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PERIPHERAL ESTATE DECLINE AND PLANNING: A Critical Analysis of Housing Policy in Glasgow

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Submitted as part of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy

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Synopsis

This thesis is an attempt to fill a gap, from an academic point of view, in the rather neglected subject of post-war peripheral council housing development in Britain, and in Glasgow in particular. It is divided into three sections entitled "Construction"; "Decline" and "Re-planning and Revitalisation", respectively, representing three phases in the evolution of such estates.

In Part One (Chapters One and Two) the historic importance of council housing in Glasgow is traced particularly with respect to the relationship between industrial development and housing. In Chapter One, emphasis is laid on the contradictions æsociated with industrial expansion and allocation of council houses to particular sections of the population. The spatial manifestations of such differentiations have implications for choice in a city-wide housing context today. Chapter Two is concerned to a lesser extent with industry, and more with ideological issues associated with the decision to build the peripheral estates, particularly central and local political motives and contemporary planning arguments.

Part Two (Chapter Three) deals with the physical decline of peripheral estates since their construction with respect to (a) Latent effects of variables outlined in Part One and (b) Issues associated with implications of rising unemployment; weakening fiscal base; child population growth; allocation policy; socio-economic imbalance and the reputation for violence and other anti-social behaviour. On this basis, a sociological casual theory of decline in peripheral estates is suggested for possible hypothesis testing in the future.

Part Three (Chapters Four and Five) attempts to utilise the ideas set out in Parts One and Two to criticise recent policy approaches operated by the District Council to deal with peripheral estate problems, and to suggest some possibilities for more sensitive solutions and additions to the current strategy. Among the major criticisms are a weak theoretical and methodological base with which to define problems and therefore attempt remedial planning. The suggestions are made that a more even distribution of responsibility within the corporate structure is necessary; that equal emphasis be paid to the large rehousing inter-war tenement stock throughout the city as well as the introduction of unorthodox sociological and psychological planning approaches to deal with an issue of long-standing complexity.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In recent years, government concern - both central and local - has been growing for the future of the post war peripheral housing estates, found in the large provincial conurbations (e.g. Weinberger, 1973; Baldwin, 1974; Griffiths, 1975; Herbert, 1975; Malpass, 1976; SSHA, 1977; Attenburrow, Murphy and Simms, 1978).

Much of the research and action has been carried out by local authorities such as Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District Council. In the city of Glasgow there is a particularly large stock of local authority housing classed as "peripheral", and vacancy rates and demands for transfer out are rising steadily (e.g. Glasgow District Council, 1978c: Appendices 1 - 3). In addition, Glasgow suffers from unemployment and deprivation on a scale that is second to that of no other British city (e.g. West Central Scotland Plan, 1974).

At the same time, this discovery of council sector problems has co-incided with the preparation of Housing Plans in Scotland, and in these documents a more determined effort to rationalise the entire city housing stock is being made. The idea of a Housing Plan system emerged nationally from dissatisfaction with old housing policies, particularly in relation to finance; assessment of needs; size and distribution of dwellings; accessibility to the public stock for special groups and links between the public and private sectors to facilitate mobility and choice (e.g. Scottish Housing Advisory Committee, 1972). The production of the Plans has co-incided with the development of a more corporate approach to local government finance and administration, following rationalisation after the Paterson Report (in Scotland) and the Bains Report (in England and Wales).

Bearing the notion in mind that the entire local authority stock should be considered when analysing the problems of the peripheral estates, this thesis will explore the development and subsequent decline of the peripheral estates in Glasgow, analyse and assess the local solutions and suggest some alternative formulations of the problem. Some policy proposals will flow from this.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework used to analyse the issues draws heavily from sociology, particularly with respect to sociology <u>of</u> housing and planning and sociology <u>in</u> housing planning. The former incorporates a historical perspective based on economic and social history, planning and architectural principles, housing finance and political theory. Attempts will be made to include the last four into the more recent issues, particularly with respect to policy proposals.

There is some debate over the role of the sociologist in planning (e.g. Albrow, 1970; Faludi, 1970; Buttimer, 1971; Stewart, 1972; Pahl, 1975). Here, the notion that there is a conflict is accepted, but that it can be overcome. To some extent, this thesis is an attempt to explore the possibility that the sociologist can be both a critic of planning as practiced i.e. analysing from a neutral standpoint (sociology of) and a participant trying to suggest remedies for given planning problems (sociology <u>in</u>).

The discipline itself contains a varied number of theoretical perspectives and methodologies. In recent years the debate within urban sociology has centred upon the stances of Marxist and Weberian sociologists and specifically between Marxists such as Castells and "Managerialists" such as Pahl. The managerialist approach stresses Weberian notions such as the "actions" of individuals working in government organisations to explain for example the incidence of poverty or delays in policy application. The Marxist perspective relies on a "structural" explanation, i.e. that all urban problems are rooted in the relationship between two major classes in society i.e. bourgeois and the proletariat (e.g. Marx and Engels, 1967).

In this thesis, heavy reliance is placed on Weberian methodology, specifically the use of the "ideal type" to attempt to explain complex historical and contemporary phenomena. A concise explanation of the use of the ideal-type would take up a considerable amount of text. (See Weber, 1947: 339-40; Weber, 1949: 83-111; Fletcher, 1971: 428-455). By way of an example, the ideal-type bureaucratic structure is outlined in Appendix I (see also Pahl, 1975: Ch II for its application to regional planning). The major advantages of this method are:-

- More applicable to the subject matter in that there is not a great deal of empirical evidence to attempt a Marxist critique.
- 2. Many of the ideas put forward in the ideal type may be useful as a starting point for the testing of hypothesis if and when empirical data becomes available. The ideal type is put up to be knocked down or qualified by future students of Glasgow's housing.

Finally, the managerialist approach may be of special significance in Glasgow which has a long tradition of local "Socialist"politicians who relied heavily on municipal agencies. The relative "monopoly" of such politicians and agencies has partially eradicated a private capital input in the affairs of the city, and on that basis, a managerialist-oriented analysis would seem pertinent.

INTRODUCTION

A comprehensive history of Glasgow's housing policies is required, particularly of the local authority sector which comprises some 195,000 of the city's entire stock of 317,000 houses(Glasgow District Council, 1977b: 6 -7). Although general histories have been produced by the city council(e.g. Glasgow Corporation, 1966; 1975b), they have not been particularly critical of allocation policy or lack of tenure choice, and the repercussions this has had in terms of choice within such a large stock. They have certainly rarely considered the possibilities of increasing turnover.

In Part One, an attempt is made to ask the fundamental question: Why did the situation arise whereby council houses in Glasgow became difficult to let? Was it because of demand for owner occupation(e.g. Jones, 1976; Glasgow District Council, 1977a)¹ or because of population movement by those most likely to take up council tenancies? Or again has there been a tradition of attempting to separatp "good" tenants from "bad" tenants resulting in ghettoisation?

The explanation of today's problems cannot be found in a purely a-historical vacuum. Housing finance, design, layout and allocation policies are historical phenomena which must be viewed within a wider societal context in economic, sociological and political terms. Consequently one is forced to rely on a theory of society which takes cognisance of historical ch_{ange}^2 . As a first step, the motives behind massive council house building of differing forms are traced.

CHAPTER I

THE DEVILOPMENT OF COUNCIL HOUSING IN GLASGOW

1. Housing Crisis and Municipal Reform 1860-1918

Checkland (1976) has traced the growth of "prosperity"² in the 19th Century Glasgow to the prevalence of the following factors:-

- 1. A lack of state intervention from the period 1875 1914
- 2. High standard of literacy among the workforce
- 3. Entrepreneurial ability, including an imnovatory capacity in marine engineering
- 4. Discipline in the workplace
- 5. A lack of industrial conflict, and
- 6. A pride in skill and strong self-discipline on thepart of skilled workers.

Such conditions, he suggests were likely to promote:-

....a general feeling of well-being and confidence such that success induses further success....standards of living will rise, civic initiative will flourish, local taxation will have little inhibiting effect. (Checkland, 1976 : 1).

However, whilst there is some credence in this "ideal" formulation, the ideal tends to infer an ideal situation of power for local businessmen, rather than for the labouring classes particularly the lowly paid. It is argued here that there were at this time, major contradictions within the economic structure, particularly in relation to housing. These were (1) The problem of locational movement of major employers and the inability of builders and landlords to respond to the change, and (2) Low pay for certain sections of the working class - both skilled and un-skilled which resulted in an inability to rent houses during a period of city-wide housing surplus.

Before 1860 there was already a considerable urban problem. Housing, health and sanitary conditions were considered by many observers to be amongst the worst in Western Europe and certainly the worst in Britain (e.g. Select Committee on the Health of Towns, 1840: viii; Arnott, 1842: 8).

It was not until the early 1860s that the City Improvement Trust, later the Housing Department,⁴ gained the power to compulsory purchase cramped dwellings and to replace them with new broader streets and to build housing at lower density, triggering off in Glasgow, a genesis of a town planning movement.

Meanwhile, population in the city and perhaps more importantly in the conurbation grew. In the city, the population stood at 547,000 in 1871; by 1891 782,000 and just over 1 million in 1914 (Checkland, 1976: 8). Much of this can be attributed to boundary extention, however, and Jones (1979) has suggested that density began to be much less of a problem after 1881, yet during this period of "prosperity" the Trustees were unable to satisfactorily deal with housing problems why? First Clydeside in the late 19th century was a region, one of continual change; of booms and depressions and the movement of the location of basic industries such as shipbuilding between 1895 and 1905. The John Brown yard at Clydebank Wasfor example, required to find deep water to launch larger ships. This created a stir in the housing market, since such a shipyard was dependent upon securing skilled labour. There was a need to entice the pool of such workers away from central shipyards on the upper reaches of the Clyde. However despite the fact that the company agreed to have houses built for these workers in Clydebank, the rents being charged by the private landlords (Brown did not own them) were 10-20% higher in 1914 than in Partick or Govan (Melling, 1978: 12). The differences in wage rates within the same trade or between skilled trades often meant the difference between being able to afford a room-and-kitchen in one of the more "respectable" working class areas which were springing up in the building booms of the 1890's and early 1900's, ² of which Clydebank was one or else having to crowd into tenements in the inner-city areas.⁶.

This contradiction may help explain why in 1911 there was an overall housing surplus in the city of around 11% falling to around 6% in 1914. In addition, private landlords were loathe to lower rents, partly because the bondholders who had invested money in construction were continually pressurising the landlords for higher returns of their investments ⁷ (Scott-Hunter, 1915: Evidence to the Committee). The landlords in turn raised rents to maintain their own position. The problems arising from these "contradictions" between and within the industrial and housing markets manifested themselves in large part in discrepancies between districts in terms of severity of overcrowding and attendant problems (e.g. Bremner, 1903; Chalmers, 1916), such as incidence of disease. Depending upon how density was calculated⁸ there were alarming differences between districts, ranging from 10 to 296 persons to: the acre(Bremner, 1903: 8).

If low wages mean poor take-up of better quality houses, and as overcrowding grows, external signs of squalor will magnify. Allen(1965) suggests that civic dignitaries may have felt that this problem was too close to their own residence for comfort. The growth of a middle class reform movement bears witness to changing attitudes - for philanthropic reasons or otherwise(e.g. Brockington, 1965; Gauldie, 1974) but it is clear that morality and industrial efficiency were important motives behind the provision of Corporation housing. The idea of separating out "deserving" workers from the rest was uppermost. Smart, speaking of the costs to the business community of slum housing noted of such areas:-

>for the disease, drunkeness and crime engendered there we pay...rates...subscriptions ...expenses of justice. And we su for in our labour supply for good workers cannot be born and bred there. (Smart, 1902: 8)

Despite the growth in a socialist party on the council, newly constructed council dwellings were allocated to:-

> •••••the well-to-do artizan class. Clerks, policemen, mechanics, shopkeepers and people who had between 24s and 30s per week. (Allen, 1965: 609)

But the move to building council houses on a large scale in Glasgow only began after the outbreak of war in 1914, when the private landlords' association raised rents in properties including those in more "respectable" areas. A rent strike followed - though not for "socialist" reasons - by the bastions of the "home front" war effort who felt a sense of injustice at producing for the war effort on the one hand and losing out to private rentiers on the other. Private landlords bacame the target of em. oyers anxious to keep the steady influx of labour provided with cheap accommodation. Such an explanation may explain the desire by politicians to build on the slogan "homes fit for herces", for it seems that the "herces" were not confined to the Western Front.

2. Inter-war Housing in Glasgow 1919 - 39

Having established a firm commitment to begin a programme of council house building, attention focussed on the following issues:-

- 1. Costs of building a house
- 2. Level of subsidy to be granted to the local authority
- 3. Size and style of housing to be built
- 4. Level of rent to be charged
- 5. Allocation

These factors are not mutually exclusive. Between the wass the question of subsidies was often dependent upon political ideology and was associated with building costs (e.g. Headey, 1978: Ch 6). Similarly, size and style of house, rents charged and allocation were not separable for reasons which will become apparent. Here, no attempt is made to delve into complexities of financial arrangements of the inter-war acts (see Nevitt, 1966: Ch 6). There are some aspects of fiscal policy which did have spatial manifestations of status group differentiation according to housetype in Glasgow, however.

Under the terms of the 1919 Act, Glasgow Corporation was obliged to survey housing needs in the city. A figure of 57,000 new houses to be built was accepted by the Housing Committee. Of these 21,000 were to relieve overcrowding 15,000 to meet normal population growth and only 5,500 to aid demobbed servicemen(Fisher, 1968). This shows that as a proportion of the total candidates for new housing only about 12% would be classed as "war veterns and their families", lending weight to the notion that pressure to build came from the interanl dynamics of the contradictions previously outlined.

In the beginning, subsidies were relatively generous and many "cottage" developments sprang up, but within a couple of years, there was a dramatic upsurge in tenement construction, as Table 1 shows:-

(a)	"Ordinary"	No	(b)	"Rehousing"	No
	COTTAGES	936		COTTAGES	Nil
	FLATTED	600		FLATTED	556
	TENEMENTS	474		TENEMENTS	5,590

Table 1 Houses built under the 1923 Act by Rent and Style in Glasgow

Source: Fisher, 1968 from Glasgow Corporation review of Operations, 1947.

This can be explained by the fact that building costs were particularly high after the war, as a result of war inflation and in Scotland, due to the fact that stone was preferred to brick. Therefore, it was cheaper to build at higher densities, thus providing accommodation more quickly whilst reducing costs of land purchase. In addition, lower rents could be charged in the rehousing schemes.

Accordingly when Labour assumed power for the first time in 1924, the Minister of Housing, John Wheatley announced an increase in the flat rate subsidy - in this case, £9.00 per annum per house for 40 years. This effectively meant the possibility of the construction of more cottage and flatted houses, since the local authority was no longer under pressure to "prove" the inadequacy of private enterprise before it could seriously enter the house 9 building field. In any case, the subsidy was considerably greater than it had been under the Chamberlain Act which granted a subsidy of £6.00 per house per year for 20 years to individuals who could build houses falling within certain minimum and maximum space standards. The notion of the construction of more "rehousing" tenements seems to have been abolished, as Table 2 shows:-

Table 2 Houses built under the 1924 Act by Rent and Style in Glasgow

(a)	"Ordinary"	No	(b)	"Intermediate"	No
	COTTAGES	3,221		COTTAGES	Nil
	FLATTED	7,992		FLATTED	1,928
	TENEMENTS	2,222		TENEMENTS	6,223
	totals	13,435			8,151

Source: Fisher, 1968 from Glasgow Corporation Review of Operations, 1947

Note however that there is still a preponderance of tenement construction In addition, the building of houses for sale under the subsidy scheme also

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flourished, but it is interesting to note that a great many more "flatted" houses were completed. The housing built under this act represents 42% of the total inter-war output - some 21,586 houses. The fact remains however that there was no effort made to directly deal with slum clearance which effectively meant that those more likely to move would be more affluent sections of the working class.

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The complexities associated with maximising output can be gauged by the fact that Wheatley, a socialist, had to diplomatically negotiate the increased entry of apprentices into the building industry, with the unions involved. Thus, one should be under no illusions that the construction of the cottage and flatted dwelling on a large scale represented some vast improvement for the lower paid sections of the working class. Indeed, many skilled workers too were left behind or chose not to move for one reason or another. What it did achieve was a general Pasing of congestion in the city tenements and a vastly improved standard of living for certain sections of the population.

By 1930, under the "Greenwood" Act however the emphasis switched to slum clearance once more. In addition to the provision of a subsidy of £2.00 per person rehoused from a slum area, a 50% grant was given to the local authority to speed up selective demolition or closure. On top of this, a higher subsidy was granted for the erection of three storey tenements on expensive inner city sites. It is the case in Glasgow that a great many of the 1930/35 housing acts properties are to be found squeezed in between the more desirable cottage and flatted suburbs, and the pre-1919 sandstone tenements of the city suburbs. Good examples of this can be seen at: e.g. Temple and elsewhere they are to be found indiscriminatly between old tenement blocks, as in Shettleston, Dennistoun and Govan or on sites surrounded by a great deal of open land as in Blackhill.

It can be generally argued that the rent structures of the overall housing stock probably represented the income levels of the tenants who first moved into them. If we accept that basic premise then it is easy to see how thelower income groups - particularly in the depression years - drifted into less desirable property, whilst those with a higher status, and possibly a more secure job could afford to remain in the better areas. We are now in a position to set up an ideal type picture of local authority housing classes between 1919 and 1939, according to style, density, the predominant act under which they were built, the rents and the class composition of the tenant.

10.

IDEAL TYPE

<u>Style</u>	Density* (houses per <u>acre).</u>	Predominant <u>Act</u>	Rent per week	Social Class
COTTAGE	6 - 15	1924	Ordinary (13/9d-23/2d)	Clerical/ Skilled Worker.
FLATTED	11 - 20	1924/30/35	Intermed (10/6d-12/-)	Mixed.
TENEMENTS	20 - 29	1923/30/35	Rehousing (6/6d-8/9d)	Unskilled/ Unemployed labourers.

*Figures are averages collated from data collected by Morton (1968). The variations can be explained in terms of the actual mix of styles of houses in many of these schemes, though it is generally the case that tenements tend not to conform to this. Table 3 shows the construction of types of house:-

Table 3 Total numbers of local authority houses built in Glasgow, 1919-1939 by style and rent category.

	Но	use Sty	<u>l e</u>
Rent Category	COTTAGE	FLATTED	TENEMENT
ORDINARY	7,419	11,338	4,522
INTERMEDIATE	867	4,178	8,441
REHOUSING	12.	7 38	13,833
	······		
totals	8,298	16,254	26,796
			

Source: Collated from figures extracted from Glasgow Corporation review of operations, 1947 by Fisher.

Contemporary observers have noted the distinctions associated with quality of housing and rents charged:-

(a)"Normal houses for "selected" tenants rents from about 13/9d to 23/2d (b) What have been called "Intermediate" houses also for "selected" tenants removed from over-

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PLATE 1: Inter-war "cottage" housing(modernised) North Carntyne. These houses are among the most sought after in the city.



PLATE 2: Inter-war "flatted" style(modernised) North Carntyne.

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crowded houses, not necessarily in slum areas, rents from about 10/6d to about 12/- and (c) Rehousing for "unselected" tenants dispossessed by clearances, rents on a still lower scale from about 6/6d to 8/9d per week all including rates It is obvious that houses in the third class are within the reach of the poorer paid wage earners who may be driven out of their homes by clearances. (Chalmers and Mann 1933:21)"

Thus we may conclude that the vast majority of council houses were constructed for the poorest sections of the population. In addition there were substantial differences in the external appearance and internal standards of these types of development:-

> ...Striking differences exist among the pre-war houses in terms of external appearance, and to some extent their internal amenities. The majority of rehousing houses are 2 and 3 storey tenements, built of plain grey concrete blockwork. About $\frac{2}{5}$ of the intermediate houses are also tenements, although these are slightly more elaborately designed and may have bay windows....In the case of those built under the 1938 Act, the houses have a more "modern" appearance, and have red aggregate added to the concrete blocks to give a more pleasing appearance. The smaller number of ordinary tenements are more complex in design and have ornamented bay windows. (Strathclyde Regional Council, 1978c: Ch 8, Appendix II).

It has already been mentioned that a possible reason for the large numbers of tenements constructed over the period was the shortage of land low quality costs of building materials and the eagerness of Glasgow district to deal with its massive housing headache. However, we have also suggested that this was largely a political move to satisfy certain sections of the population. The poorest now had a house with a bath and a toilet but were separated from the "respectable" working class. This effectively re-established pre 1914 status divisions between workers in spatial terms.



PLATE 3: An example of superior finish "ordinary" rent tenement, Riddrie



PLATE 4: Constrasting "rehousing" rent tenement off Old Shettleston Road

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PLATES 5 and 6 show clearly the distinctions which exist between housing classes in Glasgow. Above(plate 5) is prestigious Riddrie. Below(plate 6) separated by a motorway, the notorious Blackhill, revealing that the inter-war stock has serious imbalances which add to the probleme associated with post-war housing.



15.

In addition, whilst the poor were being squeezed into the slum clearance areas of the intermediate zone i.e. between the "respectable" pre-1919 tenement areas and the cottages, the wealthiest sections of the middle class utilised the benefits of the private house-building boom and moved out of the city altogether to greenfield sites where rates were much lower. A great deal of the impetus for this boom can be traced back to the Chamberlain and Wheatley subsidies for private enterprise building (e.g. Dickens, 1977; Issarachoff, 1977). On the basis of that evidence therefore, the notion that the state satisfactorily aided the poor can be challenged. Indeed by pursuing a rehousing policy within the city and reducing the city's rate generation capacity an increasing burden fell on the manual sections of the working class and on those clerical workers who chose to remain within the city boundaries.

Summary

As a result of industrial expansion and population growth, enormous demands were placed upon private landlords and builders in Glasgow. As the associated problem of overcrowding and disease affedted sustained production and morality, the building of council houses became a means of solving the contradictions of the so-called age of prosperity. It seems to have co-incided with a socialist movement pledged to providing an alternative to hardship associated with profit-making in private housing.

The period 1919 - 39 saw the first major drive in achieving those goals, but the houses tended to be allocated according to income and "deserts" which were apparently never challenged by the socialists. Any subsequent discussion on the house letting crisis in the city should condider the effects of this grading, and more importantly the vastly varying quality of the housing stock in terms of "desirability", given that inter-war dwellings take up almost half the total public rented stock in the city today.

CHAPTER II

THE POST-WAR ERA - HOUSING POLICY, DISPERSAL, INDUSTRIAL CONTRACTION AND THE PERIPHERAL ESTATES IN GLASGOW.

Introduction

The period 1945 - 1960 is pertinent to the detailed discussions on the causes of and solutions to the problems confronting us in the peripheral estates today. It is during this period that "planning" in both its "town" and "regional" senses begins to influence housing policy. We have already shown that the approaches taken to Glasgow's housing problems between 1860 and 1939 were ineffectual and produced in spatial terms two sides of local authority housing - the "desirable" and the "undesirable" property, a problem which still has repercussions today in terms of choice between house-types in the overall stock (i.e. including the private sector).

At the end of the war, however, there was a general feeling of relief followed by a euphoria, rising expectations and a growth in employment. However, the task which lay ahead of central and local government particularly in relation to Glasgow and the Clyde Valley was probably underestimated, and it can be argued that this has lead to certain latent contradictions appearing in spatial terms e.g. in empty council houses built in the post war era on theperiphery of the city and a high incidence of unemployment and "deprivation" in these areas.

1. Housing Policies 1943 - 1960

In what ways have Scottish Office and Glasgow Corporation housing policies contributed to the construction of the peripheral estates in the form that they took? To answer this question, one must look not simply at broad policy decisions relating to density and provision of amenities but also to the minutiae of standards of internal construction, design and layout. We need particulars to look at housing allocation policies for reasons which will become apparent, and to ask basic questions about the prevalent assumptions relating to choice and finance.

(a) Housing Policy Goals

Early attempts to foster a "comprehensive" approach to housing stressed the need for community planning and rationalisation of new build according to the location of industry e.g. distance from workplace, and the idea of expanded and new towns(Scottish Housing Advisory Committee, 1943). Later follow-up reports stressed the form that the new-build should take(e.g. SHAC, 1944).

The latter document took particular account of the probable strategy for towns and cities, and whilst conceding that the cottage development was the most popular housetype in Scotland, tenement construction was a more attractive proposition, for in the short-run it would overcome the chronic problems associated with bomb-damanged property and the lost building years. But the committee stressed the need for communal facilities and the infil of the large amount of space around tenement blocks. They suggested that housing departments appoint resident caretakers to maintain the property, and provide communal gardens which could be maintained by the local authority. The committee was wary of the possibility of cutbacks in internal standards such as that of sound insulation.

But the major impetus for such development was probably the question of costs. It was becoming clear that the entire building industry needed reviewed:-

> We...hope that the most energetic examination of the whole question of building costs will be undertaken so that the full standards which we have formulated may be attained at the earliest possible dates (SHAC, 1944: 69)

Alas no proper examination ever appeared, and despite the building boom of the 1950s, the costs of completing an average family house have soared, resulting often in a lowering of standards. Just as now, the building industry in Britain then, was subject to the vagaries of imperfect market knowledge resulting in shortages of crucial materials; an uncertain labour force experiencing cyclical and seasonal unemployment, who then went back into more predictable labout market situations, so creating a shortage of labour at crucial times and the problems associated with a damp climate. So what were the stumbling blocks to the achievement of these ideas? To answer that one must look at the wider regional planning context between 1945 and 1959.

- (b) Regional Policy and Municipal Ideology.
- (i) Conflict between Planners

Within the context of an overall regional strategy to employment and housing, the genesis of a two-pronged strategy of population dispersal was implemented. In relation to this two documents stand out: viz;


- 1. The Corporation of Glasgow First Planning Report (The Bruce Plan) 1945, and
- 2. The Clyde Valley Plan (Abercrombie Plan) 1946.

By 1943, the Secretary of State, Thomas Johnston had set up the Clyde Valley Planning Advisory Committee ¹¹. The brief: to set up a comprehensive plan for the region. Two leading planners of the day Patrick Abercrombie and the architect, Robert Matthew were given the task of preparing the plan. Abercrombie wanted Glasgow to be re-developed at net densities of:-

Central Zone Intermediate Outer Zone]	90	persons persons persons	per	acre	
	(see	map	1)					

However, despite the fact that Abercrombie had based these projected densities on figures supplied by Robert Bruce, the City Engineer and Master of Works, they disagreed on the amount of land to be made available to realise these densities. Bruce in his plan had assumed that the city would be built to its limits, taking up a large amount of what Abercrombie wished designated as "greenbelt". According to Abercrombie, the greenbelt was necessary for two reasons. First, to preserve good agricultural land, and second to prevent "urban sprawl" i.e. the amalgamation of towns in the Clyde Valley. He believed that Glasgow was too large, and outlined an appropriate greenbelt.

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This meant that there would only be room for 750,000 people within the city. In order to achieve net residential densities no higher than 120 per acre in the central area, it was argued that some half million people would have to be displaced to beyond the city boundaries, and the greenbelt.

Meanwhile Bruce argued that these people could be dispersed to the outer zone but still at a density of 60 per acre, but this would not be possible if the green belt philosophy were applied. In addition, ^Bruce favoured the continued construction of tenements on the grounds that communal open space and room for roads was a necessary condition for effective planning.

> 12"Density" and "Houses , versus Flats" both meet on the common ground of "allocation of open space about buildings....". The smaller area per dwelling required for flats and likewise the smaller road requirements, result in their being, for a given number of persons per acre, a higher proportion of open space available when flats are built instead of houses. Thus, "building up" secures a more open lay-out and more compact servicing. (Glasgow Corporation, 1945: 56)

Elsewhere in his report, Burce argues a case for the infill of all this vacant land, which never materialised. He did, however, in this report add fuel to the notion that tenemental development was "good for the people of Glasgow" who had always been used to living in tenements:-

>Any proposal to plan on the basis of 'no more tenements' would utterly fail to cater for the class of people who would always choose a good tenement dwelling to a house with a garden. Such a basis of planning would have further weaknesses. It would assuredly hinder the rate at which dwellings could be provided at a time when a house famine exists(Glasgow Corporation, 1945: 57)

Bruce's assumptions and the publications of the Director of Housing (^Bradbury, 1948) found eager audience in local MPs and Councillors, who, between the late 40s and early 50s found their most common source of complaint from constituents to be unsatisfactory housing. Bruce's argument that it was above all cheap was perhaps the most convincing. A recent Labour Party publication sums up the problem of pressure for new houses in Glasgow at this time:-

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Some of the houses produced were not beautiful. But beauty was considered a luxury be a family living in one room. Only those who lived close to the problem can understand the immense strains which overcrowding placed on individuals and families. (GDC Labour Group - Housing Discussion Document III; 1978: Preface).

However, despite the apparent favouring of regional planning ideas such as the creation of new towns, which did come about despite conflict with Glasgow Corporation after the designation of East Kilbride, many of the equally important tenerts, relating to community planning within the city boundary put forward in the Clyde Valley Planwere almost totally ignored by the Corporation. A reading of that section of the Plan reveals a surprisingly modern approach to the construction of peripheral estates. Such planning tenets, were put forward as the separation of fast-moving traffic from local traffic; recommendations of gross densities of 30 to the acre; housing to take the form of a balance between flats and cottages; flats to be sited adjacent to open spaces; park and school playing facilities to be associated with one another in open space systems; old peoples' houses to be near shops and main parks, and the importance of a township centre in the phasing of the development. As early as 1944 in the consultants' interim report in central - local housing terms criticisms had been levelled at the SSHA for failing to take the initiative to encourage local authorities. By 1946. the consultants were being critical of some of the sites picked by local authorities, in particular the notion that the schemes proposed did not appear to be integrated with existing developments i.e. villages. This was particularly true of Drumchapel for example. Another source of worry was the lack of obvious signs of the integration of various community facilities; carefully considered layout or landscaping.

Yet despite these warnings and an attempt to suspend development of areas such as Garscadden, Castlemilk and Toryglen, until longterm regional plans had been prepared, the Corporation went ahead. Why? Apart from the arguments of Bruce, other factors were relevant. In terms of scale of building and public rented tenure, local councillors were influential. In terms of the planning and maintenance of the estates, responsibility rested with the Housing Department.

(ii) Private Development versus Public Ownership.

The consequence of failing to promote wider tenure choice particularly owner occupation for the wealthier sections of the working class before and after 1945 created two problems. First, it tended to force out of the city boundaries those who aspired to owner occupation, and second, those who could have afforded to buy a house were often subsidised in the form of low rents, which historically weakened the generation of revenue to finance better council house building for the poor, and also ensured that the "least deserving" had to wait longer than necessary for a new house.

We must look at the ideological reasons for building such vast numbers of council houses. There are two "ideal" possibilities:-

- 1. Political Empire Building i.e. vote-catching. In the same way that Harold Macmillan encouraged a "numbers" game to assure a national Conservative majority in the 50s, a similar model may be applied to local Labour Councillors in Glasgow. By building new estates on the periphery especially for the traditional Labour vote, the Party could ensure concentrations of "safe" seats and so help the Corporation Labour Party to maintain overall control of the city.
- 2. Socialist Ideology. This explanation entails the idea that renting from the local authority was truly a "socialist" alternative to the uncertainties and inequalities associated with private renting and owner occupation, both being synonymous with "private property". The explanation implies a sense of social justice as the dominant rationale.

No real evidence is available to support either of these theories, with both major political parties anxious to discredit the other in manifestos and publications and to offer platitudes for past misdeeds. One should keep an open mind therefore on this issue. It seems likely that there is truth in both explanations. There can be no denying for example, that the Labour Party ignored the possibility that some sections of theworking class could have benefitted from owner occupation, which may well have reduced the size of the problem. Unfortunately, it seems that the ideology of council housing as a "good thing" blinded party members to the long term problems associated with a declining economy and an unacceptable lack of community facilities. In addition, they failed to realise that the more borrowing required to build more council houses, the greater the loan debt repayments for the city as a whole and therefore the greater the rates burden without any appreciable raising of living standards through the provision of services and facilities.

Equally however, the reputation and tradition for radicalism on the part of the Labour Party on Clydeside (e.g. Middlemas, 1965), may well have been best exemplified by the desire to replace capitalism with a socialist alternative, but it may also have been the case that the idealists failed to appreciate the difficulties associated with finance and the possibility that the economy would decline. It is probably true that no-one on Clydeside believed that shipbuilding would collapse until it actually happened in the early 1960s (e.g. Alexander and Jenkins, 1970: 13).

However, a further twist is that despite the proclamations of equality through council house building, there were sufficient contraditions within the Labour Party to render the concept hypocritical. Damer's (1974: 227) encounters with councillors show this, as does the recent house-letting scandal (e.g. <u>Glasgow</u> <u>Evening Times</u>, March 15, 1979: 5) which first hit the headlines just over a year ago and is still a subject of much controversy. All this has seriously undermined the integrity of the councillors and caused embarrassment within the Labour Party. 25.

(c) The Decision to Build.

Abercrombie meanwhile recommended the construction of four self-contained new towns, the remaining towns to mop up the surplus population being designated "expanded" or receptor towns. At the discussion table of the CVPA Glasgow on the advice of Bruce and perhaps through fear of losing status as the "second city of the empire" in terms of population, opposed the notion of overspill and greenbelt. However, the Scottish Office favoured new town development, and despite Glasgow's decision to take the designation of East Kilbride to a public enquiry in 1947 the political tide had turned nationally to approving the New Towns Act of 1946, and the setting up of new town development corporations.

However, Abercrombie's plans to build the other three towns were thwarted by a cutback in expenditure following the dollar crisis in 1949. By 1951 a Conservative government was re-elected pledged to outbid the Labour Party in terms of the numbers of new council houses to be built (e.g. Headey, 1978: 146-149). At the same time, it was decided as a matter of principle not to build any more new towns in Scotland under the 1946 act, however, in Glasgow, changing attitudes were in the air, as pressure built up to build more and more houses on the "sacred cow" of the greenbelt. It was further argued that the policy of building prefabricated houses at low density was wasteful of urban land - this despite the fact that it was SHAC who recommended their construction in the first place. Finally, it became obvious that the only alternative was to build upwards as Bruce had recommended, but at this time, the financial constraints prevented the widespread construction of multi-storey flats (i.e. over 6 storeys in height). Indeed, it was not until 1956 that a special subsidy was granted for buildings over 6 storeys in height.

It became obvious that the only form of construction within the city which suited the density requirements and suited the city's finances and the subsidy regulations under the 1946-62 Housing Acts was the tenement - built at 3 and sometimes 4 storeys on the only available land left in the outer zone. ¹³ This is not to suggest that there was no vacant land in or around the housing left available for community and play facilities. It is true that there are large tracts of land owned by the District Council and it true that around 80% of the land where a typical tenement block is built and is designated either "private garden" or "communal" drying/open space. The method by which such housing could be rapidly constructed could only be achieved by reducing standards such as lowering ceiling heights, cutting back on insulation, and reducing the overall floor-space, (See Ministry of Health, 1956: 7-20) and this was exactly the mehtod employed by the Ministry of Housing to increase the numbers of council houses built, (e.g. Brittan, 1964: 328). It may be argued that this was done purely to placate the electorate, particularly in the older industrial areas where the problems of overcrowding and disease were still very much apparent.

The actual construction of the peripheral estates was staggered over the period 1948 to 1975 (excluding Darnley). The major estates were built between the following periods: Drumchapel: November 1953 to May 1961; Castlemilk: January 1955 to September 1975 and Easterhouse: October 1956 to September 1974. The most notorious "pockets of deprivation" schemes were built as follows: Garthamlock: February 1954 to January 1963; Nitshill: February 1960 to January 1962 and Priesthill: March 1948 to August 1972. The decision to build having been taken, at least from a policy point of view, the scene switched to town planning in the core area of the city.

The tide towards town planning began to turn when architect/planner A. G. Jury was appointed to head the new department of Planning and Architecture in Glasgow. It was the planning section of this department in particular which set up and put into action the principle of the Comprehensive Development Area in the city, as outlined in the Development Plan Review in 1960 and it is true that in a bid to sensitively renew the inner city, most of the planning and architectural effort went into this aspect of the redispersal philosophy. As such, the planners had little to do with the design of the peripheral estates. In fact, the actual layout of the schemes rested with a handful of architects in the architecture side of the department. The actual financial responsibility and the allocation mechanism for the peripheral estates rested almost entirely with the housing management department and the Administration and Legal Offices as it does today. Thus, "planning" in its town planning sense concentrated on urban

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renewal rather than with the serious issue of planning on the periphery of a city in new communities - a paradox which is still with us today, with planners only just beginning to take an interest in these areas and recently shown in the production of the city-wide housing plan and the peripheral estates report.

Just at that time Glasgow once more opened up negotiations with the CVPA, and it was accepted that Abercrombie's model was the only realistic compromise given the Scottish Office's determination to stick to the green belt philosophy. Subsequently it was decided to construct another new town at Cumbernauld specifically to cream off the excess population in the city and to forge links with receptor towns to take on overspill.

2. The Post-War Economy and Regional Policy 1960-1979

Despite the fact that during the period following the war, local industries kept apace of technological change (e.g. Slaven, 1975: Ch9) and that unemployment in West Central Scotland remained constantly low by present day standards - an average of 3.5% between 1947 and 1957 - by the late 1950s there were signs that Clydeside, and indeed the British economy as a whole was less productive in terms of Gross National Product than competitors with similar industrial bases. In the Glasgow area in particular the following problems emerged:-

- 1. Certain industries, particularly shipbuilding, marine engineering and allied industries began to experience a collapse in output,
- 2. Lack of new industries coming to West Central Scotland, and Glasgow in particular.
- 3. Such industry as was left, particularly in the east end of the city tended not to wish to move out of congested area possibly because of low rent and rates in old sites.

With the switch in national economic policy away from the full employment/stop-go approach to controlling economic growth, by fiscal and monetary measures in the late 50s to a policy of growth through productivity, Glasgow was one of least able cities in Britain to respond. Glasgow, it may be recalled, historically had a labour-intensive, specialised economy which was particularly susseptible to major economic swings and depressions, but whereas the war economy had revitalised it and there had for a time been a demand for such work, there came a point where these industries and government were unable to redress the above problems.

Cameron (1973) however, argues that the "structural" explanation alone is insufficient to explain the decline of the economy. He suggests that the historical problems of lack of job security, low incomes and limited job opportunities have helped force the economically active to seek a better overall deal elsewhere. He argues that this will leave those least able to form new companies in the city, and this will lead to stagnation of ideas, managerial ability and effective investment. Secondly, there seems to be little new investment on Clydeside from migrant industry, and third, labour costs are relatively high in relation to productivity. 29.

Of these three explanations, the first and second are certainly valid. The third however, would appear to be a product of the first, i.e. the overall feeling that it is low wages, and therefore less demand for goods and services, for example in terms of low carownership, which forces workers to demand compensation in the form of higher wages. Secondly, there is no real explanation in the analysis of the relationship between man efficiency and technology. How do you go about separating poor investment in tool technology from "unwillingness to work" and/or tradition of work discipline (e.g. Roy, 1955; Braverman, 1975). A major factor may be the notion that, in the past, when Clydeside was an extremely productive area, especially in wartime, that the proper rewards such as higher wages should have been granted as a form of incentive if only to compensate for the housing market paradox outlined earlier.

Research into the structural problems is plentiful (e.g. Toothill 1961, McCrone, 1965, Kaldor, 1970, West Central Scotland Plan, 1974), though not so the question of out-migration, especially from peripheral estates. Smith and Farmer (1975) have however, shown on a general level that overspill and out-migration has resulted in an imbalance in the age structure of Glasgow and also the proportions of certain socio-economic groups. They noted, for example, from an analysis of the 1966 sample census and the 1971 census, that a disproportionate number of the economically active age-group between 15 and 44 moved out of the city i.e. 57.9% as opposed to 43.3% for the city as a whole in 1966 and 37.9% in 1971. Taking the analysis one stage further, they showed that in socio-economic band one (i.e. employers, managers of large companies and professionals) 20% were out-migrants between 1961 and 1966 compared to only 8% in the adult male population in Glasgow in 1966. Most of these individuals appear to have moved to the suburbs rather than the new towns since only 3% of that group had moved to new towns between 1959 and 1971. However, it appears that those in band two (i.e. foremen, supervisors and skilled manual workers) were by far the biggest overspill migrants (52% between 1959 and 1971). This undoubtedly left many more unskilled people in the city since the numbers moving out from that group remained consistent with the numbers who stayed.

In addition, housing management figures show that between December 1959 and December 1977, 10,000 nominated Glasgow families migrated to Cumbernauld; 6,700 moved to East Kilbride; 14 Linwood received 2,453; Johnstone; 1,769; Erskine; 1,430; Livingston: 1,382 and Irvine: 976. It is a plausible argument to suggest that new town development corporations tended to rake off the most active, skilled and professional sections of the population - particularly skilled manual workers. That this was a deliberate policy can be deduced from the fact that these areas received roughly double the number of nominees than those who were accepted. Why? Was it simply through the requirements of migrant industry, or was there an attempt to ensure that the "undeserving" poor were excluded from the new town, which historically has been associated with the notion of a utopia (e.g. Cherry, 1970: 9-19) i.e. "a clean break" from the city form which was seen to bring out the worst side of human nature.

Even if this was not the case, Glasgow city had the additional headache of actually helping to finance the moves of the accepted nominees by paying a subsidy for each family rehoused in the receptor towns. Meanwhile, the new town development corporations had finance and manpower to help attract new industry, which in theory might have moved to Glasgow had the city possessed the finance and the expertise, as wellas suitable industrial sites.

There can be no denying that there is a feeling within Glasgow District and Strathclyde Region that there has been an imbalance in population movement particularly in relation to employment (Strathclyde Regional Council, 1977b: 13-27). Accordingly it has been suggested that future development of new towns be cut back.

Summary

Despite the optimism of Scottish housing policy advisors in the early 1940s, the problems associated with overcrowding and rising expectations put great pressure on local authorities to provide new housing on an unprecedented scale. In Glasgow, the combination of central directives to cut standards and build cheaply were encouraged by local political ideology. Unfortunately, the massive construction of tenements on the periphery was not backed up by the promised service and community facility provision, and it was made worse by the exclusion of town planners and leisure and recreation departments such as parks. The housing department was left with too much to do without the expertise and finance to carry out the job.

Despite early attempts by regional planners to deal with such problems by forseeing the paramount importance of preplanning in such estates, the impasse was compounded by the contraction of the local economy, which the regional planners had been trying to improve by redispersal beyond the greenbelt. Unfortunately, the success story of the new towns has helped create population imbalance within the manual sections of the working class in the city although this is probably more a function of demands for labour and selection proceedures than of the planning objectives.

Chapter One

- 1. The term is, however problematical particularly in Glasgow, where renting a home has been a long-standing tradition. One cannot ascertain, satisfactorily whether or not the desire to become a home owner is a function of dissatisfaction within the range of choice in the public sector stock or whether it represents a definite change in tenure aspiration.
- 2. In particular the work of Max Weber: Weber, 1949; Gerth and Mills, 1946.
- 3. The term is not satisfactorily defined in the work, but it seems to refer to the Weberian "ideal" situation, where the wealth procured by businessmen eventually filters down to the labouring classes.
- 4. The City Improvement Trust passed through a number of stages: City Improvement Department (1916); City Improvement Department (1919) - Factors/Housing Department - land acquisition, design, layout, building supervision and maintenance. The City Improvements Department became known as the City Factor's Department responsible for letting and transfers. This was the case until 1953 when a reorganisation of all the major departments in the Corporation took place. Subsequently, a new planning and architecture department was set up, with the two former housing departments merging to become essentially factors who also carried out Maintenance and repairs and called the Housing Management Department, the form today. Recently an Environmental Reviltalisation/Community Development section has been added.
- 5. The biggest building booms were in the 1870s, with a depression setting in after 1878. In the early 1890s construction picked up again, sinking once more in the latter half of the decade, and finally booming again between 1901 and 1905.
- 6. E.g. Old Govan, Kinning Park, Anderston and Gorbals.
- 7. It was argued, evidence to the committee by John Wheatley, later Minister of Housing, that two thirds of any property in Glasgow was owned by "bondholders". Thus, they received two thirds of the total rent of that property. The property owner, he argued, put the case forward, that since the bondholders had chosen to increase the rate of interest, that the landlord had to increase the rent accordingly to maintain his present standard of living.
- 8. The ambiguity arises over the distinction between "gross" and "net" density.
- 9. Under the 1923 and 1924 Acts subsidies were granted to private builders to build for sale. In addition, under the Chamberlain Act, local authorities were obliged to "prove" that they could build houses more cheaply than private enterprise before being granted permission to build for public renting.
- 10. Some workers may well have preferred not to move out to the suburbs simply because they felt they were "too far wway" from traditional tenement way of life, leisure pursuits and so on.

Chapter Two

- 11. Made up of representatives from the eighteen local authorities in the conurbation at that time.
- 12. Houses may be defined as single, semi-detached or terraced, while Flats implies housing in blocks rising several stories off the ground and in the traditional tenement form.
- 13. The exception being Milton, which is largely composed of two-storey terraced houses.
- 14. This in addition to a further 10,000 under separate agreements with individual families and those sucked in under the 1947 Act.

PART TWO - DECLINE

35.

INTRODUCTION

In this section, an attempt will be made to link latent historical problems outlined in Part One with issues which have cropped up over the period since the estates were first constructed. There will be a discussion on the "official" views of the problem of deprivation and a short critique of the use of census indicators. Some additional possibilities will be aired, with respect to housing policy in Strathclyde. An attempt will then be made to apply some of these notions to the development of a large peripheral estate in Glasgow. LATENT PROBLEMS, DEPRIVATION, REPUTATION AND DECLINE IN PERIPHERAL ESTATES IN GLADGOW.

1. Latent Problems

Figure I shows a typology of latent influences affecting the development of slum clearance estates and peripheral estates in Glasgow in particular.

FIGURE I LATENT INFLUENCES AFFECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SLUM CLEARANCE AND PERIPHERAL ESTATES IN GLABGOW: AN IDEAL TYPOLOGY.

Category of Problem		Component	Source of Problem	
1.	ECONOMIC/CENTRAL- LOCAL RELATIONS (STRUCUURAL)	** <u>1.</u> Impending decline of heavy manufacturing sector.	Plant obsolence/lack of ideas/decline in world markets for traditional products	
		* <u>2.</u> Financial weakness of local authority to raise funds to build to higher standards, provide social back-up services and community facilities.	Contradictions in local housing market/ neglect of property/ lack of owner occup- ation/borrowing on open market/central government political strategy.	
2.	IDEOLOGICAL (LOCAL GOVERNAENT LEVEL)	 <u>l.</u> Selective dispersal of Glasgow workforce on a regional basis according to position in the labour market. 2. Pushing of greenbelt princ- 	New Town Corporation Officials/Company demands for types of labour. Regional Planners'	
		iple at a time when demand for housing on the periphery reached all-time high.	Ideology in conflict with politicians desire to maintain	
		3. Lack of variation in	population levels. City Architects/Lack	
		dwellings.	of foresight by SHAC	
		*4. Lack of town planning in- put to setates	Planner shortage	
		5. Concentrations of 4 and 5	Housing Management ?	
		apartments in given clusters.	Planners? Architects? Councillors ("numbers game")	
		*6. Tradition of low-grade hous-	Housing Management/	
		ing for /"least deserving"	Councillors	
		* <u>7.</u> Lack of good factor/tenant relationship.	Housing Management - lack of professional- ism/Housing Management ""esponsibility over- load".	
		*8. Lack of tenure choice in city as a whole	City Councillors	

* Considered to be an important issue in the period 1860 - 1939.

** Near-collapse in period 1929 - 1935.

FIGURE IIA FIRST ORDER PROBLEMS IN THE CREATION OF SLUM CLEARANCE ESTATES; PARTICULARLY OF POST-WAR ESTATES ON PERIPHERY				
Category of Importance	Component	<u>Major Effect</u>	<u>Major Constraint(s)</u>	
1. STRUCTURAL	Fiscal ^W eakness	Poor quality of environment/ lack of commun- ity services & facilities	Central govt. housing policy/declining rates base.	
2. IDEOLOGICAL	High Child Density	Destruction of local environ- ment/demand for facilities	Fiscal Weakness	
		IN THE CREATION OF S DF POST-WAR ESTATES (Major Effect	ON PERIPHERY	
Importance	Component	Major Briect	Why Less Important	
1. STRUCTURAL	Impending econ- omic decline	Poverty	Does not set in immediately	
2. IDEOLOGICAL	Selective dispersal	Socio-economic inbalance	"Poaching" from peripheral estates some time after construction	
	Greenbelt philosophy	High Density promotion	More justifiable in terms of protecting agricultural land/ difficult site conditions/assumption that population would continue to grow and that economy would not decline	
	Architectural "bankruptcy"	Monotonous housing casuing mental depression/feeling of entrapment	Not important at point of entry/ architects did what they could under the circumstances of pressure and lack of money. (See Fig. IIa Structural)	
	Lack of town planning input	Imbalance between housing and other community inputs	Unavoidable - planner shortage at the time	
			/-	

FIGURE IIb - 2. IDEOLOGICAL/ CONTINUED

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ategory of <u>Component</u> mportance		<u>Major Effect</u>	Why Less Important	
	"Deserts" in housing allo- cation.	Pockets of "difficult" tenants	Less apparent than in 1930/35 slum clear- ance estates	
	Lack of good tenant/factor relations	Loss of faith in integrity of housing manage- ment	Not apparent until "crisis"/Easily dealt with - professional- isation	
	Lack of Tenure Choice	Construction of too many rented tenements at time when aspir- ations were rising	Tradition of renting - "demand" for owner occupation not necessarily equated with "embourgoisment"	

Having already identified major historical problems associated with the construction of the peripheral estates, these may be simplified into two categories viz;

- 1. Structural and
- 2. Ideological.

Both categories can be traced to specific institutions and interest groups. Structural problems refer to the local economy and to the physical state of the pre-1919 tenement housing stock. Ideological problems refer to the nature of the planning-related inputs concerned with provision and design of housing and of social services and community facilities; that is councillors; regional planners; housing advisors; housing managers; architects and town planners. Within each category there are component parts which make up the levels. Some are likely to be more important than others when it comes to explaining such notions as "deprivation" or "bad reputation".

Figure 1 shows how these categories and components are likely to come together. Note that this is something of an "ideal" type, again to use the Weberian notion as outlined earlier. It is suggested as a possible hypothesis upon which empirical research might be based, and should not be considered as "fact". It should be made clear that without empirical analysis, it is difficult to place relative weightings on each category or component. In addition, these categories and components are not always mutually exclusive. For example, it can be argued that a re-dispersal philosophy encouraged by regional planners forms part of a macroeconomic strategy and is in addition sanctioned by political heads of state. However, to push a "mosaid" theory of society is to fall into the same trap as the authors of the Peripheral Estates Report (see Chapter 4) or "giving up the ghost" by putting forward the notion that the problems are so difficult to separate from one another that stress will be placed on those most "easy to deal with" especially in the short term; the classic example being the issue of vandalism, as will be seen later.

Ideally, it should be possible to present the categories in terms of a hierarchy of influence. If "influence" is essentially derived from the ability of the State, i.e. central government, to re-direct employment

for example and to arbitrate over allocation of the "needs" element in the rate support grant to local authorities, then it can be argued that by far the most important category is the Structural. The Ideological, which includes the allocation of resources and services to specific parts of the local area by locally elected councillors, can be seen as a secondary source of power. Figure II shows the likely distinctions between first order problems and second order problems likely to appear from the two levels at later stages in the development of the peripheral estates. The obvious ommission in the typology is that of the values and aspirations of the tenants themselves. In later sections of this chapter, an attempt will be made to incorporate such an input, particularly with regard to the period between first tenancy and today.

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2. The Re-emergence of Urban Problems and Area-Based Approaches to Deprivation

Until about 10 years ago, the concepts "deprivation"; relative deprivation"; "urban deprivation" and "multiple deprivation" were largely unheard of. Until then academic research had concentrated on material poverty, for example on the historical creation of slums in the inner city. Central and local government pursued a policy of slum clearance, largely on the basis of alleviating overcrowding, on the assumption that living standards would continue to rise as growth continued and within the context of the welfare state. Indeed the belief that a profound change was taking place in British society was summed up by the interest shown by political scientists and some sociologists in the "embourgoisement" thesis¹. (e.g. Mayer, 1956; Merton, 1957; Butler and Rose, 1959).

Such illusions were shattered in the late sixties and early seventies by the publication of influential works such as "Poverty: The Forgotten Englishman" by Coates and Silburn. By that time, the enbourgoisement thesis had been discredited (e.g. Goldthorpe et al, 1969) and a new concept was born - "relative deprivation" (e.g. Runcimann, 1966) suggesting that "poverty" meant different things to different people. Jackson and Marsden (1966) in detailed studies examined the paths of "successful" working class children revealing new "informal" barriers to upward mobility which had replaced the formal barriers such as ability to pay grammar school fees.

Meanwhile, central government began to concentrate on the problems of the inner city, and the private rented sector in particular (e.g. Milner-Holland Report, 1965). But by 1967, emphasis began to move to different parts of the city - to "pockets of poverty" found often in inter-war council estates such as Ferguslie Park, Paisley², and two years later the Community Development Project was set up by the Home Office. This took the form of a series of case-studies of "deprived" areas, many of which were pre and post-war council estates usually carried out by academics with the aid of the local authority concerned. These studies co-incided with the publication of the Plowden Report in 1967 which recommended the setting up of Educational Priority Areas im a bid to give greater resources to children in deprived areas who appeared to be lagging in educational performance. Deficiencies in social service provision were highlighted by the Seebohm Report (1968)

and the idea of "positive discrimination" and combined social services departments aired. In 1969, the Scottish Housing Advisory Committee in a pamphlet entitled "Council House Communities: A Policy for Progress" highlighted serious social and physical problems in peripheral housing estates.

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Meanwhile, as the CDP's continued, the newly elected Conservative Government initiated in 1972 the Inner Area Studies in a bid to supply the "total" answer to the problem. It is not the intention of this chapter to examine the nature and outcome of these two sets of studies. This had already been done in some depth elsewhere (e.g. Lees and Smith, 1975; Flynn, 1977; Rodgers, 1977). Such studies should not, however be considered in isolation. They formed part of a whole series of central government attempts to bring depressed areas up to a more acceptable standard. In addition, during the early seventies there blossomed a host of independent studies recommending the need to further concentrate services in areas of disadvantage (e.g. Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1973; Shelter Neighbourhood Action Project, 1973; Wedge and Prosser, 1974). The studies should however be seen in the context of broader theories of poverty and deprivation being expounded between the mid-sixties and 1976 (see resume in Rodgers, 1977: Ch 1). In the British case, the most significant of these have been the "Cycle of Transmitted Deprivation" (Joseph, 1972); the "Institutional Malfunctioning" approach (e.g. SNAP, 1973); the "Lifetime Cycle of Poverty" thesis (e.g. Able-Smith and Townsend, 1965) and the Structuralist (conflict) view (e.g. Donnison, 1974). As a result of the outcome of the CDPs and of the growing Marxist influence in British universities a Structuralist (class conflict) view has assumed some prominence (e.g. Centre for Environmental Studies, 1977). In relation to area based approaches in planning this is significant since there has been a long-standing rift between Marxists and "traditional" town planners (e.g. Benevolo, 1967: 105-110).

In terms of the present planning approaches to urban deprivation (see below) the Marxist approach may have come too late to make any real impact, but it remains an open question as to whether or not local government officials and councillors would accept the basic ideas in any case and whether or not they have the power to respond to the demands made by the analysis.

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Since the publication of the 1971 census, local authorities have been largely left to their own devices to deal with deprivation in their area, and the various action-research partnership studies and theories may have had some influence, but their profundity may depend upon the numbers and positions of professionals exposed to these issues now working on deprivation strategies within local authorities.

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In Scotland, the reform of local government has permitted the larger regions to set up policy planning departments to help combine industrial strategy with deprivation strategy, although the "deprivation" side of the equation has a longer history of local government involvement, local authorities being largely in charge of physical problems such as housing and the provision of services and facilities; having less control over the location of industry and the creation of jobs in the manufacturing sector. In addition, more grants have been made available to the region to help alleviate the problem e.g. "urban aid". In terms of understanding the nature of and solutions to deprivation, one should examine the approaches taken by these local authorities and in particular to deprived housing estates.

3. Deprivation : Definitional and Methodological Problems

The area-management approach has been modelled on the institutional malfunctioning theory of deprivation. That is to say, what has been termed the "total" or comprehensive approach. The problem of deprivation is seen to be caused by a breakdown of communication between the institutions which provide the services and welfare benefits and the clients. This sort of approach has been encouraged by important cabinet ministers such as Roy Jenkins e.g. his "What Matters Now" (1973) and by among others the Morris Committee which reported in 1975 particularly in relation to depressed council estates that 3 elements were needed to deal with the problem namely: (1) Positive Discrimination meaning, for example giving some council estates a better refuse collection service at the expense of others; (2) A Comprehensive Approach meaning the bringing together of various central and local government service and welfare departments in closer administrative contact and (3)Community Participation, meaning that the locals should be given some say in the decisions taken in a given area.

It is hardly surprising therefore that this is indeed the "ideal type" that many local authorities are working on, and the model has been modified by different local authorities (see Rodgers, 1977: Ch 5; Hambleton, 1978: Part 3) it is not intended to analyse these but to go back to the origins and evolution of the notion of "deprivation".

There are considerable <u>definitional</u> flaws stemming from the offshoots of the single term "deprivation". Since the early 1970s "deprivation" has become an umbrella term to cover a multitude of social and economic problems. The "deprived" may be thought of as those who fall below some tolerable line of poverty, or those who lag so far behind in education for example that they must be given some sort of "compensation" in the form of better teaching aids, "remedial" teachers and so on. The major criticism of the term is that "material poverty" through unemployment and low pay appears to be confused with "disadvantage" which may be an offshoot of lack of effective teaching at particular points in a child's development or lack of parental encouragement. There is however some doubt as to the "diagnosis" of the disadvantage question (e.g. Bernstein, 1970; Keddie, 1973). 44.

The prevalence of low educational attainment usually measured in terms of percentage of children with no qualifications at schoolleaving age does not always stem from parental apathy or low intelligence, it may be a product of a rejection of educational values (e.g. Cicourel and Kitsuse, 1968; Hargreaves, Hestor and Mellor, 1975; Reynolds, 1976).

Since then, to make matters more confusing, two related concepts have been bred. These are "multiple deprivation" and "urban deprivation". Norris (1979) argues that "multiple deprivation" has come to be used to explain the origins of the term "deprivation". Multiple deprivation implies "clustering" of many individual deprivations such as "tolerable" level of single parent families; unemployment; educational attainment and so on. It appears that the clustering causes further deprivation, and the "cancer" spreads geographically, apparently giving rise to a spatial component. That a great deal of this occurs in areas with large populations has given rise to the term "urban deprivation". According to the Strathclyde Region's"Urban Deprivation" Report of 1976, there were 52 Areas for Priority Treatment in the city of Glasgow alone, most of which were dominated by local authority housing or a great deal of substandard pre-1919 tenement property. Such analysis has caused some researchers to ask whether or not council housing causes deprivation (e.g. Hollingsworth and Reynolds, 1975). It is argued here that certain types of council house development add a new dimension to the problem, but the fact remains that poverty is rooted essentially in the historical development of cities, and is still found in inner city areas. A major cause of poverty in council estates may be that many of those who moved from the slums of the inner city simply took their weak bargaining position with them. Council houses are buildings. ^Buildings cannot cause poverty. In many cases they have become the homes of the poorest sections of British society. It is when these areas and buildings start to decline physically, that the cumulative deprivation process begins to overtake maintenance.

Norris (1979) suggests that the starting point must be the question of inequality following the notion outlined earlier that the so-called age of affluence in the 50s and 60s was largely a myth. What appeared to happen during this period was a process

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of relative affluence. That is to say, as the economy was growing, there was an overall raising of the standards of living especially for the employed. However, this was not accompanied by any substantial shift in the distribution of income (Halsey, 1978). The absence of a feeling of unease over relatively poor areas can be explained by an "acceptable" level of empty houses in the estates and unemployment in the country as a whole and the relative degree of freedom from central government "cashlimits" enjoyed by local authorities, in the 1960s. The crunch comes when vacancy rates rise; unemployment levels begin to become "unacceptable" and when there are cutbacks on local government services which have become a way of life. Thus, relatively poor people become unable to compete in the free labour market since they are effectively debarred because of lack of employment generally (e.g. Atkinson, 1973; Norris, 1977). They become doubly disadvantaged by, for example, poor educational qualifications, rising bus fares, rents and food prices. They become increasingly entrapped in their home environment, and the problem is made worse by reductions in internal and external maintenance of housing estates due to fiscal weakness.

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The second major flaw in the area based deprivation approach is in terms of coming to a decision on who should benefit from positive descrimination. This brings us to ask two questions. First, how does one go about deciding what constitutes a "deprived" area, and the converse, "nondeprived" areas ? There are definite <u>methodological</u> problems here.

In particular, a major criticism is the use of statistics which may be unreliable and/or out of date. A great many of the indicators used to plot "areas of deprivation" in Strathclyde Region for example were based on the 1971 census. After 5 or 6 years the problem of tenant turnover, employment changes, age structure and so on may be such that thefigures are rendered useless (.cf. Brand, 1975; Edwards, 1975; Department of the Environment, 1975; Strathclyde Regional Council, 1976 a).

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As Edwards notes:-

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"The application of precise and detailed statistical techniques to such an ambiguous area is about as meaningful as using a micrometer to measure a marshmallow' (Edwards, 1975: 280).

In addition, there is a danger in assuming an areal approach to deprivation. It does not necessarily follow that since there is high unemployment in a given area e.g. Priesthill that everyone living in the scheme suffers from material poverty despite the rundown appearance of the external environment (e.g. <u>Glasgow Evening Times</u>, March 13 1979: 13). There are just as likely to be large numbers of economically active residents earning around the median national wage.

What happens to the poor who are "trapped" in "nondeprived" areas ? despite locating concentrations of the "needy" there is a danger of making too much of "pockets of poverty" and not enough of the notion that poverty is apparent <u>throughout</u> British society, and that it happens to be <u>more</u> apparent in blackspots such as Priesthill.

Indeed, this tends to be accentuated by a second methodological criticism, namely the use of a "package" of indicators to reinforce the pockets of poverty theory:-

In the context of the identification of material poverty, measures such as the proportions of unemployed men, single parent families, large families and old age pensioners in the population, are often used without any attempt to assess the relative contribution each measure makes to the overall incidence of material poverty. (Norris, 1979: 22).

This raises problems as to how one should deal with <u>major</u> problems while at the same time giving appropriate weight to <u>minor</u> problems. The indicator package is unable to help us effectively distinguish one from theother. It is easy to quantify malproportions of socio-economic groups in the population or to use the housing records to pinpoint dwelling size mismatch. It is another thing to use numbers to describe complex social relationships; case histories of families; cultural influences and the aspirations of the population - although this can be done to some degree by use of detailed sociological surveys.

In the form of research, considerable revision of purposes and methods of census indicators is urgently required. In addition, there is a need for more detailed studies of individual and family circumstances based on some form of "community studies" research. In this respect, a great deal has been done in areas which would not necessarily be classed as deprived (e.g. Frankenberg, 1966; Pahl, 1970) but so far there has been little detailed work on areas thought to be seriously multiply deprived or even to have a "reputation" of some sort. Although some solo efforts have been made to understand these areas (e.g. Armstrong and Wilson, 1971; Damer, 1974; Baldwin, 1975) there has been no real attempt at coordination between sociological research and central and local government attempts to understand and deal with deprivation.

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The most recent attempt at combining research based on census indicators has shown that:-

> Knowledge of the estates in the sample was not sufficient to describe...characteristics ...identified in the literature as contributors to estate problems. (Attenburrow, Murphy and Simms, 1978: 9)

Their analysis did, however confirm differences between "good" and "bad" estates as suggested to them by the localauthorities concerned, the main distinction being income, suggesting that where indicators are used, they may justify a limited use in <u>confirming</u> what is already common knowlegge. It is another matter to deduce policy formulation from them.

4. Decline as a Process : Council Housing in Strathclyde

Having criticised the concept of "deprivation" as a totally acceptable approach to problem estates, it is necessary to suggest some sort of alternative. Here, it is posited that "decline" might be a better term to use and that it is a <u>process</u> lasting over a considerable period of time, and varying according to peculiar circumstances stemming from latent historical problems.


Section five of this chapter represents an attempt to combine these latent historical problems, many of which were identified in Part One with the notion of decline in Easterhouse over a 23-year period.

First, however, some discussion is required of characteristics of potential estate tenants in the city of Glasgow, and their relationship with those who allocate tenancies - the housing managers. Unfortunately, only two published studies have recently been made of housing allocation in the Strathclyde Area, those of Damer (1974) and English (1979) the latter being in Paisley, the former in Glasgow. In addition, a study was carried out on movement from the Govan area to estates on the south side of the city by Brennan (1959). The only other literature of import refers to the question of the reputation of the city as a whole for drunkeness, crime and gang violence (e.g. McArthur and Kingsley Long, 1967; Chief Constable of Glasgow's Annual Report, 1968; Armstrong and Wilson, 1971). As we shall see, it becomes difficult to separate the two issues.

There can be no denying that there exists and has existed a problem of rising crime rate in the city as a whole in recent years particularly among juveniles under seventeen years of age (see Figure III). But the notion of "anti-social" behaviour goes back to the 1930s; particularly of the relationship between authority and sub-culture:-

> "....one of the accused emerged from the dancehall, drunk and shouting. When he was arrested his friend drew a bottle and threw it at the police. This was the signal for a general assault on the pôlice".

(Taken from the <u>Evening Citizen</u> 26th August 1935 and reprinted in McArthur and Kingsley Long, 1967).



Seen in this context, the "undesirable" was viewed as a public menace who showed contempt for the law as well as his fellow man. There is evidence to suggest that fellow tenants in areas of pre-1919 tenement property already with a bad reputation, felt that there was an "undesirable" faction in close proximity:-

>all Gorbals was buzzing with the news of the coming fight. The respectable element was delighted...the coming trouble would be settled on the Green, which meant that peaceable folk could keep away from it if they chose.

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(McArthur and Kingsley Long, 1967 : 119).

The same appears to have been true in the rehousing estates, where, as Damer notes, tenants within the scheme blamed others in another part of the scheme for "giving the place a bad name". Damer further notes that the question of "just deserts" was important in re-establishing the previous city-wide status divisions alluded to in Chapter one. When the Broomloan Road (Rehousing) Scheme was built, Govan councillors had apparently promised those in poor housing conditions in the area the pick of these houses regardless of their relative inferiority to the "cottage" and "flatted" developments. When it was discovered that the new houses would go to outsiders - and from the Gorbals area in particular, there was a feeling that the authorities had let them down. Damer goes on to suggest that BRS became labelled "wine alley" because of apparent drinking habits of the residents, especially women which amplified a local moral conviction in Govan. This geems a fairly satisfactory explanation when one considers that Govan housed a great many skilled and respectable workers, who up until the first world war had rarely challenged authority. In his 1974 paper, he does not deny that there exist "anti-social" neighbours. He simply tries to reveal a more objective picture of the origins and development of stigmatised council estates, and of the dangers of applying a label to an area.

Such an analysis leads us into a broader discussion on the question of understanding "stigmatised areas". Can we show that the process of filtering the "least deserving" into the "least desirable" houses in the city stock, which appears to have gone on in the 1920s and 30s has happened again in the context

of difficult-to-let post war peripheral estates ? If so, to what extent ? What are the other major factors involved ? Let us consider the notion of stigmatisation.

"Stigma" refers to the idea of a label attached to a person or persons who are seen to be in some way different from the mainstream of society e.g. "hippie"; "drop-out"; "homosexual" and in the case of Wine Alley, "anti-social tenants". In Easterhouse this deviant has been the "vandal" or "gang boy". Stigmatisation refers to the act of being labelled by some significant person or group such as teachers or the police, even the press and television (e.g. Cohen, 1967; Young, 1971) and may be further amplified by an acceptance of the judgements of these significant institutions in British society by those who do not necessarily witness the deviant act. The "stigmatised area" is the geographical area Gited as being the location of the problem i.e. where the vandals live or congregate. The labelling of the deviants becomes synonymous in the popular eye with the name of the place and this is likely to have the effect of causing those unfamiliar with the area to dodge it by refusing to take a house there by waiting longer under their present circumstances such as living with in-laws as English (1979) has pointed out. In other words, potential tenants exercise choice and make trade-offs.

English goes on to suggest that those most likely to move into Ferguslie Park were unable to make such trade-offs; in short they were the desperate. In addition he noted that housing managers gave the area status of "the estate with the shortest waiting time period". This situation, he argues tends to concentrate the unemployed, single parent and large families in one pocket. It is only at this point that we can then talk about deprivation being cumulative, with large numbers of unsupervised children eroding the physical environment for example and helping to make existing tenants consider moving to a "better area". Such tenants as move out, may well be the economically active who never before considered owner occupation or the private rented sector, simply leaving empty houses which become easy targets for children. Those who do move in are likely to be poor people with social problems. And so the process of decline goes on.

In the case of Ferguslie Park and Wine Alley, both estates were built as rehousing schemes under the 1930/35 acts. Brennan (1959) suggests, in a comparative study of rehoused families in Govan that a higher proportion of families from a "deviant" area

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were given the lowest grade council houses - some 18.5% compared to 10.5% for the rest of Govan (Brennan 1959 : 137). This was again reflected in the lower proportion of households who moved to the new "ordinary" rent estates in lollok. Damer and Madigan in a more recent study (1974) argue that tenants are still being graded, although the present rehousing staff deny that this is still the case today, arguing that a new approach has been introduced which removes the traditional notion of housing visitors, historically associated with "degredation ceremonies" such as house inspection.

5. Easterhouse


In this section some of the previous notions and those from Part One will be applied to Easterhouse a vast sprawling estate on the eastern periphery of Glasgow. The scheme is chosen because it displays the highest percentage of residents anxious to move out in any of the "big four" peripheral estates, as Table 4 shows:-

Table	4	Percentage	Share	of	Requests	for	Transfer	В у
		Area Offic	е					

gage share of requests %age of stock

Castlemilk	7.6	6.2
Drumchapel	9.6	6.7
Easterhouse	15.5	9.7
Pollok	9•4	7.5

(Source: Strathclyde Regional Council, 19785 : Table 6, Ch 8)



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At the last count (August 1978) there were 43,016 people living on the estate in 9,623 houses mostly in 3 storey tenement blocks of two basic designs arranged largely in the familiar rectangular layout with expansive backcourts, as in the older parts of the city. The major difference being that there is no sign of industry in the backcourts, and the front gardens tend to be more than ample. By 1970, 14 years after the scheme was officially opened, according to Graham Noble, a youth leader working on the Easterhouse Project³ there were:-

> No public toilets, no public washouse, no banks, no cinema, no theatre, no public dancehall, no government offices, no internal transport system, no community centre, no cafes or restaurants and no shopping centre. (Noble, 1970 : 328)

The one and only public bar w_{as} built on a small piece of land not owned by the Corporation⁴.

There were, approximately, 5,000 young people between the ages of 15 and 20; 10,000 children of school age and 6,000 under school age. In addition, there were problems associated with travel distance and busfares to shops, social security offices and the labour exchange for the Eastern part of the city. The few doctors' and dentists' surgeries were located at one end of the estate.

By 1976, according to the Strathclyde Urban Deprivation Report some changes had been made, notably the construction of a centre which included bars, a community centre, youth centre, post office and a much improved selection of shops. A housing management department office was built; a department of employment office, nursery schools, social work office and youth wings.

In addition, there were local initiatives such a police community involvement project, play groups, neighbourhood project and the Easterhouse project. At that time, plans were in preparation for more welfare offices and a health centre.

Before 1970, however, Easterhouse had already achieved what might be termed a "bad reputation", notably through gang conflict and vandalism. The situation was considered so serious that the Lord Provost's central committee commissioned a study into ways of fostering community development as a way of dealing with these two problems. A scheme was proposed to deal with both Easterhouse and a neighbouring estate, Barlanark. The main object was to "clean the place up" and channel the aggression of young people from both schemes

out of a gang conflict which was rife between the two schemes into "healthy competition" such as inter-community sport competitions, gardening competitions and school achievement records (Armstrong and Wilson, 1971 : 8). By late 1967 and early 1968, however, this approach was undone by media coverage of the apparent increase in crime statistics in Scotland as a whole, and in Glasgow in particular, and the issue of gang violence, carrying of offensive weapons and the injury of innocent victims was given a great deal of publicity by certain newspapers, notably the <u>Scottish Daily Express</u>. To make matters worse, Easterhouse became singled out as a particularly deviant area as a result of a BBC tv "24 Hours" report on July 1968 which showed among other things a "live" gang skirmish⁵.

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The question to be answered here is : Why did Easterhouse receive a reputation and how far does this reputation explain the lack of popularity interms of vacancy rates and requests for transfer out of the scheme ? And why certain parts of the estates in particular ?

It may be fruitful to examine the history of the estate from its inception in terms of our latent problems theory and the subsequent events of the 1960s.

It is now fairly well established that most new housing schemes go through a period of "optimism" (e.g. Wilson, 1963; Ravetz, 1971). In the case of Easterhouse we may hypothesise that the following conditions were likely to be favourable to the protection of the immediate local environment:-

- 1. Full employment at the time makes it relatively cheap for tenants to buy their own fences; plants, hedges and so on
- 2. Children actively take part in this "senstruction" process by helping the head of household or other neighbours
- 3. Proximity to open countryside means that city children spend a great deal of time "discovering" the countryside e.g. climbing trees, taking the dog for long walks, using open ground
- 4. Houses tend to be under-occupied, which makes population density lower at point of entry
- 5. General sense of euphoria at "getting a new house" engenders a sense of "pride" and a desire to "keep the place in order"

In time however, certain consequences of the latent problems are likely to appear. Depending on the demographic, social and economic characteristics of the tenants in any given street or block of houses, the physical deterioration of the area will be more or less hastened by the severity of such factors. A main problem here is the question of time. At what point can we say "this street has undergone a process of decline"?

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i.e. When do we know a street to decline from its "ideal" optimistic state? This would entair a fairly detailed sociological survey of the tenants who have been living in the street for some considerable time. Unfortunately there has been little detailed research on this. Again, we hypothesise drawing on Bart Once that the problems will not appear until a few years after the first tenants have moved in, and that it is a combination of factors which seem to surface simultaneously.

In the case of Easterhouse, the following factors seem to be of importance:

(a) Poverty and Unemployment.

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There can be no doubt that poverty and unemployment have hit all peripheral housing estates very hard. There are increasing numbers of people being thrown out of work, particularly among those nearing retirement who can no longer find work, and those young people who have never experienced the psychological boost of receiving a wage and who must live with their parents on supplementary benefit. This is likely to have the effect of a feeling of helplessness in the community as a whole, which, in terms of the physical environment may prompt the feeling that the State and the "^Corporation" owes them nothing, and are contemptuous of the property which represents them.


(b) Fiscal Weakness.

By the time the estate was completed, the costs of repaying loan debt and maintaining older estates sapped the housing department's resources in providing facilities and proper maintenance. Other departments appear to have been in a similar situation, or were unwilling or unable to transfer resources (see figure IV).

(c) Large Child Population.

At the time of construction, the scene was already set for the possibility of a higher than average child population to appear on the peripheral estates (e.g. Smith, 1974). This was manifested in the numbers of 4 and 5 apartment houses in certain parts of the estates or in certain streets (see Table 5b). There is certainly a correlation between estates which have a high proportion of 4 apartments to 3 apartments, and those which are considered to have the worst problems, particularly Priesthill,

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Gathamlock, Lochend and Cleddans (see Strathclyde ^Regional Council 1977c). In addition, there is a problem common to most of the estates in the large proportion of 3 apartments to 1s and 2s. It is suggested that this problem did not immediately rise to the surface because of the 5 points representing the "optimistic" phase. However, it is posited that the following problems occurred after a few years:-

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- (i) Over a period of say 5 years, the housing situation may well have changed from one of under occupation in anticipation by housing management of expanding families to one of "overcrowding"⁷ leading to abnormally high numbers of children in an area already with densities beyond what the city's planners might have considered, "acceptable".
- (ii) The novelty of "construction" and discovering the countryside had probably worn off, particularly for the children who were getting older⁸. These children, along with their younger brothers and sisters, probably played a great deal in and around the housing areas, and by sheer weight of numbers were likely to destroy, deliberately or unintentionally fences, grass, hedges and to bring in junk and rubble as substitutes for some sort of organised play activity.
- (iii) Provision of varied facilities to suit children of all age groups and especially adolescents, <u>particularly in Easterhouse</u> did not appear for some considerable time, making the situation ripe for the unceasing destruction of the local environment and in a situation where there were large numbers of adolescents in given streets or blocks, the possibility of the formation of "young teams" or gangs of boys as well as girls was greatly enhanced.

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Estate	Total Stock		Apts) Percentage		Ap ts) Pe rcentage
Castlemilk	9,712	6,301	64 . 8 8	1,787	18.40
Drumchapel	9,050	5,724	62,90	2,150	25.81
Easterhouse	9,623	7,173	69.45	1,271	12.67

by Percentage of Estate Stock.

Distribution of 3 and 4 Apartment tenement schemes

TABLE 5b

TABLE 5a

Distribution of 3 and 4 Apartment tenement schemes by Percentage of Estate Stock : Specific Sub-scheme characteristics.

Sub-Scheme Total		(3 Apts) <u>Number Percentage</u>		(4 Apts) Number Percentage	
DRUECHAPEL Cleddans Pinewood	1,021 1,372	630 1 , 092	61 .7 0 79 . 59	341 65	33.40 4.74
EASTERHOUSE Lochend Bishoploch	1,170 977	906 754	74.44 77.18	240 57	20.51 5.83
Garthamlock	1,657	7 98	47.62	564	34.04
Priesthill*	2,164	326	15.06	754	34.84

*Priesthill has by far the highest proportion of 4 apartments of any of the peripheral estatés. Apart from the tenements shown above, there is a considerable proportion in mid-terraced houses. There are also 200 end-terraced 5 apartments. The sum total of 4 and 5 apartment houses in Priesthill takes up 79.37% of the stock.

(Source : Adapted from Glasgow District Housing Management Dept. Records)

(d) Socio-Economic Imbalance

From its very inception, there was no attempt to allocate tenancies to "professional" people such as teachers, largely because of the nature of the house letting rules at the time. Indeed it is still the case today that single people under the age of twenty-five are not eligible for council housing in ^Glasgow, thus ruling out young professionals who might have considered setting up home in the estate. In addition, in the late 1950s and early 60s the housing market in Glasgow was such that young professionals by virtue of their superior bargaining position in the labour market could afford to purchase a good quality tenement flat in a prestigious location e.g. Hyndland or Shawlands. The main problem here is that because of a lack of "leaders" who could more closely monitor for example a decline in educational standards or help organise protests to the ^Corporation to improve services, that inactivity or apathy would set into the estate.

(e) Loss of Working Class "Pioneers"

Easterhouse has often been referred to by locals and others as the "Ponderosa"⁹ presumably because of the distance to be travelled to "civilisation" (in this case Parkhead or the city centre). Similarly, the early tenants were "pioneers" who set up home and built fences and so on. Many, however were probably lured away to areas where job prospects were better, so creating a space to be filled by those unfamiliar with the early days. Such new tenants may already have heard of its reputation, whatever it consisted of, and the view taken that since it was "only a council house" in an area which was showing no visible sign of improvement, that "it was not worth the effort" to look after the environment.

(f) Blocked Mobility

For a period of about five years (1965-70) Easterhouse was singled out as an area which was "difficult-to-get-out-of". Once most of the houses had been allocated, and as disillusionment with service provision, bus services and poor maintenance¹⁰ set in, the number of transfer requests for older, more desirable areas with non-tenemental house types, and for areas where elderly relatives were located increased. It is common knowledge among tenants in Easterhouse that one can wait up to thirty years before qualifying for a house in a more desirable area. The question of choice is therefore important. Perhaps the first movers were reluctant to go in the first place but accepted the offer for a variety of reasons¹¹.

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Blocked aspirations in terms of the tradition of renting were compounded when the private rented sector was no longer able to offer anyalternative. The question of owner occupation has been a non-starter in the minds of many tenants in Glasgow. for it requires dealing with professionals who are "different" In this respect, there seems to be an inferiority complex - a fear of filling forms and trying to be polite to those who are "educated". Perhaps more importantly, there is the fear of long term financial risks especially for workers employed in industries which we prone to seasonal or cyclical redundancy and lay-offs such as shipbuilding, construction and car manufacture. Such blocked aspirations and the perplexities of figuring out a way round the problem may have led to apathy and a feeling of hopelessness.

(g) Dissaffected Tenants, Vandalism and Gang Violence

It has already been noted that "anti-social tenants", vandalism and gang violence have been cited as "bogey men" in the debate, but in view of the above issues, one cannot conclusively say that it is the root of the problem. It is yet another input which happens to be more visible or audible than say blocked mobility. Nevertheless, it is another part of the problem and will have to be dealt with. But in order to deal with it, one has to understand its causes, and not rush at it by re-introducing punitive measures, particularly in Easterhouse which has been neglected in terms of the provision of meaningful pastimes for children and adolescents. Similarly, one must ask "Who are the anti-social tenants"? Does it necessarily follow that it is their children who are the vandals and gang boys ? Does "anti-social" simply mean noisy? In that case, the cutting back on internal standards has probably accentuated this.



PLATE 7: One of the "better" parts of Easterhouse. Note the full occupancy of the houses. There is a dentist's surgery to the left, and nearby a public bar and shops. Note children making use of natural play areas but lack of play apparatus provision means they bring in their own, damaging tree. In this case, they use a rope and a rubber tyre.



PLATE 8: Over-emphasis on football pitches reveals lack of ideas in sports' facility provision. Note contrasting use of space between housing and open space. 000

An ideal-typical casual theory of peripheral estate decline in Glasgow runs as follows:-

PERIOD 1 (t_1) 1945-55 is the phase of heavy demand for new housing. Despite a redisperal policy throughout the region, large scale construction of new tenaments takes place on the remaining available land within the city boundary. At this point there is little available resources or commitment to attempting community planning, but the <u>dependent variable</u> is FISCAL CONSTRAINT. A number of <u>independent variables</u> are however, below the surface. These are:

(i)	Ideological	 Single tenure despite the possibility that some tenants could have afforded to buy socio-economic imbalance due to non- allocation to higher non-manual income groups concentrations of large family houses in
(ii)	Cultural	 certain schemes A tradition of violence and public and domestic conflicts over e.g. relitious differentiation
(i ii)	Economic	- Temporary boom in a traditionally fluctuating local economy

PERIOD 2 (t_2) 1956-64 is the phase of optimism. This may be divided up into two sections. The first five years witness the allocation process which reveals an over-emphasis on manual-working class income groups as probable in t_1 ; there is as yet no significant growth in child population and the voilence and other anti-social behavious problems which existed in the old tenements becomes temporarily dislocated. In addition, there is still relative prosperity. In the second period, the optimism is showing signs of faltering as basic "comforts" fail to appear. Some of the early tenants move on to better pastures in the new towns for example; there is a growth in child population and gang slogans begin to appear on walls marking out "territories"; garden fences "disappear" in early November, as by now most of the nearby woods have been denuded; tenants "forget" to take their turn at washing the stair; stray dogs can be seen in almost every street and there are signs of growing unemployment.

PERIOD 3 (t_3) 1966-70 is the period of Poor Reputation. Three major independent variables now assume prominence in the context of the continuing problem of the dependent variable.

(i) Despite assurances that facilities such as a shopping centre will arrive, little happens; (ii) At the same time, children are growing up creating new demands for varied play facilities, and the first generation of children search for new diversions. As a result, the local environment becomes subject to greater wear and tear and partially as a result of (ii), there is a growth of a reputation for violence and crime amongst juveniles. These three combine to create two new variables:(i) Growth in requests for transfer out of certain parts of the schemes, which are far from shops, have no especial "character"; have been subject to severe wear and tear and "harbour" gang members.
(ii) As a result of the reputation of the scheme as a whole, requests for entry into the scheme are likely to drop off, with only the most desperate accepting an offer.

Meanwhile the dependent variable remains largely unchanged and a major problem appears in the housing market as a whole. There is little chance of movement out of the peripheral schemes to the most desirable areas. Those schemes with vacancies tend to be stigmatised inter-war rehousing tenement - which re-introduce another latent problem in terms of the desirability of the stock and past allocation policies. The result is that those who do not, at first, choose to move into owner occupation or the dwindling private rented sector or to such employment related housing elsewhere in the region, are forced to move <u>within</u> the scheme. This in turn created vacancies in streets already with a run-down appearance and a reputation.

PERIOD 4 (t_4) 1971-78 is the phase of spiralling decline. As more and more empty, unwanted houses become easy targets to vandalism, the desire by more to move out is excacerbated by rising maintenance costs in the contexts of inflation-hit local authorities. The problem of the dependent variable, has by this time been offset to some extent by the provision of long-awaited community facilities but these tend to be concentrated in certain parts of the scheme, according to zoning principles and the available sites. In addition, the distance to be travelled and relative impersonality of one large complex renders a certain degree of redundancy. The situation is compounded by growing poverty and unemployment which deepens the sense of hopelessness.






PLATE 9: Demolition in progress at Dunskaith Street, Rogerfield, Easterhouse. These houses had been severely difficult to let. Note that they were four-storey tenements suggesting higher density than normal for the scheme as a whole.



PLATE 10: Semi-detached council housing, Lochdochart Road, Rogerfield, Easterhouse. Note the tidy appearance of the local environment. These houses are only 200 yards away from the tenements being demolished shown in plate 9.



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PLATE 11: Deunuded woodland. These trees are close to one of the better schemes - Bishoploch, and may partially account for its relative "success". Lack of other play diversions has ruined a local beauty spot.



PLATE 12: Auchinlea Park, Easterhouse. The park contains a historic monument, and will have a nine-hole golfcourse and "action lands". It should benefit the two adjacent sub-schemes and also Garthamlock. But what of the perimiter sub-schemes which show the worst aspects of the estates' problems?

Summary

Chapter Three has been the major attempt to draw historical and contemporary strands of the peripheral estates issue together. Two major latent problems - allocation of houses to large families in clusters and fiscal weakness in providing community facilities - were identified on the basis of historical circumstance and an ideal-typology set up to explain their relative importance. This was followed by a critique of a historical explanations of deprivation in council estates. A process of decline theory was posited on the basis of historical and contemporary developments in Easterhouse, Glasgow and the following conclusion reached: That neglect of the two major latent problems had been largely responsible for the destruction of certain areas within the estate. This had been excacerbated by a violent tradition inherited from Glasgow's past, which led to the estate's bad reputation. This reputation probably partially negated potential new moves to the scheme as a whole, but the issue of blocked mobility within the estate forced tenants in over-used, vandalised areas to move to "better" areas within the estate. The physical problem was compounded by a backlog of maintenance, ineffective soundproofing, lack of social balance, poor tenant/management relations and structural unemployment.

Chapter Three

- 1. Briefly, the embourgoisement thesis posits that as a result of rising standards of living, many sections of the working class are beginning to take on "middle class attitudes" e.g. by voting Conservative, becoming involved in voluntary organisations, rejecting the notion of the "extended family" and so on.
- Indeed, judging by the numbers of Areas for Priority Treatment (APT) those which come highest on the list are often inner city areas or the older rehousing estates (see Strathclyde Regional Council, 1977c - Schedule 8).
- Set up in 1969, this was a voluntary project essentially supported by a £10,000 donation from a showbusiness personality (see Noble, 1970).
- 4. A municipal bye-law of 1895 prohibited the granting of licences on Corporation land. This particular piece of ground was owned by Gartloch Hospital but it is very close to shops and houses.
- 5. There is some argument as to whether or not the "fight" was staged and whether or not the "hooligans" were in fact paid to do it. However, this is not to deny that gangs existed.
- 6. Again it has been difficult to track down reliable records of disputes between departments. Corporation minutes of the time tell us very little, and most of the officials and councillors involved have retired, died or refused to discuss the matter.
- 7. Housing management are not always able to detect over-occupancy, doubling up of families and so on. They are dependant on periodic reviews of the waiting list and requests from tenants for bigger houses. They can, however, spot a situation where boys and girls who have been sharing a room reach the age where they require separate bedrooms and are therefore allocated bigger houses.
- 8. It was a housing department rule that a qualification for obtaining a house was to have at least one child of a certain age (usually 10). Thereafter, the number of children below that age was considered to be less important.
- 9. The "Ponderosa" was the name given to a vast ranch owned by the heroes of a fictitious Western television series popular with the residents in the 1960s. It was some considerable distance from the nearest town.
- 10. For example, there was considerable anger over the fact that closes, window-frames and verandahs were painted regularly in schemes near main roads which were visible to passing councillors and visitors, whereas hidden areas tended to be ignored.
- 11. For example, they might have been the only remaining tenants in the close fearing burst pipes, theft of lead and burglaries.

PART THREE - RE-PLANNING AND REVITALISATION

INTRODUCTION

This section brings us up to date on the current policy approaches to revitalisation of the peripheral estates by Glasgow District Council. Chapter Four consists of a precis of the policy documents followed by a critique of the theory and method behind the strategy. This is followed by an examination of the strategy in practice in a small peripheral scheme. Chapter Five attempts to draw the thesis together, and looks particularly at the implications of chapters Three and Four, concluding with some possible modifications of the strategy and lines of research emanating from this work.

CHAPTER IV

PERIPHERAL ESTATES : CURRENT POLICIES AT CITY DISTRICT LEVEL

Introduction

Housing Plans I and II for Glasgow District are the first attempts at city-wide housing planning in the largest urban concentration in Scotland, and are brave ventures given the "dog's breakfast" of housing finance (^Crossland, 1975) and the problems associated with widely differing housing management philosophies throughout the country (e.g. Seebohm, 1956; Cramond, 1964; Cullingworth, 1969; Bull, 1969; Norman, 1975; Corina, 1976). In addition to these problems, Glasgow has inherited large scale unemployment and deprivation making for a giant headache which will require sensitive solutions produced not simply by one or two departments, but by a whole gamut of official and political inputs, as well as that of an involvement by the consumers themselves, i.e. those directly affected by the proposed actions.

"Glasgow : Implications of Population Changes to 1983" is designed to complement Housing Plans I and II, and also the Structure Plan for Strathclyde, particularly in relation to population projections and their economic and social implications. The report accordingly concentrates upon the pressure points of high unemployment and deprivation. It happens that much of this is to be found in peripheral estates. The report concentrates on four estates in particular viz: Castlemilk; Drumchapel; Easterhouse/Garthamlock and Pollok/ Priesthill/Nitshill.

In this chapter a precis will be made of the content and basic premises put forward in these reports, particularly on the "peripheral estates" content of Housing Plan II (HP2) and of the definitions of the "problem" as outlined in the peripheral estates report (PER). This will be followed by a critique of their theoretical and methodological grounds at this stage in the discussion. Practical difficulties will be discussed at a later point.

1. Housing Plans and Peripheral Estate Report: Aims and Relationship

(a) Housing Plans and Peripheral Estates

Since the publication of the first housing plan for Glasgow District in 1977, a special report has been commissioned by councillors to look into the special problems associated with apparently increasing turnover and vacancy rates in the "big four" peripheral estates. The production of the report co-incided with the appearance of Housing Plan 2(HP2). Since both have been considered as "policy" documents, there is a need to ask what the relationship between the two is supposed to be, particularly with regard to an on-the-ground planning approach to peripheral estates.

The exact relationship between the two seems to be shrouded in mystery, but it appears that HP2 represents a wider policy perspective of the housing stock of the city as a whole, with peripheral estates classed within the "council stock" sector. Housing Plan 2 does not present a physical plan of action, but appears to set out general guidelines for the improvement of all council housing types such as planned maintenance; pushing of community involvement and variation in tenure choice. Its other main function with regard to the council sector is to set out major financial commitments in terms of planning over a five-year period. Being statutory, it becomes the major mouthpiece of the political parties for housing issues. However if this is the case, why a demand for a special initiative for depressed peripheral council estates in particular?

The answer may be that peripheral estates have become a major political issue, recently, largely because they take up a considerable proportion of the council stock <u>in toto</u> some 30% excluding the many smaller post-war developments, and this is a considerable local electorate. Being post-war they also represent a considerable amount of capital outlay-which is only half-way to being paid off. They also represent the reality of the post-war dream, and are therefore

to be preserved for ideological reasons. Since PER presents a combined policy and physical land use strategy, whereas HP2 does not, the question must be resolved: Which is the major blueprint for the periphery given the political commitment of the substantial Labour Group, manifested in their official modification of PER(Glasgow District Labour Group, 1978)? It is possible that the question will not be fully resolved until after the next district elections which are coming up soon. Since the last elections, the Scottish National Party has held the balance of power between the Conservative administration and the Labour group, but should the SNP lose seats gained from Labour, particularly in post-war council house dominated constituencies, then there could be a return to the monopoly situation of Labour Group control which was largely unbroken between 1945 and 1975. If this is the case, then there could well be a special initiative in the estates to ensure that such a situation never arises again.

Even if this is not the case, the PER remains an interesting document from a corporate and a physical planning point of view. Although it was largely produced by planners, particularly with respect to implications of population loss, the actual framing of the problem and suggested solutions is a corporate effort. It is interesting in the Glasgow context, since it appears that physical planning is becoming more involved with housing schemes, not of their own design. By contrast, the Housing Plan though produced by a team from differing sections of various district departments and utilising regional planning expertise, does not appear to show evidence of practical physical application of rather grandiose aims such as the following:-

> To ensure that everyone wanting a house in Glasgow is able to obtain one which meets his or her needs in terms of condition, size, type, location, tenure and environment. (Glasgow District Council, 1978d: 3)

Another major advantage of PER is its attempt to provide some sort of explanation for decline in council estates, and at the end of the report a plan of action which incorporates physical change with some ideas for social revitalisation which are not clearly spelled out in HP2.

Despite tha ambiguity, however, it will become clear that the PER approach is much closer to the reality than HP2 in terms of the actual policy being pursued at the moment, and although, the Housing Plan does deserve more attention, emphasis here will focus on dealing with specific causes of problems in peripheral estates, which are in some ways products of historical circumstance, as Chapter Three showed, possibly more so than some explanation rooted in the belief that <u>all</u> council estate problems stem from mismanagement of housing finance and "tenure imbalance".

(b) Peripheral Estates Report

Within the context of falling population levels, the PER attempts to outline the implications for increased vacancy rates. However, the report outlines additional problems in relation to the desirebility of peripheral estates. These are listed as follows:-

- (1)Social Deprivation which includes poverty, unemployment, lack of employment skill, overcrowding, poor educational attainment. Occuring largely in pockets.
- (2)Employment lack of industrially zoned sites near estates/costs involved in travel-to-work
- (3)Environment drab, monotonous appearance of housing, vandalism(observable), litter, untidy gardens, high numbers of children, maintenance problems
- (4)Community Facilities the need for minor additions to existing facilities
- (5)Transport costs and inconvenience(other than associated with journey-to-work)
- (δ)Personal Security and Incidence of Crime Higher than city average in peripheral schemes
- (7)Housing problems of size mismatch with demand; lack of specialised housing; undesirable form(tenement); single tenure; off-putting effect of boarded up houses; overstretched resources of housing management

resulting in delays in allocation.

The following consequences are suggested:-

 (i) Financial: Closure of shops; shopkeepers' requests for rent reductions; increasing costs of maintenance in all local services; lost rent revenue 76.

 (ii) Physical: Intensified destruction of the environment
 (iii) Social: Increased number of social work referrals; weakening of public "morale"

The proposed lines of action to deal with this are outlined in the next section, and are taken from Table 7.1 of the PER. Before discussing here the effectiveness of the "corporate" approach, it may be fruitful from a theoretical point of view to ask whether or not this formulation of the problem is acceptable given the massive sums of money likely to be invested. A mistaken diagnosis of the problem could well lead to emphasis being placed on the wrong aspects of the problems which are most deep-rooted. The question of method is also important and a discussion on this requires an analysis which goes beyond the boundaries of these policy documents. (c) Peripheral Estates Report - the Probable Strategy

The probable strategy for all the peripheral estates seems likely to follow the "Drumchapel Model" as outlined in PER Appendix 15. The major elements are set out under the following headlines and current costs placed beside those which are immediately quantifiable:

(a) Housing (Physical Action)

- 1. Demolition
- 2. Conversions
- 3. New Build, public sector
- 4. New Build, private sector
- 5. Revitalisation (fullscale)
- Revitalisation (intermediate)
- 6. Energy Conservation
- 7. Rewiring
- 8. Improve Repairs and Maintenance
- 9. Redecoration

(b) Housing (Management)

- 10. Reserve stock for temporary decant
- 11. Rationalise vacancies
- 12. Foster local initiatives
- 13. Introduce alternative tenures
- 14. Under-let houses
- 15. Distribute large and/or disadvantaged families
- 16. Introduce tenant liason personnel

Such a scheme seems highly likely to develop in that within the appendix, these factors are held constant in three of the 4 possible options, the difference being the amount of money to be spent on each aspect of the physical action programme. The fourth option is really an addition, however, tagged onto one of the three major options. It is entitled "Other action" and involves the following possibilities:-

- 1. Environmental Improvement Open Space improvement Improve Gleansing Improve maintenance of open space
- 2. Social Support Services Increase social support Improve police protection Reduce anti-social behaviour
- 3. Education Provide additional nursery school places Introduce alternative uses into schools School catchment adjustment
- 4. Employment Review employment policies Build purpose built small factory units Increase environmental improvement works Improve incentive and promotional campaign Encourage use of remaining facilities

- 5. Transport Restructure transport fares Review transport routings
- 6. Recreation Develop additional recreational facilities
- 7. Community facilities Improve community facilities i.e. provide more community and day centres; tenants' meeting places; indoor sportshalls and laundrettes.

2. Critique

(a) Theoretical and Methodological Problems - Introduction.

Neither the Housing Plans nor the Peripheral Estates Report are grounded in any specific social, economic or political theory. Rather, the starting point for action on the housing stock has traditionally stemmed from "needs". Current emphasis, regionally has been on falling population. On the housing side, the manifestation of that problem particularly on the periphery of Glasgow, has been in terms of rising vacancy rates and requests for transfer out of these schemes. As such, the "problem" has been defined largely in terms of statistical inference. This co-incides with the use of computers to help for example speed up such traditionally laborious tasks as simplifying housing preferences.

The emphasis on reductionism has perhaps been the result of statistical techniques arising from the academic world which in most social sciences has a positivistic element - the notion of value freedom. When social scientists enter industry or local government, they often attempt to transport this value freedom into "the real world". Such a view co-incides with the historical notion that officials have been viewed as impartial advisors to politicians. Since all political parties are subject to reelection, but local government officers are not, those officers may be asked to advise differing political perspectives, and so the notion of value-freedom becomes paramount.

Unless the politician has help from other technical sources or has the time and ability to challenge small-scale issues that halp make up the larger ones, the positivistic assumptions of influential technical officers, who are often backed up by a professional qualification, may decide in large part the strategy to be adopted. In view of the numbers of technically and professionally qualified staff working on the housing problem in Glasgow, such an assumption can be justified.

Useful though this may be as a tool, there is a danger that what is essentially a method will take the place of a theory of housing estate decline. Since it is usually the task of method to support, empirically, a theory, one would expect some sort of theory of declining population. To date, emphasis has been on possible components of that problem such as demographic changes like number of deaths over births; out-migration due to poor job opportunities or size and

attractiveness of the housing stock. At the moment, local government is much more geared to dealing with housing stock issues, and so, not surprisingly the Housing Plans and PER have concentrated on how to improve the overall physical environment in housing areas.

(b) Peripheral Estates Report - Critique of Analysis of Problems

It has already been suggested that both HP2 and PER are not based on any particular social, political or economic theory, though to single them out along these lines may be deemed unfair given that very little local government literature is. However, in view of the feeling of seriousness prevailing in the public eye regarding the problem of the peripheral estates in Glasgow, it is suggested here that the inability of local government to satisfactorily explain the origins of the problem is likely to lead to greater difficulties in grappling with specific issues and of positing workable solutions. The aim of this section is to highlight some of the deficiencies in the present analysis, and to suggest how this might indirectly weaken the strategy. Some alternative formulations of the problem will be suggested, though only by way of example for the moment.

There are three major criticisms to be made. First, some of the major issues are pitched at a high level of generality. Second, there is a tendency not to differentiate between and within categories of problems, and to separate cause from effect (lumping). Third, there is a failure to order problems and to give them weightings.

(i) Generality Problems

According to the Regional Report, the two key problems of the region are a high level of unemployment and concentrations of socially deprived areas. These would appear to be major issues in peripheral estates, but as yet no satisfactory explanation has been put forward to explain what each constituent part of the problem of social deprivation is. Yet, when it comes to discussing the housing vacancy problems or the crime rate, there is more information to go on. In short that which is more easily quantifiable can be enlarged upon. This causes one to suspect that in "action" terms more emphasis may be placed on issues which can be dealt with by short term solutions.

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This ties in with the weighting problem. A second criticism of the tendency to over-generalise concerns the notion that the problems tend to be of a similar type throughout the estates and therefore have similar causes. This may not in fact be the case. Why, for example do there appear to be "good areas" and "bad areas" in areas of similar housetype ?

(ii) Lumping of Issues

The report's analysis is particularly at fault here. The example of environmental problems is of interest in this case. The vital issue of "environment" is summed up in one paragraph:-

> The peripheral estates are generally characterised by poor environmental quality arising from a number of factors. Apart from the <u>drab and monoton-</u> <u>ous appearance of some housing</u> areas and the <u>general</u> <u>vandalism</u> to which shop fronts and empty houses are particularly prone, there are problems of <u>litter and untidy gardens and open spaces</u>. Lack <u>of maintenance funds</u> and <u>demarcation of mainten-</u> <u>ance responsibilities</u> excacerbate these difficulties. An added factor is the <u>high number of children</u> often concentrated within particular streets*.

(Glasgow District Council, 1978c : 13)

Thus, from the analysis we see what <u>appear</u> to be two sets of problems viz;

"Major" Problem: Drab and monotonous appearance of housing vandalism Untidy gardens and abundance of litter

Contributory

Problem: Lack of maintenance funds Demarcation of maintenance responsibilities High numbers of children

Unfortunately, the passage fails to explain what starts off the problem. In short, which is cause and which is effect ? How does one go about deciding what is a contributory problem and what is a major problem? It <u>may be</u>, for example, that the major cause of the problem is that there are simply too many children in the area with too little meaningful distractions.

Below is an alternative formulation of the environmental decay problem, using the variable^scited in the report (which do not necessarily accord with the author's formulation of variables).

Figure V Alternative Formulation of Environmental Decay Problem Using PER variables.

PROBLEM (PER Variable)	CAUSES (Author's Suggestions)
Drab, monotonous appearance of housing	 Lack of money and land to build to better environmental standards at the time of construction.
General Vandalism	 High concentrations of children with little else to occupy them. Cultural factors (e.g. writing gang slogans; proving ability to conform). Lack of parental supervision.
Untidy Gardens	 Houses with gardens allocated to tenants who did not want them; condition of soil for planting and size meant tenant expected to work hard at it. Destruction of fences and hedges by children

Litter

- Disillusionment at council's apparent neglect of large gardens.
- Unsatisfactory cleansing arrangements (e.g. bins too high for small children to reach/lack of parental responsibility over this)
 Children and dogs dragging rubble and litter: Children
- rubble and litter; Children bring in junk as substitute for meaningful play facilities.

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Whilst it is not claimed that this is necessarily the correct formulation of this problem, it does attempt to separate more clearly the causal variables of a cumulative problem. There is no excuse for lack of such an analysis in this report, for it becomes clear, that when such variables are identified even theoretically, appropriate suggestions can be put to tenants regarding these issues and decisions taken. For example, an appropriate question in the survey might be "Do you want a house with a garden, and if so what size of garden?" ^Or the creation of protected backcourt toddlers' play areas, which are within the mothers' view from the back window, and where more "adventurous" play apparatus may be kept.

Now, whilst it is likely that many of these issues will be dealt with, for example, the provision of metal fencing, or improved rubbish disposal, the framing of the problem is likely to miss out on certain issues and most of all the small-scale cumulative issues which may well return once the operation has been completed. The avoidance of these problems should in theory be dealt with at the survey stage. There will be a short discussion on this issue later in the chapter with respect to the first attempts at re-vitalisation in the Peripheral Estates by the District Council.

(iii) Ordering of Priorities

The report is especially weak in placing emphasis on some of the worst problems, which structurally appear rooted in the declining industrial performance of the region manifested in unemployment and poverty, and fuelled by particularly unsatisfactory allocation policies and the under-provision of play/community facilities at the time the estates were created. The foregoing analysis of the historical development of the estates should have made this clear. It is reiterated that the Housing Plans and the PER are weak in analysing the cause of the problem in those terms i.e. structural weaknesses stemming not simply from the post-war era but from the 19th century, and in terms of housing, misplaced problem both in financial and social terms.

The tone of this meport suggests that the problems identified have equal weight, but it seems that some attempt should have been made to sort these out, especially when we hit the thorny problem of financing projects. Given the cut-backs in public expenditure and the growth of corporate policy-making in local government, it would seem all the more imperative to make sure we have some idea of where the heart of the problem lies, and resist the temptation of blindly striking out at physical manifestations of the problem, for in the long run this may be futile. In short, from a theoretical point of view, there is little evidence to support the notion that:-

> The interaction of these physical problems with the socio-economic circumstances of the residents is so complex that it is difficult to separate cause from effect.

(Glasgow District Council, 1978c : 15)

(c) Housing Plan 2 and Peripheral Estates Report - Methodological Problems in Calculating Preferences.

As noted previously, there has been an attempt to reduce the definition of problems to numbers and therefore to use these as the basis for action. These numbers are the common denominator which supposidly get round the problem of officials appearing to favour one political perspective or another. In the interests of expendiency, the method appears take the place of any theory. The method is to work out which schemes are the most popular in the city, and therefore, presumably, to improve the unpopular ones using some form of positive discrimination:-

> Direct methods of indicating preferences, by means of a questionairre study have not been attempted due to the costs involved and..... questionairre studies....are not necessarily accurate

(Glasgow District Council, 1978d : Appendix 7)

The indicators of preference in themselves - vacancy rates; turnover; transfer requests; waiting list; refusal of offers and reasons for move would appear to be problematical and not entirely satisfactory. Even so, action is likely to be based upon this, and so, not only will method be unsatisfactory, but some sort of wider social theory will have been ommitted from the strategy, so paying some attention to positivism but no attention whatsoever to any other academic approach.

The "approach" being pursued then, for want of a better term, is to analyse the least popular areas, and channel the current resources into those worst "pockets". It is no surprise, therefore, that many of those areas being singled out for priority treatment have either been at the top of the list for some time, or have unnacceptibly high vacancy rates or are being pushed by enterprising district and regional councils within the overall regional deprivation strategy which has recently made a point of spreading resources to cover areas considered not to be a "top deprivation priority" (e.g. Strathelyde Regional Council, 1977a; 1978a). At Glasgow District level, however, there is a hierarchy of priority areas, but a surprising emphasis is being placed on peripheral estates.

This special attention, manifested in the PER, does not appear to accord with that overall city-wide hierarchy of

depressed council estates, but a major methodological problem centres around the definition of "popular" estates. Glasgow has for a long number of years operated a system of graded housing in the form of amenity categories. It is not at all clear how schemes are accorded gradings, but as a rule of thumb, the most popular (categories A, B, and C) are to quote a housing official "75 percent" decided on demand. These tend to be the older cottage and flatted developments in the inter-war stock and those cottages, new developments, and tenements found in popular areas in the post-war stock. The peripheral estates have been falling down the scale from A and B since construction and are now around D and E. However, the rehousing tenement of the inter-war era occupy the lowest amenity bands and therefore, by definition, are the least desirable as tables δ to 10 show. This is not to deny that other factors influence amenity category definition, but unfortunately this has been defined on largely subjective grounds using such concepts as external appearance, internal standards and

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A second problem arises out of this in that when last totalled up (August 1978) the demands for transfer from the lowest category houses i.e. rehousing tenement, were more than double that of a "priority" peripheral estate such as Castlemilk: 13% as opposed to 6%. The total stock of rehousing tenement is around 12% of the total city council stock - again twice that of Castlwmilk. Yet there has been no special enquiry into the decline of inter-war rehousing tenement. This is very strange given that according to neo-classical location theory, the relative proximity of these schemes to the city centre would encourage a trade off, and therefore vacancy rate or demand for transfer ought to be lower than in peripheral estates.

proximity to community facilities.

Therefore the obvious question should be asked : Why all the fuss over peripheral estates ? The answer may be purely political that recently the peripheral estates, which were Labour strongholds for over twenty years have been falling to parties such as the SNP, hence weakening the overall power of the Labour Party. The Labour Party lost control of the city in 1975. Since rehousing estates are scattered and in small pockets their influence is minimal. Another possible explanation may be that since the peripheral estates were

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Table 6

1923 Rehousing Estates by Number of Schemes and Houses per Amenity Category.

		AME	NIT	Y C	АТЕ	GOR	Y		
	A	В	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
No. of Houses	0	0	0	0	110	1122	1350	3380	216
No. of Schemes	0	0	0	0	2	8	7	14	1
Table 7									
1930-35 Rehousing Estates by Number of Schemes and Houses per Amenity Category.									
		AME	NIT	Y C	АТЕ	GOR	Y		
	A	В	c	D	E	F	G	н	I
No. of Houses	0	0	0	64	40	579	762	4672	2920
No. of Schemes	0	0	0	1	2	4	5	2 8	6
Table 8									
1923 Ordinary S Category.	chemes	by Nu	nber o	f Sche	nes an	d Hous	es per	Ameni	ty
		AME	NIT	Y C	ATE	GOR	Y		
	A	AME B	N I T C	Y C D	ATE E	G O R F	Y G	н	I
No. of Houses	▲ 0		C					н о	I O
No. of Houses No. of Schemes	_	B	C	D	E	F	G		
	0	B 1406	C 450	D 168	E O	F O	G O	0	0
No. of Schemes	0 0 Scheme	B 1406 2 [°] es by 1	C 450 3	D 168 2	E O O	F 0 0	G O O	0 0	0
No. of Schemes <u>Table 9</u> 1930-35 Ordinary	0 0 Scheme	B 1406 2 [°] es by 1	C 450 3	D 168 2 of Sc	E O O	F O O and Ho	G O O UBSES P	0 0	0
No. of Schemes <u>Table 9</u> 1930-35 Ordinary	0 0 Scheme	B 1406 2 [°] es by 1	C 450 3 Number	D 168 2 of Sc	E O O	F O O and Ho	G O O UBSES P	0 0	0
No. of Schemes <u>Table 9</u> 1930-35 Ordinary	0 0 Schem Catego	B 1406 2 [°] es by 1 ry. A M E	C 450 3 Number N I T C	D 168 2 of Sci Y C	E O O hemes : A T E	F O O and Ho G O R	G O O UGES P Y	0 0 er	0
No. of Schemes <u>Table 9</u> 1930-35 Ordinary <u>Amenity</u>	0 0 Schem Catego: A	B 1406 2 ⁻ es by 1 ry. A M E B	C 450 3 Number N I T C	D 168 2 of Sci Y C D	E O O hemes A T E E	F O O and Ho G O R F	G O O UUSES P Y G	0 0 er	0

Table10

1930-35 Intermediate Schemes by Number of Schemes and Houses per Amenity Category

AMENITY CATEGORY

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TABLE 10 CONTINUED/-

	A	В	С	D	E	F	G	Ħ	I
No. of Houses	0	0	0	409	286	1159	930	20	0
No. of Schemes	0	0	0	3	2	6	6	l	0

(Source : Adapted from Strathclyde Regional Council "Glasgow District Council Housing Schemes". 1978b).

constructed for all sections of the working class, including the deserving poor, that these individuals who have lived there for some considerable time, paying their rent regularly "deserve" special treatment. Inter-war rehousing estates are already being used as "intermediate treatment centres" for "families with problems", evoking the notion - rightly or wrongly - that difficult tenents who "spoil the peripheral estates for the good tenant" must be moved well out of the way of the revitalisation strategy until they have been "socially rehabilitated". This still does not solve the problem of the rehousing tenements themselves which seem to be politically expendible in relation to the peripheral estates.

Thus, the political motive outlined earlier ties in with the rather dubious method of allocating priority areas. The lack of objective definitions of amenity groups and the emphasis on turnover in peripheral estates appears to have given free rein to a political whim.. This flaw does not seem to have been dealt with in the Housing Plan.

3. Case Study - Gathamlock and the peripheral estates report

(a) Garthamlock - Background.

Garthamlock is a post-war scheme consisting of 1,656 houses mostly in 3 and 4 storey tenements. The estate is linked to another scheme, Craigend to the West. To the East and North are open land. The Southern boundary is Phase 2b of the Monkland Motorway. Below is a summary of some of the socio-economic characteristics of the area:-

Table 11 Garthamlock - Socio-economic characteristics 1971 and 1978

	1971 Census	1978(Combined Gathamlock Community Associations/ Regional Planning Estimates.)
Population (total)	6,982	6,181
Male Unemployment	14%	49•5%
Children Under 15	42%	n.a.
Large Households (6+ Families)	31%	n.a.
Car Ownership	16.5%	6.5%
No Educational qualifications	95%	n.a.
Single Parent Families	5.6%	10%
Vacant Houses	38	173

(Source: Strathclyde Regional Council, 1976a; 173; 182; Combined Garthamlock Community Associations, 1978).

The above table shows a marked deterioration of the area in terms of unemployment, car ownerwhip rate and increasing numbers of vacant houses. Since it is assumed that the spiraling process of decline associated with empty houses is likely to continue unless action is taken to arrest it, the unpopularity of the area will continue to grow. The size of the problem can be gauged by the fact that even in 1971, Garthamlock was showing symptoms of what has been described as "multiple deprivation".

Garthamlock has been a "priority" area within the city for some time, and was classed alongside notorious inter-war estates as a "seriously multiply deprived area" in April 1975 in the planning report

"Social Deprivation in Glasgow". As long ago as 1973, plans had been made to revitalise the area by means of an environmental improvement scheme, but it had only barely been started when there were changes in policy. Partly as a result of the regional deprivation analysis of 1976-8, partly as a result of attempts by regional councillors to broaden the urban deprivation strategy and partly because Glasgow was reluctant to allow the region to "take over" many of its own problem areas, Garthamlock was not included in the "seven areas" initiative (e.g. Strathclyde Regional Council, 1976b; 1977a; 1978a). By that time Glasgow District Housing Management Department had set up an Environmental Revitalisation and Community Development Section, and in January 1978, the results of a social survey of the area were published. Subsequent action in the area has largely stemmed from this. Appendix II is a summary of that survey. Before examining the relationship between the PER and the Garthamlock proposals, it is worth examining the theory and method of the survey.

(b) Garthamlock Social Survey - Some Criticisms

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In order to complete a full analysis, it would be necessary to analyse the questionairre used in depth. However, it has proved difficult to get hold of the document. Nevertheless a brief analysis of the results reveals some problems which appear to justify some of the earlier reservations made about the entire peripheral estates strategy being attempted by the local authority concerned.

Firstly, it should be said that the idea of locating assets and deficiencies in the scheme according to the resident's views is a good idea since it helps us "tune into" the area to some extent; financial budget available. This was a one in eight random survey of the tenants, but as far as is known local children were not invited to partake. In this respect, the survey has failed to look at differing perceptions of "what is most needed in the community". This is particularly important when deciding on strategies for vandalism and the destruction of the local physical environment.

As in the case of PER, there is a lack of theory, that is, there does not appear to be any attempt at hypothesis testing on what causes the above problems. The issues are only mentioned very generally. For effective decision-making there is a need to know what kinds of play areas are required according to the needs of different age-groups. We need to know what lies behind vandalism and what different types of vandalism exist before attempting solutions.

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The definition of the problem - in this case only the most general defines the level at which the solution will be pitched. In the case of vandalism, all vandals are seen to be the same, therefore a general solution may be applied. In this case, it is vandal-proof paint and fittings. Again, in relation to play areas, despite a strong request by tenants to provide at least two levels of play facilities, they have received no professional advice on what might be suitable for each age group - the result may be the most general of facilities such as climbing frames.

Both of the above issues emphasise a long-standing grievance in peripheral estates, that there are too many children with too little varied activities to occupy them. Indeed, by pursuing a policy of "keeping the vandals out" there is danger that if it is not accompanied by meaningful diversions, the "property destroyers" may start to look to other kinds of targets - such as the local populace.

In terms of method, there has been no ordering of priorities. There has been no attempt to separate out groups of issues "Dwelling size Mismatch" can be dealt with under different sections related to destruction of the physical environment. Presumably, this was not done in the questionairre because of a lack of thought over how the issues might be grouped theoretically, which explains the random nature of the "assets and deficiencies" as set down in the report. Finally, there is little evidence to show that degree of demand for certain inputs or even the degree of importance to be attached to problems has resulted in relative action weighted to these. For example, although some 32% cited vandalism and violence as a reason for leaving the scheme, a more significant 70% said they would stay if things were improved, and 83% requested toddlers play areas and similar provision for older children. Also there were as many "would leave for personal reasons" would-be migrants as "leave because of vandalism and violence". Yet, as will be seen, a much greater emphasis has been placed on dealing with vandalism - particularly using "hard" architecture.

The genesis of a physical strategy was suggested on this 5th December 1978. The actual proposals in written terms can be found in the minutes of the public meeting of February 22nd 1979. The following draft brief proposals were made:-

1. Minimum Treatment Area.

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Rewiring; insulation; possible conversion of houses to sheltered adcommodation; planned maintenance.

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- 2. Environmental Revitalisation
- (a) Conversion Limited number of ground floor flats converted into 2 and 5 apartments from 3s and 4s in selected closes
 (b) The Building

Planned maintenance; painting of external fabric

- (c) The Close Redecorate with vandal-resistant paint; fix doors to back and front - all with child-proof locks; install vandalresistant lighting
- (d) Front Gardens Metal fences with gates; design for efficient manintenance
 (e) Backcourts
- Paved drying areas; metal railings between closes; grass where necessary; more bins with protection from children and dogs; lighting
- (f) Streets and Street Furniture Resurface pavements; reset close steps
 (g) Amenities
 - Toddlers' play area; play facilities for older children

3. Garthamlock Restructuring

- (a) Reduce heights of buildings(those not demolished)
- (b) Build mainly terraced type houses for large families
- (c) Separate pedestrians from traffic
- (d) All large family dwellings to have back and front gargens
- (e) High level of environmental treatment in the area(unspecified)
- (f) Off-street parking
- (g) Even distribution of house-types
- (h) Improve sound insulation of large family houses
- (i) Even distribution of converted community use buildings
- (j) Conversion of some dwellings for the disabled
- (k) Proposed townscape not to be restricted by existing road and block patterns

(taken from Glasgow District Council working party minutes, 22nd Feb 1979)

From the resume of proposals and the relationship to PER, in Figure VI, two major themes appear. First, emchasis is clearly on physical change, and the notion of graded change according to degree of difficult-to-let houses, rather than on some total plan for the area which might include changes in the better areas for the sake of improving the area in the future. ^Many aspects of Appendix 15 of PER have appeared in the practical side such as rewiring; planned maintenance and conversion according to needs. These reappear in the housing plan as well. In terms FIGURE VI Peripheral Estates Report and Garthamlock Draft Brief Proposals - Comparison of Content

Peripheral Estates Report	Garthamlock Draft Brief			
1. PHYSICAL ACTION - HOUSING				
Demolition	Yes - Partial in most difficult- to let areas.			
Conversion	Yes			
New Build - Public New Build - Private	Unclear Unclear, but "new build" of some discription will take place			
Revitalisation - full Revitalisation - intermediate	Yes Yes			
Energy Conservation	No			
Rewiring	Yes			
Planned Maintenance	Yes			
Redecoration	Yes			
2. HOUSING MANAGEMENT				
Reserve stock for temporary decant	Yes			
Rationalise Vacancies	Yes			
Foster Local Initiatives	Yes			
Introduce alternative tenures	No sign of this			
Under-let houses	Үев			
Distribute large and/or disadvan- taged families	Yes, but only after local pressure and only within the scheme unless there is not enough room			
Introduce tenant-liason personnel	Yes			
3. OTHER ACTION				
Environmental Improvement	Yes			
Social Support Services Social Work Police (increased protection) Anti-social behaviou r reduction	Dependent Upon resources Dependent Upon Respurces Yes, especially on vandalism			
Education Additional Nursery School Places Alternative school uses School catchment adjustment	No:suggestions for play areas for toddlers by tenants Nothing as yet Nothing as yet			

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FIGURE VI (CONTINUED)/.....

Peripheral Estates Report	Garthamlock Draft Brief
Employment Review Imployment Policies Build small purpose factory units Increase environmental improvement works Improve Incentive and Promotional campaign	Not acceptable No sign of this "Captain Clean" litter collection drive? "Captain Clean"? to give city a good image and attract investment?
Encourage use of remaining facilities	Nothing
Transport	
Restructure bus fares Review Coutings	No: applicable private bus companies. Highly unlikely given att itudes of bus companies
Recreation More development	Yes
Community Facilities	Yes

Of "other action", the revitalisation of the surrounding environment has been stressed, particularly the notions of improved litter disposal; easy maintenance of gardens, but there is heavy emphasis on a second theme - that of "hard" solutions to vandalism. It is made clear in the document that "all proposals must be resistant to vandalism"(pp 3), to which the obvious question should be asked: Where will the vandals go?

The only other additions emanating from the "other action" option of appendix 15 have been the suggestions for toddlers' play areas and phay facilities for older children(ages unspecified). Other residents' proposalsinclude a library and a laundrette.

A third and wider criticism is the lack of a meaningful corporate approach. Many "other issues" have been apparently ignored whilst physical remedies have been pursued. The notion of distributing large families throughout the city was not suggested by the working. party, but came up in the discussion over the proposals. The District had apparently no intentions of pursuing such a policy and had been content to scatter large families throughout the scheme. The problem of tenure has been avoided and a notable component missing from the strategy was the question of dealing with unemployment in a stress area. In relation to poverty the question of energy conservation for those on low income has not been taken up. The question of public transport which has been a source of frustration in the scheme since it was opened has not been dealt with. The tenants had been campaining for the use of Passenger Transport Executive buses because of dissatisfaction with the Scottish Transport groups' service operation. Such an issue is of paramount importance in terms of an overall corporate approach particularly in Garthamlock. The suggestions so far reveal that the inputs will be limited in this respect, largely servicing housing management rather dividing up responsibilities evenly.

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The most important evidence of this imbalance is epitomised in the costs. A reading of the option costs in Appendix 15 of PER shows that of a possible overall budget of say Option A plus Other Action; by far the greatest resources would go into the Housing (Physical Action) side: £22 to £28 million with only £5.3 million being spent on environmental improvement; social support; education; employment; transport; recreation and community facilities. This leads one to the conclusion that either the housing department is still very powerful or other departments are not interested in co-operating. Such an assertion would require further investigation of how these departments see their role in theoverall cooperative strategy for dealing with deprived areas such as Garthamlock.

Indeed, despite the obvious moves towards action of any serious nature, in the peripheral estates after nearly thirty years, serious doubts are being cast on the legitimacy of <u>all</u> decision makers in the planning process (e.g. Cullingowrth, 1969; Dennis, 1973; Goodman, 1974; McIntosh, 1975; Griffiths, 1975; Jacobs, 1976; Cockburn, 1978; <u>Glasgow</u> <u>Evening Times</u>, March 13, 1979). Even in an area such as Garthamlock where, because of rapid turnover and the problem of disillusionment one might expect apathy, there is clearly anger being expressed (see Appendix III) particularly over broken promises. Whilst there were important reasons for these delays, especially with respect to local government re-organisation,

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the problem of neglect by the local authority of an obviously deteriorating area have not helped the situation, and may be partially to blame for the cumulative problems.

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Summary

Chapter Four has attempted to precis the recent action responses in Glasgow to peripheral estate decline. Two major policy documents have been shown to be weak in defining satisfactorily the problem. This has shown up in the first shot in a smaller post-war estate on the eastern edge of the city, whose survey like the wider policy documents has concentrated on the physical housing stock and an over-reliance on "stock" approaches to fundamental social problems such as vandalism and the provision of play areas and other amenities in apparently characterless areas some distance from the city centre.

Thus it is predicted that, despite an overall improvement in these areas for a short time, the problems could well reappear creating further strains on a weakening local economy and rates base. In addition, it has been suggested that in terms of achieving an overall "objective" approach to the city's housing problems, the Housing Plan, which is a statutory document has in this case been superceded by a report on politically important catchment areas. The Housing Plan has become the summary of committed and planned expenditure, and a forum for ideas, but the actual strategy in large areas of the housing stock seems to be modelled on a corporate strategy within such areas. Such emphasis does however tend to distract attention from politically less important inter-war stock which is also in crisis. Even so, it is not yet a fully corporate approach.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Conclusions

As a result of a critical analysis of the construction, decline and probable solutions being suggested for revitalisation of the peripheral estates in a large provincial British city, the following conclusions have been reached:-

(a) On the basis of an ideal-typical assessment, it has been argued that the major casue of decline has been that of a continually weak fiscal base. It was this fiscal base situation which prompted short-term solutions to the post-war housing crisis, and it has continued to postpone the provision of essential community facilities. Ideological, cultural and economic factors have contributed to this weakness. The theory of peripheral estate decline suggested can be briefly summarised as follows:-

- (i) Overwhelming demand for new houses after the second world war, was capitalised upon by proponents of high density development such as the city planning officer of the day (an engineer) and a Conservative government anxious to push low-cost housing as an election-winning tool. The tenure and overall density per acre of this housing was decided upon by local politicians anxious to ensure power whilst at the same time offering an alternative to the vagaries of the private housing market.
- (ii) Despite a conflict over regional population dispersal between regional planners and local politicians, the peripheral estates were constructed on the only available land remaining within the city boundaries.
- (iii) The costs bourne by the city in providing new infrastructure and heavy commitment to paying off loan debt over 60 years left few fesources for such community and other facilities deemed necessary by physical and social planners for the longterm success of such large communities, and as a result, despite an early "optimistic" phases in estates! development, problems stemming from economic, ideological and cultural "hangovers" began to appear which triggered off a process of decline. This process was not arrested by intervention at crucial

stages in the estates' evolution. Even where intervention has taken place, it has not necessarily accorded with the specific needs of varied communities, which are on the scale of small towns and not the "community unit" of around 10,000 inhabitants.

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(b) The most recent attempts to "corporately" and comprehensively approach the peripheral estates problem can already be criticised on a number of grounds:-

- (i) There is some confusion over the main policy strategy. This is due to the fact that the introduction of housing plans has co-incided with political moves to deal with the mushrooming problem of difficult-to-let housing estates. Some sort of compromise is being worked out, with the major approach appearing to be a special planning document on the peripheral estates which borrows some concepts from the housing plan. A brief analysis of the first attempt at implementing the strategy in one of the smaller peripheral estates in the North East of the city (A largely district initiative, not to be confused with special initiatives into similar areas throughout the region), has shown that this is the strategy most likely to be adopted. Consequently other important, ostensibly "worse" areas of deprivation, described in the early part of the thesis are likely to be denied special treatment within a housing system where mobility is blocked by lack of tenure choice and styles of council housing.
- (ii) In terms of problem definition in the peripheral estates, there are ærious weaknesses in the theoretical and methodological analysis. This is rooted in a desire to reduce problems to numbers and to ignore the problem of historical determinism. Consequently a-historical definitions of the problem become commonplace. Effects are treated as causes, but at the same time never clearly grouped into categories of problems or separated from one another. On the basis of an analysis of developments in the study area, these theoretical and methodological weaknesses identified in the policy documents have manifested themselves in ineffective survey techniques and pre-determined solutions.
- (iii) There is a distinct lack of responsibility sharing between departments within the district and between the district and

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the region. This may be the result of the historical role of the housing department in Glasgow or simply that other departments do not wish to become involved in the issue. As a result, over-emphasis has been placed on housing-related aspects of the problem and solutions tend to be within the knowledge and capabilities of housing officials. This being the manifestation of the lack of theory and method, the solutions on offer are likely to run into trouble in later years, particularly over the high costs of new build and demolition which may well be unnecessary if alternative strategies can be found to break the monotony of tenement dwellings using non-destructive methods, and the fostering of meaningful social diversions for children and adults of all ages. The full basis and expansion of the theory appears in Chapter Three.

2. Recommendations

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Arising from the above conclusions, the following recommendations are put forward:-

(a) A Need for More Action-Research

There is a clear need, from the analysis, for more actionresearch into the day-to-day problems associated with life in a peripheral estate, in an effort to more closely identify the particular social and psychological needs of children and adults which have been neglected for such a long time. This should be done with respect to a theory of decline backed up by a pilot research study covering the period 1955 to 1979 at the very least. The correlated variables should then be used as starting points for the inducement of new needs criteria surveys. Such a pilot study could be carried out by independent researchers in collabouration with the Scottish Office or other central government body.

Failing this, the local authorities should utilise the growing specialisms of the social sciences by including a special research team to work only in council estates. The major drawback to both of these proposals is that they might hold up much-needed initiatives to housing schemes now, but the first approach could be carried on at the same time in one scheme whilst (hopefully) varied initiatives sponsored within the existing structure will be carried on in another. The advantages of a permanent research team, in addition, would be to improve the efficiency of datagathering and problem analysis, leading to more and more sensitive solutions, as the strategy evolves, and thereby dealing with the reservations of long-term prospects previously outlined.

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On the basis of the analysis of this thesis, Figure VIIshows possible lines of research specialisms - which may be applied to peripheral estates generally.

FIGURE VII Possible Lines of Research for Peripheral Estate Decline and Revitalisation (Four Examples Only).

PROBLEM (Ist Pilot Hypothesis Testing)	Components	RESEARCH EMPHASIS
ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION	VANDALISM	Psychological Motivation/Rej- ection of Property and Wider cultural Values.
	RUN-DOWN OF PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT	Proportion of children in area of reputation or difficult-to-let housing compared to "better" area/ Proportion of rent- arrears tenants and social work referrals,
HOUSING DESIGN AND LAYOUT	VISUAL MONOTONY	Perceptions of tenants of what "should be" - need not imply the whole s ale destruction of tenements - importance of colour, landmarks.
UNEMPLOWMENT	POVERTY, SENSE OF HOPELESSNESS	Locate skill mix; search out "other abilities"/Survey likely candidates for small workshop experiments/local would-be skill teachers/Liase with Regional Industrial Development research.
AREA REPUTATION	ANTI-SOCIAL TENANTS	Determine local definitions of meaning of anti- social behaviour e.g. noisy neigh- bours, neglect of communal mainten- ance; domestic violence; child neglect.
	GANG VIOLENCE	Relevance of school curriculum and possible alternat- ive /-

Figure VII Possible Lines of Research for Peripheral Estate Decline and Revitalisation (Four Examples Only)

AREA REPUTATION

COMPONENTS

RESEARCH EMPNASIS

GANG VIOLENCE (CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE)

ALTERNATIVE/-

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mind-set such as a youth culture/ youth, perceptions of tenants, police housing officials and concept of private property.

In addition, wider issues need further research, especially the issue of allocation criteria according to amenity groupings. Further research is also required into the possible conflict between statutory obligations to re-house large families as a priority whilst at the same time coordinating conversions to smaller units.

(b) Suggestions Within the Present Set-Up

Already, in Glasgow at any rate, the components are there to seriously begin a corporate strategy, with all of the departments involved likely to contribute in some way or another. The task remaining, assuming that research of the above kind is not implemented in the interests of financial costs and delays, is to ensure that the correct balance of inputs is created, but more than this, there may have to be serious movements away from entrenched positions on the part of certain departments. This will require a move by senior politicians and officials to recognise that the problems go much deeper then unattractive housing stock or an apparent demand for more owner occupation. It is now accepted within architecture and planning circles that physical determinism alone is not a solution to urban problems (e.g. Goodman, 1972; Ward, 1973). Accordingly there ought to be a move towards the setting up of a policy planning departments within the districts which can keep major departments in check with regard to such important ventures in the virgin territory of council estate revitalisation.

Accordingly, on the basis of the inputs in the PER, it is suggested that additional variables be considered in relation to the groups of problems outlined in Figure VII. Figure VIII shows the possible changes in the major inputs in relation to the departments/committees involved, and notes particularly the need to provide "unorthodog" methods of holding the population, particularly young adults, and providing more compelling diversions for adolescents as an alternative to "hard" architecture. Such suggestions will require a heavy financial input, and the only forseeable problems will be possible difficulties in cross-transfer between departments of resources, and a true "corporate will" to forget past antipathy between major departments. Such a model is likely to be most applicable to Glasgow, but may be applied to other British towns and cities with similar problems.

(c) Recommendations for Planners

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Town planners occupy a somewhat ambiguous role in council estate development, perhaps more so in Glasgow than anywhere else. The recent developments in revitalisation of council property provides an opportunity for planners of all kinds - regional, economic and social for example, to make a major contribution not by adhering to traditional stances such as development control - which is acceptable in areas where there is a danger of losing part of a rare heritage - to council estates which can only improve by some kind of remedial change. The question then becomes what kinds of remedial change? It is suggested that the social planner in particular can add new dimensions to the problem and accordingly suggest fresh solutions which take into account physical improvementsbut do not allow them to outweigh a balanced approach which takes cognisance of the forces at work in a society rapidly undergoing fundamental change, and requiring a new humanism and imagination.

> 31,400 words(inc. appendices and figures)

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General Problem	Component	Possible Strategy	<u>Department Involved</u>	Departmental Change Required
Unemployment and Poverty	Poverty/ Disenchantment	Largely beyond scope of local government	Social Work/DHSS / equivalent of Manpower Services.	Inter - Govermental
Housing (^D esign & Layout)	Visual Monotony	As peripheral estates Arc report and housing plan Art but with provision that demolition only as a last resort/use at community artist/colour and architectural additions to tenement blocks.	Architecture/Freelance Artist. tural ts.	Housing to alter some responsibit to planning/architecture. Housing to attempt unorthodox solutions.
Housing (Manage- ment)	Allocation rules	Total revision	Housing	Encourage constructive criticism
Environmental Destruction	Vandalism	Variation between hard and soft architecture	Architecture in conjunction with private practitioners	
• • •		Environmental education	Education in conjunction with planning and sociologists	Education - Curriculum plus more parent-teacher contact
	Lack of Play	Under 5s - Play Groups	Housing /Community Dev.	
•	Facilities	Flay pens in backcourts	Parks/Planning/Architecture	Housing to allow more influence of other departments.
		Nursery school provision	Education	Positive Discrimination in Education budgets for initiative areas.

	DEPARTMENTAL CHANGE REQUIRED			Planning to releve development control rules under certain circumstances. Dispense with justification of such provision by use of figures only (positive discrimination).	Licensing Committee to oonsider possible private licensing at tenant halls.	104
	DEPARTMENT INVOLVED	Architecture/Frivate Practitioners/Flay Barns Parks	Education (extra-mural) Scottish Sport's Council Private enterprise Community Development Civic Amenities committee	Community Development/ Planning		
	POSSIBLE STATEGY	6 - 12 year olds - Adventure schemes/ "Action" Land/Play Barns	13 - 16 year olds - Indoor sports centres/ pool halls/cafes/sponsored musicians (rock/folk/jazz)	Over 25s club night "Singalong" sessions Pensioners Club Bingo Cinema Club Licenced Bars	all in community centres/tenant halls/ privately owned clubs or bars.	
	COMPONENT			Not varied enough	·	
	GENERAL BROBLEM	·	.,	ADULT FACILITTES		

WEBER: Authority and Bureaucracy

On the basis of the concept of <u>legitimacy of authority</u>, Weber formulated his propositions about the structuring of legal authority systems:-

- a Official tasks are organized on a continuous, regulated basis.
- b These tasks are divided into functionally distinct spheres, each furnished with the requisite authority and sanctions.
- c Offices are arranged hierarchically, the rights of control and complaint being specified.
- d The rules according to which work is conducted may either be technical or legal. In both cases trained men are necessary.
- e The resources of the organisation are quite distinct from those of the members as private individuals.
- f The office holder cannot appropriate his office.
- g Administration is based on written documents and this tends to make the office (Bureau) the hub of the modern organisation.
- h Legal authority systems can take many forms, but are seen at their purest in a bureaucratic administration staff.

Bureaucracy in its most rational form presupposed the preceding propositions on legitimacy and authority, and had the following character-istics:-

- 1 The staff members are personally free, observing only the impersonal duties of their offices.
- **2** There is a clear hierarchy of offices.
- 3 The functions of offices are clearly specified.
- 4 Officials are appointed on the basis of a contract.
- 5 They are selected on the basis of a professional qualification, ideally substantiated by a dipboma gained through examination.
- 6 They have a monetary salary, and usually pension rights. The salary is graded according to position in the hierarchy. The official can always leave the post, and under certain circumstances it may be terminated.
- 7. The official's post is his sole or major occupation.
- 8 There is a career structure, and promotion is possible either by seniority or merit, and according to the judgement of superiors.
- 9. The official may appropriate neigher the post nor the resources which go with it.
- 10. He is subject to a unified control and disciplinary system. (Albrow 1970 pp. 43-5. This is an abbreviation from Weber 1947) (Source : Albrow, 1970: 43-46)

APPENDIX II Garthamlock Social Survey : Summary of Assets and Deficiencies.

SOCIAL JURVYY

The total number of houses in the survey area is 1,656 of which 1,543 are occupied at present. A random questionnaire survey was carried out using a one in eight sample, 183 tenants were interviewed. In some cases up to three calls were made, morning, afternoon and evening. Two public meetings were held and every household lettered inviting them to attend. The turnout for these public meetings was comparitively low, only 40 residents attended. In addition, meetings were held with all three residents organisations, as well as with the various officers working in the area. These meetings enabled them to outline their problems and any proposals or projects currently in the area.

ASSETS

DEFICIENCIES

The area is on the Sastern fringe of The area is located close to open the city in a location isolated from farmland and has a pleasant aspect to the north the city centre. Many residents consider that public transport is a problem. The comparatively large number of empty houses in the area give it a delapidated appearance. There is no general purpose hall for community use in the area. There is no telephone box in the area. Stray dogs are a problem and stairs and footpaths are often fouled. There is a Chemist located in the The existing shops tend to have a very ocheme limited range of goods and are regarded as being expensive. 83% of the residents considered there should be more shops. 84.7% of residents requested a toddlers' There is plenty of open space within the schemes on which play play facility. areas could be re-established The area is within walking 83.6% of residents requested play distance of Hogganfield Loch facilities for older children. A Nursery School catering for 40 There is a waiting list of over 200 children is situated in the centre children for places in the nursery of the scheme school Only 54% of residents felt that they were within easy access of a doctor. One public house exists in the 81.9% of residents did not consider area there was sufficient social life in the area

continued/9....

ASSEDS

A full time community worker has been appointed for the area by Strathclyde Regional Council

There was a very active residents association in the area some years ago and many of the working members still live in the scheme. Currently there are three active residents groups.

35.7% of those wishing to leave would stay if area was improved

Only 2.2% of the population are leaving because of the lack of amenities

35.7% of people wishing to leave the area do so because of personal reasons not connected with the area. To live near relatives was

There is a fairly stable minority of long stay residents. 37.5% of residents have lived in the area for over 7 years.

There is a comparatively low rate of evictions, onlylll from July, 1976 to July 1977.

33.9% of residents have close relatives from previous addresses in the scheme

DEFICI NCIE:

There is a general feeling in the scheme that the area has deteriorated rapidly over the past five years. On previous occasions when the residents have tried to help themselves the support of the corporate approach had not been developed.

The existing play facilities have been seriously vandalised.

During the period from July, 1976 to July, 1977 the cost of housing repairs as a direct result of vandalism was £77,259.00

70% of residents stated that they wish to leave the area.

44.3% of all residents had filled in a transfer application form.

32.5% of people wishing to leave the area do so because of violence and vandalism in the scheme.

There is a comparatively high rate of abscondences, 129 between July, 1976 and July, 1977.

10% of all households are single parent families.

Unemployment is exceptionally high. 49.5% of the male economically active are unemployed.

Car ownership is low, only 6.5%

GARTHAMLOCK - A Suitable Case For Treatment

Despite a recent upsurge in communit spirit in the Housing Schemes we feel that we are being let down by the various ^District and Regional Council ^Department.

The local Church of Scotland and Catholic Church combined to raise the morale of a people who felt that the world was slipping by them, and they succeeded admirably in enabling people to help themselves by going out with their neighbours and making an <u>effort</u> to rectify the ravages of District and Regional indifference by tidying up the area and scrubbing off a considerable amount of graffitti (as some recent publicity has noted).

We are not prepared to let this scheme DIE - which is surely what will happen if no <u>immediate action</u> is taken - there is a point (rapidly approaching) which, when passed, no amount of money or energy will revitalise the area.

The people in Garthamlock are willing - but have been so consistently let down on all fronts that each time it is harder as the cry becomes "Why bother - nothing will be done anyway !"

After the latest Clean-up campaign - organised by the <u>local residents</u> - Housing Management at Easterhouse gave a written promise to start painting the closes and verandahs as a spur to encourage others to take an interest in improving the area - two months later - NOTHING, and no likely prospects of anything being done.

"Government cut-backs" is the current "in" phrase, the one which covers everything that the District and/or Region do not want to do, or have forgotten. Yet there was no" CUT-BACK" on supplying £600,000 for a nine hole golf course at Auchenlea Park (good luck to them!) - but let us get our priorities in order. Garthamlock, and surrounding area, need a damn sight more than a putting green, and if that sort of money can be found why not put it to REAL use and implement some of their own reports and recommendations.

In a Social Survey conducted by Housing Management, and approved by the District Council, it was recognised that,

"On previous occasions when the residents have tried to help themselves....support.....had not been developed".

The Report spoke boldly of the need to "re-establish self help and to create improved conditions and quality of life for all the residents" and went on to redommend that,

"Active support should be given to any residents' groups working to develop social activities".

and that,

"....the development of community concern and selfhelp are imperative. It is vital to foster the development and regeneration of residents involvement in order that the increasing deterioration of the area is arrested and that Garthamlock offers a reasonable standard of life for its residents".

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Commendable words, commendable intentions but where is the action? The residents have sought "active support" for their efforts, but without success: there have been the local efforts to re-establish self-help and develop community concern and develop residents' involvement - but where has the support been; what has happened to the recommendations and intentions of the Report drawn up, no doubt at some expense, and approved by the District Council. Yes - the District Council set up a WORKING PARTY.

/-

The Working Party was to be an answer to all our prayers, with direct access to Heads of Departments (District and Regional); cut through all the red tape; remove "brick wall" situations: and allow close contact meetings between the local authorities and local organisations.

In fact the local Garthamlock Working Party has met <u>ONCE</u> and that was very shortly after it was set up almost six months ago. As an exercise in wasting time and money it has been a roaring success as a help to us - a dismal failure.

The area still continues to deteriorate. There have been many reports of rats in the area, with some tenants having to be temporarily moved until their houses were cleared. With over 170 vacant houses (more than 10%) in the area this situation could soon escalate out of control.

It is not surprising that residents of Garthamlock begin to feel totally forgotten by the authorities. We do not even have a G.G.P.T.E. bus service with a resulting lack of access to Transcard facilities and adequate week-end services. The Scottish Bus Group operators, who have a monopoly in the area do not have week-end services as part of their rostered week. The Eastern Scottish have a monopoly of the services to Parkhead, and recently took advantage of this position to create a <u>circular</u> bus service which now takes 45/60 minutes instead of the previous 25/30 minutes, and it only travels through one part of the scheme.

Why do we not receive G.G.P.T.E. services when we are ratepayers? Both the old Glasgow Corporation, it its East End Study, and the P.T.E. in its "Exploratory Study on Transport for the Disadvantaged" recognised the inadequacy of the Garthamlock bus services. So where is the political will to improve the position of deprived areas NOW?

When the "silent majority" move - <u>beware</u> - there have even been residents considering the possibilities of raising legal actions against the District Housing Management Department for failing in their job of managing.

Given the will and incentive mountains can be moved - WE HAVE THAT WILL - the District and Regional Authorities must provide the incentives. Local efforts have effected a considerable reduction in local vandalism, with local schools surviving virtually unscathed, thanks to the efforts of local residents and youth groups, instead of the usual round of broken windows - a saving in this alone.

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We intend to fight on all fronts to make this a better place to live in - with decent amenities and facilities. At present we are not getting value for our rates, therefore, we intend petitioning for a mass reduction in our rateable values.

We will not be treated with indifference by the "City Fathers". We do not care at this moment for their grandoise plans for sometime in the future (and subject to further cutbacks). We require IMMEDIATE ACTION, which must be seen to be believed. We invite any and all of the Councillors of Glasgow to come up and see for themselves what we have to see every day ! (We will even supply a coach).

This Release is issued on behalf of:-

Garthamlock Community Council Saint Mungo's Catholic Church Garthamlock & Craigend East Church Darnaway St. Good Neighbours Assoc. Binns Rd/Bavelww St. Action Group Porchester St. Action Group Tillycairn St. Group Tattershall Road, Group. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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