The Function and the Content of the Dream in Homer

Penelope's Dream and the Gates of Dreams in *Odyssey* 19

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the function and the content of the dream scenes and reports in Homer, principally through an analysis of Penelope's allegorical eagle/goose dream in *Odyssey* 19. It aims to demonstrate that Homer knew that dreams were products of the mind, but chose to present them as externalised (that is, coming from outside the self) for poetic and linguistic reasons. Having established this psychological basis for understanding Homer's dreams, it argues for a Lacanian interpretation of Penelope's grief within her dream which explains its negative affect. Finally, it provides an analysis of Penelope's 'Gates of Horn and Ivory', and evaluates the competing scholarly theories of their symbolism.

Acknowledgements

I want to thank my supervisor Dr Lisa Hau for all of her guidance, suggestions, thesis reading, and replies to my consistently rabbit-holed emails. I also want to thank Prof Joseph Russo for sending me a proof of his article 'The Ghost of Patroclus and the Language of Achilles' (2020), and for his correspondence. Finally, I want to thank The Harvard Library at Harvard University for providing me with a copy of Anne Amory's unpublished PhD dissertation *Omens and Dreams in the Odyssey* (1957).

Abbreviations

Cullhed	Cullhed, E. (2016), *Eustathios of Thessalonike: Commentary on Homer's Odyssey. Volume 1: On rhapsodies A–B*, Uppsala.
Dindorf	Dindorf, W. (ed.) (1855), *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Odysseam*, Oxford.
DK	Diels, H., & Kranz, W. (eds) (1952), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin, 6th ed., 3 volumes.
Erbse	Erbse, H. (ed.) (1968-88), *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem*, Berlin.
FrGH	Jacoby, F. (ed.) (1923-58), *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Berlin.
Haslam	Haslam, M. W. (ed.) (1989), *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri LIII*, London.
Herzog	Herzog, R. (1931), 'Die Wunderheilungen von Epidauros' *Philologus*, Supplementband 22, Heft III.
LIMC	(1981-1999) *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae*, Zürich, 9 volumes.
LSJ	Liddell, H. G., Scott, R., & Jones, H. S. (eds) (1968), *Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford, 9th ed.
MacPhail	MacPhail, J. A. (ed.) (2010), *Porphyry's Homeric Questions on the Iliad*, Berlin.
OCD	Hornblower, S., & Spawforth, A. (eds) (2012), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford, 4th ed.
PGM	Henrichs, A., & Preisendanz, K. (eds) (2013), *Papyri Graecae Magicae*, Berlin, 2 volumes.
Pontani	Pontani, F. (ed.) (2020), *Scholia Graeca in Odysseam IV: Scholia ad Libros η - θ*, Rome.
Schrader	Schrader, H. (ed.) (1880), *Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad Iliadem pertinentium reliquias*, Leipzig.
Wendel	Wendel, C. (ed.) (1914), *Scholia in Theocritum Vetera*, Leipzig.

Styles

References to the *Iliad* are given in Roman numerals e.g., V.123, unless citing a commentary e.g., Kirk (1985), on *Il*. 5.123, or when referring only to books, e.g., *Il*. 5, and references to the *Odyssey* are given in Arabic numerals e.g., 5.123, unless citing a commentary e.g., Stanford (1948), on *Od*. 5.123, or when referring only to books, e.g., *Od*. 5.

The Greek text of Homer's *Iliad* is after West (2006), *Homeri Ilias: Volumen Prius Rhapsodias I-XII*, Leipzig, West (2000), *Homeri Ilias: Volumen Alterum Rhapsodiae XIII-XXIV*, Leipzig, and the Greek text of Homer's *Odyssey* is after West (2017), *Homerus Odyssea*, Leipzig.

The abbreviations of ancient authors and their works are given in accordance with the *OCD.*

Where there is no standard system of referencing, competing systems exist, editions differ, or the most modern edition is incomplete, I give the reference with the name of the editor, so Porph. *Quaest. Hom.* Δ.434.7, MacPhail, but also Porph. *Quaest. Hom.* 1.6.6-10, Schrader. Similarly, Σ *ad Od*. 7.138, Pontani, but also Σ *ad Od*. 19.563, Dindorf.

Fragments of the pre-Socratics are referenced in accordance with Diels-Kranz.

References to Sigmund Freud are given in accordance with J. Strachey's *Standard Edition* (1953–1974).

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

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

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

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

Kylix depicting Selene attributed to the Byrgos Painter, c. 490 BCE, Altes Museum, Berlin. Beazley Archive Vase #203909. (After https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pittore_di_brygos,_kylix_con_selene_e_gigantomachia,_attica_490_ac_ca.,_da_vulci_01.JPG).

Introduction

Vividly juxtaposing our modern understanding that dreams are subjective experiences which emerge from the mind, it is often asserted that:

> dreams in Homer are entirely external to the dreamer and more comparable to divine epiphanies than manifestations of personal psychology.[1]

The Homeric conception of the dream by contrast appears 'extremely simple' or 'primitive', as scholars have sought to label it, for as Austin once observed, while anthropologists have abandoned such dichotomies 'in contemporary Homeric scholarship the assumption, however modified the language... still forms the ground of orthodoxy'.[2] This thesis will argue that Homer's dreams are neither 'extremely simple' or 'entirely external', for although they are typically (but by no means always) presented as external, and often (but not universally) attributed to the gods, this objectivity acts only as a poetic facade, that is, Homer's dreams were consciously externalised in order to present for his audience the inner workings of his characters' minds.

Further, the variation in Homer's dreams has been understated and rationalised away as interpolations, or the growing sophistication in poetic ability and psychical understanding of 'later' stratums. Consequently, in attempting to reach a *schema* of regularity scholars have athetised and elided that which transcends their models, demanding uniformity where Homer gives us variation. There is, however, a striking uniformity in the psychological suitability of Homer's dreams to their dreamers, along with a refusal to introduce into their dream-worlds content which could not have been dreamt by the dreamer themselves, that is, Homer anticipates Freud's view of the dream as essentially egoistic. Indeed, there is much

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[1] Traweek (2020), 110; cf. Flannery-Dailey (2000), 78; Holton (2022), 31; West (1990), on *Od*. 4.795ff.
[2] Messer (1918), 1, 6n21; Austin (1975), 3.

which unites Homer's dreams and ourselves for, as in Homer, the dream-world is built upon our own and takes as its content material wrought from our waking lives. Yet, despite these recognisable trappings the dream transcends our material constraints and offers us, as it offered Agamemnon, Achilles, Priam, and Penelope, a vehicle of communication with the dead, the gods, and the fulfilment of unrealised and repressed desires. It is, perhaps, worthwhile to recall Wittgenstein's remark that 'Frazer *ist viel mehr* savage*, als die meisten seiner* savages... *Seine Erklärungen der primitiven Gebräuche sind viel roher, als der Sinn dieser Gebräuche selbst*.'[3]

This thesis will take Penelope's dream in *Odyssey* 19 as its principal *exemplum* owing to the dream's unique elements. Through Penelope's dream it will attempt to elucidate other aspects of Homeric dreaming derivatively, arguing that dreams in Homer are, in-fact, 'manifestations of personal psychology'. In chapter one I assess the vocabulary of Penelope's dream and the nature of her request for its 'interpretation' within the wider Homeric context. In chapter two I argue that Penelope's external attribution of her dream should be understood metaphorically, which informs my discussion of Homer's externalisation of dreaming and the language used to describe dreams. In chapter three I distinguish between dreams and dream-reports, analysing the thematics of status and aesthetic production implicit in the narrativising of dreaming, and the relationship between Penelope's dream content and her psychology. In chapter four I consider the case for 'early recognition' and the possibility that Penelope invented her dream. In chapter five I discuss Penelope's grief within the dream, and the influential psychoanalytic scholarship which surrounds it. Finally, in chapter six I discuss Penelope's 'Gates of Dreams' and the competing theories of their symbolism.

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[3] Wittgenstein (1993), 130.

Overview of Scholarship

There has been much scholarship concerning dreaming in Homer. Historically, the dream was treated only *en passant*, typically as a medium through which the more philosophically rigorous arguments concerning determinism, the role of the gods, and the concepts of the soul and the mind might be discussed, or when confronting problems of authorship and interpolation.[4] Wilamowitz, however, would anticipate the debate which shaped the later scholarship, that is, as a portion of 'Homeric psychology', through his belief that Patroclus' *psychē* and *eidōlon* appearing in Achilles' dream (XXIII.54-111) demonstrated the poet's attempt to dramatise his inner psychological state.[5]

For Erwin Rohde in his *Psyche* (1890-4), influenced by Tylor's animism, the dream-experience was identified as the origin of Greeks' concept of the *psychē*, with the appearance of the dead in dreams as the mythic aetiology for the afterlife.[6] But Rohde was unable to find an example of the animistic 'double-soul' in Homer, and so, undeterred by the (lack of) Homeric evidence, he demonstrated this theory through a fragment of Pindar (fr. 131b).[7] Later, in his *A History of Greek Religion* (1925), Martin Nilsson, also seeking to clarify the relationship between the gods and the early Greek mind and similarly in dialogue with contemporary anthropology (Spencer and Frazer's social evolutionism), categorised 'two stages of religious evolution' in Homer, the first being the Homeric pantheon or 'epic machinery' which is ultimately unreligious and rationalist, and an earlier belief system which represents the 'original' religious experience through *daemones*, or 'powers'.[8] The

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[4] Wilamowitz (1916), 261; Nilsson (1925), 137-8; Kirk (1962), 216; Reider (1989), 4.
[5] Wilamowitz (1916), 111, 251.
[6] Rohde (1925), 6-8, 44n7; Tylor (1871), 49, 451; cf. Spencer (1898), 143; Dodds (1951), 156n1; Bowcott (1959), 162, 147-57; Lubbock (1870), 126. See also Frazer (1912), 260-1; cf. Durkheim (1915), 57-9; Lincoln (1935), 45-54. Also influential for Rohde was Nietzsche (1986), 12-17. For an historical overview of anthropology and dreaming see Sheriff (2021), 23-50. This idea was not unknown in antiquity, e.g., Lucr. 4.33-41,757-61.
[7] Bremmer (1983), 7; cf. Bowcott (1959), 112-3, 162-3.
[8] Nilsson (1925), 108-6, 170-1; Reider (1989), 5-6; cf. Otto (1954), 12. This is analogous to Frazer's concept of *mana* (Frazer (1906), 338-9).

daemon was used to identify the rapid change in psychological states over which Homeric people had no control:

> Homeric man is absolutely under the dominion of the emotion of the moment. When passion has subsided… His own behaviour becomes foreign to him, it seems to be something which has penetrated into him from without. He lays the blame on some *daimon* or god, on Ate or on Zeus, Moira and the Erinyes… A kind of division of personality has taken place within him.[9]

Nilsson's view demonstrated the idea that the Greek religious experience originated from a projection of psychological phenomena, as yet understood, onto coherent divine abstractions which resulted in an abdication of personal responsibility through this 'social-psychological defence mechanism'.[10]

Dreams, that is, another non-conscious intrusion of a seemingly 'other' psyche, are similarly attributed to *daemones* and the gods, externalised into objective visitations (*qua* 'epic machinery'), or otherwise presented as 'foreign' stimuli intrusive to the self (*qua* 'powers'). Accordingly, understanding Homer's gods became part of understanding the 'Homeric mind', and the Homeric dream-experience, typically divine, became a derivative portion of this 'Homeric psychology'. Moreover, Rohde and Nilsson's work exhibited the increasing introduction of anthropology and social psychology into the study of Greek religion, that is, initially, to see the Greeks as a 'primitive' culture which demonstrated the development from superstitious animism to a more rational theology.[11] This concept of an evolutionary 'progress' became pervasive in the early scholarship on Homeric dreaming.

William Messer's *The Dream in Homer and Greek Tragedy* (1918) is flawed by such a progressivist thesis. Messer, primarily focusing on the literary function of dreams, saw a

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[9] Nilsson (1925), 163; cf. Dodds (1951), 13.
[10] Nilsson (1925), 289-90; cf. Dodds (1951), 40-44.
[11] Nilsson (1925), 178-9; cf. Otto (1933), 7-8.

development in the artistic sophistication of dreaming from the 'earlier' 'simple' 'primitive', and 'objective' dreams-types, such as Agamemnon's dream in *Iliad* 2 (1-55), to the 'later' 'complex' 'allegorical' dream-types like Penelope's eagle/goose dream in *Odyssey* 19 (509-81).[12] However, there is no reason to conclude that Penelope's dream in *Odyssey* 19 is any more 'sophisticated' in its development of the poetic technique than the literal and objective types found 'chronologically' earlier, for these 'earlier' dreams exhibit different narrative functions. Further, it is difficult to suppose that *Odyssey* 4, where we find an 'objective' 'primitive' dream-type, was composed any earlier than *Odyssey* 19 where we find the 'later' allegorical dream-type.[13] Despite this, theories concerning this dichotomy of sophistication became the defining factor by which scholars delineated their approaches, often polarising Homer's dreams between those which were 'earlier' and 'later', and those which emerged from the religious or poetic imagination. Similarly, H. J. Rose in his *Primitive Culture in Greece* (1925) categorised dream-beliefs into three 'stages of progress' which he thought emerged chronologically; (1) the dream as objective fact, (2) the dream as

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[12] Messer (1918), 35. Further, Messer observed an evolution in gender dynamics, for men dream in the *Iliad* and women in the *Odyssey* (and tragedy) (Messer (1918), 51; cf. Hundt (1935), 42n7). But Odysseus' invented dream (14.457-506) and his hypnopompic dream-vision (20.92-4) damages the conformity of such a convention. These gender dynamics likely reflect poetic demands, since the *Iliad* concerns a war fought by men while the *Odyssey* allows women to feature more prominently. However, Hemingway argues that this does not explain the choice to make the epiphanies of Athena before Odysseus (20.32-4) and Telemachus (15.1.9) into 'waking-visions' rather than dreams (Hemingway (2008), 240-1; cf. Lévy (1982), 24 '*l'auteur s'est refusé a laisser rêver Ulysse ou Télémaque*'; Lake (2001), 23n49). That dreams come to women in tragedy (except the Charioteer's dream in the *Rhesus* modelled on *Il.* 10) does not necessarily support an evolution in gender associations, since it may simply represent the vehicle by which the gods and their omens were communicated to tragedy's aristocratic women. Whereas men receive premonitions by visiting oracles (Soph. *OC* 69-70; Aesch. *Eum.* 1-234; Eur. *Phoen*. 14-20) women, socially constricted to the home, are visited in dreams (Aesch. *Per*. 181-198, *Io*. 645-654, *Eum*. 103-161, *Cho.* 527-535; Soph. *Elec*. 417-424, Eur. *Hec*. 1-58, 69-97, *IT*. 42-49; cf. Pl. *Leg*. 909e-910a). Further, there are many male dreams to which the tragedians allude; Aesch. *Ag*. 13, 420-36, Eur. *Alc*. 354-5, *Cycl*. 8, Soph. *OT* 981-2 (Amory (1957), 49). See also Hemingway (2008), 236-54.

[13] Dodds (1951), 106.

an action of the soul, and (3) the symbolic dream emerging from the mind.[14] However, the first and third of Roses' stages co-exist within Homer, while the second is entirely absent.[15]

This kind of typological stage theory was also approached in Joachim Hundt's *Der Traumglaube bei Homer* (1935), who synthesised the earlier strands of analytic and psychological scholarship while incorporating newer trends in anthropology. Hundt, having noticed the variation in Homer's dreams, applied to them Lévy-Bruhl's theory of the 'primitive mind' which dichotomised thinking between a 'pre-logical' mentality, which Lévy-Bruhl thought ignorant of contradiction, and the later ('modern') 'logical mind' which could comprehend it.[16] Hundt concluded that the Homeric poems displayed a chronological progression in dream beliefs from the pre-logical to the logical, but argued that this was non-linear, that is, within Homer, Hundt saw an archaeology of 'earlier' and 'later' conceptions about dreaming co-existing owing to the poems' diachronic composition which could then be stratified into typological categories according to their temporal nuances.[17] Building on the 'exoteric' and 'esoteric' dream-types of F. O. Hey's *Der Traumglaube der Antike* (1908), Hundt defined two principal dream-types: The 'earlier' 'primitive' *Außentraum* which exists objectively in space, is enstatic, literal, often epiphanic (i.e., not symbolic), and sent by or emerging from an external force like a god or *daemon*, such as the dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon, or the *eidōlon* of Iphthime which Athena sends to Penelope, and the 'later'

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[14] Rose (1925), 151-2. The concept that the soul 'moves' during sleep is found later (cf. Artem. 1.80.3, 2.68.1-7; 1.72.2; Diodor. 37.20.2; Xen. *Cyrop*. 8.7.21; Aristides *HL* 3.48; cf. Pl. *Resp*. 616b-d; Cic. *Resp*. 6.9-29), but it is conspicuously absent from Homer (West (1990), on *Od*. 4.809; Kessels (1978), 108). However, the idea of the 'wandering' soul during bodily torpor has been observed as a widely trans-cultural phenomenon (D'Andrade (1961), 316). The absence in Homer of any relation between the soul and dreaming is likely the result of the lack of a *Seele*/*Geist* dualism (Bremmer (2010), 13; Snell (1953), 8; Flannery-Dailey (2000), 79-80), but cf. Bremmer (1983), 17-22 who argues that this does not mean the concept did not exist. Comparatively, Tedlock (1999), 89 has observed that among the Zuni of New Mexico, who subscribe to a form of mind/body dualism, there is a belief that the soul cannot wander during sleep since if it left the body the dreamer would die.

[15] Dodds (1951), 104.

[16] Hundt (1935), 5-10, 13n14. See Lévy-Bruhl (1923), 101, (1910).

[17] Hundt (1935), 5-6.

Innentraum which is subjective, often symbolic (i.e., requiring interpretation), 'psychologically real' and emerging from the dreamer's own mind, such as Penelope's eagle/goose dream, or the dream simile of *Iliad* 22 (199-201).[18]

Hundt's typologies have been immensely influential but are fundamentally anachronistic and misleading.[19] Penelope's reported *Innentraum* is also epiphanic, since the eagle-Odysseus interprets the meaning of the dream's symbols and delivers a literal message (19.547).[20] This dream is even implicitly externalised, since Penelope declares it came to her through one of two 'Gates of Dreams' (19.560-7). Comparatively, Hundt classifies Penelope's erotic dream of a young Odysseus (20.57-90) as an *Innentraum* noting that it is 'psychologically real', but at the same time argues that her attribution of the dream to a *daemon* reflects an authentic belief in Homer of god-sent subjective psychologically real dreams, thereby loosening the validity of his dichotomy.[21] Hundt's strict typological concepts are alien to Homer, being divisions unexpressed in Greek literature until, to a limited degree, by Artemidorus' subdivision of meaningful *oneiroi* into *theorematikoi* (like the Hundtian *Außenträume*) and *allegorikoi* (like the Hundtian symbolic *Innenträume*, but without the requisite 'psychological realness') (Artem. 1.2; cf. Macrob. *In. Somn*. 1.3.2; Eustathius *ad Od*. 1876:38).[22] Accordingly, it is more accurate to understand dreaming in Homer as 'kaleidoscopic' (Reider), that is, that Homer's dreams are so inconsistent so as to fail to be completely understood in both the articulation of their form and the beliefs held

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[18] Hundt (1935), *Außenträume* 44-80, *Innterträume,* 81-5; cf. Hey (1908), 10; Dodds (1951), 104; Reider (1989), 7. See also Messer (1918), 24-26.

[19] For the Greeks, there were no firm distinctions between symbolic and epiphanic dreams, and symbolic dreams could be interpreted as epiphanies, as Aristides often does in order that he emphasise his personal relationship with Asclepius (Festugière (1954), 98-102), and epiphanic dreams symbolically as in Plut. *Lucull*. 10.2-3 in which Athena appears as an *Außentraum* in order to deliver a symbolic prophecy, or Plat. *Crit*. 44a-b in which Socrates' *Außentraum* quotes a modified Homeric verse which symbolises the date on which the ship will return from Delos (Vítek (2017), 135; Behr (1968), 190-5).

[20] Kessels (1978), 21; Dodds (1951), 106.

[21] Hundt (1935), 87; cf. Reider (1989), 7-8.

[22] Harris-McCoy (2012), 14-5; Kessels (1978), 2, 121-22; Kessels (1969), 395-6.

towards them within neat typologies.[23] Despite this, the ubiquity of the 'internal-external' dichotomy, beginning in Hey, formalised by Hundt, and afterwards assimilated into most scholars (e.g., van Lieshout's 'active/passive' and 'ecstatic/enstatic' dichotomy and his subdivision of 'objective/subjective' dream-types, or Jouanna's 'rêve-vision' and 'rêve-visitation') demonstrates the degree to which Hundt's conceptions became entrenched.[24]

Prior to Hundt's study, Walter Arend in his *Die typischen Scenen bei Homer* (1933) had approached Homeric dreams from a formulaic angle. Arend coined the term '*typische Szene*' to describe the recurring highly patterned and formulaic 'scenes', such as the arming or sacrifice scenes in the *Iliad*.[25] Arend, noting the structural elements of what he termed the *Traumszene*, argued that dreams were to be understood as a variant of the *Ankunftsszene*, writing that '*Der homerische Traum ist nichts anderes als der Besuch eines Gottes bei einem Schlafenden*', and so, if acting as a messenger, as a sub-variant of the *Botenszene*.[26] Accordingly, Homer's *Traumszene* merely added the elements of 'night', 'sleep', and 'dawn' to these established type-scenes which, in turn, were defined in their structural elements by the formulas associated with arrivals and messengers. Thus, while the *Traumszene* did contain its own formula cluster, such as coming from afar, being described as outwith from the self, 'stand[ing] at the head' of the dreamer (στη δ' άρ' υπέρ κεφαλής II.20, 59, X.496, XXIII.69, XXIV.683; 4.804, 6.21; cf. 15.9, 20.33, 23.4; [Eur]. *Rhes*. 780), informing the dreamer that they are sleeping (εὕδεις, Πηνελόπεια 4.804, ευδεις, Άτρέος υιε II.23)), rebuking the dreamer for sleeping rather than taking action (II.24-5, 4.804, 6.26; cf. the inversion at 20.30-53), and ultimately delivering a message, Arend saw these elements

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[23] Reider (1989), 166-9; Arend (1933), 56, 61-3; Amory (1957), 30-70; Piettre (1997), 121. See also Morris (1983), 39-54.

[24] van Lieshout (1980), 28-34, 41-2, 54n1; Jouanna (1982), 45. See also Reider (1989), 177; Latacz (1992), 77-8; Dodds (1951), 122n8; Kessels (1978), 2-3; Russo (1982), 5n4; Schlatter (2018), 102-3.

[25] Arend (1933), 61. See also Gunn (1971), 15-17; Loney (2020), 213.

[26] Arend (1933), 61-3. See also de Jong (2001), on *Od*. 4.795-841.

merely as the *Ankunftsszene* and *Botenszene*'s particular nighttime articulation.[27] However, later scholars have argued that Homer's *Traumszene* does contain element of a unique typological consistency, noting that its formulas can occur even when the recipient is waking, and so have concluded that it must be patterned in its own right.[28]

E. R. Dodds' chapter 'Dream-Pattern and Culture-Pattern' in his *The Greeks and the Irrational* (1951) became the most influential treatment after Hundt.[29] In attempting to understand the particular externalised form of Homeric dreaming Dodds applied the psychological anthropology of J. S. Lincoln, viewing the dream-experience within its 'culture-pattern', that is, the unique culture's idiosyncratic phenomenological articulation of the trans-human psychophysiological experience of dreaming.[30] Lincoln, who was himself re-working Małinowski's concept of 'official' and 'free' dreams, had suggested a dichotomy between universal 'individual' dreams 'the unsought or spontaneous dream occurring in sleep', and the culturally idiosyncratic 'sought' or 'induced' 'culture pattern' dream which was of 'special tribal significance'.[31] Dodds argued that culture-pattern dreams, the 'sought' nature of which he elided, 'depend on a socially transmitted pattern of belief' related to myth, that is, the dream's particular form is determined by the surrounding culture which is projected inwards and 'cease[s] to occur when that belief ceases to be entertained'.[32]

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[27] Kirk (1985), on *Il*. 2.23-4.

[28] Morris (1983), 39-54; Kessels (1978), 161-2; Brillante (1990b), 29-54; de Jong (2001), on *Od*. 4.795-841, cf. Reider (1989), 162-7. In reaching a *schema* of regularity scholars typically eschew one dream or another, e.g., Kessels' (1978), 134-5 *schema* for the dream-scene is reached only by excluding Penelope's eagle/goose dream as an invention.

[29] Dodds (1951), 102-34.

[30] Dodds (1951), 108-9, 124n1.

[31] Lincoln (1935), 22-3; Małinowski (1927), 93-5.

[32] Dodds (1951), 103-4. The nature of this relationship to myth may be that myths are projected into the dream or, as in the Jungian view, that dream-content (*qua* archetypes of the collective unconscious) have determined many myths. Cf. Morgan (1932), 400 writing about the Navaho; 'myths, particularly the acted portions, influence dreams; and these dreams, in turn, help to maintain the ceremonies' with Jung (1956), 24. On the relationship between myth and dreams see Kirk (1970), 270-80; Austin (1990), 68-70; Kuper (1979), 645-662.

Dodds was likely following Lincoln's observations of a Yuma Indian 'from the time the Indian Culture was completely in force, through the stages of breakdown of this culture to the stage of acquisition of white culture or the absence of a distinctive culture of any sort', during which the patterned content of the man's dreams gradually subsided.[33] Accordingly, rejecting Jung's universal theory of inherited 'archetypal' dreams, Lincoln had concluded a correlation between 'manifest dream contents… and the religious and social culture pattern'.[34] The Victorian anthropologist E. B. Tylor had viewed this as 'a vicious circle: what the dreamer believes he therefore sees, and what he sees he therefore believes' but Dodds now posed the question 'what if he nevertheless fails to see?'[35] Instead, Dodds suggested that the dream was part of a more complex web of significations, and observing a hypnogogic state described by Aristides (*HL* 2.31-2), concluded it to be indicative of a 'self-induced trance, in which the patient has a strong inward sense of the divine presence, and eventually hears the divine voice, only half externalised'.[36]

Dodds employed Lincoln's theory in order to account for the perceived modern absence of the predominant Homeric dream-type which he termed the 'divine dream' (similar to the Hundtian *Außentraum*, but Hundt avoided incorporating the religious motif when discussing only form), and suggested it was not a literary invention (i.e., 'epic machinery') but instead belonged to a 'culture-pattern' dream-type no longer dreamt by modern Western dreamers (although, still appearing among 'contemporary primitives').[37] For Dodds, this particular culture-pattern dream in its formulaic regularity as externalised and objective belonged to the Greek 'religious experience', although 'poets from Homer downwards have… used it as

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[33] Lincoln (1935), 205-6.
[34] Lincoln (1935), 206.
[35] Tylor (1871), 49; Dodds (1951), 112.
[36] Dodds (1951), 112-3.
[37] Dodds (1951), 105-9, 118; cf. Amory (1957), 35.

a literary motif', and in viewing externalised dream-*eidōla* as 'father-figures' suggested that its demise corresponded to a general rise in individualism, the breakdown of the father as the *anax oikou*, and a shift in religious thinking to the power of the soul.[38] Consequently, Dodds concluded that Homeric people did dream *Außenträume*, that is, that Homer was employing the narrative conventions used to describe dreams in the poems from the dream-types apparent in the popular imagination at the time of composition, but that Homer was not consciously aware that such *Außenträume* were not actually 'objective' visitations.[39]

However, Lincoln had failed to distinguish between the dream as a subjective experience (the dream as object accessible only when sleeping) and the dream-report which occurs only afterwards (dreams *qua* dreams, provided they are not literary fictions, being knowable to others only through report), and thereby overlooked the social factors which influence dream-reports.[40] Further, Lincoln was likely wrong to claim that all culture-pattern dreams were sought, for as Park observed in his study of Paviosto shamans, shamanistic powers could be acquired through 'unsought' dreams.[41] Indeed, the sheer variability in dream beliefs within any given culture, especially without a religious orthodoxy, makes it unlikely that such beliefs would *inevitably* produce highly patterned dreams.[42] As Dodds later re-concluded, it may only be in recalling the dream that such patterned elements became prominent.[43]

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[38] Dodds (1951), 107-8, 118-9; cf. Brillante (1996b), 24; Feyerabend (1975), 182 '[sc. dreams] are not only *explained* by reference to gods and demons, they are also *felt* as such.' See also Gordon (1972), 48-60. Homer's transposition of inward monitions as outwith the self would then reflect the kind of cultural articulation which would determine the Hundtian *Außentraum* as a prominent culture-pattern dream-type.

[39] Dodds (1951), 45-50, 108-9. Dodds (1951), 117-8 argued that Heraclitus first demonstrates an awareness of dreams as subjective experiences (DKB89).

[40] Kilborne (1981), 170; Tedlock (1991), 161-3.

[41] Park (1934), 99-102; cf. Kilborne (1981), 170-1; Tedlock (1981), 323.

[42] Hemingway (2008), 29-30.

[43] Dodds (1965), 39. Similar to the view of Porphyry (*Quaest. Hom.* Δ.434.7, MacPhail).

The Assyriologist Leo Oppenheim in *The Interpretation Of Dreams In The Ancient Near East* (1956), took issue with Dodds' use of Lincoln's culture-pattern by arguing that the epiphanic *Außenträume* could not be termed a culture-pattern dream 'because they in no way establish the social or cultic standing of the person who experiences them, nor are they even a characteristic prerequisite'.[44] For Oppenheim, the number and regularity of what he termed 'message dreams' and the sub-variant '*Weckträume*' (like Dodds' 'divine dream' or the Hundtian *Außenträume*, which Oppenheim dichotomised against 'symbolic dreams') should not 'lead us into the belief that these dreams reflect in any way the extent and the variety of moods which characterize actual dream-experiences', that is, these 'literary' dreams cannot be expected to reflect the psychological status of the dreamer because they conform only to a pre-established literary pattern.[45] Although Oppenheim was willing to concede actual dream-experiences were used to 'embellish' the 'dream-story', he concluded that 'their substance and temper are subordinated.'[46]

Anne Amory in her *Omens and Dreams in the Odyssey* (1957) similarly diverged from Dodds on the reason for Homer's portrayal of dreams as externalised and objective. Amory argued that while Homer was cognisant that dreams emerged from the mind, he presented them 'as an objective entity' in order to create a 'full and emphatic representation'.[47] Amory concluded that Homer's dreams were an intentionally stylised illustration of a character's psychology that permitted it to be presented as 'a piece of the dramatic action'.[48] Influenced by Freud, Amory also noted that every dream in Homer (except Rhesus') could be accounted for by his principle of *Wunscherfüllung*, and suggested that Homer knew dreams

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[44] Oppenheim (1956), 185, 190.
[45] Oppenheim (1956), 185. See also Oppenheim (1966), 341-50.
[46] Oppenheim (1956), 185.
[47] Amory (1957), 69. A view reached in part by Wetzel (1931), and later by Bowcott (1959).
[48] Amory (1957), 70.

to represent unfulfilled desires thereby demonstrating his advanced poetic subtlety and high level of artistry.[49] The culmination of this psychological approach resulted, as Reid noted in his later psychoanalytic essay on Agamemnon's dream, in shifting the focus of the dream-experience from the 'sender' to the 'receiver'; 'The dream, therefore, is Agamemnon's, not Zeus''.[50]

Comparably, J. Russo and B. Simon in 'Homeric Psychology and the Oral Epic Tradition' (1968), influenced by the Parry-Lord hypothesis, Dodds, Snell's *The Discovery of the Mind* (1951), and Havelock's *Preface to Plato* (1963), sought to understand the influence of the oral tradition upon Homer's depiction of mental life. Dodds had highlighted Homer's propensity to present inward monitions as having an origin outside the self, a phenomenon which he termed 'psychic intervention'.[51] Accordingly, Dodds had argued that the influence of *atē* over Agamemnon (XIX.87-9) should not be understood as a 'personal agent' but rather a 'state of mind', that is, a lapse in 'normal consciousness' which was ascribed not to 'physiological or psychological causes, but to an external ''daemonic'' agency'.[52] Further, Dodds had suggested that these 'psychic interventions' could be presented as '*physical* interventions', highlighting the Achilles and Athena episode in *Iliad* 1 (I.188-221) and concluding that interaction between the hero and the goddess should be understood as 'the pictorial expression of an inward monition', that is, as the manner by which Athena *initiated* Achilles' mental activity.[53]

Russo and Simon went further, arguing that Homer employed his 'psychic interventions'

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[49] Amory (1957), 59; Winkler (1991), 229. A theory anticipated by Herophilus (Ps. [Plut]. *Plac*. 5.2), probably present in Plato (*Resp*. 571c-572a), and the basis for the entire Trojan War in Dio (*Or*. 20.19-24).
[50] Reid (1973), 34.
[51] Dodds (1951), 2-18; Russo & Simon (1968), 497, Reider (1989), 6, 35-6; Lev Kenaan (2010), 165-8.
[52] Dodds (1951), 5.
[53] Dodds (1951), 14.

as externalised ‘personified interchanges’ not only in order to demonstrate the ‘initiating’ of mental activity, but to depict vividly for his audience the minds of his characters, that is, Homer’s inner psychological states were presented objectively ‘owing to the the demands of the poetic performance’.[54] This argument resembles Amory’s, but Russo and Simon proposed that this propensity to externalise should not be understood as Homer’s high artistry, but rather the ‘traditional’ poetic preference ‘for depicting mental activity in terms of common and public operations’, that is, the oral tradition had preserved the form of expression best suited to public performance.[55] This was not to say that Homer was unaware that mental activity was ‘private’ or ‘located inside the individual’, but that the presentation of internalised psychological states had less interest for the oral poet’s ‘traditional style’, that is, his inherited formulas of language and established vocabulary.[56] Thus, applying this theory to Agamemnon’s dream, Russo and Simon concluded that ‘the dream does not only initiate or ‘‘trigger’’ Agamemnon’s subsequent behavior, but the whole ‘story’ of Agamemnon and the dream represents, for the poet’s audience, what we might call the way Agamemnon's mind works’.[57]

Further, Russo and Simon highlighted the lack of a distinction in Homer between the ‘gift of song’ and the ‘song itself’, observing that all of the *Odyssey*’s bards ‘receive’ their songs outwith and then ‘transmit’ them to their audiences, that is, in manner seemingly

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[54] Russo & Simon (1968), 489.
[55] Russo & Simon (1968), 489.
[56] Russo & Simon (1968), 489-90; cf. Porter & Buchan (2004), 11-12 who reach a similar view through the lens of Lacanian ‘extimacy’.
[57] Russo & Simon (1968), 483-4. Cf. Kessels (1978), 67-8 who contested that, owing to narrative function, Penelope’s dream in *Od*. 4 ‘is not simply ‘‘the way Penelope’s mind works’’, neither is *mutatis mutandis Od*. 6.13’. However, both Penelope and Nausicaä’s dreams demonstrate the psychological suitability of Homer’s dreams to their dreamers, which is then merely overdetermined with their narrative function. As Garvie (1994), on *Od*. 6.25-40 writes, ‘[Athena is] playing upon the thoughts that may have already been in the mind of a young girl who is being wooed by the best of the Phaeacians’. Is this not, then, the way Nausicaä’s mind works? Provided the dream is psychologically apposite we are gaining insight into the workings of her mind which, in turn, defines in a causative sense the content of Athena’s intervention.

analogous to the way in which mental activity is 'initiated from 'outside' of the person''.[58] Consequently, they suggested that there was an underlying 'parallelism between the ''psychology'' of oral poetry and ''Homeric psychology''.[59] This model of bardic inspiration mirrors the way Homer's characters present their dreams, for the dreamer is described as having 'received' the dream outwith before 'transmitting' it to others through the device of the report.

A. H. M Kessels' *Studies on the Dream in Greek Literature* (1978) sought to supplement a gap he perceived in Hundt's work and to refute the errors he saw in both Amory's and Russo and Simon's. Kessels argued that dreams in Homer, *qua* literary fictions, demonstrated Homer's belief that dreams were objective externalised entities that merely visited the dreamer, and concluded that Homer was unaware that dreams emerged from the mind.[60] Kessels did this by prioritising the dream's 'literary character', that is, to argue that Penelope's eagle/goose dream was 'not an actually 'dreamt' dream, but a literary dream that had a certain role to play in the story, and therefore had to be made fit for use in the narrative'.[61] However, Penelope's dream must still, following the logic of the narrative, that is, that Penelope is relating a credible dream, consciously resemble the expected dream-experience of Homeric people.[62] Kessels did concede this, but he cited as evidence for the specifically literary adaptation of Homer's dreams a 'lack of the fantastic', that is, as for Oppenheim, he viewed 'literary dreams' as having a form subordinated to their narrative function.[63] Curiously, Kessels still subscribed to Dodds' culture-pattern theory (and rejected Dodds' later emendation), and thus it is not always clear in his analysis where culture-

[58] Russo & Simon (1968), 495.
[59] Russo & Simon (1968), 495.
[60] Kessels (1978), 165.
[61] Kessels (1978), 2. See also Bremmer (1983), 19; Lake (2001), 10-57.
[62] Kessels (1978), 2; cf. van Lieshout (1980), 166-7; Harris (2009), 141-2. Cf. Cic. *Div*. 1.42. Latacz (1992), 76 argues that this is the only way that a dream narrative can be successful.
[63] Kessels (1978), 2-3.

patterned influence ends and this form subordinating literary adaptation begins.

Glenn Reider's *Epiphany and Prophecy in Dreams in the Homeric Epics* (1989), represents a break from the scholarly tradition inaugurated by Hundt through his rejection of the 'artificial' internal-external dichotomy.[64] Influenced by Lesky's *Göttliche und menschliche Motivation im homerischen Epos* (1961), Reider suggested that the psychological and divine elements in Homer were 'indissolubly intertwined', and thereby rejected the earlier psychologising theories as diminutions of Homer's religious content.[65] Reider argued that theories like Dodds' psychic intervention permitted scholars to take the gods seriously without having to understand them as divine beings, that is, while Homer believed in his gods, the scholar understanding them as only the externalisation of thought processes did not have to.[66] Consequently, Reider concluded that Dodds' triumph in reasserting the religious nature of Homer through his denial that the gods were merely 'epic machinery' was granted by the modern scholar only provided 'he can affirm the mystical element… if at the same time he can demystify it', that is, Dodds had 'established the psychological 'function' of the gods in dreams, but none of the religious 'content''.[67]

Accordingly, Reider observed a difficulty with psychologising Achilles' dream in *Iliad* 23, since Patroclus admonishes Achilles for forgetting about his burial, but as Achilles notes (XXIII.95-6), he is already in the process of burying him.[68] If Patroclus is to be understood as an expression of Achilles' mind he should, presumably, share Achilles' knowledge of the burial, rather than the *eidōlon* and *psychē*'s lack of knowledge from beyond the grave. Thus,

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[64] Reider (1989), 53-4.
[65] Reider (1989), 179.
[66] Reider (1989), 23-5.
[67] Reider (1989), 25-7.
[68] Reider (1989), 66.

Reider argued that understanding Achilles' dream as an expression of his wish to see Patroclus constituted a 'blinding' experience in which the 'richer levels of meaning' in the 'empowered universe' of Homer, that is, a universe with gods, *daemones*, and ghosts, is lost, having been substituted for a 'modern' 'internalisation' of 'life's mysteries' and the 'emotional and religious energy they contained'.[69] But one can still appreciate the richer world of Homer's religious structures and find within them their ultimately human psychological abstractions. Achilles' dream is just as much wish-fulfilment as it is the visitation of a ghost's soul, being overdetermined in its causation by its narrative function, historical religious filters, and Achilles' co-existing psychological motivation. These causative elements do not compete, but rather cooperate in order to lend the poetry its narrative power. Moreover, from the point of view of Achilles' mind, Patroclus should be imagined as unaware of the burial, for as Richardson writes, 'it is typical of Homeric psychology that Patroklos' ghost gives an extra impulsion to what is already Akhilleus' own wish (cf. 52-3 and 71).'[70]

Christine Walde's *Die Traumdarstellungen in der griechisch-römischen Dichtung* (2001) provides detailed individual literary analysis of dreams from Homer to Lucan. However, like Kessels, she dichotomises between the psychological '*spontaner Traum*' and the '*literarischer Traum*', the latter of which are her exclusive focus.[71] Benjamin Hemingway's *The Dream in Classical Greece* (2008) avoids this limiting dichotomy, and is one of the few recent works in which contemporary cultural anthropology has informed its conclusions.[72] Unfortunately, Hemingway's analysis is hamstrung by his repetition of the argument that Homer's dreams were only understood as external visitations, and lapses into the Whorfian

[69] Reider (1989), 66-8.
[70] Richardson (1993) on *Il*. 23.69-92.
[71] Walde (2001), 1.
[72] See also Harrisson (2013), 23-7.

fallacy when he concludes that Homer's absence a of verb for dreaming (which automatically implies it as a product of the dreamer) 'maintained a level of conceptual separation between dreamer and dream'.[73] W. V. Harris' *Dreams and Experience in Classical Antiquity* (2009) is limited by its scope (Homer to Late Antiquity), and therefore the depth in which Homeric dreaming is treated. Further, Harris outlines a *schema* for the deciding the 'realness' of dreams which presumes phenomenological continuity, writing that 'everyone knows that dreams have a tendency to be bizarre or illogical' and '[dreams] are never or hardly ever reruns of remembered experiences'.[74] This is not the view of Homer (e.g., 21.79), and modern anthropologists have typically agreed that acculturation changes both the form and content of dreaming.[75] Moreover, Harris fails to apply this *schema* fairly, for he while he argues that what he terms 'epiphany-dreams' were actually dreamt, these dreams are hardly ever 'bizarre or illogical'.[76] Stephanie Holton's *Sleep and Dreams in Early Greek Thought* (2022) merits mention as the most modern monograph, but her primary focus is medical-exegetic dream-interpretation and the pre-Socratics. Where Holton does engage with Homer she has a tendency to repeat earlier misreadings, discussed later in this thesis, and evaluates little of the prior scholarship.

In conclusion, analysis of Homer's dreams as conscious constructions representing a character's psychology remains limited to Amory's (unpublished) PhD thesis, Russo and Simon's article, and sporadic groundbreaking studies which have detected Homer's psychological subtlety (but which remain under-developed).[77] This thesis seeks to build from Amory's central idea, re-framing it in the light of contemporary scholarship in

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[73] Hemingway (2008), 48, following Kessels (1978), 198-9.
[74] Harris (2009), 14-17.
[75] Spaulding (1981), 338-9.
[76] Bilbija (2012), 161.
[77] See Austin (1975), Russo (1982).

cognitive anthropology, the linguistics of metaphor theory, and Lacanian psychoanalysis, in order to better understand Penelope's dream in *Odyssey* 19, and the dream in Homer more generally.

Chapter One: The Unconscious and the Implicit

In *Odyssey* 19 Penelope is at a point of heightened anxiety, an unparalleled personal pessimism (cf. 19.257-8; 19.312-316; 19.518-24), and torn between conflicting loyalties for her son and her husband (19.524-534).[78] Time has run out for Ithaca's queen, and the ploys she has woven and unwoven in order to hinder her re-marriage have been exposed (2.104-10; 19.137-164). The ravenous suitors continue to diminish Telemachus' inheritance (13.319, 372-7, 396, 428; 19.159-69; 19.534), whose life is in danger (2.246-51; 16.409-12), and whose future remains uncertain. Since the poem began the situation on Ithaca has developed rapidly and Penelope has no more tricks; she must now take action (19.157-8).[79] Simultaneously, a flurry of premonitions both human (17.513-27, 541-3, 19.304-6) and divine (17.150-65, 19.36-40) emerge which prophesy Odysseus' return and gain in importance and frequency, thereby framing Penelope's decision to hold the contest of the bow.[80] This moment of anxiety, and the interplay between the audience's knowledge and Penelope's intuition heightens the underlying timeliness of Odysseus' *nostos*, and intensifies the impending sense that the poem is reaching its eventual climax.[81]

Psychologically, Penelope is tormented by her conscious belief that Odysseus is dead (cf. 19.312-16; 23.15-19) and her repressed fantasy of his return which is founded in the omens, her dreams, and the impossible hearsay (cf. 17.150).[82] Additionally, Penelope has developed a preconscious affinity for the uncanny stranger who has appeared in her home (cf. 20.204-5), brings news of Odysseus, is seemingly connected with these omens, and in whom she feels intuitively confident enough to confide her personal anxieties (cf. 19.253-4,

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[78] Amory (1963), 105; Austin (1975), 233.
[79] See de Jong (2001), on *Od*. 19.570-81; Russo (1982), 10; Morris (1983), 41-2; Amory (1957), 174.
[80] Amory (1963), 100, 108-9; Harsh (1950), 6-7; cf. the cledonistic utterances at 17.247-253; 18.112-7; 20.97-101, 112-120; 20.199-225, 230-4, 21.153-4. See also Lateiner (2005), 91-104.
[81] Russo (1982), 4-5; Amory (1963), 102-3. On this timeliness see Austin (1975), 239-53.
[82] Amory (1963), 104-5.

19.350-2).[83] Penelope's terms of address for the stranger develop throughout the interview from ξεῖνε (19.104, 124, 215, 253) to ξεῖνε φίλος (19.350), demonstrating this increasing feeling of intimacy seemingly predicate to the dream-report (cf. 19.309, 350-1, 589-95, 598-9).[84] Accordingly, by the end of the interview, the audience begin to feel through the erosion of any distance, both physical and psychological, that the reunion is close at hand and that the fate of the suitors has become ineluctable. Yet Penelope refuses to accept the premonitions of Odysseus' return, doubts the meaning and fulfilment of her dream, and is practically the last person to recognise that the stranger is actually her husband.[85] Consequently, Penelope's dream and her reactions to it have engendered disparate readings of *Odyssey* 19, branded by Analysts as illogical and inconsistent, by Unitarians as subtle and intuitive, and attracting psychoanalysts who detect in Penelope's actions and dream her latent desires, repressions, and resistances.[86]

In the latter books of the *Odyssey* there is an increasing use of metaphor, symbolism, and allegory which illustrates a growing poetic dependence upon the implicit.[87] In Homer, moments of 'intuitive' inspiration that seem to emerge from below the level of full consciousness are typically presented as 'psychic interventions', but in *Odyssey* 19 this externalised conception co-exists with an expansion of internalised psychical events. This can be explained as the result of the returning quality of *homophrosynē* (like-mindedness), extolled by Odysseus as the cornerstone of a perfect union (6.180-185), between Penelope

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[83] Harsh (1950), 7; Russo (1992), on *Od*. 19.205-7, 9-10.
[84] Rutherford (1992), 33; Griffith (2004), 161-2; Lateiner (1995), 268, 268n49. See esp. Büchner (1940), 133-4.
[85] Reider (1989), 138; Russo (1982), 10; cf. Odysseus' reluctance to believe that he is in Ithaca (13.324-6), and Telemachus' that the stranger is Odysseus (16.194-200) (Amory (1963), 132n19).
[86] Russo (1982), 7-8; Harsh (1950), 1, 1n3-4; Hundt (1935), 86-7n17-18.
[87] Russo (1982), 2; Harsh (1950), 2; Rutherford (1992), on *Od*. 19.380-1.

and the stranger (cf. the juxtaposition of their respective *Wunschträume* 20.60-90, 92-4).[88] Consequently, there is, in *Odyssey* 19, a synthesis of the greater Homeric cosmic rhythm with an internalised psychic rhythm, which is interwoven between Penelope's fantasy of Odysseus' return, the seemingly hopeless 'reality' of Penelope's practical situation, and the special nature of the rapport between the stranger and Ithaca's troubled Queen.[89] This synthesis is then distilled within Penelope's dream. Significantly, in revealing to Odysseus and the audience the conflicts and fantasies of Penelope's mind through the proleptic allegory of the dream, Homer chooses to punctuate *Odyssey* 19 (and so the final actions of the poem) through the device of the dream-report.[90] This intimates the profound connection between the characters, plot, and dreaming in the latter books of the *Odyssey*.

At the culmination of the interview, and so at the highest point of *homophrosynē* between Penelope and the stranger, that is, at which Austin writes that she and Odysseus 'converse as man and wife, as if recognition and reunion has already taken place', Penelope reports her dream:[91]

> ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι τὸν ὄνειρον ὑπόκριναι καὶ ἄκουσον.
> χῆνές μοι κατὰ οἶκον ἐείκοσι πυρὸν ἔδουσιν
> ἐξ ὕδατος, καί τέ σφιν ἰαίνομαι εἰσορόωσα·
> ἐλθὼν δ' ἐξ ὄρεος μέγας αἰετὸς ἀγκυλοχείλης
> πᾶσι κατ' αὐχέν' ἔαξε καὶ ἔκτανεν· οἳ δ' ἐκέχυντο
> ἀθρόοι ἐν μεγάροις, ὃ δ' ἐς αἰθέρα δῖαν ἀέρθη.

[88] Austin (1975), 200-36; Russo (1982), 4-5; Amory (1963), 108-9; Whitman (1958), 168-9, 303-4; van Nortwick (1979), 272-76; Vlahos (2011), 12, 33; Walde (2001), 55. This is to read Odysseus' vision as a hypnopompic fantasy emerging (undisguised) at the moment of consciousness leading out of sleep (Amory (1963), 108). Evidence for this can be found in the description of Athena which parallels the formulaic *Traumszene* (παρεστάμεναι κεφαλῆφι) (Russo (1992), 12), and by noting that the dream-vision represents the fulfilment of a wish (to be recognised by Penelope) (de Jong (2001), on *Od*. 20.92-4). See also Amory (1963), 113; cf. Wilamowitz (1927), 19. The juxtaposition of these dreams corresponds with the phenomenon Wikenhauser called '*Doppelträume*', e.g., the dreams of Daniel and Nebuchadnezzar (Joseph. *AJ* 10.2.4), the linked dream of a mother in Epidaurus and her daughter in Sparta (B21, Herzog), or the Erinyes' dream(s) of Clytemnestra (Aesch. *Eum*. 90-141) in which two or more dreams are identical or confirm the other's validity (see Wikenhauser (1948), 100-111; Oppenheim (1956), 209). See also Dodds (1973), 168-70; Sels (2013), 567-8. For Homer, Penelope and Odysseus' *Doppelträume* demonstrate the validity of their *homophrosynē*. On *homophrosynē* in the *Odyssey* see Bolmarcich (2001), 205-213.

[89] Reider (1989), 148-50; Russo (1982), 11n15. See esp. Austin (1975), 239-53.

[90] Amory (1957), 55; Reider (1989), 148-50; cf. Austin (1975), 223-4; Guidorizzi (2013), 61 calls the dream the '*conclusione di un sotterraneo gioco psicologico*'.

[91] Austin (1975), 231.

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ κλαῖον καὶ ἐκώκυον ἔν περ ὀνείρωι,
ἀμφὶ δέ μ’ ἠγερέθοντο ἐϋπλοκαμῖδες Ἀχαιαί
οἴκτρ’ ὀλοφυρομένην, ὅ μοι αἰετὸς ἔκτανε χῆνας.
ἂψ δ’ ἐλθὼν κατ’ ἄρ’ ἕζετ’ ἐπὶ προύχοντι μελάθρωι,
φωνῆι δὲ βροτέηι κατερήτυε φώνησέν τε·
‘θάρσει, Ἰκαρίου κούρη τηλεκλειτοῖο·
οὐκ ὄναρ, ἀλλ’ ὕπαρ ἐσθλόν, ὅ τοι τετελεσμένον ἔσται.
χῆνες μὲν μνηστῆρες, ἐγὼ δέ τοι αἰετὸς ὄρνις
ἦα πάρος, νῦν αὖτε τεὸς πόσις εἰλήλουθα,
ὃς πᾶσι μνηστῆρσιν ἀεικέα πότμον ἐφήσω.’
ὣς ἔφατ’, αὐτὰρ ἐμὲ μελιηδὴς ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν·
παπτήνασα δὲ χῆνας ἐνὶ μεγάροις ἐνόησα
πυρὸν ἐρεπτομένους παρὰ πύελον, ἦχι πάρος περ.
(19.535-553)[92]

1.1 *Hypokrinesthai* and the *Oneiropoloi*

Penelope asks the stranger to ὑπόκριναι her dream, often translated as interpret (e.g., Stanford (1948) on *Od*. 19.535; cf. 15.170), but following Else, meaning more literally to ‘sort/separate’ it (as derived from the root verb, κρίνω ‘to separate’), that is, to render the dream in polarised divinatory terms (cf. V.150, 20.87-90, Pl. *Resp*. 571c-572a) for it requires no actual ‘interpretation’ as the dream self-translates its own symbolism (cf. Artem. 1.72.2).[93] The only other use of ὑποκρίνεσθαι in the *Odyssey* which takes an object occurs when Peisistratus asks Menelaus to sort the earlier eagle-goose omen (15.170), which anticipates the symbolic system of this dream, between one of two options. Before Menelaus can respond Helen interjects, speaking the words of a *mantis* (15.172) about the omen’s *telos* (15.173), that is, its fulfilment.[94] Thus, ὑποκρίνεσθαι means for Penelope ‘to pronounce a decision on the *telos* of the dream-omen’ for, as Sauer observed, Penelope is concerned only

[92] **535** translators reverse the order of the Greek, which unusually asks Odysseus to ὑπόκριναι *then* ἄκουσον to the dream. This anomaly was noticed by Eustathius (*ad loc*.), and explained as *hysteron-proteron* (Russo (1992), *ad loc*.; Stanford (1948) *ad loc.*), i.e., the more important of the two ideas comes first. On *hysteron-proteron* in Homer see Basset (1920), 39-62.
543 note the ambiguity: μοι can take χῆνας as a simple possessive, or with ἔκτανε as dative of disadvantage ‘the eagle killed them *for me*’ (Russo (1992), *ad loc*.). A third latent reading may be found in hearing μοι αἰετὸς as ‘*my* eagle’, and playing on the dramatic irony that the it is not the geese(=suitors) who are ‘hers’, but the eagle(=Odysseus) (Russo (1992), *ad loc*.). See also Austin (1975), 122-3. de Jong (2001), on *Od*. 19.535-69 views this as a ‘complex’ form of the omen type-scene. On punning in this dream see Noegel (2002), 174-178.
[93] Else (1959), 75-107; Amory (1957), 31-2; Hoekstra (1989), on *Od*. 15.170. See esp. Zucchelli (1962), 21.
[94] Nagy (2002), 143.

with the dream's fulfilment, which is the reason she follows the report with her oneirology on the 'Gates of Dreams'.[95]

While Brillante notes that Penelope does not exclude Odysseus' response from being interpretive, this can only be accepted if Odysseus is unaware that Penelope is asking him to 'sort' the dream.[96] Since 'sort' is the intended Homeric use, Odysseus is therefore excluded from a superfluous interpretive response and in taking on the rôle of the mantic Helen replies, 'it is not possible to have sorted [ὑποκρίνασθαι] this dream [ὄνειρον] any other way by bending it (away)' (19.555-6). Consequently, Guidorizzi is wrong to write that Penelope's dream inaugurates '*l'interpretazione dei sogni nella cultura greca*', for ὑποκρίνεσθαι means in Homer 'to give an opinion in response to someone's question or challenge' (cf. 2.111; VII.407), and in a divinatory context more literally to 'sort/separate' an omen, rather than 'interpret' it in the sense of translating a symbolic system.[97] Further, Nagy has connected ὑποκρίνεσθαι with 'oracular poetry' which links 'heroic poetry' and 'the language of seers', that is, Penelope speaks her dream-omen and asks Odysseus to 'formalise the speech-act radiating from the dream' thereby granting it the prophetic quality of 'mantic poetry'.[98] This aligns Penelope's request with the context of the report for it does not actually require any 'interpretation', that is, Penelope reports her dream in order to seek in response a sign, and yet also, in part, for the stranger's benefit.[99] There are, as Stockdale writes 'external and internal audiences for omens in Homeric epic', and the dream-report is

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[95] Kessels (1978), 29-30; Sauer (1965), 55; Reider (1989), 73-4n18. Struck suggests that in asking the beggar to 'interpret' the dream Penelope asks him to 'be the eagle', i.e., to be Odysseus', but this must be wrong on account of the Homeric conception of dream-interpretation, for Penelope is not asking for an 'interpretation' in any sense akin to the eagle's (Struck (2016), 260).

[96] Brillante (2009), 705.

[97] Guidorizzi (2013), 60; Else (1959), 75-107; Kessels (1978), 97, 121n44; Russo (1992), on *Od*. 19.552; Else (1959), 75-107; cf. Lesky (1966), 239-46. LSJ give the translation 'interpret' with reference to 19.535 alone. See also Ley (1983), 20-23.

[98] Nagy (2002), 142-4; Nagy (1990), 168n95; cf. Flannery-Dailey (2000), 85-6; Levaniouk (2011), 239.

[99] Amory (1957), 175; Nagy (2013), 377.

no different, acting as a sign for both Penelope and Odysseus, while simultaneously expressing their intuitive *homophrosynē*.[100] This closely resembles the context of Aeschylus' *Choephori* (527-535) where Orestes, the *nostos* hero, hears an allegorical dream-report in which he is symbolised by an animate object (a snake), thereby informing him that he is operating '*mit Wissen und Willen der Götter*' (Walde).[101]

Indeed, translating ὑποκρίνεσθαι as 'interpret' would be anachronistic to the Homeric conception of dream-interpretation. Homer makes no mention of the '*Traumdeuter*', but as Hey identified, the '*Traumseher*', that is, figures like the *oneiropoloi* (I.63, V.148-51) who dreamt dream-omens, rather than those who interpreted dreams as a symbolic system (as exemplified by the *oneirocritēs*).[102] Penelope is asking the stranger to give his view on whether or not the dream is to be fulfilled (cf. XII.228), the same conception expressed in her 'Gates of Dreams', and that which is indirectly related to the dichotomy of meaning between ὄναρ and ὕπαρ (20.90; cf. 19.547).[103] The fundamental distinction for Homeric dreams remains that of meaningfulness, as is maintained in later literature (cf. Hdt. 7.16b-c; Aesch. *Cho.* 534, 540-2).[104] Despite this, scholars have argued that *oneiropolos* means *Traumdeuter* in Homer (as it is used in Herodotus (1.128; 5.55-6)).[105] Traweek writes '[in

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[100] Stockdale (2019), 1. If we understand dream-reports in the Maussian sense as a reciprocal 'gift' (the dream in an 'external origin culture' can already be conceived of as a 'gift' to the dreamer) Penelope's report can be understood through its expectation of a revealing reply (Leonard & Dawson (2019), 390-1). For, as Wagner-Pacifici and Bershady write, the sharing of dreams is 'an intimate, if strategic, revelation with an expectation of a return in kind' (Wagner-Pacifici & Bershady (1993), 139). Comparatively, Amory (1963), 106 suggested that the request for 'interpretation' is a way of testing if the stranger is Odysseus.

[101] Walde (2001), 66; Cederstrom (1971), 133-8. Messer (1918), 31-32, 32n106 suggests Penelope's dream became the model for the allegorical dream-types of tragedy.

[102] Hey (1908), 11; Kessels (1978), 25-35; van Lieshout (1980), 165-6; Reider (1989), 160; Bowcott (1959), 162; but cf. Dodds (1951), 123n22, (1973), 178-9; Hundt (1935), 102-3; Stanford (1948), *ad loc*.; Struck (2016), 260. Zenodotus athetised I.63 because he could not find a Homeric *Traumdeuter* (Kirk (1985), *ad loc*.). Cf. Theophr. *Char*. 16.11.

[103] As Björk (1949), 307 noted any society which practices oneiromancy must distinguish between meaningful and non-meaningful dreams. Artemidorus dichotomised lexically between ἐνύπνια and ὄνειροι (Artem. 1.2; 4.praef). On dream classifications see Blum (1936), 60-7; Kessels (1969), 396-401.

[104] Dodds (1951), 106-7, 123n23; Amory (1957), 31; cf. Lévy-Bruhl (1923), 101. See also Macrob. *In Somn.* 1.7.4-6 who is probably paraphrasing a lost portion of Porph. *Quaest. Hom.*, who, in turn, was likely discussing this distinction in relation to Agamemnon's dream (Stahl (1952), 119n3; Blum (1936), 57)

[105] Herodotus' use represents the only extant mention of the *oneiropoloi* in the Classical period. Further, Herodotus is familiar with dream-interpretation without the *oneiropoloi* (Hdt. 6.107; cf. Hdt. 128.2).

Homer] there is a profession dedicated to the interpretation of dreams, *ho oneiropolos* (*Il*. 1.63, 5.149)'.[106] But *oneiropolos* cannot mean *Traumdeuter* at I.63, for when Achilles calls for an *oneiropolos* (alongside a *hiereus* and *mantis*) there are no dreams which require interpreting.[107] It seems more likely that the *oneiropolos* was summoned to report his own dreams as a *Traumseher*, that is, to report the dream-omens he subjectively experiences, which, like Penelope's dream-report to Odysseus, would have occurred prior and Achilles asserts originate with Zeus (I.64).[108] Indeed, the scholiast writes ὅτι ὀνειροπόλος ὁ διά τῶν ἰδίων ὀνείρων μαντευόμενος, οὐχ ὁ ὀνειροκριτής (Σ *ad Il*. 5.149, Erbse), while Porphyry follows the Platonic model by which the *oneiropolos*, like a poet, was a spectator to external inspiration (i.e., 'possessed by dreams'), and therefore a *mantis* who relied upon subjective experience (Porph. *Quaest. Hom.* 1.6.6-10, Schrader).[109] Moreover, if *oneiropolos* meant *Traumdeuter* it seems superfluous to then coin the word *oneirocritēs*.[110]

Although it is unclear if the practice of incubation was known to Homer (but the rituals attributed to the Sēlloi (XVI.233-5) closely resemble those of incubation shrines (cf. Eust. *ad loc.*)), the historical precedent of important individuals seeking meaningful dreams in

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[106] Traweek (2020), 110. So Hughes (2000), 11; Thonemann (2020), 20; Pratt (2011), 220-1; Harris (2009), 135; Guidorizzi (2013), 59-60; Weber (2003), 17; Renberg (2015), 235-6; Petridou (2016), 129; West (1997), 46-8. Holton (2022), 152-3 translates *oneiropolos* as 'dream-interpreter' but notes that 'it may be more likely that a scenario of inspired divination is to be understood' while later claiming that Eurydamas 'is able to interpret dreams' (189n16).

[107] Thus, I cannot follow Holton (2022) 152 when she writes that Achilles is suggesting to consult 'someone who can interpret dreams – an ὀνειρόπολος – so that they might learn the affront they have made against Apollo'. Lake's (2001), 26 argument that the absence of a prior dream matters little since 'the existence of the interpreter implies that symbolic dreams did occur' is circular.

[108] Kessels (1978), 25. Parke (1967), 13 correctly translates ονειροπόλος as 'dreamer of dreams', as does Hey (1908), 11, and Bowcott (1959), 10-6, 33, but cf. Hundt (1935), 103-4, 104n9; Rohde (1925), 50n55. The verbal form ὀνειροπολέω retains the meaning 'to dream' in Ar. *Nub*. 16, 27 (cf. *Eq*. 809) and thus, while the noun seems to have shifted with the emerging practice of dream-interpretation the verbal form echoes its original function (Brillante (2009), 710). Hey (1908), 11 suggested that the personified Oneiros reflected the reported experiences of the *oneiropolos*. Cf. Xen. *Symp*. 4.5.

[109] Brillante (2009), 696-7; Del Corno (1982), 57. Cf. οἱ γοῦν ἐξηγηταὶ τῶν ὄψεων, οὓς ὀνειροπόλους οἱ ποιηταὶ καλοῦσιν (Philostr. *VA* 2.37); μήποτε δὲ ὀνειροκρίτην ὑπείληφεν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς (Σ *ad Il*. 1.62, Erbse; cf. Eust. 5.202, Cullhed).

[110] Kessels (1978), 32.

times of crisis is well attested.[111] In extraordinary circumstances the Spartan ephors would sleep in the temple of Pasiphaē in order to receive dreams from the local cult god (Plut. *Cleom*. 7.2, *Agis* 9.1; cf. Cic. *Div*. 1.43-4; Tert. *De anim*. 46).[112] That status individuals (i.e., individuals with culturally prioritised religious or political power like the Spartan ephors or Agamemnon) dreamt such omens bolstered their public credence, and this practice has an unmistakably archaic character.[113]

It seems likely that Agamemnon's dream in *Iliad* 2 is to be understood in this sense, for the complexity of the dream-sequence seems to presuppose such a tradition.[114] Indeed, the absence of an interpreter would likely aid the dream as a choice medium for status individuals making 'sanctioned' decisions.[115]

However, van Lieshout has maintained that the meaning of *oneiropolos* remains vague, and argues that it refers to a more general *Traumseher* who might dream dream-omens, 'deal with dreams', and proscribe apotropaic rituals.[116] Yet the types of apotropaic lustrations which follow the dream-omens of tragedy (e.g., Aesch. *Pers*. 200-25, and the *Choephori*) or

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[111] van Lieshout (1980), 167; Bowcott (1959), 44; Renberg (2017), 100, 100n161; Bremmer (1983), 20. Messer (1918) 6n24 notes that there is evidence that dream-oracles antedate the historical period, as in the antiquity of the Amphiaraus oracle at Thebes (Paus. 1.34.6; Pind. *Nem*. 9.24,10.8-9), the Trophonius oracle at Lebadea (Paus. 9.39.6), and the oracle of Ge at Delphi (Eur. *IT* 1262, cf. Aesch. *Eum*. 1.20; Paus. 3.12.8) (Dodds (1951), 91-2n66, 126n49), but cf. Sourvinou-Inwood (1990), 215-41 who has argued that Delphi's mythic history 'does not reflect cultic history'. Amory (1957), 32 and Dodds (1951), 111 (implicitly following Harrison (1903), 343) suggest the absence of incubation in Homer can be attributed to its lack of association with the Olympians, but cf. Parke (1967), 9-10 who argues against Homer's knowledge of incubation. See also Janko (1992), on *Il*. 16.234-5.

[112] Brillante (2009), 700-2; van Lieshout (1980), 167; Hemingway (2008), 232-3.

[113] As Parker (2004), 149 notes of Xenophon's dreams (*Anab*. 3.1.11, 4.3.8) 'important dreams only come to important people'. In the *Iliad*, dreams come to Agamemnon, Achilles, Rhesus, and Priam, that is, to kings. In the *Odyssey* dreams remain aristocratic coming to and being reported by Penelope (a queen), Nausicaä (a princess), and the disguised Odysseus (who claims to have been third in command in assaulting Troy, 14.457-506). See also Petridou (2016), 342. Artemidorus in his *Oneirocritica* lists the figures who might appear in an *Außentraum* to whom the dreamer can give credence (2.69) of which both kings and the dead are given veridical status likely on strength of the Homeric conception. It is for this same reason that Artabanus must wear the kingly regalia and sleep in Xerxes bed in order to experience Xerxes' dream (Hdt. 7.16), and Cyrus claims mantic inspiration from the gods in his dreams (Hdt. 1.209.1-4; Xen. *Cyro*. 8.7.3). However, Harris (2009), 25, 39 and Lipka (2021), 40 are wrong to state that Homer's dreams are *exclusively* an aristocratic prerogative, for this fails to account for the *oneiropoloi*.

[114] Walde (2001), 19.

[115] Bremmer (1983), 20.

[116] van Lieshout (1980), 165-6. See also Oppenheim (1956), 22-3. Harrison (1903), 11 argues that the sacrifice to Zeus (II.369-405) following Agamemnon's dream 'is a clear instance of *do ut des*.'

are recommended for the sick ([Hipp]. *Reg*. 4.89.126, 4.90.63), are conspicuously absent from Homer, and Achilles calls for an *oneiropolos* without any dreams for him to even 'deal with'.[117] Further, in *Iliad* 5 we learn of Eurydamas, an *oneiropolos* who was unable by his mantic art to save his sons from their deaths at Troy:

> τοὺς μὲν ἔασ', ὃ δ' Ἄβαντα μετώιχετο καὶ Πολύιδον,
> υἱέας Εὐρυδάμαντος ὀνειροπόλιο γέροντος.
> τοῖς οὐκ ἐρχομένοις ὁ γέρων ἐκρίνατ' ὀνείρους,
> ἀλλά σφεας κρατερὸς Διμήδης ἐξενάριξεν.
> (V.148-51).

The Greek has caused difficulty since antiquity, especially in the use of the middle rather than the active for the main verb.[118] The majority of translators take οὐκ with ἐκρίνατο as 'the old man was not able to interpret their dreams *correctly* when coming [sc. to Troy]' but there is no parallel use of κρίνω which incorporates the value judgement of sorting something 'correctly', nor as discussed, does *hypokrinesthai* carry a meaning of 'interpret' in the sense of interpreting symbolism.[119] Eurydamas is more likely to be a *Traumseher* hindered not by his inability to interpret the symbolic meanings in either his or his sons' dreams, but to foresee their fate within his own dreams, that is, to 'sort' his dream-omens by their fulfilment accurately.[120]

This view accords with the conception offered in Penelope's 'Gates of Dreams' and what Kirk called the 'father-seer' motif.[121] At XIII.660-72 Paris kills Euchenor whose death had been prophesied by his father the *mantis* Polydius, while at XI.328-34 Diomedes slays the

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[117] On tragedy's dream rituals see Cederstrom (1971), 48-9, 87-90; Hemingway (2008), 97-99. A fragment of Magnes' *Ludoi* (Poll. 8.188) links dream-interpretation with undoing aggressive magic (Dodds (1951), 205n99). West (1997), 54 suggests I.313-5 is an apotropaic dream ritual, but this purification is for Agamemnon's seizure, not his dream.

[118] Kirk (1990), *ad loc*.; Kessels (1978), 26-9; Bowcott (1959), 35; Hemingway (2008), 275. As Kirk (1990), *ad loc.* notes, ἐρχομένῳ at V.198 refers to Pandarus coming to Troy, with νίσσεσθαι or νοστεῖν being the verb typically used for returning home. Accordingly, οὐκ should not be taken with ἐρχομένοις.

[119] Kessels (1978), 28. See also van Lieshout (1980), 166.

[120] Brillante (2009), 707-8. Hemingway (2008), 276 argues for two separate senses of *oneiropolos*, as a *Traumseher* in *Il.* 1, and as a *Traumdeuter* in *Il.* 5.

[121] Kirk (1990), on *Il*. 5.148-9.

sons of the *mantis* Merops, who had ignored his premonitions.[122] Consequently, Eurydamas follows this pattern by which a father's mantic art is ignored/mistaken by his sons who die as a result, which is only strengthened if we read *oneiropolos* as *Traumseher*, for it is unlikely that sceptical sons would report their dreams.[123] Further evidence for translating *Traumseher* may be found in noting that there are no dreams in Homer which actually require interpretation, for Homeric dreams are either literal epiphanies, self-interpreting, or unreported *Angstträume* (as in the chasing simile (XXII.199-200; cf. Aesch. *Supp*. 885-9) and Rhesus' dream (X.496-7)).[124] Nor do any of the dreamers in Homer consult an *oneiropolos*; Agamemnon reports his dream without request for interpretation to the Greek commanders, and Penelope (without request for symbolic interpretation) to the stranger, while Nausicaä, Penelope (in 4.787-841 and 20.87-90), Priam, and Achilles do not report their dreams, nor do they ever ponder their contents for symbolism.[125] Moreover, while the *mantis* Halitherses is said to surpass all men in his knowledge of bird-omens (2.150-60; cf. I.92), Penelope does not call for him to interpret her bird-omen dream, nor the *mantis*

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[122] Merops is later made a dream-interpreter ([Apollod]. 3.12.5).

[123] Cf. Kirk (1990), on *Il*. 5.148-9; Brillante (2009), 698.

[124] On dreams in Aeschylus see Cederstrom (1973), 92-149, Rousseau (1963), 101-136, Lévy (1983), 141-68, Lake (2001), 67-87, Catenaccio (2011), 202-231. Del Corno (1982), 57-58 has suggested that there was a gradual increase in symbolic dreams owing to an influx of Egyptian and Near Eastern culture-patterns into the 'collective subconscious'. However, since *oneiropolos* should be translated as *Traumseher*, there is no reason to follow Vítek's (2017), 133n22 conclusion that 'allegorical' dreams were standard for Homeric people on account of Eurydamas' inability to predict his sons' fate, for the difficulty of prediction does not result from symbolism but the problematic nature of 'sorting' dreams by their fulfilment. Butler (1998), 48-9 notes that *Angstträume* like losing teeth and public nudity are found in Akkadian texts, just as we find them in Greco-Roman (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 20.12). While it has been argued that Rhesus is not dreaming (*infra*) (cf. Kessels (1978), 44-9; Sels (2013), 556-60; Σ *ad Il*. 10.496-7, Erbse), he is depicted as sleeping by the Darius Painter (Fig. 1) (Giuliani (1996), 84). Further, it seems likely that a dream was part of the Rhesus *mythos*, since another is found in the Euripidean *Rhesus* ([Eur]. *Rh*. 780-8) just as a dream seems to be part of the Clytemnestra *mythos*, cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 527-35, Soph. *Elec*. 417-22, Steisichorus fr. 42P. See also Fenik (1964), 44-52; Fantuzzi (2020), on [Eur]. *Rh*. 780-8; Cederstrom (1971), 187-93.

[125] Amory (1957), 32; Kessels (1978), 26; Walde (2001), 23. Some scholars have argued that Priam is not dreaming (Messer), or simply elide this scene from the discussion (Traweek), despite Hermes formulaically standing at Priam's head (XXIV.682) and informing him 'you are sleeping' (XXIV.683) (Messer (1918), 23n68; Traweek (2020), 110-111). This led Wetzel (following Eustathius (*ad Od*. 1512:35)) to conclude that Priam's dream confirmed the 'real' and external nature of dreaming, since Hermes remains after Priam awakens (Wetzel (1931), 13). Wetzel's view is too dogmatic, and better understood as evidence that dream beliefs were not formalised in the modern religious sense. Leaf objected that Homer only has those known to the dreamer appear in dreams (Leaf (1902), *ad loc*.), but Hermes was known to Priam, who thought him to be a Greek solider (XXIV.362-365, 370-7) (cf. Piettre (1997), 120n36). Moreover, a connection between Hermes and dreaming must be early, since he is called a ἡγήτορ' ὀνείρων in *Hymn. Hom. Herm.* 14 which acts analogously to his better defined role as *psychopompos*. On Priam's dream see Harris (2009), 38n67; Brillante (2009), 41-3; Wetzel (1931), 13; Kessels (1978), 58-9; Hundt (1935), 98; Walde (2001), 42n65.

Theoclymenus who informs Penelope of the earlier eagle/goose omen (17.157-61).[126] This is far from the δόμων ὀνειρόμαντις of Aeschylus (*Cho.* 32-42). Consequently, it seems likely that 'official' dream interpretation was unknown to Homer, and that Penelope's request to the stranger should be understood not as one for symbolic interpretation, but as a divinatory sorting between the ambiguous nature of a dream-omen's fulfilment.

1.2 ὄναρ/ὕπαρ

The eagle's injunction dichotomises Penelope's dream between two adjacent terms, the ὄναρ ('dream') and the ὕπαρ. It is necessary to note that, from its first use here in *Odyssey* 19, ὕπαρ is employed in contrast with ὄναρ (cf. 20.90) while ὄναρ can appear alone (I.63, X.496).[127] Frisk suggested that ὄναρ was invented specifically to denote a '*Trugtraum*', since the root *oner-* is rarely attested in Indo-European, while ὕπαρ with a more common root, comparatively denoted a '*Wahrtraum*'.[128] Frisk argues that the oldest Indo-European expression for 'sleep' was likely identical with 'dream', as in Greek where ὕπνος can mean 'sleep' while ἐν ὕπνῳ can mean 'in a dream' (Hdt. 1.209; 2.139; 3.30; 3.64-5; 4.118; 6.131; Pl. *Resp*. 574e; *Tht*. 152b; cf. Ar. *Vesp*. 1218).[129] Consequently, Frisk concluded that once the early Greeks realised that '*die Träume in Der Regel Trugträume sind*' they invented the ὄναρ to dichotomise that understanding.[130] However, if the meanings of *Trugtraum* and *Wahrtraum* were intended by this linguistic dichotomy, then Penelope's 'Gates of Dreams' become superfluous.[131] Further, at 20.90 ἤδη makes ὕπαρ unlikely to mean '*Wahrtraum*', for what is meant by a '*Wahrtraum*' that is 'already' a *Wahrtraum*?[132] Likewise, 19.547 would

[126] Artemidorus, by contrast, interprets many (Artem. 2.20-1).
[127] Kessels (1978), 186.
[128] Frisk (1950), 132-5; cf. Van Lieshout (1980), 41. Later, *onar* comes to express the more illusory and ephemeral elements of the dream-experience, especially figuratively, cf. Pind. *Pyth*. 8.89, Mimnermus fr. 5 (Hemingway (2008), 62-3). See also Messer (1918), 191n46. Beekes & van Beek (2010), s.v. ὕπαρ follow Frisk.
[129] Frisk (1950), 134; Frisk (1960), 966 s.v. ὕπαρ. See also Bowcott (1959), 129-2.
[130] Frisk (1950), 134. Typically unchallenged, e.g., Piettre (2020), 64.
[131] Kessels (1978), 187; cf. Van Lieshout (1980), 42.
[132] Kessels (1978), 187.

be the only place that ὄναρ conferred the meaning of *Trugtraum*, for Achilles surely does not mean to say 'a *Trugtraum* [ὄναρ] is from Zeus' (I.63).

But it cannot be accepted that ὕπαρ means 'waking life', as Kessels concluded and it is often translated, for how could the eagle be saying 'this is not a dream, but waking life' when Penelope is still dreaming and therefore sleeping?[133] Indeed, ὕπαρ cannot mean 'waking vision' at 20.90 either because Penelope is dreaming of something impossible in waking life. Instead, ὕπαρ confers a meaning of 'reality', that is, it expresses not the fulfilment dichotomy of Penelope's 'Gates' but the distinction between the reality of the waking-world and the unreality of the dream-world, which was likely reached and rendered in polarised language very early.[134] Comparatively, the scholiast gives ὕπαρ as τὸ μεθ' ἡμέραν φαινόμενον ἐνύπνιον (Σ *ad Od*. 19.547, Dindorf). Thus, the eagle's injunction might be rendered 'this is not a *dream* [*onar*] (*qua* 'just a dream') but a *dream of reality* [*hypar*]', which then invites Penelope to explain why some dreams exist on the level of the 'unreal' (i.e., they are not meaningful), and some on the level of 'reality' (i.e., they are meaningful and indicate their fulfilment *in reality*).[135]

This close linguistic analysis has drawn three conclusions which frame the following analysis. Firstly, Penelope's request should not be understood as one for interpretation. This is key for understanding the scene, since the *homophrosynē* between Penelope and Odysseus highlighted by the dream is unconscious and largely unvocalised. A request for a symbolic

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[133] Kessels (1978), 187; e.g., Fagles (1996) *ad loc*.; Stanford (1948), on *Od*. 547; Struck (2016), 260. Asclepius/Apollo quotes this line to Aristides within a dream (*HL* 2.18), where it similarly cannot mean 'waking life'.

[134] Hemingway (2008), 62-4; cf. Lioux (2011), 71. This is the most common use of ὄναρ/ὕπαρ in Plato, cf. Pl. *Ti*. 78e, *Phd*. 277d, *Phlb*. 36e, 65e, *Resp*. 382e, 476c, 476d, 520c, 576b, *Plt*. 277d, *Tht*. 173d. So wrongly Emlyn-Jones (1997), 214. See also Reider (1989), 153n37; Russo (1982), 12-3.

[135] It might be surmised from this that if the *oneiropolos* did advise on the dreams of others, as Hundt and van Lieshout suspect, it was nothing more than akin to dichotomising between an *onar* or *hypar*. Comparatively, Anyte's dream of Asclepius is called an ὕπαρ because she wakes up with a dream-apport, that is, she wakes up to confirmation of her dream's meaningfulness by evidence of its influence upon reality (Paus. 10.38.13).

interpretation would not just be superfluous, but crude, undermining the poetics of the implicit which underpins *Odyssey* 19. Instead, dream-omens are to be understood through the kinds of dichotomies of meaning connected to the terminology employed to explain them, that is, constructions like the *onar* and the *hupar*. Further, if the *oneiropolos* advised on the dreams of others, it was likely little more than categorising between these two terms. However, the construction of specialised vocabulary for explaining dreams demonstrates a sophisticated attempt to understand their functions and meanings, reflecting the significant position dreams held in the popular imagination.

Chapter Two: A Divine Dream *Came* to Me

Penelope's dream is unique in being Homer's only allegorical formulation and breaking from the patterned elements of the 'dream-scene', since the audience are only shown the report rather than the sequence.[136] Further, for the first time in Homer, the external origin of a dream is not attributed to a god or *daemon*.[137] Thus, in Hundt's typology, Penelope's dream is an *Innentraum*; subjective, symbolic, and emerging from her own mind.[138] However, as Hemingway has noted 'simply by becoming symbolic the dream does not automatically become internalised'.[139] Indeed, Penelope then states that her dream has come through one of two 'Gates of Dreams' and so she attributes it an oblique but external origin. Accordingly, scholars have sought to label this an *Außentraum*, and to consider it as evidence that Homer *qua* the 'archaic Greek mentality' (Kessels) believed dreams to be external entities rather than activities of the mind.[140] But Penelope's view, not incidentally metaphorical, that this dream 'came' through one of two 'dream gates' is not evidence for the belief that it was actually formed externally, that is, just because a dream is attributed to an external source or described with externalised language, it does not compel us to believe that Homer only understood dreams in this sense.[141] Comparatively, when Agamemnon says that his dream 'flew away' (*apoptamenos* II.71), we are not to imagine Oneiros as winged, but to understand *apoptamenos* as a metaphorical expression (cf. XI.208, XII.203), like

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[136] I cannot follow Russo (1992) on *Od*. 19.541 'only this [dream] resembles a true dream' (also Walde (2001), 56n25), for Penelope's following dream of Odysseus is even more 'true', insofar as that which is 'true' correlates with that which is recognisable in contemporary dream reports.

[137] Amory (1957), 41.

[138] See Hundt (1935), 86-90; Dodds (1951), 106; Reider (1989), 139-40; Messer (1918), 30-1.

[139] Hemingway (2008), 96, 92-3.

[140] Kessels (1978), 29, 108, 165-6; Hemingway (2008), 96-7; Lévy (1982), 11. See also Hundt (1935), 74-81; Messer (1918), 35-42. Kessels (1978), 44 notes that 'unlike primitive man' Homer does not believe dreams were the visitation of someone's soul, for Nestor never draws any attention to having seen '*him*' in his dream (cf. Hundt (1935), 67-8).

[141] Further, as Russo (2012), 14 notes, the mind of a fictional character cannot be taken as evidence concerning the mind of its author (although, there is an implicit difference in alterity regarding dreams which come from a god and which come from 'something' or 'somewhere', as Aristotle observed *De insomn*. 436b12). Cf. Pl. *Phd*. 60e; Aesch. *Ag*. 13; *PV* 645. In Homer, it is the act of natural sleep which precipitates dreams, for the sleep which precedes dreaming is never the product of divinely induced slumber (in order to specifically 'send' a dream). Despite sleeping (I.605-11) the gods do not dream.

Homer's 'winged words', which denotes the moment of waking in a vivid poetic manner (cf. μελανοπτερύγων ὀνείρων Eur. *Hec*. 71, πτανὸν ὄνειρον Eur. *Phoen*. 1545, πτηνῶν ὀνείρων Eur. *IT* 571, and their parody in Ar. *Ran*. 1332-5).[142]

Homer has no verb 'to dream' and so when a Homeric character does dream, and even when the dreamer is an active participant in that dream, his language inclines him to externalise that experience in order to accurately (and entertainingly) describe it, that is, to translate the inner psychic state of the dream into a coherent narrative (cf. Hdt. 6.107.1).[143] Further, the Greeks typically say that they 'saw a dream', that is, they use periphrastic expressions like ὄναρ ἰδεῖν (Hdt. 1.107; Xen. *Anab*. 3.1.13, 4.3.8; cf. Pl. *Apol*. 40d; Ar. *Eq*. 1090) rather than 'dreamt' (i.e., 'had') a dream, an externalised and objective but patently linguistic conception indicative of Homer's description.[144] Thus, Euripides can write of being 'visited *in dreams*' (*Alc*. 355), combining an externalised visitation with the notion of the dream as a subjective experience, while Herodotus can write of 'wandering dreams' that are merely 'the day's thoughts' which are 'not from the gods' (Hdt. 7.16b).[145] Similarly, Aeschylus can make Clytemnestra deny the prophetic validity of dreams by declaring them to be *doxa* of the sleeping *phrēn* (*Ag*. 275) despite Clytemnestra's ghost appearing herself as an *Außentraum* before the Erinyes (*Eum*. 94-161).[146] The *Rhesus*' charioteer can even say καί μοι καθ᾽ ὕπνον δόξα τις παρίσταται ([Eur]. *Rhes*. 780) when a subjective dream-type

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[142] Cf. Kessels (1978), 42-4, 72n68, 199; Hundt (1935), 46n25; Padel (1992), 96-7. Thought is described as 'windlike' (XV.80-3; 7.36). See also Otto (1954), 209.

[143] Amory (1957), 70. The verbs ὀνειροπολέω (Ar. *Nub*. 16; Pl. *Resp*. 534c, *Tim*. 52b; cf. Dem. 4.49), ἐνυπνιάζω (Hipp. *VM* 10.36) which denotes the troubled dreams following dietary changes, and the rare ὀνειρώσσω (Hipp. *Vict*. 1.35) later come to fill this function (see Hemingway (2008), 78-80; Kessels (1978), 198-207), alongside contextually analogous verbs like δοκέω (Aesch. *Pers*. 181, 188, *Ag*. 423, *Cho.* 547, Ar. *Vesp*. 15).

[144] Hemingway (2008), 80-1; Dodds (1951), 105; Feyerabend (1975), 182; Cederstrom (1971), 198-9. Aristotle, despite concluding dreams were products of the mind, still writes of 'seeing' dreams, cf. Arist. *De insomn*. 458b20, *Div. somn*. 462b-4, 463b8, 464a4 (Gallop (1990), 4n10). A study of Greek dream words can be found in Casevitz (1982), 67-73.

[145] Dodds (1951), 118, 185-6.

[146] Padel (1992), 80. On the relation between *doxa* and the illusory dream see Lévy (1983), 151-5.

follows.[147] Later, Artemidorus interprets many such *Außenträume*, or in his terminology *oneiroi theorematikoi*, while maintaining that dreams are products of the *psychē* and οὐχ ὑπο τινος ἔξωθεν γίνονται (Artem. 4.59). This same linguistic dualism is already present in Homer through his expression ἐν ὀνείρῳ (XXII.199, 21.79; cf. ἐν ὀνειρείῃσι πύλῃσιν 4.809), for if something can be described as happening 'as in a dream' this requires that dreams could be understood as something other than as external visitations, and, indeed, demands a subjective experience, for how can something occur 'as in a dream' (especially something like the subject's inhibited movement) if dreams were thought to be purely objective and external?[148]

The argument that Homer only understood dreams as external entities is intellectually adjacent to that of Snell's Hegelian theory concerning the absence of the Homeric concept of the body, that is, since Homer lacked a single word for the abstract concepts of 'self' and 'body' (using both *sōma* and *demas*), the concept of the unified self must, therefore, not yet exist (i.e., in Hegelian terms, the movement from 'sense-consciousness' to 'Self-consciousness' has not yet occurred since the conditions requisite for the development of full psychological unity were not present).[149] Consequently, it has been concluded that since Homer presents the content and origins of his dreams as externalised and objective, employs no verb 'to dream' which automatically implies it as a product of the dreamer, and has no

[147] Cederstrom (1971), 199; cf. Fantuzzi (2020), *ad loc*.

[148] Cf. Kessels (1978), 4. Dreams, given no corporeal reality (II.99-100), are comparable to shadows (11.207) and the *psychē* (11.222), descriptions which are difficult to accommodate with their material objectivity. Further, these descriptions indicate that the notion of dreams as insubstantial and incorporeal was common (but cf. Adkins (1970), 16 who argues that Homer has no 'non-material' language). Dodds (1951) 104, 104n9 suggests that the word *oneiros* means dream-experience only in these two uses, and otherwise confers a meaning of 'dream-image', but *oneiros* is the used to describe Penelope's eagle/goose dream which is clearly a dream-experience. Kessels (1978), 121 suggests that the masculine form *oneiros* refers to personified dream-figures, while the neuter form *oneiron* referred to the dream 'as a whole'. However, the sole neuter use refers to a dream-figure (4.841), while Penelope uses the masculine to refer to her dream more generally (19.535) (Hemingway (2008), 52-3).

[149] Snell (1953), 5-8, 'This objective truth does not exist for man until it is seen in known and designated by a word'; Fränkel (1975), 76-7; cf. Russo & Simon (1968), 483-4, 484n4; Russo (2012), 12. See Adkins (1970), 13-44; cf. Pelliccia (1995), 15-27; Padel (1992), 12-48. On the influence of Hegel upon Snell see Austin (1975), 81-3; MacCary (1982), 3-15; Gill (1996), 34-41.

single word for the dream-experience (using ὄνειρος/ον, ὄναρ/ὕπαρ, and the related ἐνύπνιον), the corresponding concept that dreams emerged from the mind and were internal experiences must, *mutatis mutandis*, not yet exist.[150]

However, just as Snell's assumption relies upon the 'Whorfian' fallacy (linguistic relativity) that an absence of language requires reality be interpreted according to that absence, this argument assumes that since there is a (relative) absence of language for internalising dreams (and a multiplicity of 'dream words'), Homer was, therefore, incapable of understanding dreaming as internal.[151] But as we have seen, the absence of internalised language does not make the concept of internalised dreaming impossible. Further, much of Homer's externalisation, such as his dream gates, land of dreams, loose personification of Oneiros, and the attributing of dreams to gods, *daemones*, or otherwise outwith the 'self' is indicative of metaphor and the poetic-linguistic representation of psychical phenomena that was best suited to oral poetry, which does not preclude it as a conscious artistic construction.[152] In Homer's portrayal of sleep we find this same duality of an external and objective 'Sleep' existing alongside descriptions of the sleeping state which demonstrate an understanding of its psychology.[153]

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[150] Hemingway (2008), 48; Kessels (1978), 13, citing Snell, writes that 'Homeric man had a mental structure differing from the contemporary one' since 'the human psyche had not yet been discovered'. See Kessels (1978), 155-62.

[151] Snell (1953), 69 '[Homer] was not yet capable of understanding the soul as basically opposed to the body'. Whorfism refers to the theories of Whorf (1956) or more properly 'linguistic relativity', on which see Casasanto (2016), 158-74.

[152] Messer (1918), 7; Nilsson (1925), 172; cf. Hemingway (2008), 81. Oneiros is personified once, and nowhere else in Homer is there a dream-god (Leaf (1900), *ad loc*.). The personification of Oneiros in later works, such as Pausanias' reference to a statue (Paus. 2.10.2), or Sappho's address (fr. 63), cannot be projected back into Homer. Nor does Pausanias' statue indicate Oneiros as a cult god rather than, as Messer noted, 'the sculptor's plastic representation of the poet's conception' (Messer (1918), 4, 4n10; cf. Nilsson (1925), 172). So, wrongly Hughes (2000), 13. See also Pietre (1997), 115-140. Comparably, with the advancements in the dramatic genre and the formalised *topos* of depicting unusual internalised states, Plautus (following models in New Comedy) is able to parody Homeric interventions alongside Apolline mediumship and Bacchic frenzies as internalised states (*Men*. 830-79).

[153] Messer (1918), 36; cf. Amory (1957), 69; Bowcott (1959), 161.

Dodds suggested that Homer's externalised language may reflect in its origin a form of the culture-patterned *Außenträume* which, owing to the passivity of the dreamer and objectivity of the *eidōlon*, inclined the Greeks to describe the origins and contents of dreaming as external and objective.[154] However, more recently, the anthropologist Murray Wax has observed that dreaming represents a 'true fracturing' of the mind since it 'commences as the psyche is dissociated from conscious control' and 'disappears with the superposition of the conscious self', that is, it is only upon waking that the dreamer is able to capture and express this non-conscious 'other' psyche's experience.[155] The manner of this fracturing, that is, the parallel worlds of experience dichotomised by the states of waking and dreaming corresponds with Homer's states of psychic intervention by which conscious control is seemingly lost, as in the possession of a heightened *menos* or being overcome by *atē* which, in turn, 'demands a supernormal explanation'.[156] This polarity would then lend itself to the kind of language which Homer employs when describing dreams, for the dreamer is imagined as existing on two separate planes, just as elements of cognition are imagined as existing separately to the 'self', that is, externalised and fractured through cognitive organs like the *thymos*, but which *in toto*, form Homer's 'unity in multiplicity' and demonstrate an understanding of the unified internal mind.[157]

Thus, when Penelope says that her dream of a young Odysseus in *Odyssey* 20 was one of many sent by 'some evil *daemon*' (20.87), despite this dream having none of the qualities of

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[154] Dodds (1951), 105; Amory (1957), 69-70. Seeing persons in dreams, especially persons known to the dreamer, might generate the conception that dreams were persons, or at-least, lend credence to personifying them. However, personification does not exclusively depend on manifestation as a person (cf. Kessels (1978), 38).

[155] Wax (2004), 89-90. This 'non-conscious' experience is linguistically denoted by the Quechua, whose dream (and myth) narratives employ the suffix *-sqa* to mark events not directly experienced by the narrator in normal consciousness (similar linguistic markers are employed by the Quiché Maya, Zuni, and Kagwahiv Indians) (Graham (1999), 62).

[156] Dodds (1951), 8-9.

[157] Austin (1975), 81-107. Comparatively, Penelope's dream of Iphthime, like a character's *thymos*, can be engaged in dialogue (XI.407, 20.18-21), and yet remains an internal experience which upon waking is recalled to 'warm the *ētor*('heart'=mind)'. See also Cairns (2022), 227-46.

Homer's other 'god-sent' dreams, this intimates her attribution as an expression of frustration with the non-conscious mind's experience of unrealised dreams, rather than an assessment of the dream's origins. Penelope distances herself from the dream linguistically through what Feyerabend called the 'daemonic ontology' (cf. 4.813; Artem. 4.3) by expressing the feeling that the experience 'came' from elsewhere, that is, she is externalising the dream retrospectively as an uncomfortable mental state in a manner analogous to Agamemnon's attribution to *atē* which, as Dodds noted, acts as both a subjective 'state of mind' and the objective (if transparently paradigmatic) daughter of Zeus (IX.505-15, XIX.91).[158]

Penelope is, despite her attributions, aware that these dreams emerged from her own mind, for Homer repeatedly demonstrates his knowledge of the psychical connection between memories and dreaming (cf. 20.87-90).[159] It is for this reason that Penelope can claim that she will not forget her home once forced to leave with a suitor 'even in her dreams' (21.79) which implies no reliance on an external source.[160] Indeed, as Foley writes, the lack of a specified 'sender' for the dreams of *Odyssey* 19 and 20 means that 'we can associate them even more directly with Penelope's own inner feeling.'[161] Comparably, Penelope's dream in *Odyssey* 20:

> τῆιδε γὰρ αὖ μοι νυκτὶ παρέδραθεν εἴκελος αὐτῶι,
> τοῖος ἐὼν οἷος ἦεν ἅμα στρατῶι· αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ
> χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐφάμην ὄναρ ἔμμεναι ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἤδη.
> (20.87-90)

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[158] Dodds (1951), 5, 11; Feyerabend (1975), 182n60; Reider (1989), 155. Hundt (1935), 90 is right to call this an *Innentraum* in that it is purely psychical but, like Lévy (1982), 30, he is wrong to consider it '*gottgeschickten*' (93), for the externalisation is only metaphoric. Comparatively, Penelope claims that Eurycleia has a 'god-sent' madness when she reports that Odysseus has returned (23.10-14); cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 287-8. As Amory (1957), 41 notes 'the ordinary practice [sc. concerning dreams] is to say that a god sent it'.

[159] Hundt (1935), 91-2; Hey (1908), 12; Guidorizzi (2013), 62-3. Cf. Eur. *Alc*. 354-6. Cf. Chariton *Callirhoe* 6.7; Ap. Rhod. *Argon*. 3.442-58. Notably, Penelope calls this 'her dream' *moi oneiron* (19.525), rather than the formulaic 'a dream' which we find at II.56.

[160] Kessels (1978), 4. Cf. Aesch. *Ag*. 179-81.

[161] Foley (1978), 25n23.

is overtly erotic, for the only other use of παραδαρθάνω in Homer explicitly invokes sex (XIV.163).[162] This adds to the psychological plausibility of her dream as not just as *Wunscherfüllung*, but as precisely the kind of *Wunschtraum* to be expected from Penelope at this time, and one which demands to be understood as a 'dream-experience' in which she was an active participant. Moreover, that Homer situates his dream-*eidōla* at the head of the dreamer (cf. II.20-1, X.496) as if aware of the dream's source (even if he fails to situate all psychic function in the brain), features in dreams only those with whom the dreamer is already familiar, orientates his dreams around the fears and anxieties of his characters and draws into the dream-world objects and locations from the immediate waking world suggest that the poet was acutely aware that dreams were a product of the mind, and therefore, were predominantly influenced by the mind's waking experience.[163]

However, Kessels has argued that despite Homer's dreams being 'excellently suitable to each dreamer's mind' this is not the same as 'saying that the poet himself regarded them as products of the human mind.'[164] But it is difficult to sustain that Homer was capable of presenting a character's psychological wishes and anxieties within his dreams in such a uniformly apposite manner, that is, without creating any dreams which deviate from this pattern, without some knowledge that dreams were psychical productions.[165] While Kessels goes on to observe that not all of the narrative functions of Homer's dreams can be

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[162] Devereux (1976), 6, 50, 74, 127; Russo (1992), on *Od*. 20.87-90.

[163] Simon (1978), 58; Arend (1933), 62n1; Reider (1989), 176-7. See also Bowcott (1959), 24; Wetzel (1931), 10; Kirk (1985), on *Il*. 2.20-1. Indeed, that dream-*eidōla* remind their dreamers not to forget their dreams demonstrates Homer's understanding of the fragile connection between recalling one's dreams after waking (II.33-4).

[164] Kessels (1978), 165; Messer (1918), 12. Hundt (1935), 92-3 mentions an objection relevant to the dreams of Agamemnon, Nausicaä, and Penelope (*Od.* 4), that if the gods know the dreamer's desires they could send apposite *Wunschträume*.

[165] Bowcott (1959), 162-3.

explained solely by the dreamer's psychology, this is only evidence for an overdetermination of the dream's function with the form of its content.[166] Comparatively, while Athena's intervention before Achilles in order to prevent him killing Agamemnon (I.188-222) cannot be explained exclusively by Achilles' psychology owing to its explicit narrative function (ensuring the continuation of the plot), this episode remains psychologically apposite. In other words, Athena's intervention represents, through Homer's stylised externalisation (i.e., his 'divine machinery') Achilles' internal decision as if it was the reaction to an external stimulus. This allows the decision-making process to be presented vividly, and overdetermines the episode's narrative function (prolonging the plot) with the externalised form of its content (an internal psychical state). Indeed, Achilles has an apt psychological reason to choose to stay his hand, but Homer's inability to vividly express such internal psychological decision making with vivid internalised language inclines Athena's 'psychic intervention'.

Many of Homer's divine interventions have only limited narrative functions since the course of events which follow would otherwise be the same, and therefore merely duplicate the coexisting psychological causation.[167] However, this overdetermined form is not merely a duplication provided its function is to describe vividly for the audience's imagination an otherwise mental process, that is to say while Homer lacks the language required to express a 'purely psychological miracle' (Dodds) he does not lack the concept.[168] T Thus, just as the

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[166] Kessels (1978), 165-6. So, wrongly Holton (2022), 44. In Penelope's dream in *Odyssey* 4 Athena sends an *eidōlon* of Iphthime, whom Homer tells us is Penelope's sister, but is otherwise unknown to the audience and never mentioned thereafter. It seems more likely that Homer chose Iphthime owing to his knowledge of (and his unwillingness to deviate from) the internal connection between memories and dreaming, rather than as an inexplicable element of narrative function. Failing to note this, scholars have struggled for an answer (e.g., Clarke (1999), 197n82). Similarly, Nausicaä's dream exhibits clear narrative function (6.13-51), and yet Homer ensures both that it is a psychologically apposite *Wunschtraum* and that the *eidōlon* (the daughter of Dymas, similarly unknown to the audience and never mentioned again) is drawn from the content of Nausicaä's memory.

[167] Snell (1953), 45; Dodds (1951), 14.

[168] Dodds (1951), 14; cf. Sullivan (1988), 2. See esp. Gaskin (2001), 148-54.

Athena/Achilles episode exhibits both narrative function *and* illustrates Achilles' psychology, we should understand Homer's dreams as both artefacts of the narrative which serve their purpose within the poem's plot, and act as descriptions of the dreaming state which, owing to their artificial-linguistic context (i.e., the limited vocabulary and formulaic requirements of Homeric epic) share an overdetermined and so consciously externalised form.[169] Comparably, during Agamemnon's dream, the Homeric narrator shows us the dream's genesis and Zeus' injunction (i.e., the dream's intended narrative function). However, the extraneous formation of Oneiros into the likeness of Nestor, occurring as if unremarkable, displays Homer's psychological understanding that dreamers see in dreams those already known to them, and if heeding a message, figures who they respect.[170] Accordingly, the content of Agamemnon's dream (the appearance of his close and respected advisor Nestor) is subordinated to his psychology, and its narrative function (that Agamemnon will actually follow the dream's advice, and therefore move the plot forward) is dependent upon the form of that content, that is, the injunction which moves the plot forward is prerequisite upon the formation of Oneiros into Nestor rather than the formulation of any manner of externalised 'god-sent' dream.

Dreams are precisely where we should expect to find the interactions of Homeric causation at their most ambiguous for they act as liminal space between the 'human' motivated world and the 'divine' motivated Olympus, that is, as a fractured stratum between the psychological 'internalised' plane and the divine 'externalised' plane on which Zeus, Athena, or Hermes can communicate in a 'pictorial' manner (i.e., the manner by which people dream) their 'will' (the 'duplicated' narrative function) to humans (usually indirectly)

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[169] Amory (1957), 67; Messer (1918), 36, 52.
[170] Reid (1973), 33-38; Piettre (1997), 135-6.

through *daemones* like 'Oneiros' or dream-*eidōla*.[171] Homer's externalised language is a historical-cultural product which becomes especially prominent in his dreams owing to the use of traditional formulas and artistic objectivity which aimed to present a character's psychology as dramatic action, rather than the 'natural' product of a more 'primitive' psychic apparatus.[172] Thus, whilst most dreams in Homer appear as concrete entities their function remains abstract, that is, Homer's dream-*eidōla* like Penelope's eagle/goose dream, represent composites of the dream-experience within the popular imagination, externalised from the internalised in a sense akin to the emotions encapsulated by the *thymos*.[173]

2.1 Linguistic Relativity and the Oral Tradition

The linguist Guy Deutscher has argued for a 'softer' Whorfian position than Snell's which he terms the 'Boas-Jakobson principle'.[174] Deutscher has suggested that rather than being blocked from understanding the world in certain ways by our language ('hard' Whorfism), our particular linguistic tools 'incline' us towards 'linguistic relativity', that is, towards 'culturally-constructed' world-views. Following Deutscher, Russo has suggested that Homer's language, developed by the exigencies of the oral tradition, demonstrates such constructions in his descriptions of psychical phenomena, that is, oral bards were *inclined* (rather than determined) by the rich and varied vocabulary of thought and emotion available to them such as *kēr*, *ētor*, *menos*, *phrēn*, *phrenes*, *noos*, *kradiē* and *thymos*, which represent (except *menos*) both physical organs and cognitive capacities (cf. I.103-4, XVI.481, 504,

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[171] As Freud writes, dreams are the 'externalization of an internal process' (Freud (1915), 223).
[172] Cf. Russo (2012), 25.
[173] Cf. Dodds (1951), 112-3.
[174] Deutscher (2010), 148-56. See also Boroditsky, Schmidt & Phillips (2003), 61-78; Casasanto (2008), 63-79; cf. Porter & Buchan (2004), 11-12.

XXIII.103-4), to externalise for their audience the processes of the mind.[175] This 'soft' Whorfism is perhaps also evident in Homer's portrayal of dreaming and parallel waking fantasies, for although Homer lacks the precise vocabulary in order to conceptualise the abstract notion 'to fantasise', just as he lacks the verb 'to dream' or one single word to describe the dream-experience, he is still able to render these recognisable psychical processes through vivid description, that is, the traditional and formulaic demands of Homer's language (or what Russo has called 'Homerese'), *inclined* him towards the externalisation of dreaming and fantasising (i.e., 'oneiric' states).[176]

This 'inclined' language is exemplified by Telemachus' dramatised 'day-dream' (1.114-16) concerning Odysseus' *nostos* which he is said to be 'beholding in his *phrēn*' (1.114-16), that is, he is 'fantasising', and by Odysseus' hypnopompic dream-vision of Penelope (20.92-7), for it only 'seemed' (δόκησε) to Odysseus, qualified by *kata thymon*, that Penelope was standing above him and had recognised him, that is, it seemed to him 'in his *thymos*(=imagination)'.[177] Similarly, before Odysseus reports his invented dream he is said to devise it ἐνὶ θυμῷ (14.490), that is, he formulates the dream internally 'in his *thymos*(=imagination)', but reports it in the expected cultural model as an externalised visitation, repeating verbatim the construction Agamemnon uses in *Iliad* 2 θεῖός μοι

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[175] Russo (2012), 27; cf. Sullivan (1988), 1; Dodds (1951), 8-9; Müller (2018), 31-2. West (2011a), 383-393, (2011b), 10-5 argues the text was fixed in writing at one time, that is, it exists not as oral 'transcriptions' in the mode of Parry and Lord's Serbo-Croat heroic songs, but as the 'recompositions' demanded by the writing process (with characteristics of having been re-worked). However, Russo (1992), 15-16 agues this 're-working' could have been conducted by oral bards who, in-between performances, recomposed in their head. See also the 'Whorfian' interpretations of Parry (1956), 1-7 and Padel (1992), 9, 34-40 who has argued that there was only a limited separation between the metaphoric and the literal in early Greek thought. Padel's 'natural' anthropological approach to understanding the cognitive organs is particularly enlightening in mapping the metaphors of mind which the Greeks employed to conceptualise abstract properties like emotion.

[176] Russo (2012), 28; Rutherford (1992), on *Od*. 20.88-90.

[177] Russo (1982), 15-6; (1992), on *Od*. 19.352-7; Dodds (1951), 40; Sels (2013), 555-6. Odysseus' dream-vision is not a 'dream-thought' and yet it is still not fully conscious, an experience described by Aristides (*HL* 2.31-2) and common in epigraphy (see van Straten (1976), 13-140). Iamblichus later states that the hypnopompic state is particularly favourable to the reception of epiphanies (*Myst*. 3.2). Atossa uses ἐδοξάτην analogously in place of 'I dreamed' (Aesh. *Pers*. 181). On dream inscriptions see Renberg (2003). The ecstatic vision-omen of the suitors which Theocylmenus subjectively experiences is not localised (20.345-57).

ἐνύπνιον ἦλθεν ὄνειρος (14.495, II.56).[178] Homer does not think like this, his characters within an oral epic poem do, and here it is Odysseus' homodiegetic Odysseus-as-character who externalises the dream.[179]

Without the language to accurately internalise 'oneiric' states Homer approximates the internal experience through its dramatisation as localised within the cognitive organs. Thus, while the 'non-traditional thought' of internalised dreams is exceptional to Homeric language this does not make its presentation impossible, nor does it demand the corresponding concept unthinkable. Instead, it exists through a kind stretching of that traditional language, that is, through its approximation in 'Homerese'. Comparably, if we examine the dream-scene formula στη δ' άρ' υπέρ κεφαλής (II.20) we can appreciate its objectivity and externality as traditional, that is, it creates a vivid image for the audience through material formulaic language. But if we consider how Homer might have, within the constraints of his language, expressed his knowledge of the localisation of dreaming within the mind, this *standing at the head* can be understood as an attempt to express that non-traditional thought *within* traditional language.[180] Thus, when Homer declares that a dream-

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[178] Amory (1957), 40; Newton (1997), 144. Athetised by Aristarchus as an interpolation (Hoekstra (1989), on *Od*. 14.495; cf. Stanford (1948), on *Od*. 14.495-6.).

[179] Cf. Dodds (1951), 11; Louden (2006), 146-7. Accordingly, I cannot follow Harrison's (1960), 67-8 view that Homeric fracturing is an unconscious division, for it is Homer's *characters* who harbour fractured minds, as presented for an audience (cf. Russo (2012), 14). These lines also give us an insight into Homeric overdetermination and the daemonic ontology, for 'The Cretan' concedes that he forgot his cloak though his own folly (14.481), and yet when addressing 'Odysseus' he ascribes it to 'some *daemon*' (14.488) (cf. de Jong (2001), *ad loc*.; Lesky (2001), 171). Comparatively, although Penelope first suggests the contest, it is Athena whom Homer later credits with initiating it (21.1-4), that is, the poet can describe Penelope's decision as her own or attribute it to Athena, but either way it functions as an expression of the prerogatives of her mind. See also Vlahos (2011), 27; Kearns (2004), 59, 59n2.

[180] Sels (2013), 563; Holton (2022), 30. As Reider (1989), 63-4 notes, it is difficult to conceive of Homer situating his dream above the *thymos* or *phrēn*. Kirk's (1985), on *Il*. 2.20-1 view (also found in the scholia and Eustathius) that Homer depicts dreams standing at the head of the dreamer because 'that is where it can best penetrate both eyes and ears' is unconvincing. If this were the case we might also expect dream *eidōla* to appear at the foot of the bed, or even in suspended animation above the dreamer, since the Greeks were aware that dreamers did not see and hear from their 'real' eyes and ears (XIV.236, Arist. *De Isomn*. 458b). Evidence for the expression 'stands at the head' as suggesting dreaming as a psychical production is demonstrated by its use from Epidaurian temple inscriptions (*IG* IV²,1.121.IV), to Herodotus (Hdt. 1.34.1, 2.139.1, 141.3, 5.56, 7.12), Isocrates (10.65), Aristidies (*HL* 2.18), Acts 23:11, and the *PGM* (IV.2335) (Dodds (1951), 123n18; cf. Hundt (1935), 42-3). This cannot be explained exclusively as literary conservatism, for it is also found in Sumeria ('Stela of the Vultures' 6.25-7), along with Hebrew (I Sam. 3:10) and Akkadian texts (Oppenheim (1956), 189; West (1997), 187-8).

eidōlon ‘stood at the head’ of the dreamer, he means only to say ‘he dreamed this in his mind’.[181]

[181] Cf. the formula ἀλλὰ τί ἤ μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός (XVII.97, XXI.562, XXII.122) which introduces internal deliberation. This is similarly why Aeschylus’ Watchman can claim that instead of a dream, ‘Fear’ stood at his head (φόβος γὰρ ἀνθ’ ὕπνου παραστατεῖ *Ag*. 14-15).

Chapter Three: The Dream as Object and Report

Penelope's dream is also the first that is reported in full by a character rather than by the Homeric narrator, and so it is closer to the reality of dreaming by which the dreams of others are known to us only through report.[182] It is necessary to distinguish between dreams as experiences (the dream as object), and the 'public social performance' of the dream-report, especially in its context and cultural uses, which takes place only afterwards.[183] Dreams occur on these two separate planes and it is during the latter that, through the narrativising process which Freud called '*sekundäre Bearbeitung*' they are 'neatened', that is, the dreamer 'assimilates the dream experience to a previous cultural model' (D'Andrade).[184] Since dreamers choose the time and place in which they report their dreams, this moment represents a significant context for the 'communicative event' of the report.[185] In Homer, dream-reports are placed for their narrative effect, but owing to the increased intimacy between Penelope and Odysseus, that is, at the apex of the interview and so the climax of the *homophrosynē*, it likely reflects the socially acceptable context.[186] Comparatively, Agamemnon chooses to report his dream almost verbatim (eliding only elements of the sequence and Oneiros' instruction not to forget the dream) to the Greek commanders soon after waking (II.55-69), but not before the gathered soldiers.[187] Nestor's resistance to accept the dream-omen had it not come from Agamemnon demonstrates the precarious position

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[182] Rozokoki (2001), 1; Rankin (1962), 620; Levaniouk (2011), 242. Eliding Odysseus' invented report (14.495-506).

[183] Tedlock (1991), 161-3.

[184] D'Andrade (1961), 314; Shulman & Stroumsa (1999), 3 dreaming 'is *always* an overdetermined act'.

[185] Tedlock (1991), 161-2.

[186] Cf. Amory (1957), 32. The connection between intimacy and dream reports is maintained by contemporary psychology (Curci & Rimé (2005), 155-167; Schredl & Schawinski (2010), 93-9), especially between those in romantic relationships (Schredl & Bulkeley (2019), 212).

[187] Kirk (1985), on *Il*. 2.70. As commander of the rearguard, Xenophon reports his dream (*Anab*. 4.3.8-9) to the *strategos* Cheirisophus, but not before the gathered Cyreans. Comparatively, an earlier dream (3.1.11) occurring before Xenophon attained any rank is reported only to the reader and is self-interpreted (*Anab*. 3.1.12-3). Xerxes reports his dream to his confidant Artabanus (Hdt. 7.16), Socrates to his closest friend Crito (Pl. *Cri*. 44a-b), and Cyrus privately to Hystaspes about whose son the dream is related (Hdt. 1.209). With the advent of professional dream-interpretation reports have a natural recipient; Hipparchus to his *oneiropolos* (Hdt. 5.56) or Alexander to Aristander (Artem. 4.23-4; *Alex. Rom*. 1.35). However, when recalling older legends, intimacy is again stressed; Hecuba reports her dream to Priam who calls for his son Aesacus to interpret ([Apollod]. 3.12.5). In all, the dream-report remains the prerogative of the status individual.

reporting dreams could hold, for the subjective dream-experience was more likely to be believed prophetic if it was reported by a 'privileged dreamer' and delivered in an intimate context by someone with the requisite social status.[188] As Kilborne observes, 'divine' dreams have a significant social function in that important individuals, through the dream-report, become an intermediary between the gods and men.[189]

This aspect of 'social performance' is significant in Homer, and Levaniouk has even called Penelope's dream-report the performance of a '*muthos*', while Eumaeus informs her that the disguised Odysseus tells stories of bardic quality (17.513-27), with Odysseus' invented dream prominent among them.[190] Newton goes further, writing that Odysseus is 'a participant in the oral tradition' on account of it.[191] Since dreams are presented as 'coming' to the dreamer and then transmitted through the report (i.e., as when a bard invokes a muse for his 'external inspiration'), we can understand Penelope's dream as the manner by which culturally important symbols, experienced in dreams, were crafted into an entertaining and meaningful narrative in a manner akin to Homer's metapoetic depiction of bards, for prior to professional dream-interpretation it remained the prerogative of the dreamer (in accordance with their cultural conditioning) to delineate the dream's significant content. Evidence for this can be found by dichotomising the reported dreams in Homer with the dreams employed only as simile and metaphor, for the chasing simile in *Iliad* 22 invokes a common *Angsttraum*, whereas Penelope's dream is expressed through a report that presumes content like eagles killing geese *a priori* worthy of narrativising.

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[188] Hundt (1935), 56; Dodds (1951), 109; cf. Acts 2:17.
[189] Kilborne (1992), 176. See also Frisch (1968), 52-3.
[190] Levaniouk (2011), 239-40. Cf. Wax (2004), 93 who writes that dream-reports represent 'aesthetic productions akin to poetry'.
[191] Newton (1997), 147.

Indeed, Penelope's dream presents an intelligible allegoric-symbolic system mirroring the intratextual equation pronounced by Helen (15.160-5, 171-6) and the wider framework of Homeric religious symbolism with its emphasis upon bird-omens (cf. 17.160-1, 24.311).[192] Thus, Penelope's dream becomes the fourth in a series of bird-omens which predict Odysseus' return and the suitors' deaths (2.143-207; 15.160-81, 525-38), and so when reported by Penelope it becomes for Odysseus another omen for his plan.[193] When Capelle asked of the celestial dreams recorded by Artemidorus '*Wer träumt denn überhaput von* μετέωρα?' he was implicitly contrasting the absence of *caelestia* in modern dream-reports with those in the *Oneirocritica*.[194] Consequently, Capelle noted an important predicate, that these dreams were dreamt in a society in which a systematic observation of the *caelum* had developed, that is, since Artemidorus' society culturally prioritised celestial phenomena as god-sent omens, these symbols became, in turn, prominent subjective dream-experiences worth reporting and, therefore, were acculturated into a patterned model.[195] For Homer, the apex of significant symbols were found in the omnipresent bird-omens (cf. Hes. *Op*. 826-8) which, like dreams, were sent 'by Zeus' (cf 2.181-2) and required systematic observation in order to render their divinatory functions accurately.[196] In Aristophanes' *Wasps* Xanthias reports a dream featuring the descent of an eagle (Ar. *Vesp*. 16-20) parodying Homer's bird-omens and likely Penelope's bird-omen dream.[197] Importantly, both dreams demonstrate the influence of recognisable cultural symbols in generating dream-content and the importance of established symbolic systems in assigning meaning, for the

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[192] Hundt (1935), 87n18; Walde (2001), 60-1; Latacz (1992), 83.
[193] de Jong (2001), on *Od*. 19.535-69, (2001), on *Od*. 2.143-207. See also Kessels (1978), 98-99; Nagy (2002), 143-4.
[194] Capelle (1925), 384; cf. Del Corno (1975), xli-xlii.
[195] Capelle (1925), 384.
[196] Podlecki (1927), 12-23; cf. Burkert (1985), 112; Flower (2008), 25; Nilsson (1925), 131; Noegel (2002), 175. On bird-omens more generally see Dillon (1996), 99-121.
[197] I thank Dr Hau for highlighting this. Olsen & Biles (2015), on Ar. *Vesp*. 15-19 view it as a parody of *Il*. 12.200-7, but it is hard not to recall Penelope's dream with its parallel animate-object symbolism.

eagle as Zeus' bird of portent demands narrativising within a divinatory context (parodic, or otherwise) that is unique to Greek religion.[198]

3.1 Content and Composites

Price contrasted these culturally determined symbolic structures with the universalised approach of Freudian interpretation, concluding that 'the interpretation of dreams was based on normative assumptions… dreams thus belonged not to a baffling private universe but the public sphere'.[199] However, the creation of what Freud called 'composite figures', in this case the eagle for Odysseus and the geese for the suitors, remains apposite without knowledge of the historical-religious context.[200] The similarities implicit in Homer's 'composite images' are already textually pervasive: Odysseus and Telemachus are compared to eagles and vultures (cf. 16.216-19, 22.538, 22.302-8, esp. 24.537-8), the unfaithful female handmaidens to thrushes and doves (22.248-72), and the suitors to geese (15.160-78).[201] Consequently, the symbolic connection remains clear even to a culturally alien audience; Odysseus is a greater being than the suitors and their battle will be between a predator, the eagle, and his prey, the geese.[202] It is not, therefore, necessary that we interpret Homer's dream-content only through its religious-cultural signifiers (indeed, this is not the approach of the dream itself), for the predator/prey nexus is trans-cultural and textually supplied. Further, demonstrating Freud's dream-work, the stimuli for Penelope's dream is readily apparent. The geese, her home, and the Achaean women are condensed elements of the '*Tagesreste*' being the first thing that Penelope sees upon waking (cf. 19.617-20; 19.600-4), and among the last she sees before falling asleep (cf. Hdt. 7.16).[203] Additionally, Homer is

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[198] Synesius argued that symbols varied individually (*De insomn*. 12)
[199] Price (1986), 13. In Artemidorus geese confer a meaning of house-guardians (4.38; cf. Arist. *Hist. an.* 488b20; *Anth. Pal*. 7.425.7), and he gives three other interpretations which all depend on the context and status of the dreamer (see Vítek (2017), 142-3, 143n64).
[200] Freud (1900), 324.
[201] de Jong (2001), on *Od*. 2.143-207; cf. 15.525-528.
[202] Walde (2001), 58-60.
[203] Walde (2001), 57.

aware that the uncanny likeness of the stranger (cf. 19.378-81) must subconsciously evoke her husband, as is demonstrated by Penelope's subsequent dream of Odysseus as he looked when he left for Troy.[204] This dream occurs immediately after the interview and the vivid *ekphrasis* of Odysseus in the clothing Penelope gifted him (19.217-57).[205] Finally, in motivating the dream's meaning Penelope has received increasing evidence of Odysseus' return, and so this desire, necessarily repressed by Penelope who refuses to believe Odysseus could have returned after twenty years (and so a pertinent number in her mind corresponding with the number of geese (19.536-7)), dominates her nightly fantasies through its symbolic dramatisation (20.83-90).[206] This matches precisely Freud's formulation that '*a dream is a (disguised) fulfilment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish*'.[207]

Accordingly, it is both the culturally significant and textually pervasive allegory, along with the transparent psychological motivation for the *Wunschtraum*, never mind the dream's explicit epiphanic nature, which makes Penelope's request for Odysseus *hypokrinesthai* the dream so unusual.[208] Moreover, the symbolism is apparent even without the intra-oneiric interpretation, for the audience are aware that Odysseus has returned, plans to murder the suitors, and have had this symbolic system translated for them (15.174, 525-34).[209] Even

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[204] Amory (1957), 57; de Jong (2001), on *Od*. 20.83–90.

[205] Russo (1992), 10; (1982), 13; Büchner (1940), 133-4.

[206] Russo (1982), 18. For the twenty geese as the years of Odysseus' absence see Rankin (1962), 621, 621n9; but cf. Harsh (1951), 1n2, Athanassakis (1987), 262n13, and Georgiadès (1949), 743 who argue that εἴκοσι is used as an 'indefinitely large number' (cf. 1.280; 2.212, 355, 699; 4.778; 5.244; 9.209; 20.158). An eagle can mean a year in Artemidorus (2.20) (Walde (2001), 58), while Calchas interprets a number of sparrows as the number of years the war will last (II.336-329). Analysts have also suggested a variation in which there were twenty suitors (West (2014), 104). It seems unlikely that the geese=Penelope owing to her twenty years in the home (Pratt (1994), 150-2), but perhaps many meanings are intended as in Freud's *Mischbildung*.

[207] Freud (1900), 160. Latacz (1992), 82-3 argues this was known to Homer. I cannot follow Pratt (1994), 149 that 'entirely absent is the Freudian notion of repression', for Penelope's refusal to accept this dream demonstrates the repression of her desire for Odysseus' return.

[208] Harsh (1950), 16-17; Pratt (1994), 148. Although, verifying one omen with another is found elsewhere, cf. 15.160-5, 525-34. Comparatively, Agamemnon 'tests' his dream-omen through his 'test' of the army (Reider (1989), 54), while Odysseus further 'tests' his dream-vision of Penelope (20.92-121). On Agamemnon's test see Russo & Knox (1989), 351-358, 351n2; Reider (1989), 54, 93-108, 160; Whitman (1958), 341n13; Amory (1963), 105; West (1997), 189-90. See also Synesius *De insomn*. 8.14.

[209] This is not to say with Wetzel (1931), 18 that this is merely a transposition of the earlier bird-omen, for dreaming of animals (Aesch. *Cho.* 523-535; [Eur]. *Rh*. 780-8) and specifically of birds (Artem. 2.20-1) was apparent in the popular imagination.

Penelope has had this information divined to her by a professional seer (17.157-61; cf. 15:225-56). Thus, the dream provides an allegory which the audience (never mind the cunning Odysseus and circumspect Penelope) would readily be able to decode and render auspicious, for as Weber writes 'the comprehensibility of the images… is simply presupposed'.[210] However, Penelope cannot be convinced by the eagle-Odysseus, nor the stranger, for she goes on to articulate the difficulty in distinguishing between fulfilled and unfulfilled dreams through her 'Gates of Dreams' (19.562-7). Consequently, I cannot follow Katz's view that it is 'hard to discern… the logic of Penelope's disbelief in the dream', for there is no reason that Penelope's dream, however clear, articulate, and desired should not have come through ivory and therefore be unfulfilled.[211]

Moreover, after countless nights of anxiety and fantasy (cf. 16.37-9), it is not hard to appreciate that Penelope would feel an overwhelming skepticism about the fulfilment of her dreams and an unwillingness even against the tide of premonitions and evidence for Odysseus' return to accept that he has *actually* returned, that is, she displays conscious resistance to accepting the dream's meaning.[212] Penelope has been the victim of lies from vagabonds about Odysseus wanderings (14.124-131), and so it follows that she would have developed such a psychological defence mechanism (cf. 19.306-19; 23.215-17, and Penelope's three alternative explanations at 23.10-84).[213] Once considered against the number of dreams of Odysseus that Penelope, who shows a repeated and intimate connection with dreaming, has likely dreamt over the last twenty years, and which must continue to linger on in her mind as unfulfilled, we can discern this 'logic' as the prerequisite to her divided mind and her resistance to accepting the dream-omen which is

[210] Amory (1957), 61; Weber (2019), 56.
[211] Katz (1991), 146; cf. Kessels (1978), 92.
[212] Harsh (1950), 4; Amory (1963), 104-6.
[213] Russo (1992), 10n10.

then abstracted into her ‘Gates of Dreams’.[214]

[214] Amory (1957), 50.

Chapter Four: Did Penelope invent her dream?

Scholarly disagreements concerning Penelope's dream and her reaction to it extend more generally to Penelope's character in *Od*. 18-23. Penelope's actions have been deemed illogical, such as her decision to host the the contest of the bow (without any evident motivation) just as evidence mounts through prophecies, the stranger's report, and her dream that Odysseus has returned.[215] Kirk calls it 'a serious illogicality' that Penelope should call the contest after reporting her dream, especially since the stranger has just stated that Odysseus will return between the waxing and the waning of the moon (19.305-6), that is, on the following day, while Page writes that it 'runs absolutely counter to all that has preceded' '[it is] a fault in construction [that is] very great and very obvious'.[216] For Wilamowitz, Penelope's inability to realise that the stranger was Odysseus is '*unbegreiflich*'.[217] The Analysts offer Amphimedon's remark:

> αὐτὰρ ὃ ἦν ἄλοχον πολυκερδείησιν ἄνωγεν
> τόξον μνηστήρεσσι θέμεν πολιόν τε σίδηρον
> (24.167-8)

as evidence of a fossilised narrative in which the recognition scene took place earlier.[218]

Kirk has marshalled this evidence: Penelope's provocative action in showing herself to the suitors is not explained by the suggestion that in doing so she would become 'more honoured than before by her husband and son' (18.162), unless Odysseus had already

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[215] Kirk (1962), 245-6; Wilamowitz (1884), 62; Schwartz (1924), 111; Woodhouse (1930), 80-91; cf. Russo (1992), 7-8; Van Nortwick (1979), 269-70. Combellack (1973), 39-40 (also Knox (1996), 56-7; Scodel (2001), 324) proposes that Penelope gambles the suitors will simply fail the contest.

[216] Kirk (1962), 246; Page (1955), 125-6; cf. Woodhouse (1930), 87.

[217] Wilamowitz (1884), 62.

[218] Page (1955), 127-8; Kirk (1962), 245-6; cf. Combellack (1983), 106. This is an unnecessary inference, for Amphimedon is only deducing what he conceives to have happened, as Wilamowitz later re-concluded (Wilamowitz (1927), 46; cf. Thornton (1970), 106-8). See also Russo (1982), 7-8; (1992), 7-8; Harsh (1950), 1, 1n3-4; Hundt (1935), 86-7n17-18. Kirk (1962), 246, admitting the possibility of Amphimedon's deduction, calls it 'not a likely explanation'. For an overview of the Analytic interpretations see Katz (1990), 93-108, and for an overview of the modern theoretical approaches to Penelope's character see Doherty (1995), 31-64.

revealed himself.[219] Since Odysseus has not done so, we should expect his response to be anger, or perhaps a suspicion that Penelope harbours similar ambitions to Clytemnestra (cf. 24.191-200; 11.444), but instead we are told that he:

> γήθησεν δὲ πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς,
> οὕνεκα τῶν μὲν δῶρα παρέλκετο, θέλγε δὲ θυμόν
> μειλιχίοις ἐπέεσσι, νόος δέ οἱ ἄλλα μενοίνα.
> (18.281-3)[220]

Further, Odysseus insists that if his feet are to be washed by one of the handmaidens it should be an older woman, thereby ensuring that it is almost inevitable he comes into close contact with Eurycleia who, in turn, would recognise his scarred thigh.[221] Yet Odysseus attempts to avoid being recognised (19.388-91), and offers only an imperative by threat of death, once Eurcyleia has recognised him, that she is not to let anyone overhear (19.483-90).[222] Finally, Penelope's repeated insistence that the stranger be given a chance to string the bow, an otherwise unusual suggestion for a queen to make towards a beggar (21.311-43), seems to indicate that she already knows him to be Odysseus, for as Kirk concludes, these are unlikely to be the 'unmotivated lapses of a single composer' but indicative of a problem in poetic transmission.[223]

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[219] Page (1955), 124-5; Kirk (1962), 245-7. Hölscher (1967), 27-33 argues that Penelope's actions are the outcome of external forces, rather than her own motivations. However, it is unnecessary to suggest that these forces are any more external than internal, that is, they are overdetermined - Penelope's precise motivations remain ambiguous. Wohl (1993), 40-1 reads this as Penelope's sexual 'self-assertion'.

[220] Kirk (1962), 246; cf. Harsh (1950), 21; Whitman (1958), 303.
283 the formula νόος δέ οἱ ἄλλα μενοίνα occurs at 2.92 narrated by Antinous when Penelope is disingenuously offering hope to the suitors, and at 13.381 by Athena to Odysseus as a reassurance of this fact (Rutherford (1992), 32, 32n26). Accordingly, it is an indicator for Penelope's 'illogicality' owing to her ulterior and unstated but recognisable motives. Odysseus understands that Penelope's mind is concerned with 'other things' because this was revealed to him and no longer fears Agamemnon's fate (13.383-5). See also Russo (1992), *ad loc*.; Büchner (1940), 139-47. Adler (2017), 130-1 views Odysseus' pleasure as his appreciation of Penelope's 'exact compliance with his instructions' (cf. 18.257-71).

[221] Kirk (1962), 246.

[222] Kirk (1962), 246. Page (1955), 126 and Wilamowitz (1884), 55 place the 'original' recognition scene here. It must be remembered, however, that it is by divine injunction that Odysseus does not reveal himself (13.308; cf. 16.301-3).

[223] Kirk (1962), 267-8; cf. Whitman (1958), 303-4. But as Harsh (1950), 15n15 notes, literary analysis of the *Odyssey* must prioritise our *Odyssey*, not the hypothetical archaeology of an earlier or competing version within it.

4.1 Early Recognition

Several solutions to these inconsistencies have been proposed, two of which are significant for understanding Penelope's dream. The first is an ingenious interpretation introduced (in modernity) by Harsh and Büchner, and later built upon by Vlahos, which forms the 'early recognition' school.[224] Harsh proposed that Penelope recognised Odysseus at a much earlier stage, but that Homer does not explicitly tell his audience, and therefore Penelope's 'illogical' actions are representative of conscious manipulation.[225] Accordingly, Penelope can reveal herself to the suitors, suggest the contest of the bow (a feat that, should the stranger take part, would both reveal him to be Odysseus and arm him with the bow), and insist on the stranger's involvement, not in spite of the evidence for Odysseus' return but precisely because she knows he has returned.[226] Accordingly, Penelope must carefully navigate her communication with Odysseus in order to avoid giving away his identity to the handmaidens, who remain close-by in the hall (19.317, 601), and who have previously betrayed Penelope to the suitors (2.108; cf. 19.91-2).[227]

Consequently, Harsh and Vlahos have concluded that Penelope's dream is not a dream at all but an invention posing an implicit question: 'Is it your intention to slay the suitors in our halls?', to which Odysseus' confirmation of the dream's allegory confers an explicit answer:

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[224] Harsh (1950), 1-21; Büchner (1940), 149; Vlahos (2011), 1-75; cf. *contra* Louden (2011), 76-100. See also Fitzgerald (1963), 497-503; Levaniouk (2011), 229-246; Winkler (1990), 153-4; Felson-Rubin (1994), 32; Stewart (1976), 42. The question of Penelope's recognition was posed in antiquity by Seneca (*Ep*. 88.8), who juxtaposes it with questions of her fidelity.

[225] Harsh (1950), 5-6. Vlahos (2011), 15-6 argues that Penelope 'knows' her husband to be alive after Telemachus' lie that Odysseus remains on Calypso's Isle (17-140-6). For Vlahos, any decision regarding remarriage which comes afterwards has 'ulterior motives'. But Penelope does not 'know' that Odysseus is alive, and this news (third hand) is, like Theoclymenus' omen (17.152-9), felt subconsciously 'thus he spoke, and stirred the *thymos* within her breast' (17.150). Penelope continues to oscillate between hope and despair long after Telemachus' lie for, as Vester (1968), 423 warned, scholars ought not '*das Wissen des Hörers in Penelope zu projizieren.*'

[226] Cf. Harsh (1950), 17-19; Vlahos (2011), 54-5. See also Whitman (1958), 303-4; Walde (2001), 65.

[227] Harsh (1950), 10; Russo (1982), 10; Winkler (1990), 149-50. This is integral for Vlahos (Vlahos (2011), 14, 26, 39-40), and yet, despite this, Eurycleia vocalises her recognition of Odysseus (19.473-5) without alerting the handmaidens.

'death for the suitors is visibly at hand'.[228] Notably, Penelope's ready acceptance of her dream in *Odyssey* 4 does contrast with her unwillingness in *Odyssey* 19, and there is no point in time within Homer's strict chronology following the advent of the premonitions of Odysseus' return for Penelope to have actually slept and therefore 'dreamt' this dream.[229] Since the dream is now only a convenient cipher Harsh must find an explanation for Penelope's 'Gates of Dreams' which, in turn, become a skeptical expression of concern for the 'dream's' plan; not all dreams are fulfilled, not all plans succeed.[230] Penelope's report is transformed into a 'subtle' and 'brilliant' 'duel of indirectness', while Amphimedon's remark is no fault in the construction, instead he simply realises what the generations of scholars before Harsh had missed; Penelope knew all along.[231] Further, influenced by Harsh, van Lieshout notes that this 'almost compels us' to accept that symbolic dream-interpretation was known to Homer, for if Penelope's dream is an invention she must similarly have invented the 'interpretation scene', and so on the balance of evidence argued that the *oneiropoloi* incorporated dream-interpretation as part of their mantic art.[232]

However, 'early recognition' causes more problems that it solves. If Penelope has recognised Odysseus then her later actions become even more illogical; for she goes on to

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[228] Harsh (1950), 2, 16-17; Vlahos (2011), 46-9; cf. Winkler (1990), 153; Guidorizzi (2013), 59-61; Walde (2001), 61-2. See also Kessels (1978), 2; van Lieshout (1980), 166-7. Büchner (1940), 149 anticipated Harsh, suggesting that Penelope invented the dream to give the stranger '*einen Einblick in ihre geheimen Wünsche und Hoffnungen zu gebe… die Vernichtung der Freier durch den heimkehrenden Odysseus gerichtet sind*'.

[229] Sauer (1965), 50; Amory (1957), 172-3. Finley (1978), 27 (also Latacz (1992), 83; Amory (1963), 131n15) argued that the question of 'when' Penelope dreamt this dream is meaningless because '[Homer] no more thought to fix the dream in time than to fix in space the gifts that, though most suitors lived far off, at once appeared when she invited them.' Walde (2001), 62-3 argues that it is important when the dream was dreamt because it is catalytic for Penelope's following actions and therefore an integral element in the poem's structure. Bulkeley's (1998), 235-6 suggestion that Penelope invents the dream *ad hoc* while Athena prevents her recognition of Odysseus (19.541-2) draws upon Odysseus' earlier invention (14.457-506), but misses that Homer makes the audience aware, as he certainly would now (regardless, the dream could have occurred during Penelope's sleep at 18.188). Bulkeley's view that Penelope is then 'testing' Odysseus to see if he is 'blind to her feelings and as obsessed with killing the suitors as is the ''dream'' Odysseus' demonstrates the isolation of his approach, since Penelope rejoices at the death of the suitors. Holton (2022), 42-4 argues that Penelope narrates her dream in order that 'Odysseus will ensure her constructed prophetic dream-turned-vision will come to fruition', thereby intimating a belief in early recognition, but she never states this clearly.

[230] Harsh (1950), 17; Kutz (1989), 24, 25n13.

[231] Harsh (1950), 18-20; cf. Vlahos (2011), 71n19.

[232] van Lieshout (1980), 167.

muse suicide in order that she might meet Odysseus in death (20.61-90), refuses to believe Eurycleia when informed that Odysseus has returned and slain the suitors (23.149), and demonstrates a marked reluctance to accept Odysseus as her husband once he has revealed himself (23.181-204, cf. 8.270-5).[233] Harsh's rationalisations of these problems are unconvincing, since he argues that Penelope's rebuttal to Eurcyleia is representative of her psychological refusal to accept that Odysseus could have returned after so long, which runs counter to his entire thesis.[234] Indeed, Homer has a regular formula when he seeks to indicate to his audience that a character is withholding information 'thus he (or she) spoke, (while) thinking…' which, if Harsh was right, he would have failed to employ at his greatest moment of poetic subterfuge.[235] Instead, Homer('s gods) explicitly prevents the recognition from occurring:

> ἦ δ' οὔτ' ἀθρῆσαι δύνατ' ἀντίη οὔτε νοῆσαι·
> τῆι γὰρ Ἀθηναίη νόον ἔτραπεν.
> (19.477-9).

Further, this lack of recognition accords with the thematic characteristics of the *Odyssey*'s other recognition scenes, for neither the Phaeacians nor Polyphemus (cf. 9.506-17) recognise Odysseus until he reveals himself.[236] Even Eumaeus, who spends days with the stranger, and Eurycleia who knew him from birth, can only recognise Odysseus by his scar (cf. 21.217-20, 19.393).

Similarly, van Lieshout's suggestion that Homer knew of dream-interpretation on account of the invented 'interpretation scene' cannot be accepted since it has not been convincingly demonstrated that Penelope has recognised Odysseus and thereby invented her

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[233] Austin (1975), 232-3; Knox (1996), 55; Yamagata (2011), 127-8; Combellack (1983), 108-9. See also Winkler (1990), 157-8; Felson-Rubin (1994), 58-60.
[234] Harsh (1950), 3-5. See also Amory (1957), 172-3. Vlahos explains Penelope's suicidal thoughts as 'a wife's nervous uncertainty [!] at seeing her beloved husband after many years absence' (Vlahos (2011), 30).
[235] Amory (1963), 103; Russo (1992), 7-8; Combellack (1983), 108. See also Stanford (1954), 253n25.
[236] Louden (2011), 77-8.

dream.[237] Further, the eagle-Odysseus' interpretation fails to account for several elements of the dream's content, such as the meaning of the Achaean women who surround Penelope, or the number of the geese, that is, this is not the interpretation of a 'symbolic dream' but rather the dream is the medium through which symbolic content (i.e., the bird-omen) is introduced.[238] Moreover, Penelope's dream demonstrates only a knowledge of interpretation *within* dreams, a phenomenon known to Artemidorus (4.72.2) and reported by Aelius Aristides (*HL* 1.8, 9) and therefore presumably not an exclusively literary device, rather than the process of reporting a dream to a qualified individual for a symbolic translation.[239] Finally, it simply makes more sense to understand Penelope's 'Gates of Dreams' as a genuine expression of her inability to trust her *dream*, rather than as a double metaphor for a theorised and unstated plan emerging from her unstated recognition. The dream is simply the best device which Homer has to hand through which he can express Penelope's inner feelings to what she presumes to be a stranger, while also ensuring those feelings remain partly veiled, that is, without destroying his carefully constructed ambiguity.[240]

4.2 The Intuitive Penelope

The psychological school of the Unitarian tradition have proposed a more convincing solution which reads Penelope's character as the fundamental point for understanding *Od*. 18-23 and, thereby, her dream. Amory, Austin, and Russo have all argued that Penelope's behaviour is characteristic of her intuitive *ēthos*, and her illogicalities of character and oblique motivations are representative of her divided mind and conflicting loyalties, emotions which she repeatedly articulates, preface her dream (19.509-534), and are

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[237] See also Amory (1957), 175.
[238] Podlecki (1967), 21; Kessels (1978), 93.
[239] Aristides records a dream (*HL* 1.9) featuring an intra-oneiric dream-report and an intra-oneiric interpretation, which is then followed by his own waking interpretation (agreeing with the dream). On the veracity of Aristides' dreams see Behr (1968), 116-20.
[240] Latacz (1992), 85.

exemplified in her 'Gates of Dreams'.[241] Austin writes, 'Penelope, verging ever closer to recognition, lapses from discursive logic into allusive modes, expressing herself through the opaque style of myth, [and] dream… but the lapse is not a lapse into irrationality.'[242] That is, while Penelope has made no *formal* recognition of Odysseus, she still feels a strong psychological connection with the stranger, that is, an otherwise unconscious pull towards this uncannily Odysseus-like man.[243] Notably, this unconscious knowledge is already present in the dream, for the eagle declares not that Odysseus will return but that he *already* has (εἰλήλουθα 19.549).[244] Penelope is expressing verbally her imagined fantasy in order to have it vindicated by the stranger with whom she feels it is connected.[245] The stranger's emphatic endorsement of her dream, his earlier claim that Odysseus may return in secret (19.299), and his explicit assurances that Odysseus will return before the contest of the bow must bring Penelope's mind onto the precipice of conscious knowledge, and intimates to the audience the logic behind her irrationality: This *is* Odysseus, but that is impossible, but it *is* him; am I waking, or am I, like I have been for the last twenty years, just dreaming?[246]

Murnaghan calls the fortuitous outcome of the interview a 'combination of [Penelope's] despair and [Odysseus'] improvisation', but it is more than that, it is despair and *intuition*, a hopelessness combined with an irresistible feeling that Penelope's dream-fantasies are becoming a reality.[247] Curiously, when Eurycleia does inform Penelope (by waking her from

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[241] Amory (1957), (1963), (1966); Russo (1982), (1992); Austin (1975). See also Allione (1963), 81-98. Doherty (1995), 37-9 is critical of Amory's division along the 'stereotypical' lines of 'masculine rationality' and 'feminine intuition'. See also Murnaghan (1990), 245-6.

[242] Austin (1975), 230.

[243] Hölscher (1939), 63; Amory (1963), 104-5; Russo (1982), 8; Whitman (1958), 303. Cf. Emlyn-Jones (2009), 208-30, who writes that 'It follows from the theory that 'intuitive Penelope' often thinks and feels very differently from what she actually says. But… Homer appears not to need a 'subtext'' (213), despite Homer's repeated indication that Penelope harbours precisely this 'subtext' (e.g., 18.281-3).

[244] Bowcott (1959), 122.

[245] Cf. Amory (1963), 105-6; de Jong (2001), on *Od*. 19.536-50.

[246] Amory (1963), 106. Debate concerning the relative 'reality' of dreaming became a Greek philosophical *topos*, see van Lieshout (1980), 67-84, 103-42; Burnyeat (1970), 101–122, (1990); Gallop (1965), 1-26; (1971), 187–201; Holton (2022), 57-73.

[247] Murnaghan (1987), 127; cf. Russo (1992), 8n3, Rutherford (1992), 31.

sleeping, no less) that Odysseus has returned and murdered the suitors, and *only* when she specifies that he was the stranger whom Penelope entertained (cf. 17.586-88), the handmaiden is described in the recognisable formula of the *Traumszene* (στῆ δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς 23.4), and she even uses the same word (*etumos* 23.6), to describe her confirmation of Odysseus' return that she hears Penelope use of dreams proceeding through horn.[248] Penelope's dream is the apex of an overwhelming current of cosmic premonitions interwoven between the returning *homophrosynē* which bubbles over into conscious understanding precisely at the moment when she calls for the contest of the bow, for her unconscious motivations have moved her (by intuition) towards definite action.

Dreaming, fantasy, and the waking denial of that fantasy have hitherto characterised Penelope's mind, but by the end of *Odyssey* 19 and in the following dreams and dream-visions of *Odyssey* 20, the ontological boundaries between waking and dreaming seem to be on the verge of total disintegration. The space between these parallel worlds has already been blurred by a dream-report that finds its content, and therefore the *enargeia* (cf. 4.841) required to elicit powerful emotion, from Penelope's waking life.[249] Penelope even declares to the beggar:

> εἴ κ' ἐθέλοις μοι, ξεῖνε, παρήμενος ἐν μεγάροισιν
> τέρπειν, οὔ κέ μοι ὕπνος ἐπὶ βλεφάροισι χυθείη.
> (19.589-90)

that is, to continue sitting here with you, stranger, is akin to my dreams of Odysseus. As Wohl writes of Jocasta's distinction between dreaming and reality (Soph. *OT* 981-3), it is in making such a distinction that Penelope, unknowingly, 'collapses the two'.[250] However,

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[248] Brillante (1990a), 33; Struck (2016), 261-2; Winkler (1990), 157. Rood (2006), 8 views this as part of the dream's prophecy, which 'foretells' that Penelope will be sleeping when the revenge occurs. Sels (2013), 569 views it as a special 'focalization' of the 'unreal'.

[249] Walde (2001), 57-8.

[250] Wohl (2002), 254; Piettre (2020), 64. This blurring is shared constituent of Rhesus' dream (X.496), whose dream-world and waking-world merge just as he is killed (Flannery-Dailey (2000), 84; Sels (2013), 564-5).

recognition cannot come while the suitors live (cf. 4.836-7), of that the poet is certain and his gods ensure it from the moment Odysseus arrives in Ithaca (13.189-3), and so Penelope must call the contest of the bow and then retire to her bed, to dream her final dream of Odysseus.[251]

[251] Thornton (1970), 96-7.

Chapter Five: Penelope's Tears

There remains a puzzling 'defect' to the dream-report.[252] Why should Penelope cry, thrice emphasised (19.541-3), over the death of her geese-suitors?[253] Further, why would Penelope confess that she enjoys gazing at them (εἰσορόωσα 19.537, cf. XII.312; 7.71, 20.166)?[254] Since this dream allegorises the return of Odysseus and the death of the hated suitors (i.e., it is a *Wunschtraum*) it makes little sense that she should react with negative emotion, or take any enjoyment in seeing the geese feeding within her halls.[255] Indeed, Penelope does neither of these things in the actual waking reality which the dream anticipates (23.1-49), making its fulfilment imprecise, or the allegory unpolished. Yet attention is drawn to this by the precision of its other elements, such as the breaking of necks (ἐκέχυντο cf. 19.539, 22.15-16, 326-8), and the piling of the bodies (cf. 19.539, 22.389).[256] Moreover, despite this being a *Wunschtraum*, Penelope herself characterises it as an 'dire dream' (19.568), and her later erotic dream as one of many 'evil dreams' (20.87).[257]

Among the many attempts at resolving Penelope's tears, Dodds argued this 'defect' to the 'simple wish-fulfilment' dream was a representation of what Freud called 'inversion of affect', that is, that Homer was accurately rendering the psychological state by which

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[252] Dodds (1951), 123n21. See also Levaniouk (2011), 233.

[253] Hundt (1935), 87n18; Dodds (1951), 123n21. This also buttresses the dream's psychological plausibility, for as D'Andrade (1961), 309 noted of Hall's (1951) dream collections, 'the content of dreams seems to contain more negative feelings than waking life' (cf. Spaulding (1981), 331).

[254] Cf. Telemachus' joy (15.164-5).

[255] Harris (2009), 50n136 corrects Dodds' view that this dream is 'simple wish-fulfilment' (Dodds (1951), 106), for it has elements of the *Angsttraum* in the geese's deaths (or even a nightmarish quality, although the usual Homeric term is '*kakon onar*' (10.495)), to which Penelope reacts with expected negative emotion. Penelope's glance towards the geese is not dissimilar to a dream 'apport' which is left behind in order to validate a dream or to lend credence to its fulfilment (Dodds (1951), 105-6). Comparably, Bellerophon (Pind. *Ol*. 13.61-80) finds a bridle left by Athena upon waking, thereby 'proving' the veracity of the dream (cf. Paus. 10.38.13; Verg. *Aen*. 8.42). Notably, Bellerophon still reports his dream to the *mantis* Polydius for divinatory approval (Pind. *Pyth*. 4.159-61). See also van Lieshout (1980), 21-3; Kessels (1969), 389-90; Kaiser (1961), 12-3.

[256] Kotwick (2020), 16n56; Rozokoki (2001), 2. Walde (2001), 63 notes a further consistency between the dream and reality, for Odysseus is disguised in both (as the eagle and as the stranger).

[257] Cf. Dodds (1951), 106; Russo (1992), on *Od*. 19.568; Pratt (1994), 148.

emotions are often in-versed to a dream's context.[258] However, this inversion is found typically only when the dream-wish breaks a cultural taboo (i.e., it is ego-dystonic), which is not the case for Penelope who desires the suitor's deaths consciously and legitimately (cf. 17. 499, 17.544-7, 18.165, 19.569).[259] Instead, the psychoanalyst Devereux introduced the idea that Penelope harbours an unconscious affection for her suitors, which is latently expressed in the manifest content of her dream by her negative reaction to the geese's deaths.[260] Devereux chastises the philologists for having overlooked the realities of Penelope's situation, for she is an ageing woman denied for twenty years the companionship of her husband and the pleasures of sex, and who, although consciously chaste, must still unconsciously appreciate the flattery of the many young and available suitors (cf. 2.91-2; 16.395-8; 18.158-62; 19.524).[261] Curiously, when Penelope awakens from her dream, her first instinct is for a searching glance (παπτήνασα 19.552) towards her geese, taking relief that they continue to feed from their trough, but surely also knowing that her suitors

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[258] Dodds (1951), 123n21; Amory (1957), 62; Freud (1900), 460-5; cf. Freud (1900), 471 ('reversal of affect' in the *SE*). Rankin (1962), 622-4 observed that Penelope's dream at 20.87-90 is as upsetting as it is joyful, since she has still lost twenty years with her husband, and so this fantasy 'Odysseus' is representative of an Odysseus who can never return (cf. 19.406-9). For Rankin, Penelope's reluctance to accept the Odysseus as her husband is a refusal to accept this aged and haggard stranger as the man cherished in her memory (cf. 13.429-38; 23.100-2). Bulkeley (1998), 237-8 argues that Penelope cannot accept the 'interpretation' offered by the eagle-Odysseus simply because it is 'wrong', noting that the equation of the geese to the suitors is imprecise, for there are some 108 suitors (16.245-54), and yet only twenty geese. The geese must, therefore, denote the twenty years of their marriage, now lost, and destroyed by Odysseus's absence. Athanassakis (1987), 263-4 suggests the twenty geese are analogous to Penelope's favourites among the suitors, implicitly accepting Devereux's latent desire theory, and connects the geese by their long necks to the suitors as symbolic phalluses (broken by Odysseus, which, in turn, represent their most 'snake-like' portion, since Athanassakis reads this scene as a transposed 'eagle-against-serpent' motif). Friedrich (1997), 313 suggests the geese=Penelope and 'are a projection of Penelope's…fantasies of [Odysseus'] fantasies of her possible adulteries'.

[259] Devereux (1957), 381-2; cf. Kessels (1978), 93-4, 118-9n27.

[260] Devereux (1957), 381-2; cf. Russo (1982), 9. See also Rankin (1962) 617-24; van Nortwick (1979), 276n22; Lev Kenaan (2019), 170-1; Felson-Rubin (1996), 175-9. Cf. Rozokoki (2001), 3; Pratt (2011), 220. Telemachus's vision of Athena (15.9-45) could also be interpreted as the fulfilment of his latent desire to be free of his mother's control, that is, it demonstrates through a projected externalised fantasy his repressed desire for Eurymachus' marriage to Penelope, thereby permitting him to become the master of his own home (Amory (1957), 59-61; cf. Rankin (1962), 622). Telemachus is said to desire Penelope's re-marriage (19.533-5).

[261] Devereux (1957), 382, (1976), 329n35; cf. van Nortwick (2009), 109. Devereux (1976), xxiv highlights the competing myths in which Penelope was unfaithful (cf. Serv. *ad* Verg. *G*. 1.16; Σ *Lyc*. 766; Σ Theoc. 1.3, Wendel), typically with the god Pan, but in one version by all of the suitors (Duris of Samos *FGrH* 76F21). Cf. Penelope's infidelities in Hdt. 2.145, Pind. fr. 100, Snell; [Apollod]. 7.38, Paus. 8.12.5-6.

remain.[262]

Devereux's theory, however, requires Homer's conception of the dream to be in any sense like Freud's. Consequently, it has been argued that psychoanalytic theories pertaining to modern dreams are unlikely to apply in the same precise manner to Homeric dreams.[263] Understanding Penelope's dream through a psychoanalytic lens requires an acceptance of certain Freudian assumptions regarding the universality of the unconscious, the existence of a 'trans-historical human nature' (Goldhill), and the belief that a narrative from a culture without knowledge of psychoanalysis is best expressed as if it sought to demonstrate the principles on which it was unconsciously based.[264] Further, if Penelope did harbour an unconscious affection for the suitors, and this was constructed and encoded into the dream, it then follows that this could have been decoded by Homer's audience.[265] Similarly, Penelope should expect that it could be decoded by the stranger, with whom she feels an overwhelming *homophrosynē*. Thus, it would require us to hope that Odysseus was more familiar with Dodds' inversion of affect than Devereux's latent desire.[266]

Moreover, if we consider that Penelope has not yet equated her geese with the suitors when she cries at their deaths, a not unnecessary part of the dream's content (since it brings the eagle's attention to Penelope and catalyses the symbolic translation), then Devereux's

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[262] Rankin (1962), 622; Austin (1975), 123.Walde (2001), 61 argues that Homer understood the influence of dreaming upon waking thoughts, and so concluded that Penelope's nightingale comparison (19.512-534) corresponds to the imagery of her bird-dream and, therefore, the expected thought-image which would follow such a dream. See also Anhalt (2001), 145-159.

[263] Kessels (1978), 94; Harrisson (2013), 40-1. For critiques of psychoanalysing Greek dreams see Price (1990), 3-37; cf. Walde (1994), 67-82, (1999), 121-142.

[264] Goldhill (1997), 341. For a critical overview of classics and psychoanalysis see Lloyd-Jones (1985), 152-182; Vernant (1990), 85-112, (1972), 273-95. More sympathetic overviews can be found in Lev Kenaan (2021), Wohl (2008), 89-110, Porter & Buchan (2004), 1-19, and Rudnytsky (1987).

[265] Kessels (1978), 95.

[266] Kessels (1978), 95; cf. Levaniouk (2011), 233; Felson-Rubin (1994), 59-60.

latent dream-thought creates a purely chronological problem.[267] It is not until the eagle-Odysseus has translated the dream's symbols that Penelope would even know to express such a reaction.[268] Moreover, the parallel between the geese and the suitors does not have to extend as far as Devereux assumes, for it could be complete in noting that both are parasitical upon the household and not in the relative terms of Penelope's affection.[269] Accordingly, it has typically been concluded that Penelope cries within the dream because she cares for her geese, as she cares for them in waking life (cf. 15.162-3), that is, her dream is an *Angsttraum* inasmuch as it is a *Wunschtraum*.[270] Homer is conveying, with an impressive psychological accuracy, the fear and anxiety often felt during dreams and the perceived inability to define reality from dreaming (which is perhaps the reason why Homer's dream-*eidōla* must remind their dreamers that they are, in-fact, dreaming), just as he is reflecting within it a microcosm of the integral themes of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus' homecoming and revenge.[271] In this sense, Penelope's dream represents in its formulation the latent effects of the *premonitions and hearsay* upon her mind.

5.1 Penelope on the Couch

Devereux's Freudian reading and the popular critiques of it, however, constitute an undue focus on the dream's manifest content. Whereas for Freud it was not the encoded ('latent') content of the dream that was crucial, but the process by which content was

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[267] Walde (2001), 59; Kessels (1978), 94; Rozokoki (2001), 3. Rutherford's (1992), 37-8 objections to Devereux's theory are based upon Penelope's conscious loyalty, and so make a poor rebuttal to the suggestion of unconscious desire since conscious loyalty would be the predicate censor.

[268] Artemidorus (2.60, 1.12) argues that mourning in dreaming does not have to correspond with mourning when waking, and that dream emotions form an aspect of interpretation which influences fulfilment (Walde (2001), 59n35).

[269] Reider (1989), 143-4.

[270] So, de Jong (2001), on *Od*. 19.536-50; Reider (1989), 143; Rutherford (1992), on *Od*. 19.535-58; Heitman (2005), 72.

[271] Walde (2001). 54; Latacz (1984), 23; Amory (1966), 41. Amory (1957), 52, 56-7 (also Richardson (1993), on *Il*. 23.105) notes that Homer's dreaming corresponds with psychological observations. For example, the feeling that one has been dreaming the entire night is common, and yet dreamer's can only remember small portions of their dreams (Freud 1900), 279-280). So Achilles states that he has dreamt of Patroclus the whole night (XIII.105), despite a relatively short dream sequence. Similarly, dreaming of 'inhibited' movement, as in the *Iliad*'s chasing simile, is rendered by Freud as a 'typical dream' (Freud (1900), 335-6), as is dreaming of one's dead relatives or friends (Freud (1900), 421-30).

encoded, that is, the dream-work and its functions.[272] There is nothing 'unconscious' in the latent dream thought and Freud writes:

> Two separate functions may be distinguished in mental activity during the construction of a dream: the production of the dream-thoughts, and their transformation into the content of the dream. The dream-thoughts are entirely rational and are constructed with an expenditure of all the psychical energy of which we are capable.[273]

> Dreams are nothing other than a particular *form* of thinking, made possible by the conditions of the state of sleep. It is the *dream-work* which creates that form, and it alone is the essence of dreaming — the explanation of its peculiar nature.[274]

Thus, rather than attempting to rationalise Penelope's desire as expressed by the dream's 'latent' content, in applying a psychoanalytic reading we should trace the conscious origin of her desire, that is, what it means for her to desire Odysseus' return and to repress that desire as expressed by the transformation of the forbidden wish into a symbolic dream. Indeed, that this wish was repressed may explain its appearance as the only 'symbolic' dream in Homer, since Agamemnon's wish (to conquer Troy without Achilles) was not repressed and therefore was not translated by the dream-work into disguised symbolism. This is similarly the case for Penelope's first dream, Achilles', Priam's, and Nausicaä's.[275] Moreover, as Freud observed, overt scepticism concerning the worth of a dream, precisely of the kind Penelope expresses, that is, analogously to the remark which Freud quotes, 'this is only a dream', is a significant sign of a special resistance to its interpretation.[276] This resistance cannot be explained alone by Penelope's fear that the dream may have proceeded through ivory, for she similarly resists the omens, hearsay, and eventually Odysseus himself.[277]

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[272] Freud (1900), 506-7, 506n2; cf. Žižek (1989), 4-5; Lacan (2006), 426-35.
[273] Freud (1900), 506.
[274] Freud (1900), 506n2.
[275] Reider (1989), 129 sees this as sequential, not causal, but it is causally predicate that a *Wunschtraum* occur sequentially after the wish arises.
[276] Freud (1900), 488-8, 516-7; cf. Amory (1957), 63. Winkler argues that Penelope's 'extra degree of caution' is accounted for by her attempt to avoid Helen's mistake (23.215-24), or those of the women with whom she is compared by Antinous (2.115-28); Tyro (11.235-45) and Alkmene (11.266-8) (Winkler (1990), 151).
[277] Cf. Caravero (1995), 13-14, 122n1.

Amory rejected the value of interpreting Penelope's resistance by discounting Devereux's latent desire theory.[278] However, it is not the 'latent' desire that Penelope would be resisting (it is, after all, latent), but the repressed, that is, conscious desire of Odysseus' return as expressed by the dream's self-interpreted allegory. As Derrida once argued, 'resistance must be interpreted; it has as much meaning as what is opposes; it is just as charged with meaning and thus just as interpretable as that which it disguises or displaces.'[279] Further, if we follow Lacan's Hegelo-Kojèvian observation on the metonymic nature of desire that desire is always '*le désir d'autre chose*', and thereby note that the precondition of our fantasies are that they must be unfulfilled, we might better explain Penelope's psychological refusal to accept Odysseus' return, her negative reaction within the dream, and her resistance to the dream's meaning without deviating from Homer.[280] Lacan argued that desire is a 'drive', that is, it is never fully our own (i.e., it is drawn from the site of the 'Other', that is, the wider symbolic order), and thus it has its origins outside of the 'Self' with the locus of desire being the unconscious; Freud's '*ein anderer Schauplatz*'.[281] Penelope's resistance and her reaction within the dream, that is, within the theatre of the 'Other Scene', can be explained in Lacanian terms as her authentic reaction to the fulfilment of her repressed fantasy (Lacan's paradoxical *jouissance*).

Penelope enjoys her dream-fantasies of Odysseus, as she notes in her remark to the stranger (19.589-90; cf. 15.392-4), for his presence gives her such pleasure (τέρπειν), that, if

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[278] Amory (1957), 63-5; cf. Amory (1963), 107.
[279] Derrida (1998), 13.
[280] Lacan (1966), 518. See also Kojève (1980), 38-40. Comparably, Orestes interpretation of Clytemnestra's dream accounts for her reaction (Aesch. *Cho.* 543-50).
[281] Lacan (1977), 235, Lacan (2006), 524-5; Freud (1900), 535-6. An overview of Lacan's theory of desire can be found in Wohl (2002), 20. This is not to say that Homer understood the 'unconscious' in the psychoanalytic sense but, as Russo writes, to note he recognised 'people's behavior seems sometimes to spring from sources that are not clearly understood but buried deep and apparently irrational; and that dreams seem to arise from this same mysterious source' (Russo (1982), 6n8).

she could, she would never have to sleep again (cf. 23.208-9). Consequently, Penelope *must* deny that Odysseus has returned if she is, perversely, to continue enjoying her dream-fantasies of such a return.[282] Since one cannot desire what one already has, Penelope necessarily refuses to believe that Odysseus has returned, for acting in any other way would constitute a rejection of that desire and the theoretical *jouissance* entailed by its fulfilment, that is, of her impossible fantasy; for *jouissance* is conceivable only under a negation (Penelope's being her conscious belief that Odysseus is dead).[283] Thus, the *ainos* (19.568) consequences of Penelope's dream are twofold, for the risk is not only that it may have proceeded through ivory and force her re-marriage, but the result of it having come through horn represents, as Amory writes, 'a psychological readjustment for Penelope that is painful as well as desired'.[284]

Penelope's dream-fantasy is destroyed *by* Odysseus' return. Consider how this is demonstrated by Penelope's dream in *Odyssey* 20. Penelope goes from dreaming symbolically of Odysseus' return to dreaming directly of a young fantasised Odysseus, that is, as in the Lacanian principle of desire, her dream-wishes become more remote just as they come closer to fulfilment, for the object of desire must always be receding and exemplifying what Lacan called 'desire-in-lack'.[285] For Lacan, desire has no object *per se* since desire *qua* desire is the search for something else, that is, it seeks not satisfaction but continuation, or as Fink writes, 'the dialectical *movement* of one signifier to the next, and is diametrically opposed to fixation'.[286] The predicate to emptiness of desire is rendered by Lacan as '*objet petit a*' (=object (a)). This was built from Freud's observation in *Beyond the Pleasure*

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[282] Felson-Rubin (1996), 176-7 accepting Devereux's theory, reaches a similar conclusion about the fantasised pleasures of the suitors.
[283] Comparatively, Agamemnon dreams of taking Troy after Achilles withdraws from the battle, that is, when this wish is most unrealistic (cf. Amory (1957), 59).
[284] Amory (1966), 30-1.
[285] Lacan (1977), 167, 286, 311-12; cf. Rankin (1962), 622-3. See also Stanford (1948), on *Od*. 19.315.
[286] Fink (1995), 90-1. See also Žizek (1997), 8-9.

Principle of the child who is playing '*fort-da*'.[287] The child throws away his toy, that is, the object of his desire (*fort!*) the absence of which introduces for him the feeling of unpleasure, but only in order that he can gain pleasure when the object is returned to him (*da!*). Upon the object's pleasurable return, the child must again throw the toy, that is, he must reintroduce the unpleasure of the object's absence as a predicate to both feel and imagine the pleasure of its return.

Penelope cries in her dream because the returning Odysseus (*qua* object of desire) annihilates Penelope's desire for that return, for as Žižek has observed 'melancholy occurs when we finally get the desired object', that is, once Odysseus has returned Penelope can no longer enjoy the fantasies of such a return exemplified by her *Wunschtraum*.[288] Consequently, Penelope puts the object of desire further out of reach and thereby delays the moment of melancholy, that is, she permits herself to continue enjoying her fantasises of Odysseus' return by resisting the dream's interpretation and the stranger's divinatory sorting. As noted, this 'desire-in-lack' is demonstrated by her later dream, since Penelope introduces an even more remote fantasy with an even greater negation; sexual gratification from an Odysseus who is now lost to time.[289] Penelope's newly fantasised *jouissance* (the always receding object (a)) re-introduces the predicate lack into her desire since Odysseus is, now, the haggard and aged beggar (cf. 23.100-2).[290]

Moreover, Odysseus' return actually threatens Penelope's own being, for an ontology of

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[287] Freud (1920), 14-16. This follows also from Lacan's concept of The Real, or 'being-in-itself', which we are separated from when we gain the faculty of language (part of The Symbolic, which is loosely analogous to Freud's Super-ego but incorporates structural linguistics). For Lacan, our separation from The Real results in an incomprehensible (in symbolic structures) desire that cannot be fulfilled, except by death.

[288] Žižek (2006), 67-8 See also Guidorizzi (2013), 63; Foley (1978), 17. See Lacan's (2019), 43-123 interpretation of 'The Dream about the Dead Father' (Freud (1911), 225), esp. 44, 91-2. This was anticipated by Buchan (2004), 221 of which I was unaware until this thesis was completed.

[289] Cf. Rankin (1962), 623; Levaniouk (2011), 245n31.

[290] Cf. Rankin (1962), 622-4.

selfhood has emerged on Ithaca through which Penelope defines herself *by* Odysseus' absence, that is, by her chastity, her opposition to the suitors, her ploys, that is, by her *lack*.[291] Penelope is the archetype of the chaste wife, an archetype predicated upon the absence of her husband and a longing for his return, a longing which, although unpleasurable, defines Penelope as an *active* 'desiring subject' (Wohl), for as Fink writes lack is the 'first step beyond nothingness'.[292] Odysseus *qua nostos* hero becomes in the Lacanian metaphor something '*qui manque à sa place*', that is, a purely impossible object or the constitutive emptiness within Penelope's structural relationship by which she qualifies her selfhood.[293] Penelope's being is defined, in turn, by the Other's desire, that is, by the absent Odysseus' desire (*qua* dominant symbolic order) for her chastity.[294] Since Penelope's desire for Odysseus' return is the manner by which she constitutes her selfhood (i.e., her archetypal chastity and resistance to the suitors), this demonstrates the manner by which Penelope's desire *qua* selfhood is born in complete subordination to the desire of Odysseus, that is, the intersubjectivity of fantasy, or as Lacan repeatedly declared, '*Le désir de l'homme, c'est le désir de l'Autre*'.[295]

It is not surprising, then, that Odysseus announces that he must leave only shortly after he has returned (23.264-85, cf. West (2003), 166-9)), for his arrival threatens the symbolic order which has emerged over the last twenty years on Ithaca. This return, ecstatic to that

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[291] Cf. Fink (1995), 52. Caravero (1995), 12 approaches this position, 'In a certain sense maybe [Odysseus' return] would be the end of Penelope herself'.

[292] Wohl (1993), 40n60; Fink (1995), 52. Cf. Holmberg (1995), 104 'when [Penelope] asserts desirous subjectivity by engineering her own plots, the narrative counteracts by simultaneously reinscribing her as a wife whose desire and narrative plots (without her knowledge) are directed towards Odysseus'.

[293] Fink (1995), 52; cf. Žižek (2006), 40-1.

[294] Cf. Fink (1995), 53-4. As Doherty (1995), 38-9 notes, Penelope's fidelity has traditionally been celebrated from an androcentric perspective in which 'Penelope's happiness is subordinate to and indeed defined by that of Odysseus'. See also Murnghan (1990), 231-44; Caravero (1995), 11-30.

[295] Cf. Fink (1995), 54-5; Žižek (1997), 9-10; Porter & Buchan (2004), 11. Many of the conventions, rituals, and notions of female life in the Greek *oikos* were invented to isolate female *erōs*, which becomes a *topos* of male concern (Carson (1990), 136-45). Odysseus has been analysed as the archetypal 'trickster' by Russo (2008), 253-68.

order, is a return that can never be totally fulfilled without the destruction of the subject of its desire.[296] Note that, as it has been curiously observed, it is after reporting her dream that Penelope muses upon suicide 'with Odysseus in mind' (Ὀδυσῆα ὀσσομένη 20.80-1), that is, with her *fantasy* of Odysseus as imagined object, *eikelos autōi* (20.88).[297] This line has typically been taken as evidence that Penelope could not have recognised Odysseus, but it is, in-fact, further evidence for Penelope's intuitive recognition and her feeling that her dream-omen *will* be realised, that is, as the pure *Todestrieb* inherent in the fulfilment of *jouissance* and the destruction of Penelope as an active (desiring) subject.[298] Penelope now feels the same hollowness of fulfilled *qua* empty pleasure which the Xenophontic Hieron articulates to Simonides (Xen. *Hier*. 7.13; cf. Pl. *Resp*. 576b) upon which he muses suicide.[299]

It was earlier objected that Penelope does not equate either the geese with suitors or the eagle with Odysseus at the moment she reacts, but this interpretation relies upon the dream's synchronic narrative order, rather than the diachronic processes of the dream-work and the potential for the 'evolution' of latent content through the interpretable *parole* of the dream within Penelope's unconscious which is structured, as Lacan asserted, like a *langue*.[300] Lacan meant by this that Freudian displacement and condensation have mirrors in structural linguistics; metaphor and metonym.[301] Thus Penelope describes the χῆνες as masculine (ἀθρόοι 19.540), whereas the noun χήν is earlier used with feminine adjectives (ἀργὴν χῆνα

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[296] This is overdetermined by Teiresias' prophecy (11.132), for what is Odysseus if not a wandering hero? Cf. van Nortwick (2009), 177-8, 118 who argues that Odysseus is patterned by *stasis* and *ecstasis*, and that through this return Penelope becomes worryingly analogous to the women who have detained/desired to detain him. See also Holmberg (1995), 103-22.

[297] Penelope also muses suicide just after she awakens from her enforced sleep (18.200-5), where it has been suggested that this dream might have occurred (Amory (1957), 58-9).

[298] Lacan (2019), 44; Wohl (2002), 248. See also Johnston (1994), 148-51.

[299] Wohl (2002), 260; cf. Lacan (2019), 91-2.

[300] Lacan (2006), 197-268; Wohl (2020), 127. 'The diachronic axis gives coherence to the mythical tale, while the synchronic axis reveals the structure of the myth. Similarly, in a dream or a myth, the function of the chronological sequence, a product of (usually) secondary revision, is to provide coherence, often at the expense of distorting the underlying meaning; disclosure of meaning, then, involves "undoing" the distortion caused by diachronic sequence and isolating synchronic similarities' (Caldwell (1976), 214-5).

[301] Lacan (2006), 235; Althusser (1971), 159.

15.161, ἀτιταλλομένην 15.174).[302] Penelope's language intimates by this pregnant metonymic choice that she knows that the geese=suitors even before the symbolic translation has taken place.

Penelope's dream, then, still expresses *a priori* the allegory of her desire for Odysseus' return, and her reaction within the dream should be read as a reaction to this encoded desire.[303] Indeed, is this not the manner by which one's dreams are interpreted upon the psychoanalyst's couch? Despite their attestation, few dreams are interpreted within the dream itself, and, as discussed, there is no *Traumdeuter* for Penelope to ask.[304] If we were to remove the eagle's interpretation from the dream, place Penelope on the couch, and then submit her to the processes of free association, she would certainly reveal (should her resistances be overcome) the encoded symbolisms of geese=suitor and eagle=Odysseus.[305] In then attempting to narrate the manner by which these symbols were encoded (i.e., her repressed desire) the analyst could arrive at the reason for Penelope's reaction without either inverting the dream emotion or reaching for a 'latent' desire, since the fulfilment of the dream-fantasy would be understood as the melancholy which follows the surfeit of her perversely enjoyed and ontologically predicate desire.

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[302] Rozokoki (2001), 2.
[303] Cf. Rankin (1962), 619.
[304] For Artemidorus, if intra-oneiric interpretations are straightforward they are to be regarded as 'self-validating' and 'you should not look for any more symbolic meaning' (Artem. 72.2).
[305] Homer is without free association but he is not without the processes of the dream-work, as demonstrated by the dream's condensation and displacement (Dodds (1951), 106; Lev Kenaan (2016), 209).

Chapter Six: Dreaming at the Dark of the Moon

Penelope follows the stranger's affirmation of the eagle's translation with some of the most famous lines in all of Homer:[306]

> ξεῖν', ἤτοι μὲν ὄνειροι ἀμήχανοι ἀκριτόμυθοι
> γίνοντ', οὐδέ τι πάντα τελείεται ἀνθρώποισιν.
> δοιαὶ γάρ τε πύλαι ἀμενηνῶν εἰσιν ὀνείρων·
> αἱ μὲν γὰρ κεράεσσι τετεύχαται, αἱ δ' ἐλέφαντι·
> τῶν οἳ μέν κ' ἔλθωσι διὰ πριστοῦ ἐλέφαντος,
> οἵ ῥ' ἐλεφαίρονται, ἔπε' ἀκράαντα φέροντες·
> οἱ δὲ διὰ ξεστῶν κεράων ἔλθωσι θύραζε,
> οἵ ῥ' ἔτυμα κραίνουσι, βροτῶν ὅτε κέν τις ἴδηται.
> (19.560-7)[307]

Penelope's gates offer the closest parallel Homerists can get to an ethnopsychological approach, that is, to understand Penelope's oneirology analogously to the manner in which modern anthropologists approach indigenous dream theories. However, even more elusive than her dream, the attempts to explain and understand Penelope's gates and the symbolic meanings of horn(s) and ivory have raged since antiquity, with Eustathius providing an overview of the interpretations that, even by his day, had 'worn thin the gates of dreams' (Eust. 1877.22-3).[308]

Many scholars sympathise with Eustathius' pseudo-etymological connection between κέρας and κραίνω, and his more oblique presumed connection between ἐλεφαίρομαι and ἔλπω, via the hypothetical form *ἐλπαίρω, which are all supposed to be connected with ἐλέφας.[309] However, Analysts consider this kind of wordplay to be late and therefore alien to

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[306] Amory (1966), 3. Pl. *Chrm*. 173a; Hor. *Carm*. 3.27.40-2; Verg. *Aen*. 6.893-6; Macrob. *In Somn*. 1.3.17-20; Tert. *De anim*. 46.2; Luc. *Ver. hist*. 2.32-5, *Gall*. 1.6; Nonnus, *Dion*. 89-91; Philostr. *Imag*. 1. 27; Stat. *Silv*. 5.3.288-90; Auson. 2.8.22-34; Synesius *De insomn*. 8.12-13.

[307] **562** cf. πύλαι Ἀΐδαο V.646, IX.312, 14.156, Aesch. *Ag*. 1291; πύλαι οὐρανοῦ V.749; Tartatus' σιδήρειαί πύλαι VIII.15; Hes. *Theog*. 811; θύρας χαλκείας Hes. *Theog*. 732-3.
563 κεράεσσι is in the pl. 'horns', but is usually translated as the sg. 'horn', since ἐλέφας is singular (cf. V.583). See Hoekstra (1989), on *Od*. 14.156. Russo (1992), *ad loc*. suggests that the pl. is substitutable for the sg. (cf. 19.211), and so I write 'horn(s)'. Hermes is a 'bringer of dreams', πυληδόκος (*Hom. Hymn Herm.* 14-15), and an ὀνειροπομὸς καὶ ὑπνοδότης (Σ *ad Od*. 7.138, Pontani).

[308] Amory (1966), 3-4.

[309] Russo (1992), *ad loc.*; Amory (1966), 3-4

Homer, and so, as with Penelope's dream, the perceived 'sophistication' of these lines led to their being anathematised.[310] But it is difficult to know whether the paronomasia between κέρας and κραίνω and ἐλέφας and ἐλεφαίρομαι determined the choice of substances, or whether the invoke a preexisting folk-mythic depiction which, in turn, suggested the choice of words.[311]

Kessels, Pollman, Reider, and Rutherford have all argued that Homer created the horn and ivory gates *ad hoc* for *Odyssey* 19, but dream gates have already appeared within the poem, externalising the origins of dreaming is standard in Homer, and the connection between sleep, death, and the 'gates' between these liminal worlds have all the characteristics of the polarities pervasive in folk-mythology.[312] It seems likely that Penelope's gates were drawn from a preexisting tradition rather than etymological wordplay, that is, the punning on the symbolic substances is a kind of backwards etymologising, or what Hundt calls '*alten dichterischen „mythischen" Etymologie*', for Penelope is said to be 'slumbering at the gates of dreams' (4.809) during her epiphany of Iphthime (where no oppositional quality is implied).[313] Thus, Homer borrowed the substances from the folk-tradition using ἐλεφαίρομαι in the place of, say, σφάλλουσιν (Rank's suggestion, but the meaning is not close enough) on account of the paronomasia with ἐλέφας.[314] Moreover, there is a pervasive use of analogous dualities found throughout Greek literature, beginning in Homer, and echoed in the Durkheimian view of polarity as the fundamental human

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[310] Amory (1966), 5. Cf. Hundt (1935), 78-81; Russo (1992), *ad loc*; Amory (1966), 3-4; Vlahos (2011), 50-1; Pratt (2010), 220; Messer (1918), 35.

[311] Stanford (1948), *ad loc*.

[312] Kessels (1978), 105-6; Pollman (1993), 223; Rutherford (1992), *ad loc.*; Reider (1989), 116-7; cf. Rank (1951), 104-5. Hey (1908), 15 argues that the punning is 'Hesiodic' and late, concluding that the gates of *Od*. 4 are 'earlier'. However, dichotomising of this kind is found throughout Homer (e.g., XXIV.527-8) (Rozokoki (2001), 6).

[313] Hundt (1935), 78-80; Rank (1951), 105; Russo (1982), 10n13; Russo (2002), 223; cf. Del Corno (1975), xii; Amory (1966), 14, 32-34, 34n35. Hesiod describes Nyx as birthing the *phylon oneirōn* (*Theog*. 211-12), while Euripides' Delphic temple legend designates dreams as being sent by Ge (*IT* 1261-67; cf. *Hec*. 70-1). Both demonstrate a tradition of mythic aetiologies for dreaming.

[314] Rank (1951), 106.

organising principle.[315] Lloyd recorded this, specifically highlighting in Homer those of male/female, right/left (cf. XII.238-40), and darkness/light, but which extend here to both the dream's predator/prey antithesis, the ivory/horn(s) gates, and the intra-oneiric *onar*/*hypar*.[316] Dreams, difficult and perplexing to understand, multiplicitous in their phenomenology, and seeming 'other' in their non-conscious experience are analogously dichotomised as one of 'man's self-imposed polarities… to align himself with the symmetries of the *cosmos*' (Austin).[317]

Further, Homer is familiar with a *dēmon oneirōn* (24.12); a liminal chthonic abode where dreams coalesce near Hades and from which likely followed the conceptual image that there were 'gates' through which these dreams came (cf. ὕπνου κελεύθοις Aesch. *Ag*. 426).[318] Accordingly, Homer dichotomised a contemporary belief concerning dream fulfilment upon these pre-existing gates. Moreover, this *dēmos* is already located beside the 'Gates of the Sun' (24.12), a metaphoric abstraction denoting its rising and setting, while the dead pass through the 'Gates of Hades' (14.156), that is, all three 'gates' express conceptions of analogous 'cosmic' polarities; night/day, living/dead, fulfilled/unfulfilled dreams.[319] This choice of location for this *dēmos* is immediately apparent if understood metaphorically, for Hypnos is both the (twin)-brother of Thanatos (XIV.231, 16.682, cf. XI.241) and the state in

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[315] Fränkel (1975), 54.

[316] See Lloyd (1966), 15-85,

[317] Austin (1975), 91, 124, 267n13. Freud (1900), 395, 399-402 writes of the typical *Angstträume* of passing through a narrow space, and viewed these as 'birth dreams', but perhaps their psychophysiological nature originated the conception that dreamers 'passed through' a kind of 'gate'.

[318] Shewan (1914), 169; Kessels (1978), 105; Stanford (1948), on *Od*. 24.12; Russo (2002), 229. Cf. Alcman fr. 1.49. Although the authenticity of *Od*. 24 has been doubted (Page (1955), 101-30; Stanford (1948), 409-10), this singular instance of a *dēmon oneirōn* does not mean that it is late, or that it fails to reflect a held belief, for as Shewan (1914), 169 observed it is unlikely that there was no 'dreamland' within the popular imagination before Hesiod. See also Miller (1994), 17 who translates *dēmon oneirōn* as 'people of dreams'. Cf. Fraenkel (1950), 676n2. A chthonic connection to dreaming is maintained in tragedy, cf. Eur. *IT* 1261-2, *Hec*. 70-1, Aesch. *Supp*. 899-902, *Cho*. 38-9, Ar. *Ran*. 1331-33.

[319] When Patroclus appears in Achilles' dream he is attempting to gain passage through the 'Gates of Hades' (XXIII.71, XXIII.74). However, it is worth noting that he has not yet passed through these gates and so they should not be confused with Penelope's dream gates (Amory (1957), 57-8). Cf. the damaged lyric fragment δέσποτα Πλούτων μελανοπτερύγων [dreams?] (Demetr. *Eloc*. 143); 11.204-22, πύλας λιπών Eur. *Hec*. 1-2; Porph. *De antr. nymph.* 28. See also Hillman (1979), 23-67.

which one dreams, thereby linking dreaming with death through sleep's 'deathlike' torpor (cf. Hes. *Op*. 116, *Theog*. 212, 758).[320] Indeed, Greek eschatological tradition has many such examples of 'invisible and adjacent' worlds dichotomised by two passageways (cf. 13.109-12, πύλάι Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἥματός DK28B1.11-2, Pl. *Resp*. 614c, *Grg*. 523a-4a, *Phae*. 108c; Pind. *Ol*. 57-80).[321] Consequently, we should not conceive of the dream gates of *Odyssey* 4 and 19 as literal (although, they have their origin in myth), but as poetic expressions of the dreaming state that conceptually map its processes, that is, Penelope is not when dreaming any closer to these Hades-adjacent gates (she remains asleep in her bed as Iphthime informs her (4.804)), nor has her *psychē* undergone any kind of astral projection, but rather the psychical state of dreaming acts analogously as a 'gate' through which dreams, whose origins are presented as external and whose fulfilments *qua* omens demand a polarity of understanding 'come'.[322]

6.1 True and False or Fulfilled and Unfulfilled?

An often repeated misreading of these lines claims that Penelope is polarising dreams as either true or false rather than fulfilled and unfulfilled. This has arisen from Virgil's imitation, Eustathius' commentary, and later dream myths and aetiologies which have been projected back into Homer (cf. Eur. *IT* 569).[323] For example, Virgil dichotomised dreams between *veris umbris* and *falsa insomnia* (Verg. *Aen*. 893-899), while Eustathius

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[320] Russo (2002), 226; Lev Kenaan (2016), 201; Wohl (2020), 128-30; cf. Brelich (1966), 298. See also Lev Kenaan (2013), 36-7.

[321] Russo (2002), 224-5; West (1969) on Hes. *Theog*. 741; Usener (1913), 226-8.

[322] Amory (1957), 66; cf. van Lieshout (1980), 39; Lev Kenaan (2016), 209. Cf. πύλας ὕμνων Pind. *Ol*. 6.27, ποιητικὰς θύρας Pl. *Phdr*. 245a.

[323] Russo (1991), on *Od*. 19.565-7. Highbarger's (1940) study of this passage was distorted by Virgil's true/false dichotomy, since he is writing an 'archaeological examination' of *Aen*. 6.893-9. Plato's reference has recently been used to project back into Homer the true/false dichotomy in Tuozzo (2011), 266-7, while Holton writes of 'the use of ivory and horn to designate those dreams which are false and those which are true', and of Aesop's dream aetiology (*Vita G* 33.5-15); 'As with Penelope's story of the Gates, there are two distinct dream categories: true and false' (Holton (2022), 71, 49).

distinguished Penelope's gates as *alēthēs* and *pseudēs* (*ad lo*c.).[324] However, as Amory noted, Penelope does not describe dreams adjectively as either 'true' or 'false', but rather she distinguishes between them by verbal phrases which delineate their effects upon having passed through either gate, that is, between their being fulfilled or unfulfilled.[325] Kessels objected to Amory's distinction, arguing that in *Iliad* 2 Nestor articulates the true/false dichotomy:[326]

> εἰ μέν τις τὸν ὄνειρον 'Αχαιῶν ἄλλος ἔνισπεν,
> ψεῦδός κεν φαῖμεν καὶ νοσφιζοίμεθα μάλλον·
> (II.81-2)

But Nestor is not casting doubt on the veracity of the dream *qua* dream, but on the nature of dream-reports. In other words, he is articulating the social views held by status individuals towards the validity of non-status dreamers' reported dreams. If Agamemnon's dream had been reported by another of the Achaeans, Nestor would not have considered it prophetically 'false' but would have contended that any such dream-vision had either occurred (like Aristophanes' Sausage-Seller *Eq*. 809), or was worth considering as an omen, for prophetic dreams in Homer are the prerogative of kings, queens, princesses, and the *oneiropoloi*, that is, of 'privileged dreamers' (cf. Artem 1.2).[327]

Penelope describes dreams as *amenēnōn*, an adjective obscure even in antiquity, for in Aristophanes' *Daitaleis* the question of its meaning is used as a test of knowledge (fr. 222, Sidgwick).[328] Stanford translates 'fleeting' (α + *menōn*), but it likely derives from the alpha

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[324] Amory (1957), 21-5, 21n26, 41. Servius connected horn with sight, that is, that dreams which come through the Gate of Horn(s) are true because what we see is true (horn(s)/eyes), whereas dreams which come through the Gate of Ivory are false because what is said may be false (ivory/teeth=speech) (Serv. *ad. Verg. Aen. ad loc*; cf. Σ *ad Od*. 19.563, Dindorf). Marcobius (quoting Porphyry) suggests that the soul peers through a 'veil' in sleep which when made of thin horn is transparent but when made of ivory, no matter how thin, is opaque and disguises the truth (*In Somn*. 1.3.17-20).

[325] Amory (1966), 22; Austin (1975), 124. So, Miller (1994), 15-7, Hemingway (2008), 88n5; wrongly Kirk (1985), on *Il*. 4.2, Reider (1989), 53-4.

[326] Kessels (1978), 104. So wrongly Pratt (2011), 220.

[327] See Weber (2019), 55; Brillante (2009), 33-4; Hemingway (2008), 220-7; Dietrich (1983), 76n110; cf. Lang (1908), 51-6.

[328] Amory (1966), 19; Russo (1992), *ad loc*.

privative plus μένος, and so ‘without strength’, or as the scholiasts gloss ἀνυποστάτών ‘incorporeal’/‘insubstantial’ (Σ *ad Od*. 19.562, Dindorf).[329] Comparatively, in the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite* Anchises asks not be left *amenēnon* (188), that is, ‘enfeebled’ or ‘robbed of his strength’ (cf. 10.521, 536, 11.29, 49; and its verbal form in XIII.562).[330] Moreover, dreams in Homer are not ‘fleeting’, but protracted and memorable experiences which can be engaged in dialogue or reported in detail. These ‘insubstantial’ dreams are ‘difficult to distinguish [between their fulfilment]’ (19.560), for ‘they are not fulfilled for all people’ (19.561).[331] It is this varying fulfilment, that is, the dichotomy of a dream’s meaningfulness which demands an explanation.

For Penelope, dreams which come through the Gate of Ivory ἐλεφαίρονται (566). LSJ translate ἐλεφαίρομαι as ‘cheat with empty hopes, said of the false dreams that come through the ivory gate’, while giving two other references (XXIII.388; Hes. *Theog*. 330). An issue is immediately apparent, for LSJ write ‘false dreams’ as if this translates something adjectival from Homer, thereby making the definition of ἐλεφαίρομαι self-fulfilling. The use in *Iliad* 23 relating to the chariot race is more likely to mean ‘harm’ or ‘cause damage to’ since it describes Apollo throwing the reins from Diomedes’ hands, while Hesiod’s use relating to the Nemean lion (*Theog*. 330), cannot mean anything but that which is semantically linked to ‘cause damage to’.[332] This translation would accord with Penelope’s use, for the dreams which pass through ivory will cause harm on account of being *akraantos* (unfulfilled), and with the description of Agamemnon’s dream as ‘baneful’ (*oulos*) rather than ‘deceptive’ as it is sometimes translated (cf. Porph. *Quaest. Hom*. B8-12.2,

[329] Stanford (1948), *ad lo*c; Amory (1966), 19-20; Bowcott (1959), 128. So Lattimore (1965), *ad loc*.; Clarke (1999), 199.
[330] Amory (1966), 20-1.
[331] Dreams are δύσκριτος at Aesch. *Ag*. 981.
[332] Amory (1966), 23; Onians (1951), 242n1; Russo (1992), on *Od*. 19.565-7.

MacPhail).[333] Comparatively, *akraantos* is used only two other times in Homer, when Agamemnon describes the mission to sack Troy during his 'test' (II.137-8) and when Eurymachus tells Halitherses that the suitors are uninterested in the prophecy of Odysseus' return (inspired by a bird-omen) that he is babbling *akraanton* (2.202-3).[334] In both cases the meaning is clear, for the mission to Troy is as yet unfulfilled and Eurymachus believes that Halitherses' prophecy will be unfulfilled. The dreams which come through the Gate of Horn(s) are described as ἔτυμα κραίνουσι (568). *Etumos* and *alēthēs* are often translated as if synonymous, but *etumos* does not mean 'true' in Homer but rather 'honest' (cf. XXIII.440), that is, '*objective* truth' or 'things that have really happened'.[335] The verb κραίνω, along with its only compound in Homer ἐπικραίνω typically mean 'accomplish' and 'fulfil' (cf. I.41, 504, IX.626; 17.242), and in all but one use is wishfully addressed to a god.[336] Accordingly, *krainō* is used as the regular transitive of τελείομαι, that is, dreams which come through horn(s) 'accomplish real things', garnering the same meaning Agamemnon uses of *teleiomai* when hoping for the fulfilment of his dream (II.36).[337] Consequently, *etuma krainousi* means 'objectively fulfil', that is, that the dreams which come through horn will actually, like a successful wish to a god, be brought about.[338]

Concluding, Penelope declares:

> ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν ὀΐομαι αἰνὸν ὄνειρον

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[333] Amory (1966), 23-4. So Onians (1951), 242n1; Brelich (1966), 294; Russo & Simon (1968), 483-4; Kessels (1978), 42-3. *Oulos* should be translated as 'baneful', following V.461, 717, XXI.536 (cf. οὐλομένην I.2, Leaf (1900), *ad loc*.; Louden (2006), 141) not '*täuschend*' as in Fick (1886), 79; Bechtel (1914), 259-60; and Ameis, Hentze & Cauer (1868-1913), *ad loc.*, or '*vergänglich*' as in Thieme (1952), 12n1, or even 'with curly hair' as in Hundt (1935), 47. While the dream is deceitful, it is 'baneful' on account of the suffering that will result from its deceit, and so the adjective is to be taken in a causative sense. Accordingly, Agamemnon calls this dream a *theios oneiros* (II.56), presenting a contrast to the function of the dream as an *oulos oneiros*, that is, *oulos* embodies something about the the dream which juxtaposes Agamemnon's attribution as *theios* (the irony being that it is both *oulos* and *theios*).

[334] Amory (1966), 24.

[335] Amory (1966), 25; Russo (1992), on *Od*. 19.565-7.

[336] Amory (1966), 26-7.

[337] Amory (1966), 27; Kessels (1978), 109.

[338] Russo (1992), on *Od*. 19.565-7.

> ἐλθέμεν: ἦ κ᾽ ἀσπαστὸν ἐμοὶ καὶ παιδὶ γένοιτο.
> ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ᾽ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσιν:
> (19.568-70).[339]

Most translators have rendered the adjective αἰνὸν as 'strange', while Eustathius suggested a (late) pun upon αἶνος (cf. 14.408), but the meaning in Homer is more likely to be 'dire', that is, it is used when something has significant negative consequences.[340] Since dreams could be considered omens, and Penelope has just narrated her dream to the stranger in a divinatory context, she describes the result of having to act upon the *sēma* (i.e., calling the contest of the bow) *ainos*, for it will result in either her re-marriage, should the dream have passed through ivory, or if through horn(s), the painful psychological readjustment which would follow Odysseus' return.[341] Through her gates Penelope is expressing metaphorically her belief that only some dreams are fulfilled, that dreams by their insubstantial nature are difficult to sort by their fulfilment (as demonstrated by the fate of the *oneiropolos* Eurydamas' sons), and yet the requirement of distinguishing between dreams *qua* omens remains integral for Homeric people, for acting as if a dream has come through horn(s) when it has come through ivory would cause much harm when it fails to be fulfilled.[342] Penelope then notes that the nature of dreams as *Wunscherfüllung* (cf. 19.569, Aesch. *Ag*. 274) makes this process difficult, for although this is a *Wunschtraum* Penelope must remain cautious about acting as if is a foregone conclusion only because she desires it.[343]

6.2 What's in a symbol?

Finally, we reach one of the 'unsolved questions of Homeric scholarship' (Anghelina); Penelope's symbolism.[344] What is the relation of 'horn(s)' to fulfilment and 'ivory' to a lack

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[339] **569** the scholiast gives τον θαυμαστὸν ἢ φοβερόν (Σ *ad Od*. 19.168, Dindorf), but it must be the latter.
[340] Amory (1966), 29-30; cf. Stanford (1948), *ad loc*. As αἶνος see Kotwick (2020), 20-1, 21n71.
[341] Amory (1966), 30-1; Russo (1992), *ad loc*.; Felson-Rubin (1996), 63.
[342] As Weber (2003), 16-17 notes, this demonstrates that dreams were taken seriously as omens. However, contempt for dream-prophecy continues into tragedy (Cederstrom (1971), 203).
[343] Russo (1992), on *Od*.19.565-7; Heitman (2005), 81. Cf. Eur. *Her*. 518; Aesch. *Ag*. 491-2.
[344] Anghelina (2010), 65; cf. Van Lieshout (1980), 25 and Kessels (1978), 100.

of fulfilment? This question has preoccupied generations of scholars but few convincing answers have been found.[345] The strongest historical-symbolic argument has emerged from Russo, who observed that both substances are used in craftsmanship: Horn is practical, hard, common, and inexpensive, making items like the bows of Odysseus (21.395) and Pandarus (IV.109-10), and is used as metaphorically comparable to iron (19.211), whereas ivory is ornamental, rare, soft, and expensive, like the very chair upon which Penelope sits (19.56), the handle to the keys of her room (21.7), and the bed in which she sleeps (23.200).[346] These attributes immediately suggest an opposition between that which is durable and reliable, and that which is transient and 'mere appearance'.[347] Consequently, dreams which come through the substance symbolising that which is reliable were fulfilled, and those which come

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[345] Highbarger (1940), 23-49 connects the gates to Near Eastern mythology, but this was systematically dismantled by Amory (1966), 6-12. Carpenter (1946), 101 understood it in terms of a (supposed) historical shortage of ivory during the time the *Odyssey* was composed. Horn becomes the local, native, 'honest' material, ivory the transient, unreliable, foreign, 'dishonest' material. Amory (1966), 55-6 suggested that horn and ivory represented Odysseus and Penelope's unique world-views. Odysseus is rational and sees clearly, whereas Penelope is intuitive, and views the world as if through the veil she often holds in front of her face (19.478; 23.106-7) (cf. Amory (1963), 104-6). Amory connected these characterisations with horn and ivory as respective symbolic values, being mentioned elsewhere in the poem in association with either Odysseus or Penelope. However, Amory's 'literary' argument was criticised by Lord (1968), 34-46, who thought it anachronistic to oral poetry. Lord noted that the three references to horn which relate also to Odysseus occur across 1179 lines, and concluded it unlikely that the connection was intended by an oral poet (or that his audience would recall it). Lord likely had in mind Parry's remark that the directness of Homer means we should 'firmly exclude any interpretation which does not instantly and easily come to mind' (Parry (1971), 156). Amory (1971), 1-15 responded convincingly that Lord understated the artistry capable in oral poetry. On this capability cf. Combellack (1959), 193-208; Russo (1968), 275-95; Hainsworth (1970), 90-8. Haller (2009), 397-417 argues in favour of Servius' view that horn(s)(by synecdoche)=eye and ivory=teeth, but he varies the horn(s)=eye to be horn=Odysseus' bow, accepting the dream as an invented cipher. Vlahos (2011), 49-53 went further, connecting ivory with the (assumed 8.403-5) ivory sword-sheath that Odysseus is not to use, and horn(s) with the bow (21.393-5) which he is to use (cf. Amory (1966), 42-3; DeSmidt (2006), 287-9). However, Odysseus is not going to use the sword's sheath to murder the suitors, but the bronze blade, and so we should find bronze where we find ivory.

[346] Russo (2002), 229 notes a point of unity in that both substances grow from the head of an animal, but cf. Stanford (1948), *ad loc*. who observed that Homer never actually mentions elephants, which appear first in Herodotus (3.97, cf. Scullard (1947), 264n17) while Pausanias claims elephants were not known to the Greeks until Alexander (1.12.3-4). Scullard (1974), 32 concluded that Homer was unaware of the source of ivory. However, this may be to misunderstand the integral element of this argument, that is, that both substances are natural and so connected with the chthonic 'natural' symbolism which dreams garnered by the fifth-century (e.g., Eur. *IT* 1259-83, Aesch. *Pers*. 219-23, *Cho.* 39) (see Bakola (2014), 29-33). Cf. 4.73, 8.404; IV.141, V.583. See also Lloyd (1966), 184.

[347] Russo (2002), 229.

through that which is decorative and transient were not.[348]

However, more recently, and perhaps closer to the folk-mythology present in these lines, Müller has connected Penelope's Gate of Horn(s) with the moon, noting that Pausanias records a statue of Selene at the dream shrine dedicated to Pasiphaē, another of the names under which the moon was worshipped (Paus. 3.26.1), and draws attention to another statue of Selene which is described as horned (Paus. 6.24.6).[349] In plastic representation the crescent moon affixed to Selene's head creates such a 'horned' appearance (Fig. 2).[350] Accordingly, Müller suggests that since Selene's crescent appears like a *pair* of horns (as Selene is often described in later epic, cf. Nonnus *Dion*. 1.221, 5.163, 11.186, 48.583; Quint. Smyrn. 1.147-9), these two 'crescent moons' would be rendered in the plural.[351] Moreover, the horns of most animals suggest the crescent moon, which is a widely trans-cultural association in the ancient Near East.[352] Thus, Müller argues that Penelope means to say

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[348] Rozokoki (2001), 6 considers the difference to be in the contrast between plain horn and 'striking and impressive' ivory, finding Penelope's dichotomy in the 'deceptive' nature of ivory's 'gleaming appearance' 'whereas truth (represented by horn) often goes unnoticed' (cf. Weber (2003), 16-7). Thus, dreams which proceed through the Gate of Horn(s) 'make less of an impression'. However, Penelope's dream is fulfilled and has therefore proceeded through horn, and yet it is striking enough to be reported and inspire Penelope's oneirology. Indeed, the impression that this dream has on Penelope prompts the contest of the bow. Likewise, Müller (2018), 38-9 has proposed that fulfilled dreams pass though the '*kleines*' and '*primitiv*' horn, since cattle horns are smaller than elephant tusks, while false dreams pass through the '*schönen, großen*' ivory which things like '*Adler und Ehemänner*' can fit through. Accordingly, Müller claims that Penelope believes '*kleines*' and '*hässlichen*' dreams are fulfilled, while '*schönen*' and '*großen*' dreams are unfulfilled. But Penelope's dream *is* fulfilled, and so, if we follow Müller, Homer renders Penelope's oneirology incorrect before it has even been uttered. See also Lapatin (2001), 15, 15n104.

[349] Müller (2018), 39-40. However, Selene is never personified in Homer (with Helios personified only once by the Phaeacian Demodocus (8.271)). Personification is found in Hes. *Theog*. 371 and the *Hom. Hymn Sel*., but cf. Ar. *Pax* 400-25 in which the cults of Helios and Selene are considered barbarian. However, it is not necessary that the moon be personified in order to exercise 'cosmic' powers (cf. Pl. *Leg*. 887d-e), and Selene enjoyed little cult even after personification (Nilsson (1955), 839).

[350] The *Hom. Hymn Sel.* describes the light proceeding from Selene's 'crowned' head (3-4), which may imply the 'horned' crescent. For representations of Selene as 'horned' see *LIMC* 7.1 (1994) 707-715.

[351] Müller (2018), 39. Cf. Stat. *Theb*. 12.1-4.

[352] Eliade (1958), 93, 164, 183; cf. Onians (1951), 237-9, 241-2. Schliemann found at Tiryns '*mond-sichelförmigen Idolen*' which he thought represented cattle horns, the crescent moon, or both (Schliemann (1878), 4, 359; cf. Nilsson (1955), 350n4). Gladstone (1878), xxiin1 suggested that the translation of σελήνην τε πλήθουσαν (XVIII.484) as 'the full moon' was wrong, for it implies in its 'waxing' state the crescent. Leaf (1902), *ad loc*. and Edwards (1991), *ad loc*. note a Mycenaean ring in which a circular moon contrasts a crescent horn (Fig. 3, cf. Fig. 4). Comparatively, the sun is contained between two cattle horns on the head of the Egyptian goddess Hathor (Müller (2018), 39), and the full moon on Iah. Similarly, it is likely that Thoth was depicted with the head of an Ibis because their curved beaks were associated with the crescent moon, and like Selene, Thoth has a crescent affixed in his anthropomorphic and baboon forms (Wilkinson (2013), 217). Comparably, a horses' circular marking is likened to the moon in the *Iliad* (XXIII.455), while Selene is depicted with the full moon on a fifth-century *kylix* (Fig. 5).

‘*Träume, die wahr werden, kommen von der (Mond-)Gottheit*’.[353]

This theory is curiously apposite to the wider context of *Odyssey* 19-22, for Odysseus is said to be returning between the waxing and the waning of the moon (λυκάβαντος 14.160-2, 19.305-7; cf. 14.457).[354] Moreover, the moon’s sacral significance is repeatedly emphasised, and the festival of Apollo to be hosted on the day of the contest (20.156, 278, 21.258, 267, 22.7; cf. Pind. *Nem*. 4.35, Hdt. 6.57.2) was connected to the feast of Apollo Noumēnios by the scholiasts citing Philochorus (Σ *Od*. 20.155, Dindorf; cf. Σ Hes. *Op*. 768) and Aristonicus (*P.Oxy*. 3710, col. ii. 34-52; cf. Plut. *Sol*. 25.3).[355] If, within the folk-tradition, dreams were mythologised as coming from the moon (dreams do come by night, cf. 14.483-4; Eur. *IT* 1261-2, and the *dēmon oneirōn* is located besides the similarly metaphorical ‘Gates of the Sun’ which invites by its proximity the polarised conception), then the new moon which is invoked as the day of Odysseus’ return (that is, between the moon’s waning and waxing crescent ‘horns’) could be imagined as an open ‘gate’ through which fulfilled dreams passed.[356] Comparatively at a full moon, that is, when the ‘ivory’

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[353] Müller (2018), 39 notes that the Mesopotamian moon-god Iśtar and her male counterpart Sin, along with the solar god Šamaš, are the predominant sources of dreams and oracles. Comparatively, there is a Greek dream-shrine at Amphiaraos dedicated to Apollo who is similarly a solar deity, sender of oracles and dreams, and connected with the moon as Apollo Noumēnios. Simon (2021), 149-53 identified Šamaš with Apollo. A late connection between the moon and oneiromancy is found in dream spells (*PGM* VII.229, V.370-446; VII.862-918) in which the preparation must take place when the moon is in Aries, Leo, Virgo, or Sagittarius, images of the ‘Egyptian Lady Selene’ are crafted, and spells are directed to Selene and sent by her twelve ‘dream angels’ (Eitrem (1991), 178-9; Miller (1994), 59-60). See also Plut. *De invidia et odio* 568b-c.

[354] On the meaning of λυκάβαντος see Austin (1975), 244-5, 281n6; Russo (1992), *ad loc.*; Levaniouk (2011), 204, 204n15-16. Stanford proposes an etymology from *λυκ and βαίνω as ‘a going of the light’ (Stanford (1948), on *Od*. 14.161). LSJ note that μείς (14.162, 19.307) later comes to mean crescent moon, while Stanford writes that its meaning is ‘something intermediate between the actual state of the moon and the calendar moon’ (Stanford (1948), on *Od*. 14.161). Myths associated with the moon’s waxing and waning are widely trans-cultural, cf. Frazer (1913), 65-70; Nilsson (1925), 188-9. Comparatively, Andrews (1969), 61-2 argued that the myth of Europa and Minos was ‘astronomical’ by connecting the ‘bull-horned’ lovers of Europa (and Paisphaē) to the new moon.

[355] Austin (1975), 244-53; cf. Nilsson (1918), 38-41; Rutherford (1992), on *Od*. 19.86, 306; Levaniouk (2011), 204n16; Wilamowitz (1884), 54-5; Thomson (1943), 57n40. See also West (1990), on *Od*. 4.73; Merry, Riddell, & Monro (1901), on *Od*. 20.156; West (1978), on Hes. *Op*. 770, (1997), 229-30; Russo (1992), on *Od*. 306-7; cf. Hoekstra (1992) on *Od*. 14.161. On *P.Oxy*. 3710 see Haslam (1986), 104-8; Burkert (1993), 49-55; Sider (1994), 11-18.

[356] Heubeck (1992), on *Od*. 24.11-4. Although dreams are later imagined to emerge upwards from Ge or Asclepius (cf. XXIII.100), with those at incubations shrines sleeping on the ground (Renberg (2017), 126n30; Nilsson (1925), 300), in Homer they are (metaphorically) described as ‘flying away’, and so despite their chthonic abode can be imagined to come/return from ‘above’. Austin (1975), 247-53 (also Rutherford (1992) on *Od*. 19.139-56) notes that other cyclical folk-traditions are present in the *Odyssey*, cf. 22.240 and Frazer (1891), 1-3; Borthwick (1988), 14-22.

gate is ‘open’ and the moon shines bright white not unlike sawn ivory, just as Homer declares that Menelaus’ palace shines like *selēnē* (4.45) on account of its inlaid *elephas* (4.73), dreams which pass through this ‘ivory’ gate would be, by polarity, unfulfilled. This would place Penelope’s dream as having come to her just as the Gates of Horn(s) have opened.[357]

[357] This collection of lunar thematics would also align Penelope’s dreaming with her status as a ‘*Mondgöttin*’ which Radermacher, van Leeuwen, and Seeck detected, that is, her nocturnal patterns of weaving and unweaving (19.149-50, μηνῶν φθινόντων 19.153) analogously represent the cyclical lunar waxing and waning, along with her chastity (a *topos* of moon-goddesses) (Radermacher (1915), 32-4; van Leeuwen (1912), on *Od*. 19.138-50; Seeck (1887), 271-2; cf. Menrad (1910), 12-3). On solar mythologies see Bakker (2013), 36-52; Dorson (1955), 393-416.

Conclusion

This thesis has aimed to demonstrate that scholars have been too Frazerian, both explicitly and implicitly, in their assessments of Homer's dreams. It has argued that the Homeric poems demonstrate an understanding of dreaming as a product of the mind, and that the presentation of this inner psychological state was determined in its form by a nexus of poetic and linguistic demands. It has found that despite the significant variations in Homer's dreams they remain functionally united as an elucidation of a character's psychology, reflecting in their content composites of the popular dream-experience. Penelope's dream in *Odyssey* 19 highlights this synthesis of demands, its content drawn from her waking world, its function overdetermined by narrative prolepsis and psychological desire, and its attribution consistent with Homer's poetic depiction of mental phenomena as originating from outside the self. There are few other scenes in Homer as rich with meaning as Penelope's dream, and to understand it only as a 'literary dream' fashioned for limited narrative function (notably, this omen has already been delivered), or as Homer's expression of a 'primitive' belief in the alterity of dreaming, would diminish the insights it offers us into Penelope's character. Where this thesis has been speculative, as in my Lacanian reading of Penelope's tears, I argue that this emerges from Homer's text and is informed by the wellspring of meaning already present. Finally, through Penelope's gates of dreams, we can observe one of the ways Homeric people mythologised an aetiology for dreaming and thereby accorded this anti-world its place within the cyclical nature of the *cosmos* through the same kind of analogous polarities we find in later Greek eschatology. In *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche wrote of the '*Der schöne Schein der Traumwelten in deren Erzeugung jeder Mensch voller Künstler ist*'- let us treat Homer no differently.[358]

[358] Nietzsche (1988), 26.

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