actively push forward their cause to ensure their fellow Member States understand the importance of the issue. Member States' approaches to agenda-setting can differ depending on three factors. Firstly, the nature of an issue and how significant it is deemed to be by representatives can play a role (Kingdon, 2003). For example, issues that are framed as a threat to finance or security tend to be placed more highly on the agendas of working parties, Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and Ministerial

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[19] As illustrated in the introduction this thesis has delimited the focus to the two initial stages of agenda-setting and preference formation. These areas will be discussed separately.

meetings. Interestingly, if other issues are successfully linked to a securitized or politicised policy area then these issues can also enter the agenda or be placed higher on the agenda. The ability to successfully bring together policy concepts is normally the result of the work of political representatives who have honed skills in this area. Secondly, agenda-setting can be further influenced by a Member State, or group of Member States, which are able to convince others of the salience of an issue, as expert knowledge and experience are significant at this stage (Kingdon, 2003: 197). The "epistemic community consolidates bureaucratic power within national administrations and international secretariats, it stands to institutionalise its influence and insinuate its view into broader international politics" (Haas, 1992:5). The influence and role of experts cannot be overlooked during the agenda-setting stage. Finally, agenda-setting can vary if an issue is emerging, new or old (Young, 2015: 53). Emerging and new issues require a great degree of research, discussion and framing to enter the agenda. Entman (2004:26) expands on the definition of framing stating that "the verb to frame (or framing) refers to the process of selecting and highlighting some aspects of a perceived reality and enhancing the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of that reality." The support of older issues can also be complex during agenda-setting, particularly if a Member State is attempting to reframe the issue. Princen (2003: 597) further illustrates the process of reframing by stating that Member States are most successful in framing and including an issue on the agenda when the issue can be "linked to an existing issue which has been accepted as a concern." If a link has already been created, then creating additional linkages to an issue require less effort.

2.2.2.2 EU Policy Formation

The second stage of policy-making, policy formation, has been selected for analysis. At this stage, expertise and information from Member States can be offered to the European Commission during the formation of policy proposals. This approach is argued to be effective (Zito, 2001).

Permanent representatives[20] are the key "translators" between the EU and domestic spheres during the policy formation process (Genschel, 2001:98). The existing body of literature emphasises that Permanent Representations work closely with national capitals during policy engagement. For example, Chelotti (2013:1060) states that the majority of Member States find the "relationship between the capital and Brussels to be open and dynamic" during policy discussions. In most cases, policy formation flows easily between the capitals and Brussels.

However, upon further examination, it appears expectations of engagement with policy formation may differ slightly depending on the Member State. Panke (2010b:773) focuses on smaller Member States stating that these states have stronger, "capital-based coordination systems, with little input from Permanent Representations. Brussels diplomats send documents and information back to the capitals and just wait for their instructions." This may leave Permanent Representations from smaller states to occasionally be caught between trying to reach a consensus and follow directions from their national capitals during policy formation. Galuškova and Kaniok (2015: 2) further the possible disconnect, they state that "their permanent location in Brussels nevertheless weakens their national loyalty to a considerable extent." These key translators may be pulled in different directions between opinions in Brussels and their national governments. Post-2004 Member States may also face unique challenges during policy formation. For instance, Juncos and Pomorska (2006:4) illustrate post-2004 Member State's permanent representatives' socialisation in greater detail:

> The actors' motivation to follow social pressures stems from the desire to maintain or improve their position within the group, as part of their long-term interest calculation. Legitimacy and reputation, factors contributing to one actor's status in a group, become highly appreciated as they improve the chances of getting the national interest reflected in the policy outcome.

It is anticipated that the relationship between national capitals and Permanent Representations in Brussels is significant in understanding more about policy engagement.

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[20] Permanent Representations are comprised of representatives sent from every Member State to represent national interests in Brussels. The Permanent Representations can be seen as creating a 'link' between national governments and EU institutions.

2.2.3 Policy-making between domestic and EU levels

This section considers the complex interplay between the domestic and EU levels. This section starts by considering Putnam's two-level game metaphor to see if any of his findings may be transferable to how post-2004 Member States are engaging. Next, policy engagement is conceptualised as having two starting points either from the EU institution or from a Member State. This thesis sets out to explore the policy-making process at the EU level, which means consideration must be given to both the domestic and EU levels. The interaction between two different levels is made by a single actor, which is the head of the government. Putnam's two-level game metaphor (1988) may help to conceptualise these interactions between the domestic and EU levels. Putnam frames the two-level game metaphor as the head of the national government sitting at two 'game tables', the first of these games is at the national level and the second is the EU level. Each of these 'games' has unique concerns which may impact the other level. This sub-section starts by considering the main policy actors at the domestic level followed by the EU level, then the focus shifts to how this metaphor may help to conceptualise the policy engagement of post-2004 Member States.

Haverland and Liefferink (2012: 180) state that "interests and preferences of domestic actors are the starting point" of EU policy formation. Firstly, according to Putnam's metaphor, the elected leader interacts with different interests at the domestic level including "party and parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic agencies, representative of key interest groups, and the leader's political advisors" (Putnam, 1988: 434).[21] The national electorate is significant because they can remove and replace the Prime Minster during National Elections. Thus, the Prime Minister must carefully weigh and represent domestic interests in order to maintain his/her position, because removal from the national level also means removal from the EU level.

There may be a clash of domestic interests because each Member State must attempt to engage with other representatives during the policy-making process to push ahead policies that satisfy domestic pressures (Putnam, 1988: 434). At the EU level engagement occurs between various EU institutions, most commonly the European Commission during the agenda-setting stage of

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[21] In both empirical cases, the head of the government is a Prime Minister; hence, this terminology has been applied.

the policy-making process. Engagement at the EU level requires the Prime Minister to represent domestic interests while at the same time minimising any EU developments which could have a negative impact on the country.

Both domestic and EU levels have different policy concerns. According to Putman (1988:430), domestic and international interests are 'entangled', or these interests are interconnected messily, meaning it is difficult to fully understand domestic politics without understanding political developments at the EU level, and vice-versa. For example, a certain decision at one level may appear rational, but this same decision can seem highly irrational at the other level. Although this is not always the case. Putnam (1988: 434) states that "on occasion, however, clever players will spot a move on one board that will trigger realignments on other boards, enabling them to achieve otherwise unattainable objectives." Such as the implementation of an EU policy which would have been otherwise impossible at the domestic level.

There are a couple of possible expectations of how engagement may occur between domestic and EU levels. Firstly, the two-level game metaphor may offer a potential understanding of irrational policy choices. A national representative may appear to act irrationally; however, this irrational action may be an attempt to balance decisions between the domestic and EU levels. For example, making a 'good' decision at the domestic level may be viewed as a 'bad' decision at the EU level and vice-versa. Therefore, according to Putnam's logic, irrational engagement at the EU level may be fully rational at the domestic level. Secondly, Post and Niemann (2007:15) state that, "policy makers can draw on the European level to bring about policy changes in the domestic area, which they would not have been able to produce without indirect support and legitimacy from the European level."

Furthermore, the European Commission has the power to initiate policy proposals and implement decisions made by the EU Parliament and Council, to the extent that the European Commission is referred to as the "supranational policy entrepreneur" (Kaunert, 2009) due to the European Commission's function and systematic attempts to promote EU interests. The influence of the European Commission during the accessional process in post-2004 Member States has been highlighted (Batory, 2002; Zielonka, 2007). In previous cases of integration,

such as the 1995 accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, these candidate countries were able to engage with the European Commission on key issues of national significance such as environmental policy and democratic processes (Jänicke, 2005; Björkdahl, 2008). This indicates that previous candidate countries attempted to set the agenda during the accession process. However, it appears that the post-2004 countries were not able to influence agenda-setting (Batory, 2002; Ágh, 2011). This may be due to the Central European countries, being termed as 'new democracies' (Henderson, 2009; Dür and Mateo, 2010a; Rybár, 2010). There were clear expectations outlined in the Copenhagen criteria[22] which were 'non-negotiable' in nature, which resulted in limited leverage of post-2004 Member States. Consequently, I anticipate the relationship between the EU level, specifically the European Commission and post-2004 Member States to have specific nuances which may differ from other Member States and impact the policy-making process.

2.3 EU Policy Engagement

Policy engagement is a malleable term as the way national representatives engage may change depending on the policy area and the stage of policy development. To explain engagement comprehensively, the following three sub-sections define different aspects which the term encompasses, specifically the factors of engagement, followed by the forms of engagement, and, finally the actions of engagement.

Figure 2b: Understanding policy engagement

1) Factors of engagement	2) Forms of engagement	3) Actions for engagement
•Factors include: capacity, perceptions and domestic dynamics.	•Pace-setter, Foot dragger or Fence-sitter (Borzel, 2002).	•Actions include: expert opinion, pressure, persuasion, hard bargaining, coalition buiding, and moral appeals

Source: Compiled by the author.

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[22] The Copenhagen criteria include: free-market, stable democracy, rule of law and the adoption of all EU legislation.

2.3.1 Factors of engagement

EU policy engagement literature suggests factors which may contribute to advancing policy interests including *capacity* (Panke, 2010a; Micallef-Grimaud, 2018), *perceptions* Thórhallsson, 2006; Nguyen, 2008; Haughton, 2009; Miklin, 2009; Magnúsdóttir and Thórhallsson, 2011; Mišík, 2015) and *domestic dynamics* (Putnam, 1988; Moravcsik, 1998; Haverland and Liefferink, 2012; Leuffen et al. 2013) Figure 2c illustrates these concepts. The overlap between these factors will vary depending on the policy area.

Figure 2c: Factors which influence engagement

Source: Compiled by the author.

2.3.1.1 Capacity

Micallef-Grimaud (2015:105) defines capacity as the ability of governing national representatives to "influence the EU political agenda and take advantage of the multi-actor, multi-level governance system that characterizes the EU". Capacity can also be defined as the ability of national governing representatives to effectively represent national interests in the EU policy- making process, through the use of power or persuasion, across different levels (Kohler-Koch, 1995). These definitions are slightly adapted to suit the focus of this thesis, meaning capacity is defined as the ability of national governing representatives to engage in the EU policy- making process, which is comprised of a multi-actor, multi-level system. Capacity includes quick instructions, and administrative size.[23]

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[23] I have adapted this from Micallef-Grimaud (2018:29). He expands capacity to include: dialogues with the Council Presidency, the expertise of civil service and the length of experience by the civil service and administrative approach.

Quick instructions, or the speed by which communication occurs between national representatives and the Permanent Representation is useful because it allows more time for the stance to be articulated to other Member States Permanent Representatives (Grimaud, 2018:154). If the Permanent Representatives do not have clear instructions, it can limit the ability to communicate with the counterparts from other Member States. Furthermore, the wider EU policy-making process may move forward without input from slow Permanent Representations; therefore, the onus is on each Member State to state the national position as soon as possible. Moreover, early engagement through a clear position statement may impact the form of engagement taken by a government.[24] Börzel (2002) and Liefferink and Wurzel (2017) argue that Member States which are slower to engage may not be as influential. For instance, a more aggressive stance may need to be taken to articulate interests later in the policy-making process. There is also the expectation that the size of the national administration may influence capacity (Haverland and Liefferink, 2012) particularly in terms of unity when dealing with problematic issues (Juncos and Pomorska 2014). For example, a smaller administration may find it easier to navigate change as fewer individuals are involved in the process (Panke, 2010a).

2.3.1.2 Perceptions

Perception refers to how other policy actors see a national government's ability to engage at the EU level. National representatives' perceptions are defined as both internal (national representatives' self-perceptions) and external (the perceptions of representatives from the other Member States) views of a Member State's attributes and how these attributes are anticipated to influence the representation of national interests (Mišík, 2015: 199). Perception is "mediated by the actors themselves" so it is constantly changing (Aggestam, 2006:22). Furthermore, perceptions of a Member State's role are part of the wider discussion on the impact of individual agency upon preference formation (Haughton, 2009; Miklin, 2009; Mišík, 2015).

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[24] The forms of engagement, and the impact of timing on specific forms are discussed in greater detail in Section 2.3.2.

A Member State's attributes can be divided into objective and subjective categories[25]. Objective attributes are quite straightforward as these attributes can be measured and compared. Thórhallsson, (2006:8) argues that objective attributes include the size of the population, ability to maintain sovereignty, administrative capabilities and economic size. The subjective measures including: "perceptual size" [how domestic and external actors regard the size of the state] and the "preference size" [ambitions and prioritizations of the national representative] (Thórhallsson, 2006:8). Self-perceptions focus on the subjective measures of governing national representatives regarding the attributes of his/her Member State. Mišík (2015: 199) explains:

> Domestic preferences are not solely a result of an objective evaluation of a state's attributes but are influenced by the decision-makers subjective perceptions of these attributes. Perceptions influence the process of preference formation as they filter the impact of 'objective' attributes of a state on its preferences. Therefore, even if the attributes of states differ, decision-makers can perceive them in a similar way and can pursue alike preferences and vice versa.

The government representatives' perspective of their nation's attributes is anticipated to impact engagement. If a national representative, for example, selects to focus on the subjective aspects of perceptual size and preferential size in a positive manner it might outweigh negative perceptions and spur engagement (Thórhallsson, 2006:24). Or, in other words, even if a country is not highly populated or strong economically, other subjective attributes such as the perception of leadership in a policy area may cause an increase in engagement. This self-perception could be a result of a government prioritising a policy area and showing leadership and expertise in a policy area. These subjective views are expected to impact the forms and actions of engagement used.

External perceptions are the subjective views of national representatives regarding the attributes of a different Member State. In this case, if a Member State is considered to have high domestic standards in terms of policy regulation or development, they may receive a greater platform to shape EU policy (Liefferink and Skou-Andersen, 1998). In many cases, external perception is closely linked to reputation in a policy area (Mišík, 2015: 202). States

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[25] The division into subjective and objective was an adaption made by the author. Thórhallsson (2006) keeps all six attributes in a singular list.

that lack objective attributes may have the possibility to attempt to convince other states of more subjective attributes as an effort to shape a policy area.

2.3.1.3 Domestic dynamics

National preferences are developed through domestic dialogue and competition. Moravcsik highlights the domestic struggle:

> National interests are therefore neither invariant nor unimportant but emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political influence, national and transnational coalitions form, and new policy alternatives are recognized by governments. An understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to the analysis of strategic interaction among states (1993: 481).

According to Moravcsik, EU decision making can be best understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders, whereby national representatives behave in a logical and calculated manner. This can be linked to the rational model discussed above. Conversely, the extent of socialization may also play a role in how preferences are represented because social pressures may push certain positions and the positions within a group (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006:4).

Domestic dynamics can be impacted by the political framing used. Framing is defined as the "central organization of ideas that provide coherence to a designated set of idea elements" (Ferree et al., 2002: 127). Entman (1993: 55) stresses that "to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem, definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described." When framing is used successfully national representatives can "draw our attention to certain aspects of an issue" (Gamson, 2004: 245). Or in other words, national representatives may try to highlight certain aspects to the public while downplaying or ignoring other elements. Hänggli and Kriesi (2010: 143) argue that the national representatives can use "substantive emphasis choice" which is "capable of steering the attention of the media and the public to their own case and away from the cause of their opponents." This can be accompanied by "oppositional emphasis choice" through which the political actors can decide on the degree to which they will discuss their opponents' framing (Hänggli and Kriesi, 2010: 143). How a policy issue is depicted by the national government to its electorate can illustrate the salience the government places on an issue. An

issue can be framed positively, negatively or simply ignored from the political discourse. For example, if a policy area is not discussed by the governing party, but more so by the opposition, this indicates the government may be attempting to downplay the relevance of the issue (Gamson, 2004). Based on their political aims national governments can attempt to highlight or downplay certain policy issues during speeches or press conferences. Framing is closely linked to the constructivist position which asserts that policy issues are not "discovered, but socially constituted as part of a broader social and interactive process" (van Ostaijen and Scholten, 2017: 478). This means framing is the result of ideological and political discourses through which clear remedies are articulated (Rein and Schon, 1977). These political discourses, such as statements and speeches made by key national representatives are key to understanding how policy issues are framed.

2.3.2. Forms of engagement
In this section I use the academic literature from Héritier (1995),[26] Liefferink and Skou-Andersen (1998), and Borzel, (2002), who attempt to conceptualise the strategies which Member States use in policy-making.[27] This thesis uses the categories including pace-setters, foot-draggers and fence-sitters but adapts Borzel's work to policy engagement rather than Europeanisation.[28]

2.3.2.1 Pace-setters
Member States classified as pace-setters can be defined as those who actively attempt to push legislation forward (Borzel, 2002; Post and Niemann, 2007; Haverland, 2009). The main desire is to see a nation's domestic preferences accepted at the EU level, and ultimately, transposed into other Member States' legislation to avoid the difficulties and costs of adapting policy. Börzel (2002:198) elaborates stating that, "incorporating 'alien' elements into a dense,

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[26] This body of literature began with Heritier (1996) who developed the 'first mover strategy'. Heritier's concept of first-mover was taken and further developed by Liefferink and Skou-Andersen (1998) who argued the strategies employed by Member States could be classified into four categories including: pusher by example, defensive forerunner, constructive pusher and opt-outer. Börzel (2002) has since developed the literature into pace setters, foot draggers and fence-sitters which are the concepts I apply.

[27] Particular focus in the early literature was on environmental policy by Liefferink and Skou-Andersen (1998).

[28] There have been a few examples of adaptations of Borzel's conceptual framework being used in other areas such as the sale of pyrotechnic articles and long-term residence permits (Micallef-Grimaud, 2015), banking (Quaglia and Spendzharova, 2017), migration (Zaun, 2020).

historically grown regulatory structure that is ingrained in a particular state tradition can impose considerable costs, both material and cognitive." Each Member State has specific preferences and reaching a consensus on a policy can be a complex process. Pace-setters normally can be categorised as having strong preferences and are willing to actively push interests. This requires the "capacity to push [preferences] through the European negotiation process, very often against the opposition of other Member States with diverging policy preferences" (Borzel, 2002: 200). There are distinctions between pace-setters, Liefferink and Skou-Andersen (1998) illustrate pace-setters can be direct or indirect, based on the projected outcome of policy process shown in Figure 2d.

Figure 2d: Types of Pace-setters

Source: Liefferink and Skou Andersen (1998: pp. 256-260) and Börzel (2002).

Direct pace-setters assume that the outcome will have a positive effect on their Member State. The literature identifies two strategies that Member States can use to be direct pace-setters: a) push by example and b) constructive approach (Liefferink and Skou Andersen, 1998: 256). Member States which engage through pushing by example must be ahead of the process or have more advanced policies developed and implemented domestically (Liefferink and Skou Andersen, 1998: 256) which can provide a concrete example to the other Member States. In many cases, this means unilateral action is taken. The second type of direct pace-setter uses a constructive approach, which is a more gradual approach by which a Member States pushes a policy by "building alliances with the Commission's experts or the other Member States" to achieve a compromise, possibly even at the "expense of slightly lower EU standards than domestic" which shows conviction to improve a policy area in the wider Union (Liefferink and Skou-Andersen, 1998: 256-257). Direct pace-setting requires a Member State which has a clear track record in a policy area, but in the first case, pushing by example, the Member State

attempts to be more forceful with a unilateral approach. In the second case, a Member State is more willing to work with other actors and attempts to achieve a compromise.

Indirect pushers differ, as these national representatives assume the policy will have a negative impact on their Member State and actively try to stop the process. There are two types of indirect pace-setters: c) defensive and d) opt-out approaches. The first indirect pace-setter engages in a defensive manner. A Member State does not engage by "presenting unilateral action;" instead, the national representatives may cause interference in other policy areas to attempt to change the proposal (Liefferink and Skou-Andersen, 1998: 257). The aim of this strategic selection is more focused on protecting an element of domestic policy rather than advancing or improving wider EU policy. The form of pace-setting engagement is the indirect opt-outer in which there is a clash between domestic and EU policy aims, which is so significant that the Member State is forced to disengage leaving no possibility to try to shape the policy development further (Liefferink and Skou-Andersen, 1998: 257).

2.3.2.2 Foot-dragger

Foot-dragging is opposite to pacesetting as it aims to slow down or block policy-making process in an area (Borzel, 2002:203). In some cases, foot-draggers might have valuable contributions to make, but that they entered the policy process too late, and as a result, they are classified as foot-draggers because they did not play an active role in the start of the process (Liefferink and Wurzel, 2017). Liefferink et al. (1993:7) argue this form of engagement is often used by late comers who don't want to accept other measures, yet are also hesitant to propose their own measures. Overall, foot-dragging can be viewed as an attempt to slow down the policy-making process, and by doing so, the Member State attempts to influence the legislative process by delay. Börzel (2002: 205) elaborates, foot-dragging may have little relevance in the area in which it is used, but instead, it may be an attempt to change or earn compensation in a different policy area using exemptions, financial compensation or concessions. There are two classifications within of foot-dragging: blocker and non-constructive.

Figure 2e: Types of Foot-draggers

Source: Börzel (2002).

Foot-draggers may use blocking to slow down negative legislation by using a veto or trying to form a blocking minority. Requests for compensation or concessions may be voiced in high-level discussions (Grimaud, 2015:108). Foot-draggers may also try to be *non-constructive* to slow down the proceedings, "particularly, a government will be non-constructive by refusing to work with the Council Presidency" (Grimaud, 2015:108). Engaging in this manner is an attempt to slow down the policy process.

2.3.2.3 Fence-sitting

Fence-sitting is an "ambivalent [approach to engagement] which consistently aims neither at initiating or promoting specific policies at the European level nor at preventing the attempts of others to do so" (Borzel, 2002: 206). Fence-sitting is the intentional decision not to spend energy engaging in a policy area, perhaps due to a lack of concern in the policy area. This could also be based on the assumption that another Member State has similar interests and decides to 'free-ride' on efforts from another Member State. Fence-sitters may be unhappy with a policy and attempt to frame the EU as a "scapegoat", but the actual issue is the national representatives' ineffective representation of national interests (Micallef-Grimaud, 2015: 115) and difficulty in causing influential engagement. Interestingly, this form of engagement tends to be used by Member States which are "first-comers or late-comers" to the policy process (Liefferink and Skou-Andersen and 1998). This means that Member States which know they have limited interest in a policy area may be first to select fence-sitting as a form of engagement or the last to join. Limited interest connects both 'first-comers or late-comers' who use fence-sitting.

Figure 2f: Types of fence-sitting

Source: Börzel (2002).

As shown above, there is only one category of the strategic approach of fence-sitting, which is *neutral.* But, from a neutral position, a Member State can shift to one of the other strategies, either pace-setter or foot-dragger. This shift in engagement could be a result of national representatives failing to fully realise the costs of a policy on domestic structures (Borzel, 2002: 207). A case in which a neutral fence-sitter changes to become a foot-dragger indicates that policy development is anticipated to have negative ramifications. To shift from fence-sitter to a pace-setter usually indicates that involvement in a policy area would be beneficial for a Member State. This strategic shift may involve the Member State acting alone or joining a coalition.

2.3.3 Actions of engagement

National representatives select the most suitable actions to further policy positions. There are several different actions which national representatives can select to further engagement. As illustrated below in Table 2b, national representatives have several options.

Table 2b Actions to further engagement[29]

expert opinions (Haas, 1992; Kingdon,2003)
applying pressure to the EU Council Presidency (Hage, 2017) or EU Commision (Gron, 2014; Thorhallsson, 2015)
persuading Permanent Representations or National Representatives (Chelotti, 2013; Galuškova and Kaniok, 2015)
issuing threats/hard bargaining (Dur and Mateo, 2010; Kažoka, 2010; Panke, 2010a,b; Schneinder et al., 2010)
process of coalition building (Jakobsen, 2009)
moral appeals (Mainwaring, 2012 and Micallef-Grimaud, 2018)
speeches (Faizullaev, 2014; Szilágzi and Bozóki, 2015
written appeals*

Source: Compiled by the author.
*There was no evidence of written appeals was found in the literature, but this form of engagement emerged from interviews.

Firstly, expert opinion, which is advice from an individual classified as having reputable knowledge in a field, may be used to convince other actors of the salience of an issue (Kingdon, 2003: 197). Expert opinion may also influence national representatives or sway public opinion (Haas, 1992; also see Downie, 2013:719). This type of policy expertise is particularly valuable during the early stages of the policy process (Haverland and Liefferink, 2012: 182). The reason for this is two-fold; firstly, the literature indicates that there is space for experts' input during the early stages of policy formation. This assumption is further supported by research that has focused on former 'newer' Member States such as Björkdahl (2008) and Jänicke (2005) who argue that the use of expert opinion can help to further national interests at the EU level.

Secondly, it is possible to apply pressure on the Member State leading the rotating EU Council Presidency, particularly through scheduling. For example, it is possible to "intensify" the meeting schedule by attempting to shift certain items higher up on the agenda (Tallberg, 2008b: 199). National representatives may attempt to persuade a Presidency, or upcoming Presidency for specific policy issues to be included on the agenda (Hage, 2017: 709). Gron (2014) and Thorhallsson (2015) argue that Member States, which may experience restraints in

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[29] These actions were selected due to their relevance.

capacity, might pressure the Commissions or the Commissioner's Cabinet in order to obtain information or attempt to persuade them to move an issue onto the agenda schedule.

Thirdly, persuasion can be an action used to apply pressure to a national representative. This can normally occur informally during social interactions in Brussels (Chelotti, 2013: 1053). Officials from the Permanent Representations do not remain in "isolation" rather these officials can be shaped and persuaded by other representatives (Galuškova and Kaniok, 2015).

Next, the literature indicates national representatives may issue threats, which may include taking an explicit stance, blocking efforts to compromise, or criticism of the other side (Dur and Mateo, 2010b: 683). Issuing threats may be used by representatives in either weak or strong positions (Dur and Mateo, 2010b: 683). The use of threats needs to be carefully planned (Kažoka, 2013) and may only be "credible if the state actually experiences distributional conflict or demonstrates that it will have to act on its threat if compensation is not forthcoming for domestic political and economic reasons" (Schneinder, 2011: 336). It is a risky action because it may lead to the deterioration of a relationship, and perhaps long term consequences (Lax and Sebenius 1986) or even intensify the conflict (Dur and Mateo, 2010b, 685).

Fifthly, the ability to build coalitions can allow a Member State to be influential in a policy area (Jakobsen, 2009: 86-88). But the influence can vary depending on the Member States involved and the extent of unity (Liefferink and Skou-Andersen, 1998).

Moral appeals have been a useful action of engagement utilized by small post-2004 Member States (Mainwaring, 2012 and Micallef-Grimaud, 2018). Moral appeals are largely based on solidarity appeals within the EU.

Finally, speeches and other communication can be influential during engagement (Faizullaev, 2014: 276). Public speeches are an action that can frame policy issues in a specific manner (Szilágzi and Bozóki, 2015).

2.6 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter establishes the conceptual framework to consider how and to what extent do post-2004 Member States engage in the EU policy formation process. The conceptualisation of the policy-making process, particularly the early stages of agenda-setting, and policy-formation are further considered in the empirical chapters. Due to the nature of the EU policy-making process it is anticipated that consensus, particularly during the early stages of the policy formation process will help to understand how post-2004 Member States are engaging. The chapter also sets out the important interplay between the domestic and EU level. Policy development normally begins at the domestic level, but this does not necessarily mean that domestic policy developments are represented in the same manner at the EU level.

I anticipate that there are several factors which may impact the extent of engagement including capacity, perceptions and domestic dynamics. The analytical framework which has been adapted from previous work by Héritier (1995), Liefferink and Skou-Andersen (1998) and Börzel (2002) on the three forms of strategic engagement used by national representatives at the EU level, as well as the actions used by the national representatives is anticipated to help better understand policy engagement.

Chapter Three
Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter unpacks the methodology used to address the research question: To what extent do post-2004 Member States engage in the EU policy-making process, and why do they do so? The focus of the question is upon the representation of national interests at the EU level; accordingly, a qualitative inductive approach is used which aims to generate meaning and identify patterns from the data (Marsh et al., 2017). The focus is on understanding the "actions and context" (Ecran and Marsh, 2016: 309) of national representatives attempting to express the interests of their Member State within the wider EU. The expectation is that post-2004 Member States are no longer passive policy recipients and that these Member States are in the process[30] of developing forms and actions of policy engagement to represent interests effectively. It is anticipated that each Member State will adapt the forms and actions according to domestic and EU policy preferences. Moreover, this thesis offers an explanation of why national representatives engage in this manner, which is closely linked to the domestic level.

In section 3.2, the ontological and epistemological underpinnings are expanded upon. The research is approached from a qualitative, interpretivist perspective. From this stance, I argue that social interactions, such as policy engagement, have subjective meaning.

Section 3.3 focuses on the research design. This section starts by explaining how I approached the main steps of the research process. Particularly, I emphasise the fourth stage of the research process the collection of data through interviews, a comparative case study and the analysis of primary sources. I follow this with a detailed account of how I selected the Czech Republic and Hungary as the cases.

3.2 Ontological and Epistemological considerations

Marsh and Furlong (2010: 186) state ontology and epistemology are the "systems" that underpin research, meaning what is studied, how it is studied and the final claims which can be made. They also argue that there is an order to developing research that starts with

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[30] Arguably, each post-2004 Member State is at a different point in developing forms and actions of engagement at the EU level. Some post-2004 Member States are assumed to be more advanced in this process than others.

ontology which underpins epistemology, and finally, epistemology guides methodological choices made by the researcher as depicted in Figure 3a. Marsh and Furlong (2010) state that ontology and epistemology are like "skin" rather than "a sweater" which cannot be removed to accommodate for various situations. These views are innate to the researcher and cannot be fully separated.

Figure 3a: What underpins research?

Source: Marsh and Furlong (2010).

3.2.1 Ontology

Ontology, which in Greek is similar to the term existence, can be defined as an understanding of the world that is independent of our knowledge (Marsh and Furlong: 2010:18). Hudson and Ozanne (1988) define ontology as the 'nature of reality.' Or, in other words, ontology is our reality without any subjective lenses placed upon it. Ontology has two major traditions: positivism and interpretivism, the former states that there is a single reality, while the latter argues there is no single reality. Positivism is commonly associated with the natural sciences and the assumption theory can be built and used to generate understanding. An interpretivist view argues against a singular understanding in order to highlight the complexities of understanding various social realities. The framing of this work is closer to the interpretivist tradition which argues there are multiple understandings of a single question. Interpretivist research aims to foster understanding rather than an explanation.

3.2.2 Epistemology

Epistemology can be defined as the relationship between the researcher and his/her reality (Carson *et al., 2*001). Berg-Schlosser (2016:25) states that there are three dimensions including:

1) Objectivity, which refers to actual measures or objects, for example, GDP figures.

2) Subjectivity or individuals' perceptions.

3) Normativity, which refers to judgements of human values in terms of right or wrong.

Each of these dimensions is unique to the researcher and influences how a question is broached.

This research has been framed from an interpretivist epistemology instead of a positivist approach. It assumes that researching the policy engagement of national representatives is different from research focused on non-human subjects. The study of "people and their institutions" is "fundamentally different from that of the natural sciences" because social reality is meaningful for the actors involved (Bryman, 2008: 15-16). The primary subject of investigation in this thesis is national representatives, particularly those within the government due to their role in policy development.[31] It is argued that national representatives interpret the social world as having meaning and that social reality has "specific meaning and relevance for the beings living, acting and thinking within it." (Bryman, 2008:16). Marsh and Furlong (2010:24) further this argument by stating that, "social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the activities they shape." Bogdan and Taylor (1975:13-14) state that, the interpretivist approach aims to "see things from that person's point of view." The interpretivist approach is essential in attempting to understand how individual national representatives engage in the policy-making process. Ecran and Marsh (2016: 312) articulate the interpretivist stance:

> For an interpretivist, theory, if we choose to call it that, plays a very different role than for a positivist. Theories, and propositions derived from them, cannot be falsified, because there is no world independent of our interpretation of it which can be used in such a falsification process. Rather, all aspects of the 'real' world are constructed and there are different, and contested, views, 'narratives', of the 'world', and what we regard as 'real' within it. So, for an interpretivist, theories are no more, or less, than

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[31] In Chapter Two, it is acknowledged that there is a range of interests involved in the policy-making process, not only governing national representatives. The process is wider and includes opposition representatives and civil society. However, the decision was made to first focus on governing national representatives to advance the literature, then in the future it is possible to expand to other interests within the policy making process.

narratives about the world and how it works. At any given time, one narrative may be dominant, but it is not 'true'.

Bhattacherjee (2012: 103) describes social reality as being "embedded within and impossible to abstract from their social setting" making interpretation rather than hypothesis testing necessary. The decisive distinction between positivist and interpretivist research is based on the nature of the phenomenon which informs the best manner to study it.

Given the conceptualisation of policy engagement presented in the previous chapter, it is useful to consider the ontology and epistemology of the interpretivist approach. When considering the ontology of these forms and actions used to represent national interests it appears that there are "invisible structures that order" the Member States' behaviour (Bache et al., 2012: 65). Understanding how these "invisible structures" impact behaviour is vital to fostering a deeper understanding of these post-2004 Member States' attempts to engage in policy-making at the EU level. Hay (2002) also considers the hidden elements of the policy-making process and questions if there is an inconsistency between the actual political reality and the political appearance. In Chapter Six, I question the possibility of a degree of inconsistency between the political reality and political framing used by selected national representatives. This illustrates the ontological approach which is within the interpretivist camp's perspective of multiple realities. I approach my research according to the assumption that "action must always be understood from within" (Hollis and Smith, 1991:72).

3.3 Research design

Bryman sets out five different research designs including experimental, cross-sectional, longitudinal, case-study and comparative (Bryman, 2016). The research design selected in this thesis is closest to the comparative design which involves the study of two cases using similar methods, which is particularly conducive to the study of two countries at the same point in time (Bryman 2016:74).

3.3.1 Research process

This thesis followed the standard research process steps including a literature review, the identification of the main concepts and theories, the formation of the research question,

selection of cases, data collection and the analysis of the data (Merriam, 2009; Maxwell, 2013).

The first step was my literature review which focused mainly on the following areas: EU policy-making, post-2004 Member State's transition, asylum and migration policy development.

This was followed by the second step in which I identified key concepts, particularly the steps of the EU policy-making process and the representation of national interested. I decided that a combination of different concepts from policy-making were needed to create a useful framework to guide the empirical analysis and I focused on public policy and EU studies literature.

Thirdly, I had to develop a suitable question that would address a gap in the literature. This meant pulling "key concepts related to the project" and utilising these ideas to formulate the research question (Ackerly and True 2008). My interest was in migration and the different reactions from Member States during a crisis which appeared to require a high extent of cooperation. This triggered further questions about how different Member States engage at the EU level. Within the literature, I identified that post-2004 Member States' engagement in EU policy is evolving but there are gaps within the specific policy areas as well as our understanding of how engagement is occurring. To develop the question, I considered previous rounds of accession and how these Member States engaged with the EU before membership and during early membership, and why national representatives engaged in this manner.

The fourth step involved the case selection, which was two-fold. First, I selected the policy area of migration due to the salience of the issue and preliminary analysis indicated that post-2004 Member States were active within the policy area. Specifically, the 2015 crisis was a period in which clear lines were drawn between the Member States on how to process the large number of asylum applicants to the EU. Secondly, the specific cases of the Czech Republic and Hungary were selected to analyse.

The case selection process, shown in Table 3a, was used to find the most analytically similar post-2004 Member States. The process began with the exclusion of Poland due to size and no other comparable case. Previous single case research on Poland has generated a deeper understanding of Polish representatives' engagement at the EU level (for example, Copsey and Pomorska, 2010; Krasnodębska, 2018). Next, Romania was disregarded due to size and the inability to select a comparable case. The delimitation[32] of Romania also led to the exclusion of Bulgaria and Croatia based solely on the year of accession and the assumption that different lengths of membership may impact the extent of policy engagement.

With the first delimitations complete, the possibility of nine Member States remained for consideration. These Member States included Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta. The case selection from this grouping was more difficult. As illustrated in Table 3a many factors were taken into consideration during the case selection process. The justification process was based on country and migration specific measures. I include the type of border, the pressure in terms of new asylum applications filed and how homogenous the society is. Borders were deemed to be a key issue, as the geopolitical landscape is argued to have an impact on how Member States engage. The pressure, through the concrete measure of applications, is assumed to have an impact on how a Member State engages in asylum policy formation. And the degree to which a society is homogenous assumes the more homogenous society is the less likely it is to accept an influx of asylum seekers. Next, the majority of post-2004 Member States share a post-communist past, and this historical legacy (Camyar, 2010) is assumed to have an impact on bureaucratic functioning.

As mentioned, the selection from these nine Member States was complex, but as stated above in comparative case study selection, there is the possibility of carefully conducting some preliminary analysis and selecting the cases accordingly. During the selection process, the initial argument was strongest for selecting Malta and Cyprus as the principal cases. However, during the analysis, it was decided that these nations have specific geopolitical

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[32] The term delimit means that the researcher decides to intentionally narrow or limit the cases and is used frequently within case study literature such as: Heclo, 1974; Gerring, 2004; George and Bennett, 2005.

issues on the policy area of asylum due to being island nations, which arguably makes it more difficult to generalise the findings to non-island nations. In addition, there has been in-depth research conducted by Micallef-Grimaud (2015; 2018) and Mainwaring (2014a, 2014b) on Malta's EU engagement within migration issues. Consequently, the decision was made to delimit these cases to make an original contribution and expand the literature.

From the remaining group, further exclusions were made based on attempts to focus on active migration policy engagement by post-2004 Member States. Preliminary analysis revealed that there was no clear variance in engagement between Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Or in other words, each of these countries had similarly low levels of engagement within the migration debate and for that reason, these cases were excluded.

This resulted in four remaining Member States including Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Based on borders, the decision was made to exclude Slovenia from analysis as the other three countries are landlocked. The three remaining cases of Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic have many similarities and all Members of the Visegrád Group which provided the opportunity to consider regional engagement. However, based on Slovakia's size it was excluded from the analysis. The cases of the Czech Republic and Hungary have been selected as 'most similar' due to size (and mass and population), history, and homogeneity. These cases are anticipated to engage at the EU level in a similar manner based on these factors.

Table 3a Case selection matrix

Member States 2004 onwards	Size	Borders (accessible to migration flows)?	New asylum applicants (2015)[33]	Post-communist	Ethnically homogeneous [34]	Population (2015)[35]
Bulgaria	Small	Sea border	20, 365	Yes	No	7, 202, 198
Croatia	Small	Sea border	210	Yes	Yes	4, 225, 316
Cyprus	Small	Island	2, 265	No[36]	Yes	847, 008
Czech Republic	Small	Landlocked	1, 515	Yes	Yes	10, 538, 275
Estonia	Small	Sea border	230	Yes	No	1, 314, 870
Hungary	Small	Landlocked	177, 135	Yes	Yes	9,855, 571
Latvia	Small	Sea border	330	Yes	No	1,919,968
Lithuania	Small	Sea border	315	Yes	Yes	2, 921,262
Malta	Small	Island	1, 845	No	Yes	439, 691
Poland	Large	Sea border	12, 190	Yes	Yes	38, 005, 614
Romania	Medium	Sea border	1, 260	Yes	Yes	19, 870, 647
Slovenia	Small	Sea border	275	Yes	Yes	2, 062, 874
Slovakia	Small	Landlocked	330	Yes	Yes	5, 421, 349

Source: compiled by the author (please see individual references at the top of the chart).

The fifth step was the collection of data. Interviews[37] allowed insight into the initial policy formation process, which is informal and, in some cases secretive, due to the complex

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[33]For more information see: Eurostat (2016). "Asylum in the EU Member States" Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6. [Accessed 13 January 2016].

[34] For more information see: *The Washington Post (*2013) "A revealing map of the world's most and least ethnically diverse countries" Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/05/16/a-revealing-map-of-the-worlds-most-and-least-ethnically-diverse-countries/?utm_term=.32ddd1749927. [Accessed 13 January 2016].

[35] For more information see: Eurostat (2015). "Population on January 1 by age and sex." Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001 [Accessed 13 January 2016].

[36] Cyprus is noted as not post-communist; however, I do acknowledge the Soviet interest and influence, specifically in military equipment and arms (Sakkas and Zhukova, 2013).

[37] Contact with potential interviews was made through e-mail and phone. I outlined the study and highlighted the importance of the national representatives' participation in the development of new literature. Obtaining a balanced sample was a challenge as not all the potential interviewees who were contacted responded. Those who responded were invited to participate in a semi-structured interview in person, but by request, some interviews were arranged by phone or e-mail. Most interviews were recorded; however, due to internal policy in both the Czech and Hungarian Permanent Representations the interviews could not be recorded. Rather, the participants allowed detailed notes to be taken during the interviews. Following the interviews, the recordings were transcribed and stored in anonymised form.

representation of national interests. A genuine attempt was made to understand as much as possible about the participants, and in doing so to try to understand policy engagement from their perspective. However, this was not without challenges. As George and Bennett (2005:98) point out "when academic scholars attempt to reconstruct how and why important decisions were made, they tend to assume an orderly and more rational policy-making process than is justified." This limitation is very relevant and highlights the importance of open-ended questions and seeking to understand the perspective of the interviewee. Practically, this meant taking the time to properly prepare for each interview, not only by preparing the questions to be asked but by attempting to understand the individual's perspective and motivations. Rybář notes another challenge, as interviews conducted with members of Permanent Representations in Brussels may not provide the "whole and complex perspective on the political context of preference formation. The importance and relevance of interviews rest precisely on the fact that they offer perceptions and reflections of representatives in negotiating on behalf of their states," their statements can show how confident they feel in carrying out "mandates from their national executives" (2010: 35). Certainly, this study embraced the notion that it is a collection of individual perceptions which come together to establish a Member State's engagement.

During the interview process[38] I conducted four semi-structured interviews with senior officials from the European Commission and the European External Action Service. Seven interviews with Permanent Representatives from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Germany. Then seven interviews with Members, and former Members, of the European Parliament. A total of five interviews were conducted with Czech national representatives and staff focused on EU policy development in Prague and four Hungarian national representatives in Budapest. This was followed by three high-level interviews with former Ambassadors from the Czech Republic who headed up the Permanent Representation in Brussels. Finally, five civil society organisations and one think tank were also interviewed. These interviews took place in different rounds between June 2015 to February 2019 in Prague, Budapest, and Brussels. The interviews were conducted accordingly to attempt to understand migration engagement from the European Agenda on Migration (European

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[38] Appendix Two contains the interview list, and Appendix Three outlines the interview questions.

Commission, 2015c) to the New Pact on Migration and Asylum (European Commission, 2020a).

The ethical approval to conduct interviews was given by the Ethics Committee of the Graduate School of the University of Glasgow's College of Social Sciences on February 26, 2015[39]. Then two subsequent amendments[40] were accepted on January 22, 2016, and May 3, 2018. The ethics standards provided participants with the option to leave the research process at any time. All participants received a copy of the Plain Language Statement and consent form, although as mentioned, some national representatives preferred to use the verbal consent option. To avoid storing any personal data and comply with the EU General Data Protection Regulation the participants were coded according to city and date, but the transcripts never included their names or positions to provide anonymity. Informed consent is an important ethical component of the research process involving interviews. Informed consents were a novelty for some of the research participants based in the Czech Republic and Hungary. In a few cases, the interviewees understood that the purpose of the informed consent was for their protection, while others saw the forms as an inconvenience. This trend became apparent with the informed consents: the higher the status of representative the more the forms were disliked. Many of the national representatives felt the informed consent was a waste of their time, too formal and stated that by agreeing to speak with the researcher their consent was implicit. As this issue became clear, with the advice of the researcher's supervision team, a decision was made to request a second ethics amendment previously mentioned above to allow for the possibility of recorded verbal consent instead of written confirmation.

The interviews allowed the researcher to obtain individuals' perceptions and ask follow-up questions or challenge responses. Interviews provided an understanding of how the individual perceived the initial stages of the policy-making process and the ability to be self-reflexive (Popoveniuc, 2014). Focus groups were also an option as they provide an opportunity to better understand an individual's perspective of the policy formation process and created a space for valuable dialogue (Bryman, 2008). However, the method of focus groups was not

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[39] Please see Appendix One.
[40] The two ethics amendments were to allow the researcher to: conduct interviews via e-mail and use recorded verbal consent instead of written (if requested by the participant).

selected due to the difficulty of attempting to arrange a joint meeting between high-level officials. Additionally, many high-level officials may not have been willing to express sensitive information in a focus group.

The main difficulties encountered during the interview process were related to the nature of the migration discourse. First, it has been a policy area that developed rapidly due to the increase in asylum applications. As migration became more politicised in Central Europe, it became increasingly difficult to arrange interviews with Hungarian officials. In many cases, the interviews were cancelled shortly before the arranged time. Other difficulties experienced during the interview process was some Hungarian representatives required a second official to sit in on the same meeting or the information given was simply a re-statement of the Government's official talking points. In an ideal situation, I would have preferred to have more interviews with Hungarian national representatives.[41]

Aside from interviews, this thesis draws on different types of primary and secondary sources. The main focus was a large number of documents from EU institutions, including: communications, staff working papers, press releases of the European Commission; resolutions and other documents of the European Parliament; official documents and press releases of the EU Council of Ministers and the European Council. Secondly, I drew on party manifestos, different policy documents, speeches, and published interviews of representatives of the Czech and Hungarian governments. Thirdly, I consulted newspapers, magazines and various online sources which deal with EU issues, at the EU level and in two states that are the object of this study. Finally, I looked at a various policy briefs and reports of civil society organisations and think tanks which specialise on migration and asylum policies. These different sources have allowed me to triangulate my research which is beneficial for the credibility and validity of my research.

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[41] The limitations of the interviews meant that I was required to analyze and include more statements and speeches to articulate the Hungarian position.

The fifth step was the analysis of the data. I transcribed all the interviews, developed a codebook and coded key lines. Creating the codebook was a very significant step. George (1979:20) states that:

> The tasks involved in the construction of a codebook-constructing structures answers and structured questions, identifying multiple sources of evidence, testing for inter-coder reliability, investigating pilot cases-may seem to be tedious work for a small number of cases. Yet, this step addresses the most often heard criticisms of the case study: unreliability. Following the rules for systematic extraction of data and reporting these rules to readers enhances the credibility of conclusions from case studies. Unfortunately, this step is rarely taken in case study research.

The initial interviews were analysed using NVivo to group key themes. These themes allowed me to compare Czech and Hungarian responses. One of the difficulties encountered during coding was dealing with 'mixed evidence' which on three occasions appeared to contradict itself. In these cases, the initial recording was revisited, and in one case the interviewee was contacted and asked if they were able to clarify their statements. This process allowed the coded work to be more clearly grouped into patterns and possible inferences. This software helped to group the preliminary themes and allowed the key pieces of data to be placed into the most relevant categories, which was then collaborated with official statements, media reports or academic literature.

To achieve the depth of understanding, a case study approach was selected to explore post-2004 Member State engagement. George and Bennett (2005: 37) define case studies to:

> Include both within-case analysis of single cases and comparisons of a small number of cases, since there is a growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study or research program.

This definition is echoed by Kaarbo and Beasley (1999: 372) who state, "the term 'case' can have a variety of meanings, each with important implications regarding empirical investigation." Thus, a case study will be defined as "a method obtaining a 'case' or several 'cases' through an empirical examination of a real-world phenomenon within its naturally occurring context without directly manipulating either the phenomenon or the context. Lijphart (1971) states that a case study is closely associated with the comparative method.

Prior research particularly that of Kaarbo and Beasley (1999), would define this work as a 'comparative case study'.[42]

Case studies require the intentional selection of cases to 'control' for certain factors within the study rather than random samples which are frequently used in quantitative work (King et al., 1994). The cases selected in this thesis can be referred to as 'comparable cases' to try to find the best fit and match as an "analytically equivalent phenomena" (George and Bennett, 2005: 6). With careful selection, George and Bennett (2005) argue that case selection can provide some degree of experimental control. In addition, Burnham et al., (2008: 73) stress the importance of case selection by arguing that, "the most important aspect of formulating either a 'most similar' or a 'most different' research design is to select cases that make it possible to conclude something interesting about one's research question." Case selection is a critical step in the research process as it, "requires a detailed consideration of contextual factors" which might be difficult to model in statistical studies but is common in case studies (George and Bennett, 2005: 6).

A case study is well suited to explore the questions this thesis poses; however, it is necessary to consider the weaknesses of this method. There are three key areas of weakness highlighted in this section. Firstly, case studies are considered as a weak testing method due to the limited amount of data entries when compared with other approaches, such as statistics (Lijphart, 1971:686). But this critique should be balanced with the inherent strengths that case studies construct, namely, to control for the impact of omitted variables, and to have the potential to arrive at unique conclusions. Verba (1967) stresses the importance of having a deep understanding of the cases to do the analysis accurately, which is better suited for a small number of cases.[43] The second weakness within the case study method is that there can be the challenge of avoiding case selection bias. The process of selecting cases was complex and is discussed below which provides the rationale for case selection or delimitation. The paradox is that the case study allows for an in-depth investigation into specific cases, lending itself to

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[42] As the development of the case in 'comparative case studies' and 'case studies' are similar these terms will be used interchangeably aside from the analysis which will involve a 'systematic comparison'.

[43] The depth of analysis required meant that my initial proposal of working on the Visegrád countries as a unit was not possible.

an excellent understanding; however, to allow for this detailed work the number of cases corresponds to the depth of research. The third challenge was to ensure that the methodology is transparent.

Aside from the challenges, it should be stressed that case studies are well suited to address the complexity of real-world issues; some of which are difficult to study, or better, understand, with a quantitative approach (George and Bennett, 2005). A case study allows for conceptual validity, which provides the researcher to 'best represent' the difficult theoretical concepts under investigation. As illustrated in the section above, the concept of policy engagement is difficult to define. Research questions of 'how' and 'why' are most suited to case studies. The second advantage of the case study method is its inductive nature, for example: receiving a completely unexpected response from an interviewee, or "heuristic identification" which can lead to a new understanding (George and Bennett, 2005: 43).

3.5 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter elaborated on the methodological considerations and research process used. It has illustrated, through a variety of research considerations, the steps which this work has taken to be methodologically robust. Understanding the methodological approach, namely the case selection and data collection, serves as an important foundation for the empirical chapters which follow.

Chapter Four
The challenges of EU migration policy

4.1 Introduction

Migration is a policy issue that traverses national, supranational and global levels bringing together discussions of human rights, security, economic wellbeing and sovereignty. Consequently, due to the complexity of the issues involved, migration policy can present challenges to the policy formation process. At the EU level, these complexities have been intensified by the 2015 increase in asylum applications (Naccache and Al Ariss, 2018). Firstly, the terminology used needs to be further unpacked, the term "refugees and other migrants" which was first used by Carling (2017) and later used by Crawley and Skleparis (2018); Baldwin-Edwards, Blitz and Crawley (2019). The phrase highlights the challenge of defining 'mixed flows' of people entering the EU and "avoids the implications that refugees are not also migrants and the tendency to privilege the former over the latter" (Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019: 2153). The point made by Baldwin-Edwards et al., (2009) is heeded, but I apply the term 'asylum seekers' to reflect that the mixed flows of potential refugees and other migrants are all processed through the CEAS before a decision on the individual's classification can be made.

Section 4.2 provides an analytical evolution that unpacks the layers of migration policy development alongside the EU treaties. This section highlights the increased mandate of the European Commission that has resulted in attempts to advance migration and solidarity discussions at the EU level in a gradual manner.

Section 4.3 addresses the dynamics of EU migration policy-making. The tensions between national and supranational approaches to migration. This section considers the contending migration discourse, particularly the attempts to draw distinctions between 'genuine' and 'non-genuine' asylum seekers which can be a tool to create unease. This is a segue to the empirical chapters.

4.2 The evolution of EU migration policy

Figure 4a shows the increase in asylum applications to the EU in 2015, but this is contrasted against Figure 4b to highlight that asylum seekers arriving in the EU is not a new phenomenon as there were significant increases in the past (Pew Research Centre, 2016). There were previous periods that created a large number of refugees and migrants such as during

the1990s, after the Cold War and during the break-up of former Yugoslavia. These events contributed to the increase in asylum applications which were spread in an unequal manner across the EU[44] (Uçarer, 2006: 234-5; Boswell and Geddes, 2011). With no "natural distribution" of asylum seekers across the EU, "strong regulatory countries", such as Germany, sought ways to foster EU level cooperation and burden sharing (Zaun 2016: 141). The unequal distribution of asylum applicants within the EU was argued by Germany to place an unfair financial and administrative burden on certain Member States and a policy proposal was made to coordinate asylum practices at the supranational level which was anticipated to alleviate the burden (Hatton, 2012:10). During the 1990s, there was a consensus among the Member States that the issue of unequal asylum burdens should be addressed with a common policy position which resulted in a gradual increase in cooperation on migration issues or the harmonisation of EU asylum policy through the CEAS (Lavenex, 2001a; Uçarer, 2006; Kaunert and Leonard, 2012; Toshkov and de Hann, 2013).

Figure 4a: Asylum applicants to the EU (2008 to 2020)[45]

Source: Eurostat (2020).

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[44] Table 4b also depicts the higher number of asylum applicants to certain Member States.
[45] Eurostat (2020). "Asylum Statistics. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics. [Accessed 15 September 2021].

Figure 4b: Asylum applications to the EU (1985-2006)[46]

Source Eurostat (2007).

As further discussed later in the chapter, these events played a large role in the development of

the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The CEAS[47] aimed to create common

standards across the Union and was expected to result in a more equal distribution of claims

throughout the Union. Notably, the harmonisation of asylum policy did not create a "race to

the bottom"[48] or in other words, a situation in which Member States compete to offer lower

standards of asylum protection to keep asylum numbers low (Kaunert, 2009, 2010; El-Enany

and Thielemann, 2010; Kaurent and Leonard, 2012). But despite these efforts differences

remained, the most apparent is the differing rates of acceptance[49] (ECRE, 2015; Toshkov and

de Hann, 2013), access to the labour market (Hassel et al, 2016)[50] and reception conditions,

namely, the use of detention while asylum claims are processed (Aiyar et al., 2016 and

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[46] Eurostat, "Asylum Applications in the European Union," 2007. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5285137/KS-SF-07-110-EN.PDF/c95cc2ce-b50c-498e-95fb-cd507ef29e27. [Accessed September 15, 2020].

[47] Section 4.2.2 discusses the CEAS in greater detail. Also, see Appendix Four for a full discussion of the five components of the CEAS.

[48] This argument can only properly apply before the 2015 migration crisis.

[49] Differing acceptance rates continue to occur across the EU with regards to asylum seekers of the same nationality. For more information, please see Eurostat, available from: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics. [Accessed 1 June 2020].

[50] Access to the labour market differs due national integration policies and factors such as knowledge of the local language. European Commission, (2018b) "Peer Review of Integration into the Labour Market," Available from: www.synthesis%20report%20Labour%20Market%20Integration%20of%20Refugees.pdf. [Accessed September 16, 2020].

Baptista et al., 2016)[51]. Progress towards common standards and approaches has been made throughout the EU, yet the initial reason for cooperation, which was the unequal distribution of applicants throughout the Union, remains. Indeed, the EU migration position continues to have mixed responses and outcomes, Angeloni and Spano (2018: 473) state that "the recent [2015] asylum crisis is essentially a policy crisis which places pressure on a limited number of Member States," meaning the CEAS did not lessen the burden placed on certain Member States. All this indicates that minimum common standards may not be enough; rather, there are more complex factors contributing to refugees and migrants' country selection (Kuschminder et al., 2015).

The 2015 migration crisis reveals that despite policy developments, such as the CEAS which aimed to create a more equitable division of refugees and migrants within the Union, many of the initial concerns from the 1990s remain[52]. It has been twenty years since Lavenex (2001b:852) argued that there are "paradoxes"[53] within migration discourse. She distinguishes the "paradoxes" into two categories: state sovereignty versus supranational governance and internal security considerations versus human rights issues. These paradoxes remain within the post-2015 migration discourse with national representatives pulled between issues that may limit sovereignty, such as the proposed mandatory and automatic relocation mechanism. The balance between each of these paradoxes continues due to the "high level of competing policy beliefs" (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2014: 1147). These competing policy beliefs fall within a spectrum of liberal to restrictive approaches and migration policy at the EU level is "exacerbated by the multi-layered nature of EU governance in the areas of asylum and border control, which pits national sovereignties against Union values [such as solidarity]" (Den Heijer et al.,2016: 608). With these tensions in mind, any advancements in migration policy may indicate differing degrees of Member States bargaining success [during the policy-making process] (Zaun, 2016: 137).

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[51] Aiyar et al., (2016) and Baptista et al., (2016) state that Hungary has been using detention as a measure to control asylum seekers since 2015.

[52] The initial concerns originated from strong regulators such as Germany who advocated (and continue to advocate) for a more equal burden between Member States (Zaun, 2016).

[53] Lavenex (2001b:852) uses the term "paradox" to signify inconsistencies of within the Europeanisation of refugee policies.

Institutional change, which means adjustments to rules, norms and practices can influence the EU policy-making process (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001; Naurin and Rasmussen, 2011). The development of specific rules, norms and practices within policy areas are complex and can differ. With regards to migration policy, Brettell et al., (2014) argue that migration policy is prone to failure at both the national and international levels. It is policy failure that can drive EU policy development further and into deeper stages of integration (Scipioni, 2018). To contextualise the current discourse this section considers the evolution of the EU migration and asylum policy development and the impact of institutional changes upon the policy-making process. I argue that when considering migration policy developments, it is possible to observe an increase in EU level cooperation increasing with the European Commission's involvement. Boswell and Geddes (2011:168) state that the European Commission has been "clever in gradually introducing ideas about possible harmonisation [of asylum] to Member States in an incremental non-threatening way." This section analyses the evolution of migration cooperation at the EU level. It suggests that the increasing role of the European Commission can be linked to Member States attempts to advance deeper migration cooperation.

4.2.1 Early cooperation: from Maastricht to Amsterdam

EU asylum cooperation began by Member States affirming the definition of the term refugee (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997:500) according to the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and the Protocol (1967). This affirmation indicates that the basis for EU cooperation remains firmly rooted in international human rights protection norms (Loescher 1993; Peers, 2008). However, even with the clear linkage to international norms protection, asylum cooperation within the EU began in a restrictive manner. In fact, Karyotis (2007:3) argues that the framing of migration as a security threat to the EU began as early as the mid-1970s[54] and it "structured the development of European migration policy on a security logic, even before any security discourses were articulated and debated in the public sphere." This point is further illustrated by the development of migration and asylum beginning under the former pillar structure of the Treaty of Maastricht (1993).[55] The third pillar "Justice and Home

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[54] Karyotis (2007) illustrates the initial intergovernmental framing in the mid-1970s through the Trevi Group.
[55] The Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992 and took effect in 1993.

Affairs" was largely focused on security issues[56] (Bomberg and Stubb, 2003:5). Consequently, the initial asylum developments were formed in an intergovernmental[57] manner and argued to be restrictive due to the focus on the 'control' of non-EU nationals (Geddes, 1995).

The intergovernmental nature of Justice and Home Affairs[58] was led by the Council, aimed to "associate the [European] Commission to its work and inform Parliament about its asylum initiatives; the Court of Justice of the EU has no jurisdiction in asylum matters" (European Parliament, 2020),[59] as shown in Table 4a below. Jones et al., (2016: 1010) suggest that intergovernmental bargaining permits:

> incompleteness because it forces states with diverse preferences to settle on lowest common denominator solutions. Incompleteness then unleashes forces that lead to crisis. Member states respond by again agreeing to the lowest common denominator solutions.

Furthermore, the intergovernmental approach was combined with 'non-binding' soft law and a lack of monitoring at the EU level meant many policy-makers saw the initial developments as ineffective (Stetter, 2000). Scipioni (2018: 1360) states that Maastricht was "termed incomplete" from a policy progress perspective, which in turn, generated further migration integration based on four areas of institutional insufficiency including: "weak monitoring, lack of harmonisation, low solidarity and an absence of central institutions."

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[56] The security related issues under The Third Pillar of Justice and Home Affairs included issues of cross border crime, criminal law and police cooperation.

[57] Intergovernmental refers to relations between governments More specifically, liberal intergovernmentalism builds on an earlier approach intergovernmental institutionalism by refining its theory of "interstate bargaining and institutional compliance and by adding an explicit theory of national preference formation grounded in liberal theories of international interdependence (Moravcsik 1993: 480)

[58] Justice and Home Affairs was also previously under the third pillar.

[59] The European Parliament. "Asylum Policy." Available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/151/asylum-policy. [Accessed 1 June 2020].

Table 4a Development of the main policies concerning EU migration and asylum

Year	Treaty/Policy	Main development
1993[60]	Treaty of Maastricht	The Council was to oversee asylum policy by "associating"[61] with the Commission and "informing" the EU Parliament.
1999[62]	Treaty of Amsterdam	Article 63 (3), TEC 4
1999	Tampere European Council	Start of the CEAS
2004[63]	Hague Programme	Co-decision on immigration, except for legal migration
2008	The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum	The individual Member States as the focus
2009	Treaty of Lisbon	79 TFEU
2011-2013	The recasting of the CEAS	The CEAS is 'operational'
2015[64]	Agenda on Migration	Commission took the key role. The policy proposal stalled due to a lack of consensus within the Council.
2020[65]	New Pact on Migration and Asylum	Commission took the key role

Source: Compiled by the author.

As EU migration policy cooperation continued[66] there was an overwhelming sentiment that the third pillar was not transparent (Deloche-Gaudez, 2002). The dominant view within EU integration literature is that the 1990s was a period in which a degree of power shifted from national governments to the supranational level (Geddes, 2000; Lavenex 2001; Kassim and Menon, 2003). The Treaty of Amsterdam shifted the policy from the first to the third pillar and "community competence was firmly established in the areas of immigration and asylum"

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[60] Developed under the Delors Commission.
[61] The European Parliament. "Asylum Policy." Available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/151/asylum-policy. [Accessed 1 June 2020].
[62] Developed under the 1999-20004 Prodi Commission.
[63] Developed under the 2004-2014 Barroso Commission.
[64] Developed under the 2014-2019 Junker Commission.
[65] Developed under the von der Leyen Commission.
[66] EU Migration issues included: visas, asylum, and irregular immigration.

(Karyotis, 2007:6, also see Geddes, 2003; Kostakopoulou, 2000). Lavenex (2001b: 854) states that the shift from intergovernmental to supranational policy development resulted in "intensive trans-governmentalism," which she draws from Keohane and Nye (1974:43) who define trans-governmental relations as "sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets of chief executives or those governments." Thus, officials have certain freedoms to develop a policy agenda with a "degree of autonomy vis-à-vis their chief executives" (Lavenex, 2001b: 854). This meant different actors and the shift within the former pillar system was an effort to bring a more liberal perspective by "revalidating liberal elements against a realist drift;" however, in practice Lavenex argues that this shift brought increased liberalism to the EU while simultaneously creating restrictions upon candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe such increased border controls and visa policies (Lavenex 2001a:24). Thus, there was increased freedom within the Union, but it shifted the restrictive elements to the 2004 Member States such as discussions of increased border controls along external borders. This increased externalisation of security is commonly referred to in the literature as the "Fortress of Europe" (Grabbe, 2000).

Alongside treaty development, it is also possible to observe the evolution of the concept of solidarity. For example, increased cooperation through a "solidarity mechanism" at the EU level was expressed by the Council of the European Union entitled: the Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof stated:

> Provision should be made for a solidarity mechanism intended to contribute to the attainment of a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving displaced persons in the event of a mass influx. The mechanism should consist of two components. The first is financial. The second concerns the physical reception of persons in the Member States on the basis of voluntary action by both the receiving Member States and the displaced persons. [67]

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[67] Official Journal of the European Communities (2000 C311 E/252).

The attempts of furthering the liberal concept of solidarity began to gain momentum under the community pillar. Despite the conceptualisation of solidarity remaining quite basic at this stage, development towards a deeper level of migration cooperation began.

4.2.2 The development of the CEAS

The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Vienna Action Plan led to the Tampere Conclusions (1999), which created the CEAS. The CEAS has five main components including the: Asylum Procedures Directive, Reception Conditions Directive, Qualification Directive, Dublin Regulation and the EURODAC Regulation (European Commission, 2020). The combination of these directives and regulations attempt to harmonise who qualifies and the procedures related to the processing of asylum claims. The CEAS also provides the minimum standards for reception conditions such as food and shelter which are to be provided for asylum seekers. In addition to these humanitarian elements, there is also the Dublin Regulation which determines which Member State is responsible for processing the asylum claim and the EURODAC regulation requires the fingerprinting of all asylum applicants at the time of lodging an asylum claim. Under the Dublin Regulation, an asylum seeker can be returned to the original Member State of entry or to a Member State in which the individual has prior connections[68]. The CEAS was deemed to be the best way to curb the main perceived problem of "refugees in orbit" which refers to asylum seekers travelling between various Member States lodging applications in more than one place due to differing recognition rates and social benefits (Melander, 1986). Shortly after the creation of Dublin Regulation in the late 1990s, the regulation was deemed unable to function properly, but despite the overall distaste for the system, Dublin was still deemed to be the best approach to attempt to regulate the entry of asylum seekers to the EU (Scipioni, 2018: 1364). At the start of CEAS development, strong intergovernmental elements remained, despite the transition to the community pillar.

4.2.3 The Treaty of Lisbon: towards greater cooperation and increased solidarity

The formation of the CEAS was followed by the Treaty of Lisbon, which strengthened the mandate and role of the European Commission.[69] Under the Lisbon Treaty, the former pillar system ceased, and the European Commission is able to propose legislation for approval by

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[68] Such connections can include a previous visa issued by a Member State.
[69] The Treaty was signed in 2007 and enforced from 2009.

the European Parliament and the Council (The Treaty of Lisbon, 2009; Helstroffer and Obidzinski, 2014:30). After the initial development of the CEAS, there was deemed to be certain failures and as a result, the second generation of the policy area, or re-casting process occurred. Overall, the strengthening of the European Commission is argued to positively impact asylum policy development. For example, Kaunert (2009:149-150) states that "the [European] Commission played a very active and significant role – the role of a supranational policy entrepreneur – and in doing so managed to anchor the EU asylum policy in the prevailing norms of the international community, the Geneva Convention."

There appears to be evidence of increased asylum cooperation and solidarity at the EU level with the European Commission's wider mandate. For example, Article 80 of the Treaty of Lisbon states, "the European Union's asylum policy will be based on the principles of solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility" (The Official Journal of the European Union, 2007). However, no guidance is given as to the nature and content of these principles (Gray, 2013:175). This vagueness remains an area of frustration dividing Member States because of the imprecise language of solidarity may refer to the sharing of norms, individuals, or money (Byrne et al., 2002). However, I suggest that solidarity can have assumptions beyond the sharing of norms, money or individuals. For example, Sangiovanni (2013: 214) sees solidarity as "the binding together of citizens of each and every Member State." The differing understanding of solidarity may continue to cause tension during EU policy-making. There have been new attempts to increase normative solidarity across Member States such as the creation of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) was operational in four Member States including: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and Italy (Carrera et al, 2015; Trauner, 2016:317).

Indeed, solidarity of 'people' or solidarity through relocation remains a contentious dialogue since 2015, with voluntary forms of relocation being accepted, while a mandatory relocation scheme to promote solidarity is argued by some national representatives to overstep the boundaries of sovereignty as previously discussed. Money has also been part of migration solidarity. Trauner (2016: 317) explains there has been a movement in the sharing of money because before financial solidarity used to be: the European Refugee Fund, External Borders Fund, and the Return Fund, and now it is the "Asylum Migration and Integration Fund" Regulation (516/2014 Art 15). Norms, money and people continue to be the main elements on

which migration solidarity is based; however, the practical arrangements for solidarity in each of these areas is not clear.

Notably, not only the European Commission advocated for increased migration solidarity, but also the Council. An example of an early attempt at solidarity can be found in the 2008 Pact of Immigration and Asylum[70] which outlines five immigration and asylum aims. The pact states "those Member States whose geographical location exposes them to influxes of immigrants or whose resources are limited should be able to count on effective solidarity of the European Union" (Official Journal of the European Union, 2014). Despite the pact setting a legislative agenda, there were no legal obligations stipulated.

Overall, a precise meaning of solidarity has not been articulated within EU documentation and solidarity remains an abstract concept. Consequently, different understandings and applications of the concept may remain. For example, Grech (2017) states that the concept of EU solidarity remains voluntary, while Borgmann-Prebil and Ross (2010) argue that solidarity is increasingly becoming securitised due to the urgent nature of "crisis mentality". The European Commission remains focused on deeper integration and solidarity; however, the European Commission does not have the power to enforce solidarity (Scipioni, 2018: 1363). Some policy actors such as the European Commission may encourage solidarity, but there is also the possibility of governments indirectly shirking responsibilities or attempting to avoid solidarity. This thesis suggests that there are differing understandings of the term solidarity (between the Member States, the European Commission, European Parliament, European Court of Justice). This differing understanding of solidarity is exacerbating migration discourse because certain Member States perceive their actions, for example, border control and monitoring, financial funds to be acts of solidarity, while other Member States do not perceive these acts to show solidarity. I argue that these different conceptualisations create frustration and tension between national representatives.

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[70] The Council of the European Union, "European Pact on Immigration and Asylum" September 24, 2008. Available from: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2013440%202008%20INIT. [Accessed September 16, 2020].

4.2.4 The 2015 migration crisis and the European Agenda on Migration
Coincidently, the recasting of the CEAS was 'complete' at the start of the migration crisis in 2015.[71] Yet, despite the CEAS being complete on paper, differences remained with regards to national implementation. Scipioni (2018: 1366) argues these inconsistencies between the CEAS legislation and actual practice "pose EU-wide risks." The CEAS was quickly put to the test with a large increase in asylum seekers at southern EU borders. The urgency of the situation, namely the loss of lives at sea,[72] resulted in the Commission responding with the *European Agenda on Migration*. This agenda is significant as it brings together the concepts of irregular immigration, regular immigration[73] and asylum[74] into a singular concept: migration. This approach was an attempt to streamline the discussion and represents a more accurate description of the dynamics of migration to the EU.

The *European Agenda on Migration* is an ambitious policy development because it proposed to involve a range of actors including Member States and EU agencies such as Frontex, Europol, European Union External Action Service to address asylum, illegal and legal migration from the short-term and long-term perspectives. Due to the urgency of the situation, namely 1.2 million first time asylum applications to EU countries (Eurostat, 2016) and approximately 5,350 deaths in the Mediterranean Sea (IOM, 2015) the 'normal' policy cycle was not followed.[75] For example, Member States' national representatives may not have been fully consulted according to the normal policy-making process which may have increased some tensions due to a lack of consensus on the *European Agenda on Migration*, particularly during the early stages of the policy process. In this section I unpack this agenda in detail,

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[71] European Commission, Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom's blog entry from December 17, 2013, where she states "I am very proud that we during this year have managed to introduce the Common European Asylum System. It has been my highest priority for my term in office. After the decisions in the European Parliament and the Council in June 2013, the EU will at the latest by autumn 2015 have a common asylum system." Zoltero snapshot: file:///C:/Users/jolan/Zotero/storage/W4SHJSCZ/malmstrom.html. [Accessed January 6, 2014].
[72] The European Agency for Fundamental Rights reports that there were 3771 deaths during irregular seas crossings to the EU in 2015. European Commission, The European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2016 Available from: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2016-fundamental-rights-report-2016-focus-0_en.pdf. [Accessed 2 June 2020].
[73] For example, the call for increased legal channels of migration to the EU Parliament.
[74] Asylum, more specifically the CEAS, is one of the four major components in the European Agenda on Migration.
[75] For a complete discussion of the 'normal' policy process please see Chapter Two.

arguably due to the proposal being the starting point of the Visegrád's discontent over the development of EU migration policy.

The *European Agenda on Migration* (2015) is comprised of four pillars. The first aims to reduce incentives and irregular channels for migration to the EU. It addresses the need to protect people from attempting to use irregular ways of entering the EU. The Commission (2015:7)[76] stated:

> There are many different motivations behind irregular migration. But often, it ends in deep disappointment. The journey is often far more dangerous than expected, often at the mercy of criminal networks who put profit before human life. Those who fail the test of asylum face the prospect of return. Those who live a clandestine life inside Europe have a precarious existence and can easily fall prey to exploitation. It is in the interests of all to address the root causes which cause people to seek a life elsewhere, to crack down on smugglers and traffickers, and to provide clarity and predictability in return policies.

The high availability of human smugglers is a factor facilitating irregular migration. The European Commission (2015) argued that human smuggling is low risk and high return for the individuals running the trafficking networks. To address human smuggling, the European Commission proposed an increase in development cooperation and humanitarian assistance for third countries. The support is contingent upon these third countries actively working with the EU Member States attempting to return failed asylum seekers. The second pillar is focused on the management of external borders, including strengthening Frontex and having a common standard for border management across the Union. Like the first pillar, the importance of working with third countries is highlighted, particularly in terms of emphasising the need for these countries to strengthen and manage their borders more effectively. Thirdly, the European Commission calls for a "strong asylum policy" which includes the "full and coherent implementation of the CEAS" (European Commission, 2015:12). However, I would contend that a fundamental element of the CEAS, the Dublin Regulation, functions in a manner that limits trust between Member States (Mitsilegas, 2014). The European Commission proposed increasing the role of the EASO, which entails transferring a degree of control away from the Member State and towards the supranational level. The swift return of migrants who transited

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[76]For more information please see: A European Agenda on Migration. Brussels, 13.5.2015 COM (2015) 240 final.

through 'safe' countries such as Serbia was also included. The term 'safe' has proven

controversial because transit countries are deemed not to have persecution, torture or inhuman

or degrading treatment, threat of violence, or armed conflict;[77] however, there are questions

over access to asylum procedures and the possible risk of non-refoulment[78] (Hungarian

Helsinki Committee, 2018). This common perception of better prospects within the EU results

in many migrants leaving safe third countries and continuing towards the EU which has

resulted in the emergence of an argument by some national representatives which claims these

people are "economic migrants" rather than asylum seekers (Czech President Zeman, 2020).[79]

The movements of migrants through safe third countries and secondary movements through

less attractive Member States towards more desired countries such as France and Germany

remains a major issue within the current policy debate. The final pillar called for further

development of legal migration channels at the EU level, which the European Commission

anticipates will help to decrease irregular migration. For example, the European Commission

would like to overhaul the Blue Card process[80] which is a legal route for employment within

the EU. The European Commission also called for an increase in the dialogue surrounding

economic migration with third countries. Aside from the four pillars, the *European Agenda on

Migration* outlined the controversial permanent relocation mechanism. This mechanism is

meant to facilitate the relocation of asylum seekers, in clear need of protection, away from

frontline countries such as Italy and Greece. It is deemed by the European Commission to be

practical burden-sharing policy practice. The proposal for this type of relocation policy was

controversial due to its mandatory and automatic nature.

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[77] European Commission an EU safe countries of origin List. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_safe_countries_of_origin_en.pdf. [Accessed 2 June 2020].

[78] Non-refoulement is "reflected in different bodies of international law, protects any person from being transferred (returned, expelled, extradited) from one authority to another when there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to viola tions of certain fundamental rights" (Rodenhäuser, 2018).

[79] For example, this interview between the Czech President and the Britské listy (British Papers) shows the framing of asylum seekers as economic migrants https://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/arena/rozhovory/Zabiti-Zemana-v-poradku-slovo-invaze-ne-Poslankyne-trestana-kvuli-migrantum-Toto-si-myslim-o-situaci-v-Recku-616366. [Accessed 2 June 2020].

[80] The Blue card is available to third country nationals who reside in a Member State longer than three months and are to be employed at a position requiring a high level of skills.

Therefore, the *European Agenda on Migration* is significant due to the effort of the European Commission to provide a common EU level response to the migration challenges. The agenda's call for increased cooperation has revealed differences in Member States' preferences, particularly with regards to the suggested permanent relocation mechanism of asylum seekers within the EU. This relocation mechanism depends on the full functioning of the CEAS.

4.3 Key dynamics in EU migration policy

Migration policy is classified as "falling somewhere between home affairs and foreign policy" (Chou, 2009: 541). This multidimensional nature creates a complex policy-making process and many narratives do not properly articulate all the policy dimensions involved. This sub-section considers the dynamics of the EU migration policy-making process within the context of the 2015 crisis contending that the normal policy-making process may not have been followed and a clear consensus within the policy has not been reached. This lack of consensus may indicate tensions between the national and supranational levels on the development of migration policy.

4.3.1 Migration policy-making in the EU

The normal policy process, presented in Chapter Two, follows five steps: agenda setting, policy formation, policy adoption, implementation and evaluation (Knill and Tosun, 2020). In urgent situations of crisis, the normal process may not be followed and as a result, certain significant stage(s) may be passed over which may have negative implications such as policy discussions occurring rapidly (Versluis et al., 2011). It is argued that the normal policy-making process, particularly reaching a consensus during the initial stages of agenda-setting and policy formation, was not followed during the asylum crisis in 2015 which may have created a level of dissatisfaction among some Member States.

Establishing consensus between Member States is a key element of the policy-making process. Conceição-Heldt (2006:146) puts consensus building through negotiation at the forefront of defining the EU policy-making process, noting "decision making within the EU is accomplished through bargaining, it can be characterized as a negotiating polity." This emphasis on negotiation has impacted how Member States interact. For example, as

negotiations happen frequently, actors are "more willing to grant concessions, since they might soon be in a position to ask for favours in the following round (Bailer, 2010: 750).   As the "intensity of the EU's institutional activity gives an iterative nature to the negotiations between Member States and supranational bodies" (Lavadoux and Grasset, 2013:23). Finding consensus is a vital part of engagement and policy development within the EU, as it rests upon "bargaining between different actors rather than about automatic implementation of commands from the centre" (Zielonka, 2007: 194). Buonanno and Nugent (2013: 87) confirmed that during the negotiation process, particularly national representatives' engagement within the Council, there is normally no legislation created on which a Member State firmly disagrees; rather, every attempt is made to reach a compromise by modifying a policy in the key areas of national concern, or the worst-case providing concessions in another policy area. This emphasis on consensual decision-making ensures that the policy-making process runs smoothly, with no Member States disengaging because of an unfavourable decision, and an understanding that if a Member State is completely opposed to a piece of legislation, it is likely to be poorly implemented at the national level (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013: 93, 109). Therefore, engagement to find consensus between Member States is a key feature of the EU policy-making process (Juncos and Pomorska 2006, 2011; Chelotti, 2013; Lavadoux and Grasset, 2013).

In 2015, there was not a concession reached on the mandatory relocation of asylum seekers from Greece and Italy used the proposed mandatory relocation[81] mechanism for asylum applicants in clear need of protection within the EU. On the surface, this politically sensitive case of relocation appears to defy some key points related to consensus made in the literature above.[82] According to Trauner (2016: 322) the 2015 crisis breached the norm of consensus.

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[81] The difference between relocation and resettlement is significant. Angeloni and Spano (2018: 477) state: "Resettlement is a term used to describe the transfer of non-EU national or stateless persons, who have been identified as in need of international protection, to an EU State where they are admitted either on humanitarian grounds or with the status of refugee. Instead, relocation is a term used to designate the transfer of an applicant from the territory of the Member State, which is responsible for examining his or her application for international protection, to the territory of another Member State. The Dublin III Regulation (adopted in 2013 and replacing the Dublin II Regulation, which in turn replaced in 2003 the Dublin Convention of 1997) determines which Member State is responsible for examining an application for international protection."
[82] Chapter Two discusses the normal EU policy process for asylum policy. This specific vote did not follow previous norms of unanimity in the policy area, however the vote was argued to have a large majority according to QMV.

With regards to the norm of consensus, Roos and Orsini (2015) express the extent to which 2015 illustrates how contested and unclear the asylum policy-making processes and decisions have become. Before the 2015 crisis, Member States have not overruled each other on asylum issues because it is deemed to be a matter of sovereignty (Zaun, 2016). However, 2015 may have brought about a new manner of engagement at the EU level. Roos and Orsini (2015:2) state that the Home Affairs Ministers' Council meeting on 22 September 2015 in which Member States were "obliged" to assist the frontline countries of Italy and Greece.[83] Council decisions normally require every Member State to agree; however, in this unusual case four Member States were overruled and the decision was reached by a "very large majority."[84] Luxembourg's Minister of Immigration and Asylum[85] Jean Asselborn defended the decision: "We have an agreement in the Council by a very large majority, a majority going beyond that required by the Treaties. Today's decision reminds us that the European Union is founded on solidarity between member states, but also on solidarity with people in need of protection" (EU Council Presidency, 2015). The decision on 22 September 2015 is considered a "critical juncture in EU decision-making on refugee reception. More decisions which are not based on member state consensus can be expected" (Roos and Orsini, 2015:3). Roos and Orsini continue to stress that although Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)[86] may seem to be "efficient" during the policy-making process it may have negative ramifications as if consensus is not reached the policy may not be properly implemented or "anti-EU positions" may be presented at the national level such as with the Council decision on the relocation mechanism[87] (2015:2).

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[83] The first relocation was for 66,000 (15,600 from Italy and 50, 400 from Greece) and the remaining 54, 000 should be relocated the following year in the same proportion from Council of the EU, "Justice and Home Affairs, September 22, 2015. Available from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/jha/2015/09/22/. [Accessed September 23, 2015].

[84] Ibid.

[85] Luxembourg was Council President from July to December 2015.

[86] When the Council votes on a proposal by the European Commission a qualified majority is reached if two conditions are met: 55% of member states vote in favour and is supported by member states representing at least 65% of the total EU population. The Council (2015b) Available from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/qualified-majority/.[Accessed September 23, 2015].

4.3.2 Supranational and national approaches to migration

As previously stated, the European Commission has become a 'norm entrepreneur' meaning that it is committed to advancing normative behaviour, which can be seen as furthering EU integration. However, not all national representatives are as committed to deeper integration across the EU and may see this integration as being linked to the need to surrender certain rights, or 'denationalisation[88].' Denationalisation, in the area of migration, means the degree to which national competencies can shift towards supranational organisations, for instance due to international pressure for humanitarian protection (Sassen, 1996). The trend of 'denationalisation' of migration may have increased in 2015 through attempts to foster increased policy cooperation efforts.

Yet, elements of migration policy remained largely controlled by national governments pre-2015. A clear example is the external dimension of migration which previously was largely left to individual Member States (Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019: 2143), for example, Italy's bilateral agreements with Libya. The agreements between southern Member States and key external partners functioned for a significant period but required large diplomatic and financial commitments from the individual Member States. Indeed, these frontline migration countries of Italy, Greece, Malta and Cyprus have been burdened with the responsibility to deter irregular migration to the EU. For the most part, despite some ethical criticisms, the system of bilateral agreements functioned (Human Rights Watch, 2009). However, as a result of the sovereign debt crisis in 2008 onwards, the challenge of maintaining external relationships became increasingly difficult for some countries, such as Greece (Jones et al, 2016). This highlights the pressure placed upon the external borders of southern Member States. It also indicates the complex nature of the 2015 crisis because many factors contributed to the flow of refugees and other migrants through Turkey to Greece, then upwards along the Eastern migration route. These conditions show a gradual breakdown of the ability of southern Member States to sustain the diplomatic and financial commitments to third countries.

The process of denationalisation of migration seems to have shifted in 2015 with an increase in national approaches prevailing over a coordinated effort from the supranational level.

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[88] The process of a national reducing sovereign control.

Baldwin-Edwards et al., (2019: 2149) state that the "Balkan route" destabilised the CEAS and Schengen Agreements "in favour of restrictive and nationalised policies that appealed to domestic audiences." [89] Within certain national contexts, these decisions were upheld through the "lexicon of populism" (Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019: 2149) with the emphasis being placed upon security through border management with the assertion of sovereignty over borders. It appears in 2015, certain supranational policies such as the CEAS and Schengen were not as deeply embedded as previously thought, with some countries quickly overriding these policies in favour of nationalised security measures.[90] For instance, Figure 4c illustrates the different responses across Member States on the preferred level of immigration and asylum policy coordination (ECFR, 2020). This depicts the majority of national representatives' preference for immigration and asylum policy to be "all EU" shown the dark blue. This stance is contrasted against the fully national level shown in dark violet which are national representatives who would prefer for immigration and asylum to be a policy area which is dealt with "only [at the] national level." The national representatives which supported this stance include: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

Figure 4c: Member States' preferred actor level for common immigration and asylum policy

Source: European Council on Foreign Relations (2020).

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[89] In an unrelated policy area, health, it appears the Covid Crisis in 2020 triggered a similar national response the closure of borders. This may indicate a trend towards national governments reasserting border controls.
[90] Hungary is the best example of previous policies being abandoned due to national security measures.

Indeed, this indicates an ongoing lack of consensus between Member States. From 2015 the stages of the EU policy-making process, more specifically, agenda-setting and preference-formation are argued to not have been fully followed. This lack of consensus was coupled with the threat of denationalisation through which some Member States appear to be attempting to reassert control through national borders or domestic migration policy. Attempts of some national governments to regain 'control' may indicate the start of a change and differing policy engagement dynamics at the EU level.

Since 2015, two legislative packages were proposed in May and June 2016. However, "no legislative acts were adopted due to the files being blocked in the Council or other specific files being put on hold due to blockages on connected files" (Schmid-Drüner, 2021:4). Although minor changes were made to the CEAS through the proposal of regulations instead of directives which were adopted by the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE).[91] The main legislative suspension was the transformation of the EASO to the EUAA, which is pending until there is more progress made on the CEAS.[92]

On 23 September 2020, the Commission proposed the *New Pact on Migration and Asylum* to reinvigorate previous discussion on the CEAS with further discussions of responsibility and solidarity (ECRE, 2020). One of the main criticisms remains the Dublin system, which as highlighted earlier in the chapter, has been a contentious element because it fails to equalise any asylum burdens and the transfer of asylum seekers back to the first EU State of entry is a complex process. Despite this criticism, the *New Pact on Migration and Asylum* does make strides to take a more "humane approach" such as Article 21 which clearly defines vulnerable asylum seekers to include: minors (accompanied or not), elderly, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, persons with disabilities, serious illnesses or mental disorders, in

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[91] Schmid-Drüner, 2021 identifies the changes adopted by the LIBE Committee: clarity in asylum procedures (adopted 25 April 2018), adjustments to the Qualification Directive on who qualifies (adopted 15 June 2017), changes to the reception conditions including more "dignified and harmonised standards" for access to food, housing, health care and essentials (adopted 25 April 2017), a "corrective allocation mechanism" to help Member States under pressure (adopted 19 October 2017), high levels of enforcement of Eurodac including finger printing as early as age 6 (adopted 20 May 2017).
[92] European Council (2020) "EU Asylum Reform." Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/eu-asylum-reform. [Accessed 9 September 2021].

addition to survivors of torture, rape or other serious forms of violence, including human trafficking (Commission, 2020a). However, these vulnerable asylum seekers, including children, may still experience migration related detention depending upon the Member State of entry (ECRE, 2020). Progress was made on vulnerable asylum seekers, but the procedural guarantees remain limited (Gazi, 2021).

The external dimension of migration, particularly funding has increased. Firstly, the funding released to Turkey for a Facility for Refugees was for the amount of EUR 6 billion (European Commission, 2019). Despite the contributions, tensions remain between the EU and Turkey due to President Erdoğan's re-opening of Turkey's border to the EU as an attempt to show power and geopolitical leverage (Aras, 2019). Concerns also remain about the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees within Turkey, with scholars such as Greenhill (2016: 328) questioning the classification of Turkey as a safe third country due to the increase in human rights violations and issues with the freedom of the press. The funds allocated to the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund have increased to EUR 9.9 billion[93] and EUR 1.22 billion to the EASO (Schmid-Drüner, 2021:6).[94]

4.3.3 Contending migration discourse themes: genuine asylum seekers, unease and securitisation

The chapter has illustrated the complexity of EU migration discourse. The complexities are summarised by Velluti (2014:5) well:

> Any investigation of the EU asylum system and the creation of CEAS necessarily requires an analytical approach which unpacks its inherent tensions[95]. The multifaceted conflict that underlies this area of EU law results from a rather uneasy cohabitation between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism[96] and opposing objectives and discourses, namely *economic, efficiency/management and securitization goals versus human rights protection, fairness and justice.*[97]

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[93]The Asylum Migration and Integration Fund increase refers for the EU budget from 2021-2027.

[94] The funding to the European Asylum Support Office, and possibly the future EU Asylum Agency, is for the period of 2021-2027. There are also additional trusts: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and EU Regional Trust Fund (Schmid-Drüner, 2021).

[95] Again, the CEAS is one of the pillars of the *European Agenda on Migration*.

[96] The tensions between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism were reflected in section 4.2 the analytical evolution, as issues of asylum and migration were first framed in an intergovernmental manner in the Maastricht Treaty, but later moved to the first community pillar. Finally under the Treaty of Lisbon the pillar structure no longer exists, but legislation is largely proposed by the European Commission for the approval of the Council and EU Parliament.

[97] Italics were placed by the author and do not occur in the original text by Velluti (2014).

National representatives must engage and find the correct balance between these complex discourses both at the national and EU levels.[98] This subsection focuses on two areas which are relevant to migration discourse and provide a basis for the arguments developed in Chapters Six and Seven. This sub-section considers the discourse surrounding 'genuine' asylum seekers and the concept of unease being used as a political tool.

During the 2015 crisis the term "mixed flows" was used to refer to individuals both in need of protection and those seeking better economic conditions (Zapata-Barrero, 2010:139), or genuine versus non-genuine asylum seekers. The term 'mixed flows' creates categories between those eligible and ineligible for protection within the national asylum system. I contend that this approach is mistaken because the distinction between refugees and other migrants can be very slim (Kuhnhardt, 2017:138). The classification between an asylum seeker and a 'genuine refugee' can be contentious. Often there are multiple factors and timelines that are linked, thus determining if one qualifies is complex (Boswell, 2000: 541; Zapata-Barrero, 2010: 139). The recognition of an asylum seeker as a refugee or person in need of subsidiary protection[99] can be challenging due to difficulties in providing evidence to support the claim. In some cases, access to documentation may not be possible due to failures or insufficiencies of the applicant's state. The lack of evidence can create the possibility of the construction of the narrative of an asylum seeker as 'genuine' or 'non-genuine. In the case of 'non-genuine', the terms 'illegal' or 'irregular' have been used which some national representatives may further link to "unlawful, undocumented, economic migrants, bogus refugees or invaders" (Gyollai and Amatrudo, 2019: 435-6). Non-genuine asylum seekers may be presented as costly from the financial and societal perspectives. Lavenex (2001a) argues the framing of financial and societal costs has caused a shift from the discussion of protection norms to the price asylum seekers place upon a society. The costs related to

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[99] Council Directive 2004/83/EC. Subsidiary protections is, "the protection given to a non-EU national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee, but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown to believe that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin or, in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and who is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32004L0083. [Accessed 14 June 2020].

maintaining a functioning asylum system may be flipped by some national representatives to gain domestic support. For example, Trauner (2016: 314) states that,

> if a government decides to spend more on issues such as pensions and social welfare than on receiving asylum seekers, the administrative weakness of reception centres and asylum systems is a political choice that may aim at making the country less attractive for this group of migrants.

Huysmans (2000: 762) argues that "representing migration as a cultural challenge to social and political integration have become an important source for mobilizing security rhetoric and institutions." Therefore, the usage of the terminology non-genuine may be used for political purposes.

Increased asylum applications may result in amplified security discourse because the "dividing line between internal and external security became increasingly obsolete mainly as a consequence of the growing importance of transnational as well as other challenges to security which defy the distinction between domestic and international security" (Lutterbeck, 2005: 231, also see Loescher, 1993). The unease of refugees and migrants crossing the EU borders may be perceived as a challenge to the norms and processes of the sovereign state due to irregular entry (Bigo, 1996; Huysmans, 2000; Lavenex, 2001a; Guild 2006) and the irregular nature of border crossings can be framed as a "threat to national stability" (Lavenex, 2001b: 857) due to the clandestine nature. Securitisation attempts have been linked to attempts to justify curbing the number of applicants or creating restrictions by linking irregular entry and terrorism, criminality and the potential for wider social unrest (Huysmans, 2000). Bigo (2002: 63) states:

> Migration is increasingly interpreted as a security problem. …. The popularity of this security prism is not an expression of traditional responses to a rise of insecurity, crime, terrorism, and the negative effects of globalization; it is the result of the creation of a continuum of threats and general unease in which many different actors exchange their fears and beliefs in the process of making a risky and dangerous society.

Boswell and Hough (2008) describe migrants as posing a challenge to the norms and processes of the state which can foster a sense of unease. This unease may be linked to sovereignty, which has been framed as border control, or the regulation of whom may enter a territory. Dauvergne (2008:44) argues that migration has transformed into the "last bastion of

sovereignty." This implies that much of the migration debate is not actually about migration; rather, about the perceived loss of sovereignty due to increased migration decisions being made at the EU level.

As shown earlier in the chapter, the increase in applications created unease, but the movement from unease to a threat is socially constructed (Bigo, 2002). A possibility to move from the framing of unease to the construction of a threat is with language. For instance, the term 'inauthentic' may be further linked to illegality. Illegality is a powerful frame that places the whole population of asylum seekers as outside of the law (Dauvergne, 2008). Crépeau and Hastie (2014) see this construction of the threat of irregular entry of migrants as a "critical step in institutionalising policies and practices" and creates an obligation for a state to respond. Policy development can focus on an identified threat or problem. Politicians both at the national and EU levels can develop policies to 'assure' the population that the government is in control. The Dublin Regulation[100] is an example of this because it allows a degree of control over migrants. Huysmans (2000:751) argues that the Dublin Regulation is "implicated in the development of restrictive migration policy and the social construction of migration into a security question." This securitisation may impact the most vulnerable individuals with some being moved outside of the EU (Baldaccini et al., 2007, Guild 2009). Policies such as Dublin Regulation can demonstrate control over asylum seekers but raise ethical concerns over the transfer of asylum seekers (Guild et al., 2014:84).

4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has sketched the evolution of EU migration policy and analysed some key dynamics of the policy-making process such as the increased role of the European Commission. EU migration policy-making has gradually advanced through policy failures, which trigger further developments to improve the policy. This chapter suggests that based on the urgency of the crisis in 2015, the normal policy process, in terms of the stages of the policy process and establishing a compromise, were not upheld. A 'high majority' was used as an 'efficient' solution to respond to the crisis; however, this approach has not been embraced by all Member States which is argued to break with the norms of Council decision making with

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[100]Also referred to as the Dublin Regulation III.

regards to asylum policy. In Chapter Six, I consider how these issues are framed at the national level, which is anticipated to have an impact upon the policy approach in terms of the forms and actions of engagement at the EU level discussed in Chapter Seven.

Chapter Five
Early EU policy engagement and migration engagement by the Czech Republic and Hungary: 1990s-2014

5.1 Introduction

In this first empirical chapter, I shift from the conceptual elements to begin the construction of my argument: post-2004 Member States are not passive during the EU policy engagement process, and I consider how the Czech Republic and Hungary engaged at the national and EU levels. In order to argue that there was a shift in migration engagement by Czech and Hungarian representatives in 2015, it is necessary to first ascertain how these representatives previously engaged, I begin with evidence of previous national migration dynamics within the Czech Republic and Hungary during two time periods: pre-membership (1990s-2004) and early membership (2004-2014). Secondly, I move on to consider early EU level engagement by Czech and Hungarian representatives directly after communism during the same time period.

In Section 5.2, I begin by showing the differences in early migration to the Czech Republic and Hungary from the early 1990s to 2004. During this period, the EU's accession conditions required candidate countries to improve border procedures and controls, which forced a re-definition of former relationships with countries in the region (Grabbe, 2002; Byrne et al., 2004). I argue relationships with neighbouring countries were significant, and the re-definition of the former ties presented different challenges for the Czech Republic and Hungary.

Section 5.3 moves to consider the national migration policy dynamics during early EU membership from 2004 to 2014.

Section 5.4 considers EU level engagement from the early 1990s to 2004. The initial timing of the engagement (Liefferink and Andersen, 1998 and Börzel 2002) by Czech and Hungarian representatives with the European Commission after the fall of communism can help to understand the shift in engagement in 2015. The concept of first-movers[101] is argued to be an advantageous strategy to construct a policy-making reputation at the EU level. It is asserted that the initial interactions set expectations for future EU level engagement. These roles

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[101] The term "first-mover" was created by Heritier (1996) when she argued the importance of early engagement in the policy making process.

within the policy-making process are not static; however, changing to a more active role within the policy-making process requires representatives to show the capacity to actively contribute with policy alternatives or leadership (Jänicke, 2005).

Section 5.5 provides evidence of the early migration engagement at the EU level by Czech and Hungarian representatives after membership from 2004 to 2014.

5.2 National dynamics and EU migration policy: 1990s to 2004

After the fall of communism, border control practices shifted in the Czech Republic[102] and Hungary. The previously heavily controlled communist borders lessened, and these countries began to experience increased levels of migration. This meant there was a need to develop new border policies and practices. This section highlights the initial differences between these countries.

5.2.1 The Czech Republic

After communism, the Czech Republic was classified as a migration source country due to a large number of citizens emigrating; however, migration policy for individuals arriving in the Czech Republic also began to develop (Ministry of the Interior, 2020). There were some initial impediments in the development of this policy area due to a lack of clarity on which Czech ministry should be responsible for developing migration policy. The main possibilities for this role included the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Trade and Industry, with the security-oriented Ministry of the Interior gradually becoming the driving force behind migration policy (Kušniráková and Čižinský, 2011:499, and also see Baršová and Barša, 2005).[103]

The first important steps in the development of national asylum policies in the Czech Republic included the ratification of the 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol, and then later reconfirmed the convention and protocol in 1993 as the Czech Republic[104] (Drbohlav, 2005:1).

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[102] Until 1993, Czechoslovakia was a country; however, for clarity I use only the Czech Republic.
[103] An interview with a Former Czech Ambassador 2 (Prague. February 2, 2018) also see Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, "Migration", Available from: https://www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/article/migration.aspx. [September 10, 2019].
[104] This reconfirmation was done as the Czech Republic, to replace the previous declaration by Czechoslovakia.

However, the initial development of asylum policy was complex because it is estimated that approximately 90% of asylum applicants did not want to stay in the Czech Republic, rather the asylum applicants planned to continue to Western countries (Sýkorová, 1993: 4).[105] Even if Czech authorities granted them refugee status, they planned to leave for other Western European countries, as confirmed by Eurostat in Figure 5a. As shown in Figure 5a, the main outcome of asylum applications from 1991 to 1996 was "disappearance," which meant the asylum applicant left the Czech Republic at an early stage in the asylum process.

The disappearance of many asylum applicants created a difficult situation for policymakers. According to a former Czech Ambassador to the EU, the departure of so many asylum applicants from the Czech territory "soured the perception of asylum seekers" [106] because they were unwilling to accept help from the Czech Republic (Sýkorová, 1993).

Figure 5a: Czech asylum decisions (1991-1996)[107]

Source: Eurostat Working papers (1999).

The overall number of asylum seekers to the Czech Republic remained low during the early 1990s (see Figure 5b). Table 5a shows that during the early 1990s asylum seekers largely originated from the region, with the exception being applicants from Afghanistan.

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[105] An interview with a representative from the Czech UNHCR (Prague. June 9, 2016).

[106] An interview with a Former Czech Ambassador 1 (Prague. September 24, 2018).

[107] Eurostat Working papers "The Czech Republic: on its way from emigration to immigration country," May 1999 Available from: http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP11_Czech_Republic.pdf, p. 51 [September 15, 2020].

Figure 5b: Asylum applications to the Czech Republic (1990-2003)[108]

Source: Czech Ministry of the Interior (2019).
* Asylum data not provided from 1990 to 1997.

Table 5a: Main countries of asylum applications to the Czech Republic (1991-1996)

Country of asylum	Period	Country of citizenship[109]	Percentage
Czech Republic	1991 to 1996	Bulgaria	35%
	1991 to 1996	Former USSR	23%
	1991 to 1996	Romania	19%
	1991 to 1996	Afghanistan	4%
	1991 to 1996	The former Yugoslavia	3%

Source: Eurostat Working papers (1998).

The second major step in the development of national migration policy was the replacement of the 1965 Aliens Act with the 1992 Aliens Act. The 1965 Aliens Act was "lacking in concept and systematic design" (Drbohlav et al., 2009:46) and unsystematic (Drbohlav et al. 2010).

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[108] For more information see: Ministry of the Interior, "International Protection," https://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/souhrnna-zprava-o-mezinarodni-ochrane-za-rok-2019.aspx. [September 15, 2020].
[109] The table summarizes the top five nationalities to apply for asylum in the Czech Republic.

The Aliens Act (1992) updated previous legislation but failed to fully address the complexities of migration.[110] For example, in the early 1990s, the migration policy approach taken by the Czech Ministry of the Interior was referred to as "liberal tolerance" (Baršová and Barša, 2005: 222) or as liberal, yet chaotic (Drbohlav et al., 2009:46) due to temporary permits being issued with limited controls. In practice, many short-term residence and work permits were issued; though, the conditions to obtain permanent residence were extremely difficult if the applicant did not have Czech family members[111] (Kušniráková and Čižinský, 2011:500; also see Drbohav et al., 2009: 46). Table 5b shows that during the 1990s migrants were mainly classified as 'economic migrants' from countries within the region, or countries with previous ties from the communist period including Vietnam, China and Mongolia (Horákova, 2005: 16). Thus, the initial policy approach to migration in the Czech Republic favoured short-term labour opportunities and had very limited legal pathways for long term residence.

Table 5b: Foreigners with permits over 90 days residing within the Czech Republic[112]

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Bulgaria	3772	4282	4302	6584	5959	5030	4018	4101	4183	4030
China	2907	4210	4774	4501	4191	4328	3551	3309	3196	3031
Moldova	96	176	314	2145	3142	2939	2147	2477	2760	3261
Mongolia	418	477	681	1080	1370	1165	950	1153	1472	1542
Poland	20021	23053	24491	25019	22166	18278	17050	16489	15996	15766
Romania	1368	1628	2029	2382	2694	2577	2390	2304	2302	2273
Russia	3611	4387	6697	8938	10029	16906	12964	12423	12813	12605
Slovakia	16778	39725	50255	52178	49621	40362	44265	53294	61102	64879
Ukraine	14230	28158	46303	43402	52684	65883	50212	51825	59145	62282
Vietnam	9633	14213	17620	20950	22875	24824	23556	23924	27143	29046
Yugoslavia	4026	4824	5007	3826	3894	4106	3680	3269	3204	---[113]

Source: Czech Statistical Office (2008).

However, the Czech Republic's initial national approach to migration policy began to shift in the mid-1990s due to the need to harmonise national policy to EU standards (Drbohlav et al., 2009: 47) coupled with the Czech Government's efforts to decrease the number of individuals

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[110] "Zákon o pobytu cizinců na území České a Slovenské Federativní Republiky" translation: Act on the Residence of Foreigners in the Territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (1992) Available at: https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1992-123. [September 25, 2020].

[111] Essentially until 1992 was necessary for foreigners to marry a Czech citizen to obtain permanent residence (Drbohlav et al., 2009: 46).

[112] Due to some difficulties statistical files from the Czech Statistical Office file R04 https://www.czso.cz/csu/cizinci/4-ciz_pocet_cizincu was obtained by e-mail from Radek Valenta via-email (November 26, 2020).

[113] Reporting of the data discontinues; Yugoslavia is no longer recognized.

working illegally.[114] The start of harmonisation towards EU migration standards required changes to Czech national laws. The most significant change was the necessity to redefine previous relationships, for instance, in the case of changes to the visa policies required by the EU were particularly harsh for post-Soviet nationals (Staszkiewicz et al, 2012: 1). The changes differed from the previous approach by the Czech Republic, through which post-Soviet nationals were free to enter the Czech Republic through bilateral agreements and apply for a visa, but under the new conditions, these migrants had to apply for a visa through a Czech Embassy abroad with proof of sufficient funds and health insurance (Druhlov et al., 2009: 49).[115]

Furthermore, to align with the EU standards on migration the Czech Government passed Resolution Number 55 which outlined six principles of migration (Ministry of the Interior, 2020).[116] The principles in Resolution 55 highlighted the importance of legal migration and measures aimed to reduce illegal migration as well as criminality. The document asserted national control of migration policies alongside European cooperation, which demonstrated that migration is a policy area in which Czech representatives were firmly committed to retaining national control. For instance, national representatives argued that firm control of migration should be retained by the Czech Republic.[117] This point showed the early importance which Czech representatives placed on migration policy being an area controlled at the national level rather than the supranational level.

5.2.2 Hungary

Hungary's experience migration was earlier than the Czech Republic's due to asylum seekers escaping Ceaușescu's regime in Romania, the majority of these applicants were ethnic Hungarians as well as some Romanians and East-Germans (Szoke, 1992: 308). Initially, these

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[114] The main legislative acts are No.326/1999 (Residence of Aliens in the Territory of the Czech Republic) and No. 325/1999 (Asylum).

[115] Czech Law No.326/1999.

[116] The Czech Ministry of the Interior (2020) "The Czech Government's Migration Policy Principles," Available at: https://www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/article/migration.aspx?q=Y2hudW09MQ%3d%3d. Also see The Czech Ministry of the Interior (2020) https://www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/article/the-czech-government-s-migration-policy-principles.aspx [Accessed 1 October 2020].

[117] An interview with a Former Czech Ambassador 1 (Prague. September 24, 2018).

asylum applicants were not perceived to be problematic because the majority spoke Hungarian and shared similar cultural and religious traditions (Juhász, 2003; Móricz, 2013).

In 1989, Hungary ratified the Geneva Convention; however, the government requested an exception[118] to only allow asylum seekers from Europe (Juhász, 2003) which was a clear negation of international protection norms. Despite failing to adopt the full 1967 Protocol Relating the Status of Refugees, the initial enthusiasm by Hungarian representatives to welcome asylum seekers from Europe and alignment with western institutions led to the creation of a new Office of Refugee Affairs, which swiftly received six million USD from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Szoke, 1992: 308). Hungary's initial policy approach appeared to favour ethnic Hungarian asylum applicants. Fullerton (1996: 502) argues that "less favourable camp conditions and the restrictions on freedom of movement appear to fall more heavily on those asylum seekers who are not ethnic Hungarians. The reality of refugee status in Hungary is that it is largely reserved for ethnic Hungarians." The favourable treatment for ethnic Hungarians called into question the degree to which the Geneva Convention functioned, or if the asylum process was simply a legal route to allow ethnic Hungarians the option to return to the 'motherland'. This is further illustrated in Table 5d which shows the highest asylum application rates from neighbouring countries with ethnic Hungarian diaspora (Juhász, 2003; Móricz, 2013).[119] Table 5c and Figure 5c provide an overview of the number of applicants during this time period.

Table 5c: Main countries of asylum applications to Hungary (1994-1996)

Country of asylum	Period	Country of citizenship	Percentage
Hungary	1994 to 1996	The former Yugoslavia	65%
	1994 to 1996	Romania	16%
	1994 to 1996	The former USSR	13%

Source: Eurostat Working papers (March 1998).

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[118] Essentially Hungary adopted the Geneva Convention without the 1967 Protocol.
[119] Kocis (1998) estimates that during the 1990s approximately 24.6% of ethnic Hungarian were living outside of the border, which was approximately 3,300,000 people.

Figure 5c Asylum applications to Hungary (1995-1999)

Source: UNHCR Yearbook (2004).

Migration policy formation began with the Act on the employment of foreigners (1991) followed by the Act on Hungarian Citizenship (1993) and the Act on Entry, Stay and Immigration of Foreigners (2001a), more commonly referred to as the Aliens Act. The Aliens Act outlined the timeframe and conditions to acquire permanent residence and citizenship, which favoured ethnic Hungarians (Juhász, 2003). Previous migration was mainly through scholarship programmes from countries that supported the 'communist struggle' (Sik and Zakariás, 2005).

The opening of the Hungarian economy in the early 1990s allowed the arrival of different groups of foreign merchants, artisans and agricultural workers (Juhász, 1997: 69). Many of these individuals were Chinese entrepreneurs, and due to the liberal approach directly after the fall of communism, the exact number of entrepreneurs who arrived directly after the borders opened was unclear. It is estimated that approximately 30,000 Chinese individuals arrived (Szalai and Le Torre, 2016). The arrival of these foreign nationals from outside of the region was a new phenomenon for Hungary and the initial policy approach was unclear (Kováts et al., 2007: 158).[120] The other migrants mainly were ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring

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[120] An interview with a representative from the Hungarian UNHCR (Budapest. June 28, 2016).

countries of Romania, the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. The importance placed upon the protection of ethnic Hungarians resulted in the creation of two streams of migration policy development; one for ethnic Hungarians and another for all others.[121] The clearest preferential treatment was seen in the naturalisation process by which ethnic Hungarians experienced an expedited process.[122] Prime Minister Horn's position shifted during his time in office from 1994 to 1998 when he asserted former Prime Minister Antall was incorrect to overemphasize issues with ethnic Hungarian diaspora, he stated it was counterproductive [as a result of the upcoming EU membership] (Horváth et al., 2002).

Regardless of ethnicity issues, Hungary's initial liberal migration policies allowed many seasonal or temporary workers (IOM, 1996). Although Table 5d shows the number of resident foreigners in Hungary remained relatively stable, with a slight decline closer to EU accession in 2003. Despite the numbers remaining stable the initial migration policy began to be questioned and concerns were raised to ensure border practices were in line with EU practices. This discourse and various Parliamentary Commissions resulted in the creation of the Act on Borders and the Border Guards (1997) [123] and the Act on Asylum[124] (1998) that brought more restrictive measures; however, these measures continued to favour ethnic Hungarians (Juhász, 2003).

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[121] An interview with a representative from ECRE (Brussels. October 20, 2015) and An interview with a representative from the Hungarian UNHCR (Budapest. June 28, 2016).

[122] European Commission, "Asylum Seekers and Refugees a Statistical Report," (2001) https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3888793/5811953/KS-AP-01-012-EN.PDF/c7a92c39-781e-41c5-8cef-0729eac07072 p. 56. [September 18, 2020].

[123] Hungary: Act XXXII (1997) on Protecting the Borders and the Border Guard (repealed) [Hungary], 1 January 2002, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ed4bab82.html [accessed 27 October 2020].

[124] The Act on Asylum (1998) lifted the previous geographic restriction to allow asylum applicants from anywhere in the world.

Table 5d Total foreigners residing in Hungary from (1995-2003)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Foreigners[125] residing in Hungary from Europe	122, 917	122, 411	120, 558	123, 923	124, 084	125, 784	93, 197	97, 640	98, 230
Non-European Foreigners[126] residing in Hungary	15, 184	17, 543	21,948	24, 340	26, 161	27, 341	16, 831	18, 789	17,658
Total Foreigners	138,101	139, 954	142, 506	148, 263	150, 245	153, 125	110, 028	116, 429	115, 888

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2004).

Further changes to Hungary's migration policy did not come until 1998, which was a unique period due to the first Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (FIDESZ) coalition and increased EU harmonisation pressure before accession. As Hungary approached EU membership concerns increased about the potential hardening of EU external borders and visa regimes, particularly concerns for the ethnic Hungarians residing in neighbouring countries grew.[127] In their political manifesto FIDESZ called for increased involvement with ethnic kin through nation-building.[128] Potential visa issues developed into an attempt by the government to create a legal link with descendants of former Hungarian citizens in neighbouring countries by a special status law ahead of the EU harmonisation process called the 'Status Law 2001'[129] (Sagvari, 2011). Essentially, the Status Law aimed to extend nation-building outside of Hungarian borders.[130] Ieda (2004:12) argued that developing a Status Law was seen to "serve as a remedy against the new iron curtain, the EU Schengen border." The Status Law created a complex debate between the political right, mainly the FIDESZ coalition, which advocated for ongoing cultural and economic nation-building with Hungarians outside and other national representatives on the left of the political spectrum, which argued citizenship was too extreme

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[125] Please note: the data does not include asylum seekers and refugees. These numbers are separate.

[126] Pease note: the data does not include asylum seekers and refugees. These numbers are separate.

[127] An interview with a Former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 1(Budapest. June 5, 2015).

[128] The FIDESZ election manifesto of 1998: Szabadság és jólét, a polgári jövő programja, 1998: 135. http://www.odrportal.hu/web/guest/record/-/record/MOKKAI0008132937 [October 15, 2020].

[129] The Government of Hungary (2001b) also called the Act on Hungarians living in neighbouring countries Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring States. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f460e764.html [October 28, 2020].

[130] The concept of Hungarian nation building in Slovakia and Romania was not viewed as a positive development. A detailed discussion of this is outside of the scope of this thesis, but it is important to note that the concept of a 'Status Law' created political discord (Ieda, 2004: 230).

of a reaction (Vivi, 2005). The debate was deeper than simply the extension of citizenship because it forced a complex discussion of who qualified to be Hungarian.

The Council called the Status Law an "apparent contradiction" to the wider EU model of minority protection.[131] However, despite the opposition, Prime Minister Orbán continued with the development of the law. The opposition of Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP) called for FIDESZ not to introduce dual citizenship rather to continue the MSZP's practice of issuing certificates of Hungarian nationality, which would allow ethnic Hungarians' access to national benefits and services (Sarka, 1999). In the end, FIDESZ did accept the argument put forth by the MSZP and the Status Law was put into place to offer certificates of nationality (Csekő, 2002).[132] The rights of ethnic Hungarians to migrate to Hungary was, and arguably continues to be, a significant element of Hungarian Foreign Policy.

Increased pressure was placed on Hungary to ensure a high level of border control because during this period Hungary was a geopolitical buffer area to the EU (Grabbe, 2000). Pressures came from some EU Member States, such as Austria which, "indicated its displeasure with Hungary's liberal policies as early as 1990" due to the high number of foreign nationals apprehended at the Austrian border (Szoke, 1992: 317). Table 5e shows the number of asylum applications to Hungary in the early 2000s which remained comparable with other countries in the region, such as the Czech Republic.[133] Political pressure was placed on Hungary to align to EU practices, which were more restrictive than the Hungarian practices in the 1990s.[134]

Table 5e Asylum applications to Hungary (2000-2003)

	2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Total applications	7, 801	9,554	6,412	2, 401
Refugee Status	197	174	104	178
Subsidiary protection	-	-	-	-
Tolerated stay	608	209	1304	772

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2004).

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[131] The European Council, "Council Directive 2000/43/EC (June 2000) Equal treatment irrespective of race or ethnicity," https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32000L0043 [November 1, 2020].
[132] Csekő, (2002).
[133] For example, please see Figure 5b.
[134] An interview with a Former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 1 (Budapest. June 5, 2015).

The analysis of these two cases shows that Czech and Hungarian border legislation became more restrictive during the process of harmonisation to EU standards. The initial migration experiences differed, particularly asylum, with Hungary accepting a high number of ethnic Hungarians and the Czechs having limited experience due to the high percent of asylum seekers disappearing after their claim was lodged. These experiences, as it will be shown in the next two chapters, shaped different perceptions of national migration expertise and capacity.

5.3 National dynamics and EU migration policy: 2004 to 2014

This section continues to focus on the national migration dynamics in the Czech Republic and Hungary but shifts to the timeframe from 2004 to 2014. Despite EU membership, national migration policy did not greatly change during early membership. I illustrate the patterns before EU membership continued.

5.3.1 The Czech Republic

In this sub-section, I show that Czech migration numbers, both foreign residents and asylum claims remained relatively stable (Tables 5f, 5g 5h). Due to the stability and overall low numbers migration policy was not a key priority at the national level.

Table 5f: Largest groups of foreigners in the Czech Republic (2004-2014)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Ukraine	78, 268	87, 789	102, 594	126, 526	131, 965	131, 977	124, 339	104, 179	112, 647	105, 239	104, 388
Slovakia	47, 352	49, 445	58, 384	67, 880	76, 034	73, 446	71, 780	81, 245	85, 807	90, 948	96, 222
Vietnam	34, 179	36, 832	40, 779	50, 955	60, 258	61, 126	60, 301	55, 006	57, 360	57, 406	56, 666
Poland	16, 265	17, 810	18, 894	20, 607	21, 710	19, 273	18, 242	19, 053	19, 235	19, 452	19, 626
Russia	14, 473	16, 269	18, 562	23, 301	27, 176	30, 393	31, 939	26, 708	33, 281	33, 415	34, 684

Source: Czech Ministry of the Interior (2015a).

Table 5g: Total asylum applications to the Czech Republic (2004-2014)

2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
5, 459	4,021	3, 016	1,878	1,656	1, 258	833	756	753	707	1, 156

Source: The Czech Ministry of the Interior (2015a).

Table 5h: Main nationals lodging asylum claims in the Czech Republic (2004- 2014)[135]

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Belarus	249	128	156	154	106	54	49	71	54	22	31
China	138	77	40	22	4	2	4	7	7	8	9
Georgia	164	22	90	19	10	12	18	17	9	15	19
Iraq	52	34	42	68	39	34	29	9	5	11	22
Nigeria	37	27	19	46	27	12	30	18	12	22	26
Russia	1585	253	147	119	49	33	66	47	40	54	43
Syria	3	1	12	15	11	31	47	23	68	69	108
Ukraine	558	185	130	61	76	36	70	152	174	146	515
Vietnam	153	39	28	12	13	18	14	46	54	49	64

Source: Czech Ministry of the Interior (2015a).

Despite Czech migration numbers remaining stable, the centre-right Government of Občanská Demokratická Strana (ODS) led by Topolánek began to strengthen capacity through the establishment of the Analytical Centre for Protection of State Borders and Migration to increase border management and monitoring[136]. This centre was established on an inter-ministerial basis within the Ministry of the Interior under the Department of Asylum and Migration Policy (DAMP) to recommend migration measures, evaluate security with a focus on illegal migration, formulate a strategy for border management, and monitor visas.[137] The formation of this analytical centre illustrated an increased interest of the Czech Government to focus on migration, and a move towards a more securitised approach despite migration and asylum numbers remaining stable. Based on the low migration numbers, the creation of this analytical centre may have been an attempt by the government to assert the perception strength and increased control over Czech borders.

There are numerous actors involved to varying extents at the Czech national level. The main migration actor in the Czech Republic remains the Ministry of the Interior, which has tended

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[135] Asylum applicants according to 'first instance' (i.e. first application).
[136] An interview with a Czech Member of the European Parliament 1 (Brussels. January 30, 2018).
[137] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, "Asylum, Migration and Integration," https://www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/article/migration.aspx?q=Y2hudW09MTE%3d [September 28, 2020].

to favour a security-based approach (Kušniráková and Čižinský, 2011:499, also see Baršová and Barša, 2005).[138] Within the Ministry of the Interior is the Department of Asylum and Migration Policy (DAMP) which is responsible for the practical delivery of migration policy. Despite the institutional clarity, the role of the Prime Minister changed frequently during this period. The lack of clarity was further exacerbated by the informal, yet vocal perspective, of President Klaus, who projected a strong Eurosceptic tone[139] on migration issues early in the Czech Republic's EU membership (Hanley, 2004a). Differing perceptions of the EU between the offices of the Prime Minister and President continued (Bugge, 2003; Hanley, 2004a, 2004b; Baun 2010). The Czech President has no formal role in the policy-making process but contributes to public opinion and has the responsibility to intervene in the event of a non-confidence vote in the Chamber of Deputies, which was a frequent occurrence from 2004 to 2014 (Baun, 2010). Political divides were common during the period from 2004 to 2014, there were eight different Prime Ministers and complex governing coalitions (Table 5i). A former Czech Ambassador states that the volatile domestic political environment harmed EU policy development due to the lack of long-term priorities.[140]

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[138] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador to the EU 2 (Prague. February 2, 2018).

[139] Klaus was first Prime Minister from 1992 to 1997 and later was President from 2003 to 2013.

[140] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador to the EU 2 (Prague. February 2, 2018).

Table 5i: Czech Prime Ministers and Coalitions (2004 –2014)

Years	Prime Minister	Coalition
2004	Špidla (ČSSD)	ČSSD, KDU-ČSL and (US-DEU)[141]
2004-2005	Gross (ČSSD)	ČSSD, KDU-ČSL and (US-DEU)
2005-2006	Paroubek (ČSSD)	ČSSD, KDU-ČSL and (US-DEU)
2006-2009*[142]	Topolánek (ODS)	2006- ODS 2006-2009* ODS, KDU-ČS and SZ
2009-2010	Fischer (Independent)[143]	No coalition
2010-2013	Nečas (ODS)	ODS, Top 9 and VV[144]
2013-2014	Rusnok (Independent)	ČSSD[145] and KDU-ČSL
2014	Sobotka (ČSSD)	ČSSD, ANO and KDU-ČSL

Source: The Government of the Czech Republic (2020), compiled by the author.

5.3.2 Hungary

The substance of the Hungarian migration policy from 2004 to 2014 can be questioned because Hungary was not able to develop a comprehensive migration strategy, instead, ad hoc policies were used to respond to challenges.[146] The start of EU membership was a period of 'formal adoption', however, there was a dichotomy between the formal adoption of the EU acquis and the behavioural changes at the national level within Hungary (Tétényi et al., 2016). Although the lack of migration policy development was not tested during early membership because the number of foreign residents and asylum seekers remained relatively static until 2013 as shown in Tables 5j, 5k, 5l).

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[141] Unie Svobody–Demokratická unie (US-DEU) was active from the late 1990s to 2011.
[142] Early into 2006 the ODS lost a vote of confidence. ODS remained in power but formed a coalition with the Christian Democrats and the Green Party.
[143] Prime Minister Fisher was a non-partisan 'care-taker' government put in place due to the fall of the Government during the middle of the EU Presidency. (Král et al., 2009).
[144] Public Affairs VV was a centrist Party which later became LIDEM (Order of the Nation) (Král et al., 2009).
[145] ČSSD left the coalition which triggered the collapse of the government.
[146] An interview with a Hungarian Member of Parliament 3 (By telephone. December 17, 2018) and an interview with a Hungarian NGO Menedék (June 28, 2016).

Table 5j: Largest Groups of Foreigners residing in Hungary (2004-2014)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
China	6790	6856	8584	8979	10 218	10709	11173	11829	10114	11504	12716
Romania	55676	67529	66183	66951	65836	66368	72720	76878	41596	34795	30924
Russia	2244	2642	2759	2760	2787	2923	3275	3483	2864	3390	3657
Serbia	12367	13643	12111	12706	17186	17015	17197	16301	8281	4894	3051
Ukraine	13096	13933	15337	15866	17289	17610	17241	16537	11894	10849	8317

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2020).

Table 5k: Asylum requests by nationality to Hungary (2004-2014)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Afghanistan	38	22	13	35	116	1194	702	649	880	2328	8796
Algeria	-	-	22	48	19	11	35	56	59	1116	98
China	64	165	275	417	55	45	12	10	6	5	11
Georgia	288	114	175	131	165	116	68	21	12	41	40
Iraq	36	18	68	136	125	57	48	54	28	63	497
Kosovo	-	-	-	-	1266	1786	379	211	226	6212	21453
Nigeria	73	89	109	86	56	66	37	22	27	455	257
Pakistan	54	40	18	15	246	41	41	121	327	3081	401
Russia	35	37	63	51	21	27	23	11	4	11	19
Serbia	180	243	384	911	327	536	67	27	20	88	145
Syria	10	18	32	48	16	19	23	91	145	977	6857
Ukraine	45	26	38	19	4	9	9	5	2	7	37
Vietnam	105	319	406	862	42	73	37	11	3	8	28

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2020).

Table 5l: Total Asylum Requests to Hungary (2004 -2014)

2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
1,600	1, 609	2, 117	3, 419	3, 118	4, 672	2, 104	1, 693	2, 157	18, 900	42, 777

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2020).

Based on limited migration pressure, legislation focused mainly on the Hungarian diaspora through the National Responsibility Programme (2005). The National Responsibility programme provided the Hungarian diaspora with vocational and educational training and was beneficial to Hungary because it provided easily integrated labour (Butler, 2007: 1128).

When FIDESZ returned to power in 2008, migration discourse shifted. For instance, the UNHCR reported that indirect refoulement[147] through Serbia or Ukraine increased (UNHCR, 2012). FIDESZ also increased the importance of the Ministry of the Interior with the increased use of police stations and prisons as detention facilities for asylum seekers while their applications were processed.[148] FIDESZ was argued to be "subservient to ethnic-based naturalization and national migration" while authorities kept careful control over all other migrants (Juhaz et al., 2015: 34).

FIDESZ's ethnicity-based approach is most clearly presented in the Hungarian Citizenship law (2010). The practice of dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians has been highlighted to be a complex domestic discussion in Hungary, but as neighbouring countries became EU members, including Romania (2007) and Croatia (2013), the original purpose of 'keeping relations' lost merit. Although Romania and Croatia are not yet members of Schengen[149], it is difficult to argue that Schengen presents any relational constraints; consequently, the decision to provide dual citizenship to other EU nationals is unclear (Výborný, 2013). Thus, migration into Hungary continued to favour ethnic Hungarians and all other policy development remained marginal.

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[147] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2018a) states that: "Under international human rights law, the principle of non-refoulement guarantees that no one should be re-turned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm. This principle applies to all migrants at all times, irrespective of migration status." Indirect refoulement is the possible return of an asylum seeker from a third country to the situation above.

[148] For example, see: The European Commission, "The Organisation of Asylum and Migration Policies," (October, 2012b. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/asylum-migration/12a.hungary_factsheet_institutional_chart_october2012_en.pdf [Accessed 15 September 2020].

[149] At the time of writing, 2021, these Member States were not yet part of Schengen.

5.4 Policy engagement and EU migration policy: 1990s to 2003

The end of communism created the possibility for countries in Central and Eastern Europe to begin the transition towards membership in western institutions such as the EU[150] (Batory, 2002). This section suggests that each potential candidate country's timing of discussions with the European Commission varied (Greskovits, 2000; Hanley, 2004b). The literature identifies early engagement as a "particularly promising strategy" (Haverland and Liefferink, 2012: 180) to influence policy-making and has been referred to as the first-mover advantage (Heritier, 1996), pace-setting (Borzel, 2002) or a constructive pusher (Liefferink and Skou-Andersen, 1998). Heritier, Borzel, Liefferink and Skou-Andersen's work focuses on Member States, but in this section, I extend and adapt the concept of early engagement to non-Member States. It should be noted because Czech and Hungary were yet to be Member States, their representatives' ability to shape EU policy was limited[151]; consequently, this section focuses on early attempts of national representatives to forge relations with the EU. This section analyses the initial timing of Czech and Hungarian representatives with the EU and considers how early engagement contributed to the formation of each country's reputation within the EU policy-making process.

5.4.1 The Czech Republic

Czech representatives conceptualised the possibility of EU membership as a part of wider discussions. Hanley (2004a: 692) argues, the Czech's 'return to Europe'[152] encapsulated many different socio-political issues, as it was, "not only a geopolitical shift, but became a synonym for modernisation, democratisation and market reform." Defining these complex questions was compounded by pressing internal political issues, which ultimately resulted in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1992. The division of Czechoslovakia was peaceful but required intense negotiations between Czech and Slovak representatives (Baun and Marek, 2010: 3).[153] Consequently, the initial interactions between the European Commission and

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[150] The EU is only one example, NATO membership was also prioritised, but NATO membership is outside of the scope of investigation in this thesis.

[151] Before membership a candidate country's ability to shape EU, policy may be limited, but not impossible, as shown by the example of Sweden in environmental policy prior to membership in 1995 (Jänicke, 2005).

[152] The return to Europe signifies countries that were 'cut off' during communism, not geographically but in terms of relationships, institutions and ideology. The end of the communist period allowed post-communist countries the possibility to 'return'.

[153] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador to the EU 1 (Prague. September 24, 2018).

Czech national representatives were slow and hesitant due to other more pressing national concerns.

Circumstances impacted the ability of Czech representatives to be "early to engage with EU officials", such as the collapse of communism being classified as "abrupt" rather than gradual (Elster et al., 1998). The Soviet influence impacted the Czech institutional culture and may have slowed the start of any substantive Czech engagement with western institutions. There was less liberty in social and political realms, due to communism being more severe in the Czech Republic after the Prague Spring in 1968 when the system became extremely rigid and closer to the Soviet model (Camyar, 2010:144, 145).[154] Discussions between the Czechs and the EU were also delayed due to divides in domestic political discussions during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Rather than the concept of being 'reunited' with Europe bringing Czech society together, the prospect of EU membership caused political divisions (Hanley, 2004a: 692).

In the early 1990s, there were two dichotomous visions of how the Czech Republic should engage with the EU. On one side was the former President, Václav Havel, who championed the EU; in opposition to him was former Prime Minister Václav Klaus who reluctantly accepted the EU out of 'convenience rather than love.'[155] Both men were public figures since 1989, held high public offices and were effective in "promulgating their views at home and internationally" (Bugge, 2003: 180). Baun (2010: 144) stated that the "two main conceptualisations of the EU in the Czech political discourse also imply two different understandings of the term national interest," and ultimately, these differences had an impact upon Czech engagement. For example, Klaus defined the EU in the Czech language as a "koliště" (gladiatorial arena) in which nation-states competed against fellow Member States to effectively represent their national interests (Hanley, 2004: 528). Klaus's approach was highly intergovernmental and depicted the EU as a battle between various interests. Conversely, Havel constructed a very different understanding of the EU.[156] Havel depicted the EU to be a

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[154] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador 1 (Prague. September 24, 2018) and an interview with a former Czech Ambassador 3 (Prague. November 16, 2018).

[155] For example, see: Václav Klaus, "Romantické flirtování nebo blížící se manželská smlouva?" (September 26, 2001) https://www.klaus.cz/clanky/328 [September 15, 2018].

[156] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador 1 (Prague. September 24, 2018).

"functionalist solution to globalisation" or a method of the representation of shared values within the broader international context (Baun, 2010: 144; Fawn, 2003: 206). This divided Czech public opinion over EU membership, and as a result, it was difficult to advance initial negotiations due to the competing discourses.

One of the most divisive issues between these two leading figures was the interplay between the concepts of sovereignty and identity. Havel argued, "sovereignty and identity are not the same things, and that surrendering parts of the country's sovereignty to a supranational body does not in any way threaten Czech national identity" (Bugge, 2003: 187). Klaus, by contrast, saw sovereignty and identity as intrinsically linked and advocated for the Member States within the EU to view themselves as a "Union of Sovereign States" (Bugge, 2003: 188). These differing constructions of the EU have continued to impact Czech engagement with the EU.[157]

The divisive view of the EU framed the first post-communist election which was held in June 1992 and resulted in a victory for the ODS led by Klaus. ODS won the election, not based on hope and enthusiasm for the EU; instead, on a programme, "rejecting ideas that a country which has just escaped the Russian colonial yoke can enrich a tired democratic Europe with new and original initiatives and approaches" (Hanley, 2004b: 517). Klaus stated that the EU will not fix all the Czech Republic's problems and used the election campaign to unveil 'Czech Euro-realism'. Klaus's Euro-realism has been argued to be the "fullest and most sceptical assessment of EU integration produced by any mainstream party in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 (Hanley, 2004b: 528).[158] ODS advocated that the EU should "remain an elite intergovernmental project" and the party's policy stance went as far as an internal party resolution which banned the transfer of any further Czech policy control to the EU level (Baun, 2010: 138-140).

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[157] See example see: Europeum, "Czechs and EU as a brand,"http://www.europeum.org/data/articles/znacka-eu-summary-report-final-december-2019.pdf, p. 9. [Accessed 3 January 2020].
[158] Arguably, Hanley was correct in 2004a. However, it is possible that currently at the time of writing this thesis [2021] that Hungary exhibits more Euroscepticism than the Czech Republic.

The ideological competition between Klaus and Havel resulted in domestic political fragmentation. Tensions between the Prime Minister and the President resulted in slow administrative reforms.[159] However, the European Commission officials helped to advance the Czech's progress towards membership through the identification of problems and solutions (Camyar, 2010: 150-2). The slow engagement was evident, this statement is supported by a former Czech Ambassador[160] interviewed:

> Timing was always an issue. Better sooner of course, but it was hard at times, Czech time is different from Brussels time, they [in Brussels] saw things as more urgent as they understood them better, whereas the Czechs felt things were not so urgent. It was necessary to be the one that operated between these two different worlds.

Czech representatives' initial engagement with the Commission could be defined as cautious and slow. Based on my analysis of the initial engagement in the 1990s between the Czech Republic and the EU, I suggest that Czechs were initially classified as 'passive' at the EU level and this classification has had a degree of influence on the Czech reputation of engagement at the EU level.

5.4.2 Hungary

The timeframe of Hungary's transition away from communism was more gradual and less regimented than other countries in the region (Camyar, 2010: 143). After communism, Hungarian representatives were aware of the advantages EU membership could bring (Ágh, 1999: 841).[161] Political representatives and the general public[162] were both enthusiastic to establish the relationship as the focus was on "symbolic or geopolitical arguments supporting Hungary's return to Europe, without much discussion about what this would entail in more concrete terms" (Batory, 2002a: 3).

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[159] An interview with a representative from a Czech NGO The Association for Integration and Migration (Prague. April 17, 2015).

[160] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador 3 (Prague. November 16, 2018).

[161] An interview with a former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 1 (Budapest. June 5, 2015); An interview with a Hungarian Member of the European Parliament (Budapest. June 4, 2015); an interview with a Hungarian Member of Parliament 3 (By telephone. December 17, 2018).

[162] In a 1998 European Parliament poll 56% of the Hungarian population supported EU Membership. European Parliament, "Briefing 41: Public Opinion on enlargement in the EU Member States and Applicant countries," 22 April 1999. Available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/41a3_en.htm. [Accessed 22 September 2020].

The relationship between Hungary and the EU was framed in historical terms to justify integration (Butler, 2005: 113). In the early 1990s, there was a competition between the MSZP and the opposition Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF) to exhibit which party had policy positions deemed closer to the EU mainstream (Camyar, 2010: 147). Hungarian bureaucrats engaged early with the EU, and "through their regularised communications, Hungarian policy-makers and bureaucrats developed skills used for dealing with western international institutions" (Greskovits, 2000: 135)[163]. The prioritised interactions resulted in Hungary being the first post-communist country in Central and Eastern Europe to sign a trade and cooperation agreement with the EU (Van Ham, 1994: 171).

The promotion and importance placed on relations with the EU cut through political and sociological cleavages in Hungarian society. For example, Butler (2005: 114) referenced an official from the European Commission's Budapest Delegation Office who stated: "the most important thing concerning EU enlargement for all Hungarians, never mind what political party, what region of the country, or what social class they belong to, is the fact that it is a reaffirmation of Hungary's adherence to Western European values." This articulates the importance Hungarians placed on the transition to Western European values. *Agenda Hungary* (1997:11) reaffirmed this "since 1989 there has been a large degree of consensus among Hungarian political forces in support of Hungary's objective of EU membership" (Ágh, 1999; Camyar, 2010).[164]

The extensive level of support enabled Hungarian politicians to prioritise EU membership. Hungary was the first of the post-communist states to open dialogue with the EU (Ágh, 1999: 841; Batory, 2002:1; Agenda Hungary 1997: 11). This early and arguably bold position rebelled against previous Soviet rule and highlighted that Hungarian politicians and diplomats were ambitious[165] enough to act swiftly in a policy area deemed to be of national importance such as an agreement with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). This was the most "far-reaching" agreement signed by any of the post-communist countries (Batory,

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[163] An interview with a former Hungarian Member of the European Parliament (Budapest. June 3, 2015).
[164] An interview with a former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 2 (Budapest. June 27, 2016).
[165] Batory (2002b:2) uses the term ambitious particularly in reference to Antall's Programme of National Renewal (1990).

2002). A former Czech Ambassador to the EU involved in the transition process provided further evidence of his Hungarian colleagues' determined engagement "Hungary was the first mover, and not afraid of the potential risks. Hungary served as an example to all of us" [other potential candidate countries].[166] Hungary's early engagement with the EU was significant because it contributed to the formation of Hungary's reputation as an 'active'[167] country when compared to some of the other post-communist states.

5.4.3 Discussion

Overall, the new relationship with the European Commission brought concerns over migration and border crime from the east; consequently, the Commission encouraged Central and Eastern European countries to tighten border controls, which forced a re-definition of previous relationships (Grabbe, 2000: 520, 526; Grabbe, 2002). However, it should be noted that the European Commission's call to tighten border controls was balanced with the human rights norms set out in the Copenhagen Criteria (1993)[168]. The nexus between security, border management and the protection of human rights began for the Czech Republic and Hungary, notably not as a result of internal pressure, but as a result of external pressure from the EU. For instance, the creation of the relationship with the EU forced changes in national migration practices. One of the key policy documents which furthered migration integration towards the EU standards was the European Commissions' proposal the *Agenda for a Stronger and Wider Europe* (1997) that called for the adoption of the Refugee Convention, the Dublin Convention and the wider EU asylum acquis (2000: 52-54).[169] The European Commission's agenda was accompanied by interventions from the neighbouring EU Members of Austria and Germany which played a key role in the advancement of migration policies vis-à-vis national capitals (Byrne et al., 2004: 356). The re-definition of previous relationships and the development of a new migration policy had different implications for the Czech Republic and Hungary.

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[166] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador 1 (Prague. September 24, 2018), also see Camyar (2010).
[167] The term 'active' is adapted from Börzel (2002).
[168] European Parliament (1998), "Briefing No 20, Democracy and respect for Human Rights in the enlargement process of the European Union." Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/20a2_en.htm. [Accessed 29 September 2020].
[169] The European Commission's Agenda for 2000 was released in 1997. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:80958a30-795a-4152-99a5-cf86f455a211.0008.01/DOC_2&format=PDF. [Accessed 29 September 2020].

5.5 Policy engagement and EU migration policy engagement: 2004 to 2014

EU membership meant the start of formal engagement within the EU's policy process. With regards to migration policy, the core components such as CEAS were developed before the post-2004 Member States joined the Union. This presented initial challenges for the post-2004 Member States because "the original EU Members participated in the design and developments of the game" (Ágh, 1999:840). Ágh inferred that the inability to actively shape elements of EU policy was a source of frustration for representatives of post-2004 Member States. Strong regulating[170] older Member States such as Germany, France and Sweden with interest in migration were heavily invested in the harmonization of the basic asylum standards across the Union (Zaun, 2016). Any change to the direction of migration policy during this period would have required a tremendous amount of political and diplomatic effort from any Member State. During this period, neither the Czech Republic nor Hungary experienced pressure from high numbers of migrants or asylum requests as illustrated in section 5.3. Thus, I argue Czech and Hungarian representatives did not feel the need to invest in the resources to attempt to change or influence the direction of asylum policy at this time.[171]

During this period the Czech Republic and Hungry were both involved in migration policy due to chairing the EU Council Presidency. EU Council Presidency requires the leading Member State to play an active role in policy-making, particularly in strategy (setting priorities) and tactics (facilitating negotiations). Each Member State has ample time to prepare for the Presidency; however, crises require a quick response in which differing governmental capacities are highlighted. However, the Lisbon Treaty reduced the role of the EU Council's Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister substantially (Vida, 2011; Balázs, 2011:3, 5, Ágh, 2012). This section considers if holding the Presidency had any impact upon Czech and Hungarian migration preferences.

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[170] Zaun (2016) argues strong regulators [also referred to in the literature as high regulators] have actively shaped EU policy-making, whereas weak regulators have barely left a mark.
[171] An interview with a former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 1 (Budapest. June 5, 2015), an interview with a representative from a Czech NGO- Association for Integration and Migration (Prague. April 17, 2015) and an interview with a former Czech Ambassador 2 (Prague. February 2, 2018).

5.5.1 The Czech Republic

The Presidency of the Council marked a significant shift in migration policy engagement for the Czech Republic (Baun and Marek, 2010; Kaniok, 2014; Kaniok and Šteigrová, 2014).[172] From an institutional perspective, the Prime Minister's Office used the 2009 EU Presidency as justification to increase migration control (Šlosarík, 2016: 100). This meant that the EU Presidency created a greater degree of streamlining of migration policy development in the Czech Republic, which arguably increased policy clarity, ameliorating a degree of the lack of clarity previously discussed.

The Czech Presidency of the EU Council was preceded by concerns about possible negative consequences for the Union (Beneš and Karlas, 2010: 69). The most vocal opponent to the Czech EU Council Presidency was France. France completed the EU Presidency directly before the Czechs, and French officials voiced concerns over the ability of the Czechs to complete the term due to the Euro-zone crisis and the complex international circumstances[173] (Traynor, 2008).[174] Arguably, to a certain extent, the French representatives' premonitions were warranted. The Czech motto was "Europe without Barriers," which included the three E's of economy, energy and the EU (Lehtonen, 2009). [175] The three E's were a reflection of Czech policy interests, but the EU Council Presidency priorities highlighted the Eurosceptic stance taken by the Government headed by Prime Minister Topolánek of ODS (Beneš and Karlas, 2010:71; Drulák, 2010). Notwithstanding the limited priorities, the Czechs took over the Presidency at a difficult period of international diplomacy for the EU. The main concerns included a Russian-Ukrainian dispute which resulted in a gas supply crisis to the EU, and increased hostilities in Gaza between Palestinians and Israelis, which forced the Czechs to act as "crisis management' (Král, et al., 2009: 68). This pressure compounded because of

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[172]An interview with an official from the Czech Committee of European Affairs (Prague. August 23, 2018); An interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation1 (October 20, 2015), An interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation2 (October 20, 2015).

[173] For example, the situation in Gaza.

[174] For more information see: Ian Traynor (2008) for the Guardian, "Fears as the Czech Republic takes over the helm of the EU, Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/01/czech-republic-eu-persidency-helm [Accessed 4 November 2020].

[175] Cameron (2009) for Radio Prague International, "Czechs unveil 'Three Es' as one 'E' energy -causes crisis in Europe, January 6, 2009. Available from: https://english.radio.cz/czechs-unveil-three-es-one-e-energy-causes-crisis-europe-8588658 January 6 [Accessed 4 September 2015].

domestic infighting, and the Czech Government collapsed because of a non-confidence vote[176]. The collapse was unfortunate but is argued to be handled as best as possible (Baun and Marek, 2014:15).[177] The optimistic perspective is because many national representatives feared the collapse would provide Eurosceptic President Klaus with the ability to exacerbate problems at the EU level, but the 'caretaker' non-partisan Prime Minister Fischer was able to avoid any further disruptions to the Presidency (Král et al., 2009).[178]

Despite negative aspects, there were positive developments during the first Czech Presidency such as the increased representation of EU interests.[179] This was articulated by a Member of the Czech Permanent Representative who stated, "The Presidency was a time during which we better served our interests by serving the wider interest."[180] As a result of serving the greater EU interest, policy areas such as migration including asylum were understood from a different perspective. Within a document published by the Czech government entitled, *Achievements of the Czech Presidency: Europe without Barriers* migration progress was mentioned. More specifically the document included the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, which outlined the conditions for third-country nationals to enter and reside in the EU with Blue Cards[181] (The Government of the Czech Republic, 2009). Other developments during the Czech Presidency included the launch of the first asylum package including amended reception conditions directive as well as Dublin and EURODAC Regulations. The first asylum package was developed over a significant amount of time[182] and cannot be heralded as a Czech accomplishment, but the package did require Czech representatives' involvement in the final stages (UNHCR 2009). Border security and practices remained an important issue for the

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[176]The Czech Government, "Zaveru Ceskeho Predsednictvi," June 29, 2009 Available from: https://www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/tiskove-konference/tiskova-konference-k-zaveru-ceskeho-predsednictvi--29-6-2009-59860/. [October 14, 2018].

[177] An interview with an official from the EU Council (Brussels. February 4, 2019).

[178] An interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015).

[179] An interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015), an interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 2 (Brussels. October 20, 2015), and an interview with an official from the Hungarian Permanent Representation (Brussels. February 4, 2019).

[180] An interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015).

[181] The blue card scheme, also known as Council Directive 2009/50/EC is an EU-wide work permit for highly skilled non-EU citizens.

[182] The CEAS was under development since 1999 (Lavenex, 2001a).

Czech Republic and national representatives used the Presidency as an opportunity to enhance the second Schengen Information System.[183]

Overall, the results of the first presidency depicted Czech's leadership role negatively (Beneš and Karlas, 2010:71), as passive and slow (Erlanger, 2009) which resulted in damage to the country's reputation as an international actor (Drulák, 2010: 373). Šlosarík (2016: 91, 96) stated that the passive reputation was due to the time Czech representatives took to develop confidence as policy-makers at the EU level. Prime Minister Topolánek established a rule for representatives not to be "the first one to issue a position on a draft and not to be alone"[184] which articulates the limited ability of the Czech Republic to lead at the EU level. Moreover, migration policy was not a key concern for the Czech Republic; however, experiences such as the Presidency presented the opportunity for direct engagement with the policy area. The Presidency advanced representatives' expertise in the EU policy process and expanded relationships with the Commission and other Member States, [185] which is argued to have increased internal and external confidence in the Czech's ability to play a more collaborative role in policy development (Kaniok, 2014).

5.5.2 Hungary

After accession in 2004, Hungary entered a 'new era' of policy-making, by which representatives could play an active role in attempting to influence various areas of EU policy development. With regards to EU affairs coordination and planning at the national level, Hungary is quite a straightforward case with "explicit and comprehensive" efforts in a highly centralised structure (Batory, 2012: 924). EU membership contributed to the increased centralisation of migration policy-making structures due to the clear role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as the principal coordinator of European Affairs (Ágh and Rózsás 2003; Vida and Pyszna, 2002). A former Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that this approach offered clarity and ensured policy development progressed.[186] Batory (2012: 925) highlighted the increased centralization of the Hungarian approach, which emphasized EU policy

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[183] An interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 2 (Brussels. October 20, 2015).
[184] An interview with an official from the Czech Committee of European Affairs (Prague. August 23, 2018).
[185] An interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015), an interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 2 (Brussels. October 20, 2015).
[186] An interview with a former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 2 (June 27, 2016).

coordination including ministerial responsibility, horizontal coordination, and 'one voice'. Ministerial responsibility gave individual ministries the responsibility to manage and monitor policy developments, draft the Government's position and maintain relations with various NGOs and civic groups. The second component, horizontal coordination, referred to controls placed upon the ministries to ensure the outcomes reflected the wider national stance by the State Secretariat for European integration (within MFA),[187] the inter-ministerial committee[188] and working groups. The wider national stance of horizontal coordination had the potential to slow down the policy process, but clear hieratical structures aimed to prevent holdups.[189] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs communicated directly with the Permanent Representation in Brussels and this centralization is argued to have created clear a highly unified Hungarian voice at the EU level.[190]The centralization of the Hungarian policy process allowed for unity in the official position which is contended to have been a precursor for the strong position taken in 2015.

Similar to the Czech case, the 2011 EU Presidency was an opportunity for Hungarian representatives to engage in areas outside of the country's regular policy interests. The Hungarian Presidency occurred during a time-sensitive period because the previous EU Council presidency, led by Belgium, set an ambitious framework for Hungary to continue. This ambitious programme was not fully completed, particularly the parts of the programme which included the development of the CEAS. Researchers from the European Council of Refugees and Exiles stated that "apart from reaching a political agreement on the content of the extension of the scope of the long-term residence directive to beneficiaries of international protection, none of the other legislative files prioritised by the Belgian Presidency was successfully concluded" (Ágh, 2012). This indicates Hungary prioritised other issues on the agenda.

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[187] The State Secretariat for European Integration is within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was later renamed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Organisation," https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/organisation [October 15, 2020].
[188] The inter-ministerial committee includes the following ministries: Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Justice as well as the Permanent Representation (Batory, 2012).
[189] An interview with a former Minister of Foreign Affairs 1 (June 3, 2015).
[190] An interview with a former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 1 (June 3, 2015) and an interview with a former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 2 (June 27, 2016).

Hungary's priorities were seen as "limited but solid" by German EU officials and the focus tended to be mainly on the accession of former communist countries Kálnoky (2011:11). Migration and border concerns within the region were highlighted including the acceleration of Croatian accession, which could be further linked to the relationship with ethnic Hungarians[191] and the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen Zone; however, the Eastern Partnership[192] was deferred to the Polish Presidency (Balázs, 2011). Therefore, Hungarian priorities tended to favour regional interests.

With regards to the crisis in Libya, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011:45)[193] stated that:

> The Arab Spring, unexpected as it was, did not find Hungary unprepared, a fact that – going beyond our national interests – also brought added value for the Hungarian Presidency of the EU. Thanks to Hungary's network of contacts, favourable image and – not least – the performance of Hungarian diplomats active in the region, Hungary.

This statement is not widely supported, for example, Balázs (2011: 9) disagreed stating that the "Hungarian Prime Minister, representing the EU Council presidency, was completely left out of the EU–Libya summit meeting hosted by France with representatives from the EU, UN and the Arab League in Paris on March 19, 2011." This shows a divergence between rhetoric and reality. Moreover, the Arab Spring did result in the unexpected and "significant increase in secondary asylum movements" within the EU due to the Libyan crisis (Győri, 2011: 11) resulted in the prioritisation of increased controls of the external EU borders.[194] There was a focus on irregular movements as the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011:45)[195] stated, "illegal migration, terrorism, religious fanaticism and ever stronger illegal commercial networks in the region pose a challenge, both directly and indirectly, to Hungary's national

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[191] The Croatian Census information reports the Hungarian population as follows: 1981 (25, 439 ethnic Hungarians,) 1991 (22, 355), 2001 (16, 595) and 2011 (14, 648, or 0.03%). https://www.dzs.hr/eng/censuses/census2011/censuslogo.htm [November27, 2020].

[192] The Eastern Partnership is a joint policy initiative to strengthen relations between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. EU Neighbours (2020) "The Eastern Partnership." Available from: https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/policy/eastern-partnership. [Accessed 9 September 2021].

[193] See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary. (2011).

[194] An interview with a representative from the Hungarian branch of the UNHCR (Budapest. June 4, 2015) and an interview with a representative from the Hungarian NGO-Hungarian Helsinki Committee (Budapest. June 9, 2015).

[195] See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary (2011) .

security and socio-economic development." In his address to the European Parliament in 2011, Orbán highlighted the improved border controls:

> Another reason why the European Union is stronger today is because we can now protect our borders more efficiently than six months ago. We have made the decisions that create the necessary capacities for the European Union for border protection and migration prevention, and we have made important steps towards deepening and enlarging the Schengen Agreement.[196]

This highlights the importance Hungarians placed on Schengen controls. Conversely, despite Orbán's speech, the Hungarian record on border management was less clear. ALDE's representative Lambsdorff stressed that "Freedom dies little by little – whether it is freedom of the press or freedom to travel…. This whole area – freedom to travel, asylum policy, revision of the Dublin II Regulation, the attack on the freedom to travel within the Schengen area – is where we would have liked to have seen a greater commitment from your Presidency."[197] This statement illustrates that despite the Hungarian Presidency framed a success by some the overall leadership was questioned due to 'democratic backsliding' of media freedoms.[198]

Overall, Hungary's 2011 EU Council Presidency was seen by officials in Brussels and other EU capitals as a positive effort by Hungarian experts, yet there was a degree of criticism on the role of the Hungarian government, particularly the dominance of domestic agendas (Armitage et al., 2011; Balázs, 2011, pp 5, 7; Ágh, 2012: 68). The Hungarian experts "professionally administered"[199] the presidency but this is contrasted against the "parochial domestic politics" presented (Armitage et al., 2011, pp. 34–5). The constitutional changes and the new media legislation were a departure from democratic norms (Gati, 2012: 66, 71). In terms of migration legislation, the Libyan crisis resulted in deeper engagement and the increased prioritisation and emphasis on the protection of Schengen borders.

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[196] Viktor Orbán quoted (2011) from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-7-2011-07-05-ITM-005_EN.html?redirect. [Accessed 14 July 2021].

[197] Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, on behalf of the ALDE Group, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-7-2011-07-05-ITM-005_EN.html?redirect. [Accessed 14 July 2021].

[198] The European Parliament, "The European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2011 on media law in Hungary, Available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2011-0094_EN.html [Accessed 30 November 2020].

[199] The positive evaluation included the 'Six Pact' legislation, Roma inclusion and the advancement of Croatia's membership negotiations.

5.5.3 Discussion

Table 5m provides an analysis of early migration engagement by the Czech Republic and Hungary based on the empirical evidence presented in this chapter. Firstly, the evidence indicates that the Czech Republic and Hungary remained migration policy fence-sitters from 2004 to 2014. Both Member States showed minimal EU level migration engagement, with the key period of engagement for both during the country's term as EU Council President. Secondly, from 2004 to 2014 there was no evidence of the Czech Republic or Hungary attempting to slow down or block migration legislation. This argument can be further linked to migration and asylum numbers remaining low, hence limited pressure for representatives to attempt to set or slow down policy development. The empirical evidence does not indicate any attempts by the Czech Republic or Hungary to initiate or prevent migration legislation which are the criteria for policy pace-setters. However, the case of Hungary does illustrate the prioritisation of policies targeted towards ethnic Hungarian diaspora even enduring criticism from the EU level. Despite Hungary's prioritisation of certain ethnic migrant policies, neither of these countries could be considered pace-setters.

Table 5m: Migration engagement by the Czech Republic and Hungary (2004-2014)

	Czech Republic	Hungary
Pace-setter[200]		
Active attempts to shape European policies according to preferences	No evidence of active attempts to influence	No evidence of active attempts to influence
High regulating states (high standards, need for policy coordination)	Not a high regulatory state for migration	Not a high regulatory state for migration
High regulatory states want to avoid weak regulators from "dumping"	Not a high regulatory state for migration	Not a high regulatory state for migration
National governments need to respond to domestic concerns	Domestic concerns did not pressure migration engagement	Ongoing ethnic diaspora issues
High regulating states hope to avoid the costs of adapting	Not a high regulating migration state	Not a high regulating migration state
Foot Dragger		
Unlikely to stop the policy, but the aim is for some type of compensation	No evidence of attempts to stop migration or CEAS formation	No evidence of attempts to stop migration or CEAS formation
Tend to attempt to engage 'late' in the process	Yes, late to the process, but marginal attempts to engage	Yes, late to the process, but marginal attempts to engage
Fence Sitter		
"Don't initiate, don't prevent"	Yes	Yes
Low Action Capacity (Lewanski, 1998 in Börzel 2002)	Yes, evidence of the Ministry of the Interior being uncoordinated	No, there was a high degree of centralisation

Source: Compiled by the author.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter argued that there were differences between the Czech Republic and Hungary in how they initially engaged with the EU, and eventually on migration policy at the national and EU levels. Hungary was originally classified as a first-mover during the pursuit of EU membership; consequently, the country developed a reputation for being active at the EU level. Conversely, the Czechs were initially classified as passive and this initial classification is argued to be difficult to shift. The accession process from the mid-1990s to 2003, the increased engagement with the EU resulted in a shift in former relations, namely countries with previous ties in the region. In the Czech case, the evidence indicates that the re-definition of previous relations was accepted quite easily, and the EU procedures enhanced certain migration and border practices. The Hungarian case differed due to the complexity of domestic pressure to ensure relations were kept with Hungarian diaspora. Thus, the re-

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[200] The conceptualization of the forms of engagement adapted from Börzel (2002).

definition of past relationships was more complex for Hungary than for the Czech Republic. Finally, Czechs did not make EU migration policy a priority during early membership. Czech migration policy was agued to be fragmented, and as a result, engagement at the EU level lacked clarity. EU Migration policy engagement by the Hungarians during early membership was also marginal; however, my analysis revealed greater centralisation and emphasis upon the Schengen border within Hungary's position at the EU level.

Chapter Six
Migration policy-making: the national dimension

6.1 Introduction

The national level is asserted to be a prerequisite to analyse the interactions between states (Moravcsik, 1993: 481). To understand more about the extent of policy engagement, and how this engagement occurred, this chapter focuses on the national dimensions of the migration crisis. Literature analysing migration discourse at the national level within post-2004 Member States is expanding (Androvičová, 2016; Lindstrom and Cătuţi, 2018; Krzyżanowska and Krżyanowski, 2018; Krotký, 2019; Melegh et al., 2021). This chapter adds to my empirical work by considering the national dimension of the migration crisis in the Czech Republic and Hungary which is argued to impact agenda-setting (specifically which issues are placed higher on the EU migration policy agenda) and policy-formation. The extent of political power held by Czech and Hungarian governing representatives at the national level is used to examine the framing of key elements of the migration crisis and highlight differences between these Member States.

Section 6.2 starts by considering the degree to which national political power has been consolidated by Czech and Hungarian national representatives. A greater extent of political consolidation is argued to indicate elevated political support and increased access to resources (Cottingham, 1970).

In Section 6.3, I take the degree of the consolidation of political strength at the national level and use political speeches, official statements, and interviews to consider national representatives' attempts to frame key migration discourses. Frames are "central organizing ideas that provide coherence to a designated set of elements" (Ferree et al., 127). The concept of framing is combined with substantive emphasis choice (Hänggli and Kriesi, 2010: 143) to highlight how representatives use certain frames, either to emphasise selected themes or downplay others. I argue these differences in national dynamics, specifically the consolidation of power, have contributed to the types of frames used. More specifically, in section 6.3, I consider how Czech and Hungarian representatives have attempted to foster the perception of insecurity (Waever, 2004:13) at the southern Schengen borders. Both Babiš (2017) and Orbán (2015) have attempted to frame uncontrolled migration at the Schengen border as a threat, but I argue there are important differences in the key elements highlighted by both leaders, which indicates differences in national preferences.

Section 6.4 continues in the same manner but focuses on the Czech and Hungarian representatives' attempts to frame migration as a "threat to society" (Waever, 1993). The different framing of key migration issues is used to suggest differences in the national migration preferences and provides further evidence against portraying the Czech Republic and Hungary as unified policy actors.

6.2 National political strength[201]

National political strength can be understood as the degree of capacity (Rose and Greeley, 2005:6) which national representatives have to enact their specific policy preferences. However, despite this definition, political strength remains quite an abstract term, so I have delimited political strength to focus on the results and dynamics from the National Elections, Presidential Elections,[202] and European Parliamentary Elections. The focus in this section is upon the degree of consolidation of power at the national level which is argued to impact support for the government's policies and access to resources. The differences between the Czech Republic and Hungary, in terms of the degree of strength held by key national representatives, is argued to impact the approach of framing in sections 6.3 and 6.4.

6.2.1 The Czech Republic

The fragmentation and limits of Czech political strength, shown most clearly through the frequent replacement of the Prime Minister, discussed in Chapter Five, has continued, but to a more limited extent since 2015. This subsection asserts that there are many divides between political parties, but there is also a clear division of power between national political actors. For example, power is divided between, the Prime Minister who is the head of the Chamber of Deputies, the President and the Senate. Elections for the European Parliament are also used to illustrate the high degree of partisanship. In terms of partisan divides, since the National Election in October 2013, the Česká strana sociálně demokratická (ČSSD) and Akce nespokojených občanů (ANO) have been the most dominate parties on the political stage; however, neither party has commanded enough electoral support to form the government

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[201] Please note, I refer to political parties according to the party names in Czech or Hungarian. On p.11, I have included a list with the party abbreviations and English translations.
[202] In Hungary, the President is elected Members of the National Assembly rather than by direct election.

independently.[203] I evidence this chronologically, by analysing the political divides based on the elections for the Czech Chamber of Deputies and European Parliament.[204]

First, the division of power in the Czech Chamber of Deputies. Between January 2014[205] and December 2017 former Prime Minister Sobotka of the ČSSD party maintained a coalition government with ANO and the Křesťanská a demokratická unie-Československá strana lidová (KDU-ČSL) as shown in Figure 6a.

Figure 6a: Czech National Election results (2013-2017)

Source: Czech Statistical Office (2013).

This meant that up to 2017, Sobotka's government was formed from three political parties which spanned the spectrum from the left-ČSSD, to the centre-ANO, to the centre-right-KDU-ČSL (Havlík and Voda, 2016). The governing coalition up to the 2017 was complex because of the variety of interests involved. Cooperation within the coalition was particularly difficult due to Babiš, the leader of ANO, who served as Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister during this period. Babiš attempted to undermine the former Prime Minister

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[203] As shown in Chapter Five governing coalitions are very frequent within Czech politics at the national level.

[204] The fragmentation in the Czech Senate is an example of the numerous divisions in Czech politics. Control of the Senate is split between twenty-one different political parties.[204] In total it is comprised of 81 Senators and serves as a 'safety assurance'[204]or balance of power to the Chamber of Deputies. Senators can veto[204] legislation from the Chamber of Deputies and cannot be superseded in the areas of constitutional law, electoral law and international treaties (The Czech Senate, 2021), consequently these areas remain the Senate's focus.

[205] Elections at the Czech national level tends to occur in October, with the new government taking power in January. This is usually necessary due to coalition talks needed to form the government.

Sobotka and the ČSSD ministers by turning routine political coverage into a type of ongoing campaign-style coverage[206] which was specially developed by Babiš's various media outlets (Guasti, 2020:475).[207] This media coverage highlighted the successes of Babiš and ANO's ministers and amplified the mistakes of Prime Minister Sobotka and other ČSSD politicians (Balík & Hloušek, 2020; Jirák & Köpplová, 2020).[208]

The political divisions continued in the 2017 National Election (Figure 6b). In 2017, ANO increased in support, but not to the extent that it was able to form the government alone (Czech Statistical Office, 2017). The most significant decrease in support seen in Figure 6b was the decline of the ČSSD to less than 8% of the vote. Migration policy was a significant theme of the 2017 election and the main political parties took similar positions on this issue, despite widely differing in other policy areas (Krotký, 2019)[209]. Overt support for wider EU level migration cooperation, such as the proposed automatic and mandatory relocation scheme was not embraced by any major political party, even those with a pro-EU mandate (Czech Television Debates, 2017). The rationale for pro-EU parties, such as the Piráti, was the proposed relocation scheme might increase the EU's challenges (Piráti manifesto, 2017). Conversely, parties towards the rights of the political spectrum such as the far-right Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD) routinely linked any increase in asylum applicants to potential terrorism (SPD, 2017).

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[206] This campaign-style coverage was the norm, and not only used before the election.

[207] An interview with the Former Czech Ambassador to the EU 2 (Prague. February 2, 2018). Additionally, in 2013 Babiš bought the MAFRA media group which includes the website iDnes.cz as well as the daily newspapers (Lidové Noviny and Mlada Fronta Dnes).

[208] An interview with a policy staff member for the Czech Republic's Committee of European Affairs (Prague. August 23, 2018).

[209] An interview with a Member of the Czech Chamber of Deputies (2017-2021) and an interview with a Member of the European Affairs Committee (Prague. August 23, 2018).

Figure 6b: Czech National Election results (2017-2021)

Source: Czech Statistical Office (2017).

The results of the 2017 elections showed increased support for non-traditional protest parties such as the pro-European Piráti, and the far-right, anti-EU party SPD: both of these parties made significant gains (de Geoeij and Lyman 2017; Pink and Eibl, 2018).[210] Cirhan and Kopecky (2017) attribute the ongoing emergence of new political parties to indicate a degree of instability within Czech politics. The instability is demonstrated through the normalcy of the introduction of new political parties or the complete change of name from election to election.

In 2017, Babiš proposed cooperation with the ČSSD to form the government, despite earlier ongoing attempts to discredit the party from 2014 to 2017. This proposal was initially rejected by the ČSSD. No mainstream political parties[211] agreed to cooperate with Babiš's ANO due to the allegations of Babiš's embezzlement of EU funds which were intended for small businesses. After Babiš's government fell on its first non-confidence vote in January 2018[212] there was increased momentum to form a coalition with the ČSSD. Eventually, ČSSD accepted. Babiš's government does not consist of any members from the Komunistická strana

[210] An interview with a Member of the Czech Chamber of Deputies 2 (Prague. February 22, 2018); an interview with a Member of the Czech Chamber of Deputies 4 (Prague. November 15, 2018).
[211] Only the far-right SPD initially agreed to cooperate with ANO.
[212] The Czech Constitution (1993) Article 68, point 3 states that a government must pass a non-confidence vote within 30 days of taking office.

Čech a Moravy (KSČM), but Babiš has cooperated with KSČM to prop up his government during non-confidence votes (Havlík, 2020).

The coalition between ANO and ČSSD appears to have a degree of continuity. Hájek (2017) illustrates this continuity through a study of 8559 roll call votes within the Chamber of Deputies through which he concludes that ANO's previous voting record[213] had a higher degree of similarity to the ČSSD rather than right-wing parties. This indicates a degree of inconsistency between some of ANO's political rhetoric and voting records. Overall, this illustrates that ANO has not been constrained by traditional left versus right policy categorisations. Rather, ANO's political focus is upon how politics are conducted (Havlik, 2020) and adjusting to the "prevailing moods of the electorate" which denotes populist tendencies[214] (Hloušek and Kopeček, 2020:17).

The instability of the recent Czech government due to the complexity of the coalitions has caused the normally ceremonial role of the President to increase in political significance due to the President's ability to sustain a government in the event of a non-confidence vote and oversee the formation of any new governing coalition (Hloušek, 2014, Nejezchleba, 2013).[215] This increased perception of the politicisation of the President's role is also linked to the constitutional change in 2012 through which the Czech President is now directly elected by popular vote, instead of by Parliament, which is argued to have strengthened the legitimacy of the President (Mlejnek 2015: 60). Moreover, the process of direct elections has been significant due to the increased political rhetoric through campaign-style political rallies and debates (Ceska Televize, 2018). In the 2018 Presidential election, Zeman was narrowly re-elected[216] on a political platform that highlighted the threats of migration to the Czech Republic and argued that his opponent, Drahoš was too lenient on the challenges of migration.

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[213] The voting record is from 2013-2017 (Hájek, 2017).

[214] Populist tendencies are understood in this thesis as having three elements: anti-elitism, the depiction of direct involvement by citizens and suspicion of the support of minority interests (Enyedi, 2016).

[215] As discussed in Chapter Five, President Zeman attempted to place his own "technocratic" Prime Minister in power after the fall of the Government due to a non-confidence vote. However, Zeman's broad interpretation was rejected by the Czech Constitutional Court (Hanley and Vachudova, 2018).

[216] Zeman won the 2018 Czech Presidential Election by a narrow margin of 51.4% to Drahoš's 48.6% (Czech Statistical Office, 2018).

Ultimately, the Czech President has a degree of political influence, particularly in terms of the role the President can play in the event of a fall of the government, or if there are complexities to form a coalition. As mentioned above, Zeman played a key role in the events after the 2017 election due to Babiš's government falling on its first confidence vote. Zeman agreed to give Babiš a second chance as Prime Minister (Hervey, 2018).[217] Zeman's ability to oversee such decisions is further supported as a result of the direct election of the Czech President (Brunclík and Kubát 2016: 16).

These political divisions in the Czech Republic are further illustrated through the 2014 European Parliamentary election in which ANO, Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita (Top 9)-Starostové a nezávislí (STAN) and ČSSD all took four seats as shown in Figure 6c (European Parliament, 2014). The divergence of political ideology within the Czech political spectrum is shown through the KSČM winning three seats. The degree of ongoing political support for the KSČM indicates the deep communist legacy which remains in the Czech Republic (Camyar, 2010).[218]

Figure 6c: Czech European Parliament results (2014-2019)

Source: European Parliament (2014).

As shown in Figure 6d, the European Parliamentary election in 2019, showed the highest percentage of support for ANO followed by ODS and the Piráti. The results show political support is mainly fragmented between ANO (centrist), ODS (right) and Piráti (left). It is important to highlight the political context in which the European Parliamentary elections

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[217] Ginger Hervey for Politico (2018) available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/czech-president-milos-zeman-will-give-andrej-babis-another-chance-to-form-government/. Accessed 17 September 2021].

[218] An interview with the former Czech Ambassador to the EU3 (Prague. November 16, 2018). Also please see Chapter Five for a more in-depth discussion.

occurred; during the 2019 EU elections, there were major protests against Babiš due to allegations of fraud and mismanagement of EU funds (BBC, 23/06/2019). However, despite these allegations, a base of support remained for ANO as shown in Figure 6d.

Figure 6d: Czech European Parliament results (2019-2024)

Source: European Parliament (2019a).

This section has illustrated the complex national political dynamics within the Czech Republic. Despite ANO increasing in support, Prime Minister Babiš has been unable to make any constitutional or institutional changes to solidify power, which arguably differentiates the Czech Republic from other countries within the region such as Hungary and Poland (Hanley and Vachudova, 2018); both of these countries made substantial constitutional changes that have strengthened their political positions. This section emphasised the plurality of expression across the Czech political spectrum which may have prevented Babiš from taking strong positions. From another perspective, the plurality of national political representation means Czech representatives may have limits on the possible forms and actions taken during policy engagement which are subsequently discussed in sections 7.4 and 7.5 of the upcoming chapter.

6.2.2 Hungary

In contrast to the Czech example, Hungarian political fragmentation is more difficult to detect, but the divides are mainly located among parties of the left of the political spectrum. Instead, I argue the political strength within Hungary lies predominately with the political right which has been increasingly consolidated by FIDESZ-KDNP[219] into executive positions held by Prime Minister Orbán's government during the span of three consecutive majoritarian wins

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[219] FIDESZ-KDNP operates a coalition; however, the majority of control is held by Orbán's FIDESZ. I will refer to FIDESZ policies due to Orbán's influence.

(Sata and Karolewski, 2019).[220] Due to FIDESZ's increased political control, Hungary has been referred to as a "blend of illiberal elitism and paternalist populism" (Enyedi, 2016: 210). This political dominance is argued to have triggered the erosion of democratic norms and practices due to the largely unchecked FIDESZ leadership, with Freedom House demoting Hungary's status from 'free' to 'partly' free (Freedom House, 2020). This political dominance in Hungary has also resulted in increased "overlap between state and the ruling party resources" (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2019). I use this section to illustrate the dominance of FIDESZ at the national level due to Orbán's level of support in the Hungarian National Assembly. European Parliamentary elections are also used to further illustrate FIDESZ's control. But, an important point of clarification should be made, Hungary has fewer representative bodies to consider than the Czech Republic because it does not have a second legislative chamber such as the Czech Senate, and the President is elected by the most dominant party within the National Assembly. This combination of factors is argued to create a situation in which the power is concentrated in Hungary.

The National Election results shown in Figures 6e and 6f illustrate the clear mandate received by FIDESZ and the limited opposition, particularly from the left of the political spectrum[221] due to the "narcissism of small differences" (Kreko and Enyedi, 2018: 49). Also, partisan gerrymandering by FIDESZ is argued to have contributed to the party's increased dominance (Bozoki, 2013).

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[220]Orbán's three consecutive majorities have been in 2010, 2014 and 2018 (The Government of Hungary, 2020).
[221] An interview with the Former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs1 (Budapest. June 3, 2015) and an interview with the Former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 2 (June 27, 2016).

Figure 6e: Hungarian National Election results (2014-2018)[222]

Source: Hungarian National Election Office (2014).

FIDESZ's consolidation of political power continued during the 2018 National Election. The main issue within the election remained migration despite a dramatic decrease in migration numbers (Hungarian Immigration and Asylum Office, 2018). The politicisation of migration, which is explored in greater detail in sections 6.3 and 6.4, was used by FIDESZ as a key campaign issue (FIDESZ manifesto, 2018). It appears FIDESZ was successful in this regard because it is estimated the party was able to mobilise an additional 500,000 new supporters which registered to vote in the 2018 election (Kreko and Enyedi, 2018: 40).

Figure 6f: Hungarian National Election results (2018-2022)

Source: Hungarian National Election Office (2018).

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[222] Összefogás (In English: Unity) was a coalition of left-wing political parties includes MSZP, E14, DK, PM and MLP which united for the 2014 Hungarian National Election.

The distribution of seats in the Hungarian National Assembly is shown in Table 6a. The consolidation of power by FIDESZ is argued to be a result of changes to the Hungarian Constitution.[223] These constitutional changes reduced the number of seats in the unicameral system from 386 to 199 and the complex system combines single-Member and Proportional Representation (Enyedi, 2016).

Table 6a: Distributions of seats in the Hungarian National Assembly

Political Group	Total	Single-member seats	Proportional
Hungarian Civic Union-Christian Democratic People's Party (FIDESZ-KDNP)	133	91	42
Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)	26	1	25
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)- Dialogue for Hungary (Párbeszéd)	20	8	12
Democratic Coalition (DK)	9	3	6
Politics Can Be Different (LMP)	8	1	7
Together (EGYÜTT)	1	0	1
Representative of the German minority living in Hungary	1	1	0
Independents	1	1	0

Source: Hungarian Statistical Office (2018).

Bozóki and Hegedűs (2018: 1176) stated that Orbán's constitutional changes have created "unequal conditions for political competition" through the changes to the electoral system. Former leader of the MSZP argued this was an attempt by Orbán to create a political system in which everyone is dependent on one person[224] (Molnár, 2018). The attempts to concentrate political power in Hungary have been likened to "paternalist populism" which aims to concentrate political control in elites as the wider population is deemed to be "insufficiently mature to participate autonomously in decision-making" rather the government provides both "education" and "discipline" to the population (Enyedi, 2016:21). Other attempts by FIDESZ to further consolidate power have been through attempts to neutralise the Constitutional Court and increase executive control of the wider judiciary (Bozóki and Hegedűs, 2018: 1176; Jakli and Stenberg, 2020)[225]. Krekó and Enyedi (2018:49) argue that the changes made to the Hungarian Constitution in Hungary have resulted in a concentration of power that is

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[223] The changes to the Hungarian Constitution occurred in 2012 by the Fidesz Government.
[224] An interview with the Former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 2 (Budapest. June 27, 2016).
[225] An interview with the Former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 2 (Budapest. June 27, 2016).

"exceptional, at least in European terms." Despite these significant changes to the constitution and alterations to the election rules, FIDESZ has attempted to argue the legality of the "illiberal reforms" due to political support (Scheppele, 2018). The efforts are argued to undermine the democratic process, but not completely depart from the perception of democratic norms.

The extent of power controlled by the Prime Minister is not balanced by any other actor. For example, the Hungarian President has a limited political mandate. The President is elected by the Parliament, which ensures the most dominant party has a key role in selecting the Head of the State. In 2017, the Hungarian National Assembly re-elected President Áder for a second term[226](Kroet, 2017). The role of the Hungarian President remains largely ceremonial (Szakacs, 2017); however, the President can set key electoral dates[227]which may have certain political advantages, such as setting the timing of the national referendum on migration. With regards to migration, the President has taken a public political position, specifically on the need to limit migration within the EU arguing that "other developed states need to pull their weight in tackling the migration crisis" (Áder, 2019). President Áder remains loyal to FIDESZ and he is an example to further illustrate FIDESZ's control across national actors.

FIDESZ's political dominance at the national level was also shown during the European Parliamentary Elections as shown in Figure 6g. From 2014 to 2019 FIDESZ -KDNP received just over 50% of the votes cast and had no direct opposition. Nonetheless, FIDESZ's share of the percentage is lower than the National Elections, which could indicate less interest of FIDESZ voter's in the European Parliamentary elections, as well as the possibility of FIDESZ receiving a lower total percentage based on different voting rules. The lower results in the European Parliamentary Election might also be a form of protest voting.

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[226] The Hungarian President's term is five years, and the President can serve a maximum of two terms.
[227] The President can set election dates at the local level, the National Assembly, the European Parliament and national referendums (Office of the Hungarian President, 2020).

Figure 6g: Hungary's European Parliament results (2014-2019)

Source: European Parliament (2014).

Figure 6h shows FIDESZ-KDNP slightly increased its share of votes to 52.5% in 2019, illustrating the ongoing dominance. However, FIDESZ-KDNP's place within the European Parliament's political group the European People's Party has not been straightforward because the party has been placed "under suspension" since March 2019 due to an investigation into the anti-Brussels rhetoric and limited rule of law (European People's Party, 2021). Later in March 2021, Orbán made the decision for FIDESZ to leave the European People's Party rather than wait for the impending permanent suspension, while FIDESZ's coalition partner KDNP plans to remain in the European People's Party (La Baume, 2021; Szicherle, 2021).

Figure 6h: Hungarian European Parliament results (2019-2024)

Source: European Parliament (2019c).

This section has illustrated the dominance of FIDESZ within the domestic context through the party's ability to mobilise voters and make substantial policy changes to the constitution. I have highlighted the limited opposition to FIDESZ due to various divides

of the political left. This notion of political dominance is applied to the upcoming sections to consider how Hungarian national representatives have attempted to frame migration policy challenges since 2015.

Overall, this section demonstrated the different power dynamics with Czech and Hungarian politics. Understanding the higher degree of fragmentation of political power from 2015-2018 in the Czech Republic is an important element to understand how migration discourse has been framed. This is not to state the governing party is less 'powerful' in the Czech Republic; rather, that the recent complex coalitions create a more volatile political environment in which political statements reflect input from more than one political party, with the most prominent input from ANO and ČSSD. These political dynamics are in contrast to Hungary because FIDESZ has been able to consolidate political power. Therefore, I would like to stress that the national political dynamics differ, meaning there are more politically heterogeneous actors in the Czech Republic than in Hungary. In the following sections, I go on to analyse the frames used by key national representatives.

6.3 Framing border protection as a solution to the migration crisis

Borders have been identified as a key challenge within the 2015 migration crisis. More specifically, the external Schengen borders require the registration of asylum seekers upon their entry to the EU according to the CEAS (Rozakou, 2017; Crawley and Skleparis, 2018). The focus on borders represents the possibility of 'managing' the crisis; however, the number of asylum seekers overwhelmed some national asylum systems or caused fear and resulted in the temporary re-establishment of border checks within the Schengen area[228] (Kallius et al., 2016; Börzel and Risse, 2018). This brief re-establishment of border controls within the Schengen area highlighted the national reaction to the crisis, rather than a coordinated response from the EU level (Niemann and Zaun, 2018; Schimmelfennig, 2018). The temporary closure of Schengen borders had different connotations within the EU. For instance, given the communist history of previously closed borders, post-2004 Member States stressed the importance of

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[228] During the 2015 migration crisis Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden all temporarily re-introduced border controls at internal Schengen borders (Casella-Colombeau, 2019).

maintaining the Schengen agreement (Potyrala, 2016), particularly during discussions of the future of EU border cooperation (Carrera et al., 2015; Traynor, 2015). This section emphasises the importance of Schengen borders on the framing of the migration crisis by Czech and Hungarian representatives. Both Member States stressed the necessity of Schengen border protection during the 2015 migration crisis, albeit in different ways. This section delves into these differences to reveal important national variances.

6.3.1 The Czech Republic

Although the Czech Republic does not have any external Schengen borders and low levels of asylum applications, border protection remains a domestic concern[229] (Hrabálek and Dordević, 2017). Figure 6i depicts that the Czech Republic accepted a limited number of refugees from 2015 to 2019 with a slightly higher number of applicants given subsidiary protection.[230] The statistics show that from 2015 to 2019 a high proportion of asylum applications were discontinued. This pattern of the discontinuation of asylum applications fits with the previous behaviour of asylum seekers to the Czech Republic discussed in Chapter Five, which indicates the Czech Republic remains a transit country rather than a destination for asylum applicants. However, despite the low numbers of asylum seekers, Czech national representatives have continued to stress the importance of external protection. The Czech representatives stressed the importance of external Schengen borders to effectively address migration challenges, which arguably is an attempt to shift responsibility to other Member States.

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[229] An interview with a Czech Think-tank (Prague. January 15, 2016) and an interview with a Czech Member of Parliament (E-mail. November 15, 2018).
[230] The status of subsidiary protection was introduced in EU legislation "independent of the 1951 Refugee Convention because there were asylum seekers in need of international protection who did not fall under the scope of the Convention but were considered in need of protection in accordance with Member States' obligations under international human rights instruments and/or national practices" (European Commission, 2019).

Figure 6i: Czech Interior Ministry decisions on asylum applications (2015-2019)

Source: Czech Statistical Office (2020).

In this section, I argue that there have been attempts by Czech representatives to emphasise the importance of Schengen border protection. However, the protection of the Schengen border has been framed differently since the start of the migration crisis by national representatives including former Prime Minister Sobotka, Prime Minister Babiš and President Zeman. The difference in framing is argued to be the result of the fragmented partisan nature of Czech politics. As shown above, the number of asylum applications remains low, and the Czech Republic does not have external Schengen borders; nevertheless, both Sobotka and Babiš's governments continued to engage in border protection narratives. The political motivation for using such narratives differ marginally and are discussed below. Table 6b summarises how the Czech political party leaders framed border concerns.

Table 6b Czech political party leaders framing of border concerns

Political Party (Leader)	Negative/positive/ neutral frame	Migration Specific comments	Party Manifestos	Type of frame (s) used
ANO (PM Babiš)	Negative	8	1	-Security (crime borders) -Identity (societal)
ČSSD (PM Sobotka) ČSSD (Hamáček)	Neutral to Negative	6 1	1 0	-Political (stability) -EU Security (crime/borders)/political (stability)
KDU-ČSL (Bělobrádek)	Neutral	2	1	-Borders are not mentioned often, rather 'political duty' to help in camps
KSČM (Filip)	Negative	0	1	-borders are a security threat
ODS (Fiala)	Negative	1	1	-borders are a security threat (focus on crime).
Piráti (Bartoš)	Neutral (2014/2015) to increasingly negative	1	1	-borders are a security threat
SPD (Okamura)	Negative	5	1	-borders can allow in terrorists -borders can allow in migrants which can threaten our identity

Source: Compiled by the author

The government of Sobotka initially supported the use of European border guards to help protect the external Schengen border in 2015 through the extension of Frontex's mandate (Sobotka, 2015). Sobotka's position has several important inferences. Firstly, it showed his acceptance of the possibility of a European agency having an increased role in the management of migration, which is normally understood as an issue held within a Member State's sovereign realm. The support for increased powers to a border agency also indicated a limited degree of trust towards the southern Member States such as Italy, Greece or Hungary to maintain border protection for the wider EU (Mitsilegas, 2014).[231] Sobotka's original position was later contradicted, as he shifted his stance to oppose the mandatory redistribution of asylum seekers within the EU and placed a new emphasis upon the concept of Member States' border sovereignty (Sobotka, 2016). Former Prime Minister Sobotka did not initially use a negative frame; rather, he selected to focus on the narrow issue of enhanced border

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[231] Mitsilegas (2014) refers to Dublin Convention; however, the concept of trust within the Union could be transferable to wider border control issues.

protection as a key to the migration crisis (Sobotka, 2015). Later in 2016, after the Turkey-EU deal, Sobotka's government continued to state the importance of Schengen rules but showed an understanding of the humanitarian element stating that "all of the Member States, including the Czech Republic, pledge to intensively help Greece, both in the humanitarian field and in the protection of external borders"[232](Sobotka, 2016). This statement reaffirms Sobotka's focus on the cooperation between Member States rather than the increase of power to an EU agency. However, the 2016 statement also acknowledges the humanitarian challenges[233] placed upon the southern Member States. Sobotka's initial attempt to securitise the external Schengen borders focused on the potential threat to the wider EU, without a more precise definition of the threat (Sobotka, 2015). His focus was on the *external* element of the Schengen border which can be linked to the Fortress of Europe (Grabbe, 2000; Phuong, 2003) in which proper border management can 'control' migrants' ability to enter the EU, with the post-2004 Member States located on the eastern edges of the EU playing a key role. Moreover, Sobotka's initial framing of the crisis focused on a joint effort at the EU level to address migration numbers; however, as the crisis continued his focus shifted to individual Member States' roles to maintain order with proper CEAS procedures. This shift indicates an attempt by Sobotka to shirk any direct responsibility by keeping the dialogue focused on the external borders.

After the 2017 Czech National Election, Sobotka was replaced by Babiš,[234] who called weak borders a risk for all EU citizens and stressed the need to prioritise increased protection measures (Babiš, 2017).[235] The Prime Minister argued that lax borders increased the demand and further motivated smugglers to take more people; with human smuggling taking advantage of the most vulnerable people (Lazarová, 2018). Babiš defined migration as a threat, but he framed the threat in multiple ways, from border management to the detection and prevention of criminal activities associated with migration, such as human smuggling. Essentially by

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[232] The Czech Republic also helped Hungary through the deployment of police officers and border officials to assist Hungary (Feher, 2015a).

[233] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador to the EU 3 (Prague. November 16, 2018).

[234] Babiš previously served in Sobotka's governing coalition as Finance Minister.

[235] An interview with a Czech Member of Parliament 2 (By E-mail. January 24, 2018), an interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015), and interview with a Former Czech Ambassador to the EU 2 (Prague. February 2, 2018).

introducing criminality to the debate he was seeking to shift the discourse away from one that solely focuses on humanitarian responses to one that encourages questioning the authenticity of people crossing the borders. Hence, Babiš introduced the concept of criminality at Schengen borders to shift the discourse. This shift in discourse is significant because it attempts to negate the humanitarian elements and emphasize the possibility of criminality, which heightens unease by questioning the authenticity of people crossing the borders. This attempt fits into the wider literature discussed in Chapter Four of attempts to portray migrants as criminals rather than asylum seekers and consequently shifts the narrative and policy approach (Gyollai and Amatrudo, 2019). Despite the increased discussion of possible criminality, since his election, Prime Minister Babiš has attempted to distance himself from the extreme-right views of border protection. Babiš warns against populist rhetoric, stating that extreme views spread fear and are being used by the radical right (Czech Ministry of the Interior, 2019). He has avoided making a direct linkage between border security, terrorism and asylum in statements and reports such as the Audit on National Security (Czech Government, 2019). In terms of solidarity, Prime Minister Babiš's government has shown informal attempts to support the management of the EU's southern Schengen border through offers of assistance to Italian Prime Minister Conte in 2018, to support the Italian led operation to prevent migrants from leaving Libya (Czech Government, 2018). Babiš has focused on non-binding solidarity through offers of help to other Member States based on specifically defined missions and timeframes.

The largest shift in migration discourse in the Czech Republic was from President Zeman,[236] who was directly elected[237] in 2013, and represents his own political party, Strana Práv Občanů (SPO), With regards to the framing of migration and borders, Zeman remains

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[236] The relationship between Prime Minister Babiš and President Zeman is complex based on the support Zeman has shown Babiš by propping up the government during a non-confidence vote (Pehe, 2018:67).

[237] The first direct Czech Presidential election occurred in 2013 (Kopeček and Mlejnek, 2013). Before, indirect Presidential elections have been held for the Czech President since 1993. The role is largely ceremonial, but can be political, for example, in the case of a non-confidence vote in the Chamber of Deputies, through which the President can make recommendations for the formation of a new government, or an election. The role of Czech President political since the of Havel in 1993 due to his political stature in the Czech Republic. The tradition has continued with Klaus, and after his Presidency. For example, Klaus established his own political ideological institution: https://www.institutvk.cz/about-the-institute. Hloušek (2014) argues the Czech Republic is advancing towards semi-Presidentialism.

committed to the concept of Schengen and stated the proposal of a mini-Schengen[238] "frightened him" and would be counterproductive because it would be a "surrender to the terrorists, and exactly what they want" (Zeman, 2015). This statement lacks clarity but attempts to build unease by referring to migrants as terrorists who are threatening Schengen. Zeman has voiced concerns over weak external Schengen borders, and he has attempted to frame weak borders as a possible terrorist threat (Naxera and Krčál, 2018).[239] To advance this extreme position, President Zeman has worked with the far-right leader of SPD's Okamura towards the mutual goal of 'protecting' the Czech borders from Islam (Tait, 2017; Czech Ministry of the Interior, 2018). The close cooperation between Zeman and Okamura was noted by the Czech Ministry of the Interior (2018, 2019) which highlighted Okamura as spreading misinformation and extreme views. For instance, during the Czech Parliamentary Election campaign in 2017, Okamura made speeches attempting to link weak borders allowing Islam into the Czech Republic (SPD, 2017). Some of his election campaign billboards stated: "No Islam, No Terrorism."[240] Zeman's approach and cooperation with the SPD has attempted to create fear and mistrust towards the small Muslim communities in the Czech Republic (Heijmans, 2017). Despite this informal partnership with a far-right political leader, Zeman has retained the approval of approximately 62% of the Czech population (CVVM, 2018). As stated earlier, the President can influence public opinion, however, the President has no formal role in the policy-making process.

The external Schengen borders remain a key element of Czech representatives' attempts to frame the migration crisis. This section has shown three different responses: a degree of humanitarian concern, possibility of criminality, and attempts to explicitly link borders to terrorism. Former Prime Minister Sobotka's initial position showed a willingness to address migration at the EU level before he shifted to more of a national stance. After Babiš won the election in 2017 attempts were made to justify a strong position at the external borders to prevent criminal activity. The most extreme position was taken by President Zeman, who has attempted to link migrants crossing the border to terrorism. The fragmentation is argued to

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[238]A "mini-Schengen" was the proposal of a tightening circle to only include Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Sweden CTK https://www.novinky.cz/zahranicni/evropa/clanek/rodi-se-novy-mini-schengen-bez-ceska-332652 [Accessed 19 November 2015].
[239] An interview with a Czech MP3 (Prague. February 22, 2018).
[240] A picture of the poster can be found in Appendix Six.

result in several different narratives of border concerns at the national level. In Chapter Seven, this fragmentation is argued to have an impact upon national representatives EU level engagement in terms of the actions and forms of engagement.

6.3.2 Hungary

Asylum seekers usage of the Balkan route significantly increased in 2015 (Eurostat, 2015, also see Figure 6j). However, it was the Hungarian government's attempted prevention of asylum seekers from continuing their journey[241] which sparked an intense debate and appeared (briefly) to bring an end to the Dublin Regulation,[242] which is the requirement for asylum seekers to lodge asylum applications upon their first entry to the EU (European Commission, 2015b: 4). As shown in section 6.3, political power in Hungary is highly concentrated and controlled by FIDESZ. Consequently, the framing of border issues and the linkage to migration focuses on Orbán and his government and highlights the marginal frames which attempt to contradict FIDESZ's stance shown in Table 6c.

Figure 6j: Hungarian decisions on asylum applications (2015-2018)

Source: The Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2020).

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[241] An interview with the Former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Budapest. June 27, 2016).
[242] The Dublin System remains, but the European Commission proposed further changes in the *European Agenda on Migration* (2015) and *The New Pact on Migration and Asylum* (2020).

Table 6c: Hungarian political party leaders framing of border concerns

Political Party (Leader)	Negative/positive/neutral frame	Migration Specific comments	Party Manifestos	Type of frame (s) used
FIDESZ-KDNP (PM Orbán)	Negative	10	1	Identity, criminality, Sovereignty, terrorism
DK (Gyurcsány)	Negative to Neutral[243]	1	1	General border concern to de-securitisation
Jobbik (Vona)	Negative	2	1	Criminality/terrorism
LMP (Schiffer/Szél)[244] LMP (Hadházy/ Szél)[245]	Negative to Neutral[246]	0	1	General border concern to de-securitisation
MSZP (Tóbiás)[247] MSZP (Molnár)[248]	Negative to Neutral (humanitarian treatment of vulnerable asylum seekers)	0	1	General border concern to humanitarian

Source: compiled by the author.

Firstly, Orbán and his government displayed discontent towards Greece's handling of its border (Zalan, 2015). Orbán framed border protection as the duty of a Member State:

> No, no, it is a national obligation. To defend the borders inside the European Union, especially the Schengen, outside border is a national obligation. It is a national imperative. It is not a common [European] task. It is your job because you are a state. That is part of the definition of a state. Therefore, you have to do it. In which way, how to do it, is very difficult but that is a technical issue. The main issue is that it is your obligation to maintain your border control and defend your border. And you can't wait for the European solution. (…) But moral and human issues are basically technical in comparison to the main issue, which is the obligation of the state to maintain border security."[249]

Orbán's government rejected the notion of the possibility of Hungary becoming a refugee hotspot within the EU (Stepper, 2016: 63) and stressed the importance of Hungarian border

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[243] During the National Election in 2018 attempts were made to de-securitise.

[244] From 2013-2016.

[245] From 2016-2018.

[246] During the National Election in 2018 attempts were made to de-securitise.

[247] From 2014-2016.

[248] From 2016-2018.

[249] Orbán speaking at the Round Table of the Bratislava Global Security Forum (2015b). Text available at the website of the Hungarian Government. Available at: http://www.kormany. hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/speech-by-viktor-orban-at-theround-table-of-the-bratislava-global-security-forum. [10 February 2017].

control to ensure security for the whole EU. His statement above asserts that moral and human rights issues were not his government's primary focus.

As argued in section 6.2, Hungarian representatives from FIDESZ dominated the political domestic discourse, particularly Prime Minister Orbán. One of the main frames which Orbán and his government developed was the importance of maintaining strong protection of external Schengen borders while questioning if all migrants applying for asylum are genuine. His classification of migrants into authentic asylum seekers and non-genuine was a key narrative in the Hungarian approach. The questioning of the authenticity of asylum applicants first began in early 2014. This initial increase of asylum applications to Hungary came mostly from Kosovo[250] and were mainly individuals seeking better economic conditions (Byrne and Vasagar, 2015). These claims put pressure on the Hungarian asylum system in terms of the provision of food, lodging and the processing of applications, which on the surface level appeared to be economic migrants (Halasz, 2015a). These applications from Kosovo were significant; due to the perception of economic migrants taking advantage of the system. This situation caused changes in migration practices such as the use of detention on a routine basis and the acceleration of asylum applicants before the crisis in 2015 (EASO, 2015). Hungary's experience with Kosovar asylum seekers was the first major increase in non-ethnic Hungarian asylum seekers since joining the EU (The Hungarian Statistical Office, 2020).

The concept of genuine claims has been important in Hungarian officials arguing their border stance. A representative from the Hungarian NGO Menedék summaries the situation:

> Then it was about people arriving in large numbers as a threat to the asylum system and those who are not genuine asylum seekers. It was the authenticity of the people that was contested, in particular those from Kosovo, and once the Kosovo problem was solved the numbers were still rising and the argument was no longer about the authenticity of the asylum seekers rather the authenticity of the claim.[251]

The questioning of asylum claims from Kosovo by Prime Minister Orbán and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Szijjártó is not unsubstantiated. The majority of Kosovar claims were rejected due to the inability of the applicants to prove persecution according to the Geneva Convention

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[250] The increase in asylum seekers from Kosovo to Hungary in 2014 is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.
[251] An interview with a representative from the Hungarian NGO Menedék (Budapest. June 28, 2016).

(Hungarian Statistical Office, 2015). This means that there was insufficient evidence to prove an individual was either unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin due to well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular group or political opinion (UNHCR, 1951). However, instead of highlighting the classification of international standards, Hungarian officials chose to highlight the 'abuse of the asylum system' as an attempt to justify harsh conditions and standards. For instance, during an interview on the BBC, Minister Szijjártó stated, "those people who are violating our borders all came from peaceful countries like Serbia and Croatia. And there is not any point of reference in any piece of international regulations why you should be allowed, helped or assisted to violate the border of two peaceful countries" (Szijjártó, 2018b). In another interview, Minister Szijjártó (2018b) continued to more fully illustrate the Hungarian perspective:

> Is there an excuse for these people to violate the border between Hungary and Serbia or the border between Croatia and Hungary because all of these countries are peaceful countries, so there is no reason to violate state borders with such countries, I think we have to address this issue as well. Migration became a security threat, a security challenge. We governments have a responsibility to provide security to our citizens….Since there is no war in Serbia there is no reason for people to violate our border….That is why I raise the issue, can you consider anyone as a refugee who crosses at least four peaceful countries: Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and arrives to Hungary, because these people who seek asylum had already four opportunities to ask for asylum. And you know the Dublin Regulation says if you enter the territory of an EU Member State like Greece and if you ask for asylum you need to stay there until the procedure has been carried out. This is very clear. So, when these illegal migrants enter the territory of Greece and leave before the procedure is complete, they break EU legislation.

These statements by a FIDESZ representative highlight migration as a security challenge and attempt to illustrate that Hungary should not be responsible for 'illegal' migrants, rather according to this argumentation migrants should have lodged asylum claims in the first possible safe[252] country. Attempting to frame asylum seekers as crossing borders in an illegal manner fosters unease, but these statements also show distaste for solidarity by identifying Greece as the Member State which is perceived to have demonstrated weakness at its Schengen border and inability to process applications according to the CEAS standards.

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[252] I use 'safe' in this manner due to the ongoing debate over Serbia as a safe third country, for example the case of Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary (21 November 2019) for the complete trial details: https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,5dd6b4774.html. [Accessed 1 June 2021].

The threat of non-genuine asylum seekers crossing the border was used as justification for the construction of the 175 km fence along the southern border with Serbia, and later continued construction along the 348km with another Member State, Croatia (UNHCR, 2017).[253]Hungary's construction of fences between Croatia and Serbia were met with sharp disapproval from many NGOs and the European Commission.[254] The Hungarian military was given authorisation by the Hungarian Parliament to use non-lethal force at the borders including: water cannons, rubber bullets, pyrotechnics, tear gas or net guns (Piazza-Georgi, 2016).[255] The military measures aimed to clear the crowds which formed around the border. The emphasis on security overshadowed international commitments to allow access to asylum procedures. One Hungarian MP described the situation as an "overt and excessive focus on border security" whereas asylum is not only about guarding borders, but also "allowing people to have access to the procedures and humane conditions."[256]

The focus on military protection at Hungary's southern border continued even after the number of asylum seekers dropped as shown in Figure 6j. The drop in asylum applicants might be a result of the fence and other measures to increase militarisation, but also the decrease in asylum seekers may be due to procedures set by the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior which limit the number of asylum seekers and the time of day[257] that they can enter the transit area to lodge their asylum applications. For example, after the construction of the fence, there were one hundred applicants allowed in, but the number is reported to have dropped to only two applicants per day since 2018 (UNHCR, 2018a; Nelson, 2018).[258] Furthermore, there have been reports by NGOs of the abuse of migrants at the borders, however, the Hungarian Government denied these allegations pinning the mistreatment upon

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[253] The UNHCR (2017) states that the practice of constructing barriers continued from Hungary to other Member States including: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Greece.

[254] An interview with an ECRE Representative (Brussels. October 20, 2015).

[255] An interview with an ECRE Representative (Brussels. October 20, 2015).

[256] An interview with a Hungarian MP1 (Via e-mail. Januarys 17, 2018).

[257] The transit area is open from 06:00-22:00 daily.

[258] After the construction of the fence 100 asylum seekers were allowed into the transit area to submit their application, which dropped to 50 (February 21, 2016), 30 (March 22, 2016), 10 (January 2017) and 2 (February 2018) (UNHCR, 2018a). Nelson (2018) states the drop only allows in one asylum seeker at the two transit zones, which makes entry impossible for families. The Ministry of the Interior (2020) says there is no official number, but admissions are based on what the processing allows, but this conflicts with the UNHCR reports.

"unofficial militia" along the border (Human Rights Watch, 2016; Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2016a, 2018).

Domestic support for Prime Minister Orbán government's fence at the external Schengen border was widely accepted by opposition parties. This domestic support of the fence is significant due to normally highly partisan rhetoric[259] in Hungary. The most powerful opposition to the Prime Minister's Fidesz is the ultra-conservative Jobbik, who supported the fence and called for even more policing and restrictive measures for those attempting to cross (Jobbik, 2019). Conversely, MSZP from the left of the political spectrum provided a more humane perspective to migration such as special protections for vulnerable asylum seekers, yet MSZP see value in the fence. The party's support seems to be conditional and not seen as a long-term solution. Before the Hungarian National Election in 2017 the MSZP stated that:

> the fence will remain as long as Hungarian people are afraid. This, of course, does not mean that the border fence is the real solution. Since as we can remember: despite the border fence, hundreds of thousands passed the country with the Fidesz government's assistance (Pivarnyik, 2017).

MSZP's position has remained in the lead up to the European Election Programme (2019). The party states: "there is a limit to immigration, but none to solidarity. Europe needs to protect its borders, but it must conduct humane asylum procedures for refugees, especially the ill, pregnant women or unaccompanied minors. MSZP will not break down the southern border fence (MSZP, 2019). Other left parties including Lehet Más a Politika (LMP) and Demokratikus Koalíció (DK) all have unnatural support for the border fence, arguing it would be costly to take down and it could serve as part of a comprehensive solution, while only Együtt stated that they would completely remove the border fence during the four-year electoral cycle (Pivarnyik, 2017)[260]. A new political movement called Momentum selected not to engage with the political discourse surrounding the border fence due to the argument that the party avoids populism (Momentum, 2019).

This section demonstrated that the framing of the protection of external borders was a significant element in the national debates in both the Czech Republic and Hungary. The

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[259] An interview with an ECRE Representative (Brussels. October 20, 2015).
[260] An interview with an official from DG Home. (Brussels. February 5, 2019).

numbers of asylum applications to Hungary were high in 2015 and 2016, however, the numbers have significantly decreased, but I have argued that such decrease has not changed the political rhetoric surrounding the borders by FIDESZ. Hungary has remained committed to dealing with migration at the national level rather than at the EU level. The high degree of political consolidation in Hungary have allowed the government to take a strong position on Schengen border protection which has provided FIDESZ with an opportunity to construct a narrative of Orbán actively engaging in the protection of Hungarians. In the Czech Republic, the high amount of political variance has not allowed either Sobotka or Babiš to create a narrative to the same extent.

6.4 Framing migration as a threat to society

This section analyses the different attempts by national representatives to frame migration as a threat to societal security. Waever (1993: 23) defines societal security as concerns relating to the "ability of society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats." If these frames are accepted by the audience, they are argued to strengthen the position of the representative employing the speech acts (Buzan et al., 1998). The concept of societal protection is particularly relevant when considering the homogeneous composition of Central Europe (Hanley and Vachodova, 2018; Fabry, 2018), meaning that these societies remain largely homogenous in terms of race, language and understanding of national identity. This definition by Waever (1993) is well suited to this analysis because it addresses the changing nature of society as a result of migration and defines societal threats as "possible or actual."

6.4.1 The Czech Republic

Due to the fragmentation of national representatives in the Czech Republic, this sub-section is divided in the same manner as section 6.3.1 to consider the attempts by the former Prime Minister Sobotka, Prime Minister Babiš and President Zeman's framing of migration within Czech society.

Former Czech Prime Minister Sobotka, as in the case of the Schengen border above, took a different approach to framing the challenges of migration upon Czech society. Instead of framing migration as a societal threat, he attempted to use an oppositional

frame, warning of the dangers of President Zeman's populist statements which attempted to frame migrants as cultural threats. In opposition to Zeman, Sobotka warned of the "destabilisation of the society with [Zeman's] repeated, dire warnings of the danger that refugees supposedly present to the Czech Republic" (McLaughlin, 2016). The destabilisation Sobotka is referring to is at a societal level, specifically, he referred to rhetoric which could foster a lack of trust between individuals within Czech society. Sobotka's framing shows an attempt to deescalate tensions linked to xenophobic representations of migrants in the Czech Republic.[261]Despite attempts to reduce the tensions, Sobotka did not favour increasing the number of asylum seekers to the Czech Republic, instead, he focused on the importance of funding contributions from the Czech Government to help refugees within the countries of origin and the importance of addressing the root causes of migration (Sobotka, 2015). Sobotka's statement showed the willingness of his government to send financial aid to areas experiencing crisis; however, this statement also aims to keep asylum seekers within their area of origin. Sobotka's government's stance from 2015 to 2017 showed attempts to avoid linking migrants to societal threats, yet he emphasized keeping asylum seekers within their region of origin. This position cannot be interpreted as open to migration, but it does show a narrative that differs from the dominant discourse at the national level (CVVM, 2018).[262]

Next, Babiš's attempts to frame migration are more complex to analyse because I argue his stance shifted after becoming Prime Minister. As Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister, Babiš (2016) advocated for refugees to stay in areas as close as possible to their origins stating that

> So that after the war they could return to Syria and to Europe. When you see today that more developed countries, with a different tradition of accepting migrants, are not able to integrate immigrants from the Middle East and Africa you should not be surprised that I do not agree with the reception of any refugees. I honestly do not believe that they can integrate into our society. It is a huge risk when you see the atrocities of some people who were not granted asylum in Germany.[263]

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[261] An interview with a representative from a Czech NGO Association for Integration and Migration (Prague. April 17, 2015).

[262] An interview with a representative from the UNHCR (Prague. June 9, 2016).

[263] Translated from Czech to English by the author. For the original post please see Appendix Five.

This post by Babiš mixes the terms migrants, immigrants and refugees which lacks clarity. Despite the lack of clarity on terminology, Babiš asserted that he does not want the Czech Republic to receive any refugees due to the possibility of a lack of integration. The lack of integration is the key factor, indicating that the lack of integration could result in security risks. Babiš's statements as Minister of Finance show an attempt to build a narrative of the prioritisation of Czech interests: "we have no obligation, and I don't think we can accept anyone at all at this time. The responsibility of politicians is first and foremost to guarantee the security of our citizens and only then to consider possible solidarity with refugees" (Echo 2016). This statement builds unease due to referring to national security concerns.

Another key discussion within the Czech political context has been the settlement of Muslims into the Czech Republic, which has been met with a degree of resistance (Culik, 2017). For example, before becoming Prime Minister, Babiš voiced concerns over the Czech Republic accepting fifteen injured Syrian children and their families for medical treatment and the processing of their asylum claims. Babiš stressed these individuals should be from Christian backgrounds as they will have a better chance to acclimatise into Czech society (Jun, 2015). This classification of only accepting individuals from Christian backgrounds directly contradicts the basic premise for asylum. Asylum claims are based on the Geneva Convention (1951) and the Protocol (1967) not on religious beliefs. These initial statements by Babiš as Minister of Finance show the attempts to frame migration as a threat to the wider EU society.

As Prime Minister, Babiš attempted to emphasise the integration issues within other EU countries. Often, he indirectly mixed second or third-generation Muslims with current asylum seekers, for instance during the Czech Parliamentary election campaign in 2017, Babiš stated: "We have to fight for what our ancestors built here. If there will be more Muslims than Belgians in Brussels, that's their problem. I don't want that here. They won't be telling us who should live here" (Babiš quoted in Heijmans, 2017). This perspective shows a highly nationalistic approach to migration and does not fully consider the wider context, for example, Schengen freedom of movement by EU citizens. Much of this 'cultural threat' is not linked to

the preservation of 'Christian society'; rather to the 'protection' of western society.[264] The preservation of Christian society is not a key classification in the Czech Republic because it is largely an atheist country (Pew Research, 2017). I would like to point out an inconsistency between Babiš's integration rhetoric and integration policy reviews from the UNHCR (2018b). These reviews state that the Czech Government developed specific steps for the integration of asylum seekers arriving since 2015[265] including the three-part programme which assists with practical considerations (housing job search, education, health care and the possibility of applying for social benefits), Czech language courses[266] and civic education.[267]

Finally, as in Section 6.3, President Zeman has shown the most extreme attempts to frame Muslims as a threat to Czech culture[268]. He has attempted to link migration to multiculturalism which he states is a failure (Zeman, 2016). His rationale for the failure focuses on the German and French experiences of hosting and integrating asylum seekers and migrants. After the three attacks, which occurred in Germany during July of 2016, involving asylum seekers and a recently settled migrant, the President's official spokesperson stated on August 2, 2016, "Our country simply cannot afford to risk terrorist attacks like what occurred in France and Germany. By accepting migrants, we would create fertile ground for barbaric attacks." He also attempted to emphasise the ongoing integration of second and third generations of Muslim immigrants (Naxera and Krčál, 2018). He stated that:

> I think these people should live in their own countries, practice their own religion, and not try to disrupt normal life in countries where there is a different culture. Their countries of origin are not, however, Algeria, Mali, Libya, but France, Germany, Britain, or Sweden where their parents were born (Zeman, 2015).

These attempts to highlight the lack of integration have been framed in a heavily populist manner and used during speeches at anti-Muslim rallies. During a political rally in the Czech town of Lanškroun, November 2015, migrants were portrayed as Islamists coming to invade Czech culture. The 'attack of asylum seekers' is framed as asylum seekers wanting to take

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[264] An interview with Czech Member of Parliament 3 (Prague. February 22, 2018).
[265] An interview with a representative from the ECRE(Brussels. October 20 2015).
[266] This includes 400 hours of Czech language courses.
[267] This includes 20 hours of civic education.
[268] An interview with a UNHCR official (Prague. June 9, 2016) and an interview with Czech Member of Parliament 3 (Prague. February 22, 2018).

something from Czech society and operates based on 'us' versus 'them'. For instance, President Zeman states, "If *we* want to protect our culture, if *we* want to protect our customs, if *we* don't want to take the crosses down from our walls, if *we* have them there at all, and to ban pork and other such things, then *we* should find the courage to protect the sovereign state that is the Czech Republic" (Naxera and Krčál, 2018)[269]. Zeman has remained "a symbol of defiant anti-Muslim, anti-refugee, racist, and xenophobic rhetoric (Culik, 2017).

This section illustrated the differing attempts by Czech national representatives to frame migration as a threat to Czech culture. Former Prime Minister Sobotka attempted to articulate the dangers of extreme anti-migrant narratives, later Prime Minister Babiš has attempted to frame migrants as a disruption to the society which former generations have established. He highlighted his perception of the difficulty which non-Christian migrants have to integrate into Czech society; however, there are no factual examples included that indicate a lack of integration. Lastly, President Zeman made attempts to frame migration as an 'extreme' threat. Since 2015, Czech national representatives have attempted to use different frames to articulate the challenges which migrants are perceived to have upon Czech culture. These differences of the main representatives reflect the political fragmentation in the Czech Republic.

6.4.2 Hungary

In this section, I argue that the attempted framing of migration as a cultural threat in Hungary has been more prominent due to the dominance of FIDESZ-KDNP, specifically under Prime Minister Orbán's leadership. Hungarian representatives from FIDESZ have attempted to explicitly name the 'threat': "Muslim" (Hafez, 2018) "non-European" (Sereghy, 2016) "economic migrants" (Bocskor, 2018). This type of naming is closely linked to the next stage of framing which is classification, or the categorisation of concepts according to a hieratical relationship (van Ostaijen and Scholten, 2017). Orbán argues that an EU level asylum quota system would "redraw Hungary and Europe's ethnic, cultural and religious identities, which no EU organ has the right to do" (Sereghy, 2016: 264). This is an attempt to assert ethnocentrism, meaning attempts to stigmatise individuals who do not fit into the classifications of "Christian", "white", "ethnic Hungarian."

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[269] Please note italics were placed by the author.

Prime Minister Orbán disregarded the plight of asylum seekers and emphasised these individuals as "economic immigrants." This narrative was presented in a letter included with the National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism (2015) which stated: "economic immigrants cross our borders illegally, pretend to be refugees but in fact come for social benefits and jobs," and that the Hungarian Government will not allow economic immigrants to "threaten the workplaces and subsistence of Hungarian people."[270] European Parliamentary debates on May 19, 2015 show concern over the wording and narratives within this particular National Consultation. The date of these debates is important, as in May 2015 the number of asylum seekers was increasing, yet at this point, it was arguably not a crisis; however, as shown in the previous chapter, the number of asylum seekers from Kosovo to Hungary steadily increased since 2013 and placed stress on the Hungarian asylum system. This statement can also be linked to the literature which suggests the framing of "economic migrants" as not being authentic asylum seekers, and consequently, attempting to justify limited access to the asylum system. Based on the timeline, I suggest the position taken by Orbán's government in early 2015 was directed towards this specific issue within the Hungarian asylum system. However, given the support received, the framing of "economic migrant" continued despite a significant change in the countries of origin of the asylum seekers[271]. Secondly, the link between immigration and terrorism was made explicitly; however, no justification or support was provided (Bocskor, 2018).[272]

Moreover, Orbán made overtly racist statements that frame migration as a threat to the Hungarian identity. For example, he stated that the issue with non-European migration is the "alteration of a country's ethnic makeup," which "amounts to an alteration of its cultural identity" (Orbán, 2017). Another example of this narrative:

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[270] Please see Appendix Seven for the English translation.

[271] An interview with a representative from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (Budapest. June 5, 2015).

[272] An interview with a representative from the ECRE (Brussels. October 20, 2015).

> Diversity is no more valuable than a homogenous community. The simple fact that something is colourful and varied in character does not make it more valuable than something which is not. And it is very important for us to use this as a firm footing: we must not allow the ground to be cut away from under our feet in moral or ethical debates because we must defend Hungary as it is now. We must state that we do not want to be diverse and do not want to be mixed: we do not want our own colour, traditions and national culture to be mixed with those of others. We do not want this. We do not want that at all. We do not want to be a diverse country. We want to be how we became 1100 years ago in the Carpathian Basin.

Without approaching the normative elements of this statement, I argue that the reference to the Carpathian Basin is a radical assertion of Hungarian dominance over this geopolitical area (Scott, 2018) and a further declaration of the intent to preserve ethnic boundaries (Krasteva et al., 2017: 16-17).

The promulgation of 'Christian society' has been another narrative developed by FIDESZ in an attempt to justify the resistance of asylum seekers (Kovács, 2019).[273] The framing of Hungary as a Christian Democracy is plausible due to the high number of Hungarian Christians. During the census in 2011, over half of the population responded to following one of the Christian denominations of faith (Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2011).[274] The emphasis of Hungary as a Christian democracy was used by Prime Minister Orbán and other Members of FIDESZ including Katalin Novák, Hungary's Minister of State for Family, Youth and International Affairs (Walker, 2019) and the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Péter Szijjártó (2018c). In his speech at Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp in July of 2018, Prime Minster Orbán argued that he has a clear mandate to establish the Christian Democracy, or in other words, this new model has been mandated by the Hungarian people during the election. He also pointed to the consecutive election victories as a justification of his stance, stating that:

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[273] An interview with a representative from the Hungarian Permanent Representation (Brussels. February 5, 2019) and an interview with a Member of the European Parliament from the LIBE Committee (By telephone. February 6, 2019).

[274] During the 2011 Census 3,871, 922 Hungarian residents identified as Catholic, 13,710 as Orthodox, 1,153,454 as Calvinist, 215,093 Lutherans, other denominations 167,231 for a total of approximately 5,421,410 out of the total population of 9,937,628 residents identifying as Christian (Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2011).

In the economy, this is embodied in a Hungarian model, and in politics, it is embodied in a new constitutional order – a new constitutional order based on national and Christian foundations. Our two-thirds victory in 2014 mandated us to consolidate this system. It was then that the system of national cooperation – much mocked by our opponents – was created. And our two-thirds victory in 2018 is nothing short of a mandate to build a new era (Orbán, 2018).

The speech continued by linking non-Christians [Muslims] and the decline of Christianity as a possible threat to Christian interests being represented at the EU level. Prime Minister Orbán attempted to place himself as the "saviour of Christianity" for the Hungarian nation and to frame migrants as "invaders" (Sereghy, 2016: 388). He stated:

But, dear Friends, a situation can arise in one country or another whereby ten per cent or more of the total population is Muslim. We can be sure that they will never vote for a Christian party. And when we add to this Muslim population those of European origin who are abandoning their Christian traditions, then it will no longer be possible to win elections on the basis of Christian foundations. Those groups preserving Christian traditions will be forced out of politics, and decisions about the future of Europe will be made without them. (Orbán, 2018).

In the same speech, the Prime Minister argues against the possibility of a Christian democracy being liberal.

The bait for this trap is hanging right in front of our noses: it is the claim that Christian democracy can also, in fact, be liberal. I suggest we stay calm and avoid being caught on that hook, because if we accept this argument, then the battle, the struggle we have fought so far will lose its meaning, and we will have toiled in vain. Let us confidently declare that Christian democracy is not liberal. Liberal democracy is liberal, while Christian democracy is, by definition, not liberal: it is, if you like, illiberal. And we can specifically say this in connection with a few important issues – say, three great issues. Liberal democracy is in favour of multiculturalism, while Christian democracy gives priority to Christian culture; this is an illiberal concept. Liberal democracy is pro-immigration, while Christian democracy is anti-immigration; this is again a genuinely illiberal concept. And liberal democracy sides with adaptable family models, while Christian democracy rests on the foundations of the Christian family model; once more, this is an illiberal concept (Orbán, 2018).

Orbán has endeavoured to establish liberalism as a threat to Hungary due to the potential hazards of multi-culturalism, migration, and traditional family models. Kallius et al., (2016) claim that these are selected to "dramatize" the differences between the EU and Hungary in an attempt to develop a "Hungarian solution" in which Orbán is the saviour of the nation.[275]

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[275] An interview with the former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Budapest. June 5, 2015).

As discussed in Section 6.2, the political dominance of FIDESZ resulted in limited political opposition. Instead, there was a mainstreaming of FIDESZ's stance on the main challenges of migration including the framing of migration as a challenge to Hungarians economic stability, security, ethnicity and religious beliefs.[276]There has not been an alternative narrative, or oppositional frame presented which challenges FIDESZ or captures the same level of support.[277]

6.5 Conclusion

The national dimension of the migration crisis is a significant factor for both the Czech Republic and Hungary, albeit to differing extents. I illustrated the fragmentation across the Czech political spectrum and indicated that this division could impact how engagement occurs due to differing narratives. The Hungarian case is different due to the domination of FIDESZ across three consecutive elections. There has been limited opposition and; consequently, this enabled FIDESZ to take bolder positions.

The differing extents of the consolidation of power at the national level was used to consider the variation in the framing of border protection and societal protection between the Czech Republic and Hungary. The Czech case shows the involvement of several different national representatives which created a variety of different frames. In contrast FIDESZ has largely dominated the Hungarian political scene. But what do these differences in framing mean? The domestic political context impacts the extent to which certain frames are developed. The differences in framing may also indicate diverse approaches to the policy-making process, and further call into question the degree to which there is unity between these countries during Visegrád cooperation. This is significant because the domestic framing is argued to provide insight into the extent of EU level engagement.

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[276] An interview with a Member of the European Parliament on the LIBE Committee 2 (Brussels. February 4, 2019).
[277] An interview with a representative from the Hungarian Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. February 5, 2019).

Chapter Seven
Migration policy-making: the EU dimension

7.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the EU dimension of migration policy-making. Since 2015, migration has been an example of a policy area in which some post-2004 Member States are attempting to formulate a policy alternative that differs from the wider EU. Additionally, there is disagreement over the extent to which migration policy should be formed at the supranational level (ECFR, 2019). The debate highlights the "risk of disillusionment" (Schweiger, 2018) in which some post-2004 Member States do not feel their interests are being represented effectively at the EU level and consequently may attempt to pull control of policy areas such as migration back to the national level. Chapter seven analyses the EU dimension of Czech and Hungarian engagement through perceptions, forms and actions.

In section 7.2, I expand on the post-2004 element of this research, the self-perceptions of national representatives. Post-2004 Member States are anticipated to have experienced the "stigma of newness" (Krasnodębska, 2018) and this section considers the extent to which this stigma may continue to be a factor within policy engagement. Generally, if a national representative perceives that their Member State can be influential in the EU policy-making process, regardless of the length of membership this representative is anticipated to be more active than a representative focused on the late entry of their Member State to the EU policy-making process.

However, as shown in section 2.3.1 perception is only one of the factors of policy engagement[278]. In section 7.3, I highlight the differing external perception (reputation) of Czech and Hungarian representatives to influence migration policy at the EU level. This subsection illustrates the differences between internal and external perceptions.

Next in section 7.4, I analyse the forms of engagement used by Czech and Hungarian representatives including pace-setters, foot-draggers and fence-sitters. This section links to previous chapters to show the shift in policy engagement by Czech and Hungarian representatives in 2015.

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[278] In Chapter Two I cover the three factors of policy engagement including: capacity, domestic dynamics, and perception. Domestic dynamics and capacity were covered in Chapter Six.

Sections 7.5 further examines the actions of policy engagement that have been utilised by Czech and Hungarian representatives. This section helps to foster a deeper understanding of how these post-2004 representatives are engaging at the EU level.

7.2 Self-perceptions, policy engagement and EU Migration Policy

Self-perceptions can influence national representatives from post-2004 Member States' attempts to shape EU policy-making (Misik, 2015). Misik (2015: 216) specifies "preferences are influenced not only by objective attributes of a Member State but also by the roles ascribed to the state that mirror its perceived shortcomings and strengths." Self-perception is constantly evolving and mediated by the "actors themselves" (Aggestam, 2006: 22). More specifically, the extent of self-perception can influence a national representatives' view of their Member State's ability to contribute to migration policy formation at the EU level.

Self-perception pertains to all Member States; however, I assert that it is a particularly noteworthy concept for national representatives from Central European post-2004 Member States because national representatives observed a period during early EU membership in which their views were not perceived to be fully welcomed at the EU level (Panke, 2010a).[279] This may be a result of different extents of "will and skill" employed by national representatives and their staff members, which is anticipated to differ across Member States (Jänicke 2005: 136). Political will is defined as the "sustained commitment of politicians and administrators to invest political resources to achieve specific objectives" (Rose and Greeley, 2005:6). This is posited to have particular relevance for the policy-formation stage because this stage can be a long-term commitment. The degree of political will asserted by national representatives is anticipated to impact policy engagement, without political will the possibility to push agenda items may be lacking. Bureaucratic skills refer to a range of matters including quick instructions, administrative size and approach, the expertise of civil service and the length of experience of the civil servant (Micallef-Grimaud, 2018: 29). The self-

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[279] An interview with an official from the Polish Permanent Representation (By phone. February 12, 2019), an interview with an official from the Slovak Permanent Representation (Brussels. February 5, 2019), an interview with a Former Czech Ambassador to the EU 1 (Prague. September 24, 2018), an interview with a former Czech Ambassador to the EU 3 (Prague. November 16, 2018) and an interview with a Hungarian Member of the European Parliament 1 (Budapest. June 4, 2015).

perceptions of national representatives 'will and skill' reveals differences in the pursuit of EU migration policy goals.[280]

Before beginning my analysis, I would like to turn to Table 7a below which is based on interview data that emerged from NVivo analysis. The table highlights the themes brought up by representatives during the semi-structured interviews. In the table I classify the size of the Member State and length of EU membership as objective, or measurable (Micallef-Grimaud, 2018). Then, the willingness to collaborate and quick reaction to instructions are classified as subjective measures (Misik, 2015). The table highlights that during the interview process Czech representatives tended to focus more on objective measures than Hungarian representatives.

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[280] It is important to note that my interviews focused upon migration policy, and I cannot confirm that the perception and approach is the same in other policy areas. However, my research does provide a piece of the puzzle to understand wider EU engagement by the Czech Republic and Hungary.

Table 7a: Czech and Hungarian representatives' self-perceptions

Respondents	Size[281]	Length of EU membership[282]	Willingness to collaborate[283]	Quick reaction to instructions[284]
Czech MEP1	✓	✓	✓	✓
Czech MEP2	✓	---	---	---
Czech MEP3	✓	---	✓	---
Czech MEP4	✓	✓	x	---
Czech MP1	✓	✓	---	---
Czech MP2	✓	✓	✓	---
Czech MP3	✓	✓	✓	---
Czech MP4	✓	x	x	x
Czech Perm Rep1	✓	✓	✓	✓
Czech Perm Rep2	✓	✓	✓	✓
Former CZ Ambas 1	✓	✓	✓	✓
Former CZ Ambas 2	✓	✓	✓	---
Former CZ Ambas 3	✓	x	✓	✓
Czech Senator	✓	✓	✓	---
Former HU MEP	x	x	x	✓
Hungarian MEP	x	✓	x	✓
HU MP1	x	x	x	---
HU MP2	x	x	---	---
HU MP3	x	x	x	x
HU Perm Rep1	x	x	x	✓
HU Perm Rep2	x	x	x	✓
HU PMO	x	x	x	✓

Source: Author's interviews with national representatives.

N=22 (fourteen Czech respondents, eight Hungarian respondents).

✓=yes, there is an impact, X= no, there is no impact, --- = unwilling or unable to comment

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[281] I categorise 'size' as an objective measure.

[282] I categorise 'length of EU membership' as an objective measure.

[283] I categorise 'willingness to collaborate' as a subjective measure.

[284] I categorise 'quick reaction' as a subjective measure.

7.2.1 Can we? Czech self-perceptions and EU migration policy engagement
As shown in Table 7a size, length of membership (newness), willingness to collaborate and
quick reactions are the key self-perception themes. The first theme, defined as size, was
presented by Czech representatives as an issue that impacted engagement. Cooperation with
fellow Member States appears to be a strategy used by Czech representatives to off-set
limitations related to size. Due size constraints representatives spoke about a willingness [at
times more of a necessity] to cooperate across technical and political levels of migration, and a
collaborative approach was argued to further national interests (Fawn, 2003; Kaniok and
Majer, 2016).[285]Collaboration with other Member States is posited to be well suited to Czech
representatives based on previous patterns (Kaniok, 2014). An example of cooperation with a
more "powerful" Member States was given by a Czech Member of the European Parliament
(MEP) who expressed the careful approach needed to broach interests with more influential
actors. The MEP continued to state that:

> I am working around some issues with Mr Macron, we will see how they turn out….it
> is like a 'long game' right now. There are certain things that I want to see here in
> Prague and going through Paris is the best way to accomplish this. It is very important
> to engage with the big players in Paris and Berlin. We need to work with those who
> have weight.[286]

Secondly, Czech representatives expressed the perception of newness with regards to the
length of their country's EU membership. Newness was perceived as a shortcoming by Czech
Representatives which limited their ability to be involved in the initial stages of the policy-
making process. A representative from the Czech Permanent Representation further
explained, "it is difficult at times to show, as a new Member State, that we have the same level
of experience in issues, sometimes even more than the older states".[287] This representative is
referring directly to the integration of asylum seekers as evidenced through the integration of
asylum applicants from Ukraine, Vietnam and Russia into Czech society.[288] The official
continues, "older Member States are still convinced that they are better and more prepared. It

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[285] Interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015).
[286] An interview with a Czech Member of the European Parliament 3 (Prague. January 19, 2018) and, later, a
follow up interview with the same interviewee for clarification (By Phone. August 19, 2020).
[287] An official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015).
[288] European Commission (2019b) "Governance of Migrant Integration in the Czech Republic," Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/governance/czech-republic.   [Accessed September 7, 2020].

is not possible to prove that elites representing older Member States are more prepared than elites from newer Member States."[289] This statement summarises a sense of frustration expressed by Czech representatives during the interviews due to the difficulty encountered while attempting to contribute migration experiences and knowledge to the policy-formation stage.

Another finding linked to newness which emerged during the interview process was the issue of expertise. In particular, the main issue appears to be the existence of a gap between Czech experts and national representatives, or the resistance of some representatives to seek expert opinion (Dostál and Hloušek, 2015). Interviews further corroborated the limited expert involvement, as a former Czech Ambassador to the EU confirmed, "we suffered, and continue to suffer from not having enough experts."[290] This statement demonstrates that Czech representatives are aware of the importance of experts for EU level agenda-setting and policy formation with the European Commission yet acknowledge they do not have enough experts, particularly in migration policy.[291] This shows that the Czech Government and officials involved in EU migration policy place different levels of importance upon the policy area. Normally in policy areas of low importance fewer resources are allocated. This may in part be due to funding because many Czech migration experts are employed by NGOs rather than directly by the government (Drbohlav and Janurová, 2019).[292] The cooperation between migration NGOs and government officials is said to occur on an ad-hoc basis when requested by governing officials because migration policy is not deemed to be of 'key' importance to the government.[293] Members of society stated that cooperation usually occurs with the Ministry of the Interior.[294]The internal perspective stipulates there is an awareness that expert opinion is required to contribute to EU level migration policy and the gap during the migration crisis.

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[289] An official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015).
[290] An interview with a Former Czech Ambassador to the EU1 (Prague. September 24, 2018).
[291] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador to the EU2 (Prague. February 2, 2018).
[292] An interview with a representative from a Czech NGO2 (Prague. June 9, 2016).
[293] An interview with a representative from a Czech Think Tank (Prague. January 15, 2016), an interview with a representative from a Czech NGO1 (Prague. April 17, 2015), an interview with a representative from a Czech NGO2 (Prague. June 9, 2016).
[294] An interview with a representative from a Czech NGO the Association for Integration and Migration (Prague. April 17, 2015), an interview with a representative from the Prague UNHCR (Prague. June 9, 2016). Please note

A third finding related to the length of membership was a degree of disconnect between Czech national representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MZV) in Prague and the Czech Permanent Representation in Brussels which is corroborated by earlier research such as Georgievová (2006).[295] A former Czech Ambassador to the EU interviewed stated that "sometimes developments are seen as positive in Brussels and well, frankly, sadly in Prague, the same development is negative."[296]In the Czech case, it appears there remains a degree of tension between the representatives who decide to leave Prague for what is perceived to be better social and economic conditions in Brussels, which is akin to a rivalry (Georgievová, 2006).[297]

The third self-perception shown in Table 7a, is the willingness to collaborate. Many representatives commented on the willingness to cooperate (as discussed above in the section f size). However, some respondents identified Euroscepticism[298] as a limitation to EU level policy-making. Due to Eurosceptic views, it may be difficult to see the importance of asserting political will within institutions that are perceived to be inherently 'broken' or 'flawed.'[299] There are high degrees of Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic as shown in Figures 7a and 7b below. The figures show that Czechs are the least likely Member State to respond that the EU "is a good thing" and the most likely of all current Member States to vote to leave the EU if provided with an opportunity (Kaniok and Havlík, 2016 and Havlík and Hloušek, 2017). These Eurobarometer polls (2019a) [300] shown in Figures 7a and 7b may not reflect the views of national representatives, but they do reflect the prevalence of anti-EU views within the Czech Republic. This type of attitude has been displayed by Prime Minister Babiš:

> We do not have the same asylum policy as other EU Member States. Our public feels strongly about who would be allowed to settle in the country, and if the EC [European Commission] fails to respect this, then I fear that it will only boost those forces who want to see the EU fall apart and that would be a pity (2017).

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the emphasis upon the good working relationship was only highlighted at the EU level, relationships with national policy appear to be more complex.

[295] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador to the EU3 (Prague. November 16, 2018).

[296] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador to the EU3 (Prague. November 16, 2018).

[297] An Interview with a representative from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015; and a follow-up interview (By phone. May 15, 2019).

[298] Euroscepticism is defined as the aversion or opposition to the policies of the European Union (Leruth et al., 2016).

[299] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador to the EU2 (Prague. February 2, 2018).

[300] Eurobarometer (2019a).

Figure 7a: Member States' perception of the EU

Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU is...? (% - EU)

Source: Eurobarometer (2019a).

Figure 7b: Member States interest in leaving the EU

If a referendum was held tomorrow regarding (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU, how would you vote? (%)

Source: Eurobarometer (2019a).

The final self-perception of Czech representatives, particularly representatives with experience in Brussels, is the speed of reaction (quick instructions) particularly in cases of regional migration assistance such as in Ukraine (Leontiyeva, 2016, CVVM, 2016).[301] This was described as an advantage because smaller Member States have more direct communication channels, which can increase the speed by which information is disseminated (Panke, 2010b; Szalai, 2017: 346).[302]The internal perception of Czech representatives' from the Permanent

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[301] The largest group of asylum seekers to the Czech Republic in 2015 were from Ukraine, with a total of 104, 388 applications (Czech Statistical Office, 2016).
[302]An interview with a Czech migration policy elite (Prague. August 23, 2018).

Representation during migration policy engagement was the ability of junior to senior representatives, across both at the political and technical levels to react to the fast pace of migration policy development (Drbohlav and Janurová, 2019).[303] These representatives mentioned the speed by which migration policy developed due to the nature of the crisis and the need to be responsive to the changes at the EU level. Representatives also stressed a low turn-over rate of national representatives at the Permanent Representation in Brussels which arguably resulted in a greater level of consistency during the engagement process (Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016, 2018).[304]

7.2.1 Can we? Hungarian self-perceptions and EU migration policy engagement
Conversely, as shown in Table 7a, Hungarian representatives disagreed that size was an issue. Hungarian representatives, regardless of party affiliation, convey a strong sense of national strength (Örkény et al., 2006: 46).[305] The internal view from Hungarian representatives is that Hungary is a Member State which is large enough to have the expertise to offer the wider EU.[306] National representatives highlighted the extent of centralisation and political will of Orbán, referring to him as a 'strong-willed leader'[307] with FIDESZ carefully structured around his leadership (Lamour and Varga, 2020: 336). A representative from the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office commented "not all Member States have a strong enough government or a strong enough leader to act during the migration crisis."[308] A large part of the internal perception of size not being an issue is Orbán's ability to tap into the historical understanding

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[303] An interview with a Former Czech Ambassador 3 (Prague. November 16, 2018).
[304] An interview with a Czech migration policy elite (Prague. August 23, 2018), an interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 2 (Brussels. October 20, 2015) and interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015).
[305] A former Hungarian Member of the European Parliament 2 (Budapest. June 27, 2016), a Hungarian Member of Parliament 2 (By Telephone. January 15, 2018), Hungarian policy advisor (Budapest. January 3, 2019), a representative from the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office (Budapest. January 3, 2019), and a Representative from the Hungarian Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. February 4, 2019).
[306] Former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 1 (Budapest. June 5, 2015), Former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 2 (Budapest. June 27, 2016), Official from the Hungarian Permanent Representation (Brussels. February 4, 2019).
[307] An interview with a former Hungarian Member of the European Parliament 2 (Budapest. June 27, 2016), A representative from the Hungarian Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels, February 4, 2019), A representative from a Hungarian NGO Menedék (Budapest. June 28, 2016).
[308] An official from the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office (Budapest. January 3, 2019).

of the Hungarian nation as powerful, identifying himself as a strong leader, and showing national improvements are occurring.[309]

Secondly, a clear perception among Hungarian representatives is that the majority do not perceive length of membership to be an issue and they do not see their country as new to the EU. The stigma of newness can be complex for post-2004 Member States to overcome (Krasnodębska, 2018); however, in the Hungarian case this stigma is actively rejected by many representatives. A Hungarian policy-maker argued, "the Members from new states are not any different"[310] and "if elites take part in two or three years, they should no longer be considered new."[311] There is an internal sense that Hungary has a contribution to make at the EU level. Those interviewed communicated this conviction, with particular emphasis on the area of migration policy, due to migration being a previously 'closed' policy area to post-2004 Member States[312], but the possibility to contribute more actively 'opened' due to pressure from the Balkan route, allowing Hungary the possibility for greater input.[313]

Thirdly, Hungarian representatives expressed that cooperation can be difficult. The self-perception of strength can also be a weakness because Orbán's national narrative on migration is frequently presented too forcefully at the EU level and remains too central during discussions.[314] A former national representative provided an example, "at times I hear my former colleagues or their staff and I laugh because people are not interested in the Hungarian position as it is being presented, rather they need to show how it would be useful for the greater good [meaning advancements at the EU level]."[315] The prominence upon the national level may, in fact, have adverse consequences at the EU level (Aus, 2008): "emphasis on

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[309] Prime Minister Orban's 'State of the Union' address (Budapest. February 10, 2019). Also see Heather Conley, " How Viktor Orbán turned a century of Hungarian History into a secret weapon," Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/03/how-viktor-orban-turned-century-hungarian-history-into-secret-weapon/. [Accessed August 20, 2020].

[310] Former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 1 (Budapest. June 5, 2015).

[311] Former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 2 (Budapest. June 27, 2016).

[312] For example, France, due to previous colonial ties, making migration a pertinent policy concern (Vezzoli and Flahaux, 2017).

[313] Official from the Hungarian Permanent Representation (Brussels. February 4, 2019).

[314] A former Hungarian Member of the European Parliament 1 (Budapest. June 3, 2015).

[315] A former Hungarian Member of the European Parliament 1 (Budapest, June 3, 2015).

national politics does not get results, a more clever approach is needed," as put by a member of a civil society organisation. [316]

Lastly, the degree of centralisation was highlighted by Hungarian representatives to allow for quick instructions to be given[317] which was also collaborated in the literature (Bogaards, 2018). Due to the centralisation, there is clarity in the Hungarian position which created consistency (Juhász et al., 2015:23). For instance, a Hungarian PMO stated it is "very simple to engage because everyone knows where we stand, now." [318] A representative from a Hungarian Civil Society organisation Menedék elaborates:

> I think there is an evolution in the process and retrospectively there has always been an argument or a story that could be called clarity. It is a strong position, it is a unique position, and it is a vocal position, it is a strategic position, I think it is a dynamic position as well. And I think there have been mistakes and losses as well as successes if you consider it as a game. [319]

Quick instructions were also identified to have negative consequences. For example, in a report by the European Commission (2018c) it appears the staff turn-over rate in Hungary is quite high.[320] As illustrated above, Hungarian representatives are required to take a firm and clear stance. Since 2015 the bureaucratic approach has also changed: before it was a common practice to meet Hungarian officials on a one-to-one basis, but now in many cases, there are at least two Hungarian representatives required to attend a meeting and there is a sense of an internal monitoring occurring.[321] By adopting this firm stance, there may be limited relationship and ability to seek compromise, which in turn, could cause isolation.

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[316] A representative from a Hungarian NGO Menedék (Budapest. June 28, 2016).

[317] A representative from the Hungarian Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. February 4, 2019), a representative from the Hungarian Permanent Representation 2 (Brussels. February 2, 2019) and a Representative from Hungarian Menedék (Budapest. June 28, 2016).

[318] An official from the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office (Budapest. January 3, 2019).

[319] Representative from a Hungarian NGO Menedék (Budapest. June 28, 2016).

[320] The European Commission (2018c) "Public administration characteristics and performance in EU28: Hungary," Available from: www. 13%20-KE-01-18-793-EN-N_HU.pdf. [Accessed August 20, 2020].

[321] Representative from DG Home (Brussels. February 5, 2019). During an interview at the Hungarian Permanent Representation (Brussels. February 4, 2019) an inflexible approach was observed, the official only used the official talking points and seemed unable to deviate from the set points.

7.3 External perceptions, policy engagement and EU migration policy

The concept of perception is wider than only a national representatives' self-perception of their Member State's ability to influence EU level policy engagement. The other Member States' national representatives and institutional actors[322] also form opinions of a Member State's ability to influence EU policy development. If other actors do not perceive a Member State to be a suitable example within a policy area, then any rhetoric of leadership is not deemed to be sustainable (Haverland, 2009).[323] Therefore, the perceptions of other EU level actors are argued to play a role in the degree to which a Member State can impact EU policy. This section considers the extent to which Czech and Hungarian representatives are perceived to be able to shape EU migration policy.

7.3.1 Can they? EU actors' perceptions of Czech engagement in EU migration policy
Within the literature, the importance of reputation to gain legitimacy is highlighted (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006:4). The Czech reputation, particularly with regards to EU migration policy engagement faced criticism under Prime Minister Babiš for the framing of the crisis. Reputation is further linked to issue ownership, as discussed in Chapter Six, Czechs have limited experience with migration, with the experiences namely within the region (Ukraine/Russia) [324] or with countries with former Communist ties (Vietnam/Mongolia). Czech representatives have not been able to overcome the perception of limited issue "ownership" (Carrera and Guild, 2012) of EU migration policy. Member States deemed to have more experience continue to dominate migration policy at the EU level.[325]

The external perception of limited migration experience may restrict Czech national representatives from taking on a more active role because without the reputation of being

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[322] In this thesis, EU institutional actors include the European Commsion, Council and other Agency Officials as well as other national representatives at the EU level (National Permanent Representations).

[323] An interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 2 (Brussels. October 20, 2015).

[324] An interview with an official from the Polish Permanent Representation (By Phone. February 12, 2019), an interview with an official from DG-INTPA (Brussels. February 5, 2019), an interview with a representative from EEAS (Brussels. February 5, 2019), an interview with two representatives from the Hungarian Permanent Representation (Brussels. February 4, 2019), As interview with a representative from the German Permanent Representation (By Phone. December 17, 2018), an interview with a MEP from the LIBE Committee (By Phone. October 8, 2018).

[325] An interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015).

'knowledgeable' it is difficult to convince other representatives that they have a contribution to make. Yet, marginal migration numbers mean that it is difficult to prioritise migration and show expertise. As put by a representative from the Polish Permanent Representation "the Czechs are more pragmatic and hesitant to comment, they are not interested in shaping this area."[326] Moreover, a Committee Member from the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) continued to state that "not all Member States can be active", and the Czechs missed the opportunity to voice their perspective towards the proposed asylum changes in 2015.[327] These statements advance the literature which stresses the importance of early engagement, as confirmed by a representative from the German Permanent Representation who stated that "it can be difficult to re-direct a missed boat."[328] Therefore, the external perception of Czech representatives' ability to shape migration policy at the EU level is marginal.

7.3.2 Can they? EU actors' perceptions of Hungarian engagement in EU migration policy
The external perception of other EU actors does not align with the internal perceptions of Hungarian representatives shown in section 7.2.2. This lack of alignment between perceptions is significant to understanding how Hungary has been engaging at the EU level since 2015. Firstly, communication has been isolated as an important factor during EU level engagement (Faizullaev, 2014: 276) yet since the start of the migration crisis, communication has been reported to be less frequent between Hungarian representatives and other actors. A DG official from Migration and Home Affairs (Home) reports his colleagues have been completely denied the opportunity to meet.[329] This lack of engagement appears to continue to the highest political level. For instance, the EU Ambassador from Hungary gave a speech and swiftly left the room, which the interviewee indicates may have been to avoid any further dialogue.[330]

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[326] An interview with an official from the Polish Permanent Representation (By Phone. February 12, 2019).
[327] An interview with an official with a Member of the European Parliament from the LIBE Committee (By Phone. October 8, 2018).
[328] An interview with an official from the German Permanent Representative (By Phone. December 17, 2018).
[329] An interview with an official from DG Home (Brussels. February 5, 2019).
[330] As interview with a senior official from DG-INTPA 2 (Brussels. February 5, 2019). Please note the DG for International Cooperation and Development (DG-DEVCO) is now called DG International Partnerships (INTPA) in 2021.The opinion cited is further substantiated by Lily Bayer for Politico (2019), "Hungary's 'incredibly rude' Commission pick" Available from: https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-orban-european-commission-oliver-varhelyi-criticism-management-style-verbal-abuse/. Accessed August 27, 2020. Bayer (2019) writes,

Routine engagement between Hungarian representatives, EU actors and the other Member States representatives appears to be limited and aggressive;[331] for instance, Hungarian representatives have attempted to "dictate a specific migration language" and "create a firmer stance" on migration at the EU level.[332] A senior official from the DG of International Partnerships (INTPA) elaborates on Hungary's firm stance:

> There would be a way to explain the very same position without being so dogmatic, so what do they gain from going to the UN, and every place and saying migration is only negative, there is nothing positive about in it, and therefore it is only crime etc. That is why everyone is becoming so annoyed, because of the position, and you can be stuck for years if you don't find an agreement. But why the choice to have so much of a negative, and polemic messaging, so much black and white on this, no nuanced approach, I fail to see…[333]

Limited communication does not reflect leadership at the EU level, particularly during the agenda-setting and policy-formation stages of the policy-making process. Hence, the internal perception greatly differs from the external perception of Hungary's ability to contribute to migration policy leadership.

7.3.3 Divergent Czech and Hungarian engagement

The section indicated that other EU policy actors expressed differing assessments of Czech and Hungarian policy engagement as partners at the EU level. As shown in Figure 7c, ECFR's assessment supports my argument that there are significant differences in EU migration policy engagement by Czech and Hungarian representatives. For example, Hungary was assessed as one of the "most disappointing' partners," yet respondents also mentioned the country's ability to "punch above its weight." The assessment for the Czech Republic was neutral and reflects the marginal engagement by Czech representatives. Moreover, the chart is supportive of my argument that: Czech and Hungarian engage differently at the EU level. Which furthers my questioning of the extent of unity within the Visegrád Group during EU level policy engagement.

[Ambassador] "Várhelyi also adopts a more combative approach in ambassadors' meeting than colleagues from other countries, according to multiple diplomats."

[331] As interview with a senior official DG-INTPA 1 (Brussels. February 5, 2019).

[332] An interview with an official from the European External Action Service (Brussels. February 5, 2019).

[333] As interview with a senior official DG-INTPA 1 (Brussels. February 5, 2019).

Figure 7c: EU representatives' assessment of partners

Source: European Council on Foreign Relations (2020).

7.4 Forms of EU engagement and EU migration policy

This section analyses the different forms of engagement used by Czech and Hungarian representatives at the EU level. I argue that key national representatives select the form of engagement based on policy-specific factors, with the forms of engagement ranging from pace-setters, foot-draggers or fence-sitters (Hértitier, 1996; Liefferink and Skou-Andersen, 1998; Borzel, 2002; Haverland, 2009). It is important to highlight, for national representatives to engage in the EU policy process, a deep understanding of the positions and motivations of other representatives within specific policy areas is needed (Aus, 2008). For instance, presenting a policy proposal that other Member States will endorse is not always possible; however, it is feasible for a representative to proactively anticipate various scenarios based on past forms of engagement. This is clearly explained by a permanent representative from Slovakia:

> You must genuinely try to understand what makes the other counterpart tick, generally after a few years of experience in discussing asylum and migration whenever there is a policy concept that reaches the table and you look at it, having a few years of experience you can already estimate very precisely what the reaction of a given Member State would be, and I find it remarkable that sometimes policy initiatives are being brought which are in utter disregard of how they will be received.[334]

The limited understanding, and even disregard for post-2004 Member State's positions is expressed which indicates there is an ongoing stigma of newness during the policy-making process. This section continues to analyse the shift in forms of engagement used by Czech and Hungarian representatives since the start of the migration crisis.

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[334] A representative from the Slovak Permanent Representation. (Brussels. February 5, 2019).

7.4.1 Forms of Czech engagement in EU migration policy

In Chapter Five, previous Czech asylum engagement at the EU level was classified as passive 'fence-sitters'.[335] Czech national representatives were restrained and made an effort to avoid being the first Member State to take a position.[336] This form of engagement allowed Czech national representatives to ascertain which stance is the most beneficial without a great degree of political effort[337] (Erlanger, 2009). The slow approach (Haughton, 2010:25) provided the time and space for other Member States to invest more resources into the formation of the position and take political risks. Fence-sitting was the ideal form of engagement due to the low numbers of asylum applicants to the Czech Republic as well as the prioritisation of other policy areas.

However, representatives shifted to 'foot-draggers' during 2015, by showing opposition to any form of mandatory relocation of asylum seekers based on the principle of solidarity within the EU. The increased opposition was largely as a consequence of the 2017 election of Prime Minister Babiš who, as shown in Chapter Six increased the negative rhetoric towards increased migration cooperation based on fears of increased criminality.[338] Overall, the shift in the form of engagement by Czech representatives is argued to be significant because, as mentioned in sections 7.2 and 7.3, self-perceptions and external reputation do not exhibit the Czech Republic as active in migration policy. The shift to engage as a foot-dragger (blocking) indicated that Czech representatives viewed the direction of EU migration policy development to be negative, yet they did not attempt to present a policy alternative. Rather, foot-dragging was used as a method to slow down policy development for as long as possible. Subsequently, the *actions*[339] of Czechs as 'foot-draggers' are considered in section 7.5.

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[335] For example, Stepper (2016) refers to former Czech Prime Minister Sobotka as 'moderate on asylum issues' in The Visegrád Group and the EU agenda on migration: A coalition of the unwilling? Available from: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/151094064.pdf. [Accessed September 9, 2018].

[336] An interview with a Czech migration policy elite (Prague. August 23, 2018).

[337] Official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015).

[338] The transition is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.

[339] NB: The possible actions of engagement include the use of expert opinions (Kingdon, 2003), high-level persuasion (Chelotti, 2013; Galuškova and Kranio, 2015), hard bargaining (Kazoka, 2010; Panke, 2010a; 2010b), coalition building (Copeland, 2013), moral appeals (Micallef-Grimaud, 2015 and Mainwaring, 2012) and speeches (Szilágzi and Bozóki, 2015).

7.4.2 Forms of Hungarian engagement in EU migration policy

Based upon the interview process and supporting secondary documents, I argue that Hungarian representatives have attempted to act as pacesetter since 2015, which means that they have actively engaged to push specific proposals as well as attempted to set the tone and pace of the discussions. Chapter Two presented the different forms of engagement, with pace-setters either being direct or indirect. I highlight this is a meaningful nuance. Hungary began as a direct pace-setter by attempting to assert dominance by example through articulating the importance of security and the necessity to construct fences. This narrative which focused on security resulted in a few countries following the Hungarian example, but was not strong enough to shift dominance away from Member States such as Germany or France.[340] As a result of not being able to lead by example through direct pace-setting, Hungarian representatives shifted to indirect pace-setting, which means the application of defensive approaches or attempts to opt-out[341](Kallius et al., 2016). Hungary's attempt to use the pace-setting form of engagement can be further linked to Chapter Five, which illustrates that Hungary began involvement at the EU level as a pace-setter and was not hindered by the approaches taken by other post-communist states (Batory, 2002). This demonstrates that previous engagement patterns repeated. To understand more about how Hungary attempted to be a pacesetter the next section explores the actions taken by Hungarian representatives.

7.5 Actions of engagement and EU migration policy

The *actions* of engagement include the use of expert opinions (Kingdon, 2003), high-level persuasion (Chelotti, 2013; Galuškova and Kaniok, 2015), hard bargaining (Kazoka, 2010; Panke, 2010a, 2010b), coalition building (Copeland, 2013), moral appeals (Micallef-Grimaud and Mainwaring, 2012) speeches (Szilágzi and Bozóki, 2015) and written appeals.[342] My research into the actions of engagement during the early stages of the policy-making process is

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[340] Dan Bilesfsky in the New York Times, "Hungary's Plan to build a fence is criticized," June 18,2015 Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/19/world/europe/hungarys-plan-to-build-fence-to-deter-migrants-is-criticized.html. [Accessed June 21, 2015].

[341] Please see Chapter Two. Also, Vegh (2019), "Viktor Orban's new European battles," *European Council on Foreign Relations* Available at: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_hungary_for_more_viktor_orbans_new_european_battles. [Accessed August 25, 2020].

[342] The use of written appeals was not found in policy-making literature; however, during the research process I noticed Hungary's routine attempts at written appeals to convey their position. Consequently, I included this action.

an original contribution, drawn from the analysis of interviews conducted presented in Table 7b.

Table 7b: Interviewees actions of engagement

	Czech Republic	**Hungary**
Expert Opinion	No	No
Persuasion	Yes (limited attempts)	Yes (limited attempts)
Hard Bargaining	Yes (limited attempts)	Yes (strong attempts)
Coalition Building	Yes (routine attempts)	Yes (strong attempts)
Moral Appeals	No	Yes (routine attempts)
Speeches	Yes (limited attempts)	Yes (strong attempts)
Written appeals	No	Yes (routine)

Source: Author's interviews with officials from the Permanent Representations and former heads of the Permanent Representations.
N=7 (five Czech respondents, two Hungarian respondents)-
Respondents were asked to respond based on their knowledge of the working levels and executive levels.

7.5.1 Actions of Czech engagement in EU migration policy

This section explores each of the actions of engagement listed above. As reflected in Table 7b certain actions were preferred by Czech representatives. The selection of specific actions can be the result of national dynamics, internal perceptions, external reputations, and the form of engagement selected.

Firstly, expert opinion is relevant to migration policy-making. Trauner and Wolff (2014: 141) argue that there is a "reliance on knowledge-based networks" in the field of migration policy which is a "politically sensitive policy area, it [expert opinion] is indeed a way to legitimize policy-making." Therefore, if a Member State wants to actively engage in migration policy, the use of epistemic community[343] is anticipated to be an effective form of engagement. As discussed in section 7.2, Czech representatives perceived a lack of expert opinion to negatively influence EU migration policy engagement. An MEP from the LIBE committee spoke about the high level of technical expertise within the LIBE committee and also about the difficulty experienced by some colleagues due to national approaches which differed from the prevailing expert opinion.[344] The difference between expert knowledge and the national narrative is presumed to keep some committee members in a less vocal position. In the Czech

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[343] As used in Chapter Two, the epistemic community is a group of experts who attempt to "consolidate bureaucratic power within national administrations and international secretariats, it stands to institutionalise its influence and insinuate its view into broader international politics" (Haas, 1992:5).
[344] An interview with a MEP from the LIBE Committee (By Phone. October 8, 2018).

case, the use of expert opinion to further engagement at the EU level is argued not to be an action readily used.

Secondly, the use of persuasion, particularly attempts to influence the rotating EU Presidencies, since the start of the migration crisis appears to be underdeveloped in the Czech case.[345] Specific details could not be provided by national representatives during interviews. But the interviews indicate that Czechs have attempted to use persuasion by working frequently with Slovak representatives due to linguistic similarities and many comparable policy positions.[346]This cooperation helps both Member States make up the 'numbers game' due to having fewer representatives due to the size of the countries, although the cooperation between Czech and Slovak Permanent Representations is not guaranteed and remains informal and operates on an ad-hoc basis[347].

The third action of engagement, which is hard bargaining, was not readily employed in migration policy by the Czechs until after 2015.[348] The proposal of mandatory relocation within the EU was an issue in which Czech representatives prioritised and were willing to use this more controversial action. Even after the loss at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) Prime Minister Babiš was satisfied with the results stating, "The point is that we will not accept any migrants and that the quotas have expired in the meantime, especially thanks to us."[349] According to this statement, hard bargaining through maintaining an inflexible position appears to have achieved the objective of blocking migrants from the Czech Republic. Based on past patterns presented in Chapter Five, the use of hard bargaining is outside of normal Czech engagement at the EU level.

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[345] Council political administer 1 (Brussels. February 4, 2019), Council political administer 2 (Brussels. February 4, 2019).

[346] An interview with a Czech migration policy elite (Prague. August 23, 2018) and An Official from the Slovak Permanent Representation (February 5, 2019).

[347] An official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015), an interview with a Czech migration policy elite (Prague. August 23, 2018) and an official from the Slovak Permanent Representation (February 5, 2019).

[348] BBC (2017), "EU Targets Poland, Hungary and Czechs for not taking refugees," Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40259268. [Accessed July 5, 2017].

[349]Prague Morning (2020), "Czech Politicians call the EU ruling on migration quotas irrelevant," Available at: www.praguemorning.cz/czech-politicians-call-eu-ruling-on-migrant-quotas-irrelevant/ [Accessed August 21, 2020].

Fourthly, Czech national representatives are receptive to acting as part of a coalition (Weiss, 2017).[350] However, the Czech approach to migration coalitions may be limited to the region because during the interview process only once was cooperation with a Member State outside of the Visegrád mentioned.[351] Engaging as a coalition is an approach that closely mirrors past migration policy engagement by Czech national representatives who tend to follow other Member States with similar interests. Czech migration engagement through a coalition further supports the argument that initial patterns of policy engagement repeat.

The fifth action, which is the use of moral appeals, is an action which Czech representatives have not readily used perhaps due to a difficulty in framing a moral argument around the resistance to migrants. Other post-2004 member states such as Malta have been able to effectively illustrate the burden placed due to high numbers and limited resources (Micallef-Grimaud, 2015 and Mainwaring, 2012) but due to low numbers of asylum applications such moral appeals would be irrelevant for the Czech case. Coincidently, many representatives make the case for migrants not wanting to come to the Czech Republic based on previous experiences and articulate the resources which would be needed to attempt to 'contain' the relocated asylum seekers.[352] A key example of this was in 2016 when a group of 25 individuals, who were in the process of obtaining refugee status in the Czech Republic, hired a private bus and attempted to relocate to Germany, with German police quickly asking the Czech officials to take them back.[353] Czech Interior Minister, Milan Chovanec stated, "This time cannot be used to break laws or to move to another Schengen country. I asked the Czech police to use all legal means so that these people, who abused the goodwill of the Czech Republic and her citizens, are returned to Iraq (Reuters, 2015)." Many Czech representatives argue that forced relocation within the EU will not work because migrants have plans to settle

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[350] An interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2019). Also, Weiss (2017) does not reference migration policy, but it is anticipated that his findings also have relevance with regards to migration policy.

[351] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador to the EU2 (Prague. February 2, 2018).

[352] An interview with a Czech MEP3 (Prague. January 19, 2018).

[353] Reuters (2015) Czech Interior Minister Milan Chovanec quoted in "Czechs to return Iraqi Christians who tried to move to Germany, says Interior Minister," Availablefrom:https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-migrants-czech-iraqis/czechs-to-return-iraqi-christians-who-tried-to-move-to-germany-interior-minister-says-idUSKCN0X00HB. [Accessed April 5, 2016].

in specific countries, and the Czech Republic is not one of these countries (European Parliament, 2017).[354] However, for Czech representatives to try to use this moral argumentation effectively it would require a carefully articulated position which would need to be largely linked to the agency of asylum seekers to make decisions on which Member State offers the best chance of adapting.[355]

Finally, Czechs have rarely used written appeals to persuade colleagues or the wider policy community.[356] Empirical evidence has indicated that Czech national representatives place great value on having the freedom to speak and engage with other representatives instead of using written appeals.[357] Two Czech representatives cite the importance of receiving approval from superiors to be flexible during migration-related issues and not use the official talking points but personalise the message and context.[358] These examples highlight the importance Czechs tend to place on relationships and engaging in an informal manner. In politically sensitive policy areas, such as migration, verbal communication appears to be favoured by Czech national representatives.

7.5.2 Actions of Hungarian engagement in EU migration policy
The first action that of expert engagement, to further Hungarian interests at the EU level was not clear from the research or other secondary sources[359]. The Hungarian approach is argued to be politicised across both political and technical levels. For example, when a UN expert visited the Hungarian migration transit centres in 2019 and called for urgent changes the response was not from the expert level in Hungary, rather from the political level. A response

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[354] An interview with a Czech MEP3 (Prague. January 19, 2018).
[355] For example: United Nations (2017b) "From a Refugee Perspective," Available from: https://www.unhcr.org/5909af4d4.pdf. [Accessed September 1, 2020].
[356] For example: concept of a compulsory redistribution mechanism is supported by Italy, Spain, Greece, Cyprus and Malta found in Remix (2020) "EU set to pursue Migrant quotas again, but the Czech Republic still finds them unacceptable," Available from: https://rmx.news/article/article/eu-set-to-pursue-migrant-quotas-again-but-czech-republic-still-considers-them-unacceptable. [Accessed August 20, 2020].
[357] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador to the EU2 (Prague. February 2, 2018) and an interview with a former Czech Ambassador 3 (Prague. November 16, 2018).
[358] An interview with a former Czech Ambassador 3 (Prague. November 16, 2018) and An interview with an official from the Czech Permanent Representation 1 (Brussels. October 20, 2015).
[359] An interview with a representative from a Hungarian UNHCR (Budapest. June 16, 2016) and an interview with a representative from ECRE (Brussels, October 20, 2015),

from the expert level may have depoliticised the exchange. However, the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister continued the politicised approach stating that "illegal migrants should not be entitled to the same level of health care as those who have been honest taxpayers,"[360] which reiterates the Government's main migration talking points. Instead of experts from the government NGOs largely stepped in to provide expert support during the height of the crisis in September of 2015 (Amnesty International, 2015).[361] Expert opinion is argued to be a useful action to convince other national representatives (Trauner and Wolff, 2014), for instance, of the importance of following border procedures within the CEAS. However, a politicised approach taken by Hungary lacks the views of experts, and consequently lacks nuance, as argued by a senior Official at DG-INTPA.

The second action of engagement is high-level dialogues. At the start of the crisis, Hungarians engaged with high-level contacts across many institutions:[362] this is significant as a higher number of linkages between the EU institutions and Member States is anticipated to yield fewer conflicts (Bozóki and Hegedűs, 2018: 1182). The early high-level policy-formation in 2015, centred on clear instructions which were provided from Budapest to representatives in a centralized top-down manner.[363] An official from the DG-HOME confirmed this, "it seems [instructions] were from a high level and a very top-down political approach. Usually, public servants are preparing and bringing options to the working party. So, this is why sometimes very abruptly they are changing their mind, basically, someone at the top woke up, and was not able to agree."[364] An official from DG-INTPA continued "with such a top-down approach and unconditional stance, there has been an increased lack of relevance and contact at the technical level."[365] This shift in 2015 reflects the changing political reality in Hungary, with

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[360] Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs quoted in, Palickova (2019) for Euroactiv, "UN expert describes Hungarian migrant camps as places of detention and deterrence." Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/un-expert-describes-hungarian-migrant-camps-as-places-of-detention-and-deterrence/. [Accessed August 21, 2020].
[361] An interview with a representative from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (Budapest. June 5, 2015).
[362] An interview with a Council political administrator (Brussels. February 4, 2019) and an interview with representative from ECRE (Brussels. October 20, 2015).
[363] An interview with an official from DG-INTPA 1 (Brussels. February 5, 2019).
[364] An interview with an official from DG Home (Brussels. February 5, 2019).
[365] An interview with a senior official from DG-INTPA 1 (Brussels. February 5, 2019).

the past increase in Prime Minister Orbán's power[366] and greater centralisation of decision making (Bogaards, 2018). This highly nationalised approach to policy-making may result in decisions being made that are out of touch with the context of the situation in Brussels. Such an approach may slow down or block migration cooperation because it allows little to no leeway for negotiation. This approach has earned the Hungarian FIDESZ MEPs and representatives from the Hungarian Permanent Representation, "a reputation of being tough towards institutional actors and the other Member States. This toughness has very clear lines."[367] As a result, the European Commission and other national representatives had to search for different ways to interact because in many cases interviewees indicated that previous communication channels were closed. [368] Moreover, high-level dialogues which always stay 'on message' may be extremely challenging for political representatives, particularly in a culture such as Brussels which relies on the practice of consensus building and sharing selected sensitive information to build trust (Zaiotti, 2007; Aus, 2008). An official at the European External Action Service provided greater insight into the internal discussions as during Council working groups, "older Member States sometimes take the floor…and say I have not yet gotten the green light from the capital, but I see this and this…. I have not observed that with the Hungarians."[369] She continues to state that Hungarian officials believe they are being very clear with black and white language, but to arrive at a consensus shades of grey are needed.[370] My research indicates these nuances are missing from the policy-formation stage of policy-making.

The third possible action of engagement is hard bargaining. This action aims to "frustrate the process" or "highjack the process for national concerns."[371] This is a concern for other EU actors because blocking statements and action plans due to pro-migrant language is deemed

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[366] As discussed in Chapter Six, since 2011, the restructuring of various Hungarian institutions has given Prime Minister Orbán increased control.

[367] An interview with an official from the Polish Permanent Representation (By Telephone. February 12, 2019).

[368] An interview with an official from European External Action Service (February 5, 2019), an interview with a senior official from DG-INTPA 1 (Brussels. February 5, 2019), an interview with an administrator representing the Council (Brussels. February 4, 2019) and an interview with an official from DG Home (Brussels. February 5, 2019).

[369] An interview with a representative from EEAS (Brussels. February 5, 2019).

[370] An interview with a representative from EEAS (Brussels. February 5, 2019).

[371] An interview with a policy advisor to a MEP on the LIBE Committee (By Phone. October 8, 2018) and an interview with a senior official from DG-INTPA 2 (Brussels. February 5, 2019)

harmful to areas of EU cooperation with third countries[372]. Member States with a similar policy stance to Hungary do not see hard bargaining as being problematic to the policy process.[373] Rather, Hungary is known to have a "reputation of being tough towards institutional actors and the other Member States."[374] According to this stance, actions such as blocking are not negative, but rather blocking is perceived by some Hungarian representatives to show strength and political muscle. In the short-term, blocking may appear to be beneficial because these delays will result in the Hungarian representatives, "getting more" in the short-term.[375] However, blocking should not be a long-term strategy at the EU level which works largely according to reaching a consensus[376]. It appears the use of blocking policy progress at the EU level is becoming more systematic for Hungarian representatives. According to a senior official to DG INTPA, it is beginning to seem that the blocks happen "almost for the sake of it" with little regard to what is being lost within the wider picture.[377] An example of such attempts were made by Hungary during the Cotonou Agreement (Carbone, 2021). Overall, the action of hard bargaining used by Hungary at the EU level is becoming more aggressive and this approach is viewed by external actors as risky and leaves Hungarian representatives increasingly "isolated" (Bogaards, 2018).

Fourthly, coalition building is an important action of engagement for the representation of Hungarian views at the EU level (Nič, 2016). National representatives stated that coalitions are a significant factor in articulating interests at the EU level.[378] Coalition cooperation is argued to be an attempt to embellish Prime Minister Orban's profile at the EU level.[379] Figure 7d depicts research from the ECFR (2017) which indicates that Hungary sees the other

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[372] The European Commission (2016c) defines 'third country' as" a country that is not a member of the European Union as well as a country or territory whose citizens do not enjoy the European Union right to free movement, as defined in Art. 2(5) of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code)." Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/third-country_en. [Accessed September 2, 2020].

[373] An interview with an official from the Slovak Permanent Representation (February 5, 2019) and an interview with an official from the Polish Permanent Representation (By Phone. February 12, 2019).

[374] An interview with an official from the Polish Permanent Representation (By Phone. February 12, 2019).

[375] An interview with a senior official from DG-INTPA 2 (Brussels. February 5, 2019).

[376] Please see Chapter Two for more details on the importance of consensus.

[377] an interview with a senior official from DG-INTPA 1 (Brussels. February 5, 2019).

[378] An interview with a Hungarian Member of Parliament 2 (By phone. January 15, 2018), an interview with a Hungarian Member of Parliament 2 (By phone. December 17, 2018) and an interview with an official from the Hungarian Permanent Representative 1 (February 4, 2019).

[379] An example of this is the website, About Hungary http://abouthungary.hu/migration/ which features Prime Minister Orbán as a strong leader of a wider cause, the securitisation of migration.

Visegrád Group as partners, but Czech representatives see other Member States such as Germany and Sweden to be closer partners than Hungary. The importance of coalitions may be more a smokescreen used by Hungarian representatives to justify harsh positions.

Figure 7d: Czech and Hungarian preferences and partners

Source: European Council on Foreign Relations (2017). Taken from questions 10, 12 and 17.

The fifth action is moral appeals. In 2015, the act of using a moral appeal at the EU level could have been an effective act of engagement because in the initial proposal by the Commission (2015) Hungary was placed in the same beneficiary category as Italy and Greece[380]. Instead of accepting this offer, Hungarian representatives, as instructed by Budapest, swiftly rejected the proposal (Zalan, 2015). This rejection prevented the possibility of Hungarian representatives building a moral case. Although Hungary did appeal to the EU community for support[381] this request was for 400 million euros which was half of the costs to construct the fence along Hungary's southern border. Prime Minister Orban's former Chief of Staff Janos Lazar attempted to defend Hungary's financial appeal, in a securitised tone, he stated the fence was for "protecting all the citizens of Europe from the flood of illegal migrants."[382] This statement shows an attempt to make a moral appeal, by stating that the

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[380] See: The European Commission (2015g) "A proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of internal protection for the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary," September 9, 2015. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/proposal_for_council_decision_establishing_provisional_measures_in_the_area_of_international_protection_for_it_gr_and_hu_en.pdf. [Accessed September 12, 2015].

[381] An interview with a representative from the Hungarian PMO (Budapest. January 3, 2019).

[382] DW (2017) "Hungary's Victor Orbán sends the EU a border fence bill." Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/hungarys-viktor-orban-sends-eu-a-border-fence-bill/a-40319972. [Accessed September 4, 2017].

fence was not only for Hungarians but constructed for the protection of all Europeans. This appeal was further supported by Prime Minister Orbán who wrote: "I hope that in the spirit of European solidarity we can rightly expect that the European Commission…will reimburse half of our extraordinary border protection expenses in the foreseeable future."[383] Similar language was used by the former Chief of Staff, "If we talk about European solidarity, we must also discuss the protection of borders. Solidarity must be applicable there too. That burden must also be shared" (DW, 2017). The European Commission quickly rejected Prime Minister Orban's request in an official statement from a European Commission Official, Alexander Winterstein, "We are not financing the construction of fences or barriers at the external borders."[384] These statements reflect the divide between Brussels and Budapest over the disagreement over security for whom: either those within the EU or those outside the EU. Hungary's attempted moral appeal focused on solidarity was rejected, which further illustrates an earlier point, that not all Member States understand the concept of solidarity in the same manner. Largely due to the negative way Hungary framed the migration issues the country's efforts to strengthen the external Schengen border have been widely unacknowledged by the wider EU community.

Sixthly, speeches have been an act of engagement used frequently by Prime Minister Orbán.[385] His speeches provide insight into the connections between various issues and articulate the Hungarian stance (Bogaards, 2018: 1487).[386] A representative from the Hungarian Prime Minister's office concurs "one of the things I can say, for Hungary's advantage, no matter what side of the political debate people sit on, it is possible to say that Hungary has had a clear narrative, it has never changed, there have not been any dramatic turns, you might say this has helped Hungary in a lot of ways in making its position clear."[387] Prime Minister Orbán's speeches, particularly those given at the Bálvánzos Summer Open University and Student

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[383] The National Post, (2017) "Hungary asks for help to pay for the ant-migrant border fence," Available at: https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/hungary-asks-eu-to-help-pay-for-anti-migrant-border-fence. [Accessed September 4, 2017].

[384] Winterstein representing the European Commission (2017). Available at: https://euobserver.com/migration/138857. [Accessed September 4, 2017].

[385] Chapter Six discusses Prime Minister Orbán's speeches in greater detail.

[386] An interview with a representative from EEAS (Brussels. February 5, 2019)

[387] An interview with an official from the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office (Budapest. January 3, 2019).

Camp, have been known to provide new policy direction.[388] This further illustrates the importance placed upon Hungarian national politics and the complex attempts to represent these interests, although these attempts have had a marginal impact at the EU level.

Finally, written appeals were used by Hungarian representatives, particularly in 2015. These written appeals were normally in the form of opinion pieces written by Hungarian Ambassadors (for example, Odor, 2015)[389] to fully articulate Hungary's approach and to attempt to justify the securitisation of the southern borders against migrants. The opinion pieces used similar language and tone to Hungarian national officials, which indicates a top-down approach from Budapest. Another key example of the Hungarian Government's attempt to make a written appeal at the international level was an official proposal to the United Nations requesting a global refugee quota system arguing that the asylum crisis is not only a European issue.[390] These actions indicate Hungary attempted to find support outside of the EU. This attempt reaffirms the attempt to be a pace-setter, but Hungarian representatives were unsuccessful in building a case for global quotas without the support of the wider EU and this unilateral action was taken without regard to the normal EU policy-making process.

7.6 Conclusion

Member State engagement at the EU level is a complex process involving various perceptions, forms and actions. With regards to perceptions, I argued internalised self-perception and external perception can impact engagement and is of particular relevance for newer Member States. The chapter shows differences in the self-perception of representatives' ability to influence migration policy which is contended to either enhance or limit policy engagement. More specifically, the chapter shows how Czech representatives remain pessimistic of the

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[388] For more details, please see the "Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Summer Camp" (July 29, 2018b). Available from: https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-29th-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp. [Accessed August 10, 2018].

[389] For example, Ambassador Odor in the Montreal Gazette, "Opinion: Hungary is upholding its obligations to Migrants," September 16, 2015. Available from: https://montrealgazette.com/news/world/opinion-hungary-is-upholding-its-obligations-to-migrants. [Accessed 17 September 2015].

[390] ABC News, "Europe migrant crisis: Hungary asks United National for global quotas on asylum seekers," Available from: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-30/hungary-asks-un-for-global-quotas-on-migrants/6815542?nw=0. [Accessed 30 September 2015].

country's reputation during agenda-setting and policy-formation. Externally, national representatives from other Member States or EU institutions do not see the Czech representatives as having interest or authority in migration policy development. With regards to Hungary, internal and external perceptions of the ability of Hungarian representatives differ with regards to migration agenda-setting and policy-formation. The internal perspective projects confidence, while the majority of other actors do not accept Hungary as a migration policy leader. This indicates that reputation can have an impact upon representatives' ability to shape EU migration policy, particularly in the case of newer Member States which have been previously less involved in a policy area.

This chapter showed that the perceptions of engagement can impact the form and actions of engagement selected by national representatives, which provides a better understanding of how post-2004 Member States are engaging at the EU level. The forms of engagement: pace-setter and foot-dragger selected by Hungary and the Czech Republic link to Chapters Five and Six and demonstrate past patterns repeating. The research suggests that past patterns may be difficult for representatives to overcome.

Chapter Eight
Explaining variation in Czech and Hungarian migration policy engagement

8.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, I provided evidence to illustrate that there are differences in the Czech and Hungarian policy-making processes, both at the national and EU levels. My empirical research highlighted that these post-2004 Member States each have distinct policy preferences, and the forms and actions used by national representatives differ. This chapter aims to explain the variation between Czech and Hungarian migration policy engagement. The divergence between these Member States is emphasised to foster a greater understanding of how, and the extent to which, the selected post-2004 Member States engage in the EU policy-making process. This understanding is beneficial to better comprehend the wider EU policy-making process and the unique challenges faced by post-2004 Member States. The differences between the Czech Republic and Hungary also calls into question the extent to which the Visegrád Group will continue to cooperate on migration policy.

Section 8.2 returns to consider the 'normal' EU policy process. This section demonstrates that because of the urgency of the migration crisis in 2015, the early stages of the policy process advanced rapidly. Such acceleration limited the timeframe in which national representatives could attempt to find consensus. Migration policy development in 2015, therefore, was a departure from the previous incremental policy model through which the CEAS had gradually developed. This change is argued to have negatively impacted migration policy development.

Section 8.3 illustrates how Czech and Hungarian migration preferences did not simply emerge in 2015. To understand the shift in 2015, it is necessary to first comprehend previous engagement. To do this, I reviewed two earlier periods (accession and early membership) to identify previous patterns, meaning forms and actions of engagement. These early migration experiences can provide insight into more recent national migration dynamics. This section reconsiders the forms and actions of engagement across three periods, namely post-communism, early membership and post-2015.

Section 8.4 is an exploration of the domestic dynamics in the Czech Republic and Hungary including geopolitical border security, national representatives' subjective perceptions, populism and ethnicity at the national level. My research only focused on two members from the Visegrád Group which does not allow me to comment on the full dynamics within the

group; however, the differences do allow me to consider more about how the group functions and the depth of cooperation.

8.2 The EU policy-making process under pressure

From a conceptual perspective, the EU policy process can follow several different policy-making models. As shown in Chapter Two, a few of the policy-making models include the incremental, rational or the 'garbage can' approaches (Simon, 1957; March and Olsen, 1976). As demonstrated in Chapter Four migration policy is comprised of both supranational and national legislation. It is important to note that after 1999 the CEAS developed in a highly incremental manner. Incremental policy development worked well due to the complexity of asylum policy. The incremental manner of the CEAS's development meant that ongoing developments and improvements continued through the gradual recasting of the directives and regulations from 2011 to 2013. The challenge of incremental policy development is that policy can remain incomplete due to the gradual manner of development. The incomplete policy elements normally collapse under pressure as highlighted by the migration crisis (Scipioni, 2018). One example of a policy inconsistency is the different recognition rates of asylum seekers from the same country of origin across EU Member States (Toshkov and de Haan, 2013: 662; Eurostat, 2021). This type of policy shortcomings can be highly influential in the EU policy-making process because they can provide a rationale to improve the policy area, thus triggering further policy integration and development (Jones et al., 2016).

However, in 2015 due to the urgency of the migration crisis, an incremental approach was no longer deemed feasible. Instead, the European Commission, particularly President Junker, and national representatives from countries receiving a large number of asylum seekers, such as Germany, attempted to respond to the developing policy pressures in real-time. The main aim was to prevent the loss of lives at sea resulted in the policy-making process being sped up significantly. The speed meant the incremental model was not able to explain the policy-making process; consequently, the garbage can policy model was used to explain attempts to make swift decisions. The empirical evidence demonstrated that the increased pace of policy development did not allow for the normal policy process to be followed. As shown in Chapter Six, the normal EU policy-making process encourages attempts to reach consensus (Aus,

2008); however, in 2015 migration policy developed without a clear consensus between Member States. I acknowledge the pace of policy development was necessary to address the humanitarian crisis, but the sudden acceleration of migration policy development was unsuited to an EU wide policy solution.

In addition to the urgency of the situation, migration remains a complex policy area because it is linked to contentious matters such as national sovereignty, human rights, and security at both national and supranational levels. Before 2015, migration policy was comprised of separate strands of interrelated policy including the CEAS, which was developed at the supranational level as a package policy[391] while the other components of irregular entry and legal entry of migrants, which were mainly controlled at the national level.[392] The *European Agenda on Migration* aimed to approach migration in a more holistic manner by combining these interrelated policy areas. This meant that the *European Agenda on Migration* was viewed negatively by some national representatives as an attempt to shift migration policy away from the national level towards the supranational level. This suggests that discontentment was deeper than simple discord over differing migration policy approaches. Rather, the opposition to the *European Agenda on Migration* was more complex because it was more about the level of policy formation and the perception that national influence may be reduced.

Additionally, this policy proposal meant that there would be a need to re-frame the policy area further which added additional complexity because the process of re-framing is more complicated than developing new policy (Princen, 2007). The re-framing of migration involves the juxtaposition of human rights protection, security concerns as well as the conflict between state sovereignty and EU supranational governance, as explained in Chapter Four (Lavenex, 2001a; 2001b). These elements are all part of migration policy, but the complexity remains in which of these elements should be placed higher on the policy agenda. As shown

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[391] Package policies are frequently used at the EU level. This approach aims to balance out interests of Member States in order to ensure that there are elements within the packages which are favourable to a variety of interests.

[392] Certainly, there were elements of supranational policy development with regards to irregular and regular migrants before 2015 such as the blue card initiative.

in Chapter Six, attempts to frame migration and establish a hierarchy of these policy elements caused controversy between representatives at the national level.

This thesis, contrary to the existing literature which tends to consider later stages in the policy-making process such as decision-making and policy-implementation, has offered insights into the early stages of the policy-making process. In 2015, the urgency of the migration crisis meant it was high on the agenda the EU policy agenda national representatives did not need to engage in agenda-setting.[393] Instead, EU agenda-setting focused on which elements of migration should be prioritised. There was a lack of consensus between national representatives during the early stages of re-framing migration policy, and this limited consensus had a detrimental impact on policy development. It also highlights the extent to which the EU policy-making process depends on consensus, particularly during the early stages. My research demonstrates the importance of consensus during the early stages of the EU policy formation process.

8.3 Revisiting Czech and Hungarian EU policy engagement with EU migration policy
To understand the policy shift in 2015, it is necessary to first analyse previous policy engagement by Czech and Hungarian representatives in greater detail. The initial post-communist engagement created patterns, which contributed to the internal perceptions of representatives and the reputation of these countries at the EU level (Malová, 2010: 18). This section analyses three periods: accession, early membership, and the shift in 2015.

8.3.1 Accession engagement
National representatives from the Czech Republic and Hungary began to engage with the European Commission after the collapse of communism. My findings, concur with the existing literature, support the view that the initial engagement after communism differed largely due to the positions on EU membership held by the Prime Ministers (Batory, 2002; Hanley; 2004a; Baun and Marek, 2010). I take this argument further and maintain that this

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[393] However, after the 2015 crisis arguments to keep migration at the top of the agenda have waned and become more difficult to justify.

early engagement by national representatives contributed to the formation of certain attitudes about how these countries were expected to behave at the EU level.

The patterns highlighted in Chapter Five provide a more nuanced understanding of Hungarian representatives' attempts to be pace-setters. For instance, initial Hungarian engagement after communism involved quick communication and a willingness to act first. The Hungarian population was largely united by the pro-EU stance taken by Prime Minister Antall, which justified active and positive engagement with the European Commission (Ágh, 1999; Batory 2002). Early Czech engagement with the European Commission was of a diverse nature. In fact, my research has demonstrated that the high number of actors involved in the policy-making process – most notably the Prime Minister, various ministers, Members of the Chamber of Deputies[394], Members of the Senate, and the President[395] – may have impacted the ability of Czech representatives to engage early in the EU policy-making process. Euroscepticism, as demonstrated in each of the empirical chapters impacted the extent to which Czech representatives were willing or able to engage at the EU level.

Chapter Six revealed a higher degree of centralisation in Hungary than in the Czech Republic. In the Czech case, the number of national actors involved in the policy-making process created political cleavages which slowed down the process (Hanley, 2004b). Due to the wide range of political objectives, there was a risk that Czech policy could be 'watered down' to accommodate for the variety of positions (Lorenz and Formánková, 2019). This is contrasted by the Hungarian case because after the fall of communism the decision was made to have a Parliamentary system with a strong Prime Minister (Batory, 2002), which fostered a singular strong voice at the national level. The Hungarian system was developed to have fewer checks and balances, particularly upon the Prime Minister, for example, through the partisan role of the President (Fricz 2000). Also, the singular legislative body, the National House of Representatives, can develop policy in a more direct manner. The higher level of concentration of political power to the Hungarian Prime Minister created the possibility to

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[394] Czech governments tend to be coalitions. For example, see the history of past coalitions: https://www.vlada.cz/cz/urad-vlady/.

[395] The Czech President is not involved until the end of the policy process, the President does have the ability veto legislation in some policy areas. However, Czech Chamber of Deputies can overturn the President's veto with a majority vote.

formulate policy quickly and clearly. The office for European Relations regularly sat within the Prime Minister's Office and was recently moved to operate within the Foreign Office (Batory, 2002). This direct approach meant that engagement with the European Commission was clearer, and Hungary's policy position was more recognisable than that of Czech representatives.

The initial engagement by Czech and Hungarian representatives with the European Commission resonates with different early migration experiences after the fall of communism. My research found that in the Czech case, migrants which applied for asylum generally fit into two main categories: applicants from within the region and applicants with historical links forged during communism (Drbohlav et al., 2009). The former meant applications mainly from the Soviet Union and the latter was historical connections during communism such as Vietnam. The initial Czech experience with migration was that many asylum applicants began the process, but absconded before the final decision meaning the Czech Republic was primarily a transit country for migrants rather than a destination (Drbohlav, 1994, 2005; Jungwirth, 2017). Therefore, the Czech Republic's initial migration experience as a transit country is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it resulted in a negative view from officials at the Ministry of the Interior because lodged applications involved administrative time and resources, but many asylum applicants did not remain until a final decision was made (The Czech Ministry of the Interior, 2015a).[396] Secondly, many initial migrants to the Czech Republic were economically motivated, with a low number of asylum applicants, which meant that Czech officials had limited knowledge of the integration of asylum seekers (Drbohlav and Valenta, 2014: 62). Conversely, Hungary's initial migration policy was different because migration after communism was mostly ethnic Hungarians from Romania and the former Yugoslavia, or Chinese entrepreneurs. Many of these individuals planned to permanently settle in Hungary, and in the case of the ethnic Hungarians, there were no linguistic, cultural, or religious challenges (Grabbe, 2006). Later the Yugoslavian War created a more complex flow of asylum seekers to Hungary. From 1991 to 1992 a higher number of migrants arrived in Hungary, many of these individuals did not lodge asylum claims, rather, used Hungary as a

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[396] An interview with an official from the Czech NGO, Association for Integration and Migration (Prague. April 17, 2015).

location to wait for the hostilities to end (Byrne et al., 2004: 150). When the conflict shifted to Bosnia in 1992 the number of asylum applications lodged by ethnic Hungarians[397] increased again (Byrne et al., 2004).

This meant that the preliminary perceptions of migration formed by Czech and Hungarian representatives differed, mainly in terms of the challenges to being a transit or destination country for asylum seekers. The challenges in both cases were unique and these initial experiences with migration policy resulted in distinct perceptions and understanding of migration. For example, the initial Hungarian migration experiences were mainly with ethnic Hungarian diaspora which created a false perception of the country's migration capabilities. In the Czech case, initial migrants were viewed as temporary rather than long-term residents, consequently, the development of integration policy was limited. This signifies that the initial experiences with migration at the national levels differed between the Czech Republic and Hungary. These initial differences are important due to the dissimilar levels of experience with migrants within these societies in terms of integration, for example, language or skills training. In the Hungarian case, there was the perception of a greater ability of the country to support refugees, but this was incorrect because the majority of these individuals were ethnic Hungarians who required minimal integration. Hungary's cooperation with the UNHCR resulted in foreign funds to support the asylum seekers (Byrne et al., 2002). The perception of Hungary as accommodating to asylum seekers was not fully questioned until 2013 when asylum applications from non-ethnic Hungarians[398] significantly increased (Eurostat, 2013).

Based on the national dynamics within the Czech Republic and Hungary, I argue that the initial engagement with the European Commission during the accession process established different expectations of these countries as potential partners. As demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, Hungary previously supported wider EU integration efforts, particularly after the fall of communism. The 2015 Hungarian position on migration was a clear departure from previous support to EU integration. In the Czech case, my research indicates that the extent of

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[397] Particularly there was an increase in ethnic Hungarian asylum applications from the Vojvodina region.
[398] In 2013 the number of asylum applicants from Kosovo to Hungary increased (Eurostat, 2013).

Euroscepticism held by some leading political figures did not result in the expectation of the Czech Republic as a supporter of wider EU integration attempts.

8.3.2 Early EU Membership

As shown in Chapter Five, the initial migration engagement by Czech and Hungarian representatives was limited after these countries became EU members in 2004. In the Czech case in comparison to the wider EU, the number of asylum applicants to the Czech Republic remained low, with the most frequent applications lodged by Ukrainian nationals (Eurostat, 2008). In the Hungarian case, Chapter Five demonstrated that early migration focus remained on creating policy that provided links to the Hungarian diaspora within the region through Nation Policy. In terms of engagement with EU migration policy, my research aligns with previous research which points to the marginal contribution of Czechs and Hungarians to EU migration policy after membership (Zaun, 2020). During early membership, both Czech and Hungarian migration policy engagement could be classified as fence-sitters due to no active attempts to push forward or delay policy development.

Although EU migration engagement by Czech and Hungarian representatives was limited during early membership, this does not indicate that engagement was non-existent. High-level migration engagement occurred during the EU Council Presidency. The Czech's first EU Council Presidency began with negative statements by the French President who openly questioned the Czech's ability to lead the EU Council Presidency during a Eurozone crisis[399] (Traynor, 2008).   As shown in Chapter Five, the first Czech Presidency of the EU Council did offer insight into the issues which the Czech delegation prioritised including the Blue Card Scheme for highly skilled non-EU workers as well as border security improvements to the Schengen Information System. The decision to prioritise these elements indicates that Czechs favoured an increase in the legal migration channels to the EU which highlighted the high level of labour demands in the Czech Republic. Also, the external border and related security concerns were, and remains essential, to the Czech position on migration. The first Hungarian EU Council Presidency was post-Lisbon, meaning that the Prime Minister continued to play a

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[399] The Czech Republic has yet to adopt the Euro, thus the French President's comments signified that a Member State without the currency would not be invested to the same extent as Member State with the currency.

role in agenda-setting, but the emphasis is upon management which can advance specific issues or delay other issues on the agenda (Plechanovová et al., 2013). One element the Hungarian delegation emphasised was the importance of EU membership within the CEE region, which was not only advantageous for regional cooperation but also supported the relationship between Hungary and Croatia's ethnic Hungarian diaspora.

As shown in Chapter Five, EU Council Presidencies differed in terms of issues and the overall outcome. However, it is important to highlight that the EU Council Presidency provided key opportunities for these post-2004 Member States to engage, particularly with agenda-setting, at the EU level. Czech and Hungarian representatives both placed focus upon issues of national interests related to migration importance as shown in Chapter Five: Czechs focused on policy to address labour shortages and Hungarians attempted to advance regional interests as well as relationships with ethnic Hungarians. Both EU Council Presidencies showed marginal interest in driving forward wider EU migration cooperation with the majority of the CEAS advancement left to the other EU Council Presidencies within the trio. Importantly, during this period, there was no clear migration cooperation through coalitions such as the Visegrád Group.

8.3.3 The 2015 shift in Czech and Hungarian EU migration engagement

The passivity in migration policy engagement at the EU level changed in 2015. This shift from passive policy engagement remains underexplored within the literature, particularly due to the "stigma of newness" (Krasnoba, 2018). To overcome this stigma of newness post-2004 Member States developed specific forms and actions to attempt to advance policy engagement. As illustrated in Chapter Two, the stigma of newness can be the combination of internal perceptions, which are the self-perception of national representatives, and the external perception of a Member State held by other EU actors (Mišík, 2015). This shift was significant for Czech and Hungarian representatives because active engagement required these post-2004 representatives to attempt to overcome the latecomer stigma. This contributes to the wider literature on the post-2004 Member States overcoming the label of passive policy recipients (for example, Butler, 2013; Baun, 2014; Micallef-Grimaud, 2018). My research advances the literature on the engagement of post-2004 Member States by positing that Czech and Hungarian representatives have approached the newcomer stigma differently.

Czech and Hungarian migration policy engagement was previously argued to have shifted from fence-sitters to foot-draggers in 2015 (Zaun, 2020). My research also confirms a shift in engagement, but I contribute to the literature by arguing that the Czech Republic and Hungary did not shift migration policy engagement in the same manner; rather these Member States' migration engagement widely differed. The salience of the policy forced Czech representatives to shift from fence-sitters to foot-draggers, due to the anticipation of a negative impact at the domestic level, meaning a neutral position was no longer possible.[400] With regards to the Hungarian case, I challenge existing explanations by arguing that Hungary attempted to engage as a migration pace-setter in 2015. It should be emphasized that I do not claim that Hungary's attempts to be a pace-setter were successful. Chapter Seven demonstrates that early in the 2015 crisis Hungary attempted to be a pace-setter rather than a foot-dragger by seeking to be an exemplary Member State by emphasising the country's commitment to the CEAS with particular importance placed on the EURODAC which involved the registration of asylum seekers at the peak of the crisis. The Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, "A good European is one who keeps the rules of Europe" (Szijjártó, 2015). Another attempt to showcase affirmative action in the CEAS field was the construction of the fence along Hungary's southern border. Chapter Six demonstrated that the construction of the fence was an attempt by Orbán to portray Hungary as showing leadership and to assert his role as 'protector' of the wider EU. Yet, these attempts at pace-setting by Hungary were rejected by other actors involved in the asylum crisis including the UNHCR (2015e) and the European Commission (2015). Hungarian representatives attempted to counter the criticism by making the argument that the fence was a benefit for the whole EU (Nagy, 2019). This is an example of Hungarian representatives' attempts to show their version of solidarity through various attempts at securitisation. The Hungarian attempts were widely rejected, as these attempts were not perceived to show leadership or be beneficial to the wider EU. These failed attempts to lead as a pace-setter by example demonstrated in Chapter Seven meant that Orbán was forced to make an additional change in Hungary's form of engagement, and this shift was to defensive pace-setter. Instead of becoming foot-draggers, Orbán shifted to a different

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[400] Chapter Two illustrates the framework for the shift from fence sitter to foot-dragger.

category of pace-setters, which is "defensive" with the main aim to "protect an element of domestic policy rather than advance or improve wider EU policy" (Borzel, 2002).

Czech and Hungarian forms of engagement greatly differed, with Hungarian representatives shifting between different types of pace-setters, while Czech representatives used foot-dragging. I suggest that each form required different actions of engagement.

My research indicates that due to the different forms of engagement Czech and Hungarian representatives used different actions of engagement for example themes included the communication between the national capital and Permanent Representation, use of expert opinion and the extent of limited communication channels. I turn to an explanation of the different actions of engagement

Czech and Hungarian communication between civil servants based at home and the Permanent Representation in Brussels differed. As demonstrated in Chapters Six and Seven, the communication between Prague and the Permanent Representation in Brussels was approached as more of a conversation rather than in the form of top-down instructions which aligns with previous research (Weiss, 2017). The lack of a top-down approach allowed for more of a dialogue rather than the top-down transfer of clear talking points. This meant that the Czech position took longer, and my empirical evidence showed that in several instances Czech representatives, and their partners, found the Czech positions to be 'vague'. More specifically, in the Czech case, my research shows how Czech national interests remain imprecisely defined at the EU level which resulted in discrepancies. This position is contrasted by the Hungarian stance, which was strong, clear and top-down (Simonovits, 2020). The centralization of communication may place strain on Hungarian officials' ability to engage in informal meetings due to the need to adhere to the set talking points.[401] This point further reiterates the challenges of centralization, such as less flexibility within policy

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[401] An interview with an official from DG Home (Brussels. February 5, 2019), an interview with an Official from the German Permanent Representation (By phone. December 17, 2018) and an interview with an Official from the Polish Permanent Representation (By Phone. February 12, 2019).

negotiation positions. But the degree of clarity from a highly centralized position allowed Hungarian representatives to respond quickly and in a clear manner.[402]

In terms of expert opinion, this action of engagement remains underused by both Member States. Policy engagement, particularly with the European Commission, has been argued to fare better, particularly when the policy is supported by expert opinion[403] (Dür and Mateo, 2010). Chapter Seven demonstrates that Czech representatives are open to expert opinion and acknowledge the limited use. Hungarian representatives have placed less emphasis upon expert involvement to justify their stance. Instead, alternative approaches to expert opinion, namely political statements have been used by Hungarian representatives to further advance FIDESZ's political agendas. Despite the limited use of expert opinion, there remain differences between the Czech Republic and Hungary with regards to the extent representatives acknowledged expert opinion as a useful action to foster wider engagement.

As demonstrated in Chapter Seven, in the Czech case, communication channels remained open, although the firm position remained. In the Hungarian case, the communication channels were limited, with specific governmental talking points being reiterated. The empirical evidence provided showed that Hungary used more aggressive language during discussions. The Hungarian resistance to increased migration policy integration may have been an attempt by Hungary to increase leverage, both within the wider EU as well as within the Visegrád Group. Migration is a policy area in which leverage may be used due to the high degree of national sensitivity which is suited to attempt to increase a country's bargaining leverage (Tsourapas, 2018). Communication, specifically the type of language and the openness of various channels, differed.

8.4 Reconsidering the domestic dynamics within EU migration policy

Domestic politics shape political institutions, and these institutions, in turn, create wider engagement with other countries (de Mesquita and Smith, 2012). Putnam (1988) has expanded the conceptualisation of the two-level game in which key national representatives must convince foreign partners and the domestic electorate of a particular policy response.

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[402] An interview with an official from the Hungarian Permanent Representation2 (Brussels. February 4, 2019).
[403] This was the case with the development of Green Policy by Sweden (Jänicke 2005; Björkdahl, 2008).

This requires a careful balance between the two levels. During the 2015 migration crisis, some national representatives abandoned attempts to maintain this balance and focused only on the national level. The *European Agenda on Migration* was opposed by both the Czech Republic and Hungary. I suggest that the rationale for the policy opposition differed for several reasons including geopolitical border security concerns, the internal perspective of national representatives, the extent of populism, and ethnicity politics.

8.4.1 Geopolitical border security

Firstly, there were different concerns related to geopolitical factors related to border security. As illustrated in Chapters Five and Six, since the collapse of communism, the number of asylum seekers to the Czech Republic has remained low, meaning that any new redistribution mechanisms would increase the number of asylum applications to process. Consequently, any change at the EU level that increased the number of asylum applicants was seen by former Czech Prime Minister Sobotka and Prime Minister Babiš to be a negative development due to the increased costs related to hosting and processing asylum claims. In addition to the financial costs, the concept of increasing the number of refugees was not popular among the wider Czech electorate (CVVM, 2018). The rejection of international asylum norms was justified due to the threat of increased criminality as demonstrated in Chapter Six.

The Hungarian situation was different due to the increased use of the Balkan route in 2015[404] which resulted in higher levels of asylum applicants. The Hungarian asylum system was overwhelmed and unable to function (Nagy, 2019). [405] This was coupled with the reality that many asylum seekers did not want to lodge their claims in Hungary, rather they wanted transit to the other Member States such as Germany. Hungarian representatives insisted upon registration of the asylum seekers following the EURODAC Regulation of the CEAS, and officials refused to allow asylum seekers further transit until this registration was complete. The insistence upon following the registration rules may be due to concerns over the reaction from the wider EU community if the rules were not followed, as in Greece[406] (Szijjártó, 2018a, 2018b). For instance, my empirical research demonstrates that uncontrolled migration could

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[404] The Balkan route is also referred to as the Eastern asylum route.
[405] An interview with an official from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (Budapest. June 5, 2015).
[406] Interview with an official from the Hungarian Permanent Representation1 (Brussels. February 4, 2019).

be the first step towards a process of denationalisation of migration control like in Greece. The perception of uncontrolled migration was feared by Hungarian representatives due to the possibility of the crisis allowing an EU agency to manage a policy issue deemed national (Tsourdi, 2016).[407] Hungarian representatives predicted the possibility of further border interventions through the European Commission's proposed EU Asylum Agency (EUAA) in the *European Agenda on Migration*; [408]consequently, control of the border was prioritised to defend national sovereignty. As the crisis continued, I suggest border control became a political tool used by Orbán to advance anti-migrant policies and practices and bolster domestic political support.

This securitisation of the external Hungarian border has been used to justify FIDESZ's controversial border policies including the patrol of an 8-kilometre area around the border (Simonovits, 2020). FIDESZ officials cited that border violations have dropped 95 % by the end of 2017 (ORFK, 2017). However, FIDESZ's statistics do not consider the reduction in the use of the Balkan route due to the Turkey-EU agreement on migration in 2016. FIDESZ's focus on securitisation resulted in wider implications, for instance, in March 2017 the Hungarian Government attempted to articulate in the European Court of Human Rights that Hungary's actions reflected Schengen and CEAS rules. The Court stressed that as Hungary is part of the Geneva Convention it cannot opt-out of international protection (Kósa, 2017).

Moreover, the nuance of Hungary attempting to be a 'good partner' by following the CEAS registration has not been fully considered within the literature, rather Hungary was heavily criticized for blocking asylum seekers (ECRE, 2015). I argue that during the early stages of the migration crisis Hungary attempted to follow the security-oriented elements of the CEAS yet dismissed the humanitarian aspects.

In the Czech case, there is no external Schengen border. The number of lodged applications remained low because the asylum seekers mainly used the Czech Republic as a transit area for Germany (Burianová and Votradovcová, 2018). The ongoing migration tension between

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[407] Interview with a representative from ECRE (Brussels. October 20, 2015).
[408] Interview with an official from the Hungarian Permanent Representation1 (Brussels. February 4, 2019).

national and supranational levels can be linked in part to geopolitical border security concerns, which highlight important differences between the Czech Republic and Hungary. Border control was a focal issue for Orbán because it allowed him to construct a narrative that portrayed migrants as 'illegal' and his government's policies as the 'solution'. Despite the significant drop in the number of migrants seeking asylum this narrative continued. The focus within the Czech context remains on the external Schengen borders which shifts responsibility to the other Member States.

8.4.2 Subjective perceptions

Subjective perceptions of national representatives from the post-2004 Member States are only starting to be understood (Mišík, 2015) and my work contributes to a better understanding of Czech and Hungarian representatives. The self-perceptions of national representatives were demonstrated to be a factor contributing to the form and actions of engagement used. For instance, regardless of the objective factors such as the Member State's size or length of EU membership, a representative may focus on the subjective elements such as leadership to push policy forward. In the Czech case, national representatives tended to focus on more objective measures including the size of the country and the length of membership. Both factors were used to articulate the explanation of why engagement in migration policy was limited. In Chapter Seven, my research indicated that, due to the low number of migration policy staff, there was an emphasis on the necessity of cooperation with the other Member States, particularly with Slovakia. In contrast, Hungarian representatives had very different responses which were more subjective and linked to the perceptions of Hungary's ability to actively contribute to EU migration policy development. My empirical evidence demonstrates that Hungarian representatives commented on their perception of Hungary's strength within the EU from a subjective standpoint which tended to highlight political will and the centralisation of strong leadership. This suggests that the stigma of newness is less visible in the Hungarian case and more detectable in the Czech case. The lower level of stigma may have fostered increased EU level engagement by Hungarian representatives; however, the increased levels of engagement cannot be clearly discerned within the policy developments.

8.4.3 Populism and policy framing

Populism is argued to create more extreme positions during EU negotiations (McLaren et al., 2017) and these positions can be further reinforced or justified through electoral victories (Zaun, 2020). Populism has increased in Central Europe (Pappas, 2014; Naxera and Krčál, 2018), but the extent to which populism is used to justify and consolidate the government's position differs between the Czech Republic and Hungary. The use of populism can be linked to specific political parties or movements. Migration tends to be connected to a particular political party that shows "issue ownership" (Abou-Chadi, 2016), meaning migration can be used by a political party to further rhetoric, as demonstrated in Chapter Six.

 In the Czech case, both former Prime Minister Sobotka and Babiš have been unable, or unwilling, to show ownership of this policy area. Rather, in the Czech context, the far-right SPD and President Zeman are most readily associated with migration. President Zeman is closely affiliated with SPD leadership and framed his presidential re-election campaign around the creation of migration fear (Naxera and Krčál, 2018). President Zeman won a narrow victory in 2018, which was largely attributed to acceptance of the President's ongoing xenophobic framing. Yet, the President in the Czech Republic has limited political power to translate his nationalistic politics into policy. On the contrary, the Hungarian Government's strong positions are not only political rhetoric; rather these strong positions have developed into problematic policy, such as the normalisation of the use of detention of asylum seekers, including families with children (Juhász, 2017). Prime Minister Orbán used both the National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism (2015) and election victories to justify these restrictive policies. In Hungary's case, migration is an issue "owned"[409] by FIDESZ because Orbán convinced the electorate of his party's competence to protect the domestic population and defend Hungarian interests in Brussels (Mendelski, 2019). The issue of migration is argued to have moved FIDESZ politically to the right, with the party's policies overlapping with many of Jobbik's far-right political objectives (Bozoki, 2016).

Chapter Six demonstrates that the populist rhetoric related to migration is present in both the Czech Republic and Hungary, yet the extent to which this rhetoric is utilised differs. The main

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[409] The concept of issue ownership is developed by Abou-Chadi (2016).

difference is that populist rhetoric is widely used by Prime Minister Orbán, and this has resulted in restrictive migration practices. The attempts by other party leaders to de-securitise the language used were marginal at best. In the Czech case, Prime Minister Sobotka took a different approach and warned of the societal dangers of using xenophobic rhetoric. Sobotka's comments were made within the national context and directed specifically towards Czech President Zeman. Sobotka's attempt to warn of the dangers of the securitisation can be seen as an attempt to de-securitise the migration discourse in the Czech Republic. Paterson and Karyotis (2020:17) state that with "every securitisation move, it seems, there is the potential for counter-securitisation attempts by other actors that wish to resist and delegitimise it." In the Czech case there was limited debate that sought to de-securitise the language used. This raises wider questions about post-2004 Member States policy-making engagement at the national level, particularly in terms of the limited ability, or willingness to attempt to de-securitise the dominant narrative.[410]

Despite Sobotka's stance at the national level against migration rhetoric, he stood with the other Visegrád leaders, including Prime Minister Orbán, which brings into question Sobotka's strategy. In 2017, my research demonstrated, the shift in populist rhetoric on migration issues occurred when Prime Minister Babiš replaced Sobotka. Babiš framed migration more negatively with an emphasis upon security, but this increase in rhetoric was not to the same extent as Orbán. This difference is a further reflection of the national dynamics in Chapter Six, in which I argued that Orbán's consecutive majorities have been used as a justification for such extreme statements. In the Czech context, Babiš has a weaker position due to the complex coalition and lower domestic support, which restricts his ability to take strong positions. Domestic political support matters and my research suggests that stronger support at the national level results in stronger positions at the EU level. Furthermore, my research highlights that there is a difference between rhetoric and migration policy development in these Member States. In the Hungarian case, populist rhetoric has resulted in restrictive migration policies and practices. In the Czech case, despite an increase in negative migration rhetoric by Prime Minister Babiš a disparity continues to exist between his statements and the actual development of restrictive migration practices.

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[410] For example, the opposition or civil society could also play a role in de-securitisation attempts.

8.4.4 Ethnicity politics

Demographic differences between the Czech Republic and Hungary concerning migration policy have not been fully considered in the literature. The issue of ethnicity plays an important role in how Hungary deals with migration policy which is not fully understood within wider EU discussions. Hungary has established a national strategy that is highly focused on ethnic preservation, for example, policies to incentivise higher birth rates such as increased childcare support, specific tax breaks and benefits for families which have three or more children (Kapitány, 2015). This is coupled with the trend of successive Hungarian governments favouring policy that allows ethnic diaspora from neighbouring countries to fill any gaps within the labour market (Butler, 2007). These policies suggest that Hungary has a unique national approach to demographic and labour market challenges including attempts to increase the birth rate and ensuring that labour shortages are filled by ethnic Hungarians from the region. Consequently, any migration policy which might alter the labour market gaps could have an impact upon the relationship between Hungary and the Hungarian diaspora.

Conversely, in the Czech Republic, family-based policies have not been developed or prioritised in the same manner (Jahoda, 2017; MPSV, 2018). Despite the high labour demands in the Czech Republic[411] efforts to "manage migration through stricter and more selective access opportunities" have increased (Burianová and Votradovcová, 2018). The Czech Government has prioritised temporary workers from the region, particularly policy that has been favourable towards temporary Ukrainian workers (Leontiyeva, 2016). Chapter Six demonstrates that the regional dynamic has been an important element of the Czech position on migration, particularly in the event of conflict and subsequent displacement, assistance should come from the regional level. My research indicates that Czech and Hungary have different approaches to labour shortages, but both countries favour workers from within the region.

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[411] The Czech Republic experienced high labour demands up to the start of the Covid lockdowns which started in February 2020.

8.5 Conclusion

To conclude this chapter demonstrated the differences in national and EU level migration policy-making by Czech and Hungarian national representatives. Understanding these differences may help to predict the forms and actions of engagement utilised in future migration policy development. Indeed, reflection and recognition of the wider domestic dynamics in future EU migration policy proposals may assist in advancing the policy-making process.

Chapter Nine
Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

This chapter returns to the research objectives and highlights the main findings of this thesis and its contributions to the existing literature. The thesis began by asking, to what extent do post-2004 Member States engage in the EU policy-making process, and why do they do so? Based on a qualitative research approach I examined the process of EU policy-making and did an analytical analysis of the evolution of EU migration policy, seen from the perspective of the Czech Republic and Hungary. The empirical evidence indicated that these post-2004 Member States engaged differently due to several national factors. Neither the Czech Republic nor Hungary can be considered to be passive receivers of EU policy; however, both Member States have developed different approaches to policy engagement at the EU level. The findings have implications for the importance of consensus during the early stages of the policy process, solidarity, ongoing gaps in our understanding of post-2004 Member States and flexible coalitions such as the Visegrád Group. These findings open new avenues for further research into post-2004 Member States preferences, and how these preferences are represented at the EU level.

9.2 Post-2004 Member States migration policy-making engagement

The urgency created by the significant loss of lives at sea in 2015 pushed migration to the top of the EU policy agenda. Notably, due to the pressure of the crisis, Member States didn't need to attempt to add migration to the agenda, rather the urgency escalated it. The complexity of the policy area and different national dynamics created disagreements between EU Member States and complications in the formation of a coherent policy response. From a policy perspective, the migration crisis presented a rare policy opening for post-2004 Member States who were not involved at the start of the CEAS in 1999. The crisis allowed post-2004 Member States to increase their contribution to wider EU migration policy development and allowed national representatives to attempt to bolster domestic support based on the issue.

My research highlighted that post-2004 Member States, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary seized the opportunity in 2015 and used it as a means to shift their involvement in the EU migration policy-making process. National representatives used different forms of engagement, accompanied by different actions to represent national interests at the EU level. I did not seek to demonstrate whether these Member States were effective in the representation

of their interests; rather, I attempted to foster a deeper understanding of how policy engagement occurred to illustrate that post-2004 Member States are no longer passive policy recipients in the policy area of migration. Czech and Hungarian representatives were both opposed to the relocation element of the *European Agenda on Migration;* however, due to different national dynamics, the forms of engagement selected by national representatives differed. Hungary attempted to be a direct pace-setter by example, but due to various shortcomings, it shifted to a different form of engagement: an indirect and defensive pace-setter. By contrast, Czech representatives engaged as defensive foot-draggers.

The shifts in the forms of policy engagement were significant. This is mainly due to the challenges experienced by the post-2004 Member States to assert influence in a policy area in which other Member States are already actively involved. The attempts by the Czech Republic and Hungary show that the ability to engage does not depend upon the length of membership. This thesis demonstrated that national representatives from the post-2004 Member States are at different stages of overcoming the newcomer stigma. Hungary sought to engage as a pace-setter through attempts to uphold the CEAS through the registration of asylum seekers and to provide a security solution to the wider EU through the construction of a fence. Prime Minister Orbán also attempted to provide a policy alternative to the *European Agenda on Migration.* However, these attempts did not result in Hungary leading migration policy at the EU level. Nevertheless, the Hungarian position did have an impact on the EU's migration policy process. The Czech Representatives indicated higher perceptions of the stigma of newness and these perceptions were argued to impact the extent of migration policy engagement.

My research, furthermore, has pointed to the limited use of expert opinion by Hungarian representatives during policy engagement with DG Home and the Permanent Representations of other Member States. The Hungarian position remained firm, which indicates limited flexibility to reach a consensus. Due to such an inflexible position Hungarian national representatives had limited ability to manoeuvre politically. In the Czech case, representatives acted as foot-draggers to slow down migration policy development. The Czech representatives did not dedicate the same level of political resources to attempt to influence the policy-making process. It is important to highlight that both post-2004 Member States have

developed different strategic forms of engagement with the EU, which means that post-2004 Member State engagement with the EU does not occur in the same manner. Rather, Member States develop forms and actions of EU policy engagement in unique ways.

Although this thesis does not explore the Visegrád Group in its entirety, the fact that two Member States have differing approaches indicates that it is difficult to consider the Visegrád Group as a unified policy voice. There are differences not only in the forms and actions of engagement discussed above but also within the national migration dynamics including geopolitical security concerns, the subjective perceptions of national representatives, the extent of populism and the extent ethnicity politics. Furthermore, the centralisation of power differs in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Hungary's migration engagement highlights the conflict between national interests and the sensitivity which national representatives must apply when attempting to lead policy transformation at the supranational level. Orbán focused too greatly on the national level and damaged Hungary's reputation at the EU level. In the Czech case, the rhetoric was less extreme and there were no restrictive changes made to national migration policy.

My research has demonstrated different national dynamics, for example, the Permanent Representations of the Czech Republic and Hungary used different forms and actions of engagement and this cannot be overlooked during the EU policy-making process because these individuals play a significant role in linking the national and EU levels. For example, the self-perceptions of Czech and Hungarian representatives differed. Hungarian representatives presented more subjective views of Hungary's strong leadership to justify attempts to engage as pace-setters. Conversely, Czech representatives focused less on subjective measures, and more on objective measures including length of membership and the number of officials. The difference in self-perceptions can help to further our understanding of how Hungary attempted to engage as a migration pace-setter and Czechs engaged as foot-draggers since 2015.

9.3 Implications

The implications of my research are four-fold. Firstly, in terms of EU policy-making, my research highlights the importance of consensus during the early stages of the policy-making

process. Accession of Member States to the EU since 2004 increased the diversity of national perspectives and approaches to EU level policy-making, particularly the process of reaching a consensus among Member States. The importance of reaching a consensus in the early stages of the policy-making process has been highlighted by the case of migration policy development since 2015. The limits to consensus during the early stages of the policy-making process are particularly significant in sensitive policy areas such as asylum and migration policy. Member States aiming to advance EU policy should place greater emphasis upon consensus during the early stages when developing or modifying policy. For national representatives from post-2004 Member States, it is suggested that the process of consensus needs to be considered in greater depth, with particular emphasis on strategies that representatives can use to foster a compromise within contentious policy areas.

Secondly, due to the sensitivity of asylum and migration policy, which is particularly evident in post-2004 Member States, there remain limitations in the acceptance of the term solidarity within the EU. The differing conceptualisations of solidarity are particularly important to understand the debate over the possibility of migration and asylum policy shifting to the EU level, or if policy development will change to the national level. EU migration and asylum policy remain a developing policy area. The interconnection of migration and asylum policy to other areas such as Schengen requires Member States to cooperate more readily at the EU level. For example, any potential changes to Schengen, such as the proposal of a mini-Schengen area, would accentuate the core-periphery cleavages between Member States. This is significant because the core-periphery divide continues to highlight the ongoing disparities between newer and older Member States, which may impact the extent of EU policy engagement with possible disengagement from newer Member States due to the perception of the inability to be heard at the EU level. Moreover, my research highlighted the perspective of representatives from the Czech Republic and Hungary to illustrate the ongoing differences in the conceptualisation of solidarity, with these post-2004 Member States remaining focused on solidarity in terms of finance rather than a concept of solidarity which would require deeper integration and cooperation at the EU level.

Thirdly, this thesis highlighted the limited understanding of post-2004 Member States within the wider EU and the national policy interests. The analytical framework developed is

anticipated to have the potential to be applied to EU migration policy engagement in other post-2004 Member States. This framework could help to address the ongoing migration challenges, such as the weaponisation of asylum seekers being used by Belarus to threaten the EU external borders of Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. This framework could be applied to Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, or to better understand other post-2004, 2007 or 2013 Member States. Additionally, the framework developed could be applied to other policy areas in order to understand more about the extent of these Member States' policy engagement and why national representatives engage with certain forms and actions in the EU policy-making process.

Finally, although my research has not focused on the whole Visegrád Group, my findings do highlight implications for unity. My research highlighted significant differences between the Czech Republic and Hungary, not only since 2015 but also different patterns of engagement with the European Commission since the collapse of communism. Consequently, the extent to which these Member States will continue to take a common position is questionable. This point can be closely linked to the third implication above, which is a limited understanding of why post-2004 national representatives use particular forms and actions of engagement at the EU level. My research has highlighted the different approaches used by Czech and Hungarian representatives and it is anticipated that further research into the remaining two Visegrád countries would reflect diverse national drivers for why national representatives engage at the EU level policy. Based on these differences it is unclear the extent to which commenting on the Visegrád Group as a whole can actually deepen our understanding of these countries EU policy engagement.

9.4 Avenues for further research

Since 2015, both the Czech Republic and Hungary remain opposed to any policy developments which would increase the number of asylum seekers to the EU. After the mandatory relocation scheme was abandoned, Babiš and Orbán claimed success (BBC, 2016c; Euronews, 2020). Effectively, these leaders claimed that their migration opposition was successful. Despite these 'claims' of success, migration policy development continues with the *New Pact on Migration and Asylum* (2020). The Visegrád position against this proposal is less clear, with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland voicing opposition, while Slovakia

has been "less overt" in their criticism.[412] (Ruy and Yayboke, 2020, also see Euronews, 2020). If certain members of the Visegrád Group appear to be pulling away from migration cooperation, an understanding of this change in position would be of interest for the wider literature on post-2004 Member State engagement and the dynamics of Visegrád policy engagement at the EU level.

Certainly, research focusing on post-2004 Member State engagement at the EU level is expected to continue to develop and expand to other policy areas. With regards to my selected cases, the Czech Republic and Hungary will serve the second term of the presidency of the Council of the EU in 2022 and 2024 respectively, which will provide an opportunity to further reflect on the forms and actions of engagement used by national representatives, and to consider if advancements were made since the first EU Council Presidencies. Further research, particularly on the agenda-setting stage of the EU Council Presidency, would contribute to advancing a deeper understanding of post-2004 Member States selected policy objectives.

This thesis has highlighted key themes, particularly with regards to Czech and Hungarian national representatives' self-perceptions of their countries ability to engage in EU policy-making. I would be interested to further this work, but from a mixed-methods approach which includes surveys and statistical analysis to widen my perspective on other post-2004 Member States by applying the themes that I developed from this research project.

9.5 Concluding Remarks

To conclude, my research has, first of all, contributed to a deeper understanding of Czech and Hungarian dynamics at the national and EU levels and highlighted the subtleties between these policy levels. Secondly, it has advanced the literature that asserts post-2004 Member States are not solely passive policy takers. The post-2004 Member States examined have not always selected the best form or action of engagement to further national interests. My research has

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[412] There is also an emerging trend in which Polish and Hungarian are accused by the European Commission of democratic backsliding (Murray, 2021) restricting media freedoms (Radio Free Europe, 2021) and heavily discriminatory LGBTQ+ policies (Rankin and Walker, 2021). The initial indications are that the Czech Republic and Slovakia appear to be attempting to distance themselves from their Visegrád partners (Brudzinska, 2021).

revealed that certain actions, namely the use of expert opinions within migration policy formation, could result in a clearer articulation of national interests. This indicates that there are still improvements to be made on how these post-2004 Member States are engaging in EU level policy-making. My research implies that national representatives should focus on policy positions according to an understanding of the wider EU perspective and to avoid policy framing which is overtly focused on the national level. Thirdly, this thesis has demonstrated that regional coalitions such as the Visegrád Group have limitations due to different national dynamics: the unity and strength of Czech and Hungarian cooperation within the Visegrád Group have perhaps been oversold and, in fact, my research has found that there is less cooperation within the EU policy-making process than is often assumed.

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Appendices

Appendix One: Ethical approval

Appendix Two: List of Interviews

Appendix Three Interview Questions

Appendix Four: The CEAS

Appendix Five: Photo of Finance Minister Babiš's Facebook post opposing migration (July 26, 2016)

Appendix Six: Photo of Okamura's 2017 election campaign for the Czech Chamber of Deputies

Appendix Seven: Questionnaire for the Hungarian National Consultation for Immigration and Terrorism (2015) with the English translation.

Appendix One: Ethical approval

From: ResearchEthicsSystem@glasgow.ac.uk [ResearchEthicsSystem@glasgow.ac.uk]
Sent: 26 February 2015 16:12
To: Jolan Nisbet
Subject: Research Ethics Application Approved [The Common European Asylum System in an enlarged Europe]-[400140114]

Dear Jolan Nisbet,

The following research ethics application has been approved:

Project Title	The Common European Asylum System in an enlarged Europe
Application Number	400140114
Committee	College of Social Sciences
Submitted By	Professor Lauren McLaren

Appendix Two: List of Interviews

	Date	Place	Code	Interviewee (by institutional affiliation)
1	February 4, 2019	Brussels	Council1	Political Administrator Council
2	February 4, 2019	Brussels	Council2	Political Administrator Council
3	August 23, 2018	Prague	Czech Elite1	Committee of European Affairs policy representative
4	January 30, 2018	Brussels	Czech MEP1	Member of the European Parliament representing the Czech Republic (2014-2019)
5	January 29, 2018	Brussels	Czech MEP2	Member of the European Parliament representing the Czech Republic (2014-2019)
6	January 19, 2018	Prague	Czech MEP3	Member of the European Parliament representing the Czech Republic (2014-2019)
7	February 23, 2018	By Telephone	Czech MEP4	Member of the European Parliament representing the Czech Republic (2014-2019)
8	August 23, 2018	Prague	Czech MP1	Member of the Czech Chamber of Deputies (2017-2021)
9	January 24, 2018	By E-mail	Czech MP2	Member of the Czech Chamber of Deputies (2017-2021)
10	February 22, 2018	Prague	Czech MP3	Member of the Czech Chamber of Deputies (2017-2021)
11	February 22, 2018	Prague	Czech MP4	Member of the Czech Chamber of Deputies (2017-2021)
12	March 29, 2019	Prague	CzechSen	Czech Senator on European Affairs Committee
13	February 5, 2019	Brussels	DG Home	Official DG Migration and Home Affairs
14	February 5, 2019	Brussels	DG INTPA	Senior Official DG International Partnerships
15	February 5, 2019	Brussels	DG INTPA	Senior Official DG International Partnerships
16	February 5, 2019	Brussels	EEAS	Official European External Action Services
17	June 3, 2015	Budapest	Former Hungarian MEP 1	Former Hungarian representative to the European Parliament
18	June 27, 2016	Budapest	Former Hungarian MEP 2	Former Hungarian representative to the European Parliament

19	June 5, 2015	Budapest	Former Hungarian Minister	Former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs
20	June 4, 2015	Budapest	HU MP1	Member of the Hungarian House of the National Assembly (2018-2022)
21	June 27, 2016	Budapest	Former Hungarian Minister	Former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs
22	January 15, 2018	Telephone	HU MP2	Member of the Hungarian House of the National Assembly (2018-2022)
23	December 17, 2018	Telephone	HU MP3	Member of the Hungarian House of the National Assembly (2018-2022) Committee on European Affairs
24	January 3, 2019	Budapest	HU MPA1	Policy Advisor to Member of the Hungarian House (2018-2022) Committee on European Affairs
25	February 4, 2019	Brussels	HU Perm Rep1	Hungarian Perm Rep
26	February 4, 2019	Brussels	HU Perm Rep2	Hungarian Perm Rep
27	January 3, 2019	Budapest	HU PMO1	Hungarian PMO representative
28	December 17, 2018	Telephone	DE Perm Rep	Official from the German Permanent Representation
29	October 8, 2018	Telephone	MEP LIBE1	Member of the European Parliament Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
30	February 4, 2019	Brussels	MEP LIBE2	Member of the European Parliament Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
31	February 6, 2019	Telephone	MEP LIBE A1	Policy Advisor to the Member of the European Parliament Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
32	October 20, 2015	Brussels	NGO EU1	European Council on Refugees and Exiles
33	June 5, 2015	Budapest	NGO HU1	Hungarian Helsinki Committee
34	June 28, 2016	Budapest	NGO HU2	Menedék
35	June 4, 2015	Budapest	NGO HU3	UNHCR

36	April 17, 2015	Prague	NGO CZ1	Association for Integration and Migration
37	June 9, 2016	Prague	NGO CZ2	UNHCR
38	October 20, 2015 May 15, 2019	Brussels By Phone	Perm RepCZ1	Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the EU
39	October 20, 2015	Brussels	Perm RepCZ2	Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the EU
40	September 24, 2018	Prague	Perm RepA1	Former Czech Ambassador to EU1
41	February 2, 2018	Prague	Perm RepA2	Former Czech Ambassador to EU2
42	November 16, 2018	Prague	Perm Rep A3	Former Czech Ambassador to EU3
43	February 12, 2019	By Phone	Polish Perm Rep	Official from the Polish Permanent Representation
44	February 5, 2019	Brussels	SK Perm Rep	Official from the Slovak Permanent Representation
45	January 15, 2016	Prague	Think TankCZ1	Evropské Hodnoty

Appendix Three: Interview Questions[413]

Role
1)In the current asylum debate would you consider Czech Republic/HU to be:
a-pace setter
b-foot dragger
c-fence sitter

1b) Are you able to provide any examples?

Stages
2)At which stage (agenda setting, preference formation, decision taking, policy implementation, policy evaluation) would you say CZ was most involved? Was timing an issue?
2b) (If not active from the onset) Why may this have been?
2c) (if not discussed) could you mention about CZ's role in the first two stages (agenda setting and preference formation)
3) At the early stages could CZ see which MS were for/against their position?

Process
4)Was there information about the requirements/needs/positions of the other MS early on?
5) Where there any shifts in the process?
5b) If so, how did this impact the process?
6) In your view, did the CZ government manage to exercise influence during the initial policy formation phases (agenda setting/policy formation)?

7)Were there any **strategies** that helped in terms of the results?

7b) Are any of these strategies specific to small states?

8)Was **capacity** an issue? (expertise/knowledge/ support of experts, administrative coordination, enough staff

Conclusion
9)Any concluding points you would like to make?
10) Might you be able to recommend any one else for me to speak with?
Thank you very much for your time.

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[413] The Czech version of the interview questions is also available upon request.

Appendix Four: The CEAS

The CEAS is one of the four pillars identified in the *European Agenda on Migration.* A fully functioning CEAS is argued by the Commission to be an essential policy to ensure fair and unified migration policy at the EU level. The CEAS began as part of the single market discussions as early as 1985[414] with the first phases of planning starting in 1997.[415] Understanding the CEAS's directives and regulations fosters an understanding of who is entitled to protection, the type of protection and procedures. Moreover, the directives and regulations highlight the tensions between the concepts of humanitarian protection and security.

Asylum Procedures Directive

The recast version of the Asylum Procedures Directive took effect on July 21, 2015,[416] and the recast directive aims to be more specific and avoid past pitfalls of Directive 2011/95, primarily the lack of unification amongst Member States due to the ambiguity of how the process of asylum-seeking should occur. However, during 2015 it was evident that the vagueness of the past directive, which allowed a large degree of national discretion, for example the possibility to accelerate application processing varied across Member States (Chetail, 2016). The lack of

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[414] *Pre harmonisation of the CEAS was from 1985-1996. I*nterestingly, this was due to economic discussions of a single market, which first highlighted the need for tighter borders and a higher degree of cooperation in the areas of immigration and asylum. This need for a greater cooperation was fulfilled practically by the Schengen Agreement in 1985 in which the signatories agreed to an internal 'borderless' area between Member States. Shortly after in 1990 the first Dublin Convention was signed and it came into effect on 1 September 1997 and served to replace the Schengen's initial asylum chapter (Hailbronner and Thiery, 1997). The importance of this cooperation on borders was cemented by the external forces of the collapse of communism, and the subsequent war in former Yugoslavia.

[415] *First Phase of CEAS harmonisation (1997-2004)* The European Council's Summit in Tampere during October of 1999 that the CEAS was first mentioned by name (Toscano, 2013:10). This phase of harmonisation was to bring together Member States various practices into a common framework of minimum standards. This time period was also significant as the Treaty of Amsterdam was operational and the Treaty of Nice come into force. Both aimed to create a Union which was more transparent and efficient. The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 caused a shift away from unanimity voting to the community process. Buonanno and Nugent(2013:228) argue that under the Amsterdam treaty there was an exchange of intergovernmental decision making for the Community method which "established a more efficient and democratic decision-making process." More specifically, under the Treaty of Amsterdam the area of Justice and Home Affairs transitioned from pillar three to pillar one. This movement from pillar three to pillar one meant that the decision-making process changed to that of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) which is also known as the community method of decision making was viewed as "more efficient" (Schimmelfennig, 2013: 264).

[416] The Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) was adopted in 2013, but the directive happened to take full effect during the migration crisis in 2015.

harmonisation impedes the functioning of the CEAS and the importance of EU coordination is an issue addressed in the *European Agenda on Migration*.

The crisis revealed that despite advancements further improvements were still required to improve the harmonisation of asylum procedures across the Union (Sadowski, 2019; Schittenhelm, 2019). There are seven main areas of the Asylum Procedures Directive that are part of the ongoing policy engagement process. Firstly, the directive tries to provide greater clarity on lodging an asylum claim including the timeframe and way the application can be filed. For example, there has been training for police and other agencies that may receive an asylum application, so they can better direct the applicant. Secondly, the asylum procedures aim for faster and more efficient decisions under the recast directive. This is mainly due to an increase in training for decision-makers. In theory, this should have allowed the first response to be more accurate and separate those in genuine need from those whom to do not meet the criteria. This change has been praised, but it has also been criticised (Van Reenen, 2018). The criticism is due to 'fast-tracking' which expedites the decision-making process but raises questions if some individuals who may be unprepared or misunderstood are incorrectly rejected. Next, the asylum procedures directive makes great strides to identify vulnerable asylum seekers. This applies to young asylum seekers, or unaccompanied minors as well as individuals with disabilities, or those who have suffered 'trauma'. Under the recast directive, it also offers special help for individuals that are filing for asylum due to their sexual orientation. Although, mechanisms for determining an undocumented migrant's age need to be addressed, as some Member States continue to use a medical procedure of bone scanning, which may not be accurate. Fourthly, the process for appeals has improved by creating clearer guidelines for national courts. This should allow a greater number of cases to be effectively processed at the national level and cut down on the high number of claims that have been brought before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg due to mistakes or vagueness at the national level. Fifthly, the timeframe for processing applicants is specified, whereby, if a decision cannot be reached within six months, then the applicant will be notified and given further information on the processing delay. Next, Clause 23 of the Asylum Procedures Directive states that free legal assistance should be granted. In article 20 of Directive 2013/32/EU it is stated:

> Member States shall ensure that free legal assistance and representation is granted on request in the appeals procedures provided for in Chapter V. It shall include, at least, the preparation of the required procedural documents and participation in the hearing before a court or tribunal of first instance on behalf of the applicant.

However, in point three of the same article, it states, "Member States may provide that free legal assistance and representation is not granted where the applicant's appeal is considered by a court or tribunal or other competent authority to have ***no tangible prospect of success***" (Directive 2013/32: 180:73). This point remains vague and is open to being misapplied because a Member State can prevent free legal assistance to an asylum applicant if the national officials foresee the application being rejected on a basis on country of origin for example. This means that there may be differing access to legal assistance depending on the Member State's jurisdiction. The final point is the introduction of the European Asylum Support Office. The introduction of this new agency will allow officials access to the same training and information, which should result in a greater convergence of decision outcomes if national representatives decide to cooperate with the agency.

Reception Conditions Directive

The recast Reception Conditions Directive[417] came into effect July 2015, aiming to inform asylum seekers of their rights to shelter and food, but also outlines when Member States can utilise detention. There is a direct tension within this directive because firstly rights are presented then directly followed by the limitation of these rights through detention. The concept of detention should be more thoroughly elaborated upon in the Reception Conditions Directive, including the grounds for an applicant being placed in detention, not solely based on the individual being an asylum seeker. Detention can still be extended to accompanied and unaccompanied minors; however, national authorities must make the wellbeing of these individuals a priority. There are no firm times set for detention periods. Rather, it is inferred detention can last until authorities can access more information on the individuals. The impact of dentition is profound, and still widely employed by Member States. Officials should consider the long-term impact of detention, as Gray (2013: 178) argues, "it is not conducive to

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[417] Please see the full directive EUR-Lex: "Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection." Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0033. [Accessed 5 May 2020].

good integration in the country of asylum as the first experience of the asylum-seeker is one of deprivation of liberty, which can often be prolonged; it also delays the start of such integration." During the 2015 crisis how detention was used across Member States widely differed. The initial proposal made by the Commission attempted to overcome this contradiction, by creating a recast Reception Conditions to be of higher standards and detention was not included, but this had limited support within the European Parliament, but by the end of the recasting, these standards were heavily diluted (Velluti, 2014: 63).

The main components of the Reception Conditions Directive to come into question is the amount of financial assistance to be accessible to asylum seekers (Zaniboni, 2019). Initially, the European Commission proposed that the benefits and assistance offered to asylum seekers should be in line with that offered to nationals. However, this proposal was not favoured by either the Council or the European Parliament and ultimately rejected. Another financial area which has caused debate and contention is 'pocket money'[418]. Asylum seekers continue to receive this provision in addition to their basic food and housing provided under the Reception Conditions Directive. Another controversial area within this directive is access to the labour market. In the revamped Reception Conditions Directive access must be given to the labour market no later than nine months after a claim is submitted. This provision remains an area of contention, particularly by the Member States which have large percentages of unemployed nationals, as national representatives argue nine months is too short of a period.

Within the Reception Conditions Directive, there remain areas of vagueness. Particularly, as to the amount that asylum seekers may be required to contribute to their upkeep. In the directive it states:

> Member States may require applicants to cover or contribute to the cost of the material reception conditions and of the health care provided for in this Directive, pursuant to the provision of paragraph 3, if the applicants have sufficient resources, for example, if they have been working for a reasonable period of time (Official Journal of the European Union, 29.6.2013: 180/105).

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[418] Pocket money, or in some cases 'reception money' is provided in addition to based food and shelter and can differ depending on the Member State. For more information please see: https://www.dw.com/en/asylum-benefits-in-the-eu-how-member-states-compare/a-44298599. [Accessed 5 May 2020].

It is unclear what specifies a 'reasonable period of time.' This provision may be politically popular with the general public as it provides that working asylum seekers or those with a substantial amount of finance contribute towards their basic requirements. The conditions for medical treatments also remain vague, "Member States shall ensure that applicants receive the necessary health care which shall include, at least, emergency care and essential treatment of illnesses and serious mental disorders" (Official Journal of the European Union, 29.6.2013: 180/105). This allows for emergency treatment and other essentials, but what can be defined as 'essential'? This definition may vary, and essential care should be clearly defined.

Qualification Directive

The Qualification Directive, which has been in effect since 2013, is arguably the most important element and the overall least contested area of the CEAS. It has roots in international human rights law and it defines the reasons an asylum seeker can be granted international protection either as a refugee or under subsidiary protection.[419] This directive is straight forth as it outlines the definition of what is considered 'serious harm[420].' The possible tension or matter of difficulty in interpretation could be that the elements of serious harm are listed, but this is followed by the possibilities of protection. Therefore, claiming allegations of serious harm is not enough. Rather, it must be confirmed that there was or is the potential of serious harm coupled by a lack of access to protection. As in other CEAS directives, the

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[419] The European Commission defines subsidiary protection as: "The protection given to a non-EU national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee, but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown to believe that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin or, in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and who is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country." For more information please see: Council Directive 2004/83/EC.

[420] The definition of serious harm is found in Chapter V, Article 15 *Official Journal of the European Union* L337/9 (20.12.2011) "Directive 2011/95/ EU of the European Parliament and of the Council states: "Serious harm consists of: a) the death penalty or execution; or b) torture or inhuman or degrading or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or c) serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict."

concept of vulnerable persons is explained clearly. Despite clarity, the acceptance rates of asylum seekers of the same nationality continue to differ across the Member States.[421]

Dublin Regulation[422]

The most recent Dublin Regulation also referred to as Dublin III, has been in place since January 2014 and serves to establish which Member State is responsible for processing an applicant's claim. This regulation has elements of 'burden-sharing' as it stipulates that asylum seekers can be returned to another Member state if the person held a visa, transited or has family residing within the country. However, the Dublin Regulation has been argued to place an unfair burden on Member States with external borders as they are responsible for all applicants travelling by land or sea. Dublin cannot be seen as any 'fair sharing of responsibility between Member States", as Gray (2013: 190) states, "Dublin does not promote the fair-sharing of responsibility since it makes no formalised attempt to alleviate disproportionate burdens, nor does it make any attempt to take account of Member States' protection capacities." In 2015, frustrations indicated the possible end of Dublin due to the regulation's inability to provide solidarity within the Union and protection to asylum seekers.[423] However, the Dublin Regulation remains, and in the *European Agenda on Migration* does not call for the regulation to end rather for changes to be made. It is anticipated that this regulation will remain a significant element of migration policy development.

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[421] For more information please see Eurostat, Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex - monthly data. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics#Decisions_on_asylum_applications. Accessed 18 April 2020.

[422] Dublin I came into effect in 1997. It became apparent that a major overhaul of this policy was needed. This push was started by the Commission on 26 July 2001 by presenting a legislative proposal to the Council (Aus, 2008: 106). From the first reading there was widespread disagreement, particularly from southern external Member States, specifically Italy and Greece. Both countries formally registered their lack of support for the policy from its onset. Interestingly the Italian delegation found "a weak ally in the UNHCR" who called for a "simple and more humane solution" (UNHCR, 2001:7). During this period in which the Dublin II was adopted the negotiation stance could be described as intergovernmental and "non-cooperative zero sum" (Aus, 2008: 104). This thesis refers to Dublin III as 'Dublin".

[423] For example, please see EU Observer 20 February 2020 https://euobserver.com/migration/147511. Accessed 1 March 2020.

EURODAC Regulation

The EURODAC Regulation is closely related to the Dublin Regulation as it was originally created as a system to manage fingerprints to assess which member state is responsible for a claim. However, this database has evolved and is now used for efforts to "combat terrorism and serious crime" (Home Affairs, 2014) which infers a linkage between migration and criminality. The practice of fingerprinting remains one of the key objectives in the *European Agenda on Migration* discussed above. Fingerprints are stored for a maximum of eighteen months, although there are conditions under which the fingerprints can be deleted earlier. In this regulation, there is also clear transparency with regards to the agencies that are permitted access to the database. There can be no fault found in the storage or terms; nevertheless, inferring there is a link between asylum seekers and acts of terrorism or serious crime could be problematic. Therefore, although the system is not flawed, the premise on which EURODAC operates is debatable.

Appendix Five: Finance Minister Babiš's Facebook post opposing migration (July 26, 2016)

Source: Babiš's Facebook account (July 26, 2016).

Appendix Six: Okamura's 2017 election campaign for the Czech Chamber of Deputies[424]

Source: Political Critique (2017).

[424] The SPD election campaign poster states: "No Islam No Terrorism: a safe country for everyone."

Appendix Seven: Questionnaire for the Hungarian National Consultation for Immigration and Terrorism (2015) with the English translation.[425]

The Translation to English:

National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism

1] One can hear many different opinions with regard to the increasing acts of terrorism. How important do You consider the advance [*térnyerés*] of terrorism (the massacre in France, the alarming acts of ISIS) from the perspective of your own life?
-Really Important   -Important   -Not Important

2] Do You believe that Hungary could be the target of terrorist acts over the coming years?

-There is a serious chance of this   -It could happen   -It is totally excluded

3] There are those who believe that the advance of terrorism is connected to the poor handling of immigration by Brussels. Do You agree with these opinions?

-I completely agree   -I mostly agree   -I do not agree

4] Did You know that subsistence immigrants cross the Hungarian border illegally and that the number of immigrants in Hungary has risen twentyfold over the recent period?

-Yes   -I have heard of it   -I did not know

5] One can hear many opinions regarding the question of immigration. There are those who believe that subsistence immigrants threaten the workplaces and subsistence of Hungarian people. Do You agree with these opinions?

-I completely agree   -I mostly agree   -I do not agree

6] There are those who believe that the policy of Brussels toward immigration and terrorism has failed and that a new approach is therefore necessary with regard to this question. Do You agree with these opinions?

-I completely agree   -I mostly agree   -I do not agree

7] Would You support the Hungarian government if, contrary to the permissive policy of Brussels, it introduced stricter regulation of immigration?

-Yes, I would completely support it   -I would partially support it   -I would not support it

8] Would You support the Hungarian government if it introduced stricter regulation on the basis of which it would be possible to take into custody immigrants who cross the Hungarian border illegally?

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[425] The Orange Files (2015). Available at: https://theorangefiles.hu/2015/05/19/national-consultation-on-immigration-and-terrorism/. [Accessed 2 January 2016].

-Yes, I would completely support it   -I would partially support it   -I would not support it

9] Do You agree with the opinion that immigrants who cross the Hungarian border illegally should be turned back to their own homelands as soon as possible?

-I completely agree   -I mostly agree   -I do not agree

10] Do You agree that subsistence immigrants should themselves provide for the cost of their provision while they are in Hungary?

-I completely agree   -I mostly agree   -I do not agree

11] Do You agree that the best means of fighting against immigration would be for European Union member states to help with the development of those countries from which the immigrants arrive?

-I completely agree   -I mostly agree   -I do not agree

12] Do You agree with the Hungarian government that instead of immigration, it is necessary to support Hungarian families and children to be born [*születendő gyermekek*]?
-I completely agree   -I mostly agree   -I do not agree