Virginia Woolf's Futures, 1934-41: Substrate, Archive, Anterior

Joshua Phillips
BA (Hons), MA

Submitted in fulfilment for the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Critical Studies
College of Arts
University of Glasgow

December 2021

Abstract

My thesis discusses Virginia Woolf's late manuscript and typescript drafts. I locate the start of Woolf's 'late' work in January 1934, as she drafts the 1917 chapter of *The Years*. My thesis argues that this draft signals a 'reparative' turn characterized by a change in her thinking of the future. I use the term 'reparative' after Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's anatomy of paranoid and reparative modes of thought. I use these late draft works to make the case that, from January 1934, Woolf starts to imagine new futures premised on genuine difference, futures that offer an alternative to patriarchy, to fascism, and to war, and I further argue that Woolf uses the textual space afforded her by the draft page as a locus to imagine such futures.

My reading of Woolf's draft material is informed by the words 'substrate,' 'archive' and 'anterior'. Substrate is a term from Jacques Derrida's *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression* (1995), a work that I use as a key analytic for my work in Woolf's archive. The term 'substrate' signifies a surface for inscription: any surface, any inscription. I use this term to engage with the material specificity of Woolf's draft pages and with the material specificity of my own work in the Woolfian archive. 'Archive' is the second word that guides this thesis: on the one hand it is the simplest, but I work throughout this thesis to problematise the notion of the archive as a fixed repository for documents, using *Archive Fever* both as a guide through Woolf's archive and as a way to radically expand its parameters. 'Anterior' is a Janus-faced tense structure that speaks at once to what will have happened and to a past that precedes what has happened: it is my contention that this tense structure is apt to the archival work of genetic critics and that Woolf's writing on the future gestures towards anteriority.

This thesis is divided into three parts. Part One is introductory, providing a methodological and theoretical justification for the archival work I present later in the thesis. In Chapter One, I provide a close reading of the opening of 'Time Passes,' the second part of *To the Lighthouse* (1927), in order to establish key tropes in my thesis. I read both the published version(s) of this text and its *avant-textes*, as well as exogenetic material including Virgil's *Georgics*, which I argue is an intertext to 'Time Passes,' in order to introduce key theoretical and methodological tenets of my thesis. Chapter Two expands this reading to encompass Woolf's use of the word 'future' prior to 1934,

tracing its changing valences by means of distant reading. This distant reading provides the groundwork for my theorising of a reparative turn in the early months of 1934.

Part Two reads the holograph drafts of the '1917' chapter of *The Years* as a richly generative *avant-texte* not only for Woolf's 1937 novel but also for *Three Guineas* (1938). Chapter Three examines tropes and figurations common to both the draft scene and to *Three Guineas*, including an early and textually fraught invocation of *Three Guineas'* Society of Outsiders and a call to revolutionary arson at Oxford and Cambridge. I read between the 1934 draft and the published texts of 1937 and 1938, alongside Derrida's *Archive Fever* in order to expand the theoretical boundaries of Woolf's archive. Chapter Four offers a genetic reading of *Antigone*'s footfalls from the 1934 draft through the published texts of 1937 and 1938 and reads Woolf's interaction with Sophocles' drama in all three texts. I light on a curious instantiation of Antigone's speech—a misquotation of the 'five words' upon which *Three Guineas* tropes—in the draft, reading it alongside the children's chorus at the end of *The Years*.

Part Three of my thesis constellates the draft fragments of 'Anon' and 'The Reader' with *Between the Acts* (1941). Chapter Five examines the fragments' curatorial and editorial history, using a startling collocation of a single page from this part of Woolf's archive in order to argue that closer critical attention needs to be paid to the material form of the fragments and the archival, curatorial, and editorial context in which contemporary readers encounter them. Chapter Six investigates modes of anonymity in *Between the Acts* and 'Anon' and 'The Reader.' I use three definitions of the word 'anon,' the first an abbreviation for 'anonymous,' the second an obsolete word meaning 'of one body,' and the third meaning 'now again' to read Woolf's final constellation of works as theorising anonymity as a mode of subjectivity that is profoundly future-oriented.

Table of Figures

Abbreviations

AROO	Woolf, Virginia. "A Room of One's Own." *A Room of One's Own and Three Guineas*, edited by Michèle Barrett, Penguin, 1993 [1929], pp. 3-104.
BA	---. *Between the Acts.* edited by Mark Hussey, Cambridge University Press, 2011 [1941].
CSF	---. *The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf.* edited by Susan Dick, Harcourt, Inc., 1989.
D 1-5	---. *The Diary of Virginia Woolf.* edited by Anne Olivier Bell and Quentin Bell, Penguin, 1977-84. 5 vols.
E 1-6	---. *The Essays of Virginia Woolf.* edited by Andrew McNeillie and Stuart N. Clarke, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011. 6 vols.
F	---. *Flush.* edited by Kate Flint, Oxford University Press, 2009 [1931].
JR	---. *Jacob's Room.* edited by David Bradshaw and Stuart N. Clarke, Cambridge University Press, 2020 [1922].
L 1-6	---. *The Letters of Virginia Woolf.* Edited by Nigel Nicolson and Joanne Trautmann Banks, The Hogarth Press, 1975-80. 6 vols.
MD	---. *Mrs Dalloway.* Edited by David Bradshaw, Oxford University Press, 2000 [1925].
MoB	---. *Moments of Being*, edited by Jeanne Schulkind, Grafton Books, 1989.
ND	---. *Night and Day.* edited by Suzanne Raitt, Oxford University Press, 2009 [1919].
O	---. *Orlando: A Biography.* Edited by Suzanne Raitt and Ian Blyth, Cambridge University Press, 2018 [1928].
PA	---. *A Passionate Apprentice: The Early Journals.* edited by Mitchell Leaska, The Hogarth Press, 1990.
TG	---. "Three Guineas." *A Room of One's Own and Three Guineas*, edited by Michèle Barrett, Penguin, 1993 [1938], pp. 117-272.
TL	---. *To the Lighthouse.* edited by David Bradshaw, Oxford University Press, 2006 [1927].
VO	---. *The Voyage Out.* edited by Lorna Sage, Oxford University Press, 2009 [1915].
W	---. *The Waves.* edited by Gillian Beer, Oxford University Press, 2008 [1931].
Y	---. *The Years.* edited by Anna Snaith, Cambridge University Press, 2012 [1937]

List of editorial symbols

/	Line break
[illeg.]	Illegible text
[text?]	Uncertain reading
~~text~~	Text deleted with a strike-through
|*text*|	Longer sections of text deleted with a vertical or wavy line
+text+	Text added by means of interlineation
<u>text</u>	Text underlined in MS
[text]	Text in square brackets in MS
†	Text inserted with a caret or long swooping line
†text†	Text marked with a caret or circled for insertion elsewhere

Acknowledgments

Part One—1926-27: Woolf's Futures

Chapter One: Waiting for the Future to Show

Introduction: Substrate, Archive, Anterior

<div style="text-align: center;">1</div>

'Well, we must wait for the future to show,' said Mr Bankes, coming in from the terrace.
'It's almost too dark to see,' said Andrew, coming up from the beach.
'One can hardly tell which is the sea and which is the land,' said Prue.
'Do we leave that light burning?' said Lily as they took their coats off indoors.
'No,' said Prue, 'not if everyone's in.'
'Andrew,' she called back, 'just put out the light in the hall.'
One by one the lamps were all extinguished, except that Mr Carmichael, who liked to lie awake a little reading Virgil, kept his candle burning rather longer than the rest.

<div style="text-align: center;">2</div>

So with the lamps all put out, the moon sunk, and a thin rain drumming on the roof a downpouring of immense darkness began. (*TL* 103)

But, you may say, you said you would write about Virginia Woolf's work from 1934-41—what has that got to do with the opening paragraphs of 'Time Passes'? I am using Woolf's language, patterned after the opening of *A Room of One's Own* (1929) to explain, or perhaps to 'try to explain' (*AROO* 3) why 'Time Passes,' 1926 and 1927 sit so ostentatiously at the start of a thesis whose title indicates that it discusses the work Woolf wrote from 1934 to her death in 1941. In this thesis I read Woolf's draft work to argue that January 1934 marks a watershed moment in her thought. From 1931 through to 1937 Woolf works on *The Years*. From October 1932 to January 1933, she drafts the novel-essay hybrid eventually transcribed and published in a stand-alone volume as *The Pargiters* (1978). In 1932 to 1933, she changes tack, abandoning the novel-essay form of her earlier draft, and starts drafting, then painstakingly redrafting, the novel that she would eventually title *The Years*. In the early months of 1934, Woolf starts to draft the '1917' chapter of *The Years*, and my thesis argues that this inaugurates what I term a reparative turn in Woolf's work.

In using the term 'reparative,' I draw on Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's use of the term in her landmark 2003 essay 'Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, Or, You're So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay is About You.' I discuss this essay at greater length in Chapter Two of this thesis but briefly, Sedgwick draws on psychoanalyst Melanie Klein's theory of positions to situate paranoid forms of reading, what Paul Ricoeur called the 'hermeneutics of suspicion' (Sedgwick 124). For Sedgwick, Klein's 'depressive position' is a standpoint from which 'it is possible to use one's own resources to assemble or "repair" the murderous part-objects into something like a whole—though, I would emphasize, *not necessarily like any pre-existing whole*' (128, italics Sedgwick's). For Sedgwick, just as there are paranoid forms of reading and paranoid forms of knowledge, there are reparative ones also. It is worth noting at this point that although the paranoid and the depressive or reparative positions are 'oscillatory' and engage in 'mutual inscription,' they are not a binary: they are 'changing and heterogeneous relational stances' (128). I argue for a reparative turn in Woolf's writing on or about January 1934, but this is not to say that prior to this Woolf is exclusively a paranoid thinker, nor is it to say that at this point she abandons paranoid forms of thinking or knowledge. Abandoning paranoid manners of thought may not be possible or even entirely desirable: Sedgwick writes of the 'paranoid exigencies that are often necessary for nonparanoid knowing and utterance' (129). Rather, I make the case that it is at this point that Woolf starts to imagine new futures premised on genuine difference, futures that offer an alternative to patriarchy, to fascism, and to war. I discuss this draft material at length in Chapters Three and Four, in which I try to work through the different modes of futurity Woolf imagines in this draft, as well as in *The Years* and *Three Guineas* (1938).

My analysis of draft material throughout this thesis is informed by the triad of terms that follow the colon in the title of this thesis: 'substrate,' 'archive,' and 'anterior.' The first of these terms, 'substrate' is a term used by Jacques Derrida in *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression* (1995). A substrate is a surface for inscription: any surface, any inscription. He writes that the substrate, or 'rather this *figure* of the substrate' marks the '*fundamental* assignation of the problem, the problem of the fundamental' (Derrida *Archive Fever* 26). He continues, asking: '[c]an one imagine an archive without foundation, without substrate, without substance, without subjectile?' (26-7). I discuss the

final word of this quotation, 'subjectile' in Chapter Five of this thesis, but want to confine my remarks here to the substrate.

Although I highlight how Derrida inflected the term 'substrate,' he did not originate the term. The English word 'substrate' derives from the term 'substratum' which itself is borrowed from an identical Latin term meaning 'underlying layer' or 'background.' The *Oxford English Dictionary* (a resource to which I shall return repeatedly in this thesis) lists an array of possible senses in which the English word 'substratum' has been used: it is the 'underlying principle on which something is based; a basis, a foundation, a bedrock;' it is used in philosophical discourse—including in Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*—to indicate a 'permanent underlying thing or essence in which properties inhere;' it is used in geology to indicate an 'underlying stratum,' especially one that lies 'beneath the soil or any other surface feature;' it is used in linguistics to indicate 'language spoken in a particular area at the time of the arrival of a new language, and which has had within that area a detectable influence on the elements or features of the new language.' ("substratum, n."). Each of these senses signal a certain temporal and ontological priority, a certain directionality, a model of influence. The substratum lies beneath and comes first. Were the ground beneath one's neighbourhood resting on a different geological substratum, the view from one's window might look very different; were English based on a Latinate rather than a Germanic substrate, the language in which this thesis is written (and the literature it analyses) would read very differently. By the same token, the substrate is fundamental to the archive: it forms the grounds on which archival works are intelligible and, I will argue later in this thesis, conditions the future of the archive and work that can take place out of the archive. Were the archival documents I read written on a different substrate, the work that the substrate enables would take different forms, as would the readings out of this radically different archive. Hence, I use the term 'substrate' as the first of the triad of terms in my thesis's title: I take it as axiomatic that there is no archive without substrate, and moreover that the form of the substrate conditions the form of the archive. The substrate is what makes the archive and archival work possible and allows it to endure into the future.

My second term 'archive' is, at first glance, the simplest but I will work throughout this thesis to problematise the notion of the archive as a fixed repository for documents, using *Archive Fever* both as a guide through Woolf's archive and as a way to radically expand the parameters of

that archive. In an influential 2010 essay Finn Fordham provides an anatomy of the archive that differs from the one I theorise in this thesis. Although Fordham quotes from the opening pages to *Archive Fever* his critical lexis is Foucauldian, and he sees Derrida's work on the archive as following in Foucault's footsteps. For Fordham, *Archive Fever* 'blurs the line between the asylum (said to be designed to protect what exists within) and the prison (said to be designed to protect what exists without), a similar blurring that Foucault enacted in *Histoire de la folie* [*The History of Madness*]' (Fordham 54). Fordham draws another dichotomy in ascribing 'two quite distinct roles […] to the archive'. The modernist archive is, on the one hand, a 'practical resource for scholarship, a neutral storehouse where the originary documents of modernism are stored and preserved'; on the other hand, it is a 'conceptual metaphor for critique' (45), an imaginative resource for practitioners and scholars to write against, but not necessarily to work out of. My work in this thesis, particularly in Chapters Five and Six, militates against the binary Fordham draws. In his 2010 article, Fordham notes that 'common to' both terms of his binary is 'the fact of gathering together under a classifying name' (46) before writing about each part of his binary separately. My work on the final documents Woolf wrote in her lifetime, a literary-historical project that has come to be known under the dual title of 'Anon' and 'The Reader,' speaks to the gathering and classifying labour that the archive and archivists perform, but I see this labour as always and already imbricated with more theoretical considerations of the archive: Derrida's analysis of the archive and Woolf's own writing on literary history and on reading speak to this imbrication.

My final term, 'anterior' refers to a Janus-faced tense structure that at once speaks to a past that precedes what has happened, a precondition for a past action to have taken place, and to a future, to what will have happened. It is a term which at once means 'facing forward' and 'that which comes before in time' ("anterior, adj."). I discuss both modes of anteriority in the course of this thesis, but I want to confine my remarks to the future anterior for now. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak writes in *Death of a Discipline* (2003) of the future anterior as a temporality 'where one promises no future present but attends upon what will have happened as a result of one's work' (Spivak 29). Here, the future anterior is political: it operates under the sign of what will come to pass if one works for it. This is buttressed by the word 'perhaps'. Spivak continues: 'Given the irreducible curvature of social space—the heteronomic curvature of the relationship with the other—the political must act in view

4

of such a "perhaps." Because we cannot decide it, it remains decisive, the unrestricted gamble of all claims to collectivity, agonistic or otherwise' (29). Spivak reads Derrida here—she is commenting on *The Politics of Friendship*—and Derrida reads, among others, Emmanuel Levinas. Entering into an ethical relationship with the Levinasian Other, *le tout autre*, is fraught. Into what kind of relationship one will enter when one encounters the other, one can never know in advance. Presuming or predicting would be rendering a disservice to the other's otherness. To respect the other in their irreducible otherness, one gambles. If the future anterior 'attends upon what will have happened as a result of one's work' then to look towards the future anterior is to look to the undecidable, to gamble.

Work acts as a verb and a noun here—I gesture both to Woolf's work as a writer and the works that she wrote. I use 'work,' 'text' and 'document' after Peter Shillingsburg's influential description of the terms, which are structured somewhat like a Russian doll whereby one inheres in the other. For Shillingsburg, the document is the 'physical vessel (such as a book, manuscript, phonograph record, computer tape) that contains the text' (Shillingsburg 170), while the text is the 'series of words and pauses recorded in a document' (174). The work is somewhat of an abstraction, the 'message or experience implied by the authoritative versions of literary writing' (176). For Shillingsburg, the work is an emergent phenomenon that comes about from a reader's (or multiple readers') interactions with texts, which are themselves instantiated in individual documents.

In so doing, my thesis deploys the growing armature of frameworks, reading techniques and analytics known as genetic criticism. Much of this introduction and in the chapters that follow is devoted to discussion of manuscript and typescript drafts, proofs, and other such material in Woolf's archive. I tend to read this material as an *avant-texte*, as the material trace of the composition of a given, published, work. An *avant-texte* is usually an *après-texte*: genetic critics tend to read within the genetic dossier of a given work after the work has been published, and after they have read that published work. In these chapters, for example, I read the genetic dossier of *To the Lighthouse*, in the next section *The Years* and *Three Guineas*. I take it as axiomatic that the *avant-texte* is also an anterior text: it exists in the past anterior insofar as it is examined under the aspect of its published counterpart or counterparts, but equally this draft text (literally a before-text) gestures forward to a future text that is what will have happened as a result of the author's work. Even if we abjure

teleological readings of the *avant-texte*—a reading that sees the destiny of the draft text in its published counterpart—it is always and already conditioned by the discursive field in which it is encountered. Having said that, Woolf's late *avant-textes* are rarely as simple as the narrative I have sketched out: in Chapters Three and Four, I will trace the footfalls of a portion of the drafts of *The Years* not just through its published counterpart but also through *Three Guineas*, while in Chapters Five and Six I will read a collection of draft fragments which are *avant-textes* for a project Woolf never finished. But just as the *avant-texte* is anterior to the work of its author or authors, it is anterior to the work of those who research it.

The term *avant-texte* was coined in by Jean Bellemin-Nöel in his 1972 monograph *Le texte et l'avant-texte: les broullions d'un poème Milosz*. Early in this monograph he proposes a new terminology for the nascent genetic criticism, rooted in his dissatisfaction with the terminology previously used to discuss drafts. He defines the *avant-texte* in opposition to the *brouillon* (draft) as:

> L'ensemble constitué par les brouillons, les manuscrits, les épreuves, les « variantes », vus sous l'angle de *ce que précède matériellement* un ouvrage quand celui-ci est traité comme un *texte*, et *qui peut faire système avec lui*. Le choix de ce mot en concurrence avec brouillon tient à ce que ce dernier connote des caractèdres comme « résiduel », « informe », « insignifiant », connotations embarrassantes dès l'instant qu'on veut précisément sortir de la problématique perfectionniste de l'œuvre littéraire dotée d'un (seul) sens qu'elle recèle comme son secret, changée en elle-même par une (impensable) éternité, obtenue soit par une (divine) inspiration, soit par la médiation (personnelle) d'un esprit supérieur (génial), etc. La difficulté vient de ce que le texte n'est pas le point d'aboutissement *visé* pendant la rédaction, mais un moment d'équilibre ; dès lors qu'on envisage seulement un plus ou moins d'instabilité, où et quand commence cette décision qu'on appelle l'œuvre et qui n'est pas un achèvement ? De là l'intérêt d'un terme forgé sur le signe « -texte », et marqué par lui. On pose donc en principe que l'avant-texte est [dans] le texte et réciproquement. (Bellemin-Noël 15)

> [The ensemble [of documents] made up of drafts, manuscripts, proofs, and "variants" that can be viewed as materially preceding a work when it is treated as a text, and which can form a system with it. The choice of this word [*avant-texte*] opposed to the term 'draft' is that the latter connotes embarrassing characteristics such as "residual," "formless," "insignificant," at precisely the instance that one wants to leave behind the problematic perfectionism of the literary work endowed with a (sole) sense that it conceals as its secret, changed in itself by an (unthinkable) eternity, obtained either by means of (divine) inspiration or by the means of the (personal) meditation of an (awesome) superior spirit, etc. The difficulty [of the latter term] comes from the fact that the text is not the intended end-point of writing, but a moment of equilibrium; as soon as we envisage only more or less instability, where and when does one decide to call a piece of writing a work and not a

completed draft? Hence the interest in a term coined under the sign of the "-text" and marked by it. I posit therefore that the *avant-texte* is in the text and vice-versa.][1]

The French term '*brouillon*' evidently has overtones that the English term 'draft' does not: Bellemin-Noël writes that it connotes residuality, formlessness and insignificance—and crucially that it brings these connotations to bear on documents at precisely the moment when one wants to leave behind value judgements. Since Bellemin-Noël originated the term in 1972, the notion of the *avant-texte* has been expanded to encompass not just the work of the writer, but the work of the researcher or researchers in the archive. In his 2000 monograph *Génétique des textes*, Pierre-Marc de Biasi defines the *avant-texte* not as a document or as a set of documents, but rather as a 'critical production.' He writes:

> Lorsque les manuscrits d'une œuvre ont été conservés sans trop de lacunes, il devient possible de suivre à la trace de l'écrivain, étape par étape, depuis sa conception (notes, plan primitif incipit, etc.) jusqu'aux épreuves corrigées, en passant par les esquisses, notes documentaires, brouillons, mises au net et manuscrit définitif. Mais pour comprendre ces documents et donner à voir l'enchaînement des opérations qui ont fait évoluer la rédaction jusqu'à sa forme définitive, encore faut-il avoir inventorié, classé, daté et déchiffré toutes les pièces du dossier génétique qui, à l'état brut, ne sont ni lisibles, ni ordonnées, ni interprétables. La notion d'avant-texte désigne le résultat de ce travail d'élucidation : c'est le dossier de genèse rendu accessible et intelligible. L'avant-texte est une production critique : il correspond à la transformation d'un ensemble empirique de documents opaque en un dossier de pièces ordonnées et significatives. (de Biasi 68-69)

> [When the manuscripts of a work have been conserved without too many lacunae, it becomes possible to track the progress of the writer's work, step by step, from its conception (notes, initial plan, incipit, etc.), through corrected proofs, a trail which can encompass sketches, documentary notes, drafts, edits and definitive manuscripts. But in order to understand these documents and make visible the evolution from draft work to definitive form, it is nonetheless necessary to have inventoried, classified, dated and decoded all the pieces of the genetic dossier that, in a raw state, are neither readable, nor ordered, nor interpretable. The notion of the avant-texte designates the result of this elucidatory work: it is the genetic dossier rendered accessible and intelligible. The avant-texte is a critical production: it corresponds to the transformation of an empirically opaque set of documents into an ordered and signifying dossier of documents.][2]

This expanded definition means that *avant-texte* is doubly anterior: a draft document looks forward to its moment of publication, to the work that its author will have done, but a draft is also the documentary trace of a moment of authorial labour whose instant cannot be recovered, only ever

---

[1] Translation mine.
[2] Translation mine.

viewed at a critical distance as the trace of an anterior past. Likewise, de Biasi's formulation of the *avant-texte* as distinct from the manuscript means the *avant-texte* can develop indefinitely, with each advance in textual theory and practice, meaning that it is exposed to an unknown futurity that rests upon the work genetic critics will have done. Later in this chapter I will cite material from the genetic dossier of *To the Lighthouse* which was classified and made available online by the Woolf Online project. The work of the researchers who created the digital archive I cite have shared in the 'critical production that de Biasi discusses in the same way that the documents' earlier curators have. In much the same way, the chapters in Part Two of this thesis draw on my own novel work in the genetic dossier of *The Years*, novel work that that can be seen as part of this critical reconstitution. The *avant-texte* is an anterior text, speaking to work that readers and scholars know its author or authors will have done, and to the less certain future work that researchers in the archive will have done. The *avant-texte* opens up to an uncertain future.

Having briefly introduced these three terms, 'substrate,' 'archive,' and 'anterior,' I want to turn back to 'Time Passes' and explain why I choose to start my thesis here, with five of the guests at the Ramsays' house on Skye turning in for the night. One reason for this is a practical one: much of this thesis was written under lockdown with libraries closed. This was due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As I was shielding, it was not safe for me to access library resources during the brief interval when libraries opened in the summer of 2020, during the first and second waves of the United Kingdom's coronavirus epidemic. Thus, I had to develop a methodology that made good use of work readily available online, and the Woolf Online project has made the entire (extant) genetic dossier of *To the Lighthouse* available to a global audience of readers both common and scholarly.[3] As a corollary to this, I have made use of online facsimiles and editions of texts that the Woolfs had in their library, chasing down online versions of works listed in the short-title catalogue Julia King and Laila Miletic-Vejzovic compiled in 2003, which is itself readily available online (King and Miletic-Vejzovic n.p.). In so doing, I have been able to track down writing that Woolf is likely to have read, tracing intertexts and asking what forms of knowledge might be embedded in Woolf's writing.

---

[3] As a benefit, relying on this project allows any reader to check my workings in a way that they cannot with the archival work in my later chapters: although I have transcribed and published the drafts of *The Years* upon which my Chapters Three and Four are based (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 13-86), the drafts of 'Anon' and 'The Reader' I discuss in Chapters Five and Six are near inaccessible to readers who cannot read either the originals in the NYPL or their facsimiles.

Paradoxically, losing access to Woolf's archive (as it is traditionally understood) led me to work in the vastly expanded supplemental archive I theorise in Chapter Three. In 2003, David Bradshaw called for readers of *Jacob's Room* to treat the novel with '[a]ll the fun […] of a first-rate puzzle' (Bradshaw *Winking, Buzzing, Carpet-Beating* 28). I believe this mode of reading Woolfian intertexts, a mode of reading which came about primarily because the printed resources of institutional libraries were rendered inaccessible to me for the greater part of 2020 and much of 2021 to be apt to that call.

There is also a theoretical or thematic reason for me to begin here. The opening of 'Time Passes' with its five witnesses, making brief and gnomic statements before turning in for the night, affords me space to introduce key concepts and coordinates, suppositions and methodologies in my readings of Woolf's futures. These include Derrida's *avenir*, a mode of futurity that is open to the coming of the wholly other, as well as Rosi Braidotti's figuration of the sustainable, and the Benjaminian messianic. The remainder of this first chapter consists of a close reading of the above passage from 'Time Passes'. The first section is a reading of Mr Bankes's strange injunction, '"Well, we must wait for the future to show"' while the next section asks what Virgil Augustus Carmichael reads in bed, linking his night-time reading to the *sortes Vergilianae*, a practice of using Virgilian texts to scry the future. In addition to this, I posit a novel Virgilian source for the square bracket in which Mrs Ramsay's death is reported and begin to closely examine Andrew's statement that '"It's almost too dark to see"' alongside Derridean figurations of light and dark. The final section of my first chapter delves into the archive of 'Time Passes,' reading between the published version and the openings of both the 1926 typescript of 'Time Passes' and 'Le Temps Passe,' Charles Mauron's translation of this typescript. Throughout this chapter I argue that the future the five witnesses must wait for is the Derridean *avenir* I introduce early in my close reading of the passage.

My second chapter begins by noting that Mr Bankes says this while 'coming in from the terrace' and, presumably, turning his back on the Derridean darkness I discussed in the first chapter. This volte-face—both Bankes's and my own—gives me space to introduce other modes of futurity, including Rosi Braidotti's figuration of sustainability and to examine other moments of illumination in *To the Lighthouse*. Having opened the door to multiple conceptions of the future, I then undertake a distant reading of the word 'future' through Woolf's corpus of novels prior to 1934. This reading gives me the theoretical grounding to advance the argument that I do at the end of the second chapter,

that Woolf's work undergoes what I term a 'reparative turn' beginning in January 1934. The final section of the second chapter explains my rationale for choosing this date as opposed to other delineations of late work and late modernity and examines more thoroughly what I believe January 1934 inaugurates—a reparative turn characterised in a change in Woolf's thinking of the future.

As I have said, 'Time Passes' begins with a peculiar act of double witness: we readers watch William Bankes, Augustus Carmichael, and Andrew and Prue Ramsay watching and waiting for the future to show. As readers of 'Time Passes' we do not occupy the same vantage point as those whom we watch watching. The Ramsay children and their guests cannot know, at the moment that 'Time Passes' begins, that the lamps being extinguished in the Ramsays' summer bolthole are proleptic of Sir Edward Grey's remark on the eve of the First World War, that '[t]he lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our life-time' (Grey 20). These witnesses cannot know the devastation that is to come. But in the early years of the 2020s, the First World War has already happened—just as it had for the first readers of the 1927 editions of *To the Lighthouse*. For the witnesses on the terrace in Skye, however, the war remains in a peculiar temporality known as the future anterior: it will have happened. But my invocation of the future anterior should not be taken to imply a futurity that is already written: we have already seen how Spivak's reading of Derrida opens the anterior future to an 'unrestricted gamble' (Spivak 29). Even in a written narrative, we encounter this wager. Reading the above passage for the first time, we do not necessarily know what future the witnesses await as it is yet to be read. Woolf might set her novel exclusively in the years prior to 1914; she might indulge in a counterfactual where the war never happened. 'Time Passes's proleptic lamps might just be ordinary lamps. We do not necessarily know until we read of Andrew Ramsay's death as a shell explodes, killing some '[t]wenty or thirty young men […] in France' (*TL* 109), until we see the 'silent apparition of an ashen-coloured ship,' potentially the Iolaire, sink beneath the 'bland surface of the sea as if something had boiled and bled' (109), or hear that Mr Carmichael's fortune as a poet was boosted by the war, which 'had revived […] interest in poetry' (110). Supposing that the lamps that are extinguished are proleptic is a gamble, a gesture towards an anteriority that attends what will have happened as a result of Woolf's work as a writer.

Waiting for the Future to Show

      The precise locution Bankes uses, coming in from the terrace, is curious. What does it mean for the future, a future, any future to 'show'? What does it mean to 'wait' for a future to show? Why 'must' 'we' wait? Who is this 'we'? And what is this future? Whence does this future come: does it sneak in under the cover of the immense darkness that is left when the holidaymakers extinguish their lamps, one by one? At first glance, this sentence is not a complicated one: there are no big words, and it is not a long sentence, without the vertiginous clausal structures that mark the beginning of 'The Window,' the first section of the novel. But contained within Mr Bankes's nine words is a complex play of reference and modality. I want to dwell on this sentence to try and tease out what is at stake when Mr Bankes asks his audience to wait for the future to show. The opening word of his sentence works to hail an audience. No words, spoken or narrated, precede the word 'Well' at the start of 'Time Passes,' only the cardinal Arabic numeral '1'. It might be that Bankes's 'Well' acts like a more polite version of Louis Althusser's primal scene of interpellation, that of the policeman crying '"Hey, you there"' in the street. In Althusser's 'little theoretical theatre,' the cry of '"Hey, you" there' is an incipient moment in the formation of a 'concrete subject' interpellated by ideology. The policeman hails and the hailed individual turns round, 'recognising that it "really is he" who is meant by the hailing' (Althusser 118). By itself, Bankes's 'Well' is a marker of speech that is, by itself, devoid of content: a purely vocative syllable which is given meaning through context, through words and actions that precede and follow it. But this 'Well,' as it appears on the opening page of 'Time Passes,' only appears unconditioned and void of content should we choose to bracket off this paragraph.

      Bankes's 'Well' is conditioned by the opening word of 'The Window' and the first word of *To the Lighthouse*, Mrs Ramsay's affirmative 'Yes' (*TL* 7). These two words, 'Yes,' 'Well' themselves condition the first word of 'The Lighthouse,' 'What' (121). This last word is asked by Lily Briscoe, though not aloud. Reading between these initial words, we get the question, 'Yes, well, what?'. This question is not a univocal interrogation but rather a polyphony, an open question asked by three voices and asked of an unknown interlocutor or number of interlocutors. This little sentence of initialisms is itself in conversation with a sentence composed of the final words of each section of *To the Lighthouse* 'again. Awake. Vision.' (*TL* 100; 117; 170). It is also conditioned by Woolf's

continued citation of Alfred, Lord Tennyson's poem 'The Charge of the Light Brigade,' by its adjectival use in the lines 'Stormed at by shot and shell, boldly we rode and well' (28). It is perhaps also conditioned by an earlier usage as a verb in the opening paragraphs to *Jacob's Room* (1922): as Betty Flanders writes a letter, 'Slowly welling from the point of her gold nib, pale blue ink dissolved the full stop; for there her pen stuck; her eyes fixed, and tears slowly filled them' (*JR* 7). Betty Flanders' stuck nib dissolves the final solidity of her full stop as ink wells; tears well and blur her eyes. Filiating Bankes's 'Well' with Betty Flanders' welling ink and tears implies a loss of fixity, a blurring or erasure that undercuts the rhetorical effect of Bankes's 'Well,' a 'Well' that seeks to sum up, to signal its status as the last word. But in earlier states of the text, this sentence is not uttered. Rather, the typescript draft of 'Time Passes' start with the three-word sentence 'It grew darker' (Virginia Woolf "Typescript of 'Time Passes'" 1). I will discuss the typescript, as well as its translation by Charles Mauron, later in this chapter, but I invoke it here to show that by tugging at the thread left by the single word 'Well,' we find ourselves in the archives.

This archive is not simply a collection of documents, each of which is simple and self-sufficient, but rather is a capacious space for an endless play of supplementarity. At the very beginning of *Archive Fever* Derrida uses a peculiar word. Before even the Exergue of his slim volume, he tells his reader that 'we recall' (Derrida *Archive Fever* 1). He begins *Archive Fever* by tracing the etymology of the word 'archive': '*Arkhē*, we recall, names at once the commencement and the commandment' (1). I will discuss the importance of this doubled appellation later in the chapter, but I want to dwell on the word recall. Even at the very outset, at the moment of the 'archive of so familiar a word' (1), we are instructed to recall, to remember. Derrida continues: 'Even in the *arkhē* of the commencement'—not just the commencement, but in the commencement and the commandment of the very moment of commencement—

> I alluded to the commencement according to nature *or* according to history, introducing surreptitiously a chain of belated and problematic oppositions between *physis* and its others, *thesis, tekhnē, nomos,* etc. which are to be found at work in the other principle, the nomological principle of the *arkhē*, the principle of the commandment (1).

Derrida has not left the opening page of *Archive Fever*, nor even arrived at its exergue (let alone its preamble or its foreword), but he has already cited nature, history, *physis, thesis tekhnē, nomos*. All of these concepts are at play in the *arkhē* of the commandment, its substrate. He continues: 'All

would be simple if the *physis* and each one of its others were one or two' (1). Suffice it to say that for Derrida none of these terms is just one or two. Instead, the archive that we find ourselves in when we read this one word is vast and complex. If we find ourselves in such an archive when we read the word 'Well,' in what strange place do we find ourselves when we read a sentence, a paragraph, an entire novel? There may not be an answer to this question. But nonetheless what follows in this chapter and in the other chapters of my thesis works in this Derridean archive without bounds, this vastly capacious problem space, this endless play of supplementarity.

But who, precisely, is being interpellated by this 'Well'? Who is being hailed into being, their subjectivity constituted by Bankes's 'Well'? The next word, 'we' might answer this question, but the members of this 'we' remain obscured for now. Attentive readers might recall that at the start of Section 18 of 'The Window,' Bankes 'took Charles Tansley by the arm and went off to finish on the terrace the discussion they had begun at dinner about politics' (*TL* 91). But this moment in the first section of *To the Lighthouse* is separated from the snatch of dialogue at the start of 'Time Passes' by the remainder of Section 18 and the entirety of Section 19 of 'The Window', as well as the bibliographic codes that divide 'The Window' and 'Time Passes'. Without this context it seems that the figures who listen to and are interpellated by Bankes's 'Well' are disclosed by the reader to the narrator as they speak: Andrew, Lily and Prue are revealed only at the moment that they have spoken—Mr Carmichael, lying awake reading Virgil, has to wait to be shown—in a pattern that anticipates the beginning of *The Waves*.

But another 'we' might be hailed here: the 'we' that reads 'Time Passes'. We, as readers, must wait for the future to show, for it has not yet happened. That is a fundamental—if somewhat obvious—condition of futurity, after all. But the future for which the readers of 'Time Passes' must wait is of a different order to that which the five witnesses in the narrative await. It is, as I have briefly discussed, one in which the First World War has always already happened, and the ineradicable facticity of the conflict acts to condition our reading of the novel. But equally, the future that the first readers of *To the Lighthouse* awaited is not the same as that which we, as readers of Woolf in the 2020s, await now. All readers of *To the Lighthouse*, whether in the 1920s or the 2020s, are hailed by Mr Bankes's 'Well,' alongside the four other witnesses at the start of 'Time Passes'. But we are not interpellated equally. Bankes's act of interpellation is conditioned by the word

'future,' that slippery signifier. It is this differential exposure to the future, and the gulf that yawns between these various futurities, that gives rise to the future anterior, the peculiar temporality I have already discussed, that describes what will have happened. This is a tense structure that Mark Currie argues (he uses the term 'future perfect') lays a 'central claim' to how readers understand narrative: the 'future that has already taken place, not only offers us an account of narrative temporality, but also tells us something about how we use stories to reconcile what we expect with what we experience, the foreseeable with the unexpected' (Currie 1). That the future Mr Bankes, Andrew and Prue Ramsay, Lily Briscoe and Augustus Carmichael await is different to the future that we readers of Woolf await is perhaps rather an obvious claim to make, but it is nonetheless a claim that comes to condition the complex interplay of tense and modality in this short sentence.

Only now do we encounter the first verbs of 'Time Passes': 'must wait'. On the face of it, that we—regardless of which 'we' we discuss—must await the future is obvious. The future is yet to come, after all. Here, 'must' acquires the force of an ontological necessity: we must wait for the future, because that is the condition of the future. Read thus, Mr Bankes is just stating a fact: we must wait for the future, just as Tuesday must follow Monday. Waiting for the future is an inevitability. But this reading ignores the various other forces of the modal verb 'must', which can equally be used to express an array of imperatives both subjective, what one feels must be done, and objective, what one is obliged to do ("must, v.1"). With its dizzyingly complex and involuted free indirect discourse, the boundary between a subjective and an objective imperative in *To the Lighthouse* is often less clear. The novel opens with Mrs Ramsay reflecting that her son '*must* let future prospects, with their joys and sorrows, cloud what is actually at hand' (*TL* 7) while later we read that '[a]t a certain point, she supposed, the house would become so shabby that something *must* be done' (25).

We might read 'must' as a demand, a demand that the future places on the present. There must be a future, and that future is not to be rushed: it demands that we in the present await it. We are in the realm of the juridical here: the future places a burden on the present that might be likened to an injunction that must be obeyed or a debt that must be paid. But the debt implied in this reading of 'must' cannot not be paid—the future will never not come, regardless of whether one is content to sit and wait for it—while the future always forecloses in the moment when it arrives and becomes the present. What is foreclosed here is possibility, but possibility in the real world is rather different

to possibility to the extent that it exists in the pages of a novel. We might, for example, suggest that the possibility that Mrs Ramsay is physically present in the third part of *To the Lighthouse* exists up to the moment where she dies, and that her death represents the foreclosure of this possibility. But this narrative is somewhat complicated by the fact that Mrs Ramsay is a fictional character in a book, and that by the time a reader lights upon a copy of *To the Lighthouse*, her death is already written and exists in two variant traditions.[4] I want to dwell on one final imperative mode—the ethical— before turning to the next word in this sentence. We might read 'must' as entailing an ethical in addition to a judicial or ontological obligation. The witnesses that Mr Bankes hails, be they the five witnesses on Skye or the readers of 'Time Passes' must wait for the future to show in the sense that the future that they await is yet to come, but this act of waiting is also an ethical necessity, perhaps even a debt that one owes to the future.

But what does it mean to 'wait for' a future, the future, for futurity? Mark Currie reflects on the 'essential emptiness' of acts of anticipation or awaiting:

> There is an essential emptiness about thoughts with a future-orientation—expectations, anticipations, predictions—because they refer to something that may arrive in a different form, and a kind of provisionality, because they must wait upon the arrival of the object to which they refer for affirmation. Because the future does not exist, thinking about the future exists in a state of suspense, waiting for its arrival, and for the object of thinking to pass from virtuality into actuality. (Currie 11)

Currie's implication is that waiting for the future is an act that is fundamentally void of content. 'To wait' is, most often, a transitive verb that looks forward to the coming of its object, an action that anticipates the moment when it stops. If I say that I wait for a bus, my act of waiting has as its horizon the arrival of that bus and the moment when I stop waiting ("wait, v.1"). But what, then, does it mean to wait for 'the future,' or indeed for 'the future to show'? Here, my previous discussion of Spivak's figuration of future-facing anteriority as something political is instructive. The political freight of the future anterior, that it 'attends upon what will have happened as a result of one's work' is always supplemented with the '"perhaps",' the 'unrestricted gamble' that we make when we enter into a relationship with the other (Spivak 29). If waiting is an action that only bears semiotic freight when

---

[4] I gesture here to the two post-publication variant states of *To the Lighthouse*, the British (Hogarth Press) and US (Harcourt, Brace & Company) editions which differ in subtle but significant ways. I discuss these differences in more depth later in this introduction. I quote here from David Bradshaw's 2006 edition of the novel, which uses the first British edition as copy-text.

it is read as anterior then to await an anterior event is to make this unrestricted wager. The act of waiting gains its meaning from its anteriority. But what does the future hold?

Jacques Derrida draws a distinction between 'what one calls the future and "*l'avenir*,"' or the 'to-come.' He articulates this distinction most clearly in a voice-over at the beginning of the 2002 documentary *Derrida*. This voice-over (or, to be precise, the English translation of this voice-over, printed in a 2005 screenplay of the film) is worth quoting in full, as it lays out key coordinates for this thesis:

> In general, I try to distinguish between what one calls the future and "*l'avenir*." The future is that which—tomorrow, later, next century—will be. But there is a future, *l'avenir* (to come) which refers to someone who comes whose arrival is totally unexpected. For me, that is the real future. That which is totally unpredictable. The Other who comes without my being able to anticipate their arrival. So if there is a real future beyond this other known future, it's *l'avenir* in that it's the coming of the Other when I am completely unable to foresee their arrival. (Derrida *Screenplay*)

The future that heralds the arrival of the unknowable other is itself unknowable. We can read the future that the five watchers await at the start of 'Time Passes' as an instantiation of the Derridean *avenir*, a futurity whose coming is 'totally unexpected' and 'totally unpredictable.' The future that the five watchers await is wholly other, and its coming cannot be predicted or anticipated: it is 'almost too dark to see' its moment of emergence (*TL* 103). By the time he had read out the words that open *Derrida*, Derrida had already come to locate *l'avenir* within a complex of interests that animated his work throughout the 1990s and into the early years of the twenty-first century. In 'Faith and Knowledge: the Two Sources of "Religion" at the Limits of Reason Alone,' delivered initially at a 1994 seminar on the island of Capri, published in French in 1996 and, finally, in English two years after that, Derrida names this radically open futurity '*messianic*,' as a condition of 'messianicity without messianism' and the 'opening to the future or to the coming of the other as the advent of justice, but without horizon of expectation and without prophetic prefiguration' (Derrida "'Religion'" 17).

This radical statement, this reconfiguration of the messianic without content, without a messiah, is itself a distillation of more expansive comments made in *Specters of Marx* (published in French 1993, translated in 1994). Here, Derrida sketches a politics of messianicity, which is founded upon the 'infinite promise' of 'democracy to come'. He writes, '[t]o this extent, the effectivity or

actuality of the democratic promise, like that of the communist promise, will always keep within it, and it must do so, this absolutely undetermined messianic hope at its heart, this eschatological relation to the to-come of an event *and* of a singularity, of an alterity that cannot be anticipated.' To await this messianic hope, the coming of the utterly undetermined future is to enter into absolute hospitality and to wait, 'without horizon of the event, awaiting what one does not expect yet or any longer, hospitality without reserve, welcoming salutation accorded in advance to the absolute surprise of the *arrivant* from whom or from which one will not ask anything in return' (Derrida *Specters* 81). The coming of the *arrivant* is to be expected but can never be anticipated, never prepared for; they must be greeted with absolute hospitality and absolute openness. Later in *Specters of Marx*, Derrida renders the politics of the messianic even more explicitly: 'Open, waiting for the event *as* justice, this hospitality is absolute only if it keeps watch over its own universality. The messianic, including its revolutionary forms (and the messianic is always revolutionary, it has to be) would be urgency, imminence, but, irreducible paradox, a waiting without horizon of expectancy'. The only gesture that is adequate to this messianic politics is 'the "yes" to the *arrivant(e)*, the "come" to the future that cannot be anticipated' (211). Derrida later will write that a 'spectral messianicity is at work in the concept of the archive' and that thus the archive is tied 'to a very singular experience of the promise' (Derrida *Archive Fever* 36). Is this messianic '"yes"' the same as the 'Yes' that opens *To the Lighthouse*, and which we have seen is in conversation with the 'Well' that opens 'Time Passes'? In awaiting an unknowable future in a darkness that all but obscures the sea and the land, the watchers at the start of 'Time Passes' might be said to be practising a Derridean hospitality.

As an infinitive, 'to show' is not tensed directly, but is instead modified by the words that precede it—which, as we have seen, bear witness to a deceptively complex interplay of tense, modality and reference. To show, like 'to wait' is usually a transitive verb—one shows something, 'cause[s] or allow[s] something to be seen'—or part of a phrasal verb, as in 'show up' or 'show off' ("show, v."). Showing implies that an object or an idea has been created, formulated or otherwise brought into being, and is awaiting disclosure. I want to show you something; as has been shown; this evidence shows that. Showing can be pedagogical: I will show you how; it can be revelatory: this map shows the way. One can show oneself, show one's face, 'present oneself'. This act of showing, of showing an object, is typically something secondary, predicated on the existence of the

shown. One cannot show one's face if one does not have a face to be shown. The grammar of 'to show' is perhaps ambiguous: we can read the verb in one of two ways: either 'the future' is its subject and it does not take an object, or that 'the future' is its object and it does not take a subject. If 'the future' is its subject then we are left with a sentence that remains incomplete: 'we must wait for the future to show…' Show what? We expect another word that acts as an object to follow the verb here: to show something, to show us, to show itself. But no object arrives. Perhaps this act of showing is autotelic: in showing itself, the future is both subject of the verb and its object. In this sense, showing need not be secondary to an anterior reality. The act of showing can be an act of manifestation, an end in itself, generative, creative. For the future to show in this sense implies not that something pre-ordained will come to pass, but that the future showing itself is an act of creativity, of generativity, that the future generates itself in showing itself. But this futurity is not empty. Rather, it bears the weight of Spivak's politico-ethical anterior and Derrida's messianic, and the endless play of supplementarity that we have found in the archives. I want to expand now, leave the bounds of William Bankes's single sentence and read as far as the end of the first paragraph of 'Time Passes'. The next section of my chapter reads Augustus Carmichael reading Virgil and investigates a strange form of bibliomancy which acts to further condition the forms of futurity we find in the Woolfian archive.

Bibliomancy: Or, Reading Woolf Reading Virgil

At the end of Section One of 'Time Passes' we read that Augustus Carmichael's light burns longer than his fellow holidaymakers'. He 'liked to lie awake a little reading Virgil' and so 'kept his candle burning rather longer than the rest' (*TL* 103). His reading of Virgil further complicates the problematic implicit in Mr Bankes's statement. In an explanatory note to his edition of *To the Lighthouse*, David Bradshaw suggests that Carmichael might be engaged in 'some kind of *sortes Virgilianae*', or Virgilian lots, 'that is attempting to divine the future by opening the works of Virgil at random and reading the first words to meet the eye—another method of trying to divine what the "future" will "show".' (*TL* 191, n. 103). Sir Philip Sidney describes this practice in his *A Defense of Poesy* (1580?). He writes:

Among the Romanes a Poët was called Vates, which is as much a Diviner, Forseer, or Prophet, as by his conjoined words Vaticinium, and Vaticinari, is manifest, so heavenly a title did that excellent people bestow upon this heart-ravishing knowledge, and so far were they carried into the admiration thereof, that they thought in the chanceable hitting upon of any such verses, great foretokens of their following fortunes were placed. Whereupon grew the word of Sortes Vergilianæ, where by sudden opening Virgil's book, they lighted upon som vers of his, as it is reported by many, whereof the Histories of the Emperors lives are full. (Sidney 542)[5]

Sidney explicitly figures writing for the Romans as prophetic: the poet is a Diviner, Forseer, or Prophet, whose work can tell the future. He writes that readers who seek the 'heart-ravishing knowledge' of the ancient vatic 'Poët' simply have to open a book of Virgil to find 'great foretokens of their following fortunes'. The Virgilian lots are not hard to cast: the seeker of foreknowledge simply has to open a book of Virgil and light upon 'som vers of his' to find their fate. But Sidney's description of the Virgilian lots entails a practice of reading as much as it does Virgil's practice of writing; the 'heart-ravishing knowledge' of the future generated by the *sortes Vergilianae* imply the presence of a reading audience who can cast the lots, read Virgil's Latin and interpret the text.

Moreover, it is not as simple as saying that the presence of the *sortes Vergilianae* implies that the future has been written and can be foretold by a canny bibliomancer. The seeker of knowledge is also a reader, an interpreter of classical texts. Penelope Usher figures Renaissance use of the *sortes Vergilianae* as an expression of Aristotelean *phronesis*, or practical wisdom. She writes that the 'motive of the *sortes Virgilianae* is always pragmatic: even when the motive is supposed divertissement, the *sortes* provide a mode of practical and directed reading, reading for a particular purpose (to access prophetic guidance) that draws upon particular and selected passages.' While the Virgilian book 'itself becomes a magical object,' capable of prophecy, the reader or lot-caster's bibliomantic act is located in a 'Renaissance culture of pragmatic reading and *prudentia.*' The *sortes* thus becomes a locus for the 'coincidence of the pragmatic reader and the superstitious diviner,' the act of casting lots a sort of 'prophetic pragmatism, tied centrally to the fragmentation and redeployment of the text.' In this sense, the *sortes Vergilianae* is not an explicitly prophetic act: the

---

[5] I quote here from the 10th edition of *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia* (printed in 1655) that the Woolfs had in their library. Woolf is likely to have read this passage in her preparatory reading towards the first *Common Reader*: Brenda Silver notes that Woolf made notes on the *Defense* in 1924 (in a notebook in the Monks' House Papers archive and designated MHP/B.2o), and that she specifically cites this edition (King and Miletic-Vejzovic; Silver *Reading Notebooks* 225).

caster of lots is not a seer like Tiresias or Cassandra. Rather, the Virgilian text guides its pragmatic reader to knowledge (Usher 564-565). The suggestion that Augustus Carmichael is practicing a kind of prophecy in his room does not necessarily entail that the future is written down in Virgil, waiting to be encountered by a future bibliomancer. Rather, the *sortes Vergilianae* bears witness to an uncertain future, and its practice is not explicitly prophetic but rather therapeutic. The *sortes* do not foretell what will have come to pass, necessarily, but provide practical wisdom to guide the lot-caster through an uncertain future. But which Virgil does Augustus Carmichael read? The prophecies that he might find would, after all, depend on what book he was using to draw lots. Might he have been reading the *Aeneid*, the *Eclogues* or the *Georgics*? Epic, pastoral or didactic?

The Woolfs had multiple editions of all of Virgil's major works in their library, and Virginia Woolf was evidently familiar with at least the *Georgics* and *Eclogues*: an untranslated 1904 edition of the *Georgics* and *Eclogues* bears her annotations, and she rebound a 1915 Longman Pocket Library edition of the same poems, translated by J.W. Mackail (King and Miletic-Vejzovic n.p.). Jane Goldman suggests in a dialogue with Randall Stevenson that 'Time Passes' 'strongly echoes' Virgil's *Eclogues* (Stevenson and Goldman 13), while Margaret Tudeau-Clayton argues that 'Time Passes' cites the first book of the *Georgics*, noting an interest in 'degeneration and renewal' and 'redemptive labour' common to both Virgil and Woolf's texts (Tudeau-Clayton 296). Woolf took notes on the fourth book of the *Georgics* on 28th July 1908, writing that Virgil described bees with 'such accuracy, just twisted out of their ordinary relations that an inaccurate scholar might miss half. There is something in the exquisite delicacy & brightness of inanimate things.'[6] Later in her reading she quotes at length a portion in which Virgil recounts the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice. (ll. 471-477, reproduced in Woolf and Duchêne 139-141). In the analysis that follows I read both the original Latin and the 1915 Mackail translation that Woolf rebound in order to suggest that the specific lines of *Georgics* IV that Woolf copied down as part of her studies of Greek act as a key intertext for 'Time Passes.':

> At cantu commotae Erebi de sedibus imis,
> Umbrae ibant tenues simulacrumque luce carentum
> Quam multa in foliis avium se milia condunt,
> Vesper ubi aut hibernus agit de montibus imber:

---

[6] I quote here from Mireille Duchêne's 2019 transcription of the notebook recorded as 'Greek and Latin Studies' and collected with the Monks House Papers archive (SxMs-18/2/A/21).

> Matres, atque viri, defunctaque corpora vita
> Magnanimum heroum, pieri, innuptaeque puellae
> Impositique rogis juvenes ante ora parentum

> [But startled by his song from the deep sunken realm of Erebus thin shadows rose and phantoms of the lost to light, millionfold as birds shelter in the leaves when evenfall or wintry rain drives them from the hill; matrons and men and bodies of high-hearted heroes whose life was done, boys and unwedded girls and young men laid on the pyre before their parents' eyes] (Virgil 116)

We can, after Tudeau-Clayton, note structural similarities between Orpheus's katabasis, his descent into the underworld, and the descent of the Ramsays' house into darkness and ruin, but that is not why I quote this passage at length. Rather, I want to attend to some lexical parallels between this portion of *Georgics* IV and 'Time Passes'. I want initially to suggest that the 'downpouring of immense darkness' (*TL* 103) that heralds the years of decline in 'Time Passes' finds a precursor in the 'deep sunken realm of Erebus', '*Erebi […] sedibus imis*'. The parallel is not precise, but we can intuit a certain echo in the directionality assigned to the darkness in both texts. Both the immense darkness of 'Time Passes' and the '*sedibus imis*' of the *Georgics* provide the shadowy backdrop against which spirits, shades and 'stray airs' (*TL* 105) roam.[7]

In both Virgil and Woolf, we encounter a darkness that is not empty but rather is filled with ghostly presences. We might suggest that the 'stray airs' of 'Time Passes' find a root in Virgil's '*[u]mbrae*' and '*tenues simulacrumque luce carentum*,' the 'thin shadows' and the 'phantoms of those lost to the light'. Further to this, we might suggest that the deaths enumerated in brief square brackets throughout 'Time Passes' find their analogue in Virgil's enumeration of the dead, of the 'matrons and men and bodies of high-hearted heroes whose life was done'. Later in this chapter I will trace other ghostly presences through the genetic dossier of 'Time Passes' but for now, I want to alight on Virgil's impersonal phrase '*defunctaque corpora vita*.' This is translated by Mackail as

---

[7] This is not the first time Woolf employed *Georgics* IV. One of the most famous images from this book of Virgil's poem is that of the beehive, which Virgil extensively compares to human society. In his 2003 lecture, *Winking, Buzzing, Carpet-Beating: Reading Jacob's Room*, David Bradshaw tracks images of bees and apiary metaphors throughout *Jacob's Room*, reading both Virgil and later commentary, including Bernard Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees* (Bradshaw *Winking, Buzzing, Carpet-Beating* 19-22). In his 2002 article, '"Vanished, Like Leaves": The Military, Elegy and Italy in *Mrs Dalloway*', Bradshaw reads a similarly elegiac passage in the *Aeneid* (VI.306-8), which uses an identical phrase to the above quoted passage from the *Georgics* (*Matres, atque viri, defunctaque corpora vita | Magnanimum heroum, pieri, innuptaeque puellae*). Bradshaw uses this passage as evidence for his assertion that the phrase 'A patter like the patter of leaves in a wood' (*MD* 43) becomes an 'intertextual hotspot where Woolf brings into play a wide range of elegiac literature' (Bradshaw "'Vanished, Like Leaves'" 113, 115).

'whose life was done' and is syntactically imbricated with the '*magnanimum heroum*' who are rendered in the accusative, object rather than subject. In 'Time Passes,' however, Woolf expands Virgil's impersonal epithet but again, the parallel between Virgil's Orphic elegy and Woolf's twentieth-century elegy is not exact. One of Virgil's high-hearted heroes is given a name in 'Time Passes,' but Andrew Ramsay and his companions are far from 'high-hearted'. Their lives, moreover, are not simply 'done' but their deaths are given cause. Virgil's impersonal epithet acts as an unspoken intertext for the bracketed deaths of 'Time Passing' and thus, Virgil comes to anticipate the 'eyeless and featureless' mode of elegy that Woolf comes to write (*D* 3 76) .

Andrew Ramsay is not figured as a 'high-hearted hero' but rather one of '[t]wenty or thirty young men [who] were blown up in France' (*TL* 109). He is one of an unspecified number of dead, whose deaths are recorded in a passive voice. Agency in this square bracket is granted not to Andrew Ramsay, nor to any of his fellow dead, but to the shell, which 'exploded'. The shell explodes and the lives of twenty or thirty are done. We might find similar agential structures in the crotchets that describe the deaths of Prue and Mrs Ramsay. We are told that 'Prue Ramsay died that summer in some illness connected with childbirth, which was indeed a tragedy, people said' (*TL* 108). The structure of reference in this sentence is ambiguous: have the unnamed and unenumerated 'people' of the sentence's final clause passed judgement on the tragedy of Prue Ramsay's death, or have they reported her death *and* deemed it a tragedy?

The square bracket in which Mrs Ramsay dies is yet more ambiguous, not least because it exists in multiple variants. The history of the variant editions of *To the Lighthouse* are discussed in far more depth than I am able to here by Julia Briggs and D.F. McKenzie (Briggs and McKenzie) and Hans Walter Gabler ("A Tale of Two Texts"). Instead, I wish to confine my discussion to two major variants of this square bracket:[8] one version was published in the British first edition by Hogarth, while the other variant was published in the American first edition by Harcourt, Brace & Company. The British first edition reads thus:

---

[8] The 1938 Uniform edition published by the Hogarth Press provides another variant. It adds commas to the first British edition's variant to read '[Mr. Ramsay stumbling along a passage stretched his arms out one dark morning, but, Mrs. Ramsay having died rather suddenly the night before, he stretched his arms out. They remained empty.]' (Virginia Woolf *Lighthouse [Uniform ed.]* 199-200)

[Mr. Ramsay stumbling along a passage stretched his arms out one dark morning, but Mrs. Ramsay having died rather suddenly the night before he stretched his arms out. They remained empty.] (*Lighthouse [1st GB ed.]* 119-200)

While the variant in the American first edition reads thus:

[Mr. Ramsay, stumbling along a passage one dark morning, stretched his arms out, but Mrs. Ramsay having died rather suddenly the night before, his arms, though stretched out, remained empty.] (*Lighthouse [1st US ed.]* 194)

In both cases, Mrs Ramsay's death is rendered secondary by the syntax of the parenthesis: we hear about her death insofar as it is the reason why Mr Ramsay's outstretched arms remain empty. In both cases, her life is done, and we are left with the live flesh of Mr Ramsay's empty yet outstretched arms. There is a marked contrast, however, between the long and breathless first sentence in the British variant of the square bracket (with a prosodical echo of Gertrude Stein perhaps) and the seven commas that divide clause from clause in the US variant, which lend it a clipped precision. These commas matter.

Reading the British variant, a certain circularity or tautology is apparent: Mr Ramsay stretched his arms out, but Mrs Ramsay had died the night before he stretched his arms out. Woolf's syntax here prioritises the stretching out of Mr Ramsay's arms. The US variant, however, uses its commas to guide its readers through a structure of nested clauses—one of which notes that Mrs Ramsay died the night before—to the final clause which notes that Mr Ramsay's arms were empty. These outstretched arms can be read as another Virgilian intertext: as Orpheus looks back at Eurydice, she laments her passing, and cries that she 'pass[es] away wrapped in a great darkness, and helplessly stretching towards thee the hands that, alas! are not thine' (Virgil 117).[9] In her notes of 1908 on *Georgics* IV, Woolf remarked that Virgil used words 'with such accuracy, just twisted out of their ordinary relations that an inaccurate scholar might just miss half' (Woolf and Duchêne 139). Something similar is at play in the moments that report deaths in 'Time Passes'. The complex

---

[9] Virgil's account of Orpheus and Eurydice is not the only source for the myth. As well as reading this as a Virgilian intertext and citing the above passage from *Georgics* IV, Jane Goldman reads an intertext with Ovid here, noting that this passage follows the syntax of Ovid's rendition of this portion of the myth in the *Metamorphoses* (Ovid X.58-59): '*bracchiaque intendens prendique et prendere certans | nil nisi cedentes infelix arripit auras*' ('He stretched out his arms, eager to catch her or to feel her clasp; but, unhappy one, he clasped nothing but the yielding air'). Goldman notes that Woolf employs a distinctly 'Virgilian touch' in using an 'equivalent to the Latin ablative absolute' which 'trips and shocks the reader, just as Ramsay himself goes through the motion of reaching out for his already absent wife' (Goldman "*To the Lighthouse*'s Use of Language and Form" 40-41).

and sometimes confusing play of sense and reference in these square brackets, and the textual history of the square bracket in which Mrs Ramsay's death is marked, work to twist words out of their ordinary relations with an accuracy that Woolf noted as properly Virgilian nearly two decades before writing *To the Lighthouse*.

Returning to 'Time Passes,' as immense darkness pours down over Skye, Prue Ramsay tells her companions that '"One can hardly tell which is the sea and which is the land"' (*TL* 104). The watchers await the future in a world which, temporarily at least, has no horizon or is losing its horizon as darkness draws in. In his 1996 seminar, Derrida tells his audience that '[p]aradoxically, the absence of horizon conditions the future itself' ("'Religion'" 7). Is the absence of horizon that Derrida hails as the precondition for the unknowable, messianic future the same absence of horizon that Prue notes as darkness falls over Skye? Jane Goldman's reading of Derrida's figuration of western metaphysics as 'photology,' helps us not to illuminate this darkness but rather to dwell in it. In 'Force and Signification' (written in 1967 and published in translation in *Writing and Difference* in 1973), Derrida describes light as 'the founding metaphor of Western philosophy as metaphysics. The founding metaphor not only because it is a photological one and in this respect the entire history of our philosophy is a photology, the name given to a history of, or treatise on, light—but because it is a metaphor' (Derrida "Force and Signification" 27). In quoting *Writing and Difference* specifically, Goldman draws on a different moment in Derrida's career and thought than I have thus far: the Derrida of 1967 is different to the Derrida I cite most heavily in this introduction and throughout this thesis, the Derrida of the 1990s and early 2000s. However, it is worth noting at this juncture that Derrida returns to this trope in his 1996 essay on religion and the messianic, and explicitly links photology with spectrality and hence with all that that spectral future might entail. In a densely aphoristic passage, he writes:

> *Light takes place. And the day*. The coincidence of the rays of the sun and topographical inscription will never be separated: phenomenology of religion, religion as phenomenology, enigma of the Orient, of the Levant and of the Mediterranean in the geography of appearing <*paraître*>. Light (*phos*), wherever this *arché* commands or begins discourse and takes the initiative in general (*phos, phainesthai, phantasma*, hence spectre, etc.), as much in the discourse of philosophy as in the discourse of a revelation (*Offenbarung*) or of a revealability (*Offenbarkeit*), of a possibility more originary than manifestation' (Derrida "'Religion'" 6)

The dark/light binary becomes a fundamental binary for the Western philosophical tradition, upon which all other binaries come to rest. Goldman reads a critical tradition that includes Toril Moi and Makiko Minow-Pinkney, who themselves draw upon Derrida, Kristeva and Cixous in their readings of Woolf as a deconstructionist *avant la lettre*, and certainly as a 'deconstructor of binary differences *par excellence*'. Goldman argues that Moi and Minow-Pinkney oversimplify the arguments of both Woolf and Derrida. She concludes that 'while Kristeva's and Cixous's engagements with binary oppositions make useful analytical tools, we would have to read considerably against the grain of Woolf's texts, I suggest, in order to concur with Moi's and Minow-Pinkney's findings' (Goldman *Feminist Aesthetics* 16). In reading these scenes of falling darkness and illumination, including 'The Sun and the Fish,' (1928) Woolf's essay on the 1927 solar eclipse, Goldman finds that Woolf does not work to significantly disrupt traditional dark/light boundaries but rather seeks a 'vision of possible feminine enlightenment' (17) within the framework of a Habermasian understanding of 'intersubjectivity,' which Goldman figures as 'interstellar,' as compared to the 'solar' phallogocentric subject (21). The horizonless darkness that falls at the start of 'Time Passes,' evidently lit by neither moon nor stars—for it is too dark to see even where the sea meets the land— might herald the coming of something radically other to the 'solar,' the phallogocentric subjectivity whose emblem is the sun, which 'may be regarded as the primary metaphorical instance of patriarchal supremacy' (16), and maybe even something other than the stelliferous Habermasian intersubjectivity that might one day take its place. We do not know what stars might one day come to illuminate this downpouring of immense darkness; all we know is that the lamps are being extinguished, both on Skye and across Europe. But what strange presences haunt this darkness? Having, for the most part, read the published version(s) of 'Time Passes' in order to filiate Woolf's writing with Derrida's unknowable messianic futurity, the next section of this chapter returns to the archive and reads ghostly figures in and between the variant states of 'Time Passes,' both published and prior to publication.

Ghostly Confidantes and Archival Futures

To be clear, Derrida's messianic future does not herald the coming of a messiah. Paradoxically, to await or to work towards the coming of a messiah is profoundly anti-messianistic,

insofar as Derrida's messianism eludes any teleological or eschatological promise. Rather, the Derridean future, *l'avenir*, is to be found (if one can find it) in the radical suspension of *telos* and *eschaton*, of ends and end-times. The Derridean future, as well as the futures I read in Woolf, are far from the modern apocalypse Frank Kermode theorises in *The Sense of an Ending* (1966). Kermode finds 'a powerful eschatological element in modern thought' (95). He reads Yeats' baroque theosophical apocalypse as well as Eliot's Anglo-Catholic poetry in order to argue that literary modernism is an heir to the apocalyptic tradition he anatomises in the first half of *The Sense of an Ending*. But Woolf shared neither in Eliot's late Damascene conversion, nor in Yeats' visions of epochal gyres and I do not think that her thinking of the future is reducible to Kermode's modernist apocalypse.

Martin Hägglund points out, 'Derrida's notion of the messianic runs counter to the entire religious tradition.' He continues: 'Derrida's key formula for describing the messianic is *il faut l'avenir*, which can either be translated as "it is necessary [that there be] the future" or as "there must be the future".' (Hägglund 133)—perhaps even a future that one must wait for. In this sense, Derrida's messianic differs from the messianic figures that arise in Woolf's thinking of the future: Judith Shakespeare, Anon, the 'masterpieces to come' that Woolf heralds at the end of 'How it Strikes a Contemporary' (1925; *E*4: 241). These messianic figures, insofar as they can be named, their coming expected, anticipated, or worked towards, are different from Derrida's messianic—but, crucially, neither are they the messiah of the Christian messianic tradition.[10] In the final chapter of this thesis I will work to constellate Woolf's messianic figures with Walter Benjamin's radical rewriting of the messianic (Benjamin "On the Concept of History") and Giorgio Agamben's quasi-messianic coming community (Agamben *Coming Community*), within the framework of the Derridean *avenir*.

In a lengthy footnote to *Specters of Marx*, Derrida himself links his messianism 'without messiah' to the '"*weak* messianic power"' that Benjamin theorises in his 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' (Derrida *Specters* 227, fn. 222). I discuss Benjamin's 'Theses' in greater depth in Chapter Six of this thesis, reading his historiography alongside Woolf's late literary-historical projects, but I

---

[10] For recent and wide-ranging considerations of Woolf's engagement with the Christian tradition both biographically and in her works, see Jane de Gay's *Virginia Woolf and Christian Culture* and Kristina Groover (ed.) *Religion, Secularism and the Spiritual Paths of Virginia Woolf* .

want to turn briefly to Benjamin's archive and read the 'Paralipomena,' etymologically that which was left aside ("Paralipomenon, n."), fragments that he wrote towards the essay but which were only published in the first volume of his *Gesammelte Schriften* in 1972 (Benjamin "[Die erhaltenen Notizen und Vorarbeiten…]"). Benjamin quotes an injunction by Austrian librettist Hugo von Hofmannsthal to "'[r]ead what was never written.'" Benjamin glosses this by saying that 'the reader one should think of here is the true historian' (Benjamin "Paralipomena" 405). The past is figured here as legible, but in a curious aporia: the 'true' histo"ian—the historical materialist—should look for texts that remain unwritten. This hidden past is key to Benjamin's messianic temporality, which is always present for the historical materialist. Benjamin gives a photological analogy to explain this: '[j]ust as a physicist determines the presence of ultraviolet light in the solar spectrum, so the historical materialist determines the presence of a messianic force in history' (402). Bringing these hidden pasts to bear on the present is an act of 'redemption' or *Rettung*. In the published 'Theses,' Benjamin writes that the 'past carries with it a secret index by which it is referred to redemption' and that this index is a 'secret agreement between past generations and the present one.' This secret agreement gives rise to Benjamin's '*weak* messianic power, a power on which the past has a claim' (Benjamin "On the Concept of History" 390). I find an analogy to Benjamin's legible but occluded past in Woolf's life-writing projects, which often took as their object the 'Lives of the Obscure' that rarely made it into the history books, and indeed to *Life's Adventure*, the unwritten novel cited in *A Room of One's Own* (*AROO* 72). I expand on this analogy in Part Three of this thesis. I find a further analogy to Benjaminian historiography in my own reading of archival texts. While I cannot claim to be a 'true' historian, and read 'what was never written,' I can try my best to read what was never published: the lives of the archival texts I bring to bear on Woolf's thinking of the future certainly remain somewhat obscure.

It might be objected that I yoke together two critical idioms here in an uncomfortable catachresis, that the languages of deconstruction-inflected critical theory and of textual criticism (specifically with a genetic spin) are not to be combined idly. I want, at this moment, to attempt to justify this dual methodology (or, less charitably to myself to explain why I should have my cake and eat it). In the introduction to his much-cited 2009 anthology *Modernism and Theory*, which acts as somewhat of a manifesto for the convergent interests of modernism and theory, Stephen Ross

argues that 'theory continues modernism's concerns, aesthetics, and critical energies' and that '[i]f we are truly to understand either of them, modernism and theory simply must be thought together.' Writing over a decade later, it is hard to disagree with this. However, in making the case for modernism and theory to be read alongside one another, Ross decries the (at the time genuinely new) New Modernist Studies' 'elision' of theory in favour of 'a return to the archive and historicism' (Ross 1-2). Ross wrote these words over a decade ago, but the theory/archive binary is still active, or at least perceived as active, in the scholarly landscape of the early 2020s. To draw this binary, however, is to view writing as a noun, rather than a verb, and to read written texts as finished material rather than as the material traces of richly generative creative acts.

To this end, my thesis concerns itself with archival documents, and invokes these documents insofar as they gesture towards a fundamental openness. They are documentary traces of a richly generative writing practice, which demands a concomitant practice of reading that looks to acknowledge this generativity and dwell within it, a generativity that is not forestalled or limited by teleology, be it that of the published work or of the author's demise. As I have discussed earlier, even if they do not lead anywhere in the conventional sense, these drafts and fragments are not unfinished or forestalled, and most certainly are not dead. I find an analogy to this mode of approaching draft material in Dirk Van Hulle's call for a 'dysteleological' form of editing. Van Hulle's article draws on German biologist Ernst Haekel's work on evolutionary theory to argue for a renewed effort to present and read *penitimenti*, notes that were not used in any published work, and other such 'vestigial' draft writing. Just as 'tiny, vestigial hind leg bones buried in muscles toward the tail ends of the boa constrictor' provided Haeckel with evidence that snakes were descended from lizards, vestigial fragments of writing in notebooks come to act as 'crucial elements in the study of creative writing processes' (Van Hulle "Dysteleology" 14). To argue that readers should base their critical practice in 'theory' rather than 'the archive' is to elide the generativity, the creativity that comes from reading the archive theoretically.

I am still working within the confines of Ross's theory/archive binary. I want to turn to Olga Taxidou's philological reading of the word 'theory' in an attempt to deconstruct this binary. Taxidou notes that the English 'theatre' is 'etymologically linked with *theoria*,' which itself derives from '*theorein*, to contemplate, to behold' (Taxidou 34). The English word 'theory' has its roots in the

Greek *theoria*, which denotes an act of viewing, contemplation, sight or spectacle. Taxidou further notes that the Greek *theoria* was translated into *speculatio* by Boethius (from *speculum*, or mirror), and granted a decidedly negative spin in Aquinas, for whom speculation can only ever result in 'a distorted image.' Taxidou's project attempts to restore 'to *theoria* its initial meaning of *speculative* thinking' and thus to draw '*theoria* as philosophy by other means.' A mode of theory that draws on the word's philological heritage might 'propose a type of philosophy that embodies the idea of distortion, reproduction, citation even' (34-5). This mode of *theoria*-philosophy, which pays attention to modes of reproduction, distortion and citation, is apposite to genetic criticism, with its concerns with genealogy and filiation. Drawn thus, theory is a matter of viewing or beholding, and finding a way of doing theory that accounts for the plethora of documents that find themselves stored in the archive is a matter of shifting our gaze away from the published text. I take as a core methodological tenet that archival documents are as much objects to view, to behold and to theorise as the 'consecrated' texts (to use Laurent Jenny's formulation) that have been printed, bound and published (Jenny 212). My thesis thus argues for a flat ontology of sources.

But the archive is not just a storehouse for documents, material traces of writing that has been done. In the opening pages to *Archive Fever*, Derrida diagnoses the archive as fundamentally Janus-faced, looking simultaneously backwards in time and towards the future. We have already seen how the archive finds its roots in the word '*arkhē*,' which 'names at once the *commencement* and the *commandment*' (*Archive Fever* 1, italics Derrida's). Derrida traces the root of the word *arkhē* to the Greek word '*arkheion*: initially a house, a domicile, an address, the residence of the superior magistrates, the *archons*, those who commanded' (2). The *arkheion* was not just the place where the law resided, but 'on the account of their publicly recognised authority,' it is the place where the archons' documents, official documents, are filed. The archons are 'first of all the documents' guardians,' but they are more than that:

> They are also accorded the hermeneutic right and competence. They have the power to interpret the archives. Entrusted to such archons, these documents in effect speak the law: they recall the law and call on or impose the law. To be guarded thus, in the jurisdiction of this *speaking the law*, they needed at once a guardian and a localisation. Even in their guardianship or their hermeneutic tradition, the archives could do neither without substrate nor without residence. (2)

The archive becomes both the place where the law begins, its point of commencement, and the place where it is spoken and interpreted, a place of commandment. If we stop reading *Archive Fever* here, the archive might seem something that is wholly oriented towards the past. But just as the archive is shaped by the immutable law of its commencement and its commandment, its relationship to the future is determined. The 'technical structure of the *archiving* archive also determines the structure of the *archivable* content even in its very coming into existence and its relationship to the future' (17). The archive is concerned not just with the law of the *arkhē* but constitutes the grounds for the possibility of its endurance: 'The archivization produces as much as it records the event' (17). Derrida's argument here zigzags between the material and technological specificity of the substrate—the material surface on which writing is inscribed—and the death drive. Writing, whatever form it may take (and Derrida gives a laundry list of possible substrates, as we shall see later) is future-oriented. It is a defiant gesture in the face of oblivion, the 'anarchivic' or 'archiviolithic' death drive which is a drive to destroy not just the archive, but the very possibility of the archive. In the face of a death drive that destroys the archive, its own archive, the possibility of it being archived or archivable, the archive becomes a 'wager' (18). Wager is very close to 'gamble' a word we have seen earlier in this chapter in Spivak's figuration of an anterior future buttressed by the 'perhaps' of an 'unrestricted gamble' that one takes in forming a relationship with the other (Spivak 29). The archive, thus drawn, is not just the preservation of material against its annihilation but a '*pledge*, and like every pledge, a token of the future' (Derrida *Archive Fever* 18). It is a gesture of absolute hospitality.

Derrida returns to this orientation towards futurity later in *Archive Fever*, when he couches the archive in terms that he had introduced in *Specters of Marx*: Derrida gave the lecture upon which *Specters of Marx* is based in 1993, and he gave the lecture on which *Archive Fever* is based less than a year later. He writes in *Archive Fever* that a 'spectral messianicity is at work in the concept of the archive and ties it […] to a very singular experience of the promise.' The concept of the archive, even an 'archivable concept of the archive' is a 'question of the future, the question of the future itself, the question of a response, of a promise and of a responsibility for tomorrow' (36). The import of the archive is unknowable just as the messianic is: 'The archive: if we want to know what that will have meant, we will only know in times to come. Perhaps. Not tomorrow but in times to come, later

on or perhaps never' (36). The meaning of the archive is only knowable in the anterior—perhaps it does not yet have meaning and will only come to have meaning in the anterior. Much like the messianic, we cannot know what it means, only what it will have meant. And we can only know this in 'times to come': not in the specific and imaginable *futur*—'not tomorrow'—but in the unknowable *avenir* only expressible as 'times to come'. In Derrida's reading, the archive is both a promise and a gamble. It is a promise by the archons to store material traces of writing in the face of the archiviolithic death drive. But it is also an unrestricted gamble: the archons cannot know what the import is of the objects they secrete away. Archives only gain their meaning insofar as they are (necessarily) exposed to an unknown futurity. This relationship is not a one-way street: Derrida writes later in *Archive Fever* that '[t]he archivist produces more archive, and that is why the archive is never closed. It opens out of the future' (68). In affirming a radical openness to futurity, in permanently deferring its own archontic moment, the archive emerges from the future, opening out of the future.

This is a fitting point to turn back to Woolf's own archive, and read some of the *avant-textes* for 'Time Passes': 'Le Temps Passe,' Charles Mauron's 1926 French translation of 'Time Passes' (Woolf and Mauron) and the English language typescript draft of 'Time Passes' that Woolf sent Mauron, from which Mauron based his translation . This typescript only came to light in the 1980s, and was published by James Haule alongside an edition of 'Le Temps Passe' (Haule et al. n.p.). Haule notes that the English typescript is 'undoubtedly an intermediary text, standing between the early Holograph [of 'Time Passes'] and either published version [of *To the Lighthouse*]' (Haule et al. 267-8).[11] Mark Hussey and Peter Shillingsburg mark the English typescript as the second of ten extant variants of *To the Lighthouse*, while 'Le Temps Passe' is the third (Hussey and Shillingsburg n.p.). The variant texts presented to us in the English typescript and Mauron's translation bear significant differences from the extant proofs of *To the Lighthouse* [12] and published editions of the novel. Significantly for my reading of 'Time Passes,' the second and third states of the text do not

---

[11] Haule's phrase 'either published version' hints at the post-publication variants of *To the Lighthouse*, which I have gestured to, albeit briefly, in an earlier note.

[12] It is worth noting at this juncture that these are not the first proofs of *To the Lighthouse*. Hussey and Shillingsburg note that the marked proofs from which the first English edition were set are not extant. The proofs from which I quote were used by Harcourt, Brace to set the American first edition (Hussey and Shillingsburg n.p.).

open with the same act of double witness. Rather, the darkness that falls over Skye is not regarded by any watchers, but is rather hailed by three words 'It grew darker' (Virginia Woolf "Typescript of 'Time Passes'" 1)—'Il fit plus sombre' in French (Woolf and Mauron 91). Mr Bankes, Andrew Ramsay and Prue Ramsay and Lily Briscoe only begin their watch in the proofs of the novel (Virginia Woolf "First Proofs of *To the Lighthouse*" 195).

The temporality of the 'downpouring of immense darkness' (*TL* 103) that endures throughout all the above-mentioned variant states of the text is subtly different, too. In the printed novel, we are told that the downpouring of immense darkness 'began' only 'with the lamps all put out, the moon sunk, and a thin rain drumming on the roof'—the simple past tense implied by 'began' is contingent on the watchers' actions: darkness only begins after the lamps are turned off. In the typescript and its translation, however, we begin not with lights and their extinction but rather with an impersonal and autotelic darkness which grows without reference to any luminous counterpart. Rather than the continuously growing dark implied by the play of tense at the beginning of the second section of the published 'Time Passes,' the nights of the typescript and translation have already fallen. Darkness comes and 'starlight and moonlight and all light on sky and earth was quenched' (Virginia Woolf "Typescript of 'Time Passes'" 1). Mauron's translation bears a similarly definite temporality: once the clouds cover the moon and the '*pluie mince*' falls, '*la lumière des ètoiles et la lumière de la lune et toute lumière au ciel et sur la terre fut étouffée*'[13] (Woolf and Mauron 91). Here, the gathering dark is described in the *passé simple*—all the lights in the sky and on the earth 'fut étouffee,' or were smothered. That the darkness indeed smothers all is a predicate peculiar to the earlier extant versions of the text. While the typescript tells us that 'Nothing could survive the flood, the profusion, the downpouring of immense darkness' ("Typescript of 'Time Passes'" 1), and Mauron's translation tells us that '*Rien ne pouvait survivre au flot, à l'envahisement, à la cataracte de cette ombre immense*'[14] (91), a two-word modifier is inserted at proof stage: 'it seemed'. The proofs and published editions bear the sentence 'Nothing, *it seemed*, could survive the flood, the

---

[13] '…the light of the stars and the light of the moon and all lights in the sky and on the earth were smothered.' (My translation).
[14] Nothing could survive the flood, the invasion, the waterfall of this immense shadow. (My translation).

profusion of darkness…' ("First Proofs of *To the Lighthouse*" 195-196; TL 103). The difference is slight, but significant.

In his reading of the opening pages of *To the Lighthouse* in *Mimesis* (1953), Erich Auerbach asks a very simple question with no simple answer: 'Who is speaking in this paragraph?' (Auerbach 531). In asking this question of the novel's opening, Auerbach is led to posit, albeit briefly, the possibility of a 'realm beyond reality.' His speakers 'no longer seem to be human beings at all but spirits between heaven and earth, nameless spirits capable of penetrating the depths of the human soul.' His brief excursus on these speaking spirits leads him to compare the narrative voice(s) of the novel's opening pages to 'those "certain airs, detached from the body of the wind"' that blow through 'Time Passes' (532). We should follow Auerbach in asking the same question: who is speaking in this passage? For whom does it seem? Reading between the extant variants of the text, however, these certain airs, autochthonic and impersonal, are not a constant.

At this point in the typescript, rather, we see 'ghostly confidantes' ('*des spectres confidents*' in the French [92]) who act as 'sharers, comforters' who 'gravely treasured up and engulphed in the folds of their cloaks, in their compassionate hearts, what was murmured and cried, accepted and understood those changes from torture to calm, from hate to indifference, which came and went and came again upon the sleepers' faces.' ("Typescript of 'Time Passes'" 1-2). Reading between variants, we find that the certain, stray airs that Auerbach uses to build up his poetics of the 'random moment' (552) stray farther than a reading of the published novel might indicate. Andrew Bankes' curiously phrased question which opens the published 'Time Passes' is prefigured in the second section of the typescript, where the 'certain airs' venture inside and seem to speak, to ask questions of the objects they find in the derelict house:

> Almost one might imagine them questioning, wondering, as they gently attempted the flap of hanging wall paper—would it, they seemed to ask, hang much longer; when would it fall? Then, smoothly, brushing the walls, they passed on, musingly, as if asking the red and yellow flowers on the wall paper whether they would fade, and questioning, (gently—there was time at their disposal) the torn letters in the waste paper basket, the flowers, the books, all of which were now open to them, in communion with them, and softly illumined, now and then, by a beam from the light house. So wandering through the rooms and reaching the kitchen they paused to ask of the table and the silver-tailed saucepans ranged orderly on the shelf, the same question; how long would they endure, of what nature were they? Were they made of wind and rain, allies, with whom in the darkness, wind and rain might commune? Were they obdurate? Time would show. ("Typescript of 'Time Passes'" 3)

Some of the language in this portion of the typescript finds its way into the published 'Time Passes' (*TL* 104) but the future that is implied in the typescript is of a different order to that which Andrew Bankes hails at the beginning of the published version. Rather than waiting for an uncertain futurity to show, the certain airs and ghostly confidantes interrogate the objects that fill the Ramsays' house, the objects abandoned and the house derelict, asking them whether they will stubbornly endure, facing the passage of time obdurately, or fade into a ghostly community with the darkness, wind and rain. The five witnesses waiting for a Derridean future to show remain in the future of 'Time Passes'—they have not yet shown and remain in the draft's anterior future. Perhaps they remain in the 'immense darkness' of 'Time Passes,' waiting to be lit not by the bright light of the solar but by a stelliferous Habermasian intersubjectivity whose light comes not from one source but many. And by the same token, so do the dead Ramsays, whose deaths in square brackets—one of the typographic tools of editors—gesture to Woolf's archive and to her readings in Virgil and speak to the editorial work that Woolf will have done.

Chapter Two: (Turning One's) Back to the Future

Introduction: Zones of Visibility, Zones of Intersubjectivity

The first chapter in this thesis focused on what Mr Bankes says, not what he does while saying it. He says that his auditors 'must wait for the future to show' while 'coming in from the terrace' (*TL* 104). In so doing, he presumably turns around to go back inside, turning his back on the vanishing horizon which I have argued is the marker of an unknowable Derridean future. Absolute openness, absolute hospitality towards the *arrivant*, waiting without horizon of expectation is a tall order, after all. But this is not to say that he turns his back on the future altogether. What other orders of futurity are implied by Bankes's turn away from the darkening sea? As Bankes turns, at least two lamps are still burning: the one about which Lily Briscoe asks and the one that provides the light by which Augustus Carmichael reads his Virgil. These lamps establish a zone of visibility, even if for a moment before they are snuffed out. It is towards the house and its lamps that the witnesses turn; it is by the light of a lamp that Carmichael performs his bibliomancy. What is at stake in the turn, or return, to this zone of visibility?

An earlier moment of illumination sheds some light (so to speak) on the stakes of this action. During the dinner party in 'The Window,' between the soup and the bœuf en daube, Mrs Ramsay calls on the servants to '[l]ight the candles'. Eight candles are lit, and 'after the first stoop the flames stood upright and drew with them into visibility the long table entire, and in the middle a yellow and purple dish of fruit' (*TL* 79). Light is shed not just on the diners but on the fruit arrangement both Mrs Ramsay and Augustus Carmichael contemplate. We are told in parentheses that this moment of joint viewing brings 'them into sympathy momentarily.' Their thoughts resonate with classical overtones. Mrs Ramsay is reminded of 'a trophy fetched from the bottom of the sea, of Neptune's banquet, of the bunch that hangs with vine leaves over the shoulder of Bacchus' while in a distinctly Virgilian image which aligns the viewer with the classical bee, Carmichael 'feasted his eyes on the same plate of fruit, plunged in, broke off a bloom there, a tassel here, and returned, after feasting, to his hive.' In *Virginia Woolf and the Ethics of Intimacy* (2019), Elsa Högberg argues that 'in *To the Lighthouse*, visual observation emerges as sensual, non-possessive and non-objectifying' (Högberg

117). The candles' light creates not just a zone of visibility but a zone of contact between subjects, a zone of contact premised on the sensuous mutual observation of a common object. We might not have to look to the starless sky and wait for a stelliferous Habermasian intersubjectivity to emerge: it might already be present, waiting to emerge over a steaming dish of bœuf en daube. But this scene of viewing is more complex. We are told that '[t]hat was his way of looking, different from hers' and that 'looking together united them' but who says this is unclear. We are told that Mrs Ramsay 'saw that Augustus too feasted his eyes' on the fruit,' and it is unclear whose reference to Virgil's bees we read. We read someone's thoughts, but whose? To return to Auerbach's question, who is speaking in this passage? Do we read the thoughts of Augustus Carmichael looking at the fruit arrangement? Or do we read the thoughts of Mrs Ramsay looking at Augustus Carmichael looking at the fruit? This question does not yield an easy answer; our attempts to answer it might not generate an answer but posing the question is generative nonetheless. In this moment of readerly confusion, intersubjectivity flickers momentarily into view. The candles on the Ramsays' dinner table and this brief moment of candlelit intersubjectivity enact in miniature the 'semi-transparent envelope, or luminous halo, surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end' that Woolf theorises initially in 'Modern Novels' (1919; *E* 3: 33) and returns to again with more emphatic phrasing and greater certainty in 'Modern Fiction' (1925; *E* 4: 160). Woolf tropes upon this visual metaphor in *To the Lighthouse* by drawing observers and their thoughts into a luminous halo.

In her article 'Ethical Folds: Ethics, Aesthetics, Woolf,' Jessica Berman analyses a similar moment of apprehension. Berman reads the moment in which Mrs Ramsay and Lily Briscoe both apprehend a 'glove's twisted finger' (*TL* 43) and Lily contemplates modes of intimacy that might bring the two closer, asking '[w]hat art was there, known to love or cunning, by which one pressed through into those secret chambers? What device for becoming, like waters poured into one jar, inextricably the same with the object one adored?' (44). Berman pays close attention to the material that inspires Lily's thoughts of intimacy, writing that 'the twisted fabric conflates terms even as it connects subject (Mrs. Ramsay) and object (the glove) or folds subject (Mrs. Ramsay) onto subject (Lily) onto subject (reader)' (Berman "Ethical Folds" 165). Berman then opens the Lily-Mrs Ramsay dyad up, enfolding the reader in this already-complex play of subjectivity. She writes that 'the twisted glove exists as an object of apprehension for us and for Lily, which makes possible our engagement

with the ontological question of singular being as well as with the profound intimacy, seen between Lily and Mrs. Ramsay, that […] can be the first move toward ethics.' Reading between Gilles Deleuze, Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Blanchot, Berman uses the fold of the glove's fabric and the enfolding of Lily and Mrs Ramsay's subjectivities to posit a model of subjectivity in which being is being-toward-the-other. Berman further argues that these moments '[demonstrate] the demand of being-toward-the-other that arises out of the intimacy of this relationship' (166). Following Berman's Deleuzian line of flight, I want to suggest that we can read Woolf's investigations of intersubjectivity as future oriented.

My discussion of Berman's investigation into Deleuzian modes of intersubjectivity in Woolf leads to Rosi Braidotti, who has sought to refigure Deleuze and Guattari's theoretical lexicon in explicitly feminist terms. She writes of sustainability in Deleuzian terms throughout her career and explicitly discusses sustainability as affirming a form of futurity in *Transpositions* (2006). She writes that sustainability 'stands for […] a regrounding of the subject in a materially embedded sense of responsibility and ethical accountability for the environments she or he inhabits. What is at stake is the very possibility of the future, of duration or continuity' (Braidotti 137). That Woolf's moments of intersubjectivity, moments in which one mind contemplates the existence of another, are precipitated by solid objects—a twisted glove in one case, an arrangement of fruit in another—speaks to Braidotti's 'materially embedded sense of responsibility'. Braidotti continues, invoking Deleuze and Guattari's theoretical lexicon and writing that the model of futurity implied by sustainability is one marked by becomings, whose 'time frame is always the future anterior, that is to say a linkage across present, and past in the act of constructing and actualising possible futures' (137). The future anterior that Braidotti writes of is filiated with Spivak's politicised future anteriority insofar as both attend upon the work that one will have done. But unlike Spivak's future anterior, Braidotti's does not open onto the Derridean *avenir*, the unknowable messianic future. Braidotti's future anterior looks forward not to the *avenir* but to the *futur*. Sustainability 'expresses the desire to endure, and as such is the maker of possible futures. It is a present-based practice, which reactivates both past and present into producing "futurity". This means that sustainable presents generate possible futures' (276). In turning his back on the unknowable Derridean future and returning to the house, Mr Bankes nonetheless affirms a different kind of futurity, one rooted in the materiality of the present. This

futurity is more accommodating of the domestic and the quotidian, and it is a future that one can act to influence, rather than one that one must await with absolute hospitality. It is futurity, future, not insofar as it consists of complete rupture with the present, a step into the unexpected, but insofar as it is composed of the manifold futures of embodied and material subjects enduring in space and time.

Braidotti's endurance finds a home in the archive also. Daniel Ferrer identifies an oscillatory tendency in the idea of the project, an oscillation to which archival documentations of writing projects bear witness. On the one hand, the word project speaks to a certain kind of projection, an 'anticipatory perspective'; on the other a 'retrospective vision that characterizes it with regard to an accomplishment' (Ferrer 225). This Janus-faced structure is perhaps reminiscent of Derrida's Janus-faced archive, but Ferrer's wording aligns the future implied by the project more closely with Braidotti's endurance. We have seen how Derrida's archive is future-oriented and looks towards a 'spectral messianicity' (*Archive Fever* 36). But the Derridean *avenir* is precisely that which cannot be anticipated and therefore cannot be aligned with Ferrer's 'anticipatory perspective'. Rather, *avant-textes*, the documentary traces of a project stored in an archive speak to what a writer planned to write, and how that plan unfolded. Ferrer reproduces very early notes that Woolf made towards *Orlando*—'This is to tell a person's life from the year 1500 to 1928. / Changing its sex.'—calling them a 'form of projection' that should be viewed as an *avant-texte* alongside drafts, proofs and other documents in the genetic dossier (Ferrer 226). Archival materials come to affirm the more knowable futurity that Braidotti discusses. Establishing and maintaining an archive is an anticipatory act, which implies an 'ethical and material responsibility' towards archived materials, and is a gesture towards a 'future, of duration or continuity' for those materials and towards a future where these documents can be examined (Braidotti 137). Such a gesture towards futurity might also be explicit.

Consider the cache of 1,131 letters from T.S. Eliot to Emily Hale, sealed away in Princeton University's Firestone Library. They had been sealed both metaphorically—sealed from prying eyes—and literally—the boxes of letters were initially kept in wooden boxes sealed with metal bands—since April 1965. Hale donated the letters in 1956 and left instructions that these letters should remain sealed until 50 years after both she and Eliot had died. As per Hale's instructions, the letters were unsealed in October 2019 for processing and made available to researchers on the 2nd of January 2020 (Ramírez n.p.). Hale's instructions for the letters are anticipatory and thus necessarily

future-oriented, but even though they anticipate a moment when both letter-writer and recipient are dead, they look forward to a precise moment in the future and express an unspoken faith that there will be readers to read them and a library to store them. Or such a gesture might be implicit. Louise DeSalvo counts no fewer than nine extant drafts of *The Voyage Out* prior to its publication in 1915 (DeSalvo in Virginia Woolf *Melymbrosia* xxv), and every literary project Woolf worked on after that (save *Night and Day*) has multiple extant *avant-textes*.[15] Keeping this archive, this plethora of holograph drafts, typescripts and proofs is, in part, a gesture towards posterity. This gesture looks forward to a moment when a reader might seek out the material traces of Woolf's writing, just as the narrator of *A Room of One's Own* sought out the material traces of Milton's *Lycidas*, and perhaps even to a future readership of women whose intellectual activity is not to be policed by beadles and 'guardian angel[s]' in black gowns at library doors denying entry and demanding that women arrive wielding either a letter of introduction or a Fellow of the college (*AROO* 7). Woolf's archive, and the archives in Woolf, can be read as affirming a range of different futurities, or modalities of the future, from Derrida's utterly unknowable *avenir* to a materially specific future. This is not to say that Derrida's spectral messianic is not at play in the concept of the archive, or in specific archives, but rather that the archive implicates manifold futurities.

Woolf's Futures: 1915-34

Having opened the door to multiple conceptions of the future, I want to use them as an analytic through which to read Woolf's work prior to 1934. My thesis argues that on or about January 1934, Woolf's work changed: it becomes explicitly future-oriented and does so as a response to European fascism and global conflict. The two orders of futurity that I have discussed thus far, the Derridean *avenir* and Braidotti's sustainable future, will be brought to bear on Woolf's late writing, both published work and archival material, later in the thesis. But this is not to say that the future does not figure in Woolf's pre-1934 writing—far from it. The futures that Woolf imagines after this watershed are conditioned by those that came before. In this portion of the chapter, I perform a crude

---

[15] Although Julia Briggs writes in *Virginia Woolf: An Inner Life* (2005) that 'No one knows exactly how many times [*The Voyage Out*] was rewritten,' citing Leonard Woolf's autobiography, in which he describes the burning of a '"whole mountain of MSS"' including those of what would become *The Voyage Out* (Briggs 4). Briggs does not speculate as to what else was burnt.

form of distant reading on Woolf's novels prior to 1934 to examine what modes of futurity these works imagine, and what forms of futurity come to condition the futures Woolf works through in her post-1934 writing.

Having said this, I want to introduce 'The Moment: Summer's Night' (*E6* 509-514) here also. As a distinctly imaginative piece—not quite short story but not quite essay—whose draft is catalogued as part of the drafts of *Between the Acts* and published in the posthumous 1947 collection *The Moment and Other Essays* but whose date of composition is uncertain, 'The Moment: Summer's Night' acts as a floating text which comes to condition or act as a limit-case for both the analysis in this chapter and in my thesis more generally. The narrator's question as to 'what composed the present moment?' is a key one for the analysis in this chapter. The answer the narrator gives to this question is a bifurcated one: if one is 'young, the future lies upon the present, like a piece of glass, making it tremble and quiver' (509) but if one is 'old, the past lies upon the present, like a thick glass, making it waver, distorting it' (509). The past and the future having a claim upon the present is key to the distant reading that follows. The claim that the past lies upon the present conditions the necrolatic rituals of remembrance that I discuss in relation with *Mrs Dalloway*, while the claim that the future lies upon the present conditions the colonialist futures imagined and satirised in *The Voyage Out* as well as the eugenicist modes of futurity with which *To the Lighthouse* and *Flush* toy. 'The Moment: Summer's Night' is also structured around moments of illumination, sparks of light in the dark. The moment that the piece stages is set once the sun has set, once 'the time has come in all cottages, in all farms, to light the lamps' whose lights 'sink[] down' and 'burn[] up' (510); the moment is 'laced about with these weavings to and fro, these inevitable downsinkings, flights, lamp lightings' (510). These scenes of illumination speak to the stelliferous Habermasian intersubjectivity which my first chapter gestured towards as well as to scenes of illumination that I discuss in Parts Two and Three of this thesis.

But the scene of illumination that forms the 'nucleus' (510) of 'The Moment: Summer's Night' is more fraught than the scene of illumination I read in the first part of this chapter, the luminous halo that surrounds the Ramsays' dinner table. This moment of illumination is not premised on the mutual cognition of and communion over a platter of fruit, but on gender-based violence. As the 'four heads, eight legs, eight arms, and eight separate bodies' (510) sit and strike matches in the

dark—'a light is struck' and 'in it appears a sunburnt face, lean, blue-eyed, and the arrow flies as the match goes out' (512)—one of the party starts to discuss John, who '"beats"' his wife Liz '"every Saturday; from boredom, I should say; not drink; there's nothing else to do"' (512). The narrator's gaze does not quite turn from the 'nucleus' of sitters, but rather it follows the moment itself which 'runs like quicksilver on a sloping board into the cottage parlour' which is the locus for this violence. The reader is party to this scene of violence as 'Liz comes in and John catches a blow on the side of her head' and she 'moans in a chronic animal way,' while her children play on the kitchen floor and John 'carves a hunk of bread and munches because there is nothing to be done' (512). But the narrator cannot bear to linger at this locus of violence overly long. The narrator intercedes and addresses the reader directly:

> [l]et us do something then, something to end this horrible moment, this plausible glistening moment that reflects in its smooth sides this intolerable kitchen, this squalor; this woman moaning; and the rattle of the toy on the flag, and the man munching. Let us smash it by breaking a match. There—snap. (512)

This brief moment of illumination on a summer's night reveals a scene of violence: a scene of violence which the scene's narrator can hardly bear to narrate. 'The Moment: Summer's Night' comes to constellate both the past-facing present of the old and the future-facing present of the young with this moment of gender-based violence which is always and already present: we have seen that the moment is attracted to it with the same force with which gravity acts on 'quicksilver on a sloping board' (512). This is an apt realisation with which to begin this distant reading: that violence can be brought to bear on the present moment, regardless of its composition, with an almost mechanical inevitability. I will return to this rendering of the present moment throughout this thesis.

In *The Voyage Out* (1915), the future is almost always invoked in either direct or reported speech and speakers tend to harness it to a reproductive logic akin to what Lee Edelman critiques in *No Future* (2004) as 'reproductive futurism' (Edelman 4). Woolf and Edelman both invoke and critique a form of futurity that takes as its founding principle the imperative to reproduce privilege, reproduce capital, reproduce power, and produce a new generation of people (of the right sort) to wield privilege, power, and capital. In conversation, Hughling Elliot and Mrs Thornbury 'prove that South America was the country of the future' by means of enumerating lists they have read, 'stores of information about navies and armies, political parties, natives and mineral products.' Placed after

the sentence's final comma, natives are syntactically relegated here, collocated alongside 'mineral products,' a resource to be extracted just as rocks are to be quarried, minerals and metals to be mined. Evelyn Murgatroyd is moved to exclaim, perhaps not without irony, 'How it makes one long to be a man!' and to advise Elliot and Thornbury to 'raise a troop and conquer some great territory and make it splendid.' She continues, saying 'You'd want women for that. I'd love to start life from the very beginning as it ought to be—nothing squalid—but great halls and gardens and splendid men and women' (*VO* 151). Murgatroyd's future Edenic state is conditioned here by what came before: socially instilled understandings of what constitutes squalor and splendour, as well as the navies and armies, political parties, natives and mineral products of South America.

Later in the novel, Helen Ambrose discusses the 'future of the race,' couched in terminology that can only be described as nakedly eugenicist, panicked that the 'future of the race' is left in the hands of 'Russians and Chinese':

> 'And the *future*?' she reflected, vaguely envisaging a race of men becoming more and more like Hirst, and a race of women becoming more and more like Rachel. 'Oh no,' she concluded, glancing at [St John Hirst], 'one wouldn't marry you. Well, then, the *future* of the race is in the hands of Susan and Arthur; no—that's dreadful. Of farm labourers; no—not of the English at all, but of Russians and Chinese.' (231, italics mine)

Ambrose is moved to these ugly sentiments after she asks St John Hirst whether he has 'settled on what [he is] going to do—is it to be Cambridge or the Bar?' (230). She reflects on Hirst's appearance, and that of Terence Hewet, to whom her cousin Rachel Vinrace will later become engaged, wondering 'whether it was necessary that thought and scholarship should thus maltreat their bodies, and should thus elevate their minds to a very high tower from which the human race appeared to them like rats or mice squirming on the flat' (231). Here, futurity is explicitly figured as reproductive, and Helen implies that the content of this future is conditioned by those who marry and reproduce, continuing the 'race'. Helen might well agree with Sir William Bradshaw's medico-juridical prescriptions and proscriptions: he 'made England prosper, secluded her lunatics' and, most importantly for this analysis, 'forbade childbirth' and in so doing 'made it impossible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too shared his sense of proportion' (*MD* 84).

Later in *The Voyage Out*, Terence reads a portion of his 'novel on silence' to Rachel. His novel tracks the decay of a relationship. His protagonists Hugh and Betty begin their relationship

'shout[ing] *Love in the Valley* to each other across the snowy slopes of the Riffelhorn' (*VO* 345) but over the course of their marriage their relationship decays. Terence skips ahead to the conclusion of his novel, '"They were different. Perhaps, in the far future, when generations of women and men had struggled and failed as he must now struggle and fail, woman would be, indeed, what she now made a pretence of being—the friend and companion—not the enemy and parasite of man."' (346). Woolf's deployment of *Love in the Valley*, a long 1851 lyric by George Meredith,[16] here within the context of Terence's novel on silence—a book that only exists in the novel that we read—anticipates her later use of *mise-en-abyme*, such as the invocation of *Life's Adventure* in *A Room of One's Own* (*AROO* 72), and speaks to the abyssal, archival play of citation and reference that has guided this thesis and will continue to do so. This is perhaps the most hopeful expression of futurity in *The Voyage Out*, but the reconciliation between sexes is some distance off, in 'the far future' and it contrasts with the bellicose relationship that the narrator of Hewet's book diagnoses in the 'now' when *Love in the Valley* is set and underscored by *mise-en-abyme* and a play of textualities.

Night and Day (1919) stages moments where the Derridean and Braidottian figurations of futurity that I have discussed thus far in this chapter meet, sometimes clashing, sometimes complementing each other. The first instance of the word 'future' appears as Katherine Hilbery is being shown around the offices where Mary Datchett works towards gaining the franchise. She talks to Ralph Denham and Katherine briefly before 'reflecting that the glories of the future depended in part upon the activity of her typewriter' (*ND*: 90). Here, the future and its 'glories' are explicitly figured as something towards which Mary, her companions in the society, and her fellow suffragists can work: later Mrs Seal tells Mary Datchet that 'it's you young women—we look to you—the future looks to you' (275). On returning from the suffragist offices, Katharine enters her mother's room to work with her on their joint biography of Richard Alardyce, Katharine's grandfather and a great Victorian poet whose rooms and objects still attract tourists, even after his death. We read that Katharine 'very nearly [loses] consciousness that she [is] a separate being with a future of her own'

---

[16] George Meredith (1828-1909) was a friend of the Stephen family. In a diary entry of 14th March 1897, the young Virginia Stephen notes that Leslie Stephen paid a visit to Meredith (*PA* 54) while in 'A Sketch of the Past' Woolf notes she 'remember[s] the roll and roar of Meredith's voice,' that he 'dropp[ed] slices of lemon into the tea' (*MoB* 172-3). The library of Leonard and Virginia Woolf contains some 32 volumes by him, including multiples of the same work, and some volumes were presented to various members of the family and inscribed by Meredith (King and Miletic-Vejzovic n.p.).

(115). Here, Katharine's work memorialising her grandfather threatens to negate her own future. In working to memorialise her grandfather, Katharine 'seemed to herself to be moving among' the ghosts of her grandfather and his generation, 'better acquainted with them than with her own friends, because she knew their secrets and possessed a divine foreknowledge of her destiny. They had been so unhappy, such muddlers, so wrong-headed, it seemed to her. She could have told them what to do, and what not to do' (115). Here, we are in the realm of the future anterior: Katharine has the same relationship to her grandfather's future as we as readers of *Night and Day* do to Katharine's own future, a 'divine foreknowledge' of what will have happened. Katharine knows that her grandfather will have been unhappy and wrongheaded, just as we know that she will have become engaged to Ralph Denham. Futurity is rendered here as essentially legible, albeit not to those for those living through it: the future becomes posterity as a matter of inevitability. Both are examples of the second order of futurity I have outlined here: a future which is a continuation of the present.

But later, on finding out that Katharine is engaged to William Rodney, Ralph Denham sets his eyes on a future that is more radically heterogeneous, more Derridean. 'His eyes were set on something infinitely far and remote; by that light he felt he could walk, and would, in future, have to find his way. But that was all there was left to him of a populous and teeming world' (162). The future is again figured as a landscape through which *Night and Day*'s characters must navigate, when Katharine talks to Mary about Ralph: 'Their animosity had completely disappeared, and upon both of them a cloud of difficulty and darkness rested, obscuring the future, in which they had both to find a way' (379). We encounter both here and in the last example I cited futures that are rendered in explicitly photological terms. But whereas Mary and Katharine's future is wreathed in clouds, obscured and darkened, Ralph sees a light by which he can navigate the future. This light is not, however, the light to which the five witnesses return at the start of 'Time Passes,' the light that illuminates a 'populous and teeming world' but rather a light that allows Ralph to see something different, 'something infinitely far and remote' (275). Perhaps this something, infinitely far and remote, is something radically heterogeneous, something linked with the Derridean *avenir*? We see this far and remote future expressed again, towards the end of the novel, when Ralph and Katharine jointly contemplate their future: 'Whether there was any correspondence between the two prospects now opening before them they shared the same sense of the impending future, vast, mysterious,

infinitely stored with undeveloped shapes which each would unwrap for the other to behold; but for the present the prospect of the future was enough to fill them with silent adoration' (519-20). I take 'prospects' plural as something material, something that gestures towards future material prosperity (or lack thereof), as in the Jane Austen-esque question 'What are your prospects?' while a singular 'prospect' is something more explicitly visual. Ralph and Katherine's separate 'prospects' for the future are conditioned by the singular 'prospect' of the future as something 'vast, mysterious' and 'infinitely stored with undeveloped shapes.'

The final mention of the future comes at the very end of *Night and Day* as Katharine and Ralph sit in an omnibus heading towards Chelsea. It provides a bridge of sorts between the two articulations of futurity that this thesis has so far discussed, and that I have read as operative in *Night and Day*:

> Together they groped in this difficult region, where the unfinished, the unfulfilled, the unwritten, the unreturned, came together in their ghostly way and wore the semblance of the complete and the satisfactory. The *future* emerged more splendid than ever from this construction of the present. Books were to be written, and since books must be written in rooms, and rooms must have hangings, and outside the windows there must be land, and an horizon to that land, and trees perhaps, and a hill, they sketched a habitation for themselves upon the outline of great offices in the Strand and continued to make an account of the *future* upon the omnibus which took them towards Chelsea; and still, for both of them, it swam miraculously in the golden light of a large steady lamp. (534, italics mine)

Here the 'undeveloped shapes' of the vast and mysterious future that Katharine and Ralph contemplate resolve themselves into materials for endurance. The 'difficult region' inhabited by the 'unfinished, the unfulfilled, the unwritten, the unreturned' provides the grounds for the emergence of a futurity replete with the material conditions that will sustain Katharine and Ralph. This future is not the horizonless and heterogeneous future which the witnesses at the start of 'Time Passes' await, but rather one that is explicitly figured as having 'an horizon'. This future stretches beyond the generic horizon of the marriage plot, and into a futurity that novels which end in marriage traditionally elide. The material conditions for endurance that Ralph and Katharine imagine, the books to be written in rooms with hangings and windows that look onto land, imply their endurance beyond the final words of the novel and into a futurity that remains unwritten. But this is not what is interesting about the ending of *Night and Day*: that characters' futures stretch beyond the limit-point of the end of a text is a given for most novels that do not end in the deaths of all their characters.

Every tale that ends with the line 'And they all lived happily ever after' attests to that. What is interesting about the way that futurity is construed at the end of *Night and Day* is the dialectic between this 'difficult region' where the future cannot be scried, and the materially specific future expressed metonymically as books to be written in rooms. This is a dialectic between the Derridean *avenir*, the wholly heterogeneous future, and Braidotti's sustainable future anterior. The 'difficult region' of unknowable futurity is the grounds for the emergence of the more knowable future, but at the same time the more knowable future expressed as books to be written in rooms is a residue or condensation of the more radically unknowable future.

In *Jacob's Room* (1922), the word 'future' is used three times. We hear that Mrs Stuart 'believes in the transmigration of souls, and could read the future in tea leaves' (*JR* 125), and that as Betty Flanders writes, she imagines the future, 'sketching on the cloudy future flocks of Leghorns, Cochin Chinas and Orpingtons' (146). Leghorns, Cochin Chinas, and Orpingtons are breeds of chicken, and it is likely that Betty Flanders is hoping to keep these hens for their eggs—she might look to keep these specific breeds for their capacity to lay eggs. But later we are told that '[t]he flesh and blood of the future depends entirely upon six young men. And as Jacob was one of them, no doubt he looked a little regal and pompous as he turned his page, and Julia Hedge disliked him naturally enough' (174). Scott McCracken reads the phrase 'no doubt' and its proliferation throughout the novel (it appears 'over fifty times') as affirming a scepticism that leaves the novel fundamentally open to possibility: the phrase 'no doubt' 'always raises the possibility of doubt rather than putting it to rest' (McCracken 39). McCracken points out that one of the most frequently used words in *Jacob's Room* is 'perhaps,' which is used over a hundred times (39). The novel does not draw on the resources of the future anterior, according to McCracken, but rather, it 'seems to inaugurate a new, perhaps more radical tense, which we might call the speculative anterior' (40). This is not quite Braidotti's future anterior rooted in present praxis, and nor is it quite Spivak's future anterior that attends upon the work that one will have done. Rather, it bears more similarities to another form of futurity I discussed early in Chapter One, the 'essential emptiness about thoughts with a future-orientation' that Mark Currie discusses in *The Unexpected* (Currie 11). For Currie, thoughts about the future, 'expectations, anticipations, predictions' are always provisional and gain their content only in the moment that they are affirmed or denied. 'Because the future does not exist,'

Currie writes, 'thinking about the future exists in a state of suspense, waiting for its arrival, and for the object of thinking to pass from virtuality into actuality' (11). As it speaks to a future state that might be affirmed or denied, McCracken's speculative anterior, heralded by the 'perhaps,' casts radical doubt over its content, doubt that can only ever be affirmed or denied in the future.

The appearance of the phrase 'no doubt' calls us to cast doubt over the claims that Jacob is one of the 'six young men' upon whom the 'flesh and blood of the future' depends (*JR* 146). We return to the casually eugenicist reproductive futures of *The Voyage Out* with fresh eyes. Whose voice is represented in this passage is up for debate: do we read Jacob's supposition that he is one of those six young men upon whom a eugenicist reproductive futurity rests or do we read Julia Hedge skewering what she supposes to be Jacob's supposition? Or should we, following McCracken somewhat, dwell in the zone of uncertainty inaugurated by the phrase that is meant to dispel doubt? To decide not to decide is to affirm an openness at the heart of *Jacob's Room*, an openness to the possibility that interpretation might not be exhausted. The use of 'no doubt' in this passage signals that the narrowly circumscribed futurity that the 'six young men' represent, a future that, as we have seen already in *The Voyage Out*, is marked by the reproduction of power and those bodies that can uphold it, gives way to something far more open. One thing we can be sure of, however, is that Jacob does not live happily ever after. Jacob Flanders's death might exist in the yet-to-come for much of the novel but his death is inscribed in his name, which is a proleptic gesture towards the Flanders fields where he will die.

The reproductive futurity skewered by Julia Hedge and satirised by the narrator of *Jacob's Room* returns in *Mrs Dalloway* (1925). I have already discussed, albeit briefly, Doctor Bradshaw's eugenicist injunction forbidding 'childbirth' for 'England's lunatics' (*MD* 84). The futurity I want to discuss now is imagined by Peter Walsh as he walks down Whitehall on his return from India:

> Still the *future* of civilisation lies, he thought, in the hands of young men like that; of young men such as he was, thirty years ago; with their love of abstract principles; getting books sent out to them all the way from London to a peak in the Himalayas; reading science; reading philosophy. The *future* lies in the hands of young men like that, he thought. (43, italics mine)

The futurity Peter Walsh imagines takes its cues from the past generally, and from his own past specifically. The 'abstract principles' (43) that the metropole exports all the way to 'a peak in the

Himalayas,' (43) British science and British philosophy (or at least science and philosophy sold in Britain's bookshops) condition this futurity and circumscribe what is possible within its bounds. [17] There is a curious disjunction in this vision of the future: the 'future of civilisation lies in the hands of' men like Peter Walsh was thirty years ago, men who get books shipped from London to India. But what if young men have changed their reading habits in the intervening decades? He watches 'boys in uniform, carrying guns' marching 'with their eyes ahead of them' and 'on their faces an expression like the letters of a legend written round the base of a statue praising duty, gratitude, fidelity, love of England.' (43) He does not find the sight entirely edifying. While he reflects that the boys are given a 'very fine training,' which is in itself a gesture towards futurity, the 'boys of sixteen' look 'weedy, for the most part' and Walsh imagines them 'stand[ing] behind bowls of rice, cakes of soap on counters.' (43) The boys are engaged in an act of ritual memorialisation, laying a wreath on the 'empty tomb,' the Cenotaph commemorating the British dead of the First World War. The marchers have 'taken their vow,' (43) presumably a vow to remember and to continue to remember.

The vow is proleptic: it looks towards future ritual memorialisation, and it is performative, a speech act whose utterance forms part of what David Bradshaw diagnoses as the 'necrolatry of the state' ("'Vanished, Like Leaves'" 107). In a necrolatrous state, the content of the futurity that these boys represent is always and already conditioned by the past, by the sacrifices of the war dead. This is reproductive futurism, after a fashion. In the same article where he diagnoses the necrolatrous state, Bradshaw reads Woolf's reference to Finsbury Pavement. The location from which the boys had brought the wreath, and to which they return, David Bradshaw writes, is 39 Finsbury Square, the 'Headquarters of the Territorial Army Association of the City of London' (110). The Territorial Army was the creation of Richard Burdon Haldane, Secretary of State for War between 1905 and 1912, and Lord High Chancellor between 1912 and 1915. It was a reserve force for adults but schoolboys—the 'boys of sixteen' Walsh watches—would be prepared for it through 'cadet corps and miniature rifle club[s] where they would be thoroughly trained' (110). More than simply being a bolster for Britain's professional forces, Haldane, who was 'a prominent idealist philosopher, deeply read in German metaphysics' envisaged the Territorial Army as part of a '"Hegelian Army".'

---

[17] It is unclear what Walsh reads. In the explanatory notes to her Cambridge edition of *Mrs Dalloway*, Anne Fernald writes that Leonard Woolf took some seventy volumes of Voltaire with him to Ceylon (Fernald in Virginia Woolf *Mrs Dalloway* 241), but does not speculate as to what Peter Walsh might read.

In his article Bradshaw cites military historian M.E. Howard, who writes that Haldane wanted 'to establish a clear idea of the Army, with all its reserves as a *Ding an Sich*' a thing-in-itself which would be purposive, exist not for a purpose but as an end in itself. Haldane 'visualised an entire Nation in Arms … [where] … the military training and indoctrination of the Nation should be undertaken by a new Territorial Army and by associated training corps at schools and universities' (110). Bradshaw writes about Haldane's associations with Leslie Stephen and with the young Virginia Stephen (112), but his article does not expand on Haldane's neo-Hegelianism as ideology, *per se*. For the purposes of this analysis, I suggest that Haldane's vision for an armed *Ding an Sich* was intended to accelerate the dialectic and spread the Hegelian State not by means of sublation but by force. The boys of sixteen are not just performing an act of ritual memorialisation, but rather are recruited as part of a vast militaristic-philosophical machine that generates Haldane's neo-Hegelian futurity.

The future Peter Walsh scries in the heart of the metropole is contrasted with the one that Septimus, a victim of the same war commemorated by the Cenotaph, imagines. Septimus is moved to an 'agony of fear' when he sees a Skye terrier sniffing his trousers. He sees the dog 'turning into a man' and asks why he can 'see through bodies, see into the future, when dogs will become men' (58). I will argue in Chapter Six of this thesis that Septimus's vision of a canid futurity is instantiated in *Between the Acts*'s animal poetics, in the later novel's play between human and canine, and further, that this poetics acts as a spanner in the works of what Agamben has called the 'anthropological machine' that produces both the category of the human and of the inhuman, that which is excluded from the human and becomes bare life (*The Open* 37-38). For now, I wish to read this expression of futurity as one that evades the colonial futures planned in the ministries that line Whitehall and evades the official memorialisation of the War, but can tip into something far worse than compulsory memorialisation. A future where dogs become men has the potential to be a heterogeneous one, one that makes space for the wholly other, a Derridean *avenir*. But it just as easily has the potential to slip into eugenics. Later in this chapter, we shall see Woolf's concerns with breeding take canid form in the opening pages of *Flush*, and we will see just how easily the language of canid eugenics, of pedigree and breeds and breeding, can be applied to humans. A future where dogs become men also has the potential to be monstrous.

To the Lighthouse (1927) opens with a discussion of the future: not of just the prospect of a future trip to the lighthouse, but of James Ramsay's future prospects, in a lengthy and complicated sentence which is worth quoting in full:

> Since he belonged, even at the age of six, to that great clan which cannot keep this feeling separate from that, but must let *future* prospects, with their joys and sorrows, cloud what is actually at hand, since to such people even in earliest childhood any turn in the wheel of sensation has the power to crystallize and transfix the moment upon which its gloom or radiance rests, James Ramsay, sitting on the floor cutting out pictures from the illustrated catalogue of the Army and Navy Stores, endowed the picture of a refrigerator as his mother spoke with heavenly bliss. It was fringed with joy. (*TL* 7, italics mine)

The first question to ask of this passage is Auerbach's: 'who is speaking?' The future in this passage might be the young James Ramsay's, but it is almost certainly not he who discusses his future in these terms, but his mother, who sees for him a future 'all red and ermine on the Bench' or as a statesman 'directing a stern and momentous enterprise in some crisis of public affairs' (7). This passage posits that James Ramsay has an affective relationship with the future: perhaps he is anxious about it, perhaps he contemplates it with joy, but he nonetheless has an affective relation with it. This affective relationship with the future, moreover, is not something that everyone has, it would seem. Who else has it as a child remains unspoken but we can perhaps work backwards and suppose that those 'all red and ermine on the Bench' or 'directing a stern and momentous enterprise in some crisis' have had it at some point. What makes those who are particularly open to letting 'future prospects, with their joys and sorrows, cloud what is actually at hand' apt to sit on the Bench or direct public affairs is left similarly unspoken.

The imagery of this passage, its crystallization and transfixion is reminiscent of the conclusion of Walter Pater's *Studies in the History of the Renaissance*, and Pater's famous maxim that '[t]o burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this ecstasy is success in life' (Pater 120), although with an altogether more worldly, cynical, and perhaps even eugenicist slant. Pater's vision of 'success in life' is one that is aesthetic and philosophical in nature, one concerned with 'splendour of experience' and which 'for ever curiously test[s] new ideas and court[s] new impressions, never acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy of Comte, or of Hegel, or of our own' (120). Success for James's mother, however, wears 'red and ermine' and sits on the Bench, or perhaps directs public affairs. Unlike Pater's flame, which must be stoked, Mrs Ramsay's 'power to

crystallize and transfix the moment' is one that is given in 'even in earliest childhood' and perhaps at birth, and in being endowed with such power, Mrs Ramsay filiates her son with a 'great clan which cannot keep this feeling separate from that' and who 'must let future prospects, with their joys and sorrows, cloud what is actually at hand' (*TL* 7). In reading this peculiar admixture of feelings in her son's face, Mrs Ramsay is led to imagine a future for her son in Whitehall or Westminster, amid the grand streets that Peter Walsh prowls, thinking of futurity. By virtue of being filiated with this 'great clan' to whom an affective relationship with the future is given, Mrs Ramsay seems to say that James's success in life (which is to say success in the institutions that govern the pre-War metropole) is given. Perhaps it is as inevitable as the 'future excellence' that is bred into Flush, 'whatever might be the levity of the present […] even as a puppy' (*F* 12)—after all, James Ramsay has a 'high forehead' and 'fierce blue eyes' (*TL* 7) that are not gozzled.

The word 'future' is used eight times in *Orlando: A Biography* (1928), and three of these are concerned with gender, grammatical or otherwise. The first two of such usages occur at the moment Orlando changes sex:

> Orlando had become a woman—there is no denying it. But in every other respect, Orlando remained precisely as he had been. The change of sex, though it altered their *future*, did nothing whatever to alter their identity. […] His memory—but in *future* we must, for convention's sake, say 'her' for 'his' and 'she' for 'he'—her memory, then, went back through all the events of her past life without encountering any obstacle. (*O* 128, italics mine)

Rachel Crossland reads this moment of pronominal alteration not just as an affirmation of Orlando's new gender but also an affirmation of the far-reaching implications of the nascent field of quantum physics. Crossland notes that this shift in pronouns is not simply what she terms a 'pronoun transplant' (Crossland 50), but something far more radical. She tracks these shifting pronouns through the varying states of *Orlando* and reads the narrator's short-lived use of 'them' and 'their' to refer to Orlando, as well as a further gendered state: 'Orlando the man and Orlando the woman' (*O* 172). Neither simply man nor woman, nor a mixture of the two, Crossland filiates this final state to the newly theorised 'wave-particle duality and complementarity,' and to the 'new quantum world' that this theory heralded (Crossland 51). This is akin perhaps to the 'perpetual marriage of granite and rainbow' that Woolf theorises in her 1927 essay 'The New Biography' (*E* 4 478). Granite and rainbow, wave and light, man and woman come to intersect not only within the pages of *Orlando*

but in the body of Orlando, and to speak of Orlando in the future is to acknowledge Orlando as the locus for all these intersections.

The final invocation of the future in *Orlando* comes at the present moment, at the precise moment that Orlando realises that she is in the present: 'For what more terrifying revelation can there be that it is the present moment? That we survive the shock at all is only possible because the past shelters us on one side and the future on another' (*O* 272). The present moment here is rendered as a wafer-thin zone of contact with the past on one side and, crucially, with the future, which acts as a shield, on the other. It is this invocation of a fleeting present, with its invocation of an unknown futurity, that leads Melanie Micir to call *Orlando* a 'constitutively unfinished text' (Micir 113). Ending not just at the present moment but at the precise moment that Vita Sackville-West was to finish reading her copy 'in a careful coordination of these strange temporalities' (112), *Orlando* queers the biographical form and 'asks us to rethink queer feminist modernism more generally as an unfinished project,' Micir writes (129). I want to supplement Micir's reading by suggesting that the unfinished nature inherent to the present moment at which *Orlando* ends is an orientation towards the future, and that *Orlando* hence imagines Orlando enduring beyond the final pages of the book, beyond the 'twelfth stroke of midnight, Thursday, the eleventh of October, Nineteen hundred and Twenty Eight' (*O* 300). But as I have already discussed in the context of *Night and Day*, Micir's conclusion that *Orlando* imagines Orlando enduring is not a very radical conclusion. Bryony Randall suggests a more radical conclusion, that in its 'insistence on its now-ness,' *Orlando* 'interpellate[s]' its reader 'as co-existing with the text's moment' ("The Day of Orlando" 135). This 'now-ness' is 'paradox[ical] in the fact that this insistence on the present as 11th October 1928 becomes almost immediately anachronistic' (135). Rather than fixing the 'day' of *Orlando* in the autumn of 1928, *Orlando*'s 'insistence' on that date 'paradoxically reinforce[s]' the 'recurrence of the daily' (137), hammering home that the 'to-day' invoked at the end of *Orlando*, which is the same as the 'to-day' when Vita Sackville-West read her copy of the novel, is not the same as the 'to-day' when any later reader encounters the novel. The openness to futurity that Micir hails is thus an unruly, untimely openness which points to its own nature as paradox.

The concern with the present moment that we see at the end of *Orlando* becomes a fundamental stylistic and philosophical principle of Woolf's next novel, *The Waves* (1931), whose

stylised monologues bespeak a phenomenological landscape concerned with inhabiting the present moment. The word 'future' appears three times in the text and is only used by Bernard. He first uses the word as he is sent off to school, noting the 'pitiable' antics of his classmates 'for future reference' in his notebook (*W* 20-1). The other two uses of the word are both in his long summative monologue. Bernard says of his memories of Jinny that 'There was no past, no future; merely the moment in its ring of light, and our bodies; and the inevitable climax, the ecstasy' (151), while later he says that she 'was without future or speculation, but respected the moment with complete integrity' (159). This phenomenology is rendered as complete and sensual, even quasi-sexual (or perhaps just outright sexual) captivation by the present moment. Endurance (to return to the Braidottian terminology we saw earlier in the chapter) is a dim prospect. But crucially, this is not necessarily Jinny's phenomenology: not in this passage, at least. Rather, it is Jinny's phenomenology as described by Bernard.

Later in his monologue, Bernard will ask 'But how describe the world seen without a self?' (171). Is the 'self' that Bernard hails here 'obdurate,' to use the word Woolf employed in the typescript draft of 'Time Passes'? Do these selves extend into the past or the future? Or are they punctual, confined to and captivated by the present moment? In *The Phantom Table* (2000), Ann Banfield constructs an incredibly complex theoretical armature through which to read Woolf, encompassing a combination of Bloomsbury philosophy (Bertrand Russell figures most prominently), aesthetics and Woolf's own writings. Banfield writes of the world seen without a self as 'an unoccupied landscape, with its own contours, which is also the landscape of the past; stars light years away seen by no living person.' This landscape is 'recognisable by its multiplicity of things and its absence of one thing, by its atomism and emptiness.' Outside of perception, be that beyond the viewer's gaze, or before or after the perceiving subject is present to perceive lies a 'fertile emptiness' (Banfield 139). These landscapes are empty because they are 'mindless' (141), potential perspectives without a subject present to perceive them. The future, thus drawn, recedes from view, becoming radically inaccessible.[18]

---

[18] Inaccessibility is a potent trope in criticism of *The Waves*. J. Hillis Miller writes that the peculiar stylistics properties of *The Waves* 'presuppose[] a vast impersonal memory bank that stores everything that has ever happened, every thought or feeling of every person.' This memory bank is 'absent. It is not accessible to direct

But there is another answer to Bernard's question, one that is rooted not in Banfield's reading of Bloomsbury philosophy but in Woolf's own aesthetics. Banfield focuses on the phrase 'seen without a self' in her analysis but I think that the crucial part of Bernard's question comes earlier in the sentence: 'But how describe…'. To consider the world seen without a self is not necessarily to consider the world without oneself, but it could also be to consider it without *another* self. To *describe* the world seen without another self is to write an elegy for that missing self. And when Woolf considers, in her diary entry of the 27th of June 1925 that she 'will invent a new name for my books to supplant "novel",' 'elegy' is the word upon which she alights (*D* 3 34). In the years that follow Woolf will come to write other statements that explicitly filiate her writing with the elegiac form. It is my contention here that Bernard is not engaging in metaphysical musings but rather asking his interlocutor about a question which conditions the elegiac form: how do you describe someone's irrevocable absence? How do you write about them, without them? A future in which the subject of the elegy is no longer there? And, to be charitable to Banfield, what if that self the elegiac writer describes the world seen without is in fact one's own self? My reading of the futures—or, rather, lack of futures—of *The Waves* should be tempered with the caveat that I have only discussed Bernard's contributions to the text because the specific word 'future' (and not any cognates thereof) only appears in portions of the narrative assigned to him. Jinny, Rhoda and Susan, and Louis and Neville might have other thoughts on the future that fly by the nets of this distant reading.

Flush: A Biography (1933) returns us to the critique of reproductive futurity we saw in Woolf's earlier novels. Flush, the cocker spaniel belonging to Elizabeth Barrett Browning, whose biography Woolf writes, is given even as a puppy to 'future excellence' (*F* 12). This 'future excellence' is no happy accident, nor the fruit of Flush's hard work, but rather the result of centuries of eugenics that engineered an 'aristocracy of dogs by the time Queen Elizabeth was on the throne' (7). This aristocracy is moulded, its bodies literally given form by the Spaniel Club, which jealously polices its population and 'plainly [lays] down what constitute the vices of a spaniel, and what constitute its virtues' (7). We learn that 'light eyes' are an 'undesirable' trait in the canid bodies

---

experience' but thoughts and feelings it stores […] are always already turned into appropriate language, complete with figures of speech for sensations and feelings that cannot be said literally.' The question that animates Miller throughout is 'Why is *The Waves* like it is? This is apparently the 'simplest explanation'. (J. Hillis Miller 668)

policed by the Spaniel Club, but 'curled ears are still worse' while 'to be born with a light nose or a topknot is nothing less than fatal' (7). Meanwhile, dogs with heads that are 'smooth, rising without a too-decided stoop from the muzzle' and 'comparatively rounded and well-developed' skulls with 'plenty of room for brain power' are viewed positively (7). We might note in the Spaniel Club's interest in capacious skulls more than a passing resemblance to the human pseudoscience of phrenology. This spaniel aristocracy with roomy skulls and eyes that are 'full but not gozzled' (7) is perpetuated by selective breeding: 'The spaniel that exhibits these points is encouraged and bred from; the spaniel who persists in perpetuating topknots and light noses is cut off from the privileges and emoluments of his kind. Thus the judges lay down the law and, laying down the law, impose penalties and privileges which ensure that the law shall be obeyed' (7). The narrator goes on to note that 'No Club has such jurisdiction upon the breed of man' (8), and that the boundaries of the human aristocracy are policed with far less rigour.

We see here the terminus of a line of critique has led us from Woolf's earliest novel, *The Voyage Out*, and the imperial-eugenic musings of Hughling Elliot, Evelyn Murgatroyd and Helen Ambrose, via *Mrs Dalloway*'s Bradshaw, who makes 'England prosper' by 'seclud[ing] her lunatics, forb[idding] childbirth, penaliz[ing] despair' and 'making it impossible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense of proportion' (*MD* 84), and the 'great clan' in *To the Lighthouse* (*TL* 7). And now we come to January 1934, which is where I locate a shift in Woolf's thinking of the future, a shift from critiquing reproductive and eugenic futurities to an attempt to imagine the future as a reparative space in which these reproductive and eugenic imperatives come to be suspended. This mode of thinking through the future comes as a reaction to the rise of European fascism and the prospect—and then the reality—of a second cataclysmic global conflict.

The next sections of my thesis are concerned with the novels, essays and draft materials that Woolf wrote after this watershed. The remaining portion of this section is an attempt to make the case for seeing January 1934 as the beginning of a distinct period in Woolf's oeuvre, a period of late work.

Late Woolf: Or, Why January 1934?

The previous section of this chapter traced a narrative that drew to a close with the publication of *Flush* in 1933. This section of the chapter seeks to explain what happened in the opening months of 1934 and why I posit it as the beginning of a 'late' phase of Woolf's work which is marked by changing conceptions of the future and futurity in the face of nascent European fascism and the prospect—and then the reality—of cataclysmic global conflict. I argue that, starting in the January of 1934, Woolf's thinking of the future becomes reparative, and the future concomitantly becomes a space in which processes of reparation can begin. The future becomes a space from which genuine difference can emerge and where more sustainable ways of living can be found: difference that is not quite Derrida's radical alterity; modes of more sustainable life that are not quite Braidotti's Spinozist-Deleuzian endurance. My figuration of 'late' Woolf is thus rather different to other figurations of late Woolf, late modernity and late work.

Anna Snaith delineates a late period in Woolf's work that covers roughly a similar area to mine: for Snaith, Woolf's late works are the works of the 1930s and the early 1940s—*The Years*, *Three Guineas* and *Between the Acts*. In this period, Snaith argues, Woolf's work is marked by a distinctive 'hyperconsciousness of form and genre,' a hyperconsciousness that emerges as a response to the worsening political situation of the 1930s (Snaith "Late Woolf" 3). Late Woolf is characterised by an 'alertness […] to the politics of form, or the form of the political' (6). Snaith locates the start of this period in 1931, as Woolf puts pen to paper to start writing what would eventually be published as *The Years* and *Three Guineas*—at this stage, an essay-novel hybrid that Woolf would abandon in due course, but which was the germ from which her works of 1937 and 1938 would grow. I will expand on the genealogy of *The Years* and *Three Guineas*, which Snaith's work has done much to clarify, in the next chapter. Snaith reminds her readers that politics of form and the form of the political became ever-more pressing in this decade: she notes that the 'beginning of *The Years* […] coincided with government crisis' and that its 'composition ran concurrently with Hitler's rise to power' (6). Insofar as it is rooted in the ineradicable facticity of political crisis and nascent fascism, the argument I assert throughout this thesis shares many predicates with Snaith's. Her argument provides key critical coordinates for my own, and I will continue to draw on it throughout the remainder of this chapter.

Alice Wood's 2013 monograph *Virginia Woolf's Late Cultural Criticism* works with largely the same set of texts as I do in this thesis and like mine engages with their drafts through the lens of genetic criticism. Wood writes that her 'genetic, historicist-feminist examination of [Woolf's late] works reveals the evolution of Woolf's late cultural criticism from her previous writing and thinking, and in response to the tempestuous social and political climate of 1931-41' (Wood 2). I will return to Wood's discussion of the drafts of *The Years* in my Chapter Three, but for now I want to alight on her specific demarcation point: Wood views Woolf's 'Professions for Women' speech, delivered in January 1931, alongside the six *Good Housekeeping* essays, drafted in the early months of 1931 and published from December 1931 to December 1932, as the incipient moment in Woolf's 'late turn to experimental socio-political commentary' (31). As such, Wood's figuration of 'late' Woolf differs from mine insofar as it is not specifically rooted in imagining futures, although our respective arguments share many of the same predicates. My work on Woolf's late drafts would look very different without Wood's, and I return to her meticulously detailed, precise, and incisive analysis of the drafts of *The Years* and *Three Guineas* throughout Chapters Three and Four of this thesis.

In the final volume of her trilogy on Woolf's diaries (2018), Barbara Lounsberry demarcates a late phase in Woolf's career, as a writer generally and as a diarist specifically, which begins in 1929. Her argument tracks a similar political turn in Woolf's thought to Snaith's and Wood's and is similarly attentive to form. The form that concerns Lounsberry, however, is the physical form of Woolf's late diaries: in 1929, Woolf 'suddenly […] abandons her two-and-a-half-year-long experiment with a loose-leaf diary (meant to catch more 'stray' or 'loose' thoughts) and starts a new diary in a bound diary book' (Lounsberry 2). This return to a hand-bound codex diary marks a new and distinctive phase in Woolf's career as a diarist, Lounsberry argues. She reads this return as Woolf 'turn[ing] to a bound diary book for support, as if she sense[d] danger ahead' (2). She also notes that at the same time as turning back to a bound diary, Woolf begins to write more frequently and in the mornings, as a 'welcome new and "free page"' which is a 'morning prop but also […] a bridge from (and to register) her inner artistic fights' (3). Lounsberry's reading of an intensely politicised late Woolf seeks to add to a 'growing trend that sees Woolf's whole body of work across the 1930s, to her death in 1941, as one interrelated, yet multiform, foray against tyranny and war' (3). This reading of Woolf's late work resonates with Snaith's, and with my own. I, too, make the case that Woolf's

late work can be read as a foray against tyranny and war, and that this foray takes many forms—the form of published novels and essays, private (but published) diaries and letters, and unpublished drafts. My own contribution to the critical trend Lounsberry describes is to attend to Woolf's archive in this period and to read it as both documenting and working through Woolf's profound commitments against war and towards peace, and towards finding new modes of thinking, creating and living that would ensure peace.

The intensely political readings of Snaith and Lounsberry align with Tyrus Miller's delineation of a 'late modernism' in his landmark monograph of that title (1999). 'If modernist poetics are a mesh of interrelated statements, evaluations, and judgements,' Miller writes,' then late modernist writing is the product of the pressure of historical circumstances on that mesh, which threatens to fray or break at its weakest points' (*Late Modernism* 19). Miller locates the moment when late modernism emerges in 1927, after the General Strike, which initiated a period that Wyndham Lewis called in his 1937 memoir *Blasting and Bombardiering* the 'post-Post-War' (27). Miller writes that for Lewis, the Strike 'at once exposed the moribund nature of British social institutions and revealed the unreadiness of labour to offer an alternative' (70). Miller's demarcation comfortably accommodates my timeline—indeed, 'Time Passes,' which we read in this chapter and the previous one and which was written in the midst of the General Strike could be seen as an artifact of Miller's late modernism. Miller writes that 'late modernist writers in no way ignored their social context; in fact, they were deeply troubled by their inability to keep it at a manageable distance. […] These works are perforated and torn by their relation to history, which is here occulted beneath a dense textual tangle and there exposed in transparent allusion and bold polemic' (32). Miller's monograph reads Wyndham Lewis, Djuna Barnes, Samuel Beckett and Mina Loy, but these sentences might just as easily be applied to the late Woolf that Snaith and Lounsberry read—and that I read in this thesis.

But I am not convinced that Miller's figuration of late modernism as something deliberately unproductive can be applied to Woolf's late work. His book begins with the statement that 'Since the late 1920s, it has become an increasingly central part of the avant-garde's vocation to profess its lack of vocation' (3). His phrasing here is reminiscent of Giorgio Agamben's figuration (after Aristotle) of potentiality as the potential not to be—a modality that he theorises from as early as *The*

Coming Community (1990) all the way through to the end of the *Homo sacer* project, in *The Use of Bodies* (2016). Miller makes the link between Agamben's thought and his own explicit in a recent article on Marcel Duchamp's *Green Box*, which was itself published in 1934 (Tyrus Miller "Delay in Glass" n.p.). I draw on this strain of Agamben's thought in Chapter Six of this thesis, in reading modes of community, 'coming' and otherwise in *Between the Acts* and the drafts of 'Anon' and 'The Reader', but not in the service of the mode of futurity that Miller imagines his late modernists anticipating. Miller envisages his monograph's subjects '[s]inking themselves faithlessly into a present devoid of future, into a movement grinding to a halt and an aesthetic on the threshold of dissolution, the writers of late modernism prepared themselves, without hope, to pass over to the far side of the end' (*Late Modernism* 14). This is where I draw the line. Miller's mode of late modernist nihilism might work for Wyndham Lewis and Samuel Beckett, but Woolf does not share their affective relationship towards the future. Though the period of late work that I delineate in this thesis is temporally coterminous with Miller's late modernist period, one of my implicit aims throughout this thesis is to show just how different Woolf's relationship with the future is from the nihilist futures Miller reads in Samuel Beckett and Wyndham Lewis.

Edward Said's *On Late Style* (2006) constitutes a landmark reading of lateness and work produced at the end of a writer's life. Said's reading follows Theodor Adorno's in positing lateness as marked by a 'nonharmonious, nonserene tension, and above all, a sort of deliberately unproductive *going against*…' (Said 7). There is a commonality here between Miller's figuration of late modernism as unproductive and Said's figuration of late style as unproductive. There is also a commonality between Said's late style and the late Woolf of both Snaith and Lounsberry, insofar as Said writes that '[l]ateness is being at the end, fully conscious, full of memory, and also very (even preternaturally) aware of the present' (14). The intensely political late Woolf theorised by Snaith and Lounsberry was certainly aware of the present, perhaps even preternaturally so. I find Said's insistence that biography necessarily follows a set path troubling, however. In the opening pages of his work, Said writes of three 'great problematics,' the last of which is the 'late or last period of life, the decay of the body, the onset of ill health or other factors that even in a younger period bring on the possibility of an untimely end' (6). Applying Said's three problematics to Woolf's life highlights the flaws in Said's schema. The first of Said's three problematics is birth, 'the whole notion of

beginning, the moment of birth and origin' (4). The second great problematic is everything that goes on between birth and the 'late or last period of life': 'the second great problematic is about the continuity that occurs after birth, the exfoliation from a beginning: in the time from birth to youth, reproductive generation, maturity' (5). Leaving aside Said's assumption that the middle period of life necessarily involves 'reproductive generation' and that Woolf never had children, we ought to ask how we are to draw Said's boundary between youthful 'exfoliation' and later life in Woolf's case.

The earliest diaries of the young Virginia Stephen provide glimpses into days patterned by the therapeutic regime prescribed her after her bout of mental illness in 1895, following her mother's death. These days invariably feature at least four hours daily out of the house—Mitchell Leaska, the diaries' editor writes that this therapy was prescribed by a Dr Seton (*PA* xvi). Meanwhile, we read in the diaries themselves of trips to doctors such as the one she and her siblings took to Dr James Black on 14th January 1897 'about my medicine' (*PA* 13). She attempted to take her own life for the first time that we know of in 1904, following the death of her father and again in September 1913, the latter time overdosing on '100 grains of veronal' (Lee 178-180; 330). Over her life, according to Lee, Woolf 'consulted at least twelve doctors,' all of whom prescribed treatments such as 'rest cures, milk and meat diets for weight gain, fresh air, avoidance of exercise, avoidance of excitement and early nights,' as well as an array of medication including 'veronal, adalin, chloral hydrate, paraldehyde, potassium bromide, and digitalis' (182-4). It can be argued that the 'onset of ill health' that Said argues presages late work occurred in Woolf's childhood. Does this mean that we should mark Woolf's late phase as starting in 1895? Or does it mean we should look elsewhere?

Snaith writes, '[f]ifty-nine when she died, [Woolf's] writing in the 1930s was not dominated by those concerns often associated with late style: mortality, summation, or culmination' (Snaith "Late Woolf" 2). While one cannot argue that Woolf was unaware of her own mortality, I am not sure that death was incipient for her in the sense that Said's three-fold demarcation of life implies until 1940 at the earliest: Woolf did not spend months or years preparing to die. Rather, the prospect of suicide in the face of a Nazi invasion of Britain weighed heavily on Woolf as the phoney war turned all-too real. On the 13th of May 1940, Woolf notes in her diary that 'though L. says he has petrol in the garage for suicide shd. Hitler win, we go on' (*D* 5 284). I read the first word of this

sentence, 'though' and the final three words 'we go on' as being of similar import to Leonard's preparations for suicide: the final three words expressing a will to endure in the face of imminent death. Two days later, she writes that she discussed suicide 'if Hitler lands' as a 'sensible, rather matter of fact talk.' In the same diary entry, however, she expresses a 'wish for ten more years' (284-5). This attitude was not uncommon among Woolf's peers. Lee writes:

> The Woolfs were well aware that the threats in 'his master's voice' were meant for them, as well as for millions of others. They had good sources of information, and it was known that with the invasion plan for July 1940 the Gestapo had drawn up an 'Arrest List' or 'Black List' for Great Britain, the 'Sonderfahndungslist G.B.' which ran to 350 pages (and had blank spaces for more names to be added.) On this list, alongside many of their friends and acquaintances, were 'Leonhard Woolf, Schriftsteller, RSHA VIG I, and Virginia Woolf, Schriftstellerin, RSHA VIG.' No one in 1940 could have been *sure* of being on the list, but they could have taken a reasonable guess, and Leonard and Virginia Woolf were not the only people to make careful, practical suicide plans. (Lee 730)

Even though Woolf notes on the twentieth of May 1940 that 'the war is like desperate illness' (285), I am not sure that the illness Woolf diagnoses here is analogous to Said's final illness. Rather, this illness seems only to have come in the very final days of Woolf's life.

It is not perhaps until the first of her suicide letters to Leonard, dated the 18th of March 1941, that Woolf writes in no uncertain terms that 'I feel certain that I am going mad again' and that 'I shant recover this time' (*L* 6: 481, §. 3702). Woolf continued to write letters to correspondents including John Lehmann (with whom she discussed *Between the Acts*) and Vita Sackville-West before writing two final suicide notes. The first is dated 23rd March, addressed to Vanessa Bell. It opens with the admission that 'I am always hearing voices, and I know I shant get over it now,' and ends with the line 'I have fought against it, but I cant any longer' (*L* 6 485, §. 3708). The final letter is addressed to Leonard, in which Woolf writes that 'I know I shall never get over this' (*L* 6 487, §. 3710). This letter is dated 28th March 1941 and Woolf wrote it shortly before her death. These letters are not dated by Woolf but rather by the *Letters'* editors, Joanne Trautmann Banks and Nigel Nicolson, who use their chronology—which differs significantly from those asserted by both Leonard Woolf and Quentin Bell—to argue that Woolf's 'suicide was premeditated by ten days' (*L* 6 489). If we follow Said's definition of late work as work written after the 'onset of ill health,' (Said 6), we are led to ask when Woolf's late work is written. Does Woolf's 'late' work start in 1895, after her first serious bout of the mental illness that was to recur periodically throughout her life? Does it

start at her first suicide attempt in 1905? Or does it begin in 1940, as Leonard starts to stockpile petrol in the garage in preparation for invasion? Does it begin on 18th of March 1941, at the start of the ten-day period in which Trautmann Banks and Nicolson argue that Woolf premeditated her suicide? Woolf's lifelong illness strains at the limit of Said's model.

Said's discussion of late work draws on that of Theodor Adorno, whose own figuration of late work in his 1937 essay 'Spatstil Beethovens' (translated in 2002 as 'Late Style in Beethoven') eschews biography and the biographical. For Adorno, biography is suspect, even deceptive on a metaphysical level:

> Death is imposed only on created beings, not on works of art, and thus it has appeared in art only in a refracted mode, as allegory. […] By declaring mortal subjectivity to be the substance of the late work, it hopes to be able to perceive death in unbroken form in the work of art. This is the deceptive crown of its metaphysics. (Adorno 566)

Adorno and Woolf wrote in alarmed response to the same political climate: by 1937 Adorno was living in exile in Oxford, having fled Nazi Germany in 1934 (Jeffries 194), and his essay on Beethoven's late style is contemporaneous with Woolf's work editing the proofs of *The Years* and drafting *Three Guineas*. Adorno writes that Beethoven's late work is marked by a new relation to subjectivity. However, this subjectivity is not the subjectivity of the dying composer—Adorno has sworn off biography. Rather, '[t]he relationship of the conventions to subjectivity itself must be seen as constituting the formal law from which the content of the late works emerges' (Adorno 566). He continues,

> The power of subjectivity in the late works of art is the irascible gesture with which it takes leaves of the works themselves. It breaks their bonds, not in order to express itself, but in order, expressionless, to cast off the appearance of art. Of the works themselves, it leaves only fragments behind, and communicates itself, like a cipher, only through the blank spaces from which it has disengaged itself. (566)

My research finds a formal parallel to Adorno's figuration of the late work as shattered fragment in the fragments of 'Anon' and 'The Reader,' the drafts towards the literary-historical project Woolf had started work on in the final months of her life. I read these fragments in Chapters Five and Six. It is tempting to draw a direct correlation between the mode of fragmented subjectivity Adorno reads in Beethoven's late work and the fragments in Woolf's late archive, but we cannot know Woolf's intention for her drafts: had she lived, she may have continued working on the project and synthesised the draft fragments into a finished work. A more theoretical correlative can be found in Woolf's

diary. On the 9ᵗʰ of June 1940, after noting that the French government has retreated from Paris, she writes 'It struck me that one curious feeling is, that the writing "I", has vanished. No audience. No echo. Thats part of one's death.' (*D* 5 293). As the war presses on and the prospect of an Axis victory seems increasingly likely, Woolf notes a new and troubling form of writerly subjectivity marked by a loss of 'audience,' of 'echo' and of the 'writing 'I''. In the final paragraphs of his essay on Beethoven, Adorno writes of a similar shift in the composer's late work: 'Objective is the fractured landscape, subjective the light in which—alone—it glows into life. [Late Beethoven] does not bring about their harmonious synthesis' (Adorno 567). In the chapters that follow this, I will argue that the possibility of synthesis—harmonious or otherwise—animates *Between the Acts* and 'Anon' and 'The Reader,' the system of texts that Woolf writes in 1940-41, but this does not necessarily account for what I think is distinct about *The Years* and *Three Guineas*, or why I think that these earlier works, too, constitute 'late' work.

So, what happens in January 1934? On the 6ᵗʰ of January, Woolf starts drafting the 1917 chapter of the book that, after a long and painstaking process of drafting and redrafting, becomes *The Years*. I discuss this draft at much greater length in my next chapter. Briefly, though, I use the next section of my thesis to make the case that the 1917 chapter of the holograph draft of *The Years* acts as a key *avant-texte*, a precursor, not just to the corresponding passage in the published versions of *The Years* but also for *Three Guineas*. Much of the distinctive imagery in *Three Guineas* finds its first expression in this chapter of the draft *Years*: the revolutionary rhetorical fire that accompanies the guinea never sent for 'Rags. Petrol. Matches.' (*TG* 157); the complex invocations of Antigone and Creon; perhaps even a Society of Outsiders that exists outside the structures and strictures of the patriarchy. These tropes and more originate, I will argue, from the writing that Woolf undertook in the early weeks of 1934, from the dialogue in this lengthy draft scene—some 73 manuscript pages. The discussion of the diners, sheltering from an air raid in Maggie Pargiter's basement, constitutes a utopian imaginary, and I contend that this utopian imaginary inaugurates a new and distinctive phase in Woolf's fiction insofar as it marks a change in her thinking through the future and the prospect of futurity.

I should note that this utopian imaginary does not herald a utopian turn. I am not making the argument that Woolf thinks systematically about utopias or utopianism after January 1934, but rather

that her thinking of the future takes a reparative turn as she drafts this scene.[19] I use the word 'reparative' after Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's use of the word in her essay 'Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You're So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay Is About You,' which I discussed briefly in Chapter One of this thesis. Sedgwick draws on the work of psychoanalyst Melanie Klein in order to scope out two positionalities (out of many possible positionalities—Sedgwick's essay deals with two terms but refrains from creating a binary) from which it is possible to read. One of these modes of reading is 'paranoid.' Sedgwick's essay anatomises the paranoiac mode of reading, finding in paranoid thought five essential traits: paranoid thought is 'anticipatory,' it is 'reflexive and mimetic,' it is 'a strong theory,' and a 'theory of negative affects,' and finally, paranoid thought 'places its faith in exposure' (Sedgwick 130). By contrast, reparative thought is that which seeks to 'use one's own resources to assemble or "repair" the murderous part-objects into something like a whole—though, I would emphasise, not necessarily like any preexisting whole' (128). Sedgwick writes that the 'desire of a reparative impulse […] is additive and accretive' (149), that it seeks to add more and confer plenitude upon its object. She aligns reparative reading with what affect theorist Silvan Tomkins calls 'weak affect theory.' Weak theory 'can only account for "near" phenomena' and is 'little better than a description of the phenomena which it seeks to explain' (Tomkins in Sedgwick 134). By contrast, strong theory works to anatomise, to explain and to bring progressively more into its grasp. To read Woolf as a utopian writer or a writer of utopias would be to look for a strong theory—a strong theory of positive affect, perhaps even one that gestures at reparation—but a strong theory nonetheless.[20] To some extent, strong theory is impossible to avoid. Sedgwick's anatomisation of paranoid thought is a strong theory. Even my attempt to posit a reparative turn in Woolf's work on or about January 1934 is a strong theory, insofar as I attempt to use it as a theoretical lens through which to view Woolf's late work.

In a 2018 special edition of *Modernism/modernity*, Paul K. Saint-Amour turns the theoretical armature of weak theory towards modernism. This is a move which he sees as historically

---

[19] For a theoretically and historically rigorous examination of Woolf's interaction with utopian thought, cf. Pollentier, Caroline. "Between Aesthetic and Political Theory: Virginia Woolf's Utopian Pacifism." *Virginia Woolf, Europe, and Peace, Volume 2: Aesthetics and Theory*, edited by Peter Adkins and Derek Ryan, Clemson University Press, 2020, pp. 203-218.

[20] As a side note, the proposal for this PhD looked very different indeed. I proposed a project that sought to locate and theorize institutional power in Woolf. My work would have been both strong (in the sense of affect theory) and paranoid.

counterintuitive, as weakness is not 'a word that would seem, at first blush, to have anything to do with modernism.' This modernism 'doesn't blush; it blasts. Its reputation is for strength *in extremis*—for steep critiques of modernity, energetic convention busting, the breaking of vessels' (Saint-Amour 437). But, as he goes on to note, this modernism is nigh-unrecognisable compared to the modernism studied in the late 2010s, as the New Modernist Studies enters its second decade. He writes that the narrative of a blasting and breaking modernism 'verges on cartoon vitalism' and that 'equating modernism with this kind of muscular icon smashing and warrior masculinity misses both the traditionalism of the strong and the dissidence of the weak,' concluding that '"[s]trong" modernism belongs to a largely superseded moment in modernist studies' (437). What might be the affordances of weakness, and of a modernist studies that embraces weak thought? In spite of, or perhaps because of, all its 'baggage,' weakness, for Saint-Amour, 'helps us continue to make theory and modernism strange to itself' (438). In his article, Saint-Amour attempts to delineate an 'immanent theory of modernism weak enough to permit the horizontal frictions and attachments necessary for field formation' and to imagine a modernist studies predicated on weakness, on weak theory and as a weak field 'as a capacious and self-reflexive problem space' (441). I want to do the same for Woolf's late work in this thesis. My reading of late Woolf is aligned with the theoretical aims of Saint-Amour's weak modernism. It looks to theorise weakly insofar as it is not '*decryptive*, bent on decoding or unmasking a vast array of phenomena' but rather '*descriptive*, seeking to know but not necessarily to know better than its object' (444). I want to imagine Woolf's late work as a capacious and self-reflexive problem space, a problem space wherein she thinks through the future and futurity, finding reparative imaginaries that fly in the face of fascism and catastrophe. As such, my work draws on a wide range of theoretico-critical methodologies and frameworks—from genetic criticism to Frankfurt School thought, animal theory and Rosi Braidotti's nomadic theory—without claiming any one of them as a 'key' or a 'master theory'. Rather, the work in this thesis seeks to be 'additive and accretive' (Sedgwick 149): in this sense, my thesis is guided by a reparative impulse and it seeks to add to the discussions of Woolf's late work that I have cited above.

With that in mind, the next two sections of this thesis are organised around two systems of texts. The first is the 1934 holograph draft of *The Years*, and specifically the 1917 chapter. My transcription of this is published in full in *Woolf Studies Annual* and I include this transcription as a

documentary appendix to this thesis. I read this draft alongside the published version(s) of *The Years* (1937) and with *Three Guineas* (1938) and trace lines of filiation between each of these works. I expand significantly on the argument I made briefly earlier in this chapter, reading this scene from the draft *Years* as a richly generative *avant-texte* not just for its counterpart in Woolf's 1937 novel but for *Three Guineas* also. As well as providing a narrative overview of the genesis of the later texts from this precursor and making the case that my narrative differs from earlier accounts of the development of *The Years* and *Three Guineas*, I examine three portions of the holograph in detail and draw links between them and Woolf's later, published, texts. The first is a call to revolutionary arson in England's ancient universities—a cleansing fire that makes space for a future 'real' education. I argue that this call to arson, made by Elvira Pargiter (who becomes Sara in the published novel), anticipates the seductive rhetorical call for 'Rags. Petrol. Matches' that the narrator of *Three Guineas* never quite makes. The second is a snippet of dialogue that anticipates *Three Guineas'* call for a Society of Outsiders. In the draft, this call contains a tantalising deletion, and I use this deletion and its political ramifications as a way in to talking about the formal properties of this draft and the strange temporalities of the *avant-texte*. This section ends with an examination of Antigone and ancient Greek across all three texts. I read a potential misquotation of Sophocles' *Antigone* in the 1934 draft as an intensely productive mistake, anticipating not just Woolf's radical deployment of Antigone in *Three Guineas* but also the nonsensical children's chorus that ends *The Years*. By positing a genetic link between this chorus and Woolf's deployment of Sophocles, I find a subversive end to Woolf's 1937 novel that gestures towards an unknowable futurity.

The second constellation of texts I investigate is *Between the Acts* (1940) and the drafts of 'Anon' and 'The Reader' (1940-1), the literary-historical project that Woolf left unfinished at her death. Most readers of these essays are familiar with the edition of the drafts that Brenda Silver published in 1979—an eclectic edition which I will argue elides the documents' curious formal properties—or with one of a small number of other editions based on Silver's edition, but my work in this thesis returns to the twelve typescript drafts Woolf left in her wake. These typescripts are imbricated with the drafts of *Between the Acts*: Woolf composed them at the same time and at times used the back of a page of one to work on the other. This section of my thesis starts with a close examination of one such page in Woolf's late archive, and a startling collocation that sees *Between*

the Acts' 'horse with a green tail' stabled alongside Woolf's singular vision of early modern drama. The next portions of the chapter investigate Woolf's figurations of anonymity under the aspect of three senses of the word 'anon'. The first, 'Anonymous', reads anonymous authorship in Woolf, in these final drafts and in *A Room of One's Own* primarily, as well as in her 1938 'Craftsmanship'. The next section of this chapter, 'Of One Body', reads forms of community throughout Woolf's very late archive, bringing *Between the Acts* and 'Anon' and 'The Reader' into ideological collocation, as well as the formal collocation that I described at the beginning of the chapter. The final section of the chapter, 'Now Again', draws these strands of thought together to argue that Woolf looks to literary history in her very final works to posit a mode of anonymous authorship that is able to fulfil the messianic potential with which she imbues Judith Shakespeare in *A Room of One's Own*, a form of anonymity that is not nostalgic or inwards gazing but fundamentally oriented towards the future.

Part Two—1934-38: Thoughts on Peace in a Wine Cellar

Chapter Three: Archiving the Drafts of *The Years*

Introduction: A Brief History of Arson

> we will burn down Oxford, Cambridge
> after the war; & then we will have real education:
> beautiful +impermanent+ homes built of combustible wood, by
> running streams, in meadows, where nobody shall
> teach under penalty of death (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 84: 139.135-110)

Arson. Not a very peaceful way to begin a chapter with the word 'peace' in the title. Even for the best of reasons, to make a space for 'real' education to take root, arson is far from peaceful. The image is familiar, perhaps: it bears commonalities with the narrator of *Three Guineas*' call for 'Rags. Petrol. Matches.' (*TG* 157) to burn down the old women's college. I will expand on this filiation later but for now, I want to introduce the text from which I have just quoted. Whence does this peculiar prolegomenon to a future, to a 'real' education arrive? And how do we encounter it? I will use the chapters in Part Two of my thesis to introduce this passage, and the document from which it is excerpted to limn the contours of the archival encounters that led me to write this chapter. This chapter and the chapter that follows it both read the scene from which the above passage is excerpted, from the 1934 first drafts of *The Years*, and they read it as an important precursor text not just for *The Years* (1937) but also for *Three Guineas* (1938). In so doing, I focus on three moments from the draft *Years*. I use these moments to show the importance of this portion of the holograph *Years* to the project that became Woolf's 1937 and 1938 published works and to highlight the stakes of reading in the Woolfian archive.

The passage that begins this chapter is excerpted from the holograph draft of *The Years*, the eight volumes of which are held in the Berg Collection and designated M.42. More specifically, it is excerpted from the draft of the '1917' chapter, found in the fifth of the large, hardback folio notebooks that Woolf used to write the first draft of the novel. I refer to this notebook throughout

using its call number, M.42-5. Woolf started to work on the book that became *The Years* in 1932, and over the next two years produced a draft that would come to fill the eight notebooks that constitute M.42. Woolf conceived of her project while taking a bath on 20th January 1931: the project was to be a 'sequel to a Room of Ones Own—about the sexual life of women: to be called Professions for Women perhaps' (*D*4 6) [21]. On the 11th of October , Woolf started to write a work titled 'THE PARGITERS / A Novel-Essay based upon a paper read / to the London National Society for Women's Service' (M.42-1: 5, see Figure One), and on the 2nd of November began to theorise her project in her diary: it would 'take in everything, sex, education, life &c; & come, with the most powerful & agile leaps, like a chamois across precipices from 1880 to here & now' (*D*4 129). By the 2nd of February, less than a week after reporting that she had 'despatched' Flush (145), Woolf wrote in her diary that she was revising the first chapter of 'The Pargiters.' In this entry, she figures the 'essay' part of the 'novel-essay' as secondary to the novel, referring to the essays as 'interchapters:' she writes that she is 'leaving out the interchapters—compacting them in the text' (146). On January the 31st 1933, Woolf started writing 'additions' to Chapter One of 'The Pargiters' (M.42-2: 85) and would not employ the essay form in this project again. Woolf's work on 'The Pargiters' up until January 31st was transcribed and published in 1977 by Mitchell Leaska, but the rest of the holograph draft has remained, for the most part, untranscribed and unpublished.[22]

My work focuses on a small but significant portion of Woolf's long and densely written manuscript. As I have said, the above excerpt is taken from the fifth of the eight manuscript volumes that make up the holograph draft of *The Years*. Some 73 pages of this notebook (M.42-5: 69-142) are taken up by the draft of what would become the 1917 chapter of the published *Years*.[23] I have transcribed this passage in full, and this transcription is reproduced in the 2020 edition of *Woolf Studies Annual*, along with an essay on how I transcribed this portion of the manuscript and the importance of the transcribed draft (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 1-86). Much of this portion of the draft *Years*, written between the 6th of January and the 18th of February 1934, was excised: the version

---

[21] Woolf also wrote an essay of this title first published in the 1942 collection *The Death of the Moth* (cf. *E*6 479-484) which I do not have space to discuss in detail here.

[22] For a detailed reading of this essay-novel, cf. Snaith, Anna. *Virginia Woolf: Public and Private Negotiations.* Palgrave, 2001. pp. 88-112.

[23] pp. 143-5 briefly describe Crosby, who by this time is retired and living in a boarding house in Richmond. This passage, which describes her experience of the war, is moved out of the '1917' chapter of the published *Years* and forms the entirety of the '1918' chapter of the published novel.

of this scene in the first Hogarth Press edition of *The Years* is some 23 pages long (Virginia Woolf *Years [Hogarth]* 301-324).[24] In working to transcribe this scene, I set out to recover a mostly lost portion of *The Years*. But I did not end up doing that, precisely speaking, as I will explain in this chapter.

Figure 1: M.42-1: 5

What I found while transcribing this portion of M.42-5 was an unacknowledged *avant-texte* for *Three Guineas*. To introduce this *avant-texte* I want to circle back to the excerpt that opens this chapter. As I have said, it bears a striking similarity to the narrator of *Three Guineas*' call for her guinea to be spent on 'Rags. Petrol. Matches.' (*TG* 157). These would be used to burn down the old women's and in its place to build a 'poor college' out of some 'cheap, easily combustible material which does not hoard dust and perpetuate traditions' and which teaches 'Not the arts of dominating other people; not the arts of ruling, of killing, of acquiring land and capital.' Instead, the poor college would teach 'only the arts that can be taught cheaply and practiced by poor people; such as medicine, mathematics, music, painting and literature,' the 'arts of human intercourse; the art of understanding other people's lives and minds, and the little arts of talk, of dress, of cookery that are allied with them' (155). The narrator of *Three Guineas* has to recant her call for a poor college whose humble pedagogy rises out of the ashes of the old women's college, a college whose pedagogies and practices were patterned after those of centuries-old men's colleges. She has to disavow this call, admit to the undesirability of this desire in order to maintain the 'disinterested influence' that the daughters of educated men, as independent actors in their own right, 'possess through earning their livings' (158). To burn down the women's college would be to deprive the daughters of educated men educations of their own, and hence the means of securing an independent living, even if those educations and those incomes are enmeshed in patriarchy. The speaker in the passage I cited at the beginning of this

---

[24] This is not an exact comparison—Woolf's handwriting does not occupy the page in the same way as print does. The distinction between handwriting and print will prove instructive later in this chapter.

chapter, Elvira Pargiter (who becomes Sara in the published *Years*) labours under no such constraints, prophesying a future, post-War education as bombs drop over Westminster in 1917.

Revolutionary arson is not the only commonality that this portion of M.42-5 shares with *Three Guineas*. Rather, the two texts share enough commonalities that we can fruitfully read this portion of M.42-5 as a key *avant-texte* for both *The Years* and *Three Guineas*. Much of this chapter is devoted to examining how M.42-5 deploys tropes and vocabulary already familiar from both *The Years* and *Three Guineas*, but in curious forms. Both M.42-5 and its counterpart scene in the published *Years* conjure the utopian, a 'New World' with capitalised 'N' and 'W' (*Y* 278), but in the 1937 *Years*, the New World that the Pargiters toast as anti-aircraft guns fire overhead is a fugitive imaginary, articulated in fits and starts, ellipses and dashes where the speakers' capacity for imagination exceed their capacity to articulate their imaginings: '"But how…" she began, "…how can we improve ourselves … live more …" —she dropped her voice as if she were afraid of waking sleepers— "…live more naturally … better… How can we?"' (*Y* 281). Eleanor's dialogue here is a far cry from Elvira Pargiter's confidently oracular description of a coming university in the draft. The imaginary articulated in M.42-5 prefigures less the dashes and ellipses of the published *Years* than it does the utopian yearnings of *Three Guineas*. This portion of the draft *Years* is far more combative and strident in tone than its published counterpart, not just imagining that a new world might come but trying to imagine what that new world might be like.

My reading of this passage of the draft *Years* as part of the genetic dossier of both *The Years* and *Three Guineas* militates against a certain genealogy that sees the roots of *Three Guineas* in Woolf's first attempt at writing 'The Pargiters,' in the essayistic 'interchapters' that Woolf had abandoned by February 1933. This genealogy looms large in early accounts of *The Years* and *Three Guineas*. It is taken up by early readers of the holograph *Years*, including Charles Hoffmann in his 1969 article, 'Virginia Woolf's Manuscript Revisions of *The Years*' and Grace Radin, in her 1981 monograph, *Virginia Woolf's* The Years*: The Evolution of a Novel*, which remains the only book-length publication devoted solely to the holograph *Years*. As Anna Snaith points out in the introduction to her 2012 Cambridge University Press edition of *The Years*, these early critics have 'used Woolf's own terms "granite" and "rainbow" as a dichotomous reading lens, and have argued that research sheered off into *Three Guineas*.' (*Y* lxiii). This early genealogy supposes that what was

rainbow in this early novel-essay became *The Years*, while what was granite became *Three Guineas*. Derek Ryan has traced the valences of granite and rainbow throughout Woolf's writings from *The Voyage Out* onwards and shown that they are not so easily separated (Ryan *Materiality* 26-57). My archival research on the genesis of *The Years* and *Three Guineas* similarly shows that granite and rainbow are not the dichotomous binary that earlier critics believed.

In positing M.42-5 as a key *avant-texte* for both Woolf's 1937 novel and her 1938 essay, this chapter provides a certain narrative, which ends on the 3rd of June 1938, the day after *Three Guineas* is published, the end for Woolf of 'six years floundering, striving, much agony, some ecstasy' (*D* 5 148). In so doing, I view this portion of the holograph *Years* as doubly anterior, first to its counterpart scene in the published *Years* but also to *Three Guineas*. Circling back to the term 'dysteleology,' last seen in Chapter One, we might read much of this portion of the manuscript as 'vestigial,' as dysteleological (Van Hulle "Dysteleology" 14) when viewed as an *avant-texte* for *The Years*, but richly generative when viewed from the standpoint of *Three Guineas.* As such, my use of the term *avant-texte* strays from Jean Bellemin-Noël's 1972 definition I quoted at length in Chapter One. In the first instance, this portion of the holograph *Years* is not 'material which precedes' *Three Guineas* directly: rather, the scene is more obviously a draft for its counterpart in the published *Years*. But I contend that there are grounds for viewing this portion of the draft *Years* as a precursor to *Three Guineas*: the two perform similar ideological work, and in many cases do so using similar language. The boundaries between *The Years* and *Three Guineas* are further blurred by the diary entry I cited above, in which Woolf refers to the two as 'one book' (*D* 5 148). My work here will show that *The Years* and *Three Guineas* remained imbricated in one another well after Woolf abandoned the essay-novel form in 1931. This dual anteriority will come to inform much of my analysis of the draft '1917' chapter of *The Years*, just as my readings of *The Years* and *Three Guineas* will be informed by this originary text.

Since Radin's monograph on the draft *Years*, much has changed. James M. Haule's research into the galleys and proofs of *The Years* has revealed much about the late stages of Woolf's laborious editing process, while the exhaustive textual apparatus and notes to Anna Snaith's Cambridge University Press edition of *The Years* have provided the scholarly community with a far greater insight into the many thousands of pages of holograph and typescript drafts that eventually became

The Years. Meanwhile, in her 2013 *Virginia Woolf's Late Cultural Criticism* Alice Wood has discussed the complex genetics of *The Years* and *Three Guineas*. Wood provides an account of the documents that became these two published works which deploys the vocabulary and resources of genetic criticism. Wood's work on the documents that Woolf produced, both published and unpublished, in the years leading up to the publication of *Three Guineas* and *The Years* provides a narrative which is in some ways dissimilar to mine but nonetheless acts as an important alternative to the narrative my thesis traces. Wood reads historically, emphasising the drafts of Professions for Women and the six 'London Scene' essays Woolf published in *Good Housekeeping* in 1931-2, and the earlier volumes in the holograph *Years*. However, Wood does not discuss M.42-5 in her monograph. Hers is another possible genealogy for these two texts. Still another possible genealogy for this text, and certainly for Elvira's future university, is the louche and erotically-charged evocation of Newnham College, Cambridge, excised from the drafts of *Jacob's Room*, and published in the 1926 collection *Atalanta's Garland* as 'A Woman's College from Outside' . I dwell on these plural genealogies because to begin to contextualise *The Years* and *Three Guineas* is to acknowledge that these two texts are haunted by their submerged origins, their contexts. This chapter, in no small part, speaks to the strange presences that mark the genetic dossiers of *The Years* and *Three Guineas*— or perhaps just their genetic dossier, singular. I will expand significantly on this portion of the holograph *Years* and my transcription of it—and explain why it is necessary to use the peculiar locution 'this draft and my transcription of it'. In so doing, I examine M.42.5's position as a somewhat fraught *avant-texte* and attempt to theorise the curious gaps between this draft and its published counterparts. My analysis of M.42-5 hinges on three moments that I argue do not just bear semiotic freight but also, when read in tandem with both the published edition of *The Years* and with *Three Guineas*, help us to conceptualise what is at stake when we read within the Woolfian archive.

The first of these moments, each of which is found in M.42-5, is a call made by Nicholas that anticipates *Three Guineas*' Society of Outsiders. I use a deleted word in this call to introduce a wider interrogation of the draft document and the problematics of transcription, and as the occasion to start discussing the substrate, a Derridean term for a surface on which writing is inscribed. The second is the call to revolutionary arson that opens this chapter. I note that this call is made three times in three different ways before asking where the figure who makes this call—Elvira Pargiter—

goes. This musing on Elvira Pargiter introduces a wider discussion of draft material which I use to theorise an archive premised on boundless supplementarity. Chapter Five is concerned with a richly generative misquotation from Sophocles' *Antigone*, the footfalls of which I track through the published edition of *The Years* and *Three Guineas*. I argue that this misquotation prefigures not just Woolf's deployment of Antigone in *The Years* and *Three Guineas* but also the nonsensical song that the two children sing at the end of *The Years*: I filiate the children's nonsense with the radical new phonotactics of Dada sound poetry in order to read the end of *The Years* as oriented towards the future.

On Being ~~Silent~~: The Substrate and the Transcription

> Now that is, he said, that you have learnt to renounce, to
> control, to be ~~silent~~, to be observant, to be despised —
> to ~~have~~ +own+ nothing (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 79: 134.132-134)

Towards the end of M.42-5's lengthy underground symposium, Nicholas proposes a new form of education for his female auditors. This education calls for them, Eleanor, Elvira and Maggie Pargiter to renounce, to control, to be observant, to be despised. The call inherent to Nicholas's monastic mode of education, I argue, constitutes one of the earliest precursors to *Three Guineas'* Outsiders' Society.[25] It prefigures the call that the narrator of *Three Guineas* makes: she calls for the daughters of educated men to form a society, or perhaps an anti-society similar to the Blanchotian community of those who have no community I will discuss in Part Three of this thesis. The society the narrator of *Three Guineas* calls for should be 'anonymous and elastic before everything' and its members should 'maintain an attitude of complete indifference' going so far as to 'train themselves

---

[25] Note, *one of* the earliest: for discussions of yet earlier articulations that might be productively viewed as precursors to the Outsiders' Society, cf. Anna Snaith's introduction to the CUP *Years*, and Alice Wood, as well as Jane Marcus, who analyses this scene of the holograph *Years* but does not connect it to *Three Guineas*. Snaith discusses finding the 'crucible for *Three Guineas* and the Society of Outsiders' in the drafts of the 1907 and 1910 chapters, in M.42-4 (*Y* lxvii), while Wood argues that the letter Elvira drafts in the 1910 chapter of the holograph *Years* provides the site for Woolf to 'explore her own contrary opinions on how women might respond to and ultimately enter into patriarchal society' (Wood 91). Jane Marcus writes of the scene Wood discusses that it 'reads like a debate that might be going on among present-day feminists. Rose, a male-identified feminist, works for votes for women but does not question the patriarchal system. Maggie and Elvira, international outsiders like Woolf herself, are isolated and ignorant about birth control. […] Maggie doesn't want a vote because "Englishwomen in politics are prostitutes. Every patriarch has his prostitute. She comforts him and then asks for favours"' (Marcus 53).

in peace before death' (*TG* 232-5). Nicholas's call for a mode of education premised upon renouncing and controlling is, at first glance, not so very different from the call that the narrator of *Three Guineas* makes. But the sexual politics of this moment are very different. Nicholas is a man—for there could be no doubt of his sex. The recommendation he makes for women to renounce and be despised is not made by one who would have to renounce and would have to be despised. There is an irreducible difference between this moment in the draft *Years* and its corresponding moment in *Three Guineas*: in the former, a man is telling women that a future in which they are educated rests upon them renouncing and being despised; in the latter, a woman writes to a man telling him that in order to ensure peace, women should henceforth play no part in silly masculine games of power.

But it is worth pausing to discuss just what Nicholas says to the women assembled in Renny and Maggie's cellar. He does not, precisely speaking, propose that they learn to be silent. Rather, the word 'silent' is deleted, scored through. Perhaps it was scored through as soon as it was written or perhaps some time passed between its writing and its deletion. When a twenty-first century reader arrives at the word, the best part of a century later, however, that reader has no way of knowing. Nicholas's injunction to be silent was at one point articulated, before it was itself silenced. There is a temporality embedded in Woolf's handwriting, in its complex patina of deletions and additions, crossings-out and interlineations: a temporality that we as readers can barely access. As a handwritten draft document, the manuscript draft of *The Years* constitutes what Hans Walter Gabler calls, after Nelson Goodman, an 'autographic' document. Autographic documents are 'the material manifestation of writing […] in draft manuscripts' (Gabler "Draft Manuscript" 214). They differ from their 'allographic' counterparts in that writing in draft form is not 'vectored.' Rather, the 'prime function of draft documents, and the writing in them, is not to record text for reading' as an allographic document does, but rather 'to record, support, and engender further composition' (211). The allographic document evidences a process of drafting and thought, iteration and reiteration—we see this not just in the deletion of the word 'silent' but in the more dramatic patterns of deletion and redrafting I will examine later in this chapter. We see the traces, the signature, not the process; the 'graphical signs' and 'dynamic layering of the writing' that Wim van Mierlo, in sketching out a modern palaeography, calls 'simultaneously an obstacle' to reading a manuscript and a 'clue to the

interpretation of its genesis' (Van Mierlo 27). My discussion of the drafts of *The Years* here speaks to van Mierlo's archaeological approach to manuscript studies.

When I began to transcribe this portion of the draft *Years*, I thought my task was simple: to copy into a .doc file, as faithfully as possible, the inky marks that Woolf made in her notebook some 84 years prior to me starting my work. Since then, my view of my task has changed—or perhaps I found myself performing a task other than the one I thought I was performing. Moments like the one I discuss above, like the silencing of the injunction to be silent, have shown me this. There is what Edward Bishop calls a 'wildness' to Woolf's manuscripts (Bishop 154) which he says must be preserved but which I do not believe can be preserved entirely in the process of transcription. It is a question of substrate. As I discussed in Chapter One, Derrida uses this term in *Archive Fever* (1995) to refer to a surface of inscription: any surface on which writing, any writing, can be inscribed. In *Archive Fever*, Derrida first invokes the material conditions of the archive by citing Freud's essay on the *Wunderblock*, a children's toy whose German name James Strachey translates into English as the 'Mystic Writing-Pad'. This is 'the technical model of the machine tool intended, in Freud's eyes, to *represent on the outside* memory as *internal* archivization' (Derrida *Archive Fever* 13). Or rather, Derrida first invokes the material conditions of the archive by citing himself citing Freud's essay on the *Wunderblock*: he quotes at length from 'Freud and the Scene of Writing' (1966, trans. 1976). I will return to this chain of citations later in the chapter, but briefly, in citing himself citing Freud, Derrida recalls his earlier argument that the material form of the Mystic Writing-Pad conditioned and gave metaphorical form to Freud's model of the unconscious, and that the technology available at the time thus conditioned the ruling metaphors of psychoanalysis. Derrida continues (in *Archive Fever*, that is) to ask what psychoanalysis would have looked like if 'Freud, his contemporaries, collaborators and immediate disciples, instead of writing thousands of letters by hand, had had access to MCI or AT&T telephonic credit cards, portable tape recorders, computers, printers, faxes, televisions, teleconferences, and above all E-mail' (16). He contends that this 'would have transformed' the history of psychoanalysis 'from top to bottom and in the most initial inside of its production, in its very *events*' (16). It follows from this that the archive is not just a repository for past materials, but rather, 'the technical structure of the *archiving* archive also determines the structure of the *archivable* content even in its very coming into existence and in its relationship to

the future' (17). Technology conditions the form that archival content takes, certainly. The medium is the message, certainly. But the medium also conditions the ways in which we can think about the message, giving form to the work that scholars can do out of the archive.

Later Derrida tells us about his computer, a 'little portable Macintosh' (25) which he used to write the lectures published as *Archive Fever*. While 'tinkling away on [his] computer,' his thoughts turn to temporality, to the question of whether there is a moment 'proper to the archive' or 'an instant of archivization' (25). This moment is not necessarily the same as the instant of impression but rather its preservation in a prosthetic or hypomensic form. In considering this, Derrida seeks to update Freud's *Wunderblock* for the '90s:

> Was it not at this very instant that, having written something or other on the screen, the letters remaining as if suspended and floating yet at the surface of a liquid element, I pushed a certain key to "save" a text undamaged, in a hard and lasting way, to protect marks from being erased, so as to ensure in this way salvation and *indemnity*, to stock, to accumulate, and, in what is at once the same thing and something else, to make the sentence available in this way for printing and reprinting, for reproduction? (26)

Derrida distinguishes here between the moment when words appear on a screen probably not too dissimilar from the one that I use to write this now, and the moment in which he instructs the computer to 'save' these marks onto a hard drive. At this point, Derrida introduces the term 'substrate,' or at least the 'concept' of the substrate: 'this concept—or rather this *figure* of the substrate—marks the properly *fundamental* assignation of the problem, the problem of the fundamental' (26). He then asks, 'Can one imagine an archive without foundation, without substrate, without substance, without subjectile?' (26-7). The substrate is fundamental: it forms the foundation of the archive, and its future. As we have seen, it conditions the documents in the archive and the work that can be done out of the archive both the archive generally and this archive specifically.

In considering his little portable Macintosh, Derrida invokes two surfaces for inscription, two substrates: the 'liquid element' in his computer's screen and the disk on which the marks on the screen are saved,[26] but his computer really contains a plethora of substrates, each of which supervenes

---

[26] Derrida is ebullient about the archival capacity of his computer, writing that it can save 'a text undamaged, in a hard and lasting way, to protect marks from being erased, so as to ensure in this way salvation and *indemnity*' and so on (*Archive Fever* 26). Dirk Van Hulle, meanwhile, is more realistic about the archival capacity of digital storage technology, writing of a 'huge hiatus in the most recent history of manuscript genetics: because we were suddenly able to "save" everything on computers, we assumed that we were preserving it' (*Modern Manuscripts* 237). Needless to say, Van Hulle believes Derrida's assumption false.

on the last. Between typing at keys on a keyboard, marks that correspond to those key presses appearing on a screen, and those marks being saved as a string of 0s and 1s on a hard disk, a vast array of intermediary software and hardware processes occur. Each of these intermediary steps has the potential to constitute another inscription, perhaps on another surface for inscription, another substrate. Each of these inscriptions and each of the substrates upon which they occur condition what form a document produced using a computer can take, just as the affordances of pen and paper conditioned Woolf's draft writing. Edward Bishop's call for a mode of transcription that preserves the 'wildness' of Woolf's drafts is a seductive one, but not one that I believe can be answered adequately. As I have said, it is a question of substrate. The substrates available for Woolf, who wrote freehand, mostly using a fountain pen, on powder blue paper in the early months of 1934 were different to those available to me as a transcriber in the closing months of 2018. The resources available to me included a desktop computer with a copy of Microsoft Word: hence I had access to a telescoping array of visible and invisible substrates more or less similar to those that Derrida contemplated in 1995. My transcription is therefore enabled and constrained by these substrates. Insofar as I typed it out in 12pt Garamond, my transcription follows the logic of the word processor, text unfolding in perfectly straight lines behind a small blinking cursor. If Woolf's manuscript has a wildness to it, my transcription is thoroughly domesticated; a paid-up member of the Spaniel Club in contrast to the 'crowd of *canaille*' (*F* 74) frolicking merrily across Woolf's manuscript page.

If it is impossible to imagine an archive (or archival document) without substrate then it follows that Woolf's manuscript draft is more than just words on a page: that the draft *Years* is a physical and haptic document cannot be forgotten. As we have already seen at the start of this section of the chapter, crossings-out and interlineal additions are temporally imbricated on the page as the material trace of a process of autographic writing, and my transcription, an allographic document typed on a word processor and saved on a hard disk, can never quite be adequate to this. Figure Two, below, is another example of this. Even marked up, my transcription can never quite replicate the complex play of interlineal additions and crossings-out present in Woolf's manuscript, let alone how the addition +we shd. die of exhaustion+ bends to make way for the page number. And this is not to mention my first impulse as a reader: to strip the transcribed text of its markup and read it

tautologically, as 'We should bore kill each other to death said Elvira[…]' I thus cannot really talk of reproducing Woolf's text, only producing a new textual object.


Figure 2: M.42-5 70: 125.1

We should ~~bore~~ +kill+ each other ~~to death~~ said Elvira +we shd. die of exhaustion+ […] ("Thoughts on Peace" 70: 125.121)

It is worth pausing once again to ask about the provenance of the above image. This is not a photograph of the manuscript itself, but rather a screenshot of a PDF scan of a microfilm facsimile of the manuscript. Substrate is here layered upon substrate, each with its own affordances and limitations. I did not see the physical document I transcribed until some months after I initially finished my first draft of the transcription. Joanne Trautmann Banks' 2002 essay on the process of editing Woolf's letters and the difficulties that reproductions offer textual editors invited me to reflect on the shortcomings of my methodology: 'We behaved as though the letters that we edited were the letters that Woolf wrote,' Trautmann Banks writes. 'Yet that was not precisely true' (Trautmann Banks 36). Working on the other side of the Atlantic from Woolf's notebooks, I perforce did the same. I behaved as though I was reading the manuscript that Woolf wrote. Yet that was not precisely true. There were many degrees of separation from me and the document I transcribed—or perhaps the document it was convenient to say I was transcribing. It is more accurate to say that I was transcribing a digitisation of an analogue facsimile of a document, a facsimile that can only be used when greatly enlarged by shining light through it onto a screen. I note all this because working this way creates many vectors for mechanical and digital errors to slip in, from dust in the workings of the microfilm machine I used to the digital artefacts that inevitably sneak into scanned files—not to mention any human errors on my part. Working from black and white microfilm images made for particular difficulties at points where Woolf's pen started to run dry or she angled her nib such that less ink flowed onto the page: these passages do not tend to fare well on microfilm, where the light from the machine's projector 'blows out' lighter areas of text. By the same token, Woolf's occasional pencil jottings caused me difficulties—they proved near-impossible to read off a screen and it was

not until I was able to see the physical manuscript that I was able to settle on a reading for passages such as that in. Fig. 3.

Figure 3: M.42-5 67:122.11-14: pencil jottings in margin

Although the medium in which I encountered this document presented challenges, it also presented opportunities. I was able to manipulate the PDF of this manuscript far more readily than I could the paper original. One cannot blow up a notebook to four or five times its original size to take a closer look at individual letters, and one can't invert colours or adjust the brightness or contrast of a notebook as one can a screen. Interacting with the document in this way called into question the nature of my work. As I made this transcription, my understanding of what van Mierlo calls the archaeology of the manuscript changed. At the start of the process I thought that if I took due care excavating Woolf's buried fragments, I could dust them off, glue them back together and reconstruct an object that was lost to the ages, as though I were a palaeontologist reconstructing a skeleton from fossils. What I actually did was participate in the creation of a new textual object, a simulacrum that can never quite be similar enough to its object, and whose status as simulacrum speaks to an originary absence: the absence of Woolf's 'real' draft. There is a gulf between Woolf's 1934 draft and my new textual object.

It is easier for me to imagine a counterfactual transcription had I access to different technologies than it is for Derrida to imagine a counterfactual history of psychoanalysis had Freud

access to 'MCI or AT&T telephonic credit cards, portable tape recorders, computers, printers, faxes, televisions, teleconferences, and above all, E-mail' (*Archive Fever* 16). I can imagine going to the New York Public Library, sitting in the reading room for the Berg Collection and poring over M.42-5, to ensure that my transcription is as accurate as possible. I was lucky enough to spend a day in the NYPL's opulent manuscript reading room doing just that and in so doing managed to turn up the startling line 'The very spit & image of our nation, Creon' (M.42-5: 115.32), which I simply could not seem to read in my PDF facsimile. I can imagine changing tack, copying by hand every word, every line, every ink blot onto paper to create a transcription that is as close to a facsimile as I can manage. Such a transcription might even do justice to passages as intractable as Fig. 4 below.

Figure 4: M.45-5 50-1: 106.1-10

But I will never be able to create a transcription without the mediating affordances and constraints of substrate, of the substrates I choose to work with and the array of substrates that make those substrates work. Even if I devoted myself entirely to making an infinitesimally precise copy of Woolf's manuscript, my transcription would still be an allographic copy of an autographic document on a new substrate. I might have opted to allow readers to take my judgement out of the picture. The New Modernist Editing Network's 2017 digital edition of Woolf's 1934 'Ode written partly in prose on seeing the name of Cutbush above a butcher's shop in Pentonville' (Randall "Ode" n.p.) makes a photographic facsimile of Woolf's typescript draft available to readers. If I were to do that, readers would have access to a far more detailed replica of the document than I have been able to provide. This replica, however, would still be conditioned by the material specificity of the substrates involved in its creation: by the light available to the camera sensor, by the processes by which that light is

transmogrified into 0s and 1s in the camera's memory, the ways in which those 0s and 1s are compiled into an image file and so on.[27] An absolutely unmediated transcription, one that is absolutely unconditioned by any change in substrate, is barely possible. but is nonetheless a useful counterfactual to keep in mind while both making a transcription (this isn't accurate enough; if only I could type like Woolf writes; if only I didn't have to deal with this pesky substrate) or reading a transcription (is this accurate enough? Can this transcriber type like Woolf writes? What substrates did the transcriber have to deal with?). The gulf between this impossible unmediated transcription and the transcriptions we make as scholars and use in our research takes on the character of an aporia.

An aporia, literally, a moment of non-passage (from '*a-poros*' or without passage) is a moment of insuperable difficulty, a problem without a solution. It is an impasse, a limit that cannot be crossed. The term has a storied critical history and is a formal trope of the Socratic dialogue but has more recently become a device foundational to post-structuralist criticism. Much of Derrida's work can either be read implicitly as an attempt to think through a given aporetic or is explicitly an attempt to do so. In *Aporias* (1993), when considering the (im)possibility of his own death, Derrida tries to describe what passes in these moments of nonpassage. In a dizzying sentence he writes of

> the experience of the nonpassage, the experience of what happens, *[se passe]* and is fascinating *[passione]* in this nonpassage, paralyzing us in this separation in a way that is not necessarily negative: before a door, a threshold, a border, a line, or simply the edge or the approach of the other as such. (Derrida *Aporias* 12)

Perhaps the aporia can never be inhabited overly long: one cannot be fascinated, paralysed by it for too long a period of time. We might find a Woolfian analogy to Derrida's attempt to think through his own moments of nonpassage in Rhoda's moment of vertiginous detachment at the 'grey puddle in the courtyard' which she could not cross,' at which moment 'identity failed' her (*W* 37) . My transcription of M.42-5 is conditioned by one aporia, the aporetic substrate, but the text, however it is encountered, bears traces of many more. Moments of impasse are ever present in this portion of the draft, which bears a family resemblance to Socratic dialogues.

---

[27] A facsimile free of any editorial mediation would probably not be that helpful either: Woolf's handwriting is not easy to read at the best of times. In a 2020 reflection on digital archives, the creators of the Modernist Archives Publishing Project describe Woolf's hand as 'chicken scratch on sky blue paper in a signature purple ink, [which] is both highly recognizable and, if not entirely illegible, languidly casual about its legibility' (Staveley et al. n.p.).

In her 2016 article 'Virginia Woolf Reinvents the Socratic Dialogue,' Emily Dalgarno writes of Woolf's profound engagement with the form of the Socratic dialogue. She writes that Woolf took pleasure in Plato's complex weave of questioning, in the dialogues' patterns of *elenchus*—back and forth questioning—and *aporia* and worked these classical forms into her own texts. Dalgarno writes that Woolf 'values aporia,' those moments when a limit is reached, those moments of confusion and impasse where received understanding seems to run out of track and where dialogue as the creation of new knowledge begins. Aporia are for Woolf 'not simply the speechless confusion of the interlocutor, but […] a kind of searching for the answer to the puzzle that arises' ("Socratic" 5). Or, in Woolf's own words, from 'On Not Knowing Greek' (1925), 'What matters is not so much the end we reach as our manner reaching it' (*E* 4 46). In this portion of the draft, the road to new knowledge is a rocky one. Nicholas cries that 'there are no words for what I mean' (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 58: 113.119) while Eleanor notices that her 'stock of words | [becomes] exhausted' (59: 114.13-4). And Woolf herself butts up against impasses while writing: threads of dialogue fall in and out of view as though one is listening to a radio being tuned; whole paragraphs are scored through only to resurface later having suffered a sea-change. Woolf's speakers find themselves fascinated by and paralysed in aporia while Woolf's autographic document bears witness to Woolf's own attempts to think and write through aporia. This document is presented nearly a century later in the form of a transcription that is itself conditioned by an aporetic, the impossible transcription without substrate. These aporias seem fractal: they proliferate at every level. They are not just present in Woolf's dialogue, or even just in Woolf's writing as autograph, but rather are imbricated in the very fabric of the text that we read. We cannot read this draft (or, indeed, any draft) without encountering them. The next section of this chapter examines another moment (or set of moments) that speak to the messy textuality of M.42-5, but zooms out, as it were. It returns to the call to commit revolutionary arson with which this chapter starts. This invocation of arson is not the first call to start fires in this portion of M.42-5, but rather the final one, and the most well-developed. The next section of this chapter traces the development of this trope throughout M.42-5.

Where Do Elvira Pargiter and Her Conflagratory Imaginary Go?

The conflagratory imaginary that opens this chapter is not the first rhetorical fire to be set in M.42-5. Rather, Elvira Pargiter's call to burn down Oxford and Cambridge is actually three calls, and the fire burns hotter each time as Woolf thinks through the trope, developing it more each time she redrafts it. The fire Elvira imagines setting is kindled in a passage that is deleted, scored through with two curving diagonal lines (see Fig. 5, overleaf).

Figure 5: M.42-5 26 :81.10-21

|*And if I have a vote, said Elvira, stiffly*
~~*back I shall*~~ *this is what I shall do with it:*
I shall buy a box of matches, & I shall
sit in one of those damp fields outside Oxford
Cambridge & set alight to my vote &
burn down all the colleges... both for men &
for women| (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 26: 81.14-20)

Shortly after the first invocation of arson, two manuscript pages later, the second fire Elvira imagines setting is not deleted, but is articulated only parenthetically, set inside a square bracket (see Fig. 6 overleaf). Woolf's em-dash at the end of the penultimate line and before the word 'striking' would have required her pen to physically strike across the page in the manner of a match being struck: is this perhaps the match that kindles Elvira's vote and sets fire to Oxford and Cambridge?

Or is it one of the matches struck in 'The Moment: Summer's Night' that create a moment of illuminated intersubjectivity founded on the communal recognition of an act of gender-based violence?

Figure 6: M.42-5 83.3-8

[If I get a vote, she broke off, d'you know
what I'll do with it, I'll light a bonfire &
burn down both universities. But to continue,
after we'd been through our attitudes, we
~~sobbed in each ot~~ said so long —
striking] (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 27: 83.3-8)

Only far later in the manuscript does Elvira's imaginary fire burn undoused by deletions, unstifled by parentheses (Fig. 7, overleaf). This is the fire with which I open the chapter, a fire bright with revolutionary fervour, which anticipates *Three Guineas'* call to 'Let the light of the burning building scare the nightingales and incarnadine the willows. And let the daughters of educated men dance round the fire and heap armful upon armful of dead leaves upon the flames. And let their mothers lean from the upper windows and cry "Let it blaze! Let it blaze! For we have done with this 'education'"!' (*TG* 157).

Figure 7: M.42-5 84: 139.5-18

> Yes, said Elvira, putting her arm round his
> shoulder, we will burn down Oxford, Cambridge
> after the war; & then we will have real education:
> beautiful +impermanent+ homes built of combustible wood, by
> running streams, in meadows, where nobody shall
> teach under penalty of death; but now & again
> somebody shall sit under a flowering tree & ~~tea~~
> tell us how ~~not to make money, but~~ to love &
> ~~oh beauty~~ truth +& beauty+, cats & dogs, flowers all the
> larks of the north wind, including even those detestable
> creations, those basest, those ignoble, those most
> despicable of all created things, Nicholas and Elvira.
> +And+ ~~But~~ there ~~must~~ +will+ be no degrees; no prizes: & no
> pop guns." (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 84: 139.5-18)

In M.42-5, Elvira's conflagratory imaginary multiplies, and one stifled flame becomes three

fires, but, in *Three Guineas*, the narrator does not quite manage to burn down the old women's

college. As I have said, she never sends the guinea earmarked for 'Rags. Petrol. Matches.' Instead,

she backtracks and admits to the undesirability of this desire. For to burn down the women's college and rebuild it upon nakedly utopian lines would be to stop women from 'earning their livings,' and making them dependent once again 'upon their fathers and brothers,' rendering them 'consciously and unconsciously in favour of war' (*TG* 157). *Three Guineas'* conflagratory imaginary remains just that: imaginary. What burns instead is the word 'feminist,' apparently a 'dead word, a corrupt word' used by 'mischief maker[s],' 'groper[s] among old bones' after the 'only right, the right to earn a living, [had] been won.' (227). To burn down the woman's college in the name of feminism would be to abjure this right and to perform a kind of verbal necromancy, bringing a word back from the dead. These images of burning do not map on to each other precisely. The two texts conjure similar images, but not the same image: they are analogous, not homologous. This distinction is important. These two sets of imaginaries bear the weight of their different forms and of their different temporal moments, one a piece of autographic writing, a portion of a novel's draft written in early 1934, with Mussolini firmly installed in power in Italy and Hitler consolidating power in Germany and several years prior to the Spanish Civil War; the other the allographic text of an essay published in 1938, as European war became inevitable. These differing forms and temporalities demand different ethical frameworks and demarcate different spaces of possibility. What Woolf can say as Elvira Pargiter in the generic space granted her by a manuscript notebook is different to what Woolf, writing as *Three Guineas'* narrator, can say in a typeset and published essay.

Who talks about arson in M.42-5? I have answered this question in part already: Elvira Pargiter. But that is only half of the answer. Readers of *The Years* will note that there is no character called Elvira in the published novel. What happens to Elvira? Where does she go? The easiest answer to this question is that she does not go anywhere: she is renamed Sara. A facile explanation for this is that 'Elvira Pargiter' sounds too similar to 'Eleanor Pargiter' and having these two characters in the same scene would have proven a tongue-twister too far. But there is a world of difference between the Elvira we see in these drafts and the Sara of the published novel. Elvira is somewhat of an oracle with a bent for imagining futures, some utopian—like the 'real education' that opens this chapter— and others apocalyptic. Between her second and third calls for pedagogical arson, she prophesies the end of the world, prefiguring the sylvan language she will use to describe her future university,

when the sun fails; when the flowers
wither; when the stars *[shiver?]*; when very old men & women
crawl to the spring well for water & it is *[illeg.]*; &
they sink back +down by the well side in the & the frost snow
covers them; & they sleep" (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 72: 127.121-125)

As well as prefiguring her easily combustible outdoors institution, albeit in a more elegiac tone, Elvira's language here recalls the apocalyptic language in *On Being Ill* (1930). *On Being Ill* was initially published as an essay in *The New Criterion*, in 1926 (*E* 4 317-329) and was republished as a Hogarth Press volume in 1930 (*E* 5 195-208). The above quoted passage appears in both versions of the essay and is substantially similar in both; I quote from the 1930 edition here. The narrator of this essay imagines an icy end for the world as:

> [t]he wave of life flings itself out indefatigably. It is only the recumbent who know what, after all, Nature is at no pains to conceal—that she in the end will conquer; heat will leave the world; stiff with frost we shall cease to drag ourselves around the fields; ice will lie thick upon factory and engine; the sun will go out. (*E* 5 200)

Elvira Pargiter and her counterpart in the published *Years* are both among the 'recumbent' and are perhaps both party to the knowledge that Nature will conquer. They are both given to dozing off and do so both in this portion of the draft and in the corresponding chapter of *The Years*—as Eleanor and Nicholas discuss 'the soul' Sara is 'lying back in her chair half asleep' (*Y* 267). Some ten years prior, we see Sara recumbent in her nursery as her parents host a party in the garden below. While listening to the 'melancholy waltz music' drift upwards from the garden, she starts to read a book presented to her by her cousin: "'The Antigone of Sophocles, done into English verse by Edward Pargiter'" (120).[28] As Sara reads, she focuses on another recumbent figure, the 'unburied body' of Polyneices which 'lay on the sand' (121). Still another recumbent figure comes into focus: Antigone's, 'buried alive' in a 'brick mound. There was just enough room for her to lie straight out. Straight out in a brick tomb' (121-2). She finishes the book and Sara's sister Maggie comes upstairs. She has been to the dance and tells her sister about it, that she sat next to "'A man in gold lace'"(123). The children's mother, Lady Eugenie Pargiter, eventually comes upstairs and tells the children to go to bed, bidding Sara to follow a doctor's instructions and "'Lie straight, lie still'" (125).

---

[28] *Antigone* is invoked in the draft of *The Years*, the published novel and *Three Guineas*. I will discuss the semiotic freight that Sophocles' play bears at length in Chapter Four of this thesis.

In the draft version of this scene, transcribed by Alice Wood, we are told why Sara (or Elvira, in the draft) is prescribed recumbency: she is 'crooked not only in | her back, but everywhere, slightly, as if she had been | blown upon, made one sided' and is described as a 'hump back' (Wood 150). In the published *Years*, we are told the man in gold lace's name: he is '"Sir Matthew Mayhew" […] "A most distinguished man"' (*Y* 126), whereas in the draft he is not named but does speak. He says 'Power, Miss Pargiter,' and Maggie and Elvira speculate that he is the 'prime minister' (Wood 151). Sir Matthew Mayhew does not appear again in the published edition of *The Years*, but Maggie and Elvira discuss his draft counterpart in the 1917 chapter of M.42 and filiate him with Sophocles' Creon—I discuss this filiation at length in Chapter Four. The recumbent Elvira/Sara and Antigone are not the only recumbent figures in Woolf's oeuvre: Louise Hornby writes of Woolf's lifelong chronic tiredness and traces the recumbent figure as a trope that recurs through Woolf's work. Hornby writes that Woolf celebrates the recumbent body, reading it as a fictional instantiation of Maurice Blanchot's *le neutre* insofar as it 'provides access to a non-intrusive and nonappropriative perspective that is otherwise unavailable' (Hornby 210). Tiredness becomes an opting-out and provides a site of resistance to 'male egotism and uprightness' (219) from a position of physical and philosophical neutrality. The recumbent Elvira/Sara becomes a trenchant vehicle for Woolf's social critique, linked with the recumbent Antigone who is killed in her attempt to resist Creon's rule. This Elvira, resisting through recumbence, is in Sara Pargiter's archive, certainly, but what other Elviras can we find?

To answer this question, we need to turn our gaze outwards from the documents we have discussed thus far, away from the 'endogenetic' material of Woolf's manuscript drafts and into the farther reaches of an 'exogenetic empire' which 'knows almost no bounds' (de Biasi and Wassenaar 44). Exogenetic material derives from a 'source exterior to the writing' and can consist of a vast array of written sources including but not limited to 'overheard or reported speech, sketches and drawings made of the subject in hand, friends' letters giving useful information or anecdotes, reading notes, investigatory notebooks, newspaper cuttings, typescripts of interviews or conversations, printed textual fragments and marginalia, bibliographical references, confessions, essays and reports, and so on' (44). The only caveat is that exogenetic material can only consist of written matter: the exogenetic archive does not seek sources but rather 'the locatable trace of these source-referents in terms of

documents' (45). This near boundless archive is conceptually akin to the Derridean archive I discussed in the first chapter of this thesis and the 'chain of belated and problematic oppositions between *physis* and its others, *thesis*, *tekhnē*, *nomos*, etc. which are found to be at work in the other principle, the nomological principle of the *arkhē*' (Derrida *Archive Fever* 1). As I have said before, Derrida reminds us that even at the commencement, even at the originary moment of the archive, there is an endless chain of supplementarity at play.

As well as the Elvira Pargiter of the drafts another Elvira exists in Woolf's archive, in her diaries. On the 17th of December 1932, Woolf writes in her diary that 'the fun of' her new project is 'to come, with Magdalena & Elvira' (*D* 4 132) while on the 31st of December she notes whilst contemplating the dead goldfish in the pond at Monks House that her 'thoughts turn with excitement to The Pargiters, for I long to feel my sails blow out, & to be careering with Elvira, Maggie & the rest over the whole of human life' (134). Woolf is writing in her diary about her novel's progress: these observations are not yet overly interesting. But on the 25th of March 1933, Woolf starts to ventriloquise Elvira:

> It is an utterly corrupt society I have just remarked, speaking in the voice of Elvira Pargiter, & I will take nothing that it can give me &c &c: now, as Virginia Woolf, I have to write— oh dear me what a bore—to the Vice Chancellor of Manchester Un[iversi]ty & say that I refuse to be made a Doctor of Letters. (*D* 4 147)

Elvira becomes, in this diary entry, a means by which Woolf can 'tilt[] at universities' (79) and, crucially, do so without the constraints of her own public voice, with a measure of ironic distance. It is tempting to say that Woolf ventriloquises her creation, but this is not, precisely speaking, the case. Woolf's diary entry continues: 'I hardly know which I am: Virginia or Elvira; in the Pargiters or outside' (148). This act of imaginative identification works both ways: Elvira works her way into Woolf's own voice, marking even a document as personal as a diary. Elvira Pargiter becomes, in a sense, a shadowy counter to Woolf's own voice, an imaginative surplus that moulds what Woolf can say in her 'own' voice. On the twenty-first of July 1933, Woolf even starts to draft a portion of *The Years* in her diary, a snippet of direct speech. It is tempting to believe that it is spoken by Elvira:

> He is not a poet, no; so what is he to do "…That is poetry Maggie in its pre-natal stage; before it has taken wings to itself & flown to the—" She paused at the bookcase, & took down, the Antigone, translated by Edward Pargiter. to the utmost (*D* 4 169)

In the margin of this entry Woolf notes 'written here by mistake—damn'.

At the end of 1933, Woolf's diary becomes further imbricated with the drafts of *The Years*. As she prepares to write the 1917 chapter, Woolf reads back over her old diaries: 'To freshen my memories of the war, I read some old diaries' (193). As well as reading of 'L. & me at the Green: our quarrels; how he crept into my bed with a little purse, & so on: how we reckoned our income & how I was given tea free for a treat' (193), Woolf would have been reminded of a raid by some '25 Gothas' early in the morning the 6th of December 1917. Leonard woke Virginia at five in the morning 'to a most instant sound of guns' and the two of them 'took clothes, quilts, a watch & a torch' downstairs to 'sit with the servants […] wrapped in quilts in the kitchen passage' as anti-aircraft batteries sounded nearer and nearer and then more distant, 'apparently towards Barnes'. The two went back upstairs to bed, but some ten minutes later the guns went off again, 'apparently at Kew,' alarmingly close to Richmond where the Woolfs lived at the time, and they once again took shelter before emerging again as the sun rose (*D* 1 84-5). The Woolfs would not have to take shelter from a raid again until the night of the 6th of January through the small hours of the 7th: 'From 8 to 1.15 [they] roamed about, between coal hole kitchen bedroom & living room' (116). On the night of the 28th of January, from the warning at 9.10 to 'about 11.30' there was another raid over the west of London. Woolf reported in a diary entry written the day after that 'the guns were so near that I didn't like to fetch a pair of shoes left in the bedroom.' Later, they heard a 'thud, wh. L. distinguished from the rest' and which 'came from the explosion of bombs at Kew' (116). Woolf's diary, hence, comes to act as exogenetic material in the genetic dossier of *The Years*. The anti-aircraft guns whose progress Nicholas tracks, first over '"Hampstead"' then '"The Embankment"' and finally '"On top of us"' (*Y* 262-3) find their source in the guns that Leonard Woolf tracked over Richmond and Kew; the 'large cellar'' with a 'crypt-like ceiling and stone walls' and a 'damp ecclesiastical look' (261) where the Pargiters shelter finds a source in the Woolfs journey from 'coal hole kitchen bedroom & living room' in Hogarth House.

I posed a question before: What happens to Elvira? Where does she go? There is no easy answer to this question and my line of argument hereon in suggests that there can be no answer, that any answer is rooted in an anterior past, that any answer gestures towards an endless play of supplementarity. I want to turn back to Freud's 1925 essay on the *Wunderblock* and Derrida's two readings of it. The first of these is in his 1967 long essay, titled 'Freud and the Scene of Writing,'

published in English in 1978 in the collection *Writing and Difference*. In this essay Derrida tracks the development of metaphors of writing in Freud, analysing logocentrism through Freud's work from the 1899 *Die Traumdeutung* (translated into English in 1913 as *The Interpretation of Dreams*) through his 1925 '*Notiz Über Den 'Wunderblock*'' (translated in 1961 as 'A Note Upon on the Mystic Writing-Pad). The second of Derrida's readings of Freud's 1925 essay comes in his 1995 *Archive Fever*, where Derrida cites at length his 1967 essay. Earlier in the chapter I cited this latter reading but now I want to follow this chain of citations the other way. In 1925, Freud's worries about writing are given metaphorical form, or rather, he writes an essay which stages his thoughts on ways that he can 'supplement and guarantee' memory 'by making a note in writing,' by inscribing upon a surface. This inscribed surface becomes a 'materialized portion of my mnemic apparatus' (Freud "Writing-Pad" 227). Freud then considers specific substrates upon which to write. First, he considers paper, which has the capacity to 'preserve intact any note made upon it for an indefinite length of time' but, according to Freud, is too permanent and 'the receptive capacity of the writing-surface is soon exhausted.' One alternative he considers is a slate and chalk. This constitutes 'a receptive surface which retains its receptive capacity for an unlimited time and the notes upon which can be destroyed'. The downside of this second surface is that it 'cannot preserve a permanent trace'. Freud then states that an 'unlimited receptive capacity and a retention of permanent traces seem to be mutually exclusive properties in the apparatus which we use as substitutes for our memory: either the receptive surface must be renewed or the note must be destroyed' (227-8).

However, Freud invokes a children's toy known in German as the *Wunderblock*, the 'mystic writing pad' of the essay's title. In this object he finds a peculiar analogy for the workings of the 'system *Pcpt.-Cs.*' or perception-consciousness system, which 'receives perceptions but retains no permanent trace of them; while the permanent traces of the excitations which have been received are preserved in "mnemic systems" lying behind the perceptual system' (228). This writing pad consists of a 'slab of dark brown resin or wax with a paper edging; over the slab is laid a thin transparent sheet' which itself consists of 'a transparent piece of celluloid' layered atop 'thin translucent waxed paper'. When not in use, 'the lower surface of the waxed paper adheres lightly to the upper surface of the wax slab' (228-9). To use the Mystic Pad, one simply has to write on the top layer, on the 'celluloid portion of the covering-sheet' with a 'pointed stylus' which 'scratches the surface, the

depressions upon which constitute the "writing'" (229). As the stylus scratches the surface, 'it presses the lower surface of the waxed paper onto the wax slab, and the grooves are visible as dark writing upon the otherwise smooth surface of the celluloid' (229). The most interesting feature of the *Wunderblock* for Freud is that the user can erase their writing: 'all that is necessary is to raise the double covering-sheet of from the wax slab by a light pull, starting from the free lower end'. At this point, the 'close contact' between the two layers is 'brought to an end and does not recur when the two surfaces come together once more,' with the result that the 'Mystic Pad is now clear of writing and ready to receive fresh notes' (229).

After having described the workings of the Mystic Pad, Freud then starts to draw analogies between its workings and his *Pcpt.-Cs.* system. He first asks why the layer of celluloid is necessary: it is there to protect the waxed paper, to act as a 'protective sheath' for it and to 'keep off injurious effects from without'. Freud likens this to his figuration of the 'perceptual apparatus of our mind' in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, which similarly consists of a protective layer and a perceptive layer, which is the *Pcpt.-Cs.* (230). He then delves another layer deeper into the *Wunderblock* to find that while the surface of the pad clears, 'the permanent trace of what was written is retained upon the wax slab and is legible in certain lights.' Thus, Freud continues, 'the Pad provides not only a receptive surface that can be used over and over again, like a slate, but also permanent traces of what has been written, like an ordinary paper pad' (230). This wax slab is a palimpsest: it bears the material trace of every inscription made on the celluloid sheet. The analogy is pressed further: 'But this is precisely the way in which, according to the hypothesis I mentioned just now, our mental apparatus performs its perceptual function. The layer which receives the stimuli—the system *Pcpt.-Cs.*—forms no permanent traces; the foundations of memory come about in other, adjoining systems' (230). Perhaps we could at this point start to draw a line of filiation between Freud's toy and Woolf's archive. Such a conclusion might suggest, having read thus far, that Elvira Pargiter and her imaginary fires disappear into a kind of palimpsestic textual unconscious similar to the wax slab of the writing pad and that reading the published editions of *The Years* and *Three Guineas*, we only see the celluloid surface that lies on top. But this conclusion is too hastily drawn.

After drawing a detailed analogy between the *Wunderblock* and the mind's capacity to perceive sensations, Freud backtracks and notes that the traces of writing on the Pad's wax tablet are

not usable: 'it is enough that they are present' and 'it would be a mystic pad indeed if, like our memory, it could accomplish that' (230). In refusing to press his analogy further, Freud imagines a future substrate, a still more mystic writing pad from which past, erased inscriptions can be recovered at will. I will come back to Freud's imaginary in due course—for now, though, I want to turn to the next link in my chain of citations, Derrida's long essay of 1967, 'Freud and the Scene of Writing'. 'It is no accident,' Derrida argues,

> that Freud, at the decisive moments of his itinerary, has recourse to metaphorical models which are borrowed not from spoken language or from verbal forms, but from a script which is never subject to, never exterior and posterior to, the spoken word. Freud invokes signs which do not transcribe living, full speech, master of itself and self-present ("Freud and the Scene of Writing" 199).

Derrida tells his reader that he will turn to the essay on the Mystic Writing Pad not in order to ask whether such a 'writing apparatus' is a '*good* metaphor for the working of the psyche' or not, but rather to ask 'what apparatus we must create in order to represent psychical writing,' and concomitantly 'what the imitation, projected and liberated in a machine, of something like psychical writing might mean,' what the psyche is if it can be figured as a text (199). This discussion will be mediated through the question of technology: Derrida's final question concerns 'the relationship between psyche, writing, and spacing for such a metaphoric transition to be possible, not only, nor primarily, within theoretical discourse, but within the history of psyche, text, and technology?' (199).

Derrida then turns his attention to *The Interpretation of Dreams* and advances a rich and complex reading of Freud's figuration of the dream as essentially legible, a 'displacement similar to an original form of writing which puts words on stage without becoming subservient to them […] a model of writing irreducible of speech which would include, like hieroglyphics, pictographic, ideogrammatic, and phonetic elements' (209). Through patient deconstruction of the complex theoretical armature Freud had developed by 1895, Derrida suggests that the 'conscious text is thus not a transcription, because there is no text *present elsewhere* as an unconscious one to be transposed or transported' (211). Rather, the

> unconscious text is already a weave of pure traces, differences in which meaning and force are united—a text nowhere present, consisting of archives which are *always already* transcriptions. Everything begins with reproduction. Always already: repositories of a meaning which was never present, whose signified presence is always reconstituted by deferral, *nachträglich*, belatedly, *supplementarily*: for the *nachträglich* also means

supplementary. The call of the supplement is primary, here, and it hollows out that which will be reconstituted by deferral as the present. (211-2)

This is a vertiginously complex passage but it is worth dwelling with its language, couched as it is in the lexis of the archive: this chain of metaphors will prove useful to my future analysis. Derrida writes that Freud's conscious mind cannot be a transcription of the unconscious because the unconscious is itself 'a weave of pure traces,' a tissue of 'archives which are *always already* transcriptions' whose meaning is always belated and deferred. If the unconscious is an archive then it is not a neat, bounded archive, but rather an unruly archive that opens up to an infinite play of supplementarity: an archive that always produces more archive.

Derrida notes that Freud has not yet 'united' the 'two series of metaphors' (221) that he has tracked through Freud's early work: writing and memory. Derrida writes that it is not until 1925 that Freud will explicitly yoke the two together and advance a joint consideration of the technologies of writing and the writing of memories. He reads three analogies or stages of a single analogy in Freud's essay. The first is the physical: Derrida considers Freud's lengthy anatomisation of paper, slate, and the Writing-Pad. Derrida notes that 'the *depth* of the Mystic Pad is simultaneously a depth without bottom, an infinite allusion, and a perfectly superficial exteriority: a stratification of surfaces each of whose relation to itself, each of whose interior, is but the implication of another similarly exposed surface' (224). The *Wunderblock*'s two surfaces form a chiasmus, and only work insofar as they relate to one another, insofar as they leave their material traces on one another. Derrida's second analogy or stage of analogy concerns precisely this material trace and the writing that is preserved on the wax slab after the celluloid paper is lifted: 'We must account for writing as a trace which survives the scratch's present, punctuality, and *stigmē*' (224). In this stage of the analogy '"Memory" or writing' comes to constitute 'the opening of that process of appearance itself. The "perceived" may only be read in the past, beneath perception and after it' (224). This insight leads Derrida to the third and final analogy, that of the 'temporality of the wax slab' (225). The temporal order Derrida discusses in this analogy is different to the temporal order of the previous analogy. Whereas the previous analogy is concerned with the moment of inscription and its preservation, the third analogy is concerned with the temporality of reading, or trying to read, the inscription's traces on the wax slab. Crucially, there is an irreducible gap between temporal orders of these two analogies, the time

of inscription and preservation and the time of reading. 'Temporality as spacing will not only be the horizontal discontinuity of a chain of signs, but also will be writing as the interruption and restoration of contact between the various depths of psychical levels: the remarkably heterogeneous temporal fabric of psychical work itself' (225). Derrida concludes this final portion of the analogy by announcing that 'Time is the economy of a system of writing' (226). Derrida renders writing here as irreducibly temporal, suspended between the moment of inscription and the moment of recall or reading.

Derrida supplements his three-fold analogy with the observation that 'the machine does not run by itself' (226). The *Wunderblock* is 'not held with only one hand' and 'at least two hands are needed to make the apparatus function' (226). Just as Freud's *Pcpt.-Cs.* is an abstraction, and cannot exist without qualia to perceive and a subject to perceive them, disembodied writing on the Pad is an abstraction. Rather, 'the subject of writing is a *system* of relations between strata: the Mystic Pad, the psyche, society, the world. Within that scene, on that stage, the punctual simplicity of the classical subject is not to be found' (227). The machine, by itself, is 'dead. It is death' (227). This is not because Freud's Writing-Pad is particularly dangerous or deadly but rather because 'the origin of machines is the relation to death' (227). A machine such as the *Wunderblock* is an attempt to replicate the workings of the *Pcpt.-Cs.*, but it is lifeless; it cannot run by itself. 'Abandoned to itself,' Derrida continues, 'the multiplicity of layered surfaces of the apparatus is a dead complexity without death. Life as depth belongs only to the wax of psychical memory' (227). It is here that Derrida starts to advance the argument that he will later recapitulate in *Archive Fever*. He writes that Freud has not asked certain questions. He has not 'explicitly examine[d] the status of the "materialized" supplement which is necessary to the alleged spontaneity of memory' (227). Freud's argument rests on paper and slate being imperfect mnemic prostheses; Derrida charges Freud with failing to interrogate this foundational analogy upon which his analogy of the *Wunderblock* rests. Further, Derrida charges Freud with failing to interrogate the vehicle by which he makes this comparison: metaphor, the 'analogy between two apparatuses and the possibility of this representational relation' (227). Metaphor becomes the 'historical production of a *supplementary* machine, *added* to the psychical organization in order to supplement its finitude' (228). Rather, the

historico-technical production of this metaphor which survives individual (that is, generic) psychical organization, is of an entirely different order than the production of an intrapsychical metaphor, assuming that the latter exists (to speak about it is not enough for that), and whatever bond the two metaphors may maintain between themselves. (228).

Derrida writes that Freud's metaphor is not one metaphor but at least two. The first is a psychical metaphor that relates the workings of the mind to his audience, anatomising it and laying its processes bare. This first analogy governs the conditions by which the second analogy, a technological analogy, emerges. The *Wunderblock* is a metaphor of a metaphor, an analogy of an analogy. This realisation 'opens up the question of technics: of the apparatus in general and of the analogy between the psychical apparatus and the nonpsychical apparatus' (228). How is the hasty conclusion I drew after reading Freud's essay—that draft material exists in a palimpsestic textual unconscious akin to the wax pad of the *Wunderblock*—modified by this lengthy deconstructive reading? The palimpsestic textual unconscious underneath the Writing Pad's celluloid sheet is placed in a radical suspension, having been shown to be a rhetorical construction (not that I ever suggested it wasn't) founded on a metaphor of a metaphor.

In 1995, Derrida returns to his past analysis of Freud's 'Note upon the Mystic Writing-Pad' in *Archive Fever*. I have cited this briefly before but want to return to it now, with the benefit of having more closely read both of the texts Derrida cites here. At the end of his 1925 essay, Freud looks forward to the future of his analogy, noting that 'once the writing has been erased, the Mystic Pad cannot "reproduce" it from within; it would be a mystic pad indeed if, like our memory, it could accomplish that' (Freud "Writing-Pad" 230). By the time Derrida came to write *Archive Fever* such technology existed in the form of the personal computer and external data-storage technologies such as the floppy disc. These were readily accessible to a consumer market in a way that they were not when Derrida wrote *Writing and Difference*. We have already seen Derrida discuss the computer he used to write *Archive Fever*; a mystic pad capable of the recall of erased inscriptions that Freud said his mystic writing pad could not accomplish. As Derrida points out, 'To represent the functioning of the psychic apparatus in an *exterior* technical model, Freud did not have at his disposition the resources provided today by archival machines of which one could hardly have dreamed in the first quarter of [the twentieth] century.' He goes on to ask: 'Do these new archival machines change anything? Do they affect the essentials of Freud's discourse?' (Derrida *Archive Fever* 14).

Having read 'Freud and the Scene of Writing' we can see that these new archival machines represented by the list of telecommunicative technologies that Derrida reels off later deeply affect the terms of this discourse. In *Archive Fever*, Derrida asks, 'Is the psychic apparatus *better represented* or is it *affected differently* by all the technical mechanisms for archivization and for reproduction, for prostheses of so-called live memory, for simulacrums of living things which already are, and will increasingly be, more refined, complicated, powerful than the "mystic pad"?' (15). But as Derrida pointed out in 'Freud and the Scene of Writing,' it is not a question of whether Freud's technological metaphor is adequate or could be refined. We have already seen how in his 1973 essay, Derrida caveated his discussion of the *Wunderblock*: 'We shall not have to ask if a writing apparatus [...] is a *good* metaphor for the working of the psyche, but rather what apparatus we must create in order to represent psychical writing' ("Freud and the Scene of Writing" 199). The implications of this argument for the archival presence I have been chasing thus far are radical. The different technologies for inscription I have discussed in this chapter—autographic pen and paper draft, microform transparency, PDF scan, .doc transcription, published novel—do not necessarily bear semiotic freight in and of themselves but rather constitute the grounds on which we make meaning out of the Woolfian archive. But each of these substrates is conditioned by what came before in a chain of supplementarity that does not stop even at the moment Woolf put pen to paper to create what Derrida calls the *arkhē*, the originary document of the archive. Were I to posit a textual unconscious patterned on the wax layer of the *Wunderblock*, this textual unconscious would be a text which is 'already a weave of pure traces, differences in which meaning and force are united—a text nowhere present, consisting of archives which are *always already* transcriptions' ("Freud and the Scene of Writing" 211). The archive always opens up to more archive. The question I posed early in this section of the chapter, 'What happens to Elvira Pargiter?' opens up to an endless play of supplementarity. The archive—the archive I have been working out of, certainly, and potentially any archive—is shown to be radically open.

What are the implications of opening up the archive in this way? Woolf's archive becomes more than a collection of documents, but rather, stretches beyond even the furthest bounds of De Biasi and Wassenaar's 'exogenetic empire' and beyond the typologies and teleologies of genetic criticism. Working out of such an archive necessitates being open to the possibility of a near-infinite

play in a manner apt to David Bradshaw's call for the 'vigilant reader' to treat *Jacob's Room* as a 'first-rate 'puzzle'' (Bradshaw *Winking, Buzzing, Carpet-Beating* 28). We have already seen in this chapter how a single deleted word, an injunction to be ~~silent~~ can call into question the ways that transcriptions work and do not work; how Woolf working through a fiery trope in 1934 leads backwards in time to Gotha raids in the First World War; how a changed name leads deep into an archive that is not a simple repository for documents but rather is a site of Derridean supplementarity and play. The next chapter in this thesis reads invocations of Sophocles' *Antigone*, of Antigone and of Creon, in this radically open archive. It tracks Antigone's footfalls from a single and richly generative misquotation in M.42-5 through *The Years* and *Three Guineas* and forward into an unknowable *avenir*.

Chapter Four: Antigone's Footfalls

Introduction: Woolf's Antigone

The previous chapter introduced and closely read portions of the lengthy first draft of the 1917 chapter of *The Years*, using these close readings to theorise the status of this curious draft. It paid close palaeographical attention to the physical nature of Woolf's autographic draft writing, tracking the ways in which her attempts to think through difficult, even aporetic, problems took material form. In so doing, it found a rich and complex play of supplementarity at the heart of the archive, but which far exceeds the boundaries of the archive, traditionally conceived. Although the previous chapter discussed tropes and figurations from the drafts of *The Years* that are filiated with tropes and figurations in both the published version of *The Years* and *Three Guineas*, my work thus far has not traced these filiations as far as it could have. This is in no part because I wanted to establish the archive as a site of supplemental play. Having undertaken this theoretical work in the previous chapter, I want to devote this chapter to tracing one trope from the draft 1917 chapter of *The Years* through to the published novel and *Three Guineas*, in the radically open archive I theorised in the last chapter. To this end, I will turn now to a discussion of Antigone, and of Sophocles' *Antigone*, as they appear in this radically open archive.

Woolf's invocation of Antigone in *The Years* and *Three Guineas* has been the subject of much prior critical discussion. Woolf's Antigone tends to be figured as a revolutionary figure with the power to redefine social norms and gesture towards a more sustainable future. Diana L. Swanson reads Woolf's dual deployments of Antigone in these two texts as 'not only critical but creative' acts, 'suggestive of new possibilities for egalitarian and life-affirming social structures' (Swanson 23). For Swanson, Antigone provides Woolf with a lens through which to scry 'the anti-fascist, anti-patriarchal, and anti-authoritarian strands' embedded deep within the fabric of the 'Western tradition itself,' serving to 'both expose and critique patriarchal practices and to suggest a nascent failure of the patriarch' (33-4). Swanson suggests that Antigone, as both Oedipus's daughter and his sister at once, represents 'an opening, a crack in the system, an opportunity for the daughter's opposition to the infantile fixation of the fathers, for a force which we might name the Antigone Complex' (42).

This Antigone complex represents an irruption into the Oedipal economies that mark both the fathers who rule and those who are subject to their rule and, for Swanson, represents a way of resisting the Oedipal order. However, in couching her discussion quite so heavily in the lexis of Freudian psychoanalysis, it is questionable as to how a new Antigone complex could genuinely break with what came before it, troping as it does on Freud's Oedipus complex.

In her 2011 monograph *Virginia Woolf and the Migrations of Language*, meanwhile, Emily Dalgarno reads Woolf's Antigone historically, tracing Woolf's own interactions with Sophocles. Dalgarno argues that Woolf's Antigone 'writes history by challenging the vocabulary of public discourse' (Dalgarno *Migrations* 38). She continues, arguing that 'Woolf's Antigone is the figure who interrogates the European institution of dictatorship not only by the force of her will but by her insistence on taking the fight to language' (38). Dalgarno reads Antigone as being rendered mute: Antigone is interpellated by a language in which she has no part, 'hailed in the name of a law that she does not accept' and 'prevented by her relationship to both Creon and her brother from becoming a speaking subject' (53-4). In *Three Guineas*, Woolf's Antigone comes to act as a pattern for women who are cut off from the education that would teach them the public language of the ruling and male elite—a life-long concern of Woolf's—and hence excised from society more broadly, Dalgarno contends. Antigone's moulding of an alternate public language presents the opportunity for 'the emergence of the feminine subject from her unwritten history' (68).

Nancy Worman's argument in *Virginia Woolf's Greek Tragedy* (2019), is broadly consonant with Swanson's and Dalgarno's, although her language sheers away from the psychoanalytic mode of these two earlier critics. Worman traces the spectres of classical women in *Three Guineas*, arguing that Antigone represents a 'fierce mode of punctuation in the building argument around how women might resist patriarchal brutalities and thus war' (Worman 110-111). While summarising Judith Butler's reading of prior readings of Sophocles by Luce Irigaray and Jacques Lacan—a chain of readings I will discuss in due course—Worman says that 'Woolf's need for Antigone to stand as an outsider against the state may well inaugurate a feminist understanding of her as the original resister' (112), and that Woolf's figuration of female resistance to patriarchy is conditioned by Antigone, who acts as the 'paradigmatic representative' (115) of gendered injustice.

Antigone's presence in the genetic dossier of *The Years*, however, has not been commented on. In this chapter, I will trace the presence of this archival Antigone and attempt to sketch out the ways in which her curious appearance in this portion of the manuscript of *The Years* works intertextually, changing the ways in which the more public Antigones of *The Years* and *Three Guineas* appear in their respective works. Antigone herself is not named in M.42-5. Her name is not spoken, yet her figure is invoked. Or, rather, Creon's name is spoken and Antigone comes along for the ride, as it were, as part of a dyad or binary opposition. Words that were written by Sophocles for Antigone to speak are still present in the draft—or at least some version of the words she speaks in Sophocles' play. These words are the line of ancient Greek that Edward Pargiter intones but refuses to translate in *The Years*, 'οὔτοι συνέχθειν, ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἔφυν [*outoi synecthein, alla symphilein ephun*]' (*Y* 372) as he chats awkwardly with North and Eleanor Pargiter in the midst of the party at the novel's end. This phrase is referred to in *Three Guineas* as 'worth all of the sermons of the archbishops, 'even though the 'English rendering' is 'lame' (*TG* 207). Woolf has a lame English rendering in mind: as well as quoting the original, she quotes R.C. Jebb's translation of the line, '"Tis not my nature to join in hating but in loving,' in the essay's footnotes (n. 40, 303). M.42-5 provides us with a curious variant on this line, 'sumφilein oux ethan ephen' (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 61: 115.128). This mixture of Greek and Latin characters bears enough of a similarity with the line that Edward Pargiter correctly quotes to positively identify it with the five words of *Three Guineas*—' sumφilein' is close to 'συμφιλεῖν' or '*symphilein*,' translated by Jebb as 'join[ing] in love' while 'ephen' is close to 'ἔφυν,' '*ephun*,' which Jebb translates as 'nature.' But it is too simple to just say that Woolf did not have the whole of the *Antigone* memorised; that she was writing at haste with the intent of editing at leisure and leave it at that. Rather, we need to ask what version of the *Antigone* M.42-5 invokes: one where the eponymous character's words are given voice but curiously transmuted.

In his 1959-60 seminar published in French in 1986 as *Le Séminaire, Livre VII: L'éthique de la psychanalyse* and translated in 1992 as *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, Jacques Lacan figures Antigone as stalking the limits of *Atè*. This term is translated literally as 'bewilderment' or 'infatuation […] sent by the gods mostly as the punishment of guilty rashness' ("ἄτη") but is rendered by Lacan as 'the limit that human life can only briefly cross. […] Beyond this *Atè*, one can only

spend a brief period of time' (Lacan 323). *Atè*, as Lacan figures it, is aporetic. To return to Derrida's 1993 formulation of the aporia that I quoted in the previous chapter, Lacan understands Antigone as willing 'the experience of the nonpassage, the experience of what happens *[se passe]* and is fascinating *[passionne]* in this nonpassage' (Derrida *Aporias* 12). Lacan continues: 'The limit we have reached here is the one where the possibility of metamorphosis is located' (Lacan 325). Beyond the misfortune of *Atè*, a chaos proper to Antigone as the 'daughter/sister' (Taxidou 24) of Oedipus and the aberrant heir to the Labdacides family, lies mutability and flux, the possibility of passing the limits of the intelligible. Lacan points to the Chorus' description of Antigone as 'ōmos' or 'raw' (324). Antigone is, in Lacan's figuration, uncooked matter, indigestible, unassimilable to the order of the *polis*. This gastro-ontological priority, this rawness, is foundational. Lacan's translation implies a certain teleology: one cooks with raw ingredients, after all. But Antigone refuses to be cooked.

Judith Butler, in *Antigone's Claim* (2000) examines Antigone's refusal to obey Creon's injunction against burying Polyneices as a speech act, as an attempt to seize control of the public language that Creon wields as ruler of Thebes. She writes that 'Antigone wants her speech act to be radically and comprehensively public, as public as [Creon's injunction] itself' (Butler 28). But Antigone's speech act is radically unassimilable to the lexis of sovereign power: 'Her language is not that of a survivable political agency.' Butler's reading of *Antigone* here follows Lacan's. Butler continues: '[Antigone's] words, understood as deeds, are chiasmically related to the vernacular of sovereign power, speaking in against it, delivering and defying imperatives at the same time, inhabiting the language of sovereignty at the very moment in which she opposes sovereign power and is excluded from its terms' (28). For Hegel, Antigone represents the 'eternal irony of the community,' that which is outside of the *polis* but without which the *polis* cannot be born (Hegel in Butler 4), but the Antigone who emerges in Butler's reading of Lacan lives at the edge of what is intelligible, what can be assimilated into the symbolic order, 'appear[ing] as a figure who inaugurates its operation' (40). Butler opposes Hegel and Lacan's readings of Antigone, arguing that Lacan 'take[s] radical distance from Hegel, objecting to the opposition between human and divine law, concentrating instead on the internal conflict of a desire that can meet its limit only in death.' (40).

But I am not sure that these two readings are quite so radically opposed. Hegel's reading of *Antigone* (or Butler's reading of Hegel's reading of *Antigone*, at least) ends in the coming of the public law; Lacan's with the symbolic order, 'the sphere of laws and norms that govern the accession to speech and speakability' (3). Here, for both Hegel and Lacan, Antigone represents a curious teleology that only ever exists in the rear-view mirror: a way of getting to our current state of affairs, an affirmation of the consequent. Even Butler's own reading of *Antigone* is perhaps less radical than it first seems. In the final chapter of *Antigone's Claim*, Butler reads Antigone as 'caught in a web of relations that produce no coherent position within kinship.' Butler continues that Antigone is not 'strictly speaking, outside kinship or, indeed, unintelligible' (57). Rather, it is this radical indeterminacy that allows Antigone to '[upset] the vocabulary of kinship.' 'If kinship is the precondition of the human,' Butler writes, 'then Antigone is the occasion for a new field of the human, achieved through political catachresis, the one that appears when […] kinship founders on its own founding laws' (82). As the daughter/sister of Oedipus, Butler asserts that Antigone's aberrant bloodline distances her from the kinship structures that are the 'precondition of the human.' I could suggest that the psychology glimpsed from this vantage point, neither in nor outside of kinship, be called the Antigone complex, after Swanson. However, Olga Taxidou points out that Butler's 'quest' for such a theory is 'doomed from the outset because Antigone, the daughter/sister of Oedipus, is so absolutely implicated in the Oedipal drama that it would be almost impossible to read her outside those terms' (Taxidou 24). Try as we might to scry a new psychology in the entrails of Sophocles' play, we only ever end up back where we started, with Oedipus bearing down upon us. 'Just as she enacts the perversion of the law, its irony, without which the *polis* could not exist,' Taxidou writes, Antigone 'at once enacts the perversion of the Oedipal family, whose existence is also linked with the *polis*' (24). The eternal irony (to borrow Hegel's phrase) of Antigone is that she can never escape the community whose eternal irony it is her fate to enact.

Is there any hope, then, of reclaiming a radical Antigone? One who can be invoked, as the narrator of *Three Guineas* does, as 'anti-Fascist propaganda' (*TG* 302)? One who does not just lead us back to the State, to the symbolic order or to Oedipus' open arms? Taxidou believes we can recover a more radical Antigone by remembering that *Antigone* is a play, a 'form of production' and not a 'text' that can be read 'as if it were already philosophy' (20). One vital piece of context that

comes to form the ground for Taxidou's critique of 'humanist' readings of *Antigone* is that classical Greek drama took place in an intensely homosocial milieu: not only was Sophocles a man, but so too were all of the actors onstage and all of the audience members (20). Creon says of Antigone, 'Indeed, now I am no man, but she is a man [*aner*] if she is to enjoy such power as this with impunity' (Sophocles 46.480-481). Recovering the homosocial context of classical Greek drama further complicates Antigone's fluctuating gender. Creon uses the term '*aner*' here whereas the Chorus use the105icropoli' in their Ode to Man (35.332-3). Liddell and Scott define *aner* in opposition to woman, as well as in opposition to *105icropoli*, which is opposed to 'beast' ("ἀνήρ"; "ἄνθρωπος").[29] These two words bear more than a passing resemblance, but they are not identical. Taxidou asks how Antigone 'come[s] to theorise the position of *105icropoli* in Sophoclean terms,' concluding that she does so 'through the process by which she is turned into a man' (Taxidou 27). But Antigone is not, precisely speaking, *105icropoli*. Rather, she is anthropomorphic. As Taxidou continues, 'it is important to remember that *105icropoli* does not exactly mean man. One of its etymologies has it mean "the appearance of man." Antigone talks and walks like a man' (28). The etymology to which Taxidou refers sees the roots of *105icropoli* in *aner*: as a man playing a woman who appears to be a man (but crucially a man as defined in opposition to a woman, rather than man defined in opposition to beast). Antigone is and is not a wo/man—for there could be nothing but doubt of his/her/their sex. 'The figure of Antigone,' Taxidou writes,

> Is not a woman, and not a man but alternating between both, as the text requires, and inscribing both into the text, becomes a kind of Brechtian *gestus*. A figure that at once represents and demonstrates, who writes and does, who acts and enacts. And what is enacted through a series of travesties—indeed through a travesty of the law itself—is the ability of the law to inscribe its own resistance. (36)

It is this very indeterminacy, this oscillating, vertiginous play of difference that makes Antigone a truly radical figure.

Read thus, Antigone does not serve the teleology that Butler reads in Hegel and Lacan, does not act as a metaphorical highway to the present state of affairs, but rather acts as a spanner in a works, as a way of suspending the machinery that produces the Hegelian public law or the Lacanian symbolic order. This *ōmos* ingredient cannot be cooked; despite all our efforts, she remains

---

[29] The 'animal turn' in literary studies teaches that the distinction between 'man' and 'beast' is not to be invoked lightly. I discuss this opposition in Chapter Six of this thesis.

stubbornly raw inside. Stathis Gourgouris writes of the curious 'etymological polyphony' of Antigone's name. His analysis is worth quoting at length:

> The preposition *anti* means both "in opposition to" and "in compensation of"; *gone* belongs in a line of derivatives of *genos* (kin, lineage, descent) and means simultaneously offspring, generation, womb, seed, birth. On the basis of this etymological polyphony (the battle for meaning at the nucleus of the name itself) we can argue that Antigone embodies both an opposition of kinship to the polis […] as well as an opposition to kinship, expressed by her attachment to a sibling by means of a disruptive desire, *philia* beyond kinship. But her name also embodies opposition at a generative level, an otherness at the core, for it may be translated as "generated in the place of the other" or also "born to oppose," which is to say: bearing (generating) opposition/compensation. A freer rendition could easily be "in place of a mother" whereby the womb that generates opposition displaces the mother as premier figure of socialisation, as the first pedagogue of sublimation. (Gourgouris 133)

Antigone, by dint of being called Antigone, becomes the locus of many struggles and oppositions: of a struggle against kinship and a 'disruptive desire, *philia* beyond kinship'; of 'opposition at a generative level, an otherness at the core'; and of compensation and substitution.

Taxidou comments on this passage. As the agent of a kind of radical substitutability, one who is 'generated in place of the other,' Antigone comes to '[enact] the etymology of her name' and '[give] us its gestic dimensions.' In so doing, she 'occupies a number of positions which all problematise the concept of generation, production and reproduction.' Returning to the insight that Sophocles' play was written and performed in an exclusively homosocial environment, Taxidou concludes that 'the act of reproduction itself becomes a kind of *aporia*; one that is endlessly enacted on the Athenian stage' (Taxidou 25-26). Antigone, thus, becomes the staged embodiment of a scission that separates the logic of reproduction, of lineage and of the *polis*, from something radically different. But radically different from what? I have argued that Lacan's reading of *Antigone* uses the titular character to reinforce the status quo, as a myth for the genesis of the symbolic order, but his reading provides a way out. He figures *Atè* as 'concern[ing] the Other, the field of the Other.' Lacan continues, saying that this *Atè* 'doesn't belong to Creon. It is, on the other hand, the place where Antigone is situated' (Lacan 341-342). But to take Antigone's desire to pass the aporetic limit of her *Atè* seriously, we need to abandon the elaborate theoretical armatures of both Hegel and Lacan, as well as Butler's reading of them, and return to Sophocles' language.

The Chorus calls Antigone '*autognotos*' (Sophocles 84.875), which translates as 'self-willed' or 'self-determined.' This is etymologically linked to '*autognōstos*' which itself derives from

'*autos*,' self, and '*gnotos*' which translates as 'perceived, known, understood' (and of a person 'well-known') but with a secondary sense of 'kinsman, kinswoman'—indeed, this sense of the word is found in collocation with *aner*, the word for man defined in opposition to woman that I discussed earlier ("αὐτόγνωτος"; "γνωτός"). Reading etymologically, we encounter a figuration of Antigone not just as self-willed and self-determined, but as self-knowing. This is apposite to the draft 1917 chapter of *The Years*. Self-knowledge is key to the utopian imaginary that this draft scene invokes. Almost as soon as Nicholas meets Eleanor, he asks her 'If we do not know ourselves | how can we ~~be~~ make laws that have any | ~~bearing whatsoever~~ +to+ our ~~actions~~ beliefs, our desires?' (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 16: 71.23-15). Nicholas's new world is contingent both upon future self-knowledge and upon the will to 'make laws' apt to this self-knowledge. This dual contingency is apt to the self-willed and self-knowing Antigone I have just discussed. Having discussed how Antigone has been deployed in a European literary-philosophical tradition rooted in Hegel, and noted ways that this tradition has been read as limiting the radical potential of Sophocles' character, I want to turn to her curious instantiation in the draft 1917 chapter of *The Years*, and read Woolf's richly generative misquotation as similarly radical.

Creons Past and Present

Antigone only appears in M.42-5 tangentially. As I have said, she is not mentioned by name and her five words appear in curiously garbled form: 'sumφilein oux ethan ephen' (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 61: 115.128) rather than 'οὔτοι συνέχθειν, ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἔφυν' (*Y* 372), translated as '"Tis not my nature to join in hating but in loving' (*TG* n. 40, 303). Creon, however, is invoked far more directly, and he is not safely sequestered away in ancient Thebes but rather manages to make it to a dinner party in 1910, finding his way to the seat next to Maggie Pargiter's. Elvira first describes him as an 'old man in gold thread' (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 61: 115.131) before narrating a speech she made to Creon:

> Damn your insolence, Creon, being the very spit
> image of the old man you sat next at dinner Maggie
> two thousand years ago. But what are two
> thousand years? The flicker of a lizards eye lid —
> gone. Time to come's whats ~~we~~ matters Maggie;
> because I met a man at dinner the other night

who said to me, Time to come is all Cleopatra's needle
& this — pointing to the ladies ~~all~~ +dressed up to the 9s+ in every dress
& the footmen in plush trousers, is but a rose leaf
on the top. (63: 118.1-9)

Elvira narrates this scene once again three pages later, having discussed new substitutes for sugar, starvation as a wartime tactic and Abel Pargiter's missing fingers. In this later discussion, she returns to the 1910 dinner party and narrates similar tropes—rather than the lizard's eyelid flickering, the present is but a flicker of a 'lizards tongue' (65: 120.10). The present is still an infinitesimal moment, but rather than being filiated with the ocular and visual, the metaphor is rather more predatory: a lizard snapping its tongue out to snare a bug. Creon's last appearance is in passing, as a substitute for the Prime Minister: Elvira says that Rose is locked up 'for breaking ~~the~~ Creon's | window' (71: 125.21-2). The deleted 'the' before the name Creon might be the start of the title 'the Prime Minister.' M.42-5's Creon is a curious being, not quite ancient, not quite modern. Two thousand years of patriarchal power are elided into one figure.

Compare this instantiation of Creon to that in *Three Guineas*, where he is a thoroughly modern fascist: 'Things repeat themselves it seems' and Creon is substituted for 'the creature, Dictator as we call him when he is Italian or German, who believes he has the right […] to dictate to other human beings how they shall live; what they shall do' (*TG* 270). Dictators do not just rule overseas: J. Ashley Foster writes that Woolf 'demonstrates that Fascism is the ultimate expression of a patriarchal hierarchy and that as long as a society exists in which some men are above other men and all men are above women, as long as great financial disparity and power imbalances exist, Fascism is part of both the state and the home structure.' (Foster 58). Fascism begins at home. If we read either M.42-5 and *Three Guineas* on their own, we can readily see that Creon is more than a figuration or metaphor for patriarchal power; he is synecdoche: he is the whole force of the patriarchy condensed into one man. But read between the two texts and we can see that a double articulation of incipient tyranny is at play: one synchronic, the other diachronic; one reaching from the distant past into the present, from ancient Greece to a dinner party in 1910, the other spreading its tendrils across Europe as Woolf wrote in 1938. The two articulations intersect, inscribing a micropolitics of incipient tyranny upon the body of Creon. And this double articulation is constantly making its presence felt. It is there in every display of patriarchal power.

Deleuze and Guattari write that '[e]very society, and every individual, are thus plied by both segmentarities simultaneously: one molar, the other *molecular*. […] In short, everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a *109icropolitics* and a *micropolitics*' (*Plateaus* 249). Indeed, for Deleuze and Guattari, fascism is chiefly a micropolitical affair, one predicated upon mutated lines of flight and haywire desires. 'Totalitarianism is quintessentially conservative. Fascism, on the other hand, involves a war machine […] in fascism, the State is less totalitarianism than it is *suicidal*. There is in fascism a realised nihilism' (249). This vision of fascism is not so distant from Woolf's own. 'Let us try to drag up into consciousness the subconscious Hitlerism that holds us down,' Woolf writes in 'Thoughts on Peace in an Air Raid' (1940). 'It is the desire for aggression, the desire to dominate and enslave' (*E* 6 243). For Woolf as for Deleuze and Guattari, fascism is a desiring: a desiring-aggression, a desiring-domination, even a desiring-death. It is the interpellation of the dictator's face into one's own thoughts, of the dictator's aberrant desires into one's own. As Foster writes, '[t]his is the outcome of totalitarianism, which is an effect of Fascism; Hannah Arendt describes the totalizing effect of the state in the minds of the people. The people cease to be individuals and instead become microcosms in the efficient mechanism of state control' (Foster 58). The subject under fascism has no will of her own; rather her will is the interiorised will of the dictator.

Escaping this interpellation is by no means easy. Deleuze and Guattari write that lines of flight can mutate, that one's desire to escape one form of tyranny can lead to another, worse, tyranny. Woolf's analysis in both the draft of *The Years* and in *Three Guineas* anticipates Deleuze and Guattari's. In *Three Guineas*, Woolf writes of women who found themselves 'in favour of war':

> So profound was her unconscious loathing for the education of the private house with its cruelty, its poverty, its hypocrisy, its immorality, its inanity that she would undertake any task however menial, exercise any fascination no matter how fatal that enabled her to escape. Thus unconsciously she desired 'our splendid Empire'; unconsciously she desired our splendid war. (*TG* 160-1)

'No, the masses were not deceived,' Deleuze and Guattari write: 'they desired fascism.' They continue, 'Civilized modern societies are defined by processes of decoding of deterritorialization. But *what they deterritorialize with one hand, they reterritorialize with the other*' (*Anti-Oedipus* 295). Fascism begins at home, but escaping the fascist home is fraught with its own dangers, as this portion of the holograph *Years* makes clear. Rose Pargiter desires escape from the lot of the pre-War middle-

class English woman, which would have seen her confined to the home. Rose becomes involved with the Suffragettes and is imprisoned for throwing a brick through the Prime Minister's window. This is gestured to in the 1911 chapter of the published *Years*: Eleanor says that Rose is in court because '"She threw a brick—"' (*Y* 184). Where or why she threw a brick is not made clear. The 1917 chapter of the holograph of the holograph *Years* makes it clearer that she 'smashed the Prime Ministers plate glass window as he | sat eating a kipper with a golden spoon' (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 45: 101.107-108). After leaving prison, Rose 'went straight to the war office, Eleanor | continued, offered her services' (46: 101.14-15). Shortly after this discussion, while darning socks, Maggie tells her guests that Rose is on the front 'driv[ing] an ambulance' (49: 104.22) Perhaps Rose is impelled to the Front by the moustachioed face and dictatorial gaze of Lord Kitchener peering down from propaganda posters, his outstretched finger tracing a line of flight all the way to Flanders. In seeking to deterritorialize, to leave the territory allotted to women of her class, Rose finds herself on the Front, driving ambulances and enabling 'our splendid war' (*TG* 161).

Jessica Berman writes of 'Woolf's decision to omit the images from Spain' from *Three Guineas* as a refusal to propagandise, a refusal to use 'the documentary photograph as a sort of narrative trump card, one that appears to represent the truth about the [Spanish Civil] war as though rhetoric-free' (Berman *Modernist I* 64). Berman's reading of documentary photographs as a way of shutting down discussion points to the ease with which tyrannical tactics can take hold: images, even deployed with anti-fascist, anti-war intentions, can too easily become propaganda, a gotcha moment to which there is no comeback. The images the narrator of *Three Guineas* refuses to print come to 'act almost as the rising steam to [Woolf's] argument's pistons' according to Conor Tomás Reed (Tomás Reed 69). He points out the images that Woolf did see fit to print. Lord Baden-Powell, 'absurdly covered in overlapping piles and rows of medals […] like a shiny graveyard weighing him down;' Archbishop Cosmo Gordon Lang 'sternly hoisting a long, encrusted sceptre that seems better suited for impaling victims than spreading the word of God' (69). These figures may not be the men who dropped the bombs, but by including their images, Woolf 'ruptures the finery of these men in power to show the bomb-blasted, bullet-ridden bodies contained in every button, rosette, and stripe of their specialised garb' (68). Berman recovers from the archive some of the photographs that Woolf may have refused to print, images from the virtual archive of what was never included in *Three*

Guineas and prints them herself. But behind the bombed-out buildings and the corpses in the images that Berman reproduces waits a dictator just out of sight.

But *Three Guineas* toys with the image of one dictator nonetheless (or perhaps one dictator more), in an ekphrastic passage. We cannot escape his image: his picture 'impose[s] itself on the foreground': 'His eyes are glazed; his eyes glare. His body, which is braced in an unnatural position, is tightly cased in a uniform. Upon the breast of that uniform are sewn several medals and other mystic symbols' (*TG* 270). This dictator is uncanny, not quite human: less man than mannequin. He is sewn into his uniform as a corpse is sewn into a shroud; his body contorted as though in rigor mortis. And his eyes are not natural — they glare and they are glazed. To whom does this uncanny face belong: Franco? Mussolini? Hitler? Woolf does not specify; nor does it matter. 'It is the figure of a man; some say, others deny, that he is Man himself, the perfect type of which all the others are imperfect adumbrations. He is a man certainly' (*TG* 270). Ekphrasis in this passage may not be deployed to describe a photograph of a specific man, but rather the photograph of a Platonic ideal or perhaps of Althusser's absolute subject of ideology. That the picture of this figure depicts an 'adumbration' or a stereotype rather than a specific person leads *Three Guineas*' narrator to 'suggest[] that we too are that figure' (*TG* 271). But there is a way out. Fascism might begin at home, but so too does the possibility of escape. The face of the dictator carries with it another suggestion that pulls in the opposite direction, pulls us back from the event horizon of the dictatorial black hole: the figure of the dictator 'suggests that we are not passive spectators doomed to unresisting obedience but by our thoughts and actions can ourselves change that figure' (271). We are still far from a Levinasian face here. But we see now that the face of the dictator carries with it one call to ethics, or rather a call to ethical action. The narrator of *Three Guineas* suggests that Creon calls us to create a better future, that though fascism may begin at home, the seeds of its end are also sown at home.

Creon and his 'infantile fixation' (*TG* 258) are in the distant past and are now; are in Germany, Italy, Spain, and in England. His voice does not articulate words, or even signifying language, 'but a cry, Ay, ay, ay, ay'; a cry that reverberates across Europe and throughout history. When we hear the cry, Woolf writes, 'We are in Greece now; Christ has not been born yet, nor St. Paul either' (*TG* 269). The cry interpellates, and it calls its listeners into Creon's doubled temporality and distributed spatiality. But if Creon's cry can be heard across Europe and across the millennia,

what of Antigone's voice? *Three Guineas* invokes the *Antigone* as potential 'anti-Fascist propaganda' and imagines that 'Antigone herself could be transformed either into Mrs Pankhurst […] or into Frau Pommer.' All three women spoke and acted against unjust state actions, and the three women bore the brunt of the state's wrath: Antigone immured in a tomb; Mrs Pankhurst 'imprisoned in Holloway' and Frau Pommer 'arrested and […] tried on a charge of insulting and slandering the state and the Nazi movement' (*TG* 302-3).

Speech matters to the narrator of *Three Guineas*, who draws attention not to Antigone's deeds, but to her 'five words' which are 'worth all the sermons of the archbishops' (*TG* 207). Again, these five words are 'οὔτοι συνέχθειν, ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἔφυν,' translated by R.C. Jebb as ' 'Tis not my nature to join in hating but in loving' (*TG*: 303). Angeliki Spiropoulou suggests that Woolf was intimately familiar with Jebb's translation, writing that her 'reading notes suggest a continuous collation of the original *Antigone* with Jebb's translation, which she quoted, commented and in places corrected, thus providing her own rendering in the process' ("piropoul"u "Antigone" 176). But the narrator of *Three Guineas* is not happy with Jebb's translation, calling it 'lame'. At the risk of short-circuiting *Three Guineas*'s narrator with Woolf herself, this is a criticism that had been brewing for a long time. In a letter of February 25th, 1918, Woolf writes to Saxon Sydney-Turner of her dissatisfaction with Jebb's edition of Sophocles, writing that 'he never risks anything in his guesses: his sense of language seems ᵗo me stiff, safe, prosaic and utterly impossible for any Greek to understand.' She continues, describing a family dinner with Jebb that took place at least twelve years prior to the 1918 letter. She does not date the dinner but notes in her letter that her brother Thoby was present, from which one can infer that it took place before his death in 1906. Woolf writes that she 'there and then saw and perhaps said that he had the soul and innumerable legs of a black beetle' (*L* 2: 221; §. 910). In *The Years*, meanwhile, North thinks that his uncle Edward 'had the look of an insect whose body has been eaten out, leaving only the wings, the shell' (*Y* 365). Although Woolf's 1918 letter is wrong about the number of legs a beetle has—beetles have six rather than 'innumerable' legs—they do have wings and shells: Woolf's coleopteric jibe of 1918 comes to anticipate North's musing on Edward in *The Years*, that he has the look of a hollowed-out insect shell.

I want to turn from entomology to etymology to attempt to explain why Jebb's translation of this line, ' 'Tis not my nature to join in hating but in loving,' might be quite so lame. It should go without saying that 'συμφιλεῖν,' *symphilein*, or joining in love, 'loving"mutually" ("συμφιλέω"), is crucial to this line. But so too is 'ἔφυν,' *ephun*, translated by Jebb as "nature." The root of *ephun* is *phuō*: the primary sense of *phuō* given by Liddell and Scott is 'bring forth, produce'"or "grow' ("φύω"). In translating *ephun* as "nature," Jebb privileges a secondary sense of the word's root: the primary sense that Jebb's translation does not privilege suggests that joining in love is not something passive, not something into which one is born, but is rather active, a striving which might have more in common with a Spinozan conatus than a passively given nature. 'Each thing,' Spinoza writes, 'as far as it can by its own power, tries to persevere in its own being,' and indeed, 'The striving by which thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing' (Spinoza 75). Conatus implies nature, certainly, but this nature is not something inbuilt. A Spinozan subject has to work at it. In this rendering, Antigone is still given to join in love, but this joining is not something that she is passively predisposed to doing; it is rather an active process for which her being clamours. But even my reading here is provisional. Angeliki Spiropoulou discusses the words '*symphilein*' and 'pointing out that it is a neologism found 'nowhere else in classical Greek' and coined for—or even by—Antigone to describe her nature. This neologism, for Spiropoulou, complicates 'even the idea that we can apply the meaning of *philoi* to talk about love or peace' ("piropoul"u "Antigone" 179). Spiropoulou points out that while philia can be used to connote affection or friendship, 'it is also used to denote those reciprocal obligations that bind the rules of hospitality, the bond to a stranger [*xenos*],' a connotation further stressed by the prefix '*syn-*,' ('with'), which 'submits to an interpersonal relationship marked by the obligation to return the love shown by those whom Antigone honours.' The 'etymological complexity' of the term '*sumphilein*' ['symphilein'] and its double, 'συνέχθειν,' '*synecthein*' or 'joining in hate' bely 'easy translation into a general principle of love or non-violence' (180). It is not Antigone's nature to join in affection, plain and simple. Rather, the Spinozan nature that Antigone enacts is a shifting dialectic process marked by reciprocal obligation, a network comprised of bonds of hospitality between stranger, xenos, and host.

This line of Greek gives men in Woolf trouble. As we have seen, she, or at least the narrator of *Three Guineas*, dismisses Jebb's translation as 'lame' while Edward Pargiter, translator of

Sophocles, 'priest,' 'mystery monger' and 'guardian of beautiful words' (*Y* 368) refuses outright to provide the translation, claiming 'it's the language' (373). Dalgarno notes that Edward's specific phrasing here, his use of the pronoun '"it" shrouds Edward's motive in obscurity.' She asks '[t]o what does Edward's "it" refer?' She suggests that the 'it' Edward cites might be the sound of Greek, noting that Woolf left portions of Greek untranslated in 'On Not Knowing Greek,' including 'Cassandra's cry as she foresees Clytemnestra's bloody murder.' Dalgarno quotes Woolf's reference to ' sentences that "explode on striking the ear"' in her 1925 essay and suggests that Edward might view Antigone's five words as one such sentence (*Migrations* 151). But Edward's disavowal is apt in another sense: I want to propose here that it is not Greek that he refuses to translate, *per se*, but political speech in Rancièrian terms.

Antigone's words represent what French philosopher Jacques Rancière terms a 'rupture in the logic of the *arkhê*'[30] (Rancière *Dissensus* 36). Rancière has devoted much of his career to elaborating on the distinction between the police order and the political. In *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy* (published as *La Mésentente* in 1995 and translated in 1999), Rancière describes policing as 'not so much the "disciplining" of bodies as a rule governing their appearing, a configuration of occupations and the properties of the spaces where these occupations are distributed' (Rancière *Disagreement* 29-30). It is important to realise what is at stake here: policing is not just done by uniformed agents of the state (although it is unarguably performed by them), but rather is an action proper to any organs of power, state or private, whose action defines the emergence of subjects. Rancière tropes on this throughout his career, explaining that the police order patrols the boundaries of collective experience, governing that which can be spoken of, thought of. Politics, meanwhile, is

> an extremely determined activity antagonistic to policing: whatever breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration—that of the part of those who have no part' (30)

---

[30] Derrida, too, uses the word *arkhe* throughout *Archive Fever*. I have discussed his use of the term earlier but briefly, in *Archive Fever*'s exergue he names the *arkhê* as at once the 'commencement and the commandment,' simultaneously that which is archived, the archival document, and that which gives form to the archive (*Archive Fever* 1). Rancière's use of the term bears certain similarities to Derrida's, insofar as Rancière also uses it to name something originary and jussive, the foundational writ of the police order.

Politics is the unruly irruption of alterity into the order created by the police, changing what Rancière called the 'distribution of the sensible' in his *Politics and Aesthetics* (published in 2000 as *Le Partage du sensible*; translated in 2004) altering what can be thought, felt, perceived, and creating new possibilities, alternative ways of being (*Politics of Aesthetics* 7). A homologous structure is apparent in Woolf's distinction between laws and 'the law' which Antigone reminds us to find (*TG* 266), the divine 'Justice' (*Dike*) that Antigone contrasts with Creon's all-too human laws (*nomos*, cf. Sophocles 44.451-452). Antigone's law is a legal order alien to the laws of the state: it is an order that is not merely the negation of the state's laws and cannot be found in 'break[ing] the laws,' in disobeying Creon and his 'justice,' which can only ever be *nomos*, but is rather a positive law derived from a divine 'Justice,' *Dike*, whose writ must be sought elsewhere.

For Rancière, the police order is as much an aesthetic order as it is a legal one: it controls the 'distribution of the sensible,' the 'system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it' (*Politics of Aesthetics* 7). In short, the police order controls what can and cannot be perceived and understood. The police order sets the boundaries of signifying, and hence intelligible, speech: it controls who can and cannot possess the logos. This logos is 'never simply speech,' Rancière writes, 'because it is always indissolubly the *account* that is made of speech: the account by which a sonorous emission is understood as speech' (*Disagreement* 22-23). Antigone's five words defy translation by priests and mystery mongers and guardians of beautiful words not because Sophocles' language is particularly resistant to being rendered in English, but rather because they are political speech properly speaking. Antigone's five words break with the logic of the *arkhê*, and thus fall outside the partition of the sensible: they evade the apprehension of 'priests,' of 'mystery mongers,' of the 'guardians of beautiful words.' *Symphilein*, joining in love, is radically other to Creon's order, and Antigone's disobedience represents the irruption of politics proper into Creon's police state. Joining in love is hence the act of one who tries not to break Creon's laws but to find a law that is radically other to that of the *arkhê*. In a sense, the curious instantiation of Antigone's five words that we see in M.42-5, sumφilein oux ethan ephen' (Phillips "Thoughts on Peace" 61: 115.128), is apt: the phrase is one that does not belong to the 'guardians of beautiful

words,' which does not belong to Edward Pargiter or R.C. Jebb but exists outside of the arkhê that they guard.

The next and final section of this chapter turns from the drafts of the 1917 chapter of *The Years* and reads the final pages of the published edition of *The Years* in order to examine the children's chorus that ends the novel. I contend that this language is similar to the curiously transmuted five words of Antigone I have discussed and constitutes another moment where speech breaks with the logic of the *arkhê* and gestures towards something radically different.

The Language of the Future

The Years contains another moment where the logic of the *arkhê* is ruptured and where politics proper begins: the children's chorus, the 'unintelligible song of the children of the future' as Jane Marcus describes it (49). As dawn draws near and Delia's party comes to an end, two children unknown by any of the older guests arrive. When they are invited by Martin and Peggy to 'sing a song for sixpence' (*Y* 386) their song is notable for its sheer ineffability. This passage is worth quoting at length:

> [The children] stared at her but remained silent. They had stopped eating. They were a centre of a little group. They swept their eyes over the grown-up people for a moment, then, each giving the other a little nudge, they burst into song:
>
> > Etho passo tanno hai,
> > Fai donk to tu do
> > Mai to, kai to, lai to see
> > Toh dom to tuh do—
>
> That was what it sounded like. Not a word was recognisable. The distorted sounds rose and sank as if they followed a tune. They stopped.
> They stood with their hands behind their backs. Then with one impulse they attacked the next verse:
>
> > Fanno to par, etto to mar,
> > Timin tudo, tido
> > Foll to gar in, mitno to par,
> > Eido teido, meido—
>
> They sang the second verse more fiercely than the first. The rhythm seemed to rock and the unintelligible words ran themselves together almost into a shriek. The grown-up people did not know whether to laugh or to cry. Their voices were so harsh; the accent was so hideous.
> They burst out again:

> Chree to gay ei
> Geeray didax. …

> Then they stopped. It seemed to be in the middle of a verse. They stood there grinning, silent, looking at the floor. Nobody knew what to say. There was something horrible in the noise they made. It was so shrill, so discordant, and so meaningless. (386-7)

Jane Marcus identifies 'Latin words and Cockney English mixed with echoes of Greek' (49) in the children's song, while Vassiliki Kolocotroni notes that '"Geeray didax" evokes Solon's "Gerasko d'aei polla didaskomenos," "I grow old forever learning"' (Kolocotroni 434). But on the whole this is not a language that can be translated. Alexander Zwerdling does not look kindly on this moment. He writes that Woolf 'render[s] the language of the poor as nonsense' and thus treats 'a whole section of society […] as *terra incognita*' (Zwerdling 97). He is not wrong. The children's song is nonsense, but this is precisely why it is political speech *par excellence*. What Zwerdling dismisses is, in the Rancièrian terminology I introduced in the previous section of this chapter, the speech of the *demos*, those who are not gifted with possession of the *logos*. Rancière writes that *logos*-bearing speech is 'never simply speech […] because it is always indissolubly the *account* that is made of speech: the account by which a sonorous emission is understood as speech' (*Disagreement* 22-23). And the speech of the *demos* is speech which does not bear the indelible trace of its own accounting as speech. As such it is radically irreducible to the language that falls inside the partition of the sensible. Demotic speech such as the children's song is nonsense, certainly, but it is nonsensical not because of a failing on the part of its speakers but because it is spoken by those who are outside the partition of the sensible. Perhaps Marcus is closer to the mark when she calls the children's song the 'vatic voice of the Delphic oracle' (Marcus 38).

Defying its listeners' and its readers' attempts to parse it in the received phonotactics of an already known language, the children's song bears more than a passing resemblance to the sound poems written by figures affiliated with Dada and other surrealist movements including (*inter alia*) Hugo Ball, Kurt Schwitters and Raoul Hausmann. In 1916, Ball wrote of his performance of the sound poem 'Karawane' at the Cabaret Voltaire:

> In these phonetic poems we totally renounce the language that journalism has abused and corrupted. We must return to the innermost alchemy of the word, we must even give up the word too, to keep for poetry its last and holiest refuge. We must give up writing secondhand: that is accepting words (that is to say nothing of sentences) that are not newly invented for

our own use. Poetic effects can no longer be obtained in ways that are merely reflected ideas or arrangements of furtively offered witticisms and images. (Ball 71)

Ball's diary entry, written in the depths of the First World War, is a manifesto in miniature for an aesthetics rooted in a radically new phonotactics, a non-language which abandons even the 'word,' which has been 'abused and corrupted' by 'journalism.' This new sound poetry must seek the 'last and holiest refuge' for poetry, a refuge that cannot be sullied by 'reflected ideas or arrangements of furtively offered witticisms and images.' Shortly after the Second World War in their art book-cum-manifesto *PIN* (written in 1947 and finally published in 1962), Kurt Schwitters and Raoul Hausman restate Ball's call for a new poetry, couching their call in the language of ethical necessity. 'Poetry does not serve any more for needs […] Poetry of the PRESENT is outside the restrained history, outside the coward anthropopagous and anthromorphous utilisation' (Hausmann and Schwitters 25). Recalling the narrator of *Three Guineas*' condemnation of the word 'feminist' as an 'idle' and 'corrupt' word (*TG* 277), 'secondhand' writing turns from 'abused and corrupted' to 'anthropopagous.' Received language eats people alive. Reading the children's song as sharing in the radical new phonotactics of the Dada sound poem gives us occasion to question the ethics as well as the aesthetics of this moment.

When Kitty asks Peggy to 'speak for the younger generation,' Peggy demurs, saying truthfully enough that she is 'not the younger generation' (*Y* 380). But when the younger generation sidle in, late to a party to which they have not been invited, Peggy denies them a voice. She silences them, saying that 'the younger generation […] don't mean to speak' (386). And they do not speak—as far as Rancière is concerned, at least. Rancière writes in *Disagreement* of the nineteenth century French thinker Pierre-Simon Ballanche's 'rewriting of the tale told by Livy of the secession of the Roman plebians on Aventine Hill' (*Disagreement* 23). His lengthy and discursive reading of Ballanche 'involves finding out whether there exists a common stage where plebians and patricians can debate anything' (23). Rancière concludes that 'there is no discussion with the plebs for the simple reason that the plebs do not speak. They do not speak because they are beings without a name, deprived of *logos*-meaning, of symbolic enrolment in the city' (23). Without citizenship in the city, one cannot speak the language of the city. The same applies to this moment at the end of *The Years*. But rather than try for a 'secondhand' language, an 'abused and corrupted' language (Ball 71)

wielded by those who shut them out, the children '[begin] to syllable themselves' (Marcus 11). The unintelligible sound poem of the next generation is the irruption of politics proper into Delia's party, populated, as North notes, by 'Dons and Duchesses' but not by 'Drabs and Drones' (*Y* 364). The listeners, lodged firmly in the police order, are lost for words.

I want to end this chapter by reading this unknowable language alongside the Derridean *avenir* that I started to think through in this thesis's first chapters. Derrida distinguishes between two orders of futurity: there is '"the future"' which is essentially knowable and is 'that which—tomorrow, later, next century—will be'. But, by the same token, there is an order of futurity that is unknowable. Derrida terms this order of futurity '*l'avenir*'. He glosses this term as 'refer[ring] to someone whose arrival is totally unexpected' and states that this is, 'for [him], the real future' (Derrida *Screenplay*). The arrival of genuine alterity is itself unknowable. In the first chapter to this thesis, I discussed this unknowable *avenir* with reference to the five witnesses who watch darkness fall over Skye in the opening paragraph of 'Time Passes.' Now I want to pay closer attention to the 'someone' Derrida hails when delineating the difference between the knowable future and the unknowable *avenir*.

In *Specters of Marx*, Derrida terms the 'someone' who heralds the *avenir* the *arrivant* and begins to sketch out a politics adequate to the *arrivant*, based on absolute hospitality, 'waiting without horizon of the event, awaiting what one does not expect yet or any longer, hospitality without reserve, welcoming salutation accorded in advance to the absolute surprise of the *arrivant* from whom or from which one will not ask anything in return' (Derrida *Specters* 81). The only gesture that is adequate to this messianic politics is 'the "yes" to the *arrivant(e)*, the "come" to the future that cannot be anticipated' (211). Absolute hospitality is a tall order, and it is arguable whether or not the partygoers display it towards their young guests. Asking them to 'sing a song for sixpence' (*Y* 386), Martin asks that they entertain their hosts using the easily understood language implied by his gesture towards a nursery rhyme, the reference made literal by the 'coins in his hand; pressed between his thumb and his finger' (386). Martin wants to be entertained by his young guests; he does not want to be confronted with the speech of the Rancièrian *demos*, by speech that falls outside the partition of the sensible, by the absolutely unexpected speech of the Derridean *arrivant*.

As I have said before, the song's auditors are lost for words. Patrick blames his own lack of comprehension on the singers' 'Cockney accent' (387) while Eleanor cannot square the sounds that

she hears with the faces she sees. She notes, 'As they stood there they had looked so dignified; yet they had made this hideous noise. The contrast between their faces and their voices was astonishing; it was impossible to find one word for the whole.' The word Eleanor settles on to describe the song is 'beautiful,' but this is followed by a question mark, underscored by a 'note of interrogation' (387). She turns to Maggie, who answers the question implied by Eleanor's 'note of interrogation' with the single word 'Extraordinarily.' The song's beauty is out of the bounds of the ordinary. Eleanor does not, cannot commit to judging the song because the song falls outside of what is fit to be judged in the context of the aesthetic regime that Delia's partygoers both dwell within and uphold. The children's song may have been unintelligible to its listeners—and several generations of readers— but its unruly irruption into Delia's party highlights the possibility that the partition of the sensible can be changed. What it changes into, we cannot know. Their song is filiated with the 'absolutely undetermined messianic hope' that Derrida heralds in *Specters of Marx*, the unknowable futurity that can only be awaited with open arms (Derrida *Specters* 81). Their song speaks of an unknowable future that is to come, an unknowable future that might just be beautiful.

Part Three—1940-41: Becoming Anonymous in Woolf's Late Archive

Chapter Five: How Should One Read 'The Reader'? New Approaches to Woolf's Late Archive

Approach I: The Fragment and the Subjectile

In the final months of her life, Virginia Woolf worked simultaneously on two projects that she would not live to see published. The better known of the two became the novel *Between the Acts* (1941), edited and published posthumously by her husband Leonard Woolf. Less well known is the work of literary history she had started but would never finish. Woolf provisionally titled this project 'Reading at Random' or 'Turning the Page' but it is better known now by the dual title 'Anon' and 'The Reader'. Woolf wrote a number of drafts towards this project, of which seventeen are extant. The draft pages of this project are housed in the New York Public Library's Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, where the various drafts of 'Anon' are catalogued as M.45 through M.54 and the drafts of 'The Reader' are catalogued as M.108 through M.113. These drafts are all written, either by hand or typewritten, on loose-leaf foolscap paper, which Woolf tended to number but not to date. In addition to these loose-leaf fragments, there are extant drafts in holograph in M.1-8, a notebook kept 1938-39, which Woolf titled 'Articles, Essays, Fiction and Reviews,' and which (as the name suggests) also contains drafts of contemporaneous essays, short stories, and portions of *Between the Acts*. I will expand on the nature of these documents in the second section of this chapter and will discuss their classification in the final section.

This chapter proposes three approaches to Woolf's final work, all premised on the materiality of the documents in her late archive. The first of these approaches is materially informed close reading. It takes up Woolf's original titles for the project, seeking to read at random and turn the page. I bracket off a single folio from this project where Woolf has typed out a paragraph of 'The Reader' on the back of a sheet from the drafts of *Between the Acts* and discuss the ways in which Woolf uses this folio to place 'The Reader' in conversation with *Between the Acts*, and the ways in

which she uses this conversation to model a community of readers. The second approach expands on the materialist slant of the first approach and offers an anatomy of this archive, discussing the documents Woolf left after her death and how they have been classified and catalogued in the years following her death. My third and final approach expands on my previous discussion of cataloguing and classification, using *Archive Fever* as a key coordinate in working through a historiography of Woolf's late archive. Further, I use this section of my chapter to point up areas of the drafts where Woolf appears to anticipate this discussion. These three approaches work alongside one another to answer the question posed in my chapter's title, 'How should one read "The Reader"?' For now, though, I want to briefly discuss present editions of Woolf's final work, to help orient us in this archive.

Woolf inscribes a radical version of literary history in the draft pages of this project. It is a literary history predicated not on the singular named author but on the 'nameless vitality' of Anon, the unnamed poet-singer who emerges out of Britain's primeval forest and whose voice recedes with the advent of the printing press in the fifteenth century, but whose voice, I will argue in the next chapter, Woolf believes can be recovered. However, it is my contention that present editions of this project do not do justice to Woolf's final work. In 1979, some four decades before I came to this archive, Brenda Silver produced an edition of 'Anon' and 'The Reader' that remains the standard edition of these essays (Silver "'Anon' and 'The Reader'" 356-441). This essay is reproduced in Bonnie Kime Scott's 1990 anthology *The Gender of Modernism* ("'Anon' and 'The Reader'"), and it acts as a copy-text for the edition published in the six-volume *Essays of Virginia Woolf* (2011; *E* 6 580-607). In an introductory note to the 2011 edition, the volume editor Stuart N. Clarke writes that he is 'indebted to Professor Silver's scholarship and [has] followed her reconstruction (*E* 6 580). Silver's edition of the essays is an eclectic one, in that it constructs a single reading text from this constellation of drafts. This edition is in many ways meticulously constructed—Woolf did not date the vast majority of the fragments, but Silver has inferred a stemma for the 'Anon' drafts from the slow fading of Woolf's typewriter ribbon, dividing them up into three variant traditions, A, B, and C. Silver argues that only the C variants represent the 'rough draft of a completed and coherent essay.' She gestures towards a potential variorum edition that would display all versions, but instead provides a 'clear' reading text as the best use of the space available to her (Silver "'Anon' and 'The

Reader'" 363-364). In privileging later and more 'complete' drafts, Silver's edition of 'Anon' does not reproduce material from the earliest drafts, instead presenting exclusively material from M.50 onwards—far later in the composition process, going by Silver's stemma.

The 1979 edition does not preserve what Bishop calls the 'wildness' of Woolf's drafts—a wildness I have already discussed in Chapter Three, with reference to the holograph drafts of *The Years*. This wildness is both generative and speaks to Woolf's generative writing process, insofar as these draft fragments do not just describe literary history but also document Woolf's attempt to work through literary history. Although these fragments are not strictly speaking in Woolf's hand, being typed, they act as autographic documents in a similar way to the manuscript drafts of *The Years* I discussed earlier: they do not inscribe a text that is vectored but rather bear witness to a process of drafting. Being autographic, these documents bear the material traces of Woolf's process of composition, of creative writing, and of working through her radical vision of literary history. I contend that any reading done in Woolf's late archive necessarily has to be of a materialist bent in order to account for the messy textuality of Woolf's final project, to account for its existence not as a published work or even as a single, relatively complete draft, but rather its existence as a plurality of fragments. The section that follows is an attempt to model such a practice of reading, examining one single folio from a fragment of 'The Reader' where Woolf recycles older paper to write her literary-historical project and where her work on 'The Reader' writes back to her substrate.

This section of my chapter turns to one particular folio in Woolf's late archive, a single sheet of loose-leaf paper filed as part of M.111, to illustrate what is at stake when reading in this archive. The folio is typed on both sides, and both sides are transcribed later in this chapter. On one side, in faint type, is p. 185 (numbered by Woolf) of the typescript of *Between the Acts*. On the other side of the page, in darker type, is a single paragraph collected as part of the drafts of 'The Reader'. That this paragraph is written in darker type indicates Woolf changed her typewriter ribbon before writing it—Silver writes that Woolf did so at some point between December 1940 and February 1941 (Silver "'Anon' and 'The Reader'" 363). However, as neither side of the page bears a date, beyond this most basic of insights we cannot know for sure what the timeline for the dual composition of this folio was from the evidence presented to us by the folio itself; nor can we know what else Woolf was doing while she typed the paragraph from 'The Reader'. Perhaps Woolf wrote this paragraph of 'The

123

Reader' while re-typing *Between the Acts*, or perhaps she used a stack of already superseded pages from an earlier draft of *Between the Acts* to type out her literary-historical project. As I have said, we cannot know for sure, and I do not consider the precise timeline crucial to my analysis in this portion of the chapter—precise dates and timelines, insofar as they can be determined, will become important in the second and third portions of the chapter, but for now I wish to bracket off such questions and instead attend to this single folio.

My analysis of this folio, however, does not begin with a reading of what is typed on the paper, but rather with a discussion of the paper itself, and the mechanism by which it has been typed upon. We have already seen Derrida invoke the word 'substrate' in *Archive Fever*, and I have discussed the term at length in Chapter Three of this thesis. I do not think that the term is entirely apt when talking about typewritten documents, though—or at least that it needs to be supplemented with another term. When Derrida introduces the term 'substrate' he introduces three more terms with it. He asks, 'Can one imagine an archive without foundation, without substrate, without substance, without subjectile?' (*Archive Fever* 26-27). The typed documents in this portion of Woolf's late archive are different in kind to the autograph documents Part Two of my thesis discussed, and I wish to use the term 'subjectile' to discuss this difference. The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines the term 'subjectile' as a surface for inscription, specifically as '[t]he material on which a painting, engraving, etc. is made' ("subjectile, n. and adj."), and cites Derrida's work on Antonin Artaud twice to support this definition. It is tempting to read this definition and assume that Derrida uses 'foundation,' 'substrate,' 'substance' and 'subjectile' as rapid-fire synonyms both here and throughout *Archive Fever*. However, Derrida returns to the term subjectile at the end of *Archive Fever* in his discussion of Freud's 1907 *Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensens* Gradiva (translated into English as *Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's* Gradiva in 1959), imbuing it with different valences to the term substrate. I want to briefly follow Derrida's chain of citations now, to come to a better understanding of these valences and how they help us read Woolf's typed documents.

Charles Jensen's 1903 novel *Gradiva: ein pompejanisches Phantasiestück* (translated into English as *Gradiva: A Pompeian Fancy* in 1913) is about a young archaeologist, Norbert Hanold, who is fascinated by a Roman bas-relief of a young woman. In particular, he is fascinated by her 'sandalled feet' and the 'peculiar grace' of her gait (Jensen 4-5). Hanold purchases a plaster cast

replica of the bas-relief and dubs the young woman depicted therein 'Gradiva,' etymologically '"the girl splendid in walking,"' and imagines an elaborate history for Gradiva (5). He travels to Pompeii to seek material traces of Gradiva, an original for his plaster cast of the bas-relief, among the 'peculiar stepping-stones' that provided pedestrians a way across Pompeii's streets (6). At high noon, Hanold meets a woman in Pompeii who looks near identical to the woman depicted in his bas-relief, although not a 'stone representation' (46) but living flesh. Hanold is unable to determine whether the woman he sees is a living woman or a 'noon-day dream picture' (47) and does not determine whether she is until they converse in German—he first addresses her in Greek, then Latin, before she tells Hanold '"If you wish to speak with me, you must do so in German"' (55). Over the course of several noon rendezvous, Hanold learns that the woman he believed to be Gradiva is in fact Zoë Bertgang, his childhood sweetheart. Hanold, a philologist as well as an archaeologist and as such 'familiar with not only the classical languages but also with the etymology of German' notes that Bertgang is an etymological cousin to Gradiva and likewise 'signifies "the one splendid in walking"' (Jensen 110-111).

In 1907, Freud read the novel in light the interpretive framework he had developed in his 1899 *Interpretation of Dreams*, treating Jensen's work as a dream-work of sorts, analysing Norbert Hanold as he might have done one of his patients, reading the novel's patterns of repression and deferral, and tracing Hanold's dreams of Gradiva back to his childhood experiences with Zoë. Freud writes that 'It is right that an antique, the marble sculpture of a woman should have been what tore our archaeologist away from his retreat from love and warned him to pay off the debt to life with which we are burdened from birth' (Freud "Jensen's *Gradiva*" 49). Freud is concerned throughout *Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradiva* with the essential legibility of Hanold's psyche, and in tracing this psyche—or at least its depiction by Jensen—back to Hanold's childhood. Derrida is mildly scornful of Freud's 1907 analysis of *Gradiva* and Hanold. He writes that Freud 'dreams of' a 'nearly ecstatic instant' when the 'origin then speaks by itself' without deferral or delay, without transcription or translation, a moment when 'the *arkhē* appears in the nude, without archive' (*Archive Fever* 92). Late in *Archive Fever* Derrida traces the ways Freud intertwines the lexes of archaeology and archives from as early as the 1895 *Studies on Hysteria* through to his 1907 work on Jensen and

argues that Freud's interest in analysing Hanold to uncover a bare *arkhē* is, effectively, a culmination of this intertwining.

Jensen's work is enamoured with feet, as is the chain of citations that leads out from it. Norbert Hanold is deeply entranced by the depiction of Gradiva's sandalled feet and goes to Pompeii to hunt for the trace of her distinctive gait in the ashes of Pompeii. Freud notes Jensen's obsessive return to the foot, calling Hanold a 'foot-fetishist' ("Jensen's *Gradiva*" 46) and tracing the origins of Hanold's fetish. Derrida, meanwhile, writes of Gradiva's foot in the final chapter of *Archive Fever*. He uses it as a way of intertwining his analysis of Freud's archaeological metaphors with the materialist lexis that he has developed and troped upon throughout *Archive Fever*. Derrida writes that Freud seeks an 'imprint that is singular each time, an impression that is no longer an archive but almost confuses itself with the pressure of the footstep that leaves its still-living mark on a substrate, a surface, a place of origin. When the step is still one with the subjectile' (*Archive Fever* 97). It is important to note that substrate and subjectile have slightly different valences here. In this instance, it is not the substrate that is directly imprinted upon, but rather the subjectile, and it is the subjectile that creates material evidence of this moment of imprint. Gradiva's footprints are visible on the pavements of Pompeii not because of the pavement, strictly speaking, but because of the ash that Vesuvius heaped upon Pompeii's pavements. I want to suggest that Woolf's typewriter (or indeed any typewriter) works in the same way, that we can only read the physical imprint of a piece of type on paper because a subjectile, a typewriter ribbon, interposes. Gradiva's foot imprints upon the pavement through the subjectile, ash, just as Woolf's typewriter imprints upon the paper through the subjectile, the typewriter ribbon.

I use the preposition 'through' advisedly here. *Archive Fever* is not the first time that Derrida employed the word subjectile. He reads Antonin Artaud's three uses of the term in his article 'Maddening the Subjectile' (1988; trans. 1994)—the *OED* definition quoted above cites this article twice—examining the valences of the term more thoroughly than he does in *Archive Fever*. In his 1988 article, Derrida writes that the subjectile is, in Artaud, always in motion—Derrida plays a game of lexical hopscotch that speaks to the motility of the subjectile:

> But so many other words, a great family of bits and snatches of words, and Artaud's words are haunting this word, drawing it to the dynamic potential of all its meanings. Just to begin by subjective, subtle, sublime, also putting the *il* into the *ile* and finishing with projectile.

This is Artaud's thought. The body of his thought working itself out in the graphic treatment of the subjectile is a dramaturgy through and through, often a surgery of the *projectile*. (Derrida "Maddening the Subjectile" 157)

The notion of the subjectile in Artaud is traversed by a plethora of other words, a 'great family o" bits and snatches' that interpose 'between the beginning and the end of the word' and 'emerge from the depths to haunt all the supports, the substrata, and the substances' (157). The subjectile is a concept in progress, continually traversing and itself being traversed. It follows then, that the subjectile is permeable, neither subject nor object but rather something in between and in motion between the two: the subjectile 'institutes itself the border that it itself is,' a border which is 'between *beneath* and *above* (support and surface), *before* and *behind*, *here* and *over there*, *on this side* and *on that*, *back* and *forth*.' But if the subjectile's existence is fundamentally interstitial, as the 'interposition' between subject and object, the question becomes 'between what and what' does it exist? Derrida is not entirely forthcoming—he continues by writing that 'perhaps the *interposition* of a subjectile […] is what matters' (164). The subjectile is not, however, passive.

Rather, the subjectile 'resists. It has to resist' and it must do so 'in order to be treated finally as itself and not as the support […] of something else, the surface or the *subservient* substratum of a representation.' The subjectile exists in a zone of negation, a 'neither/nor' that constitutes 'neither object nor subject, neither screen nor projectile.' Rather, the subjectile 'can *become* all that, stabilising itself in a certain form or moving between one another. But the drama of its own becoming always oscillates *between* the intransitivity of *jacere* and the transivity of *jacere*' (169). Derrida turns here to the Latinate etymology of the term subjectile, and its middle syllable -ject-, to tease out the peculiar double motion of the word. *Jacere* is a Latin term that has a dual conjugation. On the one hand, it can conjugate to *jaceo* which means 'I have been *thrown*;' on the other it can conjugate to *jacio* which means 'I throw *something*' (169). The term subjectile thus 'has two contradictory motifs in one. Thrown throwing, the subjectile is nothing however, nothing but a solidified interval *between* above and below, visible and invisible, before and behind, this side and that' (169-170). Having read Derrida's 1988 article, however briefly, we can return to his critique of Freud at the end of *Archive Fever* with a greater sense of the complexity of Derrida's theoretical armature.

Derrida does not say that Freud casts backwards to a moment when the step is still one with the substrate, but specifically when it is 'still one with the subjectile' (*Archive Fever* 97). Derrida

127

charges Freud with seeking a moment, an instant 'when the imprint is yet to be left, abandoned by the pressure of the impression,' a moment of 'pure auto-affection,' the 'indistinction of the active and the passive, of a touching and the touched' (98). Derrida's haptic, chiastic language here recalls his anatomy of the subjectile in the 1988 article, but his language soon turns typographic—he continues by saying Freud seeks an 'archive which would in sum confuse itself with the *arkhē*, with the origin of which it is only the which it is only the *type*, the *typos*, the iterable letter or character' (98). Unlike the handwritten documents in Part Two of my thesis, which are produced by the continuous manual application of inked pen to paper, this portion of my thesis concerns itself with typed documents. I contend that the action of Woolf's typewriter mimics the footsteps that Jensen's archaeologist hunts for the ashes of Pompeii: the documents I read in this chapter and the chapter that follows are produced by the forceful but brief—near instantaneous—striking of iterable pieces of metal type onto an inked ribbon, which leaves an inky imprint on paper. Researchers working out of a typed archive have documents to read not because of the instantaneous striking action of a typewriter's metal type pieces upon paper but rather because a subjectile interposes between the two, both impelled towards the paper and impressing ink upon it. The subjectile is neither substrate nor instrument of inscription—neither foot nor ground; neither type nor paper—but rather enables the legibility of this inscription and preserves it.

In one sense, the substrate Woolf types upon here is hardly remarkable: she types on generic loose-leaf foolscap paper. But in another, it is remarkably specific: she types on generic loose-leaf foolscap paper on which she has already typed out a significant portion of a draft of *Between the Acts*. None of the writing on this page was to be published in Woolf's lifetime—*Between the Acts* was published posthumously, edited by Leonard Woolf. This portion of the draft of *Between the Acts* becomes the substrate for Woolf's writing on literary history, supporting it and conditioning it. The page from the *Between the Acts* draft reads as follows:[31]

> the horse had a green tail… What had happened tp her?
> When she looked out again, the flowers had vanished.
>   Bartholo mew flicked on the reading lamp. The circle of

---

[31] It is worth mentioning at this juncture that I reproduce Woolf's spelling mistakes and typos here, and hopefully without adding any of my own, and only seek to add clarifications where I believe they are helpful. However, for a more thorough theorisation of the Woolfian spelling mistake, and the editorial act of correction, see Randall, Bryony. ""[T]hey would have been the first to correct that sentence": Correcting Virginia Woolf's Short Fiction." *Textus: English Studies in Italy*, vol. 3, 2015, pp. 75-94.

readers was lit up. There in that hollow of the sun baked
field were congregated the grass hopper, the ant, and the
beetle, rolling pebbles of baked earth through the glistening
stubble. In that rosy corner of the sun baked field,
Bartholomew, Giles and Lucy, polished and nibbled, and broke off crumbs,
    "A gentleman at Subriton has seen a comma in his
garden" Bartholomew announced.
    "The butterfly that looks life a leaf? Lucy queried,
      looking up from her letter.
      The newspaper dropped.
"Done?" said Giles taking it from his fathers hand.
    The old man relinquished his paper. He basked,
silently, in the mixed light; one hand, caressing the dog,
xixlxcx rippled folds of skin towards the collar.
The clock ticked; the house gave little cracks as if it
were very brittle, very dry. Isa hand on the window sill
suddenly felt cold. Shadow had obliterated the garden.
Roses had withdrawn for the night.   Mrs Swithin,
folding her letter, l ant towards Isa and said; "I looked
in and saw the babies; so happy; with the paper flowers on
their cots."
    Giles looked up from his newspaper; Isa became a
mother again, and also a wife. (M.111.III.32ʳ)

The sentence that opens this folio is present in both this autographic draft passage and its allographic, published counterpart. I do not intend to trace the development of this sentence through to its published version beyond noting that the sentence is equally allusive in both published and draft version. The 'horse with a green tail' refers to the rape of a fourteen-year-old girl by a guard at Whitehall in June 1938. The guard had lured her into the barracks in Horse Guards Parade, where the arch the reader imagines is located, by promising to show her a horse with a green tail, where that guard and another raped her. The rapists were tried and the trial was reported in *The Times* on 28th and 29th June 1938. (Three Troopers on Trial; Two Troopers Found "Guilty")[32]. A second trial took place in July 1938. The defendant this time was Sir Aleck Bourne, who was charged with the 'unlawful use of an instrument' in order to 'procure a miscarriage of a woman'—or to use modern terminology, he performed an abortion. The woman was the girl who was raped by the troopers. At the time, abortion was only legal in order to 'save the life of the mother' or to 'save the life of the child' (Charge Against Surgeon). Bourne successfully argued that the abortion was necessary to

---

[32] My analysis here draws on Clarke, Stuart N. "The Horse with a Green Tail." *Virginia Woolf Miscellany*, vol. 34, 1990, pp. 3-4.

preserve the health of the girl, 'in order to save her from mental collapse,' (Surgeon Found "Not Guilty") and was acquitted. The case became a test case, setting precedent until 1967 (Clarke 3-4).

Returning to the folio in Woolf's archive and reading on, we find that this moment of intertextuality is part of a wider scene of reading, and that this moment models a community of readers. As Bartholomew turns on the reading lamp, 'The circle of readers was lit up.' The presence not just of a single reader but of a reading collective is revealed, disclosed and given form at this moment. At this point, the narrator's gaze expands to encompass the 'hollow of the sun baked field' in which sits Pointz Hall, the grand house that is the scene for *Between the Acts*. Pointz Hall is surrounded by 'congregated' insect life, 'the grass hopper, the ant, and the beetle, rolling pebbles of baked earth through the glistening stubble.' The bugs' labour is not dissimilar to that of Bartholomew, Giles, and Lucy who 'polished and nibbled and broke off crumbs.' Are this folio's bugs here drawn into the circle of readers, or is the readerly labour of Bartholomew, Giles, Isa and Lucy rendered insectile? Bartholomew then announces the sighting of another insect with a distinctly textual and typographic name, a 'comma'. Lucy glosses this as a 'butterfly that looks [like] a leaf'.[33] Whether she means a leaf from a plant or a leaf of paper is unclear. A newspaper then drops— whether this is the same newspaper Giles takes from his father's hand is not stated.

His hands no longer holding the newspaper, Bartholomew then caresses the dog's neck, 'rippl[ing] folds of skin towards the collar.' Again, we encounter a slippage between the human and the non-human akin to the moment earlier in the page where the readers' work becomes insectile and the insects' labour becomes readerly. Woolf says that Bartholomew's hand caresses the dog but stops short of saying that this act of caressing is what ripples skin towards the collar. As readers we once again encounter a moment of indecision—are these folds of skin furry canid skin or hairless hominid skin? And is the collar the sort that a dog wears or is it the collar of a human's shirt? In the process of drafting, Woolf dwells in this moment of indecision and leaves a material trace of it on the page,

---

[33] A comma is a butterfly of the species *Polygonia c-album*. In *A History of British Butterflies* (1853 but reprinted well into the twentieth century), naturalist F.O. Morris notes that this 'handsome and singularly shaped species' appeared across Britain, but evidently it was rare enough (at least in the south-west London suburb of Surbiton) by the time Woolf wrote to justify being mentioned in the newspaper. With its wings closed, the butterfly looks like a fallen autumn leaf; its wings open to reveal a 'beautiful rich fulvous orange colour.' Cf. Morris (70-72). Francis Orpen Morris (1810-1893) was a popular British naturalist, cleric, and anti-Darwinist. In *Jacob's Room*, the young Jacob Flanders corrects one of Morris's works, probably the four-volume *History of British Moths* (1859-70), cf. *JR* 34.

in the form of the nonsensical typing before the word 'rippled,' which most probably acts as a deletion, covering and erasing a word that cannot be read with the naked eye. This moment of slippage is all-too brief, however. As Mrs Swithin enters and starts to discuss the babies in their cots, Isa becomes 'a mother again, and also a wife' to Giles. However, neither Isa nor Mrs Swithin are depicted looking after the infants here: Mrs Swithin looks in on them and reports to Isa: we do not learn who takes care of them in their cots, who has placed the paper flowers upon the cots, who keeps them fed and happy. The page ends, then, with a jerk back to the anthropocentric and from the possibility (however brief) of a pan-species collective of canid/insectile/human reading labourers to the striated economies of human reproductive labour. But this pan-species collective is always and already underscored by the act of horrific sexual violence signified by the horse and its green tail.

Turning the page literally and metaphorically from one scene of reading to another, on the other side of the page I have discussed is a single typed paragraph. As I have discussed before, neither side bears a date but the fact that the *Between the Acts* side is typed in lighter type than 'The Reader' side is likely to indicate that the latter was composed later as it indicates that Woolf's typewriter ribbon had been used more and thus was less inky. The paragraph of 'The Reader' reads as follows:

> But if we cease to consider the plays separetly, but
> scra, ble them together as one common attempt;
> then we are able to make them serve as sketches for one
> masterpiece. And the darkness in which these plays
> lie helps the endeavour to conveive of that
> many nameless worjers ; and many private people
> were pressing their weight were discharging their
> emotion into that vast cauldron of seething matter which
> at last Shakespeare struck out into his plays. (M.111.III.32ᵛ)

This passage discusses Elizabethan and Jacobean theatre, the anonymous early modern drama which 'at last Shakespeare struck out into his plays.' The word 'struck' here bears the inky trace of the typographic. Does Shakespeare's striking bear a resemblance to the striking of type through subjectile onto paper, as a typewriter does—or perhaps the striking action of a printing press as it impresses inked pieces of type onto signatures of paper, to be bound into a book, a First Folio? Although Shakespeare is the only proper noun in this paragraph, his name is invoked not as fundamental or authoritative; rather, he appears 'at last,' as a culmination or summation of a long process of anonymous and coactive creation. Woolf's argument here bears more than a passing

resemblance to her argument in *A Room of One's Own* that 'masterpieces are not single and solitary births' but rather are 'the outcome of many years of thinking in common, of thinking by the body of the people, so that the experience of the mass is behind the single voice.' (*AROO* 59-60). But unlike this passage in *A Room of One's Own*, this paragraph in M.111 traces a double trajectory, tracking labour both authorial and readerly. The former labour is one of 'many nameless worjers ; and many private people' and is rendered in terms that are sensuous, bodily and sexual: they press their weight, they discharge their emotion into a 'vast cauldron of seething matter'. But what does it mean that this coactive authorship, this common labour has as its substrate a constellation between a cross-species community of insectile/readerly labour and a scene of horrific sexual violence? This is not a question that is easily answered. The sensuous, bodily and sexual 'vast cauldron of seething matter' that this portion of 'The Reader' theorises is not just a scene of co-creation but is premised on acts of sexual violence in much the same way that the present moment in 'The Moment: Summer's Night' was attracted to gender-based violence 'like quicksilver on a sloping board' (*E*6 512). Perhaps the verb 'struck' gestures not just to the striking of an inked letter but also to the striking of a match: a match that could just as easily ignite a vote that burns down Oxford and Cambridge as it could illuminate a scene of violence.

The historic model of coactive creation in this passage, which takes as its substrate an intertextual reference to sexual violence, is supplemented by a model of reading that encourages contemporary readers to look past the singular writer of singular genius and glimpse the many nameless workers and many private people labouring in anonymity who provide the 'seething matter' which Shakespeare 'struck out into his plays.' This present readerly labour is rendered contingent by a structure of conditionals—'*But if* we cease, to consider the plays separately, *but* scramble them together […] *then* we are'—and that initial 'But' is reminiscent of the explosive vocative marker that opens *A Room of One's Own*. Undertaking this readerly labour requires contemporary reading subjects (whether in Woolf's time or our own) to disabuse themselves of a model of authorship that that celebrates the author as a singular writing subject and the play as a singular dramatic object. This model does not allow for the possibility of anonymity or flux. Nor does it allow for the prospect that a literary work can be a common 'endeavour' created not just by a singular named author but by 'many nameless workers' whose contribution go unacknowledged but are recorded nonetheless in

the form of the playtext that we receive centuries later. These 'nameless' plays by 'private people' remain in the 'darkness,' but reading these relatively unknown plays allows us to recover the anonymous voices of their co-creators.

Woolf posits in the 'Reader' fragments that Shakespeare represents a watershed moment in the history of authorship. Prior to Shakespeare, Woolf argues, plays were influenced by their audience, who shared in their writing to a degree that was not the case after Shakespeare and after the birth of the singular named author, who emerges in the later fragments of 'The Reader'. Rather, the co-creators of these early plays share in a common and anonymous well of emotion, 'seething matter,' an excess which has not been recorded directly but whose imprint is left on the plays of Marlowe, Kyd, and other such early playwrights and can be seen and felt centuries later if readers look in the right places. On this side of the folio Woolf posits a model of reading that hopes to illuminate the 'darkness in which these plays lie' and which is supplemented by the play of illumination that lights up the circle of readers on the folio's other side. Reading between these two scenes of readerly illumination, we find a model of readerly and writerly labour that generates a community of reader-creators that stretches across centuries and perhaps beyond the bounds of the human but is also very fragile. Here this readerly-writerly labour is couched, swaddled almost, in conditionals as if to protect it against breakages; on the *Between the Acts* side of the page we see it broken by a snatch of dialogue from an interloper entering the circle of readers, by a glance upwards.

The language of this portion of 'The Reader' with its vision of early plays as 'sketches for one masterpiece' can be read alongside a discussion in 'A Sketch of the Past,' Woolf's draft autobiography written 1939-40, more or less contemporaneously with *Between the Acts* and 'Anon' and 'The Reader,' and edited and published posthumously in the collection *Moments of Being* (1st ed. 1976). One of the most striking passages in 'A Sketch of the Past' details what Woolf calls 'a philosophy,' or

> at any rate it is a constant idea of mine; that we—I mean all human beings—are connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of art. *Hamlet* or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this vast mass that we call the world. But there is no Shakespeare; there is not Beethoven; certainly and emphatically there is no God; we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself. ("A Sketch of the Past" 81)

Although these passages display different rhetoric—the folio from M.111 couched in an array of qualifiers and conditionals where 'Sketch' is 'constant,' 'certain' and 'emphatic'—they both advance a similar argument. Both 'Sketch' and this portion of M.111 ask their readers to consider anonymity not as a lack of name but as something richly generative. In M.111, we are asked to 'scra, ble' early plays 'together as one common attempt,' and as 'sketches for one masterpiece' The 'darkness' in which these plays 'lie' is not to be mourned as a lack of knowledge but rather 'helps the endeavour to conveive' of the 'many nameless workers' and 'many nameless people' who helped coactively shape early drama (M.111.III.32ʳ). Woolf's word 'conveive' is instructive here. On the simplest level it seems a typo for 'conceive' but thinking etymologically it seems to break down into '*con*' and '*vivēre*,' the Latin for 'with' and 'to live'—this early modern co-creation is both an endeavour to conceive and create and an endeavour to 'con-vive,' to live together. The darkness in which these plays lie helps us to live together with the anonymous co-creators of early modern drama.[34]

In 'A Sketch of the Past,' Woolf's figuration of anonymity as generative is expanded. Anonymous creation is not something that happened in the past, but rather is a continuing process in which 'we—I mean all human beings' play a role. The 'whole world' is figured as an artistic monad, a fractal form wherein the whole inheres in each part, and each part expresses the whole. Individual works of art such as '*Hamlet* or a Beethoven quartet' express the 'truth' about this work of art, but crucially 'there is no Shakespeare; there is no Beethoven; certainly and emphatically there is no God'. In Woolf's anonymous artistic monad, 'we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself.'

Thus far this chapter has focused on one single sheet of paper in Woolf's late archive and attempted a close reading of the words on that piece of paper and the substrate on which the words are written, taking up the dual methodology proposed by her original titles for the project, 'Reading at Random' and 'Turning the Page'. I have contended that, within the space of this folio, Woolf's work on 'The Reader' writes back to her previous work, which comes to act as a substrate, and that this act of writing back helps to further illuminate the *Between the Acts* draft's circle of readers as

---

[34] 'Convive' has another, more obscure, meaning deriving from the Latin 'convivīum' or feast. The *OED* attests that it was used to mean 'a feast' or 'banquet' in the late 15ᵗʰ and early 16ᵗʰ centuries, while by the middle of the 16ᵗʰ century through to the 1860s it referred to 'one who feasts with others; a fellow-banqueter, table-companion, mess-mate'. The *OED* records its use as an intransitive verb in Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida* ("convive, n.1, n. 2, v.").

well as conditioning the communal labour of anonymous co-creation that 'The Reader' discusses. In reading across the two sides of this folio I have contended that Woolf's vision of anonymous co-creation is not an act of joyous communion but is premised on a foundational act of violence. Now I want to expand my focus to historicise this phase of Woolf's archive. In so doing I do not intend to offer similarly close readings of other portions of 'Anon' and 'The Reader' but rather to give context to the reading I have given thus far and provide grounds for my last section which offers a historiography of Woolf's late archive.

Approach II: Historicising Woolf's Late Archive: What Did Woolf Write?

Woolf had been considering her literary historical project for some years. Indeed, Elena Gualtieri writes of Woolf's interest in such a project as predating the earliest drafts of *Melymbrosia*, Woolf's early working title for *The Voyage Out*, and identifies the essay 'Reading' (1919) as the 'remnants' of a literary historical project that 'weaves together different temporal planes, from the passage of time within a day to the course of human life […] interlacing these different stages with the history of English literature' (Gualtieri 32). On 13th January 1932, Woolf conceived in her diary of a project that would 'go through English literature like a string through cheese' (*D* 4 63). It is unlikely that she is referring to *The Common Reader: Second Series*, which would be published later that year, and which was largely written by that point, but is rather more likely that she is gesturing towards a future work. Some six years later, Woolf picks up this thread once again, writing on 14th October 1938 of her intention to 'collect, even bind together my innumerable T.L.S notes: to consider them as material for some kind of critical book: quotations? comments? ranging all through English lit: as I've read it & noted it during the past 20 years' (*D* 5 180). On 12th September 1940, while 'blackberrying,' Woolf 'conceived, or remoulded, an idea for a Common History book—to read from one end of lit. including biog; & range at will, consecutively.' (*D* 5 318)

On 23rd November, Woolf's thoughts 'turn, well up, to write the first chapter of the next book (nameless). Anon, it will be called' (*D* 5 340). On 1st February 1941, Woolf wrote to Ethel Smyth that she was 'reading the whole of English Literature through.' She continues: 'By the time I've reached Shakespeare the bombs will be falling. So I've arranged a very nice last scene: reading Shakespeare, having forgotten my gas mask, I shall fade far away, and quite forget…' (*L* 6 466, §.

3685, ellipsis Woolf's). This work occupies Woolf for much of the rest of her life: on 1st March she writes again to Smyth that she is struggling with the work, telling Smyth that she is 'at the moment trying, without the least success, to write an article or two for a new [third] Common Reader. I am stuck in Elizabethan plays. I cant move back or forwards. I've read too much, but not enough' (*L* 6 475, §. 3695). On 8th March, she writes in her diary 'Suppose, I bought a ticket at the museum; biked in daily & read history. Suppose I selected one dominant figure in every age & wrote round & about?' (*D* 5 358). Only three weeks later, on 28th March 1941, she would take her own life.

From 24th November 1940, Woolf wrote a number of fragmentary drafts towards this Common History, ranging from two to twenty-six pages in length. Some draft material is extant in holograph in a notebook kept 1938-39, which also contains drafts of contemporaneous essays, short stories, and portions of *Between the Acts*. The remainder of the material relating to this project was written, either by hand or typed, on loose-leaf paper. As discussed above, Woolf tended to number these pages but almost never dated them. Earlier fragments collected as part of 'Anon' were hand-written, including the only dated fragment—M.45, which is dated '24th Nov 1940' ("M.45" 1)— while later fragments of 'Anon' and the majority of the fragments designated as part of 'The Reader' are typed. Woolf collected all of these loose-leaf drafts in one of three Lifeguard Multigrip folders, somewhat like a modern-day ring binder. The first of these Woolf labelled 'Turning the Page,' and the folder contained an eight-page holograph draft headed 'Anon Introduction'. The document in this folder is probably the fragment that would come to be catalogued as M.45 ("Multigrip 1" n.p.). The second folder contained 41 typescript pages. On its front is pasted a monochrome print of two roses lying by an urn (see Figure 8). The number 2 is written on the urn in red ink—which Woolf almost never used, indicating that it might have been written by someone other than Woolf—and on a slip of paper pasted on the spine of the folder Woolf wrote in black ink 'Spare sheets T. of P.' ("Multigrip 2" n.p., cf. fig. 8). The third folder contained 'c. 50' sheets of typescript, and six pages of holograph writing. Woolf pasted a piece of paper on which she had written the title 'Turning the Page' on the folder's spine, while on the front are pasted two pieces of paper. Woolf wrote the title 'Turning the Page,' on the topmost piece of paper while on the piece of paper below she wrote 'Transformations' and 'The Lectures,' both cancelled in blue crayon. Below that, a different hand has written 'Sotheby' and the number '3' in a circle ("Multigrip 3" n.p.). According to Berg curator Julie Carlsen, who

offered meticulously detailed replies to my emailed questions about these documents, this different hand most likely belonged to Trekkie Parsons, who helped to prepare the material for accession to the New York Public Library following Leonard Woolf's death.

In 1973, these three folders acceded to the Berg Collection. Carlsen writes that they came to the Berg 'intact and were subsequently separated by Berg librarians into "sets" of 'Anon' and 'The Reader'.' (Carlsen n.p.) Woolf's two titles, 'Reading at Random' and 'Turning the Page' begin to recede from view at this point. The curators' separation was based on what they described as 'internal evidence' (Carlsen n.p.)—cataloguing notes on the folders the fragments are stored in cite paper stock and Woolf's typewriter ribbon. In curating this mass of loose-leaf material, the curators identified (or perhaps created—a distinction I will discuss in the third section of this chapter) sixteen separate manuscripts. Ten of these, designated M.45-54, were labelled as fragments of 'Anon'. Of these, the first three (M.45-7) are holograph, while the rest are typescript. M.45, 48 and 50 are titled 'Anon,' while M.45 is the only fragment to bear a date—'Nov. 24, 1940' (M45 1).

Unusually for Woolf, she did not always type on fresh sheets of paper: as wartime shortages began to bite, both Woolfs found themselves short of paper. Leonard Woolf wrote of the war as a 'publishing nightmare for the Hogarth Press' and that the 'blackest spot in the nightmare, perpetually playing on our minds, was the shortage and rationing of paper' (Leonard Woolf 106). Virginia Woolf found herself forced to type on the backs of older documents—one of which was a typescript of *Between the Acts*—when a fresh supply of paper was not readily accessible. Silver mentions this in passing in the textual apparatus of her 1979 edition of 'Anon,' but my analysis has shown that it is too simplistic to say that Woolf 'tended to use the backs of discarded typescript pages when no other paper was readily available' and move on (Silver "'Anon' and 'The Reader'" 367-368). Indeed, one of Woolf's acts of wartime recycling provided the substrate for the analysis in the first section of this chapter. We have seen one case in which material from *Between the Acts* is in conversation with material from 'The Reader,' where it seems to me at least that Woolf might be writing back to her substrate, and any one of the recycled pages in the archives of 'Anon' and 'The Reader' might provide the springboard for more such materially informed analysis. Two of the 'Anon' fragments 'dovetail,' to use the original curators' phrase, with other works. The first of these is M.49—two pages of this fragment were written on the back of a holograph draft titled 'People one wd. have liked

to have met.' (M.49.8-9). I have been unable to trace a print version of this work and it may exist only as part of M.49, a fragment within a fragment. The ninth page of M.54, meanwhile, is written on the back of a piece of writing which is unidentified by the Berg catalogue but which I believe to be another page of 'Anon' and 'The Reader'.

The remaining six fragments, designated M.108-113, are catalogued as fragments towards 'The Reader,' although Woolf rarely uses that title herself. The only fragment which bears a title is M.111, which is divided up by the curators into three sets. Page 31 of the second set is titled 'The Reader' while p. 31 of the third set is titled 'Some speculations on the life of the Reader' (M.111.II.31; III.31). All of the 'Reader' fragments are typed, save for a portion of M.109, and this set of documents dovetails far more frequently than the earlier documents: four fragments out of the six have portions typed out on the verso of other works—including the page I discussed earlier. For instance, p. 30 of M.109 is catalogued as part of the *Between the Acts* typescripts, just as p. 185 of the *Between the Acts* typescript is catalogued as part of 'The Reader,' while the manuscript pages of this fragment are written on the back of typescript drafts of the 1941 essay 'Mrs Thrale,' the last essay Woolf would publish in her lifetime.[35] The first page of M.113 is written on the back of a typescript fragment, unidentified by the Berg curators but which Bryony Randall has identified as a page of the posthumously published short story 'The Legacy' (1944).[36] There are further examples that I have not discussed here, any of which might lend themselves to the kind of materially informed close reading I undertook in the first section of this chapter.

The final section of this chapter asks how the mass of bibliographic detail that has accumulated over the past few pages helps us to read 'The Reader'. In so doing I will sketch out a historiography of Woolf's final literary-historical project and examine a moment where Woolf anticipates such a historiography.

---

[35] This essay was published initially in the *New Statesman and Nation* on 8th March 1941 and was later reprinted in the posthumous collection of Woolf's essays titled *The Moment and Other Essays* (1947). Cf. Woolf, Virginia. "Mrs Thrale." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. VI, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 292-297.
[36] This story fragment is not referenced by Susan Dick in her edition of Woolf's *Collected Shorter Fiction.* I am grateful to Randall for identifying this page.

Figure 8: Multigrip Folder 2

Approach III: The Mediating Archive

As I have already noted, 'Turning the Page,' the title Woolf had inscribed on the Multigrip folders the Berg received in 1973, has all but vanished, as has the tripartite structure of this material implied by its division into three separate folders. The Berg curators' intervention in this portion of Woolf's late archive has produced a set of documents known by the dual title of 'Anon' and 'The Reader,' and what emerges from this intervention has come to provide the ground for virtually all later encounters with Woolf's final literary-historical project, including my own. In Chapter One I read the opening pages of *Archive Fever* in which Derrida diagnoses the archive as fundamentally Janus-faced, looking simultaneously backwards in time and towards the future. He reads etymologically, noting that the word 'archive' derives from the Greek word '*arkhē*,' which 'names at once the *commencement* and the *commandment.*' As a reminder, Derrida traces the root of the word *arkhē* to '*arkheion*': initially a house, a domicile, an address, the residence of the superior magistrates, the *archons*, those who commanded.' (*Archive Fever* 1). The *arkheion* was not just the place where the law resided, but 'on the account of their publicly recognised authority,' it is the place where the archons' documents, official documents, are filed. The archons are 'first of all the documents' guardians,' but they are more than that:

> They are also accorded the hermeneutic right and competence. They have the power to interpret the archives. Entrusted to such archons, these documents in effect speak the law: they recall the law and call on or impose the law. To be guarded thus, in the jurisdiction of this *speaking the law*, they needed at once a guardian and a localisation. Even in their guardianship or their hermeneutic tradition, the archives could do neither without substrate nor without residence. (*Archive Fever* 2)

The archive becomes both the place where the law begins, its point of commencement, and the place where it is spoken and interpreted, a place of commandment. But just as the archive is shaped by the immutable law of its commencement and its commandment, its relationship to the future is determined. The 'technical structure of the *archiving* archive also determines the structure of the *archivable* content even in its very coming into existence and its relationship to the future'. The archive is concerned not just with the law of the *arkhē* but constitutes the grounds for the possibility of its endurance: 'The archivization produces as much as it records the event' (*Archive Fever* 17). The archive does not just maintain traces of documents but collects and orders these documents and governs the ways in which they are intelligible.

In the case of this portion of Woolf's late archive, this is literal: I refer to 'Anon' and 'The Reader' as distinct sets of documents throughout this essay, but this is somewhat of a bibliographic-administrative fiction. Indeed, I am not entirely convinced that there is a work called 'The Reader' given that its title appears so infrequently in this archive. As I have explained, these documents were categorised as such several decades before I came to them, and I use the dual titles more out of convenience than to refer to two distinct works. Referring to the ways in which Silver edited the fragments I have been discussing is instructive here. In constructing her edition of 'Anon', Silver interpolated one of the 'Reader' fragments into her edition of 'Anon' and appended significant portions from two more 'Reader' fragments onto the end of her 'Anon'. On this basis, Silver dubbed what remained of 'The Reader' a 'series of beginnings, none of them clear as to where the essay, or the history, wanted to go' (Silver "'Anon' and 'The Reader'" 363-365). The 'Reader' fragments Silver interpolated into 'Anon,' which correspond to M.108, M.111 and M.113, fit the chronology described in 'Anon' but they speak to different histories and different modes of literary production. The 'Anon' fragments describe the death of the anonymous poet-singer at the hands of the printing press and the named author. Meanwhile, the 'Reader' fragments delineate the slow creation of the private spectator-reader in the crucible of the nascent Jacobean and Elizabethan theatre. In my view, the two are not to be conflated.

Silver chooses to end her edition of 'The Reader' with the final sentence of M.112, 'We are in a world where nothing is concluded' (M.112.III.37). Coming to a definitive if ironized end with that statement, the 1979 eclectic edition is not entirely adequate either to the content of Woolf's draft fragments, or to their form: in my view, the form of this constellation of documents forecloses definitive conclusions and conclusivity. Whether she was right to do so or not, that Silver's edition ends thus speaks to the contingent nature of these classifications. Archival classifications both in the case of Woolf's late archive, and more broadly as Derrida argues in *Archive Fever*, generate *a* past as much as they do shelter and preserve *the* past.

Woolf points up the historiography of her literary-historical project within the draft pages of the project itself. She discusses the structures of power that produce history and make it legible, describing in the early fragments of 'Anon' a 'nimbus' of interpellating forces, a 'steeam of influences.' (M.49.3) Woolf's typo 'steeam' is instructive here—these influences exist in a zone of

undecidability between the lexis of the natural, 'stream,' and the lexis of the mechanical 'steam'—as in the steam that powers a steam engine. Woolf gives names to these forces, dubbing them Nin, Crot, and Pully. This trio is birthed at the moment of Anon's doubtful death as Caxton prints his first pages in 1477:

> But +With+ the printing press brought +came+ into existence forces that cover over the original song—books themselves and the readers of books. If science were so advanced that we could at this moment x ray the singers mind +[*as she moved?*]+ we should find a nimbus surrounding the song; a steeam of influences. Some we can name—education; class; the pressure of society. But they are so many, and so interwoven and so obscure that it is simpler to invent for them nonsense names--- say Nin Crot and Pully. Nin Crot and Pully are always at their work, tugging, obscuring, distorting. (M.49.3-4)

Silver passes over these names rather too quickly. Nin, Crot, and Pully do not appear in the body of her edition of 'Anon' but rather in the introduction, where she takes Woolf's statement that their names are 'nonsense names' at face value. Silver refers to Nin, Crot, and Pully as 'fanciful names for the complex of political, cultural, and personal forces that influence the writer.' (Silver "'Anon' and 'The Reader'" 360). She is right to describe them as a complex of political forces, but I want to dwell on their names for a moment in order to come to an understanding of how this complex of forces operates.

All three of Woolf's names are defined in Joseph Wright's *English Dialect Dictionary*, a work with which Woolf was evidently familiar: Mitchell Leaska convincingly argues for Wright's influence on Woolf's work in the '30s and '40s in his introduction to *The Pargiters*, his transcription of the first two manuscript volumes of the drafts of *The Years* (*Pargiters* xii). According to Wright's dictionary, 'Nin' is a Cornish dialect verb meaning 'to drink' but is also cross-referenced to 'none,' whose usage in various dialects bear similar valences to standard English usage ("Nin"). 'Crot' meanwhile refers to a 'dwarf' or a 'boy or girl stunted in growth' but is also a 'very small part.' ("Crot"). The 1893 first edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary* records an older usage, however: in the 12th and 13th centuries 'crot' was used to denote a 'particle, bit, atom [or] individual piece,' citing the c.1400 poem *Cursor Mundi* ("crot | crote, n."). Meanwhile the *Middle English Dictionary* defines 'crot' as a 'lump or a clod of earth' ("crōt(e n."), citing the Paston Letters, about which Woolf wrote in her essay 'The Pastons and Chaucer ,' published in the first *Common Reader* (1925; *E* 4 20-38) Pully (or Pulley, as it is spelt in some fragments) is probably the most familiar to modern

anglophone audiences. Wright defines it as the 'wheel placed over a pit over which the rope for drawing coals is passed' ("Pulley"). The *OED* records historical usages dating back to the 1350s. Reading between these various definitions we encounter a distinctly mechanical form of control, one where the levers, wheels and pullys of power are in the water we nin and saturate every atom, every clod of dirt, every single crot.

Nin, Crot, and Pully are not directly knowable through the literature that they shape, for they are 'so many,' they are 'so interwoven,' and 'so obscure.' Rather, they form the ground upon which literature is written, the unspoken 'forces' that 'cover over the original song' (M.49.4). Woolf implies that we cannot turn to literature for a thorough reading of literature's prehistory, of the influences that pre-exist literature—certainly individual literary works and perhaps literature more broadly as an institution—and interpellate its writers as subjects. Instead we must turn to historians: 'To follow his firtunes further, we must turn to an outsider one of those commentators who tell us so much about the invisib influences; about Nin Crot and Pulley' (M.53.4). As readers in the twenty-first century, we are, of course, subject to our own time's Nins, Crots, and Pulleys, our own invisible nimbuses of interwoven and obscure influences that shape what is written, what is read, and how we encounter it. Recovering 'Anon' and 'The Reader' thus constitutes not just an act of reading but an act of negotiation which is at least a double move: reading a history that tries to account for the unrecorded excess that escapes the historian's pen—and realising the impossibility of this task—while also simultaneously accounting for the mediations of the archive that govern how we encounter this history.

How Should One Read 'The Reader'?

How then should one read 'The Reader,' if indeed a work with that title exists? A literary history which has at its heart an anonymous excess that necessarily escapes the historian's grasp and which must nonetheless be recovered, expressed in a constellation of draft fragments that simultaneously work through literary history and what it means to write a history of literature, reading in Woolf's late archive is a tall order. In 'How Should One Read a Book?' (the essay that gives this chapter this title) initially published in *The Yale Review* in 1926 and republished with significant emendations as the final essay of *The Common Reader: Second Series* (1932), Woolf asks

her readers to practice an idiosyncratic and heuristic mode of reading. 'The only advice,' Woolf writes, 'that one person can give another about reading is to take no advice, to follow your own instincts, to use your own reason, to come to your own conclusions' (*E* 4 573). Rather than relying on prejudice or 'heavily furred and gowned' authorities (573), the reader should not 'dictate to your author; try to become him. Be his fellow worker and accomplice' (573). In the first instance, reading—or at least reading in a Woolf-sanctioned manner—is an act of profound empathy and mutual, coactive creation premised on the reader's unconditioned encounter with the text, premised on collecting impressions prior to aesthetic judgment. If Woolf's reader opens their 'mind as widely as possible, then signs and hints of almost imperceptible fineness, from the twist and turn of the first sentences, will bring [them] into the presence of a human being unlike any other' (573-4). Reading, however, is only the 'first process' and readers must 'pass judgment upon these multitudinous impressions; we must make of these fleeting shapes one that is hard and lasting' (579).

Woolf's 1932 essay provides a practice of reading that is almost phenomenological in its method, proceeding from a reader's unconditioned encounter with the text. Woolf asks the readers of *The Common Reader: Second Series* to consider how they encounter books, specifically. The 1929 essay cites novels old and new, criticism, poetry, biography, and drama, but implicit in both the essay's title and its choice of reading is the book as material form—a codex consisting of pages with type printed on them, bound by a spine and sandwiched between covers. Woolf's argument in 'How Should One Read a Book,' by contrast, deals with allographic, published texts. But my chapter has not engaged with much material published in codex form. This is not to say that the unconditioned encounter with the text that Woolf discusses in her 1929 essay is impossible or undesirable here. Rather, it underscores that the unconditioned encounter with the text Woolf theorises in 1932 is conditioned by the material form of the text. What happens when we do not encounter Woolf's fleeting shapes in codex form, but rather in a constellation of draft fragments? 'Anon' and 'The Reader' do not present their readers with a straightforward narrative, or even a complicated narrative in a relatively straightforward format with a clear-cut path from beginning to end. So, how should one read 'The Reader'—if indeed there is a work with such a title?

The passage of M.111 I discussed in the first part of this chapter bears a vision of flux and fluidity which is apposite to the form of the 'Anon' and 'The Reader' fragments more broadly, and

which teaches us to read in this archive, which teaches us how one should read 'The Reader'. This archive is a constellation of documents which should not be read in isolation but rather viewed as 'one common attempt' and perhaps even 'sketches for one masterpiece' that remains stubbornly unrealised and unrealisable. And this is buttressed by Woolf's substrate, a page from the typescript of *Between the Acts* that investigates modes of community. I cannot say for certain that this is the only instance in the drafts of 'Anon' and 'The Reader' where Woolf writes back to her substrate. However, this folio highlights, for me at least, what is at stake when we read in Woolf's late archive. This chapter has sought to offer a historical and bibliographic overview of the 'Anon' and 'The Reader' fragments, and to provide a close reading of a small but richly allusive portion of this archive. In so doing I hope that I have made the case for future scholars to turn back to Woolf's final project and read it as a constellation of material objects which intersect and dovetail with each other and other works in curious and surprising ways. The final chapter of this thesis sees me expand my gaze and read the 'Anon' and 'The Reader' fragments alongside *Between the Acts*, Woolf's last novel, constellating the final literary-historical and fictional projects she wrote at the end of her life. I structure this chapter around three meanings of 'Anon': an abbreviation of 'anonymous;' an archaic word meaning 'of one body,' and, finally 'now again' or 'soon.' In so doing, I filiate Woolf's late interests in anonymity, community and futurity.

Chapter Six: Becoming Anonymous

Anonymous

Anon, adj.:
Abbrev. of anonymous adj.   Hence as n., a person (esp. a writer or composer) whose name is
unknown or not given. (OED)

Anon was dead, to begin with. Perhaps. But the moment of Anon's death was also the moment of Anon's birth. In one account, Woolf dates the death of the anonymous balladeer to the moment that late medieval print technology was used to print English writing. If we take the opening of the earliest 'Anon' fragments at face value then Anon died in 1477, as Caxton printed his edition of *The Canterbury Tales.* Two witnesses testify to Anon's death, M.49, which says that 'Anon died round 1478+7+. It was the printed book with the authors name attached that killed him. After that the audience was separate from the singer.'[37] (M.49.3) and M.53, which confirms that 'Anon died round about 1477' (M.53.3). The moment of Anon's death might be a matter of record, but the evidence is less clear as to what happened after Caxton cranked the handle of his press, compressing paper onto plates of inked type and transferring it onto the paper. But the story is more complicated: this moment was also the moment when anonymous authorship came into being, as a counter to the named author. Woolf writes in another draft of 'Anon' that 'It was the printing press that +finally was to kill+ killed Anon. But it was the press also that preserved him.' (M.50.4).

Compressed into these short passages is a complex argument about the nature of authorhood, naming, and what happens when something or someone goes without a name. Briefly, Woolf is gesturing to a fundamental tension: the moment when the named author is born is simultaneously when the anonymous author, the author without name, comes into existence. Prior to the emergence of the named author, there can be no author whose name is 'unknown or not given'. Anon was, perhaps, born at precisely the moment that he was supposed to have died. Anon may have been dead, to begin with, but by the same token, Anon was born, to begin with. Anon is, in this figuration, an

---

[37] In this chapter as in the previous one I replicate Woolf's spelling and grammar without comment.

ontic necessity, a counter to the named author, an excess who eludes the taxonomic impulse to classify, to name, to put everything in its right place. In this section of the chapter, I want to dwell in this moment of tension, this aporia placed between birth and death: it is in this aporia that Woolf's Anon can be found.

While important to this chapter's attempt to work through conceptions of anonymity in Woolf's late archive, the above musing is almost too abstract. Anonymity is not a metaphysical conjuring trick for Woolf. Rather, she has a life-long interest in anonymous, pseudonymous, and forgotten figures. This interest constitutes a through-line from her earliest stories to these late fragments, and this interest is always a political one. Anon was not 'a respectable ancestor,' Woolf tells us. 'He was nameless because he was disreputable' (M.50.1). Nor was Anon always a he: Anon was 'sometimes man; sometimes woman' (M.50.1), although Woolf consistently refers to Anon as a man throughout these fragments. Man or woman, Anon was always considered an unsavoury character: 'singing at yhe back door [Anon] was despised. He had no name; he had no place' (M.50.2). This is not necessarily a bad thing. Woolf continues: 'He used the outsiders privilege to co mock the solmen, to comment on the established' (M.50.3): in some fragments of 'The Reader' Woolf will go so far as to figure anonymity as 'a great possession' (M.110.29; M.111.II.29). Woolf's discussions of authorhood in *A Room of One's Own* can help think through the implications of what this 'great possession' might entail.

In a 2002 article, Anne Ferry tracks the history of anonymous authorship and the footfall of anonymity through literary history. Ferry's history tracks the development of anonymous authorship from a way for courtly gentlemen to save face in an intensely literary environment where it was nonetheless 'considered altogether improper for gentlemen and persons of rank to appear in print,' to a more politically-charged form of anonymity that allows the anonymous author to speak truth to power (Ferry 195). Yet women barely feature in her history. By contrast, anonymity is a key figuration in Woolf's history of women's writing. The narrator of *A Room of One's Own* tells us that Anon, 'who wrote so many poems without signing them, was often a woman' (*AROO* 45). The narrator abjures a name herself, inviting her audience in a parenthetical aside to call her 'Mary Beton, Mary Seton, Mary Carmichael or by any name you please' (4)—which is itself a line from the anonymous Scottish 'Ballad of Mary Hamilton' or 'The Four Maries' (105, n. 3). But this act of

abjuring and taking anonymity for oneself—of giving up a name and going by 'any name you please'—is radically different to the 'dictated' anonymity that the narrator of *Room* discusses.

The narrator of *A Room of One's Own* gives three examples of women who were forced to publish pseudonymously—which is not quite the same as anonymously—in order (the narrator claims) to publish at all: Charlotte Brontë (who went by Currer Bell), Mary Ann Evans (George Eliot) and Amandine Dupin (George Sand) (46). In Woolf's telling, these women had to go by pseudonyms or not publish their writings—a choice that was not available to Judith Shakespeare who died without writing a word. *A Room of One's Own*'s narrator hails Judith Shakespeare as 'some mute and inglorious Jane Austen' (45), a phrase which is an allusion to Thomas Gray's 'Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard' which itself hails 'some mute and inglorious Milton' who lies dead and buried (Gray l. 59). Milton's own work later in life is premised on many hours of anonymous labour: Milton, blind and unable to write, was said to have dictated *Paradise Lost* to his daughters, their anonymity inscribed in the work that they had dictated to them.[38] It is also worth noting that Austen herself published anonymously throughout her life. Silence and anonymity are, in *A Room of One's Own*, dictated to women and are necessitated by the material conditions of their lives. The narrator of *A Room of One's Own* tells her audience that '[i]ntellectual freedom depends on material things' (*AROO* 97), and, to reach for a singular material thing from an essay abounding in them, the prunes and custard served at Fernham are metonymic of an entire *longue durée* of gendered injustice that systemically deprives women of the means to write. Prunes, 'even when mitigated by custard' are not just a disappointing way to end a meal, an 'uncharitable vegetable (fruit they are not)' (16) but, when compared to the meal the narrator has at the men's college—which ends with a 'confection that rose all sugar from the waves' (10) — become emblematic of the

---

[38] The *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* entry for Milton is inconclusive on the matter, discussing anonymous 'amanuenses' or preferring to use 'dictate' as an intransitive verb (Campbell n.p.). This scene of composition has inspired much interpretation, becoming somewhat of a trope: Woolf would have read Eliot's pointed commentary on Milton's daughters' labour throughout *Middlemarch* (Eliot; 1872), itself published pseudonymously. She might also have known of paintings depicting Milton and his daughters by John Henry Fuseli, in which Milton's blank eyes glare out of an ashen, shadowed face as one of his daughters stands in a beam of light at a lectern (Fuseli). She may also have known of Eugene Delacroix's depiction of Milton's daughter sitting at a low stool at her father's foot, in front of a distinctly Blakean painting of Adam and Eve being cast out of Eden (Delacroix), or Blake's mythic recasting of the image on the engraved plates of the 'Proverbs of Hell' wherein a vast winged man kneels between two women, equally vast, who are taking notes on a scroll long enough to stretch between writing desks on the two women's knees, draping over the winged, kneeling figure who is naked apart from this scroll (Blake "Marriage" 116). To bring this footnote full circle, Blake himself illustrated Gray's 'Elegy' (Blake "Elegy" n.p.)—I am grateful to Michael Black for informing me of this last point.

systemic exclusion of women from the means of literary production, for 'the lamp in the spine does not light on beef and prunes' (16). Masculine literary culture stifles and silences women, dictating anonymity to them, and prunes and custard helped drive Judith Shakespeare, rendered mute and inglorious, to her grave.

As I discussed briefly in Chapter Five, Woolf's interest in anonymity is a life-long one. In *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, Elena Gualtieri tracks Woolf's interest in 'forgotten lives and the writings recording them,' from the earliest essays of the young Virginia Stephen onward, arguing that these figures, by turn eccentric, obscure, and anonymous 'signal a process of revision of the terms in which literary history itself is written' (Gualtieri 44). Anonymity is always political for Woolf, as is her attempt to recover lives of the obscure. In these late fragments, however, Woolf begins to figure anonymity as a condition to be aspired to, rather than written against. The literary history written in these late fragments is a Janus-faced one, tracking the movements of named, and mostly male, authors—Spenser, Marlowe and Shakespeare—while simultaneously looking to trace the footfall of the unnamed excess who escapes being named. Anon is 'the communal voice singing out of doors' (M.50.3) whose song eludes the efforts of those who try to put it to paper.

Woolf writes in M.51 that 'in the twenty one books of the Mort DArthur that we tap into the deep reservoir of common belief that sunk, in the minds of the nobles and the peasants.' (M.51.6). But putting these common beliefs down on paper is a double move which entails both preserving and killing, like preserving the colour of a butterfly's wings by pinning its dead form to a board.[39] In printing the twenty-one books of the *Morte D'Arthur*, Caxton also 'foretold the end of that anonymous world; It is written down; fixed; nothing will be added; even if the legend still murmurs on, and still down in Somersetshire the peasants remember how "on the night of the full moon King Arthur and his men ride round the hill and all their horses are shod with silver"' (M.50.6). Anon's words are iterative and generative in a way that the printed page cannot be; there is always an implicit tension between chronicling and preserving (or trying to chronicle and preserve) works 'by Anon' and bringing them to a standstill.

---

[39] This simile is apt to the interest in 'specimen collection' that Christina Alt traces through Woolf's life and work (Alt 121). We see Jacob attempting to classify a moth that he has caught in *Jacob's Room* (*JR* 34) while in 'Craftsmanship,' Woolf writes that 'when words are pinned down they fold their wings and die' (*E* 6 97).

As a form that can be iterative and is capable of changing from performance to performance, drama becomes key to Woolf's literary-historical imaginary, acting as a bridge between the anonymous ballad tradition and the printed document. Playtexts become palimpsests, bearing the traces of their anonymous audiences as they are worked and reworked, iterated and reiterated. Woolf's discussion of the Elizabethan audience here expands on comments she made in her 1925 *Common Reader* essay 'Notes on an Elizabethan Play,' which sketches out a radically collective genealogy for Elizabethan drama. Woolf reflects in this essay on the differences between modern novels and the 'plays of the lesser Elizabethans—Greene, Dekker, Peele, Chapman, Beaumont and Fletcher' (*E* 4 62). She writes that the 'boredom of an Elizabethan play is of a different quality altogether from the boredom which a nineteenth-century play […] inflicts' (63) and ventures an explanation for this. Whereas the 'deliberate drama of the Victorian age is evidently written in the study,' Elizabethan drama bears the traces of its audience: '[t]here is, even in the worst [Elizabethan play], an intermittent bawling vigour which gives us the sense […] of ostlers and orange-girls catching up the lines, flinging them back, hissing or stamping applause' (63). Woolf suggests in her 1925 essay that Elizabethan drama is a collective project, and that 'half the work of the dramatists, one feels, was done in the Elizabethan age by the public' (63). Recovering the radical potential of co-created Elizabethan drama requires contemporary readers to 'draw in those filaments of sensibility which the moderns have so marvellously developed' and 'use the ear and the eye which the moderns have so basely starved' (67). Elizabethan drama, Woolf argues, is somatic and sensory, to be listened to and seen and felt rather than read. The contemporary reader searching after the 'true merits' of Elizabethan drama should 'hear words as they are laughed and shouted, not as they are printed in black letters on the page, see before your eyes the changing bodies and living faces of men and women' (67). That Woolf includes women among the changing bodies and living faces necessary to understand Elizabethan drama speaks to her investment in the audience as creator as the Elizabethan stage was a distinctly masculine environment—the figures she invokes at the start of the essay, Greene, Decker, Peele, Chapman, Beaumont and Fletcher are all men, and women did not perform on stage until the Restoration.

Woolf expands upon and writes back to her 1925 essay in the 'Anon' fragments. M.53 and M.54 expand on the curious power of the audience to mould the plays that it watched. The play is

'half the work of the audience': '+The play+ Tamburlaine was anonymous. That fact by itself is enough to show how largely the play was a common product, written by one hand, but so moulded in tranition from the written to the spoken that the author had no sense of property in it. It was half the work of the audience. +But+ yet the audience is dumb. That silence is one of th deep gulfs that lies between us and the Elizabetahn play' (M.53.24). M.53 continues to attribute the 'extravagance, and its riot and its plot and its glow to the audience in the penny seats' (M.53.25). In M.54, even as the private reader of poetry comes into being, the 'play is still partly the work of the audience; of the undifferentiated gluttonous word greedy mass. It is inspired by the common voice, demanding great names, simple outlines; clamour and virtory and death; not the single subtlety of one soul. (M.54.23b).

Those fragments designated as 'The Reader' attempt to theorise the Renaissance playhouse as a zone of contact between playwright and audience,[40] but this theory is hard to grasp. In reading these attempts, we are trapped in a curious double bind. Woolf is telling the history of something which is, by its nature, hard to pin down: we have already seen that the audience is rendered as 'dumb,' an epithet that Woolf expands upon. She writes that 'If we could measure the [effect] of the audience upon the play we should have a hold which is denied us upon the play itself. But the audience, drawn though it is by an irresistible attraction to the play, is silent' (M.108.26). Although the Renaissance audience was very noisy by modern standards, theirs is not a noise that we can hear first-hand: rather, we can only hear echoes of the clamorous audience in Woolf's early modern playhouse. To compound our difficulties, the documents we encounter are far from conclusive: they represent less the finished piece that the 1979 edition supposes, and more a set of attempts to work through a conceptually challenging array of ideas. In M.111, Woolf writes of the peculiar quiddities of reading Shakespeare:

> But Shakespere has nosuch appeal to the reader-writer. His styles are too innumerabel. Perhpas then he is chiefly used for more general piposes--when the ink has gone dry upon the pen to revive the sense of language; or to testify, when words seem motinless, to the enormous possibilities of speed. One reading always supersedes another. Thus the truest account of reading Shakespere would be not to write a book with a beginning middle and end; but to collect notes, without trying to make them consistent. (M.111.I.34)

---

[40] Curiously, actors do not appear very frequently in Woolf's history of the early playhouse.

Woolf's account of reading Shakespeare can equally be applied to my reading of Woolf's late fragments, which are not a 'book with a beginning middle and end' but rather are 'notes' which we should view as a 'collect[ion]' and read them 'without trying to make them consistent.' As we saw earlier, these are autographic documents that are not vectored, which were not written in one direction, and should not be read as such.

M.109 expands on 'Notes on an Elizabethan Play's suggestion that early drama was created in no small part by the public: 'If at Greenwich or Whitehall, one of them caught sight of that grave inscrutable figure, he could uickly add him to t list of characters.' (M.109.27), although it is important to note that Woolf is not clear on who 'them,' or 'that grave inscrutable figure' are. If that 'grave inscrutable figure' is an otherwise-anonymous member of the Renaissance audience then we might suggest that in writing the audience into a play, those audience members have their anonymity withdrawn as their names are inscribed in the play's *dramatis personae*. M.110, meanwhile, tracks a simultaneous rise and fall. It relates the decline of the audience as coactive creator of the plays that its members watch, and of the slow creation of the named playwright as the sole author of their plays. 'But at some point there comes a break where anonymity withdraws. It comes presumably when the playwright has absorbed the contribution of the audience; and returns it to them in a single figure which is individual' (M.110.29). This passage sets out a process of interpellation, by which early playwrights came to construct the psychic lives of their plays through 'absorb[ing] the contributions' of that silent yet very noisy mass who came to watch their plays. This slow historical process by which Anon, first balladeer and then noisy audience member, died and the reader was born created the author, but this authorhood is founded on an originary loss. Woolf writes in M.111

> Much that was lost in the playhous e was discovered in the private room. But much also has been lost. We have lost the sound of the spoken word; all that the sight of the actors body gives through the eye to the mind. We have lost too the sense of being part of the audience. We miss a thousand shades that the darmatist conveyed by infection of voice, by gesture, by the palcing of the actors vbodies (M.111.I.31)

The process by which the reading subjectivity is born is a process of naming, of uncovering, of the withdrawal of the anonymity that was once found in reading. 'The reader loses his anonymity too. He chhoses; he discrimitaes.' (M.112 I.30). Woolf contends, however, that this form of anonymity can be recovered—I discuss this recovery in the final section of this chapter.

'Anon' and 'The Reader' might track the decline of such co-active forms of creation, of collective ballad-making and dramaturgy, but Woolf's 1937 radio broadcast-turned-essay 'Craftsmanship' posits a co-active source for language itself, where meaning is collectively determined, and language itself has its roots in its speakers. It is not too far-fetched to suggest that Woolf's collective literary history has its roots in Woolf's thinking through of language as co-active. 'Craftsmanship' gestures to the inner lives of words. These lives are lived historically, but this history is not a dead one. Language is not for Woolf, as in Emerson's figuration, 'fossil poetry,' each word a geological trace of an originary spark, a 'stroke of genius' by a member of a priestly caste of poets (Emerson 13). Rather, this history is what makes words so intensely generative:

> Words, English words, are full of echoes, of memories, of associations—naturally. They have been out and about, on people's lips, in their houses, in the streets, in the fields for so many centuries. And that is one of the chief difficulties of writing them today—that they are stored with meanings, with memories, that they have contracted so many famous marriages. (*E* 6: 95)

In 'Craftsmanship,' Woolf posits a model of language where words come to acquire their meanings through centuries of use and hence come to signify more than their surface meanings. Meaning is continually created, recreated and, indeed, procreated, as words live 'variously and strangely, much as human beings live, by ranging hither and thither, by falling in love and mating together' (96). Woolf tells us, slyly citing an anonymous sea shanty, that 'the less we enquire into the past of our dear Mother English the better it will be for that lady's reputation. For she has gone a-roving, a-roving fair maid.' (96).

E.M. Forster nods also to this sea shanty in his *Anonymity: An Enquiry*, printed as the twelfth of the First Series of Hogarth Essays in 1925 (Forster 10). I contend that Forster's pamphlet acts as an underacknowledged intertext not just for 'Craftsmanship' but for 'Anon' and 'The Reader' and I will discuss the interplay between Forster's 1925 essay and Woolf's late literary history later in the chapter—for now I confine myself to talking about Forster's pamphlet and 'Craftsmanship'. Forster's discussion of language that is 'pure information' (8) seems to anticipate Woolf's discussion of the utility of words, but they reach radically different conclusions. Forster accepts that there is language that can convey 'pure information,' such as a stop sign by a tramline, which he calls 'an example of pure information,' writing that '[i]t creates no atmosphere—at least in my mind' (8).

There may not be much language that is purely informative—even a seemingly utilitarian sign on the tram saying '"Beware of pickpockets male and female"' is certainly informative but nonetheless sends Forster into a reverie about 'pickpockets, male and female' who

> hustle old gentlemen, the old gentleman glances down, his watch is gone. They steal up behind an old lady and cut out the back breadth of her beautiful sealskin jacket with sharp and noiseless pairs of scissors. Observe that happy little child running to buy sweets. Why does he suddenly burst into tears? A pickpocket, male or female, has jerked his halfpenny out of his hand. All this, and perhaps much more, occurs to us when we read the notice in question. (9)

According to Forster, there may be very little language that does not, in some way, create 'atmosphere' but there is some such language, nonetheless. Woolf's theory of language, however, seems to preclude the possibility of such purely informative language: 'Craftsmanship' gestures towards meaning being premised upon something approaching the Derridean supplemental archive I have discussed in earlier chapters of this thesis.

Words, English words, have been out and about, have contracted many famous marriages, and their meanings are inextricably linked to their historic use and are therefore always and already multiple: 'it is the nature of words to mean many things' (*E* 6 94). Words stretch out towards one another, gesturing away from the singularity of the stop sign by the tramline and into a richly significant plenitude. Woolf uses the phrase 'Passing Russell Square,' a sign on the Tube, as a potent *exemplum* of how a reading subject navigates this plenitude. 'Passing Russell Square' might, for Forster, be an example of 'pure information' but for Woolf it is as richly significant as the phrase 'multitudinous seas incarnadine' (94). Each word of this sign on the Tube can signify something else. Woolf's exegesis is worth quoting in full:

> The word 'passing' suggested the transiency of so many things, the passing of time and the changes of human life. Then the word 'Russell' suggested the rustling of leaves and the skirt on a polished floor; also the ducal house of Bedford and half the history of England. Finally the word 'Square' brings in the sight, the shape of an angular square combined with some visual suggestion of the stark angularity of stucco. Thus one sentence of the simplest kind rouses the imagination, the memory, the eye and the ear—all combine in reading it. (94)

Words suggest and signify, and insist on doing just that until the phrase 'Passing Russell Square' comes not to signify that 'the next train will pass Russell Square' but rather sends its reader into a language-drunk trance wherein 'the words shuffle and change and we find ourselves saying, "Passing away saith the world, passing away … The leaves decay and fall, the vapours weep their

burthen to the ground…" And then we wake up and find ourselves at King's Cross' (92). Many have become lost in thought and got on the wrong train—perhaps fewer specifically entranced by the prospect of Rossetti and Tennyson than Woolf's example supposes—but this passage nonetheless illustrates the 'strange [and] diabolical power' (94) that words have, to slip their authors' confines and rove freely. Language which is 'perfectly and beautifully adapted to express useful statements' is not a language of words at all, but a 'language of signs' (92) which is invoked largely in parody as Woolf expands the pictorial language of the Baedeker and Michelin Guides to the nth degree, compressing, say, the statement that 'Oliver Smith went to college and took a third in the year 1892' to 'a hollow O on top of the figure five' (92-3).[41] The 'strange' and 'diabolical power' accorded to words is the corollary to the Dada phonotactics I discussed in Chapter Four, to Hugo Ball's railing against 'secondhand' words which 'are not newly invented for our own use' (Ball 71). Words are overdetermined by their very nature, but this excess is not to be shunned. It is an excess which is intensely generative, joyous even, but it is also a potent source of anxiety for modern users of English. English may have always been 'a-roving' but Woolf traces the start of modern literary English to one particular moment in literary history—Spenser standing at the door of a great room in Penshurst Place, his patron Sir Philip Sidney's family estate. It is at precisely this moment when a modern writerly subjectivity, and an anxious subjectivity at that, begins.

The 'Anon' fragments use this image to dramatize a moment that comes not before words became overdetermined—for they have always been such—but before their overdetermination was grasped and perceived as a burden. Spenser emerges slowly and in manifold forms: this image is one of the most heavily reworked in the fragments this chapter discusses. He first appears in M.49, when 'for a moment there is a pause on the threshold of the great Elizabethan room, when the artist is not

---

[41] The phrase 'language of signs' is Woolf's but the language is reminiscent of the terminology set out by Ferdinand de Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics* (published in French in 1916 but only published in English in 1959), wherein the 'linguistic sign is arbitrary,' (Saussure 67) which is to say that there is no necessary connection between a spoken or written word and what it connotes, and therefore that a language such as Woolf's 'language of signs' could be presumably devised. Woolf could also be taking aim at Bloomsbury philosophy's interest in logical positivism, a school of thought which arguably reached its culmination in Wittgenstein's 'picture theory of language' wherein language is figured as a series of logical propositions and '[a] proposition is a picture of reality' (Wittgenstein 24, §24.021) which 'must restrict reality to two alternatives: yes and no,' representing reality truly or falsely (25, §4.023). Bertrand Russell wrote an introduction to the 1922 English translation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, and while King and Miletic-Vejzovic do not list a copy of the work among the Woolfs' library, we cannot definitively say that she did not at least know of the work through her friends: as Banfield writes, '[i]t is not necessary for Woolf to have "read" philosophy, however, to have early taken from the then current debates something she ultimately found relevant to her purposes. Woolf, we might say, had a knowledge *ex auditu* of philosophy.' (Banfield 30).

wholly writer, wholly painter, or wholly musician. The Faery Queen was the ~~natural product~~ of that momentary pause on the threshold' (M.49.10). In M.51, Spenser is mentioned by name, as 'standing on the threshold of the great room at Penshurt' (M.51.9), while in M.52, he gets a description: he is '"a little man with short hair, a small band, and cuffs"' (M.52.11)[42]. On the next page of this fragment, Spenser speaks, asking '"For why, a Gods name, may not we, as else the Greekes, hav the kingdome of our owne langauge, and measure our accents by the sound, reserving the quantity to the verse?" He applied himslef to the art.' (M.52.12)[43]—this quotation is repeated at M.54.12b. In theorising English writing as such, and in his own writing practice, Spenser partakes in a new writerly subjectivity that does not use words as a transparent medium for the transmission of meaning but rather dwells with their particular quiddity:

> thus [Spenser] proves himself word cosncious, an artist, aware of his meidum, aware that words are not paint, nor music; nbut have their possibilities, their mlimitations. To be thus aware, the writer must have a past behind him; as the histrian to see the present must set it against an earlier age. To Spenser, the golden age was Cahu Chaucers (M.54.12b)

Words on a page change in a way that paint on a board or notes on a stave do not, and as such have their own affordances, possibilities and limitations. But the existence of an earlier, golden, age implies a fall of sorts. In this rendering, Spenser's English is a postlapsarian one, albeit one that grants Spenser a vantage point that allows him to see bygone and better days.

In M.53, Woolf imagines for Spenser a kind of anxiety of influence—or rather, an anxiety of lack of influence—that made Spenser reach for the 'carbbed old words' of Chaucer, whom Woolf claims he believed was his only literary predecessor writing in English: 'Spensers revolt was against no particualr writer— who was there writing English except Cahicer? -- but against the language itself, its decay, since Chaucer, its corruption.' The fragment goes on to speculate that

> Chaucers crudity served as an antidote to [Spenser's] own facility. Perhaps too [Spenser] used the carbbed old words, not as we now might revert to them to ~~bring back~~ +[illeg]+

---

[42] The Woolfs owned two editions of Spenser's work, a five-volume 1862 edition edited by J. Payne Collier (which was presented to, and annotated by, Leslie Stephen) and a single-volume 1899 edition edited by R. Morris (King and Miletic-Vejzovic n.p.). It is likely that Woolf found this description in the 1862 edition, which contains a brief, unattributed biography of Spenser with this line (Spenser *Works [1862]* I.civ).

[43] This quotation is originally from *Three Proper Witty and Familiar Letters*, a 1580 printing of correspondence between Spenser (who wrote this correspondence under the pseudonym Immerito) and Gabriel Harvey. Excerpts from this correspondence, both of which include this quotation, were published in both editions of Spenser that the Woolfs owned (Spenser *Works [1862]* I.clviii; Spenser *Works [1899]* 708). Woolf writes on Harvey in her essay 'The Strange Elizabethans,' part of *The Second Common Reader* (*E* 5: 335-348), and he merits a passing mention in 'How Should One Read a Book?' dressed 'in his black velvet suit arguing about poetry with Spenser' (*E* 5 576).

sharp~~ness~~ where +when+ much use has worn words smooth; but to restrain what was to come. He was, as we cannot be, aware of the future. (M.53.16-17).

Woolf's Spenser is a reactionary, but a doomed one. He might write in order to 'restrain what was to come' but the catastrophe Spenser wants to stop has already happened. In fact, owing to the very nature of words, it is a catastrophe without beginning or end: we saw this in our discussion of 'Craftsmanship' but in Woolf's 1937 broadcast what Spenser sees as a centuries-long process of 'decay' and 'corruption' is something to be celebrated. Woolf's Spenser is positioned as an unenviable '*Angelus Novus*,' the 'angel of history' printed by Paul Klee in 1920 and discussed by Walter Benjamin (who had purchased the print) in his 'On the Concept of History.' Like Benjamin's Angel, Spenser turns his face towards the past, but '[w]here a chain of events appears before us,' Spenser 'sees one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet.' And like Benjamin's Angel, this catastrophe, this storm blows with such strength against Spenser's unfurled wings that 'drives him irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows toward the sky' ("On the Concept of History" 392). Try as Spenser might, he cannot hold back the future, and his very presence at the door of the great room in Penshurst inaugurates a modern subjectivity. Reading between the draft fragments and 'Craftsmanship' we can see that this subjectivity is premised upon a recognition of language as language, as something wholly but joyously overdetermined, and upon a simultaneous recognition that language seeps to the very core of this new form of subjectivity. I want to return to this mode of anonymous subjectivity later in the chapter, where I will posit that it is a subjectivity that is future-oriented. For now, however, I wish to light upon a secondary meaning of 'Anon,' 'of one body,' which brings *Between the Acts* into closer ideological collocation with the fragments of 'Anon' and 'The Reader' that this thesis has discussed thus far.

Of One Body

> But to amuse myself, let me note: why not Poyntzet Hall: a centre: all lit. discussed in connection with real little incongruous living humour; & anything that comes into my head; but "I" rejected: 'We' substituted: to whom at the end shall there be an invocation? "We"…composed of many different things… we all life, all art, all waifs & strays—a rambling capricious but somewhat unified whole—the present state of my mind? (*D* 5 135)

This section of the chapter reads *Between the Acts* as an extended gloss on the above section of Woolf's diary entry of 26th April 1938, seeking to limn the contours of the subtle, multivalent and, indeed, ambivalent 'We' that Woolf charts throughout her late work. In doing so, I hope to gesture towards both the communal, heteroglossic polyphony that 'Anon' tracks, and towards the ways in which *Between the Acts* complicates this imaginary. For while the "I" that Woolf rejects in her diary entry, the phallogocentric 'straight dark bar, [the] shadow' whose 'dominance' blots out the landscape behind it (*AROO* 90), might be able to sustain a fiction of unity (and is perhaps sustained by a fiction of unity), the 'We' that is substituted can make no such claims. Rather, it is 'rambling' and 'capricious,' only 'somewhat unified,' containing all life, all art, all waifs and strays. Woolf's 'We' contains multitudes: this chapter will argue that far from gesturing to a harmonious whole, this 'We' is clamorous and contradictory: its 'strays' bark and howl and wander, while its 'waifs,' 'ownerless' property washed up on the shore cannot be claimed ("waif, n.1 and adj."). Invoking this 'We' is not a simple matter, as this section of the chapter hopes to show.

One way of approaching Woolf's 'We' might be through the figuration of ancient drama in Jane Harrison's *Ancient Art and Ritual*, a work that Woolf was most likely was familiar with, having been presented with a copy by the author (King and Miletic-Vejzovic n.p.), who was apostrophised in *A Room of One's Own* as 'the famous scholar […] J— H— herself' (*AROO* 15). Harrison traces the roots of drama to '*dromenon*,' collective ritual dances which involved the whole community, in which the individual bodies of members of a community become anonymous, becoming a singular mass. She writes that the voice of the chorus reminds us of drama's roots in ancient ritual (Harrison 122). Dromenon is a collective matter, its voice the voice of the community that performs it: 'in the old ritual,' Harrison writes, 'the individual was nothing, the choral band, the group everything, and

in this it did but reflect primitive tribal life.' The 'heroic *saga*,*'* by contrast valorises the individual, who is 'everything, the mass of the people, the tribe or the group […] but a shadowy background which throws up the brilliant, clear-cut personality into a more vivid light' (159). Modern drama comes to erase its collective roots, which vanish as the Greek chorus wanes in popularity.

Harrison's dromenon is one that is carefully situated, 'round some sacred thing, at first a maypole, or the reaped corn, later the figure of a god or his altar. On this dancing place the whole body of worshippers would gather, just as now-a-days the whole community will assemble on a village green.' (126). In *Between the Acts*, the location that La Trobe, the author of the pageant around which the novel is centred, chooses for the day's entertainment is rendered in religious terms: its trees are 'regular enough to suggest columns in a church; in a church without a roof; in an open-air cathedral' (*BA* 47) . Woolf's description resonates with Harrison's, but it is not enough to point out this intertext uncritically. The pageant in *Between the Acts* does not take place on a communal 'dancing place' or a 'village green,' on common land geographically and psychologically in the centre of its rural community, its usage common to members of the community, but in the closed grounds of Pointz Hall, a stately home. And nor is the pageant a collective affair in the same way as Harrison's dromenon: there is a marked class divide between actors and audience. La Trobe's audience are a wealthy crowd, among the audience are the Olivers, who own Pointz Hall (5), Mrs. Swithin, the widowed sister of the patriarch Giles Oliver (6), and the tourists Mrs Manresa and William Dodge. On the stage, meanwhile, are (among others) Eliza Clark, 'licensed to sell tobacco' (61), Albert the '"village idiot"' (67) and 'Budge the publican' (115). It is tempting to consider a humanist reading of the mirror scene at the end of the pageant, that it is a disclosure of some common human essence—'our selves' showing 'our selves' to 'our selves' (132)—but considering the socioeconomic makeup of actors and audience reveals the scene as a theatrical display of social critique.

I want to turn now to the form of the pageant in *Between the Acts*, reading its false starts and interruptions, and paying close attention to how these have been rendered on the pages of various editions of the novel, but I would like to begin with a late example. The Reverend Streatfield addresses the pageant's audience after the show has ended: '"What message," it seemed he was asking, "was our pageant meant to convey?"' The form that his question takes is as important as the

words used to ask it, for it only 'seemed' that he was asking the question: 'his first words (the breeze had risen; the leaves were rustling) were lost' (*BA* 137). The placement of the parentheses in the opening to Streatfield's speech enacts what happens to his words—they are interrupted, lost under the rising breeze and the rustling wind. The world burst in on Streatfield and his speech, making its presence known. The world that intrudes on Streatfield is not just the "natural" one. One interruption is decidedly "unnatural," but patterns itself after something natural and decidedly more innocuous: 'Twelve aeroplanes in perfect formation like a flock of wild duck came overhead. *That* was the music' (138-9). It is worth noting here that the italicised '*That*' is one of the very few italicised portions of the *Between the Acts* typescript, and that I quote throughout from Mark Hussey's radical 2011 edition of the novel which restores the typesetting of Woolf's final typescript, as well as its line breaks and bibliographic codes. I will return to the line breaks and infrequent italicisations that Hussey's edition restores later in this chapter.

But it is not just Streatfield who gets interrupted. Miss La Trobe's pageant is shot through with interruptions almost from beginning to end—Phyllis Jones forgets the opening lines of the pageant (*BA* 56), while at the very end 'a hitch occurred. The records had been mixed' (135). In the interim, the peasants' chorus is drowned out by the blowing wind each and every time—at the first appearance, 'The villagers were singing, but half their words were blown away' (57), while the next time they appear 'They were singing, but only a word or two was audible' (59). The final time they appear, their interruption is described in a bracketed phrase, '(the breeze blew gaps between their words)'. In every case, these interruptions are represented visually as well as lexically, with ellipses. For example:

> Digging and delving we pass….and the Queen and the Watch Tower fall…for Agamemnon has ridden away….Clytemnestra is nothing but….
> The words died away. Only a few great names—Babylon, Nineveh, Clytemnestra, Agamemnon, Troy—floated across the open space. Then the wind rose, and in the rustle of the leaves even the great words became inaudible; and the audience sat staring at the villagers, whose mouths opened, but no sound came. (101)

Here, Mark Hussey's return to the final typescript's typesetting is shown to bear semiotic freight: that the interrupted pageant and the world which interrupts it are printed in the same roman type is important. It makes these interruptions harder and perhaps even slightly more frustrating to read, but

crucially, it goes some way in erasing the difference between the pageant and the world that interrupts it. *That* was indeed the music.

It is not just the wind that conspires to interrupt Miss La Trobe's dialogue: the cows get in on the act too. They interrupt Eliza Clark's monologue as Queen Elizabeth—'(a cow mooed. A bird twittered)' (61)—while, later on, they '[make] a triple step forward, then standing still [say] the same thing to perfection. […] Folded in this triple melody, the audience sat gaping' (97). At the pageant's denouement, as the children dance with mirrors, showing the audience to themselves, the 'very cows joined in. Walloping, tail lashing, the reticence of nature was undone, and the barriers that should divide Man the Master from the Brute were dissolved. Then the dogs joined in' (132). These moments when the unruly nonhuman world insists on making its voice heard over the pageant's actors are profoundly unsettling, dissolving boundaries between the human world and the environment.

The pageant's audience are also unruly, rendering the start of the La Trobe's rendition of the Elizabethan age inaudible: '—those were the first words that could be heard above the roar of laughter and applause' (61). But then, so are the actors: the pageant's Elizabethan playlet is inaudible above the actors' 'bawl[ing]' which became 'so loud that it was difficult to make out what they were saying' (65). At the end of the pageant, the stagehand whose task it is to play the pageant's incidental music causes an interruption: a 'hitch occurred here. The records had been mixed' (135). Interruptions become part of the pageant in the most basic sense: Miss La Trobe's script tries '"ten mins. of present time. Swallows, cows etc."' This is a willed interruption, where the actors take a back seat to reality, with which the audience would be 'douche[d],' but this moment does not have the impact that La Trobe imagined: the audience 'slip[s] the noose,' drawn away by the siren call of 'cows, swallows, present time,' which La Trobe wishes to 'shut out'. Reality just is '"too strong"'. But, by the same token, it is the intrusion of the non-human world which breaks the spell, a 'shower […] sudden, profuse,' which allows 'nature to once more […] take her part' and for another 'another voice […] the voice that was no one's voice' to establish itself (129-30). And finally, it is a departure from La Trobe's script that allows the audience to see themselves: it is only when 'Young Bonthrop

for all his muscle couldn't lug the [cheval glass] about any longer' that the children's dance stops, and the audience can see 'themselves, not whole by any means, but at any rate sitting still' (133).[44]

And finally, we end up back with the Reverend Streatfield giving a speech, a speech which is interrupted by the wind and by twelve aeroplanes. The cows lowing in the fields, the wind that carries words away, the aeroplanes whose propellers were the music; these do not signify in a readily understandable sense, but rather they gesture to a past which is 'citable in all its moments' (Benjamin "On the Concept of History" 390). *Between the Acts*, in giving space to these interruptions, to the intrusions of the world outside of the predetermined narrative of La Trobe's pageant, instantiates a Benjaminian method of making history, one which implies a past which is composed not of a continuum of historical time but rather of dialectical images which constellate past and present and which 'flash[] up in a moment of danger' (391). Colonel Mayhew asks '"Why leave out the British Army? What's history without the Army, eh?"' (*BA* 113)—but 'history without the Army' is precisely the point of Woolf's Benjaminian history-making, in which the multitudinous affects of its audience, the lowing of the cows in the next field, and the buffeting of the wind are as much a part of the drama as the actors speaking La Trobe's script. Angeliki Spiropoulou points out that this Benjaminian historiography is present not just in Woolf's presentation of La Trobe's pageant but is inherent to La Trobe's own method of pageant-making. 'Breaking down historical time into disconnected scenes,' La Trobe 'effectively produces "constellations" between now and then, by means of which historical awareness is achieved' (Spiropoulou *Constellations* 147). *Between the Acts*'s pageant scenes imply that historical awareness necessarily entails awareness of the present, and it necessarily entails constellating past and present.

Christine Froula writes of the plurality of voices, both on- and offstage, in the novel's pageant scenes that '*Between the Acts* dissolves any notion of a divide between functional and poetic language. Like a stone chip in a mosaic, the most ordinary utterance brushes against, calls out, even becomes poetry through context and contiguity […] Speech is never naked'. Froula annotates the pageant's opening scene, typographically separating each speaker with a number and noting that

---

[44] 'Bonthrop' is one of the names of Orlando's extravagantly-monikered husband, Marmaduke Bonthrop Shelmerdine: the notes to Suzanne Raitt and Ian Blyth's edition of *Orlando* explain that Bonthrop 'appears to be a made-up word,' composed of the French 'bon,' and the English surname and suffix in surnames 'Throp,' a 'variant on Thorpe' and which means 'place or village' (*O* 469, n. 229:3).

'before the play has progressed six lines, we hear at least seven voices' (Froula 304-305). It goes without saying that by the play's end we will have heard many more. This mingling of voices becomes even more pointed in Mark Hussey's edition of *Between the Acts*, which restores the typography of the novel's final typescript. As discussed previously, in the first British edition of the novel, edited after Woolf's death by Leonard Woolf, and subsequent editions that have taken Leonard Woolf's text as copytext, the dialogue of the pageant is set in italics. However, in the final typescript, only eleven words or phrases are set in italics, save titles of books and the *Times* and the vast majority of the pageant is rendered in roman type. Comparing Hussey's edition to the first British edition, the portion of the pageant's opening that Froula marks up reads:

> Gentles and simples, I address you all …
> So it was the play then. Or was it the prologue?
> Come hither for our festival (she continued)
>
> This is a pageant, all may see
> Drawn from our island history.
> England am I….
>
> "She's England," they whispered. It's begun." "The prologue," they added, looking down at the programme.
> "England am I," she piped again; and stopped.
> She had forgotten her lines.

(*BA* 56)

Whereas the first British edition reads:

> *Gentles and simples, I address you all…*
>
> So it was the play then? Or was it the prologue?
>
> *Come hither for our festival* (she continued)
>
> *This is a pageant, all may see*
> *Drawn from our island history.*
> *England am I. …*
>
> "She's England," they whispered. "It's begun." "The prologue," they added, looking down at the programme.
> *"England am I,"* she piped again; and stopped.
> She had forgotten her lines.

(*Between the Acts* [Hogarth] 94)

As I have said, these portions of the 2011 edition are harder to read. But the difficulty is precisely the point. In discussing these moments, Froula offers a materialist slant on Erich Auerbach's question of *To The Lighthouse*, 'Who is speaking in this paragraph?' (Auerbach 531), writing that '[t]he question, then, is less Who speaks than How, though thinking about How leads to

a different understanding of Who' (Froula 305). Leonard Woolf's typographic indications make it far easier to answer this question; Hussey's decision to restore the final typescript's italicisation (or lack thereof) makes this question harder to answer. I would like to use my reading of Hussey's edition to expand on Froula's expansion: the question is not just Who is speaking, or How is this speaker speaking, but rather, How do we come to read this speaker's speech? Hussey's edition places us in a world where the lowing of cows and the blowing of the wind are as much a part of La Trobe's pageant as the actors on the stage.

Hussey's edition of *Between the Acts* undoes Leonard Woolf's perhaps overenthusiastic typesetting, but this does not mean that the entirety of his edition of the novel is rendered in roman type. Rather, what Jane Goldman terms a 'spine of italicized words' runs through this edition of the novel, 'delineating the turns of Woolf's original pronominal gender politics' (Goldman "Aesthetics of Modernism" 61). Leaving aside titles of novels and newspapers, which are italicised as a matter of course, I count fourteen words or phrases italicised in the 2011 edition of the novel:

ITALICISED WORDS	PAGE
What had *he* said about the cesspool; or indeed about anything?	4
"… Sohrab," she said coming to a standstill in front of them. "What's *he* been doing?"	13
Often when Ralph Manresa had to stay in town she came down alone […] taught the village women *not* how to pickle and preserve; but how to weave frivolous hats out of coloured straw	31
She *knew*, she said, pinching a bit of bread to make this emphatic, that Ralph, when he was at the war, couldn't have been killed without her seeing him—	32
"I'm sure *she's* written it. Haven't you, Mrs. Giles?"	44
"Now *he* […] writes beautifully. Every letter perfectly formed."	45
"Oh Mr. Parker, what a pleasure to see *you* here! I'm for tea!"	70
We'll have a play of our own. In *our* Barn. We'll show 'em […] how *we* do it."	78
"We?" said Giles. *"We?"*	81
They never got *that* in the fields, I warrant! Oh faithless, cruel, hard-hearted Valentine.	98
Has Mr Sibthorp a wife?	121

And thus—she was smiling benignly—the agony of the particular sheep, cow or human being is necessary; and so—she was beaming seraphically at the gilt vane in the distance—we reach the conclusion that *all* is harmony, could we hear it. And we shall.	125
That was the music.	138-9
Did *you* understand the meaning? Well, he said she meant we all act all parts…	142

There is an evident progression from singular pronouns which are mostly masculine-gendered—*He*, *He*, *She's*, *He's*—to neuter plural pronouns—*We* and *They*—as the community of actors and spectators in the grounds of Pointz Hall step out of the shadow of *a Room of One's Own*'s dominating phallogocentric 'I,' rejecting it and substituting it with 'We', a 'we' that 'act[s] all parts'. But this progression is not necessarily a serene one. Take the '"*We?*" said Giles. *"We?"*' on page 81: this is not an invocation of a community that transcends singular personal pronouns but rather a withering reminder that such a community can scarcely be said to exist. Giles Oliver, William Dodge and Mrs. Parker are discussing Albert, the 'village idiot' who had just appeared on stage. Mrs. Parker is distressed by Albert's presence on the stage, and questions Dodge's assertion that so called-village idiots are '"in the tradition".' Mrs. Parker asks Giles Oliver whether 'we're more civilised?' Mrs. Parker does not care to disclose what a 'more civilised' approach to disability might be. Oliver's response is a sarcastic, italicised '"*We*?"' which is similarly inscrutable (80-1). Perhaps he views the disabled in the same way as he does the snake and toad he stamps upon, as a 'monstrous inversion' whose deaths constitute 'action' which 'relieve[s] him' (72).

The question then becomes who or what is this 'We'? While *Between the Acts* works to reject 'I' and substitute 'We,' we are left to ask what mode of community *Between the Acts* works to convoke, and why this politics of community matters quite so much. I want to return now to one specific interruption which highlights the stakes of Woolf's politics of community. This moment takes place as the children leap across the stage holding their mirrors:

> Mopping, mowing, whisking, frisking, the looking glasses darted, flashed, exposed. People in the back rows stood up to see the fun. Down they sat, caught themselves… What an awful show-up! Even for the old who, one might suppose, hadn't any longer any care about their faces. … And Lord! the jangle and the din! The very cows joined in. Walloping, tail lashing, the reticence of nature was undone, and the barriers which should divide Man the Master from the Brute were dissolved. Then the dogs joined in. Excited by the uproar, scurrying and

worrying, here they came! Look at them! And the hound, the Afghan hound… look at him! (*BA* 132)[45]

The nursery rhyme trochees of this paragraph's opening are profoundly unsettled by the word 'exposed' and the full stop after it acts as a caesura, bringing the rhythm of this sentence to an untimely halt. It is significant that this rhythm stops after the word 'exposed': the act of exposure becomes a rupture in the hermeneutic and economic order of La Trobe's pageant, where subalterns— workers and the disabled—present a version of history without the army to the local ruling classes, a version of history written by a queer woman. This act of exposure is not, as I have said earlier, 'our selves' showing 'our selves' to 'our selves' but becomes a form of *parrhesia*, speaking truth to power, a form of etho-political practice theorised by Foucault at the end of his life and which Stephen M. Barber sees at play in Woolf's late work (Barber n.p.). This act of exposure—and the audience's reaction to it, as we shall shortly see—shows that a transcendent 'we' to whom a reader can gesture or whom a writer can invoke is not so easily found.

The first question to ask of this passage is Auerbach's question: Who is speaking? Who calls this an 'awful show-up'? And who 'suppose[s]' that the older members of the audience 'hadn't any longer any care about their faces'? This is a passage that abounds in animal noises, and these sentences are no exception. Following Jane Goldman's work on Woolf's signifying dogs, we might see those in the back rows standing up as 'the mutant literary descendants of patriarchy's most persistent misogynistic canine figure' (Goldman "Who Let the Dogs Out?" 47)—Samuel Johnson's dog standing on its hind legs. This image comes from Johnson's remark to Boswell that a woman preaching is as unexpected as 'dog's walking on his hinder legs. It is not done well; but you are surprised to see it done at all.' (47). Woolf rewrites this image in *A Room of One's Own*, attributing

---

[45] The only noun referring to a singular being in this passage is 'the Afghan hound,' Bartholomew Oliver's dog named Sohrab. The *locus classicus* for the name Sohrab is Matthew Arnold's 1853 quasi-Miltonic epic poem 'Sohrab and Rustum.' Woolf knew this poem: her library contain's Arnold's 1859 *Poems*, which prints 'Sohrab and Rustum' (King and Miletic-Vejzovic n.p.), while she reports in a diary entry of 9th May 1897 that Leslie Stephen recited the poem 'after dinner' (*PA* 83). Arnold's poem relates how Rustum, an Iranian warrior, killed Sohrab, a warrior in the Tatar host and the son Rustum did not know he had, in single combat (Arnold 302-331). But the name Sohrab is a double intertext: within Woolf's own corpus it recalls Old Rustum in *Orlando* (cf. *O* 131), the gypsy who disabuses Orlando of her pride in what she had previously considered her illustrious heritage (*O* 136). Woolf's earlier citation of Arnold's poem and the poem itself are embedded in a discourse of kinship, filiation, and recognition: Orlando perceives that '[i]t was clear that Rustum and the other gipsies thought a descent of four or five hundred years only the meanest possible' (*O* 136) while 'Sohrab and Rustum's climax comes when the dying Sohrab shows his father 'delicately pricked […] on Sohrab's arm, the sign of Rustum's seal' and Rustum realises his grave error (Arnold 324, ll. 677-328). As a further doggy aside, Orlando has a seluchi (or saluki) in Turkey (*O* 129)—a type of sighthound related to the Afghan hound.

it originally to her fictional Nick Greene (*AROO* 50), who 'take[s] pity' on one Judith Shakespeare (44), *A Room of One's Own*'s archetypal writing woman who could never write and whose messianic promise I shall return to in the final section of this chapter. Through a complex web of filiation, those in the back rows, standing on their hind legs to get a better view, become identified with Woolf's standing dog/writing woman.

Levinasian footfalls echo in the remark that the old 'hadn't any longer any care for their faces.' The face is key to Levinas' ethics: it is that which calls one into relation with the infinite alterity of the Other. The face discloses the prohibition against killing from which all other ethical norms spring. But it is important to note that in Levinas' account, the animal does not have a face in quite the same way as a human does. When asked if the prohibition against killing applied to animals in a 1986 interview (translated in 1988), Levinas answered:

> I cannot say at what moment you have the right to be called "face". The human face is completely different and only afterwards do we discover the face of an animal. I don't know if a snake has a face. I can't answer that question. A more specific analysis is needed. (Levinas et al. 171-172)

In this interview, Levinas sets out an account of animal ethics, or rather, ethics towards the animal that is patterned after human ethics, which acts as a 'prototype.' In this account, humans 'do not want to make an animal suffer needlessly and so on.' While Levinas does not deny that the animal, that which is without a face, suffers, it is only 'because we, as human,' as that which has a face 'know what suffering is that we can have this obligation' (172). What, then, does it mean to no longer have any care for one's face? Following Levinas' account of the faceless animal, does this imply that the older members of the audience somehow slip out of the realm of Levinasian ethics as defined by the presence of the face? But we should return briefly to Auerbach's question, and the phrase 'one might suppose.' Who is supposing? Aside from an intuition that the narrator here is young and a presumption that the narrator cares for their face, we have little to go on. There is a complex interplay of humanity and animality here, complicated further by this phrase 'one might suppose.' The old people, standing on their hind legs become collocated with Woolf's standing dog/writing woman, and they do so to catch a glimpse of a face that this anonymous speaker—perhaps wrongly—believes they no longer care about.

The cows in the fields around Pointz Hall make themselves heard, and the bellowing of cattle does not serve to reinforce a putative boundary between human and nonhuman animal but rather to dismantle these barriers further. Cows are a potent trope in Woolf studies, as in modernist literary studies more broadly. Eliza Kay Sparks (2018) has examined the Aristotelean valences of the wooden cow in 'An Unwritten Novel,' a Potemkin cow visible from the train carriage in which this story takes place, while Derek Ryan (2013) tracks the varying significations of cows throughout Woolf's work, indexing them to Deleuze and Guattari's becoming-animal and de- and reterritorialization. For Ryan, Woolf's cows exemplify what Deleuze and Guattari term 'pack animals.' In Deleuze and Guattari's reckoning, the pack animal comes after, first, 'individuated animals, family pets, sentimental, Oedipal animals each with its own petty history, "my" cat, "my" dog.' The second grouping of animals is State animals, 'animals as they are treated in the great divine myths, in such a way to extract from them series or structures, archetypes or models.' Finally comes a third kind of animal, the pack animals, 'more demonic' than Oedipal or State animals. Pack animals 'form a multiplicity, a becoming, a population, a tale' (*Plateaus* 281; Ryan "Territory of Cows" 543). What is quite so demonic about a cow? Pack animals like the bellowing cows behind Pointz Hall are not reducible to the fictions of identification and psychoanalysis, as Oedipal animals are or to extrapolation into archetypes, as State animals are. There is a 'difference in nature' between pack animals and the other two kinds. 'The origin of packs is entirely different from that of families and States; they continually work them from within and trouble them from without, with other forms of content, other forms of expression. The pack is simultaneously an animal reality, and the reality of the becoming-animal of the human being' (*Plateaus* 283). In light of this, the cows bellowing away in the fields surrounding Pointz Hall do not just interrupt proceedings but act as a locus of deterritorialization, a multiplicity (we never find out just how many cows there are) whose unruly presence heralds the incipient coming of what Ryan calls 'non/human assemblages' (Ryan "Territory of Cows" 547). The 'barriers that should divide Man the Master from the Brute' dissolve as the audience members hear the call of the becoming-animal.

But, once more, we need to return to Auerbach's question: who is speaking here? For one thing, they are perhaps not very observant: nature is not very 'reticent' in *Between the Acts*. Far from it. Ryan counts six instances in which cows 'firmly mark their territory' during the pageant, reading

the becomings that these bovine irruptions herald (548-50). Not only are Pointz Hall's cows far from reticent, but in their resistance to the necessities of La Trobe and her pageant, what Ryan terms 'the call to fall under human control,' they 'launch the becoming-animal of Woolf's novel' (549). And why does this narrator insist on self-consciously capitalising 'Brute' and 'Man the Master'? It is important to remember why the cows are around Pointz Hall: they are not just heralds of deterritorialization, of the becoming-animal of the human, but are also more quotidian: they form a part of the agrarian economy of Pointz Hall and its environs. Their reproductive labour would have been used to produce milk and calves, they may possibly have pulled carts or ploughs, and they might have been slaughtered for meat. In his *The Beast & The Sovereign* seminars, Derrida glosses cattle as 'an animality not domesticated […] but always defined and dominated by man *in view* of man, an animality that is already destined, in its reproduction organized by man, to become either an enslaved instrument of work or else animal nourishment' (*Beast & Sovereign I* 12). In this sense, Man is very much the Master of these Brute creatures. Derrida goes on to gloss 'brute' as 'seem[ing] to connote not only animality but a certain bestiality of the animal' (21) and yokes bestiality to sovereignty by means of an '*et/est* analogy' which sees 'the beast *and* [*et*] the sovereign' aligned with 'the beast *is* [*est*] the sovereign' (32-33). In Derrida's anatomisation of bestiality and animality, cows are not strictly beasts, insofar as they exist to be exploited by the human economy, while beasts come from outside, but the narrator of this portion of *Between the Acts* short-circuits this distinction, imbricating them in the morphing copula, the 'and/is' that yokes together beast and sovereign, Brute and Man the Master.

A stray subjunctive further complicates matters. The narrator does not simply invoke 'barriers' which simply 'divide Man the Master from the Brute' but rather 'barriers which *should* divide'. Much like the 'one might suppose' we saw earlier, this 'should' calls into question the modality of what we have just read, of the barriers. How should one read a 'should'? Are we to read this 'should' as gesturing to the normative operation of these barriers? In this case, these barriers 'should' normally divide Man the Master from the Brute but do not, in the same way that the procedure *should* be painless. We could read this 'should' as optative, gesturing towards an ideal situation: the speaker believes that there *should* be sturdy barriers in place of these flimsy, dissolving barriers, in the same way that I *should* really get round to doing the hoovering. We could read this

'should' as jussive, expressing a command: there *should* be barriers dividing Man the Master from the Brute, and these barriers are being abrogated, in the same way that I *should* pay my taxes. How we read this 'should' models the narrator's perception of the relationship between the human and the animal—a relationship that has both ontological and ethical ramifications, as Giorgio Agamben discusses in *The Open: Man and Animal*.

In *The Open* (written 2002; translated 2004), Agamben traces the operation of a 'caesura' that has been placed between man and animal, which at once divides the two and comes to constitute the grounds on which these categorisations are intelligible (*The Open* 15). In this passage of *Between the Acts*, Agamben's caesura is doubly undermined, first by its placement into an uncertain subjunctive mood, and then by its dissolution altogether. And it is a radically different caesura from the one at the end of this sentence, the definite full stop between 'dissolved.' and 'Then the dogs joined in' (*BA* 132). An uncertain caesura is placed between Man the Master and the Brute, who may already be yoked together in a Derridean catachresis by the '*et/est* analogy,' but the dogs are placed on the other side of another caesura, this one harder and more definite, less given to dissolution, grammatical or otherwise. Who is speaking continues to be important here, because Agamben's caesura is not a fact, an ontological given, but rather, 'passes first of all within man' which means that 'the very question of man—and of "humanism" […] must be posed in a new way' (*The Open* 16). That the caesura between human and nonhuman is continually produced and reproduced by humans means that the question 'Who is speaking' acquires a further ethical dimension—to ask this question in light of these two caesurae, one certain and definite, one uncertain and dissolving, means asking who decides how the anthropological machine works.

But the anthropological machine, that which inscribes and re-inscribes this caesura continually, is not concerned solely with separating human from nonhuman. Rather, it 'functions by excluding as not-yet human an already human being from itself, that is, by animalising the human, by isolating the nonhuman within the human' (37). That this act of exclusion passes specifically through the human and does not just isolate the human from the nonhuman but the 'nonhuman *within* the human' is of import when we consider how Woolf writes of animals in *Between the Acts*. The boundaries between human and nonhuman are never secure in *Between the Acts*: the category of the human is put in abeyance. Vicki Tromanhauser writes that the novel 'turns our attention to the

violence that is required to uphold this anthropocentric charade' (Tromanhauser 75). She reads the moment when Lucy Swithin is interrupted while reading Wells' *Outline of History* to find that Wells' prehistory has come to Pointz Hall, if only briefly and she takes 'five seconds in actual time' to separate Grace, the servant who jolted Swithin from her reading 'from the leather-covered grunting monster who was about, as the door opened, to demolish a whole tree in the green steaming undergrowth of the primeval forest' (*BA* 7). Agamben's analysis shows that the boundary drawn between man and animal is never as solid as it seems and can be re-drawn at any time.[46]

Meanwhile, Goldman reads moments of slippage between man and dog, who are, in her reading, united as 'cynocephalous archons,' dog-headed, mystical Gnostic powers and canine remixes of the 'theriomorphous' archons whose presence in an illuminated Hebrew manuscript Agamben contemplates at the opening of *The Open* (*The Open* 1-3; Goldman "Consider the Dogs" 12). *Between the Acts*' dogs tend to be rendered in quite slippery terms. Take, for example, Bartholomew's exit pursued by an Afghan hound at the end of the novel:

> Shadows crept over Bartholomew's high forehead; over his great nose. He looked leafless, spectral, and his chair monumental. As a dog shudders his skin, his skin shuddered. He rose, shook himself, glared at nothing, and stalked from the room. They heard the dog's paws padding on the carpet behind him. (*BA* 157)

There is a peculiar—but constructive—lack of clarity in this passage. To whom is Woolf referring: man or dog? We know that shadows 'crept over Bartholomew's high forehead' and we know that two sets of footfalls, one human, one canine, are heard. We can guess that Bartholomew looked leafless, spectral, and his chair monumental, but the word 'dog' unsettles our presumed point of reference. Who is shuddering in this passage? Is Bartholomew's skin shuddering in the manner of his dog, or is Sohrab's skin shuddering as the skin of a dog is wont to do? The next sentence unsettles us further. If we presume that Bartholomew's skin had shuddered, the verbs in the next sentence are distinctly canine: dogs shake themselves in a way that human bodies cannot quite manage, they glare at nothing, perhaps tracking the spoor of something that human senses do not detect, and dogs stalk their prey. These sentences leave us struggling to differentiate between man and dog.

---

[46] Vanessa Bell and Duncan Grant employed a servant called Grace Higgens. It is not known whether she knew about the comparison, but it is unlikely that she would have been pleased with it (*BA* 165, n. 7:9).

Earlier in the day, Miss La Trobe overhears another moment where the cogs and wheels of the anthropological machine seem to be on show. She hears the audience talking. One audience member is asking another ""Did you see it in the papers—the case about the dog? D'you believe dogs can't have puppies?"" while another is asking their interlocutor "'And what about the Jews? The refugees…the Jews…People like ourselves, beginning life again…'" (88). Here, one eugenic project (from *eugenos*—well-born) clashes with another. The case about the dog concerned a suit brought against the estate of 2nd Baron Rothschild for an alleged breach of contract, in which the plaintiff claimed that Rothschild had sold her a Pyrenean Mountain Dog for the purposes of breeding, but that the dog in question was 'never likely to be a suitable animal for breeding'. The case made the papers and was reported in *The Times* (*BA* 216-7, n. 88:10-11). The other eugenics project discussed here is the Holocaust.

These snatches of overheard conversation highlight what is at stake when we read between Woolf and Agamben. In isolating the nonhuman within the human, the anthropological machine produces 'a kind of state of exception, a zone of indeterminacy in which the outside is nothing but the exclusion of an inside and the inside is in turn only the inclusion of an outside.' This is not just an ontological conundrum for Agamben: 'instead of this innocuous paleontological find we will have the Jew, that is, the non-man produced within the man, or the *neomort* and the overcomatose person, that is, the animal separated within the human body itself' (*The Open* 37). The anthropological machine which Woolf discloses in *Between the Acts* leads, perhaps inevitably, to a life 'that is separated and excluded from itself—only a *bare life*' (38, italics Agamben's), and thence to the camps. That the Jewish refugees discussed on the lawn at Pointz Hall are 'like ourselves' (*BA* 88) is precisely the point of the Nazi anthropological machine, a machine that creates bare life.

I have demonstrated throughout this section of the chapter how Woolf works to undermine conventional notions of 'We' to whom one can make an invocation: class, civilisation and species are unsettled throughout *Between the Acts*. The invocation to a 'We' is not one that can be made to a group defined positively, to one that can be named. Rather, this 'rambling' and 'capricious' and 'only somewhat unified' whole is a paradoxical one, one that perhaps shares commonalities with the community Maurice Blanchot invokes in his *The Unavowable Community* (1983, trans. 1988), and indeed, with Woolf's Society of Outsiders. Blanchot writes that the unavowable community is 'not

172

the restrictive form of a society, no more than it tends toward a communitarian fusion' and 'it differs from a social cell in that it does not allow itself to create a work and has no production value as aim' (Blanchot 11). In Blanchot's rendering, this community is not a 'truth or object that could be owned' (19) but rather is '"the community of those who have no community"' (25). Blanchot's inoperative society and Woolf's 'rambling,' 'capricious' 'We' are not versions of present societies that simply include more people, but rather are ontologically different, and much harder to conceive. The 'one body' gestured to in the meaning of 'Anon' that this chapter plays with is not a unitary mass but rather a noisy, jostling multitude composed of cynocephalous and theriomorphous figures busy becoming-animal, a 'we' that partakes in anonymity, shedding personality much as Mrs Ramsay does at night to become a 'core of darkness,' freed of 'the fret, the hurry, the stir' of waking life in a moment of radical suspension (*TL* 53). After sun sets on Pointz Hall turns the Olivers' bedroom window 'all sky without colour', in the dark of a prehistoric 'night before roads were made, or houses […] that dwellers in caves had watched from some high place above rocks,' Woolf gestures towards an unknown futurity—'Then the curtain rose. They spoke.' (*BA* 158). What scene the curtain rose to, we do not know, nor do we know what the Olivers spoke of, but the curtain might just have risen on a future where this 'rambling and capricious' 'we' can be lived. The next section of the chapter turns back to the fragments of 'Anon' and 'The Reader' to investigate a futurity where the anonymity lost in the Renaissance playhouse can be found once again.

Now Again

Anon, adv.:
Now again. Now at this time, in contrast to at that time, presently again; here again. (OED)

Throughout this chapter I have read the fragments of 'Anon' and 'The Reader'—what Woolf termed her 'common history'—alongside *Between the Acts* to sketch a mode of history-making that can be productively aligned with that of Walter Benjamin's 'On the Concept of History'. In doing so, this chapter has sought to align this mode of history-making with a 'We' that is not one unitary body but rather a 'rambling' and 'capricious' collective. Thus far, 'Anon' and Anon have been recruited in service of Woolf's writing of the past, but I want to use them now as ways of thinking

through an unknown futurity. Anon may or may not have been dead, to begin with, but Anon can be reborn. In drawing an explicitly messianic potentiality from Anon, I am aligning the anonymous balladeer of these late fragments with Judith Shakespeare, who died mute and inglorious but can come again.

The histories that Woolf seeks throughout her life and which her final literary-historical project sought to theorise are ones that are necessarily hidden, hard if not impossible to access. We have already seen that Woolf wrote of the 'deep gulf' that lies between the Renaissance playhouse audience and the present reader or audience member (M.53. 24), and that the early audience, despite their hand in the plays we receive in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 'remain dumb' (M.108. 26). A 'true' history of anonymous creators might seek to restore these voices but any attempt to do so will prove necessarily impossible. Impossible but not futile. In his 'Theses on the Philosophy of History,' Benjamin writes that '[t]he chronicler who narrates events without distinguishing between major and minor ones acts in accord with the following truth: nothing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost to history' (Benjamin "On the Concept of History" 390). I have already discussed Woolf's Benjaminian historiography insofar as it shapes not just the pageant in *Between the Acts*— recall the Colonel Mayhew asking '"Why leave out the British Army? What's history without the Army, eh?"' (*BA* 113)—and the pageant's interruptions. I want to expand my focus here to bring this mode of historiography to bear on 'Anon' and 'The Reader' and *A Room of One's Own*, as well as essays and stories that reference Woolf's fascination with obscure and obscured lives. The narrator of *A Room of One's Own* points out that women are the subject of men's writing, and not vice versa, that '[w]omen do not write books about men' (*AROO* 25). The official histories kept inside the 'huge bald forehead' of the British Museum Reading Room (24) may tell their readers a bewilderingly vast array of facts about women but they do not allow the narrator of *A Room of One's Own* to 'grasp the truth about W. (as for brevity's sake I had come to call her).' Despairing the paucity of books about women and by women, and the often-vicious bias of the books she reads by men about women, the narrator concludes that '[o]ne might as well leave their books unopened' (28). There is much in Woolf's *oeuvre*, both fictional and non-fictional, that aims to redress the balance of which the narrator of *A Room of One's Own* despairs.

Woolf's 1906 story provisionally titled 'The Journal of Mistress Joan Martyn' acts as somewhat of a precursor to her later attempts to write the histories of obscure lives. Miss Rosamond Merridew, the narrator of the story tours 'old farm houses, decayed halls, parsonages, church vestries always with the same demand'—for 'old papers' (*CSF* 33). In one ancient hall deep in the Norfolk countryside, she is given the journal which gives this story its (provisional) title, the journal of a woman in the late medieval period. Leena Kore-Schröder convincingly argues that Merridew's research is not 'unorthodox, but quite the opposite,' that Merridew's historiographic method was far from unpopular, and that Merridew is patterned after historian F.W. Maitland, who turned to archival sources such as manor rolls and personal writings to write 'imaginative interpretation[s] of the medieval period [which] recognise the fortuitous way in which English common law has grown out of the decisions and ambitions of a self-interested medieval power elite' (Kore-Schröder n.p.). Woolf models Mistress Joan Martyn and her journal after the Paston Letters, which were published initially in 1904, and about which she would write in 'The Pastons and Chaucer ,' part of the first *Common Reader* (1925).

Woolf writes that these letters are not written as literary artefacts but rather 'are the letters of an honest bailiff to his master, explaining, asking advice, giving news, rendering accounts' (*E*4 23). According to Gualtieri the Paston letters 'offer evidence for Woolf of the constitution of the medieval world for its average, unexalted inhabitants' (Gualtieri 44). They illuminate the obscure lives of their authors, richly detailing the domestic everyday of Chaucer's contemporaries in a way that fictive writing, at the time, did not. Woolf concludes her comparison of these letters and Chaucer's poetry by writing that it is 'easy to see, from the Paston letters, why Chaucer wrote not Lear or Romeo and Juliet, but the Canterbury Tales' (35). In one sense, the Paston letters are here rendered as instrumental, rather than as valuable in themselves: they help to contextualise the poetry of the period. But by the same token, they are the thing itself, illuminating modes of living from centuries past. Later in *The Common Reader*, Woolf will write of obscure lives in a way that does not run the risk of them being overshadowed by 'canonical' figures. In a biographical sketch of Laetitia Pilkington, the first of the 'Lives of the Obscure' Woolf writes:

> It is one of the attractions of the unknown, their multitude, their vastness; for, instead of keeping their identity separate, as remarkable people do, they seem to merge into one another, their very boards and title-pages and frontispieces dissolving, and their innumerable

175

pages melting into continuous years so that we can lie back and look up into the fine mist-like substance of countless lives, and pass unhindered from century to century, from life to life. (*E* 4 120)

The narrator advocates here for an embrace of obscurity as a way of bypassing the 'I' of the official histories of 'remarkable people' with 'separate' identities, as a way of eluding the 'straight dark bar' which the narrator of *A Room of One's Own* cannot dodge and in the shadow of which 'all is shapeless as mist' (*AROO* 90).What the narrator of this essay finds in her excavation of these obscure lives is a kind of anonymity that allows those who study them to 'pass unhindered from century to century, from life to life.' These obscure lives are hard to track down: they are long forgotten. The great library in which their lives are recorded and stored is now 'faded, out of date, obsolete,' and the 'obscure sleep on the walls, slouching against each other as if they were too drowsy to stand upright'– it is unclear whether the narrator is talking about the obscure themselves or their biographies here. 'Why disturb their sleep?' the narrator asks (*E* 4 118).

Why indeed? Perhaps because the possibility of becoming anonymous still remains, difficult and elusive though anonymity may be. Benjamin's 'On the Concept of History' ends not with an investigation of the past but with an invocation of the future. The final paragraphs of the essay discuss the Torah's injunction forbidding the Jewish people from 'inquiring into the future,' and Benjamin says that that the Torah instead 'instructed them in remembrance' (Benjamin "On the Concept of History" 397).[47] This dual injunction does not turn the future into 'homogeneous empty time.' Instead, '[e]very second of time' became the 'small gateway in time through which the Messiah might enter' (397). In neither Woolf nor Benjamin is history a homogeneous continuum of time that has past irretrievably, but rather the past exists in 'constellation' (396) with 'the now-time,' with the '*Jetztzeit*' (395). These constellations represent a 'revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past' (396).

Angeliki Spiropoulou draws explicit theoretical and thematic links between Woolf's mode of historiography and Benjamin's. She writes that Woolf's theorisation of 'everyday, lived experience' and the 'literature, biographies and memoirs of the obscure masses,' the histories I cited

---

[47] Derrida tropes on these '*kleine Pforte*' in *Archive Fever*, naming three 'doors of the future to come' in his reading of Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi's 1991 *Freud's Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable*, itself a reading of Freud's *Der Mann Moses und die monotheistiche Religion* (1939; translated as *Moses and Monotheism* that same year), cf. Derrida *Archive Fever* (69-73).

above, is often 'strikingly akin to Benjamin's radical historiographical conceptions' (Spiropoulou *Constellations* 6). The two thinkers use historiography and historical writing to critique 'the gender and class exclusions, the exploitation and repression in which official history and cultural tradition are implicated.' And, moreover, Woolf seeks a similar goal 'by means of historical remembrance' to Benjamin: she seeks 'an *apocatastasis* of the oppressed and the defeated alongside a reactivation of unfulfilled or lost potentialities of the past, with a view to understanding and revolutionising the present' (6). The term '*apocatastasis*' derives from the ancient Greek for 're-establishment' and the *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* defines its contemporary use as 'the doctrine that ultimately all free creatures—angels, men, and devils—will share in the grace of salvation' ("apocatastasis").[48] Benjamin 'complicates the term *apocatastasis*,' Spiropoulou contends' 'to refer to a continual reviewing of history from the perspective of the present with a view to ensuring the afterlife of an event or period in history rather than meaning its restoration in a complete paradisical picture.' The present thus becomes a locus for 'reworking the past through remembrance' which 'redeems the excluded' and 'creates possibilities for new constellations between past and future' (Spiropoulou *Constellations* 56). Read thus, the 'small gateways' (Benjamin "On the Concept of History" 397; '*die kleine Pforte*,' in the German [400]) that Benjamin invokes in the final fragments of his 'On the Concept of History' are gateways not just from an oppressed past to the present, but rather link past, present, and future. For Woolf, anonymity becomes one of these '*kleine Pforte*,' and anonymity is found through imaginative engagement with the obscure lives of the past. Woolf writes that historical awareness is something that allows for anonymity to be recovered:

> By choosing a view carefully to shut out a chimney or a bungalow we can still see what Anon saw—the bird haunted reed whispering fen; the down covered with turf, and the scar long healed over the moor, over the down, along which Anon came when he made his journeys. (M.53.2)

Woolf writes here that recovering anonymity is an act of seeing historically, of looking into a vanished past. It is important to note that this recovery is not just a nostalgia for a better past, a past

---

[48] My analysis here draws on Michael Black's insightful reading of Woolf's citation of the preface to Blake's *MILTON: A Poem* (better known as 'Jerusalem') in 'Thoughts on Peace in an Air Raid.' cf. Black, Michael. '"Mental Fight": Woolf, Blake, and European Peace.' *Virginia Woolf, Europe, and Peace, Volume 1: Transnational Circulations*, edited by Ariane Mildenberg and Patricia Novillo-Corvalán, Clemson University Press, 2020, pp. 85-100.

without bungalows[49] but that this act of looking into the past is an act that is profoundly future-oriented.

I find a future-oriented analogue to Woolf's historiographical project in contemporary critic Saidiya Hartman's project of 'critical fabulation,' a mode of archival studies that she theorises most thoroughly in her 2008 article 'Venus in Two Acts.' Hartman's mode of historiography journeys to the limits of the archive and searches for what has not been said or what has not been sayable in order to 'jeopardize the status of the event, to displace the received or authorized account, and to imagine what might have happened or might have been said or might have been done' (Hartman "Venus in Two Acts" 11). Hartman's 2008 article tracks two invocations of the figure or trope of Venus in the archive of the Atlantic slave trade and theorises the archive in which these invocations are written and preserved. The archive Hartman investigates bears witness to (at least) two orders of violence. The unspeakable violence of the slave trade is almost exclusively recorded by those committing the violence, privileging the records of the white slave traders and silencing the testimonies and the suffering of enslaved Black people: in so doing the archive of the slave trade inscribes a second order of violence as it records the first. Hartman cites Michel Foucault's *Archaeology of Knowledge* in asserting that the archive of the Atlantic slave trade is premised 'upon a founding violence,' a violence that 'determines, regulates and organizes the kinds of statement that can be made about slavery and as well it creates subjects and objects of power' ("Venus in Two Acts" 10). The question Hartman asks in the opening pages of 'Venus in Two Acts,' 'How does one revisit the scene of subjection without replicating the grammar of violence?' ("Venus in Two Acts" 4) is shown to present an aporia that cannot be addressed using the archive of the Atlantic slave trade uncritically. Rather, Hartman tries to narrate 'counterhistories of slavery,' a project that

> has always been inseparable from writing a history of [the] present, by which I mean the incomplete project of freedom […] As I understand it, a history of the present strives to illuminate the intimacy of our experience with the lives of the dead, to write our now as if it is interrupted by this past, and to imagine a free state, not as the time before captivity or

---

[49] Woolf displayed a lifelong anxiety about bungalows and the encroachment of suburbia into England's green and pleasant land. Mark Hussey provides a meticulously detailed account of Woolf's anxiety about suburbia and wider movements to preserve the English countryside in his monograph *'I'd Make It Penal: The Rural Preservation Movement in Virginia Woolf's* Between the Acts (2011). He writes that '[w]hat the Design & Industries Association yearbook referred to as the "bungaloid growth" of "rural slums" roused Woolf's ire in a way that is class-ridden but also typical of the resistance to change of those who feel their own presence in a rural setting has done nothing to spoil it.' (Hussey 10-11).

slavery, but rather as the anticipated future of this writing. (Hartman "Venus in Two Acts" 4)

This orientation towards the future is made yet more explicit in Hartman's *Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments* (2019). In this volume, Hartman's counterhistories are not drawn from the archive of the Atlantic slave trade but rather from the archives of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century American city—the volume tracks the lives of young Black women as they 'struggled to create autonomous and beautiful lives, to escape the new forms of servitude awaiting them, and to live as if they were free' (Hartman *Wayward Lives* xiii). Hartman narrates her counterhistories using a plethora of sources: 'the journals of rent collectors; surveys and monographs of sociologists; trial transcripts; slum photographs; reports of vice investigators, social workers, and parole officers; interviews with psychiatrists and psychologists; and prison case files, all of which represent [the young Black women] as a problem.' In so doing, *Wayward Lives* seeks to 'explore[] the utopian longings and the promise of a future world that resided in waywardness and the refusal to be governed' (*Wayward Lives* xv). Hartman does not cite Benjamin here but her approach in *Wayward Lives* seems to seek out Benjaminian constellations between past and present. These constellations open up to the future.

In filiating Hartman's archival project with Woolf's, it is important to stress that the archive I work out of bears very little resemblance to those Hartman draws upon. The archives of the Atlantic slave trade, premised upon unspeakable violence, and the archives of young Black women in a segregated America are not commensurate with the archive of a relatively wealthy white woman in the heart of metropolitan intelligentsia—let alone the archive of 'the only woman in England free to write what I like' (*D* 3 43). Rather, Woolf and Hartman seem to share a common project in deploying what Molly Farrell has called 'queer archival tactics' as a way of giving voice to the historically erased (Farrell n.p.). In *A Room of One's Own*, the narrator describes her frustration with an archive replete with works *about* women, about ' 'W.' (as for brevity's sake I had come to call her,' but almost never *by* women. This frustration is not just a frustration with past writers, but is oriented towards the future: the full sentence in which the narrator introduces 'W.' reads 'And if I could not grasp the truth about W. (as for brevity's sake I had come to call her) in the past, why bother about W. in the future?' (*AROO* 28). Woolf's archival tactics here differ from Hartman's in one crucial

way: the narrator of *A Room of One's Own* addresses a living audience while Hartman's methodology works to engage reparatively with the archives of those who are already dead. The victims of the Atlantic slave trade cannot speak for themselves but the fictional audience addressed by the narrator of *A Room of One's Own* are able to do so: the narrator encourages them to 'look past Milton's bogey' and cultivate 'the habit of freedom and the courage to write exactly what we think' (102). The narrator links this 'habit of freedom' to the quasi-messianic promise of Judith Shakespeare, whom I have already discussed and who will remain an important figure in the remainder of this chapter.

The methodology that Woolf develops in her lifelong fascination with eccentric, obscure, and anonymous figures bears a close similarity to Hartman's. Anon is dead; the obscure lie slumbering undisturbed in dusty archives. But by the same token Anon is not just a figure visible in hindsight but is allied with the quasi-messianic promise of Judith Shakespeare. At the end of *A Room of One's Own*, the narrator invokes her not as a figuration for the fugitive history of women's writing and women who could not write, but rather as the future of women's writing. Spivak writes that Woolf here 'inaugurates a ghost dance, asking all women writers in England to be haunted by the ghost of Shakespeare's sister' (Spivak 35). Judith Shakespeare 'still lives' in the narrator and her audience 'and in many other women who are not here to-night.' She lives 'for great poets do not die; they are continuing presences; they need only the opportunity to walk among us in the flesh.' And the narrator looks forward to the moment when 'the opportunity will come and the dead poet who was Shakespeare's sister will put on the body which she has so often laid down' (*AROO* 102). Judith Shakespeare's resurrection is not, however, a given, a definite future but rather exists in the future anterior that Spivak discusses in *Death of a Discipline* and which I have invoked throughout this thesis, a mode 'where one promises no future present but attends upon what will have happened as a result of one's work' (Spivak 27). The narrator of *A Room of One's Own* tells her audience that the 'opportunity' for Judith Shakespeare to once again 'walk among us in the flesh' is 'now coming within your power to give her' (102). To do so will take work on the part of the audience, it will take the 'habit of freedom and the courage to write exactly what we think'; it will take 'escap[ing] a little from the common sitting room and see[ing] human beings not always in relation to each other but in relation to reality'; it will take 'look[ing] past Milton's bogey' (102). Judith Shakespeare's future

presence attends upon 'work[ing], even in poverty and obscurity' (103). And just as Judith Shakespeare's future presence can be assured by present work, anonymity can be recovered through acts of imagination and empathy with the past.

Anonymity is not the shedding of the trappings of modernity but a mode of subjectivity into which one can enter by seeking out Benjaminian constellations of the present moment with the past. Woolf expands on this later, in the drafts of 'The Reader'. Anonymous plays have a 'nameless vitality,' and their anonymity is 'not yet dead in ourselves. For we too have become anonymous, and forget something that we have learnt, in reading the plays that no one troubled to set a name to' (M.111.II.29). Woolf works on this figuration of anonymity in the next set of fragments, indexing the anonymous plays more explicitly to Anon: 'Nor is anon dad [dead] in ourselves. The crude early drams have still the power to make us ask—as the audience asked—the childs questin; that comes next? [...] So we become ourelves anonymous in the early plays' (M.112.II.32). Here, Woolf's 'nameless vitality' is something that can be recovered by reading imaginatively, and by losing oneself, one's own distinctly modern subjectivity (whether mid-twentieth or early twenty-first century) in doing so. Reading such works gives rise to the possibility of escape, a way out from the shadow of *A Room of One's Own*'s 'straight dark bar,' the overpowering first person pronoun. Reading anonymous works and reviving Anon, who is not yet dead in ourselves becomes a way of rejecting 'I' and finding a space in which 'We' can be substituted.

Earlier in the chapter, I discussed Forster's 1925 pamphlet *Anonymity: An Enquiry* as an underacknowledged intertext for Woolf's 'Craftsmanship' (1937), and I wish to use its discussion of anonymity now as a way of grasping the figurations of anonymity Woolf deploys in these late fragments. Forster's pamphlet attempts to theorise the work of literature as something that leaves us 'conscious only of the world [the author has] created,' and a world in which we are 'in a sense co-partners.' Readers of literary works 'forget for ten minutes [the author's name]' but also, crucially, 'our own' in a kind of 'temporary forgetfulness, [a] momentary and mutual anonymity' (Forster 18). Forster's literary work is a well-wrought urn of sorts. Literary works are figured in *Anonymity: An Enquiry* as creating a 'universe that only answers to its own laws, supports itself, internally coheres and has a new standard of truth' (18). Forster points to a kind of apophatic theology of reading, where knowledge of what constitutes a literary object and how we approach it is not positively ascertained

but can only be defined 'by negations.' He continues, writing that the literary object '[i]s not of this world, its laws are not the laws of science or logic, its conclusions not those of common sense. And it causes us to suspend our ordinary judgments' (14).

Forster's anonymity arises from a figuration of the literary object that is very different from Woolf's. To take *Anonymity: An Enquiry* seriously as an intertext for 'Anon' and 'The Reader' we need to plumb the depths of this difference, the difference between Forster's anonymous poem and Woolf's anonymous play. What happens when Forster's austere literary monad, a little world unto itself, read silently and in private opens up onto an audience who might just have marked their unsigned and unannounced presence on the playtext? Or, to put it more succinctly, what happens when Woolf's rambling and capricious 'We' gets involved? Forster's monad opens up to the idea of community of readers or auditors, although not necessarily a community that announces itself as such at the outset. At the close of the last section of this chapter, I briefly cited Maurice Blanchot's figuration of an 'inoperative community,' a community that is not a 'truth or object that could be owned' (Blanchot 19) but rather is '"the community of those who have no community"' (25). I moved to filiate this inoperative community with the Society of Outsiders of *Three Guineas*, but now I want to read it alongside Giorgio Agamben's *The Coming Community*, which responds to Blanchot, and Woolf's 'rambling' and 'capricious' collectivity.

In a 2016 article, Martin Middeke reads between Blanchot's *The Unavowable Community* and Agamben's *The Coming Community* in order to explicitly figure Blanchot's inoperative community as a community of readers, reading. He short-circuits Blanchot's and Agamben's works in order to posit that the forms of community that both these works discuss are realised in the singularity of '(reading) literature' (Middeke 248). This singularity is premised upon the same triad that Middeke sees at play in Agamben and Blanchot, 'singularity/negativity, temporality and finitude, and *ekstasis*/potentiality' (256). Literature, here, is figured as a 'threshold place highlighting an in-betweenness, a simultaneity of what is real and what is possible, of what is particular and what is generic, common or proper, singular or plural, real or fictional, a play space, as it were, that opens up limitless, unworkable options for *ekstasis*' (260). In this sense, literature is a common ground for the becoming of Blanchot's inoperative community or Agamben's coming community, or indeed for Middeke's ' 'coming' and 'inoperative' community' (247). But it is important to here pause over

something that Middeke misses from Agamben's *The Coming Community* in his rush to conflate Blanchot and Agamben: the latter's messianism. In its deep and thoroughgoing engagement with medieval scholastic eschatology and Kabbalistic thought, Agamben's work takes on a distinctly messianic cast that Blanchot's does not quite. And Agamben's figuration of a messianic community defined negatively is important to our discussion of Woolf's quasi-messianic anonymity.

The Coming Community begins with a brief but gnomic statement: '[t]he coming being is whatever being' (*Coming Community* 1). 'Whatever' here is a translation of the Latin *quodlibet* via the Italian *qualunque* and as such does not connote the shallow indifference that the English word 'whatever' does but rather connotes '"being such that it always matters."' Agamben's whatever being is allied to 'singularity not in its indifference to a common property (to a concept, for example: being red, being French, being Muslim), but only in its being *such as it is*' (1). Insofar as it is a shedding of particulars and qualifiers to disclose a belonging in being which is absolute in its singularity, Agamben's whatever singularity is filiated with Woolf's anonymity. In both cases, this singularity is given ethico-political as well as ontological significance through the ways in which it emerges and becomes not a concept or thought experiment but a manner of being in the world. Agamben takes Herman Melville's Bartleby, the scrivener who preferred not to, as a parable of this manner of being, and of the political necessity of the 'power to not-be' in a brief but perplexing passage that cites Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Joseph Wilhelm von Schelling, something that Agamben calls 'the Arab tradition' and pianist Glenn Gould (35-37). Meanwhile, *The Coming Community* ends with a discussion of the then-recent Tiananmen Square protests as a 'herald' of the 'politics of whatever singularity, that is of a being whose community is mediated not by any simple condition of belonging (being red, being Italian, being Communist) nor by the simple absence of conditions […] but by belonging itself' (85)—and its inevitable state repression.

Although I want to filiate Woolf's anonymous subjectivity with Agamben's coming whatever being, we should not rush to conflate them absolutely. Woolf's anonymity-through-indifference is far more practical than Agamben's Scholastic-Kabbalistic-Messianic singularity. Woolf cannot drop qualifiers in quite the same way. Woolf's Society of Outsiders might prove an apt analogy for the kind of community Agamben saw Tiananmen Square as heralding, but with one key difference: the fundamental 'indifference' (*TG* 232) that leads the outsider to proclaim that '"as

a woman, I have no country. As a woman, I want no country. As a woman, my country is the whole world"' (234) is founded not on a communion in the singularity of absolute being but on a communion in the particularity of being a woman in a mid-twentieth century patriarchy. The ethical pressures of anonymity are different for Woolf, and they lead not to Agamben's ontologically flat singularity in being but to a plurality of beings always and already marked and interpellated by their own positionality in the world. Woolf cannot conjure with absolutes in the same way that Agamben can. Recall, for example, my earlier exposition of the scene with the mirrors in La Trobe's pageant: this scene is not 'our selves' disclosing 'our selves' to 'our selves' (132) but rather is a moment of *parrhesia* where the village's subalterns hold up a mirror to the great and good. Agamben can forget about being red, being Italian, being Communist; Woolf cannot forget being woman.

Woolf's coming community is marked, then, by a distinct paradox. On the one hand, it looks forward to an anonymity that is not just the absence of qualifiers and adjectives but to a profound unity in 'being *such as it is*' (Agamben *Coming Community* 1). But by the same token, it is founded upon the material circumstances that sent Judith Shakespeare, mute and inglorious, to her untimely end. And Woolf's messianism finds its fullest expression in the second coming of Judith Shakespeare. The narrator of *A Room of One's Own* tells her audience that Shakespeare's sister 'lives in you and in me' but also in 'many other women who are not here tonight, for they are washing up the dishes and putting the children to bed.' Shakespeare's sister 'draw[s] her life' from the lives of the unknown who were her forerunners. Here, the narrator figures those to whom she could not speak directly because they were engaged in domestic labour as living anonymous and obscured lives. This kind of anonymity bears promise as something that can be uniquely productive and generative of a future premised upon genuine difference from what came before. This anonymity is not just a shedding of identifiers or a state forced upon the anonymous subject (although can undoubtedly be either or both of these), but rather something that bears promise for an as-yet unknown future, as difficult as it may be to bring this future to fruition.

This chapter has read between *Between the Acts* and the drafts of 'Anon' and 'The Reader,' guided by three meanings of the word 'anon'—first, as an abbreviation of the word 'anonymous,' second, an Old English term meaning of 'one body, company, or mass' and, third, 'now again' or 'soon'. In so doing, it has made the case that Woolf's final works are concerned with not just with

the past, with literary and national histories, but with questions of futurity, and that these questions receive their fullest articulations when we turn to Woolf's archive and read (as far as it is possible to do so) the writing Woolf left at her death.

Coda: Night Falls Over Pointz Hall

I want to end this thesis by turning to the final pages of *Between the Acts*, and to the very final sentences of the novel, 'Then the curtain rose. They spoke' (*BA* 158)—a passage I last discussed at the end of the second section of Chapter Six. In that discussion, I noted that Woolf's final novel ends with a gesture towards an unknown futurity, with the curtain rising on scenes unknown, with Giles and Isa Oliver speaking words unknown. This is a fitting place to end this thesis, not just because it is the end of Woolf's final novel, but because it models so many of the themes with which this thesis has been occupied. The final pages of *Between the Acts* constitute a gesture towards an unknown futurity, and doubly so because *Between the Acts* remains unfinished, a text in process. I have discussed this before but want to reiterate that Woolf did not live to see her final novel published: the text we read today is the result of what Mark Hussey in his edition calls a 'very one-sided collaboration between the writer and her publisher' (*BA* xxxxix). Itself a product of a future Woolf was not around to witness or participate in, *Between the Acts* ends with a gesture towards an unknown and radically unknowable futurity embedded in a textuality left open to an unknowable future.

Between the Acts ends with night falling over Pointz Hall and its environs. A downpouring of immense darkness falls over Pointz Hall just as it falls over the witnesses in 'Time Passes': it leaves the 'window all sky without colour' (*BA* 158). This is a downpouring of immense darkness that looks to an anterior past, a past that might precede even the *longue dureé* of literary prehistory that Woolf hails in the 'Anon' fragments: 'It was night before roads were made, or houses. It was the night that dwellers in caves had watched from some high place among rocks' (158). It is in this context that the draft 'circle of readers' that I discussed in Chapter Five reappears in print—the 'horse with a green tail' material appears in the novel's opening pages as the Olivers read the morning editions of that day's newspapers. In the later state of the text, Bartholomew's reading lamp becomes a point of light in this immense darkness, illuminating not just Bartholomew, Giles, and Lucy, but the 'grasshopper, the ant, and the beetle' (156) who join in the insectile-readerly labour that I discussed in Chapter Five. But the readerly labour in this later state of the text is perhaps more

nuanced than in the instantiation we saw in Chapter Five. An unspecified narrator, perhaps Bartholomew, reads the evening paper and tries to recall a contemporary act of sexual violence, thinking that '[t]he girl had gone skylarking with the troopers. She had screamed. She had hit him. … What then?' (155). But in this later state of the text, it is not just newspapers being read: while this unspecified narrator reads their newspaper, Lucy Swithin reads her *Outline of History*, and reads of a time when England was '"a swamp",' when '"[t]hick forests covered the land"' and '"[o]n top of their matted branches birds sang"' (157). Lucy's choice of reading creates a moment of Benjaminian constellation between primeval swamp and present-day sexual violence. But this choice of reading also creates a moment of constellation between *Between the Acts* and the 'Anon' fragments, between allographic novel and autographic essay draft. Woolf writes in M.53 that '[b]y choosing a view carefully to shut out a chimney or a bungalow we can still see what Anon saw' (M.53.2). In Chapter Six, I contended that these moments of constellation do not only create what Benjamin calls a 'revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past' (Benjamin "On the Concept of History" 396) but represent a 'small gateway,' a '*kleine Pforte*' (400) to a futurity where the quasi-messianic promise of anonymity can be fulfilled. Just as the word 'Well' that inaugurates 'Time Passes' brought Chapter One of this thesis into the Woolfian archive—which I theorised to be radically open in my readings between Woolf, Freud, and Derrida in Chapter Three of this thesis—the final pages of *Between the Acts* bring us into a future-facing archive by creating a constellation between ancient and anonymous past, present, and future.

It is unclear when the birds that sing 'on top of [the] matted branches' in Lucy's *Outline* sang (157), but Woolf employs similar language in the earliest holograph fragment of 'Anon,' M.45, where she writes that 'On the matted branches of that [primeval] forest innumerable birds sang,' citing G.M. Trevelyan's 'History of England' in the margin. The fragment goes on to relate how the birdsong of the primeval forest that covered ancient England inspired the unnamed poet-singers' 'out of door songs' (M.45 1). Primeval birdsong is, in M.45, the first song, and it is from this song that Woolf's literary history emerges, as does Anon, who died with the printing press but whose radical perspective can be recovered. Pointz Hall's circle of readers, which is instantiated in print as night falls over Pointz Hall, is not just one that unites human and insect in readerly-insectile labour but one that allows for anonymity to be found once again.

It is also under the light of Bartholomew's reading lamp that we see the skin-shuddering species slippage I discussed in the second section of Chapter Six, the moment of human-canid confusion as someone or something shudders their skin '[a]s a dog shudders its skin' (*BA* 157). In Chapter One I theorised, after Jane Goldman's work on the solar and the phallogocentric, moments of stelliferous Habermasian intersubjectivity that might emerge from the immense darkness that falls at the start of 'Time Passes'. I want to return to this theoretical formulation and suggest now that the 'vision of possible feminine enlightenment' (Goldman *Feminist Aesthetics* 17) that might emerge from the darkness of 'Time Passes' is modified here: the moment of possible enlightenment at the end of *Between the Acts* is a light that lights the way to a model of intersubjectivity not just between humans but rather, one that that crosses species boundaries, one that lights up the 'animal-headed archons' (Agamben *The Open* 5) Agamben hails in *The Open* and which I discussed with reference to *Between the Acts*' canid poetics in Chapter Six of this thesis.

But this moment of illumination is brief. Before long, Bartholomew stalks from the room, the 'old people [go] up to bed' and Giles turns out the light. In the dark, Giles and Isa are 'silent' and alone 'for the first time that day.' Left alone, much is laid bare: 'enmity was bared; also love.' They are left alone to fight 'as the dog fox fights with the vixen' but also to 'embrace' and 'from that embrace another life might be born' (*BA* 157). What form of life might be conceived in the aftermath of such a moment of stelliferous, interspecies Habermasian intersubjectivity and canid combat, at the precise moment when Woolf's final novel ends with a gesture towards an unknowable *avenir*? All we know is that the curtain rises on a scene we do not see; that the pair speak words that we cannot hear. Do these words bear a resemblance to the poetry that Isa murmurs to herself throughout the day? Or are they perhaps closer to the 'words of one syllable' that La Trobe listens to sinking 'down into the mud,' only for them to make the 'mud [become] fertile' and for the words to '[rise] above the intolerably dumb oxen plodding through the mud' (152)? If they are filiated with La Trobe's mud-spattered voices of one syllable, are they also filiated with *Mrs Dalloway*'s autochthonous 'voice of no age or sex, the voice of an ancient spring spouting from the earth' singing 'ee um fah um so | foo swee too eem oo' (*MD* 69)? Are these words in English, or are they perhaps the words of Antigone that I discussed in Chapter Four? If they are, then which set of words? The words translated by R.C. Jebb and left untranslated by Edward Pargiter, or the curiously transmuted Greek

words spoken by Elvira Pargiter? And if they are closer to Elvira Pargiter's generative misquotation, are they analogous to the Dadaist phonotactics of the children's chorus at the end of *The Years*, whose song I argued at the end of Chapter Four, is a herald of Derrida's 'absolutely undetermined messianic hope' (Derrida *Specters* 81)? We are left in the end with a gesture towards a scene we cannot hope to see, speech we cannot hope to read, life whose form we cannot hope to know. A gesture towards a genuine alterity, a radical openness—with all that might bring. Woolf's final works open up onto the future.

Bibliography

Adorno, Theodor W. "Late Style in Beethoven." *Essays on Music*, edited by Richard Leppert, translated by Susan H. Gillespie, University of California Press, 2002, pp. 564-568.

Agamben, Giorgio. *The Coming Community.* translated by Michael Hardt, University of Minnesota Press, 1993.

---. *The Open: Man and Animal.* translated by Kevin Attell, Stanford University Press, 2004.

---. *The Use of Bodies.* translated by Adam Kotsko, Stanford University Press, 2016.

Alt, Christina. "Virginia Woolf and Changing Conceptions of Nature." *Virginia Woolf's Bloomsbury, Volume 1: Aesthetic Theory and Literary Practice*, edited by Gina Potts and Lisa Shahriari, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 121-134.

Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)." *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, translated by Ben Brewster, NYU Press, 2001, pp. 85-126.

"anon, adj.". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press.

"anon, adv.". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press.

"anterior, adj.". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press.

"apocatastasis". *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, edited by F. L. Cross, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 83.

Arnold, Matthew. "Sohrab and Rustum [1853]." *The Poems of Matthew Arnold*, edited by Kenneth Allott, Longmans, Green & Co., 1965, pp. 302-331.

Auerbach, Erich. *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature.* translated by William R. Trask, Princeton University Press, 1953.

Ball, Hugo. *Flight out of Time: A Dada Diary.* edited by John Elderfield, University of California Press, 1996.

Banfield, Ann. *The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry, Russell, and the Epistemology of Modernism.* Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Barber, Stephen M. "Woolf's Ethical Philosophy: Pacifism Between Politics and Ethics." unpublished conference paper given at *Virginia Woolf and Social Justice*, Mount St. Joseph University, Cincinnati, Ohio, 2018.

Bellemin-Noël, Jean. *Le texte et l'avant-texte: les brouillons d'un poème de Milosz.* Larousse, 1972.

Benjamin, Walter. "[Die erhaltenen Notizen und Vorarbeiten…]." *Gesammelte Schriften I.I*, edited by Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, vol. 1, Suhrkamp, 1972, pp. 1230-1246.

---. "On the Concept of History." *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, 4: 1938–1940*, edited by Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, translated by E. F. N Jephcott, Harvard University Press, 2006, pp. 389-400.

---. "Paralipomena to "On the Concept of History"." *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, 4: 1938–1940*, edited by Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, translated by E. F. N Jephcott, Harvard University Press, 2006, pp. 401-411.

Berman, Jessica Schiff. "Ethical Folds: Ethics, Aesthetics, Woolf." *MFS: Modern Fiction Studies*, vol. 50, no. 1, 2004, pp. 151-172, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/54057.

---. *Modernist Commitments: Ethics, Politics, and Transnational Modernism.* Columbia University Press, 2011.

Bishop, Edward. "The Alfa and the *Avant-texte*: Transcribing Virginia Woolf's Manuscripts." *Editing Virginia Woolf: Interpreting the Modernist Text*, edited by James M. Haule and J. H. Stape, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 139-157.

Black, Michael. ""Mental Fight": Woolf, Blake, and European Peace." *Virginia Woolf, Europe, and Peace, Volume 1: Transnational Circulations*, edited by Ariane Mildenberg and Patricia Novillo-Corvalán, Clemson University Press, 2020, pp. 85-100.

Blake, William. "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell." *William Blake: The Complete Illuminated Books*, edited by David Bindman, Thames and Hudson, 2000.

---. "The Poems of Thomas Gray, "Elegy Written in a Country Church-Yard"." Yale Center for British Art, Paul Mellon Collection, 1797-8, p. Watercolor with pen and black ink and graphite on paper with inlaid letterpress page.

Blanchot, Maurice. *The Unavowable Community.* translated by Pierre Joris, Station Hill, 1988.

Bradshaw, David. ""Vanished, Like Leaves": The Military, Elegy and Italy in *Mrs Dalloway*." *Woolf Studies Annual*, vol. 8, 2002, pp. 107-125.

---. *Winking, Buzzing, Carpet-Beating: Reading Jacob's Room.* Virginia Woolf Society of Great Britain, 2003. *Annual Virginia Woolf Birthday Lectures*.

Braidotti, Rosi. *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics.* Polity Press, 2006.

Briggs, Julia. *Virginia Woolf: An Inner Life.* Allen Lane, 2005.

Briggs, Julia and D. F. McKenzie. "Between the Texts: Virginia Woolf's Acts of Revision." *Text*, vol. 12, 1999, pp. 143-165, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30228030.

Butler, Judith. *Antigone's Claim: Kinship Between Life & Death.* Columbia University Press, 2000.

Campbell, Gordon. "Milton, John (1608–1674), poet and polemicist". *Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2009.

Carlsen, Julie. "Re: Question Regarding Woolf Holdings - 'Anon' and 'The Reader'". Emails received by Joshua Phillips. 05/01/2021. Email Interview.

Charge Against Surgeon. *The Times*, London. July 2, 1938, vol. 48036. p. 9

Clarke, Stuart N. "The Horse with a Green Tail." *Virginia Woolf Miscellany*, vol. 34, 1990, pp. 3-4.

"convive, n.1, n. 2, v.". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press.

Crossland, Rachel. *Modernist Physics: Waves, Particles, and Relativities in the Writings of Virginia Woolf and D.H. Lawrence.* Oxford University Press, 2018.

"Crot". *The English Dialect Dictionary Online 3.0*, edited by Joseph Wright, University of Innsbruck.

"crot | crote, n.". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press.

"crōt(e n.". *Middle English Dictionary*, edited by Robert Lewis et al, University of Michigan Library.

Currie, Mark. *The Unexpected: Narrative Temporality and the Philosophy of Surprise.* Edinburgh University Press, 2013.

Dalgarno, Emily. *Virginia Woolf and the Migrations of Language.* Cambridge University Press, 2012.

---. "Virginia Woolf Reinvents the Socratic Dialogue." *Woolf Studies Annual*, vol. 22, 2016, pp. 1-20.

de Biasi, Pierre-Marc. *Génétique des textes.* CNRS Éditions, 2011.

de Biasi, Pierre-Marc and Ingrid Wassenaar. "What is a Literary Draft? Toward a Functional Typology of Genetic Documentation." *Yale French Studies*, no. 89, 1996, pp. 26-58, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2930337.

De Gay, Jane. *Virginia Woolf and Christian Culture.* Edinburgh University Press, 2018.

Delacroix, Eugene. "Milton dictating *Paradise Lost* to his daughters." 1826, p. Oil on canvas.

Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. *Anti-Oedipus.* translated by Mark Seem et al., Bloomsbury, 2013.

---. *A Thousand Plateaus.* translated by Brian Massumi, Bloomsbury, 2013.

Derrida, Jacques. *Aporias.* translated by Thomas Dutoit, Stanford University Press, 1993.

---. *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression.* translated by Eric Prenowitz, University of Chicago Press, 1995.

---. *The Beast & The Sovereign: Volume I.* edited by Michel Lisse et al., translated by Geoffrey Bennington, Chicago University Press, 2011.

---. *Derrida: Screenplay and Essays on the Film.* edited by Amy Ziering Kofman and Kirby Dick, Routledge, 2005.

---. "Faith and Knowledge: the Two Sources of 'Religion' at the Limits of Reason Alone." *Religion*, edited by Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo, Polity Press, 1998, pp. 1-78.

---. "Force and Signification." *Writing and Difference*, translated by Alan Bass, University of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 3-30.

---. "Freud and the Scene of Writing." *Writing and Difference*, translated by Alan Bass, University of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 196-231.

---. "Maddening the Subjectile." *Yale French Studies*, vol. 84, 1994, pp. 154-171.

---. *Specters of Marx: the State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International.* translated by Peggy Kamuf, Routledge, 2006.

Edelman, Lee. *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive.* Duke University Press, 2004.

Eliot, George. *Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life.* Everyman, 1991.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo. "The Poet." *The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, edited by Alfred R. Ferguson, vol. III, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1983, pp. 1-24.

Farrell, Molly. "queer archival tactics and 'the stories we tell'." *The Modernist Review*, vol. 25, 2020, https://modernistreviewcouk.wordpress.com/2020/11/09/queer-archival-tactics-and-the-stories-we-tell/.

Ferrer, Daniel. "Clementis's Cap: Retroaction and Persistence in the Genetic Process." *Yale French Studies*, vol. 89, 1996, pp. 223-236, www.jstor.org/stable/2930349.

Ferry, Anne. ""Anonymity": The Literary History of a Word." *New Literary History*, vol. 33, no. 2, 2002, pp. 193-214, www.jstor.org/stable/20057720.

Fordham, Finn. "The Modernist Archive." *The Oxford Handbook of Modernisms*, edited by Peter Brooker et al., Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 45-60.

Forster, E.M. *Anonymity: An Enquiry.* The Hogarth Press, 1925.

Foster, J. Ashley. "Stopped at the Border: Virginia Woolf and the Criminalization of Dissent in Democratic Societies." *Interdisciplinary/Multidisciplinary Woolf*, edited by Ann Martin and Kathryn Holland, Clemson University Press, 2014.

Freud, Sigmund. "Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's *Gradiva* [1907]." *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, translated by James Strachey, vol. IX (1906-1908), Hogarth Press, 1959, pp. 7-95.

---. "A Note Upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad' [1925]." *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, translated by James Strachey, vol. XIX (1923-1925), Hogarth Press, 1961, pp. 226-232.

Froula, Christine. *Virginia Woolf and the Bloomsbury Avant-Garde.* Columbia University Press, 2005.

Fuseli, Henry. "Milton Dictating to His Daughter." Art Institute Chicago, 1793, p. Oil on canvas. https://www.artic.edu/artworks/44739/milton-dictating-to-his-daughter.

Gabler, Hans Walter. "The Draft Manuscript as Material Foundation for Genetic Criticism." *Text Genetics in Literary Modernism and Other Essays*, Open Book Publishers, 2018, pp. 209-220.

---. "A Tale of Two Texts: Or, How One Might Edit *To the Lighthouse*." *Text Genetics in Literary Modernism*, Open Book Publishing, 2018, pp. 221-256.

Goldman, Jane. "'Consider the Dogs': Englishness, Breeding, and Virginia Woolf's Canine Aesthetics." Paper delivered at King's College London, 2011.

---. *The Feminist Aesthetics of Virginia Woolf: Modernism, Post-Impressionism, and the Politics of the Visual.* Cambridge University Press, 1998.

---. "To the Lighthouse's Use of Language and Form." *The Cambridge Companion to To The Lighthouse*, edited by Allison Pease, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 30-46.

---. "Virginia Woolf and the Aesthetics of Modernism." *The History of British Women's Writing, 1920–1945: Volume Eight*, edited by Maroula Joannou, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013, pp. 57-77.

---. "Who Let the Dogs Out? Samuel Johnson, Thomas Carlyle, Virginia Woolf and the Little Brown Dog." *Virginia Woolf's Bloomsbury, Volume 2: International Influence and Politics*, edited by Lisa Shahriari and Gina Potts, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 46-65.

Gourgouris, Stathis. *Does Literature Think?: Literature as Theory for an Antimythical Era.* Stanford University Press, 2003.

Gray, Thomas. "Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard." Poetry Foundation https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44299/elegy-written-in-a-country-churchyard.

Grey, Edward, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon. *Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916.* vol. II, Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925. 2 vols.

Groover, Kristina K., editor. *Religion, Secularism and the Spiritual Paths of Virginia Woolf.* Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

Gualtieri, Elena. *Virginia Woolf's Essays: Sketching the Past.* Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

Hägglund, Martin. *Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life.* Stanford University Press, 2008.

Harrison, Jane Ellen. *Ancient Art and Ritual.* Williams and Norgate, 1913.

Hartman, Saidiya. "Venus in Two Acts." *Small Axe*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2008, pp. 1-14.

---. *Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Social Upheaval.* Serpent's Tail, 2019.

Haule, James M. "Reading Dante, Misreading Woolf: New Evidence of Virginia Woolf's Revisions of *The Years*." *Woolf Editing/Editing Woolf: Selected Papers from the Eighteenth Annual Conference on Virginia Woolf*, edited by Eleanor McNees and Sara Veglahn, Clemson University Press, 2008, pp. 232-244.

Haule, James M., Virginia Woolf and Charles Mauron. ""Le Temps Passe" and the Original Typescript: An Early Version of the "Time Passes" Section of To the Lighthouse." *Twentieth Century Literature*, vol. 29, no. 3, 1983, pp. 267-311, www.jstor.org/stable/441468.

Hausmann, Raoul and Kurt Schwitters. "Present Inter Noumenal." *PIN and the story of PIN*, edited by Jaisa Reichardt, Gaberbocchus Press, 1962.

Hoffmann, Charles G. "Virginia Woolf's Manuscript Revisions of *The Years*." *PMLA*, vol. 84, no. 1, 1969, pp. 79-89.

Högberg, Elsa. *Virginia Woolf and the Ethics of Intimacy.* Bloomsbury, 2019.

Hornby, Louise. "Downwrong: The Pose of Tiredness." *MFS: Modern Fiction Studies*, vol. 65, 2019, pp. 207-227.

Hussey, Mark. *'I'd Make It Penal', the Rural Preservation Movement in Virginia Woolf's Between the Acts.* Cecil Woolf, 2011. *Bloomsbury Heritage*.

Hussey, Mark and Peter Shillingsburg. "The Composition, Revision, Printing and Publications of *To the Lighthouse*." Woolf Online http://www.woolfonline.com. Accessed 27/04/2020.

Jeffries, Stuart. *Grand Hotel Abyss: The Lives of the Frankfurt School.* Verso, 2016.

Jenny, Laurent. "Genetic Criticism and Its Myths." *Yale French Studies*, vol. 97, 2000, pp. 198-214, www.jstor.org/stable/2903220.

Jensen, Wilhelm. *Gradiva: A Pompeian Fancy.* translated by Helen M. Downey, Moffat, Yard and Company, 1918.

Kermode, Frank. *The Sense of an Ending.* Oxford University Press, 1966 [2000].

King, Julia and Laila Miletic-Vejzovic. *The Library of Leonard and Virginia Woolf: A Short-Title Catalog.* Washington State University Press, 2003.

Kolocotroni, Vassiliki. "Strange Cries and Ancient Songs." *Virginia Woolf in Context*, edited by Bryony Randall and Jane Goldman, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 423-438.

Kore-Schröder, Leena. "Who's Afraid of Rosamond Merridew?: Reading Medieval History in 'The Journal of Mistress Joan Martyn'." *Journal of the Short Story in English*, vol. 50, 2008, http://journals.openedition.org/jsse/719.

Lacan, Jacques. *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII.* edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, translated by Dennis Porter, Routledge, 1992.

Lee, Hermione. *Virginia Woolf.* Vintage Books, 2007.

Levinas, Emmanuel, Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes and Alison Ainley. "The Paradox of Morality: an Interview with Emmanuel Levinas." *The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other*, edited by Robert Bernasconi and David Wood, Routledge, 1988, pp. 168-180.

Lounsberry, Barbara. *Virginia Woolf, the War Without, the War Within: Her Final Diaries and the Diaries She Read.* University Press of Florida, 2018.

Marcus, Jane. *Virginia Woolf and the Languages of Patriarchy.* Indiana University Press, 1987.

McCracken, Scott. "All Bets are Off: Woolf, Benjamin, and the Problem of the Future in *Jacob's Room*." *Le Tour Critique*, vol. 2, 2013, pp. 31-43.

Micir, Melanie. *The Passion Projects: Modernist Women, Intimate Archives, Unfinished Lives.* Princeton University Press, 2019.

Middeke, Martin. "The Art of Compearance: Ethics, (Reading) Literature, and the Coming Community." *Theory Matters: The Place of Theory in Literary and Cultural Studies Today*, edited by Martin Middeke and Christoph Reinfandt, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 247-263.

Miller, J. Hillis. "The Waves as Exploration of (An)aesthetic of Absence." *University of Toronto Quarterly*, vol. 83, no. 3, 2014, pp. 659-677.

Miller, Tyrus. "A Delay In Glass: Marcel Duchamp, the Possible, and the Aversion to Déjà Vu." *The Modernist Review*, vol. 21, 2020, https://modernistreviewcouk.wordpress.com/2020/07/03/a-delay-in-glass-marcel-duchamp-the-possible-and-the-aversion-to-deja-vu/.

---. *Late Modernism: Politics, Fiction, and the Arts Between the World Wars.* University of California Press, 1999.

Morris, Francis Orpen. *A History of British Butterflies.* Groombridge and Sons, 1853.

"must, v.1". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press.

"Nin". *The English Dialect Dictionary Online 3.0*, edited by Joseph Wright, University of Innsbruck.

Ovid. *Metamorphoses.* translated by Frank Justus Miller, Heinemann, 1916. 2 vols.

"Paralipomenon, n.". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press.

Pater, Walter. *Studies in the History of the Renaissance.* edited by Matthew Beaumont, Oxford University Press, 2010.

Phillips, Joshua. "How Should One Read "The Reader"? New Approaches to Virginia Woolf's Late Archive." *Textual Cultures*, vol. 14, no. 2, 2021, pp. 195-219.

---. "Thoughts on Peace in a Wine Cellar." *Woolf Studies Annual*, vol. 26, 2020, pp. 1-86.

Pollentier, Caroline. "Between Aesthetic and Political Theory: Virginia Woolf's Utopian Pacifism." *Virginia Woolf, Europe, and Peace, Volume 2: Aesthetics and Theory*, edited by Peter Adkins and Derek Ryan, Clemson University Press, 2020, pp. 203-218.

"Pulley". *The English Dialect Dictionary Online 3.0*, edited by Joseph Wright, University of Innsbruck.

Radin, Grace. *Virginia Woolf's The Years: the Evolution of a Novel.* University of Tennessee Press, 1981.

Ramírez, Stephanie. "Highly anticipated T.S. Eliot letters, among best known sealed literary archives, open at Princeton University after more than 60 years." Princeton University Library https://library.princeton.edu/news/general/2019-12-18/highly-anticipated-ts-eliot-letters-among-best-known-sealed-literary. Accessed 03/06/2020.

Rancière, Jacques. *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy.* translated by Julie Rose, University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

---. *Dissensus: on Politics and Aesthetics.* translated by Steve Corcoran, Continuum, 2010.

---. *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible.* translated by Gabriel Rockhill, Bloomsbury, 2013.

Randall, Bryony. "The Day of Orlando." *Sentencing Orlando: Virginia Woolf and the Morphology of the Modernist Sentence*, edited by Elsa Högberg and Amy Bromley, Edinburgh University Press, 2018, pp. 128-137.

---. "New Modernist Editing: Ode written partly in prose on seeing the name of Cutbush above a butcher's shop in Pentonville." New Modernist Editing https://nme-digital-ode.glasgow.ac.uk/. Accessed 12/04.

---. ""[T]hey would have been the first to correct that sentence": Correcting Virginia Woolf's Short Fiction." *Textus: English Studies in Italy*, vol. 3, 2015, pp. 75-94.

Ross, Stephen. "Introduction: The Missing Link." *Modernism and Theory: A Critical Debate*, edited by Stephen Ross, Routledge, 2009, pp. 1-17.

Ryan, Derek. "'The reality of becoming': Deleuze, Woolf, and the Territory of Cows." *Deleuze Studies*, vol. 7, 2013, pp. 537-561.

---. *Virginia Woolf and the Materiality of Theory: Sex, Animal, Life.* Edinburgh University Press, 2013.

Said, Edward. *On Late Style: Music and Literature Against the Grain.* Pantheon Books, 2006.

Saint-Amour, Paul K. "Weak Theory, Weak Modernism." *Modernism/Modernity*, vol. 25, no. 3, 2018, pp. 437-459.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. *Course in General Linguistics.* translated by Roy Harris, Duckworth, 2005.

Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. "Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, Or, You're So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay is About You." *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity*, Duke University Press, 2003, pp. 123-151.

Shillingsburg, Peter L. *Scholarly Editing in the Computer Age: Theory and Practice.* University of Georgia Press, 1996.

"show, v.". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press.

Sidney, Sir Philip. "The Defence of Poesie." *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia*, edited by Richard Bellings et al., The tenth edition with his life and death, a brief table of the principal heads, and som [sic] other new additions. edition, Printed by William Du-Gard, and are to be sold by George Calvert […] and Thomas Pierreport […], 1655, pp. 540-564.

Silver, Brenda R. ""Anon" and "The Reader": Virginia Woolf's Last Essays." *Twentieth Century Literature*, vol. 25, no. 3/4, 1979, pp. 356-441.

---. *Virginia Woolf's Reading Notebooks.* Princeton University Press, 1983.

Snaith, Anna. "Late Virginia Woolf." *Oxford Handbooks Online*, 2015.

---. *Virginia Woolf: Public and Private Negotiations*. Palgrave, 2001.

Sophocles. "Antigone." *Sophocles*, edited by Hugh Lloyd-Jones, translated by Hugh Lloyd-Jones, vol. II, Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 2-127. *Loeb Classical Library*.

Sparks, Elisa Kay. "Mrs. Brown and the Trojan Cow: Deconstructing Aristotle in "An Unwritten Novel"." *Virginia Woolf and the World of Books: The Centenary of the Hogarth Press: Selected Papers from the Twenty-Seventh Annual International Conference on Virginia Woolf*, edited by Nicola Wilson and Claire Battershill, Clemson University Press, 2018, pp. 155-159.

Spenser, Edmund. *The Works of Edmund Spenser.* edited by John Payne Collier, vol. 1, Bell & Daldy, 1862. 5 vols.

---. *The Works of Edmund Spenser.* edited by R. Morris, Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1899.

Spinoza, Benedict. *Ethics.* translated by Edwin Curley, Penguin, 1996.

Spiropoulou, Angeliki. *Virginia Woolf, Modernity and History: Constellations with Walter Benjamin.* Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

---. "Woolf's *Three Guineas*, Antigone, and Peace: Modern Echoes of Antique Debates." *Virginia Woolf, Europe, and Peace, Volume 1: Transnational Circulations*, edited by Ariane Mildenberg and Patricia Novillo-Corvalán, Clemson University Press, 2020, pp. 171-181.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. *Death of a Discipline.* Columbia University Press, 2003.

Stavely, Alice, Claire Battershill, Helen Southworth, Matthew Hannah, Elizabeth Willson Gordon and Nicola Wilson. "New Hands on Old Papers: Modernist Publishing and the Archival Gaze." *Modernism/Modernity*, no. 10/12/20, 2020, https://modernismmodernity.org/forums/posts/MAPP-new-hands.

Stevenson, Randall and Jane Goldman. "'But what? Elegy?': Modernist Reading and the Death of Mrs. Ramsay." *The Yearbook of English Studies*, vol. 26, 1996, pp. 173-186.

"subjectile, n. and adj.". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press.

"substratum, n.". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press.

Surgeon Found "Not Guilty". *The Times*, London. July 20, 1938, vol. 48051. p. 9

Swanson, Diana L. "An Antigone Complex? The Political Psychology of *The Years* and *Three Guineas*." *Woolf Studies Annual*, vol. 3, 1997, pp. 28-44.

Taxidou, Olga. *Tragedy, Modernity and Mourning.* Edinburgh University Press, 2004.

Three Troopers on Trial. *The Times*, London. June 28, 1938, vol. 48032. p. 11

Tomás Reed, Conor. ""Q. And Babies? A. And babies": On Pacifism, Visual Trauma, and the Body Heap." *Interdisciplinary/Multidisciplinary Woolf*, edited by Ann Martin and Kathryn Holland, Clemson University Press, 2014, pp. 85-89.

Trautmann Banks, Joanne. "The Editor as Ethicist." *Editing Virginia Woolf: Interpreting the Modernist Text*, edited by James M. Haule and J. H. Stape, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 11-24.

Tromanhauser, Vicki. "Animal Life and Human Sacrifice in Virginia Woolf's *Between the Acts*." *Woolf Studies Annual*, vol. 15, 2009, pp. 67-90.

Tudeau-Clayton, Margaret. "'Time Passes' — Virginia Woolf's Virgilian Passage to the Future Past Masterpieces: *A la recherche du temps perdu* and *To the Lighthouse*." *Comparative Critical Studies*, vol. 3, no. 3, 2006, pp. 291-323.

Two Troopers Found "Guilty". *The Times*, London. June 29, 1938, vol. 48033. p. 11

Usher, Penelope Meyers. ""Pricking in Virgil": Early Modern Prophetic Phronesis and the Sortes Virgilianae." *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, vol. 45, no. 3, 2015, pp. 557-571.

Van Hulle, Dirk. *Modern Manuscripts: The Extended Mind and Creative Undoing from Darwin to Beckett and Beyond.* Bloomsbury, 2014.

---. "Sheherazade's Notebook: Editing Textual Dysteleology and Autographic Modernism." *Modernist Cultures*, vol. 15, no. 1, 2020, pp. 12-28.

Van Mierlo, Wim. "The Archaeology of the Manuscript: Towards Modern Palaeography." *The Boundaries of the Literary Archive: Reclamation and Representation*, edited by Lisa Stead and Carrie Smith, Routledge, 2013, pp. 15-29.

Virgil. *The Eclogues and Georgics of Virgil.* translated by J.W. Mackail, Longman, Green and Co., 1915.

"waif, n.1 and adj.". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press.

"wait, v.1". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.* translated by David Pears and Brian McGuinness, Routledge, 2001.

Wood, Alice. *Virginia Woolf's Late Cultural Criticism: The Genesis of The Years, Three Guineas, and Between the Acts.* Bloomsbury, 2013.

Woolf, Leonard. *The Journey Not the Arrival Matters: An Autobiography of the Years 1939-1969.* The Hogarth Press, 1969.

Woolf, Virginia. "Anon [and] The Reader." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. VI, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 580-607.

---. "'Anon' and 'The Reader'." *The Gender of Modernism: A Critical Anthology*, edited by Bonnie Kime Scott, Indiana University Press, 1990, pp. 697-701.

---. *Between the Acts.* The Hogarth Press, 1941.

---. *Between the Acts.* edited by Mark Hussey, Cambridge University Press, 2011.

---. *The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf.* edited by Susan Dick, Harcourt, Inc., 1989.

---. "Craftsmanship." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. VI, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 91-102.

---. *The Diary of Virginia Woolf.* edited by Anne Olivier Bell and Quentin Bell, Penguin, 1977-84. 5 vols.

---. *The Essays of Virginia Woolf.* edited by Andrew McNeillie and Stuart N. Clarke, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011. 6 vols.

---. "First Proofs of *To the Lighthouse*." Woolf Online http://www.woolfonline.com/. Accessed 27/04/2020.

---. *Flush.* edited by Kate Flint, Oxford University Press, 2009.

---. "How It Strikes a Contemporary." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. IV, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 233-242.

---. "How Should One Read a Book?" *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. V, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 572-584.

---. *Jacob's Room.* edited by David Bradshaw and Stuart N. Clarke, Cambridge University Press, 2020.

---. "[The Journal of Mistress Joan Martyn]." *The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Susan Dick, Harcourt, Inc., 1989, pp. 33-62.

---. "The Legacy." *The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Susan Dick, Harcourt, Inc., 1989, pp. 281-287.

---. *The Letters of Virginia Woolf.* edited by Nigel Nicolson and Joanne Trautmann Banks, The Hogarth Press, 1975-80. 6 vols.

---. "The Lives of the Obscure." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. IV, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 118-146.

---. "M.45: Holograph Draft of 'Anon'." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. [Anon] Holograph fragment, unsigned, dated Nov. 24, 1940, 9p. 1940-1.

---. "M.49: Typescript Draft of 'Anon'." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. Anon. Typescript fragment, with the author's MS correction, unsigned and undated, 9p. 1940-1.

---. "M.50: Typescript Draft of 'Anon'." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. Anon. Typescript fragment, with the author's MS correction, unsigned and undated, 9p. 1940-1.

---. "M.51: Typescript Draft of 'Anon'." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. Anon. Typescript fragment, with the author's MS correction on p. 3, unsigned and undated, 9p. 1940-1.

---. "M.52: Typescript Draft of 'Anon'." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. Anon. Typescript fragment, with the author's MS correction, unsigned and undated, 19p. 1940-1.

---. "M.53: Typescript Draft of 'Anon'." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. Anon. Typescript fragment, with the author's MS correction, dated Nov. 24, 1940, 26p. 1940-1.

---. "M.54: Typescript Draft of 'Anon'." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. Anon. Typescript fragments, unsigned and undated, 33p. 1940-1.

---. "M.108: Typescript Draft of 'The Reader'." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. [The Reader]. Typescript fragments, with the author's MS corrections, unsigned and undated, 7p. 1940-1.

---. "M.109: Typescript Draft of 'The Reader'." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. [The Reader]. Typescript fragments, with the author's MS corrections, unsigned and undated, 9p. 1940-1.

---. "M.110: Typescript Draft of 'The Reader'." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. [The Reader]. Typescript fragments, with the author's MS corrections, unsigned and undated, 5p. 1940-1.

---. "M.111: Typescript Draft of 'The Reader'." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. [The Reader]. Typescript fragments, with the author's MS corrections, unsigned and undated. Three sets and two loose pages. 5p.; 4p.; 4p.; 2p. 1940-1.

---. "M.112: Typescript Draft of 'The Reader'." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. [The Reader]. Typescript fragments, with the author's MS corrections, unsigned and undated. Three sets. 4p.; 2p.; 3p. 1940-1.

---. "M.113: Typescript Draft of 'The Reader'." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. [The Reader]. Typescript fragments, one with the author's MS corrections, unsigned and undated, 5p. 1940-1.

---. *Melymbrosia.* edited by Louise DeSalvo, Cleis Press, 2002.

---. "Modern Fiction." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. IV, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 157-165.

---. "Modern Novels." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. III, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 30-37.

---. "The Moment: Summer's Night." The Essays of Virginia Woolf, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. VI, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 509-514.

---. *Mrs Dalloway.* edited by David Bradshaw, Oxford University Press, 2000.

---. *Mrs Dalloway.* edited by Anne Fernald, Cambridge University Press, 2014.

---. "Mrs Thrale." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. VI, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 292-297.

---. "Multigrip Folder: 'Spare Sheets T of P' (2)." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. Lifeguard Multigrip Folder labelled 'Spare Sheets T of P' (2). 1940-1.

---. "Multigrip Folder: 'Turning the Page' (1)." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. Lifeguard Multigrip Folder labelled 'Turning the Page' (1). 1940-1.

---. "Multigrip Folder: 'Turning the Page' (3)." Berg Coll. MSS Woolf, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English Literature, New York Public Library. Lifeguard Multigrip Folder labelled 'Turning the Page' (3). 1940-1.

---. "The New Biography." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. IV, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 473-480.

---. *Night and Day.* edited by Suzanne Raitt, Oxford University Press, 2009.

---. "Notes on an Elizabethan Play." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. IV, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 62-70.

---. "On Being Ill [1926]." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. IV, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 317-329.

---. "On Being Ill [1930]." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. V, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 195-208.

---. "On Not Knowing Greek." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. IV, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 38-52.

---. *Orlando: A Biography.* edited by Suzanne Raitt and Ian Blyth, Cambridge University Press, 2018.

---. *The Pargiters: the Novel-Essay Portion of 'The Years'.* edited by Mitchell Leaska, Hogarth Press, 1978.

---. *A Passionate Apprentice: The Early Journals.* edited by Mitchell Leaska, The Hogarth Press, 1990.

---. "The Pastons and Chaucer." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. IV, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 20-38.

---. "Professions for Women." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. VI, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 479-484.

---. "A Room of One's Own." *A Room of One's Own and Three Guineas*, edited by Michèle Barrett, Penguin, 1993, pp. 3-104.

---. "A Sketch of the Past." *Moments of Being*, edited by Jeanne Schulkind, Grafton Books, 1989, pp. 69-173.

---. "The Strange Elizabethans." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. V, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 335-348.

---. "Thoughts on Peace in an Air Raid." *The Essays of Virginia Woolf*, edited by Andrew McNeillie (vols 1-4) and Stuart N. Clarke (vols 5-6), vol. VI, The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011, pp. 242-248.

---. "Three Guineas." *A Room of One's Own and Three Guineas*, edited by Michèle Barrett, Penguin, 1993, pp. 117-272.

---. *To the Lighthouse.* Hogarth Press, 1927.

---. *To the Lighthouse.* edited by David Bradshaw, Oxford University Press, 2006.

---. *To the Lighthouse.* Hogarth Press, 1938.

---. "Typescript of 'Time Passes'." Woolf Online http://www.woolfonline.com. Accessed 27/04/2020.

---. *The Voyage Out.* edited by Lorna Sage, Oxford University Press, 2009.

---. *The Waves.* edited by Gillian Beer, Oxford University Press, 2008.

---. "A Woman's College from Outside." *Atalanta's Garland: Being the Book of the Edinburgh University Women's Union*, Edinburgh University Press, 1926, pp. 11-16.

---. *The Years.* edited by Anna Snaith, Cambridge University Press, 2012.

---. *The Years.* Hogarth Press, 1937.

Woolf, Virginia and Mireille Duchêne. *Virginia Woolf: An Unpublished Notebook (1907-1909).* translated by Carole Durix and Jean-Pierre Durix, Éditions Universitaires de Dijon, 2019.

Woolf, Virginia and Charles Mauron. "Le Temps Passe." *Commerce*, vol. X, no. Winter 1926, 1926, pp. 90-133.

Worman, Nancy. *Virginia Woolf's Greek Tragedy.* Bloomsbury, 2019.

Zwerdling, Alex. *Virgina Woolf and the Real World.* University of California Press, 1986.

"ἀνήρ". *A Greek-English Lexicon*, edited by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, Oxford University Press, 1940.

"ἄνθρωπος". *A Greek-English Lexicon*, edited by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, Oxford University Press, 1940.

"ἄτη". *A Greek-English Lexicon*, edited by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, Oxford University Press, 1940.

"αὐτόγνωτος". *A Greek-English Lexicon*, edited by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, Oxford University Press, 1940.

"γνωτός". *A Greek-English Lexicon*, edited by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, Oxford University Press, 1940.

"συμφιλέω". *A Greek-English Lexicon*, edited by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, Oxford University Press, 1940.

"φύω". *A Greek-English Lexicon*, edited by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, Oxford University Press, 1940.