Operational management during transboundary crises within the Norwegian police

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the effective organisation of Norwegian police crisis management in the last two decades. Effective crisis management requires contributions from a range of actors, starting with those directly affected and those set to respond to a crisis. In the aftermath of a crisis, the public debate tends to focus on the tactical, hands-on, and strategic levels. At the tactical level, success is often measured by reponders' ability to solve the crisis. In contrast, the assessment at the strategic and political levels often focuses on how politicians and senior management within the police have prioritised societal security and preparedness. This thesis focuses on the operational level in crisis management because this area has received much less attention. At this level, responders need to allocate the right resources, to the right place, at the right time. The conceptual framework driving this study develops our understanding of operational level requirements, specifically in crises involving more the one police district. The outline broadly follows the Norwegian police's three-phase model of crisis management: from preparation, to adaptation when the crisis peaks, to normalisation. The research unpacks these three phases into a series of dimensions that are extracted from evaluations of two major crises: the 22 July 2011 attacks and the attack against the mosque in Bærum in August 2019. The core of the thesis posits that operational success in crisis management requires: a timely, relevant and reliable threat picture, a good understanding of all available resources and appropriate planning, and an ability to coordinate relevant elements of the response, for example, through suitable communication technologies. The thesis investigates these requirements in the specific context of Norway, a small and relatively peaceful country whose police forces have recently undergone significant reforms. These reforms have reduced the number of police districts from 54 to 12. This centralisation has favoured the emergence of fewer but more robust operations centres, whose changing crisis management roles and capacities are analysed. The analysis identifies several improvements in Norwegian police crisis management over the last decade. These improvements concern threat assessments, contingency plans, modern communication technology and the scope and understanding of available resources. However, the police's ability to coordinate at the operational level is not entirely appropriate when crises involve more than one police district.

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Acronyms

AI:	Artificial Intelligence
CC:	Crisis Council
CSU:	Crisis Support Unit
FD:	Ministry of Defence
FFI:	The Norwegian Research Establishment
GSC:	Government Security Council
GFC:	Ground Force Commander
ICT:	Information and communications technology
MJ:	Ministry of Justice
NB:	The Norwegian Police National emergency resources
NOU:	Norwegian Public Report
OM:	Operational Manager
PHS:	The Norwegian Police University College
PLIVO:	Ongoing life-threatening situation
POD:	The Norwegian Police Directorate
PNB:	National Police Emergency Response Centre
PSS:	Police Situation Centre
PST:	The Norwegian Police Security Service
SA:	Situational Awareness
SSA:	Shared Situational Awareness

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Author's Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, this thesis is a result of my work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

_____ FREDDY ROTSETH

Signature Name in capitals

Introduction

This dissertation aims to fill a knowledge gap in the academic and public understanding of crisis management at the operational level within the Norwegian police. Contributing to our understanding of this issue has the potential to inform a more effective and appropriate exercise of operational management in the interest of public safety. Crisis management within the policing context is inherently complex. Several factors affect the police's ability to effectively anticipate, respond and adapt to crises. Challenges are particularly prominent at the operational level that connects the details of tactics in the field to overall strategic objectives at a more political level. Adding to this challenge, modern crises tend to have transboundary elements, involving several police districts and jurisdictions. The terror attacks, which affected Norway in July 2011 and August 2019, are good examples. One of the headlines after the terror attack in 2011 was: "The emergency resources that did not find each other" (NOU 2012:14, 2012, p. 134). Major crises like these typically lead to a greater sense of organisational connectivity within the Norwegian police and other relevant departments, but this is not sufficient on its own to improve crisis management.

Given the historical recurrence of crises in a variety of contexts, much has been written about crisis management. Most of this literature deals with the political and strategic levels. There is much less literature regarding the operational level, in which the main task is allocating first responders to the right place at the right time with the best possible situational awareness. Though the term "operational" is often used to refer to the "sharp-end", this is somewhat different in the police terminology in which it characterises activities undertaken in the operations centre to coordinate actions on the site(s), that is to say at the tactical level (Politidirektoratet, 2020b, pp. 33-39).

Dealing with emergencies is a core responsibility of the Norwegian Government, policymakers, civil servants and executive staff within the public sector (Stortinget, 2011). The Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJ) has the overall responsibility for public safety and security in Norway. Responsibility for societal protection then belongs to each public sector organisation within their own domain. For example, the Ministry of Transport is responsible for transport-related security, including Civil Aviation Authority (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2012b). During the COVID-19 pandemic in Norway, the Ministry of Health and Care Services managed health insecurity. This thesis is particularly concerned with the threat posed by terrorist attacks. Since World War II, Norway has been exposed to only a handful of large-scale

and terror-related incidents (Rykkja, Lægreid, & Lise Fimreite, 2011). Coping with these major crises is difficult because no two incidents are alike. Crises typically challenge established patterns of organisation, management and established procedures. Emergency response operations are generally large and complex, whether related to terror, significant accidents, or natural disasters. A common denominator is an inherent insecurity and uncertainty, especially in the initial phase. This uncertainty affects both the victims and the first responders and requires effective management to mitigate the risks posed by crises.

Research question and core concepts

The central research question driving this thesis is: To what extent has the organisation of Norwegian police crisis management been effective? The main focus will be on a crisis affecting several police districts simultaneously and how the police can allocate limited police resources effectively, that is to say: at the right time to the right place.

To identify relevant secondary sources and refine the use of core concepts, an initial search query used the following keywords: crises, preparedness, centralisation vs decentralisation, communication, coordination, cooperation, collaboration, situational awareness, experiential knowledge, learning, and culture. The review of existing literature helped to identify two bodies of research focusing on the two concepts at the core of the research question: effectiveness and crises preparedness.

Effectiveness is all about producing the desired result in time. For Au (1996), effectiveness refers to the degree of correspondence between an organisation's actual and desired outputs. In recent years, the Norwegian police have introduced a system that measures response time which can be used to "demonstrate" effectiveness. This system defines response time as the lapse between an inquiry and the police arriving on the scene (Politidirektoratet, 2020a). This measure is partial and overlooks at least two other factors that are crucial to explaining and understanding an organisation’s effectiveness: its capability and its response capacity. Capability is the ability to perform a specific task, such as using a specific type of weapon to defend oneself against a threat actor. Capacity is a quantitative measure of a given capability (Forsvarsstaben, 2019, p. 238). From this perspective, a police organisation is effective when it manages to deploy adequate capabilities on time to achieve its assigned objective.

Effectiveness is not a concrete aspect of an organisation, but more of a label or qualification people use with varying levels of consensus (M. Taylor, J. Cornelius, & Colvin, 2014, p. 568).

At a general level, the approach developed in the previous paragraph links effectiveness to the missions of the police as an organisation. The main task of the Norwegian police is defined in the Police Act (§ 1- 2): "the police shall be part of society's overall effort to promote and consolidate citizens' legal security and general welfare through preventive, enforcing and assisting activities". It is challenging to establish specific measurements and metrics for general concepts such as security and general welfare. Not all cases of insecurity and challenges to citizens' welfare can be attributed to police (in)effectiveness. To consider this part of subjectivity, any analysis of organisational effectiveness should set the context in which the police organisation operates and evaluate what a *reasonable standard of expectation* might look like. If the police are systematically underfunded, one cannot reasonably expect them to promote citizens' security and welfare. Standards of expectations are not fixed; they vary over time and increase during crises. (In)effectiveness is more likely to become apparent within a crisis context, as many of the organisation's objectives may not be realised and thoroughly evaluated until a disaster strikes. This makes the study of crisis management particularly relevant to understand police organisations in practice.

Several factors affect the effectiveness of police organisations, that is to say, their ability to achieve their mission in a timely manner. A review of the literature identified six core elements in the performance of operational crisis management. Each of these elements can, in turn, be grouped in pairs: threat assessment and situational awareness (Dilo & Zlatanova, 2011; Mica R. Endsley, 1995; Mica R Endsley, 2016; M. R. Endsley & Kaber, 1999; Fingar & ProQuest, 2011; Marrin, 2014, 2017; Politidirektoratet, 2020b; Seppänen & Virrantaus, 2015); communication and coordination; and cooperation and collaboration (Almklov, Antonsen, Bye, & Øren, 2018; Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010; Bjerga & Håkenstad, 2013; Blondin & Boin, 2020; Boin & Bynander, 2015; Camarinha-Matos & Afsarmanesh, 2008; Christensen, Andreas Danielsen, Laegreid, & Rykkja, 2016; Christensen & Ma, 2020; Comfort, 2007; Deverell, Alvinius, & Hede, 2019; Falkheimer, Lund, Institutionen för strategisk, Department of Strategic, & Lunds, 2014; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Fred Garcia, 2006; Goodman & Falkheimer, 2014; Groenendaal, Helsloot, & Scholtens, 2013; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; McGuire, 2006; McNamara, 2012; O'Leary & Vij, 2012; Rosenthal, Charles, & Hart, 1989; Snow, 2015). These elements will be defined and unpacked in chapter 1.

The second concept at the core of this study is "crisis preparedness". The term crisis has many different scholarly definitions. The most significant disagreement about its meaning is between communication and management studies. In communication, Rosenthal (1989) describes crises

as threats against a social system's core values or life-sustaining functions, demanding urgent response and under deep uncertainty. Hermann (1963) supports this interpretation when saying that a crisis is characterised by threat, surprise and short response time. Other scholars emphasise the complexity of crises through their increasingly transboundary nature, crossing geographical, administrative, infrastructural and cultural borders (Boin, Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2016). This complexity can be linked to various facets of globalisation. First, globalisation requires a greater sense of organisational connectivity. Second, the nature of global supply chains provides multiple points of vulnerability within an interconnected system. Third, the increased speed of communications adds reputation-based concerns to contemporary crises, which can go viral (Fischbacher-Smith & Smith, 2015). Examples include the "I cannot breathe movement / Black Lives Matter – movement" or the Covid-19 pandemic. For Christensen et al., crises threaten the underlying structures or fundamental values and norms of a system where critical decisions are crucial to deal with uncertain circumstances (Christensen et al., 2016, pp. 316-322; Rosenthal et al., 1989).

In management studies, Ansell et al. (2010, p. 169) argue that crises differ from other emergencies, such as hostage situations, explosions, and fires, because those situations occur regularly, which permits operational agencies to prepare for future events. Within the Norwegian police, a crisis is defined as a situation with a high degree of uncertainty and potentially significant consequences for those affected, whether they are individuals, organisations or society (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2016-2017; Politidirektoratet, 2020b, p. 25). Whether an incident is a crisis depends on the specific situation and the individual assessments and assumptions of those involved (ibid). Comparing the academic and Norwegian police definitions shows that the academic definitions are more specific while the Norwegian police definition is more general. Academics consider, among other things, how crises challenge administrative, infrastructural and cultural boundaries, as well as the need for critical decisions to mitigate uncertainty and risks. This thesis uses the Norwegian police definition of crisis and links it to core academic concerns about threat assessment, coordination, collaboration and communication to problematise crisis management.

Public authorities have a duty to prepare for a range of possible crises. In order to be able to meet public obligations regarding crisis management, appropriate emergency preparedness must be established. Emergency preparedness is another concept that is essential to effective crisis management and, therefore central to analysing the Norwegian police's ability to perform effective operational management. According to the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD),

preparedness refers to measures to prevent, limit or deal with daily adverse events and extraordinary events and crises (Politidirektoratet, 2020b, p. 26). Police preparedness also includes contingency in planning work, precautionary measures, competence, organisation, and training in avoiding and mitigating adverse outcomes that enable the police to prevent, limit, stop and investigate extraordinary incidents and crises (ibid). Since crises often evolve rapidly and become too complex for effective improvisation, the police need to take a range of specific actions before crises occur. This is preparedness (FEMA, 1996).

One of the biggest challenges facing the police during a crisis is receiving, understanding, and responding appropriately to the extent of the crisis. The operations centre within the police is, in many ways, the most central and crucial node of management in an acute crisis. This level is exactly where initial information about a crisis is first processed and analysed to develop and maintain situational awareness and organise and allocate police resources. Thus the study focuses specifically on crisis management at this operational level.

Methodology

The research question driving this project – and the core concepts of crisis management and preparedness – lends itself to a qualitative approach using documentary analysis and interviews to explore operational crisis management in the Norwegian police context. The primary sources include government documents: publicly available white papers, official Norwegian reports and inquiry reports. A series of four in-depth semi-structured interviews with officers who play a central role in the operational Norwegian police crisis management apparatus was carried out to add to the author's autobiographical reflections as a senior police officer. These interviews helped to examine how the extensive police reforms in the last two decades have fulfilled governmental requirements in the domain of operational management during a crisis involving more than one police district. These oral sources helped to corroborate key points and specifically to gather a broader range of professional perspectives to assess whether the current structure supports organisational effectiveness concerning operational management within the Norwegian police.

To respect the interviewees' anonymity, participants have been named interviewees A, B, C, and D. The interviewees were all police officers with over a decade of experience in operational police work. They were selected based on their experience and seniority with the range of their functions corresponding to Chief of Staff in the police district. They represent Norwegian police districts in different geographical locations, improving the representativeness of the study's

findings. They are all men aged 45-55, which reflects the overall composition of these functions within the Norwegian police in March 2022 (when the interviews were conducted). These interviews helped to discern how senior officers see, understand, and interpret their operational position during a crisis involving more than one district. They also served to verify that key insights gained from the author's experience represented trends encountered by other senior officers from different districts.

Following Granot, Brashear and Motta (2012), the interviews were organised in three sections focusing on career trajectories ("How did you get here?"), actual experience ("What is it like working in your capacity?") and reflection on the meaning of operational management ("What does operational management mean to you?"). The interviews followed a phenomenological perspective, which allows the researcher to go in-depth into the phenomenon to explore opinions and perceptions. In this study, operational management during a crisis that involves more than one police district represents the phenomenon. The phenomenological approach explores what interviewees experienced (Tjora, 2018, p. 114). This approach emphasises understanding people's world as the individual experiences it (Kvale, Brinkmann, Anderssen, & Rygge, 2015). A semi-structured interview guide with open-ended questions was used to guide this process and shed light on several aspects of the phenomenon (see Annex 1 for a questionnaire template). The questionnaire largely focused on the key criteria identified in the conceptual framework developed in chapter 1.

Analysis of qualitative data sought to create meaning based on documentary evidence as well as the informants' statements and their experiences of crisis management (Halkier, 2010). Van Puyvelde (2018) notes that interviews are particularly helpful in understanding practices and experiences beyond the information available in documentary sources. According to Jacobsen's (2015) approach to qualitative analysis proposes to constantly alternate between understanding the whole phenomenon (operational crisis management) and more specific pieces of data and information that form various parts of the research puzzle. The main features of qualitative analysis thus consist of exploring (through data collection) and documenting (through references), systematising and connecting various pieces of information (Jacobsen, 2015, p. 199).

The research process was inevitably affected by my own perspective and experience. I have worked in the police for more than 25 years, where I have dealt with crisis management most of the time. This background as a practitioner brings both challenges and benefits. The most apparent pitfall lies in the fact that the number of years can result in a reduced ability to absorb

new and discordant information, changes in conditions and related difficulties in fully understanding the development of society in general. This can, in turn, reduce the quality of the analysis concerning the problems faced by police operational management (Mercer, 2007; Prior, 2014). Systematic use of and referencing to a variety of written and oral sources can only partially mitigate this propensity for cognitive biases. On the more positive side, my experience and in-depth knowledge of the police's crisis management ability mean that I am more informed about police practices than most outsiders. This has inevitably oriented my research and interactions with documents and interviewees. Being well acquainted with the context and practices of the Norwegian police, I could focus to a greater extent on core issues affecting operational management within the Norwegian police.

Case study design

The dissertation follows a case study approach that focuses on two prominent crises. This approach focuses the study and helps to make the concept of operational crisis management much more tangible. Norway is a relatively small and peaceful country. These characteristics limit the range of possible cases and the ability to compare the organisation of its crisis management capabilities to other much larger countries such as the United States, which tend to dominate the literature. Some occasional references will be made to significant crises in other countries to compare and contrast the Norwegian situation. In the twenty-first century, two major terrorist incidents have affected Norway: the 22 July 2011 terror attack in Oslo and Utøya and the attack against the Al-Noor mosque in Bærum on 10 August 2019. These incidents were selected because both happened in Norway and are the only ones that significantly challenged the Norwegian police crisis apparatus during the last two decades. The Norwegian authorities define both cases as terror attacks, and as such, they were the subject of thorough evaluations, providing a fair amount of publicly accessible documentary sources to examine. The main focus of the analysis pursued in this dissertation is on the operational level, with references to both the strategic and tactical levels within the Norwegian police. The two case studies will help test a range of ideas developed in academia and in government guidance and reports to contribute to the body of knowledge on operational management.

The first case is the 22 July 2011 attacks. On that day, a single ethnic Norwegian right-wing terrorist parked his truck with a 950kg fertiliser bomb outside the Governmental Complex in Oslo, Norway. The bomb killed eight persons and left nine injured (NOU 2012:14, 2012, pp. 17-32). After the detonation, the terrorist proceeded to the small island of Utøya outside the

capital. On the island, the youth wing of the Norwegian Labour Party held their annual summer camp. Armed with a pistol and a semi-automatic rifle, the terrorist managed to kill 69 people before he got captured (ibid). The bomb went off on Friday, 22 July, at 3:25 PM, and at 6:36 PM, the terrorist was arrested. In total, 77 people were killed and 66 severely injured that Friday afternoon (Bye et al., 2019; NOU 2012:14, 2012). This tragic event resulted in a significant focus on the Norwegian police's ability to uncover, prevent and respond to a tremendous crisis involving more than one police district. The general threat level for the Norwegian society on that specific day did not include any indications that a terror attack was likely to happen. In fact, the Police Security Service (PST) threat assessment for that current period indicated the opposite (Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, 2012). However, in 2010, PST received a tip from the Norwegian Customs that contained a list of people who had imported remedies suitable for making a bomb. The tip originated from a joint European collaboration referred to as Global Shield. The perpetrator's name, Anders Behring Breivik, appeared on this list.

The second major incident studied in this dissertation occurred on Saturday, 10 August 2019, at 15.30, when the Imam at the Al-Noor Mosque held the daily Dhuhr prayer. Ten people participated, including the Imam. After the prayer, most left the mosque, but three people stayed behind. Earlier the same day, Philip Manshaus had shot and killed his step-sister in their family home in Bærum. Shortly afterwards, he got into his stepmother's car and drove toward the Al-Noor Mosque. He had two rifles, a shotgun, a GoPro camera and a bulletproof vest, and he intended to kill as many Norwegian Muslims as possible. When Manshaus arrived at the mosque, he shot and entered via a side entrance. Inside the mosque, he was quickly overpowered by two of those present, who managed to disarm him. The third person went out and called the police. It took about 20 minutes before the police arrived on the scene and took control of the perpetrator. Philip Manshaus was not unknown to PST and the Oslo police district. In the summer of 2018, PST received a tip from a concerned citizen who, among other things, described Manshaus' extreme attitudes. The day before the attack, about 300 people were present at the Friday prayer. The next day, the mosque expected 600-700 people to mark Eid al-Adha. The extent of the attack could have become significantly more extensive (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020).

Outline

The body of this thesis is organised into four chapters that are structured around the core concept of crisis management. Crisis management within the Norwegian police context demands rapid and timely coordination between the operation centre and the patrolling officers and between various operation centres and different units in the case of transboundary crises (Reddy et al., 2008). Time is a defining factor of effective crisis management (Boin et al., 2016), and this is reflected in the Norwegian police emergency preparedness system, which divides the handling of incidents into three phases (Politidirektoratet, 2020b, p. 32). Figure 1 represents the three phases followed by Norwegian police to handle an incident. The colour coding defines the various disciplines involved in a crisis. The lines indicate a shift in focus from prevention to an investigation and an initial increase in resources at the adaptation phase.



Figure 1- The phases of a crisis (Politidirektoratet, 2020b)

Phase 1 represents the *preparation phase*. This phase covers the time before an event occurs. Intelligence, prevention, contingency planning, open and covert investigation and patrol activities are typical or routine activities during this phase (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). Phase 2 is the *adaptation phase*. This phase occurs when the police event is in progress and is further divided into three sequences. Phase 2a is the *alert and response phase.* This phase starts with the reception of notification and lasts until the police arrive at the focus area. During this phase, the police will collect, process and share information to provide a basis for implementing plans, orders, measures and routines. Phase 2b is the *action phase*. This phase starts when the police

arrive at the area of interest and lasts until the place is secured for other relevant personnel such as health services. The police need to delimit a clear perimeter to protect the scene and the local population. Overview and control are central during this period. Phase 2c is the *operation phase* (ibid). In this phase, it is assumed that the police have established sufficient control over the situation. Tactical (e.g. questioning witnesses) and technical investigation (e.g. search for fingerprints) are implemented when needed, and the head of the investigation assesses access to resources against the needs emerging from the scene. This phase continues until the operational effort is completed (Politidirektoratet, 2020b).

Phase 3 is the *normalisation phase*. During this phase, the police follow up to ensure a good transition back to a normal situation. Normalisation includes evaluation and implementation of learning points and transitions back to phase 1. Evaluations can be carried out before, during, and after implementation changes (Bolstad, 2021). In the aftermath of crises, an essential task for public authorities is to draw lessons from what happened to prevent similar events in the future (Boin et al., 2016; Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008). In theory, there should be a smooth transition between the three phases of a crisis, but transitions are not always smooth in practice. The different units involved do not start at the same time from the exact geographic location. They tend to have different emergency preparedness requirements and turnaround times. Various units will thus arrive at the operation area at different times. A crisis involving multiple units would see several additional lines appearing at different points in time in figure 1, leading to a much more complex response requiring better preparation, communication and coordination.

The outline of this dissertation broadly follows the three main phases of crisis management: preparation, adaptation and normalisation. The first chapter sets the context and looks at the Norwegian police structure, overarching principles, peculiarities, and responsibility regarding societal security, focusing on crisis management in the Norwegian police. The discussion emphasises the recent centralisation of the Norwegian police and examines whether this development breaks with a historical model that emphasises local anchoring. A review of the two main police reforms carried out in the twenty-first century emphasises recent developments toward centralisation, which are important because they affected police performance during the two cases of terror attacks. Chapter 2 focuses on the adaptation phase and examines more specifically issues of planning, threat assessment, preparation, and emergency resources as they relate to the terrorist threat in Norway, which is the main security issue the police confronted in the two cases. The third chapter focuses on the adaptation phase and discusses whether the

current organisation and structure of the Norwegian police's operational level are effectively aligned to support the police's ability to adapt to such crises and normalise the situation as soon as possible. The chapter is organised around three sections that emphasise key factors that explain adaptation: communication and coordination, cooperation and collaboration compared to capacity and capability. The last chapter examines the normalisation phase. This chapter explains the Norwegian police's effort to develop experiential knowledge and learning and evaluation of past performance. The chapter also examines efforts to anticipate the needs of the Norwegian police in the coming decade, specifically as they relate to crisis management.

The dissertation finds that the Norwegian police crisis management capability has benefited from a range of improvements in the last decade or so. Inquiries into the terror attacks in 2011 and 2019 have acted as catalysts that have reinforced reforms toward centralisation, which have helped to develop more robust capabilities in threat assessment, contingency plans, communication technology and a range of available emergency resources. Nevertheless, coordination continues to suffer from a lack of clarity regarding which authority is responsible when the crisis involves more than one police district. This limits appropriate preparedness schemes among relevant contributors to Norwegian crisis management.

Chapter 1. Effectiveness in the context of the Norwegian crisis management system

This chapter sets the scene of crisis management in the Norwegian police. Crisis management seeks to mitigate threats to fundamental values and risks to life and health of citizens. The Norwegian Ministry of Justice notes that providing civil protection against man-made, natural or technical disasters requires emergency preparedness (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2017a). The discussion emphasises a range of contextual factors that affect Norwegian crisis management and emergency preparedness, including the Norwegian police structure, overarching principles, peculiarities, and responsibilities regarding societal security. The main objective of this chapter is to better understand how Norwegian crisis management is structured, which historical considerations continue to affect this system, and how recent police reforms have improved the Norwegian police's overall ability to conduct operational crisis management.

The Norwegian approach to crisis management is based on four principles, which are explained in the first section of this chapter (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2012b, p. 39). These principles must form the basis for all crisis management, including the police. The main objective of this section is to explain the principles, their validity and relevance related to dynamic crises that affect several police districts simultaneously. The second section explains the overall crisis management structure in Norway. The section highlights the division of responsibilities between the various ministries and focuses on the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJ), assigned a coordination role. The Norwegian police structure shows a relatively clear division of political responsibilities. Nevertheless, some tensions can emerge between ministries, leading to reduced operational crisis management. It is conceivable that MJ could serve as the responsible coordinating ministry in all civilian crisis management, which would resolve some of these tensions. However, this would presuppose that the other ministries will support this approach and, to a certain extent, adapt their crisis structure to the coordinating ministry. If this does not happen, misunderstandings are likely to emerge and reduce the management of relevant resources.

The third section covers the centralisation of the Norwegian police. The Norwegian police have followed a decentralised model with solid local anchoring throughout history. Over the past two decades, the police have undergone two significant reforms, both of which have led to a significant reduction in the number of police districts, thus centralising the Norwegian model. The main reasons for both reforms have been a politically and primarily professionally rooted

desire for more similarity in the police service around the country, better and more robust professional environments, and a search for more efficiency in policing. The crises that form the core focus of this study tested this search for efficiency and professionalism. The tension between the need for control and centralisation and the need for decentralised services that are best aligned to local needs is a structuring factor that explains much of the challenges in the organisation of Norwegian police.

The fourth section presents the more specific command structures for emergency management within the Norwegian police. The section links these command structures to the context of the four overarching crisis management principles and the overall crisis management structure at the government level. The working scenario on which much of the discussion is based is a crisis that simultaneously affects several police districts, as is often the case in major incidents. The section zooms in on the role of the police's joint national emergency preparedness resources (NB). NB is a separate operating unit in the Oslo police district headed by Oslo's police chief. The common denominator for the bomb squad, the special intervention unit, the helicopter unit and the crisis- and negotiation unit is that they are limited in size and possess subject-specific competence that can be useful in some crises. They have a national responsibility and are essential to managing significant crises such as the two incidents that are studied in this thesis. Overall, the chapter suggests that Norway has a comprehensive system of crisis management that has adapted to societal changes through a range of reforms which have supported a move toward centralisation and more robust police districts. However, this system is not perfect, and the broad range of actors responding to modern crises challenges two core principles of Norwegian crisis management: responsibility and conformity.

1. Four main principles of crisis management

In the Norwegian understanding, civil protection and emergency preparedness are based on four fundamental principles, which form the basis of all crisis management (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2016-2017). Each principle comes with particular challenges that are presented in this section.

First, the *responsibility* principle holds that the units responsible for regular operations in a specific sector during a normal situation also have an obligation during extraordinary events. This responsibility involves identifying the threats and incidents that may affect the organisation, preventing incidents, preparing crisis and contingency plans—if necessary, establishing a crisis organisation and implementing safety and emergency measures. The

responsibility principle is rooted in the government's constitutional responsibility and the division of responsibilities. Simultaneously, the authorities maintain that the principle of responsibility should not be an obstacle to appropriate coordination among ministries (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2017a, p. 13). The principle of responsibility entails maintaining essential functions and tasks within one's organisation if any extraordinary event occurs. A challenge with this principle is that the various ministries are organised differently concerning their operational approach, and they have different interests and perspectives on crises. Crises that cross areas of responsibility are challenging because they often involve systems that follow different logics and operating imperatives. When systems fall under the purview of different organisations, bureaucratic interests and professional norms tend to diverge. Because systems are often only loosely or incidentally coupled and may be designed to function independently, crises that cross-functional boundaries often surprise their operators and constituents (Ansell et al., 2010). For example, a conflict of interest can emerge between the police, whose primary aim is to detect and stop crime, and the health service, whose primary goal is to save lives. These different organisational interests and ambiguities can make crisis management less flexible and reduce operational effectiveness.

Second, the *conformity* principle holds that the organisation involved in managing a crisis should be as similar as possible to the organisation that is usually responsible for the area on a daily basis. This principle is based on the notion that people and organisations master their tasks best when they know and have trained on them (Kopia & SpringerLink, 2019). Experience and knowledge of responsibilities, roles, and daily resources are good starting points for effective crisis management. However, the principle of conformity is a starting point and must be weighed against needs, especially those emerging from major incidents (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2017b). The Norwegian Police Directorate doctrine points out that the principal in charge of crisis management shall not prevent organisations that need it from establishing and exercising strengthened crisis organisation (Politidirektoratet, 2020b, pp. 123-145). This is especially valid for dealing with large and complex crises where the day-to-day organisation and available resources are likely to be insufficient. Significant incidents are relatively rare in Norway, which suggests there is no need to develop and train an extra crisis management capacity within each police district. In these conditions, it is fair to expect regular police units at the district level will not have the capability to handle major crises at the operational level because their daily routines do not train them for such situations. Furthermore, some crises require significant contributions from other affected ministries, besides the

Ministry of Justice, which is in charge of the police. If they do not *conform* to the Ministry of Justice (MJ) management structure, units from other ministries are likely to hamper the effectiveness of the operational management effort.

Third, the principle of *proximity* holds that all emergencies should be handled at the lowest organisational level possible (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2001-2002, pp. 4-5; 2017b). The definition of the lowest level possible depends on the type of crisis. This principle seeks to ensure fast and efficient handling of the crisis by actors who have the required knowledge and control over necessary resources, materials and expertise. These are often the emergency actors geographically close to the emergency services, the health service and the municipalities. Short command lines are often an advantage in a crisis because they facilitate rapid decision-making and implementation. However, the principle of proximity shall not prevent these local actors from requesting help and support. Local resources are sometimes insufficient, and additional needs often require raising crisis management to a higher management level. An example would be the police's national emergency preparedness resources (NB) (Politidirektoratet, 2020b, pp. 53-57). NB supports relevant police districts and advises various national crisis management levels. Assistance from the NB or other police resources with national responsibility challenges the principle of proximity because it takes time in an acute crisis to bring these units to the area of operations. External, national units tend to be less knowledgeable about local conditions reducing their initial effectiveness.

The fourth principle, the principle of *cooperation*, was introduced by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security shortly after the 22 July terror attacks in 2011. One of the main findings of the 22 July report was that organisational resources did not find each other (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2012b; NOU 2012:14, 2012). Each organisation and agency involved in a crisis has an independent obligation to ensure cooperation with relevant agencies toward prevention, preparedness and crisis management. The aim of this principle is for government agencies, and private and voluntary organisations to use their resources and expertise to solve tasks together. This means developing suitable forms of cooperation and collaboration (further discussed in chapter 3). The principle of cooperation does not involve any changes in the primary responsibilities. However, it underlines the need for actors and organisations at all levels to develop an understanding of mutual dependencies and which actors they will need to interact with, both when it applies to preventive work and in more reactive settings such as in emergencies (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2015b, p. 6).

These four principles are central to understanding the government responsibility and associated guidelines to manage crises in Norway, but they seem partially outdated and should be considered abandoned or updated. In particular, the principle of responsibility and conformity needs revision. If the principles are to be continued, everyone involved in crisis management must share the same perception of the importance of the principles. Both because the potential for some crises to be very dynamic and involve several police districts simultaneously are likely to challenge individual police chiefs' responsibility, and some crises, due to their nature and extent, require extra operational management. The principle of cooperation seems relevant and will be further discussed in chapter 3.

2. Government responsibility for emergency preparedness

The government has principal responsibility for emergency preparedness in Norway, including a political responsibility and a more strategic responsibility for crisis management. Each minister has constitutional responsibility within their area, based on the acts and allocations laid down by the Norwegian Parliament. At the top of the government apparatus, the Governmental Security Council (GSC) is the primary body for discussing Norway's security issues; it was established in 2005 (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2017b, p. 7). The GSC discusses defence, security and emergency preparedness. The permanent members of the GSC are usually the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Justice and Public Security and the Minister of Finance. If necessary, the GSC can be expanded to include other relevant ministries. Representatives of underlying units, companies and actors with particular competencies participate when needed. Figure 2 (below) represents the government security decision-making structure at the higher echelons of the Norwegian Government. Any ministry can take the initiative to convene the GSC. If the lead ministry has not been decided, the Ministry of Justice will lead the GSC.

The Crisis Council (CC) is an administrative coordinating body established to strengthen central crisis coordination at the inter-ministerial level, and they work in parallel to the GSC. The CC plays a role in all crises, from peacetime to major security crises up to armed conflict (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2017a). The CC has five permanent members: the Secretary to the Government from the Office of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Secretary-General from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary Generals from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Health and Care Services. The responsible ministry chairs meetings of the council (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2017b, pp. 2-9). The

council can be expanded and determine which ministry shall manage an incident. If the CC is in doubt or disagreement, the choice of responsible ministry shall be made by the Prime Minister in consultation with involved ministers. This way of organising the council offers some flexibility and ensures that the most relevant ministry will manage a crisis. The Crisis Support Unit (CSU) is the secretariat of the CC and supports the responsible ministry and the CC with their crisis management (ibid). The CSU is a secretariat for the Crisis Council and supports the leadership of the designated ministry and the CC in their coordination functions. A civilian situation centre within CSU is responsible for implementing and developing a knowledge basis and offer training on central crisis management to relevant actors (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2017b).

The Minister of Justice and Public Security (MJ) has overall responsibility for the Norwegian police, and MJ is the permanent lead ministry in civilian crises unless the Crisis Council decides otherwise. During the global COVID-pandemic, the Ministry of Health and Care Services was the lead ministry. The designation of a responsible ministry does not entail any change to constitutional responsibilities, and all ministries retain the responsibility and decision-making authority for their respective areas (Christensen, Fimreite, & Lægreid, 2011; Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2012b, 2015b, 2017a, 2017b). These functions were already established before the 22 July attack but were further optimised post 22 July, not least through developing a 24/7 capacity at CSU.



Figure 2 - The Norwegian superior crisis management structure for civilian crisis (Politidirektoratet, 2020b)

3. A legacy of decentralisation and police reforms

At lower levels, Norwegian policing has inherited historical legacies that are important to understanding the context in which contemporary crises are being managed. This section explores the legacy of decentralised management within the Norwegian police. Norway is a widespread, decentralised and sparsely populated country. Compared to other Western countries, Norway is demographically small, with approximately 5.4 million inhabitants, but vast geographically. Norway has a long coastline and shares borders with Sweden in the South-East and Finland and Russia in the North-East. The existence of the Norwegian police can be traced back to 1682 when King Fredrik III established the first Danish-Norwegian police government post. The role of the Norwegian state was enshrined in the Constitution of 1814. The adoption of this constitution, however, did not eliminate tensions between central and local authorities. During this period, the police service, in general, was a municipal enterprise, and their autonomy was reinforced through presidency laws established in 1838 (Stortinget, 2019).

In 1927 the Norwegian Parliament approved a law that gave the state, if needed, the right to use local police forces outside their jurisdiction (Ellefsen, 2018). At that time, left-wing politicians supported a robust local police service to maintain and protect social rights, while the right-wing wanted armed and robust state police to deal with rebels and demonstrations. During the "Menstad-battle", which opposed police to strikers in 1931 due to economic downturns, the Armed Forces were ready to support the local police if needed (Dyndal, 2010). The "Menstad-battle" can be considered as a significant crisis. This crisis prompted a push toward centralisation. In its aftermath, the government established a 72-men armed state police force to support the local police. World War II further reinforced the move toward centralisation. The central government expanded its control over the police force, and local forces had minimal influence on police performance and structure. Nevertheless, the preference for a decentralised system that was more adapted to local needs did not disappear. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the government reaffirmed the need for a decentralised police. This approach would enable the police to be proactive and focus on crime prevention rather than fighting crime in a more reactive and centralised manner (NOU 1981:35, 1981).

By a Royal decree of 3 September 1999, the Norwegian Government appointed a Vulnerability committee [*Sårbarhetsutvalget*], whose mandate was to study society's vulnerability and suggest how to strengthen security and preparedness. Former Prime Minister Kaare Willoch led the committee. The committee was broadly composed and consisted of 19 representatives from

various societal functions. The committee's final report recommended gathering the most central players in a crisis and emergency situation in a single Ministry (NOU 2000:24, 2000). The main objective was to maintain and further develop a relevant focus on prioritising security and emergency preparedness and strengthening adequate crisis management opportunities through centralisation (NOU 2000:24, 2000, pp. 263-274). The recommendation was inspired by the British "Cabinet Office Briefing Room", the "White House Situation Room" in America and Germany's Interior Ministry "Lagezentrum", among others (NOU 2000:24, 2000, p. 242). However, the proposal was not adopted as initially intended, but only in parts. Political disagreement about whether societal security and emergency preparedness should be concentrated in a single ministry – which might be related to the difficult memory of the state police during the Second World War – limited the push toward centralisation. The preference for decentralisation, already expressed by the Government in the 1970s, continued.

The political crisis management structure in place in the 2000s is best understood in the context of the relative absence of severe crises and disasters in Norway at the time (NOU 2000:24, 2000, pp. 241-246). The absence of significant disasters created an environment where decision-makers did not feel the need for centralisation. However, scholars debated the benefits and drawbacks of centralised operational control. For Groenendaal, centralised coordination is the most effective model for aligning frontline units (Groenendaal et al., 2013, pp. 114-131). Boin and t' Hart (2010, p. 362) found that centralised coordination is almost impossible during large-scale emergencies due to the lack of information to control every move of first responders. This argument is further supported by Berlin and Carlstrom (2008; Leonard & Howitt, 2010). In the dynamic, uncertain crisis management environment, operational control is often misused as the exercise of power over an organisation's participants by a small group of managers. Comfort (2007, p. 195) defines operational control as the capacity to keep actions focused on the shared goal of protecting lives, and property and maintaining continuity of operations. This definition is interesting because it does not equate control with centralisation. Another argument is that professionals working in the frontline usually are trained and prepared to act in a specific way, so there is uncertainty related to instructions from the centre, which could conflict with typical practice at a more decentralised level (Groenendaal et al., 2013, p. 127). Practitioners and researchers sometimes overestimate the need and ability to exercise control over frontline responders during the initial phase of a crisis. Once a crisis involves more than one police district, it is difficult to determine its territorial, temporal and functional boundaries. Communication difficulties further increase the challenges, primarily when no established,

centralised or high-status organisation can act as a hub for information collection and distribution (Ansell et al., 2010, p. 199). After the terror attacks in Norway in 2011, the inquiry committee recognised this was a significant challenge in the initial phase, especially when coordinating the police first responders (NOU 2012:14, 2012). However, this challenge and how crises are affected by centralisation or decentralisation remains under-researched and will be further discussed in the following chapters.

The academic debate that developed in Norway over crisis management in the 2000s overlooked crises that require prioritisations of limited resources—most notably during large-scale emergencies that require support from specialists. A crisis involving more than one police district or jurisdiction naturally challenges the ability to develop, communicate and implement a common strategy because it is unclear who has overall operational responsibility in crises involving more than one police district. Before the 2011 attacks in Norway, the police operated as autonomous entities with reliable local anchoring for centuries. As a result of each district's peculiarity, there has been little standardisation and an unprecedented effort to protect local identity.

Since the beginning of 2000, the Norwegian police have undergone two significant reforms. The first was introduced in 2000-2001 and called Police reform 2000 for a safer society [*Politireformen 2000 Et tryggere samfunn*], and resulted in a reduction from 54 to 27 police districts (Justis- og politidepartementet, 2001). New challenges such as the rise of organised crime at a national and international level and increasing public demands for public services were central to the preparation of the reform (ibid). The main objective of this reform was threefold. First, there was a desire for a police force that is more preventive and more effective in fighting crime. Second, a police force that is more service- and audience-oriented. The third wish, was for an agency that works more cost-effectively (ibid).

The reform further aimed to make the police districts more sustainable in gathering and utilizing competence (Justis- og politidepartementet, 2001, p. 5). There was a belief that centralisation would lead to some efficiencies. The reform was a clear starting point for the centralisation of the Norwegian police. On 8 November 2012, the Government set up a committee to analyse the Norwegian police's challenges [Røksund rapporten]. The analysis was to identify suggestions for improvement and measures to facilitate better problem solving and more efficient use of police resources. The report paved the way for a Norwegian Public Inquiry (NOU 2013). The committee consisted of 15 experts representing different professional circles, including the National Police Commissioner, Director of the Police Security Service, the Tax

Director and an Appellate Court Judge. Secretary-General Arne Røksund led the committee (NOU 2013:9, 2013, p. 11). The recommendation from the Røksund committee included a reduction from 27 to 6 police districts. After considerable debate within the Parliament, the police were restructured in 12 districts (Birkmann et al., 2010, pp. 638-640; Christensen, Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2018; NOU 2013:9, 2013, pp. 17-20; Sørli & Larsson, 2018).

Figure 3 (below) presents the 12 police districts that have emerged from the latest reform and are still in use today. Before this reform, the police service and the quality varied a lot from district to district. The main objective of this reform was to establish a local police force that was operational, visible and accessible and, at the same time, had the capacity and competence to prevent, investigate and prosecute criminal acts, and ensure the safety of inhabitants. This reform sought to develop a police force that could meet future needs. The Røksund committee recommended two main changes in structure and quality. The structural reform sought to focus the police on core tasks and adapt structures and organisations, including operational management. The quality reform aimed to lay the foundations for increased competency regionally and nationally. The reform also sought to improve management processes relating to quality standards and achievements (NOU 2013:9, 2013). One of the main objectives of the reform was to establish a competent and efficient local police force where people live, thus maintaining an emphasis on decentralised services too.



Figure 3 - The police districts, including Svalbard (Politidirektoratet, 2020b)

Robust professional environments must be developed and equipped to meet today's and tomorrow's criminal challenges (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2014-15). It is impossible to understand the reduction of numbers of police districts otherwise than as a centralisation of the Norwegian police. This centralisation contrasts with the statement that the Norwegian police should operate in close contact with the community (Groenendaal et al., 2013, pp. 114-131; Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2004-2005; Justis- og politidepartementet, 2001-2002; NOU 1999:10, 1999; NOU 2000:24, 2000; NOU 2013:9, 2013). Recent reforms inevitably affected how the operational management of police operations is carried out. Particularly

relevant to this study's research question is the confirmation that organised crime is becoming more organised and mobile (NOU 2013:9, 2013). According to the Røksund committee, fighting this type of crime requires the police to coordinate and lead efforts across police districts (NOU 2013:9, 2013, p. 19). This observation anticipates the transboundary nature of modern crises.

As a result of fewer police districts, there are also fewer operations centres within the Norwegian police. On the one hand, these operations centres have become more robust and comprehensive, indicating that they can more professionally manage a more significant crisis than before. On the other hand, larger and more robust operations centres do not solve the challenges of operational responsibility in crises involving more than one police district when the crises are linked to each other. According to the principle of responsibility, each chief of police has full responsibility in their police district. The division of responsibilities in the Norwegian police coincides with the geographical division of the various police districts. The individual district boundaries determine the geographical area of responsibility. However, current regulations and guidelines do not provide sufficient information to clarify who is in charge of a crisis that moves from one geographical boundary to another. In such occurrences, the default option is to maintain responsibility at the level of the district where the crisis started. This solution can be seen as a legacy of the decentralised police model and might not always be best suited to the situation at hand.

During the last 20 years, the Norwegian police have undergone two relatively large reforms that can hardly be interpreted as anything other than the centralisation of the police. Arguments in favour of centralisation emphasise the more efficient use of the nation's total police resources, more equality in the general police, and strengthened professional environments. However, the implications of these reforms are less clear at the managerial and leadership levels. The principle of (local) responsibility is still valid, but it is unclear who has authority in crises involving more than one police district at a time. The following section zooms in further to take a closer look at the Norwegian police's command structure and resources for emergency management. This will further emphasise some of the tensions between centralised control and decentralised resources and situations.

4. Command structures for emergency management

The police's role as society's civilian power apparatus, with a monopoly on the use of legitimate physical force on behalf of the state, requires substantial political, democratic and legal control. The police's central function in society is reflected in the great political interest in controlling what the police should do and how it should be done – preferably also when and where. Few Norwegian public enterprises are exposed to such significant oversight and public pressure as the police. This level of political attention creates challenges for efficient resource utilisation, which should not be overlooked (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2019-2020). Control primarily happens through a hierarchy. The executive part of the Norwegian police is organised with a central Police directorate [Politidirektoratet (POD)], with a total of 21 underlying units, consisting of 12 police districts and five special bodies with national tasks: The National Criminal Investigation Service [Kripos], National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental crime [Økokrim], Police Immigration Unit [Politiets utlendingsenhet], Central Mobile Police Force [Utrykningspolitiet], the Norwegian Police University College [Politihøgskolen]. There are also four other transversal units: Police Joint Services [Politiets fellestjenester], Police ICT Services [Politiets IKT tjenester], National ID Center and Border Police [Grenskommensiaret] (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2018). The national police emergency resources [Politiets nasjonale beredskapsressurser (NB)] is not categorized as a special body, but the unit has national responsibility within its domain. The Oslo police chief is formally responsible for NB. On 11 May 2016, the Government appointed a committee to study and propose the future organisation of special police bodies and national police emergency preparedness resources. The analysis assessed efficiency measures, improvement areas, and recommendations and was published in a Norwegian public report (NOU) in May 2017 (NOU 2017:11, 2017). This report emphasizes that the current integrated model concerning NB as part of the Oslo police district works well. At the time of the publication, all these units still had to develop their operational experience, something they would achieve through their daily presence and participation in the fight against everyday crime.

However, several factors pushed the committee to recommend establishing an independent police body for national emergency preparedness resources. The committee recommended the establishment of a National Emergency Response Center [Politiets nasjonale beredskapssenter or PNB]. Other national responsibility units are already established in various special bodies, which gave further credence to this recommendation. The committee noted that national

emergency preparedness resources constitute a cutting-edge competence and capacity no police district has, with assistance as its primary function. NB thus has more in common with the special bodies than with the police districts. NB should, in the eyes of the committee, also be a driving force for professional development and transfer of emerging competencies to the police districts. Here NB could use its involvement in international cooperations to identify and develop best practices and contribute to competence and capacity development within the broader Norwegian police apparatus (NOU 2017:11, 2017, pp. 204-209).

Another relevant challenge with NB's organisational affiliation is the possibility of a conflict of interest where the Oslo police district refuses to hand over the resources to another district if they need them by themselves. In the past, such refusals history has sparked discussions about whether NB is a relevant and accessible resource beyond Oslo and the central-eastern region of Norway. Such decisions could lead to a reduced ability to provide appropriate assistance and thereby a reduced crisis management capacity at the national level. The current organisation of NB is further challenged by the fact that the assigned portfolio of the Oslo police district is so extensive that it can be questioned whether they can maintain a contemporary understanding of relevant threats at the national level. These issues can be linked to the broader tensions between centralisation and decentralisation that have emerged as a key theme in this chapter and seem to similarly challenge police forces in other countries (Landström, Eklund, & Naarttijärvi, 2020; Roché & de Maillard, 2009). The tension between the need for control and centralisation and the need for decentralised services that are best aligned to local needs is a structuring factor that explains much of the challenges in the organisation of Norwegian police. In order to better understand the command structure and the distinction and tensions between the national and local operational levels, the following section takes a closer look at a somewhat distinctive Norwegian division of the level structure in the justice sector.

Figure 4 shows the different levels of overall responsibility in Norwegian police crisis management. The strategic level represents the Ministry of Justice. The operational level represents the Norwegian police directorate, and the tactical level represents the 12 separate police districts and special bodies.

Figure 4 - Management levels in the national emergency preparedness apparatus (2020b).

The same division applies in a police district. However, within a police district (figure 5), the strategic level is represented by the chief of police, the operational level by the chief of staff/operations manager (OM), and the ground force commander (GFC) represents the tactical level (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2012-13, 2012a, 2019-2020; Politidirektoratet, 2020b).



Figure 5 - Management levels within a police district (Politidirektoratet, 2020b)

Usually, a police operation is led through a hierarchy where the chief of police represents the top management level, also referred to as the strategic level. In contrast, the operations manager (OM) leads the operational level, while a ground force commander (GFC) leads the tactical or frontline units. The OM has authority over the GFC (Politidirektoratet, 2020b, p. 127). In extraordinary events, this operational level will be headed by a Chief of Staff. The person in

question then establishes the staff, typically responsible for personnel (P1), intelligence (P2), operation (P3), and logistics (P4). During significant incidents or specific events like state visits, the police chief may decide that the staff shall step in and lead the operation (Politidirektoratet, 2020b).

The transition from classic line management to staff management can, in some cases, lead to a delay, mainly because crucial players must step into an already ongoing operation and continue and take over operational guidance (Mehus, 2020). The issue becomes particularly relevant when a crisis operation starts with a classic line organisation management and then moves to staff-oriented management. This can, for example, happen when an event starts relatively normally but then develops into a major incident. When the staff leads the operation from the start of an incident, the same issues become less relevant. Mehus' research concludes that in the search for an optimal operational management structure, the police have placed too much emphasis on situations (e.g. state visits) that allow time for planning, order writing and training rather than more acute and unexpected situations that often pose more significant challenges at the operational level. Interviewee D (2022) supports Mehus' conclusion: "there has been a reluctance to look more closely at the effect of the transition from line to staff management. There should only be one operational management structure throughout the crisis".

The transfer of responsibility from classic line management to staff management is problematic. This was emphasised by interviewee B (2022), who noted that "the transition from line to staff management violates the principle of conformity" (see also (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2017b)). Issue linked to the transfer of responsibility can affect a crisis because the actors have unclear expectations and a vague understanding of the management structure. Maintaining effective decision-making can be challenging because the pressure is high, and the organisational model, either line management or staff management, is unclear. A change in the management structure in an ongoing crisis can lead to the loss of important information, especially in rapidly developing cases. In interviewee A's (2022) experience, a transition from line to staff management can result in a loss of momentum in dealing with the crisis and reduced situational awareness: "there is a danger of loss of key players at the operation centre when someone has to leave their current position to update the staff ".

According to the MJ (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2018, p. 4), the National police commissioner, who also is the head of the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD), is responsible for ensuring adequate emergency preparedness and crisis management capability in the police

(Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2012a). Besides being an ordinary state administrative body under MJ, POD is responsible for coordinating and prioritising efforts that challenge capacity and competence in one or more police districts in serious incidents or crises. The POD's situation centre (PSS) manages the directorate's role during severe incidents and crises at the national operational level.

No official document or preparatory work clearly explains POD's operational responsibility compared with police district(s) involved in a developing crisis. The only point that appears in public documents is that POD must contribute to – but is not responsible for – a recommendation for who shall be responsible when the crisis involves several districts (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2015b, p. 10). Current guidance does not clarify who will decide. This ambiguity is puzzling because it had already been identified in some of the findings concerning the 22 July attacks and the mosque attack in Bærum in August 2019 (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020; NOU 2012:14, 2012, pp. 147-160). Uncertainty about who decides when crises involving several police districts simultaneously have the potential to reduce the effectiveness of operational management efforts. From a theoretical perspective, a clear chain of command at the operational level positively contributes to the assignment of key tasks (Boin & Bynander, 2015).

Determining an effective crisis management structure for operational management is challenging when a crisis involves several police districts and jurisdictions simultaneously. It is particularly complicated when the operational roles are not clearly defined. The current Norwegian system does not clarify who will decide at the national operational level when a crisis involves several police districts and the crisis is linked to each other (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020; Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2012a, p. 3; NOU 2012:14, 2012). These organisational issues emphasise a persisting tension between the national and local levels and between centralisation and decentralisation. This tension is problematic when unresolved because it might affect the effectiveness of crisis management, especially at the operational level. When a crisis is established, and its size and scope mean that local resources are insufficient, current guidance does not clarify who has the authority to decide where the national emergency preparedness resources (NB) are to be used.

Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the Norwegian crisis management principles, its crisis management structure, and police responsibilities within this context. The four overarching principles for crisis management seem partially outdated, and the principles of responsibility and conformity need revision. The potential for some crises to be very dynamic and involve several police districts simultaneously is likely to challenge individual police chiefs' responsibility. Such crises, due to their nature and extent, require extra operational management, which will test and stretch the principles of responsibility and conformity.

The discussion has emphasised the police's decentralised anchoring and the extent to which police reforms in the twenty-first century have influenced this distribution. The division of responsibilities in the Norwegian police coincides with the geographical division of the various police districts. At this stage, there is insufficient guidance to confirm that responsibility for a crisis that moves from one geographical boundary to another falls with the district where it originally started. The Norwegian Police Directorate determines emergency preparedness, in line with the Ministry of Justice's current guidelines. However, current guidelines do not clearly define the police directorate's operational role when a crisis involves several police districts.

The chapter also highlights a lack of clarity regarding the Norwegian Police Directorate's operational role and authority, which further questions the possibility of effectively implementing the principle of responsibility. Furthermore, the command structure in a police district has been discussed. Both interviewees and documentary sources support the claim that the current guideline to change from line to staff management during a crisis is unhelpful. This change is likely to increase the danger of losing essential information and momentum when a crisis is imminent or unfolding. These general issues must be clarified for the future, and it is better to do this now than to wait until the same problem becomes more pressing during the next crisis. Some crises require extra effort and a dedicated organisational structure. There are evident shortcomings in the Norwegian crisis management system that obscure responsibilities and appropriateness regarding available capacities, capabilities, and distribution due to crises' unique nature or scope. Most of these shortcomings can be linked to the broader tension between centralisation and decentralisation in the Norwegian police.

Finally, it is also essential to understand the relationship between structure and performance in the Norwegian police. This relationship can shape public policy because funding, among other factors, impacts structure and performance and varies over time. The latest police report (2019-

2020) from the MJ shows that public budgets will be reduced. This political reality underlines an explicit demand for more efficiencies, which must be considered when assessing the police's ability to exercise efficient operational crisis management (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2019-2020). According to Christensen et al. (2011), the self-evaluation of Norway as an (international) crisis manager is generally high in the population. This perception might create a belief in the Government's ability to manage domestic crises, both for clarifications of liability, structure and performance. Nevertheless, as this chapter revealed, the situation is not as rosy as public perceptions suggest. The study will now move on to the three phases of Norwegian crisis management, starting with preparation.

Chapter 2. The preparation phase

This chapter takes a closer look at key factors that enable a robust preparation phase in the lead-up to a crisis. Performing appropriate operational control in a crisis presupposes that the police have a good and comprehensive overview of available resources and an up-to-date and appropriate plan for different scenarios. At the operational level, plans must rely on a timely, relevant and reliable threat picture. The Norwegian Police Directorate (POD) considers this period dedicated to threat assessment, preparation and planning as the preparation phase (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). One key challenge here is that it is difficult, not to say impossible, to prepare for all possible crises.

The preparation phase provides a crucial opportunity for the police to anticipate and prepare for the broad range of threats and scenarios it is likely to confront. This phase is essential to implement the current strategic vision developed by the National Police Commissioner, who leads the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD). The vision the National Police Commissioner developed for 2020-2025 puts forward the preventive and proactive role of the police (Politidirektoratet, 2020c). Lunde (2014) defines proactivity as a person or group's ability to determine and act safely in the present time with a qualified assessment of future situation development. This ambition applies to all types of crime and is not only related to the most severe part of a national crime picture, including crises. Those who carry out preventive actions need to be informed about the range of potential issues and threats they are likely to confront. They need to know where, when and what to prevent and then prepare accordingly. This type of situational awareness needs to be shared to achieve a common threat picture. In the absence of common access to relevant threat information, the police effort will mainly be reactive. Police are reactive when an incident has already been committed, and they are called to limit the damage, bring the situation back to normal and further investigate a possible future trial.

The main objective of this chapter is to analyse how the Norwegian police are organised so that they are best prepared for sharing critical information in the form of threat assessments, maintain a common picture of relevant emergency preparedness resources in their own and neighbouring districts, as well as the extent to which planning is conducted across district boundaries. These elements are particularly relevant for crises that involve more than one police district and where the crisis has a clear connection in the districts involved. The main sections of the chapter focus on threat assessments and situational awareness, contingency planning, and emergency resources. This outline comes from the evaluation reports from Oslo's 22 July

2011 attacks and the attack against the mosque in Bærum in August 2019 (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020; NOU 2012:14, 2012). It follows a logical sequence: threat assessments help build situational awareness, which is necessary to plan for multiple possible contingencies. Contingency plans should, in turn, identify the best possible use of appropriate resources to tackle a crisis when it emerges. Both individually and collectively, these elements affect the effectiveness of the operational management of the Norwegian police during crises. The chapter finds that centralisation has led to more robust local capabilities to deal with crises, but this comes at a cost: less opportunity for "weak" signals to emerge from the local to the national level. This can be related to the wicked nature of a terrorist threat and affects shared situational awareness. The authorities should also develop more comprehensive contingency planning, especially for more complex crises affecting multiple districts.

1. Threat assessment and situational awareness

Threat assessments apply to many different societal actors, each playing a decisive role in crises. One of the top priorities of the Norwegian government is to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens and guarantee their safety by fighting all kinds of terrorism. According to the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB), Norway's general threat picture is complex. DSB explains the complexity of the considerable variation in possible risk-related incidents, such as climate-related attacks, civil society attacks, supply security, ICT security and health-related challenges (DSB, 2019). It is challenging for the security services to deliver timely, relevant and reliable threat assessments that cover all the needs of the 12 police districts in Norway. A complex national threat picture challenges the operational level of the police because the individual police districts have different challenges related to topography, weather and population composition.

In practice, the operations centre sends messages that contain various types of information distributed orally, in writing, or in combination. Different forms of information form the basis for different actions on the site. Dilo and Zlatanova (2011) distinguish two types of information needed in emergency response: static and dynamic. Static information exists before a crisis, whereas dynamic information is collected during the crisis (ibid). Considering a typical Norwegian crisis that the police have to deal with, an example of static information will be what resources are available and the general threat picture communicated by the security services. Dynamic information can be considered as situational information deduced from the incident and its effects on the operational information and processes activated to handle a crisis. Both

static and dynamic information is relevant for the operational level to conduct effective and appropriate operational crisis management. In the preparation phase, static information will be most relevant, and procedures to process dynamic information must be established and practised. Interviewees A and B (Interviewee A, 2022; Interviewee B, 2022) found that static information from the Police Directorate works satisfactorily. Interviewee A found that "threat assessments and operational orders from POD are easy to relate to". Interviewee B noted that "static information sharing has improved in recent years and is especially visible in handling the COVID-19 pandemic. POD has a better national picture of the situation today than before".

All actors dealing with crises depend on timely, relevant and reliable intelligence. According to the Norwegian Police Directorate intelligence doctrine (Politidirektoratet, 2014, pp. 18-22), timeliness is information delivered in a timeframe relevant to the client or consumer's decisions. Timely delivery must be weighed against other priorities, specifically the desire to corroborate between a broader range of sources and use more resources to process and digest various pieces of information which could improve the quality of the report. Relevance refers to the intelligence product's ability to deal with the issue at hand (ibid). US intelligence official Thomas G. Fingar (2011) notes that when assessments are declassified, their relevance is often judged against the criteria of "were they useful to decision-makers when they were produced?". In the follow-up of a terrorist attack, it is easy to put the various pieces of the puzzle together and then pass judgment on what should have been done before the attack occurred. A good understanding of the context in which officers worked before the attack is essential to reflect the complexity of the puzzles they faced. One key issue that affects the relevance of intelligence products is assessing the reliability of various pieces of information. Norwegian police define reliability by considering that intelligence analysis must be open-minded and objective. Reliability presupposes integrity, which is necessary for the quality and credibility of the products. As a general rule, intelligence products must rely on several sources and communicate levels of uncertainty in their assessments (Politidirektoratet, 2014). Before the 22 July 2011 attacks, the general terrorist threat in Norway was rated as low, meaning that authorities deemed a terrorist attack on Norwegian interests unlikely to happen (Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, 2011). The low probability threat assessment resulted in the police not implementing any extraordinary preparatory measures.

Terrorist threats are often defined as wicked problems. A wicked problem is a social or cultural problem that is difficult or impossible to solve for many reasons. These reasons typically include a) incomplete or contradictory knowledge about the problem, b) the high number of

people involved, c) enormous economic burden, and d) the interconnected nature of these problems with other problems (Paquet, 2017). In other words, there is only that much intelligence and threat assessment can do to prevent a terrorist attack. The 9/11 terror attack showed that terrorist armed with small, bladed weapons carried on board was enough to overtake the aircraft's control. US intelligence had anticipated an attack by Al Qaeda but not the specific modus operandi (9/11 Commission Report, 2004). The asymmetrical impact of the damage caused by the hijacked aircraft was beyond the scale of what had been seen before (Fischbacher-Smith, 2016). Besides, the threat picture regarding terrorism is complicated to uncover because the threat actors often aim at soft targets and live relatively everyday lives to blend in. Both case studies in this thesis substantiate these findings (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020; NOU 2012:14, 2012).

The 22 July attack was a turning point for counter-terrorism in Norway by all accounts. The 22 July Commission recommended that the experience and lessons learnt from that day should be used for a fundamental review of how the national security and intelligence services are coordinated and interact to optimise capacity, strategic understanding and detect future threats (NOU 2012:14, 2012, p. 395). The Commission found that the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) had indicators that some imported ingredients were used to make a bomb. In the summer of 2010, the introduction of an international anti-terrorism project called Global Shield aimed to map the export of 14 legally marketable chemicals known to be used in the manufacturing of improvised explosives to establish more effective restrictions on terrorists' ability to build explosives (NOU 2012:14, 2012, p. 370). Following the absence of a PST consultant, the tip and the documents from Global Shield were not processed and acted upon for nine months. According to the 22 July Commission, there were no appropriate established routines for handling information from Global Shield. The procedure between the Norwegian Directorate of Customs and PST concerning who and how such tips should be processed was unclear. The Commission believes that PST's leadership and routines for case processing, as it emerged in handling the tip, are to be blamed (ibid, p. 378). This point of failure emphasises how essential timely access and processing of relevant intelligence is for the Norwegian police to anticipate and prevent serious crime. A similar point of failure was actualised when the terror attack against the mosque in Bærum on 10 August 2019 was evaluated.

On 13 September 2019, a joint mandate was issued by the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD), the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), and the Oslo Police District (OPD), which announced that an external committee under the leadership of Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen was to

evaluate the police and PST's handling of the terrorist attack against the Al-Noor mosque in Bærum on 10 August 2019. The purpose of the evaluation was to identify learning points about what went well and what could have been done better related to the dissemination and follow-up of PST's threat assessments related to right-wing extremism, the handling of tips and the operational handling of the incident at the Al-Noor Mosque (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020). In 2018, PST received a tip from an anonymous person concerned about a person's extreme attitudes. The informant wrote, among other things, that the person in question had apparent nationalist attitudes and that he was interested in reactive political movements and promoted conservative views related to family, marriage, intoxication and sex. Furthermore, the report of concern contained information that the person in question had a small circle of friends and a strong need for recognition. These indicators suggest a strong potential for radicalisation (Gill, 2015; Lara-Cabrera et al., 2017).

In addition, it was revealed that the person in question had signed up for a shooting club and thus had legal access to handguns. However, there were no indications that the person had expressed any intention to attack. PST identified the person to be Philip Manshaus and started initial investigations of the tip. After the person in question had been identified, PST sent a request to the Oslo Police District to investigate whether there may be more information about him (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020, pp. 12-15). According to the Dalgaard-Nielsen evaluation report, the case then went back and forth between PST and the Oslo police and no concrete measures were implemented before the Manshaus carried out the attack. Measures like a conversation with the named person were not performed (ibid). The ambiguities between the security service and the local police indicated that even in 2019, there were still no appropriate routines for further processing of tips about people with extreme attitudes. In retrospect, it should be acknowledged that the outcome of the attack on the Al-Noor mosque with only one person killed could have been far worse if the terrorist had arrived at the mosque when it was full of people. Given the tip about the potential for radicalisation of the culprit and his access to firearms, some might reasonably expect the police should have taken a more proactive stance.

In summary, the evaluation reports from both the 22 July Commission report and the attack against the mosque in Bærum in 2019 show a need for increased attention to cooperation and information exchange on threat assessments and follow-up plans across public agencies and authorities. Both reports highlight the importance of POD and PST clarifying roles and division of responsibilities in working with radicalisation and violent extremism to develop a more proactive stance (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020; NOU 2012:14, 2012). This recognition has

implications for police crisis management at the operational level. When the flow of information between the various public authorities does not seem appropriate, the operational level of the police will not be able to anticipate what constitutes the most significant threat. This shortfall will, in turn, reduce its ability to conduct operational management properly.

Taken together, intelligence analysis provides a basis of knowledge for decision-makers to interpret the past, understand the present and forecast the future (Marrin, (2014). Without reliable knowledge of the threat picture, the police cannot anticipate and prevent criminal acts. At the operational level, police need good intelligence to inform the allocation of the right resources at the right time to the right place. Intelligence facilitates anticipation, which allows the police to be proactive more than reactive. If the emergency responders have a timely, relevant and reliable picture of the most likely threats to societal security, they will be more likely to have developed appropriate situational awareness.

Situational awareness (SA) can be understood as understanding the variety of contexts that humans confront (Endsley 1995). Endsley (2016) further defines situational awareness as "the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future". SA was first recognised as a crucial commodity for military aircraft crews as far back as World War I and has recently both been further developed and implemented in various industries confronting dynamic challenges in a wide range of disciplines (ibid). In order to successfully respond to a crisis, emergency responders need to develop situational awareness. They must understand what is happening and what might happen next (Seppänen & Virrantaus, 2015). From an operational point of view, the operations centre must convey the threat assessment to various responders so that they have a similar understanding of the situation or what is called shared situational awareness (SSA) (Mica R Endsley, 2016).

Possessing an accurate threat picture and having the same situational understanding and the right resources is optimal for effective crisis management, especially during the preparation phase. Such a scenario is the desired condition, but the reality is more complicated due to laws and regulations, priorities, budgeting, as well as fog and friction. No modern democracy has established a surveillance society where the authorities have a complete overview of potential dangers they may confront. Doing so would constitute a threat to our way of life and associated liberal democratic values, which the security services, including the police, work to protect. Like other western countries, Norway has relatively strict laws and regulations regarding monitoring and collecting personal information (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2005).

Norwegian police must optimise access to information so that the material they legally have access to is best used for carrying out their mission. Intelligence is shared following well-defined structures, routines, rules and guidelines. This sometimes creates silos of compartmentalised information. From a police practitioner's perspective, it is difficult to see the desired effect of a threat assessment if it is not operationalised and distributed to those performing the job. Interviewee D (2022) argues somewhat differently by saying: "When we decide to take action based on a threat assessment, we manage to get the information out in the police organisation". Threat assessments can sometimes reduce uncertainty but never entirely eliminate them, and this poses significant operational challenges. If an operational manager (OM) receives a threat assessment that says there is a 50% chance of something happening, how should the OM prioritise and allocate emergency resources?

Another example is a threat assessment with the wording "can not exclude," which most likely only raises awareness among the police on the ground, which of course, in some cases, can be appropriate. The terrorist attacks that hit Norway in 2011 and 2019 nevertheless show potential improvement regarding how the Norwegian police utilise both available information and current regulations to increase operational efficiency. In 2011 PST could have handled the Global Shield information more appropriate, and the same applies to the tip concerning a radicalised citizen in 2018.

2. Contingency plans

Regardless of the threat, society generally assumes that the police and other relevant social actors make the necessary preparations to deal with any crisis (Drennan & McConnell, 2007). Preparations all typically aim to provide societal security. For the emergency services in general and the operational level especially, to be as well prepared as possible, it is a prerequisite that they also have the necessary routines and contingency plans established. A contingency plan is a course of action designed to help an organisation to respond effectively to a significant future event or situation that may or may not happen. A contingency plan is sometimes called “Plan B” because it can also be used as an alternative for action if expected results fail to materialise (Westergaard, 2008). The Norwegian police preparedness system emphasises the centrality of good contingency planning (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). Contingency plans also referred to as operating frameworks, provide the operational level with better decision support and increase the police's effectiveness in handling a crisis (ibid). However, it is essential to recognise that one cannot have detailed plans for all imaginable and unimaginable scenarios that might occur.

Hypothetically, if the operational and tactical levels had a complete recipe for all types of scenarios, it would reduce individuals' ability to think creatively and on time. It would then be easy to be forced into a mindset and course of action that requires a solid plan before action, and very often, there is no time for doing that.

In crises, it is frequent that one does not imagine the current scenario before it happens, and thus there might be no basis for preparing and implementing an appropriate plan. According to Reilly (1993), crises by nature are novel, unstructured and outside the organisation's typical operating framework. This novelty does not annihilate the need for planning. On the contrary, Mitroff (1987) substantiates the need for planning and states that planning teaches an organisation how to cope more effectively with whatever does occur. A cardinal rule of crisis management is that no crisis ever unfolds as envisioned or planned. Thus effective crisis management is a never-ending process, not an event with a beginning and an end (ibid). In that context, it is vital to have the ability to improvise because one type of crisis does not raise the same pattern of behaviour as another (Lundberg et al., 2014, pp. 143-155).

When discussing contingency plans, the terror attacks on 22 July 2011 are a case in point. In 2011, the police had a comprehensive plan for various emergencies, including terrorist attacks, but it was only used to a limited extent on 22/7. The plan contained several implementation measures with an unclear threat picture in a confusing situation. For example, there were measures to increase capacity and reduce response time using police resources. There were measures to prevent terrorists from moving around and thus prevent further severe criminal acts. There were also measures to protect people, buildings and areas from possible terrorist attacks (NOU 2012:14, 2012, p. 82). Why this contingency plan was not fully utilised is unclear in the 22 July commission report. One assumption may be that no appropriate routines were established for how relevant planning should be translated into practice when an actual crisis emerged. The terrorist attacks on 22 July show the importance of connecting the adopted plan on paper and the police's actual ability to operationalise existing plans.

Following the 2015 police reform, one of the objectives was to work more efficiently, with better quality, and more unified. The authorities identified a need for standardised and similar contingency plans within the Norwegian police (NOU 2013:9, 2013, pp. 43-47). The Committee that led the work on the reform proposal revealed that few national standardised routines and processes existed for the performance of police tasks. In some areas, supervisors had received guidelines for how certain types of work were to be organised and carried out, but in the main, it was up to the management in each police district to decide how to perform police

work in their jurisdiction (ibid). Since the 2015 reform, the police districts' plans have been included in the Norwegian police emergency preparedness system (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). The reform also reduced the number of police districts from 27 to 12, which resulted, among other things, in a larger geographical area of responsibility for the individual police district but also more extensive and more robust operations centres better able to deal with a significant crisis (NOU 2013:9, 2013). Having fewer and more robust operations centres makes it easier to update appropriate contingency plans continuously and improves the odds that these plans will be used in a crisis. Yet, the reform did not clarify who has the overall responsibility if a crisis affects several police districts at the same time and plans for such crises are therefore likely to differ from one district or unit to another.

Several scholars researching terrorism-related crises have proposed that plans are nothing but planning is everything (Lentzos & Rose, 2009; Murti et al., 2016; Newman, 2019). On the one hand, it is impossible to predict future challenges systematically, and thus problematic to make contingency plans to cover all eventualities comprehensively. On the other hand, planning activates a number of standard practices such as coordination and the maintenance of essential skills which are necessary for good crisis management (ibid), whether appropriate contingency plans exist or not. All crisis management depends on boots on the ground to prevent a crisis from occurring, reduce damage, and normalise the situation.

In some emergency areas, the police have the primary responsibility, and in other areas, the primary responsibility lies with other actors, which requires further coordination. An example is a crisis dealing with national security, also defined as a security policy crisis. Although the police can be a central stakeholder in the preparation phase, the Armed Forces will typically lead (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2004-2005, 2015b). Therefore, the police districts shall prepare plans to care for the police's roles and tasks. They should also develop follow-up routines that ensure necessary updates of their local planning (Politidirektoratet, 2020b, p. 95). Given the uncertain character of crises, the planning process is, in many ways, more important than plans. While relevant and updated contingency plans and planning are essential, they also require resources that allow them to be implemented when necessary.

3. Emergency resources

When plans, structures, and risk-reduction measures are not enough to prevent a crisis, regardless of the event or scenario, what is left is people with the right skills and attitude, appropriate equipment, and relevant training. These constitute emergency resources. In the

Norwegian context, fire-, health- and police resources are the primary emergency services, which both individually and collectively form a central part of Norwegian crisis management preparedness. These resources provide the basic substrate of resilience (Dariagan, Atando, & Asis, 2021; Duit, 2016; Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2016-2017; Politidirektoratet, 2020b). The discussion surrounding resilience to disasters and natural hazards has advanced considerably in the last decade. According to Kuhlicke (2013) and in the context of this study, resilience is defined as a system's capacity to adapt to or respond to singular, unique and most often radically surprising events. The approach favoured in this study focuses on crises that do not necessarily threaten the survival of the Norwegian institutions and society directly. Therefore the study disregards military forces even though they play a central role in Norway if the crisis becomes large enough (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2001-2002, 2012-13).

The Norwegian police is a central stakeholder in society's preparedness for serious crimes, such as terrorism, hostile intelligence activities on Norwegian soil, sabotage and organised crime, and accidents and natural disasters. The police must be prepared for incidents that may require a more significant and coordinated police effort. Emergency resources within the police comprise the total available capacity and competence within operational efforts, investigation, intelligence, civil justice and prosecution (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). The POD divides police response personnel into four categories primarily based on competence. Category one is personnel serving in the special intervention unit. Category two is the bodyguard service, while category three deals with personnel belonging to the different police district's Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units. The fourth category includes all other police officers who conduct annual training and approval tests for carrying weapons approved by the police (Politidirektoratet, 2020b, p. 45). Professionals in all four categories perform regular 24-hour on-call duty and emergency response and will be the most available resources for the operational management in the preparation phase.

When discussing the structural change within the police implemented in 2015 concerning available emergency resources, it is easy to think only of tactical units or boots on the ground and less attention to those set to allocate the resources. Another focus area is the capacity of the individual operation centres in the police districts. The last police reform reduced the number of police districts from 27 to 12, and the remaining 12 operations centres' staffing increased. It must be added that some of the operations centres in the old structure had a very low workload due to a low crime rate (NOU 2013:9, 2013). This change in structure means that the various operation centres have a significantly increased capacity to handle extraordinary incidents and

crises than the previous organisational structure with 27 different operations centres. Before the 2015 police reform, some operations centres were very sparsely staffed (NOU 2013:9, 2013). During the 22 July attacks, it was clear that the operations centres in Oslo and Nordre-Buskerud were overloaded with emergency calls. According to the 22 July Commission report, the operation centre in the Oslo police district was staffed with one operational manager and four operators at the time of the bomb's impact on the Governmental building (NOU 2012:14, 2012, p. 84). The Commission notes that this staffing level was far too low because of the massive amount of emergency calls made to the operation centre (ibid). Unfortunately, one of those calls contained vital information about the perpetrator, how he was dressed and which car he left the scene in (NOU 2012:14, 2012, pp. 85-94). In hindsight, if distributed, this information might have prevented the massacre on the island of Utøya. Of course, this is a counterfactual hypothesis, but it shows the central role of an operations centre in a police district during a crisis in the preparation phase and the need for such centres to be well resourced. This missed opportunity underlines the role of operational management in the preparation phase. Without a well-functioning operations centre, the resources involved will operate in the blind to a greater extent. In connection with the attack against the Al-Noor mosque in August 2019, no similar findings have emerged concerning staffing challenges at the operation centre in the Oslo police district (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020). Although the attack on the mosque was minor compared to the terrorist attacks on 22 July 2011, it is likely that the reform that followed the 2011 attacks, restructuring districts and increasing the staffing of operations centres in the various police districts and POD, bore fruit.

Conclusion

This chapter started by referring to the importance of timely, relevant and reliable threat assessments. When such assessments are appropriately distributed to those on the ground who benefit most from the information, they can form the basis for a shared situational awareness. In the run-up to the 22 July attacks, PST's routines, the concerned police districts and other relevant departments failed to receive, process and disseminate vital information leading to discrepancies in situational awareness. Although the security services underwent a relatively thorough restructuring in the wake of the 22 July attacks, the attack on the Al-Noor mosque in August 2019 demonstrated that some weaknesses in the processing of information have persisted. These cases shed light on some of the most demanding challenges in working with intelligence and preparing and distributing threat assessments. Developing situational

awareness is not just about structure and routines but equally about rules and regulations, priorities and budgeting, the difference between policies, doctrines and plans and the novelty and uncertain character of crises on the ground. Terrorist threats and the crises they cause are often defined as wicked problems due to the inherent complexities they create and exploit. Regardless of these challenges, operational management depends entirely on relevant threat assessments to operate preventively and proactively allocate the right resources to the right place at the right time with the best situational awareness possible. When or if this is not possible, decision-makers must acknowledge that the police are bound to be reactive more than proactive.

The second section looked at the importance of appropriate contingency plans within the Norwegian police. These plans must be generic and not overly detailed. A significant degree of detail in the current planning will hinder the necessary flexibility and creativity in the execution of the assignment. Today's threat picture and the wide range of actors involved in crisis management require standardised planning to be valid across various police district boundaries. During the 22 July attacks, the planning in force was neither updated nor made available to the police districts involved. In connection with the attack on the Al-Noor mosque in 2019, there was no lack of planning that prevented effective operational management. Instead, a failure to process available information hindered a preventive approach and led to a reactive intervention. While the Norwegian police have managed to avert potential terrorist attacks and severe crime and effectively respond to natural disasters in the last few years, it has not been tested by crises involving several police districts simultaneously since the 22 July attacks. Although Norway has not recently been exposed to crises that have affected several police districts simultaneously, the fact that the police directorate does not have straightforward contingency plans for such incidents is problematic.

The third section discussed the importance of available emergency resources. Without adequate emergency resources available, crisis prevention will inevitably fail, and the ability to conduct effective operational management will be absent. The most recent police reform of 2015 reduced the number of police districts from 27 to 12. One of the reasons for this change was the desire for more centralised and strongly resourced professional environments. On the one hand, increased centralisation means a reduced local presence, which goes against the historical Norwegian preference for local anchoring and the ability of this approach to provide early warning through local patrols. On the other hand, increased centralisation reduces the number of coordination points and supports a more unified police service around the country. This form

of centralisation has become vital to deal with the sort of complex threats and the most pressing crises that can emerge in contemporary society.

Threat assessments, contingency plans and emergency resources play a crucial role in effective operational management within the Norwegian police during the preparation phase. In many areas, these factors form both individually and collectively the foundation for effective operational management in the preparation phase. In recent years, developments in the Norwegian police have shown that extra focus has been placed on more comprehensive police services for the whole country, while the attack on the Al-Noor mosque in 2019 revealed continuing weaknesses in the treatment of raw information on potential threats.

In summary, changes have been introduced that have resulted in a more comprehensive Norwegian police, especially at the district level. Nevertheless, and relevant to the research question, the extent to which these changes have enhanced efficiency related to operational management in crises involving more than one police district is not clear. Although Norwegian authorities have historically prioritised a decentralised model of policing, they still have to clearly define who has what operational responsibility in crises involving more than one police district. Timely, relevant and reliable threat assessments, contingency plans and emergency resources are all crucial for the operational management in the preparation phase to succeed. A clarification of how this should be managed in the lead-up to transboundary crises is crucial to fulfilling the emphasis on prevention and deterrence in the Norwegian police strategy. Key issues seem to remain here regarding the processing of information and contingency planning. Enduring problems in processing information to develop shared situational awareness might never be fully resolved due to the wicked nature of the terrorist threat. This limits the police's ability to be proactive. The police develop more comprehensive contingency planning, especially for complex crises affecting multiple districts. Finally, centralisation has led to more robust local capabilities to deal with crises, but this comes at a cost: less opportunity for “weak” signals to emerge from the local to the national level. The study will now move on to the second phase of Norwegian crisis management – the adaptation phase.

Chapter 3. The adaptation phase

This chapter analyses whether the current organisation and structure of the Norwegian police's operational level are effectively aligned to support the police's ability to adapt to a crisis. Specifically, the discussion examines whether the current operational structure contributes to an increased crisis management capacity compared with the old district division, focusing specifically on crises involving more than one district.

The adaptation phase starts when a crisis occurs. The Norwegian approach further distinguishes three sub-phases. First, the *alert and emergency phase* covers the period from when the police receive the message that a significant incident is unfolding until the police arrive at the area of operation. In this phase, the operational centre collects, processes and shares information that forms the basis for implementing plans, orders, threat assessments, measures and routines. Second, the *action phase* starts when the police arrive at the area of operation and last until the place is secured. "Secured" in this context means that other actors, such as health personnel, can move safely in the area. The main focus in the action phase is saving lives, securing the perimeter, and gaining an overview and control over the incident. Third, the *operational phase* starts when the police have achieved sufficient control over the situation. Tactical and technical investigations are implemented as needed, assessing resource access against resource needs. This phase continues until the operational effort is completed, and then the normalisation phase begins (Politidirektoratet, 2020b).

The main concern of this chapter is with the organisation of the Norwegian police effort in this context. The three sub-phases structure police operational management, informing how operations centres allocate necessary resources and convey strategies to tackle a crisis. The chapter is divided into three sections that focus on core elements of the operational structure. These elements have been extracted and inferred from a review of the evaluation reports on Oslo's 22 July 2011-attacks and those against the mosque in Bærum on 10 August 2019. They are 1) *communication and coordination*, 2) *cooperation and collaboration* and 3) *capacity and capability*. To illustrate changes regarding the Norwegian police's operational ability concerning these elements during the adaptation phase, this chapter will, to some extent, address the situation before 22 July, as well as changes that have been implemented before the attack on 10 August 2019.

Even though many institutions have responsibilities when a crisis emerges, the police usually conduct operational management, especially at the early stage. Threat assessment, planning,

and available resources must be conveyed and managed at the operational level. Doing so requires *coordination* among multiple actors, which, in turn, requires adequate *communication*. All the actors involved in tackling a crisis bring specific resources to the table. These actors need to *cooperate and collaborate* to utilise all the resources efficiently. Concerning *capacity and capability*, Norway is a small country with limited means. If the extent of the crisis is complex enough, a broad range of societal actors must contribute with their respective capacities and capabilities, from the police to the military, the fire brigade to the local service providers and small businesses. Further complexity arises when an incident emerges in domains that a police district cannot handle appropriately. The principle of cooperation introduced after the terrorist attacks on Norway in 2011 and discussed in Chapter 1 guides the effective utilisation of the national resources across multiple responders (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2012b). This principle means that all relevant contributors have an independent responsibility to solve the problem (ibid), but they can only do so together, especially in major crises. From a practitioner's point of view, these elements are central for the adaptation phase to succeed.

Norway's decentralised police structure meets the political requirements for a fast, efficient and appropriate crisis management structure when the crisis occurs in a single police district. Short lines of communication are a crucial success in fast-burning crises (Boin & 't Hart, 2010), and they are facilitated when the structure is decentralised. However, the analysis in this chapter focuses more specifically on how crises affecting several police districts in Norway are to be handled at the national operational level at the same time. The research shows that the lack of clarity and centralised authority to simultaneously coordinate operational tasks in transboundary crises involving several police jurisdictions is problematic. The chapter thus sheds light on the challenges caused by the absence of a central hub for information collection, dissemination, allocating resources and operational decisions during a crisis involving more than one police jurisdiction. The absence of a central hub limits coordination, communication, cooperation and collaboration to maximise all available capacities and capabilities.

1. Communication and coordination

Communication and coordination are essential to respond to a crisis. If the emergency personnel are unaware that something has happened, it is difficult to respond. If one does not coordinate the response, the effect of the effort will be limited. This section examines the role of communication and coordination in aligning police activities in the adaptation phase. The

section starts with a definition of key terms and considers their implications for this research. The main focus is related to the emergency network and the advantages and disadvantages of various ICT solutions in Norwegian crisis management, focusing on cross-boundary incidents. At the end of the section, the proposed solution regarding communication and coordination at the operational level drafted by the Røksund-committee (2013) will be discussed.

In the last decades, crisis communication researchers have primarily focused on the external dimension of crisis communication. In the context of this study, this dimension is related to the police's ability to interact with external partners both orally and in writing. Researchers argue that one of the most critical communication challenges is creating organisational commitment, but they also confess that there is still little knowledge about what is happening inside an organisation during a crisis (Johansen, Aggerholm, & Frandsen, 2012). According to Comfort (2007), coordination means acting with involved and relevant actors and organisations to achieve a shared and common goal. However, various stakeholders, such as medical health personnel vs police officers, tend to have conflicting interests in a crisis. Health professionals typically focus on saving lives. In contrast, the police will often focus on securing the perimeter first and then finding the culprit(s). The need for confidentiality further complicates coordination between different actors. In the health sector, this duty sometimes limits the work of the police. Those who are mentally imbalanced must be handled by health personnel, but the police must, from time to time, assist as some are violent in their conduct. Regulatory barriers related to patient confidentiality can lead to unwanted behaviour from the police, either by using too little or too much force. These barriers challenge the police as crisis managers because they require in-depth knowledge of the various actors' approaches.

Coordination is inherently linked to crisis managers' ability to define or redefine tasks to operators, units or relevant resources during the handling of a crisis in the adaptation phase (Boin & Bynander, 2015). Coordination is, therefore, entirely dependent on suitable and appropriate communication. Crisis communication should follow a fixed pattern for optimal effect, especially in the adaptation phase. Faraj and Xiao (2006) find that organisations' work is best coordinated through prespecified programs and mutual adjustment. Routine coordination cannot always be specified in sufficient detail to be carried out, especially not in emergency response organisations (ibid). Any crisis communication should start with an instructive conversation, in which the first responders must learn what happens where and which other departments are involved. Such interaction presupposes that the entities involved can communicate with each other in the most effective way possible. Therefore, interoperability

among involved actors is central to discussing the importance of communication in crisis management (Comfort, 2007, p. 194). Interoperability refers to the ability of different computerised systems to connect and exchange information with one another readily without restriction (Forsvarsstaben, 2019). During the police operation on the island of Utøya in 2011, the involved police units confronted significant challenges in communicating with each other due to an old analogue communication system (NOU 2012:14, 2012, p. 140). Appropriate communication systems established with the other relevant partners were not established. A robust, well-functioning and proven system for joint and rapid crisis warning did not exist that day – neither locally nor centrally (ibid).

On 10 September 2015, before the final implementation of the latest police reform, a new digital emergency communication network covering 86% of the mainland of Norway was established. The remaining 14% primarily cover mountainous areas where topography limits radio communication and areas with very little to no population. Information and communication technology (ICT) changes have created new societal conditions, adding further complexity to police work. Changes in ICT have provided a basis for more efficient work processes in the police and better information handling. The emergency network in Norway is now digital and has encryption that makes unwanted attention more complex than the old analogue system, which was relatively easy to eavesdrop on. Nevertheless, problems do remain. For example, the new system is not approved for classified discussions (Nødnett.no, 2020). Interviewee A (2022) noted that "The biggest obstacle to conducting effective operational management is the lack of being able to share classified information from the operations centre to the patrols". From a user's perspective, the current emergency network in Norway today seems satisfactory. It gives the executive branch, including the operational level, a much stronger ability to maintain and develop an appropriate picture of the situation before, during and after a crisis to a far greater extent than before. Today's modern ICT systems give police patrols and operation centres easier and better access to relevant information. However, the public also has increased access to information and can follow unfolding crises on Twitter, Tik Tok and other social media. These platforms can spread rumours and fake news, leading to unnecessary alerts for the police. For instance, this was an issue during the 2015 terror attacks in France (Bubendorff, Rizza, & Prieur, 2021). If the scope of fake news becomes too important and influential, it will pose additional challenges at the operational level, forcing it to deploy resources where they are not needed and burdening communication channels unnecessarily.

ICT also gives inhabitants more opportunities to contact the police, partly because they can send tips and messages via social media and possibly even chat with online patrols (DFØ, 2021, p. 14). Several digital and automated services offer effective ways for the police to meet higher expectations from politicians and the public concerning local presence. Improvements regarding communication technologies within the Norwegian police also include video conferencing, which is now used to a much greater extent than before. Recent experience suggests that video conferencing during crises has resulted in better and shared situational awareness by reaching several recipients simultaneously. The ability of interlocutors to see non-verbal cues ensures messages are communicated more clearly. Compared to the police's old analogue communication system, today's ICT platforms provide a robust basis for better resource allocation from the operations centres and contribute to increased operational efficiency. ICT developments have also significantly improved the police's ability to access and share classified information to satisfy security requirements, except when using radio communication. The new digital system also helps convey a common understanding of the situation by providing better access to digital mapping systems necessary for general fleet management. Interviewee B (2022) nuances this statement and highlights that there is always room for further improvement: "the emergency network is one of the better things we have, but we lack a more modern version of the multimedia idea to take advantage of the opportunities in digital communication between relevant actors". Security studies research similarly shows that technological revolutions can only deliver so much. Technologies are developed by and for humans whose cognition limits their utility (Ferris, 2003).

Responders can no longer blame the established radio connection for defects in communication with other actors, such as the Armed forces, who also have access to the new emergency network. Yet the technical aspect of this improvement is not sufficient on its own. It is also vital to establish good communication routines to avoid overcrowding available frequencies when a crisis arises. My professional experience suggests that, during significant crises, a variety of responders are very keen to contribute and will therefore use the emergency network to convey their intentions. When dozens of individuals do this simultaneously, available communication frequencies are blocked because the number of calls exceeds the capacity of the emergency network. At critical times and especially in the adaptation phase, this bandwidth problem can be decisive for the outcome of an ongoing crisis. In order to remedy this problem, the operations centre can establish different groups within the emergency network that allow more communication between fewer participants. However, the establishment of such groups is not

a panacea. Interviewee D (2022), for example, highlighted that “the new emergency network is a double-edged sword. It is much better than the old one, with national coverage, among other things. The system's possibilities regarding the number of speech groups lead to more groups being distributed rather than structuring the communication, leading to potential loss of essential information”.

One solution to mitigate this issue might be to create a more comprehensive understanding of the limitations of the emergency network while at the same time conveying through training what is essential to communicate and when. Frameworks and guidelines regarding communication both internally and externally contribute to a more consistent approach to effective communication routines. The Norwegian Police University College (PHS) syllabi touch on key points concerning effective liaison routines. These routines address some of the technical limitations of the available ICT system and general operational liaison procedures such as the phonetic alphabet to spell a critical or complicated word or name. My own experience shows that the syllabi of the PHS still have some shortcomings, especially concerning practical training in the field of radio communication. It is not easy to use radio communication during crises professionally only by reading theory - this must be practised. Further, it can not be ruled out that some will refuse to adapt to the agreed-upon guidelines and might lack restraint and professionalism.

A crisis of a certain level involves many actors with different backgrounds and professional points of view. When the crisis involves many different responders who cannot see or hear what is happening and unexpected situations occur for which there are no established procedures, the need for appropriate communication is even more acute. In a confined emergency response operation, the parties involved can share relevant information directly by sight and speech (Netten & van Someren, 2011). Even in a confined area, people working in the frontline are usually trained and prepared to act in a specific way according to local requirements, for example, using hand signals to communicate about movement. Individual adaptations and procedures can lead to uncertainty related to cooperation with other contributors because they do not use the same procedures (Groenendaal et al., 2013). This issue underpins the need for centralised training and common overarching principles for effective crisis management. Communication is closely linked to an organisation's ability to appropriately coordinate human and technical resources.

The 22 July inquiry report focuses on the lack of an infrastructure to enable a coordinated interaction of an incident that occurs in multiple districts or exceeds the capacity of a single

district (Goodman & Falkheimer, 2014; NOU 2012:14, 2012, p. 96). The evaluation report on the attack against the mosque in Bærum on 10 August 2019 did not highlight particular challenges with the police communication technology systems. That day, the problem with communication was that POD was slow to notify other police districts of the attack, and there were also some language barriers between the person who reported the attack and the liaison operator at the operations centre. The person who was at the mosque and experienced the attack was naturally upset and nervous. This person spoke in broken Norwegian, which led to the operator at the operation centre having difficulty understanding the problem (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020, p. 17). The ability to receive and understand a message is central when dealing with communication, and misunderstandings between messenger and recipient can lead to loss of time.

Time is during a crisis closely linked to communication and coordination, especially at the operational level and in the adaptation phase. When a crisis occurs, it is essential to respond promptly and protect the affected people (Rosenthal et al., 1989). Speed matters, and time is often missing in a crisis. Crisis management professionals talk about the "golden hour" of crisis response, a metaphor borrowed from emergency medicine. The "golden hour" does not refer to a particular period but the observation of a delay related to the approach adopted by the professionals, their travel to the crisis zone, and other unexpected events (Fred Garcia, 2006). Random delays frequently occur when an emergency response to a crisis involves multiple units from different agencies like medical services and fire departments. For those involved to perform optimally and minimise the risk of delay, they need to be coordinated. The framework of emergency response institutions is a complex interagency network. Both government agencies and non-government institutions contribute to coordinating crisis management (Christensen & Ma, 2020). In severe crises, units that belong to organisations like the Armed forces or municipalities can also be crucial. During the management of a crisis, these units usually operate at different locations, but frequently information that becomes available at one location could be relevant for responders at other locations. These different networks could result in silo thinking or "stovepipes" (Therrien, Normandin, Paterson, & Pelling, 2021). If the operation requires seamless interaction between the actors involved, such silos could hamper necessary progress because of their various tactics, techniques and procedures. Coordination and good communication are therefore crucial.

Crises sometimes fall neatly within the pre-defined area of responsibility of a police district. However, the development of a crisis like the 22 July attacks calls for more national support

from other police departments, medical support, firefighters and volunteers, and it will be therefore more challenging to coordinate. Such challenges arise because different systems and the agencies that host them are often loosely or incidentally coupled and may function independently. Cross-functional boundary crises are challenging to manage because they often involve contributors following different logic and imperatives (Ansell et al., 2010; Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2012b). In addition to the coordination problems, simultaneous mobilisation at multiple scales might create conflicts over priorities and resource allocation. If there is a need for limited specialised service in more than one place, allocation problems arise. The response to Norway's 22 July terror attack in 2011 exemplifies these problems. As the impact of the disaster affected two different police jurisdictions, it was unclear at the beginning who had the overall responsibility (NOU 2012:14, 2012). This case illustrates the complexity of coordinating crises across different jurisdictions.

The committee which drafted the latest police reform (2015) made a series of recommendations to distribute critical functions and coordinate responsibility in crisis management. These proposals are represented in table 1 below (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2014-15; NOU 2013:9, 2013, p. 243). The proposals focusing on the operational level within the police districts describe how the reform envisioned cross-border crises should be coordinated. The proposal regarding operational management proposes that the national police director should have the necessary authority and tools to hold an appropriate coordinating role. Today, this recommendation on a central coordinating role and authority has not been introduced. Although the guidelines for cross-border incidents at the operational level remain ambiguous, the committee emphasises their relevance. The reform proposal highlights the need for a national structure. For critiques, such a national super-structure could add a layer of bureaucracy that could hinder and slow progress in the adaptation phase.

	Ministry of Justice	The Norwegian police directorate	Special bodies	The police districts
Strategic management	Develop parent frameworks and long-term strategy for the agency. Set overall goals for the agency.	Provide input to the Ministry'sframeworks and the long-term strategy for the agency. Operationalise the long-term political strategy in a holistic strategy for the agency	Provide input to the holistic, operational strategy within their respective areas. Implement the overall strategy into operational plans within respective field.	Provide input to holistic, operational strategies. Turn the whole strategy into operational plans for its own police district
Business management	Establish guidelines and requirements for business management in agencies. Assess the quality of corporate governance	Develop guidelines for the daily operation of the agency. Establish a mechanism for sharing best practices. Establish operational goals for the business. Arrange regular performance monitoring.	Implement and execute the audit measures and directions given by The Police Directorate, including performance monitoring. Ensure that measures and operational plans are implemented.	Implement and execute the audit measures and directions given by The Police Directorate, including performance monitoring. Ensure that measures and operational plans are implemented.
Operational management	Ensure that the National Police Commissioner has the necessary Power of attorney and tools for coordination and control in the exercise of the role. Maintain inter-departmental coordination as the head department in civilian crises	Ensure that operation managers can focus on their mission. Maintain cross-sectoral coordination and provide resources for operational management	Operational management for own cases where special bodies are responsible for running the case	Operational management and responsibility to deal with events within own police district. Events of national character is taken care of by national emergency preparedness centre/operations centre

Table 1- Allocation of crisis management responsibility in Norway (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2014-15)

The evaluations after the attacks both in 2011 and in 2019 and academic research strongly support the claim that communication and coordination are central elements of crisis management situations. In the vast majority of cases, including those that cross jurisdictional borders, the operational level of the Norwegian police will be challenged to maintain effective coordination and communication between various stakeholders. The 2015 police reform, combined with newer communication technology and better education at the Norwegian Police University College and more relevant training within the different police districts, has improved the police's ability to communicate with and coordinate the resources involved. The reduction

in the number of police districts from 27 to 12 means that there are now fewer coordination points with a larger geographical area of responsibility. This centralisation mitigates some of the uncertainty regarding cross-border crises. Improvements in the ICT system have further improved communication lines and are likely to increase operational efficiency. However, several years have passed since the last reform, and – in the absence of a major cross-boundary incident - it is still unclear who and to what extent coordination and communication will work as smoothly as desired.

2. Cooperation and collaboration

Cooperation and collaboration are essential for effective crisis management and efficient utilisation of societal resources in cross-border crises. This section starts with definitions of key terms and then discusses the various factors that affect the effectiveness of cooperation and collaboration in a crisis. The section then discusses the recommendation from the Røksund-committee for the co-location of the police, firefighter and health operation centres to further increase operational cooperation and collaboration.

According to Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh (2008), cooperation involves exchanging and sharing resources to achieve compatible goals, while collaboration describes how different stakeholders share information, resources, and responsibilities to achieve a common goal. Cooperation occurs when one person or group helps another carry out a task that benefits both partners. The primary determinant of cooperative behaviour is that the desired task cannot be accomplished alone (Snow, 2015, p. 434). Zagumny (2013) adds that cooperation includes both behavioural and instrumental components. The behavioural component is that people work together, while the instrumental component involves a common purpose or benefit for those involved. Without collaboration between all actors involved, an effective response seems elusive. The effective management of crises involving different jurisdictional borders requires collaboration between different policy sectors and involved departments (Blondin & Boin, 2020). The adaptation phase is all about mobilising appropriate resources to reduce the time from a crisis occurring until the situation is normalised. The police must utilise all available resources in the most efficient way possible to achieve this.

The challenges involved in managing a crisis deepen when this crisis takes on a transboundary dimension. The more complex flow of information is more likely to lead responders to wrong decisions and, as a consequence, to less effective collaboration (Netten & van Someren, 2011). Another challenge of collaboration is the increasing level of complexity as more tasks and

policy subsystems affect management processes (Deverell et al., 2019). Stakeholders during a crisis who are not previously used to collaborating are now expected to work together, which may lead to problems because some of these units have different ways of assessing the challenge and follow different procedures. The 2011 and 2019 terror attacks in Norway illustrated some limitations in Norwegian police management's capacity to cooperate and collaborate. On 22 July 2011, the local police appeared somewhat passive in the adaptation phase because the special intervention unit was on its way. This is contentious because it is challenging to determine a reasonable expectation of intervention from regular police officers in hazardous scenarios. From experience, this is difficult to prepare because the nature of crises varies. There can be a long time between significant crises that challenge the range of actors involved in different types of cooperation and collaboration. The rarity and peculiarities of major crises toads to the difficulty of anticipating and practising appropriate interactions between different contributors. The rare occurrence of severe crises can result in reduced continuity regarding training, and constantly focusing on development is crucial to cooperate and collaborate at the optimal level. Changes in threat assessments can lead to variations in focus and organisational priorities, which can further hamper the development of appropriate cooperation and collaboration routines between key players.

For events that require coordinating management on the field, there should always be one ground force commander (GFC) acting as the police district's leader at the tactical level (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). If a permanent GFC has not been appointed, the operational manager (OM) should appoint a dedicated and well-suited person. The GFC must work closely with the operations centre to resolve the crisis and take care of external communication and media handling. The operational manager and the ground force commander review their plans in advance for pre-planned events, like state visits or major sporting events. In the event of an emergency, the OM and the GFC must communicate about the progress and the solution of the mission. Even though the GFC primarily works at the tactical level, they must cooperate and collaborate with other relevant stakeholders at the same level, for example, with their equivalent in the fire department, medical services or armed forces.

The 2015 police reform emphasises the importance of appropriate cooperation and collaboration for efficient crisis management within the Norwegian police. This reform signalled political support for improving the country's crisis management resources (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2014-15). The reform did not pay attention to the fact that the different GFCs involved in a cross-border incident need to coordinate and collaborate to solve

the mission appropriately and efficiently. The interaction between the OM and the GFC during a crisis is vital for the end state of the crisis and is even more critical if the crisis involves more than one police jurisdiction. One view is that the overall proposals for coordination and collaboration presented in the 2015 reform apply primarily to the tactical level. However, this was not stated clearly in the reform. In any case, the resolution of a crisis starts at the tactical level, especially for those results that society is most concerned about, that is to say, their physical security. Currently, there is a lack of research and understanding of the duty of the OM function concerning coordination and collaboration with the ground force commander during a transboundary crisis within the Norwegian police.

It is easy to think that challenges related to cooperation and collaboration only occur at the executive level, either the operational or the tactical level, but this is not necessarily true. Collaboration challenges also occur at the strategic-political level. Major crises are becoming increasingly difficult to handle because of organisational silos and increased public visibility in the modern information environment. With increased complexity and interconnections defining modern society, inter-organisational cooperation and collaboration have become a necessary part of public crisis management, not the least to align strategic-political and technical-operational efforts (Keast et al., 2007; McGuire, 2006; McNamara, 2012; O'Leary & Vij, 2012). Boin and 't Hart (2010) distinguish between technical-operational response and strategic-political response. Challenges concerning collaborative crisis management on the technical-operational level include agreeing on, presenting and continuously updating the operational picture of the events, finding and deploying necessary resources, sharing accurate information, and mobilising response networks to subsystems and relevant stakeholders (Nohrstedt, 2018). The strategic-political response deals with who has what responsibility when a crisis includes several constitutional subject areas.

In Norway, the Ministry of Justice leads civilian crisis response unless otherwise decided by the Government's crisis committee (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2015b). According to Christensen et al., the Ministry of Justice's assigned role as a "driving force in internal security" lacks clarity. There seems to be a lack of solid steering instruments and enforcement tools (Christensen, Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2015, p. 360). These problems are particularly clear when a crisis requires support from the military. The lack of appropriate collaboration between the Norwegian police and the Armed forces was an issue in the aftermath of the 22 July terror attacks (Hjelum & Lægreid, 2019). According to the commission of inquiry set up after the 22 July attacks, this was more of a cultural problem than a structural one (NOU 2012:14, 2012).

According to the 22 July commission report and other researchers, the attacks highlighted persistent interagency coordination and collaboration problems. For instance, the operations centre in Nordre-Buskerud was not aware that the special intervention unit was on its way from Oslo to Utøya. Neither was it aware that a rescue helicopter was ready in Oslo and that it could have been used to transport emergency personnel from Oslo to Utøya (Almklov et al., 2018; Bjerga & Håkenstad, 2013; NOU 2012:14, 2012). These issues point to a lack of clear leadership that can effectively coordinate crisis response across ministries and agencies.

Disagreements at the political and strategical level are not optimal, but they tend to have less direct relevance for the police operational level in dealing with the intricacies and demands of the crisis. The hub of the Norwegian police crisis management competence concerning cooperation and collaboration lies with the operational manager in each police district (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). The operational centres are 24/7 institutions, and their most essential role is to make sense of a variety of signals to identify the most important ones and respond as early as possible to a crisis (ibid). Unclear guidelines as to who has what authority, when a crisis involves more than one police district, can complicate timely response once a signal has been identified. This ambiguity can reduce appropriate cooperation and collaboration among the involved actors. During a crisis involving different jurisdictional boundaries and levels of authority, OM representing different stakeholders need to cooperate and collaborate to respond to the problem. Concerning the investigation, which is a crucial part of the last subphase in the adaptation phase (the operation phase), responsibility during transboundary crises seems less ambiguous. Within this field, lines of responsibility are delineated, and when they are unclear, the Attorney General decides who has the investigative responsibility (Politidirektoratet og Riksadvokaten, 2020).

The last two sections have looked at the importance of appropriate communication, coordination, cooperation and collaboration to efficiently utilise Norway's emergency preparedness resources in the adaptation phase. Resolving a crisis depends on deploying suitable capacities and capabilities at the right time and place. The latest police reform clarifies that emergency services, such as the police, fire departments and health services, must cooperate and interact better to enable more efficient use of the country's total resources. The 2015 reform strongly recommends that the three emergency services' operations centres be co-located to improve collaboration and coordination (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2014-15, pp. 93-96). More than six years after the reform, this co-location has not been completed in all 12 police districts. This can be explained by space and budgetary challenges and

requirements related to information security. The police, fire and health services also have different cultures and management philosophies that align with their primary missions. The 22 July commission identified such cultural discrepancies as possible a factor that prevented effective coordination and collaboration among the different actors involved in managing the crisis (NOU 2012:14, 2012). Based on relevant plans and procedures for cooperation and collaboration, a state's ability to resolve a crisis will always depend on what resources are available to do the job. Regardless of which guidelines are stated for cooperation and collaboration, either centrally or locally, one will always depend on timely, relevant and reliable capacities, which in turn require the right capabilities and a more general willingness to work together and adapt to each other.

3. Capacities and capabilities

This section examines the capacities and capabilities of responders performing at the tactical level and those who coordinate the operational level within the Norwegian police. These two subjects are relevant for all three phases of a crisis, but the need for relevant capacities and capabilities is most prominent in the adaptation phase. In this context, capacity refers to a quantitative measure or required size amount of a given capability. For example, a measure of capacity might focus on how many operators are working in an operation centre within the Norwegian police and relate the figure to a defined scale that rates different levels of human resources capacity. Capability means the ability to perform a specific task, such as responding to an emergency or the ability to receive, process, decide and convey an emergency call to relevant actors (Forsvarsstaben, 2019, p. 238). The section is divided into two subsections. The first subsection focuses on the overall situation before the terrorist attacks that hit Norway on 22 July 2011 and provides a baseline to compare and contrast how capacities and capabilities have evolved. The second subsection examines the changes introduced in the wake of the attacks in 2011 and until today. Although investigation and prosecution are also central in the adaptation phase (figure 1), this field will not be discussed in more detail because the primary concern of this study is with the police's ability to manage a crisis in the short term. Therefore, medium and long-term roles, such as investigations and prosecution, are out of scope. The analysis suggests that the changes introduced after the attack on 22/7 impacted how the police handled the attack on the mosque on 10 August 2019.

The pre-July 2011 police system was heavily influenced by the tradition of decentralisation in Norwegian police. In 2011 the Norwegian police were divided into 27 different police districts,

each with its dedicated operation centre. The various districts were poorly coordinated, and the population's access to police services varied greatly (NOU 2013:9, 2013). At that time, the police did not have a good emergency network to communicate orally via radio from one police district to another. The parliamentary enquiry into the 22 July attacks concluded that the police districts did not provide the necessary conditions to develop specialist functions and handle major and severe crises (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2015a). Only a few police districts, based on their size and portfolio, were able to maintain and develop appropriate specialist environments that could deal with the challenges posed by serious crime and major incidents in an effective manner. Significant differences between police districts in size, volume, and crime rate explained these discrepancies.

The training and the procedures defining the role of operation managers were limited and varied considerably between the 27 police districts. Training provided a weak foundation for building a joint knowledge base, procedures and methods across districts. The national emergency response units (NB) had an explicit limitation in dealing with acute incidents that required immediate action. Because of a lack of predictable air transport capacity, the NB, during a fast-burning crisis, were only able to act as a resource in the vicinity of the central-eastern region of Norway, meaning it had no rapid access to other regions. In addition, NB was poorly coordinated mainly because they were located in different locations.

Before 2011, no measurable criteria had been set for the police's ability to respond to major crises. As a result, individual police districts more or less independently determined local criteria for their response without any central anchoring (NOU 2013:9, 2013, p. 179). From 2000 to 2011, Norway was not exposed to major national crises. Perceived needs were thus primarily local and did not align with the requirements of a major crisis. The entire organisation of the Norwegian police thus made it very difficult to establish effective management for such a situation. Organisational problems became apparent during the crisis, especially in managing its transboundary aspects. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in 2011, there was a broad political agreement that the entire justice field had to be revisited.

The aftermath of disasters and national crises, like the 22 July attacks, represents an opportune time to examine national strategies for societal security and emergency preparedness (Birkmann et al., 2010, pp. 638-640). From a practitioner's point of view, it is understandable that both the political level and the top police management felt that something had to be done. The police's general ability to recognise risk and plan for the unthinkable was not good enough. Norwegian policymakers and police authorities did not perceive similar incidents in Europe as

sufficiently strong signals to provide a basis for reform before the incidents on 22 July 2011. The problem, however, with a system that only reacts to major crises instead of anticipating them is that crises generate unusually high levels of governmental attention, which can politicise the reform in ways that do not always serve professional requirements. Crises are also typically accompanied by requests to increase reporting, and business management, which increase the sense of political accountability but do not necessarily improve professionals' ability to prevent and deter crises.

In the aftermath of the 22 July attacks, the Norwegian police began a significant restructuring. On 8 November 2012, the government set up a committee to analyse the Norwegian police's challenges. The committee sought to identify recommendations to facilitate better problem solving and more efficient use of police resources. The report was released as a Norwegian Public Inquiry (NOU) in June 2013 (NOU 2013:9, 2013). The committee recommended fewer and larger police districts.

After 22 July, there was a broad political agreement that the police should be strengthened. According to the magazine *Politiforum*, in 2011, there were 13,506 employees in the Norwegian police (Politiets Fellesforbund, 2021). By 2021, this number had increased to 17,618 employees (ibid), a 23 per cent personnel increase since the terrorist attacks in July 2011. It is unclear how many of these additional employees work in operational service (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2014-15; Politiets Fellesforbund, 2021, pp. 38-39). Among other things, a target of 2 police officers per 1,000 inhabitants was a clear political goal (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2019-2020, p. 18). This ambition necessitated an annual increase of 75 police officers each year in the years to come (ibid). Of the approximately 2,800 person-years added from 2014 to early 2020, around 1,700 are police graduates, 180 lawyers, and 1,000 civilian employees. Of the 1,700 police person-years, about 1,500 employees are in the police districts (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2019-2020, p. 23). These figures provide evidence of the government's willingness and ability to support and empower the Norwegian police.

However, personnel growth does not directly translate into the more and better capability to handle cross-border crises - this requires a closer examination of the police's ability to conduct appropriate operational management. The reorganisation into fewer and more extensive operations centres has been significant for strengthening emergency preparedness. Extensive training and skills development has also benefited staff at the operations centres. New routines for increased collaboration have been implemented. A new mapping system was introduced to

improve situational awareness concerning technical infrastructures. A new internal communication system has led to a significant increase in individual districts' ability to share information on and during severe crises (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2019-2020, p. 47).

Despite these improvements, the evaluation committee appointed after the terrorist attack on the Al-Noor mosque in August 2019 concluded that the Norwegian Police Directorate's situation centre (PSS) was not sufficiently staffed to handle the crisis (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020). Although this crisis only involved the Oslo police district, it is reasonable to assume that the role of PSS in a more complex cross-border crisis would have been further challenged. Media coverage further substantiates this critique, suggesting that PSS was only staffed with one person outside office hours (P. F. Johansen, Andres, 2020). There are limits to what only one person can handle, especially in the adaptation phase, during which information grows exponentially and needs to be treated on time. This shows that improvements have not solved every single issue.

Another change implemented in the wake of the terrorist attacks in 2011 is the procedure regarding ongoing life-threatening violence (PLIVO). This new procedure includes clear guidelines that all emergency services should seek to neutralise the threat as soon as possible and without delay when receiving a PLIVO message from the operations centres. This order conveys an implicit understanding that everyone involved must accept a higher degree of uncertainty in the face of threats to their own lives and health (Walden, 2016). The authority to decide a PLIVO report is with the OM in the police district where the incident occurs (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). The success criteria, which is to normalise the situation as soon as possible with available resources contained in the PLIVO procedure, is expected to increase efficiency for all the emergency services (Helsedirektoratet m.fl., 2017).

On the one hand, the restructuring, staffing and training of the various operations centres seems to have strengthened the individual district's ability to handle both major and multiple crises simultaneously in their own district. On the other hand, how crises in several police districts are to be handled at the operational level remains vague. This issue becomes particularly relevant when multiple crises have a clear connection and where the authorities' overall intentions and strategic decisions can directly impact the assignment solution in the various police districts. At some point, someone has to decide on priorities and allocate relevant emergency resources to the right place at the right time, defining a clear intention and conveying a clear message to staff working at the tactical level. The principle of local responsibility stands firm in the

Norwegian police. Nevertheless, this principle can represent an obstacle to appropriate coordination without a relevant super-structure, especially in transboundary crises.

From a practitioner's point of view, the reform, which has now been implemented for a few years, has also affected individual attitudes. Today's police officers seem to have a better and more appropriate mental disposition for approaching various incidents – especially incidents with great potential for damage. Nevertheless, the reform has also introduced more bureaucratisation through increased reporting requirements, a focus on corporate governance, and a significant increase in centrally and locally staff and management structures. Determining and adopting an effective crisis management structure is all about finding a balance between past, present and future requirements. The need to balance requirements is also tangible through national and international incidents and the varying extent to which the Norwegian police are perceived as an appropriate structure to ensure the population's security in peacetime.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the importance of appropriate communication, coordination, cooperation and collaboration in the police adaptation phase during a significant crisis involving more than one police jurisdiction. Appropriate communication is a prerequisite for performing effective coordination. The new emergency network completed in 2015 has strengthened communication internally in a district and across districts. Cooperation and collaboration are essentially about utilising society's total resources most efficiently and appropriately, where the primary purpose must be to bring society back to a normal situation. The starting point here is the police's ability to utilise its own resources to deal with a crisis at the operational level. The analysis shows that significant challenges remain when crises involve more than one police district simultaneously. The section discussing cooperation and collaboration identified some stovepipes between different ministries during a civilian crisis, specifically between MJ and the Armed forces. This friction might have a limited impact on the outcome of the adaptation phase, but its negative impact on further cooperation and collaboration should not be overlooked. Ambiguities at the ministerial level can negatively affect agencies and hinder the best possible use of society's resources. The chapter also examined the police's capacities and capabilities before and after the 22 July 2011 attacks. The Norwegian police have undergone significant restructuring and centralisation since the terrorist attacks that affected the country in 2011. The introduction and implementation of the PLIVO procedure have facilitated a more proactive stance from all parties involved in crisis response. My personal experience suggests that this

procedure has been appropriately introduced in most police districts in Norway. The introduction of this procedure has also resulted in more joint training between the emergency services and better utilisation of resources. The police's capacity for operational management, especially at the district level, has been strengthened through increased training, better procedures and new and more adapted technology.

Despite clear improvements, the police's ability to lead in cross-border crises remains unclear. Improvements have mainly occurred in individual police districts without sufficient clarification of the police's overall ability to perform appropriate and efficient operational management in transboundary crises. This lack of clarification limits the ability of the police to utilise society's total resources in the most efficient way possible and is further reinforced when the scale of the crisis exceeds the capacity of a single district. This ambiguity becomes particularly prominent and acute in the adaptation phase and affects both the police and Norway's overall crisis management apparatus. The study now moves to the last phase in the Norwegian police's three-phase crisis management model – the normalisation phase.

Chapter 4. The normalisation phase

The normalisation phase seeks to bring society and response services back to normal. The Norwegian police directorate (POD) defines this phase as the time after the adaptation phase, and this lasts until those involved are back in a somewhat similar setting as before the crisis occurred (Politidirektoratet, 2020b, p. 32). But crises inevitably affect norms, and thus this is a new normal. It is crucial for society and the police to return to a typical situation to resume their activities and follow up on any lead. For the police, much work remains in this phase. The crisis will be investigated, including the police handling of the incident. If individuals are to be prosecuted, the suspects' intentions must be elucidated, documented, and an indictment must be issued and forwarded to the court.

This phase also includes time for learning and knowledge sharing to adapt professional practices and norms. The chapter focuses on the police's ability to maintain and develop what went well during a crisis, learn from its mistakes, and identify and implement a way forward. Considering the main research question driving this thesis, the focus is on assessing the effectiveness of operational crisis management. In this context, assessing effectiveness is interpreted as assessing the ability of the police to identify leads and lessons from an incident and act upon them. Here, the inquiry report from the terrorist attacks on 22 July 2011 and the evaluation report after the terrorist attack at the Al-Noor mosque in August 2019 serves as the primary evidence base to evaluate the Norwegian authorities' ability to review and draw lessons from the police's performance (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020; NOU 2012:14, 2012). A variety of additional sources, including the author and interviewees' perspectives, are used to reflect a range of perspectives on the post-mortem assessment that characterise the normalisation phase.

According to McConnell (2003), deciding what event or course of events constitutes a crisis is not an exact science, and the same applies to the evaluation of its handling. The amorphous character of crises reinforces subjectivity in how they are experienced, described, and analysed. McConnell points out that there is often a lack of clearly written objectives during a crisis, apart from stabilising the situation and returning to normal (ibid). This context reinforces the importance of individual qualities, suitability and mental preparation for various functions related to operational crisis management. In the aftermath of crises, there is a demand for answers and accountability (Boin et al., 2016), which can politicise assessment and reporting. Several issues thus arise with the way crises are remembered and studied. Renå (2020), for example, highlights how the current political agenda can affect commission and evaluation

reports. This political agenda and the composition of personnel in committees of enquiry can influence the direction of their review.

The chapter does not seek to assign personal responsibilities for what went right or wrong. Instead, the focus continues to be on operations and structures. An obvious pitfall in this respect is that it is challenging to determine whether increased staffing, changed routines, new technologies, practice, and education have the desired effect because Norway, after the terrorist attacks in 2011, has not confronted similarly severe crises. In this context, the absence of evidence – that problems have persisted or new ones have emerged – does not constitute evidence of absence. Whether the Norwegian police succeeds with experience-based learning and implementation will probably not be answered until the next crisis of the same dimension arises.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section highlights experiential knowledge, learning and culture within the Norwegian police and pays particular attention to organisational learning. It finds that much has been done since the 22 July 2011 attack, but ambiguities concerning sharing relevant experiences across districts remain. The second section focuses on post-incident evaluations and questions the different types of the legitimacy of the 22 July inquiry commission report and the Dalgaard-Nielsen evaluation report and their recommendations. This section highlights the contrast between political and expert legitimacy, which affects the type and depth of assessment provided in publicly available reports and thus frames the public debate. The third section deals with the police's learning culture and the platforms the police have developed to support this culture in the aftermath of both incidents. The last section highlights the possible challenges facing the Norwegian police in 2020-2030 and makes the case that the normalisation phase should be extended beyond past crises to better anticipate future challenges.

1. Experiential knowledge and learning

Experiential learning is essential to modern policing and crisis management. Experiential learning is a never-ending process that requires constant attention and openness to new methods. Systematic experiential learning means establishing routines for learning from experiences. There is broad literature that defines the concept and identifies best practise in this domain. Beard and Wilson define experiential learning as the sense-making process of active engagement between the person's inner world and the outer world of the environment (2006, p. 19). Yardley (2012) defines experiential learning as constructing knowledge and

meaning from real-life experience. The role of interpersonal interaction, combined with the importance of the contexts in which learning episodes are situated, is particularly central to experiential learning (Yardley et al., 2012). Experiential learning is based on experiential knowledge built from available information (Ackoff, 1989; Rowley, 2007). For experiential knowledge to become experiential learning, it must be linked to theoretical knowledge (Dewey, 1963). A common criticism points out that experiential learning is based on knowledge and practices that are already known (Kolb & Kolb, 2009). Experiential learning can contribute to gradual development but rarely leads to disruptive change or innovation. Experiential learning is a continuous learning process in which several elements are linked: through police work, experiences are made, and experiences combined with other knowledge are analysed before corrective measures are implemented. The corrective measures can then contribute to developing new experiential knowledge.

Knowledge-based policing involves the accumulation of knowledge that contributes to the police carrying out their social mission and tasks in the best possible way. It presupposes a systematic and methodical collection of relevant information to build knowledge (both experience-based and theoretical) that is analysed to make strategic and operational decisions about preventive and reactive measures. Figure 6 represents the traditional DKIW model in which data are processed into information which is then turned into knowledge and tailored into intelligence, enabling consumers to make wiser decisions. The police's operational management thus combines intelligence and experience-based knowledge with analytical and scientific data, information and knowledge to invest resources appropriately. In this context, and at the operational level, intelligence can increase efficiency by focusing resources where they are most needed (Rowley, 2007, p. 166). The police must also apply and relate actively to knowledge other than experience-based knowledge. Therefore, interdisciplinary cooperation and respect for and consideration for the knowledge and competence of other professions are crucial for police work to be knowledge-based. The reports from the attacks of 22 July 2011 and the attack in August 2019, respectively, support this argument and thus emphasise the importance of interdisciplinary exchange of experience with and outreach to relevant partners (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020; NOU 2012:14, 2012).

This section emphasises and justifies the importance of further developing the police as a learning organisation (Roberts & ProQuest, 2012). Experiential learning turns reactive into proactive control using experiences from what one has done (reactive) to avoid making the same mistake again (thus being proactive). However, it is just as much about developing what

organisations are already doing well. This effort extends to the individual level, the most basic unit of an organisation. An important factor in continuous learning is updated planning available to employees (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). Learning can therefore be analysed from multiple perspectives. Individual learning is the learning that personnel go through. The police have many good organisational routines that seek to foster experiential learning like computer-based systems, various professional forums, and educational opportunities under the auspices of the Police University College (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). The Norwegian police leverage Nordic and international cooperation with various police units where the exchange of experience regarding technics, tactics, procedures and modus operandi is central (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2019-2020).



Figure 6 - DIKIW model (Ackoff, 1989)

Applying this knowledge-based approach to the two case studies will show whether learning has occurred and specifically where it leads to changes in behaviour. The police directorate's definition of learning directly links to the emergence of a relatively lasting change in behaviour attributed to past experiences (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). A concrete example of changed behaviour among police operations centres is an awareness of the routine: "Ongoing life-threatening violence" (the PLIVO procedure mentioned earlier in the thesis). Raising awareness of this procedure (PLIVO) will change the police and their partners' perceptions of the extent to which the police, on a general basis, will make an effort expected and not necessarily wait

for specialists. The discussion will now move from a conceptual discussion of learning to its implementation within the Norwegian police.

Organisational learning occurs when a police district develops knowledge from what individual employees or groups have learned, while systemic learning occurs when many police districts learn from one another. The challenge for the police districts is to develop and implement an appropriate system for organisational and then systemic learning. At the national level, the Norwegian Police Directorate and the Norwegian Police University College seek to produce and promote systemic learning through which the entire police force can learn from what takes place in the police districts (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). According to interviewee B (2022), the police as an organisation is not good enough regarding organisational learning: " we lack appropriate information channels that can take care of structural learning from one police district to the POD and onwards to the other police districts". Interviewee A (2022) substantiates this by saying: "One of the biggest challenges for the Norwegian police is the flow of communication internally."

Organisational learning is a prerequisite for organisational competence and thus competent leaders and employees. In this view, leadership refers to people's ability to influence and motivate others to perform at a high level of commitment. A learning organisation requires a leader who brings out the best in others, and more adaptive and flexible leadership is highly relevant for effective operational management within the police (Geier, 2016; Longshore, 1987). Organisational learning occurs in practical work through knowledge sharing, knowledge development, and change, while strategic organisational learning follows organisations' overall visions, strategies, and goals (Franco & Almeida, 2011). Organisational learning is a management responsibility (Politidirektoratet, 2020b).

Developing organisational learning depends on many factors, where the essential factor is the employees. In this context, diversity is a crucial factor. Diversity is an essential component of organisational learning (Machado & Davim, 2021) and is commonly related to gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation. O'Donovan (2019) promotes a broader conception of diversity as differences. Even organisations that appear, or appeared, to have quite a homogenous workforce are inescapably diverse. The Norwegian police special intervention unit is a predominantly white male workforce, but these men have diverse backgrounds and a multitude of differences. They differ in religious beliefs, education, cognitive style, work experience, family status, general interests, culture and politics. The challenges posed by diversity are often about the different personalities realising the importance of sharing their knowledge and experience

rather than retaining it to themselves. In any organisation, there is some tacit knowledge. Such knowledge is found both at the individual and organisational levels. The challenge is to extract this tacit knowledge and transform it from individual to collective knowledge. Organisational learning occurs when observations and experiential actions create lasting changes in the organisation's structure and procedures. Such changes are visible when values and norms evolve, new guidelines and management principles are produced, new training is offered, and new communication and collaboration initiatives are launched.

Each of the twelve police districts in Norway possesses much knowledge-based experience. This knowledge will remain local if it is not shared with others. Such knowledge is a valuable "unused" asset and constitutes a large proportion of the police districts' total knowledge base, which can be lost without a system for extracting and using it. A supportive culture should thus be built for continuous learning, and conditions must be created for newly acquired learning to be incorporated throughout the organisation. Only then can one say that organisational learning has taken place. In recent years, the Norwegian police have focused on establishing various appropriate arenas for learning, while at the same time, there has been an ongoing focus on maintaining and further developing a supportive culture at the organisational level.

2. Developing a learning culture

Norwegian authorities insist that the police should be a learning organisation with a solid culture to support this approach (Politidirektoratet, 2020b, p. 224). Vesso and Alas (2016) define learning or coaching culture as a model that provides the structure that defines how the organisation's members can best interact with their working environment and how the best results are obtained and measured. All employees in the police have a responsibility to develop a good learning culture. This creates a requirement to identify and facilitate learning opportunities and platforms. Without reflection and conscious evaluation of experiences, experiential learning will be random. The peer community is an important learning arena. Small talk between colleagues has a learning effect and influences the norms and practices of police officers. Evidence from the interviews suggests that Norwegian police do indeed provide a learning-oriented environment. For instance, interviewee C (2022) pointed out that "most people working in the police have a strong desire to perform better". Such informal experiential learning takes place at all levels in a work hierarchy. It often contributes to new thinking and knowledge, which must be captured, evaluated, and formalised to achieve systematic learning. Knowledge from experiential learning is typically formalised through new instructions,

guidelines, curricula, and training. The police districts and special bodies such as the NB are responsible for implementing organisational learning experiences (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). They must also inform the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD) and the Norwegian Police University College (PHS) about experiences and evaluations relevant to national learning (ibid).

POD is responsible for facilitating the establishment of relevant arenas or platforms where experiences are shared to develop an appropriate culture of constant learning at the national level. In recent years, the Norwegian police have established some computer-based learning platforms and, at the same time, increased the focus on organisational learning in the curriculum of the PHS (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). Everyone who is to serve as a police officer must now complete a three-year bachelor's degree under the auspices of PHS. PHS is also responsible for systematic experiential learning in the police and obtaining professional advice from actors inside and outside the police. Experiences from actual events, exercises, and research must be analysed, published, and implemented.

Another arena to develop a learning culture is the use of training exercises. In 2016, the POD decided to hold an annual counter-terrorism exercise entitled “the Northern Lights”. Three of the country's twelve districts were expected to participate in this exercise simultaneously, a requirement that sought to improve cooperation across districts. In 2021, this exercise took place in Norway's three northernmost police districts. Their remoteness means that districts in more populated areas are less used to cooperating with them. Every year, relevant scenarios are created based on input from the Police Security Service, local partners and conditions. Deploying the police's national emergency preparedness resources during this annual exercise is always crucial. In the aftermath of each exercise, reports are written to synthesise lessons learnt. The primary purpose of the evaluation reports is to optimise existing standard operating procedures and doctrines. PHS shall, both on its own and in collaboration with POD and others, develop studies based on research-based and experience-based knowledge (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). PHS and other colleges and universities are researching to improve the police's ability to learn from and prevent significant errors. The research results are often written reports that must be processed to be practical knowledge in the performance of police service. Whether the police effectively implement findings after evaluations or research is debatable. In any case, such a transboundary exercise is an excellent opportunity to determine who will have the operational responsibility when a crisis involves more than one police district and particularly when a decision in one district will impact the outcome in another.

The emphasis in recent years has been chiefly on introducing relevant evaluation routines and supporting appropriate arenas of experience but less on closing gaps that have been identified (Dew, 2012; McCormick, 2006; Tikka, 2019). Part of the explanation is that the police have been the subject of a significant reorganisation since the 2015 reform (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2014-15). Another explanation is that some identified recommendations are time-consuming to implement and costly. Examples include developing a new emergency network structure. The development of the emergency network was politically decided in 2011 and completed in 2017 (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2016-2017, p. 179; NOU 2013:9, 2013). Other demanding changes include constructing a new emergency centre (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2016-2017, p. 40) and acquiring new helicopters (ibid, p. 180).

Other sources of experiential learning arenas include general complaints about police work, reviews, investigations and experiences from the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Equality and Anti-discrimination Ombud's complaints concerning the police. The sum of these different arenas for learning contributes to developing an appropriate culture that conforms to political guidelines and adapts to people's expectations. Experiential learning is central to developing the Norwegian police's ability to manage and lead police operations, whether they occur in one or more police districts. The literature strongly suggests that facilitating appropriate arenas and supporting a positive learning culture are critical elements in a learning organisation (Charlesworth, 2008; Froehlich, Segers, & Van den Bossche, 2014; Kennedy, 2002). It is essential to evaluate efforts personally, in teams and then at the organisational level. Even with good learning arenas and appropriate learning culture within the organisation, appropriate, structured, relevant and reliable evaluation processes and a willingness to implement and adapt recommended changes are needed to achieve the desired change.

3. Evaluation

The police must regularly carry out systematic evaluations to evaluate and ensure the quality of their handling of demanding incidents. There is broad agreement within the police about the importance of conducting evaluations after actual incidents and exercises. On 18 August 2011, the Norwegian Government set up a committee to evaluate the police's handling of the terrorist attacks in Oslo and on the island of Utøya. The decision was based on POD's overall professional management of the police and the responsibility for a systematic learning experience (Politidirektoratet, 2012). However, evaluations do not appear to be systematically

used to lead to change. Interviewee D (2022) noted: “when we are “forced” to evaluate, often after significant incidents, we have become better - also to close gaps that have been identified. The police's total portfolio and workload hamper good evaluation processes in minor incidents and exercises. We have an enormous focus on evaluating, but very little focus on what we should use the evaluations for". This statement is further supported by interviewee A (2022), who noted that "as soon as the evaluation report is signed, we put it in a drawer so that we can move on to the next case".

Evaluation of police efforts must have a positive, pedagogical purpose: to learn as much as possible from what was done (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). These evaluations should concentrate on factors that may be important for future problem-solving. They are not intended to detect errors and find scapegoats. Experiential learning and evaluation are inherently linked. An evaluation aims to learn whether implemented measures work as intended: was the goal reached, and what can we possibly learn? In order to get a balanced view of the experiences from a service performance, an evaluation is usually done at a certain distance to the immediate experiences made during the intervention phase (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). The POD identifies two primary methods of evaluation: 1) tactical debrief and 2) systematic evaluation. A tactical debrief is a relatively quick summary that often occurs in the direct aftermath of an incident or experience, while a systematic evaluation leads to a more formal and comprehensive evaluation report that requires more time (ibid). Whether one should only carry out a tactical debrief or prepare an evaluation report is decided individually, depending on the case. Both forms can be used both for actual events and for exercises. Many practitioners seem to consider that the primary purpose of evaluation and investigation reports is to uncover errors and omissions, correct them and implement new guidelines and procedures in the organisation so that the police avoid making the same mistakes in the future. However, evaluation can also uncover best practices and new positive experiences and contribute to maintaining and further developing such practices.

Identifying and implementing relevant changes in the aftermath of severe crises is not straightforward (Nilsen 2018). First, the Norwegian police are part of a “complex political and social network of organised interests, citizens, user groups, and clients.” (Christensen, Lægreid, & Røvik, 2020). Increasing focus from this variety of actors on a specific event, such as the 22 July attacks, does not guarantee learning and changes throughout this complex network (Birkland & ProQuest, 2006). When large-scale crises occur, the government faces pressure to restore citizens’ confidence in the country’s leaders. This pressure may cause an intense

political focus to shift from one issue to another in ways that do not always serve the best interest of the organisations under scrutiny. Political priorities can also cause a loss of momentum away from relevant or desired changes (Bodensteiner, 1995; Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006). It can be politically difficult to conclude that the public sector's handling of a crisis is on par with reasonbale expectations. The nature of crises challenges common wisdom in terms of what a state can handle. It is unrealistic to expect Norway, or other societies, to anticipate all crises before any innocent people are injured, killed, or their values are challenged. Vice versa, averted crises – a form of success for police and the security services – achieve little or no public interest and, therefore, attract limited political attention.

To develop a more systematic and general understanding of how Norway seeks to draw lessons from major crises, the thesis now turns back to its case studies. Specifically, the analysis will focus on the 22 July commission report and the Dalgaard-Nielsen report to critically assess the *post-mortem* evaluation process of major incidents. To shed further light on this issue, the evaluations from the terrorist attacks of 22 July 2011 and the attack of 10 August 2019, respectively, are reviewed (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020; NOU 2012:14, 2012). This section critically examines the report's legitimacy based on a) *composition of the participants in the committee*, b) *contradictions in the report regarding planning vs characteristics of extraordinary crises*, and c) *evaluation based on hindsight*. Significant progress has been made within the Norwegian police since the 22 July 2011 attacks. On the other hand, there is more uncertainty about the extent to which the police organisation can close the gaps identified in the wake of an evaluation.

22 July Commission report

In the wake of the attacks that hit Norway on 22 July 2011, the Government appointed a commission of inquiry whose mandate was threefold: 1) What happened? 2) Why did it happen? 3) How could our society allow this to happen? (NOU 2012:14). The report was completed one year after the terrorist incidents, and its conclusions were accepted and recognised by the authorities, the media and the general public. The commission followed the guidelines set by the authorities and the law on public commissions of inquiry (NOU 2009:9, 2009). The commission was composed of 19 members, eleven women and eight men, and was chaired by Alexandra Bech Gjørv. Bech Gjørv is a lawyer and partner in the law firm Hjort and former director of Hydro and Statoil. Gjørv herself believes she was commissioned to lead the work because she was an independent lawyer without any impartiality problems and with experience

in investigations, both at the law firm Hjort and accident investigations in Norsk Hydro (Haugstad, 2015). The other members represented a wide range of backgrounds representing central societal functions, such as the former head of the Intelligence Service, retired General Torgeir Hagen (NOU 2012:14, 2012, p. 39). Only one participant (the committee's secretary) had experience in police work (ibid). The overall composition of the committee indicates a holistic approach to the investigation. This approach stands in stark contrast to the police's own evaluation report. The police report's committee consisted of eight police officers, all men (Politidirektoratet, 2012). In 2013, the proportion of women in police positions was approximately 28%, while in 2017, it had increased to 31% (Politidirektoratet, 2017). What the two different compositions may indicate, however, is that the police professional representation in the police's evaluation group was dominant while it is nearly absent from the 22 July inquiry committee. Unsurprisingly, the police report findings did not align with those of the Gjørv commission findings, specifically regarding the police's operational assessments and general police efforts. The Gjørv report missed a series of specific police decisions that either should have been implemented or were taken in the lead-up to the 22 July attacks. These missing points could have been avoided had the commission better represented subject-specific, that is to say, police competencies. To be too professionally rooted can result in an in-group bias because the evaluation group is too narrowly composed concerning the background knowledge of the members involved. In-group identities can shape preferences, thoughts, behaviour and social perception (Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2008). From my perspective, the least diverse and most professionally rooted is the police committee. The 22 July Commission have at least some different profiles. So the most significant risk of in-group bias is the police report. The 22 July Commission is at the greatest risk of being politicised and to lack nuance due to a lack of in-depth understanding.

The Government set up the 22 July Commission, while POD decided on the police evaluation committee. Respective compositions further suggest the aims and objectives were fundamentally different, which affected the reports' content in terms of the evidence they look at and how they corroborate findings and emphasise some issues over others. This also, of course, affected the type of recommendations they identified. The analysis will now turn to the content of the reports and point out three core elements of the reports: a contradiction, an oversight caused by hindsight bias, and a point of agreement.

First, in both the 22 July inquiry and the police evaluation reports, the most prominent contradiction regards the importance of appropriate planning. The 22 July inquiry report

concludes that the general plan was either deficient or not used, while at the same time acknowledging that it is not possible to have a complete plan for every crisis (NOU 2012:14, 2012, p. 16). Generally, the police report, not unexpectedly, found that the police acted following established tactics, techniques and procedures, and police officers acted to the best of their ability (Politidirektoratet, 2012, p. 74). On the one hand, following established procedures is vital for everyone who takes part in crisis management. Without any "roadmap", it would have been difficult for those involved to handle a crisis appropriately. On the other hand, and from a practitioner's point of view, police officers must deviate from already established procedures to solve the problem in some cases. It is interesting to note that the 22 July inquiry report found that the current planning was not followed effectively, at the same time as it acknowledges that it is difficult to make complete plans for all conceivable and unimaginable scenarios. Both reports partly overlook the level of uncertainty confronted by police officers during the crisis. This context of uncertainty is a missing dimension of the official post-mortem analyses that limit the quality of these reports and would have strengthened their overall legitimacy. This view is supported by Renå (2017), who further points out that the 22 July inquiry report, to a small degree, alternates between focusing on the uncertainty that prevailed and the challenges associated with this and the need for a clear and distinct presentation of what happened and why it happened (ibid).

Second, critics of the 22 July commission report maintain that some of its findings and conclusions suffer from hindsight bias (Blank, Diedenhofen, & Musch, 2015; Blank & Peters, 2010). How we look back on the past is inherently shaped by how things turned out and how they look like in the present. A concrete example is understanding the actual threat on Utøya on 22 July. How response personnel interpret and understand the threat situation is crucial for how they choose to tackle the challenge they face. According to the 22 July inquiry report, it is clear that there was only one perpetrator (NOU 2012:14, pp. 136-137). This conclusion contrasts with the situational understanding of some of the emergency personnel. This personnel had a clear opinion, based on, among other things, witness descriptions, that there was more than one perpetrator on the island, dressed as police officers. Some of the explanations given by the various witnesses can be explained by the fact that the perpetrator sometimes used a pistol, while other times he used an automatic rifle. The violence of the attack and the shock it caused to victims on the island also explains their confusion and difficulty in precisely identifying and defining the threat they confronted. Understandably, untrained people confronting a life-threatening situation sometimes have difficulty remembering details. The

investigation of the terror attacks on 22 July 2011 stated that the perpetrator used both types of weapons, which supports the statements of witnesses. This information does not appear clearly in the 22 July inquiry report.

Third, and reassuringly, both committees reached similar findings on a range of issues. One of those is that the police's role as a coordinating unit should be clarified. This consideration addresses this thesis's central research question and focus on cross-border situations. Crises involving several jurisdictions require precise strategy, intention, and resource allocation management. Appropriate management can either be done by clarifying the Police Directorate's operational role or by the same directorate pointing to one of the districts involved and assigning them the coordinating responsibility for handling the crisis. One thing that was clarified relatively early during the 22 July attacks was that the Oslo police district, not the Norde-Buskerud police district, the geographical "owner" of Utøya, should be responsible for the investigation response in the normalisation phase. However, there was no significant operational coordination between the various police districts handling the incident response in the adaptation phase.

From my own experience and professional affiliation, the 22 July commission was crucial for developing the Norwegian police. Without this thorough review of the entire police crisis apparatus, there is reason to claim that the current situation concerning structure, staffing and facilities would not look as it does today. However, I would argue that if the commission's composition had been represented to a greater extent with professional expertise (police competence), the report would, at least at some points, achieved greater legitimacy – especially among the executive part of the police. The analysis now moves to the report on the Bærum mosque shooting.

The Dalgaard-Nielsen report

On 13 September 2019, a joint mandate was issued by the Norwegian police directorate (POD), the Police Security Service (PST), and the Oslo Police District (OPD), which announced that an external committee led by Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen would evaluate the police and PST's handling of the terrorist incident in Bærum on 10 August 2019. The primary purpose of this evaluation was to identify learning points about what went well and what could have been done better related to the dissemination and follow-up of PST's threat assessments related to right-

wing extremism, tip handling, and the operational handling of the incident at the Al-Noor Mosque.

Dalgaard-Nielsen is head of the Department of Strategy at the Danish Defense Academy and Professor at the Center for Risk Management and Societal Security at the University of Stavanger in Norway. She is a former head of department in the Danish Police Intelligence Service, where she was responsible for the service's strategic terrorist threat analysis, external advice on security, and early preventive efforts against violent extremism. She is chairman of the board of Nordic Safe Cities and a board member of Copenhagen Insitute for Future Studies. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen has a PhD from John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and is affiliated with Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. The other members serving the committee included four men and two women who represented different professional environments, including the police, research and health sectors (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020, pp. 226-228). The difference in the composition of the 22 July inquiry committee and the Dalgaard-Nielsen evaluation group is clear: the Dalgaard-Nielsen composition appears to be more professionally balanced.

The most relevant sections of the Dalgaard-Nielsen report focus on the operational handling of the incident. It is also relevant to look for issues identified in the 22 July 2011 report and compare how these evolved by August 2019. That said, the challenges for the police in these two incidents are not entirely comparable, mainly because the attacks on 22 July 2011 took place in two different police districts simultaneously, while the attack on 10 August 2019 only involved the Oslo police district. The level of planification of the attacks and the challenge they posed is clearly also not the same.

Nevertheless, some of the findings of the 2019 report are relevant because they suggest forms of learning and adaptation. For example, the communication challenges regarding the analogue and outdated communication system that affected police response in 2011 were not found in Dalgaard-Nielsen's report. Appropriate communication is a prerequisite for operational management and leadership, regardless of whether the crisis concerns several or only one police jurisdiction. This was not an issue during the 2019 incident. Another finding related to operational management is that in the attack in August 2019, there were no disagreements between the operations manager and the ground force commander, which suggests an ability to effectively coordinate actions in the context of this crisis. Ambiguities concerning collaboration challenges were more prominent on 22 July 2011 than on 10 August 2019, especially during the incident on Utøya (NOU 2012:14). However, contextual factors such as the extent of the

crisis and the geographical location provide a convincing explanation for better interaction between the operations manager and the ground force commander during the 2019 attack.

Another interesting finding emerging from the Dalgaard-Nielsen report is that there was no contingency plan for operation managers and project management support, those who work with communication, or those who work with service planning. There were some on-call arrangements to increase intelligence staff during the crisis, but it was unclear who was responsible for supporting the operations centre with ongoing intelligence. The operations manager must fill in the capability gaps when significant incidents occur until dedicated staffing is established. This means they must spend a disproportionate amount of their own time and capacity on tasks not central to operational management. Media management, writing minutes from the assessment group meetings and pushing the assessments to national management are examples of such secondary tasks (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020, p. 220). The Dalgaard-Nielsen report notes that the operations centre in the Oslo police district has a preparatory potential to establish practices for internal interaction in the initial phase of crises. Particularly relevant in this context is the division of tasks between the shift members, coordination and collaboration (ibid). These findings point to a lack of contingency planning and are comparable to those found on 22 July (NOU 2012:14, 2012). This suggests that some critical lessons drawn from the 22 July crisis did not lead to adaptation. Following the Norwegian police's definition, learning has not occurred as it should have.

Both evaluations point out that the Norwegian Police Directorate's operational role in significant incidents must be clarified (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020; NOU 2012:14, 2012). The Dalgaard-Nielsen report finds that POD should clarify expectations regarding the contribution of their situation centre (PSS) during significant events. The report further maintains that if PSS retains its current portfolio of responsibilities and tasks, POD should scale up staffing and prepare better schemes, to quickly strengthen staffing levels outside office hours when extraordinary events occur. Alternatively, POD should scale down PSS responsibilities and tasks portfolio (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020, p. 224). In other words, the committee claims that PSS, with the current staffing, cannot take its full responsibilities and coordinate police resources in national crises and serious incidents. An interesting consideration in this respect is that the Dalgaard-Nielsen report does not say anything about who will carry out PSS functions if they are reduced or deprived of their operational portfolio. According to the report, PSS would probably not be able to take appropriate responsibility for coordination in national crises and in serious incidents that challenge the capacity and competence of one or more police districts in

the critical first hours of acute, unforeseen events (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020). The same issues were identified in the 22 July commission report (NOU 2012:14, 2012). With the current level of staffing and portfolio at the PSS, the reports identify a clear risk that the situation centre will become a bottleneck for a time-critical, national, coordinated response when a severe incident of national significance occurs (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020). This issue is still unresolved and is an example of the difficulty of closing capability gaps well after they have been identified. Such a clarification would hardly have a crucial impact on the police's course of action during the adaptation phase but could play a decisive role during a crisis mainly if it includes several severe incidents at the same time and becomes long-lasting. One reasonable explanation for why this issue has still not been solved is that politicians continue to have a strong preference for the traditional Norwegian model of a decentralised police force, which aligns with their electoral interests. This further explains why politicians prefer the decentralised model, it makes them look close to the electors.

Focusing solely on the evaluation of operational management, the evidence presented in the reports questions whether the police have learned from the findings identified in the case of the 22 July incident and closed the shortcomings it pointed out, especially regarding the police's ability to perform national operational management during severe incidents. Significant changes were introduced from 2011 to 2019, both individually and collectively, thus suggesting that the Norwegian police are better prepared to handle various crises. These include organisational restructuring to reduce the number of police districts from 27 to 12, more appropriate training and learning arenas like annual exercises and a new emergency preparedness centre, and better and new technology and equipment like new emergency networks and new technology and equipment as new emergency networks and new helicopters.

4. Anticipating future challenges

Crises usually occur unexpectedly and require efforts for which good plans and exercises have not previously been developed. Therefore, institutions such as the Norwegian police must establish good arenas for learning and maintain and further develop a good culture for learning. What significant challenges the Norwegian police will face in the future is difficult, if not impossible, to predict. Nevertheless, public authorities need to anticipate threats over the horizon to reduce – though not necessarily eliminate – uncertainty and constantly prepare for the next crisis. Researchers working in this field have identified and summarised various warning indicators or signals from home and abroad on behalf of the Norwegian authorities.

Their findings can support the police in identifying priorities and increasing effectiveness at the operational level. Such foresight, it is hoped, will enable the Norwegian police to handle future challenges better.

The uncertain nature of the threat environment does not only concern the police but everyone who works on societal security issues. Looking more closely at possible future challenges can help to evaluate whether the current structure and processes of the Norwegian police are appropriate. Focusing on possible future challenges can also inform operational management and leadership within the Norwegian police in the normalisation phase, primarily utilising national resources efficiently. Two traditional approaches to foresight are to make counterfactual assessments and "what if" analyses. This approach imagines what would have or could happen if basic conditions changed (Beebee, Hitchcock, & Menzies, 2009). A counterfactual assessment could be what would have happened if the Norwegian police had a good digital communications platform available to them on 22 July 2011? A "what if" example is if tensions between NATO and Russia continue to rise, this may result in the Norwegian Armed Forces becoming less available to support the Norwegian police in dealing with a crisis. In turn, this may lead to the Norwegian police, which bases part of their crisis management apparatus on relevant assistance from the military, also having to think and organise themselves differently in terms of operational management and leadership to deal with the crisis effectively.

In 2015, the previous National police commissioner, Odd Reidar Humlegaard, stated that:

> The challenge for the Norwegian police may never be more extraordinary, complex and demanding. Society is becoming increasingly complex. There is a sharp increase in migration to Norway. The global threat picture becomes increasingly complex and confusing. Globalisation ties the world closer together, and for Norway and Norwegian interests, developments and events far away can have serious consequences. Extremism has become more transboundary and closely linked to international relations and conflicts. The Internet is used to convey extreme views. Development and more cross-border crime demand the police's ability to adapt to an ever-changing threat picture and increase the importance of international police cooperation.
>
> (Politidirektoratet, 2015)

This quote highlights a range of potentially significant challenges for the determination of the Norwegian police in the light of the future. Is it inconceivable that an increase in polarisation among the people in Europe could lead to migration across national borders? Will the Covid-19 pandemic lead to more significant differences between the rich and the poor? Will an intense rivalry of great powers affect how Norway distributes its financial resources regarding national

security priorities? None of these issues and possibilities can or should be completely ruled out in efforts to anticipate future threats and incidents. These analytical challenges all belong to the normalisation phase – which needs to be defined more broadly than recovering from an incident. A range of possible future challenges could affect how Norwegian police, in general, will align their focus to make the best possible use of the police's and society's overall capacities and capabilities in the most efficient way possible. Future challenges thus concern the police's ability to conduct operational management to a very high degree.

In May 2021, The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) delivered an analysis of possible threats to national security towards 2030 to the Ministry of Justice (MJ). The main objective was to support long-term planning for the police, the Police Security Service and the Prosecuting Authority. The report substantiates the former National police commissioner statement from 2015 (Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, 2021; Politidirektoratet, 2015). The report highlighted four essential drivers of change that might impact future threats. The first relates to future conflicts, particularly the great power rivalry between the USA, China, and Russia. Such a rivalry may increase tension, affecting Norway's security policy strategy, and recent development in Ukraine suggests that this is exactly the case. For the police, an increasing rivalry of great power can lead to a greater focus on hybrid warfare (or hostile activities below the threshold of armed conflict), with specific concerns over the Norwegian border with Russia as well as Norwegian sovereignty across various dimensions (i.e. air, land, sea and cyberspace) (Ashibani & Mahmoud, 2017; Beaulieu & Salvo, 2018; Cullen & Wegge, 2021). This grey zone challenges the division between the police and the Norwegian Armed Forces' primary tasks. For the operational level within the Norwegian police, a hybrid scenario may require a more holistic national approach than the current decentralised structure where each chief of police is responsible for incidents in their geographical area of responsibility. Such a hypothesis probably requires a clearer national super-structure than the current system offers.

The second driver focuses on national and international socio-economic changes, primarily related to the long-term consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. More considerable differences and inequalities among the population, both nationally and internationally, due to the challenges in the wake of the global pandemic may lead to changing needs and expectations of the Norwegian police. More demanding tasks, such as radicalisation and thereby increased danger of terrorism, could challenge the police differently than today. A possible increase in the terrorist threat could affect the police's operational management structure regarding competence and support from national emergency police resources.

The third driver concerns technological developments, particularly emerging and disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, and digital security through encryption (Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, 2021). Technology develops rapidly, and it is difficult to predict how it will affect the Norwegian police's ability to conduct effective crisis management. The Norwegian police's establishment of a separate cybercrime unit is a relatively new (2018) example of adaptation to recent security trends (Politidirektoratet, 2020b). On the one side, this field challenges the police in knowledge, capacity, capability, and finances. The growth of cyber threats is likely to require a reallocation of resources and focus areas in terms of the police's ability to conduct operational management and leadership. The ubiquitous character of cybercrime also challenges current geographical areas of responsibility. A crime in the cyber domain does not necessarily relate to geographical boundaries on the ground in the same ways as more traditional crimes. Even if the IP addresses used have a location and the victim has been identified, it is not sure that this address is geographically located at the same place where damage has been registered. Here the absence of a national super-structure is likely to complicate investigations because each of the country's 12 police districts must establish the same competence and acquire the same technical equipment, which is not cost-effective.

On the other side, technological development can strengthen the police's ability to conduct effective operational crisis management. New technology can improve communication opportunities, both secure and open. New technology can facilitate the police's sharing of images and other relevant data and information across boundaries and partners, thus supporting knowledge and learning. It can also help to identify unusual activity that warrants further investigation. According to Leese (2021), predictive policing is among the most prevalent new technological tools for law enforcement. Understanding how the police produce and develop knowledge about crime and society in technologically mediated ways is essential to maintain its role in providing social order. In some ways, AI is already revolutionising policing. AI technology is already available, like facial and vehicle recognition cameras or powerful digital crime mapping tools to identify crime hotspots in real-time (Berk, 2021). This technology and its applications raise ethical, legal and human rights issues that have not yet been fully answered and grasped by the police and other government authorities (Leese, 2021; Rodrigues, 2020; Torresen, 2018).

The last driver of change relates to societal changes because of mitigation and adaptation to climate change (Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, 2021). If climate change continues to develop negatively, it will lead to more extraordinary natural disasters. One of the police's main tasks is

to lead rescue operations onshore, which could impact the police's operational capacity (Politidirektoratet, 2020b, p. 156). Such tasks can be demanding for the operations centre to handle efficiently, mainly because many actors have to contribute. Demanding search and rescue operations also require special units and skills that differ from the more traditional role associated with the police. Such operations are often time-consuming regarding overview and control, and they are often very resource-intensive, affecting the police's total operational capacity. Another aspect of climate change relevant for this study is the correlation between raising temperature and crime rate. According to Ranson (2014), climate change will substantially affect the prevalence of crime in negative terms. Although previous assessments of the costs and benefits of climate change have primarily focused on other economic endpoints, Ranson claims that crime is an essential component of the broader impacts of climate change (ibid). This issue might mean that the police will have to enforce new laws protecting the environment and fighting against environmental crimes (Pink & Lehane, 2012).

Both individually and collectively, these drivers of change already challenge the police's operational management structure, capacity, and capability. Although Norwegian politicians maintain decentralised operational management of the Norwegian police, FFI's hypotheses indicate that a relevant national operational super-structure may be appropriate to plan for and handle significant crises (ibid). The police is a social institution that is constitutive of the existence of modern society (Birkeland, 2007). It must remain open to the society it seeks to protect, to learn and adapt to it.

Conclusion

The normalisation phase aims to bring society, both at the individual and organisational levels, back to normal as soon as possible. This chapter expands the typical normalisation phase to include broader evaluation efforts that seek to draw lessons from crises as well as foresight efforts, informing post-crises priorities and change. The police must evaluate their efforts to learn from what was gone wrong and, at the same time, highlight what went well before, during and after a crisis. The events that hit Norway on 22 July 2011 and 10 August 2019, respectively, posed significant societal and police challenges that offered a broad range of lessons to be learnt, as this thesis exemplifies.

The police's establishment of a digital emergency network in 2013 was essential to handling the terrorist attack on 10 August 2019 and constitutes an excellent example of a lesson that was learnt and led to adaptation. However, some of the deficiencies highlighted by the events in

2011 have persisted. One striking finding concerns the police's ability to manage personnel effectively. The lack of appropriate operational management from the PODs situational centre is pointed out both in the reports on 22 July 2011 and the 2019 attack. That said, crises are often characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and rapid changes in the situation. Whether further changes to the police's operational organisation would have significantly changed the outcome of these crises is uncertain.

The police must facilitate conditions for experiential learning both at the individual and the organisation levels. These are vital points for the police to develop in line with the ever-changing security picture and range of emerging challenges. The Norwegian police have, to a certain extent, implemented significant changes to promote learning through exercises, education, and experience sharing in the last decade. Further research is needed to evaluate the range of impact these changes are likely to have. The challenges the Norwegian police will face over the next ten years are difficult to determine with a high degree of reliability. Scenarios based on key drivers of change provide a good starting point to anticipate future crises and needs individually and collectively. Looking toward the future can usefully challenge thinking on the current organisation of the police and its ability to conduct effective operational management so that society's shared resources are utilised in the most appropriate way possible.

Conclusion

Efficient and appropriate management is essential to provide societal security and public safety. This dissertation has examined how the Norwegian police's operational organisation contributes to resolving crises. The focus has mainly been on the operational level during crises affecting more than one police district simultaneously and where the crises are linked. Operational crisis management, especially after a crisis has emerged, is mainly about allocating the right resources to the right place at the right time with the best situational awareness possible. To answer the research question and assess the extent to which the organisation of Norwegian police crisis management has been effective, this dissertation has focused on two significant crises that affected Norway in the twenty-first century and engaged with a range of relevant academic debates relating to the different phases of crisis management. The overall arc of the argument developed in this thesis is that in the wake of the terrorist attack on 22 July 2011, the Norwegian police have made significant progress regarding operational management, especially during crises involving only one police district. These improvements concern key areas: from communication through new technology, new emergency procedures such as PLIVO, and the development of more robust capabilities at the district level. Nevertheless, this research also reveals persisting problems regarding the lack of clear guidance to coordinate operational management during crises that simultaneously affect several police districts. This argument has been developed across four chapters that are summarised below.

The first chapter looked at the Norwegian structure, overarching principles, peculiarities, and responsibilities regarding societal security, focusing on crisis management in the Norwegian police. Central to this chapter are the four main principles of crisis management and the individual and collective responsibility between the various ministries and the Ministry of Justice's coordination role. The two last police reforms reduced the number of police districts significantly from 54 in 2001 to 12 in 2015. These two reforms unequivocally take the entire police towards a more centralised organisation. Throughout history, the Norwegian police have followed a decentralised model with solid local anchoring – this model has been challenged by the new, more centralised approach. Whether this structural change increases efficiency at the operational level remains to be seen. One of the challenges with this centralisation, and relevant to the research question, is the ambiguity of who has what authority when the crisis involves more than one police district. Further ambiguity is likely to emerge at the political and strategic level, where ministerial responsibility is not always clearly delineated, depending on the type of crisis.

The subsequent chapters followed the stereotypical timeline of crisis management: from preparation to adaptation to normalisation. Chapter 2 focused on the preparation phase that precedes the emergence of a crisis. The analysis focused on the police handling of threat assessments and how that affected the situational awareness among those performing the missions. Timely, relevant and reliable intelligence is crucial to avert and prevent crises from occurring. Evidence shows that, in recent years, the Norwegian police have become better at sharing relevant information, including bringing the information to police officers. These changes can at least partly be attributed to the wake-up call that constituted the incidents that hit Norway in 2011 and 2019. The police have also put an emphasis on contingency planning to get used to preparing for a range of possible incidents. Specifically, the Norwegian Police Directorate and the Norwegian Police University college have led an effort to develop more uniform emergency planning to a far greater extent than before. In recent years, better information sharing and more uniform contingency plans have contributed to increasing efficiency at the operational level, especially in crises involving only one police district. But there continues to be a lack of a uniform planning system that unambiguously determines who has what responsibility in a crisis that affects several police districts simultaneously.

Chapter 3 moved to the adaptation phase, examining the police's capacity and capability for operational crisis management and their ability to effectively communicate and coordinate, cooperate, and interact. Considering the police's capacity and capability, the expectation is that the police will utilise society's total resources in the best possible way to bring it back to a somewhat typical situation. There are still some stovepipes within the Norwegian police, especially between the different districts and between the districts and the Norwegian Police Directorate. At the strategic-political level, the same issue arises between the MJ and other relevant ministries. These stovepipes hamper effective operational management and leadership, especially when the crisis is of such magnitude that it challenges the total capacity of an individual district. That said, significant progress has been made. Increased staffing, training, new communication technology and better routines for interaction between the various emergency services have improved capacity and capability, communication and coordination, cooperation and collaboration at the district level. However, there are still ambiguities related to crises that simultaneously cover several districts, especially when decision-makers have to prioritise limited resources.

The last chapter examined the normalisation phase and explored the police's ability to learn from their own mistakes through evaluation and implementation of best practices. Compared

with the period before 2011, the Norwegian police today have a greater focus on experiential learning and knowledge, both at the individual and organisational levels. The development and implementation of a learning culture among police employees seem to be well on track. At the same time, some of the interviewees claim that the challenge may be that the police's massive workload and overall portfolio stand in the way of optimising the police's ability to benefit from evaluations in the most efficient way possible. Managing time is about prioritisation, and prioritisation is a management responsibility. The end of the last chapter touches on the range of possible challenges for the police in the future. It is difficult to predict what challenges the Norwegian police will face in the future in general and even more at the operational level. Combined with the findings in the various chapters, these uncertainties form the basis for some implications and practical problems discussed below.

A policy implication of this thesis concerns the validity of the overall crisis management principles that define Norwegian crisis management, especially the principles of responsibility and conformity. On the one hand, the principle of responsibility stipulates that a chief of police has no limits in terms of responsibility in their police district. On the other hand, their liability is limited to a geographical extent. This does not correspond to the development of modern crises. Research suggests that contemporary crises are increasingly transboundary, and if this is taken as a basis, the principle of responsibility should be revised accordingly. Clarifying the significance and authority of operational authority at the national level in the Norwegian police will contribute to resolve cross-border crises more effectively. This is particularly relevant in crises that are closely linked to each other and where a particular action in one district could impact the outcome in another district. The weakness of such a recommendation is that it can increase the amount of time between when the police become aware of a crisis and when they respond. But centralisation is not a panacea. There is a risk that adding a national layer to the system will further delay police responsiveness. Another issue is that centralisation contrasts with a historical preference for local anchoring, which is equally helpful in identifying "weak signals" from the field. Perhaps the solution lies in maintaining local anchoring, especially during a crisis that only involves one police district, while at the same time having a clearly defined national operational superstructure that can both contribute to cross-border crises and also help to set direction and correct deviations both in the preparation phase and the normalisation phase of more major transboundary crises.

Excessive conformity can limit effective crisis management. Here, a shift from line management to staff management in fast-burning crises challenges traditional practices, mainly

because of a potential loss of momentum in handling crises. This dissertation has revealed weaknesses with this transition, and the recommendation is to maintain only one structure – either line management or staff-oriented management. Both structures can be scaled up or down as needed and deployed at the level of the Norwegian Police Directorate, the twelve police districts and the special bodies. Such a solution could help the police to achieve even more conformity and make future crisis management more predictable.

One overarching problem that emerged from the study is the inevitable tension between political and professional (police) dynamics. This issue is not unique to the police context, and was most visible when discussing the commission of enquiries and implementation of their recommendations. The tensions between the political and professional levels during the 22 July inquiry report were more visible compared with the evaluation after the terror attack in August 2019. Some of the differences can be attributed to the fact that the commission of inquiry after the attacks of 22 July was significantly more politically controlled than the evaluation of the attack on 10 August 2019. Similar tensions arise when coordination is required both at the political level between ministries, within the police, between various districts and between the two levels. In both cases, and over the medium to long term, effective crisis management requires an appropriate balance between political representation and professional expertise from the police.

At the conceptual and more academic level, this study questions the relevance of the three-phase model that dominates the Norwegian approach to crisis management within the police. Contemporary crises have become so complex that it is difficult to determine when individual phases start and end. The three-phase model is relevant when describing core elements and functions in handling a crisis, but its applicability is more limited in efforts to understand and assess operational crisis management guidelines. Moreover, timely, relevant, and reliable threat assessments are crucial in the preparation phase but also important during the adaptation and normalisation phases. Indeed most of the core requirements to effectively manage a crisis transcend the three phases.

Using an academic approach helps to broaden the way the police think about the normalisation phase and makes it more future-oriented. Predicting future challenges is demanding, but if the police make greater use of national and international research that summarises national and international criminal trends, it will be able to identify a range of possible improvements to a greater extent than today. In addition to the refinement of evaluations, academic outreach can

contribute to increased knowledge sharing and efficiency at the operational level. This future-oriented approach supports the preventive strategy of the National police commissioner.

Overall this thesis poses questions about what can and should be reasonably expected from the police in crisis management, with a particular focus on the operational level. What are reasonable standards of expectation? Standards of expectations are not fixed; they vary over time and increase during crises. They tend to be relatively broad because, by definition, future crises are uncertain. Government policymakers and the national commissioner will never stipulate a clear framework for what the police should be able to handle, but they and society do expect the police to perform exceptionally well at all times. This dissertation has focused on the police's ability to perform effective operational management in crises that affect several police districts simultaneously. When doing so, it has sought to restore some form of balance in the public and academic debate—using academic research and primary sources to develop more reasonable standards of expectations. Police reform and adaptations have enabled much progress since the 22 July 2011 attack. However, some critical deficiencies remain in the national coordination of major transboundary crises. It should be possible to clarify and resolve this issue to further reduce uncertainty before the next crisis occurs.

Appendix – Interview questionnaire

Background and experience

1. Current position and function
2. What is your role during a crisis or severe event

    - To what extent do you experience the Norwegian police national operational management in crises affecting several police districts simultaneously as effective?

    - To what extent do you find the transition from line management to staff management effective during fast-burning crises?

    - To what extent do you find the police's ability to operationalise national threat assessments, for example, issued by PST, to be effective? Are the police able to effectively turn threat assessments into concrete actions for the tactical level?

    - To what extent has the police's new emergency network contributed to streamlining the police's ability to exercise appropriate operational management?

    - In the police's latest reform, the focus was on the police as a learning organisation. To what extent do you assess the police's ability to close identified gaps after exercises and actual missions?

    - What do you consider the biggest challenge for the Norwegian police to exercise effective operational management and leadership in crises that affect more than one police district and where the crises are linked to each other? The police's ability to allocate the right resources to the right place at the right time.

- **General**
    - Other issues you want to address related to the research topic?

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