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The New Age of Fear: An Analysis of Crisis Framing by Right-Wing Populist Parties in Greece and France.

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Abstract

From the 2009 Eurozone economic downturn, to the 2015 mass movement of forcibly displaced migrants and the current COVID-19 pandemic, crises have seemingly become a 'new normal' feature of European politics. During this decade, rolling crises generated a wave of public discontent that damaged the legitimacy of national governments and the European Union and heralded a *renaissance* of populism. The central message of populist parties, which helped them rise in popularity or enter parliament for the first time, is simple but very effective: democratic representation has been undermined by national and global elites. This has provoked a wealth of studies seeking to explain the rise or breakthrough of populist fringe parties, without adequate consideration of how crises transform, not only the demand side, but also the supply of populist arguments, which has received scarce attention.

This thesis seeks to address this imbalance by synthesising insights from the crisis framing literature, which facilitates an understanding and operationalisation of populism as a style of discourse. To assess how far-right parties employ this discourse, and the implications of this for their electoral prospects, a comparative case-study design is employed, exploring the discourse of parties, the National Rally (NR) in France and Golden Dawn (GD) in Greece. Their ideologically similar profile but differential electoral performance, allows for a more nuanced analysis of their respective framing strategies.

The thesis examines the discourse of the two parties MPs on month by month basis over a four year period, 2012-2015 for GD and 2012-2013 and 2016-2017 for NR, via the use of the NVivo software. Their respective discourses are quantified and broken down into four key areas associated with Foreign Policy, the Economy, the Political System and Society, analysing the content, frequency and salience of key crisis frames. Discourse analysis of excerpts adds a qualitative element to the analysis that showcases the substantial differences between the two case studies. The analysis demonstrates that references to 'the people' and anti-elitism were the centrepieces of each case study's discourse with strong nativist and nationalist elements.

The two parties were extremely similar in the diagnostic stage of their framing and the way which they attribute blame for the crises. However, their discursive strategies diverge regarding their proposed solutions to the crises. Golden Dawn remained a single issue party in terms of discourse, since it never presented a comprehensive plan for ending the crises. As

a result, Golden Dawn's discourse remained one-dimensional throughout its brief period of success, being centred solely on attributing blame and attacking its political opponents and the European Union. On the other hand, National Rally's framing was more elaborate and ambitious both in terms of the variety of issues raised and, especially, the proposed solutions if advocated. This, it is argued, contributed to the evolution of RN into a mainstream competitor that is no longer dependent on a niche part of the electoral market, while the inability of GD to develop equally successful crisis frames offers a unique understanding as to why the party failed electorally and was unable to enter Parliament in the 2019 elections. The overall analysis produces a rich framework that maps out the key elements of populist crisis discourse by far-right parties, which has implications for electoral politics and for our understanding of populism, more broadly.

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Author's Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree atthe University of Glasgow or any other institution.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The Problems with Studying Populism

Recent events such as the global economic crisis in 2008 and the migrant crisis in 2015 have made populism the epicentre of discussions across the globe. Political actors, policy makers, and scholars have attempted to examine the steady rise of populism, since it simultaneously inspires and undermines democracy. It seems that the world is currently living in an era where populism has been reinvigorated and is here to stay (Knight, 1998:223-224). The economic and migrant crises were crucial in allowing populist actors to make significant gains within the electorate market. All of them converged into a perfect storm that was: '...powerfully conducive to populist claims to protect the people against threats to their economic, cultural, and physical security.' (Brubaker, 2017: 369).

The effects of these crises keep dragging on, and have threatened the cohesion of the European Union. More broadly speaking, they have accelerated a spill-over effect that has affected the faith in representative democracy, and has left the electorate alienated and disillusioned. Democratic institutions are faced with a crisis of legitimacy, since the crises have negatively affected the governments' ability to create laws and policies (Boulianne, 2019:4). The economic crisis that threatened the unity of the EU was the starting for this gradual decline in trust. More specifically, before 2010 the citizenry in both the debtor and creditor countries was more trusting towards the EU than their own national governments, as Frieden showcased by utilising the data from 24 Eurobarometer surveys (2016:158). This decline has been debated as a crisis of democracy itself, with democratic norms having been exhausted (Blundhorn & Butzlaff, 2019).

Academia has paid close attention to these developments, and populism has been revitalised as a topic of study, much in the same way that it did within the political system. Yet, still the majority of research is characterised by fragmentation, from providing a singular definition of populism to attempting to identify its causes due to its geographical and social variety. For example, the term was utilised during the 50's and 60's in order to describe the grassroots mobilisation of multiclass urban alliances spearheaded by charismatic leaders in less developed countries, with Peronism in Argentina being the prime example (Meny & Surel, 2002:2). Later on, the concept lost most of its heuristic usability, and was utilised

retrospectively in order to designate unfamiliar or unusual forms of mobilisation such as the Poujadist movement in France during the 1950s (Meny & Surel, 2002:2).

The difficulty in defining populism has led some scholars to argue that it is not a meaningful concept and that it has lost its analytical value and thus should be abandoned (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Canovan, 1981; Moffitt, 2016). As Brubaker has noted: 'For half a century, the literature on populism has been haunted by doubts about the nature and even the existence of its object of analysis' (Brubaker, 2017:358). The term is marked by a high level of contestability, and it has almost become a cliché to write about the lack of clarity of the concept. Agreements on its meaning and who qualifies as a populist are difficult since it has become '... an analytical attribution rather than a term with which most political actors would willingly identify.' (Panizza, 2005:1). However, its staying power in the literature stands as a testament to its relevance. Populism has proven quite alive, and the epoch that we are currently in verifies its resilience. The continuing debate about populism as well as its perseverance in the political landscape indicates that the concept is significant and resonant. It is for these very reasons that this thesis seeks to address this gap in the literature caused by the aforementioned difficulty in defining populism.

Therefore, it is important to first examine the definitions of populism in the literature. On the one hand, the two dominant approaches to populism are to either view it as an ideology or a strategy. The ideational approach was developed by Cas Mudde, conceptualises populism as a thin-centred ideology that separates society into two antagonistic groups: 'the people' and 'the elite' (Mudde, 2007). This approach has become the dominant position in the literature, with many authors structuring their analyses on populism around it, such as Akkerman (2012), Rovira Kaltwasser (2012), and Abts and Rummens (2007).

The strategy approach was developed by Kurt Weyland (2001), focusing on the role of the leader in populist parties and movements, as well as the organisational principles and strategies utilised by them in order to mobilise largely unorganised members of the electorate. This approach has also gained significant traction within the literature on Latin American Populism (Roberts, 2003), or modes of election campaigning (Barr, 2018). In this approach, populism is not defined by the political values of the populist actors nor by their communicative style; but rather by their relations with their supporters (Moffitt, 2016:20).

Both of these approaches are useful since they examine different aspects of populism. Mudde's thin-centred ideology looks at the core of every populist articulation, while Weyland's strategic approach looks at the relationship between populist actors and the electorate. However, both approaches share a common problem since both of them view populism as an 'either/or' category (Moffitt, 2016:21). Moreover, defining populism as an ideology robs it of its conceptual validity, since there is no common historical or referent that facilitates its conceptualisation as an ideology (Moffitt, 2016:20). There are also problems with the strategy approach since its emphasis on material aspects such as coalitions, policies and historical preconditions formulates an account that is incomplete and ignores the notion of 'the people' (Hawkins, 2010:39). To overcome the limitations of these two approaches, this thesis proposes a third understanding of populism, not as an ideology or a strategy, but as a style of discourse, one which finds particularly fertile ground to thrive during crisis conditions.

The first advantage of examining populism as a style of discourse is that as opposed to an ideology it lacks the official texts and vocabulary that accompany it, and thus has to be examined via the utilisation of diffuse linguistic elements and broad themes (Hawkins, 2010:30-31). Discourse does not refer to the instances of speech or written text, but to: '... a technical term describing any distinct language that subconsciously expresses- and, in the post-modernist view, shapes or constitutes- our fundamental assumptions.' (Hawkins, 2010:31). Therefore, this approach can provide a more nuanced analysis of populism, since the key components of populist discourse can be identified and measured. In addition, this approach will allow this thesis to showcase how both parties and political actors ascribe a particular meaning to the crises via their discourses since: 'Each of these discourses is a [specific] social and political construction that establishes a system of [meaningful] relations between different objects and practices, while providing (subject) positions with which social agents can identify.' (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000:3). A discourse is created through a process of articulation – the brining together of different, pre-existing discursive elements, in a particular way to construct a novel arrangement of meaning (Laclau & Mouffe, [1985] 2001:105). Therefore, this approach will also allow the thesis to compare and contrast the discursive strategies of the two case studies, and how they have incorporated the crises within them.

The problems in studying populism are not only related to the different definitions but also to the equally divergent analyses of the causes of populism. Crises do not only vary significantly with regards to their nature and consequences, but they offer diverse opportunities for populist parties, in a given context, to make electoral gains by referring to ensuing economic and socio-cultural grievances (Pirro et al., 2018:378). The explanations for the electoral ascendance of right-wing populism in Europe vary based on the emphasis placed on the behaviour of voters and the parties (Lamprianou & Ellinas, 2017). Therefore, these analyses on populism focus on economic or cultural grievances. In the case of the former, research focuses on how the shift to a post-industrial globalised economy has proved detrimental to certain demographics (Betz, 1994; Ignazi, 2003). For example, Gabriel Goodliffe has found that the majority of National Rally's base of electoral support is comprised of blue collar workers, small firm owners, and young, less educated males (Goodliffe, 2012).

Other analyses have focused on cultural grievances, since right wing populist parties are firmly opposed to unchecked immigration. Their growing popularity is seen as a 'cultural backlash' by social strata that have been resistant to cosmopolitan liberal values (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). These analyses have shown that the perception that the presence of immigrants is a threat to the country's culture can boost the popularity of these parties (Stockemer, 2016; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Ivarsflaten, 2008). Both types of analyses can provide some extremely valuable insights regarding the rise of right wing populism.

A third strand in the literature focuses on institutional grievances and the way that voters associate with their political institutions. The relationship between the electorate and their polities has received less systematic attention in the efforts to examine the success of right-wing populism (Lamprianou & Ellinas, 2017:45). Moreover, the empirical analyses that have focused on institutional grievances have produced mixed results both at the aggregate and individual levels (Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al., 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2008). Most importantly, existing studies ignore the multi-faceted nature of political support and thus rely on relatively 'thin' measures of institutional grievances (Lamprianou & Ellinas, 2017:45). Pippa Norris has recognised the need to examine whether support towards populism is generated by a rejection of core democratic institutions, rather than to dissatisfaction with political actors (2005).

However, the problem with all three approaches is that by emphasising the economic, cultural or institutional aspects of the populist phenomenon, they fail to grasp the symbiotic relationship shared among them, since all of them are equally relevant and connected (Bluhdorn & Butzlaff, 2019:193). Most importantly, the majority of these analyses focus on

the demand side of politics. Demand drives supply, and the inability of mainstream politics to address the aforementioned grievances provides these parties with the opportunity to capture part of the electoral market (Halikiopoulou, 2019:40). From 2016 and onwards a considerable part of research on populism has focused on the supply side (Bernhard & Hanggli, 2018:510). However, it is predominately focused on measuring degrees of populism by utilising party documents or politicians' speeches (Jagers & Walgrave 2007; Rooduijin et al., 2014). Lately, the literature has come to recognise that the success of right-wing populist parties is jointly determined by demand-side and supply-side factors, and while some analyses include both of them (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2002; Van der Brug et al., 2005), they ignore the inherent interaction between them (Golder, 2016:490). This thesis will focus on the supply side of populism, and how populist actors strive to exploit the demand generated by a crisis.

The inner workings of populist discourse have not been extensively explored within the literature (Busby et al., 2019). The majority of the literature has focused on three aspects in studying populism: 1) the issue profile of populist parties and politicians (Inglehart & Norris, 2016), 2) the contextual factors that make support towards populist actors more likely (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015), 3) research based on surveys that attempt to identify the unique set of attitudes that result in a predisposition towards supporting populist parties (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016; Akkerman et al. 2014). However, scholars have yet to connect these findings in order to show how the supply side of populism develops and functions during crises, which may provide favourable facilitating conditions for populist parties to thrive (Busby et al., 2019). The aim of this thesis is to systematically explore how a crisis is framed by right-wing populist actors, with the purpose of increasing their electoral support.

1.2 Populism and Crisis

While researchers such as Allan Knight (1998) and Paul Taggart (2000) have made references to the connection between crisis and populism, detailed treatments remain rare (Stavrakakis Et al., 2018:5). Many academics have attempted to link the emergence of populism with the onset of crises (Tagart 2000; Weyland, 1999; Kriesi et al., 1995). Populism is intrinsically linked with the onset of crises in the majority of the literature (de La Torre & Arnson, 2013:18). For Laclau, populism cannot exist without a crisis, and goes on to argue that populist leaders such as Hitler, De Gaulle and Peron would not have gained any

significant support without it (Laclau, 2005b:175-177). In a similar vein, Roberts has argued that populism is stronger within contexts of crisis, where state institutions or patterns of authority have become incapable of structuring the political behaviour and identities of the electorate (Roberts, 1995:113).

However, the pairing of the two has generated an important gap within the literature that this thesis will address. Overall, there are three approaches to the role of crisis in the contemporary populist literature: 1) the authors that draw a clear link between a crisis and the emergence of populism, 2) authors that are sceptical about this link, 3) authors that outright reject any linkage between populism and crisis (Moffitt, 2016:114-115). Despite their differences, all three approaches view the crisis as external to populism; it either triggers it, or it doesn't (Moffitt, 2016:117-118). The first problem associated with this view is that the relationship between the two does not lend itself to casual explanations. Cas Mudde has critiqued the existing literature on populism and crisis due to the fact that most authors:

... do not even bother to try to articulate what constitutes a crisis, they simply state that a certain process has led to one, assuming that both the meaning of the term and the existence of the crisis are self-evident. Others define the term so broadly that virtually every period can be interpreted through the lens of crisis. Finally, a number of authors seem to determine the existence of a crisis largely on the basis of the success of populist actors, which makes the relationship tautological. (Mudde, 2007:205).

Solving the puzzle of the relationship between crises and populism becomes even more complicated due to some additional factors. First, a crisis is a contested phenomenon without clear and discrete boundaries, and is a product of complex causality (Moffitt, 2016:118). Moreover, while there is some sound empirical research on the relationship between support towards populist parties and the variables that we can associate with a crisis, such as economic instability, these variables do not automatically equal crisis (Mudde, 2007:205).

These problems necessitate a minimal definition of crisis to base the analysis upon. According to Hart and Tindall crises are '... the combined products of unusual events and shared perceptions that something is seriously wrong.' (2009:6). Moreover, if the perceptions of crises become widespread they inevitably give rise to public leadership challenges (Hart & Tindall, 2009). How these challenges are tackled, by whom and when determine how they will run their course and their overall impact. The key challenges to leadership during a crisis are: 1) sense making: accurately diagnosing rapidly changing and often confusing

circumstances, and 2) meaning making: providing a persuasive account on the origins, overall impact and viable solutions (Hart & Tindall, 2009; Boin, Kuipers & Overdijk, 2014).

This is where the literature on framing comes into play and will allow the thesis to examine how populist parties incorporate crises within their discoursse. The choice of framing theory and examining populism as a discursive style creates a synergy that offers some important advantages. Recent research has begun to support the idea that populist discourses at the elite level influence populist attitudes and support at the electoral level. A study in the Netherlands found that populist communication strategies, even with the minimal manipulation of a few words, increase support towards right-wing populist parties and generate political resentment among individuals with lower education and the politically cynical (Bos et al. 2013:204-205). However, the key problem with these studies is the fact that they fail to offer a coherent framework on how populist discourse works, and the elements that comprise it. Framing theory offers useful analytical and methodological instruments for cross-case analyses of populist discourses.

Framing theory helps in identifying the mechanisms behind populist discourse in several ways. First, it suggests that a frame will become more resonant in contexts where it is deemed as sensible. In the framing literature, this relevance is referred to as applicability (Chong & Druckman, 2007:110). The context that this thesis examines is that of the economic and migration crises. It is a context that is more likely to make their frames applicable since it is characterised by multiple systemic failures (Busby et al., 2019). Crisis as an interpretive frame and discursive form serves as a signifier of urgency and that extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures (Brubaker, 2017:374). Therefore, this thesis will deal the framing of crises by populist actors by seeking to examine to what extent and in what ways do farright parties employ populist frames, both diagnostic and prognostic, during a crisis. The choice to analyse populism as a discursive style comes into play once more, since this approach '... lends itself to its operationalisation of specific instances of political expression (Bos et al., 2013) rather than an essential attribute of political parties or political leaders that can be captured by a simple populist/non-populist dichotomy.' (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013:8).

Second, framing theory allows to examine how different crises are framed as crises of representation at their core within a populist discourse. Research on populism has placed an emphasis on representation irrespective of how it is theorised (Canovan, 2005; Mudde &

Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Failures of representation characterise times of economic, social and political upheaval, since during these periods the relations of representation and subordination that were previously stable have become '... unsettled and dealigned, and thus open to new forms of identification.' (Panizza, 2005:11). Populism provides this new form of identification by separating society into two opposing sides. Therefore, populism is not simply a regression in response to the perceived corruption of a political form, but rather: '...indicative of a new socio-cultural condition that is, as yet, in search of a suitable political form.' (Blundhorn & Butzlaff, 2019:201).

As Brubaker notes, the proverbial perfect storm came into being by the active process of discursively tying together: '...the economic, refugee, and security crises and of the economic, demographic, cultural, and physical insecurities and anxieties that these crises enabled political actors and the media to dramatize, televisualize, and emotionalize.' (Brubaker, 2017:377). One of the main criticisms of European right-wing populist parties is that the sovereignty of the people has been undermined by the interventionism of the EU (Kallis, 2018). Therefore, the different crises extended the range of the Eurosceptic frames of these parties, since they criticised it for the devastation of national economies, the weakening of national sovereignty and cultural homogeneity and the creation of an illegitimate system of supranational governance (Pirro et al., 2018).

1.3 Case Selection, Context and Research Questions

In order to examine how crises are framed within populist discourses it is important to select some case studies that will make this endeavour possible. Selecting cases is crucial since they represent a population much larger than them (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Case studies are political and/or social instances that are spatially and temporally bound. These boundaries are determined by the theory that the researcher will address (Vannoni, 2015). Since this thesis focuses on the economic and migrant crises that affected the EU, the focus will be on European populist parties. For this reason, this thesis will examine the discourse of rightwing populist parties, and more specifically National Rally (NR) in France, and Golden Dawn (GD) in Greece. The selection of the two case studies is crucial since at the outset of any investigation an area of homogeneity must be defined and that will further define the boundaries within which cases will be selected (Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 2009:20).

The selection of the two case studies is not random, and is based on the most similar system design. According to Przeworski and Teune this design is based 'on a belief that a number of theoretically significant differences will be found among similar systems and that these differences can be used in explanation.' (1970:39). Both parties belong to the right-wing side of populism, however there is a crucial difference between the two, and that is their electoral success. Therefore, the thesis is driven by the primary research question: What were the differences in the discursive strategies between a successful right wing populist party and an unsuccessful one?

Before the analysis proceeds, it is important to operationalise the concept of success for the sake of clarity. In this thesis success is defined in terms of electoral performance. According to Allan McConnell (2010:27-28) the majority of the literature on the success of policy making and implementation takes an 'all or nothing approach', while in reality success and failure are ambiguous concepts. Most importantly, there are different dimensions on how these two can be measured such as the programme, the process and the political ones (McConnell, 2010:55). Since for the purposes of the thesis 'success' is operationalised to refer to the electoral performance of the two parties, only the political dimension will be considered. In the presence of perceived crises, threats are considered imminent, uncertainty is prevalent and thus quick decisions must be made. The leadership challenges that emerge can potentially turn the government into heroes or villains (McConnell, 2010:25). The same applies for parties in the opposition, since crises open up opportunities for framing contests to take place from both sides.

NR is the most successful right-wing populist party, and its popularity has steadily increased since its founding in 1972 to the point of becoming the main opposition party on two separate occasions in 2002 and 2017. Furthermore, as Pappas and Kriesi have noted, France was the only case among the group of Western countries where populism remained strong after the 2008 global economic crisis in 2008 (Pappas & Kriesi, 2015:308). Taking advantage of the crisis, Marine Le Pen made the issues of national sovereignty against European integration, the national and cultural integrity against immigration, and the safeguarding of interests of the working class against the elites the focal points of her discourse (Pappas & Kriesi, 2015:308). Table 1.1 demonstrates the electoral performance of the party from the 90s onwards:

Table 1.1 National Rally Presidential Election Results

Year	Candidate	1st Round Votes	Percentage of Votes	2 nd Round Votes	Percentage of Votes
1995	Jean-Marie Le Pen	4.570.838	15.0 % (4 th)	-	-
2002	Jean-Marie Le Pen	4.804.713	16.9 % (2 nd)	5.525.032	17.8 %
2007	Jean-Marie Le Pen	3.834.530	10.4 % (4 th)	-	-
2012	Marine Le Pen	6.421.426	17.9 % (3d)	-	-
2017	Marine Le Pen	7.678.491	21.3 % (2 nd)	10.638.475	33.9%

(Source: *Ministère de l'Intérieur*)

The same story of success cannot be said for the other case study, since GD gradually lost the majority of its electoral support. The party had not enjoyed any success since its founding in 1983, and it would be two and a half decades until the party began to have an impact on the Greek political scene (Georgiadou, 2013:76). Amid high levels of electoral volatility and major realignment during the economic crisis, the party achieved its first electoral breakthrough in the national elections of 2012, winning 6.97% of the vote with its strong anti-systemic and anti-immigrant discourse (Roumanias et al., 2020:5). Despite a criminal conviction and the arrest of several of its members in 2013, the party maintained some of its support and became the third largest party in the parliament after the 2015 elections (Lamprianou & Ellinas, 2017:46). This would change in 2019, when the party failed to win any seats in the parliament. Table 1.2 demonstrates the electoral performance of GD in all the Greek legislative elections that it participated in:

Table 1.2 Golden Dawn Electoral Results

Year	Votes	Percentage	Seats Won
1996	4.537	0.1 %	0/300
2009	19.636	0.3 %	0/300
2012 (May)	440.966	7.0 %	21/300
2012 (June)	426.025	6.9 %	18/300
2015 (January)	388.387	6.3 %	17/300
2015 (September)	379.581	7.0 %	18/300
2019	165.709	2.9 %	0/300

(Source: Hellenic Republic: Ministry of the Interior)

Furthermore, right-wing populist movements have been present in the history of both Greece and France. In the case of France, the populist right has always been present in times of crisis, such as the formation of French Action (*Action Francaise*) in 1899 (Kalman & Sean, 2015:1), the rise of the French Union and Fraternity Party (*Union et Fraternite Francaise*) during the

1950s (Davies, 2002:128-130), and instances of authoritarianism such as the Vichy Regime headed by Marshal Philippe Petain during the Second World War (Shields, 2007:15). Critical decades in Modern Greek history were also defined by authoritarianism such as the Fourth of August regime led by Ioannis Metaxas, and the military junta from 1967 to 1974 (Fleischer, 2006). Golden Dawn members have often paid tribute to Metaxas and the Junta's colonels, and have cited the Fourth of August regime as the ideal mode of governance (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2015:26).

The second research question complements the first one, and addresses the two important gaps that were identified in the two previous sections: examining the supply side of populist politics, and the framing of crises within the discourse of the two case studies. As mentioned in the previous section, populist parties attempt to create a sense of urgency, attribute blame and propose solutions during periods of crisis but the process through which they do so has not been examined sufficiently. These gaps motivated the second research question: How does a crisis affect the type of populism that is being supplied by right-wing populist parties? Focusing on the discursive aspect of populism allows this thesis to utilise the vast literature on framing in order to answer the two research questions.

According to Entman framing is a process that selects and highlights certain aspects of events or issues, in order to promote a specific interpretation, evaluation and solution (Entman, 2004:5). While there are a variety of frames, this thesis will focus on the issue-specific substantive ones. Other frames such as conflict or contest frames are useful and provide some valuable insights at the content level (Gerth & Siegert, 2012), but they are not relevant to the whole framing process (Matthes, 2012). This is due to the fact that the key idea of framing is one of strategic communication. Political actors need to bring their views to the public's attention. According to Entman, substantive frames perform at least two of the following basic functions when they cover political events, issues and actors: 1) defining effects or conditions as problematic, 2) identifying causes, 3) conveying a moral judgement, 4) endorsing remedies or improvements (Entman, 2004:5).

A crisis or a major systemic failure provides this opportunity to fuse different frames and make them more resonant. As Boin, Hart and McConnell have noted: 'Contestants manipulate, strategise and fight to have their frame accepted as the dominant narrative.' (2009:82). Political actors seek to exploit the disruption of 'governance as usual' and the crisis-induced opportunity space (Boin et al., 2009). These frames are related to the various

crises and their impact on different areas such as security, the economy, state institutions and society itself, and have been separated into four broad areas within the thesis: The Economy, Society, the System of Politics, and External Policy. Each of these areas includes a number of different frames which were associated with a different topic such as border controls, protectionism, democratic representation etc. The end result is an analysis of the discourse of the populist right on the crisis regarding their nature, causes and the responses of the government to them. However, it is important to provide some brief context on the two crisis that will be the focus of the analysis.

The onset of the economic crisis in 2008 proved detrimental for several periphery economies in the EU (Matsaganis, 2017:50). Countries such as Greece, Portugal and Ireland were forced to accept a full bailout in return for massive fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, supervised by the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission (Matsaganis, 2017:50-51). The economic crisis generated a significant level of policy interventionism at the EU, national and international levels aimed at preventing a series of defaults (Howarth & Quanglia, 2015:458). In the case of Greece, the austerity measures led to a series of protests, physical and verbal assaults against the politicians (Dinas & Rori, 2013:275). Even though France was also affected by the economic crisis, leading to significant cuts in public health and social benefits, the country did not experience the same dramatic situation as Greece (Cardoso et al., 2017:414). As a result, no large scale mobilisations took place in the initial years of the economic crisis. However, a wave of contention would emerge in 2016, in response to the labour reform package known as the El Khomri Law. The protests channelled the discontent for the failure of Francois Hollande's government to keep its pre-election promises, such as tackling the issue of youth unemployment (Cardoso et al., 2017:414). How the two parties framed the economic crisis will be the primary focus of Chapter 3.

The economic crisis was followed by the immigrant crisis in 2015. This crisis captured the world's attention due to its magnitude, and the growing number of people dying in the attempt to reach Europe from war-torn countries such as Syria and Afghanistan (Newsome et al., 2021:444). Between 2015 and 2016, close to 1 million people passed through Greece on a journey towards northern Europe, according to the UNHCR (Oikonomakis, 2018:65). The country serves as a transition point between the Middle-East and the rest of Europe due to its geographic location. As a result, a number of centres were established on the islands of the

Aegean Sea, under pressure from the EU, to process the registration and fingerprints of incoming immigrants (Oikonomakis, 2018:65). GD, capitalised on this opportunity by creating nuclei in the islands, regularly sending deputies to visit them and often incited violence against the immigrants (Oikonomakis, 2018:82).

France is also a point of transition to the United Kingdom through its northern border (Castelli Gattinara, 2018:278). However, the country's history of terrorist attacks allows NR to add another dimension to its framing strategy through the inclusion of the issue of security. France was one of the first countries targeted by state-sponsored terrorism by the Middle-East and has the dubious distinction of confronting terrorism in a variety of forms (Bartolucci, 2017:349). Several terrorist incidents in French soil have received worldwide attention such as the November 2015 Paris Attacks, the Charlie Hebdo shooting in January 2015, and the murder of Samuel Paty in October 2020. This framing difference will be examined to a greater extent in Chapter 4.

The analysis of the discourse for the two case studies will focus on a four-year period: from 2012 to 2015 for GD, and 2012 to 2013 and 2016 to 2017 for NR. In the case of GD, the specific time period was chosen due to the fact that it was characterised by political and economic instability. During this period four elections took place, along with a referendum that would decide Greece's future in the Eurozone. In the case of France, the primary criterion for the time period chosen was the inclusion of the elections in 2012 and 2017. Via this way the discursive strategies of the two parties during the elections will be compared and contrasted. This leaves a two-year gap from 2014 to 2015 but it ensured that both case studies would be analysed evenly. Political actors attempt to achieve an emphasis effect in order to garner support, which means to lead the public and the media to focus on certain aspects of an issue instead of others when they are constructing their opinions during elections (Druckman, 2001:230). The entire framing process of an issue is strategic and they '...campaign on behalf of competing ways of understanding what is at issue' (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004, p. 158). Therefore, the inclusion of the elections allows to compare and contrast the discursive strategies of the two parties during the crucial period of the elections.

The choice of a four-year period for each case study adds longitudinal value because it examines the beginning of the crises and their aftermaths (Yin, 2009:49). Selecting a four year period that included two elections maximises the range of possible discourse on the

various crises. While there have been longitudinal quantitative content analyses on the discourse of populist actors, they have certain limitations, since they mostly focus on election periods, party manifestos, and on a small set of themes such as people-centrism and anti-elitism (Bernhard & Kriesi, 2019; Roodujin et al. 2014; Reungoat, 2010). Therefore, the aforementioned literature is narrow in terms of scope and the time-frames chosen. This thesis analyses the discourse of the two case studies on a month-by-month basis of the aforementioned areas. Most importantly, no research on populist discourses has attempted to analyse the linkage between populist discourse and the crises.

The literature on framing fits neatly to an analysis of the linkage between crises and populism. The frames employed by political actors and social movement act as modes of attribution and articulation (Rydgren, 2005:426). They can condense the 'world out there' via selectively encoding and punctuating events and experiences. Crucially, these frames attribute blame on individuals, social groups, and structures believed to be the cause of the problem (diagnostic framing); and also propose solutions to the problem (prognostic framing) (Rydgren, 2005:426). The incorporation of framing adds an important level of depth to the empirical analysis since it allows it to go beyond the aforementioned set of themes in right-wing populist framing (people-centrism, xenophobia, anti-elitism) that have been extensively examined. Therefore, the incorporation of framing theory is perfectly suited for analysing and comparing the content and salience of crisis frames, which two far right parties, NR and GD, promoted respectively in an attempt to harness electoral support.

1.4 Nationalism and Populism

The choice of the two case studies for examining the framing of crises by populist parties needs some additional elaboration. This need stems from the fact that the two parties, and especially GD, utilise a blend of populist and nationalist frames within their crisis discourse. According to De Cleen and Stavrakakis, academic and public debates on populism have taken the overlap between the concepts of populism and nationalism for granted (2017:301). Furthermore, the case of GD complicates matters even further, since the party's ideology is essentialist Nationalist Socialist, with the nations decay and eventual rebirth being the keystone of this ideology (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015:53). Even the party's structure is akin to a militia, typical of marginal totalitarian parties (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2015:25-26).

Despite the success of left-wing populist parties since the beginning of the crisis, such as *SYRIZA* and *Podemos*, the European literature on populism has long exhibited the tendency to use the term almost solely when referring to parties such as the National Rally and the Freedom Party of Austria (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017:303). The two discourses often enter a partnership of convenience since they are concerned with the sovereignty of the people, and as a result academics tend to view them as inseparable (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017:303). I will argue that the two concepts should remain distinct, but not analytically independent. Conceptualising populism as a discursive style will allow for a closer examination of its intersection with nationalism. As noted by Brubaker, the discursive turn in examining populism allowed scholars to accurately capture discursive and stylistic commonalities present in substantively different forms of politics (2020:49).

The choice to define both case studies as populist may seem problematic. And as was previously mentioned, even the conceptual meaning and normative valence of populism are extensively debated (Brubaker, 2020:44). Since the thesis examines populism as a style of discourse, it is imperative to start with the core of populist and nationalist discourses. The focus of nationalism is the nation itself (Jenne, Hawkins & Castanho Silva, 2021:175), as the name implies, and its main principle it that a community of common descent has the right to territorial or external sovereignty (Gellner, 1983:1). On the other hand, populism focuses on internal sovereignty, and the threats towards the *demos*, the people that share a homogenous general will (Jenne, Hawkins & Castanho Silva, 2021:175).

The common element between populist and nationalist discourses is the boundary between those who belong to 'the people' and those who do not (Singh, 2021: 252). However, while both of them invoke 'the people', they do so in distinct ways: populism invokes 'the people' as underdogs against 'elites' on a vertical axis, whereas nationalism invokes them as 'the nation' against dangerous 'outsiders' on a horizontal axis (Brubaker, 2020:45). Therefore, the overlap between the two axes occurs when the core frame of populist articulations is utilised as shown in Table 1.3. It is for this reason that populism is habitually associated with xenophobic politics in the European context and radical right-wing parties (van Kessel, 2015:2).

Table 1.3: Axes of exclusion in nationalist and populist discourses.

		The vertical discursive space of populism: up-down semantics	
		The elite power bloc	
The horizontal discursive space of nationalism: in-out semantics	The 'people' as a nation	←	The outside
		The 'people' as an underdog	

(Source: Adapted from Rogers Brubaker, 2020:52)

It should also be noted that these overlaps between the vertical and horizontal axes of exclusion do not only occur in the discourse of right-wing populist politics. For example, Hugo Chavez would regularly label his political opponents as 'little Yankees' and 'lackeys of imperialism' (Hawkins, 2009:1044). Decades before him, Juan Peron, the person that defined Latin American populism, had employed the same rhetoric in order to lambast his internal opponents (de la Torre, 2017:378). In the case of Greece, SYRIZA's leader Alexis Tsipras had utilised the terms 'external troika' and 'internal troika' (*troika eksoterikou- troika esoterikou*), as a way of delegitimising the previous three-party coalition that governed Greece in the early years of the crisis (Stavrakakis & Siomos, 2016). However, these overlaps occur more commonly within the discourse of right-wing populist parties (Brubaker, 2020:55).

Despite their criticisms, De Cleen and Stavrakakis also agree that any analysis of a particular politics that blends both discourses should focus on the specificities of the case in question (2017:313). Therefore, the emphasis should be placed not on examining whether a party is purely populist or not, but rather on how they structure their discourse around the aforementioned axes of inclusion/exclusion. Are the two case studies purely populist? Certainly not. However, as the empirical chapters will showcase, the two utilise a blend of both populism and nationalism in their respective discourses. As previously mentioned, the

continued relevance of populism is partially attributable to its adaptability. Taggart has convincingly argued that populism is essentially hollow, with no core ideological values except for its populist message itself (2000).

A populist discourse can be effectively employed by a broad spectrum of ideologies, from ultra-progressive to ultra-conservative. Moreover, both populism and nationalism are discursive frames utilised by political leaders in order to '... project a more restrictive image of the sovereign community in the political sphere.' (Jenne, Hawkins & Castanho Silva, 2021:173). When it comes to the two case studies, they employ their unique blend of populism and nationalism during two instances that generate an overlap in both the horizontal and vertical axes of exclusion. In the first instance, there is the traditional conflict between 'the people' and 'the elite'. However, Eurosceptic parties such as NR and GD conceptualise elites as both internal and external as will be shown in the Empirical chapters. In the case of GD the elites are Greece's creditors, also known as the troika, and also the national elites that are consistently framed as their collaborators. Similarly, NR has attacked the national government for harmonising economic and immigration policies according to European Commission directives. The frame of reference for the discourses of both parties is the individual polity contained within the nation, and the distribution of power, opportunities and resources between 'the people' and the illegitimate 'elite' exercising power (Brubaker, 2020:51).

In the second instance, the overlap occurs when they define who belongs to the 'people'. The 'people' are not only defined in relation to the top in the vertical register, but also in relation to those at the bottom (Muller, 2016:23). Those at the bottom are framed either as parasites or deviants, and thus not belonging to the pure 'people. In the case of right-wing populist parties, this differentiation is not only framed in terms of morality but also in terms of culture, such as in the case of Muslim immigrants. Therefore, these 'dangerous others' are defined as such due to their culture, which is framed as inherently hostile. As was previously mentioned, cultural grievances are also important in generating support for anti-immigration parties, and their rise in popularity is viewed as a 'cultural backlash'.

What needs to be kept from the literature on the intersection between populism and nationalism is that populist politics are never exhausted by their populist dimension (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2020:318). As noted by De Cleen and Stavrakakis, the articulation between the populist dimension and the other dimensions of these politics, be they socialist,

nationalist and so on, must be studied (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2020:318). This thesis seeks to make a contribution in the study of the intersection between populism and nationalism. Only by treating nationalism as contingent to populism (instead of an inherent attribute) can more local forms of populism be examined. As the analysis proceeds through the empirical chapters, the core characteristics of the blend between populism and nationalism will become more apparent such as the aforementioned overlaps between the two axes of exclusion. In addition, these overlaps are extremely helpful in understanding how the two parties frame crises when attributing blame to internal and external elites, and also those who have been labelled as 'dangerous others'.

Right-wing populism was chosen as the focus of the thesis for this very reason. In addition, the two case-studies are ideal for examining how all three types of grievances (economic, cultural, and institutional) are incorporated within a populist discourse. Left-wing populism is not exclusionary in its definition of 'the people', and instead focuses on the aspect of exploitation by 'elites' (Bonikowski et al., 2019:68). Cultural grievances are the calling card of right-wing populist parties, and the migration crisis provides them with the opportunity to increase their electoral appeal. Therefore, the choice of right-wing populism allows the thesis to examine how both the economic and migrant crises are framed within a populist discourse regarding causes and solutions.

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 2 of the thesis will focus on the existing literature regarding populism and its relationship with crises. The chapter will also set up the conceptual framework that will form the basis for analysing populism as a discourse. The starting point for the chapter will be a reconceptualisation of populism. The main theories which define populism either as a thin centred ideology or a form of political strategy will be scrutinised and their main weaknesses identified. Then, populism is re-conceptualised as a type of discourse, where its core is essentially the Manichean dualism between the 'people' and the 'elite'. The chapter then proceed with scrutinising the 'losers of modernity' paradigm, and showcasing its blind spots. The next part of the chapter is an examination of how the battlefield of political discourse changed with the dominance of neoliberal policies, which led to the demise of the cleavage between the left and the right. Populism emerged as the opposing pole in this conflict within

the political terrain, since its discourse is quite similar to the one utilised by the proponents of neoliberalism. The chapter moves on to the often misused concept of crisis, and showcase how populism, through its discourse, thrives during the crises. The chapter concludes with an analysis of what are the most important frames of the populist-right have and how they have gradually become more salient.

Chapter 3 will deal with the methodological and analytical framework of the thesis. First, the analysis focuses on the components of crisis framing and blame attribution within political discourse. Afterwards, the two case studies will be presented along with the reasons behind this choice. After that the chapter will proceed with mapping out the data collection process over the period of four years, and why the specific time-frame best suits the goals of the thesis. In addition, the framing and categorisation process will be presented in order to showcase how the different topics of discussion form a coherent whole. The chapter will conclude with the two methodologies which were chosen to work in tandem, along with their strengths and limitations. In this section the blended approach utilised in this thesis will be presented along with its two key components: 1) the Essex School of Discourse Analysis, and 2) Framing.

Chapter 4 focuses on the topic of External Policy. The chapter will begin with examining the events and actions that provided both parties with the opening that they needed in order to question the EU's legitimacy. The chapter will then focus on the framing process itself. Topics such as the EU membership, the issue of national sovereignty, and the Schengen agreement will be the centrepiece of this chapter. Most importantly, this chapter will present the linkages between the issue of national sovereignty and the management of crises, such as the Eurozone debt crisis, and the 2015 migrant crisis.

The aim of Chapter 5 is to map out the parties' discourse on the economy, both at the global and national levels. This binary in their discourse is vital, since both parties vehemently oppose globalisation and the neoliberal model of economy. The economy is the most vital indicator of a government's performance, and as a result policies associated with it are given the greatest amount of scrutiny. In addition, the issues of national sovereignty and democratic representation are once again utilised as the binding agent for all the different frames. More specifically, the austerity, privatisations and other measures imposed by the EU and their respective governments are harshly criticised.

Chapter 6 focuses on the discourse of the two parties regarding the government. Here, both parties go to battle with their political opponents. One of the key themes that will emerge is that both parties utilise a strategy of total war against all. The moral binaries become more pronounced, as the attribution of blame is the main element of the specific frames. The focus of this chapter is broad, since it does not only include excerpts where MPs criticise specific failures in legislation and policy making, but how these criticisms are tied to the broader narratives of sovereignty and lack of representation. Also, in this chapter the evolutionary disparity between the two parties in respect to their mode of communication will be examined to a greater extent. Since GD never actually tasted electoral success before 2012, it never had the opportunity to be tested and adapt. On the other hand NR managed to become more mainstream and refine its discourse in the form of a scalpel, aggressive and yet precise without being alienating to the electorate. Essentially, the clash with their political opponents binds all the different frames together.

Chapter 7 looks at the basis of populist discourse: the electorate. Indubitably, every party structures its discourse around the central concept of the 'people'. However, in the case of populism this focus is crucial for the division they wish to create and their conceptualisation of crisis. In this chapter, every systemic failure and crisis goes back to the 'people', since they are the ones that suffer. Both parties present themselves as liberators and heroes of the current epoch. Yet still, while they do present themselves as exceptional, they do not neglect to firmly establish their place at the side of the electorate. The Manichean dualism that has been at the epicentre of every analysis on populism will be showcased and scrutinised in a truly novel and systematic way in this chapter.

As opposed to the majority of research on populism, which has focused on fragmentary information, this chapter will synthesise all different thematic frames together. Frame overlapping defined all previous chapters, but the sixth and seventh chapters finally quantify the binary between the 'people' and the 'elite'. Topics such as the crisis of representation, policy failures, national sovereignty and other are fused around this basic core. Most importantly, another significant aspect of populist discourse emerges in this chapter: the dramatisation of crises and failures. When populist parties are in the opposition, they wish to foster a sense of urgency. This is achieved by accentuating the negative aspects of a given situation to an extreme level. As it will be shown during both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the analysis, the discourse of both parties is rife with dramaturgical elements where any systemic failure is presented as a tragedy. The purpose behind this is twofold: 1) as it was

mentioned previously it creates a sense of urgency and calls for immediate action, 2) the bleak present can be juxtaposed with a bright and hopeful future, a future which can only come into being by them.

After the empirical analysis is complete the thesis will move on to Chapter 8, which is the conclusion. Here the entire thesis will be encapsulated, including the findings, the contributions to the research on populism, and future research directions. More specifically, the chapter will recognise that right-wing populism has remained relevant due to its great adaptability. However, dominating the discursive terrain of politics is not an easy task. The framing process should be adaptable, since these parties need to stay relevant and grow out of their niche audience. One-dimensionality is an issue that plagued GD's discourse as it will be shown in the empirical chapters that analyse the substantial differences in discourse between the two case studies.

NR managed to reinvent itself by making significant changes. From ousting Jean Marie Le Pen and the more radical members to changing its name, the party has striven to increase its appeal without diluting its discourse to a great extent. GD never managed to do that. Some would argue that they tasted electoral success all too briefly, and as a result they did not possess the experience or the time to evolve. However, this argument does not hold true, as it will be shown in the empirical chapters. The discourse of NR was flexible, and the frames evolved organically, accumulating all different issues and systemic failures, and transmuting them into new interpretative schemata. GD's discourse was characterised by rigidity and one-dimensionality, not only in the case of the party leader but every single member. So these two parties essentially show two sides of the same coin. In certain regards, GD is similar to NR during its beginning, in terms of its agenda and discourse.

1.6 Conclusion

The literature on populism is characterised by fragmentation, both in providing a singular definition to what populism is, and identifying its causes. This thesis will examine populism as a discursive style, and will examine the different elements that comprise it. Regarding the causes of populism, most studies either focus on the demand side (the electorate) or the supply side (the politicians) of populism, and a small number of studies have focused on the interplay between the two. Crucially, the demand side studies focus on a specific type of

grievances: 1) economic, 2) cultural, and 3) institutional. This thesis regards all three of these grievances as relevant and interconnected. For example, a severe enough economic crisis could potentially generate distrust towards the political system if it is not resolved, or if the government's solutions dissatisfy the electorate. In addition, this thesis will focus on the supply side, and how the two parties take advantage of the crisis context in order to increase the impact of their framing, and potentially earn greater electoral support. This is the first contribution of this thesis.

The crisis context dovetails with another conundrum associated with the study of populism: the role that a crisis plays in the emergence and success of populism. The majority of the literature views a crisis as an external variable to populism, it either causes it or it does not. However, populism persists even before a crisis has occurred or after its conclusion. Furthermore, a critical contingency such as a crisis must be framed by political actors regarding its severity, causes and what needs to be done, since it is not a neutral phenomenon. Therefore, the studies that view crises as an external trigger do not allow the analysis of their linkage within the discursive field. This thesis seeks to address this gap by utilising the literatures on crisis management, and framing in order to examine how populist parties attempt to maximise the demand for their framing through their discourse.

The two case studies that were chosen are ideal for this endeavour, since they are the two sides of the same coin. NR has thrived since its crashing defeat in 2007, while GD almost vanished after its brief period of success. The two case studies will be compared on the crisis frames that they promote, to what can be collapsed into three key framing contests: 1) gauging the severity of the crises, 2) attributing blame/responsibility, and 3) appropriate remedies to the crises. The combination of content and discourse analyses adds a considerable amount of depth to the analysis of the supply of crisis- induced populism. The content analysis will reveal the salience, and evolution, of crisis frames over time. This is a major methodological contribution of the thesis, since the majority of crisis-management research is based on qualitative methods.

Finally, the qualitative analysis of key excerpts will reveal the substantial differences in the framing of the two parties. The choice of this methodology is linked with the primary research question of the thesis: What were the differences in the discursive strategies between a successful right wing populist party and an unsuccessful one? This is another significant contribution of the thesis, since the analysis will showcase where the two parties converge

within the crisi	is discourse, where	they diverge, an	nd the implications	of this for their	electoral
fortunes.					

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The global economic downturn in 2008, and its subsequent impact on the Eurozone, served to galvanise and give greater prominence to Europe's right-wing populist parties (Startin, 2014:279). The two case studies in this thesis were no exception. By 2012 GD had achieved its first electoral breakthrough, while NR under the leadership of Marine Le Pen had managed to rebound from the disastrous electoral result of 2007. A significant amount of literature has been produced by academics from various disciplines that have attempted to define what populism is, and its growing appeal. Most importantly, a number of authors have attempted to examine the relationship between populism and crisis.

The last decade can be characterised as the age of crisis due to the occurrence of the global economic crisis, the Eurozone crisis, the migrant crisis, and the list goes on. More broadly, it is alleged that the faith in democracy is also undergoing a crisis (Boulianne, 2019; Norris, 2011). However, the relationship between crisis and populism is ambiguous. For example, populism increased modestly during the onset of the Eurozone crisis, and its development varied considerably from region to region (Pappas & Kriesi, 2015:303). The mixed success of populist parties and movements in Europe suggests a need to challenge the view that a crisis acts as a triggering mechanism or a necessary precondition of populism.

The chapter begins with examining the key theories which have attempted to define populism, in order to provide a minimal definition that will do away with any unnecessary elements. As mentioned in Chapter 1 populism will be examined as a discursive style, and the reasoning behind this choice will be the focal point in this part. The analysis then moves on to an examination of the 'losers of modernisation' theoretical approach and highlights its weaknesses in explaining the growing salience of right-wing populism's message.

The next part will focus on identifying the core characteristics of populism as it has been championed by parties of the Far Right, and more specifically GD and NR, which are examined empirically in this thesis. It proceeds to examine the literature on the relationship between populism and crisis, the theoretical roadblocks found within it and how they can be potentially overcome. Finally, the analysis proceeds with examining the underlying factors

that facilitated the dissemination of right-wing populism's message, namely the increased influence of neoliberal principles in policy making and it overall impact on the trust of the public towards political elites.

2.2 Populism Reconceptualised

An important theoretical approach which will prove vital for this analysis is the minimal definition of populism put forward by Cas Mudde, who defines populism as: '...a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté general* (general will) of the people.' (Mudde, 2004:543) ¹. Nonetheless, the definition provided by Mudde possesses an important theoretical weakness, and that is that populism falls short of the status of ideology. There are no key theoreticians or philosophers on populism, nor are there any texts which could solidify its ideational identity (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014:383).

Another definition of populism is the one formulated by Kurt Weyland, who conceptualises it as a political strategy: '... through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalised support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers'. (Weyland, 2001:14). While Weyland's formulation holds some merit and certainly uncovers some interesting facets of the populist agents' conduct, it suffers due to its lack of conceptual depth. One could argue that each political action is strategically calculated, since political actors aim to maximise their electoral gains.

Therefore, it would be preferable for the ideational clause in Mudde's formulation to be eliminated, and only for a purely discursive definition to remain: that populism is essentially a discourse which invokes the supremacy of popular sovereignty in order to claim that 'the elites' have undermined democracy, thus robbing 'the people' from their rightful political authority (Aslanidis, 2016:96). By conceptualising populism as a type of discourse, the task

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¹ Edward Shils defined populism along the same line as: '..a widespread phenomenon ... [that] exists wherever there is an ideology of popular resentment against the order imposed on society by a long-established, differentiated ruling class which is believed to have a monopoly of power, property, breeding and culture.' (Shils, 1956:100-101). He goes on to comment that there are two core principles of populism: that the people are sovereign, and that there is a direct connection between them and their government breeding and culture. (Shils, 1956:100-101).

of defining its core and peripheral characteristics becomes significantly easier. This is possible since certain contested and ambiguous elements, for example in relation to: political identity, stances on immigration, economy, foreign affairs and programmatic commitments; may be operationalised as peripheral frames attached to the aforementioned core frame of populism.

This discursive strand in the study of populism is not novel, since it has already been present in the work of Ernesto Laclau. For him, a movement is not considered populist due to the presence of actual contents which can be identified as populist within its politics or ideology; but because there is a particular logic of articulation of those contents, a deliberative emphasis (Laclau, 2005a). The 'displacement of the conceptualisation, from contents to form' (Laclau, 2005b:44), is the key element of populist discourse, since it pits 'the people', the proverbial 'underdogs', against an elite. It is this quintessential element of populist discourse which accounts for the affinity perceived among the various phenomena collected under the populist umbrella, while the malleable nature of their contents is attributable to their unique ecosystem (Aslanidis, 2016:98).

2.3 The Discursive Approach

The choice to examine populism as a discourse dovetails with the primary research question of examining the differences in the discursive strategies between the two case-studies. However, it is imperative to first acknowledge that there is no unified method in conducting discourse analysis on political communication, and researchers must choose the most appropriate model for their research interests (Sengul, 2019:2). Before choosing a model for data analysis, it is important to provide a minimal definition of discourse analysis. According to Teun A. van Dijk, critical discourse analysis is a type of discourse analytical research that focuses on how power, control and inequalities are enacted, reproduced and resisted within the social-political context through text and speech (2001:352). Therefore, its purpose is to analyse the structure of political communication, and potentially uncover strategies seeking to shape the representation of events or legitimise certain courses of action.

In a similar vein, the discourse-historical approach, pioneered by Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl, seeks to provide the criteria that enable a researcher to distinguish between manipulative practices and convincing argumentation (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001:265). As its

name implies, the discourse-historical approach also focuses on the historic aspect of discourse (Sengul, 2019:3). The approach also identifies six dimensions of politics: 1) the performative aspect of politics, 2) the everyday life of politics and politicians, 3) the impact of the politicians' personality on the aforementioned performance, 4) the mass-production of politics through the media and advisors, 5) the re-contextualisation of politics in the media and 6) participation in politics (Wodak, 2009:24). While all of these are interesting aspects that are worth studying, they do not fit with the crisis-induced context that the thesis will focus on. Moreover, defining the dividing line between manipulative procedures (distorted communication) and emancipatory ones (undistorted communication) is a difficult task (Forchtner, 2011:10). The main focus of this thesis is how crisis are framed within a populist discourse, in terms of blame attribution and possible remedies.

It is for these reasons that the thesis will employ the Essex School variety of discourse analysis, developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Two ontological ideas constitute the School's approach: 1) an object becomes socially meaningful by being articulated within a discourse, 2) these discourses are objectively 'groundless', which means that they lack any extra-discursive foundations (Marttila, 2019:19). Furthermore, Laclau and Mouffe argued that the meaning of an object is contingent on its articulation within a discursive system of differences (1990:109). Meaning and identity are constituted through a system of differences, and these differences have the potential to generate antagonisms between different groups. As was previously mentioned, the antagonism between the 'people' and the 'elite' is the centrepiece of any populist articulation. More specifically, Laclau and Mouffe define antagonism as a threat to identity: "But in the case of antagonism, we are confronted with a different situation: the presence of the 'Other' prevents me from being totally myself. [...] Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself." ([1985] 2001:125).

Identity is extremely significant within the populist blend of far-right parties, and always present when there is an overlap between the vertical and horizontal axes of exclusion. In addition, hegemonic struggles usually involve juxtapositions between negativity and positivity (Stavrakakis & Galanopoulos, 2019:183). In the case of the economic and migrant crisis, national governments, the EU and their proposed solutions to the crises are always framed in a negative way within the discourse of the two parties. On the other hand, the return to normalcy, the sovereignty of the people, and a more direct form of democracy, completely free of EU interventionism, are framed positively and as the ideal outcome should

these parties govern. In terms of the crises, this type of framing is related to the diagnostic and prognostic components. More specifically, political discourses need to win consent in two aspects: 1) the diagnosis of the malaise and thus localising negativity through the creation of a negative empty signifier (injustice, disorder, poverty etc.) 2) in providing a solution for the malaise, and add an element of positivity to the localised negativity they have highlighted through a positive empty signifier (justice, order, solidarity etc.) (Stavrakakis & Galanopoulos, 2019:184).

Parties employing a populist discourse seek to simplify political space by developing narratives based on the logic of equivalence (Laclau & Mouffe, ([1985] 2001:130). As defined by Laclau and Mouffe, the chain of equivalence is formed through simplification (the 'us' versus 'them' discourse) and an emphasis on negativity (Laclau & Mouffe, ([1985] 2001:144). The chain of equivalence creates a unified front against an external threat (Thomassen, 2019:44). Antagonism is the central element of the two case-studies' crisis discourse, since they identify three threats to the 'people' and the nation: national governments, the EU and other supranational organisations, and illegal immigrants. These threats generate an overlap in the aforementioned vertical and horizontal axes of exclusion. In the case of national governments, they are routinely characterised as traitors that follow the directives of the EU; The EU and supranational organisations such as the IMF are labelled as violating their respective nations' sovereignty, and the immigrants are framed as a threat to security and culture.

Antagonisms simultaneously make meaning possible (since it allows different grievances to coalesce into a totality) and impossible (since these differences are subverted by equivalence) (Thomassen, 2019:45). However, antagonism is not detrimental to the chain of equivalence that has been created. Equivalence is achieved through the common opposition of the 'other' (Thomassen, 2019:45). As it will be shown in the Empirical chapters, the two case-studies unify all different grievances under the conflict between the 'people' and the 'elite' (or dangerous 'others' in the case of immigration). Therefore, in the case of the crises the chain of equivalence is formed in the diagnostic stage of framing, when the parties identify their causes and attribute blame. A number of the population may be in a precarious economic situation (economic grievances), others may be worried about the potential threat of terrorist attacks by radicalised immigrants (cultural grievances), and others may simply be disillusioned with representative democracy due to policy harmonisation under EU directives (institutional grievances). All three of these grievances can be unified by identifying a

common cause.

This process of unifying different grievances motivates the second research question of the thesis: How does a crisis affect the type of populism that is being supplied by right-wing populist parties? In the previous sections two important gaps were identified in the literature of populism and crisis: 1) the supply side of populism has not been sufficiently examined within the literature, 2) the framing of crises within a populist discourse has not been examined in a rigorous way that will allow to identify the key strategies that these parties employ in order to maximise their electoral appeal. Here the vast literature on framing can shed additional light regarding how the two case-studies carry out this process. Framing is arguably the most frequently employed concept in communication and media research, and encompasses a wide array of topic areas such as political campaigns, policy formation, news coverage etc. (D'Angelo & Kuypers, 2010:1; Borah, 2011:247-248). However, framing is not simply a concept. Some scholars have defined it as an approach, (Pan & Kosicki, 1993), a multi-paradigmatic research program (D'Angelo, 2002), or a theoretical tool (Matthes, 2009).

The thesis will employ the definition developed by Robert Entman, since it encapsulates how frames function. According to Entman framing is a process that selects and highlights certain aspects of events or issues, in order to promote a specific interpretation, evaluation and solution (Entman, 2004:5). While there are a variety of frames, this thesis will focus on the issue-specific substantive ones. Other frames such as conflict or contest frames are useful and provide some valuable insights at the content level (Gerth & Siegert, 2012), but they are not relevant to the whole framing process (Matthes, 2012). This is due to the fact that the key idea of framing is one of strategic communication. Political actors need to bring their views to the public's attention. According to Entman, substantive frames perform at least two of the following basic functions when they cover political events, issues and actors: 1) defining effects or conditions as problematic, 2) identifying causes, 3) conveying a moral judgement, 4) endorsing remedies or improvements (Entman, 2004:5).

The key premise of framing theory is that an issue can be viewed from a plethora of different angles and '... be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations.' (Chong & Druckman, 2007b:104). Politicians attempt to mobilise the public behind policies by encouraging them to think about them in a certain way (Chong & Druckman, 2007b:106). Existing beliefs can be altered through persuasion or by altering the salience of a specific issue. This is not an automatic process and entails certain conditions that must be met. First,

the framing should increase the availability of a consideration, by being available in an individual's memory and for the individual to understand its meaning (Chong & Druckman, 2007b:110). Second, the framing should increase the accessibility of the consideration, in order to increase the likelihood that it will be applied when making an evaluation (Chong & Druckman, 2007c:108). One way of increasing accessibility is through regular or recent exposure to framing that emphasises the consideration (Chong & Druckman, 2007b:110). The final condition that must be met is applicability. Applicability refers to the strength or relevance of a frame (Chong & Druckman, 2007b:110).

A crisis or a major systemic failure provides this opportunity to fuse different frames and make them more resonant. As Boin, Hart and McConnell have noted: 'Contestants manipulate, strategise and fight to have their frame accepted as the dominant narrative.' (2009:82). Political actors seek to exploit the disruption of 'governance as usual' and the crisis-induced opportunity space (Boin et al., 2009). This is the point where the Essex School of discourse analysis and framing theory intersect. The necessary condition in creating an antagonism is the identification of an enemy. This is a diagnostic frame, since the situation is identified as problematic, and then blame is attributed, often with the inclusion of moral judgements. The solutions are prognostic frames, and they maintain the antagonisms within populist discourses, since these parties often attack the parties in government for the implementation of unpopular policies. As previously mentioned, the return to normalcy is a positive signifier, and gives voters a sense of hope; and this signifier is juxtaposed with the negative signifier of the ongoing crises, and the policies that have proven ineffectual.

2.4 Crisis: A Misused Concept in Understanding Populism

As it was previously mentioned, detailed treatments on the connection between populism and crises remain rare. Most of the times, the concept of crisis is taken for granted in explaining the gradual dominance of populist discourses. As a result, little attention is paid to the gaps between what it perceived as its objective conditions and its social construction, i.e how it is represented within the populist discourse (Stavrakakis et al., 2018:5).

The vital role of crisis in the study of populism has been acknowledged by Mudde, but he critiques the majority of the literature since '...most authors do not bother to articulate what constitutes a crisis.' (2007: 205). The concept therefore remains vague and underdeveloped.

Despite this, associations between crisis conjectures and the emergence of populist discourses are commonplace within the literature of populism. Indeed, most analyses such as the one conducted by Paul Taggart, have claimed that populism gets its impetus from the perception of crisis, breakdown or threat (Taggart, 2000).

What needs to be kept from this conceptualisation is that a crisis presents an opening for new discourses enter the field of politics. As Laclau notes: '...the emergence of populism is historically linked to a crisis of the dominant ideological discourse, which in turn is part of a more general social crisis.' (1977:175). Thus, it can be concluded that populist discourses draws from the crisis context, highlighting it and calling for immediate action in order to resolve the problem at hand. The theorisation of Janet Roitman is extremely helpful in understanding how crises are essentially turning points which may lead to a new type of understanding reality:

Crisis is mobilised in narrative constructions to mark out 'a moment of truth' or as a means to think 'history' itself. Such moments of truth might be defined as turning points in history, when decisions are taken or events are decided or events are decided, thus establishing a particular teleology. (Roitman, 2011).

However, evoking the concept of a crisis entails the reference to a norm, or more specifically what is considered as normal. Crises disrupt normalcy. This disruption is caused by systemic failures, be they economic, political, judicial etc. Therefore, the desire of the public is to return to the previous state of equilibrium. But in order to do so, the causes behind the failure must be identified before any type of remedial action is taken. This is the most critical phase which determines whether populist discourses will be able to take root within society. Thus, populist mobilisation pre-exists any type of crisis, lying dormant until:

... a sizeable number of voters (or potential voters) are alienated or detached from established parties and political elites. Such mobilization is a sure sign of failed or ineffectual political representation- a crisis, so to speak, in the transmission of societal interests, values and preferences to the policy-making arena by parties and other intermediary organizations. (Roberts, 2015:147).

Crises are not the wellspring from which populist movements and parties flow, but rather they are the events that can imbue their discourse with legitimacy. Many authors have outright rejected the link between a crisis and the emergence of populism. For example, Alan Knight argues that the concept of crisis is characterised by vagueness, has been utilised indiscriminately and lacks a robust aetiology despite the fact that it might be historically valid to a certain extent (Knight, 1998). While such criticisms hold some merit, they still suffer from the aforementioned analyses of populism, namely that they view the crisis as an external variable. The problem with linking crises with populism is further exacerbated from ontological issues. A truly 'neutral' or 'objective' conceptualisation of crisis that populism can be measured against is not feasible (Moffitt, 2015:190). This theoretical 'brick wall' can be bypassed by focussing instead on how a crisis can be a trigger for populist mobilisation. Therefore, the main focus should not be any type of crisis, but rather a crisis of representation.

According to Kriesi, the political crisis is the key factor in explaining the reinvigoration of populism across Europe, since political parties are essentially the agents of representation for the citizenry: 'This crisis may interact and be reinforced by economic crises, but in the final analysis, it is the political component of the joint crises that is decisive for the rise of populism.' (Kriesi, 2018:16). As it was previously mentioned, the cleavages of old have diminished with the onset of globalisation and the increased interconnectivity it brought forth. In turn, this has provided political space for parties which can mobilise around less structured political cleavages due to their versatility, such as the migration crisis (Guiso et al., 2017).

Seeing a crisis as an external triggering mechanism or a necessary pre-condition, does not allow any type of political analysis to highlight the internal linkages between populism and crisis at the performative level. Moreover, crises and systemic failures cannot and should not be equated with each other. The systemic failure is an undeniable fact, but its linkage with the

² Benjamin Arditi is similarly suspicious of the link between populism and crisis. He argues that: 'However, the reference to 'crisis' also narrows down the scope of the populist experience to moments when politics fails to address participatory, distributive or other demands. One could draw from Panizza's advice to distinguish 'populism in the streets' from 'populism in power' (2000: 190) and argue that the emphasis on the exception does not allow us to differentiate populist politics in opposition from populism in government.' (Arditi, 2007:63). Therefore it is important to look at populism within a broader framework and not solely focus on that single instant of a crisis.

concept of crisis is a process of careful mediation and framing. Colin Hay has highlighted the significance of constructions of crises, which may supersede the initial systemic failures:

... crisis and failure simply cannot be equated. Crises are representations, and hence 'constructions' of failure. [...] Such perceived and identified failures thus form the basis for contested and competing constructions and mediations of crisis which attempt to find and construct resonance with individuals' and groups' experiences of the symptoms of failure. (Hay, 1995:68).

This can be neatly linked with the previously mentioned erosion of traditional political cleavages, since the older and established parties were ill-equipped when it came to dominating the discursive field during the crises. This failure to earn the support and confidence of the public, is attributable to plethora of factors such as the decline of political ideologies and the bipolar order of left and right (Bell, 1976; Fukuyama, 2006). In addition, the diminishment of social cohesion and capital under the conditions of extreme complexity has made the electorate passive and unable to mobilise (Zolo, 1992; Putnam, 2000). It is against this background that democratic norms have become largely exhausted, and susceptible to being reshaped by populist parties.

Within Laclau's work this process of reshaping is known as a 'dislocation'. Dislocation is understood as the moment of failure and the subversion of a system of representation. A dislocation essentially embodies a radical type of negativity, since they literally shatter the socio-symbolic reality (Stavrakakis et al., 2018:10-11). However, there is also a positive aspect, since a dislocation opens up the potentialities through which new identities can be formed (Laclau, 1990)³. In a sense, populist discourses which are based on such a dislocation are like the scalpel of a surgeon, as they cut they simultaneously destroy and heal.

And yet, there is another important theoretical obstacle which needs to be cleared before the thesis proceeds to the empirical chapters: How do the articulations of populist actors differ from 'crisis politics' in general? 'Crisis politics' are the *zeitgeist* in this era of globalisation

1990:65).

³ Laclau utilises the rise of National Socialism in Germany as the prime example of a dislocation of the dominant hegemonic discourse. According to him: 'The National Socialist discourse emerged as a possible response to the crisis and offered a principle of intelligibility for the new situation.' (Laclau,

and austerity, and as a result this is a truly timely question (Streeck & Schafer, 2013). According to Benjamin Moffitt there are two important points of differentiation: 1) the centrality of the people, and 2) the perpetuation of the crisis (Moffitt, 2016:130). The first one is not anything novel, since populism always places the notion of 'the people' at the epicentre of its discourse.

The second point is the most crucial one since it is associated with the continued relevance of populist parties. As time passes the invocation of crisis becomes less effective, especially if successful remedial actions were taken in order to combat it. Even if the crisis persists (such as in the case of the sovereign Greek debt) a party still needs to offer some sort of solution. If populism is a reaction to an extreme sense of crisis as Taggart (2000) notes, then its survival depends on the propagation of the crisis. This is the very reason that this analysis of populism will focus on its performative aspect. Most forms of 'crisis politics' will seek to provide a swift and decisive resolution to the specified crisis at hand, rather than attempting to perpetuate it for political gain (Hart & Tindall, 2009).

For example, it would be unwise for leading actors to prolong a sense of crisis especially in countries which were severely affected by them such as Greece (e.g debt, migration) In Moffitt's own words:

As such, while narratives within more general forms of 'crisis politics' tend to have a broadly teleological structure- they have a defined beginning, middle and, most important, end- the performances of crisis by populist actors are ongoing, in that they either extend the scope of the crisis, or alternatively switch their notion of crisis so that the sense of crisis continues. Unlike 'crisis politics' in general, populist performances of crisis never really end. (Moffitt, 2016:131).

Therefore, the main problems with previous attempts to link crises with the success of populist parties have omitted two important aspects: 1) That a crisis is not a triggering mechanism which leads to populism. Rather, the onset is a systemic failure, and whether it will be elevated to the level of crisis or not depends on its severity, and whether populist actors will be able to successfully frame it as such. 2) Like any type of frame, crises must be permanently embedded to the perceptions of the public. Since populist parties espouse a new way of doing politics, they must ensure that their message will remain temporally resonant.

Therefore, the perpetuation of the sense of crisis and urgency is intrinsically linked with their survival.

2.5 The Losers of Modernisation

The losers of modernisation thesis, is a theory associated with the academic Hans-Georg Betz. According to him the electoral success of right-wing populist parties stems from '... a profound transformation of the socioeconomic and sociocultural structure of advanced Western European democracies.' (Betz, 1994: 35). The transition from an industrial to a post-industrial economy has led to increased individualisation in society and '... established subcultures, milieus, and institutions, which traditionally provided and sustained collective identities, or getting eroded and/or are being destroyed.' (Betz, 1994:29). The losers are the individuals that are unable to adequately adapt to the rapidly changing social and economic landscape.

Part of the literature that aims to analyse the rise of the populist right in France and Greece has attempted to map out the collectivities of individuals that may be drawn to it. In his work 'The Resurgence of the Populist Right in France', Goodliffe focuses on the lower middle class called les petits independants, who have formed the core of support for the populist right (Goodliffe, 2012:16-17). Being small firm owners and self- employed, they were unable to adapt to the gradual modernisation of the industry and the economy and therefore felt that the state had practically abandoned them. Their feelings of alienation and disappointment were further exacerbated with the adoption of neo- liberal policies by the French state during the 80s and the 90s, and imprinted upon their psyche a feeling of being eternally underprivileged (Goodliffe, 2012:289).

Similarly to France, the lower middle class forms the core of support for GD. Being the ones that were hit the hardest by the economic crisis and the austerity measures, their desperation and anger led them to support GD in 2012 (Ellinas, 2013:554). More specifically, the party was overrepresented among those that were most exposed to market conditions, such as small-firm owners, the self employed and the unemployed (Ellinas, 2015:7). While, this analysis of the electorate of GD and NR certainly provides a valuable insight in regards to who are more likely to support a populist right party, yet it fails to explain the growing appeal of these parties to a broader audience. For example support for GD among younger voters (aged 18 to 24) was almost double the national average in 2012 (Ellinas, 2013:555).

Moreover, Hawkins et al. (2012) have shown that the majority of voters for populist parties predominantly belong to the lower socio-economic strata and lower education. Elchardus and Spruyt had detected a similar pattern when studying the distribution of populism in Flanders (2016:115). Overall, a large block of research has focused on the appeal of right-wing populism among the working-class, lower middle-class and the unemployed voters (Rydgren, 2013; Kriesi et al. 2008). However, Gilles Ivaldi has noted that there is a social desirability bias associated with the populist-right that might affect the responses in surveys (2018:160). Yotam Margalit has noted that: '... most complex social phenomena are not caused by one factor alone. Widespread support for populism is no different in that respect. In addition to the economic factors discussed above, there are a host of other contributing factors— for example, anxiety about immigration and demographic shifts, disaffection with progressive cultural change, or opposition to EU integration—that underlie the appeal of populism.' (Margalit, 2019:159).

Therefore the 'losers of modernisation' theoretical approach is rather narrow in scope and it does not take into account the various factors, be they political, economic or cultural that may contribute to the populist right's growth in popularity. Yet still it can offer a valuable insight in a historical and sociological analysis of the Far Right and how it has persisted throughout the course of history. More importantly this theoretical approach can be applied to the impact of neo-liberalism and its disembedding effect upon the state and the system of politics, and the subsequent hollowing- out of democracy that may lead to feelings of alienation and enmity by the public. Therefore the next section will deal with the literature on the effects of neo-liberalism on the system of politics and democracy.

2.6 From *Homo Politicus* to *Homo Economicus* and the Hollowing of the Democratic State

The adoption of neoliberal economic policies by states had a significant impact on the system of politics. The most significant and detrimental one was the disembedding of the political system from the demos, effectively creating a democracy without the demos. This separation signifies the transition from governing to governance, as the hierarchical structures of the state became replaced with vast, integrated, interrelated, and partly self-organising networks (Brown, 2015: 123). Therefore governance is a type of governing that is characterised by processes of rule, completely separated from agents and institutions of a democratic state that

leads to the erosion of the sovereignty of the state (Brown, 2015: 124). Greece best exemplifies the shift from governing to governance due to its enormous debt that necessitated the intervention of the IMF and the European Union, in order to avoid the possibility of a default.

Despite the fact that Greece's economy and membership in the EU were in dire peril, and thus certain measures had to be taken, the intervention of the IMF and the EU was seen as a blow to its national sovereignty by GD. Similarly in France, NR has repeatedly attacked the EU and has characterised the Schengen, Maastricht, and Amsterdam treaties as the foundation for a supranational entity which will lead to the end of France's national sovereignty. The hostility towards European integration has become one of the most potent weapons in the arsenal of the populist-right, since it has effectively displaced public political debate. The harmonisation of policies in tandem with limiting the capacities of national governments, and in extent the political parties has led to the de-politicisation of the nation states⁴. Key decisions are taken by non-political bodies and the system of politics becomes devalued and an alien entity to the citizens as a result (Mair, 2013:117). In addition there is no constraint on policy makers by the public and this lack of accountability erodes the legitimacy of the EU and in extent the system of politics (Mair, 2013:125-128).

The EU is perceived as being ruled by elites who have created a new polity, and disregarding the idiosyncrasies of the various member states for the sake of teleological efficiency. In turn, this perception provides a fertile ground for nationalist ideologies that promote the safeguarding of the sovereignty, and cultural values of each nation state. Furthermore, this rhetoric is aimed not only towards the EU, but also towards the parties that have supported the decisions of the EU which according to them are in direct conflict with the best interest of their state and its citizenry. This attack toward Europeanisation serves to promote the populist-right as morally superior as opposed to their opponents. However, the crisis itself was not the sole factor responsible for their rise in popularity, as it only provided the opening that they needed in order to finally have a more significant impact within the political arena.

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⁴ Wolfgang Streeck has also analyzed the impact of the implementation of neo-liberal policies within the EU, via the balancing of budgets and national debts. The politics of the modern debt state have become increasingly complex and less democratic, because they take place as international politics, in the shape of intergovernmental diplomacy (Streeck, 2014:90). Nations appear as homogenous moral individuals, with shared responsibilities, as they have been dictated by the EU.

2.7 Homo Hominis Lupus Est

The permeation of all social institutions by the economy has led to increased fragmentation, since everything is organised similarly to a large company. Every individual is fully responsibilised when it comes to achieving prosperity or ending up in misery. As it was previously mentioned, human beings are remade into human capital, the transition from *homo* economicus to homo politicus. The foundation for civic participation vanishes, and as a result not only public goods are devalued but citizenship itself 'loses its political valence and venue' (Brown, 2015:39). This new context through which individuals operate is replete with risk, contingency and continuous mutability since any event (such as the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers) could potentially upset the balance on a global scale.

Neoliberalism extols freedom as the highest virtue, but their brand of 'freedom' is in actuality unbridled individualism. And yet, the need to constantly remain competitive and adaptable is what replaces freedom with coercion. As a result, the individual becomes limited in terms of choices and capabilities available. The core concept of capability developed by Amartya Sen can further showcase how this extreme emphasis on individualism can prove deleterious for the cohesion of society. Capabilities indicate a person's wellbeing, since they refer to the potential and the actual power of what he/she is capable of doing and achieving in terms of valued choices (Sen, 1985).

Capability is a form of freedom, since it makes the achievement of alternative functioning combinations possible (Sen, 1999:75). Valued capabilities enable a person to function in society, that is, to possess actual opportunities to choose between alternative functionings (or, less formally put, various lifestyles). They can range from enjoying good health, social integration and self-respect. The salience of these functionings is dependent upon the value orientations of agents and wider collectivities. According to Sen:

The well-being of a person can be seen in terms of the quality (the 'wellness', as it were) of the person's being. Living may be seen as consisting of a set of interrelated 'functionings', consisting of beings and doings. A person's achievement in this respect can be seen as the vector of his or her functionings. The relevant functionings can vary from such elementary things as being adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable morbidity and premature mortality, etc., to more complex

achievements such as being happy, having self-respect, taking part in the life of the community, and so on. The claim is that functionings are constitutive of a person's being, and an evaluation of well-being has to take the form of an assessment of these constituent elements. (Sen, 1992: 39).

These functionings are the normative and achievable benchmarks for a good life of communal well-being (Deneulin & McGregor, 2010). They allow communities and individuals to compare and aspire, making the choices incumbent upon material and social conditions of human development more salient. Therefore, well-being is not only associated with material wealth but with the potentialities of personal evolution. The choices an individual possesses are part of their being, their social identity and their place in the cosmos. This sense of belonging is crucial not only because it associated with fulfilment but also due to the fact that from it spring forth social stability and cohesion⁵. The parties of the populist right claim that stability has been undermined both from above and from below, since they do not focus their attacks solely on elites, but also on migrants and minorities (Davidson & Saull, 2017). Their project is a restorative one, aiming to return 'the people' to a previous state of eudemonia.

Grievances associated with an individual's wellbeing can become a potent mobilising force, since shared suffering can potentially substitute the pre-existing bonds of solidarity. However, it must be noted that while they do provide the necessary backdrop for political mobilisation, they do not always count as sufficient factors (Aslanidis, 2017:307). This is where political opportunity and agency come into play, as it was mentioned in the previous section. Populism acts as a mode of articulation of social grievances, since it is a 'flexible way of animating political support' (Jansen, 2015:161). The interpretative perspective of a problematic situation is shifted to make the recruitment of the disaffected social groups or individuals under the all-encompassing banner of 'the people' possible (Aslanidis, 2017:309). The people are always viewed as pure, morally superior and homogenous; the silent majority which is the backbone of society (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008).

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⁵ One of the most harmful after-effects of the economic crisis was the loss of social cohesion, brought forth by the erosion of the middle class. Social cleavages became more pronounced, and as a result the stability of many nations was undermined. Francis Fukuyama stated the importance of a middle class as follows: "Democratic governance has now achieved the status of being taken to be generally right. It is most broadly accepted in countries that have reached a level of material prosperity sufficient to allow a majority of their citizens to think of themselves as middle class, which is why there tends to be a correlation between high levels of development and stable democracy. (Fukuyama, 2012:56).

For neoliberalism, individuals (homo economicus) are completely economised, meaning that they are viewed as nothing more than financialised human capital. They seek to strengthen their competitive positioning, and attract potential investors in every sphere of their existence (Brown, 2015). One of the numerous ways in which social solidarity may be manifested is through social capital, that is: 'the depth of the network between individuals that makes social life possible and underpins economic growth.' (Hollaway, 2008:7). Social capital reflects trust, reciprocity, civil engagement and community networks. A society lacking these fundamental traits ties in nicely with the Durkheimian concept of anomie, a perceived state of deregulation and disintegration (Durkheim, 2013[1897]). Furthermore, Robert Merton suggested that anomie is more likely to occur in societies where the majority of the population is unable to obtain accepted cultural aspirations through legitimate means (Merton, 1938). The feeling that someone is under constant threat may eventually lead to hostility towards the others involved in this intergroup struggle for limited opportunities.

The denizens of modern neoliberal society have not demonstrated any semblance of personal identity, or the much valued flexibility, until they have submitted every iota of their existence to risk. The uninhibited embrace of risk is tantamount to the absolute freedom reified by neoliberalism, and as noted by Mirowski:

Salvation through the market comes not from solidarity with any delusional social class or occupational category, but instead bold assertion of individuality through capitulation to a life of risk. [...]Risk is the premier device for combining a supposed instrumentally rational approach to action with a post-hoc moralisation of any market outcome whatsoever, and as such, has become central to neoliberal narratives of the crisis. (Mirowski, 2013:120).

Economic growth and the availability of a plethora of choices for personal development can make the electorate optimistic about their immediate future, and makes established means for personal betterment appear appropriate. Thus, prosperity can strengthen integration not only via the minimisation of conflict, but also by simply giving people what they desire, muting their protests, strengthening system legitimacy and enforcing pragmatism in political mobilisation (Finsterbusch, 1998). Simply put, social conflict is controlled since attention is diverted from other issues to economic bargaining. Everyone can win something so nobody

really feels left out, since this process of negotiation is continuous under normal circumstances.

However, a severe crisis can disrupt this process. Feelings of resentment boil over and may eventually make the members society turn against each other. The neoliberal world is characterised by cruelty, since everyone is completely accountable for their success or failings. This spectacle of shaming not only serves as a lightning rod for resentment, but it can also be employed in a myriad of ways in order to reshape society (Mirowski, 2013:120). Since there is an affinity between the technocratic neoliberal mode of organisation and populism, it comes as no surprise that the latter would harness the very same feelings to gain support. The electoral success of right-wing populist parties and what accounts for the broadening of their electoral base, can be partially explained by the ways which they define the in-group ('the people') and justify exclusion for an out-group, such as migrants (Halikiopoulou, 2019).

The adoption of this discourse has certainly allowed these parties to appear legitimate to a broader range of social groups, irrespective of their backgrounds and preferences. The fragmentation of social identity becomes central once more, since political participation is one of its aspects. Identities are formed by a variety of interlocking relationships, and can be reorganised by contingencies from within and without (Connolly, 1991:204). Identificatory practices provide existence with meaning, since they define needs, self-actualisation, the placement within society, antagonisms and the drawing up of frontiers between outsiders and insiders. Therefore, the populist mode of identification is not solely defined by the collectivisation of grievances and resentments, but also by the re-imbuement of existence with meaning.

Their world is not one defined by winners and losers, but by underdogs and elites. A new type of solidarity and cohesion comes into being, one that is not born out of collective sense well-being but from constant threat and insecurity. The compatibility between technocratic neoliberalism and populism is being showcased through this exaltation of antagonism, which according to their proponents exemplifies freedom. Therefore, the rise of populism is not solely attributable to the dissatisfaction of the citizenry with democratic processes. Rather, populism has become a sensible choice much in the same manner that neoliberalism became the dominant doctrine in economic organisation.

2.8 Loss of Trust and Legitimacy

The economic crisis brought the underlying pathologies of the political system within the EU to the surface and crystallised the frustrations of the public towards it. A significant blow to the political system was the loss of trust. Trust is the binding agent for the relations between the citizens and state institutions. Moreover, trust is important regarding the process of 'disembedding' in the formation of modern state institutions, due to the fact that it takes the form of: '... faceless commitments, in which faith is sustained in the workings of knowledge of which the lay person is largely ignorant.' (Giddens, 1991:88).

Therefore trust is intrinsically linked with legitimacy when it comes to social institutions and especially the system of politics. The loss of trust is linked with the loss of legitimacy by the political system. More specifically, in Greece the amount of citizens not trusting politicians increased from 18.2 in 2009 to 50.2 percent in 2011, while the total distrust towards the parliament increased from 15.6 to 58.3 percent during the same time (European Social Survey, Rounds 4 and 5). France has also exhibited decreasing amounts of trust towards the political system. A poll that was conducted in 2013 showed that trust in government was only 25 percent, while trust towards the president, Francois Hollande, was at 31 percent (*Le Barometre de la Confiance Politique*, 2013:28). Regarding the EU, a Eurobarometer poll conducted during the autumn of 2015 showed an increase of distrust towards it. Greece and France exhibited an increase in distrust at 38 percent and 25 percent respectively (Standard Eurobarometer 84, 2015:10).

This erosion trust towards the entirety of the political system is a far more serious threat than the loss of trust towards a specific political party or an individual. Governments come and go and voting preferences may fluctuate, but a general distrust towards one of the major pillars of social order is especially problematic (Newton & Norris, 2000:54). Trust is essential for the obtainment of legitimacy since it provides the system of politics with the moral justification to exercise power and take collectively binding decisions (Beetham, 2001:107-116). If the citizens perceive the system of politics as unable to resolve a crisis or that it has

become an alien entity to them and therefore not accountable, their trust will diminish accordingly ⁶.

In representative democracy legitimate authority rests on the notion of popular sovereignty, meaning that it is the will of the people that is responsible for endowing the elected representatives with political authority (O' Sullivan et al., 2014:549). It is important reiterate that a single crisis cannot be the sole factor responsible for the declining levels of trust towards the political system. Economic performance is certainly important, but it is not the only factor that citizens take into consideration regarding the amount of trust that they place into the system of politics (McAllister, 1999:188-203). As it was previously mentioned, this initial crisis only served as the catalyst for the declining trust in the political system and the centrifugal tendencies of the public that led to the steady climb of the populist-right.

Therefore it is important to analyse other factors besides the economic performance, in order to be able to understand why trust towards the system of politics received such a major blow, and why the support towards the center began to diminish. The perceptions of the citizens regarding a crisis are crucial for this analysis, since 'perceptions are reality when explaining citizen behavior.' (Dalton, 2004:114). Extreme conditions may alter the perceptions of the citizens and the basic drivers of trust. In addition since political parties are carriers of beliefs and ideologies they can actively shape these perceptions, and in turn earn the trust of the citizens when suitable circumstances for doing so present themselves.

2.9 The Creation of Meaning and Collective Identities by the Right-Wing Populist Parties

According to Simon Bornschier, right-wing populist discourse is centered on three convictions: 1) Traditional norms stand over abstract universalistic principles, 2) A multicultural community has a detrimental effect on the national community, 3) Politics must

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⁶Elmer Eric Schattschneider, had written in 1942 that party politics are intrinsically linked with democracy. The failure of party politics may have an adverse effect on democracy: 'The rise of political parties is indubitably one of the principal distinguishing marks of modern government. The parties, in fact, have played a major role as makers of governments, moreover they have especially been the makers of democratic government. [...] The most important distinction in modern political philosophy, the distinction between democracy and dictatorship, can be made best in terms of party politics. The parties are not therefore merely appendages of modern government; they are in the center of it and play a determinative and creative role in it.' (Schattschneider, 1942:1)

remain national and not subordinate to supranational organisations (Bornschier, 2010:18)⁷. These convictions form the core of their framing and are at the same time the reasons for their continued existence and their success. Their winning formula is their adaptability and focus on matters that other parties may ignore such as migration or national sovereignty. In order for a traditional or authoritarian potential to be politicised in such a way that it will mobilise the citizens, it is essential to be connected with concrete political conflicts, which in turn are crucial for the formation of a collective identity. The collective identity is linked with the concept of 'the people' since the citizens of a nation are bound together by a common past and a common culture. By pitting new enemies against 'the people', the populist right can persevere throughout the course of history, and thrive when the conditions are ideal.

The creation of enemies is vital for the populist right whether they are a minority, a large ethnic group, or an elite. The creation of enemies is a simplification of complex developments since there must be someone solely responsible for the grievances of the people (Pelinka, 2013:8). Going back to the three principles of the populist right, their relationship with the formation of a collective identity and the identification of enemies becomes clearer. First, by emphasising the preeminence of traditional norms over universalistic principles, the parties of the populist right present themselves as the safeguard against the homogenising effects of globalisation and liberalism. Second, the identification of a multi-national community as a threat to the national community is practically the creation of an enemy. It serves as a clear cut demarcation between 'the people' and 'outsiders'. And finally the belief that politics must remain national is another simplification via the creation of an enemy who threatens national sovereignty.

The discourse of the parties of the populist-right achieved its first significant positive resonance with the public with the advent of the economic crisis. Suddenly, their doom-laden discourse about the subjugation of the nations belonging to the EU under a technocratic leadership, and the erosion of their community by universality and unchecked migration seemed all too real. However, it is important to note that grievances alone are not enough to

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⁷ In his work 'Three Faces of Fascism', Ernst Nolte analyzes how the Far Right political movement *Action Francaise*utilized the idea of the nation within its discourse. For them, the preservation of the nation and its culture were the duty of the people indigenous to it. They were bound together by common values, blood and this sacred duty, that were more significant than any of the universalistic principles of democracy (Nolte, 1966:61). *Action Francaise*was one of the first Far Right movements, and served as a blueprint for subsequent movements and parties. More importantly in 1971, a breakaway movement '*Nouvelle Action Francaise*' was formed, and some of its member would join Jean-Marie Le Pen's RN later on.

mobilise the public and garner its support. They have to be interpreted and formulated into a specific type of meaning that can earn them support and provide their claims with legitimacy (Tarrow, 1992:177). These parties combine both ideological positions, according to the circumstances present, and this adaptability has ensured their continued success (Bornschier, 2010:18). Equally important to their success is their agenda setting capabilities which deal with the issues of national sovereignty and immigration, both major issues in the last years. Their positions are widely commented by the media and some of them may be integrated to the agendas of other parties. In the case of Greece the national sovereignty issue was addressed not only by GD, but also by SYRIZA, and the Independent Greeks (ANEL), especially during times where additional austerity measures had to be taken by the government, or during the bailout referendum of 2015.

Similarly, contemporary NR discourses regarding anti-Islam positions, such as the vilification of street prayer and the spread of halal butchers in poor neighborhoods, or the democratic deficit in the EU, have been commented by the media and also integrated to varying degrees in the discourse of other parties (Beauzamy, 2013: 181). This impact on the mainstream political agenda reveals the growing acceptability of the theses by the populist right. The normalisation of their standpoints is a crucial element in explaining their growing electoral successes, since support towards them is not a one off vote of protest anymore (Berezin, 2006:271). In addition the view that these parties represent a group of modernity losers is not suitable anymore due to their growing acceptance by a larger number of the public. These parties have managed to change what is considered as acceptable and salient within the broader political discourse.

The politicisation of these issues is linked with the types of analyses that focus on cultural grievances when examining the rise of right-wing populism. Analyses like these examine how the social and demographic changes caused by the onset of globalisation, supranationalism and post-industrialism affect the support towards these parties (Lamprianou & Ellinas, 2017:44). The rising number of immigrants has generated demand for cultural protectionism, and has generated new issue dimensions and opportunities that allow right-wing populist parties to capture part of the electoral share (Kriesi et al. 2008). Of course, mobilisation on cultural grievances focuses on the issue of immigration. The common element among all right-wing populist parties is their firm opposition to immigration since it

can easily be linked with the demands for cultural protectionism parties (Lamprianou & Ellinas, 2017:44).

Aggregate-level studies have established a positive link between immigration and support for right-wing populist parties. For example, a research Professor Daniel Oesch utilised data from Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, France and Norway in order to uncover the factors that affect support towards these parties. The findings showed that the fear that immigration may undermine the country's culture was a decisive variable for voting a right-wing populist party for all countries except Belgium (Oesch, 2008:359). Individual level analyses have also produced strong results. Ivarsflaten examined the success of right-wing populist parties in Denmark and France, and concluded that the cultural threats to identity are more significant than economic threats (2005:489). Therefore, the issue of culture must also be taken into account when examining the electoral success of right-wing populist parties.

However, less attention has been paid to the supply side. While demand is an important driver of voter choice, it cannot fully explain the voting preferences towards these parties (Halikiopoulou, 2019:41). Furthermore, it can argued that parties do not only respond to popular demand but they also attempt to shape it with their discourse, and as a result a better way in understanding this phenomenon is by examining how they capitalise on demand-side opportunities (Hallikiopoulou, 2019:41). A crisis provides this opportunity to set the agenda in the discursive terrain of politics. Within the terrain of symbolic politics, political entrepreneurs can create novel worldviews and new group identities (Bourdieu, 1999:22-24). By crafting symbolic and ideological articulations called frames, they provide the people with simplified schemata of interpretation, as explained by Goffman (1974:21). In turn, these frames can ascribe meaning to events and occurrences, and thus function to organise experience and guide action, be it individual or collective (Snow et al., 1986:464). These frames are essentially crystallised meaning, a novel worldview, and thus they can be utilised for the construction of collective identities. The 'losers of modernity' concept is insufficient since the new meaning created by the populist right encompasses the entire society. This new concept of identity does not need to be coherent and specific, because its success is based on its vagueness, a motley of social categories, which become homogenised by the symbolic discourse of these parties.

2.10 A New Type of War

The pertinence of the left-right distinction as the principal axis of political confrontation has been challenged by the emergence of technocracy on the one side and populist politics on the other (Bickerton & Accetti, 2017). A new type of war is fought between a conglomerate of unelected regulatory bodies, which draw their legitimacy from their technical competence and administrative expertise, and the populist parties presenting themselves as the defender of 'the people' against established institutions and elites. This novel type of warfare was necessitated by the fact that the entire world changed with the onset of globalisation and the fusion of the economy with policy making. A new type of war meant that the stratagems of the past became obsolete, and the parties that traditionally employed them soon saw their electoral fortunes change for the worst.

The onset for this dramatic change was the gradual erosion of democratic principles by the market, and was expedited during the global economic crisis. Therefore the common denominator for these two poles that have dominated the political battlefield is the crisis. According to Philip Mirowski, neoliberalism must be understood as a flexible and pragmatic response to the previous crisis of the Major Depression (Mirowski, 2013). It entailed a long-term comprehensive plan which would reshape society simultaneously opposing a planned economy and a vibrant welfare state at all costs (Mirowski, 2013). Thus, society itself had to be 're-educated' according to Friedrich Hayek:

But what to the politicians are fixed limits of practicability imposed by public opinion must not be similar limits to us. Public opinion on these matters is the work of men like ourselves, the economists and political philosophers of the past few generations, who have created the political climate in which the politicians of our time must move. [...] It is the beliefs which must spread, if a free society is to be preserved, or restored, not what is practicable at the moment, which must be our concern. (Hayek, [1948]1996:108).

The purpose of neoliberal economists was to disseminate and amplify their message until it became 'common sense' regarding how the economy and the state ought to be organised. This new 'common sense' is comprised of four core attributes as they have been defined by Ludwig Von Mises, another forefather of neoliberalism. First, he opposes socialism and

interventionism and juxtaposes them with capitalism and the market economy (von Mises, [1922]1981:13). In doing so, he follows a dichotomous line of reasoning not unlike the one utilised by populist parties ⁸. Second, he considers the market and interventionism as homogeneous, and thus applies a strictly binary code where the market is attributed with exclusively positive characteristics (freedom, equilibrium, systematic and scientific etc.), while interventionism with negative ones (chaos, arbitrariness, authoritative command etc.) (Puhringer & Otsch, 2018). Third, he claims that the two are locked in a dynamic conflict since they are polar opposites; hence, the enemy that one must fight is socialism or the 'hampered market' (Puhringer & Otsch, 2018). Finally, von Mises conceptualises the market in an idealised manner; for him the potentiality of a truly unhampered market would inevitably lead to collective prosperity (von Mises, [1929]:1996).

Therefore, populism and technocracy became the two opposing forces of our epoch due to their conceptual similarities. Both are based on a simple dualism defined by the element of conflict between the two sides. In addition, both of them offer the promise of salvation in a period of crisis, and continuously strive to obtain the moral high ground. Finally, they both seek to create a new type of understanding reality in their attempt to secure a broader consensus from society. In essence, they are two contradictory and mutually reinforcing forces. In an article taking analysing the multiple dimensions of the ongoing European crisis Mark Leonard noted that:

On the one hand, the EU has been the ultimate technocratic sphere. [...]By building the EU in an incremental way, the technocrats managed to lower political temperatures in national capitals and find agreement among bureaucrats who were more interested in negotiating deals than grandstanding for the national media. They first created a coal and steel community, then a customs union, then a single market and finally a single currency. But, as the EU matured as a political project, its very success as a bureaucratic phenomenon fuelled a populist backlash at a national level. (Leonard, 2011:2).

⁸ This small excerpt taken from 'Critique of Interventionism' aptly summarises the dichotomy which he utilizes in order to construct his interpretation of reality: 'There is no other choice: government either abstains from limited interference with the market forces, or it assumes total control over production and distribution. Either capitalism or socialism; there is no middle of the road.' (von Mises, [1929]:1996).

Ideally the harmonisation of policy making under neoliberal doctrines would have eliminated the element of conflict from party politics and ensured stability, and yet the exact opposite occurred. Political elites became increasingly unable to achieve outcomes which are desirable by the voters, and convince them that everything was done in their best interests. The binding of mainstream politics by neoliberal economics provided populist parties with the perfect opportunity to increase their electoral support and further damage the credibility of their opponents. Once again the complementarity between technocracy and populism becomes apparent, since their form of discourse is predicated on the critique of a specific political form: party democracy (Offe, 2013).

Indeed, populism and technocracy are correlative and related to one another. Jan-Werner Muller has even gone on to suggest that they are mirror images of each other, writing that: 'Technocracy holds that there is only one correct policy solution; populism holds that there is only one authentic will of the people. [...] In a sense, therefore, both are curiously apolitical. For neither technocrats nor populists is there any need for 'democratic debate'' (Muller, 2016:97)⁹. Both technocracy and populism are opposed to procedural legitimacy. Legitimacy for them emerges from the procedures themselves rather than being: '... imported into politics from outside the political system in the form of some pre-political conception of 'truth' or 'justice.'' (Bickerton & Accetti, 2017:330). Therefore, the legitimacy of a position is not based upon moral principles but rather on the strength of support which can be won for it. Populism places all moral authority to the people and thus challenges all procedural conceptions of legitimacy.

This is evident in the discourse of both parties, since they frequently reify popular sovereignty as the panacea for all the maladies of modern democracy. Political rule is embodied in the popular will and thus supersedes procedural rules. Technocracy removes the 'right policy' from political competition, much in the same way that populism removes the 'the people' from political life. From the perspective of technocrats, only knowledge and expertise are truly legitimate, and as a result the partisanship associated with political

⁹ Vivien Schmidt has proposed a similar characterization regarding the relationships between technocracy and populism: 'This runs the risk of political disaffection, as decisions are seen to be made by the government and bureaucracy, and of demobilization through decreasing citizen engagement in traditional politics, with a concomitant turn to identity politics, issue politics, and even extremist politics. [...]All in all, then, while the EU has *policy without politics*, the member-states end up with *politics without policy* in EU-related areas. And this makes for major problems for national democracy.' (Schmidt, 2006:113-114).

completion must be removed. The appeal of scientific knowledge is the basis of technocratic legitimacy and according to Miguel A. Centeno: 'This claim accompanies an implicit, and often explicit, rejection of 'politics' as inefficient and possibly corruptive.' (Centeno, 1993: 313).

But the complementarity between these antithetical poles is not the sole reason for their primacy. As it was previously mentioned, populism and technocracy displaced traditional party politics since they were better suited for this new type of warfare which began with the global economic meltdown in 2008. What made gave them the advantage in this ever shifting terrain was their ability to continuously adapt to changing circumstances. For example, the repeated failures of the technocrats to revitalise the economies of the European South with their policies should have been the death knell for neoliberalism.

Instead, the same solutions are paradoxically implemented again and again without any variations in their results. Wendy Brown gives an accurate description of neoliberalism's chameleonic nature, which has allowed it to persevere:

Neoliberalism is a distinctive mode of reason, of the production of subjects, a 'conduct of conduct', and a scheme of valuation. It names a historically specific economic and political reaction against Keynesianism and democratic socialism, as well as a more generalized practice of 'economizing' spheres and activities heretofore governed by other tables of value. Yet in its differential instantiations across countries, regions, and sectors, in its various intersections with extant cultures and political traditions, and above all, in its convergences with and uptakes of other discourses and developments, neoliberalism takes diverse shapes and spawns diverse content and normative details, even different idioms. (Brown, 2015:21).

Populism is no different, since it has also been able to persevere despite its chequered electoral history. Populism is capable of articulating interests, identities and needs which have been ignored by the mainstream parties. Their dissemination of frames accounts for the strategic implications which were previously mentioned. Political entrepreneurs engage in

strategic framing in order to persuade the public to adopt their own interpretation of reality¹⁰ (Benford & Snow, 2000).

2.11 Mainstreaming of the Frames of the Populist- Right

A crisis can have a significant impact on the psyche of the public since it disrupts the normalcy of its everyday life. The shock that it produces can be regarded as a traumatic experience. Following Lacan's understanding of the concept of trauma as being both outside the experience of the individual and psychologically debilitating, it can be understood that the trauma created by a crisis can be exploited, due to the need of individuals or groups for security and stability (Kinnvall, 2012:267)¹¹. Extreme ideas usually begin their lives as politically and socially marginalised and as radical counterpropositions to the established cognition. Slowly but steadily they can manage to cross the boundary between what is considered as "unacceptable" and "acceptable", and attempt to reshape these established cognitions and override the frames linked with them (Kallis, 2013:55-56). It must be noted though, that the public will not mindlessly follow this new frames since there are a number of factors that will determine whether it will be influenced by them or not. Frame repetition is an important contributing factor to the overall impact of new frames. Furthermore the effects of frames tend to be weaker if they are competing with opposing frames (Chong and Druckman, 2007:103-126).

Competition between frames is natural for all modern democracies, since political actors actively compete with each other in order to push their own agenda. Finally, frames are based on the strength of the arguments behind them. Frames backed up by weaker arguments will have a less significant impact as opposed to the ones with stronger arguments that involve compelling and convincing facts, or they appeal to emotions be they negative such as anger and despair, or positive such as hope (Matthes, 2012:250). By taking into consideration these

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¹⁰ Meaning is not fixed, since it largely depends on the interpretative filters of each observer. Robert Benford notes that: "Meanings are derived (and transformed) via social interaction and are subject to differential interpretations. Hence meaning is problematic; it does not spring from the object of attention into the actor's head, because objects have no intrinsic meaning. Rather meaning is negotiated, contested, modified, articulated, and rearticulated. In short, meaning is socially constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed." (Benford, 1997:410).

¹¹A collective traumatic experience can also exert influence on the individual, as it may disrupt the sense of one's self. It is a fragmentation of subjectivity that results in the search for a new kind of security, at the personal, interpersonal, societal and national levels (Danieli et al., 2004:1-17). A collective identity may be especially appealing to those that have suffered a traumatic experience, since it provides the much coveted sense of security.

factors, it can be understood how the frames that have been formed by NR and GD managed to have such a significant impact. The initial crisis became the catalyst for the broader acceptance of these frames and a validating factor. In addition the political opponents of GD and NR were repeatedly attacked not only for their inability to resolve the issues brought forth by the crisis, but were also deemed as unworthy to rule since they were characterised as subordinate to the EU. The most critical factor regarding the success and propagation of a frame is its ability to enter the mainstream of social and political constituencies, well beyond the small initial number of their early adopters (Kallis, 2013:56). Demand and supply are also critical for this to become possible, and they may fluctuate according to current events.

Therefore the more relevant and seemingly convincing these new frames are to the perceptions, fears and desires of the public at the current time period, the higher their capacity to have a positive resonance with the public and thus mobilise it, and activate sentiments and attitudes. The creation and acceptance of frames is a dynamic and diachronic process, and thus frames evolve over time (Entman et al., 2009:175-190). Moreover frames are not singular persuasive messages or assertions, according to Jorg Matthes (2012). They always refer to a pattern that involves the interpretation, evaluation and attribution of issues. The fiscal crisis, and later on the refugee crisis that began in 2015, were contributing factors to the gradual process of integration of the frames produced by the populist right into the mainstream. These events added the legitimacy that they needed in order to be more widely embraced by the electorate. Therefore, their discourse regarding national sovereignty and the safeguarding of national culture resonated successfully with current events and their effect upon society as a whole.

Frames based on conflict, morality, and responsibility became mainstream, due the ongoing crises that have plagued the European Union. The acceptance of frames entails changes in judgment, which are engendered by subtle alterations in the definition of judgment or the evaluation of the significance of problems. To put it in another way, in framing the salient attributes of a message, such as its organisation and selection of content, render particular thoughts applicable, resulting in their activation and use in evaluations (Price & Tewksbury, 1997:486).

The ongoing fiscal crisis, the lack of accountability of the EU, terrorist attacks in European countries, and the rise of Islamophobia, have created a volatile mixture that gives validity to the frames of the populist right. In addition, the hollowing of the democratic state resulting

from EU integration increased the demand for these new frames. What can be considered more worrisome, regarding the mainstreaming of these frames, is the potential of a gradually increased demand for even more of them. A notable example is the electoral contraction of NR during 2007, where initially many had claimed that this was the death knell for the party. Yet a number of voters that abandoned NR were attracted to the anti-immigrant discourse that Nicolas Sarkozy had adopted, and thus made the mainstreaming of NR's frames possible (Kallis, 2013:56). Therefore, even if these parties do not manage to govern, the acceptance of their frames is still a victory for them. The mainstreaming of their ideas, prognoses and diagnoses within their discourse can radically alter what is considered as acceptable and at the same time provide them with greater freedom within the political arena in which they compete. However, the contribution of the crisis to the broadening appeal of their frames must also be examined if this analysis is to be complete.

2.12 Conclusion

The study of populism and its connection with crisis is a contested topic within the literature. As this chapter has shown, the 'losers of modernisation' thesis is insufficient in explaining the growing appeal of these parties. The same applies for theories focusing on cultural or institutional grievances, since they examine the growing appeal of populist parties through a singular perspective. Still, all three of them can be utilised together in order to examine how GD and NR have framed the various crises, and how they attribute blame when they diagnose their causes. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the focus of the thesis will be the issue-specific substantive frames. According to Entman these frames can perform at least two of the following functions: 1) define conditions or effects as problematic, 2) identify the causes of a crisis, 3) convey a moral judgment and 4) endorse suitable remedies (Entman, 2004:5).

By conceptualising populism as a discursive style this thesis will examine how GD and NR have utilised all of these functions in order to maximise the demand for their own framing. The analysis of populism as a discursive style is linked to the primary research question of the thesis: What were the differences in the discursive strategies between a successful rightwing populist party and an unsuccessful one? The starting point is the two crises, and how they have generated grievances that are economic (the economic crisis), cultural (migrant crisis) and institutional (the unresponsiveness of national governments). Both parties claim to

speak for the people, and that they defend them against the self-serving elites. This is the core of every populist discourse. According to them, the main cause of the crises is the unresponsiveness of political elites, be they their national governments or the EU. Therefore, all different types of grievances can be unified by diagnosing the cause of the crises as a democratic deficit. The perpetuation of the crises added legitimacy to these claims, and both parties took advantage of the opportunity to make their framing more salient.

Moreover, the fact that these two crises persist allows the two parties to utilise their framing continuously, as opposed to the brief window of opportunity that an economic scandal would create. This directly links to the emphasis effect mentioned in Chapter 1, where political actors utilise a specific set of frames continuously, in order to promote their own interpretation and evaluation of an issue. Furthermore, as was previously mentioned, the majority of analyses on the relationship between populism and crisis regard the latter as an external variable. The previous examination of the literature on populism and crisis has shown that this is an important gap, and the thesis seeks to address it through the second research question: How does a crisis affect the type of populism that is being supplied by right-wing parties? Populism is not created through the crisis, and the presence of a crisis does not automatically equate to a greater salience for the frames of populist parties. Therefore, this thesis will examine how GD and NR try to enhance the salience of their populist frames within the context of the crisis. The next chapter will focus on the analytical and methodological framework chosen for this specific task, as well as the rationale behind the choice of the two case studies and the type of data collected.

Chapter 3: Analytical and Methodological Framework

3.1 Introduction

The focus of this chapter will be the analytical framework of the thesis, the choice of the two case studies, the process of data collection and finally the methodologies utilised for the interpretation of the data. The starting point is the two parties that will be compared and contrasted regarding their discourse on systemic failures and crises. Both of them are populist right-wing parties, and gained a significant amount of support with the onset of the 2008 sovereign debt crisis. However, while NR grew to become the main opposition party in France, GD stagnated and eventually lost the majority of its electoral support.

Therefore, this thesis will attempt to answer the following research questions:

- 1. What were the differences in the discursive strategies between a successful right-wing populist party and an unsuccessful one?
- 2. How does a crisis affect the type of populism that is being supplied by right-wing populist parties?

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the majority of studies on populism ignore how supply may influence demand. Furthermore, while the literature on the supply side is vast it mostly focuses on measuring the degrees of populism within the discourse of political actors (Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018:70). Most importantly, the literature has not examined the interplay between demand and supply during periods of crisis. Crises are moments of danger and opportunity, and as such possess both subjective and objective aspects (Jessop, 2015:485). Objectively they occur when previous social relations cannot be reproduced in the way that they used to. Subjectively they are moments of indeterminacy, where decisive action can either repair these relations or lead to some radical innovation (Jessop, 2015:485).

The process of making sense of a crisis involves the narration of its causes, identifying its implications and consequences, and examining possible solutions (Castelli Gattinara & Zamponi, 2020:627). As a result, crises become the battleground upon which political actors compete for the discursive and epistemic construction of what they entail and what short of remedial actions must be taken (Castelli Gattinara & Zamponi, 2020:627). This chapter will showcase the analytical framework and methodologies utilised in the thesis, with the purpose

of examining how the two case studies framed the crises that affected their respective countries.

The first two sections in the chapter will set up the analytical framework on crisis framing as well as the key frames that the two parties utilise within their discourse. The next section outlines the rationale behind the selection of the two case studies in relation to the two research questions. The chapter then progresses by outlining the two methodologies that have been chosen for the analysis of the data and how they are suited for answering the two research questions. Both content and a more streamlined version of discourse analysis have been employed for this purpose, and these parts will examine how the two can be employed synergistically in order to map out the crisis discourse of the two case studies. These methodological sections are followed by the data collection process for the two case studies as well as the reasoning behind it. The final section presents the coding process for the content analysis and how the main frames emerged via the application of an inductive thematic analysis.

3.2 Framing the Crises

A crisis offers a break in hegemonic discourses and allows counter-discourses (like populism to emerge (Stavrakakis, 2005). Populism therefore, is not about issues such as immigration, multiculturalism, or even the economy, but rather about the perceived degeneration of representative democracy (Akkerman, 2003). Within this chaos the citizens are in search for a semblance of stability and a sense of belonging. This is where populist parties step in and provide this much sought after stability through their interpretative simplifications.

Public deliberation is not a harmonious process but an ideological contest and political struggle over the right to define and shape issues, as well as the discourse surrounding them (Pan & Kosicki, 2001:35). According to William A. Gamson framing is a discursive process of strategic actors which utilise the symbolic resources available to them, to take part in collective sense making about important issues (1996). Essentially, to participate is to frame since the public is transformed from a mere spectator to an actor by developing their own interpretations of events, and incorporating them to their knowledge storage.

In turn, this knowledge can be activated and utilised in judging the most appropriate courses of action on any given matter. Price and Tewksbury have applied the associative network model of memory structure and related concepts in order to better define how this process takes place. They have noted that framing effects result from the salient attributes of a message, and can alter the patterns of knowledge activation, and by formulating public choices in different terms they can affect audience judgments of 'issue importance or approval of public actors' (Price and Tewksbury, 1997:184)¹².

Political debate unfolds through the concentrated meaning contained within a frame, and can spur forth collective action and determine political alignment (Snow & Benford, 1988). In order for political actors to be able to 'mould' the perceptions of the public, they must carefully strategise about which frames they should sponsor and choosing the ones which will achieve the greatest degree of cultural resonance. The entire process can be tricky, since extra care must be taken in order to ensure that the public will fully feel the sense of urgency associated with a crisis, but despair should never fully set in. Instead, negative sentiments must be successfully harnessed in order to galvanise the public, and provide it with a sense of hope.

The disruption of normalcy and expectations open up two types of spaces for actors both inside and outside of government. First and foremost, crises can be utilised as political weapons. The government is always challenged to rise to the occasion and show that it can muster an effective response (Hart & Tindall, 2009). At the same time, the government might face the scrutiny of the public, political actors and the media regarding its role in the occurrence of the crisis. Crises challenge political and non-political actors to formulate persuasive narratives about: '...what is happening and what is at stake, why it is happening, how they have acted in the lead-up to the present crisis and how they propose we should deal with and learn from the crisis moving forward.' (Hart & Tindall, 2009:22).

Second, crises may become a contributing factor to the de-institutionalisation of policy beliefs and practices which were previously taken for granted (Boin & Hart, 2003). Critical

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¹² The analysis of framing by Price and Tewksbury is mainly focused on the media system. However, political actors themselves engage in this process of framing where they attempt to affect the evaluations of the public, in order to influence that certain aspects of an issue will come to mind rather than others.

reconsideration of current policies and the advancement of more radical reform proposals (such as the ones espoused by the parties of the populist right) are dependent on how severe a crisis seems, and how much have current policies contributed to it. Thus, the critics of the status quo are the ones who benefit the most from crises.

Since the financial and migrant crises are socio-political in nature they create a sense of uncertainty regarding the public's expectations on security, prosperity and predictability (Hart & Tindall, 2009). Uncertainty accompanies each crisis, which pertains to the causes and consequences of the developing threat. In addition, uncertainty can easily cloud the judgment of the public since they are still reeling from the initial shock. Expert systems such as politics are burdened with combating uncertainty and finding a solution. Past research has shown that when critical contingencies unfold the political system must provide answers to the following questions: 1) How bad is the situation? 2) How did it occur? 3) Who should be held accountable? 4) What changes must be implemented to the current policies and practices in order to deal with it? (Hart & Tindall, 2009:9).

The first three questions are the most critical ones since someone can make sense out of the chaos which characterises a crisis by answering them. Simply put, if the cause is identified then remedial actions can be taken so that the crisis can be resolved. The next step is for political actors to propose solutions and serves two purposes. First, the existence of solution eliminates the all-consuming feeling of fear, and provides a glimmer of hope. Second, the solutions proposed allow political actors to further differentiate themselves from their opponents, and to attribute the blame to them. As it will be shown in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, both parties employ the same modus operandi when framing the different major crises, and other minor problems within their respective countries.

Crises of any type can be transformed into opportunities by political actors belonging to the opposition, since their type framing allows them to make specific choices from a repertoire of interpretations (Mooney & Hunt, 1996:178). Frames define the boundaries of the discourse concerning an issue, and also categorise the relevant actors based on an established scheme (Pan & Kosicki, 2001:41). As a result, language is utilised for renegotiating the boundaries of this scheme, as well as the relative degrees extendibility and openness of various frames (Snow et al., 1986). The entire process of framing is not linear but rather multifaceted, since

the stimulus provided by political actors is not sufficient in itself in order to reshape perception.

Benford and Snow have identified three key factors which affect the mobilising potency of proffered framings:

Does the framing strike a responsive chord with those individuals for whom it is intended? To what extent does it inform understanding of events and experiences within the world of potential constituents? Is it relevant to their life situations? There appear to be three interrelated but analytically distinct constraints that bear upon this relevancy issue: 1) empirical credibility, 2) experiential commensurability, and 3) narrative fidelity. (Snow & Benford, 1988:207-208).

The first standard is the fit between the framing and events in the world. In the case of the crisis the lowering of living standards and the dismantling of the welfare state indubitably show that neoliberal policies have aggravated the effects of the economic crisis. The next standard associated with competing frames is the factors which will determine whether a set of claims will be found as more credible than the others (Snow & Benford, 1988). This choice is dependent on the interpretive filter through which evidence is filtered.

Personal experience is the most important filter, and as a result the proposed explanations and solutions must harmonise with it. If the framing is too distant or abstract from these experiences, then it will fail to positively resonate with the public. The experiences of the Greek citizens were compatible with the explanations provided by GD as to who is responsible for the economic crisis. The decades of clientelist politics, coupled with the scandals which frequently plagued Greece's political system made the framing of GD all the more impactful. Similarly in France, the November 2015 Paris attacks led to increased media attention and exposure for NR due to its strong anti-immigrant stance.

The final standard is the degree to which proffered framings can resonate with the artefacts included within the public's cultural heritage, and are utilised to make sense of the immediate

present ¹³(Snow & Benford 1988). When this correlation occurs the frames obtain the aforementioned narrative fidelity. Ideological aspects can be both inherent and derived, and they can also synergise with each other. This means that certain experiences such as a crisis or a collective trauma could potentially form into a new ideological aspect, or they could also fuse with an old one and thus create a new type of understanding of the present. However, it is important to delve deeper into the societal aspects which have allowed the populist-right frames to become more broadly accepted. The impact of a frame is also dependent upon the receivers, since they will not accept information in a passive manner.

3.3 Rules of Engagement

Political actors set the parameters and the points of reference which allow the citizenry to construe meaning out of complex events. As it was previously mentioned, this is a battle for dominance between different narratives. Crises generate emotions of insecurity and anger, and also questions about responsibility. A process of reconstruction is needed in situations such as these, as everybody tries to understand how such events came to pass. This is a two part process which entails: 1) Discovering the truth of what happened, and 2) The allocation of responsibility (Brandstrom & Kuipers, 2003:279).

According to Brandstrom and Kuipers the two are closely intertwined since:

...when incidents are (made) big enough to arouse collective stress, some sort of catharsis is required to alleviate it. Accountability and blame assignment affect the political realm if during the reconstruction process the incident is recast as the product of failures of public officials or agencies. This involves specific temporal, spatial and causal representations of the problem, which highlight the responsibility of some and minimize the responsibility of other (f)actors. (Brandstrom & Kuipers, 2003: 279-280).

In the eventuality of a crisis, frames define problems and determine the costs and benefits of an agent's actions. In addition, they diagnose causes as the framework developed by Hart and

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¹³ This is similar to what Alvin Gouldner termed as 'domain assumptions'. For Gouldner these are the beliefs associated with a single domain and more specifically: "... they are, in effect, the metaphysics of a domain. [...] Domain assumptions are the things attributed to all members of a domain; in part they are shaped by the thinker's world hypotheses and, in turn, they shape his deliberately wrought theories. They are an aspect of the larger culture that is most intimately related to the postulations of theory." (Gouldner, 1970:31).

Tindall showed. Most importantly, they make moral judgements and offer remedies (Entman, 1993). The last two functions are the most crucial ones, since they serve as the point of differentiation between a party and its rivals. In the literature review chapter, the importance of moral juxtapositions was examined as one of the key attribute of populist discourses. The key element which defines all these articulations, irrespective of cultural background or placement in the political spectrum, is division or more aptly put Manichean dualisms.

Since the core of populism is the division between 'the people' and 'the elite', the attribution of blame is not sufficient in itself. These parties need to present themselves as morally superior in order to strengthen their connection with the electorate. This is attributable to the fact that crises pose two interrelated sets of challenges for policy makers and political parties, according to Hindmoor and McConnell (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2015). The first is associated with choosing the appropriate policy tools which will eventually eliminate a crisis. The second one is symbolic in nature, since political actors need to make sense out of rapidly evolving events, under extreme uncertainty and often facing an overload of information, in order to be able to dominate political discourse (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2015)¹⁴.

Producing an authoritative account of the crisis will eventually determine whether the public will support the solutions proposed by political actors. Similar to how news are presented, policy failures are the creations of the language utilised for their depiction (Edelman, 1988:31). The way in which policies and policy-makers are evaluated within the political arena is important, since the social consequences matter less than their political construction (Stone, 1997). Both NR and GD are highly adversarial in the way which they frame crises and policy failures. This is attributable to the fact that a crisis is essentially a high-stakes situation, which generates the potential for vote maximisation (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2015). In addition, none of these parties wishes to form any kind of cooperation with their political adversaries, and as it will be shown in the subsequent chapters their attacks are unceasing. The following table is incorporates the key elements of right-wing populist

¹⁴ Hindmoor and McConnell stress the importance of the second challenge in earning the electorate's trust and support by stating: 'If those in positions of power and authority are not able to convince citizens, media, stakeholders and others through public communication strategies that they are in control, they become vulnerable to impressions of crisis mismanagement, including neglect, delay, misjudgment and insensitivity.' (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2015:18).

discourse by utilising a typology developed by Hindmoor and McConnell as well as the other authors that have been cited in the chapter:

Table 3.1 Main right-wing populist narratives in relation to crisis.

1. Causes	The parties accuse their political opponents of being a major causal factor of the crisis. Blame is also relegated to the EU, the global financial system, and ethnic minorities. Their blame attribution contains strong nationalist elements.
2. Motivations	The parties accuse their political opponents of being corrupt and acting on their own self-interest.
3. Severity	The parties present the situation as extremely severe.
4. Exploitation	The parties connect the crisis to the issue of popular sovereignty by utilising the Manichean dualism of 'the people' versus 'the elite'.
5. Government Response	The parties argue that government policies are aggravating the crisis.
6. Democratic Representation	The parties claim that the government is ignoring the people. They thus link the crisis to a broader crisis of representation.

As the analysis of the finer points of the parties' discourse progresses in subsequent chapters, it will be shown that for the most part the pattern followed is the classic adversarial one. However, there are certain points of differentiation which must be noted and are linked with the parties' placement in the political spectrum. First, the ills of policy making areas such as the economy are evenly attributed between the government and other external factors, such as the EU and the financial markets. Both parties are first and foremost ultranationalist, and as such they would not miss the opportunity to address the issue of national sovereignty, be it in economic matters (e.g austerity policies imposed by the EU) or the safeguarding of national borders. The second point of differentiation is associated with the attribution of blame at the level of national party politics. The approach of both parties could be characterised as war against all, since their attacks are not solely aimed at the government but to other parties as well. There are two reasons behind this constant aggression: 1) the parties do not wish to dilute their carefully constructed image of saviours. Therefore, they must remain steadfast in their beliefs and values. 2) Both parties are categorised as 'undesirable' regarding their coalition potential.

As a result, these parties must capture a part of the electoral market in order to ensure their continued survival. A crisis offers the opportunity to do so due to its magnitude. Policy failures will go unnoticed most of the times under normal circumstances. Moreover the politicisation of such failures is not an automatic process, meaning that dissident voices must properly dramatise them. Being a loser in the political arena is not necessarily a *coup de grace* for parties that espouse more radical views. A critical juncture which leads to widespread dissatisfaction and suffering: '...provides critics of existing policies or incumbent power-holders with a powerful signal and a symbol that 'something is rotten'. This can unleash an expanding wave of criticism, which may result in a thorough delegitimisation of key programmes, individuals and organisations.' (Brandstrom & Kuipers, 2003: 281).

There are multiple layers of meaning within political discourse, which in terms of failures or crises are related to their severity, their causes and blame attribution (Bovens & Hart, 1996). Therefore, the most crucial battle to be won is the one that will mould the electorate's perception of the crisis¹⁵. In addition, if issues are successfully linked with substantive values associated with important and all-encompassing social themes such as justice and democracy, the framing process and the political debate will be heightened (Nelkin, 1975). Political conflict is not solely restricted to material conditions and choices but also what is legitimate and right since: 'Ideas are the very stuff of politics.' (Stone, 1997:36).

Policy failures and crises are linked with other concepts such as morality, democracy and justice. Concepts such as these are vague in nature, especially in terms of how each individual conceptualises them. However, this vagueness ultimately serves as the binding agent for a plethora of grievances and most importantly: perceptions. Since policy and decision making processes are practically on auto-pilot, issues regarding sovereignty and democratic participation inevitably rise. The representation of issues is strategically designed to attract support towards one side and form alliances (Stone, 1997). Thus, there is a strong affinity between ideas and alliances.

¹⁵ Deborah Stone has noted that most models examining the policy making process, ignore one crucial component: the struggle over ideas. As she notes: 'Ideas are a medium of exchange and a mode of influence even more powerful than money and votes and guns. Shared meanings motivate people to action and meld individual striving into collective action. All political conflict revolves around ideas. Policy making, in turn, is a constant struggle over the criteria for classification, the boundaries of categories, and the definition of ideals that guide the way people behave.' (Stone, 1997:13).

Explanations such as chance or misfortune are no longer satisfactory in modern societies which are characterised by risk, due to the increased interconnectivity of globalisation. Identifying the causes of a crisis and attributing blame is a process which involves careful examination and going back in time. Placing the crisis in a broader time perspective is what allows political actors and experts to zoom in on significant underlying causes (Brandstrom & Kuipers, 2003). And the further someone goes back in time, the higher they will go up the policy making ladder (Bovens & Hart, 1996). If a catastrophic failure is presented as a manifestation of endemic problems, which have persisted for a great amount of time, blame attribution and the eventual fallout become more severe. The entire system of governance may become permanently tarnished and trust irreparably damaged.

Severe crises are different from minor scandals due to their causes and impact. In the case of a scandal, an individual can be identified as a 'rotten apple' and face the repercussions for their actions. A crisis is a systemic shock, since it affects the very foundations of trust which are essential for the health of a democratic state. It is not about a corrupt individual or a group of them, but rather about the foundations of the state itself. Therefore the attribution of blame becomes dispersed instead of concentrated. This dispersion will irreversibly mar the image and question the make-up of the entire governance system (Brandstrom & Kuipers, 2003).

If a problem is solely attributable to an individual or a group in a relatively small time frame then a 'lighting rod' solution might be applied. But, if the origins of the problem are complex and include past commitments, adjacent policy areas and a plethora of actors across a vast time frame, quick fixes become obviated. This temporal aspect in identifying the causes of a crisis and attributing blame will be a key component of this thesis. The framing of the parties regarding specific policy failures, the crises, their overall impact and their causes, will be analysed as events unfold and as other factors come into play such as the elections.

3.4 Case Selection

The selection of cases is the most fundamental task for any researcher, since along with the selection of the cases one sets an agenda for studying them. According to Robert Yin the need for case studies stems from the need to understand complex societal phenomena because: '... the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful

characteristics of real-life events.' (Yin, 2009: 4). However, this can be a challenging endeavour since in these types of analyses the cases chosen must undertake a daunting task: to provide insight into a causal relationship across a larger population of cases (Gerring, 2007:86).

Both the cases selected are right-wing populist parties. The choice of the two parties may indeed seem puzzling at first sight. As it was previously mentioned, GD's success was extremely brief as opposed to its French counterpart. This failure makes GD the best possible choice to draw comparisons with the most electorally successful right- wing populist party. One of the most common criticisms on case studies is sample bias, and its sources and impact have been debated at length by a multitude of academics (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994; Collier & Mahoney, 1996; Rohlfing, 2008). Nevertheless, a completely random sample would be equally problematic if the choices were made without any prior stratification (Seawright & Gerring, 2008:295).

It is for this very reason that the selection of cases must be purposive to an extent. While it is true that purposive methods cannot fully overcome the intrinsic element of unreliability when generalising from small samples, they can still make an important contribution to the inferential process since they enable the selection of the most appropriate cases (Seawright & Gerring, 2008:295). But what makes NR and GD the most appropriate cases in analysing the discourse of right- wing populist parties? This question can be answered through the method of selection for these two cases, which is the most-similar one. This method employs a minimum of two cases, and in its purest form the chosen pair is similar in all respects except the variable(s) of interest (Gerring, 2007). The variable of interest here is the way that these two parties frame the various crises. In addition, their respective electoral fortunes serve as another important point of differentiation between them.

The two parties in this thesis exemplify the most-similar case selection method as it has been defined by John Gerring: 'Often, fruitful analysis begins with an apparent anomaly: two cases are apparently quite similar, and yet demonstrate surprisingly different outcomes. The hope is that intensive study of these cases will reveal one—or at most several—factors that differ across these cases.' (Gerring, 2007:668). The difference in their respective framing of crises is the most significant reason behind the methodology selected for this thesis. One of the main criticisms towards case studies is that they provide little basis for scientific generalisation (Yin, 2009). However, case studies can be utilised in order to test theoretical

propositions, and in Robert Yin's own words: '... case studies [...] are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study [...] does not represent a 'sample', and in doing a case study, your goal will be to generalize theories (analytical generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).' (Yin, 2009:10).

Moreover, case studies are explanatory in nature, and are better suited in answering 'how' and 'why' questions since they: '... deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence.' (Yin, 2009:9). This is the main reason that the data collected include two election periods for each case. By incorporating the election periods within the dataset the analysis will be able to showcase if the discourse of these parties changes according to specific circumstances, or if it remains the same. Therefore, the analysis of their style of discourse and the frequency of the frame utilisation will serve to answer the 'how' question, whereas the month- by- month analysis and visualisation will aim to answer the 'why' question. Case studies facilitate the study of over-time data and how the temporal intersection or duration of variables is decisive for them according to James Mahoney (Mahoney, 2007). In a similar vein, Robert Yin makes a specific mention to this particular strength of case studies, since they allow the researcher to trace events over time (Yin, 2009).

Therefore, the choice and analysis of the data is not a mere snapshot of specific event such as an election, or the onset of a crisis (e.g the onset of the refugee crisis during the summer of 2015). Instead, the research will focus on a four- year period that does not only include the elections, but also how the months before and after them, in order to showcase how the salience of the frames changes over time. The starting point for the analysis is that populism will be defined as a discursive style rather than an ideology, as it was stated in the Chapter 2. The reasoning behind this choice is that the reference to the people can hardly be defined as an ideology, or some type of movement (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007:322). Therefore, populism will be defined in accordance with Margaret Canovan's 'politicians' populism' (Canovan, 1981). From this starting point, the research will proceed to analyse the specific elements of this style of communication during periods of crisis. The next section will develop how the data were chosen for this specific task.

3.5 Content Analysis

Content analysis is the methodology chosen for this specific research. It can be both quantitative and qualitative, and both approaches will be utilised for analysing the data. Content analysis does not focus on physical events, but rather on communicative materials which are: '... created to be seen, read, interpreted, and acted on for their meanings, and must therefore be analysed with such uses in mind. Analysing texts in the contexts of their uses distinguishes content analysis from other methods of inquiry.' (Krippendorff, 2004: xiii).

Texts utilised in content analyses are fundamentally different from data used normally in qualitative research. The reason behind this is the fact that researchers have no control over producing the data as they would if they were conducting interviews for example. Krippendorff states that:

Most content analyses start with data that are not intended to be analysed to answer specific research questions. They are texts in the sense that they are meant to be read, interpreted, and understood by people other than the analysts. Readers may decompose what they read into meaningful units, recognise compelling structures, rearticulate their understandings sequentially or holistically, and act on them sensibly. (Krippendorff, 2004:30).

Content analysis primarily deals with the quantitative aspect of the manifest content of communication (Berelson, 1952:18). However, this does not mean that the qualitative aspect should be ignored, since it could potentially leave the analysis incomplete. Every text contains meaning, which is often established through relationships or implicature. Therefore, a purely quantitative content analysis would be unable to fully examine how meaning is constructed by the two parties. Writers or speakers of texts intend for them to convey meaning related to their attitude and purpose (White & Marsh, 2006:28).

Since the focus of the thesis is the framing of crises, and systemic failures by right-wing populist parties, it is important to outline how the qualitative aspect will be handled. The four questions on crisis management outlined by Hart and Tindall previously in the chapter will make the breaking down of the parties' discourse to its individual components possible: 1) How bad is the situation? 2) How did it occur? 3) Who or what is to be held responsible for

it? 4) What if any changes to our current ideas, policies and practices are required to deal with it? (Hart & Tindall, 2009:9).

First, the severity of the current situation must be gauged. This question is linked with how the two parties frame the crises in terms of their impact. The second part is the identification of the causes behind the crisis. After this comes the most crucial question: who should be held accountable for the current predicament? This is the part where blame is attributed, and also forms the division between 'the people' and the 'elite'. Finally, the political actors need to propose some solutions to end the crises. The final part allows them to further showcase the ineptitude of their political opponents if the solutions they proposed are not working.

Going back to defining populism as a style of discourse, it is important to note that it possesses both thin and thick aspects. The thin aspect is essentially the appeal and identification with 'the people', and the claim that populist leaders and parties speak in their name (Taggart, 2000). This thinness, or vagueness, makes the Manichean dualism of populist discourse a master frame (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007:322). This simple division can be utilised in order to unify a multitude of issues. By directly referring to the electorate:

...a populist communication style stresses the sovereignty of the people and the popular will. Political actors speak about the people all the time. [...]By referring to the people, a political actor claims that he or she cares about the people's concerns, that he or she primarily wants to defend the interests of the people, that he or she is not alienated from the public but knows what the people really want. (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007:323).

In this thin conceptualisation populism has no political colour, and is completely stripped from all pejorative and authoritarian connotations. It is nothing more than a communication strategy to mobilise support and reach out to the constituency. This thin definition was employed as an operational device for the coding of the data, and as a pre-selector for instances of thick populism¹⁶. When political actors utilise the division between 'the people'

textbook example of populism.

¹⁶ The structure of the coding was inspired by the methodology utilised in an article by Jan Jagers and Stefan Walgrave. In this article the authors looked at the discourse of political parties in Belgium, including Vlaams Belang. The empirical study showcased that Vlaams Belang behaved quite differently from the other parties in terms of discourse, and its messages can be considered as a

and 'the elite', and link this concept with crises and systemic failures, the transformation from thin to thick populism becomes possible.

3.6 The Blended Approach

The thesis utilises a blended approach for the analysis of the data and to complement the quantitative methodological component. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the blended approach utilises the basic principles of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis in conjunction with framing. The limitations of the former is what motivates the choice to utilise the two methodologies in tandem. A common criticism of studies utilising Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is the lack of rigour. According to Widdowson, the lack of impartiality from researchers when employing CDA is especially problematic (1998:146-148). Widdowson's criticisms stem from the fact that CDA analyses focus on specific lexical items or grammatical features while ignoring others (1998:146). According to him, it would be impossible to objectively discern which linguistic features take on particular saliency over others if language is so 'ideologically saturated' (1998:146-147).

Sample size is also another point of criticism towards CDA. Stubbs has noted that there is very little discussion on whether it is adequate to restrict the analysis to short fragment of data, if the sample is representative and how the data should be sampled (1997: 7). It should be noted, that Stubbs is not entirely hostile towards CDA, but his main argument is that the methods that are being utilised are not sound enough to justify the results that are obtained (1997:10). In a similar vein, Verschueren has criticised the tendency of CDA analyses to ignore important aspects of text that do not fit the interpretive framework, and characterises their finding as a 'product of conviction rather than the result of a careful step-by-step analysis that reflexively questions its own observations and conclusions' (2001:65). However, choosing and analysing a sufficiently large sample via CDA, for both case studies, would prove quite a laborious process, since the thesis seeks to examine their respective discourses over a four-year period. It is for this reason that the blended approach has been chosen which employs a stripped down version of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis and framing.

It is imperative to first present the elements of the two analytical approaches, before unifying them into a coherent whole. As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, political actors strategically employ their framing, and try to dominate the discursive terrain, by crafting persuasive and authoritative accounts on the causes and solutions of crises. While the public maintains a degree of cognitive autonomy, it can be affected in a significant way by framing, when the public is presented with ambiguous issues (J. Phillips, 2019:154). Furthermore, a crisis is not a neutral phenomenon, and as a result its causes, and especially the attribution of blame, are open to be framed by political actors, as was mentioned in Chapter 1. As Kuypers has noted, frames are powerful since they induce the public to filter its perceptions of the world in a very specific way, essentially raising the salience of certain aspects of reality over others (2009:181).

Likewise, Gamson has noted that events remain neutral until they are framed, and argues that they: 'take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or storyline that organises them and gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasise while ignoring others.' (1989:157). Therefore, framing analysis as a method is invaluable in identifying and critically examining which aspects of a particular issue are highlighted, de-emphasised or completely ignored (Kuypers, 2010:301). Moreover, the various frames compete with each other until one of them becomes dominant. These framing contests take place when political actors attempt to strategically align their frames with the cognitive predispositions of the public, in such a way that they can promote their own positions on a given issue (Kaplan, 2008:730). As a result, framing contests are a significant element when analysing instances of agenda setting and agenda extension (J. Phillips, 2019:155).

Framing analyses can be employed for both quantitative and qualitative ways (eg. Bigl, 2017; Famulari, 2020; Dekker & Scholten, 2017). However, Kuypers has noted that it is methodologically sensible to study instances of framing in relation to the impact of mediated communication- especially via a comparative perspective (2009:182). Therefore, by comparing the different framing strategies employed by the two case-studies to address the crises, the differences and similarities of these strategies, and their significance can be identified and critically analysed. The comparison of the two case-studies begins with a crucial function that frames perform: the creation of boundaries. Framing does not only highlight certain aspects of an issue, but it also sets the boundaries within which the issue can be discussed (Pan & Kosicki, 2001:41-42).

The creation of boundaries assists in the development of a discursive community, since it includes the way in which an issue is discussed, the terms that are being used, and what

positions and perspectives are accepted (J. Phillips, 2019:157). Therefore, the creation of this discursive community entails the exclusion of incompatible narratives along with social and political actors. The discursive community develops and reproduces itself through the continuous engagement with an issue (J. Phillips, 2019:157). The creation of this discursive community, along with the boundaries around it, are the two elements that make the combination of framing and the Essex School of Discourse analysis possible. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, the discourse of the two case studies is based on the principle of exclusion. Moreover, their unique blend of populist and nationalist elements generates an overlap between the vertical and horizontal axes of exclusion. As a result, the community that they create not only involves the exclusion of political elites (vertical axis), but also immigrants (horizontal axis).

It is here that discourse analysis comes into play, since its focal point is the creation of meaning and how it is dependent on '... socially constructed and contingent relations of articulation.' (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017:305). Discourses are social and political constructions that establish meaningful relations between objects and agents, and also allow the aforementioned social agents to identify with subject positions (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000:3). As a result, the meaning of what is being articulated can radically change (Laclau & Mouffe, [1985] (2001):113-114). The two axes of exclusion are not only utilised in the creation of boundaries (identifying the enemies of 'the people'), but also during the framing of the crises' causes and attributions of accountability. As previously mentioned, a crisis is not an entirely neutral phenomenon, and can be framed by political actors with the prospects of damaging their opponents' credibility, and maximising their electoral support. Therefore, the blended approach employed in the thesis seeks to map out how the two case-studies strategically employ their discourses in order to achieve both goals in the crises' context.

Both the Laclauian discourse analysis (Laclau & Mouffe, [1985] (2001); Howarth et al., 2000) and framing (Snow & Benford, 1988; Gamson, 1992) seek to examine the discursive strategies employed by political actors and social movements. But how can the two be combined into a coherent whole? The starting point is the primary function of frames: to draw attention on certain aspects of a given issue while ignoring the rest (Johnston, 2002:64). Figure 3.1 maps out the entirety of core framing tasks as they have been put forward by Benford and Snow.

Table 3.2: Core Framing Tasks

Diagnosis	Prognosis	Motivation
 Problem Definition 	 Solutions 	 Severity
 Cause Identification 	 Denial of other 	 Urgency
 Blame Attribution 	Solutions	 Efficacy
	 Targets of Influence 	 Propriety

(Source: Adapted from Juhan Saharov, 2021:189)

As previously mentioned, the Essex School of Discourse Analysis is primarily focused not with facts but rather with their 'conditions of possibility' (Laclau, 1993:541). This does not mean that objects cannot exist outside of a discourse, but rather that they obtain meaning through discourse. In addition, discourses have a hegemonic character. For Laclau, hegemony is the relation by which a particular content becomes the signifier of the 'absent communitarian fullness' (Laclau, 1996:43). As mentioned in Chapter 1, signifiers can be either positive or negative. For example, calls for the reclamation of popular sovereignty against the directives of the EU can be considered as a positive signifier. In other words, these signifiers can be utilised to signify the absence of positive values in a society. Moreover, these signifiers can act as nodal points for other signifiers.

Nodal points can sustain the identity of a discourse through the construction of 'a knot of definitive meanings' (Torfing, 1999:98). Discourse is formed by partially fixating meaning around certain nodal points (Laclau & Mouffe, [1985] (2001):112). These nodal points are linguistic signs of extreme importance since other linguistic signs are connected to them and acquire their meaning, much in the same way that the knots in fishing nets function (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002:26). In order to properly grasp how discourse generates meaning it is important to not only look at these individual elements but also how these elements are connected (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017:306). Furthermore, the nodal points allow the chains of equivalence to be formed around them, as mentioned in Chapter 1. As a result, different types of grievances can be unified through a process of simplification.

For example, the large influx of immigrants has been linked to the nodal points of national sovereignty and democratic representation by both case-studies, since they have often framed the enforced immigrant quotas as undemocratic. What is important to note here, is that a major crisis will generate a rupture with a previous hegemonic discourse, as mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2. The rupture provides an opening for new narratives to enter the discursive

field, and offer a recipe to heal it. Therefore, a political struggle will begin on how to diagnose and solve the crisis (Torfing, 2005:16). As it can be observed, there is significant degree of compatibility between the Essex School of Discourse Analysis and crisis framing. Signifiers and nodal points perform the same function as frames, since they not only condense available information, by simplifying it and excluding other narratives, but also create boundaries of exclusion.

The compatibility between the two allows for a stripped down version of discourse analysis to be employed for the thesis. The chosen excerpts for each case study will be examined based on the three previously identified framing functions: 1) diagnosis, 2) prognosis, 3) motivation. These three functions can easily be further broken down to the four questions that political elites are called to answer during crises: 1) severity, 2) causes, 3) blame attribution, 4) solutions. By using these four questions as a foundation, the basic concepts of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis can be employed in order to further analyse how the two case studies answer each of these questions. The Table below is a combination of the literature on framing, crisis management and the Essex School of Discourse Analysis, and outlines how the blended approach will be employed in analysing the excerpts from each case study.

Table 3.3: Schema for the Analysis of the two Case Studies' Discourse

Re-	articulation of Signifiers (Fram	ing)
Diagnosis	Prognosis	Motivation/Facilitating Conditions
\prod		\prod
What are the causes for the crisis?Who should be held accountable?	 What changes in policy must be implemented? Are the policies implemented by the government effective? 	 How bad is the situation? Is the situation improving or getting worse?
Right-Wing Populis	st Discourse (Blend of Populis	m and Nationalism)
\prod		

- EU interventionism.
- Illegal immigrants.
- National elites.
- Global capitalist system.
- Other supranational organisations (IMF, NATO).
- Exclusionary policies such as stricter border controls or the expulsion of immigrants.
- Reclamation of national sovereignty.
- A more direct form of democracy.
- Protectionism/Self-Sufficiency.

- Presenting the situation as dire and invoking a sense of urgency.
- The situation is getting worse.
- Representative democracy is faltering due to the unresponsiveness of the elites.
- Policy design and implementation is dictated by nonelected bodies for their personal benefit.

The above schema is not exhaustive, but it incorporates the key elements of right-wing populist discourses as they have been identified in Chapters 1 and 2. The substantive differences between the two case-studies' discourses will be explored in the subsequent empirical chapters. Each chosen excerpt will be analysed based on whether all three framing functions are present, and afterwards the finer points of their discursive strategies will be examined. The latter part of the analysis will be achieved by analysing the excerpts based on the key elements of right-wing populist discourses, as they have been outlined in the second half of Table 3.3. This extra step in the analysis will allow for a more nuanced comparison of the two case studies, along with the unique socio-political, historical and economic factors that have shaped their discursive strategies.

As previously mentioned, the continued relevance and survivability of populism can be attributed to its adaptability. The thesis seeks to make a contribution to the literature examining the characteristics of populism as a discourse, by comparing and contrasting the discursive strategies that the two case-studies have employed in response to their unique socio-political and economic crisis context. By comparing and contrasting the two, the points of convergence, and divergence, within their respective discourses will be identified. As a result the thesis will not only compare the differences in the discursive strategy between an

electorally successful right-wing populist party and an unsuccessful one; but will also map out the core characteristics of crisis framing by right-wing populist parties.

3.7 Data Collection

It is important to mention that a case study is not a method but a research strategy (Titscher et al., 2000), or to put it differently: '...[c]ase study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied. By whatever methods, we choose to study the case.' (Stake, 2000: 435). The same principle applies to the choice of data for the case study, since the analysis will be structured around them. Moreover, the development of a solid theoretical framework is vital not only for the purpose of this thesis, but for case studies in general (Yin, 2009:28-29). The theoretical framework does not only facilitate the collection of the data, but it can also assist in the generalisation of the case study results. In the case of data collected for content and discourse analysis, the data communicate; they convey a message from a sender to a receiver (White & Marsh, 2006). Krippendorff has expanded this definition of textual data to include '... other meaningful matter.' (Krippendorff, 2004:18). This last part is extremely significant, since the focus of this thesis is the way that the two case studies frame crises in relation to their causes and how to end them.

But what are the constitutive characteristics of populist discourses? The article 'Populism as a political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' in Belgium' provided a triad of characteristics found in any populist articulation, irrespective of political orientation (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). First, populism always provides justification for its actions by appealing to and identifying with 'the people' (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Second, it is rooted in feelings of anti-elitism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). And finally, 'the people' are considered as: '... a monolithic group without internal differences except for some very specific categories who are subject to an *exclusion* strategy.' (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007:322). This triad serves as the starting point for the codification of the data for this thesis. However, it is important to outline how the data were selected first.

According to Robert Yin a single source of evidence is not recommended when conducting case study research (Yin, 2009). On the contrary, one of the main strengths of case studies is that they provide the opportunity to utilise a plethora of different sources of evidence, as opposed to other methods such as surveys, histories and experiments. However, the most fundamental advantage of utilising multiple sources of evidence is 'the *converging lines of*

inquiry (emphasis in the original), a process of triangulation and corroboration', which makes the conclusion or findings of a case study more convincing and accurate (Yin, 2009:117).

Therefore, the choice to utilise a variety of different sources for this thesis was a relatively straightforward process. Validity is the most important issue for any type of research, and the utilisation of multiple sources of data (or triangulation) can address certain aspects pertaining to it. More specifically, the lack of internal validity can be a major threat to the overall validity of a research (Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2001). Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln have defined internal validity in qualitative research as credibility, i.e how well the findings match reality (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Therefore, utilising multiple sources of data, or triangulating, can enable a researcher to validate and cross check their findings¹⁷.

Moreover, Robert Yin has noted that the issue of construct validity can also be addressed via utilising the triangulation of data (Yin, 2009). According to Neuendorf, construct validity is 'the extent to which a measure is related to other measures (constructs) in a way consistent with hypotheses derived from theory.' (2017:117). Multiple sources of evidence can provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon (Yin, 2009). The choice of different sources such as interviews, public rallies, press statements, and discussions within the parliament can fully showcase if the discourse of these parties changes according to context, or if it is one-dimensional. Yet still, there are two additional criteria that need to be satisfied, in order to prove the robustness of this thesis and its findings: external validity and reliability. How these two criteria are satisfied will be the focus of the coding section, and as a result their omission in this one is intentional for the sake of thematic cohesion.

In addition, the robustness of the research findings has been enhanced by the fact that they were collected over several years. This method of compiling chronological events focuses on a major strength of case studies cited earlier; that they allow the researcher to trace events over time (Yin, 2009). This does not only facilitate the organisation of the coded data, but it can also allow the researcher to investigate presumed causal events: '... because the basic sequence of a cause and its effect cannot be temporally inverted.' (Yin, 2009:148). This

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¹⁷ Kaplan and Duchon have argued that: 'Collecting different kinds of data by different methods from different sources provides a wider range of coverage that may result in a fuller picture of the unit under study [...] Moreover, using multiple methods increases the robustness of results because findings can be strengthened through triangulation – the cross-validation achieved when different kinds and sources of data converge and are found congruent.' (1988:575)

means that the data chosen for the analysis can showcase if the discourse of the two parties changes according to spatial and temporal factors. In the case of the former, it would be extremely useful to examine if party members alter their discourse in accordance with the setting they are currently in, such as an interview or within the parliament.

As for the latter, case studies can provide an intensive analysis of the sequence of events over time and are well suited for uncovering intervening causal mechanisms, and exploring reciprocal causation (Levy, 2008). This is what Freedman calls 'causal-process observations' which are: '... [a]n insight or piece of data that provides information about context, process or mechanism, and that contributes distinctive leverage in causal inference. A causal-process observation sometimes resembles a 'smoking gun' that confirms a causal inference in qualitative research, and is frequently viewed as an indispensable supplement to correlation-based inference in quantitative research as well.' (Freedman, 2004: 227–228). Therefore, the choice of a four year period for both parties will allow this research to delve into the 'black box' of populist discourse, and thus explain the motivations behind the fluctuations in the framing frequencies.

The final aspect that needs to be addressed is the sources of evidence chosen for the procurement of data. The sources themselves fall between the two categories of documentation and archival records. This is due to the fact that the data for both parties were collected through archives that were stored in sites. In the case of NR, the party maintains a strong internet presence where anyone can easily look at the archives of the party which include press statements, televised interviews, debates and public rallies. As for GD the majority of the data were obtained via the website of the Greek Parliament, and a smaller part from the party's website.

However, before the data for each case are presented, it is important to first outline their respective strengths and weaknesses. The most important strength lies in their stability and their exactness, since they can be viewed repeatedly, and the also contain important information such as names, references and details of an event. Most importantly, they are unobtrusive, and any external influence by the researcher is effectively removed (Yin, 2009). But their strengths are accompanied by certain weaknesses, as is the case with every methodological approach. The two most significant ones are the possibility of biased selectivity and reporting (Yin, 2009). How these weaknesses have been addressed is part of

the coding section, since they are intrinsically linked with the two aforementioned criteria of validity. The chapter will proceed with the presentation of the data sources for each case.

3.7.1 Greece

The starting point for collecting data of GD's discourse was the archives of the Greek parliament. The reason behind this choice is the fact that the party was largely ostracised from media outlets during its brief period of success. As a result, the majority of the data for GD's discourse has been obtained via the archives of the parliamentary meetings. Furthermore, national parliaments are well- placed in expanding the space of political contestation and making political opinions more visible to the public (Gheyle, 2019:228). The website itself is extremely organised and the files are stored in PDF format. In addition each file includes the date that the meeting took place, the topics of discussion, what type of legislation they passed in the specific meeting, and a detailed index where the name of each speaker is included along with the page number where the speech is located.

In order to ensure that the data sample would be representative, parliamentary meetings were collected from every month. The total number of meetings for the time period starting from 2012 to 2015 was 600. The first meetings that were chosen for the data sets were the ones associated with the austerity measures, since the catalyst for GD's electoral success was the economic crisis. Other notable events include the 2015 July referendum as well as the onset of the migrant crisis. After these meetings were collected and codified the other ones were chosen randomly on a month by month basis totalling to one fifth of the 600 meetings. By collecting data from every month, the analysis obtained a considerable amount of depth, due to the day to day monitoring of the party's interaction with its political opponents. Moreover, the austerity packages themselves included a multitude of reforms for all sectors of the Greek state, and their implementation was gradual. This was a great opportunity to analyse the party's discourse on topics that they have not attempted to monopolise, such as the agricultural production, tourism, education, healthcare and many others

However, the data collection would be incomplete if the parliamentary meetings were the sole focus. This part of the data was especially challenging to collect due to GD's aforementioned toxic image. Thus, the majority of media outlets avoided them even during

the election periods¹⁸, with the only exception being the state-owned Hellenic Broadcasting Cooperation (*Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorasi*). This problem was eliminated via the party's website, which includes a solid library of YouTube videos from public rallies, and televised interviews. Since the Greek Parliament is dissolved after the call for elections, all the data during this period are taken from interviews, public rallies, and press statements.

From 2012 to 2015 there were four elections in total, and both of these years are considered as exceptionally turbulent for the country. In the case of 2012, Greece had gone through a period of political and economic instability, which led to the formation of a temporary coalition government headed by the economist Lucas Papademos, and the adoption of a second bailout package. The 2012 election period lasted from March to June, since the elections were back to back, and in 2015 the elections took place in January and September. The number of public rallies that were available in video format was 50 in total, and all them were codified as part of the data. The codification of these videos was significant, since these were the moments where the party actively communicated with the electorate. Furthermore, some of the videos included interviews that the most prominent members gave before the elections, and presented the reform program that they wished to implement. As a result, the elections are different not only in terms of context, but also in terms of the audience that they are addressing.

Ideally, the data would have been evenly distributed between the parliamentary debates, the public rallies and the televised interviews. Unfortunately, the party's conduct and its past made them unappealing to the mainstream media. Yet still, all the data available from the election periods were collected and provide a solid framework for the party's discourse. Most importantly, the parliamentary debates are the most suitable sources of data for analysing how crises are framed, and weaponised against their opponents. Below is a Table that includes the different number of sources that were codified:

Table 3.4 Golden Dawn Sources

Source	Number of Sources
Parliamentary Debates	166
Interviews	12
Public Rallies	50

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¹⁸ The party attempted to utilise this isolation to its advantage, by claiming that the media were controlled by political and economic elites. Therefore, they wished to present themselves as true underdogs who face insurmountable odds in their crusade to liberate the Greek people.

3.7.2 France

The data collection for NR did not suffer from the setbacks and limitations of its Greek counterpart. This is attributable to the fact that the party has been extremely successful in reinventing itself, and detoxifying its brand. Moreover, the party has a strong online presence via its website and multiple social media accounts, which allows it to be in direct contact with the electorate. The website itself is well designed, with a robust database that includes press statements, podcasts, speeches, and interviews from 2011 and onwards. In addition, each of these type of data are organised, and include the name of the party member, the topic, and the relevant links in the case of speeches, podcasts and interviews. The tight organisational structure of the site was crucial for the collection of the data for two reasons: 1) there was a great variety of data sources from a multitude of different party members, and 2) all of them are easily retrievable via a simple search.

However, the large volume of data present made a careful selection process imperative. The first criterion was that every month of the time period chosen should be part of the dataset. The years chosen were from 2012 to 2013, and from 2016 to 2017. The choice was made since I deemed it important to include two different election periods, and also the periods before and after them. The second criterion was simpler in nature, since it was about the total number of data sources which would be included in the coding. For the time period selected the total number of sources was 3780, and the number that was incorporated in the analysis was 365, close to one tenth of the total. Another important, criterion for the section was to include as many party members as possible. The discourse of each individual party member will be inevitably subject to their idiosyncrasies. However, all of them utilise a specific framing core which is characteristic of populist discourse in general. The third criterion is directly linked with the fourth and final one, and that is the selection of the data themselves.

The press statements and interviews have been given by various party members, and some of them were about the same topic. Therefore, it made sense to choose data where specific topics were framed by multiple party members. It is only through this method that the party's most utilised frames can be properly identified, examined, and compared and contrasted with the ones by GD. However, there were two minor issues regarding the data collection. The

first issue is the fact that France possesses a different electoral system from Greece. The elections themselves only serve for the election of the President. Therefore, the leader of a party is the main point of focus during the election period. The majority of data collected during the election periods are speeches made by Marine Le Pen, but they are complemented by interviews and press statements by other party members. The second issue is also associated with the different electoral system, where the legislative elections are separate from the presidential ones. Furthermore, both type of elections utilise the two-round model, and this may actually lead to a reduction of the seats that a party can capture. For example, after the 2012 election NR managed to elect only Gilbert Collard and Marion Marechal as its deputies in the National Assembly. Inevitably, the data from the meetings were limited but they were still included.

At first glance this might seem problematic. Parliamentary debates revolve around policies and their finer points, and they also offer a unique opportunity to scrutinise the interaction of the two parties with the political opponents as it was previously mentioned. The parliament is the primary battlefield where policies are contested and blame is attributed. However, a party must break the narrow confines of the parliament in order to dominate the discursive terrain, and garner the support of the public. As a result, the press statements, interviews and podcasts along with experts are more effective in creating a resonance with the electorate. This effectiveness is directly linked with the party's professionalism brought forth by the reinvention of its identity. They do not wish to reach out to the people solely for the purpose of stirring their passions with an aggressive rhetoric. But rather, they wish to showcase that their proposed policy solutions are superior to the ones implemented by their opponents. Most importantly, linking the attribution of blame with a concrete solution effectively eliminates the thin aspect of populist discourse. This is what can potentially separate a serious contender from a mere protest party. Below is the Table including the different sources utilised for the analysis of NR's discourse:

Table 3.5 National Rally Sources

Source	Number of Sources
Press Statements	290
Public Rallies	45
National Assembly Debates	15
Interviews	15

3.8 Coding

In the data section there were two important omissions pertaining to the internal validity and the reliability of the data. As it was previously mentioned, this omission was intentional since they are associated with the coding of the data. According to White and Marsh, external validity is the equivalent to transferability (White & Marsh, 2006:38). It is essentially: '...a judgment about the applicability of findings from one context to another. Generally a qualitative researcher tries to situate his findings within a relevant theoretical paradigm, understanding that findings sensible within it can be applied to other, comparable contexts with greater confidence.' (White & Marsh, 2006: 38).

According to Robert Yin, a common critique regarding case studies is the fact that single cases offer a poor basis for generalising (Yin, 2009:43). This is was the most significant reason that the thesis focuses on two different parties. Overall, it must be noted that the evidence from multiple cases is often considered as more compelling. However, replication is the most crucial criterion in multiple case designs (Yin, 2009: 54). The selection of each case must be careful so that it either a) predicts similar results or b) predicts different results but for anticipatable reasons (Yin, 2009: 54).

As previously stated, both parties belong to the right-wing populist category but there are some significant differences between them in terms of their discourse. The theoretical framework for this thesis needs to be tested in order to uncover the common elements present in right-wing populist discourse and the points of deviation. In her widely cited paper, Kathleen Eisenhardt argues that case studies can serve as the starting point for theory development (Eisenhardt, 1989: 546). She states that:

One strength of theory building from cases is its likelihood of generating novel theory. Creative insight often arises from the juxtaposition of contradictory or paradoxical evidence. [...]the process of reconciling these contradictions forces individuals to reframe perceptions into a new gestalt. Building theory from case studies centres directly on this kind of juxtaposition. That is, attempts to reconcile evidence across cases, types of data, and different investigators, and between cases and literature increase the likelihood of creative reframing into a new theoretical vision. (Eisenhardt, 1989: 546).

This new theoretical framework can then become the vehicle for the study of populist discourse in general. Yet still, the theoretical framework itself is not the only aspect which will ensure that the criterion of external validity will be satisfied. The other aspect is the coding itself, and is linked with the final criterion of reliability. Reliability refers to the absence of random error, which enables later investigators to arrive at the same insights if they conduct the study all over again (Gibbert et al., 2008:1468). Therefore, the two keywords here are transparency and replicability.

Transparency can be significantly enhanced via the careful documentation and clarification of the research procedures, whereas replication can be accomplished by creating a case study database (Gibbert et al., 2008: 1468). Regarding content analysis, Kimberly Neuendorf specifically states that for these two criteria to be met, the requirements are:

... full reportage of all content analysis procedures-dictionaries, complete codebooks, additional protocols for message handling and so on- is important to ensure replicability, the ability of others to repeat the study with a different set of messages. Replicability is highly desirable, and the existence of successful replications supports the measures' external validity. (Neuendorf, 2017: 125).

In order to ensure that these two criteria are successfully met, all the data which were utilised were meticulously compiled and stored. More specifically, the NVivo software allows for the automatic creation of databases, and all the different documents utilised in the analysis are stored within them. In addition, some extra steps were taken in order to ensure that the data collection and analysis would be as transparent as possible. In the case of GD all the records parliamentary meetings have been saved in separate files, categorised on a month by month basis. As for the interviews and the public rallies, the relevant links from YouTube have been stored, and the NVivo software allows for the creation of timestamps, so that other researchers can find the exact points in the video where the excerpts are taken from.

NR required a more meticulous process of collecting and storing the data since the speeches, press statements, interviews and podcasts were scattered throughout the site. The first step in the collection process was the collection of the texts in docx format. This included the texts in French which were then translated into English and stored in separate documents. Each text

was given a title which included the name of the speaker or writer, the date, the topic of the discourse, and finally the links from which they can be retrieved within the site. All documents were categorised on a month- by- month basis so that retrieval can be further facilitated.

The next step was to employ thematic analysis to codify the data. Thematic analysis is commonly used for encoding qualitative information and to generate descriptive patterns (Boyatzis, 1998). The approach chosen for the thematic coding of the data was inductive (i.e. data driven). This approach yields some important advantages: 1) it increases the likelihood that different researchers examining the raw data will interpret and encode it in a similar way; 2) it eliminates intermediaries as potentially contaminating factors such as in the case of a theory-driven approach where the code is developed in accordance with an existing theory (Boyatzis, 1998:29-30). During the codification the data was separated into 4 broad areas: The Economy, Society, the System of Politics, and External Policy. Each of these areas includes a number of different frames which were associated with a different topic and were organised as following:

Table 3.6 External Policy Frames

Greece	France
Anti EU Sentiments	Anti EU Sentiments
 National Sovereignty 	National Sovereignty
 Alliance with Russia 	Alliance with Russia
 Anti-Immigrant Discourse 	NATO Membership
-	Criticisms about USA's External Policy
	Anti-Immigrant Discourse
	Criticisms of the Schengen Agreement

Table 3.7 Economy Frames

Greece	France
 Attacking the Banks 	Globalisation
Attacking the IMF	Banks
Agricultural Production	Common Currency
Tourism	 Attacking the Financial Markets
Maritime Industry	Austerity Measures
 Achievement of Self-Sufficiency 	Agriculture
 Austerity Measures and Privatisations 	The Economy
The Economy	Sport Industry
	Industrial Sector
	Service Sector
	Protectionism

Table 3.8 Society Frames

Greece	France
The People versus the Elite	The Underdogs versus the Elite
• Farmers	LGBTQ Community
Animal Breeders	 Journalists
Police Officers	• Farmers
 Pensioners 	Blue Collar Workers
Army Officers	Unemployed Youth
Small Independents	 Pensioners
Unemployed Youth	Small Independents
 Persons with Disabilities 	Army Officers
Utilising a Bleak Imagery	Middle Class
Democratic Representation	 Police Officers
	Civil Servants
	Healthcare Specialists
	Utilising a Bleak Imagery
	Democratic Representation

Table 3.9 Political System Frames

Greece	France
 Accusations of Corruption Attacking the Government and other Parties by Claiming that they Attempt to Undermine GD Attacking the Government by Claiming that they are Following the same Policies as their Predecessors Attacking the Government by Claiming that they Went Back on their Pre Election Promises Attacking the Left Attacking the opposition (New Democracy or SYRIZA) Attacking the Previous Government by Claiming that they Went Back on their Pre Election Promises. 	 Attacking Emmanuel Macron Attacking Francois Fillon Attacking the Government Claiming that they are Following the Same Policies as their Predecessors Attacking the Government by Claiming that they Attempt to Undermine NR Attacking the Government by Claiming that they Went Back on their Pre-Election Promises Accusations of Corruption Attacking the Left by Claiming that they Went Back on their Pre-Election Promises Attacking the Right Attacking the other Parties with Accusations of Corruption Attacking the other Parties with Accusations of Incompetence Attacking the Previous Government by Claiming that they Went Back on their Pre-Election Promises Attacking the Previous Government with Accusations of Corruption

After the data were collected and distributed among the different frames, the frequency of referencing from month to month was calculated as well as the rate of change. The frequency

of utilisation was calculated through the following formula: Frequency= Number of References/Total Number of References. The rate of change in the salience of each frame was calculated by using this formula: ROC= (Current Value- Previous Value/Previous Value)*100. These additional calculations added a valuable quantitative component to the data analysis, since they can showcase the ebb and flow of the different frames. Finally, the frequencies were visualised in stacked area charts that present the changes in the utilisation of frames on a month- by- month basis.

3.9 Overview of Framing Areas

Before the thesis moves on to the Empirical Chapters, this part will examine how the two parties utilised each of the four framing areas per year. The figures include the frequency of utilisation on a month-by-month basis, and showcase which framing area was prioritised over time. The first framing area to be examined is External Policy. The penultimate years for both case studies would exhibit divergent trends in the utilisation of the External Policy frames. In the case of NR these frames would dominate the party's discourse for the majority of the year, with only September and December exhibiting a slight decline to the second place, as shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.14. As it was previously mentioned the issues of security and tighter border controls were presented as paramount due to the increase in migrant flows and a series of terrorist attacks both in Europe and France. Another key event that led to the frequent utilisation of these frames was the Brexit referendum, and the summer months mark the peak of utilisation, reaching at 43.24% in July.

The case of GD would greatly differ, but it should be mentioned that the migrant crisis would not begin until the summer of 2015. Yet still, the utilisation of these frames would be sporadic as shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11. The only notable exception would be the months of June, July and September. July would mark the peak of utilisation for the External policy frames at 30.20%, when the referendum was underway. SYRIZA's decision to broker a new agreement between Greece and its creditors would be framed as a betrayal, and as a result these frames were second in utilisation during the elections in September. The final year for NR would showcase a stable pattern of utilisation for the External Policy frames. However, it is interesting to note that Le Pen's campaign was not based around the topics associated with External policy as it can be observed from Figure 3.15, where they were in the third and

fourth place from March to May. However, their utilisation would be more stable than that of GD.

Overall, GD's frequency of utilisation would be affected by financial events and the migrant crisis and as a result would fluctuate more often as opposed to NR's. The more stable pattern observed in NR showcases that the party focuses on framing a greater variety of topics, and as a result its discourse is not dominated by certain topics as it can be observed from the stacked area charts. The impact of the crisis in Greece provides a more fertile ground for this type of discourse, and thus it makes sense that GD heavily employed it both before and after its brief period of success.

The utilisation of economic frames reflect the patterns observed for the External Policy. Once again, the maturity of NR as a political contender is showcased in the stability that it exhibits in framing economic issues, while GD is unable to shake off the label of the single issue protest party, since it frequently bases its strategy on opportunism rather than pragmatism.

Notable examples of this evolutionary disparity between the parties can be observed in the stacked area charts. In 2012, the frequency of utilization for GD's economic frames increased in response to specific events such as the passing of the second part of the reform bill for the 7th austerity package in October. Similarly, in 2015 the most significant increases can be observed during the periods where new austerity packages were adopted, such as the months of October and November. Additional examples include the summer period which was marked by the July referendum.

NR has perfected its own style of rhetoric and its members ensure that their attack is continuous and focused. This is evident in the 2013 stacked area charts where the frequency of the frames remained consistently high, since the party focused on a plethora of different policies and issues arising from the government's handling of the economy. For example, in January 2013 the party focused on the privatization of TGV (*Train à Grande Vitesse*), and how this would lead to increased ticket prices, the multiplication of accidents, and the loss of revenue for the country.

NR's stacked area charts from 2017 are identical to their counterparts from 2012, 2013 and, irrespective of the fact that in 2012 and 2017 the presidential elections took place. However, in 2016 most of the other framing areas were overtaken by the External Policy one, since the

migrant crisis and the issue of terrorism became more salient. The party remained focused and seamlessly incorporated these events in its own discursive repertoire, utilizing them in such a way in order to increase their own legitimacy and present themselves as victors even before the elections took place. In this respect NR is more meticulous in terms of formulating a strategy and then implementing it as opposed to their Greek counterpart. NR managed to avoid the pitfalls which most populist parties may fall into because it has realised the need to change despite its early successes.

This crucial difference becomes more evident by examining the frequency of utilisations of the Political System frames. GD exhibits a greater amount of fluctuation than NR which is always tied in with the austerity bills or the ongoing criminal conviction. More specifically, in the 2012 elections the frames associated with the political system dominated the discourse of the party along with the frames referring to society (i.e. 'the people' versus 'the elite'), and of course the economy. In the subsequent months these frames were largely overtaken by the ones associated with external policy, starting in the month of July, when the newly elected government entered into negotiations with the country's creditors.

These frames would remain steadily at first place for the remainder of 2012 up until November. This month is significant since the parliament adopted the seventh austerity package, in order to receive the second economic bailout of 31.5 billion Euros. For the month of November the two frames that dominated the discourse of the party were the ones associated with the political system and society. The excerpts that were chosen are representative of this trend that exhibits that GD was firmly entrenched in its position as an anti-political establishment party.

The politics frames would be frequently utilised throughout 2013. Before that, they would remain in third place behind the economy and external policy frames. The only exception would be the month of February, where the main focus was Greece's strategic planning for hydrocarbon explorations in the Aegean Sea (135th Parliamentary Meeting, 2013:8359). GD has often stressed the importance of utilising the country's natural resources in the path to economic recovery and independence, and the specific meeting provided the MPs with the opportunity to attack their political opponents.

Regarding July, the Parliament approved an eighth austerity package to secure payment of its next €2.5 billion credit tranche, something which triggered another salvo of accusations of betrayal by GD. Afterwards, the murder of Pavlos Fyssas served as the catalyst for these frames to take first place in the party's discursive repertoire. As it can be observed from the 2013 stacked area charts these frames rose to primacy and would only experience a small decline after the July 2015 referendum. These frames would dominate the party's discourse in the last two months of 2015. The upward trend began in November where the SYRIZA government called for a vote on a series of austerity measures as they were dictated by the new bailout agreement between Greece and its creditors (22nd Parliamentary Meeting, 2015:2277).

The attribution of blame is the main discursive strategy for the party, since in all four of the elections that took place in 2012 and 2015 these frames are always in first place in terms of frequency. As it has been shown from the excerpts taken from public rallies Michaloliakos focuses entirely on the scandals and the corruption of the previous governments, as opposed to Marine Le Pen who skilfully blends attributions of blame, Manichean dualisms, and policy alternatives in her discourse. Therefore, the vital component that GD is lacking is balance.

NR exhibited a greater amount of stability in terms of the frequency of utilisation, but there are still some fluctuations which need to be scrutinised further. In the case of 2012, the Annency shootings, the murder of two students in Grenoble, and the closing down of Arcelor Mittal's steel plant in Florange led the party to harshly criticise the government on issues such as policing and the rising unemployment. Another change in the frequencies occurred in the first two months of 2013, where the main topic of contestation was the complete liberalisation of national train lines by the end of 2019 under the directives of the European Commission.

2016 was marked by several events that impacted the party's discourse and the frequency of utilisation of these frames. The first one was the terrorist attack at the Bataclan club, which led the party in doubling down upon its anti-immigrant rhetoric and its harsh criticism of the Schengen agreement. Furthermore, on the 23d of June the Brexit referendum took place, where 51.9% of the votes cast were in favour of leaving the EU. As a result, an overwhelming emphasis was placed on the frames associated with the country's external policy and of course the citizens themselves. The issue of national security, tighter border

controls and the country's national sovereignty formed the centrepiece of the party's discourse for the greater part of 2016.

Finally, the last change which can be observed in terms of frame utilisation comes from the 2017 elections. In 2012, the three frames that dominated the party's discourse were related to the economy, external policy and society, whereas in 2017 the triad was comprised by the frames associated with the economy, society and politics. The Fillon scandal in conjunction with the inability of the Hollande government to fully implement its pre-election reform program shifted the focus in the party's rhetoric. Le Pen wished to present herself as the only one capable of bringing a positive change in a system characterised by corruption and broken promises. Overall, GD's emphasis in the four-year period is on the attribution of blame, and as a result these frames are the most heavily utilised ones.

The frames associated with society where some of the most frequently utilised ones in the discursive repertoire of both parties. In the case of NR, these frames were at the top in terms of the frequency of utilisation for the majority of 2012 and especially during the election period. In the case of GD, the frames were utilised frequently, but the attacks towards their political opponents dominated their discourse during the election period, thus solidifying their image as a protest party. A notable exception would be November, when the Parliament passed the seventh austerity package. As it can be observed from Figure 3, these frames accounted for 35.34% of the party's discourse.

2013 would be quite different for NR, since these frames were not frequently utilised until April, where they reached a 45% total. The reason for this change was the steady increase of unemployment, with 10.4% of the population being unemployed by the first quarter of 2013 (Insee, 2013:1). These frames would resurge in utilisation during the summer months since the government was forced to take additional measures in order to reduce the country's deficit as shown in Figure 3.13. For GD, these frames would be increasingly utilised every time a new austerity bill would be passed in the Parliament. As shown in Figure , the frequency of utilisation for these frames increase during the months of April, July, November and December.

These trends would radically change regarding the years 2014 for GD, and 2016 for NR respectively. In the case of GD the majority of their discourse would be dominated by the

relentless attacks towards their political opponents. The party's legal troubles led to label itself as a victim of a corrupt political system, as it has often been mentioned within this thesis. As a result, the frequency of utilisation for these frames was very high, as it can be observed from Figures 3.10. The party wished to present itself as the people's last hope, and this was the reason that the political system had conspired in order to legally prosecute them.

RN also utilised these frames quite frequently in tandem with the ones associated with External Policy for the better part of 2016. The series of terrorist attacks in Europe, the migrant crisis, and the Brexit referendum provided the most fertile ground for the party's nationalist and anti-immigration agenda. However, from September onwards the frequency of utilisation would decline since these frames would be overtaken by the ones associated with the Economy, External Policy, and the Political system as it can be observed from Figure 9. The last year for each case study would provide a stable pattern of frame utilisation. In the case of NR their election discourse would be quite even between the different framing areas as shown in Figure 3.15. The economy was the major point of contention, especially after the unpopular policy reforms of the Hollande government. Therefore, the party made the economy its centrepiece, by presenting the failures of the previous government and how they had severely impacted the electorate's quality of life. Afterwards, the Society frames would remain in the third or fourth spots in terms of frequency of utilisation.

For GD the references to society and 'the people' would dominate their rhetoric in the elections of January, along with the attacks towards their political opponents as shown in Figure 3.11. These frames would be used more frequently from May onwards with negotiations between Greece and its creditors breaking down, and referendum taking place in July. The frames would be utilised in tandem with the Political System frames, since the party labelled the SYRIZA government as traitors.

Overall, the frames associated with society and the constructed identity of 'the people' were frequently utilised by both parties. The 'patchwork' nature of this identity means that they can unify all types of grievances irrespective of socio-economic status or previous political affiliations. Most importantly, these frames transform any type of systemic failure or crisis into a crisis of representation. This reference to popular will and democratic representation has often been presented through this thesis whether the parties frame economic issues or

external policy ones. It is the connective tissue not only in terms of the populist rhetoric; but also how the causes of a crisis are identified and blame is attributed.

3.9.1 Stacked Area Charts

Figure 3.8 Golden Dawn Frames Frequency of Utilisation (2012)




Figure 3.9 Golden Dawn Frames Frequency of Utilisation (2013)




Figure 3.10 Golden Dawn Frames Frequency of Utilisation (2014)




Figure 3.11 Golden Dawn Frames Frequency of Utilisation (2015)




Figure 3.12 National Rally Frames Frequency of Utilisation (2012)




Figure 3.13 National Rally Frames Frequency of Utilisation (2013)




Figure 3.14 National Rally Frames Frequency of Utilisation (2016)





Figure 3.15 National Rally Frames Frequency of Utilisation (2017)



3.9 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to outline and critically discuss the central aims, objectives and research questions guiding, and giving shape, to this research. Crucially, this thesis seeks to provide a comprehensive analytical framework on the crisis discourse of populist right wing parties. As outlined in the Chapter 1, focusing on GD and NR serves a dual purpose: 1) it makes the creation of a discursive framework which can be applied to other right wing populist parties possible, and 2) it compares the discourse of a successful right wing populist party and an unsuccessful one.

The time period that was chosen was characterised by a plethora of crises both major and minor, with some of them threatening the cohesion of the EU, such as the sovereign debt crisis and the migrant crisis in 2015. Therefore, the focus of this thesis can yield some interesting insights on the process through which these parties seek to dominate the discursive terrain of politics via the exploitation of crises and systemic failures.

However, the two crises will not be the sole focus of the thesis. This is the reason that a four year period was chosen for each party, which also included the elections. Via this way the analysis can also focus on the day to day interactions of the two parties with their political opponents on a variety of topics ranging from the economy to issues associate with healthcare, education, sanitation etc. Most importantly, the two major crises and other minor systemic failures were unified under a master frame of a crisis of representation. This master frame holds within its core the quintessential division utilised by populism: 'the people' versus 'the elite'.

Moreover, the methodology chosen for the analysis of the data is both quantitative and qualitative in nature. This will make the analysis more nuanced and will allow it to go beyond from merely quantifying the evolution of frames over time with the utilisation of the stacked area charts that include the frequency of utilisation for each of the four main areas within the parties' discourse: External Policy, Economy, Political System and Society. The end result will be an analysis which links the discourse with key events and policy decisions as they unfold across time. The subsequent chapters will focus on the analysis of the five areas in which the different frames were categorised and coded.

Chapter 4: The Question of National Sovereignty

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines how the two parties framing issues associated with External Policy. The chapter will focus on three frames: EU membership, national sovereignty and antiimmigration stance. Before the advent of the 2008 fiscal crisis, euroscepticism was largely
confined to the margins of the political spectrum. The evolution of the EU and its
competences, in conjunction with developments such as the unification under a single
currency, the Maastricht Treaty and a rapid enlargement in terms of membership during
2004, increasingly strained the 'permissive consensus' vital for the union's legitimacy (Brack
& Startin, 2015:239). Thus, euroscepticism gradually became increasingly embedded within
the EU's member states, in the sense that it has become more mainstreamed and legitimised
(Usherwood & Startin, 2013:2). 'Taking back control' is the standard rallying cry among the
parties of the populist- right. As a result, the issue of national sovereignty has become the
common political denominators among them.

GD and NR jumped at the opportunity to exploit the economic and migrant crises. As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the key characteristics regarding the *modus operandi* of these parties is their ability to oversimplify complex developments and reduce them to the most basic of dualisms: 'the people' versus 'the elite'. Of course the elite need not be a specific group, and the vagueness of the term provides ample opportunity for discursive maneuverability. The motto of 'taking back control' is an evocative discursive construction, due to its urgency and emotive tension, and suggests that a potential catastrophe can be averted, while offering an alternative potentiality which presupposes a rupture with the present (Kallis, 2018:286). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that these two parties have frequently debated on the matter of national sovereignty by attacking the EU, especially regarding its responses towards crises.

The first part of the chapter provides some background information regarding the EU's and national government's handling of the crises, and how it has contributed to generating distrust from the electorate. The analysis then moves on to the issue of EU membership and how the two parties have framed it. The harmonisation of economic policies by the directives of the EU Commission provides both parties with the opportunity to utilise the core framing

mechanism of populism by identifying the EU as an enemy to the people, and raise the salience of democratic representation. The next part builds upon this analysis and focuses on the issue of national sovereignty. Both parties are ultra-nationalist and thus the directives of the EU in relation to the economic and migrant crises are presented as harmful and illegitimate. The final part of the chapter focuses on the anti-immigration discourse of the two parties before and after the beginning of the immigration crisis in 2015. Here the two parties identify a new enemy with the immigrants coming to Europe.

Each part begins with a content analysis that showcases the salience of each frame during a four-year period and during the elections, and focuses on key dates that led to greater utilisation by each party. The analysis also incorporates a number of excerpts by the two parties in order to examine how they have framed each crisis regarding their causes, severity and potential solutions. The combination of the two methodologies includes both quantitative and qualitative components and facilitates the comparison between the discursive strategies of the two parties. In addition, the analysis will showcase how the two parties employ their populist discourse in order to frame the crises in relation to identifying their causes and attributing blame.

4.2 Teleological Efficiency and Popular Will: Two Incompatible Notions?

The parties of the populist- right deploy an extreme concept of popular sovereignty, since according to their claims the power of the people and in extent the nation state, has been gradually slipping away, and has thus reached a tipping point where their future welfare is at stake (Kallis, 2018: 287). Public policy is no longer so often decided by the parties, and with the transition towards the neoliberal mode of governance decisions are increasingly passed to non-partisan bodies which are not democratically accountable (Brown, 2015:68).

Therefore, the basic functions of interest representation, aggregation and intermediation which were traditionally carried out by political parties occur more and more outside of the political world (Mair, 2013:93-94). As it was mentioned in the Chapter 2, the old cleavages which were fundamental for the process of identity formation and active participation have become largely obsolete. The relative prosperity enjoyed in the last thirty years created a form of complacency by both the parties, which have moved towards the centre of the

political spectrum (Mair, 2013:50-51), and by the citizens through their growing indifference and lack of participation in the democratic process.

The establishment of a second spirit of capitalism led to a galloping eudemonism via legitimating consumption and luxury, and eventually to the de-democratisation of democracy itself since on one hand the political parties gave part of their authority to other 'expert' systems of governance, while on the other hand most of the citizens limited their democratic participation solely during the election period (Stavrakakis, 2014:507)¹⁹. Initially, this transition from governing to governance did not create any significant strain, due to the fact that the EU was largely successful in delivering on the imperatives of economic growth and prosperity.

Since the modern capitalist world is characterised by increasing complexity in terms of legislation and policy-making the parties will inevitably resort to a greater amount of delegation and de-politicisation to officials which are not elected, and as a result accountability becomes problematic (Brown, 2015:69). The key issue is legitimacy, and the EU along with all the different bodies which comprise it, have not successfully obtained it yet. The distrust towards the EU was further aggravated with the onset of the migrant crisis in 2015. Right-wing populist politicians have raised the issues of national safety, identity and economic insecurity in order to cultivate a societal divide that pits 'the people' against both political elites and immigrants (Hameleers, 2019:805). Public discourse has been dominated by the crisis vocabulary of right-wing populist parties since 2015. The sudden influx of immigrants and the EU's response highlighted certain limitations within the legal design and implementation modes of the Union's asylum policy (Tsourdi, 2020:191). Most importantly the handling of the crisis generated a political rift. At the heart of this rift lies contestation over several central issues such as the nature of the obligation to provide asylum and the scope for central EU action to enhance solidarity in providing asylum among member states (Tsourdi, 2020:193).

¹⁹ The following quote by Colin Crouch aptly demonstrates how democracy was separated by the demos via neoliberal principles: 'Under this model, while elections certainly exist and can change governments, public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams of professionals, expert in the techniques of persuasion, and considering a small range of issues selected by those teams. The mass of citizens plays a passive, quiescent, even apathetic part, responding only to the signals given to them. Behind this spectacle of the electoral game, politics is really shaped in private by interaction between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent business interests.' (Crouch, 2000:4)

In accordance to the thesis conceptual framework, the crisis has generated distrust towards the EU. More specifically, trust in the EU has not recovered fully according to the Standard Eurobarometer published on June of 2018 since the majority of respondents in 13 member states (including Greece and France) still distrust the EU (Standard Eurobarometer, 2018:105). In France 55% of the respondents tend not to trust the EU, while in Greece the percentage is up to 69%, and in addition these percentages have remained relatively stable from Autumn 2017 to Spring 2018 (Standard Eurobarometer, 2018:105-106). These trends indicate that the lack of trust towards the EU is still a significant issue. Thus, there is a failure of convergence on significant economic and social fronts, which is compounded by the differing perceptions regarding the role of the state and the welfare state, while the EU directives aimed at combating the crises are highly contested (Murray & Longo, 2015:59).

While the EU claims to represent the citizens, it has failed to fully abandon its elite origins since there are weak affective ties at the societal level which leave the citizens out of the entire decision making process. The continuous attempts at austerity combined with the perception that the EU is effectively regarded a hybrid between a state and a supranational organisation featuring a novel legal order along with an array of multilevel governance arrangements, has created scepticism not only among the citizens but also at the system of politics. The current era along with the crises can be viewed as a historical threshold, a particular moment in time where a new type of balance may be forged in the crucible of the crisis. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that both GD and NR took advantage of this period of destabilisation and uncertainty. The next part will delve into the specifics of their process of framing regarding the issues of national sovereignty and the EU membership.

4.3 The European Union and the Question of National Sovereignty

Both parties have criticised the EU regarding the common currency, the open border policy, and the issue of national sovereignty especially when it comes to decisions about economic policies. However, it should be noted that there are important differences in the parties' discourse on how they conceptualise the EU and its negative impact on their respective states. The most important one is the crisis itself, and the fact that while both parties attribute the blame to the EU for its perpetuation and the way it was handled their countries were not affected in the same way. For Greece, the sovereign debt crisis led to a series of bailout agreements between the EU, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF, along with 13

austerity packages in total. The case of France is different due to the fact that while the country was certainly affected by the crisis it did not lead to an extreme reshaping of society and the system of politics.

Still, the anti-EU frames are quite robust, and are ever present in the discourse of both parties as it can be observed by the tables included in the next part of the Chapter, and are usually part of their arguments on other topics such as the economy. It is vital therefore to provide a more nuanced analysis on how the EU membership is framed by these parties by looking at specific excerpts from speeches made by party members and the overall utilisation of the frame for every month.

4.3.1 Frame Salience: Anti- EU Frames

The continuous pressure exerted by the financial markets on politically fragmented national budgets intensifies hostility towards the EU and provides the two parties with the opportunity to make their nationalist frames more salient. Both GD and NR are too eager to ride on the wave of anti-EU sentiments as it is showcased by Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. More specifically, in the case of GD each increase is associated either with the elections or the adoption of austerity packages. In 2012 the months where the frame was most frequently utilised were April until June, when the two legislative elections took place, and November when the parliament passed the bill for the seventh austerity package.

The utilisation of the frame would follow a similar pattern for 2013, with some interesting exceptions. The first increase occurs in April, when the government passed the first part of the multi-bill for the eight austerity package. The number of references increased by 533 % as shown in Table 2.1 of Appendix A, and then declined when the event lost relevance. The second part of the multi-bill was approved in July, and the number of references increased accordingly to 21 in total. What is interesting is that the anti-EU frames were frequently utilised in October and November despite the fact that there were no additional austerity bills proposed. The reason behind the increase is that the party was under criminal investigation for the murder of Fyssas and other past criminal activities. The remaining MP's claimed that this was an elaborate conspiracy by the EU and the Greek government so that they could finally silence the sole patriotic party in Greece.




Figure 4.1 Salience of Anti-EU Frame: Golden Dawn 2012-2013

The first important increase in 2014 occurred in May since both the local and the European Parliament elections took place. Most importantly, the parliament approved the Medium-term Fiscal Strategy plan for 2015 to 2018, and as a result the number of references increased steadily over the months of April and May. The number of references remained relatively high for the next months with September being the highest point at 15 references in total. The main topic of discussion for the month was a new agreement for the extraction of hydrocarbons in the Thracian sea (38th Parliamentary Meeting, 2013:2973). The party viewed the agreement as a sell-out of the country's resources to its creditors. The final point of interest is December since a series of events unfolded, and would radically change the country's political system. The first notable event was that the government's candidate for presidency of the Hellenic Republic failed to win majority support from the parliament. As a result, the government collapsed and snap parliamentary elections were announced for the next month. By that time the majority of GD MP's that were held into custody had been released, and were thus able to campaign across the country.

2015 was an exceptionally turbulent year for Greece, marked by two elections and the July referendum and as a result the utilisation of anti EU frames was frequent. According to Figure 4.2 the total number of references on May was 27, while on June the number rose to 52 after the referendum was announced. However, the number skyrocketed after the conclusion of the referendum and the snap elections held in September where the SYRIZA government passed the 12th austerity package in order for Greece to receive a third loan. The

number of references was 87 in total as opposed to the 3 from the previous month, a 2800% increase in total²⁰.




Figure 4.2 Salience of Anti-EU Frame: Golden Dawn 2014-2015

NR also exhibited a steady utilisation of Anti EU discourse, and claims that France's national sovereignty had become undermined. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show there was an increase in the utilisation of the specific frame before and during the elections in 2012 and 2017. In March 2012 there was an increase of 72,73% from the previous month, but later on the number of references steadily decreased by 36,84% in April and a further 16,67% in May as shown in Table 1.5 of Appendix A. Then, during the legislative elections in June the number of references fell by half and remained so for the next month. This can be attributed to the fact that the party placed third in the elections and thus failed to make it in the second round.

In the case of 2013 the number of references was high with several months exhibiting significant increases such as May where the main topic of discussion is the worker's rights. The month of July also exhibited a small increase due to the budget cuts that the Hollande government announced, after the Council of the EU recommended that France would need to reduce its deficit. The month of September exhibited the most significant increase for the year at 24 references in total. An increase always occurs during that month due to the fact that

July, 52 for November and 45 for December respectively.

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²⁰ It is important to note that since the elections were held in September the parliament was dissolved, and as a result only 2 meetings took place. However, a closer inspection of Table 4 shows that for the previous months (with the exception of August which the parliament does not hold regular meetings) the number of references was quite high, and it remained so for the rest of 2015 with 43 references in

the party's summer School takes place then and also because the recent budget cuts were announced only two months ago, and as a result they were still a contested topic.




Figure 4.3 Salience of Anti-EU Frame: National Rally 2012-2013

The utilisation of the anti-EU frames would significantly increase in the penultimate year. A series of terrorist attacks over the previous months combined with the escalation of the refugee crisis provided the party with the watershed moment that it needed in order to make its anti-EU message more salient. January began with 25 references in total, but the number would fluctuate by a small margin as it can be observed in Figure 4.4. However, the months of June and July would exhibit the highest number of references for the entire year. There are two reasons behind this significant spike: 1) The historical significance of May and 2) the Brexit referendum. The party framed the latter as an indication that the EU was slowly losing its hold over the member states, and the first step towards a union of sovereign nation states completely free from the control of Brussels.

The 2017 elections were entirely different due to a variety of factors. First, the confidence ratings towards Francois Hollande had fallen to just 8%, according to a poll conducted by CEVIPOF between the 16th and 30th of December 2016 (*Le Barometre de la Confiance Politique*, 2016:35). Second, the year 2016 was marked by the Brexit referendum in June and the election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States. Emboldened by these recent events the party's anti EU discourse intensified, and in the number of references rose by significantly in March, and was maintained at around the same levels for the next two months.




Figure 4.4 Salience of Anti-EU Frame: National Rally 2016-2017

4.3.2 Discourse Analysis

The analysis can now move on to the qualitative side, in order to examine how the parties have framed the issue of EU membership. The first excerpt is taken from a parliamentary meeting which took place on the December the 18th 2012, and one of the key topics of discussion were a series of reforms about the various investment agencies which would deal with the privatisation of Greece's public transportation network:

We are continuously making adjustments according to the EU directives. Unfortunately for us, we prioritise the European directives over the Greek ones. We could have agreed that this is for the best, if there was any short of positive outcome, but most often than not the results can be considered as catastrophic for Greece and the economy. We can already see this with the new legislation about taxation, which will be part of tomorrow's meeting. By reading through it, the only thing which someone can perceive is that it only includes cuts in wages and pensions and everything under the sun. (Panagiotaros, 2012:5590).

The next excerpt is from a speech made again by Panagiotaros during a parliamentary meeting on the 31st of October 2015, and the topic of discussion was the recapitalisation of the Greek banks by the European Stability Mechanism:

Whose side are you on? You are certainly not on the side of the Greek people, as it has been shown by your actions. You are not on the side of the Greek people and Greece.

You are on the side of the foreign loan sharks, the creditors, the pimps, and all of those who planned, demanded, and unfortunately succeeded in acquiring our national sovereignty.

I say all this in reference to one of your previous speakers who claimed that SYRIZA is not on the side of the loan-sharks. You are with them, either willingly or unwillingly, following their orders to the letter. (Panagiotaros, 2015:1141).

The first excerpt is part of a speech that Marine Le Pen gave on the 4th of March 2012:

The Europe of Brussels will do nothing for the Europeans, let alone the French. The Europe of Brussels as it has been built is not just a failure, it is a tragedy! The state, the nation, the fatherland must rise up and reaffirm very clearly what are the interests of the French! It is up to the state to go tell its four truths²¹ to these technocrats and their masters! State authority against people's prison! The authority of the state and the firmness of its leaders for the freedom of the French people! (Le Pen, 2012).

The second excerpt is taken from a speech made by Marine Le Pen at Arcis-sur-Aube on the 11th of April 2017, just two weeks before the first round of the presidential elections:

My ambition is to be a president who will preside and protect! Not a president of the incessant media commentary. Not a spokeswoman for the Brussels' Commission or Madam Merkel's assistant! The first weeks and months of my five-year period will be devoted entirely to taking action, in the service of France and the French.

I will channel all my energy during this period towards two directions: to provide immediate services for the French in terms of employment, security, purchasing power; and at the same time to break up the chains of the European Union which prevent us from being free and moving forward. As you know, I will deal with the European Union through close negotiations with Brussels, in order to regain our national sovereignty, followed by a referendum on our membership in the European Union. Be aware that Brussels will not let go unless it is convinced that the people will have the last word through the voice of a referendum. (Le Pen, 2017)

²¹ Dire ses quatre verites: This is a French idiom which means to be perfectly blunt and honest when giving your opinion.

All four excerpts mention how the technocratic approach of the EU Commission has undermined the national sovereignty and democratic foundations of their respective countries. According to Habermas, the balance between politics and the market has shifted, and thus ruined their complementarity (Habermas, 2015). For Habermas 'politics is the only means by which democratic citizens can intentionally influence the fate and social bases of existence of their communities through collective action', while markets on the other hand are completely autonomous systems which can decentrally coordinate an enormous amount of decisions (Habermas, 2015:81). Thus, if the logic of teleological efficiency undermines political legitimacy at the national level, democracy will become vulnerable to populist parties such as the NR and GD which utilise the enmity towards the EU as the cornerstone of their rhetoric.

By disabling democratic accountability during the crisis the EU 'removed crucial instruments of macro-economic management from the control of democratically accountable governments', according to Fritz Scharpf (2014:108). The EU policy response to the sovereign debt crisis was lacking in terms of input legitimacy, and would prove detrimental on output legitimacy in the middle term. There is a trend of self-immunisation, since the EU is following a policy of consolidation which aims to unify all member states under the same rules, which is supposed to be 'beyond the reach of democratic will-formation' (Habermas, 2015:100). As a result, European policy is becoming increasingly unassailable and the public perceptions of crisis are steered in the wrong direction.

Some additional observations can be made regarding the discourse employed by the speakers. While both excerpts include an attack against the parties' political opponents and the EU, the way that this attack is carried out differs between the two speakers. In the case of Ilias Panagiotaros, the language that is being utilised is a lot coarser, and more aggressive, since the party wishes to emphasise the fact that they are anti-systemic and also part of the common people. In the case of Marine Le Pen, her criticism towards the government and her opponents in the presidential campaign is more subdued, and she avoids utilising a vulgar vocabulary. Still, the common element in both excerpts is the ever-present division between the 'people' and the 'elite'. Appearing as close to the 'common people' is essential in redefining the relationship between politicians and the electorate (Ekstrom & Morton, 2017:294), especially when issues such as national sovereignty and the EU membership are being discussed. This is a moral discourse, since the 'common people' are deified and

fictionalised while the political elite are characterised as immoral and self-serving (Wodak, 2015:8).

Thus, the purpose of both speeches is not only to criticise the EU in terms of how it has affected national sovereignty, but to prove that the speakers and their respective parties possess the moral high ground, and to consistently produce antagonistic relationships which signify closeness to a fictive homogenised public, as opposed to the perceived remoteness of 'the elite' (Ekstrom et al, 2018:4). Furthermore, politicians are constantly involved in expressive activities, by performing authenticity and trustworthiness, and in the case of populism it is equally vital to accentuate the difference between them and the establishment (Moffitt, 2016:43).

However, this closeness is articulated differently by these two speakers. First, Ilias Panagiotaros is consistently aggressive as a part of his discursive performance and mentions how the SYRIZA government reneged on their promises towards the Greek people, and ignored their will during the referendum, by agreeing for a third loan with Greece's creditors. He concludes his speech by mentioning that the government is not on the side of Greece and its citizens but on the side of the creditors. The speech is short, aggressive and direct, mainly focusing on attacking the government. The cornerstone of their rhetoric is blame attribution, and to besmirch their opponents. Marine Le Pen on the other hand attacks her two main opponents, Macron and Fillon, proceeds to attack the European Union, and lastly claims that she wishes to be a president in the service of the people.

Most importantly, she mentions that the only way that France can be free of the EU is via a referendum, inspired by Great Britain in 2016. As opposed to GD's speaker, she offers an alternative by mentioning the utilisation of a democratic procedure which entails the participation of the entire electorate. Thus, the excerpt from her speech manages to unify the key frames of national sovereignty, anti EU sentiments, democracy, and finally binds everything together via the element of conflict between 'the people' and the 'elite'. In addition, Marine Le Pen proposes a solution in the form of a referendum, and does not only focus on attributing blame and attacking her political opponents. In the case of GD solutions are completely absent from both excerpts and as a result their framing remains incomplete.

The differences in discourse are attributable to the fact that NR has been a contender in the political arena for 46 years, and has evolved significantly since its early days. Notable changes include the retirement of Jean-Marie Le Pen from the party's leadership, and Marine

Le Pen working towards the detoxification of the party's identity from various controversial elements in order to usher NR into the mainstream. GD was a relative newcomer and as a result it has been unable or even unwilling to soften its image in order to garner a greater amount of support. As a result, there are important qualitative differences in regarding the form and style of the speeches.

4.4 Taking Back Control

The National Sovereignty frame forms a binary relationship with the Anti EU frame, as it can be observed by the Figures. These two frames are bound together since the crisis made the issue of national sovereignty more salient. Vivien Schmidt, perceives the crisis a first and foremost a political crisis caused by no alternative on the input side of legitimacy, no transparency in the process of EU decision making, and finally the negative consequences on the output side due to the harmful impact on growth and social welfare²² (Schmidt, 2015:90-94).

The lack of alternatives in economic policies is mainly driven by this structural overhang of excessive and public debt. Therefore, policy makers are left with few palatable options, resulting in the alienation of the voters from the political process, and weakening the foundations of democratic participation (Matthijs, 2017:275). For Wolfgang Streeck, the technocratic experts and not the voters are the ones deciding on the most 'appropriate' market conforming policies, leaving parties which have been labeled as anti-establishment to serve as the voice for the discontented (Streeck, 2015: 26).

Being able to stage emotive spectacles about the reclamation of sovereign power is an essential component of populist strategies, since it aims to juxtapose the re-empowerment of the demos to the systemic crisis which threatens the welfare of the people (Taggart, 2000). European integration has provided the perfect stage for this form of 'spectacular' politics

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²² Saskia Sassen has made a very insightful observation regarding the denationalization of sovereignty by supranational organizations, and the transition from governing to governance in her work titled 'Losing Control? Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization': 'Sovereignty remains a feature of the system, but it is not located in a multiplicity of arenas: the new emergent transnational private legal regimes, new supranational organizations (such as the WTO and the institutions of the European Union), and the various international human rights codes. All these institutions constrain the autonomy of national states; states operating under the rule of law are caught in a web of obligations they cannot disregard easily[...] What I see is the beginning of an unbundling of sovereignty as we have known it for so many centuries.' (Sassen, 1996:29-30)

since it has spurred forth an evolution of the mainstream parties, which includes the marginalisation of activist and protest elements, the strengthening of the autonomy of the parties' elites, and a new form of legitimising political decision making based on the deliberative model of EU institutions (Reungoat, 2015:297).

4.4.1 Frame Salience: National Sovereignty

The concept of the crisis is central since according to Benjamin Moffitt it is not a neutral phenomenon, but rather it must be mediated and performed by certain actors (Moffitt, 2014:190). Populist actors actively spectacularise the failure that underlies a crisis in order to pit 'the people' against a dangerous 'other' and as a result radically oversimplify the political terrain, while advocating for strong leadership and immediate solutions (Moffitt, 2014:190). The decisionistic core of political power has been broken down since there is an uncompensated erosion of legitimation processes. In addition, supranational organisations such as the EU and the IMF exercise their mandates on the basis of international treaties and thus not in accordance with democratically generated law according to Habermas (Habermas, 2015: 56).

There is an element of paternalism which permeates this type of governance, and provides both parties with the opportunity to mainstream the frame of national sovereignty. Moreover, this technocratic legitimacy permeates the communication of EU institutions, based on the principles of neofunctionalism and its widespread utilisation of technical terms such as 'directives' and 'regulations', and conveys the idea that these institutions are not democratic (Diez, 1999:7). In this context, the anti EU and national sovereignty frames re-inject politics in a largely de-politicised polity, since their mainstreaming can be interpreted as a politicisation of the EU, and EU issues become a relevant dimension of public debates at the national level (Leconte, 2015: 256). Yet still, the citizens both countries exhibit different trends regarding their EU membership and how it has affected national sovereignty. In France the opinion on EU membership is positive to an extent with 41% of the population thinking it is a good choice, 24% thinking otherwise and the rest of the respondents remaining neutral on the matter (*Barometre de la Confiance Politique*, 2016:67).

Greece is an entirely different case due to the extreme austerity imposed by its creditors. A research published in 2016 analysed the beliefs of Greek citizens on a variety of topics and

asked the respondents to evaluate Greece's membership in the EU and whether they consider it as positive or negative. 49,3% of GD voters respondent that they viewed Greece's membership as something negative, while an additional 21,9% answered that Greece's membership probably had a negative impact for the country, amounting to a total of 71,2% (What do the Greeks Believe 2016:8). Furthermore, 75.3 % of GD voters answered that they believed that the EU's organisational structure and interests do not serve Greece. (What do the Greeks Believe 2016:12). Thus, in the case of France it is the political system being viewed negatively and its inability to affect EU policies rather than the membership itself, whereas in Greece both the EU membership and the political system are viewed in a negative light. Still, the issue of national sovereignty is consistently framed and utilised by both parties since it can be linked with other issues such as the weakening of democracy, the economy and austerity measures, and the way in which both parties attempt present themselves as grand reformers and saviors. In the case of GD, for 2012 the increases were either tied with the elections or the austerity measures. In the case of the latter the highest number of references was in November with 20 as shown in Figure 4.5.

In 2013 the number of references remained high, but showed a considerable increase in April and July, since in these months two multi-bills were passed in the parliament per the directives of the eighth austerity package. For April the number of references rose to 19 from only 3 the previous month, an increase of 533.33% as shown in Figure 4.5 and Table A5 in Appendix A. In July, when the second bill was passed the number of references increased considerably once more to 12 from only 2 in the previous month. Furthermore the number of references remained high for the next months with the exception of November where most of the party's MPs were taken into custody after the murder of Pavlos Fyssas.




Figure 4.5 Salience of National Sovereignty Frame: Golden Dawn 2012-2013

For 2014 the first significant change occurred in May since the European Parliament elections took place along with the approval of the Medium-term Fiscal strategy plan for 2015-2016 by the parliament. Afterwards the references remained high and reached their peak on December when the government called for elections. More specifically the number of references was the highest for the year with 16 in total as Figure 4.6 shows. The frame would reach the peak of its utilisation in 2015. In January the number of references doubled since the elections took place on the 25th. The second significant spike would occur in June when all parties were campaigning for the July referendum. The sources increased and then dropped slightly for the next month after the referendum's conclusion. However, the elections in September along with the new agreement between Greece and its creditors in October caused a sharp increase. In September the number of references increased to 41, and continued to increase throughout October. The number of references in October marks the highest point of utilisation for the entire four- year period as it can be observed from Figure 4.6.




Figure 4.6 Salience of National Sovereignty Frame: Golden Dawn 2014-2015

NR opened 2012 with 26 references to national sovereignty. However, the next month exhibited a significant drop despite the fact that the pre-election period was in full swing. The frames would resurge in utilisation on the month of March with an increase of 72.73% as shown in Table B1 in Appendix B, but then dropped again after Le Pen failed to advance to the second round. The only other notable increase can be observed during the month of August and September as shown in Figure 4.7. By then the legislative elections had concluded and the Hollande government began its reform program. Furthermore, the party holds its summer school each September and Marine Le Pen traditionally delivers a speech in order to evaluate the government. As a result the month of September is always characterised by a spike in the utilisation of the frame.

2013 would be characterised by a higher number of references since the party could now fully engage in its role as the opposition to the government's policies. The first increase occurred in February when the EU adopted a new regulation on the Multiannual financial framework from 2014 to 2020, which would reduce the payments made by member states to the budget (Official Journal of the European Union, 2013:885-886). May also exhibited an important increase as shown in Figure 4.7 since the main topic of discussion is always the worker's rights due to the month's historical significance. Most importantly, an important increase occurred in July. The event that caused will often be referenced in the thesis, and it was the sacking of Delphine Batho from the ministry of the environment, after she criticised Francois Hollande for the budget cuts he implemented. The frame was consistently used afterwards, since the party labelled the Hollande government as subservient to the EU.




Figure 4.7 Salience of National Sovereignty Frame: National Rally 2012-2013

2016 proved a pivotal year due to the Brexit referendum, and the US presidential elections. As it can be observed from Table B9 in Appendix B, the number of references remained consistently high throughout the entire year. In addition, most of the spikes in the number of references occurred during the end of spring summertime period, especially in May, June and July. For June the number of references increased to 49 from 33 the previous and then fell slightly to 38 references as shown in Figure 4.8. These three months alongside September included the greatest number of references, which is attributable to the Brexit referendum and in the case of May the historical significance of the May 1968 events, where the party always finds the opportunity to frame the issues of national sovereignty and anti EU sentiments. Lastly, September exhibited a small increase of from the previous month, since the main topic of discussion was the influx of refugees from war-torn areas, and the planned closing of the Calais camp in Northern France.

NR MPs were exceptionally critical of both the government and the EU regarding the way they had handled the crisis, and the frames of national sovereignty, anti EU sentiments, and xenophobia became the most prevalent ones during this period, as Chapter 5 will show in greater detail. The final year was marked by the elections. The specific frame started increasing steadily since January with 31 references in total. The peak for its utilisation would occur from March until May as it can be observe from Figure 4.8. In March and April, when Le Pen advanced to the second round of the presidential election the utilisation of the specific frame increased dramatically. Afterwards, a small decline occurred in May since

eventually Macron won a landslide victory, and then the number of references to national sovereignty decreased even further.




Figure 4.8 Salience of National Sovereignty Frame: National Rally 2016-2017

4.4.2 DiscourseAnalysis

The analysis can now move on to the excerpts by the two parties. The issue of national sovereignty is used in tandem with the criticisms towards the EU. By including this qualitative analysis the process through which the two parties frame the crises can be examined more effectivelly. The excerpt for GD is taken from the 47th parliamentary meeting of 2014, where the main topics of discussion were the election of the new President of Greece and the removal of legal immunity from several of GD's MPs:

The voting procedures for such an important bill should have been postponed due to the current political events. No such luck! Instead we see that you are doing your best to fix some holes, and comply with the directives of our creditors in the days leading up to the election of the new President. We see your candidate for the presidency, Mister Dimas, and by reading his CV we can understand why you nominated him for this post. He has previously worked as a lawyer for Sullivan and Cromwell, a Wall Street Legal Firm, and at the legal department of the World Bank. They are the ones that have put the noose around our necks and won't let us breathe.

We are well aware that the IMF, the troika and the other loan sharks wish to enclose us from all directions. Thus, they are casting their dice with the election of the new President. (Panagiotaros, 2014:3299).

The second excerpt is part of a speech made by Ilias Kasidiaris on the 14 January 2013 regarding the reforms on Greece's pension system, and a new legislation for the facilitation of bond payments from the Greek state towards the European Financial Stability Facility:

I shall now move on to the legislation, which is nothing new for the miserable protectorate that our once glorious Greece has been turned into. It is a faithful reproduction of the first pact of financial stability on the 4th of June 2010, which demanded that we abandon our national sovereignty and bind ourselves with the shackles of ECB and the IMF. The pact was not approved by the parliament back then. According to the 5th paragraph of article 14, Greece would unconditionally surrender any type of protection afforded by the principle of national sovereignty. [...] GD refuses to view the government's theatrical performance with any seriousness. GD's goal is to put an end to this policy of unconditional surrender. We are tirelessly working towards the formation of a true sovereign state which will cancel all these financial pacts, write off Greece's odious debt and take advantage of our national resources for the benefit of the Greek people and not the creditors.

We will vote against any law and act of legislative content which does not respect the Greek constitution and our national sovereignty. Greece belongs to the Greeks, not to the loan sharks. (Kasiadiaris, 2013:6339).

The first excerpt for NR is taken from an interview Marine Le Pen gave at the Andrew Marr show on the 10 November 2016, just two days after the electoral victory of Donald Trump:

Andrew Marr: You have said that Donald Trump's victory is a world-changing moment. How does it change the world?

Le Pen: Clearly, Donald Trump's victory is an additional stone in the building of a new world, destined to replace the old one. Obviously, we have to compare this victory with the rejection of the European constitution, by the French people, of course, with the Brexit vote, but also with the emergence of movements devoted to the nation, patriotic movements in Europe. All the elections are essentially referendums against the

unfettered globalisation that has been imposed upon us, that has been imposed upon people, and which today has clearly shown its limits.

Andrew Marr: A lot of people have said that the victory of Donald Trump makes the victory of Marine Le Pen in the presidential elections in France much likelier. Do you agree with them?

Le Pen: Well, he made possible what had previously been presented as impossible. So, it's really the victory of the people against the elite. So if I can draw a parallel with France, then yes, I wish that in France also the people upend the table, the table around which the elite are dividing up what should go to the French people. And so, this is going to be the real question of the presidential election. The presidential election is going to establish some real choices of civilisation. Do we want a multi-cultural society, following the model of the English-speaking world, where fundamental Islam is progressing and we see major religious claims, or do we want an independent nation, with people able to control their own destiny, or do we accept to be a region managed by the technocrats of the European Union? (Le Pen & Marr, 2016:1).

The next excerpt is a press statement regarding the new national budget approved by the EU according to the Fiscal Stability Treaty on the 15 November 2013, the speaker is Florian Philippot the former Vice President of NR:

Today is a black day for France. The European Commission has just approved the state budget in accordance with the new powers transferred to it by the UMP and the PS - since the voting of the Two-Pack and the Budget Pact (TSCG) - and effectively placing France under budgetary supervision. In addition to the form, which recalls that the French have been dispossessed of their sovereignty, this validation reveals a particularly worrying reality. It confirms that it is not the interest of the people that has been defended in this budget but that of the banks and the big-finance. [...]The National Front will fight to restore France's full budgetary sovereignty. No one can decide instead of the French people the main orientations of its budget and therefore of its policy. So is consent to taxation, a basic republican principle. Similarly, we will make the necessary savings on bad public spending starting with the cost of the European Union, immigration, social fraud, tax evasion but also the excesses of local authorities. (Philippot, 2013).

The first and most significant difference between these two excerpts is the context. In the case of Andrew Marr's interview, the focal point is the election of Donald Trump, and how it can potentially serve as a turning point for global politics and France. In the case of Ilias Panagiotaros' speech, there is a significant event but it is locally bound. There is an isolationist tendency in the rhetoric of GD, and this is attributable to the fact that most of the times the party presents the case of Greece as unique, in order to enhance the image of martyrdom. However, both parties blend the core populist frame of 'the people' versus 'the elite' with their own nationalistic discourse. In the excerpts 'the people' are the nationals, and the issue of sovereignty is coupled with the issue of democratic representation.

Another important point of differentiation that is also present in these excerpts is the lack of policy alternatives from GD. Florian Philippot made sure to identify the problematic areas that negatively impact France's state budget, and presented some solutions to address these issues. While he did not delve into the specifics of these solutions, he still presented an alternative policy proposal that could potentially stabilise the country's economy, and ensure its autonomy. The pattern that is observable up to this point is that GD's discourse does not go beyond the blame attribution phase. Similar to the excerpts in the previous section, GD's framing on these issues remains purely diagnostic, and the only 'solution' that the members have to propose is the refusal to vote in approval for any of the bills. Therefore, the party's discourse is mostly geared towards protest, since it lacks the prognostic component.

4.5 Dangerous Others

The immigration issue is featured prominently in the profile and campaigning of right-wing populist parties. Issues such as terrorism, the austerity due to the global economic downturn and more recently the flow of refugees from predominantly Muslim countries have been utilised by these parties in order to imbue the electorate with the sense of constant threat that characterises a crisis. However, the way they frame the issue of immigration in general is by no means one-dimensional. As Jef Huysmans notes:

It is far from clear in the European Union that immigrants, refugees and asylum are fixed into a threat to the cultural self-definition of the people in the member states. Instead the construction of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees into sources of societal fear follows from a much more multidimensional process in which immigration

are connected to and float through a variety of important political debates covering at least three themes: internal security, cultural identity and welfare. (Huysmans, 2006:66).

The last theme that Huysmans mentions is directly linked with the concept of capability deprivation which was utilised in the Theory chapter; and more specifically the evaluation of well-being. Therefore, the issue of migration is not only linked with cultural incompatibility but also with the threat to the security and the well-being of society due to the competition over scarce resources. By politicising the issue of migration, these parties are not only able to carve their share of the electoral market but also add it to their broader narrative of crisis.

Politicisation is equivalent to saliency, and whether a party will raise its relevance is dependent upon strategic considerations related to the dynamics of party competition according to Green-Pedersen (2012:117). Moreover, the entire agenda setting-process is not only about capturing the attention of the public, but also about framing; i.e to select certain aspect of a perceived reality and present them as significant. However, while certain frames are more influential than others, the truth is that no single political actor can completely control the framing of an issue since it can be affected by real-world events (Green-Pedersen, 2012:117). A crisis is the perfect opportunity to control this process of framing since it serves as a proof for the failure of existing policies. In addition, the migrant crisis can be linked with the broader narrative of these parties' hostility towards the EU.

As it was mentioned in the Literature Review chapter, the world and in extension societies are characterised by increased complexity. Schattschneider argues that complex societies inevitably produce a plethora of conflicts over public policy and: '...the game of politics depends on which of these conflicts gains the dominant position: The process in which one or several of these issue conflicts gain political dominance involves a mobilisation of bias.' (Schattschneider, 1975:62). Therefore, it is in the best interest of these parties to mobilise the bias stemming from all the previous crises that plagued the EU in order to make a topic which they specialise in more salient.

Indeed, the immigration issue is the calling card of these parties. Furthermore, the hostility towards immigrants is part of the core frame of their rhetoric: the division of the society into two opposing camps. Pelinka argues that for populist right-wing parties the foreigner, and in extension the foreign culture, have successfully penetrated the nation-state, and the political

elites are responsible (Pelinka, 2013:8). In this case the 'elites' are: '... the secondary 'defining others', responsible for the liberal democratic policies of accepting cultural diversity.' (Pelinka, 2013:8). The EU is depicted as not taking national specificities such as values, norms and beliefs into consideration, and thus poses a threat to each member state's cultural homogeneity (Vasilopoulou, 2017:124).

Crucially, the resurgence of xenophobic sentiments has not occurred in a social, political and cultural vacuum. The events of 9/11 changed the world forever, and made the normalisation of anti-immigrant discourses and policies possible. The parties of the populist-right were able to reframe Islam as an existential threat, and revitalise the narrative of the 'West' versus the 'East'. The hostility towards Islam has been reframed as a matter of security, and is based on stereotypes of cultural and religious differences. In addition, the economic crisis had already created a constant sense of threat among the EU citizenry. As Aristotle Kallis has noted: 'In promoting a populist, anti-Islam, and anti-immigration security agenda, the populist- right has accurately sensed the profound roots of a nativist backlash that runs through mainstream society, constantly fed and reshaped by new anxieties about cultural, economic, and existential security.' (Kallis, 2017:53). The outbreak of the migrant crisis, followed terrorist attacks across Europe have heightened the fear of insecurity. The parties of the populist-right have eagerly jumped at the opportunity to add another weapon in their discursive arsenal and exploit it to their political and electoral advantage. Therefore, it is important to examine how the two study cases of this thesis have framed the topic of immigration within their crisis narrative.

4.5.1 Frame Salience: Anti-Immigration Frames

In 2012 GD utilised this frame more frequently during the first and second rounds of the legislative elections in May and June as it can be observed from Figure 4.9. The next month the anti-immigrant frame dropped by 45.45% in terms of utilisation a shown in Table A1 in Appendix A, and would resurge only for the month of September. The reason behind the increase was the creation of several reception and identification centres in the Dodecanese islands (36th Parliamentary Meeting, 2012:1845). The utilisation of the specific frame would remain constant for the duration of 2013. The greatest number of references was concentrated on the month of April when the parliament approved the first part of the multi-bill for the

eighth austerity package. Utilising the specific frame when the main topic of discussion was the economy seems unusual, but the party wished to present the crisis as more severe and as a result other issues such as the cuts in the police force, and how the uncontrolled migration led to an increase in crime.




Figure 4.9 Salience of Anti-Immigration Frame: Golden Dawn 2012-2013

2014 was a quiet year overall for the party. Its attention was focused on the imprisonment and impeding trial of several members for the majority of the year and as a result other topics rose to prominence. As it can be observed from Figure 4.10 the only significant increase occurs in September. During that month the government decided to close down several migrant camps across Greece, and to transport the residents to newly built hospitality centres (38th Parliamentary Meeting, 2014:2973). The party had to make its presence known on topic which it had monopolised even before its sudden and rapid success. 2015 would be a tipping point for the utilisation of the specific frame due to the onset of the migrant crisis during the summer.

Interestingly enough, the specific frame was under-utilised in the legislative elections in January with only 5 references in total, as it can be observed from Figure 4.10. The first upward change occurred in April at 283.33% over the previous month as shown in Table A13 in Appendix A. The reason behind this sudden change was the government's new plan for the rescue and transportation of migrants arriving via the sea (28th Parliamentary Meeting, 2015:1867). Afterwards, the anti-migration rhetoric would resurge during June and July when the party was campaigning for the referendum, and would relentlessly attack the EU's

migration policies. The final and greatest increase for the entire four year period would occur in September, during the snap legislative elections. More specifically, the total number of references increased to 45, coinciding with the peak of the migrant flows towards Greece.




Figure 4.10 Salience of Anti-Immigration Frame: Golden Dawn 2014-2015

NR would also utilise the anti-immigration frame but in a more frequent manner. Predictably, the first significant increase occurred during the first round of the presidential elections in March, as shown in Figure 4.11. The other important increase occurred in September where the number of references rose to 16 from only one in August. As it was previously mentioned, the party's Summer School takes place during this month and serves as an opportunity to evaluate and criticise the government's policies up until that point. The frame would be utilised with a greater frequency for the next year, with the first noteworthy increase occurring in July, as shown in Figure 4.11.

During the previous month a new Smartphone application by LICRA (International League against Racism and Anti-semitism) was launched, and would enable users to report incidents of racism. The party held a conference the next month, in order to promote and assert its positions, and that other forms of racism against white people, and French nationals would not be forgotten (Gollnisch, 2013). Therefore, the increase is not only significant in a quantitative sense but also in how the party restructured its anti-immigrant rhetoric in order to get rid of the more toxic elements of the past.




Figure 4.11 Salience of Anti-Immigration Frame: National Rally 2012-2013

The penultimate year for NR would also exhibit a more frequent utilisation of the specific frame. The Bataclan terrorist attack, the New Year's Eve sexual assaults in Cologne along with the escalating migrant crisis led to an increase of references at the start of the year. In addition, other events such as the terrorist attack in Nice on the 14th of July, led to additional increases as it can be observed from Figure 4.12. Overall, the frame would not experience severe fluctuations throughout the year since the unfolding events fit perfectly with the party's anti-immigration and securitisation discourse. However, this trend would not continue in 2017.

The number of references was on a steady increase since January and would continue to increase until the conclusion of the presidential elections. More specifically, the references increased by 140% on February, and then by an additional 79.17% on March as shown in Table B13 in Appendix B. The highest point in terms of references would be reached on April when Marine Le Pen advanced to the second round of the elections. More specifically, the references numbered 102 in total, since the issue of security and tighter border controls became one of the focal points of Le Pen's presidential campaign. Yet still, the frame would experience a decline in the next month when Macron emerged as the eventual winner. Afterwards, the frame would never experience the same highs as the previous months.




Figure 4.12 Salience of Anti – Immigration Frame: National Rally 2016-2017

4.5.2 DiscourseAnalysis

The excerpts chosen will complement the analysis and better showcase how the two parties have framed the migrant crisis. The first excerpt for GD is taken from the 13th Parliamentary Meeting 2012. This was a Q and A meeting where the MPs could ask questions on various policy matters. What is of interest here is that a few days ago a teenage girl was assaulted by a migrant and left in a critical condition. Therefore, Ilias Kasidiaris found the opportunity to reference the specific event as a criticism for the migration policies of the EU and the government:

Since there has been a lot of talk about migration, and since my question is related to a specific person, the Pakistani rapist and murderer, since we are not certain that the little girl will survive, the 15 year old victim, I will insist on using the term 'trash'. We classify that person as trash, since this is where he belongs. And we will also insist on using the term 'Europe's garbage dump', because we live in a democracy and have every right to do so. [...]

I and my party will insist on using the terminology 'trash' and 'Europe's garbage dump'. This is what they have turned Greece into. Let's get to the point. At the most basic level, my question exceeds the narrow confines of today's meeting. It is about the

anxiety of an entire society who has fallen victim to an uncontrollable war, an unstoppable crime wave, which stems almost exclusively from illegal immigrants. The main cause for this phenomenon Mister Minister, is that thousands of criminals enter our country and we know nothing about them. (Kasidiaris, 2012:500).

The second excerpt is part of a 10 minute TV spot for the September 2015 elections. The speaker is Ilias Kasidiaris again:

They call us fascists. It is completely ridiculous to treat the third largest party like this, in a country which has been betrayed and sold out to foreign powers. We will soon be the opposition against the alliance between SYRIZA and New Democracy, who have taken it upon themselves to finalise the sell-out of our country.

I would also like to warn the Greek citizens that they should not believe any of the theatrics of Meimarakis and Tsipras, since both of them voted in support of all the memorandums and the construction of a mosque at the centre of Athens. And now the MP's of New Democracy pretend to be patriots in order to sway the Greeks on their side. GD will continue its struggle against all for a great and liberated Greece, for national liberation and popular sovereignty. GD will continue its struggle so that Greece can truly belong to the Greeks. Not to the foreign loan-sharks or the illegal migrant criminals. (Kasidiaris, 2015, 00:31-1:35).

The excerpts chosen for NR are taken from the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017. The first excerpt is part of a speech that Marine Le Pen gave in Nantes, on 25 March, and presented her reform program:

Our elites gave their power to the Islamists. I commit to reduce legal immigration in five years from 200,000 entries per year to 10,000 entries per year, and to severely limit the number of asylum seekers.

I commit to abolish the right of soil. The acquisition of nationality should no longer be a formality. Naturalisation must be subject to strict conditions. Being French is a source of pride, not a right!

If the National Front was in power, Mohamed Merah would not have become French. I commit to remove any possibility in our right to naturalise illegal immigrants, to expel anyone entering the national territory illegally, and to remove all suction pumps of illegal immigration. I do not want any more demonstrations from illegal immigrants or support for illegals: they will be prohibited. (Le Pen, 2012)

The second excerpt is taken from a speech that Marine Le Pen gave in Paris during the 2017 elections:

We can see it: in the fight against terrorism it is imperative to put an end to angelism. Intelligence, police and control resources must be bolstered. I said that during my tenure I will hire 15,000 additional police officers and gendarmes and 6,000 customs officers. The breeding ground for terrorism in our country is Islamism. The list of organisations which are hostile towards France must be established.

How do you fight an enemy you dare not name? Salafism and the organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood, which promotes an ideology contrary to all our human values, must be banned in France. There should be no complacency with hate preachers. Foreign hate imams and jihadist preachers must be expelled. Salafist mosques must be closed. I was the only one to call for the ban of the UOIF congress, now shamefully renamed the "Muslims of France", which receives imams who preach the hatred towards Jews, homosexuals or that justify the stoning of women. (Le Pen 2017).

As it can be observed from the Tables, the two parties converge in the utilisation of the specific frame within their discourse. After all, their harsh stance towards unrestrained migration has been their calling card even before they tasted their first instances of electoral success. In the case of GD, the fluctuations of the other two frames were tied with the country's financial woes and the austerity measures. However, their anti-immigration frames often experienced increases outside of the aforementioned time frames. Similarly, NR members made sure to preserve the sense of the threat from within, the dangerous 'others' which threatened the security and the cohesion of French society. In this aspect, the two parties are quite similar; their ideal of social purity and unity is a constantly repeated in their discourse.

The excerpts showcase several important differences between the discourses of the two parties. GD speakers are rude and abrasive, even going as far to label the immigrants as trash. Marine Le Pen's vocabulary is devoid of such excesses, even after the terrorist attacks across Europe. Most importantly, she does not neglect to offer her own policy alternatives in order to resolve the crisis. In the case of GD, the discourse of the MP's did not include this vital component. Therefore, the party remained solely focused on protesting the policies. While both parties consistently utilised the core frame of "us" versus "them", NR offered a more robust discursive framework which: 1) created a sense of urgency, 2) successfully attributed the blame for the crisis, and 3) created the division between 'the people', 'the elite' and 'the dangerous others'. The deficiency in GD's framing becomes apparent once more via the examination of the selected excerpts. The MPs solely focus on accentuating the severity of the crisis in line with their ultra-nationalist discourse and relentlessly attack the immigrants and their political opponents. Therefore, their framing stops at the diagnostic stage and the framing contest on policy alternatives never takes place.

4.6 Conclusion

The anti EU frames along with the issue of national sovereignty and anti-immigration stance are intrinsically linked with the nationalist identity of both parties, and as a result they are always present. The External Policy frames function as a binding agent since they ensure that the element of conflict, so vital for the continued relevance of both parties, persists via the identification of additional enemies. Other framing areas such as the economy and the political system can easily be linked with these particular frames. The compliance of government policy to EU directives provides a plethora of opportunities for both parties to mix and match other frames along with the external policy ones as the excerpts have shown in order to present various problems as more severe, and identify the cause as a lack of leadership and national sovereignty.

Furthermore, the EU is faceless and this attribute makes it the perfect enemy for their attacks. Unlike their political opponents, the EU and its representatives cannot enter the political arena and compete against these parties in an active manner, and the only way they are judged is by the outcomes of their policies. Therefore, both NR and GD would not miss the opportunity to include another enemy within their discourse in order to unite the citizenry under their banner. However, this is the point where the similarities end since as it previously

mentioned these parties are at different evolutionary stages. NR has come a long way since its inception back in 1972, and serious attempts have been made in order to soften the party's image under the leadership of Marine Le Pen. While the element of conflict is prevalent in their discourse, it is utilised in a more sophisticated way as opposed to GD. Finally, GD solely focuses on the problem and their attack against their opponents, while NR seamlessly blends these two attributes along with their own counterproposals.

Every single GD MP attacked the EU by exclusively focusing on the negative aspects of their policies, and only repeated that their party is the sole bulwark against them, without elaborating on the alternative which they could offer should they come into power. Simply put, NR has matured throughout its long course and has learned its lessons from the past by pursuing the principles of modernisation and pragmatism, while GD remained somewhat limited in terms of its ability to appeal to a broader audience and unable or unwilling to break away from its ultra-nationalist far right identity. The excerpts for GD lacked the prognostic component within their framing as opposed to NR's.

Therefore, the last framing contest as it was defined in the typology by Hart and Tindall where political actors suggest policy changes was absent in the discourse of GD. These differences are important, and they will be further analysed in the next chapters which will focus on how these parties frame economic issues and their anti-systemic identity in the political system. In the case of the former the External Policy frames will be frequently utilised in tandem with the Economic ones, since one of the main functions of the EU is the harmonisation of economic policies and the balancing of state budgets. Thus, the next chapter will better showcase how both GD and NR utilise the economic crisis as the fulcrum of their criticisms regarding how the EU and their respective governments have handled it.

Chapter 5: The Economy

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will examine how the two parties have framed the economic crisis within their discourse. The crisis began in 2009 and still affects the member states of the EU to varying degrees. In addition, the crisis has simultaneously created a new context for party competition, augmented the politicisation of European issues and finally led to widespread voter pessimism (Ivaldi, 2018). As mentioned in Chapter 2, crises serve as the impetus for framing competitions to take place in relation to diagnosing their causes, accessing their severity and what policy changes must be implemented for their successful resolution. These framing competitions are linked to the primary research question of the thesis, and will make the examination of the parties' discursive strategies possible. Moreover, the identification of the causes and subsequent blame attribution are linked with the second research question, and will showcase how the crisis context affects the type of populism that is being supplied. The Chapter will examine how the core populist framing mechanism where 'the people' are pitted against 'the elite' is employed in relation to the crisis. In the case of the economic crisis 'the elite' can be the government, the banking sector and the financial markets.

The first part of the chapter provides a brief background on the economy of the two case studies, as well as how they have framed the economic crisis, their criticisms towards the interventionism of the EU and the linking of the economic crisis with a broader crisis of representation. The chapter then progresses with the analysis of the data. The first framing topic is the economy of the two countries and how it has been affected by the crisis. This part is linked with the previous one and Chapter 4, since the issues of national sovereignty and democratic representation are part of their crisis framing. The next part analyses the framing of the banking sector crisis. Here the two parties frame the crisis in relation to their division between 'the people' and 'the elite', and also attack their political opponents by claiming that they have sacrificed popular sovereignty for the sake of the economy.

This mode of framing is present in the next part where the parties criticise their respective governments on the issue of privatisations and austerity measures. The final part of the chapter examines two different frames employed by the parties. In the case of Greece, GD's frames deal with their attacks towards the IMF and Greece's creditors. For France the new

enemy that is identified is the global capitalist system and the markets. Two different frames that are representative of the unique socio-economic circumstances identified at the beginning of the chapter. The chapter concludes with an overall assessment on how the two parties have framed the topics associated with the economic crisis and how it is linked with the subsequent empirical chapters in the thesis.

5.2 Ground Zero

The continuous evolution of the capitalist economy under neoliberalism did not only redefine the way which spatial and temporal boundaries are perceived, but also how crises are conceptualised. The crises of legitimacy themselves have also changed due to the increased permeation of the economic system in all aspects of human life, and now they do not only include the state and the wage earners but also the capital-as-actor (no longer only as machinery and other resources) (Streeck, 2014:21). Therefore, the political system must not only legitimate itself among the voters but also the profit-dependent owners and managers of capital (Streeck, 2014:21). However, the demands of the latter are far more important than those of the citizens, since they are the ones which can ensure the stability of the global economy.

The two countries which are the focus of the thesis are significantly different in terms of their economy. Yet still, their respective governments have been forced to implement austerity policies under the directives of the European Commission in order to prevent the collapse of the Eurozone. Since the onset of the crisis the legitimacy and tasks of the state have become inseparable with economic growth and maintaining competitiveness on a global level, and as a result the economy has become the sole organising and regulative principle (Brown, 2015:40). Greece has been at the forefront of the crisis and has often been described as the 'sick man' of Europe. Its fragile economy threatened the common currency and its continued membership in the monetary union, and as a result drastic measures had to be taken (Vasilopoulou, 2018:311).

Of course, the state of Greece's economy was the result of 30 years of populist politics, where the public sector effectively became the employer of party clients coupled with a steep increase in public expenditures and decreasing productivity (Pappas, 2014). Consequently, it came as no surprise that the initial reaction to Greece's sovereign debt crisis by the other

member states was outrage. On the other hand, France's economy has not been plagued by the aforementioned maladies. Yet still, the French economy after the end of the Second World War was largely moulded by the doctrine of *dirigisme*, which combined the encouragement of inflation and frequent devaluations and a greater amount of interventionism by the state (Ansaloni & Smith, 2018:156). The country had been ravaged by the war, and the direct intervention of state via central planning was the most sensible choice. The death knell for this model was the presidency of Mitterand during the 80s, where there was a U-turn towards liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation:

The 1980s brought the *dirigiste* era to a close. Ever since the state has progressively abandoned the interventionist tools it once forged for itself [...]. Neo-liberalization has redefined the status of the state, restored the prestige of company directors and modified the very terms under which economic competition takes place (Denord & Lagneau-Ymonet 2016: 14)²³.

Greece is a unique case since the age of plenty which the citizens enjoyed for over 30 years, was essentially an artifice, whereas France whom maintained interventionism to a certain extent is on par with the other western democracies in terms of economic development. However, both countries have been forced to submit to the will of the markets, despite the differences in how severely their economies have been affected. It all comes down to the most important principles of democracy, which is the freedom of choice.

The ascendancy of populist politics is a warning sign that there is something wrong with democracy, and these parties present themselves as a panacea to the laypeople's growing frustrations and anger over party politics (de la Torre, 2015). Up until the crisis, the European project was promoted with the assistance of political elites pretty much in an autonomous way, and the permissive consensus was achieved due to the fact that the EU was a community of winners (Habermas, 2015:77). In the post-crisis period, the EU increasingly abandoned the model of financial stimulation and moved towards economic consolidation, by utilising both austerity and structural change, with an emphasis on

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²³ In a similar vein Wendy Brown mentions how neoliberalism essentially became the most sensible choice in determining how to best stabilise the economy: 'While neoliberal policy was often imposed through fiat and force in the 1970s and 1980s, neoliberalization in the Euro-Atlantic world today is more often enacted through specific techniques of governance, through best practices and legal tweaks, in short, through 'soft power' drawing on consensus and buy-in, than through violence, dictatorial command, or even overt political platforms. Neoliberalism governs as sophisticated common sense, a reality principle remaking institutions and human beings everywhere it settles, nestles, and gains affirmation.' (Brown, 2015:35)

prevention and the enforcement of discipline towards the member states which deviated from its fiscal rules (Hermann, 2017:63).

Both parties have proven quite capable in seizing opportunities presented by watershed moments in the European integration process, such as the economic and refuge crises (Leruth et al., 2017:9). As a result, their firm opposition towards the EU and globalisation should be viewed as a pragmatic component of their strategy aimed towards the obtainment of legitimacy. The indecisiveness of the mainstream political elite has created a vacuum which was filled in by populist parties. In addition, the EU itself has been an elite-driven project since its inception, and the rise in populist sentiment: '...is essentially an illiberal democratic response to decades of undemocratic liberal policies.' (Mudde, 2015).

5.3 It's the Economy Stupid!

Each successive crisis has been assimilated by the rhetoric of these two parties, and combined with the core tenets of their ideology. Their anti-migrant rhetoric gained greater support and validity after the onset of the 2015 migrant crisis, and before that their relentless attacks on globalisation and the fiscal and economic policies of the EU were finally justified by the economic crisis. Both parties have managed to reframe the crises and link them with other aspects of their discourse, such as their criticisms of the EU's interventionism and the submissiveness of the political elite. In addition, the element of accentuating the negative aspects is prevalent in the entirety of their articulations as it will be showcased by the excerpts about the failing performance of the economy.

How government policies affect the economy is an important criterion through which the citizens evaluate the government's overall performance. Therefore, economic crises are the easy to politicise, and link with issues related to the ultra-nationalist identity of these parties. Mainstream political parties are in a deadlock situation, and have become easy prey for the parties of the populist right. Most importantly, the issues of political legitimacy and national sovereignty have become paramount since policies are made for the people but not by them (Offe, 2015:56-57). The next part will examine the utilisation of the specific frame within the discourse of the two via content analysis, which will then be followed by a discourse analysis of excerpts regarding their diagnosis of the issue, the identification of the causes and possible solutions.

5.3.1 Frame Salience: The Economy

The frames about economy were almost always present in the rhetoric of both parties; any increase in the number of references per month was caused by specific and differentiating factors. In the case of GD the largest spikes in the utilisation of this frame occurred in 2014 and 2015 respectively. More specifically, during the month of April in 2014 there was a significant increase as seen on Figure 5.2. This was caused by the fact that on 30 March the government had passed a new multi-bill, which would allow Greece to receive its next bailout payment. The multi-bill included reforms in four different sectors: tourism, food processing, building materials and retail (116th Parliamentary Meeting, 2014:9441-9451). In addition, the legislation restructured the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF), in order to facilitate the recapitalisation of privately owned banks (116th Parliamentary Meeting, 2014).




Figure 5.1 Salience of the Economy Frame: Golden Dawn 2012-2013

This would not be the only battle about the economy that would take place within the Greek parliament, since the government was busy drafting an additional austerity package, in order to plan out the economic policy for the next four years. The bill froze wages and pensions until 2018 and included significant cuts of 5.5 billion Euros in public expenditures, such as the National Health Care System (135th Parliamentary Meeting, 2014:11841-11891). The other significant increase occurred in 2015 in September, during the election period. Out of all the years of the crisis, 2015 can be considered as the most tumultuous for Greece since its EU membership, political and economic stability all hung in the balance. GD would not miss

the opportunity to attack the parties of the governing coalition as well as the previous government regarding the way they handled the crisis. The frames associated with criticisms regarding the economy rose by an unprecedented 800%, the highest during the four-year period, and increased by 16.67% and 4.76% for the next two months as shown from Table A14 in Appendix A.




Figure 5.2 Salience of the Economy Frame: Golden Dawn 2014-2015

NR's framing of the economy was more stable over time, and did not exhibit the same dramatic increases its Greek counterpart. The most notable spikes occurred on November of 2012 and March of 2017 at 600% each, as seen on Tables B2 and B14 in Appendix B. In the case of the latter, the increase occurred during the two-month election period, where Marine Le Pen continuously criticised the economic policies of Francois Hollande. Furthermore, notable increases occurred every May as it can be observed in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. The specific month is associated with the International Workers' Day and most importantly the events of 1968. As a result, there is a deep reservoir of historical significance which the party can utilise.




Figure 5.3 Salience of the Economy Frame: National Rally 2012-2013

As for March in 2017 the main reasons behind the increase in the utilisation of the economy frames were the French presidential elections. After 5 years, the Socialist party's popularity had declined under the leadership of Francois Hollande, with his approval ratings reaching only a meagre 15% in the beginning of 2017 (*Le Barometre de la Confiance Politique (Vague 8)*, 2017:34). The perceptions of the public regarding the economy were similarly grim since 60% of them answered that they believed that the economic situation in France has degraded, and 64% of them answered that they believed that the younger generation had less chances to succeed than their parents (*Le Barometre de la Confiance Politique (Vague 8)*, 2017:67-68).




Figure 5.4 Salience of the Economy Frame: National Rally 2016-2017

There is a similar trend in Greece, where in a research conducted in 2016, 60.5% of the respondents answered that they did not believe that the country would be able to get out of the crisis in the span of 10 years (*Ti Pistevoun oi Ellines*, 2017:37). Most importantly, 93.6 of the respondents answered that the cause for the crisis was the corruption and inadequacy of the current and previous governments (*Ti Pistevoun oi Ellines*, 2017:167). Therefore, in the minds of the Greek citizens the political system is mainly responsible for the dire situation that the economy is currently in, as opposed to other factors such as joining the EU, where only 41.4% of the respondents answered that Greece's membership had caused the crisis (*Ti Pistevoun oi Ellines*, 2017:167). The statistics showcase that the citizens in both countries are not entirely hostile to the EU and its economic policies, but they do blame the political system since they have perceived it as incapable of safeguarding their rights and interests.

5.3.2 Discourse Analysis

The quantitative analysis showcased that the salience of the Economy frame followed a more stable pattern in the case of NR. However it is important to also examine the qualitative similarities and differences in the discourse of the two parties through excerpts that were chosen. The excerpt for GD is taken from 2014, one and a half months after the EU imposed sanctions against Russia, including an embargo in trade relations. The speaker is Dimitrios Koukoutsis, a GD MP:

I will read a small excerpt from an article which was published yesterday: 'The Greek economy has suffered losses close to 50 million Euros due to the embargo against Russia, according to conservative estimates. The fruit production, fishing and transportation industries are literally on their knees. The losses are evenly distributed and are predicted to increase since the export season is fast approaching for some of these products.'[...] Unfortunately the government agreed to the sanctions without offering any substantial counterproposals. They dragged themselves in this disastrous situation for our country, only to prove once more that they are the mouthpiece of their master's voice and disregarded the interests of our people. This is the simple reason we are unwilling to vote for any of these agreements. (Koukoutsis, 2014:2727).

The excerpt for NR is part of an interview that Marine Le Pen gave to the magazine 'Foreign Affairs':

What I want is a negotiation. What I want is a concerted exit from the European Union, where all the countries sit around the table and decide to return to the European 'currency snake' (a 1970s policy designed to limit exchange-rate variations), which allows each country to adapt its monetary policy to its own economy. That's what I want. I want it to be done gently and in a coordinated manner.

A lot of countries are now realising that they can't keep living with the euro, because its counterpart is a policy of austerity, which has aggravated the recession in various countries. I refer you to the book that the economist Joseph Stiglitz has just written, which makes very clear that this currency is completely maladapted to our economies and is one of the reasons there is so much unemployment in the European Union. So either we get there through negotiation or we hold a referendum like Britain and decide to regain control of our currency. (Le Pen, 2016).

Both of these excerpts include certain characteristics which exemplify right-wing populist rhetoric. The first which has often been referred as its core is the demarcation between the virtuous and homogenous national people against self-serving 'powers- that- be' (Mudde, 2004:543). Both speakers attacked the EU, and addressed the issue of national sovereignty. However, Marine Le Pen is more sophisticated in her criticisms, and she aptly binds together the issues of the economy, democratic representation, and national sovereignty. In addition,

her solution includes the negotiation between the different states and a policy alternative which was used effectively in the past. GD's framing is purely diagnostic in this excerpt, and while the speaker evaluates the severity of the crisis and attributes the blame towards the government and Greece's creditors, he never offers a counter-proposal to the austerity measures. In addition, he makes no reference about his party having a program that could potentially end the crisis. As a result, the prognostic component that includes solutions is completely absent in that case.

5.4 Human Capital versus Bank Capital

Another often utilised frame within the rhetoric of both parties is the criticism of the banking system, and how it has further aggravated the economic crisis. Due to the disembedding effect of globalisation, the political system has lost much of its dynamism while the small circles of overlapping business lobbyists and economic elites have risen to prominence²⁴. According to Brigitte Young, calling the present Eurozone crisis a sovereign debt crisis is actually a misnomer since its main cause was the transformation of the private banking sector debt into public sector debt via consecutive bail-outs (2014). The crisis was redefined by political and corporate leaders, as having been caused by excessive public spending in order to be able to implement permanent reductions on the welfare state in the afflicted countries (Crouch, 2016:72).

In reality, the cheap money provided by the banks in combination with their extensive risk taking in terms of lending, and the secular decline in growth rates of advanced economies created the first fault lines that would undermine the stability of the global economy (Offe, 2015). The fiscal deficit rose due to the rescue operations of national banks, the extensive tax revenue losses due to the meltdown of the real economy, the rising unemployment and the decline in incomes (De Grauwe, 2010). It was one of the moments where what was politically necessary could finally become compatible with what was deemed as desirable from the

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²⁴ According to Colin Crouch this process is attributable to three factors: 1) the political parties of Western Democracies were based on religious and class antagonisms initially. Later on, these antagonisms were phased out and the struggle for inclusion was minimized. However, this was not applicable to the global class of major share holders and business executives, who were united under a common ideology (neoliberalism) and also had the power to influence the political system. 2) the onset of economic globalisation and how power became increasingly exercised by international business interests, and 3) as a result of these two factors, the political system was reduced to an empty shell, being increasingly unable to relate with the voters, while business elites provided guidance regarding policy making by utilising combination of offers, threats and ideology (Crouch, 2016:71).

neoliberal point of view. The impending doom of the international banking system compelled public authorities to join the battle for economic stability with greater vigour, but their struggle has been for naught according to Wolfgang Streeck:

Since 2008, governments have had little or no idea how to clear away the debris of the financial crisis and recreate some kind of order- a task that certainly cannot be privatized. In the measures taken by governments and central banks to save the private banking system, the distinction between public and private money has become increasingly irrelevant, and finally with the takeover of bad loans, it became clear how seamlessly the one passed into the other. Today it is virtually impossible to tell where the state ends and the market begins, and whether governments have been nationalizing banks, or banks have been privatizing the state. (Streeck, 2014:40).

Therefore, the banks are another faceless enemy against which the people must unite, according to the parties of the populist- right since they are an extension of the global financial system. The next part will look at how the specific issue was framed by the two parties.

5.4.1 Frame Salience: Banking System

Additional points of divergence can be observed in the quantitative data for both parties. A closer inspection of Figures 5.5 and 5.6 reveals that the utilisation of these frames was sporadic up until 2015, with a few notable increases occurring from 2012 to 2014. More specifically, the first notable increase occurred in January 2013 and then rapidly decreased with no banking frames being utilised in the next two months. The cause for this brief increase was a new bill passed in the parliament between the 11th and 14th of January which would facilitate the payment of interest rates by the Bank of Greece and the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund towards the European Financial Stability Facility. As usual, the MP's smelled blood and were all too eager to harshly criticise the government for selling out Greece to the bankers.




Figure 5.5 Salience of the Banking Sector Frame: Golden Dawn 2012-2013

In 2014 only two months exhibited a significant increase in the utilisation of banking sector frames, in March and July. As it was previously mentioned, on the 30th of March the parliament passed a new multi-bill as a prerequisite for Greece to receive its next bailout payment. On the other hand, July was a relatively quiet month, but there was one particular topic of discussion which fanned the flames of 'righteous fury' for GD, and that was the privatisation of 30% of the Public Power Corporation's (*Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou*) total assets. Despite the fact that privatisations generally provide an opening to criticise the government, the EU and the IMF, the party did not miss the chance to mention that the greatest amount of the bailout loans were utilised by the banks in order to prevent their collapse.

The banking frames would subsequently be used more frequently during 2015, a year which was initially considered as a turning point for Greek politics after SYRIZA's ascension to power. As it can be observed from 5.6, August was the only month where no banking frames were incorporated in the party's discourse. The reason behind this sudden decline was the fact that the referendum took place at the end of the previous month and the party was mainly preoccupied with attacking the government for what they considered as a betrayal of Greece. The next two months exhibited a notable increase at where the utilisation of the bank frames reached its peak with 57 total references in October, and the highest in the span of 4 years, since elections were held for the second time in September and the newly elected government had to pass the 12th austerity package on the 16th of October.




Figure 5.6 Salience of the Banking Sector Frame: Golden Dawn 2014-2015

NR's utilisation of the bank frames showed more consistency, with extreme fluctuations being relatively rare during the four year period. As usual, the most significant increases were observed during May and the election periods of 2012 and 2017 as shown in Figures 5.7 and 5.8, where campaigning activities would inevitably intensify. There were some notable exceptions to this trend such as in the case of May 2012, where the number of references decreased to only 2 as opposed to the high point between January and March, but this can be attributed to the fact that the party failed to progress to the second round of the presidential elections. Other cases where the incorporation of these frames increased were the months of September and December, where Marine Le Pen traditionally gives speeches to the French public which are not solely restricted on the economy but include a plethora of different issues such as migration, the need to improve policing and most importantly the failings of the government.




Figure 5.7 Salience of the Banking Sector Frame: National Rally 2012-2013

Lastly, the period where the most noticeable increase can be observed are the elections of 2017. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter the party had gained a significant amount of momentum, and they were certain that they would win this time. Francois Hollande and the Socialist party had been found wanting, while Francois Fillon, the candidate representing the Right had been recently embroidered in a scandal that severely damaged his credibility. The only contender capable of winning the elections was the relatively unknown and untested Emmanuel Macron, and as such the party held the view that the field was clear for them to finally seize power.

The banking sector references went from only 8 references in February to 57 in the next month. There was a slight decrease in their inclusion within their rhetoric in April and they once again increased in May, where the final round of the presidential elections would take place with 42 references in total. This fluctuation is attributable to the fact that the first round included a variety of candidates, and once the smoke cleared and Le Pen and Macron stood as the two finalists. As a result, the party had to capitalise on the opening they were provided with and once again attacked their opponent based on his past as a banker.




Figure 5.8 Salience of the Banking Sector Frame: National Rally 2016-2017

5.4.2 Discourse Analysis

The analysis will now move on to the qualitative aspects of the two parties' discourses. For this purpose four excerpts have been chosen, and two of them are taken from election speeches since in both cases the significant spikes in the number of references occurred during the election periods. GD's first excerpt is taken from a parliamentary meeting which took place on the 13 November:

The previous governments are also responsible for the country's pitiful condition, with the policies they implemented in the last 30 years.

It would be impossible to leave out the parties of New Democracy and PASOK, in a conversation about non-performing loans. Both of them owe hundreds of millions of Euros to former banking giants like the Agricultural Bank of Greece, which they gifted overnight to mister Sallas, the main shareholder of Piraeus Bank. [...] We are also well aware of the triangle of corruption in Greece, comprised by the government, the mass media and the banks.

Even now, where the majority of the citizens live in poverty the Ministers of Finance pass one bill after the other, while simultaneously changing the previous legislation in a futile attempt to keep the banks standing instead of helping the over indebted Greeks. (Gregos, 2014:1607).

For GD the references regarding the banks during the election periods are mostly utilised in an attempt to further accentuate the division between the people and the elite, as shown by the second excerpt taken from the party's pre-election rally in Athens:

The day after the elections, the pro-austerity front, the national and international loan sharks, the illegal immigrants, the bankers and all the traitors who plan the destruction of our nation will unleash their attack. As such, we must resist not only on the 20th of September but also the day after. Because fortunately or unfortunately in this country, GD is the last bastion of resistance against chaos. [...] We must convince the remaining Greeks that we have nothing to fear. That the bank shutdown and the capital controls will not bring chaos. The true bringers of chaos are those who make these claims. They are the same people who caused the financial ruination of our country in the past five years. (Panagiotaros, 2015).

The first excerpt is taken from Marine Le Pen's annual speech on the 1st of May:

How is it possible to be indifferent, and not ready to defend France's interests? How is it possible to accept that the ECB threatens to cut off the liquidity supply to our banks, as it previously did to Greece and Portugal, to make us accept the policies which our people have rejected?

From the moment of my election, I will engage in negotiations with the European Institutions and take the necessary steps for the establishment of mechanisms which will allow us to restore our national currencies. Therefore, any nation in the EU will have the opportunity to mobilise at any time. [...] I do not wish to cut France off from the rest of the world, but to recover the abandoned instruments of national sovereignty. (Le Pen, 2016).

In the case of the 2017 elections, Emmanuel Macron's previous employment at *Rothschild & Sie Banque* was often referenced as shown by the second excerpt taken from a speech on the 18th of March 2017:

After earning nearly three million Euros by working at Rothschild for three years, he declared financial assets that were thirty times lower. This man there does not know how to manage his business, and he will not know how to manage France. It is quite obvious to me that Macron and Fillon are the puppets of the EU. They are the puppets of finance. They dream of finalising France's liquidation, its independence, its national

identity, its democracy, its social model and they want to give the keys to power to the big finance. They dream of becoming Vice-Chancellor to Madam Merkel or a spokesperson for the Brussels Commission. (Phillipot, 2017).

A common characteristic that can be observed in the excerpts for both case studies is that they utilised the banks in order to identify another potential threat during the election period. This particular type of framing does not change in a significant way during the periods where no elections take place. In these excerpts the centrepiece is the nation and the issue of national sovereignty. This is an important characteristic of the right-wing populism since the collective identity of 'the people' is often used interchangeably with the nation, as it was mentioned in Chapter 2. However, any propositions for policy alternatives are absent from GD's discourse. Le Pen on the other hand proposes the return to national currencies as a tool to regulating the national economy. Most importantly, she does not propose that France should leave the EU, but rather that France should be the first to demand changes in the Union's economic planning. The main problem with GD's framing becomes apparent again since the speakers do not propose any solutions regarding the banking sector. What is also interesting is that this deficiency in their framing is also present during the election period. During the elections the parties compete among themselves in order to garner support, and as a result this would be the most ideal opportunity to present their own policy program to the voters. Therefore, GD's framing in the excerpts is solely centred on the diagnostic aspect of framing.

Similar to the EU, banks are presented as a faceless enemy. The majority does not fully comprehend how they played the part in the catastrophe which first unfolded in 2008. In this period of uncertainty the citizens were forced to face the increased complexity of the world they inhabited, and how the interlocking relationships between the economy and other state institutions created a butterfly effect. Most of them are unable to fathom the level of interconnectedness between the different systems, and as a result they usually form their opinions based on the simplifications provided by experts. Thus, these parties do not need to provide a meticulous analysis of how the banking sector played a part in the onset and perpetuation of the crisis, but rather, they must ensure that they will continuously blame them for the misery they have brought upon 'the people'. Framing as a process is dependent upon the changing structural conditions, and as a result one meaning may become more easily accepted than the other if the general consensus has changed. More specifically, in the case of France trust in the banking sector has been exceptionally low for almost a decade.

The lowest percentage of trust in France was recorded in December 2010, where only 20% of the sample responded that they trusted the banking system, and in the upcoming years there was only a slight increase, where the total of positive responses reached 27% in December 2017 (Le Barometre de la Confiance Politique (Vague 9), 2018:27). Similarly in Greece, only 27.9% of the sample from a research conducted between January and February 2018 responded that they trusted the banking sector (Ti Pistevoun oi Ellines, 2017:435). The diminishment of trust by the Greek citizens towards the banking sector is largely attributable to the repeated bailouts the private banks have received since the onset of the crisis, and the widespread panic which was caused by the enforcement of capital controls when the Greek government failed to reach an agreement with its creditors. The uncertainty produced by the crisis coupled with it's truly Gordian nature greatly benefits these parties, since their rhetoric is based on vagueness; meaning that they are able to mould the collective consensus more easily by gathering the pieces left by the crisis and amalgamating them with their own framing by using the feelings of resentment, confusion and despair as the binding agents. Since the crisis has not ended yet neither by the interventionism of the EU or the individual efforts of nation states, the context for employing their populist discourse will always be present.

5.5 The Operation Was Successful, but the Patient Died

Whatever the origins of the debts may be, the governments must ultimately choose between defaulting or painful consolidation programs (Basevi & D' Adda, 2014:14). This is another important aspect of the crisis itself, since the EU has put itself in a deadlock situation where any type of divergence from austerity will inevitably lead to further sanctions in order to ensure that fiscal discipline is maintained. The dogmatic persistence towards austerity and strict fiscal control is the very essence of neoliberal politics and has prevented the member states from adopting a more interventionist Keynesian approach. This creates a knock-on effect since the states wish to reduce public spending and may resort to reducing any liabilities associated with it (Corbett & Walker, 2019:95). The social aspect of policy making becomes increasingly dependent upon economic integration and fiscal rules, and this has proven detrimental for the citizens of failing national economies (Copeland & Daly, 2015). Furthermore, this emphasis on strict monitoring and control is the direct opposite of the *laissez-faire* concept which is characterised by relative passivity, since the core belief of the

particular economic system is that the economy operates in an organic manner; and as a result it will always stabilise itself if left undisturbed²⁵.

This line of reasoning may hold some merit, since stricter control could potentially stabilise the chaotic situation prevalent in the economy, but it has also created significant backlash by the EU members who may feel that their national sovereignty has been sacrificed for the sake of the markets. Wolfgang Streeck has identified four lines of continuity in the actions of the EU and its leading states since the onset of the crisis, despite the general disarray: 1) The markets must be spared of any cost from rescuing insolvent states. As a result, other states and in extension their citizens must shoulder this burden. 2) Private Banks which are facing collapse should not be rescued via nationalisation but through the expenditure of public funds. 3) Insolvent states must be prevented from defaulting or rescheduling their debt unilaterally at all costs. 4) If the financial crisis can only be dealt with a general devaluation of debt, it must be done through a long and soft process in order to protect large investors against sudden losses. (Streeck, 2014:152-153).

Most national governments and political parties tend to avoid implementing such policies on their own, and prefer to transfer their responsibilities to the European Commission since their voters may become mutinous (Habermas, 2013). This creates a situation where democracy is slowly falling by the way side for the sake of the economy, and the parties of the populist - right are eager to claim that they are the only ones who can reverse this decline. Their rhetoric about the economy would not be complete if it did not incorporate harsh criticisms towards the implementation of austerity, privatisations and the global economic system. While there are similarities, there are also important differences in the way that both parties utilise this part of their rhetoric.

The first and most significant difference is the fact that GD is solely focused on the memoranda between Greece and the IMF, while NR has identified the Financial Markets and Globalisation as the country's greatest threats. Furthermore, NR MP's have been extremely

²⁵ Friedrich Hayek was firmly against the *laissez-faire* economic system and notoriously opined: 'There is nothing in the basic principles of liberalism to make it a stationary creed, there are no hard-and-fast rules fixed once and for all. The fundamental principle that in the ordering of our affairs we should make as much use as possible of the spontaneous forces of society, and resort as little as possible to coercion, is capable of an infinite variety of applications. There is, in particular, all the difference between deliberately creating a system within which competition will work as beneficially as possible, and passively accepting institutions as they are. Probably nothing has done as much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden insistence of some liberals on certain rough rules of thumb, above all the principle of *laissez-faire*.' (Hayek 2001[1944]:18)

hostile towards the common currency and have identified it as a burden to the French economy, whereas GD has abstained from such criticisms. These differences are fundamental and representative of the unique economic circumstances within each country and must be examined. Crucially, the identification of potential enemies that threaten the sovereignty of the people is not only related to populist discourses but also to diagnosing the causes of a crisis and attributing blame as it was mentioned in Chapter 3. The next frame which will be analysed is one shared by both parties, and focuses on privatisations. Of course, both parties colour their performance with a good amount of righteous fury since they describe these processes as sell-outs; sacrifices for the global capitalist system whom the ruling parties obediently serve.

5.5.1 Frame Salience: Privatisations

The frequency of utilisation for the specific frame was relatively similar for both parties, since fluctuations were triggered by specific events. In the case of Greece any type of increase was always linked with the country's financial woes, such the adoption of new austerity packages, or the elections. Likewise in France, the party utilised this frame when significant privatisations in the public sector occurred, and during the elections, with the only noticeable difference once again being the month of May due to its historical and symbolic significance. However, NR carefully observes events as they unfold and makes its presence known immediately, not only as a critic but also as a party that can become the new government.




Figure 5.9 Salience of Privatisations Frame: Golden Dawn 2012-2013

A notable example of this trend for Greece would be the months of October and November in 2012, when the coalition government was in negotiations with the country's creditors in order to create a fiscal plan which would be implemented with the adoption of the 7th austerity package. As shown in Figure 5.9 the references rose rapidly. Still, there were other cases where the party found the opportunity to accuse their political opponents of selling out the country such as in August 2013 when the 8th austerity package was adopted, and the elections held in September 2015.




Figure 5.10 Salience of Privatisations Frame: Golden Dawn 2014-2017

For France, one of the most significant increases can be observed during the months of September and October in 2016 when the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), was signed between the EU and Canada. The MP's of NR bitterly opposed the signing of the treaty, since according to them it would weaken European consumer rights, and would only benefit large multinational corporations. The number of references for this frame rose significantly during September as shown in Figure 5.11. This amounted to a 1700% increase for that month, and only decreased slightly in the next one as it can be observed in Table B10 in Appendix B.




Figure 5.11 Salience of Privatisations Frame: National Rally 2012-2013

This would be the most significant boom the specific frame would experience, up until the elections of 2017. Overall, the utilisation of this specific frame did not exhibit any significant differences between the parties since two of their core characteristics in terms of economic policies are the opposition to privatisations.




Figure 5.12 Salience of Privatisations Frame: National Rally 2016-2017

5.5.2 Discourse Analysis

Overall, the utilisation of this specific frame did not exhibit any significant differences between the parties. Therefore, it is imperative to examine their respective framing in a qualitative manner. The excerpt for GD is taken from a parliamentary meeting which took place on the 29th of August 2013. Usually, summertime is considered as a 'dead period' and as a result most topics of discussion and bills cannot be considered as significant. This particular meeting was a notable exception, since one of the bills included the privatisation of the Greek Organisation of Football Prognostics (*OPAP*). This particular company remains one of the most profitable ones in Greece, and its privatisation caused uproar from the parties belonging to the opposition since the entire purpose for such a process is to unburden the state from ailing companies:

It is a purely economic matter. We are being told that this is an economic matter. You insist that the agreement to sell *OPAP* and the State Lotteries is profitable for the Greek state. We have one important question: First of all, you sell something either because someone is holding a gun to your head and you are unable to make the choice based on whether it is beneficial or not or you keep it because it's the goose that lays golden eggs.

[...] When this story about the memoranda first started and the EU had appointed its *gauleiters*, the foreign commissioners, in every ministry you were saying: 'There is no way this could happen. We cannot turn over our national sovereignty.'. And what is happening now? Every prime minister is a secretary to these guys appointed by the EU in every ministry. (Panagiotaros, 2013:943)

The second excerpt is taken from the 28th Parliamentary Meeting where the government passed a series of austerity measures as part of the new agreement with Greece's creditors (28th Parliamentary Meeting, 2015:2277). The speaker is Ilias Kasidiaris, and the topic of discussion is the planned privatisations of several Greek companies:

You are carrying out a plan which aims to destroy Greece. Most recently, you sold out the airports, companies that bloomed financially and produced wealth. When a house is about to be repossessed, it does not sell out a company which brings it revenue. You cannot sell companies which bring revenue to the state coffers. This is why we say that your goal is to destroy the country, because your policies will lead us there, without a doubt. Only taxes, zero productivity, the theft of housing. The last act in this drama will be the selling out of energy, the selling out of the country's mineral resources. (Kasidiaris, 2015:2305).

The first excerpt for NR is taken from a speech that Marine Le Pen gave on the 9th of December 2016, and one of the topics she spoke about was a new bill aiming to reform social security and finally balancing the budget which had exhibited significant deficits since 2002:

This 'removal from state control', as he himself says, is nothing but privatisation which will result at an extra cost of 100€ per month for a family with two children. For a man who frequently talks about the family in his campaign speeches, he has certainly put some considerable effort in burdening them; especially during a time where the poverty rate continues to grow and 9 million French citizens live below the poverty line. [...] the most disadvantaged will be forced to take an insurance contract from the complementary private market, whose prices will inevitably explode in view of the transfer of repayments for health insurance. In short, let's destroy Social Security and subsidise insurance indirectly. (Le Pen, 2016).

The second excerpt is a press statement that by Florian Philippot on the 22nd of February 2013:

The European Commission confirms our economic forecasts and analyses: France and the Eurozone are in a much greater slump than our UMP and PS leaders want to admit. The Eurozone, which is sinking by the single currency, would be worse off than the rest of the European Union in 2013, with a recession, but also with significantly higher debt and unemployment. But Brussels proposes to aggravate the evil instead of solving it![...]In other words, Europe wants to turn France and the countries of the euro zone into Greece, while it should instead take into account the lamentable failures of this policy in Greece! France and the European Union will emerge from the doldrums only if we radically change our economic model: rearm in the face of savage globalisation by intelligent national protectionism, break with the dogma of the euro, and economic patriotism to boost our VSEs, SMEs and SMIs. (Philippot, 2013).

The excerpts from both parties are characterised by undertones of aggression, and the speaker from GD has veered off into verbally attacking and insulting his political opponents in a vulgar manner as most MP's from his party frequently do. Most importantly, all the speakers over-emphasise the negative aspects in a given situation in order to gain the moral high ground. In the case of GD this is achievable via the issue of national sovereignty, since the government is following the directives of the EU and the IMF, and the speaker goes as far as to call the EU commissioners *gauleiters*, the regional leaders of the Nazi Party. NR has taken a different approach since France is not in a state of supervision by the EU, and the speakers mention how families will be adversely affected by the re-structuring of social security in order to accuse the government of hypocrisy. Two different approaches, characterised by different settings, but in the end all too similar since the core of their message is a moral dualism. Furthermore, in the case of GD the main focal point is the nation itself and the issue of national sovereignty, whereas in the first RN excerpt the often used populist framing of 'the people' versus 'the elite' is present.

Yet still, since the process of framing is dependent upon the re-conceptualising events as based on context, there are additional differences which can be observed. The most significant ones is NR's emphasis on protectionism for the industries, something which is entirely absent from the discourse of GD since Greece does not possess any heavy industry. As a result, NR is fundamentally different in this regard since it is able to politicise a broader range of topics, as opposed to GD which is solely limited on the few different sources of revenue for the Greek state such as the public sector, agriculture and tourism. Most importantly, NR is able to present a more comprehensive alternative to privatisations in the

second excerpt. As a result GD's framing lacks the fourth and final component of crisis framing as they have been defined by Hart and Tindall: 'What policy changes must be implemented in order to end the crisis?' (Hart & Tindall, 2009: 9).

5.6 More Enemies to Fight

The last of the frames comprising part of the parties' rhetoric on the economy are their attacks on globalisation and the IMF. This is another point of differentiation between them due to the aforementioned economic circumstances of their respective countries. For GD, the IMF represents another threat to Greece's sovereignty since it is part of the triumvirate of creditors. As for NR, globalisation has increasingly put more pressure to state economies and its criticisms stem from the fact that France has been handicapped due to unfair competition and the interconnectivity between global capitalism and state policy. GD remains somewhat limited once again

In the end, GD is a case which perfectly exemplifies the well known adage: 'You cannot teach an old dog new tricks.' since they were not contenders in the political system for the majority of their existence. GD has placed Greece's financial and national liberation at the forefront of its discourse, but it has done so in a narrow way, as opposed to NR who envisions France to become a great power once more, completely unhindered by the restraints imposed by the global capitalist system and the EU.

By taking into account these two key differences between the parties it can be concluded that the rise of right wing populism, is essentially: '... a response to, and a critique of both globalism and pluralism which have been at the core of the operation of contemporary democratic political economies.' (Bang & Marsh, 2018:251). As it was mentioned in the Literature Review and Theory chapters, the old cleavage between the left and the right has lost its relevance and it's gradually being phased out by the division between the global and the national. As a result, the rise of populism irrespective of its placement in the political spectrum presents the first major challenge to neoliberalism (Bang & Marsh, 2018:251).

The primacy of neoliberal principles has led to the growth of anti-politics and the turn towards political ideologies which denounce pluralism (Vines & Marsh, 2018). This does not mean that the people would choose totalitarianism over democracy and that the world is experiencing a dictatorial *renaissance*; but rather that they may become more inclined

towards supporting a political party which embodies a dynamic style of leadership, and could revitalise democracy. The philosophy of these parties regarding how democracy can be brought back from the brink of extinction is reminiscent of Carl Schmitt's writing on dictatorship and the state of exception:

The exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like. But it cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law. It is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty, that is, the whole question of sovereignty. The precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out what may take place in such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of an extreme emergency and how it is to be eliminated. (Schmitt, 2006[1922]:6-7).

This state of exception calls for a strong leadership style which will be able to face the challenges presented by a crisis. It can effectively cut the Gordian knot formed by the strict adherence to what is considered the orthodox way of conducting politics, and achieve a concrete success (Schmitt, 2013 [1921]). And like Schmitt, the members of the two parties claim that they are the ones with the will to reclaim democracy for 'the people'. The next part in the empirical chapter examines how the two parties have utilised the division between 'the people' and 'the elite' by creating new enemies to stand against.

5.6.1 Frame Salience: IMF and Globalisation

The attacks towards the global financial system (and the IMF in the case of Greece), is a staple of these parties' discourse when they mention the maladies of the economy in general. GD's MPs attacked the IMF and the global financial system quite frequently, as it can be observed from Figures 5.13 and 5.14. Due to the country's economic turmoil and the bailout agreements necessitated by it, the party frequently utilised the specific frame.




Figure 5.13 Salience of IMF Frame: Golden Dawn 2012-2013

Furthermore, rapid increases were observed ruing the months where the government had to pass new austerity bills such as April 2013 and May 2014. In addition, the attacks towards the IMF and the global capitalist system intensified during the elections, and reached their peak during the months of September and October 2015. As it was previously mentioned, by that time SYRIZA had adopted a pro-memorandum stance, something which GD considered as a betrayal of the hopes and expectations of the Greek people.




Figure 5.14 Salience of IMF Frame: Golden Dawn 2014-2015

In NR's case the two frames where they attacked globalisation and the financial markets were not so frequently utilised during the 2012 presidential elections, as it can be observed from Figure 5.15. A significant spike did occur in March where the references regarding globalisation rose by 86.67%, but dropped in the next month as shown in Table B2 in Appendix B. In the case of the financial markets, the number of references was in a constant decline, and remained low for the rest of the year.




Figure 5.15 Salience of Globalisation Frame: National Rally 2012-2013

Overall, these two frames exhibited increases alongside the other ones which comprise part of the party's discourse about the economy, such as in the case of September and October 2016. The greatest increase in utilisation would come with the 2017 elections where the total number of references almost tripled as it can be observed from Figure 5.16. This is attributable to the fact that the party had to make some modifications to their discourse in accordance with the backgrounds of Emmanuel Macron and Francois Fillon, the main rivals of Le Pen.




Figure 5.16 Salience of Globalisation Frame: National Rally 2016-2017

5.6.2 Discourse Analysis

The analysis can now move on to the selected excerpts from the two parties in order to map out their different discursive and framing strategies. Despite the differences regarding the topics that the two parties have focused on it is imperative to examine how they have been framed regarding their severity, causes and solutions in the form of policies. The excerpt for GD is taken from the 65th Parliamentary Meeting, which took place on the 27th of June 2015. This particular meeting can probably be considered as one of the most significant ones during the years of the sovereign debt crisis, since all members of the parliament were called to decide on whether the July referendum should be held:

Regarding the referendum's proposal, we believe that it essentially bogus. We say "No" to the memorandum, to the extortion of the international loan sharks, to national subjugation and the pillaging of our national wealth. We also say "No" to this circus which has been going on for the last couple of months and has led to a new memorandum. We say "No" to your feeble pleading towards the international loan sharks.

Stop using the popular will to hide your spectacular failure in the negotiations. The people decided against the slavery of the memorandum on the 25th of January. Today, the upcoming referendum only reveals your inability to serve the popular will. (Kasidiaris, 2015: 3838).

This NR excerpt is taken from a speech which Marine Le Pen gave on the 11th of March 2017, during the first round of the presidential elections:

The system also wants the French to cower in the face of a globalisation that is never framed, never regulated, never constrained.

Like immigration, globalisation for the system is a dogma, and for them a good financial deal. Poverty can expand, unemployment can continue to explode, and businesses can relocate or close. Nothing will stop the system which always wants more globalisation, therefore more deregulation, more carelessness, more laissez-passer, more laissez-faire.

The system therefore always wants more European Union, because this European Union is accelerating globalisation, because it accelerates immigration. The European Union, always more and more. Against democracy and popular will. The system wants to speed up what goes wrong, what hurts, what hurts you. (Le Pen, 2017).

Both excerpts are very similar in terms style and thematic components, despite the fundamental differences between the economies of the two countries. Both speakers mention the greed of the markets, the strict adherence to the neoliberal dogma imposed by the EU and finally the people themselves. The neoliberal dismissal of effective social categories further fuels the feelings of hopelessness and alienation shared by the public, and effectively destroys any sense of solidarity (Mirowski, 2013). Indeed neoliberalism: "...has prioritised a 'culture of individualism', which has downplayed the collectivisation of risk and culpability in the state, and emphasised individual responsibility and self-reliance." (Corbett & Walker, 2019:96)

Populist parties are able to fill this vacuum left behind by the death of social categories by making the separation between the 'people' who suffer under the rule of the 'elite' which has conspired in order to deprive them of their rights and their well-being. In a sense, right- wing populists perform the exact act of identity obliteration as neoliberalism, since they aim to unify the entire society in a homogenous collectivity whose only defining and unifying characteristic is national identity. Whereas neoliberalism defines people according to their value within the market, right wing populism defines them based on national identity. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, populist discourses create 'frontiers' between an in-group and an out-group. The in-group in these excerpts are the natives of their respective countries,

irrespective of their economic and social status and they are all united due to their suffering from the economic crisis. Most importantly, the economic crisis is tied with a crisis in democratic representation, since in all of the excerpts the notion of popular will serves as a central frame.

The similarities shared between the two parties in terms of their discourse become more pronounced, regardless of the different economic events that have transpired. It is in these frames that the basic core of populism becomes increasingly noticeable since the enemy this time is faceless. As opposed to their political opponents who they can easily target and attack, the markets and intergovernmental organisations, such as the WTO and the World Bank, transcend most boundaries due to the interlocking relationships they have formed across the globe. None of the parties' speakers offered any counter-proposals in terms of how they could limit the influence of these organisations. Instead, they solely focused on attacking them and their political opponents, by mentioning the suffering that the people must endure because of them. These types of issues are a great opportunity for these parties since they are not forced to offer any actual counterproposals in terms of policy making, and they can instead focus on the emotive aspect.

5.7 Conclusion

The Economic Policy frames were more frequently utilised by NR as it was shown in the Figures in the Chapter as well as the Tables in Appendices A and B, including the month by month rate of change. GD utilised these frames during the periods where new austerity measures were introduced, as opposed to NR's discourse where the number of references did not exhibit many dramatic fluctuations. In terms of the qualitative aspect, even during the months were austerity bills were approved in the Hellenic Parliament, the greatest emphasis was placed on the frames associated with the system of politics as opposed to the economy. This indicates that GD is mostly focused on attributing blame and attacking its political opponents. In the previous chapter it was observed that the External Policy frames were the binding agent for the majority of the other frames, since economic policy is largely dictated by the EU.

However, since the EU is considered as detached from the electorate's will it is far easier to focus their attack on their political opponents since the long term plan for every party is to

hold the reins of power. As it was previously mentioned this is the point where the differences between the two parties become even more pronounced. In addition, this emphasis on accentuating the severity of the crisis and attributing blame towards the government, the EU, the banking system and the IMF left the GD's discourse completely devoid of any solutions. Therefore, the party did not showcase that it possesses the capability to resolve the crisis.

Another factor that should be taken into consideration is that GD's newcomer status eventually led to its decline, since its members singularly focused on riding upon the momentum generated by the citizenry's negative sentiments, rather than developing a cohesive strategy which would blend criticisms with policy alternatives. Identifying the root of the problem or trying to hold the moral high ground does not automatically translate to greater electoral support; rather a party should show to the public that there is an alternative way in policy making, and thus raise its credibility further. NR was framing of the crisis was more complete since they did not only identify the cause of the problem (diagnosis), but they also introduced their own counter-proposals (prognosis). GD's framing falls short of being complete since their narrative of the crisis lacks any policy alternatives. While, both of the parties employ the key framing mechanism present in populist discourses where 'the people' are pitted against 'the elite' in the chosen excerpts, only NR answers the crucial question of that needs to be done in order to end the crisis.

Most of the times GD members become carried away in their overwhelming appeal to emotion, and the few times they attempt to offer any policy alternatives their propositions seem loose and unfocused. After the disastrous defeat of 2007 NR understood that their survival was dependent on their ability to evolve, and the party went to great lengths to slowly eliminate all the old elements which could doom them to obsolesce. The core of the party's rhetoric is still based on the division between the 'virtuous people' and the 'corrupt elite', their attempt to generate morality and their promises of a utopia. However, as opposed to GD, their utopia is presented as something feasible; there is a way out of the darkness and it's not paved with empty promises or emotionally laden slogans, but rather with cold pragmatism and meticulous planning. As before, these differences will become better defined in the next chapter which will focus on the frames associated with the system of Politics.

Chapter 6: Locking Horns

6.1 Introduction

This chapter will continue breaking down NR's and GD's discourses in their constituent parts, by focusing on how they interact with their political opponents, and their criticisms towards their policies. The attributions of blame, in conjunction with moral juxtapositions, have already been exhibited in the previous chapters, but become even more prominent in the utilisation of the specific frames. A crisis must be linked with the government's policy failures or inability to make good on their pre-election promises, if it is going to be utilised for increasing electoral support, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Any attempt to examine the rise of populism must address the deficiencies of party- based modes of political representation.

It must be understood that the phenomenon of populism is not one of parthenogenesis, spontaneously coming into being without any underlying factors, and thus must be situated in the larger domain of political representation. Populist leaders and parties claim that they can offer correctives to the deficiencies of the political system. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the interactions of the two parties with their political opponents. As it has been shown in the previous chapters focusing on External Policy and the Economy, populism thrives when the mainstream parties are in crisis, or if they have become detached from the electorate. According to Kenneth M. Roberts the study of political parties and populism:

...has often been conducted along separate tracks that occasionally connect but never truly intertwine and enrich each other as they might, or more importantly, should. Both 'topics' have been defined by a distinctive set of seminal studies, canonical literatures, and paradigmatic rivalries, but these remain relatively impervious to intellectual developments in the other field, even after "populist parties" became a widely (albeit loosely) used analytical category in several different regions of the world." (Roberts, 2017:288).

However, they cannot be fully understood in isolation from each other, since populist leaders and movements will invariably form some kind of political party, which will allow them to formally compete in the political arena (Roberts, 2017:288). The decline and deficiencies of mainstream party-based modes of political representation must be examined in any type of explanation for the rise of populist parties. Despite their rejection of established

representative institutions, their study should be firmly situated within the larger domain of political representation and the pathologies plaguing it. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, the successive crises within the European Union redefined the rules of engagement for political parties. Populism emerged as a force of creative destruction, since on the one hand it assisted in the crystallisation of the failures of representation; on the other, it added new contenders in the national democratic arena (Roberts, 2017:288).

This chapter builds upon the two previous empirical chapters but this time the focus on crisis framing is on the political system. The first part focuses on the impact of crises to the legitimacy and credibility of political actors, and how the two parties utilise their populist discourse in order to attribute blame. The next part examines how the two parties utilise economic scandals and accusations of corruption in order to attack their political opponents. The analysis then moves on towards criticisms that the political opponents of the two parties have reneged on their elections promises. The final frame that is examined is associated with victimhood. Here the two parties present themselves as victims that are marginalised by the political system due to their staunch resistance towards government policies. All of the frames are first analysed in terms of their salience and how different events lead to changes in it. The analysis then proceeds with an examination of the constituent parts of their discourse focusing on the parties' diagnosis of the crisis causes, their attribution of blame and finally proposed solutions.

6.2 Crises to Suit all Tastes

The best starting point for the subsequent analysis would be to answer the following question: Under what conditions does support towards mainstream parties break down or weakens, allowing right wing populist parties to enter the electoral marketplace? For Laclau the root of any populist outbreak is a crisis of representation (Laclau, 2005a). As mentioned in Chapter 2, such a crisis is the most fundamental component in the success of a populist party, since it opens up space for its counter-discourses since:

... the emergence of new discourses and new identities is always related to the dislocation or crisis of previously hegemonic discursive orders. It is a certain failure of previous identifications that forces subjects to seek refuge in a new discursive

attachment and investment. This is also the case with populist discourses. (Stavrakakis, 2005:247).

However, the key issue with this approach is that it perceives a crisis as external to populism. As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, a crisis is not a neutral event and is itself a product of complex causality (Byrne & Uprichard, 2012). As a result, a crisis needs to be reconceptualised in terms of its causes and in which way it must be combated in order to be utilised effectively by these parties²⁶. Moreover, populism cannot be considered as a purely democratic pathology precisely due to the synergy of different factors that might lead to the delegitimisation of democratic procedures. Once again, the 'losers of modernity' hypothesis which argues that support for populists comes from the strata who suffer from the objective indicators of crisis often fails to stand up to empirical analysis. Rovira Kaltwasser has expressed similar reservations when he argues that: 'Populist parties have shown a great success precisely in those regions of Europe where the structural prerequisites for their rise were hardly existent.' (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012:188).

As such, a conception of crisis within populism cannot be strictly structural, but also must take into account factors such as the perceived loss of status and moral decline. Therefore, it would be more productive to view any type of crisis as a phenomenon that can only be truly experienced via a mediated performance (Moffitt, 2016). Both case studies in this thesis exemplify how the various crises need to be reconceptualised in order to be used effectively by political actors. In addition, the fact that NR has evolved into the main opposition while GD sunk into irrelevance further showcases that a crisis in itself is not sufficient. Parties need to evolve in order to overcome their initial electoral niche and ensure their continued relevance and survival.

NR was able to successfully perform and perpetuate a sense of crisis, by aptly taking advantage of events such as the terrorist attack at Bataclan, the EU debt crisis, and the migrant crisis. As opposed to their Greek counterpart, NR did not simply react to these crises,

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²⁶Alan Knight makes an extremely perspicacious observation regarding the linkage between a crisis and the ascendancy of populist politics: 'Crisis' being a vague term, it is easily coined and devalued. Thus it is not difficult to associate 'populism' (or almost anything else) with 'crisis'. There is also a tautological tendency to impute populism (or anything else) to 'crisis', as if 'crisis' were a discernible cause, when, in fact, it is often a loose description of a bundle of phenomena. Disaggregation sometimes reveals that it was not 'crisis' which generated populism (or mobilisation, rebellion, etc.), but rather populism (or mobilisation, rebellion, etc.) which generated crisis.' (Knight, 1998:227)

but rather constructed a complex and ongoing reinterpretation. This has allowed them to divide 'the people' and 'the elite', and to legitimate strong leadership by presenting themselves as the voice of the former. The focus therefore should not be on the crisis, but on how populist actors create a sense of crisis and: '...use that sense to inject an urgency and an importance to their message' (Taggart, 2004: 275). Crises are experienced through the shared values, norms and prejudices of the people, and as a result they are always culturally mediated. Since they are situations out of the ordinary, most of the times they signify a radical break from the past, the death of the old and the potentiality of the new. Furthermore, a crisis is usually signified by being linked to failure, whether that is of the economy, public policy, democracy etc.; as a result the impetus to act and end the crisis stems from it (Moffitt, 2016)²⁷.

Trust is the binding agent between the government and the electorate, since the latter gives the authorisation to the former to make decisions in their name. Scandals and corruption can break this bond of trust, and provide parties in the opposition with new opportunities to attribute blame. Populist rhetoric is highly moralistic in nature, and both parties have frequently attacked their political opponents with accusations of corruption. In the case of Greece the accusations of corruption are the main mode of attack towards their political opponents, since decades of clientelist practices in conjunction with rampant corruption and mismanagement of state funds led to the delegitimisation of the political system.

6.3 There is Something Rotten in the Heart of the Nation

The support that the parties alternating in government had enjoyed became part of their eventual downfall because the political landscape had been dominated by them for decades. The attribution of blame was greatly facilitated by this fact and allowed other parties to capture a greater share of the electoral market. Furthermore, the fact that these parties have not come into power benefits them, since they have not suffered the same wear and tear that their political opponents have. Moreover, their proposed solutions have never been

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²⁷ Colin Hay has argued that while failure may provide the structural preconditions for a crisis, it first needs to gain wider salience via its mediation in the cultural and political spheres: 'Failure provides the structural preconditions for perceived crisis; the necessary but insufficient conditions for the mobilisation of perceptions of systemic failure (crisis). By 'crisis' I refer to a condition in which failure is identified and widely perceived, a condition in which systemic failure has become politically and ideationally mediated.' (Hay, 1999:324)

implemented and as result their success up until now has solely depended upon their public relations skills. Both parties can also be classified as anti-political establishment since they challenge 'the status quo in terms of major policy issues and political system issues' as well as 'the parties that make up the political establishment' (Abedi, 2004:72). Should they wish to seek office, the major challenge that these parties will face is the dilution of their identity, (Abedi & Lundberg, 2009:77).

On the one hand they must maintain their anti-establishment status, and on the other they must exhibit that they are fully capable to be entrusted with the reins of power. GD is a prime example of a party that failed to strike the proper balance between the two and eventually lost all electoral support. NR faced a similar situation in 2007 when the party came fourth with 11% of the votes. The electoral defeat signified a change of the old guard, and included Jean Marie Le Pen. The party managed to become more mainstream without having to sacrifice its anti-establishment identity which put it on the electoral map initially²⁸. The issue of trust emerges once more, since a crisis or systemic failure can severely damage it. Voters are more likely to have confidence in parties which perform reasonably well while in office. It comes as no surprise then that incumbent parties will bear the brunt of the political costs generated by crises or scandals, which can often produce retrospective anti-incumbent voting patterns (Remmer, 1991). Such systemic failures can be conductive to the rise of populist parties since they loosen voter attachments to political parties. In the case of Greece, PASOK and New Democracy suffered greatly in the first years of the crisis, and it was not until the elections of 2019 that the latter was able to form a stable majority government. Similarly in France, the Socialist party which had previously enjoyed considerable levels of support became a mere shadow of itself during the presidency of Francois Hollande. The downward spiral continued in the 2017 presidential elections where presidential candidate Benoit Hamon finished fifth with 6.36% of the vote.

²⁸ Abedi and Lundberg the populist aspects of anti-establishment parties allow them to present themselves as credible forces of opposition and make electoral gains (2009:80). However, a change occurs once they shift their goals towards office-seeking since: '...these strengths are likely to turn into disadvantages, and the failure to solve organisational problems jeopardises long-term survival. Moreover, while they greatly depend on their leader's skills, the leader him/herself is, in many cases, a political neophyte and hence inexperienced in the business of managing a party. Stabilising the party and making it fit for government participation requires the leader to give up some of his/her power, to delegate responsibilities, and to accept some factionalism.' (Abedi & Lundberg, 2009:80). The rigid structure of GD in combination with the towering presence of its leader in all party matters was one of the reasons that the party was unable to adapt and eventually started fragmenting.

Populist discourses do not simply revolve around the division between 'the people' and 'the elite', but they also emphasise that 'the people' are blameless victims, whereas the corrupt 'elite' are responsible for their misery (Vasilopoulou et al., 2013:381). Blame becomes a useful tool for populist parties since it allows them to maintain the sense of crisis and their own political legitimacy (Vasilopoulou et al., 2013:381). As a result GD often linked the country's financial woes with the corruption of its political elite. NR's utilisation of these accusations differs significantly, since the aforementioned phenomena of clientelism were never the norm in France. Nonetheless, party MP's have often accused governing parties of serving the interests of global corporations. This difference is important since it showcases the framing difference between the two parties, as it can be observed by the excerpts on accusations of corruption.

6.3.1 Frame Salience: Accusations of Corruption

The two parties differ significantly in how they utilise this frame, as it can be observed from the Figures. GD frequently attributed the state of the economy to the clientelist policies and rampant corruption of the previous governments throughout the four year period. In addition, the utilisation of this specific frame increased significantly when the government passed new austerity measures. Such a notable case can be observed in November 2012, where the total references of corruption increased from 13. Another notable increase occurred in June 2013 when the government closed down the country's public broadcasting company (ERT). The company had been associated with the clientelist policies of the past governments, and served as a source of employment for potential voters.




Figure 6.1 Salience of Corruption Frame: Golden Dawn 2012-2013

Overall the accusations of corruption are more frequently employed as a frame by GD since Greece's political system has been plagued by economic scandals and cases of mismanagement of state funds as shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. Another point of interest is the second spike in utilisation that occurred on October 2015, exactly one month after the elections where the twelfth austerity package was passed as part of the agreement between SYRIZA government and the country's creditors. Up until that point SYRIZA was viewed as a newcomer that would end the austerity and change a political system characterised by corruption and scandals, and GD took the opportunity to identify the party as another enemy of the people that betrayed their hopes and expectation




Figure 6.2 Salience of Corruption Frame: Golden Dawn 2014-2015

NR on the other hand didn't utilise this frame to the same extent that GD did. Most importantly, during the election periods the specific frame was not utilised as often as the others as it can be seen from Figures 6.3 and 6.4. There are only a few notable spikes in the salience of the specific frame. The first one occurred during the months of January and February in 2013, where the main topic of discussion was the presentation of the new state budget along with the closure of a Goodyear factory in Amiens when union members refused to agree to new working conditions that would only benefit the company. The second spike in 2013 occurred in September. The two topics of discussion were the new budget for the Ministry of Culture, and the privatisation of Air France. In the case of the former, the party viewed the allocation of finding as favouritism towards the supporters of the Hollande government. As for the latter, the privatisation of Air France was viewed as a sell-out of an extremely profitable company, and a personal favour to private investors.




Figure 6.3 Salience of Corruption Frame: National Rally 2012-2013

In 2016 the salience of the frame remained low, with a minor increase occurring during October. The reason behind the increase was the EU Ethics Committee did not find any fault in Jose Manuel Baroso, the President of the European Commission, joining the investment bank Goldman Sachs. In the case of 2017 the greatest increase can be observed in March, after the political-financial scandal involving Fillon became publicly known. The total number of references increased rapidly and then steadily declined.




Figure 6.4 Salience of Corruption Frame: National Rally 2016-2017

6.3.2 Discourse Analysis

Despite these significant differences in salience the qualitative aspect must not be overlooked. Therefore, this part of the chapter will now proceed with the analysis of certain excerpts from both parties. The first excerpt for GD is taken from a parliamentary meeting which took place on 11 November 2012, 4 days after the adoption of the seventh austerity package. The main topic of discussion was the 2013 austerity budget, and the speaker is Nicholaos Michaloliakos:

Theodoros Pangalos claimed that 'We devoured the money together', and then wisely chose to retire from politics. When the clouds began to gather he decided to leave. Who devoured all that money? Why is the total debt of our country at 360 billion Euros? Would you like me to tell you which sectors of the economy should have been scrutinised but were not? Public works. What was their original cost, and how much money did they end up costing to Greece? What was the cost for our International Airport or the Olympics? [...] What happened to the ones that embellished all that money? Are they phantoms perhaps? Are they in countries where they cannot be extradited? No, they are here, and they are in charge." (Michaloliakos, 2012:4523).

The second excerpt is part of a speech made by Ilias Panagiotaros, on a meeting which took place on the 30th of March 2014. This was a crucial meeting for all parties, since they were going to vote for a new multi-bill which was need for Greece to receive its next bailout payment:

As for the speaker from New Democracy that pompously asked the leader of the opposition how we got there, we have an answer for you. It is due to the fact that your parties were in charge of this country for the past forty years. And now, as their swan song, the parties of New Democracy and PASOK play their respective roles. It is because you governed for the benefit of your 'associates' instead of the benefit of the people. Many MPs entered politics with a shady past, and left with businesses, money and stocks in their possession. [...] It is you, and not the Greek people, that led this country to having a debt of 350 billion Euros. (Panagiotaros, 2014:9329).

The final excerpt is part of a speech made by Nicholaos Michaloliakos during a public rally. The public rally took place on the 16th of September 2015, just four days before the second elections:

My fellow Greeks. My fellow comrades in arms. Unfortunately, I did not ridicule the Greek political system. But I am earnestly trying. However, the fact remains that this rotten system has ridiculed the entirety of the Greek people, dragging them to despair, the soup kitchens, unemployment. It is the rotten system that pillaged the hopes and dreams of the Greek people, and we will fight against it to the bitter end. We will fight until it crumbles and GD rises. (Michaloliakos, 2015).

The first excerpt for NR is taken from an interview that Marine Le Pen gave on the 29th of March in 2012, during the first round of the presidential elections where she was up against Francois Hollande and Nicholas Sarkozy. The interviewer asked Le Pen if she would restore military service, and how she would achieve that since many of the military facilities have closed down:

I am very attached to this national wealth issue. When I come to power, I will do an audit on all the transfers of French heritage made in the last ten years, because there are

a lot of conflicts of interest and a lot of people who made a lot of money then. These goods, these hospitals, these barracks do not belong to those who govern us. They belong to the French. I will also pass a law that will prohibit any transfer of the national wealth, whatever the circumstances. I will set up usufruct agreements which will be renewed every 20 years, that is to say that they can use, as a rental in a way, buildings, but in no case will they ever be allowed to transfer these properties to Saudi Arabia, or Qatar or I do not know what. (Le Pen, 2012)

The second excerpt is part of a press statement that the party released on the 14th of December 2013. The topic was the creation of a fund for the training of employees in small and medium sized enterprises:

In fact, these training contributions increase the unbearable tax burden of which our SMEs fall victim to with more than 153 taxes and 62% of compulsory levies.

It is therefore essential, on a subject as important as the training of our employees, that the government finally have the courage to assume its proper role and guarantee French companies good management and good reallocation of these funds by effective measures:

- Accumulated State control over the sums allocated to the social partners.
- Drastic savings measures on the internal operating costs of the social partners.
- Application of the public procurement code for the social partners.
- Systematic annual publication of the social partners' accounts.
- Obligation to redistribute 100% to employees to enable them to receive training
- Possibility for SMEs to create "reserve training" on the principle of "legal reserve".
- Real control of the creation of training organisations and the reality of the training deployed.

Unfortunately, this agreement only maintains an opaque, clientelist and totally unfair system for the SMEs which finance and for the employees who do not fully receive these funds. (NR, 2013)

The differences that can be observed by the chosen excerpts are substantial regarding the utilisation of the specific frame. NR utilised it in a more focused matter and seamlessly

blended it with broader policy making issues, while GD solely focused on attacking its political opponents without presenting any kind of policy alternatives. The main problem therefore is that GD focused exclusively on the identification of the causes of the crisis and blame attribution. This emphasis is reasonable to a certain extent since the Greek political system has been plagued by clientelism, nepotism and economic scandals, something that is not the norm in France. However, even in this case where the accusations of corruption would suffice the speakers for NR made sure to present some of their policies such as the creation of a fund and protectionism. Therefore, in these excerpts GD's framing stops at the diagnostic stage. As was previously mentioned, crises and scandals can loosen voter attachments to political parties, but this does not mean that they can sever them completely. Diagnosing the causes of a crisis is not sufficient, since the electorate expects some solution.

Most importantly, despite the fact that this frame was not very salient in RN's discourse, the party still exploited the opening provided by these economic scandals. Crucially, the party promoted their own prognostic frames, and thus were able to amplify the severity of these economic issues. However, it is important to further examine how the two parties create new meaning through their discourse, and the reason why it has become accepted by a part of the electorate. The accusations of corruption are only a part of their broader strategy against their political opponents, and the process of blame attribution cannot be fully examined without the other frames that are associated with it.

6.4 Broken Promises

The global economic crisis in 2008 can be considered as a monumental paradigm shift. From this point onwards the adoption of neoliberal policies was carried out with an unprecedented level of vigour. The EU is a prime example of this shift towards neoliberalism as it was mentioned in Chapter 2, since one of its functions is the harmonisation of economic policies. In addition, one of the most nocuous effects of neoliberalism that the author has identified is that the domain of the political itself is rendered in economic terms. As a result, the foundation for civic participation vanishes along with the idea of the electorate asserting its collective political sovereignty. Moreover, contemporary politics have become increasingly unappealing to the electorate since the connection they once shared has waned considerably. Public life has become greatly weakened and politics are in a state of limbo. According to Wendy Brown this is especially devastating since:

Struggles remain over power, hegemonic values, resources, and future trajectories. This persistence of politics amid the destruction of public life and especially educated public life, combined with the marketisation of the political sphere, is part of what makes contemporary politics peculiarly unappealing and toxic — full of ranting and posturing, emptied of intellectual seriousness, pandering to an uneducated and manipulable electorate and a celebrity-and-scandal-hungry corporate media. (Brown, 2015:39).

However, the fact that politics have become increasingly adversarial and devoid of any meaningful content is only one part of the problem. The other part is associated with the available policies in a government's toolbox. Regardless of their ideological persuasion most parties have been forced to choose austerity measures. This programmatic convergence has proven detrimental to the appeal of mainstream parties since they can no longer draw their legitimacy from their capacity to satisfy social demands (Roberts, 2017). The compression of the left-right spectrum led to the creation of vacant political space; which in turn allowed for the revitalisation of more radical ideologies. As stated by Rovira Kaltwasser:

However, when the mainstream political forces become too similar, they provide a fertile ground for the rise of populism. In fact, the latter relies on the critique of the elites for their incapacity for and/or lack of interest in taking into consideration the 'true' will of the people. [...] Under these circumstances, the notion of a 'silent majority' serves as a useful tool for populist entrepreneurs.... (RoviraKaltwasser, 2015:198).

Consequently, a single type of crisis cannot be the sole trigger for the rise of populist movements and parties. Rather, a crisis showcases the structural weaknesses within a political system, and most importantly the lack of communication between the electorate and the government. Increased support towards populist parties starts with a pre-existing crisis of is process is effectively a domino effect since according to Kenneth M. Roberts: '...populism thus emerges as a probable – though hardly an inevitable or exclusive – political strategy for appealing to mass constituencies where representative institutions are weak or discredited, and where various forms of social exclusions or political marginalisation leave citizens alienated from such institutions.' (Roberts, 2015:141) Such a crisis background enhances the appeal of populist discourse since it can connect anti-establishment discursive calls (supply

side) to the alienated public (demand side) (Roberts, 2015). Therefore, what is significant to note is that a crisis of representation pre-exists any type of populist mobilisation. In short: "...populism cannot make its presence felt before such a systemic failure starts short-circuiting the effective democratic representation of social interests, values and demands in the decision-making process..." (Stavrakakis et al., 2018:8).

Interestingly, Ernesto Laclau argued that populism is not just any political logic, but rather the logic of the political (Laclau, 2005a). Any political project is based on the antagonisms between two different groups. At the most minimal level the formation of these groups is based on demands. An unsatisfied demand may come into contact with other demands and through their osmosis they form a chain characterised by equivalence. However, the more this chain is extended, the weaker the connection to the initial demand becomes. Thus, the initial demand loosely holds together all other additional demands by becoming a general equivalent. These antagonisms become more prominent in the frames where the parties accuse their political opponents of reneging on their pre-election promises. After the election period a governing party will be subject to scrutiny from the opposition regarding its performance, and whether it was able to keep the promises it made during the election period.

6.4.1 Frame Salience: Election Promises

This is where the mediated performances of populist parties come into play by linking the different systemic failures in their attempt to '...homogenise a disparate set of phenomena as symptoms of a wider crisis, with these discrete 'failures' contextualised in the form of a temporally bounded and significant event.' (Moffitt, 2016:123). Going back to the previous chapters it can be observed that the different systemic failures were linked together via the attribution of blame towards the elites, be they the EU, the markets, or the political system. Moreover, the entire process would be incomplete if the issue of representation was not added. This vital component not only accentuates the division between 'the people' and 'the elite' but also facilitates the aforementioned homogenisation process²⁹.

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²⁹Ernesto Laclau had already sketched out this process in his work 'On Populist Reason'. As he notes: 'If I refer to a set of social grievances, to widespread injustice, and attribute its source to the 'oligarchy', for instance, I am performing two interlinked operations: on the one hand, I am constituting the 'people' by finding the common identity of a set of social claims in their opposition to the oligarchy; on the other, the enemy ceases to be purely circumstantial and acquires more global dimensions. [...] we are dealing not with a conceptual operation of finding an abstract common

This unique situation could be characterised as the perfect storm. First, the convergence of policies by centre-left and centre-right parties effectively eliminated the social cleavages which formed their basis of support. And second, the various crises led to the creation of a new resonant narrative by the parties of the populist right. As noted by Robert Brubaker:

This narrative defined the opposition between open and closed or inside and outside as more fundamental than that between left and right. In this fundamentally protectionist narrative, the basic imperative is to protect 'the people'—economically, demographically, culturally, and physically—against the neoliberal economy, open borders, cosmopolitan culture, and 'open society' said to be favored by the economic, political, and cultural elite at national and European levels. (Brubaker, 2017:378).

When it comes to accusing the government that they reneged on their pre-election promises the two parties are quite similar in terms of the frequency of utilisation, with notable increases occurring when certain policy decisions do not match the government's pre-election manifesto. In the case of GD the increases are always tied in with an austerity package or a reform bill associated with it, such as in the case of November 2012 where the parliament passed the 2013 austerity budget, as it can be observed in Figure 6.5. Another notable increase can be observed in January 2013, where the government implemented a series of reforms on the income tax and pensions. However, there is a notable decline during the latter half of 2013 and the entirety of 2014. The reason behind this steep decline is the fact that the majority of the party members were arrested and held in pre-trial detention during this period.

feature underlying all social grievances, but with a performative operation constituting the chain as such.' (Laclau, 2005a:94).




Figure 6.5 Salience of Election Promises Frame: Golden Dawn 2012-2013

The end result was a shift in the party's framing, with the accusations that the government was trying to undermine them rising to prominence. The only noticeable difference in this trend can be observed in 2015, after the electoral victory of SYRIZA. The rate of change increased dramatically, especially during the months of June and October. As it has been mentioned in the previous chapters, this period was especially difficult for the entire political system due to the July referendum. For GD these series of events provided them with a great opportunity to obtain a greater share of the electoral market, since the actions of SYRIZA were framed as a betrayal of the Greek people.

Jan- Feb- Mar Apr- May Jun- Jul- Aug- Sep- Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb- Mar Apr- May Jun- Jul- Aug- Sep- Oct- Nov- Dec--15 -15 References

Figure 6.6 Salience of Election Promises Frame: Golden Dawn 2014-2015

This is a key difference between the two parties, since GD brief period of electoral success was largely defined by the ongoing financial crisis. Moreover, while NR did utilise the specific frame throughout the entire four year period, the total frequency was significantly lower. There were some notable exceptions such as the month of May in 2013, or September 2016 which was marked by the Notre-Dame bombing attempt as shown in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. However, this was not the case with the election periods in 2012 and 2017. While the frequency of utilisation increased in March during the first round of the 2012 elections, it did not compare with the spikes that occurred in the 2017 elections.




Figure 6.7 Salience of Election Promises Frame: National Rally 2012-2013

During March when the country was well into the presidential race the rate of change increased by 525%, and remained consistently high for the next two months as shown in Figure 6.8 and Table B14 in Appendix B. One of the main reasons that this frame was so often utilised was the tenure of Francois Hollande. As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, his approval ratings gradually declined due to the government's inability to fully realise its pre-electoral promises, and NR found the opportunity to strike against them.




Figure 6.8 Salience of Election Promises Frame: National Rally 2016-2017

6.4.2 Discourse Analysis

The analysis can now proceed with the qualitative aspects of the two parties' discourse. The first excerpt for GD is taken from a speech given by Ilias Panagiotaros within the Greek parliament on the 16th of July 2013. The main point of discussion was a reform bill on the income tax:

Thank you very much, Mister President. Three years ago our ex Prime Minister, who has been proven to suffer from reduced mental capacity, claimed that there's money. After the elections, with the beautiful Kastelorizo as the background, he admitted that there was not a single cent to be found. Afterwards, he and his gang which included Mister Papakonstantinou, put our country in the vice of the IMF by using falsified evidence. New Democracy had the raised the banner of rebellion back then against the memorandum, but afterwards they too agreed with the second and third memorandum, the new taxation plan, the mid-term fiscal plan and so on and so forth. (Panagiotaros, 2013:14786).

This particular excerpt is taken form a parliamentary meeting which took place on the 6th of October 2015, right after the elections and the July referendum. The discussion revolved around the newly elected government's manifesto and reform plan. The speaker is Ioannis Lagos:

Thank you very much. Yesterday within this chamber we heard the Prime Minister talk about nothing for two hours. We heard him promise numerous things about the things to come from his government and the parliament, but you must allow me and my party to not believe a single word of what he said because he did the same thing seven or eight months ago. In addition, before he became the Prime Minister he claimed many other things such as tearing up the memorandum and that he would render everything void with a single legislative act. [...] The only reason that the Prime Minister held the elections twenty days ago was to clear out the board from any type of opposition, so that he can continue his work to the detriment of our country. (Lagos, 2015:67-68).

The first excerpt for NR is taken from a press statement by Marie-Christine Arnautu on the 17th of May 2013 regarding the reforms on Social Security, and more specifically family allowances:

Sarkozy dreamed of it: Hollande did it: put under the carpet by the UMP during the presidential campaign, the drastic reduction in family allowances will take place under the reign of the Ayrault government.

Decreasing for households with an income of $5000 \in$ monthly, i.e. for a father and a mother each earning $\in 2,500$, they will now be divided by 4 for households with an income of $\in 7,000$! To believe that this government has lost all common sense, apart from the fact that the French will have understood that his priority is to destroy French families. (Arnautu, 2013)

The next excerpt is part of a press statement made by the party in the European Parliament, on the 26th of September 2017, only four months after the presidential elections where Macron emerged the victor. The topic of discussion was the merger between the Alstom, a French railroad transportation company, and Siemens:

This is a new game of dupes for French industry. The Alstom-Siemens merger that is presented as the birth of a European champion is nothing less than the takeover of a French flagship by a German company. The "energy" branch of our national champion had already been sold off by François Hollande under the benevolent gaze of Emmanuel Macron. [...]Emmanuel Macron like all his predecessors gives proof of a total absence of industrial strategy. While he had declared during his campaign: 'France without industry is not an option', he auctioned off the TGV. Its displayed European policy is only the facade of an unbearable national renunciation. (NR, 2017).

All the excerpts are centred on the failure of the governing parties to implement the policy changes that they promised during the elections. This issue is elaborated by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser when they point out that: '...a key factor in the activation of populist attitudes is the general feeling that the political system is unresponsive. When citizens feel that the political parties and governments do not listen to them and ignore their demands, the possibility grows that populism becomes active, at least within the constituencies that feel

abandoned by the establishment.' (2017: 101). This is especially true for Greece and other countries of the European South, which witnessed a sharp rise of public support for populist parties from both ends of the political spectrum. Furthermore, not only has the failure of the political elites provided an opening for populist parties, but their intransigence on a plethora of policy areas has let little room for any plausible alternatives³⁰. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, the issue at hand is not any type of crisis like an economic or a migration one, but rather a crisis of representation. Countermeasures to combat a crisis will be taken by the government, but this does not mean that they will be approved by the electorate. In addition, the precedence of EU policies over national ones further aggravates an already volatile situation. Crucially, these parties will attribute the blame by first separating 'the people' from the ones responsible for the crisis, be they the 'elite', a dangerous 'other' or a combination of both (Moffitt, 2016).

However, there is an important difference in the discourses of the two parties. The excerpts showed that NR's framing is more complete than its Greek counterpart. Once again, the first three framing contest of examining the severity of the crises, diagnosing their causes and attributing responsibility follow a similar pattern with the division between 'the people' and 'the elite' being the core element. The divergence occurs in the last framing contest where the proposed solutions are completely absent in all of GD's excerpts. While both parties employ the core populist frame of 'us' versus 'them', and place the blame on the government or the EU, only NR's speakers try to show that there is an alternative way of policy making.

6.5 The Proverbial Underdogs

The common element that can be identified in all the excerpts is that the speakers moralise to an extensive degree. As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, the incorporation of moral dualisms

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³⁰This post-democratic mutation of liberal democracy is further discussed by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser: 'Because of the widespread implementation of neoliberal reforms and the adoption of programs such as New Public Management, national governments have become heavily constrained by private companies, transnational organizations, and the (in)visible hand of the market. Mainstream politicians have willingly implemented these policies but they have rarely tried to sell them to their citizens. Instead, they often present them as necessary, or even inevitable, forced upon the country by powerful foreign organizations (e.g., EU or IMF) and processes (e.g., globalization). As a consequence, little time is spent debating the extent to which at least some of these policies are wrong or can have unintended consequences, which might end up producing more harm than good.' (2017:117)

within their discourse serves to accentuate the division between 'the people' and 'the elite'. Richard Hofstadter has aptly highlighted populism's moral absolutism in the following quote:

The basic scheme of populist thought resolved itself into a number of relatively simple propositions. First, the populist mind tended to posit an essentially innocent folk, victimized by economic catastrophes for which it shared no responsibility. For all practical political purposes, it was assumed that the people constituted a more or less homogeneous mass. This was not because the Populists could not see any difference between the farmer and the worker, and between those and, say, the honest small trader, but because they considered that occupational differences were not of consequence in politics and morals; what mattered was that society was divided between 'the people' who worked for a living and the vested interests who did not. In some populist literature the farmer, conceived as the honest yeoman, was considered to have a certain moral priority because of the 'natural' character of his labours, his closeness to the soil, and the fundamental character of agricultural production. (Hofstadter, 1969:17).

It is important to note that the incorporation of moral binaries within political discourse is not a characteristic which is exclusively present in populism. Such invocations are more or less unavoidable in any political conjecture, and especially pronounced in crucial turning points such as a major crisis (Stavrakakis & Jager, 2018:559). Yet still, as ubiquitous as they are they provide a valuable insight in the way that these two parties frame systemic failures and crises. Going back to the five questions posited by Hart and Tindall, the moral binary is part of the second and third questions: 1) How did it occur? 2) Who should be held accountable?

As it has often been mentioned in this thesis, the lack of policy alternatives had two important effects: 1) the creation of a vacuum in the left-right political spectrum, and 2) the alienation of the public from the political system. Therefore, the lack of alternatives in terms of policy making has proven crucial for the success of populist parties. Most importantly, the availability of policy alternatives is what separates GD from NR even further. While the discourse of both parties is a textbook example of adversarial politics, GD again remains focused on attributing blame instead of proposing some plausible solutions. As it can be observed from the excerpts, RN identifies the root of the problem and who should be held accountable, and then moves on to presenting the necessary policy changes.

This mode of framing also showcases the differences in evolution between the two parties. Yet still, the basic narrative framework is quite similar. The two key characteristics of their discourse on the crisis, as they were identified by Hindmoor and McConnell, are again present in the utilisation of this frame. First, the rhetoric of both parties is heavily skewed towards the side of classic adversarial politics since both of them accuse their political opponents of grossly underestimating the crisis, they argue that their policies are damaging, and finally refuse any joint working with the government (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2015:23). Second, as it was mentioned in Chapter 3 two parts of their narrative do not fall under the classic adversarial category: causes and blame. Both parties are ultra-nationalist, and national sovereignty is the cornerstone of their rhetoric. Most importantly, the homogenisation of policy making under the directives of the EU and the global economic system lends further credence to their claims that democracy has been severely compromised and as a result blame is not solely attributed to the government.

These characteristics are the final point of convergence for both parties when framing political issues. The final frame, the accusations that the government is actively attempting to undermine them, has largely been coloured by the unique circumstances present in each party's life. Nonetheless, it is important to define the characteristics of creating the identity of the victim (victimhood) first. According to Andreas Schedler, anti-political-establishment parties structure the world in a very specific way via the creation of a triangular symbolic space: the political class, the people, and themselves (Schedler, 1996:293). Moreover, each edge of this triangle possesses certain characteristics according to Schedler:

The first represents the malicious rogue, the second the innocent victim and the third the redeeming hero. While citizens and anti-political-establishment actors live in peace and harmony, their relationship with the political establishment is deeply antagonistic. Those 'above' do not even belong to the pre-established community of those 'below'. They are not just enemies; they are outsiders.

In the following we look at how anti-political-establishment actors construct the two rapports of conflict: the cleavage between the political establishment and the people, on the one hand, and the opposition between the former and themselves, on the other. (Schedler, 1996:293).

This triangular symbolic space is the foundation for the creation of a new political class. Since the majority of the cleavages of old died out, these parties have created a new type of conflict and presented it as society's fundamental cleavage: the conflict between politicians and the electorate. Though the semantic clothing may vary, the core message remains the same: '... public officials form an anti-popular coalition; they have degenerated into a political class.' (Schedler, 1996:294) 31. Furthermore, the homogenisation of the entire political stratum under a common identity serves to showcase that the differences between 'traditional parties' are mere simulacra. This key characteristic is present in the discourse of both parties, but is utilised differently as a framing device both in a quantitative and qualitative sense. In the case of the latter the final collection of excerpts can better showcase the fundamental differences in the parties' discourse when they claim that they are fighting in the name of the people against a corrupt political system. For GD, the use of this framing device was inevitably defined by the murder of Pavlos Fyssas and the ongoing trial of its members since September 2013.

6.5.1 Frame Salience: Victimhood

In the case of GD the utilisation of the specific frame was frequent. A notable example would be the month of June when the party first entered the Greek Parliament, and wished to set themselves apart from the other parties that were in favour of the austerity measures. The salience would increase dramatically during the month of September 2013, after the murder of Pavlos Fyssas. In this month the rate of change increased by 466.67% and would remain consistently high for the next two years as shown in Figure 6.9 and Table A7 in Appendix A.

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³¹ Parties translate societal conflicts into political conflicts according to Lipset and Rokkan's seminal article on party systems and cleavage structures (1967). However, the anti-political appeals of populist parties differ in one significant aspect: they are self-referential from a systemic point of view. Instead of politicizing an extra-political conflict they construct and exploit an intra-political one.

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Figure 6.9 Salience of Victimhood Frame: Golden Dawn 2012-2013

In addition, this framing device was more frequently utilised in the two elections of 2015 as opposed to the ones in 2012. The highest point for the party would be the month of October 2015, where the new government of SYRIZA had recently been sworn in and began drafting the new austerity bill. The change was dramatic with an increase of 22 references from August to September, and then doubling the total amount for October. The trial was ongoing during this period, and GD presented itself as the last obstacle that the 'elite' wished to remove before they proceeded with their plans.

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Figure 6.10 Salience of Victimhood Frame: Golden Dawn 2014-2015

The utilisation of this frame by NR was negligible, even during the election periods. As it can be observed from Figure 6.11 the salience of the specific frame was relatively low for the entirety of 2012 and the majority of 2013. The only exception during this period was the month of December in 2013. The topic of contention was a series of accusations about anti-Semitism and several members presented the accusations as an elaborate conspiracy with the purpose of besmirching the party's image.




Figure 6.11 Salience of Victimhood Frame: National Rally 2012-2013

The greatest increases were observed in May 2016 and during the 2017 elections from March until May followed by a steep decline. Regarding 2016, the Brexit referendum became the focal point of the party's discourse. The party presented the event as a vindication to its struggle for France's exit from the EU, and to also present themselves as the defender of the people, and the reason that the other parties were actively trying to undermine them. Overall, this is a frame that the party does not use as often as GD. Even during the election periods the number of references was relatively small compared to other frames such as the issue of national sovereignty or the economy. Despite this significant difference in salience, a qualitative analysis is essential in order to examine how the two parties frame victimhood.




Figure 6.12 Salience of Victimhood Frame: National Rally 2016-2017

6.5.2 Discourse Analysis

The analysis will now proceed with the qualitative elements of the two parties' discourse on victimhood. The first GD excerpt is taken from one of the final parliamentary Meetings for 2013 which took place on the 19th of December. The parliament voted for the passing of a new bill on the Single Property Tax and auction houses. Most importantly, many MPs were absent due to the ongoing investigations for the murder of Pavlos Fyssas:

The Greek people chose all three hundred of us. Therefore, they are the only ones that are truly qualified to keep us here or send us back home. The other people that try to undermine and prosecute a legally elected party, and silence the voice of GD, are not qualified to do so. [...]

You should not be puzzled by the fact that GD is on the rise. Even though you cut off our government funding we are still going to distribute food in Piraeus this Saturday. And we will do so in Perama and Thessaloniki. And we will do so until you withhold the wages we receive as MPs. We are on the rise because we speak the truth. You imprisoned us, murdered some of our members, slandered us, and terrorised the people but you did not break our will. (Panagiotaros, 2013:5036).

The other excerpt which will be utilised for the framing analysis is a TV spot by GD for the January 2015 elections:

GD remains isolated. It has endured an enormous amount of persecution but is currently on the rise. It is the rising political power in Greece. Our political opponents refuse to sit in the same table with us, because they don't have a plan as opposed to us, the popular association, and the nationalist movement which has a plan for ending the crisis. It is this very plan that I will present to you now in the minimum amount of time I have according to the Greek constitution. We begin by stating that the economy cannot flourish without a revitalised national production.

GD has formulated a detailed plan to revitalise the first sector of the economy. It is only through the development of the first sector that and the revitalisation of the agricultural and livestock production that the economy can stand back on its feet. [...] GD also proposed to end the funding of parties by the state budget. The parties should not receive fifty million Euros per year. The only exception is GD, which has not received a single cent from the public funds, and it is to our honour that we carry on our struggle without any state funding. (Kasidiaris, 2015:0:57-5:17).

The first excerpt for NR is a press statement made by Florian Philippot on the 21st of June 2012, four days after the conclusion of the legislative elections where NR captured two seats:

The minister responsible for relations with parliament Alain Vidalies has just abandoned the republican field by refusing Marine Le Pen the possibility of being

received by the President of the Republic within the framework consultations with party leaders.

After François Hollande's refusal to receive Marine Le Pen a few weeks ago, this new declaration is a real provocation: it proves the hatred of the new socialist power towards democracy. It is also contradictory to the argument put forward at the time to justify the exclusion of the National Front from presidential consultations, namely the absence of our party from Parliament.

The minister's position is anti-republican because it excludes millions of voters from democratic procedures. What moral authority does this minister believe he possesses for deciding to ban the consultation of the 6.4 million French who chose Marine Le Pen? This position demonstrates that a small caste in power claims the right to sort out French votes according to its own criteria.

It is time for the French people to choose leaders respectful of democratic and republican values. In the immediate future, we ask François Hollande to indicate that this position does not reflect that of the government. (Philippot, 2012)

The last excerpt is also a press statement made by Bruno Bilde on the 26th of October 2017. Bilde is one of the eight members of NR elected in the parliament, and this excerpt can provide an insight on how the party interacts with its opponents within the parliament:

Worse still, the government voluntarily closed its eyes and never responded to the alerts launched by the National Front or to the amendments tabled by its deputies which notably planned to suspend the payment of social benefits to anyone who goes abroad for the purpose of committing terrorist acts. Why did the government and "En Marche" deputies reject this common sense amendment that would have more effectively suffocated Daesh fighters? Their opposition of yesterday relates to their political responsibility of today!

Finally, during the debates on the PLFSS 2018 RN deputies brought an amendment aimed at cutting social benefits for families where at least one member was convicted of an act of terrorism. This amendment will be voted on by the National Assembly on Friday or Saturday. In light of this new case, the adoption of such an amendment is of urgent urgency. A refusal on the part of the majority LREM would constitute a real abuse of authority! (Bilde, 2017)

The core element that can be observed in the chosen excerpts is that both parties accuse their political opponents of undermining them. As was previously mentioned, GD and NR want to present themselves as a positive form of change. Their struggle is a struggle for the people and their freedom. This is a textbook populist framing method since it creates an in-group and an out-group. However, there are some important differences that can be observed regarding the framing of the crises. While NR is adversarial in its discourse it avoids playing the role of the martyr, and instead utilises the aforementioned triangulation in order to present itself as the only viable alternative to a declining political system. As it can be observed from both excerpts, the party focuses on its own policy alternatives, and how the government is preventing them from taking part in the decision-making process. It is for this reason that the framing of NR is more robust and closer to a party that wishes to be a true contender in the political arena.

On the other hand, GD focused on presenting itself as the victim of a conspiracy fighting against insurmountable odds. The second excerpt does contain a mention to their plan to revitalise the Greek economy, but it is extremely brief and vague. NR's utilisation of the victimhood frame is more effective since it covers all three key framing contests: 1) diagnosing the severity of the crisis, 2) identifying the causes and attributing blame, 3) proposing suitable policy alternatives. Therefore, NR members are more successful in presenting their party as capable of ending the crises, and they also maintain the division of us versus them by presenting their own policies. According to them there is a way out and they know it, but the powers that be are opposing them for this very reason.

6.5 Conclusion

Both parties share a common core within their discourse on the political system. These frames are one of the most utilised along with the ones associated with Society and External Policy. This triad is indicative of liberal democracy's gradual weakening due to the primacy of globalised forms of governance. The parties that hold the reins of power inevitably bear the blame for any policy failures or the inability to end a crisis. Democracy is based on the symbiosis between the electorate and the political parties, and if this symbiotic relationship dies out so will democracy itself. The lack of policy alternatives coupled with the elimination of past societal cleavages provided populist parties not only with a piece of the electoral

market, but also with a greater amount of manoeuvrability. The void which was created could easily be filled with their own framing regarding the causes, the nature, and the severity of the crises. Populism is not created through a crisis, but rather populism creates the crisis or the constant sense of threat that is associated with one as was mentioned in Chapter 2.

This core is what binds the two parties together. However, their diverse evolutionary paths along with their different starting parameters have resulted in some fundamental differences. The most significant ones are the fact that NR had more time to mature as a political party and that it had not relations to Nazism or criminal activities. GD's discourse in relation to the crisis has proven limited and one-dimensional. Their MPs, ranging from the party leader to other members, mainly focus on moralising and attributing blame. While these aspects are vital, they are not sufficient and should be linked with feasible solutions to the problem at hand. NR has formulated a richer discursive framework which traces a crisis at its root, creates a new type of cleavage, and then proposes solutions. Therefore, the party presents itself as an outside thinker, a revitalising force within a system that has withered away.

Simply put, voters turn to the political parties so that they can resolve the problems that they are facing. GD's inability to provide a solid programme to end the crisis harmed its electoral prospects in the long run, as it can be seen from the 2019 elections. Once the economy stabilised the parry quickly sunk into irrelevance and was unable to maintain any of the initial momentum that catapulted it into electoral success. Therefore, even a party that wishes to present itself as a radical reformer must abide to the basic rules that govern the electoral market. The discourse of NR members successfully covered the framing contests associated with crises. Even in the case of the victimhood frame, where the main emphasis was the attribution of blame the party made sure to present its own policy alternatives, and thus present itself as more capable in resolving the crises. With the framing of the political system outlined and examined, only one piece of the puzzle remains: the people. Every populist invocation involves the division between 'the people' and 'the elite'. Taking into account the triangular symbolic space that these parties create, it can be observed that 'the people' is the final component that makes their message salient. Therefore, the next chapter will focus on the analysis of society itself and how both parties attempt to create new cleavages in their bid to win electoral support. In this chapter the core framing mechanism of populist discourses that divides society into two opposing camps takes centre stage.

Chapter 7: We the People

7.1 Introduction

The focus of this chapter is the electorate, democratic representation and most importantly the framing of crises in terms of their severity within the discourse of the populist right. The last part is crucial since it is directly linked with identifying the causes of the crises, attributing blame and accentuating the sense of urgency that a crisis creates._Most definitions of populism are centred on the division between 'the people' and 'the elite' (Panizza, 2017:407). The cleavage between the two can be identified as the quintessence of populist discourse, as it has been shown throughout the entirety of this thesis. Irrespective of the topic of discussion, the discourse of both parties always returns to the issue of popular sovereignty.

According to them, any type of systemic failure or crisis is essentially a sign that democratic representation has been undermined. The notion of 'the people' is not exclusive to the populist lexicon. After all, political parties essentially serve as representatives of the electorate. What is of interest in this chapter is to analyse how the two parties frame the notion of the people, and how they link it with their crisis discourse. The people are not only the cornerstone of populist discourse, but also their audience. Therefore, a series of important questions need to be answered: how is the notion of the people constructed? Who are populist performances aimed at? Why has the populist conceptualisation of the people gained traction during our current epoch?

These questions are worthwhile to explore since they are linked with the crisis discourse of both parties. Crucially, they are directly linked with how populist discourse transforms all crises into a crisis of representation. Umberto Eco makes a keen observation regarding the populist notion of 'the people':

Appealing to the people means constructing a fictitious entity: since the people as such do not exist, populists are those who create a virtual image of the popular will.... A populist identifies his plan with the will of the people and then, if he can manage it (and he often can), he takes a goodly number of citizens—who are so fascinated by this virtual image of themselves that they end up identifying with it—and transforms them into the very people he has invented. (Eco, 2007:130).

It is important to note that this does not mean that 'the people' are a fictitious construct, or that their identity is conjured out of nothing but that it is a central concept in understanding populist discourse. Simply put, it is a matter of constructing identities and meaning in relation to crises. Therefore, the first part of the chapter will examine how this identity is formed and what its constitutive parts are. The next part in the chapter deals with the issue of democratic representation and how it's always present within the crisis framing of the two parties. As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2 any type of crisis can be presented as a crisis of representation. According to populist actors the suffering of the people is caused by an unresponsive political system. The analysis then moves on to the key frame of populist discourses: the people against the elite. This part is connected with the previous one since populist politicians claim to fight for the people that have been betrayed by the political system. The final part in the chapter examines a very salient frame within the discourse of the two parties: describing the crises as extremely severe. This part is directly linked with the first crisis framing contest identified in Chapter 2, where political actors diagnose the severity of the crisis. By describing the situation as extremely dire these parties seek to enhance their blame attribution frames. The analysis of the frames will focus both on their salience and how it fluctuates according to specific events such as the elections, as well as a qualitative analysis of chosen excerpts. Crucially, this chapter will showcase how these frames that form the core of populist discourses are utilised in the framing contests of crisis in relation to their severity, causes and proposed solutions.

7.2 The People

Margaret Canovan has noted that: '... all forms of populism without exception involve some kind of exaltation and appeal to 'the people'.' (Canovan, 1981:294). In a democracy the people are not only the electorate, but also the sovereign. The issue of sovereignty is the nexus of populist discourse, since 'the people' are at the same time 'the underdogs' and the holders of sovereignty. However, this is not the only reason that makes 'the people' significant in populist discourse. This is due to the fact that social cleavages are linked with social identities such as 'workers' or 'the middle class' (Moffitt, 2016:99). 'The people' do not possess an automatic social base ascribed to them. As a result, the concept of 'the people' cannot by solidified into an identity with specific characteristics, boundaries and permanence, despite the fact that it is capable of carrying these senses (Canovan, 2005:140).

For all intents and purposes, 'the people' is an empty signifier which can never be truly filled (Laclau, 2005b). This is not necessarily a problem, and in the hands of a capable orator 'the people' can include and unify a plethora of disparate identities via the opposition to 'the elite', or an associated 'other' in the case of right- wing populism. As a result, 'the people' can become a political identity. The elevation of 'the people' to a novel and all-encompassing identity for the demos has been greatly facilitated by the elimination of previous sociopolitical cleavages. According to Francisco Panizza:

Any demand, no matter how specific, is grounded on some kind of identity claim: what *I am* determines *what I want*. Demands being addressed by institutional means can be, and often are, intensely political, creating antagonisms *within* the institutional structure. Struggles for their fulfilment involve processes of hegemonic construction and challenges to the limits of the political order in so far as we understand institutional orders not as fully constituted totalities but as the articulation of a plurality of partially constituted social, economic, political, ethnic, regional, gender, etc. institutional networks. (Panizza, 2017:418).

This new type of cleavage is not a rupture between different social groups like the working and middle classes, but rather one between the political establishment and society itself. In a sense, populism has an ambivalent relationship with democracy, since it invokes its most fundamental principles: equality and popular sovereignty. In addition, populist parties denounce the government's lack of accountability and detachment from the electorate, as well as their failure to represent its interests (Diehl, 2018:131). Therefore, populist parties consider the authority of the established political elite as illegitimate.

Populism aims to construct a single homogenous identity, the identity of the people. This identity is based on the politics of equivalence since it simplifies the political space into two antagonistic camps as it was mentioned in Chapters 2 and 6. In the crisis discourse of populist parties this equivalence is articulated between different demands against a common enemythe government, the EU, the global capitalist system- in terms of a common claim, such as the weakening of democracy. This element of equivalence is present in all types of political discourse, but in populist articulations there is one significant difference: the emphasis on the negative aspects.

Laclau and Mouffe note that there are two ways in articulating all differences as equivalent:

1) the differences share something positive, or 2) they are unified by reference to something external (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:129). In the case of populist discourse the first option is rejected since the common feature is immediately expressed. Instead, the equivalence is expressed negatively, unifying different demands, identities and social groups against something which all oppose (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:128). According to Charles Taylor political identities are part of social imageries, the ways in which: '...people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met and the deeper normative images that underlie these expectations.' (Taylor, 2002: 106). In general, identities are complex constructs and also relational since they are based on the network of social relations that differentiate one individual from another (Connolly, 1991:204).

Most importantly, identities are incomplete both at the personal and political levels. As Yannis Stavrakakis put it, identity is nothing but what an individual desires but can never fully obtain (2001). Yet still, the search for completion is what gives meaning to life itself. The concept of 'the people' facilitates this search through its extreme reductionism. Crucially, the need to identify with an idea, a movement or a political ideology stems from the fact that a complete identity does not exist in the first place. Moreover, the identities along with the institutions that accumulate them are never fully structured and are already dislocated (Glynos & Howarth, 2007:14). According to Glynos and Howarth identities redescribe social relations by stipulating different dimensions of social reality. More specifically:

The social dimension captures those situations in which the radical contingency of social relations has not been registered in the mode of public contestation, whereas the political dimension refers to those situations in which subjects responding to dislocatory events re-activate the contingent foundations of a practice by publicly contesting and defending the norms of that practice. (Glynos & Howarth, 2007:14).

Identificatory practices involve the construction of differences and of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between 'outsiders' and 'insiders'. As a result, an underlying tension will always be present in participatory democracy. This tension between the

electorate and the government needs to be examined closely, since it is the catalyst that leads to the creation of 'the people' as a political identity.

7.3 A Precarious Balancing Act

In democracies, representatives need to maintain a balance between authorisation and accountability. This is done in order to: '(a) decide what is best for their constituents, and (b) remain committed to informing citizens about their activities and allowing the latter to supervise what they do.' (Diehl, 2018:130). There is a constant but essential tension between the two, since they are complementary and competitive features. Populist parties have developed a rather sophisticated method of dealing with this tension. A common characteristic of populist parties and movements is that they are '... of the people but not of the system' as Paul Taggart puts it (1996:32).

Therefore, the first step of this method is the radicalisation between verticality and horizontality within democratic representation. Populist parties demand a greater amount of popular sovereignty (horizontality), while also claiming that in order for this to be feasible a stronger leadership is required (verticality) (Diehl, 2018:130). The next step is to emphasise the connection between the leader or the party and the people. By doing this, any tension between them and the people becomes obscured (Diehl, 2018:130). Populism can have different contents based on the establishment that it mobilises against. In the case of European-populist parties the content is structured around the issue of national sovereignty, the EU membership and the harmonisation of policies at the national level according to its directives.

This does not make populists unfocused or unprincipled, but rather what makes them populist is their reaction to power structures. Both NR and GD utilise a democratic discourse as it has been shown in previous chapters³². Furthermore, the relationship between the government and the electorate is vertical, since representation always involves authorisation (Manin,

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³² Populist discourses are not only based on a reaction against power structures, but also on an appeal towards an established authority: 'the people'. As stated by Margaret Canovan: 'Populists claim legitimacy on the grounds that they speak for the people: that is to say, they claim to represent the democratic sovereign, not a sectional interest such as an economic class. Although economic grievances are always important to populist movements, these are translated into political questions of democratic power.' (Canovan, 1999:4-5).

1997:170). The electorate authorises their representatives to take decisions and act in their place. The aforementioned tension becomes prominent once more. The government must at the same time act in accordance with the principle of equality, and also make decisions in the name of the electorate. Inevitably these decisions will not satisfy everyone since it is impossible to include the entirety of the electorate in every decision making process.

While democratic representatives have received authorisation by their constituents, they are also accountable to them. According to Paula Diehl there are three characteristics that are pivotal for democratic accountability: '...that the people are the source of sovereignty; second, that the constituents should exert control over their representatives; and third, that formal governmental institutions realise democratic accountability.' (Diehl, 2018:134). In a period of crisis accountability can potentially become an issue of contention not only by populist parties but parties belonging to the opposition in general. In the case of populists, they promise to build a horizontal relationship with 'the people' by promising them the restoration of their sovereignty, and demanding a greater amount of accountability by the government.

A crisis or a catastrophic systemic failure can be beneficial for populist parties since: '... a crisis is a moment for contestation and struggle to construe it and inform individual and collective responses. This involves, among other issues, [...] identifying rightly or wrongly purported causes (agential, structural, discursive and technical).' (Sum & Jessop, 2013:398). As it has been already showcased in Chapters 5 and 6, a crisis can be re-interpreted by political actors regarding its causes and possible solutions. Therefore, it is important to look at how both parties reinterpret the crises or systemic failures into a crisis of representation in their discourse. The main themes of the following excerpts are democratic representation and accountability.

7.3.1 Frame Salience: Democratic Representation

In the case of the 2012 Greek legislative elections the claims that democracy had been undermined were frequently used as a framing device. As it can be observed from Figure 7.1 the number of references remained consistently high only a slight decrease for the month of May. This is attributable to the fact that none of the parties was able to win a majority or form

a coalition government despite lengthy negotiations taking place. As a result, a second round of elections was held on June the 17th, and as Figure 7.1 shows the specific frame increased in salience again. The second and largest increase occurred during November when the 7th austerity package was adopted by the Greek parliament. The total number of references was 30, an overall increase of 275% percent over the previous month as shown in Figure 7.1 and Table A3 in Appendix A.

2013 began with an increase in references during the month of January since the main topic of discussion was a major reform to the pension system in accordance with the proposed reforms of the 7th austerity package (103d Parliamentary Meeting, 2013: 6181). The other two notable increases occurred on the months of April and June to July. The first one is attributable to first multi-bill which was approved by the Greek Parliament as part of the eight austerity package. As for the months of June and July, two events contributed to the extended usage of the specific frame: 1) the second part of the multi-bill of the 8th austerity package, 2) the shutting down of the country's Public Broadcasting Service (ERT). As Figure 7.1 shows, the total references to the weakening of democracy increased to 20 on the month of June, and then increased again in July.




Figure 7.1 Salience of Democratic Representation Frame: Golden Dawn 2012-2013

The next year was relatively quiet since the majority of the MPs were under house arrest while the investigation for the murder of Pavlos Fyssas was being carried out. Yet still, the months of March, April and December exhibited a greater frequency of utilisation over the previous months. On March and April a new multi-bill was passed so that Greece could receive its next bailout payment in accordance with the 9th bailout package. For the month of March only the total number of references increased by 1600% as shown in Table A11 in Appendix A, and remained high for the next month. As for December, the aforementioned election of the President of the Hellenic Republic dominated the discourse of the party as well as the call for snap elections in the next month as it can be observed from Figure 7.2.

2015 was a pivotal year, not only for the party but for the the country itself. Elections were held on the 25th and SYRIZA won for the first time, securing 149 of the 300 seats. On the 27th of June Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras called for the Bailout Referendum to be held on the 5th of July. After the referendum Greece came into a new agreement with its lenders, but the unity of the party started to erode since many MPs refused to support the new bailout plan. This led to the resignation of the Prime Minister and the call for elections to be held on the 20th of September. The increase in references was dramatic for the months of September and October. More specifically, the claims that democracy had been undermined increased to 29 and again in the next month. Moreover, the month of October exhibits the greatest number of references regarding the state of democratic representation from 2012 to 2015, with 78 references in total. The increase coincides with the agreement for a twelfth austerity package between Greece and the quartet of its creditors.




Figure 7.2 Salience of Democratic Representation Frame: Golden Dawn 2014-2015

For NR the first notable fluctuation can be observed on the month of February 2012. The first contributing factor for the increase was the ratification of the treaty for the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism on the 28th of February. The second factor was the beginning of Le Pen's campaign for the Presidential Elections. However, the specific frame declined in utilisation over the next month when it became apparent that Le Pen would not advance to the second round of the elections. The next months did not exhibit any significant increases until September where the total references rose to 29 when the new state budget was adopted by the Council of Ministers on the 28th of September.

2013 began with a significant increase in references due to the participation of the French army in operation in Mali against Islamist armed groups as shown in Figure 7.3 (Bergamaschi, 2013). The party found an opportunity to attack the Islamic community in France, and what they referred to as a form of 'enforced multiculturalism" that went against the will of the French people. The next notable increase occurred in May, and has a historical significance as it was mentioned in the Economy chapter due to the 1968 May events. The important upward change of 88.24% in the number of references occurred in September, as shown in Figure 7.3 and Table B7 in Appendix B. The first reason behind the increase was the adoption of the budget for 2014, and the party seized the opportunity to attack the Hollande government for reneging on their pre-election promises. The second reason was France's decision to join the US in a military strike against Bashar Akl-Assad in Syria in the wake of his alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians (Gaffney, 2014). Despite the fact that the attack did not take, NR MPs presented the event as the dissolution of democracy since the country was following the directives of the US.




Figure 7.3 Salience of Democratic Representation Frame: National Rally 2012-2013

In the beginning of 2016 the references regarding democracy remained high due to the Bataclan terrorist attack in the previous year. Once again, the point of contention for the party was the damaging effects that enforced multiculturalism had on the country's security. However, the main points of interest are the months of May, June and July. During May the number of references was 38 as shown in Figure 7.4. While the aforementioned 1968 May events certainly contributed to this increase, another significant event was unfolding and dominated the party's discourse; and that event was Brexit. Marine Le Pen and other NR MPs welcomed this event as the death knell for the EU, and the proof that the people were eager to wrestle the control of their fates back from the 'technocrats of Brussels'. The upward trend continued well into June with a small increase and started declining after the result was announced.

2017 can be characterised as a 'winner take all' type of year for a variety of reasons. First and most important, the presidential elections took place on the 23d of April and 7th of May. In addition, several events emboldened the party such as the aforementioned Brexit referendum, the onset of the 2015 refugee crisis, the electoral victory of Donald Trump and the declining approval ratings of Francois Hollande. The rate of change from February to May is indicative that Marine Le Pen viewed these elections as one of the most, if not the most, pivotal moments for her party's electoral fortunes. The upward trend began in January with an increase of 87.50% as shown in Table B16 in Appendix B, and hit their peak on March

with 67 references. The month of April exhibited a miniscule decrease, but this is attributable to the fact that there was a small cool down period at the conclusion of the first round of the elections. In May the references increased by a small amount but then declined rapidly by in June after Le Pen's electoral defeat as Figure 7.4 shows.




Figure 7.4 Salience of Democratic Representation Frame: National Rally 2016-2017

7.3.2 Discourse Analysis

The rate of change for both parties does not exhibit any significant differences other than key events which are unique to their socio-cultural repertoire. However, the qualitative analysis of their discourse will showcase some fundamental differences. The two excerpts for GD are taken both from parliamentary Meetings and public rallies during the elections. The first excerpt is taken from the 47th Parliamentary Meeting that took place on the 10th of December 2014. The month of December was pivotal for the Greek political system since the three separate attempts to elect the President of the Hellenic Republic ended in failure. This eventually led to snap elections on January 2015 where SYRIZA achieved its first electoral victory:

Kasidiaris: Popular sovereignty has been overthrown. We cannot take part in the voting because you have thrown us in prison. Nobody mentions this crime! You are all hypocrites! You have swept this crime under the rug because you hate GD! GD was the

sole voice that brought to light the corruption and all the scandals which had been covered up.

Tragakis: Please conclude with your speech.

Kasidiaris: I am professing my innocence! You cannot interrupt me! Please be respectful to me!

Tragakis: I have been respectful, and I have also given you more time than the other speakers. Please conclude.

Kasidiaris: I am asking as a member of the parliament and in the name of the Greek people for free elections to take place! Free elections mean that the MPs of the third largest party will be granted their right to freedom of speech. (Kasidiaris, 2014:3310).

The second excerpt is taken from a speech that Nikolaos Michaloliakos gave in Megara on the 4th of April 2012:

We have achieved something truly significant. We have achieved unity throughout the entire country's political system. They finally agree upon something! What to do they agree upon? From Karatzaferis, ANTARSYA, KKE, New Democracy, PASOK, Dimaras, Kouvelis and so on and so forth? They all agree that a major calamity is approaching and they must stop it at all costs! And what is this calamity? Its Golden Dawn! They will not stop us! They will not succeed whatever they do! There is a very wise proverb that says: 'The voice of the people is the wrath of God.'. The wrath of God is coming for their sins and their thievery since 1974. They have been ruling this country through a betrayal. I am referring to the betrayal of Cyprus, whose case they never examined. We had a powerful war-machine, primed to crush Turkey. But they did not unleash it! Why? So that they could bring their democracy! This pseudodemocracy which in reality is only a kleptocracy and nothing more! We are living in an age of decadence. However, this crisis may have helped the Greeks to become aware of their predicament. Do not despair Greeks! Seek out the ones responsible for your misery and punish them! Do not punish yourselves! (Michaloliakos, 2012).

The two NR excerpts are taken from the speech that Marine Le Pen gave at Arcis-sur-Aube during the first round of the 2017 presidential elections. The first excerpt is a presentation of ten measures that she would implement should she be elected:

Brussels will not let go if it is not convinced that the people will have the last word through the vote of a referendum, be well aware of this. In addition, from the first weeks of my mandate, I commit to ten measures that I will immediately implement:

- 1- Suspension of the Schengen agreements and restoration of controls at national borders.
- 2- Expulsion of all foreign S files, and implementation of article 411-4 of the penal code for forfeiting their French nationality, and ban bi-nationals convicted with links to terrorism.
- 3- Repeal of Dati and Taubira Criminal Laws to end judicial laxity.
- 4- Organisation of a referendum on a major institutional reform including, among others: proportional representation, popular initiative referendum, national priority, defence of our identity and our historical and cultural heritage and the decline in the number of deputies and senators.
- 5- Decrease of 10% in the first three instalments of income tax and restoration of the additional tax share for widows and widowers.
- 6- Reinstatement of retirement at 60 with 40 annual contributions.
- 7- The removal of Help State medical service reserved for illegal immigrants.
- 8- Reinstatement of the tax exemption and the increase in overtime and revaluation of small pensions.
- 9- Redirection of the 50 billion Euros in reductions in CICE charges towards VSEs / SMEs exclusively.
- 10- Repeal of the Labour Law, of the El Khomri Law.

With these first 10 measures, all of which will be applied within two months, I want to show you that every second of my mandate will be a useful second for France and the French and not a second will be lost. (Le Pen, 2017).

The second excerpt was chosen since she employs some well-known populist devices in her discourse, especially that 'the people' are the sole source of sovereignty:

This is what has become of the idea of Europe: a clique of courtiers entrenched in Brussels, who dine with the minions of Monsanto-Bayer and look at you with contempt and disgust, you the people, you who hold sovereignty, you before which they should lower their foreheads into the dust because they are not legitimate as you are. (Le Pen, 2017).

The first important point of differentiation between the two parties that can be immediately observed is that GD does not frame the issue of democratic representation in an efficient and complete manner. Marine Le Pen first identified the EU as the root of the problem, then proceeded with the presentation of her reform program, and finally tied everything together with an appeal to popular and national sovereignty. Both of GD's speakers only focused on attacking their political opponents, and portraying themselves as victims. While they utilised the division between 'the people' and 'the elite', their discourse was nothing more than rudimentary adversarial politics. The pattern that emerges from this chapter, and all that have preceded it, is that GD never offers a substantive alternative to the policies that it is criticising. Even the party's site included a reform program that does not go into great detail on how the goals of the party for economic revitalisation can be achieved.

Another important observation regarding the different approaches to framing between the two parties is that GD again utilised the issue of democratic representation in relation to their ongoing trial. Their attempt was not only to present themselves as victims of an elaborate conspiracy, but also close to the people that they are representing. In both excerpts the speakers claim that the Greek political system hates GD because they are the only party that stands with the people. However, it should be mentioned that this particular point of differentiation is attributable to the unique circumstances of GDs tenure, and it is a form of damage control. While NR makes this closeness to 'the people' the centrepiece of its discourse, it does not neglect to offer solutions to their problems.

In this sense, populism is not solely a form of anti-politics, a response to the diminishing structural integrity of liberal democracy (Kelly, 2017:513). Populism is also a political discourse that seeks to replace the foundational democratic commitments of political equality with new forms of unity (Urbinati, 1998:110). Both parties claim that politics should be based on the immediate expression of the general will of the people. This is directly linked with the afore-mentioned homogenisation of party politics and the lack of communication between the government and the electorate. Peter Mair had described this pathology plaguing democratic representation when he wrote that:

As party leaderships become increasingly remote from the wider society, and as they also appear increasingly similar to one another in ideological or policy terms, it simply becomes that much easier for populist protestors to rally against the supposed privileges of an undifferentiated political class. As party democracy weakens, therefore, the opportunities for populist protest clearly increases (Mair, 2002: 88).

In other words, the voters feel that the parties that govern are all the same, and that they only serve their own private interests. Democratic representation becomes delegitimised since the electorate feels that their support is inconsequential. The void that is created between the electorate and the more established parties can be turned into a new cleavage by populist framing. However, it is also important to look at how the two parties have utilised democratic representation as a frame throughout a four year period. Both of them utilised it in an adversarial manner, but GD failed to provide any convincing arguments on why it is capable to end the crisis. The call for a pure and direct form of democracy is present in the discourse of both parties, but the presentation of this ideal is vastly different. NR presents this form of democracy with policy alternatives that will be formed based on popular will. As a result, their crisis discourse does not revolve solely around their anti-elitism but on a better future which can become a reality should they gain power. GD makes similar promises but they are based on abstract notions of freedom, sovereignty and popular democracy. Once again GD's framing in the excerpts never moves beyond the diagnostic stage. This difference in framing will become even more prevalent in the subsequent section where the core frame of populism, 'the people' versus 'the elite', takes centre stage.

7.4 Modern Age Frankensteins

The core frame of populist discourses is the division between the people and the elite. It is an efficient way to homogenise grievances, demands and identities. However, there are two important questions which must be answered before the analysis proceeds: 1) Who are the people? , 2) How is this collective identity constructed? As it was previously mentioned, the concept of 'the people' is vague since it does not possess a well defined social base attached to it, but this vagueness is not necessarily problematic since it can it be utilised to create an artificial form of unity.

What Benjamin Arditi defines as the 'rendering-present' of 'the people' is particularly useful in understanding how populist representation operates (Arditi, 2007a:65). According to Arditi: 'The gap between the absent presence of the people and the action of representing them ... is bridged by a 'presentation' that forgets the iterability at work in the 're-' of 're-presentation'. One way of doing this is through the presumed immediacy of the relation between the people and the leader or his movement.' (Arditi, 2007a:65). Via this way, populist parties and leaders eliminate the distance between the representatives and the represented.

Most importantly, 'the people' are held up as the moral source of legitimacy, and claim to descriptively represent them as an idealised majority (Mény & Surel, 2000: 76–80). Populists favour more direct forms of democracy and speak and behave as if: '...democracy meant the power of the people and only the power of the people.' (Mény & Surel, 2002:9). Therefore, populism despises any form of compromise and emphasises that politics should be based on the immediate expression of the popular will, since populist politicians: '...claim to present and proclaim, not to represent, the essentialist will of the people.' (Abts & Rummens, 2007:408).

This is an important artifice which is constantly present in any type of populist articulation. According to them, the will of the people is the wellspring from which democracy flows, but they are unable to properly articulate it. Therefore, an unmediated relationship between 'the people' and the party is of utmost importance. However, populists do not simply give voice to them, but they also 'shape' the popular will that they claim to express (Diehl, 2018). The prerequisite for this is the drawing of cleavages, since the unified identity they have created can only be brought into being via the conflict with an opposition. Populist discourse in periods of crisis is paradigmatic of the creation of new cleavages via the attribution of blame.

Most importantly, this type of discourse creates impenetrable boundaries between the two opposing camps since it is fuelled by the negative sentiments of anger, resentment, loss of status etc³³. As David Snow argues: 'A collective identity in which the boundaries between

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³³ The following quote by Daniel Bell summarises his assessment of the populist- right in the US during the 1950s, and aptly describes the underlying tensions that allow these parties to gain support through different time periods: 'Today the politics of the populist- right is the politics of frustration –

'us' and 'them' are unambiguously drawn, in which there is strong feeling about those differences, and in which there is a sense of moral virtue associated with both the perceptions and feelings, should be a more potent collective identity than one in which either the emotional or moral dimensions are weakly developed.' (Snow, 2001:218).

The strong formal elements of the populist collective identity do not only render it as a compelling force, but also allow it to capture the moral high ground against any type of counter-framing by the opposition. Furthermore, populist framing is a conscious effort to make a qualitative change in the identity of the citizens, from passive to active. According to Bert Klandermans and Marga de Weerd collective identities remain politically neutral for the majority of time (2000:70). Therefore, this qualitative change is possible when collectively defined grievances create a sense of unity ('we') against an unresponsive authority ('they'), thus making the routine in-group and out-group dynamics conflictual (Klandermans & Weerd, 2000:70).

However, this is not a straightforward process, since claiming to speak for 'the people' does not automatically translate into political support and mobilisation. Political representation also entails the creation of imageries that will resonate with the public. Michael Saward recognises the need of political actors to create these imageries due to the fact that:

Political representation is a variable, dynamic and competitive process encompassing in principle a range of actors, and not a static and incontestable factual status that some (the elected) possess utterly and others (everyone else) lacks utterly. It is also a phenomenon with strong aesthetic and cultural components—would-be representatives present themselves *as* such and such, to a constituency and perhaps a wider audience which itself is characterised (or portrayed) by the claimant in particular, selective ways. (Saward, 2008:273).

Therefore, the unity of 'the people' is merely a representation and not a thing in itself. Effectively, it constitutes the paradigmatic case of political representation, since populist politicians create the 'very authority it presupposes in incarnating its (impossible) symbolic unity' (Carreira da Silva & Brito Vieira, 2019:501). 'The people' become a unifying political

the sour impotence of those who find themselves unable to understand, let alone command, the complex mass society that is the polity today.' (Bell, 1964:42)

authority whose will is the sole source of legitimacy in a liberal democracy, as populist politicians claim.

7.4.1 Frame Salience: The People versus the Elite

The salience of this frame exhibits fluctuations but it has never dropped to zero as opposed to the frames in the previous empirical chapters. In the case of GD the references regarding the clash between 'the people' and 'the elite' hit their peak from April to June as it can be observed from Figure 7.5. The highest point was the second round of elections in June where the total number of references reached 30. The other noticeable change for 2012 would occur on November when the government passed the 2013 austerity budget, and the total references increased by 150% according to Table A4 in Appendix A. For the next year the number of references never reached the highs of the 2012 election period, but they were more evenly distributed.

However, the most interesting trend that can be observed by the charts is the fact that these frames and the ones associated with the weakening of democratic representation form a symbiotic relationship. The peaks for the two occur on the exact same months as it can be observed from the charts. More specifically, the frames increase during January due to the reform of the pension system, but then decrease steadily for the next two months. The first multi-bill for the 8th austerity package in April led to another brief increase, as well as the months of June and July where the total number of references peaked at 15 for the year. During the months of September and October, the pre-trial detention of the Nicholaos Michaloliakos and several MPs dramatically diminished the party's presence. The party started to become more active in November and December due to the aforementioned abolition of its state funding, and the passing of a new bill on property taxes.




Figure 7.5 Salience of the People versus the Elite Frame: Golden Dawn 2012-2013

In 2014 the core frame of the people versus the elite was not utilised as frequently as the previous year. The ongoing investigation on the party's past criminal activities meant that its members could not actively participate in political matters. The utilisation of the frame exhibited an increase of 275% during April, when the bill for the 9th austerity package was published as shown in Table A12 in Appendix A. 2015 would be an entirely different story since the country's future within the European Community was put into doubt. The elections in January mark a high point in the utilisation of the frame, with an increase from only 9 references in the previous month to 54 in total. Most of the members had been released from prison, and were able to actively campaign in an election that was characterised by a great amount of hope for a change in the political system. For the next two months the party was less aggressive in its rhetoric since the SYRIZA government had maintained its anti-austerity rhetoric.

This would change in April when the government began negotiations with the country's creditors for an alternative austerity program. GD viewed this as a backtracking on their promises, and the number of references increased on April and March. The peak during this period would occur in July, when all parties were campaigning for the July referendum. In addition, the government struck a new deal with the country's European creditors after the conclusion of the referendum for a new bailout of 86 billion Euros. As a result, the total number of references increased to 29. The final summer month was a dead period, since the

parliament was dissolved in preparation for the September elections, and as a result the number of references declined. Predictably, the September elections marked the single greatest increase for the year at 1125% as shown in Table A16 in Appendix A. The party took full advantage of the opportunity to present the new bailout agreement as an act of betrayal towards the Greek people who voted against it in the referendum. The references continued to increase over the next month when the Hellenic Parliament passed the twelfth austerity package, and finally reached 54 in total as shown in Figure 7.6.




Figure 7.6 Salience of the People versus the Elite Frame: Golden Dawn 2014-2015

For NR 2012 saw the utilisation of the particular frame starting off strongly during January with 25 references and then exhibiting a slight decrease in the next month. The first round of the election period coincides with an increase for the specific frame as it can be observed from Figure 7.7. The rest of the year did not exhibit any significant increases, other than the month of November where the two main topics of discussion were a new set of criteria for the normalisation of immigrants and a new agreement between Greece, the IMF and the European Central Bank for a partial erasure of its debt until 2020. In the case of the latter this was seen as an additional blow to the French taxpayers by the EU who dutifully implemented the austerity policies of the global markets.

The number of references was higher for the next year, and the frame of the people versus the elite was used consistently throughout it. Similar to the claims that democracy was being weakened, one of the topics that the party framed was the military intervention in Mali. The month of May exhibited a significant increase as it is always the case due to its historic

significance. The next noticeable change would occur in July and it is attributable to a plethora of reasons. First, the sacking of the Environmental Minister Delphine Batho over her criticisms on the budget cuts provided the party with the opportunity to condemn the Socialist government over its fixation with austerity. Another important event was the visit of Wolfgang Schauble to Athens, which triggered a series of riots in the capital. Florian Phillipot described the event as "...the visit of the master to the slave in a country under siege." (Phillipot, 2013). He then went on to describe the EU as being built around the interests of Germany, and how countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and France are being ransacked in the name of the Euro. The final noticeable change can be observed in December with an increase of 36.36% as shown in Table 2.8 from Appendix A. The last month of the year always includes an evaluation of the government and its policies, and as a result an increase was inevitable.




Figure 7.7 Salience of the People versus the Elite Frame: National Rally 2012-2013

The number of references would remain high during 2016 since the refugee crisis had began half a year ago in conjunction with a series of terrorist attacks throughout Europe. However, the upward trend began in March with the Tripartite Social Summit where the main topic of discussion was the integration of immigrants and their children through education. The number of references would remain consistently high, finally hitting their peak for 2016 during May and June when the Brexit referendum was underway. More specifically, the number of references increased during May and remained stable for the next month as shown in Figure 7.8. The second peak would occur in the last two months of the year when the US

Presidential elections took place, and concluded with the electoral victory of Donald Trump. The party presented these events as a sign that the people were gradually waking up and taking control of their own fates.

All of these events would culminate on the 2017 presidential elections where the party seemed primed for electoral victory. As shown in Figure 7.8 the references were on a steady increase since the beginning of the campaign period on February. The total references would increase by 144.12% on March and would reach their highest point for the four year period on April at 91 references in total. However, the eventual defeat of Marine Le Pen led to an inevitable decline in the utilisation of the frame. By looking at the rates of change for both parties it can be concluded that GD' discourse is indeed one dimensional. The spikes occurred solely during the periods where austerity bills were passed, or when the election periods were underway. Simply put, GD never managed to go beyond the single event which allowed it to taste electoral success. NR on the other hand is always present, and efficiently utilises its populist rhetoric on a multitude of different policy issues and systemic failures. The party's discourse is more intricate, and succeeds in gradually phasing out its previous identity of a protest party. However, there is still one frame left to analyse, which is the utilisation of a bleak imagery in order to present failures as more severe than they actually are.

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 References 10 0ct.76 404.76 0ec.76 Jan-17 feb.27 Jan- Feb-Mar-Apr-May Jun- Jul- Aug-Sep-Oct-Nov-Dec-Jan- Feb-Mar-Apr-May Jun- Jul- Aug-Sep-Oct-Nov-Dec 16 16 -16 | 16 16 16 16 | 16 | 16 16 17 17 | 17 | 17 -17 17 | 17 17 | 17 17 References 3 12 24 | 24 | 13 9 15 | 11 | 15 | 18 15 | 34 | 83 | 91 76 3 4

Figure 7.8 Salience of the People versus the Elite Frame: National Rally 2016-2017

7.4.2 Discourse Analysis

The next step is to examine how this frame is utilised within the discourse of the two parties in relation to the crises. The two excerpts for GD are taken from 2013, and the purpose is to showcase how the utilisation of the specific frame changed qualitatively after the murder of Pavlos Fyssas. More specifically, after several members and MPs were placed under arrest, the party began to present itself as an underdog that was unjustly persecuted by a corrupt political system. The first excerpt is taken from the 175th Parliamentary Meeting, on the 28th of April. This is a very important meeting, since the first part of the new multi-bill for the eight austerity package went through a voting process:

A political catharsis will only be possible through a national leadership pioneered by GD, and after it has been legitimated by the popular will in the form of a referendum. Because the people will be the ones making the important decisions through referendums once GD is in power. The people will vote for the abolition of the memorandum and all the catastrophic austerity measures. [...]

Our people will choose whether we will stay with the Euro or return to the drachma, and if this policy of subjugation will continue or if we will go against the anti-Hellenist loan sharks. Breaking off with the loan sharks will be tough. The country will bleed. However, we are also currently bleeding with the thousands of suicides and the millions of unemployed Greeks. (Kasidiaris, 2013:11383).

The final excerpt for GD is taken from the 9th Parliamentary Meeting, on the 17th of October the same year. After the murder of Pavlos Fyssas discussions began in order to decide whether the party would continue to receive funding by the state. The MPs declared the decision as unconstitutional and punitive, and a solid proof that the entire political system was against them:

First, two days ago I mentioned that the investigations from the Department of Financial Crimes proved what we have been claiming all along: our finances are in order. You could ask the department to check on your finances too if you have the guts, because there are some among you that claim that they will not allow the officers to enter through their doorstep. You know who we are talking about. Therefore, you can

check your own finances and find the black holes which have drained millions of Euros, if you have the guts.

Second, we are not disheartened at all that this legislation that will cut or government funding will inevitably be approved. We are not dependent on state funding. The only crime we committed was the fact that we returned the money back to the Greek people through our soup kitchens and other social welfare provisions. This is the true crime that you are accusing us of today. State funding or not, either three of our MPS in prison or all eighteen of us, know this: the vision for a free and independent Greece shall never die. (Mattheopoulos, 2013:683).

The first excerpt for NR is part of a press statement released by the Vice-President of NR, Louis Aliot, on the 22nd of February 2013:

The BVA institute conducted a survey in February regarding the French population's view of the European project and on the Community institutions which clearly demonstrates a conscious decision by the French people in regards to the Europe of Brussels.

If in October 2003, 61% of French people considered European construction as a source of hope, ten years later they are only 38%. In addition, this percentage has dropped by twelve points over the last year. Three-quarters of French people consider European action to be ineffective in matters of immigration, unemployment, economy, growth and want to question this policy that creates misery and fear for the future.

The French remain, to the great disappointment of the Europeanists, very attached to national sovereignty and worried about the austerity measures taken by the government. The National Front welcomes the lucidity of the French people who validate the program of Marine Le Pen, and her desire to change the system. The rejection by referendum of the European Constitution was therefore the harbinger of a national and popular awareness and foreshadows the inevitable and salutary political re-composition to come around on our ideas! (Aliot, 2013)

The second excerpt is from a speech Marine Le Pen gave on September, at the party's summer School:

Our strategy is also to talk about all subjects, and to make proposals on all subjects.

We will go on all fronts. There is no longer an area of public debate where we are not present. And in many of which we are the only ones to speak, imposing debate, without taboo: Europe, the euro, globalisation, immigration.

Our strategy is also to go everywhere in the country, to meet all French people, whoever and wherever they are, wherever they come from. We want lists everywhere in France, and I'm telling you that by this date 623 representatives have already been selected!

You also know that I started a tour of France in early 2013 for the forgotten, closer to reality

French people, all over France, from all walks of life, it allowed me to see how in our countryside, in our distant suburbs, in all these despised corners of France we are all expected, we are hoped for! (Le Pen 2013).

The elements that GD's discourse is missing become apparent once more. As opposed to NR, there is no mention of policy alternatives to the problems themselves. Everything revolves around the attribution of blame to a political system that has failed the citizens. Most importantly, after the murder of Pavlos Fyssas the image of the party as an underdog, not unlike 'the people' that it represents, becomes the part of its master frame; them against 'the elite'. According to them, the only crime that they are truly guilty of is the fact that they shook a declining political system to its very core. While both parties are adversarial in their discourse, this trait is more prominent in GD. NR's discourse is still adversarial but it based on a more focused and precise form of pressure. The party does present itself as morally pure and in touch with the people, but it does so via their proposed solutions to the problem at hand, or public opinion polls in the case of the first excerpt. NR's strategy is more refined and versatile since it manages to blend together the discursive elements of a protest and a mainstream party, without making any significant compromises. GD's approach is blunter as it has also been shown in previous chapters, and if an allegory to compare the two is to be used then NR would be a scalpel, whereas GD is more akin to a broadsword.

Furthermore, the first excerpt from Louis Aliot mentions the policy proposals of NR, and how the rejection of the European Constitution is an indication that the people are more supportive towards them. In this excerpt the speaker covers all the framing contests, from diagnosing the cause of the crisis to proposing solutions, and presents the policy failure of the EU as an indication of their own success. GD's discourse includes the first two framing contests since they identify the causes of the problem and attribute blame, but then the excerpts become dominated by appeals to emotion. While both parties employ a populist discourse in their framing of crisis is only NR that manages to successfully combine both the diagnostic and prognostic frames. In the case of GD their discourse in all the excerpts follows a fixed pattern where they present the crises as extremely severe, then relentlessly attack their political opponents or the EU and finally veer off to emotional appeals where they present themselves as saviours.

7.5 It's Always Darkest Before the Dawn

According to Ruth Wodak: '...right-wing populism does not only relate to the form of rhetoric but to its specific contents: such parties successfully construct fear and – related to the various real or imagined dangers – propose scapegoats that are blamed for threatening or actually damaging our societies, in Europe and beyond.' (Wodak, 2015:3) Negative sentiments such as fear and anger frequently colour the discourse of right-wing populist politicians as it was mentioned in Chapter 2. The purpose behind this emphasis on negativity is two-fold: 1) to present a systemic failure as more severe than it is and 2) to create a sense of unity among 'the people'. The first aspect is directly linked with one of the questions in the crisis management typology developed by Hart and Tindall: How severe is the situation? (Hart & Tindall, 2009). During a full-blown crisis the perception of threat is accompanied by high levels of uncertainty. Crucially, the very occurrence of significant crises (rather than minor systemic failures or slow-burning problems) raises important questions regarding the effectiveness of current policies and institutions (Hart & Tindall, 2009:9). As a result, all parties will seek to take advantage of this opportunity provided by crises.

In Chapter 2 it was mentioned that populist actors elevate a systemic failure to the level of crisis, or they frame a crisis in a way that heightens its severity. According to Hart and Tindall, political actors confronted with the same situation will inevitably frame it according

to their own needs. Taking into account all the excerpts from previous chapters, the frames utilised by the populist right belong to the third type, a described by Hart and Tindall: 'Crisis as opportunity frame: deeming the events to be a *critical opportunity* to expose deficiencies in the status quo ex ante, and hence a predisposition to pinpoint blameworthy behaviour by status quo agents and dysfunctional policies and organisations in order to mobilise support for their removal or substantive alteration.' (Hart & Tindall, 2009:24-25). The frames belonging to this type are geared towards maximising the significance and severity of a crisis.

This is where the second purpose of this negative type of framing comes into play. Populist discourse seeks to create a facade of unity through its master frame of 'the people' versus 'the elite'. But in order to do so a catalyst must be present, which will make this type of framing more salient. The Manichean dualism employed by populism contains a highly emotional core (Fieschi, 2004:238). Moreover, one of its main features is its appeal to resentment, which is an externalisation of feelings of impotence and outrage towards a perceived injustice, as Robert C. Solomon has argued (1994:103). However, resentment is more than the expression of all the aforementioned negative sentiments, since it also invokes the desire for radical change: '...the world could and should be other than it is, with those at the top no longer on top, and those on the bottom no longer at the bottom.' (Solomon, 1994:119).

Right-wing populism manages to play on both aspects, since it appeals to the sentiments of anger and injustice and simultaneously promises recourse and remedy. Anger motivates the public to take action against the ones who are held accountable, and thus promote a corrective response. Furthermore, three studies conducted by Christopher Weber consistently showed anger to be a potent mobilising force since it elevated the desire and importance attached to political participation (2013:423). Emotions also inform judgement regarding the situations that elicit them (Rico, et al. 2017:447). In the case of anger, it can make the individuals experience a sense of confidence in their judgements and experience increased approach motivation (Isbell & Lair, 2013:451). On the other hand, fear leads individuals to be more cautious, risk-averse and open to compromise (Rico, et al., 2017:449).

Therefore, populist discourse seeks to elevate the feelings of anger and injustice, since they are motivating and they also make the public more susceptible to their oversimplification of complex events. Essentially, populism is the perfect fit for the action tendency of anger. The Manichean dualism of 'us' versus 'them' denotes a conflict between the two sides and is also

'...a way of interpreting the moral basis or legitimacy of a political system.' (Hawkins, 2010:15). As a result, populism with its anger-fuelled and anti-elitist discourse prompts individuals to become less sceptical and follow more superficial considerations and stereotypes. Events such as crises act as the triggering mechanism that lends legitimacy to these stereotypes regarding political elites. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser have postulated these views are '... often latent i.e., lying dormant or hidden until circumstances are suitable for their development or manifestation. [...] Demand for populism manifests itself under specific (sets of) circumstances. It is set in motion when the perception is widespread that threats to the very existence of society are present.' (2017:99).

Here, the concept of relative deprivation utilised in Chapter 2 comes into play once more. The individual's vulnerability and weak position are explained as consequences of injustice, the divisions between 'the people' who are good and virtuous, and 'the elite' who are corrupt and evil. More specifically, a study conducted in Flanders with the purpose of measuring susceptibility to populism clearly showcased that the support for populism is quite strongly embedded in different kinds of feelings of vulnerability (i.e., lack of external political efficacy, anomie, and feelings of deprivation) (Spruyt et al., 2016:342). Moreover, a previous study conducted by Elchardus and Spruyt in Flanders showed that economic position does not have a direct effect on the susceptibility to populist framing, but rather that it will be mediated by an interpretation (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016:125).

However, the view that society in its entirety is in decline does share a positive correlation with the acceptance of populist frames (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016:125). Therefore, economic position can have an indirect effect to the acceptance of populist framing, since it leads the individual into adopting a pessimistic and fatalistic view of the future. And populism offers a form of salvation by tapping into the feelings of anger and resentment since it '…is inherently about attributing blame to others while absolving the people of responsibility.' (Hameleers et al., 2017:871). It is through this method that despair can turn into anger and the desire to punish the ones held accountable. The next step in this analysis is to examine how the two parties utilise this type of framing in order to increase the severity of systemic failures and crises, and to attribute blame.

7.5.1 Frame Salience: Utilisation of a Grim Imagery

As it can be observed from Figure 7.9 the specific frame was consistently utilised in 2012, and reached its high points during the second legislative elections in June and in November when the 7th austerity package and the 2013 budget were passed by the Greek Parliament. In the case of the latter, the total references increased to 24 over the previous month, but then dropped significantly to only 1 reference in the next one.

The utilisation of the specific frame would increase in the subsequent years. The beginning of 2013 coincides with an increase of 1300% as shown in Table A8 in Appendix A. The main reasons for this were two bills passed in the parliament during this period. The first one is the aforementioned pension reform, while the other was a new agreement between Greece and the EU which would facilitate the country's loan disbursements and the recapitalisation of its banks (103d Parliamentary Meeting, 2013: 6181). It is important, to note that the previous two frames associated with the broader topic of Society increased accordingly, and thus form a triadic relationship up until that point. This is further proved by the next increase during the months of June, July, November and December, with each increase occurring during the passing of austerity bills and reforms.




Figure 7.9 Salience of Grim Imagery Frame: Golden Dawn 2012-2013

The pattern would not be repeated in 2014 with the party still reeling from the imprisonment of its most prominent members. However, the frame witnessed a resurgence during the month of October, where the total number of references doubled as shown Figure 7.10. The reason behind this was a new bill drafted by the Interior Ministry, with the purpose of initiating a financial investigation of all the parties within the parliament (9th Parliamentary Meeting, 2014:389). Overall, the entire year could be characterised as the calm before the storm that would characterise the entirety of 2015. The elections of January caused an increase of 90% over the previous month since the majority of GD's members could campaign once more as it can be observed from Table A16 in Appendix A. The next two months exhibited a small number of references since the electoral victory of SYRIZA created a sense of hope for the end of austerity. As it was previously mentioned, the government began negotiations with the country's creditors for a possible extension regarding the payments for the bailout package, and the total number of references doubled as shown in Figure 7.10. The next peak for the frame would be July and the referendum campaign, with a total increase of 250%, and then a dramatic drop in August when the parliament was dissolved. The frame would be heavily utilised in the elections of September with the total number of references increasing by 2100%. This upward trend would continue in the next month, when the parliament passed the 12th Austerity package, and would mark the largest number of references for the entire year.




Figure 7.10 Salience of Grim Imagery Frame: Golden Dawn 2014-2015

NR also used the specific frame consistently throughout the entire four year period. For January the references numbered 30 in total, the second highest number for 2012. The beginning of the year was also the beginning of the road towards the elections, therefore the party wished to start disseminating its message as early as possible. In addition, the party was preoccupied with the issue of youth unemployment, which had reached 25.5% until that point (Cahuc et al., 2013:3). March would mark the peak for the utilisation of the frame with an increase of 100%, when the first round of the presidential elections was underway as shown in Table B4 in Appendix A. As always the electoral defeat caused the number of references to shrink, before bouncing back during May due to its historical significance for France as it can be observed from Figure 7.11. The final significant increase occurred in November, and as it was mentioned previously the announcement for a new set of criteria for the normalisation of immigrants and the new bailout agreement between Greece and its creditors monopolised the party's rhetoric.

The next year exhibited an overall increase for the utilisation of the specific frame, since a sufficient period of time had passed where the Hollande government could be judged based on its performance. As a result, the year opened with an increase of 142.86% as it can be observed from Table B8 in Appendix B. Another important change occurred in July where the total number of references increased to 21 from 11 the previous month, and was directly linked with Hollande's announcement for further budget cuts. More specifically, on the 18th of June 2013 the European Commission recommended that France should reduce its excessive government deficit below 3% by 2015 (Council of the European Union, 2013:13). This was not only viewed as a serious backtracking on the part of Hollande by NR, but also a perpetuation of the French peoples' suffering due to austerity. The last two months of 2013 also exhibited an increase in the utilisation of the frame as shown in Figure 7.11. The increase was caused by the reduction of France's credit rating by Standard and Poors in November due to the high level of unemployment and the lack of austerity measures (Peston, 2013).




Figure 7.11 Salience of Grim Imagery Frame: National Rally 2012-2013

The frame was consistently utilised in 2016 due to the outbreak of the migrant crisis and events such as Brexit, the terrorist attacks in Europe and Donald Trump's presidential election. The number of references changed in response to these events starting as early in January with 21 in total as shown in Figure 7.12. However, it should be noted that the number of references decreased in June, when the Brexit referendum took place, while the other two frames increased. This change occurred since the party wished to present the event as a positive change; one that could potentially signal their eventual electoral victory in the elections next year. The final significant increase occurred in December during the aftermath of the truck attack in Berlin. The party linked the event with the previous terrorist attack in Nice as part of its anti-immigration narrative, and attacked both the French government and the EU for their laxity.

2017 would begin with a decrease in the number of references. As it was often the case, the election campaign period would cause a sharp increase, starting with 24 references in February. The number of references would increase once more by 158.33% and 51.61%, for March and April respectively as it can be observed from Table B16 in Appendix B. As always, the peak for the number of references is the month of April for that year, since the first round of the elections concluded during its last week. In addition, while the total number of references remained high at 72, there was a decline in references similar to the other

frames. The frame was not so frequently used in the subsequent months, with September being the only exception as it can be observed from Figure 7.12. However, the annual speech that Marine Le Pen gives to the party's summer school takes place during that month and this always coincides with a spike with all the frames associated with populist crisis discourse. Another important reason for the decline in the utilisation of the frame is the fact that the Macron government was the beginning of its tenure, and as a result the impact of their policies could not be properly assessed.




Figure 7.12 Salience of Grim Imagery Frame: National Rally 2016-2017

7.5.2 Discourse Analysis

Overall, both parties frame a crisis or a systemic failure in a way that they will be perceived as more severe than they already are. Furthermore, both parties seek to perpetuate the sense of uncertainty that a crisis creates, as it was mentioned in Chapter 2. The frame was consistently utilised every month and spiked during key events such as the beginning of the migrant crisis, or new austerity bills in the case of Greece. The analysis will now move on to the excerpts chosen in order to examine how the parties utilise the specific frame within their discourse. The excerpt for GD is taken from the 6th Parliamentary Meeting, which took place on the 7th of October 2015. SYRIZA had achieved its second electoral victory on the 20th of September, and had recently agreed upon a new bailout agreement with the country's

creditors. Therefore, the government requested for a vote of confidence that would allow it to proceed with the drafting and implementation of the new austerity bill. The speaker is Ilias³⁴ Panagiotaros:

You continue with this ethnocidal, criminal and treacherous policy. You continue doing what your predecessors did. You are literally raping the Greek people, you are eradicating them. We are talking about an unprecedented genocide.

Thousands of our fellow citizens are taking their lives daily and you do not mention it. Hundreds of thousands of young people, our brightest minds, have gone abroad. You say that you will bring them back to work for 300 or 400 Euros, if there are any jobs available that is. [...]

However, you bring hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants and support them by multiple means. We have witnessed how an entire nation is mobilised to transport, feed, and provide them with accommodation, while at the same time thousands of homeless Greek citizens are not so fortunate. (Panagiotaros, 2015:170).

The excerpt for NR is a press statement made by Steeve Briois on the 18th of October 2016, after the rape of a female interpreter near the Calais migrant camp:

This despicable act is a testimony to a situation which has become uncontrollable and which seriously threatens the dignity and security of women.

Above all, it reminds us of the hundreds of sexual assaults committed by migrants on New Year's Eve in Cologne. Yesterday Cologne, today Calais, tomorrow our cities and towns? [...]How can the Minister of the Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve, allow the risk of exposing women to a real threat of sexual assault to continue after this tragedy? In this migratory crisis, the worst is yet to come and this with the total complicity of the socialist government, of all the elected representatives on the right as well as the left who promote the settlement of migrants on our territory.

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³⁴ Normally an ethnocide refers to the extermination of culture as a component of genocide. However, the speaker utilises the term in a loose sense, that is similar in meaning to the word genocide, but it encompasses the entire Greek nation (*ethnos*) and not only the people.

Steeve Briois gave his full support to the victim of this sordid act. He asked that, in the name of the safety and dignity of French women, the Minister of the Interior should adopt the precautionary principle in matters of migrant reception. The Calais jungle must therefore be dismantled and all its occupants expelled from the national territory, de facto burying the migrants' distribution plan. The security of our compatriots must now pass above all other ideological or electoral considerations. (Steeve Briois, 2016).

By examining the two excerpts the fundamental differences between the discourses of thww two parties become apparent once more. The element of exaggeration is more prevalent in the Greek case, not only in terms of the language used, but also in describing the situation. Furthermore, the migrant crisis is linked to the financial one so that the suffering of 'the people' can be showcased. Most importantly, the entire excerpt is focused on the attribution of blame. In the case of NR the failure of the government and EU policies becomes even more severe due to the fact that the speaker offers an alternative, despite the fact that he does not go into great detail about it. Therefore, the promise that the suffering will end is more concrete in the case of NR, whereas in the case of GD it remains vague and elusive.

The lack of policy alternatives from the side of GD remains as the main point difference between the two parties. In addition, GD's incomplete transformation from a protest party to a mainstream contender is evident in the qualitative elements of it framing. Ilias Panagiotaros' choice of words is vulgar, and he even described the government policies as a form of rape. Steeve Briois utilised a gentler approach, which also showed sympathy toward the victim of the sexual assault and great concern for potential future victims. Therefore, GD's message is louder in terms of its emotional appeal but less coherent. Harsh language aside, the same observable pattern emerges once more between the two excerpts. Both parties describe the specific crisis as extremely severe, and damaging to the nation itself due to their nativist ideology. In the case of NR Steeve Briois describes the situation as a slippery slope, and references the New Year's Eve sexual attacks in Cologne. Panagiotaros describes the influx of migrants as a form of genocide to the Greek people, since he describes them as the dangerous 'other' that drains the scarce resources available in the crisis ridden Greece. Therefore, both parties employ a populist discourse in their diagnostic framing. However, only NR's speaker utilised a prognostic type of framing in order to fully exploit the crisis.

7.6 Conclusion

The three most important frames associated with Society the broader topic of Society, were the references to 'the people', the issue of democratic representation and describing a crisis in the direst manner possible. These three frames are linked with the questions pertaining to the severity of the crisis and who should be held accountable. Within the lexicon of the populist right the references to popular sovereignty are of paramount importance, not only because the division between 'the people' and 'the elite' is their core frame, but also because it is an extremely effective simplification.

All types of crises can be traced back to the unresponsiveness of the government and the EU. For the two parties the quote by Thucydides that: "... the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must." perfectly encapsulates the predicament in which their people are currently in. However, as it was mentioned in Chapter 2 the people must also accept their framing as a fact. Therefore, these parties must first dominate the discursive terrain and convince the electorate that 'the elites' are solely responsible for the crisis.

How are they responsible? In the case of the economy, their strict adherence to austerity under the directives of the European Commission is responsible for issues such as the rising unemployment and the degradation of the welfare state. Crucially though, the governing parties bear a greater amount of the blame since they cannot serve the interests of the electorate. Therefore, the common issue that emerges in all the excerpts which have been utilised throughout this thesis is the democratic deficit.

And this is the point where the two parties diverge, because identifying the root of the problem is not enough. The representatives of NR were meticulous in showcasing that there are alternatives to austerity, to uncontrolled immigration, to the lack of public order etc. GD merely protested about these important issues and called for immediate action to be taken; however they never clarified what type of remedial action should be taken. In the end, their framing of the crises remained incomplete since they could not offer an alternative which will unite the electorate under their banner. In the end 'the people' became unresponsive to their message due to this deficiency.

Both parties framed the crises around the division of 'the people' against 'the elite', and then proceeded to attribute blame to either the EU or their national governments. Therefore, the three framing contests of gauging the severity of the crises, identifying the causes, and attributing blame follow a rather similar pattern in both case studies. However, as with the previous empirical chapters, the divergence in framing occurs in the fourth framing contest where solutions are proposed. This contest never takes place within the chosen excerpts of GD. RN members on the other hand always ensure to present their own policy alternatives. Even in the frame where the two parties attempted to present the crises as more severe, and utilised a grim imagery, RN made sure to showcase that it has developed policies that can end the crises. Therefore, the party made its message more impactful not only be accentuating the severity of the crises, but also by showcasing that they have policies that can end them, and thus presented their political opponents as inefficient to do so. RN's framing is characterised by balance brought forth by the synergy of all framing components.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

Since 2009 the EU and the governments of member states have faced a series of crises. Both the economic and migrant crises threatened the cohesion of the EU and generated a wave of distrust regarding the measures taken to combat them. The EU and national governments are not only up against the crises, but they also must contend with parties that utilised this opportunity to increase their electoral support. Some of these parties have been labelled as populist, and politically they belong to both ends of the political spectrum. As a result, populism has been revitalised as a topic of study within the field of politics. However, the study of populism has been characterised by contestability, ranging from providing a singular definition that accurately describes this phenomenon, to defining which political parties and actors are populist.

The divergent political orientations of these parties compounds the existing problem of defining what parties are actually populist. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the difficulty in defining populism has led to scholars arguing that the concept has become devoid of any analytical value. One significant reason behind the scepticism towards populism as an analytical concept is that its study has been largely fragmented. The study of populism has been episodic, and the concept has been cast in a reactive rather than a generative role, often viewed as pathological or deviant (Brubaker, 2020:47). These problems extend to analyses of the relationship between crises and populism, as it was showcased in Chapters 1 and 2. In the majority of the literature, crises are viewed as a necessary condition for populism to exist and thrive.

The thesis tackled these significant issues in two ways. First, the thesis conceptualized populism as a style of discourse. Second, the thesis did not view the crises as a triggering mechanism for populism, but rather as a window of opportunity that can make populist framing more impactful. In doing so, the thesis provided new knowledge in the study of populism and the symbiotic relationship it shares with crises. The thesis accomplished this by comparing the discursive strategies of two right-wing populist parties, National Rally (NR) and Golden Dawn (GD), over a four-year period. In addition, the thesis utilised the rich literatures on crisis management, framing and populism, in order to synthesise a framework

for analysing the discursive strategies of populist parties, which blended both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. In doing so, the thesis allowed for a more systematic and nuanced analysis of the supply-side of populism, and our understanding of crises frames these parties promote, by focusing on three central framing contests: 1) the nature/severity, 2) blame/responsibility and 3) appropriate remedies to crisis episodes.

The choice of a four-year period that included two elections was crucial in examining the agenda-setting strategies of the two parties. Crises possess an immense agenda-setting potential due to their disruptive nature, and as a result political actors may seek to exploit them. Boin *et al.* have defined crisis exploitation as: "The purposeful utilisation of crisis-type rhetoric to significantly alter levels of political support for public office-holders and public policies." (2009:83). The thesis examined this process of agenda-setting as a continuous process rather than an episodic one (ie. when the critical contingencies first occurred and their immediate aftermath). Therefore, the thesis was able to map out the evolution of the frames that the two parties employed not only during elections but also during their daily interactions with their political opponents. This final chapter will summarise the key findings, contributions and will acknowledge the thesis limitations and outline potential avenues for future research.

8.2 Findings

The first important finding is that RN's frame salience exhibited a greater amount of stability over time as opposed to GD's. As shown in the Empirical Chapters, any spikes in the salience of GD's frames occurred mostly during the periods where new austerity bills were approved or during the elections. This indicates that GD's framing is more opportunistic, and protest-oriented. This disparity in stability is important, since frames that are utilised over a longer period are more likely to resonate with the citizenry and influence their opinions. More specifically, it was shown that repetitive news framing led to stronger and more persistent effects than single exposure (Lecheler et al., 2015:348-349). Furthermore, effects on opinion formation can be strengthened when the delay between two exposures to frames is short (Lecheler & de Vreese 2013:163-164). However, these fluctuations in the case of GD can be attributed to its newcomer status and overall lack of experience in competing in the political arena. As mentioned in Chapter 6, niche protest parties have to make the decision of maturing

and becoming more institutionalised at some point, since their early success cannot be maintained indefinitely (Abedi & Lundberg, 2009:78).

The party's inability to shed its protest image is linked with the second key finding of this thesis. NR included a greater variety of frames within its discourse as opposed to GD. The party's presence was constant, and its members participated in debates over a broad spectrum of policies ranging from the economy and migration to sanitation and the development of a green economy. GD on the other hand focused almost exclusively on the issues of immigration, the economy and national defence. The limited range of topics where framing contests could take place is a combination of two factors: 1) GD's newcomer status, 2) the overall impact of the crisis in Greece. These two factors are interrelated, since the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in 2009 was that gave GD its first taste of electoral success in the municipal elections of 2010. Therefore, the constant attacks towards their political opponents for the bad state of the economy was a true and tried method that had paid off. As for the immigrant crisis, the issue of immigration is the calling card for such parties. GD criticized both the government and the EU regarding the large influx of immigrants in Greece.

Therefore, there is a logic behind the heavy emphasis towards the frames of the economy and immigration. As mentioned in Chapter 3, frames are more impactful if: a) they harmonise with personal experience, b) they can be verified by being connected to a significant event (e.g the crises), and c) if there is compatibility with the cultural artefacts in a society (Snow & Benford, 1988: 208). Greece was one of the most affected countries from the global economic downturn, and its future within the EU was put into question. The immigrant crisis also impacted Greece due to its geographic location, since its coasts and islands can provide access to mainland Europe. The two crises also impacted France, however to a different extent than Greece. Regarding the economic crisis, France possesses a significantly more robust economy than Greece, and thus was able to absorb the shockwave from the global economic meltdown more effectively, as mentioned in Chapter 5. However, the country's social welfare, which was considered its crown jewel, had to face important cuts in budget. As for the immigrant crisis, France has a long history with terrorist incidents and the influx of immigrants was framed as a security threat by NR.

Yet still, the party did not make the two crises the focus of their discursive strategy. NR made sure to incorporate other minor systemic failures and link them to the broader crisis context, as show in the empirical chapters. The party managed to synthesise the two crises into a

broader spectrum of policy issues and the overall dissatisfaction of the public. As a result, NR was able to frame a greater variety of issues, and to simultaneously employ a populist discourse that included the two axes of exclusion as they have been identified in Chapter 1. On the other hand, GD's strategy was one-dimensional and there was a repetition of a small number of frames, as shown in the empirical chapters. While these frames fulfilled all three conditions that would ensure the maximisation of their impact, they remained thematically limited.

The smaller number of frames in GD's discourse is linked with another important finding of this thesis. When comparing the discursive strategies of the two case-studies it was observed that the prognostic aspect was almost completely absent from GD's framing. There was an overwhelming emphasis on blame attribution for most of the excerpts, and a very small amount of proposed policy solutions. Moreover, the party's proposed solutions were scarcely detailed and more akin to broad objectives, such as Greece achieving self-sufficiency through greater financial support towards farmers. NR's framing was significantly more balanced since the MPs and party leader made sure to present their own policy counterproposals. The diagnostic and prognostic components in framing are interconnected, since their overarching objective is to build consensus around a specific interpretation of events, and clearly articulate who should be held accountable and what needs to be done (Snow et al., 2018:396-397). Effective framing must include both the diagnostic and prognostic components, and the diagnosis must translate into a credible prognosis, lest the stability or the staying power of the framing strategy become undermined (Schoon & Duxbury, 2019:638).

GD was unable to present a coherent plan that could end either of the crises. Instead, their framing strategy was reactive rather than proactive. This is another contributing factor to the fluctuations of the frames' salience that the party utilised throughout the four-year period. GD placed such an overwhelming emphasis on the diagnostic aspect that the overall staying power of their framing strategy diminished. As the empirical chapters have shown, the overall content of the party's message remained stagnant, with the only significant addition being the image of martyrdom that the party adopted after the murder of Pavlos Fyssas. However, it should be mentioned that the party had already been labelled as a pariah due to its ties with Nazism and criminal past well before the murder.

Another important finding of the thesis was that GD's discourse was considerably more aggressive than its French counterpart. The party leader and MPs consistently attacked and

insulted their political opponents, frequently labelling them as traitors and collaborators to foreign centres of power. Most importantly, the party presented the Greece's financial woes as a fabricated crisis by global capitalist powers, with the purpose of draining the country of its resources. The inclusion of conspiracy theories also characterised their discourse on the murder of Fyssas, their subsequent prosecution and trial. The party presented the event as an effort to be silenced by political elites since they were the only party that fought for the Greek people. While RN harshly criticised their political opponents, they never utilised an extremely aggressive discourse, nor did they promote any conspiracy theories. For the party, the root of the problem was the elites, both political and economic, and their insatiable greed. From there, they could apply the core frames of populism and the two axes of exclusion, both for internal and external outsiders, and incorporate them in the diagnostic frames for the causes of the crisis. However, their diagnosis was linked with a substantive prognosis that was focused on policy alternatives and not to calls for revenge or other emotionally charged and vague solutions.

Yet still, for all the important differences in their framing strategies there are some common elements present in both case studies and this is another significant finding of the thesis. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the two case studies employ a blend of nationalism and populism. Both their discourses aimed at fostering divisions between 'the people' and 'the elite' (vertical axis), but also between the immigrants and external elites (horizontal axis). Therefore, both parties are quite similar in their diagnostic framing. In the case of the migrant crisis, both first talked about the influx of immigrants, and how they were not only a potential threat to security but also to the values and culture of the nation. Moreover, the concerted effort to accept and relocate immigrants across the EU was harshly criticised as a form of undemocratic interventionism, akin to the harsh austerity imposed during the onset of the economic crisis. The two case studies initially employed a textbook populist framing in the diagnosis of the crises and associated systemic failures, as shown in the empirical chapters. The point of divergence was always the solution to them, also known as the prognosis. All the above findings have major implications for the research on populism and its relation to crisis. The next section will focus on the contributions that this thesis has made with its findings.

8.3 Contributions

The thesis contributes to the existing knowledge on populism and crisis in four main ways. Firstly, the thesis thoroughly examined how populist and nationalist discourses can intersect within the crisis context. An overly 'thick' definition of populism is problematic since it cannot fully encapsulate all types of populist politics, as De Cleen and Stavrakakis have noted (2020318). In a similar vein, Brubaker has stated that populism is understood as a matter of degree, since certain instances can be populist in some respects but not in others (2020:61). Therefore, the 'leaner' character of concepts is what makes the study of empirical variety and multidimensionality possible (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2020:318). The frequently referred adaptability and hollowness of populism were the main impetuses for this study. Therefore, the thesis did not seek to provide a pure definition of populism, but rather to showcase the specificity of the phenomenon based on the unique social, political, and economic characteristics of each case study.

As the theoretical and empirical chapters have shown, the two parties employed their blend of populism and nationalism in order to frame crises in regard to their causes, and to attribute blame. The thesis provided a solid theoretical and methodological framework, supported by a considerable amount of empirical evidence, to uncover how populism and nationalism intersect during a crisis. The choice to examine populism as a discursive style made this endeavour possible, since it made the identification of the common elements between the two discursive strategies possible. The diagnostic stage of their framing includes a set of common elements that can also be employed in the study of other manifestations of right-wing populism such as the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (PVV).

Secondly, by examining populism as a style of discourse the thesis was able provide an indepth analysis of its symbiotic relationship with crisis. As it has already been argued about Latin America, populism often occurs and is framed by politicians within a crisis context (Caiani & Graziano, 2019:1145). As a result, a crisis is often viewed as an external triggering mechanism that allows populist manifestations to emerge. However, populist parties such as NR predated the economic crisis, and enjoyed considerable success. Therefore, the crises were examined not as a catalyst but rather as a window of opportunity to employ a populist type of framing for identifying their causes and proposing solutions. As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, a crisis is not neutral and their causes, attribution of responsibility and possible remedies are open to contestation within the field of politics.

By employing a simplified version of discourse analysis, the thesis was able to not only compare and contrast the discursive strategies of the two case studies, but also to examine the crisis frames that they promoted in relation to what could be collapsed as three central framing contests: 1) nature/severity, 2) blame/responsibility, 3) appropriate remedies. In doing so, the thesis was able to examine how right-wing populist parties frame crises, and how they blend together economic, cultural and institutional grievances. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the majority of the literature focuses on a single type of grievance when examining populism, but this thesis regarded all three of them as relevant and interconnected. Both parties presented the unresponsiveness of the democratic system as the cause for the onset and perpetuation of the economic and immigrant crises. Therefore, the schema found in Chapter 3 for the analysis of the two case-studies' discourse can be employed for the examination of other instances of right-wing populism. Most importantly, the schema can be modified and employed for left-wing populist parties with the removal of the nationalist component.

Another important contribution was that the thesis systematically and rigorously documented the supply-side of crisis induced populism by utilising quantitative methods. In doing so, the thesis was able to showcase how the salience of the frames promoted by the parties fluctuated during a four-year period and pinpoint any events that may have caused these fluctuations such as terrorist attacks, new austerity measures, election periods and the onset and aftermath of crisis episodes. Therefore, the thesis added a longitudinal component that has been absent from prior research examining the discursive strategies of populist actors. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the main premise of framing theory is that issues can be presented from various perspectives. Framing is the process through which people develop specific conceptualisations of issues or reorient their thinking about them (Chong & Druckman, 2007b:104). Consequently, every framing effect can also lead to- as a secondary step- a persuasion effect (Matthes & Schemer, 2012:321).

This process of reorienting opinions on specific issues is not automatic. One of the factors that moderate framing effects is time. The repetition of frames over time can determined their overall endurance, as was previously mentioned. Repeated exposure to or use of a consideration can increase the likelihood that a frame will be applied when making an evaluation (accessibility) (Busby et al., 2018:39). Therefore, the methodological design of the thesis makes a significant contribution to the study of framing through the incorporation of a longitudinal study. There is still debate regarding frame duration, and current research is still

limited by the frames and time periods employed (Busby et al., 2018:39). The literature on over-time experimental designs is still in its infancy and scattered, as Lecheler and de Vreese have stated (2016:4). These problems are also present in the examination of populist framing, since longitudinal studies are either: a) choosing a relatively small time-frame for the analysis (6 months) (Hameleers, 2019), b) examine a small number of frames ('the people' vs 'the elite', weakening of democracy, xenophobia) (Bobba & McDonnell, 2016), and c) they focus on specific events such as election campaigns (electoral campaign in Spain) (Ruiz-Sanchez & Alcantara- Pla, 2019).

The thesis focused on a four-year period that included two presidential elections in France and four legislative elections in Greece, to obtain the data. By doing so, the thesis was able to examine the salience and type of the frames that the parties employed before, during and after the election periods. The end result was a robust data framework, which accurately captured the agenda-setting strategies of both case-studies, leading to the crucial periods of the elections. If I had chosen to focus only on the election periods, then it would not have been possible to examine and showcase how the two case-studies attempted to increase their demand for their frames, and potentially strengthen their electoral support. As previously mentioned, enhancing the resonance and strength of a frame is dependent on how often the public is exposed to it. Therefore, the inclusion of the four-year time frame was crucial in showcasing this process of frame-strengthening on the road to the elections. This is the final contribution of the thesis, and the findings can be applied in order to examine the strategic framing of populist parties during elections.

8.4 Limitations and Future Research

The thesis, like most research, has some potential limitations and weaknesses. First, GD's pariah status made it increasingly difficult to find any televised interviews or roundtable conversations with their political opponents. The party's criminal past, coupled with an extremely aggressive disposition, which culminated with an MP assaulting another MP from the Communist Party of Greece on live television, effectively led to the expulsion of the party from major media outlets. As a result, a large amount of data for GD comes from parliamentary debates that the party participated in. A similar problem was encountered in the data collection for NR. The party's detoxification from its far-right past under Jean Marie Le

Pen seems to have worked, since its MPs and leader are quite vigorous in their efforts to promote their frames, often participating in TV panels, debates, and issuing press-statements.

Despite the party's proclivity for participating in public debates and promoting its frames through the media, it was only able to elect two MPs between 2012 and 2017. As a result, the party's presence in the parliament was miniscule. As a result, the data did not include a large number of debates within the parliament, where the party would battle their political opponents on policy issues. Future research should address this imbalance in the sources. GD's toxic image and the eventual imprisonment of its central leadership meant that the party would be avoided by large media outlets. However, NR could be compared with other right-wing populist parties such as the Austrian FPO, especially after the 2017 elections where the number of its elected MPs rose to eight.

Another limitation of the thesis was a two-year gap in the data collected for NR. The decision to omit these two years was made since presidential elections take place every five years. In addition, the French political system enjoys a considerable level of stability, as opposed to Greece where four elections took place in the span of four years. This imbalance could have been resolved if a smaller timeframe was selected for data collection, like from 2012 to 2014. This would have included only one election for each case-study and its aftermath. However, I decided that the inclusion of two elections was crucial for two reasons. First, they were the first elections that Marine Le Pen participated as a party leader, and the first time that GD entered parliament. Therefore, 2012 was a new beginning for both parties. Second, the two Greek elections in 2015 and the French Presidential elections in 2017 would allow for a more accurate comparison of the strategies employed by the two parties. In addition, the two-year gap was a relatively stable period for France, without any major incidents.

The inclusion of the two years would result in a significantly larger dataset for France, and therefore a difference in the overall salience of the frames. Future research should take the differences in the electoral systems into consideration, and choose a time a timeframe without any gaps. Therefore, a future comparison between an electorally successful right-wing populist party and an unsuccessful one could focus on the 2019 elections for Greece, where GD met its electoral demise, and 2017 for NR, where the party became the main opposition. By doing this, any imbalances and gaps in the data collection can be removed, and the study will also focus on the turning point for the two parties, where one of them soared to greater

heights while the other completely disappeared. In addition, the ongoing immigrant crisis, and a series of terrorist attacks across Europe provide the context in which the two case-studies promote their frames.

A third limitation of the thesis is that certain frames overlap with others, since the two casestudies can utilise several of them in tandem as part of their discursive strategy. For example, a GD MP could criticise the government for the new austerity measures, mention that they are following orders by the IMF, reference the long history of economic scandals that have plagued the Greek political system, and finally invoke the plight of 'the people'. Therefore, in one sentence the MP combines frames about anti-austerity, accusations of corruption, and the centrepiece of all populist articulations: 'the people' against global and national 'elites'. The empirical chapters have examined how the different frames overlap within their discourse, but a quantitative component along with some visualisations in the form of overlapping circles (such as a Venn diagram) would have added more depth to the analysis. However, this type of analysis can easily be conducted in a future publication with the assistance of the R programming language and text-as-data methodological tools. The reason that this methodology was not incorporated in the thesis was my relative inexperience with the aforementioned methods of analysis at the beginning stages of the PhD. However, the codebook developed in this thesis can be utilised in conjunction with machine learning methods in future articles, that will focus on specific topics that the parties frame, such as the immigration crisis.

The thesis findings can also be complemented by survey data that will showcase the impact of the case-studies' frames on the electorate. The thesis focused on the supply-side of populism, but its findings should be applied on research that will deal with the demand-side and the interaction between the two. As previously mentioned, the two parties seek to maximise the demand for their frames during periods of crisis, by taking advantage of the feelings of uncertainty and dissatisfaction among the electorate. Therefore, future research combining both supply and demand-side factors, can yield some fruitful results about the impact of populist framing on public opinion and voter preferences. The findings along with the codebook can be broken down to individual projects that could focus strictly on the election periods, or even on specific crisis events as they unfolded, such as the start of the immigrant crisis in 2015 or terrorist attacks. Overall, the data and methodological framework of the thesis can be utilised in a plethora of different projects, and as was previously mentioned even in the study of left-wing populist parties with some modifications.

8.5 Conclusion

The word 'crisis' has become a permanent fixture in political discourse. As was previously mentioned, the occurrence of successive crises has generated a considerable amount of anxiety, despair, and distrust towards national governments among the electorate. The global economic meltdown in 2008 was followed by the migrant crisis in 2015, and then the climate crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. Governments and supranational organisations do not only have to contend with the crises, but also with parties that utilise this 'window of opportunity' to increase their electoral support. The two case-studies in the thesis are prime examples of the opportunism that characterises periods of uncertainty. One of them achieved its greatest success, while the other vanished from the political landscape after a brief and turbulent period of success. The thesis used the two parties and their divergent electoral fortunes as the starting point for analysing how right-wing populist parties framed two significant crisis events in regard to their causes, the attribution of blame and their own policy proposals for ending them.

The thesis did not examine the crises as a catalyst for the emergence and proliferation of populism, as opposed to most of the literature on the relationship between the two. After all, NR was constantly present in French Politics since the late 80s and enjoyed a steady amount of support. Instead, the thesis examined how the crises made it possible for new types of framing to enter the discursive field in politics. While the two parties were quite similar in their diagnostic framing, the same cannot be said for the prognostic component which was almost absent in GD's case. Furthermore, GD's approach to framing can be characterised as one-dimensional and myopic. As previously mentioned, the party's frame repertoire was considerably smaller, and largely revolved around attacks towards their political opponents and the EU.

These substantive differences in the framing of the two parties identified in the empirical chapters do not only serve as a plausible explanation on why GD failed. After all, the party already had a dark past, characterised by violence and criminal convictions. Furthermore, the conduct of its MPs, along with several other criminal convictions, meant that the party was living on borrowed time. Therefore, the lack of policy alternatives and framing one-dimensionality were only one of the reasons that the party eventually sunk into irrelevance. Instead, researchers and other interested parties reading this thesis should focus on NR's

crisis framing. NR has not only proven itself as a viable contender due to its longevity, but it also became the main opposition party as of the 2017 Presidential elections. NR is the most successful right-wing populist party, and as a result the focus should be on what it did right in terms of its discursive strategy, as opposed to the other case-study.

There is a possibility that the findings of this thesis could be utilised by populist and opportunistic parties, that wish to enhance their electoral appeal. However, the findings can also be utilised by parties in government, policy makers, communication specialists and other interested parties to counter the frames produced by such parties more effectively. Their focus should be the counteracting of both the diagnostic and prognostic frames, with an emphasis on the prognostic component. Deflecting blame or engaging in blame attribution contests will only result in a war of attrition. Therefore, the parties in government should seek to increase transparency on policy making and enhance democratic participation. The key in achieving both is communication. While crises require an immediate and effective response, since their consequences could be catastrophic for everyone involved, democratic dialogue should not be sacrificed for the sake of efficiency.

Populist parties have framed each crisis as being a crisis of democratic representation at its core, with national governments and technocratic lobbies disregarding popular will when designing and implementing policies. Therefore, governments need to face the additional challenge of regaining the citizenry's trust. This does not mean that they should take a page out of populism's book, but rather that they should seek to reconnect with the citizenry. The findings of this thesis are not a guidebook on how to effectively employ a populist framing. Instead, they are a significant addition to the study of populism and can potentially be utilised to counteract this type of framing in discursive contests. The era that we are going through has been defined by the unfolding crises, and by all indications they will not be resolved soon. Politicians and policy advisors have to navigate this treacherous terrain and maintain the delicate balance between successfully resolving the crises and regaining the citizenry's trust. Hopefully, the findings of this thesis can aid them in this challenging task.

Appendix A: Thematic Indexes Golden Dawn

Table A1 External Policy Frames (Golden Dawn 2012): Anti-EU Rhetoric,

National Sovereignty, Alliance with Russia, Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric.

Anti- EU	Sources	References	R.C	Sovereignty	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	5	18	0.00%	April	5	14	0.00%
May	5	17	-5.56%	May	5	10	-28.57%
June	5	21	23.53%	June	5	18	80.00%
July	2	8	-61.90%	July	3	14	-22.22%
August	2	2	-75.00%	August	1	1	-92.86%
September	2	3	50.00%	September	2	8	700.00%
October	2	6	100.00%	October	1	3	-62.50%
November	4	18	200.00%	November	4	20	566.67%
December	2	10	-44.44%	December	2	9	-55.00%

Russia	Sources	References	R.C	Immigration	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0
April	2	3	0.00%	April	5	15	0.00%
May	1	1	-66.67%	May	5	20	33.33%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	5	22	10.00%
July	1	1	0.00%	July	2	12	-45.45%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	2	11	-8.33%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	1	18	63.64%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	2	8	-55.56%
November	1	1	0.00%	November	4	10	25.00%
December	0	0	-100.00%	December	1	1	-90.00%

Table A2 Economic Frames (Golden Dawn 2012): Banking Sector, Agriculture, Tourism, Maritime Industry, the Economy, Self-Sufficiency, Privatisations, International Monetary Fund.

	1_		l	l	 _		l
Banks	Sources	References	R.C	Agriculture	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	3	6	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	3	4	-33.33%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	4	5	25.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	1	2	-60.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	3	8	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	3	5	-37.50%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	1	1	-80.00%	December	0	0	0.00%
Tourism	Sources	References	R.C	Maritime	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	1	1	0.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	0	0	-100.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
		0			0	0	0.00%
September	0		0.00%	September	-	-	
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	2	0.00%
November	1	2	0.00%	November	1	2	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	-100.00%
Economy	Sources	References	R.C	Self Sufficier	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	4	6	0.00%	April	5	8	0.00%
May	4	5	-16.67%	May	4	6	-25.00%
lune	5	5	0.00%	June	5	8	33.33%
luly	1	4	-20.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	2	0.00%
November	1	1	0.00%	November	2	3	50.00%
December	1	1	0.00%	December	0	0	-100.00%

Privatisation	Sources	References	R.C	IMF	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	5	14	0.00%	April	5	16	0.00%
May	3	6	-57.14%	May	5	11	-31.25%
June	5	12	100.00%	June	5	18	63.64%
July	2	5	-58.33%	July	3	14	-22.22%
August	1	1	-80.00%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	1	1	0.00%
October	3	14	1300.00%	October	2	13	1200.00%
November	3	7	-50.00%	November	4	20	53.85%
December	1	2	-71.43%	December	1	3	-85.00%

Table A3 Political System Frames (Golden Dawn 2012): Accusations of Corruption, Claiming that the Government is Trying to Undermine Golden Dawn, Claiming that the Government is Following the Same Policies as their Predecessors, Claiming that the Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises, the Left, Claiming that the Previous Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (PASOK), Attacking SYRIZA.

Corruption	Sources	References	R.C	Undermining	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	5	30	0.00%	April	5	16	0.00%
May	5	15	-50.00%	May	5	14	-12.50%
June	5	19	26.67%	June	5	23	64.29%
July	3	10	-47.37%	July	1	1	-95.65%
August	2	2	-80.00%	August	1	1	0.00%
September	2	3	50.00%	September	2	10	900.00%
October	3	13	333.33%	October	2	10	0.00%
November	4	37	184.62%	November	2	6	-40.00%
December	2	8	-78.38%	December	1	1	-83.33%

Policies	Sources	References	R.C	Promises	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	4	8	0.00%	April	5	9	0.00%
May	1	1	-87.50%	May	3	3	-66.67%
June	5	8	700.00%	June	5	9	200.00%
July	1	1	-87.50%	July	2	4	-55.56%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	1	1	-75.00%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	1	1	0.00%
October	1	3	200.00%	October	2	3	200.00%
November	4	8	166.67%	November	4	10	233.33%
December	0	0	-100.00%	December	0	0	-100.00%

Attacking the	Sources	References	R.C	SYRIZA	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	3	8	800.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	4	7	-12.50%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Table A4 Society Frames (Golden Dawn 2012): The People versus the Elite, Farmers, Animal Breeders, Police Officers, Pensioners, Army Officers, Small Independents, Persons with Disabilities, Utilisation of Bleak Imagery, Democratic Representation.

People	Sources	References	R.C	Farmers	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	5	28	0.00%	April	3	5	0.00%
May	5	23	-17.86%	May	4	4	0.00%
June	5	30	30.43%	June	2	3	0.00%
July	3	9	-70.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	2	5	-44.44%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	2	5	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	3	8	60.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	4	20	150.00%	November	1	1	0.00%
December	1	1	-95.00%	December	1	1	0.00%
Animal Bree	Sources	References	R.C	Police Office	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%
Pensioners	Sources	References	R.C	Army Officer	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	1	1	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	2	2	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	1	1	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	1	1	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
-		4	300.00%	November		3	0.00%

December 0

-100.00%

-100.00%

December 0

Small Indep	Sources	References	R.C	Persons with	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	2	2	-50.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	1	1	100.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	2	2	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	1	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	1	1	-100.00%	December	1	1	0.00%

Bleak Image	Sources	References	R.C	Democracy	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	5	9	0.00%	April	5	23	0.00%
May	5	8	-11.11%	May	5	18	-21.74%
June	5	17	112.50%	June	5	22	22.22%
July	2	4	-76.47%	July	2	3	-86.36%
August	3	8	100.00%	August	1	4	33.33%
September	1	3	-62.50%	September	1	6	50.00%
October	2	5	66.67%	October	2	8	33.33%
November	5	24	380.00%	November	5	30	275.00%
December	1	1	-95.83%	December	1	2	-93.33%

Table A5 External Policy Frames (Golden Dawn 2013): Anti-EU Rhetoric, National Sovereignty, Alliance with Russia, Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric.

Anti- EU	Sources	References	R.C	Sovereignty	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	14	40.00%	January	2	22	144.44%
February	1	5	-64.29%	February	1	2	-90.91%
March	1	3	-40.00%	March	1	3	50.00%
April	3	19	533.33%	April	3	14	366.67%
May	4	7	-63.16%	May	5	8	-42.86%
June	5	8	14.29%	June	4	11	37.50%
July	3	21	162.50%	July	3	13	18.18%
August	3	16	-23.81%	August	3	8	-38.46%
September	1	2	-87.50%	September	1	2	-75.00%
October	2	14	600.00%	October	1	9	350.00%
November	2	13	-7.14%	November	2	12	33.33%
December	4	11	-15.38%	December	5	12	0.00%

Russia	Sources	References	R.C	Immigration	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	0	January	2	4	300.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	1	10	150.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	1	10	0.00%
April	1	1	0.00%	April	3	13	30.00%
May	0	0	-100.00%	May	1	7	-46.15%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	5	10	42.86%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	2	8	-20.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	3	9	12.50%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	3	10	11.11%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	3	-70.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	2	4	33.33%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	3	5	25.00%

Table A6 Economic Frames (Golden Dawn 2013): Banking Sector, Agriculture, Tourism, Maritime Industry, the Economy, Self-Sufficiency, Privatisations, International Monetary Fund.

Banks	Sources	References	R.C	Agriculture	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	7	600.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	1	1	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	-100.00%
April	3	7	0.00%	April	2	2	0.00%
May	0	0	-100.00%	May	1	2	0.00%
June	3	16	0.00%	June	1	1	-50.00%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	3	7	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	-100.00%	September	1	1	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	1	0.00%
November	2	4	0.00%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	2	4	0.00%	December	1	3	0.00%
Tourism	Sources	References	R.C	Maritime	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	1	1	0.00%
February	1	1	0.00%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	0	0	-100.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	2	3	0.00%	April	1	1	0.00%
May	1	1	-66.67%	May	0	0	-100.00%
June	1	3	200.00%	June	1	3	0.00%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	1	3	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	-100.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	1	2	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	1	4	100.00%
Economy	Sources	References	R.C	Self Sufficier	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	1	1	0.00%
February	1	5	0.00%	February	1	5	400.00%
March	0	0	-100.00%	March	0	0	-100.00%
April	1	1	0.00%	April	2	8	0.00%
мау	1	1	0.00%	May	1	2	-75.00%
June	1	2	100.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	2	3	50.00%	July	1	1	0.00%
August	2	7	133.33%	August	1	1	0.00%
September	1		-85.71%	September	1	1	
Octobor							
October November	1	3	100.00%	October November	2	9	800.00% -66.67%

December 3

66.67%

December 0

0

-100.00%

Privatisation	Sources	References	R.C	IMF	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	12	500.00%	January	2	12	300.00%
February	1	10	-16.67%	February	1	5	-58.33%
March	1	2	-80.00%	March	1	1	-80.00%
April	2	7	250.00%	April	3	20	1900.00%
May	1	2	-71.43%	May	1	1	-95.00%
June	5	11	450.00%	June	5	16	1500.00%
July	2	3	-72.73%	July	3	23	43.75%
August	3	22	633.33%	August	3	17	-26.09%
September	2	10	-54.55%	September	2	2	-88.24%
October	1	5	-50.00%	October	2	8	300.00%
November	1	7	40.00%	November	2	7	-12.50%
December	3	4	-42.86%	December	3	6	-14.29%

Table A7 Political System Frames (Golden Dawn 2013): Accusations of Corruption, Claiming that the Government is Trying to Undermine Golden Dawn, Claiming that the Government is Following the Same Policies as their Predecessors, Claiming that the Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises, the Left, Claiming that the Previous Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (PASOK), Attacking SYRIZA.

Corruption	Sources	References	R.C	Undermining	g Sources	References	R.C
January	1	9	12.50%	January	2	10	900.00%
February	1	14	55.56%	February	1	6	-40.00%
March	1	3	-78.57%	March	0	0	-100.00%
April	2	12	300.00%	April	2	4	0.00%
May	1	3	-75.00%	May	1	2	-50.00%
June	5	35	1066.67%	June	2	9	350.00%
July	3	31	-11.43%	July	3	18	100.00%
August	3	25	-19.35%	August	2	3	-83.33%
September	4	7	-72.00%	September	5	17	466.67%
October	2	14	100.00%	October	1	12	-29.41%
November	2	15	7.14%	November	1	4	-66.67%
December	4	25	66.67%	December	5	10	150.00%

Policies	Sources	References	R.C	Promises	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	6	600.00%	January	2	14	1400.00%
February	1	1	-83.33%	February	1	1	-92.86%
March	1	2	100.00%	March	1	3	200.00%
April	1	2	0.00%	April	2	8	166.67%
May	0	0	-100.00%	May	1	2	-75.00%
June	1	2	0.00%	June	3	6	200.00%
July	1	1	-50.00%	July	2	7	16.67%
August	1	1	0.00%	August	2	2	-71.43%
September	2	4	300.00%	September	1	1	-50.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	2	2	100.00%
November	1	1	0.00%	November	2	5	150.00%
December	1	1	0.00%	December	3	5	0.00%

Left	Sources	References	R.C	Opposition	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	1	4	400.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	-100.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	6	600.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	1	2	-66.67%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	2	14	1400.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	1	1	-92.86%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	4	6	500.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	1	1	-83.33%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	1	3	200.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	2	2	-33.33%	December	0	0	0.00%

Pre-Election	Sources	References	R.C	SYRIZA	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	1	1	100.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	3	3	300.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	1	1	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	1	5	500.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Table A8 Society Frames (Golden Dawn 2013): The People versus the Elite, Farmers, Animal Breeders, Police Officers, Pensioners, Army Officers, Small Independents, Persons with Disabilities, Utilisation of Bleak Imagery, Democratic Representation.

		•			•	-	•
People	Sources	References	R.C	Farmers	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	14	1300.00%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	1	6	-57.14%	February	1	1	0.00%
March	1	1	-83.33%	March	0	0	-100.00%
April	3	11	1000.00%	April	2	3	0.00%
May	2	3	-72.73%	May	0	0	-100.00%
June	5	10	233.33%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	3	15	50.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	3	7	-53.33%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	3	4	-42.86%	September	1	1	0.00%
October	2	4	0.00%	October	1	1	0.00%
November	2	10	150.00%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	3	10	0.00%	December	2	2	0.00%
Animal Breed	Sources	References	R.C	Police Office	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
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Animal Breed	Sources	References	R.C	Police Office	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	1	3	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	-100.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	1	1	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	2	7	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	1	1	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Pensioners	Sources	References	R.C	Army Officer	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	1	1	0.00%
April	1	1	0.00%	April	0	0	-100.00%
May	0	0	-100.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	1	2	0.00%	July	1	1	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	2	2	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	2	2	0.00%
December	1	1	0.00%	December	2	2	0.00%

Small Indep	e Sources	References	R.C	Persons with	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	3	200.00%	January	1	1	0.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	9	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	1	3	-66.67%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	2	6	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	1	1	-83.33%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	-100.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	2	8	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	2	3	-62.50%	December	0	0	0.00%

Bleak Image	Sources	References	R.C	Democracy	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	14	1300.00%	January	2	17	750.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	1	11	-35.29%
March	1	6	0.00%	March	1	7	-36.36%
April	3	16	166.67%	April	3	16	128.57%
May	3	5	-68.75%	May	1	2	-87.50%
June	4	7	40.00%	June	4	20	900.00%
July	3	15	114.29%	July	3	27	35.00%
August	3	5	-66.67%	August	2	11	-59.26%
September	1	3	-40.00%	September	5	10	-9.09%
October	1	1	-66.67%	October	1	9	-10.00%
November	2	7	600.00%	November	2	14	55.56%
December	4	14	100.00%	December	5	13	-7.14%

Table A9 External Policy Frames (Golden Dawn 2014): Anti-EU Rhetoric, National Sovereignty, Alliance with Russia, Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric.

Anti- EU	Sources	References	R.C	Sovereignty	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	10	-9.09%	January	3	14	16.67%
February	1	2	-80.00%	February	2	3	-78.57%
March	1	6	200.00%	March	2	4	33.33%
April	3	6	0.00%	April	3	5	25.00%
May	2	13	116.67%	May	2	4	-20.00%
June	2	2	-84.62%	June	2	3	-25.00%
July	4	12	500.00%	July	3	6	100.00%
August	2	11	-8.33%	August	2	7	16.67%
September	5	15	36.36%	September	5	26	271.43%
October	5	13	-13.33%	October	4	18	-30.77%
November	2	7	-46.15%	November	2	5	-72.22%
December	4	16	128.57%	December	5	14	180.00%

Russia	Sources	References	R.C	Immigration	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0	January	2	2	-60.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	1	2	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	-100.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	1	3	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	1	1	-66.67%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	1	2	0.00%	August	2	8	0.00%
September	3	3	50.00%	September	4	40	400.00%
October	1	1	-66.67%	October	3	12	-70.00%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	3	8	-33.33%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	4	18	125.00%

Table A10 Economic Frames (Golden Dawn 2014): Banking Sector, Agriculture, Tourism, Maritime Industry, the Economy, Self-Sufficiency, Privatisations, International

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Monetary	Fund.						
Banks	Sources	References	R.C	Agriculture	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	3	-25.00%	January	2	14	366.67%
February	1	1	-66.67%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	1	4	300.00%	March	1	1	0.00%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	1	1	0.00%
May	1	1	0.00%	May	1	1	0.00%
June	1	1	0.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	2	4	300.00%	July	2	3	0.00%
August	2	5	25.00%	August	1	1	-66.67%
September	0	0	-100.00%	September	3	4	300.00%
October	3	5	0.00%	October	3	8	100.00%
November	1	4	-20.00%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	3	4	0.00%	December	2	2	0.00%
Tourism	Sources	References	R.C	Maritime Inc	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	1	1	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	-100.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	3	0.00%	April	1	5	0.00%
May	1	3	0.00%	May	1	2	-60.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	1	1	-50.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	1	1	0.00%
August	2	2	0.00%	August	1	2	100.00%
Sentember	0	0	-100 00%	Sentember	0	0	-100 00%

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January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	1	1	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	-100.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	3	0.00%	April	1	5	0.00%
May	1	3	0.00%	May	1	2	-60.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	1	1	-50.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	1	1	0.00%
August	2	2	0.00%	August	1	2	100.00%
September	0	0	-100.00%	September	0	0	-100.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	1	1	0.00%	December	1	1	0.00%

Economy	Sources	References	R.C	Self Sufficier	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	1	1	-80.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	1	1	0.00%	March	1	1	0.00%
April	1	5	400.00%	April	1	1	0.00%
May	1	2	-60.00%	May	1	2	100.00%
June	1	5	150.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	1	3	-40.00%	July	1	1	0.00%
August	2	5	66.67%	August	1	2	100.00%
September	3	9	80.00%	September	2	2	0.00%
October	3	10	11.11%	October	3	4	100.00%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	1	1	0.00%	December	2	2	0.00%

Privatisation	Sources	References	R.C	IMF	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	5	25.00%	January	1	1	-83.33%
February	1	2	-60.00%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	1	3	50.00%	March	1	4	0.00%
April	3	8	166.67%	April	2	3	-25.00%
May	2	4	-50.00%	May	2	12	300.00%
June	1	6	50.00%	June	1	1	-91.67%
July	1	7	16.67%	July	2	9	800.00%
August	2	11	57.14%	August	2	9	0.00%
September	2	10	-9.09%	September	3	8	-11.11%
October	2	10	0.00%	October	5	15	87.50%
November	2	2	-80.00%	November	2	4	-73.33%
December	3	3	50.00%	December	4	14	250.00%

Table A11 Political System Frames (Golden Dawn 2014): Accusations of Corruption, Claiming that the Government is Trying to Undermine Golden Dawn, Claiming that the Government is Following the Same Policies as their Predecessors, Claiming that the Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises, the Left, Claiming that the Previous Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (PASOK), Attacking SYRIZA.

Corruption	Sources	References	R.C	Undermining	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	4	-84.00%	January	2	5	-50.00%
February	1	5	25.00%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	2	18	260.00%	March	2	14	0.00%
April	3	13	-27.78%	April	3	21	50.00%
May	2	6	-53.85%	May	2	16	-23.81%
June	2	12	100.00%	June	2	10	-37.50%
July	3	11	-8.33%	July	3	20	100.00%
August	2	15	36.36%	August	2	9	-55.00%
September	5	17	13.33%	September	3	27	200.00%
October	5	24	41.18%	October	5	34	25.93%
November	4	20	-16.67%	November	3	23	-32.35%
December	5	49	145.00%	December	6	46	100.00%

Policies	Sources	References	R.C	Promises	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	0.00%	January	1	1	-80.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	1	1	0.00%
March	1	2	0.00%	March	1	3	200.00%
April	3	7	250.00%	April	1	2	-33.33%
May	1	2	-71.43%	May	1	12	500.00%
June	1	1	-50.00%	June	1	1	-91.67%
July	2	2	100.00%	July	1	1	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	2	8	700.00%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	4	9	12.50%
October	1	2	100.00%	October	4	21	133.33%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	2	4	-80.95%
December	2	4	0.00%	December	4	15	275.00%

Left	Sources	References	R.C	Opposition (Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	-50.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	1	1	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	1	1	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	2	2	100.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	1	1	-50.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	2	5	500.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	2	5	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	3	11	120.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	1	2	-81.82%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	2	11	450.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	4	7	-36.36%	December	0	0	0.00%

Attacking the	Sources	References	R.C	SYRIZA	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	1	1	100.00%	March	1	1	100.00%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	1	1	100.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	1	1	100.00%	August	2	4	400.00%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	2	8	100.00%
October	1	1	0.00%	October	4	7	-12.50%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	2	2	-71.43%
December	2	2	200.00%	December	4	8	300.00%

Table A12 Society Frames (Golden Dawn 2014): The People versus the Elite, Farmers, Animal Breeders, Police Officers, Pensioners, Army Officers, Small Independents, Persons with Disabilities, Utilisation of Bleak Imagery, Democratic Representation.

People	Sources	References	R.C	Farmers	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	3	-70.00%	January	2	7	250.00%
February	1	2	-33.33%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	1	4	100.00%	March	1	1	0.00%
April	3	15	275.00%	April	0	0	-100.00%
May	2	6	-60.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	2	9	50.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	2	10	11.11%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	2	6	-40.00%	August	2	2	0.00%
September	3	6	0.00%	September	0	0	-100.00%
October	4	8	33.33%	October	2	6	0.00%
November	2	9	12.50%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	4	9	0.00%	December	2	2	0.00%
Animal Breed	Sources	References	R.C	Police Office	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	9	900.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	2	2	0.00%

Animal Bree	Sources	References	R.C	Police Office	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	9	900.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	2	2	0.00%
March	1	2	200.00%	March	0	0	-100.00%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	1	1	100.00%	August	1	5	0.00%
September	0	0	-100.00%	September	0	0	-100.00%
October	1	3	300.00%	October	1	1	0.00%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	1	1	100.00%	December	1	1	0.00%

Pensioners	Sources	References	R.C	Army Officer	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	1	1	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	1	1	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	1	2	0.00%
May	1	2	0.00%	May	0	0	-100.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	1	2	0.00%	August	2	7	0.00%
September	0	0	-100.00%	September	1	1	-85.71%
October	2	3	0.00%	October	1	3	200.00%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	3	3	0.00%	December	1	2	0.00%

Small Indepe	Sources	References	R.C	Persons with	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	-66.67%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	2	2	0.00%
March	1	1	0.00%	March	0	0	-100.00%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	1	1	0.00%
May	1	2	0.00%	May	0	0	-100.00%
June	1	1	-50.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	2	4	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	-100.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	1	2	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	1	2	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	1	1	-50.00%	December	1	2	0.00%

Bleak Image	Sources	References	R.C	Democracy	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	2	-85.71%	January	2	4	-69.23%
February	1	2	0.00%	February	1	1	-75.00%
March	2	4	100.00%	March	2	17	1600.00%
April	1	2	-50.00%	April	3	29	70.59%
May	2	7	250.00%	May	2	9	-68.97%
June	2	3	-57.14%	June	2	13	44.44%
July	2	5	66.67%	July	3	20	53.85%
August	2	7	40.00%	August	2	14	-30.00%
September	2	6	-14.29%	September	5	29	107.14%
October	4	13	116.67%	October	5	35	20.69%
November	1	2	-84.62%	November	3	18	-48.57%
December	4	10	400.00%	December	6	41	127.78%

Table A13 External Policy Frames (Golden Dawn 2015): Anti-EU Rhetoric,

National Sovereignty, Alliance with Russia, Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric.

Anti- EU	Sources	References	R.C	Sovereignty	Sources	References	R.C
January	9	32	100.00%	January	9	28	100.00%
February	5	19	-40.63%	February	4	13	-53.57%
March	7	22	15.79%	March	5	17	30.77%
April	11	24	9.09%	April	7	20	17.65%
May	9	27	12.50%	May	10	24	20.00%
June	3	52	92.59%	June	4	26	8.33%
July	6	43	-17.31%	July	6	23	-11.54%
August	1	11	-74.42%	August	1	5	-78.26%
September	10	64	481.82%	September	9	41	720.00%
October	7	87	35.94%	October	6	51	24.39%
November	7	52	-40.23%	November	7	24	-52.94%
December	5	45	-13.46%	December	5	24	0.00%

Russia	Sources	References	R.C	Immigration	Sources	References	R.C
January	3	3	0	January	3	5	0.00%
February	1	3	0.00%	February	1	6	20.00%
March	2	2	-33.33%	March	4	6	0.00%
April	2	2	0.00%	April	6	23	283.33%
May	2	3	50.00%	May	4	11	-52.17%
June	1	2	-33.33%	June	5	23	109.09%
July	1	1	-50.00%	July	2	23	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	1	3	-86.96%
September	4	5	0.00%	September	9	45	1400.00%
October	2	5	0.00%	October	6	39	-13.33%
November	3	4	-20.00%	November	4	23	-41.03%
December	2	2	-50.00%	December	4	30	30.43%

Table A14 Economic Frames (Golden Dawn 2015): Banking Sector, Agriculture, Tourism, Maritime Industry, the Economy, Self-Sufficiency, Privatisations, International Monetary Fund.

Banks	Sources	References	R.C	Agriculture	Sources	References	R.C
January	5	9	125.00%	January	4	4	100.00%
February	1	3	-66.67%	February	2	9	125.00%
March	3	5	66.67%	March	3	5	-44.44%
April	3	6	20.00%	April	1	1	-80.00%
May	4	9	50.00%	May	2	8	700.00%
June	2	10	11.11%	June	2	5	-37.50%
July	3	7	-30.00%	July	5	12	140.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	1	4	-66.67%
September	7	13	0.00%	September	6	13	225.00%
October	6	57	338.46%	October	3	8	-38.46%
November	4	18	-68.42%	November	4	27	237.50%
December	2	20	11.11%	December	3	10	-62.96%

Tourism	Sources	References	R.C	Maritime Inc	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	1	1	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	1	1	0.00%	March	1	1	0.00%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	1	1	0.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	1	2	100.00%
June	1	1	0.00%	June	1	1	-50.00%
July	2	2	100.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	1	1	0.00%
October	1	2	100.00%	October	1	1	0.00%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	2	5	0.00%	December	1	1	0.00%

Economy	Sources	References	R.C	Self Sufficier	Sources	References	R.C
January	7	12	1100.00%	January	8	11	450.00%
February	2	10	-16.67%	February	2	9	-18.18%
March	4	7	-30.00%	March	6	8	-11.11%
April	2	2	-71.43%	April	2	2	-75.00%
May	3	3	50.00%	May	2	3	50.00%
June	2	7	133.33%	June	2	7	133.33%
July	2	6	-14.29%	July	4	8	14.29%
August	1	2	-66.67%	August	1	7	-12.50%
September	9	18	800.00%	September	9	17	142.86%
October	5	21	16.67%	October	3	10	-41.18%
November	4	22	4.76%	November	4	12	20.00%
December	2	13	-40.91%	December	1	1	-91.67%

Privatisation	Sources	References	R.C	IMF	Sources	References	R.C
January	9	20	566.67%	January	9	30	114.29%
February	2	2	-90.00%	February	2	11	-63.33%
March	3	5	150.00%	March	1	3	-72.73%
April	2	2	-60.00%	April	4	15	400.00%
May	4	6	200.00%	May	3	12	-20.00%
June	1	12	100.00%	June	2	41	241.67%
July	3	6	-50.00%	July	2	7	-82.93%
August	1	3	-50.00%	August	1	6	-14.29%
September	9	20	566.67%	September	9	46	666.67%
October	7	26	30.00%	October	6	68	47.83%
November	4	11	-57.69%	November	4	18	-73.53%
December	2	27	145.45%	December	3	21	16.67%

Table A15 Political System Frames (Golden Dawn 2015): Accusations of Corruption, Claiming that the Government is Trying to Undermine Golden Dawn, Claiming that the Government is Following the Same Policies as their Predecessors, Claiming that the Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises, the Left, Claiming that the Previous Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (New Democracy), Attacking New Democracy.

Corruption	Sources	References	R.C	Underminin	g Sources	References	R.C
January	9	42	-14.29%	January	9	43	-6.52%
February	2	20	-52.38%	February	3	27	-37.21%
March	8	27	35.00%	March	8	50	85.19%
April	7	43	59.26%	April	6	47	-6.00%
May	5	16	-62.79%	May	9	45	-4.26%
June	5	31	93.75%	June	5	17	-62.22%
July	3	11	-64.52%	July	5	8	-52.94%
August	1	3	-72.73%	August	2	3	-62.50%
September	9	35	1066.67%	September	9	25	733.33%
October	7	127	262.86%	October	7	56	124.00%
November	4	42	-66.93%	November	2	2	-96.43%
December	3	23	-45.24%	December	3	13	550.00%
Policies	Sources	References	R.C	Promises	Sources	References	R.C
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Policies	Sources	References	R.C	Promises	Sources	References	R.C
January	4	9	125.00%	January	6	10	-33.33%
February	2	5	-44.44%	February	2	18	80.00%
March	7	15	200.00%	March	4	9	-50.00%
April	4	20	33.33%	April	5	26	188.89%
May	7	20	0.00%	May	6	18	-30.77%
June	2	14	-30.00%	June	3	29	61.11%
July	4	13	-7.14%	July	4	12	-58.62%
August	1	5	-61.54%	August	1	10	-16.67%
September	9	20	300.00%	September	9	18	80.00%
October	7	48	140.00%	October	7	59	227.78%
November	4	28	-41.67%	November	4	27	-54.24%
December	3	10	-64.29%	December	3	28	3.70%

Left	Sources	References	R.C	Attacking the	Sources	References	R.C
January	7	17	142.86%	January	1	2	0.00%
February	2	5	-70.59%	February	2	5	150.00%
March	5	7	40.00%	March	1	1	-80.00%
April	4	11	57.14%	April	2	5	400.00%
May	6	14	27.27%	May	1	2	-60.00%
June	3	7	-50.00%	June	2	6	200.00%
July	5	9	28.57%	July	1	2	-66.67%
August	1	9	0.00%	August	1	3	50.00%
September	9	28	211.11%	September	7	23	666.67%
October	6	51	82.14%	October	7	24	4.35%
November	5	30	-41.18%	November	3	16	-33.33%
December	3	17	-43.33%	December	3	16	0.00%

Promises (N.	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	2	0.00%
February	1	5	150.00%
March	2	2	-60.00%
April	2	3	50.00%
May	1	1	-66.67%
June	0	0	-100.00%
July	2	4	0.00%
August	1	2	-50.00%
September	5	11	450.00%
October	3	6	-45.45%
November	1	1	-83.33%
December	1	1	0.00%

Table A16 Society Frames (Golden Dawn 2015): The People versus the Elite, Farmers, Animal Breeders, Police Officers, Pensioners, Army Officers, Small Independents, Persons with Disabilities, Utilisation of Bleak Imagery, Democratic Representation.

People	Sources	References	R.C	Farmers	Sources	References	R.C
January	9	54	500.00%	January	3	3	50.00%
February	3	9	-83.33%	February	1	3	0.00%
March	3	8	-11.11%	March	1	3	0.00%
April	7	25	212.50%	April	1	1	-66.67%
May	10	28	12.00%	May	0	0	-100.00%
June	3	22	-21.43%	June	1	2	0.00%
July	6	29	31.82%	July	5	6	200.00%
August	1	4	-86.21%	August	1	4	-33.33%
September	9	49	1125.00%	September	7	9	125.00%
October	7	54	10.20%	October	4	15	66.67%
November	6	24	-55.56%	November	3	20	33.33%
December	5	22	-8.33%	December	3	13	-35.00%
Animal Bree	Sources	References	R.C	Police Office	Sources	References	R.C
January	3	3	200.00%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	1	3	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	1	3	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	1	1	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	4	4	300.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	4	6	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	1	1	-83.33%	October	2	3	0.00%
November	2	16	1500.00%	November	1	1	-66.67%
December	2	3	-81.25%	December	3	4	300.00%
Pensioners	Sources	References	R.C	Army Officer	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	2	2	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	1	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	0	0	-100.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	1	1	0.00%	June	1	1	0.00%
July	1	3	200.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
	_	_	0.000/	C t l	4	4	0.000/
September	0	0	0.00%	September	4	4	0.00%

November

December

2

2

-33.33%

0.00%

-75.00%

200.00%

3

9

November

December 3

Small Indep	e Sources	References	R.C	Persons with	Sources	References	R.C
January	3	3	200.00%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	1	1	-66.67%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	2	3	200.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	1	1	0.00%
May	2	2	0.00%	May	0	0	-100.00%
June	1	2	0.00%	June	2	11	0.00%
July	1	1	-50.00%	July	1	3	-72.73%
August	1	2	100.00%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	4	5	150.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	5	16	220.00%	October	1	1	0.00%
November	3	8	-50.00%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	3	11	37.50%	December	1	2	0.00%

Bleak Image	Sources	References	R.C	Democracy	Sources	References	R.C
January	9	19	90.00%	January	9	34	-17.07%
February	1	3	-84.21%	February	3	23	-32.35%
March	3	5	66.67%	March	6	50	117.39%
April	6	12	140.00%	April	7	58	16.00%
May	3	6	-50.00%	May	7	36	-37.93%
June	3	6	0.00%	June	4	38	5.56%
July	6	21	250.00%	July	6	34	-10.53%
August	1	1	-95.24%	August	2	9	-73.53%
September	9	22	2100.00%	September	9	29	222.22%
October	5	31	40.91%	October	7	78	168.97%
November	6	17	-45.16%	November	4	21	-73.08%
December	5	19	11.76%	December	3	17	-19.05%

Appendix B: Thematic Indexes National Rally

Table B1 External Policy Frames (National Rally 2012): Anti-EU Rhetoric, National Sovereignty, Alliance with Russia, NATO, US External Policy, Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric, Border Controls.

Anti- EU	Sources	References	R.C	Sovereignty	Sources	References	R.C
January	8	26	0.00%	January	8	29	0.00%
February	4	11	-57.69%	February	4	14	-51.72%
March	4	19	72.73%	March	4	27	92.86%
April	4	12	-36.84%	April	4	6	-77.78%
May	3	10	-16.67%	May	4	10	66.67%
June	4	5	-50.00%	June	3	4	-60.00%
July	2	5	0.00%	July	2	5	25.00%
August	2	12	140.00%	August	1	5	0.00%
September	5	13	8.33%	September	4	8	60.00%
October	2	4	-69.23%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	2	5	25.00%	November	3	7	0.00%
December	4	10	100.00%	December	3	5	-28.57%

Russia	Sources	References	R.C	NATO	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

US Ext. Polic	Sources	References	R.C	Immigration	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	6	18	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	3	11	-38.89%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	7	37	236.36%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	3	4	-89.19%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	4	5	25.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	3	4	-20.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	3	3	-25.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	1	1	-66.67%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	3	16	1500.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	1	-93.75%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	5	9	800.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	2	4	-55.56%

Border Conti	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%
February	2	3	0.00%
March	4	16	433.33%
April	2	3	-81.25%
May	3	7	133.33%
June	1	2	-71.43%
July	2	3	50.00%
August	2	2	-33.33%
September	3	8	300.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%
November	3	3	0.00%
December	1	2	-33.33%

Table B2 Economic Frames (National Rally 2012): Globalisation, Banking Sector, Common Currency, Financial Markets, Austerity, Agriculture, Sport Industry, Economy, Industrial Sector, Service Sector, Protectionism, Privatisations.

Globalisation	Sources	References	R.C	Banks	Sources	References	R.C
January	9	38	0.00%	January	6	11	0.00%
February	3	15	-60.53%	February	4	15	36.36%
March	5	28	86.67%	March	5	11	-26.67%
April	4	6	-78.57%	April	1	1	-90.91%
May	2	4	-33.33%	May	1	2	100.00%
June	4	5	25.00%	June	2	2	0.00%
July	2	3	-40.00%	July	1	4	100.00%
August	2	5	66.67%	August	2	3	-25.00%
September	4	5	0.00%	September	4	4	33.33%
October	2	3	-40.00%	October	1	1	-75.00%
November	3	4	33.33%	November	2	4	300.00%
December	4	8	100.00%	December	4	4	0.00%

Euro	Sources	References	R.C	Financial Ma	Sources	References	R.C
January	4	11	0.00%	January	5	9	0.00%
February	3	33	200.00%	February	4	21	133.33%
March	2	2	-93.94%	March	5	15	-28.57%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	3	3	-80.00%
May	1	2	0.00%	May	2	3	0.00%
June	2	2	0.00%	June	3	4	33.33%
July	1	2	0.00%	July	2	5	25.00%
August	1	2	0.00%	August	2	5	0.00%
September	4	8	300.00%	September	4	5	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	1	1	-80.00%
November	1	3	0.00%	November	3	6	500.00%
December	1	1	-66.67%	December	4	8	33.33%

Austerity Pol	Sources	References	R.C	Agriculture	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	1	1	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	3	4	300.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	2	16	300.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	2	4	-75.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	2	2	-50.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	2	3	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	1	1	-66.67%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	3	200.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	1	1	-66.67%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	1	1	0.00%

Sport Industr	Sources	References	R.C	Economy	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	6	26	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	4	15	-42.31%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	5	8	-46.67%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	3	5	-37.50%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	5	9	80.00%
June	1	3	0.00%	June	2	3	-66.67%
July	1	2	-33.33%	July	3	5	66.67%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	2	6	20.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	4	7	16.67%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	1	-85.71%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	4	7	600.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	3	4	-42.86%

Industrial Sec	Sources	References	R.C	Service Secto	Sources	References	R.C
January	3	6	0.00%	January	1	1	0.00%
February	2	6	0.00%	February	2	3	200.00%
March	4	5	-16.67%	March	2	2	-33.33%
April	1	1	-80.00%	April	1	1	-50.00%
May	2	2	100.00%	May	1	1	0.00%
June	1	1	-50.00%	June	1	1	0.00%
July	2	2	100.00%	July	2	2	100.00%
August	1	2	0.00%	August	1	1	-50.00%
September	1	1	-50.00%	September	1	1	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	1	1	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	4	5	400.00%	December	1	1	0.00%

Protectionism	Sources	References	Rate of Char	Privatisation	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	3	7	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	3	12	71.43%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	3	10	-16.67%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	2	2	-80.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	3	6	200.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	2	3	-50.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	2	5	66.67%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	1	3	-40.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	4	5	66.67%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	2	-60.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	2	3	50.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	3	6	100.00%

Table B3 Political System Frames (National Rally 2012): Attacking Macron, Attacking Fillon, Criticising the Government's Policies (Hollande), Criticising the Government's Policies (Macron), Claims the Government is Undermining NR (Hollande), Claims that the Government is Undermining NR (Macron), Claiming that the Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (Hollande), Claiming that the Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (Macron), Accusations of Corruption (Hollande Government), Accusations of Corruption (Macron Government), Attacking the Left by Claiming that they Went Back on their Pre-Election Promises, Attacking the Left, Attacking the Right, Accusations of Corruption (Other Parties), Attacking the Previous Government by Claiming that it Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (Hollande), Attacking the Previous Government with Accusations of Corruption (Hollande).

Macron	Sources	References	R.C	Fillon	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Policies	Sources	References	R.C	Policies M.	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	2	2	200.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	4	5	150.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	2	4	-20.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	1	2	-50.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	1	2	100.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	1	3	300.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Underminin	g Sources	References	R.C	Undermining	Sources	References	R.C
January	3	4	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	4	8	200.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	5	10	25.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	3	4	-60.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	2	5	25.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	3	4	-20.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	1	100.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	1	2	100.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	1	4	100.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	-100.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Promises	Sources	References	R.C	Promises M.	Sources	References	R.C
January	6	17	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	3	10	-41.18%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	6	23	130.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	4	5	-78.26%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	7	10	100.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	4	6	-40.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	4	4	-33.33%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	3	9	125.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	5	7	-22.22%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	1	1	-85.71%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	5	9	800.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	3	9	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Corruption	Sources	References	R.C	Corruption (l Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	2	5	400.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	4	5	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	2	2	200.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Left Promise	Sources	References	R.C	Left	Sources	References	R.C
January	5	12	0.00%	January	6	8	0.00%
February	4	16	33.33%	February	5	19	137.50%
March	7	15	-6.25%	March	3	19	0.00%
April	2	2	-86.67%	April	2	2	-89.47%
May	2	2	0.00%	May	6	12	500.00%
June	1	1	-50.00%	June	5	7	-41.67%
July	1	1	0.00%	July	4	4	-42.86%
August	1	1	0.00%	August	2	2	-50.00%
September	3	3	200.00%	September	2	3	50.00%
October	1	1	-66.67%	October	1	2	-33.33%
November	1	2	100.00%	November	4	7	250.00%
December	1	1	-50.00%	December	3	6	-14.29%

Right	Sources	References	R.C	Corruption (Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	3	13	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	2	8	-38.46%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	3	5	-37.50%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	1	1	-80.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	0	0	-100.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	1	2	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	-100.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Incompetend	Sources	References	R.C	Attacking the	Sources	References	R.C
January	4	7	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	2	4	-42.86%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	2	6	50.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	2	2	-66.67%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	0	0	-100.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	1	1	100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	1	1	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Danisa da Car	C = = = = =	Deference	D.C
Previous Gov	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%
May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%

Table B4 Society Frames (National Rally 2012): The People versus the Elite, Attacking the LGBT Community, Farmers, Blue Collar Workers, Army Officers, Journalists, Middle Class, Pensioners, Unemployed Youth, Small Independents, Police Officers, Civil Servants, Persons with Disabilities, Healthcare Specialists, Utilising a Bleak Imagery, Democratic Representation.

People	Sources	References	R.C	Homosexual	Sources	References	R.C
January	7	25	0.00%	January	1	1	0.00%
February	6	19	-24.00%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	4	24	26.32%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	4	13	-45.83%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	4	8	-38.46%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	4	10	25.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	1	1	-90.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	1	3	200.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	3	6	100.00%	September	1	1	0.00%
October	1	4	-33.33%	October	1	1	0.00%
November	6	9	125.00%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	2	2	-77.78%	December	1	1	0.00%

Farmers	Sources	References	R.C	Blue Collar	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	2	0.00%	January	3	8	0.00%
February	1	1	-50.00%	February	3	5	-37.50%
March	1	13	1200.00%	March	3	5	0.00%
April	1	2	-84.62%	April	1	1	-80.00%
May	2	2	0.00%	May	2	2	100.00%
June	1	1	-50.00%	June	1	1	-50.00%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	3	3	0.00%
October	1	4	300.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	1	1	-75.00%	November	1	1	0.00%
December	1	1	0.00%	December	2	2	100.00%

Army Officer	Sources	References	R.C	Journalists	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	1	2	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	1	1	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	1	1	0.00%
May	1	1	0.00%	May	0	0	-100.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Middle Class	Sources	References	R.C	Pensioners	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	13	0.00%	January	2	8	0.00%
February	1	1	-92.31%	February	2	2	-75.00%
March	0	0	-100.00%	March	2	2	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	1	1	-50.00%
May	2	2	0.00%	May	1	1	0.00%
June	1	1	-50.00%	June	1	1	0.00%
July	1	1	0.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	1	1	0.00%	August	1	1	0.00%
September	2	2	100.00%	September	2	2	100.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	1	1	0.00%

Unemployed	Sources	References	R.C	Small Indepe	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	13	0.00%	January	1	9	0.00%
February	1	1	-92.31%	February	2	5	-44.44%
March	1	1	0.00%	March	3	4	-20.00%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	2	5	25.00%
May	2	2	0.00%	May	2	2	-60.00%
June	1	1	-50.00%	June	2	2	0.00%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	3	3	50.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	3	3	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	1	1	0.00%	December	1	1	0.00%

Police Office	e Sources	References	R.C	Civil Servant	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	1	2	200.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	2	8	300.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	3	5	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	2	5	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	1	2	-60.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	2	4	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	-100.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Persons with	Sources	References	R.C	Healthcare S	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	1	1	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	2	100.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	0	0	-100.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Bleak Image	Sources	References	R.C	Democracy	Sources	References	R.C
January	9	31	0.00%	January	7	17	0.00%
February	5	30	-3.23%	February	7	41	141.18%
March	6	40	33.33%	March	6	28	-31.71%
April	4	6	-85.00%	April	6	11	-60.71%
May	10	21	250.00%	May	7	10	-9.09%
June	4	8	-61.90%	June	6	11	10.00%
July	3	4	-50.00%	July	2	5	-54.55%
August	3	10	150.00%	August	1	4	-20.00%
September	7	10	0.00%	September	4	14	250.00%
October	2	2	-80.00%	October	1	8	-42.86%
November	8	15	650.00%	November	4	10	25.00%
December	3	7	-53.33%	December	3	4	-60.00%

Table B5 External Policy Frames (National Rally 2013): Anti-EU Rhetoric, National Sovereignty, Alliance with Russia, NATO, US External Policy, Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric, Border Controls.

Anti- EU	Sources	References	R.C	Sovereignty	Sources	References	R.C
January	3	10	0.00%	January	6	12	140.00%
February	5	16	60.00%	February	5	8	-33.33%
March	4	10	-37.50%	March	3	10	25.00%
April	5	11	10.00%	April	5	9	-10.00%
May	6	29	163.64%	May	7	38	322.22%
June	6	16	-44.83%	June	7	14	-63.16%
July	4	19	18.75%	July	4	15	7.14%
August	3	9	-52.63%	August	5	10	-33.33%
September	5	24	166.67%	September	4	27	170.00%
October	4	11	-54.17%	October	3	12	-55.56%
November	7	18	63.64%	November	3	10	-16.67%
December	5	17	-5.56%	December	6	18	80.00%

Russia	Sources	References	R.C	NATO	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

US Ext. Polic	Sources	References	R.C	Immigration	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	7	15	275.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	2	2	-86.67%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	3	6	200.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	1	2	-66.67%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	5	15	650.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	4	8	-46.67%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	4	36	350.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	5	20	-44.44%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	5	22	10.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	6	17	-22.73%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	4	18	5.88%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	6	12	-33.33%

Border Conti	Sources	References	R.C
January	5	7	250.00%
February	1	1	-85.71%
March	2	3	200.00%
April	2	2	-33.33%
May	2	11	450.00%
June	2	5	-54.55%
July	3	6	20.00%
August	2	2	-66.67%
September	3	14	600.00%
October	2	3	-78.57%
November	1	5	66.67%
December	5	8	60.00%

Table B6 Economic Frames (National Rally 2013): Globalisation, Banking Sector, Common Currency, Financial Markets, Austerity, Agriculture, Sport Industry, Economy, Industrial Sector, Service Sector, Protectionism, Privatisations.

Globalisation	Sources	References	R.C	Banks	Sources	References	R.C
January	4	12	50.00%	January	1	1	-75.00%
February	7	10	-16.67%	February	4	6	500.00%
March	4	7	-30.00%	March	2	4	-33.33%
April	4	4	-42.86%	April	1	1	-75.00%
May	4	20	400.00%	May	3	12	1100.00%
June	5	6	-70.00%	June	4	5	-58.33%
July	4	9	50.00%	July	1	1	-80.00%
August	4	7	-22.22%	August	1	1	0.00%
September	2	9	28.57%	September	2	9	800.00%
October	6	8	-11.11%	October	2	2	-77.78%
November	5	9	12.50%	November	2	3	50.00%
December	8	18	100.00%	December	5	13	333.33%
Euro	Sources	References	R.C	Financial Ma	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	0.00%	January	4	9	12.50%
February	3	6	500.00%	February	6	8	-11.11%
March	3	5	-16.67%	March	3	7	-12.50%
April	3	3	-40.00%	April	3	4	-42.86%
May	4	8	166.67%	May	5	19	375.00%
, June	4	7	-12.50%	June	3	4	-78.95%
July	4	8	14.29%	July	4	10	150.00%
August	2	4	-50.00%	August	2	3	-70.00%
September	2	6	50.00%	September	2	12	300.00%
October	1	1	-83.33%	October	3	3	-75.00%
November	2	2	100.00%	November	5	5	66.67%
December	4	8	300.00%	December	8	19	280.00%
Austority Dol	Cauraas	References	D.C.	Agricultura	Courses	Deferences	пС
Austerity Pol	0		R.C	Agriculture	Sources	References	R.C
lanuary		0	0.00%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	2	2	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	2	2	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	1	3	50.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	2	5	66.67%
lune	0	0	0.00%	June	1	1	-80.00%
luly	0	0	0.00%	July	3	3	200.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	2	3	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	2	-33.33%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	3	8	300.00%

December 2

-50.00%

0.00%

December 0

Sport Industi	Sources	References	R.C	Economy	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	4	9	125.00%
February	1	4	0.00%	February	5	11	22.22%
March	1	1	-75.00%	March	4	5	-54.55%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	2	5	0.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	8	23	360.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	4	7	-69.57%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	6	17	142.86%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	4	8	-52.94%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	4	18	125.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	5	11	-38.89%
November	2	2	0.00%	November	5	14	27.27%
December	0	0	-100.00%	December	5	13	-7.14%

Industrial Se	Sources	References	R.C	Service Secto	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	4	-20.00%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	2	3	-25.00%	February	1	1	0.00%
March	2	2	-33.33%	March	0	0	-100.00%
April	1	2	0.00%	April	2	2	0.00%
May	3	7	250.00%	May	3	4	100.00%
June	2	2	-71.43%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	1	1	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	2	5	0.00%	September	2	4	0.00%
October	1	1	-80.00%	October	2	2	-50.00%
November	2	3	200.00%	November	2	2	0.00%
December	3	8	166.67%	December	2	5	150.00%

Protectionis	Sources	References	R.C	Privatisation	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	4	0.00%	January	5	15	150.00%
February	4	4	0.00%	February	5	7	-53.33%
March	1	1	-75.00%	March	4	6	-14.29%
April	2	2	100.00%	April	5	9	50.00%
May	4	11	450.00%	May	7	30	233.33%
June	4	7	-36.36%	June	5	8	-73.33%
July	4	6	-14.29%	July	4	8	0.00%
August	2	3	-50.00%	August	2	3	-62.50%
September	4	14	366.67%	September	5	19	533.33%
October	1	1	-92.86%	October	3	6	-68.42%
November	2	2	100.00%	November	5	12	100.00%
December	5	15	650.00%	December	5	13	8.33%

Table B7 Political System Frames (National Rally 2013): Attacking Macron, Attacking Fillon, Criticising the Government's Policies (Hollande), Criticising the Government's Policies (Macron), Claims the Government is Undermining NR (Hollande), Claims that the Government is Undermining NR (Macron), Claiming that the Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (Hollande), Claiming that the Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (Macron), Accusations of Corruption (Hollande Government), Accusations of Corruption (Macron Government), Attacking the Left by Claiming that they Went Back on their Pre-Election Promises, Attacking the Left, Attacking the Right, Accusations of Corruption (Other Parties), Attacking the Previous Government by Claiming that it Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (Hollande), Attacking the Previous Government with Accusations of Corruption (Hollande).

Macron	Sources	References	R.C	Fillon	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Policies	Sources	References	R.C	Policies M.	Sources	References	R.C
January	6	10	233.33%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	4	4	-60.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	3	8	100.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	4	4	-50.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	7	17	325.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	2	3	-82.35%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	3	7	133.33%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	2	3	-57.14%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	5	15	400.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	4	4	-73.33%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	4	8	100.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	8	18	125.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Undermining	Sources	References	R.C	Underminin	g Sources	References	R.C
January	2	5	500.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	1	2	-60.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	2	3	50.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	2	4	33.33%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	2	8	100.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	2	5	-37.50%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	4	7	40.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	1	1	-85.71%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	2	7	600.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	3	8	14.29%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	4	11	37.50%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	3	18	63.64%	December	0	0	0.00%

Promises	Sources	References	R.C	Promises M.	Sources	References	R.C
January	5	7	-22.22%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	3	4	-42.86%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	4	11	175.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	4	9	-18.18%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	6	22	144.44%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	5	5	-77.27%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	5	11	120.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	5	9	-18.18%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	5	13	44.44%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	4	9	-30.77%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	3	10	11.11%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	7	23	130.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Corruption	Sources	References	R.C	Corruption I	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	4	400.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	3	6	50.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	2	2	-66.67%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	1	-50.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	1	4	300.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	1	1	-75.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	3	4	300.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	6	13	1300.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	2	5	-61.54%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	3	9	80.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	5	9	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Left Promise	Sources	References	R.C	Left	Sources	References	R.C
January	4	5	400.00%	January	4	9	50.00%
February	4	5	0.00%	February	6	11	22.22%
March	1	4	-20.00%	March	6	18	63.64%
April	4	9	125.00%	April	6	15	-16.67%
May	5	16	77.78%	May	8	26	73.33%
June	5	5	-68.75%	June	8	16	-38.46%
July	4	7	40.00%	July	5	9	-43.75%
August	2	4	-42.86%	August	4	5	-44.44%
September	4	9	125.00%	September	5	24	380.00%
October	3	6	-33.33%	October	7	20	-16.67%
November	3	10	66.67%	November	7	28	40.00%
December	7	20	100.00%	December	7	15	-46.43%

Right	Sources	References	R.C	Corruption (Sources	References	R.C
January	4	5	0.00%	January	2	3	0.00%
February	4	4	-20.00%	February	2	4	33.33%
March	3	5	25.00%	March	0	0	-100.00%
April	2	2	-60.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	4	12	500.00%	May	1	2	200.00%
June	4	6	-50.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	3	4	-33.33%	July	1	1	0.00%
August	1	2	-50.00%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	5	18	800.00%	September	2	2	200.00%
October	2	3	-83.33%	October	1	1	-50.00%
November	3	6	100.00%	November	1	1	0.00%
December	6	7	16.67%	December	1	1	0.00%

Incompetend	Sources	References	R.C	Attacking the	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	2	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	1	4	100.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	3	5	25.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	1	-80.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	1	2	100.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	1	1	100.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	1	1	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	3	4	300.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	1	1	-75.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	1	1	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	2	3	200.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Attacking the	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	4	0.00%
February	2	2	-50.00%
March	2	2	0.00%
April	2	2	0.00%
May	3	7	250.00%
June	1	1	-85.71%
July	2	3	200.00%
August	0	0	300.00%
September	4	10	0.00%
October	2	3	-70.00%
November	2	5	66.67%
December	5	7	40.00%

Table B8 Society Frames (National Rally 2013): The People versus the Elite, Attacking the LGBT Community, Farmers, Blue Collar Workers, Army Officers, Journalists, Middle Class, Pensioners, Unemployed Youth, Small Independents, Police Officers, Civil Servants, Persons with Disabilities, Healthcare Specialists, Utilising a Bleak Imagery, Democratic Representation.

People	Sources	References	R.C	Homosexual	Sources	References	R.C
January	3	11	450.00%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	5	7	-36.36%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	5	8	14.29%	March	1	1	0.00%
April	4	7	-12.50%	April	0	0	-100.00%
May	7	25	257.14%	May	1	1	0.00%
June	5	7	-72.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	5	18	157.14%	July	1	2	0.00%
August	3	11	-38.89%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	3	24	118.18%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	4	9	-62.50%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	5	11	22.22%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	4	15	36.36%	December	0	0	0.00%

Farmers	Sources	References	R.C	Blue Collar	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	2	4	100.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	1	1	-75.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	-100.00%
April	1	3	300.00%	April	1	1	0.00%
May	2	6	100.00%	May	4	8	700.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	1	1	-87.50%
July	4	4	0.00%	July	4	5	400.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	2	2	-60.00%
September	1	2	0.00%	September	1	3	50.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	3	7	0.00%	November	2	2	0.00%
December	3	5	-28.57%	December	4	6	200.00%

Army Officer	Sources	References	R.C	Journalists	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	1	3	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	2	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	1	2	0.00%	May	1	1	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	1	1	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	2	3	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Middle Class	Sources	References	R.C	Pensioners	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	0.00%	January	2	3	200.00%
February	1	3	200.00%	February	1	2	-33.33%
March	0	0	-100.00%	March	0	0	-100.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	1	1	0.00%
May	2	4	0.00%	May	5	9	800.00%
June	1	1	-75.00%	June	2	2	-77.78%
July	3	3	200.00%	July	3	5	150.00%
August	1	1	-66.67%	August	2	3	-40.00%
September	0	0	-100.00%	September	3	6	100.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	2	2	-66.67%
November	1	1	0.00%	November	4	4	100.00%
December	1	3	200.00%	December	2	4	0.00%

Unemployed	Sources	References	R.C	Small Indepe	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	2	100.00%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	1	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	3	6	500.00%	May	3	5	0.00%
June	1	1	-83.33%	June	2	2	-60.00%
July	2	2	100.00%	July	3	3	50.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	1	1	-66.67%
September	3	7	0.00%	September	1	1	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	1	5	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	3	5	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Police Office	Sources	References	R.C	Public Sector	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	1	1	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	1	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	1	3	200.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	1	1	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	1	2	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Persons with	Sources	References	R.C	Healthcare S	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	3	4	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	1	1	100.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	3	300.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	1	1	100.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Bleak Image	Sources	References	R.C	Democracy	Sources	References	R.C
January	7	17	142.86%	January	7	21	425.00%
February	5	10	-41.18%	February	3	14	-33.33%
March	5	12	20.00%	March	7	12	-14.29%
April	4	8	-33.33%	April	5	6	-50.00%
May	10	36	350.00%	May	6	38	533.33%
June	8	11	-69.44%	June	6	11	-71.05%
July	7	21	90.91%	July	6	19	72.73%
August	4	18	-14.29%	August	7	17	-10.53%
September	5	30	66.67%	September	6	32	88.24%
October	6	12	-60.00%	October	6	14	-56.25%
November	5	15	25.00%	November	7	18	28.57%
December	7	20	33.33%	December	5	8	-55.56%

Table B9 External Policy Frames (National Rally 2016): Anti-EU Rhetoric, National Sovereignty, Alliance with Russia, NATO, US External Policy, Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric, Border Controls.

Anti- EU	Sources	References	R.C	Sovereignty	Sources	References	R.C
January	8	25	47.06%	January	6	17	-5.56%
February	8	19	-24.00%	February	8	20	17.65%
March	7	25	31.58%	March	7	20	0.00%
April	7	22	-12.00%	April	8	23	15.00%
May	6	42	90.91%	May	4	33	43.48%
June	8	57	35.71%	June	6	49	48.48%
July	6	34	-40.35%	July	6	38	-22.45%
August	7	22	-35.29%	August	5	26	-31.58%
September	7	28	27.27%	September	4	33	26.92%
October	5	20	-28.57%	October	3	16	-51.52%
November	6	20	0.00%	November	4	14	-12.50%
December	6	19	-5.00%	December	4	11	-21.43%
							-
Russia	Sources	References	R.C	NATO	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	1	1	0.00%
February	1	1	0.00%	February	1	1	0.00%
March	1	1	0.00%	March	1	2	100.00%
April	2	8	700.00%	April	2	5	150.00%
May	1	3	-62.50%	May	3	5	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	2	4	0.00%
October	1	2	0.00%	October	1	1	-75.00%
November	1	2	0.00%	November	1	1	0.00%
December	1	1	-50.00%	December	0	0	-100.00%
US Ext. Polic	Sources	References	R.C	Immigration	Sources	References	R.C
January		2	0.00%	Immigration January	5	14	
•	0			February			16.67%
February		0	-100.00%		6	16	14.29%
March	1	3	0.00%	March	8	26	62.50%
April	3	8	166.67%	April	7	15	-42.31%
May	2	6	-25.00%	May	3	22	46.67%
June	1	1	-83.33%	June	5	14	-36.36%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	4	15	7.14%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	5	13	-13.33%
September	1	2	0.00%	September	5	21	61.54%
October	1	3	50.00%	October	3	10	-52.38%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	5	11	10.00%

Border Cont	Sources	References	R.C
January	7	21	162.50%
February	5	12	-42.86%
March	8	20	66.67%
April	5	11	-45.00%
May	6	30	172.73%
June	4	10	-66.67%
July	4	6	-40.00%
August	3	3	-50.00%
September	4	10	233.33%
October	5	15	50.00%
November	2	3	-80.00%
December	5	11	266.67%

Table B10 Economic Frames (National Rally 2016): Globalisation, Banking Sector, Common Currency, Financial Markets, Austerity, Agriculture, Sport Industry, Economy, Industrial Sector, Service Sector, Protectionism, Privatisations.

Globalisatio	Sources	References	R.C	Banks	Sources	References	R.C
January	3	5	-72.22%	January	1	2	-84.62%
February	3	4	-20.00%	February	1	1	-50.00%
March	1	2	-50.00%	March	0	0	-100.00%
April	2	2	0.00%	April	2	2	0.00%
May	4	20	900.00%	May	2	5	150.00%
June	2	3	-85.00%	June	2	2	-60.00%
July	2	2	-33.33%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	2	2	0.00%	August	1	1	0.00%
September	4	18	800.00%	September	3	8	700.00%
October	5	19	5.56%	October	2	5	-37.50%
November	5	8	-57.89%	November	2	2	-60.00%
December	5	11	37.50%	December	4	6	200.00%
Euro	Sources	References	R.C	Financial Ma	Sources	References	R.C
January	3	5	-37.50%	January	4	7	-63.16%
February	2	2	-60.00%	February	3	3	-57.14%
March	1	1	-50.00%	March	1	2	-33.33%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	2	3	50.00%
May	2	4	0.00%	May	3	11	266.67%
June	4	10	150.00%	June	4	10	-9.09%
July	2	2	-80.00%	July	3	5	-50.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	3	3	-40.00%
September	2	6	0.00%	September	4	17	466.67%
October	1	1	-83.33%	October	5	12	-29.41%
November	2	4	300.00%	November	5	8	-33.33%
December	1	2	-50.00%	December	5	9	12.50%
Austerity Po	Sources	References	R.C	Agriculture	Sources	References	R.C
January	4	13	0.00%	January	1	2	-50.00%
February	3	6	-53.85%	February	2	7	250.00%
March	1	1	-83.33%	March	1	1	-85.71%
April	1	1	0.00%	April	2	8	700.00%
May	4	9	800.00%	May	2	6	-25.00%
	4	11	22.22%			1	-83.33%
June				June	0		-83.33%
July	3	5	-54.55%	July	1	0	
August	4	4	-20.00%	August	1	1	0.00%
September	3	18 5	350.00%	September	3	9	800.00%
October November	1	1	-72.22% -80.00%	October November	1	3	-88.89% 200.00%

December 1

0.00%

1400.00%

December 6

15

Sport Industi	Sources	References	R.C	Economy	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	5	13	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	7	7	-46.15%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	2	3	-57.14%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	4	6	100.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	2	15	150.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	6	14	-6.67%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	4	8	-42.86%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	5	8	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	5	20	150.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	5	12	-40.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	3	6	-50.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	4	7	16.67%

Industrial Se	Sources	References	R.C	Service Secto	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	3	-62.50%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	1	1	-66.67%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	1	1	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	4	300.00%	April	2	2	0.00%
May	3	4	0.00%	May	1	3	50.00%
June	3	5	25.00%	June	2	2	-33.33%
July	2	2	-60.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	3	19	0.00%	September	3	10	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	2	4	-60.00%
November	1	3	0.00%	November	1	1	-75.00%
December	1	6	100.00%	December	0	0	-100.00%

Protectionis	Sources	References	Rate of Char	Privatisation	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	-93.33%	January	2	3	-76.92%
February	3	3	200.00%	February	2	6	100.00%
March	2	2	-33.33%	March	3	3	-50.00%
April	2	3	50.00%	April	2	5	66.67%
May	3	8	166.67%	May	5	21	320.00%
June	4	8	0.00%	June	4	6	-71.43%
July	1	1	-87.50%	July	2	4	-33.33%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	1	1	-75.00%
September	4	16	0.00%	September	3	18	1700.00%
October	3	5	-68.75%	October	5	11	-38.89%
November	4	5	0.00%	November	5	7	-36.36%
December	2	6	20.00%	December	5	8	14.29%

Table B11 Political System Frames (National Rally 2016): Attacking Macron, Attacking Fillon, Criticising the Government's Policies (Macron), Claims the Government is Undermining NR (Hollande), Claims that the Government is Undermining NR (Macron), Claiming that the Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (Hollande), Claiming that the Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (Macron), Accusations of Corruption (Hollande Government), Accusations of Corruption (Macron Government), Attacking the Left by Claiming that they Went Back on their Pre-Election Promises, Attacking the Left, Attacking the Right, Accusations of Corruption (Other Parties), Attacking the Previous Government by Claiming that it Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (Hollande), Attacking the Previous Government with Accusations of Corruption (Hollande).

Macron	Sources	References	R.C	Fillon	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	3	8	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	3	7	0.00%
December	3	3	300.00%	December	5	8	14.29%

Policies	Sources	References	R.C	Policies (Ma	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	4	-77.78%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	2	2	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	2	3	50.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	3	7	133.33%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	3	5	-28.57%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	2	2	-60.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	4	11	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	5	7	-36.36%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	3	3	-57.14%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	5	13	333.33%	December	0	0	0.00%

Underminin	g Sources	References	R.C	Undermining	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	1	1	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	1	2	100.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	-100.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	2	13	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	3	11	-15.38%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	1	1	100.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	2	2	100.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	1	1	-50.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Promises	Sources	References	R.C	Promises (M	Sources	References	R.C
January	4	8	-65.22%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	2	2	-75.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	5	8	300.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	4	8	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	6	15	87.50%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	5	10	-33.33%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	3	5	-50.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	2	2	-60.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	6	18	800.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	2	3	-83.33%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	1	1	-66.67%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	7	14	1300.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Corruption	Sources	References	R.C	Corruption I	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	3	-66.67%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	1	2	-33.33%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	1	2	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	1	-50.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	3	3	200.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	2	2	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	5	9	350.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	7	10	11.11%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	2	4	-60.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	2	4	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Left Promise	Sources	References	R.C	Left	Sources	References	R.C
January	4	7	-65.00%	January	5	9	-40.00%
February	2	2	-71.43%	February	3	3	-66.67%
March	5	10	400.00%	March	5	8	166.67%
April	3	7	-30.00%	April	3	8	0.00%
May	6	15	114.29%	May	8	41	412.50%
June	4	6	-60.00%	June	5	13	-68.29%
July	2	3	-50.00%	July	3	7	-46.15%
August	2	2	-33.33%	August	3	4	-42.86%
September	6	15	650.00%	September	7	19	375.00%
October	6	10	-33.33%	October	6	13	-31.58%
November	1	1	-90.00%	November	4	7	-46.15%
December	7	15	1400.00%	December	8	20	185.71%

Right	Sources	References	R.C	Attacking th	Sources	References	R.C
January	3	3	-57.14%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	3	3	300.00%	March	1	2	200.00%
April	2	2	-33.33%	April	0	0	-100.00%
May	4	19	850.00%	May	1	2	200.00%
June	3	5	-73.68%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	1	1	-80.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	5	9	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	4	6	-33.33%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	5	10	66.67%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	7	10	0.00%	December	2	2	0.00%

Incompetend	Sources	References	R.C	Attacking the	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	2	-33.33%	January	3	3	0.00%
February	2	2	0.00%	February	2	2	-33.33%
March	2	3	50.00%	March	3	3	50.00%
April	3	4	33.33%	April	2	2	-33.33%
May	2	5	25.00%	May	2	9	350.00%
June	1	1	-80.00%	June	3	3	-66.67%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	1	1	-66.67%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	1	2	100.00%
September	3	4	400.00%	September	4	10	400.00%
October	1	1	-75.00%	October	4	5	-50.00%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	2	5	0.00%
December	4	4	0.00%	December	5	6	20.00%

Attacking the	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	3	-57.14%
February	1	1	-66.67%
March	0	0	-100.00%
April	0	0	0.00%
May	1	1	100.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%
July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	1	100.00%
October	5	5	400.00%
November	2	3	-40.00%
December	2	2	-33.33%

Table B12 Society Frames (National Rally 2016): The People versus the Elite, Attacking the LGBT Community, Farmers, Blue Collar Workers, Army Officers, Journalists, Middle Class, Pensioners, Unemployed Youth, Small Independents, Police Officers, Civil Servants, Persons with Disabilities, Healthcare Specialists, Utilising a Bleak Imagery, Democratic Representation.

People	Sources	References	R.C	Homosexual	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	2	-86.67%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	2	3	50.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	7	12	300.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	6	11	-8.33%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	3	24	118.18%	May	1	1	0.00%
June	8	24	0.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	4	13	-45.83%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	2	9	-30.77%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	4	15	66.67%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	5	11	-26.67%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	5	15	36.36%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	8	18	20.00%	December	0	0	0.00%
Farmers	Sources	References	R.C	Blue Collar	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	1	3	-50.00%
February	2	7	0.00%	February	0	0	-100.00%

Farmers	Sources	References	R.C	Blue Collar	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	1	3	-50.00%
February	2	7	0.00%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	0	0	-100.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	2	5	0.00%	April	2	4	0.00%
May	2	5	0.00%	May	3	4	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	1	1	-75.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	3	4	0.00%	September	3	10	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	3	3	-70.00%
November	1	2	0.00%	November	2	4	33.33%
December	1	3	50.00%	December	1	1	-75.00%

Army Officer	Sources	References	R.C	Journalists	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	2	-33.33%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	1	1	-50.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	-100.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	1	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	2	3	200.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	2	2	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	1	1	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Middle Class	Sources	References	R.C	Pensioners	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	1	1	0.00%
May	2	3	0.00%	May	2	4	300.00%
June	2	4	33.33%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	2	2	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	1	1	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	2	2	100.00%	December	2	5	0.00%

Unemployed	Sources	References	R.C	Small Indep	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	5	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	0	0	-100.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	1	1	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	2	5	400.00%	May	1	3	0.00%
June	2	2	-60.00%	June	2	3	0.00%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	4	10	0.00%	September	2	5	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	2	3	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Police Office	Sources	References	R.C	Public Sector	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	5	150.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	1	1	-80.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	0	0	-100.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	4	12	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	2	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	3	7	250.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	1	2	-71.43%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	2	4	100.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Persons with	Sources	References	R.C	Healthcare S	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	2	6	0.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	3	4	-33.33%
March	0	0	0.00%	March	1	1	-75.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	0	0	-100.00%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	1	1	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	1	3	0.00%	December	1	7	0.00%

Bleak Imagei	Sources	References	R.C	Democracy	Sources	References	R.C
January	7	21	0.00%	January	5	16	0.00%
February	6	12	-42.86%	February	5	11	-31.25%
March	7	16	33.33%	March	4	10	-9.09%
April	6	11	-31.25%	April	7	15	50.00%
May	7	27	145.45%	May	5	38	153.33%
June	8	20	-25.93%	June	7	42	10.53%
July	4	10	-50.00%	July	6	33	-21.43%
August	3	8	-20.00%	August	4	18	-45.45%
September	7	25	212.50%	September	5	20	11.11%
October	9	18	-28.00%	October	5	10	-50.00%
November	6	9	-50.00%	November	4	7	-30.00%
December	8	25	177.78%	December	4	8	14.29%

Table B13 External Policy Frames (National Rally 2017): Anti-EU Rhetoric, National Sovereignty, Alliance with Russia, NATO, US External Policy, Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric, Border Controls.

Anti- EU	Sources	References	R.C	Sovereignty	Sources	References	R.C
January	6	31	63.16%	January	3	13	18.18%
February	6	42	35.48%	February	6	53	307.69%
March	8	80	90.48%	March	8	73	37.74%
April	8	93	16.25%	April	7	58	-20.55%
May	9	84	-9.68%	May	9	62	6.90%
June	6	12	-85.71%	June	5	8	-87.10%
July	5	5	-58.33%	July	4	4	-50.00%
August	5	11	120.00%	August	4	9	125.00%
September	7	25	127.27%	September	5	17	88.89%
October	6	11	-56.00%	October	5	5	-70.59%
November	7	12	9.09%	November	4	7	40.00%
December	8	24	100.00%	December	4	13	85.71%
			-				
Russia	Sources	References	R.C	NATO	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	1	1	0.00%	February	3	9	0.00%
March	1	1	0.00%	March	3	7	-22.22%
April	1	1	0.00%	April	0	0	-100.00%
May	0	0	-100.00%	May	2	3	0.00%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	2	3	0.00%
US Ext. Polic	Sources	References	R.C	Immigration	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	5	10	25.00%
February	1	3	0.00%	February	5	24	140.00%
March	0	0	-100.00%	March	7	43	79.17%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	8	102	137.21%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	8	67	-34.31%
lune	0	0	0.00%	June	2	4	-94.03%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	4	6	50.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	4	8	33.33%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	5	18	125.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	4	5	-72.22%
October November	0	0	-100.00%	October November	4	9	-72.22% 80.00%

December 3

-55.56%

December 0

0

0.00%

Border Cont	Sources	References	R.C
January	4	8	22.30%
February	2	14	75.00%
March	6	35	150.00%
April	7	81	131.43%
May	7	64	-20.99%
June	1	1	-98.44%
July	4	5	400.00%
August	2	2	-60.00%
September	5	15	650.00%
October	4	6	-60.00%
November	1	1	-83.33%
December	4	6	500.00%

Table B14 Economic Frames (National Rally 2017): Globalisation, Banking Sector, Common Currency, Financial Markets, Austerity, Agriculture, Sport Industry, Economy, Industrial Sector, Service Sector, Protectionism, Privatisations.

Globalisation	Sources	References	R.C	Banks	Sources	References	R.C
January	6	21	90.91%	January	2	2	-66.67%
February	5	34	61.90%	February	4	8	300.00%
March	7	84	147.06%	March	8	57	612.50%
April	7	61	-27.38%	April	6	33	-42.11%
May	8	55	-9.84%	May	6	42	27.27%
June	1	1	-98.18%	June	1	1	-97.62%
July	1	1	0.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	2	2	100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	5	17	750.00%	September	2	5	0.00%
October	3	3	-82.35%	October	3	3	-40.00%
November	1	1	-66.67%	November	3	6	100.00%
December	4	5	400.00%	December	1	1	-83.33%
	_				_		
Euro	Sources	References	R.C	Financial Ma		References	R.C
January	2	7	250.00%	January	6	19	111.11%
February	4	7	0.00%	February	5	25	31.58%
March	7	25	257.14%	March	8	79	216.00%
April	6	12	-52.00%	April	6	49	-37.97%
May	7	19	58.33%	May	7	56	14.29%
June	1	1	-94.74%	June	1	1	-98.21%
July	1	1	0.00%	July	1	1	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	2	2	0.00%	September	3	11	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	3	3	-72.73%
November	1	1	0.00%	November	2	2	-33.33%
December	1	1	0.00%	December	3	3	50.00%
Austerity	Sources	References	R.C	Agriculture	Sources	References	R.C
,	4	8	-46.67%		2	2	
January	3	8		January		7	-33.33%
February			0.00%	February	5		250.00%
March	8	47	487.50%	March	6	10	42.86%
April	8	59	25.53%	April	6	15	50.00%
May	9	63	6.78%	May	7	21	40.00%
June	3	7	-88.89%	June	2	2	-90.48%
July	4	6	-14.29%	July	1	1	-50.00%
August	3	4	-33.33%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	2	2	-50.00%	September	1	2	0.00%
October	2	5	150.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	1	4	-20.00%	November	1	1	0.00%

Sport Industi	Sources	References	R.C	Economy	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	6	13	85.71%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	5	9	-30.77%
March	2	2	-100.00%	March	9	63	600.00%
April	0	0	0.00%	April	8	45	-28.57%
May	0	0	0.00%	May	9	56	24.44%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	3	5	-91.07%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	4	8	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	2	3	-62.50%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	2	2	-33.33%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	3	5	150.00%

Industrial Sec	Sources	References	R.C	Service Secto	Sources	References	R.C
January	4	15	150.00%	January	1	3	0.00%
February	4	6	-60.00%	February	1	1	-66.67%
March	7	28	366.67%	March	6	19	1800.00%
April	6	26	-7.14%	April	6	15	-21.05%
May	6	21	-19.23%	May	5	10	-33.33%
June	2	2	-90.48%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	1	1	-50.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	2	5	0.00%	September	1	1	0.00%
October	1	2	-60.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	1	1	0.00%
December	1	2	0.00%	December	1	1	0.00%

Protectionis	Sources	References	R.C	Privatisation	Sources	References	R.C
January	3	5	-16.67%	January	2	8	0.00%
February	4	6	20.00%	February	4	8	0.00%
March	8	45	650.00%	March	8	58	625.00%
April	6	33	-26.67%	April	7	48	-17.24%
May	6	28	-15.15%	May	7	50	4.17%
June	1	1	-96.43%	June	2	2	-96.00%
July	1	1	0.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	4	4	0.00%	September	4	11	0.00%
October	1	1	-75.00%	October	1	1	-90.91%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	1	2	100.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	3	4	100.00%

Table B15 Political System Frames (National Rally 2017): Attacking Macron, Attacking Fillon, Criticising the Government's Policies (Macron), Claims the Government is Undermining NR (Hollande), Claims that the Government is Undermining NR (Macron), Claiming that the Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (Hollande), Claiming that the Government Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (Macron), Accusations of Corruption (Hollande Government), Accusations of Corruption (Macron Government), Attacking the Left by Claiming that they Went Back on their Pre-Election Promises, Attacking the Left, Attacking the Right, Accusations of Corruption (Other Parties), Attacking the Previous Government by Claiming that it Went Back on its Pre-Election Promises (Hollande), Attacking the Previous Government with Accusations of Corruption (Hollande).

Macron	Sources	References	R.C	Fillon	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	2	-33.33%	January	4	8	0.00%
February	5	19	850.00%	February	5	16	100.00%
March	7	37	94.74%	March	6	35	118.75%
April	7	63	70.27%	April	7	62	77.14%
May	8	68	7.94%	May	7	66	6.45%
June	4	9	-86.76%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	2	2	-77.78%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	1	2	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	5	17	750.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	2	2	-88.24%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	2	3	50.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	3	4	33.33%	December	0	0	0.00%

Policies	Sources	References	R.C	Policies (Mad	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	-92.31%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	2	3	200.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	6	19	533.33%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	7	25	31.58%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	7	29	16.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	5	7	700.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	1	1	-85.71%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	2	2	100.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	3	6	200.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	1	-83.33%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	1	1	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	3	4	300.00%

Undermining	Sources	References	R.C	Undermining	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	0.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	4	5	400.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	7	15	200.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	4	10	-33.33%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	7	16	60.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	1	1	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	1	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	3	7	600.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	2	3	-57.14%

Promises	Sources	References	R.C	Promises (M	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	-92.86%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	3	4	300.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	7	25	525.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	8	21	-16.00%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	8	30	42.86%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	3	6	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	2	2	-66.67%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	1	2	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	3	5	150.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	1	-80.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	2	3	200.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	4	5	66.67%

Corruption	Sources	References	R.C	Corruption (I Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	-75.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	2	5	400.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	7	30	500.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	7	13	-56.67%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	7	11	-15.38%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	1	2	-81.82%	June	2	2	0.00%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	1	3	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	1	1	0.00%

Left Promise	Sources	References	R.C	Left	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	3	4	-80.00%
February	0	0	0.00%	February	5	17	325.00%
March	7	18	0.00%	March	8	43	152.94%
April	7	16	-11.11%	April	8	38	-11.63%
May	0	0	-100.00%	May	8	45	18.42%
June	0	0	0.00%	June	3	4	-91.11%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	2	2	-50.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	3	9	0.00%
October	0	0	0.00%	October	1	1	-88.89%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	1	1	100.00%

Right	Sources	References	R.C	Corruption (Sources	References	R.C
January	2	3	-70.00%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	3	11	266.67%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	8	36	227.27%	March	5	17	1700.00%
April	7	32	-11.11%	April	6	9	-47.06%
May	5	17	-46.88%	May	6	14	55.56%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	3	8	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	2	2	-75.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	2	3	50.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	1	1	-66.67%	December	0	0	0.00%

Incompetend	Sources	References	R.C	Attacking the	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	-75.00%	January	2	2	-66.67%
February	2	2	100.00%	February	3	4	100.00%
March	5	14	600.00%	March	7	15	275.00%
April	6	14	0.00%	April	7	25	66.67%
May	6	17	21.43%	May	7	29	16.00%
June	2	2	-88.24%	June	2	2	-93.10%
July	0	0	-100.00%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	4	400.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	1	1	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Attacking the	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	-50.00%
February	3	4	300.00%
March	6	20	400.00%
April	5	11	-45.00%
May	5	14	27.27%
June	2	3	-78.57%
July	0	0	-100.00%
August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	1	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%
November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%

Table B16 Society Frames (National Rally 2017): The People versus the Elite, Attacking the LGBT Community, Farmers, Blue Collar Workers, Army Officers, Journalists, Middle Class, Pensioners, Unemployed Youth, Small Independents, Police Officers, Civil Servants, Persons with Disabilities, Healthcare Specialists, Utilising a Bleak Imagery, Democratic Representation.

People	Sources	References	R.C	Homosexual	Sources	References	R.C
January	5	15	-16.67%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	7	34	126.67%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	9	83	144.12%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	8	91	9.64%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	8	76	-16.48%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	3	3	-96.05%	June	0	2	0.00%
July	2	2	-33.33%	July	0	0	-100.00%
August	3	4	100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	6	23	475.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	2	2	-91.30%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	3	5	150.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	5	9	80.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Farmers	Sources	References	R.C	Blue Collar	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	1	-66.67%	January	2	7	600.00%
February	3	4	300.00%	February	2	4	-42.86%
March	6	8	100.00%	March	7	20	400.00%
April	6	11	37.50%	April	7	17	-15.00%
May	5	10	-9.09%	May	7	15	-11.76%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	1	1	-93.33%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	1	1	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	-100.00%
September	1	2	0.00%	September	1	2	0.00%
October	1	2	0.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	1	1	-50.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	-100.00%	December	1	1	0.00%

Army Officer	Sources	References	R.C	Journalists	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	0.00%	January	1	2	0.00%
February	3	5	0.00%	February	0	0	-100.00%
March	5	9	80.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	5	8	-11.11%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	4	8	0.00%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	2	4	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	1	2	-50.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	1	-50.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	1	1	0.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	-100.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Middle Class	Sources	References	R.C	Pensioners	Sources	References	R.C
January	0	0	-100.00%	January	1	1	-80.00%
February	2	2	0.00%	February	2	2	100.00%
March	5	9	350.00%	March	6	12	500.00%
April	5	10	11.11%	April	5	12	0.00%
May	6	13	30.00%	May	5	8	-33.33%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	2	2	0.00%	September	1	1	0.00%
October	1	1	-50.00%	October	0	0	-100.00%
November	1	1	0.00%	November	1	1	0.00%
December	0	0	-100.00%	December	0	0	-100.00%

Unemploye	Sources	References	R.C	Small Indepe	Sources	References	R.C
January	1	2	-33.33%	January	1	1	0.00%
February	3	3	50.00%	February	3	5	400.00%
March	6	15	400.00%	March	5	14	180.00%
April	6	21	40.00%	April	5	14	0.00%
May	7	20	-4.76%	May	3	10	-28.57%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	1	2	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	-100.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	1	1	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	0	0	-100.00%	October	1	1	0.00%
November	0	0	0.00%	November	0	0	-100.00%
December	1	2	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Police Office	e Sources	References	R.C	Public Sector	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	2	-50.00%	January	0	0	0.00%
February	3	5	150.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	3	8	60.00%	March	0	0	0.00%
April	6	11	37.50%	April	0	0	0.00%
May	5	9	-18.18%	May	0	0	0.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	0.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	1	1	0.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Persons with	Sources	References	R.C	Healthcare S	Sources	References	R.C
January	2	2	-33.33%	January	0	0	-100.00%
February	1	1	-50.00%	February	0	0	0.00%
March	2	2	100.00%	March	3	4	0.00%
April	4	7	250.00%	April	3	5	25.00%
May	3	4	-42.86%	May	2	4	-20.00%
June	0	0	-100.00%	June	0	0	-100.00%
July	0	0	0.00%	July	0	0	0.00%
August	0	0	0.00%	August	0	0	0.00%
September	0	0	0.00%	September	0	0	0.00%
October	1	1	100.00%	October	0	0	0.00%
November	0	0	-100.00%	November	0	0	0.00%
December	0	0	0.00%	December	0	0	0.00%

Bleak Imagei	Sources	References	R.C	Democracy	Sources	References	R.C
January	5	7	-72.00%	January	3	15	87.50%
February	5	24	242.86%	February	6	32	113.33%
March	8	62	158.33%	March	8	67	109.38%
April	7	94	51.61%	April	7	60	-10.45%
May	8	72	-23.40%	May	8	64	6.67%
June	3	3	-95.83%	June	3	5	-92.19%
July	3	4	33.33%	July	2	4	-20.00%
August	2	2	-50.00%	August	2	3	-25.00%
September	3	19	850.00%	September	4	19	533.33%
October	4	4	-78.95%	October	2	2	-89.47%
November	1	1	-75.00%	November	3	6	200.00%
December	4	5	400.00%	December	3	6	0.00%

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