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PERIPHERAL ESTATE DECLINE AND PLANNING:
A Critical Analysis of Housing Policy
in Glasgow

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Synopsis

This thesis is an attempt to fill a gap, from an academic
point of view, in the rather neglected subject of post-war
peripheral council housing development in Britain, and in
Glasgow in particular. It is divided into three sections
entitled "Construction"; "Decline" and "Re-planning and
Revitalisation", respectively, representing three phases in
the evolution of such estates.

In Part One (Chapters One and Two) the historic importance
of council housing in Glasgow is traced particularly with
respect to the relationship between industrial development
and housing. In Chapter One, emphasis is laid on the
contradictions associated with industrial expansion and
allocation of council houses to particular sections of the
population. The spatial manifestations of such differentiations
have implications for choice in a city-wide housing context today.
Chapter Two is concerned to a lesser extent with industry, and
more with ideological issues associated with the decision to
build the peripheral estates, particularly central and local
political motives and contemporary planning arguments.

Part Two (Chapter Three) deals with the physical decline
of peripheral estates since their construction with respect to
(a) Latent effects of variables outlined in Part One and (b)
Issues associated with implications of rising unemployment;
weakening fiscal base; child population growth; allocation
policy; socio-economic imbalance and the reputation for violence
and other anti-social behaviour. On this basis, a sociological
casual theory of decline in peripheral estates is suggested for
possible hypothesis testing in the future.

Part Three (Chapters Four and Five) attempts to utilise the
ideas set out in Parts One and Two to criticise recent policy app-
roaches operated by the District Council to deal with peripheral
estate problems, and to suggest some possibilities for more sensitive
solutions and additions to the current strategy. Among the major
criticisms are a weak theoretical and methodological base with which
to define problems and therefore attempt remedial planning. The
suggestions are made that a more even distribution of responsibility
within the corporate structure is necessary; that equal emphasis be
paid to the large rehousing inter-war tenement stock throughout the city
as well as the introduction of unorthodox sociological and psychological
planning approaches to deal with an issue of long-standing complexity.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In recent years, government concern - both central and local - has been growing for the future of the post war peripheral housing estates, found in the large provincial conurbations (e.g. Weinberger, 1973; Baldwin, 1974; Griffiths, 1975; Herbert, 1975; Malpass, 1976; SSHA, 1977; Attenburrow, Murphy and Simms, 1978).

Much of the research and action has been carried out by local authorities such as Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District Council. In the city of Glasgow there is a particularly large stock of local authority housing classed as "peripheral", and vacancy rates and demands for transfer out are rising steadily (e.g. Glasgow District Council, 1978c: Appendices 1 - 3). In addition, Glasgow suffers from unemployment and deprivation on a scale that is second to that of no other British city (e.g. West Central Scotland Plan, 1974).

At the same time, this discovery of council sector problems has co-incided with the preparation of Housing Plans in Scotland, and in these documents a more determined effort to rationalise the entire city housing stock is being made. The idea of a Housing Plan system emerged nationally from dissatisfaction with old housing policies, particularly in relation to finance; assessment of needs; size and distribution of dwellings; accessibility to the public stock for special groups and links between the public and private sectors to facilitate mobility and choice (e.g. Scottish Housing Advisory Committee, 1972). The production of the Plans has co-incided with the development of a more corporate approach to local government finance and administration, following rationalisation after the Paterson Report (in Scotland) and the Bains Report (in England and Wales).

Bearing the notion in mind that the entire local authority stock should be considered when analysing the problems of the peripheral estates, this thesis will explore the development and subsequent decline of the peripheral estates in Glasgow, analyse and assess the local solutions and suggest some alternative formulations of the problem. Some policy proposals will flow from this.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework used to analyse the issues draws heavily from sociology, particularly with respect to sociology of housing and planning and sociology in housing planning. The former incorporates a historical perspective based on economic and social history, planning and architectural principles, housing finance and political theory. Attempts will be made to include the last four into the more recent issues, particularly with respect to policy proposals.

There is some debate over the role of the sociologist in planning (e.g. Albrow, 1970; Faludi, 1970; Buttimer, 1971; Stewart, 1972; Pahl, 1975). Here, the notion that there is a conflict is accepted, but that it can be overcome. To some extent, this thesis is an attempt to explore the possibility that the sociologist can be both a critic of planning as practiced i.e. analysing from a neutral standpoint (sociology of) and a participant trying to suggest remedies for given planning problems (sociology in).

The discipline itself contains a varied number of theoretical perspectives and methodologies. In recent years the debate within urban sociology has centred upon the stances of Marxist and Weberian sociologists and specifically between Marxists such as Castells and "Managerialists" such as Pahl. The managerialist approach stresses Weberian notions such as the "actions" of individuals working in government organisations to explain for example the incidence of poverty or delays in policy application. The Marxist perspective relies on a "structural" explanation, i.e. that all urban problems are rooted in the relationship between two major classes in society i.e. bourgeois and the proletariat (e.g. Marx and Engels, 1967).

In this thesis, heavy reliance is placed on Weberian methodology, specifically the use of the "ideal type" to attempt to explain complex historical and contemporary phenomena. A concise explanation of the use of the ideal-type would take up a considerable amount of text. (See Weber, 1947: 339-40; Weber, 1949: 83-111; Fletcher, 1971: 428-455). By way of an example, the ideal-type bureaucratic structure is outlined in Appendix I (see also Pahl, 1975: Ch II for its application to regional planning). The major advantages of this method are:-

1. More applicable to the subject matter in that there is not
   a great deal of empirical evidence to attempt a Marxist
   critique.
2. Many of the ideas put forward in the ideal type may be
   useful as a starting point for the testing of hypothesis
   if and when empirical data becomes available. The ideal
   type is put up to be knocked down or qualified by future
   students of Glasgow's housing.

Finally, the managerialist approach may be of special
significance in Glasgow which has a long tradition of local
"Socialist"politicians who relied heavily on municipal agencies.
The relative "monopoly" of such politicians and agencies has
partially eradicated a private capital input in the affairs of
the city, and on that basis, a managerialist-oriented analysis
would seem pertinent.

PART ONE — CONSTRUCTION

INTRODUCTION

A comprehensive history of Glasgow's housing policies
is required, particularly of the local authority sector
which comprises some 195,000 of the city's entire stock
of 317,000 houses(Glasgow District Council, 1977b: 6 -7).
Although general histories have been produced by the city
council(e.g. Glasgow Corporation, 1966; 1975b), they have
not been particularly critical of allocation policy or
lack of tenure choice, and the repercussions this has
had in terms of choice within such a large stock. They
have certainly rarely considered the possibilities of
increasing turnover.

In Part One, an attempt is made to ask the fundamental
question: Why did the situation arise whereby council
houses in Glasgow became difficult to let? Was it because
of demand for owner occupation(e.g. Jones, 1976; Glasgow
District Council, 1977a)[1] or because of population movement
by those most likely to take up council tenancies? Or
again has there been a tradition of attempting to separ-
ate "good" tenants from "bad" tenants resulting in
ghettoisation?

The explanation of today's problems cannot be found in
a purely a-historical vacuum. Housing finance, design,
layout and allocation policies are historical phenomena
which must be viewed within a wider societal context in
economic, sociological and political terms. Consequently
one is forced to rely on a theory of society which takes
cognisance of historical change.[2] As a first step, the
motives behind massive council house building of differing
forms are traced.

CHAPTER I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF COUNCIL HOUSING IN GLASGOW

1. Housing Crisis and Municipal Reform 1860-1918

Checkland (1976) has traced the growth of "prosperity"[3]
in the 19th Century Glasgow to the prevalence of the following
factors:-

1. A lack of state intervention from the period 1875 - 1914
2. High standard of literacy among the workforce
3. Entrepreneurial ability, including an innovatory capacity
   in marine engineering
4. Discipline in the workplace
5. A lack of industrial conflict, and
6. A pride in skill and strong self-discipline on thepart
   of skilled workers.

Such conditions, he suggests were likely to promote:-

> ....a general feeling of well-being and
> confidence such that success induses further
> success....standards of living will rise,
> civic initiative will flourish, local taxation
> will have little inhibiting effect.
> (Checkland, 1976 : 1).

However, whilst there is some credence in this "ideal"
formulation, the ideal tends to infer an ideal situation of power for
local businessmen, rather than for the labouring classes particularly
the lowly paid. It is argued here that here were at this time, major
contradictions within the economic structure, particularly in relation
to housing. These were (1) The problem of locational movement of major
employers and the inability of builders and landlords to respond to the
change, and (2) Low pay for certain sections of the working class - both
skilled and un-skilled which resulted in an inability to rent houses
during a period of city-wide housing surplus.

Before 1860 there was already a considerable urban problem.
Housing, health and sanitary conditions were considered by many
observers to be amongst the worst in Western Europe and certainly
the worst in Britain (e.g. Select Committee on the Health of Towns,
1840: viii; Arnott, 1842: 8).

It was not until the early 1860s that the City Improvement
Trust, later the Housing Department,[4] gained the power to compulsory
purchase cramped dwellings and to replace them with new broader
streets and to build housing at lower density, triggering off in
Glasgow, a genesis of a town planning movement.

Meanwhile, population in the city and perhaps more importantly in the conurbation grew. In the city, the population stood at 547,000 in 1871; by 1891 782,000 and just over 1 million in 1914 (Checkland, 1976: 8). Much of this can be attributed to boundary extention, however, and Jones (1979) has suggested that density began to be much less of a problem after 1881, yet during this period of "prosperity" the Trustees were unable to satisfactorily deal with housing problems why? First Clydeside in the late 19th century was a region, one of continual change; of booms and depressions and the movement of the location of basic industries such as shipbuilding between 1895 and 1905. The John Brown yard at Clydebank was for example, required to find deep water to launch larger ships. This created a stir in the housing market, since such a shipyard was dependent upon securing skilled labour. There was a need to entice the pool of such workers away from central shipyards on the upper reaches of the Clyde. However despite the fact that the company agreed to have houses built for these workers in Clydebank, the rents being charged by the private landlords (Brown did not own them) were 10-20% higher in 1914 than in Partick or Govan (Melling, 1978: 12). The differences in wage rates within the same trade or between skilled trades often meant the difference between being able to afford a room-and-kitchen in one of the more "respectable" working class areas which were springing up in the building booms of the 1890's and early 1900's, [5] of which Clydebank was one or else having to crowd into tenements in the inner-city areas.[6] .

This contradiction may help explain why in 1911 there was an overall housing surplus in the city of around 11% falling to around 6% in 1914. In addition, private landlords were loathe to lower rents, partly because the bondholders who had invested money in construction were continually pressurising the landlords for higher returns of their investments [7] (Scott-Hunter, 1915: Evidence to the Committee). The landlords in turn raised rents to maintain their own position. The problems arising from these "contradictions" between and within the industrial and housing markets manifested themselves in large part in discrepancies between districts in terms of severity of overcrowding and attendant problems (e.g. Bremner, 1903; Chalmers, 1916), such as incidence of disease.

Depending upon how density was calculated[8]there were alarming
differences between districts, ranging from 10 to 296 persons
to the acre(Bremner, 1903: 8).

If low wages mean poor take-up of better quality houses,
and as overcrowding grows, external signs of squalor will
magnify. Allen(1965) suggests that civic dignitaries may
have felt that this problem was too close to their own resid-
ence for comfort. The growth of a middle class reform movement
bears witness to changing attitudes - for philanthropic reasons
or otherwise(e.g. Brockington, 1965; Gauldie, 1974) but it is
clear that morality and industrial efficiency were important
motives behind the provision of Corporation housing. The idea
of separating out "deserving" workers from the rest was upper-
most. Smart, speaking of the costs to the business community
of slum housing noted of such areas:-

> ....for the disease, drunkeness and crime
> engendered there we pay...rates...subscriptions
> ...expenses of justice. And we su er in
> our labour supply for good workers cannot
> be born and bred there. (Smart, 1902: 8)

Despitethe growth in a socialist party on the council,
newly constructed council dwellings were allocated to:-

> ....the well-to-do artizan class. Clerks,
> policemen, mechanics, shopkeepers and people
> who had between 24s and 30s per week. (Allen, 1965: 609)

But the move to building council houses on a large
scale in Glasgow only began after the outbreak of war in
1914, when the private landlords' association
raised rents in properties including those in more "respectable"
areas. A rent strike followed - though not for "socialist"
reasons - by the bastions of the "home front" war effort
who felt a sense of injustice at producing for the war effort
on the one hand and losing out to private rentiers on the other.
Private landlords bacame the target of em oyers anxious to
keep the steady influx of labour provided with cheap accomm-
odation. Such an explanation may explain the desire by polit-
icians to build on the slogan "homes fit for heroes", for it
seems that the "heroes" were not confined to the Western Front.

2. Inter-war Housing in Glasgow 1919 - 39

Having established a firm commitment to begin a
programme of council house building, attention focussed
on the following issues:-
1. Costs of building a house
2. Level of subsidy to be granted to the local authority
3. Size and style of housing to be built
4. Level of rent to be charged
5. Allocation
These factors are not mutually exclusive. Between the
wars the question of subsidies was often dependent upon
political ideology and was associated with building costs
(e.g. Headey, 1978: Ch 6). Similarly, size and style of
house,rents charged and allocation were not separable for
reasons which will become apparent. Here, no attempt is made
to delve into complexities of financial arrangements of the
inter-war acts(see Nevitt, 1966: Ch 6). There are some
aspects of fiscal policy which did have spatial manifest-
ations of status group differentiation according to house-
type in Glasgow,however.

Under the terms of the 1919 Act, Glasgow Corporation
was obliged to survey housing needs in the city. A
figure of 57,000 new houses to be built was accepted by the
Housing Committee. Of these 21,000 were to relieve overcrowding
15,000 to meet normal population growth and only 5,500 to
aid demobbed servicemen(Fisher, 1968). This shows that
as a proportion of the total candidates for new housing
only about 12% would be classed as "war veterns and their
families", lending weight to the notion that pressure to
build came from the interanl dynamics of the contradictions
previously outlined.

In the beginning, subsidies were relatively generous and
many "cottage" developments sprang up, but within a couple
of years, there was a dramatic upsurge in tenement construction,
as Table 1 shows:-

Table 1 Houses built under the 1923 Act by Rent and Style in Glasgow

(a)	"Ordinary"	No	(b)	"Rehousing"	No
	COTTAGES	936		COTTAGES	Nil
	FLATTED	600		FLATTED	556
	TENEMENTS	474		TENEMENTS	5,590

Source: Fisher, 1968 from Glasgow Corporation review of Operations, 1947.

This can be explained by the fact that building costs were particularly high after the war, as a result of war inflation and in Scotland, due to the fact that stone was preferred to brick. Therefore, it was cheaper to build at higher densities, thus providing accommodation more quickly whilst reducing costs of land purchase. In addition, lower rents could be charged in the rehousing schemes.

Accordingly when Labour assumed power for the first time in 1924, the Minister of Housing, John Wheatley announced an increase in the flat rate subsidy - in this case, £9.00 per annum per house for 40 years. This effectively meant the possibility of the construction of more cottage and flatted houses, since the local authority was no longer under pressure to "prove" the inadequacy of private enterprise before it could seriously enter the house building field.[9] In any case, the subsidy was considerably greater than it had been under the Chamberlain Act which granted a subsidy of £6.00 per house per year for 20 years to individuals who could build houses falling within certain minimum and maximum space standards. The notion of the construction of more "rehousing" tenements seems to have been abolished, as Table 2 shows:-

Table 2 Houses built under the 1924 Act by Rent and Style in Glasgow

(a)	"Ordinary"	No	(b)	"Intermediate"	No
	COTTAGES	3,221		COTTAGES	Nil
	FLATTED	7,992		FLATTED	1,928
	TENEMENTS	2,222		TENEMENTS	6,223
	totals	13,435			8,151

Source: Fisher, 1968 from Glasgow Corporation Review of Operations, 1947

Note however that there is still a preponderance of tenement construction In addition, the building of houses for sale under the subsidy scheme also

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flourished, but it is interesting to note that a great many more
"flatted" houses were completed. The housing built under this act
represents 42% of the total inter-war output - some 21,586 houses.
The fact remains however that there was no effort made to directly
deal with slum clearance which effectively meant that those more
likely to move would be more affluent sections of the working class.

The complexities associated with maximising output can be
gauged by the fact that Wheatley, a socialist, had to diplomatically
negotiate the increased entry of apprentices into the building
industry, with the unions involved. Thus, one should be under no
illusions that the construction of the cottage and flatted dwelling
on a large scale represented some vast improvement for the lower
paid sections of the working class. Indeed, many skilled workers too were left
behind or chose not to move for one reason or another.[10] What it did
achieve was a general easing of congestion in the city tenements and a
vastly improved standard of living for certain sections of the
population.

By 1930, under the "Greenwood" Act however the emphasis switched
to slum clearance once more. In addition to the provision of a subsidy
of £2.00 per person rehoused from a slum area, a 50% grant was given
to the local authority to speed up selective demolition or closure.
On top of this, a higher subsidy was granted for the erection of
three storey tenements on expensive inner city sites. It is the
case in Glasgow that a great many of the 1930/35 housing acts
properties are to be found squeezed in between the more desirable
cottage and flatted suburbs, and the pre-1919 sandstone tenements of the
city suburbs. Good examples of this can be seen at: e.g. Temple,
and elsewhere they are to be found indiscriminatly between old
tenement blocks, as in Shettleston, Dennistoun and Govan or on sites
surrounded by a great deal of open land as in Blackhill.

It can be generally argued that the rent structures of the
overall housing stock probably represented the income levels of the
tenants who first moved into them. If we accept that basic premise
then it is easy to see how thelower income groups - particularly in
the depression years - drifted into less desirable property, whilst
those with a higher status, and possibly a more secure job could
afford to remain in the better areas. We are now in a position to set
up an ideal type picture of local authority housing classes between 1919
and 1939, according to style, density, the predominant act under which they
were built, the rents and the class composition of the tenant.

IDEAL TYPE

Style	Density* (houses per acre).	Predominant Act	Rent per week	Social Class
COTTAGE	6 – 15	1924	Ordinary (13/9d-23/2d)	Clerical/ Skilled Worker.
FLATTED	11 – 20	1924/30/35	Intermed (10/6d-12/-)	Mixed.
TENEMENTS	20 – 29	1923/30/35	Rehousing (6/6d-8/9d)	Unskilled/ Unemployed labourers.

*Figures are averages collated from data collected by Morton (1968). The variations can be explained in terms of the actual mix of styles of houses in many of these schemes, though it is generally the case that tenements tend not to conform to this.

Table 3 shows the construction of types of house:-

Table 3 Total numbers of local authority houses built in Glasgow, 1919-1939 by style and rent category.

Rent Category	COTTAGE	FLATTED	TENEMENT
ORDINARY	7,419.	11,338	4,522
INTERMEDIATE	867	4,178	8,441
REHOUSING	12.	738	13,833
totals	8,298	16,254	26,796

Source: Collated from figures extracted from Glasgow Corporation review of operations, 1947 by Fisher.

Contemporary observers have noted the distinctions associated with quality of housing and rents charged:-

(a)"Normal houses for "selected" tenants rents from about 13/9d to 23/2d (b) What have been called "Intermediate" houses also for "selected" tenants removed from over-

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PLATE 1: Inter-war "cottage" housing(modernised)
North Carntyne. These houses are among
the most sought after in the city.

PLATE 2: Inter-war "flatted" style(modernised)
North Carntyne.

Over/-

> crowded houses, not necessarily in slum
> areas, rents from about 10/6d to about
> 12/- and (c) Rehousing for "unselected"
> tenants dispossessed by clearances, rents on a
> still lower scale from about 6/6d to 8/9d
> per week all including rates ....
>   It is obvious that houses in the third
> class .... are within the reach of the poorer
> paid wage earners who may be driven out of
> their homes by clearances. (Chalmers and Mann .
> 1933:21)"

Thus we may conclude that the vast majority of council houses
were constructed for the poorest sections of the population. In
addition there were substantial differences in the external appearance
and internal standards of these types of development:-

> ...Striking differences exist among the pre-war
> houses in terms of external appearance, and to
> some extent their internal amenities. The
> majority of rehousing houses are 2 and 3 storey
> tenements, built of plain grey concrete block-
> work. About $\frac{2}{5}$ of the intermediate houses are
> also tenements, although these are slightly
> more elaborately designed and may have bay
> windows....In the case of those built under
> the 1938 Act, the houses have a more "modern"
> appearance, and have red aggregate added to the
> concrete blocks to give a more pleasing appearance.
> The smaller number of ordinary tenements are more
> complex in design and have ornamented bay windows.
> (Strathclyde Regional Council, 1978c: Ch 8, Appendix
> II).

It has already been mentioned that a possible reason for the
large numbers of tenements constructed over the period was the
shortage of land low quality costs of building materials and the
eagerness of Glasgow district to deal with its massive housing
headache. However, we have also suggested that this was largely
a political move to satisfy certain sections of the population.
The poorest now had a house with a bath and a toilet but were
separated from the "respectable" working class. This effectively
re-established pre 1914 status divisions between workers in
spatial terms.

14.

PLATE 3: An example of superior finish "ordinary"
rent tenement, Riddrie

PLATE 4: Constrasting "rehousing" rent tenement
off Old Shettleston Road

PLATES 5 and 6 show clearly the distinctions which
exist between housing classes in
Glasgow. Above(plate 5) is prest-
igious Riddrie. Below(plate 6)
separated by a motorway, the
notorious Blackhill, revealing that
the inter-war stock has serious
imbalances which add to the problems
associated with post-war housing.

In addition, whilst the **poor** were being squeezed into
the slum clearance areas of the intermediate zone i.e. between
the "respectable" pre-1919 tenement areas and the cottages,
the wealthiest sections of the middle class utilised the benefits
of the private house-building boom and moved out of the city
altogether to greenfield sites where rates were much lower. A
great deal of the impetus for this boom can be traced back to the
Chamberlain and Wheatley subsidies for private enterprise
building (e.g. Dickens, 1977; Issarachoff, 1977). On the basis
of that evidence therefore, the notion that the state
satisfactorily aided the poor can be challenged. Indeed by
pursuing a rehousing policy within the city and reducing the
city's rate generation capacity an increasing burden fell on
the manual sections of the working class and on those clerical
workers who chose to remain within the city boundaries.

Summary

As a result of industrial expansion and population growth, enormous demands were placed upon private landlords and builders in Glasgow. As the associated problem of overcrowding and disease affedted sustained production and morality, the building of council houses became a means of solving the contradictions of the so-called age of prosperity. It seems to have co-incided with a socialist movement pledged to providing an alternative to hardship associated with profit-making in private housing.

The period 1919 - 39 saw the first major drive in achieving those goals, but the houses tended to be allocated according to income and "deserts" which were apparently never challenged by the socialists. Any subsequent discussion on the house letting crisis in the city should condider the effects of this grading, and more importantly the vastly varying quality of the housing stock in terms of "desirability", given that inter-war dwellings take up almost half the total public rented stock in the city today.

CHAPTER II

THE POST-WAR ERA - HOUSING POLICY, DISPERSAL, INDUSTRIAL
CONTRACTION AND THE PERIPHERAL ESTATES IN GLASGOW.

Introduction

The period 1945 - 1960 is pertinent to the detailed
discussions on the causes of and solutions to the problems
confronting us in the peripheral estates today. It is
during this period that "planning" in both its "town" and
"regional" senses begins to influence housing policy. We
have already shown that the approaches taken to Glasgow's
housing problems between 1860 and 1939 were ineffectual and
produced in spatial terms two sides of local authority housing
- the "desirable" and the "undesirable" property, a problem
which still has repercussions today in terms of choice between
house-types in the overall stock (i.e. including the private
sector).

At the end of the war, however, there was a general
feeling of relief followed by a euphoria, rising expectations
and a growth in employment. However, the task which lay ahead
of central and local government particularly in relation to
Glasgow and the Clyde Valley was probably underestimated, and it
can be argued that this has lead to certain latent contradictions
appearing in spatial terms e.g. in empty council houses built in
the post war era on theperiphery of the city and a high incidence
of unemployment and "deprivation" in these areas.

1. Housing Policies 1943 - 1960

In what ways have Scottish Office and Glasgow Corporation
housing policies contributed to the construction of the peripheral
estates in the form that they took? To answer this question, one
must look not simply at broad policy decisions relating to density
and provision of amenities but also to the minutiae of standards
of internal construction, design and layout. We need particulars
to look at housing allocation policies for reasons which will
become apparent, and to ask basic questions about the prevalent
assumptions relating to choice and finance.

(a) Housing Policy Goals

Early attempts to foster a "comprehensive" approach to
housing stressed the need for community planning and
rationalisation of new build according to the location of
industry e.g. distance from workplace, and the idea of
expanded and new towns(Scottish Housing Advisory Committee,
1943). Later follow-up reports stressed the form that the
new-build should take(e.g. SHAC, 1944).

The latter document took particular account of the
probable strategy for towns and cities, and whilst conceding
that the cottage development was the most popular house-
type in Scotland, tenement construction was a more attractive
proposition, for in the short-run it would overcome the
chronic problems associated with bomb-damanged property and
the lost building years. But the committee stressed the need
for communal facilities and the infil of the large amount
of space around tenement blocks. They suggested that
housing departments appoint resident caretakers to maintain
the property, and provide communal gardens which could be maintained
by the local authority. The committee was wary of the possibility
of cutbacks in internal standards such as that of sound
insulation.

But the major impetusfor such development was probably
the question of costs. It was becoming clear that the entire
building industry needed reviewed:-

> We...hope that the most energetic examination
> of the whole question of building costs will
> be undertaken so that the full standards
> which we have formulated may be attained
> at the earliest possible dates (SHAC, 1944: 69)

Alas no proper examination ever appeared, and despite
the building boom of the 1950s, the costs of completing
an average family house have soared, resulting often in
a lowering of standards. Just as now, the building industry
in Britain then, was subject to the vagaries of imperfect
market knowledge resulting in shortages of crucial materials;
an uncertain labour force experiencing cyclical and
seasonal unemployment, who then went back into more predictable
labour market situations, so creating a shortage of labour
at crucial times and the problems associated with a damp
climate.

So what were the stumbling blocks to the achievement of these ideas? To answer that one must look at the wider regional planning context between 1945 and 1959.

(b) Regional Policy and Municipal Ideology.

(i) Conflict between Planners

Within the context of an overall regional strategy to employment and housing, the genesis of a two-pronged strategy of population dispersal was implemented. In relation to this two documents stand out: viz;
1. The Corporation of Glasgow First Planning Report (The Bruce Plan) 1945, and
2. The Clyde Valley Plan (Abercrombie Plan) 1946.

By 1943, the Secretary of State, Thomas Johnston had set up the Clyde Valley Planning Advisory Committee [11]. The brief: to set up a comprehensive plan for the region. Two leading planners of the day Patrick Abercrombie and the architect, Robert Matthew were given the task of preparing the plan. Abercrombie wanted Glasgow to be re-developed at net densities of:-

Central Zone	–	120 persons per acre
Intermediate Zone	–	90 persons per acre
Outer Zone	–	60 persons per acre

(see map 1)

However, despite the fact that Abercrombie had based these projected densities on figures supplied by Robert Bruce, the City Engineer and Master of Works, they disagreed on the amount of land to be made available to realise these densities. Bruce in his plan had assumed that the city would be built to its limits, taking up a large amount of what Abercrombie wished designated as "greenbelt". According to Abercrombie, the greenbelt was necessary for two reasons. First, to preserve good agricultural land, and second to prevent "urban sprawl" i.e. the amalgamation of towns in the Clyde Valley. He believed that Glasgow was too large, and outlined an appropriate greenbelt.

Drumchapel

Knightswood

Yoker

Maryhill

Spring

Hyndland

Partick

Govan

Kinning Park

Anderston

Penilee

Gorbals

B

Shawlands

Pollok

Priesthill

Castlemil

This meant that there would only be room for 750,000 people within
the city. In order to achieve net residential densities no higher
than 120 per acre in the central area, it was argued that some half
million people would have to be displaced to beyond the city
boundaries, and the greenbelt.

Meanwhile Bruce argued that these people could be dispersed
to the outer zone but still at a density of 60 per acre, but this
would not be possible if the green belt philosophy were applied.
In addition, Bruce favoured the continued construction of
tenements on the grounds that communal open space and room for roads
was a necessary condition for effective planning.

> ....''Density'' and ''Houses[12], versus Flats''
> both meet on the common ground of ''allocation
> of open space about buildings....''. The
> smaller area per dwelling required for flats
> and likewise the smaller road requirements, result
> in their being, for a given number of persons per
> acre, a higher proportion of open space available
> when flats are built instead of houses. Thus,
> ''building up'' secures a more open lay-out and more
> compact servicing. (Glasgow Corporation, 1945: 56)

Elsewhere in his report, Burce argues a case for the infill of
all this vacant land, which never materialised. He did, however, in
this report add fuel to the notion that tenemental development was
''good for the people of Glasgow'' who had always been used to living
in tenements:-

> ....Any proposal to plan on the basis of 'no
> more tenements' would utterly fail to cater
> for the class of people who would always choose
> a good tenement dwelling to a house with a
> garden. Such a basis of planning would have
> further weaknesses. It would assuredly hinder
> the rate at which dwellings could be provided
> at a time when a house famine exists(Glasgow
> Corporation, 1945: 57)

Bruce's assumptions and the publications of the Director
of Housing (Bradbury, 1948) found eager audience in local MPs
and Councillors, who, between the late 40s and early 50s found
their most common source of complaint from constituents to be
unsatisfactory housing. Bruce's argument that it was above all
cheap was perhaps the most convincing. A recent Labour Party
publication sums up the problem of pressure for new houses in
Glasgow at this time:-

'Some of the houses produced were not
beautiful. But beauty was considered
a luxury be' a family living in one room.
Only those who lived close to the problem
can understand the immense strains which
overcrowding placed on individuals and
families. (GDC Labour Group – Housing
Discussion Document III; 1978: Preface).

However, despite the apparent favouring of regional planning
ideas such as the creation of new towns, which did come about
despite conflict with Glasgow Corporation after the designation
of East Kilbride, many of the equally important tenets, relating
to community planning within the city boundary put forward in the
Clyde Valley Plan were almost totally ignored by the Corporation. A
reading of that section of the Plan reveals a surprisingly modern
approach to the construction of peripheral estates. Such planning
tenets were put forward as the separation of fast-moving traffic
from local traffic; recommendations of gross densities of 30 to the
acre; housing to take the form of a balance between flats and
cottages; flats to be sited adjacent to open spaces; park and school
playing facilities to be associated with one another in open space
systems; old peoples' houses to be near shops and main parks, and the
importance of a township centre in the phasing of the development.
As early as 1944 in the consultants' interim report in central – local
housing terms criticisms had been levelled at the SSHA for failing
to take the initiative to encourage local authorities. By 1946,
the consultants were being critical of some of the sites picked
by local authorities, in particular the notion that the schemes
proposed did not appear to be integrated with existing developments
i.e. villages. This was particularly true of Drumchapel for
example. Another source of worry was the lack of obvious signs of the
integration of various community facilities; carefully considered
layout or landscaping.

Yet despite these warnings and an attempt to suspend development
of areas such as Garscadden, Castlemilk and Toryglen, until long-
term regional plans had been prepared, the Corporation went ahead.
Why? Apart from the arguments of Bruce, other factors were relevant.
In terms of scale of building and public rented tenure, local
councillors were influential. In terms of the planning and maintenance
of the estates, responsibility rested with the Housing Department.

(ii) Private Development <u>versus</u> Public Ownership.

The consequence of failing to promote wider tenure choice
particularly owner occupation for the wealthier sections of the
working class before and after 1945 created two problems. First,
it tended to force out of the city boundaries those who aspired
to owner occupation, and second, those who could have afforded to
buy a house were often subsidised in the form of low rents, which
historically weakened the generation of revenue to finance better
council house building for the poor, and also ensured that the
"least deserving" had to wait longer than necessary for a new
house.

We must look at the ideological reasons for building such vast
numbers of council houses. There are two "ideal" possibilities:-

1.   Political Empire Building i.e. vote-catching. In the same way
      that Harold Macmillan encouraged a "numbers" game to assure a
      national Conservative majority in the 50s, a similar model may
      be applied to local Labour Councillors in Glasgow. By building
      new estates on the periphery especially for the traditional
      Labour vote, the Party could ensure concentrations of "safe"
      seats and so help the Corporation Labour Party to maintain
      overall control of the city.

2.   Socialist Ideology. This explanation entails the idea that
      renting from the local authority was truly a "socialist"
      alternative to the uncertainties and inequalities associated
      with private renting and owner occupation, both being synonymous
      with "private property". The explanation implies a sense of
      social justice as the dominant rationale.

No real evidence is available to support either of these
theories, with both major political parties anxious to discredit
the other in manifestos and publications and to offer platitudes
for past misdeeds. One should keep an open mind therefore on this
issue. It seems likely that there is truth in both explanations.
There can be no denying for example, that the Labour Party ignored
the possibility that some sections of theworking class could have
benefitted from owner occupation, which may well have reduced the
size of the problem. Unfortunately, it seems that the ideology of
council housing as a "good thing" blinded party members to the long
term problems associated with a declining economy and an unacceptable
lack of community facilities.

In addition, they failed to realise that the more borrowing
required to build more council houses, the greater the loan
debt repayments for the city as a whole and therefore the
greater the rates burden without any appreciable raising of
living standards through the provision of services and
facilities.

Equally however, the reputation and tradition for
radicalism on the part of the Labour Party on Clydeside
(e.g. Middlemas, 1965), may well have been best exemplified
by the desire to replace capitalism with a socialist alternative,
but it may also have been the case that the idealists failed
to appreciate the difficulties associated with finance and the
possibility that the economy would decline. It is probably true
that no-one on Clydeside believed that shipbuilding would
collapse until it actually happened in the early 1960s (e.g.
Alexander and Jenkins, 1970: 13).

However, a further twist is that despite the proclamations
of equality through council house building, there were sufficient
contradictions within the Labour Party to render the concept
hypocritical. Damer's (1974: 227) encounters with councillors
show this, as does the recent house-letting scandal (e.g. Glasgow
Evening Times, March 15, 1979: 5) which first hit the headlines
just over a year ago and is still a subject of much controversy.
All this has seriously undermined the integrity of the councillors
and caused embarrassment within the Labour Party.

(c)   The Decision to Build.

Abercrombie meanwhile recommended the construction of four self-contained new towns, the remaining towns to mop up the surplus population being designated "expanded" or receptor towns. At the discussion table of the CVPA Glasgow on the advice of Bruce and perhaps through fear of losing status as the "second city of the empire" in terms of population, opposed the notion of overspill and greenbelt. However, the Scottish Office favoured new town development, and despite Glasgow's decision to take the designation of East Kilbride to a public enquiry in 1947 the political tide had turned nationally to approving the New Towns Act of 1946, and the setting up of new town development corporations.

However, Abercrombie's plans to build the other three towns were thwarted by a cutback in expenditure following the dollar crisis in 1949. By 1951 a Conservative government was re-elected pledged to outbid the Labour Party in terms of the numbers of new council houses to be built (e.g. Headey, 1978: 146-149). At the same time, it was decided as a matter of principle not to build any more new towns in Scotland under the 1946 act, however, in Glasgow, changing attitudes were in the air, as pressure built up to build more and more houses on the "sacred cow" of the greenbelt. It was further argued that the policy of building prefabricated houses at low density was wasteful of urban land — this despite the fact that it was SHAC who recommended their construction in the first place. Finally, it became obvious that the only alternative was to build upwards as Bruce had recommended, but at this time, the financial constraints prevented the widespread construction of multi-storey flats (i.e. over 6 storeys in height). Indeed, it was not until 1956 that a special subsidy was granted for buildings over 6 storeys in height.

It became obvious that the only form of construction within the city which suited the density requirements and suited the city's finances and the subsidy regulations under the 1946-62 Housing Acts was the tenement — built at 3 and sometimes 4 storeys on the only available land left in the outer zone. [13] This is not to suggest that there was no vacant land in or around the housing left available for community and play facilities. It is true that there are large tracts of land owned by the District Council and it true that around 80% of the land where a typical tenement block is built and is designated either "private garden" or "communal" drying/open space.

The method by which such housing could be rapidly
constructed could only be achieved by reducing standards
such as lowering ceiling heights, cutting back on insulation,
and reducing the overall floor-space, (See Ministry of Health,
1956: 7-20) and this was exactly the mehtod employed by the
Ministry of Housing to increase the numbers of council houses
built, (e.g. Brittan, 1964: 328). It may be argued that this
was done purely to placate the electorate, particularly in the
older industrial areas where the problems of overcrowding and
disease were still very much apparent.

The actual construction of the peripheral estates was
staggered over the period 1948 to 1975 (excluding Darnley).
The major estates were built between the following periods:
Drumchapel: November 1953 to May 1961; Castlemilk: January
1955 to September 1975 and Easterhouse: October 1956 to
September 1974. The most notorious "pockets of deprivation"
schemes were built as follows: Garthamlock: February 1954 to
January 1963; Nitshill: February 1960 to January 1962 and
Priesthill: March 1948 to August 1972. The decision to
build having been taken, at least from a policy point of
view, the scene switched to town planning in the core area of
the city.

The tide towards town planning began to turn when
architect/planner A. G. Jury was appointed to head the new
department of Planning and Architecture in Glasgow. It was
the planning section of this department in particular which
set up and put into action the principle of the Comprehensive
Development Area in the city, as outlined in the Development Plan
Review in 1960 and it is true that in a bid to sensitively
renew the inner city, most of the planning and architectural
effort went into this aspect of the redispersal philosophy.
As such, the planners had little to do with the design of the
peripheral estates. In fact, the actual layout of the schemes
rested with a handful of architects in the architecture side of the
department. The actual financial responsibility and the
allocation mechanism for the peripheral estates rested almost
entirely with the housing management department and the
Administration and Legal Offices as it does today. Thus,
"planning" in its town planning sense concentrated on urban

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renewal rather than with the serious issue of planning on the
periphery of a city in new communities - a paradox which is
still with us today, with planners only just beginning to take
an interest in these areas and recently shown in the production
of the city-wide housing plan and the peripheral estates report.

Just at that time Glasgow once more opened up negotiations
with the CVPA, and it was accepted that Abercrombie's model was
the only realistic compromise given the Scottish Office's
determination to stick to the green belt philosophy. Subsequently
it was decided to construct another new town at Cumbernauld
specifically to cream off the excess population in the city and to
forge links with receptor towns to take on overspill.

2. The Post-War Economy and Regional Policy 1960-1979

Despite the fact that during the period following the
war, local industries kept apace of technological change
(e.g. Slaven, 1975: Ch9) and that unemployment in West
Central Scotland remained constantly low by present day
standards - an average of 3.5% between 1947 and 1957 - by the
late 1950s there were signs that Clydeside, and indeed the
British economy as a whole was less productive in terms of Gross
National Product than competitors with similar industrial bases.
In the Glasgow area in particular the following problems emerged:-

1. Certain industries, particularly shipbuilding, marine
   engineering and allied industries began to experience a
   collapse in output,

2. Lack of new industries coming to West Central Scotland,
   and Glasgow in particular.

3. Such industry as was left, particularly in the east
   end of the city tended not to wish to move out of
   congested area possibly because of low rent and rates
   in old sites.

With the switch in national economic policy away from the
full employment/stop-go approach to controlling economic growth,
by fiscal and monetary measures in the late 50s to a policy of
growth through productivity, Glasgow was one of least able cities
in Britain to respond. Glasgow, it may be recalled, historically
had a labour-intensive, specialised economy which was particularly
susseptible to major economic swings and depressions, but whereas
the war economy had revitalised it and there had for a time been
a demand for such work, there came a point where these industries
and government were unable to redress the above problems.

Cameron (1973) however, argues that the "structural" explanation
alone is insufficient to explain the decline of the economy. He
suggests that the historical problems of lack of job security, low
incomes and limited job opportunities have helped force the
economically active to seek a better overall deal elsewhere. He
argues that this will leave those least able to form new companies
in the city, and this will lead to stagnation of ideas, managerial
ability and effective investment. Secondly, there seems to be little
new investment on Clydeside from migrant industry, and third, labour
costs are relatively high in relation to productivity.

Of these three explanations, the first and second are certainly valid. The third however, would appear to be a product of the first, i.e. the overall feeling that it is low wages, and therefore less demand for goods and services, for example in terms of low car-ownership, which forces workers to demand compensation in the form of higher wages. Secondly, there is no real explanation in the analysis of the relationship between man efficiency and technology. How do you go about separating poor investment in tool technology from "unwillingness to work" and/or tradition of work discipline (e.g. Roy, 1955; Braverman, 1975). A major factor may be the notion that, in the past, when Clydeside was an extremely productive area, especially in wartime, that the proper rewards such as higher wages should have been granted as a form of incentive if only to compensate for the housing market paradox outlined earlier.

Research into the structural problems is plentiful (e.g. Toothill 1961, McCrone, 1965, Kaldor, 1970, West Central Scotland Plan, 1974), though not so the question of out-migration, especially from peripheral estates. Smith and Farmer (1975) have however, shown on a general level that overspill and out-migration has resulted in an imbalance in the age structure of Glasgow and also the proportions of certain socio-economic groups. They noted, for example, from an analysis of the 1966 sample census and the 1971 census, that a disproportionate number of the economically active age-group between 15 and 44 moved out of the city i.e. 57.9% as opposed to 43.3% for the city as a whole in 1966 and 37.9% in 1971. Taking the analysis one stage further, they showed that in socio-economic band one (i.e. employers, managers of large companies and professionals) 20% were out-migrants between 1961 and 1966 compared to only 8% in the adult male population in Glasgow in 1966. Most of these individuals appear to have moved to the suburbs rather than the new towns since only 3% of that group had moved to new towns between 1959 and 1971. However, it appears that those in band two (i.e. foremen, supervisors and skilled manual workers)were by far the biggest overspill migrants (52% between 1959 and 1971). This undoubtedly left many more unskilled people in the city since the numbers moving out from that group remained consistent with the numbers who stayed.

In addition, housing management figures show that between
December 1959 and December 1977, 10,000 nominated Glasgow families
migrated to Cumbernauld; 6,700 moved to East Kilbride;[14]
Linwood received 2,453; Johnstone; 1,769; Erskine; 1,430;
Livingston: 1,382 and Irvine: 976. It is a plausible argument
to suggest that new town development corporations tended to
rake off the most active, skilled and professional sections of
the population - particularly skilled manual workers. That
this was a deliberate policy can be deduced from the fact that
these areas received roughly double the number of nominees than
those who were accepted. Why? Was it simply through the require-
ments of migrant industry, or was there an attempt to ensure that
the "undeserving" poor were excluded from the new town, which
historically has been associated with the notion of a utopia
(e.g. Cherry, 1970: 9-19) i.e. "a clean break" from the city form
which was seen to bring out the worst side of human nature.

Even if this was not the case, Glasgow city had the additional
headache of actually helping to finance the moves of the accepted
nominees by paying a subsidy for each family rehoused in the
receptor towns. Meanwhile, the new town development corporations
had finance and manpower to help attract new industry, which in
theory might have moved to Glasgow had the city possessed the
finance and the expertise, as wellas suitable industrial sites.

There can be no denying that there is a feeling within
Glasgow District and Strathclyde Region that there has been an
imbalance in population movement particularly in relation to
employment (Strathclyde Regional Council, 1977b: 13-27).
Accordingly it has been suggested that future development of new
towns be cut back.

Summary

Despite the optimism of Scottish housing policy advisors in the early 1940s, the problems associated with overcrowding and rising expectations put great pressure on local authorities to provide new housing on an unprecedented scale. In Glasgow, the combination of central directives to cut standards and build cheaply were encouraged by local political ideology. Unfortunately, the massive construction of tenements on the periphery was not backed up by the promised service and community facility provision, and it was made worse by the exclusion of town planners and leisure and recreation departments such as parks. The housing department was left with too much to do without the expertise and finance to carry out the job.

Despite early attempts by regional planners to deal with such problems by forseeing the paramount importance of pre-planning in such estates, the impasse was compounded by the contraction of the local economy, which the regional planners had been trying to improve by redispersal beyond the greenbelt. Unfortunately, the success story of the new towns has helped create population imbalance within the manual sections of the working class in the city although this is probably more a function of demands for labour and selection proceedures than of the planning objectives.

Notes (Part One)

Chapter One

1. The term is, however problematical particularly in Glasgow, where
    renting a home has been a long-standing tradition. One cannot
    ascertain, satisfactorily whether or not the desire to become a
    home owner is a function of dissatisfaction within the range of
    choice in the public sector stock or whether it represents a
    definite change in tenure aspiration.

2. In particular the work of Max Weber: Weber, 1949; Gerth and Mills,
    1946.

3. The term is not satisfactorily defined in the work, but it seems
    to refer to the Weberian "ideal" situation, where the wealth
    procured by businessmen eventually filters down to the labouring
    classes.

4. The City Improvement Trust passed through a number of stages:
    City Improvement Department (1916); City Improvement Department
    (1919) - Factors/Housing Department - land acquisition, design,
    layout, building supervision and maintenance. The City Impro-
    vements Department became known as the City Factor's Department
    responsible for letting and transfers. This was the case until
    1953 when a reorganisation of all the major departments in the
    Corporation took place. Subsequently, a new planning and
    architecture department was set up, with the two former housing
    departments merging to become essentially factors who also
    carried out maintenance and repairs and called the Housing
    Management Department, the form today. Recently an Environmental
    Reviltalisation/Community Development section has been added.

5. The biggest building booms were in the 1870s, with a depression
    setting in after 1878. In the early 1890s construction picked
    up again, sinking once more in the latter half of the decade,
    and finally booming again between 1901 and 1905.

6. E.g. Old Govan, Kinning Park, Anderston and Gorbals.

7. It was argued, evidence to the committee by John Wheatley,
    later Minister of Housing, that two thirds of any property
    in Glasgow was owned by "bondholders". Thus, they received
    two thirds of the total rent of that property. The property
    owner, he argued, put the case forward, that since the bond-
    holders had chosen to increase the rate of interest, that the
    landlord had to increase the rent accordingly to maintain his
    present standard of living.

8. The ambiguity arises over the distinction between "gross" and
    "net" density.

9. Under the 1923 and 1924 Acts subsidies were granted to private
    builders to build for sale. In addition, under the Chamberlain
    Act, local authorities were obliged to "prove" that they could
    build houses more cheaply than private enterprise before being
    granted permission to build for public renting.

10. Some workers may well have preferred not to move out to the suburbs
    simply because they felt they were "too far away" from traditional
    tenement way of life, leisure pursuits and so on.

Notes (Part One)

Chapter Two

11.   Made up of representatives from the eighteen local
        authorities in the conurbation at that time.

12.   Houses may be defined as single, semi-detached or terraced,
        while Flats implies housing in blocks rising several
        stories off the ground and in the traditional tenement
        form.

13.   The exception being Milton, which is largely composed of
        two-storey terraced houses.

14.   This in addition to a further 10,000 under separate agreements
        with individual families and those sucked in under the 1947 Act.

PART TWO - DECLINE

INTRODUCTION

In this section, an attempt will be made to link latent
historical problems outlined in Part One with issues which
have cropped up over the period since the estates were first
constructed. There will be a discussion on the "official"
views of the problem of deprivation and a short critique of
the use of census indicators. Some additional possibilities
will be aired, with respect to housing policy in Strathclyde.
An attempt will then be made to apply some of these notions
to the development of a large peripheral estate in Glasgow.

CHAPTER III

LATENT PROBLEMS, DEPRIVATION, REPUTATION AND DECLINE IN PERIPHERAL
ESTATES IN GLASGOW.

1.   Latent Problems

Figure I shows a typology of latent influences affecting
the development of slum clearance estates and peripheral
estates in Glasgow in particular.

FIGURE I   LATENT INFLUENCES AFFECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SLUM
CLEARANCE AND PERIPHERAL ESTATES IN GLASGOW: AN IDEAL
TYPOLOGY.

Category of Problem	Component	Source of Problem
1. ECONOMIC/CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS (STRUCTURAL)	**1.** Impending decline of heavy manufacturing sector.	Plant obsolence/lack of ideas/decline in world markets for traditional products
	*2. Financial weakness of local authority to raise funds to build to higher standards, provide social back-up services and community facilities.	Contradictions in local housing market/ neglect of property/ lack of owner occupation/borrowing on open market/central government political strategy.
2. IDEOLOGICAL (LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL)	1. Selective dispersal of Glasgow workforce on a regional basis according to position in the labour market.	New Town Corporation Officials/Company demands for types of labour.
	2. Pushing of greenbelt principle at a time when demand for housing on the periphery reached all-time high.	Regional Planners' Ideology in conflict with politicians desire to maintain population levels.
	*3. Lack of variation in dwellings.	City Architects/Lack of foresight by SHAC
	*4. Lack of town planning input to estates	Planner shortage
	5. Concentrations of 4 and 5 apartments in given clusters.	Housing Management ? Planners? Architects? Councillors ("numbers game")
	*6. Tradition of low-grade housing for /"least deserving"	Housing Management/ Councillors
	*7. Lack of good factor/tenant relationship.	Housing Management - lack of professionalism/Housing Management "Responsibility overload".
	*8. Lack of tenure choice in city as a whole	City Councillors

* Considered to be an important issue in the period 1860 - 1939.
** Near-collapse in period 1929 - 1935.

FIGURE IIa   FIRST ORDER PROBLEMS IN THE CREATION OF SLUM CLEARANCE
ESTATES; PARTICULARLY OF POST-WAR ESTATES ON PERIPHERY

Category of Importance	Component	Major Effect	Major Constraint(s)
1. STRUCTURAL	Fiscal Weakness	Poor quality of environment/ lack of community services & facilities	Central govt. housing policy/declining rates base.
2. IDEOLOGICAL	High Child Density	Destruction of local environment/demand for facilities	Fiscal Weakness

FIGURE IIb   SECOND ORDER PROBLEMS IN THE CREATION OF SLUM CLEARANCE
ESTATES; PARTICULARLY OF POST-WAR ESTATES ON PERIPHERY

Category of Importance	Component	Major Effect	Why Less Important
1. STRUCTURAL	Impending economic decline	Poverty	Does not set in immediately
2. IDEOLOGICAL	Selective dispersal	Socio-economic inbalance	"Poaching" from peripheral estates some time after construction
	Greenbelt philosophy	High Density promotion	More justifiable in terms of protecting agricultural land/ difficult site conditions/assumption that population would continue to grow and that economy would not decline
	Architectural "bankruptcy"	Monotonous housing casuing mental depression/feeling of entrapment	Not important at point of entry/ architects did what they could under the circumstances of pressure and lack of money. (See Fig. IIa Structural)
	Lack of town planning input	Imbalance between housing and other community inputs	Unavoidable – planner shortage at the time

FIGURE IIb – 2. IDEOLOGICAL/ CONTINUED ,.,,...

Category of Importance	Component	Major Effect	Why Less Important
	"Deserts" in housing allocation.	Pockets of "difficult" tenants	Less apparent than in 1930/35 slum clearance estates
	Lack of good tenant/factor relations	Loss of faith in integrity of housing management	Not apparent until "crisis"/Easily dealt with – professionalisation
	Lack of Tenure Choice	Construction of too many rented tenements at time when aspirations were rising	Tradition of renting – "demand" for owner occupation not necessarily equated with "embourgoisment"

Explanation of Figures 1 and 2

Having already identified major historical problems associated
with the construction of the peripheral estates, these may be
simplified into two categories viz;

    1. Structural   and

    2. Ideological.

Both categories can be traced to specific institutions and
interest groups. Structural problems refer to the local economy
and to the physical state of the pre-1919 tenement housing stock.
Ideological problems refer to the nature of the planning-related
inputs concerned with provision and design of housing and of
social services and community facilities; that is councillors;
regional planners; housing advisors; housing managers; architects
and town planners. Within each category there are component parts
which make up the levels. Some are likely to be more important
than others when it comes to explaining such notions as "deprivation"
or "bad reputation".

Figure 1 shows how these categories and components are likely
to come together. Note that this is something of an "ideal" type,
again to use the Weberian notion as outlined earlier. It is
suggested as a possible hypothesis upon which empirical research
might be based, and should not be considered as "fact". It should
be made clear that without empirical analysis, it is difficult to
place relative weightings on each category or component. In
addition, these categories and components are not always mutually
exclusive. For example, it can be argued that a re-dispersal
philosophy encouraged by regional planners forms part of a macro-
economic strategy and is in addition sanctioned by political heads of
state. However, to push a "mosaic" theory of society is to fall into
the same trap as the authors of the Peripheral Estates Report (see
Chapter 4) or "giving up the ghost" by putting forward the notion
that the problems are so difficult to separate from one another that
stress will be placed on those most "easy to deal with" especially
in the short term; the classic example being the issue of vandalism,
as will be seen later.

Ideally, it should be possible to present the categories in terms of
a hierarchy of influence. If "influence" is essentially derived from the
ability of the State, i.e. central government, to re-direct employment

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for example and to arbitrate over allocation of the "needs"
element in the rate support grant to local authorities, then
it can be argued that by far the most important category is the
Structural. The Ideological, which includes the allocation of
resources and services to specific parts of the local area by
locally elected councillors, can be seen as a secondary source
of power. Figure II shows the likely distinctions between first
order problems and second order problems likely to appear from
the two levels at later stages in the development of the
peripheral estates. The obvious ommission in the typology is
that of the values and aspirations of the tenants themselves.
In later sections of this chapter, an attempt will be made to
incorporate such an input, particularly with regard to the
period between first tenancy and today.

2. The Re-emergence of Urban Problems and Area-Based Approaches to Deprivation

Until about 10 years ago, the concepts "deprivation"; relative deprivation"; "urban deprivation" and "multiple deprivation" were largely unheard of. Until then academic research had concentrated on material poverty, for example on the historical creation of slums in the inner city. Central and local government pursued a policy of slum clearance, largely on the basis of alleviating overcrowding, on the assumption that living standards would continue to rise as growth continued and within the context of the welfare state. Indeed the belief that a profound change was taking place in British society was summed up by the interest shown by political scientists and some sociologists in the "embourgoisement" thesis[1]. (e.g. Mayer, 1956; Merton, 1957; Butler and Rose, 1959).

Such illusions were shattered in the late sixties and early seventies by the publication of influential works such as "Poverty: The Forgotten Englishman" by Coates and Silburn. By that time, the enbourgoisement thesis had been discredited (e.g. Goldthorpe et al, 1969) and a new concept was born – "relative deprivation" (e.g. Runcimann, 1966) suggesting that "poverty" meant different things to different people. Jackson and Marsden (1966) in detailed studies examined the paths of "successful" working class children revealing new "informal" barriers to upward mobility which had replaced the formal barriers such as ability to pay grammar school fees.

Meanwhile, central government began to concentrate on the problems of the inner city, and the private rented sector in particular (e.g. Milner-Holland Report, 1965). But by 1967, emphasis began to move to different parts of the city – to "pockets of poverty" found often in inter-war council estates such as Ferguslie Park, Paisley[2], and two years later the Community Development Project was set up by the Home Office. This took the form of a series of case-studies of "deprived" areas, many of which were pre and post-war council estates usually carried out by academics with the aid of the local authority concerned. These studies co-incided with the publication of the Plowden Report in 1967 which recommended the setting up of Educational Priority Areas in a bid to give greater resources to children in deprived areas who appeared to be lagging in educational performance. Deficiencies in social service provision were highlighted by the Seebohm Report (1968)

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and the idea of "positive discrimination" and combined social services
departments aired. In 1969, the Scottish Housing Advisory Committee
in a pamphlet entitled "Council House Communities: A Policy for
Progress" highlighted serious social and physical problems in
peripheral housing estates.

Meanwhile, as the CDP's continued, the newly elected
Conservative Government initiated in 1972 the Inner Area Studies
in a bid to supply the "total" answer to the problem. It is not
the intention of this chapter to examine the nature and outcome of
these two sets of studies. This had already been done in some
depth elsewhere (e.g. Lees and Smith, 1975; Flynn, 1977; Rodgers,
1977). Such studies should not, however be considered in
isolation. They formed part of a whole series of central government
attempts to bring depressed areas up to a more acceptable standard.
In addition, during the early seventies there blossomed a host of
independent studies recommending the need to further concentrate
services in areas of disadvantage (e.g. Calouste Gulbenkian
Foundation, 1973; Shelter Neighbourhood Action Project, 1973;
Wedge and Prosser, 1974). The studies should however be seen in
the context of broader theories of poverty and deprivation being
expounded between the mid-sixties and 1976 (see resume in Rodgers,
1977: Ch 1). In the British case, the most significant of these
have been the "Cycle of Transmitted Deprivation" (Joseph, 1972);
the "Institutional Malfunctioning" approach (e.g. SNAP, 1973);
the "Lifetime Cycle of Poverty" thesis (e.g. Able-Smith and
Townsend, 1965) and the Structuralist (conflict) view (e.g.
Donnison, 1974). As a result of the outcome of the CDPs and of
the growing Marxist influence in British universities a
Structuralist (class conflict) view has assumed some prominence
(e.g. Centre for Environmental Studies, 1977). In relation to area
based approaches in planning this is significant since there has
been a long-standing rift between Marxists and "traditional" town
planners (e.g. Benevolo, 1967: 105-110).

In terms of the present planning approaches to urban
deprivation (see below) the Marxist approach may have come too late
to make any real impact, but it remains an open question as to whether
or not local government officials and councillors would accept the
basic ideas in any case and whether or not they have the power to
respond to the demands made by the analysis.

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Since the publication of the 1971 census, local authorities have
been largely left to their own devices to deal with deprivation
in their area, and the various action-research partnership studies
and theories may have had some influence, but their profundity may
depend upon the numbers and positions of professionals exposed to
these issues now working on deprivation strategies within local
authorities.

In Scotland, the reform of local government has permitted
the larger regions to set up policy planning departments to help
combine industrial strategy with deprivation strategy, although
the "deprivation" side of the equation has a longer history of
local government involvement, local authorities being largely in
charge of physical problems such as housing and the provision of
services and facilities; having less control over the location
of industry and the creation of jobs in the manufacturing sector.
In addition, more grants have been made available to the region
to help alleviate the problem e.g. "urban aid". In terms of
understanding the nature of and solutions to deprivation, one
should examine the approaches taken by these local authorities
and in particular to deprived housing estates.

3. Deprivation : Definitional and Methodological Problems

The area-management approach has been modelled on the institutional malfunctioning theory of deprivation. That is to say, what has been termed the "total" or comprehensive approach. The problem of deprivation is seen to be caused by a breakdown of communication between the institutions which provide the services and welfare benefits and the clients. This sort of approach has been encouraged by important cabinet ministers such as Roy Jenkins e.g. his "What Matters Now" (1973) and by among others the Morris Committee which reported in 1975 particularly in relation to depressed council estates that 3 elements were needed to deal with the problem namely: (1) Positive Discrimination meaning, for example giving some council estates a better refuse collection service at the expense of others; (2) A Comprehensive Approach meaning the bringing together of various central and local government service and welfare departments in closer administrative contact and (3) Community Participation, meaning that the locals should be given some say in the decisions taken in a given area.

It is hardly surprising therefore that this is indeed the "ideal type" that many local authorities are working on, and the model has been modified by different local authorities (see Rodgers, 1977: Ch 5; Hambleton, 1978: Part 3) it is not intended to analyse these but to go back to the origins and evolution of the notion of "deprivation".

There are considerable definitional flaws stemming from the offshoots of the single term "deprivation". Since the early 1970s "deprivation" has become an umbrella term to cover a multitude of social and economic problems. The "deprived" may be thought of as those who fall below some tolerable line of poverty, or those who lag so far behind in education for example that they must be given some sort of "compensation" in the form of better teaching aids, "remedial" teachers and so on. The major criticism of the term is that "material poverty" through unemployment and low pay appears to be confused with "disadvantage" which may be an off-shoot of lack of effective teaching at particular points in a child's development or lack of parental encouragement. There is however some doubt as to the "diagnosis" of the disadvantage question (e.g. Bernstein, 1970; Keddie, 1973).

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The prevalence of low educational attainment usually measured in
terms of percentage of children with no qualifications at school-
leaving age does not always stem from parental apathy or low
intelligence, it may be a product of a rejection of educational
values (e.g. Cicourel and Kitsuse, 1968; Hargreaves, Hestor
and Mellor, 1975; Reynolds, 1976).

       Since then, to make matters more confusing, two related
concepts have been bred. These are "multiple deprivation" and
"urban deprivation". Norris (1979) argues that "multiple
deprivation" has come to be used to explain the origins of the term
"deprivation". Multiple deprivation implies "clustering" of many
individual deprivations such as "tolerable" level of single parent
families; unemployment; educational attainment and so on. It
appears that the clustering causes further deprivation, and the
"cancer" spreads geographically, apparently giving rise to a
spatial component. That a great deal of this occurs in areas
with large populations has given rise to the term "urban
deprivation". According to the Strathclyde Region's "Urban
Deprivation" Report of 1976, there were 52 Areas for Priority
Treatment in the city of Glasgow alone, most of which were
dominated by local authority housing or a great deal of sub-
standard pre-1919 tenement property. Such analysis has
caused some researchers to ask whether or not council housing
causes deprivation (e.g. Hollingsworth and Reynolds, 1975). It
is argued here that certain types of council house development
add a new dimension to the problem, but the fact remains that
poverty is rooted essentially in the historical development of
cities, and is still found in inner city areas. A major cause
of poverty in council estates may be that many of those who moved
from the slums of the inner city simply took their weak bargaining
position with them. Council houses are buildings. Buildings
cannot cause poverty. In many cases they have become the homes of
the poorest sections of British society. It is when these areas and
buildings start to decline physically, that the cumulative deprivation
process begins to overtake maintenance.

       Norris (1979) suggests that the starting point must be the
question of inequality following the notion outlined earlier that
the so-called age of affluence in the 50s and 60s was largely a
myth. What appeared to happen during this period was a process

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of _relative_ affluence. That is to say, as the economy was
growing, there was an overall raising of the standards of
living especially for the employed. However, this was not
accompanied by any substantial shift in the distribution of
income (Halsey, 1978). The absence of a feeling of unease
over relatively poor areas can be explained by an "acceptable"
level of empty houses in the estates and unemployment in the
country as a whole and the relative degree of freedom from
central government "cashlimits" enjoyed by local authorities,
in the 1960s. The crunch comes when vacancy rates rise;
unemployment levels begin to become "unacceptable" and when
there are cutbacks on local government services which have
become a way of life. Thus, relatively poor people become
unable to compete in the free labour market since they are
effectively debarred because of lack of employment generally
(e.g. Atkinson, 1973; Norris, 1977). They become doubly
disadvantaged by, for example, poor educational qualifications,
rising bus fares, rents and food prices. They become in-
creasingly entrapped in their home environment, and the problem
is made worse by reductions in internal and external maintenance
of housing estates due to fiscal weakness.

The second major flaw in the area based deprivation
approach is in terms of coming to a decision on who should
benefit from positive descrimination. This brings us to ask
two questions. First, how does one go about deciding what
constitutes a "deprived" area, and the converse, "non-
deprived" areas ? There are definite _methodological_ problems
here.

In particular, a major criticism is the use of statistics
which may be unreliable and/or out of date. A great many of the
indicators used to plot "areas of deprivation" in Strathclyde
Region for example were based on the 1971 census. After 5 or 6
years the problem of tenant turnover, employment changes, age
structure and so on may be such that thefigures are rendered useless
(cf. Brand, 1975; Edwards, 1975; Department of the Environment, 1975;
Strathclyde Regional Council, 1976 a).

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As Edwards notes:-

> The application of precise and detailed
> statistical techniques to such an
> ambiguous area is about as meaningful
> as using a micrometer to measure a
> marshmallow' (Edwards, 1975: 280).

In addition, there is a danger in assuming an areal approach to deprivation. It does not necessarily follow that since there is high unemployment in a given area e.g. Priesthill that everyone living in the scheme suffers from material poverty despite the rundown appearance of the external environment (e.g. Glasgow Evening Times, March 13 1979: 13). There are just as likely to be large numbers of economically active residents earning around the median national wage.

What happens to the poor who are "trapped" in "non-deprived" areas ? despite locating concentrations of the "needy" there is a danger of making too much of "pockets of poverty" and not enough of the notion that poverty is apparent throughout British society, and that it happens to be more apparent in blackspots such as Priesthill.

Indeed, this tends to be accentuated by a second methodological criticism, namely the use of a "package" of indicators to reinforce the pockets of poverty theory:-

> In the context of the identification of
> material poverty, measures such as the
> proportions of unemployed men, single
> parent families, large families and old
> age pensioners in the population, are often
> used without any attempt to assess the
> relative contribution each measure makes
> to the overall incidence of material
> poverty. (Norris, 1979: 22).

This raises problems as to how one should deal with major problems while at the same time giving appropriate weight to minor problems. The indicator package is unable to help us effectively distinguish one from theother. It is easy to quantify malproportions of socio-economic groups in the population or to use the housing records to pinpoint dwelling size mismatch. It is another thing to use numbers to describe complex social relationships; case histories of families; cultural influences and the aspirations of the population - although this can be done to some degree by use of detailed sociological surveys.

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In the form of research, considerable revision of purposes and methods of census indicators is urgently required. In addition, there is a need for more detailed studies of individual and family circumstances based on some form of "community studies" research. In this respect, a great deal has been done in areas which would not necessarily be classed as deprived (e.g. Frankenberg, 1966; Pahl, 1970) but so far there has been little detailed work on areas thought to be seriously multiply deprived or even to have a "reputation" of some sort. Although some solo efforts have been made to understand these areas (e.g. Armstrong and Wilson, 1971; Damer, 1974; Baldwin, 1975) there has been no real attempt at co-ordination between sociological research and central and local government attempts to understand and deal with deprivation.

The most recent attempt at combining research based on census indicators has shown that:-

> Knowledge of the estates in the sample was
> not sufficient to describe...characteristics
> ...identified in the literature as contribu-
> tors to estate problems. (Attenburrow, Murphy
> and Simms, 1978: 9)

Their analysis did, however confirm differences between "good" and "bad" estates as suggested to them by the localauthorities concerned, the main distinction being income, suggesting that where indicators are used, they may justify a limited use in confirming what is already common knowledge. It is another matter to deduce policy formulation from them.

4. Decline as a Process : Council Housing in Strathclyde

Having critisised the concept of "deprivation" as a totally acceptable approach to problem estates, it is necessary to suggest some sort of alternative. Here, it is posited that "decline" might be a better term to use and that it is a process lasting over a considerable period of time, and varying according to peculiar circumstances stemming from latent historical problems.

Section five of this chapter represents an attempt to combine these latent historical problems, many of which were identified in Part One with the notion of decline in Easterhouse over a 23-year period.

First, however, some discussion is required of characteristics of potential estate tenants in the city of Glasgow, and their relationship with those who allocate tenancies - the housing managers. Unfortunately, only two published studies have recently been made of housing allocation in the Strathclyde Area, those of Damer (1974) and English (1979) the latter being in Paisley, the former in Glasgow. In addition, a study was carried out on movement from the Govan area to estates on the south side of the city by Brennan (1959). The only other literature of import refers to the question of the reputation of the city as a whole for drunkeness, crime and gang violence (e.g. McArthur and Kingsley Long, 1967; Chief Constable of Glasgow's Annual Report, 1968; Armstrong and Wilson, 1971). As we shall see, it becomes difficult to separate the two issues.

There can be no denying that there exists and has existed a problem of rising crime rate in the city as a whole in recent years particularly among juveniles under seventeen years of age (see Figure III). But the notion of "anti-social" behaviour goes back to the 1930s; particularly of the relationship between authority and sub-culture:-

> "....one of the accused emerged from the dancehall, drunk and shouting. When he was arrested his friend drew a bottle and threw it at the police. This was the signal for a general assault on the police".
>
> (Taken from the Evening Citizen 26th August 1935 and reprinted in McArthur and Kingsley Long, 1967).

FIGURE III   Juvenile Delinquency 1949 - 1969 Glasgow
Number of Persons Under 17 Years of Age Against whom Charges Were Proved
(Source: Jackson, 1976)

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Seen in this context, the "undesirable" was viewed as a public menace who showed contempt for the law as well as his fellow man. There is evidence to suggest that fellow tenants in areas of pre-1919 tenement property already with a bad reputation, felt that there was an "undesirable" faction in close proximity:-

> ....all Gorbals was buzzing with the news
> of the coming fight..The respectable element
> was delighted...the coming trouble would be
> settled on the Green, which meant that
> peaceable folk could keep away from it if
> they chose,.
>
> (McArthur and Kingsley Long, 1967 : 119).

The same appears to have been true in the rehousing estates, where, as Damer notes, tenants within the scheme blamed others in another part of the scheme for "giving the place a bad name". Damer further notes that the question of "just deserts" was important in re-establishing the previous city-wide status divisions alluded to in Chapter one. When the Broomloan Road (Rehousing) Scheme was built, Govan councillors had apparently promised those in poor housing conditions in the area the pick of these houses regardless of their relative inferiority to the "cottage" and "flatted" developments. When it was discovered that the new houses would go to outsiders - and from the Gorbals area in particular, there was a feeling that the authorities had let them down. Damer goes on to suggest that BRS became labelled "wine alley" because of apparent drinking habits of the residents, especially women which amplified a local moral conviction in Govan. This seems a fairly satisfactory explanation when one considers that Govan housed a great many skilled and respectable workers, who up until the first world war had rarely challenged authority. In his 1974 paper, he does not deny that there exist "anti-social" neighbours. He simply tries to reveal a more objective picture of the origins and development of stigmatised council estates, and of the dangers of applying a label to an area.

Such an analysis leads us into a broader discussion on the question of understanding "stigmatised areas". Can we show that the process of filtering the "least deserving" into the "least desirable" houses in the city stock, which appears to have gone on in the 1920s and 30s has happened again in the context

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of difficult-to-let post war peripheral estates ? If so,
to what extent ? What are the other major factors involved ?
Let us consider the notion of stigmatisation.

"Stigma" refers to the idea of a label attached to a person
or persons who are seen to be in some way different from the
mainstream of society e.g. "hippie"; "drop-out"; "homosexual" and
in the case of Wine Alley, "anti-social tenants". In Easterhouse
this deviant has been the "vandal" or "gang boy". Stigmatisation
refers to the act of being labelled by some significant person
or group such as teachers or the police, even the press and
television (e.g. Cohen, 1967; Young, 1971) and may be further
amplified by an acceptance of the judgements of these significant
institutions in British society by those who do not necessarily
witness the deviant act. The "stigmatised area" is the geographical
area cited as being the location of the problem i.e. where the vandals
live or congregate. The labelling of the deviants becomes synonymous
in the popular eye with the name of the place and this is likely to
have the effect of causing those unfamiliar with the area to dodge
it by refusing to take a house there by waiting longer under their
present circumstances such as living with in-laws as English (1979)
has pointed out. In other words, potential tenants exercise choice
and make trade-offs.

English goes on to suggest that those most likely to move
into Ferguslie Park were unable to make such trade-offs; in short
they were the desperate. In addition he noted that housing managers
gave the area status of "the estate with the shortest waiting time
period". This situation, he argues tends to concentrate the unemployed,
single parent and large families in one pocket. It is only at this
point that we can then talk about deprivation being cumulative, with
large numbers of unsupervised children eroding the physical environment
for example and helping to make existing tenants consider moving to a
"better area". Such tenants as move out, may well be the economically
active who never before considered owner occupation or the private
rented sector, simply leaving empty houses which become easy targets
for children. Those who do move in are likely to be poor people with
social problems. And so the process of decline goes on.

In the case of Ferguslie Park and Wine Alley, both estates
were built as rehousing schemes under the 1930/35 acts. Brennan
(1959) suggests, in a comparative study of rehoused families in
Govan that a higher proportion of families from a "deviant" area

were given the lowest grade council houses - some 18.5% compared
to 10.5% for the rest of Govan (Brennan 1959 : 137). This was
again reflected in the lower proportion of households who moved
to the new "ordinary" rent estates in Pollok. Damer and Madigan
in a more recent study (1974) argue that tenants are still being
graded, although the present rehousing staff deny that this is
still the case today, arguing that a new approach has been
introduced which removes the traditional notion of housing
visitors, historically associated with "degredation ceremonies"
such as house inspection.

5. Easterhouse

In this section some of the previous notions and those from
Part One will be applied to Easterhouse a vast sprawling estate
on the eastern periphery of Glasgow. The scheme is chosen because
it displays the highest percentage of residents anxious to move
out in any of the "big four" peripheral estates, as Table 4
shows:-

Table 4   Percentage Share of Requests for Transfer By
              Area Office

	%age share of requests	%age of stock
Castlemilk	7.6	6.2
Drumchapel	9.6	6.7
Easterhouse	15.5	9.7
Pollok	9.4	7.5

(Source: Strathclyde Regional Council, 1978c : Table 6, Ch 8)

Playing Fields
School
Blackfaulds Farm
276
Church
Drain
300
GARTHAMLOCK
Todd's Well
Spr
313
Garthamlock Secondary School
Woodcroft School
Playing Fields
Craigellachie
Provanhall Road
Cardowan Quarry
Spr
School
Provan Hall
300
300
Auchinlea Road
PO
300
Gartloch Road
296
287
Coxton Place
Queenslie Quarry (Disused)
Late Bronze Age Spearhead found AD 1952
Works
Chy
Works
Path
Light Burn
264
Queenslie Bridge
Path
267
Monkland Canal (Disused)
FB
Tug Station
Piggery
Works
Bartiebeith Bridge
Blairtummock Road
Queenslie Primary School
Piggery
School
Queenslie Industrial Estate
Factory
Ar Hau
Works
Factory
Works
Easter Queenslie
Works
Queenslie Nursery
264
Bartiebeith Road
School
School
EDINBURGH ROAD
Recn Gd
215
Remand Home
PS
200
church
Ogilvie Primary RC School
Recreation Ground
School

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At the last count (August 1978) there were 43,016 people living on the estate in 9,623 houses mostly in 3 storey tenement blocks of two basic designs arranged largely in the familiar rectangular layout with expansive backcourts, as in the older parts of the city. The major difference being that there is no sign of industry in the backcourts, and the front gardens tend to be more than ample. By 1970, 14 years after the scheme was officially opened, according to Graham Noble, a youth leader working on the Easterhouse Project[3] there were:-

> No public toilets, no public washouse, no
> banks, no cinema, no theatre, no public
> dancehall, no government offices, no int-
> ernal transport system, no community centre,
> no cafes or restaurants and no shopping
> centre.·· (Noble, 1970 : 328)

The one and only public bar was built on a small piece of land not owned by the Corporation[4].

There were, approximately, 5,000 young people between the ages of 15 and 20; 10,000 children of school age and 6,000 under school age. In addition, there were problems associated with travel distance and busfares to shops, social security offices and the labour exchange for the Eastern part of the city. The few doctors' and dentists' surgeries were located at one end of the estate.

By 1976, according to the Strathclyde Urban Deprivation Report some changes had been made, notably the construction of a centre which included bars, a community centre, youth centre, post office and a much improved selection of shops. A housing management department office was built; a department of employment office, nursery schools, social work office and youth wings.

In addition, there were local initiatives such as a police community involvement project, play groups, neighbourhood project and the Easterhouse project. At that time, plans were in pre-paration for more welfare offices and a health centre.

Before 1970, however, Easterhouse had already achieved what might be termed a "bad reputation", notably through gang conflict and vandalism. The situation was considered so serious that the Lord Provost's central committee commissioned a study into ways of fostering community development as a way of dealing with these two problems. A scheme was proposed to deal with both Easterhouse and a neighbouring estate, Barlanark. The main object was to "clean the place up" and channel the aggression of young people from both schemes

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out of a gang conflict which was rife between the two schemes into
"healthy competition" such as inter-community sport competitions,
gardening competitions and school achievement records (Armstrong
and Wilson, 1971 : 8). By late 1967 and early 1968, however, this
approach was undone by media coverage of the apparent increase in
crime statistics in Scotland as a whole, and in Glasgow in particular,
and the issue of gang violence, carrying of offensive weapons and the
injury of innocent victims was given a great deal of publicity by
certain newspapers, notably the <u>Scottish Daily Express</u>. To make
matters worse, Easterhouse became singled out as a particularly
deviant area as a result of a BBC tv "24 Hours" report on July
1968 which showed among other things a "live" gang skirmish[5].

The question to be answered here is : Why did Easterhouse
receive a reputation and how far does this reputation explain the
lack of popularity in terms of vacancy rates and requests for transfer
out of the scheme ? And why certain parts of the estates in particular ?

It may be fruitful to examine the history of the estate from
its inception in terms of our latent problems theory and the subsequent
events of the 1960s.

It is now fairly well established that most new housing schemes
go through a period of "optimism" (e.g. Wilson, 1963 ; Ravetz, 1971).
In the case of Easterhouse we may hypothesise that the following
conditions were likely to be favourable to the protection of the
immediate local environment:-

1.   Full employment at the time makes it relatively cheap for
        tenants to buy their own fences; plants, hedges and so on

2.   Children actively take part in this "construction" process
        by helping the head of household or other neighbours

3.   Proximity to open countryside means that city children spend
        a great deal of time "discovering" the countryside e.g.
        climbing trees, taking the dog for long walks, using open ground

4.   Houses tend to be under-occupied, which makes population
        density lower at point of entry

5.   General sense of euphoria at "getting a new house" engenders a
        sense of "pride" and a desire to "keep the place in order"

In time however, certain consequences of the latent problems
are likely to appear. Depending on the demographic, social and
economic characteristics of the tenants in any given street or block
of houses, the physical deterioration of the area will be more or less
hastened by the severity of such factors. A main problem here is the
question of time. At what point can we say "this street has undergone
a process of decline"?

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i.e. When do we know a street to decline from its "ideal"
optimistic state ? This would entair a fairly detailed
sociological survey of the tenants who have been living in
the street for some considerable time. Unfortunately there
has been little detailed research on this. Again, we
hypothesise drawing on Part One that the problems will not
appear until a few years after the first tenants have moved
in, and that it is a combination of factors which seem to
surface simultaneously.

In the case of Easterhouse, the following factors seem
to be of importance:

(a)   Poverty and Unemployment.

There can be no doubt that poverty and unemployment have
hit all peripheral housing estates very hard. There are in-
creasing numbers of people being thrown out of work, particularly
among those nearing retirement who can no longer find work, and
those young people who have never experienced the psychological
boost of receiving a wage and who must live with their parents
on supplementary benefit. This is likely to have the effect of
a feeling of helplessness in the community as a whole, which, in
terms of the physical environment may prompt the feeling that the
State and the "Corporation" owes them nothing, and are contemptuous
of the property which represents them.

(b)   Fiscal Weakness.

By the time the estate was completed, the costs of re-
paying loan debt and maintaining older estates sapped
the housing department's resources in providing facilities and
proper maintenance. Other departments appear to have been in a
similar situation, or were unwilling or unable to transfer resources
(see figure IV).[6]

(c)   Large Child Population.

At the time of construction, the scene was already set
for the possibility of a higher than average child population to
appear on the peripheral estates (e.g. Smith, 1974). This was
manifested in the numbers of 4 and 5 apartment houses in certain
parts of the estates or in certain streets (see Table 5b). There
is certainly a correlation between estates which have a high
proportion of 4 apartments to 3 apartments, and those which are
considered to have the worst problems, particularly Priesthill,

FIGURE IV   Corporation of Glasgow Housing Expenditure
(at current prices) 1950 – 1970 Source:
Jackson(1976)

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Garthamlock, Lochend and Cleddans (see Strathclyde Regional Council 1977c). In addition, there is a problem common to most of the estates in the large proportion of 3 apartments to 1s and 2s. It is suggested that this problem did not immediately rise to the surface because of the 5 points representing the "optimistic" phase. However, it is posited that the following problems occurred after a few years:-

(i)   Over a period of say 5 years, the housing situation may well have changed from one of under occupation in anticipation by housing management of expanding families to one of "over-crowding"[7] leading to abnormally high numbers of children in an area already with densities beyond what the city's planners might have considered, "acceptable".

(ii) The novelty of "construction" and discovering the country-side had probably worn off, particularly for the children who were getting older[8]. These children, along with their younger brothers and sisters, probably played a great deal in and around the housing areas, and by sheer weight of numbers were likely to destroy, deliberately or unintentionally fences, grass, hedges and to bring in junk and rubble as substitutes for some sort of organised play activity.

(iii) Provision of varied facilities to suit children of all age groups and especially adolescents, particularly in Easterhouse did not appear for some considerable time, making the situation ripe for the unceasing destruction of the local environment and in a situation where there were large numbers of adolescents in given streets or blocks, the possibility of the formation of "young teams" or gangs of boys as well as girls was greatly enhanced.

TABLE 5a   Distribution of 3 and 4 Apartment tenement schemes
            by Percentage of Estate Stock.

Estate	Total Stock	(3 Apts)		(4 Apts)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Castlemilk	9,712	6,301	64.88	1,787	18.40
Drumchapel	9,050	5,724	62.90	2,150	25.81
Easterhouse	9,623	7,173	69.45	1,271	12.67

TABLE 5b   Distribution of 3 and 4 Apartment tenement schemes
            by Percentage of Estate Stock : Specific Sub-scheme
            characteristics.

Sub-Scheme	Total	(3 Apts)		(4 Apts)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
DRUMCHAPEL					
Cleddans	1,021	630	61.70	341	33.40
Pinewood	1,372	1,092	79.59	65	4.74
EASTERHOUSE					
Lochend	1,170	906	74.44	240	20.51
Bishoploch	977	754	77.18	57	5.83
Garthamlock	1,657	798	47.62	564	34.04
Priesthill*	2,164	326	15.06	754	34.84

*Priesthill has by far the highest proportion of 4 apartments of
any of the peripheral estates. Apart from the tenements shown
above, there is a considerable proportion in mid-terraced houses.
There are also 200 end-terraced 5 apartments. The sum total of
4 and 5 apartment houses in Priesthill takes up 79.37% of the
stock.

(Source : Adapted from Glasgow District Housing Management Dept. Records)

(d)   Socio-Economic Imbalance

From its very inception, there was no attempt to allocate
tenancies to "professional" people such as teachers, largely because
of the nature of the house letting rules at the time. Indeed it is
still the case today that single people under the age of twenty-five
are not eligible for council housing in Glasgow, thus ruling out
young professionals who might have considered setting up home in the
estate. In addition, in the late 1950s and early 60s the housing
market in Glasgow was such that young professionals by virtue of
their superior bargaining position in the labour market could afford
to purchase a good quality tenement flat in a prestigious location
e.g. Hyndland or Shawlands. The main problem here is that because
of a lack of "leaders" who could more closely monitor for example
a decline in educational standards or help organise protests to
the Corporation to improve services, that inactivity or apathy
would set into the estate.

(e)   Loss of Working Class "Pioneers"

Easterhouse has often been referred to by locals and others
as the "Ponderosa"[9] presumably because of the distance to be travelled
to "civilisation" (in this case Parkhead or the city centre).
Similarly, the early tenants were "pioneers" who set up home and built
fences and so on. Many, however were probably lured away to areas
where job prospects were better, so creating a space to be filled by
those unfamiliar with the early days. Such new tenants may already
have heard of its reputation, whatever it consisted of, and the
view taken that since it was "only a council house" in an area which
was showing no visible sign of improvement, that "it was not worth
the effort" to look after the environment.

(f)   Blocked Mobility

For a period of about five years (1965-70) Easterhouse was
singled out as an area which was "difficult-to-get-out-of". Once
most of the houses had been allocated, and as disillusionment with
service provision, bus services and poor maintenance[10] set in, the
number of transfer requests for older, more desirable areas with
non-tenemental house types, and for areas where elderly relatives
were located increased. It is common knowledge among tenants in
Easterhouse that one can wait up to thirty years before qualifying
for a house in a more desirable area. The question of choice is
therefore important. Perhaps the first movers were reluctant to go
in the first place but accepted the offer for a variety of reasons[11].

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Blocked aspirations in terms of the tradition of renting were
compounded when the private rented sector was no longer able
to offer anyalternative. The question of owner occupation
has been a non-starter in the minds of many tenants in Glasgow.
for it requires dealing with professionals who are "different"
In this respect, there seems to be an inferiority complex - a fear
of filling forms and trying to be polite to those who are
"educated". Perhaps more importantly, there is the fear of
long term financial risks especially for workers employed in
industries which re prone to seasonal or cyclical redundancy
and lay-offs such as shipbuilding, construction and car
manufacture. Such blocked aspirations and the perplexities of
figuring out a way round the problem may have led to apathy
and a feeling of hopelessness.

(g)   Dissaffected Tenants, Vandalism and Gang Violence

It has already been noted that "anti-social tenants",
vandalism and gang violence have been cited as "bogey men" in
the debate, but in view of the above issues, one cannot con-
clusively say that it is the root of the problem. It is yet
another input which happens to be more visible or audible than
say blocked mobility. Nevertheless, it is another part of the
problem and will have to be dealt with. But in order to deal
with it, one has to understand its causes, and not rush at it
by re-introducing punitive measures, particularly in Easterhouse
which has been neglected in terms of the provision of meaningful
pastimes for children and adolescents. Similarly, one must ask
"Who are the anti-social tenants"? Does it necessarily follow
that it is their children who are the vandals and gang boys ?
Does "anti-social" simply mean noisy? In that case, the cutting
back on internal standards has probably accentuated this.

PLATE 7: One of the "better" parts of Easterhouse.
Note the full occupancy of the houses.
There is a dentist's surgery to the left,
and nearby a public bar and shops. Note
children making use of natural play areas
but lack of play apparatus provision means
they bring in their own, damaging tree. In
this case, they use a rope and a rubber tyre.

PLATE 8: Over-emphasis on football pitches reveals
lack of ideas in sports' facility provision.
Note contrasting use of space between housing
and open space.

An ideal-typical casual theory of peripheral estate decline
in Glasgow runs as follows:-

PERIOD 1 (t_1) 1945-55 is the phase of heavy demand for new
housing. Despite a redisperal policy throughout the region,
large scale construction of new tenaments takes place on the
remaining available land within the city boundary. At this
point there is little available resources or commitment to
attempting community planning, but the dependent variable
is FISCAL CONSTRAINT. A number of independent variables
are however, below the surface. These are:

(i)   Ideological - Single tenure despite the possibility that
                       some tenants could have afforded to buy
                     - socio-economic imbalance due to non-
                       allocation to higher non-manual income groups
                     - concentrations of large family houses in
                       certain schemes
(ii)   Cultural   - A tradition of violence and public and domestic
                       conflicts over e.g. relitious differentiation
(iii) Economic   - Temporary boom in a traditionally fluctuating
                       local economy

PERIOD 2 (t_2) 1956-64 is the phase of optimism. This may be divided
up into two sections. The first five years witness the allocation
process which reveals an over-emphasis on manual-working class
income groups as probable in t_1; there is as yet no significant
growth in child population and the voilence and other anti-social
behavious problems which existed in the old tenements becomes
temporarily dislocated. In addition, there is still relative
prosperity. In the second period, the optimism is showing signs
of faltering as basic "comforts" fail to appear. Some of the
early tenants move on to better pastures in the new towns for
example; there is a growth in child population and gang slogans
begin to appear on walls marking out "territories"; garden fences
"disappear" in early November, as by now most of the nearby woods
have been denuded; tenants "forget" to take their turn at washing
the stair; stray dogs can be seen in almost every street and
there are signs of growing unemployment.

PERIOD 3 (t_3) 1966-70 is the period of Poor Reputation. Three
major independent variables now assume prominence in the context
of the continuing problem of the dependent variable.

(i) Despite assurances that facilities such as a shopping centre
will arrive, little happens; (ii) At the same time, children are
growing up creating new demands for varied play facilities, and
the first generation of children search for new diversions. As
a result, the local environment becomes subject to greater wear
and tear and partially as a result of (ii), there is a growth
of a reputation for violence and crime amongst juveniles. These
three combine to create two new variables:-

(i) Growth in requests for transfer out of certain parts of the schemes,
which are far from shops, have no especial "character"; have been
subject to severe wear and tear and "harbour" gang members.

(ii) As a result of the reputation of the scheme as a whole,
requests for entry into the scheme are likely to drop off, with
only the most desperate accepting an offer.

Meanwhile the dependent variable remains largely unchanged
and a major problem appears in the housing market as a whole. There
is little chance of movement out of the peripheral schemes to the
most desirable areas. Those schemes with vacancies tend to be
stigmatised inter-war rehousing tenement - which re-introduce another
latent problem in terms of the desirability of the stock and past
allocation policies. The result is that those who do not, at first,
choose to move into owner occupation or the dwindling private rented
sector or to such employment related housing elsewhere in the region,
are forced to move within the scheme. This in turn created vacancies
in streets already with a run-down appearance and a reputation.

PERIOD 4 (t_4)   1971-78 is the phase of spiralling decline. As more
and more empty, unwanted houses become easy targets to vandalism,
the desire by more to move out is excacerbated by rising maintenance
costs in the contexts of inflation-hit local authorities. The
problem of the dependent variable, has by this time been offset to
some extent by the provision of long-awaited community facilities
but these tend to be concentrated in certain parts of the scheme,
according to zoning principles and the available sites. In addition,
the distance to be travelled and relative impersonality of one large
complex renders a certain degree of redundancy. The situation is
compounded by growing poverty and unemployment which deepens the sense
of hopelessness.

PLATE 9: Demolition in progress at Dunskaith Street,
Rogerfield, Easterhouse. These houses
had been severely difficult to let. Note
that they were four-storey tenements
suggesting higher density than normal
for the scheme as a whole.

PLATE 10: Semi-detached council housing, Lochdochart
Road, Rogerfield, Easterhouse. Note the
tidy appearance of the local environment.
These houses are only 200 yards away from
the tenements being demolished shown
in plate 9.

PLATE 11: Deunuded woodland. These trees are close
to one of the better schemes – Bishoploch,
and may partially account for its relative
"success". Lack of other play diversions
has ruined a local beauty spot.

PLATE 12: Auchinlea Park, Easterhouse. The park
contains a historic monument, and will
have a nine-hole golfcourse and "action
lands". It should benefit the two
adjacent sub-schemes and also Garthamlock.
But what of the perimiter sub-schemes
which show the worst aspects of the
estates' problems?

Summary

Chapter Three has been the major attempt to draw historical and contemporary strands of the peripheral estates issue together. Two major latent problems – allocation of houses to large families in clusters and fiscal weakness in providing community facilities – were identified on the basis of historical circumstance and an ideal-typology set up to explain their relative importance. This was followed by a critique of a historical explanations of deprivation in council estates. A process of decline theory was posited on the basis of historical and contemporary developments in Easterhouse, Glasgow and the following conclusion reached: That neglect of the two major latent problems had been largely responsible for the destruction of certain areas within the estate. This had been excacerbated by a violent tradition inherited from Glasgow's past, which led to the estate's bad reputation. This reputation probably partially negated potential new moves to the scheme as a whole, but the issue of blocked mobility within the estate forced tenants in over-used, vandalised areas to move to "better" areas within the estate. The physical problem was compounded by a backlog of maintenance, ineffective soundproofing, lack of social balance, poor tenant/management relations and structural unemployment.

Notes (Part Two)

Chapter Three

1. Briefly, the embourgoisement thesis posits that as a result
    of rising standards of living, many sections of the working
    class are beginning to take on "middle class attitudes" e.g.
    by voting Conservative, becoming involved in voluntary
    organisations, rejecting the notion of the "extended family"
    and so on.

2. Indeed, judging by the numbers of Areas for Priority Treatment
    (APT) those which come highest on the list are often inner city
    areas or the older rehousing estates (see Strathclyde Regional
    Council, 1977c - Schedule 8).

3. Set up in 1969, this was a voluntary project essentially
    supported by a £10,000 donation from a showbusiness personality
    (see Noble, 1970).

4. A municipal bye-law of 1895 prohibited the granting of licences
    on Corporation land. This particular piece of ground was owned
    by Gartloch Hospital but it is very close to shops and houses.

5. There is some argument as to whether or not the "fight" was
    staged and whether or not the "hooligans" were in fact paid
    to do it. However, this is not to deny that gangs existed.

6. Again it has been difficult to track down reliable records of
    disputes between departments. Corporation minutes of the time
    tell us very little, and most of the officials and councillors
    involved have retired, died or refused to discuss the matter.

7. Housing management are not always able to detect over-occupancy,
    doubling up of families and so on. They are dependant on periodic
    reviews of the waiting list and requests from tenants for bigger
    houses. They can, however, spot a situation where boys and girls
    who have been sharing a room reach the age where they require
    separate bedrooms and are therefore allocated bigger houses.

8. It was a housing department rule that a qualification for obtain-
    ing a house was to have at least one child of a certain age
    (usually 10). Thereafter, the number of children below that age
    was considered to be less important.

9. The "Ponderosa" was the name given to a vast ranch owned by the
    heroes of a fictitious Western television series popular with
    the residents in the 1960s. It was some considerable distance
    from the nearest town.

10. For example, there was considerable anger over the fact that
    closes, window-frames and verandahs were painted regularly in
    schemes near main roads which were visible to passing councillors
    and visitors, whereas hidden areas tended to be ignored.

11. For example, they might have been the only remaining tenants in
    the close fearing burst pipes, theft of lead and burglaries.

PART THREE - RE-PLANNING AND REVITALISATION

INTRODUCTION

This section brings us up to date on the current policy approaches to revitalisation of the peripheral estates by Glasgow District Council. Chapter Four consists of a precis of the policy documents followed by a critique of the theory and method behind the strategy. This is followed by an examination of the strategy in practice in a small peripheral scheme. Chapter Five attempts to draw the thesis together, and looks particularly at the implications of chapters Three and Four, concluding with some possible modifications of the strategy and lines of research emanating from this work.

CHAPTER IV

PERIPHERAL ESTATES : CURRENT POLICIES AT CITY DISTRICT LEVEL

Introduction

Housing Plans I and II for Glasgow District are the first
attempts at city-wide housing planning in the largest urban
concentration in Scotland, and are brave ventures given the
"dog's breakfast" of housing finance (Crossland, 1975) and the
problems associated with widely differing housing management
philosophies throughout the country (e.g. Seebohm, 1956; Cramond,
1964; Cullingworth, 1969; Bull, 1969; Norman, 1975; Corina, 1976).
In addition to these problems, Glasgow has inherited large scale
unemployment and deprivation making for a giant headache which
will require sensitive solutions produced not simply by one or
two departments, but by a whole gamut of official and political
inputs, as well as that of an involvement by the consumers them-
selves, i.e. those directly affected by the proposed actions.

"Glasgow : Implications of Population Changes to 1983" is
designed to complement Housing Plans I and II, and also the
Structure Plan for Strathclyde, particularly in relation to
population projections and their economic and social implications.
The report accordingly concentrates upon the pressure points of
high unemployment and deprivation. It happens that much of this
is to be found in peripheral estates. The report concentrates
on four estates in particular viz: Castlemilk; Drumchapel;
Easterhouse/Garthamlock and Pollok/ Priesthill/Nitshill.

In this chapter a precis will be made of the content
and basic premises put forward in these reports, particularly on
the "peripheral estates" content of Housing Plan II (HP2) and of
the definitions of the "problem" as outlined in the peripheral
estates report (PER). This will be followed by a critique of
their theoretical and methodological grounds at this stage in the
discussion. Practical difficulties will be discussed at a later
point.

1. Housing Plans and Peripheral Estate Report: Aims and
   Relationship

(a) Housing Plans and Peripheral Estates

Since the publication of the first housing plan for
Glasgow District in 1977, a special report has been
commissioned by councillors to look into the special
problems associated with apparently increasing turnover
and vacancy rates in the "big four" peripheral estates.
The production of the report co-incided with the
appearance of Housing Plan 2(HP2). Since both have been
considered as "policy" documents, there is a need to ask
what the relationship between the two is supposed to be,
particularly with regard to an on-the-ground planning
approach to peripheral estates.

The exact relationship between the two seems to be
shrouded in mystery, but it appears that HP2 represents
a wider policy perspective of the housing stock of the city
as a whole, with peripheral estates classed within the
"council stock" sector. Housing Plan 2 does not present
a physical plan of action, but appears to set out
general guidelines for the improvement of all council
housing types such as planned maintenance; pushing of
community involvement and variation in tenure choice.
Its other main function with regard to the council
sector is to set out major financial commitments in terms
of planning over a five-year period. Being statutory,
it becomes the major mouthpiece of the political parties
for housing issues. However if this is the case, why
a demand for a special initiative for depressed peripheral
council estates in particular?

The answer may be that peripheral estates have become a
major political issue, recently, largely because they take
up a considerable proportion of the council stock in toto
some 30% excluding the many smaller post-war developments,
and this is a considerable local electorate. Being post-war
they also represent a considerable amount of capital
outlay-which is only half-way to being paid off. They also
represent the reality of the post-war dream, and are therefore

to be preserved for ideological reasons. Since PER
presents a combined policy and physical land use strategy,
whereas HP2 does not, the question must be resolved: Which
is the major blueprint for the periphery given the political
commitment of the substantial Labour Group, manifested in their
official modification of PER(Glasgow District Labour Group,
1978) ? It is possible that the question will not be
fully resolved until after the next district elections
which are coming up soon. Since the last elections, the
Scottish National Party has held the balance of power between
the Conservative administration and the Labour group, but
should the SNP lose seats gained from Labour, particularly
in post-war council house dominated constituencies, then there
could be a return to the monopoly situation of Labour Group
control which was largely unbroken between 1945 and 1975.
If this is the case, then there could well be a special
initiative in the estates to ensure that such a situation
never arises again.

Even if this is not the case, the PER remains an interesting
document from a corporate and a physical planning point of
view. Although it was largely produced by planners, particu-
larly with respect to implications of population loss, the
actual framing of the problem and suggested solutions is a
corporate effort. It is interesting in the Glasgow context,
since it appears that physical planning is becoming more
involved with housing schemes, not of their own design. By
contrast, the Housing Plan though produced by a team from
differing sections of various district departments and utilising
regional planning expertise, does not appear to show evidence
of practical physical application of rather grandiose aims
such as the following:-

> To ensure that everyone wanting a house in
> Glasgow is able to obtain one which meets
> his or her needs in terms of condition,
> size, type, location, tenure and environment.
> (Glasgow District Council, 1978d: 3)

Another major advantage of PER is its attempt to provide
some sort of explanation for decline in council estates,
and at the end of the report a plan of action which incorpor-
ates physical change with some ideas for social revitalisation
which are not clearly spelled out in HP2.

Despite tha ambiguity, however, it will become clear
that the PER approach is much closer to the reality than
HP2 in terms of the actual policy being pursued at the
moment, and although, the Housing Plan does deserve more
attention, emphasis here will focus on dealing with specific
causes of problems in peripheral estates, which are in some
ways products of historical circumstance, as Chapter Three
showed, possibly more so than some explanation rooted in
the belief that all council estate problems stem from
mismanagement of housing finance and "tenure imbalance".

(b) Peripheral Estates Report
     Within the context of falling population levels, the
PER attempts to outline the implications for increased
vacancy rates. However, the report outlines additional
problems in relation to the desirability of peripheral
estates. These are listed as follows:-
(1)Social Deprivation which includes poverty, unemployment,
        lack of employment skill, overcrowding, poor education-
        al attainment. Occuring largely in pockets.
(2)Employment - lack of industrially zoned sites near
        estates/costs involved in travel-to-work
(3)Environment - drab, monotonous appearance of housing,
        vandalism(observable), litter, untidy gardens, high
        numbers of children, maintenance problems
(4)Community Facilities - the need for minor additions to
        existing facilities
(5)Transport costs and inconvenience(other than associated with
        journey-to-work)
(6)Personal Security and Incidence of Crime - Higher than
        city average in peripheral schemes
(7)Housing - problems of size mismatch with demand; lack of
        specialised housing; undesirable form(tenement);
        single tenure; off-putting effect of boarded up
        houses; overstretched resources of housing management

resulting in delays in allocation.

The following consequences are suggested:-

(i)   Financial: Closure of shops; shopkeepers' requests for
                   rent reductions; increasing costs of
                   maintenance in all local services; lost
                   rent revenue

(ii)   Physical: Intensified destruction of the environment

(iii)   Social: Increased number of social work referrals;
                  weakening of public "morale"

The proposed lines of action to deal with this are outlined
in the next section, and are taken from Table 7.1 of the PER.
Before discussing here the effectiveness of the "corporate"
approach, it may be fruitful from a theoretical point of view
to ask whether or not this formulation of the problem is accept-
able given the massive sums of money likely to be invested.
A mistaken diagnosis of the problem could well lead to
emphasis being placed on the wrong aspects of the problems
which are most deep-rooted. The question of method is
also important and a discussion on this requires an analysis
which goes beyond the boundaries of these policy documents.

(c)   Peripheral Estates Report - the Probable Strategy

        The probable strategy for all the peripheral estates seems
likely to follow the "Drumchapel Model" as outlined in PER Appendix
15.   The major elements are set out under the following headlines
and current costs placed beside those which are immediately
quantifiable:

(a) Housing (Physical Action)

    1.   Demolition
    2.   Conversions
    3.   New Build, public sector
    4.   New Build, private sector
    5.   Revitalisation (fullscale)
         Revitalisation (intermediate)
    6.   Energy Conservation
    7.   Rewiring
    8.   Improve Repairs and Maintenance
    9.   Redecoration

(b) Housing (Management)

    10.   Reserve stock for temporary decant
    11.   Rationalise vacancies
    12.   Foster local initiatives
    13.   Introduce alternative tenures
    14.   Under-let houses
    15.   Distribute large and/or disadvantaged families
    16.   Introduce tenant liason personnel

Such a scheme seems highly likely to develop in that within the
appendix, these factors are held constant in three of the 4 possible
options, the difference being the amount of money to be spent on
each aspect of the physical action programme.   The fourth option is
really an addition, however, tagged onto one of the three major
options.   It is entitled "Other action" and involves the following
possibilities:-

1.   Environmental Improvement
        Open Space improvement
        Improve Cleansing
        Improve maintenance of open space
2.   Social Support Services
        Increase social support
        Improve police protection
        Reduce anti-social behaviour
3.   Education
        Provide additional nursery school places
        Introduce alternative uses into schools
        School catchment adjustment
4.   Employment
        Review employment policies
        Build purpose built small factory units
        Increase environmental improvement works
        Improve incentive and promotional campaign
        Encourage use of remaining facilities

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5. Transport
   Restructure transport fares
   Review transport routings
6. Recreation
   Develop additional recreational facilities
7. Community facilities
   Improve community facilities i.e. provide more
   community and day centres; tenants' meeting
   places; indoor sportshalls and laundrettes.

2. Critique

(a) Theoretical and Methodological Problems - Introduction.

Neither the Housing Plans nor the Peripheral Estates
Report are grounded in any specific social, economic or political
theory. Rather, the starting point for action on the housing
stock has traditionally stemmed from "needs". Current emphasis,
regionally has been on falling population. On the housing side,
the manifestation of that problem particularly on the periphery of
Glasgow, has been in terms of rising vacancy rates and requests for
transfer out of these schemes. As such, the "problem" has been defined
largely in terms of statistical inference. This co-incides with the
use of computers to help for example speed up such traditionally
laborious tasks as simplifying housing preferences.

The emphasis on reductionism has perhaps been the result
of statistical techniques arising from the academic world which in
most social sciences has a positivistic element - the notion of
value freedom. When social scientists enter industry or local
government, they often attempt to transport this value freedom
into "the real world". Such a view co-incides with the historical
notion that officials have been viewed as impartial advisors to
politicians. Since all political parties are subject to re-
election, but local government officers are not, those officers may
be asked to advise differing political perspectives, and so the
notion of value-freedom becomes paramount.

Unless the politician has help from other technical sources
or has the time and ability to challenge small-scale issues that
halp make up the larger ones, the positivistic assumptions of
influential technical officers, who are often backed up by a
professional qualification, may decide in large part the strategy
to be adopted. In view of the numbers of technically and professionally
qualified staff working on the housing problem in Glasgow, such an
assumption can be justified.

Useful though this may be as a tool, there is a danger that
what is essentially a method will take the place of a theory of housing
estate decline. Since it is usually the task of method to support,
empirically, a theory, one would expect some sort of theory of
declining population. To date, emphasis has been on possible components
of that problem such as demographic changes like number of deaths over
births; out-migration due to poor job opportunities or size and

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attractiveness of the housing stock. At the moment, local government
is much more geared to dealing with housing stock issues, and so,
not surprisingly the Housing Plans and PER have concentrated on how
to improve the overall physical environment in housing areas.

(b) Peripheral Estates Report - Critique of Analysis of Problems

It has already been suggested that both HP2 and PER are not
based on any particular social, political or economic theory, though
to single them out along these lines may be deemed unfair given that
very little local government literature is. However, in view of the
feeling of seriousness prevailing in the public eye regarding the
problem of the peripheral estates in Glasgow, it is suggested here
that the inability of local government to satisfactorily explain
the origins of the problem is likely to lead to greater difficulties
in grappling with specific issues and of positing workable solutions.
The aim of this section is to highlight some of the deficiencies in
the present analysis, and to suggest how this might indirectly
weaken the strategy. Some alternative formulations of the problem
will be suggested, though only by way of example for the moment.
There are three major criticisms to be made. First, some
of the major issues are pitched at a high level of generality.
Second, there is a tendency not to differentiate between and within
categories of problems, and to separate cause from effect (lumping).
Third, there is a failure to order problems and to give them
weightings.

(i) Generality Problems
According to the Regional Report, the two key problems of the
region are a high level of unemployment and concentrations of
socially deprived areas. These would appear to be major issues
in peripheral estates, but as yet no satisfactory explanation
has been put forward to explain what each constituent part of the
problem of social deprivation is. Yet, when it comes to discussing
the housing vacancy problems or the crime rate, there is more
information to go on. In short that which is more easily quantifiable
can be enlarged upon. This causes one to suspect that in "action"
terms more emphasis may be placed on issues which can be dealt with by
short term solutions.

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This ties in with the weighting problem. A second criticism of the tendency to over-generalise concerns the notion that the problems tend to be of a similar type throughout the estates and therefore have similar causes. This may not in fact be the case. Why, for example do there appear to be "good areas" and "bad areas" in areas of similar housetype ?

(ii) Lumping of Issues

The report's analysis is particularly at fault here. The example of environmental problems is of interest in this case. The vital issue of "environment" is summed up in one paragraph:-

> The peripheral estates are generally characterised
> by poor environmental quality arising from a
> number of factors. Apart from the drab and monoton-
> ous appearance of some housing areas and the general
> vandalism to which shop fronts and empty houses
> are particularly prone, there are problems of
> litter and untidy gardens and open spaces. Lack
> of maintenance funds and demarcation of mainten-
> ance responsibilities excacerbate these difficulties.
> An added factor is the high number of children often
> concentrated within particular streets*.

(Glasgow District Council, 1978c : 13)

Thus, from the analysis we see what appear to be two sets of problems viz;

"Major" Problem: Drab and monotonous appearance of housing
vandalism
Untidy gardens and abundance of litter

Contributory
Problem: Lack of maintenance funds
Demarcation of maintenance responsibilities
High numbers of children

Unfortunately, the passage fails to explain what starts off the problem. In short, which is cause and which is effect ? How does one go about deciding what is a contributory problem and what is a major problem? It may be, for example, that the major cause of the problem is that there are simply too many children in the area with too little meaningful distractions.

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*MY EMPHASIS

Below is an alternative formulation of the environmental decay problem, using the variables cited in the report (which do not necessarily accord with the author's formulation of variables).

Figure V   Alternative Formulation of Environmental Decay Problem
           Using PER variables.

PROBLEM (PER Variable)   CAUSES (Author's Suggestions)

Drab, monotonous appearance   1. Lack of money and land to
of housing   build to better environmental
                                         standards at the time of
                                         construction.

General Vandalism   1. High concentrations of
                                         children with little else to
                                         occupy them.
                                      2. Cultural factors (e.g.
                                         writing gang slogans;
                                         proving ability to conform).
                                      3. Lack of parental supervision.

Untidy Gardens   1. Houses with gardens allocated
                                         to tenants who did not want
                                         them; condition of soil for
                                         planting and size meant tenant
                                         expected to work hard at it.
                                      2. Destruction of fences and
                                         hedges by children
                                      3. Disillusionment at council's
                                         apparent neglect of large
                                         gardens.

Litter   1. Unsatisfactory cleansing
                                         arrangements (e.g. bins too
                                         high for small children to
                                         reach/lack of parental
                                         responsibility over this)
                                      2. Children and dogs dragging
                                         rubble and litter; Children
                                         bring in junk as substitute
                                         for meaningful play facilities.

Whilst it is not claimed that this is necessarily the correct formulation of this problem, it does attempt to separate more clearly the causal variables of a cumulative problem. There is no excuse for lack of such an analysis in this report, for it becomes clear, that when such variables are identified even theoretically, appropriate suggestions can be put to tenants regarding these issues and decisions taken. For example, an appropriate question in the survey might be "Do you want a house with a garden, and if so what size of garden?" Or the creation of protected backcourt toddlers' play areas, which are within the mothers' view from the back window, and where more

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"adventurous" play apparatus may be kept.

Now, whilst it is likely that many of these issues will be dealt with, for example, the provision of metal fencing, or improved rubbish disposal, the framing of the problem is likely to miss out on certain issues and most of all the small-scale cumulative issues which may well return once the operation has been completed. The avoidance of these problems should in theory be dealt with at the survey stage. There will be a short discussion on this issue later in the chapter with respect to the first attempts at re-vitalisation in the Peripheral Estates by the District Council.

(iii) Ordering of Priorities

The report is especially weak in placing emphasis on some of the worst problems, which structurally appear rooted in the declining industrial performance of the region manifested in un- employment and poverty, and fuelled by particularly unsatisfactory allocation policies and the under-provision of play/community facilities at the time the estates were created. The foregoing analysis of the historical development of the estates should have made this clear. It is reiterated that the Housing Plans and the PER are weak in analysing the cause of the problem in those terms i.e. structural weaknesses stemming not simply from the post-war era but from the 19th century, and in terms of housing, misplaced problem both in financial and social terms.

The tone of this report suggests that the problems identified have equal weight, but it seems that some attempt should have been made to sort these out, especially when we hit the thorny problem of financing projects. Given the cut-backs in public expenditure and the growth of corporate policy-making in local government, it would seem all the more imperative to make sure we have some idea of where the heart of the problem lies, and resist the temptation of blindly striking out at physical manifestations of the problem, for in the long run this may be futile. In short, from a theoretical point of view, there is little evidence to support the notion that:-

> The interaction of these physical problems
> with the socio-economic circumstances of the
> residents is so complex that it is difficult
> to separate cause from effect.

(Glasgow District Council, 1978c : 15)

84.

(c) Housing Plan 2 and Peripheral Estates Report → Methodological
Problems in Calculating Preferences.

As noted previously, there has been an attempt to reduce
the definition of problems to numbers and therefore to use these
as the basis for action. These numbers are the common denominator
which supposidly get round the problem of officials appearing to
favour one political perspective or another. In the interests
of expendiency, the method appears take the place of any theory.
The method is to work out which schemes are the most popular in
the city, and therefore, presumably, to improve the unpopular ones
using some form of positive discrimination:-

> Direct methods of indicating preferences, by
> means of a questionairre study have not been
> attempted due to the costs involved and.....
> questionairre studies........are not necessarily
> accurate

(Glasgow District Council, 1978d : Appendix 7)

The indicators of preference in themselves - vacancy rates;
turnover; transfer requests; waiting list; refusal of offers
and reasons for move would appear to be problematical and not
entirely satisfactory. Even so, action is likely to be based
upon this, and so, not only will method be unsatisfactory, but
some sort of wider social theory will have been ommitted from the
strategy, so paying some attention to positivism but no attention
whatsoever to any other academic approach.

The "approach" being pursued then, for want of a better
term, is to analyse the least popular areas, and channel the current
resources into those worst "pockets". It is no surprise, therefore,
that many of those areas being singled out for priority treatment
have either been at the top of the list for some time, or have
unnacceptibly high vacancy rates or are being pushed by enterprising
district and regional councils within the overall regional deprivation
strategy which has recently made a point of spreading resources to
cover areas considered not to be a "top deprivation priority" (e.g.
Strathclyde Regional Council, 1977a; 1978a). At Glasgow District
level, however, there is a hierarchy of priority areas, but a
surprising emphasis is being placed on peripheral estates.

This special attention, manifested in the PER, does not
appear to accord with that overall city-wide hierarchy of

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depressed council estates, but a major methodological problem
centres around the definition of "popular" estates. Glasgow has
for a long number of years operated a system of graded housing
in the form of amenity categories. It is not at all clear how
schemes are accorded gradings, but as a rule of thumb, the most
popular (categories A, B, and C) are to quote a housing official
"75 percent" decided on demand. These tend to be the older
cottage and flatted developments in the inter-war stock and those
cottages, new developments, and tenements found in popular areas
in the post-war stock. The peripheral estates have been falling
down the scale from A and B since construction and are now around
D and E. However, the rehousing tenement of the inter-war era
occupy the lowest amenity bands and therefore, by definition, are the
least desirable as tables 6 to 10 show. This is not to deny that
other factors influence amenity category definition, but
unfortunately this has been defined on largely subjective grounds
using such concepts as external appearance, internal standards and
proximity to community facilities.

A second problem arises out of this in that when last totalled
up (August 1978) the demands for transfer from the lowest category
houses i.e. rehousing tenement, were more than double that of a
"priority" peripheral estate such as Castlemilk: 13% as opposed to
6%. The total stock of rehousing tenement is around 12% of the total
city council stock - again twice that of Castlemilk. Yet there
has been no special enquiry into the decline of inter-war rehousing
tenement. This is very strange given that according to neo-classical
location theory, the relative proximity of these schemes to the
city centre would encourage a trade off, and therefore vacancy rate or
demand for transfer ought to be lower than in peripheral estates.

Therefore the obvious question should be asked : Why all the
fuss over peripheral estates ? The answer may be purely political -
that recently the peripheral estates, which were Labour strongholds
for over twenty years have been falling to parties such as the SNP,
hence weakening the overall power of the Labour Party. The Labour
Party lost control of the city in 1975. Since rehousing estates are
scattered and in small pockets their influence is minimal. Another
possible explanation may be that since the peripheral estates were

Table 6

1923   Rehousing Estates by Number of Schemes and Houses per
        Amenity Category.

	AMENITY CATEGORY								
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
No. of Houses	0	0	0	0	110	1122	1350	3380	216
No. of Schemes	0	0	0	0	2	8	7	14	1

Table 7

1930-35 Rehousing Estates by Number of Schemes and Houses per
          Amenity Category.

	AMENITY CATEGORY								
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
No. of Houses	0	0	0	64	40	579	762	4672	2920
No. of Schemes	0	0	0	1	2	4	5	28	6

Table 8

1923   Ordinary Schemes by Number of Schemes and Houses per Amenity
        Category.

	AMENITY CATEGORY								
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
No. of Houses	0	1406	450	168	0	0	0	0	0
No. of Schemes	0	2	3	2	0	0	0	0	0

Table 9

1930-35 Ordinary Schemes by Number of Schemes and Houses per
          Amenity Category.

	AMENITY CATEGORY								
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
No. of Houses	0	393	497	0	0	0	0	0	0
No. of Schemes	0	6	4	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 10

1930-35 Intermediate Schemes by Number of Schemes and Houses per
          Amenity Category

AMENITY CATEGORY

TABLE 10 CONTINUED/-

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
No. of Houses	0	0	0	409	286	1159	930	20	0
No. of Schemes	0	0	0	3	2	6	6	1	0

(Source : Adapted from Strathclyde Regional Council "Glasgow
District Council Housing Schemes". 1978b).

constructed for all sections of the working class, including
the deserving poor, that these individuals who have lived there
for some considerable time, paying their rent regularly "deserve"
special treatment. Inter-war rehousing estates are already being
used as "intermediate treatment centres" for "families with
problems", evoking the notion – rightly or wrongly – that
difficult tenants who "spoil the peripheral estates for
the good tenant" must be moved well out of the way of the revit-
alisation strategy until they have been "socially rehabilitated".
This still does not solve the problem of the rehousing tenements
themselves which seem to be politically expendible in relation
to the peripheral estates.

Thus, the political motive outlined earlier ties in with
the rather dubious method of allocating priority areas. The
lack of objective definitions of amenity groups and the emphasis
on turnover in peripheral estates appears to have given free rein to a
political whim.. This flaw does not seem to have been dealt
with in the Housing Plan.

3. **Case Study - Garthamlock and the peripheral estates report**

(a) Garthamlock - Background.

Garthamlock is a post-war scheme consisting of 1,656 houses mostly in 3 and 4 storey tenements. The estate is linked to another scheme, Craigend to the West. To the East and North are open land. The Southern boundary is Phase 2b of the Monkland Motorway. Below is a summary of some of the socio-economic characteristics of the area:-

Table 11 Garthamlock - Socio-economic characteristics 1971 and 1978

	1971 Census	1978(Combined Gathamlock Community Associations/ Regional Planning Estimates.)
Population (total)	6,982	6,181
Male Unemployment	14%	49.5%
Children Under 15	42%	n.a.
Large Households (6+ Families)	31%	n.a.
Car Ownership	16.5%	6.5%
No Educational qualifications	95%	n.a.
Single Parent Families	5.6%	10%
Vacant Houses	38	173

(Source: Strathclyde Regional Council, 1976a; 173; 182; Combined Garthamlock Community Associations, 1978).

The above table shows a marked deterioration of the area in terms of unemployment, car ownership rate and increasing numbers of vacant houses. Since it is assumed that the spiraling process of decline associated with empty houses is likely to continue unless action is taken to arrest it, the unpopularity of the area will continue to grow. The size of the problem can be gauged by the fact that even in 1971, Garthamlock was showing symptoms of what has been described as "multiple deprivation".

Garthamlock has been a "priority" area within the city for some time, and was classed alongside notorious inter-war estates as a "seriously multiply deprived area" in April 1975 in the planning report

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"Social Deprivation in Glasgow". As long ago as 1973, plans had been made to revitalise the area by means of an environmental improvement scheme, but it had only barely been started when there were changes in policy. Partly as a result of the regional deprivation analysis of 1976-8, partly as a result of attempts by regional councillors to broaden the urban deprivation strategy and partly because Glasgow was reluctant to allow the region to "take over" many of its own problem areas, Garthamlock was not included in the "seven areas" initiative (e.g. Strathclyde Regional Council, 1976b; 1977a; 1978a). By that time Glasgow District Housing Management Department had set up an Environmental Revitalisation and Community Development Section, and in January 1978, the results of a social survey of the area were published. Subsequent action in the area has largely stemmed from this. Appendix II is a summary of that survey. Before examining the relationship between the PER and the Garthamlock proposals, it is worth examining the theory and method of the survey.

(b) Garthamlock Social Survey – Some Criticisms

In order to complete a full analysis, it would be necessary to analyse the questionairre used in depth. However, it has proved difficult to get hold of the document. Nevertheless a brief analysis of the results reveals some problems which appear to justify some of the earlier reservations made about the entire peripheral estates strategy being attempted by the local authority concerned.

Firstly, it should be said that the idea of locating assets and deficiencies in the scheme according to the resident's views is a good idea since it helps us "tune into" the area to some extent; financial budget available. This was a one in eight random survey of the tenants, but as far as is known local children were not invited to partake. In this respect, the survey has failed to look at differing perceptions of "what is most needed in the community". This is particularly important when deciding on strategies for vandalism and the destruction of the local physical environment.

As in the case of PER, there is a lack of theory, that is, there does not appear to be any attempt at hypothesis testing on what causes the above problems. The issues are only mentioned very generally. For effective decision-making there is a need to know what kinds of play areas are required according to the needs of different age-groups. We need to know what lies behind vandalism and what different types of vandalism exist before attempting solutions.

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The definition of the problem - in this case only the most general - defines the level at which the solution will be pitched. In the case of vandalism, all vandals are seen to be the same, therefore a general solution may be applied. In this case, it is vandal-proof paint and fittings. Again, in relation to play areas, despite a strong request by tenants to provide at least two levels of play facilities, they have received no professional advice on what might be suitable for each age group - the result may be the most general of facilities such as climbing frames.

Both of the above issues emphasise a long-standing grievance in peripheral estates, that there are too many children with too little varied activities to occupy them. Indeed, by pursuing a policy of "keeping the vandals out" there is danger that if it is not accompanied by meaningful diversions, the "property destroyers" may start to look to other kinds of targets - such as the local populace.

In terms of method, there has been no ordering of priorities. There has been no attempt to separate out groups of issues "Dwelling size Mismatch" can be dealt with under different sections related to destruction of the physical environment. Presumably, this was not done in the questionairre because of a lack of thought over how the issues might be grouped theoretically, which explains the random nature of the "assets and deficiencies" as set down in the report. Finally, there is little evidence to show that degree of demand for certain inputs or even the degree of importance to be attached to problems has resulted in relative action weighted to these. For example, although some 32% cited vandalism and violence as a reason for leaving the scheme, a more significant 70% said they would stay if things were improved, and 83% requested toddlers play areas and similar provision for older children. Also there were as many "would leave for personal reasons" would-be migrants as "leave because of vandalism and violence". Yet, as will be seen, a much greater emphasis has been placed on dealing with vandalism - particularly using "hard" architecture.

The genesis of a physical strategy was suggested on th$5th December 1978. The actual proposals in written terms can be found in the minutes of the public meeting of February 22nd 1979. The following draft brief proposals were made:-

1. Minimum Treatment Area.

   Rewiring; insulation; possible conversion of houses to sheltered adcommodation; planned maintenance.

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2. Environmental Revitalisation

(a) Conversion
    Limited number of ground floor flats converted into 2 and
    5 apartments from 3s and 4s in selected closes
(b) The Building
    Planned maintenance; painting of external fabric
(c) The Close
    Redecorate with vandal-resistant paint; fix doors to back
    and front - all with child-proof locks; install vandal-
    resistant lighting
(d) Front Gardens
    Metal fences with gates; design for efficient manintenance
(e) Backcourts
    Paved drying areas; metal railings between closes; grass
    where necessary; more bins with protection from children
    and dogs; lighting
(f) Streets and Street Furniture
    Resurface pavements; reset close steps
(g) Amenities
    Toddlers' play area; play facilities for older children

3. Garthamlock Restructuring

(a) Reduce heights of buildings(those not demolished)
(b) Build mainly terraced type houses for large families
(c) Separate pedestrians from traffic
(d) All large family dwellings to have back and front gardens
(e) High level of environmental treatment in the area(unspecified).
(f) Off-street parking
(g) Even distribution of house-types
(h) Improve sound insulation of large family houses
(i) Even distribution of converted community use buildings
(j) Conversion of some dwellings for the disabled
(k) Proposed townscape not to be restricted by existing road
    and block patterns

                    (taken from Glasgow District Council working party
                    minutes, 22nd Feb 1979)

From the resume of proposals and the relationship to PER,

in Figure VI, two major themes appear. First, emphasis is

clearly on physical change, and the notion of graded change

according to degree of difficult-to-let houses, rather than on

some total plan for the area which might include changes in

the better areas for the sake of improving the area in the future.

Many aspects of Appendix 15 of PER have appeared in the practical

side such as rewiring; planned maintenance and conversion according

to needs. These reappear in the housing plan as well. In terms

FIGURE VI   Peripheral Estates Report and Garthamlock Draft Brief
             Proposals - Comparison of Content

Peripheral Estates Report	Garthamlock Draft Brief
1. PHYSICAL ACTION - HOUSING	
Demolition	Yes - Partial in most difficult-to let areas.
Conversion	Yes
New Build - Public	Unclear
New Build - Private	Unclear, but "new build" of some discription will take place
Revitalisation - full	Yes
Revitalisation - intermediate	Yes
Energy Conservation	No
Rewiring	Yes
Planned Maintenance	Yes
Redecoration	Yes
2. HOUSING MANAGEMENT	
Reserve stock for temporary decant	Yes
Rationalise Vacancies	Yes
Foster Local Initiatives	Yes
Introduce alternative tenures	No sign of this
Under-let houses	Yes
Distribute large and/or disadvantaged families	Yes, but only after local pressure and only within the scheme unless there is not enough room
Introduce tenant-liason personnel	Yes
3. OTHER ACTION	
Environmental Improvement	Yes
Social Support Services	
Social Work	Dependent Upon resources
Police (increased protection)	Dependent Upon Respurces
Anti-social behaviour reduction	Yes, especially on vandalism
Education	
Additional Nursery School Places	No: suggestions for play areas for toddlers by tenants
Alternative school uses	Nothing as yet
School catchment adjustment	Nothing as yet

FIGURE VI(CONTINUED)/.......

Peripheral Estates Report	Garthamlock Draft Brief
Employment	
Review Employment Policies	Not acceptable
Build small purpose factory units	No sign of this
Increase environmental improvement works	"Captain Clean" litter collection drive?
Improve Incentive and Promotional campaign	"Captain Clean"? to give city a good image and attract investment?
Encouraged use of remaining facilities	Nothing
Transport	
Restructure bus fares	No: applicable private bus companies.
Review routings	Highly unlikely given attitudes of bus companies
Recreation	
More development	Yes
Community Facilities	Yes

Of "other action", the revitalisation of the surrounding environment has been stressed, particularly the notions of improved litter disposal; easy maintenance of gardens, but there is heavy emphasis on a second theme - that of "hard" solutions to vandalism. It is made clear in the document that "all proposals must be resistant to vandalism"(pp 3), to which the obvious question should be asked: Where will the vandals go?

The only other additions emanating from the "other action" option of appendix 15 have been the suggestions for toddlers' play areas and play facilities for older children(ages unspecified). Other residents' proposals include a library and a laundrette.

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A third and wider criticism is the lack of a meaningful
corporate approach. Many "other issues" have been apparently ignored
whilst physical remedies have been pursued. The notion of distributing
large families throughout the city was not suggested by the working,
party, but came up in the discussion over the proposals. The District
had apparently no intentions of pursuing such a policy and had been
content to scatter large families throughout the scheme. The problem
of tenure has been avoided and a notable component missing from the
strategy was the question of dealing with unemployment in a stress
area. In relation to poverty the question of energy conservation for
those on low income has not been taken up. The question of public
transport which has been a source of frustration in the scheme since
it was opened has not been dealt with. The tenants had been campaining
for the use of Passenger Transport Executive buses because of dissatisfaction
with the Scottish Transport groups' service operation. Such an issue is
of paramount importance in terms of an overall corporate approach particularly
in Garthamlock. The suggestions so far reveal that the inputs will be
limited in this respect, largely servicing housing management rather dividing
up responsibilities evenly.

The most important evidence of this imbalance is epitomised in
the costs. A reading of the option costs in Appendix 15 of PER shows that
of a possible overall budget of say Option A plus Other Action; by far the
greatest resources would go into the Housing (Physical Action) side: £22
to £28 million with only £5.3 million being spent on environmental
improvement; social support; education; employment; transport; recreation
and community facilities. This leads one to the conclusion that either
the housing department is still very powerful or other departments are not
interested in co-operating. Such an assertion would require further
investigation of how these departments see their role in the overall co-
operative strategy for dealing with deprived areas such as Garthamlock.

Indeed, despite the obvious moves towards action of any serious
nature, in the peripheral estates after nearly thirty years, serious
doubts are being cast on the legitimacy of all decision makers in the
planning process (e.g. Cullingowrth, 1969; Dennis, 1973; Goodman, 1974;
McIntosh, 1975; Griffiths, 1975; Jacobs, 1976; Cockburn, 1978; Glasgow
Evening Times, March 13, 1979). Even in an area such as Garthamlock
where, because of rapid turnover and the problem of disillusionment one might
expect apathy, there is clearly anger being expressed (see Appendix III)
particularly over broken promises. Whilst there were important reasons for
these delays, especially with respect to local government re-organisation,

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the problem of neglect by the local authority of an obviously
deteriorating area have not helped the situation, and may be
partially to blame for the cumulative problems.

Summary

Chapter Four has attempted to precis the recent action responses in Glasgow to peripheral estate decline. Two major policy documents have been shown to be weak in defining satisfactorily the problem. This has shown up in the first shot in a smaller post-war estate on the eastern edge of the city, whose survey like the wider policy documents has concentrated on the physical housing stock and an over-reliance on "stock" approaches to fundamental social problems such as vandalism and the provision of play areas and other amenities in apparently characterless areas some distance from the city centre.

Thus it is predicted that, despite an overall improvement in these areas for a short time, the problems could well reappear creating further strains on a weakening local economy and rates base. In addition, it has been suggested that in terms of achieving an overall "objective" approach to the city's housing problems, the Housing Plan, which is a statutory document has in this case been superceded by a report on politically important catchment areas. The Housing Plan has become the summary of committed and planned expenditure, and a forum for ideas, but the actual strategy in large areas of the housing stock seems to be modelled on a corporate strategy within such areas. Such emphasis does however tend to distract attention from politically less important inter-war stock which is also in crisis. Even so, it is not yet a fully corporate approach.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Conclusions

As a result of a critical analysis of the construction, decline and probable solutions being suggested for revitalisation of the peripheral estates in a large provincial British city, the following conclusions have been reached:-

(a) On the basis of an ideal-typical assessment, it has been argued that the major casue of decline has been that of a continually weak fiscal base. It was this fiscal base situation which prompted short-term solutions to the post-war housing crisis, and it has continued to postpone the provision of essential community facilities. Ideological, cultural and economic factors have contributed to this weakness. The theory of peripheral estate decline suggested can be briefly summarised as follows:-

(i)   Overwhelming demand for new houses after the second world war, was capitalised upon by proponents of high density development such as the city planning officer of the day (an engineer) and a Conservative government anxious to push low-cost housing as an election-winning tool. The tenure and overall density per acre of this housing was decided upon by local politicians anxious to ensure power whilst at the same time offering an alternative to the vagaries of the private housing market.

(ii)   Despite a conflict over regional population dispersal between regional planners and local politicians, the peripheral estates were constructed on the only available land remaining within the city boundaries.

(iii)   The costs bourne by the city in providing new infrastructure and heavy commitment to paying off loan debt over 60 years left few resources for such community and other facilities deemed necessary by physical and social planners for the long-term success of such large communities, and as a result, despite an early "optimistic" phases in estates! development, problems stemming from economic, ideological and cultural "hangovers" began to appear which triggered off a process of decline. This process was not arrested by intervention at crucial

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stages in the estates' evolution. Even where intervention has
taken place, it has not necessarily accorded with the specific
needs of varied communities, which are on the scale of small
towns and not the "community unit" of around 10,000 inhabitants.

(b) The most recent attempts to "corporately" and comprehensively
approach the peripheral estates problem can already be criticised
on a number of grounds:-

(i)   There is some confusion over the main policy strategy. This
        is due to the fact that the introduction of housing plans has
        co-incided with political moves to deal with the mushrooming
        problem of difficult-to-let housing estates. Some sort of
        compromise is being worked out, with the major approach
        appearing to be a special planning document on the peripheral
        estates which borrows some concepts from the housing plan.
        A brief analysis of the first attempt at implementing the
        strategy in one of the smaller peripheral estates in the North
        East of the city (A largely district initiative, not to be
        confused with special initiatives into similar areas throughout
        the region), has shown that this is the strategy most likely
        to be adopted. Consequently other important, ostensibly "worse"
        areas of deprivation, described in the early part of the thesis
        are likely to be denied special treatment within a housing system
        where mobility is blocked by lack of tenure choice and styles
        of council housing.

(ii)   In terms of problem definition in the peripheral estates, there
        are serious weaknesses in the theoretical and methodological
        analysis. This is rooted in a desire to reduce problems to
        numbers and to ignore the problem of historical determinism.
        Consequently a-historical definitions of the problem become
        commonplace. Effects are treated as causes, but at the same
        time never clearly grouped into categories of problems or
        separated from one another. On the basis of an analysis of
        developments in the study area, these theoretical and method-
        ological weaknesses identified in the policy documents have
        manifested themselves in 'ineffective survey techniques and
        pre-determined solutions.

(iii)   There is a distinct lack of responsibility sharing between
        departments within the district and between the district and

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the region. This may be the result of the historical role of the
housing department in Glasgow or simply that other departments do
not wish to become involved in the issue. As a result, over-emphasis
has been placed on housing-related aspects of the problem and solutions
tend to be within the knowledge and capabilities of housing officials.
This being the manifestation of the lack of theory and method, the
solutions on offer are likely to run into trouble in later years,
particularly over the high costs of new build and demolition which
may well be unnecessary if alternative strategies can be found to
break the monotony of tenement dwellings using non-destructive
methods, and the fostering of meaningful social diversions for
children and adults of all ages. The full basis and expansion of
the theory appears in Chapter Three.

2. Recommendations

Arising from the above conclusions, the following
recommendations are put forward:-

(a) A Need for More Action-Research

There is a clear need, from the analysis, for more action-
research into the day-to-day problems associated with life in a
peripheral estate, in an effort to more closely identify the
particular social and psychological needs of children and adults
which have been neglected for such a long time. This should be
done with respect to a theory of decline backed up by a pilot
research study covering the period 1955 to 1979 at the very least.
The correlated variables should then be used as starting points
for the inducement of new needs criteria surveys. Such a pilot
study could be carried out by independent researchers in collabouration
with the Scottish Office or other central government body.

Failing this, the local authorities should utilise the
growing specialisms of the social sciences by including a special
research team to work only in council estates. The major drawback
to both of these proposals is that they might hold up much-needed
initiatives to housing schemes now, but the first approach could
be carried on at the same time in one scheme whilst (hopefully)
varied initiatives sponsored within the existing structure will
be carried on in another. The advantages of a permanent research
team, in addition, would be to improve the efficiency of data-
gathering and problem analysis, leading to more and more sensitive
solutions, as the strategy evolves, and thereby dealing with the
reservations of long-term prospects previously outlined.

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On the basis of the analysis of this thesis, Figure VII shows
possible lines of research specialisms - which may be applied to
peripheral estates generally.

FIGURE VII Possible Lines of Research for Peripheral Estate Decline
and Revitalisation (Four Examples Only).

PROBLEM (Ist Pilot Hypothesis Testing)	COMPONENTS	RESEARCH EMPHASIS
ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION	VANDALISM	Psychological Motivation/Rejection of Property and Wider cultural Values.
	RUN-DOWN OF PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT	Proportion of children in area of reputation or difficult-to-let housing compared to "better" area/ Proportion of rent-arrears tenants and social work referrals,
HOUSING DESIGN AND LAYOUT	VISUAL MONOTONY	Perceptions of tenants of what "should be" - need not imply the whole scale destruction of tenements - importance of colour, landmarks.
UNEMPLOYMENT	POVERTY, SENSE OF HOPELESSNESS	Locate skill mix; search out "other abilities"/Survey likely candidates for small workshop experiments/local would-be skill teachers/Liase with Regional Industrial Development research.
AREA REPUTATION	ANTI-SOCIAL TENANTS	Determine local definitions of meaning of anti-social behaviour e.g. noisy neighbours, neglect of communal maintenance; domestic violence; child neglect.
	GANG VIOLENCE	Relevance of school curriculum and possible alternative /-

Figure VII Possible Lines of Research for Peripheral Estate Decline
         and Revitalisation (Four Examples Only)

AREA REPUTATION	COMPONENTS	RESEARCH EMPHASIS
	GANG VIOLENCE (CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE)	ALTERNATIVE/- mind-set such as a youth culture/ youth, perceptions of tenants, police housing officials and concept of private property.

In addition, wider issues need further research, especially the issue
of allocation criteria according to amenity groupings. Further research
is also required into the possible conflict between statutory obligations
to re-house large families as a priority whilst at the same time co-
ordinating conversions to smaller units.

(b) Suggestions Within the Present Set-Up

       Already, in Glasgow at any rate, the components are there
to seriously begin a corporate strategy, with all of the departments
involved likely to contribute in some way or another. The task
remaining, assuming that research of the above kind is not implemented
in the interests of financial costs and delays, is to ensure that the
correct balance of inputs is created, but more than this, there may
have to be serious movements away from entrenched positions on the
part of certain departments. This will require a move by senior
politicians and officials to recognise that the problems go much
deeper then unattractive housing stock or an apparent demand for more
owner occupation. It is now accepted within architecture and planning
circles that physical determinism alone is not a solution to urban
problems (e.g. Goodman, 1972; Ward, 1973). Accordingly there ought to
be a move towards the setting up of a policy planning departments within
the districts which can keep major departments in check with regard to
such important ventures in the virgin territory of council estate
revitalisation.

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Accordingly, on the basis of the inputs in the PER, it is
suggested that additional variables be considered in relation to
the groups of problems outlined in Figure VII. Figure VIII
shows the possible changes in the major inputs in relation to
the departments/committees involved, and notes particularly the
need to provide "unorthodox" methods of holding the population,
particularly young adults, and providing more compelling
diversions for adolescents as an alternative to "hard" archit-
ecture. Such suggestions will require a heavy financial
input, and the only forseeable problems will be possible
difficulties in cross-transfer between departments of resources,
and a true "corporate will" to forget past antipathy between
major departments. Such a model is likely to be most applic-
able to Glasgow, but may be applied to other British towns
and cities with similar problems.

(c) Recommendations for Planners

Town planners occupy a somewhat ambiguous role in council estate
development, perhaps more so in Glasgow than anywhere else. The
recent developments in revitalisation of council property provides
an opportunity for planners of all kinds - regional, economic and
social for example, to make a major contribution not by adhering
to traditional stances such as development control - which is
acceptable in areas where there is a danger of losing part of a
rare heritage - to council estates which can only improve by
some kind of remedial change. The question then becomes what
kinds of remedial change? It is suggested that the social planner
in particular can add new dimensions to the problem and accordingly
suggest fresh solutions which take into account physical improve-
mentsbut do not allow them to outweigh a balanced approach which
takes cognisance of the forces at work in a society rapidly
undergoing fundamental change, and requiring a new humanism and
imagination.

31,400 words(inc.
appendices and
figures)

FIGURE VIII Possible Strategies for change within Existing Structure.

General Problem	Component	Possible Strategy	Department Involved	Departmental Change Required
Unemployment and Poverty	Poverty/ Disenchantment	Largely beyond scope of local government	Social Work/DHSS / equivalent of Manpower Services.	Inter – Governmental
Housing (Design & Layout)	Visual Monotony	As peripheral estates report and housing plan but with provision that demolition only as a last resort/use at community artist/colour and architectural additions to tenement blocks.	Architecture/Freelance Artist.	Housing to alter some responsibility to planning/architecture. Housing to attempt unorthodox solutions.
Housing (Management)	Allocation rules	Total revision	Housing	Encourage constructive criticism
Environmental Destruction	Vandalism	Variation between hard and soft architecture	Architecture in conjunction with private practitioners	
		Environmental education	Education in conjunction with planning and sociologists	Education – Curriculum plus more parent-teacher contact
	Lack of Play Facilities	Under 5s – Play Groups Play pens in backcourts	Housing /Community Dev. Parks/Planning/Architecture	Housing to allow more influence of other departments.
		Nursery school provision	Education	Positive Discrimination in Education budgets for initiative areas.

GENERAL PROBLEM	COMPONENT	POSSIBLE STRATEGY	DEPARTMENT INVOLVED	DEPARTMENTAL CHANGE REQUIRED
		6 - 12 year olds - Adventure schemes/ "Action" Land/Play Barns	Architecture/Private Practitioners/Play Barns Parks	
		13 - 16 year olds - Indoor sports centres/ pool halls/cafes/sponsored musicians (rock/folk/jazz)	Education (extra-mural) Scottish Sport's Council Private enterprise Community Development Civic Amenities committee	
ADULT FACILITIES	Not varied enough	Over 25s club night "Singalong" sessions Pensioners Club Bingo Cinema Club Licenced Bars / all in community centres/tenant halls/ privately owned clubs or bars.	Community Development/ Planning	Planning to relieve development control rules under certain circumstances. Dispense with justification of such provision by use of figures only (positive discrimination).\n\nLicensing Committee to consider possible private licensing at tenant halls.

APPENDIX I   An Example of the Weberian "Ideal-Type" Construction

<u>WEBER</u>:   <u>Authority and Bureaucracy</u>

On the basis of the concept of <u>legitimacy of authority</u>, Weber formulated his propositions about the structuring of legal authority systems:-

a   Official tasks are organized on a continuous, regulated basis.

b   These tasks are divided into functionally distinct spheres, each furnished with the requisite authority and sanctions.

c   Offices are arranged hierarchically, the rights of control and complaint being specified.

d   The rules according to which work is conducted may either be technical or legal. In both cases trained men are necessary.

e   The resources of the organisation are quite distinct from those of the members as private individuals.

f   The office holder cannot appropriate his office.

g   Administration is based on written documents and this tends to make the office (Bureau) the hub of the modern organisation.

h   Legal authority systems can take many forms, but are seen at their purest in a bureaucratic administration staff.

Bureaucracy in its most rational form presupposed the preceding propositions on legitimacy and authority, and had the following character-istics:-

1   The staff members are personally free, observing only the impersonal duties of their offices.

2   There is a clear hierarchy of offices.

3   The functions of offices are clearly specified.

4   Officials are appointed on the basis of a contract.

5   They are selected on the basis of a professional qualification, ideally substantiated by a diploma gained through examination.

6   They have a monetary salary, and usually pension rights. The salary is graded according to position in the hierarchy. The official can always leave the post, and under certain circumstances it may be terminated.

7.   The official's post is his sole or major occupation.

8   There is a career structure, and promotion is possible either by seniority or merit, and according to the judgement of superiors.

9.   The official may appropriate neither the post nor the resources which go with it.

10. He is subject to a unified control and disciplinary system. (Albrow 1970 pp. 43-5. This is an abbreviation from Weber 1947)
     (Source : Albrow, 1970: 43-46)

APPENDIX II   Garthamlock Social Survey : Summary of Assets and
               Deficiencies.

SOCIAL SURVEY

The total number of houses in the survey area is 1,656 of which 1,543 are
occupied at present. A random questionnaire survey was carried out using
a one in eight sample, 183 tenants were interviewed. In some cases up to
three calls were made, morning, afternoon and evening. Two public meetings
were held and every household lettered inviting them to attend. The turnout
for these public meetings was comparitively low, only 40 residents attended.
In addition, meetings were held with all three residents organisations, as
well as with the various officers working in the area. These meetings enabled
them to outline their problems and any proposals or projects currently in the
area.

ASSETS	DEFICIENCIES
The area is located close to open farmland and has a pleasant aspect to the north	The area is on the Eastern fringe of the city in a location isolated from the city centre.
	Many residents consider that public transport is a problem.
	The comparatively large number of empty houses in the area give it a delapidated appearance.
	There is no general purpose hall for community use in the area.
	There is no telephone box in the area.
	Stray dogs are a problem and stairs and footpaths are often fouled.
There is a Chemist located in the Scheme	The existing shops tend to have a very limited range of goods and are regarded as being expensive. 83% of the residents considered there should be more shops.
There is plenty of open space within the schemes on which play areas could be re-established	84.7% of residents requested a toddlers' play facility.
The area is within walking distance of Hogganfield Loch	83.6% of residents requested play facilities for older children.
A Nursery School catering for 40 children is situated in the centre of the scheme	There is a waiting list of over 200 children for places in the nursery school
	Only 54% of residents felt that they were within easy access of a doctor.
One public house exists in the area	81.9% of residents did not consider there was sufficient social life in the area

- 2 -

ASSETS

A full time community worker has been appointed for the area by Strathclyde Regional Council

There was a very active residents association in the area some years ago and many of the working members still live in the scheme. Currently there are three active residents groups.

35.7% of those wishing to leave would stay if area was improved

Only 2.2% of the population are leaving because of the lack of amenities

35.7% of people wishing to leave the area do so because of personal reasons not connected with the area. To live near relatives was

There is a fairly stable minority of long stay residents. 37.5% of residents have lived in the area for over 7 years.

There is a comparatively low rate of evictions, only 111 from July, 1976 to July 1977.

33.9% of residents have close relatives from previous addresses in the scheme

DEFICIENCIES

There is a general feeling in the scheme that the area has deteriorated rapidly over the past five years. On previous occasions when the residents have tried to help themselves the support of the corporate approach had not been developed.

The existing play facilities have been seriously vandalised.

During the period from July, 1976 to July, 1977 the cost of housing repairs as a direct result of vandalism was £77,259.00

70% of residents stated that they wish to leave the area.

44.3% of all residents had filled in a transfer application form.

32.5% of people wishing to leave the area do so because of violence and vandalism in the scheme.

There is a comparatively high rate of abscondences, 129 between July, 1976 and July, 1977.

10% of all households are single parent families.

Unemployment is exceptionally high. 49.5% of the male economically active are unemployed.

Car ownership is low, only 6.5%

APPENDIX III   Press Release ....Embargo until 9a.m.
                                              Sat. 2 Sept. 1978.

GARTHAMLOCK - A Suitable Case For Treatment

Despite a recent upsurge in communit spirit in the Housing Schemes
we feel that we are being let down by the various District and
Regional Council Department.

The local Church of Scotland and Catholic Church combined to raise
the morale of a people who felt that the world was slipping by them,
and they succeeded admirably in enabling people to help themselves
by going out with their neighbours and making an effort to rectify
the ravages of District and Regional indifference by tidying up the
area and scrubbing off a considerable amount of graffitti (as some
recent publicity has noted).

We are not prepared to let this scheme DIE - which is surely what
will happen if no immediate action is taken - there is a point
(rapidly approaching) which, when passed, no amount of money or
energy will revitalise the area.

The people in Garthamlock are willing - but have been so consistently
let down on all fronts that each time it is harder as the cry becomes
"Why bother - nothing will be done anyway !"

After the latest Clean-up campaign - organised by the local residents
- Housing Management at Easterhouse gave a written promise to start
painting the closes and verandahs as a spur to encourage others to
take an interest in improving the area - two months later - NOTHING,
and no likely prospects of anything being done.

"Government cut-backs" is the current "in" phrase, the one which
covers everything that the District and/or Region do not want to do, or
have forgotten. Yet there was no" CUT-BACK" on supplying £600,000 for
a nine hole golf course at Auchenlea Park (good luck to them!) - but
let us get our priorities in order. Garthamlock, and surrounding area,
need a damn sight more than a putting green, and if that sort of money
can be found why not put it to REAL use and implement some of their own
reports and recommendations.

In a Social Survey conducted by Housing Management, and approved by the
District Council, it was recognised that,
            "On previous occasions when the residents have
             tried to help themselves....support......had
             not been developed".
The Report spoke boldly of the need to "re-establish self help and to
create improved conditions and quality of life for all the residents"
and went on to recommend that,
            "Active support should be given to any residents'
             groups working to develop social activities".
and that,
            ".....the development of community concern and self-
             help are imperative. It is vital to foster the
             development and regeneration of residents involvement
             in order that the increasing deterioration of the
             area is arrested and that Garthamlock offers a
             reasonable standard of life for its residents".

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Commendable words, commendable intentions but where is the action?
The residents have sought "active support" for their efforts, but
without success: there have been the local efforts to re-establish
self-help and develop community concern and develop residents'
involvement - but where has the support been; what has happened to
the recommendations and intentions of the Report drawn up, no doubt
at some expense, and approved by the District Council. Yes - the
District Council set up a WORKING PARTY.

The Working Party was to be an answer to all our prayers, with direct
access to Heads of Departments (District and Regional); cut through
all the red tape; remove "brick wall" situations: and allow close
contact meetings between the local authorities and local organisations.

In fact the local Garthamlock Working Party has met ONCE and that
was very shortly after it was set up almost six months ago. As an
exercise in wasting time and money it has been a roaring success -
as a help to us - a dismal failure.

The area still continues to deteriorate. There have been many reports
of rats in the area, with some tenants having to be temporarily moved
until their houses were cleared. With over 170 vacant houses (more
than 10%) in the area this situation could soon escalate out of control.

It is not surprising that residents of Garthamlock begin to feel
totally forgotten by the authorities. We do not even have a G.G.P.T.E.
bus service with a resulting lack of access to Transcard facilities and
adequate week-end services. The Scottish Bus Group operators, who
have a monopoly in the area do not have week-end services as part
of their rostered week. The Eastern Scottish have a monopoly of the
services to Parkhead, and recently took advantage of this position to
create a circular bus service which now takes 45/60 minutes instead
of the previous 25/30 minutes, and it only travels through one part
of the scheme.
Why do we not receive G.G.P.T.E. services when we are ratepayers?
Both the old Glasgow Corporation, it its East End Study, and the
P.T.E. in its "Exploratory Study on Transport for the Disadvantaged"
recognised the inadequacy of the Garthamlock bus services.
So where is the political will to improve the position of deprived
areas NOW?

When the "silent majority" move - beware - there have even been
residents considering the possibilities of raising legal actions
against the District Housing Management Department for failing
in their job of managing.

Given the will and incentive mountains can be moved - WE HAVE THAT
WILL - the District and Regional Authorities must provide the
incentives. Local efforts have effected a considerable reduction
in local vandalism, with local schools surviving virtually unscathed,
thanks to the efforts of local residents and youth groups, instead of
the usual round of broken windows - a saving in this alone.

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We intend to fight on all fronts to make this a better place to
live in - with decent amenities and facilities. At present we
are not getting value for our rates, therefore, we intend petitioning
for a __mass__ reduction in our rateable values.

We will not be treated with indifference by the "City Fathers". We
do not care at this moment for their grandoise plans for sometime
in the future (and subject to further cutbacks). We require
IMMEDIATE ACTION, which must be seen to be believed. We invite any
and all of the Councillors of Glasgow to come up and see for
themselves what we have to see every day ! (We will even supply
a coach).

<u>This Release is issued on behalf of:-</u>

Garthamlock Community Council   Darnaway St. Good Neighbours Assoc.
Saint Mungo's Catholic Church   Binns Rd/Bavelaw St. Action Group
Garthamlock & Craigend East Church   Porchester St. Action Group
                                       Tillycairn St. Group
                                       Tattershall Road, Group.

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