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Inclusionary Populism: Old Antagonisms, New Challenges

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Submitted in fulfilment for the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
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Abstract

This thesis seeks to chart the development of inclusionary populism, that is populism that seeks to expand membership of the people and not exclude from it on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, sexuality or other discriminations, in order to better understand this phenomenon. Existing literature on inclusionary populism tends to focus on Southern European and Latin American territories and on inclusionary populism as a means to improve economic circumstances through redistributive policies. Limited attention is paid to parties outwith these territories and to the other demands advanced by inclusionary populists.

The thesis attempts to answer the question: what, if anything distinguishes contemporary iterations of inclusionary populism from traditional ones? To do so it builds an initial typology of inclusionary populist parties through analysis of historic inclusionary populism identifying three distinct types: nationalist, egalitarian and anti-colonial. The theories of Laclau and Mouffe are then leveraged to create a framework of analysis which is applied to data obtained through elite semi-structured interviews from the SNP, SYRIZA and Sinn Féin along with data from manifestos of these parties. The analytical framework and data allow for a more advanced and detailed typology to be constructed which then demonstrates the development of each type of inclusionary populism. This process is followed by a comparative analysis which reveals how each type has developed into a more heterogenous form which articulates multiple demands across multiple policy areas.

The data analysis reveals a heterogenous people, challenging the belief that a populist people are homogenous, whose diverse identities are united by their demands being unfulfilled and their exclusion from political, economic and social life.

The thesis concludes that these new forms have emerged due to wider societal changes which inclusionary populist movements reflect. The implications of the findings of the thesis impact not only on populism studies but on wider contemporary debates in political science such as party families, sub-state actors and political representation. The thesis provides both a platform and direction for further research into inclusionary populism.

List of contents

Abstract.....	2
List of contents	3
List of Figures.....	6
Acknowledgements	7
Author’s declaration	9
Chapter 1 -Introduction	10
1.1 Overview	10
1.2 Trends and gaps in populism studies.....	11
1.3 Research design and case study selection.....	15
1.4 Analytical framework.....	18
1.5 Thesis structure.....	19
Chapter 2 -A history of inclusionary populism	22
2.1 Introduction	22
2.2 The Russian Narodniks.....	22
2.3 The USA: People’s Party, Huey Long and the New Deal.....	26
2.4 Latin America: Classical populism, neopopulism and pink wave populism.....	31
2.5 Discussion.....	39
2.6 Conclusions	42
Chapter 3 -Building a framework of analysis.....	44
3.1 Introduction	44
3.2 Ideational, strategic and discursive approaches to populism.....	45
3.2.1 Populism as an ideology.....	45
3.2.2 Populism as a strategy	48
3.2.3 Populism as a discourse.....	50
3.3 Analytical framework: the people, the elite and their relationship from the approach of Laclau and Mouffe	51
3.3.1 The Theory of Hegemony	52
3.3.2 The people	53
3.3.3 The elite.....	55
3.3.3.1 We/they in populism.....	56
3.3.3.2 Laclau and the elite.....	57
3.3.4 Reflections on Laclau and Mouffe’s approach.....	57
3.4 The role of political parties.....	60
3.5 Building into inclusionary populism	61
3.5.1 What is inclusionary populism?	61
3.5.2 Laclau, Mouffe and inclusionary populism.....	64
3.6 The analytical framework.....	65

3.7	Conclusions	68
Chapter 4 -Methodology.....		69
4.1	Introduction	69
4.2	Methods of data collection	69
4.2.1	Manifestos	70
4.2.2	Interview participants	70
4.3	Manifesto analysis	73
4.4	Interviews	74
4.5	Data analysis.....	76
4.6	Conclusions	83
Chapter 5 -The Scottish National Party: Nationalist inclusionary populism.....		84
5.1	Introduction	84
5.2	The electoral development of the SNP	84
5.3	The SNP's core ideology.....	86
5.3.1	The political goals of the movement	87
5.3.2	The people	88
5.3.2.1	The empty signifier.....	94
5.3.3	The elite	95
5.3.4	The relationship between the people and the elite.....	97
5.3.5	Articulation.....	100
5.4	Discussion.....	101
5.5	Conclusions	104
Chapter 6 -SYRIZA: Egalitarian inclusionary populism		106
6.1	Introduction	106
6.2	The electoral development of SYRIZA.....	106
6.3	SYRIZA's core ideology.....	110
6.3.1	The political goals of the movement	111
6.3.2	The people	113
6.3.3	The elite	118
6.3.3.1	The Empty signifier	122
6.3.4	The relationship between the people and elite.....	123
6.3.5	Articulation.....	126
6.4	Discussion.....	127
6.5	Conclusions	131
Chapter 7 -Sinn Féin: Anti-colonial inclusionary populism.....		133
7.1	Introduction	133
7.2	The electoral development of Sinn Féin.....	133
7.3	Sinn Féin's core ideology.....	136

7.3.1 Irish anti-colonialism.....	138
7.3.2 The political goals of the movement	141
7.3.3 The people	143
7.3.3.1 Empty signifier	151
7.3.4 The elite.....	152
7.3.5 The relationship between the people and the elite.....	155
7.3.6 Articulation.....	158
7.4 Discussion.....	160
7.5 Conclusions	163
Chapter 8 -Comparative analysis.....	165
8.1 Introduction	165
8.2 The people	166
8.3 The elite.....	171
8.4 The relationship between the people and the elite.....	175
8.5 The empty signifier.....	180
8.6 Articulation.....	183
8.7 Challenges and confirmations to existing literature	186
8.8 Conclusions	190
Chapter 9 -Conclusions	193
9.1 Introduction	193
9.2 The contributions of this thesis.....	193
9.3 Contributions to wider issues in political science	198
9.4 Limitations of this study	204
9.5 Scope for further research.....	205
Appendices	208
References	214

List of Figures

Table 2.1 Overview of historic inclusionary populism	40
Table 2.2 Forms and characteristics of historic inclusionary populism	41
Table 3.1 The analytical framework	67
Table 4.1 Trustworthiness in thematic analysis(Nowell <i>et al.</i> , 2017).....	79
Table 5.1 Characteristics of the SNP's populism	102
Table 6.1 Characteristics of SYRIZA's populism	128
Table 7.1 Characteristics of Sinn Féin's populism.....	161
Table 8.1 The people in contemporary inclusionary populism	167
Table 8.2 The elite in contemporary inclusionary populism	172
Table 8.3 The relationship between the people and elite in contemporary inclusionary populism	177
Table 8.4 The empty signifier in contemporary inclusionary populism	181
Table 8.5 Articulation in contemporary inclusionary populism.....	184

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Author's declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Printed Name: Michael Andrew Scanlan

Signature:

Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.1 Overview

There are few more widely used and more contested terms in contemporary politics than populism (Peters and Pierre, 2020) As Laclau (1979, p. 143) argues:

Populism' is a concept both elusive and recurrent. Few terms have been so widely used in contemporary political analysis although few have been defined with less precision.

Within political science there is consensus that populism is an appeal to the people against the elite (Canovan, 1999), yet in terms of wider and deeper definitions, there is little agreement. It is presented as an ideology (Canovan, 2002; Mudde, 2004), a strategy (Weyland, 2017), as a discourse (Laclau, 2007), as a threat to democracy (Müller, 2016), as a necessary component of democracy (Laclau, 2007) or as a combination of the above (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). With that said, we can understand populism as a politics that puts the 'people' at the centre (Featherstone and Karaliotas, 2019) with the people as the 'many' on one side and the smaller 'elite' on the other. (Featherstone and Karaliotas, 2019).

Mudde and Kaltwasser, (2012) identified two main forms of populism, exclusionary and inclusionary. Inclusionary generally involves a construction of "the people" that aims to include or re-include those who are prohibited from full engagement with public and political life due to factors such as economic circumstances or ethnicity (Filc, 2015) while exclusionary populism seeks to exclude groups from the people, often based upon nativist ideas. (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). There is a significant and growing body of literature examining inclusionary populism, but it is often limited in scope, with a tendency to focus on Southern Europe and Latin America and frames inclusionary populism as a phenomenon leveraged primarily to articulate economic demands; in particular, demands to change existing socio-economic structures (Fanoulis and Guerra, 2021) and redistributive economic policies (Agustín, 2021).

As such, inclusionary populism is often framed as left or radical left populism (March, 2011; Katsambekis and Kioupiolis, 2019) and research on focusses on left-wing components. While this research has moved the debate about left populism away from Southern Europe to consider parties in the Netherlands, Germany, France the UK, in the form of the Corbyn-era Labour Party (Katsambekis and Kioupiolis, 2019) and even Scotland in the form of the defunct Scottish Socialist Party (March,

2011), the focus on this research remains on the radical-left.

While the economic component of inclusionary populism is a critical characteristic over time, it is not the sole component. Inclusionary populism is used increasingly to articulate a wider suite of demands, such as secessionist calls and rights for marginalised groups such as LGBTQI+ communities and refugees (Agustín, 2021) and need not be limited to the radical left.

These developments remain significantly under-explored within studies of inclusionary populism, with very little literature expanding from an inclusionary populism materialist phenomenon to a post-materialist phenomenon. It is this gap that this thesis aims to fill by expanding inclusionary populist scholarship from the politics of Latin America and Southern Europe and the demands for economic justice to Northern Europe and a wider variety of demands. To illustrate the diversity of inclusionary populism, it proposes a new typology of inclusionary populism, identifying three distinct sub-types: nationalist, egalitarian and anti-colonial inclusionary populism, which demonstrate both the origin of the sub-type and the nature of the demands it articulates.

The typology is derived through an analysis of historic inclusionary populist movements and then refined and developed through studies of contemporary case studies of the SNP, SYRIZA and Sinn Féin, using a new analytical framework derived from the theories of Laclau and Mouffe. The importance and impact of the research is twofold. First, by expanding the study of inclusionary populism beyond the territories it is currently limited to, it offers new insight and new paths for further research. Second, it offers a new toolkit for further research.

1.2 Trends and gaps in populism studies

This section examines the empirical, theoretical and methodological gaps in populism and inclusionary populism literature and explains how this thesis contributes to filling those gaps. For each of these areas, there shall be a consideration of what is known, what is not known and how this thesis addresses these aspects.

Recent literature on inclusionary populism emphasises its social inclusivity (Fanoulis and Guerra, 2021a), expanding the boundaries of democracy to include marginalised groups (Markou, 2017a), and that there is a link between the rise of inclusionary populism in some territories with the Global Economic Crisis of 2007/08 (Lisi,

Llamazares and Tsakatika, 2019). Inclusionary populism as the primary form of populism in Latin America is also emphasised (Mudde and C. Kaltwasser, 2012). This gives us a number of useful starting points for further research, most notably in terms of the differentiation between how inclusionary and exclusionary populists view the people.

The major empirical gaps are linked to how inclusionary populism is viewed in space and time. The literature primarily views inclusionary populism as a phenomenon of Southern Europe and / or Latin America (Mudde and C. Kaltwasser, 2012), with the argument advanced that the populism found in Northern Europe is principally exclusionary (Markou, 2017a). This limits the study of inclusionary populism as, if it is erroneously assumed to be a geographically limited phenomenon, parties which could be classed as inclusionary populist, such as the SNP and Sinn Féin, are ignored by researchers in this field, leading to a narrower understanding.

In terms of time, few attempts are made to chart the development of inclusionary populism. There are exceptions, in particular the work of Kazin, (1995), which charts the growth and development of the populism of the USA. However, this is still limited to one territory. While the current trend of populism studies has encouraged authors to investigate past populisms such as the Narodniks (Sivakumar, 2001; Morini, 2013) and Perón (Bolton, 2014; de la Torre, 2017) the link between these historic cases and contemporary global cases is rarely made. Without this link, it is not possible to chart the foundations and development of inclusionary populism, and so there remains a contemporary political phenomenon lacking in context and lacking in an understanding of where it comes from and why.

Finally, while there have been attempts to explore, for example, the differences between inclusionary and exclusionary populism (Mudde and C. Kaltwasser, 2012) and initial considerations of types of European inclusionary populism (Font, Graziano and Tsakatika, 2021), there have been few attempts to link contemporary inclusionary populism in Europe and other regions with historic inclusionary populism. Equally, the focus on Southern European inclusionary populism, which is primarily of the left and radical left (Spourdalakis, 2014; Fanoulis and Guerra, 2021) means that inclusionary populism in general is cast as a phenomenon of the radical left. While this is true in some cases, it is not true in all cases such as Fujimori of Peru (Levitsky and Loxton, 2012) and Italy's Five Star Movement (Font, Graziano and Tsakatika, 2021), and there remains only a partial understanding of inclusionary populism.

To summarise; the limitations of studies on parties and movements mean that there is an incomplete view of contemporary inclusionary populism in terms of both territory and type. The limitations on time mean that it is not possible to place contemporary inclusionary populism into its context and fully understand its development from materialist to materialist and post-materialist. This thesis addresses these two limitations by placing contemporary inclusionary populism within an appropriate historic context, analysing the antecedents to identify three distinct sub-types: nationalist, egalitarian and anti-colonial inclusionary populism.

Nationalist inclusionary populism has an emphasis on nation building through highlighting and arguing for differences in values between the nation and forces which keep that nation from achieving its demands. Achieving these demands can often include territorial claims. This sub-type is derived initially from the Narodniks of Tsarist Russia.

Egalitarian inclusionary populism has an initial focus on economic demands and a recalibration of economic systems to benefit the people. As it develops, these economic demands are joined by social and political demands. This sub-type was derived initially from the pre-World War II inclusionary populists of the USA. The final type is anti-colonial, which includes both the nation-building claims of the nationalists and the economic, social and political demands of the egalitarians, and is a reaction against colonial legacies and continued colonial pressures. This sub-type was derived initially from the inclusionary populism of Latin America.

Second, this thesis looks beyond the cases in Latin America and Southern Europe to also include a focus on Northern Europe, where cases are overlooked as examples of inclusionary populism. In doing so, this challenges the arguments advanced that there is a distinct north/south divide in European populism, where materialist concerns take priority in the south and post-materialist concerns take priority in the north, and so inclusionary populism is more likely to be found in Southern Europe (Bernhard and Kriesi, 2019) and argues that this is not necessarily the case, as inclusionary populism can also articulate post-materialist concerns such as identity and is also found in Northern Europe.

Why, though, does it matter that the SNP and Sinn Féin are presented as inclusionary populist parties? Viewing these parties as inclusionary populist opens up new lines of enquiry into existing literature on sub-state actors, nationalism and secessionism and, in particular, how these parties work to achieve their goals through inclusionary populism,

which this thesis will cover in detail.

The second area where there are literature gaps concerns the theories of populism currently being advanced by scholars. The dominant approach is the ideational approach (Hawkins and Kaltwasser, 2017), which treats populism as thin ideology that attaches itself to a thick ideology, such as conservatism, in order to mobilise support (Mudde, 2004, 2017a). The majority of the literature on either populism in general or inclusionary populism focuses on two elements; the people and elite. These are core elements of populism that lie at the heart of populism studies. However, by focussing only on these elements, they leave a number of questions unanswered, most notably why there is antagonism between the people and elite, what unifies the people and how and why there are different forms of inclusionary populism To address these questions, the analytical framework builds on the initial two components of people and elite by adding more themes and offers ways to answer these questions in order to build a stronger and more detailed understanding of inclusionary populism.

The third area where there are gaps is in methodology. Within inclusionary populism studies there is a growing trend of arguments for using the discursive approach of Laclau and Mouffe to effectively analyse inclusionary populism (Markou, 2017b; Katsambekis, 2020; Fanoulis and Guerra, 2021a) and it is this trend that this thesis will build and expand upon. The efficacy of the theories of Laclau and Mouffe in analysing inclusionary populism is becoming established. However, equally established is the fact that these theories are complex (Rey-Araújo, 2020)

In an attempt to overcome this complexity, this thesis attempts to leverage the discursive approach of Laclau and Mouffe into an analytical framework, which is simple and parsimonious, to be used by researchers as widely as the ideational approach in order to further demonstrate its efficacy in analysing inclusionary populism, but which retains the core elements necessary for this efficacy. By contributing to resolving this problem, this thesis adds to the growing support for discursive analytics in inclusionary populism.

To summarise the theoretical and methodological limitations, studies of inclusionary populism feature an unsuitable and incomplete framework that does not allow for the appropriate analysis of inclusionary populism. They use either an analytical framework which is unsuitable—the ideational approach, or that is complex and challenging to effectively apply to empirical data—the discursive approach. Through the creation and application of a new analytical framework, drawn from the theories of

Laclau and Mouffe, this thesis tackles these limitations.

Having discussed the research gaps, the research question of this thesis can now be posed: what, if anything, distinguishes contemporary iterations of inclusionary populism from traditional ones? The quest for an answer involves two processes: the first is to place contemporary inclusionary populism in its proper historic context in order to chart this development. The second is to develop the typology of inclusionary populism to illustrate how it has developed and begin to answer why. In addressing all these issues, the thesis will fill these gaps, most notably offering the first analysis of inclusionary populism that includes both historic antecedents and looks beyond parties in Southern Europe and Latin America and developing an improved typology of inclusionary populism and a framework for further research. The typology is a means to an end, which is a better and richer understanding of the under-explored phenomenon of inclusionary populism.

1.3 Research design and case study selection

Before the discussion of why the cases for this thesis were selected, it is important to explain the three-step inductive and deductive reasoning processes that this thesis employs.

The first step is a review of literature on both the history and theories of inclusionary populism. Through this review, certain patterns and themes become apparent, which allows for the construction of a basic, foundational typology and an understanding of historic inclusionary populism advancing primarily materialist demands. This leads to an analysis of the major theories surrounding populism and inclusionary populism to construct an analytical framework. The second step, presented in Chapters 5-7, is a single-case study analysis of each of the parties examined. This will reveal a number of themes from each party that fit the analytical framework. These themes will be explored and analysed in depth, revealing rich detail about the form and context of the inclusionary populism of each party.

The third and final step takes place in Chapter 8 where, having established the contemporary form of the subtypes of inclusionary populism, the thesis continues to use deductive reasoning to examine the continuity and change of inclusionary populism, demonstrating the efficacy of the analytical framework and answering the research question.

The rationale behind this process is that the first step identifies the research gap and problem; the inductive analysis of data on historic inclusionary populism reveals the basics of a typology of subtypes of inclusionary populism, but this typology is too limited to be of significant value for researchers. The second step leverages new contemporary empirical data and the analytical framework to expand upon the initial typology through adding to the existing themes and including more themes, allowing for an understanding of the development of each subtype. The third step then completes this process by using the information revealed in the second step to draw comparisons with the information revealed by the first step.

Justifying the case-study selection is critical in research (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Beginning with the historic cases, the literature review revealed consensus that the cases used in Chapter 2, the Narodniks, pre-World War II USA populism and Latin American populism, were indicative examples of historic populism and inclusionary populism (Williams, 1981; Frierson, 1993; Kazin, 1995; Sivakumar, 2001; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012; Filc, 2015) and so were selected upon this basis. With regard to Latin America, this region has a rich history of inclusionary populism, with multiple movements that could have been selected as case studies. Chapter 2, while acknowledging these other movements, focusses on the three waves of inclusionary populism—classical, neopopulism and pink wave—in Brazil and Argentina, due to the fact that these waves have occurred at similar time periods and with similar movements. The cases were chosen based on the most similar method (Seawright and Gerring, 2008) in that there were commonalities across variables such as an excluded people and excluding elite with the exception of one variable, in these cases the identity of the people which changed across cases.

In terms of the contemporary case studies, a decision was made to focus on European cases. This is not to say that contemporary inclusionary populism is limited to this region, far from it, and this is acknowledged. However, as a goal of this thesis is to carry out comparative analysis across the cases, focussing on European cases, where each territory is liberal democratic with similar political cultures and party systems reduces the number of variables and allows for greater comparative analysis.

The three parties chosen for the contemporary case studies can be considered as typical cases for each type used in the typology. As per Sartori's "ladder of abstraction" (1970), there will then follow a move from the high-level categorisation of these parties as inclusionary populist towards lower-level differences in the themes in the analytical framework, with sufficient difference to confidently frame each one as

typical of a unique subtype of inclusionary populism.

Moving from the general to the specific rationale for choosing these particular cases, the SNP will be examined first. The SNP as a civic nationalist party is well-established within existing literature (Mycock, 2012; Duclos, 2016) and it is possible to use this to take the SNP as a crucial case of nationalism. However, the concept of the SNP as a populist party, while occasionally arising as a pejorative in the popular press, is not something that is established within academic literature. Yet the initial literature review of inclusionary populism suggests that the SNP could be framed as inclusionary populist in that, in manifestos, for example, they speak of a unified people of Scotland whose demands are ignored by an elite (SNP, 2017) and, as such, the SNP fit into a broad definition of populism.

SYRIZA posed fewer challenges as they are widely accepted as an inclusionary populist party (Mudde, 2017b; Font, Graziano and Tsakatika, 2021) Yet they are not the only European egalitarian inclusionary populist party, and cases could be made for, for example, Podemos (Agustín, 2021) and the Labour Party under Corbyn (Airas, 2019). However, SYRIZA were chosen due to the fact that, unlike the other similar parties, they have a record as a majority party in government, and this was a line of enquiry in the research questions to interview participants.

Sinn Féin presented the most challenges. There is very little literature on Sinn Féin being populist and, even then, it tends to classify them more as a socialist party (Field, 2020). The interest in Sinn Féin as an inclusionary populist party was piqued by frequent claims in Irish media by Eoin Ó Broin, a leading Sinn Féin spokesperson, not only classing Sinn Féin as populist (Lavin, 2020), but also using a profoundly Laclauian conception of populism in his definitions (Ó Broin, 2013). Similar to the SNP, Sinn Féin manifestos demonstrated evidence of a people who were being excluded from power by an elite (Sinn Féin, 2020) and so fit into this broad definition of populism. Furthermore, the colonial history of Ireland suggested that a case could be made for Sinn Féin being anti-colonial populist.

As discussed in Chapter 7, Sinn Féin operates within two jurisdictions, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland although this is a distinction rejected by Sinn Féin. However, there was the question on whether to concentrate on data and participants from one of these territories or both. Given Sinn Féin's rejection of them operating in two jurisdictions and also wishing to explore possible differences in attitudes, particularly to Irish unification, between Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland and the Republic

of Ireland, the decision was made to focus on both sides of the Irish border.

1.4 Analytical framework

The approach, derived from the theories of Laclau and Mouffe, is an attempt to take core components from their works and develop them into a framework that can be applied to multiple inclusionary populist movements and even wider populist parties and movements. The justification for this is that both proponents (Katsambekis, 2020) and opponents (Mudde, 2017a; Weyland, 2017) of Laclau and Mouffe's discursive approach point to its complexity, most notably in the construction of a people, the core element of Laclau's theories (Laclau, 2007). Criticisms of Laclau and Mouffe have pointed towards a vagueness in their approach where, ultimately, everything could be considered populist (Mudde, 2017a), and there is too much focus on the role of crisis in populism (Gauna, 2017).

The components can be summarised as follows; the people in terms of their identities and demands, the elite in terms of theirs, the relationship between the people and elite, the empty signifier that unifies the people and the articulation between the core ideology and populism of each movement, explaining how the core ideology and populism combine to create an identifiable type of inclusionary populism.

The analytical framework of this thesis, by focusing on core and applicable components of Laclau and Mouffe's theories, resolves these problems by applying it to contemporary cases and then carrying out comparative analysis to demonstrate validity, in that the framework measures what it was supposed to measure, and reliability, in that it can be applied to other populist movements to reveal similar themes.

Data for the contemporary case studies come from elite interviews with activists, staff and elected politicians from the three case studies, along with analysis of manifesto content. The analytical framework is used to carry out thematic analysis of the data, identifying inclusionary populist themes. Data from participants and manifesto are then thematically analysed, where the five components of the analytical framework are used to identify and explore discourse from participants and manifesto that could be considered inclusionary populist and identify the type of inclusionary populism.

The creation of the typology and its applications is timely and relevant because it offers answers as to how and why inclusionary populism has developed into the forms it currently holds. It places contemporary iterations of inclusionary populism into wider

families, both historic and contemporary, and gives scope for further additions to be made to these iterations.

As well as advancing the knowledge of populism and inclusionary populism, the thesis also makes contributions towards wider contemporary debates in political sciences such as party families and party systems offering answers as to how inclusionary populist parties electorally challenge established parties and the extent to which the discourse of inclusionary populist parties influences the discourse of other parties.

The discussions on inclusionary populism and identity contributes to debates on national identity and secessionist parties most notably in terms of the supply and demand side of national identity and how national identity drives support for secessionist parties, supporting literature that argues that secessionist parties capture demand-side national identity but further arguing that, over time, these parties may also prove supply-side national identity as their electoral success continues.

The thesis also contributes to supply and demand-side debates in populism and representation with the data adding support to the argument that inclusionary populist react both to demands from the electorate for representation while also advancing demands of their own that the electorate might not share to the same level of salience.

1.5 Thesis structure

Chapter 2 examines and charts the historic development of inclusionary populism, from the early Russian Narodniks to the pink wave of Latin American inclusionary populism. The chapter focuses on three cases: the Narodniks, pre-War US populism and the three waves of Latin American inclusionary populism: classical, neopopulist and pink wave. This investigation allows for the initial typology of this thesis, with the Narodniks exemplifying a nationalist inclusionary populism subtype, the pre-War US populists exemplifying an egalitarian inclusionary populism subtype, and the Latin American populists exemplifying an anti-colonial inclusionary populist subtype, and also reveals two key analytical themes: the identity of the people and elite.

Chapter 3 establishes the analytical framework and begins with an overview of the current literature on populism theories and examines the strengths and weaknesses of ideational, strategic and discursive approaches to populism and advances the argument that, in the case of inclusionary populism, the discursive approach is best suited for analysis. From here, the chapter focusses in-depth on the theories of Laclau and

Mouffe, exploring their development, meaning and application, before drawing on core components of these theories to build an analytical framework and discussing its strengths and weaknesses. The two analytical themes of Chapter 2 (the people and the elite) are given confirmation by the theory and are joined by three further themes: the antagonistic relationship between people and elite, empty signifier and articulation.

Chapter 4 explains the methodology in detail. It establishes how parties and participants were selected and approached, the format of interviews, how the questions used in the interviews were designed and what they were intended to uncover. There is a discussion on the methods considered for analysing the data and a full and transparent explanation of how and why the method of thematic analysis was chosen and how it was used. Finally, consideration is given to the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on data collection.

Chapter 5 is the first empirical chapter and focusses on the SNP. The data obtained for this chapter explores how the SNP frame their politics as a clash of values-based demands between the people in Scotland and the Westminster elite, revealing how the SNP reject any notions of a Scottish elite and an antagonistic clash of meaning over the empty signifier of independence.

Chapter 6 turns to SYRIZA, with interview data all coming post-SYRIZA's 2019 election defeat. The analytical framework confirms the positioning of SYRIZA as inclusionary populist and, also, as egalitarian, but noting how egalitarian politics has developed from being primarily economic to now focussing on other minority identities, such as LGBTQI+ and refugees, while still retaining the economic core.

Chapter 7 completes the case studies by presenting Sinn Féin. Similar to the SNP, the thesis is able to confidently frame Sinn Féin as inclusionary populist, something rarely achieved in literature prior to this. The chapter reveals how Sinn Féin use their anti-colonial inclusionary populism to attempt to build bridges and reach out to other communities, including refugees and LGBTQI+, and have even made claimed attempts to engage with loyalist communities in Northern Ireland.

Chapter 8 takes each of the themes in the analytical framework design to examine inclusionary populism in turn and shows how each sub-type of inclusionary populism has developed over time. It achieves this through looking at the development of each of the themes, revealing a number of key developments which add new insight to populism studies. In doing so, a number of insights about inclusionary populism and its subtypes emerge, such as the heterogeneity of the people, how the empty signifier is

deployed by parties to unify and rally support and how, while the core components of inclusionary populism remain constant over time, they have adapted to respond to social and political changes.

Chapter 9 concludes the thesis and explains the implications of what this thesis has demonstrated and its implications for wider debates in political science, while assessing the strengths and limitations of the research. Finally, there is a discussion of scope for further research based on the findings of this thesis.

Chapter 2 - A history of inclusionary populism

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the history of inclusionary populism from the mid-19th century for three reasons. First, and in line with the research question of this thesis, it seeks to uncover the nature and forms of historic inclusionary populism so as to have a baseline to explore the development in later chapters. Second, it aims to give context to the theories of inclusionary populism covered by Chapter 3. Third, it seeks to introduce the threefold typology as the historical evidence and context reveals three distinct forms of inclusionary populism: nationalist, egalitarian and anti-colonial.

The three major inclusionary populist movements prior to the contemporary wave of European inclusionary populism which this thesis examines will be considered in turn. The thesis shall start with the proto populism of the Russian Narodniks and then turn to the pre-World War II inclusionary populism of the USA, focussing on the People's Party, Huey Long and the New Deal. Next, there will be an examination of the inclusionary populism of Latin America, focussing on Argentina and Brazil and considering the three waves of populism seen in those countries: classical populism, neopopulism and pink wave populism. The historical analysis takes us up to the period immediately prior to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. The reason for this cut-off date is that the empirical research of this event will concentrate on inclusionary populist movements which have arisen or flourished post-crisis. While it was intended to give each section equal consideration and length, this proved difficult due to the scarcity of material concerning the pre-war USA populists and, especially, the Narodniks when compared to Latin America. Both the pre-war USA populists and Narodniks have had periods where they have been subjected to considerable study, in particular the 1950s and 1960s and, as populism studies continue, more work is being undertaken. However, these still represent under-explored periods of political history.

2.2 The Russian Narodniks

The Narodniks, while not the first political movement to focus on “the people”, are one of the first movements, along with the People's Party of the USA, to which contemporary populism is traced back to (Kaltwasser, 2014)The Narodniks, literally translated as “people-ists”, but commonly translated as “populists”, were a broadly

middle-class intellectual movement in the latter half of the 19th century which advocated the masses over the educated elite (Walicki, 1969), seeking to save and preserve what they saw as the traditional peasant way of life (Hermet, 2013) and use this to build a new Russia for the benefit of those peasants. It was not a single coherent doctrine but, rather, a broad collection of ideas about the Russian peasantry (Walicki, 1969)

The foundation of Narodnism resides within a wider intellectual tradition of concern for the Russian peasantry, which included a variety of strands from Jacobin to conservative (Sivakumar, 2001). The genesis of Narodnism itself can be found within the ideas of Herder and, in particular, his rejection of Enlightenment thinking and an idealisation of bucolic and cultural life (Hermet, 2013). Although German, Herder displayed a strong Slavophilia, the 19th century movement which rejected the Westernising agenda initiated by Peter the Great and argued for a return to what was seen as the traditional values of the communal peasant life (Engelstein, 2009), believing that the Slavic peoples had the potential to be a great European power. His ideas had a profound influence on Slavophilism in Russia and other Slavic nations (Gesemann, 1965), viewing, as he did, Western civilisation as being fully formed and complete but Slavic civilisation as still in development. Therefore, this growing Slavic civilisation had, Herder argued, the ability to reawaken not just the Slavic world, but all of Europe, and to turn it away from Enlightenment thinking (Sydoruk, 1955).

While the actual terms of *Narodnichestvo* (populism) and Narodnik (populist) did not appear until around 1870 (Hermet, 2013), the Narodnik movement can be traced back to the 1840s and the arguments of the writer and critic Alexander Herzen, who advocated a form of utopian socialism based upon Russian peasant values (Hermet, 2013). Herzen witnessed the revolutions of 1848 first-hand, and his experiences and disdain for the intellectual debates around these revolutions led him to reject the Jacobin tradition as elitist and, instead, focus on a peasant-based revolution (Hermet, 2013)

Like Herder, Herzen was a Slavophile. However, unlike most Slavophiles, Herzen was not advocating simply returning to this past but, instead, to build a new Russia based upon those peasant values (Hermet, 2013) which came from the *obscina*, the rural village, and viewing these values as the vehicle for the moral and cultural revival of Russia (Morini, 2013). The *obscina* was central to peasant life, and it was through the village unit that local economics such as distribution, taxation and the allocation of land were managed (Sivakumar, 2001).

By the 1860s, the Narodnik movement was centred around the leadership of Nikolai Chernyshevsky, who looked to the primitive collectivism of the *obscina* and argued that this was sufficiently similar to more sophisticated socialist collectivism as to allow a direct transition to socialism without a capitalism phase (Walicki, 1969). This cause was formed around the political party *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Liberty), which was clandestinely active in the 1860s and 1870s (Vergara, 2020).

Through his support of the *obscina* model of Russian economics and society, Chernyshevsky was willing even to ally with ultra-nationalist Slavophiles as he argued for peasant emancipation and the preservation of the peasant economy (Sivakumar, 2001). The hoped-for peasant emancipation from Alexander II failed to materialise and, by the 1870s, the Narodnik movement was the cause of the urban middle-classes, most notably students, and through this adoption of the cause by the intelligentsia, a more systemic analysis of the lives and conditions of the peasantry arose, such as that of V. V. Bervi (Sivakumar, 2001).

Bervi's 1869 work, *The Condition of the Working Class in Russia*, had a significant impact on Russian populism (Offord, 1988). Bervi toured Russia and documented the poverty of industrial worker and peasant alike, painting a picture of misery and deprivation, pointing to an oppressive regime of taxation (Sivakumar, 2001) and the breakup of families through men being required to carry out military service or leave the village to seek seasonal or longer-term employment (Offord, 1988). Bervi's remedies for this deprivation were both populist and Slavophile (Offord, 1988; Sivakumar, 2001). The Slavophilism can be seen through Bervi, like both Chernyshevsky and Herzen, emphasising the role of the *obscina* in managing land reform and distribution (Sivakumar, 2001), and the populism through Bervi giving the Russian people distinct and admirable values, such as industriousness and a willingness to cooperate, values not shared by the Russian elite (Offord, 1988).

The *narods* (the people) were, in the eyes of the urban elite, the simple people of rural Russia who represented true Russia (Frierson, 1993). These peasants, only recently emancipated from serfdom, were idealised as both Russian national identity and something separate from the Westernised Russian cities (Frierson, 1993). As late nineteenth-century Russia sought to modernise and catch up with the industrialised Western Europe and USA, this was opposed by the Narodniks (von Laue, 1954). While the Russian Marxists of the time viewed the capitalisation of Russia as a battle between bourgeoisie and proletariat, the Narodniks, instead, viewed it as Westerniser versus Slavophile (von Laue, 1954), a battle for the soul of the new Russia. While Marxists

objected to capitalism on the grounds that it was exploitative, the Narodniks objected to it on the grounds that it was un-Russian (von Laue, 1954).

It was through the cultural integrity, untainted by Westernism, applied to the *narods* that the conception of the true Russian people arose, standing against the educated, Westernised urban elite, the *obshchestvo* (Frierson, 1993). The narods represented the civic unity and moral strength of the true Russia (Frierson, 1993). It was through their values that the new Russia was to be forged, a Russia that rejected both capitalism and Marxism as alien concepts, with the former focussed on the Westernised bourgeoisie and the latter focussed on the urban proletariat, both at the expense of the true Russia of the peasantry (von Laue, 1954). The Russia the Narodniks wished to build was a socialist Russia, but one based on what they saw as the traditional values of the true Russians; the peasantry.

The Narodniks were unable to successfully marry the traditional with the new, they were unable to keep pace with Marxism and they were unable to keep pace with the rapid changes in Russia which led to the revolutions of 1917 (von Laue, 1954).

However, the influence of the Narodnik movement continued into the 20th century and beyond. Any political movement which seeks to protect its people and values from damaging foreign interests and values shares a commonality with the Narodniks (von Laue, 1954)

Nineteenth-century Russia was a period of multiple causes aimed at building a new Russia. Marxists agitated for the revolutionary emancipation of the proletariat, the Westernising bourgeoisie worked for an industrial revolution to keep pace with the West and the pan-Slav and pan-Orthodox movements argued for the preservation of Tsarist autocracy through a return to traditional values (Vovchenko, 2012). What makes the Narodniks unique within these competing nation-building movements is that, through their Slavophilic nationalism, they looked both to the past and the future. They rejected the autocracy of the pan-Slav and pan-Orthodox movements but embraced their belief in traditional values. The traditional values were there to build a new Russia, not to preserve the old.

In discussing the Narodniks, the populism, although not yet fully formed, is clear. What is less clear is the idea of inclusion. This is an area where there is limited research,

possibly because the Soviet Union downplayed the Eurocentrism of the Narodniks, an approach then mirrored in subsequent writings by non- and post-Soviet researchers . (Tikhonov, 2016). However, there is evidence that although Narodism was Slavophile, it lacked the anti-East Asian racism prevalent among Russian elites of the time, and that some Narodnik leaders expressed admiration for Japanese culture and society (Tikhonov, 2016). Accordingly, while it cannot be stated with confidence that Narodism was an inclusionary movement, there is evidence, albeit limited, to suggest that it lacked the nativism of mainstream Russian thought of the time.

2.3 The USA: People's Party, Huey Long and the New Deal

From the “We, the people” declaration of the Founding Fathers onwards, American political rhetoric has been defined by an appeal to the people (Kazin, 1995), and the first political movement of the USA considered to be truly populist are the People's Party (Kaltwasser, 2014).

On February 2nd, 1892, the birthday of George Washington, a public meeting was held in St. Louis, MO, attended by a broad coalition of disenchanted Americans. While the bulk of those attending were small farmers, it also included women's movements, such as the Women's Christian Temperance Movement, labour unions and even Christian socialists. At this meeting, the People's Party was founded. This was by no means the first attempt at founding a populist movement in the USA, but it did represent the first broad alliance of interests ignored by the “elite” (Pollack, 1976). In its membership there is a key divergence from the Narodniks. The Narodniks focussed on the peasant in response to industrialisation. But the People's Party, while being predominantly founded on small farmers, was a much broader coalition of shared, anti-elite interests and brought organised labour under its banner. This sense of common purpose between farmer and labourer was due to a shared economic position; a sense that farmers were now, themselves, labourers (Pollack, 1976). While the populists were not socialist, as Pollack, (1976) argues, they stood against the increasing gap between the wealthy elite and the farmers of USA, as much the idealised backbone of USA as the *narods* were of Russia.

These American populists were egalitarian in nature; they saw themselves as honest men seeking a fair deal from an industrialising USA that was rapidly changing and giving birth to an almost aristocratic elite of plutocrats (Nugent, 1963). It was this

increasing gap between the plutocratic elite and the honest workers of USA, perceived as a betrayal of the founding principles of America, that fuelled the populist drive (Kazin, 1995). “We the people” no longer meant the entirety of the USA but the excluded masses, and it was big business and its political representatives which had excluded them.

This idea of a people being excluded by big business developed further through the politics and rhetoric of Huey Long. Yet for a few short years in the 1920s and ‘30s, his influence as both governor of Louisiana from 1928 to 1932 and as senator for Louisiana from 1932 until his 1935 assassination, had a significant and profound impact on the politics of the age (Kazin, 1995). Long took inspiration from the rhetoric and methods of the People’s Party, and who used populist rhetoric, most noticeably in his slogan of “Every Man A King, But No One Wears A Crown” to argue for and enact a redistributive platform in his home state as governor (Williams, 1981). As senator and potential challenger for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1936, he took this message nationwide (Williams, 1981). In essence, this was a similar platform to the earlier People’s Party, not anti-capitalist but rather in favour of an egalitarian capitalism that supported small businesses, including farms.

Long’s conception of the excluded people expanded greatly on the small farmers of the People’s Party to now include the “God-fearing ordinary poor and common God-fearing middle class”, (Lee, 2006, p. 364). Long was explicit about who the people truly were. His “Share Our Wealth” platform drew a line between the 120 million “sovereign” citizens of the United States and the 12 “fortune holders” who owned the USA ((Lee, 2006, p. 344). Long’s discourse of “top and bottom” and “lords and slaves” painted a divided society of a "them and us". Yet his policies, even including as they did a redistributive tax policy, should not be viewed as socialist. What Long was proposing was making capitalism fairer through anti-trust legislation and curbing the powers and influence of big business.

Huey Long’s conception of the people contained elements from both Narodism and the People’s Party. For the Narodniks, only the peasants could be considered the true people, and this resonated with the appeal to small farmers that Long made. With the People’s Party, who had been a significant influence on Long’s formative years (Williams, 1981), this conception was expanded to include the industrial workers. While the primary audience was still the poor small farmer, representing the “true” USA in the same manner as the *narod* represented the “true” Russia, Long further

expanded this to include the industrial worker as an equal of the agricultural worker and also include the “common God-fearing middle-class” (Lee, 2006). In other words, for Long, the people were virtually anyone who was not a moneyed oligarch or their political enabler.

The context for the politics of Long and the New Deal was the Great Depression, the global economic collapse of the 1930s, precipitated by the Wall Street Crash of 1929. The Great Depression hit the USA especially hard, and the period was marked by multiple bank failures, business closures and high unemployment (Crafts and Fearon, 2013). The response of many governments, including in the USA, was to adopt a more socialist, planned economic approach to recover the economy (Temin, 1990) and, in the USA, this took the form of the New Deal (Crafts and Fearon, 2013).

The New Deal is a catch-all term for the wide-ranging and radical policies implemented by the Franklin D Roosevelt presidencies of the 1930s. Through an extension of federal government regulatory and economic influence in multiple directions (Collins, 2013), the Roosevelt administrations sought to pull the USA from the economic ruin of the Great Depression. While FDR was by no means a populist of the same ilk as Long, he had his own conception of the people; workers who had suffered under the monopolistic excesses of the pre-Depression and Depression eras. Roosevelt allied himself with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the federation of unions that existed in the USA and Canada from 1935 to 1955, going so far as to say, in 1936, that if he were a factory worker, the first thing he would do would be to join a union (Kazin, 1995)

FDR privately admitted that the New Deal was partly instigated to steal the thunder of Long, whom FDR viewed as one of the two most dangerous men in America (the other being General Douglas McArthur) (Seaton, 2017), considering him as a potential Hitler whose disdain for democracy could spell the downfall of the Republic. While Long was initially supportive of FDR and his New Deal, by 1935 he had begun to become critical of it, viewing it as not going far enough to support the common man of America betrayed by big business, and he had begun to be talked of as a possible opponent for the Democratic nomination of 1936 (Williams, 1981). His assassination meant that this would not come to pass, so all that can be done is speculate as to whether he might have beaten FDR and whether a Long presidency would have seen the USA slide into demagogic dictatorship, or whether this was simply the scaremongering rhetoric of a political establishment seeking to preserve itself from radical threats.

As Kazin, (1995) argues, much of American politics is defined by the idea that the USA has somehow abandoned or betrayed the founding principles of the Republic, and that this is manifested and demonstrated through the political movements that have been examined making both an appeal to the people and associating themselves with the people. Both the People's Party and Huey Long made appeals to the "honest" farmer and labourer of the USA. Indeed, the People's Party, in reaction to the rise of big business, would view the small farmer as now being a labourer himself (Pollack, 1976). This was developed further by Long and FDR to include almost everyone who was not considered to be a plutocrat. FDR even allied himself with the organised labour of the USA, making it clear that he saw himself on the side of the people.

The demands of the people throughout this era were primarily economic. The People's Party, for example, were leading proponents of the Free Silver movement of the late 19th century, which argued that silver should be accorded the same rights and privileges as gold, namely the ability to have bullion turned into coins and thus receive "free silver". This was a cause adopted by small farmers as a possible remedy to their debt crisis and was thus adopted by the People's Party (Kazin, 1995). A similarity with Huey Long's economics can be seen, described as: "...rustic radicalism, the same small-capitalist philosophy that his audience really believed in, and they heard him with pleasure and applause." (Williams, 1981, p. 65). Neither the People's Party nor Long sought to overthrow capitalism and replace it with a socialist variant; rather, this was about rearticulating capitalism to make it fairer and more egalitarian.

Equally, the rhetoric employed by FDR to promote the New Deal demonstrated these economic demands. Roosevelt delivered a message in which monopolies were the enemy of the people and the enemy of economic reform (Goebel, 1997) This can be seen clearly in *his Message to Congress on Curbing Monopolies*, delivered in 1938, where he argued that when private power (monopolies) grew stronger than government, this was, in effect, fascism, and that when private power failed to guarantee a standard of living, it was a threat to the liberty of democracy (Roosevelt, 1938) .

In considering the inclusionary aspects of this populism, it is important to consider the racism of both the People's Party and Huey Long, although there is little evidence of Long using anti-immigration rhetoric and adopting the same racist and antisemitic tropes as Father Charles Coughlin, for example. Coughlin reached a radio audience of around ten million each Sunday as he articulated a message supporting the "average Joe" against the modern industrial state, but he quickly became pro-fascist, anti-

immigrant and antisemitic (Ketchaver, 2008). While Long was never as explicit as this, he was a politician of the Deep South and dabbled in the racist rhetoric of that region (Williams, 1981).

However, historical evidence would suggest that the racism of Long was more opportunistic than heartfelt. He would occasionally rally his Louisiana supporters by stoking racist sentiment, but he rarely used the racist language of the time, and nor did his policies seek to benefit whites at the expense of others. Indeed, Louisiana blacks benefitted from his policies as much as whites did (Williams, 1981). For Long, the battle was the common man versus the elite, not the common man versus the elite and immigrants. Moreover, while he did not explicitly include blacks within his “common man” grouping, neither did he explicitly exclude them. It is reasonable to conclude that, by the admittedly poor standards of the Deep South at that time, Long was not explicitly racist in the manner of other southern demagogues.

The People’s Party is even more problematic in this respect. While not anti-black in its rhetoric, it was not pro-black either. By the 1910s, the People’s Party had adopted a white-supremacist rhetoric as it attempted to remain relevant and gain support (Kazin, 1995), but this was not evident in its brief 1890s heyday. It did, however, articulate an anti-immigration rhetoric, even at the height of its popularity. While this should be put in the historical context of racism not having the negative connotations it does today (Kazin, 1995), the People’s Party were not as inclusionary in their politics as other movements this thesis has examined.

If the populism of pre-War USA was focussed on building a wide coalition of the economically excluded, there remains the question of what it was that was excluding them. The answer appears to be capitalism but not capitalism in general. For the pre-War US populists, it was big business capitalism and its political supporters which were the enemy. The People’s Party appealed to the small business owner, labourer and farmer (Pollack, 1976), arguing that they represented the true spirit of America, the America of the founding fathers and pioneers that had been betrayed by an elite of plutocrats (Nugent, 1963). Huey Long, while arguing for a more redistributive economics than the People’s Party, still sided with the worker and small business owner, railing against the 12 “fortune holders” who owned the USA (Lee, 2006). FDR launched similar invectives against monopolistic capitalism, blaming it for the Wall Street Crash and subsequent depression (Goebel, 1997) While the People’s Party in particular had an anti-immigrant aspect to their rhetoric, the elite that the pre-War US

inclusionary populists had in their sights was primarily the domestic capitalism they believed had failed the people of the USA. The monopolies and trusts were not only the elite, but they were also anti-American and a betrayal of the founding principles of the Republic, an attack on the “real American”, the average Joe of FDR, Long and the People’s Party (Kazin, 1995).

There are similarities between the Narodniks and pre-war USA populists, most notably the idea that the country has deviated from its core values and that these should be returned to. Yet while the Narodniks were seeking to build a new nation, the movements of the USA were seeking to reconfigure the existing structures towards a more egalitarian state where the people, upon whom that state had been founded, got their fair share.

2.4 Latin America: Classical populism, neopopulism and pink wave populism

Throughout the three waves of Latin American populism there are differences between each wave, but there are also similarities, most notably a belief in the sovereignty of the people (Basset and Launay, 2013) and the legacy of colonialism. In order to properly contextualise this discussion, the ideology of colonialism and the response of anti-colonialism shall be considered first.

The differences between Western and non-Western nationalism are now examined, with Western nationalism being the preservation of its values and non-Western nationalism as a rejection of these values, seeing them as alien, and an attempt to develop one’s own national identity (Chatterjee, 1993). The colonial projects of the 19th and 20th centuries can be seen as an attempt to impose Western values upon the rest of the world (Kleinschmidt, 2016) and anti-colonialism as a non-Western nationalist rejection of this. At the heart of the colonial project is the idea of difference, a “them and us” between coloniser and colonised, with race being the key differentiator (Chatterjee, 1993), and the belief in the superiority of the white man (Cooper, 2005). The idea of the colonised being excluded is not unique to the colonial projects of the 19th and 20th centuries; this has been a characteristic of empires throughout history. What marks the exclusion of this period is the post-Enlightenment emphasis on rankings of peoples, with inclusion being dependent upon adopting those Western “civilised” values of the coloniser (Cooper, 2005).

The people, therefore, in the colonised countries did not include those seen as uncivilised (Filc, 2015). In Latin America, the Spanish elite introduced a caste-based hierarchy with an emphasis on “purity of blood”, where the whiter a person was, the higher in the hierarchy they were. This hierarchy included the children of those born to white and indigenous peoples (*mestizos*), white and black people (mulattoes) and white and Indian people (*zambos*) (Clayton, Conniff and Gauss, 2017). As this history of inclusionary populism within Latin America is considered, anti-colonialism, in the form of the rejection of the colonial division of the people and expansion of the membership of the people to include those excluded by colonialists, shall be apparent throughout the three waves of populism of Latin America, beginning with the classical populism of Vargas in Brazil and Perón in Argentina.

In the 24 years from 1930 to his suicide in 1954, Getúlio Vargas was a revolutionary leader, interim president, quasi-fascist dictator and, finally, an elected populist leader (Wolfe, 1994). It was during his time as democratically elected president, from 1951 to 1954, that his populism truly emerged and flourished (Conniff, 2012).

Understanding the Vargist conception of the people must begin with considering the impact of the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre and his 1933 work *Casa-Grande e Senzala*. This translates literally as “The Big House and the Slave Quarters” but is more commonly known in the English-speaking world as “The Masters and the Slaves”. This book painted a persuasive picture of a multiracial Brazil, where its miscegenation was portrayed in a positive light (Celarent, 2010). Through a celebration of culture, cuisine, society, sexuality and music, Freyre penned almost a love letter to the multicultural Brazil of his age. The book was an instant success and continues to play an important role in racial understanding in Brazil, although it should be remembered that, as a member of the Brazilian middle-class, Freyre viewed the Brazilian miscegenation through a lens of privilege, which those he was studying would not share (Celarent, 2010).

Freyre’s theories provided the ideological foundations for how Vargas would view and approach race, in both his dictatorial and democratic periods in Brazil (Reiter and Mitchell, 2010). Under Vargas, “race” was removed from textbooks, censuses and official discourse. No matter what their ethnic background, Brazilians were viewed as “one”, and to suggest otherwise was considered reactionary (Reiter and Mitchell, 2010). At a time when the racial chauvinism of fascism was dominant in Germany and Italy and had adherents around the world, this approach to the ethnos of Brazil does

appear to be both radical and inclusionary. Membership of the “people” of Brazil was not concomitant on class or ethnicity, and Vargas’ message was delivered to all.

This expansion of the people was central to the Vargist movement. During the Estado Novo, the “New State” dictatorship led by Vargas, the labour rights of the urban working classes were extended (Conniff, 2012) and, consequently, the citizenry of Brazil was expanded (Grigera, 2017). Indeed, the 1943 expansion of labour rights can be seen as the first truly populist mobilisation by Vargas (Jansen, 2011). By expanding labour rights, Vargas was expanding democratic rights and bringing the excluded workers into the political establishment of Brazil through a broadening of citizenship (Grigera, 2017).

However, the very act of inclusion can, in itself, be exclusionary. In 1937, the Estado Novo decreed that all political parties were illegal and must be dissolved. Included in this number was the Frente Negra Brasileira (FNB – The Brazilian Black Front). The FNB had, until this point, been a fast-growing and developing political movement, seeking to include themselves in a Brazilian society that had excluded them socially, culturally and economically (Reiter and Mitchell, 2010). By creating and imposing this designed multiracial society, Vargas had turned issues of racial identity and solidarity into unpatriotic activities. Those who continued in the expression of black solidarity could be subject to imprisonment, torture and even execution ((Reiter and Mitchell, 2010).

An irony of the Vargas era is that, in an attempt to impose and celebrate a multicultural society, in opposition to the racially driven policies of many other contemporaneous societies, for those who excluded themselves from the Vargist paradigm there was the same state-sponsored torture and death that similar groups faced in other countries. Unlike in the USA, the people in the Vargist paradigm were not defined by their economic exclusion, as such, but rather by their politics. Those who supported Vargas were the people, while those who did not, such as critical media and newspapers, were the enemy elite.

The economic definition of the people was fundamental to the populism of the leading contemporary of Getúlio Vargas: Juan Domingo Perón, who served two terms as president of Argentina, 1946-1955 and 1973-1974. The ideology of Perón, referred to in literature both as Peronism and Justicialism, was influenced by Hellenic philosophy, Marx, Hobbes and Hegel, as he attempted to create a third way between capitalism and socialism, creating a new politics for Argentina (Bolton, 2014). For the purposes of this

discussion, however, the term “Peronism” shall be used to refer to the ideology and practice of the Justicialist movement.

The ideology of Peronism is complex and rich, and its populism is made explicit in a speech Perón gave in 1950, where he outlined the “twenty principles of Justicialism” (Bolton, 2014). The first principle expresses the populism of Peronism in unequivocal terms: “True democracy is the system where the government carries the will of the people defending a single objective: the interests of the people” (Perón, 2014). Perón stated that the defence of the interests of the people is the *sine qua non* of Peronism. The second principle then seeks to delegitimise non-Peronists from claiming to act in the name of the people: “Peronism is an eminently popular movement. Every political clique is opposed to the popular interest and, therefore, it cannot be a Peronist interest.” In the rhetoric of Perón, only Peronism can represent the will of the people, and any movement which opposes Peronism therefore opposes the popular will. The fourth principle gives an idea of who the people are in Peronism: “There is only one class of men for the Peronist cause: the workers”.

The ordinary workers of Argentina represented the “true” Argentina, while the elite, Perón’s opponents, were the oligarchs, imperialists and foreign powers who stood against their interests (de la Torre, 2017). It is through the embracing of this people that some of the inclusionary characteristics of Peronism are evident. The middle-class elites dismissed the supporters of Perón as “*los cabecitas negra*” (the little black-headed ones), in reference to their dark skin and black hair, and racialised them as “black Peronists”, highlighting not just their physical appearance but the cheapness and poor taste of their clothes (de la Torre, 2017). Yet this was taken as a badge of pride with Juan and, especially, his wife, Eva Perón, turning the “*descamisados*” (shirtless ones) insult used by the Argentinian elites at Peronist workers into a semi-official term for their supporters (Clayton, Conniff and Gauss, 2017).

Similar to Vargas, Perón allied himself with organised labour and had an almost sanctification of his *descamisados*, framing them as the true people of Argentina (Clayton, Conniff and Gauss, 2017). Similar to Vargas, Perón widened the membership of the people through, for example, expanding of the franchise in 1949 to include, for the first time, women. Equally, Perón did not discriminate between ethnic groups in his appeal and considered the people of Argentina to be a blend of the European and the indigenous (Filoc, 2015). Racism was a legacy of colonialism and this was a legacy that Peronism stood against.

Filc, (2015) characterises this approach as “inclusionary nativism” which he describes as setting “‘The people’ against imperialist and colonialist forces and their internal ally—the oligarchy” (p. 271).

Perón, like Vargas, was neither anti-immigrant nor explicitly racist, but his conception of the people also demonstrates a paradox within the taxonomy of “inclusionary” for his particular brand of populism which can be seen in his treatment of Argentinian Jews. While his government relaxed laws barring Jews from certain roles in public life and there was significant Jewish support for Peronism, his ideology, which placed national interest above sectional interest, stood against special interest groups, such as Argentinian Jews. (Bolton, 2014). While Perón was one of the first leaders to recognise and send embassies to the new state of Israel and Eva Perón organised charitable appeals for Israel, any Zionist sentiment among Israel’s Jews was quashed. There was no official policy of antisemitism in Argentina and no persecution of Jews but only if they identified, only as Argentinian through adherence to Peronism (Bolton, 2014). The parallels with Vargas’ treatment of black interest groups in Brazil are evident. By classifying all ethnic groups as being either Brazilian or Argentinian only and characterising identity and special interest as counter to the general will of the people, a chauvinistic nationalist element to this inclusionary populism is clear. Being part of the people of Argentina was concomitant on being a Peronist as they were one and the same (Bolton, 2014). While Perón sought to bring the excluded into Argentinian politics this was only possible if they identified as Peronists and supported the cause.

This first wave of populism came to an end in the mid-1950s, when much of Latin America fell under dictatorial regimes. As countries began to democratise once more in the late 1970s and 1980s, classical-style populists again bid for power. However, unlike in the first wave of populism, their bids were unsuccessful, as new, younger voters with no direct experience of this “golden age” of populism failed to be mobilised by populist appeals (Clayton, Conniff and Gauss, 2017). Towards the end of the 1980s, though, a new wave of populism began across Latin America. This populism shared much of the discourse and rhetoric of classical populism; the leaders framed themselves as outsiders, untainted by the corruption of the elite, and made a direct appeal to the people from outside the political establishment. The critical difference, however, was not the rhetoric but the policy. While the classical populists had pursued an avowedly redistributive and statist economic policy, the neopopulists took a more free-market and business-focussed approach (Clayton, Conniff and Gauss, 2017). Yet the conception of the people was still central to their appeal.

With the classical populism of Latin America emphasising statist and redistributive economic policies, the free-market emphasis of the neopopulists does not appear to sit neatly within a Latin American populist paradigm. Indeed, the received wisdom prior to the neopopulist second wave of Latin American populism was that populism was incompatible with the austere politics of liberalisation (Weyland, 1996). Despite attempts to argue that the neopopulists gained power through a ‘bait and switch’ technique, running on a redistributive platform and then governing with neoliberal policies, with the possible exception of Fujimori in Peru, this theory lacks evidence (Weyland, 1996).

In the Latin America of the late 1980s, the economic crises and hyper-inflation were the failures that the neopopulists capitalised upon to mobilise support. This was the strategy pursued by Fernando Collor de Mello, president of Brazil from 1990-92, as he positioned himself as a political outsider, using this very alienation from the political mainstream as his authority to create change (Panizza, 2009). Much like Vargas before him, Collor utilised mass media to galvanise support, reaching directly to the voters of Brazil with a powerful message of ending the economic crisis, appealing to the unorganised rural and urban poor (Conniff, 2012).

The people in the neopopulist paradigm of Collor were those failed by the economic and political systems. However, the allies and enemies of this neopopulism were almost a mirror image of classical populism. Vargas (and Perón) had mobilised organised labour as a key ally and railed against the interests of big business, while using the state as a redistributive mechanism. Yet Collor turned the popular resentment against organised labour and the state, accusing them and their restrictive practices of being the cause of the economic crisis and turned to business as the route back to economic stability (Horowitz, 2012). While the core identity of the people changed, their circumstances, politically and economically excluded, remained.

There was a marked difference in Argentina, though, where the perception of the people of Carlos Saúl Menem Aki, president of Argentina from 1989-1999, remained similar to Perón’s. As president of Argentina from 1989 to 1999, Menem “represents neoliberal populism par excellence” (Filc, 2011, p. 244). Although a member of the Peronist Justicialist Party (PJ), Menem had been a key member of the Renovardes group, founded within PJ in 1987 with a view to modernising Peronism and making it more relevant to the changing and increasingly globalised world. It was through this modernising effort that Menem, despite being a long-standing member of PJ, was still

able to frame himself as a political outsider, rejecting the economic orthodoxy of PJ while still remaining true to the populist rhetoric pioneered by Perón (Filc, 2011). Yet while the economics of Menem were diametrically opposed to the economics of classical populism, the message was fundamentally the same; Menem represented the will of the people, and the poorest, the *descamisados* of historic Peronism, would benefit (Szusterman, 2000). The people were the same, but the vehicle of their economic and political liberation was different.

The third wave of populism can be perceived as a reaction against the neopopulism and the failure of the Washington Consensus, and it saw a distinct shift towards the left. In the 2000s, there was a new vigour to socialist parties in Latin America. Fuelled, in part, by a global commodities boom that allowed an increase in public spending, these movements, for the first time in Latin American history, reached out to groups such as environmental activists and indigenous peoples to build a new politics (North, 2018). This third wave of populism has been called variously “post-neoliberalism”, “21st century socialism” and “neo-developmentalism” (Rojas, 2017). For the purposes of a consistent taxonomy, this third wave shall be labelled as “pink wave populism”, and its fundamentals can be defined as:

The set of political aspirations centred on ‘reclaiming’ the authority of the state to oversee the construction of a new social consensus and approach to welfare, and the body of economic policies that seeks to enhance or ‘rebuild’ the capacity of the state to manage the market and the export economy in ways that not only ensure growth but are also responsive to social need and citizenship demands. (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012, pp. 2–3).

This wave was embodied by leaders such as Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Néstor and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina and, more contentiously, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva of Brazil. Lula da Silva was born into poverty in North-East Brazil. As a teenager he migrated with his mother to São Paulo and found work as a metalworker. Injury stopped him from continuing in this trade, and he became active in the trade union movement, working his way up through the ranks. A rebel against the Brazilian military government, he organised walkouts in defiance of laws preventing them and, in 1980, he helped found the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores). Lula stood, unsuccessfully, for president twice, including when he was defeated by Collor in 1990. By 2002, though, the Workers’ Party had softened some of its more radical and hard-line economic policies and, by gaining the support of the middle classes, Lula was, on his third attempt, elected president (Clayton, Conniff and Gauss, 2017)

Classifying Lula and his government as populist is contentious, not least because Lula declared that he was not a populist, and his popular appeal to the poor of Brazil was not matched with an anti-elitist/anti-colonial rhetoric (Grigera, 2017). Opponents of Lula characterised him as a populist, using the term pejoratively, accusing him of buying favour through land reform and other methods of redistributive economics (Grigera, 2017). However, analysis of both what Lula said and how he said it demonstrates populist sentiment (Coutinho, Lopes and Silva, 2017). Lula had an unsophisticated speaking style and by, for example, referring to the favela-dwelling poor as “my dear comrades”, he made an explicit identification with them (Coutinho, Lopes and Silva, 2017). The poor were his people, his comrades.

The populism of the Kirchners of Argentina is more straightforward to pinpoint. Néstor Kirchner was elected to the presidency of Argentina for the PJ in 2002, after the fall of a corruption-tainted Menem and a number of short-lived interim presidents. In 2007, he decided against running again for the presidency, instead supporting his wife, Senator Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, popularly known as CFK, who was elected president that year and again in 2011, holding the office until 2015. Both Néstor and CFK were from the nationalist Peronist traditions, and their presidencies saw an economic rebuilding with an increased role for the state, although the Global Economic Crisis did cause this to tail off during CFK’s second term in office (Clayton, Conniff and Gaus, 2017).

Néstor and CFK signalled a move back to traditional, state-driven redistributive Peronism (Horowitz, 2012), utilising populist discourse in their “wars” against the oligarchical elites standing against the people of Argentina (de la Torre, 2017). The Kirchnerist faction of the PJ represented the pink wave populist tendency within Argentina, and people in the Kirchnerist Peronism remained the excluded—the urban and rural poor—and a direct appeal was made to them (Grigera, 2017).

In the populism of the Kirchners there is a return to the classical populism of Latin America but also new elements. For both Nestór and Christina Kirchner, the people were no longer represented by the trade unions or the impoverished middle classes but by the *piqueteros*, the mass unemployed who had suffered under the neoliberalism of the 1990s (Horowitz, 2012). Both Nestór and Christina Kirchner railed against the foreign interference of the IMF and World Bank via the Washington Consensus (Horowitz, 2012), articulating the same anti-colonial message as Perón before them, appealing to a nationalist populism and dismissing opposition, both domestic and

international as, if not explicit enemies of the people, against their best interests. Again, while the precise identity of the people had changed, their fundamental characteristic as excluded, politically and economically, remained consistent.

There are strong egalitarian elements to Latin American populism. While few of the Latin American inclusionary populist movements are anti-capitalist, rather, like the US movements, they did seek to reform a capitalism that had failed the people it was supposed to serve. However, it is anti-colonialism that gives Latin American populism its distinctive element. Filc, (2015) argues that the very conception of the people in Latin American inclusionary populism is synonymous with the colonial subaltern, that is, as per Gramscian theory, those outside the power structure of the colonial hegemony. Latin American populism therefore combines nationalism with anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism and takes pride in the indigenous past of its countries, seeking to overcome the colonial hierarchies and build a united and equal people.

This anti-colonialism can also be seen in the elite; much like US inclusionary populism, there is an internal elite, often associated with capitalism. But there is also an external elite, the colonisers, and the internal elite is seen as being synonymous with them and supporting their values and demands rather than the people. Critically, this means that the xenophobia that is associated with populism, even inclusionary populism, is not directed at powerless minorities, such as that seen in the anti-immigration rhetoric of European exclusionary populism, but at the powerful interests of the USA and Europe (Filc, 2015).

2.5 Discussion

There are a number of characteristics that have emerged from this examination of the key movements in historic inclusionary populism (Table 2.1). To begin with, there are commonalities between the conceptions of the people and the elite. With the people in each paradigm, it is clear that they are excluded from political and/or economic life. With the Narodniks and the classical populism of Latin America, this political exclusion is literal; nineteenth-century Russia was a Tsarist autocracy, and both Vargas and Perón expanded the franchise to include those previously excluded, such as women and workers. Additionally, in instances where there was a wider franchise, such as in the USA, the idea of political exclusion, that the political system was focussed towards protecting the elite and not the people, is still present. Economic exclusion is also a common theme throughout, with the need to relieve the people from their poverty,

whether those people are the *narods*, *descamisados* or Honest Joes. They have found themselves in poverty due to the elite, and it is the goal of the populist to help them out of that poverty by recalibrating the system to their benefit.

The similarity of the elite can be seen primarily in that they are the ones who are excluding the people. Their identity might change from paradigm to paradigm, yet their role of excluding the people and preserving the system that benefits them remains. Equally consistent in each paradigm is the idea of a divided society, a “them and us”, with the “us” being the majority of people and the “them” being a minority elite.

Table 2.1 Overview of historic inclusionary populism

Component	Narodniks	USA	Latin America
People	The simple peasant class of Russia, upon whose communitarian values a new Russia would be built	The “average Joe” American worker, small business owner and farmer who had lost out under big business-focussed capitalism	Those who were excluded from political life and/or economic prosperity, no matter their ethnicity.
Elite	Western influences such as capitalism and Marxism and those in Russia who supported those influences	Big business and its political allies	A capitalism that has failed the people the legacy of colonialism and those who continue that legacy, both internal and external

When the differences between each historic case are examined, it is noticeable how much of these differences stem from the ideologies of each form of populism. Starting, again, with the Narodniks, their ideology of Slavophilia, that nationalist belief in traditional Russian values (Engelstein, 2009), runs through the unique aspects of their people and elite. The Narodniks are focussed on building a new nation based on the values of the *narods*, and the elite are represented by those alien forces that would stop this. The egalitarianism of the US populists influences both the wide conception of the people, remembering Long’s argument that the people were everyone in the US bar the “12 fortune holders” (Lee, 2006, p. 344) and the economic conception of those people being failed by an economic system that had betrayed its founding principles. For the Latin American populists, the people can be seen as the economically and politically excluded, as per the US and Narodniks, but with a new characteristic inherent in its anti-colonial ideology: expanding the people beyond the racially based colonial legacy

to now include those the colonial powers excluded, such as the mestizos, and to continue to protect them from colonial powers, both internal and external (Filc, 2015)

The ideology associated with each of the movements also gives a uniqueness to its elite; for the Narodniks, the elite are alien forces, external and internal, that threaten the traditional values they seek to uphold, while for the US, the elite are internal: the moneyed classes who benefit from the poverty of the people. There is a similarity between the elites of the Narodniks and Latin American populists, in that they are both alien forces, external and internal. The core difference is that, for Latin America, the elite is one who once ran those countries and whose legacy is still strong.

It is now possible to make some observations about the characteristics of each of the three forms of inclusionary populism that have been examined in this chapter.

Table 2.2 Forms and characteristics of historic inclusionary populism

Ideology	People	Elite
Nationalist	A values-based group whose values are those on which the nation should be built.	Those who challenge those values or prevent them from being truly fulfilled by promoting values alien to the nation.
Egalitarian	Those who have been failed by the economic system and are economically excluded. This economic exclusion can also be linked to a political exclusion.	Those who benefit from the unfair economic and political systems.
Anti-colonial	Under colonialism, the people were a small group of colonisers and allies of the colonisers. Anti-colonialists seek to expand this to include all of those excluded for racial reasons.	Both the external historic colonial powers and their internal legacy and supporters.

While there are commonalities across each of the case studies, there are also marked differences, and it would appear that these are a result of the thick ideology each one is wedded to. The nationalism of the Narodniks give rise to a populism that emphasises the values of the people, values that the new nation should be built upon, and which are under threat from an external elite. The egalitarianism of the US inclusionary populists leads to an inclusionary populism that focusses upon improving the economic circumstances of the people and re-calibrating capitalism to a form that benefits them and not the big business elite. Finally, the anti-colonial populists seek to reconfigure society away from the colonial model of racially based hierarchy to build a fairer and more equal society.

However, there do exist crossovers between the general categories of inclusionary and exclusionary populism and between the sub-types themselves. Beginning with the concept of inclusion, it is accepted that all of the historic cases have a degree of exclusion that can be seen. The racism of the People's Party and Huey Long has been noted as has the authoritarianism of some of the Latin American cases such as Vargas and Perón and so the question remains the extent to which they can truly be considered inclusionary.

It can be argued that the cases, most notably the pre-war USA and Latin American ones, had an express desire to expand the membership of the people with the USA populists seeking to create cross-class unity and the Latin American attempts to break the colonial hierarchies. It should also be noted that our understanding of inclusion has developed, and a case can be made that these movements can be understood as being inclusionary for their time while making no excuses for the racism demonstrated. Therefore, while there are exclusionary elements, there exist sufficient inclusionary elements to class these cases as inclusionary.

In terms of the crossovers between each of the subtypes, these do exist. Most notably, each of the cases has a strong egalitarian element to it. However, in the cases of the Narodniks and Latin American populists, this egalitarianism is linked to a wider ideology, in the case of the Narodniks the pan-Slavic nationalism and, in the case of the Latin American populists, anti-colonialism and so this is sufficient to class them as different types.

2.6 Conclusions

Returning to the three aims of this chapter, the first one was an attempt to give a baseline of historic inclusionary populism to better understand its growth and development. As these case studies are explored, there will be commonalities throughout. Although the wave of inclusionary populism this thesis examines is a contemporary phenomenon, modern populism, as it is understood, is almost 200 years old, and by understanding its past it is possible to better understand its present.

The second aim was to give context to the theories which shall be discussed in Chapter 3. One particular characteristic from the historical evidence is that populism is a dualistic relationship between two actors: the people and the elite. As the theories of populism are explored, with an attempt to build an analytical framework for this thesis, who the people and elite are and why they are in an antagonistic relationship will be at

the heart of the theoretical discussions.

Having achieved these first two aims, the third and primary aim was to introduce the new typology of inclusionary populism proposed by this thesis, a way of classifying inclusionary populist movements according to the core ideology they are allied with.

Through exploring and analysing both the inclusionary populism and ideology of each movement, this has been achieved. It should be remembered, though, that such typologies are indicative and that characteristics in one sub-type may be found in others, such as the anti-colonials sharing much of the material demands of the egalitarian inclusionary populists.

Having charted and analysed the history of inclusionary populism, there will now be an examination of inclusionary populist theories, which shall inform the analysis of this thesis.

Chapter 3 - Building a framework of analysis

3.1 Introduction

This chapter builds the theoretical foundation for the empirical analysis of this thesis. The previous chapter identified two core themes within historic inclusionary populism: the people and elite. The aims of this chapter are: 1) to explore these themes within the literature on populism and develop a better theoretical understanding of them, and 2) to identify further themes that can be added to these initial themes to build a robust framework of analysis for the empirical chapters of this thesis.

In keeping with the core arguments of this thesis, this chapter advances the argument that a discursive approach applied to contemporary inclusionary populism can reveal more about this form of populism than ideational and strategic approaches. The approach that will be used for this thesis is drawn from the theories of Laclau and Mouffe and is rooted firmly within post-Marxism (Acha, 2019), which seeks to move the Marxist tradition away from structural and materialist conceptions and frame it as the articulation of social struggles (Rekret and Choat, 2016). Laclau and Mouffe, and the wider Essex School, such as Howarth and Glynos, which continues their legacy, argue that the main actors of populism, the people and the elite, are discursively constructed, and that discourses are central to exploring and explaining the antagonistic relationship between them.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: it will begin with a literature review of the current thought on ideational, strategic and discursive approaches to populism, assessing the strengths and weaknesses, including a short justification as to why the discursive approach has been selected. This will be followed by a focus on the approach of Laclau and Mouffe, used to introduce the main analytical framework for this thesis, which focusses on who the people are, in terms of their identity as constructed by inclusionary populists, what their demands are and how their various demands give them unity as a people. It is also necessary to consider who the elite are and their role as being the adversary of the people, as well as the wider nature of the relationship between people and elite. From here, this justification will be expanded upon, paying particular attention to how this approach can be used to understand political strategy and party politics, discussing inclusionary populism as a subset of populism and examining the inclusionary nature of Laclau and Mouffe's populism. The chapter concludes by introducing the analytical framework and explaining the function

of each theme before demonstrating how the themes work together to identify both inclusionary populism and types of inclusionary populism.

3.2 Ideational, strategic and discursive approaches to populism

The literature on populism tends to focus on three major approaches to populism; ideational, strategic and discursive, and so this discussion shall start by examining these approaches through the theories of the key proponents of each one.

3.2.1 Populism as an ideology

The ideational approach takes the view that populism should be viewed as an ideology and is currently dominant in populism studies (Hawkins and Kaltwasser, 2017). What is meant by ideology? There are a number of ways to define this, but it can be considered as “A verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society” (Downs, 1957, p. 96), and one which allows us to take a stand on any particular issue (Downs, 1957).

(Canovan, 2002) approaches populism as an ideology of democracy, albeit a thin ideology, in that it is a set of coherent ideas about how democracy should be. Populists, she argues, place “the people” at the heart of their politics, and so democracy should be understood as government by the sovereign people and not through liberal democratic structures such as politicians or the judiciary (p.33). The people, in populism, are those excluded from political power by a corrupt elite, a theme that runs throughout all approaches to populism, and through mechanisms of popular sovereignty, such as referendums, democracy can be refocussed to serve their needs (Canovan, 2002).

Mudde, (2004) takes this view of populism and develops it further, arguing that it should be viewed as a “thin” ideology in that it has a narrower range of concepts than fuller ideologies such as liberalism or socialism (Mudde, 2017a)

Expanding upon this initial definition, Mudde explains the “thin-centred” idea as follows:

Populism is only a ‘thin-centred ideology’, exhibiting ‘a restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts. The core concept of populism is obviously ‘the people’; in a sense, even the concept of ‘the elite’ takes its identity from it (being its opposite, its nemesis). As a thin-centred ideology, populism can be easily combined

with very different (thin and full) other ideologies, including communism, ecologism, nationalism or socialism (Mudde, 2004, p. 544).

Canovan, (2002) saw populism as a thin ideology that was attached to the thick ideology of democracy. However, Mudde now takes this idea forward by arguing that populism can be combined with all ideologies. A critical further element to Mudde's approach is the introduction of morality, as he argues:

Populism is *moralistic* rather than programmatic. Essential to the discourse of the populist is the normative distinction between 'the elite' and 'the people', not the empirical difference in behaviour or attitudes. Populism presents a Manichean outlook, in which there are only friends and foes. Opponents are not just people with different priorities and values, they are evil! Consequently, compromise is impossible, as it 'corrupts' the purity. (Mudde, 2004, p. 544)

The idea of morality is important to this approach to populism as, by ascribing morality towards populist movements or policies, it gives a legitimacy to the idea of the "will of the people" and strengthens the populist cause (Stanley, 2008) and Mudde casts populism as a moral cause (Katsambekis, 2020). This emphasis on morality is criticised by Stavrakakis, (2018) who argues that moralisation is not the preserve of populism and that it exists in all "passionate attachments", from sport to culture, from sexuality to religion. It is not unique to populism and so cannot be used as an exclusive identifier of populism. Katsambekis, (2020) makes a similar point, arguing that, for ideational populism, if morality is not salient within the paradigm then it cannot be considered populist through the ideational approach.

In terms of who the people are, Mudde builds upon the writing of Taggart, (2000). Mudde considers Taggart's concept of "the heartland", which Taggart argued is a place "in which, in the populist imagination, a virtuous and unified population resides" (p. 95). While Mudde and Kaltwasser, (2012) revisited this approach to guard against overplaying the role of the populist leadership as a modern "great man of history" approach (p. 10), there still exists the idea of the moral purity of the people. However, Mudde's people do not have a fully formed identity. For example, when discussing who the people are, he defers to the core ideology that the thin ideology of populism takes its shape from (Mudde, 2017a) namely that a left populism would take a socialist view of the people, a conservative populism a conservative view and so on (Mudde, 2016). Equally, Mudde's people are homogenous, as per their moral purity. However, as will be explored in this thesis, inclusionary populist movements stress heterogeneity and a wide and diverse conception of who the people are (Katsambekis, 2020). Therefore, an approach to populism which stresses homogeneity cannot be used to understand and interrogate inclusionary populism.

Turning to the elite, Mudde, (2004) argues, “The core concept of populism is obviously ‘the people’; in a sense, even the concept of ‘the elite’ takes its identity from it (being its opposite, its nemesis)” (p. 544), and here there are similarities with Canovan’s approach of the elite being those who exclude the people from power. However, Mudde argues that the distinction between the people and the elite is normative and not empirical, emphasising once more the element of morality he has introduced into populism (Mudde, 2004). However, Mudde would go on to expand upon his ideas of the elite, moving away from the idea that the elite are simply *ex-negativo*; they are those who are not the people (Mudde, 2017). The morality Mudde introduced remains but, as with the approach to the people, the identity of the elites takes its shape from the core-ideology the populism is allied to (Mudde, 2017a) and this is a point the findings of this thesis confirm.

It can be seen that, for the ideational approach, the core ideology that populism is attached to is the dominant partner in the relationship; it is the core ideology that gives shape to the people and the elite, not the populism itself. This approach is used notably in *Populist Radical Right Parties In Europe* (Mudde, 2007), where Mudde carefully defines what he means by radical right as opposed to traditional conservatism or neoliberalism, with the concept of nativism being identified as a key differential. However, the populism within this ideational relationship appears to be a junior partner; little more than a way of framing that the policy programme is the “will of the people”, thus lending that programme legitimacy.

Mudde argues that the ideational approach offers both a demand side and a supply side to populism (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012), yet it seems that this argument does not especially stand up; it is the core ideology that can answer these questions, not the populism. As per Mudde’s work on the populist radical right, it is not the populism but the nativism that attracts voters (Hawkins and Kaltwasser, 2017); the populism is secondary to that core ideological appeal.

Overall, it appears that, for the ideational approach, the role of populism is to provide legitimacy to a political cause. This legitimacy is further strengthened by ascribing an intrinsic moral purity to the people, as opposed to the elite, who are viewed as corrupt. Yet this ideological relationship seems to be a one-way street; it can be seen how populism can give a legitimacy to the nativism of the radical right or redistributive policies of the left (Hawkins and Kaltwasser, 2017) but there is no consideration of how the core ideology influences the populism. No matter what

ideology it is attached to, the populism remains constant: an anti-elite appeal that frames politics as a moral choice between the pure people and corrupt elite. Equally, and with the exception of this moral purity, there is a lack of a populist conception of either the people or the elite. Rather, what exists is a set of expectations about how people will act based upon assumptions of populist attitudes, many of which are phenomena of the right, such as anti-immigrant attitudes, rather than the left (Katsambekis, 2020). What this approach offers is a view of these twin components that is conditioned by the core ideology to which the populism is attached, so a radical left populist movement would take a socialist view of the people and use populism to legitimise their grievances as being morally just and politically authentic.

3.2.2 Populism as a strategy

If ideational approaches to populism are considered as what populists stand for and, as shall be addressed later, discursive approaches are considered as who populists are, then it is possible to understand strategic approaches as a focus on the actions of populists, especially populist leaders. (Weyland, 2017). The problem with the ideational approach, argues Weyland (2017), is that it puts too much weight on the people. This may seem an unlikely problem, given that populism is, by its very nature, a people-centric phenomenon. However, given that the people in the populist paradigm are heterogenous and amorphous, Weyland (2017) argues that they cannot truly exercise agency. Rather, to understand populism, the pivotal actor must be the populist leader, as it is they who take the popular sovereignty of the people and give agency to their demands (Weyland, 2017).

Weyland's approach comes from his studies of the two waves of populism¹ in Latin America, which were examined in detail in the previous chapter, with each wave having differing policy objectives but still being considered as populism (Weyland, 2001). In attempting to justify both waves as populist, Weyland looked for commonalities between the classical populism of Juan Perón and Carlos Menem and focussed on the role of the political leader and on populism as a "political strategy focuse(d) on the methods and instruments of winning and exercising power" (Weyland 2001 p. 12). Indeed, in his examinations of neoliberalism and neopopulism, Weyland

¹ At the time Weyland's study was published, 2001, Latin America had seen two waves of populism; the classical populism of Perón et al and the neopopulism of Menem et al and was yet to experience the third wave, that of pink-wave populism.

(1996) argued that there was a strong similarity between the top-down approach of both neoliberalism and neopopulism, thus making them a strong strategic fit.

The people, argues Weyland, (2017) transfer their popular sovereignty to the leader, who uses this popular sovereignty, often bolstered through elections and plebiscites (Weyland, 2001) and through personal identification with the people, even representing themselves as the embodiment of the people (Weyland, 2017), to maintain legitimacy and power.

Ware, (2002) takes a similar approach, using the experiences of the politics of the USA to argue the strengths of viewing populism as a political strategy. Calling on a variety of American political traditions such as the centrality of the people to politics and debates about just who the people are, anti-governmentalism, egalitarianism and debates and confusion about what even the USA is, Ware makes the case for a people-centric politics as a strong strategy for American politicians and populism as a mainstream phenomenon in the USA. This is something that shall be discussed in more detail in the following chapter; however, it is evident that, for Ware, populism is an opportunistic strategy, utilised by politicians within polities where there is space for that strategy to work.

The strength of these strategic approaches is surely their simplicity, but this is also where one of their core weaknesses lies. By focussing on the leader, Weyland's approach tells us even less than the ideational approach of Mudde. Who are the people? Who are the elite? Weyland is not concerned with this. These are questions that Ware cannot answer either. Indeed, the very ambiguity of these issues is at the heart of his approach; the vagueness of who the people are in the USA gives, he argues, strength and cause to populism (2002).

Equally, as Mudde (2017) argues, the strong leader is not necessarily a vital component of populist movements. Indeed, none of the case studies in this thesis have leaders who fit Weyland's mould of what a populist leader should be like. The chameleonic nature of populism (Taggart, 2004) is frequently cited as a core strength, and yet, with its consistent focus on leadership, the strategic approach of Weyland lacks this aspect. Strong and charismatic leadership is hardly unique to populism; it can be found in a wide variety of political movements, both historical and contemporary. Weyland's "great man" approach might be able to offer an analytical framework for the historic populism of Latin America, but it is questionable as to whether it can offer a similar framework for contemporary populism.

Just as Weyland's approach is rooted in the politics of Latin America, Ware's is rooted in the USA's. Ware makes a strong case that the politics of the Americas is particularly fertile for populism. Yet the presidential nature of these politics is more conducive to personality and strong leadership than the European parliamentary systems. Similar to Weyland, Ware's approach cannot be fully applied to other areas, thus limiting it in scope and potential.

3.2.3 Populism as a discourse

In this section, there shall be a consideration of what is meant by discourse in the wider sense, before focussing on the discursive approach of Laclau and Mouffe later in the chapter. There are a wide number of approaches to discourse theory, including that used by Laclau and Mouffe, but discourse can be understood as being based upon the idea that language is a social construct, and that through its use social identities are formed (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2012).

Here, a primary difference can be observed between structuralist discourse theory and the post-structuralist discourse theory used by Laclau and Mouffe: fixity. In structuralist discourse theory, meanings are fixed (Howarth, 2000; Stengel and Nabers, 2019), but within post-structuralist discourse theory, they are not. It is this unfixity that makes change possible (Stengel and Nabers, 2019). To understand this, it is necessary to examine how Laclau and Mouffe use signifiers.

Language exists as the system of relations between signs and is perceived as the complete system of fixed relations. Yet if this system is incomplete, the signifiers and the signified would not be bound together, and signifiers could "float" free of attached meaning. In essence, a floating signifier means different things to different people. It is "the semantic function whose role is to allow symbolic thought to operate despite the contradiction inherent in it." (Lévi-Strauss, 1987, p. 67).

The next step is understanding Laclau's use of "nodal points." As he explains with Mouffe:

Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre. We will call the privileged of this partial fixation, nodal points. (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 112).

To explain this, the following floating signifiers can be considered: "wheels", "seat", "floor", "window". As they stand, even together, these signifiers could refer to a variety

of things. However, if the nodal point of “aeroplane” is assigned, meanings can be fixed on these signifiers as being components of a passenger jet. It is the nodal point that fixes meaning to the floating signifier. At its most fundamental level, the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe holds that all objects and actions are meaningful, and that that meaning is conferred by “particular systems of significant differences” (Howarth, 2000, p. 101). Returning to the example of the passenger jet, even this does not have a fixed meaning. In the discursive structure of a holidaymaker, it would signify excitement, something to look forward to. In the discursive structure of an environmentalist, it would signify environmental damage. In the discursive structure of someone who lived under the flight path of an airport, it would signify a source of nuisance and annoyance. Discourse ties these elements together and gives meaning through a process Laclau calls articulation, a term this chapter shall return to, where the discursive elements become interlinked to form a totality (Stengel and Nabers, 2019).

Why, though, is this important to understanding politics? To answer this, it is useful to consider how (Howarth, (2000, p. 103) explains the discursive approach of Laclau and Mouffe. To begin with, he examines how, through the use of words such as “freedom” and “monetarism” and practices such as “entrepreneurialism”, Thatcherism can be seen as a discourse which attempted to change British society. Within post-structuralist discourse theory, unfixity exists and so meaning is never fully fixed. Because of this partial fixation, there is a surplus of meaning, what Laclau and Mouffe (2001) call the ‘discursive exterior’. Because society is never closed and discourse is never closed, this surplus of meaning means that no matter how dominating a discourse may be, such as Thatcherism was, there is still room for alternative discourse to challenge this hegemony.

3.3 Analytical framework: the people, the elite and their relationship from the approach of Laclau and Mouffe

This section builds the analytical framework for this thesis by using some of Laclau and Mouffe’s ideas to construct three analytical components: the people, the elite and the relationship between them. Before this, however, it is necessary to give context to these components by examining Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony to understand the wider theoretical construct in which these components exist.

3.3.1 The Theory of Hegemony

Gramsci's theories of hegemony can, briefly, be understood as how a dominant class—in the case of capitalism, the bourgeoisie—imposes through civil society its own values upon the subordinated class, the proletariat. Therefore, the proletariat, or the leadership of the proletariat, must counter this through the development of their own ideas and values (Bates, 1975). This is critical to Laclau and Mouffe's ideas of politics because, as they argue, society cannot be simply viewed as two opposing classes locked in antagonistic struggle, and that the Marxist conception of the working class as the universal class is insufficient and inaccurate (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001).

Laclau and Mouffe argue that the last time society divided itself into two antagonistic fronts was the French Revolution and that since this point all politics has been hegemonic (2001). Drawing upon post-structuralist ideas of language and society such as those of Foucault, Derrida and Lacan, they argue that the identities of all social subjects are negotiable. Their post-structuralist grounding leads them to argue that identity is neither fixed or non-fixed and every social practice is articulatory. Laclau and Mouffe then argue that in order for hegemonic practices to be possible, it is necessary to have both chains of equivalence and antagonistic frontiers. These points shall be addressed again in more detail when discussing Laclau's theories of populism but, for now, chains of equivalence can be understood as being formed when one set of demands becomes displaced from one social site to another (Howarth, 2004).

Laclau and Mouffe (2001) also introduce the idea of subordinate relationships, where one agent can be subject to the decisions of others, such as in the workplace. It is in the post-Second World War period where these subordinate relations become truly hegemonic as, alongside the existing subordination to capital, growing state power and bureaucratisation led to subordination to the state, driven by mass communication and a media-based culture. Further struggles against this (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) caused a landscape based on multiple different forms of subordination, not always economic, and on multiple struggles against these subordinate relations.

However, these acts of subordination remain hegemonic, as illustrated through the example of neoliberalism in the 1980s. Thinkers such as Hayek and Friedman reformulated liberalism so as to emphasise individual liberty and that this was possible only within free market capitalism (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). This reformulation was possible, argue Laclau and Mouffe, through the use of nodal points. As Howarth (2004,

p. 259) explains, neoliberals organised their ideas round nodal points such as “strong state” and “free market economy”.

Neoliberals have created their own chains of equivalence and, thus, their own hegemony and discursive identity. Through their use of nodal points, they have fixed meaning upon discourse and are preventing others from creating their own identity. On the other side of the hegemonic frontier are what Laclau and Mouffe call a “polyphony of voices, each of which constructs its own irreducible discursive identity.” (2001. p. 197) As will now be discussed, the task of populism is to form this polyphony into a unified people which can create its own identity and use this to challenge the hegemony.

3.3.2 The people

The goal of this section is to examine the circumstances in which, according to Laclau, a unified people arise, and the first point to consider is Laclau’s (2007) argument of the centrality of the people to all politics, not simply populism.

The construction of the people is the political act par excellence...the sine qua non requirements of the political are the constitution of antagonistic frontiers within the social and the appeal to new subjects of social change. (p. 169)

Having established this, Laclau then turns to considering the necessary circumstances for the people to emerge:

The emergence of the ‘people’ depends on the three variables I have isolated: equivalential relations hegemonically represented through empty signifiers; displacements of the internal frontiers through the production of floating signifiers; and a constitutive heterogeneity which makes dialectical retrievals impossible and gives its true centrality to political articulation. We have now reached a fully developed notion of populism, (p. 156)

Laclau explains equivalential relations as follows; he describes a hypothetical shantytown outside a developing industrial city as problems of housing arise and residents begin to make demands that these problems are solved. With an accumulation of unfulfilled demands and an institutional inability to absorb them in isolation from the others (i.e., in a differential way), an equivalential relation is formed between them. These equivalential relations serve to widen the gap between the institutions and the people (Laclau, 2007, pp. 73-74). The people become formed when these unfulfilled demands become interlinked to become popular demands (Gauna, 2017).

Put simply, the political elite is unable, or unwilling, to address these demands *en masse*. As the holders of these demands, the people understand that they are linked by these shared and unfulfilled demands, and so a sense of common cause arises as these demands become understood to be popular demands. The empty signifier sits outside of the existing hegemonic discourse; that is, the discourse which is set by the dominant powers in any given political sphere both express and constitute the equivalential chain of popular demands (Laclau, 2007). Empty signifiers that constitute these popular demands perform the function of nodal points and thus define what might be called the popular hegemony of the subordinated people, giving them their constitutive heterogeneity, uniting them as a people while maintaining the diverse identities of that people. As Laclau explains, “An ensemble of equivalential demands articulated by an empty signifier is what constitutes a ‘people’” (2007, p. 171).

For a populist movement to arise and be effective, according to Laclau, the institutional system has to be “broken” (Laclau, 2007 p. 177). Crisis in the existing structure is necessary for a populist alternative to take shape. As Laclau affirms, this is due to the necessity of equivalential chains of unfulfilled demands forming. As an example, he points to the rise of Hitler, arguing that, without the Great Depression, Hitler would have remained a political fringe figure.

When individual demands become frustrated, the people begin to see themselves not simply as demanders but as bearers of rights. Thereafter, what were claims to institutions become claims within institutions and, finally, claims against institutions (Laclau, 2006). By the very act of ignoring the demands of individuals, the hegemony itself causes the populist people to rise.

Recalling Laclau’s three requirements for the emergence of a people, the equivalential relations and empty signifiers which arise from the unfulfilled demands have been explored, as has the constitutive heterogeneity in the people being unified through these demands. The third component shall now be examined, “the displacements of the internal frontiers through the production of floating signifiers”. To understand the importance of floating signifiers, Laclau’s approach to heterogeneity and homogeneity (Maschai, 2010) must be considered.

Laclau argues that nothing is fully homogenous or heterogenous, because nothing is fully inside or external, since the frontier between interior and exterior is not fully fixed (Maschai, 2010). The unfixity of this frontier is caused by the plurality of discourses, and so floating signifiers arise (Butler, Laclau and Žižek, 2000). The floating signifiers

are a result of both the non-fixity of the frontier and the displacement of the frontier and so represent the formation of the people in that they are seeking representation.

Floating signifiers arise when “the same democratic demands receive the structural pressure of rival hegemonic projects” (Laclau, 2007, p. 131). When positioned within different systems of signification, the rival hegemonic projects, the floating signifier will therefore signify different meanings. An empty signifier is concerned with the construction of a popular identity once there is the presence of a stable frontier, and a floating signifier is an attempt to understand the displacement of that frontier (2007, p. 133). However, without floating signifiers there would be an immovable frontier, and without empty signifiers there would never be fixed frontiers, and as both of these situations are impossible, both signifiers are necessary for the hegemonic construction of a people (Laclau, 2007). Floating signifiers emerge during times of crisis, when the signifying chains are being radically disrupted and can be seen as an attempt to impose a particular hegemonic viewpoint on the world (Farkas and Schou, 2018)

Laclau illustrates this relationship by examining the history of populism within the USA, arguing that the shift from the pre-World War II left populism, which was explored in the previous chapter, to the post-War right populism of Wallace, Nixon and Reagan was possible because the right was able to hegemonically form new chains of equivalence between the floating signifiers used by the pre-War left populists and thus create a new antagonistic frontier (Laclau, 2007). The meaning of these floating signifiers became fixed, as they were able to win the struggle against other hegemonic discourses (Farkas and Schou, 2018).

Therefore, for a populist people to arise there must be a common and unified meaning to the demands of the people, allowing them the ability to form a rival hegemony, a crisis point giving space for this new, unified people to arise and that while they have a collective identity, that identity and the demands it expresses remain diverse.

3.3.3 The elite

Having identified the people within Laclau and Mouffe’s populism, there will now be a focus on the elite. Before examining this concept in detail, it is necessary to give it a context by exploring the wider political antagonism in which the relationship between the elite and people functions.

3.3.3.1 We/they in populism

In constructing an “enemy” for the people, Laclau uses the approach of Schmitt (Claviez, 2019) and so, to begin this discussion, it is useful to explore the friend/enemy model of Schmitt and its further development by Mouffe. The basics of this theory can be understood as follows: “The specific political distinction to which political motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” (Schmitt, 2013, p. 26). The enemy, argues Schmitt, does not have to be “morally evil” or an “economic competitor”, but does have to be sufficiently different, so that “extreme conflict” is possible with them. (p. 27).

Mouffe, (2013) proposes an approach to politics which she calls “agonism”. Using the earlier thought of Schmitt, Mouffe, (2000) maintains that there is always an “us and them” relationship within democracy, and that this is necessary for the exercising of democratic rights (p. 4). Mouffe's (2000) central point is that there exists, between liberalism and democracy, a constitutive tension which cannot be overcome, only negotiated. Historically, this has seen the creation of temporary hegemonies, established through what she calls the pragmatic negotiations between the competing forces. There will be periods where popular sovereignty will be the dominating force, and periods where liberalism will be the dominating force. Yet even during a period of democratic hegemony, this will always be kept in check by the forces of liberalism and vice versa. While a paradox does exist, the articulation between the competing forces continues to modify them.

The act of building consensus is about creating a unified “we”, yet there cannot be a “we” without a “they”. What Mouffe (2013) proposes is a paradigm she calls “agonistics”. She holds that the friend/enemy relationship is central to the political, yet she also contends that it is not compatible with pluralistic democracy. Within antagonism, argues Mouffe, there is no common ground between the friends and the enemies. In agonism, though, while the “we” and “they” have irreconcilable differences, they nevertheless recognise the legitimacy of the other. While there is conflict, they recognise each other as belonging to the same political space. The task of democracy, says Mouffe (2013), “is to transform antagonism into agonism” (p. 20). This we/they dynamic is central to populism, with the “we” being the people and the “they” being the elite.

3.3.3.2 Laclau and the elite

While “elite” is a commonly used term within populism and studies of populism, it is not one used by Laclau. But if the term is not used, this does not mean that the concept does not run deeply within Laclau’s theories.

Laclau points to three preconditions for populism to arise; first, an antagonistic frontier separating the people from power, and second, the equivalential articulation of demands and third, that these demands are becoming a stable system of signification (2007). Laclau and Mouffe (2001) also argue that antagonistic frontiers are a necessary prerequisite for hegemonic practices to emerge. It can therefore be assumed that the constructors of these antagonistic frontiers, those who keep the people from power and subordinate the subordinated, can be considered the elite within Laclau’s paradigm. To explore the concept of the elite in more detail, there follows a return to the concept of antagonism.

Social antagonism, argue Laclau and Mouffe, is caused by agents being unable to attain their identity and thus the associated interests with this identity by an external enemy (Howarth, 2000, p. 259). This approach was criticised by Žižek, most notably the eternality of the enemy. This led to Laclau modifying the approach to consider antagonism as dislocations that discursively disrupt and destabilise existing social orders (Howarth, 2000, p. 260). The idea of being able to attain identity is closely linked to the idea of the nodal point and empty signifier. In the discussion on the people within Laclau’s theories, there was an exploration of both equivalential relations in demands and how, through the production of empty signifiers, these now popular demands become hegemonic in nature and the people have a constitutive heterogeneity. It is therefore possible to see how the antagonism of the elite, the subordinators in the terminology of Laclau and Mouffe, is an attempt to prevent the development of identity and thus the formation of a rival hegemony.

3.3.4 Reflections on Laclau and Mouffe’s approach

Having explored the key elements of the approach of Laclau and Mouffe; how the people are created, the antagonism between the people and elite, the empty signifier and the articulation between the core ideology and populism, it is useful to reflect upon the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. When examining ideational and strategic approaches, it was argued that neither of these approaches could adequately

explain who the people and the elite were and why they were in an antagonistic relationship. Mudde (2004), for example, noted that the people were excluded from power by the elite, but there was little discussion about how this happens, why the people want to be included in the political and, with the exception of Mudde's idea of the moral purity of the people, little discussion about why it matters that the people are included in the political. In both the ideational and strategic approaches, the people lack agency; there is little consideration as to how they are formed. This is of critical importance, because it is possible to understand how the people are formed by understanding the nature of their demands and why and how those demands are unfulfilled. Without this understanding the people find themselves, curiously, not at the heart of populism.

Yet the formation of the people is at the heart of Laclau and Mouffe's discursive approach; the people are formed through a commonality of demands being unfulfilled and an attempt to create identities through which to challenge the hegemony which is the cause of their unfulfilled demands. Equally, Laclau and Mouffe offer a richer conception of the elite, the hegemony in their approach being the dominant force in any society which seeks to prevent the people from fully realising their own identity, and thus a rival hegemony in order to preserve its hegemonic dominance.

The discursive framework also offers an idea of how hegemony can be challenged. Laclau and Mouffe's (2001) post-structuralism argues that social identities, being discursively created, are never fixed, and the fact that no hegemony can ever contain the entirety of discursive meaning allows for alternative meanings to exist and so challenge the hegemony. By applying this discursive approach, it is possible to understand how the populists attempt to form their own identities through the creation of empty signifiers in order to create a counter-hegemony.

Another key in examining the differences between the forms of inclusionary populism studied in this thesis is the relationship between the populism and core ideology of each party. When discussing Mudde's approach, a significant weakness was to be found in the relationship between the thin ideology of populism and the thick ideology to which it was attached, with the argument that it was the thick ideology which carried the weight in the relationship in terms of who the people and elite were, and that the populism served mainly to offer a moral justification for the political goals of the movement.

Within Laclau and Mouffe's theory of articulation/articulatory practices, there is a far richer theory of how populism and ideology interact. Articulation proposes that when a relationship is formed between two elements, the identity of those elements is modified (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). The next step is to consider how articulation explains the relationship between populism and ideology.

Laclau advances this idea in his first book, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, where he argues that the class character of an ideology is revealed in what he terms its "specific articulating principle" (1979, p. 160). Taking nationalism as an example, he maintains that it has no intrinsic class character, and class character is only achieved through its articulation with other ideological elements; for example, a bourgeois ideology would articulate with nationalism to form an ideology that emphasises national unity, whereas a proletarian ideology's articulation with nationalism would create an ideology that articulates nationalism and socialism as a single cause, such as Maoism (Laclau, 1979). Laclau argues that articulation requires the presence of non-class contents, such as nationalism in this example, otherwise politics will merely be a series of antagonistic articulations as each class seeks to present itself as the authentic voice of the people (Laclau, 1979). This paradox can be resolved through the introduction of populism, a non-class component, into the discourse. Populism can therefore be linked to class-based components, such as radical socialism and non-class-based components, such as nationalism, to allow for full articulation between these components.

Full articulation means that there is a full symbiosis between populism and the ideology to which it is attached; the populism influences the ideology, and the ideology influences the populism. With Mudde's "thin ideology" approach, the core ideology influences the populism. However, with Laclau this is a two-way street, with the populism influencing the core ideology in return.

There are weaknesses and criticisms of the approach of Laclau and Mouffe. Mudde (2017) argues that the discursive approach is simply too vague to give a robust definition of populism, singling out the empty signifier, which can be anything, as being so abstract as to be devoid of any meaning. Weyland (2017) makes the same argument, insisting that the discursive approach cannot apply delimitations to populism; in short, with the discursive approach, everything can be populism from a certain point of view. Weyland continues his argument that it is only through looking at populist leaders that populism can be truly understood.

In countering these arguments, one of the stated goals of the analytical framework this thesis uses is an attempt to leverage the discursive approach into creating a working and adaptable framework to accurately identify inclusionary populism and sub-types.

This thesis does not focus on the populist idea of leadership, largely due to the fact that none of the case studies feature a stereotypical populist leader. However, this does not mean Laclau has ignored the role of the leader within populism; far from it. Laclau has argued that “the symbolic unification of the group around an individuality...is inherent in the formation of a ‘people’” (Laclau, 2007, p. 100). It is important to note that Laclau also says “The equivalential logic leads to singularity, and singularity to the identification of the unity of the group with the name of the leader” (Laclau, 2007, p. 100), because what is critical is the name of the leader rather than the leader themselves (Arditi 2010). The role of the leader is important to Laclau, inasmuch as that leader, or even their name, can act as an empty signifier.

However, one important weakness can be identified at this stage: the role of the political party in Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to populism. Given that political parties are the unit of analysis of this thesis, this is a weakness that must be discussed and resolved.

3.4 The role of political parties

As the empirical chapters of this thesis will use a framework drawn from the theories of Laclau and Mouffe to analyse the strategies of political parties, it is important to examine how these theories can be put into practice and what role parties play. Mouffe, (2018) argues for the necessity of left populism and attempts to approach it strategically. She revisits the neoliberal hegemony she and Laclau explored in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, arguing that this has been the prime mover in transforming social democracy into social liberalism, thus causing post-democracy, and that the contemporary European populist movement (and here she seems only to be referring to the inclusionary populist movements of the left such as SYRIZA and Podemos) have shown how to build an alternative to this hegemony. The challenge is to create a people around what Mouffe refers to as “a project which addresses the diverse forms of subordination around issues concerning exploitation, domination or discrimination” (Mouffe, 2018, p. 61).

However, Mouffe identifies no specific role for political parties in this except for the leader who, in left populism, she envisages as a *primus inter pares* who serves to “crystalise” the bonds of the people (p. 70), referencing in her work leaders such as Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders but not the political parties they represented. An exception to this, though, is the Spanish radical left party, Podemos, a party inspired by the theories of Laclau and Mouffe and associated with Mouffe (Monedero, 2020) and whose strategies are noted with her approval.

Literature on how political parties and movements deploy empty signifiers, however, reveals insight into the role of political parties within Laclau and Mouffe’s theories. Research into the populist discourse of Obama’s 2008 campaign argues that Obama produced and deployed empty signifiers such as “Hope” and “Change”, so that supporters and potential supporters could attach their own meaning and understanding onto them (Kumar, 2014). Further research has also demonstrated how exclusionary populists, such as PEGIDA (Nam, 2020), use “the people” as an empty signifier in order to limit membership of this group by excluding refugees and immigrants. The political centre also sees empty signifiers being used, with research making the case for Macron using “revolution”, a profoundly powerful empty signifier in France, throughout his election campaign (Fougère and Barthold, 2020).

The commonality across these cases is that the empty signifier is deployed by the political movement or party in question. The discourse, including the empty signifier, flows from them. The argument can therefore be advanced in this thesis that the primary role of the political party or movement within the analytical framework is to produce and deploy empty signifiers.

3.5 Building into inclusionary populism

So far, this chapter has focussed on populism in general. However, as this thesis is concerned solely with inclusionary populism, it is important to examine what is meant by inclusionary populism and how Laclau and Mouffe’s theories and concepts can inform the understanding of this particular phenomenon.

3.5.1 What is inclusionary populism?

The core difference in exclusionary and inclusionary populism is who is included and excluded from the people (Font, Graziano and Tsakatika, 2021), and this is primarily

predicated upon ethnicity (Filc, 2015). Exclusionary populists view the people through a nativist lens, seeing them as an ethnically and culturally homogenous unit threatened by non-natives and to be protected from the dissolution of their identity by these non-natives. Inclusionary populists do not have that nativist element. Inclusionary populism is a bi-partite antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, while exclusionary populism is a tri-partite antagonistic relationship between the people, the elite and a non-native “other”.

To understand this better, Balibar’s work on transnational citizenship gives a useful framework. Balibar, (2009) constructs a theory of citizenship by examining the processes of creating a European citizenship. The ‘people’, as Balibar argues, are understood not as *ethnos*, attached to myths of communalist identity, but as *demos*, as ‘constituent political power’ (p.1 57). The *demos/ethnos* dichotomy can help to better explain the fundamental difference between exclusionary and inclusionary populism. The exclusionary populist views the people as the *ethnos*; a culturally, even ethnically, homogenous unit, as described by Filc (2015). The inclusionary populist predominantly views the people as the *demos*.

The people are, in the main, defined by their membership of the polity, not by sexuality, ethnicity or any other demarcation that exclusionary populists may deploy. “In the main” is stressed as, as Filc (2015) notes, inclusionary populism in Latin America arose from the legacy of colonialism and its inherent racism, and so there is a significant cultural element to the people in this paradigm. However, even this cultural “people” is inclusionary, in that it includes not just Hispanics but an identity comprising of “a mixture of creole, mestizo and indigenous heritages” (p. 270). Even inclusionary populism has an exclusionary element to it, as membership of the people does not include the elite. However, it can be seen that with exclusionary populism, the fact that certain people are excluded and othered is a fundamental characteristic, and this is not the case with inclusionary populism.

Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012) have also written on the differences between inclusionary and exclusionary populism using cases from Latin America as inclusionary and cases from Europe as exclusionary. In doing so they identify three dimensions; material, political and symbolic. The material emphasises economic redistribution and material conditions and they argue that inclusionary populists, in the poorer countries of Latin America, seek to establish better material conditions for the people while the European exclusionary populists seek to preserve material conditions, often through welfare chauvinism.

The political dimension is similar to that of Laclau and Mouffe in that for the inclusionary populists they propose a radical democracy, bringing in groups previously excluded from the political process. They note that this is less pronounced in exclusionary populism however elements of this still exist in terms of expanding the membership of the political classes.

The final dimension is the symbolic which, they advance, is concerned with the delineation of the boundaries between the people and elite. Both inclusionary and exclusionary populists claim to be the voice of the people and not the elite however, with exclusionary populists, there is still nativism within their conception of the people.

It is noted, though, that for Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012), there does exist a degree of overlap in that there is a degree of inclusion within exclusionary populism and a degree of exclusion within exclusionary populism, especially within the political and symbolic dimensions. Both inclusionary and exclusionary populists seek, to an extent, to expand the people although this is more pronounced within exclusionary populism and, through the delineation between people and elite, inclusionary populists will still deem that certain groups are not part of the people although, as noted, this is not predicated upon ethnicity.

The occasional blurred lines between inclusionary and exclusionary populism are further examined by de la Torre (2021) who notes the authoritarianism of some Latin American inclusionary populist movements who see membership of the people as concomitant with support for the populist leader. This is further examined in the European context by Agustín, (2021) who argues that while this does not exist to the same extent within European left populism the potential remains. Agustín (2021) also notes a potential illiberalism in left populist movements through their voiced distrust of mainstream media.

Within this thesis, inclusionary populism is considered to be a people-centric politics which focuses upon those people the inclusionary populists believe to be excluded from political, economic and social life and whose demands are ignored by the elite. As per Filc (2015), the people are heterogenous, comprising multiple identities and demands and overcoming their exclusion is the core goal of the inclusionary populists. However, the occasional exclusionary elements that exist shall also be noted.

3.5.2 Laclau, Mouffe and inclusionary populism

While Laclau and Mouffe do not mention the terms “inclusionary” or “exclusionary” in their work, it can be argued that their theory of populism is both inclusionary and ideally suited for the analysis of inclusionary populism. Starting with Laclau’s conception of the people, inclusionary populism does not restrict membership of the people on the basis of ethnicity (Filc, 2015). In Laclau’s populism, the people are the politically excluded, the subordinated groups, and inclusionary populism is a vehicle for them to be constituted as political subjects and overcome their exclusion. Ethnicity does not factor into this. Secondly, it is apparent that this populism is a vehicle to challenge hegemony; it is an attempt to unite a “polyphony of voices” (2001. p. 197) through the construction of equivalential chains, and that this polyphony consists of those who are subordinated. Indeed, even the choice of the word “polyphony” signifies diversity.

It can also be seen how people can be subordinated by ethnicity, sexuality, culture and many other characteristics which exclusionary populists argue would exclude them from the people. However, these very characteristics that would exclude such groups from the exclusionary conception of the people would, under the populist theories of Laclau and Mouffe, include them within the people. Fundamentally, Laclauan populism is about unifying a heterogeneous people through their various unfulfilled demands in order to challenge the hegemony, and this can be seen as an inclusionary act.

It is this heterogeneity that strengthens the case for using Laclau and Mouffe to analyse inclusionary populism. Mudde (2004) describes populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’” (p. 543). However, it is apparent that for Laclau and Mouffe, the people are far from homogeneous; their heterogeneity is a core descriptor of their collective identity. Their ethnicity, gender identity, sexuality or nationality does not matter; what matters is that they have demands that are ignored by the political elite. Laclau’s theories of populism emphasise uniting a diverse, heterogeneous people to then challenge that elite, while Mudde’s theories emphasise a homogeneous and exclusionary people.

In the case studies of this thesis, there shall be an examination of the diverse people constructed by inclusionary populists, showing how this diversity is viewed as a strength. Indeed, de Cleen, Glynos and Mondon, (2018) argue that left-populist

movements work to bring together not just various demands but various people and movements into chains of equivalence. Therefore, the approach of Laclau and Mouffe, with its emphasis on diversity of support, will reveal far more about the movements this thesis examines than the homogenous populist theory of Mudde.

3.6 The analytical framework

At the beginning of this chapter, it was noted that there were two core components of populism, the people and elite.

The primary aims of the chapter were to leverage theories of populism to expand and deepen these themes and also to seek other themes from the literature that could be used to explore, fully and robustly, contemporary inclusionary populism. This section will now recap and summarise these five components and put forward as relevant to the construction of the analytical framework.

The people: As has been explored, the idea of the people drives populist politics (Espejo, 2017). The first step in understanding who the people are in inclusionary populism is that the inclusionary populist does not view membership of the people as being dependent upon ethnicity but on residency. From here and through the theories of Laclau and Mouffe, the people may be viewed as those who are subordinated. They gain their identity as the people through forming equivalential chains with others who are subordinated, recognising that their diverse demands are being unfulfilled by the elites and forming their own hegemony. Despite these equivalential chains, the people are not homogeneous, and they maintain their heterogeneity. They are not united by culture, ideology or even demands, which remain varied and diverse. What unites the people is that their demands are unfulfilled, and that they are hegemonically excluded from political life. The discursive element is critical in this as, because meaning is never truly fixed, there is a surplus of meaning, giving the people the opportunity to create their own discourse and identities through which to challenge the elite.

Constructing an inclusionary populist people is therefore about creating unity from heterogeneity through their equivalential bonds (Katsambekis, 2020). The analysis will therefore focus on the discourses of each party on who their supporters are, what their demands and values are and how the party argues that they have been excluded from political life and their route back into political inclusion.

The elite: If the people are the excluded, then the elite are the excluders, those behind the dominant hegemony in any given paradigm. Laclau and Mouffe argue that they exclude—subordinate, in their terminology—the people preventing them from forming their own identities through which they can form a rival hegemony. Therefore, it is necessary to identify who each party considers to be the elite and to explore what the party considers to be their values and goals.

The relationship between people and elite: The division between the people and the elite, the excluded and excluders, is an antagonistic frontier, and the relationship between the people and the elite is antagonistic. This antagonism is caused by the elite attempting to preserve their position of hegemonic privilege and the people attempting to challenge this (Katsambekis, 2020). The discursive approach emphasises how the elite seek to preserve their own identity by preventing the people from creating theirs. Having explored the values and goals of the people and elite as constructed by populist party discourses, the analysis will then attempt to understand why these are incompatible with each other and how the elite is argued to seek to prevent the people from achieving their own identity and their goals.

Empty signifier: Given the centrality of the empty signifier to Laclau's approach to populism (Laclau, 2004), empty signifiers must also become part of the analytical framework. Although the concept is complex and often accused of being vague (Mudde, 2017), it is possible to understand the empty signifier, for the purposes of this framework, as being the concept which unites a populist movement, bringing together the various demands and identities into a common cause and goal. With the surplus of meaning that allows space for alternative identities to form, it is clear that the empty signifier that unites the people is created within this surplus meaning. It has also been argued that the role of a political party can be seen as the employment of empty signifiers in order to unite the people. The analysis will focus on identifying the empty signifier that is designed to unite the populist movement and, more broadly, on understanding what each party claims unites their supporters and unifies the latter's various demands.

Articulation: The relationship between parties' populism and core ideologies is a vital component of the analytical framework. It has been argued above that Laclau and Mouffe's theory of articulation allows for a far richer understanding of the relationship between populism and the core ideology. This understanding differs from Mudde's thin ideology approach, in that it allows for examination of how thick and thin ideologies

influence each other, rather than taking it for granted that the thick ideology is dominant in the relationship.

The analytical framework that will be used to analyse the three case studies that we will be looking at in the following chapters is summarised in the table below:

Table 3.1 The analytical framework

Element	Characteristics
The people	A diverse group with multiple identities and unfulfilled demands. They are united by their demands being unfulfilled and by their exclusion from political life. Within inclusionary populism, membership of this people is not dependent upon ethnicity or nationality but on residency.
The elite	Those who exclude the people in an attempt to maintain their own dominant position.
The relationship between the people and elite	One of antagonism, as the people attempt to have their demands fulfilled and the elite attempt to stop this.
Empty signifier	What unites the people. It can be a cause, a political party, the leader of the party or other. What matters is that it gives unity to the people.
Articulation	How the core ideology of a political party is shaped by inclusionary populism and vice versa.

Earlier this chapter discussed how Laclau and Mouffe and the Essex School advanced the argument that the people and elite are discursively constructed, and it is through discourses that the antagonistic relationship between them could be explored and explained. This then gives us the first three elements of the framework. The empty signifier and articulation are both equally vital elements of this discursive construction. The empty signifier, as deployed by political parties, is the short-term strategic trope that can give unity to the heterogenous people while articulation delineates the longer ideational approach of the party, allowing for the party to be classified as a particular sub-type of inclusionary populism.

Taking the framework as a whole, it can be seen how this works across a number of functions. The first function confidently identifies that any given party is populist. In particular, the first four themes fulfil this function. Each theme is useful in identifying inclusionary populism but, on its own, is insufficient. All political parties, ultimately, appeal to a people, but this does not mean every political party is populist. All political

parties have an opponent which may not be explicitly called an elite but still carries that populist function. Many parties voice antagonisms, and there are, no doubt, empty signifiers deployed too. However, when all of these themes are identified together, it can be stated with confidence that the party is populist.

The final element is articulation which allows for an exploration of the relationship between the core ideology and populism of each party, and this is where its value lies. By exploring the relationship, the symbiosis proposed by Laclau (1979) it is possible to flesh out the form that the populism takes when it is advanced by those parties and allows for the opportunity to then classify that form of populism.

The core commonality of the five components of the analytical framework as being discursive gives them the ability to work in conjunction and without contradiction. Each component, each analytical theme, allows researchers to identify and explore critical aspects of populism, building up a picture of how populist parties construct a people and elite, how they leverage the antagonistic relationship for their benefit, how they deploy empty signifiers to unite the people and how their core ideology and populism work in conjunction to create a distinct and identifiable form of populism.

3.7 Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to build the arguments for the efficacy of the discursive approach in analysing populism. Answering the research question posed by the thesis requires the framework to explore contemporary iterations of inclusionary populism in detail to understand if and how it has developed and changed from the historic iterations of Chapter 2. With such a framework now in place and with its efficacy justified, the thesis now turns to a discussion on methodology to explore how the data was gathered and how the analytical framework is applied to it.

Chapter 4 - Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the methods used in this thesis and attempt to justify the approach adopted to answer the research question posed; what, if anything distinguishes contemporary iterations of inclusionary populism from traditional ones?

In answering the research question, the thesis takes a purely qualitative approach, using the framework introduced in the previous chapter to analyse the discourse of the three political parties chosen as case studies in order to first identify the parties as inclusionary populist, then their sub-type and finally, to identify changes in that sub-type from the historic iteration identified in chapter 2.

The data obtained from the parties, both elite interviews and manifesto analysis, is subjected to deductive thematic analysis and this chapter will look at this in detail, explaining how the process was carried out, how it was mitigated and giving examples so as to make the process fully transparent and allow for replication.

The structure is as follows: it begins with a discussion of the research methodology, including a discussion on how participants were recruited and how the barriers and challenges were overcome. There shall also be reflections on how the COVID-19 crisis impacted on this research and the steps taken to mitigate against this. From here, there will be a discussion of the three components of the research methodology of the thesis: elite interviews, manifesto analysis and deductive thematic analysis. Finally, the details of the participants and manifestos examined shall be listed before the concluding remarks.

4.2 Methods of data collection

There were two methods of data collection, namely manifesto analysis and elite interviews. Consideration was given to using the speeches of political leaders as a source of data, a source whose efficacy is well established in literature (Schoor, 2017). However, as the decision had already been made not to focus on the leaders of each movement due to them not demonstrating the stereotypical characteristics of the populist leader, I decided against this approach.

4.2.1 Manifestos

A full list of manifestos obtained and analysed can be found in Appendix 1. Manifestos were selected from 2003 onwards. The reason for this timeframe is that there was, initially, an attempt to identify whether the electoral success of the three cases examined, which happened post-2003 in all cases, could be traced to an adoption of populist sentiment. However, this line of enquiry was dropped due to insufficient evidence and a change of focus in the thesis from why parties adopted populism to identifying different types of populism. The decision was made not to consider local election manifestos as the goals of the parties studied, from which the unfulfilled demands come from, were primarily at a national level. With the SNP, manifestos for both Westminster and the Scottish Parliament were selected and with Sinn Féin, Dáil, Northern Ireland Assembly and Westminster Elections were chosen. With SYRIZA there were limitations on the manifestos available, even on the Manifesto Project database, and so I used what was available to me. For those manifestos in Greek, I worked with Greek colleagues in translating and coding the material I was looking for.

The manifestos varied in length and format, SNP and Sinn Féin manifestos being long and detailed with a focus on policy as well as ideology. These manifestos tended towards a similar format: introductions from party leaders setting out the vision of their manifestos and then detailed sections on policy priorities. Given the fundamental political purposes of the SNP and Sinn Féin, which shall be discussed in detail in their respective chapters, manifestos included significant sections on constitutional matters and, in particular, the necessity for Scottish independence and Irish reunification respectively.

SYRIZA manifestos tended to be much shorter, and while there were some policy considerations, the text was more focussed on rallying support through campaigning rhetoric that focussed on ideology and arguing clear differences between SYRIZA and the traditional systemic parties of Greek politics.

4.2.2 Interview participants

In order to get a full perspective on each movement, I used the Katz and Mair, (1993) three faces of the party model; the party on the ground (i.e. a local organiser for each

movement), the party central office and the party in public office (i.e. an elected member of the parliament in the movement's home territory). It was hoped that this approach would offer a wider perspective from each movement and increase the quality of the data obtained. For each case, participants from each face of the party were recruited and interviewed. While I was not able to achieve an equal split between the three faces of the party in each case due to the willingness of potential targets to participate, an effort was made in each of the case studies to ensure that elected politicians, local organisers and party staff were represented.

Recruitment of participants proved challenging at times. The first case study I attempted to engage with were the SNP, speaking to two elected politicians I already had a limited personal relationship with. Emails of invitation were also sent to around 50 SNP MSPs and MPs and this elicited only one positive response.

From here my strategy changed and I engaged with friends who were active in the SNP and asked them if they could assist in finding participants and this approach led to the remainder of the interviewees agreeing to take part.

SYRIZA participants proved equally challenging. Emails of invitation were sent to around 70 SYRIZA MPs, none of whom responded. I then made contact with an organiser for SYRIZA in the UK who agreed not only to participate but put me in contact with an organiser in Greece. This organiser participated in an interview and, subsequently, invited me to a SYRIZA event in Athens where I was able to interview further SYRIZA politicians and activists. The final SYRIZA participants were interviewed through personal contacts at the University of Glasgow.

Sinn Féin proved the most straightforward to speak with. Around 20 emails of invitation were sent to MLAs, MPs and TDs and three agreed to participate. To speak with party staff and activists, I made contact with friends active in Sinn Féin who assisted me with recruitment.

There exists a significant body of literature on the challenges of recruiting participants for elite interviews. A number of potential challenges exist, including time demands, willingness to participate and concerns about the nature of the research (Deane *et al.*, 2019). Indeed, literature suggests that the recruitment process can be time-consuming and frustrating (Deane *et al.*, 2019), and these aspects were experienced throughout my recruitment and interview process, with emails and phone calls unanswered, promises to participate not kept and interviews rescheduled and cancelled. To overcome these challenges, the consensus of literature is that researchers approach recruitment with

determination and persistence and attempt to persuade potential participants of the importance of the research and the importance of that participant's contribution (Deane *et al.*, 2019). This is what I attempted to do.

Participants for all three parties came from a wide variety of backgrounds. From new and enthusiastic activists to highly experienced politicians with significant government experience, I was able to gain access to all levels of each party, including the highest levels and, in all three cases, certain participants I spoke with had considerable experience in developing party strategy and ideology. In the case of Sinn Féin, due to their operations in two jurisdictions, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, I sought out participants from both. All participants were interviewed either face to face or over Skype, Zoom or similar, with the exception of P14, who provided written answers to the questions posed. A full list and profile of interview participants is found in Appendix 2.

The use of gatekeepers in social science research is the subject of considerable debate as to how this can impact upon research and data quality (Singh and Wassenaar, 2016; Haltinner, 2018). However, this was not an issue I faced, as I did not have to rely upon gatekeepers for this research. While some participants did facilitate introductions with other participants, none of these party members were in positions of sufficient power as to be considered gatekeepers.

Approximately two-thirds of the way into the fieldwork of this thesis, the COVID-19 crisis struck. However, this did not have a significant impact on the fieldwork subsequently carried out. All interviews during the crisis were carried out remotely using Zoom, Skype or telephone, as per university ethical guidance, but by this stage I had carried out five interviews remotely; hence, this did not impact on the fieldwork. For transparency of data, I have noted which interviews were carried out during the crisis. However, there was no noticeable difference between data obtained from interviews during the crisis and interviews carried out pre-crisis.

The crisis did, however, impact on participant recruitment with SYRIZA, where there was, more reliance upon activists than elected members or staff members due to the availability and willingness of participants. However, I do not believe, based on data obtained pre-crisis, that this has had a significant effect on the overall SYRIZA data.

Six out of the seven SNP interviews and two of the six SYRIZA interviews were carried out face to face. The remaining interviews were carried out online. All of the Sinn Féin interviews were carried out online, with the exception of P17, where this was

conducted over the telephone. It had been hoped to conduct more interviews face to face, and I had invitations to meet with party members in both Ireland and Greece for further fieldwork. However, the COVID-19 pandemic meant that these interviews had to be carried out remotely.

There exists a small but growing body of literature on methods of carrying out online research (Salmons, 2016), and this was engaged with during research design. However, most of the specific recommendations focus upon the ethics of engaging with vulnerable individuals and groups within the online environment, and the recommendations for elite interviews were sufficiently similar to the recommendations for face-to-face interviews (Salmons, 2016), so that no changes in methods were required. There were no noticeable differences in data obtained face to face or online.

4.3 Manifesto analysis

I conducted manifesto analysis based on documents drawn from the Manifesto Project and party websites, for several reasons: first, to explore the discourse of these parties and identify populist sentiment; second, to fill in gaps that might exist where issues were not covered sufficiently by participants; and, finally, to lend further evidence to the data from participants where possible.

Regarding the use of manifestos in identifying populist sentiment, a study of populist sentiment of Latvian parties using qualitative manifesto analysis (Balcere, 2014) demonstrates the efficacy of this technique. Using common populist tropes such as the we/they dynamic, Balcere was able to identify degrees of populism across a variety of parties in Latvia. Of particular note to my research was her ability to utilise the conception of the elite in manifestos to point to evidence of left or right populism.

While Balcere was not looking to differentiate different types of populism, per se, her research demonstrates the ability of manifesto analysis to identify not only populist sentiment in general but also different types of sentiment.

4.4 Interviews

The interviews were semi-structured and, in designing the interview guide, the work of Mitchell, Bennie and Johns, (2011) on the SNP's transformation into a party of government proved informative. In this work, the authors used a mixed-method approach, with a quantitative survey of the membership and 87 semi-structured interviews with SNP elites including MPs, MEPs, MSPs and members of the SNP NEC. Through this, the authors explored a number of issues of particular interest to me, including the ideological cleavages within nationalism, the relationship between nationalism and liberalism and their political values. While the work did not examine populism within the SNP, it did demonstrate the value of semi-structured interviews in exploring how participants understand their political world.

The effectiveness of semi-structured interviews in exploring abstract and often contradictory themes within political movements has been demonstrated by Haltinner, (2018), whose work in exploring and identify the ideological diversity in the Tea Party movement has proved useful in informing my own research. In this study, Haltinner used interviews with 45 Tea Party members and also participant observation to identify and map five different ideological subsets within the Tea Party. While ultimately satisfied with the reliability and validity of her data, Haltinner identified a number of limitations, including the use of gatekeepers. As already discussed, this was not an issue that I faced in my own fieldwork.

The efficacy of elite interviews in generating reliable and valid data is well established, especially when dealing with abstract concepts (Beamer, 2002). However, this efficacy is determined by a number of factors, including the researcher being clear on what they wish to learn (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). It was therefore important that I was clear about what I wanted to glean from interviews. A full list of the questions asked is available in Appendix 3.

Elite interviews were particularly appropriate to my analysis, as I was seeking to understand how populist movements perceive the people and the elite. Understanding who the people are and what their demands and values are is critical to understanding the essence of that populist movement. It is also known that just as populism has to have a people, it also has to have an elite. Identifying that elite and their goals and values is equally important in understanding populism. Historical evidence demonstrated that inclusionary movements displayed differences in the identity of the people and the elite; the core identity of the people as the excluded and the elite as the

excluders remains constant. However, the demands and values of the people differs from movement to movement, as does the nature of the elite.

As per the analytical framework of this thesis, an empty signifier is necessary for a people to be unified, and political parties play a significant role in the production of this empty signifier. Analysis of the discourses of interview participants helped reveal these empty signifiers. The idea of plurality was initially thought to be important in my research, as I was interested in the idea that populist parties were less plural in outlook than non-populist parties (Müller, 2016). However, data from interviews revealed that this was not the case for the parties studied. Indeed, many participants spoke at length about the relationships they had with other political parties and movements, both domestically and internationally. While plurality did not remain as a line of enquiry, the questions posed around this subject still revealed much about the views of participants regarding politics and political engagement.

Finally, I asked participants about the goals of their political party. There were two reasons for this; first, it could help point to the unfulfilled demands of the people as the political party understood them and, second, it could point to the core ideology of that party and what it sought to achieve on behalf of its supporters.

The challenges to obtaining reliable data through elite interviews are also discussed by Köker, (2014), who reflected upon his own experiences of elite interviews with politicians from Central and Eastern Europe. He discussed a major concern in elite interviews where the interviewees have skills in deflecting questions and misrepresenting information in their own favour. While I kept this in mind, the questions I was asking were not related to demonstrable fact, such as policy and policy outcomes, but to the perceptions held by participants about their supporters and opponents. There was little evidence that participants gave misrepresenting information, and participants spoke freely and, on occasion, were critical of their own parties.

Köker's reflections also raise another potential concern; the power dynamic between myself and those I interviewed. Power imbalance between the interviewer and interviewee is a well-documented concern within quantitative research methodology. There can be occasions where the power rests with the interviewer and, in the case of elite interviews, with the interviewee. Neumann, (2011) discussed this concern in her interviews with policy elite in Hungary. She reflected upon interviewees who were abrupt and dominated the conversation, discussing what they wanted and not what she

wanted, and those who took issue with the entire nature of the research she was conducting. I shared both of these concerns at the commencement of fieldwork. However, I found that the semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed participants the space to discuss what they wished to discuss, while also allowing me the ability to keep the interview focussed. Regarding the second concern, a key reason given by participants for agreeing to take part was that they were interested in the research, and many indicated an interest in reading the research once it was completed. Indeed, on several occasions, participants voiced off-the-record gratitude for being able to set the record straight on perceived inaccuracies in media reporting of their parties.

A critical issue in the design of these interviews is raised by Beamer (2002), who cautions against the use of academic jargon in elite interviews. Inclusionary populism is a concept not common in everyday discourse and so, when discussing this with participants, I gave the same simple definition to each one and, where participants were unsure of terms, explained these clearly.

4.5 Data analysis

The first step in data analysis was to code interviews and manifestos. What words and phrases might be considered not just populist but inclusionary populist? A starting point for this was the research by Stavrakakis, Andreadis and Katsambekis, (2017) into populist attitudes of candidates in the Greek elections of 2015. The authors of this study created a populism index which not only identified populist sentiment but was able to differentiate between what they classified as left- and right-wing populism.

I coded the data according to the five elements of the analytical framework and the wider discursive theoretical approach. In identifying references to an inclusionary populist people, I was looking for data mentioning unfulfilled demands, heterogeneity and exclusion from power. For the elite, this was a phrase that rarely occurred in manifestos and so I looked for references to those who caused demands to be unfulfilled and caused the people to be excluded. In terms of the relationship between the people and elite, I was looking for the populist we/they dynamic and differences in policies, goals and values. With the empty signifier, I was looking for common themes and words which might bind together the ideas, ideology and strategies of the parties and which might exist in a contest semantic space against the ideas of political opponents. Finally, regarding articulation, this was not an element of the analytical framework that was often immediately clear from initial data but, rather, became clear

following analysis of the data, which we now turn to.

Initially, data was analysed using the methods proposed by Fairclough and Fairclough, (2012). At first, this provided promising results, focussing, as it did, on the goals of the political movements and the various premises the participants created to justify those goals. However, subsequent refining of the analytical framework for analysis of this thesis required a method of discourse analysis that was more appropriate for the framework, and so the initial approach was abandoned.

There was also a consideration of using the discursive analysis approach as proposed by Howarth (2000), who made a compelling case for the use of discursive analysis in research such as mine. He argues that the aim of discursive analysis is to “Describe, understand, interpret and evaluate carefully constructed objects of investigation” (p. 139). As per the discussions in the previous chapter, it is known that identity can be discursively created, and through this method that identity can be explored. As Howarth, (2000, p. 129)) explains:

While discourse theory does seek to provide novel interpretations of events and practices by elucidating their meaning, it does so by analysing the way in which political forces construct meanings within incomplete and undecidable social structures. This is achieved by examining the particular structures within which social agents take decisions and articulate hegemonic projects and discursive formations.

Initial analysis demonstrated that this was a useful method of data analysis, inasmuch as it was in keeping with Laclau’s own methods of analysis. Yet, as analysis continued, it became apparent that while it was important to discover the identities of the people and the elite and that this was an important part of the investigation, in order to perform a comparative analysis, I was looking for themes that could be understood and compared with the other cases. Equally, as I was conducting deductive research, I wanted a method of data analysis that reflected that. Further research and investigation led me to the methods and step-by-step approach of these methods as proposed by (Nowell et al., (2017) which I shall discuss in detail.

To begin, the question of what thematic analysis is must be addressed. Clarke and Braun, (2017) define it as “A method for identifying, analyzing, and interpreting patterns of meaning (‘themes’) within qualitative data” (p. 297). It is a flexible method for developing codes and then themes which can be analysed according to the research question. In the case of my own research, the themes at this point already existed; these were the five elements of the framework for analysis developed in the previous chapter.

In terms of “coding”, I should be clear about how I interpreted this approach in my analysis. It was a simple method of identifying and noting instances in the data I studied where one or more of the five themes of the analytical framework emerged. For example, if a participant spoke about their party appealing to those who were ignored by other political parties, as many did, this could be classed as a reference to the people, as per the framework of analysis of this thesis.

Returning to the discussion of thematic analysis, it can identify patterns across the lived experiences and perceptions of participants (Clarke and Braun, 2017), and it is this strength that made it suitable for my own research. However, the lack of substantial literature on thematic analysis, coupled with its flexibility, means that it can lack consistency and coherence (Nowell *et al.*, 2017), and accordingly, full transparency on how this method is used is vital for research integrity and validity. To this end, they produced a six-step method to ensure a trustworthy thematic analysis, and this was the method I used.

While not every recommendation in this method was appropriate for my own research, most were, and these are noted below in Table 4.1. All the steps shall now be presented in turn to explore my own actions in response to each set of recommendations.

Table 4.1 Trustworthiness in thematic analysis(Nowell *et al.*, 2017)

Phases of thematic analysis	Means of establishing trustworthiness	Action taken	Outcome
Familiarise yourself with the data	<p>Prolong engagement with data</p> <p>Triangulate different data collection modes</p> <p>Document theoretical and reflective thoughts</p> <p>Document thoughts about potential codes/themes</p> <p>Store raw data in well-organized archives</p>	<p>Data was read and reflected upon in detail.</p> <p>Data from interviews was compared against data from manifestos.</p> <p>Notes were kept throughout the process.</p> <p>Two thematic codes, people and elite, were already in place.</p> <p>Data was kept well organised.</p>	<p>As this research was deductive, I commenced data analysis with a strong idea of what I was looking for within data. This allowed me to immediately familiarise myself with the data. Indeed, even during interviews, prior to transcription, I could spot and identify interesting and relevant themes.</p>
Generate initial codes	<p>Use of a coding framework</p> <p>Audit trail of code generation</p>	<p>The coding framework used was the analytical framework for the thesis.</p> <p>The thematic codes that were generated were consistent with this framework.</p>	<p>Through using thematic codes generated by the analytical framework which was, in turn, generated through close engagement with key literature, I had confidence in their validity.</p>
Search for themes	<p>Keep detailed notes about development and hierarchies of concepts and themes</p>	<p>As I analysed both manifestos and transcripts, I kept notes about what to look for in terms of themes.</p>	<p>What I was looking for within themes was directed by both the analytical framework and the historical evidence. The analytical framework allowed me to identify parties studied as being populist; the historical evidence allowed me to identify those parties as being a particular type as per the typology being developed.</p>

Phases of thematic analysis	Means of establishing trustworthiness	Action taken	Outcome
Reviewing themes	<p>Themes and subthemes vetted by team members</p> <p>Test for referential adequacy by returning to raw data</p>	<p>As work on empirical chapters progressed, this was checked and appraised by my supervisors and improved where necessary.</p> <p>I frequently returned to the raw data to ensure that themes were being properly represented.</p>	<p>The empirical chapters were consistently reviewed to ensure that the themes being produced and discussed were truly reflective of the data gathered. This was counter-checked by my supervisors.</p>
Defining and naming themes	<p>Peer debriefing</p> <p>Team consensus on themes</p>	<p>Supervisors were kept fully appraised on the development of themes.</p>	<p>Through regular feedback from my supervisory team, I was able to ensure that the themes being developed and explored reflected the data and theory.</p>
Producing the report	<p>Describing process of coding and analysis in sufficient details</p> <p>Thick descriptions of context</p> <p>Report on reasons for theoretical, methodological, and analytical choices throughout the entire study</p>	<p>These are all covered in both this chapter and the following empirical chapters.</p> <p>Thick descriptions of the themes are at the heart of the empirical chapters, and in this chapter the methodological and analytical choices are explained and explored in detail.</p>	<p>By having an analytical framework, supported by historical evidence, I was able to identify the themes and apply them to the research question.</p>

The final discussion in this section looks at how the methodology was put into practice in the thesis. We shall do this by looking at the analytical framework, taking the three themes of people, elite and relationship between the people and elite, and discuss how data from interviews and manifestos was identified and coded to explore these themes. For each of the themes, data will be presented that was not used in the empirical chapters.

In coding for the people, I was looking for a people who were heterogenous, excluded from political life and united by unfulfilled demands.

This paragraph from the SNP's 2019 Westminster Manifesto gives examples of this:

The people of Scotland voted decisively to remain in the EU and their wishes should be respected. And whatever the different views of Brexit might be, there is no doubt that the whole process has descended into chaos and confusion. (SNP, 2019, p. 8)

The first point of note in this paragraph is that there is a mention of "the people of Scotland". While this does not mean that the paragraph displays immediate populist sentiment, it does suggest that it is worthy of further investigation. Moreover, it is in the phrase "their wishes should be respected" that an unfulfilled demand can be seen.

Therefore, this paragraph can be coded as being a populist reference to the people, in that it makes reference to unfulfilled demands and implies the existence of an other who cause these demands to be unfulfilled.

Another key characteristic of the people in the analytical framework of the thesis is the idea that they are excluded from political life. This is something alluded to in this comment from P7, an SNP activist:

I think for a long time in Scottish politics, there was a lot of people who kind of voted Labour for the sake of it, but they were continually becoming disenfranchised by Labour, what they're standing for and what they were pushing for. And I think the SNP kind of swooped in at that point and was able to scoop up a lot of support as a result of that.

On first glance this may not look especially populist, but by using both the framework and historical evidence to lead to an understanding that the political re-inclusion of those excluded or left behind by other political parties is central to populism, this paragraph can also be coded as being a populist reference to the people.

Regarding the elite, I was looking for a dominant hegemony that was seeking to maintain its dominance through excluding the people from politics and rejecting their demands. This can be illustrated through the following section from SYRIZA's 2009 election manifesto:

The early elections will not take place because ND wanted them or under the requests of PASOK. They have been pressured by strong business interests in

Greece, Europe, the US and other supranational centres, which call for more "bold reforms" at the expense of labour rights and the welfare state, as the current government is now completely unable to implement such a plan. (SYRIZA, 2009, p. 4)

As shall be discussed in Chapter 6, for SYRIZA, the elite encapsulates a wide range of identities, primarily economic, united by the desire to preserve their economic privilege. It also encapsulates the systemic political parties, such as ND (New Democracy) as cited here, whom SYRIZA believe work to support that economic elite. Thus, while there is no specific mention of the word "elite" in this section, I have sufficient understanding from historic and theoretical evidence of what an inclusionary populist elite looks like to be able to class this section as a reference to the elite.

This section from the interview with P13, a SYRIZA activist could, again, be immediately coded as elite:

They represent all the different values that we discuss about individualism, about the importance of succeeding in economic terms, in other terms as well, and especially in Greece, there is this elite in Greece (that) has a particular characteristic politically, which it is happening in England as well. But they don't talk that openly about the country. They own the country, it's their country. It's not my country.

What makes this paragraph interesting is that the participant refers to the values and actions of the elite and makes a clear distinction between the elite and the people; the values of the elite are different from those of the people, and they are the ones, not the people, who own Greece. Also of interest here is the participant's belief that this elite is not confined to Greece but is global.

The final element of analysis to be discussed at this point is the relationship between the people and elite. The ideological framework and historical evidence point to this as being one of antagonism, as the elite seek to preserve their hegemonic privilege at the expense of the people. How these themes are identified can be explored through data from Sinn Féin, starting with this paragraph from their 2017 Westminster manifesto:

It (the 2017 election) was called by the British Prime Minister to serve narrow right-wing English Tory interests. Irish interests – of any kind – unionist or nationalist are of no concern to Theresa May. Her only interest is Brexit. Her only interest is British or English national interest. (Sinn Féin, 2017, p. 13)

In this section there is a reference to the people, represented by "Irish interests" and an elite, in this case "English Tory interests". The demands of the people of Ireland, in this case regarding Brexit, remain unfulfilled, because the elite is putting its interests first in order to retain power. This section can therefore be coded as referring to the people/elite

antagonism, and it can be understood that Sinn Féin view the elite as being contrary to the interests and demands of the Irish people.

The same antagonism can be seen manifested in a different form in this comment by P17:

The journalist that I was speaking about earlier - and I have this off the record - was asked to come in and present. And of course, his presentation very clearly and aligned himself with the camp of those who are most nervous about change. So, these are more of networks of interests and influence, but do they exist? Absolutely.

This paragraph came from a section in the interview where elites in general were being discussed and the participant was discussing his idea that elites existed as networks of self-interest. As per the analytical framework of the thesis, it is known at this point that the self-interest of elites is often manifested in their self-preservation, and the participant was arguing that this was done through resisting change. Equally, it is known that populists seek to change the system, challenge the hegemony, in order to recalibrate that system to benefit the people. Hence, this section could be coded as representing the antagonistic relationship, as the participant makes clear reference to an elite being nervous about change.

Through careful, consistent and diligent thematic coding, based on a robust analytical framework that is supported through historical evidence of inclusionary populism, I have leveraged what I believe is a reliable, valid and transparent method of using deductive reasoning to identify the core themes I am looking for. Furthermore, once identified, these themes are explored, discussed and analysed using the framework of this thesis.

4.6 Conclusions

All research, including political research, must demonstrate validity and reliability. A critical component of this is full transparency throughout the entire research process, and this is what this chapter has attempted to provide. The analytical framework and its application is intended not simply to answer the research question posed by this thesis, but to provide opportunities for researchers to apply it to other inclusionary populist cases to better understand them. In order for this to be possible, the methodology must strive towards transparency.

This chapter represents the foundation for the empirical evidence and analysis in the following chapters. Having built that foundation and explained the rationale behind how the data were collected and analysed, this thesis can now turn to an examination of the data.

Chapter 5 - The Scottish National Party: Nationalist inclusionary populism

5.1 Introduction

The Scottish National Party (SNP) are the current party of government in Scotland and have been since 2007. The party was founded in 1934, and its journey from peripheral organisation, even within the wider Scottish independence movement (Farquharson, 2003), to the dominant party of Scotland, both in Holyrood and Westminster, took almost 80 years. The SNP has defined its core nationalist ideology as civic nationalism and has done since Alex Salmond was first elected leader in 1990 (Mycock, 2012) and this will be discussed and defined in this chapter. The aim of this chapter is to apply the analytical framework to the SNP through data drawn from manifestos and interviews with SNP activists, staff and politicians in an attempt to define the SNP as inclusionary populist and to explore specific characteristics of the SNP's civic nationalist inclusionary populism.

The structure of this chapter is as follows; it will begin with a short history and contemporary overview of the SNP in order to properly contextualise the data and analysis. This is followed by a discussion and definition of civic nationalism, before the data is introduced and analysed through the analytical framework of the thesis to explore the identity of the people, including their demands and values and the empty signifier that gives meaning to these demands, the identity of the elite and the nature of their relationship, before examining the articulation between the SNP's core ideology and their inclusionary populism.

5.2 The electoral development of the SNP

From its founding in 1934, the SNP had occasional electoral success, most notably Winnie Ewing's surprise victory in the 1967 Hamilton by-election, but it wasn't until the 1970s that the SNP managed a significant breakthrough, when it secured 11 seats in the October 1974 UK general election. This breakthrough had been sparked by the discovery of oil in the North Sea, and the SNP's campaign slogan "It's Scotland's Oil" proved successful with the Scottish electorate (Farquharson, 2003). Scottish devolution provided a significant opportunity for the SNP and saw a change in their electoral fortunes (Mitchell, Bennie and Johns, 2011a). The SNP ran a strong campaign in the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections

against a Labour/Liberal Democrat coalition that had been in power since 1999. Under the banner of “It’s Time”, the SNP emerged as the largest party in the Scottish Parliament, albeit short of the 65 seats needed for a majority. Unable to find coalition partners who would support the SNP’s demands for a referendum on Scottish independence, the SNP governed as a minority government with support from the Conservative party on budgetary measures (Farquharson, 2003).

The 2011 Scottish election saw the SNP win 69 seats. Now with a majority, the SNP could legislate to hold an independence referendum. In 2012, the pro-independence Yes Scotland, led by the former Labour politician who had sat as an independent in the Scottish Parliament, Dennis Canavan, and supported by the SNP and the Scottish Green Party, was formed and launched. Campaign groups were formed, particularly on the pro-independence side, most notably Women for Independence and the Radical Independence Campaign (RIC), with RIC taking a strong role in on-the-ground campaigning (Mitchell, 2016). Equally, the pro-Union Better Together campaign also formed a broad coalition, bringing together Scottish Labour, Scottish Conservatives and Scottish Liberal Democrats, led by former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling. Better Together ran a negative campaign, dubbed “Project Fear” by their own director of communications (Mitchell, 2016), and while the Yes Campaign did manage to climb in the opinion polls, at some points even leading, the 2014 referendum saw 55% voting to remain in the UK, with 45% voting for independence (Rose and Shephard, 2015). In the aftermath, Alex Salmond resigned as leader, replaced by Nicola Sturgeon.

The referendum loss, rather than damaging the SNP’s electoral prospects, only strengthened them, as the broad coalition of pro-independence supporters voted *en masse* for the SNP in the 2015 general election, with the party gaining 50% of the popular vote in Scotland and increasing their number of MPs from six to 56, reducing Labour, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats to one seat each (BBC News, 2015) and replacing the Liberal Democrats as the third party in Westminster, the first time a nationalist party had achieved this (Thompson, 2018). Of particular note was the collapse of the Labour Party in Scotland, once the dominant party of Scottish politics. While a majority of traditional Labour voters in Scotland remained pro-Union, a significant minority of an already dwindling base could not forgive Labour for standing with the Conservatives in Better Together, and 33.4% of those who had previously supported Labour switched to the SNP in the 2015 election (Fieldhouse and Prosser, 2018).

The 2016 Scottish Parliament elections saw the SNP remain in government but now with 63 seats, no longer holding a majority, and with the Conservatives overtaking Labour to become the opposition (BBC News, 2016). In the 2017 snap general election, the SNP again lost ground, falling to 36.9% of the vote and 35 seats, with the Conservatives again the second party in Scotland (BBC News, 2017b). However, the 2019 general election saw the SNP recover considerable ground, gaining 45% of the vote and 48 seats (BBC News, 2019). The 2021 Scottish Parliament elections saw the SNP returned for a fourth term in government, with their seat share rising to 64, one seat short of an overall majority (BBC News, 2021).

5.3 The SNP's core ideology

The ideology of the SNP has, as is often the case with nationalist and regionalist parties, been fluid throughout its history (Lynch, 2009). As it has attempted to challenge dominant parties in Scotland, from the Conservatives to Labour, its core ideology has moved from conservative, giving rise to the Tartan Tories label of the 1970s and '80s, to social democracy to currently having a wide, catch-all appeal (Lynch, 2009). Equally, the SNP has also progressed from a more general nationalism to civic nationalism, that is, a non-ethnic nationalism (Mycock, 2012). In order to properly interrogate the SNP's populism and understand its link with civic nationalism, it is necessary to explore what civic nationalism is, and attempt to understand what the SNP mean by it.

The first differentiation between civic and ethnic nationalism can be found in the writing of Hans Kohn (Tamir, 2019). Kohn considered nationalism to be a secularising force, in that it replaced religion and also continued the mission of religion as a force demanding faith and self-sacrifice (Maor, 2017). In his 1944 work, *The Idea of Nationalism: a Study in its Origins and Background*, Kohn examined five Western nation states; the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, the United States and Switzerland and argued that as, for each of these cases, the state had been formed prior to the nation, nation-building had been conditioned by the requirements of the state (Tamir, 2019). He compared these to Eastern nation states, where, he argued, because the nation had preceded the state, the nationalism was crude and politically divisive. It is assumed that Western nationalism, the civic nationalism, will grow and prosper in countries where there is a strong, stable and confident middle-class with the civic spirit needed for nation-building, as civic democracy is placed ahead of ethnic democracy (Tamir, 2019).

The idea of shared values is at the heart of civic nationalism in general (Larin, 2020) and at the heart of the SNP's civic nationalism in particular (Mycock, 2012). The civic nationalism of the SNP claims to emphasise tolerance and equality through an active citizenry, regardless of ancestry or culture (McAnulla and Crines, 2017). The SNP are careful, for example, to refer to the "people of Scotland" and not "Scottish people", creating an idea that membership of the Scottish people is denoted by residence and not birth (Duclos, 2016). The nationalism presented by the SNP is one of inclusivity, presenting Scotland as a cohesive whole bound by common values that emphasise welfare policies, but also emphasising a difference between Scottish values and English values (Duclos, 2016).

However, there remains the question of who sets these values. Who has decided what "Scottish values" are? Larin, (2020) takes the view that the values of civic nationalism are simply the values of the majority, which are taken to mean the values of the society as a whole and values that all, including immigrants, are expected to adhere to. Is it the case, as Yack, (1996, p. 196) says, that:

The characterization of political community in the so-called civic nations as a rational and freely chosen allegiance to a set of political principles seems untenable to me, a mixture of self-congratulation and wishful thinking?

As the empirical evidence is examined in this chapter, it will become clear that the Scottish values the SNP make the claim to uphold are the values that the SNP themselves say they are, and that the SNP's civic nationalism gives rise to a claim for the sole ability to speak on behalf of Scotland, with only the SNP having the legitimacy to represent Scotland (Mycock, 2012). Therein lies the dichotomy of civic nationalism, and one that shall be explored; even the act of creating a supposedly inclusionary nationalism is still an act of exclusionary othering; if *we* are the inclusive and civic-minded, then there must surely be a *they* who are not (Yack, 1996).

5.3.1 The political goals of the movement

In Chapter 3, the concepts of equivalential and unfulfilled demands were examined, noting Laclau's argument that "An ensemble of equivalential demands articulated by an empty signifier is what constitutes a 'people'" (2007, p. 171). Later in this chapter, an attempt shall be made to identify and explore the empty signifier utilised by the SNP, but first, there is an exploration of the equivalential demands of the people and, to perform this, it is first necessary to examine the political goals of the SNP.

Each participant was asked to discuss what they believed the goals of the SNP were, and there was unilateral agreement, as expressed by P3, who said: “Independence I would say is the goal.” However, while independence for Scotland is the primary goal, it is not the only goal of the SNP, and participants offered a number of other goals. P2 said, “Just as fundamentally, to create a more prosperous and equal society here in Scotland.” P1 stated, “I think I'd like to see a far more equitable share of wealth”, and P6 said, “To improve the lives of the people in Scotland.”

These comments feed into an argument advanced by P3:

The party has never been independence, nothing less. In a thesis which we put forward in the '90s and it still remains true, if you can persuade the people of Scotland, you can govern them in some things, you'll be able to persuade them you can govern them in all things. So, it's building confidence in the idea of self-determination and independence.

This argument gives us two clear themes which are worth examining. The first one, as per the brief comments from other participants, is the idea that independence is not an end in itself, it is a means to an end. The SNP have a clear vision of the Scotland they wish to live in, and there are emphases on values such as fairness, equality and shared prosperity. As shall be explored in this chapter, the SNP see Scotland's continued membership of the United Kingdom as a barrier to these values and independence as the only path towards achieving them.

The second theme is the idea that through good governance the SNP can persuade the people in Scotland that independence is a viable path for Scotland. The path to achieving the core goals of the SNP is therefore through creating a wide-ranging support by demonstrating the viability of independence.

5.3.2 The people

The creation of a unified people is a vital component of populism (Breeze, 2018) and, as Laclau argues, “The construction of the people is the political act par excellence” (2007, p. 154). Therefore, any attempt to identify and classify the SNP's populism must begin by identifying their idea of who the people are. As per the framework of this thesis, a heterogeneous group must be found who are united through their unfulfilled demands and whose nationality or ethnicity does not exclude them from that people.

To explore the SNP's conception of the people, participants were asked a series of questions about their supporters and their shared values. A common claim from

participants was the breadth of support the SNP has. When asked who the SNP represented, P1 said:

I'd like to think, actually, we are a very broad church. I think we represent those from the very poorest in society through to some wealthy individuals... So actually, I think it's an incredibly broad and diverse representation. And I don't think we're as focused as, for instance, the Conservatives or Labour. I think we represent a much wider group of our population.

This claim was further supported by other interviewees, either in a starker or more nuanced way. The stark view: "It is quite clear we represent a cross-section of people in Scotland. The demographic of the SNP is pretty much the demographic of Scotland" (P3), while the more considered view reads as follows:

The SNP has, throughout its history, had a very broad base of support. It's drawn support from all walks of life, all kinds of traditions, all parts of the country. It's not got the same-- its historic roots are different from the Labour Party, which has its roots in the trade union movement and the working-- the broad working classes, if you like and organized Labour. And then the Conservatives basically at the other end of the spectrum. The SNP has always drawn on that kind of cross-section of society. (P4)

The goal of independence for Scotland was cited as a key reason for this universalist appeal: "If your ultimate goal is independence for Scotland, you want to take everybody with you, as high a number as you can possibly get." (P6)

There are a number of characteristics that are immediately identifiable. Most notably, there is the heterogeneity of the people, and this is seen as a strength. P4 points to the lack of a historic core support, such as Labour and the Conservatives have enjoyed, as a strength, allowing the SNP to appeal to a broader section of society. P3 makes a clear and unequivocal claim: the SNP support is reflective of the wider Scotland. The SNP as a party is heterogenous, its supporters are heterogenous and Scotland is heterogenous, so that the SNP represents the people of Scotland in a way that none of the other parties active in Scotland can.

This heterogeneity is further strengthened by the SNP's belief that Scottish citizenship and thus membership of the people is based not upon birth or ethnicity but on residency (Duclos, 2016). This was a point alluded by P4 when asked who the people of Scotland were:

It's anyone who lives here. It's an incredibly broad and incredibly open definition... And not even people of Scotland but people in Scotland, and that's a phrase that I much prefer to use because it's inclusive. It's not an exclusionary thing that you are all of Scotland. It's that you are in Scotland. You're living here. You

want to make this place your home. You want to contribute to the economy and society and you're welcome here.

On the surface, this seems like an inclusive approach, but there are several inconsistencies within it. Firstly, the concept of “citizenship” is not clearly defined. Citizenship is a legal status, and Scotland is not a legal entity as a sovereign state. However, this concept of a residency-based citizenship is a common theme within the rhetoric of the SNP. For example, in his Scottish Parliament speech in 2011 on his second election as First Minister, Alex Salmond said, “Our new Scotland is built on an old custom of hospitality. We offer a hand that is open to all, whether they hail from England, Ireland, Pakistan or Poland” (Salmond, 2011). Yet neither the SNP nor the Scottish Parliament has the right to grant citizenship; this is a reserved matter, as only Westminster has this power.

There are two reasons why the SNP might adopt this rhetoric. Firstly, through the lens of nationalism, the SNP are attempting to demonstrate that their nationalism is inclusive, that the SNP is the sole defender of an inclusive Scotland, and to offer the implicit argument that a residence-based citizenship is not what is now as part of the UK but what could be under an independent nation. The second reason is that of the people being heterogeneous, thus giving a larger constituency and pool of potential support for the SNP.

The second inconsistency is in P4’s concluding statement: “You want to contribute to the economy and society and you're welcome here.” P4 is suggesting that citizenship is more than simply about residency; it is dependent upon a willingness to contribute somehow to Scotland. P4 was the only participant to make such a statement and, while the SNP has, in official statements, made reference to the contributions that immigrants make (SNP, no date), there is no evidence that P4’s statement is a reflection of official SNP policy. However, this statement is still at odds with the idea of a truly inclusive citizenry, as it is based upon the idea of contributing to Scotland and not merely on residence.

While the idea of shared values is hardly unique to populism, there is a significant body of research that points to populists creating or appealing to shared values and experiences (Ylä-Anttila, 2017; Marchlewska et al., 2018; Blühdorn and Butzlaff, 2019). Analysis of SNP manifestos reveals compelling evidence to suggest that the SNP have done similar.

It is about electing local champions - MPs who will stand up for the people they represent. Our MPs will speak up for Scottish values and argue to scrap the £5 billion ID card project, the £100 billion replacement for Trident, the £100 million House of Lords and the near £10 million Scotland Office so we can instead protect the vital public services we all rely on and make the investment we need for economic recovery. (SNP, 2010, p. 5).

Scotland is a diverse, welcoming and outward-looking nation, with compassion and a drive for fairness sitting at the very heart of our values. The SNP has demonstrated a strong and enduring commitment to international engagement. Our relationships and engagement with the international community are important – they benefit trade, investment, travel, education and knowledge exchange, and help to promote our values, including human rights. (SNP, 2016, p. 41)

SNP manifestos and other official publications make frequent mention of “Scottish values”. But what are these values? References are made to ideas such as “fairness and solidarity” (Sturgeon, 2018) “internationalism” (Sturgeon, 2019) and “social justice” (Sturgeon, 2013), all bound up in the inherently egalitarian values of Scotland (Duclos, 2016).

Participants were asked what they believed were the values of SNP supporters, and similar themes emerged: “Equality, inclusion, tackling racism, tackling deprivation” (P6); “open-minded...supportive of an inclusive society” (P7); “They want to see a healthier, more prosperous, more egalitarian society” (P3). In this respect, the SNP are not much different from the other Scottish parties. The Scottish Labour Party claims to value “equality and social justice” (2019); the Scottish Liberal Democrats stand for a “fair, free and open society” (2016); the Scottish Conservatives make a claim for “equality of opportunity” (2019) and the Scottish Greens want Scotland to be “fairer” (2016). However, none of these parties make the claim that their values are intrinsically “Scottish”.

As per the arguments of Duclos (2016), the SNP make a claim for inherently egalitarian Scottish values and a further implication that only the SNP can represent and articulate these values on behalf of Scotland. By doing so, the SNP have attempted to create a Scottish people bound not by ethnicity but by values.

When stating the values of SNP supporters, the party are making a claim that the SNP’s values are Scotland’s values, implying that only they can truly represent this people, as their party is the only one that is truly Scottish. This is a claim that can be found in SNP manifestos.

We are Scotland’s Party and put the interests of the people of Scotland first. The SNP is the party of Scotland. We are in business to make Scotland more successful. We care about our nation’s welfare and will do all we can to make Scotland the best it can possibly be. (SNP, 2011, p. 3)

Only the SNP understands and represents the shared common values of Scotland; they are the ones who are “Scotland’s Party”, not Labour or Conservative. It would be a bold statement to argue that these common values are a creation of the SNP, but evidence suggests that they have drawn upon myths and generalisations to associate these values

with themselves and Scotland. It is possible, however, to understand these shared values as being equivalential, as giving unity to the people.

Central to the conception of the people used in the analytical framework of this thesis is the idea that they are bound together by equivalential chains, and that these chains are forged through the people having unfulfilled demands. The 2016 Scottish Parliament manifesto, which saw the SNP returned to government for the third time, albeit as a minority government, contains evidence of unfulfilled demands.

In the run-up to polling day for the 2014 referendum, there were occasions where the Yes campaign took the lead in opinion polls and the leaders of the three main unionist parties in Scotland (Scottish Conservatives, Scottish Liberal Democrats and Scottish Labour) made a public pledge, known as The Vow, on the front of the leading Scottish tabloid, the *Daily Record*, where they promised more powers for the Scottish Parliament, to persuade voters to back the No campaign (McGarvey, 2015). After the referendum, the Smith Commission was set up to look at expanding the powers of the Scottish Parliament. The Commission had members of all parties represented in the Scottish Parliament and reported back in 2015, with the recommendations forming the Scotland Act (2016).

However, the SNP continued to argue that the Commission had not delivered for the people of Scotland.

During the referendum, big promises were made to the people of Scotland by the UK parties. The promise was made of more powers for Scotland, and that the Barnett Formula – the system used to allocate money to Scotland – would be maintained. After the referendum, the UK Government set up the Smith Commission to decide which extra powers Scotland should get. People's expectations around the process were extremely high – and rightly so. The SNP made the case for substantial new powers to boost our economy, tackle inequality and build a fairer society. The UK parties cut back on the promises they made before the referendum. (SNP, 2016, p. 4)

For the SNP, the promise of more powers for the Scottish Parliament and, by extension, the people of Scotland, represents a core unfulfilled demand. Evidence can also be seen of similar demands for policies based on the Scottish values identified by the SNP within their manifestos. Their 2019 Westminster manifesto, for example, includes demands to protect the NHS from being included in post-Brexit trade deals, an expansion of free childcare, a promise to maintain free higher education tuition and demands to end austerity through an increase in social security funding (SNP, 2019). Indeed, these are common policy demands from the SNP and are reflected in all of their manifestos.

The SNP express a number of demands around a central theme of having a better society. It cannot be seen that these demands are rooted in what the SNP claim are the values of Scotland. The people in Scotland demand the policies that will lead to an egalitarian society because of their core values.

Exploring the idea of the people of Scotland being somehow excluded, as per both the historical evidence of populism and the analytical framework, gave further evidence of unfulfilled demands.

Participants were asked if they believed that the SNP represented those who had been ignored by other political parties in Scotland, and there was a degree of consensus on this.

I think to an extent, yes. I think for a long time in Scottish politics, there was a lot of people who kind of voted Labour for the sake of it, but they were potentially becoming disenfranchised by Labour, what they're standing for, and what they were pushing for. And I think the SNP kind of swooped in at that point and was able to scoop up a lot of support as a result of that. (P7)

Some participants pointed to the 2014 independence referendum being key to this:

The referendum was a time when people who hadn't voted for a long time or who had never voted at all became politically engaged in a way they hadn't been for some time or never had been. And a number of those people have, because they've been engaged in the political process and supporting independence, they now have carried that support forward to support the SNP. So yes, I do believe that (the SNP represents those ignored by other political parties). (P2)

Others, though, looked to the wider nature of the SNP and its policies for this: "I think we're kind of supported by a wider range of people. But yeah. I think they do sort of represent Scotland more" (P5).

Yes. Because I think that our party represents the idea of subsidiarity, where we are the closest to those that need-- the closest in need to the decisions that are being taken close to the ground. (P6)

There was, however, a dissenting voice:

I think there are people who are completely unrepresented by political parties, but I don't think the SNP would represent many more of them than say Labour might or maybe the Scottish Socialists might. But I don't think that they would be less in the SNP than correspondingly in other parties for example. (P3)

However, when P3 was asked if the SNP appealed to the economically excluded, he conceded "Yeah, it may have done", with P2 explaining: "The politically marginalised are the economically marginalised and vice versa."

Continuing the discussion of the re-inclusion of the politically excluded, participants were asked if they believed the SNP had re-politicised people, a common concept across

multiple inclusionary populist movements. There was a general consensus that the SNP had done this, in particular through attracting disaffected Labour supporters and through the independence referendum.

I met somebody, when I first started campaigning, who had a long history of working with the Labour Party...and had really stopped, given up politics for a really long time. And only through the kind of independence movement did they become back involved. So, I think that there's that group of people who would have been really active for the Labour Party in the '80s had the answers, then really lost hope of that, felt probably, yeah, quite lost. (P5)

You were engaging with people who were telling you that they'd never voted before or hadn't voted for some time or had been voting habitually...for the Labour Party, but who just suddenly took a totally different view because they felt that party kind of alienated them. So, yeah. I think we have (re-politicised people). (P2)

P1 argued, though, that it was the wider independence campaign and not the SNP as such that had caused the re-politicisation: "It was the socialist groups that were pro-independence that were doing that." This was echoed by P3, although they did still claim credit for the SNP in this:

The Yes campaign did (re-politicise). Now in so far as the SNP was the petrol in the engine of the Yes campaign but we weren't alone. I think the Yes campaign re-energised politics.

5.3.2.1 The empty signifier

The final aspect of this discussion of the people is to identify a possible empty signifier. While it is not possible to highlight a word and say, with absolute confidence, that it is an empty signifier, given that the empty signifier is what gives meaning and unity to the demands and, in this instance, values of the people, an argument can be made that, for the SNP, the empty signifier is "independence". This is, as already observed, the ultimate goal of the SNP, and it is through this goal, the SNP argue, that the demands of the people for economic inclusion, justice and egalitarian values can be fulfilled. It is Scottish Independence which gives meaning to all of the demands of the SNP.

At this point in the discussion, there are a number of characteristics of the SNP's conception of the people which the analytical framework can help to make sense of and analyse. To begin with, the SNP's claim to appeal to everyone, regardless of demographic, gives them both an inclusionary appeal and a people who are heterogenous. From here, the unfulfilled demands are apparent. The primary unfulfilled demand is independence. Yet alongside this there remain other unfulfilled demands, most notably the policies to create a

more inclusive and egalitarian society with a strong welfare state and economic and social justice. These demands are rooted in what the SNP believe to be the values of Scotland, and the SNP frame themselves as the champions of these values and the demands that emanate from them. Finally, there is the critical existence of an empty signifier: independence, which gives meaning and unity to the demands of the people. The next stage in the discussion is to explore who causes these demands to be unfulfilled.

5.3.3 The elite

For the SNP, the elite is represented by the Westminster political establishment: it is unionism, the belief that Scotland should remain part of the United Kingdom, that represents the hegemony of the elite, as the SNP see them. Participants were asked if they believed there was such a thing as an elite and, if so, what their values were. This was something that some participants initially struggled with as, being politicians of various levels of seniority, they worried if they themselves were an elite.

However, despite initial conflict, they all ultimately rejected this idea:

I would recognise that it's a term (the elite) that can be utilized by different people to mean different groups. I mean, looking at it objectively I can see how people would perceive me to be part of an elite group, and sometimes you are. There's only 129 people in Scotland who have been elected to The Scottish Parliament, so in some ways that does make you part of an elite group, but I don't particularly perceive myself as being part of the elite. (P2)

Or:

I certainly don't see signs of elitism in Scotland and the Scottish politics and the Scottish political class. I don't get that impression that that exists to anything like the same extent. You look at the Tory MSPs and the vast majority have come from quite ordinary backgrounds and whatever. (P1)

The claim is that there is an elite, but within this claim there is another claim: this elite is not Scottish. This is a claim made explicit by P6: "At this point, there is still an elite in Scotland, but I would say a lot of them have very strong ties to England, or they might be established families that have a lot of the land."

Very few participants made explicit reference to England, even when talking about elites, but P6 did, arguing that the many of the elites in Scotland were, in fact, English or had strong ties to England. P6 is, herself, English, and so any concerns of xenophobia or othering should be appropriately contextualised. The argument that Westminster is seen as

the enemy and not the English was made explicit by P5: “I don't think the SNP hate English people. They just hate the government!”

The consensus among the participants that the elites are not Scottish is an idea deeply rooted in Scottish culture. There is a common Scottish saying: “We're a' Jock Tamson's Bairns”, meaning that people in Scotland are not only all part of the same family, but that there is an inherent equality and egalitarianism (Hayward and MacBride, 2010). The ideas expressed by P1 and P2 are indebted to this saying: there cannot be a Scottish elite, and we cannot be part of an elite, because elites are not Scottish. This was made explicit by P3 when discussing the appeal of the SNP: “I think that the egalitarian view that it has, we're all Jock Tamson's Bairns, the way in that people work together are inclusionary in that regard.” This view might appear contradictory to the SNP's claim for inclusive nationality; does one have to be born in Scotland to be truly one of Jock Tamson's Bairns? There is no compelling evidence from the SNP either way.

The view that elites are not Scottish is supported by the fact that the SNP and, in particular, Alex Salmond have traditionally emphasised the idea of the “sovereignty of the people of Scotland”, the myth that, until the 1707 Act of Union, the people of Scotland were sovereign (Duclos, 2016). Whether this has basis in historical fact is not the point; what matters is that the SNP create a message where the people of Scotland, and not the elite, have always been sovereign. This is the heartland, for the SNP, the sense of identity and belonging (Breeze, 2018); an egalitarian, sovereign and diverse people whose values are in opposition to those of the elite. And this elite, for the SNP, is represented by Westminster. P3 argued, “You can't do the job I do working with the UK government and not see the elite in action. There is an elite and you see it in the UK government.”

By saying that elitism is “un-Scottish”, the SNP are creating a clear frontier between the people of Scotland and the elite of Westminster. It has been established that the demands of the people in Scotland come from their shared values. It can be seen that due to the SNP arguing that their values are incompatible with the values of the elite, the Westminster hegemony, the demands that emanate from these values will be unfulfilled by the elite. This will now be discussed in more detail as the relationship between the people and elite is explored.

5.3.4 The relationship between the people and the elite

During the discussion of the identity of the people, it was evident that the SNP based much of this upon an idea of common Scottish values, and it was from these values that the demands of the people arose. These values of the people can be summarised from what participants claimed, such as “More left values, more welfare, higher taxes so that you can supply NHS and get education for everyone rather than it being privatised” (P5), and:

I would say we're socially liberal. We wish to be inclusive. We would wish to be seen as a party that welcomes all and actually accepts a wide range of opinion and shades of opinion that can be kind of melded into effectively a kind of socially liberal outlook for our country, our kind of left-of-centre party. (P5)

An attempt to understand the relationship between the people and elite can begin by discussing what the SNP believe the values of the elite to be and exploring how these differ from those of the people.

Participants were asked what they believed the values of their political opponents were. All of the participants identified the Conservative Party, a key component of the Westminster elite, as being their opponents, and participants were explicit in what they believed the differences in values were.

P3 highlighted the importance of independence as a disputed issue, but then focussed on more values-related issues:

I think they (Conservative Party) are because they're opposed to independence, but I think they're also very much individually orientated as opposed to community orientated, and individually orientated in terms of what I would regard as fairly selfish motivations rather than motivations for society as a whole. (P3)

The SNP emphasised their interpretation of the Scottish values of egalitarianism and the desire to see a fairer and more inclusive society with shared prosperity. The values of their Westminster-based opponents are in clear opposition to this. Selfishness and individualism are not, according to the SNP, Scottish values, but are alien to Scotland.

This idea is further reflected in SNP manifestos:

Indeed, our plan for an independence referendum once the Covid crisis has passed is about ensuring that our Parliament is the powers it needs to build a fair recovery for all – and that our recovery is driven by the values and priorities of the people of Scotland and not those of a Westminster government that Scotland did not vote for. (SNP, 2021, p. 26)

In framing the values of the people in Scotland, the SNP are offering what they consider to be positive ones. The values of the elite, though, are far from positive. P3, when discussing the values of the Conservative Party, made this clear: “I dislike their political

philosophy because I think it's about greed and not about generosity and I think it's patronising too.” The SNP are not only othering the values of the elite by claiming that these values are not Scottish; they are also claiming that the values of the people in Scotland are superior or preferable to those of the elite, as well as being incompatible with them.

P7 used Brexit to draw attention to how the incompatibility of these values had an impact upon Scotland:

I think there's definitely clear evidence that would suggest that Scotland is going in a very different direction to the rest of the UK. So obviously, the rest of the UK in terms of what the voters think is very much this idea of being Eurosceptic, of centre-right and even far-right politics. And I think the UK and British elite, if you like, and the British government are really only dancing to that tune. (P7)

This is a particularly interesting paragraph, as this is the only occasion where there was an explicit claim that the values of Scotland were counter to the values of the rest of the UK as a whole. Participants were careful to frame antagonisms as being between Scotland and Westminster and, as can be seen with P3, even opposing values were framed as values of the Westminster elite and not England or other parts of the UK. Yet it makes a clear argument of how Scotland's values have been drowned out by the Euroscepticism of other parts of the UK, causing further rifts between Scotland and the rest of the UK.

This idea of the elite causing the demands of the people of Scotland to be unfulfilled is discussed on several occasions by SNP manifestos. The SNP's 2017 Westminster election manifesto contains a section on a possible second referendum on Scottish independence:

And, in such circumstances, any continued Tory attempts to block the people of Scotland having a choice on their future, when the options are clear, and on a timescale determined by the Scottish Parliament, would be democratically unsustainable. (SNP, 2017, p. 28)

The people/elite antagonism is clear. The SNP are making a direct claim that the Conservatives, part of the Westminster elite, are thwarting the demands of the people of Scotland. While this paragraph does not use language such as “will of the people”, it comes very close to that populist sentiment.

This Westminster antagonism is also expressed in a section of the 2010 manifesto arguing for independence for Scotland:

The Westminster parliament and system is discredited and too often works against the interests of the people of Scotland – the system is failing us and that is why we need a fresh start and a new approach. (SNP, 2010, p. 22)

The elite is failing Scotland by working against the interests of the people, by causing their

demands to be unfulfilled. Moreover, the SNP are explicit about where their loyalties lie: “SNP MPs will always stand up for Scotland. We answer to the people who live here – not to any leader at Westminster” (SNP, 2019, p. 2). Only the SNP, they claim, can truly represent Scotland, because only they have loyalties that are Scottish.

The final area where this antagonism can be explored is around the empty signifier of independence. It has been explored how, for the SNP, this gives unity and meaning to their demands; every demand that the people have can, ultimately, be achieved through independence. However, for the elite, this is a contested semantic space. This can be seen by examining the manifestos of rival political parties: Scottish Labour and Scottish Conservatives. The 2019 Scottish Labour manifesto makes only one reference to independence, arguing that it is radical reform of the UK and not independence that will benefit the people in Scotland (Scottish Labour Party, 2019a). The Scottish Conservatives, however, make opposition to independence and the second referendum (IndyRef2) needed to achieve this the entire focus of their manifesto. Indeed, even the title is “No To IndyRef2” (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, 2019a). Throughout this text, the Scottish Conservatives argue that, far from being a unifying route to achieving Scotland’s value-based demands, independence and the necessary referendum are divisive and against the interests of Scotland, as can be seen from this passage:

We oppose a second independence referendum not just because it would divide us all over again, but because if Scotland spends the foreseeable future arguing about the constitution, we will not be addressing the challenges in our schools, hospitals and police force. We can divide the country all over again with a second independence referendum, or we can restore our public services to their rightful place as the best in the world. We cannot do both. (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, 2019a, p. 16)

The antagonism over the semantics of “independence” is clear. The elite, as represented by the Scottish Conservatives in this instance, argue for better public services in the forms of schools, hospitals and the police, mirroring many of the demands of the SNP. However, they make the claim that independence, far from being the route to these demands being fulfilled, is a barrier to it. This is an insurmountable difference that cannot be resolved.

There is an antagonism between the people in Scotland and the elite of Westminster, and this antagonism is built on two premises. First, by making the claim that elites are un-Scottish, the SNP are creating a clear boundary between the people and elite. Second, they emphasise the difference in values as being the cause of both this division and this antagonism. As long as Scotland remains part of the UK, with its different values, then the values of Scotland and the demands that emanate from them will remain subordinated.

5.3.5 Articulation

The final element of analysis to discuss is the concept of articulation, the modification of identity that happens when a relationship is formed between two elements (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). In the case of the SNP, those two elements are civic nationalism and inclusionary populism.

It is clear that there exists a strong commonality between inclusionary populism and civic nationalism. Both of these elements emphasise a diverse but united people and the idea that the people are different from an other, whether this is the elite, as per populism, or foreign pressure, as per nationalism. Finally, there is the common idea that the people are subordinated by this other.

However, there are also differences. To begin with, the analytical framework of this thesis views the people as being unified by their unfulfilled demands, whereas civic nationalism focuses more upon the values than the demands of the people. However, this can be resolved by identifying the unfulfilled demands of the people as arising from their values. Second, within populism the elite can be both internal or external, whereas in the case of the SNP, their civic nationalism causes them to view the elite as entirely external.

How, then, do these two elements modify each other? Beginning with civic nationalism, the emphasis on values allows for a better understanding of the unfulfilled demands of the people. It enables an understanding of where these demands come from and why they are so important to the people. It also strengthens the chains of equivalence necessary for a populist movement to arise; the people are united not simply by the populist unfulfilled demands, but also by the civic nationalist values.

The civic nationalism component also enables an understanding of both the elite and the nature of the antagonism with the elite. It frames the difference between the people and the elite as being one of a difference in values, with the people having values which are intrinsically superior to the elite, with the antagonism arising from the values of the elite leading them to thwart the values-based demands of the people, such as social justice, equality and, ultimately, independence.

Turning to the inclusionary populist component, it can be seen that this gives the SNP a wide appeal, enabling them to appeal to all of Scotland, particularly the economically and politically excluded, with the heterogeneity of the people being a strength. It also allows us to view the demands of the people as being unfulfilled, and that the cause of these demands being unfulfilled is the elite. Inclusionary populism also allows us to better understand the

nature of the antagonism between the people and the elite, as it can be viewed as a hegemonic struggle between Westminster and the people in Scotland. Finally, the inclusionary populist component allows for the identification of an empty signifier, independence, that gives meaning and form to the demands of the people of Scotland.

There is one final element of articulation that is of critical importance to this case, and that is the idea of the “underdog”. The idea of the people as the underdog is common within populism (de Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017). In this thesis, this concept is framed as exclusion, but the fundamental characteristics are the same. Within nationalism, however, the people are framed as the nation (De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017). Articulation allows for the modification of the meaning of signifiers, and thus, with the articulation of civic nationalism and inclusionary populism, it is possible to see both the people as underdogs and the people as the nation being articulated to become the nation as underdog.

5.4 Discussion

This chapter has applied the analytical framework of the thesis to reveal a number of populist characteristics of the SNP, and each of these shall be considered in turn to explore them, in order to properly frame the SNP as inclusionary populist. Within the analytical framework laid out in Chapter 3, there is considerable evidence from the discourse and rhetoric of the SNP and participants to consider the SNP as a populist party.

Beginning with the people, as has been explored, the SNP identify them as those who share what they consider to be Scottish values, no matter what their demographic. Additionally, in this there is a constitutive heterogeneity assigned to them. The SNP have created a set of values through which they ascribe an essential Scottishness which can then be used to create a diverse people whose values are different from those of the elite. These values drive the demands of the people, the demands to live in an inclusive, egalitarian country with social and economic justice.

Equally, the SNP can further be described as inclusionary populist, as their populism, despite being fundamentally nationalist, does not have an explicitly nativist element. For the SNP, membership of the Scottish people is not dependent on birth or ethnicity but on sharing what the SNP claim to be the egalitarian and inclusionary values of Scotland.

Table 5.1 Characteristics of the SNP's populism

Component	Overview	Analysis	Populism
People	All of Scotland	The SNP has a cross-class appeal, and its lack of the traditional class-based support of Labour and Conservatives has been turned to a strength. The SNP argue that only they can represent all of Scotland.	By appealing to all of Scotland, the SNP has applied a heterogeneity to its people. The people are unified by shared values, and these values are the basis of their unfulfilled demands.
Elite	Westminster	The elite is both against the people of Scotland and represents an otherness. Participants argued that the concept of an “elite” is at odds with the idea of “Scottishness”, and that an elite cannot truly exist within Scotland.	By othering the elite, the SNP are making an explicitly populist claim: the elite and the people are different and bound by different values, and the values of the people are superior to those of the elite.
Relationship between people and elite	An antagonistic incompatibility	The fundamental difference in the core values of the people and elite, as expressed by the SNP, signifies that there will always be an antagonism present.	There exists an antagonistic hegemonic frontier, as the value-based demands of the people remain unfulfilled.
Empty signifier	Independence	The fundamental goal of the SNP and what their core politics always strives towards	This gives meaning and unity to the demands and values of the people. It is through independence that the demands of the people can be truly realised.
Articulation	Inclusionary populist civic nationalism	The values of civic nationalism give rise to the demands of populism, and the values-based differences between people and elite give rise to the antagonism.	Populism allows for full articulation between these two components, allowing for an inclusionary populist civic nationalism in which the entire nation is framed as excluded underdog.

With the Narodniks, it was evident that a key characteristic of this movement was a desire to build a new nation upon what were believed to be the traditional values of that nation, coupled with a belief that these values were inherently superior to the alien values which threatened the cultural integrity of that nation. There is a considerable similarity in the civic nationalism of the SNP. The SNP are, like the Narodniks before them, engaged in a project of nation-building; in this case, the building of an independent Scotland, founded upon the principles of inclusivity, fairness and egalitarianism, principles the SNP believe to be Scottish. Similarly, the SNP frame the values of the elite as being based upon selfishness and individualism, making them alien to Scotland and inferior to the positive values of its people.

There do exist differences; there is no evidence that the Narodniks were inclusionary in their conception of the people, whereas this is a key component of the SNP's nationalism, and that this is a key differentiator between ethnic and civic nationalisms.

The historical evidence of inclusionary populism also points to those movements making an appeal to the excluded, politically and/or economically, and conceptualising the people as the excluded and the elite as the excluders. Again, there is strong empirical evidence from participants that they believed the SNP had done this, with participants agreeing that they had gained support from those who were abandoned or felt abandoned by unionist parties, in particular Labour. The articulation between civic nationalism and inclusionary populism allows for a deeper understanding of many of these components, most notably how the unfulfilled demands of the people emerge from the core values of Scotland and how the difference in values between the people and elite lead to the antagonism between these two groups. Also, the articulation between the populist people as underdog and the nationalist people as the nation allows the SNP to present the entirety of the people of Scotland as underdogs, combining populist appeal with nationalist sentiment.

At the conclusion of each interview, participants were given a definition of inclusionary populism as defining the people by their membership of the demos and not ethnos and having no nativist elements while still retaining an antagonistic relationship between people and elite. After this, each participant was asked if they believed the SNP could be considered an inclusionary populist movement. P5 said: Yeah. I think that's (inclusionary populism) how they (the SNP) sold their message; that is Scotland versus Westminster" and P1 said: "I mean, we have an element of inclusionary populism because we do talk very much about Scotland and the people in Scotland and the people of Scotland."

Each of the participants agreed that the SNP could be considered to have inclusionary

populist elements, to varying degrees, and none rejected the idea. Inclusionary populist was a label that all participants felt comfortable with for the party.

5.5 Conclusions

There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of the data.

First, the framework of analysis of this thesis has pointed to strong evidence of the SNP being a populist party and, in particular, to what unites the people and why their demands are incompatible with those of the elite.

Second, there is a critical contradiction within the SNP's civic nationalist populism which is evident within wider inclusionary populism: namely, the extent to which it is truly inclusionary. It is evident that neither the SNP's civic nationalism nor its populism is entirely inclusionary. The SNP claim that their concept of citizenship is inclusionary and it is based only on residency. This is in keeping with the inclusionary populist ethnos-based conception of citizenship. Yet they also claim that citizenship is linked to sharing values such as egalitarianism and social justice and a willingness to contribute to the economy or culture. It is not clear, however, if those who do not share these values are considered part of the people of Scotland. While the SNP do not exclude on the basis of ethnicity, they may, albeit not deliberately, be excluding those who do not share what they claim to be the values of Scotland, values which appear to be the SNP's values. It may be too much of a leap to claim that the SNP's conception of citizenship is really based on whether people share the values of the SNP itself, but my research and analysis has uncovered suggestions that this may sometimes be the case.

Finally, the articulation between the SNP's civic nationalism and inclusionary populism allows us to fully understand two unusual elements to their populism. It has been identified that the elite is entirely external to Scotland, with even members of that elite within Scotland being defined by their relationship to, or membership of, that external elite. Unlike other inclusionary populist movements, there are no internal elites that the SNP rally against; no Scottish bankers, financiers, bureaucrats or politicians to direct their supporters' anger at, and this helps give the SNP's civic nationalist populism its character. The articulation between civic nationalism and inclusionary populism allows the SNP to frame the people as the nation and thus the nation as the underdog with the SNP as their champion.

There is also the concept of values. Values are at the heart of nationalist movements, as

was seen with both the Narodniks in Chapter 2 and with the initial framing of the SNP in this chapter. Within the analytical framework of this thesis, what unites a people within populism are unfulfilled demands, and through the articulation of inclusionary populism and civic nationalism, it can be seen that these unfulfilled demands emanate from their values of the people. Further to this, the nature of the antagonism between the people and elite can also be understood as a clash of values and the demands that come from them.

Chapter 6 - SYRIZA: Egalitarian inclusionary populism

6.1 Introduction

From 2015 to 2019, SYRIZA were the major party in the coalition government of Greece. The trajectory of SYRIZA, from an offshoot of the minor Synaspismos party, which rarely polled more than 4% (Tsakatika, 2016), to a party of government that has overtaken PASOK as the dominant force on the Greek left, has echoes of the electoral successes of the SNP and Sinn Féin, albeit within a shorter time frame. Unlike those other two cases, though, SYRIZA are widely defined as a populist (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; Mudde, 2017b), even inclusionary populist (Font, Graziano and Tsakatika, 2021) movement.

The aim of this chapter is to apply the analytical framework to the discourse of SYRIZA, in an attempt to explore and understand its inclusionary populism and to examine this populism in the context of its egalitarian ideology and explore the articulation between these two components in order to position SYRIZA as an egalitarian inclusionary populist party.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: it will begin with a short history and contemporary overview of SYRIZA to provide appropriate context. This is followed by a discussion and analysis of SYRIZA's egalitarian ideology. The data will then be introduced and analysed through the analytical framework of the thesis to explore the identity of the people and their demands. From here, there will be a discussion on the elite and the empty signifier and how SYRIZA view their relationship with that elite and, finally, an examination of the articulation between SYRIZA's inclusionary populism and its egalitarian ideology.

6.2 The electoral development of SYRIZA

The politics of the Third Hellenic Republic was, up until fairly recently, a two-party model, with the right-wing New Democracy (ND) and the social democratic PASOK defining Greek party politics with PASOK being the dominant party (Lyrintzis, 2011) from the 1980s onwards.

The main founding party of SYRIZA was the Coalition of the Left, of Movements and Ecology, known commonly as Synaspismos and represented as SYN, the Greek word for

coalition (Spourdalakis, 2014). Founded in 1992, SYN's appeal was broad and trans-class, targeting youth, the excluded and other similar groups and claiming itself to be a democratic party in which members had a role to play at all levels (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, 2013). At SYN's fourth party congress in 2004 and driven by the ambition to help SYN achieve the 3% threshold needed to achieve parliamentary representation, SYRIZA was born as an electoral coalition, with SYN remaining the dominant faction within this new party (Katsourides, 2016). In 2008, Alexis Tsipras was elected leader of SYN with a comfortable majority and, under his nascent leadership, SYRIZA continued to move further to the left (Katsourides, 2016).

Economic crisis, austerity and political consequences

It was the election of the George Papandreou-led PASOK government in October 2009 that was to prove the catalyst for the Greek debt crisis (Simitis, 2016), as the incoming government realised that the previous ND government had doctored the deficit figures (Wyplosz, 2017). This left the new government in a position where Greece was losing market access and was now in a position where, unless it received international help, it would default (Wyplosz, 2017). However, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced that there would be no approach to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and no default which, given that the European treaty governing the Eurozone has a no-bailout clause (Wyplosz, 2017), left Greece in a deeply perilous state.

These blocks were circumvented through the creation of what was to become known as the Troika, a triumvirate of the IMF, ECB and European Commission which, in May 2010, signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which would offer Greece a substantial package of financial aid but in return for a programme of austerity (Wyplosz, 2017). The financial package was a loan of €30bn, with a further €5.5bn to be made available immediately (Jacobs, 2015) but with stringent austerity measures attached.

The Greek public reacted strongly to the MoU and, by 2011, mass protests were breaking out in response. The atmosphere of protest had already been febrile, with 2008 having seen mass protests across the country in reaction to the police shooting of the 15-year-old Alexis Grigoropoulos (Miloni and Panos, 2011), and in 2011, the Indignants (*Αγανακτισμένοι*) took to the streets to protest against the Troika, austerity and the Greek politicians deemed responsible. SYRIZA actively supported these protests, with Tsipras accusing Papandreou of plotting to hand Greece over to Germany and making comparisons to the junta era. (Pantazopoulos, 2019). By 2012, and with the collapse of the PASOK vote, SYRIZA were the main opposition party and now began to take seriously the prospect of government.

SYRIZA's election victory and 2015 referendum

SYRIZA won the January 2015 election, winning 149 out of 300 seats, and formed a government with the populist radical-right ANEL, with Tsipras as Prime Minister (Markou, 2017b), promising to 'tear up' the MoU and renegotiate the loan agreement with the Troika (Crespy and Ladi, 2019).

SYRIZA's programme for government was based around the four pillars for reconstruction, as expressed in the Thessaloniki Programme. These pillars were: Confronting the humanitarian crisis; Restarting the economy and promoting tax justice; Regaining employment; Transforming the political system to deepen democracy (Ratajczak, 2019, p. 244). However, SYRIZA's programme would be conditioned by the realities of government and the wider pressures from the Troika necessitating further cuts and austerity (Ratajczak, 2019), and the first significant obstacle SYRIZA would face was with the EU.

During negotiations for a new MoU, Tsipras called for a referendum on the second MoU. For the Greek electorate, the referendum was perceived in a variety of ways. It was a plebiscite on austerity, on the EU, on the Tsipras government (Kivotidis, 2018), on Grexit either from the Eurozone or the EU in general (Hansen, Shughart and Yonk, 2017). Given that the bailout package to which the referendum had been called had been withdrawn prior to the vote, voters were asked to vote on bailout packages that had now run their course (Hansen, Shughart and Yonk, 2017). With such vagueness, it is not surprising that the referendum became an avatar for Greek anger against the EU and austerity.

With only eight days of campaigning between the referendum being called and the ambiguous nature of what the referendum was asking, the short campaign was marked by claim and counterclaim about what a No vote would mean. Ultimately, the No campaign won, taking 61.3% of the vote which was split largely on party lines (Hansen, Shughart and Yonk, 2017).

What happened next and why is a matter of considerable debate. Despite campaigning for a No vote and further austerity, Tsipras negotiated a new bailout, the third MoU, with the EU, in essence ignoring the result. There is no consensus on why. With polls close prior to the vote, it could have been that Tsipras was not expecting "No" to win and could thus negotiate a new bailout and argue that his hands had been tied (Paravantes, 2019). In either event, the immediate reversal of the referendum result caused a further crisis of political

legitimacy within Greece and failed to spark similar anti-austerity moves against the EU in other Eurozone countries (Paravantes, 2019).

SYRIZA post-referendum

The fall-out was immediate, with 43 SYRIZA MPs who refused to support the third MoU leaving the party to form a new one, LEA, causing Tsipras to call an election for September 2015, which SYRIZA won, forming a new government again with ANEL (Markou, 2017b) and the LEA bloc failing to win any seats. Despite SYRIZA claiming that the third MoU had better financial support for Greece, the fiscal and structural adjustments demanded in the first two MoU remained in place (Crespy and Ladi, 2019). The SYRIZA-led government continued working within the confines of the third MoU, with continued tax rises and spending cuts (Ratajczak, 2019; Rori, 2020) leading to further political violence in the forms of protests, although these did not match the intensity of the first anti-austerity protests of 2011 (Rori, 2020). In 2018, Greece exited the MoU and distributed what it called a social dividend of €710m to the poorest in order to attempt to compensate for the austerity cuts the country had undergone (Rori, 2020).

If SYRIZA was unable to carry out progressive economic policies, in the field of social and cultural policies it enjoyed more success (Ratajczak, 2019; Rori, 2020). The government allowed same-sex civil unions, allowed same-sex couples to adopt, prohibited discrimination based on sexuality and allowed legal change of gender for people aged 15 and above (Rori, 2020). Of particular note was SYRIZA resolving the Macedonian question which had loomed large over Greek politics for two decades. Segments of Greek society had rejected the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia) using the name Macedonia, believing it was a dilution of Greek identity. However, in 2018, the SYRIZA government worked with the FYR Macedonia to negotiate a new name, Northern Macedonia, which was ratified by the Greek parliament despite significant protests on the streets (Rori, 2020).

Despite the social reforms, the popularity of the government never fully recovered from the perceived capitulation over the third MoU, and in the 2019 elections, ND won a majority and was returned to power under the leadership of Kyriakos Mitsotakis. However, SYRIZA managed a strong second place, confounding poll expectations, (Rori, 2020) and remains the main opposition party.

6.3 SYRIZA's core ideology

There is, within existing literature, broad consensus that SYRIZA is a left-populist party (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; Aslanidis, 2016; Mudde, 2017b; Font, Graziano and Tsakatika, 2021) This populism and its articulation with the core ideology of SYRIZA will be examined in subsequent sections of this chapter but, to begin, it is necessary to identify and define the core ideology of SYRIZA. This will not be an attempt to define egalitarian ideas in general but, rather, an attempt to define the egalitarian ideas of SYRIZA.

To understand the ideology of SYRIZA, first there must be a brief consideration of the ideology and legacy of Eurocommunism, which, as SYRIZA does, sought to forge a third way between Soviet communism and social democracy (Katsourides, 2016) and this is where SYRIZA has its ideological roots (Douzinas, 2017). Eurocommunism in the 1970s was a rejection of both Soviet and American spheres of influence (Elliott and Schlesinger, 1979). Greece's Eurocommunist tradition was hugely influenced and shaped by the work of the intellectual and academic Nicos Poulantzas (Katsourides, 2016). Poulantzas pushed for a gradualist approach towards socialism, arguing that small battles were necessary in order for communists to slowly acquire positions within and outside the structures of the state (Katsourides, 2016). His approach was adopted by the reformist Greek communist party, KKE- Es, itself a forerunner of SYN and of which Poulantzas was a member and leading intellectual (Katsourides, 2016). Indeed, the extent to which the ideas and strategy of Poulantzas influenced SYN and SYRIZA is evident in the fact that SYRIZA's think-tank is named after him. This gradualist approach, which necessitated a willingness to work both within and outside government, marked a key difference from the vanguardist tactics of KKE.

SYN's strategy, which would feed into SYRIZA's, was based on a trans-class approach, appealing to workers, the young and the excluded, with a particular appeal towards issues such as feminism and environmentalism, with a desire to participate in social movements without attempting to lead them (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, 2013). This can be seen by the SYRIZA response to the anti-austerity protests of 2011. SYRIZA was already an established political force by the time the indignants arose in May 2011; however, the party was quick to ally itself with the protestors, encouraging supporters to join with the protestors, albeit without party flags and banners (Katsourides, 2016). SYRIZA embraced the diversity of the protestors, seeing them as a core part of their strategy of a popular front (Katsambekis, 2016)

The linkage strategies of SYRIZA, forming bonds with the protestors and sharing and articulating their anger and goals, helped further legitimise the party (Tsakatika and Lisi, 2013) and inform the trans-class anti-austerity and anti-memorandum alliance the party was seeking to build (Katsambekis, 2016). This is what Douzinas refers to as an “anti-systemic popular mood” (Douzinas, 2017). Douzinas discusses a “philosophy of resistance” (Douzinas, 2017, p. 4), and much of SYRIZA’s ideology can be seen within this concept; resistance to austerity, resistance to the Troika, resistance to neoliberalism. This idea of the philosophy of resistance is one that shall be returned to throughout this chapter.

This juxtaposition of identity politics and class politics allowed SYRIZA to speak in the national interest (Douzinas, 2017). While Douzinas accepts that this was not always successful, he makes the point that while SYRIZA could not deliver on class promises, it was able to deliver on identity promises.

How, then, can the ideology of SYRIZA be encapsulated? By beginning with Douzinas’ philosophy of resistance, the ideology of SYRIZA is defined in part by what it is against, namely neoliberalism and austerity. It can be seen that SYRIZA brings together class politics and identity politics, arguing for radical economic restructuring (Tsakatika, 2016) and an end to the corruption that SYRIZA argues is symptomatic of capitalism (Douzinas, 2017), while also supporting identity issues such as LGBTQ+ rights (Rori, 2020).

As data from manifestos and participants is explored in this chapter, the core ideology of SYRIZA will be examined further but, at this point, there is a sufficient understanding to commence this analysis.

6.3.1 The political goals of the movement

The data analysis begins by exploring the political goals of SYRIZA. SYRIZA have multiple goals across multiple policy areas reflecting their egalitarian ideology, and this was evident in data from participants and from manifestos, which covered a wide variety of goals, such as social justice, economic justice and structural reform:

P11: The goals of SYRIZA are to change the balance of forces in Europe and Greece towards a model that is socially inclusive and actually addresses the major problems which lay behind the world crisis.

P12: I see it as a party that its long-term goal would be to work towards a political-social system that is characterized as democratic socialism. That's a long-term goal. Now democratic socialism means that we believe in the parliamentary system. We're not seeking to overturn things through revolution if you want. We would like the society to gradually move towards socialism through democratic procedures.

Similar goals can be seen within SYRIZA's manifestos:

Unity and a joint fight for peace, social rights, individual freedom, the liberation from economic coercion. For the protection of the environment and a new growth model. For a world without racism, bigotry and marginalization. For a democratic Europe which will be accountable to the needs of the labour force and the youth, completely liberated from the neoliberal coercion of the EU. (SYRIZA, 2004, p. 1,2)

While the sentiments may be expressed slightly differently in each response, they are all, broadly, similar. The ending of austerity, fighting against bigotry, EU reform and so on can all be synthesised as a call for radical economic and societal restructure to benefit the people, as expressed in this section from SYRIZA's 2009 election manifesto:

The strengthening of SYRIZA marks, for the present and the future, a new course, focusing on the needs of society and the labour force, the proactive protection of the environment, the defending of democracy, and the creation of a society based on freedom and equality, men and women, Greeks and foreigners. (SYRIZA, 2009, p. 8)

It can be seen, therefore, that SYRIZA's egalitarianism is not confined to the economic sphere; it expands into the social, cultural and political spheres too.

As the rhetoric and discourse of SYRIZA is explored further, the nature and identity of their people shall become clearer. However, at this point, a number of unfulfilled demands can be seen: economic, such as ending austerity; societal, such as fighting bigotry and ending marginalisation; and political, such as reform of the Greek political system, which will be explored in this chapter.

How, then, do SYRIZA attempt to achieve these goals? There was general agreement from participants that these goals were to be achieved through the construction of as wide a coalition of support as possible. P10 described the approach as:

The first thing we did after 2010 when the first memorandum was signed was to participate, encourage, support all kinds of movements. Both the typical mainstream ones from trade unions etc. but also new movements that rose like the *Aganaktismenoi* (Indignants)...or a broad network of solidarity movements...SYRIZA participated in all this but not doing them in a very solemn way under the party name...kind of discreet.

P12 echoed this and argued that this was still the approach of SYRIZA:

We support movements that defend ecology, the environment. We defend movements that support human rights, in all the spectrum of human rights. We're very supportive of protection of refugees in England, the LGBTQ community, people who are imprisoned, everything. Everything that's revolving around human rights, is something that we are involved in and we support as members.

A number of themes are clear from the data. To begin with, SYRIZA have a wide variety of policy goals, all of which are egalitarian in nature. It is evident that, in order to achieve these goals, SYRIZA deploy linkage strategies with various groups to build unity between them. In order to understand who these groups are, though, it is necessary to turn to SYRIZA's conception of the people.

6.3.2 The people

As per the previous chapter, the examination of the populism of SYRIZA shall begin with an examination of who their people are by looking at their identity, values and demands. Again, as per the previous chapter, participants were asked a series of questions about who their supporters were and what their shared values were. In terms of the identity of the supporters, there was a certain amount of unanimity from participants:

If you look at the sort of qualitative data of the voting in the last parliamentary election, it's quite class based. So, it's quite working class lower middle-class people. It's people who have been side-lined by the crisis who either have no job or have stagnant jobs or have awful labour relations. It's people who lost a lot of income in the crisis. (P11)

Traditionally we were in favour of the working class. However, the crisis completely changed the whole structure of the Greek society. So, it's not anymore just the working class, it was also very large part of ...the middle class, lower middle class that were really impoverished and also became part of the social alliance in favour of SYRIZA. And I think right now it is mostly the unemployed, the precarious workers and the younger voters that are really supporting SYRIZA. (P10)

These quotes indicate that SYRIZA take a strongly class-based approach to the people, particularly in terms of how they understand society. However, they also look beyond the working class and class in general for their people. The working class are central to their appeal but, alongside this, there is also an appeal to what might be considered the precarious middle class, those who suffered under austerity. There are also strong inclusionary elements in what P9 said; SYRIZA's people are more than class-based; they include the LGBTQI+ community and immigrants, some of the most marginalised people in society.

It can therefore be surmised that SYRIZA make their appeal to those excluded, those left behind and ignored by the other political parties. This belief is supported by SYRIZA's manifestos: "Our constant referencing to the socially disadvantaged, the unemployed, the young, were not selective nor random choices. It is who we are." (SYRIZA, 2009, p. 2)

To understand the identity of SYRIZA's people in more detail and to understand where their demands might come from, participants were asked about the values of those who supported the party. This line of questioning revealed an interesting set of arguments from participants.

Actually, I don't believe that the SYRIZA supporters have all of them core values. For example, I don't believe that the 32% that the SYRIZA got in the national election was from radical, progressive people...I would lie to you if I told you that all SYRIZA supporters have full understanding of what progressive politics is. (P9)

According to the findings of the exit polls only one third of our voters feels ideologically close to the party. So, I really can't say what all these people feel. At the beginning it was just the common ground of ending memorandum position then it was the discussion about the old establishment and corruption and all of this. (P10)

Not only are SYRIZA's values not the values of the Greek people, but they are also not even the values of most of SYRIZA's supporters. This belief is supported by research undertaken into the policy positions of voters in the January 2015 elections on issues such as immigration and the economy, both raised by participants as being important to SYRIZA, with SYRIZA candidates proving themselves to be to the left of SYRIZA voters (Andreadis and Stavrakakis, 2017).

P12 discussed why there may be this disconnect between the values of supporters and the values of SYRIZA, and they pointed to the fact that SYRIZA had grown from a fringe party to a party of government and needed to appeal to as wide a group as possible.

We've broadened the spectrum of the people we talk with right now. They could be people who are more conservative in terms of human rights, if you want. What I'm trying to say is that they may not like everything that we say about the LGBTQ community. But these people, on the other hand, believe in a society that tolerates and a society that respects the people's rights. So, we're talking with this type of people as well and try to integrate them, not in the party, not necessarily make them members of SYRIZA, but to work with them on an electoral level.

Participants were asked, if there was a lack of congruence between the values of SYRIZA and the values of the SYRIZA voter, why people voted for them, and it is here that the unfulfilled demands of the people can begin to be understood. P11 made the claim that "Because they feel that both in opposition and in government there was a party that had

their interests at heart.” What, then, are these interests? Earlier in this chapter, the unfulfilled demands of the people were identified as falling, broadly, into three categories: political, economic and societal reform, reflecting the wide-ranging egalitarianism of SYRIZA.

Beginning with political reform, P9 expressed the belief that SYRIZA was a break from the past politics of Greece:

SYRIZA never was and never became a part of a really corrupt establishment which used to dominate the Greek politics. I mean, in the four or five years of government SYRIZA did not develop many special relations with big economic interests etc.

The political patronage or clientelism of both PASOK and ND in the Third Hellenic Republic has been the subject of considerable research and is well-documented. Even in its early years PASOK was building a patronage-driven system of political advancement as part of its attempts to build a mass movement (Pappas, 2009), and both PASOK and ND, in the immediate post-1974 years, used a clientelist system to appoint supporters to roles in the public sector, including publicly owned corporations (Trantidis, 2016). PASOK, in particular, are identified as a clientelist movement which, by the 1980s, had control of most of the Greek trade unions which, in turn, diminished trade union militancy (Trantidis, 2016).

P9 was explicit on this point:

PASOK had party members convicted for money laundering and similar things. So, I think the general idea was that it was a corrupted party, could not represent the people, and so they voted for us, hoping that we would be...something new and without any ties to corruption. So, I think that's why they voted for us.

SYRIZA’s January 2015 manifesto makes explicit mention of this clientelism:

SYRIZA is not responsible for the clientelist state created by the parties that were in power and destroyed the country. We perceive the pathologies of public administration! We insist, however, that the pro-memorandum governments did nothing to change them. (SYRIZA, 2015a, p. 9)

The second category of unfulfilled demands, economic, can be seen in SYRIZA’s anti-austerity message. It was the EU-mandated austerity that brought SYRIZA into the mainstream of Greek electoral policies, and this was something that still resonated with participants when discussing their appeal.

This strategy was discussed by P13, who explained:

So, the strategy, the strategy, first of all, it was to talk, to take the demands of the people, to talk against austerity and to create a discourse which will say that, look, particular appeal to the economically excluded, those who had suffered worst under austerity. There was agreement on this question with P11 saying: “Yes, obviously and that's enough. And that again is not a matter of belief, if you just look at the quality of data who votes for us.”

P8 explained this in more detail:

We have a saying in Greece that people vote with their wallets. So, they're voting for the person who they're hoping will improve their economic situation, obviously. And it wasn't easy with what was happening in Greece. Obviously, Greece, was bankrupt and within the memorandums, it wasn't easy to make more money.

The final category of unfulfilled demands are the social demands, and these can be examined through SYRIZA's policies on LBGTQI+ issues. The progress that SYRIZA made on these issues has already been explored, such as same-sex civil unions, sexuality-based discrimination prohibited, same-sex adoption allowed and legal change of gender for people aged 15 and above (Rori, 2020). This was something that P9 held up as an area of particular pride for SYRIZA:

The LBGTQI+ people that for the first time they have the right to proceed to-- not to marriage yet because it is our goal to finally achieve these as well., but also to be a same-sex couple to have the right to establish for example (civil partnerships).

When these demands are examined together using the analytical framework of this thesis, a significant inclusionary populism can be discerned in how SYRIZA view the people. To begin with, there is what Laclau and Mouffe called the “polyphony of voices”, each with their own discursive identity (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001), different constituencies with different demands. What gives these people unity is the equivalential chains formed by the fact that, pre-SYRIZA, these demands were unfulfilled. This therefore shows a people with a constitutive heterogeneity, a broad coalition of support for SYRIZA.

From theoretical and historical evidence, it is also known that in inclusionary populism, the people are often those who are excluded politically and/or economically. To explore this further, participants were asked if SYRIZA had a particular appeal to those ignored by other political parties, and this was something that participants agreed upon.

P10 looked at social classes who they argued had been neglected by PASOK and who now found a home within SYRIZA.

I think yes in a large extent. I mean there was a great shift of electoral power from PASOK, the Social Democratic Party, to SYRIZA. And I think it was exactly the fact that PASOK neglected its traditional social bases, working class and lower middle class that now are expressed by SYRIZA and represented by SYRIZA.

P11 spoke about the crisis of representation, not just in Greece but the wider EU, and explained how SYRIZA had attempted to address this:

I think the rise of SYRIZA as of other non-systemic parties is due to a crisis of political representation made before the crisis and during the crisis, major parties of the traditional centre left and centre right Conservatives and Labour in Britain, SPD and CDU in Germany and so on just didn't represent those people. Yes, there was a crisis of political representation because the policies that those centre-left and centre-right governments pursued didn't address the issues of inequality, poverty, poor jobs.

This argument about the crisis of representation and SYRIZA giving support and voice to those elements ignored or marginalised by what P11 would call the systemic parties is also evident in SYRIZA manifesto texts:

Our country's political system is in a state of decay and decline. In this crisis of representation, legitimacy and public confidence in the political system, SYRIZA responds with a policy that aims to bring the people back to the forefront of political developments. Only through this way can the interests of the workers, the youth and the people be served. (SYRIZA, 2015b, p. 19)

This was explored further by asking participants if they believed SYRIZA had politicised or re-politicised people. On this, there was broad agreement from participants:

Yes. Categorically yes. It was really obvious during the first months of its government. The negotiations were discussed in the public sphere in Greece. People were invited by SYRIZA to support the government's efforts even with pro-government rallies. Something like this never happened before. And it was also the case during the really intense week of the Greek referendum. (P10)

However, there was a dissenting voice from P8, and this is worth considering in detail:

I think it was the economic crisis. A lot of people didn't think or talk about politics because I think that they didn't think it was anything could change, the end of history. They thought that everything was on track. It would keep going. There was nothing left to do, and we would live our lives happily ever after. So, people weren't actually engaged in politics, but when the economic crisis hit us, I think that was the wake-up call for people to start going into politics again. It didn't necessarily mean that people had started going the right way. People were confused. They didn't know what hit them. They wanted revenge.

P8 is making the argument that it was not so much SYRIZA that politicised people but the economic crisis and the subsequent anger that this caused. To understand this further, it is necessary to return to the crisis of representation which has already been touched upon. The crisis in political representation caused by the Global Financial Crisis and subsequent austerity measures has been well documented (Conti, Hutter and Nanou, 2018). In those countries hit hardest by the Crisis and austerity, including Greece, there were the twin factors of growing awareness and distrust of corruption and equal distrust of political institutions, both domestic and EU (Hutter, Kriesi and Vidal, 2018), which would then

become, via protest and electoral results, twin conflicts against those domestic and EU elites (Hutter et al., 2018). The crisis of political representation was, in essence, when the peoples of those countries believed that the political elites no longer represented them. Yet other countries such as Italy, Hungary and even the UK, through Brexit, responded to this crisis of political legitimacy through right-wing governments and national retrenchment. What was different about Greece? How did this anger of P8 manifest itself in a left-wing government? P11 offered an explanation:

What is different about Greece and one of the reasons why now Golden Dawn, the fascist party, is being side-lined, there was a left-wing party that could break the crisis of political representation in Italy there wasn't, and the result is Salvini, in Hungary there wasn't, and the result is Orbán.

The politicisation of the people and the direction of their anger towards the elite and away from the scapegoats of the right was a key part of SYRIZA's linkage strategy as previously discussed in this chapter.

The final point to consider is the inclusionary aspects of SYRIZA's people. It has been established that SYRIZA has a particular appeal to groups such as the LGBTQI+ community and other marginalised groups such as immigrants, as SYRIZA legislated to extend citizenship rights to all second-generation immigrants living in Greece (Font, Graziano and Tsakatika, 2019). The inclusionary aspect of SYRIZA's appeal is not merely an adjunct, it is a central part of their politics.

Through participant and manifesto data, the multiple unfulfilled demands already identified are evident. The people are, according to SYRIZA, demanding economic, political and societal reform so that their demands are met, and this can only happen through SYRIZA and their egalitarian policies. To understand what causes these demands to be unfulfilled and to explore the empty signifier used by SYRIZA to unite the people, it is necessary to consider SYRIZA and the elite.

6.3.3 The elite

The literature on SYRIZA's discourse has pointed to a strong anti-establishment, anti-elite message (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014) as a key component of their populism. As per the theoretical and historical analysis of populism, it might be expected that the elite in the SYRIZA paradigm are the excluders of those whom SYRIZA identify as the excluded, those who cause their demands, as identified in the previous section, to be unfulfilled.

To understand this, participants were asked a number of questions about elites, political opponents and what they stood for, and, in doing so, the identity of SYRIZA's empty signifier became apparent.

To begin with, participants were asked if they believed there was such a thing as an elite:

There is an elite. Not necessarily the rich people. Of course, you have to put the rich people inside an elite, but not strictly the rich people that they just have money... Elite can be the people that they have the opportunity to have a normal life, to study, to go to universities, to study abroad...the multi-nationals, they are elites. Also, they are the people that always have their own way inside things without the right to have those things. (P9)

And there are these are the ones (the vulnerable) the elite of the country that are engaged in corruption that they never gave a shit about the country and so on. And we have to get them out of power, which we did in 2015. (P13)

There was one dissenting voice, however. P10 said, "I don't like the idea of an elite as such. I am more old school! I prefer the class distinction." However, prior to saying this, P10 had said:

Actually, in Greece was quite clear after a while that there was an anti-SYRIZA bloc that was formed both by the right-wing party of New Democracy and the social democratic party of PASOK and it was expressly formed...I mean, they said the ultimate destruction for the country was SYRIZA so we have to ally and stop with it was also supported by the vast majority of media and a large part of big businessmen etc. So, I think it was really, really clear ...the bloc against this. And it remains this way.

While P10 may not agree with the use of "elite" as a political term, this section shows evidence of a hegemonic elite, as per the analytical framework of this thesis. P10, along with P9 and P13, offers an idea of an elite whose identity and lives are markedly different from those of the people.

When participants considered the exact identity of the elite, there was a wide variety of responses. It has already been seen how P10 highlighted ND and PASOK as a political elite. P11 explained their idea of the elite as:

There is an elite which can be centre right, or centre left which are doing very well. There's financial services, marketing, there's communications. And they go to the same restaurants, same bars they socialize, they see the world even if they have political differences on the agenda and so on.

To explore the elite further and compare them with the people, participants were asked who they considered the elite to represent. P12 argued:

This is the elite in Greece. People who do their business outside of Greece but participate in the Greek economy without taking any risk though. So, I don't consider it to be a very patriotic position. So, everybody loves hating on the elite in Greece

and the elite has been involved a lot in the corruption existing in the public state... They do everything around profit.

This was echoed by P13

There is an elite and there was always an elite and there is an elite in every country. They represent all the different values that we discuss about individualism, about the importance of succeeding in economic terms, in other terms as well, and especially in Greece there is this elite in Greece has a particular characteristic politically, which it is happening in England as well.

To continue this exploration, participants were asked what they thought the values of their political opponents were and why those values might be incompatible with their values. All participants identified the political right as their opponents and identified a number of values that they felt were incompatible with the values of SYRIZA. P8 identified the social and cultural values, saying:

Their (ND) main values are our country, family and religion. They're not necessarily incompatible...we respect people's religion but we're not trying to impose them on others... We respect families. We want to support families. However, having a family is a choice and not necessarily something that you have to do as a duty to your country otherwise you're marginalized. And obviously, we love our country very much. However, we don't want to invest on the instincts of nationalism against minorities.

P11 took a Marxist approach to this question, raising the idea of who the universal class are; that is, a class who, by defending their interests, defends the interest of society as a whole (Llorente, 2013):

For neoliberals, for business interests, for right wing parties the answer to that question are the entrepreneurs and industrialists. Their interests represent the interests of the whole of society... We think that the opposite is true...it is the working class is the universal class and their interests for less inequality for more public services represent the interests of the whole society not just them.

It is clear that, for SYRIZA, the elite are the ones whose economic priorities stand against the economic priorities of the people and the ones whose focus on faith and family prevent the rights of groups such as the LGBTIQ+ communities from being realised. This is especially evident in manifesto texts:

The partners of the two-party system and their satellites are neither willing nor able to exercise a policy for the benefit of the people. Their existence is linked to the big business interests, bankers and big industrialists. (SYRIZA, 2012, p. 1)

This short excerpt gives strong evidence of SYRIZA's belief that the priorities of the elite stand against the priorities of the people, and that it is the elite who are responsible for the demands of the people being unfulfilled.

It has also been noted that SYRIZA has, historically, made reference to an external elite in the form of the EU. While participants did not especially mention the European Union as an external elite, there is significant evidence within manifestos of this:

The architecture of the Eurozone and the EU structure have turned today's Europe into an ultraconservative construct that oppresses the lives of its peoples... The crisis has turned into an opportunity for restructuring in the eurozone and EU countries against the interests of the people. (SYRIZA, 2014, pp. 3, 4)

The antagonism is clear within this passage, and SYRIZA continues to expand upon its idea of the elite as being international. It is not simply the forces of national neoliberalism which stand against the people in Greece, it is European forces of neoliberalism, representatives of the old political and financial order, which stand against the people of Europe. The idea of an international elite, so often conceptualised as the Troika, as an elite is one which runs deep within the politics of SYRIZA, as can be seen from this passage:

In these elections the people can and must close a sad parenthesis with their vote, end the regime of the Memoranda and of the Troika and open a new page of hope and optimism for the future. (SYRIZA, 2012, p. 4)

A similar perspective can be seen in this passage from the September 2015 manifesto:

Following the result of the referendum, we found ourselves within a completely hostile European political landscape and faced a punitive attitude from both the lenders and the institutions. (SYRIZA, 2015b)

During the run-up to the January 2015 election, Tsipras would make reference to the “troika exoterikou—troika esoterikou” (external Troika, internal Troika), making a direct comparison between the external, EU elite and the internal elite of the ND, PASOK, DIMAR coalition that was responsible for carrying out the mandated austerity policies (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014).

Participants did not make specific reference to the EU as a specific elite or enemy, and this is of interest as, during the austerity protests, SYRIZA focussed much of their discourse against the EU (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014), and in the early days of the SYRIZA government, most notably during the 2015 referendum, SYRIZA continued with this discourse (Paravantes, 2019). However, by the time fieldwork was carried out for this chapter, 2019-2020, SYRIZA were no longer in government and Greece had exited the MoU. It may be that, for participants, the EU was no longer seen as an important antagonist in their politics.

At this point, a strong theme develops concerning SYRIZA's elite; while it may, at first sight, appear to be primarily economic, on closer examination it is far more wide-ranging

and encapsulates political parties and other structures of the conservative Greek society, such as the church. Moreover, it is in the elite, and not the people, where evidence can be seen of the empty signifier deployed by SYRIZA.

6.3.3.1 The Empty signifier

In the previous chapter, the empty signifier was explored during the discussion on the people but, for SYRIZA, an empty signifier is most apparent when participants were discussing the elite and, from the data obtained from participants, “neoliberalism” was a term frequently deployed by those participants in order to frame what it was SYRIZA stood against:

There was huge call for all Progressive and Democratic Parties and organizations and movements from SYRIZA. And many of them came and they said, "Okay. Let's do a very big progressive front to tackle nationalism, extreme right and neoliberalism. (P8)

And then put an alternative to what was in the whole world seen as the orthodoxy of neoliberalism (P13)

We're trying to create sort of a movement against neoliberalism and extreme right-wing parties because these are our enemies. (P12)

It is also evident throughout SYRIZA manifestos:

The strategic horizon of neoliberalism is nothing more than the continued degradation of the social state and the endless attempt to diminish social rights. SYRIZA's position is against such a design. (SYRIZA, 2015b)

There is evidence, therefore, that it is neoliberalism that SYRIZA deploy as an empty signifier, as it is through this that both the elite and the demands of the people can be understood. Neoliberalism, as per Laclau and Mouffe (2001), is a hegemony organised around nodal points such as “free market economy” (Howarth, 2004, p. 259), and it seeks to subordinate groups that would challenge it, in order to maintain this hegemony. SYRIZA’s philosophy of resistance, the idea that much of what SYRIZA are for, can be understood as what they are against (Douzinas, 2017). It has already been established, per the considerable evidence in literature, that much of what SYRIZA stand against can be considered as neoliberalism (Spourdalakis, 2014; Grollios, 2016). However, this does not automatically mean that neoliberalism is used as an empty signifier by SYRIZA, and thus more evidence is required.

Limited work in identifying an empty signifier in the discourse of SYRIZA already exists, and arguments have been advanced for “the people” (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014;

Markou, 2017a) and, in the January 2015 elections, for “hope” (Katsambekis, 2016). In all of these instances, the authors make strong cases for these as empty signifiers, inasmuch as they served to unify the various demands of the people. As established, it is not possible to point to a word or phrase and state with absolute confidence that it is an empty signifier; all that can be done is to extrapolate from the data available, and the data from participants in this thesis suggests that neoliberalism is an empty signifier, as it represents all that SYRIZA are against and can be used to unite and mobilise support by uniting demands.

Equally, while previous attempts to locate an empty signifier in the SYRIZA discourse have been theoretically and empirically robust, they come from an earlier period in the history of SYRIZA, the pre- and immediate post-January 2015 election period, before the idealism of SYRIZA was faced with the realities of governance, before the splits in the party and the necessity of continuing austerity. The data for this chapter was obtained, however, after the 2019 Greek elections, which saw SYRIZA lose seats and lose the government to ND, and so participants were reflecting on where SYRIZA had not been successful, as well as on successes, and it is known that on economic issues, SYRIZA was not as successful as it would have hoped. SYRIZA are in opposition once more, and participants are reflecting on why this happened, particularly where they were unable to make the economic reforms they promised. Highlighting neoliberalism as an empty signifier gives them both a rationale for their lack of success in economic policies and, also, a continuing force for their support to resist against as an opposition party.

In the following section, where the relationship between the people and the elite is examined, this shall be explored in more detail and, in particular, the contested semantic space that exists between SYRIZA and their opponents regarding neoliberalism.

6.3.4 The relationship between the people and elite

This section ends with an examination of the antagonism between the people and elite. The multiple demands of the people have already been explored, as has the identity of the elite and how that elite is represented as the empty signifier of neoliberalism. In this section, the nature of SYRIZA’s relationship with the elite will be examined, to explore how SYRIZA believe their demands are prevented from being fulfilled.

P11 described their view of this strategy by the elite:

Neoliberalism is dominant but it's not hegemonic. Hegemonic would mean it can incorporate enough of the people from the popular classes so that it's not just a model

for the rich and the powerful projection, but actually poorer sections of the middle class and the working class see themselves in it. We see Trump and Salvini and Johnson as the results of a non-hegemonic politics...if you had a hegemonic neoliberal project, you wouldn't need a Johnson or an Orbán.

This is a particularly interesting comment, as P11 is arguing that neoliberalism is still an uncompleted project in that it is not yet a hegemony. This is curious, as at other points in the discussion, P11 had claimed neoliberalism to be a hegemony. Why this contradiction? It could be that P11 is arguing that the fact that it is not hegemonic leaves an opportunity for parties such as SYRIZA to challenge neoliberalism with an alternative to its orthodoxy. Critically for this section of the chapter, the fact that P11 argues neoliberalism is not a hegemony helps explain the antagonism that exists between the elite and people; the refusal to fulfil the demands of the people can be seen as an attempt to build the dominance of neoliberalism into a hegemony. At this point, it can be seen that the elite is one that has enjoyed a position of privilege within Greece, a privilege which is primarily economic and is supported and maintained by the systemic parties that SYRIZA sought to challenge. What is more, the antagonism between the people and the elite is due to this attempt by SYRIZA to challenge this privilege and the elite attempting to preserve it.

The final area of discussion in this section involves a consideration of the contested semantic space around the empty signifier of neoliberalism. The previous chapter explored how the SNP used independence as an empty signifier to give shape and meaning to their various demands and to argue that independence was the path to realising these demands, whereas their opponents argued the opposite. This same approach will be adopted for SYRIZA; however, there is a significant difference this time, as the empty signifier that this thesis argues is currently deployed by SYRIZA represents what they are opposed to and not what they stand for. To adopt this approach, how ND frame neoliberalism will be explored and compared with SYRIZA. In manifestos and texts, ND do not refer to neoliberalism as such, but rather to signifiers of neoliberalism, such as “entrepreneurs” and “prosperity”, and it is through these signifiers that the differences shall be examined. The first step towards this involves seeing how SYRIZA frame “entrepreneurs”:

It's back to the conservatives because they offered a vision that it has been worth, I think, the Greeks psyche for a very long time that we will like... We should all become entrepreneurial and that the church will be given to us from a right-wing government that likes free market and things like that. And we will have so many opportunities. (P14)

Because we've had 30 years of neo liberalism... the level of ideology... our opponent's job is much easier and you see just say an entrepreneur, entrepreneurship

and just say free markets, you just say liberalisation and they sound good words and it's very easy to do. You don't have to explain (P11)

Two ideas are evident from these statements. First, the concept of the entrepreneur is associated with the elite, and it is promoted as a positive concept by the elite. Second, the participants are advancing the argument that neoliberalism is so embedded in Greek political discourse that aspects of it, such as the entrepreneur, are almost automatically seen as a positive and, by implication, the alternatives are not.

If this is compared to the view of the elite which, in this instance, is represented by ND, then this positive framing is evident in the following sections from a speech by Vangelis Meimarakis, the then party leader, in 2015:

And we have to mention again that we are not a party that believes that making profit is a crime. We believe that making a profit is good as long as it comes out of healthy entrepreneurship and through transparent practices. (Meimarakis, 2015, p. 8)

The main goal of all the proposed changes is to fire up the engines of growth, to improve the entrepreneurial environment so businesses can stand up on their own feet, especially those that were challenged during the last years. (Meimarakis, 2015, p. 8)

These two short sections from Meimarakis demonstrate a degree of truth in what participants argue: entrepreneurs and associated culture are promoted by the elite as a positive. For SYRIZA, the concept of the entrepreneur as a positive is something that they have to work to challenge with their own vision of positivity, as expressed by P13:

The idea is that it (SYRIZA) was offering a different future, a different vision for the future, that we could create a society, that it would be more equal, that it will be less hardship. But we can have solidarity, that we can take care of people, all people, refugees as well.

This can be observed further by examining how SYRIZA and ND differ on what they understand prosperity and the path to prosperity to be, starting with a section from New Democracy's January 2015 manifesto: "The aim: for Greece to become a world champion of development, competitiveness and prosperity." (New Democracy, 2015, p. 1). Compare this sentence with how SYRIZA frame prosperity:

The aim of our policy is a social and democratic Europe of prosperity for its people, respecting the national and popular sovereignty of its member states and will be a factor of peace and international cooperation. (SYRIZA, 2015a, p. 127).

Both SYRIZA and ND want Greece to be prosperous, but what that prosperity looks like and the path towards it are profoundly different. Prosperity for SYRIZA means peace, cooperation and a social democratic society. For ND it means “competitiveness”, and economic competition is a concept that participants treated with suspicion: “We need more cooperation in the economy not just competition, why the public services could be part of the solution in the public sector” (P11).

There is a clear antagonism in this space, a contestation over the meaning and implication of neoliberalism, and this is where the populism lies, given that in the analytical framework of this thesis, meaning is not fixed and so can be contested (Howarth, 2000) and that the antagonistic frontier between the people and elite can form over this contestation. Consequently, SYRIZA’s leveraging of neoliberalism as an empty signifier and contesting the meaning and implications of this with the elite is a populist act of people/elite antagonism.

6.3.5 Articulation

The final element of analysis to discuss is the concept of articulation; the modification of identity that happens when two components form a relationship; the inclusionary populism is changed by the core ideology and the core ideology is changed by the inclusionary populism. In the case of SYRIZA, there are their core egalitarian ideology and inclusionary populism.

There exist considerable similarities between these components; this thesis has explored how SYRIZA’s people are a diverse group of those who have been excluded by the elite on a number of grounds, such as economics, sexual identity and nationality, and through the crisis of representation, which left many Greeks feeling that the systemic politics of PASOK and ND no longer represented them, and that this is rooted both in their inclusionary populism and their egalitarian ideology, most notably the linkage strategies it proposes. Equally, both the inclusionary populism and egalitarian ideology of SYRIZA allow for an elite who, in attempting to preserve their own position of privilege, cause the exclusion of the people.

However, there are also existing differences. For some participants, their conception of the people has a stronger, class-based element, and it is apparent from historic and theoretical evidence that inclusionary populism is not a class-based appeal, so there is a stronger

influence of the egalitarian component at play. However, it is also clear that, as per Laclau's (1979) arguments, articulation between components is only truly possible when one of those components is not class-based, and so the lack of class-based politics within inclusionary populism allows for the articulation between SYRIZA's egalitarian politics and inclusionary populism.

Attempting to identify this articulation is challenging, however, largely due to the fact that much of SYRIZA's core ideology, with its Eurocommunist heritage, already displays the linkage strategies that would normally be seen within inclusionary populism. However, the argument can be made that this articulation happens when the linkage strategies of SYRIZA are combined with the unfulfilled demands of inclusionary populism. The multiple unfulfilled demands of SYRIZA's people which have already been examined in this thesis lend themselves well to an inclusionary populist appeal. The linkage strategy combines with the unfulfilled demands, and the radical nature of these demands leads to an egalitarian inclusionary populist people.

This articulation also exists for the elite. From inclusionary populism, it is evident that the elite are those who prevent the people from fulfilling their demands, but the precise identity of this elite is unclear. The egalitarian politics of SYRIZA reveals that identity; they are the big businesses whose economic demands are contrary to those of the people, they are the media who support that business agenda, they are the old parties of ND and PASOK, who supported austerity, they are the EU and their austerity agenda. In short, they are everyone who stands against the demands of SYRIZA's people. The inclusionary populism of SYRIZA allows a clear view of this elite through the lens of the empty signifier of neoliberalism, as well as an understanding that their goal as to embed neoliberalism as a hegemony, as per the arguments of P11.

6.4 Discussion

Having applied the analytical framework to the data gathered for this chapter, how the data fits within the five themes of analysis can be seen in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Characteristics of SYRIZA's populism

Component	Overview	Analysis	Populism
People	A diverse group which includes the working classes, precarious middle classes and marginalised groups such as LGBTQI+ and immigrants	The diversity of the group is reflected in the diversity of their demands, which include economic demands, such as ending austerity, political demands, such as ending the crisis of representation, and rights for marginalised groups.	The constitutive heterogeneity of the people is its strength, with SYRIZA being able to transcend a class-based appeal. The people have diverse demands, but the chains of equivalence forged by the demands being unfulfilled bring a unity to them.
Elite	The elite are as diverse as the people; they are the old parties of PASOK and ND, they are big business, they are the media, and they were the EU and the Troika.	The philosophy of resistance runs deep within SYRIZA's discourse and strategy, and this can be seen in their conception of the elite: a diverse group united by their desire to maintain their privilege at the expense of the people.	SYRIZA use this elite to give the people a focus for blame. A diverse elite means that SYRIZA can build a diverse support.
Relationship between people and elite	An antagonistic clash of demands	SYRIZA are attempting to challenge the privilege of the elite through the demands of the people; the elite attempt to prevent this through the promotion and preservation of the status quo.	The antagonism is clear from both sides, with SYRIZA and the elite arguing that their demands are the path to a better Greece.
Empty signifier	Neoliberalism	Although neoliberalism is a value of the elite and not the people, it is leveraged by SYRIZA as an empty signifier.	This empty signifier still unites the people, as it gives them something to unite against. The unfulfilled demands of the people are given shape and meaning by them being seen as demands against neoliberalism.
Articulation	Egalitarian inclusionary populism	There already exists considerable cross-over between SYRIZA's egalitarian ideology and inclusionary populism, most notably in SYRIZA's linkage strategies.	The articulation gives SYRIZA a people united through unfulfilled demands and through the empty signifier of the elite's populism.

While significant literature exists framing SYRIZA as inclusionary populist, this does not mean that there should not be an attempt to frame SYRIZA as inclusionary populist, as per the analytical framework of this thesis, and accordingly, such an attempt now follows.

Starting with the people, strong evidence of inclusionary populism is observable in how they are envisaged by SYRIZA. It has been established that they are heterogenous, having both a cross-class appeal and a cross-identity appeal. Indeed, the fact that participants believed that many of their supporters did not share the core values of SYRIZA only adds to this heterogeneity; SYRIZA are able to make a claim that they are speaking even for those who do not share their politics. This diversity of the people is also reflected in the diversity of their demands, which are wide-ranging. Again, this is in keeping with the heterogeneity expected to be seen in an inclusionary populist movement. The critical component for these demands and the people expressing them is that they are united by equivalential chains, due to them being unfulfilled. Moreover, through this diversity of the people, the inclusionary component of SYRIZA's populism is clear; the appeal goes beyond economics and includes marginalised groups such as LGBTQI+ and immigrants.

When the focus turns to the elite and their relationship with the people, strong evidence of inclusionary populism continues to be apparent; the elite are those in a position of privilege and are engaged in an attempt to maintain that privilege at the expense of the demands of the people. In framing this, SYRIZA make use of neoliberalism as an empty signifier, utilising their philosophy of resistance to express their politics as much of what they are against as what they are for. What is more, by stating their resistance to neoliberalism, they are able to encapsulate a wide range of political positions, such as being anti-discrimination and anti-austerity. as all being facets of neoliberalism that they stand against.

When comparing the egalitarian inclusionary populism of SYRIZA with the egalitarian inclusionary populism explored previously, similarities can be seen, especially in the idea that the economic structures of the elite do not serve the interests of the people. Historic egalitarian populists did not wish to replace capitalism per se but replace it with a model which they believed was fairer and would serve the people. Can this be seen with SYRIZA?

Looking at participant data, only one participant, P11, makes specific reference to capitalism, arguing:

“I mean there's a huge psychological difference in this stage of capitalism which we haven't seen in 150 years of it. It's not just that young people are facing stagnant wages, poor jobs, jobs without any prospect of social mobility but that their rights, pensions and wages are going to be worse than their parents. That's very very difficult. Even in very poor times, in the 50s, 60s and 70s there's always a hope of progress and things would be better for my children and for me that's been reversed.”

While this statement is, indeed, anti-capitalist, P11 specifically refers to the current form of capitalism and not capitalism in general. Indeed, by referring to previous generations, there is almost a sense that the capitalism of those eras did serve a purpose. Even though P11, along with all other participants, speaks of the necessity of improving the economic circumstances of the people, there was no specific demand to replace capitalism. Manifesto evidence points in a similar direction. There are occasional references, for example: “It is clear that corruption is an integral part of the capitalist economic mode” (SYRIZA, 2015b), but again, there is little evidence that SYRIZA wish to completely replace capitalism.

That is not to state that SYRIZA are a pro-capitalist party, rather that the evidence available from participants and manifesto suggests that much like the egalitarian populists of history, they wish to recalibrate capitalism to make it work for the people. Finally, the articulation of SYRIZA’s egalitarian ideology and inclusionary populism demonstrates both the strong fit of these two components with the populism, allowing the realisation of SYRIZA’s linkage strategies through the formation of equivalential chains.

As per the previous chapter, at the end of each discussion, participants were given a definition of inclusionary populism as being one where there was a people whose membership was demos- and not ethnos-based, an elite and an antagonistic relationship between them. After this, participants were asked if they believed SYRIZA were inclusionary populist. Of the six participants, four broadly agreed with this proposition. P8 said, “I’d say that SYRIZA is an inclusionary populist movement”, while P13 said, “Loosely, yes. And there are members of our party who-- their political speech represents that. They do address the people in that spectrum.”

However, P10 and P11 rejected this proposition. P10 said: “No strongly disagree. Because SYRIZA is I think that opposite of populism. The opposite of populism is democracy and SYRIZA is, inside and out, democratic so it can't be populist”, while P11 said:

I mean there are leftists who support populism...The thing is I'm in favour of the popular and what right wingers tried to do is to associate populism with the popular. and that anything that comes from below that is it is also ipso facto populist.

Without wanting to take away from the agency and intent of these participants, it is possible to explain their rejection of this proposition as considering populism to be something other than that which this thesis advances. Regarding P10's comments, the analytical framework of this thesis has populism as a profoundly democratic phenomenon, whereas P11 seems to be viewing, with caveats, populism as more of a phenomenon of the right which, as this thesis demonstrates, is not the case. The data and analysis presented in the thesis therefore points to strong evidence of SYRIZA being inclusionary populist, as per the consensus of existing literature.

6.5 Conclusions

When examining the egalitarian inclusionary populism of SYRIZA, there are a number of conclusions that can be reached. To begin with, the analytical framework of this thesis, when applied to the data available, has demonstrated that SYRIZA have a number of inclusionary populist characteristics, most notably in a heterogenous people given unity by their demands being unfulfilled, an elite who seek to preserve their dominant position by refusing these demands and an empty signifier that is deployed to focus resistance against this elite.

A strong crossover can also be seen between SYRIZA's egalitarian politics and inclusionary populism, most notably in SYRIZA's linkage strategies, which saw them work to build a coalition of the various groups seeking change in Greece, such as the Indignants and LGBTQI+ communities. Through this, there is strong evidence of the articulation between these two components.

Finally, when comparing the case of SYRIZA back to the historic egalitarian inclusionary populism of Chapter 2, strong similarities are evident. Similar to those egalitarian inclusionary populists of the USA, SYRIZA seek to recalibrate the economy to benefit the people and not the elite. Equally, the data obtained for this chapter seems to point to SYRIZA not being against capitalism as such but, rather, the form of capitalism—

neoliberalism—which led to the financial crisis and austerity. There are, however, differences. The historic egalitarian inclusionary populists had an appeal that was fundamentally economic. While an economic appeal is important to SYRIZA, it is not their sole appeal, and social reforms, an area where they enjoyed success, are also key to their politics. The second key difference is that the historic egalitarian inclusionary populists appealed to the history and founding principles of the USA and argued that big business-focussed capitalism had taken the USA away from those principles and that the country needed to return to them. No evidence was found for this thesis that SYRIZA had made similar arguments regarding the principles of the Third Hellenic Republic. Nevertheless, strong similarities exist between the historic and contemporary cases examined.

With this examination of SYRIZA having been completed, the final empirical chapter features an examination of the anti-colonial inclusionary populism of Sinn Féin.

Chapter 7 - Sinn Féin: Anti-colonial inclusionary populism

7.1 Introduction

Similar to the SNP, Sinn Féin has had a long journey from the periphery of politics to being a party of government in Northern Ireland and, at the time of writing, is the second largest party in the Dáil Éireann and a potential party of government in the Republic of Ireland. The aim of this chapter is to apply the analytical framework to the discourse of Sinn Féin, in an attempt to define Sinn Féin as inclusionary populist party, examine the populism of Sinn Féin alongside its core ideology of republicanism and identify the anti-colonial elements of this populism.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: it will begin with a short history and contemporary overview of Sinn Féin and the major issues in current Irish politics. This is followed by a discussion of the development and schisms within Irish republicanism and its journey from a revolutionary movement to one in the mainstream of Irish politics, as well as a discussion of what is meant by anti-colonial populism. In what follows, the data is introduced and analysed through the analytical framework of the thesis to explore the identity of the people, including their demands and values and the empty signifier that gives meaning to these demands, who the elite are and what their relationship with the people is and the articulation between Sinn Féin's republicanism and their inclusionary populism. Finally, there shall be an attempt to frame Sinn Féin's republican inclusionary populism as anti-colonial.

7.2 The electoral development of Sinn Féin

Founded in 1905, Sinn Féin has been subject to a number of splits in its history, as Irish republicanism has changed and evolved in reaction to events such as the Anglo-Irish war and Irish Civil War (Whiting, 2018). Indeed, the two historically dominant political parties of the Republic of Ireland, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, trace their lineage to Sinn Féin. The island of Ireland is unique in Europe in that it has transnational political parties; parties that operate in more than one country, and Sinn Féin are one such party, operating both in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, part of the United Kingdom. It should be explained, though, that Sinn Féin do not believe the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland to be separate countries but separate jurisdictions. This was a point made by P17:

We're not a transnational party because nobody disputes, I suppose, the parameters of the nation, certainly not on this side of the border and not about half of the people on the other side of the border. So, while we do cross two jurisdictions, it's not two separate nations.

For much of its history, on both sides of the Irish Border, Sinn Féin was a revolutionary republican movement, the political wing of the IRA/Provisional IRA that operated, largely, outside the boundaries of liberal democratic politics. However, from the 1980s onwards and, in particular, from the 1994 ceasefire in Northern Ireland and 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA), Sinn Féin moved from being a radical republican party to a more moderate force (Whiting, 2018). Sinn Féin's stated aim is still the reunification of Ireland, but now it seeks to achieve this through democratic means rather than through armed struggle (Whiting, 2018).

The journey towards the Good Friday Agreement is critical in understanding the change in Sinn Féin that led it from being the political wing of a terrorist organisation to a party that is increasingly dominant on both sides of the Irish border. Ó Broin, (2009) advances the argument that this journey truly began with the leadership of Gerry Adams, who became Sinn Féin president in 1983 and, in particular, with the aftermath of the Einniskillen Bombing in 1987, when an IRA bomb exploded during a Remembrance Sunday parade, killing 12 and causing outrage both in Ireland and Great Britain, with tens of thousands of people in the Republic of Ireland signing a book of condolences (Ó Broin, 2009).

Adams began to go on record claiming that he would be prepared to consider non-violent paths towards achieving the goals of Sinn Féin and, by the late 1980s, the party was in dialogue with John Hume, leader of the moderate nationalist SDLP (de Bréadún, 2015). Although controversial at the time and with no small measure of electoral and reputational risk to Hume, this dialogue sparked other dialogues with mainstream political figures, most notably Albert Reynolds, Fianna Fáil Taoiseach, and John Major, Conservative Prime Minister.

It took Sinn Féin considerable time to come round to the idea of a Northern Ireland Assembly, having to placate the more hard-line members and the IRA that this did not mean Sinn Féin had abandoned its commitment to a united Ireland (De Bréadún, 2015).

The GFA included provisions to form a new assembly for Northern Ireland with a power-sharing executive, wherein government would be shared between parties representing both the Unionist and Nationalist communities. In the first election to the Assembly in 1998,

Sinn Féin came fourth, behind the UUP and DUP, the two major parties for the Unionist community, and the SDLP, the more moderate Nationalist party, with 18% of the popular vote and 20 seats (EONI, 2001). By the most recent elections in 2017, with 27.9% of the popular vote and 27 seats, Sinn Féin were now the second party in Northern Ireland, displacing the SDLP as the primary party for the Nationalist community (BBC News, 2017a). While the Northern Ireland Assembly has been frequently suspended during its history, it is currently sitting, and Sinn Féin are a party of government in Northern Ireland.

Sinn Féin's displacement of the SDLP as the primary party for Nationalists is a result of a number of factors. First, there is the idea that through the setting up of the Assembly and power-sharing executive, the SDLP, has achieved its primary goal. Secondly, the retirement of the senior figures of John Hume and Seamus Mallon, figures with international reputation and renown, left a personality vacuum at the top of the party. Voters who had been attracted to the SDLP because of these men no longer felt the party had the same appeal (McGlinchey, 2019). Most notably, though, Sinn Féin has managed to present itself as a stauncher defender of the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland. As an example, McGlinchey (2019) points towards Northern Irish parades and the differing approaches of the SDLP and Sinn Féin.

Approximately 90% of parades in Northern Ireland are from Loyalist organisations such as the Orange Order and Apprentice Boys (Walsh, 2015), and while they are viewed as celebrations of cultural identity by that community (Kirkland, 2002), they are viewed as displays of sectarian intimidation by Nationalists, especially when those parades pass through or near Nationalist areas (Walsh, 2015). In attempting to negotiate contentious parades, the SDLP tried to use the Parades Commission, a post-GFA body that was intended to settle intra-community disputes over parades, while Sinn Féin took a more strident stance, framing themselves as defenders of Nationalist communities against sectarian Loyalism (McGlinchey, 2019). Ultimately, this paid electoral dividends, as Nationalist voters in Northern Ireland came to believe that their interests and safety were better served by Sinn Féin.

The story is similar in the Republic of Ireland. In the 1997 elections to the Dáil Éireann, Sinn Féin obtained 2.5% of first choice votes and won one seat, with the traditional duopoly of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael unchallenged. Yet the 2020 elections resulted in Sinn Féin winning 24.5% of the first-choice votes, the highest of all parties, and 37 seats, one fewer than Fianna Fáil (RTÉ, 2020). If the GFA was the catalyst for Sinn Féin's success in Northern Ireland, the catalyst for success in the Republic of Ireland was the Global

Financial Crisis of 2007/08 and the subsequent austerity measures imposed (Allen and O'Boyle, 2013; de Bréadún, 2015). The causes and nature of the Irish crash will be discussed later in this chapter when considering the subsequent housing crisis and Sinn Féin's reaction to it. However, Sinn Féin's strong anti-austerity stance, stronger than that of the Irish Labour Party, saw it eclipse the latter, then Fine Gael, leading it finally to become what it is now: a significant challenger to the dominance of Fianna Fáil.

However, the GFA and peace process also had a significant impact on Sinn Féin's success in the Republic of Ireland. Prior to the peace process, Sinn Féin were a pariah party in the Republic of Ireland with them, and not the British and Unionists, taking the bulk of the blame for the continuation of the Troubles (Allen and O'Boyle, 2013). Post-GFA, Sinn Féin had a legitimacy they had lacked before. Sinn Féin framed itself as the primary anti-austerity party in the Republic of Ireland (Allen and O'Boyle, 2013; De Bréadún, 2015), leading some authors to draw comparisons between them and SYRIZA and Podemos (De Bréadún, 2015). Similar to these parties, Sinn Féin were able to frame themselves as Ireland's radical left party and political outsiders, with the ability to challenge the dominance of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael (Allen and O'Boyle, 2013), a strategy which, as shall be seen, has paid dividends.

7.3 Sinn Féin's core ideology

Sinn Féin describe themselves as:

An Irish republican party. We are a United Ireland party. We believe in the sovereignty, independence and freedom of the Irish people and the right of our people to build our own society (Sinn Féin, 2011, p. 8).

Republicanism is a political term with a variety of meanings, from the French anti-monarchist tradition to contemporary US conservative politics. Irish republicanism is an ideology that is unique to Ireland and which can be traced back to the late 18th century (Small and Small, 2010). Modern Irish republicanism can be seen to begin, broadly, with the Proclamation of the Republic, as issued by the leaders of the 1916 Easter Rising as part of their attempt at armed insurrection against the British governance and its forces in Ireland (Hearty, 2018). There has never been a true consensus on what Irish republicanism is (McGovern, 2000) given that it has a range of competing, even contradictory, intellectual traditions which has seen it be left wing, right wing, non-sectarian, sectarian, supportive of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, xenophobic and inclusive

(McGarry, 2003). Yet it can be seen to have three key dimensions: “An alternative claim to sovereignty and a rejection of British rule; a refusal to work through existing structures; and a belief in the use of violence to achieve their goals” (Whiting 2018, p23). Even within this, there are two distinct strains of republicanism: the ethno-nationalism of Pearse and the international socialism of Connolly (Hoey, 2019). The radical socialist element of republicanism has always been present, with Munck, (1981) arguing that “Republicanism in Ireland cannot be reduced to the ideology of the bourgeois revolution; it has always had a radical component which has tended towards socialism.” (p. 61). As shall be explored in this chapter, it is the socialist tradition that Sinn Féin belong to and espouse.

Republicanism has had eras of being both moderate and radical/revolutionary. The first radical period was from the Easter Uprising in 1916 to 1926 and the formation of Fianna Fáil, who split from Sinn Féin and were willing to work within the structures of the Irish Free State, still a dominion of the United Kingdom and not yet a republic (Whiting, 2018). The second period was during the Troubles, from 1970 to 1994, when Sinn Féin were, again, supportive of the use of armed violence to achieve their goals. It was within this period, and thanks to pressure from Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland, that Sinn Féin’s republicanism began to become more left-wing in nature, reflecting Sinn Féin as it is now: a party of the left (Whiting, 2018).

In the immediate pre- and post-GFA periods, Irish republicanism went through a period of profound transition and change (McGovern, 2000), with Sinn Féin, the principal force of Irish republicanism (McGovern 2000), moving from being a revolutionary force to being the democratiser of this revolutionary republicanism, through its increased participation in liberal democratic structures such as the Dáil, Northern Ireland Assembly and, to a certain extent, Westminster (Whiting 2018). Sinn Féin remain an abstentionist party, and politicians elected to Westminster as MPs do not take their seats. In its current form, the Irish republicanism of Sinn Féin can be seen as multicultural and pluralist (McGovern 2000), with a strong anti-austerity and socialist message (Hearty 2018), as can be seen from how they frame themselves in their manifestos:

The republican vision is about building of ‘An Ireland of Equals’. It is at the core of our agenda for change. For this reason we need a new type of politics based on inclusion, equality and fairness. (Sinn Féin, 2011a, p. 34)

As the various dimensions of Sinn Féin’s populism are explored, key moments in the history of the party will be touched on and expanded upon, along with wider Irish republicanism when necessary but, for now, this is sufficient context to understand their

core ideology: that of a socialist party with a fundamental belief in the sovereignty of the people of Ireland, both in the Republic and the North.

7.3.1 Irish anti-colonialism

As this chapter is aiming to frame Sinn Féin as being an anti-colonial inclusionary populist movement, it is necessary to consider what is meant by anti-colonialism and, in particular, anti-colonialism in the Irish sense. In Chapter Two, the impact of colonialism upon the identity of the people in inclusionary populism was discussed, looking, in particular, at the work of Filc (2015). This work will now be returned to, in order to explore this in a little more detail.

The first point to raise is that colonialism is profoundly exclusionary in nature, with the colonisers seeking to exclude the colonised from power and to legitimise and institutionalise exploitation, often through racial hierarchies (Filc, 2015). Even from the early colonisation of Ireland from the British mainland, the Irish were othered by the colonisers and they and their culture viewed as barbarous (Morrissey, 2004), and the impact of British colonialism on the development of Irish culture and national identity (White, 2010) is well established. Filc (2015) argues that the colonial legacy of Latin America has had a significant impact on its populism, most notably the anti-elite element, as represented by the colonisers and their legacies, and the notion that a united people, those whom the colonisers othered and excluded from power, are now seeking to reclaim that power for themselves and this drive to include the excluded is core to Sinn Féin's politics.

The legacy of Ireland's colonial past still has a strong influence on contemporary politics in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. In terms of the Republic of Ireland, this legacy remains within Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, the historically dominant political parties of the country. Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael's origins are rooted in the foundations of the modern Irish state and, in particular, the partitioning of Ireland and the subsequent civil war. Ireland won its independence from the United Kingdom through the Anglo-Irish war of 1919-1921, and this independence was ratified in the treaty signed between Irish leaders and the British government. However, the treaty included the partition of Ireland, with six counties in the north which had a Protestant and pro-Union majority forming Northern Ireland and remaining part of the United Kingdom. This treaty and partition caused a split within Sinn Féin and subsequent civil war between forces in favour and against the treaty

(Coakley, 2010). Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael were both splinter groups from Sinn Féin and, broadly, Fianna Fáil represented those who were anti-treaty and Fine Gael those who were pro-treaty (Coakley, 2010).

The six counties of Northern Ireland which remained part of the United Kingdom post-partition have a politics which is even more profoundly influenced by colonial legacy. The Protestant majority in Northern Ireland traces its history and culture back to the Ulster Planters, Scottish farmers who were sent to what is now Northern Ireland in the early 17th Century to ensure loyalty to the British crown (O'Brien, 1999). The Ulster Plantation was a colonial project, an attempt to impose British values upon what was seen as the uncivilised and barbaric Irish (McVeigh and Rolston, 2009), most notably Protestantism and allegiance to the British Crown (O'Brien, 1999; McVeigh and Rolston, 2009). This colonial legacy remains strong in Northern Ireland, as shall be explored in this chapter, with 45% of those living in Northern Ireland considering themselves British, compared to 25% who consider themselves Irish (Hughes, 2016).

Post-partition, the government of Northern Ireland sought to preserve the dominance of the Protestant majority, and the discrimination against the Catholic minority led to the peaceful Civil Rights movement of the 1960s and early 1970s and, ultimately, to the violence of the Troubles, which saw armed conflict between Republican forces, most notably the Provisional IRA which was linked to Sinn Féin, and Loyalist forces, those committed to using violence to ensure Northern Ireland's continued place in the United Kingdom (O'Brien, 1999).

At this point, it is important to briefly discuss community identity within Northern Ireland, as this shall be referred to throughout this chapter. Within Northern Ireland there are two main communities: the Protestant and Catholic, and within each of these communities there are two main strands. The Protestant community identifies as British and wishes to maintain the political and cultural links with the United Kingdom. Those who wish to maintain this through non-violent and democratic means are referred to as unionists, while those who sought this, prior to the peace process, through violent means are loyalists. The Catholic community identifies as Irish, and those who seek to maintain cultural unity and unite Ireland through democratic means were nationalists, while those who sought this through violence, again prior to the peace process, were republicans (O'Brien, 1999).

While the GFA saw an end to the campaign of the Provisional IRA, Sinn Féin, as shall be explored, still wish to see a united Ireland, with the six counties of Northern Ireland joining the 26 counties of the Republic. As the data is explored in this chapter, it shall be seen that

the colonial legacy of Ireland in terms of the ethno-nationalist divide in Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin's perception of the United Kingdom and Sinn Féin's perception of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael is still profound and relevant.

The aim of this thesis is not to frame Sinn Féin as a republican inclusionary populist party, but as an anti-colonial inclusionary populist party. To frame Sinn Féin as anti-colonial inclusionary populists, the arguments of Filc will be considered. Filc (2015) argues that colonisers racially differentiated between the colonised and colonisers, with the colonisers being inherently superior.

How this played out through Britain's history of colonialism within Ireland has been explored, most notably with the Ulster Planters, along with the legacy of this within the ethnonationalist schism in Northern Ireland (O'Brien, 1999) and Sinn Féin's political reaction to it. The anti-colonial populism of Latin America also sought to re-include the formerly colonised people within politics (Filc, 2015) and, again, this can be seen within Sinn Féin. In Northern Ireland this is particularly pronounced, as Sinn Féin draw their support from the historically marginalised Catholic community (O'Brien, 1999), whom Sinn Féin still believe are ignored by the former colonial powers of Westminster (Sinn Féin, 2015, 2017). Filc (2015) also points to how the anti-colonial populists of Latin America attempted to unify the people through their own native cultures. Again, this is something Sinn Féin adopt through calls to form a proposed Irish Language Act in Northern Ireland, which would give the Irish language the same legal status as English (Sinn Féin, 2017), and calls for greater support for the Irish language in the Republic of Ireland, including more Irish language education, cultural awareness through broadcasting and the embedding of the Irish language in the day-to-day work of the Irish state (Sinn Féin, 2020).

This support for Irish culture can be seen in the 2020 Sinn Féin Dáil manifesto:

Sinn Féin recognises that culture, its expression through art and its preservation through heritage is neither produced or owned by the state. Culture is the product and the property of people and communities. (Sinn Féin, 2020, p. 31)

There are two aspects of this short paragraph that are of particular note when making the case for Sinn Féin as anti-colonial inclusionary populists. To begin with, there is the anti-colonial argument of the importance of culture and heritage and the necessity of its preservation. There is also a strong populist element; the culture that is to be preserved belongs to the people. It is not the role of the state to promote a particular version of history but to preserve and support the culture that comes from the people.

In the Republic of Ireland, this marginalisation is more complex but is still rooted in Ireland's colonial past. With Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, the colonial history of Ireland and Sinn Féin's opposition to that legacy is clear. Much of the antagonism towards these parties from Sinn Féin is, as has been noted, rooted in the modern history of Ireland and, in particular, the Irish Civil War and subsequent partition. The lack of republicanism demonstrated by these parties, a failure to challenge the colonial legacy of Ireland, is central to Sinn Féin's criticism of them. Filc (2015) argues that within the anti-colonial populism of Latin America, the elite includes the allies of colonialism. This is a line of anti-elite attack that Sinn Féin maintain, as featured in their 2020 Dáil manifesto:

The current Fine Gael Government, supported by Fianna Fáil, has shown a complete lack of empathy and a detachment from the reality of life for most people in Ireland in 2020. At every step over the last four years, they have sided with landlords, developers, insurance companies and vulture funds. And our people have been left the poorer for it. Successive governments have delivered for their friends and cronies. They have delivered for big business, for vested interests and for golden circles. (Sinn Féin, 2020, p. 4)

Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael are not on the side of the people, they are on the side of the rich. Colonialism is a phenomenon of exploitation, with a small group of colonial masters benefitting at the expense of the colonised people (Filc, 2015). While Sinn Féin do not argue that Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael are colonisers, there is the implicit suggestion that, due to their governance of the Republic of Ireland and their rejection of what Sinn Féin believe to be the true principles of republicanism, these parties continue that colonial legacy.

Irish republicanism is a profoundly anti-colonial ideology in origin. By applying Filc's conception of anti-colonial inclusionary populism, there are sufficient contemporary similarities, in terms of the elite as either post-colonial powers or those who continue their legacy and people as those excluded from power by colonialism and its legacy and whose culture should be preserved and promoted, to frame Sinn Féin as anti-colonial inclusionary populism.

7.3.2 The political goals of the movement

The analysis of the data begins by exploring the political goals of Sinn Féin and, on this, there was complete agreement from each participant: the fundamental goal of Sinn Féin is a united Ireland. P14: "A new republic founded on socialist principals and equality for all inspired by the 1916 Proclamation".

However, further evidence from participants shows that this is not an end in itself but a means to an end with P17 saying: “The second (goal) is democratic socialism, social justice, the idea of an Ireland of equals” and an elaboration from P15:

I suppose, it's not just the united Ireland, it's to form the united Ireland that we want, we want a fair, inclusive democratic socialist united Ireland which caters for all the different traditions----of united-- a pluralistic --- democratic-- a democratic united Ireland.

This aim is also evident from manifestos: “Sinn Féin wants to be in Government to deliver for ordinary, working people. But we don’t want to be part of the system. We want to change the system.” (Sinn Féin, 2020, p. 4)

Each participant was clear in their belief that their goal of a united Ireland was, fundamentally, about changing Ireland, making it into an inclusive and socialist country. P14 makes mention of the 1916 Proclamation, the call to arms of the Easter Rising which marked the beginning of modern republicanism, and it is worth exploring this Proclamation in more detail because, as shall be seen, it is linked closely to much of what Sinn Féin still believe.

The Easter Rising of 1916, referred to contemporaneously as the Sinn Féin rising, although Sinn Féin were not officially involved in it (Ó Broin, 2009), was a failed attempt by Irish republicans to overthrow the British rule of Ireland and create a new Republic of Ireland. The insurgency lacked widespread popular support and went against the grain of the majority support for a constitutional route towards Irish sovereignty (Frost, 2017). However, the Proclamation of the Irish Republic, which was published by the leaders of the insurgency, would, in a short time, prove to be hugely influential in Irish politics (Frost, 2017).

The Proclamation² includes the following section:

The Republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien Government, which have divided a minority from the majority in the past. (Pearse, 1916)

As the discourse of Sinn Féin is explored in an attempt to understand their conceptions of the people and elite, the ambitions of the Proclamation and, in particular, this section will

² The full text is available in Appendix 4.

still resonate over 100 years later, demonstrating the profound influence of the early years of the Irish state on the current politics of Sinn Féin.

7.3.3 The people

As per the previous two chapters, in order to explore who Sinn Féin consider to be the people, participants were asked a number of questions about their supporters, values and demands, beginning again with who supported them.

There was a lack of overall consensus from participants, with some, such as P15, taking the view that Sinn Féin had a universalist appeal: “I feel that we represent everybody in the country”, while P18 and P19 emphasised a class-based support: “Overwhelmingly I think we represent working class people, both North and South.” (P19). A more nuanced view came from P17 and P20, who acknowledged the working-class roots of Sinn Féin but also pointed towards their growth within the lower middle classes:

Broadly speaking, north and south, we represent working-class and lower-middle-class households. We represent people who would be positioning themselves either explicitly or implicitly on the left of the political spectrum. We represent people, particularly I suppose in the north of Ireland because you have that much more acute Unionist/Nationalist divide and see themselves as Nationalists and aspiring toward a united Ireland. (P17)

In Northern Ireland, the question of who Sinn Féin represent is more complex, as alluded to by P17, due to the ethnonationalist voting that is a feature of politics in the province where Catholics will largely vote for the nationalist SDLP and Sinn Féin and protestants will vote for the unionist UUP and DUP (Garry, 2016). This is a theme that will be revisited in this chapter, but while participants acknowledged this ethnonationalist cleavage in Northern Ireland, many were keen to emphasize their desire to appeal to every community in Ireland, including in Northern Ireland:

We have come to embody that we are a party for everyone, we're not just a party for Catholic Republicans we are coming over a party for everyone...Irish republicanism was born from the 1790 rebellion where there was the Presbyterian Ulstermen and united Irish that's all of us. Yeah, everyone on the island can fight to be a republic. So, we are here for everyone, we don't want to put anyone out. (P15)

However, it should be pointed out that this approach was more predominant in those participants from the Republic of Ireland. While those from Northern Ireland did not express animosity towards the Unionist community, neither did they say that they had

ambitions for Sinn Féin to appeal to them. In order to consider the inclusionary aspects of Sinn Féin's populism, their cross-community relationships in Northern Ireland will be explored in more detail. However, when looking at who Sinn Féin consider the people to be, the twin traditions of republicanism, the ethno-nationalism of Pearse and the socialism of Connolly (Hoey, 2019). are clear throughout the responses, with some participants taking the view that Sinn Féin represent all of Ireland, while others argue that this representation is focussed on the lower middle classes and working class.

It is in the values of these supporters, though, that there appears to be more agreement among participants, with P14 making the argument clearly: "The bulk (of our support) are united Irishers.", a belief shared by all participants. However, P17 cautioned about the issue salience of a united Ireland for those in the Republic of Ireland:

I do think there's a divergence north and south in the sense that I think in the north it is a much stronger mixture of the constitution and the social and economic. Whereas I think in the south, not that our voters in general don't have an aspiration to united Ireland, but I don't think it motivates them in terms of their electoral choices or certainly not to the same extent.

P17 elaborated further on this:

I think in terms of our core, core vote, the vote that's been with us in the south for 20 years, that's more similar to our votes to the north to united Ireland and social and economic change. But those growing layers of electoral support, again we know from the opinion poll and exit poll data, and those are from our own day to day engagement with the community, that is the social economic issue. So, for example, in the last election housing, health, and childcare were probably the three biggest issues in terms of people coming over to the party in large numbers.

A united Ireland remains the core unfulfilled demand for Sinn Féin's people, but a united Ireland is not an end in itself, it is a means to an end. Sinn Féin manifestos speak, for example, of the economic benefits of a united Ireland: "A United Ireland in which the economy serves the needs of our people and not the other way around." (Sinn Féin, 2020, p. 2)

However, for those in the Republic of Ireland in particular, there are more pressing, day-to-day issues, and chief among those for all participants from the Republic was housing. This is, therefore, an issue worth exploring in more detail.

The current crisis in housing in the Republic of Ireland, marked by a lack of affordable housing (Healy and Goldrick-Kelly, 2018), is linked to the Celtic Tiger economy (Norris and Coates, 2014) and its subsequent collapse. The state, which had traditionally been the

major supplier of affordable housing, withdrew from provision of housing as the private sector moved in (Ó Broin, 2019). Ultimately, this housing boom was a major driver in the collapse of the Celtic Tiger, as banks and other lenders were left overexposed to the 2007 credit crunch (Norris and Coates, 2014). The situation now, as Sinn Féin argue, is that housing is the primary concern for many people in the Republic of Ireland and a major driver in new support for the party.

P20 made the argument that the housing crisis was key in attracting younger voters to Sinn Féin:

If you look at young people, I think their core-- I think what seems to be driving a lot of the politics here for younger people and people kind of out of the market seems to be the housing issue. And the kind of locked out generation.

P20 then expanded on this initial appeal:

And I think people have kind of-- and it's their parents as well. What I noticed a lot during canvassing in the election was, it would be Fine Gael households traditionally, but these middle-class parents are fed up with their kids are at home with them, till their thirties.

P20 was the only participant to make the explicit link between the housing crisis being faced by younger people, and their parents also being impacted by this, and so switching their vote to Sinn Féin. However, polling data from the 2020 Irish elections points to the fact that housing was the most important reason why voters voted for Sinn Féin, with 38% of those polled saying that the housing policy was their reason for voting Sinn Féin, and both Eoin Ó Broin, Sinn Féin's housing spokesperson, and Mary Lou McDonald claiming that this policy had resonated with younger voters especially (Bray, 2020).

Sinn Féin's 2020 manifesto had an ambitious programme for housing, which centred around a large-scale programme of state-house building, the right to a house being enshrined in the constitution of the Republic of Ireland (Sinn Féin, 2020). The architect of this policy was Ó Broin, and the thinking behind it can be found in his 2019 book, *Home*. Ó Broin discusses the history of housing in the Republic of Ireland, pointing to the right to land and housing as being a central tenant of republicanism throughout the 19th Century and this right to shelter being part of the Democratic Programme, as adopted by the Dáil Éireann when it first met in 1919 (Ó Broin, 2019). Ó Broin (2019) charts the move away from state-provided housing in the 1970s and the dominant role of the private sector in providing housing leading, he argues, to the current crisis, and he calls for the policies which would become a core component of the 2020 Sinn Féin manifesto.

The analytical framework of this thesis reveals a strong populism in this issue. Housing can be seen as an unfulfilled demand and one that creates chains of equivalence, not just between younger people, for whom a lack of affordable housing is a priority, but also for their parents who, as per the arguments of P20, are seeing their children let down by other parties.

The second populist manifestation in this issue can be seen in Ó Broin's arguments. Historic inclusionary populism, most notably in the USA, would advance the argument that the country had failed the people by deviating from its founding principles. From citing the land reform tradition of republicans to the Dáil's Democratic Programme, Ó Broin makes this point sharply in his writings: through the housing failure, Ireland has abandoned the core principles of both the state and of republicanism.

Participants were asked if they believed Sinn Féin had a particular appeal to those excluded from mainstream politics. All participants agreed that Sinn Féin had such an appeal and, in particular, an economic appeal, pointing to areas such as a larger welfare state, a stronger health service and, in particular, reform or abolition of the Universal Social Charge (USC):

If we get into power, the first thing is to cut USC for first thirty thousand of your wages and that would mean...a huge percentage of the working class would pay no USC at all and put an extra €600 back into their pocket. It can help them feed their families, pay rent to all and ultimately survive and being able to you know live properly. (P15)

The impact of the Global Financial Crisis and bailout of Ireland on Ireland's health service was considerable, with the Irish health service, the Health Service Executive (HSE), cutting €3.3bn in funding and around 10% of jobs (Thomas, Burke and Barry, 2014). In 2011, in response to this crisis in funding, the Fianna Fáil-led government of Brian Cowen introduced the controversial and unpopular USC (McConnell, 2014), which all those earning over €13,000 a year had to pay. Despite both Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil frequently promising to scrap this charge, it remains.

Participants singled this out as a significant financial burden for the poorest in the Republic of Ireland:

It's kind of bizarre in that it's directly retrogressive. Literally, it's designed to make sure that a lot more of the burden of fixing the crisis falls on working people rather than anybody else instead of directly so we're making kind of piecemeal reforms to that. (P16).

The final area of examination is the question of inclusion within politics. Participants were asked if they believed that Sinn Féin represented those who had been ignored by other

political parties, and there was strong unanimity in this from both sides of the Irish border, with P17 making the most unequivocal claim: “Not only do I believe it, but it would be a broadly held view here, even among our opponents”. P16 expanded on this:

I mean, do we represent ignored people? We absolutely did. Historically, we represented possibly the most marginalised community in these islands. The Northern working-class Irish and nationalist community. Today, we represent kind of abandoned (areas).

On how Sinn Féin had achieved this there was, again, unanimity, with participants arguing that this had been done through community engagement:

Our activists are some of the hardest working... anyone I work with, even my own TD, for example, they're the hardest working reps in the building, which means then there's a difference there. And they're all set with different standards, I think, as well because so many of them are from the local communities and started out as trade union officials or Drug Task Force reps or-- so they're all embedded in those communities (P20)

I would like to think that one of our objectives (is) to try and empower and activate all communities, particularly those that are in need of investment and services so that they can assist us and assist them in articulating their demands. (P18)

When examining historic inclusionary populism in Chapter Two, it was noted that populist leaders and movements would work to associate themselves with the communities they sought to represent and lead, and this can clearly be seen here. However, for participants, this is not showboating but a core component of their politics.

This aspect was examined further by asking participants if they believed that Sinn Féin had politicised or re-politicised people. This was an area that participants agreed on, with P18 arguing that it was a key strategy of Sinn Féin:

Well, I certainly think that's our objective... So our job is to encourage and activate those people. And so, in that sense, we are politicizing people... So, I think for somebody who wants to maximize the political change in the country, our objective is to try and to activate and politicise people and motivate people to come out and vote for change.

P16 gave an unequivocal “yes”, pointing to the enthusiasm of the 2020 Dáil election campaign: “There was just real enthusiasm on the ground with people who were full of politics of hope and politics of, Jesus, yeah, there might be somebody who represents (us).”

P19 pointed to Sinn Féin giving voters something other than the Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael duopoly to choose from:

I think that's happening-- definitely after the last election, we found a lot of people coming to us interested in becoming active that had never been active before and

maybe had voted for the first time in February. And not all 18-year-olds or 20-year-olds who never had the chance to vote before but people who had spent their whole lives looking at politics and just been sick of it.

P17, however, argued that because people were not engaging in the party electoral system, it did not mean they were not politicised, but that Sinn Féin had taken an already politicised people and engaged them with party politics:

It's important not to patronise people who aren't actively involved in the political process as somehow not politicised. Just their political experience has led them to disengage, or they've been pushed out to the margins... Politics is about contestation. It's about challenge. It's about campaigning for change. And to do all of that you have to be politicised. So absolutely, I think that's the case.

The final area of exploration within the concept of inclusion is the extent to which Sinn Féin can be considered inclusionary in who they view the people to be. This is particularly important when examining Sinn Féin due to both the ethno-nationalist tradition within republicanism and the community divide in Northern Ireland.

All participants were keen to emphasise the social inclusivity of Sinn Féin and its commitment to secularism. P15 argued:

I feel like those times have changed, we're not...especially in the south it's no longer a religious state with the Catholic Church. As you can see with the gay marriage referendum and the 8th it's a more secular open state and I feel like that's what Sinn Féin has really come to embody.

Sinn Féin have a record of campaigning for issues such as the legalisation of same-sex marriages and women's reproductive rights, in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The party has conflated such campaigns for sexual minority rights and reproductive rights with its own struggle in Northern Ireland as a minority group (Hayes and Nagle, 2019), forging clear equivalential chains.

This identification with other minority struggles was something P18 made clear:

We're campaigning, we're a revolutionary organisation or we're campaigning for social justice, for change. So that'll be in some of the areas mentioned: people's rights, LGBT rights. I mean, we campaigned for marriage equality, we campaigned for women's reproductive rights. And in those campaigns, you do forge a range of alliances with other people.

3 In 2018 there was a successful campaign in the Republic of Ireland to repeal the 8th Amendment to the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland, which criminalised abortions. Sinn Féin played a significant role in this campaign (Hayes and Nagle, 2019).

For participants in the Republic of Ireland, this inclusivity was particularly evident through their opposition to Direct Provision. Since 2000, the Republic of Ireland has housed all asylum seekers in Direct Provision reception centres, where asylum seekers are given accommodation and a small weekly allowance. Direct Provision has been a source of considerable controversy, with researchers highlighting the poor conditions and health stresses caused by the system, especially on children (Moran *et al.*, 2019). Sinn Féin's opposition to Direct Provision has been consistent in their manifestos since its inception: "We will end Direct Provision and replace it with a not-for-profit model with integration and human rights best practice at its core." (Sinn Féin, 2016b, p. 6)

Given the housing crisis in the Republic of Ireland, this could be a controversial, even unpopular policy among Sinn Féin's core support, many of whom are, themselves, waiting for permanent accommodation, a point raised by P19: "Our position on direct provision, by and large, up until very recently, probably didn't do us any good politically."

This was a point addressed in detail by P17:

It wouldn't be unusual for me to be talking to a really good family and they would be saying, 'Look, we don't have a problem with people from other countries but how is it that their kids have to wait so long?' Now that's a really important moment of our political engagement, because the conversation I can have with that family and Sinn Féin can have with the community is that the reason why your son or daughter is waiting so long isn't because of the families coming out of Direct Provision; it's failure of the government to invest adequately in public housing, so why don't we all campaign together?

This comment is worthy of closer inspection, as it features a number of inclusionary populist sentiments as per the analytical framework of this thesis. To begin with, the inclusionary element is evident; even though P17 and P19 know that being so strongly in favour of asylum seekers could be electorally challenging, especially given the housing crisis, they refuse to enter into this discourse. Instead, P17 works to form chains of equivalence between those families coming out of Direct Provision and into housing and Irish families looking for housing to try and prevent blame and othering and, instead, unite for a common cause and against a common adversary: the government and its failure to provide housing.

Sinn Féin also make claims towards inclusivity in Northern Ireland. This is of particular importance given the ethno-nationalist divides in this region and Sinn Féin's historic link with the Provisional IRA and its support base coming from the Catholic republican community. However, Sinn Féin attempt to demonstrate that their politics and, in

particular, the demand for a united Ireland should not be seen as a threat to the identity of the Protestant community in Northern Ireland, as this manifesto section demonstrates:

The identities of all citizens must be respected and supported. This includes those who cherish their British identity. A united Ireland must and will deliver and be a place for all our citizens. (Sinn Féin, 2015, p. 6)

Manifestos also demonstrate Sinn Féin's desire to transcend the ethno-nationalist divide, as can be seen here:

Sinn Féin wants to build a New Ireland that is not based on the division of the people, which has in the past been 'carefully fostered by an alien government'. We recognise that all our people have suffered greatly because of the divisions between our communities and that this has stood in the way of improving the lives of all of the people who live here. We know that much hurt exists within our society. We acknowledge that we have all contributed to this hurt. Consequently, we all share a responsibility to advance reconciliation on this island. Sinn Féin seeks to build a society in which tolerance and equal treatment are standards governing all institutions and everyday life. (Sinn Féin, 2007, p. 41)

This is a lengthy paragraph, but it is worth including in full, as it includes a significant amount of evidence towards Sinn Féin's inclusionary ambitions and anti-colonialism. To begin with, there is a strong anti-colonial othering in the paragraph; Sinn Féin is making the claim that the ethno-nationalist divisions are as a result of colonialism, the "alien government" of the UK. They then claim that these artificial divides, this colonial legacy, have hampered growth within Northern Ireland and led to hurt. In keeping with their inclusionary message, Sinn Féin accept blame for their contribution to this, implying that this was through the actions of the Provisional IRA. Finally, Sinn Féin argues that the way to resolve these colonial divides is through an open and inclusionary society.

P18, a Northern Irish politician, expressed similar inclusionary sentiments, arguing that Sinn Féin wanted to support those in the loyalist community in Northern Ireland:

And our constituency offices are open to anybody... We hope by demonstrating that we actually get people who've been loyalist working-class areas to question the type of political representation and leadership that they have had over the years.

Whether those in the loyalist community would ever consider themselves to be part of Sinn Féin's people is another matter, but it is clear that in their conception of the people, class and political exclusion matter far more to Sinn Féin than ethno-nationalist status. However, this does not necessarily mean that Sinn Féin has a positive attitude towards unionist and loyalist politics.

As this section of the discussion concludes, there are a number of characteristics of how Sinn Féin views the people which fit within the analytical framework of this thesis. To begin with, the people are a heterogeneous group; while some participants emphasised a core working-class support, there was general consensus that Sinn Féin appealed to the economically and politically excluded and that this included the precarious middle classes. Despite republicanism being an appeal to Irishmen and women, as per the 1916 Declaration, while participants did not explicitly include migrants within the people, they did not exclude them either and spoke about trying to make common cause with them.

It is clear that what unites these groups are unfulfilled demands. The fundamental demand of Sinn Féin is a united Ireland, yet they are aware that this is not the primary issue for people, especially in the Republic of Ireland, where material causes, most notably housing, take priority. However, while Irish reunification might not be a primary issue at this point for Sinn Féin's supporters, participants still saw reunification as being the vehicle to achieve the recalibration of the economy and an adoption of the socialist principles of republicanism they believe that Ireland has abandoned.

7.3.3.1 Empty signifier

The final component of this section is to identify an empty signifier. As per the previous two chapters, a word cannot be highlighted with absolute confidence as the empty signifier used by Sinn Féin. However, as per the analytical framework of this thesis, the empty signifier is what gives shape and meaning to the demands of the people. Some of these unfulfilled demands have been explored, most notably the housing crisis in the Republic of Ireland and the call for a united Ireland which, although cross-border, is more prevalent in Northern Ireland, and there is evidence that the empty signifier deployed by Sinn Féin is "republicanism". It has been established that Irish republicanism is a fluid concept whose meaning has changed multiple times. Yet it is apparent that, for Sinn Féin, republicanism means a united, 32-county, socialist and sovereign Ireland.

It can be seen how republicanism as an empty signifier gives shape and meaning to the housing demands, for example. Ó Broin, (2019) has argued that a right to housing was central to the pre-independence appeal of republicanism, and this has now been abandoned by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. For Sinn Féin, solving the housing crisis is not simply the right thing to do, it is the republican thing to do.

This can also be seen in the demand for a united Ireland. Sinn Féin make the case for a united Ireland as being of political, economic and social benefit to the people of Ireland: “Almost 100 years after the imposition of partition it is clear that it has failed all of our people politically, socially and economically.” (Sinn Féin, 2016a, p. 4). Yet despite these benefits that Sinn Féin claim, the call to unite Ireland can truly be understood through the empty signifier of republicanism:

The republican vision is about building of ‘An Ireland of Equals’. It is at the core of our agenda for change. For this reason we need a new type of politics based on inclusion, equality and fairness. (Sinn Féin, 2011b, p. 34).

Republicanism is empty of meaning outside the discursive chains of Sinn Féin but, as can be seen, when included in these chains, it gives meaning to their unfulfilled demands.

7.3.4 The elite

Participants were asked if they believed there was such a thing as an elite and, if so, who were they and who did they represent. There was broad unanimity that there was an elite, as expressed by P15: “I do. I do genuinely believe there is such a thing as an elite class.” P16 went further, emphasising the colonial legacy leading to there being an elite:

I suppose in Ireland, the political elite would include absentee landlords, the kind of upper echelons of Anglo-Irish society, industrial, Ulster Scots unionists, Catholic upper-middle-class -- 100 years ago. And if you scale that up today, we've got kind of a financial elite, a multinational elite. We've still got kind of the remnants of those other guys, the powers-that-be.

For participants there are two groups which comprise the elite: the rival parties in the Republic of Ireland and the forces of unionism and the United Kingdom that impact across Ireland, most notably in Northern Ireland. P16 summarised this view as: “Just to say that these opponents are Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, DUP, British Government. British unionism and the old forces of reaction.” P18 said:

Clearly, the northern state was never fair. It discriminated on sectarian grounds and political grounds. The southern state has never been fair in that the kind of wealthy elites have controlled the country and controlled it and run it in their own interests.

In examining Sinn Féin’s conception of the elite, it is therefore necessary to examine the internal elite, those rival parties, and external elite in turn, beginning with the external elite of the British government and unionism.

Participants, including those from Northern Ireland, had very little to say about the United Kingdom, despite the antagonisms of both the history of Britain in Ireland and the potential impact of Brexit upon the GFA and, in particular, the open border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland that was so central a component of the GFA (Doyle and Connolly, 2019). However, evidence of Sinn Féin's attitude towards the UK can be seen in manifestos for both the Northern Irish Assembly and for Westminster:

It (the 2017 election) was called by the British Prime Minister to serve narrow right-wing English Tory interests. Irish interests – of any kind – unionist or nationalist are of no concern to Theresa May. Her only interest is Brexit. Her only interest is British or English national interest. (Sinn Féin, 2017, p. 13)

This difference between the interests and values of the United Kingdom and Ireland was something that some participants did touch on: “We don't have an aristocracy. We don't have a history of landed gentry. We don't have a lordship.” (P17) This unwillingness not to engage with the United Kingdom, even as an elite, can be explained through a comment from P15: “We are sticking to our mandate to not get involved in the affairs of the British because we believe ourselves Irish.” The United Kingdom is a foreign country, and Sinn Féin do not wish to concern themselves with it.

In terms of the loyalist and unionist communities in Northern Ireland, while participants believed that they shared the values of the elite of the United Kingdom, this does not mean that they themselves were an elite. When discussing Sinn Féin's conception of the people, it was noted that they did not exclude the Unionist/Loyalist community from this conception, and that some had ambitions to appeal to that community. P18 discussed this in detail:

I mean, obviously, in the north in particular, when you get into the likes of loyalists in working-class estates and have largely been left behind, that are suffering greatly as a consequence of lack of education, crime, drugs, all of the issues that affect working-class communities that have been left behind, we have a difficulty in penetrating there, although we absolutely offer support to-- and we like to think that the policies we pursue in terms of fairness and social support apply equally to those areas as they do to working-class nationalist areas.

What is clear from this comment is the idea of equivalential chains existing between the loyalist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland. P18 accepts that the ethnonationalist divide will prevent Sinn Féin from appealing to the loyalist community. However, he draws clear equivalence between the unfulfilled demands of both communities, arguing that Sinn Féin has more to offer in terms of policies than traditional loyalist parties such as the DUP. Additionally, there is a clear linkage here with what Sinn

Féin consider to be the true ideals of republicanism, that it is an Ireland for all, no matter what religion, a point argued by P15:

We're not going to be discriminatory against loyalists...if there is ever to be a united Ireland it has to be a clean slate. Health care is not just going to be offered to Irish people or people who identify as Irish people.

However, despite this attempt at inclusivity, there was also evidence of the othering of the leaders of the Unionist/Loyalist communities in Northern Ireland:

I suppose they also... they see the world and history in a different way than us...a lot of them like the DUP think the world is 3,000 years old and that they're direct descendants of (the) Lost Tribe of Israel and stuff like that so it was obviously incredibly different. (P16)

The internal elite for Sinn Féin is represented by the rival parties of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael and who they represent. While participants accepted that Sinn Féin might have slightly more commonality with Fianna Fáil due to a shared republican past, they were all keen to distance themselves from the duality of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael that has dominated politics in the Republic of Ireland since the state's inception. The dominance of these parties was summarised by P16 saying, "Unless you're hard aligned to those parties, most Irish people go, 'Two cheeks of the same arse'", before expanding on this metaphor by explaining:

You have kind of two parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael that essentially see themselves-- the same neoliberal policies. They essentially see themselves as kind of managers of our society. The policies are the same. They all know they got kind of the same kind of tax. They meet the same people, and maybe with a very, very slight difference in those social backgrounds. These are two groups and one of them is kind of old money and the other one's new money. There's very little difference between them.

Participants tapped into this colonial legacy by arguing that Fine Gael remained a non-Republican political force:

I think Fine Gael is for the professional, upper-- actually, I'd say it's for, I suppose, that historically kind of pro-treaty. You can go back that far, and then you can say, "Who do they represent?" The big farmers, landlords, all those kinds of classes, and so it's just different values. (P20)

P16 agreed:

Fine Gael is complicated by the fact that their origins are both on the nationalist and unionist side so that there's a lot of them that just want to-- there's a lot of people in Fine Gael who are basically angry at the rest of the country for messing up home rule for them.

As for Fianna Fáil, participants acknowledged their republicanism while maintaining that it was a weakened republicanism:

Fianna Fáil gets squeezed because they're trying to straddle both horses of half a foot in the Fine Gael centre-right camp half a foot in their kind of republican quasi-social democratic camp. (P17)

They're the party of the 26-county state of just a small capitalist state that's abandoned the kind of grand vision of a republic and is instead trying to mould this 26-county state into something that represents their interests. (P16).

Within this argument can be seen the theme, again, of the republican foundations of the Republic of Ireland having been abandoned by the elite of Ireland. In the case of Fianna Fáil, by supporting the 26-county state⁴, they are insufficiently republican, and, in the case of Fine Gael, their pro-treaty history leads them to being not republican at all, an argument made by P18:

Fine Gael are a partitionist party. They're not interested in a united Ireland. They exist to serve and maintain the 26-county state, and that's a very fundamental difference between ourselves and themselves. They're much more like a unionist party in that respect.

To understand how these parties operate and who they operate for, the final part of this section will consider the relationship between the people and elite.

7.3.5 The relationship between the people and the elite

To complete this section, antagonisms between the people and elite will be looked for, as will the cause of those antagonisms. Sinn Féin ultimately seek to recalibrate Ireland back to what they believe are the core principles of republicanism, as this section from their 2011 Dáil election manifesto makes clear:

The republican vision is about the building of 'An Ireland of Equals'. It is at the core of our agenda for change. For this reason we need a new type of politics based on inclusion, equality and fairness. (Sinn Féin, 2011b, p. 34)

The question for this final section is how Sinn Féin believe that the elite, as they have identified them, prevented this? In short, what is the nature of the antagonistic frontier between the people and the elite? To explore this, participants were asked about the values of the elites, and the responses focused on economics, as highlighted by P20:

⁴ Meaning that they do not support Irish reunification

I think there's definitely elites in Ireland. I mean, look at Dennis O'Brien⁵ and how he carries on and the Beef Barons⁶ and the monopoly they have there, and the insurance industry monopoly and Ireland is too small for people not to have created a kind of-- and that's why between Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, they don't really care who gets in.

There was a general consensus among participants that Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael existed to preserve this economic hegemony, which P16 made clear when discussing a comment Mary Lou McDonald, President of Sinn Féin, had made during a televised election debate for the 2020 Irish elections:

There was a moment in the debate with Mary Lou where she said Fine Gael are the party of the landlords, Fianna Fáil are the party of the developers, Sinn Féin is the party of the people.

Sinn Féin are articulating a clear message that Fianna Fáil, and Fine Gael are the parties of the elite and that their role is to preserve their hegemony. This was made clear by participants discussing what they thought the goals of the elite were:

They are individuals and sectors in our society and our economy for whom change is not a good thing, and they want to, inasmuch as they can, preserve the social economic and political and constitutional status quo. (P17)

Whether that's economically, politically, they have a vested interest and that's reflected largely through class interests because those are the people...who are wealthy or have an interest in things not changing. (P18)

In terms of the external elite, the United Kingdom and forces of unionism, within the manifestos for the Republic of Ireland there is no evidence of antagonism. Sinn Féin's manifesto for the 2020 Dáil elections, for example, only mentions unionism as a waning force and a need to bring unionists into a discourse about uniting Ireland (Sinn Féin, 2020). This is understandable, given Sinn Féin's focus on domestic matters in the Republic of Ireland such as housing. However, in manifestos for the Northern Ireland Assembly and Westminster, the antagonism is significantly more evident, as can be seen here: "It is the people who live here who will make the best decisions, not a cabinet of millionaires in London which is neither elected by, nor accountable to the people here." (Sinn Féin, 2015, p. 2)

5 Irish billionaire owner of telecoms and media companies

6 A group of eight farming families who own 80% of the Irish beef market, worth an estimated €2bn (McCullough, 2016)

This short sentence demonstrates a strong populist antagonism. The difference between the demands of the people and the values of the elite is made abundantly clear, along with both the othering of the UK government and the argument that they are not representative of Sinn Féin's people. This is made even more stark by this section from Sinn Féin's 2017 Westminster manifesto: "The interests of our economy, our rights and our people will not be delivered at Westminster." (Sinn Féin, 2017, p. 3). Sinn Féin are arguing that their people can never be represented at Westminster, that their demands will never be a priority. Throughout this antagonism, the implicit argument is that this can only be resolved through Sinn Féin's core unfulfilled demand of a united Ireland.

The final component of this section is to consider the contested semiotic space around the empty signifier of "republicanism" as deployed by Sinn Féin. Sinn Féin apply particular meaning to republicanism as a concept, arguing, from the tradition of James Connolly, that republicanism must be based upon socialism. To explore whether there is contestation between Sinn Féin, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael around the concept of republicanism, the manifestos of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael must be examined. The first point of interest is that the term "republicanism" does not appear in Fine Gael manifestos. It is not a term that they use or engage with, giving credibility to the claims of participants that Fine Gael are not a republican party. Fine Gael do make mention of Northern Ireland in their 2020 manifesto (Fine Gael, 2020), but that is in the context of Brexit and Fine Gael making promises to work for the interests of all of Ireland in supporting the EU's Brexit deal with the UK. The language has none of the antagonism towards Brexit and the UK that Sinn Féin employ, and nor do Fine Gael make mention of constitutional issues such as a Border Poll.

Turning to Fianna Fáil they, unlike Fine Gael, claim themselves to be republican. Indeed, their strapline is "The Republican Party". However, republicanism is not a fixed idea and can refer to any number of traditions and ideologies (O'Malley and McGraw, 2017), and as they have developed as a party, Fianna Fáil have not been as wedded to articles of republican faith, such as a united Ireland, as Sinn Féin have (O'Malley and McGraw, 2017). Similar to Sinn Féin, their manifestos make mention of protecting Northern Ireland and the peace process from the Brexit fallout but, unlike Fine Gael, there is mention of managing this through stronger North-South political bodies (Fianna Fáil, 2016). However, unlike Sinn Féin, there is no mention of reunification and, again, the language is not as antagonistic as Sinn Féin's. Similarly, as with Fine Gael, there are no explicit mentions of republicanism. The closest Fianna Fáil come to this is a discussion of the

promotion and protection of the Irish language (Fianna Fáil, 2016), which can be seen as a form of ethno-nationalist republicanism.

When considering the idea of the contestation of republicanism between Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, what emerges is not a picture of a contested semantic space but one where both Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil seem to have surrendered this space entirely to Sinn Féin. It remains uncertain as to why this is, but it does appear that republicanism and what it entails is now a space occupied by Sinn Féin and not their two main rivals.

The core aim of Sinn Féin is a united socialist Ireland, a recalibration of Irish politics, economics and society back towards what Sinn Féin believe are the founding principles of the Irish state, because the abandonment of these principles has led to a situation where the people are economically excluded. It is evident that the role of the elite is to prevent this from happening, to maintain the status quo which serves the needs of the hegemony and not the people. In doing so they are creating the antagonistic frontier which prevents the people from fulfilling their demands through the recalibration of society and a return to the ideals of republicanism.

7.3.6 Articulation

The final element of analysis to discuss is the concept of articulation. As has been re-emphasised in the previous two chapters, articulation is the modification of identity that happens due to the relationship between two components. In the case of Sinn Féin, these elements are their republicanism and inclusionary populism, and the question to be answered is how these elements articulate to produce an anti-colonial inclusionary populism.

It is necessary to begin to answer this question by exploring the similarities and differences between inclusionary populism and Sinn Féin's republicanism. Starting with similarities, it can be seen that in terms of the people, republicanism, like inclusionary populism, offers a diverse people that crosses some class divides and has an inclusionary appeal towards marginalised sections of society. Equally, both republicanism and inclusionary populism allow this people to be framed as the excluded, republicanism through the legacy of Ireland's colonial past and populism through their unfulfilled demands. Regarding the elite, both republicanism and inclusionary populism have a strong and pervasive "other". There is also a similarity in how some historic inclusionary populist movements have claimed that their country has lost its way from egalitarian founding principles and the

same claim that Sinn Féin make about contemporary Ireland based on the founding republican principles of the Declaration of 1916.

There are also differences which exist. As has been seen through both theoretical and historical evidence, inclusionary populism does not necessarily have a class-based appeal.

Yet, while Sinn Féin have ambitions to widen their electoral appeal, their republicanism still has strong class elements to it, and they focus their appeal on the working and precarious middle classes. It can also be seen that Sinn Féin's republicanism has a cultural element to it, as demonstrated through manifesto commitments to supporting and preserving the Irish language, and this is not a feature of inclusionary populism.

How do these elements combine to create an anti-colonial inclusionary populism? As it is known from the analytical framework of this thesis, central to the foundation of a people are unfulfilled demands and, in this chapter, identified two core demands have been identified: housing and a united Ireland. Sinn Féin take these demands and frame them within the discourse of republicanism. As has been explored, Sinn Féin argue that the fulfilment of these demands is not simply a matter of making the correct political choice for the people but is a matter of making the republican choice. Republicanism is what gives the imperative to fulfilling these demands.

With the elite, both the internal and external elites are framed as a barrier to the demands of the people, as per inclusionary populism. The republicanism of Sinn Féin allows these elites to be framed within a historic context and, also, adds the anti-colonial element.

Within Northern Ireland, that colonialism still exists in the form of the United Kingdom and also in the unionist and loyalist communities, which share the values of the colonisers and remain dominant in the politics of Northern Ireland. The internal elite, that of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, are also framed within the republican context, being insufficiently republican in the eyes of Sinn Féin, and their refusal to fulfil the demands of the people being linked to this failure to be republican.

This articulation leads to an anti-colonial inclusionary populism. This is seen in Northern Ireland, where the political dominance of the Unionist and Loyalist communities, and Sinn Féin's reaction to this, has strong similarities with the hierarchical structures of colonised societies (Filc, 2015). This is also apparent in the unfulfilled demand of housing which, as Sinn Féin argue, should be a republican priority, due to the legacy of the colonial history of Ireland. Finally, this populism is especially evident through the unfulfilled demand of a

united Ireland, with the partition of Ireland being the most visible legacy of the colonial past of the island.

7.4 Discussion

Having explored the different components of Sinn Féin's politics and populism, these shall now be examined one at a time in Table 7.1 and, through applying the analytical framework of this thesis, an attempt will be made to frame Sinn Féin as anti-colonialist inclusionary populist and to examine that populism in more detail.

Table 7.1 Characteristics of Sinn Féin’s populism

Component	Overview	Analysis	Populism
People	The economically excluded of Ireland. This includes members of the unionist/loyalist community and also other marginalised groups, such as refugees and LGBTQ+ communities.	On initial sight, Sinn Féin appear to have a class-based appeal. However, this is expanded beyond the working class and into all of those who have been failed by the hegemony on both sides of the border.	The diversity of the people gives them their heterogeneity. This is then made constitutive by their unfulfilled demands. No matter the community, the people are economically excluded.
Elite	Internally, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael and the economic interests that they represent. Externally, the political structures of the United Kingdom, although this is prominent only in the north.	The internal elite are those who benefit from the current status quo, whether economically, politically or both. In the North the external elite are the existing structures of colonialism in the form of the UK and their unionist and loyalist supporters. In the South, the elite have a colonial legacy inasmuch as they are insufficiently republican.	In the South, the elite represent and seek to preserve a hegemony that has failed the people of Ireland and abandoned the promises and goals of early republicanism. In the North they represent an attempt to continue the colonial legacy of the United Kingdom
Relationship between people and elite	An antagonistic incompatibility.	The people want change, the elite do not.	There exists an antagonistic hegemonic frontier between these two forces, as the elite work together to prevent any kind of meaningful change to benefit the people
Empty signifier	Republicanism	Republicanism, as articulated by Sinn Féin, is a socialist appeal.	Through this appeal to socialism and sovereignty and a return to the values of the early revolutionary republicans, Sinn Féin give meaning to the other causes they espouse from a united Ireland to improving housing; all of these can be achieved through a socialist republicanism.
Articulation	Republican inclusionary populism	There are considerable similarities between contemporary republicanism and inclusionary populism, making them a strong fit.	The articulation gives republican populist strategy to mobilise support for Sinn Féin, with the historic actors of republicanism becoming the people and elite of populism.

The analytical framework of this thesis demonstrates considerable populist characteristics within Sinn Féin. Beginning with the people, at first glance, what appears to be a class-based conception of the people reveals itself, on deeper analysis, to be far more than this. Many participants identified Sinn Féin as a party of the working classes, but the Global Financial Crisis and its impact on Ireland, most notably in housing, has meant that Sinn Féin now appeal to anyone who has been failed by the hegemony of Ireland, including the middle classes, who now find themselves in a precarious position. Through their appeal to, and advocacy for, marginalised groups, such as those in Direct Provision, and their attempt to appeal across the ethnonationalist boundaries in Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin demonstrate a distinct inclusionary element to their politics, and they have a heterogeneous people. Even within the ethnonationalist-divided Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin seek to appeal to the loyalist communities by putting forward an argument that they have common economic cause with the nationalist community that is stronger than the religious divides. What unites them are their unfulfilled demands, which are primarily economic in nature and, in the Republic of Ireland, exemplified by the housing crisis, and their demands are given shape and meaning through Sinn Féin's use of republicanism as an empty signifier.

When examining the elite and the relationship between the people and the elite, there is strong evidence of the antagonistic frontier of the analytical framework, as the elite work to preserve their privilege at the expense of the inclusion of the people. However, there is also a strong similarity with many of the historic case studies of inclusionary populism studied in Chapter 2, through the idea that the country has strayed from its founding principles and that this has to be rectified. For Sinn Féin, this is an abandonment of the principles of republicanism and a free and equal society for all, and only a realignment of these principles, through the vehicle of a united Ireland, can bring the country back to how it should be.

Finally, it can be seen how the colonial history of Ireland has had a profound influence on the politics of the island on both sides of the border. This history still informs much of the politics of Sinn Féin, and in particular their conception of the internal and external elites, and it allows for the framing of Sinn Féin as an anti-colonial inclusionary populist party, as their demands are rooted in the colonial past of Ireland, and the failure of contemporary politics, both in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, to overcome the legacy of this colonialism.

As per Chapters 5 and 6, at the end of each interview, participants were given a definition of inclusionary populism as defining the people by their membership of the demos and not ethnos and having no nativist elements, while still retaining an antagonistic relationship between people and elite. After this, each participant was asked if they believed Sinn Féin could be considered an inclusionary populist movement, and there was broad agreement that this was the case. P16 made a direct reference to the articulation between republicanism and inclusionary populism:

I think yeah, republicanism is by its nature at least a little bit populist because it rests on popular sovereignty. That is the idea. That was the core tenant of your power is coming from the people, not from economic or social or-- not social, economic or military or divine right of kings or something like that sort of thing but from the people.

7.5 Conclusions

There are a number of conclusions about the populism of Sinn Féin that can be drawn from this chapter. To begin with, there is strong evidence that Sinn Féin are an inclusionary populist party, as per the framework of this thesis, and this is a view shared by participants. Sinn Féin's people have a constitutive heterogeneity and are united through their unfulfilled demands. Through their conception of people and elite and the antagonistic frontier between these two groups, their populism is evident. Moreover, Sinn Féin's desire to make common cause with what they consider to be other marginalised groups points to an inclusionary core to their politics.

A strong fit between their republicanism and populism is also apparent. Republicanism, like populism, has a profound sense of "us versus them". Yet while the "us" (the people of Ireland) has remained constant, the "them" has changed. Historically, this would have been the colonial forces of the United Kingdom but, today, it is the duopoly of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. However, this does not mean that anti-colonialism is no longer a component of Sinn Féin's discourse; participants consistently highlighted, in particular, Fine Gael's historic support for partition and lack of republicanism, a legacy of Ireland's colonial history.

Finally, Sinn Féin strongly demonstrate the populist characteristic that the state has abandoned its principles and failed the people. It can be observed that, through the empty signifier of republicanism, Sinn Féin's politics are an attempt to force a recalibration of

Irish politics to what they believe are the socialist principles of the foundation of the Irish state, and populism is the vehicle they use to achieve this.

Having completed the final empirical case study in this thesis, there is now a comparative analysis of the cases, in order to build the typology, the thesis is proposing and to examine the growth, change and continuity of inclusionary populism.

Chapter 8 - Comparative analysis

8.1 Introduction

Having examined the data in the previous three chapters to develop a richer understanding of both the political parties studied and their inclusionary populism, there now follows a comparative analysis of the historic and contemporary data to identify and explore the development of inclusionary populism.

The inductive analysis of Chapter 2 provided a basic typology of inclusionary populism, with two themes: the people and the elite. These themes are sufficient for a basic understanding of inclusionary populism. This led to Chapter 3 and an examination of the theories around inclusionary populism, developing three further themes: the relationship between people and elite, empty signifiers and the articulation of the core ideology of a political movement with the inclusionary populism of that movement. These three themes could be added to the two initial themes for a comprehensive analysis of what inclusionary populism stands for. This typology could now be built upon by adding new elements to the traditional people/elite dichotomy through the analytical framework to strengthen it further.

Chapters 5-7 brought empirical evidence to substantiate this claim and produced a rich and detailed analysis of three critical cases, each one representative of each variant of inclusionary populism, using the five themes of analysis adopted by this thesis. This more in-depth understanding of contemporary forms of inclusionary populism can then be used to highlight the new, non-material claims of inclusionary populists, along with the well-established economic claims, demonstrating the development of inclusionary populism.

This chapter will take each of the five analytical themes in turn, presenting the historic evidence first and then introducing the evidence from the contemporary cases. In each case, there will be a consideration of how each type of inclusionary populism—nationalist, egalitarian and anti-colonial—has developed, examining both changes and continuity, and how the analytical framework of this thesis allows for an understanding of this development.

8.2 The people

Chapter 2 brings evidence to suggest that the people in historic inclusionary populism were those excluded from power. The analysis from Chapters 5-7, using the framework developed in Chapter 3, reveals much greater detail, including the nature of this exclusion, how the people seek to overcome it and more specific information about their demands as displayed in Table 8.1:

Table 8.1 The people in contemporary inclusionary populism

	SNP: Nationalist inclusionary populism	SYRIZA: Egalitarian inclusionary populism	Sinn Féin: Anti-colonial inclusionary populism
Overview	Everyone who lives in Scotland. The SNP have a universalist, cross-class appeal and include everyone in Scotland as part of the people.	A heterogenous group which includes the economically excluded such as the working classes, precarious middle classes and marginalised groups such as LGBTQI+ and immigrants.	A heterogenous group including the economically excluded, members of the unionist/loyalist community and also other marginalised groups such as refugees and LGBTQI+ communities.
Analysis	The SNP has a cross-class appeal, and its lack of the traditional class-based support of Labour and Conservatives has been turned to a strength. The SNP argue that only they can represent all of Scotland.	The diversity of the group is reflected in the diversity of their demands, which include economic ones such as ending austerity, political demands such as ending the crisis of representation and rights for marginalised groups.	The diversity of the people gives them their heterogeneity. This is then made constitutive by their unfulfilled demands. No matter the community, the people are economically excluded.
Populism	By appealing to all of Scotland through their universalism, the SNP has applied a heterogeneity to its people. The people are unified by shared values, and these values are the basis of their unfulfilled demands.	The constitutive heterogeneity of the people is its strength, with SYRIZA being able to transcend a class-based appeal. The people have diverse demands, but the chains of equivalence forged by the demands being unfulfilled bring a unity to them.	On initial sight, Sinn Féin appear to have a class-based appeal. However, this is expanded beyond the working class and into all of those who have been failed by the hegemony on both sides of the border.

Across all cases there are both developments and continuities. Beginning with the SNP, the most striking difference is that the concept of the people has expanded considerably from their historic antecedents. For the SNP, the people represent the whole of Scotland, and there is no apparent discrimination on the basis of nationality, gender identity, sexual identity or any other minority status.

This claim to represent all of Scotland was consistent across all participants. There were frequent comments on how the SNP had moved beyond the traditional class-based politics of Scotland with Labour representing the working-classes and the Conservatives representing the middle-classes. P3 spoke about his own electorate and how this was representative of the wider appeal of the SNP:

I represent a very wide range of people who vote for me. There are people who vote for me who are professionals. There are people who vote for me who are unemployed people. There are retired people. There are people from all religious groups. It is actually a very wide-ranging thing.

This is a significant development from the nationalist inclusionary populism of the Narodniks. The people of the Narodniks were a single, homogenous group, and it was this homogeneity that gave a strength to the people. For the SNP, it is the heterogeneity that gives strength to the people.

The Narodniks are a people unified by values believed to be superior to those of the elite. With the SNP, the values still matter and there is still a claim of superiority. Nonetheless, it can now be seen that these superior values are where the unfulfilled demands that unite the people come from, and it is through the fulfilment of the primary demand—*independence for Scotland*—that these values can be realised. Therefore, while the people of nationalist inclusionary populism may still be framed as being values-driven, the analytical framework of this thesis enables an understanding of the importance of these values as giving a set of core beliefs to generate the demands the people can unite around.

This, however, poses the question: if the SNP are able to have policy successes based on the value-led demands of the people of Scotland, can they be considered to be unfulfilled? This was a paradox resolved by P2 when he gave his rationale for independence for Scotland:

I think it's quite vividly demonstrated, right now, that there are huge hindrances in our ability to do so because a lot of macroeconomic policy is still determined by UK parliament, UK government...the significant power to provide economic stimulus still resides within the hands of the UK government. The fact that our overall budget in Scotland, obviously for the Scottish government, is determined by expenditure

decisions for England through the UK government kind of limit of our ability to go as far we would like. But yes, that's a fundamental driver for me and, I believe, for most of us in the SNP.

For the SNP, no matter how far they are able to go in fulfilling demands through policies, these demands will never be entirely fulfilled, due to the limitations of the Scottish Parliament in its current form as a devolved assembly. As long as Scotland remains part of the UK, the demands of the people cannot truly be fulfilled.

Chapter 6 explored how SYRIZA had used linkage strategies to build alliances with groups representing marginalised and minority groups, taking forward the demands of refugees and LGBTQI+ groups, for example, as well as the economically excluded.

P13 made specific references to this support:

I mean, in the same way, people who have any alternative lifestyle, sexuality, gay men, women are out people who are... political activists as people who belong to movements, people who are Antifa. All these they are the opponents of their right wing.

When this is compared with the people of the historic egalitarian inclusionary populists, it is evident that this represents a considerable expansion of who the people are, and this is the key point. The historic egalitarians focussed almost exclusively on the economically excluded, those who had been left behind or marginalised by big business capitalism. While the core of SYRIZA's support still remains the economically excluded, as made clear by P10, who said: "So yes I think that the economically excluded were the main focus of SYRIZA", they are no longer limited to this group.

This expansion of the identity of SYRIZA's people has seen a correlating expansion of their demands. While economic demands remain a critical part of their appeal, these are now joined by demands across multiple policy areas including social, cultural and calls for political reform.

This expansion of the people can be linked to societal changes since the end of World War II, which also marked the end of the era of the historic egalitarian inclusionary populists in the USA. Since then, through the counterculture of the 1960s, the post-materialist protest groups of the 1970s and contemporary liberation movements, the concept of egalitarianism has grown to accommodate emerging groups demanding their own rights, as argued by Laclau and Mouffe (2001). The linkage strategies of SYRIZA are well-established, building alliances with a diverse range of protest and liberation groups, as participants in Chapter 6 argued, and these strategies come from SYN's, the largest founder member of

SYRIZA's, historic Eurocommunist-influenced approach of engaging with social movements (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, 2013). Hence, as liberational struggles expanded beyond class struggles and into different policy areas, SYRIZA reflected this in their appeal.

Sinn Féin also illustrate this expansion of the people. Colonialism is an exclusionary project, and anti-colonialism seeks to redress this. Yet this re-inclusion does not include those who remain loyal to the colonial powers. Sinn Féin are different; they have an appeal to the Unionist/Loyalist communities, those still loyal to the colonialists, seeking to include them within the people by making the case that they, and not the colonial powers, can fulfil their demands. This was a point made by P16, who argued: "I'm able to persuade people from a Unionist political background because we got the peace in an ordinary political system." P16 was referring to Sinn Féin's role in bringing about GFA, the peace settlement in Northern Ireland, and arguing that if they could fulfil this demand, the demand for peace, then this demonstrated they could fulfil other demands and so reach out to communities outside of their traditional support.

Although Sinn Féin's primary demand was a united Ireland, this had limited salience in the South and stronger salience in the North. The demands of their people were, again, primarily economic in nature, with a focus on core demands such as housing and health, a point made by P19, who described the Sinn Féin support as "A very, very marginalised group of people in an Irish society who are totally living very, very difficult lives of struggle." There are strong similarities between the conceptualisations of the people by the historic and the contemporary anti-colonials. The historic anti-colonials have a strong emphasis on economic justice, and this remains the case with the contemporary anti-colonial Sinn Féin.

Throughout all cases, the primary change has been the heterogeneity of the people. While historic egalitarian and anti-colonial populism had a degree of heterogeneity, this was still limited. The egalitarians had a cross-class heterogeneity, and the anti-colonials had a heterogeneity across class and ethnicity. However, as society has become more diverse, with more identities forming through movements such as feminism and LGBTQI+ and liberation and increased migration both economically and in terms of refugees, inclusionary populists across all sub-types have actively sought to include these groups by expanding their conception of the people. With this expansion of the people, there is a concurrent expansion of demands which now occur over multiple policy areas such as secessionism, economic justice, social justice and political reform.

There does remain a critical continuity across the historic and contemporary cases; the people remain those prevented from fulfilling their demands, material or post-material, and so they remain politically and economically excluded.

8.3 The elite

Chapter 2 identified an elite from the historic evidence and ascertained that their primary role was excluding the people from power to preserve their own privilege. With the evidence from Chapters 5-7 and with the analytical framework, the elite can now be explored in far more detail, as seen in Table 8.2 below, revealing how the exact identity of the elite can be fluid and how they are positioned as the opponents of the people and their demands.

Table 8.2 The elite in contemporary inclusionary populism

	SNP – Nationalist inclusionary populism	SYRIZA – Egalitarian inclusionary populism	Sinn Féin – anti-colonial inclusionary populism
Overview	A political elite as represented by Westminster.	The elite are as diverse as the people; they are the old parties of PASOK and ND, they are big business, they are the media, and they were the EU and the Troika.	Internally, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael and the economic interests that they represent. Externally, the United Kingdom.
Analysis	The elite is both against the people of Scotland and represents and is foreign to Scotland. Participants argued that the concept of an “elite” is at odds with the idea of “Scottishness” and that an elite cannot truly exist within Scotland.	The philosophy of resistance runs deep within SYRIZA’s discourse and strategy, and this can be seen in their conception of the elite: a diverse group united by their desire to maintain their privilege at the expense of the people.	The internal elite are those who benefit from the current status quo, whether economically, politically or both. The external elite are the forces of British colonialism and their allies, particularly in the North.
Populism	By othering the elite, the SNP are making an explicitly populist claim; the elite and the people are different and bound by different values, and the values of the people are superior to those of the elite.	SYRIZA use this elite to give the people a focus for blame. A diverse elite means that SYRIZA can build a diverse support.	In the South, the elite represent and seek to preserve a hegemony that has failed the people of Ireland and abandoned the promises and goals of early republicanism. In the North they represent an attempt to continue the colonial legacy of the United Kingdom.

With the historic nationalists, the elite was both internal and external: the alien influences on Russian culture and those within Russia who supported those influences. With the SNP and contemporary civic nationalist inclusionary populism, there are two major developments: the elite now has a precise identity—Westminster—and is fully external to Scotland.

P4, when discussing Conservative MPs, said, “They had been to Eton, the most select, fee-paying, expensive school in the United Kingdom, and then they had all gone onto Oxford together”, emphasising their bonds as an elite. In comparison, he described the educational background of the 56 SNP MPs elected in 2015: “Literally, four or five had been privately educated for a start, but even more than that very few of them had even been to the same school.” Even what might be considered part of a Scottish elite, such as a privately educated MP, is not truly part of an elite, at least not by the standards of Westminster, because the Scottish MPs have a diverse background which the Conservative ones do not. Again, there is an emphasis on the people being heterogenous and the elite being homogenous.

This leads to the key area of similarity between the elites of the historic and contemporary nationalists; they have different values from the people. The SNP’s people are egalitarian and inclusive, the elite are not. This was a point illustrated by P7:

The rest of the UK in terms of what the voters think is very much this idea of being Eurosceptic, of centre-right and even far-right politics. And I think the UK and British elite, if you like, and the British government are really only dancing to that tune.

Like their historic antecedents, the SNP have othered the elite; they are not of Scotland, their values are not Scottish, and they cannot represent Scotland.

With the egalitarians, participants placed the elite as primarily economic, with P12 saying: “They do everything around profit.” However, it was also clear that, just as the conception of the egalitarian people has expanded beyond the economic, so too has the conception of the elite. With SYRIZA, the elite are far more diverse than their antecedents. This continues the theme noted earlier with the people of SYRIZA; as egalitarianism developed as a concept, moving beyond being purely economic in nature, so too did the identity of the people, and the same can be said of the elite. They are still the big businesses and their political allies who promote an economic system that benefits them and not the people, as per the historic egalitarians, but they are also, for example, the Church that oppresses the LGBTQI+ communities and the politicians who scapegoat immigrants, which participants made multiple references to in Chapter 6.

A final point to notice is the location of the elite for SYRIZA. When considering the elite of the historic egalitarian populists, it was noted that they appeared to be primarily internal. However, when examining the elite of SYRIZA, it appeared that its location had changed over time. In the early period of SYRIZA, from the anti-austerity protests they joined to

much of their period in government, SYRIZA's elite were both the conservative forces in Greece and also the austerity-imposing Troika, as is clear from this section of SYRIZA's September 2015 election manifesto: "The subordination of public interest and public morality to the organized interests of the old parties continued in the years of the Memorandum, with the Troika's tolerance." (SYRIZA, 2015b, p. 23). However, as the influence of the Troika waned, SYRIZA have focussed more on their internal opponents as an elite.

Turning, finally, to Sinn Féin, it was noted in Chapter 7 that there were both internal and external elites; the internal elites being the duopoly of Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil and the big businesses they were seen to support at the expense of the people, and the external elite being the old colonial forces of the United Kingdom. In terms of the values of these elites and their incompatibility with the values of Sinn Féin's people, there was evidence that participants believed there to be more commonality with the internal elite than the external, as illustrated by the arguments advanced by P16. In discussing the external elite, the UK and its unionist and loyalist supporters in Northern Ireland, he argued:

In terms of the British state well, I suppose we're republicans, They're monarchists. We see the core value of republicanism is popular sovereignty ruled by people for the people, all that craic. They see themselves as kind of that authority runs from the crown down and it's legitimised by parliamentary democracy and things like that instead.

Even at the most basic political level, the idea of political sovereignty, there was no commonality between the elite and the people, and nor could there ever be. The republican idea of politics and the British, monarchist idea were absolutely incompatible. However, when considering Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, P16 accepted: "Whereas there's probably some commonality in the way that Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and Sinn Féin people might view Irish history." While P16 would, like all participants, question the republicanism of both these parties, he noted their commonality, inasmuch as they both emerged from the post-civil war republican politics of Ireland.

When considering what the elite of Sinn Féin are seeking to preserve, there are elements from both the nationalist and egalitarian parties. This is not surprising as, as was touched upon in the previous chapter, Sinn Féin's republicanism can be understood as a form of egalitarian nationalism. Their elite is primarily political in the form of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael and, in Northern Ireland, Westminster and Westminster-supporting parties, yet these elites exist to preserve systems that are contrary to the interests and demands of the people.

With the elites of the SYRIZA and Sinn Féin cases, it is evident that, just as the people have expanded and changed, so have the elite. Their primary role, that of excluding the people from the power to fulfil their demands, remains the same. However, in the cases of SYRIZA and Sinn Féin, the identity of the elite has expanded and changed.

In looking for possible reasons for this expansion of the elite, it can be linked to the expansion of the people. New identities within the people mean new demands. While the elite of the historic egalitarians were principally economic, the changing nature of capitalism has seen an equal changing nature of a capitalist elite, and so while they remain principally economic in nature, their actions are no longer limited to the economic sphere. This is also the case with the anti-colonial populists; Sinn Féin continue to argue against the colonial legacy in Ireland and against the impact of neoliberalism, most notably within housing, but also form links between the neoliberal housing crisis and the treatment of refugees.

This is far less salient with the SNP, whose elite is a single institution: Westminster. Of the three elites from the case studies, this is the most straightforward and easily identifiable. This could be because the SNP lack the economic radicalism of SYRIZA and Sinn Féin and so did not demonstrate an anti-neoliberal discourse. The data did show that the SNP believed they had an appeal to the economically excluded and that their ability to improve the circumstances of this group was hampered by the elite's refusal of their primary demand: independence for Scotland. While the nation-building exercise of the SNP includes differing economic priorities to those of the elite of Westminster, there was little of the attack on neoliberalism seen in the other cases, thus this could explain the continued homogeneity of their elite.

As the people's identity and demands have expanded across multiple spheres, so, too, have the elite expanded as they thwart these demands. Despite this development, continuity remains with the historic examples. As with the people, the core identity and function of the elite remains; they are the ones who prevent the people from fulfilling their demands and keep them excluded.

8.4 The relationship between the people and the elite

When the initial typology from Chapter 2 was being constructed, there were, at that time, only two themes: people and elite. The development of the analytical framework in Chapter 3 introduced three further themes: relationship with the people and elite, empty

signifier and articulation between core ideology and inclusionary populism. Therefore, when examining these three further themes in this chapter, there will be a return to the evidence from Chapter 2 and an attempt to identify those historic themes and compare them with the contemporary themes in order to explore their development.

When applying the analytical framework to the limited evidence from Chapter 2, the following general observations can be made about the historic cases and this theme:

In historic nationalist inclusionary populism, the relationship is an antagonism based upon a clash of values: the people seek a new nation to be built upon the true values of that nation, while the elite wish to prevent this. In historic egalitarian inclusionary populism, the relationship is an antagonism across economic frontiers, as the elite seek to preserve a capitalism that benefits them, and the people seek to recalibrate it in their favour. Finally, in anti-colonial inclusionary populism, the relationship is an antagonism primarily across economic frontiers, as the people seek to dismantle the colonial structures which preserve inequality.

Next, contemporary evidence will be presented, in Table 8.3, in order to explore how these themes have developed and understand more about their causes and nature.

Table 8.3 The relationship between the people and elite in contemporary inclusionary populism

	SNP – Nationalist inclusionary populism	SYRIZA – Egalitarian inclusionary Populism	Sinn Féin – anti-colonial inclusionary populism
Overview	An antagonistic incompatibility.	An antagonistic clash of demands.	An antagonistic incompatibility.
Analysis	The fundamental difference in the core values of the people and elite, as expressed by the SNP, signifies that there will always be an antagonism present.	SYRIZA are attempting to challenge the privilege of the elite through the demands of the people; the elite attempt to prevent this through the promotion and preservation of the status quo.	The people want change, the elite do not.
Populism	There exists an antagonistic hegemonic frontier, as the value-based demands of the people remain unfulfilled.	The antagonism is clear from both sides, with both SYRIZA and the elite arguing that their demands are the path to a better Greece.	There exists an antagonistic hegemonic frontier between these two forces, as the elite work together to prevent any kind of meaningful change that would benefit the people.

Unlike the themes explored previously, there does appear to be little difference in the relationship between the people and elite; the antagonism remains. However, with the analysed data now available from this research, the causes and nature of these antagonisms can be more easily understood.

With the SNP, the antagonism emerges from a clash of values. P1, when discussing the values of the Conservative Party, said, “My view has always been that for the Tories, the first question they ever ask is, ‘What’s in it for me?’ They just look like a party of selfishness.”

Scottish values were framed as being in stark opposition to this, as expressed by P3:

There's quite a lot of altruism. People believe in a better world, but they're not necessarily doctrinaire socialist. They're more often to be social-democratic. They

have a social-democratic outlook, and they want to see a fairer distribution of wealth within society.

The values of the people are altruistic, while the values of the elite are selfish, a significant and clear difference and cause of antagonism.

In terms of the core demand of the people—independence—this is a zero-sum game, and there is no room for compromise on this; Scotland will either be independent of the Westminster elite, or it will not. Hence, this remains the key source of the people's demands being unfulfilled and consequently of the antagonism that exists.

With regard to SYRIZA, there is the antagonism over the unwillingness of the elite to fulfil the wide variety of demands of the diverse people of SYRIZA. P11 framed this antagonism as follows:

What is the universal class? So, for neoliberals, for business interests, for right wing parties the answer to that question are the entrepreneurs and industrialists. Their interests represent the interests of the whole of society.

P11 argues that it is the elite who see themselves as holding the role which Marxist theory ascribes to the proletariat. What is best for the entrepreneur and the industrialist is best for the people. P11 then explained how SYRIZA saw the people:

We think that the opposite is true, that the interests of ordinary working people, in other words, it is the working class is the universal class and their interests for less inequality for more public services represent the interests of the whole society not just them.

This antagonism can therefore be seen as being based upon a clash of who society should be configured to benefit, the people or elite. In this respect, little has changed from the historic to contemporary egalitarians. However, the antagonism can now be understood in more detail.

With the contemporary anti-colonial inclusionary populists, there is a clear development of this antagonism and how it is framed and manifested. With the historic anti-colonials, this antagonism appeared as a struggle to remove the structures and legacy of colonialism and resist contemporary colonialism. With Sinn Féin, this is framed as the elite being resistant to the change that will benefit the people.

The external elite is represented by the UK and the groups still loyal to the UK in Northern Ireland, and this is very much to be expected from anti-colonial inclusionary populism. P18 discussed the history of Northern Ireland and explicitly framed the UK as a colonial power:

And what we had was a solution which was being imposed, I suppose, by the British across the world in various colonial situations where they imposed borders and partitions and political solutions designed by themselves in other countries.

P18 then went on to explore the antagonism between the people and elite, saying, "...there are times you do have to attack some of the activities of the British government in Ireland. They do need to be confronted and challenged, and we do that without a hesitation." This antagonism is based on Sinn Féin's primary demand of a united Ireland and the external elite's unwillingness to grant this. P18 acknowledged that there was the capacity, within the GFA, to have a referendum on Irish unification, referred to as a Border Poll, but still pointed to what he believed to be the unfair and unjust interference of the external elite in this:

The fact the British Secretary of State here in the north has a role in deciding when to call such a referendum and a quite, as yet ill-defined judgment to make in relation to when a unity referendum would be called.

Regarding the internal elite, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, it is among participants in the Republic of Ireland where an antagonism was expressed, and this can be explored by focussing on the core unfulfilled demand for housing reform in the Republic of Ireland.

Multiple respondents spoke at length about Sinn Féin's housing policies, with P18 saying:

That sector (housing) has really substantial financial interests that has entered into the Irish markets on the back of legislation passed by Fine Gael in 2014, past that global labour equity investment in property and real estate investments, trusts, etc. We had brought on a very, very strong path for almost banning rent increases in the private sector for three years, closing all of the tax advantages for big investment trusts, massive investments in non-market public housing led by local authorities include housing bodies.

Sinn Féin want to deliver housing as a demand of the people, while the elite will prevent this because they do not represent the interests of the people but the interests of big business, and so the antagonism exists.

The existence of an antagonistic relationship between the people and elite remains true from the historic to the contemporary cases. This is not unexpected, as the theoretical and empirical evidence points strongly towards the consistent antagonistic nature of inclusionary populism, and therefore this consistency is present across all cases, historic and contemporary. However, with the contemporary data of this thesis, it is now possible to better understand the nature and causes of these antagonisms. Fundamentally, they are due to the refusal of the elite to accede to the demands of the people, thereby maintaining their own identity, position and privilege as the elite. In the eyes of the populists, the

antagonistic relationship is caused by the intransigence of the elite, and so it is from the elite that the antagonism flows.

8.5 The empty signifier

The fourth theme to consider is the empty signifier, the word or phrase devoid of meaning apart from that which is applied to it, and which gives meaning to other signifiers within the discursive chain, which are produced by political movements to fulfil this function. As per the relationship between the people and elite, this was a concept that emerged and was discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, this section shall begin by attempting to identify empty signifiers from the limited historical data.

In historic nationalist inclusionary populism, the *obscina*, the traditional peasant village of Russia, can be identified as the empty signifier. For the Narodniks, this was the source of the values of those peasants upon which the new Russia was to be built. With historic egalitarian inclusionary populism, it was the people themselves, as expressed through terms such as the “God-fearing ordinary poor and common God-fearing middle class” (Lee, 2006, p. 364) and the “average Joe” (Kazin, 1995) who were the empty signifier. This was also the case with historic anti-colonial inclusionary populism where, again, the empty signifier was the people themselves, as expressed through a variety of terms, most notably “*descamisados*” (Clayton, Conniff and Gauss, 2017) to bring unity and also demonstrate a break from the racial hierarchies of colonialism.

The empty signifiers which can be identified from the historic cases are largely what would be expected; however, there is still only a basic understanding of them. To expand upon this, it is necessary to turn once more to the contemporary evidence and analysis, in Table 8.4.

Table 8.4 The empty signifier in contemporary inclusionary populism

	SNP – Nationalist inclusionary populism	SYRIZA – Egalitarian inclusionary populism	Sinn Féin – anti-colonial inclusionary populism
Overview	Independence	Neoliberalism	Republicanism
Analysis	The fundamental goal of the SNP and what their core politics always strives towards.	Although neoliberalism is a value of the elite and not the people, it is leveraged by SYRIZA as an empty signifier.	Republicanism, as articulated by Sinn Féin, is a socialist appeal.
Populism	This gives meaning and unity to the demands and values of the people. It is through independence that the demands of the people can be truly realised.	This empty signifier still unites the people, as it gives them something to unite against. The unfulfilled demands of the people are given shape and meaning by them being seen as demands against neoliberalism.	Through this appeal to socialism and sovereignty and a return to the values of the early revolutionary republicans, Sinn Féin give meaning to the other causes they espouse, from a united Ireland to improving housing; all of these can be achieved through a socialist republicanism.

The empirical data uncovered and examined in Chapters 5-7 gives a far richer and more detailed understanding of the form and function of the empty signifiers in each of the contemporary cases when compared with the historic cases. To explore this fully, each empty signifier shall be compared with its historic antecedent, followed by the contemporary cases with each other.

Starting with nationalist inclusionary populism, there is a move from a values-based empty signifier to a demands-based empty signifier. The *obscina* represented a set of values that the people could rally around to build a new nation. Independence, the empty signifier of the SNP, represents the goal of the SNP and the way to realise the demands of the people. It unifies the demands of the people and the values that produce these demands and also gives a path to realising them.

This can be seen in the argument put forward by P4, who said, “And frankly, even if we win independence, we then want to see transformational economic and social change in the country that we feel we can't achieve under devolution.” The values-based demands, as expressed by the people, are only achievable through independence; devolution alone is not enough. This echoes the claims from P2 explored earlier in this chapter; the SNP can fulfil some demands to a limited extent under devolution, but it is only through independence that all demands can be fulfilled.

Sinn Féin demonstrate a similar scenario. The historic anti-colonial inclusionary populists have the people themselves, often represented through the term *descamisados*, as the empty signifier. However, Sinn Féin use republicanism and, in particular, their socialist, James Connolly-derived republicanism, as their empty signifier, as it is the route to achieving all of their unfulfilled demands. This was a point made clearly by P18:

It's a crucial distinction that what we want to do is politicise and republicanise more and more people, and by doing so, move the centre of gravity in our direction because that's the only way we think we can achieve things.

Republicanism is the pathway to the Ireland that Sinn Féin want to see, it is the rallying call to their people, and it is what gives unity to their demands. Sinn Féin participants argued that policies such as housing were not simply the right things to do for the people but were the republican things to do for the people, and that Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil failed the people because they were insufficiently republican.

With SYRIZA, the empty signifier is neoliberalism, and this is where an even stronger difference with their historic antecedent is apparent. The historic egalitarian inclusionary populists, like the anti-colonials, used a positive representation of the people, the “honest Joe”, as an empty signifier to unite that people. However, SYRIZA use neoliberalism as an empty signifier, not so much to unite the people for their demands but to give the people something to unite against as the cause of those demands being unfulfilled. In Chapter 6, the SYRIZA philosophy of resistance (Douzinas, 2017) was examined, and so their use of neoliberalism as an empty signifier to resist against can be understood within this context. This can be seen in how P8 expressed SYRIZA’s strategy: “Let's do a very big progressive front to tackle nationalism, extreme right and neoliberalism.”

There is a clear development of how empty signifiers are deployed. In the historic movements studied, the empty signifier united the people through identity, either directly as the people, in the case of the egalitarians and anti-colonials, or the *obscina* in the case of the nationalists. In all cases, the empty signifier has a values element to it and has an

important function of differing the people from the elite through the identity and values of the empty signifier.

In the contemporary cases, there are both continuity and significant changes. The core function of uniting the disparate demands of the people remains. Yet, for both the nationalists and anti-colonials, the empty signifier now represents both an unfulfilled demand and the pathway to having all other unfulfilled demands realised. In doing so, the empty signifier becomes more strategic and linked to the core goals of the parties deploying it. There is an even more pronounced change with the egalitarians, where the empty signifier now represents not the goals of the party but the barrier to these goals, while the strategic element remains.

8.6 Articulation

Articulation, how the identity of two separate components is modified by the other component when they work in conjunction, is another critical component of the analytical framework of this thesis, and one which sets the framework apart from the ideational and strategic approaches to populism. In considering the evidence in this section, it is apparent that while the concept of articulation remains the same, what has developed from the historic to contemporary cases are the implications of this articulation.

It is necessary to begin to identify the articulation in the historic cases. Historic nationalist inclusionary populism is an attempt to build a nation on the true values of that nation against an elite who support and promote alien values, while historic egalitarian inclusionary populism is one which expresses economic struggles through non-class politics. Ultimately, a historic anti-colonial inclusionary populism is one which attempts to build a popular, cross-class movement against the legacies of colonialism and those who still promote colonialist attitudes.

If the contemporary data is now introduced, it is possible to explore the development of articulation within these three types and see how the identities of the twin components of the core ideology and inclusionary populism are modified by each other and develop into distinct types of inclusionary populism.

Table 8.5 Articulation in contemporary inclusionary populism

	SNP – Nationalist inclusionary populism	SYRIZA – Egalitarian inclusionary populism	Sinn Féin – anti-colonial inclusionary Populism
Overview	Nationalist inclusionary populism	Egalitarian inclusionary populism	Anti-colonial inclusionary populism
Analysis	The values of civic nationalism give rise to the demands of populism, and the values-based differences between people and elite give rise to the antagonism.	There already exists considerable cross-over between SYRIZA’s egalitarian ideology and inclusionary populism, most notably in SYRIZA’s linkage strategies.	There are considerable similarities between contemporary republicanism and inclusionary populism, making them a strong fit.
Populism	Populism allows for full articulation between these two components, allowing for an inclusionary populist civic nationalism in which the entire nation is framed as excluded underdog.	The articulation gives SYRIZA a people united through unfulfilled demands and united in opposition to the elite and an elite united by wanting to maintain their dominance.	The articulation allows republican populist strategy to mobilise support for Sinn Féin, with the historic actors of republicanism becoming the people and elite of populism.

Beginning with nationalist inclusionary populism, the values component of nationalism remains strong. However, as per previous themes, it can now be seen how these nationalist values become populist demands, and this is where articulation of these two components is most evident. By framing the entire nation as being excluded, not just a section of the nation, as per the historic nationalists, the contemporary nationalists have a stronger ability to form a rival hegemony to the elite through a diverse people who are unified by their unfulfilled demands.

This idea of Scotland as a whole being excluded was something that SNP participants touched on frequently. For example, P1 stated, “I don't think from a government point of view that the United Kingdom works well for Scotland.” There is no specification of one particular group within Scotland, such as the working classes or minority groups; it is the whole of Scotland that is excluded from power.

A common word used to describe this exclusion is “unfair”, as can be seen from the 2015 Westminster manifesto:

“At this election with every SNP seat, comes more power for Scotland. More power to pursue a real alternative to unfair cuts, an end to the Bedroom Tax, a higher minimum wage and protection for our NHS and valued public services.” (SNP, 2015, p. 7)

The articulation into contemporary inclusionary nationalist populism by allowing the SNP to frame all of Scotland as being excluded—the underdog—as explored in Chapter 5, also allows the SNP to position themselves as the only party who can truly fulfil the demands of the people.

The concept of egalitarianism has grown considerably from the historic egalitarians, and so the most significant difference in articulation is that while the historic egalitarians framed what were, primarily, economic demands through non-class politics, the contemporary egalitarians are able to frame all their far wider demands through non-class politics. P8 demonstrated this by explaining the support of SYRIZA as “Working-class to lower middle-class people, and the LGBTI community, and students, immigrants, younger people in general.” There is considerable evidence that SYRIZA moved beyond class-based politics, and the articulation between the non-class element of inclusionary populism with the egalitarianism allows their egalitarianism to move beyond class politics.

Finally, regarding the anti-colonials, it can be observed that, historically, there was already a strong fit between inclusionary populism and anti-colonialism, as both components emphasise the inclusion or re-inclusion of those who had been excluded by an elite, and this continues into the anti-colonialism of Sinn Féin.

Participants from Sinn Féin spoke at length about their desire to expand the people, to include the excluded within their politics and to engage with the marginalised, and this can be seen as an inclusionary populist action. Participants also spoke of the importance of sovereignty. As P18 argued when discussing the goals of Sinn Féin: “The first is the united Ireland. It's the ending of the partition and the creation of a fully sovereign democracy on the island of Ireland.” The link between the socialist republicanism of Sinn Féin and its belief in the sovereignty of the people and the similar populist belief was expressed by P17 in Chapter 7, and it is useful to repeat the key point here: “I think yeah, republicanism is by its nature at least a little bit populist because it rests on popular sovereignty.”

What can now be seen, with Sinn Féin, is that the articulation allows the traditional actors of their republicanism, the Irish people and British colonisers, to be framed as the inclusionary populist actors of people and elite, thus updating republicanism for the contemporary politics of Ireland and reflecting the changing nature of Irish society.

Articulation is the theme that has seen the least change and the greatest continuity. This was expected, as it is as much a theme of inclusionary populism as it is a way of understanding inclusionary populism and so, unlike the other themes of the framework, it has remained constant. However, with the application of the new data of this thesis, how this concept works can now be understood in practice in far more detail.

8.7 Challenges and confirmations to existing literature

Throughout this thesis, there has been a consideration of prevailing trends within the existing literature on populism and an argument that this thesis is an attempt to challenge these through the application of new data and a new analytical framework. Equally, the analysed data has confirmed some arguments in existing literature. This chapter concludes by taking each of the themes of the framework in turn and showing how and where the thesis has done this.

The people

It has been established that the predominant populist view of the people is that they are homogenous and morally pure (Mudde, 2004). This thesis has significantly challenged that view. In terms of the historic populisms, the people of the Narodniks are homogenous, but as historic populism developed, this homogeneity diminished, with the US populists moving cross-class and the Latin American populists moving both cross-class and cross-ethnicity, wherein the development of this homogeneity can be seen.

With contemporary inclusionary populism, it has been demonstrated that this heterogeneity is now firmly established as a core characteristic of the people. Not only does this challenge the dominant, ideational viewpoint that the homogeneity of the people is what gives them strength, but it also adds weight to the theoretical arguments of Laclau (2007) that, within inclusionary populism, the strength of the people comes from their heterogeneity.

The thesis also confirms Filc's (2015) three mechanisms of inclusion by inclusionary populists, which can be summarised as members of a previously excluded group being given access to power as elected representatives and leaders of the movement, the excluded group becoming an active political subject and the re-politicisation of issues where they become technocratic issues (Filc, 2015, pp. 266, 267). In terms of the first mechanism, this was seen across all cases, as each party had participants who had been enthused by issues

such as republicanism or Scottish independence and joined the inclusionary populist party in question, often holding office. P3, a former chief executive of the SNP, said:

I'd sort of come to the conclusion that the things I believed in, any sort of progressive social democracy I call it more than anything else at that time in the Labour Party, were not going to be achieved in the UK, but could be achieved in Scotland.

P3, a member of the people in Scotland and thus, according to the SNP, one of the politically excluded, joined the SNP to challenge that exclusion and ended up holding the highest office within the party. This pattern was not unique to the SNP.

In terms of the excluded becoming an active political subject, again this was common across all cases; P8, a SYRIZA activist, in talking about the excluded in Greece, said:

(They were) completely invisible. Not ignored, they are acknowledged, but not in a good way. For example, in Syriza, in all the rallies before the elections, spoke many times our MPs and our politicians spoke in favour of the global population, which was completely ignored by everybody else.

Equally, as was seen in Chapters 5-7, the politicisation or re-politicisation of the excluded was a commonality across all parties.

Finally, with regard to issues becoming re-politicised and technocratic, this was also evident across all cases. Sinn Féin focussed on housing, politicising this issue, and P20 explained how this issue had been both politicised and turned into a technocratic issue through their expertise:

So, it's the kind of idea that the term social housing and council got a bad name and has a stigma. So, it's about re-imagining all of that and the messaging making it simple, making it-- trying to take the policy kind of words out of it and making it just as clear as possible for people to kind of get their heads around... and then when the election came and obviously Eoin (Ó Broin) doing the book, it all kind of caught people's attention.

Sinn Féin, argues P20, have made the question of social housing into a political one, in order to make the electorate understand that it can be solved politically through Sinn Féin. Equally, by referencing Eoin Ó Broin's book *Home* (2019), P20 is advancing Sinn Féin and Ó Broin in particular as having the technocratic expertise to solve these problems.

A second challenge to existing literature comes with the question of morality. Again, while there was evidence that this has existed in some forms of historic inclusionary populism, there is no evidence that contemporary inclusionary populists frame their politics as a moral struggle. The demands of the people may have economic, social or political imperatives, but there was no compelling evidence from the data of a moral imperative.

Therefore, it can be seen that applying an ideational approach to the people in an inclusionary populist paradigm will not enable a full exploration of the identity and demands of that people, and so it allows for only a partial understanding.

The elite

With the elite, the prevailing view is that if the people are morally pure then the elite are framed as corrupt (Canovan, 1999; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Within the ideational approach to populism, this is the core characteristic of the elite. The nature and causes of this corruption are rarely considered; rather, it is simply presented as the case that the elite are corrupt and that the morally pure people challenge this. In some cases, both historic and contemporary, for example SYRIZA, the corruption of the elite was argued as an important characteristic of their identity. However, in the case of Sinn Féin and, especially, the SNP, the idea of corruption had far less salience. The evidence therefore suggests, counter to the dominant views, that while corruption can be a component of the identity of the elite, it is not necessarily the sole, or even the most important, component.

Instead, the evidence and analysis of this thesis has pointed towards the elite's function as being to prevent the demands of the people from being fulfilled, so as to preserve their own position of dominance and identity as an elite. If the SNP fulfil their demand of independence, the elite of Westminster loses power over Scotland. If SYRIZA gain their demands for economic and social justice, then the power of their neoliberal elite is diminished. If Sinn Féin gain their demands for Irish unification and social and economic justice, then the power of their elites in the United Kingdom and the political and economic elites in Ireland diminishes. As per the arguments of Laclau (2007), just as the people struggle to develop their identity, so, too, the elite fight to maintain theirs.

The ideational approach limits understanding of the people and, equally, it limits understanding of the elite, viewing them only as a corrupt group that stands against the general will of the people (Mudde, 2004, 2017a). The data and analysis of this thesis allows for the ascription of a more precise and detailed identity and function to the elite.

Relationship between the people and elite

These struggles lead to the third component: the antagonistic nature of the relationship between the people and elite. This is something that exists both in ideational and discursive approaches to populism (Aslanidis, 2016) The ideational approach takes root of this clash as still being based within the moral/corrupt dichotomy between the people and elite (Katsambekis, 2020). However, the evidence in this thesis challenges this viewpoint.

While there is some evidence of a values clash from participants, this is not the core reason for the antagonism.

Instead, it is necessary to return to the arguments advanced about the identity of the elite; they are attempting to maintain their position as elite, and this is the source of the antagonism. This builds upon the arguments of Kastambekis (2020), who argues that the antagonism comes from competing interests, the demands of the people versus the privilege of the elite and competing ideological values. The evidence of this thesis confirms these arguments and enables an understanding of the depth, nature and causes of the antagonisms.

Empty signifier

With the empty signifier, while there have been attempts to apply this concept to empirical evidence, such as the 2008 Obama presidential campaign (Kumar, 2014) and the rise of PEGIDA (Nam, 2020), to date there have been no comparative studies of empty signifiers and their use across differing parties and times.

Having done such a comparative study, this thesis can now introduce a new element to the understanding of empty signifiers. Laclau offered the people themselves as an empty signifier (Laclau, 2007), and other literature has pointed towards empty signifiers such as “hope” (Kumar, 2014; Katsambekis, 2016) and “change” (Kumar, 2014) as being successfully deployed by political movements. These are all signifiers with positive connotations, pointing towards what the people want. However, this thesis has demonstrated that an empty signifier need not have such connotations; it can signify something the people are against as well as for. What matters is that it provides unity to the people.

As discursive approaches to populism, particularly for inclusionary populism, continue to gain traction, the ability to highlight and explore an empty signifier, given its centrality to this approach, becomes increasingly important. Understanding that an empty signifier need not always be related to the demands of the people but can also be the barrier to those demands allows for the identification of more appropriate and informative empty signifiers.

Articulation

Concluding with the final element, articulation, the impact of the thesis is similar to that of the empty signifier in terms of the practical application of this concept. There are, for example, existing attempts to apply articulation to exclusionary nativist Nordic populism

(Herkman, 2017) and across different iterations of radical left populism (Kim, 2019). While these demonstrate the applicability of the concept to empirical evidence, there has been, until now, no attempt to apply this to inclusionary populism as part of an attempt to identify and classify various types.

The primary challenge that this presents to existing literature is in the approach of populism as a thin ideology (Mudde, 2004, 2017a). Chapter 3 advanced the argument that this approach was limited, as it only demonstrated how the ideology influenced the populism and not vice versa, and so it left the populist element as an unchanging constant. Only through articulation could it be understood how inclusionary populism develops and takes different yet related forms. Through the Laclau-derived framework of this thesis, it has been demonstrated that, just as the ideology changes in each form, so, too, does the populism. It is therefore the use of articulation that has allowed for the creation of the typology of this thesis; it has allowed for the identification of different sub-types of inclusionary populism and the ability to classify them as such.

The final question in this section is to consider the implications of the typology and analytical framework and the concept of populism advanced by this thesis. Fundamentally, it offers a method to explore and understand inclusionary populism. First, it allows for focus on multiple demands, including but not limited to material demands, strengthening the case for the debates on populism to move from left vs right to inclusionary vs exclusionary. Second, it takes the discursive approach, which this thesis has argued is better suited to understanding inclusionary populism than the ideational and strategic approaches and addresses some of the criticisms of its vagueness through offering a holistic framework that is adaptable and more straightforward to use. Finally, and with a focus on empirical implications, it has the potential to be expanded further to include quantitative elements, measurements of inclusionary populist sentiment for example, to further strengthen it.

8.8 Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to explore the development of inclusionary populism, from the historic cases to the contemporary cases, using both the data from the contemporary cases and the analytical framework of Chapter 3. In doing so, it was hoped that it could demonstrate that the basic typology from Chapter 2 was insufficient for building a comprehensive analysis of contemporary inclusionary populism, and also to demonstrate

the development of inclusionary populism from a phenomenon that articulated primarily economic demands to one which now articulates a far wider variety of demands.

Chapter 2 noted that there was a degree of crossover between the wider categories of inclusionary and exclusionary populism and between the subtypes of the typology and, having constructed the full typology, we can see that these still exist and should, therefore, be addressed. The SNP offer a fully unified people of all of Scotland but also claim that membership of this people is dependent on holding certain values and it was noted that this was an exclusionary act. While such exclusionary acts were not so evident within SYRIZA and Sinn Féin, their possibility cannot be discounted. However, as per the arguments advanced in Chapter 2, despite the existence of certain exclusionary elements, the desire to expand the membership of the people and, in particular in the contemporary cases, the explicit rejection of nativism and other forms of discrimination in all cases makes them sufficiently inclusionary to be classed as such.

In terms of the subtypes, much as with the original cases in Chapter 2, crossover does exist. All of the subtypes are egalitarian to an extent and both the SNP and Sinn Féin advance nationalist territorial claims and this does present a challenge to the typology. This challenge can be resolved, though, by noting that the typology accepts these crossovers and does not propose absolute delineation between the types and cases rather that there exist sufficient differences, most notable in the core ideology, to frame them as different types. The SNP are egalitarian but this egalitarianism is linked to their nationalism and desire to build what they see as a better Scotland which can only happen through their nationalist cause of independence. Sinn Féin are also both nationalist and egalitarian but both of these elements are fundamentally linked to their republicanism, an anti-colonial cause.

The final question regarding the typology is, having established that contemporary inclusionary populist parties now advance post-materialist demands along with materialist demands does this mean that they can be classed in different types. The answer to this is linked to the previous paragraph: the demands may have similarities but the rationale behind them, nationalist, egalitarian or anti-colonial, remain sufficiently different to allow for the typology.

Through the data and analytical framework, the chapter has shown how inclusionary populism has grown and developed, from the historical antecedents to the contemporary forms. Sufficient change and difference have been identified between the types to maintain the proposed typology, as has sufficient continuity across the cases, historic and

contemporary, to continue to define them as inclusionary populist. The thesis now turns to the conclusion where the implications of these findings will be considered.

Chapter 9 - Conclusions

9.1 Introduction

This thesis has been able to add a more precise identity to the people, demonstrating how populist parties construct them as heterogenous and explaining how and why they have been excluded. It has also been able to identify the elite and explain more precisely how and why they exclude the people. This nature and the causes of the exclusion are further refined by the addition of analysing the antagonism between the people of the elite and the identity and the demands of the people are further refined by identifying and analysing the empty signifier. Finally, the concept of articulation allows us to fully define each of the subtypes of inclusionary populism.

This chapter will offer a brief summary of the main findings and contributions of the thesis. There will then be a discussion on what these findings contribute to wider debates of party families and party systems, national identity in sub-state politics and representation. There will then be a consideration of the limitations of the thesis, before finishing with an exploration of areas for further research.

9.2 The contributions of this thesis

In Chapter 1, empirical, theoretical and methodological gaps were identified, and cases were made as to how the thesis proposed to address these gaps. Returning to these gaps, they can then be used to discuss the contributions of this thesis. There is overlap between the theoretical and methodological contributions and while contributions have been classes as theoretical and methodological, this overlap is acknowledged. However, this does not diminish the contributions themselves.

Empirical

When looking at the empirical contributions this thesis has made, the most important ones have been made to frame each party as inclusionary populist. Earlier in this chapter, what has been learned from such framing was considered, but it is also critical to consider why it is important that this has been done.

There is very little literature that frames the SNP as an inclusionary populist party, although there have been occasions when they have been cast as populist, as a pejorative

by political opponents. Therefore, by framing the SNP as inclusionary populist, a strong contribution to existing literature has been made. Viewing the SNP as an inclusionary populist party allows researchers a new lens through which to analyse them and also offers new insight into their strategies, in particular how they attempt to unite the entirety of Scotland against an external and othered elite. By further using the historical and contemporary data to classify them as a nationalist inclusionary populist movement, it is possible to understand the importance of values within their inclusionary populism, something that was not as apparent in the other cases.

With regard to SYRIZA, as has been discussed on several occasions in this thesis, a substantial body of literature exists which frames them as inclusionary populist, including literature which uses a discursive approach to do so (Markou, 2017b) Yet this does not mean that there is less of an empirical contribution than in the other two cases. Literature on SYRIZA takes three main forms; it considers them on their own (Mavrozacharakis, Kotroyannos and Tzagkarakis, 2017)), in comparison with right-wing populist parties (Salmela and von Scheve, 2018) or in comparison with other radical-left populist parties, such as Podemos (Katsourides, 2016; Morlino and Raniolo, 2017). By framing them as an egalitarian inclusionary populist party and then comparing them with the SNP and Sinn Féin, this thesis has signalled a major departure from existing literature, offering new ways to comparatively analyse SYRIZA: historic and contemporary and allowing for new comparative analytical opportunities for researchers.

Sinn Féin are in a similar position to the SNP, with little in the way of existing literature framing them as inclusionary populist. However, there was a further challenge with Sinn Féin; with their republican ideology and egalitarian element politics, they have sat comfortably as either a nationalist or egalitarian inclusionary populist movement. Instead, this thesis sought to include Sinn Féin within the wider anti-colonial inclusionary populist classification. This makes a number of important contributions. To begin with, Sinn Féin can be placed within a wider family of political parties. Literature predominantly frames them as a socialist party (Maillot, 2005), and while this particular lens can tell us much about their politics, it cannot tell the whole story, particularly as regards who Sinn Féin frame as their opponents, their elite, and why. Nor can it adequately explain how they conceptualise their people. By placing their politics within the wider context of anti-colonial parties and movements, there are new ways to approach Sinn Féin.

This leads to the second contribution; Irish republicanism as a political concept is one that is challenging for those outside of Irish politics to fully comprehend, as was discussed in

Chapter 7. Anti- or post-colonialism, on the other hand, is a far more established political phenomenon. Therefore, placing Sinn Féin within this phenomenon opens them up to further research and analysis which, as they continue to grow in importance in Irish politics, is exceptionally timely.

The final empirical contributions relate to the research question of this thesis. The tendency in literature to focus on inclusionary populism as a Southern European and Latin American phenomenon that focusses on redistributive economic policies was noted in the introduction. The core arguments of the thesis were that this geographic limitation meant other inclusionary populist movements were being ignored and that there was only a partial understanding of this phenomenon. The thesis has demonstrated that inclusionary populists can be found outside traditional territories and analysed the nature of inclusionary populist movements outside these traditional territories. It has also shown the extent to which all inclusionary populist movements, both in the traditional and emerging regions, have moved beyond articulating not only redistributive policies but also liberational policies for multiple groups and identities.

Theoretical

The theoretical contribution is reflected in the typology created which reveals nuances and details about inclusionary populism as a whole and the subtypes which were hitherto absent from literature. Of particular note are the post-materialist demands which can now be seen as a core element of inclusionary populism along with the materialist demands which have formed the basis of much of the existing literature on inclusionary populism.

It is through the discursive approach that this thesis proposes that these nuances and their foundation become clear. This approach allows for a detailed analysis and understanding of the identity of the people and their demands. When inclusionary populism is viewed as a struggle to develop identities which can challenge the hegemonic identity of the elite (Laclau, 2007), it becomes easier to understand how materialist, post-materialist and identity issues can unite while maintaining those diverse identities around common causes.

The discursive approach allows researchers to ask appropriate questions about inclusionary populism, focussing, as it does, on these issues that are key to inclusionary populism, rather than issues with less salience, such as morality (Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2004). Equally, its emphasis on heterogeneity reflects the people within inclusionary populism. In advancing the efficacy of the discursive approach in understanding

inclusionary populism, the thesis challenges the dominance of the ideational approach and offers a more revealing theoretical approach for inclusionary populism.

Methodological

There are a number of contributions made through the methodology advanced by this thesis, most notable the analytical framework. One of the issues raised in Chapter 3 and throughout wider populism studies is that there are multiple approaches to populism and no academic consensus on either what populism is or how to approach it. While the methodology of this thesis does not propose that it can be the consensus, by moving the debate from the theoretical and into the empirical, it has demonstrated its efficacy through both historic and contemporary data as a method through which to identify and analyse inclusionary populism and its types in a robust and accurate manner.

The framework strikes a balance between simplicity and effectiveness. It has been noted that a major argued drawback in the discursive approach is that it is complex (Mudde, 2017a) and challenging to apply to empirical cases (Gauna, 2017). By applying the framework to three cases and producing, in each case, a robust identification of the case as inclusionary populist, the thesis has demonstrated the applicability of the framework. Furthermore, by allowing for detailed analysis of the cases, the framework has also demonstrated that it has struck the required balance.

The framework is also adaptable. Although the three cases were all inclusionary populist, they all represented different types, and the framework was able to be applied to each case and reveal data similar enough to confidently place the parties as inclusionary populist and different enough to confidently place the parties as different types. Chapter 2 and Chapter 8 noted that there were crossovers between both inclusionary and exclusionary populism and between the subtypes although it was argued that the inclusionary characteristics in all cases significantly outweighed the lesser exclusionary characteristics and that while there were crossovers between types in terms of demands, sufficient differences existed, most notably in the ideological roots of these demands, to allow for the typology. The social world is rarely clean cut and absolute delineations rarely exist. While this thesis accepts this, it also argues that these types have sufficient differences to be classed as different from each other.

Chapter 3 also discussed the complexity of populism, noting multiple components, many of which, such as morality, were not considered by this thesis. With so many potential components, there always remains the challenge of creating an adaptable framework of

analysis which demonstrates validity and reliability. By concentrating on the five core elements of the framework, the methodology focusses on the core components of inclusionary populism, allowing for targeted and consistent analysis.

In Chapter 8 the implications for this framework were discussed. This discussion can be continued by considering wider implications. While the contemporary typology focussed only on parties in Europe, this does not mean that it is limited to this territory. The initial typology drew mostly from non-European sources, the USA and Latin America, and so with this in mind there can be confidence that non-European cases could fit such as the Parti Québécois of Canada as nationalist inclusionary populist, Reiwa Shinsengumi of Japan as egalitarian inclusionary populist and continued inclusion of Latin American inclusionary populist parties, such as PSUV, as anti-colonial inclusionary populist.

Another question to consider is why it is important that the distinction between the subtypes is made in the typology. The importance of understanding the subtypes themselves has been made throughout this thesis but what does this distinction add to our understanding of populism in general? To begin with it builds upon the existing work (Mudde and C. Kaltwasser, 2012; Fanoulis and Guerra, 2021b; Font, Graziano and Tsakatika, 2021) that seeks to explore the differences between inclusionary and exclusionary populism. The existing identified differences between such as the lack of nativism, have been confirmed as has the fact that the lines between inclusionary and exclusionary populism can be blurred on occasion.

The addition of the subtypes further adds to these difference. As per (Mudde and C. Kaltwasser, 2012), inclusionary populism has a greater tendency towards egalitarianism in the three dimensions, material, political and symbolic, that they propose, and this has been confirmed. We also continue to note that anti-colonialism, either in Latin America and now, in Irish politics, remains an inclusionary act. The link between exclusionary populism and regionalism and nationalism is already well-established in literature (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2007; van Haute, Pauwels and Sinardet, 2018). However, by bringing in the more civic nationalism of the SNP, the link between this and inclusionary populism can also be made.

The case can be made that the addition of the subtypes further adds to the debates about the differences between inclusionary and exclusionary populism, making the differences clearer and more precise. It therefore advances our understanding of inclusionary populism as a distinct and definable subset of populism as a whole.

9.3 Contributions to wider issues in political science

The contributions of this research to the study of inclusionary populism have been discussed in this and the previous chapter. There are also contributions made to the significant contemporary wider debates currently taking place in the field of political science, notably party families and party systems, sub-national parties and national identity and representation.

Party families and party systems

The study of party families is a critical component of comparative politics (Mair and Mudde, 1998). Initial work in this area focussed on issue cleavage (Rokkan, 1970) with further characteristics such as historical origin, ideology, trans-national links and party names being added (Mair and Mudde, 1998; Jungar and Jupskås, 2014)

Mair and Mudde (1998) were critical of these characteristics, arguing that the origin approach is useful in terms of understanding where the party began, but that parties change and shift over time and, so, this is less accurate in terms of where any given party is now. Equally, the trans-national links can give some information about party families in terms of how parties view their families, but this is still limited. For example, both SYRIZA and Sinn Féin are members of the GUE/NGL European Parliament group. This reflects both parties' radical-left appeal but does not reflect Sinn Féin's other key characteristic as a nationalist party with territorial claims. Finally, in terms of ideology, there is the argument that this is too fluid to accurately define a party as part of a wider family (Mair and Mudde, 1998) especially with the emergence of new parties, such as the Five Star Movement, which do not fit neatly into existing categories (Bickerton and Accetti, 2018)

There have been successful attempts to create a new party family of right-wing populism, as there exist sufficient ideological similarities, such as an anti-immigration appeal and an emphasis on "ordinary people" (Rydgren, 2005; Bickerton and Accetti, 2018) to classify parties as part of this family. However, can there be a party family for inclusionary populism in the same fashion?

To answer this, the arguments advanced by Mair and Mudde (1998) may be used and that party families can be best understood through shared origins and goals, characteristics examined in detail by this thesis. There is not sufficient commonality in either of these

characteristics to argue for a family party of inclusionary populism. SYRIZA, along with other inclusionary populist parties not studied in this thesis, such as Podemos, have an origin in the Global Financial Crisis, while the SNP and Sinn Féin have a much longer history with different origins. Equally, while the generic goals of the parties might have a general commonality, such as building a fairer society, this is not precise enough to demonstrate a party family.

However, considering at the sub-types, the efficacy of the Mair and Mudde approach can be seen, most notably with the idea of the goal. It is not unreasonable to expect to see nationalist inclusionary populist parties, for example, having a core goal of territorial ambitions. However, this only explains the ideology of each subtype, not their populism. As yet then, there is insufficient literature and research within the core characteristics of party family classification to accurately classify inclusionary populism.

Regarding party systems, the thesis adds confirmation to two arguments concerning the relationship between populist parties and party systems. The first concerns the cartel party model and populism, with populism being seen as a reaction to the cartel party model, which sees ostensible political opponents cooperating and colluding rather than competing and the decline of catch-all parties (Katz and Mair, 1995). In arguments advanced by (Hopkin and Blyth, 2019), populist parties have challenged the cartel of neoliberalism-supporting parties, most notably from the left. This has been confirmed by data and analysis in this thesis in the cases of both SYRIZA and Sinn Féin, with participants consistently arguing that they stand against the established cartel parties of their countries and these parties' support for neoliberalism and the market.

This does leave the question of the SNP, however. It has been established that the SNP do not have the same level of anti-neoliberalism expressed by the other parties examined in this thesis. Yet this does not mean that economics can be the only area of party collusion leading to cartelisation. In the UK and especially Scottish politics, the argument can be made that cartelisation has occurred over the issue of the Union and its support by the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberals. The SNP's support for Scottish independence can be seen as a challenge to this cartel. The argument that populism is a challenge to the cartel still holds, but it has been expanded beyond the economic cartel to other issues of cartelisation.

The second area to which this thesis makes a contribution is the extent to which the success of populism has impacted on the policies and rhetoric of non-populist parties. Research by

(Vachudova, 2021) has identified different types of impact upon party systems by populist parties. While left and centre populist parties have impacted upon party competition through challenging established parties in these spheres, the most significant impact has been seen on the right, where traditional right parties adopt the anti-immigrant stances of right populist parties. Similar research by Abou-Chadi & Krause, (2020) also points towards this adoption not only of anti-immigrant stances but also cultural protection stances of traditional right parties while Wolinetz & Zaslove, (2018) find that right populist parties can pose significant challenges to existing party systems through introducing new policy demands. However, there is little literature available on how inclusionary populist parties, even the narrower left populist category, have impacted on the policies and rhetoric of non-populist parties. been seen on the right, where traditional right parties adopt the anti-immigrant stances of right populist parties. Similar research by Abou-Chadi & Krause, (2020) also points towards this adoption not only of anti-immigrant stances but also cultural protection stances of traditional right parties while Wolinetz & Zaslove, (2018) find that right populist parties can pose significant challenges to existing party systems through introducing new policy demands. However, there is little literature available on how inclusionary populist parties, even the narrower left populist category, have impacted on the policies and rhetoric of non-populist parties.

The research certainly points to the electoral challenge provided by the parties studied. However, there is little evidence of these parties influencing the policies and rhetoric of the parties they are challenging. If anything, there are suggestions from participants that their success has had the opposite effect with the antagonism between these parties and their opponents continuing. While this thesis cannot point to definite reasons for this it could be that these parties demand such profound constitutional, economic and societal changes that these are too much of a challenge to the position of opposing parties to consider whereas, with traditional right parties, the adoption of anti-immigrant and culturally protective policies does not present a similar challenge to their core aims.

Sub-national parties and national identity

For sub-national parties, a significant contemporary debate is where voter demands and sub-national identities emerge from; are they supply-side, in that these issues come from the nationalist parties, or demand-side, in that the parties are reflecting wider demands from the electorate?

To begin with, significant linkage between strength of national identity and strength of

territorial demand salience in voters has been identified, (Deschouwer, 2013; Heinisch and Jansesberger, 2021) and this goes some way towards explaining the enduring emotional appeal of sub-national parties within the electorate. (Heinisch and Jansesberger, 2021). Yet the question remains whether these parties create or reflect national identity.

Existing research focussing on the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) suggests that sub-national parties are predominantly demand-side where N-VA were able to tap into an existing sense of Flemish national identity to build support, with the authors arguing that this was aided through the existence of previous Flemish sub-national parties, further arguing that other sub-national parties such as the SNP have used a similar route (Boonen and Hooghe, 2014)

Research into the attitudes of SNP voters and members also demonstrates a strong sense of national identity, with 43% of voters considering themselves Scottish and not British and 39% considering themselves more Scottish than British. In total, 82% of SNP voters have a stronger Scottish than British identity, compared to 60% of all voters (Mitchell, Bennie and Johns, 2011b, p. 104). Clearly, there is a strong demand-side to the SNP's politics.

Returning to the arguments of (Boonen and Hooghe, 2014), the data and analysis in this thesis present a challenge, in that the SNP had no similar historic party to draw from and build upon. While smaller political parties in Scotland, such as the Scottish Greens and Scottish Socialist Party, have also articulated territorial demands for Scottish independence, the SNP have always been the dominant party for these demands. It has also been established that what the SNP consider to be "Scottish" values are also the values of the SNP.

Equally, despite the seminal nature of the research carried out by Mitchell et al (van der Zwet, 2015), the data was gathered in 2007-2008, the period following the SNP first being elected to government in the Scottish Parliament as a minority administration. That there was a significant demand-side at this point is demonstrated by the data. However, since 2007, the SNP have increased their vote share significantly to a position of dominance, both in Holyrood and Westminster. Does this mean that there has been a correlating rapid growth in the salience of national identity in the electorate? If we were to accept the demand-side argument, then we would also have to accept this. Clearly, demand-side national identity is critical in the support for sub-national parties, especially during their foundational and growth stages. However, when they reach the stage, the SNP has achieved, other factors must be considered, including the possibility of supply-side

national identity.

This is where this thesis makes its contribution. In examining how the SNP creates and frames the people, the thesis has explored how the SNP draw upon traditional Scottish concepts such as Jock Tamson's Bairns and use this to create a people bound by egalitarian values. To be sure, these values already exist and can be seen as a component of the demand-side of national identity. But by leveraging them in such a way, the SNP are also using them as supply-side national identity, offering the people of Scotland an idea of what Scottish national identity. The evidence in Chapter 5 demonstrates the existence of supply-side national identity as, as expressed by participants, the SNP seek to expand the people and take as many people with them as possible towards their goal of Scottish independence. We can therefore see that subnational parties can and do leverage supply-side national identity to build support and achieve their goals.

Populism and representation

The final wider area of debate to be considered is the political representation and the role of populist parties within it. The crisis of representation was discussed, either directly or indirectly, by multiple participants across all cases and has been the subject of much literature. In essence, it can be considered a disaffection with mainstream parties' ability to fully represent the people (Kajsiu, 2010) and the multiple identities and interests which exist, (Verma, 2019) with authors pointing to the Global Financial Crisis and subsequent fall out as a catalyst for this (Usherwood, 2015)

There is a clear link between this issue and the cartel party model (Cohen, 2019) with such parties unable to offer clear ideological and policy differences to voters, especially in the post-Global Financial Crisis era. Multiple authors have argued the case that populist parties have used their anti-establishment message to take advantage of the crisis in representation to build support (Mudde and C. Kaltwasser, 2012; de la Garza, 2018; Eklundh, 2018) Participants from each of the parties studied emphasised that they represented or sought to represent those ignored or excluded by other mainstream political parties, and this is a common claim among populists.

There is evidence in literature to support these claims, as those who feel unrepresented by the professionalised cartel parties, per Katz and Mair (1995), turn instead to populist challengers of the left and right (Roberts, 2019). However, questions remain in the literature about the nature of this representation from populists. Cohen (2019) argues that the representation offered by populist parties is divisive and polarising, pointing, in

particular, to the Trump Republican Party, further arguing that populists are a threat to pluralism in that they claim to be the only ones who can represent the people. In doing so, Cohen echoes many of the arguments advanced by Müller (2016) of populism being anti-pluralistic and a threat to liberal democracy.

While Cohen's arguments are based on the American experience and particularly that of Trump, with the SNP there is the argument that only they, as the promoters of Scotland's values, could fully represent the people of Scotland. With Sinn Féin there was a similar argument, in that their republicanism, the James Connolly socialist republicanism, was the true republicanism of Ireland. These arguments had less strength with SYRIZA, but there remained the argument that they, and not other parties of the left, could best represent the Greek people. That the support of these parties, the people, is pluralistic does not necessarily mean that the party's strategy has to be pluralistic. Equally, while participants did speak about their strong relationships with interest groups, pressure groups and parties in other territories, this does not entail a pluralistic party-political strategy. However, the question remains as to what extent this is a particularly populist characteristic, as opponents of populism would argue, or a general characteristic of political parties.

A second aspect of representation and politics that can be considered is the relationship between supply and demand, that is the populist positions of individuals (demand) and the parties (supply) (van Hauwaert and van Kessel, 2018, p. 70). This is a subject that is currently undergoing a considerable amount of debate, with arguments being promoted to challenge the view that populist demands are supply-side (Canovan, 1999). A study of the Canadian Federal Election of 2015, which excluded the Quebecois parties, who demonstrate a degree of populism, found degrees of populist sentiment among Canadian voters, despite no federal party outside of Quebec offering populist policies (Medeiros, 2021). A similar survey of Portuguese voters in the 2019 European Elections, with Portugal being unusual in Southern European politics, in that it has no major populist parties, again revealed populist demands from voters, despite no populist supply from parties (Santana-Pereira and Cancela, 2020)

Even where there are parties supplying populist policies, demand is critical, as argued by van Kessel, (2013). Parties must still resonate with the demands to achieve electoral success. In terms of left and right populist parties, research from the Netherlands suggests that demand sidetends to be higher among left populist parties and calls for economic redistribution, whilst demands for anti-immigration policies from the right tends more

towards the supply side (Akkerman, Zaslove and Spruyt, 2017)

Party mobilisation comes from a mixture of demand and supply and the question remains the extent to which demand is driven by parties.

This thesis supports the arguments of the importance of both demand and supply in inclusionary populism. There is a clear demand for Scottish independence, which the SNP also supplies; SYRIZA took popular demands from the indignants into parliament, and Sinn Féin have turned popular demand for housing reform into a strong electoral platform. Equally, and this is most evident with SYRIZA and Sinn Féin, the parties have policies which are not necessarily in tune with popular demands, with SYRIZA participants regularly accepting that their political values are not necessarily those of the majority of Greek voters and Sinn Féin accepting that the saliency of Irish reunification is not significant among much of their support.

9.4 Limitations of this study

The primary use of interviews for data gathering presents a methodological limitation, along with participant recruitment. With interviews, there are well-established concerns about accuracy of data from participants, and in terms of participant recruitment, it should still be acknowledged as a potential limitation, through self-selection bias and the data obtained also having bias. It should be noted that common themes across all participants were noted in each case, and so the possible bias seems to be limited.

There was also the issue that all cases had a gender bias, with the SNP and Sinn Féin having a bias towards men and SYRIZA a bias towards women, despite all attempts to mitigate this. Again, though, no discernible difference in data from men and women was noted, and while the potential limitation should be highlighted, it does not appear to have been significant.

The cases in the study also present potential limitations. The case-study rationale was established in Chapter 1, but it is acknowledged that more cases could have produced differing data. The fact that all the cases chosen were European is also a limitation that could impact on data, as is the fact that, with regards to SYRIZA, I could only access English speaking respondents

These identified limitations have an impact on internal validity. As much as possible, this was mitigated against. In terms of participant interviews, while some of these took place

over longer time frames than hoped for—for example, data gathering for SYRIZA took over a year, due to the COVID pandemic limiting the availability of participants—no significant political event, such as an election, took place during the fieldwork for each of the studies. Equally, where possible, claims by participants were checked against existing literature and other empirical evidence, such as manifestos, in order to mitigate against bias and maintain internal validity. The case study limitations were more challenging to mitigate against, particularly the language barriers, but attempts were made to mitigate by comparing data obtained with data in existing literature so as to ensure veracity.

There are also limitations with external validity. As this is new research, where there is the discussed literature gap, there cannot be strong confidence of external validity. It cannot be certain that Plaid Cymru, for example, a similar party to the SNP in terms of its nationalism, would have a similar inclusionary populism. While it can be said, with confidence, that the parties studied in this thesis are inclusionary populist and fit within the proposed typology, the same cannot currently be said for other similar parties. However, this does leave significant scope for further research, as shall now be discussed.

9.5 Scope for further research

One of the key aims of building the typology was to give space for further research in what remains an under-explored area, not only in populism studies but political science in general. The bulk of existing literature still focusses either on radical-right exclusionary populism or on individual inclusionary populist parties, such as SYRIZA or Podemos, rather than the phenomenon as a whole, and this is where this thesis makes its core contribution. The secondary contributions are in framing both the SNP and Sinn Féin as inclusionary populist and in demonstrating the strengths of the discursive approach to populism in examining inclusionary populism. Also, the consideration of the contribution of this thesis to wider debates within political science has suggested potential areas for further research.

Beginning with the typology, it is hoped that this and the methodology behind it will prove useful for future research in identifying and classifying emerging and political parties as inclusionary populist and then as types of inclusionary populist and adding to each subtype. Could Plaid Cymru and Bloc Québécois be considered nationalist inclusionary populist? Could Corbyn-era Labour be framed as egalitarian inclusionary populist? Are there more parties outside Latin America which could be considered anti-colonial populist?

Equally, the sub-types within the typology should be viewed as a starting point, and it is possible that there could be further subtypes or crossovers between the types, as further research into other political parties across the world takes place. While the historic research was global, the contemporary research has been focussed on parties in Europe, and it would be further hoped that research into parties outside this territory would be aided through the typology.

As has been discussed throughout this thesis, SYRIZA and similar parties, such as Podemos, are well established as inclusionary populist in a manner that the SNP and Sinn Féin are not. In the field of sub-state actor, secessionist and nationalist political studies, these two parties are widely studied, and there is a wealth of research on them, research that was drawn upon in their respective chapters. However, by framing these parties as inclusionary populist, new lines of research enquiry open up, most notably in how these parties construct a people and an elite to mobilise support for their nationalist project, and it is hoped that this thesis can support and encourage these lines of enquiry.

Finally, in terms of discursive approaches and their efficacy in examining inclusionary populism, there is already a developing body of literature, most notably the efforts of Katsambekis (2020), that build on the work of Howarth (2000) and others to break through the often-abstract discourse theory approach and build and operationalise the concepts advanced by these approaches into analytical frameworks. It is hoped that this thesis will add to this and provide researchers with the tools to further investigate inclusionary populism.

Regarding party families and party systems, it was argued that if the approach of Mair and Mudde (1998) is used, while there is sufficient evidence to class the sub-types as party families, there is insufficient evidence at present to propose a party family for inclusionary populism in the same way. Research into the organisation and structure of inclusionary populist parties, which is currently very limited, may present a possible way forward in this.

The issue of national identity and sub-national parties also has considerable potential, given the limited work undertaken. Literature has established the critical role played by national identity as a demand-side factor in driving support for sub-national parties. However, this can only take a party to a certain level of support, and, at some point, other factors must also impact. Equally, when sub-national parties, such as the SNP, reach a particular level of political influence or, in the SNP's case, dominance, to what extent does this influence enable them to contribute towards national identity? For example, is

increasing support for Scottish independence driving an increasing salience in national identity or vice versa? Exploring this would help us to understand the enduring appeal of sub-national parties and help explain the circumstances where they can make electoral breakthroughs.

Finally, with representation, the two areas discussed, namely quality of representation and supply and demand, both have potential for further research. The ability of inclusionary populist parties to take advantage of the crisis of representation is well established within literature and this thesis. However, further research is needed to ascertain the quality of this representation and its impact upon wider democracy. Arguments have been advanced that populism in power is polarising and damaging to democracy, but is this true for inclusionary populism? There is a lack of literature on whether inclusionary populist parties in power have strengthened or damaged democracy. Related to this is the idea of the demand and supply of populist sentiment. The literature and this thesis confirm the importance of demand-side inclusionary populism and has also noted that demand seems to be stronger for left-wing issues and parties. As steps are taken to further define differences between inclusionary and exclusionary populist parties and also look to define an inclusionary populist party, this difference could, with further investigation, prove important in continuing to identify difference and commonality.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Manifestos analysed

Party	Title	Election	Year
SNP	Stronger for Scotland	Scottish Parliament	2003
SNP	If Scotland Matters To You, Make It Matter In May	Westminster	2005
SNP	It's Time	Scottish Parliament	2007
SNP	Elect a Local Champion	Westminster	2010
SNP	Stronger for Scotland	Scottish Parliament	2011
SNP	Stronger for Scotland	Westminster	2015
SNP	Re-elect	Scottish Parliament	2016
SNP	Stronger for Scotland	Westminster	2017
SNP	Stronger for Scotland	Westminster	2019
SNP	Scotland's Future, Scotland's Choice	Scottish Parliament	2021
SYRIZA	Everything new is born within the social movements. The left is the future.	Hellenic Parliament	2004
SYRIZA	Unified and left, we make the impossible, possible!	Hellenic Parliament	2007
SYRIZA	Strong SYRIZA both in the Parliament and struggles: It's in our hands!	Hellenic Parliament	2009
SYRIZA	Overtake in Greece, a signal to Europe	Hellenic Parliament	May 2012
SYRIZA	Escaping austerity, rebuilding Europe	European Elections	2014
SYRIZA	Hope is coming! Greece is moving forward- Europe is changing	Hellenic Parliament	January 2015
SYRIZA	Coalition of the Radical Left: Government plan	Hellenic Parliament	September 2015
Sinn Féin	Agenda For Government	Northern Ireland Assembly	2003
Sinn Féin	Delivering For Ireland's Future	Northern Ireland Assembly	2007
Sinn Féin	Peace, Equality, Jobs, Unity	Westminster	2010

Sinn Féin	Leadership Across Ireland	Northern Ireland Assembly	2010
Sinn Féin	There Is A Better Way	Dáil	2011
Sinn Féin	Equality Not Austerity	Westminster	2015
Sinn Féin	For A Fair Recovery	Dáil	2016
Sinn Féin	Better With Sinn Féin	Northern Ireland Assembly	2016
Sinn Féin	Equality, Respect, Integrity	Northern Ireland Assembly	2017
Sinn Féin	No Brexit, No Border, No Tory Cuts	Westminster	2017
Sinn Féin	Time for Unity	Westminster	2019
Sinn Féin	Give Workers And Families A Break	Dáil	2020

Appendix 2: Profile of interview participants

Party	Code	Demographic	Age	Role
SNP	P1	Male	50-70	Councillor
SNP	P2	Male	30-50	MSP
SNP	P3	Male	50-70	Former party Chief Executive
SNP	P4	Male	30-50	MP
SNP	P5	Female	18-30	Former member of staff in SNP Holyrood whips' office
SNP	P6	Female	30-50	Councillor,
SNP	P7	Male	18-50	Activist
SYRIZA	P8	Female	30-50	Activist based in UK
SYRIZA	P9	Female	18-30	Member of Central Committee, SYRIZA youth
SYRIZA	P10	Female	30-50	A member of the SYRIZA Central Committee
SYRIZA	P11	Male	50-70	SYRIZA MP and former government minister
SYRIZA	P12*	Female	30-50	SYRIZA activist and former parliamentary candidate
SYRIZA	P13*	Female	30-50	SYRIZA activist based in UK
Sinn Féin	P14	Male Northern Ireland	50-70	Former MLA
Sinn Féin	P15	Male Republic of Ireland	18-30	Sinn Féin activist
Sinn Féin	P16	Male Republic of Ireland	18-30	Member of party staff
Sinn Féin	P17*	Male Republic of Ireland	30-50	TD
Sinn Féin	P18*	Male Northern Ireland	50-70	MLA
Sinn Féin	P19*	Male Republic of Ireland	18-30	Sinn Féin activist
Sinn Féin	P20*	Female Republic of Ireland	18-30	Member of staff
Sinn Féin	P21*	Male Republic of Ireland	18-30	Ogra Shinn Féin Activist

* Interview carried out during COVID-19 pandemic

Appendix 3: Interview questions

Introduction – Can you briefly outline your history within your movement? What did you do before politics? What attracted you to politics?

Goals – What are the political goals of your movement? How do you seek to achieve them? Has your party being in government impacted upon your goals and, if so, how?

Who are your support? – Who do you believe that you represent? How do you believe that you represent them? Do you feel that your movement represents those ignored by other political parties? What do you believe are the core values of your supporters? Why do they support your movement? How important is improving the economic circumstances of the electorate? Do you believe that you particularly appeal to the economically excluded? Do you believe your movement to be part of the political mainstream? What messages do you use to engage with your supporters? Do you believe it is important to use positive messages? How do you feel about using negative messages? How do you engage with those who aren't your supporters? Do you believe that your role is to lead the people or follow them? Do you believe that you have politicised or re-politicised people? How has being in government impacted upon your ability to gain and maintain support?

Who are your competitors? – Who would you consider your political competitors and opponents? What do you believe their values are? Why are these values incompatible with yours? Do you believe there is such a thing as an “elite”? If so, who are they and what do they represent?

Plurality – Which movements, domestically and internationally, do you feel an affinity with and why? Which movements would you be willing to work with, formally or informally, to achieve your aims? Which movements could you never work with? What are your red-line issues when it comes to working with other movements?

Populism – What do you understand by the term “populist”? Have you heard of the term inclusionary populist? Would you consider your party to be inclusionary populist?

Appendix 4: The Proclamation of the Republic

POBLACHT NA hÉIREANN

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE IRISH REPUBLIC TO THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND

IRISHMEN AND IRISHWOMEN:

In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom.

Having organised and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organisation, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organisations, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, having patiently perfected her discipline, having resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first on her own strength, she strikes in full confidence of victory.

We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people. In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty; six times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State, and we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades in arms to the cause of its freedom, of its welfare, and of its exaltation among the nations.

The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman. The Republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien Government, which have divided a minority from the majority in the past.

Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment of a permanent National Government, representative of the whole people of Ireland and elected by the suffrages of all her men and women, the Provisional Government, hereby constituted, will administer the civil and military affairs of the Republic in trust for the people.

We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God, Whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause

will dishonour it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline, and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.

Signed on behalf of the Provisional Government:

THOMAS J. CLARKE

SEAN Mac DIARMADA

P. H. PEARSE

JAMES CONNOLLY

THOMAS MacDONAGH

EAMONN CEANNT

JOSEPH PLUNKETT

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