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A STUDY OF THE CONDITIONS WHICH LED TO
THE ATHENIAN AND SPARTAN TYRANNIES,
AND THE EFFECT OF THESE TYRANNIES
ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF OTHER STATES.

BY

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PREFACE.

Many causes, material and ideological, helped to produce the Greek tyrannies. The historian must pick the fundamental ones and arrange them in such a pattern that the essential characteristics of the period leap to the eye and present a coherent picture. In this thesis, as a result of the emphasis of new points, the pattern presented is rather different from the usual ones. The series of events which had the most profound effect in creating the tyrannies was the economic revolution involved in the revival of trade and manufacture and the revolutionising, therefore, of agriculture. This affected all aspects of men's lives, brought into being new professions and new ideas and so mobilised sections of the population to demand new social and political conditions, which would favour and suit themselves as representatives of the new life, in place of constitutions and customs representing the old aristocratic way of life. Such an approach not only underlines the essential features of the period so that they act as signposts for the student, but it also gives a comprehensive picture of man's history, in which all the richly varied complexity and diversity of man's interests finds its place. Attempts to interpret history according to only one factor, whether economics, law, or any other, must be deprecated. Man's activities are complex and varied and his history, therefore, equally so. Only an approach which will embrace all his activities and interests in one coherent whole, can be regarded as adequate. For economic conditions in Greece the works especially of Glotz, Guiraud, Francotte, Toutain, Heichelheim and Rostovtzeff have been used, but these conditions have not been allowed to remain isolated from other activities and developments.

In the Bronze Age, too, however, such an urban revolution had produced great changes in man's societies. It had created the first cities and ordered governments, new techniques and professions and new ideas. To understand the Greek tyrannies, therefore, this Bronze Age economic revolution must be kept in mind. It must be asked, especially as much of the technique of Bronze Age was rediscovered in early Greece, was the Greek revolution a mere repetition of the Bronze Age one. A study of the ultimate effects of each revolution quickly reveals that in Greece the social and political effects were much more profound, since not only were new types of people brought into being as in the Bronze Age, but these people eventually became sufficiently organised to demand social privileges for themselves and, finally, with a tyrant as their spearhead, forced the abolition of aristocratic states and cleared the ground for the creation of a type of state new to man's history, the bourgeois or middle class republic. Since social evolution in the Bronze Age reached no such advanced point, it is obviously/

obviously the historian's task to ask why it did so in Greece. The works especially of Childe have been used as authorities on the Bronze Age period, but this method of using the Bronze Age revolution as a measure for estimating the extent of social progress in a similar period in Greece, is, I believe, quite new in its approach.

In Greece the economic revolution took place within a more advanced social and political framework than that of the Bronze Age and so social revolution had, in this case, a more advanced starting point. To appreciate this an appraisal of the Homeric problem, to which some new suggestions have been contributed, has had to be made. Most important of all, however, just as man's history hitherto had been marked by a series of what might be called "revolutionary milestones" - that is, discoveries which helped to revolutionise man's life and caused human progress, for a time at least, to bound forward, so in Greece still more discoveries, when fully used by the conditions of the urban revolution, made possible a rapid advance in man's culture and society. Of these discoveries in the early Greek period, the two really fundamentally important ones were iron and the simple alphabetic script. Their effect was essentially democratic, that is, as a result of the extension and intensification of production in manufacture and agriculture because of increased efficiency, and as a result of a great advance in theoretical knowledge and the possibilities of education for all, they made possible the extension of social achievements to wider sections of the population, many of them hitherto untouched by the achievements of civilisation. Just, therefore, as comparison with the Bronze Age urban revolution is a new method, so its results, an appreciation of the more advanced point of departure in Greece and of the significance of the new discoveries, have not been emphasised before. Here, too, a knowledge of past discoveries, which have proved of revolutionary value to mankind, is important for the historian, while, in the process of tracing the full development of the most recent ones, the essential features of the history of the Greek tyrannies begins to unfold. In the detailed account of social evolution at Athens, the role of Theseus, the social crisis caused by the dislocation of the old economy by the new, and the social alignments in the social and political struggle which finally matured, the accounts given by Aristotle, Herodotus and Plutarch have been followed closely but the interpretation of some points differs from those given by many scholars. As a logical development, the states these discoveries helped to create, although still limited in the extent of their democracy, were far more democratic than the Bronze Age type. The new way of life in the Iron Age, because of the profound effects of iron and the alphabet, was extensive enough to draw far more people into its orbit than had been involved in the Bronze Age and these/

these people had the advantage of acquiring far greater intellectual and technical qualifications than those who laboured with Bronze Age script. The new people, therefore, became powerful enough to threaten aristocratic privilege. Outstanding individuals saw in them a means of advancing their own ambitions and used them - as well as being used by them - to become tyrants. Because of the type of his supporters, the tyrant's policy had to conform, in the main, to certain requirements if he wished to maintain his position, and the tyrannies, therefore, destroyed the remnants of aristocratic constitutions and aristocratic opposition and cleared the ground for the new trading republics. Of the two usual theories, therefore, one to the effect that the tyrants just happened to appear when they did and the other that the merchants deliberately and consciously chose them to perform the function they did, neither is here accepted. There were definite conditions which provided the opportunities for tyrants, but, on the other hand, both the tyrants themselves and their supporters would be conscious only of their immediate objectives and ambitions. Between the two extreme interpretations of the individual's place in history, a new compromise, which avoids the obvious fallacies of the others, has been elaborated.

So long as the tyrannies are not abstracted from the conditions which produced them - the revival of trade and manufacture, of mobile agriculture and all the social effects of these - they should not be confused, as they sometimes are, with modern magnates who obtain great power on the basis of a concentration of capital. Money in Greece was a symbol of the development of trade and a mobile economy and was at the stage of development it regained when England experienced her trading revolution in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Modern conditions, when money itself has become a commodity, are quite foreign to ancient societies. The new approach presented here to the question of the importance of the individual in history prevents such distortions, since it insists on the importance of the tyrant's supporters, who are the personification of all the developments which gave the tyrant his opportunities, in determining the real position of the tyrant. The tyrannies, therefore, illustrate the importance both of groups of people who organise for certain demands or to resist these, and also of talented individuals, who seize the opportunities presented by their period to carve outstanding careers and who, in these careers, personify the movements, the aspirations and achievements of their time. This period in Greece, when changed ways of living had thrown society into a state of flux and new ideas and professions were mobilising sections of the population in more and more clearly defined directions, was a gift to such individuals and the interaction of the Greek tyrants who made use of it and the conditions which provided their opportunity, produced states of essentially the same type but with various detailed differences arising from the different/

different characters of the tyrants as well as from the variation in social alliances which supported them. In order to underline the real significance of the tyrants and their periods real parallels taken from fundamentally, not specifically, similar conditions, have been used. While these must not be pressed too far, they can, by underlining the significant and obscuring the unessential, contribute considerably to an understanding of the period. In selecting these parallels use has been made of the works of Pirenne, Huberman, Morton, Boissonade, Power and others.

The character of the tyranny, as essentially the spearhead of the middle class against aristocratic privilege and exclusiveness, is the key to its effect on the foreign policy of other states. In Athens the effects of the tyranny were very widespread and produced a middle class republic which had possibilities of advancing to a still broader democracy. In Sparta the aristocracy, for special reasons, succeeded in excluding the conditions which gave the tyrants their opportunities and, as a result, took the offensive against these conditions in other states. Here the research of scholars such as Dickins and Grundy have proved invaluable as a guide to ancient sources, including Plutarch's *Lycurgus*, but an interpretation different from either of theirs has been made and the pieces arranged to make a different pattern. Sparta, however, not only failed to defeat these conditions abroad, but fought a losing battle in her attempt to exclude them at home. Centuries later, as a result of the continued attempts at repressing the free development of the new life and as a result, too, in spite of repression, of the increased influence of this life, partly caused by Sparta's interference in the affairs of other states, although the intervention was designed to have the opposite effect, and partly because of Alexander's conquest of the East and the social troubles it evoked in Greece as a whole as well as in Sparta itself, a tyranny finally erupted explosively in Sparta. It is insisted here, as a new interpretation, that it was the necessity to prevent or suppress the social evolution, which would have led to a tyranny, which was the dominating motive behind Sparta's policy at home and abroad. It explains not only many of the apparent inconsistencies of Spartan policy, but also the final eruption of a tyranny in the third century. Only this interpretation of the revolution under Cleomenes and Nabis as of essentially the same type as the early tyrannies, can make sense of Spartan policy and of the revolution itself. Confusion of the Spartan tyranny with mere upheavals in many third century Greek states fails to explain the peculiar characteristics of the Spartan revolution, while the interpretation of it as some sort of "communist" revolution gives it so unique a character that it is entirely divorced from the general trend of Spartan history and social evolution. While again, therefore, the work/

work of scholars such as Tarn, Hadas, Bux and others has been useful, a different interpretation has been drawn from Plutarch and Aristotle. A careful study has also been made of the work of Glotz, Tarn, Heichelheim, Larsen and others, as well as of the inscriptions themselves, in order to estimate social conditions in third century Greece, a matter of fundamental importance to an understanding of the tyranny at Sparta.

This tyranny, because of the conditions in Greece and the growing interrelation of all parts of the civilised world, incurred the hostility of most Greek states and the interference of first Macedon and then Rome. Historical irony! The state which had done most to oppose the Greek tyrannies and had done much to prevent the greatest of the post-tyrant states, the Athenian democracy, from creating a united Greece, was now, under her tyrant, faced with the combined hostility of Greek and foreign states. The problem of Roman intervention in Greece has provoked so much discussion that an attempt to provide a new interpretation may seem foolhardy. Yet knowledge grows not only from the accumulated knowledge of the past but also from the new experiences which fresh historical periods provide. The analysis, in section one of the appendix, of various historians' viewpoints, while not to be pressed too far or applied in detail, serves as a warning that the historian cannot isolate himself from his own historical interpretations. Like the scientist he must recognise his bias and allow for it, and this has been attempted here in addition to suggesting the unconscious bias of others. In following the thread of the reaction of other states to Nabis' tyranny, the intervention of Rome at that time seems so obviously part of this reaction that, once seen from that angle, all the difficulties of this intervention promptly fall into a coherent pattern. The very careful examination of Livy, Polybius and Plutarch, which produced this interpretation, indicated too, that only this interpretation could make sense of apparent inconsistencies in the accounts and could resolve the difficulties and contradictions raised by nearly all modern writers.

This new method of interpreting Spartan and Athenian history, not from the usual angle of chronological development of the two states at the same period, but from the point of view of their internal development, in this case the success of a tyranny and the new type of state created by it on the one hand, and their failure on the other, throws fresh light on many problems. The very difference in their rate of internal social development and the contrast therefore in the aims and policies of their governments, produced hostility and opposition between them which had enormous effects not only on their own histories, but on those of all Greek states, of the Eastern world and of Rome, all of which has not been without/

without its effect on our modern world. It places Sparta in a peculiarly balanced position between early Greek conditions and those of Hellenistic and Roman times; for it was the Spartan aristocracy which acted as the spearhead of the threat to the revolutionary tyrannies of Athens and other states, and the Spartan tyranny which, as an unconscious magnet for the new class of unprivileged in Greece, was the spearhead of a threat to existing conservative governments in Greece and beyond. This new angle of approach therefore, illuminates points obscured by the old treatment and suggests some quite new explanations for old inconsistencies in the relations of Sparta and Athens. In interpreting, within this new synthesis of the material, the role of the individual in history, which had always swung violently between two schools, proper emphasis has certainly been given to those technical conditions and productive capacities which create the limits of a period's potentialities, but it has also been appreciated that it is man himself who makes history and so an individual, if he closely identifies himself with his period, can nullify its apparent limitations on individual achievements.

In spite of the quick suppression of the Spartan tyranny, the social effects of the Iron Age communities could not be avoided by Rome. They were part of her cultural heritage. The Roman Empire, therefore, had a stability and long life unknown to the Bronze Age states. Even the small Greek states had enjoyed a longer life than most Bronze Age ones (which either experienced a whole series of lives or broke up completely), but the Roman Empire developed all these qualities, including industrial slavery which had developed in the Greek trading states, to their exhaustion point and, by her stability, allowed society to revert almost to feudal conditions before her framework finally broke. She therefore left no legacy of urban civilisation based on slavery, but rather static, largely self-sufficient communities based on serfdom. Slavery had been converted into serfdom and the traditions of industrial slavery, which had been transmitted from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age, were broken between the end of the Roman Empire and the revival of trade and industry in Western Europe. There is a direct link, therefore, between the urban revolution in Greece with the special effects of iron and the alphabet, and modern industrial life based on free labour, for the democracy and stability which the first made possible, created the conditions for the development of the second.

The philosophy of history which is used throughout as a main guide to an interpretation of the material, although based on the work of many scholars such as Spiller, Childe, Livy and others, in its final synthesis is virtually new. This is no rigid set of categories into which the material must fit willy-nilly, but both an appreciation that history is/

is the full complexity of the actual lives of men, material and ideological, and such an arrangement of all this material that there stands out the most significant features which will illuminate both the main achievements of the period and the path of future progress for mankind, and such an arrangement, too, that all the rich and varied culture of the period, by being set in intelligible relationship to these important features, will acquire a deeper significance. Finally, events in history must always be presented against their background. If the material is isolated, then error will result and statements which apply to one case will be applied in sweeping but erroneous fashion to other periods. Cause and effect must be viewed in relation to history as a movement, since the effect of one thing at one time may become the cause of another in a later period. Historical material, therefore, should never be immobilised, or history itself, as the creation of living men, will elude us. In short, in studying the conditions which set in motion the social movement culminating in the tyrannies, attention should be paid, as has been stressed, to the similar Bronze Age conditions and the ideological heritage from them, so that a real understanding will be acquired of what in early Greece was essentially new and fundamental. These will then be seen to be the more prominent because of the large measure of similarity between the two periods; and, if once again the differences in the results of the Bronze Age and early Iron Age revolutions are sought, the effects of those new features will be traced not only on Greek and Roman history but, ultimately, in the foundations of the modern world. This appreciation of what was new in the period of Greek tyrannies compared with earlier conditions and what, on the other hand, it had not yet achieved compared with later societies, throws into bold relief the essential characteristics of this period and of the tyrannies themselves.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORICAL PRELUDE TO THE GREEK TYRANNIES.

Διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτερον τὰ ἦθη εἶναι φύσει οἷ μὲν βάρβαροι
τῶν Ἑλλήνων ---- ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν
συσχεραίνοντες.

Aristotle, Pol. iii. 14. 1285 a.

τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ---- ἐνθυμον καὶ διαλογτικόν
ἐστίν, διότι ἐλεύθερόν τε διατέλει καὶ μάλιστα
πολιτευόμενον καὶ συνάμενον ἀρχεῖν πάντων, μίᾳ
τυχεῖαν πολιτείας.

Aristotle, Pol. vii. 7. 1327 b.

οὐτινος σοῦλοι κέκληνται φητὸς οὐδ' ὑπήκοοι.

Aeschylus, Persae, 242.

The flower of Greek civilisation reached full bloom in the early years of the republics, after the tyrannies had overthrown the old aristocratic type of state and laid the basis for states of a new type. An understanding, therefore, of the conditions which produced the tyrannies will help to explain also much of Greece's greatness. However, to be able to estimate the most fundamental features of the new conditions, it is essential to study Greece's past history and traditions, not only in order to assess its influence on later Greek life, but also in order to detect, by comparison, what new historical features were at work in the period preceding the tyrannies.

The Greeks themselves were not unaware of their outstanding qualities but lacked sufficient knowledge of early history to be able to analyse on the one hand those cultural and social traits inherited from the past and, on the other hand, to detect those features which were new in man's development and which laid the basis for future progress. To-day however it is no longer excusable to talk of the "Greek miracle" without analysing its cause and the reason for its far-reaching influence. It is increasingly argued that Greek civilisation cannot be studied without reference to early periods (1), and that to explain our debt to Greece it is necessary to delve into Greek origins (2). It is even argued that an understanding of the origin of societies, the very first beginnings of states and empires, is important for a study of those "classical" societies from which our civilisation has inherited so much (3).

While/

While Raglan's criticism (4) of Greek scholars, therefore, is probably not universally true (5), yet frequently all that is argued is that a certain ceramic style derives ultimately from Minoan culture or that some artistic technique must have come from the East, so that many of those who use our growing knowledge of the past are archaeologists rather than historians, or, if historians, not purely classical ones. Hogarth (6), among others, rightly emphasises that to show past influences on Greek art and civilisation is to place the latter in its true perspective, but the historian must not stop short at this point. There is still no real attempt to explain how and why the Greek city states were an advance on former states. True, there is much talk of Greece's contribution to democracy, but little attempt is made to select those features which made this democracy possible and to explain why it should have become possible then, and not previously or at some later date in world history. The impression must not be conveyed that the Greeks simply produced democracy as an abstract idea and applied it to their own lives, and that the modern world then benefitted by a study of it. History does not evolve as if man lived in the scholar's study. It is a slow, very indirect process which, however, does give the historian an opportunity of finding links in the long historical chain; and it is one of the most important tasks of the historian to discover such links rather than merely to emphasise the greatness of some cultures and their importance for the modern world, without attempting to analyse why such a culture could and did arise at that period, and why it was possible for it to influence the modern world.

To explain, therefore, the conditions which gave rise to the Greek tyrannies and which produced eventually the great period of Greek civilisation, the historian must study two aspects of early history. He must understand the cultural and social heritage of the Greeks. Whether consciously or not Greeks were influenced by and used this tradition. Secondly, and more important, it is the historian's task to understand the general trend of man's development from earliest times so as to be able not only to point to the influence of the past, but to select those features in the period which he is studying which are new in man's development, and which are so important that they are destined to play a fundamental role in historical development. Thus the historian not only looks back to the past but looks forward to the future, to advances in man's development made possible by these new features in the period under consideration. This method therefore puts Greek history in its place in world history and so avoids some extreme views caused by isolation of the historical material.(7). Now that so much detailed work has been done by historians, a more comprehensive view of the period's relations to its past and future is both possible and necessary(8). Modern science, too, it is interesting to note, now uses this synthetic method based on the work of specialists in all its branches (9).

Attempts to interpret Greek society on the basis of geographical and race theories are generally discredited to-day (10). Geographical changes and conditions have not been without effect on man's life especially in the very early periods, but these alone cannot explain man's development and the forms and characteristics of his communities. The race theory has been discredited not only because its possible application is so limited, since most historical peoples have mixed ancestors (11) - the Greeks too of classical times we shall find were mixed both racially, and culturally - ; but also because it is now agreed (12) that the mental characteristics inherited by a man are of so general a type as to have little influence on his character, and therefore on his history.

More plausible is the theory that men living within a certain area develop characteristics peculiar to that area. These are usually called "nations", and even to-day there is a tendency to talk of national characteristics as if they were sufficient explanation of historical development. These characteristics are of the most general kind and are themselves subject to radical changes. Such a theory therefore would give some general results, but not usually very significant ones (13). A wealth of examples (14) clearly indicates that characteristics of nations living in certain geographical areas are not only insufficient as historical criteria, but at times definitely misleading.

In general it should never be forgotten that man is essential a social animal, and so to understand Greek or any other history, it is necessary to study first the means man has adopted to satisfy his animal needs of food, shelter, and protection, and secondly the type of community he has formed in associating with other men for that purpose (15). However, to understand any historical period it is essential to study not only the existing conditions of society but also previous ones, partly for the material and cultural legacy acquired by the later period, but also because of the very important role played by ideas and beliefs which had their origin in earlier periods.

How then had men lived before the age of the Greek city states? Hesiod (16) recalled a legendary tradition of several ages of men, the age of gold, when men with the gift of speech lived on the fruits of the earth without great toil; the silver age, when life was less happy and prosperous but more settled so that a child enjoyed a long period of protection before attaining maturity; the age of bronze, when war and conquest became an important part of men's lives; the age of heroes who lived by plunder and adventure; and finally the age of iron which was just beginning in Hesiod's time, a period marked by hard labour, injustice, and the destruction of old loyalties and principles. The classical Greeks had such a wealth and diversity of social and cultural tradition that the essential features/

features of man's entire history had some influence, direct or indirect, on Greek development. Previous types of community, therefore, and those great discoveries which opened up new paths of advance are of vital interest to the historian who seeks to explain Greece's own contribution to progress. Moreover, it was precisely those conditions which finally produced the tyranny and then a democratic republic, which also made possible the full development of those new features which were to carry Greece along the road of progress to a point much more advanced than man had hitherto reached.

Early man was concerned primarily, like other animals, to find the means of survival, food, drink, shelter and protection from animals, but his superior brain and his ability to speak - a characteristic noted by Hesiod for this age - made it possible for him to evolve in an entirely new direction, a mental and social development instead of a physical one (17). Speech was an especially revolutionary innovation which made possible a great social development through the transmission of experience. It also lays on the historian the necessity of studying man's social relationships, since only in association with others of his kind can man acquire speech and therefore have access to the whole range of man's own history and development (18).

During the Palaeolithic period when either fruits and berries were available or game was plentiful and easily killed, man lived content with no stimulus to progress. He lived by food gathering, not food producing, a way of life represented in Greek tradition by Hesiod's description of a golden age. For some reason, perhaps the drying up of pasture lands such as the Sahara, and the consequent crowding of game into oases which led to too easy hunting, or even improvements in hunting technique which also led to too easy hunting (19), game became short and over a long period man had to evolve new methods of obtaining food (20). Out of some such crisis arose the practice of domestication of animals and of agriculture. This probably made no significant change in man's social life for some time. Agriculture at first consisted of scratching a piece of earth, sowing a few seeds, reaping the harvest, and then moving on to a new patch (21); and there is no reason why this change in the means of subsistence should have changed men's habits immediately from those of Palaeolithic times. They probably continued to live and work in social units embracing several families, units which survived till recent times where there prevail similar modes of producing a living. This type of community and ideas and beliefs peculiarly associated with it had very direct effects on the Greek states, for the waves of immigrants to South Greece before the Dark Ages brought with them communities and ideas fundamentally similar to those of such ancient times, although modified/

modified by time and changed conditions. Hesiod's silver age suggests some of the essential characteristics of Neolithic village culture. If the gradual drying up of former parkland had initiated the practice of agriculture, then the drift of men at that time would be towards river valleys. Once there, the changes latent in the new productive methods would develop for the first time. In settled conditions the possibilities of storing grain could be exploited and so a stimulus given to pottery making (22). The production of a surplus eventually made possible a further division of labour, and a certain amount of authority, probably of a religious character, might gradually crystallise around a few members of the village community (23); for living by agriculture and domestic animals in settled conditions must have led to a great extension of the size of man's social unit and, therefore, to the need for some primitive form of government. The new way of living gave new prominence to women, since they were usually the potters (24), and so this Neolithic period is usually considered to be one when matriarchy predominated (25).

So the discovery of agriculture, once fully used, by making possible life in settled conditions and by producing a surplus which led to division of labour and the beginning of authoritative positions in the community, was perhaps the second outstanding revolutionary feature in man's development. Neolithic culture is the earliest to be found on the Greek mainland and has left traces in Thessaly, Central Greece, the Acropolis of Athens and Arcadia (26). It had the usual characteristics of agricultural village life, domestic animals, pottery, polished stone tools, obsidian and no weapons, and, in Thessaly at least, the worship of a mother goddess (27). This culture probably began about the first half of the third millennium B.C. (28). Of course, such ways of living survive even to recent times, and peoples who entered south Greece with the traditions of such a culture long after trade had modified Greek society, made the influence of Neolithic culture on Greek states more direct and vital.

Within the Neolithic communities a second economic revolution was initiated by the gradual development of trade and exchange. This was made possible by the production of a surplus and was stimulated by a series of explorations which developed relations with other communities and helped to discover metals (29). This economic revolution was probably the third revolutionary milestone in man's history. By stimulating agriculture and creating new ways of living it gave rise to a host of inventions such as the plough (30), artificial irrigation by canals and ditches (31), wheeled carts and sailing ships, the potter's wheel, writing and measures (32), a solar calendar and bronze (33). This probably led to a decline in the importance of women since it was man who used the plough and filled the new occupations so/

so that patriarchy tended to become the rule (34). Another result was the increased division of labour. The smith, potter, and perhaps the carpenter became full time workers. New professions developed to organise trade and keep accounts. Trade as it developed became more regular and less piratical. It produced more wealth for some sections of the community, and so created economic and social inequalities which helped to alter the whole structure of the family and society (35). Accumulation of wealth was a necessary prerequisite of developing trade, but this advance in trade accentuated still further the growing division between rich and poor, the oppression of the latter and the increased use of slaves. (36). On the other hand contact with other civilisations helped to enhance local cultures.

The rulers, products and embodiments of the social and religious traditions of the pre-trading days (37), represented the culmination of the process which had begun in Neolithic times with the acquisition of authority by a few elders. While a travelling group of families had been the ideal social unit for Palaeolithic man, and the settled village life with a few elders in authority for Neolithic culture, in the Bronze Age with its wide cultural contacts, its highly organised metal trade and its extensive division of labour, the social unit was frequently a large state, agglomeration of states or empire, with a bureaucratic rule of one or a few persons imposed on a rigid social hierarchy. Because of their origin and traditions the rulers frequently opposed the inventions (38), but in general they adapted themselves to the new conditions, encouraged the establishment of cities which replaced the village as the social unit for the new trading civilisation, and saved their authority by a judicious mixture of encouragement of the new forces and strict exercise of their traditional political and religious control. However, this control and the rigid social framework soon proved obstructive to the new economy and a period of stagnation followed (39).

In seventh and sixth century Greece we shall find apparently a repetition of such changes in means of subsistence and ways of living, changes which in Greece forced the new people to act in association and produce new political forms to support their interests. In the Bronze Age it is doubtful if this was a regular development but there is some hint of political changes to remedy the economic stagnation and to institute a policy favourable to trade in the Middle Bronze Age in Egypt and Mesopotamia (40). In Greece, however, some new features may be detected in the economic revolution of the seventh and sixth centuries, which indicate that it was something more than a repetition of this earlier urban revolution, that it was a real step forward in historical progress. Greece's further development, therefore, followed quite new lines from those of Bronze Age times. Instead of the/

the bureaucratic Bronze Age empire or large state, there appears for the first time in history the bourgeois or middle class republic based on trade and wide contacts. Accordingly this economic revolution of seventh and sixth century Greece throws out the first stepping stones to our modern society instead of following the well worn steps of the past (41).

In the Bronze Age states, however, the ruling class generally clung to power by exploiting a large mass of peasants and labourers, many of whom were slaves (42), and so the Bronze Age states broke up usually after only about a hundred years (43). The productive methods of the period would produce only a small surplus of priests and nobles (44). Possibilities in the use of bronze however meant a demand for more workers which led to war and enslavement - so that Hesiod's Age of Bronze is not inaccurately depicted - while the demand for metals stimulated trade and exploitation of local mines and intensified the exploitation of the local population (45). However even when the productive processes could be expanded, the restricted size of the ruling class then effectively limited the demand for industrial products (46), so states soon exhausted their period of progress and either stagnated or broke up (47).

In short, the development of trade and the beginning of the use of metals which made further trading a necessity, was a third revolutionary feature in the history of mankind. Within the village agricultural community of Neolithic times there grew up an urban economy based on trade and the use of metals. This produced new inventions and new professions, and finally there evolved an autocratic imperial type of state, oppressing slaves and serfs at home and waging war abroad, but necessary for organising extensive trade especially in metals (48).

Some Greek states, too, in the seventh and sixth centuries experienced such an urban revolution with the consequent developments in technique and manufacture, but did not thereafter form a large bureaucratic type of state. Man's progress was carried a stage further and to the cultural and economic advantages of the urban economy were added some of those democratic qualities which had been lost in the Bronze Age states. This was made possible by the appearance of yet another of those revolutionary milestones, in this case iron and the alphabet, which, like the others, were to alter yet again man's future history (v.sub.).

Long before then, however, Greece had followed the general lines of the Bronze Age revolution. The age of metals in Greece began in the Peloponnese and Central Greece with the intrusion of new people from the south and from Cyclades. As already noted, the use of metals involves the development of trade and the influence of other cultures, so in Greece sites were/

were chosen by the intruders at places such as Tiryns, Mycenae, Corinth, Megara, Attica and Central Greece which were suitable for trade. The Greek mainland was linked by trade with the Cyclades, with Sicily, Spain and France (49).

While it is possible that the first Greek speaking peoples to come into Greece were intruders of the second half of the third millennium, who came probably from Transylvania through Thrace and East Thessaly as far south as Corinth (50), the more popular view is that a new wave of invaders about 2000-1900 B.C., who introduced Gray Minyan ware and probably rectangular houses, were responsible for the first introduction of the Greek language into Greece (51). The most plausible theory to explain the division into dialects so closely related to each other is that they were differentiated in a "linguistic continuum", that is, an area of cultural unity, established in the second half of the third millennium and extending throughout the Balkan area (52). The actual origin of the newcomers who used Minyan ware is obscure but some movement within this cultural unity was probably responsible for their descent into Greece (53). These people were warlike, using bronze weapons, and their coming interrupted trade. They settled in large numbers in Central Greece but in south Greece they were probably only a ruling class since their type of pottery was a luxury (54). As a result of their domination, there was an area of unified culture throughout the Balkans from about 1900 to the sixteenth century B.C. (55).

The extension of this Minyan culture to Attica and the Peloponnese would hellenise the Early Helladic people and produce the ancestors of the Ionians and the Arcadians, while the continuation of the culture in Thessaly and central Greece, even throughout the Mycenaean period, would be the work of the ancestors of the Aetolians (56).

As early, therefore, as the first half of the second millennium B.C. Greece had progressed through a Neolithic culture to a Bronze Age trading civilisation, while peoples speaking an Indo-European language, which was to develop into the various Greek dialects, had already begun to dominate the peninsula.

About 1625 B.C., what was to be one of the most dominating features of Greek cultural tradition, first appeared when the Minoan civilisation was transplanted almost bodily to the Greek mainland, probably as a result of the arrival of a few adventurers from Crete who facilitated the gradual spread of Minoan civilisation on the mainland by the entry of artisans, but who were few enough to have their speech absorbed by Greek (57).

This/

This Minoan culture of Crete had exhibited most of the characteristics of Bronze Age states. It was an urban civilisation based on extensive division of labour and extensive trade with Egypt and the West, and produced great wealth and luxury for a small ruling class which maintained its privileged position by bureaucratic oppression of the people (58). Many of the products of this brilliant, cultured civilisation, especially its metal work and jewelry, its mother goddess and script, now appeared in Greece, and much of it was to influence the culture of archaic and classical Greece (59). Greece became the heir, too, to the various discoveries and inventions of the Bronze Age. It is even possible that there had been Minoan experiments in the use of steam. At any rate, the story of tripods walking makes sense if interpreted in this way (60). From the sixteenth century onwards this culture spread over the rest of Greece, and was established at sites suitable for trade. After 1400, when the Cretan palaces were sacked, the main centre of this civilisation shifted to the Greek mainland, and Mycenaean civilisation reached its greatest extension when it spread as far as Thessaly (61). Trade relations with Egypt, Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, Sicily and elsewhere X carried on the Cretan traditions of international trade (62).

Almost immediately, however, the artistic tradition was exhausted, probably because this had been merely a late flower on an old plant, that is, on the Bronze Age civilisation of Greece before 1600. The same stagnation and weakness which had developed in other Bronze Age states developed here too, and the building of great walls and fortifications at Tiryns, Athens and other citadels probably illustrates the growing weakness of the ruling power in a period of increasing restlessness (63). After the fall of Knossos, piracy flourished in the East Mediterranean and trade became more dangerous and less regular (64).

The disintegration of the Bronze Age states slowly continued and their growing weakness undermined the forces which had maintained ordered government, trade relations, and cultured civilisations, so that gradually the forces of disorder, pirates, adventurers and migratory peoples encroached more and more on the civilised world. Between the fifteenth and twelve centuries the "Peoples of the Sea" and of "The North", among them some Greeks and some Achaeans, harried Egypt and the East Mediterranean (65).

The Achaeans were probably a branch of peoples who moved from Central Europe into Asia Minor, carrying with them the slashing sword, the round shield and the custom of cremation and the use of tumuli to mark the resting place of chiefs (66). They probably arrived about 1500 B.C. and later appeared with the Raiders against Egypt. About the middle of the thirteenth century/

century (67) some Achaean chiefs and their followers, coming probably by the seaward route since they had recently been engaged in seafaring activities (68), established themselves in Greece. They probably did not speak Greek, but soon acquired it along with most of the Mycenaean customs and culture. On the other hand they probably introduced the European type of armour and cremation, thus accounting for the mixture of armour types found in Homer (v. sub., ch.ii).

The Achaeans took over the decaying Mycenaean civilisation without much disruption, since sites were not disturbed (69). They were probably few in number, adventurers who maintained their position by war - like the heroes of Hesiod's Heroic age - piracy and plunder. Their rule over Greek people probably did not last much more than a century, since the Achaeans have left almost no trace of their presence on the Greek language, except perhaps the names of a few Anatolian beasts such as epops, merops and konops (70).

Trade had been disrupted to such an extent that it was now despised by the princes and adventurous piracy preferred (71); and by 1200 B.C. the Aegean was split into isolated communities, the Hittite empire was destroyed and Egypt weakened (72).

The Trojan War was probably a final episode in a series of raids and expeditions which weakened an already exhausted and disrupted civilisation (73). After it the princes quarrelled among themselves and still further weakened their power so that they were probably easily overthrown by the new wave of immigrants from the North, usually known as the Dorians.

It was probably an early wave of immigrants from north-west Greece which had introduced a west Greece dialect to the Peloponnese and isolated Arcadian (74). They had probably been a southern wing of West Greek tribes of whom the Dorians were the most northerly (75), and the movements which had pushed the first wave south had continued. A few Danubian intruders into Macedonia forced a movement of peoples from Macedonia into Thessaly. The Dorians were then driven from Thessaly to Pindus and from there to Epirus, where a west group probably concentrated for some time before travelling via Ambracia to the Corinthian gulf and across by sea to Elis, while the Dorians proper, mentioned by Herodotus (76), took the East Greek route from the Janina plain to the upper Spercheius via Ambracia (77). The Dorians were probably a pastoral, nomadic people who had been outside the influence of Mycenaean civilisation and probably contributed little to Greek cultural heritage except the spectacle fibulae and perhaps an increased use of the new metal iron (78). However their social organisation and the ideas and beliefs associated with it were to play their part along with so many other influences in creating the new city states.

Probably/

Probably because of the little positive contribution the Dorians made to the old culture, the old civilisation largely survived (79), and indeed its influence was extended by the movement of peoples initiated by the entry of the Dorians. The Dorians were probably still in tribal formation(80) when they entered Greece and, in assuming control of the old society, they tended to use this to intensify the old type of social hierarchy and modified both in the process.

After their coming and the movement of Ionians to Asia Minor, the raids and migrations practically ended. The old states had largely disintegrated; the migratory peoples had found a home. The fever died down and man's societies slumbered, gaining strength for the next period of human achievement. During the next few centuries Greece developed internally. The great variety of seeds, sown since the first entry of Greek speakers and scattered by waves of refugees, now germinated in the Dark Ages. These Dark Ages were on the whole static in form, but within the feudal structure assumed by the Greek states of this period and largely a legacy from the decayed Bronze Age, there slowly developed again conditions which produced an urban revolution similar to that of the Bronze Age, but with additional features which made possible great progress for mankind. This was Hesiod's Age of Iron, and though it did produce at first that poverty and toil, that injustice and destruction of old loyalties he describes, it was to throw open the doors of progress and prosperity to entirely new classes of people who, in struggling for their desires, helped to create the tyrannies and so laid the foundations for the greatest achievements of Greece.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I.

1. Evans, J.H.S., xxxii, p.227.
2. Myres, The Political Ideas of the Greeks, p.vi.
3. Moret et Davy, Des clans aux Empires, p.2.
4. Raglan, How Civilisation came, Ldn. 1939, p.12. "If classical scholars had to admit that Greek culture, far from being the product of the special genius of the Greek race, imposed upon the general genius of the human race, was really the fruit of a tree whose roots extended as far afield as Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, and even India, they would have either to widen the range of their studies, or abandon their pretence to a localised omniscience". Cf. G. Spiller, Towards an Agreed Basis in Sociology, Soc. Review, xxv. p.170. He points out that to study a society in isolation not only gives that society a false independence but even suggests it is immutable.
5. Hogarth, Ionia and the East, p.20, attacks this attitude adopted by O.Mueller and others.
6. Op.cit., p.117.
7. As far as Greek history is concerned, for long there has been a need to put it in its place in world history. Robertus and Bücher think that Greece never developed beyond domestic economy, while Poehlmann talks of "socialism" and "the proletariat". A knowledge of world historical development would rectify both these extreme views.
8. Most historians abstract their period from world history and then abstract their special subject from its period. What is now needed is that every problem should be set in its period and every period in its place in world history, if only in general outline. Cf. H.T. Buckle, Civilisation in England, Thinker's Library vol. 1., p.3. "The unfortunate peculiarity of the history of man is that, although its separate parts have been examined with considerable ability, hardly anyone has attempted to combine them into a whole, and ascertain the way in which they are connected with each other. In all the other great fields of enquiry the necessity of generalisation is universally admitted, and noble efforts are being made to rise from particular facts in order to discover the laws by which those facts are governed. Cf. also n. 4, sup.

9. Cf. J.B.S. Haldane, *New Paths in Genetics*, Ldn., 1941, p.45.
10. Jarde, *La formation du peuple grec*, p.4, refutes both theories but gives no details.
11. Cf. J. Huxley, A.C.Haddon, A.M. Carr-Saunders, *We Europeans*, Penguin ed., passim.
12. Cf. R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, i. pp.23 ff.; G. Spiller, *op. cit.*, pp.163 ff.
13. Examples of such results are that most inhabitants of the British Isles speak English, objects in the sun are warmer than objects in the earth. Observations like these do not carry us very much further.
14. For example Mme. de Stael wrote in 1810 that the German race was loyal, good, and simple, but dreamy and melancholy; full of sentiment, music and abstract thought (quoted in J.A. Barzun, *Race, a study in modern superstition*, Ldn. 1938, p.115) Compare this with the so-called German national character of to-day! So in 1854 Loudun wrote that the Germans were honest and respectful of tradition; they do not know how to fight, but wait for trouble, and in consequence their land is a theatre of war. (cf. Barzun, *op. cit.*, p.123). Obviously characteristics of nations living in certain geographical areas are insufficient criteria and at times definitely misleading. Only our knowledge of the enormous change in the entire life of Germany from 1850-1870 saves us from complete bewilderment. Moreover, at the time when Mme.de Stael was writing, the French were everywhere considered incurably militaristic and aggressive; (cf. *The Life and Trial of Thomas Muir, Esq.*, Rutherglen, 1919, pp.18, 45. See any reference to Napoleon.) After the execution of Charles I the English were considered on the Continent not as a "nation of shopkeepers", but as assassins and anarchists. Cf. G. Spiller, *op.cit.*, pp.163 ff., for a further attack on national characteristics, with interesting examples. Cf. also *We Europeans*, pass. Cf. "The English are only out for loot. This characteristic is innate". *The Fuggers News Letters*, Second Series, 1926, p.280.
15. Renard, *Life and Work in Prehistoric times*, pp. 35 ff. 60, emphasises the importance of man's need of food and drink in influencing his history.
16. *Op.* 109 ff.
- 17./

17. One physical feature left is the retention of infantile characteristics such as the later closing of the cranial sutures. This however makes possible a very large brain development (cf. V.G. Childe, *Man Makes Himself*, p.31). Cf. W.N. & L.A. Kellogg, *The Ape and the Child*, N.Yk., 1933, for comparisons of an ape and child brought up together. The child had greater manual dexterity which seems to have concealed its lack of initiative, but was better at imitation. The experiment was unfortunately broken off just as the child's superiority was about to show itself through speech.
18. It is unnecessary to repeat the classic arguments of Briffault, *op.cit.*, 1, pp.23-42, that men who do not learn to talk remain animals, without memory or the power of thought, and incapable of the human sentiments of gratitude or affection. Childe, *op.cit.*, pp.31 ff., reaches the same conclusion by a slightly different route. Cf. also G. Spiller, *op.cit.*, pp.167 ff. Only by forcing on Helen Keller some means of contact with other human beings could she be educated or civilised, cf. *The Story of My Life*, Helen Keller, Ldn, 1936, p.243. The case of a girl brought up by wolves is quoted by A. Gesell, *Wolf Child and Human Child*, Ldn., 1941. She had actually learnt to perspire through her tongue like a dog instead of through her skin, if this account is accurate. Cf. pp.17, 42.
19. The orthodox view is that shortage of water led directly to shortage of game. It seems at least as probable that reduction in the number of water holes or an improved technique made the game too easy to find; v. n. 20.
20. Cf. Huish Edey, *The Angler and the Trout*, Ldn., 1941, p.140. Wild animals normally breed up to the limit of their food supply; cf. the similar interrelation, with a ten year cycle, between the Canadian Lynx and the Snow-Shoe Rabbit, quoted by Elton in *Proc. Second Assembly of the International Population Union*, 1931, p.227. Cf. S.E. Winbolt, *Britain B.C.* (Pelican ed. 1943), pp. 19ff., on the change from berry and fruit picking to game hunting owing to changes in the weather conditions.
21. Childe, *op. cit.*, p.80.
22. Cf. *ibid.* pp. 101 ff., for the beginnings of pottery. The idea of its social implications in permitting storage has not previously been stressed.

23./

23. Professor Childe includes division of labour and the first ordered governments as a later development arising out of the trading revolution. The character of those early governments suggests that they are a direct heritage from the rulers of the Neolithic communities. They co-operated to a certain extent in the trading life which developed, but could not free it from the hampering effect of the politico-religious autocracy which was a legacy from pre-trading days. The Tudors of England were products of a feudal period and yet vigorous supporters of the new pursuits of trade, but could not avoid the effects of those parts of the feudal structure that remained. See A. Morton, *A People's History of England*, Ldn., 1938, pp. 219-221. In short, the development of a small authoritative group in the community is one of the most important innovations made possible by the first revolution from food-gathering. Cf. Moret et Davy, *op.cit.*, pp.408-9, who argue that once a clan settled down to village life power and prestige were assumed by a few Elders. This power was associated with religious rites. Later power might be absorbed by one person only. A social hierarchy gradually evolved on this religious-magical basis, culminating in a monarchy - such as the Pharaohs - in which the spiritual forces were concentrated.
24. Childe, *op. cit.*, p.138; Myres, *Who were the Greeks*, p.242.
25. Matriarchy probably arose in Neolithic times and tended to die out with the Bronze Age, cf. Childe, *op.cit.*, p.138; Renard, *op. cit.*, p.209. Thomson, *Aeschylus and Athens*, pp.15-16, thinks that matriarchy was in existence first, and that the change to patriarchy took place as a result of hunting and stockraising. He thinks this change was checked for a time by the first attempts at agriculture. It seems more plausible that men's social organisations followed those of other primates, cf. Zuckerman, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes*, and that it was only the revolutionary change from food-^{producing} ~~producing~~ to food-gathering which forced men into social units quite different from the primates and produced new forms of family and social life. Matriarchy lingered on in various places and sometimes arose under different social conditions, not as a result of those conditions, but as a result of the influence of matriarchy and ideas about it from other states. Matriarchy is a much disputed problem, and confusion will certainly continue if it is not studied in relation to the past and its influence on later conditions. That it was still to be found in Bronze Age times seems clear from the evidence about Minoan civilisation, cf. Glotz, *La Civilisation Egéenne*, p. 142: Hall, *Civ. of Greece in the Bronze Age*, p.272. Childe, *Dawn of European Civilisation*, 24-6.

26. Hall, op.cit., p.21; Myres, op.cit., p.215; Childe, Dawn, pp. 65-6; Blegen, A.J.A., xxxii, p.149.
27. Childe, op.cit., pp. 66-7.
28. Childe, op.cit., p.72; Aryans, pp.58-9.
29. Childe, Man Makes Himself, p.30.
30. Childe, Bronze Age, p.2.
31. Childe, Man Makes Himself, p.257.
32. Childe, Bronze Age, pp.49-53; Renard, op.cit., pp.156, 161-2.
33. Childe, Man Makes Himself, p.257; cf. p.218.
34. v. sup., n. 25; cf. Renard, op.cit., pp.200, 207 ff.
35. Renard, op.cit., p.204.
36. ibid., pp.161-2.
37. The totem is considered to be the symbol of the first centralised and unified power of a few over many. It is plausible to consider the Pharaoh and other Bronze Age rulers as logical and historical developments of this unified power; cf. Moret et Davy, op.cit., pp. 11-12.
38. Childe, Man Makes Himself, p.260.
39. Childe, University Forward, vi. 5., p.4.
40. The code of Hammurabi was favourable to trade. Cf. Lehmann-Haupt, Solon the Athenian, 32., n.40, for the evidence on this. Similarly in Egypt the policy of Ikhnaton and the conditions of his period suggest a definite attempt at changing the basis and structure of political power. It took a religious form and his monotheism was said to reflect the unity achieved under the empire, but both the French revolution of 1789 and the English one of 1645 had a religious dress (v.sub.). Only the breaking of the power of the priests in the Bronze Age could have made possible real political and social changes.
41. Thomson, op.cit., p.3, emphasises it is important to ascertain not only what the Greek city state was and was being but what it had ceased to be.
42. Childe, Man Makes Himself, p.151; cf. Bronze Age, pp.40, 172, for slave trade in the Bronze Age; cf. University Forward, l.c., p.5 for the small governing class in the Bronze Age.
- 43./

43. Childe, Man Makes Himself, p.264 n.2; Bronze Age, p.18.
44. Childe, Bronze Age, p.4.
45. *ibid*, p. 9.
46. Childe, University Forward, p.5.
47. *ibid*, p.4.
48. Cf. Heichelheim, Wirtschaftsgeschichte d. Altertums, I. p.209; Moret et Davy, *op.cit.*, p.410.
49. Childe, Dawn, pp. 74 ff.; 97; cf. Bronze Age, p.20, for the tin trade; Myres, Who were the Greeks? pp.216-21. This culture is known as Early Helladic in order to illustrate its connection and parallelism with Early Minoan and Early Cycladic cultures; cf. Childe, Aryans, p.134; cf. also, Blegen, A.J.A., xxxii, p.150.
50. Childe, Dawn, p.170, points out that this is a possibility.
51. Myres, *op.cit.*, pp.287, 364; Blegen, A.J.A. xxxii., p.153, argues from linguistic and archaeological evidence that 1900 B.C. is the only period for the entry of Greek speakers; cf. also Nilsson, Homer and Mycenae, p. 68; Harland, Harvard Studies, xxxix, pp. 1 ff. Buck, Class. Phil., xxi, p.26, thinks about 1600 more plausible.
52. Childe, Aryans, pp. 43 ff. Myres, *op.cit.*, p.532 is also of the opinion that the dialects were differentiated before distribution; Nilsson *op. cit.*, p. 86, argues that most philologists are of the opinion that Greek dialects are so deep rooted that their origin is before migrations.
53. cf. Childe, Dawn, pp. 78 ff. for ideas and theories on their origin.
54. *ibid*, p.78.
55. Childe, Aryans, p.60.
56. *ibid*. Harland, *l.c.*, p.19, agrees in general with this theory but believes that the Minyan ware people who entered the Peloponnese were already speaking an Arcadian dialect. Burn, Minoans, Philistines and Greeks, pp.35 ff. accepts Childe's view.
57. This is the view roughly speaking of Childe Aryans, pp.56-8; Beloch, Gr. Gesch., I. 1. p.20; etc. More widely favoured is the view that Crete conquered and colonised Greece, cf. Evans, J.H.S. xlv. p.45 n. 1; Myres, *op.cit.*, p.282; Hall, *op.cit.*, p.140; Burn, *op.cit.*, pp. 75-6, etc. There were sufficient differences however between Mycenaean/

Mycenaean and Minoan civilisations, and the spread of Minoan influence was gradual enough, to be best explained by the entry of a few conquerors or adventurers. It has actually been argued that Greeks raided Crete and then brought back Minoan civilisation to Greece, cf. Nilsson op. cit., pp.71-2, but this is insufficient to explain that most of Minoan civilisation was transplanted to Greece.

58. Myres, op.cit., p.281; Glotz, op.cit., pp. 198 ff. Myres, Political Ideas of the Greeks, p.31; Hall, C.A.H., ii, pp. 277 ff; Burn op.cit., pp. 72-4.
59. Probably the archaic terracotta figurines of a female deity were directly influenced by Minoan culture. No less important but more difficult to assess are the influences of ideas from earlier cultures, cf. Carpenter, The Humanistic value of Archaeology, pp. 78 ff., on the impossibility of artists freeing themselves from the influence not only of environment, but also of the past traditions and technique.
60. cf. Iliad, xviii, 376. I have not seen this suggested before but it is ^{not} an impossible discovery for such an inventive period and is paralleled by the Hellenistic experiments with steam.
61. Childe, Dawn, pp. 82-4; Blegan, l.c., p.152; E.A.Gardner, C.A.H. iii, p.572, cf. C.A.H. ii, p.459.
62. Childe, Bronze Age, p.23; Myres, Who were the Greeks? p.119; Lang, The World of Homer, pp.2-3; Hall, Civ. of Greece in the Bronze Age, pp. 207, 238.
63. Harland, l.c., p.31, uses the artistic decay as an argument for invasion by new people, but actually it reinforces the opposite argument; artistic staleness was due to lack of contacts and fresh inspiration; cf. the decay of Egyptian art after the eighteenth dynasty.
64. Burn, Minoans, Philistines and Greeks, p.108; P. Giles, C.A.H. II, p.98.
65. Giles, C.A.H., ii, pp. 8 ff., Hall, C.A.H., iii, pp.275 ff; Myres, op.cit., pp.120 ff., 296, 352; Moret et Davy, op.cit., pp. 336-44; Burn, op.cit., p.119; Maspéro, Hist. anc. d. peuples de l'orient, ii. pp. 351 ff; Chadwick, Heroic Age, p. 189. However Petrie, Hist. Egypt., vol.iii, pp.112, does not agree that the Akhaiwasha mentioned in Egyptian and Hittite records were Achaeans.

66./

66. It is significant that while men of the first city of Troy (and probably the next four) buried their dead, those of the sixth city used cremation in urns.
67. Myres, *op.cit.*, p.351; Childe, *Aryans*, pp.47-8; Holland, *Har. S.*, xxxix, p.90; Bury, *C.A.H.*, ii. p.473. Harland, *H.S.*, xxxiv, pp.35 ff., thinks the Achaeans came into the Peloponnese just before or about 1400; cf. however Hall, *Civ. Greece*, pp. 249 ff., for arguments against the arrival of the Achaeans being earlier than the thirteenth century.
68. Childe, *Dawn*, pp.198-216, thinks the Achaeans may have come from Asia Minor to Southern Greece by a North West Greek route, and that they acquired the slashing swords etc. by a culture contact with the Danube. Burn, *op.cit.*, pp.40-43, thinks the Achaeans themselves must have come from the Danube, since he regards a culture contact as inadequate to explain the slashing swords. It should be noted however that Achaean pottery was different from Danubian. In addition the sea raiders in the East Mediterranean had slashing swords. Many of the details in the above account of the Achaeans are new. (Cf. also Chap.II).
69. Childe, *Aryans*, p.53.
70. On the small numbers cf. Peake, *Bronze Age*, pp.106 ff; Hall, *op.cit.*, pp.264-7; Leaf, *Homer and the Hist. of his Age*, intro; Burn, *op.cit.*, p.223, *The Age of Hesiod*, p.8; Wace, *C.A.H.*, ii, p.466. It has already been noted that in Greek legend the adventurers come singly or in small groups, kill the king, and marry his daughter; this may have been easy if the inhabitants worshipped divine kings who were killed by their successors. Compare a similar episode among the old Slavs, where a party of captives killed the King and were immediately invited to become his successors. Cf. J.G.Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, (abridged ed.) Ldn. 1929, p.278.
71. Cf. *Od.* iii, 71 ff; viii. 159 ff. V. sub., ch. ii, for the argument that Homer's poems give a picture of Achaean society.
72. Myres, *op.cit.*, p.457.
73. Nilsson, *op.cit.*, p.239.
74. Childe, *Aryans*, pp. 43 ff., following Meister; Harland, *l.c.*; Chadwick, *op.cit.*, pp. 28 ff. It is frequently assumed that these were Achaeans, but the sea route for Achaeans seems more plausible, v.sup. Holland, *H.S.* xxxix. pp.64-6, and Wace and Blegen, *Korakou*, p.725, take/

take a variation in the order of entry of Greek dialects. Obviously these must vary according to the theory adopted of the first Greek speakers and of the origin of the Achaeans.

75. Childe, op.cit., pp.55-6; Bury, V.A.H., ii, p.474; Jarde, op.cit., p.96; Harland, l.c., pp.41-2.
76. i. 51.
77. Hammond, B.S.A. xxxii. p.151, has worked out these routes by actually walking over the routes himself. Cf. also Myres, op.cit., pp.151, 458, 536; Heurtley, B.S.A. xxviii, p.190. Myres, pp.503, 536, believes that the heavy rainfall of the period was an additional factor in forcing people from the hills. Heurtley, l.c., pp. 159 ff, points out that this route from Macedon was used by people in the Bronze Age.
78. Hammond, l.c., pp.147 ff., 169; Burn, Minoans, Philistines and Greeks, pp.226-7; Myres, op.cit., pp.425, 447; Harland, l.c., p.49.
79. Harland, l.c., p.56; Hogarth, op.cit., pp.104-5.
80. Thomson, op.cit., p.69.

CHAPTER II.

BACKGROUND: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGES WHICH LED TO THE TYRANNIES.

The Bronze Age in the Aegean, therefore, as elsewhere, ended in confusion, interruption of trade and the growth of piracy, and the movement of barbarian peoples (1). The Iron Age begun without a real break with Mycenaean traditions, at least in South Greece and Crete (2), but the use of iron could not affect the general decline of civilised life but awaited favourable traditions before it could exercise a decisive influence in the next stage of man's history. In fact, those who carried knowledge of the new metal to Greece and the West were probably peoples of the East Mediterranean, who had been cut off from supplies of iron in Asia Minor, and who, therefore, moved Westwards, probably combining trade and prospecting with looting and piracy (3). The spread of the use of iron was therefore another feature of the decline of civilisation, characterised as it was by the interruption of trade which had provided copper and tin, and by the movements of peoples.

As a result of the interruption of trade, economy tended to revert to the self-sufficient type. To live people again had to be content with local resources, and this in turn gradually reacted on piracy and the movements of the peoples until, in general, Greece and neighbouring lands presented a picture of increasing disintegration, of isolation of small units, and finally an apparently stagnant society settled on the land. However, this did not mean that society reverted entirely to a Neolithic type of society. Man's history goes in waves. It advances so far, breaks up, and then recedes, but not so far back as its starting point. It again advances, and this time reaches further than the previous wave until it too declines and sinks back. So although the economy of the Dark Ages in Greece became agricultural and self-sufficient, in contrast to the trading one of the Bronze Age, the technique of artisans was not entirely lost and the social structure remained very similar, although it was modified by conquests and migrations.

While in Asia there was a tendency to revert to the Oriental Monarchy (4), elsewhere the movements of peoples resulted in the preservation of some sort of "feudal" state with lords, peasants, and bondsmen living on the land (5), such feudal conditions being caused as a rule by this type of breakdown in trade (6). Parallel with the increasing decay of trade, there declined, too, urban civilisation in general since towns, with a few exceptions (7), and these probably against war and pirates (8), were not necessary to the new type of economy (9). The form of society, however, was in many ways a continuation of Achaean society, which belonged to/

to a period when the decline of Bronze Age civilisation was already quite far advanced. The Achaeans lived in a time of flux when raids, wars and piracy were the rule, but once the nobles settled more permanently on the land and society crystallised into stagnancy, the essential outlines of society for long remained similar.

Our best guide to those social forms is the Homeric poems, which are usually agreed to depict in essentials Achaean Greece of the twelfth century (v.sub). These outlines of Homeric society, however, overshadow those of the Dark Ages, and are therefore of vital importance for the age of tyrants, since it was within such a social framework that the new conditions which gave rise to the tyrants developed and expanded. It was essentially this type of rigid social class structure which had organised the trade and industry of the Bronze Age and which, in early Greece, allowed the growth once more of trading and industrial forces. In Greece, however, new factors were to draw a much greater proportion of the communities' population into the orbit of the new life than ever had been done in the Bronze Age, so that, when eventually the social framework became an obstacle to further economic and social advance, the new forces combined to burst its bonds and, under the tyranny, to lay the basis of the republic, a type of state new in history. This was a state controlled essentially by the bourgeoisie, that is, the burghers and trading farmers, in fact, the middle classes generally. Even where the middle class, parts of which soon became a new nobility, was in alliance with the old nobility in controlling the state, the state itself, thanks to the tyranny, was able to assume a new character and constitution suitable to the economic and social activities of the new people and to the further advancement of these activities. Whether these states were oligarchical or, as in the case of Athens, elastic enough to allow a great advance in democracy, was only a difference of degree not of character. Sparta, too, after her tyranny, although she retained the monarchy, belonged to the new type of state and was essentially a constitutional monarchy with a free economy, just as England was after the Restoration of 1660 (v.sub.)

Although it has been suggested that Homer's world is late eighth or seventh century Greece (10), while other scholars (11) believe the Achaeans were the people of Mycenaean civilisation and that the poems refer to that period, the revival of a theory adequately disproved by Ridgeway (12), the most popular view is that the Homeric poems describe a transition period following on the Mycenaean civilisation, in which some Achaean innovations were imposed on a culture essentially Mycenaean (13). The most important objection to accepting Achaean Greece as Homer's Greece is the fact that no cremation tomb as described in Homer has yet appeared in Greece (14). While it is no doubt true that/

that the importance of cremation in indicating the arrival of new people can be exaggerated (15), the absence from Greece of the Homeric type of tomb still demands an explanation.

The tomb in Greece most like those of the Homeric poems is one at Halos in Thessaly, but, as the weapons from it are iron, its date is probably later than the Achaeen period (16). Cremation indeed was never sufficiently widespread in Greece to be caused by the immigration of great numbers of new people (17), and so it seems probable that the Achaeans carried cremation rites with them to Asia Minor (v. sub., ch. i), and that the rites became modified there by contact with the previous tholoi, since it has been noted that in the Trojan war the rites of Patroclus' and Hector's funerals were the same (18). The minstrels of the Achaeen warriors probably used material originating in Central Europe and no doubt incorporated into their descriptions of tombs and funeral rites all the details which originally belonged to the burial of chiefs in those parts of Europe (19). The subsequent travels involved in the voyages to Greece probably modified still further the cremation rites, so that a different type of cremation tomb was used in Greece, while the small numbers of the Achaeans and their comparatively brief rule in Greece (v. sup., ch. i), and the great influence of Mycenaean traditions would account for the fact that cremation in Greece never became very general (20).

It has been asked how Homer's method of burial persisted in memory if abandoned in fact (21). The answer seems to be that the basis of at least parts of the poems, or at least some of the cultural background of them, belong, like some of their armour, to central Europe. This involved a belief in the theory that the Homeric poems contain passages which were composed at different times (22), although many scholars have argued that the Homeric poems form a unity (23). The vivid descriptions of Minoan art in Homer may be due partly to the preservation of originals which the poet had before him, and partly to descriptions which were also a legacy of the period (24), but some references in Homer must date to about 1400 B.C. (25). References too to Sicily, South Italy and to trade in slaves, bronze and iron in the Odyssey, probably belong to the thirteenth and later centuries since Tarentum had a continuous history from the thirteenth century onwards (26). In general, however, there is evidence of ignorance of the Eastern Mediterranean in Homer, which can only be explained by the fact that the bulk of the poems was written in the Dark Ages, when the age of trade and international relations had gone, and before contacts were revived (27).

To sum up, according to both tradition and archaeological evidence, the fall of Troy occurred in the early twelfth century. The Achaeans had been active in raiding Egypt in the thirteenth, but missed the great raid of 1193; presumably/

presumably they were otherwise engaged at Troy or in returning from Troy. Odysseus at any rate, when accounting for the beginning of his travels after the fall of Troy, explains that he immediately joined in a raid on Egypt (28). Secondly, the armament and general culture of the Homeric heroes is of a mixed character (v. sup.). Part of it is Mycenaean, part belongs to the urnfield culture of the European Bronze Age. Troy, too, had this mixed urnfield culture (29), and the arms of the Egyptian raiders were of urnfield type. The Achaeans came to Greece about the middle of the thirteenth century, but it is unlikely that the mixed conditions of Achaean lords and Greek people lasted much more than a century (v. sup.). These arguments seem decisive for accepting the general picture in Homer as correct for the twelfth century B.C. The picture then is a valuable one for later Greek history, both for the indications it gives of the social framework within which the new Greek urban revival was to take place, and also for the evidence it contains of the general direction in which Greek social and economic life was moving.

In Homer the estates of noble families serve as economic centres. The nobles are frequently engaged in war, while the majority of the people attend to agriculture. Commerce in a few luxury goods had not entirely died out, but is scarcely to be distinguished from looting and piracy (30), or courtesy gifts (31). Simple exchange of goods is known (32), and more extensive exchange is referred to (33), while the development of the talanton as a standard of value (34) marks an advance on the cow as a standard (35). Slaves from war and piracy are used only for domestic purposes and are usually women employed in weaving and other household tasks (36). Only in later parts of the Odyssey do slaves occur in any numbers. Palaces and mansions are self sufficient and do their own milling, baking, weaving, and tailoring. Artisans are few and therefore free. The demand for their goods was limited, and so supported only a few craftsmen, who had therefore to be free to move from place to place (37). Contempt by the princes for trade (38) and their pride in piracy (39) indicate how far the trading civilisation of the Bronze Age had degenerated into the transition period of adventure and raids.

In the Dark Ages the general trend of the economic decline indicated in the Homeric poems had deepened. Even piracy and adventurous expeditions probably became less frequent, around Greece at any rate. Handicrafts probably became fewer, but the native population tended to be the means of preserving some technical knowledge, while the migrations had helped to spread both old and new techniques (40). Pottery was one of the essential manufactures which ^{was} still maintained and the geometric pottery of this period, while suggesting influences of both pre-Mycenaean pottery (41) and Late Mycenaean (42), that is illustrating the complex cultural traditions of Greece, is/

is noticeable for its variety of local types (43), unlike Mycenaean pottery which had a uniform style. While Greece had almost achieved a type of Panhellenism in the expedition to Troy (44), the variety of Geometric pottery obviously reflected the growing isolation of Greek communities. Such Panhellenism could only have developed, even temporarily, on the basis of a civilisation and society which had sufficiently wide contacts to be able to distinguish the various Greek cities from states beyond Greece, and so disappeared when Greece reverted to isolated self sufficient units. It was only, however, a federation of principalities based largely on feudal loyalties and achieving unity only for a short period for the purpose of war, much in the manner of the crusades in the Middle Ages. When trade and urban life revived in Greece, and created conditions which eventually could produce the tyrannies, there again arose a consciousness of local and international relations, just as there was again produced really international pottery such as proto-Corinthian. Then the combination of circumstances which gave birth to city states in which the individual enjoyed a new freedom, produced on the one hand a new sentiment of real nationalism, and, on the other, a new manifestation of international relations.

On the whole, therefore, Greek communities became essentially static, agricultural states but this was not, as has already been emphasised, a complete reversion to Neolithic conditions. Society retained something of the rigid structure of the Bronze Age (v. sup), and when trade again revived and a second urban revolution took place, it had a more advanced framework in which to develop. This framework played a certain part in moulding the new life by giving it an advanced starting point, but it was the new content of the situation, man's new discoveries, such as iron and the alphabet, which really distinguished the urban revolution leading to the tyrannies from that of the Bronze Age, and which led to a movement new in man's history, a democratic popular movement which was to result in Greece, in the establishment first of tyrannies and then of bourgeois republics favourable to still further advances in economic and social change (45).

The decline of trade had made it increasingly difficult to obtain bronze. Even in Homer metals were becoming scarce and used only for luxury goods and armour. Iron therefore, which had been used occasionally since the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, became more generally used as a necessity to provide for the warring in the period of the raids and migrations. Peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean, who had been cut off from supplies of iron in Asia Minor, moved Westwards and helped to introduce to the West both the new metal and many new methods of metal working (46). As a result, soon after 1200 iron was in general use/

use not only in Asia Minor but in Crete and Greece. Iron probably intensified for a time the economic dislocation in the Eastern states, but later, when there was sufficient demand for goods, it greatly improved production. For instance, once the use of iron was established, more goods were made at less cost since it became possible to produce much more cheaply (47). Copper and tin had been the main trading need of the Bronze Age (48), and had been costly because of the length of transport. In the Iron Age long distance trade became unnecessary (49), and iron, which was much cheaper because it could usually be obtained locally, made it possible for a greatly increased use of metal tools in industry, and so for a greatly improved production.

Out of settled conditions and spurred on by the advantages of the new methods, a gradual revival and extension of production took place in the East. This threw new luxuries on the markets of the Greeks in Asia Minor, and affected eventually the economy of the Greek islands and mainland. War and adventure, looting and piracy, had produced costly goods and ornaments to adorn the palaces and mansions of princes and nobles in the declining years of the Bronze Age states. Where those goods were still to be had, such methods were no doubt occasionally employed in later centuries and were probably stimulated by the increasing appearance of such objects. Gradually, however, piracy gave way to trade, though the dividing line was for long obscure (as it was in fifteenth and sixteenth century A.D. Europe), but the demand for luxuries, however obtained, would continue to grow.

The Phoenicians were probably the first in the Mediterranean to take advantage of the renewed intercourse, but this phase of their activity belongs to the late ninth and early eighth centuries at the earliest. There was for long a tendency to explain all Greek achievements as due to Phoenician influence (50), but there has been increasing criticism of this view, which was based only on comparisons of a few place names and religious rites (51), while archaeological evidence does not support the Phoenician theory (52). It was Greek tradition which launched the Phoenicians as traders and culture bearers from an early age, but it is probable that such legends arose to explain Minoan works of art and the Greeks' own religious and cultural heritage, which, we have seen, was very rich (53).

In the Middle Bronze Age, as one would expect in such a trading period, there were close connections between the Aegean and the land which became known as Phoenicia (54), and this connection probably continued in spasmodic fashion until the period when relations were finally disrupted (55). During the migration periods, and the raids on Egypt and the East Mediterranean, Tyre was probably destroyed by the raiders
e raiders incorporated/

incorporated in it and other coast towns (56). In fact, the inhabitants of what historically was called Phoenicia frequently changed from the fourteenth century onwards, so that the population became exceedingly mixed (57). It is possible that the new people who flooded the cities never took deep root but maintained a society in continual flux, since their culture was hybrid, clumsy, imitative, eclectic, and unprogressive (58). However great Phoenician cultural influence was on Greece, it cannot be maintained that it was a good influence.

In general, scholars have accepted the evidence of Aegean and Phoenician connections in the Bronze Age, and the appearance of people from Phoenicia during the raids and migrations, and have seemed to imply from this that the Phoenicians continued to haunt the Mediterranean during the following centuries and even carried on regular trading activities (59). They have ignored the conditions of the times they are describing. Most of their statements are plausible and perhaps accurate in themselves, so long as a clear distinction is drawn between entirely different periods, the Bronze Age, the break up of the Bronze Age states in migrations and piracy, and the revival of trade in the eighth century after a period of comparative stagnation. Unfortunately, most authors seem to assume that if people from Phoenicia were in the Mediterranean in one period, the people who inhabited the cities centuries later, were also there. In the Bronze Age trade connections were to be expected because it was a period of international culture and intercourse. In the period of raids and migrations people from Phoenicia would naturally appear since the cities of Phoenicia were almost at the centre of much of the disturbance. When so many peoples were moving, it would have been strange if they too had not taken part in it. Indeed, there may have been people from Phoenicia among those who were driven Westwards about 1200 B.C., and who carried the knowledge of the new metal iron to the West (v. sup.). But by this time regular trade was very much disrupted. In such disturbed conditions piracy and looting were the rule and, in the following centuries, even that became less frequent as the migrations ceased, the sackings ended and conditions became more static and people again lived mainly by agriculture. Only an occasional wave of stragglers rippled the surface of this stagnant pool around Greece during these dark centuries, and it was only in the eighth century that life reflowered. In this reflowering the Phoenicians did play a leading part, but their role can be the better appreciated if it is not confused with the earlier movements of peoples.

In addition, there is clearly one overwhelming motive behind the movements of Phoenicians which is never suggested. Phoenicians were interested, on the whole, in inland relations/

relations rather than seaward expansion. There was no distinction between coast and inland towns in Phoenicia, and Phoenicians were connected by regular trade with inland states (60). In fact, the Phoenicians only seem to have taken to the sea when they could not expand inland. In the tenth century, Phoenicia had trading relations and marriage alliances with inland states (61). However, the Assyrian expansion in the ninth century B.C. finally drove them into the Mediterranean. Under Ashur-Nasir-Pal II, King of Assyria from 884-859 B.C., Assyria extended her power and influence westwards and received gifts from Phoenician cities (62). Under his successor Shalmaneser III (859-24), Assyria continued this policy of expansion north and west, and the King of Tyre and Sidon paid tribute (63); and it was during this period that Carthage was founded (64), which fits perfectly with the theory that it was internal conditions which directed Phoenician seaward activities. Then, after the collapse of this Assyrian hegemony and when Assyria was weak, the Phoenicians again turned their attention inland and tried to strengthen their position by local alliances (65).

The second Assyrian advance under Sennacherib and Sargon in the second half of the eighth century, again drove the Phoenicians westwards, and at this time and during the following years, they made settlements in Sicily and later in Spain, the Lipari Islands, the Maltese group, and Sardinia (66). It was precisely at this period, immediately before the Greeks' seagoing activities were well established, that the Phoenician thalassocracy was established, and probably lasted from 709-664 B.C. (67). During the early period of this rule, it is interesting to note, Tyre maintained a hostile attitude to Assyria (68), and it was only in the last ten years of the thalassocracy that, with increasing competition at sea, Tyre was forced to attempt to win Assyrian support (69).

Accordingly, Assyrian expansion helped to quicken the stirrings of new life in the East and, by forcing the Phoenicians westwards, no doubt hastened the influence which the general eastern movement was bound to have on Greek life. Thucydides' picture (70) of Phoenician workshops and depots on the shores of the Mediterranean, at the time when the Greeks began to travel abroad, was probably substantially accurate, and it was precisely this immediately previous Phoenician activity which gave colour to legends about Phoenician dominance of the seas for centuries. This is confirmed by Herodotus' description (71) of Phoenician methods, which involved raids and kidnapping. The very basis of regular trade, as distinct from piracy, is that good relations should be established with the other parties, since the intention is to return and continue exchange. Only in a period when trade is not yet regularly established, or when it has been disrupted, /

disrupted, do piratical, raiding methods prevail.

Phoenicians in the Homeric poems are frequently craftsmen (72), although Hogarth (73) points out that in Homer most works of art are done by Gods, or in the local workshops of palaces, and only occasionally by Sidonians. Occasionally they are pirates or traders (74), although Phoenician goods are frequently brought from Phoenicia in Greek bottoms (75). Now this type of period, when the borderline between trade and piracy is confused, could belong either to the twelfth century, which is the general period of the poems, and which was a period of raids and migrations when regular trade was becoming less frequent, or to the late ninth or early eighth centuries, when the Phoenicians were pushed westwards and when trade was restarting and, therefore, took the form more often of piracy than of trade proper. Some scholars argue that some of the bowls carried by the Phoenicians belong to the early eighth century rather than the earlier period, and that this is confirmed by the references to Phoenicians appearing usually in the Odyssey or in passages in the Iliad which are considered late (76); but such bowls can be dated fairly early. Others, on the other hand, actually argue that the Phoenicians were Minoans (77), while Hogarth (78) assumes the Sidonians to have appeared occasionally on Greek shores in Achaean times, and that this is the period referred to by Homer. Arguments about Phoenicians in Homer are bound up with the re-establishment of Tyre, since Sidon was always the chief Phoenician city in Homer and the place of wealth and craftsmanship (79). However, which^{ever} theory is correct, the really vital point to note is that there were at least two distinct periods of activity at sea in which people from Phoenicia were involved, and that the expansions westwards at the end of the ninth and in the eighth centuries were new phases unconnected with any stray stragglers of the preceding centuries. The Phoenicians are important for the Greeks in that they were immediately before them in the Mediterranean and helped to spread the Oriental influence which was to fan the embers of Greek civilisation and culture into new life. However, even if the Phoenicians were carriers of culture, it is clear they were not the only source of influence (80), and their role in Greece's rebirth not a fundamentally important one.

It was during the second half of the eighth century B.C. that Greeks in Asia Minor, and the the Greek islands and mainland, were stimulated by contact with the East (81). While Eastern art did have some influence on the new Greek art and culture, it should not be forgotten that the Ionians had probably carried to Asia Minor a fusion of Danubian and Aegean cultures; which was now, with some modifications from/

from local craftsmen, reacting again on the Greek mainland (82). This influence was therefore as important in connecting classical Greek culture directly with its own past as in introducing some new elements (83). The general effect on Greece of this renewed contact with the outside world was not only to intensify interest in overseas lands, an interest which had been first aroused as a result of the colonising activities undertaken to alleviate land hunger, but also to change its character from a search for colonies to raids and piracy. Later this developed still further into trade proper, since the new goods from the East prompted the manufacture of goods for exchange and export and the intensification of agriculture for the market. This development stimulated the work of artists and craftsmen and the period witnessed the growth of a composite culture composed of some survivals of Mycenaean technique, some North Aegean contributions, and some influences from native arts in Asia Minor and elsewhere (84).

Who were these first Greek traders? Certainly not the captains of commerce and industry that Hasebroek pictures, and rightly rejects (85). In periods of trade revival such as this, the first traders on land are mere packmen, and on sea, pirates, adventurers, the landless, debtors and bastards (86); in short, all those for whom the static economy had offered no living, and who were therefore all the more eager to risk their lives in dangerous ventures, which, if successful, would produce enormous profits (87). Early trade such as this is similar to looting in its profits too. The goods are scarce, and before regular trade develops, the demand is probably greater than the supply. The traders, or pirates, can therefore ask enormously high prices, and make their fortunes in less than a lifetime (88). Probably a few adventurers combined together to build a boat and set out for piracy and trade, whichever offered, perhaps a little of both (89).

What results did this trade revival have on Greek domestic, self-sufficient economy? When it became necessary to pay for luxury and other goods by means of exchange instead of seizing them in warfare, the running of an estate would no longer be a question of satisfying the needs of the local population, but, in addition to this, it would be necessary to produce a surplus to exchange and pay for articles brought by traders. This at first would be a mere sideline to the prevailing domestic economy, but must have grown steadily as the supply of, and demand for, the articles increased. Artisans migrated from the East and brought their arts and technique with them (90). Local Greek craftsmen copied their methods and styles, and a few workshops sprang up (91). Most important of all, the development of olive and vine growing stimulated pottery making, which became the most important Greek manufacture (92).

Between/

Between the Iliad and the Odyssey there had been signs of a change from pasturage to cereal growing as the dominant type of agriculture. The cold and wet climate of this period in Greece may have had some influence in this change, since people were forced from the highlands into the valleys (93); and this type of climate also explains the large number of forests in early classical Greece. Since communities tended to remain settled on the land after the migrations, and reverted to a self-sufficient agricultural economy, land became of increasing importance in the community. Achaean nobles had won their wealth in war and raids, but after the imigrations families gradually came to be distinguished for wealth by the size of their estates. It was noticeable that whereas in the Iliad wealth referred to moveable goods, not land, in the Odyssey, private property in land was growing (94). The temenos had been granted by the elders of the people to the chief or king in Achaean times, and once the office of chieftan was hereditary it became the private property of the ruling family. (95). In the Homeric poems there is evidence of the primitive "open-field" or "common-field" system, but in the Odyssey there is developing a system of individual lots of land (96). While the king had no power over common land, he could use his oxen and hired labour to enclose and work waste land beyond the common land. The noble families, too, probably benefitted from this type of individual property, since the temenos was probably given to temples and priests, who were as a rule also nobles (97), and they too had the means for enclosing and working new land. However, poor people could also clear waste or forest land (98), because of the new metal iron. As this could usually be obtained locally, cheap and efficient agricultural tools were available to all, and so provided the basis for the growth in prosperity of a class hitherto continually depressed, the poor peasant class; and, ~~even~~ eventually, through the growth of private property in land which led to mobility of land and finally agricultural crises, the serfs too could become free and, for the first time in history, could share in the new prosperity.

It is doubtful, however, if all landless were able to obtain a plot in this fashion. In the Homeric poems seasonal agricultural work was carried out, for large estates at least, by a great mass of beggars, adventurers, and landless poor (99), who were often desperate enough to become virtually serfs, or at least to enter service for a year or more at a time (100). This practice probably continued in later centuries in spite of enclosures of waste land, since the population was growing at this period. Moreover, the temenos and nobles' estates were precisely those which could adopt new and better methods of husbandry, as the lord's domain did in mediaeval times, not only because of/

of private interest and freedom from old rules of tillage (101), but also because they alone had the means necessary to risk and launch new methods. It was those, therefore, who adopted an improved agricultural technique who were most likely to prosper, and who, eventually, ousted the poor from their smaller uneconomic plots. As a result of this growth in private ownership of land, by Hesiod's time individual lots seem to have been the rule, land was inherited by the children and was bought and sold (102).

This increase in the numbers of landless was a process that had been slowly developing even before the advent of trade intensified and accelerated it. After most of the migrations were over there had followed a period of comparative peace and prosperity (103), during which the population grew considerably. There was a limit in most Greek states to the amount of new land which could be enclosed and, since the noble families enjoyed very early the advantages of acquiring progressive units of land, they tended to win the race to enclose the remaining land, and even to oust some peasants from plots, which had grown uneconomic as a result of the growth of agriculture for trade and therefore agricultural competition (104). The landless, therefore, increased to a point where piracy and casual labour could not absorb them in sufficient quantities. The solution to the resulting outcry for land was found in colonising (105). These colonies naturally stimulated trade which, as yet, was only spasmodic, and helped considerably the whole course of the change of economy. However, these colonies were not caused by trade. This sort of commercial policy is a later development when trading interests have become dominant in the community. Blakeway (106) points out that Greek Geometric pottery is found on sites earlier than the Greek colonies in Italy, Sicily, and Marseilles. He maintains that many of these can be traced to a variety of centres in the Greek islands and mainland and on the West coast of Asia Minor at least a century ^{before} the foundations of Naxos (107). His arguments against the Travelling Potter (v. sup.) are sound when applied to a trading period, but these early pots are so few that they do not form evidence for trade. The migration of Etruscans from the Troad, probably in two waves between the Trojan War and the eighth century (108), would explain these Greek pots, since the travellers probably took jars of ware with them; while some of the deposits, such as many in Sicily, were probably the result of travellers from Phoenicia, since these deposits have obvious connections with the culture of Carthage and belong to the period immediately preceding the Greek colonising activities. When settled, they would probably produce similar pottery with local clay and natives would make imitations (109).

The essential point to remember is that this was a period when/

when trade and intercourse had been broken and such contacts as did take place were the result of occasional waves of travellers. People did occasionally move during the Dark Ages, and therefore essential goods such as pots must have gone with them, so that spasmodic connections may be traced between Sicily, West Italy, and the East Mediterranean during this period, but this was in no way the beginnings of a trading period, but only the mere remnants of such a period that had passed. The beginning of another trading period was only really under way when the Greeks developed regular trade instead of adventure, and used colonies, which had been established to solve land problems, as bases for the new kind of economic activity, that is, trade. (110). Blakeway himself (111) emphasises the difference in character between these early deposits and the post-colonising ones but gives an unconvincing explanation. The later deposits were overwhelming Corinthian, which suggests that the post-colonising pottery was exported as a part of that developing trade which had its beginnings about the same time as the first colonies. Blakeway (112) points out that Greek imports to Etruria in the eighth century seem to have come especially from the Cyclades. That these were carried by migrations is supported by the fact that the Etruscans were associated especially with the islands and coasts of Asia Minor (113).

It is of course possible that most of the old centres of culture had continued to turn out a few pots even during the break-up period, and, while movements of peoples would help to dissipate them, it is also possible that connections with the West never entirely died out. The Phoenician carrying trade in the eighth century would intensify the process. It is true, as Blakeway (114) asserts, that these connections would indicate possible colonial sites, but not that these were the result of commerce. His arguments (115) that the necessary geographical knowledge for colonies could only have been acquired by trade are not valid, since it is precisely in these break up periods when trade is first disrupted that most movements of peoples take place and memories of such movements would be handed down. He is correct (116) in arguing that the change of character of Greek exports from about 735 B.C. onwards is not a coincidence, but wrong in his conclusions that commerce by then was dominating policy. Even if trade had been reasonably active during the eighth century, it could not have been long enough established to dictate policy. The difference arose from the fact that trade was again reviving as a result of contact with the East. Corinth, it is admitted, was one of the first Greek states to be affected by this economic revolution (117). Tradition assigns to Corinth the earliest fleet, so she would naturally be in a position to dominate the Western market. Had colonies been a result of trade, most states would have had/

had sufficient ships to prevent Corinth from establishing a monopoly. Chalcis and Corinth were among the first colonising states (118), which gave them a local advantage when trade did revive, while building ships gave Corinth (119) everything else needed to establish her monopoly. Finally, trade, by promoting cultivation for the market, would intensify the process of expropriation from the land, and at the same time offer a new life overseas, all of which would still further stimulate both colonising and trade.

The economic revolution involved in the use of olive oil for lighting and personal uses has been emphasised by Professor Rostovtzeff (120). The significance of the demand for olive oil was that olive growing in Greece from then on was definitely an industry; that is, olives were grown with a view to selling oil in exchange for other goods. It is never sufficiently appreciated that the growth of trade and exchange of goods must eventually disrupt and destroy the old domestic economy. Luxuries have to be paid for by other goods, usually agricultural produce at first, and so estates have to be run to produce a surplus, which involves ultimately a revolution in agriculture itself. It will lead to more intensive and extensive farming, that is to better methods and to enclosures, and ultimately to the sale of land itself as a commodity.

It is frequently assumed that if one can show that few manufactured goods were exchanged, then in some way the economic revolution involved in the development of trade can be largely discounted. It is sometimes even suggested that trade in agricultural produce or other necessities is not trade at all (121). Indeed, the need for agricultural produce is frequently the very basis of trade, and may be the stimulus that initiates this development. In fact, one of the tests of the effectiveness of a trading revolution is its effect on agriculture. It makes land mobile and so produces inequalities in ownership. It leads to debts and mortgages but eventually, as the demand for free labour for new jobs increases, it demands the break up of serfdom and the development of a reserve of free, mobile labour. The growth of slavery is a much later development, after the period of mobility in land, labour and ownership and of rapid expansion is over.

The growth of farming for the market led gradually to a division of labour. The small farmer would concentrate on producing a surplus (122) and so look to the artisan for tools and work which he had formerly made and done himself (123). This meant that the mass of peasantry would become consumers even if only on a small scale, and such an extension of the market always acts as a stimulus to further trade and handicrafts (124). On the other hand, the peasant home/

home industries would suffer from competition from the superior urban ones, and so add to the discontent of the peasants (125). The development of olive growing stimulated the pottery industry, the need for boats that of carpentry, and the cheapness of iron that of metal work, so that all these probably became full time professions. Even textiles eventually became an industry when circumstances were favourable, although this was a trade which longest remained domestic (126). In fact, increased division of labour and the extension of the home market, leading to the transformation of domestic industry into manufacture for the market, and therefore to a further extension of the market and division of labour, are other characteristics of such trading revolutions. Even in Hesiod's time not only had division of labour developed, but manufacture had expanded so far that Hesiod could talk of the competition between potter and potter and between carpenter and carpenter. Soon after, the production of goods, especially pottery, on a considerable scale for export - in Aegina and Corinth and, later in Athens and other cities - emphasised the importance and independence of manufacture on the one hand, and, on the other, the corresponding change in agriculture, which had to produce enough for sale to the industrial workers and perhaps also for export. Oil for instance was exported. Agriculture and the price of its produce, therefore, were affected by trade and exchange, and this fact influenced considerably agriculture's future development.

The change to a new type of agriculture however is usually a slow process. Those well content with the status quo would tend to cling to the old methods, with possibly disastrous results to the family fortunes in later times. On the other hand, people who had already made a fortune in trade or piracy and had succeeded in marrying into a landed family, would bring with them sufficient enterprise to see the advantages of running estates on new lines and of developing olive and vine growing, especially when the latter needed capital. (So in England at a similar stage of development it was the new squires, once merchants, who especially went in for the new type of farming) (127). A steady change too would gradually take place in the character of the landed nobility, in so far as the new rich succeeded in merging with it. As trade became more regular, profits would be less, but still sufficiently large to prove attractive as a sideline. Not only would the small peasant eke out his earnings by a little trade (128) but even some less well off members of noble families, who had insufficient or unfertile land, or who were fortunately situated near the shore, might also engage in trade, either directly, or by providing a boat or cargo (129).

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The growth of trade would mean more goods and luxuries, more paid jobs, and therefore a rise in the standard of living, and consequently many nobles must have been driven to make extortionate demands on the peasants, or to engage in trade. Once trade and exchange had developed the most direct method of obtaining the new goods and luxuries was to intensify the cultivation of the land, extend one's estate and so produce a greater surplus. Where that was insufficient, trade itself, as a sideline or eventually as a full time occupation, might attract the poorer nobles as well as other sections of the population. Where, therefore, a plot, or estate, under domestic economy had proved sufficient, the desire for a surplus to exchange would lead to enclosures of waste land (130), speculation, and therefore to loans, debts, and the shift of land into fewer hands. Olive growing probably intensified the process of enclosures and the growth of a landless population, since it required more land and fewer free labourers (131).

To sum up; there is never one simple cause of economic revolutions. In this case, there were a variety of reasons; the increased production of the East, due to the use of iron, which produced new contacts with Greeks in Asia Minor, piracy and spasmodic trade which were a legacy from the Bronze Age, the spread of the knowledge of iron working and of new metal processes from Asia Minor to the Greek islands and mainland, the desire of nobles for precious goods which formerly they had obtained in war but which gradually they had to pay for, and the increase of population which intensified land hunger and so played no small part in the drive for colonies (132). While evidence for details is not always available the general trend of the economic changes is clear and the evidence from a period of similar changes, although not to be pressed too closely, can be of use.

For instance, the revival of trade in Italy after the break up of the Roman Empire and the subsequent Völkerwanderungen, followed similar lines and has sufficient interest to be compared with Greece. In the ninth century A.D. communities were agricultural and grouped around family estates (133), which were self-sufficient, did their own smelting and weaving (134) as in Homer, had only a few domestic slaves, and depended on wage labour for seasonal work only (135). As in Homer, the peasant class was largely left to itself when wars called away princes and their retainers (136). If there should be a bad harvest and lack of grain, there might be some trade; but as a rule trade was confined to a few luxury goods for the Churches and aristocracy (137). The trade of Venice had never been completely interrupted and gradually re-developed by supplying food to Constantinople and slaves to the harems of Egypt and Syria (138). As a result, agriculture was improved and intensified (139), since it/

it began to be the basis of trade and no longer consisted of production for local use. Following on this were the beginnings of manufacture for export (140), but, as in Greece, the greatest industry remained agriculture.

The first traders were landless people, younger sons for whom there was no land, people who had left home for wars and not returned, adventurers and beggars (141). The nobles' love of luxuries which could no longer be seized in war, gave these people their opportunity, as it had in early Greece. Professor Pirenne points out (142) that very little surplus is necessary for speculation in a period of such primitive trade. People become rich in a fantastically short time (143), as they must have done in early Greek trading. Occasionally nobles near the coast may have put some of their surplus into trade, but as a rule traders were essentially "new people" (144). The profits were such that this new way of life developed rapidly (145). Some of the new rich rose in the social sphere by marrying their daughters to nobles (146) and by investing in land or acquiring it through loans to nobles and peasants (147).

As in Greece, there was a great increase in the population from the beginning of the tenth century A.D. as the result of more peaceful conditions (148). The family estates, with a more or less fixed output, were inadequate to support the increased numbers, and many left for the wars, trade and piracy; while there was a steady emigration to new parts of Europe and an increase in land clearances, dyke building and irrigation (149).

Such economic revolutions bring about changes in ways of living, in men's beliefs and ideas, in social groupings and eventually in the type of state and society (150). This, as we saw, happened in the Bronze Age after the urban revolution, and one reason for regarding a knowledge of the Bronze Age as absolutely essential to an understanding of this period in Greek history is that the historian thereby appreciates that this second trading revolution did produce results very similar to those of the Bronze Age. In addition, it is only by analysing the Bronze Age revolution and comparing it with the Greek one of the eighth and seventh centuries, that it is possible to detect what is new in the Greek one and so to bring into relief those very points which were to be the main-spring of the new civilisation which Greece produced.

However, to emphasise the importance of such economic revolutions is not to make the "economic factor" the mainspring of history. Indeed, any attempt to make one aspect only of men's lives, such as economics, law, or ethics, act as the determining role in history is to be deprecated, because/

because history, since it deals with mankind, must analyse and explain the full complexity of men's lives; their institutions and societies, their ideas and philosophies, their art and culture. To make a historical analysis from the standpoint of only one branch of human activity is to make an abstraction from reality (151); and to treat the result as history is to substitute for the complexity of real life one facet only of men's activities.

Many historians such as Guizot, Augustin Thierry, Tocqueville, and Thorold Rogers, and, for ~~the~~ ancient history, A.A. Trever, Tenney Frank, and others (152), have given the pre-dominant role in history to economics. These and others who have studied special aspects of human activity have contributed to our accumulation of knowledge, knowledge which is indispensable to the historian; but any one part of it is not man's history (153). In modern science, too, all branches have contributed to a great store of facts which the scientists now tends to handle by a synthetic method (154).

What is, however, of fundamental importance is that man is forced by necessity to obtain food and drink, and, when forced or led to change his methods of doing so, frequently finds himself living an entirely different type of life (155). Franklin defined man as a tool making animal, since man's evolution has followed the evolution of tools he makes for satisfying his needs. This quality, though existing in germ among certain animals, is peculiar to man and marks his evolution as a new kind of history. Tools, it may be pointed out in passing, are the basis of the archaeologists' work even when the type of tool can only be deduced from things made by them, and the value of archaeological evidence for history is gradually being realised (156), while for early history it is indispensable.

One of the characteristics of man's food producing methods is that they have never remained at one point without some development, and changes in these methods throughout history have brought changes in man's association with others, new ways of life and new ideas, new problems and new ways of solving them. There is exhibited all through man's history a continual growth of man's conquest over nature and his methods of doing so, destruction and reforming of his social relations and a continual formation and transformation of ideas (157); and all these changes must be taken into account by historians. Growth and decay, attributes of individual man, must never be forgotten as attributed of man's society (158). The necessity of studying the past in order to understand what is new in the period has already been stressed, for to abstract a period from its setting is to give man's activity a one-sided appearance, with no apparent heritage from the past or influence for the future. Historical error results from such abstraction; but immobilisation of historical material by ignoring change removes life itself.

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It is man himself, it must not be forgotten, who is the agent of these changes, and not some blind fate or some general conditions apart from man. Certainly people of any period are limited by the type of society into which they are born. A man cannot be an air pilot in a non-mechanical age. Man finds around him a certain type of community, a body of opinions and morals, a certain type of institution and law, in fact a way of life already in existence. But this way of life is not only developing and changing as he is born into it, but he himself, by virtue of being a part of it, must alter it in the very process of living. A man will follow one of the many careers offered by the community and enter into certain relations with others as he does so. But in improving his own daily life, in adding to his skill and experience, in pursuing his own, and perhaps others', advantage and desires, he is unconsciously initiating a process which will change eventually men's professions and technique, their types of associations with each other, men's ideas, habits and beliefs; for entirely new professions and productive processes demand different associations and new ideas, and these, in their turn, influence men and the methods and tools with which they work.

If sufficient changes are made over a long period of time, such changes for instance as the development of trade and industry in an agricultural community as in the trading revolutions of the Bronze Age and early Greece, many people in that community will eventually lead different lives, do new jobs, develop new ideas, and enter into different social relationships; for instance former peasants may become artisans, and slaves and free men be used instead of serfs (159). If this continues long enough an entire section of the community will eventually be living a life quite different from and feel in opposition to the old way of life. So in Greece, opposition to aristocratic rule grew more widespread until the new people used the tyrants to overthrow it and create a new type of rule. Just as the new life influences man, so man in following the new paths open to him will influence their further development. There is no way of stopping this process, though it may be slowed up or diverted, even if man did realise clearly where he was going, because it is man himself in a thousand ways in his daily life who is the cause of its development (160). So, although the Spartan aristocracy succeeded in stemming temporarily the flood of new ways and ideas resulting from the economic and social changes, it could not prevent that flood from rising again and swelling to far greater dimensions in later centuries (v.sub.)

Men's ideas, however, are influenced not only by contemporary social conditions but by the whole intellectual heritage of the past, which plays an important part in moulding the prevailing sentiment of the period (161). Beliefs, customs and ideas linger on long after the period when first they/

they arose has passed, and help to influence entirely new conditions. This is still another reason for keeping the early ages of Greece before us when studying the formation of the city state, for the ideological and ritual heritage of Greece was probably as rich if not richer than the material one. If we are to understand the form as well as the content of man's experience and history, we must study not only the development of his material life, which provides much of the content, but also the prevailing state of sentiment of the period and society under review and their intellectual traditions, which will largely determine the form into which the material is moulded. A period, therefore, should not be judged only by its own consciousness, although such consciousness can be used as a signpost by the historian. Only a careful study of both contemporary conditions and also the social and intellectual traditions of the community will prevent error.

In seventh and sixth century Greece, then, as would be expected, changes in society, law, politics, literature, and even military technique, took place as a result of the new ways of life, and themselves created still more changes, new professions and still more new ideas. In general, the economic revolution, as that of the Bronze Age, was an urban one in that cities became the centres of organisation for the new types of people, traders, seafarers, artisans and merchants. In Achaeen times the polis was essentially a place of refuge against attack, but in classical times it became a social centre of town life as opposed to country life (162). Moreover, just as the growth of a self-sufficient agricultural society after the migrations had intensified the decline in importance of towns (v.sup.n.9), so now the revival of trade and industry and agriculture for sale led to a revival of town life. This explains why in the seventh and sixth centuries large areas of Greece, for example in the north west, which retained their static agricultural economy, also retained their tribal structure based on village life (163).

The growth of large family estates on the one hand and the increasing number of landless on the other, when allied to other economic changes, gradually modified the tribal structure of the Greek communities affected by the changes and gave the polis a new character. As the position of land became more and more important, aristocracies based on land ownership had appeared almost everywhere in Greece. Moreover, since they emerged irrespective of whether there was a conquered population or not, their creation is clearly based on a "common social and economic foundation" (164). The Kings had been important in Achaeen times because of their leadership in war (v.sup), but after a war the princes tended to quarrel amongst themselves. In settled conditions the noble families gradually felt themselves bound by common ties based on land ownership, and these ties bound them all the/

the more closely when the shortage of land and the miseries of the small peasants provoked social crises in the communities, which threatened their privileges. The tribal groupings were therefore either gradually modified or overshadowed by those new social groupings which, as we should expect, arose out of new ways of living and which were no less important for having at first no obvious definition or name (165).

In Achaean Greece dike was in general an interpretation of the divine will given by the king (166). In the Heroic Age and following centuries the nobles usually gave judgments, but naturally, because of their social and economic status, their judgments, especially on matters dealing with land, were regarded by poor men such as Hesiod as almost invariably crooked. Once the new way of life had gained sufficient hold that it influenced agriculture and so, eventually, produced an agricultural crisis, mere criticism of nobles' judgments was insufficient and the demand arose for new laws and especially for a written code of laws.

Religion, too, had had a revival once communities became settled. The Aegean civilisation had been soaked in religious beliefs, and in Achaean times the Olympic world probably reflected something of the Achaean social organisation (167); but the disruption of civilisation and the inrush of immigrants and sack of sites had shaken man's beliefs in the old gods. As a result, the worship of heroes and a belief in ghosts filled the gap left by the discarded beliefs (168). The uncertainty of life and insecurity of ordered government had made men unsure of themselves and of fate, and it was natural for them to turn to stories of former days for comfort, and to invest the heroes of traditional legends with almost magical powers. Vase paintings had begun to illustrate this growing interest in man himself (169). Gradually in settled conditions, new religions arose or old ones revived and these, like the laws, were usually in the hands of noble families (170). However, the new life developing in Greece in the seventh and sixth centuries, by its production of social and political crises, was again to shatter men's faith in old beliefs and to revive an individualist, temporal attitude to life, which culminated in the secular, materialist philosophies of the Ionian philosopher-scientists.

Beyond the settled conditions of Greek communities, however, pirates and adventurers occasionally travelled the seas, probably in increasing numbers as the beggars and landless, turned loose by the break up of the Bronze Age states, sought for some means of subsistence. As protection against possible attacks, Greek states built new types of warships and even Athens, which was one of the most backward of Greek states in seaward expansion, had acquired them early in/

in the eighth century (171). New methods of warfare were also evolved in Greece in this period, influenced perhaps by Asiatic methods (172). War chariots had been replaced by cavalry about the ninth and eighth centuries B.C., and the horse appears on late geometric pottery (173). Once supplies of copper and tin could again be acquired in the period of settled conditions - and once again the importance of iron must be stressed, since its use for tools and other articles left such bronze as there was available for weapons and so, in effect, added to the total amount of metal available for armour - armed infantrymen replaced the hordes of javelin throwers and charioteers. Spartan ivories give us an indication of the early use of this hoplite armour, although the use of the phalanx was probably later, since Tyrtaeus seems to suggest it was not yet in use in his day (v.sub.). These changes were naturally bound up with the whole trend of social change, and it was not surprising that possession of a horse and of the expensive hoplite armour, gave the owners a definite place in the social hierarchy and in political life. Before the self-sufficient economy was entirely disrupted, there had grown up "Leagues of Neighbours" or Amphictyonies, which helped to mitigate the savagery of war (174). It is noticeable, however, that with the development of trade and external contacts and the parallel growth of nationalism, states become more aggressive and their warfare more ruthless and impatient of set rules. (175). In the same way, once trade became regular, piracy was regarded as an obstacle to trade and states used their fleets to clear them from the seas.

The new social groupings and the loosening of tribal bonds created a polis within which the individual had considerable freedom for choosing new ways of life or directing old ones such as agriculture on new lines, and, in doing so, to create those new loyalties and associations which inevitably develop in such periods of economic and social change (176). This was further intensified with the development of trade and industry, which stimulated further division of labour and eventually affected the social status of men and women and of manual and brain workers (177). Gradually this led to new political associations as well as social groupings, to new policies, and, eventually, to tyrannies, which, for a time at least, unified the state and personified that feeling of patriotism and nationalism which had been evolving, as the polis itself evolved, out of mongrel ancestry into a true national community (178). Indeed, in such periods of economic change and expansion the increasing demands for individual freedom culminate, eventually, in that assertion of the community's independence and freedom which we call nationalism. The old federation of semi-federal cities of Achaean times was replaced by an ever-growing national independence which was/

was to play no small role in Greek history. Only in later centuries did new federations or leagues evolve, and these were on a 'national' rather than 'feudal' basis. In this way the polis of classical Greece went far beyond the Homeric polis, although it contained, as all Greek life contained something of the past, some survivals from it. In essence it was quite different. The Homeric polis had been part of a type of society which is usually known as feudal, under princes who claimed divine ancestry (179); but the new elements in this economic revival in Greece of the eighth and seventh centuries, especially iron and the alphabet, and the advanced starting point for the urban revolution, namely the feudal social framework, compared with the neolithic village society as a basis for the Bronze Age urban revolution, were to carry political progress to a new stage in history - to the creation of the bourgeois republic. It is interesting to note the different types of community man had evolved to suit new ways of living. Agriculture and settlement on the land had produced village life in contrast to the nomadic community of food-gathering days. The trading revolution of the Bronze Age had brought into being city life, more professional workers and autocracies of priests and nobles. These cities however were still embraced by a rigid social framework, and frequently incorporated in empires, while their culture and civilisation was based on the exploitation by a small class of serfs, peasants, and perhaps slaves. However, although this social organisation had gradually developed out of the Neolithic community, it had been the means of solving the most pressing problems of the Bronze Age, the organisation of long distance trade. The Greek middle-class republics, established after the tyrannies, were also the result not only of their social traditions and background, which were in this period much more advanced than at the beginning of the Bronze Age, but also of the strength of the democratic, popular, forces created by the new conditions, their political organisations, aims and achievements.

Characteristic of such periods of economic and social change are the invention of new tools, the improvement of old ones, and new scientific discoveries prompted by the new problems which had been created by the new jobs and ways of life. Science based on practice, by attempting to solve the many new problems created by economic changes, receives a great impetus at such times and so stimulates theoretical work in science and philosophy. These theoretical activities in their turn greatly aid the practical needs of the time, since they were originally prompted by those needs. So in Western Europe as a result of the trading revolution in the 15th and 16th centuries, A.D., a great revolution in technique was initiated, especially in shipping and navigation, to solve the problems created by long distance trade. As a result, the period acquired the name, "the century of inventions" (180).

We have seen how the urban revolution in the Bronze Age gave rise to a series of inventions to solve the problems created by the new type of economy (v. sup., ch. i). In Greece in the seventh and sixth centuries many of the Bronze Age inventions were rediscovered or put into use again (181), while others were produced for the first time. Included in this technical florescence of early Greece were rules of measuring from Egypt and, from Babylonia, arithmetic and the knowledge that the phenomena of the heavens occur in cycles. (182). Practical arts such as dying and perfumery were probably also revived or rediscovered (183).

Entirely new inventions, however, were produced when needed. Corinth, which was one of the earliest Greek States to start trading (184), is not unnaturally credited with many of the inventions (185). She is said to have invented the trireme (186), a windlass for her ships (187), the potter's wheel and a particular kind of bronze (188) - the last two being rediscovered. Other inventions of the period were the anchor, new metal processes, the mixture of ruddle with clay (189), and possibly a new kind of ship (190).

One of the most important inventions of the period was that of coinage, about 700 B.C. (191), and introduced to Greece about 650 (192). This had probably evolved gradually as a result of efforts to simplify trading transactions, but at first one result of its use was to intensify dislocation of the old economy. The fact that "nothing upsets social conditions more radically than the influx of metals" (193) is due, of course, to the fact that it intensifies the changes already underway because of the connection of money with trade and exchange.

Its ultimate significance when trade was firmly established, was to facilitate the further development of trade, but, after money had been accepted for use but was still very scarce, this scarcity, if prolonged, would lead to a fall in prices which would harm the farmers most because of the dominant position of agriculture; and, more important, the lack of abundant supplies of money would restrict the development of trade at home and abroad and, therefore, the development of manufactures and agriculture, itself. This is quite characteristic of the first effects of the introduction of money and its scarcity (194). In early Greece, therefore, it would intensify the general economic and social trend, namely, increased indebtedness of the small peasant and even of some nobles who had persisted too long in the patriarchal type of agriculture, increased enclosures of land, and transference of land through debts incurred by the drop in prices. Ultimately, conversion of taxes and rents in kind to money payment would be accompanied by the impoverishment and expropriation of the peasant. Where payment in kind is based on the harvest, the economy remains static, (the long/

long life of the Ottoman empire was due to its use of this method). No check however is placed on rent or taxes when paid in money, nor any guarantee given that the crop will yield sufficient money to meet it. Agricultural produce has entered the uncertain world of market prices. Once, however, the economic crisis caused by the increasing numbers of landless and debtors was solved, money, by simplifying exchange, especially among poor peasants who, until the invention of coins of smaller denominations, had taken least part in a trading community, would give fresh impetus to both industry and agriculture and help to raise the standard of living. Again, for details of the development evidence is lacking, but once more the example of the Italian city states is worth considering.

In Italy, in the ninth-eleventh centuries A.D., money again began to circulate in response to the development of agriculture for sale (195). Of course, exchange in kind did not disappear; it never has even in modern times (196). Money however still remained scarce and natural economy prevailed. It was only in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries A.D. that coins were plentiful enough to raise prices and benefit the farmers (197).

Such periods of economic expansion are renowned as much for making use of older inventions, for which society hitherto had found little use, as for creating new ones. Some form of steam engine, it is interesting to recall, was invented in the seventeenth century A.D. but only used in mines until the late eighteenth century, when new conditions could make full use of it and so led to further improvements (198). So in Greece the alphabet had probably been available for some time (v.sub., ch.iii) but was only fully employed when that type of urban civilisation, which in the Bronze Age had produced the first writing and accounts, again developed and could make full use of the new invention. Iron, too, although it had been used in Greece since about 1200 B.C. (v.sup.) and had played quite a part in accelerating the economic changes of the eighth century onwards, only exercised its full effect on the community when the new economy had advanced sufficiently far to demand it. Already it had made it possible for some poor landless to ^{clear and} enclose a piece of land by obtaining cheap metal tools, it had released supplies of bronze for weapons and so brought new sections of the population into the fighting forces, it had made possible a very intensive agricultural technique because of improved tools, and this, like the enclosures of land, became possible even for poor peasants who could therefore begin to cultivate for the market instead of merely for their own consumption; it had greatly improved, cheapened, and intensified industrial productive processes by providing supplies of cheap metal, and/

and so drawn into productive employment both landless and workless and some poor peasants whose plots were uneconomic. These results reacted on each other, stimulated production in industry and agriculture, and offered new prospects for many people from those classes which were in most need of them. However, the full development of these possibilities was only realised in later centuries, when the tyrannies had created conditions suitable for further economic and social advance.

Since so much in the economic revolution of eighth and seventh century Greece was repetition of the Bronze Age urban revolution, how did Greek social and political life develop so differently? This is the crux of the whole understanding of this period of Greek history, and therefore of the greatness of Greece, since its foundations were laid by the time of the tyrannies. To answer the question we must not only emphasise once more the more advanced social framework within which this economic revival took place, in contrast to that of the Bronze Age, but we must also select what is new in this period compared with the Bronze Age economy. Two recently acquired stepping stones in the path of progress leap to the eye, iron and the alphabet. Coinage, too, was new but by itself was really a culmination of a process in which standards of exchange had been increasingly simplified. It had, therefore, a less far-reaching effect than the other two. Its role was rather to intensify a process already set going by the others, that is, to intensify division of labour, to bring the poor peasant and the landless into the new economic stream and to make it possible for them to participate in the new social and political life. As the use of speech had set man's steps on a new evolutionary path, as the discoveries of agriculture and the domestication of animals had eventually revolutionised the life of Palaeolithic man, as the production of a surplus and the discovery of metal working had made possible the development of trade and industry, and therefore of ordered government and an urban civilisation with international contacts, so iron and the alphabet were to produce no less revolutionary an advance, to broaden the basis of society, to draw more and more of the community's population into public life, and to create the first bourgeois republics or states based essentially on the middle classes supported at first by peasants and artisans, and in which trade and finance eventually dominated the whole life of the community including agriculture. Since the real importance of iron and the alphabet has been obscured by the confusion created around the quality of iron in ancient times, and around the date of the alphabet, there is clearly a demand for a more detailed treatment which will be reserved for the following chapter (v.sub., ch.iii).

Every/

Every aspect of men's lives, it was noted, is affected by such economic and social changes. It should not be surprising, therefore, to find reactions to the new conditions in men's thoughts, and indeed the literature of early Greece, although remains are not abundant, illustrates all the trends of the period. Hesiod, and later Solon and Thøegnīs, reveal the change in ideas, for instance in their attitude to the new wealth made especially in trade. Hesiod in fact harps on this subject (199). This does not necessarily make the new type of wealth long established by Hesiod's time; on the contrary, his pre-occupation with it suggests its recent development. It is the new type of wealth made by new people that is resented (200), and the methods of obtaining it that are criticised (201). Hesiod depicts very vividly the difficulties of the small peasant, who is in danger of losing his land, and how trade, which was just beginning, provided some means of eking out his income; but how, too, he is still at the mercy of the nobles' interpretation of the laws (202). He bemoans his fate to have lived in such a period when old loyalties are destroyed and when new ideas turn citizen against citizen. However his solution is to advise resignation for the oppressed and to urge both sides in the social struggle to attempt to work in harmony. So in Hellenistic times when social unrest was widespread, philosophers such as Cercidas advocated moderation in order to avoid revolutionary outbreaks (v.sub.ch.viii). Hesiod also illustrates another characteristic of this period, when international relations had not yet been widely re-established, by his very vague knowledge of geography especially in the West (203).

Solon belongs to a later period, when the economic development had produced chaos in the countryside, had affected landlords as well as peasants, and when the concentration of land in a few hands led the peasants to demand some sort of division of land (204).

In England, in a comparable period, even while the rigid social structure of feudalism, where each had his appointed place, was still recognised, for instance in Piers Plowman, ("To some he gave wisdom....And to some he taught trades and cunning of eye, And with selling and buying to earn them a living, And some he taught to labour on land and water", etc. etc.), the misery of the peasants already found expression, ("The most needy are our neighbours....charged with children and landlord's rent"), and the inequalities of property attacked ("So gorgeous garments and so much wretchedness; So much portly pride with purses penniless", John Skelton). Peasants looked backwards to some "Golden Age", when land was held in common or equally divided. Proposals on these lines were quite reactionary, since the progressive tendency of a period of developing trade & industry, is to make possible the full development/

development of the latter by attracting peasants, freed from obligations on the land, to the towns, where they will provide not only labour power but a home market for some of the new commodities.

This belief in a Golden Age explains why the peasants' own solution for the chaos in agriculture is usually expressed in Utopian terms, such as More's Utopia (205), and, earlier, the demand by John Ball for freedom from serfdom and the division of land (206). Similar demands by Jack Cade (207) and in Greece by the peasants of Solon's time (208), are little better than Utopias. Solon himself (209), and people like Bishop Latimer (210) took a middle course, and expressed unconsciously the view of that middle class which was slowly becoming dominant. Rather more advanced was Bacon's Ideal State based on practical experimental science, while other Utopias varied from the revolutionary Utopias of Winstanley and Babeuf to idyllic tales such as Henry Neville's Isle of Pines and Mrs. Behn's Oroonoko, the latter advocating freedom and attacking slavery (211).

These Utopian ideas died out as the peasants were freed from debts and obligations which tied them to the land, and as trade and industry developed. Meanwhile the break up of the old way of life and the new opportunities for adventures abroad, had begun to produce a literature more personal in outlook and concerned with the present. To this type belongs Greek lyric poetry as well as the lyrical poetry of Elizabethan England.

In Greece, Archilochus illustrates perfectly the adventurous period when trade is still half adventure and piracy. When quite young he set out to make his fortune in the gold mines of Thasos and, though disappointed, he continued his life of wandering and adventure (212). It is interesting that he was probably a bastard (213), since this is just the type of person suggested as a follower of the new professions. He gives an interesting picture of the transition period when women took a more active part in public affairs than later (214) and when the old epic gods had lost their influence, but no new beliefs had yet crystallised (215). In Hellenistic times during a period also characterised by rapid social change, individual poetic expression in elegies and epigrams was again popular. Indeed the tradition of Archilochus was considered to be maintained by the popular moralists of the Hellenistic age (216).

Simonides of Amorgos represented rather a later stage when trade had become a business. Although he too was a colonist like Archilochus he described the post-colonising period, when trade was more firmly established (217).

Local/

Local festivals with music and athletics were characteristic of early Greece and reflected the life of the nobles (218). The poetry of the old aristocracy of which the choral ode was most characteristic, was, as we should expect, religious and collective (219). In Asia Minor the long choral ode had flourished for a time (220), when the old religious rites were still vigorous and the control of the nobles secure. Later, as the old social relations were broken up, individualism of expression became the rule. This reached perfection at Lesbos, with the personal lyric of Alcaeus and Sappho. They represented the new aristocracy, to whom the new type of life essentially belonged, but who did not wish to share its privileges with others; who could not see that once the methods and spirit of life had changed, to attempt to cling to the old political forms was futile (221). Sappho's poetry, however, was sufficiently divorced from this political background to avoid the weaknesses of Alcaeus. In general, the elegies characteristic of this period were secular and individualistic in outlook (222).

Not everyone, however, enjoys the destruction of old ways of life and thought; and Mimnermus of Colophon aptly expressed the miseries of this period of shifting values. Later still, in the midst of actual political strife, still more bitterness was expressed by poets involved, voluntarily or not, in the actual struggle (v.sub., ch.v).

In England, too, towards the end of the sixteenth century a great revolution in literature took place, both in technique and content (223). The outstanding representatives of this period were Sidney and Spencer, both intimately connected with current affairs at home and abroad (224). Like the Greek lyric poets, both Spencer and Shakespeare expressed aristocratic views (225), but the power of the new type of wealth (226) and the injustice suffered by the poor (227) were not unrecognised. On the continent, too, Moliere who was one of the "new people" supported by the French King against the feudal nobles, contrived to ridicule feudal customs, and actually portrayed upholders of mediaeval ideas as clowns.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II.

1. cf. Thuc. i, 2 for a picture of the period of migrations, piracy and interruption of trade; cf. ii. 12, for social upheavals and invasions from outside at the end of the Bronze Age.
2. Childe, Bronze Age, p.23. This is contrary to Professor Burnet, Early Gk. philosophy, p.6. n.1, who says "The Greek Middle Ages represent a break in the normal development", (from bronze to iron). The normal development is to have a break.

Cf. Blakeway, B.S.A. xxxiii. p. 171 for evidence of Greek trade with the West before colonies.

Archaeological evidence shows a continual tradition from Mycenaean to early classical period; see Artemis Orthia pp.248, 282. Cf. also B.S.A. xiii, pp. 75, 378.

3. Childe, op.cit., p.193.
4. Cf. Heichelheim, Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Altertums, i, 214.
5. ibid, p.210.
6. Feudal conditions usually develop out of this kind of breakdown in trade; cf. Pirenne, La Civilisation occidentale au moyen age, pp. 8 ff; Mediaeval cities, pp. 45 ff., esp. p. 46, n.25.
7. Homer, Joshua-Judges all have examples; cf. Od. vi. 262-3; Judges i. 27 ff., Joshua xvi, 9, xviii. 28, xix.50.
- 7-8 8. cf. Thuc., i. 78.
9. cf. Heichelheim, op.cit., p.210; cf. Pirenne, La Civ., pp. 40 ff; Mediaeval Cities pp. 13 ff., 75-7 for the connection of commerce with the growth of towns.
10. Carpenter, Humanistic value of Archaeology, pp.68-72.
11. ^{Allen,} Homer, The Origins and Transmission, ch. vi; C.R., xxv.(1911) pp. 233 ff. Helbig, La question mycenienne, pp. 50-2.
12. The differences between Mycenaean and Achaean periods usually cited against Allen's view are the appearance of iron tools in Homer but only iron ornaments in Mycenaean tombs, cremation in Homer and tholos burial in Mycenaean, a difference in the shape of shields and swords and in details in dress; cf. Childe, Aryans, p.51. However, in very late Mycenaean deposits some cutting swords, breast plates, round shields and fibulae are found; even some cremation is found, but the urns are laid in chamber tombs and so are unhomeric, ibid., p.52.

13. cf. Evans, J.H.S. xxxii, pp. 277 ff.; Childe, Aryans, p.52; Chadwick, The Heroic Age, pp. 192, 218-9; Mackenzie, B.S.A. xiii pp.423 ff.; Hogarth, Ionia and the East, p.104; Lang, The World of Homer, pp.2-3; Homer and his Age, p.195; Jevons, J.H.S. xiii, pp.31; Burn, Minoans Philistines and Greeks, p.7; Ridgeway, Early Age of Greece, I. passim; Myres, Political Ideas of the Greeks, p.33; Wace, C.A.H. ii. p.460.
14. Lang, World of Homer, pp.105-7.
15. cf. Childe, Aryans, pp. 48 ff., where he emphasises how Ridgeway exaggerates its importance. Cf. also Lang, op.cit. p.4 n.1, who thinks it can be exaggerated. So Myres, Who Were the Greeks, pp. 385 ff., points out that great variations of funeral rites are possible among the same people, and that such things as lack of firewood could be important in influencing rites.
16. Childe, Aryans, p.52; Myres, op.cit., p.444.
17. Myres, ibid.
18. Myres, op.cit., p.385.
19. For minstrelsy in Homer cf. Od., viii. 73 ff.; 499 ff. i. 325 ff.; Il., vi. 358.
20. In South Russia tombs very like those Homer described are to be found. It seems clear that the first modifications of the cremation rites took place in Asia Minor. Lang, op.cit., p.108, suggests that the pillar and cairn described by Homer may have been abandoned in a migration period because they would invite destruction, but he does not link this with cremation rites in Asia Minor and does not explain the Halos tomb which was probably influenced by more direct contact with the South Russian district. The above account of cremation, therefore, has some new points.
21. Cf. Lang, op.cit., p.109. n.2, on an argument of this sort used by Burrows.
22. cf. Burn, op.cit., pp.6-9; Nilsson, Homer and Mycenae, pp. 139 ff.; Leaf, Iliad, (1912), vol.i. pp. xiv-xv, II. p.10, for this view.
23. Lang, op.cit., pp. 6 ff., 229 ff., Bury C.A.H. ii, pp. 506 ff.; J.T. Sheppard, The Pattern of ^{the} Iliad, Ldn.1922, passim. However the argument that the poems could not have been one work because they would have been too long to be remembered is not necessarily true. To-day memories/

memories are out of practice because so much mental energy is expended in other directions. The use of notebooks allows memory to become slack. Memories can be trained and improved even to-day, and where it was essential to remember and there were fewer things to be remembered, memorising should have been fairly easy.

24. Lorimer, J.H.S. xlix, pp. 145 ff; Evans, J.H.S. xxxii, p.293. Cf. Nilsson, op.cit., pp.137, for evidence of a knowledge of Mycenaean civilisation in Homer.
25. Lorimer, *ibid*, gives these. Thebes was a great city in the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries. She argues that it became less important in the fourteenth and was abandoned as a royal residence in the thirteenth century, and that before the reference is to an early period. It is more likely that, although the city continued to be important, it was little visited after the Fall of Knossos, while the sea raiders never penetrated so far.
26. Myres, op.cit., p.126.
27. Nilsson, op.cit., pp.136-7, for evidence of this ignorance. Reference to Sidon, not Tyre, indicates that the period was prior to the overthrow of Sidon and the dominance of Tyre. Cf. also Scott, *The Unity of Homer*, p.9.
28. Od. xiv. 244 ff.
29. Palestine, too, had an urnfield culture similar to this one, cf. ii. Chron., xvi, 14; xxi. 19; Lev. xxxiv. 5; i. Sam., xxxi. 10-13. The above argument on the dating of the Homeric poems has some new features.
30. Od., xv. 415 ff.
31. Il., vii. 470-1; xxiii, 745; Od., vii. 10.
32. Cf. Od., i. 184; viii. 63.
33. Il., vii. 473.
34. Il., ix. 122, 264; xviii. 507; ^{xxiii.} 269, 614; Od., iv. 129; viii. 393; ix. 202.
35. Il. ii. 449; vi. 236; xxiii. 705, 885; Od. i. 431. The talanton is regular currency in the late Bronze Age, (Seltman, *Greek Coins*, ch.1). With the breakdown of trade and scarcity of metals in the Homeric period there was probably a reversion to the cow currency. With the revival of trade the talanton probably began to displace the cow again.

36. Od. xvi. 138 ff.; xviii. 313-4.
37. The connection between the small demand for the products of artisans in Homer and their free status has not been emphasised before.
38. Od., viii. 159 ff.
39. Od., iii. 71 ff.
40. Heichelheim, op.cit., p.210, Myres, op.cit., p.537, points out in addition that the migrations had helped to spread this knowledge. Cf. Evans, J.H.S. xxxii, pp.285, 295-7, for examples of the influence of Minonian and Mycenaean works of art, religion, etc. on later generation in Greece.
41. Childe, Aryans, p.54.
42. Wace, C.A.H. ii. 406; Wade-Gery, C.A.H. ii. 523.
43. Burn, op.cit., p.237; Wade-Gery, l.c., p.524.
44. Myres, J.H.S. xxvii. pp.182-3.
45. The whole argument on the more advanced social framework and on the importance of iron and the alphabet in creating the tyrannies and making further historical progress possible, is new. For further details v.sub.ch.iii.
46. For the use of iron from the 15th and 14th centuries onwards, cf. Childe, Bronze Age, p.23; University Forward, VI. 5. For peoples moving westwards with the new metal, cf. Bronze Age, p. 193.
47. cf. Heichelheim, op.cit., pp.203-4, for figures.
48. cf. Davies, B.S.A. xxxv., pp.136 ff. In the Late Bronze and early Iron Age Greece obtained copper ores from several districts, and had some connections with Italy and Crete, etc.
49. Heichelheim, op.cit., pp.204-9. Cf. Moret et. Davy, op.cit., p.140.
50. Bérard, Les Phéniciens et l'Odyssee, is one of the most whole-hearted exponents of this view.
51. Hall's arguments, Civ. Greece in Bronze Age, pp.269-70, which are based on religion, are quite inadequate, since knowledge of such rites does not necessarily depend on the movements of peoples, especially when a little earlier an international culture had prevailed in the Mediterranean./

Mediterranean. The arguments from place names, p.275, prove too much. It is unlikely that places were renamed so late as the eleventh and tenth centuries, while "semitic" covers more than Phoenician. Many of those place names probably go much further back than this period.

52. Myres, C.A.H. iii. p.639, criticises these scholars. Harland, A.J.A., 38, p.91, admits it is possible that the Phoenicians may not have been in the Aegean until the eighth century. Carpenter, op.cit., pp. 41 ff., A.J.A. xxxvii, pp. 8 ff., is the most vigorous opponent of the theory of Phoenician dominance in the Mediterranean and does not believe they appeared before the eighth century.
53. Myres, *ibid*, Cf. Gomme, B.S.A. xviii, pp.189 ff.; J.H.S. xxxiii, pp.71-2, where he argues against regarding Thebes as a trading centre in very early times and maintains that it was only in the fifth century that the legend identifying the Cadmeans with Phoenicians took shape. Burn, *Age of Hesiod*, p.155, points out that the Boeotian civilisation which the Greeks used the Phoenicians to explain, owes its origin on archaeological evidence to the Minoan civilisation. Cf. Burn, *Minoans Philistines and Greeks*, p.240, where he argues that the Greeks used the Phoenicians to explain the legacy of Minoan civilisation.
54. W.F. Albright, *Jour. Pal. Or. Soc.*, v.(1925) p.83, says the discoveries at Byblos illustrate this connection.
55. This is supported by the appearance of Egyptian faience and Phoenician imitations of Egyptian scarabs at Attica in Late Minoan tombs, cf. E.A.Gardner, C.A.H. iii, p.575. However, Carpenter A.J.A. xxxvii. 17, *Humanistic Value of Archaeology*, pp. 41 ff., argues that no Phoenician objects appear in the Aegean before the eighth century. This is almost certainly an exaggeration, since there is no reason why stray objects should not have travelled even in the dark ages, when a few stragglers probably did occasionally travel. However, Hall, C.A.H. iii, pp.326-8, points out that objects previously considered Phoenician at Naucratis are now to be considered to be Egyptian-Greek, so caution is clearly necessary in assessing Phoenician influence.
56. Myres, *Who were the Greeks?*, pp.132-3. There was a tradition that Tyre was refounded in the year before the fall of Troy, and this would fit with the time of the raiders; cf. Myres, C.A.H. iii, p.636.
57. Myres, *ibid*; Cook, C.A.H. ii, pp.303 ff.; Hall, C.A.H. ii. p. 282.
- 58./

58. Myres, C.A.H. iii, pp. 636, 645; Hogarth, op.cit., p.22; Hall, C.A.H. iii, pp.326-8.
59. Nilsson, op.cit., p.134, considers the eleventh and tenth centuries were the most favourable for Phoenician trade, without citing any evidence of conditions which could be regarded as favourable for trade when cities were being destroyed and countries invaded. Bérard, op.cit., regards Phoenicians as responsible for nearly everything in Greek life and culture. Ullman, A.J.A. xxxviii, p.378 n.3, does not see why the Phoenicians should not have begun their activities as early as the twelfth century. Buck, Cl. Phil., xxi, 15, talks of Phoenicians activity at sea beginning in the twelfth century and reaching its height in the following centuries. Giles, C.A.H. ii, p.27, thinks Phoenicians had settlements in Greece at a very early age. Hall, Civ. Greece in Bronze Age, pp.269-70, believes they appeared in the Aegean in the eleventh century after the break up of Achaean power.
60. Cook, C.A.H. ii, p.302; Myres, C.A.H. iii, p.639.
61. King Hiram I of Tyre, King of the Sidonians, in the tenth century, (i. Kings. v. 1. ff), sent timber to Solomon for the temple at Jerusalem and received agricultural produce in return.
62. Myres, C.A.H. iii, p.642; cf. pp. 12 ff., p.362.
63. C.A.H. iii, pp. 18 ff; p.24.
64. Myres, l.c., p.639.
65. Amos, i. 9-10, obviously refers to relations with Israel at this period.
66. In Sicily elements of the same culture as that of Carthage appear before the first Greek settlements, that is probably in the eighth century. In the Lipari isles, however, there is no Phoenician settlement before the Greek ones in the early sixth century. In the Maltese group Phoenician settlements begin abruptly about the seventh century. In Italy Phoenician vessels appear with sub-geometric and protocorinthian ware about the second half of the eighth century. Parts of Sardinia were occupied in the late seventh or early sixth century. In Spain the earliest finds belong to the late seventh or early sixth century. Myres, C.A.H. iii, pp.643-4. The theory that Gades was founded by Phoenicians as early as 1000 B.C., cf. Gardner, C.A.H. ii, p.590, probably arises from a confusion of Tartessus and Gades, which later took the place of Tartessus. The earlier date is the period of movements of peoples and it is possible that there was a refounding of a city at that time; v.sup., Tyre.

67. These are the dates given by Myres, J.H.S. xxvi, pp.115 ff. He argues against Winkler's dating of 675-630.
68. *ibid.*, p.118 following Winkler.
69. Myres, *ibid.*, p.120.
70. VI. 2.
71. i. 1.
72. II., xxiii. 740; vi. 290; Od., xv. 118.
73. Ionia and the East, p.83.
74. II., xxiii, 740; Od., xiii. 285; xv. 415.
75. II., vi. 290; Od., xv. 118.
76. Nilsson, *op.cit.*, pp.135-6.
77. Cf. Nilsson, *op.cit.*, p.131, for the evidence to support this argument.
78. Ionia and the East, p.83.
79. Od., xv. 415: iv. 84; xiii. 272; II., xxiii. 740. Myres, *Who were the Greeks?* p.133, dates the refounding of Tyre to the time of the sea raiders. Justin, xviii. c. 3, talks of Tyre being founded at this time, but actually Tyre is mentioned in Egyptian documents much earlier. Josephus, *Ant.*, vii. 3. 1., also thinks this was the beginning of a new period for Tyre.
80. Cf. Hogarth, *Ionia and the East*, p.85 on this. The above argument on the Phoenician question is, I believe, quite new.
81. Cf. Carpenter, *op.cit.*, pp.58-65; Rostovtzeff, *Hist. Anc. World*, i. pp. 198 ff. V. sub., on Blakeway, *B.S.A.* xxxiii p.191, where it is pointed out that a new type of export from Greece to the West begins from about 735 B.C., Cf. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften*, p.104.
82. Hall, *Civ. Greece in B.A.*, p.270; Hogarth, *op.cit.*, p.41.
83. For Eastern elements cf. Hogarth, *op.cit.*, pp.61-3; Burn, *Age of Hesiod*, pp.155-6.
84. Myres, *Who were the Greeks*, p.537.
85. Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece*, p.16.
- 86./

86. For exx. of bastards and younger sons leading bands of colonists because there was no land at home, cf. Aris. Pol., v. (viii) 7. 1306 B. Strabo xiv. l. 3; Antiochus, F.H.G. i. p.184; Ephor. Hist. p. 247.
87. cf. Hesiod, Op. 643 ff. He considers trade dangerous and more suited to his adventurous brother; cf. 646-647, where trade is recommended as a means of escape from debts and a hard life. cf. 236. Renard, Life and Work in Prehistoric Times, p.153, points out that trade in its beginnings is related to raids and piracy.
88. cf. Hd. iv. 152, for examples of high profits in early Greece. cf. ps-Aris. Oecon, ii. 2.1; Nic. Dam. frg.59. Vasco da Gama's first voyage to India brought a profit of 6,000%; L. Huberman, "Man's Worldly Goods", p.91. Queen Elizabeth held shares in one of Drake's piratical expeditions against the Spaniards in return for the loan of some ships; the profits were 4,700%, from which Queen Elizabeth got £250,000 as her share, *ibid.* pp.93-4, quoting W.R. Scott, "The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1720", Ldn. 1910-12, i. p.81. (v.sub. n.143).
89. cf. Hesiod, Op. 630 ff. In later times, when some noble families engaged in trade, commerce had been long established. Theognis deplors the fact that poor nobles engaged in trade, but their poverty was a result of the development of trade. Meanwhile, others had become rich and powerful through commerce, and, by marriage or moneylending, had joined the ranks of the new nobility.
90. Early Greek gems indicate Phoenician influence; cf. B.M. Catalogue of Gems, 1926, No.205, 490. Phoenician gems were cut, not ground (*ibid.*, pl. v-vi); The revolution in Greek engraving was caused by the introduction of grinding; style, shapes and kind of stone chosen at this period all derive from Mesopotamia, *ibid.* No.491; No.553 shows the later development of the same style. The only conclusion possible is that engravers with tools and stock moved from Mesopotamia; the grinding technique can only have been learnt by long apprenticeship, and there is no indication of Greek engravers in Mesopotamia in the sixth century.
91. cf. Artemis Orthia, pp. 80, 113, 245-7, for local artistic work influenced by Eastern models. This is probably true of most Greek art of this early period, *ibid.* p.248.
92. Hasebroek's idea of the "Travelling Potter" (*op.cit.* p.50, n.4, and p.51) to explain the widespread finds of Greek pottery, cannot be maintained. Potters cannot move so easily as some craftsmen, e.g. gem engravers, v.sup. He would have had to carry his potter's wheel - a bulky object/

object - with him, as well as a sack of clay, in order to maintain himself on the journey. The craftsman needs capital before he dare separate himself from the tools of his trade. In practice this only happens when trade and industry are well developed. Moreover clay usually varies from place to place, and archaeological evidence can usually decide where a pot has been made. cf. Blakeway, op.cit., p.172, n.1, for a similar refutation.

93. Myres, op.cit., p.503.

94. Ridgeway, J.H.S. vi. p.330.

95. *ibid.*, pp.335 ff.

96. *ibid.*, pp.319, 332. Toutain, Economic History, etc. pp.12 ff. Guiraud, La Propriété Fonc. pp.21 ff. argue against a system of agricultural communism in early Greece. This is probably correct but this public land does not mean communism but was probably a relic of static, feudal conditions. Such common land survived in England until the 18th century.

97. Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens, p.72.

98. Glotz, Le travail dans la Grèce ancienne, p.35, gives examples of this *eschatia* from the *Odyssey*.

99. *Od.*, ix. 648; xv. 59.

100. *Il.*, xxi. 444; *Hes.Op.*, 405, cf. 603-8; cf. *Hdt.* viii.137; *Apollodorus*, iii. 4. 2. In the Middle Ages, too, a freeman without work or home would "offer himself (to a lord, as serf) a rope round his neck and a penny on his head"; cf. *Boissonade*, *Life and Work in mediaeval Europe*, p.137.

101. *Ridgeway*, l.c., pp.337-8.

102. *Hes., Op.*, 336-441, quoted by *Ridgeway*, l.c., p.338.

103. cf. *Thuc.*, ii. 12, for a picture of more settled conditions after the migration period which was then followed by colonising. Cf. *Hes., Op.*, 374, for overpopulation as a cause of land hunger.

104. *Jarde*, *La formation du Peuple grec*, p.222, points out that land hunger was more the result of social conditions than geographical ones. Cf. *Hesiod*, *Op.* 374 ff., on the necessity of a small family if the family plot was to remain adequate for their needs.

105. cf. *Hdt.* iv. 148, 151, 154; *Thuc.*, vi. 3. 2; *Plat.*, *Legg.*, iv. 708B; v. 740C; *Thuc.*, i. 2; *Strabo*, vi. 1.7; 2.2; 3.3; xiv. 1-3; xvii. 1. 6. V. sup., n. lxxxvi.

106. *B.S.A.* xxxiii. pp.171-2; cf. *Myres*, *CAH.* iii. p.673, where he quotes *Strabo's* description of the founding of *Metapontum* as a sort of *synoecism* as evidence of some earlier settlements which had continued from an earlier period.

107./

107. *ibid.*, p.174, Cf. pp. 176-184 for details.
108. Scher^{sch}meyer, *Die Etrusker*; Burn, *Minoans Philistines and Greeks*, p.240, following Dr. R. McIver, makes the earliest Etruscan bands to reach western Italy to arrive no earlier than the ninth century.
109. Cf. Blakeway, *l.c.*, p.172, esp. n.i.
110. Myres, C.A.H. iii. p.670, points out that there are a few traces of communication after the Late Minoan breakup.
111. Blakeway, *l.c.*, pp. 191 ff.
112. *ibid.*, pp.192-9.
113. cf. C.A.H. iv. pp.408 ff., on the close connection of language between Etruria and Asia Minor in the pre-classical period; cf. Od. VIII. 294., for Sinties who speak a barbarous language. The Anatolian -nth, -nd termination is also characteristic of Etruscan; cf. Aruns, Nethuns, and probably also names like Porsenna; the Lemnian Stele (C.A.H. iv. 408) indicates the presence of Etruscans in Lemnos as late as the sixth century.
114. *op.cit.*, pp.200-1.
115. p.200, *ibid.*
116. *ibid.*, p.201.
117. cf. *Hdt.*, ii., 178; cf. Blakeway, *op.cit.*, p.207.
118. cf. Blakeway, *op.cit.*, pp.205 ff.
119. cf. *Thucyd.*, i. 13.
120. Rostovtzeff, "*Hist. Anc. World*", i.pp. 194-5; cf.C.Seltman, "*Athens, Its History and Coinage*", p.9, for the early cultivation of olives in Greece. Perhaps olive growing was developed soon after Theseus made Athens the centre of the community, since the plain of Attica is more suited to olives than corn; cf. P.N. Ure, "*Origin of Tyranny*", p.308.
121. cf. Hasebroek, *op.cit.*, pp.107, 111, 112, 115. cf. A.W.Gomme, "*Essays in Greek History and Literature*", p.44, n.2, for ridicule of this idea.
122. cf. *Hesiod*, *Op.* 31 ff., 361 ff.
- 123./

123. Hesiod, Op. 25, 423 ff., 455-6, 493, 643, 807-8. The carpenter and smith are called in to help the farmer make his plough, cart and boat.
124. Hesiod, Op. 631-2, 643-4; v. supra. n.62.
125. cf. C.E.H. I. p.503 for this development in Europe.
126. Textiles at Miletus and Samos were famous; cf. Athen xii. 540D.
127. cf. A.L.Morton, "A People's History of England", p.163.
128. Hesiod, Op. 632, 646 ff., 689-691.
129. v. sup. n.88 on Queen Elizabeth.
130. cf. G. Glotz, "Le Travail dans l'ancienne Grèce", p.36; G. Thomson, "Aeschylus and Athens", p.71.
131. M. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., i. p.199; de Sanctis, Atthis, etc. pp.235-6.
132. Increases in population are characteristic of economic revolutions; cf. H. Pirenne, "La Civilisation au Moyen Age, etc.", p.62, for the connection between the revival of trade and growth of population in the Italian city states. Consider the growth of population in England and Wales from 5½ million in 1740 to 12 million in 1821. In the late seventeenth century Lichfield could be referred to as "a large town in the Midlands of nearly 3,000 souls" (Gregory King, "Natural and Political Observations", 1694). V.G. Childe, "Man Makes Himself", pp.16, 39, makes the growth of population a result of economic revolution, since the latter makes possible a greater production. (For his first revolution see pp. 77 ff., for the second pp.160 ff). However he ignores the fact that a less sensational growth of population in a static economy will upset that economy and help other changes in bringing about the economic revolution.
133. cf. H. Pirenne, "La Civilisation au Moyen Age", etc.p.14-5.
134. Cambridge Economic History, I. p.114.
135. ibid., pp.228 ff.
136. ibid., p.238.
137. H.Pirenne, op.cit., p.15.
138. ibid. p.20.
- 139./

139. *ibid.*, p.33. cf. C.E.H. I. p.323.
140. H. Pirenne, *op.cit.*, p.34.
141. *ibid.*, p.44.
142. *ibid.*, p.45.
143. cf. St.Godric de Finchal in the eleventh century; H. Pirenne, p.45. He began as a down and out gathering goods washed up on the beaches. He very soon became a merchant of consequence.
144. *ibid.*, p.43.
145. *ibid.*, p.46.
146. *ibid.*, p.47.
147. C.E.H. I. p.341.
148. *ibid.*, p.326, cf. Pirenne, *op.cit.*, p.62.
149. *ibid.*, p.62. cf. C.E.H. I. p.323.
150. v. sup., ch.1.
151. A. Thierry, *The Formation and Progress of the Third Estate in France*, Ldn., 1859, i.p.11, admits he makes an abstraction from the general body of history. Cf. F. Guizot, *The Hist. of Civilisation*, Ldn., 1856, i.p.17.
152. F. Guizot, *op.cit.*, p.17; A. Thierry, *op.cit.*, i. pp.11, 15, 208, 211-2; ii. pp. 2 ff.; A. de Tocqueville, *The State of Society in France*, Ldn., 1873, pp. xiv, 8 ff.; J.E.T. Rogers, *The Economic Interpretation of History*, New York, 1888, pp. 1 ff. Cf. Preface; A.A.Trever, *Greek Economic Thought*; Tenney Frank, *An Economic History of Rome*, etc. etc.
153. This should be obvious and yet is frequently ignored. Scholars instead of confining themselves to cataloguing their discoveries in one branch of history will try to draw conclusions of the widest historical significance and even to interpret history as a whole according to their own particular branch. Rostovtzeff, in his *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, introd., p.viii, defends his choice of social and economic aspects only, but rightly suggests in his summary, p.1310, that his book is essentially intended as a catalogue of social and economic facts, not as a full history of the period.
154. J.B.S. Haldane, "New Paths in Genetics", Ldn., 1941, p.45.
- 155./

155. cf. Renard, Life and Work in Prehistoric Times, pp.35 ff. where he emphasises the importance of food and drink in affecting man's work and history.
156. cf. Ure, Origin of Tyranny; Rostovtzeff, passim; Blakeway, B.S.A. xxxiii, pp. 170 ff; Rogers, op.cit., p.3, on the fact that primitive societies have been less neglected than others from the point of view of material conditions.
157. Cf. Childe, Man Makes Himself, pp. 9 ff., for the importance of tools and methods of production in moulding social systems and economic organisation. Cf. H. Levy, Philosophy for a Modern Man, Ldn., 1938, pp. 183-4, 189, on the importance of tools, natural resources, and man's fundamental needs in characterising society. Cf. Childe, op.cit., p.34, on how new inventions and discoveries produce new rules for action and behaviour.
158. cf. Polyb., vi. 51, on the growth, zenith and decay of states.
159. Cf. Report of Irish Commission on Banking, endorsed by a bishop of the Roman Catholic Church; "In society the motive power is enterprise and the desire for reward". Contrast with this the "just wage" of the mediaeval schoolmen, cf. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, ch. 1 passim. This change was the result of the growth of a new way of living and of economic freedom for the individual.

Cf. Scott, in his epilogue to Waverley, "The destruction of the patriarchal power of the Highland chiefs, the abolition of the heritable jurisdiction of the Lowland nobility.....commenced this innovation, the gradual influx of wealth and extension of commerce have since united to render the present people of Scotland a class of beings as different from their grandfathers as the existing English are from those of Queen Elizabeth".

160. Social work both in this country and abroad gives practical proof of this. People with similar jobs live strikingly similar lives and exhibit much the same sort of outlook, reactions, and ideas. Indeed, a closer similiarity can be found between people of the same profession in different countries than between people of the same nationality but of different professions. It is obvious, for instance, that in most vital matters the lives and opinions of bricklayers and bank managers in this and other countries are very dissimilar. Bricklayers of Britain and France, however, while they have many superficial differences, yet in their relation to their work and workmates, to the foreman and manager, and in their/

their views on their job and its conditions and wages, and on other matters connected with their daily lives, are strikingly alike. This likeness is of course only relative. There is always a vivid variation between one person and another. It is the average behaviour of groups of people that is important for the historian in this connection.

161. Cf. Carpenter, *op.cit.*, pp. 78 ff., on the impossibility of artists freeing themselves from the influence either of environment or of the past traditions and technique of their art. More's Utopia deals with contemporary economic and social conditions, but makes great use of Plato's Republic.
162. Myres, *The Political Ideas of the Greeks*, p.37.
163. cf. Adcock, C.A.H. III, pp.690 ff. on this and on Sparta's unique position. v. sub. chs. VI and VIII.
164. Burn, *Age of Hesiod*, p.104.
165. cf. Myres, *op.cit.*, p.58, on the reorganisation of the tribes in the polis. Cf. Renard, *op.cit.*, p.212, where he argues that settlement on the land modified the clan groupings until finally they were replaced by territorial divisions of the community.
166. Myres, *op.cit.*, p.113.
167. Chadwick, *op.cit.*, p.397; Thomson, *op.cit.*, 60-1,
168. Myres, *Who were the Greeks?* pp.209-10; Burn, *Minoans Philistines and Greeks*, p.252; Lang, *The World of Homer*, pp.107, 110.
169. Lang, *op.cit.*, pp.4-5.
170. cf. Thomson, *op.cit.*, p.72; v.sub., ch.iv for Athens.
171. cf. Burn, *Age of Hesiod*, p.240 on these new warships.
172. Burn, *op.cit.*, pp.155-6.
173. Burn, *op.cit.*, pp.159-61; Lang, *op.cit.*, pp.4-5; cf. Adcock, C.A.H. iii, pp.695-6 on military changes.
174. Burn, *op.cit.*, pp.143-4.
175. cf. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*, I. i. p.348; K. Freeman, *Life and work of Solon*, p.66. The spirit of warfare was changed too; warfare gradually became a business and less of a game with fixed rules. During the Lelantine War/

War there was an attempt to forbid the use of missiles, cf. C.A.H. iii. p.623. The new type of government in Corinth, however, aggressive in its policy of colonising and trade was more concerned to invent more effective weapons of war such as the trireme. cf. Thucyd. I. 13, for Corinth clearing the seas of pirates.

176. cf. Myres, Political Ideas of the Greeks, p.60, on this individualism and new life.
177. cf. Renard, op.cit., pp.214-5, on these results in general arising from trade and industry.
178. cf. Myres, op.cit., p.61, on the individual and his new support for the community, not the tribe, Cf. p.15, on the development of nationality out of mongrel ancestry.
179. Myres, op.cit., p.47.
180. Childe, University Forward, vi. 5., p.7, points out that big advances in science and man's control over nature coincide with periods of economic expansion. cf. Hogben, Science for the Citizen, pp.547-580, on the European inventions.
181. cf. Diod. Sic. i. 50. 1., where Egyptians are suggested as the originators of astronomy, science and philosophy. Practical work had certainly been done in Egypt and elsewhere; cf. Diod. Sic. i. 69. 5. where Egypt is suggested as the origin of astronomy, geometry, arts and writing; the latter is certainly incorrect.

Cf. Childe, Man Makes Himself, p.254 for the fact that long before the end of the Greek dark ages the results of Egyptian and Babylonian science were known on the Aegean coast. cf. Heichelheim, op.cit., p.210, on the persistence of technical tradition.

Cf. Evans, J.H.S. xxxii. p.278 on the rediscovery of Bronze Age inventions in Greece which were then hailed as new inventions. He mentions sailing ships, weights and measures, and the antecedents of coinage.

182. cf. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, pp.21-3; cf. Heath, The Legacy of Greece, p.103.
183. Darcy Thompson, Legacy of Greece, p.142.
184. Strabo viii. 6. 20, talks of Corinth as a powerful sea city very early.
185. Pindar, Ol. xiii. 16-24, praises her ancient skill.
186. Thuc. i. 13.
- 187./

187. Thuc., iii. 15.
188. Plin., H.N., xxxiv. 3.
189. Paus., iii. 148; Hdt., i. 25; Plin., H.N. xxxv., 152.
190. Plut., Per., 26; Athen, xii., 540C.
191. Seltman, Gk. Coins, p.81.
192. *ibid.*
193. cf. C.E.H. i. p.503.
194. Cf. Seltman, Athens, etc., pp.14-17, on scarcity of coins in Athens at first. cf. Childe, What Happened in History p.141, on the fluctuations in price after the introduction of metals as currency in the Bronze Age and the steadily rising prices as the money became plentiful. v.sub. on the Italian states. In England, too, in the early stages of the trading revolution, the scarcity of money restricted the development of trade and industry. cf. Morton, A People's History of England, Ldn., 1938, p.153.
195. cf. H. Pirenne, La Civilisation au Moyen Age, etc. p.72.
196. *ibid.*, p.73.
197. *ibid.*, pp.95, 73.
198. cf. L. Hogben, Science for the Citizen, pp.552 ff.; A.P. Rossiter, The Growth of Science, (Pelican ed.1943) pp.88-90.
199. Op. 21 ff., 38 ff., 221, 308 ff. 381-2, 644 ff., 686.
200. Op. 35, 313, 319³⁵², 644, 686.
201. Theognis 316 ff.; Plut., Sol. 3.; Solon., frgg., ii. 12, 14. (Hiller-Grusius); Hes., Op. 38, 321 ff., 352.
202. Op. 30 ff., 35 ff., 40 ff., 210 ff., 248 ff., 262-4, 403 ff., 637 ff., cf. 118 ff., for the destruction of old ties and the growth of social tension.
203. cf. Burn, Age of Hesiod, pp. 250 ff., for examples of Hesiod's geography.
204. Plut., Sol. 16; Solon, frg. 28-32.
205. pp. 155, 190, 192.
206. cf. Froissart, "Collections des Chroniques", viii. C.106.
- 207./

207. Shakespeare, 2 Hen. vi., Act iv., Sc. vii.
208. Plut. Sol. xvi.
209. cf. frg., 28-32.
210. cf. The Fifth Sermon on the Lord's Prayer, on the verse "Give us this day our daily bread". Bishop Latimer pointed out that if things were held in common there could be no theft, and so the commandment "Thou shalt not steal" would be in vain.
211. cf. Gerard Winstanley, The New Law of Righteousness (1649) The Law of Freedom (1652); E. Belfort Bax, The Last Episode of the French Revolution being a history of Gracchus Babeuf and the Conspiracy of Equals, Ldn. 1911, For the tales of Neville and Mrs. Behn, cf. Jacobin and Restoration Novels, (Everyman ed).
212. cf. Jevons "History of Greek Literature", pp.115-116.
213. cf. Rose, "A Handbook of Greek Literature", p.89.
214. Jevons, op.cit., p.116.
215. ibid., p.117.
216. Barber, The Hellenistic Age, p.68.
217. Jevons, op.cit.p.118.
218. Burn, Age of Hesiod, p.144-5.
219. Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens, p.79.
220. Thomson, op.cit., pp.179/80.
221. Aris. Pol. iii. 14, 1285A. 35.
222. Thomson, op.cit., p.79.
223. G. Saintsbury, "A short History of English Literature, Ldn. 1898, pp.260 ff.
224. ibid, pp.265 and 269.
225. cf. Spenser, Faerie Queene, v. canto 2; Tempest, act.ii, Sc.1.
226. Timon of Athens, Act IV., Sc.III. "O blessed breeding sun" ff.
227. King Lear, Act IV. Sc. VI. "What art Mad?" ff. "And the creature run from the cur? ff.

CHAPTER III.

IRON AND THE ALPHABET.

The importance of iron for a study of Greek history lies essentially in the difference it made to the new urban civilisation just developing. It has already been stressed that many factors played a part in producing such a civilisation both in the Bronze Age and in the Early Iron Age, but, while emphasising this, it is the historians' task to detect what new features in such a civilisation made possible a real advance on former cultures of this sort. Iron and the alphabet have already been selected as two of these features, (v. sup., ch. ii), but the subject of iron in the ancient world has been so debated that its real significance has been obscured. In order to understand its importance, therefore, it is necessary first of all to clear away some confusion, caused by approaching the subject from too narrow an angle. The assumption most widely favoured by historians is that iron was a much superior metal to bronze, and that therefore people with iron swords were inevitably conquerors (1). However, some adopt the ^{contrary} argument that iron was neither too soft or too hard (without however any explanation given of why it should be so), and so practically useless for military and many other purposes (2).

More recently, metallurgists have entered the field against the archaeologists and, in correcting some glaring errors, such as the loose and sometimes quite erroneous use of technical terms, and ascribing to the ancients processes impossible for them (3), they have themselves, however, frequently added to the confusion by their own lack of archaeological knowledge (4). This controversy has obscured the real importance of iron to the ancient world, and for long there has been a need for an unbiased analysis of the subject which will make use of the work of both metallurgists and archaeologists.

Those who rashly assume the superiority of iron over bronze are not ^{only} unthinkingly talking in terms of the best modern steel but, in addition, are quite unaware of the uncertainty of obtaining good results even from modern steel making processes, unless the fullest use is made of the latest scientific resources. It is essential, therefore, to consider the sort of ^{above} results obtained from modern iron and steel working before arguing ^{about} ancient processes, since, otherwise, the assumption of the excellence of steel is applied to ancient iron. Pure iron may be ignored for our purpose since/

since it is seldom produced, and would be of little use if it were because of its extreme softness (5). Iron and steel are, strictly speaking, alloys and the various types depend mainly on the amount of carbon present. An increasing proportion of carbon gives wrought iron, steel, and cast iron (6). Pure iron has a very high melting point, 1532 deg. C., but the more carbon present the lower the melting point.

The metal iron can be obtained direct from iron ores by means of charcoal, that is, by smelting the ores in a charcoal fire at a moderate temperature (7). Iron and carbon do not combine at ordinary temperatures but, when heated to redness and higher, are rapidly affected. From this direct process some type of wrought iron will be produced in the shape of a spongy mass, which can then be hammered into the desired shape. In modern times a more complicated process is used, but the wrought iron it produces is essentially similar to that produced by the direct process. Wrought iron has a very low carbon and silicon content and, therefore, has a high melting point and great plasticity (8). For use on metal, however, it is too soft (9).

Cast iron has a greater carbon and silicon content than wrought iron (it may have as much as 5% carbon), and this is obtained by increasing the blast pressure and the proportion of charcoal. (10). To cast iron it is necessary to raise the temperature sufficiently high, not only to smelt the iron from the ore, but to liquefy it. Pure iron melts at 1532 deg. C., but the increase of carbon in producing cast iron reduces the melting point to about 1150 deg. C. (11). Because of the large quantities of massive graphite caused by the high carbon content, cast iron is a non-flexible material and breaks very easily (12).

The increased carbon and silicon necessary for cast iron were obtained in the Middle Ages when the furnace used for producing wrought iron was increased in height. In such a furnace the metal takes some time to descend, and passes, as it does so, through a zone which is very hot and very highly charged with carbon and carbon monoxide (13). The carbon is absorbed by the iron in this zone, a process which changes everything, for a highly carburised iron melts at only 1150 deg., and so liquid iron is produced and cast. The main ingredients of cast iron ~~are~~ iron, carbon and silicon. The hotter the furnace the more silicon will appear in the iron and the less glass like and brittle will it be (14). The higher the furnace the more carbon will the iron contain.

However, enormous variations in results are obtained in producing cast iron (15). In general, when the silicon content is relatively high, that is when the furnace has been hot, the carbon is almost entirely in the free graphitic state and the metal is almost black and very soft. On the other hand, when little silicon is present, the whole of the/

the carbon is in the combined state, Fe_3C , and the metal is white and almost glass-hard (16). There appears to be a certain ratio of combined to graphitic carbon which gives the maximum strength, and this ratio can be obtained if the silicon content can be controlled.

However, the rate of cooling is also an important factor. If the cooling of a casting is rapid, so much carbon may remain in the combined state that the metal is excessively hard and somewhat weak. If cooling is slow, every particle of carbon will appear as graphite and the casting will be soft, weak, and possibly porous (17). If there is a lot of silicon in the cooling metal, the two substances form graphite, and an iron-carbon-silicon solid solution, and large graphite flakes appear among the metallic crystals. If the silicon content is too high, and the rate of cooling prolonged, then additional graphite will form and the metal be very weak (18). On the other hand, if the cooling metal has little or no silicon, the resultant solid will be glass hard and brittle. In general, rapid cooling checks changes and tends to preserve the metal as it was when hot. Prolonged cooling facilitates further changes (19).

So far, apart from great variations and uncertainties of results, we have noticed that wrought iron tends to be too soft and cast iron too brittle for many purposes. In modern times methods of hardening wrought iron and softening cast iron have been evolved. If wrought iron is re-heated to redness in close contact with leather, bones, and other animal refuse from which the iron can absorb carbon, a thin coat of highly carburised iron forms on the outside. If this is heated to a hardening heat and then plunged into cold water, then a steel-like surface is imparted to the metal. This of course is only a thin layer of hard metal with soft iron inside. This process is called case-hardening (20). This, however, is not so satisfactory as it sounds, since the process is very uncertain, so much so, indeed, that workers will frequently apply the process only to certain parts of the tools so as to avoid cracking the whole tool. Cracking when quenching is the main weakness of this process (21).

As cast iron is non-flexible and brittle because of the large quantity of massive graphite due to the high carbon content, it is obviously necessary to reduce the quantity of carbon if a more malleable metal is required (22). To-day there are several methods of doing this (23). The brittle castings can be packed in ferric-oxide and heated for several days at a temperature of 800-900 deg.C., or the castings can be heated in sand at about 730 deg.C. (24). However, it is important to note that these malleable castings are still inferior/

inferior in ductility to wrought iron or mild steel, since the ferrite of malleable castings contains about ten times as much silicon in solution, the individual crystal grains are usually larger, and, in almost all cast metals, the crystalline cohesion is less than in metals which have been forged (25).

Both wrought and cast iron, therefore, have serious defects even when subjected to hardening or softening processes.

Steel is, in general, an iron with a high carbon content (.99% being about the saturation point) (26). It cannot, however, be made by stopping the modern (puddling) process of making wrought iron at the point when the carbon content is 1.0% instead of 0.1%, which is normal for wrought iron. This is impossible for a variety of reasons. The metal at this stage lacks plasticity and the high silicon content makes the metal of bad quality. Nor can steel be obtained from cast iron, since the result, malleable cast iron, is inferior to wrought iron (27). In fact, while wrought iron and mild steel pass into one another without a very distinct dividing line, structurally they are quite different (28).

Even the best of modern mild steels have many weaknesses, and, most important of all, the processes of obtaining them produce very uncertain results. Blister steel, for instance, can be produced under very primitive conditions - it can be produced by packing wrought iron in charcoal and leaving it for several days - but even under modern conditions results, even of one process, are very uncertain, while at best the steel has only the qualities of wrought iron (29). If this blister steel is then melted in a crucible and cast, crucible cast steel is obtained, but again results are very varied. By the process of fusing, (that is, melting wrought iron and cast iron in a crucible and casting it), crucible cast steel may again be obtained, but the process is unsatisfactory and the metal usually too hard, since the high temperature necessary to melt the cast iron means a high absorption of carbon. Another defect of crucible cast steel is its tendency to form bubbles, so that the metal is weak and fragile (30). Some of the best modern steel is produced by the Bessemer steel method, but even this gives uncertain results unless very great skill is exercised, and this is true of most steel processes (31). Even the best tool steel has many grades, and can be very fragile because of its increased carbon content. The low carbon steels, on the other hand, are not strong enough for working on metal (32).

Tempering, it should be stressed, is a process applicable only to high-carbon (that is tool, or best), steel. Moreover, tempering is not merely heating and quenching. It is a very prolonged process, involving first of all the process/

process known as "hardening" which involves heating the steel to a definite temperature and then rapidly cooling it by quenching it in some cool liquid. Rapid cooling alone will not harden steel. That depends on raising the steel first of all to the correct temperature. "Tempering" proper then consists in modifying or reducing this hardness of the steel by reheating the hardened steel to a temperature far short of that to which it was raised before hardening, and this heating may or may not be followed by rapid cooling. Hardening depends on the amount of carbon present. Between 0.2% and 1.0% of carbon the hardness caused by quenching from full red heat increases. Beyond that percentage, of course, the temperature necessary for the iron to absorb that amount of carbon will lead to the melting of the iron and so to cast iron (33). It is tempering proper which gives both the hardness and toughness characteristic of best modern steel.

However, the degree of hardness caused by tempering depends on the uniform quality of the steel, as well as on the tempering process itself, which involves finding the correct temperature for hardening, the cooling and re-heating. Accordingly, it is extraordinarily difficult to obtain accurate tempering and even the same piece of steel will exhibit varied results, which will probably only be revealed by actual use. Moreover, while the range of colours is a useful guide for the workman in reheating, its use is limited. While one colour will show the same temperature for the same quality of steel, the same colour will probably represent quite a different temperature for a different quality of steel. Colour, therefore, is no indication, to a workman, of hardness, since wrought and cast iron, if softened to the lowest degree, will exhibit all the colours on a polished surface if heated to the necessary temperature.

Very rapid cooling, by quenching in a cold medium, retains the metal structurally in the condition in which it was hot, and so the carbon remains in the state in which it was dissolved in the iron as carbide. During slow cooling this dissolved carbide can separate itself from the iron, so as to assume the form in which it occurs in mild steel; and the metal is accordingly soft. Silicon, however, accelerates changes in the metal instead of checking them, in increasing degree in proportion to the amount present. It is the presence of carbon in the iron, which makes hardening possible by quenching in water from a full red heat. This explains why wrought iron and mild steel cannot be tempered,, since tempering depends on the initial hardening and this on the carbon content. If wrought iron and mild steel are heated to redness and quenched in cold water, no change takes place in the wrought iron and only a slight hardening in the mild steel. It is exceedingly difficult to produce even this amount of hardening in mild steel and also/

also to obtain a uniform grade of mild steel, both of which are necessary for tempering. Quenching in cold water usually produces cracks to such a degree that many workers only quench parts of the tools to be hardened; and so tepid water, oil or milk are preferred as quenching media (34).

Forging, that is, heating the metal to make it malleable and then hammering it into the required shape, may help to improve the metal by welding cracks together, especially if heated to white heat and then hammered to red and black. Here too, however, there are difficulties, such as the danger of overheating and overworking the metal and a lack of proportion in both. In fact, the metal can be damaged by too much hammering. It should be noted, too, that malleable cast iron cannot be worked when heated, although it may be hammered to a certain extent when cold. A very small percentage of sulphur will make iron unsuited to hammering at red heat. It may then be treated when cold but tends to become brittle (35).

To sum up, iron possess a great variety of weaknesses, while iron and steel processes are characterised even in modern times with uncertainties in results. When the results of all the manifold operations involved in producing good steel are successful in every detail, then an excellent metal is produced. The capacity of steel to cut is due especially to the temper, while the durability of the cutting edge is due to the quality of the steel. But even tool steel has many grades, and even if tempered may be fragile if its contains as much as 1.5% of carbon. Not only does tempering depend on the quality of the steel, itself uncertain, but the tempering process also produces varied results. The low carbon steels and wrought iron cannot be tempered, and are in any case unsuited for working on metals. They may be case hardened, but this leads to cracking and in any case has a limited use, since, once the original hard cutting edge has been blunted, only soft iron remains underneath. Cast iron is too hard and brittle for many uses, and malleable cast iron is inferior in many respects to wrought iron (36).

It is clear, then, that iron is an exceedingly difficult metal to handle, and results are always uncertain. Its importance to the modern world is that it is used where wood, brick or stone were formerly used, and is cheaper or more suitable for many purposes. In addition, it is useful for many new purposes such as machines. It is more valuable to the modern world than most other metals because it is available in large quantities in many localities, and is therefore cheap, and because it can be adapted to so many different types of purposes. It is not superior because it is always stronger than/

than other metals. Certainly the very best steel made by modern processes is both strong and tough when tempered, and is therefore used for special purposes, but this is not true of iron and mild steels.

If weakness and uncertainty characterise modern iron working, it is almost inevitable that these should have been even greater problems in the ancient world. Since it is around the question of iron and metal working in ancient times that most of the confusion has arisen it is necessary to consider the whole question in the light of our account of modern iron working. Read has made the interesting suggestion (37) that smelting was not first discovered by man accidentally as a result of the action of the domestic fire, as is sometimes assumed or argued (38). He argues that the melting of metal was in existence thousands of years before smelting was discovered. Native metal, that is in its metallic state and not in an ore, is still practically our only source of gold. This was almost certainly true in ancient times too and so early man had only to melt it in order to make ornaments (39). Smelting, Read argues, would then be the result of experiments in melting, in an attempt to obtain other materials for ornaments to supplement the rare gold. This seems plausible when it is remembered that copper ores, the first to be smelted on a considerable scale, are bright blue and therefore likely to attract men looking for material for ornaments. Read is of the opinion that men tried to melt small lumps of native copper without trying to separate it from adhering minerals. The workman would see that the final cake seemed to have more copper than appeared in the original material, and that the adhering mineral had changed during the melting. He would therefore experiment on the mineral and occasionally might obtain metal from it.

This discovery, Read thinks, was probably made in different places independently. After this, experiments with other minerals would be made and lead and tin, both capable of melting at low temperatures, would be obtained. Copper-tin ores are not only the mixture most easily handled, but also produce best results, so the production of bronze was a natural development. At first naturally mixed copper-tin ores were probably used, and later they could be deliberately smelted together or fused, (that is melted), together. In the true Bronze Age the deliberate fusing together was the usual method, and then, later still, the metals may have been separately smelted and mixed in remelting (40). The furnace used was probably similar to that used in the last century in Japan. This consisted of a hollow in the ground with a dry clay lining. Alternate layers of charcoal and copper ore were laid in the hole and bellows applied to a blast pipe. The ore was reduced, the charcoal consumed, and, when the unburnt charcoal and slag had been raked out, molten copper was left. The/

The metal was solidified in thin layers by sprinkling with water and then plunged into cold water. The pieces were then broken up for remelting (41).

Some metallurgists have argued that iron working must have preceded copper and bronze working, either because of the prevalence of iron ores, or because iron working, they argue, if it had been subsequent to copper and bronze, would have used similar methods; while in fact iron working has quite a different technique (42). The archaeological evidence, accumulated since many of these metallurgists wrote and ignored by the modern ones, points conclusively to a copper and/or bronze age before the iron age proper began (43). Certainly a few scattered iron objects appear long before the real iron age did begin, but many of these were made from lumps of magnetic iron picked up by chance. The fact that they were used as a rule for ornamental work proves that the metal was rare and therefore regarded as precious (44). Jevon's argument (45) that iron rings do not indicate that the metal is rare because in Pliny's and Aristotle's time iron rings were cheap, is based on a false premiss. Since iron rings appear in graves it is clear that they were chosen as precious ornaments. Their appearance in quantities at a low price in later centuries is no better argument against their rarity in earlier times than is the cheapness to-day of such articles as window glass and knives and forks. It is significant that when bronze became scarce and iron more common, bronze ornaments were placed in the graves beside some iron weapons (46). Even the famous sword from the tomb of Tutankhamen is clearly not of a regulation type issued to the army as a whole, although arguments have been made on the basis of its presence for an iron age in Egypt at this period. The fact that it was fitted with a crystal and gold-worked hilt and that it was placed beside a gold sword, argues that it was a luxury possession (47).

If it is admitted that melting, not smelting, was the original process in prehistoric times, then this would be a partial explanation of the appearance of copper working before iron working, because iron, having a much higher melting point than copper - 1532 deg. C. for iron, 1084 deg. C. for copper - would require a bigger furnace and increased air pressure. Even if smelting did occur first, the difficulties of reducing iron ores would have precluded the use of iron on a large scale until lack of other metals made an increased use of it essential, and forced the smiths to apply their knowledge of metal working to overcoming the difficulties involved. The process of direct reduction of iron from its ores may be a complete failure, and, even if not, to produce really useable iron from its ores is an extremely difficult process (48). To produce copper or lead from their ores, all that is necessary is a mixture of sulphide and oxide minerals which are commonly found associated, and heat./

heat. Heat alone applied to these ores is sufficient. With iron the process is quite different. Iron oxides are common and iron can be smelted (not fused), in the presence of carbon at a temperature lower than that necessary to melt copper or gold, but no amount of heat alone will reduce a mixture of iron oxide and iron sulphide to useable metal. Indeed, a natural mixture of iron sulphide and iron oxide is much less common than a natural mixture of sulphide and oxide ores of copper or lead, while iron sulphide makes the metal so brittle that useable metal could not be produced this way. To produce useable iron only iron oxide should be used along with both heat and carbon, the latter performing an essential chemical function which it did not do with copper. Without sufficient carbon and heat the metal simply re-oxidises again. A spongy mass of iron may be produced from the smelting, but if exposed to air and water it quickly reverts to oxide. In fact, the "control of carbon in iron is a complicated and baffling matter", and until this was learned empirically continual failures would be the result (49). By hammering, the mass of spongy metal could be compacted, but it was probably a long time before this technique was discovered. Meanwhile, copper ores provided a more easily acquired metal and so iron was neglected until later times. The discovery of a piece of iron, apparently worked, from Tell-Amar in Mesopotamia about 3400 to 2850 B.C., suggests that the metal had already been found unsatisfactory and abandoned (50).

It was almost certainly the increased difficulties of obtaining copper and tin, that hastened the use of iron. Tin had to be imported from long distances and so required settled conditions and ordered governments. During the upheavals of the "Peoples of the Sea" communications were more and more disrupted and governments were unable to obtain metals by peaceful exchange. It became necessary to use local resources, and iron, which was already in use in some places, gradually became the most commonly used metal, the knowledge of iron working being spread by the movements of peoples. The fact that iron was used as a substitute for bronze at this time is borne out by the fact that many early iron swords were copies of bronze ones (51). As iron was more and more used, eventually it was possible to say that the Iron Age proper had begun.

It seems almost certain that there were two quite distinct trends in iron working before the Iron Age proper began. Bronze users who had been forced to eke out their supplies of metal by using iron, would naturally first of all apply the technique of bronze working to iron in a bronze furnace. This process, of course, involved melting the metal and, where successful, would produce cast iron (v.sup.). Practically all metallurgists (52) argue that cast iron was not discovered until the middle ages, when the increased height of the furnace made it possible for the iron to absorb more carbon and so reduce the melting point of iron from
1532/

1532 deg. C. to 1150 deg. C. (53). What metallurgists ignore, however (54), is the fact that bronze in ancient times was made as a rule in two stages. The metals were smelted and allowed to cool. Later they were remelted in crucibles and then poured into moulds (55). Now if iron was smelted, wrought iron with a varying percentage of carbon would be produced. If this were then melted, (the reheating would help to add to the carbon content if this were low (56)), the melting point would be about 1150 deg.C., which is not much above the melting point of gold (57).

Cast iron, we have seen, although a useful metal for some purposes, is too hard and brittle for general use; and in ancient times it would probably be even more unsatisfactory. It is the silicon content which affects the proportions of combined carbon^{and} graphite and this proportion affects the finished castings. A low silicon content would make the metal white and glass hard and therefore quite unusable. But the silicon content depends on a high furnace and great heat, and a bronze furnace would be too shallow and too cool to produce a high proportion of silicon. Early attempt at casting iron, therefore, were probably abandoned quite soon. The results of the Persian crucible process, which aimed at producing cast mild steel, were also uncertain. This process, too, is difficult enough and unfruitful enough to have been abandoned by most early metal workers (58). In addition, the Japanese method of making bronze, which is said to be that of the ancients (v.sup.), includes plunging the castings into cold water, and if this were done with cast iron it would intensify the hardness by preserving the structure of the metal when cast (v.sup.). However, occasionally usable cast iron may have been produced, which would be suitable for working on wood, although not on metals (59). In later times cast iron was produced probably by accident, but was little used because of the brittle quality mentioned by Pliny (60).

On the other hand, the production of wrought iron by the direct process - that is, directly from the ore producing a bloom or lump of malleable iron (61) - is so entirely different from the bronze process that it must have had an independent origin. People unhampered by different metallurgical traditions and living in a place possessing easily worked iron ores, might develop the new methods (62). Again, the break up period of the People of the Sea, when old civilisations were collapsing and barbarian tribes coming in contact with cultured peoples, must have led to changes in ways of living and to the spreading of odd scraps of knowledge, which helped to solve the new problems created by changed conditions. It is almost certain that the new methods of iron working originated among non-bronze users, and a possible explanation of their discovery can be suggested. Early attempts at smelting iron were probably unsuccessful as we have seen. However, /

However, if the iron ore is heated to redness in close contact with leather, bones and other animal refuse (v.sup.), then the necessary carbon might be imparted to the iron and a reasonably hard metal produced. The technique of hammering and forging would gradually be acquired by experience later. It seems likely that this happened by accident. Some iron may have been left in the fire accidentally, with the sort of refuse that might be expected to accumulate around the domestic fire. Production of wrought iron by the direct process as carried out in Japan in the last century (63), gives an iron of low carbon content, which is therefore rather soft and not at all like steel. However, when the process is carried on over a period of days some mild steel may occasionally be found amongst the wrought iron. If this were then heated to a hardening heat and then quickly cooled, the metal would be case hardened (v.sup.), and eventually Greek iron workers no doubt acquired this technique (v.sub.). This, of course, it must again be emphasised, would not be tempered steel but only wrought iron or mild steel with a hardened layer on the outside; and this is frequently too hard and weakened by crystalline formations, while even slight surface scratching will develop into cracks as a result of quenching, and then into cracks in the core (v.sup.). While tempering of a good steel will produce a metal which is both hard and tough, case-hardening only produces a thin layer of hardness which, when blunted, is practically useless because of the softer metal inside. In ancient times men had to choose between hardness and toughness (64).

It is clear that, although cast iron was probably produced for a time by former bronze workers, eventually the other method displaced it. The limitations of cast iron would make it impossible for use for weapons of war, since it would so readily break; and it is, in any case, unsuited for use on metal. Since the demand for metal at this time was especially for weapons, in a period of raids and almost continual warfare, it is clear that this method would soon be abandoned. Moreover, the movements of this period would also facilitate the spread of the other method of iron working, which probably had its origin in North-west Asia Minor (65).

In Homer, iron is used for tools and bronze for weapons and that this is a transitional period is further emphasised by the evidence that iron was still occasionally regarded as semi-precious (66). It is significant that it is the Trojans who are the real masters of the new metal, while the Achaeans only make use of it after plundering Asiatic towns (67). The references to iron in Homer suggest that both cast iron and wrought iron had been known fairly recently. The fact that iron is used so often as a metaphor for hardness (68), definitely suggests cast iron rather than wrought iron. On the other hand, the description of a mass of iron/

iron providing agricultural tools for five years rather suggests wrought iron, unless the mass referred to was iron ore, which could then be treated by either method. Certainly, the adjective "autochoōnos", suggests that it was still part of the earth and had not yet been worked, and it has also been suggested that this mass was a small meteorite (69). The description of quenching in cold water could apply either to the cooling of a cast iron sword as in the Japanese method of cooling bronze (v.sup.), or it could be applied to the partial case hardening of a wrought iron sword. The insistence that it was the quenching process which made the metal hard does suggest that it was part of a process of case hardening, since bronze is less hard if plunged in cold water than if slowly cooled (70). The adjective "much worked" on the other hand, definitely suggests the hammering of wrought iron rather than the casting of iron into moulds. Again, however, it could refer to the enormous amount of labour involved in producing even a small amount of metal by the direct process (v.sup.). The adjectives "dark" and "grey" also suggest wrought iron (v.sup.) but "gleaming" seems to indicate a harder, polished metal (71). The case-hardening process, it will be remembered, is not tempering. The "temper colours" do not necessarily indicate tempering process (v.sup.), but, in any case, Homer never described them. It is inconceivable that he should not have described such a vivid process had he known of it.

There is no positive evidence about the weapons and metallic resources of the Dorians (72), but, in Homer, there are two references to iron in places probably inhabited by the Dorians at that time (73). By the time of Hesiod the wrought iron process was well established, and the distinction drawn between melting tin by the crucible process and smelting iron in the fire (74). The smith was practically a full time worker in the village and the technique of forging and hammering was already acquired. We have no evidence from Hesiod that the process of case-hardening was known, but as this would be used especially for swords, it is not surprising that it does not appear in an agricultural poem.

In classical Greece the open hearth process, that is the production of wrought iron by the direct process, was the one always in use (75); and welding of iron was said to have been discovered by Glaucus the Chian (76), although the welding of bronze had been known long before. It is clear that difficulties involved in producing iron and especially in producing it of consistent quality were, as we should expect, experienced by the Greek metal workers. Two iron clamps of Pericles' time were found on analysis to be not only poorly made, but to be of inconsistently poor quality (77).

In the Roman Republic and Empire the wrought iron process was used. This can easily be deduced, apart from other evidence, /

evidence, from the high percentage of carbon left in the old Roman slag heaps in Britain (78). Again there is direct evidence of the uncertainties and variations in results obtained not only because of the difficulties of the process itself, but because of the types of ore used. The exceedingly soft iron swords described by Polybius (79) belonged to Celtic tribes who inhabited a district where the iron ores were of very poor quality, while the tribes who opposed Caesar's conquest of Gaul were all near the best iron ores of Western Europe (80). The best ore for direct reduction of iron is Spathic (FeCO_2) ore, since it belongs to the iron carbonate group. This is not found in West Asia but appears in parts of Europe (81).

Pliny stresses the variety of quality in iron ores and the uncertain results of iron working, and emphasise that decarburisation and the loss of a cutting edge were the greatest problems for the iron worker (82). This illustrates clearly that at best it was only a case-hardening process on wrought iron that had been acquired, while more often, owing to poor ores and uncertainties of results, the wrought iron was too low in carbon to be capable even of the surface hardening involved in the case-hardening process. Rome, however, imported good swords from India and Parthia. Indians produced crucible cast steel, but this was only possible because they used magnetite ore and carbonaceous plant leaves, allied to a capable technique of rolling, forging and case-hardening (83). However with normal material, that is, wrought iron and charcoal, results of this process too were unsatisfactory. Its yields were meagre for a great deal of labour, and results were uncertain (84). This was the method used in Persia, and is probably similar to the process ascribed by Aristotle to the Chalybes (85). The Chalybes, like the Indians, had the advantage of magnetite ore which will produce good steel (86). It is significant that Aristotle stresses that it was unlike any other method.

In later Roman times small blast furnaces appeared in the Rhine, in the Jura, and still earlier in Transylvania. They were smaller than those furnaces of the middle ages which finally proceed a cheap cast iron, but were probably capable of producing some cast iron if required (87). However, there was probably no demand for new metals. Wrought iron was used for agricultural tools, arrowheads, daggers, spear points, and for many building jobs (88). Bronze, however, a hard and comparatively tough metal and capable of withstanding the attack of metal as neither wrought nor cast iron could do, was still used for helmets, breastplates, coats of mail, and greaves (89).

From the evidence, then, of both modern iron working and that of ancient times, it is clear that the main characteristics of iron processes are uncertainty of results in general, and variety of results of even a single process; and/

and these were probably even more characteristic of ancient times than modern, since the direct process was the prevalent one and this was especially uncertain in its results. Even the semi-fused mass obtained from the higher furnaces of Europe gave uncertain results, and had to be cleared of the slag impregnated in the mass of metal before the latter was forgeable (90). This helps to explain why bronze users were reluctant to adopt such an unreliable metal to arm their troops, quite apart from conservatism. It explains, too, why bronze was used for so much armour throughout the Iron Age. On the other hand, very occasionally, and more often if conditions were suitable, as in India, the usual weaknesses were overcome and a piece of fairly high grade steel might be produced, which, when well worked and case-hardened, would produce a formidable sword. Such a sword would become almost a legend, and would spread the fame of the possibilities of the new metal, so that artisans would try, usually in vain, to repeat the result. The legend of Excalibur is precisely of the type which would grow around such a sword. However, the continual failure to reproduce such excellent results would militate against the attractions of the metal. Metal workers in the Bronze Age had probably discovered the proportions for tin and copper necessary to make the best possible bronze (91), but this was a question of experiment in adding quantities. The control of carbon, on the other hand, was a process of extraction from the charcoal. A certain amount of experience of handling charcoal might be acquired, but this at best could only be a rough guide, while the silicon content, the result of the furnace temperature, was just as important as the carbon content. The letter of Hattusil III (1287 B.C.) to Ramses II, replying to the latter's request for 'pure iron', shows clearly that the properties of iron were not understood. It is not expected, of course, that the ancients understood the properties of iron and so knew that pure iron was of no practical use (v.sup.), but the use of the word 'pure' does show, not only ignorance of composition, but also knowledge that the metal had great varieties of quality. There was no point in emphasising the quality, implied in the word 'pure', if results were always reliable. No doubt Ramses had in mind one of those fine swords that antiquity probably did occasionally produce by accident, and which any king would therefore covet. Another evidence of the ignorance of iron processes shown by the ancients comes from Pliny's explanation of the difficulties and uncertainties of results, which he considered to be mainly due to the type of water in which the iron was quenched (92). It is true that tepid water or oil is less likely to cause cracking than cold water (v.sup.), but this again is only a small part of the whole process. Yet by Pliny's time iron working was very widespread.

It is clear that the importance of iron was not its superiority to other metals, and it was absolutely essential to/

to prove this conclusively before its real value could be appreciated. Its fundamental importance lay in the fact that, for the first time, metal was available in considerable quantities without the necessity for long, laborious and expensive transport. The weaknesses of iron would not matter so much when it was to be used for work on materials softer than metal. It would replace wood and other materials, including other metals where possible. Even to the modern world the importance of iron was that it was so much cheaper than most metals and more efficient than wood and other materials for many purposes. At this time, too, its weakness and the uncertainties of results prevented its widespread use for some time, and till Elizabethan times bronze was still preferred for cannon barrels. Even the importance of the high furnace of the Middle Ages was that it could produce cast iron really cheaply for the first time (93). Metallurgists point to the small quantities of metal produced by the direct process and the large amount of labour and fuel employed, and argue that the process was expensive for the ancients (94). This, however, is again due to ignorance of ancient conditions. They base their argument on modern ideas of wages, transport, and production for profit in the market. In ancient times labour was comparatively cheap; in early Greece a slave might work metal on his lord's estate or a free artisan might work the lord's metal in return for food and perhaps clothing. Moreover, manufacture for profit was not an incentive at so early a period. If metal was needed and iron was the only one available, iron would be used. Later, with settled conditions, bronze would again be available, but by then iron would be well established and used for everything except armour. In the Bronze Age copper and tin had frequently travelled long distances. Even in the Iron Age, therefore, bronze was still costly, because in ancient times transport was by far the most expensive item in a commodity (95). As in modern times, the advantage of iron was that it could be obtained locally, or at least reasonably near at hand, in large quantities, and since charcoal, too, could be found locally, iron could be produced cheaply. The labour of producing it at such a period would not add much to the cost.

As in modern times, too, it became possible for metal to replace wood and other materials for agricultural tools and other purposes, such as carpentry and building. As a result, productive processes were improved in many ways. Even in Homer it is pointed out that a local store of iron will avoid the waste of time involved in going to town (96). Presumably in this case there was a workshop on the estate. Axes for carpentry were made of iron (although battle axes were still made of bronze), and were therefore available to the small peasant for clearing land. In Hesiod sickles and other agricultural tools were made of iron. Once the technique/

technique was acquired & as long as iron was available, any peasant could have tools made for him and might even make rough tools for himself. In addition, iron could be used for weapons where possible, for instance for arrowheads which are easily lost. This again presupposes easily acquired supplies of metal (97).

It is not true, therefore, that people with iron swords were victorious because they possessed a superior metal. People who talk like that are thinking of the best grade modern steel. An occasional sword might be of high quality but it would be an exception. What is important is that large supplies of iron could make it possible for a community to arm the whole people at a time when bronze was scarce. So the Dorians, whose tribal organisation probably did not preclude the arming of all their people, attacked the Achaeans, who were only a small armed ruling class, ruling over a population which was largely unarmed and agricultural. More important still of course, Achaean power and Mycenaean civilisation was already very weakened and disintegrated. The new military technique, employed with a sword which had a cutting edge, might also have possessed some advantage, since the cutting edge of an iron sword, though often blunted in ancient times (cf. Pliny) could be remade. A bronze cast sword on the other hand was probably more suitable for thrusting than the new technique of slashing (98).

The Romans, too, had huge supplies of iron throughout the empire and so, from local supplies, could equip armies with swords, and estates with agricultural tools, quite cheaply. Bronze, however, was still essential for armour.

However, without conditions to use it, iron, like the first steam engine, could not produce any real effect. Sparta's development proved that. (v. sub. Ch. VI). It is worth noting that Egypt, since she had a large supply of labour power, did not develop the use of the wheel or use much metal (99); so conditions had to be suitable for the use of iron and these conditions were the development of trade and manufactures and of agriculture for sale which, with the help of iron and the alphabet, eventually produced the tyrannies. It is true, of course, that iron, by facilitating land clearance and enclosures, stimulated the general economic trend which led to colonies and trade. It was, however, the revival of trade with its results in intensified agriculture and industry, that made the full use of iron possible. During this process large numbers of poor landless and workless were drawn into the new economic and social life, and so profoundly affected the new state which was coming into being. Burn (100) turns the argument on its head. He regards iron as the means of arming a large number of the population, and believes it was this which created/

created the middle class. But the middle class was already being formed by the general economic and social changes of which iron was one part. The arming of large numbers of the population was part of the process of creating a democracy and a result of the urban revival, but not in itself a cause of democracy. Iron made it possible for the new middle class to become really predominant, not only by providing it with arms but also, as a result of increasing productivity, by raising the standard of living, and providing more leisure, and by drawing more people into the new life and, therefore, into support of the middle class.

Instead of a mass of labourers, who were virtually slaves or serfs, and a small ruling class as in the Bronze Age, increased productivity in agriculture released more citizens for trade and industry, while the improvement in all productive processes raised considerably the standard of living and general wealth of the community. As in Asia earlier (v. sup., ch. ii), more goods were produced at less cost and in less time, and so wealth and leisure could increase, both of which were pre-requisites for a civilised democracy. Industry was then further stimulated by cheap tools and cheap products, improved vehicles and ships, and by the increase of agricultural products for the market, made possible as a result of improved agricultural technique. This led to still further division of labour, to a demand for more artisans, and so to more opportunities for the population. That meant more leisure for the citizens, and so the possibility of establishing democratic republics in which citizens took a real part in public life.

Larger supplies of metal also made possible heavily armed infantrymen, who represented the new middle class, in contrast to the individual charioteer of the heroic age and the cavalry of aristocratic times. The new citizen armies were a formidable defence of the new republics (101). In addition, local supplies of metal made small states possible, unlike the Bronze Age states which had to organise long distance trade (102). Concentration of wealth had been an essential backing to this trade. Iron, however, not only created more wealth by increased productivity in industry and agriculture, but, since long distance trade was unnecessary, made it possible for that wealth to be spread over a much greater part of the community.

The extensive influence of iron into all parts of the economy and the rapid rise in productivity eventually transformed the social groupings of the community by the changes of professions and by the rapid enrichment of some and the impoverishment of others. In the Bronze Age the economic and cultural florescence following on the urban revolution soon relapsed into stagnancy. In the Greek trading states, however, so many of the population had been affected/

affected by the new life as a result of the influence, probably unrecognised, of iron on the economy, that the new people involved in trade, industry and agriculture for the market were powerful enough to demand more and more social and political privileges, until, finally, under the tyrants, they laid the basis for a new type of state, which carried civilised culture not merely to new heights but, something new in history, to new depths in the social strata.

The alphabet, too, contributed to the mobilisation of new social forces in early Greece, once the urban revival made its full use possible. Like iron, the alphabet was invented fairly early (103) but also, like iron, it awaited favourable conditions before its effects could be realised. Its importance, however, has been obscured by the concentration of discussion around the date of its introduction to Greece.

Some years ago Carpenter (104) argued that about 700 B.C. was the earliest date possible for the adoption of the alphabet in Greece. His main argument was that the evidence from Semitic sources suggests the close of the eighth century as the period when the earliest surviving examples of the Greek alphabet are most similar to the Semitic one. As additional arguments he points to the lateness of any examples of the Greek alphabet, the earliest, he maintains, being on a Dipylon vase which he dates to the first quarter of the seventh century; he points, too, to the lateness of written laws among the Athenians and Locrians and the lateness of lists of archons and kings at Athens, Argos and Sparta.

However, Ullman (105), quoting different authorities, challenges Carpenter's view that the late eighth century is the period when the Semitic alphabet is most like the earliest known Greek examples and, whereas Carpenter argues that there was a considerable amount of change in the Semitic alphabet over a long period, Ullman argues there was very little change. In fact, Ullman on his evidence, argues that the thirteenth and following centuries was the period when the script was most like the Greek. On the other hand, Buck (106) thinks that the ninth century was more plausible than the thirteenth. Where experts can be quoted to prove different dates, and especially where they are used to prove preconceived theories, it is impossible, without a thorough knowledge of the semitic sources, to judge between them. It can only be pointed out that the evidence is inconclusive.

The discovery of some inscribed protocorinthian sherds dated to 750-700 B.C. (107), and of some inscribed geometric Hymettus pots, Dipylon jugs and sherds from Thera (108), all suggests that Carpenter's date is too late. In addition, some attempt has been made to date geometric pottery, including the Dipylon vase quoted by Carpenter, rather earlier (109)/

(109), although it is admitted that the inscription on the vase may have been added some time after the vase was made (110).

However, the argument that the alphabet was used in everyday life on perishable material before it appeared on monuments, or stone of some sort (111), does not seem very plausible. The technique of inscribing the new symbols would not be readily acquired by everyone, and would tend to be used at first for special occasions on prominent and permanent places. In general, Carpenter has made the mistake of linking the arrival of the alphabet in Greece too closely with the appearance of the Phoenicians in the Mediterranean especially as he adopted the extreme view of dating their appearance as late as 700 B.C. (v.sup., ch. ii). There is no evidence that the alphabet was actually brought to Greece by the Phoenicians, and indeed it has even been argued that the Greek alphabet did not come from the Phoenician one, but that both came from a common source (112). On the whole, the general tendency of semitic scholars and archaeologists is to force the date of adoption of the alphabet in Greece rather further back than the eighth century (113).

However early the alphabet was introduced to Greece, and the early fourteenth century has actually been suggested (114) it could not fully be employed until conditions really needed it. This does not at all mean that the Greeks suddenly came in contact with the new alphabet, saw its advantages and therefore adopted it! (115). Man, it has been stressed already, is a very conservative creature and only adopts new methods and inventions when they are forced upon him. Just as the Bronze Age urban revolution had demanded some sort of writing and accountancy, so, during the Greek urban revolution, the new script would be found useful. It was also the beginnings of the economic crisis in the countryside which provoked the demand for written laws so as to evade irresponsible judgments by the nobles, who were also large landowners (116). This is a usual demand at such periods when an agricultural, self-sufficient community is beginning to suffer from the growth of trade (v.sub., ch. iv), and so the appearance of written laws at this time does not necessarily mean that the alphabet had only just been discovered, as Carpenter implies. The example of the steam engine and any number of inventions could again be quoted. In the same way, it was only when the organisation of the trading cities into centralised states was well established, that the new needs of the unified nations demanded regular state records.

The importance of speech in setting men apart from other animals (v.sup., ch. i) needs no further stressing, but some languages were to prove better vehicles for men's thoughts/

thoughts than others. The Aryan languages were a much more flexible and exact medium than any other hitherto evolved, and, as a result, of the mentality they generated, were of the greatest advantage to the people who used them(117). The simple alphabetic script, however, was such an enormous advance on the Bronze Age scripts that its adoption and use created a great gulf between Bronze Age life and that of later peoples. In the Bronze Age scripts each symbol or picture represented an actual object and, if we can only soak ourselves sufficiently in the atmosphere created by such an attitude, we soon realise that, until a simple alphabetic script was created, thought could never be dissociated from the concrete. Language is spoken thought, but, so long as the language is tied to concrete symbols, thought is bound to material facts. Man's thoughts could not soar into the realm of ideas. Even the numerical calculations of the Bronze Age were bound up with actual concrete things. Two and two did not make four in the Bronze Age; two jars of wine and two jars of wine made four jars of wine.

Moreover, the symbol of a thing was the thing. This explains why Ikhnaton erased all the names of the god Amon. It was not the result of anything so subtle as vindictiveness or hope that the people would thereby forget the god. It was quite simply a necessity. By destroying the name he destroyed the god. To leave his name would be to allow the god to continue to exist. Clearly, under such conditions, magic rather than rational thought prevailed. On all sides man was bound by the limitations of such beliefs. Pictures of the clove hitch and reef knot appear in Egyptian script, but they are never tied, since that would be a binding spell (118).

With the new alphabet a single symbol did not represent a thing but a letter. Words were made up of several letters, and so, eventually, words would be made to represent ideas as well as concrete things. To kalon was the regular Greek word for beauty long before kallos was used in an abstract sense. For the first time man could think abstractly and theoretically, since the medium of his thought could advance beyond the realm of concrete things. Mathematics was no longer tied to definite practical problems but became a real science, playing a vital part, not only in solving new problems of the day, but also in creating possibilities for future advance. In the Bronze Age practical knowledge about stars was useful for agriculture, but now real thought about the universe and man's place in it became possible. Philosophy had come into being. Since the alphabet could be learned easily and quickly, and since it did not form a barrier to the understanding of ideas expressed by it, many people were able to contribute to scientific and philosophic thought. The great florescence of such sciences in Greece is not, therefore, unexpected.

When/

When the great gulf fixed between the magical outlook of the Bronze Age and the new methods of thought made possible by the alphabet is appreciated, it is clear why the Greeks enjoy the distinction of being the first to think abstractly and theoretically. The urban revival made necessary the full use of the new alphabet and by its use a great revolution in man's thought gradually took place. Ideas and abstractions became as real to man as concrete objects, and the full realisation of this had an intoxicating effects on men's minds. The idea of numbers, as such, was so startling that Pythagoras made then the basis of his universe. Clearly, too, Plato's theory of ideas owed much to the new script. Alethia, while used in Homer as a concrete thing, the opposite of alie, in Plato's hands acquired a far wider significance.

In addition, the alphabet, like iron, made possible a more democratic basis for society. In the Bronze Age scripts had been too complicated for any but a small class of priests and officials to master; and, indeed, it frequently happened that even the scribes understood so little of what they were copying, that one of them in the nineteenth dynasty copied an entire chapter backwards, without apparently discovering his mistake (119). Clearly literacy was a life's work and the possession of literacy by such a small class had given that class an enormous power.

The alphabet, however, made it possible for every citizen to understand official documents and proclamations. Citizens could then demand the writing and, therefore, stabilising of laws and take an active interest in their interpretation. With a literate citizenry the ordinary business of life could be considerably simplified and every citizen could take an active part in public life. It is significant that backward countries, which have in modern times initiated a progressive, democratic policy - countries such as Turkey and parts of China - made the adoption of a simple alphabet one of their first tasks. The increased standard of living and hopes of a greater leisure, made possible by iron, gave citizens the material conditions essential for participation in public life. Literacy gave them a weapon, which secured them against deception by officials, and created for them the basis for demands for further rights and privileges. Both processes made an extension of democracy almost inevitable. In short, once the urban revolution, which made possible the full use of iron and the alphabet, was itself intensified and extended by their influence, the basis was laid for a great step forward in man's history (120).

NOTES TO CHAPTER III.

1. cf. Renard, *op.cit.*, p.72; Hogarth, *Ionia and the East*, p.112, *Hall. Civ. Greece in B.A.*, p.253; cf. p.264, where he argues that the Dorians conquered the Achaeans because they had iron swords, although on the same page he has to admit that the Achaeans conquered with bronze swords; Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria*, p.156, refers to the iron sword as the most formidable weapon yet invented, and seems to refer more to the metal than the shape. Ridgeway, *op.cit.*, i. p.305, even argues that when the Phaeacians gave Odysseus a sword of bronze it should have been of iron because this was the superior metal. He therefore argues that the Phaeacians must have been too poor to give him an iron sword! Cf. Also Moret et Davy, *op.cit.*, pp.385-6.
2. cf. Lang, *Homer and his Age*, pp. 188-9, who thinks iron was too soft for military purposes. Bérard, *les Phéniciens et l'odyssée* i pp. 435 ff., is of the opinion that the production of iron was not well understood and so men preferred to trust their lives to bronze.
3. Nilsson, *op.cit.*, p.140, quotes *Od. ix. 392* as a description of tempering, although this was unknown to the ancients, v.sub.; Bérard, *op.cit.*, i. p. 435, talks of the rustic method of iron production making the metal too hard. The rustic method was almost certainly direct process, and this tended to produce a soft iron, v.sub. Lang, *op.cit.*, p.180, calls quenching tempering. Leaf, *Il. vi. 48*, assumes that primitive smelting would have too much carbon, and that pure iron was a good metal. Cf. Read, *A.J.A. xxxiv. p.382*, on archaeologists ascribing processes to ancients impossible for them. S.E. Wihbolt, *Britain B.C. (Pelican 1943) p.130*, interprets tempering as merely cooling. cf. Gowland, *Archaeologia LVI, p.303*, for the argument that some archaeologists are quite ignorant of the methods of iron reduction. cf. Read, *A.J.A. xxxiv., pp. 382 ff.* A. Hertz, *A.J.A. XLI, pp. 441*, talks of "melting iron from its ores" although the context shows "smelting" is meant.
4. Swank, *The History of the manufacture of iron in all ages*, pp. 1 ff., shows a need for some archaeological knowledge.
5. Hasluck, *Mechanic's Workshop Handybook*, p.3.
6. Hasluck, *ibid.*; Roberts-Austen, *An Introduction to the Study of Metallurgy*, p.144.
7. Gordon, *Elementary Metallurgy for Engineers*, pp. 23 ff., 48.
- 8./

8. Gordon, op.cit., p. 52.
9. Gordon, op.cit., p.57.
10. Hasluck, op.cit., p.4; Gordon, op.cit., p.23.; Gowland, Archaeologia, lvi. (1899). p.308.
11. Gordon, op.cit., pp. 24, 27.
12. ibid., p.45.
13. ibid, p.24.
14. ibid., p.28.
15. ibid., p.30.
16. ibid.
17. ibid., p.31.
18. ibid., pp. 35-6.
19. ibid.
20. ibid., p.22
21. ibid., pp. 65-6.
22. ibid., p.45.
23. Attempts were made for a century to improve the strength of cast iron by melting a mixture of cast iron and wrought iron or mild steel. This process does not always work well and, where improvements have taken place, it is probably because of a reduction in sulphur and phosphorus rather than of carbon; cf. Gordon, op.cit.pp33-4.
24. Gordon, op.cit., p.46.
25. ibid., p.47. Malleable cast iron should not be confused with wrought iron, (which in Scotland) is frequently referred to as malleable iron.
26. Roberts-Austen, op.cit., p.195.
27. Gordon, op.cit., p.54.
28. Roberts-Austen, op.cit., p.152; Hasluck, op.cit., p.27.
29. Gordon, op.cit., pp. 54 ff.
30. ibid., pp. 34, 56-7.
- 31./

31. *ibid.*, pp. 55 ff.
32. *ibid.*, p.57.
33. For the details of tempering cf. Hasluck, *op.cit.*, p.4; Roberts-Austen, *op.cit.*, pp.127, 142, 195; *The Home Workshop*, Odhams Press, p.304.
34. For details of cooling and further details on tempering cf. Hasluck, pp. 27, 36-8. 41-3; Gordon, *op.cit.*, pp. 58, 120-1; Roberts-Austen, *op.cit.*, pp.94, 145.
35. For details on forging cf. Hasluck, *op.cit.*, pp.4-5, 19, 16, 28; Gordon, *op.cit.*, p.57.
36. On ~~Solidifying~~ after melting all metals crystallise; this is of great importance since it may render the metal useless if the crystallisation is severe or aggravated by the method of cooling; cf. Gordon, *op.cit.*, pp.56-7; Hasluck, *op.cit.*, pp.27-8; Roberts-Austen, *op.cit.*, p.37.
37. A.J.A. xxxviii (1934) pp. 382 ff.
38. Gowland, *l.c.*, p.302.; cf. Childe, *Bronze Age*, p.14; M.M.H., p.131.
39. Gold may have been important for magical reasons, since it does not change or perish. The blue copper ores had magical significance too, cf. Childe, M.M.H., pp.129-30.
40. Read, *l.c.*, p.383, is of the opinion that bronze was made first of all from naturally mixed ores. Later, the ores were deliberately mixed and, later still, better results were obtained by reducing the metals from their ores separately and then mixing them by melting them together; cf. also Childe, B.A., p.29.
41. cf. Gowland, *l.c.*, pp. 276 ff., for a full description of the Japanese methods. Cf. Childe, *op.cit.*, p.30, where he accepts the argument that the Japanese method was probably similar to that of the Bronze Age.
42. cf. Gowland, *l.c.*, p.309. He gives no evidence to prove that workmen did not attempt to apply copper technique to iron.
43. Some accept the pre-existence of a Bronze Age but believe the reason was that there were no heavy hammers with handles which could handle red hot iron; cf. Peake, *Geogr. Rev.*, xxiii. (Oct.1933), p.639. This is too simple and is not even strictly true since Peake himself, p.645, admits these hammers were introduced at the end of the Bronze/

Bronze Age and double axes, that is an axe on one side and hammer on the other, in stone, were used in South Russia; cf. Childe, Dawn, etc. pp.149-50. Rickard, A.J.A. XLIII, p.87, is of the opinion that iron smelting may have depended on the development of blast as used in copper furnaces.

44. Some of these early iron articles are beads from Egypt as early as about 4,000 B.C., and probably of meteoric iron cf. A Guide to Antiquities in the Bronze Age, British Museum, 172; an iron plate from Egypt in the fourth dynasty, picks and a lump of iron in the fifth and sixth dynasties (ibid). In addition, there is a dagger from Mesopotamia, c. 2278 B.C. or a little later, a cube of iron from Crete, M.M. ii., and two rings from Greece, cf. Childe, op.cit., p.83.
45. J.H.S., xiii. p.29.
46. cf. Casson, op.cit., 146-7; In spite of this Lang, op.cit., p.195, does not believe that iron was ever precious.
47. cf. Howard-Carter, The Tomb of Tut-ankh-amen, Ldn.(1927), ii. p.268, pl. lxxxvii. B. This is unlikely since in the same tomb were discovered some ornaments of wrought iron and, in an annex to the tomb, sixteen miniature iron tools.
48. cf. Read., l.c., p.386. Richardson, A.J.A. xxxviii., p.575 n.2, maintains that attempts at direct reduction of iron ores in a small hole in the ground, with or without an artificial blast, usually failed. In experiments of his own he was successful only twice out of ten attempts and in one of the successful experiments the process was incomplete and in the other it was over-carburised. cf. Rickard, A.J.A. XLIII. p.86, for the difficulties of reducing iron ore. He argues, too, that even if iron were produced accidentally, it would be a dark, spongy mass which would not be recognised as a metal.
49. cf. Read, op.cit., pp.383-7. If iron oxide is reduced at a temperature below 900 deg. C., then the result is little different from the original particles of ore. If reduced at 1000-1050 deg., a loosely coherent mass, still showing the outlines of the original particles of ore, is obtained. At 1100-1150 deg. the iron begins to flow together, forming a pasty, semi-fused, porous mass called a "bloom", which can be hammered to form a product similar to modern wrought iron. Even this usually has some slag in it and is too low in carbon to make even mild steel; cf. Richardson, l.c., p.577, n.1., quoting from "Production of Sponge Iron", Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Mines Bulletin, 270, 1927.

50. cf. Peake, l.c., p.652..Peake thinks this was because it was not hammered enough but again that is too simple. The results of the process were uncertain and any workman would soon discover that and abandon further attempts. This lump was attached to a bronze dagger and found with copper objects. This tends to confirm the theory that so long as copper and bronze were found in sufficient quantities iron would be regarded as too unreliable for regular use. Sumerians could smelt iron ores but did not exploit their knowledge; cf. Childe, *New Light on the East*, p.189.
51. The fact that the earliest iron swords in Greece were copies of bronze originals, while at Hallstatt the first iron objects were slavish copies of bronze, cf. Hall, op.cit., p.257, tends to confirm the theory that iron was very often only adopted because bronze was unobtainable. Indeed, Jevons, l.c., p.29, argues that commentators usually agree that so-called early iron axes were made of bronze and only a little iron used. They were made either of some bronze with iron mixed, or with an iron blade and the rest bronze. Macedon in the early iron age had iron tools and swords but bronze shields and ornaments. However, some bronze shields were rivetted with iron, which again suggests that it was when bronze was short that iron had to be used; cf. Casson, op. cit., pp. 148 ff. In Homer, too, although axes for carpentry were made of iron, bronze was retained where possible for battle axes. In fact, only when driven to it would man change from copper or bronze to iron. He did not suddenly see a superior metal and decide to adopt it. Man's history is altogether contradictory to such an attitude. Man is naturally conservative, and has made radical changes only when driven to it. In this case, too, bronze was a superior metal for warfare. Again metallurgists appreciate this more clearly than historians. Richardson, l.c., pp. 504, 556 ff., argues that if bronze were available no one would use iron for weapons. Bronze is a much more beautiful metal than iron and probably harder and more durable. As a result, bronze users were reluctant to adopt iron, Egypt being perhaps the best example of this conservatism. A. Hertz, l.c., pp.442, suggests that the Assyrians had amassed great quantities of iron as booty and that this intensified the use of it.
52. cf. Richardson, l.c., pp.573-5; Gowland, l.c., pp.303,321. Swank, op.cit., p.56; Rickard, l.c., p.86. They admit that cast iron was sometimes produced by accident but it was then thrown back into the fire. Read, l.c., pp.388-9, is an exception. He believes the Greeks and Romans could cast iron, but thinks they made few castings because it was difficult to work, too brittle, and liable to rust.
- 53./

53. Gordon, op.cit., pp.23-4. The importance of this discovery however was that cast iron could for the first time be made really cheaply; v.sub.
54. Read, for example, ignores his own excellent point that melting of metals was probably carried out long before smelting.
55. Gowland, l.c., p.281; Childe, B.A., p.29; Read, l.c., p.383; Richardson, l.c., p.575, admits that it would be reasonable for attempts at melting iron in a copper furnace to be made. He thinks however that even if a high enough temperature were reached it could not be maintained. He is apparently ignorant however of the two stage process of the Bronze Age.
56. Gordon, op.cit., p.31. However the presence of mild steel in Japanese furnaces indicates that a fairly high carbon content was sometimes obtained.
57. Gordon, op.cit., pp.23-4. Read, l.c., p.388, gives 1070 deg. C. for gold. Davies, B.S.A. xxviii, p.198, argues that the melting point of copper is 1500 deg., although the usual figure given is 1084 deg., cf. Roberts-Austen, op.cit., p.67. Davies argues from this that iron could quite easily be melted in a blast furnace. It is not clear how he could have made such a mistake. The melting point of tin is 232 deg. C. (Roberts-Austen, op.cit., p.67; Gordon, p.102), and the melting point of alloys is lower than that of pure metals, so that the melting point of bronze would be even lower than that of copper, Hasluck, op.cit., p.11.
58. Richardson, l.c., p. 579, n.5.
59. I am told by a consulting engineer that even to-day in Britain axe heads are cast.
60. N.H. xxxiv. 41.
61. Cf. Swank, op.cit., p.56. This method produces a wrought iron very similar in composition and physical properties to the wrought iron produced by the puddling process in this country today; cf. Gordon, op.cit., p.47. The direct process of ancient times was probably very similar to the Japanese method of the last century; cf. Gowland, l.c., p.306.
62. At Vardarofça in Macedonia a cast iron sword appears with pottery dated to about the fourteenth century B.C. Macedonians used to get their tin from the south and, when supplies of the older metals were scarce, it seems clear that/

that they were driven to an attempt to use the new metal iron by means of bronze technique. The appearance of a wrought iron sword at the same place about the sixth century B.C. was probably the result of the introduction of the new technique from another source. Cf. B.S.A. xxviii. p. 198 ff.; xxvii. pp. 61 ff. Davies, l.c., p.198, believes cast iron came first and then wrought iron. He bases this on the argument that, as wrought iron is the result of the superior method, it must have come later in time. It is more plausible to believe that the two processes have different origins, and that it was probably the more civilised people, who had used bronze, who attempted to use cast iron, and more primitive peoples who discovered the other metal. Read, l.c., p.388, believes that iron working was discovered over a wide field and that a considerable variety of method was used. He thinks, however, that cast iron was only discovered later after some control of the carbon content had been acquired.

63. Cf. Gowland, l.c., p.306.
64. Read, l.c., pp. 386-7. Even some method of carburisation was only acquired by the Romans probably as late as 200 A.D. cf. Richardson, l.c., p.579 n.2, following experiments by J.M. Robertson and H.C.H. Carpenter.
65. Cf. Childe, Aryans, p.53; cf. p.118; R.A. pp. 192 ff., 204; Myres, Who were the Greeks? pp.442-9 is of the opinion that iron working came first from Asia Minor but that later this method was influenced by Danubian iron working, which had an independent origin. Cf. Casson, op.cit., p.156 n.1., and Davies, l.c., p. 198, for much the same place of origin as Childe adopts. Richardson, l.c., p.563, believes Hallstatt to be the origin of all other iron working in spite of the archaeological evidence for much earlier iron working than Hallstatt. Peake, l.c. pp. 643-5 and Read, l.c., p.386, name the Hittites as the first users of the direct process of producing wrought iron. Heurtley, B.S.A. xx, p.199, points out that the renewal of relations between Macedon and Asia Minor coincides with the appearance of iron weapons in Asia Minor. He points out that there was a two way traffic and that it is difficult to decide which way iron travelled.
66. A mass of iron for instance is given as a prize; cf. Il. xxiii, 826; and is included with rarer metals as a sign of wealth; cf. Il. vi, 48; ix, 365-6; x, 379; xi, 133; Od. xiv, 324; xxi. 3. It may be noted that bronze appears in Homer 279 times and iron 48 times; although iron axes are used in Homer for carpentry and other uses, cf. Il. iv. 485; xvii. 520; xxiii. 850; Od. iii, 442; for battle axes bronze is preferred, cf. Il, xiii, 611; xv. 711; cf. Lang, Homer and his Age, p.183 on this. Such/

Such transitional periods occurred in China in the seventh century B.C.; cf. Peake, l.c., p.650, and in Palestine, cf. Land, C.R. xxii, p.47, and in Cyprus. In Crete some graves had bronze spears and iron tools with an occasional iron sword; cf. J.H.S. xxvii (1907)p.320.

67. Childe, Aryans, p.53; Burn, Minoans, Philistines and Greeks, p.161.
68. cf. Il. xxii, 357; xxiv, 205, 521; Od. iv, 293; v. 191; xii, 280; xxiii, 172.
69. cf. Rickard, l.c., p.86. For the description of this mass, cf. Il. xxiii, 826. This translation suits the point of evolution of ironworking better than most. cf. Rickard, *ibid.*, for criticism of the usual translations.
70. For the quenching process in Homer cf. Od. ix, 393. For "much-worked", cf. Il. vi. 48.
71. cf. Il, xxiii, 850; Od. xxi. 3; Il. iv, 485.
72. Myres, *op.cit.*, p.443. However, Casson, *op.cit.*, p.157, believes the Dorians were responsible for bringing iron to Greece. Cf. Wade-Gery C.A.H. ii, p.525.
73. Od. i, 184; xiv, 314. cf. Hammond, l.c., p.167 on this.
74. ~~Teog.~~, 862-6.
75. Myres, *op.cit.*, p.441.
76. Hd.t. I, 25, following Paus. X, 16, l. rather than Athen. V, 45, 210B-C.
77. cf. W. Campbell and E.E. Thun, Ancient Greek Iron, Metal Progress, Nw.Yk., 1931.
78. Gordon, *op.cit.*, p.23.
79. ii, 33.
80. Richardson, l.c., p.568.
81. Richardson, l.c., p.561.
82. N.H. xxxiv, 40-41.
83. cf. Richardson, l.c., pp. 568 ff.
84. Swank, l.c., pp.49-50; Richardson, l.c., p.579 n.5.
- 85./

85. De Mirabilibus auscultat, Ionibus, ch. xlviiii (Tr. Dowdall).
86. Richardson, l.c., p.568; cf. p.566 n.6.
87. Myres, op.cit., p.442.
88. cf. Polyb., vi, 23. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Soc. and Ec. Hist. of the Roman Empire, pl. x. These iron goods were made until the end of the Republic in the local workshops of country estates or by travelling smiths; cf. Varro, de Re Rustica, l. 16. 4.
89. Polyb., vi, 23. In the early Iron Age in Britain even swords, as well as other weapons, were made of bronze. Only the development of some type of case-hardening made iron at all popular for swords, cf. Winbolt, Britain, B.C. p.130.
90. Richardson, l.c., pp. 577, 582. cf. Gowland, l.c., p.308, on the uncertain results of even one process in ancient iron working and the variable quality, therefore, of the results.
91. Childe, B.A., p.7.
92. N.H. xxxiv, 41. The best Scottish iron swords about the time of the Renaissance it should be noted had been quenched in running water.
93. Read, l.c., p.389.
94. Gordon, op.cit., p.22; Richardson, l.c., p.575.
95. v. sub., ch. vii, for the prices at Delos. Transport costs remained high at a time when practically all other prices were tumbling.
96. cf. Il. xxiii, 826-35.
97. Nilsson, op.cit., p.140, argues that iron must have been cheap even in Homer's time, since it was used for arrowheads, and, as they are frequently lost, they were usually made of cheap materials.
98. Chadwick, The Heroic Age, p. 206, n. 4, quotes Il., xvi, 338 ff., to prove that bronze swords, if used in this way, broke very easily at the hilt.
99. Childe, B.A. p.26.
100. Age of Hesiod, p.105.
101. cf. Adcock, C.A.H. iii, p.696; he argues that the new methods of fighting were those of the middle classes; that/

that they developed a unity of action and uniformity of arms and tactics which both reflected and assisted the centralised city state.

102. cf. Heichelheim, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte d. Altertums*, i.p. 204-9; Moret et Davy, *op.cit.*, p.410.
103. About 1500 B.C. the alphabet was invented, according to Childe, *University Forward*, l.c., p.4.
104. Humanistic value of archaeology, pp.52-64; A.J.A. xxxvii, pp. 8 ff. Blakeway, l.c., p.191, accepts the late eighth century for the introduction of the alphabet to Greece.
105. A.J.A. xxxviii, p. 359 ff.
106. *Cl. Phil.*, xxi, p.15, n. 3.
107. Stillwell, A.J.A., xxxvii, pp. 605 ff. Carpenter, however, A.J.A. xlii, p.58, challenges this date and argues that the writing belongs to the sixth century Corinthian type.
108. Blegen, A.J.A. xxxviii, pp. 10 ff. Carpenter, however, A.J.A. xlii, p.61, argues that the Hymettus jugs are later than the Dipylon one.
109. Blegen, following Schmeitzer, argues for this; cf. Buck, l.c., p.14.
110. cf. Buck, *ibid.*
111. cf. Bury, C.A.H. ii, p.508. Buck, l.c., p.15, believes early writing was used on papyrus before it was used on stone.
112. Newberry, *Harvard Studies*, 45, pp. 105 ff., Cf. Hogarth, *Ionia and the East*, pp. 73-4 on this.
113. About 900 B.C. is quite a popular date. Gercke, *Hermes* xli. (1906), pp. 540 ff. accepts not long after 900. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*, I. 1. pp.31-2, 228, accepts the tenth or ninth century B.C. Bury, C.A.H. ii, p.508, accepts a little before 900 as the date.
114. The early fourteenth century B.C. has actually been suggested; cf. Kenyon, *Books and Readers in ancient Greece and Rome*, Oxford, 1932, p.12. The eleventh or twelfth century was suggested by Ullman, but he does not think the alphabet was fully used till later. The early tenth century is adopted by Buck.
- 115./

115. Harland, A.J.A., xxxviii, p.91, argues on these lines.
116. cf. Hes. op., 220-1, 260 ff., 248 ff., where he denounces the nobles for oppressing the people by unjust judgments. Cf. 35-8, where he advises his brother to settle a dispute amicably instead of going to courts of "bribe devouring kings". Cf. Op. 30 ff., for the disadvantages of the law for a poor man. cf. 210 ff., where he argues that there is no redress under the laws and institutions and that the poor are at the mercy of the rich. Cf. Op. 217 ff., Theog., 88 ff., for the praise of fair justice.
- Cf. his contemporary, in similar social conditions in Palestine, Amos ii. 6; vi. 12, etc.
117. cf. Childe, Aryans, pp. 3, 212, on this point.
118. cf. M.A. Murray, Knots, Ancient Egypt. 1922, pp.14 ff.
119. cf. Maspero, Recueil de travaux iv. p.62, quoted by Budge, Book of the Dead, i. pp. 26-7. Cf. Carpenter, Humanistic value of archaeology, p.63, on the "helplessness of illiteracy", and the "illumined self-consciousness which writing bestows".
120. I have just acquired a copy of Childe's, What Happened in History, in which, p.170, he accepts the idea that iron and the alphabet had a democratic influence on society. He does not, of course, in this very general history, elaborate the idea or draw any conclusions from it. However, it is gratifying to find accepted there the main, general principles argued for in this chapter. The angle of approach to these two subjects and especially the selection of them, as a result of comparison with the Bronze Age trading revolution, as two of the most important features within the revolution in making possible great social advance, is, I believe, entirely new.

CHAPTER IV.

ATHENS.

Athens followed the general trend of historical evolution in Greece already outlined. Both the long complex tradition in Greek society and the economic revolution in the eighth and seventh centuries played their part in moulding her history. She even shared in the Neolithic culture of Greece, while the pottery of the Mycenaean Age was well represented at Athens. Indeed, in many respects Athens, more than any other Greek city, was directly influenced by older cultures and traditions, as well as by those more recent events which were to produce tyrannies in Athens and other Greek cities. Perhaps it was this continuity of tradition which was the origin of the legend that the Athenians were autochthonous (1). The original inhabitants Herodotus called Pelasgians and, although non-Greek, gradually over a considerable period, he maintained, they became Hellenised. Thucydides, on the other hand, thought the Pelasgians were only one out of several pre-Greek tribes and believed the non-Greeks to have been hellenised through actual contact with Hellenes.

The earliest kingship at Athens was said to have been founded by the autochthonous Actaeon, while Cecrops was named as the founder of the real Athenian dynasty in the sixteenth century B.C. (2). In the fourteenth century, after the fall of Cnossos, Erechtheus was credited with making the population Athena's people and was probably responsible for building the fortifications similar to those of Mycenae and Tiryns (3).

Between 1330 and 1260 B.C. Ion and his followers moved from the north-east Peloponnese to Attica at the invitation of the inhabitants who were in need of help. The newcomers probably introduced the four Ionian tribes with tribal kings which eventually, after a merging of different cultures and traditions, became the basis of Attic military organisation and remained so until the sixth century (4).

About the middle of the thirteenth century the divine-born families with foreign names - probably the Achaeans (v. sup., ch. i) - established themselves in Greece. Athens retained some independence but she too had a great "hero" about this time, whatever his origin (5). This was Theseus, who might almost be called the founder in Attica of that type of independent, self-contained state within which the economic revolution was to take place. It was also within the constitution and framework of this state that the new social forces were to produce the tyranny, and it was this state, already modified by social changes, which was to be superseded by the tyranny and finally replaced by the democratic republic.

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While the decaying Bronze Age civilisation had produced an increasing isolation of communities on the one hand, on the other hand, within these isolated units there was a gradual tendency to form more closely knit communities for their common protection and advantage. It was Attica's distinction under Theseus' leadership to achieve this much earlier than any other Greek state; possibly because Athens was already becoming a refugee state, which forced modifications in political and social structure and produced a society of greater flexibility and adaptability.

As might be expected during this period of decline in culture and civilised living, Attica had been torn by factions and had proved incapable of combining to meet an emergency (6). Theseus seized the opportunity to overcome his local rivals and establish himself on the throne (7). This process of quarreling followed by the temporary victory of one faction had probably been going on for some time (8), and it was only by his victory in war that Theseus gained the submission of the local chiefs. Theseus united the various independent communities of Attica into one state, dissolved the local courts and councils, and established a central administration at Athens (9).

The significance of Theseus in history is roughly that of the chiefs of Wessex who united the early English kingdom (10) and also of later kings such as Henry I (11), who waged a more or less continuous struggle to maintain his supremacy over the other noble families. The process which took many centuries in a large state such as England, was telescoped in a small community like Attica. However, the general struggle between local lords and chieftans, and the unification into a single state under one ruler, went on in both England and Attica for some considerable time.

Theseus' own conscious role was simply that of any other local chief, to defeat the others and establish his own supremacy (12). His objective role however was a progressive one, in that a centralised state which could check the power of the local chiefs made for efficiency in war and so the possibility of freedom from invasion from the countryside, for a diminution of factions within the country and the suppression of robbers (13), and so, in general, gave opportunities for the peaceful development of agriculture, and where the possibilities of trade were realised, conditions favourable to its growth (14).

In doing this, Theseus - perhaps unconsciously - favoured the enemies of the local chiefs, the poor and the strangers (15). By inviting strangers to equal privileges in his state (16), he not only limited the power of the chief families, but attacked the power and influence of local privileges and local ties, and made the social grouping of nobles, farmers and artisans/

artisans the basis of a new centralised state with one man at the head. Formerly there had been several noble families with their own retainers, peasants and artisans, but Theseus, by bringing the nobles together and forming them into a class instead of warring individuals, and by diverting the allegiance of their followers from their chiefs to the central government of the state, deprived the nobles of individual power and cut across local relationships (17). By doing this, Theseus had increased the potential power of the nobles once they learned to act together as a class. However, that development was for the future. The nobles, meanwhile, were too much concerned with their individual rivalries and their jealousy, especially of Theseus.

The adventures of Theseus overseas (18) are typical of this period of unrest and adventure, although they may reflect that growing interest in the sea which is suggested by the traditions of an early Athenian thalassocracy (19). However, Theseus' absence from Athens and the general unrest and change of the period combined to make Theseus' organisation of the Attic state only temporary. The fact that the nobles tried to persuade the people how much better off they would be under a number of separate princelings (20) illustrates their own "feudal" position perfectly, while the fact that Theseus gave up the kingship as he promised, but maintained his control in war and law (21), indicates that, while he was prepared to make a nominal concession if it would help his position, in reality he retained the essential control of the centralised state. Moreover the nobles, according to Plutarch (22), were persuaded to submit to Theseus' centralisation because they feared his power and were afraid of being forced to submit. Here there is no evidence of voluntary abdication of power by Theseus but rather the fear and probability of that power being increased.

In fact Theseus' achievements were not allowed to be permanent. When the military crisis was over and Theseus engaged in adventures abroad, one faction of the nobles conspired against him and Theseus never really succeeded in re-establishing his control over the local chiefs (23). The revolt of Menestheus not only ended for the time being the home policy of Theseus, but it deprived Attica of much of her independence and brought her within the feudal regime of the House of Atreus (24).

Theseus' departure from Athens (25) represents a victory for the nobles, and for the separated, feudal type of state over the development of a city state based not on local tribes led by the important members of the latter, but on a large united community with new social divisions, and only held together as yet by a strong central authority vested in one/

one person. Tradition makes the so-called abdication of Theseus a victory for democracy. This tradition, like that of Magna Carta, somersaults the real tradition. Magna Carta was a further attempt by the nobles to restrain the power of the king, their feudal overlord, and represented a temporary victory of local feudal rule over the development of a centralised authority in the person of the king. Its role in history was forgotten - Shakespeare's King John does not mention it - then rediscovered and, its technical feudal language being misunderstood, was used by the new middle class as its own Bill of Rights. The demands remained the same, but were applied to totally different circumstances and people (26). In England, too, the peasants tended to benefit at first by the loss of influence incurred by their own overlord.

So, also, the victory of the nobles over Theseus represented a temporary victory of the old local rule over the central authority, the latter often appearing merely as a rival to the others. Theseus and Henry I of England were not democratic in the fifth century Attica or seventeenth century English sense of the word, but they were progressive in the sense that only the defeat of local and feudal rule, and the establishment of a centralised state made possible those settled conditions which led to an increase in population, to colonisation, and to opportunities for the development of trade, all of which finally led to popular movements culminating in tyrannies and then states of a new, bourgeois type. The whole process was one which tended to fluctuate over a long period of time according to the varying strength of the kings and the nobles. Louis XIV of France for instance, after the monarchy had been involved in the clash of various factions of the nobility in the wars of the Fronde, deprived the nobles of much of their power and influence by creating a unified state with a central government around the King. He only succeeded in this, however, by making his court lavish enough and, therefore, influential enough to make it essential for the nobles to stay there instead of on their estates.

It is true that in establishing this type of state Theseus laid the basis for the rule of an oligarchy, whether a king was maintained or not. The nobles, for instance, had control of religion, they supplied the city with magistrates and were the interpreters of the laws (27). It was the multitude of individual rulers that Theseus fought, not their united rule as a class. Theseus could not establish a full-blown democracy at such a period. The conditions were quite unsuitable. The paradox however is this; that by establishing oligarchial rule (for centralisation eventually led to this), he took the necessary first steps which later made possible the growth of a middle class whose function, by means of the tyrants, was to be the overthrow of the oligarchy and the establishment/

establishment of a democratic state. Neither Theseus nor his rivals could of course have foreseen this development even though its beginnings were before their eyes (28). In the same way these kings of France and England, who destroyed the individual power of the nobles, not only helped to secure the power of the old and the rising new nobility as a class based on land ownership and privilege, but also facilitated the development, up to a point, of trade and agriculture for sale; since only in an ordered, centralised state could trade and exchange enjoy the facilities of roads and uniform laws necessary for their growth. Only in this type of state, too, could there arise a middle class involved in these pursuits, a class which, in England and France, too, as in Athens and Sparta, was to use some type of dictator to overthrow that same aristocracy (v.sub.)

While the rest of Greece was suffering from invasions, Attica was practically unscathed. The Boeotian raids had been repelled and, although the Dorians penetrated to the central plain, they soon withdrew (29). As a result Athens became an asylum for refugees from other parts of Greece (30). Notable families such as the Alcmaeonidae, Peisistratidae, Melanthidae, and Paeonidae arrived in Athens and Melanthus became king after expelling the descendants of Theseus (31). His occupation of the kingship seems to have been connected, as was that of Theseus, with the defence of Attica in war against the Boeotians (32). This suggests that after the collapse of Theseus' central administration Attica had tended to disintegrate again. Thucydides (33) stressed the persistence of local loyalties even after the synoikism, and it would be natural for these to become dominant again once the central power had lost strength. It is almost certain that the unification of Attica and centralisation of government attributed to Theseus was a process which covered a long period, perhaps several centuries. The importance of Theseus lies in the fact that he made the first successful attempt at centralisation and laid the foundations for its consolidation (34). Theseus had attempted this in a period of adventure and individual heroes and his success had been at the expense of other chieftains and to the advantage, temporarily at least, of the peasants and artisans. Once the nobles were settled on the land in the dark ages, however, the nobles tended to associate as landowners instead of fighting as individual chiefs and centralisation became organised around them and their magistrates (v.sup., ch.ii). However, since the immigrant noble families had apparently no difficulty in becoming part of the state, since one of their number actually became king, it seems as if Theseus' attack on local exclusiveness and his extension of privileges to foreigners may have been maintained, or else revived in a period of crisis.

Athens, because she escaped invasion and so avoided a break/

break in tradition and culture, and because she became a home for refugees, enjoyed to the full the traditions and culture of Greece (35). This rich heritage was to bear full fruit in the florescence of Athenian culture and art in the early years of the republic, after the tyranny had made it possible to remove the last shackles hindering their full development. So two of the most important elements in man's history, contemporary social conditions and the legacy of the past, combined in this case to produce one of the richest cultures the world has known.

As communities settled more firmly on the land, wealth was judged more and more according to landed estates and the tendency, therefore, to increase the size of estates became more and more common. Parallel with this development the social division of the community gradually changed (v.sup., ch.ii). While the four tribes had become the basis of the military organisation in Attica, and the phratries, which had probably been local organisations of the citizens (36), lost some influence by the centralisation of the government, gradually the clans became the most important groups in the community. These were unofficial and probably had their origin in the tendency of large landowners to associate together, especially when their privileges became threatened through the growth of landless and debtors (37). This represents the development of the nobility as a class instead of a group of isolated families with only local power; and this was a process caused not only by more permanent settlement on the land after the heroic age, but was a result, too, of Theseus' policy although unforeseen by him and his rivals. The class were therefore composed of the nobility, including some immigrant noble families, and, later, perhaps of some wealthy plebeians. They exercised enormous influence in their localities and, more important, when they acted together they dominated the whole community.

Here, then, we see the growth of an aristocracy based on private property in land, and, as we should expect (v.sup., ch.ii), political and state forms were modified accordingly. Control of religious rites and of fighting forces, control of magistrates and of the laws - which even Theseus had had to allow them - were used to sanction and maintain the growing power of this minority (38). Athens, unlike Sparta, had not been divided by invasion into conquered and conquerors, but, out of similar economic and social conditions in conquered and unconquered Greece alike, similar state and social forms emerged (v.sup., ch.ii). In short, centralisation was now established not around an individual such as Theseus, but - a much later development but initiated by Theseus - around a class. In associating as landowners and as holders of political offices and other privileges the nobles, whether old or new, gradually found themselves associating as a ruling/

ruling class, although without the centralisation begun by Theseus the nobles would have tended to remain feudal lords, regarding only their own estates and retainers as their special kingdoms. However, in consolidating their economic hold on the countryside, and especially when faced with the growing discontent of many of the peasants, they found themselves supporting their interests with such weapons as they happened to have, control of religion, magistracies, laws and fighting forces. Ultimately, therefore, instead of a group of local communities, there emerged a real state run by an aristocracy whose position was maintained by their ownership of land as much as by nobility of birth. The outlines of the polis proper were already sketched in, and within it individuals were to find new freedom and new ways of living until they, too, forced another change upon the form of the state.

The growing strength of the noble families as a whole was paralleled by the loss of power of the king. The same peaceful conditions and settlement on the land, which encouraged the growth of the one, made less obviously essential the maintenance of the other. In peacetime the kingship was less important, (v. sup., ch. ii), and the nobles had no desire for a king of the type of Theseus who might favour the peasants and new people against the nobles. They needed people whom they could trust to act as representatives of themselves and of no other section of the community. Of course they were not clearly conscious of this. Indeed they probably quite sincerely interpreted their own interests as those of the whole community, a common fallacy, and without fully understanding their own policy adopted one measure after another as the need arose in a more or less short-sighted fashion. Accordingly the archonship was instituted and the powers of the basileus absorbed by it (39). The tenure of the archonship was reduced to ten years in 752 B.C. (40), but still remained in the family of the Medontidae. In 712 B.C., however, the archon was elected from among the Eupatrids (41). The polemarch took over the king's military functions while the archon eponymos took over the king's civil jurisdiction, which, with the growth of private property in land, was increasingly concerned with property (42). The chief sources of power and control were now in the hands of the aristocracy. Finally, in 683 B.C. (43), all offices were made annual and six thesmothetae were added to the magistrates. The Areopagus was similar to the Spartan and other early Greek gerousiae and combined the functions of tribunal and council. It was probably recruited from ex-archons and itself appointed magistrates, while the people had no real power as yet. By this time the rule of the aristocracy was well established in military, legal and religious matters. In short, the government and power of the state was in their hands and therefore in their interests (44).

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The Dipylon pots illustrate the life of the aristocracy, their horses, elaborate funeral processions, and sea fights which indicate the adventure period before trade proper began. Once a section of the community is really dominant it stamps its influence on every aspect of human activity so, besides the legal, military, political and social aspects, even the literature of the period was suited to an aristocracy settled on the land. In contrast to the dynamic, secular epic of the age of heroes, aristocratic poetry, of which the choral ode was the most characteristic example, was static, religious and collective (45), and was paralleled by the revival of religious rites and ideas which had been shaken by the break up period (v.sup., ch.ii).

It was within this aristocratic type of state that the economic revolution, which so transformed the life of these Greek cities affected by it, took place and forced changes of living, professions, people and thought (v.sup., ch.ii). Just as settlement on the land, land hunger and the small beginnings of trade had helped to transform feudal communities into well knit centralised aristocratic states, so the growth of trade which was affected by the land question and itself accelerated changes on the countryside, was to create the new people and conditions which would demand still further changes in the form of state and of society. This was a movement which only partially developed in the Bronze Age but in the Greek trading states, as a result of the democratic effect of iron and the alphabet, it was to be carried to its logical conclusion in the overthrow of the aristocratic state and the establishment of a bourgeois republic.

The growth of exchange in place of the old static economy had probably been responsible for the setting up of a treasury and a board of kolakretai to administer it, probably in the seventh century (46); while the growth of a centralised national state produced new types of finance and taxation to maintain the growing central expenses of government. In military organisation, too, changes soon became necessary (v.sup., ch.ii). The development of exchange and a mobile economy not only produced increased supplies of metal but gradually produced fresh reserves of people ready to bear arms. Cavalry were still pre-eminent in aristocratic society, but the hoplite was beginning to be important just as the middle class, which the hoplite essentially represented in military organisation, was also struggling for increasing power and influence. The general form of military organisation, too, was soon to be based on property and birth rather than on birth alone (47). In addition, the influence of the east which was stimulating the revival of trade, was reflected in pottery and all artistic work. The rather backward state of Athenian culture was only a reflection of her comparatively slow economic development (48).

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Indeed it was under the nobility, within the aristocratic type of state that the new urban life brought into being new types of people, who eventually became powerful enough to overcome the aristocracy and establish their own type of state. These new people, traders, artisans, and farmers interested in trade and new techniques, became more wealthy and influential as trade and industry expanded in Athens. Accordingly, the process of divesting the King of powers, which had originally been the result of the growth of importance of the aristocracy, tended in later years to be a further consolidation of the aristocracy against the new trading interests. These could always find some sort of backing from the peasants, whose condition was steadily deteriorating as a result of the economic changes taking place, and the discontented elements might use, or be used by, one of the Eupatrids themselves against the aristocracy.

Just as Athens, although not divided into conquered and conquerors, produced an aristocracy, so also in Attica, as elsewhere, although there was sufficient land to make it unnecessary for Athens to take part in the early Greek colonising activities, a land crisis eventually affected the whole community and threatened the very existence of the aristocratic rule of privilege. Clearly, just as the aristocracies of Greece grew out of similar economic and social conditions (v.sup., ch.ii), so also the land crises, which occurred in several Greek states at this period, had a similar origin.

The fundamental cause of the crisis was that any new type of life springing up within the framework of an older society develops more or less freely only up to a point, when its further growth then conflicts with some part of the old society which had taken shape out of quite different conditions. Niebuhr is one of the few modern scholars who has emphasised the importance of the growth of new life within an older society. He points out (49) that actual changes take place although not a letter of the law has been changed. Changes, for instance, in the distribution of property, social conditions, mode of life, and the spirit and feeling of the nation may all take place within the old constitution. Eventually however, the interests of the new people - in this case the traders, trading farmers and artisans - begin to clash with the older interests. The laws suitable for the old society and evolved for that society become a hindrance to the further development of the new forces. A struggle, sometimes concealed, sometimes easily recognisable, between opposing interests will result perhaps first of all in modifications of the laws (50), then in compromises and concessions to the growing power of the new section of the community (51). The Epicureans showed an appreciation of the realities of social change when they maintained that when circumstances changed, laws which had been expedient ceased to be so and so ceased to be just (52).

In Attica, then, the changed conditions arising from the growth of agriculture and industry for trade profoundly affected the old domestic economy surviving from the early dark ages. The growth of mobility of soil and the tendency for those who possessed wealth to benefit by the new type of agriculture (v. sup., ch. ii), had already increased the numbers of landless and poor on the countryside; but the growth of agriculture for the market and of manufacture for exchange accelerated the process until it could no longer be ignored.

The demand for written laws was a natural reaction. The interpretation and execution of the laws was firmly in the hands of the nobles and it was under their ruling that peasants were falling into debt and losing their plots (53). The immediate issue, therefore, before the oppressed was the need for justice and a written code of laws which, by being written, could then be stabilised. This is entirely typical of such a period when an agricultural, self-sufficient community is beginning to suffer from the growth of trade. In England in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the revival and growth of trade made it profitable to change from arable to pasture land, enclosures of common land brought great misery to the peasants, one of their main grievances being that the laws were not well known and so suffered from "crafty interpretations" (54).

It is interesting to note that in the history of ideologies and customs some particular custom long survives the conditions which gave rise to it, or, on the other hand, some custom is picked out early as an object for attack. Such customs are usually associated with certain social interests and those particularly defended or attacked are precisely those most closely associated in men's minds with particular interests (55). In Attica the custom of unwritten laws was an object of special attack, since it was an important mainstay of privilege for the nobility and of protection of landowning rights against the peasantry who formed the majority of the population. Later the custom that birth alone should confer political and social privilege was challenged by the new wealthy, since to them it seemed the most immediate and greatest obstacle to their own social and political advancement.

In Attica the demand for written laws culminated in the code of Draco (56). Although this was undoubtedly a victory for the peasants and traders it was only a concession wrung from the still dominant aristocracy whose opinions of the code, therefore, were the ones most likely to find their way into tradition. Accordingly the harsh opinion of Draco's code (57) probably represented the aristocracy's reaction to the laws and it was this reaction which dominated traditional legend. It was the stabilisation of the laws through publication which was their harshest feature from the nobility's point of/

of view, since it must have curtailed a substantial part of the nobles' power. For such a period the laws themselves were not unduly harsh (58). However, a more lenient age may have regarded them as unduly severe and so have added to the legend of harshness.

It will be remembered that after the Bronze Age urban revolution and the brilliant technical florescence which resulted from, and accompanied it, there followed a long period of stagnancy after only a comparatively brief florescence (v.sup., ch.i). This, it was noted, was the result first of the small ruling class which, by absorbing the surplus wealth necessary for organising trade, impoverished the rest of the community and so restricted the demand for products, and secondly, of the hampering effect of the rigid social framework of the Bronze Age of which the size of the ruling class was an integral part (59). Clearly this will be characteristic of all such economic revolutions taking place within a state which had first evolved from quite different conditions (60). In Greece, for instance, the economic revolution spread gradually and drew more and more members of the community under its influence, changing their mode of life and even their ideas. But this growth was taking place within a form of state and society adapted from feudal conditions to suit an aristocracy settled on the land. Laws, customs and constitution were therefore suited to an agricultural, largely self-sufficient type of economy. To expect such a state to facilitate, or even to be suited to, the full development of a trading society with agriculture for sale was absurd. Modifications could be made but these would have only a temporary advantage.

It is clear that the new trading interests must eventually find the laws, customs and constitution a hindrance to further developments. Some modifications had been taking place as a result of the centralisation of government in Attica. But there came a time when more drastic changes were needed if the economy of the community was to advance. There are usually two solutions for economic crises of this sort; the extension of the foreign market, or intensification of the home market. History cannot turn the wheels backwards. The new economic interests are growing and so are more vigorous than, and usually destructive of, the old forces. Only facilitation of their further advance will create the conditions for real progress; but this unfortunately is usually accomplished only after the new economy has been so hampered and the old so dislocated that economic stagnancy and social crisis result and the whole community is shaken by the upheaval. Internally only a radical social change can break the limitations of restricted demand and, by bringing less privileged sections of the community into the economic stream, stimulate the economy once more (61). Externally a vigorous encouragement of foreign trade would bring temporary relief/

relief by giving some prosperity to the community. But this policy in itself would tend to increase the wealth and influence of the new people, the traders, and so ultimately intensify the social crisis. This, indeed, was precisely the effect of the reforms of Solon who adopted this particular policy.

Of course mankind always follows the easy path. When a law or institution hampers a section of society from pursuing its aims, it will at once become conscious of this. But this is far from demanding its complete abolition. Men will simply try to evade it and find a way round the difficulty. Perhaps this explains why history has taken such a round about path. Men are seldom conscious of where they want to go and what they must do to get there. They are only conscious of immediate needs and follow these in a semi-blind, certainly short sighted, fashion and only take the extreme step of fighting for what they want when they realise they must fight or be submerged. Equally the section of society representing the existing state will fight the new forces only if forced to do so. It may make concessions or call in help from outside. Only in the last resort do both sides fight.

In Athens, then, in spite of the growing distress on the countryside and the growing strength of the traders, Cylon's attempt at overthrowing the aristocracy and making himself tyrant (62) received little support. The extreme conditions necessary to force large sections of a community to the extreme step of fighting for their demands were not yet at maturity. Only when there is no alternative to fighting, when there is a choice only between fighting and being submerged, will the struggle develop into an open attack on the whole state structure on the one hand, and a defence of the control of it on the other. Cylon's attempt was premature and gave his rising the character of a mere insurrection which could not affect as yet the type of state, since the new forces were not yet sufficiently matured to replace the aristocratic government by anything else.

Indeed, even the extreme crisis in Attica in Solon's time was not solved by fighting, but by the use of an arbitrator. By this time the beginnings of coinage had probably helped to bring the economic crisis to a head, a crisis expressed in social unrest especially among the peasants. It was essentially an agricultural crisis, since the old economy had consisted largely of domestic agriculture and Attica seems to have suffered most severely since she had most land. Other Greek states had solved much of their agricultural problem by colonising and so trading interests developed more easily, since there was less competition from other interests and since agriculture was not so overwhelmingly important that it affected the whole community when disrupted by trade.

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By the time of Solon money had been coined in Attica for nearly thirty years but was still scarce and so may have depressed prices, the usual effect of a currency shortage (63) (v.sup. ch.ii). The most serious effect of the shortage, however, would be to place a check on the expansion of trade. The new currency was the most convenient means of exchange and, where plentiful, would encourage its development both at home and abroad. A steady flow of currency at home would bring even the small peasants into the trading market and so stimulate both agriculture and industry, while the more currency available for foreign trade, the more ventures merchants would be able to undertake. Although the larger farmers would probably produce enough to sell abroad, perhaps to states where coinage had begun to be more plentiful (64), the small farmers, the few that were left, would not be able to trade on a big enough scale.

The transition from the commodity exchange to money exchange would also have unsettling effects on trade, including trade in agricultural produce, while it is possible that the exporting Attic farmers had suffered by the recent war with Megara, which may have stopped exports and so caused a slump in prices (65). The scarcity of the new coins must also at first have tended to check the free development of trade, and so produce discontent amongst the merchants, who almost certainly would not understand its cause. Since the three main classes of the population, large farmers, small peasants, and traders, were all dissatisfied, the unanimity of the demand for an arbitrator causes no surprise.

Solon found the land held by a few, the poor in debt to the rich and many enslaved or sold abroad (66). Whether there was any definite prohibition of sale of land in Attica before Solon is not known, but it is possible that custom frowned on it (67), in spite of the growing mobility of land as a result of enclosures, debts and other measures. The widespread indebtedness would then not only be a result of the growing difficulties of the farmer, especially on a small plot, but a result of the evasion of such a custom by some system of loans with land as security. M. Fustel de Coulanges (68) has argued the case for such an evasion of a similar law in Sparta in the fourth century B.C. There seems no reason to doubt that the same sort of loophole was used elsewhere. If so, then old families, who had clung to the patriarchal type of agriculture, might try to solve the resulting difficulties by a concealed sale.

Not only were many peasants sold abroad, but many had become tied by obligations at home, a position which earned them the name of Hektemors (69). This seems to have been a sort of nickname, probably of recent origin, which died out when the circumstances which gave rise to it disappeared. It is/

is extremely unlikely that they were free workers paying five-sixths and retaining one-sixth (70). Casual labour had been used since Homer, but there had never been so fixed a rate of payment, either of wages or of rent, that a whole class could be given one nickname (71). In all periods when the land is gradually becoming concentrated in the hands of a few, a small plot must suffer from competition and become more and more uneconomic. A peasant with several children would either divide the lot amongst them, with the result that all the shares would soon become uneconomic, or he would have to send some of his sons to colonies or to engage in trade or piracy (72). Daughters proved just as great a burden as sons in this respect, as part of the land probably went to them as marriage portions, and this is probably the explanation of Solon's law against dowries (73).

In such conditions it is easy to understand how large numbers of peasants borrowed, pledging themselves and their belongings, and then were unable to repay the loan since the general dislocation caused by the growth of trade and exchange was increasing and so continuing to produce more indebtedness. The peasants were then sold abroad or became some sort of serf at home (74). Those who believe the hektemors paid five-sixths of the produce (75), usually do so because, they maintain, there could be no oppression in paying one-sixth (76). This argument however only holds where serfdom is the prevailing custom. In Attica serfdom was not established as a result of foreign conquest, with fixed rules as to payment. It must have developed as a result of the economic conditions of the community, in this case surely the indebtedness of most of the peasants. If the payment were repayment of a loan, it would mean that after borrowing, which itself indicated that the holding was uneconomic, the peasant had to produce enough for himself the next year, and, in addition, so much for the creditor. One-sixth would then be very high, and five-sixths impossible. Moreover, Plutarch (77), and Hesychius (78) both make it one-sixth, followed by many modern authors (79). (A few ancient authors interpret it as keeping one-sixth (80), but Aristotle (81) is ambiguous). One-sixth might then refer to labour during two of those twelve equal parts into which the daylight of each day was divided (82). Plutarch, however, (83) expressly refers to one-sixth of the crops. It is possible then that he referred to the interest on a loan (84). One of Solon's laws was to allow the creditor to fix his own rate of interest (85) and this would surely have been unnecessary if it had already been established in practice. It is probable that the amount of interest was fixed by custom before Solon's time, and therefore, freedom in economic affairs restricted, since there is usually opposition to any interest at all when it is first initiated (86). This is precisely the sort of custom, characteristic of a state suited originally to a static economy, which traders and their associates would have to fight and such

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a struggle, once begun, might be the final one, which led to the overthrow, not only of such a law, but of the state itself and the aristocracy's control of it.

If this were so, how did the interest come to be fixed at one-sixth? Professor Woodhouse (87) rightly argues for a connection between the hektemors and the fact that one medimnus was equivalent to six hekteis. But it is probable that they were also connected with the coinage (88). Heichelheim (89) thinks that coinage, loan capital, and the polis were all related. If coinage and loans were connected, then it is possible that the coin denominations may have been related to interest. In Rossel Island, the two coins, the Dop and the Kō, are each arranged on the basis of interest. For instance, the Dop has 1-22 values, and each dop is equivalent to the old dop plus a time unit representing interest (90). When therefore coins were struck in Attica, the *abol* may have been made one-sixth of the drachma because the accepted rate of interest was one-sixth in kind; and this would influence standards of weight also.

This new interpretation cannot be pressed, since the data for any theory are inadequate. There are an enormous number of possible interpretations of the word hektemors. The development may have been quite straightforward. For instance, in the Middle Ages some smallholders gave up their land to the abbies and manses for security. They enjoyed the produce freely, but had to make a fixed payment of wax on feast days. They then acquired the name *cerocensuales*. So a case can be made out for interpreting Hektemors as clients of this sort (91).

Solon's economic reforms consisted of taking away the horoi and freeing the land itself (92). This is usually taken to mean that the horoi had been set up as mortgage pillars and that their removal freed the land from the burden of debt (93). It has been argued (94) that horoi cannot have this meaning so early, and that they could only be interpreted as record stones indicating that the produce of the land, or part of it, belonged to some other landlord.

The only known meaning for so early a period is simply a boundary stone. If these were used to indicate the private property of an individual then they were probably of recent use, since the importance of private land only developed with the growth of production for sale. During this process much formerly public land may have been enclosed by local lords (95). To abolish the stones around formerly public land, would free the land and yet be technically consistent with the statement that no land was taken from the landowners (96). Again, the lack of sufficient data makes it impossible to determine that this, or any other theory, is necessarily the correct one.

Solon brought back those sold abroad as slaves (97), and perhaps paid for this by selling some of the public land; or more probably, he used some of the surplus money he gained from his financial reforms (98). He forbade the export of all agricultural produce except olive oil (99), perhaps to keep the price down when other prices began to rise as a result of the reform of the coinage (v.sub.), or perhaps to stop the contrast of hunger at home and the export of food abroad. Cheap food would be necessary to keep the landless and workless quiet until they were absorbed by industry (100). By allowing a man who had no son to adopt an heir and leave his estate to him, Solon was helping to preserve the property of a family intact, just as he had done by his law against dowries (v.sup). This reflects on the one hand the growing importance of private property as the basis of a family's wealth and position and, on the other, the growing freedom of the individual from customs and traditions which no longer corresponded to the changed social conditions (101). As Solon did not re-divide the land (102) and as he brought back former slaves, (103), and finally, as he cancelled all debts (104) and thus freed many from obligations of service not all of whom had any immediate means of subsistence, there must have been many unemployed. These were advantageous to the development of trade and industry for which a regular supply of labour, even on a small scale, was necessary. Indeed, it is probable that the opportunities for new jobs in the ports made the discontent of those tied to the land vocal for the first time, since only then was there any alternative. So long as freedom meant unemployment, serfs were better as serfs (105).

The further development of both industry and trade was stimulated by encouraging skilled craftsmen from other states to settle in Attica with their families, and by offering them the citizenship (106); with the same benefits to local industry no doubt as resulted from the settlement of Flemish craftsmen in East Anglia (107), and from the refuge given in England to Huguenot craftsmen in the seventeenth century (108). Fathers were compelled to have their sons taught a trade (109), and to protect the community while the workless were being absorbed by developing trade, laws were passed against idleness (110) and theft (111). Agriculture as an industry was encouraged by regulations on improved methods and technique (112).

Most important of all in carrying the state over the economic crisis was Solon's reforms of the coinage, weights and measures (113). He debased the coinage and thus added to its quantity by introducing a lighter standard (114). This would have the effect of easing the blockade of trade caused by lack of money, and, while at first easing the burden of the consumers, eventually it would reverse the fall in prices which had probably proved so disastrous, especially to the farmers. The new standard was the same as that of Corinth, and so acceptable in Cyrene, Sicily, South Italy and Etruria (115). Its effect was/

was to throw open the existing foreign markets to Attic goods (116) and thus to stimulate both trade and industry. The weights were increased at the same time and with the same immediate results of relieving distress (117).

In addition to relieving the economic distress, Solon had to make political and social concessions to the new social groups brought into existence by the economic revolution. Solon divided the citizens into four classes according to their income in agricultural produce either dry or liquid (118). This was a blow against those who had formerly assumed places of first importance in the community on the basis of birth and tradition alone. Those merchants who had acquired land by evasion of the law or open sale, and those who had married into landowning families, and, by the application of new business methods to the estates had made the family wealthy, those families whose younger sons had gone into trade and restored the family finances, and those who had developed vine and olive growing, now received an important place in society (119). Moreover Solon made it certain that this development would accelerate in the future. By giving foreigners the citizenship and allowing the sale of land (120), quite a new class of landlords would develop; while on the other hand more and more peasants turned to trade and industry. The law of this period (121) declaring that membership of a phratry and, therefore, the possession of civic rights should not be restricted to clansmen indicates, on the one hand, the extent to which the aristocracy had carried their exclusiveness in dominating the state and, on the other, the strength of the new social forces who could demand the suppression of this law or custom. The social transformation which had been evolving as a result of economic changes, now developed still further. Solon himself could not have foreseen these possibilities, since he actually established an oligarchial constitution by allowing the magistrates to be chosen only from the highest classes (122).

To all citizens however he gave the right to sit in the ecclesia, which probably meant very little; and the right to sit in the law court to hear appeals against sentences (123). This was meant no doubt to act as a restriction on the decisions of magistrates, all of whom were drawn from the top class.

Finally his law forbidding any citizen to be neutral in time of civil strife (124), may have been an attack on those important families, whose prestige was such, that they wielded undue influence in the community over large numbers of peasants on and around their estates (125).

In the Italian city states too, at a very similar stage of development, the first symptoms of the economic and social crisis caused by the development of trade and the consequent dislocation/

dislocation of the old economy, took the form of peasant revolts, probably because of the new opportunities offered to freemen in the towns. Nor were the old type of nobles contented, since many of them, desiring luxury goods, had fallen into debt through failing to reorganise their estates. Meanwhile, commerce stimulated mobility of soil, and merchants, who had become rich, bought land as an investment and for social prestige, while peasants demanded more land. To the new towns were welcomed merchants and artisans. Money began to circulate, although many payments, for instance tolls, were still made in kind (126).

In England too, in a comparable period, the agricultural crisis following on the trade revival of the fifteenth century, took the form of peasant revolts, lasting, as one would expect in so much larger an economic unit, over a long period and spread over many parts of the country. In Europe too, in the fifteenth century, there was a famine in currency which proved a serious check on the growth of trade (127). The effect of the discoveries, however, in increasing metals, gradually reversed that position, and proved a further stimulus to trade.

In English history the position of the Tudors, and Henry VII in particular, is objectively very similar to that of Solon. The Tudors represented and were supported by the new social groups which had arisen as a result of the trading revolution of the fifteenth century (128). Henry supported the building of ships and thus laid the basis for a commercial prosperity which would go far to absorb the landless peasants. Henry was supported by merchants and artisans, and the growth of the latter meant a demand for more foodstuffs, which checked the enclosures for pasturages and stimulated agriculture. During the transition period however, as in Attica, society was protected by penal laws against the unemployed and against theft, and by poor laws, some of which insisted on the apprenticing of children. Henry attacked the power of local nobles by prohibiting the keeping of retainers, and restricted their power as a class by setting up new legal machinery to deal with offenders who escaped the local courts. These were used mainly against the nobles and were therefore popular with the people. In many ways this represented a culmination of a centralising policy begun by earlier English Kings, as Solon's organisation was the culmination in many ways of Theseus' policy. Like Solon too, Henry VII made possible the growth of a new nobility, a process which had probably been developing but which now received official recognition. While the new rich developed into a new aristocracy, Parliament, destined to be the weapon of the Middle Class, though passive, grew strong under the Tudors (129). Finally the Tudors, like Solon, rested essentially on a balance of social forces and economic interests. The subsequent strengthening of one of these altered not only the balance, but the policies, of both Tudors and Solon. In short, /

short, the Tudors, like Solon, really provided a form of political and social organisation through which the new economic methods could express themselves and develop, and, by strengthening the unity of the community under central control, they provided unity and coherence in economic organisation and political structure.

These analogies naturally must not be pressed too far. Similar revolutions in economy do present similar general lines of development, but as there are always many differences in detail, and as the heritage of their pasts differs widely, any analysis would uncover an enormous variation of development. In England especially, not only was the economic unit much larger, but, because there was no slavery, the social and economic developments were a prelude to the growth of a large landless proletariat, and finally the industrial revolution which absorbed them. However, the analogy is still worth drawing, as much to emphasise the differences as the similarities.

As Solon's greatest contribution to progress was his unconscious removal of obstacles to still further economic and social changes (130), it is not surprising to find that the situation developed rapidly to further crisis. The nobles began to realise that their monopoly of privileged positions was threatened, and the trading interests, while they were certainly growing strong enough to struggle for direct power, were more consciously concerned with securing a settled government of business based on the free exchange of commodities. This desire ultimately led them to political power, but they did not see that as their immediate objective. (No more did all the Parliamentary supporters in England visualise a Civil War and the execution of Charles I, when they first entered the struggle for certain economic demands).

If Solon had obstructed the development of trade and the new type of agriculture, a political crisis might have been avoided for a considerable time. By encouraging their development, however, he not only increased the numbers and strength of the new trading and artisan section of the population, but also served to emphasise still further the hampering effect of a state based on aristocratic privilege and on customs associated with a static agricultural economy. For a short time the economy expanded rapidly under his encouragement but probably quite soon after found itself again hampered by the restrictions of tradition and aristocratic control. The rapidity of the advance would soon demand still more changes if that advance was to continue, Solon's increase of coins had facilitated the advance of trade but the rapidity of this expansion would demand a still further increase in coins. It was Peisistratus, therefore, who issued coins on a scale far greater than hitherto (131). Once he was in control of the state/

state he could make such measures part of the state policy and so accomplish what the traders and supporters of the tyrant had unconsciously been striving for, a state and policy in their interests and eventually dominated by them. Many peasants had acquired land from Solon but no capital to ensure their prosperity. So long as the majority of the population was too poor to buy many of the new goods and the laws were suited to the needs of the nobles, landlords and aristocratic privilege rather than for the purpose of expanding trade at home and abroad, the economy and ultimately the whole life of the community would stagnate. Evidence of the details of economic advance and decline is of course not available for early Greece, although the general lines are clear from Solon's reforms, the evidence of coinage, and later social and political developments in Attica. Suggested details, therefore, although their possibilities may be indicated, should not be pressed too far. What is of fundamental importance is that there was an economic crisis in Solon's time, that Solon encouraged trade and so increased the power of the new people and partially solved the agricultural crisis, but that his laws were soon outgrown and the new people compelled to take other measures to complete their advance to influence and power.

The contrast, therefore, between the new wine and the old bottle was becoming more acute. No further modifications and concessions were possible. Solon had represented the limit of such a policy. When a social struggle has reached the point where further concessions would mean the irreparable wrecking of the existing political and social system and the ruling class's control of it, then the rising economy can no longer develop until the new people gain sufficient authority and power to remove all these obstacles to progress and create a form of state which will correspond no longer to the decaying economy, but to the new content, the new economy already flourishing (132). This development took time even in a small state like Attica but once the old form of the society is outworn and tottering and the rising economy and new social forces, already matured, then the necessity for change is forced on men's consciousness (133).

Thereupon religion and morality, philosophy and ideologies, are all called upon to help mobilise and justify the struggle of each section. Men's ideas, which are strongly influenced by the intellectual and social traditions of the past (v.sup.ch.ii), usually lag behind the new social alliances. Again it must be emphasised it is man himself who is involved in this struggle and not some abstract forces or principles; and it was those men, who found their own careers and businesses affected, who took the obvious step of removing the obstacles which appeared obstructive to them. Since, then, it is man who makes history, an economic crisis will usually be expressed by his demand for work, /

work, land or cancellation of debts as in Solon's time. The actual social struggle is usually only half comprehended by the men participating in it, and it is frequently expressed in an ideological, sometimes religion, form. Moreover men's ideas will be all the more confused and incomplete if the material conditions are such that no practical solution is yet possible. Individuals occasionally produce by an inspired guess theories which anticipate even the need for them, but, in general, men cannot be criticised for failing to solve problems not yet fully developed or insoluble at such a period (134). That is why Solon's solution was only temporary. Without the full maturity of the problem, the solution for it could not be ascertained.

However, man's cognition^{does} at least keep in touch with social conditions and becomes clearer and better defined as the real associations develop more fully and the new life becomes more clearly visible. A distinction should always be drawn however between the practical changes in economic and technical methods which can be determined almost statistically (135) from archaeological and other evidence, and the ideological forms under which men defend and develop these changes and through which they are conscious of them. Religion and morality, for instance, may play their part in influencing men who call in different creeds to their aid. The Reformation is a striking example of the type of ideological form a social struggle can assume and also of how an ideology can enforce the struggle (136). In the French Revolution, too, social revolt was partially expressed in religious form although religion was not a fundamental part of the struggle (137). In many Dorian states the tyrants used anti-Dorian sentiments to aid their cause, while in England during the Civil War anti-Norman sentiments were similarly employed (v.sub., ch.v).

While the new ideas and theories which arise with social changes become tremendously important and powerful in solving new problems, in organising, mobilising, and transforming men's opinions and their material conditions and, in general, in furthering the progress of society (138), the old ideas and theories which had almost outlived the conditions which gave rise to them, serve to hinder and obstruct the rising section of the community by the influence they exercise on those whose interests are expressed by and associated with the old theories (139). The party fighting for the status quo will use all the customs and religious rites of the existing state and society as arguments for a policy of no change, while the new conditions which produced the new people will also have helped to produce new ideas and philosophies, which, in their turn, will help to mobilise the new people and may give the whole struggle a quite different appearance./

appearance. The content of laws and institutions aimed at or attacked reflect, on the whole, the material interests of the people supporting them, but the form in which they are expressed is strongly influenced by this social psychology or accepted ideology which, in turn, influences the appearance of the whole conflict. Of course men are seldom conscious of the role played by customs and ideologies. The new religion associated with Dionysus had considerable social importance (v. sub.), but that is not to say its supporters were conscious of the fact or deliberately used it as such.

The dominant section of a community will stamp the ideas, customs and beliefs characteristic of it on the whole community and for long the whole influence of custom and tradition is, therefore, opposed to those advocating or demanding social reform. Not only do laws and institutions closely reflect the society under which they took shape, but even art and philosophy and all the creations of the mind and imagination reveal the influence both of current society and older ideologies. When we talk of a work of art, a poem or philosophic theory being in the "spirit of the times" or in accordance with the "national character", we really mean that it corresponds to, and is harmonious with, the prevailing sentiments of those parts of the population which set the tone of the period or country. People become accustomed to the prevailing beliefs and only a radical change in their lives and associations will introduce a new note or spirit. Only when the new social groupings have themselves become matured do the new ideas which accompany their appearance begin to make headway against accepted custom and behaviour. The new spirit may then be expressed in religious beliefs and new philosophic concepts as well as in new traditions in science and art.

In Attica the religious rites which had assumed importance in the settled conditions of the early aristocracy began to break down when social upheavals again raised doubts in men's minds. The aristocratic assumption that social privilege belonged to birth as a right began to be challenged by ideas associated with the new wealth despised so much by nobles such as Theognis. The demand for improved technique in crafts and seamanship was paralleled by new forms of art and a fresh approach to science and philosophy. In fact, periods of economic expansion are always periods of ideological diversity (140), since so many new activities and interests produce new opinions and ideas without at first displacing the old. Moreover while new social arrangements produce new rites and customs, further modifications and variations of these social alliances will produce similar modifications and variations of customs and beliefs associated with them, although many of the older customs linger on, so that a complex picture is presented for the historian to analyse.

The new people who had, at the beginning of the economic revolution/

revolution in Greece, been mere packmen, adventurers, even pirates, and artisans were by this time wealthy merchants, traders, prosperous farmers who had money with which to adopt the latest technique, and owners of small industries. Periods when trade is beginning or reviving usually offer prospects of speedy enrichment to those willing to face its hazards (v.sup.). The aristocratic polis had allowed this fairly rapid growth of individual prosperity and social transformations to a degree impossible for the new people in the Bronze Age trading revolution. Since in the break up period society did not revert completely to a Neolithic type of community, but retained much of the social structure of the Bronze Age (v.sup., ch.ii), the early polis was a much more advanced state form than the Neolithic village in which the Bronze Age trading revolution had had its beginnings.

Meanwhile the lower ranks in this new economy were being continually recruited from former peasants, workless and adventurers. Here it was the progressive rôle of iron which made it possible for some landless to clear a plot and to produce for the market, and for others offered even better opportunities in the expanding workshops in the town. The alphabet was having an equally progressive effect on the social status of the new people. It was making possible an intelligent interest in laws and public affairs generally. It was helping to create craftsmen of real intelligence instead of types of serfs. In short, it was helping to provide all the new people with an intelligence and public spirit, which not only played a part in mobilising them for their attack on the nobility, but helped to assure their success and provided them with the qualities essential for the maintenance and organisation of their own control of affairs.

These people had already challenged the old nobility's right to privilege based on birth and had claimed equal rights on the basis of their wealth; and, eventually, had won substantial concessions from Solon. They were not however all powerful in the community. They still occupied only second place. While for some this may have been sufficient, the majority no doubt felt that the future belonged to the new type of wealth and its possessors and that society and the state should recognise this. In addition, until the people controlled the laws and government and directed them to suit their own interests, trade and industry could not be given every facility for growth. This might be felt in various ways. Perhaps the merchants wanted a particular kind of financial measure to suit their business. Perhaps they desired the state to pursue a certain line in foreign politics or a home policy which would provide them with sufficient supplies of labourers and raw materials on the one hand, and markets at home and abroad for their goods on the other. While in any state involved in this particular type of/

of crisis the general movement is on the whole, fairly similar, details of conflicting demands will vary greatly. For Attica, too, the evidence for social alliances, as for economic changes, is of the most general character. It is, of course, the general trend of events which is of real importance and details suggested to illustrate that trend, although of value and interest, must not be pushed too far.

In general, in Attica, too much of the old form of society and state remained for full social and economic advance to be possible so long as the nobility remained in control. Of course this was not clearly understood by the people themselves but the immediate effects of economic decline would affect everyone so directly that action would be forced on them. If trade, industry and agriculture did not continue to expand, not only would the absorption of workless and landless into new jobs be slowed down and ultimately stopped, but actually the numbers of unemployed would probably increase. Slackening trade would hurt the farmers as much as the town merchants and the seamen, while the poor peasants, who had gained land but no capital, would again be reduced to hardship. Virtually all sections of Attica's population must have been suffering in some way or other and so found themselves associating with those who attacked the status quo and demanded some sort of change. The new people did not this time merely demand equal rights with the nobility but, by being forced to fight, were virtually, though probably unconsciously, challenging the whole control of society and the state. The nobility too, therefore, were forced to organise in defence of their power and position.

In 580 B.C. the strength of the Eupatridae - who probably represented by then a coalition of old landed families and those who had become rich by the new agricultural or trading methods (141) - was still equal to the combined strength of the small farmers and the smaller merchants and artisans (142). By 570 B.C., however, the strength of the merchant party must have been formidable, since it probably included both Megacles of the Alcmaeonidae (143), and Peisistratus, whose family had long been opposed to the Philaid clan which led the party of the Plain. Peisistratus later formed a third party, the "Hill Party", leaving Megacles as head of the "Shore Party" and Lycurgus leading the "Plain" (144). The Party of the Plain was obviously in the main, that of the big landowners, including families whose estates had probably been in the Attic and Eleusinian plains since the time of Theseus. The Attic plain is nearest to Athens itself, which Theseus made the centre of the community, while some of the oldest families with control of religious rites, came from Eleusis, which had perhaps the most fertile plain in Attica (145).
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These families controlled the religious rites of the community and no doubt enjoyed the greatest prestige. The Plain party probably also included some families, whether old or new, engaged in olive growing since the Attic plain is one of the most suitable parts of Attica for olive growing (146). Some of these families may have acquired their land by marriage or some form of sale. It should be remembered that not all noble families were necessarily prosperous. If old families had tried to maintain a static economy and old-fashioned methods, when an expanding economy was facilitating mobility of soil, many of them would have been forced to give up their estates. At best, they may have succeeded in retaining their land without being able to make it prosper. Solon's father was one noble who solved his sudden poverty by frankly adopting the new means of subsistence offered by trade. In addition, there may have been some who had made their fortune in trade but who had been associated long enough with the nobility through marriage or land ownership to link their interests with theirs and to defend their privileges rather than support the merchants, whose money came from the same source as their own but was unfortunately of more recent date! No doubt some landowners in the Plain party depended on trade for prosperity, but they wished to combine this with a retention of the old type of privilege; failing to realise that it was just this preservation of old institutions and customs and the control of the state and its policy by people not directly interested in trade and the new economy, which eventually prevented trade from prospering.

The Shore is that part of Attica nearest to Prasiae, the only port used in Attica until well into the sixth century (147). The party of the Shore would therefore consist mainly of merchants and artisans in the port. In addition there were probably some farmers closely allied to the merchants, especially those farmers who were particularly interested in new agricultural technique, in closer connections between agriculture and trade and, therefore, desired those activities freed from the hampering effect of the old type of society.

The Hill Party is usually supposed to have been composed of peasants on the poor land of the uplands, but Professor Ure (148) argues that the supporters of Peisistratus were free miners from the Laureion mines. While these probably represented the bulk of his party, there is no reason to suppose that they were his only supporters, or that they played the part of a private army (149). His arguments (150), that the peasants were notoriously reactionary, contradicts the evidence of Plutarch and Aristotle (151). A few peasants may just have succeeded in existing on the stony ground of the hills, while those landless still unabsorbed by trade, no doubt eked out a miserable existence by casual labour in the countryside./

countryside. Some of Peisistratus' supporters may therefore have been agricultural workers in the Plain. Such divisions as Plain, Shore and Hill must have involved overlapping. (The division in the English Civil War was between the South-West and North-East; however it only indicated very general lines of support). Those who still had land had been assisted by Solon's abolition of debts, practical hints on farming, and sufficient coinage to stimulate trade and raise prices, but probably the peasant never had a chance to benefit by this since he lacked the capital necessary to launch him (152). Moreover, the fact that his land was now freed from debt would tend to encourage his thirst for more land (153). Supporters of Peisistratus also included descendants of immigrants who had been admitted to citizenship but, in a period of growing aristocratic exclusiveness, probably felt their position precarious and so backed Peisistratus in order to consolidate their privileges (154).

In general, Peisistratus was supported by the extremists (155), those whose demands went further than others. Yet Peisistratus was still in harmony with the demands of the trading party, including small farmers of the new business type (156), since, to satisfy the needs of his supporters, whether miners, artisans or peasants, he must satisfy the merchants' demands. The difference in the two policies was simply that the merchants saw no need to go further and give any concessions to peasants and artisans. Peisistratus' policy of doing so was, however, the basis of that broad democracy and economic vitality, which so stimulated Athenian commerce, prosperity, and political strength. Peisistratus himself was probably only using these supporters as a weapon in his rivalries with other great personalities, but his strength and power was the result of his alliance with the most progressive sections of the community.

It might be useful here to consider the leaders of the three parties, and their family history. The Plain had as leaders Cimon and Miltiades of the Philaid clan (157), and Lycurgus (158) of the Butadae (159). The latter were an old aristocratic family settled in the plain, probably in Athens itself (160), and with control of certain religious rites (161) which point to their dominance at the time of Theseus (162). The Philaidae were immigrants to Attica and settled at Brauron (163). They might therefore have been expected to join the Shore party, but their long-standing rivalry with the Peisistratidae, whose estates were not far off at Brauron (164), may have forced them to accept the leadership of the Plain in opposition to Peisistratus (165).

The Alcmaeonidae, the Peisistratidae, and the Medontidae, of whom Solon was a member, were all immigrants from Messenia (166), and became part of the aristocracy of Attica as a result of the welcome extended to foreigners by Theseus and his successors,
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No doubt, however, they had to take such land as was available, and this was probably less fertile. Moreover they did not have control of the important religious rites in the community. Even the new cults brought in by Ion and his sons were usually relegated to the Eastern and North Eastern parts of Attica, while even those which did succeed in gaining a foothold in Athens, never penetrated to the Acropolis but had to be content with sanctuaries in the lower town (167). The Gephyrean clan, to which the murderers of Hipparchus belonged, was of foreign origin and while its members received the citizenship they were still excluded from a number of privileges (168). Poverty of soil and the geographical situation of their estates, help to explain why these families were interested in trade early (169). The Alcmaeonidae probably lived on the south slopes of Parnes (170), which might well mean in a valley with an outlet to the sea on the east. At any rate they had trading connections with the East which brought them huge profits (171). The Peisistratidae were well situated for trade at Prasiae. Solon, was said to have become interested in trade because his father had lost his fortune. Although of noble family he was regarded as one of the middle class, since his fortune rested on trade and he represented therefore the new type of wealth (172).

When Peisistratus seized power in Athens by force, an alliance between the Shore and Plain parties expelled him almost at once (173). However, the parties of the Shore and Hill had too much in common to allow the victory of the Plain, and so allied themselves to restore Peisistratus (174). A further quarrel forced Peisistratus to retire from Attica to Thrace, and it was only after ten years, and with the wealth of the Pangaeian mines in his control, that he was re-established as tyrant (175). The tyranny, thereupon, was responsible for the destruction of the remnants of aristocratic privilege and domination and, while laying the foundations of a new type of state characteristic essentially of the middle class, it also threw open the doors of social advance to the poorest and most depressed classes in the community.

Thanks, therefore, to the role played by iron and the alphabet within a more advanced social framework, the new economy in the Greek states had had a more widespread effect than in the Bronze Age, and so had severely weakened the static, land economy on which the power of the nobility had rested. In addition, the people involved in the new economy became far more numerous than they had ever been in the Bronze Age and so, in face of a greatly weakened aristocracy, were finally strong enough to challenge and overthrow aristocratic rule.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV.

1. Hdt., vii. 94; cf. i. 57; ii. 51; vi. 137; viii. 44; Thuc., i. 2; ii. 30; Isocr., Pan.; cf. Plato, Menex., 237, B-C., etc.
2. Mar. Par., Ep. i. LL. 3-7; cf. Hdt., viii. 44; Paus.I. 2.5.
3. cf. Myres, Who Were the Greeks? p.325. For the dating of all this early period cf. Myres, op.cit., pp.154 ff., 325 ff., 348 ff.
4. Hdt., v.66, 69; viii. 44; Aris., Ath. Pol., xii, 2 and frag. i; Eur., Ion, 1575-88; cf. Myres, op.cit., p.155, esp. nn. 125, 131; cf. p.160; cf. E.A. Gardner, C.A.H.iii, p.583. On the four tribes of Attica generally cf. Pollux, viii. 9. 109-11; Strabo, viii. 7. 1. gives different names. So Plut., Sol., 25. For the arguments cf. Francotte, La Polis grecque, pp. 6-9, and Wilamowitz, Aristotile u. Athens, II. p.140, who reject the idea of the names representing occupations. W.M. Ramsay, J.H.S. xl., p. 197 ff., and C.F. Hermann, Greek Antiquities, pp. 193 ff., accept the theory of occupations.
5. Plut., Thes., 2. Cf., Myres, op.cit., pp. 325, 351, 537.
6. Plut., Thes., 12, 13, 24.
7. *ibid*, 12, 13.
8. cf. E.A. Gardner, C.A.H., III, p.580.; cf. Thomson, Aesh. and Athens., p.75. I disagree however with Thomson's view that the nobles had been trying to establish a state against their own people and that the legend of Theseus represents this. The establishment of the aristocracy was a later development. The legend of Theseus is I believe essentially correct, but many of the events it describes were probably either repeated or spread over a considerable time.
9. Thuc., ii. 15; Theoph., Char., 29. 4; Plut., Thes., 24.
10. Cf. G.W. Cox, History of Greece, i.p. 189, for this view.
11. Henry I, like Theseus, had struggled against any attempts at local rule by feudal lords, and actually defeated one such attempt made by Robert, Duke of Normandy, with the aid of the Saxons who were said to have supported Henry in much the same way as the poor supported Theseus; and probably for the same reason, that central power gave more settled conditions and more uniform laws. It must however be stressed that in England, since it was a large social unit, the process took much longer.

12. cf. Aris. Ath. Pol., 41, 2, where he says Theseus was very little different from a monarch.
13. Plut., Comp. Rom. and Thes.
14. Theseus had been connected with copper ingots of the ox type, cf. Plut., Thes., 25; Pollux. ix. 60; Schol. Ar. Av., 1106. The latter two do not mention Theseus, but only regard the ox type as the earliest Athenian coinage. Cf. Seltman, Athens, etc., pp.1-5, on the factual basis of the tradition.
15. Plut., Thes., 25, 36. Cf. the ideas of John Wycliffe on monarchy. He supported the idea of a king who should use his authority (against the local nobles) to protect the peasants; cf. Wycliffe, Civ. Dom., I. c. xiv, p.99.
16. Plut., Thes., 25.
17. Aris., Pol., ii. 6. 13; Plut., Thes. 25; Dion. Hal., ii. 8. Wade-Gery, C.Q., xxv. p.4, argues that Theseus added the Eupatridae to the state which had formerly consisted of Georgoi and Demiourgoi. Actually before Theseus there had been noble families with their own peasants, artisans and fighting retainers. That had been the basis of military and social organisation in the heroic age. What Theseus did was to create a centralised state in which the nobles - now brought together for the first time - peasants and artisans were the basis of the whole state and not of small localities. The description of Attica (Dion. Hal. ii. 8) as divided into rich Eupatrids and poor peasants could only mean that the nobles had become rich by plunder in warfare, while the majority of the people were left to carry on agriculture. Later, as the nobles settled more permanently on the land they became organised more definitely as a class. Theseus had laid the basis for this, but did not deliberately add the Eupatrids as a new class to the state. Further changes in economic and social arrangements probably continued steadily until the crisis in Solon's time forced action on the community.
18. Plut., Thes., 16-31.
19. cf. Ure, Origin of Tyranny, p.321, for the evidence for this early Thalassocracy.
20. Plut., Thes. 32.
21. *ibid*, 24.
22. *ibid*.
23. Plut., Thes., 32, 34.
- 24./

24. Myres, *op.cit.*, pp.348-51.
25. Plut., *Thes.*, 32.
26. cf. Morton, *A People's History of England*, pp.83-5.
27. Plut., *Thes.*, 25.
28. The above interpretation of Theseus contains many new features. It is consistent both with the essential features of the accounts given by ancient writers and the general development of Attica as interpreted according to archaeological evidence. It avoids many of the discrepancies pointed out by various authors.
29. Myres, *Pol. Ideas of the Greeks*, p.52.
30. cf. *Hdt.*, v.66; *Strabo*. xiv. 1.3.; *Xen.*, *Hell.*, vi. 5.45. Cf. Hogarth, *Ionian and the East*, p.104 on this.
31. *Paus.* ii. 18; cf. vii. 1-2.
32. *Strabo*, ix. 1.7. *Paus.* I. 3.2., stresses that the Greek tradition of a democracy existing continuously from Theseus' day was clearly false since his descendants ruled in Athens for three generations after Menestheus. Clearly the process begun by Theseus would be a fluctuating one extending over a long period.
33. ii. 15.
34. Gardner, *C.A.H.* iii, p.580, also argues for a long process.
35. Hogarth, *op.cit.*, p.38, points out that Aegean culture survived to a late date in Attica according to archaeological evidence. Myres, *op.cit.*, p.58, argues that many survivals of Minoan civilisation, which were destroyed elsewhere, remained in Athens. When it is remembered that in spite of invasion much of Mycenaean civilisation did survive in Greece, one has some idea of the rich legacy that Athens enjoyed.
36. Adcock, *C.A.H.* iii, p.693; cf. Gardner, *ibid*, p.583.
37. Gardner, *ibid*, p.585, thinks that they originated from a group of landowners associating together; cf. Adcock, *ibid*.
38. Gardner, *ibid.* V. sub., ch.ii, on the development of cavalry in the time of the aristocracy instead of the individual charioteers of the heroic age.
39. Justin, ii, 7.
40. *Aris. Ath. Pol.*, 3.1; *Dion, Hal.* i. 71; *Euseb., Chron.* I. 189; II. 80.
- 41./

41. Dion. Hal., *ibid.*; cf. Paus., iv. 13. 7; 1.3.2., who makes it Ol. xiii, 2, and not, xiv, 3 as Dion. Hal. does.
42. Gardner, *ibid.*, pp.591-2.
43. cf. Freeman, *The Work and Life of Solon*, p.46 n.2., on this dating.
44. cf. Adcock, *ibid.*, pp.695-700.
45. Thomson, *Aeschylus and Athens*, p.79.
46. Gardner, *ibid.*, p.594, believes these financial changes were due to the introduction of a money economy, but this seems too early a period for money to have this effect. The development of exchange within a static economy had a much more revolutionary effect (cf. C.E.H., I. 503), which money later intensified, and it was probably this which caused the financial re-arrangements; cf. pp.594-5 on taxation.
47. Aris. Ath. Pol.4, believed the arrangement into Hippias, Zeugitae and Thetes was pre-Solonian, although Greek tradition usually ascribes it to Solon.
48. Gardner, *ibid.*, p.597.
49. *History of Rome*, iv., p.231.
50. In nineteenth century England, for instance, the liberal manufacturers passed corn laws and land bills which attacked the landlords, while the landlords passed factory acts which injured the manufacturers. Cf. the struggle of the merchants with the Stuarts over ship money.
51. Consider how the Church first opposed usury outright, for example "Bill Against Usury" in England (Tudor Economic Documents, vol.ii, p.142, ed. Tawney and Power, Ldn.1924). Compromise in sixteenth century Europe is expressed by Eumoulin, a French lawyer who talks of "moderate and acceptable usury", (cf. "Early Economic Thought", ed. A.E.Monroe, Ldn.). Cf. Tawney, "Religion and the Rise of Capitalism", Pelican ed., 1940, p.57, for exx. of the Churches attack on usury, and p.64 for exx. of its compromise with it.

For an example of how new conditions arise in spite of laws cf. T. Hodgskin, "The Natural and Artificial Rights of Property Contrasted", Ldn., 1832, pp.98-9; "the Capitalist may now be said to be the first owner of all the wealth of the community though no law has conferred on him the rights to this property..... this change has been effected by the taking of interest on capital all the lawgivers of Europe endeavoured to prevent this by statutes against usury".

52. Diog. Laert., x. 153.
53. v. sup., ch. iii, n.116.
54. cf. More's Utopia (ed. Lupton, Oxf., 1895) pp. 89 ff., 105 ff., for the importance of this point.
55. The Court of the Star Chamber and similar courts were picked out for special attack in England. Almoner's Thursday is the type of custom that still survives. For other survivals cf. "Britain", by Mass-Observation (Penguin, ed.).
56. Aris., Pol., ii. 12. 1274 B; Rhet., ii. 25; Plut., Solon, 19; Paus., ix. 36., 4.
57. Aris. Pol. ii. 12, 1274 B; Rhet. ii. 23; Plut., Sol.17.
58. Whibley, Greek Oligarchies, p.78 n.21, believes that Draco's laws were a recognition of changes which had already taken place. This is very probable, but the most revolutionary feature about them was that they were written.

At a similar period English laws were just as harsh. In 1536 A.D. when there were many landless as a result of the enclosures, it was decreed that vagabonds should have their ears cut off and the death penalty was enacted for a third offence. In 1547 anyone who refused to work was condemned to be the slave of whoever denounced him. In 1572 unlicensed beggars of 14 or over were to be flogged and branded unless someone would employ them. For a second offence they were to be executed. Cf. Morton, op.cit., pp. 163-4. In England 72,000 persons were executed in the reign of Henry VIII. cf. Draco's law against idleness and theft, prescribing death, (Plut.Sol.17), or atimia (Pollux viii. 42).

59. Childe, Man Makes Himself, pp.159-61.
60. Childe, Univ. Forward, l.c., p.7.
61. cf. Certel, C.A.H. xii, pp.252-3. To solve the economic crisis in the Roman empire industry^{they} would have had to "exploit the internal market more actively" since expansion was no longer possible. To do that however would have involved "a modification in the social structure" since it would have been necessary to extend the home market to "include the lower classes".
62. Thucyd., I. 126.,
63. Seltman, Athens, etc., pp.14, 16-7. v.sup., Ch.ii, n.194.
- 64./

64. Argos for instance began to coin in the first half of the seventh century; cf. Seltman op.cit., pp.33; cf. Ure, op.cit., pp.153 ff.
65. cf. W.J. Woodhouse, "Solon The Liberator", pp.117 ff. Cf. however C. Seltman, op.cit., p.30, who puts the war with Megara between Solon and Peisistratus.
66. Aris. Ath. Pol. 2.2; 5. 1.; Plut. Solon, 13.
67. cf. Woodhouse, op.cit., pp. 74 ff. Cf. however Giraud, La Propriété foncière, pp.93-107, who thinks sale began about the middle of the seventh century B.C. in Attica. Cf. Hes. Op.341 for a reference to sale; cf. Plut. Sol. 15, for the story of Solon's friends buying land. Cf. Theoph. frg. xcvi. 5 on the sale of land in the seventh century.
68. Nouvelles Recherches, pp.111-117.
69. Aris. Ath. Pol. 2.2; Plut. Sol. 13.
70. Cf. Bury, "Hist. Greece", pp.181 ff., for this view. His idea that wage labourers would borrow and then become serfs cannot be maintained. Security of the debtor's person was not enough. Where free labour was plentiful it was cheaper to use it than to use slaves. In the Middle Ages some peasants had such small strips that they were forced to work days on the lord's land too. It was having that strip of their own which bound them to the soil. If they had been landless they would probably have drifted to the towns.
71. Quite recently the peasants of Bukovina worked for one sheaf in 10. Others were prepared to work for 1 in 12, which illustrates how plentiful labour will lower the rates and so prevent the maintenance of one fixed rate. At reaping time when there was demand for labour some landlords paid one in 9, or 1 in 8 sheaves.
72. Hes. Op. 37, 376, 633 ff., 647 ff. So in eighteenth century China the custom of dividing the land among the sons on the death of the father still existed and led to the parcelling of land at a time when big landlords were beginning to increase the size of their estates cf. A. Clegg, The Birth of New China, Ldn. 1943, pp.7-9.
73. Plut. Sol. 20. This connection between Solon's law and the cutting up of family estates has not been drawn before. In Bukovina the peasants followed the same custom, giving both daughters and sons portions of land when they married, with the result that a whole family became landless in a generation.

74. cf. Solon, frags. 30-31 (H-C.) where he distinguished
a/ tous krathentas and tous enthade autou douleian
aeikei echontas. In eighteenth century China similar
conditions turned "free" peasants into tenants and
serfs. cf. Clegg, op.cit., p.8.
75. W. Wayte, CR. viii. p.146 ff; P. Guiraud, op.cit., p.422;
J. Toutain, "Economic Life of the Ancient World", p.42;
U. v. Wilamowitz, Aristt. u. Ath. ii. p.58; Busolt,
Gr. Gesch., ii. p.108 ff.; H. Francotte, "L'industrie
dans la Grèce ancienne" ii. p.341.
76. It is true that French peasants in the eighteenth
century paid 80% of their income in taxes; cf. Huberman,
op.cit. p.153. However Hindu peasants paid one-sixth
before the British occupation; cf. Code of Manu.
77. Solon, 13.
78. s.v. Epimortos.
79. H. Sidgwick, C.R. viii. p.296 ff.; J. Sandys, "Constitution
of Athens", p.5; E.S. Thompson, C.R. viii. pp.444 ff.;
G. de Sanctis, "Storia della Repubblica Ateniese", p.196.
80. Hesych. s.v. Hektemoroi; Photios, s.v. Pelatai; Schol.ad.
Plat. Euthyphr. 4C.
81. Aris. Ath. Pol. 2. 2.
82. For the division of the day cf. L. Whibley, "Companion
to Greek Studies", p.589. This connection with Hektemors
has not been suggested before. Though plausible, it
does not solve all the difficulties.
83. Sol. 13.
84. cf. G. de Sanctis, op.cit., p.196 n.4.
85. Lys. x. 18.
86. cf. the laws against usury in the Middle Ages v. sup. ~~51~~
n. ~~51~~. Cf. the feeling against the new kind of money
in Hesiod, ch.ii. ~~51~~. The struggle against Ship
Money in England proved the final one which led to the
overthrow of the state itself and the establishment of
a state of a new type.
87. pp.123-124.
88. cf. Plut. Sol. 23, where the medimnos is reckoned as
equivalent to one drachma.
89. Gesch. des Altertums, I, p.224.
- 90./

90. W.E. Armstrong, "Economic Journal", 1924, pp.423 ff.
91. cf. H. Pirenne, op.cit., p.61, on the cerocensuales. Hektemors are classed with Pelatai by Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 2.2. Pelates is used by Plato and Aristotle, cf. Liddell and Scott, to mean a dependant or hireling, one who approaches to seek protection. Aristotle Ath. Pol. 2.2. suggests that hektemors cultivated land in the possession of the rich, not their own.
92. Plut. Sol. 15. Cf. Solon frgs. 30-31; Aris. Ath. Pol. 12. 4.
93. P. Giraud, op.cit., pp. 280 ff; K. Freeman, "Work and Life of Solon", p. 62. n.2.
94. Woodhouse, op.cit., pp. 99 ff., pp.149 ff. See Gilliard, "Quelques Réformes de Solon", pp.130-135.
95. v. sup. ch.iii. n. 130. Cf. the enclosures in England. For an example of the opposite process where the rich remove the landmarks of the poor and thus encroached on their land, cf. Proverbs 23. 10. "Remove not the old landmarks, and enter not into the fields of the fatherless".
96. Aris. Ath. Pol. ii. 2. Plut. Sol. 16.
97. Aris. Ath. Pol.12.4.; Plut. Sol. 15.
98. In 484 B.C. surplus money from the mines was treated as public property; cf. Hdt. vii. 144, Seltman op.cit., pl. xx and p.106.
99. Plut. Sol. 24.
100. In Italy the workless in the towns created the same problem. Forbidding exports of grain in order to provide them with cheap food was one measure adopted, C.E.H. I. p.339 This led to less production of grain eventually, and later Florence actually had to import corn, which led to price fluctuations; p.340. Eventually too it meant a rise in prices because of the shortage.
101. For varying views on this law cf. Fustel de Coulanges, Nouv. Rech. p.42; Toutain, Economic History, p.44.
102. Aris.Ath. Pol. xi. 2.; Plut. Sol. xvi.
103. Aris. Ath. Pol.12. 4.; Plut. Sol. 15.
104. Aris. Ath. Pol. ii. 2. Cf. 13. 3.; Plut. Sol. 15. Androtion, ap. Plut. Sol. 15, thought that this was brought about as a result of the reforms of currency and measures. This theory is usually rejected, but some scholars deny that the seisachtheia was the remission of all debts; cf. G. de Sactis, op.cit., pp.206 ff.
- 105./

105. cf. Aris. Ath. Pol. 2.3., where serfdom was stated to be the worst part of their condition. The general trend of economic and social development in this period and under the tyrannies was the freeing of labour from restricting ties. It was much later that the great expansion of trade and industry led to the growth of slavery (v.sub.).
106. Plut. Sol.24.
107. A. Morton, op.cit., p.149.
108. ibid. p.274. In seventeenth century France Colbert practically kidnapped foreign craftsmen where other methods proved useless; cf. P. Boissonade, Colbert, Paris, 1932, p.292. Queen Elizabeth showed extraordinary solicitude for skilled foreign craftsmen; cf. Tudor Economic Documents, ed. Tawney and Power, Ldn. 1924, I.p.249.
109. Plut. Sol. 22. Cf. Aesch. C. Timarch. 27 (4), on the attention paid to artisans.
110. Plut. Sol. 22.; Diog. Laert.I. 55.
111. Hdt. ii. 177; Demosth. xxiv. 105, 113, 114; Lysias, x. 16-17; Diod. Sic. i. 77.
112. Plut. Sol. 23.
113. Aris. Ath. Pol. 10.
114. C. Seltman, op.cit., p.17.
115. ibid. pp.17-18.
116. ibid. p.16.
117. cf. ibid. p.17 n.1. For the whole argument on the currency and measures reforms, see ibid. pp.16-18.
118. Plut. Sol. 18.
119. cf. B. Keil, "Die solonische Verfassung", p.70, for the idea that assessment in oil was now added to that in grain.
120. Plut. Sol. 21.
121. cf. Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens, p.200; Gardener, C.A.H. III, pp.583-4.
122. Aris. Pol. II, 12. 1274A. 19.
123. Aris. Ath. Pol. 9. 1., Plut. Sol. 18.
124. Aris. Ath. Pol. 8. 5., Plut. Sol. 19.
- 125./

125. This seems a plausible explanation of a much debated law. In the English Civil War Charles I relied very largely on feudal retainers for his army and recruited from landowners and their dependants. cf. Morton, op. cit. p.232.
126. cf. H. Pirenne op.cit., pp.48, 74, 77, 62, 95; J.C.L. de Sismondi, "The Italian Republics" (Everyman ed.) p.13.
127. These peasants' revolts included the Pilgrimage of Grace in 1536, risings in Devon and Cornwall and in Norfolk in 1549. On the currency famine, cf. Morton, op.cit.p.153.
128. ibid. p.169.
129. ibid. pp.169, 172. cf. p.170, for details of famous families created by the Tudors. v. sup. n.58, for penal laws.
130. For the evidence of expansion of Attic trade after Solon's reforms cf. C. Seltman, "Athens", p.32. Such rapid advance forces still more changes in social alliances. The merchants who had only desired some reforms and had still been loyal to the aristocracy were probably forced unconsciously into a more revolutionary position. So in England many merchants demanding reforms were horrified at the climax of this policy, the execution of the King. cf. also A. Thierry "The Formation and Progress of the Third Estate in France", Ldn. I., p.18, who points out that the Third Estate and Monarchy developed in harmony, until royalty was forced to protect the remains of feudal privilege and so the middle classes found themselves opposed to it.
131. cf. Seltman, Athens, etc., pp.43-4.
132. In the case of very rapid change old institutions are frequently used under new conditions and suffer transformation in the process. Japan, for instance, developed from feudal conditions to modern ones in a generation. Many feudal traits, therefore, remain but have an entirely different meaning under the new conditions. The clan system for instance still survives in name, but in practice the clans control the army and navy and huge cartels of the most modern type.
133. F. Guizot, The History of Civilisation, Ldn., 1856, i. p.12, points out that great crises are caused by social development which has changed men's relations to each other. However he stresses, p.14, that it is improvements in men's relations with each other which can really be called the progress of civilisation.

134. cf. Freeman, op.cit., p.83, on Solon's failure to see the potentialities of his laws. Gomme, Essays on Greek History and Literature, pp.204 ff., rightly points out that Aristotle and Demosthenes could not be blamed for not foreseeing the future, since the situation had not yet developed sufficiently to make it possible for them to do so. The Early Stoa, for example, stood in theory for the equality of slaves and freemen, without however demanding any sweeping practical reforms for the obvious reason that a total abolition of slavery was impracticable when the privileges, luxuries and civilisation of the Hellenistic world rested ultimately on slavery. Later the Middle Stoa even reverted temporarily to Aristotle's theory that slavery was natural to some peoples; cf. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, p.1132.
135. cf. H. Levy, Philosophy for a Modern Man, Ldn., 1938, pp. 256-61, on the importance of statistics in analysing the behaviour of groups of men; cf. pp.173-4 on prediction tests; cf. p.184. Cf. G. Spiller, The Origin and Nature of Man, p.99, on the possibilities of making scientific predictions about men. Most types of scientific enquiry to-day are statistical and a really scientific approach to history would approximate to this as far as possible. It is not always remembered that even a reasonably exact science such as chemistry is only relatively exact. The weight of atoms in any measurable sample of chlorine is about $35\frac{1}{2}$ but the individual atoms differ in weight, the commonest being 35 or 37. The atomic weight is only constant because we always take the average of very large quantities. If we could operate on the atomic scale we should be able to reverse the Second Law of Thermodynamics, since the molecules only conform to the law in groups, not individually; cf. J.C. Maxwell, Theory of Heat, Ldn., 1891, pp.338-9. So with people we can predict the average age at which a large number of normal individuals will die - life insurance is based on this - although we cannot predict the age at which any particular normal individual will die. However historical material is less fully statistical than chemical and historical approximations are even more inaccurate than chemical. Men have a greater range of variability than atoms, and we are dealing with comparatively small quantities of men. Moreover even one outstanding individual may outweigh temporarily the influence of thousands of people who are passive in a given situation. cf. Haldane, Science and Everyday Life, Ldn. 1939, p.106, on the possibility of making only general predictions about human beings. Cf. R.A. Freeman, The Eye of Osiris, p.115, for a popular statement on the need for large numbers in prophecies about men.

136. cf. R.H. Tawney, pp. 134 ff.
137. A. de Tocqueville, *The State of Society in France*, Ldn. 1873, p.7, points out that although religion and the Church were attacked by the French revolutionaries, it was only a transient feature. The Revolution, he argues, was not a religious struggle as many people thought. Religion was only one illustration of the struggle; "A passing result of the ideas, the passions, and especial events which preceded and prepared it (i.e. the Revolution), and not an integral part of its genius".
138. A. de Tocqueville, *op.cit.*, pp.7-8, states that the French philosophers of the eighteenth century were rightly acknowledged to have organised the French Revolution. Cf. A.F. Mignet, *The History of the French Revolution*, Ldn., 1826, p.17, where it is asserted that the philosophers of the eighteenth century enquired into everything, governments, religion, laws. They revealed abuses and wrongs, organised and enlightened public opinion, and so prepared the way for reform.
- Cf. Gomme, *op.cit.*, p.233 n.1, on the importance of Alexander's idea of a World State.
139. Cf. Childe, *Man Makes Himself*, p.260. Consider the opposition of the Church to usury; v. sup., n.51, and to Galileo amongst others. cf. the influence of Confucianism and Taoism in preserving the status quo in China; cf. Clegg, *op.cit.*, pp.10-11 for examples.
140. Childe, *Univ. Forward*, l.c., p.6.
141. So too the new aristocracy created by Henry VII of England became part of the reactionary party in the Civil War; cf. Morton, *op.cit.*, p.170. In the early history of the Italian city states too there was much overlapping of social divisions. Many of the old noble families had tried to maintain old-fashioned agricultural methods and had fallen into poverty, while many who had made a fortune in trade acquired estates and acted as a new nobility.
142. *Aris.*, *Ath. Pol.* xiii.
143. *Plut. Sol.* 29.
144. *Hât.* i. 59.
145. cf. Ure, *op.cit.*, p.308; Gardner, *C.A.H.* iii. p.574, states that the plain near Eleusis was the best for wheat growing.

146. cf. Ure, *ibid.*
147. Seltman, *op.cit.*, pp.11-13; cf. p.30.
148. *op.cit.*, p.38, pp.136-8; cf. J.H.S. xxvi, pp.131 ff.
149. Ure, *Origin of Tyranny*, pp.35 ff., 301.
150. *ibid.*, pp.37-8. Cf. *Apx. A*, p.307.
151. *Plut. Sol. pass.*; *Aris. Pol. 2. 1 ff.*
152. "Stravelings' Oak", by Petras Cvirka, describes land reform in Lithuania and the dividing of some estates among the peasants. A labourer was given land but not capital, so he had to borrow seed and cattle. The land became a millstone, and finally the local landlord took back the land, while the peasant went to work for him as a labourer.
153. The French peasants of the eighteenth century had far more land than those in the seventeenth, but this only increased their desire for more. Cf. L. Huberman, *op.cit.*, p.154.
154. *Aris. Ath. Pol. 13. 5.*
155. *Aris. Ath. Pol. 13. 4.*
156. Cf. the strife between the new improved farming around the Italian cities and the old type of estates run by the nobles in the country; cf. Sismondi, *op.cit.*, p.98. Cf. also the close alliance between merchants and the new progressive landowners in the English Civil War; cf. Morton, *op.cit.*, pp.229-30.
157. *Hdt. vi. 35.*
158. *Hdt. i. 59.*
159. J. Toepffer, "Att. Genealogie", p.122.
160. *ibid.*, pp.113 ff.
161. *Paus. i. 26. 5.* Cf. *Androtion ap. Athen. ix. 374.*
162. *Plut. Thes., 25.* The nobles were given control of religion.
163. *Plut. Sol. 10.*
164. *ibid.*
165. J.Toepffer, *op.cit.*, p.270.
- 166./

166. Hdt. v. 65; Paus, ii. 18. 8.
167. E.A. Gardner, C.A.H. III, p.516.
168. Hdt. v. 57-61.
169. This sketch of the lines of division in the social struggle has new features. It has not perhaps been sufficiently appreciated that the noble families were not necessarily all on the same side in the struggle, and that some of them joined the Shore Party; meanwhile some comparatively new but wealthy families had probably succeeded in becoming associated with the families in the Plain.
170. Hdt. v. 62; cf. J. Toepffer, op.cit., pp.227. However there is no evidence that the Alcmaeonidae had always been there. The fortification of Leipsydriion was a later development, since Peisistratus was already in the town. Toepffer admits (p.227) that it is impossible to say definitely where they lived. Cf. Ar. Lys. 664 ff., where it said they went to Leipsydriion.
171. Hdt. vi. 125; Isocrates, De Big. 25; Cf. E. Meyer, Gesch. des Altertums. ii. p.637, for the interpretation of Herodotus.
172. Plut. Sol. 2; Aris. Ath. Pol. 5. 3.
173. Aris. Ath. Pol. 14. 3.; Hdt. i. 60.
174. Hdt. *ibid*; Aris. *ibid*.
175. Aris. Ath. Pol. 15. 3; Hdt. i. 62-4.

CHAPTER V.

CHARACTER AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TYRANNY.

That Peisistratus depended on all the new trading and artisan sections of the population, in addition to his own supporters, and also discontented elements such as poor peasants, is clear from the fact that he could not maintain his position without the support of the Shore Party. Not only did he require their support to establish himself as tyrant, but he needed their continued allegiance if he was to remain in power. Even after he had been in power for seven years, having been established as tyrant by an alliance of the Hill and Shore Parties, a quarrel with the Shore Party and the threat of the combination of the Shore and Plain groups against him, forced him to retire once more. When he returned after ten years with wealth and a private army, he seems to have won the confidence of the citizens fairly easily. However he took the precaution of disarming the citizens and seizing as hostages the sons of possibly hostile citizens who were still in Athens. The flight or expulsion of many of those who were hostile to him, or regarded him as a rival for power, including the Alcmaeonidae, must have made his task easier (1).

However his past experience of alliances against him no doubt convinced him that he would have to adopt a compromise policy suitable, as far as possible, to the Shore Party as well as to his own followers. He could not pursue very extreme measures favourable only to his own party if these were going to antagonise the Shore Party and thus drive them again into the arms of the Party of the Plain. Peisistratus may have had a personal quarrel with Megacles of the Shore, but the basis of the hostility was probably deeper. In other Greek cities the struggle was more clear cut between two parties, the reactionaries trying to maintain the status quo in the one, and all those desiring change in the other. In Attica the use of a third party by Peisistratus placed the Shore Party in a middle position. While aiming at the overthrow of the nobles' privilege, they had no desire to give concessions to more extreme sections of the population (2). The Shore Party, therefore, probably saw no need for a more extreme party at all, and resented Peisistratus' use of it for his own personal advancement. The feeling against him in the Shore Party must have been bitter, and the main reason which saved Peisistratus from their continued active hostility must have been the fact that the Shore disliked the policy of the Plain section even more. They wanted above all to ensure for themselves and the new wealth a dominant position in the state, and if the nobles resisted that, as most of them probably would, then the Shore Party could find no permanent basis for alliance with them. Clearly it was in the interests of both Peisistratus and the Shore Party to form an alliance, but Peisistratus would only maintain this by considering the interests of these allies.

His reforms, generally speaking, were in the interests of the new economy. This had already produced some new rich and Peisistratus' measures would facilitate the further development of commerce and all the pursuits which depended on it, and so the growing prosperity of more and more people. What he had to avoid was offending the Shore Party by giving too many concessions to the extremists among his own supporters. Solon, although his fortune was based on trade, had been opposed to concessions to the extreme section of the population and adopted a neutral position between this and the nobles. Later developments had made a break between merchants and nobles inevitable although many successful merchants may have allied themselves with the nobles, while some less prosperous nobles may even have supported the Shore Party. However, hostility to the third party would still persist among the more prosperous merchants who now formed a respectable middle class and perhaps almost a new nobility; they therefore resented the demands of the "small" people, some of whom no doubt aspired to the position of the merchants.

The favourable descriptions of Peisistratus, who was called statesmanlike rather than a tyrant, temperate and honest, humane and honourable (3), show that he probably succeeded in pursuing a policy approved by both the Shore and his own party. Aristotle stresses that his long reign was the result of his ability to win the support of the majority of the citizens and to charm all sections of society, and he maintains that Peisistratus took pains to carry out a pacific policy both at home and abroad (4). Peisistratus' own letter to Solon (5), in which he stresses that, if Solon had known the type of government Peisistratus intended to establish, he would not have opposed it, gives a clear indication that Peisistratus himself believed he had adopted a middle course as far as possible, and had not been so favourable to the extreme party that he had offended the adherents of the Shore section. Indeed, Solon himself admitted in a letter to Peisistratus that he was the best of all the tyrants, a handsome admission from one who was opposed to the whole principle of tyranny (6). On the other hand, the actual existence of this third party and the part it played in establishing Peisistratus was largely responsible for the fact that Athens achieved a broader democracy than other Greek cities, the basis for which was laid during the tyranny.

Although Peisistratus left the constitution and laws unchanged (7), actually he overruled them and established what was virtually a dictatorship backed by his bodyguard. He was clever enough, and strong enough, to leave the laws and magistracies as they were, but to ensure their use for his own policy by seeing that the magistrates were members of his own family (8) and by himself appointing judges for the demes (9), thus centralising the legal system on the one hand, and weakening the nobles' hold on it on the other. His moderate bearing and apparent respect for the laws won his praise from most/

most Greek writers (10), while in actual fact he was above the law and able, therefore, to carry out the policy he desired so long as he retained the support of the majority of his followers. The fact that the Areopagus itself did not dare to oppose him, although he made the gesture of submitting to its judgement (11), is an indication of his power. In spite of his favourable remarks about Peisistratus' moderation, Aristotle admitted that Solon's laws had fallen into disuse under the tyranny (12).

Peisistratus used his dictatorship, on the whole, to further the interests of those who supported him, the peasants, traders, and artisans, for without their support he could not long have maintained his rule. However, the statement that merchants supported tyrants and defeated the party of the nobles is such an oversimplification as to be almost misleading. It explains nothing, neither why the merchants needed a tyrant, nor what gave the tyrant his opportunity, nor why he, like other types of tyrants, outlived his usefulness. The view, however, that tyrants were great individuals and moulded history by themselves through their own outstanding characters, leaves much unexplained (13). Nor is the theory that the tyrants, like other outstanding individuals, were the products of some blind forces or principles (14), any more adequate. The one theory does not explain why the Greek tyrants appeared more or less at a similar period in most Greek states; the other fails to account for the varying characters of the different tyrants.

These two views are usually to be found, partially or in their entirety, in most theories on great personalities. They are the products of the two schools of thought which evolved in the last few centuries around the problem of the part played by individuals in history. The eighteenth century historians tended to reduce the whole of history to the conscious actions of individuals. Mably, for instance, represented Lycurgus as forcing the change in Sparta's way of life by means of his own personality and against the will of all the citizens (15).

In reaction against this extreme view, French historians of the early nineteenth century, such as Guizot (16), Mignet (17) and Thierry (18) tended to deny individuals any importance at all in history, and to give the fundamental role to general causes, whether social institutions or the qualities of human nature. Naturally, after the events of the French revolution, it was almost impossible for them to interpret history as made by a few outstanding individuals imposing their will on more or less passive masses, but in their reaction they went to the other extreme.

Throughout the sixteenth century the controversy raged between the two schools of historians, the German scholars as a rule arguing from the individualist standpoint, and the French from the/

the other (19). If we are to understand the historical role of the Greek tyrants, the confusion resulting from the controversy must be cleared away.

One of the most common examples quoted by those who regard outstanding individuals as the only makers of history, is that of Napoleon. The history of Europe, they maintain, would have been entirely different had there been no Napoleon. This assertion is based on the assumption that Napoleon himself and his appearance at that time were entirely accidental. But can that be maintained? By no means. France needed above all the restoration of order. The Directoire was unable to do this. What was needed was a strong military personality (20). General Joubert was first thought of but was killed at Novi, and various others were then suggested (21). Buonaparte was not mentioned at all until later (22). Granted he was energetic and ambitious, otherwise he would never have arrived at the position of being mentioned at all. If Buonaparte however had been killed someone else would have filled his place. This person might have been less aggressive, less talented, than Buonaparte, and so numerous historical details would have been different; but the general trend of events would have been the same. The French soldiers enjoyed by far the best training and morale in Europe at that time (23), so the French Republic would have survived the wars it waged. Granted that a general other than Buonaparte might have proved more conciliatory to the rest of Europe and so maintained his power in France instead of ending his life in St. Helena. Eventually, however, with order restored, the bourgeoisie would soon have tired of his dictatorship. A reaction to liberalism would have flared up and the dictator would have been swept out and perhaps the Bourbons restored. Such a development would have brought its own political and economic results, influencing not only France but most of Europe, but these results would not, and could not, have been in direct opposition to those which did take place; they would still have followed the same general tendency of the time, since that tendency not only gave individuals their opportunities, but helped to formulate both the opportunities and the individuals themselves.

It should be pointed out too that when a Buonaparte or some other outstanding individual has filled the vital place the period demands, all other candidates, so to speak, are then excluded. The historical spotlight illuminates the successful figure, and since all the others are left in shadow, we are apt to forget that they were there at all, and that if for some reason the outstanding figure had not filled the position, or had died soon after, there were others to take his place. This applies to the activities of all individuals, outstanding or not. One could give many examples from one's own life. If such and such had not happened one would never have taken up a certain activity and brought one's own influence to bear on it; but that activity would still have been/

been carried on. It was there before one became a part of it and would have continued without one's intervention, although details of it might have been different.

The history of scientific discoveries follows much the same lines. Certain problems are created by the social conditions of the time, and naturally many scientists are working on these problems at the same time (24). If one dies, others carry on. Barrow, Newton's Cambridge teacher, had already done much of the groundwork on the calculus, while Leibnitz discovered it independently of Newton. Meanwhile many others were working on the same problem. The fact that Newton discovered it not only prevented them from being the discoverers of it themselves, but, once the discovery was made, diverted our attention from their potentialities as discoverers. Whether Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, would have achieved what his son did, we cannot say; but had he lived and continued his expansion, Alexander would probably never have been "The Great"; he would never have had the opportunity.

Moreover, people of outstanding ability do not exercise their talents in a vacuum. Only if these talents are needed by the social conditions of the time, and if the particular individual is not prevented by the conventions and laws of the existing society, can his talents be fully used and thus he himself become an outstanding historical figure. Under Louis XV and XVI, for instance, it was almost impossible for members of the Third Estate to have a military career (25). So if the old order in France had lasted another fifty or more years, Bernadotte, who was a sergeant major in 1789, Macdonald who was a subaltern, and many who were still civilians, would never have attained the military reputations they did establish. Napoleon might have become a little-known colonel or even a general, but would never have been considered as a possible ruler of Europe, given favourable circumstances.

The failure of Cylon's attempt at the tyranny (26) and the success of the attempt made by Peisistratus can only be explained by the change in circumstances, which provided sufficient support to Peisistratus and yet denied it earlier to Cylon.

Hitler is sometimes talked of as if he, as an individual, had imposed his will on Germany and Europe to such an extent that he alone was responsible for the course of events. But Hitler as an individual was little known and almost powerless until he was taken up, financially supported, armed, and launched at a critical moment by wealthy supporters both abroad and in Germany (27). It was this group of men who really influenced events, and to a large extent Hitler was their tool. Granted that Hitler, once in power, used that power for his own ends, but the general trend of his actions could not conflict with the desires of his backers without precipitating a crisis between them.

Certainly/

Certainly the degeneracy or abnormality of individuals such as Louis XV or Hitler do have an influence on history, but only in so far as the social conditions of the time allow it. It was not as any individual, but in his social position as King of France, that Louis XV influenced events, and even so he did not affect the general trend of events but only their individual features. In the same way it was only after Hitler had been placed in power - and the critical political and social conditions of Germany in 1933 gave him an opportunity without which he might never have become notorious - that his ideas and character wielded such an enormous influence. In short, individuals are themselves the product of the general trend of events, from which too they gain opportunities to exercise their talents.

It is a common historical feature that great scientists and artists often flourish as leaders of "schools" of lesser talents. It has already been noted that trends in literature, art and science express and deal with ideas and problems arising indirectly from certain social conditions (28). Many people only partially express these trends (29), but one or two outstanding individuals may so meet and express these needs that their place in history is assured for all time (30). These geniuses affect the quality of the output and its subsequent development, but not its general trend.

In short, the school of historians who claim that history is the result only of the conscious actions of outstanding individuals, ignore the conditions under which these individuals must work and so virtually reduce history to a chain of accidents.

The opposition school, as a reaction, tried to explain all history as the result of general causes and laws. For them individual lives and actions make no difference to events even in detail. If this is accepted, then individuals have no possibility of influencing events, and so the theory of these historians assumes a fatalistic character. Whether the general causes which they regard as fundamental are social and economic conditions, as some have suggested (31), or the qualities of human nature, as others (32) maintain, the result is the same; the individual is absorbed by the general, and this is the very essence of fatalism.

While it is true that human nature exhibits a bewildering variety of characteristics in different conditions, it is still man himself who makes his history, and we cannot therefore deny that individuals by their conscious action can and do determine the individual features of historical events. This of course allows the element of accident a certain amount of force, since for instance if a large number of people outstanding in some field of human activity were to die within a short period of each/

each other, the development of this activity would be affected. However these individual actions and accidents cannot bring about fundamental changes in those conditions which are moulding the general trend of events. It is those groups of people who in pursuing their own interests, facilitate the further developments of the community through the improvement of its technical equipment and the solution of its problems, who unconsciously make historical progress, and the importance of any individual depends on how far his life and activities further the interests and advance of these groups, either directly by association with them, or indirectly by solving problems which are hindering their advance. Any man with special talents for these tasks would find every opportunity for developing them and furthering the progress of mankind.

A great man, then, is one whose talents are best suited to the needs of the times, whose vision is such that he can anticipate others in seeing clearly the problems of his day and in pointing to a solution of these (33). Certainly he does not by himself create the problems nor change the fundamental type of development from one to another, but his power and importance within that framework can be tremendous.

It has been noted that the type of life and associations men experience give rise to a general body of opinion which itself has a great influence on the development of society. Individuals cannot arbitrarily choose any profession or type of society. Moreover, the whole intellectual tradition may be changing from day to day. Some individual may understand this general trend more clearly than others and realise in which direction the whole body of opinion of the community is changing. Thereupon an individual may choose to help or hinder that development, and in doing so he is consciously making history. There is no possibility here of history being made for men by some general causes or laws. So possibilities of usefulness, if not greatness, are there for all intelligent people who can learn from past and current events, and the more there are who can take advantage of events the greater will be the variety of detail and the more rapid will be the development of these less obvious general trend of events.

The life of Alexander the Great provides an effective illustration of an individual's historical significance. No one, surely, will deny the great influence he expressed, not only on his contemporaries, but on subsequent events. On the other hand, Alexander did not obtain his ideas from a vacuum. The idea of pan-Hellenism was prevalent in Isocrates' time (34), while Macedon was the obvious state to carry it out. The economy of the Greek states had lost some of its vigour (35) and so impaired the unity of policy and action even within the same states (36). The East was static and decadent. Macedon however was developing and expanding and had already produced one/

one king capable of seeing the opportunities of his day and making use of them (37).

The appearance of Alexander in the East, however, did not arise out of the social development of these communities, and thus for them Alexander's conquest appears as an accident. But accident is always relative. Alexander's conquests cannot be separated from Macedon's development, her conquest of Greece and the relations of the latter with the East. Nor was the actual conquest of the East in so short a time purely accidental. That did arise from the social conditions of both conquered and conquering states. Such accidents appear at the confluence of two historical processes, but the same accident at a different stage of development would have had quite different results.

What Alexander did was to develop his father's ideas and carry them a stage further. He did not create the opportunities of the time; he saw them and made full use of them, impressing his own ideas and characteristics on events so that the individual features of the history of this period and its consequences owe their characteristics to Alexander's influence. So perfectly did he interpret and express the trend of the times that, more than most great individuals, he changed what might be called the secondary features of historical progress, moulding events in such a way that his influence can be traced even to modern times. To point out that Alexander could not have forced the general trend of events to go backwards or in some direction quite impossible for the social conditions of the time, does not detract from his greatness; on the contrary, it only enhances it by throwing it into bolder relief (38). For it is when the character of the individual is closest to identity with his social environment that the greatest freedom is attained by the individual and the greatest influence exercised by his talent.

Social freedom within similar types of society is a constant total; only its distribution can be varied. In Germany for instance, members of the Nazi party have freedom to loot and murder Jews and others, which is denied to anyone in Britain. As a result however, or to make it possible, the majority of the German people have less freedom than the great majority of the British people. Mental or philosophical freedom, however, depends largely on the ability to understand the conditions of the time. Once a man realises these conditions and the direction of their development, and when he realises his own potentialities as part of that environment, he can so identify himself with its progress, that the limitations imposed by the society into which he was born, become the very means of his freedom from them. For this society, in moulding his life, actions, and thoughts, directs his activities in the same direction as the general progress of the times, and/

and so stimulates his ambitions and desires for the very things that are needed in the current development. Hence the restriction - if one can call it that - caused by the general trend of events, itself created the possibility of the greatest freedom for the individual (39).

How can this be applied to the Greek tyrants? The first essential is to consider the period when tyrants are prevalent and then the conditions under which they arise. Having determined the general trend of events which give rise to tyrants, it will then be necessary to consider which of several groups of people the tyrant represents. Only by his outstanding ability to represent some important section of the population and its interests could he have become outstanding and maintained his power. Accordingly, tyrants at different periods, in different societies, may serve quite different interests (40)

Just as many people interpret Hitler's demagogy and military machine as the source of his power, forgetting his history and his powerful supporters in Germany, so ancient writers considered the obvious characteristics of tyrants as the basis of their power; such characteristics as the use of bodyguards, their demagogy and wealth (41). These are probably characteristic of most single rulers who have gained their position by force, but tell us nothing of their role in history or the conditions which gave rise to them. However, a vague recognition that the essence of a tyrant was in the type of his supporters is revealed by the accusations against Pheidon of Argos and Cleomenes of Sparta, that they had turned the monarchy into a tyranny (42).

While these tyrants then were not the mere passive instruments of economic or other types of principles or forces, as Professor Ure rightly argues, (v. sup., ch. ii, for the argument against the interpretation of history according to the economic and other factors), social conditions of the period did provide opportunities of power for people capable of seizing them. These conditions also determined the type of supporters available to the tyrants in order to obtain power and determined many of the fundamental characteristics of the tyrannies. Ure rightly points out that the demagogy and military leadership were not basic characteristics of the tyrants. However, the possession of money, especially when due to commerce, which he selects as their most important characteristic, was itself the result of the social changes just as the tyranny was, and not the cause of these changes. It was not, as he argues (43), because the tyrants owned fortunes based on, or connected with, commerce that they carried out commercial policies. Trade benefitted from all the tyrannies as he says, but this was because of its release from the restrictions of out-of-date social and state institutions and customs and the creation of conditions favourable to their growth. Even where/

where the tyrants deliberately fostered trade, it was because the trading revolution had brought about the social crisis which gave the tyrant his opportunity and produced these new people involved in trade, who were the tyrant's main supporters. It was not because the tyrant controlled labour and trade that he carried out a commercial policy, as Ure argues, but because the tyrant's supporters, who were engaged in or connected with trade, controlled, more or less unconsciously to both, the tyrants themselves, for without their support he could not have seized power and without pleasing them by a rise in prosperity, he could not avert their hostility.

Since Ure only sees one alternative to the economic forces theory, and that is the theory of the individual creating history (44), he has distorted the part the tyrant could play and, by comparing him to outstanding individuals in quite different historical and social periods, has placed him in a false position. Both Ure and Niebuhr (45) have compared the early Greek tyrants to Cosmo de Medici. Their circumstances and supporters, however, were quite different. Cosmo de Medici belonged to a period more like fourth century Athens, when the middle classes and new nobility pursuing trade and agriculture for trade were firmly established in control of the state, rather than the earlier centuries in Greece when these people were not strong enough to do without a tyrant acting as their spearhead against the nobles and aristocratic privilege. Ure (46) actually compares Theagenes of Megara to Monopolists of the U.S.A. and their methods of destroying rivals. But the social conditions and, therefore, the types of power and careers offered to the individual are entirely different. Human beings have a limited number of methods of dealing with emergencies and so superficial likenesses can always be detected. To use these as the basis of historical interpretation, however, will produce only a superficial analysis. The character of money by itself will tell us no more of the real historical role played by the tyrants than will the use of body guards and demagogic speech; except that the introduction of coinage and the new type of wealth give some indication of the conditions of the period. Without probing deeper and unfolding the interaction and relation of the tyrant and his environment, the historian will only have skimmed the surface of the period and left the most important features unexplained. Moreover, by placing the tyrant in perspective against his own background, the historian will not only add to our understanding of the history of the period but, by probing to the fundamental role played by the tyrants, he will enhance the tyrants' position and importance in history, instead of merely distorting it.

While the third century tyrants in Greece were, as a rule, supported by Macedon and pro-Macedon Greek elements and so acted as some sort of native governors, helping to maintain a foreign despotism (47), the tyrants of the seventh and sixth/

sixth centuries, including Peisistratus, and the later Spartan tyrants, Cleomenes and Nabis, were supported by most of the rising merchant class, artisans and small peasants, and connected with the development of trade and industry in the Greek states (48). Detailed evidence of social alliances of the period is not available but general lines are clear from the formation of the three parties and especially from the appearance of the third party, and from Peisistratus' own policy when tyrant. The economic crisis, which produced tyrants in other Greek states, was probably not so predominantly agricultural as in Attica, since they had less land and had solved the problem of land hunger earlier by colonisation. This had the result of producing tyrannies rather earlier than in Attica, since the reactionary interests had a less widespread economic backing in land ownership. In Corinth, in fact, the old aristocracy family, the Bacchiadae, had based their power on trade and fostered its development (49), in much the same way as the English Tudors (v. sup.). However, this could not prevent the old type of rule from proving eventually obstructive. The archaic type of privilege had to be replaced by new laws, customs and government to suit the new, expanding economy and the free development of citizens, many of them already living in new social relations to each other (50).

Accordingly, Cypselus was able to establish himself as tyrant with the support not only of the middle classes, but of most of the pre-Dorian population (51). At Argos Pheidon turned his monarchy into a tyranny (52), which can only mean that, by putting himself at the head of the new people in the state, he organised the community on ~~the~~ new lines. Theagenes, like most tyrants, established his dictatorship at Megara by means of armed force (53). At Samos trade had probably developed freely under the Geomoroi's vigorous policy, since they were probably olive-growers and so dependent on trade for their own prosperity (54). Eventually, however, as elsewhere, if further progress was to be made, changes both in the constitution and in personnel were essential. Polycrates seized the opportunity to establish a tyranny.

Not all the tyrant's supporters, of course, would even be conscious of the ties binding the tyrant and the new economic and social forces, nor would they all realise the part played by the tyrant in advancing these interests. The individual reasons for supporting the tyrant were probably countless, but so long as the tyrant's rule did not lead to a deterioration of their position but rather to an improvement, they would not be likely to complain. The/

The really fundamental benefit which trade received from the tyranny was the freedom from old restrictions. The archaic type of privilege based on a monopoly of control of laws, religion and government, originating usually in static conditions, had been overthrown by the tyrant simply by ignoring it and overruling it and, as a result, the way was open for laws and institutions favourable to an expanding economy based on trade. In addition, the excellent and abundant coinage issued by Peisistratus and other tyrants (55) at last laid the basis for a great expansion of trade on a more permanent basis. Solon's reforms had produced a temporary revival of trade but soon more far-reaching measures were necessary. Until the peasants became prosperous enough to provide an adequate home market and until state policy was directed towards the encouragement of foreign trade, the full potentialities of a trading economy could not be realised.

In all fundamentals the early Greek tyrants, as we should expect of individuals representing the same general social interests, carried through policies essentially similar, since they were designed to favour the same type of supporters. Most of the social legislation of Peisistratus, therefore, was paralleled by similar policies under other Greek tyrants of this period. Shipbuilding, naturally, was encouraged by these tyrants and Polycrates probably encouraged piracy and no doubt found it profitable (56). Confiscations of estates of exiled nobles were common and must have helped to solve agricultural problems and to stimulate trade by increasing mobility in land. Peisistratus settled the peasant problem in Attica for several centuries, lending capital on favourable terms to those settled on the land, and was said to have encouraged, like Solon, the cultivation of olives, an industry obviously designed for trade and not for the self-sufficiency of the farmer (57). This agricultural policy indirectly gave a further impetus to trade since the chief home market for goods, the peasantry, had been put on a secure economic basis. Polycrates, too, helped agriculture and industry by importing sheep, goats and pigs to Samos (58), and Theagenes of Megara probably encouraged both trade and the staple industry in wool to develop (59).

Measures to overcome unemployment had probably been adopted by Solon and may have been continued by Peistratus (60), since other tyrants adopted such measures. Peisistratus was interested in social legislation and passed a law to the effect that people maimed in war should be kept at the public expense (61). A similar measure was introduced by Polycrates of Samos to the effect that a pension should be given to mothers of soldiers killed in service (62).

Peisistratus/

Peisistratus and the other early tyrants were also renowned for public works, which must have helped to relieve unemployment. Aristotle (63) maintains that the public works of the tyrants were designed to create employment and poverty. The poverty probably refers to the wealthiest classes, who no doubt paid for the works by taxation or confiscation. This makes sense of the statement and is more plausible than the idea that it refers to the impoverishment of the labourers (64). In addition, the public works were frequently of the type which would be beneficial to trade and general prosperity. Among these were the mole in the harbour of Samos and the underground aqueduct (65), the water conduit built by Theagenes (66) and the Nine Fountains which supplied Athens with water (67). The provision of water supplies was a progressive measure favourable to the new people, since the economic changes had produced a rapid growth of city life and, accordingly, the need for hygienic measures if prosperity were not to be impaired by a new enemy, disease (v.sub). Periander was said to have planned to cut a canal through the isthmus (68). By all these measures Peisistratus, like other tyrants of this type, created a contented population, especially among those parts of the population which had been most in need of economic help. Moreover, the benefits to trade from having a prosperous peasantry as a home market, in addition to other favourable measures, would go far to allay any uneasiness the larger merchants might have felt as a reaction to Peisistratus' measures to help the most depressed parts of the population.

The historical function of all these tyrants, whatever they personally thought of their position, was so to overrule or suppress the old type of state and its supporters as to allow the full growth of the new interests and those engaged in them. Whether intended or not, this was the result of the exiling of nobles and confiscations of their estates, of the break with tradition in law, custom and government and of all these measures favourable to the tyrants' supporters. Accordingly, although details of alliances and methods of obtaining power differed, and indeed in most cases they can only be assumed in the most general terms since detailed evidence is lacking, the tyrants exhibited essentially similar characteristics. Most of them came from noble, if not actually royal, families; (it is a regular feature of such revolutions that they are led by a member of the class which is being attacked); but frequently were less privileged than the exclusive aristocracy (69). This would react either on their characters by making them discontented and hostile to the older nobility, or on their economic position by making them take an interest in trade and so leading them eventually to head the opposition to the nobility. Probably both motives were at work. They had to seize power by force since the time for compromise was past, and to maintain that power had to employ a bodyguard (70). To safeguard their own interests - but unconsciously they were carrying out their historical function of establishing their supporters securely by destroying the opposition - most of them smashed/

smashed the old type of privilege and power by executing or exiling the most prominent supporters and advocates of these (71).

Once a tyrant was securely established, however, the personality of the tyrant could have an effect on the history of the period. The position of tyrant could not be obtained or maintained without support, but once the tyrant was securely established, the virtual dictatorship could be exercised for good or evil according to the temperament of the individual tyrant. Peisistratus, whether he acted from shrewdness or humanity, was so skilful in his exercise of power that men talked of his reign as the return of the golden age (72). This was no doubt partly due to the prosperity resulting from his economic reforms, but, in addition, his own character played an important part in producing this happy effect. He was shrewd enough not to underestimate his opponents - his various expulsions at the hands of his opponents would help to produce that state of mind - and could take severe measures if necessary to avoid future trouble. His seizure of hostages is an illustration of this. Such measures prevented the recurrence of civil strife and so laid the basis for a united, contented state. Nor was he the sort of person to allow dictatorial powers to overwhelm his judgment. It was always stressed that he respected the laws and constitution, that he had a democratic and philanthropic spirit and took no personal privilege for himself as ruler (73). He was said to be a charming person, upright and honourable, and, therefore won the respect of all sections of the population including probably some of those who did not approve of his policy. Moreover, he was prepared to take endless trouble to ensure the wellbeing of his people. His personal supervision of agriculture and his judgment in civil cases in the countryside indicate the active personal interest he gave to his responsibilities. Peisistratus' character, therefore, allowed the beneficial effects of the tyranny to have full effect and restrained to the minimum some of the disadvantages of this type of period, such as civil strife, personal ambition and jealousies. While he had been shrewd enough to take strong measures where necessary, he was also wise and tolerant enough to relax restrictions where possible. The more support there is for a government, the less rigid and oppressive to the majority need that government be, although in a period such as this when a party was only in process of establishing its power, dictatorial methods are necessary, since at such a time the opposition, no matter how small, is particularly active. Peisistratus felt secure enough to live without guards in fortified places, a clear indication that he had the support of the majority of the population, and he threw open his gardens for the public enjoyment (74). It is clear from Peisistratus' own claims that he was quite aware of the advantages of toleration and, therefore, deliberately adopted it. In his letter to Solon he claims that he asked for no private privileges as ruler and that, if Solon had realised the type of moderate government Peisistratus had intended to introduce, /

introduce, he (Solon) would not have opposed it (v.sup.). Clearly if he believed his government could be approved by Solon, who had always advocated conciliation between rich and poor, Peisistratus was attempting to please the majority of the citizens who had remained in Attica, and not merely his own followers.

This overthrow of the old type of state and the new policies carried out by the tyrants had a profound effect on all aspects of life. Evidence suggests that immediately before the seizure of power by the tyrants most of the Greek states had been militarily weak. Athens, for instance, seemed to lack morale as well as efficiency for fighting (75). This is not surprising. Such periods of economic stagnation and social crisis naturally tend to paralyse all other activities. Apathy and inefficiency tend to flourish, while the hampered economy and distress of the population prevent either the material or psychological backing for war. The hoplites could not become the basis of a new citizen army until the new middle class, which they essentially represented, was well enough established to play a prominent part in the states. Once the restrictions and hampering customs, laws and governments were overthrown or overruled however, the economy could again bound forward and so produce prosperity among the citizens and advance of inventions and industrial technique, and so revive the spirit and strength of the whole nation.

The centralisation of the state around the aristocracy had been so shaken by the economic and social crisis that the community had been split into factions and the central framework become an artificial restraint on these. As a result of the civil strife this framework was broken but, under the tyranny, centralisation was again made a reality, this time around the tyrant, but on the basis of the middle classes with the support of the peasants and artisans, that is, the most important parts of the population, since the new people were growing in influence and numbers and were therefore more powerful than the old. Accordingly, a real citizen army appeared, ready to fight for its own state, for which the population now had patriotic sentiments, while the new unity and harmony in the state found expression in unity of action and greater uniformity of arms and tactics (76). The increased use of fleets also helped to extend democratic tendencies. Seamen, by reason of their type of job, have broken with old loyalties and, by creating their own loyalties based on association among themselves, became an important force in the trading state. At this early period their support, whether they were employed by merchants or whether a few of them owned or shared a ship of their own, probably went to the merchants and trading interests generally. The trading revolution had demanded ships for commerce and later, through the growth of a national spirit and policy and of international relations, created a demand for fleets. As a result, this section of the/

the community grew both in numbers and influence, their influence on the whole probably being of a popular, democratic character.

These citizen armies were only fully effective after the tyrant's function had been performed and the tyrant himself overthrown. The personal bodyguard of the tyrant was used to keep the tyrant in power and, since his enemies were essentially the nobles, this army served, at first at any rate, the interests of the middle class. Once the tyrant himself was no longer needed, the need for his private army as a weapon against the nobles went too. If, however, the tyrant tried to overstay his welcome, he would probably try to use his army against his former supporters. At first the period of political instability following on the overthrow of a tyrant was reflected in the general insecurity of the state. A community whose factions still fight cannot be strong. Usually, however, the nobles had been so weakened by the tyranny that civil strife was only of short duration, the last gesture of the reactionaries before the establishment of the bourgeois type of state. The Athenian people, when this happened, were already beginning to be conscious of the joys of freedom and, by combining to throw out the reactionaries and their Spartan supporters, laid the basis for the future strength of Athens. When the middle class, with the support, even if only passive, of the majority of the people, was well enough established to look after its own interests, the citizen army could really function as the army of the new national state. The brilliant lead given by Athens to the Greek world against the Persians was the outcome of the triumph of democracy, which enabled the city to prevent a united front to the enemy, the reactionary party being now an insignificant handful and other factions not yet being developed, and to display a high courage and vigour inspired by a new-found freedom and hatred of oppression. To this end the tyrants had played their parts. Although they usually outlived their usefulness and often become tools of reaction, the tyrants in their heyday laid the foundations of democracy.

The tyrants were no doubt aware of the necessity to combat the influence of the old nobility, if only to safeguard their own position, although they probably did not realise that in doing so they were, by removing the enemies of the middle class and popular forces, preparing the way for their own removal. In addition, therefore, to banishments and confiscations they attacked the nobles on ground where the latter had been strongest. They initiated, or reorganised on a nationalist basis, games and festivals which were, therefore, a blow at the influence of the nobles in the localities and their control of local religious rites. The Panathenaia, for instance, at Athens was the culmination of many different/

different local cults (77) and served to emphasise that Athens was a national state with a national religion to which loyalty should first be given (78). This was a tendency, of course, which had been growing for some time as a result of centralisation. Peisistratus' use of a girl to act as Athena and give apparently divine sanction to his tyranny, illustrates this; but under the tyranny this feeling became very much deeper and more widespread.

Many of the tyrants' public works, too, expressed that pride in their states which was one result of the patriotism of the period. These included the temple of Hera at Samos, a temple at Corinth, the temple of Olympian Zeus at Athens, which was begun under Peisistratus, and a portico at Sicyon (79).

Most striking of all the new nationalist features was the excellent coinage produced by the tyrants. Quite apart from its invaluable contribution to a prosperous economy, coins were used as a sort of national emblem or flag. Tyrants stamped on their coins emblems representing the source of the state's prosperity, or symbols representing the new spirit of nationalism (80). This aspect of the coinage was never wholly lost to the Greek states and it is noticeable that if a city were freed from foreign domination, one of its first acts was to issue its own coinage, an equivalent to flying once more the city's flag.

The tyrants were usually patrons of all the arts, and, by attracting artists and poets to their courts (81), gave the new nationalism a brilliant expression and cast the nobility into still deeper obscurity. Not only did poets sing the praises of the tyrants and the new states, but artists made the cities places of beauty of which the citizens could be proud. This attracted both natives and foreigners to the cities, made the citizens intensely proud and conscious of their new status as members of a nation, and so still further weakened the influence of the nobles, the basis of whose strength lay, on the whole, in the countryside.

It isⁱⁿ the light of this patronage of the arts and the attempts to make the tyrants' courts brilliant and renowned beyond the limits of their states, and to make the citizens conscious not only of their nation but of their cultural heritage, that we^{must} interpret the traditions regarding the connection of Peisistratus with the Homeric poems. Peisistratus and Hipparchus may have encouraged the recitation of Homer at festivals such as the Panathenaia (82), or the tradition may refer to the fact that the poems were actually written down for the use of the city for the first time. The alphabet, even if it had been in existence for some time, need not have been used for this or any other such purpose when there was no obvious demand for it. Peisistratus' policy/

policy of making Athens an art and cultural centre probably created the first demand for the Homeric poems to be adapted and used on a national scale; but this of course does not mean that Peisistratus had anything to do with the existing arrangement of the poems (83).

In addition, Peisistratus' personal supervision of agriculture and the fact that he appointed local judges for the demes and himself gave judgment in civil cases on the countryside, not only ensured justice for the peasants but weakened the nobles, whose position had been strong in the local structure of the state. This may have strengthened the legal position of the people and so may have made it easier in the future for the people's right to hear appeals - a right granted them by Solon - to become of real importance, until it became one of the greatest weapons of the future democracy.

Most of the tyrants also gave the citizenship freely, one of the strongest blows at the old type of privilege. In addition, they developed connections overseas, which not only served to foster trade but strengthened their own position by a policy of unity against mutual enemies (84). So a new type of internationalism grew up, parallel with the development of patriotic nationalism. This was the first foundations of the really pan-hellenic feeling which Greece, under Athenian leadership, was to acquire in the struggle against Persia, and which developed in later centuries, in spite of inter-state wars, as knowledge was acquired of the outside world as distinct from the Greek one. After the isolation of the dark ages there emerged, then, a spirit and feeling of hellenism more advanced than that which was possibly felt in Greece in the Heroic Age, for instance in the expedition against Troy (v. sup., ch. i). This growing internationalism, however, had other results. The intervention of one state in the affairs of another, for example Sparta's overthrow of the Athenian tyranny, emphasised not only the growth of international relations but also the fact that, as a result, the internal affairs of one state could affect the foreign policy of another.

In general, therefore, it can be pointed out that no matter what the supporting interests may be, the function of the tyrant was to overcome obstacles and opposing forces and to maintain his supremacy, probably by force, while his supporters established themselves. Obviously the latter were not strong enough to do without the tyrant immediately, or they would never have used him at all. So far therefore as the tyrant's own individual interests were similar to those of his supporters, so far would he remain peacefully in power. If however those interests did not remain in sympathy with all or some of his supporters, then, sooner or

or later, there would be friction and the tyrant would find it necessary to exercise force against some of his own followers as well as against the original opposition (85).

Even with harmonious development there would come a time when the supporters felt strong enough to look after their own interests, especially if the opposition had been well crushed. Such periods of great social change are characterised by great activity in all aspects of social, economic and cultural life. The tyrant's dictatorship, however, which had at first facilitated the activity by preventing the old forces from mobilising against the new, would soon become an obstacle to the rapidly advancing community's further development; for the tyranny was a very rigid framework imposed on fast moving conditions, which soon reached the limits of the frame and had then to break it or stagnate. This general development would find expression in many ways, personal feuds with the tyrants, unemployment and discontent as a result of the beginning of a new type of restriction, and conspiracies.

Perhaps the weakest link in the tyrant's armour was finance. Finance was always one of the main problems of a newly centralised state based on a growing trade. Even under the aristocracy modifications had had to be made to meet this need (v.sup., ch. iv). As the state becomes more and more of a single unit with one policy, and as the community becomes concerned more and more with trade and relations with other states, a primitive form of civil service becomes necessary to deal with the increasing number of administrative affairs, just as navies and armies had to be provided to protect the state's interest.

The English Tudors, it was noted, played a role similar to that of Solon in Attica, and while under them trade and agriculture prospered and a new nobility arose, and the middle class grew stronger, one of their greatest problems was to finance the state. It is states of this sort which, by centralisation, have solved their internal troubles, for a time at least, that are free to take an active part in foreign affairs; a policy which most states prefer to back with powerful armies and navies. In such states as sixteenth century England or seventeenth century France the King only made centralisation effective by organising a court influential enough to keep the nobles around it and away from their localities (v.sup. ch. 4). This, however, adds enormously to the king's expenses. In such states when the middle class is not yet very strong, the monarch is recognised as the equivalent or symbol of the state as a whole, so that the state treasury is a royal treasury and the things it pays for, such as the army and navy, the possessions of the king. (Until the victory of the Parliament, the Tudors and Stuarts had to/

to finance a centralised state with the income from Crown estates and from trade monopolies, which were thus an integral part of this feudal -absolutist type of state (86)). Not only had the king therefore, to provide for all the officials and institutions which become necessary for the efficient conduct of a state in which business plays an important part, but also for guards, royal servants and all the expenses of lavish living essential to maintain the prestige of the king.

In Attica, of course, which was a tiny state compared to the modern nation, the needs were much less. There was no extravagant court and, as yet, no extensive civil service. Provision of armour and horses for the army was still on a primitive basis and the navy was not yet large. Nevertheless, certain financial readjustments had already had to be made (v.sup.ch.4), and Solon's reforms had placed the new economy on a much more centralised basis, so that subsequently the demands for central expenses must have grown. Those expenses for which as yet no central organisation had been established, the tyrants had to meet themselves. To maintain their position they had both to keep a bodyguard and to advance the interests of their supporters; and to do both effectively, and to organise the state effectively in addition, they needed a steady supply of money. Tyrants realised the necessity of a good financial backing both to establish themselves and to maintain their position, and Peisistratus and his sons spent the years before their final attempt at the tyranny in collecting money from as many sources as possible (87); while Aristotle explicitly states that wealth was essential to maintain the tyrants in their position (88). It was only after Peisistratus had gained control of the Pangaeian mines that he maintained his position after the second attempt on the tyranny (v.sup.ch.4), and most tyrants must have had access to mines to stamp their own coins. Access to this new type of wealth was an essential prerequisite to the running of a centralised state backed by a paid bodyguard.

When the tyrant was no longer necessary to his supporters, these supporters probably would not become aware of it; while it is doubtful if the tyrant ever did, although he was probably aware of growing opposition to his rule. So long as he continued to serve their interests there would be few complaints, but once he failed in this, discontent would grow and the tyranny seem oppressive. On the whole, where he failed consistently and most disastrously was in finance. Not only would private fortunes not last for ever, but in any case this financial arrangement, like the tyranny itself, was merely of a transitional character. Even the private fortunes had not been sufficient and most tyrants had to resort to a variety of measures to obtain the necessary money. Control of/

of mines had been one method, and confiscations of property of exiled nobles had probably helped. Obviously, however, if the state's finances were to be settled on a sound basis, there would have to be introduced some form of regular taxation, which would have to be large enough to benefit the administration without crippling trade and agriculture, on whose prosperity the state was now dependent. Peisistratus introduced a tax of 10% on agricultural produce, agriculture being the main industry, but it may have applied to all, whether farmers or not (89). He did not apply it automatically, however, without consideration of the problem. He inspected personally both the countryside and the state of agriculture and the story of the stony plot and its exemption by Peisistratus from taxation, probably illustrates his care for the wellbeing of the citizens. The advancement of capital to poor peasants (v. sup.) and the general rise in prosperity of the peasants, would also help to benefit the state's finances. Indeed, Aristotle states that this was the purpose of his care for the peasants.

Although none of the states had yet developed sufficiently to be in a position to organise a public treasury on a permanent basis, some type of central fund was usually maintained from taxation. Peisistratus impressed upon the citizens that the tax of 10% went, not to him, but to such a fund from which sacrifices and other public services were financed and a fund maintained in case of war (90). Some tyrants attempted to run their finances in a business-like way, and, to prove to their citizens now essential finance was, or perhaps to stress their honesty, issued accounts of income and expenditure (91). When other methods failed, many tyrants resorted to debasement of the coinage (92). This, of course, could only aggravate the problem and would not long postpone the evil day. Its effects, too, would be especially detrimental to the interest of the main supporters of the tyranny, the merchants, artisans and peasants. When the supply of money finally failed, payment for troops and for other services became impossible, and so the basis of the tyrant's power was undermined. The tyrant, no doubt did not realise he had outlived his usefulness, and usually clung to his power against the wishes of his supporters. This applied even more so to his sons, if the power had been left to them by their father. Ancient writers noticed that the sons exercised a more violently despotic power than their fathers and were more luxurious and vicious in their habits (93). There are two main reasons. First, the tyrant was no longer necessary to his supporters and so maintained his position by more oppression; and secondly, the son, unlike his father, who attained his position through his talents and personality which were suited for the task, was actually brought up in a despotic atmosphere and so was completely unsuited for handling such a delicate balance of forces as that which sustained his position.

In Athens, on the death of Peisistratus, Hippias, either alone or in conjunction with his brother Hipparchus, succeeded to the tyranny (94). For a time Hippias, who was said to be serious-minded and interested in government, continued the policy of his father (95), and the rule of the tyranny after Peisistratus' death was not considered oppressive. Hippias appeared, temporarily at least, to follow his father's policy of moderation and personal integrity. He was capable enough, too, to understand the need for a sound financial basis for the state and exacted a tax of 5% on income. He, too, welcomed poets and artists to Athens. And Anacreon, Simonides and other poets visited Athens and enjoyed his hospitality. Money was wisely spent in continuing to make the city a place of pride and beauty for its citizens and also in giving the state financial backing for war (96). Moreover, the tyrants' interest in learning and the arts was not a restricted, personal pursuit. It seems to have been a matter of public policy designed to produce enlightened and educated citizens both in the town and on the countryside (97). The welfare of the citizens therefore, seems to have been their care as it was that of Peisistratus.

Four years after Peisistratus' death, however, Hipparchus was murdered. Although the usual explanation is that it was the result of a personal insult and quarrel, it is also admitted that the murder was connected with a conspiracy against the tyranny (98). Many nobles were said to have been implicated in the plot so that it could mean that a section of the reactionary party was still hoping to overthrow the tyranny and restore the aristocracy. However, the fact that the attempt was made does suggest that the tyranny was perhaps beginning to outlive its usefulness and did not enjoy the same positive, widespread support as before. Peisistratus' security, which had allowed him to dispense with city guards, was a thing of the past. At any rate, after Hipparchus' murder the rule of Hippias was much more despotic and oppressive (99), and many citizens were put to death. While this was no doubt partly due to the growing insecurity of the tyrant, Hippias' own personal fear as a result of the murder and the causes which provoked it, would make him suspicious and oppressive and so intensify such discontent as there already was.

However, lack of financial security was the most important cause of his undoing. It has been suggested (100) that Hippias and Hipparchus instituted extravagant banquets and lavish entertainments, and it was the necessity of securing sufficient money to finance these and other luxuries that made the government oppressive. If this were true, his taxation and other financial methods would be more resented than when the money was honestly accounted for and was clearly used for the benefit of the state. In addition, /

addition, Hippias' fears and insecurity led him to further expenditure. His suspicions had driven him to fortify Munichia (101) as a place of safety for himself and this must have demanded additional money. So desperate was he for money that he resorted to a number of dishonourable, and sometimes dishonest, financial tricks. He put up for sale parts of upper rooms which jutted into the streets, steps and fences in front of houses and doors which opened outwards. Naturally the owners were forced to buy them. Resentment against such measures must have been bitter. No longer was it possible to point to honest accounts and to a well-run and well-financed city. Hippias also allowed citizens to be enrolled among those who had performed state services on payment of a fine, much in the manner of selling a knighthood, and introduced what was virtually a death tax and a tax on birth. Even this was not enough, so finally he debased the coinage, a measure which, if continued, would lead to inflation with harmful effects to trade and prosperity (102).

Hippias rightly appreciated the growing opposition to his regime which now appeared so oppressive to many citizens. The merchants and their supporters must have been very much stronger as a result of the expansion of trade and growing prosperity arising from the tyrants' policy, and as a result of the corresponding decline in strength of the nobles, and would feel secure enough to do without the tyrant. Moreover, it would be they, the people of wealth, who would suffer most seriously and directly from Hippias' financial tricks although all sections of the population probably suffered indirectly as the financial difficulties grew more intense. However, he may not have anticipated that some Athenians would be ready to invite the co-operation of foreigners in their desire to be rid of him. At any rate, his position was already so weakened that he was easily overthrown when the Spartans entered Athens as a result of the manoeuvres of the exiled Alcmaeonidae (103). Hippias, apparently, received little support from the citizens since he was soon besieged in the Acropolis and forced to surrender when his children were seized as hostages.

Although the Alcmaeonidae had used the Spartans to help them overthrow the tyranny, Cleisthenes, their leader, realised there was no permanent basis for their position in Athens unless they gained the support of the people. The power of the old aristocracy was too weakened and the democratic forces too strong to be ignored. Accordingly, Cleisthenes appealed for support to the people by offering them a certain amount of power. The reactionaries, however, had appreciated the lesson of Spartan intervention and, under Isagoras, recalled Cleomenes of Sparta and his army. Under their rule the Alcmaeonidae and 700 families were banished, on the plea of pollution by sacrilege (104). The reactionaries had no hope of winning the support of the majority of the population for/

for their policy but they hoped to force their rule upon the people by restricting the citizen list. The granting or refusal of citizenship can always be a formidable weapon in the hands of a section of the population. Solon had made access to the citizenship fairly easy and so facilitated still further social changes. Peisistratus had confirmed those, who had recently received the citizenship, in their privileges and extended them to others. Naturally, the conservatives, if they wished to stop the general trend of social development, saw the restriction of the citizen list as an obvious measure.

The Spartans then attempted to dissolve the Senate and placed Isagoras and 300 of his followers in control of Athens (105). The Athenians, however, had already tasted the joys of freedom. The tyrant had overstayed his usefulness and had become oppressive, but that did not mean the people were willing to return to the old pre-tyrant conditions. They had begun to appreciate their own strength when they installed the tyrant, and so it was not surprising to find them combining to throw the Spartans and their Athenian collaborators out of the city. Under Cleisthenes, they were ready to go forward to a more advanced form of constitution, not back to an old one.

The early Greek tyrants have frequently been compared to other outstanding individuals in history (v.sup.). Comparisons of this sort can be of great value in understanding the essential characteristics of the period and obscuring the superficial. It will be of little value, however, to compare tyrants to individuals with a few similar characteristics of an unessential character when the backgrounds of the periods are entirely different. Tyrants must not be judged purely as individuals to the exclusion of outside events. Only if the role of tyrants is interrupted in relation to their environment and the circumstances under which they seized power, will a fuller understanding of their importance be gained. If the Italian city states produced tyrants similar to those of early Greece, we should expect them to appear, not at the time of Cosmo de Medici (v.sup.), but when the social changes arising from the revival of trade and industry had produced a middle class, which was strong enough to challenge the nobles but not sufficiently strong to do without a strong individual as the spearhead of their attack. Many circumstances, of course, were different and alliances varied greatly, but many tyrants did appear, just as many of the other changes and new ideas in Greece were paralleled in Italy. For instance, a new patriotism began to flourish as the Italian states expanded and became organised units. New constitutions were drawn up, public works were undertaken and prosperity increased. In Rome, a tyrant, Bronculeone d'Andolo, /

d'Andolo, was used by the merchants to break the power of the nobles, who had been attacking them, and to break the power of the nobles, who had been attacking them, and to raze their towers to the ground. In Florence in 1250 A.D. the people revolted against the nobles and set up a Captain of the People, with control over military affairs. The revolt was led by the middle classes, and the people were organised on a military footing, so that the government was virtually a military dictatorship to keep the gains of the revolt. The "popular government" lasted for ten years, during which Florence coined her golden florins, which remained unaltered as long as the republic lasted. Trade flourished and agricultural methods were improved. Bridges and palaces were built, literature and the arts, history and philosophy, showed new vitality and laid the basis for the great florescence of art in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Florence became renowned for victories in war. Under the popular government, in fact, the foundations of Florence's freedom and greatness were laid. She became the head of Tuscany and renowned in Italy, and "might have risen to any height had she not been afflicted by new and frequent divisions" (106). This indeed was the weakness of the Italian city states. They were oases of commercialism in a sea of feudalism. As a result, the nobles, usually Ghibellines, when defeated could call in the emperor and his followers, while the burghers, usually Guelphs, called in the Church (107). Naturally, factions continued and prevented peaceful progress. In Greece some stability was acquired and some progress recorded before the city states became the battlefield of great states on their borders.

An analogy to the Greek tyrants more familiar for English readers is that of Cromwell. He belonged to a family which had grown rich on land confiscated from the Church under Henry VIII, and he was already one of those landowners closely associated with the merchants. He led merchants, farmers and artisans in the Civil War, which ended with the execution of Charles I and the destruction of the last remnants of feudalism, and established virtually a military dictatorship to retain that victory. He trained the new model army, an army of a new type based on yeomen farmers, to replace the type of army which consisted of feudal retainers. He maintained his power through the support of this army, but was forced to manoeuvre between moderates and extremists, and finally to repudiate the latter. Land taken from Church, Crown and royalists he sold at nominal prices, and his rule saw a general rise in the level of wages. His weakness, like that of the tyrants, was finance, and he had to resort to heavy taxation, especially of landowners. The finances under the Tudors and Stuarts had been of a medieval character unsuited to the new centralised state. The monarchs had resorted to heavy taxation, dues and taxes on sales, tolls and monopolies to increase their personal fortunes, which were the/

the basis of the state's finances. These measures were still inadequate and the kings were always badly pressed for money and even inflation was occasionally used (108). Moreover, although the finances were modernised by Parliament, and controlled by Cromwell, they were not sufficiently developed, to maintain the standing army, and without the army the Commonwealth, like the tyranny, could not exist. Cromwell's son succeeded him but, like any tyrant's son, he was unsuited to the position, especially when the office of dictator was no longer needed. Accordingly he was forced to resign. The middle classes of the towns proved too weak to form a state entirely in their own interests and, at the same time, resist the demands of the more revolutionary parties. The Restoration of 1660 was therefore a more or less harmonious compromise between the landowners of both royalist and Presbyterian type, and the merchants, probably much in the manner of the compromise at Corinth. However, the essentially feudal characteristics, both religious and political, had been smashed by the revolution and never returned. The settlement of 1688 represented a further modification in the social alliance and from that time on the merchants and trading farmers gained in influence. The turmoil of the Civil War and Restoration weakened England's military power for a time but, once stability was restored, her strength returned and her lead in political and social changes was paralleled by her lead in industrial and other fields (109).

Although the Greek word "tyrant" was applied in ever wider senses to cover any sort of despot, this does not altogether explain why the word, whatever the type of tyrant, had hateful associations for the Greeks (110). The function of the tyrant explains this. Whatever their supporters, and these reveal their social background, they were always used by some part of the community, sometimes even in alliance with foreigners, as a dictatorship of this section over the rest of the population. Their supports may have been in the majority, but some citizens suffered or the tyrant would not have been needed (111). Accordingly, the history of every tyranny was the history of upheaval and some discontent, and it was the memory of this that was uncomfortable. People are naturally conservative and the association with social upheaval rendered the tyranny unpleasant (112). The word "revolution" in Western Europe has something of the same effect (113).

To sum up, the tyrant is neither an outstanding genius, either of finance or in some other sphere, nor is he a mere puppet, used by others because of these useful qualities of the plaything of blind forces, economic or otherwise (114). The tyrants, by their outstanding qualities, which found full scope in the conditions of their period, were cast for an/

an outstanding historical role. Large sections of the population had various objectives in view sometimes not very clearly defined. They frequently found themselves led by, or using, outstanding personalities during part of the struggle for their objectives. Their motives and those of the tyrants themselves would be countless. Sometimes the tyrant would deliberately use his supporters for his own ends and sometimes be used by them. Frequently no clear-cut realisation of the situation would emerge at all, but the closer the identity of interests and purpose, the greater would be the results in access of power for both tyrant and supporters and in social advance for the community as a whole.

The tyranny, therefore, its actual legislation and choice of method, was the outcome of both the tyrant and his supporters, whether engaged in struggle or harmonious co-operation; the outcome also of the relative strength of the reactionary forces and finally of the general conditions in which the tyranny arose and which might provide additional allies or enemies from foreign sources. It is possible, if the tyrant is regarded in abstract, to say he was progressive or reactionary according to the angle of interpretation. If he is studied as he should be, however, as an individual in relation to his background, it becomes clear that he was both. In the beginning he made progress possible by overruling his dictatorship in face of rapid advance and the demand for still more change, unconsciously his role became reactionary. (the nobility's resistance to social change. Later, by still maintaining)

For the historian, individual actions and lives are more obvious and so more easily recognised than the social background of the period, and so tend perhaps to be over-emphasised. The lack of any coherence in history when interpreted only according to the conscious lives and actions of individuals, was largely responsible for the reaction against this theory. Individuals can, however, play a very decisive part within the conditions of their period. Moreover, to the bare form of historical movement, whose lines are traced by men acting in social groups, the individual adds colour, variety and richness of content.

Since the function of the tyrant was essentially to overrule and suppress the old type of state until their supporters were strong enough to set up a government suitable to themselves, it is clear that after their overthrow, the suppression of the nobility's power, which had been a fact under the tyrant, was legalised by further reforms. Although the changes would only occur gradually over a period of decades, the basis for the new type of state was laid at once as a result of the tyranny and the constitution would be adapted more and more as the new section of the population became/

became more and more dominant. Ancient writers were too familiar with social and political changes in their small states to be unaware of this. Plato points out (115) that justice is the legal system set up by a governing class and designed to maintain them in power, while Aristotle (116) argues that varieties in constitutions reflect varieties in social systems, in the balance of power between rich and poor, in armed and unarmed classes, and that changes in the strength of social classes led to changes in the constitution. The final victory over the aristocracy would, therefore be marked by further constitutional and social changes.

In Attica Solon had introduced certain changes in the constitution which recognised the new social make-up of the community. They were only a partial recognition of the influence of the new people but Solon's economic reforms allowed these people to increase in numbers and power, for a time at least. However, as a result of the tyranny, custom and tradition were broken. The constitution had been maintained in theory, but was used to serve the tyrant and his supporters. When he was overthrown, therefore, the ground had been cleared for the rebuilding of the state on revised lines. For instance, since the nobles' control of magistracies had been virtually superseded by Peisistratus and his sons, and since the Areopagus had lost much of its power under them (v.sup.), while its composition was probably affected by the tyrant's control of the archonship and other offices, there was little basis for any immediate opposition to the reforms of Cleisthenes (117). The fact that many of the magistracies, for instance the archonship, were maintained and revitalised after the tyrant's overthrow does not mean continuity in the constitution but, since they were controlled by a dominant section containing many of the new people with new interests, serves to emphasise the break. Just as the English monarchy after the Restoration was of quite a different character (v.sub. n.127), and made to serve new interests, so the archonship was adapted to new policies as it came under the control of different sections of the community. Accordingly, a new constitution helped to destroy the last traces of aristocratic privilege and influence, and put the rights of the people, already freed from aristocratic control, on a positive basis. Aristotle stresses (118) that since the tyranny had allowed Solon's laws to fall into disuse, Cleisthenes' new constitution was virtually created on new lines after a complete break with the past, and was, probably as a result, much more democratic than the Solonian constitution. The democratic republic was beginning to take shape.

Perhaps Cleisthenes' most fundamental reform was his introduction of a system of ten tribes instead of four. The demos or parish was the basis of the system. The demoi were/

were incorporated in thirty trittyes, ten composed of demoi near the city, ten of demoi from the interior and ten of demoi on the coast. Each tribe consisted of three trittyes, one in the city, one in the interior and one on the coast (119). As a result, the city and trading population was represented in every tribe and, since Athens was the political centre of the state, the people of the city, who were overwhelmingly supporters of the new policy, since they would be, in the main, traders, seamen and artisans and people connected with these, were obviously favoured by the new arrangement. In addition, an Athenian's patronymic no longer indicated birth but the deme to which he belonged. One advantage of this, it was pointed out, (120), was that those newly enfranchised would not be recognised by the foreign sound of their father's name, a real attempt at breaking the influence of custom and tradition, and at creating a feeling of equality among old and new citizens. All adult males in a demos were enrolled in the register as citizens and enjoyed municipal privileges. These reforms emphasised in the citizens' minds the new status of a citizen as a member of a nation with loyalties to that rather than to old tribal and local ties. The religious control of the nobles, probably their last main hold on the community's social structure, was broken by the introduction of new names for the tribes and the abolition of the old ones with their old association (121). Since this was largely a culmination of a process which had been taking place during the tyranny, it was, therefore, all the more easily carried out.

Of course a full democracy could not be established in Attica at once; Cleisthenes was in many ways the logical successor of the tyrants (122). But by giving the citizenship freely and taking the people into partnership (123), the framework for its growth was laid down. Moreover, since the results of this increased democracy meant that the common people, who had lost the considerable freedom they had enjoyed in more primitive forms of society as a result of the dominance of the nobles on land, now recovered much of their lost equality, it is not surprising that some tribal institutions were now revived. Although, since conditions were so different, these naturally were severely modified, the popular assembly, common festivals and the use of the lot were essentially revivals rather than completely new customs (124). Certainly much of the new equality was only political and not economic. Offices, for instance, were still awarded according to property. However, since industry and trade, with their new freedom and influential position were able to expand tremendously, the poorer people had an opportunity to prosper and to gain that economic status necessary for some political privileges. It was only in later centuries, when this process was slowed down and finally stopped, that social troubles again became apparent.

The degree of democracy achieved after the tyrannies depended largely on the strength of the various parties in the state. In Corinth an oligarchial government was set up after the tyranny, (125), probably because there were not the same facilities for broadening the basis of the state and probably, too, because of the social alliances which had supported the tyranny. It is interesting that Athens, where the extreme party of artisans and miners, peasants and seamen, played a part as well as the merchants in creating the tyranny, produced a more extreme democracy than most other Greek states. Here, too, the personality of individual tyrants could play a great part in moulding future developments. Once they had obtained their dictatorial powers through the strength of their supporters, the expression of their characters through those powers carried great weight in influencing events. Peisistratus is usually recognised to have pursued a moderate policy which may indicate that, while carrying through reforms favourable to his supporters, he sincerely worked towards healing sectional differences and creating a national state which could command the support of all citizens. The extent of the duration of the tyranny, too, probably had some effect on the future state. Aristotle (126) argues that the tyrannies which lasted longest were those which were moderate and which were supported by the people because the tyrants took care of them.

In general, however, Peisistratus' policy had to favour his own party as well as the big merchants, and so the basis of the state was already very broad when Cleisthenes took control. The very existence of a third party in Attica indicated that there were more extreme social interests already preparing to play their part in the state, and Peisistratus' use of them encouraged their growth and influence. Corinth, however, after the tyranny, in spite of being an oligarchy, was quite different from the old aristocratic type of state. It was no doubt based on an alliance of old families and new, but its basis was essentially that of a free expanding economy with laws and institutions to suit and further this, and no longer that of hereditary privilege and aristocratic control (127). The narrow basis of the state in Corinth compared with Athens simply meant that the privileges of state were shared by fewer people. The character of the two states, however, was essentially the same. In Megara the tyrant was expelled very quickly and the new people proved too weak to establish a stable government. Instead of obtaining a compromise (128), they wasted their own strength and devastated the community's peace and prosperity in futile, factional strife (129). Here, too, however the state was of a new type. When the aristocratic faction was restored, a new constitution was introduced, which, although it favoured only/

only a few, recognised the importance of the new wealth, which was becoming the basis of even the nobles' position and fortune, whether it was invested in agriculture or not (130).

In general, the broader basis of state laid down in Attica was the result of the broader forces involved in Attica and the use made of them by Peisistratus; and the cause, therefore, on the whole, of the great florescence at Athens in all spheres of human activity. Naturally, many of the details of alliances and groupings suggested here are only inferences which, from the general history, seem most plausible. There is no direct evidence for much of the detail, which can only be inferred indirectly from the policies of the tyrants, the apparent strength of certain sections of the population and the type of states set up after the tyrants were overthrown. However, the general character and effect of Peisistratus' rule and of the Athenian state which succeeded him - and it is this which is of fundamental importance - is not in dispute.

The most immediate result of the broad basis of the new Athenian state was the brilliant leadership Athens presented against Persia. Naturally at first, as a result of the temporary instability after the fall of the tyranny, Athenian policy and strength were weakened. Hippias, after the expulsion of the Spartans, appealed to the Great King for support. Cleisthenes, too, having lost faith in his supporters or, perhaps, fearing their strength if they took the lead in a war against Sparta, appealed to the Great King and so lost political influence. The Alcmaeonidae as a whole, now largely weakened as a result of their eclipse under the Peisistratidae, and the loss of their leader, were also suspected of pro-Persian leanings (131). If it is remembered that tyrants and other outstanding individuals should be judged from the standpoint of their supporters as well as from their own characters, it is clear that Hippias since his overthrow had passed beyond the stage of being merely useless and an obstacle to his former supporters to a point where he was willing to be the tool of their enemies. The Great King expected to obtain some support in Athens from the remaining supporters of Hippias and others (132). By now, however, these were probably only a few disgruntled individuals liable to become anyone's tool. Athens had imprisoned most of those who had supported Cleomenes and had recalled all those exiled by the Spartans and Isagoras (133), and used the new feelings of patriotism in calling on all parties to combine against the enemy. Themistocles took the place of discredited leaders and drew together the most progressive and patriotic sections of the population (134). The new state had produced a citizen army of real efficiency. Now the victory of the people ensured the most important weapon of all in war, that is, morale (135). The victory/

victory of democracy in Athens to which so many things had contributed, but especially the role played by iron and the alphabet within the trading revolution in producing the tyranny, now called forth a spirit of high patriotism and courage, which shone like a beacon to summon and challenge the rest of Greece.

Previous to the tyranny, the economic and social life of the community had been affected by contradictions of opposing institutions and factions and by the disruptive action of the new type of economy, which was not yet well enough established to force laws and institutions which would give full play to its own further development (136). Once, therefore, the restrictions on economic and technical development had been swept away, first by the political revolution under the tyranny and finally by the establishment of a bourgeois republic, the economic and social life of the community again bounded forward, its progress facilitated by the creation of laws and practices designed to suit the new conditions, as well as by freedom from old ones. This is reflected not only in more inventions closely connected with the enormous new demands of the time (v. sup.), but in science and philosophy, which played a big part in the further development of the new paths man was pursuing (137). This advance in knowledge seems to have been the culmination of all periods of rapid progress, for instance in the Bronze Age, in the Italian Renaissance and in seventeenth century England. Art and culture, too, at such times are not only stimulated by the increased tempo of life, but indirectly and unconsciously exhibit its influence in their choice of subject (138). Examples are given from similar periods of social and technical advance, but not because they are considered as absolute parallels. The influence of the past in intellectual and artistic tradition would produce many differences in different periods, and it would be as easy to pick out differences as similarities. Moreover, in any period of change older opinions and ideas linger on, even when the new ones have become dominant. Yet in spite of all this the general social advance is so intense and important that, in very general terms, similar attitudes to science, art and philosophy may be detected in periods, which may differ in many things but are alike in this characteristic of social progress.

Further changes in ideas and opinions in Greece expressed men's reactions to the new social and political conditions. The struggle of the period drew even poets into action and some of the most bitter attacks on the new rich came from the pens of aristocrats such as Theognis of Megara and Alcaeus of Lesbos (139), whose work suffered from the cramped effect of/

of belonging to a defeated minority (140). To a member of an old family such as Theognis the middle class and the merchants were merely the mob. The "Good" were aristocrats and the "Bad" were the people (141). However wealth can make the "Bad" become "Good" and clearly it is this which is resented. This attitude is typical of such periods when it is the middle class which is revolutionary and when a class of workers scarcely exists. In Greece the independent craftsman with his own raw materials and tools still existed - and continued to do so during the following centuries - and the small workshop was probably the rule. Even in England, after the trading revolution, this is true and only gradually did the middlemen grow up to supply raw materials and the workers become organised as an economic unit (142). At Florence, too, the aristocrats were called "Buoni". Later when the "People", that is the middle class, had become more firmly established, and a class of workers had emerged, Macchiavelli (143) talks of three classes, the Great, the People, and the Working Class. Obviously, in the early period, it was the "People" who had been revolutionary and challenged the power of the nobles before a class of workers even emerged. Tyrannies established after revolutions have been attacked by de Tocqueville (144). He maintains that since money flows freely at such times and is the chief measure of distinction, many families lose their distinguished positions while new ones are suddenly honoured. Even his language is strongly reminiscent of Theognis.

Instead of the individual lyric song, which had expressed the destruction of former traditions and the freeing of individuals from old ideas and obligations before the crystallisation of new ones, the choral ode was revived since it expressed something of the new nationalist spirit. This had been the poetry of the aristocracy (v. sup.). Now it was adapted for a new purpose. The task of the new poets was to inspire the whole people with a new sense of unity under the tyrant, to help them to forget the strife of civil war and the isolation of individuals. Their poetry was meant to assist the tyrants' policy of national unity and to praise and adorn their courts. Anacreon wrote lyric songs and elegies of great elegance at Polycrates' court and later at the court of Hipparchus. Simonides of Ceos enjoyed the bounty of the Peisistratidae in return for his choral poetry. In Corinth under Periander Arion introduced the dithyramb from Lesbos, the singing being performed by trained and costumed choruses (145). This does not mean, of course, that the tyrants deliberately chose this type of poetry and the poets (instructed) to write it. Poetry, like all other forms of expression, had gradually been changing in order to express more effectively the new sentiments. Where these did raise the prestige of the tyrants' courts, naturally they would receive full encouragement from the tyrants themselves.

The new nationalist sentiments, which had found expression both in the coinage and in games and festivals (v. sup.), were expressed in religious form too. The old religious rites and privileges died out or lost their power under the tyrants, as a result mainly of the defeat of the nobles who had exercised them (146). Sometimes these nobles were actually exiled and so new cults were needed to fill the gap. The cult of Dionysus was fostered by Peisistratus, Periander and Cleisthenes (147). This had been the cult of peasants as opposed to the nobles (148), and swept over Greece in a wave of enthusiasm, which was religious in form, but based on economic and social changes on the countryside (149). Under the tyrants it acquired a more urban character, and city festivals to Dionysus were encouraged (150). For these Dionysiac processions the dithyramb was used as a musical accompaniment and, with further modifications, proved the germ of tragedy (151). So the tyrants' courts provided a meeting place for choral poetry and Dionysiac mimes, from which was to evolve eventually the drama, the literary form par excellence of the post-tyrant democracies (152). Music and lyric poetry frequently flourish together and Greek music, like other arts, progressed about this period, especially as a result of technical improvements.

In England, too, a new nationalism sprang up in a similar period. In the Civil War some of Parliament's supporters used anti-Norman sentiments to mobilise and inspire the people and there was a tendency to regard the Norman Conquest as the cause of the decline from equality (153). In the same way, in the Dorian states, anti-Dorian feeling was used to mobilise the people (154). A variety of religious beliefs from Wycliffe to Calvin had interpreted doctrine in a popular way according to the needs of the various sections of the population and eventually challenged the whole authority of the Roman Church. The influence of Puritanism in England, however, was much more obvious than religious influence in Greece. The Roman Church had in theory opposed usury, so the religious reformers not only defended the new economic ideas (155) but also appealed to the new nationalist sentiments against the feudal, internationalism of the Roman Church (156). Lyric song had flourished in England, too, amid the new freedom and adventure of sixteenth century England. Although romantic poetry such as Spenser's Faerie Queene and moralistic romances like Lyly's Euphues and Greene's Carde of Fancie, with their wealth of learned allusions and adventure in foreign lands, had been written for and appreciated by the small literate circle of Europe at the time - in the same way as much of the early Greek aristocratic poetry must have been intended for reciting in a small cultured circle - the people, too, like the Greek peasants, had their own art forms such as mumming plays and folk dances (157). In addition, writers like Thomas Delaney used the everyday life of the common people as material for their very realistic prose works/

works (158). In England too, however, as in Greece, lyric poetry combined with popular art forms such as former liturgical plays, now secularised (159), and, under Tudor patronage, developed into lyric drama and, in Shakespeare's time, into drama proper. Music, like lyric poetry, was a medium of expression of the spirit of the times and English music of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and, in France, the music of the revolutionary period, were outstanding in merit and influence.

In periods of social change science and philosophy always tend to be linked very closely with practice. It is as if the world had been shaken up and all men's ideas thrown into the melting pot. Man must start from the beginning again, and all such starts are made step by step from the world around. Moreover, since a period of technical advance following on the trading revolution had preceded the florescence of philosophy and science and laid the practical basis for them, it was inevitable that the theories should have evolved out of the practical work and problems of the age. In Greece, the earliest known philosophers, who were also scientists, date from the sixth century, but there may have been others before them, and almost certainly their conclusions were based on practical work which had been carried on for some time previously. Further technical improvements had been evolving as a result of the progress of industry and trade, and the philosopher-scientists of this time were usually practical inventors. They conceived everything to be in a state of motion (160), a natural reaction to the rapid transformation of societies going on around them. They were all interested in cosmogonies (161), however, which was no doubt partly a reaction to the widening of the world's boundaries through colonies and trade, but also represented an attempt to find some formula for the universe which would serve as a basis for stabilisation in spite of the flux.

A striking characteristic of all great thinkers in such periods of great cultural revival is not only their combination of practical and theoretical qualities, but also their "allroundness", their ability and interest in every phase of men's activity in that period. Thales was not only a philosopher but a practical engineer and an inventor. He applied the empirical rules of the Egyptians to new problems and worked out how to measure the distance of ships at sea, and how to steer by the Little Bear. He was interested in politics like many of the philosophers of his time, and a friend of Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus. He is even said to have been a practical business man and to have made a corner in oil (162).

Anaximander was also an inventor and was the first to construct/

construct a map. Interest in the sea may have stimulated Anaximander's work on the evolution of animal life, which was based on practical observation (163). In general the work of all these philosopher-scientists was closely connected with ships and sea voyages, with agriculture and with building and military engineering (164); in fact, with the most important activities of their time. Interest in music, too, advanced from the purely practical stage to intense theoretical research by Pythagoras and others.

With the growth of city life, medicine became a practical necessity. Epidemics were probably not infrequent at first before the need for sanitation and hygiene was understood. At Athens the outbreak of plague in Solon's time was probably due to the lack of such precautions (165). While the reaction among the population was an outbreak of superstition, the only method of attacking the plague seems to have been some form of magic. This would soon prove inadequate as cities expanded, and just as the renewed interest in the sea and industry produced inventions and improved technique, so in medicine probably a few practical measures were soon learned. On the basis of such practical work medicine, like other sciences, acquired the status of a science proper and the medical schools of Crotona and Cyrene were famous (166). It was almost certainly the growth of cities which made medicine a necessity. Just as the urban revolution in general produced new technique and new sciences, whether directly or indirectly, here city life itself probably directly forced the development of a new science. In Hellenistic times, too, the rapid growth of cities helped to make medicine and surgery important and these sciences benefitted greatly from practical work such as vivisection and dissection of corpses (167). Even medical poems were written as well as poems on astronomy, geography and farming, all reflecting the renewed interest in the sciences characteristic of the Hellenistic period.

In Europe, after the break up of the Roman Empire, Thomas Aquinas was probably the first exponent of the new life which eventually began to spring up out of the dark ages. He was strongly influenced by Aristotle, who had watched the beginnings of new life in the Hellenistic East and was not unacquainted with practical research work. Like most thinkers in a period which presented fresh problems, Thomas Aquinas was an extreme realist, while his optimism reflected the rising tide of new life around him. In Europe, too, as the tide of new life spread not only to cities but to countries, the intellectual and cultural revival was expressed by men who were outstanding in every sphere, who were practical men as well as brilliant theoreticians, who could not avoid taking sides in the political and social struggles of their day/

day any more than the Greek thinkers could. So Dürer was not only painter, engraver, sculptor and architect, but also inventor of a system of fortifications. Macchiavelli was statesman, historian and poet, and a military author. Leonardo da Vinci was mathematician, mechanic and engineer as well as a great painter. In England, as the trading revolution produced new problems and new discoveries, Bacon held the function of philosophy, as that of natural science, to be the increase of man's power over nature through the growth of scientific knowledge (168). Here we have a repetition of the early Greek alliance of science and philosophy and a close link between practical work and theory, although Bacon was still in the more primitive stage of attaching too much importance to empiricism alone and too little to thought. Of course, backward features existed in England as superstition had flourished in Athens. In sixteenth century England John Doe made his living from astrology and no doubt found it profitable (169). The dominant trend, however, was to use the new interest in stars, aroused by the problems of shipping, to advance from astrology to astronomy, as Newton did (170), and to build real sciences on the basis of practical discoveries. After the victory over autocratic monarchy and feudal privilege, science and philosophy made even greater strides, as they had done in Greece. Practical inventions were stimulated and the keen interest they evoked is well illustrated by John Evelyn (171). Locke retained the scientific spirit expressed in question and research in his criticism of innate ideas. Newton and a score of other scientists, and the establishment of the Royal Society, mark England's outstanding position in the sciences just as she was advanced in economic and social development. Little wonder that John Ray, the naturalist, gave thanks to God in 1694 "for the gift of life in such an age of discovery and scientific enthusiasm" (172). These scientists and philosophers, as those of early Greece, were not uninfluenced by their social background and the theories of the universe which they evolved were based on the simple mechanical principles of the machines of that period (173).

In Germany the middle class matured rather late but intellectual heritage, it was noted, is of enormous importance in moulding ideas, and, in Europe, science and philosophy were rapidly becoming international. Kant and Hegel revived the early Greek theory of motion by contradiction. However, details of social background and intellectual tradition were very different and produced quite different results in their mature philosophies (174).

Medicine in Europe, too, developed on new lines with the growth of cities (175). In England, medicine had been organised on new lines when the Royal College of Surgeons received/

received its charter from Henry VIII (176), but modern, scientific medicine did not emerge until after the industrial revolution, when the cities of the eighteenth century were depleting the population so rapidly that new methods were needed to deal with the problem (177).

In general, in the early years of the republics, Greece was growing and experimenting in every sphere. She was evolving new forms in poetry, new theories in philosophy and new technique in art (178). In fact, she was laying the basis for that great florescence in art and culture which, centred around Athens in the fifth century B.C. The long process, initiated by the opportunities afforded to men as a result of the trading revolution and the influence of iron within it, and carried further by the social and intellectual transformation which followed and the profound effect of the alphabet on this, had reached its climax in the overthrow of the tyrant, that weapon so essential to the victory of the middle class but so soon outdated, and the establishment of the democratic republic. As a result, such opportunities were opened up both for the collective nation and for individual initiative and advancement, that Athenians displayed a vigorous enthusiasm and progressive character which was carried into every sphere of human endeavour. If, in later years, this cultural florescence declined and social advance was not only halted but even reversed, it was not that the benefits to mankind involved in all the discoveries had been exhausted, but rather that their full possibilities were no longer being fully exploited. The methods of using these benefits had led men into economic contradictions and social conflicts which demanded radical changes before still more progress could be recorded (v.sub. ch.vii). Even so, the achievements already made by Athens were a source of pride and inspiration, not only to the ancient Greeks, but to all progressive mankind today.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V.

1. Hdt. I. 63-4; v.62.
2. cf. Plut. Sol. 13, where it is stated that the Shore Party seemed to desire a mixed sort of government between the extremes of the other two parties.
3. Aris.Ath. Pol. 14. 2; 16. 1; Hdt. I. 59; Paus. I. 23. 1.
4. Ath. Pol. 16. 3, 4.
5. Diog. Laert. I. 53.
6. Diog. Laert. I. 60 ff.
7. Arist. Ath. Pol. 16. 3; Hdt. I. 59; Thuc. vi. 54.
8. Thuc. vi. 54.
9. Arist. Ath. Pol. 16. 2.
10. Arist. Ath. Pol. 16.3; Hdt. I. 59; Thuc. vi. 54; Athen XII. 532F-533C.
11. Arist. *ibid.*
12. Ath. Pol. 22. 1.
13. cf. Ure, *Origin of Tyranny*, p.301, for this view.
14. Ure, *op.cit.*, p.301, J.H.S. xxvi, p.131 ff. rightly criticises this view held among others by Plass, *Die Tyrannis*, I. 120 ff, and to a certain extent by Beloch, *Griech. Gesch. I.* 347 ff.
15. M. L'abbé de Mably, "*Observations sur les Grecs*"; Geneva 1749. pp. 18 foll.
16. F. Guizot; "*The History of Civilisation*"; London 1856. I. p.14.
17. A.F. Mignet, "*History of the French Revolution*"; London 1826, I. p.17. cf. p.40.
18. Augustin Thierry, "*The Historical Essays*", London 1835;p.6.
19. G.Monod, "*Les Maitres de l'histoire, Renan, Taine, Michelet*"; Paris, 1896. pp. vii, x, xi.
20. cf. De Broc, "*La Vie en France sous le premier Empire*"; Paris 1895, p.36.
- 21./

21. *ibid.* pp. 35 foll.
22. *ibid.*
23. Their artillery and the increased rate of march were decisive cf. Liddell-Hart, "The Strategy of Indirect Approach" p.122; quoted in A.L.Morton, "A People's History of England", London 1938, p.341.
24. v. sup., chs. I,II.
25. It was essential to be a noble in order to be an officer, and in practice, a rich noble. Joubert, Jourdain, and Kleber were reduced to being mercenaries or engaging in civil careers. Marceau, Ney, and Augereau seemed destined to be non-commissioned officers. cf. A.Rambaud, "Histoire de la Civilisation Française", Paris 1894, II. pp.226-7.
26. cf. Thucyd. I. 126.
27. cf. F. Elwyn Jones, "The Battle for Peace", London, 1938, p.57; Cecil F. Melville, "The Truth about the New Party", London, 1931, pp.21, 34-5; Hans Behrend, "The Real Rulers of Germany", London 1939, pp.34, 40, 50; cf.P.Noel-Baker, "The Private Manufacture of Armaments", London 1937, I. p.195.
28. cf. Schumann's letter to Spohr on his symphony No.1 in B flat. "I do not wish to portray, to paint, but I believe firmly that the period at which the symphony was created influenced its form and character and shaped it as it is". cf. G. Spiller, "The Origin and Nature of Man", Appendix A, pp.355-356. "In fact, instead of being independent of his environment, he (Raphael) appears utterly unintelligible without it". His whole analysis of "Greatness", *op.cit.*, pp.358-367, explains the activity of mankind in every sphere as the result of "a combination of individual, social and historical circumstances". His quotations are well worth reading. He goes no further, however, and fails to explain why man's activity reveals these characteristics. cf. pp.280-1, for his interesting table on polar exploration.
29. cf. Taine, "History of English Literature", vol.I. pp.4-5, 13 ff. Scores of talents who only half express social thought appear round one or two geniuses who express it perfectly when a fresh step in the development of civilisation calls into being a new form of art.
30. "Like all great composers, whose music is really vital, Elgar was a product of his age". Ralph Hill, Radio Times, April 3rd, 1942.

"Beethoven's personality was profoundly affected by the social and political upheavals of his time. It is no belittling of Beethoven's genius to admit that this (i.e. a new musical character) came to him from the music of the French Revolution". Edward J. Dent, "Opera", Pelican Edition. 1940, p.58.

31. cf. Augustin Thierry, op.cit., p.11, cf. p.6.
32. A.F. Mignet, op.cit., I, pp.3-5; 147.
33. The reverse is true. A man who is born "out of spirit" with the times becomes a social failure, a historical tragedy. Entire novels have been written around this theme; cf. "The Don flows home to the Sea", by M. Sholokhov, for a modern example. This well illustrates how a strong personality cannot express itself against the current of history, while a less striking character may have the opportunity to become a leader because he is moving with the stream of events.
34. Isocr. Paneg.
35. M. Rostovtzeff, "The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World", pp.,94 foll.
36. A.W.Gomme, "Essays in Greek History and Literature", p.246.
37. Even before 340 B.C. Philip was planning to attack the East and to colonise it with Greek and Macedonian soldiers. cf. Diod. Sic. XVII. 7. i. cf. Gomme, op.cit., 207-8.
38. If Alexander had died before carrying any of his plans into effect, the general trend of times would probably have been deep-rooted and widespread enough to produce another person who could, however inadequately compared with Alexander, carry out similar plans. If the general trend were not strong enough, what would have happened? The Eastern and Greek states would have continued to decay gradually until Rome conquered Greece, absorbed her culture, and spread it with new economic life throughout the East. This would have involved many differences in the appearance of these states but the general development would have been the same even if much delayed. Alexander had in fact begun to lose some of his effectiveness before his death. He had succumbed to some extent to the attractions of luxury and wealth, cf. Diod. Sic, XVII. 77. vi-vii and, probably as a result, was even threatened by a mutiny of some of his own Macedonian troops. See Diod. Sic. XVII. 109. ii-iii.

39. It is interesting that some of those who treat history purely from the standpoint of the conscious actions of individuals are forced by their attitude to detract from the greatness of individuals. Mably for instance attacks Alexander; cf. Observations sur les Grecs, 1749, pp.199-202. cf. Observations sur l'histoire de la Grèce, 1766, pp.229-232.
40. Professor Ure's theory of the individualistic role of Greek tyrants, cf. Origin of Tyranny, passim, fails to explain why they are characteristic of certain periods.
41. cf. Aris. Pol. III. 14. 1285a. 26; V. (VIII). 5. 1305a. 10. Thuc. I. 13; Plato, Rep. VIII. 565. 568.
42. Arist. Pol. V. 8. 1310b. 26; Polyb. II. 47; Paus. II.9; VIII. 27.
43. Origin of Tyranny, pp.300/1.
44. op.cit. p.301.
45. Ure, op.cit., p.2; Niebuhr, Lectures on Ancient History, I. p.274.
46. op.cit., p.267.
47. cf. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, p.209; Tarn, C.A.H. vii. p.733.
48. cf. Aris. Pol. v. (viii) 5. 1306B; 10. 1310B; Thuc. I. 13; Phaenias ap. Athen. iii. 90E.
49. Strabo, viii. 6. 20.
50. Aelian, V.H. 1. 19, maintains that the Bacchiadae lost their^{power} through their arrogance. Compare Charles I's attitude to the divine right of kings; obstruction may well assume the form of arrogance. Strabo, l.c., says that they took the profits of trade; cf. again the attitude to ship money. Nic. Dam. F.H.G. III. pp.391 ff., merely says their rule became oppressive.
51. Hdt. v. 92; Paus. ii. 4. 4. cf. Hdt. v. 67-68, for other exx.
52. Aris. Pol. v. 10. 1310b.
53. Aris. Rhet. 1.2.1357b.
54. Plut. Quaest. Graec. 57; Apul. Florida, ch.15.
55. Hdt. iii. 56.
- 56./

56. cf. Hdt. iii. 39, 122; Thuc. i.13, Strabo, xiv. 1.16; Nic. Dam. F.H.G. iii. p.393.
57. cf. Aris. Ath. Pol. 16. 2; Aelian, V.H. ix. 25.
58. Athen. xii. 540 c-d.
59. Ure, op.cit., p.205.
60. cf. Plut. Sol. 31. It is disputed whether this applies to Solon or Peisistratus. Cf. Nic. Dam. F.H.G.iii. p.393, for Periander. The law limiting the number of slaves (v.Heracleides F.H.G. ii. p.213), may have been a temporary measure to relieve unemployment until trade and industry developed.
61. Plut. Sol. 31.
62. cf. Ure, op.cit., p.78, on this.
63. Pol. v.11. 1313b.
64. Ure, op.cit., p.77, suggests this and then explains it away as due to Aristotle's ignorance of the conditions of Greece at that time. Aristotle was probably reporting quite accurately a tradition which reflected the view of the wealthier parts of the population, who no doubt regarded taxation as complete impoverishment.
65. Hdt. iii. 65.
66. Paus. i. 40. 1; 41. 2.
67. Thuc. ii. 5; Paus. i. 14. 1.
68. Diog. Laert. i. 99.
69. Hdt. v. 92; Paus. iv. 4; v. 18.
70. Hdt. i. 59; iii. 39 & 45; Aris. Pol. vii. 1313b; Rhet.1.2. 1357b; Nic. Dam. F.H.G. iii. p.392.
71. Hdt. i. 64; v.92; Plut. Lys. 1; Polyaeus, v.31.
72. Aris. Ath. Pol. 16. 7.
73. v. sup. n.5; Aris. Ath. Pol. 16.3; Athen. xii. 533c, mentions that some thought Peisistratus' rule oppressive almost as if he felt he had to apologise for his own praise of him. It is singularly unconvincing.
- 74./

74. Athen. xii. 532F-533C. On his judging civil cases, cf. Aris. Ath. Pol. 16. 2.
75. Plut. Sol. 8, 12; Diog. Laert. i. 46 ff.
76. Cf. Adcock, C.A.H. iii. p.696, where he argues that the new methods of fighting were those of the middle class. This he says is the army of the middle class and helped the tendency towards centralisation even before their victory under and after the tyranny.
77. Jardé, op.cit. p.292.
78. ~~Th~~knaton, too, who seems to represent the political movement following on the Bronze Age urban revolution, imposed monotheism on his subjects. This is usually regarded as the ideological reflection of the unity created by imperialism, and it also seems possible from ~~Th~~knaton's methods that it was used by him, perhaps unconsciously, to hold the people together under one god and to destroy some of the more harmful effects of the old religion on the lives of the people. S. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, Ldn. 1939, pp. 35 ff., has an interesting interpretation of ~~Th~~knaton's religion and its possible influence on Jewish monotheism.
79. Cf. Hdt. iii. 60; Aris. Pol.v.11. 1313b; Paus ii. 9. 6.
80. Cf. Hdt. iii. 56; For a ship on coins of Polycrates cf. Ure, op.cit., pp.74-5. For the head of Athena on coins of Peisistratus, cf. Seltman, op.cit. p.40.
81. Hdt. i. 23; iii. 121; Aris. Ath. Pol. 18.1; Strabo, xiv. 1. 16; Athen. xii. 540D.
82. Lycurgus, Leucr. 102. c.26; Ps. Plato, Hipparchus, sec.4.
83. Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 34, and Paus. vii. 26, 13, mention that Peisistratus was said to have been the first to arrange the books of Homer. This view is now fairly generally discredited. There was also a tradition that Solon, not Peisistratus or Hippias, collected them. cf. Diog. Laert. i. 57. Cf. Nilsson, Homer and Mycenae, pp. 3 ff. and Lang, Homer and His Age, p.180, The World of Homer, p.282, on this.
84. Cf. Hdt. v.92, 94; Thuc. vi. 59; Nic. Dam. F.H.G.iii. p.393.
85. Cf. de Broc, op.cit. p.36, where he points out that dictators flourish in an atmosphere of division, factions and distrust which render decisive action impossible. This only indicates the civil strife which gives the tyrant his opportunity and perhaps the conflicting alliances under the tyrant as conditions changed. Cf. Aris. Pol. v.10. 1311a.

86. Cf. Morton, A. People's History of England, p.206.
87. Hdt. v.61.
88. Pol. v. 10. 1311a. cf. Ure, op.cit., passim, on the role of wealth.
89. Aris. Ath. Pol. 16. 2. However Diog. Laert, i.53, says that Peisistratus imposed the tax of 10% on all possessions. This seems more probable, unless he was deliberately penalising landowners and allowing trade and manufacture even greater freedom.
90. Diog. Laert. i. 53.
91. Aris. Pol. v.11, 1314b.
92. Aris. *ibid.*; Oecon. ii. 1347a. Cf. Ure, op.cit., pp.63 ff. 183. Financial difficulties followed by inflation were common in the Italian city states too. cf. Pirenne, op.cit. pp.99-100.
93. Aris. Pol.V. 10. 1312B.
94. Thuc. vi. 54/5, stresses several times that Hippias succeeded, not Hipparchus, and points out as proof that Hippias must have been tyrant when Hipparchus was murdered or he could not have so easily asserted his power. This is probably true but does not prevent Hippias and Hipparchus from having ruled jointly, with the latter as a sort of junior partner, as Aristotle seems to suggest, cf. Ath. Pol. 18.1.
95. Aris. Ath. Pol. 17. 2; 18.3.
96. Thuc. vi. 54. On the visits of poets, cf. Aris. Ath. Pol. 18. 1; Ps. Plato, Hipp. 4.
97. Ps. Plato, Hipp. *ibid.*
98. Aris. Ath. Pol. 18. 3. Ps. Plato, Hipp. *ibid.*, points out that the usual story of the quarrel is a ridiculous one. His own account, however, is not a great improvement on it.
99. Aris. Ath. Pol. 19. 1; Hdt. v. 55; Thuc. vi. 59; Heraclides Ponticus, F.H.G. ii. p.209; Ps.Plato, Hipp.*ibid.*
100. Athen. xii. 532F-533C.
101. Aris. Ath. Pol. 19. 1.
- 102./

102. Cf. Seltman. Athens, etc., pp.77/8, on Aris.Oecon.ii.1347a.
103. Aris. Ath. Pol. 19. 1; Hd.t. v.62 ff.; Thuc. vi. 59. Jarde, op.cit. p.210, believes there was always a pro-Spartan party at Athens. It is more probable that this was of recent growth and especially as a result of the tyranny. Exiles would tend to look for help outside if they had failed themselves as indeed Hd.t. points out, v.62.
104. Aris. Ath. Pol. 20. 1; v. 70, 72.
105. Aris. ibid; Hd.t. v. 72.
106. On all this, cf. Sismondi, A History of the Italian Republics, pp.19-21, 75-78, 98-99; Villari, History of Florence, pp.189, 195-6; Macchiavelli, Storie, ii.pp.194.
107. Sismondi, op.cit. p.64. The Church was the most progressive force at this period, and had been the means of continuing education and medical services after the break up of the Roman Empire; cf. Pirenne, op.cit., pp.176ff.
108. The Tudors usually sold the monopolies instead of using them themselves. Henry viii had to use inflationary methods, cf. Morton, op.cit., pp.174-5. In Europe, however, inflation was much more widespread than in England, cf. Pirenne, op.cit., pp.99-100. The closing years of the French monarchy before the revolution were also characterised by inflation, cf. Gottschalk, "Jean Paul Marat", Ldn. 1927, p.84, Carlyle, History French Rev." Ldn. Chapman and Hall, p.95.
109. v, sub. n.127; Cf. Morton, op.cit., pp.215, 242, 232, 250, 261-3, 264; Tawney, op.cit., p.192.
110. Polyb. ii. 56, 59, 60; Plato, Rep. viii. 544, 566. Cf. Ure, op.cit., p.303.
111. cf. de Broc, op.cit. p.36, where he asserts that in the time of Napoleon half of France was put in prison in the name of liberty.
112. Aris. Pol. iv. 8. 1293b, points out that tyranny is not constitutional but the interruption of legal rule.
113. Contrast the ideas associated with the Terror of the French Revolution and the reaction to the Paris Commune of 1871, which killed about twenty times as many people in one thirtieth of the time. Pre-revolutionary France needed 160 executioners on the permanent payroll; normal methods of execution were breaking on the wheel and boiling in oil; these were abolished by the revolutionary government. The 1,225 persons executed under the Terror in/

in Paris during thirteen months compare favourably with the 72,000 executed in England during the reign of Henry viii. All this is an indication of how certain ideas associated with some events ~~can~~ can exercise far greater influence than the facts.

114. v. sup. n.14.
115. Rep. i. 338.
116. Pol. iv. 3. 1289b-1290a; 12. 1296b; v. 3. 1303a.
117. Cf. Wade-Gery, C.Q. xxv. p.81. cf. Aris. Ath. Pol. 23.1.; it was only after the Persian War that the Areopagus recovered some of its influence. Until then it had apparently been weak.
118. Ath. Pol. 22. 1.
119. Aris. Ath. Pol. 21. 4.
120. Aris. *ibid.*
121. Hd. v. 66; Aris. Ath. Pol. 21. 2ff.; Paus. i. 5. 2-5.
122. Cf. Seltman, *op.cit.*, p.94 on this.
123. Aris. Pol. iii. 2. 1275b; Ath. Pol. 20. 1; Hd. v.66.
124. Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens, p.199.
125. Nic. Dam. F.H.G. ii. p.394.
126. Pol. V. 12. 1315b.
127. England, too, under Charles II was a coalition of landowning and trading sections of the community, but the state was radically different from what it had been before the revolution against Charles I. cf. the letter from the French ambassador to Louis XIV; "This government has a monarchical appearance because there is a king, but at the bottom it is very far from being a monarchy".
128. So in England the middle class and new nobility were too weak to maintain their supremacy against both reactionaries and the extreme party of the people, so they entered into an alliance with the big landowners; cf. Morton, *op.cit.* p.264.
129. Plut. Quaest. Graec. 18.
- 130./

130. Aris. Pol. iv. 15. 1300a. Although this was of an oligarchical character, it was based on all the rich, whether old or new, and not on birth and tradition.
131. Hdt. v. 73. 96; vi. 102, 115; Thuc. vi. 59.
132. Hdt. vi. 115; vii. 6.
133. Hdt. v. 72-3.
134. Aris. Ath. Pol. 23. 2; Thuc. i. 14, 74.
135. Napoleon rated morale to material in the ratio of three to one. cf. Hdt. v. 78, on Athens' great increase in strength after the tyranny, as a result of democratic feeling.
136. Examples of such periods are the time of Solon, eighteenth century France when the peasants were overwhelmed with taxes and trade was hampered by the expenses of the court, and seventeenth century England when Charles I and the merchants quarreled over shipmoney.
137. A. de Tocqueville, op.cit. pp.7-8, states that the French philosophers of the eighteenth century were rightly acknowledged to have helped to organise the French revolution, cf. A. Mignet, "The History of the French Revolution", Ldn. 1826, p.17, where it is asserted that the philosophers of the eighteenth century enquired into everything, governments, religion, laws. They revealed abuses and wrongs, organised and enlightened public opinion, and so prepared the way for reform.
138. H.A. Taine, "History of English Literature", Edinburgh, 1871, I. p.245, points out that Shakespeare, Beaumont, Fletcher, etc. appeared at the same time and represented the new generation, which, owing to its favourable position, flourished on the soil which had been prepared by the efforts of the preceding generation. v.sup. nn.28,30.
139. cf. Theognis, 197-202; Land given by the gods is the true form of wealth. cf. "Money makes the man"; Alc. frg. 49, Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. iii. 168.
140. Jevons, "History of Greek Literature", pp.133-4.
141. Theognis, 1117.
142. In sixteenth century England Jack of Newbury, the clothier, organised what was virtually a modern type of factory with the exception of the machinery. This however was an exception, and until the industrial revolution the workshop was the common productive unit.

143. History of Florence, ed. Bohn, II. ch. viii, p.97.
144. op.cit., pp.xx-xxl.
145. Hdt. i. 23.
146. cf. Theognis, 1135-50, the gods have left the earth, etc. Whibley, "Greek Oligarchies", p.50, talks of the break up of religious privilege being a necessary preliminary to the destruction of the religious and social power of the nobles. I suggest that it was only after their political defeat that their religious privileges were removed so as to prevent their recovery of power. The same order of events appears in the proceedings of the Paris Commune of 1793. It was the political defeat which really made possible the removal of all privileges.
147. Hdt. i. 23; v. 67.
148. Cf. Curtius, "History of Greece", i. p.369.
149. Carpenter, op.cit., pp.54-5.
150. Thomson, op.cit. pp.152 ff. cf. Burnet, "Early Greek Philosophy", p.82.
151. Aris. Post. iv. 14. 1449a. cf. Thomson, op.cit. p.171.
152. Jevons, op.cit., p.159; Thomson, op.cit., pp.194-5.
153. John Hare wrote three pamphlets against the Normans; cf. Hare Misc. vol. viii. p.96ff. cf. John Lilburne, "Just Man's Justification", pp.11-15, cf. Gerard Winstanley, "Law of Freedom", 1652, p.3, for other examples. All regarded the Norman Conquest as the cause of the decline from equality.
154. Hdt. v. 67.
155. The Puritans said, "You may labour to be rich for God, though not for the flesh and sin", cf. M.Weber, "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism", p.162. The Methodist Wesley wrote, "We must exhort all Christians to gain all they can and to save all they can; that is in effect to grow rich", *ibid.* p.175. Calvin wrote, "What reason is there why the income from business should not be larger than that from landowning? Where do the merchants' profits come, except from his own diligence and industry"; cf. Tawney, op.cit., p.105.
156. L.Huberman, Man's Worldly Goods, Ldn. 1937, pp.83-5.
- 157./

157. Bishop Latimer, on giving notice of his intention to preach on a certain day in some parish, was informed that this was impossible as the parish had "gone abroad to gather for Robin Hood"; cf. Latimer's Sixth Sermon before King Edward VI, quoted by Raglan in "The Hero", Ldn. 1936, p.51. In 1557 the Scottish Parliament requested the king to prohibit plays of "Robin Hood, King of May", on the Sabbath; cf. *ibid.*
158. Cf. "The History of Jack of Newberie and Thomas of Reading", Elizabethan and Jacobean Novels, ed. Everyman.
159. cf. E.K. Chambers, "The Mediaeval Stage", Oxford, 1903, p.268.
160. Burnet, *op.cit.*, p.146. Anaximander talked of an eternal motion and the strife of opposites; cf. p.54 for refs. Heraclitus said strife was common to all things, frg. 62 (Bywater), cf. Burnet, p.9, for the connection between this and their social background.
161. *ibid.* p.7. Aris., *Metaphysics*, I. 983Bff., points out that in spite of motion and change, these philosophers conceived the principle of all being to be a permanent substance.
162. On Thales, cf. Aris. *Pol.* i. 11. 1259a; *Hdt.* i. 75, 170; Plato, *Rep.* 600A; *Diog. Laert.* i. 23-7, 37; ii. 2.; *Ar. Nub.* 180; Proclus, *In. Euclid.* (Friedlein) p.352, 14; cf. Burnet, *op.cit.* p.46. Heraclitus wrote a part of his work on politics, cf. *Diog. Laert.* ix. 5.
163. Strabo, i. 1. 11.; *Diog. Laert.* ii. 2. cf. Burnet, *op.cit.* pp. 51, 71.
164. Mandrocles of Samos built the bridge on the Bosphorus for King Darius, *Hdt.* iv. 88. In general, on Thales and the others as practical scientists, cf. Drabkin, *C.W.* xxx. p.59.
165. *Plut. Sol.* 12; *Diog. Laert.* i. 110ff. Plutarch describes only a symbolical purification from pollution but the talk of a cure in Diogenes, although also given in religious, symbolical terms, seems to be based on practical fact since he talks of an outbreak of plague.
166. *Hdt.* iii. 131.
167. Rose, "Handbook of Greek Literature", p.385. Farrington in his lecture, "The Hand in Healing", etc. suggests the decline in medicine after Galen to have been due to the contempt for manual work, and explains the high standard/

standard of Greek medicine as due to the fact that, since citizens were doctors as well as patients, medicine was not so completely despised. W.H.S.Jones, in his review of this lecture in "Nature", May, 1942, Vol.149 p.529 criticises the application of this theory to Greek medicine and the application of Greek ideas on work to the late Roman Empire, but he is unable to suggest an alternative theory. I suggest that the growth of cities - itself an effect of social and economic changes - is always the most important cause of the development of medicine, and I agree with Farrington that it is based, especially at first, on a tradition of practical work. Its decline after Galen was due to the reversion of the Roman Empire to an essentially static, agricultural economy, a process which had been developing for some time. The continued success of Greek medicine was due to the growth of cities in Asia and Egypt in Alexandrian and Hellenistic times, which gave medicine and surgery a new lease of life. Like building and military engineering it had a steady demand. Most crafts were limited by the small market and so rarely developed new principles and methods. This fact, and the late development of medicine, which usually follows the growth of cities, explains its vigour in Greece when other sciences declined. Contempt for manual work, therefore, was not a cause of the decline of the sciences and eventually of medicine, but was itself, along with this decline, a result of the cause, namely, social maladjustment leading to economic stagnation, social decay and the decline from a full, urban life. Naturally, once this attitude to manual work had developed, it played an important part in influencing technicians, and Italian doctors in the post-Empire period probably suffered from this attitude. Had old and new cities continued to develop, however, medicine would have flourished on a steady demand. Actually, the same social causes which produced the contempt for labour, produced eventually an economic crisis which led to the decay of urban life. It was only the growth again of cities which restimulated medicine and also destroyed this attitude to practical work.

168. Contrast eighteenth century France, where production was hampered to a degree unknown in England, and where the task of philosophers was to analyse everything and find entirely new concepts in their organisation of forces for the coming struggle; cf. de Tocqueville, op.cit. pp.7-8. cf. Mignet, op.cit. p.17.
169. "English Diaries of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries", ed., J. Aitken, (Pelican), 1941, pp.14 ff.
170. A.P. Rossiter, "The Growth of Science", (Pelican), 1943, p.63.

171. Aitken, English Diaries etc. pp.24ff.
172. cf. C.E.Raven, "John Ray, His Life and Work", Cambridge, 1943.
173. Cf. Randall, "Making of the Modern Mind", pp.239-42.
174. Kant in his early phase propounded a theory of the origin of the solar system from revolving nebulae without the intervention of God. He made the system of planets arise from the struggle caused by the attraction and repulsion of compounds of primeval nebulae. Hegel actually made the strife of opposites the basis of self-movement. Detailed comparison, however, with early Greece reveals enormous differences, since their background and especially their intellectual traditions were very different. Both Kant and Hegel were strongly influenced by the Idealist tradition. Kant defended religion from attack by materialists, and Hegel was no friend of democratic tyrants but defended the Prussian autocracy.
175. cf. Hogben, "Science for the Citizen", Ldn. 1938, pp.789ff.
176. *ibid*, pp.579, 789.
177. The excess of deaths over births in London during the first half of the 17th century was 6,000 a year; the deficit was made up by immigration from the country districts. cf. M. Buer, "Health, Wealth and Population in the early days of the Industrial Revolution", Ldn. 1926.
178. P.Gardner, "Legacy of Greece", p.354.

CHAPTER VI.

EARLY SPARTA.

It was the Spartans who helped Athenian exiles to overthrow the tyranny in Athens. How was it that, at a time when so many Greek cities were producing tyrants, the Spartans should have pursued an active policy against tyrants?; for it was not only the Athenian tyranny that Sparta opposed. Her policy was directed against all such tyrants of this period (v.sub.). In other words, it was not because the tyrant was Athenian, but because Athens had a tyrant, that Sparta interfered in the city's affairs and tried to re-establish an aristocratic government. To understand how Sparta came to adopt such a policy, it is necessary to consider how she reacted to these events which in Athens and other states produced tyrannies.

The Homeric Sparta was sacked by the Dorians (v.sup.ch.1), and for a time life continued in scattered villages, probably of a self-sufficient type. Although sites were destroyed, much of the older cultural tradition survived, probably through the medium of artisans, who were able to make use of the older technique for such goods as were still needed, and to study older works of art which survived when culture again ~~survived~~ (v.sub). According to the archaeological evidence the historic city of Sparta began some time in the tenth century B.C. (v. sup. ch.1). While Athens had not suffered invasion and had, therefore, been able to unite the separate communities at an early age for the protection of all of them, in Lacedaemon the destruction of sites made a complete break of continuity with the past (1), and delayed this unification until a considerably later date. In spite of this, what is noticeable is the similarity of general development of early Sparta and a non-Dorian state such as Attica. It was only when the Spartan aristocracy deliberately prevented social change by banning the new activities and ideas associated with them, that Attica and Sparta followed really divergent paths (2). Once the village communities began to revive after the destruction and to have some intercourse again amongst themselves, the need for unity was forced upon them. As in Attica, the various communities quarrelled among themselves and it was only after a struggle that the first stage of the synoikism took place under the chiefs of the Agiad and Eurypontid clans. While this may not be the actual origin of the double kingship, it was probably the beginnings of its importance as a feature of the Spartan state.

Clearly the synoikism was the first stage in creating a centralised state and, therefore, it is not surprising that Greek tradition persists in connecting the king of this period, Charilaus, with Sparta's first constitution (3). Just as tradition associated Theseus with the beginnings of Athenian democracy, so Charilaus was connected with the establishment of/
of/

of the oligarchy to which Sparta evolved. The reason is obvious. Although the traditions are not accurate, they contain a modicum of truth; for the synoikism laid the basis of the centralised state within which the aristocracy emerged as a class in control of the state and within which in Attica the new middle class and its supporters grew to strength and finally power; but a class which, in Sparta, was defeated by the aristocracy and therefore for long hampered in its growth. In Attica Theseus, in opposing the nobles, favoured the people and foreigners. So too, in Sparta, at the time of the synoikism, citizenship was not rigidly controlled (v.sub.).

However, as in Attica, it would take some time after the synoikism for the aristocracy to become dominant. The synoikism rather represented the victory of one or two individuals over other princelings with local influence. In Sparta the two kings acted together and compelled the surrounding communities to join the new state. The first of those to be conquered was the city of Aegys (4) and a third clan, the Aigeidai, was added to the state, if not immediately, then soon after (5). Herodotus (6) shows that this was a non-Dorian clan, which suggests that Sparta was generous with her citizenship at this time (7). At a time when the state is in a state of flux and the outlines not yet hardened, the distinguishing line of citizenship is not very clearly marked. In Attica, too, it will be recalled, citizenship was acquired by newcomers until the aristocracy was strong enough established to become exclusive about its privileges.

In Lacedaemon the communities in the upper part of the plain were incorporated into the state by the early eighth century. Meanwhile, Amyclae had united the communities of the lower half of the plain. During the next generation Sparta conquered Pharis, Geronthoi and Amyclae in the middle Eurotas valley (8) and spread west along the coast and colonised Tragion, Echeia and Poiëssa (9). Gradually, however, the lines of the state proper became more fixed and the aristocracy as a result of centralisation began, as in Attica and elsewhere in Greece, to act together as a class. Citizenship was more jealously guarded. Amyclae was incorporated in the state, but other cities were maintained by colonies of Spartans and their friends (10).

Some time after the conquest of Amyclae, Sparta conquered the lower basin of the Eurotas and the coastal plain, and made the inhabitants serfs, who were probably called Helots ~~and~~ from the name of a coast town, Helos (11). Obviously the aristocracy was now firmly in control and jealous of its privileges. Already they had probably excluded many of the conquered people from full citizenship, but the actual enslavement of people was a new stage in their policy. They were/

were essentially a landed aristocracy as elsewhere in Greece, and serfdom was a policy necessary for the maintenance of their estates. Athens, as a refugee state, had probably provided abundant casual labour to the growing number of large landowners. In Lacedaemon the simplest solution seemed to be to conquer the land itself and use the inhabitants as its cultivators to maintain, not only themselves, but also their new masters.

However, the growth of population, as elsewhere in Greece, produced land hunger and the conquest of Messenia may have been undertaken mainly to obtain more land as Tyrtaeus says, just as other Greek cities sent out colonies. The Spartans had already established settlements around the Messenian Gulf and they now turned their attention to the fertile inland plain of Stenyclarus. Under their King, Theopompus, in the second half of the eighth century, they attacked the Messenians (12), and, at the end of the war, the aristocratic policy was continued and the Messenians were made serfs and forced to pay half of their produce to their masters (13). The effect of this was to alter the entire proportion of serfs to citizens and so create a state radically different from the other Dorian states, which had serfs certainly, but far fewer than in Sparta.

However, before the state could obtain any benefit from the conquest, it was shaken by a conspiracy. The unprivileged had received no political rights in return for their military service in the war, although they may have hoped for them (14). A conspiracy, in which the illegitimate sons of some nobles were involved, was discovered when King Polydorus was murdered (15). This was almost certainly partly caused by the social changes which had been transforming Sparta as other Greek cities. As elsewhere, the growth of population and the consequent demand for land had provoked social unrest. During settled conditions, the aristocracy, as elsewhere in Greece, had been steadily strengthening their hold on the land and the state and resented the demands of those less fortunate. Meanwhile, Sparta's early connections with the revival in the East (v.sub.) had probably forced the pace of social changes. In Attica, these economic changes had been backward and therefore the social crisis and, eventually, the tyranny fairly late. Society in Attica had undergone changes as a result of internal changes in landownership and social conditions. In Lacedaemon, too, serfs were the result of the encroachment of the nobles on landownership, but here serfdom was introduced more directly than in Attica, by actual conquest of land and people. Moreover, the ease with which Spartans obtained both land and serfs probably stimulated them to further conquests until the state was overweighted with serfs. This not only increased the prestige and wealth of the nobles, but exacerbated the discontent of the less privileged.

Social changes come in waves rather than in a steady, straightforward line. In England, even in the ninth century, the small traders and craftsmen were beginning to be numerous enough to produce some social changes gradually, especially in the growth of towns and their importance; and the peasant revolt of 1387 was led by the merchants in order to break some of the power of the nobles. While in the Italian and Greek city states the whole movement was telescoped, in England and Europe generally, the merchants had first to control not only individual cities but, through the association of city with city, to gain sufficient importance and strength to control the whole country. Naturally, it was only when the whole country had been centralised around the king that suitable conditions allowed their further growth, which resulted in the trading revolution of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and ultimately the demand for power which led to the Civil War. In Greece, too, in settled conditions, craftsmen had grown in importance, so that even Hesiod talked of competition between potter and potter. The outcry for land was one of the peaks of these successive waves which culminated in the final crisis and the victory of the new people under the tyranny. The attempt made by Cylon at establishing himself as tyrant was another of these peaks. Although it failed, the attempt marked another landmark in the path of social advance and change; while the crisis in Solon's time marked the last highlight of advance, before the actual challenge, which led to power and victory under the tyranny. Sparta, however, was to experience even more peaks, even more advanced points and then reverses, before the final climax matured.

The people concerned in such changes were not, of course, conscious of ultimate aims or the results of their actions. They were conscious only of immediate objectives, whether those were desire for citizenship and land, or a determination to maintain these to the exclusion of others. The Spartan nobles were probably more aware of their immediate policy than their opponents and were sufficiently determined to introduce measures strong enough to ensure the success of this policy for several centuries. In Sparta, therefore, the new people had a much longer and more difficult road to travel to attain influence and power. Not only did the aristocracy learn the lesson of the tyrannies too well to minimise their own danger, but they were also, as a result of their policy of conquest instead of merely colonising, much more firmly entrenched in the economic life of the community than the nobles of most other Greek states affected by trade. Accordingly, they could take the offensive against the new people with some success, and, as a result, the number of waves and peaks leading to the final overwhelming of the aristocratic type of state was much greater in Sparta than in Athens and other Greek states which had developed trade and industry.

In this crisis after the First Messenian War, which Terpander may have helped to overcome (16), the immediate social unrest was abated as a result of the allocation of the Messenian land and by sending colonies to Tarentum and Rhegium and elsewhere (17). Attica had had more land than most Greek states and so had not participated in the early colonising movement. Sparta, too, had sufficient land, but she used colonising as an outlet for the social troubles which followed her conquests and settlements. Athens usually reacted to a crisis in a progressive manner by allowing more scope for still further developments. Sparta usually maintained the status quo or, if possible, restored earlier conditions, and was helped in this policy by sending many of her discontented people on colonising expeditions.

However, besides making some economic and social concessions to the landless and non-privileged, the aristocracy felt sufficiently shaken by the conspiracy to attempt to strengthen if possible its control of the state, as a preventative measure for the future. Whether the Lycurgan Rhetra was introduced at this time (18), or after the Second Messenian War (19), clearly it is the first part of the same policy - a policy designed to strengthen the aristocracy against the non-privileged. Just as much of the legislation associated with Theseus was probably spread over a long period, so, in Sparta, the legislation attributed to Lycurgus probably represents a series of social changes which had been taking place for some time, including a final rearrangement of the constitution in the light of these changes. Some form of council of the nobles had probably existed for some time, but this reorganisation definitely placed the Senate, and that meant the nobles who composed it (20), in control of policy. Plato (21) maintains the Senate was introduced some time after the synoikism to control the royal power. This clearly represented the general trend of social evolution correctly, since, once centralisation had made it possible for the nobles to grow in strength as a class, they would tend to find the autocratic rule of a king or two kings irksome and possibly dangerous to themselves, unless the monarchy could be controlled by them. The struggle of the nobles against Theseus, as of the English nobles against King John and other English Kings, illustrates the widespread character of this part of the evolution of society. The apparently contradictory development is this. Only when a king has overcome the individual power of the nobles in the localities can a centralised state really evolve. Then, as a result of the centralisation and other things, the nobles learn to combine together as a class and the next stage is to weaken or control the king, who is no longer so essential to the state. By controlling the power of the king, the Spartan nobles could hope to prevent the non-privileged from using the monarchy in the future against the aristocracy. They could then, if necessary, /

necessary, support the king against the less privileged or, if possible, persuade these people to support them in limiting the power of the king (22).

In addition, the Assembly of the people, since it could only accept or reject proposals made by the King or Senate, was now allowed to initiate business (23). To make doubly sure, a clause, said to have been inserted later to the effect that any change in the laws due to the encroachment of the people could be annulled by the Senate and the Assembly dissolved, probably reflects the growth of a middle class, including perhaps non-privileged nobles and new people involved in trade, and the possibility of their combining with the less privileged citizens against the aristocratic constitution, whether that constitution had already been clearly defined by a decree or not. If the Rhetra dates to about 720 B.C., then the clause may have been inserted in 620 during the final reorganisation, as a result of the growing influence of the middle class. Alternatively, it may have been introduced in 720, as Plutarch suggests, because of the threat of these people to the privileges of the nobles even before that. Agreement cannot be reached as to the definite date of each part of the constitution and Lycurgan reforms, but, since the general chronological order of the legislation is fairly clear, the trend of social evolution can be traced comparatively easily.

The Ephoralty either originated at this time, that is, about 720, or, if in existence before (24), began at this time to be of some importance as a state feature. While Aristotle and Plutarch (25) say that the king introduced the Ephoralty, and Herodotus and Xenophon (26) believe Lycurgus appointed them, practically all Greek writers agree that the Ephoralty represented a curb on the king's power. The argument of King Theopompus that, by appointing Ephors he limited the power of the monarchy but made it more secure, suggests that the Ephors gradually absorbed much of the civil power of the monarchy and made the king a less irresponsible factor in the state. The Ephors were said to be appointed from the people, that is the whole body of citizens including old nobles and new citizens (27). However since ^{not} many new citizens were ~~not~~ made, it is clear the Ephoralty was useful as a weapon of the restricted citizen class against non-citizens and those aspiring to citizenship; and, secondly, against the power of the king, who might be used by the disfranchised to further their ambitions. This had the further effect of maintaining the split between those fortunate enough to secure citizenship and those still lacking civil privileges. The fact that a magistracy was introduced to which all citizens had the right to be elected would be the type of institution to be expected in 720 when the aristocracy was shaken by the conspiracy and so strengthened its hold partly by its control of the state and partly by concessions of land and civil rights to a few people which brought new supporters to themselves against/

against the rest of the population. Plutarch's remark (28) that the aristocracy had become ~~more~~ wanton and violent by the time of Theopompus is probably fairly accurate and the introduction of the Ephoralty would seem a remedy against this, and so act as an appeaser of popular discontent. Actually, however, as Plutarch himself has to admit (29), the Ephors strengthened the aristocracy and their constitution (v.sub).

Therefore, both the introduction of the Ephoralty and the fixing of the constitution as described in the Lycurgan Rhetra, if it really belongs to this period, limited the royal power and so prevented the kings from playing too independent a role and perhaps being used by the non-privileged; partly by the strengthening of the aristocracy's position through the introduction of a few non-privileged to citizenship, and the sending of others to colonies and the strengthening of the nobles' political power through the Senate, the aristocracy was safeguarding itself from future attacks from the non-privileged sections of the population.

Elsewhere in Greece, hereditary monarchs began to be superseded or weakened in power as the nobles became settled more firmly as a landed aristocracy and combined as a class. In Sparta, too, the nobles, as a result of the synoikism and continual coalescing into a centralised state, became strong enough to increase their hold on the state, and probably to weaken the kings. However, there seems to have been no move to abolish the kingship altogether, no doubt partly because King Theopompus had been wise enough to make concessions, if the story of his acceptance of the Ephoralty as a limitation of his power is true, and partly because Sparta was still pursuing a military policy, which demanded the retention of the king as the accepted leader in war from heroic times. There is no indication that Theopompus encouraged the new people or the unprivileged against the nobles, nor evidence of desire on the part of the nobles to abolish the monarchy. Since Sparta had definitely been committed to an aggressive policy to obtain the land which was the basis of the economic and social eminence of the nobles, the king continued to have a definite function in the state. Gradually from this time, however, the Ephors became more important and, apart from war, became the weapon of the citizens against the new people with no privileges, until eventually the king, if he wished to assert his own independence, was forced to adopt policies in opposition to theirs (v.sub).

Another change included in the Lycurgan Rhetra, whether introduced at the end of the eighth or seventh century, was the re-organisation of the state on the basis of five local tribes instead of the three hereditary tribes. These localities/

localities included the four quarters of Sparta and the town of Amyclae (30). This therefore helped to concentrate the citizens in the centre of the state and to ensure control by their members over the various parts of the city. If this had been accompanied by the generous gift of citizenship, and the localities extended to cover all Laconia and Messenia, the arrangement might have been progressive in its effect; but the restriction of citizenship made it reactionary. While Cleisthenes' reorganisation of the tribes in Attica had definitely benefitted the urban and trading sections of the population, in Sparta the original citizens, with perhaps a few who had recently acquired citizenship although that is uncertain (31), were strengthened against the possible encroachment of the non-privileged, traders and artisans and possibly Helots. This is the beginning of the conscious organisation of the aristocracy against the rest of the population for immediate objectives, a policy which culminated in the introduction of the rest of the so-called Lycurgan laws.

The crisis after the First Messenian War was caused largely by what might be called the first waves of the movement which changed economic and social conditions in many Greek states. These changes included the concentration of land in the hands of the nobles and their growing exclusiveness in rights and privileges, which produced land hunger, lack of work and discontent. In addition, however, the effect of the revival of trade and industry as a result of contact with the East, which played the most decisive part in revolutionising the life of those Greek cities affected by it, was probably already felt in Sparta; for Sparta was one of the earliest of all the Greek states to be influenced by the renaissance in the East (32). Whether this influence came via Corinth, Crete, Rhodes, Cyprus or Ionia (33) is disputed, but does not alter the important fact that Sparta^{was} so influenced. Even soon after the synoikism Sparta had spread along the coast to Tragium and Poiëssa (v. sup.) and then broken through to the sea by annexing Prasidae, which was probably the main port for Sparta's Eastern connections in the eighth century (34). The Messenian raids on the towns of Laconia in the First Messenian War (35) were almost certainly a blow at the developing trade of Laconia, otherwise there could be little sense in the attack.

As in Corinth and Athens the crude, strictly local art was replaced by an art showing Oriental influence and worthy of competing in an international market. In Sparta this development was even earlier than in Corinth. A few ivory articles may have been imported from the East, but even by the eighth century local ivory work was flourishing (36). (It is possible that spasmodic connections with the East had never entirely/

entirely died out since ivory kohl needles have been found which are of a very Oriental type and which belong to the ninth century or earlier (37)). This work was probably influenced by earlier art as well as by the East. Other Spartan artistic work also shows the influence of the long tradition of Greek culture and art, just as Athenian art did. This combination of Aegean art with early connections with the East produced an artistic florescence at Sparta (38), while the strong influence of Minoan and Mycenaean religion is apparent in the Spartan ivory figurines (39). Lead figurines and scaraboid gems were also produced in considerable quantities during the eighth century, and these, too, show that Spartan artists were inspired not only by Eastern art but also by the work of the Mycenaean Bronze Age (40). The technique in the eighth century is inferior to that of the Bronze Age, probably because the eighth century saw the beginnings of a new trading era and a corresponding artistic revival in which artists were only beginning to acquire skilled technique. The persistence of this artistic tradition illustrates once again how influential local tradition can be in moulding individual details of the general trend of development (41). In the seventh century B.C. lead figurines and bone plaques reached a high artistic standard, jewelry was abundant, pottery was rapidly developing, decorative acroteria and antefixes for temples were made locally (42), and tiles too were made locally, not only for home use but for export (43).

In short, all forms of art including sculpture and architecture, although the influence of Phoenician and Mycenaean bronze work is clearly distinguishable, exhibit even more strongly local characteristics which could be summed up as a Laconian style (44). It is clear that more regular trade developed out of this contact with the East. Ivory was imported from Phoenicia until Tyre submitted to Nebuchadnezzar in 573 (45), and the actual export of tiles from Laconia in the seventh century has already been mentioned. From the beginning of the eighth century onwards pottery was exported from Sparta (46), but it was during the early sixth century, when the very finest Laconian pottery was produced, that exports were made on a considerable scale (47). Even before this, in the eighth century, there is evidence for connections with Egypt (48), and she had connections with Sardis and Ephesus about 700 B.C. (49). Moreover, even as early as the Messenian wars she seemed to have developed some form of alliance with other states, since Samian ships were said to have helped Sparta in these wars (50). Sparta's connections abroad were no doubt stimulated by the colonising expeditions she had made (51). As in other Greek cities influenced by trade, colonies, for whatever reasons they had been established, proved useful once trade and international relations began to develop.

Under the Spartan aristocracy of this early period, as under the Greek aristocracy in general, under whose rule the renaissance from the East took root, the culture typical of the nobility reached great heights. The pursuits characteristic of the aristocracy, such as hunting, were for long characteristic of Spartan life (52). The freedom and public role played by Spartan women were merely the continuation of the Heroic tradition and were maintained in Sparta when elsewhere in Greece women had virtually ceased to play any public role (53). The aristocracy based on land and serfs retained many social traditions which had evolved out of the earlier semi-feudal conditions. Of these customs hospitality as a sort of generally accepted principal was an outstanding one. Traditional hospitality is very characteristic of leisured, landowning people living in settled conditions on big estates with large numbers of serfs or servants. Anyone who has visited friends in Hungary, where the estates are as similar to feudal conditions as can be found in modern times, acquires some impression of this type of hospitality, where a guest may come for a week-end and stay for several months. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Sparta was famed for her hospitality (54).

In addition to her growing prosperity and importance as an art centre, Sparta was one of the first Greek states to become a literary centre. Naturally the state where the new culture was most advanced would attract poets. Contemporary with Hesiod were poets writing on genealogies and the exploits of the Heroes, always a popular type of poetry in the immediate post-Heroic age (55); but during the seventh century B.C. the outstanding choral poets of the period appeared in Sparta, where the atmosphere, as a result of the cultural advance and foreign contacts, was progressive and congenial enough to stimulate them to make musical reforms and poetic innovations. For instance, Terpander from Lesbos, Clonas from Thebes, Thaletas from Crete, all made technical improvements while working at Sparta (56). Alcman came from Sardis to Sparta and apparently had the rights of citizenship there and an important position in the direction of public worship (57). If tradition is correct on this point, the Spartan nobility had not become so rigidly exclusive as they did in later times; and other foreign artists gravitated to Sparta as an art centre as poets went to her as the literary capital of the Greek world. Bathycles of Magnesia was made welcome and built a throne at Amyclae, and other distinguished foreigners took a prominent part in Spartan life (58). This choral and lyric poetry seems to have been connected with religious rites at Sparta as elsewhere in Greece, and these rites too, as in Athens, were controlled by the nobility and expressed something of their social organisation and ideas (59). In short, the early history of Greek music was laid mainly in/
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in Sparta. While epic poets praising Heroes for long remained popular, in choral lyrics and, under Alcman, in the beginning of a more individual lyric, Sparta led the Greek world. In general, the surmounting of the social crisis at the end of the eighth century seems to have made possible the highest peak of aristocratic strength and cultural activity. The first Spartan appeared as winner at Olympia in 720 (60), and from then on Spartan names appeared frequently.

Eventually, as the changes in life consequent on contacts with the East began to disrupt the static, agricultural economy of the Spartan state, the same social crisis appeared here as in other Greek states. Economic dislocation, social tension and military weakness, in fact all the conditions only too familiar to other Greek states of this period or a little later, had matured in Sparta too. Wealth and property were concentrated in the hands of a few with a consequent loss of vigour to the community (61). Although some lived in luxury, there were many in debt (62). As a result of this inequality, tension between rich and poor grew more obvious and demands for a redistribution of the land became popular (63), while the love of wealth was widespread (64). The use of money (65) no doubt accelerated the process as it did elsewhere in Greece.

Either because of the obvious weakness of the Spartan state as a result of internal friction, or because they felt strong enough to challenge Sparta - or perhaps for a combination of several reasons - the Messenians chose this moment to revolt, about two generations after the end of the First Messenian War (66). As in Attica in the midst of social troubles, in Sparta, too, morale was at a low ebb. Economic crisis and social discontent did not make for either efficiency or spirit in war. The Spartans therefore suffered defeats during the war and, as a result, tended to lose heart and long for peace (67).

The danger to the state from external attack and internal discontent was such that the Spartans seem to have summoned Tyrtaeus to cope with the situation, much as the Athenians had invited Solon to act as mediator. Tyrtaeus inspired the troops with new vigour by writing martial verses and gave them more practical aid by enrolling Helots in the ranks to replace the fallen (68). However, the Messenians were shrewd enough to attack where they could do most damage. They raided Messenia and parts of Laconia and so made it impossible for the Spartans to sow the land (69). They probably continued to attack the maritime towns, as they had in the First Messenian War (v. sup. ⁿ¹³). As a result of these measures great discontent arose among landless and poor and dissention and sedition flourished (70). Tyrtaeus succeeded in appeasing the population during the war but once peace was/

was restored the discontent seems to have broken out with renewed vigour (71). The Spartans had won the war but their power was severely shaken (72). The allocation of the Messenian land after the first Messenian War had been upset by the revolt and, until a new arrangement was made, the landless and discontented would be likely to make sufficient noise to attract attention, each party hoping that it would be included among the recipients of land. Apart from the fact that many former owners of this land may have been killed, the amount of social discontent clearly demanded a new approach to the whole question.

The problems confronting the ruling aristocracy at Sparta included first of all how to maintain their own position and privileges. Clearly this could not be done without some far-reaching changes in the state. They had to appease some of the social discontent, adopt measures to prevent further outbreaks and to increase the military strength of the state as a weapon for internal as well as external policies. Fortunately for the Spartan nobility they were not without experience of the causes of their troubles. In both Messenian wars the greatest danger to the state and themselves had come, not so much from the Messenians, but from discontented elements in their own population. The origin of the social upheavals, although it is almost certain that they did not appreciate all the causes, especially those extending over some centuries (v.sup.), was clearly linked in their minds with the growth of money, of commerce and agriculture for the market, (v.sub.); and the culmination of this process in tyrannies in other Greek trading states gave the Spartan nobles serious warning of their danger in time for them to take steps to avert it. The concentration of property in the hands of a few, the demand for a redivision of the land and the widespread love of wealth (v.sup.) all indicate that this social crisis was of a character essentially similar to that in Athens in Solon's time and in other Greek cities affected by the growth of money and trade. By this time in both Argos and Corinth the aristocratic governments had been overthrown and tyrannies established with the support of the merchants and other sections of the population who were connected with the new pursuits or discontented with their present lot. The Spartan nobles understood very well their own danger. The rebellion under Polemarchus in the previous century had probably not received mass support, since there had scarcely been time for society to be so disrupted by the new life that all sections of the population were affected. The sedition in the time of the Second Messenian War seems to have been more widespread since it involved not only the Messenian Helots, who were part of the economic structure of the state, but also former landowners resentful of their loss of land, and those who would like to acquire/

acquire land, including probably many Perioikoi who had made money in trade and industry and wished to enjoy the privileges of landownership and citizenship. In its character, then, the crisis was similar to that in Attica in Solon's time, a crisis which, if used by some outstanding individual, could lead to a serious attack on the nobility's position. Fortunately for the Spartan nobility, no such individual had yet come forward and so the nobles prepared to remove these conditions which could give such an individual his opportunity.

If the Lycurgan Rhetra dealing with the political constitution of the state was really enacted at the end of the eighth century (v.sup.), then clearly the nobles were in a position to use their power under it to introduce their measures. If, however, it too belonged to the end of the seventh century, then the reinforcement of the aristocracy's control of the state was their first measure by means of which they acquired the power to enforce the others. The control and influence of the aristocracy was reinforced through the power given to the Senators who were chosen from the nobility, held office for life and had to be over sixty years of age (73). Even age was used to weigh the scales in favour of conservatism as Aristotle pointed out (74). Meanwhile the people in the Assembly could only ratify or reject proposals of the King and Senate, and, if they tried to change a law, the Senate could dissolve the assembly (v.sup.).

The Senate was regarded as an effective control of the monarchy which had been too autocratic and unrestrained before and tending either towards despotic power or towards "pure democracy". Indeed, it was stated that although he had the title and appearance of a king otherwise he was indistinguishable from the mass of the people, while the people themselves were insolent (75), and that the legislation was designed to prevent the king from attempting to be tyrannical or to inspire the citizens with ambitions (76). The actual use of the word tyrannical is significant. This entire attitude expresses the potential danger of an individual who might use the social divisions to attack the nobility; and who, at Sparta, was more outstanding than one of the kings? Already at Argos Pheidon had turned the monarchy into a tyranny by becoming the leader of the middle class against the aristocracy (v.sup., ch.5). There is a double process in this clash of interests between the king and the nobility, the one merging into the other in time and the whole process spread over a period. After the nobility was settled on the land, they became more influential in the state and less inclined to submit to the central control of the monarchy (v.sup.). The stage at which the monarchy may be used by discontented elements of the population against the organised aristocracy, clearly must be later when the conditions producing social crises have matured. The legislation in the Lycurgan reforms on this point may well be the summary of a series/

series of measure and counter-measures, not necessarily expressed in legal form and extending over a considerable period; but the explicit complaint that the king favoured democracy is almost certainly a late development belonging to this crisis after the Second Messenian War.

The policy of the Senate from this time on seems to have been one of preventing an alliance between the king and the people, that is, probably less privileged citizens and perhaps non-citizens, by playing them off against each other. They supported the king against the people where possible and, if necessary, used the people against any attempts at despotism by the monarchy, always a situation of potential danger to the nobility (77). Not only did the laws associated with Lycurgus favour the aristocracy in general, but so deliberate was the policy that force was used by the nobles against the people (78). Whether the story of the thirty armed men used to strike terror into any opponents of the laws (79) is true or not, Plutarch does state that Lycurgus had to use force and had mobilised the nobles against the people (80). This indicates the vigorous determination with which the legislation was carried through and helps to explain the long life of the laws, in spite of their reactionary character and the renewal of social changes which undermined them.

To maintain, and defend if necessary, the political and social legislation, an efficient army was required. Some time before the Second Messenian War Sparta had been defeated by Pheidon of Argos and this setback and the weakness displayed against the Messenians indicated that as in Attica in time of social crisis, an improvement in technique and morale was needed. In reforming the army the aristocracy had in mind the necessity for improving the efficiency and spirit of the troops, both apparently not of the best in the Second Messenian War. They saw, too, the need for keeping the army as far as possible under their control, no doubt both as a weapon against internal troubles and as a medium for their foreign policy. Possible danger came from both sources. The conspiracy in the First Messenian War and the revolt of the Messenian Helots which provoked the Second War, had given an indication of the amount of social discontent in the state and, if discontented elements should against emerge from among some of the citizens themselves, or from the Perioikoi, and these would combine with the Helots, the position of the aristocracy would be gravely threatened. The remark attributed to Lycurgus (81), that the best defence for the Spartans was to avoid inequality of positions at home is a clear pointer to the lack of morale and to the possibility of sedition and betrayal to the enemy arising from discontent at home, a danger which might re-emerge in the future. In both/

both the Messenian Wars the great weakness had been the home front, which was divided, and the lack of morale in the army itself which probably arose from the same source. According to Xenophon (82), moreover, special guards were appointed in camp to keep surveyance over the army itself, while cavalry were used as outposts against the enemy. Meanwhile international relations were becoming more widespread in Greece so that the spread of tyrannies and the ideas associated with them were a danger to the aristocratic settlement in Sparta. In this situation an efficient and loyal army was not only a sound defence but, if necessary, a weapon for attack.

The reorganisation of the army was based on the division into five localities, whether these had been brought into existence in the late eighth century or whether they were introduced now with the other political reforms (83). Formerly the three tribes had been the basis of the military organisation and the various subdivisions of these had equipped horsemen for war and thus provided the cavalry which was the basis of the aristocratic army in early centuries (84). After the reorganisation the army consisted of five regiments, which were probably larger than formerly if some new citizens were included. It was much better organised than previously and the sub-divisions of the regiment were carefully elaborated (85). The hoplite had gradually been replacing the cavalry, as elsewhere in Greece, and Spartan ivories prove that this was happening at a comparatively early date in Sparta, probably because of her early connections with the East. It was only after this reorganisation that the tactics suited to the hoplite army and to a centralised state with a central command, were fully adopted (86).

Finally an elaborate system of training was introduced, not only as a military but as a social measure. This involved removing boys from their parents at an early age and giving them a rigorous training. They were prepared essentially for warlike efficiency, but, in preparing for that, were encouraged only in that type of pursuit which would be conducive to loyalty. Their minds as well as their bodies were suitably trained for the defence of the state, which virtually meant the defence of the refortified aristocracy. The youths were encouraged to interest themselves in the affairs of the state, to acquire what were considered public virtues and so to achieve loyalty to the Spartan type of state (87). They were allowed only such learning as was considered necessary. Their education was designed to make them obedient and loyal to military command and to suffer without question for the good of the state (88). The guiding rule was clearly one of blind obedience to the state and army, a complete contrast to the democratic spirit which inspired the new Athenian army, but necessary for the purpose of the aristocracy. It produced too, until new conditions and ideas undermined it, as efficient and high-spirited an army as any in Greece.

The Spartan aristocracy obviously realised, however vaguely, the influence of trade, industry and money in creating social upheavals, since they took the almost unique step of reorganising the community on the former basis of static, domestic economy and of hampering the future development of trade and manufacture so severely that these would not be likely to cause further trouble. Citizens were completely forbidden to engage in trade and industry and even agriculture was left to the Helots and Perioikoi. However, even the Perioikoi were not allowed to pursue these professions with much freedom, although Laconian trade had probably originated amongst them in the first place. Since agriculture was strictly confined by regulations which restricted the amount of produce given to a citizen, and since the citizens were forbidden to engage in trade, the internal market must have been severely limited. Foreign trade was also severely hampered by the ban on gold and silver (89) and the introduction (or continuation) of a crude unwieldy iron coin (90). Plutarch admits that, while useless arts and crafts were suppressed, actually the introduction of this coinage practically put an end to all foreign trade. With the ban on money and manufacture, it was possible to ban all lawsuits (91), which assumed importance in Greece as land became mobile and the economy more affected by this change. Aristotle points out (92) that in many aristocracies there were laws against making money in trade. Obviously, whether this method was learned from Sparta or not, it became a regular means of preserving an aristocratic, landowning constitution.

However, these measures could not be introduced successfully without some rearrangement of land ownership. If the economy was to be restored to the old static domestic type, then ownership would have to be restored to the old days of comparative equality among citizens before the nobility encroached on the economic, social and political aspects of the state. Moreover, to prevent outbreaks of discontent in the future, some of the non-privileged sections of the population must receive the citizenship and so be won as supporters of the aristocracy against the rest of the population instead of being potential leaders of the discontented against aristocratic privilege. Accordingly, in the re-allocation of the Messenian land which was necessary after the conclusion of the second war, some new citizens were probably created by being given estates in this territory (93).

However, while much of the land was probably divided equally among citizens old and new, the older citizens may have retained other land already in their possession (94). Moreover they retained many privileges, including some religious ones, just as in Attica religious privileges were retained/

retained by the older nobility even when a ^{new} nobility was allowed to be assimilated to them (v. sup.). It was only, too, from this inner circle of nobles that the Senators were chosen (95). The fact that the "people" elected them merely meant that the whole citizen body, restricted as it still was, had some say in choosing a Senator from a limited circle. Certainly the Ephors were chosen by the people from among old and new citizens (96), but this means that they were essentially the representatives and instruments of the citizens, who were opposed not so much to the nobles with whom they had much in common, but against those without any civic rights at all. Just as in estimating the role of any individual, so here, it is necessary to probe below the surface appearance and to consider who supported the Ephors and, therefore, helped to direct their policy. Clearly, along with those changes in social alliances which were to take place in Sparta during the next centuries, the position of the Ephors would change too, according to the composition of the citizen body from which they were chosen. At this period they could not be a weapon of the old aristocracy against the new citizens, since they were elected from the whole citizen body. But when they are said to be the magistrates of the "people" it must be remembered that the "people" in Sparta at this time included not only a small group who might be called a new nobility or middle class, but also the old aristocracy. Certainly the "people" included those citizens who were not members of the old nobility, but these were still citizens and, therefore, the "people" was essentially a restricted class.

Always at such periods when a landed aristocracy is challenged by new people, the latter are called the people or mob, although when they themselves are well established they are recognised to be essentially a middle class or new nobility while a new class of workers is only just developing to challenge their position. In the early Italian city states the nobles were called Buoni (v. sup. ch. v.), just as Aristotle refers to the nobles as the virtuous (97), and the people or mob of the time was really the middle class, since no working class had yet emerged. So Theognis called the people the mob and the Bad, but it is clear from his poems that the so-called mob often consisted of rich merchants, richer than the nobility but not of noble birth. It was only after the long establishment of the middle class, whether associated or not with the old nobility, as the ruling class of a state based on trade, banking and agriculture for the market, that the new opposition to them might conceivably be called the working class.

The Ephors, therefore, were on the whole at this period a possible weapon against the king and the non-citizens including/

including Helots and Perioikoi, just as the rest of the legislation was. Whether the Ephors really celebrated their entry to office by declaring war on the Helots (98), and whether this account belongs to this period or not, the story indicates the position of the Ephors as defenders of citizens' privileges against non-privileged, especially by that time the Helots. The non-privileged even at this early period, were in the majority. They were part of the state in that they had an economic and social function to perform in it, but had no political rights, much in the manner of the English working class before they gained the vote. It is sometimes assumed (99) that slaves and foreigners are not part of the state, but, since they were an integral part of the community's economic and social structure, they could not be excluded, any more than one would say the English workers in the early nineteenth century were not part of the English nation. Lycurgus had servants and attendants as a matter of course (100), and although he would never have considered giving them political rights, to him they were^{an} essential part of society. The aristocracy had won the support of the new citizen by its concessions of land and citizenship and could expect their support against the non-citizens. Gradually the citizens would be fused into a harmonious ruling class to maintain the state and economy and for this the Ephoralty was to become a strong weapon in the future. The reference to a unique case of a Spartiate who was a naturalised foreigner is an indication of the exclusiveness of the Spartan citizens after this period (101). Moreover, since the Ephors gradually usurped much of the civil power of the community, with the aristocracy's backing, the King was left with only his leadership in war and some control of religious rites as weapons to ensure his independence, although these too were frequently supervised by the Ephors (102). Indeed the emphasis on his position as religious head and priest of the community and his right of arbitration in religious and family affairs suggests he was becoming merely the head of the family as in older tribal conditions (103). Increasingly, therefore, in the future the struggle was to be between the policy of the king attempting to retain some independence and the policy of the aristocracy expressed through the Ephors. After the Second Messenian War the power of the Ephors in relation to the king gradually increased (104) and by 550 B.C. the Ephors were said to have been made equal in power to the monarchy (105). In later conditions as the citizen body shrank, the Ephors noticeably pursued a more and more reactionary policy, not so much deliberately as unconsciously since they represented a declining citizen body opposed to a growing mass of discontented people.

All this explains the contradicatory references to the Ephors by Greek authors. Although the Ephors were elected from the "people", that is the whole citizen body, since/

since this body became so restricted, the Ephors, as Plutarch says (106), so far were they from weakening the constitution that they gave it additional vigour, and, although they seemed to be established in favour of the people, actually, they strengthened the aristocracy. In the early years they strengthened the reinforced aristocratic constitution by representing the whole citizen body against potential danger from the king and non-citizens. In later years, as the citizens dwindled, they became representative more and more of a small aristocracy against a mass of non-privileged. The accusation that they were frequently poor men and took bribes (107) does not affect their fundamental position since these "poor men" must have been citizens and, therefore, more privileged than most inhabitants of Laconia. Eventually, if they became poorer, they would lose their citizenship (v. sub.) and so leave the post for a still more restricted body of citizens. It was, therefore, essentially the prosperous landowners who controlled the Ephoralty in later years, since it was they who retained the citizenship. This development belongs to a later stage and indicates too the growth of inequality and the bribery and corruption which resulted from it. Along with this development went the growth of the Ephors' power in relation to the monarchy. The Ephors showed them no respect and justified their conduct on the grounds of their magistracy, which suggests that its function was by then definitely recognised as a restraint on the monarchy (108). The kings frequently had to court the Ephors and Aristotle's statement (109) that the constitution had therefore become a democracy instead of an aristocracy simply means that the Ephors as representatives of the whole citizen body were all-supreme. But, in effect, with a restricted citizen body and a king prepared to be progressive, the Ephors, by representing only citizens and restricting the power of the kings, made the constitution more reactionary than ever and stood in the way of all progress.

The institution of common meals was introduced partly as an additional means of training for war and partly as a measure to produce harmony and solidarity among the citizens and perhaps to emphasise their distinction from the non-citizens (110). There, too, the youths were instructed, by discussions, in government and behaviour and the whole institution served to train the citizens in loyalty to old traditions (111). Although the wealthy resented this measure and probably also the redivision of land (112), it probably did produce a more or less harmonious citizen body which could, therefore, be used as a bulwark against the Helots and Perioikoi should they ever seem dangerous.

If this attempt at turning back the clock, which this reorganisation at Sparta involved, were to succeed, both education and propaganda would have to be rigidly controlled. The/

The outcry of the wealthy at the enforcement of frugal habits and the abandonment of luxurious furniture, clothing and way of life generally (v.sup.), but all necessary to remove discontent, was a clear indication of the amount of teaching and propaganda that was necessary before all the citizens would whole-heartedly accept the new customs. The training therefore of the youth from so early an age was a social necessity as well as a military advantage. There is no better guardian and defender of a state than one inspired with some faith or belief, and, while the Spartans could not be filled with the wine of democratic freedom, which belongs to a community where the majority of the inhabitants share in the privileges of the state, and which was to raise Athens to such great heights in all spheres of human activity, they could be inspired with old-fashioned ideals and principles, so long as they were not contaminated with ideas from elsewhere in Greece. This training of the youths, therefore, and the observance of all these customs was made an essential condition of the right to a portion of land and to citizenship (113). Indeed, all hopes of obtaining some permanent value from this legislation was said to have been based on this matter of training the youths (114). In addition, the thirst for learning, which seized those parts of Greece affected by the renaissance, was deliberately discouraged and only the minimum of learning allowed. While the principles of blind obedience and loyalty were encouraged on the one hand, on the other, contamination from new customs and ideas sweeping across Greece was deliberately prevented by forbidding foreigners to visit Sparta and citizens to travel abroad (115). All foreign education, that is, on subjects which had become popular in Athens and other Greek cities, was forbidden (116). Even seamanship, in addition to trades and industry was forbidden for citizens, since, it was said, under the influence of foreign ideas and customs their characters would deteriorate (117). The laws of the state were not allowed to be disturbed and new sciences useful to commerce such as astronomy, geometry and accountancy were virtually unknown in Sparta (118).

In contrast, the culture and customs characteristic of a semi-feudal, landowning aristocracy were encouraged. The praise of ancient heroes in song and poetry continued to be favoured in order to fill the citizens with the spirit of the past as much as with a martial spirit for the present (119). Even the introduction of the custom of burial within the city and the new attitude to the dead (120) seems likely to have helped to keep the past and respect for the past to the forefront of the citizens' minds. Equally, the continual stress on respect for older men and the influence the latter were given over the youth would also have the same conservative effect (121). The training of the young, too, since it included many old tribal customs (122), helped to create a respect for tradition and the past. Choral music and festivals/

festivals characteristic of the aristocracy (v.sup.) were renowned in Sparta long after they had died out elsewhere in Greece (123). While women in trading states in Greece tended to retire from public life, in Sparta they retained a prominent social and public position (124), which was to have an important effect on the evolution of society in Sparta. Girls' choruses, too, were still maintained in Sparta when they had died out elsewhere in Greece (125), and these and the general training of the girls helped the women to play their important role in society naturally and without affectation. In short, music, poetry and even speech at Sparta were said to have been suited to the old, heroic tradition and innovations even in music were strictly forbidden (126). In place of the pursuit of learning and new sciences, Spartans were taught to regard training for war as a full time profession, while in peace time athletics and dancing, feasting and hunting, all characteristic of aristocratic society, received encouragement and long continued to be enjoyed at Sparta (127).

In fact, the reorganisation of the Spartan state at the end of the seventh century was in all essentials a reversion to semi-feudal conditions. Spartan citizens lived on a fixed revenue from their estates which were worked by serfs (128). The Spartan citizen was to ignore not only manufactures and trade, but even agriculture and devote himself to war and other aristocratic pursuits. So a noble in feudal Europe was one who lived from the produce of his land without working on it and who, on his part, had military obligations to perform (129). In both cases artisans, serfs and nobles were almost rigidly separated classes.

In Egypt, too, such class divisions were the rule and it is interesting to note that Lycurgus was said to have visited Egypt and been so impressed by the strict separation of the military nobility from the rest of the population, that he introduced a similar arrangement to Sparta and so made the constitution more aristocratic (130), although this story may have been invented to explain the similarities in the two social structures. In the Rhetra it is clearly stressed that not only was the population arranged in five tribes, but it was also divided into classes, an indication perhaps of the deliberation of this policy. It is not surprising to hear that in Sparta a freeman was most a freeman and a slave most a slave (131).

The deliberate purpose behind the legislation is admitted and emphasised by the laws preventing contact between Spartans and new ideas (v.sup.), which led to the discouragement of sophists and lecturers, who might induce the Spartans to start thinking for themselves and so to question all that they had been brought up to believe (132). In addition, the encouragement/

encouragement of aristocratic culture and customs on the one hand, and the banning of all so-called useless arts such as law, and the exclusion of rhetoric and philosophy because of their subversive influence (133), on the other, all point to a conscious, deliberate policy. The training and public meals, too, and the insistence on marriage were laws designed to maintain a strong citizen body capable of withstanding the encroachments of non-citizens. While Sparta, for a time at least, avoided some of the disadvantages of the new type of state such as fortune-tellers and soothsayers, keepers of infamous houses (134), and other attendants of a money economy, she never developed the drama nor an interest in - much less contribution to - science and philosophy and all the other arts and sciences which found their spiritual home especially at democratic Athens.

Why then, if Sparta reverted to a static economy, did not the political structure of the state revert, too, to a loose federation of semi-independent localities? It was only when the aristocracy developed as a class in Greece that centralised states took a more or less permanent form and it was only with the development of trade and manufacture and the social changes accompanying them that there emerged national states with national policies and international alliances and connections. However, while in Sparta the economy was restored to a domestic, self-sufficient type, it was only done as a deliberate policy after the economy had been disrupted by social and economic changes. Accordingly it was a reactionary settlement which had to be backed by the organised power of a centralised state; for it meant preserving the aristocracy's position and privileges in opposition to the immediate interests of those who had engaged in new pursuits as a result of the social changes. Far from producing a reversion to a loose form of state organisation, therefore, this economic and social policy demanded a strengthened and even more highly organised political form by means of which the aristocracy could carry through and maintain these changes. Moreover, as a result of this deliberate, organised policy, Sparta played an important part in the international affairs of Greece, just as other centralised states such as Corinth and Athens did, although these states had allowed the full growth of commerce to reach its logical conclusion in social and political changes. Many Greek communities remained for long semi-feudal communities based on village life but, as a result, they never developed organised city states and were "almost devoid of political life" (135). Sparta, however, was already a centralised state and she reinforced its organisation to restore an old economy, while, as a result of the deliberation and force used in settling her own affairs, she was forced to carry her policy into foreign affairs to preserve her own settlement. It is this which gives Sparta the/

the unique appearance of having a static, agricultural aristocracy like so many Greek communities at this period, and yet, unlike them, pursued an active policy at home and abroad. As a general principle it may be stated that the weaker the position of a governing class in relation to other classes, the stronger the state power that it required to maintain its control in the community. From this time onwards the Spartan aristocracy had chosen to fight to maintain its privileged position, but to do so in face of threats to its power it had to increase its hold on the state, on the training of youth and the life of the adults, until, finally, it produced citizens inspired by loyalties and obedience but lacking individual freedom and initiative, and unappreciative of the new culture and art. This process of strengthening its own position by almost dictatorial powers at home affected inevitably the Spartan aristocracy's policy abroad. Its relatively weak position at home could not be allowed to be still further weakened by influences dangerous to its privileges and so Sparta's foreign policy was a combination of aggressiveness designed to destroy tyrannies and all the influences arising from them, and passiveness adopted in the hope of avoiding too much foreign contact and all that that implied.

While Solon and Lycurgus had both dealt with social and economic crises essentially similar in character, their solutions had been entirely different. Solon, by facilitating, whether consciously or not, the further development of trade and manufacture, allowed the new people to grow strong enough to challenge the old type of constitution and, under the tyranny, to overrule it; so that after the tyranny a new constitution could be set up in conformity with the new economic and social alliances. Solon thus initiated the development which laid the foundations of Athens' strength in the Persian War and her greatness and prosperity in the fifth century (v. sup. ch. v). Lycurgus, like Solon, made some agricultural reforms but the re-allocation of land was a backward step towards an earlier type of society prevailing before the monopoly of economic and social power by the aristocracy, not a forward step to some type of "socialistic" economy. Some of the social measures accompanying it were nearer probably to tribal customs than anything more modern, while its economic settlement could be compared to a hypothetical, deliberate reversion in Europe to static, feudal states at a time when trade was developing, land increasing in mobility and new people challenging the position and privileges of the feudal nobility. To be progressive within the conditions of this period, Lycurgus would have had to allow still greater mobility of land while making it easier for the peasant to share in the general prosperity, as Solon and Peisistratus did. The Lycurgus settlement solved the social/

social crisis, not by allowing the further development as in Attica, of the new economic and social interests, but by abolishing them from the ranks of the citizens, hampering their future development and re-establishing the old-fashioned, self-sufficient type of economy. To enforce and maintain this change it was necessary, therefore, to strengthen the organised power of the nobles and their control of the centralised government by reinforcing the rigid class structure of the state, and not to weaken, as in Attica, the social eminence of the nobles by granting political and social concessions to possessors of the new type of wealth. The only concessions in Sparta were to allow a few non-citizens to gain land and citizenship and thus turn them against their former associates. This had quite the opposite effect from that produced in Attica by allowing the new rich some privileges on the basis of their new type of wealth. On the contrary, by allowing some new people to share in the old type of wealth and privilege, the aristocracy strengthened the position of those possessing them and weakened future attempts to gain recognition for the new wealth and professions. To win conviction among the citizens and loyal support for the settlement it was necessary to change the entire life of the community, to supervise the education of the youth and the spiritual and intellectual as well as physical life of the citizens, until Sparta resembled an armed camp.

In short, instead of paving the way for a change of constitution to suit the new economy and new type of society as Solon had done, Lycurgus reinforced the aristocratic character of the constitution and changed the economy. This is an arrangement almost unique in history but Japan does offer some similarities. Although trade between Japan and Western Europe had already developed in the sixteenth century A.D., in the seventeenth century Japan adopted a policy of self-isolation from Western Europe; and this policy, although it profoundly affected the details of development of Japan as the arrangement in Sparta did, still did not alter the general trend of events, that is, the ultimate industrialisation of the country and the growth of its intervention in international affairs, although they assumed peculiar characteristics because of the delay. In the same way, the general trend of events in Sparta was only delayed not averted, although it, too, was profoundly affected and modified by this delay and the measures which caused it. As a result, however, of the extensive character of these measures and probably owing to the force used or threatened, the reconstituted state at Sparta did survive for several centuries even after changes had again created havoc within the society. Solon's laws on the other hand, did not outlive himself. Yet it is Solon who deserves praise because the very speed of its dating/

dating emphasised the progressive character of his legislation which facilitated further progress. For the Lycurgan legislation it can only be claimed that it lasted so long as it did because of the extreme character of its measures and the Vigour with which they were enacted (136).

Plutarch asserts that Lycurgus excluded unprofitable and useless arts from Sparta and therefore forced the skilled craftsmen, who had produced such outstandingly lovely work at Sparta, to devote their skill merely to essential articles such as household furniture and cups. It was evident that articles were not valued for their beauty but judged only according to their usefulness, and makers of fancy articles were not allowed in the state. Even in those articles which were allowed to be made, for instance, household furniture and fittings such as ceilings and doors, any elaboration was frowned upon (137). However, it was probable that the decline in all art and culture which began in Sparta soon after this period of reorganisation was caused mainly by the interruption of trade and intercourse with other states and, therefore, the lack of fresh sources of inspiration for artists. The economy was petrified around self-sufficient estates and a rigid social framework choked the new life. As a result, from about 550 B.C. Spartan art in every form began to decline (138). Naturally, it would take some time for the laws to have effect and between 600 and 550 some excellent pottery was produced and an extensive building programme, including a temple of Orthia and the Brazen House and a throne to Apollo at Amyclae, was undertaken (139). Naturally buildings for religious purposes would not be discouraged but the general effect of the restrictive laws could not be avoided and after about 550 B.C. building virtually ceased (140). In the sixth century too, works of art were dedicated by Lacedaemonians at Delphi and a bronze bowl with figurines was made by Lacedaemonians for Croesus (141). Although Sparta was said to have sent to Croesus for gold to face a statue of Apollo (142), this may only indicate the popular use of iron. This building of temples and religious statues and the actual importing of gold for the latter, suggests that Sparta was, if anything, emphasising her religious rites even more than before, although the new temple to Artemis Orthia showed signs of change in the cult which might indicate the changes in society itself (143).

Music made no further progress in Sparta and foreign musicians and artists were no longer attracted to the city while the Spartans themselves took little interest in the Greek festivals (144). In culture and art, as in political and social advance, the hegemony in the Greek world had passed from Sparta to Athens and other cities of the new, bourgeois republican type. Sparta had excelled in aristocratic culture, Her failure to make any social advance, when people and conditions/

conditions demanded it, and her deliberate return to an older way of life meant not only that she could not cultivate the new art which was inevitably bound up with the new society, but also that even her former art died, since the society from which it had sprung was itself no longer living but only artificially preserved. In literature, too, there were changes, or rather, old styles became formalised and no progress to new types, such as appeared in other Greek cities, was recorded (145). The flowing type of lyric of Alcman became stiffer and more rigid. Instead of developing to individual personal lyric on the one hand, and, through the dithyramb, to drama on the other, as in Attica, the choral lyric, closely bound up as it was with aristocratic culture and religion, continued to flourish long after it had died out in other parts of Greece which were affected by the new life (v.sup.). Even in later centuries Spartans were still interested in past heroes and in genealogies, while in the sciences which benefitted commerce, such as geometry, astronomy and accountancy they had no interest (146). Moreover, a rather uncultured contempt for art and even for music, apart from military marches, was frankly expressed (147). Archilochus was said to have been banished from Sparta (148) because of his poems expressing the wisdom of saving one's life by flight rather than staying to risk death on the battlefield. Clearly, in a state which was training its youth and citizens in unquestioning loyalty and obedience such as an outspoken, individualist and irresponsible point of view could not be tolerated. Such opinions, if only because they were contrary to state training and education, might set men thinking for themselves. It is little wonder then that poetry failed to make progress. The inspirational flow had been cut and the expression of the new life and new ideas died from strangulation, but at the same time, some of the culture typical of the Greek landed aristocracy was deliberately fostered and so continued to survive. It was not the destruction of the aristocracy which destroyed Sparta's art and culture (149), but the preservation of the old type of aristocracy when conditions demanded social change, and the destruction by the nobility of those new conditions which could have produced a new type of society and a new type of culture as in Attica. Of course the aristocracy almost certainly did not foresee this result. On the contrary, they were obviously attempting to create a body of citizens, of men and women, of high moral character, which, if it lacked the culture and intelligence of the new life, was also uncontaminated by its less fortunate aspects. In this they succeeded for some time and Spartan men and women were famous for certain virtues. Unfortunately, the exclusion of the new life could not be continued indefinitely and the continued restrictions in face of this merely led to the loss of the old virtues and culture, without the compensating acquisition of the new. Unconsciously, in imposing an archaic/

archaic way of life on their people, the Spartan aristocracy had foregone a brilliant culture but revived many of the Heroic virtues, with all their charm. Once these virtues were destroyed by contamination from abroad, however, the lack of new culture and science revealed a bankrupt society, whose citizens became as notorious for extravagance, degeneracy and corruption, as they had once been famous for the simple, Heroic virtues.

All the effects of the settlement would, however, not be immediately apparent and in the sixth century Sparta was regarded by Croesus as the most prosperous and powerful state in Greece (150), a reflection of Sparta's leading position in art and international contacts so early in Greece. It seems clear that as a result of the immediate solution of the social crisis and because of the military reforms the Spartan army was more efficient and, probably because of the renewed harmony in the citizen body, enjoyed a better morale. Military training was once again the full time profession of the nobility and to many Greeks who had forgotten such feudal conditions Sparta's mastery of the military art seemed unique and military excellence appeared always to have been the main aim of her organisation (151). Early in the sixth century she used this army to attack the Tegeans and although she failed in this she succeeded in all other wars of this period. These included attacks on the Arcadians which may have been undertaken in revenge for the help given to the Messenians and as a warning for the future. The motive, therefore, would be to ensure the security of the Spartan aristocracy from possible attacks or threats of attack. By about the middle of the century, when the social reorganisation was beginning to cause a decline in her art, it was also bringing to perfection her military strength. She finally defeated the Tegeans and from then on Sparta became a supreme power in the Greek world.

Greek writers commented on this access of military strength in Sparta once her internal factions had been appeased (152). Thucydides notes, too, that this military power, once acquired and stabilised was used almost at once against the Greek tyrannies. This meant that the policy of the Spartan aristocracy, which had directed the internal settlement, was being directed in the international sphere against the same type of social revolution which had looked as if it might develop in Sparta to the point of challenging the aristocracy. The settlement of about 620 B.C. in Sparta reinforced a state in which a few citizens controlled a great mass of serfs and freemen without citizen rights. These were an integral part of the state and, so far from being ignored because they had no political rights, should be considered all the more carefully because of this fact./

fact. The denial of citizenship and the attempt to prevent the possibility of ever conceding such rights was itself a reactionary policy which could only be maintained by force or its threat. Accordingly, Grundy's statement that there were no parties at Sparta until Lysander's time (153) is only true of Spartan citizens - and that only partially true - and therefore means very little. Sparta's policy at this time, therefore, was not merely the result of a personal quarrel between Ephors and king as Dickins thinks, not the product of a fear of a Helot revolt as Grundy believes. It was not the Messenian revolt in itself but the social crisis at home which had given the revolt some hope of success and severely weakened the state. Sparta's policy, therefore, was designed to maintain Sparta's social settlement at home and to defend it from possible danger abroad and, if possible, to increase its power by establishing governments under its influence elsewhere in Greece and by increasing its prestige throughout the Greek world. Whether this was a precautionary policy, or whether the Spartan nobles actually feared the effect on all Greece and Sparta itself if tyrannies and the ideas associated with them continued, is not clear. She put down the tyranny of Aeschines at Sicyon and sent an expedition against Polycrates, tyrant of Samos (154), and was responsible for expelling many more (155). Meanwhile, it was probably to be free to concentrate on this new type of foreign policy that Sparta agreed to an alliance with Tegea after the latter's defeat instead of attempting to maintain it as a permanently conquered state. The Spartan state was now organised for defence against possible attacks either from within or without and this organisation was on the basis of an organised aristocracy whose limits, they hoped, were fixed for all time. They were not so concerned, therefore, with extending the state as using it in its rearranged form to further their policy. Accordingly, for the future, the aristocracy tended to use their power as a weapon for increasing their influence and to weaken that of hostile interests, either by force or threat of force. This explanation of the Tegean alliance seems more sensible than that of Dickins (156). Conflicts of imperialism and socialistic principles do not make sense at such a period. Sparta was not, as he says, foregoing empire for the purity of the Spartan state, but was pursuing a policy of aggression by different tactics, striving to increase her influence by setting up governments favourable to herself and her policy instead of using absolute conquest as a method. Moreover, this^{was} justified in the earthquake of 464 B.C. when troops from Arcadia virtually saved Sparta (157).

Aristotle stresses that where constitutions are so opposed as an aristocracy and tyrannies, the aristocracy will have the will to overthrow them and so Sparta put down most of the tyrannies./

tyrannies.(158). This, of course, gives only a superficial explanation. Interference in the internal affairs of one state by another is almost always caused by two factors, the internal situation of the attacking state and, in the state which is attacked, such conditions as can be regarded as useful to the attackers or as dangerous and therefore to be destroyed. If the attacking state has been or is threatened by internal troubles and regards the affairs of another state as a danger to or aggravation of this trouble, then it may feel sufficiently threatened to interfere in the affairs of the other state and try to remove the danger. Where, on the other hand, the attacking state is strong and pursuing a policy of expansion it may regard the internal affairs of small states as an excuse to interfere to further her own ambitions. Of these two possibilities, but of course variations on them are almost limitless, Sparta was clearly influenced by the first while, historic irony, she herself was to suffer interferences from Antigonus of Macedon because of the second (v.sub. ch.viii). It was not then that the Spartan aristocracy deliberately pursued such a policy out of sheer hatred of tyrannies and democracies. Governments are usually more practical. It was the aristocracy's reaction to its danger at home and the increasing use of force which became necessary to maintain its position there, which forced on Sparta a foreign policy with the same objective in view. Whether tyrannies and democracies in other states were really a source of danger to the Spartan aristocracy does not affect the issue. The point was that the aristocracy, as a result of the crisis at home and events abroad, must have been firmly convinced of the danger either in the present or for the future.

Indeed the international association of the tyrants in Greece was producing an international association of their opponents. In Attica Sparta chose an excellent time to interfere. The tyrant was becoming increasingly irksome to his former supporters and a time of discontent and faction provides opportunities and individuals for another state to use (159). In addition, some of the Athenian exiles were so anxious to return that they did not scruple to use the Spartans to help them, a method quickly learned by Isagoras and the reactionary party. The attempt by Cleomenes of Sparta to establish a strict oligarchy at Athens under Isagoras and his supporters indicates clearly the motive behind Sparta's policy. What she probably did not realise was that unless Isagoras and his party deliberately reversed the economic and social advance already made in Attica, and this was almost impossible since they had advanced far enough to become of real importance in the state, then the best that could result from Cleomenes' manoeuvres would be an oligarchical state still based on commerce, manufacture and agriculture for trade, even though only a restricted number of citizens controlled/

controlled it; but that would have meant that wealth as well as birth had an important control in the state. The great strength and cultural achievements of Athens would probably have been affected, but the basic change to a trading state, the fundamental cause of the social and intellectual changes which were alarming Sparta, would have been maintained, although perhaps in a modified form. An aristocracy based on hereditary privilege and static agriculture as at Sparta, was an entirely different type of state. The trading oligarchy and democracy were far more alike than the trading oligarchy and semi-federal aristocracy. Aristotle stresses the frequent confusion between aristocracy and oligarchy, clearly linking the latter with wealth and the former with noble birth and hereditary privilege, and, therefore, probably landownership (160).

After the expulsion of Cleomenes, the Athenian people proved so strong that only a fairly broad democracy would have satisfied them. This result, the very opposite of that intended by Cleomenes, no doubt infuriated Sparta and an attempt was made to mobilise the whole of Central Greece against Athens. The Corinthians, however, left the expedition and King Demaratus of Sparta disagreed with Cleomenes about the advisability of the undertaking. As a result, the alliance broke up at Eleusis and the expedition fell to pieces (161). However, Athens continued to grow in strength and, in desperation, Sparta was prepared to try to restore Hippias whom she had expelled. Hippias, now a mere individual without a party and without a policy, was a potential tool for any organised policy which would restore him. It was not Sparta that had changed but Hippias, but it is a measure of Sparta's desperate fear in face of Athenian democratic strength that she was prepared to summon and consult one of those tyrants whom she had represented to the Greek world as the enemies of all true Greeks, in order to crush Athenian freedom and democratic ideals, which were as dangerous to Sparta as they were a tower of strength to Athens herself (162). Now that the Athenians had outgrown the need of a tyranny, to restore a tyrant would have meant restricting and finally stopping the rapid advance in political, social and cultural life. This plan, however, was too fantastic for the Corinthians, who had also experienced the period when the overthrow of the tyrant becomes a necessity and who, therefore, saw little hope for any permanent settlement arising out of such an attempt at restoration in Athens. The Corinthians may have adopted this policy on this occasion and previously at Eleusis because of jealousy of Sparta and fear of any increase in her power and influence, and possibly out of friendliness to Athens who was engaged in a war with Corinth's rival, Aegina (163).

The/

The Spartan nobles, on the other hand, obviously changed their tactics once more in accordance with new circumstances. They had ~~already~~ passed from interference in Athens' affairs to the organisation of open attack upon her. Now it began to be possible for Sparta to adopt a passive role and leave the policy of active attack on Athens to others. This would have the double advantage of conserving Spartan strength and avoiding too much contact with other states whose ideals were different, ^{from} and even hostile to those of Sparta. Just before the expedition had set out from Eleusis, the Athenian envoys, who had submitted to King Darius, had been repudiated on their return and Athens made it clear that she at least, had no intention of submitting to Persia. This may have suggested new tactics to Sparta, namely, to leave Athens to be dealt with by Persia, but these were almost at once laid aside when Athens showed her increasing strength in her retaliation on the prepared expedition. However, when Hippias had been rebuffed by the Corinthians, he had gone to Sardis to beg Artaphernes to conquer Athens and reinstall him as tyrant (164). The first reaction of the Athenians, to send envoys to the Persians, was quickly discredited and the increasingly hostile attitude to Persia adopted by Athens probably again suggested to Sparta that one day Athens would have to face the might of the Great King.

In such a situation there was no need for Sparta to undertake either such a doubtful enterprise as the attempt to restore Hippias to Athens, or a large scale expedition to defeat Athens. Both would involve an expenditure of strength, while Sparta's new policy and tactics demanded the conservation of her strength and, if possible, its increase for possible emergencies at home or abroad. So long as there was a possibility of Athens being weakened by someone else, Sparta was not eager to expend her own energy and resources in doing it. In any case, the anti-tyrant policy had already reached its limits. The overthrow of tyrants had not, as Sparta had probably expected, meant the disappearance of new ways of living and new ideas, but rather their intensification. When that stage had been reached, instead of a policy of interference in internal affairs made possible by factions at the time of the overthrow of a tyranny, Sparta had to deal in international affairs with nations pursuing national policies. Individuals might still be used or bribed if they were available but the city states themselves were beginning to develop national policies just as they were developing national cultures. As a result, the era of wars between state and state in Greece, which was to reach its height in the Peloponnesian War, was already foreshadowed even now. This gradually affected Sparta policy too. Once the trading states had outlived the first flush of expansion, prosperity and democratic enthusiasm, they would cease to be potential sources of danger to the Spartan aristocracy. However, /

However, while the external danger might be less, parallel with this development, the internal danger, especially from the Helots, from the time of the great earthquake (v. sub. ch. viii) onwards, grew steadily more menacing. Her policy, therefore, became more and more a passive one in an attempt, usually in vain, to maintain the status quo within Sparta by shunning the world outside it.

Meanwhile, this change of tactics towards Athens on the part of the Spartan aristocracy led to a break between them and King Cleomenes. Until then the Spartan tactics had allowed Cleomenes scope for initiative and leadership and at first, therefore, he was clearly a willing executant of the aristocracy's policy. Although he had acted against supporters of Persia in Aegina it was for his action in overthrowing the Athenian tyranny that he was renowned (165), no doubt especially by the Spartans themselves. The new tactics, however, severely limited his own power and activities and he was forced to oppose them. The Ephors did not deliberately adopt a policy opposed to the monarchy as Dickens (166) believes. Far from being so devoid of policy that they were free to follow any whim which would hamper the monarchy, the aristocracy, using the Ephors as representatives of the citizens to defend a constitution favouring only a privileged few, was very firmly tied to a definite policy designed to maintain that social arrangement and, if possible, to extend its influence at home and abroad. That, however, does not imply a fear of Helot revolts as Grundy (167) argues. He admits there is no evidence for this fear in the sixth century but argues from the growing discontent among the Helots in the fifth century. It is not the Helots qua Helots but the whole social structure, which excluded many aspirants to citizenship from privileges as well as maintained serfdom, which was dangerous. It was essentially the Messenian Helots who were rebellious and in the Messenian Wars the great weakness of Sparta had been not the Helots but the internal factions caused by freemen hoping to acquire the citizenship and other privileges. In such a situation it was the Kings, when their military exploits were hampered, who were driven to oppose the Ephors' policy and the kings then became a possible danger to the whole Lycurgan settlement, which had been designed, in part, to prevent the kings from playing an independent role to the danger of the constitution.

Already Cleomenes had been tried by the Ephors on a charge of bribery to explain his failure to capture Argos (168), but his acquittal by a large majority of the citizens suggests that the Ephors may have been clutching at straws in their efforts to curb Cleomenes' energy and power. It is even possible that Cleomenes had recognised Athens as Sparta's main enemy for the future and, not appreciating the Ephors' subtle policy of abandoning her to the Persian attack, felt he should/

should direct all his energies to defeating Athens, even if it meant allowing Sparta's old enemy, Argos, to escape. One of the first of Cleomenes' enterprises in opposition to Sparta's policy was his intervention in Aegina. The herald of Darius had already received submission from most Greek cities and only Athens was outstanding in her protests and resistance. When the Athenians informed Sparta that the Aeginetans had also submitted, Cleomenes entered Aegina and attempted to seize those responsible. He was then accused by the Aeginetans of acting without the consent of the Spartan government and apparently against the wishes of King Demaratus who had sent a message to that effect. There seems no reason to doubt this complaint since Sparta's subsequent behaviour in the Persian War confirms the suspicion that even before this she was not averse to the defeat of Athens at the hands of Persia. Cleomenes, on his return to Sparta, had to face the accusation of Demaratus. However, by an involved plot, he succeeded in having Demaratus desposed and a friend of his own elected in his place (169). When his plot against Demaratus was discovered he fled to Arcadia and there tried to win support for war against Sparta (170). He had, therefore, at last adopted the tactics the whole aristocratic settlement was designed to avert if possible, and to render harmless if it should be adopted. The position for the aristocracy, therefore, was critical. Cleomenes was promptly recalled, nominally on his own terms, but he committed suicide almost at once. This result was so fortunate for the Spartans and the tale of his sudden madness so suspicious, that it is not surprising to find murder suspected (171).

The comparative ease with which the Ephors dealt with Cleomenes was the result of their steadily increasing strength. Soon after the Second Messenian War their power had been increased in relation to the monarchy and, by the middle of the century, was said to equal that of the kings (v. sup.). Chilon, who was said to be responsible for this increase in the power of the Ephors against the monarchy (172), was also, interestingly enough, apparently opposed to commerce and all foreign connections for Sparta, since he expressed the opinion that it would be better for Sparta if Cythera were sunk in the sea (173). As Cythera was an important Laconian port (174), and could become very influential if trade were again allowed to expand, its danger to Sparta seems obviously to be the same as that from all trade and its consequence, and not because it represented a policy of conquest of the whole Peloponnese as Dickens (175) assumes. It is clear Chilon was a firm exponent of Sparta's new policy. Already, the Ephors had interfered in one king's affairs and claimed the right to arrange his method of living according to their own ideas of what was correct (176). The new regulation, too, which insisted that one Spartan king should remain at home during a war (177), was probably designed to give the Ephors one king as a weapon if the other should prove too/

too independent, especially as this regulation was introduced just when the change of tactics by the Ephors began to create a divergence of interest between them and Cleomenes. With the opposition so well entrenched the Spartan Kings in future, if they wished for independence, would have to pursue an ever more ambitious, individualist policy.

It was probably this reactionary policy at home and anti-tyrant, anti-democratic policy abroad which helped to determine Sparta's attitude to the war against Persia. That Sparta did not seem over-anxious to oppose Persia and frequently delayed taking action is evident (178). Even Plato, who defends Sparta's delay on the grounds of a war against Messenia, admits he is ignorant of any excuse Sparta had been able to give (179). The Peloponnesians had no great desire to defend any part of Greece except the Peloponnese and Sparta sent only 300 Spartiates and 1,000 Lacedaemonians to Thermopylae (180). Finally, Central Greece and Athens were abandoned to the Persians (181). Sparta was given the command on land and sea, probably not only in deference to her prestige but in the hope of committing her definitely to a more active anti-Persia policy. At sea, too, the Spartans wished to retreat and Spartan and Corinthian admirals had to be bribed to prevent this (182). Once Athens was burned, only at sea was action for a time possible, but Sparta did not wish to risk naval action. She and the other Peloponnesians were preparing to retreat when Themistocles persuaded them to stay, largely by warning them that the Peloponnese would easily be invaded if they continued to withdraw without fighting (183). Athens had to threaten Sparta with a separate peace before they could be persuaded to take the offensive and so defeat the Persians at Plataea (184). From the statement of the Athenian envoys it is obvious that Sparta was concerned only to defend the Peloponnese and would leave Athens to her fate. It is doubtful if she had hitherto believed it possible that Athens would come to terms with Persia, since she had been so vehement in her leadership of the resistance. Even the Persian attack was ostensibly against Athens, although it soon became evident that it was really directed against all Greece (185). At any rate, she still continued to delay even after the threat given by the Athenian envoys. It was only when Chileus of Tegea took seriously the possibility of an Athenian peace with Persia and even warned Sparta of a possible alliance between them directed against Sparta, that the Ephors finally acted (186).

It is significant that, on the whole, it was aristocracies and reactionary parties among the Greek population which were ready to come to terms with Persia. In Larissa, for instance, the Aleudae actually asked for the intervention of the Great King and the small ruling caste at Thebes prevented the people from fighting and hoped for the success of/

of Persia in order to strengthen and maintain their own aristocratic privileges (187). In general, it was Central and North Greece, which were still semi-feudal and aristocratic and had few towns in which popular forces could have emerged, which accepted the Persians most readily (188).

It is plausible, therefore, to believe that Sparta's hesitation to oppose Persia was due to her desire to overthrow tyrannies and the new states the tyrants had helped to bring into being, especially Athens, the strongest and most democratic of them all. If she could have been sure that Persia would not maintain a permanent domination nor seek to conquer the Peloponnese, but merely act as a bulwark against the more popular forces of society which were emerging in Greece, Sparta would probably not have hesitated at all. On those points, however not only could she not be sure, but, as the Persians advanced further into Greece, she must have become increasingly doubtful of their intentions.

Her jealousy of Athens was probably another motive for her policy. In spite of her success in expelling the Athenian tyranny, the constitution which the Athenians then drew up had been quite the opposite of that which Cleomenes had attempted to impose. Indeed Cleomenes of Sparta's interferences probably helped to arouse the Athenian people and so produced an even broader democracy. To see Persia destroy this democracy and all the ideas and new strength it represented and produced, would suit Sparta very well, but she had no guarantee that this destruction would be maintained. Meanwhile Athens was winning great glory for herself as leader of the Greeks against the Persians and this may have helped to influence Spartan policy in the other direction and finally persuaded her to play some part, however grudgingly, in the resistance movement. It was only after the battle of Marathon, when Athens had won glory and when she began to build a fleet, that Sparta took a more active part in the defence against Persia, either through fear of Persia for herself, or jealousy of Athens, or a belated realisation that Athenian patriotism and democratic strength might even be able to withstand the might of autocratic Persia and that Athens had no intention of every admitting defeat no matter how long she had to fight. It was after Marathon, too, that Themistocles got rid of the supporters of both Miltiades and the Alcmaeonidae, so that the Athenian government became not only more radical than ever, but also more efficient and determined than ever in its prosecution of the war (v. sup., ch. v).

So those conditions in Greece which had provoked social changes in both Attica and Sparta as well as in many other Greek cities, while in Athens and other cities they mobilised sufficiently/

sufficiently strong and numerous new people to produce, ultimately, the tyranny, in Sparta they provoked the nobles to impose an intensification of aristocratic control. If any further arguments were needed to vindicate the importance of the historical role played by individuals and groups of people, this surely would serve. Faced with the threat to their social, political and economic privileges, as elsewhere in Greece, the Spartan aristocracy determined to take the offensive before the danger became really menacing. Partly because of the vigour with which they took the offensive before the danger matured and partly because, as a result of the policy of land conquest, their economic position in the community was probably stronger than that of any other Greek aristocracy which was threatened at this time, the Spartan nobles succeeded in their attempt. In trying to make their settlement permanent, however, they had to revert to a static, feudal economy and therefore to exclude from Sparta those economic pursuits and new ideas and professions which could upset this arrangement. Consequently, this internal policy of defence of aristocratic privilege and offensive against its social opponents was the chief driving motive behind Sparta's foreign policy, which might change its tactics according to circumstances, but continued to be motivated by the same objectives,

In Athens, the influence of iron and the alphabet exercised within the general effect of the trading revolution made it possible for a majority of the population to acquire sufficient economic strength on the one hand as a result of the iron, and a far reaching intellectual conviction and technical ability on the other, thanks to the alphabet, so as to overthrow aristocratic privilege and establish a democratic republic based on the new ways of life and the new ideas brought into being by these social changes. Athens, then, and the other Greek states which followed the same path, carried human progress a stage beyond the highest point of advance created by the Bronze Age urban revolution. The Spartan aristocracy, however, being more firmly entrenched, prevented for the time being the full effects of iron and the alphabet, removed as far as possible the material and intellectual conditions from which the challenge had come, and retained, in an increasingly dictatorial form, the old political framework comparable to the semi-feudal, autocratic type of the Bronze Age.

So long as the progressive results of the changes at Athens continued, the increase in prosperity, in democracy and, therefore, in morale, patriotism and national culture, so long did Athens reach new heights in strength and democratic leadership against invasion, in art and culture, in science and philosophic thought, so that even today the glories of Greek/

Greek achievements are inevitably linked with her name. Sparta, on the other hand, lost her early artistic and cultural glories and failed or refused to practise the new arts and sciences. She retained some of the attractive customs, arts and traditions of an earlier age, but only did so artificially by imposing an autocratic regime on the community, which crushed its individuality and independence and produced only blind, unthinking obedience on the one hand, or a reckless and corrupt defiance on the other.

However, two main factors had to be consideredⁱⁿ interpreting the tyrannies (v.sup.), the social background and the individuals who made use of current conditions. While the victory of the Spartan nobles in 620 illustrates the importance of people in creating history, equally the final eruption of a tyranny at Sparta, in spite of all efforts to prevent it, (v.sub.), is a warning against ignoring the influence of social conditions. So, although the Spartan aristocracy established their static regime in the hope that it would be permanent, they could not exclude for long the conditions which produced the tyranny. Actually, from the end of the Persian War onwards, their economy and, consequently, their social settlement were gradually threatened and upset; and once the land settlement based on feudal estates, which had been the mainstay of the aristocracy and the chief source of their strength, was affected and landownership, therefore, afflicted by continual change, it became a powerful weapon against the shrinking circle of citizens. Finally, an intensification of these conditions caused by Alexander's conquest of the East, allied to the social unrest which this conquest created in the rest of Greece, produced the final crisis which, this time, reached its logical conclusion in a tyranny. This postponement not only made the revolution to establish the tyranny in Sparta more explosive and widespread, but, through the influence of this delay on Spartan policy, profoundly affected the detailed development of Greek history both before and after the Spartan tyranny (v.sub.).

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI.

1. Dawkins, B.S.A., xvi. pp.4 ff.
2. cf. Jardé, op.cit. pp.99/100, on the similarities between early Sparta and Athens and how differences only developed later.
3. Aris. Pol. v. 12. 1316a. Thuc. I. 18, implies the same date.
4. Paus. iii, 2.5.
5. Gilbert, "The Constitutional Antiquities of Athens and Sparta", pp.7ff.; and Toynbee, J.H.S. xxxiii.p.250, think this was part of the synoikism. Dickens, J.H.S. xxxii. p.6, believes it was a later development.
6. iv. 149.
7. cf. Aris. Pol. ii. 9. 1270a. cf. Wade-Gery, C.A.H. ii. p.539, on this.
8. Paus, iii. 2. 6.
9. Strabo, viii. 4. 4.
10. cf. Wade-Gery, C.A.H. ii. P.540.
11. Paus. iii. 2.7.; Strabo, viii. 5.4. cf. Wade-Gery, ibid; Toynbee, op.cit., p.255.
12. For the date cf. Myres, C.A.H. iii. p.674; Toynbee, l.c. p.258; Dickins, l.c. p.15.
13. Paus. iv. 14. 3.
14. cf. Toynbee, l.c. p.250.
15. Aris. Pol. v. 7. 1306b.; Paus. iii. 3. 1.
16. cf. Diod. Sic. viii. 27/8. This date probably fits this war better than the Second Messenian War.
17. Aris. Pol. v. 7. 1306b.; Paus. iii. 3. 1; Strabo, vi.3. 3.
18. So Dickins, pp.8ff; and Toynbee, p.256, believe.
19. So Wade-Gery, C.A.H.iii, p.561, n.1. cf. Gilbert, "Constitutional Antiquities of Athens and Sparta", p.7, n.2, for the arguments for and against the authenticity and antiquity of the Lyncurgan Rhetra.
20. Aris. Pol. ii. 9. 1270b.
- 21./

21. Laws, iii. 692.
22. Plut. Lyc. 6.
23. Plut. *ibid.*; Agis, 9; Thuc. i. 87; Xen. Hell. iii. 3.8.
24. Dickins, J.H.S. xxxii, pp.4, 13, following Mueller and Neyer, believes it was in existence in 1,000 B.C.
25. Pol. v.ii. 1313a; Lyc.7.
26. i. 65; de rep. Lac. viii. 3.
27. Aris. Pol. ii. 9. 1270b; Plato, Legg., iii.692.
28. Lyc.7.
29. Lyc. 29.
30. Wade-Gery, l.c. p.560.
31. Wade-Gery, *ibid.*, says it is not known if the five tribes included more citizens than the three although he thinks it probable.
32. cf. Artemis Orthia, pp.113, 176. In fact, the evolution of society in Sparta was, in all essentials, similar to that in Athens and other cities affected by changes in land and population and especially by the renewal of contacts with the East. It was the Spartan aristocracy's deliberate removal of these conditions in the late seventh century, which started the peculiarities in Sparta's development.
33. *ibid.*, pp.113, 246, 180.
34. cf. Burn, Age of Hesiod, p.207.
35. Paus. iv. 7.2.
36. Artemis Orthia, pp.245, 53, 201.
37. *ibid.*, pp.201, 245; cf. R.M. Dawkins, B.S.A., xiii, p.73. Amber was imported into Sparta from the North before trade relations with the East had opened up. This may be connected with the Dorians, cf.p.74 cf. Hdt. iv.33, for reference to "Hyperboreans" and their connections with Greece via the Adriatic.
38. Hogarth, Ionia and the East, pp.36/7.
39. Evan J.H.S. xxxii. p.285.
40. On these three points, cf. Artemis Orthia, pp.282/3; 379, 248, 378/9.
- 41./

41. v. sup. chs. i & ii; cf. Heichelheim, Geschichte des Alt., I. p.210, for the persistence of craftsmen's traditions between the Bronze Age and the Iron Age.
42. On all these points cf. Artemis Orthia, pp.176, 381, 112/3, 126/7.
43. ibid., p.127; cf. A.J.B. Wace, B.S.A. xii. p.347.
44. Artemis Orthia, pp.246-8.
45. ibid., pp.245, 201.
46. J.Droop, J.H.S. xxx. pp.5ff.; B.S.A. xiv. pp.30ff., 44/5; Blakeway, B.S.A. xxxiii. p.204, n.1.
47. Artemis Orthia, p.109; Droop, J.H.S. xxx. p.2; B.S.A. xiv. pp.44/6.
48. Artemis Orthia, p.384; B.S.A. xiii. pp.75, 77.
49. B.S.A. xiii. pp.84ff.
50. Hdt. iii. 47.
51. v.sup.; cf. Hdt.i.174; iv.147/54; Polyb. xii.5ff.; Diod. Sic. xv. 67.3; cf. O.Mueller, "The Doric Race", i.pp.143/4. In fact, Mueller, i.p.141, comments that Sparta sent out more colonies than one would expect of a state uninterested in maritime affairs. Actually, Sparta had overseas connections at this time, and colonies also played a useful role in ridding the state of dangerous elements.
52. cf. Xen. de rep. Lac. iv. 7, on hunting. cf. Plut.Lyc.24.
53. cf. Alcman's Maiden Songs on the Spartan girls, cf.Bury, C.A.H. iv. pp.501ff.
54. cf. Theognis, ll. 875/80; 991/6.
55. cf. Hammond, B.S.A. xxxii. p.176, quoting W.R.Halliday, Indo-European Folk Tales and Greek Legends, p.65.
56. Jevons, A History of Greek Literature, pp.123/4.
57. ibid., p.127.
58. Paus. iii, 12. 11; iii. 18. 9.
59. cf. Wade-Gery, l.c. p.560, on the inner circle of nobles retaining religious control and special privileges.
- 60./

60. Dion. Hal. Antiq. Rom. vii. 72.
61. Plut. Lyc. 8; Comparison of Numa and Lycurgus.
62. Plut. Lyc. 9-11.
63. Aris. Pol. v.7.1307a; Paus. iv.16.6; Plut. Lyc.8.
64. Plut. Lyc. 11; cf. Hiller-Crusius, Anth.Lyr.,
Introd.p.xv, on a fragment of Tyrtaeus; a Philochremata
Spartan Olkei, allo de ouden; cf. Diod. Sic. vii.14.5.
65. Plut. Lyc. 9, mentions the cessation of gold and silver
which implies that it had been in existence. This is
not necessarily correct however. Seltman, Greek Coins,
pp.32/3, believes iron money at Sparta to have been a
practical measure since Laconia possessed so much iron.
cf. T.Reinach, L'histoire par les monnaies, p.28. Plut.
Lyc. 12 mentions fines, but there is no evidence that
they were not paid in kind.
66. Paus. iii. 3.4. The date of the Second Messenian War
is usually said to be about 650-600. cf. Wade-Gery, l.c.
p.557, n.2; Toynbee, l.c.p.258.
67. Paus. iv. 16, 2-3.
68. Diod. Sic. viii, 27. 2.; xv. 67, 3; Strabo, viii, 4.10;
Athen. xiv. 630F; Paus. iv. 16.3; Tyrtaeus, frg.ii. l. 35.
69. Paus. iv. 18. 2.
70. Paus. iv. 18.
71. Aris. Pol. v. 7. 1307a; Paus. ibid.
72. cf. Wells, Studies in Herodotus, p.49.
73. Aris. Pol. ii. 9. 1270b; Polyb. vi. 10. 9; vi. 45. 5;
Isocr. xii. 154; Plut. Lyc. 5; 26; Xen. de rep. Lac.
x. 1-2; Dion. Hal. ii. 14.
74. Aristotle says that the holding office for life was
not good since the mind grows old as well as the body,
cf. Pol. ii. 9. 1271a.
75. Plut. Lyc. 5.
76. Xen. de rep. Lac. xv. 9.
77. v. sup.; Plut. Lyc. 5.
- 78./

78. Plut. Comp. Numa and Lyc., cf. Lyc. 19, where Lycurgas^u is advised to establish a popular government, and where Lycurgus' own answer indicates that his policy was quite the reverse.
79. Plut. Lyc. 5.
80. Comp. Numa and Lyc., 4.
81. Plut. Lyc. 19.
82. de rep. Lac. xii. 2.
83. Wade-Gery, l.c. p.562, argues that in the Second Messenian War the army organisation was still based on three tribes.
84. cf. Toynbee, l.c. p.255.
85. cf. Wade-Gery, l.c. p.560, on this.
86. cf. Adcock, C.A.H. iii, p.695/6, who suggests that the phalanx was not adopted for some time. cf. Burn, op. cit. p.57, on this.
87. Plut. Lyc. 18.
88. ibid., 16-18.
89. Plut. Lyc. 9; Comp. Numa and Lyc.; Inst. Lac. 40; Xen. de rep. Lac. vii. 1-5; Aelian, V.H. vi. 6.
90. Plut. Lyc. 9.
91. Plut. Lyc. 24.
92. Pol. v. 12. 1316b.
93. Plut., Lyc.8.
94. Toynbee, l.c. p.259, n.54; Wade-Gery, l.c. p.560.
95. Aris. Pol. v.6. 1306a. cf. Wade-Gery, ibid. on all this.
96. Aris. Pol. ii. 9.1270b. 23; Plato, Legg. III, 692; cf. Wade-Gery, l.c. p.561.
97. Pol. ii. 9. 1270b. 22. This distinction between middle class and potential working class is usually ignored by most historians. If kept in mind many of the less happy comparisons between ancient and modern times would be avoided. v.sup. ch.v., nn.140-2, for further details.

98. Plut. Lyc. 28.
99. cf. Hasebroek, Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece, passim, Contrast, however, Wallon, L'histoire de L'esclavage, i. p.153. and Glotz, Le Travail etc. p.229.
100. Plut. Lyc. 11.
101. Hd. ix. 33/5.
102. Xen. de rep. Lac. xiii. 5.
103. Hd. vi. 56/7; Thuc. v.66; Xen. l.c. xiii. 11; xv. 2; Aris. Pol. iii. 14. 1285a.
104. Plut. Cleom. 10. cf. Dickins, l.c. p.15 on the date.
105. Diog. Laert. i. 68.
106. Lyc. 29.
107. Aris. Pol. ii. 9. 1270b.
108. Plut. Mor. 217C; Xen. de rep. Lac. xv. 6.
109. Aris. Pol. ii. 9.1270b. The above interpretation of the Ephors does explain inconsistencies in Greek accounts. By analysing the magistracy in relation to the changing conditions in Spartan society, a logical development of the Ephoraty's role and importance can be traced.
110. Plut. Lyc. 10.
111. Xen. de rep. Lac. v. 5; Plut, Lyc. 12.
112. Plut. Lyc. 11.
113. Xen. de rep. Lac. x. 7; Plut; Inst. Lac.21.
114. Plut. Lyc. 13.
115. Plut. Lyc. 27.
116. Plato, Hippias Major, 8.
117. Plut. Inst. Lac. 42.
118. Plato, Hippias Major, 8.
119. Plato, ibid; Plut. Lyc. 21; Paus. iii. 17. 5.
- 120./

120. Plut. Lyc. 27.
121. Plut. Lyc. 15; Inst. Lac. 10; Mor. 235D.
122. cf. Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens, pp.103/6.
123. Plut. Lyc. 21; Xen. Mem. i.2; Paus. iii. 11. 9. cf. Rose, Handbook of Greek Literature, p.106.
124. Plut. Lyc. 14; cf. Jevons, op.cit. p.128, on the contrast between the women of Sparta and those of other cities.
125. cf. Jevons, op.cit. p.128.
126. Plut. Lyc. 21; Mor. 220C; Inst. Lac.17.
127. Plut. Lyc.24.
128. Plut. Inst. Lac.41; Aelian, V.H. vi. 1.
129. cf. C.E.H. i.p.272.
130. Plut. Lyc.4.
131. Plut. Lyc. 28.
132. Plato, Hipp. Maj.8; Plut. Mor.226D.
133. Plut. Lyc. 9; Athen. xiii. 611A.
134. Plut. Lyc.9; Mor. 226D.
135. Adcock, C.A.H. iii. p.692.
136. This interpretation of the crisis in Sparta in the late seventh century as being essentially similar to that in Athens and other cities affected by the economic and cultural revival, has many new features. For instance, it excludes the interpretation of the aristocracy's settlement as progressive, since, under such conditions only the continued advance of the social, economic and cultural tendencies could produce real progress. It was this unique, reactionary, settlement, too, which gave Spartan policy its peculiar character and left its mark on the Spartan tyranny when it did appear.
137. Plut. Lyc. 9, 13; Mor. 226D.
138. Artemis Orthia, pp.72, 166, 202; B.S.A. xiv. p.40. cf. however/

however Tod, *Encyclo. Brit.* xxv. p.614, who puts the decay in 600 B.C. The later date is more probable as the effect of the social and economic changes on Artistic work would probably not be immediate.

139. Paus. iii. 17. 2. cf. B.S.A. xiii. pp.60/1.
140. cf. Wade-Gery, l.c. p.564.
141. Hd. 1.51, 70.
142. Athen. vi. 232A.
143. cf. Artemis Orthia, p.163.
144. Spartan victories at Olympia were very rare after about 550 B.C. cf. Dickins, op.cit., p.19, n.106.
145. Plato, Legg. ii. 666C.
146. Plato, Hipp.Maj.8.
147. Plut. Lyc. 13; Mor. 218C; 220A; 234D.
148. Plut. Inst. Lac. 34; Val. Max. vi. 3; cf. Archilochus frg. 6, (Bergk).
149. cf. Ferguson, Greek Imperialism, p.83, for this view. The contrary view and the emphasis placed here on the reactionary settlement made by the aristocracy, and its effect on Spartan policy and history and, finally, on the Spartan tyrann~~y~~^y is essentially new.
150. Hd. i. 69.
151. Aris. Pol. ii. 9. 1271B; vii. 2. 1324B; vii. 14.1333B; Plato, Legg., ii. 666C; Xen. de rep; Lac. xiii. 5.
152. Thuc. i. 18.
153. J.H.S. xxxii. p.262.
154. Hd. iii. 44, 46/8, 54/6.
155. Plut. Lyc. 30.
156. cf. J.H.S. xxxii. pp.22ff. This interpretation arises from a confusion of Sparta's land settlement with some form of "socialism". Sparta's settlement was essentially reactionary, in spite of some concessions, and is comparable to demands in Hellenistic times and in early England for a Utopian redivision of land on static conditions at a time when social advance demands an increase in mobility of land, in trade and manufacture. (v.sup.ch.iv., v. sub. ch.vii).

157. Xen. Hell. v.2.3.
158. Pol. v. 10. 1312B.
159. Jarde, op.cit. p.210, believes there had always been a pro-Sparta party at Athens. It is more probable that this was of recent growth as a result of the factions in the city.
160. Pol. v. 7. 1306B.
161. Hd. v. 75.
162. Hd. v. 91.
163. cf. Thomson, op.cit., p.221.
164. Hd. v. 96.
165. Paus. iv. 7-8.
166. l.c. pp.31ff.
167. l.c. p.264.
168. Hd. vi. 82.
169. On these points, cf. Hd. vi. 50, 61ff.
170. Hd. vi. 74.
171. cf. Dickins, l.c., pp.31/2; Walker, C.A.H. iv. pp.261 ff.
172. Diog. Laert. i.68.
173. Hd. vii. 235. cf. Dickins, l.c.pp.19ff., on the date of Chilon.
174. Thuc. iv. 53.
175. l.c. p.24.
176. Hd. v.39-40.
177. Hd. v.75.
178. Hd. vi. 106, 120; Thuc.i.69. The above interpretation of Sparta's anti-tyrant policy, her changes of tactics in foreign affairs and especially her attitude in the Persian War, and the close connection of this policy with her settlement at home, gives a coherent account of Sparta's actions and avoids many of the inconsistencies emphasised by critics of other theories. cf. Dickins and Grundy.

179. Legg. iii. 698C.
180. Hdt. vii. 202; Diođ. Sic. xi. 4.
181. Hdt. viii. 40, 71.
182. Hdt. viii. 4-5.
183. Hdt. viii. 56ff.
184. Hdt. ix.7ff.
185. Hdt. vii. 138/9; cf. vii.5.
186. Hdt. ix.9.
187. Hdt. vii. 6, 130, 172; cf. vii. 205; Thuc.iii. 62.
188. Hdt. vii. 132, 172/4, 205; viii. 31/2, 66; ix. 31.

CHAPTER VII.

BACKGROUND TO THE SPARTAN TYRANNY.

Before continuing the study of Sparta's social evolution, it is essential to an understanding of the Spartan tyranny which did finally erupt to appreciate the social background in Greece against which these tyrants played their part. For without understanding this background, the reaction of the Greek states to the Spartan tyranny and, therefore, the possibilities for interference by Greece's neighbours would be incomprehensible. Moreover, although those conditions, namely, a mobile economy and development of new trades, which produced the early tyrannies, had been temporarily suppressed in Sparta, they soon began to grow again and, as a result especially of Alexander's conquests, were strongly reinforced. By that time not only were the Greek states more closely connected with each other, but even the development of Greece's neighbours affected Greek conditions and policy. Accordingly, the effect of Alexander's conquest on Greek conditions generally was as important in its ultimate reaction on Sparta as its direct effect on Spartan economy.

Even before Alexander's conquest of the East, in the second half of the fourth century B.C., a gradual decline in prosperity had started in the Greek states, with a corresponding increase in social unrest and discontent(1). The Athenians of that period were not "degenerate" in some moral or psychological way (2), but their economy was no longer expanding (3), and, since rich and poor both tried to keep what they had, at a time when the economy was producing less to go round, social tension was the result. Where there is a choice of policy before different sections of a community (4), then that community can no longer act with that decisive strength which springs from a unity of purpose and policy. The small section of traitors at Athens in the Persian War had been discredited and powerless since the end of the tyranny (5). In fourth century Athens, however, it was a still influential section of the population which was looking beyond the city boundaries and its traditions for future policy.

Athens had compensated for the decline in prosperity due to the loss of her empire by rebuilding her trade relations. Her economy was essentially a trading one, that is, goods, including agricultural produce, were made for sale. The importance of agriculture and the hoarding of money does not make the economy primitive as Hasebroek (6) suggests. In a trading community, where money had become the standard of exchange, money tends to be hoarded because it is the standard of wealth. Far from being primitive, this/

this is a sign that the economy had advanced beyond the stage of simple exchange. Only modern industrial capital has made money a commodity amongst other commodities, with the same mobility as other commodities. So treasure stored in temples was a natural development in a trading community (7). Moreover, when poets and philosophers criticised the social conditions of the time, it was money, the concrete form which wealth assumed, that they attacked (8).

As for agriculture, this was also the main industry in England even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (9), but like agriculture in fourth century Athens, it was an industry in which agricultural produce was sold on the market; (it is true of course that a certain amount of domestic economy always remains). The new landowners in Attica were therefore the new aristocracy, which had grown from Peisistratus' time as a result of this alliance of trade and agriculture. That ownership of land brought social prestige denied to traders and manufacturers was natural in a community where agriculture was still the basic industry; and this attitude for long prevailed in England too (10). By the eighteenth century however, England had already entered on the initial stages of the industrial revolution, an economic change ignored by the Greek states which had encouraged slave labour instead. Although slaves had facilitated the development of Greek economy for a time, eventually they served to intensify the social and economic crisis in the Greek states. The more slaves there were, the more goods they produced and, since the slaves used on a large scale received no wages, the less purchasing there was in the state. As a result, overproduction was one of the main evils noted by Greek authors of this period (v.sub.)

In Greek commercial cities fortunes had accumulated during the fifth and fourth centuries and had been invested, mainly in land, mining, slaves and trade (11). But where in Europe the Industrial Revolution had created innumerable new profitable investments for accumulated capital, in Greece such investments as there were grew less profitable, while money from the Greek treasuries and the Persian King found no investments at all and only succeeded in raising prices (12). Trading cities were losing markets for their goods, with harmful consequences to every part of their economy (13). This includes agriculture, too, the basic industry. Indeed, the fact that agriculture was so important a part of the state economy made its plight all the greater when a decline in prosperity set in. Even comparatively early the rapid sale of land in Attica suggests that farmers could not make a living (14). From the middle of the fourth century, local industry had been replacing Greek manufactures, not only in foreign countries both East and West, but in hitherto undeveloped/

undeveloped parts of Greece itself (15). There are usually two solutions for economic crises of this sort; the extension of the foreign market, or intensification of the home market. The former was not only impossible but the market was actually shrinking, and intensification of the home market through inventions and change in technique would have needed the abolition of slavery. A certain amount of specialisation and improvement of technique had taken place (16), but, until the home market itself was extended, that progress was limited. Extension of the home market, however, would have involved increasing the purchasing power of the mass of the population. Since, however, slavery was growing (17), the purchasing power must have been decreasing in proportion to the increase in productive capacity. To have altered this would have involved social changes at a time when everyone, far from sharing with others, was endeavouring to retain what he had (v. sup. ch. iv. n. 61). In fact attempts to narrow the basis of society, rather than to broaden it, had been made before in order to increase the individual's share of privileges. At Argos, for instance, an attempt was made to overthrow the democracy, and when Athens lost her empire the Thirty had attempted to introduce the same sort of programme (18).

The results of the economic decline were a gradual increase in unemployment, and therefore in poverty, and a shortage of food, partly due to the growing trade crisis and partly to the decline of the small farmer (19). Science suffered from the lack of vitality in the economy and from its divorce from practical experimental work (20). From about 400 B.C. a period of "eclecticism and reaction" in philosophy and science set in (21), just when a further advance of economy through industrial development should have taken place, had conditions allowed it. Administration suffered from the decline from active interest in politics of just those sections of the population who might best have aided it (22). From this period dates the popularity of Utopias, some of them influenced by the new life opened up by Alexander in the East, but all of them trying to satisfy the needs of society for civil peace, and of the individual for social security. The orators contrasted the luxury and extravagance of their own days with the simple^{life} of former times. They regretted that free men and women must work because of poverty and some looked to a Golden Age with no civic strife (23). Philosophers blamed money and trade for the evils of society and Plato meditated on an Ideal State which would not result in economic stagnation and social tension. Aristotle, however, under the influence of Macedon, was already looking to the new Hellenistic world. He was more closely related to current problems, and, if he did not solve the difficulties of the small city state, he was not unconnected with the torch of progress as it moved East.

It/

It is generally stated that, as a result of Alexander's conquest of the East, the economic centre of gravity had shifted away from Greece to the East, so that Greek trade and prosperity still further declined. However, it is seldom explained how precisely this came about. The opening up of new lands by Alexander might have been expected to benefit Greek trade which had already begun to decline and, indeed, some such advantage did result for a time. Very soon however, far from benefitting Greek trade, the new lands began to develop as trade rivals and, ultimately, were so victorious that Greek economy was brought almost to a standstill, her standard of living slashed and her social troubles increased until they were all-prevailing. In fact, trade and industry developed in the Hellenistic kingdoms on a scale much larger than that of the Greek city states. In the same way, after the trading revolution of the fifteenth century in Europe the trade of countries in Western Europe was enormously greater than that of the small Italian city states (24); and just as the discoveries, which initiated the revolution in Europe, shifted the economic centre away from the Italian states, so, in the Hellenistic world, the centre had shifted East and the prosperity of the Greek states declined (25).

Practically all the states under Oriental monarchies had retained many feudal characteristics, such as a social hierarchy of peasants, landowner-fighters and an influential class of priests. Even these districts which had enjoyed trade and urban life, good roads and coinage had achieved only a limited social advance and had tended, by this time, to disintegrate towards a semi-feudal decentralisation with control of districts by local barons. Their economy was largely stagnant or disintegrating (26). What Alexander did in the East was to revive trade, agriculture, industry and urban life where they had existed before and, still more important, to open up quite new lands to the influence of these activities (27). Merchants followed the troops and new trade routes were opened up and sea trade developed, new towns established and old ones transformed from oriental markets to cities of the new type, and native communities became civilised colonies and markets for goods. Irrigation and drainage works were begun and great building programmes undertaken (28).

Finally, the large amount of money put into circulation in countries where barter had largely been the rule (29), also helped to revolutionise the economy, for nothing upsets social conditions more rapidly than the influence of metals and the development of trade (30). What this use of metals allied to the increase in commerce and urban life meant was that the number of people earning wages was enormously increased. Many new jobs were available in trade and official positions/

positions under Alexander and his Successors. In addition, therefore, to the demands of Alexander's army and his followers, all these people in new jobs with money to spend demanded a great increase in the supply of goods.

At first it was Greece especially which benefitted from the economic transformation of the East. The declining Greek industries enjoyed a last burst of prosperity when the extensive new markets were created by Alexander. Many of the unemployed were absorbed, partly perhaps by the revival of industry but mainly by the demand for mercenaries and other personnel (31), and so themselves helped to stimulate Greek industry by earning money and therefore increasing the demand for goods, especially if they actually returned to Greece to spend it; and indeed, many mercenaries and other adventurers, traders and various other types who had gone East and made money fairly quickly, did return to Greece bringing money and booty with them (32). Greek cities enjoyed a brief period of prosperity and some parts at least of the population benefitted. New investments were available for capital and the rich became richer. Merchants and bankers, landowners and business men of all kinds were busy supplying the increasing demands of the revived East and grew rapidly prosperous (33). It is significant that the income of 1200 talents a year belonging to Demetrius of Phaleron, (34), although outstandingly high for Greece, does belong to this prosperous period.

However, this prosperous period was probably very brief. Certainly the absorption of some unemployed and the sudden revitalisation - and in some cases expansion - of Greek industries including agriculture, must have directly benefitted those who had suffered from the beginnings of economic decline. The prosperous period, however, was probably too short for the benefits to penetrate to the majority of the population in Greece. In fact, many must have suffered considerably from the violent rise in prices, which resulted from the flood of metals brought from the East into Greece in the form of wages, gifts and rewards.

In addition to the levying of tribute and seizure of booty, Alexander had opened the great treasuries of the East. At Persepolis 120,000 talents of gold and silver were taken from the public revenues alone. In addition, much furniture and other goods were taken and rewards given to soldiers (35). Alexander sold 13,000 talents worth of goods such as carpets and furniture. He gave three talents to the soldiers remaining with him and paid those he discharged. Much more than 13,000 talents worth of goods was given to soldiers (36). At Susa 45,000 talents were taken (37). In all the treasure was said to amount to about 180 to 190 thousand talents (38).

All this does not take into account what Alexander received from the satrapies and from India and much of what he took in goods (39). Tarn (40) calculates the total to be 180,000 talents in coined money and 180,000 in plate and goods. Arguing from the wages of hoplites and from farm rents at Delos, he maintains that the value of money in Greece halved about 300 B.C. If $\frac{2}{3}$ of this total of 360,000 talents is regarded as a reasonable proportion for the money which actually reached Greece (41), then 240,000 talents flooded the Greek market. Cavaignac (42) estimated the total capital in the Aegean for the end of the fifth century B.C. at 100,000 to 200,000 talents, and more than that in the fourth century, since Athens alone had 20,000 talents and the Peloponnese 100,000. If 240,000 talents is taken as the total for the late fourth century, it would tally both with Cavaignac and Tarn and confirm the latter's arguments from a different standpoint.

Since, then, an amount of money and plate roughly equivalent to the total amount already in Greece entered the Greek market, the value of money was practically halved and prices rose until, by about 300 B.C. they were roughly double their previous level (43).

If studied in isolation, the flood of gold and silver from the new world into Europe might suggest a comparison with the influx of metals into Greece. From 1545 to 1560 A.D. the Spanish mines turned out six times more silver than in 1500-1520. By 1600 the output was eight times that of 1520. Prices in 1600 were more than double those of 1500, and by 1700 were more than $3\frac{1}{2}$ times those of 1500. However, this money eventually went into trade and industry, including agriculture, and helped the economy to progress at an enormous rate. It is thus more comparable, although on a much greater scale, to the growth of money in early Greece, when it had the same sort of effect, or to the effect of the Eastern treasure on the Hellenistic kingdoms themselves, where industry and agriculture and commerce did expand. In Greece itself at this period, with its declining prosperity, it again resulted in intensification of the general trend, but in this case the trend was towards economic stagnation, political bankruptcy and social chaos. To regard these periods as close parallels could only be the result of abstracting them from their historical background. For a true interpretation they must be studied in relation to their respective pasts and futures (v. sup. chs. 1 & 11).

However, before long the direction of the flow of money was reversed. Gradually, surplus money began to follow goods from Greece and was invested in land in the East and then in new local industries which were beginning to spring up (44). More emigrants to the East probably took their money with them/

them and settled in the East and shared in its development and prosperity, which was to mean the decline and impoverishment of Greece. The new jobs demanded more local industries and these soon demanded still further division of labour, which produced still more artisans and workshops and so more goods for sale (45). As a result, goods formerly made at home were produced in workshops for sale on the market (46). This and the other changes profoundly affected agriculture in the East as this growth of trade and manufacture always does. While serfdom had been the rule in Asia, the policy carried out by the Seleucides of sale and gift of estates to the cities with the possible freeing of serfs, the settling of immigrants on the land without serfs and the abolition of feudal landowners must have facilitated the development of a free peasantry and mobility of land, which would add to the size of the home market and help to stimulate industry and trade when the first wave of immigrants was over (47). In Egypt only semi-serfdom existed but even this was undermined by the establishment of soldiers on the land and by gifts of estates to officials, many of them without serfs (48). Even in Egypt, where control of trade, industry and agriculture was fantastically strict, some private property and free play of economic forces had to be allowed in order to develop local resources and to encourage improved technical methods (49). The new jobs in industry and trade, in spite of the development of industrial serfdom (50), probably intensified the change in agriculture by attracting people from the country to the towns.

This whole development was bound to react on Greek prosperity. The development of local industries and the change in agriculture not only encouraged local manufactures and agriculture to the exclusion of Greek ones, but their further expansion made it essential that local industry and agriculture should be protected if they were to continue to expand. Far from now absorbing Greek products, Eastern industry and agriculture first produced sufficient for their own needs and then themselves began to produce a surplus for export. From 300 to 250 B.C. the value of money in Greece had been rising again after its catastrophic fall (51). This was the result of the absorption of money by the East in land, industries and other investments. However, after 250 B.C., the value became more stabilised which suggests that the period of absorption in the East was over. That meant that the first rapid expansion was at an end and from then on the Eastern states gradually became more exclusive and protective of their industries to the further disadvantage of Greece.

Under Alexander's Successors the organisation of the economic life of the countries and this policy of protection had been extended still further. Great attention was paid to/
to/

to coinage and something like a monetary unity was established, while the new banks which developed beside the old covered the kind of operations found in fourth century Athens (52), and so excluded Greek banks from much business in the East. (The fact that it was Greeks who operated many of the new businesses in the East is not the point. It is the effect on Greek industries and agriculture in Greece itself which is at issue). New manufactures were created and old ones extended on a considerable scale, while industries were created out of formerly domestic work. In general, policies directed to the further advance of trade both at home and abroad were pursued by these monarchs (53), and the development of a common language in addition to financial unity also played a considerable part in facilitating foreign trade (54).

The expansion of trade and the production by workshops and farms for the market involved, as one would expect, a revolution in agricultural technique and this further intensification made Greek competition even less profitable for the Greeks. In Egypt, for instance, the introduction of vines and extension of olive groves (55) stimulated industry to an enormous degree, but these were industries which were perhaps the two most important in Greece. The policy of introducing new plants and new breeds of cattle and poultry and entirely new animals and, in general, of extending and intensifying agricultural production, made the possibility of imports from Greece even less likely (56).

As we should expect in such a period of economic transformation and expansion, as indeed happened in Greece in the eighth and seventh centuries, there appeared new inventions in all spheres, which still further increased the efficiency of agriculture and manufactures in the Hellenistic states and, therefore, sent Greek ones into still deeper decline from inability to compete (57). Technique also benefitted from the close alliance between science and practical work characteristic of such periods of economic change and advance, which place new problems before both technicians and theorists (58). Indeed most of the theorists were the inventors (59). Eventually, as in early Greece, a florescence of the sciences arose out of this technical and theoretical work. Those subjects especially concerned with expansion both on land and sea, such as astronomy, geography and ethnography, acquired the status of sciences, while, with the foundation of new cities and the rapid growth of old ones, medicine and surgery made great advances (60). All these achievements were placed at the disposal of the Eastern societies, who could afford to make use of them, and so still further outstripped Greek production, which could rarely find capital for new technical methods.

After/

After 250 B.C. the period of rapid expansion came to an end and protection of industry was probably increased. The Hellenistic Kings had provided a form of political organisation within which the new economic methods could develop and in which unity and coherence in economic organisation could be established. In fact, these monarchs were in a very real sense heads of the states and controlled and supervised the financial and business life of the countries, as well as its political and social aspects. To finance the centralised state with its huge expenses in armies, civil servants and courtiers not to mention the public works, heavy taxation and royal monopolies were the rule in the Hellenistic states, but especially in Egypt, where control of trade, manufacture and agriculture was most rigid (61). While taxation would tend to make prices high, Greek production still had no chance of competing unless it was part of the policy of the Hellenistic kings to import any particular product. The control over production was so complete that a tax on imports could be made high enough to prevent competition. Greek oil, for instance, was probably only imported at all into Egypt because it was superior to the Egyptian product, but it had to pay so high a tax that it is doubtful if the industry was very profitable (62).

In Greece, as a result of the absorption of money first perhaps in production in Greece and then on a much larger scale in investments in the East, prices fell steadily from their peak in 300 B.C. to 250 B.C. (63). Exceptions to this drop in prices (64) were monopolies and metals. Monopolies had their prices controlled, while metals were probably in demand for the various requirements of the frequent wars of the period. They were probably needed for other purposes too. Iron for instance, was being used in increasing quantities for agriculture in the East (65), and the expansion of industry must also have demanded an extension of its use as in early Greece. This fall in prices, however, did not bring any advantage to the majority of the Greek population. The influx of metals had been so sudden that the comparatively slow process of balancing prices and wages had been thrown out of gear.

Glötz and Tarn have both commented (66) on the extraordinary phenomenon of wages falling when prices were rising. Actually what seems to have happened was that prices rose extraordinarily quickly. Wages always lag behind prices, and in this case prices were already beginning to fall again before wages changed at all; (with a few exceptions, such as letter-cutting, where wages fell in 302 and again in 300 B.C. (67)). Then, when prices started to fall from 300 to 250 B.C., wages, although they had risen and some had even fallen, began to fall too. Building wages alone/

alone seems to have maintained their original level, probably because of the general demand for building workers in the Hellenistic world (68). At Delos, in 285 B.C., various figures were given for building a wall, among them 18 dr. the orgua (69). Glotz (70) thinks 18 dr. an exception, since it is the same rate as that paid at Eleusis (71), and he maintains there had been a drop before 285 B.C. and a rise only during the following eighty years. It seems more reasonable to suppose that building wages remained steady because the demand was steady. Such a demand would be more characteristic of 285 B.C. as a result of the building programmes in the Hellenistic kingdoms, than of the second century B.C., when the economy of these states was probably declining (v.sub). In 246 B.C. a payment of 13 dr. 2¼ ob. was made for building a wall (72), but this is a single figure. In 208 and 190 B.C., 18 dr. again appears (73). It is obviously unsafe to argue that 18 dr. is an exception, but equally it cannot be maintained from such scanty evidence that this is the average wage. What can reasonably be concluded is that building wages maintained their former level for certain short jobs at a time when other wages were falling.

After 250 B.C. no more money seems to have been absorbed in the Eastern industries and so it became plentiful again, with the result that, in Greece, prices tended to rise and remained stable but high in the first half of the second century B.C. (74). Wheat especially was high. From 190-169 B.C. it was about 10-11 dr. the medimnus, that is about twice the average price in 250 B.C. (75). Oil in 250 B.C. averaged 16 dr. 2½ ob. the metretes (76), and in 246 B.C. 14 dr. 4 ob. (77). For the next fifty years it averaged 15 or 16 dr. (78). In 190-180 B.C. 11, 12 and 13 dr. are quoted (79), in 179 B.C. 17 dr. appears (80), and in 171 B.C. 15 dr. (81). About 169 B.C. 15 dr. is again quoted (82), and later there is a rise to 22 dr., but there was a poor crop (83).

Wine in 296 B.C. was 11 dr. the metretes (84), and in 274 B.C. averaged 10½ dr. (85). In 190 B.C. wine was quoted at 15 dr. (86), at 18 dr. (87), and at 16 dr. (88). Later, there is again a slight fall, and about 180 B.C. 14 dr. is quoted (89), 13 dr. 2 ob. (90) and 12 or 12½ dr. (91).

Pigs rose in price about 25% after 250 B.C. (92). In 246 B.C. they averaged 2½ dr. (93), in 233 they rose to 3 dr. (94), and reached 3½ dr. in 223 (95). In 179 B.C. they were 4½ dr. (96), and this price is either maintained or rises still higher (97).

In general, therefore, the price curve seems to rise after 250, and wine and oil, if they are exceptions (98), probably dropped for special reasons. For instance, now that big estates in Greece were so common vine and olive cultivation may have/

have been extended to new parts, for example, the islands. This might aggravate the tendency to over-production and cause a slump in prices.

Wages after 250 B.C. were comparatively stable. For instance letter cutters in 179 B.C. still earned the same rates as in 250 B.C. (99). Rates of pay for varnishing with pitch, which had dropped steadily from 300-250 B.C. (100), tended to drop slightly after 250 or just to maintain themselves. In 250 the average wage rate, calculated according to the amount of pitch used, was 1 dr 4 ob. (101). In 224 B.C. the average rate on the same calculation was 1 dr. $1\frac{1}{2}$ ob., and in 200 B.C. 1 dr. 4 $\frac{2}{3}$ ob. (102). In 179 B.C. 1 dr. $2\frac{3}{4}$ obols is quoted (103). The general picture, therefore, is one of wages dropping or just maintaining themselves, a rise in the cost of living especially of necessities such as wheat, and a fall in the price for oil and wine, products of the staple industries in Greece (104).

The striking feature about the labour problem, as illustrated by the evidence from Delos, was the tremendous unemployment. As Professor Glotz (105) pointed out, the fact that Leptines and Bacchios accepted a regular wage of 4 ob. a day when the normal rate for their work was 2 dr., indicates the fierce competition for their jobs. In such periods workers demand security above all things (106). At first there had been openings for unemployed as mercenaries and in other professions in the East, but eventually no more could be absorbed (107). This extreme unemployment helps to explain why wages did not follow prices in Hellenistic Greece. In the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. wages had followed the rise in prices (108), but the inscriptions of the Erechtheum and Eleusis show that, when a big building programme was undertaken, labour had to be attracted from other Greek states; so if anything there was a shortage of labour. In the second half of the fourth century, when Greek industry was losing its markets, unemployment had already developed considerably (109). The growth of mercenaries indicates a supply of men with no other profession in view (110) and the fact that piracy had to be stamped out by Alexander, and its enormous growth under the Successors, provide additional evidence of the lack of normal employment.

Agriculture in Hellenistic Greece was characterised by large estates (111). Even in fourth century Athens large estates had become more and more common (112), and, as in Hellenistic times industries for investment were lacking except in the East, money was probably invested in land, especially for the development of olive and vine growing. It must have become even more difficult for the small peasant to compete, since new improved methods were being introduced in the East, and capital sunk in estates in Greece./

Greece. Smallholders must have fallen more and more into debt, and finally had to leave the land and swell the unemployed in the towns (113). The social results as a whole of the economic decline were the impoverishment and gradual disappearance of the middle class in Greece (114), always a sign of economic maladjustment, since it is only under an expanding economy that a regular flow of people from workers to middle class can function. A second result was the impoverishment of the great majority of the population, since further employment in the new lands had ceased, industry at home was decaying, and agriculture, the staple industry, had little room for the small peasant or farm labourer since the large estates probably used slaves (115). Owing to the dislocation of trade and industry, food supplies were not always regular and famines actually occurred (116). Menander's Georgos everywhere gives a picture of the trials of the poor, the struggle for existence in the city being especially bitter (117). With such a background it is not surprising that the revolutionary sentiments inspired by the Spartan tyranny thoroughly alarmed the Greek governments and persuaded them ~~to~~ to act against the tyranny.

The worst features of the decline in Greek economic life and prosperity were intensified by later social conditions in the Hellenistic kingdoms. After the first shock caused by metals ~~by metals~~ flooding the market, Greek farmers, traders and bankers had at first benefitted by the new markets for products and investments. Certainly wages had fallen although prices, in spite of a steady fall, were still much higher than in pre-Alexander days. However, there must have been more jobs in Greece as a result of the brief burst of prosperity and, when that prosperity ended, there were still opportunities for immigrants to the Hellenistic kingdoms. Not only mercenaries were needed but craftsmen and business men, farmers ready to teach improved technique to the native peasants, and officials of all descriptions.

This immigration, however, the provision of new jobs and opportunities for enrichment or, at least, security, depended on the continued expansion and advancement of the economy of the Hellenistic kingdoms. Once the first two stages consisting of imports from Greece and then the development of local industries and agriculture of an improved type for sale had been passed, a new phase was entered upon, a phase first of failure to advance the economy and then the beginning of its decline (118). From about 250 B.C. money became steadily more plentiful, which suggests that the period of ready absorption of money and, therefore, labour in the East was over and that the limit had been reached in expansion of foreign trade, in development of new regions and new industries. Further advance, therefore, depended on the home market. As in the Bronze Age expansion of trade and in that of early Greece, /

Greece, there came a time when still further advance was hindered by social traditions and institutions which hindered free expansion by restrictive customs and laws and by the impossibility of providing a large home market among the peasants without destroying the remains of the feudal conditions, which prevented them from providing sufficient labour to manufacture goods and sufficient purchasing power to buy them. So long as the mass of the population in the Hellenistic kingdoms remained poor and the use of slaves increased, the home market must always have remained small (119). It was for this reason that the most common productive unit remained the small workshop. Large royal factories in Pergamum and Egypt were exceptional and only in military engineering and in building had industry developed on a really large scale (120). Otherwise production was still in the handicraft stage and could not expand without a great increase in the market for its goods.

The first signs of a decline in prosperity appeared all the sooner in the Hellenistic kingdoms because the policies of the Kings had been one of encouragement to the new economy and the new social forces which that economy was bringing into being. As a result of the gradual development of private property in land without serfs (v. sup.), and with the right to leave it to one's sons and to run it as one pleased, but preferably with the new improved methods (121), of the growth of sale and mortgage of estates and of the increase in small farmers working for their own profits (122), the form of rigid, class structure of the Hellenistic states began to be transformed. In industry, too, private workshops and private banks dealing among other things with licences and mortgages between private persons, developed. Even in Egypt private enterprises in trade and industry and private ownership of ships and draft animals grew steadily; and even where control and restriction was still severe loopholes could usually be found (123). As a result, there developed a new middle class of officials, merchants, new farmers and owners of workshops (124). This consisted largely of foreigners but was also recruited from a petit bourgeois class of natives who filled the smaller jobs (125). As a result a fusion of cultures had begun and the line of potential antagonism in the states gradually shifted until it was between well-to-do natives and foreigners on the one hand, and the majority of the natives with the probable addition of some foreign workers on the other (126).

However, these people, and the free trade, agriculture and industry on which their prosperity depended, were prevented from advancing further by the restrictions of the autocratic Hellenistic states. The strong centralised state form had been of advantage in creating the conditions necessary/

necessary for the free economy to develop at all, but now this and the strong class of priests proved restrictive (127). The priests, the out of date laws (128), the monopolies and controls and the heavy taxation, all of which had been tolerable and some even necessary when the economy was expanding, would be deeply resented when further advance was denied it. In many respects the restrictions had been strengthened by the imposition of a new aristocracy on the native population (129), while the decline in prosperity was paralleled by an increase in dishonesty and oppression of the Greek bureaucracy (130).

While the slowing down of the economy reacted on Greek social life, naturally, it had its effect, too, on social conditions in the Hellenistic kingdoms themselves and these still further affected conditions in Greece. Although a few people in the kingdoms had become enriched and a middle class created, after a certain point of development the rich merely became richer and such possibilities for the poor to better their lot as had existed practically ceased (131). Parallel to the economic decline was the cessation of creative work, of experiments and construction (132), in strong contrast to the early spirit of "buoyant optimism", which had been the reflection of the opportunities and the quickening speed of life and which had been expressed in great engineering works, architecture, painting, sculpture, town planning, literature and music (133). The social effects were felt soonest in Egypt, where the conditions of the peasants, far from being static, steadily deteriorated (134). The prosperity of agriculture declined catastrophically (135), the countryside was full of robbers and the prisons full of debtors (136), so that in spite of concessions to the natives (137), revolts broke out. War with Syria, which had produced an increase in taxation, gave rise to a widespread revolt not purely national in character but against both native and foreign oppressors (138). This was supported by large scale secessions from the land by the peasants, while "strikes" of this character were used by guards, quarry workers, retail dealers and even officials in the third century B.C. (139).

All these upheavals were still disorganised and badly led, but this general trend of growing challenge to the existing type of social privilege and state structure indicates that one day, probably centuries later, some such revolt might have developed into the final overthrow of the existing ruling class. However, the influence and power of Rome had become important enough before that to prevent any such development (140). The revolts in Alexandria had brought the urban workers into the struggle but the result was merely to exchange one bad leader for another (141). There is no evidence to suggest that the revolt had reached the point of mobilising the majority of the population against the regime or that it had reached such political maturity that it could/

could actually challenge the aristocracy's power; and after that the new markets opened in the West as a result of Roman influence gave a new lease of life to the economy (142). In Asia, where the loss involved in bad harvests was shared between peasants and King and where prosperity did not decline so soon, there seems to have been no active discontent until after Roman influence was established (143).

In Greece the beginnings of decline in prosperity of the Hellenistic states removed such opportunities as there had been for Greek immigrants. Greeks were therefore thrown still more on the resources of their own country at a time when these resources were steadily dwindling. Then, as a result of the economic decline in these kingdoms, the policy of protection of their interests was probably intensified and so hurt what little was left of Greek industry. Later, when this decline in the East resulted in social discontent there, the social unrest and discontent, which had already appeared in Greece following on the social conditions created by Alexander's conquests, became even more acute, and were no doubt stimulated by the spread of social unrest throughout the Eastern world.

However, wealth was still to be found in Greece. Those who had obtained some position in the Hellenistic kingdoms comparatively early no doubt made a fortune which descendants may have increased or, after returning to Greece, invested in land. There were probably many who had returned from the East with fortunes and who lived on them or on income from various financial operations in which they were involved. It was they, probably, who owned large estates in Greece and houses with fine furniture and ornaments and, as a result, threw into even more contrasting relief the majority of the population who were poverty stricken. As a result, therefore, wealthy people were to be found in the Greek cities of this period, living on investments in land and industry abroad and, in many cases, with large estates at home. Athens, for instance, always retained a number of wealthy residents and in Thebes and Corinth, too, there were some rich citizens (144). In the districts of Greece which had remained semi-feudal, agricultural states at a time when many Greek cities were developing trade, wealth and large estates began to be common. Probably the economic upheaval following on Alexander's conquests had accelerated a process which had been underway for some time and which culminated in the concentration of riches and land in the hands of a few. In Boeotia and Elis, for instance, large landowners were prosperous and wealthy and Aetolia, Achaea and Euboea had wealthy citizens (145).

However, this wealth tended to become the property of a smaller and smaller group (146), at a time when the poor were becoming poorer and their ranks larger. The gulf/

gulf between rich and poor, therefore, was greater than at any previous period in Greek history. Some idea of this gulf between rich and poor in Hellenistic Greece may be obtained from a study of incomes and wages for fifth, fourth and later centuries. In the fifth century, about 410 B.C., Diodotus left 80,000 dr., 48,000 of them invested (147). Forty-eight thousand dr. at 12%, the usual rate of interest, and the rest probably at 8%, would bring in a revenue of 8,320 dr. a year, that is about 23 dr. a day. Workers wages for the period were 1 dr. a day, (v.sup., n.109), so the relation of income of well-to-do to that of workers was 23:1. It is impossible to tell if 80,000 dr. was a typical fortune. There was less tendency to invest in the fifth century and there was little division of labour and wages as yet, and so it is possible that Diodotus was a progressive, and therefore more than usually prosperous, citizen.

By the fourth century B.C. great progress had been made. Athens was less dependent on tribute from the allies, and more on industry and trade, which had probably quickly recovered from the Peloponnesian War as a result of the drop in prices due to the loss of tribute (148). Mines produced enormous profits. Kallias, for example, made a fortune of 200 talents, Nicias 100 talents, and Diphilos 160 talents. Epicrates and Co. made 100 talents a year, but they had many shareholders. However, those with money invested in several enterprises, were as prosperous as those in mining (149). Pasion's fortune of 60 talents, 20 talents invested at 8% and the rest at 12% (150) would produce an income of 40,000 dr. The income from a fortune of 200 talents at 12% (151) would be four hundred dr. a day. 100 talents must have produced 200 dr. a day, and 160 talents 310 dr. a day. Pasion's fortune would yield 111 dr. a day, and his own private fortune (152) 78 dr. a day. The ratio of these incomes to the wage of very skilled workers at $2\frac{1}{2}$ dr. a day (v.sup., n.108) is 160:1, 80:1, 124:1, 45:1, 31:1. To skilled workers at 2 dr. a day the ratios would be 200:1, 100:1, 155:1, 60:1, 39:1. The ratio to the labourer's wage of $1\frac{1}{2}$ dr. is 267:1, 133:1, 207:1, 80:1, 52:1.

At the end of the fourth century Demetrius of Phaleron was said to have had an income of 1200 talents a year at a time when wages were beginning to fall. Certainly this was a period of great prosperity for some sections of the Athenian population, but this period was short-lived and this fortune must have been exceptional. No comparison therefore has been made of this income and current wages. Agis of Sparta had six hundred talents in money in addition to his estate (153). Spartan kings were probably exceptionally wealthy however. Nabis' house and goods when sold yielded 120 talents (154). In the second century, Alexander of Isius had a fortune of
over/

over 200 talents and was said to be the richest man in Greece (155). Two hundred talents is only equivalent to the highest fortunes known in the fourth century, when prices were lower. However the rich in Greece had little to invest in by the second century B.C., and so fortunes were not likely to grow. Skilled workers on the other hand were earning much less, and the ratio of these fortunes to a skilled artisan's wage at 4 ob., (156) is 1800:1 for Agis, 360:1 for Nabis, and 600:1 for Alexander.

The gulf therefore between rich and poor had grown enormously. It is true that this gulf was probably even greater in the new lands in the East where there were fortunes of 2,000 talents (157), but not only had Greeks been used to better conditions, but, in the East, prosperity was growing, and, with it, the opportunity for workers to obtain a few crumbs from the general prosperity, and perhaps to make a small fortune and set up in business for themselves. Only when the economy became stagnant and this progress was no longer possible, did unrest and revolts occur. So in Greece it was only when there was no longer any prospect of improvement, but, instead, a deterioration of conditions took place, that revolts occurred and the cry went up for a redivision of the land and the cancelling of debts (158). Moreover, after 250 B.C. although wages on the whole remained steady, the cost of living tended to rise and grain especially reached fantastic heights, at a time when the price of oil and wine, products of the staple industries, continued to fall (v.sup.). In addition, this was the period when absorption of unemployed in the East was at an end^{and}, therefore, unemployment in Greece must have been mounting, while the failure of the small peasant in Greece would only aggravate this process.

Childe (159) has illustrated how every economic revolution has meant an increase in population, probably because it involved a growing prosperity to the community. It is not surprising, therefore, in a period when the economic tendency was in the opposite direction, to learn that the population was decreasing (160). The poor had no means with which to bring up children and so exposed them. The prosperous sections of the community, too, were less wealthy than formerly. Rostovtzeff (161) maintains that the cause of depopulation in the case of the rich was partly psychological. This may be so, but where so many of the well-to-do were rentiers on fixed incomes, in a period of rising prices their real incomes must have been decreasing. Even if their real incomes were fixed, to have children would involve sacrifice. Only when prosperity and incomes are growing, do large families become popular.

The effect of the social conditions on the outlook of all sections of the population must have been disastrous. Arrogance, dishonesty and corruption flourished (162). True philosophy and science were dead in Greece and astrology and superstition flourished in an atmosphere of social misery (163). On the other hand, the new philosophies, which were acquiring such popularity in the new kingdoms, helped to mobilise men's opinions under the new conditions. Especially did they try to compensate for sudden loss of fortune, always a common occurrence in restless times. The Cynics even went so far as to laud poverty (164), although they did not advise renunciation of wealth when one had it. The Stoics, although they encouraged men to make as large fortunes as possible, and so gave their sanction to the growing middle class in the new kingdoms which did benefit by the social changes, also recommended resignation if this fortune were immediately lost again (165). These philosophies played an important part in influencing the work of moralists and satirists. Some of the latter were actual preachers, for instance, Crates of Thebes (166). Not only did they take no part in the court life of the Hellenistic world, but they were probably actually hostile to it (167). They expressed in verse much of the teaching of the philosophies and criticised details of current society. However, when social struggle seemed imminent, some of them called, not for action but for tolerance and moderation from both sides (168).

As a result first of the dislocation of society by Alexander, and then of the social unrest which developed later, Utopias were again popular (v.sup.ch.iv), and Zeno and Hecataeus expressed men's longing for settled communities of an ideal kind. Euhemus clothed his ideal state in the garb of his background by giving the control of the state to a priestly aristocracy. Later, however, when the decline of prosperity began to produce restlessness among the peasants and artisans, a more extreme form of Utopia was suggested by Iambulus in his Sunstate. Here everyone was treated as absolutely equal and the economic impossibility of this under current conditions was overcome by reducing the state to a food-gathering instead of a food-producing economy (v.sup. ch.i).

Greece could no more be unaffected by the ideas and philosophies of the East than she was by the economic and social changes. If Alexander had imposed garrisons on all Greek cities, Greece would have been no more dependent on and affected by the East than she was by Alexander's conquests there and the results on Greek economy, society and thought. Accordingly, the new philosophies were used in Greek social struggles. Cercidas (v.sup.^{n.295}) warned the rich of the danger of revolt if they did not provide some relief for the extreme misery of the poor. When action was attempted, the teaching of/

of Stoicism was used to mobilise men for it. It was a Stoic, Chryssippus of Soli, who brought into prominence the political role of men (169). The Stoics, too, reacted to the breakdown of social barriers in the East by advocating equality of slaves and freemen, although when the growth of slavery in the East made practical reforms impossible, the Middle Stoa adopted a more reactionary view of slavery (170).

Finally, it was a Stoic, Sphaerus, who was adviser to Cleomenes and the first Spartan tyranny. This gave an intellectual and spiritual garb to the social and political struggle and helped to mobilise citizens as well as the disfranchised against the existing social and political settlement. This was not without its effect on future outbreaks. The Greek, Roman and Hellenistic worlds were drawing more closely together and sympathetic revolts were paralleled by the spread of sympathetic ideas. So Aristonicus of Pergamum, in addition to using Iambulus' Sunstate as the basis for his plans for social reform, was advised by Blossius the Stoic; and Blossius was the tutor of the Gracchi (171). This process reached its logical development when in the first century A.D. under the Roman Empire, both the Stoics and Cynics were accused of subversive activities; the former in order to restore some form of republic, the latter apparently to abolish all government in a completely anarchistic fashion (172). Meanwhile, it was the Spartan tyranny which, by its late development, played an important part in combining Greek social unrest and the Hellenistic ideas and philosophies, in accelerating Roman interest in Greece, and so in influencing the process of Roman domination and revolts against it, all of which was not without its effect in spreading the influence of Greek culture and ideas even as far as the modern world.

1. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic Hist.*, pp.94-125.
2. Mr. Gomme, *Essays, etc.*, pp.205ff., has rightly pointed this out.
3. Rostovtzeff, *op.cit.*, pp.104-124.
4. cf. Gomme, *op.cit.*, p.246, where he admits that there was a pro-Philip section at Athens, and so a lack of any positive policy.
5. Hdt. vi. 107-124. The fact they had to go outside Athens to gain any real support is evidence for this.
6. *Trade and politics in Ancient Greece*, pp.88, 96, 152.
7. cf. The Mercantilists' theory of gold. Gold for them was equivalent to wealth, and so every country tried to attract it and keep it in the community. Acts against the export of gold and silver became common; cf. *Tudor Economic Documents*, ii, pp.177, 177-8, for such an act in England. Even as late as 1757 Joseph Harriss wrote of the convenience of gold and silver for hoarding; cf. *An Essay upon Money and Coins*, quoted by J.Viner, *English theories of foreign trade before Adam Smith*, *Journal of Pol. Economy*, xxxviii, June 1930, p.277. All hoards provide the source for that expansion and contraction of the mass of money which is essential to trade; cf. Sir D. North, *Discourses Upon Trade*, Ldn. 1691, postscript, p.3. Cf. J.M. Keynes, *A Tract on Monetary Reform*, p.7. for a slightly later period; "To save and to invest became at once the duty and the delight of a large class The morals, the politics, the literature and the religion of the Age joined in a grand conspiracy for the promotion of saving".
8. cf. *Soph., Ant.* 295ff. for a denunciation of money as subversive of the economic and moral order of things. Cf. *Plato, Rep.* viii. 555; *Aris. Pol.* I. 8. 1256A-1257B.
9. cf. Morton, *op.cit.*, p.319, where he describes England as still predominantly agricultural, and yet characterises the whole period from 1688 to the middle of the eighteenth century as one of accumulation of capital from trade and plunder. Cf. p.310.
10. In England, too, this was the case; cf. *Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice*, Ldn. 1931 (Peter Davis, Ltd.) pp.31-2. With an uncle in business there was little chance for his relatives to marry "men of any consideration in the world". Cf. p.228, Elizabeth's uncle was "surprisingly cultured" although he was in trade. Cf. p.12. The fortune of the Bingleys had been made in trade, and Bingley/

Bingley was going to use it to buy an estate. When this was written the Industrial Revolution was already under way. Hugh Walpole interprets the period in a similar way; cf. Judith Paris, p.298 "Scorning him for a city merchant who was pushing into society" (date 1796); cf. p.605, "the time was coming when a city man granted that he had retired would be admitted into good company, but that time was not quite yet", (date 1820). Morton, op.cit., p.313, maintains that in every generation scores of city magnates acquired titles and bought estates at this period. Land was profitable, but it also gave a social status which could be obtained in no other way. At the same time landowners began to invest in industry and commerce. The descendants of these people became indistinguishable from older families.

Cf. Gogol, *Dead Souls*, Everyman ed., p.13, for the type of man who retires from business and becomes a landowner.

11. cf. Glotz, *Le Travail dans la Grèce Ancienne*, pp.287ff. 365-6; Hasebroek, op.cit., pp.89, 153.
12. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., p.99, For the money taken from the Greek treasuries, cf. Diod. Sic. xvi. 56. 6; Athen. vi. 231D.
13. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., p.104; cf. Xenophon. Rev. iv. 6. on the evils of over-production.
14. Xen. Oecon.xx. 22-26.
15. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.104, 108, 109, 111, 120, 124.
16. *ibid.* 100-1.
17. cf. A.W. Gomme, *The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries*, pp.22, 26, 40, etc.
18. Diod. Sic., xv. 57-8; cf. C.A.H. v. chs. xi-xii, for the various attempts at Athens.
19. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., p.94.
20. cf. Rose, op.cit., p.373; *Legacy of Greece*, pp.143, 175.
21. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, pp.350-1.
22. cf. Athen, xiii. 604D; Sophocles was not able or energetic in politics, but behaved as any other virtuous Athenian. This was a falling away from the days^{when} even philosopher-scientists were interested in politics, /

politics, and may have been the product of the prosperity and settled conditions after the Persian War.

23. cf. Demosth. lvii. 35 and 45; Isaeus, v. 39, on citizens having to work because of poverty.
24. Consider the differences in fortunes of banking families. The Peruzzi in about 1300 A.D. had £160,000, the Medici about 1440 had about £1,500,000, and the Fuggers of the sixteenth century about £8,000,000; cf. C.J. Hayes, A Political and Social History of Modern Europe, New York, 1931, p.66, n.1.
25. Rostovtzeff, "Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World", p.127, argues that the discovery of America was not comparable to Alexander's conquest of the East because in the latter case the East was already civilised. Europe, too, however, had already progressed considerably. Since about the tenth century artisans and small traders had slowly increased in numbers. The crusades, especially the fourth one, had stimulated the demand for luxury goods which had been met by the development of trade, although as yet, on a small scale. Flemish craftsmen settled in East Anglia where they taught the natives their superior methods of weaving, which became England's most important manufacture. This process culminated in one of these peaks or crests of that wave motion of human progress, a peak which took the form of peasant revolts which finally destroyed serfdom. From then on trade and industry increased and the discovery of America and the route to India as well as other discoveries opened up new lands to trade, flooded the European market with gold and silver and produced a revolution in trade and industry. The similarity with Alexander's conquest lies in the fact that Western Europe, where some trade and manufacture existed, then experienced an economic and social revolution owing to the reaction of the discoveries on their economy, not America's; just as economic and social conditions in Asia Minor, Egypt and Syria were gradually transformed as a result of the opening of new trade routes and new markets and the increased circulation of metals. This approach to the subject from the transformation of the Eastern states themselves and the subsequent effect of this on Greek society and so on the reactions of Greece to the Spartan tyranny, has not been emphasised before.
26. cf. Diod. Sic. i. 70-74; Hdt. ii. 164ff.; Strabo, xvi. 1. 10-11; xvii. 1.3; For details cf. Rostovtzeff, op.cit. pp.77, 272, 507; A Large Estate in Egypt, pp.3-4.

27. J.Kaerst, "Gesch. d. Hel. Zeitalt", i. pp.405-6; J.G. Droysen, "Hist. de Hel." i. pp.689-90.
28. cf. Rostovtzeff, "A Large Estate, etc.", pp.3-4; "Journ. Eg. Arch", vi.(1920), p.164, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World", pp.130-135; Droysen, op.cit. i. pp.689-92; Kaerst, op.cit. i. pp.405-6; Cavaignac, "Hist. de L'ant." iii, pp.12-13, 137, 193. cf. Plut., de fort. Alex., i. 8, on the economic importance of Alexander.
29. cf. Diod. Sic. xvii. 66. 1-2; xvii. 71. 1; Strabo, xv. 3.9; Justin, xii. 1; Rostovtzeff, "Social and Economic etc." p.263. In Egypt too, money which had been lying in temples and private treasuries, was put into circulation; Rostovtzeff, op.cit. p.446.
30. cf. C.E.H. i. p.503.
31. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.127-132.
32. Theoph. Char.vi.(23), Boastfulness; he boasts that he has brought home jewelled cups from the East. This is obviously a commonplace.
33. Theoph. Char. iv. 15; v.7; xxxiii. 2; Menander, Georg. (cf.on these Knapp, Cl. Phil. 1907, pp.1ff., 281ff.); Diod. Sic. xix. 103. 4. On Greek prosperity at this time, Diod. Sic. xviii. 18; Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.159-68; Ferguson, "Hellenistic Athens" p.24.
34. Athen. xii. 542C.
35. Diod. Sic. xvii. 71. 1; 74. 4.
36. Diod. Sic. xvii. 66. 1-2.
37. cf. Strabo, xv. 3. 9, where it is said the treasure at Susa and Persis alone was 40 to 50 thousand talents.
38. Strabo, ibid.; Justin, xii. 1. 190,000 talents were taken by Alexander to Ecbatana.
39. cf. Droysen, op.cit., p.688, on the treasure.
40. "The Hellenistic Age", pp.115-17.
41. 2/3 is probably too high but 360,000 talents is almost certainly too low a total.
42. "Population et Capital dans le monde méditerranéen antique", ch.9, p.86.
- 43./

43. Glotz, Jour. des Sav., 1913, pp.16-39; Tarn. op.cit.p.117.
44. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.207, 538, 1271.
45. *ibid.*, 1228; Toutain, "Economic History of the Ancient World", pp.33-5.
46. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., p.1271.
47. *ibid.*, pp.144, 465, 1195; Tarn, "Hellenistic Civilisation", p.123.
48. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., 286-7, 1199.
49. *ibid.*, p.273.
50. *ibid.*, p.564.
51. Glotz, l.c. Prices at Delos are taken to apply to the rest of Greece; cf. Heichelheim "Wirtsch"Schw., etc".p.97.
52. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.425, 446.
53. For instance, the Ptolemies practically introduced the woollen industry to Egypt, extended the oil and textile industries and even organised the catching of fish; cf. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.305, 367, 1180. The Seleucids encouraged foreign trade and new and more efficient methods in agriculture, industry and commerce, *ibid.*, pp.456, 464, 541. The Pergamene rulers were also responsible for organising industry and agriculture and so stimulating trade, *ibid.*, p.564. Roads were built by Seleucids and Ptolemies and the Seleucids founded cities. Many harbours were built or remodelled, cf. Strabo, xiv. l. 24; Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.476, 517, 1038, 1228, 1240.
54. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., p.1240.
55. *ibid.*, pp.353-5.
56. *ibid.*, pp.1164-5. Improved methods of irrigation and drainage greatly extended the area under cultivation, while the enforcement of the two crop a year system, experiments in types of grain and the use of iron in considerable quantities for agricultural implements greatly intensified cultivation, cf. Strabo, xvii. l.52; Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.355-67. All the Hellenistic monarchs were interested in new methods and in scientific treatises on agriculture, cattle breeding, etc. *ibid.* pp. 562-3, 1165.

57. The screw for pumping mines and for irrigation, the water mill and improved type of water clock, the hedometer, an improved plough, the sextant, improved rudders and anchors, all appeared at this period; cf. Diod. Sic. v. 2; Strabo, xii. 3. 30. Rostovtzeff, op.cit. pp.1041, 1234; Hogben, "Science for the Citizen", p.229. Many mechanical toys were invented and steam experimented with; cf. Rose, op.cit., p.381; T.L. Heath, "Legacy of Greece", pp.122, 135.
58. This was characteristic of building and military engineering in the Hellenistic world, the two sciences for which, owing to the building and military policy of the kings, there was a steady demand; Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.1083, 1233-7.
59. For instance, Ctesibius of Alexandria invented the hydraulic organ, Archimedes of Syracuse invented many military and siege engines, in addition to a screw for pumping water, and Philon of Byzantium was also an inventor. Heron of Alexandria was also interested in practical inventions such as mechanical and steam toys. It is interesting that the earliest work of Archimedes were on applied mathematics; for example, his "Mechanical Theorems". His theoretical work came later and was based on the practical; cf. Athen. iv. 174B; Polyb. viii. 3; cf. Rose, op.cit., pp.377, 381; Heath, op.cit. pp.122, 135. Heron's date may be as late as 200 A.D.
60. v. sup., ch.v. n.167, on medicine. Even the golden age of astronomy belonged to Hellenistic times, not earlier. It was closely allied to practical work and showed great accuracy of observation, cf. Rose, op.cit. pp.377-8; Burnet, "Early Greek Philosophy", p.22. This alliance between practical and theoretical work is illustrated by the work of Eudoxus, Euclid, Aristarchus, the father of Archimedes, Hipparchus of Nicaea, etc. A great advance in mathematics and knowledge of climate made geography a science. Eratosthenes, for instance, actually invented a mathematical instrument, the mesolabos, for finding the two mean proportions necessary for the duplicate of a cube; Rose, op.cit. p.382; Heath, op.cit. p.127; for Eratosthenes' own epigram on it, cf. Powell and Barber, "New Chapters in the History of Greek Literature", p.66.
61. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.309, 316, 470, 517; Toutain, op.cit. pp.137, 161; P. Roussel, "La Grèce et l'Orient" etc. p.484.
62. Certainly when prices of other goods in Greece were tending to rise after 250 B.C., oil and wine were the main/

main exceptions, probably because there were insufficient markets to absorb them. cf. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., p.305, on the high import tax; cf. Heichelheim., op.cit. pp.451ff., on the lowness of the prices of oil and wine, the local products of Greece, which suggests a decrease in exports, v.sub.

63. Glotz, l.c.; v. sup. n.51.
64. These exceptions have been pointed out by Glotz, cf.l.c.p.26.
65. cf. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.1083, 1233, for a steady demand for military engineering as a result of the policies of the Kings, and p.362, for the use of iron on a revolutionary scale in Egypt. Arms factories were probably always larger than the normal workshops; cf. Lys. xii. 8, 19, for an arms factory in fourth century Athens with 120 slaves; cf. Demosth. xxvii. 9, for one with 32 or 33. Armour making was probably the only regular craft in "feudal" times, and one of the staple industries when trade developed. This connection with the steady price for metals in the Hellenistic world has not, I think, been suggested before.
66. l.c.pp.255ff.; op.cit., p.120. The reason suggested above, of the time lag before wages follow prices, seems more reasonable than those usually put forward. Lack of work also helped to keep wages low. v.sub.n.106.
67. F.Durrbach, Comptes des Hieropes, 145, LL, 27, 43; 147A, LL. 18-19.
68. Rostvotzeff, op.cit., p.1237. This would make such workers scarcer in Greece, and so in a position to demand higher wages.
69. 156A, L.66. cf. LL. 23, 27, 25, 68, 69.
70. l.c.p.255.
71. I.G. ii. 834B. LL.54-5. cf. Glotz, l.c.p.255.
72. I.G. xi. F.3. No.290, L.16.
73. B.C.H. xxxii. p.82, LL.5-6; xxxiv. pp.123ff., No.26A, L.55.
74. Heichelnheim, op.cit., pp.55-6.
75. 287A, LL.45ff.; J.Larsen, "Roman Greece, Economic Survey of Rome", pp.380-6.
76. 287A, LL. 43-82; cf. LL.131-2.
- 77./

77. Heichelheim, op.cit., pp.131-2; Larsen, op.cit.p.381.
78. Glotz, Rev. de Études grecques, xxix, p.287.
79. Heichelheim, op.cit., 132-5; Larsen, l.c. p.381.
80. B.C.H. vi. pp.66f., A.L. 183.
81. B.C.H. xxxv. pp.280ff., No.65, L.55.
82. B.C.H. xxviii. p.159; cf. No.55, L.8.
83. Heichelheim, op.cit., p.135. In general oil, a basic industry in Greece, seems to have fallen in price. cf. Larsen, op.cit., pp.388-90; *Class.Phil.*, xxxvi. pp. 164-5.
84. 154A, L. 15.
85. 199A, L.22; cf. Glotz, *Jour. des Sav.*, p.20.
86. I.G. xi, F. 3. No.401, L. 18; cf. Glotz, *Rev.des ét. gr.*, l.c., p.287.
87. I.G., xi. F. 3. No.401, L. 20. the price was probably high because of the small quantity.
88. B.C.H. xxxiv. p.122, No.26B., L.71.
89. 440A., L.62; cf. Glotz, *Rev. des Ét. gr.*, l.c.p.287.
90. 445, LL. 3-4.
91. 468, LL.3-4. cf. Glotz, *ibid*, p.287. But cf. Larsen, op.cit., pp.391-4, where calculations are made in *Keramia*. Prices are given from 4 dr. 2 ob. to 6 dr. a *keramion* of Cnidian wine, and from 3 dr. 1.6/7 ob. to 2 dr. 5½ ob. a *keramion* of Coan wine. Heichelheim, op.cit., p.111, n.2, argues that 1 ker. of wine is equivalent to 6 choes, and to 36 *kotylai*. Glotz seems to have adopted a different standard. Larsen, p.394, seems to favour a *keramion* of 8 choes. The price of Cnidian wine was perhaps rising because the wine was beginning to establish a reputation.
92. Heichelheim, op.cit., pp.130-2; Larsen, *Ec. Sur.*, p.381.
93. 290, LL. 47ff. Cf. Glotz, *Rev. des Ét. gr.l.c.*, p.287.
94. 314A, L. 81.
95. 354, LL. 57 ff. Cf. Glotz, *ibid*.
- 96./

96. B.C.H. vi. pp.1 ff.
97. Heichelheim, op.cit., p.134.
98. Larsen, op.cit., p.380; Class. Phil. l.c. pp.164-5, maintains that they were exceptions. However, Heichelheim's tables, op.cit., pp.130-5, shows that oil remained about the same from 250 to 200 B.C. There was a slight drop about 190-180. B.C., and then a rise to 169 B.C., beyond the 250 B.C. level.v.sup.n.62.
99. B.C.H. vi. pp.1.ff., A.L. 203, For the argument cf.pp.82-3.
100. Glotz, Jour. des Sav. l.c. p.257.
101. ibid.
102. 338A. LL. 39-40; 372A. LL. 84-5.
103. B.C.H. vi. pp.1, ff., L.188. Cf. however Larsen, op.cit. p.412, where 15 dr. is quoted, making a rate of one dr. 2.2/11 ob.
104. cf. Larsen, op.cit., pp.408-12; 383-95; Class.Phil.l.c. pp.163-5.
105. Glotz, Jour. des Sav., l.c. pp.211 ff.
106. In early Greece and in Europe in the Middle Ages, at times when labour was plentiful, free workers^{would} offer themselves as some sort of temporary serfs. cf. Homer II.xxi, 444; Hes. op. 405; cf. 603-8; Apollodorus, III. 4.2. In the Middle Ages a freeman without work or home would "offer himself (to a lord, as serf) a rope round his neck and a penny on his head". cf. P. Boissonade, "Life and Work in Mediaeval Europe", p.137. In 1940 the Glasgow Dockers turned down by an overwhelming majority the offer of a fixed wage. This at first caused some surprise, as dockers had been demanding a fixed wage in peace time. The reason was simply that in war time jobs were plentiful and earnings high. To accept a fixed wage would therefore have meant a cut in earnings. In peace time, when unemployment had been common among dockers, a guaranteed wage was their main aim. A recent survey of interests of workers (in peace time) showed that security topped the list; cf. "Britain" by Mass Observation, Pelican ed. In Hellenistic Greece workers not only accepted lower rates of pay; they preferred sometimes the security of slavery to the uncertainties of freedom. cf. Menander, ap. Stob. Flor.LXII. 7; Eubulus ap. Stob. Flor. LXII. 32.
107. Rostvtzeff, op.cit. p.1127.
- 108./

108. The price of wheat in Solon's time was one dr. Plut. Sol. 23. During the Peloponnesian War it was 4 dr., Plut. de. Tranq. An. 10; Stob. Florileg. xcvi. 28; In the fourth century it was usually 3-5 dr., Ar. Eccl. 547-8; C.I.A. ii. 631, LL. 2, 17; Demosth. xxxiv. 39; Diog. Laert. vi. 2. 35; C.I.A. iv. 2. 179b. Oil in Solon's time cost 1 dr., Plut. Sol. 23. In the fourth century it was 11 dr. and more, C.I.A. ii. 631.

Wages were 1 dr. a day for all types of work in the fifth century, cf. C.I.A. I. 324. A. Col. i. In the fourth century very skilled artisans earned $2\frac{1}{2}$ dr. a day, C.I.A. ii. 834b, col. i. LL. 26-8. Other skilled workers earned 2 dr. a day, C.I.A. ii. 834b, col. i. LL. 41-42. Labourers earned $1\frac{1}{2}$ dr. a day. C.I.A. ii. 834b. col. 1. LL. 28, 32, 45, 60.

109. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.94, 97, 101, etc.
110. Isocr. viii. 48; vii. 9. and 54; Demosth. 1. Phil. 20. Isocr. viii. 21. mentions that Athens was deserted by merchants and metics during the social war. In viii. 24. he refers to refugees roaming the country. The former would tend to increase unemployment, the latter confirms its existence.
111. Glotz, Le Travail, etc. p.413; Guiraud, La propriété foncière, pp.401 ff; Toutain, op.cit., p.116. Heitland, Agricola, pp.108-9; Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.210-11, 243, 618.
112. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., p.18; cf. Heitland, op.cit., 106-7, for the evidence.
113. cf. Tarn, "The Hellenistic Age", pp.118-9, on the fall in farm rents at Delos from 300-179 B.C.; cf. Larsen, op.cit., p.403; cf. Homolle, B.C.H. vi. pp.65-6, where a detailed picture is given of the rise in house rents and a fall in farm rents at Delos from 297-180 B.C. Homolle thinks this is due to the increase in urban life, with the result that agriculture became less remunerative.
114. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., p.207.
115. See Menander, 642; (Kock). Menandrea, pp.15, 25, 155; Theoph. Char. xiv. (Jebb) The Rustic Boor; see Polyb, iv. 73 and 75 for slaves in Elis. Some of these were probably household slaves, but most of them must have been agricultural.
116. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.168, 618.
117. cf. Menander 14. (Kock). Death is better than the painful struggle for life. Cf. Menandrea, pp.159-161, ed. Koerte. A poor man has no chance in the town where he is despised and wronged. In the country there is no witness to his distress.

118. Rostovtzeff, *op.cit.*, p.1204.
119. *ibid.*, p.1083.
120. *ibid.*, pp.1083, 1233-7. On the royal factories cf. *ibid.*, p. 564; Rostovtzeff, *C.A.H.* viii. p.611. This is typical of this stage of industrial development; cf. A.S. Cunningham, "Rambles in the Parishes of Scoonie and Wemyss", Leven, 1905, pp.141ff. The Earl of Wemyss, when mining was only just developing, organised coal and salt mining based on serf labour under his personal supervision. A freer type of industry and labour only developed later.
121. Rostovtzeff, *op.cit.*, pp.286-7.
122. *ibid.*, p.289, "A Large Estate, etc". p.87.
123. *ibid.* pp.133, 142; "Social and Economic, etc.", pp.314, 406, 1280. Even in the textile industry, which was a monopoly in Egypt, private weavers probably had licences to manufacture for the general market, *ibid.* p.307. The wool trade was much freer and workshops appeared on private estates, *ibid.*, p.308. Artisans as a whole frequently worked independently, *ibid.* p.298. In non-monopolised goods state control did not exist in wholesale, and even retail trade was allowed a fair and not completely limited profit, *ibid.*, p.1275. Alexandrian and foreign trade was open to merchants and many foreign merchants traded not only in Alexandria but probably up-country too, *ibid.*, 331, 397. The beginnings of associations for trading ventures can be seen in Alexandria, *ibid.*, pp.397, 1269. Such associations of traders and bankers were common in the Hellenistic world. Sometimes they were formed for the purpose of evading competition; cf., Toutain, *op.cit.*, p.168, for examples, and sometimes to create an artificial price by restriction; cf. Strabo, *xlvi.* 1.15. cf. Glotz, "Le Travail, etc"., iii. ch.10; iv. chs. 1, 4, 6; cf. Tarn, "Hellenistic Civilisation", ch.7.
124. Rostovtzeff, *op.cit.* pp.290, 230, 1271; The Ptolemies encouraged officials and merchants to invest their money in tax-farming and monopoly-farming, in trade and banking and in land. These new landowners were not a reversion to feudal nobility, as Rostovtzeff, *Jour. Eg. Arch.* vi. p.173, maintains, but a new type of landowner producing for trade and forming the basis of a free middle class and, eventually, a new kind of nobility. Zenon, steward on the estate of Apollonios, became rich, left Apollonios and probably invested in land. Many officials probably did this; cf. Rostovtzeff, "Social and Economic History, etc"., p.1153. Like the higher officials/

officials of the East India Co., they handled many of the monopolies. Cleomenes of Memphis created a monopoly of wheat during a bad harvest in the Aegean, and as it cost 32 drchs. in Athens, he must have made a fortune, cf. Aris. Oecon. ii. 2. 1352B. In 1769-70 A.D. the English bought all the rice in India and resold it at fabulous prices.

125. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.320-22, 330; cf. p.519, Retail trade was largely in the hands of natives and native priests had large incomes from land and industries and probably tended to ally themselves with, and merge with, the foreigners and upper class.
126. *ibid.*, pp.519, 522-3, 1071-7. Intermarriage of well-to-do natives and Greeks developed. Theocritus and Herodas illustrate perhaps that fusion of cultures which was emerging in later Hellenistic times. They took the popular art form, the mime, and produced poetry of a high literary standard yet based on a realistic appreciation of contemporary life. Their poetry, therefore, contrasts strongly with the learned, romantic and didactic poetry for the literate and cultured few, and the scientific and purely individualist poetry.
127. cf. Hdt. ii. 164ff.; Diod. Sic. i. 70, 2-4; i. 73; Strabo, xvii. 1.3. cf. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.266, 271.
128. *ibid.*, p.1067.
129. Diod. Sic. i. 70-74; cf. Jouguet, "Macedonian Imperialism", p.349; A. Reinach in "L'Hellenisation du Monde Antique", p.205.
130. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., p.1082. This was probably because they, too, suffered from this depression and were driven to oppressive methods to maintain their own incomes; cf. *ibid.*, p.305, on the system of spying and house searches. My own experience in Roumania was that state officials and even priests had to supplement their meagre incomes by the most ingenious forms of graft.
131. cf. Rostovtzeff, p.1147, for fortunes of two thousand talents. Slaves and stewards in the East were popularly supposed to be richer than all the Spartan kings; Plut. Agis. 7; a reflection of the great wealth of the East. The poor were probably even poorer than in Greece; cf. Rostovtzeff, p.205, on the great inequalities in the Hellenistic kingdoms.
132. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.1096, 1204.
133. *ibid.*, pp.1095-6; cf. R.Blomfield, "Legacy of Greece", pp.417-20.
- 134./

134. In Egypt the peasants had to shoulder the full burden of a bad harvest. The increased restrictions in Egypt would also affect the economy more quickly than in states where more freedom was allowed. Once increased production ceased to be absorbed, prices would drop and the prosperity of the small farmer be affected. From 300 to 250 B.C. prices in the Aegean had been falling, probably because money was being absorbed in new ventures in the East. Heichelheim, "Wirtsch. Schw!", pp.55-6, shows how prices rose after 250 and remained high with a tendency to rise still higher in the first half of the second century B.C. This suggests that the period of absorption in the East was over, that is, that the productive capacity of the Hellenistic kingdoms could no longer advance without some social changes. In Egypt, too, the amount the peasant paid in dues and taxes was not closely linked with the harvest as in Asia, cf. Tarn, op.cit., p.151, and so the heavy taxation would soon become intolerable.
135. The amount of cultivated land in Egypt began to decline fairly early and, by the end of the third century, fields were being abandoned and dykes and canals neglected; Rostovtzeff, "A Large Estate, etc!", pp.142-6.
136. Rostovtzeff, "Social and Economic History, etc." p.711.
137. The Ptolemies gave natives more and more concessions by training a native militia and giving the peasants more control over their land and so more economic independence; cf. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.706-8, 718.
138. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.707-8, 712; cf. Polyb. v.107; xiv. 12.
139. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.710; "A Large Estate, etc.", p.178.
140. In Egypt the loss of Western markets due to the Second Punic War and the interest of the king in wars to the neglect of trade had aggravated the situation and it is possible that even debasement of the coinage was used in an attempt to save the situation; cf. Rostovtzeff, op.cit. pp.711-12. Rostovtzeff's opinion, p.274, that the free element in the economy created disharmony within the state is certainly justified, but once the free economy was there, only its further development could have made further progress possible. However, while the early Ptolemies had been the protectors of the poor by their economic and social policy, (cf. the role of Theseus and Henry I of England, v.sup. ch.iv), the later Kings, through the progress of events which demanded changes in society and in the state itself, on which the monarchy was an integral part, found themselves forced to use the/

the new upper class of natives and foreigners, the priests and other upholders of the status quo, against the rising temper of the peasants and poor natives, *ibid.* p.1101. Rome's influence prevented this from developing to its logical conclusion.

141. cf. Polyb. xv. 20ff.; xvi. 21; Justin, xxv. 2.3; Val. Max. vi. 6.1; Tac. ann. ii.6.
142. cf. A. Bouché-Leclercq, "Hist. d. Lagides", i.p.393.
143. Aristonicus' revolt, Strabo, xiv. i.38; Justin, xxxvi. 4, was not only a national war of liberation against the Romans, but also an expression of discontent due to the economic crisis which involved all sections of the population; cf. T.H.S. Broughton: "Roman Asia Minor, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome", vol. iv. pp.505ff. A similar revolt by natives against their native exploiters as well as against Roman domination occurred in Judaea; cf. Rostovtzeff, *op.cit.*, p.705.
144. cf. Polyb. xx. 4-7; Duris, ap. Athen, xii., 542C; cf. the New Comedy, *passim*; cf. Rostovtzeff, *op.cit.*, pp.1181; Ferguson, "Hellenistic Athens", pp.287ff; 373-7, 418.
145. cf. Polyb. iv. 73,75; xviii. 3; xx. 6. 1; xxi. 6; Plut. Philopoemen 9; Athen. x. 418B; Theocritus, xxii. 156; Heraclides, F.H.G. ii. pp.254ff.
146. Rostovtzeff, *op.cit.*, p.618. The age of the Fuggers was also characterised by great wealth on the one hand, and an enormous number of beggars on the other; for instance, one quarter of the population of Paris in the 1630s consisted of beggars. This was partly due to wars, but also to the flood of metals and to unemployment. cf. C.J. Hayes, "A Political and Social History of Modern Europe", pp.209ff., 229; cf. G. Renard and G. Weulersse, "Life and Work in Modern Europe", Ldn. 1926, pp.286-7. In Greece, however, where the economy was contracting, not expanding as in this period in Europe, even the rich became fewer, and, as prices were rising, rentiers would become less rich. It was only in the early Hellenistic period that there was great wealth in Greece; cf. Rostovtzeff, *op.cit.*, p.627.
147. Glotz, *Le Travail*, etc. p.287.
148. Zimmern, *Greek Commonwealth*, p.414, n.1.
149. cf. Xen. Rev. iv. 14; Xen. ap. Athen. vi. 272C; Plut. Nic. 4; Hyperb. Pro Eux. 44; Plut. Vit. Dec. rhet. Lyc.34.
150. Glotz, *op.cit.*, p.224.
- 151./

151. Mines probably yielded a higher rate of interest than 12% because of the wear and tear, but some of the fortune may have been in land at 8% and so 12% is a fair average. cf. Wallon, Histoire de L'esclavage I. pp.202-203; Glotz, op.cit., pp.287-8.
152. Glotz, op.cit., p.364.
153. Plut. Agis 9.
154. Plut. Philop. 15.
155. Polyb. xxi. 26. 14.
156. Glotz, Jour. d. Sav., l.c., p.213.
157. v.sup. n.131.
158. Polyb. iv. 17; vii. 10; xv. 21; Plut. Q. Gr. 18., Plut, Aratus. 2, 12.
159. Man Makes Himself, p.16; cf. Pirenne, La Civilisation au Moyen Age, p.73.
160. Polyb. xxxvi; 17; cf. H.Collitz, Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschr., 345, L.5, *ὑμετέραι πόλεις διὰ τοῦς πολέμους προσέτι πλεόνων οἰκητῶν.* (c.214B.C.) Wars certainly aggravated the problem but were not the basic cause of it.
161. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.63-4.
162. Polyb. vi. 56. advises people not to trust a Greek with a talent. This is an obvious sign of poverty. Polyb. iv. 35, pointed out that ta Kala (Hultsch's reading), that is the nobility, is only a question of a little money.
163. Burnet, "Early Greek Philosophy", p.24, n.1.
164. Teles, ap. Stob. quoted by E. Bevan, "The Hellenistic Age", pp.84-5.
165. These philosophers helped to give practical guidance to people who had lost their social anchorage through Alexander's conquest of the East. The kingdoms were much larger social and political units than the city states and took so much the longer to become stabilised. Moreover, the city states had developed rapidly into well-knit communities of which the individual felt himself an essential part. In the Hellenistic world this was a longer process and the individual, therefore, was more lonely and adrift.

166. cf. Barber, "The Hellenistic Age", p.69.
167. *ibid.*, p.65.
168. cf. Oxyrh. Pap., viii. Cercidas frg. i, first part; and frg.2; cf. Powell and Barber, *op.cit.*, pp.5-6. Cercidas the moralist was not sympathetic to social revolt but warned the rich of their danger if they did not make some concessions to the poor (v.*sup.*).
169. Phusei politika zoa; Von Arnim, Stoic frgg. iii. pp.77, 314.
170. Rostovtzeff, *op.cit.*, p.1132.
171. cf. Tarn, "Hellenistic Civilisation", p.107,, on all these people.
172. Charlesworth, C.A.H. xi. pp.9-10. cf. the use of Hegelianism by reformers, although Hegel's philosophy was used in his lifetime to justify Prussian autocracy, just as the Hellenistic philosophies all supported the monarchies. These Utopian ideas and activities were as historically reactionary as those prevalent in early Greece and post-mediaeval Europe; (v.*sup.* ch.ii). Their ideas were quite impractical in the conditions of their time and no substitute for practical reforms. Their lack of any realistic approach reminds one irresistably of Tchekov's "Lunatic".

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SPARTAN TYRANNY (I).

After Plataea King Pausanias of Sparta was virtually commander in chief of the allied Greek forces. However, his ambition and irresponsible behaviour soon alienated the Greeks and the Ephors were forced to recall him and retain him in Sparta (1). Obviously Pausanias, like Cleomenes, was finding the aristocracy's policy restrictive, and was making use of his one weapon, military command, to acquire as much prestige and practical advantage as possible. In preserving their privileges, however, the Spartan aristocracy had now one main objective before them, namely, to conserve as much as possible of their strength against possible attack from within or without. Athens, far from being obliterated by Persia, had emerged with greater prestige and strength than ever and she was generally praised as the real saviour of Greece against Persia (2). Sparta had learned her lesson. She was no longer eager to take the offensive as she had against the tyrants. The results had been unfortunate for Sparta, since it was the Greek republics which had experienced tyrannies who were the most vital and potentially strong states. Sparta, therefore, adopted a passive role, content if she were not attacked by Athens or other Greek states and if the latter did not become so overwhelmingly strong that they were a real danger to her security. Accordingly, although she tried to prevent Athens from rebuilding her walls, when she was actually presented with a fait accompli, she made no complaint (3).

With her Kings, however, the Spartan aristocracy still had to be more aggressive. They were a more immediate and direct danger to her social security, which rested on the political and social settlement of the late seventh century. That is why the history of Spartan politics at this time and for some subsequent decades appeared to be a struggle between the aristocracy employing the Ephors, and at least one of the kings. Pausanias had been acquitted of the most serious charges brought against him, but was retained in Sparta. The Spartans feared the corruption and ambition of anyone they sent out and were not concerned to help to finish the war against Persia. Since Athens was competent to finish it, and had won all the honours for her resistance in any case, Sparta saw no reason for expending her own strength and thus exposing her kings and generals to temptation which would react on the Spartan constitution (4). Already, Pausanias' policy of Spartan hegemony, adopted probably to further his own ambitions, was securing a following in Sparta, especially among the young. This was the beginning of another internal faction among the citizens themselves which could split/

split the Spartan policy, such a faction as the settlement had tried to prevent for all time. From this time on, it grew more powerful and more popular. As a result, a suggestion in 475 B.C. that Sparta should invade Attica, received support from some citizens, especially the young. Moreover, among the advantages of the war, which they stressed, was included the enrichment of private families. On this occasion it required the influence of the Senators before the passive policy could be maintained (5). After reappearing in Byzantium Pausanias again returned to Sparta and was imprisoned by the Ephors - an indication of the power of the Ephors by this time. He succeeded in being released and was said to have then entered into a conspiracy with the Helots to whom he offered freedom and citizenship in return for support in a revolt against the government. In trying to evade arrest he was trapped and starved to death (6). Dickins (7) maintains that the charge of Medism brought against Pausanias was faked. This is doubtful. The Ephors seemed reluctant to go to the extreme of trying Pausanias, partly because they admitted they had little direct evidence and partly from fear lest the trial provoked that Athens was likely to be so dangerous to Sparta that Persia was worth using as an ally or whether, more probably, he was merely advancing his own career, it seems possible that he was prepared to come to some agreement with Persia. *an outburst in Pausanias' favour. Whether Pausanias had realised*

Of course, this ambition of Pausanias had led to a policy of expansion of Spartan influence and hegemony, but this in itself would have demanded changes in Sparta's social organisation if she was to assimilate and control increased wealth, power and perhaps empire. It is significant that Pausanias was said to be trying to overthrow the Ephoralty, the weapon of the citizens against progress and change (8). However, although there was probably already in Sparta a group of citizens favourable to Pausanias' ideas on Spartan policy and, therefore, constitution, they were still too few to be decisive. Accordingly, Pausanias had looked around for further supporters and attempted to attract some of the Helots to his standard. Here it can be seen that the very weakness of the Spartan aristocracy's settlement, that is, the fear of social revolt, which forced upon them the policy which the kings found so restrictive, also provided the weapon for the kings to turn against the Spartan state. Ambitious citizens and non-citizens who were discontented, were the weak link in the Spartan settlement. If Helots should be added to these, a formidable opposition could be created. In an endeavour to prevent the Helots from being used in the future, the Spartan citizens probably intensified their repression of the Helots (9).

Again, /

Again, therefore, the Ephors had emerged victorious and, meanwhile, difficulties in the Spartan League had been settled. However, an unforeseen enemy, nature herself, entered the field against the Spartans. The earthquake of 464 B.C. might have seemed to the Helots and Perioiki to have been designed purely for their benefit, for it was essentially the city of Sparta itself which suffered most. Only about five houses were left standing and about 20,000 men were killed in Laconia (10). Some of the Helots may have been already organising for a revolt when this opportunity offered. At any rate, they were at once ready for an attack and only the prompt action of King Archidamus and the Spartans forced them to retire (11). It was still mainly the Messenian Helots who were the chief danger (12) and it was the troops from Mantinea who saved Sparta (13). This was justification of Sparta's new policy of influence and alliance rather than conquest. If she had continued to conquer and impose garrisons on her neighbours, far from receiving help in a Helot revolt, she would probably have had a bigger revolt on her hands. As it was the revolt spread and even two of the perioikic cities joined the rebels, so that the war lasted ten years (14).

made it possible for Sparta to have an ally within the Athenian state

In this extremity the Spartan government was not averse to any allies who might help her. The reappearance in Athens of a conservative party which had some influence in the state, instead of merely bluntly opposing it. Archidamus was especially friendly with this party and invited their help against the Helots. Under the influence of Cimon, the leader of the pro-Spartan group in Athens, in spite of the protests of the radical Ephialtes, the Athenians were persuaded to send troops to assist Sparta to reduce Ithome (15). Again, however, Sparta miscalculated, as she had done when she expelled the Athenian tyrant. Cimon and a few Athenians who probably formed something like a new nobility, may have been in sympathy with Sparta's aristoc^{atic} views, but the majority of the Athenian people, with their newly acquired democratic freedom, could not be sympathetic. Obviously, the sympathies of the Athenian soldiers would tend to be with the Helots rather than with the Spartan citizens. As a result of this sympathy, the Spartans had to send the Athenians home again. This action was clearly not intended as a deliberate insult against Athens but arose solely as a result of the fears of the Spartan aristocracy lest the besieged should fraternise with the Athenian soldiers and, far from being overthrown by them, should persuade them to help in securing political changes (16). However, the action did not make the future development of friendly relations between the two states any easier. In fact, the Athenians promptly showed where their true feelings lay by overthrowing Cimon and the pro-Sparta party and broke off the alliance between Sparta and Athens, which had existed since the Persian War, and entered into an alliance with Argos, Sparta's rival (17).

The heavy loss of citizens in the earthquake had gravely affected Sparta's military strength, and it may have been largely as a result of this that a reorganisation of the army took place, although it is possible that the reforms were first introduced before this. The mora became the basis of the new military arrangement. This was a composite crops of both Spartiates and Perioikoi. There were six of these and, instead of having Spartans and Perioikoi in their former proportions of 5:5, they were composed of Spartans and Perioikoi in the proportions of 4:6 (18). The purpose, therefore, was probably to increase the hoplite force by $1/5$ without increasing the Spartans, and to offset the obvious danger in that by mixing the Spartans and Perioikoi together (19). This must have given the Spartan state a renewed military strength, but it was acquired at the extreme cost of weakening the social arrangement. While the mixing of Spartans and Perioikoi was essential in order that the Spartan's control could be applied over a greater number of non-citizens, it must have had its effect in blurring the former clear distinction between citizens and non-citizens. In addition, the division into six morai divorced the military organisation from the political one based on five komai. Members of the same koma and even of the same family could be scattered to different morai (20), and this, too, helped to undermine the rigid social arrangements which had formerly helped to prevent changes from taking place.

As a consequence of contact with the outside world, the most disruptive element of all was creeping into Sparta. At the end of the Persian War the Spartans obtained quantities of booty in a variety of forms including gold and silver (21); and it was no doubt Pausanias' introduction of this into Sparta and the consequent change in ways of life and ideas that the Ephors had regarded as the immediate danger. His tampering with the Helots was only a final attempt to which he was driven in desperation in an attempt to break the restrictive policy of the organised aristocracy. If wealth and the changes in living and ideas associated with it were allowed once more to operate freely in Sparta, the constitution would not long be able to resist some change. The Ephors, however, and through them the organised citizen body, now more restricted than ever, were increasing their control over the state structure, a necessary corollary of the citizens' loss in numbers and the decline in the influence of their aristocratic way of life. The continued victory of the Ephors over the kings made it possible for the Spartans, by means of the Ephors, to ensure their control of foreign affairs. During Cleomenes' reign it was Cleomenes himself who received embassies (22). After his death, however, the Ephors and Gerousia combined received ambassadors (23). Even at the time of Marathon and Plataea appeals for help had been directed, /

directed, not to the king but to the Ephors, and it was the Ephors who ordered the Spartan army out and placed Pausanias in command of it (24). This process continued throughout the century while the Ephors, or they and the chief citizens together, were regarded as the proper people to receive embassies and to deal with foreign negotiations (25). The struggle to prevent the kings from wrecking the aristocratic constitution became easier during subsequent years, since the Eurypontid kings, now the dominant house, were apparently ready to pursue a moderate, passive policy in contrast to the individualist, ambitious, disruptive policy which their predecessors had attempted to pursue.

The main problem the Ephors and citizens had to face at this time was the possibility of war with Athens. On this question their policy seems to have been determined by two factors. On the one hand they were afraid of the influence of the Athenian popular, democratic sentiments on their own constitution. Already their experience of the dangerous effects of this at Ithome, whether that danger was real or merely the product of their own fears, or its possibilities if it had been allowed to develop, and their reaction to it, had hurt themselves by discrediting the pro-Sparta group at Athens and making war more likely. Themistocles, the Athenian radical leader, had been suspected of helping Pausanias in his plans to overthrow the Spartan constitution (26), presumably from Themistocles' point of view because he saw Sparta as the main obstacle to Athenian hegemony. This policy, therefore, might be attempted again by other Athenian radicals. On the other hand, the Ephors had already had to decide not to pursue an actively offensive policy unless necessary. Passive defence, which might of course, involve occasional offensive action, was their chief policy. For that reason, if war with Athens could be avoided and at the same time the extension of democratic influence prevented, the Ephors would probably be glad to seize the opportunity. The best way of effecting this had been to maintain friendly relations with the pro-Sparta group in Athens. Unfortunately for Sparta, when this party lost influence, war became almost inevitable. Corinth, too, tended to force Sparta into the war, but for long Sparta's conduct of it was half-hearted and sympathy for peace and a desire to return to the status quo no doubt still existed. In other words, Sparta's policy was still directed by the aristocracy's need for security and the alternative measures offered at this time were the possibility of friendship with a conservative party at Athens, or war. Of these, war was likely to be more harmful to Sparta. Not only had she nothing to gain in the way of commercial advantages from the war, but for her there would be the great disadvantage of increased foreign contacts. It must again be emphasised that it was not fear of Helots which alone dictated Spartan policy as is frequently supposed. It was only after the/

the earthquake that the Helots became almost a permanent problem, yet Spartan policy had shown the same lack of aggressive drive for some time, ever since her anti-tyrant policy had failed to halt popular tendencies. It was the new people and new ideas associated with trade, money and manufactures whom the Spartan citizens feared and against whom this policy was directed. The use of Helots as a solution of their own economic settlement designed to exclude trade, was only one part of her policy, although in later centuries the use of Helots, like the maintenance of the old-fashioned constitution, in the face of other changes, was to prove more and more dangerous to the Spartan government. This is a much more commonsense explanation of the policy of Sparta than to say it was determined by a mere whim, namely the opposition of the Ephors to whatever ^{admitted} Kings (27). To argue that a) the kings wanted peace, that b) at one period the policy of Sparta was pro-peace and therefore c) the kings were in control of the state, is to base one's arguments on a premiss which is still to be proved.

In 457 B.C. when Athens was introducing reforms more radical than ever and strengthening the position of the radical party in Athens (28), and therefore, becoming a greater danger to Sparta, the Ephors sent an expedition to Tanagra and a battle took place between Athenians and Spartans partly, it was said, because the Ephors had information from the reactionary Athenian party that there was a possibility of overthrowing the Athenian democracy (29). However, this battle was indecisive and although Sparta agreed to support the Thebans against Athens, it was apparently on the condition that the Spartans themselves did not need to fight (30), a policy like that attempted in the Persian War, of leaving someone else to weaken Athens. In addition, Sparta rejected the Persian bribes offered to induce Sparta to attack Athens in order to force a withdrawal of Athenian troops from Egypt (31). It seems evident that Spartan policy was not likely to be aggressive unless there was some hope of definite support from within Athens itself. Moreover, Sparta would not complain if Athens wasted her strength outside Greece. It was just what Sparta wanted. On the return of Cimon to Athens soon after, Sparta agreed to a five years truce with Athens and succeeded in making a peace treaty with Argos on the understanding that the latter should break her alliance with Athens (32). The tactics of alliance and conciliation were still being used by Sparta where possible. However, the death of Cimon forced a more aggressive policy once more on Sparta, and in 446 B.C. Eleusis was invaded. The Spartan army, however, withdrew without fighting and Pleistonax was punished by the Ephors for not destroying Athens (33). It is not clear whether the Spartan government was still more afraid of the individualist actions and ambitions of the king than of Athenian power. Tradition accused/

accused Pleistonax of desiring peace and of accepting bribes to obtain it, but this tradition could well have been established by the Spartan government itself to cover its own policy in the matter. The fact that the counsellor to the king ~~was~~ appointed by the Ephors was largely responsible, suggests that the Ephors had had to give way to the disaffected faction at Sparta and allow the king to march out, but had advised the counsellor not to allow actual warfare. It is significant that although the king and counsellor were both punished as scapegoats, the policy of peace was continued and the thirty years peace signed.

Ultimately, however, the conviction was probably forced on the Spartan government and the Ephors that there was less and less hope of solving their difficulties without the defeat of Athens, while the increasing influence of the people in Athens and its effects on Athenian policy and strength was such that it is possible that the Ephors eventually were forced to pursue a vigorous policy in order to destroy Athens, her influence and power. They insisted on war in 431 B.C. against the wishes of Archidamus who, like kings before him, did not at once comply with the Ephors' change, not of policy, but of tactics. Naturally, all Spartan citizens did not realise the need for a change of tactics and sympathy with peace and a desire for a return to the status-quo, now probably recognised by the Ephors and the more alert citizens as impossible, since Athens had far outstripped her former influence and ambitions, continued to be expressed for some time, especially by the king (34). The Ephors, therefore continued to keep a strict watch over the kings and in 418 a new law was introduced by which ten counsellors were attached to King Agis, who had to receive permission from them before he could march from the city (35). After the Athenian disaster in Sicily,, Sparta pursued the war with real vigour until the logical conclusion in the defeat of Athens, the establishment of an oligarchy and the imposition of a Spartan garrison on the city (36). However, Sparta had only just been strong enough to reduce Athens and did so only because Athens by then was weakened by internal factions. It was the decline of the vigour of Athenian democracy which gave Sparta her opportunity (v.sup.ch.vii).

The Spartan aristocracy might well feel their danger was over. They had their own social problems, true, but the greatest external danger likely to influence and aggravate those troubles had gone, and, with the Athenian democracy crushed, all the other democracies established under Athenian influence lost any real influence. Meanwhile Sparta herself, in opposition to Athens' establishment of democracies, had extended her influence as far as possible by establishing oligarchies friendly to herself, a logical development of her anti-tyrant policy (37). However, individuals other than the/

the kings themselves, were now beginning to be a danger to the Spartan constitution. Lysander, like any other outstanding individual at such a time, would naturally regard the defeat of Athens as the opportunity for Sparta's expansion and greatness. Personal desire for wealth does not seem to have been one of his motives (38), but rather the desire for Sparta's greatness and glory and, therefore, his own. He was able to identify his own interests with those of Sparta and therefore to interpret Sparta's foreign policy as one of imperialist expansion. No more striking contrast could be found than between this attitude and that of Callicratidas, who was clearly a product of the old-fashioned Spartan education and not a rebel against it (39); the one possessing virtues which had little value in the world outside Sparta, the other with the talents necessary for furthering the interests of himself and the state in a world full of ambitions and expediency. Lysander was opposed to popular governments, partly no doubt because Athens favoured democracies, and partly because of his Spartan training and the ease with which he could win the oligarchic group in the cities for his schemes. He therefore set up in several places oligarchies favourable to Sparta in place of democracies (40). His method of imposing a Spartan governor to administer the cities with the aid of the chief citizens (41) clearly could best be executed by using oligarchies, for it was in the interests of both the chief citizens and the Spartan governor to work in harmony against the popular demands. The policy of allowing a small reactionary clique to control the cities made them weaker and more submissive to Lysander and his plans for incorporating them in a Greek world under Spartan hegemony. So, too, when Athens submitted to him he was concerned to impose on the population a small clique of former exiles friendly to Sparta and a Spartan garrison and by these means and the destruction of the fortifications of the city to be satisfied that Athens would be weak enough (42). The strength of the popular forces, however, were too much for both the oligarchy and Lysander himself, especially when added to the division of opinion in Sparta itself on matters of future policy (43).

However, tribute was paid to Sparta instead of to Athens(44) and Lysander clearly planned to establish a Spartan empire. The Spartan government naturally opposed this. Not only would it give undue power to Lysander but the very existence of an empire would mean ultimately the transformation of Sparta's social settlement. The effect on the aristocratic society of foreign ideas and customs would be disruptive enough, but the really revolutionary influence would be the introduction of a money economy. Already Laconian subjects acting as seamen under Lysander had become accustomed to regular money wages and to buying and selling in ports, while Sparta was not only filled with gold and silver by Lysander, but the citizens filled with desire for them (45). If Sparta tried to control/

control an empire, her whole economy would inevitably be transformed from that of a feudal, static economy to a monetary one based on exchange as well as on tribute. The social effects of this would be once again to allow the increase in numbers and influence of "new people", traders, officials and all the new professions connected with a society in which a money economy and international relations played an important part.

In other words, it was because of the increase in social democracy which Lysander, probably quite unconsciously, would have introduced eventually, that the Spartans attacked him, and not because they were defending their "democracy" against the imperialism of the kings and Lysander. Dickins (46), for instance, argues that the kings were imperialist and yet toyed with ideas of emancipation. He seems to think this inconsistent but actually if the position of the Ephors and Spartan citizens is understood, it is perfectly consistent. The Ephors, Dickins thinks, stood for democracy, although he admits the "Lycurgan" laws were reactionary. Actually, the settlement of the late seventh century was clearly in favour of the citizens and against the extension of privileges indefinitely, and so was aristocratic in character. Certainly this settlement allowed greater freedom and democracy to the citizens themselves and, by reverting to a feudal type of society, retained some of the freedom of earlier days but this was at the expense of the majority of the inhabitants, who were an integral part of the economy of the community. It is possible to argue that members of the Fascist party in Germany have greater freedom than the British people in that they can loot and murder with impunity, but their freedom is at the expense of the majority of the population and makes their regime reactionary not democratic. It was the Ephors as the representatives of the citizen body, who were the chief instruments in defending the settlement and were therefore against progress and emancipation. Dickins rightly thinks the kings progressive, but it does not make sense to say the Ephors were both democratic and reactionary. The imperial policy would have meant a change of social influence and, therefore, an extension of civil privileges and, therefore, in these conditions, an imperial policy was progressive from the standpoint of the society of Laconia as a whole. The kings, therefore, because they adopted a policy of expansion, were helping to break the reactionary constitution at home and were therefore progressive. The Ephors, in order to preserve the Spartan constitution, opposed an imperialist policy and were therefore both passive and reactionary; for only an advance to a money economy and to the kind of life adopted by so many other states could, in these conditions, make possible any social progress in Sparta at all. Meanwhile, Lysander was doing his best to encourage the Spartan king to pursue the same policy and it seems possible that it was Sparta/

Sparta and her greatness, not his own career, ^{with which} ~~that~~ he was primarily concerned. ~~about~~ (47). The Spartan government, therefore, opposed Lysander's plans. They recognised the authority of the Great King over the Greeks in Asia Minor and, with the backing of Persia, enjoyed prestige as the executors of peace throughout Greece (48).

However, the danger from Lysander was not only indirectly from his policy abroad, but directly from his policy and influence at home. He brought home gold and silver and gained sufficient support to be welcomed for it (49). Obviously, the Ephors' influence over many of the citizens themselves was beginning to slip. The very ban on money probably increased the desire for it. Since, too, Lysander was regarded as master not only of Sparta, but of all Greece and possessing greater power than any previous Greek (50), his ~~influence~~ ^{insistence} at home must have been considerable. When his attempt to secure Agesilaus' co-operation in his policy abroad had failed, Lysander determined to attempt to change the constitution at home and thereby make his own policy the dominant one in the state. That he was sure of support among some of the citizens is evident from his intention to secure their co-operation first. However, the strength of the opposition forced him to seek all the help he could get and he planned to gain religious sanction for his proposals (51).

His intention seems to have been to make the monarchy accessible to all the chief citizens and, perhaps, even to all the citizens (52), probably because the kings at this time were so submissive to the Ephors' policy. Obviously this was an attempt to revive the power of the monarchy at the expense of the organised citizen body and Ephors. It would have had the effect of making a strong king ~~the~~ centralising influence in the state and, therefore, of increasing the influence and power of other sections of the population who were ready to support the king. Ultimately, this would have weakened the influence of the restricted citizen body and probably have led to an extension of political and social privileges. The king could then have carried out a policy of expansion and, by giving his support to the new people, inevitably called into being by such a policy, allowed the growth in numbers and influence of a middle class at home, and the growth of an empire abroad. This would eventually have transformed the whole basis of the aristocratic settlement and produced far-reaching social changes (53). But that would have been for the future and Lysander was concerned with the present policy, which would have brought glory and power to himself as a king of the new type, and to Sparta.

The Ephors and their supporters in the reactionary group among the citizens probably saw more clearly the dangers involved in this policy or else simply clung blindly and tenaciously/

tenaciously to their own privileges. Already they had fined Agesilaus (54) through fear of his increasing his power; but Lysander's plan went far beyond Agesilaus' moderate ambitions. Moreover, Lysander, like the kings, was forced to seek allies among the disfranchised and discontented in the Laconian state (55). However, it is almost certain that he had at least potential support for his plan among the citizens themselves, for the Ephors forbade Agesilaus to publish Lysander's letter, in case it converted the citizens to Lysander's plans! (56). Lysander's followers at home and great prestige abroad probably explains why the Ephors were so cautious in taking action against him (57), and his death must have been extremely fortunate for them.

Although the Ephors, representing the whole body of Spartan citizens, now considerably reduced in numbers, had again emerged victorious against potentially dangerous individuals in Sparta, they lost steadily against the influence of money. Lysander had not only filled Sparta with gold and silver, but had inspired the citizens with the love of wealth (v.sup.). The fact that Athens, under the Thirty, actually asked for a loan from Sparta as well as military help, indicates that already Sparta was considered a wealthy city (58). The Ephors realised the danger perfectly well and, in fact, there was an attempt to ban all gold and silver once more as in the Lycinan settlement and to revert to iron money (59). It is significant that it was pointed out that to allow money to be the basis of the national economy would soon affect the minds of all the citizens, whereas, if only a few were affected, the evil could be stamped out, as indeed the Spartans had done for a time in the late seventh century. However, supporters of Lysander's policy were already so strong that they were able to secure a compromise policy. They advocated that the money should be kept in Sparta but that it should be regarded as public treasure and not allowed for private use. It is doubtful if this were ever put into effect or, if so, was maintained for very long. Sparta never really had a permanent public treasury (v.sub.), but many of her citizens did become wealthy. Indeed, from the time of Lysander onwards, more and more money flooded Sparta (60). At first, Spartans tended to evade the law against possession of gold and silver by depositing it in Arcadian banks (61), especially as severe penalties were still enforced (62). Before long, however, money was kept more or less openly and the payment of fines indicates that compromises had been made (63). Sparta became famous for her riches and was said to possess more gold and silver than the rest of Greece (64). She was notorious for the love of money exhibited by her citizens (65) and for the honour paid to wealth and its possessors (66). Luxurious living in Sparta became a byword (67), especially among Spartan women (68).

Many citizens no longer stayed at home but went abroad and acquired foreign customs and habits and eventually returned home with still more wealth to disrupt the state (69). It is significant that the fact that Agesilaus did not change his habits after his return from the East was considered remarkable. Yet Agesilaus advised his friends to buy and sell the spoils of war so that, even if he personally was not corrupted, the practice of exchange and the use of money were spreading (70). The very fact that foreign foods and perfumes were becoming popular in Sparta (71), indicates not merely changes of customs, but a regular exchange of goods with foreign countries, a much more revolutionary change for a state whose society and constitution were arranged to suit a static, landowning economy.

The effect of this influx of wealth was all the more violent and degrading because of the strictness of the ban which the Ephors had attempted to retain. Once Spartans had been abroad and experienced a desire for wealth, the ban on it would serve only to stimulate the desire and the lack of it produce corruption and dishonesty. Corruption began to creep into Spartan society even at a comparatively early date, before the flood of wealth really started. Spartan kings were frequently accused of bribery although it is not always possible to decide if the accusations were correct or not, since on the one hand, the kings in the early period were in the most favourable position for acquiring wealth by bribery or other means but, on the other, the Ephors, if they thought the kings dangerous, were probably quite capable of inventing charges against them. Certainly, it was almost a commonplace for King Cleomenes to be accused of bribery (72), but a less prominent king, Leotychides was also said to have accepted bribes (73). A Spartan admiral was said to have been bribed by Themistocles (v. sup. ch. vi) and the story that Pericles bribed the Spartan magistrates regularly for several years is interesting, not so much because it is likely to be true, but as an indication of the growing reputation Spartans were gaining for corruption (74). Thorax, a friend of Lysander, was convicted of having silver in his possession (75). Even the story of Glaucus the Spartan, who at an early date was tempted to keep for himself money deposited with him by a Milesian (76), probably reflects both the ban on money in Sparta and the consequent desire to possess it. The temptation and corruption of Gylippus is precisely the same and was accepted by the Spartans themselves as evidence of the corrupting effect of wealth on the Spartan way of life (77). So, because of the rigorous attempt to exclude the new life, when this life did gain ground it assumed far more degrading forms than the aristocracy could ever have feared, and its spreading influence was only equalled by the rapid decline in the old heroic virtues.

Eventually, /

Eventually, corruption and bribery were rampant among the Senators and the Ephors themselves (78). Far from preventing the rot among the citizens, it seems evident that the Ephors, citizens themselves, were also affected by it. Gradually, therefore, they were no longer so much the representatives of a citizen body determined to exclude money and trade and foreign ideas and customs in order to preserve a strictly aristocratic way of life. They were rather, as representatives of the citizens, concerned mainly to prevent non-citizens from having a share in social and political privileges even though they themselves shared in the general corruption and extravagance, which were the result of the change of life; and yet this change of life itself cried out for social and political changes. The Ephors, however, could not change the conditions which created corruption and decay. The party favouring the old way of life was no longer so powerful, while the conditions favourable to the growth of the new life were far more widespread than before. Now that some of the citizens themselves were attracted by foreign ways of living, the others were waging a losing battle. Indeed, it was not only from outside Sparta that the danger represented by the new life came, but from within it too.

Trade and manufacture in Laconia, although barred to citizens and hampered by the laws associated with Lycurgus, had no doubt continued. Grain was exported to Corinth and other cities, and imports from Libya and Egypt arrived at Cythera (79). The influx of money about 400 B.C. and the opening up of relations with the outside world, must have given them a tremendous impetus, while the taste for luxury goods stimulated by this contact with the East, would develop trade still further (80). Certain goods manufactured in Laconia were famous and even sought after. Purple fishery was a regular industry (81). Iron working naturally flourished since Laconia was rich in iron mines (82), and Laconian swords, helmets, and spears were famous (83). This metal work for armour helped to preserve artistic metal work, and Laconian bowls and drinking cups were renowned (84). Houses in Sparta had been famed for their beautiful furniture, including tables, chairs and even doors (85) and probably continued to be so. Laconian cloaks (86) and felt hats (87), were also well-known, and their shoes were considered the best (88). Laconian tiles were exported to Athens and Eleusis, and probably elsewhere, in the fourth century (89).

Whether merchants were allowed the use of silver money in order to carry on this trade (90) or whether they used some form of barter or found some standard of exchange for their iron coins, Laconian economy, with the influx of money and development of trade, must have been brought into the orbit of, and so affected by, the general economic development in Greece and the East. Accordingly, while merchants must have/

have prospered through the growth of trade and manufacture, consumers, especially if they were not landowners and had to depend on the local market for food, would suffer from the influx of metals and consequent rise of prices. Spartan citizens could sell their surplus at the local market, either by barter or by means of iron money (91), but if they attempted to take manufactured goods in exchange, then the local economy of Sparta itself must have become part of the general economy of the Aegean. The domestic self-sufficient type of economy, bolstered up in the late seventh century, must have been violently dislocated by the whole development in the fourth century. Foreign foods, wines and perfumes were popular at Sparta and some of the luxurious couches and covers were probably of foreign origin (92). Moreover, the rise in the standard of living and in prices must have rendered estates, run as they were on a self-sufficient basis, totally inadequate even to support the former standard of living (93), and to continue to pay taxes (94). The increased cost of living on the one hand, and the desire for wealth and luxury goods on the other (95), led to borrowing and mortgages, impoverishment of the majority, and enrichment of the few (96), while the women of Sparta were probably used by citizens as a means of evading the ban on trade, manufacture and moneylending (97).

Obviously, the Perioikoi generally, but especially the artisans and traders, must have grown enormously with the changes in the state and the changes in the proportions of citizens and Perioikoi. The special mention of artisans in calling men up for the army indicates their size and importance in the population (98). When the further advance of trade and manufacture was restricted by the constitution and their prosperity affected by the decline of prosperity, and, therefore, of purchasing power, in other states, they would tend to support demands for reform. The Helots too, provided an additional weapon for anyone seeking to overthrow the constitution. The Helots were like slaves (99), but they were more strictly serfs, since they were tied to the land and were the property, not so much of one owner, as of the state (100). So long as the economy was static, the Helots had merely to produce a certain amount of produce for their masters. The surplus was their own and they were allowed to sell this as well as booty taken in war, and to save money (101). So long as these conditions were maintained, the Helots, in Laconia at least, were not likely to be actively discontented. The Helots had helped Sparta in the Second Messenian War and had continued to do so in later wars (102), and even won their freedom for bravery in the field. The policy of occasionally freeing Helots may have helped (103) and they may have been used even for police duties in Sparta, as slaves were used in Athens (104). However, the Messenian Helots were in a different position. They had never lost their consciousness of belonging to an independent nation, while their tendency to rebel had probably been met by more extreme oppression/

oppression (105). However, once the desire for wealth seized the citizens, more direct exploitation of the Helots probably developed. To produce extra for exchange was the obvious method of obtaining or adding to wealth, apart from serving as a mercenary in the East. But this obvious method of increasing wealth also increased exploitation. Slavery in the southern states of North America, for instance, was of the patriarchal type, until the country's economy became involved in the trading economy of Western Europe and the northern states of North America. Direct exploitation of the slaves then became the rule (v.sub.n.178).

The increasing discontent, therefore, of all sections of the population in Lacedaemon provoked frequent attempts to change or overthrow the government. The attempts of Pausanias and Lysander, although probably the result of personal ambition, had shown how discontent had increased the numbers of those likely to support the overthrow of the government. Indeed, a party desiring constitutional change had probably been in continued existence for some time at Sparta (106), and ready to use any opportunity, such as military weakness and defeat, in order to seize Sparta and change the type of government. Plots, therefore, were frequent, some being discovered even before the revolts were actually made (107). The conspiracy of Cinadon (108) gives a picture of the social forces desiring change. Disfranchised citizens, Perioikoi, Helots and freed Helots, in fact, an enormous majority of the population, were united by an almost vicious hatred of the Spartiates (109). While Cinadon and others of his type were merely ambitious of acquiring all the privileges of the "Peers", the mass support from other sections of the population indicates widespread misery, discontent and social unrest.

The state, however, by the very severity of its control, survived attempt after attempt, and thereby merely intensified the crisis and drove the reformers to further extremes. Among the reformers there must have been a great variety of objectives, extending from mere desire to join the privileged, through various plans for modifying the constitution, to the aim of completely overthrowing the government and changing the type of state. The continued suppression, however, must have forced even the moderates to more extreme measures. In spite of the rapid changes in the lives of many Spartans, the constitution and state form remained in its out-of-date, aristocratic garb, so that some Greek writers commented on the changes in Spartan economy and customs and the decline from the days of Lycurgus, while the constitution alone remained unchanged (110); and others contrasted the changes in manners and social conditions at Sparta with the retention of the old forms and rites, while it was even recognised that, since Spartan laws and customs were suited to static conditions, although actual conditions in Sparta were changing and the need/

need for flexibility in her foreign policy was more pressing, as a result of this contradiction, a lack of efficiency and drive compared to the trading states was characteristic of Sparta's international relations (111). Even in Socrates' time it was pointed out that, although the Spartans now had money, it was still forbidden to employ sophists (112), and even later, in spite of the growing influence of wealth and especially of rich women, there was still an attempt to forbid marriage into rich rather than "good" families (113), language reminiscent of Theognis and the early Italian conditions. The Ephors, indeed, actually strengthened the power of the constitution by increasing their own control of it, for now that the citizen body was dwindling and social tension increasing, the Ephors' policy was forced to become more and more reactionary (114). Eventually, the supreme control of the state seems to have been practically concentrated in their hands (115). It was the Ephors, too, who enforced the law forbidding foreigners to live and travel in Lacedaemon (116). They judged in civil courts and therefore, since the laws were still unwritten, were virtually independent in their interpretation of them, as the nobles of early Attica and other Greek states had been (117).

It was through the Ephors, too, that the citizens, who desired to maintain the status quo, continued to control the king (118). While the king swore to govern according to the existing laws, the Ephors merely swore that, so long as the king maintained this promise, they would preserve his kingdom intact (119); a rather one-sided arrangement, especially when it is remembered that the interpretation of the laws rested mainly with the Ephors. It was the Senate, that is the representatives mainly of the leading citizens, assisted by the Ephors and the other king, who judged the king if accused (120), and more and more the kings were forced to court the Ephors (v.sup.ch.vi). The king had to rise when the Ephors entered to dispense justice, although the Ephors remained seated when others rose for the king's entry (121).

In short, the constitution and state form continued to possess and even intensify the same characteristics as those of early Greece, before the establishment of constitutions suited to the republican type of states. The Senate sat as tribunal in cases of murders (122), as the Areopagus had done in Attica. The king's functions as leader in war and head of some religious and family affairs (v.sup. ch.vi), were characteristic of kings of very early times. The Assembly, too, since it had the right only of accepting or rejecting the proposals of magistrates and kings (v.sup. ch.vi), had scarcely progressed at all from heroic times, and the more advanced principle of individual, secret ballot was unrecognised at Sparta (123).

Naturally, the state had no public treasury when the aristocratic/

aristocratic settlement was designed to exclude money and commerce, but even when wealth began to flood the state, no modifications in the state were allowed and no public treasury was established on a permanent basis, nor did the principle of regular taxation to provide a permanent fund find acceptance (124). Pericles' statement that the Peloponnesians were autourgoi, while Athens had money (125), is obviously emphasising the point of difference between a comparatively primitive economy such as that of the greater part of the Peloponnese, where each man was personally interested in his plot which was the source of his livelihood, and that of Athens, where the economy had so developed that it supported a rentier class living on money invested in various concerns (126), and where division of labour had advanced far enough so that each man was no longer self-sufficient. Pericles was again emphasising the money economy of Athens in contrast to Sparta, when he said that working farmers served in person rather than by making payment. This applied to Sparta as well as to the rest of the Peloponnese. Although the Spartans did not take an active part in running their estates, they were directly dependent on land and its produce for their maintenance, while they performed their function as fighters. The Spartan nobles were essentially "feudal" still, the economy of the state ^{being} static and self-sufficient, until completely disrupted by money and trade. This self-sufficient economy was characteristic of that primitive economy before division of labour developed. Division of labour leads to better work and is characteristic of a more advanced economy. The economic method of the Peloponnese, therefore, was considered primitive (127). Most of the Peloponnese, too, was still based on domestic agriculture, in contrast to Attica where agriculture was one of several industries run with a view to sale on the market. Athens, therefore, thought Sparta poor, because it is typical of communities run on a money basis to represent the actual coin itself as wealth and to think that a country with no, or poor, coinage is literally poor.

Women in Sparta were still as free as they had been elsewhere in Greece in early times (128), but, elsewhere, the growth of national states based on a mobile economy had led to a change in the social position of women involving their exclusion from public affairs. In Sparta heiresses were not obliged to marry their next of kin as in Attica (129). This meant that Spartans could not leave property as they pleased but were obliged to leave it to the heir whether a woman or not. This was a much more backward stage of development than in Attica. In Athens the development of exchange and private property in land had produced modifications. Solon had allowed a man to adopt a son and leave it to him if he had no heirs and, in this way, and by restricting the size of dowries, he had kept the property intact./

intact. The important factor was becoming unconsciously the property of a family and not, as in Sparta, still, the family itself. In fact, the attitude to property and marriage was for long in Sparta similar to those of very early Attica (130), since the conditions which had originally produced these laws and customs were preserved artificially in Sparta for a much longer period. Women in Sparta, therefore, were in a strong economic position in the state, once wealth entered the community without producing a corresponding modification of the laws, and through this position they exerted increasing influence on the politics of the state, especially when the men were absent at war (131). The reason for the continued existence of these marriage laws and customs was that in Sparta the family was still an integral part of the state. In the trading states the development of new ideas and customs on the basis of new conditions had broken old ties and led to the growth of individualism and loyalty to the state rather than to the family and tribe. Old loyalties, therefore, and the importance of the family in the state had been weakened. In Sparta even the control of the children by the state was not a blow against the family so much as an illustration of the close identity of family and state. The king's control of family and religious affairs is still another illustration of the continuance of older characteristics and customs.

Meanwhile, on the one hand, choral songs of a military and religious type still flourished in Sparta, while, on the other, drama failed to develop and philosophy and rhetoric were forbidden because of their subversive influence (v. sup.). Sparta had not only ceased to be an artistic and literary centre, but the town itself had remained very much as it was in earlier times. Thucydides (132) described Sparta as a collection of villages in the early manner of Greek towns. This had not always been true of Spartan life, which had far surpassed the culture of village communities until the reactionary settlement in the late seventh century effectively reversed the character of the community. The appearance of the city in spite of fine buildings could not, at that time, have been that of a fully developed national city. In Athens although the tyranny had embellished the city, it was only after the establishment of the democracy that the city was really transformed into a centre worthy not only of Attica, but of all Greece. Sparta's development, on the other hand, had been halted in the early period when the aristocratic settlement placed its dead hand on all the new life just beginning to flower in the community. Sparta, therefore, although she had temples and other buildings (133), was not a business and cultural centre, the heart of a state based on trade and where, therefore, urban life was important as in Athens. The general character, of/

of the city, therefore, as Thucydides noted was, in contrast to Athens, that of an old-fashioned semi-feudal community.

It is probably true to say that only such a rigorously controlled government could have held the state together for so long, and maintained its strength when its very foundations were being rapidly transformed. In early Greece, the old form of state had proved inadequate, and even restrictive, to the new type of community rapidly evolving. In Sparta this had been temporarily averted by strengthening the state control and by forbidding the citizens to have any share in trade, manufacture, or any of the new interests which were rapidly becoming all powerful in other Greek cities. However, the continued flood of gold and silver into Sparta and the breakdown of her isolation from the rest of Greece and Asia Minor, soon produced a crisis even more intense than the early one. The early artificial repression of the community's development, and, later, the extremely obstructive effect of the constitution through its very strength and rigidity, combined to make the explosion, when it came, more extreme and far-reaching in its effects than those which took place in the seventh and sixth centuries in Greece.

Another result of the continued social transformation and tension within the rigid constitution was, as in early Attica and Sparta under similar conditions, military weakness due to apathy and lack of morale among the citizens, intensified by the actual corruption and dishonesty in Sparta which arose from the same causes. The conflict of policy between individuals of Lysander's type and the Spartiates' objective of preserving their own constitution could not make for effective conduct of affairs abroad. Sparta's loss of empire and influence after the Athenian defeat was almost inevitable so long as the Spartan passive policy continued to gain successes over the expansionist one of some of the kings and generals. The trouble was, not that the Ephors did not carry out actively the citizens' policy, but rather that they carried it out too effectively. As a result of their consistency of policy against that of the kings and other ambitious individuals, the foreign policy of Sparta seemed to lack drive and ambition. When added to this was the military weakness reflecting the corruption of the citizens and the beginnings of disorganisation of the economy and social basis of the community, the military disaster of Leuctra was not surprising. The wonder was that it had been postponed so long.

Indeed, the defeat of Sparta by the Thebans in which 1,000 of the population had been killed, and the invasion of Laconia by the Thebans was the signal for still more outbreaks and attempts at social change (134). While the king acted as the guardian of the citizens against the non-privileged, what is significant about these outbreaks is that many/

many of the Perioikoi, especially those by the coast who were therefore presumably traders or artisans, seem to have been involved in this conspiracy (135). For long the Perioikoi were contented enough since trade and manufacture, although they were hampered by restriction, were at least reserved for the Perioikoi. When money began to corrupt Spartan society, trade and manufacture probably actually benefitted at first and it was only when further prosperity was hindered by the reactionary constitution and chaos caused by the conflict between the constitution and the new conditions, and when the Perioikoi themselves probably began to be affected by the growing inequalities in the state caused by the economic dislocation, that they, too, were forced to join attempts to overthrow the government, or at least to modify it. All supporters of such attempts would not be aiming at the complete overthrow of the government. Some would probably have been content with very slight concessions. It was the very exclusiveness of the Spartan citizens which drove so many into the reform party and drove this party to such extreme measures. In this attempt against the Spartan government a party which had long been disaffected seized the opportunity offered by the defeat and invasion to attempt to seize the city. Their plot was discovered in time and the king in consultation with the Ephors took the unprecedented step of putting the conspirators to death without trial and so avoiding risings in the city in their favour. Many of the Perioikoi and Helots then deserted to the enemy but this was concealed as far as possible in order to avoid discouraging the Spartan army.

Perhaps the most significant fact of all was the panic among the Spartan women and old men at the time of the invasion (136). Spartan women had been renowned for their courage and dignity, their participation in public affairs and their patriotism. One of the effects of the flood of wealth into Sparta and the growth of inequality was the growing economic and, therefore, political power of Spartan women. They tended to control more and more of the wealth and therefore the political and social privileges of the state. They especially, therefore, would suffer from the corrupting effects of the changed social conditions. The necessity for them to defend themselves and the small citizen body against the attacks of the non-privileged could only engender a selfish anti-social attitude among the women and citizens which ill equipped them for meeting military defeats and the actual invasion of Laconia. Significantly, too, it was the old men of the state who had been given so much authority over the life of the community and who, therefore, when that community was cracking under the strain of decay within and attack without, were least capable of exercising such authority.

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The whole social fabric was crashing. The social arrangement by which the citizens should lead the fighting, the Helots till the land, and the Perioikoi either engage in agriculture or in such trade and manufacture as was necessary, could not continue when the citizens were eager to indulge in other occupations, the Helots and Perioikoi were dissatisfied and there were too few citizens to lead the fighting. Already the proportion of Perioikoi had been increased (v. sup.). In this crisis, with the Thebans in Laconia itself, the position of Sparta was so desperate that Helots had to be offered their freedom in return for military service and 6,000 were said to have responded (137). The reaction of the free fighters was typical and indicates the impossibility of the continued existence of the Spartan state as an influential factor in Greece without drastic social and political changes. The free fighters were alarmed in case there were now too many Helots to control in the army ranks. Such fears within a state where the citizens were dwindling in numbers and at a time when the enemy was on their doorstep, could never produce efficiency in war. In earlier days when the citizen body was comparatively large and united and the Perioikoi were content, and many of the Helots themselves loyal in the field, Spartan military efficiency had been renowned. Now nothing but a total reorganisation of society itself could make possible an effective military reorganisation.

The loss of the Messenian land as a result of the Theban invasion led to the intensification of the general process of concentration of wealth in the hands of a few and the rapid decline in the number of citizens. Many Spartans who had lost their land solved their economic problem by going abroad as mercenaries, but this only added to the danger to the constitution; for more inhabitants were thus brought into contact with foreign customs and ideas and, if the mercenaries made money, more wealth entered Sparta, while the number of citizens was seriously diminished and so the balance of social classes within the state still further altered. Partly as a result of the increase in power of those concerned in trade and who therefore demanded mobility of land (for in a state where wealth was becoming so important, the possessors of this new wealth must have enjoyed an influence and importance out of proportion to their legal and political status); and partly perhaps to allow those who had lost land in Messenia to buy land with money acquired as mercenaries (138), a fundamental change in the economy was made. Probably the growing influence of those enriched by the development of trade among non-citizens and the discontent among those who had lost their citizenship were strong enough to help in forcing through this important legal change in the economy of the country. Land, with the possible/

possible exception of any not included in the family lot, had been inalienable (139), but now a law passed by Eпитadeus the Ephor allowed the alienation of land by gift and will (140). Possibly this merely legalised transfers of land which had already taken place (141). Loopholes had no doubt been found as a result of the pressure of circumstances and the desire for wealth among the citizens, and the Ephors and reactionary citizens, therefore, were probably forced not only to yield to the pressure of the reformers but also to give official recognition to changes which had already been made.

This change was of such fundamental importance that its chief effect must have been to facilitate still further changes; for it struck at the whole basis of the settlement of the late seventh century. That settlement had been based on a static economy. This law was bound to lead to increased mobility of land and, once agriculture the basis of the Spartan economy, became mobile and, therefore, subject eventually to exchange and trade, the whole character of the economy and society of Sparta would be transformed. Then Alexander's conquest of the East and its effect on Greece still further dislocated the Spartan state. The gulf between rich and poor became wider (142). The common meals became richer and the poor were therefore excluded and lost citizenship (143). Bribery and corruption continued to flourish and honour and respect were frankly said to depend on wealth (144). Clearly the right of birth rather than wealth to enjoy prestige, which had been a fundamental characteristic of Spartan society, had radically altered.

As usual, the lack of economic prosperity was accompanied by a fall in population (145), but this was greatly aggravated by wars, by the restrictions on citizenship and, most of all, by the actual loss of citizenship through convictions in law courts and for other reasons, and through the loss of estates owing to debts or the loss of Messenia (146). Many disfranchised had gone abroad as mercenaries; King Agesilaus set the example and his son continued the practice. With Alexander's conquest this became even more common and again it was the king, Agis, who set the fashion. The Ephors by this time were obviously less able to restrain the actions of the kings. In any case, to keep Spartans at home where there was no means of subsistence for them would have meant intense social troubles. Many Spartans who made fortunes probably returned home and were able to make use of Eпитadeus' law to force existing landowners into debt and then out of possession of their land. Some of those who had retained their land probably also used Eпитadeus' law to speculate and perhaps mortgaged their land (147), probably not always with happy results. Others, on the other hand, may have been successful enough to add to their estates by making use of money acquired in enterprises abroad.

For a time the merchants and manufacturers in Sparta, as elsewhere in Greece, would benefit from the new markets opened up by Alexander, and Sparta's alliances with other countries may have been accompanied by trade relations (148). The opportunities in the East for disfranchised would relieve the social tension for a period. This respite however, could only have been very brief. The general economic slump in Greece must have affected Sparta, too, now that her economy was becoming more and more a mobile one and, therefore, affected by the economy of Greece and the East as a whole. In any case, the Perioikoi had always been engaged in some trade and they certainly would suffer at this time and so would add to the discontent. When the opportunities for mercenaries and others in the East had become scarcer, there was no hope for the ex-citizens. Once they had lost their land they had no further security for borrowing and, if they had not been among those fortunate enough to make some money in the East, their position was desperate. Meanwhile, the fantastic rise in prices hurt all consumers who were not landowners. After that only the successful landowners benefitted. Those with wealth and land obtained more land while the landless, far from getting land, became even more numerous and more desperate.

As a result of all these changes accelerated by Epitadeus' law and the conquests of Alexander, the land of Laconia was soon concentrated in very few hands (149). Aristotle's vivid description (150) of the economic distress and social chaos in Sparta remind one irresistably of his picture of Attica in Solon's time, and the Accounts available of the crisis ^{in seventh} century Laconia. The state could not permanently resist the crying need for reform. The citizens, who had numbered about 31,000 in the fifth century (151), had been reduced to 1,000 in Aristotle's time and, by the time of Agis IV, they numbered only 700 of which about 100 had landed estates (152). So long as the ex-citizens could compensate for loss of citizenship by activity in a prosperous trade and manufacture (153), there was probably no widespread desire among them for citizenship and, in fact, it is suggested that many were actually glad to lose it (154). Only when the position of the Perioikoi, too, was affected by the general decline in prosperity, would loss of citizenship cease to become a possible blessing and the ex-citizens turn more and more to attempts at revolt.

The decline in prosperity, allied to the impossibility of improving ~~ing~~ trade and industry until the old restrictions were swept away and the traders themselves had some influence in establishing a constitution favourable to the new conditions, forced all the discontented elements to demand changes./

changes. Artisans and Helots probably followed the lead given them by traders, whether these were Perioikoi or disfranchised citizens, especially when the general decline in prosperity aggravated their ~~poverty~~ already oppressed status. The Helots, when domestic economy prevailed, were probably fairly contented and many actually saved money (155). Slaves, unless directly exploited, do not invariably rebel. Unless an opportunity, such as defeat of their masters in war, is offered, they were not likely to go out looking for danger to themselves. Only when their position becomes really unbearable do people revolt, although the reasons which make their conditions intolerable can be enormously varied. Sentiments and ideas not obviously connected with their conditions can play an important part in moulding and influencing the opinions and actions of the oppressed (v.sup. ch.ii & iv). At Sparta, once the landowners were interested in running estates in order to produce a surplus to exchange for luxury goods, serfs would be more directly exploited (156). Even amongst the few citizens there were demands for reform since some of them, although they had so far succeeded in retaining their estates, were heavily in debt.

While social misery in Greece no doubt had its influence on the rising tide of discontent in Sparta, the new philosophies were also able to influence thoughtful men of the period. Popular philosophies criticised details of current society but, when social struggles seemed imminent, called for harmony much in the manner of Hesiod and other early Greek writers (v.sup.ch.ii). Cercidas went rather further. He warned the rich of the necessity for making concessions to the poor if social revolt was to be avoided (157) and so adopted that middle position which was filled in Athens by Solon who also appealed for compromise and harmony (v.sup.ch.iv). This represents in essentials the position of Agis of Sparta, although the different character of the crisis in Sparta from the mere upheavals of other Greek states of the third century called for different and perhaps more extreme reforms. So, while it was the King of Sparta, Agis iv, who put himself at the head of those desiring change in Sparta, as the Spartan aristocracy and Ephors had so often feared, he acted from motives quite different from those of Lysander or Pausanias and individuals of that type. Agis seems to have been a thoughtful person, sensitive to the miseries and weakness, the dishonesty and corruption in Sparta and brave enough and sufficiently convinced of what was right to try to change Spartan conditions even at the expense of his own fortune. Moreover, his own conviction of the rightness of his plans persuaded his family and friends, all wealthy people, to sacrifice their own wealth for the good of the community.

Agis, /

Agis, therefore, found overwhelming support for reform and this, allied to his own ideas, produced a revolutionary movement with himself at its head. Among the youth especially he found support and enthusiasm for his proposed reforms. Many of the youth he armed and helped them to inspire the entire army with a new and much needed discipline and vigour (158). Agis, therefore, had little difficulty in passing a law to cancel all debts, but immediately afterwards, those landowners just freed from debts joined the reactionaries and strengthened them sufficiently to have Agis and his family murdered and so prevented his plans to divide the land and greatly extend the citizenship (159).

His successor, Cleomenes, was converted to the idea of reform by Agis' wife and to these ideas he added the strong influence of Stoicism from his adviser Sphaerus (160). He too used the magic name of Lycurgus to lend support to his projects, ignoring the fact that Lycurgus' settlement was quite reactionary in character, even if he was responsible for some agricultural reforms. This use of tradition is quite characteristic of periods in which reforms are demanded, for people tend to seek justification for their demands. In early Greece and the corresponding period of peasant unrest in England traditions of equality and a sort of "Golden Age" were used to justify and mobilise the claims of the peasants (161). Cleomenes, however, learned from the mistakes of Agis. The mother ^{of Agis} had said of him, "Too much caution, gentleness and humanity had ruined him and them" (162), and Plutarch adds that Agis gave more reason for complaint to his friends than to his enemies since he was too trustful of his opponents. So Cleomenes learned what he regarded as a fundamental ^{lesson} the lesson of all such tyrannies, ~~lesson~~, that force, or its threat, was essential before constitutional changes and economic and social reforms involving a real revolution could be attempted; and defended his methods as the only possible ones (163). Here again the importance of the individual in history is emphasised. Cleomenes was quite a different type of person from Agis, vigorous, decisive, perhaps ambitious. It is true it was additional experience which helped him to avoid Agis' mistakes but his own personality was important in interpreting that experience as a need for force to back his reforms. By adopting this policy, Cleomenes performed the function of the tyrants of early Greece and was recognised as a tyrant by the Greeks themselves (164). Indeed, the whole crisis in Sparta was exactly of the same type as those in the Greek states in the seventh and sixth centuries, and as that crisis in Sparta herself in the seventh century B.C. Cleomenes, whatever his personal ambitions, acted as leader of the new forces and established an autocracy which, if it had lasted long enough, would have allowed these new forces to establish themselves firmly and, finally, would have led to his/

his overthrow by them. Some form of centralised state, resting on the new middle classes, in which agriculture and manufactures would be developed for trade, would then probably have evolved, as it had elsewhere in Greece. The masses of the population were not directly involved in the revolution (165). They supported it for a variety of reasons and received some immediate benefits from it, but it was not their revolution nor were the reforms directly in their interests (v.sub), just as in the early Greek tyrannies, it was the middle class who benefitted and so became a new ruling class, usually in alliance with remnants of the old nobility, while a new class of workers only arose later to challenge their power (v.sup. chs.iv & v). At last, therefore, after experiencing a far greater number of peaks in the wave movement of social revolution than those states which produced tyrannies centuries earlier, the latest being Agis' attempt at reform, Sparta, too, had finally been overwhelmed by a social crisis which could only be solved by revolutionary changes carried through under the dictatorship of a tyrant.

This interpretation of the Spartan tyranny is entirely new, and not only helps to clarify Spartan history, but is of great importance to a proper understanding of the history of Greece and Rome, and so of Western and modern Europe (v.sub.).

Analysis of opposition to and support from Cleomenes in Sparta vary from the simple interpretation of rich against poor, to that of landowners against capitalists, with some variations of these. The rich against poor advocates, perhaps because of the very vagueness of this interpretation, produce the most fantastic terminology. Poehlmann, for instance (166), ignores the conditions of the period and applies modern phrases, for example "Marxist concentration of capital"!, to Sparta, a state which not only had slaves unlike modern times but was still largely feudal in the character of its institutions. Bux (167) talks of "socialist" propaganda. This application of modern economic phrases to the ancient world is a common fault of nineteenth century German scholars and is followed by a number of historians of this century. Hadas (168) quotes Zimmern to comment on the strangeness of some Greek radicals advocating private property and others advocating what he calls communism. Such "strangeness" arises from the failure to appreciate the background of the period and, in this particular case, from the crude confusion of "peasant communism", of reallocation of land, which, at a time of growing trade and mobile economy was a backward measure advocated in early Greece, in the Hellenistic East, and later mediaeval England by peasants who could not be expected to see any other method of alleviating their own distress, and "modern communism", which was not, and could not be, known to the ancient world.

The theory of landowners against capitalists is much more specific but even its advocates have to admit that the dividing line is not clear, since some say that capitalists were also landowners, while others say the landowners were ruined by moneylenders (169). One of the more interesting of the variations on the above theories is that of Kazarow (170), who thinks that it was the lack of both land and industry that drove people to revolt against landowners and moneylenders, although he has to admit that the indebted landowners sided at first with Agis.

In general, the lines are similar to those in Greek states in the seventh and sixth centuries, but, as we should expect, in a more advanced form. As then, there was a mass of landless and indebted farmers who wanted agricultural reforms. There were, on the other hand, landowners, many of them in this case being women, some of whom were not only successful traders and moneylenders (171), but, in their capacity as landowners, must have been the most reactionary section of the population, since to them alone belonged all the privileges of the state; just as in early Greece it was, on the whole, the landowners who enjoyed traditional aristocratic privileges and power. So few landowners were left that it is probable that the majority of them belonged to the reactionary party and did not form the main body of the opposition as is so often supposed. Even those landowners who were heavily in debt only paid lip service to the full reforms and, once debts were abolished, joined the reactionary forces (v. sup.). Obviously landowners, unless prepared to make sacrifices like Agis and Cleomenes, inevitably formed the main body of the reactionary party, since confiscation of land was an essential prelude to the agricultural reforms. It is probable that some of those non-citizens who had become prosperous from trade, manufacture and moneylending fairly early, were now sufficiently wealthy not to feel as yet, the economic decline, and so would also join the reactionary party, especially since in their capacity as moneylenders they would be opposed to the cancelling of debts; but, whatever individual ambitions and objectives there were, the chief object of attack, as in early Attica and other Greek states, was the possession of aristocratic privilege by only a small section of the population and so the control and direction of the state in the interests of that minority.

While it is true that there were many landless and indebted, the decisive leadership of the opposition must have come from the middle class of merchants, who had never enjoyed the citizenship or who had lost it, and who were now faced with a decline in prosperity. Some historians (172) believe the crisis in Sparta to have been due to the disappearance of the middle class. As far as citizens only are concerned the middle class did disappear and left only the/

the very wealthy and privileged and the poor threatened with loss of privileges. However, in a crisis of this character, it is the whole economic, social and political life of the community involving every individual from citizen to Helot, which must be considered. To approach the problem from a narrower angle is to lead to distortions at once. It was precisely the growth of a middle class involved in commerce and manufactures and, perhaps, finance between the landowners and serfs, which had been the main influence in corrupting citizens and changing the life of the community as a whole. This new life which was sweeping Sparta in spite of restrictions and was helping to disintegrate still further the economic and social life of the community, was expressed especially through this middle class composed of people, whether ex-citizens or Perioikoi, with interests other than those characteristic of an aristocratic state. It was this middle class excluded from political rights which provided the means for carrying out the new kind of life, and the leadership and support for the revolutionary movement, which demanded reforms in the interests of the new social forces. The custom of bringing up some non-citizens with citizens (173) probably helped to keep the former contented until the economic crisis affected not only them, but the citizens too. The disfranchised then may have found support for reform among their former associates, especially as many of them had probably already lost some of their privileges as a result of poverty and the loss of land.

The immediate objectives of the reformers were land reform and an extension of the citizen body and it was only of these probably that the revolutionaries were conscious. What they were doing in addition, however, was, by introducing land and social reforms, to overthrow the aristocratic type of state and, therefore, make it possible for a new type of state to be established, a national state in which trade could develop and the old and new nobility and some of the new middle class shared the privileges under a monarchy; that is, a constitutional monarchy based on a mobile economy and loose social structure.

So in early Greece after the tyrannies, there was set up a new type of state based on the advance of commerce and not its restriction and therefore further progress in all spheres was made possible. In England, too, after the Restoration of 1660, a compromise of old and new nobility, of landowners and merchants took place under the monarchy, but the state and monarchy were of an entirely different character (174) and so developed on quite new lines. In the French Revolution, too, (v. sub.), although peasants and workers were drawn into the struggle, it was the middle classes who organised and led it and benefitted from it. It could happen that there would be ~~no~~ more wealthy among the revolutionaries than among the/

the reactionaries of their wealth was of the new type which, in an aristocratic state, did not carry social privileges with it. It was this wealth among some of the revolutionaries which Theognis resented so much, especially when contrasted with poor and indebted nobles. In France the Jacobin Club actually asked 12 French pounds as an entrance fee and 24 as a yearly subscription (175).

In Sparta the law directed against those who married into rich rather than good, that is, noble families (v.sup.), indicates that there were "new" people possessing the new wealth and demanding privileges, as in early Greece. The very use of the word "good" in its sense of the "nobles" as Theognis used it, and as Aristotle uses it when referring to aristocracies (v.sup.), all helps to place this revolution at Sparta in its right perspective as the overthrow of that aristocratic state, which had been reinforced in the late seventh century, and its replacement by a type of state in harmony with the new social conditions and state policy and similar in character to the other Greek national states, but, in Sparta's case, with a constitutional monarchy.

Sparta's revolution must never be confused with the various social upheavals in other Greek states in the third century B.C. There, as a rule, the state had allowed its commerce and manufactures to develop freely, until the loss of markets in the fourth century began to produce social tension, while the economic decline and social misery in the third century provoked continual upheavals. These social risings were also for land and bread but, since in most cases the aristocratic type of state had long ago been overthrown there could be no question of creating a new type of state with prosperous trade, but merely a redivision of the restricted wealth of the city at the expense of the present owners. Here it was ^{the} lack of a middle class as a result of the decline in prosperity and the lack of any lasting economic solution, which made these social upheavals sterile and temporary (v.sup. ch.vii, n.114). Sparta's revolution was also strongly affected by the economic and social conditions in the rest of Greece. The effect as in other states was to intensify the general trend of development but, whereas in the rest of Greece this trend was one of decline in trade after the heyday of its prosperity, in Sparta the trend was one of growing strength of new people, based on trade and manufacture and increase of money within a state still trying to maintain its aristocratic static form. The Spartan revolution, therefore, was quite distinct in character from those other third century upheavals and must not be confused with them. It was essentially of the same type as the revolutions in early Greece which also culminated in tyrannies. It is true that Aristotle and Plutarch described pre-revolutionary conditions in both Attica and Sparta as a social crisis where poor and rich were directly opposed. This, although/

although part of the situation, was an over-simplification (v.sup.ch.iv), but it is commonly made of such revolutionary periods and indeed has also been made of the French revolution, although it, too, was a revolution led by and in the interests of the middle classes even if it, too, enjoyed the support of the peasants and such workers as there were at that period (v.sub.).

The reform party in Sparta therefore, as far as they were conscious of definite demands, wanted more privileges, and extension of landownership and, therefore, indirectly, more freedom for exchange of goods and manufactures. The middle class was probably few in numbers - it usually is even when it is the leadership of a revolution against an aristocracy - but, as it was their unconscious function to lay the economic basis for the reformed state and so to make agricultural reforms really practicable, they were very powerful. Supporting the middle class would be the artisans, who usually follow the merchants at such an early period in the development of trade (v.sup.ch.iv), and who were probably suffering from the restrictions on industry and from the economic slump in third century Greece. At the time of the Theban invasion and even earlier the Perioikoi had been disaffected and these probably included as many artisans as traders, especially as this section of workers was especially mentioned in mobilisation for the army (v.sup.).

The Helots, too, even of Laconia, had been disaffected during the Theban invasion and were probably ready to support the reforms of Cleomenes. The Helots of Laconia had been comparatively loyal for a long time. So long as domestic economy prevailed the half of the produce they handed to the citizens (176), would not necessarily be burdensome. The surplus they could then use for exchange and trade and many Helots actually saved money. However, when citizens began to desire wealth and luxuries, one obvious method of obtaining them was to increase the output of the estate and even perhaps to increase the proportion of the produce given up by the Helots. If this happened, direct exploitation of the Helots would be the rule. No longer would they be family serfs, suffering from social and political restrictions certainly, but not physically driven by economic circumstances to produce beyond their strength. It is significant that in the ancient world, especially in Hellenistic and Roman times, it was only where the market for the produce was large or unlimited or there was some other incentive to increase production, such as in certain types of agriculture and in mining, is there evidence of definite ill-treatment of slaves (177), since only in these cases does increased exploitation of slaves produce increased profits; and even this depends on a regular supply of slaves. Slavery in the southern states of North America was of the patriarchal type until the country's economy became involved in the general trading economy of Western Europe and North America. Direct exploitation of the slaves then became the rule((178) v.sup.):

Cleomenes, like the early tyrants, obtained secure control of an army before he made his attempt at dictatorship. Like other tyrants, too, he had to overthrow and render powerless the representatives of the existing government. In Sparta's case these were the Ephors who, as the representatives of the few citizens, had obtained more and more power and, because of the small citizen body they represented and the increasing social tension, had used it in a more and more reactionary fashion. It was the Ephors, therefore, whom Cleomenes attacked first. He had the Ephors killed and thus, by removing the leadership of the opposition, saved further bloodshed. In this Cleomenes expressed something of his own personality, his confidence that the use of force when necessary would save a great deal of suffering, which might have arisen out of gentler methods and did indeed result from Agis' peaceful attempts at reform. Cleomenes exiled those opponents likely to act as a counter-revolutionary force and then exercised a virtual dictatorship based on his supporters and the army (179). He recalled Archidamus, brother of Agis, perhaps as additional support or perhaps to give an appearance of legality to his position, but Archidamus was killed by the opposition (180).

As a result of the aristocratic settlement in the late seventh century, the Spartan monarchy had been forced more and more out of any position of influence within the state. Only leadership in war remained, and this was hedged around with as many restrictions as possible (v.sup.). The continued success of the Ephors' policy against attempts by the king at pursuing individualist policies drove those kings who desired change further and further into the ranks of the general body of opposition to the aristocratic government. It was because of this historic evolution of the Spartan monarchy that the king became the tyrant of Sparta. Agis, lacking the vigour and ambition of a Lysander, attempted to introduce his reforms by persuasive methods and never became tyrant. Cleomenes, a more forceful and perhaps ruthless personality, learned by Agis' mistakes and used his followers to become tyrant and to back his reforms by organised force. Here again is illustrated the interrelation of individual personalities and social conditions in history. Cleomenes, although ready to use force where necessary, was strong enough to stay his hand where possible and therefore created his state with a minimum of opposition, as Peisistratus had done in Athens. Cleomenes succeeded, therefore, where Agis failed and created a state and an army young in enthusiasm and vigour and wise in ideals.

Cleomenes' next step was to abolish the office of Ephor except for one which he kept himself. Thus, like Peisistratus at Athens, by controlling the chief office, he really overruled the constitution and acted as dictator. To defend his/

his actions from a constitutional standpoint, and thus remove a possible basis for opposition, Cleomenes pointed out how the kings had once had far greater powers than the Ephors but that the latter had usurped more and more power until they were so much more powerful than the kings that they could depose and kill kings and threaten those princes who had desired to restore Sparta's glory and prestige, clearly a reference to people like Lysander. While it was not true that the Ephors had introduced luxury into Sparta as Cleomenes said, it was true that their position as guardians of the restricted aristocratic government, did make wealth and the desire for it take corrupt, dishonest forms and the debts and inequalities mentioned by Cleomenes arose, too, from the restrictive, static constitution, which hindered the straightforward growth in mobility of the economy and diverted it into distorted, corrupt channels.

Cleomenes, therefore, argued that he was restoring the Spartan state to the conditions it enjoyed in earlier times. While this was true superficially, since he again gave the monarchy more power than the Ephors, the change was fundamentally an advance to a new state, not a reversion to an old one, except that the conditions prevailing before the aristocratic settlement had been restored and even advanced to their logical conclusion. Conditions had been transformed by the changes in economic and social life in Sparta as well as in the rest of Greece and in the East. The supporters of the king could not be exactly the same type as the supporters of centuries ago. For instance, there were far more Helots and probably also more traders and artisans than in early times. The changes of several centuries could not be ignored. In the early period there had been the possibility of new people using the king against the nobles but the situation had not reached maturity. Now in Cleomenes' time the situation was more than mature, it was overripe, and it was not for want of other attempts that the fruit had not already been picked.

Cleomenes completed his destruction of the power of the organised aristocracy, that is, rule by the restricted number of aristocratic citizens, by breaking the power of the Senate and substituting a Council of Elders with only nominal powers (181). The way was then open for an advance to a more democratic type of constitution on the basis of an extended citizen body. Instead of in hundreds, the Spartan citizens could again be reckoned in thousands. This, by the very magnitude of the increase, was a revolution in itself, for the new people, many of them engaged in new ways of life and new professions and with new ideas, dominated the citizen body and would, therefore, stamp their own outlook on the Spartan community (v. sup. chs. ii & iv) (182).

Once the power of the aristocracy was broken and his own dictatorship/

dictatorship secure, Cleomenes introduced his economic reforms. Agis' mistake had been to attempt such revolutionary land reforms without first securing the power necessary to put them through. Cleomenes abolished debts and divided the land among a large number of Perioikoi who thus acquired citizenship (183). This was an extreme solution to which most early tyrants did not have to resort, since none of them had much agricultural land. In Attica, however, where there was a considerable amount and, therefore, a severe land crisis as in Sparta, Solon and Peisistratus did abolish debts, restore lands which had been pledged and granted credits, and so settled the agricultural question for several centuries (v.sup.ch.iv). The division of land by Cleomenes was quite different in character from most of the attempts made in Greek cities in the third century B.C. (v.sup.). The need for it in Sparta arose from the dislocation of domestic economy by the growth of trade and increase in money and by the mobility of land legalised by Epitadeus, which led to its concentration in a few hands as it had in early Greece; in contrast to the old laws and customs which created a very restricted citizen body and prevented any advance for the majority of the population in either prosperity or prestige. The crisis in other Greek states in the third century was due to the decay of trade and manufacture, which, in Sparta, had only just been given freedom to develop by the revolution.

Like the early tyrants, Cleomenes recognised the importance of trade by issuing coins (184), and facilitated its further development by the creation of many new citizens, many of them probably interested in trade or manufacture (v.sup.). He was probably responsible for the building of a new wall round Sparta (185), which was not only a means of employing workless and landless, but a sign of renewed strength, prestige and patriotism. Indeed, a new patriotic spirit, based on social security, democracy and revolutionary fervour, swept through Sparta (186), as it had through the early Greek states.

The Spartan army, as a result of the degeneracy and corruption at home, had lost much of its morale and vitality. Cleomenes, like Agis, by giving the Spartans something to fight for, and by new methods of training and discipline and extension of the citizenship, produced an army renowned as much for its high character as its fine fighting qualities. At a time when other armies were characterised by licentiousness and camp followers, Cleomenes' army became distinguished for its freedom from these characteristics. Moreover, Cleomenes himself set an example of simplicity and sobriety on the one hand, and, on the other, by making himself accessible to all, encouraged the best fighting qualities on the basis of democratic feelings and sincere respect for their leader (187). Instead, therefore, of the military weakness and social panic which had characterised Sparta during the Theban invasion, the new Spartan/

Spartan army not only revived old glories, but wrote new pages in ^{the} history of Greek fighting qualities. So Athens, after her democratic revolution, had been an inspiration to all Greece in the fight against Persia.

Unfortunately for Sparta, because of the long delay in achieving her revolution under the tyranny, the conditions in Greece had radically changed and, far from being an inspiration to the rest of Greece, she roused hopes only among the poor and oppressed and, therefore, incurred the fear and hostility of the governments of Greek states. Sparta, in fact, was having this long delayed establishment of a democratic state in very different conditions from those of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. and so it involved some quite distinct differences both in Sparta itself and even more in its effect on other states. In Sparta and the lowest stratum of the population was drawn into the struggle on a wider scale. The ability of the Spartan government to preserve its constitution in the face of disintegration and actual revolt against it, only intensified, by continued restrictions, the inequality, oppression and misery which provoked the revolts. Accordingly, a far greater proportion of the population was actively interested in change than had been the case in the early Greek states, which had not withstood the continued attacks the Spartan ~~state had to~~ state had to face and, therefore, had not perpetuated and aggravated the existing conditions until virtually the whole of the state demanded change. *the result was that a much greater number of people demanded reform*

In Sparta, therefore, the Laconian Helots had been added to the Messenian ones as discontented elements. The Perioikoi, too, were disaffected, while leadership was provided by ex-citizens and citizens who had lost some of their privileges. However, this did not alter the character of the reforms, The demands were led by and in favour of, the middle class, the merchants and those who desired citizenship. not only for the prestige involved, but also in order to be able to run estates for sale on the market, agriculture being Sparta's most important occupation, or capable of being, if it were allowed to develop into a real industry. That is, in general, it was the middle class who led the revolution and who most benefitted from it. The mass support from artisans and Helots only serve to indicate the widespread character of the crisis and perhaps to produce rather more far-reaching demands. The reforms, therefore, which followed on the establishment of the dictatorship, were of a rather more extreme character than those of early Greece, since the economic and social crisis which produced it was so much more extreme. Even so, both the economic and social reforms favoured essentially the middle class. Prosperity was restored in the countryside, Sparta's military strength was revived and the citizenship extended but only to a certain number of free men. The proportion of population who benefitted directly by these changes was still small. However, as in Attica, although complete democracy/

democracy was not acquired by the whole population even after the end of the tyranny, still, under the tyranny, the basis for its further development was laid. So in Sparta the restrictions of aristocracy were broken and the road to further progress thrown open.

The effect outside Sparta must be judged according to the economic decline, unemployment, poverty and social tension prevailing in the third century (v.sup.ch.vii). The type of person who had supported the tyrannies in Athens and other states in early Greece and the middle class in general had, in the Greek republics, gradually developed into a new ruling class only to be challenged themselves by the landless and workless produced by the decline in prosperity. In the Italian city states, too, the revolutionaries who overthrow the feudal nobles, formed eventually a new aristocracy which was challenged by the growing class of workers (188). Macchiavelli's analysis of the classes of this period as Nobles, People and Workers (v.sup. ch.v), gives a clear explanation of both their origin and their contemporary status. The people, the middle class, the revolutionaries who destroyed the power of the aristocracy and merged with the remnants of it to form a new ruling class, were now challenged by a new class, the workers.

So, in the Greek states, the rich landowners, merchants and bankers and the body of citizens, now usually small since the social tension had usually been met by the application of a property qualification to the citizenship (189), rightly felt their position to be still further threatened by the revolutionary feeling aroused in Sparta; for the discontented, especially in the Peloponnese, took the opportunity of demanding for themselves the agricultural reforms carried through in Sparta. The fact that abolition of debts and allocation of land in Greek states in the third century had only replaced one discontented party by another, made no difference. In Sparta there was some possibility of more permanent benefit from the reforms since, with a growth in prosperity of the population and increased exchange, she could provide an extended home market for agriculture and manufactures. Other Greek states, however, had exhausted this period of development a long time ago and something more than a mere allocation of land and abolition of debts would have been required to restore prosperity. Naturally enough, however, this was not understood by the oppressed and sympathetic revolutionary outbreaks occurred.

It has already been noted (v.sup.ch.v) that various motives lie behind a desire to intervene in another state's affairs, but fear of part of one's own population is a very pressing/

pressing one. The ruling class in the Greek states in the third century had only a very precarious hold on their position and could not tolerate the further danger from the upheaval in Sparta. So revolutionary Sparta incurred the active opposition of the privileged classes in Greece. The historical irony of it! Sparta, because of her aristocratic settlement in the late seventh century, had been the spearhead of the opposition to the tyrannies and now, because of her own tyranny, its delay still another result of that aristocratic settlement, she herself was the object of the concentrated hatred of those states she had once attacked. And worse was to come. Just as the Spartan aristocracy had readily combined with Athenian exiles and friends of Greece's enemy, Persia, to overthrow the Athenian tyranny, so the ruling classes of Greece, terrified for their safety, readily combined with Greece's enemies on her borders to overthrow the Spartan tyranny.

Cleomenes himself probably visualised a strong Sparta at the head of the Achaean League and was not really conscious of his potential role as revolutionary leader in all Greece. However, it is doubtful even if he had been accepted as leader of the Achaean League, as seemed possible at one time (190), whether he could have maintained that position without bringing some relief for the poor. Any reforms elsewhere in Greece, however, could only be temporary. Real reform was only possible if the stagnant industries of Greece could be revitalised, but the whole economic development after the few years of prosperity following on Alexander's Eastern conquests was against this. In Sparta, on the other hand, the further growth of trade and industry was made possible, for a time at least, by the removal of restrictions on them and by the creation of a home market - a market denied to other Greek states without a complete reorganisation of their societies involving perhaps the abolition of slavery - through the increase in the number of landowners, a growth in the prosperity of those engaged in an advancing trade and manufactures and the freeing of Helots and household slaves (191). Moreover, Sparta's main industry was agriculture, for which there was always some sort of market in most Greek states. Of course, eventually, Sparta too would have suffered from the lack of markets, all the more quickly because of the economic decay around her, and the lack of extensive markets outside the Spartan state, but she had prospects of prosperity for some time, and now that conditions at last allowed it, iron, in which Laconia was very rich, could be used on a greater scale to increase efficiency and productivity in both agriculture and manufactures. Economic reform in other Greek states, which had passed through Sparta's type of crisis three centuries before and where the available privileges and prosperity were contracting, would merely create a new distressed class and more social discord.

This/

This naturally did not prevent active sympathy for Cleomenes all over the Peloponnese and even in the Achaean League itself (192), perhaps the strongest ^{political} unit in Greece at this period. Aratus, the acknowledged leader of the League, had already lost a certain amount of prestige before the reforms of Cleomenes (193). Cleomenes had defeated Aratus and the Achaeans then refused to continue the war. This seems to have been an expression not only of disinclination to fight Cleomenes, but also distrust of Aratus himself (194). Aratus, therefore, was all the more alive to the danger these reforms represented to his own position. He and his associates no doubt quite honestly considered Cleomenes' proposals would upset all law and order, and, indeed, so far as their own ideas of law and order were concerned, they were quite correct (195). Plutarch (196) points out that what Aratus resented most in Cleomenes' reforms was the abolition of riches and the return to a life of simplicity, and to prevent this he was prepared to ask Greeks to submit to the royal power of Macedon, his most bitter enemy in his youth. Clearly, two motives influenced Aratus; one of fanatical hatred of social concessions to the people and the other a jealous fear of Cleomenes' prestige and power as a military leader.

Aratus, therefore, incited Antigonus Dason of Macedon not only to persuade Ptolemy to stop his subsidies to Cleomenes, but actively to intervene against Cleomenes (197), representing the latter as Antigonus' rival for the control of Greece (198). Did the ghosts of those Athenians who had asked for Sparta's intervention against Athens and of those Greeks who had even invited Persia's intervention in Greece, now haunt Aratus? Did the tyrants overthrown by the Spartan aristocracy now haunt the Spartan revolutionaries? The Spartan tradition had been to welcome such invitations to attack revolutionaries in other states and now Sparta herself had to watch the same technique being employed against herself. The interveners were now themselves subject to intervention. The Spartan revolutionaries were now having to pay for the failure of the early opposition in Sparta to break the power of the Spartan aristocracy when other Greek aristocracies were crushed. As a result of this, the Spartan aristocracy had formed an alliance strong enough to prevent Athens from becoming head of a united Greek world based on trade and perhaps empire. The disunity of Greece arising from this and other causes made her an easy victim for larger states. Moreover, these states used the victory of the Spartan revolution, delayed as it was, as an excuse for interference in Greek affairs. History can exact terrible punishment for failure and weakness.

A special meeting of the Achaean League had been called to support Aratus. It is possible, however, that the majority could not afford to come to a special meeting of this sort. The poorer people, in any case, usually abstained from the Achaean/

Achaean assembly because of work and the expense of travel (199), and the assembly seems to have been controlled on the whole by wealthy and distinguished families who would be ready to support action against the Spartan revolution (200). In any case, Aratus probably had his own supporters there in force and was clever enough to insult Cleomenes and so provoke him into declaring war on the League (201). Freeman (202) is of the opinion that the Assembly could not have known of Cleomenes' terms or they would not have agreed to call in Antigonus. Only a minority naturally would support Aratus in such an extreme step, just as only a minority demanded Sparta's and Persia's intervention in Athenian and Greek affairs. Apparently, after this meeting of the Assembly the terms did become known and there was a decisive swing towards a peace policy, but it was already too late.

It was pointed out (v. sup. ch. v) that intervention in another state's affairs may be the result of fear of one's own social and political settlement at home or used as an excuse for furthering one's own ambitions. Sparta had been influenced by the first motive when she overthrew tyrannies in Greece. Antigonus of Macedon was probably concerned mainly with the second, when he defeated Cleomenes and destroyed his reforms. However, Macedon's traditional role in Greek politics was to favour the establishment of oligarchic governments since they were composed of people with something to lose in war and social upheaval and who, therefore, welcomed a power which would maintain social order. The democratic leaders having little or nothing to lose, had been the leaders of the opposition to Macedon (203). Since sections of the Greek population were already friendly, it was easier for Macedon to use them and strengthen their position at the expense of other sections in order to maintain order and Macedon's supremacy. Nor had Philip II and Alexander disappointed their Greek supporters. The treaty between Macedon and the League of Corinth expressly stated that attempts at division of land and abolition of debts and the use of slaves for revolutionary purposes were forbidden and would be prevented with the combined might of all Greece and Macedon (204).

Aratus recognised this function of Macedon's when he invited Antigonus to intervene against Cleomenes. Polybius no doubt expressed the view of contemporary Greeks of the privileged class, when he declared his appreciation of Antigonus' benefits to Greece and the loss involved in his death (205). Moreover, Polybius was well aware of the true tradition of Macedon's role in Greece. After praising Antigonus for sparing Sparta and warring only against Cleomenes and his reforms, he went on to compare him, significantly enough, to Philip II of Macedon (206). Many Greeks had regarded Macedon as the saviour of their freedom and culture (207) although others found it a useful argument to accuse Philip and/

and Alexander of enslaving Greece (208). This accusation, however, was made by an Aetolian, who was therefore a rival to Macedon at this time rather than a victim. Antigonos, therefore, followed that tradition and, having already been invited to intervene by the conservative Aratus and his party, was not concerned so much to conquer Sparta as to extend his influence in Greece. To that, however, the Spartan revolution was a danger and obstacle, and was therefore crushed. As a result of his intervention the amount of independence left in Greece was still further reduced and the strength of Macedon increased at Greece's expense.

When Cleomenes took the field, his own personal dash and daring and the courage, efficiency and high morale of his army amazed and impressed all Greece. Even those who had formerly sneered at Cleomenes' reforms now began to understand that it was precisely those reforms which were filling Sparta with a new and vigorous life (209). It was because Aratus had already experienced this at close quarters and had appreciated the danger to all he held dear if Sparta should continue to advance, that he felt compelled to invite Macedon's intervention.

Cleomenes' strength in the war lay largely in the support he enjoyed in practically every Greek state because of his reputation as a revolutionary leader. Cleomenes, therefore, made a fatal mistake when he alienated support in Argos where reforms were apparently expected (210). It is not clear if this was intended or not. Cleomenes was said to have been angry with Megistonus who had been made responsible for the obedience of the Argives. It is possible, therefore, that Cleomenes was quite willing to carry through reforms in Argos but had left the decisions of policy there to Megistonus. He had certainly allowed some moderate political reforms in Mantinea (211). However, it is doubtful if Cleomenes had intended to act as revolutionary leader in Greece. In carrying through reforms in Sparta he was, in his own estimation, restoring to Sparta her ancient greatness and glory and he saw himself probably as the head of a strong Sparta and perhaps of the whole Peloponnese, but not of a revolutionary movement embracing all Greece. He was, like the early tyrants, almost certainly unconscious of his historical role as the spearhead of the movement which broke the aristocracy based on birth and landownership. He would, therefore, fail to understand its effect on other states, since his own personal ideas and ambitions were not extended in that direction.

Napoleon, too, had been aided in his early victories by the support he received because of the social reforms he initiated in other countries (v.sub.). This was not a deliberately revolutionary policy, however, but only a means, whether/

whether consciously applied or not, to his own advancement. By the time of his invasion of Russia, however, the balance of social alliances in France had changed sufficiently for him to attack the extremists among his former supporters much in the manner of Cromwell (v. sup. ch. v). Accordingly in Russia, far from abolishing serfdom as he had done elsewhere, he fought the peasants who were revolting against their own landowners and so raised a national war against himself from which he never recovered (212).

However, Cleomenes, like the other tyrants of his type who represented the interests of the middle class against the nobility, failed ultimately through lack of money. He had lost his subsidy from Ptolemy as a result of the intrigues of Aratus and Antigonos and his new army and state, like those of early Greek states, had difficulty in finding money to finance all the services and institutions necessary for the efficient running and defence of the state. Cleomenes' success, too, like that of the tyrants, would not survive unless he could introduce some system of regular taxation and a permanent public treasury which would continue to serve the interests of the people, help the economy, to advance and so increase the prosperity of the population. The first financial demand, so long as Sparta was ringed round by hostile states, was for the army and the war and for this purpose Cleomenes even had to sell the citizenship to those Helots who could buy it (213).

A further weakness in Sparta was that Cleomenes had not given citizenship to free men and freedom to Helots on a really extensive scale so as to build a real citizen, or at least free, army which would embrace practically all the inhabitants of the community. Certainly, his reforms in that direction had been revolutionary, but still more was needed to meet a powerful state such as Macedon. To have done this, of course, would have involved practically the abolition of the Helots and Cleomenes, like most people, was not interested in long distance plans but in securing these reforms he saw were immediately necessary. Probably more and more Helots would have been freed gradually once a free economy really developed and the demand for free, or industrial slave labour arose; (of course, as in the other commercial states, slave labour may have developed later still but that was quite different from serfdom;) but it was no part of Cleomenes' social policy to free them. Instead, Cleomenes relied on mercenaries - no substitute for free men - to supplement the army and paid for them with the occasional money he received from Ptolemy. When that money ceased and other sources of income dried up, the mercenaries became discontented and therefore the morale of a decisive section of his army was shaken.

It/

It was because of this lack of money and supplies that Cleomenes had to choose an unfavourable moment to fight and was defeated at Sellasia. However, Polybius is inaccurate (214) in suggesting that if only Antigonus had been recalled to Macedon a few days sooner, Cleomenes would have been saved. Cleomenes would no doubt have won the battle of Sellasia but he would have had to fight again and would probably have lost. He had been relying on foreign money, which was no longer available, and he had lost prestige and the confidence of the people since the loss of Argos.

It has also been suggested that a united Greece would have proved stronger than Macedon, but the only basis for a strong, permanently united Greece was a revitalised economy and a voluntary union under one leadership. This could only have been achieved by enormous revolutionary changes, probably impossible for the Greeks at that time, and even so might have been completely impossible since the economic centre had shifted East where economic and social conditions were decisive factors in determining Greek social and political development. Even if Cleomenes had defeated Macedon, however, the Spartan revolution would still have had to face Rome (v.sub.ch.ix), so that the general line of historical evolution would still have been the same.

Antigonus maintained he was at war only with Cleomenes, not Sparta. He therefore spared the city, but the reforms were abolished and the old regime established (215). Clearly this was the most direct method of reducing Sparta to her former weakness and apathy. Cleomenes' only hope was to obtain money which was essential for his army and to attempt a restoration of his tyranny. For his overthrow was not at all like the expulsion of the Athenian tyrant. The latter had already outlived his usefulness, his supporters were strong enough to maintain control without him and so the tyranny had grown more oppressive and the population more restless. The overthrow of tyrannies by Sparta was therefore easy since the population had probably no interest in defending the tyrants. It was only when Sparta tried to impose a reactionary settlement on Athens that the people showed where their interests and sympathies really lay and drove them out and laid the basis for the democracy.

In Sparta's case Cleomenes was still fighting for the revolution against reactionary forces, and his destruction was therefore followed by the successful overthrow of his revolutionary reforms and a deliberate imposition of the old regime upon the people, whereas in Athens the overthrow of the tyrant, who was no longer needed by the revolutionary forces, far from leading to a reversal of the economic and social progress which had been made, was the signal for a further extension of democracy in spite of the Spartan attempts to impose/

impose an oligarchy. Under the circumstances prevailing at Sparta, if Cleomenes could have returned with money and an army he would no doubt have been welcomed with joy by the majority of the population. However, money and support were lacking. The strength of the opposition to the tyranny, represented by Macedon and the governments of practically all the Greek states, had been too great for Cleomenes to withstand for long without more permanent financial backing.

It was the delay in the revolution and, therefore, the changed conditions in which it took place, which destroyed the tyranny. The early tyrannies had had to face the consistent hostility of only one Greek state, namely Sparta, and had emerged victorious; and only after the new states established after the tyrannies had had time to settle down did they then have to face Persia. Sparta, however, by her unique development, just as she had been alone in her hostility to the tyrannies, now found herself alone in defence of her own tyranny against the now reactionary Greek governments and, most formidable of all, the power of Macedon. So the French revolution had to face not only Britain, who had experienced her revolution a century before but was afraid, like the Greek states, of the effect of French revolutionary sentiments on her own growing class of workers, but also the opposition of most of the still feudal countries of Europe (v.sub.).

Cleomenes' attempt at rousing the people of Alexandria to revolt for liberty (216) is significant. The influence of the growing social troubles in the Hellenistic kingdoms (v.sup.ch.vii) had clearly not been without effect in Greece. Moreover, Cleomenes was beginning to realise by hard experience that one of his greatest sources of strength was the support of the discontented masses. Unfortunately for him, the variation in the rate of development of society and discontent in the Hellenistic kingdoms in comparison with each other and with Greece, meant that discontent had not yet matured in Egypt to the point of revolt. Cleomenes was twenty years too early for a revolt in Alexandria. Moreover, this failure to synchronise revolts in Greece and the East gave Rome her opportunity, since the opposition was divided and Rome could use such revolts to excuse intervention and so could deal with the various states one by one.

The general analogy of the French revolution is worth indicating here. The Bourbons had established an autocracy on the basis of their standing army, which the English kings were never able to do although the Stuarts had attempted it, and which delayed the reforms carried through by the French revolution for a century and a half after the English one. The revolution in France was therefore more explosive, and involved more artisans and labourers, than the English. (Most/

(Most wage-earners took no interest in the English revolution; Morton, op.cit., p.231). Meanwhile the stimulus given to England's trade and industry which led to the growth of colonies and the industrial revolution, in France produced defeats in war and the loss of colonies, and so increased chaos and tension at home. France had more developed industries than England in the eighteenth century, and yet the state's feudal characteristics such as expensive court and heavy taxes still remained to cause great distress by their restrictive effect. The revolution, the organisation for which was helped by the French philosophers of the eighteenth century (217), was promptly followed by confiscation and re-allocation of estates to the peasants, and the smashing of restraints on trade and industry (218). In France, however, as in Sparta, the revolution favoured the middle classes, not the artisans, or, apart from a few immediate reforms, the peasants (219).

Outside France itself, as outside Sparta, support for the revolution was found in every European country (220). By its very lateness the French revolution was concerned with modern European conditions, as Sparta had been with the Hellenistic-Roman world, rather than with those very similar conditions which had produced the same kind of revolutions in early Greece and in seventeenth century England. It should again be emphasised, however, that separate traditions produce enormously varied results, even though the general conditions are similar. Britain, like the Greek states, was afraid of those popular forces at home which had been crushed by 1660 but had grown stronger since then (221), and became a most active opponent of the Revolution (222).

Napoleon performed the function of a tyrant by maintaining the gains of the Revolution. He even carried them into other countries, where serfdom and feudal dues were abolished (223). Under Napoleon the Revolution was maintained by a new type of army based on discipline, improved technique, including artillery and increased speed, revolutionary fervour and friendliness between general and troops, (224). He had to resort to heavy taxation to pay the army and was finally defeated, partly because he had outlived his usefulness as dictator, like the early Greek tyrants, and also because he was opposed, as Cleomenes and later Nabis had been, by a coalition of countries, the power of at least one of which was steadily growing.

In Sparta Cleomenes' overthrow represented a defeat for the democratic revolution, not its crowning as in early Greece. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Spartan revolutionary movement threw up another tyrant to lead the people once more to victory, only to meet once again with overwhelming defeat (v.sub.).

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII.

1. Thuc. i. 95, 134.
2. Hdt. vii. 139.
3. Thuc. i. 90/2.
4. Thuc. i. 95; Plut. Aris. 23.
5. Diod. Sic. xv. 50.
6. Thuc. i. 134.
7. J.H.S. xxxii. p.34.
8. Aris. Pol. v. 1.1301B; cf. vii. 14. 1333B.
9. Thuc. i. 128; Paus. iv. 24.
10. Thuc. i. 101; Diod. Sic. xi. 63; Plut. Cim. 16; Polyaeus, i. 14. 3; Aelian, V.H. vi. 7.
11. Plut. Cim. 16.
12. Plut. Cim. 17; Paus. iv. 24. 6; Diod. Sic., xi. 64.
13. Xen. Hell. v. 2.3.
14. Thuc. i.101.
15. Thuc. i. 102; Diod. Sic. xi. 64. 2; Plut. Cim. 16.
16. Thuc. i. 102.
17. Thuc. i. 102; Plut. Cim. 17.
18. cf. Arist. Lak. Pol. ap. Harpocrationem, s.v. mora; Xen. de rep. Lac. xi. 4; Hell. vi. 4. 15; on this cf. Toynbee, J.H.S. xxxiii. pp.266/7. cf. p.268. n.86.
19. cf. Toynbee, l.c., p.268, n.86.
20. Toynbee, l.c.p.268.
21. Hdt. ix. 81.
22. Hdt. iii. 148; v. 49; vi. 84.
23. Hdt. vi. 85, 106.
24. Hdt. ix. 10.
- 25./

25. Thuc. v. 36; viii. 6.
26. Thuc. i. 135.
27. cf. Dickins, J.H.S. xxxii. pp. 1. ff.; C.Q. v.p.243.
28. cf. Aris. Ath. Pol. 20, 3; 27. 4; cf. Walker, C.A.H. v.pp.98ff., for the dating of this period.
29. Thuc. i. 107; Diod. Sic. xi. 80.
30. Diod. Sic. xi. 81.
31. Diod. Sic. xi. 74; Thuc. i. 109.
32. cf. Walker, l.c. pp.86/7; cf. p.86, n.2.
33. Thuc. i. 114; v. 16; Plut. Per. 22-3.
34. On the declaration of war, cf. Thuc. i. 80 ff. For expressions of peace, cf. Thuc. ii. 18.
35. Thuc. v. 63.
36. Aris. Ath. Pol. 37 ff.; Xen. Hell. ii.3. The above account of the vagaries of Spartan policy is essentially new since it arises from the new interpretation of the seventh century settlement, the position of the Ephors and the motives behind the aristocratic policy (v.sup. ch.6). It does seem to make more sense of Spartan policy than most accounts.
37. Thuc. i. 19; v. 81.
38. Plut. Lys. 30.
39. Plut. Lys. 6.
40. Xen. Hell. ii. 3, 6-8; Plut. Lys. 5, 13.
41. Plut. Lys. 13.
42. Plut. Lys. 14-15.
43. Plut. Lys. 21.
44. Diod. Sic. xiv. 10.
45. Plut. Lys. 2, 4.
46. C.Q. v. p.242. This mistaken interpretation arises from considering the period too abstractly, away from its background/

background. It is necessary to consider not what is progressive in general or from a modern standpoint, but what, in the conditions of the period, was possible to achieve in the way of immediate advantage to a majority of the whole population, and what would make future progress possible.

47. Plut. Lys. 23.
48. Xen. Hell. v. 1.
49. Plut. Lys. 2, 16-17; Inst. Lac. 42.
50. Plut. Lys. 16, 18.
51. Plut. Lys. 24 ff.
52. Aris. Pol. v. 1. 1301B; Plut. Lys. 24.
53. Jardé, op.cit. p.389, believes Lysander's plan was the beginning of a series of constitutional changes. I doubt if Lysander actually planned those so far ahead, but probably more changes would have followed if he had succeeded in carrying through his first change.
54. Plut. Ages. 5.
55. Plut. Lys. 24/6; 30.
56. Plut. Mor. 230A; Lys. 30.
57. Plut. Lys. 19-21.
58. Aris. Ath. Pol. 38. 1. cf. 40.3.
59. Plut. Lys. 17.
60. Plut. Lyc. 30; Agis, 5; Paus. ix. 32. s? / Ages. 1?
61. Poseidon, ap. Athen. vi. 233F.
62. cf. Plut. Lys. 19, where Thorax, a friend of Lysander, was put to death for having silver in his possession.
63. cf. Plut. Ages. 2, where Archidamus was fined; Ages, 4, where Agesilaus was fined; Ages. 34, for a fine of 1,000 dr.; Lyc. 12, where Agis was fined; cf. Pericl. 22; cf. Thuc. v. 63, where Agis was threatened with a fine of 100,000 dr. It is possible that Spartan kings were allowed to possess money while this was forbidden to citizens, perhaps to pay for some essential state expenses. For other exx. of fines cf. Xen. de Rep., Lac. 8; Plut. Pelop. 6, 13; Diod. Sic. xv. 27.
64. Plato, Alcib, I. 122E.
65. /

65. Isocr. de Pace, 96; Aris. Pol. ii. 9. 1271B; Plut. Ages, 20; Lys. 17-8; Agis. 5, 7; Inst. Lac. 41.
66. Aris. Pol. ii. 9. 1270A; Xen. de Rep. Lac., 14.
67. Xen. de Rep. Lac., 14; Aris. Pol., ii. 9. 1271A; Plut. Agis, 3; Phyl. ap. Athen, iv. 142A-C; Agatharchides ap. Athen. xii. 550D.
68. Plato, Legg. i. 637; vi. 781; Aris. Pol. ii. 9. 1269B; Plut. Agis, passim.
69. Xen. de Rep. Lac. xiv.
70. Plut. Ages, 18-19.
71. Phyl. ap. Athen, iv. 142A-C.
72. Hdt. vi. 50, 82.
73. Hdt. vi. 72.
74. Plut. Per. 22.
75. Plut. Lys. 19.
76. Hdt. vi. 86.
77. Plut. Lys. 16.
78. Aris. Pol. ii. 9. 1270B. 19; 1271A. 25; Paus. iv. 5.
79. cf. Thuc. i. 120, where it is pointed out that even inland states will suffer if the coast is attacked in war for the exports and imports of these states would be affected. cf. Thuc. iv. 53, for evidence of the importance of Cythera to Laconian trade.
80. cf. Phyl. ap. Athen, iv. 142A-C, for the use of foreign foods, wines and perfumes.
81. Ar., Eccl., 542; Plin., H.N. ix. 60.
82. Seltman, "Greek Coins", p.32.
83. Xen. Hell., iii. 3. 7; Plin., H.N., vii. 56.
84. Plut., Lyc., 9; Athen, v. 198D; 199E; Critias, Lac, Rep., ap. Athen., 483B; Pollux, iii. 46, 97.
85. Plut. Lyc., 9.
86. Ar. Eccl. 542; Athen., v. 198F; xi. 483B.
- 87./

87. Strabo, vi. 3. 3.
88. Critias, ap. Athen., xi. 483B.
89. I.G. ii. (2). 463, L.29; I.G. ii. (2). 1672, L.188.
cf. Plut. Agis, 9; Plato.Alcib, I. 133E, for evidence
of financial and industrial development in Laconia
after the Peloponnesian War.
90. O. Mueller, op.cit., ii. pp.221/2, is of this opinion.
91. Polyb., vi. 49.8.
92. Athen, iv. 142A-C.
93. cf. Aris. Pol., ii. 9. 1270B, where he points out that
Spartans with large families would be poor.
94. cf. Plut. Ages., 35, where exemption from taxation was
given as an honour.
95. Since early times in Greece the cost of living had been
rising steadily, (v.sup.ch. vii). Sparta must have
been affected in the same way once she was interested
in buying imported articles and in selling produce
to help to pay for these. Indeed even the limited trade
carried on by the Perioikoi must have brought Sparta within
the orbit of Greek economy.
96. cf. Aris., Pol, iii. 1. 1275B; Plut. Mor., 221B, for
cases involving contracts which were held every day.
cf. Plut., Agis, 13, for references to account books and
money lenders.
97. cf. Aris. ii. 9.1269B; 1270A; Plut. Agis. 7.
98. Xen., de Rep. Lac., xi. 2.
99. Plato, Alc., i. 122D; Strabo, viii. 5.4.
100. Plut. Lyc., 24; Strabo, viii. 5. 4.; Myron, ap. Athen.,
xiv. 657D; Paus. iii. 20. 6.
101. Hdt., ix. 80; Pollux, iii, 83.
102. v. sup. ch. vi; cf. Hdt., ix. 10; Thuc. iv. 8, 80;
v. 34; vii. 19.
103. cf. Thuc. iv. 26; v. 34; Xen. Hell., i. 3. 15; Plut.,
Ages. 6; Pollux, iii. 83; cf. Hesych., v. Neodamoi;
Phyl., ap. Athen., vi. 271E.
- 104./

104. Hdt. vi. 75.
105. Thuc. i. 101; iv. 41, 80; v. 14, 35; Diod. Sic., xv. 67. 3-6; Paus., iii. 11. 8; iv. 14.
106. Plut., Ages. 32.
107. v. sub; cf. Xen. Hell., vi. 5. 25; Plut. Ages., 32.
108. Xen. Hell., iii. 34-11.
109. cf. ibid., iii. 3.5-6.
110. Xen. de Rep. Lac., xiv; xv. 1.
111. Isocr., Helen, par. 63; de Pace, par. 95ff.; cf. Jarde, op. cit., p.153, who emphasises that the Sparta of Herodotus' time was not that of Agesilaus' time and that if this is not recognised the historian will inevitably make mistakes. cf. Thuc. I. 71, on the lack of efficiency in Sparta due to the contradictory characteristics of the state
112. Plato, Hippias Major, 8.
113. Plut. Lys. 30.
114. Plut., Lyc. 29; Cleom. 3.
115. Aris. Pol, ii. 9. 1270B; Plut. Agis. 8-11; Cleom., 10;
116. Xen., de Rep., Lac., 14; Thuc. i. 144; Hdt. iii. 148; Plut., Lyc., 27; Agis. 10.
117. On the Ephors' control of the laws and law courts, cf. Aris., Pol., iii. 1. 1275B; Plut. Mor. 221B; Nicocles, ap. Athen., iv. 141A. On the laws being unwritten, cf. Plut., Lyc., 13.
118. v. sup. Aris., Pol. ii. 9. 1270B; Plut. Cleom. 10; Agis, 8-11.
119. Xen., de Rep. Lac., xv. 7.
120. Paus, iii. 5. 3.
121. v. sup. ch. vi; Plut., Ages. 4.
122. Aris. Pol, iii. 1. 1275B.
123. Thuc., i. 87; Plut., Lyc. 26.
124. Thuc. i. 80, 141; Aris., Pol., ii. 1271B; Plut., Mor., 217B.
125. Thuc. i. 141; This passage has always caused difficulty. Beloch, /

Beloch, "Die Bevolkerung, etc.", p.150, concludes that the Peloponnese always used free labour while Athens used slaves. Heitland, "Agricola", pp.50ff., disagrees because of the huge slave population of Sparta, but while he refutes Beloch, he can make no positive suggestion of his own. The account given here, v.sub., is an attempt at one and has some new features.

126. cf. Heitland, op.cit., p.439, where he points out that autourgoi was never used of slaves since it meant "working for oneself" as well as "working by oneself".
127. On division of labour and specialisation, cf. Homer, Od. xiv. 228; Archil. ap. Sex. Empiricus, Math., xi. 44, allos allo ep' ergo kardian iainetai. cf. Xen. Cyr. viii. 2; Isocr., Busiris, 8, for the opinion that specialisation produces better work.
128. Aris., Pol. ii. 9. 1270A. For Athens cf. Justin, ii. 6; Suidas, s.v. Prometheus; Varro, ap. Aug., C.D. 18. 9. They give a picture of the position of Athenian women in very early times not dissimilar to that of Spartan women in much later times.
129. Aris. Pol., ii. 9.1270A.
130. Aris., ibid.; Polyb. xii. 6. 8; Plut. Sol., 20-30; Suidas, l.c. Plut. Lyc. 15; On all this, cf. Thomson, op.cit., pp.203ff.
131. Aris., Pol. ii. 9. 1269B.
132. i. 10.
133. Paus., iii. 16. 7; 17. 2-6; 18-19.
134. Plut. Ages. 31ff. Xen. Hell., vi. 4ff.
135. Xen. Hell., vi. 5. 32; Plut. Ages. 32.
136. Aris. Pol., ii. 9. 1269B; Plut. Ages., 31.
137. Xen. Hell., vi. 5. 28/9.
138. This is the opinion of Toynbee, l.c., p.273.
139. Aris. Pol., ii. 9. 1270A; Plut., Inst. Lac., 22; Heracleides, F.H.G. ii. p.211.
140. Plut., Agis, 5.
- 141./

141. cf. F. de Coulanges, "Nouv. Rech"., pp.111-7.
142. Plut. Agys.^{e?}, 5; Cleom., 3; Perseus, ap.Athen., iv.140C.
143. Aris., Pol. ii. 9. 1271A; Phyl., ap., Athen., iv. 142A.
144. Plut. Agys.^{e?} 7.
145. Aris., Pol. ii. 9. 1270A; Plut., Agis, 5.
146. Thuc., v. 72; Plut., Ages., 32.
147. cf. Toynbee, l.c., p.273, n.102. It was not, however, just an agricultural crisis and nothing else as Toynbee seems to think. The development of a mobile economy, represented by trade and money and the growing mobility of land were the fundamental causes of the trouble, as in the agricultural crisis in early Attica.
148. cf. 1 Maccabees, xii. 20ff., for an alliance between Sparta and Judaea. There is some evidence that this may have involved trade relations; cf. *ibid.*, xii. 23. For the date of King Areus mentioned in Maccabees, cf. Herman, "Greek Antiquities", p.401.
149. Aris. Pol., ii. 9. 1270A; Isocr. de Pace, 96; Plut. Agis, 5.
150. Pol., ii. 9. 1270A-1271A.
151. 8,000 bore arms; cf. Hdt., vii. 234; cf. Wallon, Hist. de L'escl., i. p.111; Cavaignac, Klio, xii. pp.261ff; cf. Aris., Pol., ii., 9. 1270A.
152. Aris., *ibid.*, Plut. Agis, 5.
153. cf. F. de Coulanges, *op.cit.*, p.108.
154. Sim., ap. Plut., Ages., 1, is interpreted in this fashion by Jardé, *op.cit.*, p.156. This passage alone is not conclusive but the growing attractions of life in the East contrasted with increased hardships and difficulties of citizenship at home must have had some effect in making loss of citizenship seem actually a blessing.
155. cf. Plut., Cleom., 23.
156. The rule had been that Helots should make a fixed contribution and then trade with the rest; cf. Plut., Inst., Lac., 41. On the possibility of increased exploitation, v.sub., n.178.
- 157./

157. On this position of Cercidas, cf. Oxyrh. Pap. viii. Cercidas, frg. 1, part 1; cf. Powell and Barber, op.cit., pp.5-6.
158. Plut., Agis, 6, 8, 14.
159. Plut., Agis, 8, 13, 20.
160. Plut., Cleom, 1-2.
161. v.sup., ch.ii. John Ball's rhyme, "When Adam delved and Eve span, Who was then the gentleman?" , is an extreme example of the use of tradition.
162. Plut., Agis, 20-1.
163. cf. Plut., Cleom, 10.
164. Polyb., ii. 47; Paus., ii. 9. 1.
165. Beloch, Gr. Gesch., iii. 1. 328, n.3, rightly points this out.
166. cf. "Gesch. d. Sozialen Frage, etc", i. p.445, "Gesch. d. Ant. Komm. u. Soz.", ii. p.360.
167. Klio, xix. p.426.
168. C.W. xxvi. p.66.
169. cf. Beloch, ibid., for the first view and Francotte, "L'Industrie dans La Grèce Ancienne", ii. 346, for the second.
170. Klio, vii. pp.45ff.
171. Aris. Pol. ii. 9. 1270A; Plut., Agis., 6-7.
172. cf. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., pp.206-8; Tarn, "Hellenistic Age", p.31. While most historians would agree that a middle class of non-citizens was developing in Sparta; their failure to emphasise this and to study the community as a whole has led to too superficial an interpretation and so to a failure to realise the essential similarity between this crisis and that of early Athens and other trading states, where ~~there~~ also developed a middle class which demanded citizenship and social privileges.
173. Athen., vi. 271E.
- 174./

174. cf. the letter from the French ambassador to Louis xiv after the restoration of Charles II; "This government has a monarchial appearance because there is a king, but at bottom it is very far from being a monarchy".
v.sup. ch.v.
175. cf. H. Wendel, "Danton", Ldn. 1936, p.37.
176. Plut. Inst. Lac., 41.
177. cf. Diod. Sic., iii. 13; xxxiv., xxxv, frg. 25 (Dindorf); cf. Xen., Rev., iv. 17-30, where it is argued that the state should take a direct part in exploiting the mines of Laureium since it was impossible to produce too much of this product as happened with every other commodity. Moreover, the very development of slaves in masses tends to expropriate free peasants and "small men" generally from the economy, which further intensifies the impoverishment of the majority of the population and the enrichment of the few.
178. cf. Cairnes. "The Slave Power", passim. So in Roumania in the nineteenth century, when it became profitable to enforce more work from the serfs, the number of working days which the peasant had to devote to the lord by law, was extended by all sorts of twists and tricks; cf. E. Regnault, "Histoire politique et sociale des principautés danubiennes", Paris, 1885, p.299.
179. Plut. Cleom., 8-10. If the essential position of the Ephors as representatives of the citizen body (v.sup.ch.vi), is remembered; the nature of Cleomenes' constitutional changes becomes clear and the similarity to Peisistratus and other such tyrants more evident.
180. cf. E. von Stern, Hermes, L. 554ff., for the whole argument on this question.
181. Paus. ii. 9. 1.
182. v. sup. chs.ii & iv. On the creation of new citizens cf. Plut., Cleom. 11.
183. Plut. Cleom., 10-11.
184. cf. A.J.B.Wace, B.S.A. xiv. 157; E.J.Seltman, Num. Chron., 1909, pp.1ff.
185. cf. Tarn, C.A.H. vii. p.754.
186. Plut., Cleom., 18.
- 187./

187. *ibid.*, 11-13.
188. cf. Pirenne, "La Civilisation au moyen âge etc"., p.172.
189. As a result of the settlement at Athens in 321 B.C., 22,000 lost the franchise. This oligarchy at Athens, it must be stressed, was quite different in character from the aristocracy and old-fashioned aristocratic constitution and customs which were the object of attack at Sparta.
190. cf. Plut., Cleom., 15.
191. cf. Plut. Comp., Agis and Cleom. with ^T~~C.~~ and ^{C.}~~C.~~ Gracchus, for evidence for a large number of household slaves.
192. cf. Plut., Arat., 39-40; Cleom., 15.
193. cf. Plut., Arat., 37.
194. Plut., Arat., 37.
195. cf. Freeman, "History of Federal Government", p.462, for sympathy with reforms based on the author's intimate knowledge of the Swiss League and the Italian wars of independence. He reveals, however, a real understanding of the difficulties of Aratus' position.
196. Cleom., 16.
197. Plut., Cleom., 16.
198. Polyb., ii. 49.
199. cf. Freeman, *op.cit.*, pp.264-7; cf. pp.255, 276, 294.
200. cf. Livy, xxxii. 21, where the form of address suggests an assembly composed of distinguished families.
201. Plut., Cleom., 17.
202. *op.cit.*, p.69.
203. cf. Diod. Sic., xviii. 18, for the oligarchical society and constitution at Athens under Macedonian control; cf. Gomme, "Essays, etc.", p.123, on the democrats as the opposition party.
204. Demosth., xvii. 15.
205. Polyb., ii. 70.
- 206./

206. cf. v. 9-10.
207. Polyb., ix. 33; xviii. 13, 14, 15.
208. Polyb., ix. 28.
209. Plut., Cleom., 18.
210. *ibid.*, 20-21.
211. *ibid.*, 14.
212. cf. E. Tarlé, "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812", Ldn. 1942, pp.184ff.
213. Plut., Cleom., 23.
214. *ii.* 70.
215. Polyb., v. 9; Plut., Cleom., 30; Justin, xxix. 4.
216. Polyb., v. 39.
217. cf. A. de Tocqueville, *op.cit.*, pp.7-8; A.F. Mignet, "Hist. Fr. Revolution", i. 17; cf. the influence of Stoicism on the Spartan revolution.
218. Mignet, *op.cit.*, p.2.
219. Only seven articles of the Napoleonic code deal with labour while 800 deal with property; cf. also n.175 sup.
220. Morton, *op.cit.*, p.336.
221. Unemployment and high prices as a result of the wars aggravated the general agitation. Looting and burning broke out, Habeas Corpus was suspended for eight years, radical agitations declared illegal and Tom Paine's "Rights of Man" was banned; cf. Morton, *op.cit.* p.339. Yet, as Ralph Broome pointed out, a century before the English had acted as the French had done; cf. Ralph Broome, "Strictures on Mr. Burke's two letters", 1797, p.4.
222. Huberman, "Man's Worldly Goods", p.159.
223. *Ibid.*, p.158.
224. cf. Liddell Hart, "The Strategy of Indirect Approach", Ldn. 1941. p.122. cf. the friendliness between Cleomenes and his troops; Plut., Cleom., 13.

CHAPTER IX.

THE SPARTAN TYRANNY (II)

It is incorrect to state that Sellasia marked the close of Spartan history or of Spartan development(1), for, under Nabis, Sparta's history was carried an important stage further.

Although temporarily defeated, the progressive forces in Sparta could not be smashed. The conditions which had produced them were still there and, until these were changed, attempts at reform would continue. Machanidas set himself up as tyrant but suffered a severe military defeat at the hands of the Achaeans. Four thousand Lacedaemonians were killed including Machanidas himself (2). Nabis then seized the opportunity to establish a dictatorship and make himself tyrant. Nabis may have been of royal blood (3). This is quite probable, since leaders of such revolutions usually belong to the class they are attacking (v. sup. ch. v). Peisistratus and the other early tyrants were usually of noble family. In Sparta the peculiar development of the monarchy and Ephoralty had finally forced the monarchy under Agis and Cleomenes into a revolutionary position and, if Nabis had any claim to be king, in making himself tyrant he was merely following quite a revolutionary tradition in the Spartan monarchy.

Once again, when the tyrant had control of the state, the economic reforms overthrown by Antigonos were carried through. Nabis cancelled debts and gave land to the poor (4) probably those who had received land from Cleomenes and then lost it under Antigonos. However, just as Cleomenes had learned from Agis's mistakes, so Nabis learned from those of Cleomenes. In addition Nabis appears to have been more revolutionary in outlook than Cleomenes or, at least, shrewd enough to understand the importance of revolutionary fever and to make use of it. He was therefore ready to carry reforms much further and to apply them in other cities if they would strengthen his position. When in control of Argos, therefore, he carried through the same basic economic reforms as he had in Sparta (5). These, of course, in a city which had pursued a policy based on trade and exchange since comparatively early times, could not have the same effect as they had in Sparta. In Argos, once the period of prosperity was over, continual social revolts had broken out and she was said to have watched tyrants indifferently. In this case, tyrants were simply the/
the/

pockets. At any rate, the Argives refused to revolt against Nabis because they saw no advantage in doing so. (10). The people, apparently, far from suffering from Nabis' activities, actually benefitted by them. Moreover, even when the Argives were freed from Nabis' rule, which meant that the opponents of Nabis' policy could become vocal and active again, Nabis' deputy was allowed to go free because he had governed with mercy(11).

Nabis' reforms in Argos were not without effect. He attracted support from highwaymen, robbers, criminals and exiles from all over Greece (12). Whatever Nabis' own personal opinions, the dispossessed classes in Greece saw in him not only a leader of the Spartan revolution, but their champion against the possessing classes all over Greece and, therefore, possibly a revolutionary leader for the whole of Greece. Nabis probably used them in his army, for such men would have everything to gain by fighting desperately.

Nabis freed slaves on a wide scale, no doubt also for military reasons and exiled many of the citizens (13). Moreover, he seems to have tried to prevent these exiles from securing anywhere in Greece ^{an} asylum, from which they could plan their return, such plans being a regular feature of Greek social upheavals. Cleomenes had actually set aside plots of land for the exiles but the failure of Agis and then the overthrow of Cleomenes had forced sterner, less compromising measures on Nabis. Only great strength and a secure position could make generosity to a potential counter-revolutionary force safe, and perhaps, Nabis's character was also responsible for his consistent hostility to his opponents. Peisistratus had been great enough and strong enough to dispense with guards when possible and to win the support of all sections of the population by his tolerance but, in different circumstances, when large states outside Greece were ready to make use of exiles and any weakness in the tyranny, similar tolerance on the part of Cleomenes had probably made it easier for Aratus and his supporters to win support for their attack on Sparta. In early times the tyrannies had had to face only one really hostile state, namely Sparta. Now, revolutionary Sparta had to withstand not only the opposition of virtually all other Greek states, but also of Greece's large and powerful neighbours.

By his freeing of slaves, creation of new citizens and expulsion of old ones, Nabis must have transformed the entire basis of the state and created an almost entirely new citizen body. This would make the transformation of the character of the state more rapid, for the new citizens who now, by their numbers in proportion to the old ones, must have controlled the state, would bring new ideas and new policies which would become/

the dominant ones in the community.

Like other tyrants of this type, that is the leaders of the middle class and new nobility against an aristocratic, semi-feudal type of state, Nabis encouraged good coinage. He issued silver coins (14), partly as a gesture of national pride no doubt (v. sup. ch. v), and partly to facilitate trade and exchange. Such a policy would help the free economy, in which the important section of his supporters were probably engaged, to make great strides. In this way and by his expulsion of those citizens who had tried to maintain the old, semi-feudal type of state and so hindered the development of a free economy, Nabis, like the early Greek tyrants, laid the basis of a new type of state based on trade and exchange and agriculture for sale, and run in the interests of traders and those landowners who were ready to produce for the market. As a result, artisans and all the other supporters of trade and manufacture, and small farmers, would all benefit. It is significant that when the tyranny was overthrown and the reforms abolished, Philopoemen took precautions to keep money out of Sparta on the grounds that money was the basis of a tyrant's power (15), an opinion commonly held about the early tyrants too. Although it was not just the direct use of money by the tyrant which was so important (v sup. ch. v), money was the symbol of the economic and social changes from which these Spartan revolutions, which were so disturbing to the forces of ordered government in Greece, were arising. Where ordinary trade failed, Nabis probably found piracy profitable and a source of revenue (16), as Polycrates of Samos had done in earlier times (v.sup. ch. v).

Nabis' power, like that of the early tyrants, rested on his army and the general support of the majority of the population. However, he used a democratic Assembly (17), an indication of the importance to any tyrant of his supporters. This Assembly would have proved of great importance for Sparta's future development. If the Spartan tyranny had developed without outside interference, the tyrant would have made it possible for his supporters to grow strong enough to do without him and once the tyranny was overthrown, the new type of state could have taken definite shape. Whether it would have been a democracy or an oligarchy or, as it might have developed under Cleomenes, a constitutional monarchy, its fundamental character would have been the same as those post-tyrant states of early Greece, a really national bourgeois state based on a mobile economy, with a ruling class composed of a middle class allied to new and perhaps some old nobles; a state in which there were opportunities for an increase in both economic prosperity and political democracy.

In short, Nabis performed the same function as other Greek tyrants of this type, and if he used freed slaves and carried out confiscations on a large scale, these were natural developments/

developments of the history of Sparta, of its use of masses of serfs and of its repressive regime. The result, however, was not some form of socialist or communist state. The conditions were quite unsuited to such a development. What Agis and Cleomenes started, Nabis finished; namely the destruction of the "feudal" characteristics still clinging to the Spartan state, and the establishment of a community with institutions suited to the free development of what had become, in spite of legal restrictions, the main type of economy, that is, no longer domestic, but based on exchange. The small citizen body, who were inevitably opposed to his revolution, he mostly expelled and created a new body of citizens, who thus made their own ways of living and own ideas the prevailing ones of the community. In doing so, he laid the basis of a wide democracy which might have produced great works of science and art and great men, had it developed in more favourable times. That democracy would, however, have been based on, and in favour of, the middle class, including merchants and landowners, not the artisans and peasants. Serfdom practically died out (18) since the production of a fixed amount by serfs was impossible to maintain under the new economy and harmful both to the Helots and to the landowners. Artisans and traders probably grew more numerous, some of them perhaps slaves. Agriculture must have been especially affected since production for sale would stimulate good farming, mobility of soil, and no doubt would have led eventually, as elsewhere in Greece, to the exclusion of the small farmer, many of whom had probably been created by the reallocation of land. The new citizens no doubt engaged actively in trade, as probably most of them had done before they became citizens. Even under Agis some of the land given to new citizens was near the shore (19). It is significant that the Romans, when they defeated Nabis, took the coast land from him and all his ships except two, perhaps for strategic reasons, but perhaps also as a blow at the source of Sparta's new power, her trade and piracy (20). In addition, one of the most fundamental features of all these revolutions was the change involved in the constitution. In Sparta not only had the power of the Ephors and Senate been curbed (v. sup. ch. VIII) but the position of the Assembly improved so that, when the need for the tyranny was over, it would have been able to assume real control of the state. Of immediate advantage to the people were the economic reforms, but it was the acceptance by law and custom of the new type of community that made future progress possible, and it was precisely in this quality that the Spartan and early Greek revolutions differed from the purely economic upheavals of most of third century Greece.

Nabis had been too shrewd in recognising Cleomenes' mistakes to have been unaware of the hostility he aroused in the rest of Greece. He had not hesitated to aggravate that hostility by carrying through reforms in Argos. No doubt he realised/

realised that the hostility would continue whatever he did, while, by introducing reforms, he could add greatly to his strength and to his supporters. Where possible, too, he seems to have established friendly relations with other states. For instance, he had secured the friendship of the priests of Delos(21).

However, not only did his extensive confiscations and persecution of his opponents produce more direct and personal hatred against himself than was aroused against Cleomenes, but his extensive freeing of slaves was bound to be an additional danger to the rest of Greece. True, it was chiefly Helots, that is serfs, who were freed, although some Helots served as domestic slaves. Indeed, in such periods when supporters of a mobile economy overthrow aristocratic privilege the tyrannies, which frequently spring up, usually encourage free labour in the interests of free exchange and the expansion of trade and manufactures which require a growing number of labourers if they are to develop, and also because free labourers make good supporters of the tyrannies and so would be encouraged to develop. So in Athens the process witnessed the freeing of those sold as slaves, the abolition of debts and the breaking of the ties which bound debtors to the soil. As a result, many were set free for jobs in the new trades in the town. Others, under Peisistratus's system of credits, could develop as free farmers. So in Sparta the freeing of Helots would create a free labour reserve, and eventually an increased purchasing power, which would help the further development of trade. Nabis, however, was probably even less aware of the significance of his measures than the early tyrants were of many of theirs. While the tyrannies freed labour from ties to the land and broke up serfdom along with other feudal characteristics, at the same time, by creating the basis for the development of trade, mobile agriculture and manufacture, in conditions in Greece where the seeds of slavery were already there, they laid the basis too, for the growth of slavery. And just as the Spartan revolution threatened the security of a class in Greece which had once been revolutionary itself but now feared for its own privileges, so also the freeing of serfs, which had been part of the early revolutions, threatened to influence the industrial slaves who had become part of the economic life of the trading cities.

In the Bronze Age the development of trade and manufacture had led to the exploitation of slaves (22). The break up of the Bronze Age states had led first to migrations of peoples and then settlement on the land ~~was a type~~ when a type of serfdom was the rule (v. sup. chs I & II). Slaves for domestic purposes, however, were still used and many of the links with the Bronze Age remained unbroken (v. sup. ch. II), and so the tradition of slavery as an institution was preserved. Accordingly when trade and manufacture in Greece again developed sufficiently far to demand the exploitation of labour on a considerable/

considerable scale, then slavery developed once more (23).

Comparison of the Erechtheum and Eleusis inscriptions (24) shows that in later years more citizens were occupying the positions of contractors and merchants and that, along with the metics and slaves, they formed a hierarchy of jobs (25). In general, it is usually agreed that in the fourth century there was a marked increase in the use of slaves in factories and workshops (26). It is also maintained, although with less agreement, that, after the Peloponnesian War, there was a growth in the size of estates with a parallel growth in the use of slaves in agriculture (27). Some historians (28) actually assert that slaves were used an increasing numbers in Greek agriculture from Homer's time onwards. On the other hand, others (29) maintain that Greek agriculture employed no or a very few slaves. Of the three views the first is probably correct. Slavery grew with the development of trade and manufacture and, since this revolution in the economy brought about a revolution in agriculture itself (v. sup. ch. II), one trade had developed sufficiently to provide a steady supply of slaves for the labour market - and such a supply was an essential preliminary to the development of slaves on a considerable scale - slavery could develop in agriculture, too. It was probably after the Peloponnesian War, when many farms were ruined and farmers lacked capital to repair them (30), that large estates worked by slaves really began to develop (31), and in the third century B.C. in Greece slaves became even more common in agriculture as estates grew still larger (32).

The importance of slavery in Greece rests not merely on the numbers but on the relative position of slaves to citizens and freemen both in numbers and in their economic position in the states. In fifth century Athens the majority of citizens were probably engaged in agriculture (33). Citizens did however work at a great variety of other jobs (34). In the fourth century citizens still worked in a variety of professions (35) but they tended to occupy the better jobs. In fact, a hierarchy of professions occupied by citizens, then metics and slaves has been noted by several writers (36). So long as the trading cities of Greece were prosperous there must have been a steady progress from slave to freedman and to citizen (37).

Slaves received different treatment and different privileges so that there was always a section of them certain to be loyal to the state, for they hoped one day to obtain their freedom and, in prosperous times, even the citizenship. The governments were not unaware of the advantages of this treatment. Distinctions were made between skilled slaves and labourers and it was recommended that rewards and punishment should be given/

given according to merit, and freedom offered as the highest reward (38). Many slaves actually worked for themselves and paid a small tax to their owners, and these slaves included even doctors (39). The status of these slaves, therefore, was not irreconcilably different from that of freedmen. The type of slavery which predominated in Greece was essentially what Zimmern (40) calls "apprentice slavery", that is, employment of slaves in such small numbers that it is possible to give them a certain amount of freedom and the hope of complete independence. Although all slaves in Greece were not of this type, there were enough to affect the character of slavery as a whole. Obviously this type of slavery could only be maintained before industry had developed to the point where employment of masses of slaves was profitable. So long as this process of advancement from slave to "independent slave", to metic and then even to citizen continued, slaves in the Greek states were not likely to combine against their owners (41). At times of crisis slaves who were employed in mines had taken the opportunity to escape, for instance at Decelea, but these could not hope for the support of more isolated slaves and these with some independence, until all were in a depressed condition with no hope of bettering it. Only in the third and later centuries, when the economic decline had set in in the Greek trading states, would the slaves be an added danger to those parts of the free population who were resisting demands for reforms.

Nabis' freeing of slaves, in large numbers was, therefore, an additional danger to those arising from the effect of his reforms on the discontented parts of the population in Greece. Even in Hellenistic times free labour was still common in Greece but where there was still a demand for goods, such as metals and, occasionally, agricultural products, slavery was largely the rule. However, the decline in prosperity and, therefore, the lack of work, tended to blunt the distinction between slaves and free. At Delos free men allowed themselves virtually to become slaves in order to live (v. sup. ch. VII). Meanwhile it was becoming profitable for slave-owners to free their slaves on the condition that the freedman then paid the former owner a regular tax. The slave-owners could then purchase a younger and more vigorous slave or employ free labour (42). More and more, therefore, it was possible and even necessary for poor free men and slaves to combine against the owning class in the social revolts of third century Greece, a policy expressly forbidden by Macedon (v. sup. ch. VIII). As a result, Nabis' revolution, which bluntly freed slaves for its purposes, was even more of a menace to the ruling classes of Greece than that of Cleomenes had been.

To whom were the Greek rulers to appeal as a saviour this time?/

time? The obvious choice was Macedon. It was Antigonus of Macedon who, at the instigation of Aratus and his supporters, had destroyed the Spartan revolution under Cleomenes and this was in the correct tradition of Macedonian politics in Greece (v. sup. ch. VIII). Unfortunately for Greece, Philip V of Macedon, successor to Antigonus, far from following in the Macedonian tradition and protecting the forces of law and order in Greece against revolutions and social outbreaks, was behaving irresponsibly and even favouring the democratic parties in Greece. At first, Phillip had acted as a worthy successor to Antigonus. When trouble broke out in Sparta after the flight of Cleomenes, Philip was guided by Aratus in settling it (43). When Polybius pointed out that Philip created a pleasant impression on the Greeks at first (44), it may be assumed that he had, as yet, done nothing to violate what had come to be Macedon's function in Greece. Philip then obtained a reputation for courage and ability in the field, and for consideration of his allies (45). Finally, Agelaus of Naupactus asked Philip to reaffirm the old policy of Macedon by uniting the Greeks in harmony, preventing quarrels, and retaining the power of making peace and war with the Greeks; and warned him that if he did not, outsiders might take advantage of this internal fighting in Greece (46).

Philip, however, became less and less attracted to such a policy. Aratus, the individual Greek most responsible for Macedon's part in crushing revolutionary Sparta, was replaced as leader of the Achaean League as a result of intrigue (47); he was restored to Philip's favour but only temporarily (48). The most serious break between Philip and Aratus took place at Messene. Aratus naturally advised Philip not to alienate those who had trusted Antigonus, but to vindicate that trust. To seize the Acropolis of Messene by treachery, he maintained, would be to lose the trust not only of those Messenians, but of all Greeks of the same status (49). Philip, however, allowed the massacre of the aristocracy (50), and thereafter his policy in Greece was said to have been completely changed (51). Once he failed to follow the advice of Aratus, Philip lost the goodwill of that widespread body of opinion in Greece whom Aratus represented (52).

Philip however, continued in his new policy. In two letters to Larissa (53) he asked that the franchise should be extended so that the citizen ranks could be filled and the country cultivated and defended. Military considerations no doubt prompted this advice, but the effect would have been to break down oligarchic exclusiveness. This was naturally resented, and, when Larissa followed the advice given in the first letter, the nobles drove the new citizens out. At Argos Philip courted popular favour by mingling with the crowd and making a display of his goodwill (54). Polybius quite hated Philip by this time and even called him a tyrant, probably because of his association with the people; and significantly enough Athens enforced against Philip all the decrees originally passed against the Peisistratidae (55).
This/

This indicates, of course, not that Philip was really a tyrant of the early type, but merely that his policy was hostile to the interests of the conservative ruling class of Greece. Philip was actually suspected of poisoning Aratus (56), and, even if this were not true, that type of rumour indicated the change in Macedonian policy. In Boeotia Philip tolerated the paying of poor relief and communal dining clubs, a policy which led Megara to leave the Boeotians in disgust and return to the Achaean League. (57).

Instead of maintaining control over Greek cities and establishing ordered conditions, Philip actually warred against them in the most brutal fashion. The people of Thasos, for instance, were even willing to accept his control, yet Philip not only refused their offer but used violence against them (58). Polybius, when summing up the differences between Philip and other Macedonian kings (59), pointed out that Philip did not protect Greek cities but destroyed them. He thus exacerbated those internal disorders which it was his function to quell, and maintained his power of imposing his own policy by the tactless and offensive method of garrisoning Greek cities. Clearly Philip could not be regarded as the preserver of law and order in Greece against revolutions and, when, finally, he deserted the Achaean League in its struggle against Nabis, a heinous crime which provoked a bitter contrast, from some Achaeans, between Philip and Antigonus (60), it was no doubt regarded as a logical conclusion of his policy and justification of those who advised the Greeks to look elsewhere for help. Moreover, by 201-200 B.C. Nabis had conquered Messenia and was growing in strength and influence. Yet not only did Philip do nothing to stop him, but he actually wasted in futile wars both his own and Greek resources.

Far from expecting help from Philip, therefore, the Greeks who desired peaceful conditions above all else were now in need of protection against Philip. Fortunately, a new state had begun to play a role of some influence on the fringe of the Greek world. This was Rome and to her some Greeks gradually began to look for protection. Polybius (61) describes how both Rome and Macedon were regarded as supporters of the status quo. Once Philip, however, proved himself unreliable for that purpose, more and more Greeks looked to Rome. It was not merely a change in Philip's personality which made the difference. Macedon had lost some of its early vigour and strength and, like so many other states, had reached that period of decline resulting from the growth of wealth and luxury, at least among a few (62). As a result, many Greeks welcomed the Romans even before they defeated Macedon (63). Happily for those Greeks who looked to Rome for help, but less fortunately for the rest of Greece and, ultimately for even those supporters of Rome among the Greek population, Rome /

Rome herself was forced to interfere in Greek affairs.

When Sparta intervened in Athens to overthrow the tyranny, it was fear of the tyrant's effect on her own social settlement which prompted her policy. Nothing can be more infectious than popular, revolutionary ideas, and Sparta realised that if she was to continue to exclude money and trade, the new professions and the ideas which accompanied them, she would have to attack the source of their strength and their supreme representatives, not only in Sparta, but in the rest of Greece. Macedon under Antigonos had been in quite a different position. She was ready to pursue a vigorous expansionist policy and, for this purpose, to use any means which were offered. It was the chief rulers of the Achaean League^{and} of other Greek states who really feared the effects of the Spartan revolution on their own societies, as Sparta had feared the Athenian and other tyrannies. It was they who desired intervention against Cleomenes, and Macedon for them was only a means to an end. In 201-200 B.C. Rome, too, had not attempted any such reactionary policy as early Sparta had pursued. The course of her development and the position she had reached in her social evolution were quite different. However, the security of the state had been so shattered by the First Punic War that the Senate was in a very precarious position. As a result, one of these historical accidents caused by the coincidence of several different historical trends produced a crisis in Rome just when revolutionary action abroad could do most harm, and so forced the Roman Senate to adopt, only temporarily however, a policy aimed at preventing social unrest in Greece and so directed, against the Spartan tyranny, a policy which the Spartan aristocracy had had to adopt almost permanently and to pursue consistently.

In 201-200 B.C. Rome's position was quite different from what it had been in earlier years. With her empty treasury and war debts still unpaid she was in no position to start another war if she could possibly avoid it. Moreover, in addition to the war-weary people, both landowners and merchants must have desired peace in order to develop their estates and the new lands in the West. The Senate had nothing to fear from Carthage at that time since she was as exhausted as Rome herself, and if ever Philip of Macedon had seemed hostile, for the moment he was too preoccupied with the East to be a threat to Rome. The only enemy threatening the Senate's position was the majority of the population both in Rome itself and in virtually all the towns of Italy. How much more dangerous, however, such an enemy was compared with an external one, Polybius himself had pointed out (64). During most of the Second Punic War and with increasing vigilance towards the end, the Senate had shown itself aware of the dangerous mood of the people and adept at dealing with it. (65) Religious rites, games, and, when possible, cheap or free food were quite regular/

regular methods. In addition, senators had shown themselves ready to give an example of self-sacrifice in order to quell complaints and to encourage the people to sacrifice still more. They had only done so, however, under pressure from the consul, who had argued that the safety of their position and property depended on their action. That the Senate recognised the real power of the people when moved by a grievance, was revealed very clearly when they actually incurred the hostility of the contractors, on whom the state depended for the financing of the war, in order to appease the popular clamour for a trial of those suspected of fraud (v.sub.apx).

If the Senate had had to be vigilant during the war, even stronger measures were necessary to meet the problems of the peace. There was no prospect of employment for the majority of the population for many years to come (v.sub.apx). Both the allies and Roman citizens were restless after the long war period and the policy of games and cheap grain was only demoralising them further. Apart from grain to keep them from actually starving, many people must have been destitute. The empty treasury forbade any type of state dole, while the money acquired by contractors and individuals from loot and booty kept prices high. Yet these difficulties no doubt seemed almost trifling compared with those which would confront the Senate once demobilisation was begun. A few soldiers might be, and were, given land (66), but, without capital, this probably proved more of a liability than a benefit to a soldier looking for an easy life. Complaints of unemployment had actually been made during the war (67). How much worse would this problem be at the end of the war, and especially after demobilisation began, all the more so since agriculture was virtually closed to the ordinary citizen (68). The post-war years are practically always more difficult than an actual war period. The people who endured privations in order to finish the war, expect some reward, and instead, frequently find their situation much worse. That is the peak of the danger period for any government.

The Senate, however, had proved its outstanding ability in dealing with such a danger. So long as Italy alone was to be considered, they could no doubt control the situation. Already they had divided the discontented by settling Roman citizens on land taken from disloyal allies (v. sub. appx. sec.2), and by discharging citizen troops and using allies and volunteers for further service.(69) This no doubt caused further discontent among the allies, but it would be directed partly against the citizens, who were thus prevented from joining forces with the others. Those towns which had proved disloyal during the war were prevented from being used as future centres of revolt by being razed to the ground and the inhabitants scattered (70). This was probably as much a practical policy as one of revenge. Meanwhile, two legions were kept in Italy to guard against outbreaks (71).

The Senate was not experienced in dealing with such dangers. They/

They had not only learned the dangers of popular revolt and how to deal with them but, in the Second Punic War had learned with bitterness the ways of treachery and how these could be turned to account (v. sub. appx.) It is probable that, if Italy in 201-200 B.C. could have been treated in isolation from the rest of the civilised world, the Senate could have controlled the situation without any very extraordinary measures. They had tended to isolate citizens from the allies and had taken vigorous measures against the latter. By the time the citizens had a recurrence of discontent, the allies would probably have been crushed. Demobilisation of the army and the tremendous unemployment problem would still have had to be faced but further measures of the same sort might have weathered that crisis too, although that was less certain. Italy, however, was not isolated. The states of the Mediterranean were becoming more and more interlinked, by influence and news if nothing more (72). Romans and Italians were increasingly conscious of the world around them and the histories of other states could actually be used as a basis for arguments on Rome's future policy (73). At a period of crisis the Senate actually sent an envoy to consult the Delphic oracle (74), and a keen interest in, and knowledge of Greek rites was shown by most Romans (75). The Senate had been quick to apprehend the danger of the Mercenary War even when Italy was comparatively peaceful. In 201-200 B.C., when Italy was practically seething with revolt, and likely to become worse within the next five to ten years, the effect of the anarchy in Greece, and especially of the revolutionary exploits of Sparta, could not be ignored. When the Roman ambassadors were visiting the Achaean League after the Illyrian War (v. sub. appx.), they must have heard of the attempted reforms of Agis of Sparta and his subsequent death. It was almost certainly the favourite topic of conversation in the Peloponnese at that period and there is little doubt that the Achaean leaders would have expressed strong views on the danger of such reforms and the necessity of crushing them. It is even conceivable that the Roman envoys met some of the exiled partisans of Agis and learned to distrust from personal contact the revolutionary fervour of the reformers. They would hear of the new king Cleomenes, his strength of character and daring on the battle field. Walek (76) has suggested that Rome probably sent embassies to Greece, officially or unofficially, for some years 229-8 B.C. It is equally possible that some Roman citizens, who had travelled with the embassy to Greece, remained there for several years afterwards. At any rate the Senate no doubt heard of Cleomenes' future career, the threat he represented to the existing governments in the Peloponnese, if not in all Greece, and his final defeat by Antigonus of Macedon.

It has been suggested (77), that Rome ought to have interfered on Cleomenes' behalf. The Senate however, had no love for revolutionary activity. No doubt they did not need to hear the opinion/

opinion of the Achaean leaders on Agisto make up their own minds about the dangers of revolutionary Sparta. It was the embassies, probably, who were responsible first of all for Roman admiration of Greek culture, but also, no doubt, for an equal abhorrence of their politics and social anarchy. Macedon's defeat of Cleomenes would, therefore, be approved by the Senate, especially since Macedon had not yet appeared as a possible enemy of Rome. To the Senate Macedon's action was the natural one for a strong state among many small and unstable ones; and, although Rome was probably unaware of it, Macedon was playing her traditional role in Greek politics (v. sup. ch. VIII).

While the Senate, then, was not unaware of Greek affairs, in 208-7 B.C. they actually sent Titus Manlius abroad to report on what was happening outside Italy (78). During his travels he attended the Olympic games, where he must have heard of Machanidas of Sparta, and, if he stayed sufficiently long, of Nabis and his revolution. His information would be more valuable to the Senate than that of military leaders, since it would probably be devoted exclusively to social and political affairs. Nabis was a more thorough revolutionary than even Cleomenes had been and had no compunction in initiating social upheavals elsewhere, for instance in Argos. Nabis was in a position to control the Peloponnese and perhaps all Greece (79). A revolutionary neighbour would have been abhorrent to the Senate at any time, but when her own citizens and allies were in a dangerous mood, it became a positive menace. The rapid spread of revolutionary sentiments in Greece had proved their infectious quality. In Rome's own experience, too, the mercenaries of Carthage had displayed a full appreciation of the advantage of appealing across national barriers for support. Invitations to outsiders to interfere in a state's internal affairs were quite a commonplace in the Mediterranean world, and Rome herself had taken advantage of this. There was nothing, therefore, fantastic in Rome's fear of sympathetic contact between revolutionary parts of Greece and her own discontented population. That Greece could not solve Italy's economic problems any more than the Senate could for the moment, would not matter. The population of Italy was in that dangerous mood when any spark would set them ablaze, and the Senate had most to lose in the conflagration.

Since Philip of Macedon could no longer be relied upon to control Greece, but, by his irresponsible behaviour was aggravating the disorders in Greece and, therefore, the danger to Rome, the Senate had to use other measures. Appeals to Philip by Rome would have been useless, and might have provoked Philip to further excesses from personal spite against Rome. The Senate, therefore, had to take action for themselves. Greece, and especially Sparta, had to be controlled if only for a decade, by which time the crisis in Italy would probably have been passed. It is significant that the Senate, in trying to persuade the Roman people to go to war against Philip, argued that he had the entire Peloponnese under his control (80). Since Philip enjoyed control of much more territory than this, the specific mention of the Peloponnese suggests that it/

was of special importance to the Senate and much in their thoughts. It was neither imperialist aggression nor fear of an attack by Macedon which inspired Rome in the Second Macedonian War. Her main aim was to pacify social troubles in Greece. To do this, control by a larger power was essential and, since Philip had proved irresponsible and unsuited for the task, Rome herself had to take control. Accordingly it was Philip's weakness, not his strength, which drove Rome to war. It was Philip's failure to maintain peace and ordered governments in Greece, (allied of course to the peculiarly dangerous position in Italy at that moment), that made a firm policy by Rome so essential. By inspiring the people with the fear of invasion, the Senate finally obtained consent for the war and so probably produce a less demoralised attitude for at least a few years, during which the sparks in Greece, which might have ignited such inflammable material, were effectively stamped out.

It would be unfair to incorporate this intervention of Rome in Greek affairs as an integral part of the reactions of other states to the Spartan tyranny and to its growing influence on Greek discontent, when allied to the internal position of these states especially the discontent on Italy and the precarious position of the Senate, without producing detailed evidence. The refutation of other interpretations of Rome's intervention, therefore, and the detailed argument for this theory are set out in an appendix (81).

After peace was made between Macedon and Rome, Nabis was in control of the Peloponnese and was said to have spies everywhere (82), which suggests support for him in most Peloponnesian and perhaps most Greek towns. Ten commissioners were sent to report to the Senate that they must make war on Nabis or he would soon be tyrant of all Greece (83). To recall the Roman armies before he was crushed would be, they argued, to leave Argos, the Peloponnese and perhaps all Greece to Nabis. This very detailed and open report was no doubt necessary to secure the Assembly's consent to still further military operations. The report was silent on the specific question of Chalcis, Corinth and Demetrias, the key towns of Greece for which Rome had fought. Naturally there could be no question of evacuating these until governments friendly to Rome had been established in all Greek cities, and this involved the destruction of Nabis, since he stood for all those qualities which might lead to the overthrow of Rome's own type of peace in Greece. Flaminius who was essentially ~~was~~ the executor of the Senate's policy in Greece, was given a free hand to carry on with the war (84) and at the elections in Rome it was maintained that Nabis of Sparta constituted a real danger to the Romans (85). This is the more remarkable since, in addition to assisting Rome against Philip of Cynoscephalae, Nabis had been quite peaceful since then.

Flaminius finally received the decree of the Senate declaring war on Nabis (86) and summoned the allies to a meeting at Corinth. Although/

Although aware of the Senate's decision to go to war with Nabis, Flaminius cleverly suggested that the allies must decide about Argos and Nabis for themselves, but he then proceeded to paint the horrors consequent on the spreading of this social upheaval initiated by Nabis. As most of the delegates were of "first rank" (87) as one would expect from the new governments in Greece, they pursued the course so clearly suggested to them. Flaminius argued that Philip's treatment of Greek states had persuaded Rome to go to war with him (88) and he could not rest content while Nabis retained control of Sparta and Argos. Flaminius was therefore becoming more and more open regarding Rome's motives for interfering in Greece, and when he refused to agree with the allies' opinion that the war should begin with Argos, since that was the cause of it (89), but argued that Nabis and Sparta itself should be attacked, Rome's position in Greece was made abundantly clear. Athens then praised Rome for seeing the necessity for fighting Nabis without being asked! (90).

Nabis asked for peace, and maintained the Romans had no case for war against him, either on the grounds that he held Argos or because he was a tyrant, since both these conditions prevailed when the Senate had previously come to an agreement with him (91). Meanwhile he had not changed. The inference was obvious. It was Rome's tactics in Greece which had changed. Rome was now in control and could therefore be more open about her motives, and could settle affairs as she wished. Nabis suggested that government by the Roman Senate meant that a few wealthy people directed policy for the mass of the population and that the Senate's hatred for him was that, as a tyrant, he freed slaves and gave land to the poor. This was so near the truth that Flaminius could only produce the very weak argument that formerly an alliance had been made with the lawful king of Sparta, not with a tyrant. He maintained he must free all Greek towns including Argos. So Roman "freedom" assumed its true colours of freedom from tyranny and "mob" rule, that is, freedom and security for the wealthy in Greece at the expense of the poor, the unprivileged and the reformers. Flaminius proceeded to make it clear that he was concerned not only with Argos but Sparta itself, and was indignant that Rome, who had gone to war for this purpose, to give this freedom to the Greeks, should not interfere with the internal affairs of Sparta (92).

Flaminius hoped for a rising in Argos against Nabis but was disappointed. Indeed the Argives considered the rule of Nabis' deputy exceedingly mild (v. sup.). Flaminius then moved against Sparta, and brought with him king Agesipolis and other Spartiates exiled by Machanidas and Nabis (93), as if to underline once more Rome's true policy in Greece now she was in a position to carry it out. Nabis, with only eighteen thousand men, including those in Argos, beat off the attack launched by fifty thousand troops consisting/

consisting of Romans and their Greek supporters. The army of Nabis was no doubt inspired by revolutionary fervour, but, in addition, the troops must have fought desperately, since defeat would have meant a return to slavery or destitution for most of them.

At first, Nabis considered the interests of his supporters and took steps to prevent any treachery during the fight with the Romans (94). Soon after, however, he showed an eagerness to come to terms with Flamininus, even against the wishes of his followers (95) which smacked strongly of treachery or, at least, self-preservation. Even earlier, Nabis had proved himself ready to compromise with the Romans, perhaps in an endeavour to buy off Rome's interference, which he was probably shrewd enough to realise was the ultimate aim of Rome's entry into Greece. Although he had already made an arrangement with Philip, he promptly allied himself with Rome against Macedon. At best, he could be said to have been careful of the interests of his followers, who, if Nabis and the Spartan revolution were destroyed, would be reduced to slavery.

His hopes of averting Roman intervention were in vain, but, as in the case of Philip (v. sub. appx.), Flamininus and the Senate were anxious not to fight unless necessary. They were concerned to render Nabis harmless as a revolutionary influence in Greece and so indirectly in Italy. If that could be done without fighting so much the better. As usual Flamininus showed his appreciation of the best tactics of winning a victory in the Mediterranean world, namely to use dissensions among the enemy and gain a victory with a minimum of fighting. However, as in Argos, Flamininus failed to find a chink in Sparta's armour (96), an indication of the strength and, therefore, danger of the Spartan tyranny, and so the tactics adopted included the bribery of Nabis himself. Flamininus made it clear that he regarded the freeing of slaves and distribution of land to the poor as crimes, and that it was in Nabis' capacity of tyrant that he quarrelled with him. "Speak as a tyrant and as an enemy", he maintained (97). This attempt at compromise, especially by persuading Nabis to betray his own followers rather than fight the Romans, was supported by Aristaeus, praetor of the Achaean, who appealed to Nabis to give up his tyranny, citing examples of other tyrants who had done so. He argued that this was best for Nabis' own interests, quite correctly if only Nabis' own personal interests were concerned, but would only be achieved at the expense not only of his followers' interests but even of their lives and freedom. Nabis, then, although he had just won a victory, appealed to Flamininus for a peaceful settlement (98). However, he had been shrewd enough to deal with possible treachery in his own ranks in case he was unsuccessful. He may have hoped to secure the best possible terms for Sparta and his followers by this approach, or he may have been considering only his own safety and welfare. The proposed terms would probably have involved the reselling of freed slaves, the loss of property for those who had only just acquired it, and destitution for most of his supporters (99). They would certainly have meant a great decline/

in Sparta's prosperity since it was her trade and expanding industries which were especially attacked by the treaty (v.sub.)

It is almost certain that Nabis hoped to persuade a few of his friends to support these proposals, come to an agreement with the Romans and then present his people with a fait accompli (100). The news leaked out, however, and popular clamour forced him to continue the fight (101). His Assembly, composed as it was of freed slaves and mercenaries, would have committed suicide if it had accepted those terms, and its ability to force Nabis to reject them is an indication of the power of the supporters of a tyrant. Without this support the tyrant cannot maintain his power. If he wishes to act contrary to the wishes of his supporters, his only alternative to expulsion is to transfer his position so that his power rests on different supporters and his policy is changed to suit these. This is the method Nabis eventually adopted in order to maintain his own position in Sparta.

Nabis's own statement that Sparta could withstand a siege underlines his treachery in even considering peace. Moreover, when the peace proposals were rejected, Nabis, apparently, did his utmost to prevent the Spartan resistance from being successful. He gave wrong directions, or omitted to give any at all, and finally was concerned only for his own safety, " as if the town were already taken" (102). Thanks to Pythagoras, the Spartans repelled the Romans, yet Nabis abjectly asked for peace (103) and this time accepted them. The alternative theory quoted by Livy (104), no doubt to explain Nabis' extraordinary conduct in asking for peace, is so absurd that it serves only to emphasize that the theory of Nabis' treachery alone makes sense of the sequence of events (105).

According to the treaty, Nabis lost Argos, which was then given to the Achaean League, the coast towns, which were given suitable governments and put under the protection of the Achaean League, and Messenia (106). It is significant that it was the Achaeans, who had been mainly responsible for curbing the Spartan tyranny before, who were treated favourably by the Romans and given control over those parts of Spartan territory which it was evidently considered dangerous to leave to Sparta herself, (v.sub. appx.) The most significant point of the treaty is that the Romans struck a blow at the main economic basis of this type of revolution, in this case, at Sparta's developing trade. By depriving her of her coast towns and rendering the latter harmless from a revolutionary point of view, through the establishment of reactionary governments to control the revolutionaries, and by removing all Sparta's ships except two, the Romans not only deprived Sparta of a strategic outlet to the sea-Sparta's main strength had always been on land - but also prevented the development of Spartan trade and, therefore, of her agriculture and manufacture and general prosperity. The fact that Pergamum and Rhodes helped the Romans against Nabis (107) suggests they were anxious to destroy a rival trade/

trade and prevent his piratical expeditions.

Nabis kept Sparta certainly (108), but he killed the revolutionary tradition in Sparta. No deliberate attempt was made to force Sparta to return to the old-fashioned type of state. That was no longer necessary. After the flight of Cleomenes, the abolition of the reforms had merely provoked later attempts at revolution. In this case, the Spartan state could now retain its new character - as in Athens, there had come a stage of development in the new state when it was no longer possible to restore an out-of-date type of state, but only to curb its prosperity and independence and restrict its privileges to a small ruling class - but only under the restricting influence of Rome's patronage. As a result, therefore, Sparta's opportunities for further development of trade and manufacture were restricted, and such prosperity as there was was enjoyed by only a few. The possibility of developing into a real democracy as Athens had done and of producing a brilliant culture was made impossible by the international situation in which Sparta had had her tyranny. Her tyranny was so delayed that other governments had become conservative and settled in their outlook and, forgetting that the first foundations of their own power had been laid by similar tyrannies, were resentful of a revolution which might strengthen the aspirations of their own citizens for change. By then, too, the world's boundaries had extended and powerful states outside Greece were beginning to use Greece as a pawn in their policies, or to be affected themselves by events in Greece. The combined hostility of so many states, therefore, prevented the full fruition in Sparta of the results of the tyranny and reduced Sparta to the status of other Greek states, with their economic stagnation, discontent and lack of independence. Nabis' followers were no longer the real rulers of a strong, prosperous state, but only the clients of Rome. However, Nabis saw to it that his own position was safeguarded since the exiles were not restored (109).

Thereafter, Sparta became very much like other Greek states under Roman control. She had disorders and upheavals, but the revolutionary programme based on the armed force of slaves and mercenaries was killed by Nabis' defection. Such movements cannot survive surrender while still undefeated, no matter what the motives. Flamininus was especially fortunate since, by coming to an agreement with Nabis in this way, he prevented further exhaustion of his troops, avoided too much contact between his army of Greeks and Romans and the revolutionary Spartans and, most important, he prevented further danger from Sparta. To have defeated and killed Nabis would probably have meant another revolutionary outbreak sometime later. Chopping off the head of such movements usually produces another head, but bribing the head kills the whole body by slow poison.

Athens, after the establishment of her tyranny and then her democracy/

democracy, inspired and led the Greek world to defeat one of the most powerful states of the time, Persia. It might be asked why, then, did not Sparta lead the Greek world in defeating Macedon and Rome? In early Greece, in spite of the readiness of backward Greek communities to compromise with Persia and Sparta's half-hearted conduct of the war, there was a sufficiently large number of states full of young life and vigour, as a result of their new status as real, national bourgeois republics, to give the Greek army and prosecution of the war a morale and energy which carried it to victory. Moreover, Persia, although a large and still powerful state, since she was an autocratic, bureaucratic type of state, lacked these very qualities in which the Greek states were so strong. In the third century B.C, however, these states which had been so vigorous and spirited were, by then, in a period of decline in prosperity and, therefore, of increase in social troubles, and were accordingly weak and dispirited. In addition, as a result of these troubles, they were prepared to do what backward states had done with Persia, to compromise with the enemy of Greece. To them with their precarious social position, the Spartan revolution was a far more immediate enemy than Macedon and Rome. To them, first Macedon and then Rome seemed the friend and protector of their privileges, as Persia had seemed to the Aleuadae and other members of the ruling class in Greece (v. sup. ch. vi). Now, however, as a result of the delay in Sparta's revolution, it was the vital majority of the Greek states who were, at worst, prepared to welcome Rome and, at best, not in a position to oppose her because of the lack of unity and purpose among their own population. Far from being the leader of a more or less united Greece against Rome, the Spartan revolution provided the occasion for the intervention of Rome at this particular moment and welcome of her by Greek states,

Only if Nabis and Cleomenes could have united Greece under one voluntary unified leadership could real opposition have been presented. This, however, would have required a revitalising of the Greek states, which could not have been effected without such economic and social changes as would restore both their total of prosperity and the extension of its distribution among the inhabitants, whether citizens, foreigners or slaves. Under the conditions of third century Greece, with the centre of industry moving East and the Eastern states themselves becoming first exclusive and then less prosperous, it is doubtful whether their prosperity could have been very substantially increased. Of the two possible measures for doing so, extension of the foreign market and enlargement of the home market (v. sup. ch. IV.n.61), the latter was possible, but this would have involved radical changes involving, in this case, probably the abolition of slavery. Just as the early economic and social revolution had included the freeing of serfs and those tied to the land by debts, which had led to changes of professions, increased division of labour, expansion of the home market and both extension and intensification of trade and industry including agriculture, so, in this later stage of development, further economic advance and another social transformation would have had to be based on the freeing of slaves (v. sub). Such radical measures however/

however, would inevitably have been opposed by the wealthy classes, for they would certainly have involved a decline in prosperity for them, at first at least. Their policy, on the contrary, was, if possible, to restrict still further the number of people sharing in such privileges (v. sup. ch. VII).

It might then be asked, if Nabis had continued to free slaves, would Sparta have developed an economy based on free labour and, by her example and by revolutionary incitement, have freed slaves all over Greece and, eventually, introduced a system of free labour to the Eastern Mediterranean. This raises again the question of accidents in history and the suggestion that only some one small thing could change entirely the course of history. The fallacy of such reasoning has already been demonstrated (v. sup. ch. V.) Cleomenes and Nabis could not have changed the entire course of history merely by avoiding defeat at Sellasia and treachery at Sparta. It was actually Nabis' freeing of slaves that was one of the main causes of hostility from the Greek governments and, far from becoming the basis of a united Greece, helped to turn Greek against Greek.

Naturally, the wealthy Greeks did not understand the possibilities underlying Nabis' freeing of slaves, any more than Nabis did. Both saw only the immediate effects, an increase of strength to Nabis and a threatened loss of prosperity and privilege to the wealthy. It was almost inevitable, therefore, that the wealthy Greeks, threatened by the less privileged, frequently in alliance with foreigners and slaves, should turn to outsiders for help and, in this case, the state appealed to, unlike Persia, was increasing in strength at a time when Greek states were declining, instead of, as in early Greece, the Greek states who were expanding in strength being opposed to a larger state whose strength was declining or static. In spite of temporary crises, Rome's economy was expanding and her prosperity and power increasing. If Cleomenes had lived to defeat Macedonia he would have had to fight Rome. The latter's interference at that particular time was due to fear of disruptive elements in Greece and at home, but, as she was growing in strength and influence, she was bound to have become an important force in Greece sooner or later, and even if Rome had been beaten by Cleomenes and Nabis, the victory would not have lasted. Those Roman individuals whose privileges were threatened might have lost those privileges and perhaps their lives, but sooner or later the stronger, expanding country would have won. Only if Sparta could have introduced a free, instead of a slave economy on a wide scale throughout the whole of Greece, and even Italy itself, could history have been altered, but, although tyrannies developed free labour for a time, there was no reason why Sparta should not have developed industrial slavery later, as other Greek states had done after their tyrannies. Rejuvenated though she was by her social reforms, and although she defeated the Romans when they were weak, Sparta could not maintain a victory over Italy and Greece too. Only if she could have won Greece to her side and so inspired a united Greece with her own spirit, might she have succeeded. But/

But that was impossible (v. sup.) and the economic stagnation in Greece which made it impossible provoked chaotic revolts on the one hand, and invitations to Rome on the other, which made Rome's victory even easier. It was only the historical " accident" (v. sup. ch. v) caused by the meeting of two trends, Roman distress and Spartan revolution, which made it possible to raise the question at all.

Thereafter, Roman domination led to a great expansion of slavery and postponed its abolition for many centuries. Rome's development of slavery on a really mass scale made any revolts against her almost purely slave risings caused by sheer misery, and were usually resisted by all citizens (110). In Pergamum Aristonicus used slaves in his revolt against Rome, in association with free men engaged in a nationalist revolt, and, later, Mithridates too made use of them, but by then slavery was firmly established as an integral part of the economy of the Roman empire.

What then, would have been the effect if Nabis had freed slaves all over Greece? Just this; that if it had led to the disappearance of slavery and, therefore, to a great expansion of the home market, inventions, especially in industry, would have had the opportunity for really widespread application. Periods of increased tempo in trade and manufacture had given rise to improvements in technique and new inventions (v. sup. chs. II&V), but only where slaves were not used in large quantities, for instance on ships and in small workshops(111). So long as slaves were used in even moderate quantities there could be no mass demand for goods. Slavery creates a vicious circle which arises from the very nature of a slave. He is both the tool and the man who handles it. These tools and methods of work are improved by men in the course of earning a living. This applies, too, to an apprentice slave, since, with the prospect of freedom before him and earning his own living, he had the same incentives to work and improvements as freemen. But where the slave earns no money, then he provided no market for goods, and the more slaves in a community in proportion to free, the more restricted the market, since the slave owner is expropriating the value of the slave's work, with the exception of that small part of it which pays for his upkeep (112). So long then as the majority of the population was not in a position to buy many goods, small local workshops remained adequate to supply the demand and no inventions were needed. Where the demand was large, as in mining, the use of slaves in masses took the place of machines and so again invention was stifled. There was no lack of inventors (v. sup. ch.VII), but only a lack of opportunities for their employment. The Emperor Vespasian, for instance, paid an inventor for a machine designed for moving heavy stones but forbade its use on the grounds that it would cause unemployment (113). It was only in later centuries, when there was a shortage of labour, that machines began to be used more freely(v.sub.) In Europe, too, inventions/

inventions such as the steam engine were devised long before the conditions arose which could make use of them (v. sup. chs. II & VII) Of course, the Greek ruling class did not perceive this. They were merely clinging blindly to their privileges and, therefore, resented Nabis' measures which threatened them.

There naturally arises a question which has never, strangely enough, been raised before, ~~why~~ why modern society is not based on slavery. Why, when the Bronze and Iron Age societies used slaves, were they not used again in modern times? This enormously important problem has hitherto been ignored. It has been asked why slavery in the colonies or in South America was attacked, without, however, a generally accepted reason having been found (114), but no one has thought to ask why the Italian city states and, later, Britain, Holland and other countries early in the trading and industrial field, should not have used slaves. Yet the answer to this question is the explanation ultimately of our modern civilisation, and the revelation of that essential condition, without which the industrial revolution and its social and cultural results, present and potential, would have been impossible. The most fundamental cause of its disappearance is to be found in the conditions giving rise to the Greek tyrannies and the social effects of the tyrannies themselves. Just as the revolutionary milestones - iron and the alphabet - had their roots in former societies, so the new type of communities which they helped to make possible provided the soil for the growth of yet another milestone - namely urban civilisation based no longer on slave, but on free labour.

While the influence of the Greek tyrannies can be traced in this process, only a study of the tyrannies in relation to their own pasts and future makes possible a real appreciation of their importance on subsequent historical development. The tyrannies at first tended to free labour from restrictions but made possible the subsequent growth of industrial slavery. Yet it was the tyrannies which, as a result of the influence of iron and the alphabet within the urban revolution, made possible democratic communities for the first time. Democracy, however, is no abstract thing. The spirit of freedom had produced great victories over Persia and great cultural achievements. Its spirit burned again in the Spartan revolution and the influence of this on subsequent revolts against Rome in Pergamum and elsewhere is plausible. Yet that is still not the most important influence of the new democracy of Greece on the rest of the world. It was a much more practical and sustained influence.

This democratic influence on the modern world was not merely one of ~~the~~ ideas but arose from the fact that the Iron Age, with its cheap metal and simple alphabet, having made possible a great increase in democracy - and therefore efficiency - compared with the Bronze Age states (v. sup.), gave the Greek states the possibility/

possibility of democracy and stable governments in spite of their small size, and gave the Roman Empire a stability and adaptability in face of crises which earned for it an enormously long life compared with the Bronze Age states. The legacy of Greece, therefore, was not merely an ideological and cultural one, but a practical one incorporated in the actual evolution of social and political forms; forms which were, first of all, the products essentially of the social results of the urban revolution, including iron and the alphabet, and which, then, while being modified by changing conditions, themselves exercised changes on man's future development. In short, it was that latest revolutionary milestone in man's historical evolution and the tyrannies and republics which they helped to produce, which formed the bridge between the ancient world and the modern. Rome developed slavery to its logical use in masses and its logical end in the exhaustion of supplies, but, because of her stability, she proved adaptable enough to survive by reverting to a more or less feudal economy over a period of centuries, during which slavery was transformed and virtually died out both in practice and as an idea. The revival of trade and industry in the Italian city states occurred when this slave decline was well advanced, when free labour was available and when the only regular source of supply for slaves, the surrounding countries, was impossible for them to exploit without inviting their own destruction. When bourgeois republics again arose, therefore, they were based on free labour and their influential democratic and popular ideology was not only a cultural legacy from the Greek world, but also a material one, for new ideas on democracy sprang up from the new condition made possible by the practical evolution of society.

Conditions in the Homeric period and in the eighth and ninth centuries A.D. in parts of Europe were so similar (115) that it is necessary to ask why, with the revival of trade and industry, slavery did not develop in Europe as it had in Greece. After the breakdown of civilisation at the end of the Bronze Age, trade and industry made possible a new civilisation which made increasing use of slaves as in the Bronze Age. After the breakdown of this civilisation, culminating in the disintegration of the Roman Empire, why, when trade and industry again revived, again made possible a new civilisation, did slavery not develop again too ? (116) The decline of slavery after the break-up of the Roman Empire has been dealt with before (117), but this, although it happens to be important for our problem is in itself quite a different question. It does not even state the problem of why slavery did not again develop after this decline. Slavery must have declined after the Bronze Age too. The interruption of trade would have made regular supplies virtually impossible, while the reversion to a self-sufficient economy would have made their use unprofitable. Yet slavery revived with the revival of trade and industry.

Of course, there have been slaves in modern Europe (118),
but/

but these were late developments in a world in which the dominating economy was based on free labour. It is not a question then of explaining late developments of slavery on a small scale or local uses of it. The question is why slavery did not develop when trade revived in the Italian city states and, later, in Western Europe. The answer is not that the Church opposed it. On the contrary, the Church accepted and compromised with slavery (119). Nor did the solution lie in humanitarian considerations as statements on African slavery show (120). Only because slavery was the exception and because, therefore, many people had interests in furthering a free economy, was slavery fought and abolished. Granted humanitarian ideals played a magnificent part in mobilising people for the attack, but they only succeeded, where the Stoa failed, because their ideals were also practicable and suitable to the conditions of the day(121).

However, what was of vital importance in early Greece for the subsequent development of slavery was that, as a result of the very slight break between the Bronze Age and Iron Age, the seeds of slavery remained and the tradition of slavery in the Bronze Age was still maintained. Among the Greeks, then, with the tradition of the Bronze Age just behind them and the example of the Eastern states before them, the growth of slavery was inevitable so long as there was a regular source of supply (122). Moreover, once this development started, it could not be stopped or arbitrarily abolished, however much humanitarian considerations may have demanded it(123). It has been pointed out that in the Southern states of North America, once slavery was accepted, it could not be stopped by natural development nor knocked out merely by competition of free labour, since " slavery" is in possession of the field and enjoys all the advantages which possession in such a contest confers"(124)

In spite of their size, the Bronze Age states had tended to break-up after about a hundred years (v. sup. chs. I&II). City states, unless they could extend their influence as Athens continually tried to do, had a shorter life than bigger states with similar economies, and yet, the Greek states had a surprisingly long existence compared with those of the Bronze Age. However, when this stability of government, made possible by the effect of iron and the alphabet on the social development of mankind, was applied not only to small city states, but to a large empire such as the Roman Empire, far from breaking up at the first signs of internal tension and social strife, the Roman Empire was able to surmount crisis after crisis. By a hierarchy of privilege, not only in Rome and Italy but throughout the Empire, the basis of the whole structure was broadened to an extent impossible for the Bronze Age states with their low level of productivity and their small literate and skilled class. So, instead of breaking up at the first clash of internal interests and external attack, the Roman Empire proved versatile enough and stable enough to withstand almost six centuries of internal struggles (125). In spite of economic/

economic stagnation and, therefore, gradual loss of strength, Rome did not succumb to the attack of barbarians for some centuries. It was then she reaped the benefit of the broad basis of empire and of her adaptibility. The slave supply dried up, and, under Constantine, there was a development again of serfdom in land and industry, which dragged on with further modifications until the very idea of slavery was changed and lapsed. Moreover, since current ideas are usually based on former customs and conditions because ideas lag behind the conditions which gave rise to them (v.sup.ch.iv), this negative condition became a very positive factor in building a free economy (126).

When trade and industry revived, therefore, the slave tradition had been broken, and, while the tendency to free serfs so as to work in towns was similar to early Greek practice, the development of slavery did not occur, since the period was still one of a decline in such slaves as were left. Moreover, the Italian city states, which were the first to develop again on a trading and industrial basis, were surrounded by feudal states, who continually interfered with their development. Not only could they not use these as a source of slaves, but, on the contrary, it was to their advantage not to provoke undue interest in themselves. The Greek states in a period of similar development had barbarian tribes from whom they could seize slaves, while the bigger Eastern states, since they were already using slaves, were an encouragement rather than otherwise of their use.

In the Merovingian period captives from Gaul had been sold as slaves in Naples, and captives from Italy as slaves in the markets of the Frankish kingdom. Two or three centuries later, however, slavery played only an insignificant part, and that purely domestic. Slaves had become scarce and were therefore expensive. The Roman empire had continued to exist by changing both slave and free into serfs, and, after its break up, in spite of a limited revival of domestic and agricultural slavery, the very word "slave" changed its meaning. "Habit and common speech had nearly erased it" - that is, the line between free and servile tenant. Free and unfree then came to mean those who could choose their own lords on the one hand, and, on the other, tied tenants. These new meanings could only have matured on the death of slavery of all types except perhaps domestic. While the end of the Roman Empire and the early Middle Ages had been characterised by a change of slaves into tenants, in the later Middle Ages serfdom was the characteristic economy; and during this long slow process the very idea of masses of slaves in industry and agriculture died out (127).

There had certainly been some trading in slaves (128).
The/

The general trend, however, was still definitely one of decline in slavery (129), which led ultimately to its transformation and final disappearance in the last four centuries of the Dark Ages (130). When, therefore, trade revived among the Italian city states from the ninth century onwards, it was in a period of increasing decline of slavery, when, that is, slave labour was expensive and almost unobtainable. By the time the trade and industry of the Italian city states had grown sufficiently to make the use of slaves possible, the very meaning of the word had changed and freedom had become freedom from service to the local lord, so that the idea of slaves in industry as a regular practice had been forgotten or was not thought of. Moreover, there was a regular supply of free labour from landless peasants, adventurers, and beggars (131), so the need for slaves was not acute. Contrast this with the position of the Greek states where, on a building project, it was necessary to import labour from other states (132). In addition, when trade revived in Greece it was a different type of slavery from that found in Homer that developed, namely slavery in industry and the new type of agriculture (v.sup.). This was not based on the remnants of slavery from Greek feudal times, but was linked by tradition with the urban civilisation of the Bronze Age. In Europe, thanks to the influence of iron and the alphabet in creating such long-lived states, this urban slave tradition had been broken, and the decaying remnants of slavery in feudal conditions were no more a source for the revival of slavery in Europe than they would have been in Greece. While it was possible, too, for the Italian states to obtain a few slaves to send to Eastern harems, a steady supply at an economic price for their own industries could only have been obtained by continual war on surrounding countries. In fact, no sources were available for a regular supply of slaves (133), and such a supply is an essential prelude to slave industry (v.sup.). From the military point of view, it had been impossible either for the decaying Roman Empire or the new small Italian city states to acquire them (134). The policy of these city states, indeed, was, if possible, to prevent the surrounding countries warring on them. The entire influence of these surrounding states was against slavery, since they were static and self-sufficient in a period of decline of slavery, and frequently involved in warfare detrimental to trade and industry. In the case of the Greek states, on the other hand, the influence, a relic from the Bronze Age, was all in the interests of slavery, and the surrounding states co-operated in using them (135).

The Church, therefore, while it failed to prevent trading in slaves, did find it possible partially to enforce the rule that Christians must not enslave true Christians, that is, those of the Roman Church (136). Since the Church and nobility set the tone, this was equivalent to the development/

development of the Greek idea of enslaving only non-Greeks (137). Meanwhile, the shortage of labour had led to the introduction of reaping machines in Italy and a fairly general use of the water mill (138), so that by the end of the Middle Ages the continued shortage of labour had produced an increased tempo in the use of machines in general (139).

The ending of serfdom and the establishment of a free economy in Italy about 1200, was followed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries by a similar development on a wider scale in Western Europe. Free economy was established there too, partly for the same reason that slavery in Western Europe had ceased to exist in its former meaning and practice, and partly for the additional reason that the immediate example of the Italian city states exercised an important influence. The late use of colonial peoples as slaves was quite a different development connected with the exploitation of colonies, and arose from the growth of trade and industry based on free labour at home.

Rome has been accused of putting civilisation back for centuries by her development of slavery (140). On the contrary, it should be maintained it was Rome's development of slavery to its full capacity and therefore her exhaustion of it - for slavery can only be fully maintained by war and piracy, since breeding is not enough (141) - that made possible not only its decline and disappearance in practice, but the dying out of the very idea of it in the old sense. Nor was this some freak of history. The Iron Age was not a mere repetition of the Bronze Age, but made definite progress from it. It was that growth of democracy and stability, made possible by the characteristics of the Iron Age, which also made possible Rome's continued existence up to and beyond the exhaustion point of slavery; and in this process the Spartan tyranny and the freeing of slaves by Nabis served as at least one link in transmitting these democratic, popular ideas and practices, throughout the Roman world, while Rome's full use of the resources of the Iron Age ensured the practical basis for this social advance. Instead of the rapid collapse before invaders while slavery still existed, as happened in Bronze Age conditions, the barbarians eventually simply broke up the empty shell of the empire which was already drained of the old life based on slavery. Moreover, since the same strength and stability had made it possible for Rome to conquer the civilised and parts of the uncivilised world, and use them as sources of slaves, so the change to feudal conditions and the disappearance of industrial, (including agricultural), slaves affected all the parts of the world which then mattered.

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It was a long way round to reach a slaveless economy, but history does not follow a straight line. It is not for us to criticise slave societies and the long existence of slavery, but to assess those influences which caused slavery to die out and to feel grateful that, as an ultimate consequence, we live in a machine age which provides us with luxuries and a standard of living beyond the most fantastic dreams of those living even a few centuries ago (142).

Cleomenes and Nabis and the Spartan revolution, therefore, although they did not in themselves create a new society based on free labour, by producing the social effects of iron and the alphabet within the economic revolution so much later than the other tyrannies, formed a link between the ancient and modern world; for the Roman state was the heir of Greek achievements and acquired that stability which was both the basis of its strength and the cause of its slow decay rather than quick collapse, so that the Roman Empire in its turn was able to clear the ground in the Middle Ages for a new type of society based on free labour; for, when serfdom was once more destroyed by tyrannies representing urban revolutions, not only iron and the alphabet, but still another great revolutionary milestone was included, namely, the possibility of civilised living based on free rather than slave labour.

In itself, however, the Spartan tyranny and its potential achievements were all but still-born. A brief flame, an indication of the possibilities of a future culture and strength had conditions allowed, and then disease and death. Certainly, once Rome's interest had been provoked, any attempts at maintaining the achievements of the Spartan tyranny, not to mention developing them still further, would have entailed continued revolts against Rome and continued opposition from Rome and the Greek states. Nabis, however, did not leave Sparta even that last flourish of life. By his weakness and treachery he denied Sparta a fighting death from external attack worthy of her best achievements, and inflicted on her a humiliating, internal, fatal disease.

Only this interpretation of the private agreement between Flamininus, acting for the Senate, and Nabis can explain the Senate's extraordinary forbearance when Nabis, trying no doubt to have it both ways, attempted to regain the coast towns (143). He may have been hoping to restore his prestige among his followers. At any rate he was in communication with sympathisers in those towns. The Achaeans were alarmed and anxious to attack. The Senate, however, practically ignored the Achaean embassy sent to obtain support for war against Nabis (144). Flamininus advised the Achaeans to do nothing until the Roman fleet arrived, advice which naturally caused some confusion in the League (145). The Achaeans were persuaded.

persuaded to fight by Philopoemen, who argued that Gythium was about to fall and yet Flaminius was doing nothing (146). Philopoemen would perhaps have defeated Nabis, but Flaminius made a truce with the tyrant, ordered Philopoemen to break off the blockade of Sparta, and thus saved Nabis (147). This behaviour is only understandable if it is accepted that Flaminius had come to an agreement with Nabis by which he had left him Sparta and his personal security in return for a cessation of hostilities and revolutionary activities. This is further confirmed by the fact that all the Spartan hostages were released by the Romans except the son of Nabis. It was Nabis personally who was to be controlled (148). Almost certainly, in spite of provocation, Flaminius and the Senate were anxious to maintain that agreement. If Nabis were seeking to re-establish his position with his supporters, Flaminius did not wish to strengthen that movement by fighting it, but to ensure its destruction by again buying off Nabis and thus, incidentally, underlining his treachery.

It is significant that, as soon as Nabis had been killed by a raiding party of Aetolians (149), the attitude of the Senate completely changed. On this occasion no opposition was raised by the Senate to Sparta's joining the Achaean League. In fact, the chief Spartans were persuaded to bring Sparta into the League, ostensibly by Philopoemen, but actually by the presence of the Roman praetor and his fleet (150). The Senate's policy had never been to retain Nabis as a counter force against the Achaeans. If this were so, they would not have strengthened the Achaeans by giving them Argos and the control of the Laconian coast towns (v.sup.). They were concerned especially to render Nabis harmless, by buying him if possible. Once Nabis was dead they had no interest in saving Sparta, and when she broke away again from the Achaean League and appealed to Rome for direct protection against the Achaeans, even offering to submit to direct Roman control (151), the Senate almost ignored the Spartan embassy. Before Nabis' death it was the Achaean embassy which was ignored (v.sub.appx). In the first crisis after his death it was the Spartan embassy which was virtually ignored. Only the special relationship of Nabis to Flaminius and the Senate can explain that rapid change of Attitude. To the Achaean embassy the Senate gave so obscure an answer that the Achaeans interpreted it as a sign to themselves to go ahead (152). Sparta was attacked and defeated, the walls destroyed, all the exiles restored, the new citizens disfranchised, the freed slaves resold, territory removed, and, in general, the new spirit fostered by the revolution entirely crushed. Livy admits that what really weakened Sparta was the loss of the so-called Lycurgan institutions, that is, the revolutionary spirit and the way of life introduced by the tyrants. Plutarch tells us that Philopoemen insisted on the youth of Sparta being/

being given an Achaean education since the only way to crush their spirit was to remove their constitution. As a result, the Spartans grew tame and submissive (153).

However, Sparta did not return to her pre-Cleomenes days. That was no longer possible. Compromises and modifications might be made but not the complete reversal of historical development. Affected by the more advanced stage of development of other Greek states, Sparta had rapidly progressed until she was in line with the rest of Greece. Whoever ruled, new citizens or nobles returning from exile, the community remained, like other Greek states, in harmony with the new economy, even if this was not flourishing, and not with patriarchal serfdom. The political basis of the state was severely restricted, but its character remained the same, namely one based on free economy, trade and mobile agriculture. The dying out of serfdom emphasises this (v.sup.). It is significant too, that the Spartans later complained to Rome that, as a result of the removal of her coast towns, she had no outlet to the sea and that such an outlet was essential for her foreign trade (154). The advantages and privileges of the state, however, would go to fewer people once the exiles were restored and this probably affected the spirit and vitality of the state even after the Spartans had thrown off Achaean customs and restored as many of their own as possible.

France's new state, too, after the revolution, was no more of a socialist or communist type than Sparta's; it favoured especially the middle classes (v.sup.). The restoration of the Bourbons, moreover, was not a reversal to pre-revolutionary conditions, any more than the restoration of Charles II was in England, or the destruction of the more revolutionary features was in Sparta. The French kings were of a new type in as much as they were supported by quite different social groupings, while the French state retained its changed character, since it not only represented the new interests but, by its legal code, allowed them the fullest possible development (155).

From this time onwards, in Sparta, with the possible exception of Chaeron and his supporters, there was no longer a party advocating social revolution, but only a pro-Roman party and an anti-Rome one as in the other Greek states (156). The delayed effects in Sparta of the urban revolution including iron and the alphabet had been paralleled by the rapidity with which she overtook the other Greek states. The explosive character of her tyranny caused by the delay and by the advanced conditions of surrounding states in the third century hastened the maturity of the new state, but also stunted its further growth. Because of those peculiar characteristics, the Spartan tyranny had probably for a time given partial expression to the oppressed in Greece. In a sense/

sense they could be called a third party since they resented not only both Roman and Macedonian domination but also the rule of their own Greek owning class. However, since these were unorganised and inarticulate, they lacked the purpose and means of expression which would give them the character of a real party. They were as important, however, to Greek society as the working class was to nineteenth century England (v.sup.ch.vi, n.99), or as were the metics of fourth and fifth century Athens, where the metics have even been considered to have exercised a decisive influence on Athenian policy (157).

If the social changes involved in the abolition of slavery outlined above could have been carried through in Greece, the oppressed would eventually have become vocal, as in England, and taken an increasing part in influencing policy. Rome, however, although she greatly added to the numbers of the oppressed, kept them effectively subdued except for occasional revolts in different parts of the Roman world. Since, however, the Roman Empire carried within itself the seeds of this new social transformation, the very effectiveness of her suppression of its (unconscious) exponents cleared the ground for the regrowth of urban civilisation based this time on free labour and capable, therefore, of cultivating the flower of freedom and democracy for all, which Rome had apparently so successfully crushed.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX.

1. cf. Toynbee, l.c. p.275.
2. Polyb., xi. 18; Plut., Philop., 10; Paus., viii.50-52.
3. cf. Homolle, B.C.H. xx. 502ff.; Wolters, Ath. Mitt., xxii. p.145.
4. Livy, xxxiv. 31.
5. *ibid.*
6. Livy, xxxii. 40.
7. Polyb., xiii. 6-8; xviii. 17.
8. iv.29.
9. cf. Hadas, C.W.xxvi. pp.65ff., 73ff., on the false tradition about Nabis as about other revolutions.
10. Livy, xxxiv. 25.
11. Livy, xxxiv. 40.
12. Diod. Sic., xxvii. frg. 1. (Dindorf); Polyb.,xvi. 13.
13. Polyb., xvi. 13.
14. Wace, B.S.A. xiv. 157.
15. Polyb., xxi. 41.
16. Livy, xxxiv. 36. The piratical expeditions of Dikaearchus, for instance, were said to have been for money; cf. Holleaux, Rev. d. Et. Gr., xxxiii.pp.223ff.
17. cf. Livy, xxxiv. 36-7; the Assembly referred to here obviously has a popular basis.
18. cf. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., p.1185, where it is maintained that serfdom lost its importance after Nabis.
19. Plut., Agis, 8.
20. Livy, xxxiv. 35-36.
21. cf. Dittenberger, Syllogue, No.584, for a decree of the priests of Delos in which Nabis was called Euergetes.
22. cf. Childe, "Man Makes Himself", p.151; "Bronze Age", pp.40, 172.
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23. Francotte, "L'Industrie dans la Grèce ancienne", i. pp. 184-5, maintains that slaves increased in proportion to the increase in prosperity and development of industry and trade. cf. Theopompus ap. Athen., vi. 265 B.C., where the Chians are stated to have been the first to use "bought" slaves, in contrast to domestic slaves and serfs, and this is connected with the development of industry on a national scale, cf. Athen., vi. 266 F.
24. I.G. (2) i. 373-4; I.G. (2) ii. 1670-3.
25. cf. Gomme, "Population of Athens etc.", p.27, n.11; Ure, "Origin of Tyranny", p.15. Of the citizens at Eleusis only 1 out of 36 was a worker, the others being contractors and merchants, cf. Gomme, op.cit., p.40. Even in the time of the Erechtheum building programme the slaves were as numerous as the citizens. There were 18 citizens, 38 metics, 17 slaves and 24 unspecified who could be metics or slaves. Of course, it can be argued that as 20,000 slaves fled from Decelea in 412 B.C., cf. Thuc., vii. 27, there must have been fewer slaves than usual at the Erechtheum, since attempts were probably made to replace the mining slaves. Equally well it could be maintained that, as citizens and metics were fighting, their numbers in building would be below normal. Obviously definite conclusions on numbers of slaves in proportion to free men cannot be drawn from such meagre evidence. The Eleusis inscriptions are even more confusing since the proportion of unknown is very high. Here again the wars of the second half of the fourth century may have meant an increase in the number of slaves used.
26. cf. Francotte, op.cit., i. pp.214, 225ff.; Gomme, op.cit., p.27, n.11; Rostovtzeff, "History of the Ancient World", i. p.289; Ure, op.cit., pp.19ff.; Wallon, "L'Histoire de l'esclavage", i. pp.141, 251. Aristophanes, especially in his early plays, emphasised the important part citizens played in the economy of the country, cf. Ar. Pax., 276-8; Eq., 738-40; Eccl., 431ff. However, evidence for the fourth century suggests that the larger workshops especially were run on slave labour, cf. Lysias xii. 8, 19, for 120 slaves in an arms factory. Demosthenes' father had 32 or 33 slaves in an arms factory, and 20 in furniture making; cf. Dem., xxvii. 9. For other exx. cf. Dem., xxxvii. 4.
27. cf. Guiraud, "La Propriété foncière etc.", p.452ff.; Toutain, "Economic Life of the Ancient World", p.40; Wallon, op.cit. i. pp.184-5.
28. cf. Heitland, "Agricola", pp.19ff; Rostovtzeff, op.cit., i. pp.184-5, 199.
- 29./

29. Glotz, "Le Travail dans la Grèce ancienne", p.239; Gomme, op.cit., p.22.
30. cf. Ar., Ach., 1018-36, for the ruin of farms by invasion, the loss of oxen, etc.
31. For evidence of slaves in agriculture at this period cf. Ar., Plut., 223-6; Dem., xlvii. 53; liii. 21; Xen., Mem., ii. 8; Oecon, xxi. 9; xiii. 9-10; v. 16; C.I.A. i. 274, LL. 7, 9; 275, LL. 3, 5; 276, L.3; 277, L.9. This refers to the end of the fifth century and it includes among objects confiscated by the state, houses, land and slaves. In Homer slaves were not very common on the land although so-called male domestic slaves were probably employed for farming work as well as in the house, cf. Od., xiv. 449-52; iv. 644, 735-7; xv, 412-92; xxiv. 208-10. In Hesiod both slave and free labour were employed in agriculture, cf. Op., 370, 459, 469-71, 573, 602-3, etc. However, this evidence from a small-holder's point of view cannot be applied to Greek agriculture as a whole at this period. Nor can Rostovtzeff's view, cf. op.cit., i. pp.199-200, that olive growing meant the wide use of slaves in agriculture as early as the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. be maintained. First of all at that period semi-serfs and debtors were cleared off the land and free labour established. Only later when the market expanded and when a regular supply of slaves was available, and was therefore reasonably cheap, would it pay the landowners to use slaves regularly. If it were true as Niebuhr suggests, cf. "Lectures on Ancient History", i. p.286, that in Greece and Rome debtors could only be sold out of the state, then even this must be abandoned as a source of supply for the home labour market. When debtors were enslaved at home they became a sort of serf like the hektemors, but when actually sold, it was outside the country; cf. Aris., Ath., Pol., 5.1; Plut., Sol., 13, for evidence that debtors were sold out of the country even before Solon's time. A clear distinction is drawn between tous prathentas and tous enthade autou doulian aeike~~x~~ enchontas, Plut., Sol., frgs. 30-31 (H-C) (v.sup. ch.v). After Solon at Athens only daughters could be sold. In other parts of Greece the sale of debtors probably continued to a much later date; cf. Lysias, xii. 98; Isocr., xiv., 48. After the Peloponnesian War, however, people were restless and probably preferred to go abroad as mercenaries or to hang about the Piraeus in the hope of a job, rather than settle down to the old steady life of farming; cf. Ar., Nub., 71-2. Meanwhile, people who had ^{made} money during the war were eager to speculate in land; cf. Xen., Oecon., xx. 22ff. These two factors led to large estates and the use of slaves, since little free labour was available. Such agricultural conditions/

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conditions at the end of the Peloponnesian War in Attica were similar to those in Italy after the Second Punic War and produced the same changes to large estates run by slaves (v.sub. appx).

32. Menander, 642, to the effect that agriculture was a slave's job illustrates the change in agricultural conditions from the days when it was considered suitable only for citizens. For further evidence for slaves at this period cf. Menander, Georg; Koerte, Menandrea, p.25. cf. Polyb., iv. 73, 75, for slaves in Elis, and ii, 62, for slaves in the Peloponnese generally. Many of these were probably domestic as well as agricultural. It seems conclusive, therefore, that slaves were used in Greek agriculture especially from the fourth century onwards. Gomme, op.cit., p.32, gives an analysis of manumission inscriptions from 340-320 B.C. Of 115 men only 12 were agricultural and of 77 women only 1 was in agriculture. The explanation of the low proportion is probably that male domestic slaves were employed on the land as well as in the house and around it (v.sup. on Homer). The proportion of male domestic slaves in the above analysis is too high without some such explanation; cf. Gomme, op.cit., p.21, n.3, where he says there were probably more women domestic slaves than male. However, Gomme, "Essays in Greek History etc", p.50, allows the possibility of a few large estates with slaves in fourth century Attica. Moreover, since much agricultural work is seasonal and depends therefore on hired casual labour at certain times, such agricultural slaves as there were would probably be permanent and, as agriculture is a skilled occupation, not likely to be freed at all until past useful work. While artisans were no doubt freed in order to set up in business for themselves, and so provide a regular source of income for their former masters, agricultural slaves could not work for themselves in an industry reserved for citizens, and were, therefore, not likely to be freed. For the argument that the motives behind manumission were usually the owners' own profit cf. M.P.Foucart "Memoire sur l'affranchissement des esclaves", pp.23ff (published in Wescher et Foucart, "Inscriptions Recueillies à Delphes).
33. cf. Ar., passim; Xen., Rev., iv. 12, points out that ownership of land was reserved for citizens.
34. v. sup. n.24, for the Erechtheum inscriptions; cf. Ar., Pax, 296-8; Eq., 738-40; Eccl., 431ff; Plut., Per., 12.
35. Xen., Mem., iii. 7; Dem., lvii. 35, 45; Isaeus, v. 39; Aeschines, Timarch., 27; Aris., Pol., iv. 4. 1291B; C.I.A. ii. 1104. ii. 782, L.6.
36. /

36. cf. Francotte, op.cit., i. pp.219ff., following Clerc and Scherling. With the exception of mining and quarrying in which slaves only worked, cf. Xen., Rev., iv., 24, metics appeared everywhere. They could not own land but they could probably buy the citizenship fairly easily even after restrictions on citizenship were imposed.
37. cf. Lysias, Nicom., 1-7; Dem., xlvi. 13; xxvii. 19. Even when entry into the citizen ranks became more difficult, manumission probably continued, so that metics probably became the dominant section among the workers; cf. Guiraud, "La Main d'oeuvre industrielle", pp.173ff., for inscriptions showing competition between citizens and metics, and the great increase of the latter from the end of the fifth to the end of the fourth century.
38. Pseud-Aris., Oecon., 1.5; Xen., Oecon., v. 16; xiii. 10-12; Aris., Pol., vii. 10. 1330A; Pseud. Xen., Ath. Pol., i.10.
39. Dem., xxxvi. 4, 11, 12, 35; xxxvii. 4, 5; Hypereides. ap. Athen., xii. 1; Pseud. Xen., Ath. Pol., i.10-11; On the doctors, cf. Plato., Legg. 720; Dem., xlvi. 12.
40. "Solon and Croesus", p.153, v. sup. n.39.
41. It was not a question of citizens of Greek states living at the expense of slaves as Hasebroek, op.cit., pp.30ff., 138, suggests, (he includes aliens with the slaves but considers their status little better than that of slaves), nor of Greek life and civilisation being based on slavery as Heitland maintains, cf., op.cit., p.453. The evidence shows that rich and moderately well to do citizens, rich metics who had not yet succeeded in buying the citizenship and who were in a position to employ others, were all, to a greater or less extent, exploiting poorer citizens, who certainly had privileges denied to ^{non-citizens} poor metics and slaves. Only in the case of mining and quarrying was there any direct exploitation of the slave population by the whole citizen and metic body. Even from the point of view of numbers, only a few scholars such as Wallon, "Histoire de l'esclavage", I. pp.222ff., Boeckh, "The Public Economy of Athens", pp.36-7, and Guiraud, "La Propriété foncière, pp.157ff., believe that the free population lived on the work of a mass of slaves and even they do not deny the evidence for citizens working and there is even evidence for poor citizen women working, cf. Dem., lvii. 45. By multiplying male citizens between the ages of 18 and 64 by four, and metics by three (cf. Gomme, op.cit., pp.25, n.4., 75ff., for this method), the proportions of slaves to a) citizens and b) citizens and metics, are as follows: Wallon, 300% and 187%, Boeckh, 405% and 270%, Guiraud, 500% and 333%. These extraordinarily high/

high figures of Guiraud are the result of his low estimate of the male population, and especially of women and children. On the basis of a male citizen population of military age of 20,000 he estimates the total citizen population at 60,000 instead of 80,000. If we take the latter figure to bring the figures into harmony with the other estimates, the percentages become 375% and 273%

42. cf. Foucart, l.c. pp.23ff., against the view that manumission was due to lack of work, lack of prosperity or humanitarianism. Calderini, "La Manomissione, etc.". pp.13ff.; Zimmern, "The Greek Commonwealth", pp.177ff., 399, n.1, 415ff., argue that manumission was common even in the fifth century B.C. but there was probably an even more rapid purchase of slaves when industry was expanding.
43. Polyb., iv. 22-24.
44. iv. 27.
45. Polyb., iv.77.
46. Polyb., v. 104.
47. Polyb., iv. 82, 84.
48. Polyb., iv. 86.
49. Polyb., vii. 11.
50. Polyb., vii. 11, 13; Livy, xxxii. 21; Plut., Arat., 49.
51. Polyb., vii. 12.
52. Polyb., vii. 14. Alcaeus of Messene, for instance, attacked Philip from his place of exile; cf. Anth. Pal., vii. 238, 247; ix. 518-9; xi. apx. xvi. 5-6.
53. Dittenberger, Syll., No.543.
54. Polyb., x. 26; Livy, xxvii. 30-1.
55. cf. Livy, xxxi. 40. On Polybius calling Philip a tyrant, cf. Polyb., iv. 77.
56. Livy, xxxii. 21; Plut., Arat., 55.
57. Polyb., xx. 6.
58. Polyb., xv. 24.
59. xviii. 3.
60. Livy, xxxii. 21; v. sub.
61. x. 109.
- 62./

62. cf. Athen., iv. 128C-130D, for evidence of wealth and luxury in Macedon in later times.
63. Plut., Philop., 5, 6.
64. xi. 25.
65. cf. Polyb., vi. 16, on the deference shown by the Senate to the feelings of the people; v. sub., apx., for the methods used.
66. Livy, xxxii. 1.
67. Livy, xxvi. 26.
68. v. sub., apx.
69. Livy, xxxi. 8; v. sub., apx.
70. Livy, xxviii. 46; xxxi. 4.
71. Livy, xxxi. 8.
72. cf. Philip of Macedon's letter on Rome to Larissa; cf. Dittenberger, Syll; No.543, pt.ii. It was inaccurate but showed interest and some information.
73. Livy, xxviii. 43.
74. Livy, xxiii. 57.
75. Livy, xxv. 12.
76. Rev. d. Phil. xlix. 38.
77. cf. Holleaux, "Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques", p.124.
78. Livy, xxvii. 35.
79. Livy, xxxii. 38-40; v. sub.
80. Livy, xxxi. 7.
81. The Spartan tyranny under Nabis really affected Rome in two ways, one direct and the other indirect. The Roman Senate, whether justifiably or not, was afraid of any revolutionary action or ideology at that time and feared, therefore, the effects of the Spartan tyranny especially if Nabis controlled much more of Greece, as a whole and, since this was aggravated by Nabis, the Spartan tyranny was exercising another, indirect influence on Rome. Secondly, Rome feared the anarchy in Greece

82. Polyb., xvi. 37; Livy, xxxii. 38-40.
83. Livy, xxxiii. 44-45. cf. Justin, xxxi. 1, where the Senate is said to have written to Flaminius asking him to deliver Greece from Nabis because Nabis had seized so many cities in Greece.
84. Livy, xxxiii. 45.
85. Livy, xxxiii. 43.
86. Livy, xxxiv. 22.
87. Livy, xxxiv. 22.
88. *ibid.*
89. Livy, xxxiv. 26.
90. Livy, xxxiv. 23.
91. Livy, xxxiv. 31.
92. Livy, xxxiv. 32.
93. Livy, xxxiv. 26.
94. Livy, xxxiv. 27.
95. Livy, xxxiv. 33-36.
96. Livy, xxxiv. 33.
97. Livy, xxxiv. 32.
98. Livy, xxxiv. 33ff.
99. Livy, xxxiv. 36-37.
100. Livy, xxxiv. 36.
101. Livy, xxxiv. 37.
102. Livy, xxxiv. 38-39.
103. Livy, xxxiv. 39-40.
104. Livy, xxxiv. 41. It is suggested that the Spartans were beaten outside the walls. It is maintained they had lost 15,000 men killed and 4,000 men prisoners, that is one thousand more than their total force! Nabis had fifteen thousand troops in Sparta; cf. Livy, xxxiv. 27, and three thousand more who came from Argos, xxxiv. 29. cf. Livy, xxxiv. 38, on the Roman numbers.

105. This account is new but it alone explains away all those difficulties and inconsistencies pointed out by many scholars as the main weakness of the usual accounts.
106. Livy, xxxiv. 34-36. Dittenberger, Syll., No.592.
107. Dittenberger, Syll. No.595.
108. Livy, xxxiv. 41.
109. Livy, xxxiv. 36.
110. At Delos, for instance, the free population combined to drive the slaves back to their quarters, Ferguson, "Hell. Athens", p.379. For slave revolts of this period cf. Diod. Sic., xxxiv. and xxxv. frg. 25 (Dindorf); Athen., vi. 272E-F; Orosius, v. 9. These are later developments caused by Rome's use of masses of slaves and her methods of splitting any potential opposition by providing a hierarchy of privileges. Before this, in Greece, slaves were being used by free men to help their social revolts. On Mithridates, cf. Diod. Sic. ibid. On Aristonicus, cf. Strabo, xiv. l. 38; Justin, xxxvi. 4.
111. Rostovtzeff, "Soc. and Econ. Hist. etc.", p.1083, points out that, with the exception of arms and shipbuilding, there was no large market and mass demand to stimulate such a development of industry as would demand machines; and even where there was a demand, for instance in metals, this led to the use of slaves in masses, not to the use of machinery.
112. It is significant that only where the market was large or unlimited, that is in certain types of agriculture and in mining, is there evidence of definite ill-treatment of slaves, v. sup. ch.viii, n.177, since only in these cases does increased exploitation of slaves produce increased profits; and even this depends on a regular supply of slaves. So in the southern states of North America, slavery was patriarchal in character until brought into the orbit of trade by producing cotton for the international market. (v.sup. ch.viii. n.178).
113. Suetonius, Lives of the Twelve Caesars, Vespasian, 18.
114. Wallon, op.cit. l. pp.xxxi, lxxff., iii. pp.86, 296ff., argues that Christianity was responsible for its abolition. Heitland, op.cit., p.450, points out that Christianity accepted slavery and compromised with it; cf. also C.E.H. i. p.236, on this latter view.
- 115./

115. v. sup. ch.ii. In Europe estates were usually self-sufficient, doing their own smelting and weaving, and wage labour was only used for seasonal work. There were tenant farmers on small farms, but slaves were few and these generally some form of serf or tenant. Slaves on bigger estates were also rare and usually domestic. In the ninth century for instance, there is evidence of 93 slaves out of 1,400 tenants but most of these were domestic. In addition, in Europe, monks were confined to religious duties, so big estates run by masses of slaves were not practicable as overseeing and accounting would have needed settled conditions and more manpower. cf. C.E.H. i. pp.114, 228-9, 238-9.
116. Since this problem is being raised for the first time, obviously a satisfactory solution could only be reached by the co-operation of scholars in a variety of fields, covering the Bronze Age, Greece and Rome, the late Roman Empire, the early Middle Ages, and late Middle Ages and the beginnings of modern Europe.
117. cf. C.E.H. i. pp.235ff.; cf. also P. Boissonade, "Life and Work etc.", pp.3, 21ff.; Wallon, op.cit., iii.pp.86ff.
118. Meyer, "Kleine Schriften", p.178, points out that slavery was not completely forbidden in Prussia until 1857, but he does not explain whether these were agricultural serfs or industrial slaves. In Scotland the development of mining often led to the use of slaves or, more correctly, industrial serfs, cf. A.S.Cunningham, "Rambles in the Parishes of Scoonie and Wemyss", p.144, and in the nineteenth century people were occasionally sold as slaves. In London, in 1772, there were about 20,000 slaves, but these were negro domestic slaves, cf. A. McKenzie-Grieve, "The Last Years of the English Slave Trade, Liverpool, 1750-1807". Ldn. 1941. p.37. In modern times in Pechora, a district of Estonia, it was the custom for poor peasants to "sell" their children to some landlord or factory owner. The labour of the child then belonged to the "purchaser"; (reported in Vestni Dnya", 1939, a Pechora newspaper). This is a regular custom in Japan. This is the same sort of desperation of the peasant that prompted the sale of children before Solon's time and in Hellenistic Greece. In North America slave labour was used at first, since free labour was scarce and dear. When cheaper, however, free labour drove out slavery which had never been fully established. In fact, all the above examples are either late, exceptional developments in countries where free labour was already established, or local cases which were bound to die out, since they could not face the competition of free industry already dominant in Europe and especially in/

in Britain. The same argument applies to the southern states of North America and other localities where slavery was dominant. Since free labour was already firmly established elsewhere, slavery in modern times was doomed, since it could not compete with the output of machinery, which itself only developed because labour was free. In the southern states of N. America, where the challenge of competition was accepted, a slave's life was estimated at about 7 years, cf. Cairnes, "The Slave Power", pp.110-111, on the treatment of slaves in the West Indies, where the annual profits often equalled the whole capital of the plantations. Obviously, only so long as the slave supply lasted, could this monstrous exploitation continue. Moreover, the result in quality of work was quite alarming, so much so that even the output of poor whites was affected in consequence, cf. Cairnes, op.cit., 378-9. Africa, before the coming of white people, had a small ruling class and a few slaves who were originally prisoners of war. The economy was essentially agricultural with a little trade in slaves and a few commodities, (quoted in an article in "Nature", Dec. 1941). Had their trade and industry developed independently, it is possible that slavery might have developed with it. Once Africa was dominated by Europe, however, her economy was linked with the general world economy based on free labour.

119. cf. Heitland, "Agricola", p.450. Even where action was taken, for instance, the threat by the Pope of excommunication of merchants dealing in Christian slaves. The threat was frequently ignored, cf. Pirenne, "Hist. d. l. civilisation du m. age", p.21.
120. cf. "Any man who does not love slavery for its own sake as a divine institution, who does not adore it as the only possible social condition on which a permanent republican government can be erected, and who does not in his inmost soul desire to see it extended and perpetuated over the whole earth as a means of human reformation second in dignity, importance and sacredness alone to the Christian religion...." (quoted in "Southern Literary Messenger", 1860.). What a monstrous perverter of thought wishful thinking can be! Boswell is little better: "To abolish a status which, in all ages, God has sanctioned, and man has continued, would not only be robbery to an innumerable class of our fellow subjects, but it would be extreme cruelty to the African savages, a portion of whom it saves from massacre or intolerable bondage in their own country, and introduces into a much happier state of life....To abolish this trade would be to shut the gates of mercy on mankind". This expresses the common fallacy that slavery under a self-sufficient economy, and slavery under an economy which depends/

depends on sales in the market, are the same. The latter actually leads to much worse conditions for the slaves; v. sup. n.113.

121. Even so Wilberforce, one of the leaders of the anti-slave movement, was a staunch defender of the exploitation of child labour in factories.
122. cf. Homer, *Od.*, vii. 7; xiv. 452; xv. 427; xx. 383; xxiv. 211, 366, 389; *Iliad*, xxi. 40; xxiii. 747; xxiv. 753.
123. v. sup. ch.vii, n.170, on the Stoics and the changes in their attitude to slavery.
124. Cairnes, "The Slave Power", p.68. cf. pp.381-2, for further examples of how slavery would never be given up by slave owners.
125. cf. C.A.H. xi. p.41, on the use of spies and agents provocateurs by the Roman government to detect treason. This suggests the ability of the state to devise a variety of means for preserving its safety. Like all other empires and states before it, the Roman Empire, once the limit of its expansion had been reached, found its economy stagnating. To cure the stagnation it would have been necessary to extend economic privileges to more sections of the population with a view to increasing the home market, but this would have involved social changes throughout the whole empire (v.sup.ch.iv,n.61). It is only in a period of expanding economy, however, that privileges can be extended in a community without taking them from those already in possession. On the contrary, when the economy is contracting, privileges are fewer and so more greedily conserved by the possessors (v.sup. ch.vii).
126. cf. *Aris., Pol.*, i. 2. 1252^B, where he assumes that in a primitive community with, as yet, no clear social divisions, the members must all be slaves. This is false, but is interesting since it shows the importance of ideas. The prevalence of slavery and the acceptance of the idea of it made Aristotle read it into conditions where it did not exist. Of course Aristotle was probably regarding anyone who had to work as virtually a slave. cf. also *Pol.*, iii. 5. 1278A, where Aristotle argues that in ancient times artisans were slaves or foreigners. This was not true in Homer's time, so, either Aristotle's view is a result of direct tradition from Bronze Age conditions, or it was a later development to justify the use of slaves in industry.
127. cf. C.E.H. i. pp.235, 241-4.
- 128./

128. Venetian trade had never been completely interrupted and used to furnish slaves called "slavs", to the harems of Egypt and Syria, cf. Pirenne, op.cit., p.20, while, in the Mediterranean regions of Spain and Italy, slavery was partly restored by wars and commerce, although never on a large scale, cf. Boissonade, op.cit., p.259. Even in Germany slaves were found in moderately rich homes, cf. C.E.H. i. p.235. On the whole, however, these slaves were domestic and only used in agriculture when there was a shortage of free men, cf. Boissonade, op.cit., p.326.
129. C.E.H.i. p.236. In addition, the change from slavery to serfdom under the late Roman Empire was widespread enough and influential enough to overcome and replace those limited revivals of slavery after the final break up of the empire.
130. Boissonade, op.cit., p.93.
131. Pirenne, op.cit., p.44.
132. cf. the Erechtheum and Eleusis building inscriptions, v. sup. n.24.
133. C.E.H. i. p.237.
134. *ibid.*
135. cf. Heichelheim, "Wirtsch. d. Altert", p.214, on the tendency of Eastern states to revert to monarchies and that type of state after the confusion following on the break up of the Bronze Age.
136. C.E.H. i. p.237.
137. cf. Aris. Pol., i. 6. 1255A. Aristotle criticises this view since he believed men were free or slave by nature cf. also Pol. iii. 14. 1285A; vii. 14. 1333B. Alexander gave new opportunities to free men which probably frequently led to the sale of slaves, and this general social upheaval of this period is here reflected in Aristotle's new approach to slavery. This breakdown of the idea that foreigners were slaves and Hellenes not, was probably an advance on the Bronze Age, and was carried still further by the Roman Empire.
138. C.E.H. i. pp.121, 95.
139. cf. Hogben, "Science for the Citizen", p.551; cf. Cairnes, op.cit. pp.46-9, on the wasting of tools by slaves when exploited in masses, so that old clumsy tools were generally used.

140. cf. J. Strachey, "A Faith to Fight For", Ldn.1941, pp.30ff.
141. cf. Rostovtzeff, op.cit., p.1262.
142. We should always remember that man through the ages has expressed in Utopian terms his aspirations to a better life. Even the ancients were not unaware of the enormous differences a machine age could make to man's conditions. Aristotle, Pol., i. 4. 1253B, pointed out that if tools could do their own work, there would be no need for servants and slaves. The author of the poem on the Water Mill, cf. "The Greek Anthology," Leob. ed. III, p.232, saw even further. He knew his machine and showed a real fascination for it. One can easily picture him hanging over the water, absorbed in the working of the mill; "Slaves at the mill, your task now leave; Though crowing cocks the dawn proclaim, yet sleep; For water-sprites your hands relieve And light and swift down on the wheel they leap. The axle spins, the spokes then turn, The slow Nisyrian mill stone heavy swings; The Golden Ages now return When Ceres, not our toil, her harvest brings". I have endeavoured, in this rendering, to bring out what I consider the most significant points in the poem, namely, the dawning appreciation of the value of the machine to man, and the idea that this should mean a return of society to Hesiod's Golden Age of the food-gathering period (v.sup.ch.i). In actual fact, it was much more than a mere return, for the machine age has meant an enormous increase in the standard of living and an increase in leisure and, what is more significant, this increase is open, for the first time, to all men.
143. Livy, xxxv. 12; Zonaras, ix. 18.
144. Livy, xxxv. 22.
145. Livy, xxxv. 25.
146. *ibid.*
147. Plut., Philop, 15; Paus., viii. 50. 10; App. Syr. 21; Zonaras, ix. 19.
148. cf. Livy, xxxvii. 25, where it is asserted that Nabis would have been left secure if his own madness and then the treachery of the Aetolians had not ruined him; (quoted from a letter from Scipio).
149. Livy, xxxv. 35; Plut., Philop., 15.
150. Livy, xxxv. 36; cf. Plut., Philop., 15, where it was the chief Spartans - from the context clearly opponents of Nabis - who welcomed the Achaean League as the protector of their liberty.
- 151./

151. Livy, xxxviii. 31.
152. Livy, xxxviii. 32.
153. Livy, xxxviii. 33-4; Plut., Philop. 16.
154. Livy, xxxviii. 30.
155. Huberman, op.cit., p.158. cf. A. de Tocqueville, op. cit. pp. 7-8, on the fact that economic demands were still made after the revolution, since many were still dissatisfied. The peasants and artisans had not fully benefitted from the revolution. cf. Mignet, op.cit., i. pp.1-3, on the destruction of the remnants of feudalism by the revolution and the maintenance of a new type of state after it.
156. Fustel de Coulanges, "Polybe etc"., in "Quest. Hist.", pp.162ff., argues that Philopomen and other "moderates" really formed a third party in Greece. He has to admit, however, that they were more pro-Roman than pro-Macedon, ^{indeed} ~~and~~ they were simply part of the pro-Roman party. When parts of this party changed their views, they did not form a third party, but joined the pro-Macedon one. If there was any third party in Greece at this period it would consist of the disfranchised and slaves, who probably resented both Roman and Macedonian control as well as their own Greek governing class. This party, however, was not vocal in Greece at this period, except that parts of it might be said to have found some expression in the revolution at Sparta, and in the revolts against Rome. Since the submerged classes did not have their historian, their actual position in these struggles can only be mere speculation. v.sub. n.157.
157. Cornford, "Thucydides Mythistoricus", pp.19-20, argues that the economic importance of metics in Attica resulted in their having such an influence on Athenian policy. In nineteenth century England government enquiries into the conditions of life and work of the working class revealed that there was a great part of the population whose conditions and thoughts were unknown to the nation as a whole simply because this class was inarticulate, being without organisation (except for some few skilled workers) and without any means of expression. cf. also, Charles Booth, "Labour and Life of the People", 1866.

CONCLUSION.

Out of the richly woven period from which the Greek tyrannies arose, the dominating thread, the leit motif of the composition, was the urban revolution and the part played within it by the use of iron and the alphabet. As the urban revolution in the Bronze Age had created a new way of life, new states, new political forms, new ideas and new sciences, so a similar revolution in the Greek states repeated this transformation. It was not merely a repetition however. First of all, the Greek states started from a more advanced point of departure in political and social forms and had a richer cultural and ideological heritage to draw upon than the Bronze Age. Secondly, while rediscovering all the technique of the Bronze Age, Greece enjoyed the benefit of additional discoveries. As a result, the new way of life and ideas were swept beyond the achievements of the Bronze Age both to new forms of society and new types of state, and to more profound and more widespread theoretical and cultural achievements. Thus democracy, in the sense of the spread of political, social and cultural advantages to wider sections of the population, was born in practice and in theory and the effects of both exercise a profound influence today. In this process certain individuals, whose talents suited them for the demands of the period and whose temperaments impelled them to use these opportunities in the interests of their own careers, played the part of heralds, clearing the historical path of the remnants of former aristocratic occupation and preparing the way for the entry of new types of people and new ideas into man's society. They did not create the conditions which gave them this opportunity but, since they as individuals made outstanding use of these conditions, they made an important contribution to man's history, while their varying characters fashioned the details of social advance.

The creation of national states pursuing national policies revived international relationship in the world. Since, however, not all the Greek states were affected by the urban revolution, and since in at least one, Sparta, the ruling aristocracy was strong enough to exclude the influence of the new life, the policies of the various Greek states were at variance with one another. As a result, the trading states and especially Athens, whose popular influence was probably greatest, seemed a menace to the Spartan aristocracy, whose position depended on their ability to isolate their state from the new influences. This, in a world growing ever more closely connected, eventually proved impossible. The Spartan and Athenian tyrannies, although arising out of similar conditions and exhibiting similar characteristics, because of the variation in opposition to them within their respective states produced numerous variations of development and affected the foreign policy of quite different states.

Athens/

Athens and other early Greek tyrannies incurred the hostility of Sparta herself under her aristocracy, while Sparta under her tyranny suffered for this by incurring the hostility of the rest of Greece now grown conservative, of Macedon, and finally of Rome. The strength of the resistance to reform of the Spartan aristocracy altered the time schedule for the Spartan tyranny and, therefore, made it possible for quite new conditions, including Alexander's conquest of the East, to play an important role in creating the final victory of the tyranny at Sparta. By deliberately abolishing the economic and urban developments which would have made possible the full use of iron and the alphabet and the social changes which all that involved, the aristocracy in Sparta, a city, ironically enough, with plentiful supplies of iron available, had maintained their supremacy for several centuries after the first serious threat to it. To do this effectively they had attacked the tyrannies and democracies of Greece. They prevented Athens from becoming head of a more or less united Greece at a time when much of Athenian democratic vigour, mobilised in later times for the benefit of Athens, especially her citizens, at the expense of her allies, remained to make such a policy possible. If all the various Greek governments had been composed of the some type of people at the same time, they might have been able to unite on the basis of common interests. While the Athenian government, however, was pursuing a popular policy and was interested in commerce the Spartan government was still composed of an aristocracy whose counterpart in Athens had suffered political and social defeat. Sparta's interests were therefore different from and, under the special circumstances, hostile to those of Athens. It was not that the Spartan aristocracy was fanatically opposed to tyrannies as a matter of principle, but rather that practical concern for their position and interests forced them into opposition to Athens where the social effects of the tyranny were perhaps strongest. This interplay of Athenian and Spartan policy, when viewed from the internal development of each state rather than the usual standpoint of chronological, external relationship, presents a fascinating study.

Eventually, this failure to obtain unity in Greece and the growing decline in prosperity of the trading states, who had lost their early vigour, gave an opportunity to the powerful neighbours of Greece to intervene in Greek affairs and use her states as pawns in power politics. It has been argued (cf. Jardé, p.407), that unity of the Hellenistic world was only attained, not by opposing foreigners, but by agreeing with them and helping to transmit Hellenic culture to the outside world. However, if Athens and other Greek states had not fought so valiantly for their newly created individual nationalities against Persia, there would have been little or no Hellenic culture to transmit! It was the new/

new nationalism and patriotism which largely provided the soil for the growth of Greek culture. Only the growth of individual nationalities first, in place of semi-feudal conditions, could have laid the basis for a larger unity - a unity of a type more advanced than the feudal federalism of the Heroic Age, the unity of a large centralised nation embracing all Greece. After the break up of the Bronze Age states, society had reverted to isolated, self-sufficient communities. The Greek urban revolution led to a redevelopment of national states and international relations and, even in the early period, to a feeling of pan-Hellenism against the barbarian. The different levels of development among the Greek states however, and especially between the two most important of them, Athens and Sparta, prevented the growth of real unity. The attempt was left therefore to a foreign state which, by being strong enough to maintain its control over all the states, imposed some sort of unity on the Greek world, on the surface at any rate. Finally, Rome created a unity which lasted long enough to sink deep into the body of the Roman world and so led eventually to a reversal to feudal conditions similar to those of the break-up period after the Bronze Age but much deeper, more widespread and long lasting.

The Spartans themselves had proved even less capable of leading a united Greece. This is not surprising for to do so would have meant a complete transformation of the Spartan economy and social life, a revolution still resisted by influential people at Sparta. This deliberate attempt at suppressing the conditions which produced the tyrannies was responsible for the intensification at Sparta of the usual characteristics of these tyrannies, reflected in more far-reaching reforms and wider support for them among the population; for the character of the background to the Spartan tyranny and the isolation of Sparta as a result of the delay and changed conditions of its growth were responsible for the adoption by Nabis of vigorous measures at home, such as the freeing of slaves and widespread confiscations, and a deliberately revolutionary policy abroad, such as the carrying through of reforms at Argos, the attempt to exclude Spartan exiles from asylum in other Greek cities and the use of dispossessed and discontented people from all over Greece. This background to the Spartan tyranny included the active interest of other states in Greek affairs, an interest begun by Philip and Alexander of Macedon. The tradition of interference in the affairs of other states was strong in the Greek and Mediterranean world, partly as a result of the different rate of development among the Greek states and then as a result of the growing division of interests within individual Greek states. Sparta herself had probably been responsible for setting the fashion, in Greece at least, and the practice continued for several centuries. The intervention of Macedon under Philip and Alexander and the welcome given to/

to them by certain sections of the Greek population was only a logical development of this attitude and the invitation to Antigonus of Macedon to overthrow Cleomenes and the Spartan tyranny suggests historical justice to the disinterested student of Spartan history. The tyranny under Nabis only hastened an interference by Rome in Greek affairs which would almost certainly have taken place sooner or later, but, in doing so, it probably forged a link of popular ideology and revolutionary sentiment between the Greek world and the Roman world of the East and the West.

Although the different rates of development in Sparta and Athens helped to prevent the unification of the Greek world-(it does not necessarily follow however that unity would have been achieved if Sparta had produced a tyranny about the time of the other early Greek tyrannies) - it could not prevent the most fundamental influence of the tyrannies and all they represented from taking effect. While Athens, because of the vigour of her development of the possibilities of the Iron Age, produced the most outstanding results, Sparta, by her late development, pointed to the future and, by provoking Rome at that particular time, strongly linked the social products of the Iron Age in Greece and the Hellenistic East to the rising state of the West. Rome, of course, would almost certainly have interfered in any case since she was growing in strength and expanding in influence. The course of historical development therefore would have been the same. The Spartan tyranny and the Greek conditions of the period allied with the conditions in Italy did, however, provoke the interference at that time and so affected details of historical development and profoundly affected the Spartan tyranny itself.

The influence of the tyrannies on later times was expressed not in any dramatic discovery of a culture lost for centuries and then recovered to enrich the modern world, but in the slow, not very obvious evolution of man's society. Through the strength ~~of~~ Roman institutions ~~the~~ cultural activities of Greece affected Europe even when the direct products of Greek culture were lost. Roman administration and laws, ideas of freedom and society were inherited from Greece (cf. Myres, "Who etc." pp.xiv-xv), either directly, or because they arose from the same basic conditions which were a legacy from Greek society and the Iron Age generally. These then provided the practical medium for transmitting Greek culture at a time when that culture was lost to the world. Some of the finest of Greek ideas, for example, on abolition of slavery, on men being free by merit and not by birth or fortune, on freedom and democracy, on the best type of life worthy of man, failed to be achieved in Greece because of the limitations of the period/

period, but, as a result of the positive legacy of practical achievement passed to the Roman world accompanied by this ideology, eventually, a new synthesis of such ideas with a more advanced practical basis for them produced the flower of the modern world, namely, a new type of society, cultured, highly productive yet based on free labour, which made possible a still further advance in democracy, that is, the extension of social progress and cultured, leisured living to a greater number with the possibility this time of embracing all men.

Nor did this influence travel directly from one point of advance to another, but only after a series of reactionary phases and after what seemed the very end of all progress did another really vital advance in man's history take place, the building of a trading and manufacturing economy on free labour. So after the break-up of the Bronze Age civilisation and a period of Dark Ages, the full use of iron and the alphabet made possible by the trading revolution, was the outstanding revolutionary milestone which affected the period of the Greek tyrannies. Their continued effect through: out the following centuries and the gradual evolution of the social changes set in motion by them, finally produced, again after a period of break-up and darkness, and again after a revival of trade, another of those milestones, the use of free labour in a trading economy and, therefore, the beginning of an industrial age with the possibility of extending still further both economic and political democracy. Just as the trading revolution of early Greece began from a more advanced starting point and possessed some new features which made the societies of Greece and Rome develop characteristics quite different from those of the Bronze Age, so the trading revolution of fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe did not merely repeat the earlier one but, starting from a much larger type of state within a much larger world than in ancient times and pursuing, therefore, policies of more extensive influence, and having, in addition, the use of free labour and so the possible development of machines in: stead of the seeds of slavery, the modern states have developed quite differently from those of Greece and Rome.

The conditions which gave rise to the Greek tyrannies, therefore, while they did not actually create the bricks, did provide the clay from which the bricks for the foundations of a future society could be made, a society in which all men should live in freedom and dignity. In addition, these conditions also produced the first ideas of freedom and democracy, ideas which, although for long they lay fallow, never entirely died out. It is this faith in freedom, and the courage to die that all men may be free, which is sweeping like a flame through mankind today, a flame which had its first glimmerings in the early Iron Age and now, like a beacon, lights the way to future progress.

Quiet in the land of Greece lie buried those
Who died for freedom; yet lives on their name
While still the heart of man within him glows
 With freedom's flame.

In dark death wrapped, with glory bright they crowned
Their land. Immortal life from Death they won
Who dared to fling back Death's dark doors, and found
 A radiant sun. (1).

- (1). A free rendering of Greek Anthology, No.253, the last
line of No.294 and No.251.

APPENDIX.

ROME'S INTERVENTION IN GREECE.

SECTION I.

VARIOUS THEORIES WHICH HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED TO EXPLAIN THE INTERVENTION OF THE ROMANS IN GREECE.

Little support can be expected for the new theory suggested above to explain Rome's intervention in Greece unless existing theories can be proved unsatisfactory on the one hand, and detailed evidence supplied for the new theory on the other. The following sections, therefore, will be devoted to an examination of other theories, and sections II and III will argue the case for the new hypothesis in greater detail.

This problem of the Roman intervention into Greece has provoked a variety of solutions, each with a variety of supporters. Before formulating a new hypothesis, the existing ones must be analysed. These may be arranged under eight headings, as follows:

- (a) The theory of conquest, or aggressive imperialism, usually considered to have been carried out with great cunning. Supporters of this view include G. Colin, *Rome et la Grèce*, etc; V. Duruy, *History of Greece*, vol. iii; C. Peter, *Gesch. Roms*, i. pp.425 ff.; W. Ihne, *The History of Rome*, vols. ii and iii; C. Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, vol.viii; U. von Willamowitz, *Stadt und Gesellschaft der Griechen und Roemer*, (who thinks however there was little to choose between Rome's aggression and Philip's brigandage); G. de Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*. iv. l., pp.21 ff.; Carcopino, *L'Impérialisme Romain*, pp.58 ff.; and T. Walek, *Rome and Greece in the third century*, *Rev. d. Phil.*, xlix, pp. 28 ff., 118 ff. The latter makes the driving policy of Rome one of "pure" imperialism, by which, apparently, he means an aggressive policy for no gain, or even to her disadvantage.
- (b) The theory of defensive imperialism, that is the belief that the war was undertaken by the Romans to prevent an attack on themselves. This theory is perhaps the most popular, and includes among its supporters Macchiavelli, *The Prince*, Bohn. ed., pp.413 ff.; W.E. Heitland, *The Roman Rep.*, vol. ii; L. Homo, *L'Italie Primitive* etc., who however thinks this theory inadequate by itself and explains the policy and the timing of the attack by Rome as due to the deliberate choice of favourable conditions, although he has already described Rome's policy/

policy as short-sighted and lacking in common sense; M. Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World*, vol.ii, who includes a certain amount of philhellenism as a motive; M. Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce et les Monarchies Hellenistiques*, and C.A.H. viii, pp.158 ff., who is of the opinion that Rome mistakenly regarded Antiochus and his alliance with Philip as the main threat; and E.T. Griffith, *An Early Motive of Roman Imperialism*, C.H.J. v. pp. 1. ff; who thinks it was Philip's sea power which Rome especially feared.

- (c) The theory of economic imperialism is supported by Tenney Frank, *Economic History of Rome*, ch.iv; Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol.ii, includes this as one motive. L. Homo, *Flamininus et la Politique romaine en Grèce*, 198-4, *Rev. Hist.*, cxxi. pp. 241 ff. cxxii, pp. 1 ff., includes commercial motives in the general defensive policy.
- (d) The theory of Philhellenism seldom stands by itself, but is frequently included among other motives. Mommsen, *op.cit.*, gives it more importance than most, but he too adds other motives. Heitland, *op.cit.*, and Rostovtzeff, *op.cit.*, and Tenney Frank, *Roman Imperialism*, also include this in their list of motives.
- (e) The theory of a policy based on a series of accidents. Supporters of this view usually advocate some other theory in addition. For instance, Holleaux thinks that the lack of method and concentration shown by the Romans and their ignorance of geography played an important part in formulating their policy of defensive attack. Tenney Frank, in his *Roman Imperialism*, while giving a variety of motives for Rome's actions, maintains that there was no definite plan behind the conquest, but that a series of accidents led Rome from one step to another. E. Bickermann, *Les Preliminaires de la Seconde Guerre Macédoine*, *Rev. d. Phil.*, lxi. pp.59 ff., pp.161 ff., is of the opinion that neither Rome nor Philip wanted war, but that a chain of circumstances, starting with the peace of Phoinike, finally led them to fight each other.
- (f) The theory of the inevitability of war between Rome and the East is supported by E. Pais, *Histoire Romaine*, Ch.x, who also includes among Rome's motives a certain amount of defensive imperialism, revenge on Philip, and the opportunity provided by the appeals of the Greeks; by J.F. Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought from the Age of Alexander to the Roman Conquest*, Ch.xix, who thinks, however, that much of the so-called inevitability arose from Philip's alliance with Hannibal; and by F. de Coulanges, *Questions Historiques; Polybe ou la Grèce conquise par les Romains*, who believes that the inevitability was a result of expansionists plans by both Philip and the Romans, and that both sides were therefore to blame.

- (g) The theory of revenge is used as part of many of the other theories. E.A. Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, pp.565 ff., takes revenge as the main motive and considers that Philip had only himself to blame. Later, p.607, philhellenism is added as an influence on policy in the early period of intervention in Greece, but he does not think it lasted long. G.F. Herzberg, *Histoire de la Grèce sous la Domination des Romains*, vol.i, makes revenge the whole motive for the Roman attack. He admits that the moment was unfavourable for Rome, but seems to suggest that the provocation to Rome was so great that she ignored that.
- (h) The theory of disinterestedness on the part of the Romans finds advocates in A. Piganiol, *La Conquête Romaine*, who believes that Rome was always ready to put her armies at the disposal of others; in Ed. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften*, pp.276 ff., who take the more moderate view that the Romans were forced by their position to answer the appeals of the Greeks. E. Bickermann, l.c., p.170, believes that it was a matter of honour for Rome to save Greece, although she did not really wish to do so at first; and A. Holm, *History of Greece*, vol.iv., maintains that Rome's government was a centre of attraction for weaker states and that accordingly Rome answered appeals directed to her; cf. p.350. Heitland, l.c., p.10, believes that Rome sincerely wished to help her Greek allies but did not realise it would lead to one war after another.

Professor Ure (1) has pointed out that "the scepticism or credulity of any given scholar has always depended largely on that of his generation." This could be expanded to explain the beliefs of the scholar, partly according to the intellectual heritage available to him, and partly in the light of prevailing social conditions (v.sup., chs.ii, iv. & v.). For instance, Mommsen's social background was much more in harmony with the Roman state of about 200 B.C. than it could be with the contemporary Greek states, which were rapidly degenerating into pure anarchy. This finds expression in his belief that only Senataors could rule (2), as much as in his sympathetic treatment of Rome's intervention in Greece.

Colin, on the other hand, who was writing in 1905, must have grown up with vivid memories of the Franco-Prussian war and the German occupation. There is no evidence that this influenced his interpretation of ancient history, but it is quite reasonable to assume that he had an aversion, conscious or not, to victory by aggression, and so identified himself with Greece.

Bishop Thirlwall reflects something of that democratic nationalism characteristic of Britain in the nineteenth century, when she led the world in the industrial field and when life/

life was characterised by freedom of development in every sphere. That background in maturity, coupled to a childhood no doubt filled with tales of Napoleon and the threat of his invasion of Britain, probably helped to produce a dislike of any spirit of domination.

Fustel de Coulanges reflects two very different trends of France's history in the first half of the nineteenth century. The growth of the republican state aroused a feeling of national patriotism and the sympathetic understanding of the need for expansion. On the other hand, the internal struggles during the French Revolution and the revolt of 1848, gave him a clearer insight into internal conditions in Greece and other states than most writers of ancient history. In spite of this, he could not approve of the invitation extended to the Romans by some sections of the Greek population. These two trends give him a peculiarly balanced position, which has led him to blame both sides equally.

Freeman has obviously been tremendously impressed by the Italian war of national liberation, which he frequently quotes. This gives him a very realist approach to some of the problems of ancient history. He sympathises, for example, with the reforms of Cleomenes, and regrets the failure of these and the lost opportunities of Philip of Macædon. While he identifies himself with the progressive forces both in current affairs and in ancient times, and so condemns Aratus, his knowledge of that type of conflict gives him a profound understanding of the problem confronting Aratus and people like him. Such a broad appreciation of the whole canvas makes it certain he will understand Rome's point of view, while failing to sympathise with it. It is against weakness as shown in Philip's lost opportunities that he turns his disapproval and regards Philip's senseless provocation as responsible for making war inevitable.

Mahaffy, an Irishman living happily under British rule, found it possible to appreciate the advantages, material and cultural, which Britain could offer him. He would almost certainly assume that any cultured Greek would prefer an ordered government under Roman control, to the anarchy hitherto prevailing in Greece. For an Irishman, then, with no objections to British rule, it would be easy to sympathise with Rome.

Tenney Frank has been strongly influenced by the economic school of historians. While this flourished especially in Germany in the late nineteenth century, it has attracted many adherents in Britain and the U.S.A. in the present century. He does not stress this view consistently, and, like most of the moderns, he is very eclectic in his theories. In his Roman Imperialism/

Imperialism he suggests four motives for Rome's actions, and the fact that he has to make one of them the Romans' resentment against being called barbarians seems to indicate his own consciousness of the weakness of his case.

Most modern scholars of ancient history, for instance Rostovtzeff, Homo and Heitland, are clearly more influenced by the academic tradition of scholarship on the question, than by their own environment, and so adopt some sort of middle view. They show perhaps a greater appreciation of the complexities of the problem of war between states, but this occasionally leads them into contradictions. Heitland, for instance, talks of the blunders of the Senate (l.c., p.10), and then later, (p.18), remarks that the Senate was always far sighted and astute. It is probably true that in so far as they have neutralised any contemporary influence and concentrated on the history of the problems' interpretations, modern scholars show a more thoughtful and reasoned approach. This is especially true of Holleaux, who is in revolt against the two extreme views. He has worked exhaustively on the material, he has viewed the problem from almost every angle, and so, although he favours Rome, he is not strictly anti-Macedon. He too, however, is not a consistent interpreter of character; he regards the Romans as short-sighted and indifferent and yet asks us to believe that they went to war in 200 B.C., merely on a suspicion which Holleaux himself maintains was proved to be false.

Of the ancient writers, Livy saw and expressed the view only of Rome, while Polybius was one of those cultured Greeks who saw in Rome's control the only possible future for Greece. To accuse Polybius of lack of patriotism is to ignore the conditions in which he wrote. By that time Rome, whatever may have been thought of her methods, was already well on the way to uniting much of the civilized world, and, as far as Greece herself was concerned, opportunities for opposition on a really "national", that is Hellenic, scale had already passed. In any case, only a movement in which the distressed peoples of Greece were given some material security and political responsibility, could have roused such a martial spirit that their resistance might have had some success. Polybius, however, was quite incapable of appreciating this. To him the masses were ignorant, and cowards, to be kept subdued by the use of religion and mythology (3). While this was no doubt true of the Greek masses in the conditions of the third and second centuries B.C., Polybius failed to realise how they might have been transformed by new opportunities and a new spirit. Polybius had admired the strength and stability of the Roman state and hoped under her rule to enjoy a restoration of harmony in the Greek states, based of course on the existing social conditions. To a certain extent Rome tried to do this, especially at first, and it was only the growth of inequalities and the desire for wealth/

wealth in Rome herself that probably prompted much of the oppressive quality of her rule in Greece. This eventually provoked revolts and wars, which led to the final defeat and devastation of Greece. Polybius could not have anticipated this. In fact, he had already regretted the changed conditions in Rome.

These analyses must not be overstressed. It is entirely possible that the view stressed by various historians arose from reasons quite different from those mentioned. Without detailed biographies it is obviously impossible to decide. It is, however, plausible that, whether consciously or not, historians are influenced by contemporary society and history and especially by events during which they matured; and so the historian, like the scientist, should make allowances for the personal factor in his material.

But what of the theories themselves? An analysis of each reveals flaws in all of them. "Pure imperialism" need not be considered since it means nothing. People and states do not act in a sort of vacuum without some objective in view, whether acknowledged or not. If the policy pursued is one of conquest, then gain of some sort, whether prestige, or more material reward, will be the objective. If the policy is defensive then the objective is protection. If it is commercial, it is also for gain. The policy may be designed to help others, or to impress others, that is for prestige, but it must be for something; and this applies as much to imperialism as to any other policy. Imperialism is not a thoughtless folly as Walek seems to suggest.

As far as imperialism for immediate conquest is concerned, this could not be attributed to Rome as her motive for intervening in Greece since it would be directly contradicted by the facts. After Cynoscephalae the Romans took no land and even withdrew their troops. They had won increased prestige and influence but much less in material rewards.

Were they then acting according to a long-term policy of conquest? If Rome had been preparing for a very long time to attack the East, as Colin and de Sanctis (4) maintain, why did she miss so many opportunities? During the mercenary war at Carthage Rome had a good army and fleet (5), and yet made no move eastwards. No action was taken against the Ilyrian pirates for a considerable time, and when eventually the Romans did act, they made no attempt to go further east for conquest. Even Walek, who interprets the war of 229 B.C. as one of Imperialism for expansion, has to admit that the subsequent diplomatic visits to Greece had no immediate effect, since Rome had first to settle with Carthage; an explanation which invalidates Walek's own theory. It must have been obvious that Carthage and Rome were going to fight again, /

again, and even if it were not, Rome could not have undertaken new adventures while the power of Carthage remained unbroken. It is quite incredible that Rome could already be looking beyond the defeat of Carthage to the conquest of the East. Carthage's defeat was not so easily planned or accomplished, and there were so many possible changes of policy involved that definite plans could not be made so far ahead. At the most, it could only be admitted that Rome was securing her Eastern flank before war with Carthage again flared up.

When Demetrius of Pharos deserted the Romans, the latter remained apparently indifferent, because, according to Walek, no vital interests were involved in Illyria, and on this Walek bases his theory of "pure" imperialism! The Romans at the time of Demetrius' desertion were absorbed by the war with the Gauls and were not freed from this till about 220 B.C. (6). In any case, the gains of the first Illyrian war were still intact until 220, when Demetrius stirred up further revolt (7), and it was only in 219, when Demetrius took to the sea, that the Senate acted (8). In both Illyrian wars, then, Rome was content to safe-guard the coast, which could be used as a base of operations against her (v.sub.). So far her policy had been purely defensive.

The alliance with the Aetolians and the war against Philip of Macedon and his allies in 211-10 B.C. was also one of military defence. If the Romans had been planning anything more, why had they passed over the opportunities already offered; and even if they had changed their aims meantime, this was hardly the time to carry out a new policy of aggression in the East when Carthage was still strong enough to demand all their attention. In fact, this war against Philip was precisely for the purpose of freeing Rome for full concentration on Carthage. Her actions in withdrawing her troops about 209 B.C. and then attempting to rekindle the war after peace had been made in 205, seems to indicate that Rome was concerned only to keep Philip from interfering in the Western struggle. Even Colin (9) admits that this was unwise if Rome were planning to conquer the East. The peace gave Rome no territory, and in fact she abandoned much of what she had had. So far at any rate there were no signs of a desire for Eastern conquests. Even Walek admits that from 211-200 B.C. Rome had little interest in the East, since her attention was absorbed by Carthage. Only a quarter of the Punic fleet had been destroyed according to Walek, and, although Tarentum was lost to the Carthaginians, they had other ports (10).

Walek's argument that Rome's intervention in Illyria was certain to antagonise Philip, and therefore was foolhardy, is a case of being wise after the event. Normally, Macedon was absorbed by activities in Greece and the East, and Rome with Carthage. It was not obvious to either at this time that they were going to be enemies. Colin's idea that one war leads to another, the view also of Polybius (11), is no doubt true, but that Rome had planned this beforehand has already been disproved. Looking back it is always easy to trace a conscious, planned pattern running through events that may well have been carried through with the minimum of foresight. Historians work according to reason and logic, and so read into historical acts those same qualities. Actions, political and otherwise, may be done for all sorts of reasons. They may be performed on impulse or through a sudden necessity. They do not as a rule fall into an orderly planned campaign. Even a military campaign, which probably has been prearranged, will usually suffer change and redirection as the war proceeds.

Pyrrhus (12) and Demétrius of Pharos (13), it is true, both argued that Rome was aspiring to world empire. They, however, had a grudge against Rome and no doubt found that type of statement useful in obtaining means for fresh adventures. The warning of Agelaos (14) was certainly justified, but could have been based merely on the probability of a clash taking place in a world of expanding states.

However, many scholars who admit that Rome was not attempting the conquest of the East during the third century B.C., if only because she was too occupied with Carthage, do maintain that she acted according to a policy of aggressive imperialism in the Second Macedonian War. Even Colin (15) handsomely admits that it may be possible to explain Rome's previous actions as defensive, but asserts that the Second Macedonian War cannot be so explained. If, however, Rome was pursuing a deliberate policy of aggression, why did she choose the most disadvantageous time possible? Why did she act in 200 B.C. when the treasury was empty, agriculture ruined, the people war weary, and reconstruction, although vitally necessary, prevented for lack of money? Would any state, no matter how "imperialistic", immediately after a war which she had nearly lost and a peace which she had not begun to win, start another war purely for conquest? Obviously, if possible, she would wait until the benefits of victory began to be realised, when she could then use some of the spoils to restore the country's shattered economy.

Moreover, Philip himself, in turning eastwards and there wasting his strength and resources, obviously saw no reason for an attack - immediately at any rate - on Macedon. Philip had been checked, if not defeated, by Rhodes and Attalus. If Rome really wanted to conquer the East, the simplest method was/

was to encourage and fan this war of attrition until the resources of all combatants were exhausted. Rome would then have had an unopposed entry and could have settled affairs to her liking with probably a mere threat of force. Instead of that, she diverted the burden of war to herself at a moment when she was least capable of shouldering it. This can have only one explanation; she could not wait. Far from carrying out a carefully planned policy with great cunning and deliberation, she was being driven into actions apparently unfavourable to herself by some over-riding consideration (v.sub. sec.III).

Arguments on the foolhardiness and stupidity of Philip in not realising his provocation of Rome merely illustrate the weakness of the aggression theory. Taken by itself, there was no reason to suppose Philip's behaviour would provoke Rome to War. After Zama Hamilcar had roused Cisalpine Gaul to revolt. He was defeated by the local population, but he kept two legions busy for years. Spain and Corsica, too, demanded attention before they were finally subdued (16). In 205 B.C. the Senate had been opposed to "adventures", the case under consideration being Scipio's expedition to Africa (17) which finally brought the war to an end; yet in 200 B.C. it was the Senate which pressed for the Macedonian War! A policy of conquest or aggressive imperialism will not explain these actions.

On the theory of defence or preventive attack, there are a number of variations. There is the belief that Philip was a danger to Rome during the Second Punic War, and even more so after his alliance with Hannibal. Freeman, who holds this view, is of the opinion that only Philip's indecision saved Rome. Others, among them Mahaffy, Mommsen, Herzberg, Heitland (l.c., p.12) Homo and Rostovtzeff, believe Philip to have been a danger only after his treaty with Antiochus. Finally, it is believed by Pignaniol, Holleaux, Heitland (p.10 cf. sup.) and Rostovtzeff (he thinks Philip and Antiochus wanted to restore Alexander's empire, but that actually the alliance between them was proving a check on each of them), that Philip was not really a danger, but that Rome ~~actually~~ thought he was.

Holleaux (18) actually maintains that Macedon under Antigonus Doseon was a threat to Rome, and that the latter should therefore have helped Cleomenes in 221 B.C. The Romans took no action, probably for the simple reason that there was no threat against them. It certainly could not have been obvious. In 219 B.C. Rome secured Illyria and thereby, no doubt, risked offending Antigonus Doseon, but there is no evidence that he bore Rome any illwill; and if Rome did not attack Macedon, it was presumably because she saw no reason to do so. To have moved further East would have been to invite Antigonus to become an enemy of Rome just when Hannibal/

Hannibal was besieging Saguntum. That would have been completely unrealistic. In so far as Macedon and Rome were both expanding, there was a probability that they would clash one day, but there was no evidence of plans of attack from either side.

Livy (19) complains that Philip of Macedon allowed his lieutenants to make incursions against the part of Illyria under Roman protection. It is true that after the battle of Trasimene Lake Philip made a hasty peace with the Aetolians, with no advantage to himself, and engaged in hostilities in Illyria, but no evidence suggests that these were a prelude to the invasion of Italy. Polybius (20) reveals that in the treaty with Hannibal, Philip was concerned only with the Roman possessions in Illyria and that neighbourhood. There was no mention of freeing Greek cities in Italy. Moreover, the argument that Philip wanted Illyria as a springboard of attack against Italy could be reversed to maintain that he wanted to prevent Rome from using it as a base against Macedon. Even when Hannibal was master of South Italy, including ports for disembarkation, and with a fleet still unbroken, Philip made no attempt to invade Italy. It is doubtful, indeed, whether Hannibal would have wished him to do so. He was probably more useful as a possible diversion in the future if it became necessary. It is clear from the terms of the alliance that Philip was a very junior ally, and not likely to be allowed territory in Italy if Hannibal could seize it for Carthage.

In 216 B.C., Philip had built a fleet of galleys, but was so panic-stricken at the mere report of the arrival of a Roman squadron that he retired and returned to Macedon (21). In 215-14 Philip did not even attempt to challenge the Romans at sea, but concentrated his attention on Messenia (22). Even Griffith (23), who thinks Philip's fleet was the main cause of the Second Macedonian War, has to admit that Philip did virtually nothing with it in the West. It is little wonder that Livy expresses contempt for Philip as an enemy, even when allied to Hannibal (24). Holleaux (25) believes that Philip was afraid to go further West, in case the Aetolians rose in his rear, but this, if true, would be applicable at any time and so would invalidate the whole case for defensive action. In any case, when Philip, according to Holleaux, was preparing to invade Italy in 213/2, he was again attacking Messenia. If Philip was continually seeking an opportunity for attacking Italy, why did he sign the Treaty of Phoenike in 205 B.C.? It has been suggested (26) that an attack would then have involved the Roman legion which had been sent to Illyria after the treaty, but if Philip felt disinclined to fight one Roman legion when Carthage was still unbeaten, surely it cannot be suggested that he was planning to attack Rome after the Carthaginian War, which Rome would possibly win. Livy (27) accuses Philip of sending money and men to Africa. Since the Senate never used/

used this as an excuse for their subsequent actions against Philip, and since the troops are not mentioned in Polybius' account of the battle of Zama, it has been suggested that they may be a later invention (28).

The more popular view is that Philip's expeditions in the East, and finally his alliance with Antiochus, brought him such increased power that he could upset the balance of power in the East and prove a serious threat to Rome. But Philip's expeditions in the last few years of the third century B.C. were not only dissipating his resources, but any territorial gains they won were so far from Macedon and each other that they demanded more resources to maintain them. In fact, Dicaearchus' piratical expedition was probably undertaken purely for money (29). The battle of Chios, even if not a great victory for Attalus and Rhodes as Herzberg (30) thinks, was responsible for enormous losses for Philip in men and ships. Philip won the battle of Lade, but probably was not capable of following it up (31). By the summer of 201 any mastery Philip may have had in the Aegean had disappeared (32), and the campaign in Pergamum still further exhausted Philip's forces, so that by the autumn or winter of 201 his army was in need of still further supplies and reinforcements (33). As a finish to his expedition Philip was blockaded in Bargylia by Rhodes and Attalus and thus exposed to attacks by the Aetolians. Philip was perhaps at his weakest. If Rome really feared him, this was the time to stir up an attack. Attalus and Rhodes had taken away many of Philip's conquests, but Philip next turned his attention to Thrace and the Hellespont, and was obviously quite unconscious of being a threat to Rome. Rhodes and Pergamum had shown themselves capable of holding Philip in check. In fact, Livy (34) maintains that Philip by then was unequal in strength to Attalus and Rhodes combined (35).

As for the alliance between Philip and Antiochus, there was no guarantee that it would last (36). Indeed the usual jealousies and rivalries of the Hellenistic kings made the prospects of the alliance very poor. Holleaux (37) maintains that it was bound to break and Rostovtzeff (38) goes so far as to assert that Antiochus and Philip were proving a check to each other by the alliance. MacDonald and Welbank (39) are of the opinion that neither would have allowed the other to become supreme in the East, and that the pact was an empty form by the time it was revealed (40).

There are those, however, who believe that Rome only heard of the alliance in the autumn of 201 (41), and failed to realise its ineffectiveness. Yet, by the time it was revealed, it was already an empty form (42) and Rome herself had the best of reasons for knowing this, since she succeeded in detaching Antiochus from Philip with no apparent difficulty and/

and certainly no resort to war (43). Moreover, even if Rome still believed Philip to be a menace, there was no need for her to take the immediate burden of war on her own shoulders. She could have stirred up further trouble against Philip and she could have used diplomacy. Rome had shown herself adept at both methods. She had already stirred up the Aetolians against Philip (44); and Walek (45), who is loud in his statements on Rome's wanton aggression, admits Rome's skill in splitting her enemies and making alliances. Colin, too, points out that in the first Macedonian war, although only one legion was sent against Macedon, Roman diplomacy was active (46). In fact, the experience of the Social War proved to Rome how easy it was for her to stir up trouble in Greece and the East. She could also have ~~used~~ used the barbarians against Philip. They actually needed little encouragement, for they attacked Macedon as soon as Philip turned eastwards (47). The advantage of fostering such strife or allowing it to continue, had been proved for Rome by the appeals of the Mamertines at Syracuse (48) and the occupation of Sardinia at the invitation of the mercenaries (49).

Even in the East, where such methods could now have proved useful, Rome had already made use of them. She had, for instance, neutralised Egypt and isolated Antiochus (50). Egypt, who considered herself threatened by Philip, actually offered to help Athens against Philip and allow Rome to stand aside, but Rome insisted on acting herself! (51). It seems possible, too, that once Antiochus was detached from Philip, it would actually have been more advantageous to Rome to leave Philip as a bulwark against Antiochus; and so maintain that balance of power about which Rome is said to have been so concerned. (It is noticeable that it is almost immediately after Philip's defeat that Antiochus became actively hostile against Rome. cf. Mommsen p.443 on this). With Syria bought off and Egypt protected, and Attalus and Rhodes at hand in the Aegean, it was only necessary to fan the flames already burning against Philip in Greece, and Rome could then have controlled future developments in the East at her lesiure and without resort to war. Playing the Hellenistic monarchs off against each other would have been simple for Rome with her experience. And yet she never even attempted to apply these methods and avoid war. The only reasonable conclusion is that, for some reason, she definitely wanted war, not with Antiochus whom she had neutralised, but with Philip.

Moreover, the main threat from Philip and Antiochus was assumed to be directed against Egypt, and yet Rome made no attempt to make Egypt the base for organising the war, whether diplomatic or military. On the contrary, she went out of her way to make Greece the occasion of her quarrel with Philip.

The/

The pretext used by Rome, that Philip was trying to rescue the Greeks of Sicily and South Italy, was so absurd since Philip had had excellent opportunities during the Second Punic War but had shown no inclination to use them - that it merely shows the weakness of Rome's case against Philip. It is, however, interesting that Rome rejected as pretexts both Egypt, and others, for whom a much more plausible case could be put, and deliberately used the Greeks.

In short, Macedon was considered to be exceedingly weak by 200 B.C. (52). Tenney Frank (53) admits that invasion by Philip was not imminent, and supporters of the defensive theory are forced to explain that Rome's actions were due to an attack of nerves (54), or that Philip's lack of any serious threat was due to his indecision and weakness (55); although Herzberg has to admit that Philip showed courage and determination in the Social War. These explanations are very reminiscent of the excuses offered to explain Rome's failure to seize her earlier opportunities for conquering the East (56). If it was a question of preventing Philip from regaining his strength, methods other than war have been suggested. For actual warfare, Rome always had a preponderance of strength which would have assured her of ultimate victory, even if Philip should actually win a few battles (57). Philip, therefore, offered no real threat. The defensive theory, in short, is unable to explain Rome's haste and choice of time, her insistence on Philip as her enemy, on war as her method, and on Greece as her pretext.

The theory of economic imperialism has been adopted as part of Rome's motives for this period, rather than the only one. Rome had been almost constantly expanding and agriculture had absorbed her labour and capital. There was no immediate need, therefore, for her to develop trade and industry. For the last twenty years of the third century B.C. Romans and Italians are not found in the East (58), perhaps because of the Second Punic War. In 200 B.C., therefore, a commercial policy could not have been initiated and directed by Italians resident in the East. Were there sufficient of them before 220 to make such a policy possible? Hatzfeld has shown how few there were. At Delos, where they were most numerous in later times, the references are scanty. There was the family of the Staii, probably Companians (59), who were established at Delos in the last quarter of the third century B.C. (60). At the end of the third century Marcus Sestius, a Latin, was at Delos and his father had been there before him (61). Nymphodorus, the Syracusan banker, and his father and son were there at the turn of the century (62). Someone from Tarentum was also there about 200 (63). It is not even certain that all these people were merchants, and even if they were, there were too few of them to influence policy. Colin suggests (64) that many of these people were agents for the/

the Senate, but even if they were, there were still not enough of them to carry through a national policy. In any case, if Rome was pursuing a commercial policy, the instigators and directors of it must have been resident in Italy where they could influence decisions of policy. If a lot of money were already involved in the East, then their foreign policy might be designed to protect it. However the few Italians who had moved East so early, and the economic independence of the East and West Mediterranean at that time (65), make that suggestion extremely improbable.

Was then an Eastern policy fostered in order to find investments for money? It is true that bankers and contractors must have amassed fortunes as a result of the war (v.sub., Sec.II), so that a search for new investments is a more plausible motive than the protection of old ones. However, Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain were still largely undeveloped, and practically the whole of Carthage's foreign market was at Rome's disposal. There was therefore enormous scope for trade and banking without even considering the East. No matter how greedy merchants may be, they do not run into war in one direction for the sake of markets or plunder, when enormous fields of activity in some other direction are lying open for them. Moreover, while war had certainly brought fortunes to some, peace was urgently needed for their further development. Land was crying out for capital and peaceful reconstruction. Peace and normal conditions at home would stimulate trade and prosperity. In fact, after 200 there was no need for a commercial policy in the East. Merchants no doubt began to benefit from Eastern conquests, but they did not direct that policy. It was probably not until the end of the second century B.C. that they had sufficient power at Rome to direct policy in their own interests (66).

While some scholars maintain that the Romans were phil-hellenes others assert that, on the contrary, the Romans despised the Greeks. It seems probably that both are correct. At first the Romans probably did admire the products of Greek culture, but this no doubt gave way to disgust at the civil strife and social chaos among the Greeks. The Romans did not champion the Greeks at Massalia against Carthage at a time when they were adopting a favourable attitude to the Greeks in the East (67). Colin has emphasised the fluctuations in phil-hellenism at Rome. In Sicily and South Italy, and in Greece during the First Macedonian War, there was not a trace of it. Accordingly, the extraordinary leniency shown by Rome after Cynoscephalae has given an exaggerated importance to the whole theory of Phil-hellenism. It is probable that certain sections at Rome were sincerely influenced by their admiration of Greek culture, but it is equally probable that the Senate used this sentiment to lend aid to its own policy. If Rome gave the Greeks special treatment/

treatment in the Second Macedonian War it was because it suited the policy of the moment. Moreover, this had nothing to do with Greeks as such, since the Greeks of Asia Minor were at first ignored, and it was left to Rhodes to ask for their freedom. In short, philhellenism is a useful gauge of policy, not a cause of it.

Polybius (68) pointed out how one Roman war led to another, and a number of historians have considered that little more was needed to explain Rome's intervention in Greece. At best, it is only the vaguest sketch of events, and could be accepted by anyone. It probably arose from a rejection of the theory of planned attack either by Rome or by Philip, but any theory must try to give more detail. If it is added that the Romans were driven almost against their will into the Second Macedonian War, the theory fails to explain why the Senate insisted on the War against the wishes of the population. It is frequently true that great masses of people are involved in policies which they took no part in formulating, but this usually arises from the deliberate actions of some people, no matter how few. A small number of people, who know what they want and are in positions of authority, are quite capable of carrying through their policy when great masses of the population are merely passive and apathetic. Only in the general sense that Rome's policy was the result of her reaction to each new crisis as it arose, and not the result of one policy into which all events had to be fitted, can this theory of accidents find acceptance.

The theory of the inevitability of war between Rome and the East is true in the very general sense that, if Rome continued to expand and the Hellenistic states to fight amongst themselves, then they would probably get in one another's way sooner or later. It fails, however, to indicate the particular cause which precipitated the war, or the reason for the time Rome chose for it. It is not denied by any historian that Rome took the initiative in 200 B.C. Indeed, Homo, who believes Rome's policy was defensive, admits that Rome took the initiative on three occasions one of them being in 200 B.C. (69). This is not accounted for by the inevitability theory.

Revenge is a possible additional motive, but by itself is inadequate to explain the time chosen for the war. By stirring up trouble in the East against Philip Rome could have stepped in at her leisure to take full revenge for Philip's actions against her. Merely desire for revenge would not have driven Rome to risk her own legions on the battle-field when the treasury was empty and the people war weary,

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If Piganiol (70) means that Rome, in pursuing her policy, was always ready to place her own troops at the disposal of others in order to further that policy, no objection could be raised. That, however, is a question of tactics or method, not of strategy or motive. It should therefore be attached to a fundamental policy as the means chosen to further it. Piganiol himself seems uncertain to which policy he should attach it, and only seems to have adopted it because otherwise the motives assigned to Rome make no sense (71). Even if Rome had allies in the legal sense, as Larsen (72) and Bickermann (73) maintain, it does not follow that Rome had to answer their appeals. Quite apart from her undoubted readiness to refuse or not, (she answered the appeals of the Mamertines, but rejected those of the mercenaries at Carthage and of the Aetolians), she could have chosen her own methods of fulfilling the alliance and maintaining her prestige. She could have excused herself from immediate direct action on the grounds of the strain of the Second Punic War which had only just finished. She could also have accepted Egypt's offer of help, used diplomacy, sent military advisers and even some troops to stiffen resistance and direct operations. Instead, she attacked from the West and bore the brunt of the fighting herself (74). Moreover, in 201, the Senate made no response to the appeals of the Rhodians and Egyptians. Only in 200 when she had already picked a quarrel with Philip over the Greek states, did she make use of these demands. Even Bickermann (75) admits the difficulties of explaining the Senate's change of policy with regard to Egypt and Rhodes between 201 and 200 B.C.

In conclusion, it must be reaffirmed that all these theories either fail to realise the peculiar time chosen by Rome for war, or, if they do not, fail to explain it. The following two sections will set out in detail the theory which was outlined above and which ~~will~~ will explain, it is hoped, not only this problem, but also many of those difficulties which other theories have failed to solve.

NOTES TO SECTION I.

1. Origin of Tyranny, p.297.
2. History of Rome, II. pp.419-20.
3. cf. X. 2. 10; VI. 56; cf. III. 20 for his opinion of the views of the man in the street.
4. Colin, op.cit., pp.18-30; G. de Sanctis, op.cit., IV.1. pp.27-8.
5. Polyb. i. 88. 11-12.
6. ~~G.~~ de Sanctis, op.cit., iii. 1. pp.318 ff.
7. Holleaux, Rev. d. Phil. L. pp.195-6.
8. v. sub., ~~sec.~~ iii, for an interpretation of this.
9. op.cit., p.43.
10. cf. however Holleaux, l.c. pp.213-14, who thinks that the Punic fleet was broken and that Rome had therefore little to fear from an attempt at invasion by Philip. She therefore withdrew her troops since she had no direct interest in the East.
11. III. 32.
12. cf. Paus. 1. 13. 1.
13. cf. Justin, xxix, 2.
14. cf. Polyb. v. 104.
15. op.cit., p.53.
16. Livy, xxxiii, 21-23.
17. Livy xxviii. 40; Appian, Pun., 11. 7.
18. Rome, La Grèce, et les Monarchies, Hellenistiques, p.124.
19. xxx. 42.
20. vii. 9.
21. cf. Polyb., v.109-10.
22. Polyb., vii. 14; viii. 3; Livy, xxiv. 10. cf. Livy, xxvi.22.
23. l.c. pp.6-7.
- 24./

24. Livy, xxiv. 40; cf. xxvi. 24.
25. op.cit., p.197.
26. cf. Holleaux, Rev.d. Phil., 1. 213 ff.
27. xxx. 26 and 42.
28. cf. Holleaux, C.A.H. viii. 156; Heitland, op.cit., I. p.339; Cary, History of the Greek World, etc., p.189, n.1.
29. cf. Holleaux, Rev. d. Ét. Gr., xxxiii. 223 ff.
30. op.cit., I. p.53.
31. For the arguments on which battle comes first, see Holleaux, Rev. d. Ét. Anc., xxii. 237 ff. If the battle of Lade took place first then Philip for some reason waited long enough to have his fleet severely damaged at Chios; if after, it is doubtful if the fleet would yet have been capable of very big undertakings after the losses of Chios; cf. Polyb., xvi. 2-9.
32. Polyb., xvi. 8; Livy, xxxi. 15. 10.
33. Livy, xxxiii. 3; cf. Polyb. xvi. 24 for the change in Philip's position. Cf. Holleaux, Rev. des Ét. Anc., xxiii. 179 ff; xxv. pp.330 ff.
34. xxxi. 16.
35. cf. Holleaux, Rev. d. Et. Anc., xxv. 363-4.
36. It has been even suggested that there was no such alliance, and that it was merely the fruits of Rhodian propaganda; cf. D. Magie, J.R.S. xxix. 32 ff. Cf. Walbank, Philip V. of Macedon, p.113, n.4, for a refutation of this view.
37. Rome, La Grèce et les Monarchies Hellenistiques, p.329.
38. op.cit., ii. p.71.
39. J.R.S. xxvii. 183.
40. They suggest that Antiochus had reconciled the Cretan cities to Rhodes and maintain that there is some evidence to show that Rhodes and Attalus had come to the rescue of Athens against Philip in 200 B.C.; cf. pp.188-9.
41. cf. MacDonald and Walbank, l.c., p.187 ff.
42. *ibid.*
- 43./

43. Polyb. xvi. 27; Livy, xxxii. 27. Antiochus had been persuaded by the Romans to withdraw his troops from Pergamene territory.
44. Livy, xxvi. 24.
45. l.c. p.39.
46. cf. Polyb. v. 105.
47. This happened on various occasions; cf. Livy, xxvi. 25; Polyb. iv. 66. 7; x. 41. 4; Livy xl. 57.
48. Polyb. I. 10.
49. Polyb. I. 88.
50. cf. Polyb., xvi. 27; Livy, xxxi. 9; xxxii. 27.
51. Livy, xxxi. 9.
52. Livy, xxxiii. 3. 1-3, on the military exhaustion of Macedon. Cf. Florus, ii. 7, "Introisse victoria fuit". Cf. Livy, xxxi. 1; Justin. xxix. 3.
53. Roman Imperialism, p.149.
54. cf. Griffith, l.c., p.13, who admits that Philip's sea power was no real threat.
55. cf. Freeman, Herzberg.
56. cf. Colin, Walek.
57. Tarn, Antigonus Gonatas, 424-5, estimates Philip's men at a maximum of 30,000 in 200.
58. cf. Hatzfeld, Les Trafiquants Italiens dans l'Orient Hellenique, 90.
59. Hatzfeld, B.C.H. xxxvi. 71-2.
60. Hatzfeld, B.C.H. xxxvi. 80.
61. *ibid.*, p.78.
62. *ibid.*, pp.57, 85.
63. *ibid.*, p.98.
64. *op.cit.*, p.93.
- 65./

65. cf. Larsen, Roman Greece, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, IV. 382, who argues from the fact that the Second Punic War and the First Macedonian War did not affect prices in Delos.
66. cf. Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens, p.428.
67. cf. Reid, J.R.S. iii. 178 on this.
68. iii. 32.
69. op.cit., p.306.
70. op.cit., pp.204, 214.
71. cf. Rev. d. Ét. Anc. xxvi. 181.
72. Cl. Phil., xxxii. 15 ff.
73. Rev. d. Phil. LXI. 59 ff., 161 ff.
74. cf. Livy, xxxiii. 35, where the Aetolian claim to have given substantial aid to the Romans is ridiculed.
75. l.c., p.166.

SECTION II.

THE ITALIAN BACKGROUND.

History is not made by so-called "National" characteristics, nor do such characteristics necessarily remain the same over a long period of time (v. sup. ch. I). Nor is it possible to treat a nation through the many generations of its life as a single moral agent" (1). Consequently, to analyse the spirit of the Romans or of Philip at some period, and then to apply it rigidly to a variety of circumstances, inevitably leads to distortion. Only a careful examination of each crisis and the circumstances in which it arose, will lead to a correct interpretation of the reactions to it.

In general in the second half of the third century B.C. two major factors influenced Roman policy; conditions at home on the one hand, and the international situation on the other, and, in addition, the interaction of each on the other. The first of these will be dealt with now, and the second in the following section. During the Punic Wars, and for some considerable time afterwards, the Senate was in effective control of Rome and her policy (2). It was especially secure in the direction of foreign affairs, since it controlled finance and relations with other powers (3). Warfare, too, was effectively directed by the Senate, since the consuls, who were in charge of military matters, were controlled by the Senate and were dependent on it for supplies (4). In home affairs too, however, the Senate was effectively though less obviously, in control. It required the ratification of the people for many of its actions, but this was easily obtained by its control of the courts (5), of magistrates, (6), and of contracts and finance (7). Any influence the Assembly had was exercised only so long as it did so suitably (8).

The policy of the Senate tended to represent the conservative, fairly wealthy sections of the community from whom the senators were recruited. As yet there was no property qualification laid down by law, but in actual practice, no doubt, most senators were above the qualification later imposed (9). In 214 B.C. when the rich were required to provide rowers and their wages, the senators were the first on the list of those approached (10). Moreover, they controlled their own membership (11). and members of the most noble of their families usually filled the consulships (12).

After the victorious conclusion of the First Punic War money poured into Rome and a rise in prices took place, which, by the time of the Second Punic War, represented a monetary revolution (13). This wealth no doubt benefitted only a few. The great majority of the population would suffer from the rapid rise in prices and the state treasury itself was not always in a happy condition. The Senate seemed alive to the dangers of allowing wide-spread distress to continue and the division of the Ager Gallicus on the advice of C. Flaminius no doubt helped to allay some of the discontent.

discontent.

The effect on the people, however, of undertaking a new war against Carthage, with almost immediate defeats on their own soil, seems to have produced an outbreak of superstition at Rome (14) to which the authorities responded by encouraging the cult of both old divinities and new ones (15). A tribune of the people accused the nobles of being responsible both for beginning the war and for prolonging it (16). Even after making allowances for partisan exaggeration, this was a dangerous statement after only a few years of war. At Rome religion was used deliberately as a means of keeping people contented (17) and so in this crisis the number of religious rites was increased (18).

The disaster of Cannae intensified the social crisis. The shortage of public funds was so acute that a special commission was appointed to deal with it (19). The need of man power, too, was so desperate that eight thousand slaves had to be used, and, later more slaves and any criminals who volunteered. Further outbreaks of superstition led to many new rites, including even human sacrifice, and Fabius Pictor was actually sent to Delphi to consult the oracle (20).

Perhaps most serious of all, confidence in Rome's ultimate success was so slight that great numbers of her allies had begun to desert her for Carthage. In Capua wealth and luxury had produced a spirit so unsuited to the rigours of war that treachery was the result and it was only the many marriage ties with Rome that prevented many of the nobles of Capua from joining the revolt. In the end many of them probably did take part since they were said to fear their own people and since many nobles subsequently asked Rome for forgiveness. The revolt was led by an noble, but he, it is clear, played off the Commons against the Senate to his own advantage (21).

At Nola the Senators were said only to have pretended to desert to Carthage, but they may have connected this story afterwards to protect themselves. In any case only a minority seemed intent on treachery since the citizens fought bravely and not unwillingly. Locri, too, was betrayed to the Carthaginians by leading citizens (22).

Sicily and Sardinia had asked for money and food for the troops but had had to be left to manage as best they could for themselves. The treasury was empty and contractors had to be used to supply Spain with money, clothes and food. The contractors obtained exemption from military service during the contract and losses at sea, or from enemy action, were to be made good by the state; severe terms which could only have been accepted by a desperate government. Meanwhile, the citizen's tax had to be doubled. However, food and money from Hiero helped a little (23).

A hundred and seventy seven vacancies in the Senate were filled by the dictator newly appointed by the Senate to guide the state through the crisis. The dictator said he would choose the senators by a "preference of class to class, not of individuals to individuals", and from his methods it is clear he chose those who might have been expected to become senators some day, then the next best, and so on down the social scale. As the total number of seats was 300, a majority was appointed in this arbitrary fashion. A proposal to co-opt two members of the Senate of the Latine towns was dropped, on the grounds that it might suggest fear and would therefore encourage the allies to make demands (24). This failure to take either their own people or their allies into full confidence and partnership was perhaps the Senate's greatest weakness in this war.

Syracuse made a treaty with Carthage, and the consequent loss of tribute provoked a fresh financial crisis so that the war tax, which had been doubled, had to be trebled. As all young men were fighting, this bore heavily on the old, the widows and orphans. Rich citizens were called on to provide rowers for the fleet, and even slaves were used. Contractors gave supplies to the state to be repaid only after the war, and individuals gave slaves on the same conditions. Gold and silver were surrendered, the moderately wealthy in the army refused pay, and the widows' and minors' funds were given to the state. A law was passed to restrict luxury spending among women. One of the few favourable signs of the year was that the chief and wealthy citizens of Arpi, who had deserted to Carthage after Cannae, wished to reaffirm their loyalty to Rome. Outbreaks of superstition had been common and rites to deal with them probably encouraged, but when these rites were of non-Roman origin and showed influence from abroad, the Senate took steps to forbid their practice (25). As various foreign rites had previously been allowed, it seems possible that this particular outbreak had represented a real lack of faith in the old rites and beliefs, and therefore to a certain extent in the government, rather than an increase in the vehicles for that faith. It is significant that it was suggested that some of the rites were introduced to the towns by the peasants. Peasants frequently maintain revolutionary traditions in religious forms which are opposed to the existing government (26). Because of this and the dangerous sentiments among the Greeks of South Italy, the public games were celebrated on an exceptionally lavish scale and gifts of olive oil were distributed. In addition, new games in honour of Apollo were created (27).

The people, however, were making their influence felt in a much more positive way. Fraud on the part of contractors, involving the deliberate sinking of ships which the state had guaranteed to replace, had been taking place for some time. It had been discovered the previous year, but the government was in so desperate a position that it did not dare do anything about it. The people however, heard of it and insisted on a trial which eventually took place. The senate obviously felt that the contractors held the whip hand, but their fear of the people during the miseries of the war/

war, was even greater. On the people fell the heaviest burdens of war and special commissions were even then being sent round the rural districts to recruit citizens even when under military age. The people, too, continued to complain about the war and to accuse the consuls of being in favour of it. Livy remarks that want of employment as usual caused complaints among the people. If true, it is extraordinary that in the middle of a war which taxed resources in manpower to the utmost, unemployment should be a matter for complaint. No doubt it referred to older peasants driven into the towns from their ruined farms. Demands for rowers from private people were again made and provoked further outbursts of protest. The people pointed to the barren land, the burned houses, the lack of slaves and the heavy taxation, and refused further help. The consul argued that if the senate wanted the people to help, they must lead them by themselves making sacrifices. Moreover, he pointed out that the safety of their property depended on the safety of the state and advised them to give their money. The senators accordingly lent their gold and silver to the state, and a limit was imposed on the amount of metals kept by individuals and the surplus then borrowed (28).

The loss of Tarentum, probably through the agency of a few noblemen (29), was compensated for by the recovery of Syracuse, and later Capua and other Campanian towns, which were then punished for their defection. Meanwhile the plunder taken from Syracuse was enriching some Romans and the sale of Capua's land helped the public finances (30). However the food position reached a new crisis and wheat touched famine prices. (31).

The recovery of Tarentum helped to persuade many of the allies to swing back to Rome but the problems of finance and manpower were still unsolved. The last reserve of the treasury, the money obtained from the tax of 5% on enfranchisements, had to be used to provide clothes for the troops in Spain. The census figures showed that the number of citizens had been about halved in twenty years, and the refusal of twelve Latin colonies to provide their usual contingent of conscripts produced consternation in the Senate (32). These were a favoured class of allies, so the condition and sentiments of the others can well be imagined. Livy maintains that they could have provided their quota, and that the other eighteen colonies did so. Livy, however, is not impartial where Rome's interests are concerned and Reid (33) argues that the colonies, although not in the war zone, had been drained of resources to supply places that were, and that consequently they really were unable to provide their quota, and moreover that the other eighteen were probably unable to do so, in spite of Livy's assertion that they did. In Etruria, too, there was some disaffection, especially amongst the nobles. Slaves were again enrolled and the consuls given unlimited powers to fill up vacancies amongst the rowers with anyone they pleased. Apparently some of the /

the more well to do citizens were shirking their military duties, since about this time those who should have been serving as cavalry, and were not, were disfranchised. Special religious processions were ordered, and Polybius accused Publius Scipio of deliberately using religion to persuade the people to accept new policies without protest and to face dangers without flinching (34).

In the following year a serious mutiny of the troops broke out in Spain, ~~and~~ under the leadership of a Latin, and provoked apparently by the length of service from Italy and the amount of pay still in arrears. Unfortunately, the treasury was again empty, Hasdrubal had entered Italy, even the legion in Greece was recalled and Spain had to be left to look after itself. Rome won the battle of Metaurus but her losses were heavy and although only one Punic army was left in Italy, the Roman army did not dare go near it for four years (35).

During this time there was an attempt to settle people on the land, perhaps because those in the towns were restless (36). Polybius (37) argues that to protect the state from attack from without is comparatively easy compared with protecting it from internal troubles such as revolutions, a task which requires both tact and acuteness. The land settlement seems to have been unsatisfactory. Pressure was needed to persuade people even to try farming again, but the lack of stocks, farm buildings, labour and capital must have made the attempt futile from the beginning, and no doubt most of the settlers drifted back to the towns before long.

A call for volunteers and contributions for Scipio's expedition to Africa, actually produced a good response. Perhaps the people saw the possibilities of really finishing the war, and that, too, on soil other than their own, and so were perhaps enthusiastic for the first time during the war. The Senate, strangely enough, was opposed to the expedition. Perhaps they felt they could not risk any more disasters, or perhaps they were not ready to face the new problems that peace would raise. Etruria gave voluntary contributions for the expedition⁽³⁸⁾ which suggests that later reports of disaffection applied to only a small section of the population, probably nobles. (39).

Meanwhile one third of the voluntary loan was repaid and arrangements made for repayment of the rest in two further instalments. A salt tax was passed to increase the state's income. A law to put an end to the practice of giving fees and presents to advocates was probably in the people's favour, since most of the advocates were senators. In addition, new games, the Megalesian, were established. The Senate, however, only yielded where expedient. When, therefore, the tribune of the people summoned the /

the censors for trial, the Senate, fearing lest the office of censor should become subject to the influence of the people, forbade the proceedings to continue(40).

For some years wheat had been arriving in Rome from Sicily and Sardinia in such abundance that prices slumped and merchants refused to handle it. As so often in previous years, the games, both plebeian and Roman, were repeated three times. Finally, Carthage offered peace and although, with the exception of an indemnity of five thousand talents, the terms practically established the status quo, Rome was apparently too exhausted to refuse them. Moreover, according to Polybius the news of the peace treaty was received with enthusiasm by both Senate and People(41).

The armistice was broken but the second peace terms, although Rome had meantime won the battle of Zama, only added two demands to the former treaty; Rome apparently could not afford to risk a further renewal of the war. The additions were five thousand talents more as an indemnity and a clause stating that no war was to be waged by Carthage without Rome's consent (42). This latter clause was more a gesture of superiority than anything else since its effectiveness would depend entirely on the relative recovery and prosperity of the two countries. Naturally victory and peace produced demonstrations of great joy in Rome. The Roman games were celebrated in lavish style for two days, the plebeian games were repeated three times and large quantities of corn were distributed at a very low price(43).

The African veterans were promised land but no indication was given of how they were even to start farming with no capital. The state had not even sufficient money to repay the instalment of the loan which was due and, since the creditors were clamorous for land which was going cheap, the state gave them the land, with the option of retaining it or exchanging it later for their loan(44). The contractors had obviously made money from the war and, as Hannibal was forced south, individual soldiers had received a certain amount of booty, but the state's share had been inadequate even to pay for the current expenses of the war without resort to further taxation and loans(45). Even money which came in after the war was over would have to go to pay off debts and so reconstruction of agriculture by the state was out of the question(46). Hannibal boasted he had destroyed four hundred districts in south Italy (47) and the loss of life was particularly heavy. As a result, a great deal of land was on the market and offered profitable means of speculation. The Senate was no doubt relieved when contractors bought up land and started big scale farming, mostly with slaves (48). It meant, however, that the peasant class was now landless and workless. Many of them, who had been in the army or had left the country for the towns, no doubt did not wish to return to farming, while young people who had left the farms at the beginning of the war would not even remember the attractions of country life. The immediate problem for the Senate was to keep this workless and landless mass quiet. For /

For this reason, no doubt, the games were again celebrated in a magnificent manner for two days and large supplies of corn from Africa were distributed (49). This, however, could serve only as a temporary relief and did not even approach the problem of what to do with the demobilised soldiers.

The influx of money, even if the state did not get it, must have caused prices to rise eventually and, when ten thousand talents arrived from Carthage, one thousand from Philip of Macedon, five hundred from Nabis, ten thousand from Antiochus, and five hundred from the Aetolians, in addition to the booty of individual soldiers, prices must have continued to rise steadily. This money would help trade and farming to recover, but, as the state was forced to distribute corn free or at low prices, most landowners probably started vine and olive growing with slaves as labour (50). This agricultural development made it still more impossible that the small farmer could compete since olives and vines needed capital, and grain growing was unprofitable so long as cheap corn arrived in quantities from Sardinia and Sicily (51). Moreover, the increased use of slaves excluded the agricultural labourer as well as the peasant from profitable employment.

Because of the interest to be paid on the public debts, taxes were no doubt high (52) and many people ^{must} have found them an intolerable burden. Even these parts of Italy which had suffered least from the war had contributed to the African expedition, so they too must have been exhausted. A natural result of the reaction after the war, of the lack of present security and of future prospects, was an increase in robbery and social unrest. From this time onwards increasing numbers took to highway robbery and, in Apulia alone, 7,000 brigands, formerly peasants, were condemned (53). The senate had increased its power and prestige during the war and continued to be the effective head of the state for some time to come. It helped to appease some of its own citizens by razing the towns of those who had deserted to Carthage during the war and settling Roman citizens on their land; and to guard against future disloyalty, reinforcements were sent to the most important of these colonies. For reasons already stated it is doubtful if this would solve the unemployment and agricultural problems. As an experiment it would probably last only a few years.

In view of the conditions and sentiments of the majority of the population it was not at all surprising that, when the senate asked for ratification of its decision to go to war immediately with Philip of Macedon, it should have been refused. Indeed the tribune of the people accused the nobles of involving the country in one war after another to prevent the people from ever having peace; an accusation which especially annoyed the Senate (54). The people were thoroughly war weary (55) and in no mood to incur the divine wrath which their/

their strong superstitions would anticipate from a violation of the jus festiale which the war probably involved (56). Moreover, the alleged selfish ambition and arrogance of the nobles (57) in a period of general distress would not help to placate the people's anger and discontent. It was only by a campaign of propaganda on the alleged threat of invasion directed against Italy by Philip (58), and also by certain concessions such as taking the troops for garrisoning Gaul, Sicily and Sardinia from the allies, contrary to the usual custom, that the Senate could finally obtain the Assembly's consent for its war with Philip.

NOTES TO SECTION II.

1. cf. Dr. Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury on "Britain and Germany after the war", "The Times", 19/10/42.
2. Livy xxxiv. 31.
3. Polyb. vi. 13; cf. Livy, xxvi. 29-32.
4. Polyb., vi. 13, cf. iii. 107, where the Roman commanders asked Rome for instructions and the Senate ordered them to give battle.
5. Polyb. vi. 17.
6. cf. Livy, xxix. 37, where the Senate prevented the tribunes from summoning the censors.
7. Polyb., vi. 13.
8. cf. Livy xxvi. 22, where the Assembly chose two consuls one of whom was nearly blind and changes had to be made. cf. Livy, xxxi. 6-8, where, after the assembly had rejected the war proposals, it finally accepted them after a skilful propaganda campaign by the Senate.
9. cf. Livy, xxxiv. 31, where Nabis pointed out the timocratic character of the Roman constitution.
10. Livy, xxvi. 36.
11. For instance 177 vacancies in the Senate were filled by one man chosen by themselves; cf. Livy xxiii. 23.
12. cf. Hallward, C.A.H. viii. p.110, where it is pointed out that from 233 to 133 B.C. 159 consulships out of 200 were held by 26 noble families, and half held by ten families.
13. cf. Belot De la Revolution économique et monétaire, pp.65 ff 104 ff., 113 ff. cf. however, Mattingly and Robinson, Proceedings Brit. Acad. XVIII, p.253, who argue that inflation was adopted by the government between the two Punic Wars. This, too, would cause prices to rise or, at any rate, to maintain their high level.
14. Polyb. iii. 112; Livy, xxi. 62; xxii. 1.
15. Livy, xxii. 1, 9, 10.
16. Livy, xxii. 34.
17. Polyb. vi. 56.
- 18./

18. Livy xxii. 9, 10.
19. Livy xxiii. 21; Zonar. viii. 26. D.1, 416. From this period until beyond the end of the war, inflation was used by the government as a necessary financial measure, cf. Mattingly and Robinson, l.c. p.254; cf. pp.222 ff.
20. On all these points cf. Livy xxii. 57; xxiii. 14.
21. On all these points cf. Polyb., vii. 1; Livy xxii. 61; xxiii. 2, 3, 4; xxiv. 47.
22. For these events cf. Livy xxiii. 14, 30, 44ff
23. On all this cf. Livy xxiii. 31, 38, 48, 49.
24. On these points cf. Livy xxiii. 22-23.
25. On the above points cf. Livy xxiv. 6, 11, 18, 45-47; xxv. 1.
26. v. sup.ch. v, on the importance of the cult of Dionysus and its anti-noble character, and on a similar tradition amongst the English peasants. So, too, the "Cutty Wren", a song of the English peasants' revolt of 1381, in the British Museum Collection, is a survival of old religious ritual.
27. cf. Livy, xxv. 2, 12.
28. For all these events. cf. Livy xxv. 3-5; xxvi. 26, 35-6.
29. cf. Polyb., viii. 27, where the conspirators were found out hunting, almost certainly a rich man's sport. cf. Livy xxv. 8, where young nobles were mentioned as being responsible.
30. On all these points cf. Polyb., viii. 37; ix. 10, 26, 44; Livy xxv. 31; xxvi. 16.
31. 15 dr. the medimnus was quoted, which was about three times the usual price; cf. Polyb., ix. 44.
32. On these events cf. Livy xxvii. 9-10, 15, 36.
33. J.R.S. 1915, pp.122-3; cf. "The Municipalities of the Roman Empire", p.87, for the estrangement of Rome from her closest allies as a result of the war.
34. For all these points cf. Livy xxvii. 11, 24, 38; Polyb., x. 2.
35. For these events cf. Polyb., xi. 1-3, 25-30; Livy xxvii. 47-9; xxviii. 11, 24-9.
- 36./

36. For settlement on the land cf. Livy xxviii. 11; cf. Livy xxvi. 26, quoted above, on complaints against the war caused by lack of employment.
37. xi. 25.
38. On all these events cf. Livy xxviii. 40, 45.
39. cf. Livy xxix. 36, xxx. 26, where the principal inhabitants are mentioned. cf. Reid, l.c. pp.123-4.
40. For all these events cf. Livy xxix. 6, 14, 37; xxxiv. 4.
41. For these points cf. Livy xxx. 17, 26 & 39 (cf. xxix.11), 38; Polyb. xv. 4.
42. Polyb. xv. 18; Livy xxx. 37, cf. Livy xxx. 16, for the first terms.
43. cf. Livy xxx. 45; xxxi. 4.
44. cf. Livy xxxi. 4, 13.
45. Booty^{was} taken at Capua, Livy xxvi. 14; at Syracuse, Polyb. ix. 10; Livy xxv. 31, 40; at New Carthage, Polyb. x. 19; at Metaurus, Polyb. xi. 3; at Tarentum, Livy xxvii. 16, Plut. Fabius xxii; in Spain, Livy xxviii, 38; and in Africa, Livy xxx. 45, Appian, Punica viii, 48; The government, in fact, was still using inflation cf. Mattingly and Robinson, l.c. p.228; v.sup.n.20. Inflation must have caused a steady rise in prices throughout the war with consequent distress to the population. When such methods were no longer necessary, the influx of tribute and indemnities would still keep prices high.v.sub.
46. cf. Tenney Frank, Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, i.80-1, who shows that the booty and money acquired by the state would not go far to meet expenses.
47. cf. Appian, Libyca 134; cf. Reid, The municipalities of the Roman Empire, p.86.
48. Livy xxxi. 13. Cf. Appian, Bel. Civ. i. 7, for reference to the growth of large estates at this time.
49. Livy xxxi. 50.
50. cf. Tenney Frank, op.cit., p.126. Moreover by 150 B.C. the value of land had probably trebled. cf. ibid. So even the recovery of agricultural~~all~~ hurt the small holder, since it encouraged large estates and unequal competition with these.

51. cf. Livy xxx. 26, 38; xxxi. 4, 50, for low prices of grain. Tenney Frank, op.cit., p.160, thinks that Italian grain growing did not suffer from competition once the wars started again, but that would not solve the problem of the small peasant. v.sup. n.50.
52. Livy xxxi. 13.
53. Livy xxxix. 29.
54. Livy xxxi. 6.
55. ibid; cf. Livy xxxiii. 25.
56. cf. Tenney Frank, Economic History of Rome, p.146; Cl. Phil. iv. 122, for this argument.
57. cf. Heitland, Roman Republic, I. p.335, for exx.
58. Livy xxxi. 7-8.

SECTION III.

ROME'S FOREIGN POLICY.

The motives underlying Rome's foreign policy, as those of most states, varied according to circumstances. The fundamental motive, dictating more immediate ones, was self interest, again as in most states. This does not, of course, explain the choice of immediate policy, whether offensive or defensive action, diplomacy, aggression or a passive policy.

Rome's policy in 201-200 will be better understood if the general development of her international relations over the preceding generation are fully appreciated. Of these, her actions in the Illyrian wars are most debated. The active steps taken by Rome to suppress the pirates in 230 B.C. have been regarded as a new policy of protecting Italian traders (1), defence against Macedon (2), and the beginning of a policy of aggression in the East (3). Suppression of piracy by itself is inadequate as a motive so early in Roman history. Ferguson (4) points out that up to 108-7 B.C. piracy was allowed to flourish since it supplied Roman landowners with slaves, and it was not until then that merchants were strong enough to impose their policy against that of the landowners. Only if support of traders coincided with some other motive would Rome be likely to use it in 230 B.C. This is borne out both by the fact that until 230 B.C. Rome had persistently ignored all complaints about the Illyrian pirates (5), and also by Queen Teuta's contemptuous reception of the Roman envoys (6), a welcome which surely reflected Rome's former indifference.

The most obvious features of foreign relations in 230 B.C. was that another war with Carthage seemed inevitable. Not only were both states still uncrushed, but they were continually expanding in influence and increasing in strength. Indeed Polybius (7) says that immediately after the Mercenary War Hamilcar began to prepare for war with Rome. On the whole, Rome was stronger by land, while Carthage's strength lay especially in her fleet. At the beginning of the First Punic War, Carthage had been the greatest sea-power of the West (8). Rome's policy had been to build a fleet and challenge Carthage on her own "ground", so to speak (9). As a result of this policy, Carthage was defeated at sea and lost the war (10). Obviously, Rome would continue that policy so long as Carthage remained her rival and possible enemy. When she seized Corsica and Sardinia (11) therefore, although nominally at peace with Carthage, she was not being merely greedy or aggressive. She was removing a possible base of operations for the Punic fleet in a future war. Then, when Rome realised that Carthage had again become strong enough to challenge her, she gained more time by a treaty with Hasdrubal/

Hasdrubal (12) and took further precautions against attack by sea.

Although, by acquiring Sicily and annexing Sardinia, Rome had partly removed the danger of an attack by sea from the south and west, attack from the east, if Carthage could gain a foothold there, was a very probable development. The Illyrian pirates and the anarchy on which they flourished, could either provide Carthage with an excuse and opportunity for interfering, or they could, through bribery, be made the instruments of Carthage's policy. Fortunately for Rome, the pirates proved an even better excuse for her interference, and the messages sent by Demetrius of Pharos (13) could also be turned to her advantage. There was no reason at all why Rome should even have considered the risk of antagonising Macedon, much less believed that Macedon represented a serious threat to her. It was not for another ten years that the second Illyrian war and the desertion of Demetrius brought Rome and Macedon closer together. Carthage was the immediate enemy and it was against Carthage that the first Illyrian war was directed. A glance at the map will confirm this. Once Rome had conquered the Eastern Italian seaboard, the other side of the Adriatic was clearly seen as a possible base of operations against her. It was not, however, Macedon who had proved herself hostile and aggressive to Rome, but Carthage, a Carthage, too, deprived of her bases in Sicily and Sardinia. Rome forestalled her and set up her puppet Demetrius. The peace terms then left the districts friendly to Rome since no territory was annexed or tribute levied (14). The movements of Illyrian ships were restricted to waters where Rome, not Carthage, could control them, while friendly relations had been established with their base of operations.

The embassies sent to Greece after this (15) have given rise to much discussion. Did they represent the first step in a policy of imperialist expansion? Surely not, when Carthage was still uncrushed. Was it a result of phil-hellenism? This is just possible but phil-hellenism was more likely to develop later when contacts with Greece became more frequent. Most probably, Rome was merely ensuring that as many as possible of those states around her should be friendly before her clash with Carthage. She was adept at diplomacy and would be quick to realise the possibility of using her action against the pirates in order to establish friendly relations with the most important Greek states.

Demetrius' desertion to Macedon in 225 B.C. (16) brought Macedon within Rome's sphere of action for the first time. Rome took no action at first, probably because she was engaged in Cisalpine Gaul, but when, in 219, her gains in Illyria were lost and Demetrius took to the sea where he could be used by Carthage, Rome took decisive action. Polybius (17) pointed/

pointed out that war with Carthage seemed imminent so naturally Rome had to restore the damage done by Demetrius. Indeed, Polybius actually asserted that Rome was preparing for war with Carthage by securing Illyria (18). Since Hannibal actually attacked from Spain, Polybius attributed the danger to Macedon, a very natural result of allowing later events to colour earlier motives. Even if Hannibal were actually operating in Spain, it must still have seemed more likely that Carthage would attack by sea rather than by a land route which involved crossing the Alps. The fact that Hannibal did actually choose the land route seems to argue more for the success of Rome's frustration policy than for an error in her judgment. By the beginning of the Second Punic War Rome had obtained a superiority at sea which Carthage declined to challenge (19), and it was no doubt to impress on Carthage her growing strength at sea that Rome had sent such a large fleet to Illyria; and not to impress the Greeks as Colin thinks, nor to intimidate Macedon as Holleaux believes (20). In short, Holleaux is correct to maintain that Rome's policy was essentially defensive in the Illyrian wars. Carthage, however, was the enemy, not Macedon. Holleaux has made the mistake of reading into the situation factors which Rome could not have seen so early, such as Philip of Macedon's entanglement with Hannibal and Rome's entanglement with Greece (21).

In 201-200 B.C. Rome's position was quite different. The chief source of danger to the Senate was the majority of the population in Rome and Italy and the possibility of revolutionary outbreaks when the trials of war were replaced by the even greater problems and disappointments of peace (v. sup. ch. ix). The Senate was not inexperienced in gauging the dangers of popular revolt. Just after the end of the First Punic War, the revolt of mercenaries against the Carthaginian government, provoked by lack of money and supplies, endangered Carthage's very existence. It might have been expected that Rome would watch the destruction of her rival with the greatest satisfaction and, when actually invited by the mercenaries to co-operate, would eagerly have seized the opportunity, but she neither helped the revolt nor did she remain neutral. She helped Carthage! She even refused the offer of Sardinia made by the revolting mercenaries and the offer of submission made by the people of Utica. She forbade Italian merchants to trade with the mercenaries, she allowed her friend and ally, Hiero of Syracuse, to assist Carthage with supplies and men and allowed Carthage to recruit mercenaries in Italy. This last concession was the more remarkable since it involved the violation of one clause of the treaty just concluded with Carthage, according to which hiring mercenaries in Italy was forbidden to Carthage. The Senate allowed Italians to send food and supplies to Carthage/

Carthage, they bought up all Carthaginians enslaved in Italy, and sent them back home, and, as Polybius neatly expresses it, "reponded generously to all requests that were made" (22).

It was no delicacy of feeling that prompted Rome's refusal of invitations to intervene, since she had welcomed and used such invitations before (23). Nor was it purely goodwill towards Carthage that made Rome refuse the offer of Sardinia, since, as soon as the revolt was quelled, Rome answered another appeal and promptly seized it (24). However much Rome desired the final defeat of her rival, she could not afford to use such revolutionary methods against her, since not only could they be used by an enemy against herself, but they were liable to develop without any provocation from outside. She had no compunction in using disaffected minorities where the situation was completely under her control, but the successful revolt of large numbers of mercenaries and subject peoples was too widespread to control and might prove sufficiently infectious to endanger all ordered governments in the Western Mediterranean including the Senate itself. Rome made her policy clear when, on seizing Sardinia, she did not encourage the rebellious natives, but, after destroying Carthage's influence, subdued them (25). Rome's forbearance towards Carthage during the Mercenary War, and her rapid change of policy in connection with Sardinia, have excited comment from both ancient and modern writers (26), but careful consideration of the character and conditions of the Roman and Carthaginian states makes it clear that it was an essentially commonsense policy.

Treachery too, and its possible uses against an enemy, were learned by the Senate through bitter experience during the Second Punic War. It is probably that in most cases nobles and wealthy families were responsible for desertion to Carthage, since these people had something to lose if captured by Hannibal, and something to preserve by making an alliance with him. Except where Livy expressly blames the people (27), the evidence does tend to confirm this view (28). Whoever was mainly responsible, this type of defection was recognised as an effective weapon in peace or war.

If Italy in 201-200 could have been treated in isolation from the rest of the civilised world, the Senate probably could have controlled the situation without extreme measures. However, the states of the Mediterranean were becoming more and more interlinked. Information about the various states was beginning to circulate and, where information travelled, so could revolutionary sentiments, a most infectious ideology. The Senate had been quick to apprehend the danger of the Mercenary War even when Italy was comparatively peaceful. In/

In 201-200 when Italy was seething with revolt and likely to become worse in the next five to ten years, the effect of the social anarchy in Greece and the revolutionary exploits of Sparta which aggravated and fed it, could not be ignored (v.sup.ch.ix). Moreover, they could no longer rely on Macedon to play her traditional role of controlling Greece. In fact, it was the failure of Philip to do this and his aggravation indeed of the unrest in Greece by his irresponsible behaviour, which forced the Senate into action against him (v.sup.ch.ix). The overriding consideration, therefore, for Rome at this particular moment was the reactions of the Roman and Italian people to the situation at home and events abroad.

There is nothing fantastic in this fear by a government of its own citizens, especially when a large body of allies could be added to the discontented forces. Many ancient writers (29) spoke of it openly, probably because in the small relatively unstable Greek states the threat so often took practical form. Aratus' invitation to Macedon to crush Cleomenes was only one of many examples of how the privileged will maintain their privileges even at the cost of losing political independence. Many other examples were known to Greek tradition (30). Those who invited foreigners to intervene, would perhaps call it the preservation of civilisation against the rule of anarchy and sincerely believe it to be so, just as the revolutionaries no doubt attributed their attempt to seize some, or all of these privileges, as patriotism and humanity. The co-operation between a ruling class and a foreigner to keep control at home was familiar to Rome too, since, among other examples, it was openly stated by the Carthaginian people to have been the motive behind the truce with Rome (31).

The proof of the Senate's motives is in their actions. Bickermann and Holleaux (32) have pointed out the indifference of the Senate to Greece and Macedon in 205 B.C. and in the winter of 202-1. It was probably only when peace with Carthage was assured and the problems of peace and reconstruction assumed gigantic proportions, that the Senate fully realised the danger from the East. Even so, in 201 she did not respond to the appeals from Rhodes and Pergamum. The Senate did not want war if it could be avoided. Only when the situation at home became worse and Philip became even more irresponsible, were the embassies sent to those places whose support would be advantageous in the event of war. The envoys publicised the Roman policy of "protection of Greek autonomy" among everyone except Philip himself and solicited support should it be rejected by Philip (33).

The embassy spent the summer of 200 at Rhodes, where they were told that if Abydos fell to Philip the Achaeans would make a separate peace with him (34). Bickermann (35) thinks/

thinks that this was the final cause of the war, since Rome did not wish to fight alone. It has already been emphasised how Rome could have used others to fight for her, yet undertook most of the fighting herself. It is, however, certain that the danger of an Achaean peace with Philip did make the war inevitable for Rome, since the Achaean League had been the bulwark in the Peloponnese against revolutionary outbreaks in Sparta. Should they now ally themselves with Philip in his new policy, the possibility of defeating Nabis, and restoring order in the Peloponnese and in Greece, would be very slight, and certainly much more difficult. The Roman embassy therefore acted. They offered mediation between Antiochus and Ptolemy and succeeded in isolating Antiochus from Philip (36). Egypt was not ~~so~~ friendly. She was ready to fight instead of Rome (37). To Philip, however, no mediation was offered, but an ultimatum (38). It was Philip who was failing to control Greece and, unless the Senate could be satisfied that he would change his ways in that respect, then Rome must control Greece herself. The embassy made this clear in their answer to Philip at Abydos, when he challenged their right to interfere. They asserted their determination to defend Greek autonomy and demanded that Philip should leave the Greeks alone, (39), that is, that Philip should re-establish ordered governments in Greece or leave this task to a state which could, namely Rome. Egypt was persuaded to abandon the problem of Coele-Syria, and Antiochus' friendship was won, so that the Senate made it clear that the war was only against Philip and only for Greek so-called autonomy (40). Once war seemed inevitable the Roman embassy was concerned to have as many nominal allies as possible. Attalus and Rhodes were the chief ones, and, since they were obviously in favour at Athens, Rome used them and Athenians such as Cephisodorus who were favourable to Rome, to win Athens to the alliance (41). The Achaeans, ^{however,} were perhaps the Greeks most desired as allies by the Senate (v.sub.).

Although P. Sulpicius the consul was elected late in 201, he only left Italy with his troops in September of 200 B.C. (42). If Rome could get what she wanted without fighting she would be delighted, and the first years of the war were virtually wasted by the Roman commander (43). Meanwhile, there was a serious revolt of the so-called volunteers for the Macedonian War, who maintained they had been forced to serve in spite of their protests (44). Indeed Flaminius deliberately chose those veterans (45) from Spain and Africa although they must have been anxious for leave, probably because they especially would have caused trouble if they had returned home and found nothing for them. The Senate had solved neither the problem of demobilisation nor that of reliable manpower. Even the/

the slaves near Rome had revolted, and the Roman games were repeated four times to appease the people (46).

The peace terms, therefore, which were offered to Philip before fighting actually took place, are extremely significant, since they stated the minimum Rome needed if she were to avoid war and so explained exactly for what Rome was prepared to fight. If it were only a question of keeping Philip occupied, that could easily have been attained, as previously, by stirring up some of the Greek and Eastern states against him (v. sup, Section I). But unsettled conditions would have been disadvantageous to the Senate rather than beneficial in the prevailing state of Italy. The Senate's terms were quite specific. They did not attempt to conceal them. From 200-197 B.C. they quite consistently made the same demands.

Before the Romans had gained any successes Philip, who was obviously astonished that the Romans had gone to war with him, and had no desire that they should continue to prosecute it (47), asked for negotiations to discuss peace terms. Flaminius was blunt. Evacuate Greece entirely was the main demand. Philip agreed to give up his recent conquests although he refused, naturally enough, to surrender those conquests he had inherited from his ancestors (48). Flaminius, however, who had obviously been sent by the Senate to negotiate if possible, insisted on the surrender of former conquests, too, including Thessaly. In other words, the control of Greece, which had been the function of Macedon since the days of Philip II and Alexander was now to pass to Rome, who, truly enough, had proved herself more capable of exercising it than Philip. It is significant that, although Flaminius demanded that Philip should put his quarrel with Attalus before a neutral arbitrator, he yet refused Philip's offer to submit his differences with the Greek states to the decisions of a neutral state. The Senate insisted on their own control in Greece. Philip offered to withdraw his garrisons from some towns but refused to give up his control of the whole of Greece and the negotiations broke down (49). The Senate had made clear their objective.

Although reinforcements had arrived previously to this, Flaminius still tried to obtain what the Senate wanted without war. Philip too, had no desire to fight Rome and asked for negotiations at Nicaea (50), where the evacuation of Greece was again the main demand while the restoration of land taken from Ptolemy and parts of Illyria were others. Philip wished to know if it was essential that he should evacuate those parts of Greece inherited from his ancestors (51). Flaminius this time was silent. Polybius (52) only mentions his silence without commenting on it. Homo (53) is of the opinion that Flaminius wished to defer to his allies while Holleaux (54) believes that Flaminius was trying to be sympathetic to Philip./

Philip. The latter seems more probable, especially as Philip was granted a private interview at his own request. Flaminius was probably silent because he could not come to an agreement except on the basis of Philip's evacuation of all Greece and was wondering how to make the terms acceptable to Philip. He certainly did not succeed, since he had to announce that although Philip accepted all other terms, agreement was still not reached on this question. Philip, naturally failing to understand the importance of this one demand, and perhaps suspecting Flaminius of reiterating it for some personal motive, asked that an embassy should be allowed to approach the Senate for a final decision. To this Flaminius promptly agreed, against the wishes of his Greek allies (55). Philip's envoys, to their chagrin, were not only treated with much less consideration than Flaminius had shown, but were finally convinced by the Senate's brutal frankness, that the question of the control of Greece through the occupation of the three "fetter" of Greece, was unmistakably the Senate's own policy (56).

From all these negotiations one point clearly emerges. The only point of disagreement between the Senate and Philip was the question of the control of Greece and for this the Senate was prepared to fight. It was not trade or conquest that was desired, for troops were withdrawn after Philip's defeat and no trade agreements made. What was wanted was simply that type of control from afar which Macedon herself had exercised in her stronger and more stable days. The peace treaty after Philip's defeat at Cynoscephalae added very little to the Senate's original demands. Of course, now that Rome had been forced to fight and had actually won, she could increase her demands, but on the whole Philip himself was treated very lightly. He had to pay an indemnity and give his son as hostage, but he was left in control of Macedon. He was called an ally of Rome (57), and proved to be an active ally in Rome's wars with Antiochus and Nabis (58). What he lost was what the Senate had demanded from the beginning - control of Greece - and the Romans at once proved to those Greeks who had welcomed them that their trust was not misplaced. Even before Philip's defeat many Greeks had welcomed Flaminius (v. sup. ch. ix). It was the Achaeans, however, whom Flaminius made especial efforts to win. Not only were they the most stable and perhaps the strongest of the Greek states, but they were the strongest bulwark against Nabis. Although the Aetolians had early joined the Romans against Philip no formal treaty was offered them. To the Achaeans, however, such a treaty of alliance was proposed and though delayed, finally passed probably in 196 B.C. The Achaeans had always taken an oath of loyalty to Philip in accordance with the agreement between them (59), but they were persuaded to transfer their allegiance to Rome (60). Perhaps the speech in the Achaean assembly which did most to effect this desertion of Philip was/

was the one which accused Philip of failing to wage war against Nabis and of abandoning the Achaeans to Nabis' mercy. The speaker contrasted Philip and Antigonus, significantly enough. They had long desired to be free of Philip they maintained, and now the Romans made it possible (61). Polybius (62) strongly approved of the Achaeans' action in siding with Rome. To him, it was a policy of common sense which would avoid further disorder and perhaps bloodshed. Rome's position in interfering in Greece at this particular time was becoming clearer.

Philip reproached the Achaeans at Nicaea for their desertion (63), and almost at once approached Nabis for help (64), perhaps because the Achaeans were now on Rome's side. Nabis agreed and received control of Argos in return for his promised help (65). Nabis, however, was probably alert to the danger the Romans represented to himself and attempted their policy of diplomacy. He therefore came to a working agreement with Flaminius to help him against Philip, a very mistaken policy as it proved. It is significant however, that Flaminius made no attempt to have a definite treaty with Nabis as he did with the Achaeans, while one of the conditions of the agreement was that Nabis should conclude a peace with the Achaeans (66).

The Senate ratified the peace treaty with Macedon without delay, since they had succeeded in the first stage towards obtaining what they wanted. Cisalpine Gaul and Spain were in revolt and, at home, control was increasingly difficult. The plebeian tribune had first accused the nobles of indulging in war after war so that the people could never have peace and, more recently, had practically accused the Senate of deliberately prolonging the war in Macedon for their own purpose (67). During the next few years, too, the Senate had to cope with a slave conspiracy in Etruria (68), during which one of the city legions, no doubt allocated for such a task, had to be called into action. Priests, who had apparently been shirking their obligations, were forced to pay their debts when the last instalments of the state loan fell due. As so often before, corn was distributed cheaply and the Roman games were celebrated with great magnificence three times and the plebeian games for two days (69). Once the peace with Macedon was ratified Flaminius' command was prolonged to "settle Hellenic affairs", the real task of the Senate.

Wherever possible lenient treatment was meted out in Greece. For instance, Epirus and Acarnania, although they had opposed Flaminius, were leniently treated after the peace (70). It was no part of the Senate's policy at this period to stir up antagonism to Rome or internal trouble, unless forced on them. On the contrary, Flaminius' immediate task/

task was to restore peaceful conditions and ordered governments in the Greek states, to establish where possible friendly relations between the important Greek states and Rome, and to stamp out social unrest and revolutionary activity. As a result of the Senate's treatment of the Greeks after Cynoscephalae, which was in marked contrast to that meted out to Greeks in Sicily and Italy, and which no doubt gave rise to the theory of phil-hellenism as a motive of Rome's policy (71), many Greeks, especially among the governing class, responded eagerly to Rome's overtures. In Corcyra and Boeotia, although support had been given to Philip during the war, the chief citizens welcomed Flamininus (72). In virtually every city support for Rome manifested itself, mostly among the rich since they had most to lose by Philip's weakness and therefore most to gain by the substitution of Roman control for that of Macedon (73). Flamininus stated quite frankly that he increased the power of those parts of the state which desired ordered government (74). It was not that Rome automatically supported the rich and governing class against the democrats, nor probably were they consistent in this support (75). It was simply that the rich, because they were rich, followed what to them was a commonsense policy, namely support of Rome, and so everywhere Flamininus set up rich and oligarchic governments and destroyed the pro-Macedonian democratic ones (76). In Euboea and Thessaly, too, where there had been internal troubles between rich and poor, Flamininus again established rich aristocratic governments (77). The Senate knew from its own experience in Italy and elsewhere that the rich had more to lose in war and social upheavals and were therefore more likely to support the restoration of order by a strong state. However, had her own interests demanded democratic governments, Rome would certainly have established them. That in practice it was usually the rich who benefited from Roman rule was actually maintained in letters by the Scipios, describing advantages from the Romans enjoyed by princes in Spain, Africa, Illyria and Greece (78). Moreover, from the Roman point of view, as from that of the cultured Greek, the Greeks were free under the Romans (79). Less favoured sections of the Greek population, however, naturally disputed this (80), for this "freedom" meant freedom from social unrest and the attacks of the unprivileged, and was, therefore, acquired at the expense of the oppressed parts of the community.

The Aetolians proved suspicious of Rome's intentions. They summed up the Senate's policy by saying that the Greeks welcomed a foreign domination in exchange for one to which they were long accustomed, that is, of course, Macedon (81), and argued that Flamininus was so skilful in his policy that the Greeks scarcely realised their chains were there. This was essentially correct, but it was not a domination of Rome over Greece but an alliance between the Senate and Greek oligarchic governments designed to maintain order and peaceful conditions./

conditions. It was, therefore, no more oppressive to parts of the Greek population than the rule of Philip II and Alexander had been. The Aetolians, however, continued to argue that the Greeks were simply changing masters, not obtaining their freedom (82). Flaminius told the Aetolians they misunderstood Rome's policy and motives and the true interests of Greece, and, when the Aetolians maintained that the lenient treatment of Philip practically restored the status quo, Flaminius jumped up in anger and said he would see to it that Greece was not molested by Philip (83). The Senate had no intention of allowing the Aetolians to become masters of Greece now that Macedon was defeated (84). This control of Greece was what Rome had fought for, and Flaminius was now tacitly admitting that fact. Flaminius prevented the Aetolians from seizing the cities they wanted (85) and "protected" them in the Roman style, that is kept the general control in Roman hands. For this many Greeks must have felt grateful, since the Aetolians would have proved worse masters than the Romans at this stage. The Aetolians professed to be ignorant of why Flaminius ignored and slighted them (86), but obviously to have given them even a say in controlling Greece would have been to revert almost to the status quo (87).

Once the peacetreaty was settled and preliminary re-arrangements made in Greece, the Senate's most immediate task remained, namely to defeat Nabis or render him harmless. While Flaminius' policy, in general, was designed to enlist the support of those most likely to be opposed to Nabis' social reforms, he made especially sure of the Achaean League. When the Aetolians proved a danger to the Senate's plans by rousing distrust and suspicions of Rome's intentions, and so rendering the task of the Roman commission unnecessarily difficult, Flaminius was forced to counteract this by making some gesture. He persuaded the Roman commissioners to free, among other towns, Corinth, and to turn it over to the Achaean League (88), which not only strengthened the League against Nabis, but must have confirmed the growing strength of the alliance between the Achaeans and Rome. When Flaminius announced he was going to punish Boeotia for her hostile acts, the Achaeans persuaded him to meet the Boeotian envoys and peaceful relations were established, an illustration of Achaean influence on Flaminius, of his desire to please them, and to establish peaceful relations generally in Greece (89). The Senate then proceeded to the task of obtaining support for the war against Nabis. He was represented as the potential ruler of all Greece and his defeat presented as an essential prelude to the Roman settlement of Greece. Until then there could be no thought of withdrawing from the three key towns of Greece (v. sup. ch. ix).

After the conclusion of the war against Nabis Flaminius then settled disputes at Elatea, and made some changes of government in places where Philip had put his own partisans in/

in power (90). Similar arrangements were made in Euboea and Thessaly, where senators and judges were chosen according to property, and power given to those interested in maintaining peaceful conditions (91). Now that Nabis was defeated and suitable governments established in Greece, the Senate at last allowed their troops to be withdrawn (92). The treaty between Rome and Nabis was ratified at Rome with the declaration that Greece was at last free (93), again an underlining of the Senate's interpretation of freedom.

Before departing from Greece, Flaminius summed up his reactions to the state of society in Greece and Rome's attitude to it, and left some practical advice. He asserted that an excess of liberty led to discord and perhaps to tyranny, another clear pointer to the Senate's attitude. He expressed his belief that a party defeated at home usually invited in foreigners to support them (94), and thus proved himself fully conversant with this type of situation and so the ideal executor of the Senate's policy. The Senate themselves were not unaware of the necessity for practical methods in dealing with such situations (95), and Flaminius had proved to be the almost perfect vehicle for carrying out the Senate's very complicated policy. He is thus a good example of the individual who is successful and popular, because he harmonises so well with the policy or trend of his period (v.sup.ch.v). It was the Senate's knowledge of partisan politics in Italy and elsewhere which had made it possible for Flaminius to use it as a diplomatic weapon in Greece, and thus win to Rome's side decisive sections of practically every Greek community.

Flaminius, however, had to quell a certain amount of criticism of his treatment of Nabis, made by some of the allies. After having been roused to fight against Nabis because of his appalling tyranny, they naturally concluded that his destruction was the only satisfactory conclusion to the war. Yet Flaminius had allowed him to remain in Sparta and had only removed that surrounding territory which had made him a powerful force in Greece. Flaminius defended his action by arguing that he would have had to destroy Sparta itself to destroy Nabis. This was almost literally true so long as Nabis remained loyal to his revolutionary supporters. To persuade Nabis to become traitor was not only a much less expensive policy for Flaminius and the Senate, but it made possible the removal of Roman troops from the dangers of revolutionary infections. The subsequent very special treatment of Nabis emphasised the agreement between Nabis and Flaminius, while the readiness to allow the Achaeans to wipe out the last traces of revolutionary reform and spirit in Sparta once Nabis was dead and the Roman troops at a safe distance, underlined the Senate's motives in intervening in Greece at this time (v.sup.ch.ix).

The Senate had therefore accomplished its task. All
it/

it had desired at this period was control of Greece and, through that, a tranquil, friendly Greece. And this was all Rome took. She did not destroy Macedon or occupy Greece. Her motive in this war was not a very common one for her, or any state, but neither were the conditions which gave rise to it. Her policy was simply an expression of her reaction to an exceedingly dangerous situation. If she usually favoured the rich at this period, it was because it was a practical effective policy. In changed circumstances her tactics would change and, in fact, her suppression of popular revolts in the East in later years was not an attempt to save the world from some "Red International" (96), but the practical means of maintaining, and perhaps extending, her conquests.

This whole theory, if it seems fantastic, only does so because for so long Europeans have been dominated by national politics. They have been trained to regard nations as the only entities in matters of policy. International action tends to be regarded as a matter of warfare, or, if friendly, as exceptional. In feudal Europe this was not so. The obvious dividing line of interest then was rather between nobles of varying place, and serfs, and, at times of extreme internal friction, the new national boundaries were apt to be superseded and the old "feudal" ones revived. For instance, at many periods of crisis those deprived of privileges, or threatened with their loss, have resorted to foreign aid. The case of Aratus, who invited his extreme enemy, Macedon, to intervene again in Greece because of his fear of the Spartan revolution and its effect on the Achaean League and the Peloponnese generally, is a very clear example. During the French Revolution French nobles enlisted the aid of the Prussians, their former enemies (97). In very modern times, reactions of certain sections of a state's population to what they considered the threat of their own workers, has been very similar to that of the Greeks. This makes the analysis of conditions in 200 B.C. much easier to master today. Activities of the fifth column in various countries have received too much publicity to need emphasising. The keeping of French tanks in Paris for use against the French workers instead of sending them to the front, reported by American and other journalists, is only one of many such examples while Weygand was notorious for his policy of reserving reliable troops and material for use against what he regarded as a possible rising of his own people, rather than use them against the enemy (98). The final treacherous alliance between sections of the population and the Germans no doubt sprang from the same type of motive as the actions of the Greeks. For them culture and ordered government depended on the preservation of the existing order of things, and, like the Greeks, when they were no longer strong enough to do this for themselves (99), they quite logically used the proffered/

proffered help of a stronger power. Their gradual disillusionment, if any, was probably no greater than that of many Greeks.

Military action, undertaken through fear of the effect on one's own population of revolutionary conditions in another country, was known to eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. Revolutionary France, once it had been reorganised under Napoleon, proved such a danger to the existing governments in Europe with its appeal of Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality, that a Holy Alliance of Austria, Russia and Prussia was formed to combat its threat (100). Moreover, the initiation of a new war, although the population was exhausted by a previous one, in order to quell a neighbour's revolutionary activities which might have proved dangerous for the government, has occurred in modern times too. In 1917 Britain and Germany practically declared a truce in the Baltic in order to help the White Russians to fight the Bolsheviks (101). In 1918 this policy culminated in the active intervention of fourteen countries in Russia, a policy inspired not by blind hatred but by very practical considerations. In this Britain took a leading part, as a result mainly of the enterprise of Mr. Churchill an essentially realist politician (102). Britain alone spent £100,000,000 on this war, although her people were war weary and the troops of all countries mutinous (103). With the immediate possibilities of demobilisation and unemployment instead of "a land fit for heroes to live in", this war of intervention was perfectly rational. Britain, perhaps the most stable of the countries involved, was none the less severely shaken by the General Strike. This was already eight years after the war in the difficult years of reconstruction, and, had Russia not been severely weakened by the interventionist wars, and revolution in the rest of Europe averted, who can say what might have happened in these restless years of the twenties (104).

In conclusion, it is usually accepted that some of the Greeks welcomed the Romans. Why then should it be regarded as fantastic that the leading Romans should have been anxious to intervene in Greece for precisely the same reason, namely internal troubles at home? That this motive had prompted similar actions at exceptional historical crisis is a matter of record. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that such occasions when this motive does operate are very exceptional, and attempts to apply it on a large scale could only be deprecated. Moreover, whether a government's fear of its own population at any particular moment was justified is not the point at issue. Weygand, for instance, was probably mistaken, and it is possible that Rome exaggerated her danger. The important fact is that the fear was real because the danger could sometimes be real. The danger, too, was interpreted as a threat to the whole state, its culture and traditions, an interpretation which was on the whole correct.

correct, since a widespread and violent upheaval would probably have involved the destruction of the old state and, therefore, the necessity for rebuilding the state, probably on new lines and with, eventually, a new cultural tradition. These so-called traitors, therefore, were no doubt convinced they were acting from the highest motives, while, in addition, their actions were provoked ultimately by the threat, consciously applied or not, of these popular forces who most bitterly attacked and criticised them.

New interpretations of historical processes invariably meet with severe criticism, partly because of their unfamiliarity, and partly because, in their first exposition, they inevitably incorporate many mistakes of detail. If, however, this interpretation only provokes scholars to find new arguments, and polish up old ones, in support of other views, it will not have been without some value (105).

NOTES TO SECTION III.

1. eg. by Frank, Roman Imperialism, p.117.
2. eg. by Holleaux, Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques, pp.109 ff.
3. eg. by Colin, Rome et la Grèce, etc., p.26. cf. J.Fine, J.R.S. xxxvi. p.37, who thinks that Philip was on the defensive against Rome in the Illyrian Wars.
4. Hellenistic Athens, p.428.
5. cf. Polyb., ii. 8. 1-4.
6. *ibid.*
7. *iii.* 10.
8. cf. Tarn, The fleets of the First Punic War, J.H.S.xxvii.49.
9. cf. Polyb., i. 20; cf. Tarn, *l.c.*, p.57.
10. Polyb., *iii.* 9.
11. Polyb., i. 88; Zonaras, viii. 18; cf. Festus, p.233b, where both islands are mentioned.
12. Polyb., ii. 13.
13. Polyb., ii. 11.
14. cf. Zippell, Das römische Herrschaft in Illyrium, p.91; For the peace terms, cf. Polyb., II. 12; Zonar. viii.19.
15. Polyb., ii. 12.
16. Polyb., *iii.* 16.
17. *ii.* 36.
18. *iii.* 16.
19. Tarn, *l.c.*, p.58. cf. Polyb., III. 75, where at the first threat to Rome in the war, even from the North, troops were sent to Sardinia, Sicily and Tarentum and "other places of strategic importance", and a fleet of 60 quinqueremes was fitted out. cf. Livy, xxi. 1, where Hamilcar emphasised the great loss of Sicily and Sardinia.
20. Colin, *op.cit.* p.25; Holleaux, *op.cit.*, p.102, n.3.
- 21./

21. This interpretation of the cause of the Illyrian wars, has not, I think, been suggested before, although it is a very obvious theory and explains most of the debated points about the wars.
22. On all these points cf. Polyb., i. 65, 71, 83, 88; Appian, Punica i. 5; Sic. ii. 2.
23. eg. Rhegium, Polyb. i. 7, and of the Mamertines, Polyb. i. 10.
24. Polyb. i. 88; Zonaras, viii. 18.
25. Zonaras, *ibid*; Festus, p.322B.
26. Sallust, *Cat.*, 51, comments on the mildness shown by Rome to Carthage. Sardinia is not specifically mentioned. Niebuhr, *R.H.* iv. p.143, comments on Rome's peculiar attitude over Sardinia and her rapid change of policy. Pais, *Hist. romaine*, pp.242-3, understands Rome's position when he interprets the Mercenary War as an international social upheaval. cf. Cavaignac, *Hist. de l'antiquité*, iii. pp.243, who emphasises the feeling of solidarity among the civilised nations when Carthage was attacked by the mercenaries.
27. eg. Livy, xxiii. 2; xxiv. 2; xxiv. 13.
28. cf. Livy, xxiii. 15, where the senators is Nuceria were shut out of Capua because their gates had been closed against Hannibal. Cf. Livy, xxiv. 13, where five young nobles approached Hannibal. Cf. Livy xxiv, 45-7, where the few who were in charge of affairs at Arpi were said to have betrayed the city. Cf. Livy xxvii, 24, where the children of Senators of Etruria were said to have been taken as hostages. Cf. Livy, xxix. 36; Etruscan nobles were found guilty of treachery.
29. Cf. Polyb. xi. 25, where it is stated that to protect the state from external attack is comparatively easy, but against internal troubles such as revolutions it is much more difficult and requires tact and acuteness. Cf. Polyb. i. 65, where it is pointed out that the Mercenary War threatened Carthage's very existence; cf. i. 71, for the argument that domestic insurrection was more serious than an external attack. Cf. Livy xxiii. 2, where the nobles who were probably responsible for the revolt, were said to have feared the threat of revolt from their own people. Cf. *Aris. Pol.*, 1304B. 21. 1305A. 7, for the warning not to press a governing class too strongly; otherwise it will resist and perhaps destroy democracy./

democracy. Cf. Plato, Laws I. 626-7, where Sparta is criticised for subduing her neighbours first although the more important task is for a ruling class to establish its supremacy over the lower classes. Cf. I.628, where it is advised that reconciliation should be attempted at home and the people's attention diverted to the external enemy. The Roman Senate had surely learned this lesson! Plato, of course, gave this advice because naturally he loathed internal faction.

30. Cf. Strabo, viii. 5, on the betrayal of the Achaean cause to the Dorians by Philonomus. Cf. Joshua, ch.ii, for similar treachery at the same type of period; cf. Paus. vii. 10, for many such examples.
31. Appian, Pun., vii. 38.
32. Bickermann, Rev. d. Phil., lxi, pp.162 ff. He emphasises how the Roman envoys in Greece publicised their policy amongst everyone but Philip himself. This isolation of Philip was deliberate; v. sub. Holleaux, op.cit., p.306.
33. Polyb., xvi. 27; Livy xxxi. 18. v. sup.n.32.
34. Polyb. xvi. 35.
35. l.c., p.174.
36. Polyb., xvi. 27; Livy xxxiii. 20.
37. Livy xxxi. 9.
38. Polyb. xvi. 34.
39. Polyb., ibid.
40. cf. MacDonald and Walbank, J.R.S. xxvii. 205, on this. Holleaux, op.cit., p.323, and Rev.d. Et. Anc. 22. p.80, sees that Greece was made the occasion of the war but does not explain it.
41. Livy xxxi. 15; Holleaux, Rev. d. Et. Anc. , xxii. 77ff., argues that the Athenians did not appeal to Rome but were persuaded to join the Roman alliance by Attalus and Rhodes. cf. however Bickermann, l.c. who thinks that Athens did appeal to Rome. On Cephisodorus see the inscription published by B.D. Meritt, Hesperia, v.419 ff.
42. Cf. Livy xxxi. 5, for the election of the consul. cf. Bickermann, l.c., p.167, on the reluctance of the Romans to fight. However, the Assembly had only ratified the decision to go to war a short time previously.

43. Livy xxxii. 6; Plut., Flam., 3. cf. Polyb. xviii. 37, where Flamininus stressed that war with Philip would not have been necessary if Philip had agreed to the Senate's demands.
44. Livy xxxii. 3.
45. Livy xxxii. 9.
46. On these two points, cf. Livy xxxii. 26-27.
47. cf. Bickermann, l.c., 169-71, where he maintains that Philip's astonishing behaviour was only explicable if he did not expect war. Obviously Philip was not likely to realise the Senate's danger at home and the necessity for them to control Greece.
48. Livy xxxii. 10; Plut., Flam., 5.
49. Livy, *ibid.*
50. Polyb., xviii. 1; Livy xxxii. 33.
51. Polyb., xviii. 7; Livy xxxii. 35.
52. xviii. 7.
53. Rev. Hist. cxxi. p.252.
54. Rev. d. Ét. Gr. xxxvi. p.36, cf. n.4.
55. Polyb., xviii. 10.
56. Livy, xxxii. 37-8. The above interpretation of the negotiations between Flamininus and Philip varies slightly from the usual ones. It is, however, consistent within itself, and with the whole theory worked out in this section.
57. Plut. Flam., 14.
58. cf. Appian, Maced., ix. 21, where Flamininus says the Romans would not destroy Philip because that was never their policy. He quotes the example of Carthage, where enemies were turned into allies by restoring their property. This gives additional evidence that the Senate was always capable of winning over some sections of a potentially hostile population.
59. Livy, xxxii. 5.
60. Livy, xxxii. 19ff.
61. Livy, xxxii. 21.
62. xviii. 13.
- 63./

63. Polyb. xviii. 6.
64. Livy, xxxii. 38.
65. Livy, xxxii. 38-39.
66. Livy, xxxii. 39-40. Nabis only agreed to a cessation of hostilities with the Achaeans until the war with Philip was over. This was probably sufficient for Flamininus' purpose, since it meant that the Peloponnese was safe from Nabis until Philip should be defeated and the control of Greece in the Senate's hands. Moreover, by requiring Nabis to give practical aid to the Romans against Philip, Flamininus made doubly sure that Nabis would be kept out of mischief until he was in a position to deal with him.
67. Livy, xxxi. 6; xxxii. 28.
68. Livy xxxiii. 36.
69. On the payment of debts by priests, the distribution of corn and the games, cf. Livy, xxxiii. 42.
70. Livy xxxii. 14; xxxiii. 16-7.
71. cf. Mommsen's disgust at this lenient treatment, Hist. Rome, ii. p.443. He fails to understand it.
72. Polyb., xviii. 43; ^{Livy} xxxiii. 1, 2, 16.
73. Polyb., xx. 6-7; xviii. 43; Livy xxxii., 25; xxxiii. 1, 2, 16, 27, 28.
74. Livy, xxxiv. 51.
75. cf. Passerini, Athen., xi. pp. 309 ff., where it is demonstrated that support of the rich by Rome was not rigid and invariable. cf. Rostovtzeff, Soc. and Ec. Hist. of the Hell. W., p.612, n.14. (vol. iii, p.1460), for the argument that the "mob" was sometimes used by Rome against the rich in later times. This of course is quite probable, since Rome was not pursuing some sort of abstract pro-rich policy.
76. Polyb., xxvii. 2; Plut., Flam., xii. ff.
77. Livy xxxiv. 51.
78. Livy xxxvii. 25; cf. also Dittenberger Syll. No.684 for an inscription describing a later rising by the people of Dyme in Achaea, which was only quelled by the intervention of the Romans invited in by the rich Achaeans. cf. Beasley, Cl. Rev., 1900, pp.162 ff., on this inscription.

79. Cf. Caes. de Bell. Civ., iii. 3; Appian de Bell., Mithr. 58, for this attitude, cf. Also Dittenberger No.684, 11.
80. Cf. Livy xxxv. 31, where Eurylochus the Magnetian maintained that Demetrius was free only in name, and that actually everything was directed by the will of the Romans.
81. Plut., Flam., 10.
82. Polyb., xviii. 45.
83. Polyb., xviii. 37. It would probably be more correct to say that the Aetolians understood the position very well and were annoyed because they had no share in the control of Greece, not because they were victims of this control.
84. Polyb., xviii. 34.
85. Polyb., xviii. 38.
86. Livy, xxxiii. 11; cf. xxxiii. 35. The Aetolians in general proved themselves the main obstacle to the quick fulfilment of the Senate's plans in Greece, and Flamininus went to great lengths to silence them; v.sub. After the withdrawal of the troops from Greece Flamininus wrote to the Chyretians in Thessaly, expressing the hope that they would not need to be recalled, since he wished to silence the critics of Roman policy; cf. Ditt. Syll. No.593.
87. Polyb., xviii. 46, said it was incredible to the Greeks that the Romans should incur expenses and danger solely to free the Greeks. Obviously they did not. That "freedom" depended on Roman control. cf. Polyb., xviii. 49, where it is maintained that it was ridiculous that Antiochus should get the spoils of Rome's war with Philip. Control of Greece is clearly implied; cf. Polyb. xxiv. 13, where it is admitted, even by the Greeks themselves, that during the war against Antiochus Roman influence in Greece was supreme.
88. Polyb., xviii. 45; Livy, xxxiii. 31, 34.
89. Livy, xxxiii. 29; Flamininus had skilfully obtained the kind of government he wanted in Boeotia. He refused to take an active part himself but told the Boeotians who approached him where to find assassins! cf. Polyb., xviii. 43. Even Mommsen disapproves of this. cf. op.cit. II. pp.441, 443.

90. Livy, xxxiv. 48.
91. Livy, xxxiv. 51.
92. Livy, xxxiv. 49; cf. xxxiv. 43. The defeat of Nabis was the essential prerequisite of this withdrawal. It had nothing to do with Antiochus, or indeed with the rest of Greece once peaceful conditions had been established.
93. Diod. Sic. xxviii. frg. xii. (Dindorf).
94. Livy, xxxiv. 49.
95. cf. Livy, xxxv. 23, where the Senate emphasised the necessity of choosing people capable of winning over allies to the Romans, not just bullying people. This was in connection with the war against Antiochus,, but it applied equally well to the Macedonian War. This whole policy of winning allies and sections of a population illustrates, perhaps, Rome's weakness in Italy and is in marked contrast to her later more violent methods, when her power was once more firmly established.
96. Tarn, "Hellenistic Civilisation", ch.iii, criticises, this attitude. He points out that slave revolts, for instance, were merely blind uprisings as a result of miserable conditions.
97. "Those who regard themselves as custodians of National Patrimony are concerned with but one thought - to preserve their privileges and retain their wealth. They would rather see France ruled by despotic German Princelings than by the people of France.....Only the people of France, Madame, can save France from her inner and outer foes". Letter from Mirabeau to Marie Antoinette in 1790.
98. cf. Melville, "Guilty Frenchmen", Ldn. 1941, p.40, and O. Paul, "Farewell France", Ldn. 1941, p.136, on the prevalence of this attitude among a small section of the French population, cf. Melville, pp.31, 67-8; Paul, p.154; and E. Bois, "Truth on the Tragedy of France", Ldn. 1941, p.157, on Weygand in particular.
99. Aristotle warned citizens that it was unwise to attack the possessing classes too strongly since it would make them resist and so perhaps destroy democracy; v.sup. n.29. It is certainly obvious that both in ancient and modern times the process is a two-sided one. It is the threat, or believed threat, of popular revolt which provokes reaction and even treachery, and not some inherent wickedness of a few wealthy people.

100. Napoleon freed other countries from serfdom and other feudal traits as a matter of policy. v. sup. ch.viii. Indeed, it was his abandonment of this policy in Russia which was largely responsible for his defeat there. v.sup. ch.viii. n.212.
101. cf. "Vigilantes", "Between Two Wars?", Ldn.1939, p.119.
102. It has been suggested that Mr. Churchill was inspired only by a blind hatred of Bolshevism and nothing else; cf. D. Lloyd George, "The Truth about the Peace Treaties", Ldn.1938, i. pp.325, 367-8, 569, where he says that "his ducal blood revolted" at the destruction of Grand Dukes in Russia. cf. also "Vigilantes" op.cit., pp.106-7. The policy of intervention was not merely a result of some abstract policy based on "class interest" and "class war", as "Vigilantes", pp.89, 100, and others, have suggested. Actually, both the writings and actions of the period show how real was the threat of a revolutionary Russia and, therefore, a potentially revolutionary Europe to the Governments of Britain, France, and even the U.S.A. cf. "The whole of Europe is filled with the spirit of Revolution....all Eastern Europe will be swept into the orbit of the Bolshevik Revolution.....Bolshevik imperialism does not merely menace the states on Russia's border. It threatens the whole of Asia, and is as near to America as it is to France" - Memorandum of Lloyd George to the Peace Conference, March 25th, 1919, published in 1922, cmd. 1614. cf. also, "Two and a half years after the Armistice, the back of Bolshevism in Central Europe had been broken.....The expenditure of £137,000,000 (largely in relief credits - M.O.W.), was probably one of the best investments from a financial and political point of view ever recorded in history"; - Sir William Goode, The Times, Oct.14th, 1925. In fact, the real aim may well have been to prevent the spread of Bolshevism if its utter destruction was impossible. So the Roman Senate may have aimed only to prevent the spread of anarchy and social revolution through Greece, without specifically planning the destruction of the Spartan revolution.
103. cf. Morton, op.cit., pp.511, 517, 519. cf. "Vigilantes", op.cit., p.120. In Britain it was only after the Armistice that mutinies became widespread, and the danger of general revolt became apparent. Lloyd George especially realised the danger, and took quick action at home to meet it; see Morton, p.520. It is significant that the British Government, like the Roman Senate, found it necessary to launch a propaganda campaign involving deception of the workers in order to win their support for the war and its continued prosecution: cf. Lloyd/

Lloyd George "War Memoirs", pp.220, 1059, 1882, 2483-6, 2659; and, "The Intimate papers of Colonel House", vol.iii, p.349, all quoted by Vigilantes, pp.64-81. In Europe, too, peace with its attendant problems and especially with the danger of the spread of revolution, was dreaded by the allied governments; cf. Vigilantes, pp.120-1. This fear of peace, added to the dread of revolution, has already been suggested as a partial explanation of the Senate's behaviour in first opposing Scipio's expedition to Africa, and then insisting on war with Philip; v.sup., Section II.

104. Big states, such as those of Western Europe and the Roman state, have a far greater stability, and therefore strength, than small ones. This policy, therefore, of defence against internal troubles would be rarely used. On the other hand, the small states of Greece, being relatively unstable and, in 200 B.C. having perhaps reached their peak in anarchy and social disorder, would always be potential centres of danger for bigger states in moments of crisis.
105. All previous theories to explain the Roman intervention in Greece have very serious flaws (v.sup., Section I), while one of the strongest arguments in favour of the above theory is that virtually all of these problems left unexplained by other theories have been used actually to support this interpretation, and find their natural place in it. Previously, some problems have been explained with great ingenuity by being examined in isolation, but these, if fitted into the whole complex background, only create new inconsistencies. Not only does the above theory make sense of apparent inconsistencies such as the change of the Senate's policy in 201-200 B.C., the negotiations between Flaminius and Philip, those between Flaminius and Nabis, phil-hellenism after Cynoscephalae, and the treatment of Nabis by Flaminius and the Senate, but it explains, too, other difficulties such as the deliberate manoeuvring to place Philip in the position of sole enemy to the Senate and the Senate's attitude to the Achaeans in their relations with Nabis before and after Nabis' death, difficulties which have previously been ignored or insufficiently emphasised.

ABBREVIATIONS.

A.J.A.	American Journal of Archaeology
Am. H.R.	American Historical Review
Ar.	Aristophanes
Aris.	Aristotle
Athen.	Athenaeus
Ath.Mitt.	Mitteilungen des deutschen arch. Inst. Athen. Abteilung
B.C.H.	Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique
B.S.A.	Annual of the British School at Athens
C.A.H.	Cambridge Ancient History
C.E.H.	Cambridge Economic History
C.H.J.	Cambridge Historical Journal
C.I.A.	Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum
Class. Phil.	Classical Philology
C.Q.	Classical Quarterly
C.R.	Classical Review
C.W.	Classical Weekly
Dem .	Demosthenes
Diog. Laert.	Diogenes Laertius
Diod. Sic.	Diodorus Siculus
Dion. Hal.	Dionysius Halicarnassensis
F.H.G.	Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum
Hdt.	Herodotus
H.S.	Harvard Studies of Classical Philology
I.G.	Inscriptiones Graecae
I.G. (2)	Inscriptiones Graecae, editio minor
Il.	Iliad
J.E.A.	Journal of Egyptian archaeology
J.H.S.	Journal of Hellenic Studies
J.d.S.	Journal des Savants
J.R.S.	Journal of Roman Studies
Od.	Odyssey
Paus.	Pausanias
Polyb.	Polybius
Plut.	Plutarch
Rev. d. Et. Gr.	Revue des études grecques
Rev.d.Et. Anc.	Revue des études anciennes
Rev. Hist.	Revue historique
Rev. d. Phil.	Revue de Philologie
Riv. Fil.	Rivista di Filologia
Thuc.	Thucydides
Xen.	Xenophon.

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