Ideology and the Revolutionary Process:

Two Socialist Case Studies

Jade Miguel Bassem Saab

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Interdisciplinary Studies

College of Social Sciences

University of Glasgow

January 2023

Abstract

Contemporary theories of revolution have been unable to convincingly integrate the role of ideology in understanding the process of revolutions. They have therefore been unsuccessful in overcoming, and reproduce, critical research gaps and problematics including a false structure/agency dichotomy and substituting macro-economic and class markers for causal analysis. This dissertation addresses these shortcomings by developing a theory of revolution which explains the process of revolutions through the ideologies of the groups and organisations which wage and resist them. This ideological analysis addresses current research gaps and provides a richer explanation of revolutions than competing theories.

The dissertation first develops a theoretical framework for studying ideology at the level of groups and organisations by combining framing theory with Michael Freeden's (1996) "conceptual approach". The framework shows that ideology is a tangible force that enables and constrain practice. Furthermore, it informs the objectives, structures, tactics, and resources of groups and organisations.

A Marxist approach is utilised to illustrate the interaction of ideologies within a "field of power". A four-stage process of revolution is derived from this field. The process highlights how revolutions emerge from social movements, and how participating groups and organisations change their ideologies as they simultaneously create and negotiate the stages. The ideological account of revolution is assessed against rational choice theories (RCT), resource mobilisation (RM), deprivation theories, and structural theories of revolution. This appraisal demonstrates that these theories are incomplete without an explicit account of ideology.

Ideological analysis is applied to the Bolshevik party and the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT, National Confederation of Labour) across specific phases of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Spanish Civil War and Revolution of 1936 respectively. The original insight developed in these case studies provides evidence that ideological analysis is better at explaining revolutionary processes than competing theoretical approaches.

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This dissertation represents a significant step in my defection from the business world which I was both academically and practically engrossed in before I began research in 2019. I call it a significant step as I am aware that academia, the arena I hope to enter following this, is becoming increasingly part of the "business world" I am looking to escape. As such this step constitutes a small part of a much larger personal project shared by many. This project will not be complete until the "business world" is fully exorcised from academia, an achievement inextricably linked to the emancipation of all from capital.

I began this PhD with no academic or professional experience in political philosophy or theory beyond the hours I spent reading during my free time, on my long work commutes while I lived and worked in Toronto, and the lived experiences that come with growing up in Lebanon and my activism. This lack of experience presented challenges when it came to completing this project, the largest of which was writing academically. I want to thank my supervisors, Benjamin Franks and Helen Yaffe, for their support and patience in this regard, I know I have tested the limits of both. For better or worse, Benjamin and Helen also provided me with a high degree of autonomy emphasising that "I am the expert" despite my insistence on the contrary and my tendency to use this autonomy to pursue other projects or activities. I hope that this dissertation, shaped in many ways by their input, is worthy of its association with their names.

I would also like to thank my parents. My father continues to be cynical of my defection. The defeat of the revolutionary projects of his time have made it difficult for him to understand why I would leave a well-paid job for ephemeral interests and the hopes of radical change if the outcome is expected to be a lower standard of living (itself an ideologically shaped understanding). While my project accentuates, at times, the tenuous relationship between his aspirations for me and my own goals, his pessimism has yet to override his concern for my well-being. My mother remains unbothered by such complexities. Her support knows no limits and I cannot begin to explain how thankful I am for our daily morning chats which always helped me start the day on the right foot.

A special thank you goes out to my partner. Pursuing this PhD meant putting the Atlantic Ocean between us. This presented a set of challenges beyond the academic or existential. The distance did not weaken her support or readiness to listen to my complaints and offer words of solace and encouragement.

Finally, I must thank all my friends who asked about my progress or suffered my groaning. I am forever indebted to those who braved reading my drafts and offered their comments and reassurance.

Author's declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Jade Saab

January 31, 2023

Chapter 1 Introducing the research

1.1 Introduction

In 2011, I was working as an HR Generalist with a multinational consulting company in Beirut, Lebanon, an alienating and dead-end job. Between January and February of that year, the monotony of my desk work was interrupted by the news of the Egyptian Revolution. For two months, I avoided most of my work responsibilities to take advantage of the high-speed internet, at that time only available in large corporations and private universities, to watch the live coverage of the thousands of Egyptians who had taken to Tahrir Square, Cairo. The crowd demanded, and eventually succeeded in gaining, the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, the president who had ruled the country since 1981.

The Egyptian people were following in the footsteps of their Tunisian counterparts who, in January of the same year, succeeded in ousting their president, in power since 1987. The demands of the crowds in both revolutions were not limited to the removal of presidents but called for bringing down the entire political system which supported their continuous rule. This included ending the by-products of their rule, corruption, unemployment, inflation, and lack of civil rights. In short, these revolutions sought a complete transformation of the political superstructure within their countries.

My interest in these events went beyond the drama inherent in unfolding revolutions. While my home country of Lebanon did not suffer from a single despotic leader, many of the symptoms that Egyptians and Tunisians were also protesting could be found there. Low wages, corruption, failing infrastructure, poor social provisions, political violence including assassinations and armed skirmishes, foreign dependence, war, and mass poverty defined (and continue to dominate) the post-civil-war period in Lebanon (1990 onwards). This made fundamental change a goal for many Lebanese including myself.

Lebanon had experienced its own revolutionary upsurge more than half a decade before what would come to be known as the “Arab Spring”. The 2005 “Cedar Revolution”, of which I was a young participant, expelled the Syrian army, present in the country in a “peacekeeping” capacity since the end of the civil

war, under pressure of popular protests which demanded “freedom, sovereignty, independence”. While it successfully expelled the Syrian army, the Cedar Revolution failed to make any other changes to the political system. The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions provided hope that Lebanon could overcome the failures of the past and achieve the change I and others desired.

The revolutionary atmosphere brought forth by the Arab Spring and my experiences in Lebanon pressed the importance of specific questions. What drives fundamental change? How can it be enacted? How do revolutions unite people from diverse backgrounds and varying interests? The eventual failure of the Egyptian revolution reinforced the pertinence of these questions. It also undermined the romantic notion that anything is possible if the masses mobilised for change. It became apparent to me that revolutions should not be seen simply as a flurry of activity from a uniform “mass”, but as the concerted actions of multiple groups and organisation with sometimes overlapping, sometimes antagonistic, perspectives and objectives. It is what these groups and organisations do during a revolution that determines its process and the eventual outcome.

This dissertation represents a continuation and evolution of this line of questioning and has two main objectives. First, to develop a theoretical framework which explains the process of revolutions through the ideologies of the groups and organisations which wage and resist them. Second, to demonstrate how this framework can be applied through the use of historical case studies. These objectives further the main argument of this dissertation, that the ideological analysis developed herein is better suited to explaining revolutions than competing theories, namely rational choice, resource mobilisation, deprivation, and structural theories. By meeting these objectives, this dissertation presents a new theory of revolution which addresses the critical research gaps and problematics pervading within the disciplines that have attempted and failed to adequately integrate ideology in the study of revolutions (see section 1.3).

Before proceeding to develop the method of ideological analysis in the proceeding chapters, this introductory chapter first explains how this research project developed, including its limitations and future applications. Second, the

chapter assesses how current researchers deal with the question of ideology and revolution and the limitations of this research. Finally, it provides a summary of the chapters to come and their main arguments.

1.2 Reflecting on the research process

The dissertation did not originally aim at studying the impact of ideology on the revolutionary process. Rather, it had intended to study the relationship between the structures of violence which emerge within socialist revolutionary activity, such as guerrilla armies, militias, secret police, and post-revolutionary state structures. This was to be done by investigating how violence was utilised and rationalised by the Bolshevik Party during the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT, National Confederation of Labour) during the Spanish Civil War and Revolution of 1936, and the Movimiento 26 de Julio (M-26-7, the 26th of July Movement) during the Cuban Revolution of 1956.

My interest in the Russian and Cuban revolutions stems from the fact that the leading organisations of those revolutions continue to inspire would be revolutionaries in Lebanon who seek fundamental, anti-imperialist, and egalitarian change. As examples of profound change with equality at their core (at least rhetorically), they also inspired and shaped my interests in politics. The Spanish Civil War and Revolution was included as a control case reflecting a failed socialist revolution. All three cases hold significant social currency as examples to emulate or avoid. Thus, despite being well researched, each revolution remains subject to important debate on why they resulted in a specific outcome. For example, debate rages on whether the authoritarian post-revolutionary state in Russia was the intended outcome of the Bolshevik party.

It was assumed that a positive link between centralised military organisation and the emergence of a centralised authoritarian state could be established due to the importance, if not domination of, military activity throughout the respective revolutionary processes. The failure of the Spanish Republic and the CNT to centralise their armed forces throughout the civil war was hypothesized as a cause for their defeat.

That research would have used the conceptual approach of ideology developed by Michael Freeden (1996) (explained in the following section) to analyse how organisations decontested the concept of violence and legitimatized its use. Research would have been limited to the concept of violence, and not the complete ideology of an organisation. As research began, several problems with the research question became apparent. First, attempting to explain the outcome of revolutions by studying one variable, the centralisation of coercive forces and the use of violence, was revealed to be impractical. As chapter three explains, the revolutionary process is determined by the interaction and conflict of/between groups and organisations. Thus, no one variable can be identified as the cause of a specific outcome.

Second, the hypothesis around the case studies themselves proved to be false. The Bolsheviks adopted labour militarisation for a brief period before reanimating market dynamics. The Republican and CNT forces in the Spanish Civil War quickly identified the need for, and made quick efforts to build, a centralised army but still lost the war. Third, as the dissertation argues, the ideological morphology of groups and organisations change throughout the revolutionary process. Thus, it is difficult to argue that one stable decontestation of violence, even within the same organisation, can be attained. Even if this was possible, the practices of a single group can only be explained through the relationship of concepts within its ideology and not one concept within that ideology no matter how central it might be.

Finally, and most importantly, no clear method through which this research could have been conducted was available. The existence of a research gap around the use of ideology to study the outcomes of revolutions meant that that gap had to be addressed before any research on the role of violence in centralisation could be carried out. As such, I decided that a more suitable task for this dissertation would be to utilise the same case studies to show how the ideologies of groups and organisations play a central role in the process of revolution.

While the focus of the dissertation changed, Freeden's method is still used as a base for the development of a broader framework. The three case studies were also preserved as they provide rich terrain for ideological analysis. The fact that

the Russian, Spanish, and Cuban revolutions have already been thoroughly researched by others means that applying ideological analysis to them highlights the original contributions this method can make in a way that would not be possible with less researched revolutions. Second, the fact that each case presents an iteration of a "socialist" ideology reinforces the need to analyse revolutions through the specific ideologies held by groups and organisations to explain varying outcomes and not just a generalised expression of it. Third, the diversity of the cases and the conditions under which their revolutionary processes unfolded acts as a test for the reliability of the process of revolution developed in chapter three.

The dissertation was also shaped by external factors. In late 2019, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, and Iran all entered their own revolutionary processes. Resisting the urge to return home and participate, I chose instead to engage with these revolutions by editing and contributing to a book (*A Region in Revolt*, 2020). The book paralleled the objectives of this dissertation in that it highlighted the various groups and organisations participating in the revolutionary process. As I had only recently begun the research needed to develop ideological analysis, *A Region in Revolt* focused on the agency of different groups and organisation within the revolutionary process moving analysis away from generalisations and abstractions of "the people" or "the masses". Editing and contributing to the book helped hone the scope of this dissertation and revealed some of the implicit biases I held towards structural explanations of revolution, dealt with in more detail in chapter four. The compounding economic crisis in Lebanon, which is still ongoing, and my concern for the wellbeing of my friends and family there has been a consistent challenge over the past few years. Theoretically engaging with the concept of revolution through my research became almost surreal as real revolution was unfolding in my home country impacting those I cared for.

The onset of the COVID-19 Pandemic and ensuing travel bans in early 2020 meant that planned trips to Spain and Cuba for archival research and interviews were no longer possible. Therefore, secondary sources had to be used where primary material was unavailable in English.

It is worth noting that the availability or lack of availability of translated resources is itself determined by the outcome of the respective revolutionary process. The Bolsheviks emerged from their revolutionary processes victorious yet isolated. Driven by the internationalist outlook found within their ideology and desperate to win over the working class of more developed countries, they prioritised the production and translation of revolutionary Russian texts.

On the other hand, the defeat of the Spanish Revolution and Republican forces led to an "intellectual cordon" around Spain (Ealham, 2006: i) and the loss of primary material from that era. What remained of this material, including selection of the CNT's English bulletin published throughout the civil war, remains in archives within Spain. As a result, chapter six on the Spanish Civil War and Revolution rellies more heavily on secondary sources.

The pandemic also meant that opportunities for building a network of researchers with similar interests for the exchange of ideas was limited as many seminars, conferences, and events usually accessible through the university were cancelled. Therefore, this dissertation did not benefit from the feedback and input that usually accompanies collegiate interactions. Moreover, as was the case for many expatriates, the pandemic exacerbated the toll of being away from my partner, friends, and family. Least of these negative effects was the two weeks in which I contracted the virus myself.

Revolutions and the pandemic impacted the dissertation in two important ways. First, I eventually decided to drop the third case study exploring the role of the M-26-7 in the Cuban Revolution. While that chapter would have investigated the Cuban Revolution across the institutionalisation phase, its exclusion does not weaken the overall arguments presented in the dissertation except for the loss of some analytical diversity. Although not included as a standalone case, examples relating to the M-26-7 are still used to support arguments where relevant.

Second, the dissertation shifted in weight from a more empirical approach, with a focus on case studies, to greater emphasis on theory. While partly caused by time constraints, this shift was primarily a result of the multiple obstacles which needed to be overcome to create a method for the integration of ideology into

the study of revolutions. This required engaging with a wider range of theoretical material and debates than originally expected. Despite this shift, theoretical assertions are always supported with examples from contemporary and older revolutions to show how the arguments forwarded in this dissertation are relevant beyond the two case studies selected.

Two limitations of this dissertation are worth highlighting. First, ideological analysis in the case studies was limited to the main actors within each case, the Bolsheviks and the CNT. The ideologies of other groups and organisations, including opposing ones, are discussed only to the extent that they relate to the main actor of each revolutionary process and depend on secondary sources. While this focus is justified on account of their leading roles and space limits, analysis of the revolutions themselves would be made richer by including an analysis of all the groups and organisations involved. This would also enrich analysis into the main groups themselves as ideological morphologies are partly formed through comparison and contrast.

For example, a detailed look at the ideologies of the *Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista* (POUM, Workers' Party of Marxist Unification), the *Partido Comunista de España* (PCE, Spanish Communist Party), and the various groups and organisation supporting Franco would have generated a richer account of the entire revolution including decisions taken by the CNT. Such an in-depth analysis into the Spanish Revolution and Civil War, or any other case, would require its own research project. Furthermore, it is not necessary to meet the objective of this dissertation: showing how the ideology of groups and organisations impacts the revolutionary process.

Second, the method of ideological analysis can be further refined. For example, software based textual analysis can be used to more accurately determine the concepts included in an ideological morphology and their positions and relationship within it. The technical requirements for establishing such a system, not to mention the access to primary material necessary, extends beyond the scope of this project. Despite the benefits software based textual analysis would bring, the textual and discursive analysis undertaken here continues to be regarded as standard in the field meaning that it does not present a fatal weakness.

As mentioned, the years preceding this research and the years during which it was conducted signified that the age of revolutions has not passed us. Even though the cases explored in this dissertation are confined to the 20th century, the last decade supplied many revolutionary cases. The so called “Arab Spring” and the second wave of revolutions which spanned from 2018 to 2019 in North Africa and West Asia show that research into revolutionary processes and their outcome is still relevant if not necessary.

The method of ideological analysis developed in this dissertation has academic applications that extends beyond the scope of the project. For example, the argument that ideology functions as an ever-present social force within society, developed in chapter two, can be combined with world-systems theory to help explain the movement of concepts on a global level. Ideological analysis enriches the methods available for conceptual historians, a field which has already seen fruitful collaboration with theorists of political ideologies across the past two decades (Ewing, 2020: 262).

Ideological analysis reinvigorates the debate on the predictability of revolutions. This debate has been dominated by two contentions which argue against predictability. The first claims that revolutions are determined by the complex decision-making processes of multiple actors (Keddie, 1995: 20). The interaction of these decisions and the availability of alternative decisions (including accidental decisions) make predictability a mathematical impracticality. The second contention is that it is difficult to observe the preferences of individuals, especially when expressed public preferences often differ from private preferences (Kuran, 1995: 30). Ideological analysis addresses these issues by showing how ideologies constrain decisions and practices, significantly reducing the availability of alternatives, and uses the concept of dominant ideologies to predict generalised preferences. Ideological analysis provides a more convincing counter to these issues than previous conjunctural and structural models presented by those like Jack A. Goldstone (1995). The contributions of ideological analysis can be strengthened by the integration of methods developed by network analysts within social movement studies and human geographers to test the hypothesis of predictability.

The contributions made by this dissertation extend beyond academic application. Ideological analysis equips researchers and activists to understand how what is seen as structural issues such as global warming (Scheffran et al., 2012), increased stratification of society along economic lines (Foster, 2010), and the loss of trust in government (Foa & Mounk, 2017) refract through the ideologies of groups and organisations to determine the scope and objectives of social movements.

Finally, ideological analysis allows for critical evaluation of groups and organisation by researchers or movement leaders and members. This self-critical evaluation can improve decision making structures and ensure more equitable processes.

Before moving on to the next chapter where ideology is defined, it is worth exploring, in some more detail, the research gaps and problematics which have impeded the adequate integration of ideology as a tool of analysis for revolutions. It is these gaps that the method of ideological analysis developed in this dissertation addresses.

1.3 Reviewing the research

Integrating ideology into the study of social movements and revolutions has been a long-standing agenda item for researchers. John Foran, a leading researcher of revolutionary theory, argued that it is “of crucial importance” to the field that there be “better integration of understanding of how culture, in its range of meanings from collectively shared values to explicit ideologies, becomes effective in the causation, course, and outcomes of social revolutions”. Foran concluded that this project has “barely begun in the present literature of the subject” (Foran, 1995: 133).

More than two decades since Foran made that claim, a methodological gap persists around how ideology can be integrated in the study of social movements and revolutions (Aron, 2006: 449). Revolutionary theorists, led foremost by Jack A Goldstone, have sought to “incorporate leadership, ideology, and processes of identification with revolutionary movements as key elements in the production of revolutions” (Goldstone, 2001: 139) to create what they call a fourth-

generation theory of revolution. These attempts have been described as “decidedly imperilled” (Abrams, 2019: 383) or remain an “unfulfilled agenda” (Lawson, 2016:106) as they recreate the issues they set out to solve.

As an example, Goldstone argues that ideology and culture only shapes the form of state breakdown and is not the cause of it (Goldstone 1995: 186). He thus relegates ideology to a secondary position prioritising structural factors such as “disrupted or altered resource flows”. The frustration with the lack of progress in the field of revolutionary theory has led some researchers to conclude that the entire field has been “bedevilled by a lack of progress” (Beck, 2018: 134).

This lack of progress and methodological gap persists despite the presence of a wide range of research that grapples with the question of integrating ideology into understanding the process of revolutions. Sociologists, political scientists and theorists, psychologists, activists and revolutionaries, and even organisational researchers interested in increasing the efficiency of corporations have made important contributions to understanding how ideology works. However, three challenges have meant that a methodological gap persists, and the same problematics continue to reappear.

The first challenge is that the intangible nature of “culture”, “values”, and “ideology” has created a bias towards “tangible” or “objective” variables. Paul Hollander, writing on the collapse of the Soviet Union, rightfully noted that ideology is more “difficult to observe and prove, especially in comparison with more tangible, even measurable social facts such as declining productivity, the decay of public health, and lost or inconclusive wars” (Hollander, 1999: 276). The methodological gap is made more difficult to close by the task of defining “culture”, “values”, and “ideology”, how they interact with each other, and how they interact with newer concepts and sub fields such as framing.

Second, the problem is compounded by the loosely defined scope of the field of social movement studies and revolutionary theories. Rife with debate, there remains a lack of clarity on how to define revolutions, what their causes are, and their relationship to social movements (Abrams, 2021: 145). Finally, with some notable exceptions to be discussed below, research into social movement studies and revolutionary theory tends to be siloed from research on ideology.

This means that there is little or confused overlap between the disciplines as they develop isolated from one another.

These barriers mean that three key problematics have yet to be overcome. These are: a false structure/agency dichotomy. Substituting macro-economic and class markers for causal analysis. And an inadequate method of determining the interests and preferences of groups and organisations and how these interests and preferences impact practice.

Critiquing the available research on the role of ideology in revolutions and how they recreate these problems is facilitated by dividing it into three disciplines. The first is that of ideology studies. The second, Marxist and Marxist-inspired researchers. The third and largest discipline, social movements studies and revolutionary theory. The remainder of this section briefly explains these disciplines and their most prominent strengths and weaknesses. Following the inter-disciplinary nature of research in this area, this dissertation draws on the assets of each of these subjects and improves on their limitations.

1.3.1 The contributions and limits of ideology studies

Ideology studies treats ideology as a discrete subject. Those involved in the field such as Freeden, Terry Eagleton, and Karl Mannheim aim to “categorize, elucidate and decode the ways in which collectivities … think about politics, the ways in which they intentionally practice the art of political thinking, and unintentionally express the social patterns which that kind of thinking has developed" (Freeden, 2000: 304).

As mentioned above, this dissertation bases its method on Freeden’s (1996) conceptual approach. While Freeden’s work should not be substituted for the wide range of work in the field, the strengths and weaknesses of his approach can be generalised and, as the examples below show, are carried forward in a way that impedes the integration of his method in the study of revolutions. Freeden’s main works are dealt with extensively in chapter two, but it is worth summarising his position and its weaknesses here.

Freeden has successfully developed a rigorous method of studying ideologies by breaking them down into constituent concepts which act as the “raw material of political thinking” (Freeden, 2006: 15). Freeden argues that these concepts can be organised on the basis of their priority as core, adjacent, and periphery. Core concepts are those which are long-standing, while as adjacent and periphery concepts can be more short-term (Freeden, 2006: 16). Adjacent concepts “flesh out the core” (Freeden, 2003: 62) providing “logical and cultural” context (Freeden, 1996: 78). Periphery concepts, of which there are two, “straddle the interface between the conceptualization of social realities and the external contexts and concrete manifestations in and through which those conceptualizations occur” (Freeden, 1996: 79). In addition to the priority of concepts, Freeden highlights three other dimensions based on which concepts are organised including proximity, how tightly bound concepts are to each other, permeability, how much concepts overlap with each other within and between various ideologies, and proportionality, how much space a concept takes. These variables can create ideologies which are “bombastic, totalizing, doctrinaire; or modest, fragmented, and loose” (Freeden, 2006: 19). The concepts found within an ideology interact with each other in a mutually defining ways meaning that “each component interacts with all the others and is changed when any one of the other components alters” (Freeden, 1996: 67). This mutually defining relationship provides clarity to concepts which are otherwise essentially contested and whose meaning “involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users" (Gallie, 1955: 169).

While Freeden’s method is unparalleled, he does not explicitly make a connection between it and the study of social movements and revolutions. Additionally, three weaknesses in his method need to be addressed. First, Freeden applies his method to “ideological families” ideologies that can be “grouped together in broad family resemblances” (Freeden, 2006: 19). This emphasis on ideological families dulls the potency of his method and the ability to apply it to the specific groups and organisations which wage and resist revolution. This means that Freeden does not adequately explain how groups and organisations form their ideologies. Second, while Freeden acknowledges that ideological morphologies can change over time (Freeden, 1996: 78), the rate of change at a group or organisational level is underestimated, especially during

times of revolution. There is also a gap in explaining when ideologies at a group or organisational level undergo changes. Third, Freeden presents discourse as the main mode through which ideologies are transmitted (Freeden, 2003: 69, 79). This undervalues the role power plays in maintaining the potency of an ideology.

Those interested in radical groups and organisations and their ideologies, as this dissertation is, have either adopted Freeden's method explicitly, or utilised its focus on concepts to help forward their arguments. However, they carry forward the weaknesses identified above even when looking at specific groups or organisations.

For example, Franks et al. (2018), rightfully argue that Freeden's approach is better than analytical approaches to ideology which ignore the accounts of movements who profess these ideologies. This leads to their misrepresentation in favour of an "academic construction" (2). Despite identifying this critical weakness, they then proceed to develop an ideological morphology of anarchism which is not "tied to any given thinker, time period, or tendency within the anarchist movement" (7). Meaning that although the ideological morphology developed draws on the experiences of various groups and organisations, it does not pertain (at least not exclusively) to any one of them but represents an ideological family which combines the most common features – an academic construction. As chapter two argues, when it comes to social movements and revolutions, it is the specific iterations of ideology held and formed by groups and organisations which matter, not abstracted ideological families.

Another common theme has been to use conceptual analysis to argue that two competing ideological families are more permeable than assumed, or that concepts shared by competing ideologies can be organised into their own ideological family. The main subjects of this trend have been anarchism and Marxism (Pinta, 2013; Franks, 2012; Pritchard et al., 2017). In their *Libertarian Socialism* (2017) Ruth Kinna and Alex Prichard, both accomplished researchers on Anarchism, open by saying "This book is about two currents of ideas, anarchism and Marxism" (1). What follows, however, is a compilation of investigations into specific organisations, movements, and thinkers with distinct ideologies that have shared features with anarchism, Marxism, or both. What

these investigations show, despite their own conclusions, is not the need to reassess the boundaries of different ideological families, but the inadequacy of using ideological families to understand specific movements, groups, or organisations.

In a slightly different vein to the above approach, the ideas and practices of groups and organisations are compared against ideological families to better locate their ideas and practices. For example, Bates et al. (2016) conduct a discourse analysis of the official publications of Occupy Wall Street (OWS) and Occupy London (OL) to assess the concepts found within those organisations against permutations of the ideological families of anarchism, post-anarchism, Marxism, and post-Marxism. They conclude that OWS and OL represent re-articulations of "discursive democracy to the demands of the twenty-first century" (351). This finding reinforces the argument that the thoughts and practices of groups and organisations are better studied based on their own historical contexts as opposed to held up against abstracted ideological families.

In addition to replicating Freeden's errors, at no point do Bates et al. refer to the thoughts and practices of OWS and OL as an ideology reserving the term for ideological families. This distinction between ideology and the thoughts and practices of specific organisations mimics a trend found in social movement studies and revolutionary theory where ideology is used to signify something that exists outside of or above the groups and organisations that practice and create them. The consequence is that, as Bates et al. demonstrate, other frameworks and theories are used as substitutes for studying thought and practice at the groups and organisational level, namely framing theory. As the next chapter shows, this creates even more confusion about where and how multiple frameworks interact or overlap.

While the focus on groups and organisations reflected in most of the previous examples is in line with the larger shift in ideology studies away from "macro-political ideologies" (ideological families) (Freeden, 2019: 1), this transition has yet to explicitly identify ideologies with groups and organisations. This dissertation overcomes this resistance by further developing Freeden's method. This is done by first infusing it with Marxist and Marxist inspired analysis of power and ideology which explains how ideologies and the concepts found within

them are reproduced. Second, by critiquing framing theory, which provides valuable insight into how concepts are selected and ordered by groups and organisation, and incorporating it with Freeden's method to create a single framework for studying ideology at a group and organisational level.

Making these two improvements reaffirms groups and organisations as sites in which ideologies are produced and maintained (Benford and Snow, 2000: 613; Gillian, 2008: 253) and explains how the ideologies of individuals, groups, and organisations interact to produce social movements and revolutions. More importantly, it addresses the first challenge to integrating ideology into the study of revolutions by explaining the tangible nature of ideology.

1.3.2 The contributions and limits of Marxist research

The second discipline to deal with ideology and revolution, and arguably the first to bring the two together, is that of Marxist and Marxist inspired researchers. The dissertation uses three concepts found within this research to remedy the poor explanation of how ideologies are transmitted in Freeden's method. These concepts are: tying power to control over material resources and decisions making, the superstructure, and dominant ideology. It must be acknowledged that these concepts present their own challenges when it comes to their ambiguity and have solicited strong disagreement and debates as to their use and meaning. For example, debate continues about what institutions belong to the superstructure and its relationship to the "economic base". This dissertation side steps these debates and uses these concepts in so far as they act as a framework to analyse the institutions relevant to revolutionary processes and their complex interconnectedness (Ervin, 2020: 377).

By drawing on the analysis of Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, philosopher and leader of the Italian Communist Party, and Louis Althusser, French Marxist philosopher, this dissertation builds on a critical strengths found within Marxist analysis, connecting the domination and reproduction of the ideologies of specific groups and organisations to their control over the "means of material production" (Marx, 1998: 67). Through this relationship, Marxist theories are able to explain how the ideologies of groups and organisations become and remain dominant,

reproduce themselves, insulate themselves from radical groups and organisations, and adapt to change.

This theory of domination is developed to further several arguments. First, that ideology is a constant social force. Second, that structural changes, such as involvement in war, an inability to adjust to population growth, and rapid economic development, are practices tied to the ideology of dominant groups and organisations. Third, that the ideologies of various groups and organisations relate to and interact with each other in a field of power (see section 2.5). Changes within the field of power creates opportunities for social movements and revolutionary activity. This makes understanding the ideologies of groups and organisations central to the process of revolution since it is their interaction which begins the process. Finally, Marxist concepts are used to clarify the relationship between ideology and culture and argue that culture represents historically prevalent concepts shaped by the interaction of groups and organisation in the field of power. This explanation breaks with the distinction social movement studies and revolutionary theorists make between ideology and culture.

While Marxist and Marxist inspired researchers make valuable contributions to the study of ideology and revolution, an important weakness remains. Since Marxist analysis focuses on dominant groups and organisations, such as the state and those who control the means of production, it appears that Marxists do not consider non-dominant forms of thought and practice as ideological (see for example Freeden, 2003: 7-10). This is more prevalent in classical readings of Marx's works, however, later Marxists such as Gramsci and Althusser have expanded the use of the term. For example, Althusser argues that "there is no practice except by and in ideology" (2008: 44) making it clear that even radical thoughts and practices are ideological. While the argument that Marxists do not consider non-dominant thought and practice as ideological is mistaken, it touches on the real weakness of Marxist and Marxist inspired research, an inadequacy of explaining the process through which radical ideologies emerge. This weakness has led to those who use Marxist methods to overemphasise material or structural factors when explaining revolutions recreating a false structure/agency dichotomy and substituting macro-economic markers for causal analysis.

For example, in his writing on *Ideology and Popular Protest,* Marxist inspired historian George Rudé, building on Gramsci's work, argues that popular ideology, found within social movements and revolutions, is a combination of inherent and derived ideologies. Inherent ideologies, he argues, are based on the experience, tradition, and memory of groups. Derived ideologies, on the other hand, are borrowed and more structured (Rudé, 1995: 22). Rudé warns that these two elements are not divided by a "Wall of Babylon" but often overlap with derived elements becoming embedded in inherent ideologies (22). One is also not superior to the other. Derived ideas, while being more sophisticated, are but a "distillation of popular experience and the people's 'inherent' beliefs" (23).

Rudé's account of ideology reinforces the claim that ideologies are permeable and can borrow concepts from each other to develop. However, his explanation of how inherent ideologies become more revolutionary does not give credit to the innovation that groups and organisations are capable of, thus overemphasising the role of external and professional ideologues and recreating a hierarchy of ideas. Even if Rudé's assertions that the emergence of popular ideologies hinges on the presence of derived ideologies, Rudé does not explain the internal processes through which derived ideas are adopted.

The weaknesses in Rudé arguments are remedied in this dissertation in two ways. First, by using Freeden's work to draw a clear link between practice and Ideology. This link is expressed as a feedback loop through which actors reflect on their own thoughts, values, and decisions to convert "past experience into knowledge and projection of that knowledge in ideas and purposes that anticipate what may come to be in the future" (Freeden, 2000: 310, 319). Practice and experience thus provide a creative engine for ideological construction. Simultaneously, ideologies act as windows through which experiences are interpreted and incorporated into ideological morphologies.

Second, by acknowledging, as argued by social movements studies and revolutionary theory, that groups and organisations develop through "cycles of contention", phases of heightened conflict across the social system with characteristics of "rapid diffusion of collective action", "a rapid pace of innovation in the forms of contention", and "sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities" (Tarrow,

1998: 142). Through these cycles, groups and organisations can develop a network of individuals with a high level of trust, seasoned activists who can play a leading role, and reflect on and develop new strategies and practices (Disalvo, 2015: 276; Fominaya, 2015: 143). Cycles of contention thus serve as experiential superchargers for conceptual innovation and incubators for the conceptual cross contamination Rudé identifies.

1.3.3 The contributions and limits of social movement studies and revolutionary theory

The third and largest discipline this dissertation draws on is that of social movements studies and revolutionary theory. Presenting social movement studies and revolutionary theory as one discipline is by no means an attempt to present them as uniform. As other researchers have noted, the study of revolutionary theory is confined to revolutions themselves (Abrams, 2019: 383). Social movement studies, on the other hand, focus on forms of institutionalized collective actions that contest the orientation of society as a whole and seek to challenge or alter elements of the social structure or reward distribution of society (Bell, 2001: 193).

Despite these differences, the two fields considerably overlap in scope and methodology and social movement studies have made important contributions to revolutionary theory (Abrams, 2019: 382) including attempts to explain revolutions. For example, Rational Choice theories (RCTs) and Resource Mobilization theory (RM), which are critiqued in chapter three, are primarily concerned with Social Movements (SMs), yet they present their own theories of revolution.

Social movements studies and revolutionary theory offer three important contributions which this dissertation carries forward. The first is that there has been widespread consensus that revolutions overlap with or occur alongside a spectrum of phenomena such as mass protests, civil wars, coup d'états, rebellions, wars of national liberation, processes of democratisation, and attempts to reform social orders (Goldstone, Gurr, and Moshiri, 1991; Allinson, 2019: 2; Lawson, 2016: 107; Beck and Ritter, 2021: 5; Goldstone, 1991: 407). This has expanded the agenda of studying revolutions to include failed attempts

at revolution (Allinson, 2019: 321), revolutionary movements that reject capturing state power (Prichard, 2021: 27) and “conservative” or “reactionary” revolutions and coups which have been largely ignored in the field (Beck, 2018). This expanded agenda shapes the definition of revolution provided by this dissertation. It has also helped develop the four-stage process of revolution argued for in chapter three and used in the case studies which also provide examples of how revolutions overlap with civil-wars or can be initiated by “reactionary” forces as was the case in the Spanish Revolution and Civil-War.

Second, while not as widespread, some social movements studies and revolutionary theories place a focus on groups and organisations. Edgar Schein, writing on organizational culture, defines a group as “a set of people who have been together long enough to have shared significant problems, who have had opportunities to solve these problems and to observe the effects of their solutions, and who have taken in new members” (Schein,1984: 5-7). Groups can emerge from loose categories such as workers, community members, or be part of a broader network. The defining characteristic of groups is that they are well-integrated and therefore do not require formal organisation to mobilize and engage in forms of collective action (Calhoun, 1983: 897).

Groups need to be differentiated from Social Movement Organisations (SMOs) – referred to simply as organisations throughout this dissertation. As John McCarthy and Mayer Zald have noted, SMOs are “complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1218). Organisations can emerge from groups as defined above, or by organizing previously unorganized members of the public (Jenkins, 1983: 529; McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1217). Participants in social movements can be classified based on their relationship to groups and organisations as constituents, adherents (supporters), bystander publics, and opponents (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1221). The goal of groups and organisations is to convert adherents into constituents, bystanders into adherents, and discredit opponents if they cannot be converted.

A focus on groups and organisations is carried forward in this dissertation which argues that revolutions should be studied through the groups and organisations

which wage them. This includes the ideologies of these groups and organisations, and how these ideologies change during revolutionary times. The case studies in this dissertation focus on the Bolshevik party and the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT, National Confederation of Labour) to show how studying their ideologies and the changes their ideologies went through provides better explanatory evidence for the process of revolutions.

The third strength of some social movements studies and revolutionary theory is that they present revolutions as processes, rejecting the argument forwarded by structural and deprivation theorists that revolutions constitute events. For example, Goldstone's argument that revolutions unfold in three phases (1995: 108) has become largely accepted by researchers (see for example Lawson, 2019 and Goldstone et al., 1991). This dissertation agrees that revolutions should be seen as processes but argues that a four-stage process is better for integrating revolutionary movements that do not seek to capture state power and for explaining the overlap between revolutions and other forms of contentious politics such as social movements (see section 3.3). The four-stage process argued for does not only better explain revolutions, but it helps identify key junctures during which the ideologies of groups and organisations may change.

The weaknesses of social movements studies and revolutionary theory this dissertation seeks to overcome are fourfold. First, there remains a confused distinction between culture or cultural frameworks and ideology. This distinction is summarised well by Goldstone who argues that cultural frameworks represent "longstanding background assumptions, values, myths, stories, and symbols that are widespread in the population" (2001: 154-155) while ideologies are "consciously constructed … more coherent beliefs, arguments, and value judgements that are promulgated by those advocating a particular course of action" (2001: 155). Goldstone also argues that cultural frameworks provide the basis for differing ideologies (1995: 185). Similarly, Colin Beck argues that ideology is "a form of activated culture" (Beck, 2013 :2) and defines culture as "mere ideas" (Beck, 2013 :1).

These distinctions between culture and ideology fail to explain how "assumptions, values, myths, stories, and symbols" inherent in "mere ideas" become longstanding or widespread in a population. The argument that cultural

frameworks provide the basis for differing ideologies also ignores the fact that groups and organisations can innovate to break from pre-existing cultural frameworks (Saharov, 2021: 14). This includes the adoption and transmission of values, myths, and symbols external to a specific culture, such as the adoption of communist concepts or the language of human rights. More importantly, while attesting to maintain a separate role for culture, these distinctions undermine the role of culture as a non-active form of thought leaving it with little analytical use when it comes to the decisions and practices of groups and organisations within revolutions. Finally, differentiating between culture and ideology creates the impression that it is only oppositional groups which operate on ideology while states operate on non-ideological calculated interest inherent to their relationship to classes within their borders and their position in a given geopolitical environment (see for example Skocpol, 1979: 30-31).

As mentioned above, this dissertation argues, in line with Marxist inspired researchers, that "culture" represents historically stable and reproduced concepts within a specific context (nation-state, group, or organisation). As such, "culture" is not a discrete category but reflects a conceptual bank from which individuals, groups and organisations can draw from. The shape of this conceptual banks and the concepts readily available within it is shaped by the ideological actions of groups and organisations and their interaction.

Culture should not therefore replace ideology simply because individuals, groups, and organisation are acting in line with longstanding background assumptions, values, myths, stories, and symbols. For ideologies can be both longstanding and widespread, or novel and occupying a prominent conscious position (Freeden, 2006: 19). Additionally, ideology should not be seen as "activated culture" (Beck, 2013: 2) since individuals, groups, and organisation can draw on concepts from outside of their immediate culture and innovate their own. They are thus not simple transmitters or refiners of concepts found within culture".

The second weakness of social movement studies and revolutionary theory, which is also replicated by some in the field of ideology studies, is substituting frames, as used in framing theory, for ideology at the level of groups and organisations. Framing theorists, dealt with extensively in section 2.3, argue

that ideologies are concerned with long term processes of reflection that happens at an elite level not in crowded public meetings (Gillan, 2008: 257-258). Frames, on the other hand, represent "mental templates of appropriate behavior for common situations, acquired through socialization and experience and fine-tuned by the individual on the basis of what worked in the past and/or what others report as useful" (Johnston, 2005: 239) and thus deal with more immediate needs and requirements for "communicative interaction" (Oliver and Johnston, 2005: 187).

While framing theorists agree there is an overlap between ideologies and frames, just like there is an overlap between culture and ideology, they do not adequately explain how the two interact and fail to acknowledge that communicative interaction is itself ideologically shaped. This, in part, is a mistake that can be credited to ideology studies who continue to focus on abstracted "ideological families" and not how decisions are made at a groups or organisational level. As mentioned above, this issue is remedied in this dissertation by combining framing theory with Freeden's conceptual approach to create a single framework explaining how groups and organisations construct and alter their ideological morphology.

This leads to the third weakness of social movements studies and revolutionary theory, using ideology in a abstracted way to explain revolutions. For example, in his analysis on the *Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, Bernard Bailyn focuses on "the specific attitudes, conceptions, formulations, even in certain cases particular phrases, which together form the ideology of the American Revolution" this includes the flexibility of these ideas and their complex variations (Bailyn, 2017: 28, 19). These attitudes and conception are not tied to specific groups or organisations in the revolutionary struggle and are therefore dealt with abstractly. Similarly, Goldstone speaks of the importance of "constructing" a revolutionary ideology which inspires a broad range of followers, provides a sense of inevitable success, and convinces people that existing authorities are weak and unjust (Goldstone, 2001: 156). Goldstone does not touch on the process through which such a revolutionary ideology can emerge, or who should be seen as the "owner" of such an ideology. The construction of a revolutionary ideology is thus taken as an activity which takes

place outside of, or in addition to, the regular functioning of groups and organisations, not as inherent to the existence of groups and organisations.

Contrary to this ideational and abstracted presentation of ideology, this dissertation argues that for ideology to be useful in explaining the revolutionary process, it must be situated within the groups and organisations which produce and maintain them (Benford and Snow, 2000: 613; Gillian, 2008: 253). These groups and organisations should be seen as the owners of their own ideologies (Schein, 1984: 5) and the concepts which make them up. It is therefore not enough to study ideology as an immaterial presence within a revolution, but in its concrete formulation encompassing the specific practices sanctioned or condemned by groups and organisations, their structures, membership, language, methods for decision making, and the forms of collective action that are permissible or seen to be worthwhile.

The fourth and final weakness of social movements studies and revolutionary theory is that although it has become generally accepted that interest plays a role in the revolutionary process, how interest can be defined and studied remains vague and is therefore substituted with assumptions. For example, Rational Choice Theories assume that revolutionary groups are motivated by a desire to secure power whereas individuals are assumed to mobilise to redress grievances (Aya, 2001: 152). Resource Mobilisation Theories argues that medium and long-term interests can be deduced based on community, associations, and relations to social structures of power and production, and short-term interests can be deduced from a groups or organisation's own articulations (Tilly, 1978: 61). Neither of these assumptions explain how groups and organisations determine their preferences or interests or how multiple preferences are ordered or ranked (Friedman and Hechter, 1988: 202).

This dissertation argues that a group or organisation's ideology can be deduced from the writings, speeches, and debates conducted by active members including early joiners, leaders, creators, or the cadre. However, it uses the conceptual approach to order and rank multiple preferences and interests and explain how this ordering can change based on developments in internal debates or adjustments to external changes.

1.4 Summarising the proceeding chapters

This dissertation is divided into two sections. The first section, containing chapters two, three, and four, establish a theoretical foundation and method for using ideological analysis to explain the process of revolutions. The objective of these chapters is to remedy the barriers which have resulted in the inadequate integration of ideology in the study of revolution (identified in section 1.3) and show how ideological analysis is better suited for explaining revolutionary processes than rational, deprivation, resource mobilisation, and structural theories of revolution.

Chapter two critiques Freeden's conceptual approach and integrates it with framing theory to create a single framework. This framework allows for the study of ideology at a group and organisational level. It also explains how ideology is as tangible as any "material" or "structural" variable as it enables and constrains practice, and informs the objectives, structures, tactics, and resources of groups and organisations. This link makes it possible to study revolutions through the ideologies of those who wage or resist it.

The chapter then utilizes the Marxist concept of "dominant ideology" to explain how the ideologies of various groups and organisations interact with and relate to each other within a "field of power". The field of power, a conceptual space that includes the ideologies of all groups and organisations, illustrates how ideology is an ever-present social force and how changes in the relationship between groups and organisations can lead to the "ideological openings" necessary for revolutions. The field of power also clarifies the relationship between ideology and "culture".

Chapter three develops the concept of a field of power to explain the relationship between social movements, revolutions, and ideology. The chapter advances the argument that revolutions, while distinct, are processes which overlap with or occurs alongside a spectrum of phenomena such as mass protests, civil wars, coup d'états, rebellions, wars of national liberation, processes of democratisation, and attempts to reform social orders (Goldstone, Gurr, and Moshiri, 1991; Allinson, 2019: 2; Lawson, 2016: 107; Beck and Ritter, 2021: 5; Goldstone, 1991: 407). The chapter develops a new definition of

revolution integrating new arguments which allow for richer analysis and the inclusion of failed attempts at revolution (Allinson, 2019: 321), revolutionary movements that reject capturing state power (Prichard, 2021: 27), and "conservative" or "reactionary" revolutions and coups which have been largely ignored by the field (Beck, 2018).

An original four-stage process of revolution consisting of pre-revolution, revolutionary window, revolutionary situation, and institutionalisation is derived from changes within the field of power. This four-stage process clarifies the relationship and overlap between revolutions and social movements and identifies key junctures where the ideological morphology of a groups or organisations may undergo rapid change. Presenting revolution as a process allows for a more accurate study of how events unfold based on the decisions and action of the groups and organisations which wage and resist them.

Chapter four critically evaluates rational choice (RCT), resource mobilisation (RM), deprivation, and structural theories of revolution showing how they recreate the main problematics in the field and why they are incomplete without explicitly accounting for the role of ideology. For example, while both RCT and RM reference "interests" as a motivating factor for collective action, they do not adequately explain how interests can be deduced. Ideological analysis, on the other hand, provides a ranking and organising method for concepts within a group or organisation's ideology leading to more accurate interpretations. Deprivation and structural theories, on the other hand, substitute macro indicators such as deprivation or economic and political crises for causal analysis which explain why and how these macro indicators lead to mobilisation and revolution. This substitution leaves out the ideological process through which deprivation and crises are subjectively experienced and that crises result from the actions of ideological groups and organisations.

Section two of the dissertation applies the method developed in the previous three chapters to historical case studies. The case studies map the ideologies of the leading radical organisations and the changes their respective ideologies underwent by breaking them down into core, adjacent, and periphery concepts. This breakdown is used to explain how the interaction of these concepts

constrained and enabled their action in a direction that facilitated or hindered their progression through the revolutionary phases.

Chapter five focuses on the Bolshevik party during the revolutionary situation phase of the 1917 Russian Revolution stretching from the first transfer of power from the Tsar to the Provisional Government in February 1917 until the end of the Civil War in early 1921 where the Bolsheviks were able to secure their claim to power. The chapter argues that the authoritarian outcome of the Russian Revolution was a result of changes within the Bolshevik party's ideological morphology triggered by their capture of power and the antagonistic reaction of other groups and organisations to their ascension.

The changes within the Bolshevik ideological morphology magnified the authoritarian elements already present within it at the expense of democratic principles and concepts. These changes are represented by the cannibalization of the core concept of "all power to the soviets", a move of the adjacent concept of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" to the core, and the emergence of new adjacent and periphery concepts such as "cultural development" and "market control". The emergence of new adjacent and periphery concepts and the cannibalization of democratic concepts resulted in a shift in the meaning of more stable concepts such as "socialist revolution", "democratic centralism and the party" and "state capitalism" in a way that enabled the creation of a party-state apparatus.

Contrary to structural accounts, the chapter argues that the Bolsheviks did not simply fill a void left by the collapse of the Tsarist regime but were able to capture and maintain power due to the permeability of their ideology with ideologies of other groups such as peasants, the urban proletariat, and other nationalities previously considered part of the Russian Empire. This permeability provided the Bolsheviks with the support and resources needed to capture and maintain power over other mobilised groups. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the deepening of the revolutionary situation into a civil war cannot be attributed to the Bolsheviks drive for power but was a result of ideological differences between the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary parties such as the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Chapter six investigates the CNT during the revolutionary window and situation of the Spanish Civil War and Revolution of 1936. It argues that the struggle for power over Spain was caused by ideological opposition between dominant groups such as large landholders, the Church, and the army, and radical organisations with the CNT at the forefront. The chapter argues that the opposition of dominant and radical groups and organisations to the project of the Second Republic created a long term "protest spiral" culminating in General Francisco Franco's failed coup. Thus, it was ideological competition and not structural or deprivation factors alone which progressed the revolutionary process from window to situation.

The chapter also argues that Franco's failed coup led to the reconceptualization of the CNT's adjacent concept of "cooperation" into a core position of "collaboration". This transformation was enabled by the core concept of "federalism" and allowed for a tenuous alliance between the CNT and other Republican and anti-fascist forces. In contrast to resource mobilisation theory, the chapter shows how this alliance resulted in an ideological deadlock leading to the defeat of Republican forces and their allies, including the CNT, despite a material advantage.

1.5 Conclusion

This introductory chapter explained what motivated this dissertation and the selection of the case studies within it. The central arguments of the dissertation are that revolutions should be studied at the level of the groups and organisations which wage them, and that ideological analysis is better suited for explaining revolutionary processes than rational, deprivation, resource mobilisation, and structural theories of revolution. The dissertation takes an interdisciplinary approach to overcome the research gap left by the fields of ideology studies, Marxist and Marxist inspired researchers, and social movement studies and revolutionary theory while building on their strengths.

The next chapter develops a method to study the ideological morphologies of groups and organisations. It also explains how concepts within ideologies proliferate during revolutionary and non-revolutionary times showing that ideology is an ever-present social force.

Section One: Establishing a theoretical foundation

Chapter 2 Elaborating a method for studying ideology at a group and organisational level

2.1 Introduction

Chapter one argued that a barrier to the adequate integration of ideology into the study of revolutions has been the persistence of a methodological gap (Aron, 2006: 449). The objective of this chapter is to overcome this gap by improving Michael Freeden's (1996) conceptual approach to create a framework for studying the ideologies of groups and organisations. Developing a framework of studying ideology tackles one of the major persistent problematics in the field of revolutionary theory, an inadequate method of determining the interests and preferences of groups and organisations. The development of the conceptual approach in this chapter is a crucial and necessary first step before this dissertation can turn its attention to how ideology can be used to explain revolutionary processes, and how ideological analysis is better than competing theories of revolution.

The conceptual approach argues that ideologies are constellations of concepts which form an ideological morphology. The way concepts are organised and interact within an ideological morphology determines how the practices of individuals, groups, and organisations are enabled and constrained. While there is no ontological priority between ideology and practice (Freeden, 2000: 308), there can be no practice without ideology (Althusser, 2008: 44). By explicitly tying ideology to practices, ideology becomes a material and tangible force (Daldal, 2014: 158) impacting the revolutionary process and day to day life.

This chapter improves on Freeden's approach by integrating it with framing theory further defining ideology and explaining how groups and organisations form, and when they alter, their ideological morphologies. How groups and organisations change the structure of their ideological morphologies clarifies the decisions they make during revolutionary processes as done in chapters five and six. Second, the chapter uses the Marxist concept of dominant ideology to show how ideologies are ever-present social forces and how the relationship of groups and organisations, based on their ideological morphologies, either maintains equilibrium or create change. This relational approach lays the groundwork for

the following chapter which shows how changes in the ideologies of groups and organisation are critical in creating the openings necessary for the mass action required for revolutionary change.

Section 2.2 explains and assesses Freeden's conceptual approach. Three strengths and three weaknesses are identified. These weaknesses impede the application of Freeden's approach to the ideologies of groups and organisations.

Section 2.3 combines framing theory with Freeden's conceptual approach to address the weaknesses identified in the previous section and create a single framework which explains how groups and organisations construct and alter their ideological morphology. To successfully combine the two theories, the section clarifies the currently confused relationship between frames, as used in social movement studies, and ideologies. The section argues that frames should be viewed as "slices" of an ideological morphology since framing theorists argue that they can only be understood in relation to a "larger system of meaning" (Oliver and Johnston 2005: 193). On the other hand, framing processes represent how a group or organisation determine which concepts are integrated into their ideological morphology, how those concepts are organised, and how they change.

By integrating framing theory, this section shows how groups and organisations are sites in which ideologies are produced and maintained (Benford and Snow, 2000: 613; Gillian, 2008: 253). As sites for the production and maintenance of ideologies, groups and organisations should be seen as the owners of their ideologies (Schein, 1984: 5). The section also identifies that the ideological morphology of a group or organisation can be deduced by studying the writings, speeches, and debates conducted by active members of a group or organisation including early joiners, leaders, creators, or the most active members - its cadre. This is as leaders, creators, and cadres possess social capital, have access to networks of support within the organisation, and access to resources such as communication channels or the labour of other members.

Section 2.4 builds on the previous one by explaining that individuals undertake similar framing tasks. However, since these tasks do not involve the consensus driven debate and discussion found within groups and organisations, it is more

appropriate to refer to them as sense-making. Understanding how individuals formulate their ideologies explains how or when they mobilise in favour of or against specific groups and organisation.

Where the previous three sections describe how the content of ideologies can be determined and studied, section 2.5 explores how the ideologies of individuals, groups, and organisations relate to each other. Leaning on the work of European Marxists Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser, the section argues that ideologies and the groups and organisations which hold them can be classified on a value-system spectrum based on their relationship with power as either dominant, subordinate, or radical (Abercrombie and Turner, 1978: 158). Each group and organisation exerts a force with a specific magnitude that either supports or opposes dominant ideologies creating a field of power. The interaction of these forces either maintain a level of equilibrium or produce change (Lewin, 1947: 32). The magnitude of the force each group or organisation possesses is determined by their access to and control over material resources which facilitate or obstruct the transmission and reproduction of their ideologies (Marx, 1998: 67; Tilly, 1978: 75). Understanding how different groups ideologies interact, overlap, and diverge with each other in this field of power explains how changes in ideologies occur in an interrelated manner and how ideologies represent an ever-present social force.

This chapter makes two original contributions. The first is by applying Freeden's method directly to the study of the revolutionary process at the level of groups and organisations. While, as agued in chapter 1, the conceptual approach has been used to study the ideologies of groups and organisations during revolutionary times, it has not be used to link the impact these ideologies have had on the revolutionary process. The second original contribution is developing a relational approach to the ideologies of groups and revolutions into a field of power. This relational approach clarifies the relationship between ideology and culture vindicating ideology as a driving and ever present force in society, justifying its use to better understand revolutions.

The next chapter uses arguments developed here to resolve the remaining two barriers of integrating ideology into the study of revolutions, the muddled relationship between social movements and revolutions and the research silos

which have seen little and confused overlap between ideology studies and revolutionary theory. This clarification, in turn, allows for assessing ideological analysis against competing theories of revolutions in chapter three before applying it to the case studies in section two of this dissertation.

2.2 Assessing the conceptual approach to ideology

Michael Freeden's (1996) conceptual approach to studying ideologies provides a solid foundation to close the methodological gap which has stood in the way of fully integrating ideology within social movement studies and revolutionary theory. This section first explains the conceptual approach and how it concretely ties ideology to practice. It then critically assesses the method identifying three strengths and three weaknesses. The weaknesses identified in this section are remedied in the following sections. This amelioration develops the conceptual approach so that it can be applied to the analysis of groups and organisations during revolutionary times, as done in chapters five and six.

Freeden defines the study of ideology as "unquestionably the study of substantive, concrete *configurations* of political ideas that matter to, and in, societies." (Freeden, 2006: 15, emphasis added). These "political ideas" are synonymous to concepts which form the "raw material of political thinking" (Freeden, 2006: 15). Freeden asserts that concepts in an ideology must be "perceived as clusters" (Freeden, 2006: 16). It is the relationship of concepts in a cluster that give us the character of an ideology – its morphology.

It is not only which concepts are in an ideological morphology that determine its character, but also the way these concepts interact with each other. This interaction simultaneously clarifies the meaning of each individual concept and presents a meaning for the whole ideology which makes up more than the sum of its parts (Freeden, 1996: 88). Absent this relationship, concepts would remain "essentially contested" meaning their definition "involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users" (Gallie, 1955: 169). The mutually defining interaction of concept thus determines their decontestation within a morphology.

For example, while the concept of revolution, on its own, elicits endless debate on its proper meaning, how revolution is used can be clarified through its relationship with other concepts within an ideology. Therefore, revolution, as used by the Bolsheviks, is distinct from revolution as used by the CNT. This is because the meaning of the concept is decontested through its relationship with the other concepts found within their ideological morphologies. In the case of the Bolsheviks, as chapter five shows, "revolution" is flanked by the concepts of "the party" and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" among others. Within the CNT, as chapter six argues, the concept of "revolution" is flanked by the concepts of "federalism" and "direct action" giving revolution a different meaning. The similarities and differences of shared concepts present in the ideological morphologies of multiple groups or organisations can be understood through their relationship with other concepts. This relationship creates a stable, but not unchangeable, understanding of a concept within its respective group or organisation.

It is the relationship of concepts to each other which fixes, even if temporarily, their meaning. This relationship is reciprocal in that all the concepts mutually define each other to create an ideological morphology. Thus, a change in even one of the concepts of a morphology indicates a change to the meaning of the whole ideology as it triggers a new decontestations of other unchanged constituent concepts (Freeden, 1996: 67).

Freeden (2003: 60-66) presents a framework highlighting four characteristics of concepts within ideological morphologies. He calls these the "four P's" and include: proximity, priority, permeability, and proportionality. The relationship of concepts within a morphology, based on the four P's, means that ideologies can be "bombastic, totalizing, doctrinaire; or modest, fragmented, and loose" (Freeden, 2006: 19).

Proximity relates to the space or distance found between the various concepts within an ideology. It is the distance between these concepts which determined how much influence they have in mutually defining each other, and, also, in how easily replaceable concepts may be. For example, chapter six argues that within the ideological morphology of the CNT the two concepts of "direct action" and "insurrectionary revolution" are so close that the abandonment of one would

necessitate the abandonment of the other. Had these concepts been “looser”, their interdependence would be less prominent.

Priority refers to the importance (weight) given to concepts within an ideology. Freeden divides these into core, adjacent, and periphery concepts (Freeden, 1996: 79). Where in one instance Freeden argues that core concepts are “ineliminable key concepts” (Freeden, 2003: 61), in another instance he argues that they reflect “long-standing … elements” (Freeden, 2006: 16). For example, Freeden argues that the ideology of socialism cannot be understood without the core concept of equality (Freeden, 1996: 425). Absent this concept, the entire ideological morphology would change in meaning in such a drastic way that it would be unrecognised as the ideology of socialism.

Benjamin Franks, critiquing Freeden’s work argues that core concepts are best thought of as those which are “prevalent and stable” (Franks, 2020: 25). This prevalence and stability of a concept means that the absence of such a core concept would make an ideology unintelligible in a specific geographic and historic context, but escapes the essentialism suggested by Freeden. This dissertation follows Franks’ argument and chapters five and six show how core concepts can shift to protect other concepts and ensure the continued coherence of a morphology.

Core concepts, Freeden continues, are flanked by concepts that present “logical and cultural adjacency” (Freeden, 1996: 78). These adjacent concepts “flesh out the core” (Freeden, 2003: 62) to form “overlapping and shared areas, which then react back on their separate ineliminable [core] components to constitute full but mutually dependent concepts” (Freeden, 1996: 78). Freeden gives the example of democracy as a culturally relevant concept that is adjacent to liberty (Freeden, 1996: 78). Thus, liberty, within the liberal ideological morphology, is difficult to understand without the adjacent concept of democracy which, culturally and historically, is understood as universal suffrage, but can be contested through the interjection of other concepts such as citizenship.

Finally, peripheral concepts can be divided into two types, margin, and perimeter concepts. Both are “still significant to the central meanings carried by

the ideology" (Freeden, 2003: 62). Margin concepts have an "intellectually and emotionally insubstantial" relationship with the core concepts (Freeden, 1996: 78). The location of marginal concepts can "gravitate from a more central to a marginal position, or vice versa" (Freeden, 1996: 78). This, however, takes place on a longer-term basis reflecting accumulated change (Freeden, 1996: 78). For example, democracy was once seen as a threat to the stability of the ideological morphology of Conservativism. However, with time, democracy became a central concept now seen as enhancing stability and protecting what has become regarded as a traditional institution. This shift in priority took place only once a majority of groups and organisations operating within the ideological morphology of "conservativism" accept democracy as a core concept.

Perimeter concepts, on the other hand, "straddle the interface between the conceptualization of social realities and the external contexts and concrete manifestations in and through which those conceptualizations occur" (Freeden, 1996: 79). They are more often policy proposals that do not have an impact on "the total ideological morphology" as it "does not depend on its presence or absence" (Freeden, 1996: 80). These perimeter concepts then "conceive of, assimilate, and attempt to shape 'real-world' events" (Freeden, 1996: 79) and are necessary to avoid an ideology from "being couched at levels of generality that have no relevance to social and political worlds" (Freeden, 1996: 79). The perimeter is thus where "concepts lose their abstraction and are interwoven with the concrete practices sanctioned or condemned by an ideology" (Freeden, 2003: 62).

For example, the CNT's periphery concepts of "prison support" and "unemployment mobilisation" reflected the concrete realities of labour suppression and the economic downturn during the Second Republic. The concepts contained within them specific policy proposals of amnesty and full employment which were shaped through the relationship with other core and adjacent concepts. However, the absence of these periphery concepts, and the social realities which called them forward, would not have significantly altered the other concepts within the ideological morphology. Rather, the existence of another social reality would have called forward an alternative set of periphery concepts.

Permeability means that concepts, and indeed ideological morphologies intersect with each other and at times contain parts of each other's meanings. Certain concepts cannot exist without an element of the other and "reinforce each other" (Freeden, 1996: 67). Additionally, whole ideological morphologies "are not hermetically sealed: they have porous boundaries and will frequently occupy overlapping space" (Freeden, 2003: 64). Different ideologies can share the same concepts – albeit decontested along different lines. For example, the Bolshevik's core concept of "all power to the soviets" combined with the periphery concepts of "land redistribution" and "national self-determination" was highly permeable, or resonated deeply, with the ideological morphologies of other groups and organisations involved in the revolutionary process such as peasants and nationalities oppressed under tsarist rule. Although the other groups and organisations decontested these concepts differently, their permeability allowed for their mobilisation in favour of the Bolshevik's objectives.

Finally, proportionality refers to how much importance is given to each of the concepts found within ideology. If priority is concerned with weight, proportionality can be seen as referring to volume, the relative space taken up by a concept within an ideological morphology. For example, Freeden argues that the concept of individual liberty is overemphasised at the expense of other concepts within the market libertarian ideology (Freeden, 2003: 64). The concept of individual liberty thus plays a larger role in the ideological morphology of market libertarianism than it would in the ideological morphology of liberalism, even if the concept is found in the core of both. Chapter five argues that, within the ideological morphology of the Bolsheviks, the concept of "state capitalism" was proportionally larger than the concept of "socialist revolution" thus dominating the way "socialist revolution" was decontested.

2.2.1 Strengths of the conceptual approach

Freeden's conceptual approach presents three strengths and three weaknesses. The first strength is that Freeden's presentation of ideologies as constellations of concepts is supported by longitudinal and definitional analyses of the term which draw similar conclusions. For example, Kathleen Knight's (2006) longitudinal study into the definitions of ideology found that the most stable

feature has been an emphasis on the coherence and temporal stability of interrelated ideas (619-623). Similarly, John Gerring (1997), through a definitional analysis, concludes that “Ideology, at the very least, refers to a set of idea-elements that are bound together, that belong to one another in a non-random fashion” (980). This affirms Freeden’s definition as reliable.

The second strength of the conceptual approach is that it shows how ideologies are not just abstract thoughts but directly influence and are influenced by practice. Freeden argues that neither practice nor priority have an “ontological priority over the other” (Freeden, 2000: 308), rather, practice creates a feedback loop in which past experiences are converted “into knowledge and projection of that knowledge in ideas and purposes that anticipate what may come to be in the future” (Freeden, 2000: 310, 319). Thus, ideologies shape practices and practices help assess an ideology. In other words, practices provide the evidence that ideologies have a concrete impact in the world (Freeden, 2003: 21).

Ideologies do not only create knowledge to be used in the future but also contain, within their adjacent concepts, internalised perspectives of history (Freeden, 2000: 306). Internalised perspectives of history determine how groups and organisations interpret the present and which practices are seen as most suitable and likely to create the preferred outcome. Ideological morphologies thus enable and constrain all types of practices. They sanction or condemn specific actions within the organisation such as the organisations’ structure, membership, language, methods for decision making. Ideologies also determine the forms of collective action that are permissible or seen to be worthwhile. The concreteness of ideology means that the conceptual approach can be used to study it and its impact with the same veracity of other tangible variables.

This is both a challenge to rational choice theories and structural theories of revolution (see sections 4.2 and 4.5) which respectively argue that various forms of “rationality” or economic, demographic, and international pressures corresponding to a specific point in history determine the actions of groups and organisations.

For example, Adrian Jones (1992), a structural theorist, argues that the Bolsheviks abandoned their ideological commitment to world revolution and anti-imperialism when they struck a peace accord with Imperial Germany. This, according to him, represented a "surrender of reality" (892), evidence that practice was determined by structural factors external to the organisation. What is ignored in that assessment is that the Bolshevik ideology contained a critical interpretation of world history arguing that the entire world was on the precipice of a socialist revolution. This internalized conception of history justified peace as a means to deepen the political crisis in the West and hasten the spread of socialist revolution (Figes, 1997: 539). Thus, any shift in the Bolshevik's ideological morphology was itself constrained and enabled by their own ideological morphology and did not represent an abandonment of ideology. This example shows that the actions of groups and organisations need to be contextualised based on their own internalised perspectives of history which are found within their ideological morphologies, and not retrospectively imposed based on our perception of "reality" today.

The third important strength and contribution of the conceptual approach is showing how concepts themselves can belong to different ideological morphologies and at the same time mean different things. This allows us to appreciate how competitions for meaning play out in the real world and "how choices among values occur in a world of contestable concepts… with some understanding of the consequences of particular idea combinations: the outcomes, costs, benefits, limits and opportunities that the raw material of political thinking generates" (Freeden, 2006:15). The existence of concepts within multiple ideological morphologies is key to the central argument of this dissertation. It is the permeability of ideological morphologies and concepts which explains how groups and organisations mobilise constituents, convert bystanders into adherents, and demobilise opponents. The permeability of concepts makes action possible even if there is not a complete overlap in ideological morphologies between multiple actors in a social movement or revolution.

The mutually defining relationship of concepts within an ideological morphology means that the transition between ideologies happens in a much more subtle way and a change in ideological orientation does not require the adoption of a

new ideological morphology in toto. Rather, a simple addition or removal of a concept from an individual's morphology, while maintaining other already present concepts is enough to trigger a fundamental change in outlook. In other words, ideological conversion does not happen when an entire ideological morphology is substituted for another, totally different, ideological morphology. Rather a simple change in one or two concepts is enough to change the decontestation of other concepts and catalyse an individual, group, or organisation, into action.

Conversely, groups and organisation can integrate or appeal to concepts already present within adherent or bystander ideological morphologies and, by decontesting them in a novel way, show that they are more likely to achieve the outcome those individuals are looking for. For example, many groups and organisations incorporated the concepts of social justice and economic independence into their ideological morphologies during the 1956 – 1959 revolution in Cuba. These concepts were also already widespread within Cuba as evidenced by its historical struggles. However, it was the M-26-7's novel (in that specific moment) integration of the concept of "armed struggle" alongside social justice and economic independence which animated those concepts towards a desired outcome. As such, the M-26-7 did not need to "convert" individuals to adopting these concepts but rather built on them by incorporating new concepts which showed, through practice, their efficacy.

2.2.2 Weaknesses of the conceptual approach

In addition to the above-mentioned strengths, there are three weaknesses in the conceptual approach which need to be corrected or further developed so the method can be applied to revolutionary periods. First, although Freeden identifies groups as the site of study for ideologies, and that ideologies need to be situated in a social setting, that is, through the interaction of individuals and groups (Freeden, 2000: 307, 317), he excessively focuses on ideologies that can be "grouped together in broad family resemblances" (Freeden, 2006: 19) which he calls "ideological families".

He justifies this choice in two ways. The first is practical, arguing that studying ideologies at an individual level is “indecipherable” (Freeden, 2000: 307). This difficulty is extended to groups and organisations where he argues that

> the likelihood that different exponents of, say, socialism would display a fixed and common ideational profile is remote. There are as many socialisms as there are instances of that ideology, and hence a degree of fluidity will apply within any ideological grouping (Freeden, 1996: 82)

Thus, “The myriad variants they [ideologies] manifest can only be broadly reduced to the few main categories, or families, with which we are conversant” (Freeden, 1996: 88). These families must be constructed from the “general concepts, often courting universal appeal, and shared by the preponderant membership of an ideological family” (Freeden 2000: 306). This makes ideological families a heuristic tool, “scholarly conventions for simplicity's sake” (Freeden, 1996: 88).

The second way Freeden justifies an emphasis on ideological families is by arguing that groups “may give publicity and weight to a particular variant of an ideological family and it may even contribute significantly towards changing and renewing some of an ideology’s features” (Freeden, 2006: 18). He holds that parties and groups only simplify, make user-friendly, internally harmonize, and assertively energize, and overblow aspects of an ideology. According to Freeden, then, parties and groups simply “trim” an ideology so that it fits within an institutional framework (Freeden, 2006: 18).

Before critiquing ideological families, it is worth pointing out two benefits. First, ideological families are broad recognizable patterns of concepts shared by many groups. This allows them to act as a heuristic tool allowing us to quickly get a sense of the ideologies of the groups and organisations which belong to that family despite their particularities. Second, ideological families allow us to understand how ideology influences groups in a trans-national way. For example, both the Spanish and Cuban revolution were influenced by concepts found within the Communist ideological family. More recently, the so called “Arab Spring” was strongly influenced by concepts within the liberal ideological family (Bayat, 2017: 25), the globally dominant ideology.

The weakness in ideological families is specifically that they can only ever serve as heuristics. Thus, while they help with a general understanding, their generality can obscure and at times even mislead analysis at a group or national level. This is especially true concerning the amorphous nature of peripheral concepts at a family level which serve as the link between theory and practice. This can lead to substituting ideological families for distinct group practices creating generalisations or presenting groups as uniform appliers of a uniform ideology. For example, the Bolsheviks and the M-26-7 can mistakenly be seen a purveyor of the same "communist" ideology.

Furthermore, as argued in the previous chapter, an emphasis on ideological families, common in the field, necessitates the introduction and use of other frameworks to study the thoughts and practices of groups or organisations. This space has been monopolised by framing theory which, as the next section shows, has created confusion about the use and relationship between the terms of frames, ideologies, and culture. In this confusion, ideology has lost its analytical potency as its use has been confined to indicate something that exists above or outside of the actors who shape and use them. This makes improving the conceptual approach all the more necessary.

For the purpose of this dissertation, and in relation to social movements and revolutions, it is specifically the different "instances" of an ideology and the way they change which need to be studied. This is especially true as there may be several groups operating in a revolutionary process that can be classified as belonging to the same ideological family. Here, ideological families prove of little use due to how different they may be from their specific instances. Furthermore, change comes through collective action and practice which itself is ideologically shaped (Tucker, 1989: 35; Taylor, 1989: 121; McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1214). These forms of collective action can only be understood by studying the specific ideological morphologies of the groups engaged in or encouraging them. Limiting the study of ideology to the level of "ideological families" can obscure how group ideologies impact the revolutionary process through their specific practices. Therefore, ideologies must be studied at the level of group and organisations whose practices produce change.

Emphasising ideological families also does not adequately explain how individuals, groups, or organisations form or construct their own ideologies. The presentation of groups and organisation as entities that simply "trim" an ideology so that it fits within an institutional framework undermines the fact that groups are sites in which ideologies are produced and maintained (Benford and Snow, 2000: 613; Gillian, 2008: 253). As such, it is not that groups and individuals draw from abstracted ideological families in a vertical way. Rather, the thought-practices of groups and individuals are developed through a process of reflection (including historic) and competition at a group level. This may well include incorporating concepts put forward by political philosophers, groups, and individuals that came before them. Therefore, groups and organisation should be seen as the owners of their respective ideologies (Schein, 1984: 5) and it is their shared concepts which provides the building blocks of an ideological family. The next two sections of this chapter utilise framing theory to address this weakness and further develop the method in which individuals, groups, and organisations, construct their ideological morphology and decide the proximity, priority, permeability, and proportionality of the concepts within them.

The second weakness demanding some slight development is the rate of change which ideological morphologies undergo. Freeden acknowledges that ideological morphologies do change. The priority and proportionality of concepts within them is not only alterable, but some concepts may altogether be "swallowed up whole" or "cannibalized for useful parts" (Freeden, 1996: 67). However, Freeden, argues that this happens in an accumulated way over a long period of time (Freeden, 1996: 78).

This argument can be sustained for ideological families since they are based on the general concepts shared by their corresponding member groups. Therefore, changes within group ideological morphologies need to become "general" enough to "court universal appeal" before their location changes within the family's ideological morphology. In other words, a change in the location of specific concept needs to be shared by a majority of other groups within that ideological family before they are reflected in the ideological family's morphology. However, this argument is tenuous at a group or organisational level. Indeed, at the group and individual level change can come rapidly during periods in which there are "bursts of ideological activism" (Swidler, 1986: 279)

such as during times of heightened social movements and revolutions. During these times, groups can go through considerable ideological reorganisation and internal review.

Writing on how culture shapes action, Ann Swidler (1986) identifies two distinct models for the operation of “culture”. The first accounts for continuity during “settled lives” where "people profess ideals they do not follow, utter platitudes without examining their validity, or fall into cynicism or indifference with the assurance that the world will go on just the same” (Swidler, 1986: 280 - 281). The second model accounts for change during our “unsettled lives” where “differences in ritual and practice or doctrine may become highly charged” and “people formulate, flesh out, and put into practice new habits of action” (Swidler, 1986: 279).

Swidler’s distinction has been replicated and advanced by others (Rutar, 2019), but even in its updated versions it still suffers two weaknesses. First, it recreates the culture/ideology divide criticized in the previous chapter (and remedied in section 2.5) by arguing that “settled cultures” reflect traditions and common sense, while as “unsettled cultures” reflect explicit ideologies. Second, there is little explanation of how settled cultures, characterised by routinised habits, transform into unsettled cultures and vice versa, an error clarified in the next chapter. Despite these weaknesses, the classification of settled and unsettled times remains useful as it shows that revolutions can expedite conceptual changes within groups and organisations.

Freeden’s formulation of accumulated change is thus not entirely wrong, but it needs to recognize that change can accumulate more rapidly during unsettled times. It remains not enough, however, to simply state that the ideologies of groups and organisations change more rapidly during unsettled time. The following section uses framing theory to explains how these changes happen, and the next chapter elaborates on when such changes are more likely to take place within the revolutionary process.

The third and final weakness of Freeden’s conceptual approach is its inadequate integration of the role power held by groups and organisations plays in the proliferation, adoption, and acceptance of ideologies. While Freeden argues that

the success of an ideology is its ability to muster significant groups to capture control of political language and collective decision making (Freeden, 2003: 69). He presents these competitions as a largely discursive effort and does not deal with the fact that once a group has successfully captured control of collective decision making it has the material resources available to ensure its dominance and reproduction. Thus, ideological competitions are not simply discursive but also material and coercive.

Freeden acknowledges that all groups and individuals "begin their cogitations against the background of an already existing political vocabulary" (Freeden, 2006: 19), however, he does not fully acknowledge how this "already existing political vocabulary" is itself shaped by the struggle for control over political language and collective decision making. This includes the struggle to maintain control and propagate preferred concepts. Thus, when Freeden refers to liberalism as a dominant ideology (Freeden, 1996: 137), he leaves out of his analysis the material way in which it became and sustains itself as a dominant ideology.

Section 2.5 develops the argument that ideologies must be tied to questions of power (Eagleton, 2007: 5) and analysed through "a hierarchical pattern of domination and subordination, some being more important than others" (Smith, 1984: 947). This is not only necessary to understand how ideologies and specific preferred concepts are transmitted and reproduced, but also because a group's relationship to power impacts its ideological morphology. For example, a group, be it a parliamentary political party or a revolutionary party, will have a different ideological morphology when it is aspiring to gain power from when it secures power because its practices, and thus its ideology, need to be altered to carry out different tasks. As it relates to the central argument of this dissertation, how an ideology held by a group or organization influences the process of revolutions is directly related to how that organisation or group's ideological morphology changes according to its relationship with power.

2.3 Adapting framing for ideological construction

As explained in the previous section, Freeden's emphasis on ideological families means that he does not sufficiently explain how groups and organisations

construct their own ideological morphologies. The dominant use of ideological families has also required the creation of another framework to explain the thoughts and practices of groups and organisations, framing theory. This has led to a further confusion of terms in the field. This section resolves these two problems by combining framing theory with Freeden's conceptual approach to produce a single framework. This framework explains how groups and organisations determine which concepts are integrated into their ideological morphology, how those concepts are organised, and how these concepts change. The framework firmly situates ideology as a product of groups and organisations and closes the methodological gap which has impeded the adequate integration of ideology into the study of revolutions.

This section first explains framing theory and its component parts. Then addresses the arguments presented by framing theorists to distinguish between framing and ideology. This distinction is then removed to enable the use of framing theory in conjunction with the conceptual approach. This is done by arguing that framing processes represent the means of ideological construction, while frames represent "slices" of an ideological morphology. Combining framing with the conceptual approach provides a method for explaining how the ideologies of groups and organisations constrain or enable their objectives, structures, tactics, and resources to impact the process of revolutions.

2.3.1 Explaining framing theory

Framing theory finds its origins in social movement studies and is geared at explaining the differences between groups and organisations mobilising around the same issue. It is therefore not a theory aimed at studying groups and organisations involved in revolutionary change but rather those engaged in institutionalised forms of collective action defined as actions which have "become part of a repertoire that is generally known and understood" and therefore seen as conventional, consistent with implicit expectations, and involve relatively low risk (Tarrow, 1998: 98-99).

Framing theory is built on two dimensions, the first is concerned with "frames", and the second with the process of framing. Frames can be defined as "mental templates of appropriate behaviour for common situations, acquired through

socialization and experience and fine-tuned by the individual on the basis of what worked in the past and/or what others report as useful" (Johnston, 2005: 239). They are schemas which help individuals interpret and negotiate daily encounters and interactions. For example, a "school" frame sets expectations on the relationships between students and teachers, the material which one is expected to come across: books, pens, notebooks, blackboards, and expected behaviours.

Frames can be grouped into master frames, "general assemblages of concepts that are often new and ascendant, but relatively unelaborated compared to established ideologies" (Oliver and Johnston, 2005: 189) which provide "an angle or a perspective on a problem" (Oliver and Johnston, 2005: 193). A nationalism frame, rights frame, and injustice frame are just some examples of master frames. New master frames can be introduced by movements and "could subsequently be used in different contexts by different social movements… to utilize broadly agreed cultural values in order to transcend current practices" (Gillan, 2008: 250). For example, a nationalism master frame can be used to argue for secession or the necessity of unity in the face of a common enemy or economic self-sufficiency.

Framing processes, on the other hand, are ways in which groups and organisation engage in "reality construction" to mobilize adherents, convert bystanders, and demobilize opponents. Framing processes occur within groups and organisations as they are internally diverse (Gillan, 2008: 248). Through their engagement in a group or organisation, individuals engage in interpretive discussion and debate (Snow and Benford, 2005: 207) as they seek to create a consensus founded on rational argument in which "participants orient their actions toward reaching mutual understanding in a noncoercive manner" (Tucker, 1989: 37-38). This includes coming up with a vision of good and evil which will provide the criteria for moral evaluation (Tucker, 1989: 40). These discussions result in a dominant discourse within a group or organisation (Westby, 2005: 220).

Through these interpretive discussions and debates, groups and organisations develop collective action frames, "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization" (Benford and Snow, 2000: 614) and "orientational frames" where

in addition to analysing the 'external world', organisations also discuss their own agency and ability to bring about change (Gillan, 2008: 254; Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1996: 370). Collective action frames are constructed by completing three broad framing "tasks" divided into diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing (Benford and Snow, 2000: 615). Diagnostic framing includes decisions on who is good and bad. Prognostic framing involves making decisions about what the solution is and how to get there – plans and strategies (Benford and Snow, 2000: 616). Finally, motivational framing explains why now is the right time to mobilize and engage in collective action (Benford and Snow, 2000: 617). By navigating these tasks, a group or organisation becomes a conscious agent of framing demonstrating an ability to manipulate particular issues to win over adherents and make opponents' positions seem illegitimate while proactively attempting to blunt attempts at demobilisation (Gillan, 2008: 249; Benford and Snow, 2000: 625). It is through these framing tasks and processes that a organisations structure, interorganizational relations, and collective identity is shaped, and most importantly what sort of practices are considered legitimate and which opportunities or threats justify mobilization (Benford and Snow, 2000: 626, 627).

Due to the diversity within them, groups and organisations are not just seen as inanimate transmitters of pre-held ideologies but are also sites in which meaning is produced and maintained (Benford and Snow, 2000: 613; Gillian, 2008: 253). Individuals within these groups and organizations may disagree with the general orientation of the organization but may continue to support the organization because they support the processes by which the decision was made (Gillan, 2008: 254). Discussions and debates are influenced by the practices of other groups and organisations within a social movement, adversaries, and the media (Snow and Benford, 2005: 207). This is as groups and organisation compete with one another over resources such as money, third party support, and status (Benford, 1993: 681).

2.3.2 Combining framing and the conceptual approach

Despite identifying master frames as general assemblages of concepts, framing theorists argue that frames are distinct from ideologies. This distinction recreates Freeden's argument that groups and organisations only simplify, make

user-friendly, internally harmonize, and assertively energize, and overblow aspects of an ideology. For example, Pamela E. Oliver and Hank Johnston (2005) argue that frames are "the cognitive process wherein people bring to bear background knowledge to interpret an event or circumstance and to locate it in a larger system of meaning" (193) and are concerned with "the study of communicative interaction" (187). Ideologies thus represent the "larger system of meaning" from which individuals, groups and organisations, draw from to inform their communicative interaction.

Kevin Gillan (2008), who engages with Freeden's work, argues that while frames and ideologies are both perceived to be belief structures, frames are more ephemeral and porous whereas ideologies are concerned with long term processes of reflection that happens at an elite level not in crowded public meetings (257-258). He adds that frames are concerned with more immediate needs and the development of practices to deal with these needs whereas ideologies, as discussed in Freeden's work, are more ideational.

Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000) explicitly subordinate framing to ideology. They argue that framing involves "the articulation and accenting or amplification of elements of existing beliefs and values, most of which are associated with existing ideologies" (Snow and Benford, 2005: 209). Snow and Benford add that framing fulfils the function of "remedial ideological work" which reflects the conceptual "thinking about and analyzing the not infrequent remedial, reconstitutive work that is required when members of any ideological or thought community encounter glaring disjunctions between their beliefs and experiences or events in the world" (Snow and Benford, 2005: 209).

These distinctions have made it common to confine the use of the term ideology to ideological families and use frames when discussing the ideas of groups and organisations. For example, in their research on the far right, Katrine Fangen and Maria Reite Nilsen (2021) refer to Neo-Nazism and anti-Islamism as ideologies but refer to the ideas and outlooks of the groups they interview through the language of frames and framing. Similarly, Feng Chen's (2021) study on labour activism in China uses ideology to refer to the ideas and practices encouraged by the state but speaks of labour activists and organisations as only accentuating, bridging, or amplifying concepts found within the official ideology.

The insistence of framing theorists on differentiating between ideology and framing undercuts the agency they are attempting to imbue groups and organisations with. This is because the communicative function of framing is presented as something that occurs outside of the process in which a group or organisation determines its ideological morphology. As if to say that groups and organisations first decide which ideology they wish to emulate, then how to relay specific facets of this ideology to the public. This reduces groups and organisations into mere imitators and modifiers of pre-existing ideologies instead of being the source of ideologies.

While groups and organisations do articulate, accent, or amplify specific concepts when communicating about a specific issue. They are articulating, accenting, or amplifying concepts they have already internalised within their own ideological morphologies and not concepts found in an abstracted, external, ideological family. As such, which concepts are articulated, accented, or amplified is itself an ideological act and not an afterthought in which groups and organisation determine how best to relay their message. Additionally, debates on what language should be used to reach out to bystanders, or if bystanders should be reached out to at all, can itself result in a reformulation or change within a group or organisations ideological morphology.

Frames, therefore, should not be seen as substitutes for a group or organization's ideology. Rather, they should be seen as a view of an ideology from the window of a specific issue, as if peering through a peephole. Thus, a group or organisation may focus on specific concepts when communicating around an issue presenting a "slice" or spotlighting aspects of their ideological morphology. This retains frames as "general assemblages of concepts" which still relate to a "larger system of meaning". However, this larger system of meaning is not an abstracted ideological family, but the group or organisation's own ideological morphology.

Since frames represent spotlighted concepts within a group or organisations ideological morphology, framing processes must represent, not collective action frames, but the way in which groups and organisations determine which concepts are included in their ideological morphology and how these concepts are organised based on the 4 P's. This means that the debates taking place

within a group or organisation are critical in understanding how their ideological morphology is constructed and changes based on the domination of specific discourses. The consensus or domination of certain discourses informs the objectives, structures, tactics, and resources sought and used by a group or organisation. These internal debates are thus the way organisations determine their interests and preferences and how to rank and prioritise multiple preferences.

Research has shown that dominant discourses are predominantly shaped by the thoughts and arguments made by early joiners, leaders, creators of a group or organisation, or its cadre - the most active participants involved in decision making (Aron, 2006: 439; Tyler, 2006: 383; Zald, 1996: 268). Leaders can also use their personal influence to open up spaces for creative discussion leading to "conceptual innovation" (Saharov, 2021: 14). The debates, discussion, and arguments used to shape an ideological morphology can be found in the work of early joiners, leaders, and creators be it written or verbal.

For example, the Bolshevik ideological morphology underwent significant change from 1914 to 1917 led by shifts in internal discourse. These shifts led to reconceptualization of revolution which abandoned previous claims that Russia's next revolution would construct a bourgeois order. This conceptual innovation allowed the party to justify seizing power to build a socialist state. The innovation was not automatically accepted and went through a series of intense internal debate which can be found in pamphlets, meeting minutes, and other historical records.

Identifying framing processes as the method through which groups and organisations determine which concepts to include in their ideological morphologies and how these concepts may change strengthens Freeden's conceptual approach in two critical ways. First, it allows for the application of the conceptual approach at a group and organisational level. For the purpose of this dissertation, the groups and organisation waging revolution. Second, it explains how concepts come to be a part of the ideological morphologies of groups and organisation before becoming the generalised concepts found within ideological families. This addresses one of the main problematics found within

revolutionary theory, how to determine a groups and organisations interests and preferences, and how multiple preferences can be ranked.

2.4 Forming ideology at the individual level

Individuals are also owners of ideological morphologies and play a role in creating meaning by decontesting concepts in new ways. It is this activity of individuals within groups and organisations which animates the framing processes discussed above. While it is, as Freeden argued, impracticable to study ideology at an individual level (Freeden, 2000: 37), the process in which individuals shape their ideology and, in turn, their practices, is important as it clarifies how or when individuals may mobilise in favour of or against specific groups and organisation, a topic dealt with more extensively in chapter four.

Just like groups and organisations, individuals enact processes in which they reflect on practices and experiences, compare and contrast their lives with others, and undergo diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational tasks. This led Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, who's work is dealt with more closely in the next section, to correctly note that, "the majority of mankind are philosophers in so far as they engage in practical activity and in their practical activity (or in their guiding lines of conduct) there is implicitly contained a conception of the world, a philosophy" (Gramsci, 1971: 344).

The major difference between ideological construction on an individual level is that it does not contain the consensus driven discussion and debate found within groups and organisations. Since these tasks happen on an individual and not collective level, the process of generating this "conception of the world" is better described as sense-making as opposed to framing.

There is no definitive reason as to why individuals engage in sense making. Engels argues for "an imperishable desire of the human mind … to overcome all contradictions" (Engels, 1959: 202). Others point to the need for order and consistency to avoid anxiety and "the chaos and panic that staring into the void will cause" (Freeden, 2003: 111; see also Schein, 1984: 4). This makes ideology necessary as we "cannot act without making sense of the worlds we inhabit"

(Freeden, 2003: 2). This link between the need to understand and acting reinforces the materiality of ideology and its link to practice.

Freeden (2000: 317) also points out that rational intelligence has its roots in pre-rational impulse and emotions. Yet, as the next section shows, emotions and desires can themselves be actively shaped by dominant ideologies (Eagleton, 2007: 14). This does not mean that all desires are shaped by dominant ideologies, as Terry Eagleton, a literary critic and researcher on ideology argues, "once a desire has become a reason for action… it ceases to remain identical with itself; it is no longer some blind unquestionable cause, but enters into our discourse and undergoes significant transformation" (Eagleton, 2007: 173). Therefore, once a desire is transformed into practice, it can, as previously mentioned, interrogate the individual's ideology. If the practice does not produce the desired outcome, an individual is open to challenging certain concepts of their ideology and reconfiguring their ideological morphology the same way an organisation or group would, thus changing their desires.

Individuals, like groups and organisations, do not engage in sense making in a neutral field. Rather, they do it in a field flooded by the ideologies and concepts of other individuals, groups, and organisations. Each of these groups present their own symbols, values, concepts, language, and practices which individuals can orient themselves towards or away from. As such, sense making occurs in a social setting which also allows for persuasion, frequent and repetitive contact between educator and learner that is "reinforced by social group membership and networks in which other people share the same meanings and learn new ideas together" (Oliver and Johnston, 2005: 196).

While an individual's beliefs are subject to change and can be intentionally modified (Taylor, 1989: 145) individuals are more likely to be exposed to, engage with, and integrate some concepts into their ideological morphologies over others due to different levels of proliferation or dominance. Which concepts achieve dominance is itself a function of power which the next section now turns to.

2.5 Situating ideology in a field of power

The previous sections defined ideology as a cluster of mutually defining concepts organised based on their priority, proximity, proportionality, and permeability. Framing theory was used to explain how individuals, groups, and organisations select which concepts are included into their ideological morphology and how these concepts are organised. The section also showed how ideological morphologies constrain and enable practices, concretely impacting the real world.

This section has two main objectives. First, it argues that ideologies of groups and organisation interact with and relate to each other to produce dominant, subordinate, and radical value-systems which can be placed within a field of power. The field of power illustrates how ideology is an ever-present social force operating during settled and unsettled times. Second, the section expands on the concept of a field of power to clarify the relationship between culture and ideology.

To meet these objectives, this section utilises the concepts of a Superstructure and Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) as advanced by Italian Marxist philosopher and leader of the Italian Communist Party Antonio Gramsci and French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser. These concepts are used to show how dominant groups and organisations transmit their preferred concepts transforming bystanders into adherents thus reproducing their ideological morphology. While Gramsci and Althusser's theories differ, their work is sufficiently overlapping to further this conversation. Additionally, although both the concept of a superstructure and ISAs are subject to intense debate about their meaning and delineations, they remain useful as frameworks to analyse and classify groups and organisations based on their interconnectedness (Ervin, 2020: 377).

2.5.1 Tying ideology to material control

As explained in section 2.2, Freeden argues that groups and organisations compete to muster significant adherents to capture control of political language and collective decision making (Freeden, 2003: 69). He also argues that that all

groups and individuals "begin their cogitations against the background of an already existing political vocabulary" (Freeden, 2006: 19). However, he does not adequately explain how this background of already existing political vocabulary is itself shaped by the struggle over the capture of control of political language and collective decision making. As such, his explanations of how different ideologies interact with each other is heavily discursive.

Marxist and Marxist inspired philosophers share Freeden' assessment of a continues struggle over the control of political language and collective decision making. For example, Gramsci argues that history should be seen as "a continuous struggle … to change what exists in each given moment" (Gramsci, 1966, cited in Bates, 1975). However, these authors, like Swidler, clarify between settled and unsettled times where the pace and nature of this struggle can be differentiated.

Michael Foucault, who has been described as a post-structuralist philosopher and draws heavily on Marxist analysis, differentiates between periods of "war" and periods of "civil peace" which can be equated to Swidler's unsettled and settled times. He notes that "civil peace" represents a "continuation of war" (Foucault, 1980: 91) where "the role of political power… is perpetually to reinscribe this relation through a form of unspoken warfare; to re-inscribe it in social institutions, in economic inequalities, in language, in the bodies themselves of each and everyone of us" (Foucault, 1980: 90). Like Foucault, Althusser argues that this use of power is meant to ensure that individuals and groups continue their "submission to the rules of the established order" (Althusser, 2008: 6). Thus, the struggle is not simply to gain control of political language and decision making, but to maintain it by successfully reproducing this dominance across time.

Marx ties the ability to gain and reproduce dominance with control over the means of material production arguing that

> The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production (Marx, 1998: 67).

While Marx refers to a class, this class itself is composed of groups and organisations. These groups and organisations' control over the means of material production puts them in a position to promote and enforce allegiance to their preferred concepts and practices. In his research on organisational culture, equitable to the ideology of a group or organisation, Edgar Schein, who is not a Marxist but mirrors Marxist arguments, argues that groups and organisation choose to reproduce the concepts and practices which have succeeded in the past. In the context of power, this would be the concepts and practices which enabled the domination of political language and decision making and the capture of the means of material production. This success means that these concepts and practices are seen as valid and worth being taught "to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel" (Schein, 1984: 3).

The preferred concepts and practices of dominant groups and organisations are reinforced, argues Marx, through a "legal and political superstructure … to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness" (Marx, 1977). Gramsci and Althusser both elaborate on the concept of a superstructure similarly dividing it into two segments. Gramsci divides the superstructure into two "floors", the first being political society and the second civil society.

Political society, according to Gramsci, represents the direct practices of power, including state institutions such as courts, police, and the army (Gramsci, 1971: 12). This section of the superstructure does not have control over the means of material production, but they control coercive resources. Civil society, on the other hand, relates to what occurs in private life (Gramsci, 1971: 12). It is composed of private, non-state, institutions such as "schools, churches, clubs, journals, and parties – which contribute in molecular fashion to the formation of social and political consciousness" (Bates, 1975: 353).

Civil society is necessary since maintaining dominance by consistently leaning on the use of naked force of political society builds resentment and unrest (Abercrombie and Turner, 1978: 160). Civil society thus allows for submission in non-coercive ways because it "does not only repress and restrict, but also produces and rewards. It reinforces those "praise-worthy" activities of the citizens just as it punishes criminal actions" (Daldal, 2014: 156). To maintain dominance, Gramsci argues that groups and organisations need to effectively

control both of these “levels” which constitute a “historical bloc” (Gramsci, 1971: 137). Only then can it be said to have secured hegemony or “the consent of the led … secured by the diffusion and popularization of the world view of the ruling class" (Bates, 1975: 352).

Similar to Gramsci’s two floor model of superstructure is Althusser’s discussion of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs). According to Althusser, ISAs are “institutions which for the most part do not possess public status, but are quite simply private institutions" (Althusser, 2008: 18). As ISAs he lists religious institutions, educational ones, the family, the political system, trade unions, and culture. ISAs are to be differentiated from state apparatuses that coincide with Gramsci’s political society. Like Gramsci, Althusser asserts that it is only once ISAs are installed that dominant groups and organisations can secure their rule.

Althusser clarifies that groups and organisations classified as ISAs can have ideologies that differ from or are contradictory to that of dominant groups and organisation. Despite this, they remain unified “beneath the ruling ideology” (Althusser, 2008: 9) meaning their ideological morphologies are highly permeable with that of dominant groups and organisations.

Both Gramsci and Althusser’s explanations of the superstructure show how ideological plurality can be tolerated without the intervention of “political society”. Dominant groups allow for and indeed materially encourage the flourishing of groups and organisations within civil society or ISAs to strengthen their hold over the historic block and promote their preferred concepts. As resource mobilisation theorist Charles Tilly points out, since dominant groups have control over the means of material production, they often have a surplus of resources at their disposal and can move to de-mobilize opposition groups before they develop articulated claims. On the other hand, those who are powerless and poor need to contend with daily necessities making mobilization more costly (Tilly, 1978: 75).

Gramsci argues that civil society acts a “trench-system” (Gramsci, 1971: 235) protecting and ensuring the continuity of dominant groups and organisations in what appears to be non-coercive ways. It does so in at least three ways. First, by promoting preferred concepts into “social consciousness”. Second, by allowing

dominant groups and organisations to co-opt and absorb concepts found within radical group ideologies in a safe way allowing them to "revitalize a hegemonic culture by incorporating what they imagine to be the instinctual vitality of the lower order" (Lears, 1985: 587). Third, civil society and ISA's can also buffer the population at large from conflicts between dominant groups and organisation. Therefore, the entire superstructure can be seen to "help manage … contradictions in the interests of a ruling class" (Eagleton, 2000: 239). Where civil society fails, groups and organisations found to be antagonistic to dominant ones can be struck down by utilising political society (Lears, 1985: 579).

The different way in which the superstructure protects dominant groups means that there is a considerable degree of independence between the various groups and organisations operating within this system. Theda Skocpol (1979), a structural theorist, convincingly argues that groups and organisations within the political level of the superstructure, especially the state, are autonomous from other dominant groups and organisations and can act in ways that go against or override the interest of some dominant groups (24-32). This is clear in the case of the Spanish Civil War and Revolution in which the creation of a Republic was seen as a direct threat to the dominance of those with control over the means of material production and thought. This created a division between dominant groups and organisations at the political level of the superstructure.

The presence of a high level of autonomy despite domination means that the recreation and transmission of preferred concepts is not mechanical. Preferred concepts are not simply instilled in others. Rather, individuals, groups, and organisations consciously adopt the language, concepts, and practices of dominant groups and organisations and integrate them into their own ideological morphologies looking upon them as their own (Abercrombie and Turner, 1978: 158). Althusser refers to this as "interpellation", a process akin to socialisation in which preferred concepts become internalised due to interaction between an individual and ISAs. He argues that this process begins even before birth since a child is already looked at as a subject by their parents and an entire legal system that has set out their rights and a range of their first experiences. Althusser concludes that individuals are thus "always already subjects" (Althusser, 2008: 46).

Marx argues that the pervasiveness of dominant concepts misleads individuals and lead them to "imagine that they form the real motives and the starting point of his activity" (Marx, 1963: 47). Their consciousness is thus shaped only as freely as made possible by their "social existence" within the superstructure (Marx, 1977). Schein recreates this assessment within organisations arguing that individuals

> represent accurately only the manifest or espoused values of a culture. That is they focus on what people say is the reason for their behaviour, what they ideally would like those reasons to be, and what are often their rationalizations for their behaviour. Yet, the underlying reasons for their behaviour remains concealed or unconscious (Schein, 1984: 3).

The above illustrates how ideologies, especially dominant ones, play a continuous role within society and do not only become salient during unsettled times. The description of domination also provides insight into how unsettled times could transform into settled times, a key criteria to ending revolutions explored in more detail in the following chapter.

2.5.2 Plurality within domination

While dominant concepts are pervasive, they are not inescapable. As the previous sections argued, by reflecting on their practices, groups and organisations create a feedback loop through which they can incorporate new concepts into their ideological morphology or decontest old ones in new ways. Individuals can also intentionally modify their ideological morphologies.

The existence of dominant ideologies and practices, therefore, does not mean an absence of alternative ideological morphologies but a submission to the dominant one. This submission can be a result of a beneficial trade-off where required practices are accepted so long as individuals can maintain and pursue more valued relations freely outside of this domination such as family, religion, or community (Lears, 1985: 578). A second and simpler perspective is to read this submission not as an embrace of the current order of things, but that a radical opposition does not appear realistic (Eagleton, 2007: 56) necessitating temporary accommodation. Finally, submission can be a result of uncertainty and anxiety avoidance which encourages a greater commitment towards

maintaining stability (Schein, 1984: 9). These factors can result in a “divided subjectivity” (Holloway, 2019: 145, 157) where the internalised yet supressed desire for rebellion and insubordination can become fuel for conceptual innovation.

Reflecting on this ideological plurality while accepting domination, Nicholas Abercrombie and Bryan Turner (1978) rightfully argue that groups and organisations can be divided into “three competing meaning systems: a dominant value system, a subordinate value system which promotes accommodative responses … and a radical value system which promotes opposition" (158). Groups or organisations operating within a dominant meaning system are ones concerned with upholding the established order. As mentioned above, their success in ascending to a position of power and gaining control over the means of material production is seen as a confirmation of the “correctness” of their ideology. Their control over decision making allows them to reinscribe their ideology in those that come after them making it easier to mobilise adherents, convert bystanders, and discredit opponents.

Those operating within a subordinate meaning system buffer and influence the dominant value system while not directly challenging power. Groups and organisation within a subordinate meaning system have ideological morphologies that are largely consistent and permeable with the ideologies of dominant groups and organisations, especially the core concepts. They are also aware of groups with radical meaning systems and may integrate some of their concepts by decontesting them in ways that are consistent with the core concepts of dominant groups or organisations.

Groups and organisations within a radical meaning system oppose part of or all the core concepts found within the dominant group’s ideologies, especially the concepts which legitimise a hold on power. Due to this opposition, they may also find themselves in conflict with groups and organisations in the subordinate meaning system. This fundamental opposition to core dominant concepts means that groups within this meaning system should be the focus of social movement and revolutionary studies as their ideological morphologies inform their practices, their ability to convert bystanders into adherents, and helps predict the potential change to come as they seek to substitute themselves for current

dominant groups and organisations or, at a minimum, replace dominant ideologies with concepts found within theirs without taking power themselves. As the next chapter argues, radical groups and organisations may not be present or may constitute a small portion of the population due to their limited access to resources and the domination of other groups and organisations. As chapters five and six show the existence of radical groups, in a meaningful way, has a critical impact on the process of revolution.

The three value systems explained above are not disjointed from each other. Rather, the groups and organisations within them constantly interact in a process of composition, decomposition, and re-composition (Holloway, 2019: 162). Each group and organisation, represented by a circle in Figure 1 below, exerts a force with a specific magnitude and direction determined by their ideological morphology creating a field of power. The interaction of these forces either maintain a level of equilibrium, allowing for the recreation of dominant ideologies, or produces change (Lewin, 1947: 32). Within this field of power, groups and organisations can also be placed on a continuum from closed to open. At the closed end, groups and organisations lack the language and concepts necessary to conceive concerted resistance. At the open end, the capability for resistance flourishes (Lears, 1985: 573-574). Radical groups seek to influence the concepts withing subordinate and dominant groups to increase their access to resources and impact change.



Figure 1 - Visualisation of the distribution of groups and organisations in a field of power during settled times

By looking at the interaction and relationship between the various groups and organisations with the field of power, it becomes clear that changes within any group or organisation's ideological morphology can lead to an overall change in the distribution of power. This is because, like concepts within an ideological

morphology, groups and organisations within a field of power exist relationally. Thus, any change within one group and organisation can create an opportunity for social movements and revolutionary activity. This opportunity, however, depends on how far a change in the ideological morphology of one groups or organisations "cascades" across the others. This, in turn, is determined by the reaction of other groups and organisations. As argued above, changes in the ideological morphology of those with control over the means of material production travels through the field of power with ease when compared to radical groups and organisation which possess little or no control over the means of material production.

When it comes to revolutions, this means that while understanding the ideological morphology of radical groups and organisations is critical, they should not be the sole focus of social movement and revolutionary studies. Rather, their ideologies need to be understood in relationship to the experiences, practices, and concepts found within the ideological morphologies of dominant and subordinate groups and organisations. It is this relationship which helps explain how settled times can quickly become unsettled times creating the opportunities for revolution.

2.5.3 Culture and the field of power

The field of power has important implications on the concept of culture. As previously criticised, researchers within social movements studies and revolutionary theory argue for a distinction between culture and ideology. Those who favour the dichotomy hold that culture represents "longstanding background assumptions, values, myths, stories, and symbols that are widespread in the population" (Goldstone, 2001: 154-155). While ideologies, they argue, are "consciously constructed … more coherent beliefs, arguments, and value judgements that are promulgated by those advocating a particular course of action" (Goldstone, 2001: 155).

The above subsections have shown that values, myths, stories, and symbols which are longstanding, widespread, or constitute background assumptions reflect concepts which have been successfully reproduced by groups and organisations. The most widespread of which are those relevant to and favoured

by dominant groups and organisations. What is referred to as culture by researchers thus reflects the preferred concepts of those in power and the long shadow they cast over the superstructure. Culture, however, is not limited to the concept of dominant groups and organisations but must include the concepts within subordinate and radical value-systems. In other words, culture must contain within it all the concepts within the field of power.

Since the concepts within the field of power are not fixed, then culture itself must be a dynamic stock of concepts, language, and practices from which individuals, groups, and organisations can draw from. The range of concepts found within this stock is itself determined by the ideologies of groups and organisations with the prominence of such concepts dependent on their position as dominant, subordinate, or radical. Thus, culture shapes ideology only in so far as it is shaped by ideology itself, meaning that neither precedes the other. As such, an argument that ideology is activated culture or that ideologies are derived from or only finetune culture is misleading.

A further implication is that while culture can limit which ideologies are seen as legitimate (Williams, 2013: 2), the actions of groups and organisations can change what is perceived as legitimate due to their ability to influence culture. Therefore, while it is true that groups and organisations that integrate familiar concepts may face less resistance in gaining adherents and supporters and converting or discrediting opponents, as has been argued by framing theorists focused on “strategic alignment” (Benford and Snow, 2000: 624; Oliver and Johnston: 2005: 189; Gillan, 2008: 251), culture does not place set limits and is not insurmountable. Ideological innovation by groups and organisation can break through any limits and reshape culture itself. Ideology is thus vindicated as a tool for explaining changes within society.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter tackled the first barrier leading to the inadequate integration of ideology in the study of revolutions, the methodological gap. Section 2.2 defined ideologies as constellations of core, adjacent, and periphery concepts which form ideological morphologies. These ideological morphologies are not simply ideational, but directly constrain and enable practices making them as concrete

as other factors used to analyse revolutions. They also contain within them an understanding of history making all practice ideological.

Section 2.3 combined framing theory with the conceptual approach to create a single framework that explains how groups and organisations determine which concepts are included in their ideological morphologies, how these concepts are organised, and how these concepts change. It was argued that groups and organisation undertake prognostic, diagnostic, and motivational framing tasks which identify what the problem is and who is responsible, what the solutions are, and why now is a good time to mobilise to create a dominant discourse. This dominant discourse, its ideology, can be deduced from the writings, speeches, and debates their members participate in. It is these artifacts which are used to identify the ideologies of the main groups waging the Russian and Spanish revolutions.

Sections 2.5 argued that the ideological morphologies of groups and organisation do not exist in isolation, rather they relate to each other based on their position in a field of power and can be classified into dominant, subordinate, and radical value systems. Where a group or organisation falls within this classification depends on their access to and control over the means of material production. This control either facilitates or hinders a group or organisations ability to transmit and reproduce the preferred concepts within their ideological morphologies.

While this chapter established the tangible nature of ideology and how it can be studied, it has not shown how it can be integrated into the examination of revolutions. The next chapter develops the distinction between settled and unsettled times presented here, and the concept of a field of power, to show the critical role ideology plays in moving between the two phases. It also argues for a four-stage process of revolution addressing the remaining two barriers to the integration of ideology in the study of revolutions, the confused relationship of social movement and revolutions, and the silos which have emerged between social movement studies and revolutionary theory and ideology studies.

Chapter 3 Integrating ideology into the revolutionary process

3.1 Introduction

Chapter one argued that there are three barriers to the inadequate integration of ideology in the study of revolution and the persistence of a methodological gap. The intangible nature of ideology, a lack of clarity on the relationship between social movement and revolutions, and the parallel development of research into social movement studies and revolutionary theory and ideology studies which leaves both siloed in from each other.

Chapter two took the first step towards developing ideological analysis by demonstrating how, through its link with practice, ideology is a tangible and ever-present force in society. In this way the chapter overcame the first barrier to the integration of ideology in the study of revolution. The chapter developed a method for studying the ideologies of groups and organisations by combining Michael Freeden's "conceptual approach" with framing theory. It was argued that the ideologies of groups and organisations consist of mutually defining core, adjacent, and periphery concepts. The chapter also argued that groups and organisations determine which concepts are admitted into their ideological morphologies through a process of internal debate focused on diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing tasks. These debates result in a dominant discourse within the organisation defining its objectives, structures, tactics, and the resources it seeks to gain. The dominant discourse and changes within it indicate how groups and organisations determine their interests and rank competing preferences.

Having shown the tangible nature of ideology and how it can be studied, this chapter takes the second step in developing ideological analysis by showing how the adjusted conceptual approach can be applied to studying revolutions. By expanding on the concept of a field of power, the chapter develops an original four-stage process of revolution consisting of: pre-revolution, revolutionary window, revolutionary situation, and institutionalisation. The chapter argues that using the adjusted conceptual approach to study the ideologies of groups and organisations as they negotiate and create the four stages provides a better

understanding of revolutions. The chapter also argues that the four-stage process highlights when groups or organisations may change or adjust their ideological morphologies. This tackles the second barrier to the integration of ideology in the study of revolutions, bridging the research silos which have developed around ideology studies and revolutionary theory. Through the development of a four-stage process of revolution, the chapter also offers a new expanded definition of revolution which clarifies the relationship between social movements and revolutions. Therefore, the four-stage process also addresses the final barrier of integrating ideology into the study of revolutions, the lack of clarity on the relationship between social movement and revolutions.

Presenting revolutions as a process that is a continuation of or emergent from social movements and other contentious episodes allows for the integration of ideology into the study of revolutions in three key ways. First, it acknowledges that the groups and organisations which participate in and shape the revolutionary process develop or can be formed during previous unsettled episodes. Second, it provides evidence of how the ideological morphologies of groups and organisations shape the "opening salvo" of the revolutionary process and that ideology does not only come into play after structural factors. Lastly, a processual approach breaks the structure/agency binary by showing how revolutions are causally connected sequences (Tilly, 1995: 1602) whose outcomes are determined by the conscious choices, actions, and reactions, of the groups and organisations which wage and resist them. These choices, actions, and reaction are best explained through the ideologies of the relevant groups and organisation.

Section 3.2 briefly summarises two other important processual approaches to revolutions and identifies their weaknesses. The section argues that the four-stage process has several advantages over these processes-based approaches. First, it breaks the structure/agency binary persistent in the field by showing how the ideological morphology of groups and organisation both create and shape the revolutionary process. Second, it does not equate revolution with the capture of state power. Finally, the four-stages demarcate when changes in a group or organisations ideology are likely to take place. These demarcations are used in the second section of this dissertation to show how changes in the

ideologies of the Bolshevik Party and the CNT impacted the process of the Russian and Spanish Revolutions.

Sections 3.3 to 3.5 incrementally develop the four-stage process. Each section explains why the delineation between a stage is necessary and how these delineations aid in the understanding of revolutions. Section 3.3 explains how ideology plays a critical role in the transition between settled and unsettled times. It argues that while the movement between these two phases is not exclusive to revolutionary times, this transition bounds the start and end of the revolutionary process presenting the first and last stages in the four-stage process. The section illustrates how, due to the interrelated nature of groups and organisations in the field of power, changes in ideology which challenge or interrupt normative and generalised practices are the primary cause of the movement from a settled to an unsettled time. The central role of ideology in the transition between the two phases reaffirms it as an ever-present social force necessary to the explanation of revolutions.

Section 3.4 clarifies when social movements, a form of unsettledness, become revolutionary and how this distinction leads to a third stage of a revolutionary situation. By looking at the interplay between social movements and revolutions, the section develops an expanded definition of revolution which includes failed attempts at revolution (Allinson, 2019: 321), revolutionary movements that reject capturing state power (Prichard, 2021: 27), and “conservative” or “reactionary” revolutions and coups which have been largely ignored by the field (Beck, 2018). These additions allow researchers to draw on more diverse examples of revolution leading to richer analysis. The section argues that revolutions, while needing to be differentiated from other forms of contentious episodes such as social movements, are a continuation of and emerge from them. This overlap means that the ideological morphologies of groups and organisations have a critical and determining role in what the “opening salvo” of a revolution looks like. However, the divergence of social movements and revolutions delineates a third stage in the revolutionary process.

Section 3.5 argues for the inclusion of a “revolutionary window” stage between the pre-revolution and revolutionary situation stages. This phase is necessary as it explains how non-revolutionary groups can become revolutionary, or how

revolutionary movements can voluntarily choose to exit the revolutionary process due to ideological preferences, a noted trend in contemporary revolutions which has been referred to as “refolutions” (Bayat, 2017:18), “negotiated revolutions” (Lawson, 2019: 201), or “self-limiting” revolutions.

By clarifying the relationship between social movements, revolutions, and ideology this chapter finalises the development of ideological analysis illustrating how revolutions are better understood by studying the groups and organisations which wage and resist them and their ideologies. The completion of ideological analysis here allows for its assessment against competing theories of revolution in the following chapter.

3.2 Other process-based approaches to revolution

Before explaining the four-stage process of revolution, it is worth differentiating it from two other processes of revolution to explain why this innovation is necessary. This section looks at two such examples. First, Crane Brinton’s (1965) five stage model of revolution. Second, the three-stage model of revolution argued for by fourth-generation theorists. Both these models are still widely used in contemporary literature on revolutions.

Crane Brinton’s (1965) five stage model argues that all revolutions follow a pattern making them uniform in the way they unfold. According to Brinton, revolutions begin with the collapse of a regime resulting in the rise of moderates. This is followed by their unseating at the hands of radicals, resulting in a violent “terror”. Finally, revolutions end in a “thermidor”, a restoration or reversion to a form of government similar to the one revolutionaries originally sought to unseat. Brinton’s uses the French and Russian revolutions as case studies to illustrate this process.

While Brinton’s process remains highly regarded, it suffers from important and critical weaknesses. For example, his definition of revolution centres around the capture of state power. As such, he does not account for failed revolutions. Additionally, Brinton’s account does not integrate the emergence of non-violent revolutions most associated with processes of democratisation. Occurrences which became more frequent after the publication of his book.

Contrary to Brinton's model, the four-stage process of revolution argued for here maintains that revolutions are unique and not replicable (Lawson, 2019: 9). The four-stages serve as guiding tools for analysis and not a prescriptive track that each revolution follows. For example, whether or not a revolutionary process progresses to the next stage, and how it progresses to the next stage, is determined entirely by the actions, and in turn ideologies, of the groups and organisations within them. the process also does not focus on the capture of state power. It acknowledges that a revolutionary process can be ended before it reaches the next stage by the decision of revolutionaries or as a result of suppression or co-optation. The demobilisation or co-optation of revolutionary groups and organisation does not make their attempts any less revolutionary.

The four-stage process of revolution developed here is also significant different from and improves on the three-stage process developed by "fourth generation" theorists. According to fourth generation theorists, the revolutionary process begins with pre-revolution, a period leading up to state breakdown where the state is struggling to maintain itself at previous levels as it contends with domestic and international challenges. During this phase, they argue, concerns could be more restorative than revolutionary (Aya, 1979: 46-47). The second phase is that of revolutionary struggle and reconstruction in which contenders mobilise to displace the current state and can include a period of civil war and terror. The third and final phase is that of stabilisation of authority and is signified by a routinization of the new reconstructed state (Goldstone, 1991: 407). At this stage it can be said the revolution is over as the stability and survival of the new state is no longer in doubt (Goldstone, 2001: 167). Fourth generation theorists argue that these phases may overlap and interpenetrate. However, if focus is placed on the central state, and whether or not its power is still intact, is weakening, or has changed hands, it becomes easier to identify where in the revolutionary process things are (Goldstone, 1991: 407).

Assessing the three-stages of revolution exposes a strength and two weaknesses. A strength of the above three-stage model is that none of the transition points relate to the seizure of power. Rather, the seizure of power is seen as an event within the second phase of revolutionary struggle and reconstruction. This is an important distinction as revolutionary struggle can extend well after the seizure of central power as was the case with the Russian Revolution. The seizure of

power can also happen at the very end of the revolutionary struggle with the process transitioning almost immediately to stabilisation as was the case with the Cuban revolution.

Two weaknesses remain. First, as with other definitions of revolution, the model still focuses on the attainment of state power as the most critical element of a revolution. As such, it does not consider or accurately reflect what has been called “negotiated” or “self-limiting” revolutions which do not directly seek to capture state power. Additionally, as Charles Tilly, a resource mobilisation theorist argues, revolutions do not always result in a complete transfer of power or a reversal in a challenge and can end in a settlement between dominant and challenger groups or organisations (Tilly, 1978: 213). Such an outcome is readily presented by the 2019 revolution in Sudan where the opposition coalition agreed to share power in a civilian-military government (Mustafa and Abbas, 2020: 30).

Second, and implicit in the prioritisation of structural factors within fourth generation theories (critiqued in section 4.5), the three-stage model assumes that a state collapse automatically leads to multiple sovereignty (defined in section 3.4). However, as explained below, a revolutionary situation develops only if a group, organisation, or coalition with an ideological morphology that justifies the direct contestation of power exist. In addition to an ideology that justifies the contestation of power, a group must grow in strength substantially in order to successfully challenge the state and other groups with any chance of success at defeating it and constructing a new one (Pettee, 1971: 108). Absent these conditions, it is possible for dominant groups and organisation to subvert and co-opt radical concepts into their ideological morphology to demobilise contenders and reinforce their position of power. For example, the 1905 Russian Revolution was crushed by a combination of outright suppression and the creation of a state Duma (parliament) which posed no real threat to the power of the Tsar.

Unlike the three-stage process of revolution, the four-stage process of revolution argued for in this chapter attributes the progression (or lack thereof) of groups and organisations through the process to their ideologies and their complex interplay within the field of power. The next section bounds this process by

explaining the beginning and end of revolutions as transitions between settled and unsettled times.

3.3 Relating ideologies to settled and unsettled times

Section 2.2 criticised Freeden's account of the conceptual approach for not considering that a change in the concepts within an ideological morphology can happen at a faster rate during times of revolution. Swidler's differentiation between settled and unsettled times was used to create a distinction between times when the ideological morphologies of individuals, groups, and organisations are relatively stable, and times when "differences in ritual and practice or doctrine may become highly charged" and "people formulate, flesh out, and put into practice new habits of action" (Swidler, 1986: 279). Despite this useful distinction, Swidler's account was criticised for not adequately explaining how or when settled times may become unsettled and vice versa.

This section remedies this weakness by building on the concept of a field of power to first explain how settled times are transformed into unsettled times, and then how unsettled times become settled. It is worth clarifying that unsettled times do not automatically produce revolutionary times. However, revolutions necessarily begin with a transition to an unsettled time and end with a reversion to settled times. As such, these two events represent the first and last stages of any revolution.

Despite its necessity for the beginning of revolutions, "unsettledness" can come about from a series of causes including institutionalised forms of politics such as elections, the passing of new laws, and protests or social movements. This means that a further clarification is needed to differentiate between these events and revolutions, a task undertaken in section 3.4. Unsettled times can also occur as a result of extra-legal activities such as civil wars, coup d'états, rebellions, wars of national liberation, and processes of democratisation which overlap with revolutions (Goldstone, Gurr, and Moshiri, 1991; Allinson, 2019: 2; Lawson, 2016: 107; Beck and Ritter, 2021: 5; Goldstone, 1991: 407).

While both institutionalised and extra-legal activities are political in nature, unsettledness can also be caused by natural disasters. What all three causes

share is that they can disrupt the normative practices of individuals, groups, and organisations. This break with normative practices creates an opening for ideological reconceptualization. Notable is that, as section 4.3 expands, what is perceived as a break in normative practices and what the reaction to this perceived break is itself determined by the ideological morphologies held by groups and organisations, reinforcing the need to study and integrate ideology within the study of revolutions. The explanations provided below present general guidelines of this process and show how ideologies play a determining role in the movement between the two phases which is necessary for the explanation of revolutions.

3.3.1 From settled to unsettled times or pre-revolution

As explained in the previous chapter, settled times reflect periods when dominant groups and organisations practice hegemony over the historic block, the two floors of the superstructure. This creates a sense of tacit consent needed to maintain stability. Unsettledness is caused by a break in the “historic bloc”. This pre-revolutionary situation, the first necessary step in the revolutionary process, can occur in two ways. Dominant and subordinate groups and organisations within the superstructure, or at least a section of them, can abandon or contest concepts held by dominant groups in a way that results in a break of a previously stable explicit or implicit alliance. A second way is that the actions of radical groups or organisation forces a split within dominant and subordinate groups with some “defecting” to the radical value system. As section 4.3 shows, this withdrawal of control from remaining dominant groups and organisations signifies a transfer of resources away from them, leaving them less able to practice control (forcefully or otherwise) shifting the equilibrium point in the field of power. Both forms create doubt about the viability of the current established structures and power/resource distribution leading to increased polarisation (Stone, 1966: 165; Jones, 1992: 876).



Figure 2 - Visualisation of the distribution of groups and organisations in a field of power during unsettled times caused by "defection"

While a break in the historic block weakens and threatens the hold on power remaining dominant groups and organisations poses, it does not necessarily spell an end of the system of domination. As mentioned, dominant groups and organisation can co-opt oppositional concepts to revitalize the hegemonic structure and re-enter a settled time. This is especially likely if subordinate groups and organisation do not challenge dominant groups' hold on power or if there is an absence of radical groups who can credibly do so. Thus, while unsettled times do not automatically result in revolutions, they are a necessary "pre-revolutionary" condition for them making them the first step in the revolutionary process.

While there is usually a constant sense of grievances within a society, especially among groups and organisation within the radical value system (Jenkins, 1983:530), a sense of generalised grievance is necessary to push for a break in the superstructure and a transition towards "unsettledness". For example, continuous economic crises in late 1920s Spain led to a break between political parties, members of civil society, and Dictator Primo de Rivera, within the political floor of the superstructure. This break expressed itself through the abandonment of the dictatorship for the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic. While calls for the establishment of a republic have been longstanding, it was the economic crises that led to a generalised sense of grievance and dissatisfaction which political parties were able to capitalise on and mobilise to meet their ideological goals.

Worsening economic crises in Spain did not just happen all on their own. They were a product of practices enabled and constrained by the ideological morphologies of dominant groups and organisations. Similarly, the Russian Tsar's

commitment to the First World War, and the resulting transportation and production crises, was driven by the desire to preserve Russia's prestige among European states which included building close industrial relations with France before the beginning of the war. Revolutionary theorists, especially structuralists (critiqued in section 4.5), take these crises as inevitable consequences of changes within global systems. However, as shown by the above examples, they are caused by practices driven by the ideologies of dominant groups and organisations within nation-states which themselves shape global systems.

Furthermore, both examples show how a dominant group or organisation's commitment to their ideologically defined goals creates a generalised sense of grievance by disrupting normative practices through their control over resources and decision making. For Spain, this was increased inflation and reduced wages. In Russia, it was the depression of wages, demands on production, and conscription. Many other historic examples are readily available. The removal of subsidies on fuel or food stuffs or the introduction of onerous taxes were major ways in which normative practices were disrupted in the 2019 revolutions in North Africa and West Asia (Saab, 2020). A sudden increase in the use of repressive force was a prominent cause of mobilisation in pre-revolutionary Cuba (Gott, 2004: 133). These changes result from a drive to maintain core concepts found within the ideological morphologies of dominant groups and organisations in the face of change. Within the current dominant system, this means the preservation of private property and market relations. All these examples make it clear that the structure/agency dichotomy is indeed a false one. Structural factors are shaped by the ideologies of groups and organisations and they in turn trigger reactions from other groups and organisations within the field of power leading to further adjustments to their ideological morphologies.

Changes in practice triggered by dominant groups and organisations "cascade" through the superstructure due to their control or influence over the material means of production. This forces individuals, groups, and organisation to reconceptualise their ideological morphologies in a way that accommodates these changes. Individuals, groups, and organisations may, however, see these break from normalised practices as an overreach, and, already needing to reconceptualise their ideological morphologies, reorient themselves around

radical value systems. In this way practices encouraged and now abandoned by dominant groups become a source of radicalisation as this sudden change is seen as a threat to a coherent way of life.

The previous examples emphasised changes in normative practices resulting from dominant group's dedication to their ideological morphologies. However, changes in normative practices can also be caused by changes in the ideology of radical groups or organisations. As argued in the previous chapter, the ideologies of dominant, subordinate, and radical groups relate to each other within a field of power meaning that a change within any group or organisation's ideological morphology can lead to shifts in the ideologies of other groups. This means that the ideologies held by dominant groups and organisations can be moved and changed by the actions of subordinate and radical ones. In other words, the actions of subordinate and radical groups and organisations can create the breaks in the historic bloc producing unsettled times.

As chapter six argues, it was the labour insurrections, some led by the CNT, which pushed the army and other groups to break from the Republic and stage a coup. The obstruction caused by labour insurrections and strikes presented a challenge to and disrupted normative practices. In Cuba, the release of the "total war against tyranny" manifesto by the M-26-7 pushed Batista, the de-facto dictator, to suspend constitutional guarantees, a break from normative practice even under his corrupt rule. Batista's move led to the further radicalisation of other organisations who had been reluctant to confront the regime through guerrilla war (Sweig, 2002: 111-112).

As shown above, unsettledness can be caused by changes in the ideological morphologies of dominant or radical groups and organisations within a field of power. These changes create the "ideological openings" necessary for reconceptualization. Due to the interrelated nature of groups in the field, trigger changes in the ideological morphologies of other groups and organisations. Whether or not and how these groups and organisations challenge the equilibrium point in the field of power depends on their own ideological morphologies. Understanding how the ideologies of groups and organisations are formed, change, and enable or constrain practice is thus critical to understanding even this early stage of the revolutionary process.

3.3.2 From unsettled to settled times or institutionalisation

Transitioning from unsettled times to settled times is similarly dependent on the relationship between groups and organisations in a field of power and can happen in two ways. Dominant groups could re-establish their control over the historic bloc, or challenging groups and organisation successfully gain control over the means of material production *and* successfully institutionalise their ideology. The later bounds the end of the revolutionary process and is called institutionalisation.

For dominance to be maintained, dominant groups or organisation need to successfully co-opt other groups and organisation or reintegrate those groups and organisations which created a split to restore the equilibrium point to a position that is in their favour. Both options necessitate a change in the ideological morphologies of dominant groups and organisations so that they are more permeable with those groups and organisation they seek to win over. This means that changes in the ideological morphology of the groups and organisation which constitute a field of power can change without impacting the equilibrium point within the field of power. A successful restoration of the equilibrium point can happen at any stage of the revolutionary process bringing it to an end before it can advance to the next stages.

In the event of the ascension of a new group or organisation, an unsettled time becomes settled when there are no longer any challenges to a claim on power. This happens when the concepts and practices which have served the contender in the past are routinised and proliferated. These “correct” concepts must be integrated into the ideological morphologies of other groups and organisations in a way that provides the new group control over both levels of the superstructure. At the end of this stage, the ideological struggle can be said to have re-entered a “settled” stage with a new dominant ideology.

Since a group or organisation secures its status as a dominant class only when it successfully controls both floors of the superstructure, it must either successfully co-opt individuals, groups, and organisation found in civil society, or eliminate any that stand to threaten its dominance. In ideological terms, this means that to become dominant, groups, organisations, and alliances must

successfully alter the ideological morphology of subordinate groups and organisations to an extent where they can viably co-exist with them or destroy them to remove resistance. Which path is taken depends on how the ideological morphologies of groups and organisation relate to each other.

For example, the M-26-7 successfully formed an alliance with the Cuban Communist Party and Revolutionary Directorate to seize power. In forming this alliance, the ideologies of all three organisations changed throughout the process of the revolution negating previous antagonisms. On the other hand, the Bolshevik's ideological morphology and the practices resultant from them were, at the core, at odds with most other contending organisations such as the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries. This meant they were unable to form an alliance and had to eliminate their opponents. This extended to organisation within civil society such as unions, factory committees, and the soviets, which were essentially absorbed into the functioning of the party. The need to successfully control both floors of the superstructure in order to retain power means that "the beginning of every great socio-political transformations…is characterized by a period of dictatorship, the length of which depends precisely on the ability of the dictatorship to promote general acceptance of the change occurring" (Bates, 1975: 355). This dictatorship ends once control over the entire superstructure is achieved, or until another group is successful in doing so ushering in a new "settled" period.

As shown above the transition from an unsettled to settled time (pre-revolution) and vice vera (institutionalisation) are triggered by and can trigger changes in the ideologies of groups and organisations. They therefore cannot be fully explained without accounting for the way in which the ideological morphologies of various groups and organisation interact with each other across the field of power. This interaction can be fully explained by the adjusted conceptual approach developed in the previous chapter which not only provides the method in which each group or organisations ideology can be studied, but also how these ideologies interact through their permeability. While this furthers the argument that ideologies are critical in understanding revolution as a type of unsettledness, it does not adequately define revolution, a task which the next section turns to.

3.4 Defining revolution and its relationship to social movements

The previous section explained how settled times transform into pre-revolutionary unsettled times and how all revolutions end through a process of institutionalisation or transition from unsettledness to settledness. The section clarified that unsettledness does not automatically translate into a revolution, but that all revolutions occur during (and cause) times of unsettledness. This section refines this distinction and argues that it warrants a further delineation within the four-stage process of revolution through the introduction of the "revolutionary situation" stage.

To improve this distinction, the section compares Social Movements (SMs) to revolutions. SMs represent another form of unsettledness and share the greatest characteristics with Revolutions. Like SMs, one of the most prominent features or revolutions is mass mobilisation. Trotsky, for example, claims that "The most indubitable feature of a revolution is the direct interference of the masses in historic events" (Trotsky, 2017: 15). Political scientist Hannah Arendt claims that we could speak of revolutions only when "the poor, driven by the needs of their bodies, burst onto the scene" (Arendt, 2016: 54). Theda Skocpol, who advocates for a structural theory of revolution, claims that "social revolutions" "are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below" (Skocpol, 1979: 4). The similarity of the two hinders the delicate task of distinguishing between them despite their overlap.

The section first highlights the similarities between SMs and revolutions showing how social movements can become revolutionary. The continuity of social movements and revolutions means that the same groups and organisations found in social movements can also be found in revolutions making an understanding of their ideologies, and how they might change, all the more important. The section then distinguishes the two based on how the demands and claims of groups and organisations change and develop.

Finally, these similarities and differences are used to advance an enlarged definition of revolution which integrates new developments and arguments in revolutionary theory, does not put forward a set of criteria according to which

an event can be considered a revolution or not (Lawson, 2016: 112, Beck and Ritter, 2021, 137; Tilly, 1995: 141), and captures the dynamic nature of revolutions in a way that reflects the four-stage process. This includes 1) Showing how revolutions can overlap with or occur alongside a spectrum of phenomena such as mass protests, civil wars, coup d'états, rebellions, wars of national liberation, processes of democratisation, and attempts to reform social orders (Goldstone, Gurr, and Moshiri, 1991; Allinson, 2019: 2; Lawson, 2016: 107; Beck and Ritter, 2021: 5; Goldstone, 1991: 407). 2) Acknowledging that every revolution is unique as the events and decisions that shape them are not replicable (Lawson, 2019: 9). 3) Accounting for failed attempts at revolution and the forces of counter-revolution which may succeed at ending the revolutionary process before a revolutionary movement can establish a sovereign power of their own (Allinson, 2019: 321). 4) Including revolutionary movements that reject capturing state power as a condition of revolution (Prichard, 2021: 27). 5) Finally, a definition that encompasses “conservative” or “reactionary” revolutions and coups which have been largely ignored in the field (Beck, 2018). This expanded definition allows researchers to draw on more diverse examples of revolution leading to richer analysis that centres the actors within a revolution and their ideologies.

3.4.1 How social movements become revolutionary

SMs are extensions of institutionalized collective actions that contest the orientation of society as a whole and seek to challenge or alter elements of the social structure or reward distribution of society (Bell, 2001: 193). This can be done through already organized groups and organisations, or by organizing previously unorganized members of the public (Jenkins, 1983: 529; McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1217). SMs are best understood as “a series of demands or challenges to power-holders in the name of a social category that lacks an established political position” (Tilly, 1985: 736).

SMs usually consist of multiple groups and organisations (Jenkins, 1983: 540; Benford and Snow, 2000: 616) which compete with one another for limited resources within a movement, be it labour, funds, members, third party support, and symbolic goods such as status and prestige (Benford, 1993: 681; McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1234). The existence of social movements and the availability of

a mobilised mass also “calls out” to leaders who may “attempt to form a viable organization" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1226). These leaders are usually cadres of former groups and organisations who may have either disbanded or factionalized. Leaders can seize on “major interest cleavages and redefin[e] long-standing grievances in new terms" (Jenkins, 1983: 531). SM’s therefore meet the criteria of unsettled times as defined by Swidler.

As chapter two argued, leaders and cadres play a major role in the interpretation of and decontestation of political concepts and are major sources of “conceptual innovation” (Saharov, 2021: 14). New concepts and decontestations are promoted through groups and organisations as the correct way of interpreting a situation and offer alternatives to dominant interpretations. The leadership and cadre do not only play an internal role in the reorganisation of an ideological morphology. They are also critical to building trust between participants and a vision of the future, giving meaning to and direction to actions of the masses, organising and arming disparate groups, and taking initiative to build coalitions. These tasks mean that the leaders and cadre of groups, and the ideologies they promote, have a direct impact in which vision of the future “wins out” (Gottschalk, 1944: 6; Goldstone, 2001: 154; Stone, 1966: 166; Schweitzer, 1944: 417, 420; Goodwin and Skocpol: 1989: 492; Disalvo, 2015: 276; Fominaya, 2015: 143).

As social movement researcher Sidney Tarrow notes, SMs do not occur “all on their own” (Tarrow, 1998: 141), they happen through “cycles of contention”. Phases of heightened conflict across the social system with characteristics of “rapid diffusion of collective action”, “a rapid pace of innovation in the forms of contention”, and “sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities” (Tarrow, 1998: 142). Tarrow’s definition of a “cycle of contention” neatly overlaps with Swidler’s description of unsettled times. Therefore, as with unsettled times, these cycles are triggered by changes within the ideological morphologies of groups and organisations which cascade through the field of power due to the interrelated nature of ideologies.

As individuals, groups, and organisations pass through multiple cycles, they establish new relationships, create new groups, alliances, or re-emerge with altered ideologies. These changes do not only happen at the height of cycles of

contention but continue to happen, at a slower rate, “behind the scenes” (Fominaya, 2015: 149) during settled periods. Groups and organisations are likely to develop radical ideologies if their grievances are not addressed and the state begins to be seen as a barrier to change (Pettee, 1971: 7). Or if the state itself imposes changes which create a sense of divergence from established norms and practices - that is to say, divergence from a dominant ideology.

Several examples support this argument. The M-26-7 emerged as a network of activists from different organisations convinced that change can only be attained by armed revolutionary means as opposed to the ballot. This happened after attempts to bring about change through the ballot failed. During the 2018 Sudanese revolution, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), an organisation that brought together various trade unions and was active in previous cycles of contention, entered and led a coalition of twenty-two groups and organisations looking to oust the country’s dictator (Mustafa and Abbas, 2020: 22-23). While the SPA existed before the revolution its focus on radical change was a new development. One of the main causes of the Iranian Revolution is credited to the evolution of a network of Shiite clergy who leveraged mosques to proliferate a radical ideology meant at ousting the Shah (Keddie, 1995:11). Speaking on the hardening of the Russian working class, historian Neil Faulkner, describes the process by which workers learned lessons through successive waves of mass strikes. With each wave, he explains, the worker learned more “about the bosses, the police, and the narks, about unity and solidarity, about whom they could trust in their own ranks, about how to organise and fight" (Faulkner, 2017: 49). The radicalisation of groups and organisations has a knock-on effect on others within the field of power. For example, the Civic Institutions in Cuba, a collection of NGOs and professional associations, were propelled into the spotlight when the M-26-7 suggested that they should be the ones to appoint a new government (Castro, 1972: 364).

The development of new radicalised ideologies through cycles of contentions creates new conceptual decontestations. These innovations become poles which others can reorient themselves around as they reconceptualise their own ideological morphologies after experiencing the unsettledness caused by challenges to normative practices. The experience and evolution of groups and organisations during cycles of contention explains why many revolutions have

their origins in movements for reform, not fundamental change (Arendt, 2016: 38; Aya, 1979: 46-47; Goldstone, 2001: 160; Calhoun, 1983: 902).

This highlights the continuity between social movements and revolution as the same individuals, groups, and organisations which participate in social movements make notable appearances during a revolution. How the ideologies of these actors changes is critical to explaining the development of revolution. The ideologies of groups and organisation within a social movement or revolution produce the terrain on which the struggle over political language and decision-making is fought. This reaffirms the argument that revolutions should be studied at the level of groups and organisations, and the importance of studying their ideologies outside of revolutionary times as these constitute the ideological morphologies which groups and organisation enter the revolutionary process with and shape its "opening salvo". The history of a revolution must thus be invariably tied to the history of the groups and organisations that participate in it.

3.4.2 Distinguishing revolutions from social movements

Although most revolutions contain SMs, not all SMs are revolutionary (Tarrow, 1998: 157). This means that in addition to the transition from settled to unsettled times, any revolutionary process needs to distinguish between a social movement phase and a revolutionary phase. Charles Tilly, a resource mobilisation theorist, makes a widely accepted distinction in saying that SMs become revolutionary when they meet three conditions. 1) contenders, or coalitions of contenders, advance exclusive alternative claims to control over the government. 2) when there is commitment from a "significant segment" of society to those claims in the face of directives from the government. 3) When there is an inability or unwillingness of the government to supress groups and organisations making an alternative claim (Tilly, 1978: 200). If these conditions exist then a social movement enters a revolutionary situation with multiple sovereignty, as opposed to "dual power", since there may be more than two contenders (Tilly, 1978: 191).

Tilly does not explain what constitutes a "significant segment" of society or how this significant segment can come to be. Using the field of power, significant can

be quantitatively understood as possessing enough resources to seriously challenge the force of dominant groups. To gain these resources during unsettled times, radical groups and organisation need to successfully sway those "defecting" from dominant or subordinate value systems to reconfigure their ideological morphologies along more radical lines – to the point of contesting power. It is thus usual that contending groups form economic and cultural alliances (Lears, 1985: 571). Groups and organisations may adjust their ideological morphologies to accommodate such alliances.

Contending groups and organisations also need to mobilise previously un-mobilised sections of society. To successfully do so, the ideological morphologies of contenders need to "resonate" with the experiences, practices, and concepts found within ideological morphologies held by individuals (Zald, 2000: 3-4; Benford, 1993: 693; Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1996: 366). The need for permeability between the ideological morphologies of ascending groups and organisation and large sections of society means that no group or organisation institutionalises a completely novel ideology upon capturing power. Thus, as Marx argued, new societies are founded "in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges" (Marx, 1959: 117).

While Tilly's definition of a revolutionary situation has been widely accepted within the field, it suffers from one important weakness that needs to be corrected. Tilly limits his definition to claims of control over an already existing state, as such he rules out those movements that reject capturing state power or seek to establish autonomous areas within current sovereignties. A more accurate definition of a revolutionary situation would be

> contenders, or coalitions of contenders, advancing exclusive alternative claims of control over the government or sections of a territory and its resources

The wide acceptance of Tilly's definition has seen an important question overlooked; how do we know if and when contenders are advancing exclusive alternative claims? The answer is that these contenders can only be said to exist if and when their ideological morphology contains, or has developed in a way to contain, concepts which justify making exclusive alternative claims to control

over a government or sections of its territory and resources. In simpler terms if there exists groups and organisations willing to take and hold power (Arendt, 2016: 112). While this appears circular, it is important to acknowledge because it means that at least for the occasion of identifying the existence of a revolutionary situation, all theories of revolution which agree with Tilly's definition must admit the centrality of ideology in revolutions.

3.4.3 A new definition of revolution

The following definition of revolution results from combining the distinction and overlap between revolutions and social movements:

> Domestic, forceful, attempts to establish, replace, and transform sovereign power and its political, economic, and symbolic relations.

Unlike other definitions of revolutions (see Lawson, 2019: 5; Tiruneh, 2014: 4; Skocpol, 1979: 4; Aya, 1979: 40), the above definition places no constraint on the time, source of origin, or depth/limit of the transformation of political, economic, and symbolic relations. A revolutionary attempt may come from a coup, a mass movement, a revolutionary war, or a combination. It might be quick or last several years and include civil wars, foreign intervention, or coincide with a war of liberation.

The definition's grouping of "establishing, replacing, and transforming sovereign power" as a related triad, emphasises the dynamic processes of revolutions where pursuing one of the goals leads to changes in the others due to the interrelatedness of groups and organisation within a field of power. For example, the CNT established sovereign power over specific areas of Spain which were organised into collectives but did not seek to replace sovereign power. Yet even this limited scope of operation resulted in a transformation in the way the state operated including the acceptance of collectives and their limited legalisation. The M-26-7 first sought to transform sovereign power in Cuba but ended up substituting itself for it.

The use of sovereignty and force in the definition distinguishes revolutions from reform movements that seek to alter political, economic, and symbolic relations through institutional channels, be it through social movements or through

already existing seats of power (change from above). It also excludes independence movements utilising constitutional means for secession while allowing for wars of liberation as found during the American or Algerian Revolutions. Finally, the emphasis on domestic attempts distinguishes the locus of revolutionary change from interventionist programs of regime change such as the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. This distinction is important as both independence movements which utilise constitutional or legal means and regime change driven by foreign intervention constitute unsettled times which are not revolutionary.

By including attempts to establish new sovereign power, the definition accounts for movements that do not seek to capture state power. This allows for the inclusion of the CNT (the subject of chapter six), which successfully established sovereignty over specific areas, factories, and communes, without a program for capturing the Spanish state. This analysis can be extended to movements such as the Zapatista's of Mexico or the establishment of autonomous zones in northern Syria during the 2011 revolution.

The definition also acknowledges that revolutionary situations do not always result in a revolutionary outcomes. Groups and organisations advancing exclusive alternative claims to power can be defeated despite their ability to mobilise a significant section of society. Yet all attempts, even unsuccessful ones, result in changes to the political, economic, and symbolic relations. As explained in the previous section, this is because re-stablishing the equilibrium point at its previous position within the field of power requires dominant groups and organisations to adjust their ideological morphology in a way that increases the magnitude of their force by gaining new resources or co-opting those of challengers.

The above definition of revolution preserves the uniqueness of every revolution and acknowledges that the character and preferred outcomes of attempts depend on the interaction of the groups that wage them thus preserving the relational approach argued for in the previous chapter. The overlap and distinction between SMs and revolutions demonstrates the importance of ideological morphologies in explaining when a SM becomes revolutionary, and how the same groups and organisations can be involved in revolutions that emerge from SMs.

3.5 Challenging power and the revolutionary window

If the process of revolution is left at the three stages of pre-revolution, revolutionary window, and institutionalisation it would replicate the errors found in three-stage process of fourth-generation theorists. More importantly it would not address the gap that emerges between groups and organisation that make alternative claims to power, and those who do not make such claims but challenge the hold on power practiced by dominant groups. This section attends to this gap by arguing for the inclusion of a "revolutionary window" stage as a mediating one between pre-revolution and revolutionary situation.

The addition of the "revolutionary window" stage, an original contribution, allows for a more accurate explanation of the period in which non-revolutionary groups can become revolutionary, and how radical groups and organisations can simultaneously oppose dominant group's claim to power while refusing to advance the revolutionary process by making alternative claims to power due to ideological preferences. The latter representing a trend in contemporary revolutions which have been referred to as "refolutions" (Bayat, 2017:18), "negotiated revolutions" (Lawson, 2019: 201), or "self-limiting" revolutions. Unlike other researchers, this dissertation argues that this trend does not denote the emergence of a new "form" of revolution (Lawson, 2019: 194). Rather, it denotes the need to finetune our understanding of the revolutionary process itself and the role of groups and organisations within it. The four-stage process of revolution thus significantly improves on alternative processes.

3.5.1 The revolutionary window

As discussed in the previous section, the demands of groups and organisation in a social movement can shift from redress to a withdrawal of control from the state. This means that the ideological morphologies of groups and organisations become radical enough to contest dominant groups' claims to power. This can be triggered by a sudden and unexpected event which acts as a catalyst (Tiruneh, 2014: 8) and marks a clear break from normalised practice under the dominant ideology. These catalysts are not themselves destabilising, but they represent concrete expressions of commonly held anxieties leading to their widespread interpretation as proof of the need for fundamental change (Törnberg, 2021:

91). This can be the imposition of a new tax, the removal of subsidies, a financial crash, a major political defection, attempted reforms, or even an act of desperation from an individual citizen such as a self-immolation.

These catalysts usher in a revolutionary window in which groups and individuals begin to revoke the control of the state but may not have vested it with another group or leader but rather to "the people". As section 4.2 explains, a revolutionary window can be characterised by a collective sense of "milling". Various groups and organisations may engage in "shadow boxing" where oppositional and radical groups "feel each other out, try their strength and solidarity, build their confidence or lose it" (Pettee, 1971: 112). This phase is necessary as no group ever truly knows its mobilisation strength and the resources available to it although it might be shorter in coups where the army acts as a readily available resource for mobilisation.

This type of guerrilla mobilisation can lead to a "protest spiral" where responses create increasing militancy and escalating confrontation (Lawson, 2019: 184). This phase of the process can be best characterised by a "negative" quality where clarity is achieved on what is rejected but a clear alternative is not yet present or is underdeveloped. Concrete examples of this might be pressing a demand for a transitional government or the convention of a constituent assembly. Both demands contest current power distribution but put pressure on, require action from, and depend on the acquiescence of dominant groups.

The transition from a pre-revolutionary situation to a revolutionary window is not guaranteed even if a catalyst is present. The importance of the catalyst is not the event itself but its interpretation as significant by a substantial section of the population. In ideological terms, the "event" must be offensive to or challenge the ideological morphologies of those who usually support (at least implicitly) the state for it to be catalysing. Radical groups have a lower threshold of interpreting events as significant catalysts. However, this interpretation leads to mobilisation only if it resonates with the ideological morphologies of a substantial section of the population. This means that radical groups must offer new decontesations of concepts found within the ideological morphologies of adherents and bystanders or poses an ideological morphology that is permeable with those members of the public it wishes to win over.

3.5.2 The necessity of the revolutionary window

Within the three-stage process of revolution, it is assumed that the same groups and organisations which contest the right of dominant groups to power are the same ones which advance exclusive alternative claims for control over the government or over sections of a territory and its resources. This is certainly possible. For example, the emergence of the M-26-7 in Cuba shows how a contender can develop within the pre-revolutionary phase. The Bolshevik Party's leadership during the 1917 Russian Revolution provides an example of an organisation that existed well before the pre-revolutionary situation but became powerful enough to enforce their alternative claim to power after the onset of the revolutionary process.

However, exclusive alternative claims to the control over the government or over sections of a territory and its resources does not always come from radical groups or organisations. In some cases, there may be no group or organisation with the resources necessary to make a credible claim. In other cases, groups and organisation may not be interested in such a claim at all meaning that if the revolutionary process is to progress to a revolutionary situation, it would not do so based on the actions of those groups. Multiple sovereignty can also be triggered by the actions of dominant groups acting in the name of "the people" or under the guise of restoring "stability".

Two contemporary examples show how the four-stages of revolution is relevant beyond the cases assessed in this dissertation. The Egyptian revolution of 2011 entered a revolutionary situation only when the army deposed Hosni Mubarak. As such, it was a dominant group, and not mass protestors who progressed the revolutionary process. The army claimed to be acting in the name of mass protestors and created a condition of dual power by setting itself up against a yet to be constituted republic. Protestors acted as a mass lobby who could "veto" the actions of dominant groups but did not themselves progress any exclusive or alternative claims of power. This does not mean that these groups were not revolutionary or did not possess a radical ideology. On the contrary, they were spurred by their opposition to core concepts within the dominant ideology and called for transformation in political, economic, and symbolic relations.

A similar situation can be found in the Ukrainian revolutions of 2005 and 2013/14. There, mass mobilisation led to power changing hand not through exclusive claims to power advanced by those who mobilised, but through elite negotiations (Lawson, 2019: 194). As such, mass mobilisation, and the groups and organisations that led them, created the opportunity for elites to stake their alternative claims to power. This does not mean that the masses did not possess any power and that elites acting in the name of the masses were exclusively opportunistic or acting as "free riders". The presence of the mobilised masses enabled or constrained elite claims based on their own ideological morphologies. In the language of ideological analysis, how permeable the concepts advanced by elites were with ideological morphologies of the masses determined which claims were seen as legitimate.

These contemporary examples have been contrasted with "classical" revolutions in which exclusive alternative claims to power were advanced by competing institutions set up or supported by the masses. In the Russian Revolution of 1917 this was the soviets, the factory committees, the trade unions, and the various parties. In the Spanish revolution it was the various parties and unions such as the CNT, the Socialist Party, and the POUM. In Cuba it was the M-26-7 along with the Communist Party and the Revolutionary Directorate.

The multiple ways in which a revolutionary situation may develop has led to confusion. For example, revolutionary theorist George Lawson (2019: 194) argues that contemporary revolutions represent a "shift in revolutionary tactics", tying this into a larger argument that the "forms" of revolutions change across time (Lawson, 2019: 2). This confusion results from continuing to see revolutions as a flurry of activity by the general masses as opposed to the conscious actions of multiple groups and organisations with different ideological morphologies. Without an accounting of the way in which ideologies of different groups and organisations impact process of revolution it becomes easy to confuse the unique ways individual revolutions pass through the four-stages with an emergence of a new form of revolution due to some shared characteristics.

Studying revolutions at the level of groups and organisations makes it clear that soviets, trade unions, or parties in classical cases serve the same function of advancing the revolutionary process as elites acting on behalf of masses in

contemporary cases. The division between classical and contemporary cases is also less clear as assumed. For example, the transfer of power from the Tsar to the provisional government in the Russian revolution of 1917 presents an example of elites acting in the name of the people in the same way that is argued to be exclusive to contemporary new "forms" of revolution. In both cases it is the permeability, the overlap, of the ideological morphologies of the masses with that of the groups or organisation seeking to advance the revolutionary process which determines their success. Elites, trade unions, and parties are differentiated, however, by their ideologies, resulting in unique revolutionary outcomes. Therefore, while the outcome of the revolutions may be different, the process of revolution itself is much the same.

Contemporary revolutions, just like classical revolutions, are thus much better explained not by claiming the discovery of a new type of revolution, but by studying why those engaged in mass mobilisation have not themselves advanced alternative and exclusive claims to power. In other words, why did the ideological morphologies of those groups and organisation not contain concepts that justify making exclusive alternative claims to control over a government or sections of its territory and resources?

The "self-limiting" character of contemporary revolutions have been convincingly attributed to the integration of neo-liberal concepts within the ideological morphologies of "elites, professional groups, and the political class" (Bayat, 2017: 25). While it has been argued that the integration of neo-liberal concepts has had a "deradicalizing" effect. This argument holds true only if radical is defined as the willingness to advance exclusive alternative claims to power. However, these "self-limiting" movements are no less radical in their opposition to currently constituted power or in their opposition to core concepts advocated for by dominant groups and organisation. This means that groups and organisation who have integrated neo-liberal concepts into their ideological morphologies explicitly reject progressing a revolutionary windows into revolutionary situations as their ideology constrains that choice. This argument is strengthened by the similarity of "self-limiting" revolutions to processes of democratisation seen with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Tarrow, 1998: 159-160).

The refusal to advance exclusive claims to power means that the revolutionary process can only advance once another group or organisation whose ideological morphology justifies advancing exclusive claims to power, and whose ideological morphology is permeable enough with that of the masses, is present. The mobilisation of groups which reject advancing the revolutionary process creates the opportunity for other radical, subordinate, or dominant groups to do so. Sometimes acting genuinely on their behalf, at other times acting opportunistically to reconstitute and re-secure the dominance of those already in power.

It is also possible that the absence of any group or organisation to advance the revolutionary process results in an exit from it. However, as argued within the new definition of revolution, attempts to establish or replace sovereign power, even if they never progress to a revolutionary situation are still revolutionary as they ideologically identify the need to get rid of dominant groups and organisations. We can also witness reversals or relapses through the process. For example, the provisional government in the Russian Revolution of 1917 failed to move from a revolutionary situation to institutionalisation despite its seizure of power. This led to a further change in power and a deepening of multiple sovereignty.

Whether events progress fully through the four stages or are reversed, changes to the ideological morphologies of groups and organisations, be they dominant, subordinate, or radical, are bound to change as the equilibrium point in the field of power is reset or changed. The four-phases explained in this section thus also represent key junctures in the revolutionary process when the ideological morphology of a group or organisation may change.

In addition to changes in ideology resulting from shits in the field of power, changes in the ideological morphology of groups and organisation can be expected as participation in different phases requires changes to practices. As explained in chapter two, the existence of a feedback loop between practice and ideology means that any change in practice results in adjustments to an ideological morphology. Since different phases of the revolution require different practices, and adjustments to the transition between phases results in changes to the ideological morphologies of groups and organisations. For

example, the pre-revolutionary stage of the revolutionary process may see groups engaged in a "stocking up" of resources such as acquiring new members or developing new skills. A revolutionary window on the other hand may open opportunities for new alliances or shift the focus of groups and organisations to mobilisation thus requiring the integration of new practices. Entering a revolutionary situation means the transition of practices away from opposition to take on tasks usually reserved for states. Institutionalisation means building the infrastructure and mobilising the resources necessary to ensure that preferred practices become dominant. These changes in practice are all reflected in changes in the ideological morphologies of groups and organisations.

Utilising the method of ideological analysis allows this dissertation to show how changes in the ideological morphologies of the Bolshevik Party and the CNT impacted the revolutions in Russia and Spain across specific phases of their revolutionary processes.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter expanded on the method developed in chapter two to further illustrate how ideology plays a central role in the process of revolution. It argued that revolutions overlap with social movements and are waged by groups and organisations who have formed and evolved through previous cycles of contention. As such, the study of revolutions must also be the study of the history of the groups which wage and resist them, including their ideological morphologies.

Revolution was defined as domestic, forceful, attempts to establish, replace, and transform sovereign power and its political, economic, and symbolic relations. This broad definition includes failed attempts at revolution, coups, wars of liberation, and processes of democratisation. While revolutions emerge from social movements, they are also differentiated from them by the presence of contenders, or coalitions of contenders, advance exclusive alternative claims to the control over the government or over sections of a territory and its resources.

To clarify how revolutions emerge from social movements, the chapter developed an original four-stage process of revolution. The four-stages improved on previous three stage models by adding a “revolutionary window” stage phase which helps explain democratisation and “negotiated revolutions”. The four stages reaffirm the role of groups and organisations and their ideological morphologies in determining the process of revolution breaking the structure/agency dichotomy. It also highlighted how, based on the ideological morphologies of groups and organisation, those who mobilise may not always be, or want to be, the ones to gain control over the government or over sections of a territory and its resources. The four-stages of revolution also identify key junctures where the ideological morphologies of groups and organisation are likely to change.

Now that the method of ideological analysis has been fully developed, it is possible to assess it against other theories of revolution. This is what the next chapter turns to.

Chapter 4 Critiquing competing theories of revolution

4.1 Introduction

Now that the method of ideological analysis has been developed, it can be assessed against competing theories of revolution. While it is customary for research projects developing a new theory of revolution to begin with a critique of older theories (see for example Tilly, 1978: ch2; Skocpol, 1979: ch1; Goldstone et al, 1991: ch2; Ritter, 2015: ch1), a critique could not be made earlier for two reasons. First, the extent of the research gap required a full accounting of what ideology is, how it can be studied, and how it impacts the revolutionary process before any meaningful comparison and critique could occur. Second, although this dissertation is proposing a new theory of revolution which supersedes past theories, it rejects the premise that new research in the field needs to present a "dramatic break" (Beck and Ritter, 2021: 137) from past research to be considered useful, a path other researchers have pursued (see for example Allinson, 2019). Instead, the critiques in this chapter show how past research enhance the argument for a four-stage process of revolution, and how ideological analysis addresses the weaknesses found in these theories.

Four competing theories of revolution are critiqued across four sections. Rational choice theories (RCTs), resource mobilisation (RM), theories of deprivation, and structural theories of revolution. Each section points out how the respective theory contributes to the persisting problematics in the field identified in chapter one, supports the four-stage process of revolution, and how they are incomplete without explicitly accounting for the ideological morphologies of individuals, groups, and organisations. The chapter argues that ideology conditions rationality, the accrual and mobilisation of resources, the interpretation of deprivation, and shapes structural factors.

Section 4.2 critiques various RCTs for inadequately explaining how the preferences of various subject can be determined, how multiple preferences are ordered or ranked, and where these preferences come from (Friedman and Hechter, 1988: 202). The section argues that ideological analysis remedies these weaknesses as it explains how preferences arise through the internal debates

and discussions within groups and organisations, and how these debates are reflected in the order of concepts (proximity, priority, permeability, and proportionality) within an ideological morphology.

Section 4.3 critiques resource mobilisation (RM) (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1993; Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy and Zald, 1977). While RM presents social movements and revolutions as dynamic contests between groups and organisations, they inadequately explain how groups and organisation decide when to mobilise resources and what resources groups and organisation choose to accrue. The section argues that it is the ideological morphology of a group or organisation which determines what resources are sought and how and when resources are used. Therefore, resource mobilisation must be subordinated to ideology.

Section 4.4 critiques deprivation and relative deprivation theories of revolution (Davies, 1962; Geschwender, 1968). These theories substitute macro-economic or psychological markers for causal analysis. As such they do not adequately explain how deprivation, or perceived deprivation, leads to mobilisation, who is more likely to mobilise, or why this mobilisation may become revolutionary. The section argues that deprivation is better understood as a factor of divergence from normalised practices (explained as unsettledness in section 3.3). Additionally, whether or not mobilisation caused by deprivation becomes revolutionary is determined by the ideologies already held by groups and organisations and the availability of alternative concepts and practices.

Section 4.5 critiques structural and fourth-generation theorists (Skocpol, 1979; Moore, 1969; Goldstone, 2001, 2016) for rejecting the role of ideology in creating political and economic crises and promoting a false structure/agency binary. The section argues that while the pre-revolutionary structure of a society presents explanatory value for revolutions, these structures, and changes within them are products of ideological practices.

By analysing individual theories of revolution, this dissertation rejects the generational classification of theories of revolution popularised by Goldstone (1980). The generational classification groups the work of revolutionary theorists into three chronological “generations”: “natural history of revolutions” covering research conducted during the 1920s and 1930s, “general theories of revolution”

research occurring during the 1950s and 1960s, and "structural theories of revolution" developed in the 1970s (Goldstone, 1982) and a post-third generation theory of revolution dubbed a "fourth-generation" (Goldstone, 2001).

Goldstone's classification has come under due criticism for ignoring the fact that theories develop concurrently and not sequentially. Theories belonging to past "generations", while suffering from weaknesses, have not been proven to be "incorrect" and continue to offer valuable insight to current research (Beck and Ritter, 2021: 134). The classification has also led to the exclusion of some theories and researchers (Cacuta, 2013: 1112). For example, RCTs are not mentioned in the generational classification at all despite their consistent relevance. This exclusion represents the classification's preference of structural explanations at the expense of agency focused theories (Cacuta, 2013: 1112) reinforcing the analytic binary between structure and agency (Lawson, 2016: 110-111).

Contrary to generational categorisation, the following sections shows how theories continue to develop, and how the four theories discussed borrow from and overlap with each other. Critiquing competing theories of revolutions shows how ideology conditions rationality, the accrual and mobilisation of resources, the interpretation of deprivation, and shapes structural factors. This reinforces the argument that understanding the ideologies of groups and organisation is imperative in explaining the process of revolution.

4.2 Improving on Rational Choice Theories' macro-micro link

While there are multiple forms of RCTs (Rutar, 2019: 300), this section first critiques their most common features before focusing on James Coleman's (1990) work who argued that collective behaviour is based on a rational transfer of control over one's actions to others (Coleman 1990: 198). The common features of RCT are critiqued for inadequately identifying preferences or interest and how multiple interests are formed.

Coleman's work improves on most RCT approaches as it presents rational choice as a process and is still regarded as the standard way of explaining macro-

outcomes with a micro foundation (what is known as the macro-micro link) (Aya, 2001: N2, Raub et al., 2011: 9). Coleman's RCT model reinforces elements of the four-stage process of revolution argued for in the previous chapter and provides a basis for causal analysis. Despite these strengths Coleman's model does not adequately explain when individuals may choose to transfer control.

This section argues that when individuals, groups, and organisations choose to transfer control relates to the permeability of the ideological morphologies of actors within a field of power. Moreover, calculations of costs and benefits are determined by the concepts found within an ideological morphology at any given time. Ideology, therefore, precedes rationality, making ideological analysis a more comprehensive macro-micro theory.

4.2.1 The common features of RCT

RCTs argue that since all we can observe is individual action, understanding individual agency is necessary to explaining events and structural conditions (Aya, 2001: 144). RCTs hold that agency is driven by held preferences and the perceived consequences associated with available choices (Aya, 2001: 145). All action, RCTs argue, is based on a calculated decision which balances preferred outcomes with possible costs to maximise benefits, also referred to as utility (Friedman and Hechter, 1988: 202; Opp, 2013: 1). To be able to understand individual action, researchers must account for preferences, constraints (costs and benefits), and the fact that actors must choose between alternative actions in a way that maximises utility (Opp, 2013: 1).

Various RCTs do this in different ways. For example, instrumental RCTs attempt to explain individual action based on an assessment of costs and benefits "from the perspective of an omniscient observer" (Opp, 2013: 2). These "narrow" versions of RCTs assume an objective position from which utility maximization can be calculated and that rationality is egoistic and self-serving (Taylor, 1988: 66). Other RCTs integrate social relations and argue that social networks lead to the creation of a system of norms and sanctions which shifts costs and benefits by punishing or rewarding individuals belonging to a particular group (Coleman, 1988: 53). This perspective is shared by RM theorists who argue that through a process of socialisation, costs related to exit or non-participation are increased

through social sanctions and rewards (Tilly, 1978: 73; Taylor, 1988: 67). Threshold models of collective behaviour convincingly argue that costs decrease with an increased number of participants. As such, every individual has a "threshold" representing the number of others that need to be taking action before an individual chooses to join in (Granovetter, 1978: 1422).

Another set of RCTs argue for "cognitive rationality", tying costs and benefits to beliefs held by the individual (Boudon, 2003: 8). These models clearly argue that "attitudes produce the beliefs about instrumentality" (Klandermans, 1984: 584). Expectancy theory adds to this formulation by arguing the motive to participate in a specific action is a function of the expectation that the action will bring one closer to achieving a specific goal, the value of that goal, the expected costs and benefits and their likelihood, and the value of those costs and benefits, all of which are determined by beliefs (Klandermans, 1984: 586).

While primarily focused on individual choices, many RCTs use outcome maximisation to explain macro-sociological problems. This is done in one of two ways. The first is by presenting the preferences of a group or organisation as uniform and singular (homogeneous), therefore treating an entire organisation as you would an individual. The second way is through an aggregating mechanism in which different individual actions are combined to produce an outcome (Friedman and Hechter, 1988: 203). Even though these methods allow for the use of RCTs at a group level, they both collapse the agency of a group or organisation into a single datapoint meaning that outcomes are reduced to two options, either an action is taken, or it is not. This makes RCTs two-dimensional and lacking the dynamism of other competing theories.

The core and persistent problem faced by RCTs is how to determine the preferences or interests a subject may hold, how multiple preferences are ordered or ranked, and where these preferences come from (Friedman and Hechter, 1988: 202). As RCTs do not offer much guidance on this, interest is often assumed. For example, revolutionary groups are assumed to be motivated by a desire to secure power whereas individuals are assumed to mobilise to redress grievances (Aya, 2001: 152). However, such assumptions fail to explain how grievances are defined, which ones are seen as worth redressing, and what form this redress takes (Rutar, 2019: 306). To overcome the problem of

identifying preferences, Karl-Deiter Opp (2013), a defender of RCT, argues for the usefulness of a "inventory" of preferences and constraints. While possible, applying such an inventory to individuals would be as impracticable as studying ideology at an individual level as it would produce a near infinite number of possible combinations.

4.2.2 RCT and ideological analysis

Despite these weaknesses, RCT researchers continue to challenge the usefulness of ideological analysis. For example, John Roemer (1985), in an attempt to rationalise revolutionary ideology, argues that groups and organisations acting in a disinterested manner to maximise the probability of revolution take actions that appear ideological, when in fact they are not (Roemer, 1985: 86). Roemer presents a "game" in which a "Lenin" seeks to overthrow the regime of a "Tsar" who seeks to defend the status quo (Roemer, 1985: 86).

Within this game, it is argued that "charisma" helps build a coalition encouraging others to participate. This creates an "assurance" game in which individuals choose to cooperate as opposed to compete against each other as this is the only way to achieve success (Roemer, 1985: 86). It is then theorised that "Lenin" can adopt a beneficial income distribution strategy which further rationalises the participation of others in the revolution. On the other hand, the "Tsar" would be limited in the adjustments they can make to income redistribution as redistribution may cut into the income of a dominant alliance (Roemer, 1985: 91). Finally, it is argued that the dominant group have limits on increasing the costs of participation for would be revolutionaries as increased penalties would mean that more individuals see the current political system as unjust. Thus, increased costs mobilise instead of de-mobilise individuals (Roemer, 1985: 99).

The findings of Roemer's game resonate with other research on revolutions. For example, revolutionary coalitions have often displayed a great consistency in seeking rectification, redistribution, and displaying a sense of nationalism (Goldstone, 1991: 412). From an RCT perspective, the need for rectification reflects a high cost for maintaining current political systems, redistribution presents the benefits of mobilising, and nationalism creates a sense of identity

and social belonging that facilitates cooperation. The inability of dominant groups to lean on income redistribution as it threatens dominant alliances is also a feature of structural theories of revolution explained in section 4.5. Finally, a clear example of how the use of force can galvanise opposition can be found in revolutionary Cuba. There, the use of force against middle class university students, previously seen as acceptable to break up labour actions, motivated the middle classes to come out against the dictatorship (Gott, 2004: 133).

Apart from coinciding with some of the research, Roemer's game presents an idealised version of what an organisation should do to secure power. It does not explain why "Lenin" seeks to gain power as opposed to pursue other alternatives, the extent to which "Lenin" would seek to redistribute income, or how "charisma" really contributes to the formation of a coalition. Even if the game presents a rationally fool proof method for the success of revolutions, revolutionary theorists are left with the question of why some contenders refuse to follow this "rational" model or why those who follow it can still fail.

The inability of RCTs to adequately answer the question of preferences means that they are more useful for answering the question of "under what conditions are individuals most likely to take action?" as opposed to "why do individuals take action?". Ideological analysis addresses the weaknesses found in most RCTs in six important ways. First, the processes of sense making and framing (see sections 2.3 and 2.4) explains how individuals, groups, and organisations choose between competing concepts and practices based on their potential "outcomes, costs, benefits, limits and opportunities" (Freeden, 2006:15).

Second, the resultant ideological morphology of individuals, groups, and organisations contains an order of preferences based on the location of the concepts within the morphology as explained by their proximity, priority, permeability, and proportionality. This order can be used to explain what interests or preferences an individual, group, or organisations prioritises. Chapters five and six show how this can be practically done.

Third, the constraining and enabling facets of ideology explains why individual behaviour can be consistent and does not require a re-calculation of costs and benefits every time a decision must be made. This is because an ideology allows

individuals to call on concepts they are familiar with to engage with different situations as if they were not completely new (Oliver and Johnston, 2005: 188; Rutar, 2019: 306). Additionally, individuals seek to be consistent with their moral self-expression, this means that an individual might need to take action even if costs are greater than benefits (Taylor, 1988: 87-89; Jenkins, 1983: 536). This moral-self-expression is best understood through the ideological morphology of an individual, and not the cost benefit calculations RCTs assert are made with every decision.

Fourth, ideological analysis can explain what norms are socially prevalent and how they and their relating sanctions emerge and differ, something social RCTs fail to do. Section 2.3 addresses this by arguing that groups and organisations establish norms and practices through a process of internal debates centred around three framing tasks. Additionally, section 2.5 argued that dominant practices, including norms and sanctions, become internalised to individuals' calculations of costs and benefits by their transmission across the superstructure. Thus, studying the relationship of individuals to dominant, subordinate, or radical groups and organisations within the field of power is a more fruitful approach than attempting to establish an all-encompassing "inventory" of preferences and costs. The ideological morphologies of the groups and organisations individuals are aligned to can be used as approximation of what practices are seen as low or high risk due to their institutionalised or non-institutionalised nature and what practices are worth enacting since they advance goals as determined by ideology.

Fifth, as argued in the previous chapter, when or why a group or organisation seeks to capture power is a function of its ideological morphology and is not based on objective rationality. As chapter six shows, not all groups and organisation seek to capture power even if the costs are low and opportunities present.

Finally, the permeability of concepts between different ideological morphologies explains the collaboration and solidarity of individuals with each other better than the loosely defined "charisma" which is insufficient to lead to mobilisation on its own. It is the resonance of concepts which leads to the conversion of adherents, bystanders, and potentially opponents.

4.2.3 Coleman's RCT

The weaknesses of RCTs and its focus on an individual (micro) level of analysis has meant that those who rely on RCTs to explain social movements and revolutions remain a minority (Opp, 2013: 1) and that the various theories are treated with suspicion by other researchers (Rutar, 2019: 298). However, as supporters of RCTs correctly argue, it remains a critical theory in the toolbox of researchers as it provides a method for connecting micro variables (individual disposition, perceived costs and opportunities, expected success) to macro-outcomes (collective action, social movements, revolutions) (Opp, 2013: 4; Aya, 2001: 143). RCT, and to a lesser extent, RM, is therefore at the forefront of theories which do not substitute macro indicators for causal analysis, an error central to deprivation and structural theories. It is for this reason that social movement researchers and revolutionary theorists continue to implicitly integrate concepts advocated by RCTs into their analysis (Rutar, 2019: 304).



Figure 3 - Illustration of the macro-micro link or "Coleman's boat"

The prime example of how RCT helps solve the micro-macro problem of collective behaviour is found is the work of Coleman (1990). Coleman argues that collective behaviour is based on a rational transfer of control over one's actions to others (Coleman 1990: 198). An individual may transfer control to a crowd, a leader, or simply revoke control from a group or organisation without vesting it anywhere else. Individuals transfer control to others due to the costs associated with remaining knowledgeable, acquiring expertise, or becoming a leader (Coleman, 1990: 234). Transferring control is seen as a process in which an individual first revokes control, assesses available contingencies, referred to as "milling" (Coleman, 1990: 224), and then potentially chooses to vest that control elsewhere or keep it revoked. The central question to rationality,

Coleman asserts, is not the calculation of costs and benefits at every decision, but understanding when this transfer of control occurs, and to who the transfer takes place (Coleman, 1990: 201).

Coleman convincingly shows how transfers of control take place in examples of fire escapes, bank and stock market panics, fads, protests, and revolutions. Particularly relevant is his example of fire escapes. Coleman finds that fire drills establish a normative practice inhibiting running due to the social sanctions it creates enabling an orderly exit (Coleman, 1990: 209). He also notes that the presence of an audible and visible individual on stage can capture the control of those looking to escape and encourage a safe exit for all (Coleman, 1990: 214-215). He concludes that,

> the greater the heterogeneity in the distribution of attention (or power) in a crowd, the more likely it is that control will be transferred in a way that makes it to someone's interest not to run- and the more likely that this example will be followed, leading to an orderly exit. (Coleman, 1990: 215).

Colemans observations reinforce two arguments that have been made thus far. First, normative practices are indicative of probable outcomes. This assessment is shared by deprivation theories which tie normative practices to “official dogmas” (Davies, 1962: 16). However, neither Coleman’s model or deprivation theories present a method in which normative practices, or “official dogma” can be understood. Ideological analysis overcomes this hurdle since, as argued in section 2.5, what constitutes normative practices is best determined by studying the ideologies of dominant groups and organisations who through their control of the means of material production can enforce preferred practices through the superstructure.

Second, Coleman’s example shows how audible and visible groups and organisations with radical decontestations of concepts could, during unsettled times, capture control of those looking to “escape” unsettledness and coordinate their collective behaviour (Ruab et al., 2011: 6) to generate the outcome they would prefer. The presence of such groups and organisations encourages individuals to transfer control away from dominant groups and organisations to radical ones. This reinforces the argument that the availability

of audible and visible groups and organisation is indicative of whether or not the revolutionary process proceeds from the pre-revolutionary situation to revolutionary window. However, as Coleman points out, the availability of too many alternatives may lead to confusion and inaction as the distribution of attention is more equal (Coleman, 1990: 215).

When it comes to protests and revolutions, Coleman argues that the process is more complicated than situations in which the structure of rewards in inherent such as escaping with your life in a fire (Coleman, 1990: 203). In protests and revolutions, individuals transfer or withdraw control when there is an increased belief that change will be successful or at least that attempts at change will not be punished (Coleman, 1990: 485). In a protest, this can be the formation of a crowd with similar interests. Such a crowd facilitates the withdrawal of control from authorities (Coleman, 1990: 223).

Coleman argues that a withdrawal of control does not always mean vesting them elsewhere. Rather a full transfer of control happens only if the impact of the existing authorities' policies negatively impacts an individual's interests "as he defines them" (Coleman, 1990: 489). Coleman also argues that the process of withdrawing and revesting control is punctuated by a period of "milling" in which individuals try to find those with common sentiments (Coleman, 1990: 223). If such sentiment is found, individuals will withdraw the right of control from authorities and vest them into the small set of activists who have already withdrawn rights of control (Coleman, 1990: 489). Withdrawing control without vesting it elsewhere, Coleman notes, can still have an impact by freeing others to do the same or even permit them to actively join a revolution (Coleman, 1990: 496).

Again, Coleman's arguments support another two key arguments forwarded by this dissertation. First, although Coleman does not explain how to identify "similar interest", his acknowledgment that it triggers the withdrawal of control reinforces the argument that ideological permeability enables mobilisation.

Second, the process of milling bolsters the description of the revolutionary window where competing groups and organisations "feel each other out, try their strength and solidarity, build their confidence or lose it" (Pettee, 1971:

112). Groups and organisations attempt different actions or promote different concepts to tests the availability of individuals, groups, and organisations with common sentiment. The “milling process” symbolises how individuals, groups, and organisations adjust their ideological morphologies as they grapple with new realities and appeal to each other. This adjustment, however, is constrained by the already existing concepts found within an ideological morphology.

While Coleman’s model is robust, it also suffers from three important weaknesses. First, like other RCTs, Coleman inadequately explains how to determine the interest of actors or how these interests are formed and ranked. Therefore, Coleman cannot explain what type of macro changes lead to a reaction at the micro level (line 1 in Figure 3). This problem is dealt with more thoroughly in the following section.

Second, Coleman’s qualification of “common interest” is not enough to explain who, or more accurately, which group or organisation, an individual vests control with and therefore which practices they will carry out. As argued in the previous chapter, groups and organisations compete with one another over access to resources including followers. Therefore, Coleman’s model cannot predict what the micro-outcomes will be (line 2 in Figure 3).

Finally, it is wrong to assume that any situation contains an inherent structure of rewards. Even self-preservation, which is often assumed as the most basic and inherent of rewards, must be understood normatively or else the actions of suicide bombers would be inexplicable. As argued previously, what is or is not considered normative is a function of ideology. Therefore, the probability of bank and stock market panics must be based on a normative acceptance of the value and function of money which needs to be explained through the existence of a dominant ideology which preferences market relations. Individuals, groups, and organisation which reject such norms will display actions that contradict what can be expected if a inherent structure of rewards is assumed. For example, the CNT’s ideology rejected market relations and ignored banks as a field of contestation throughout the Spanish Civil War and Revolution (Alexander, 1999: 39-40). A CNT member may thus take pleasure in the collapse of the banking system and see it as a validation of their beliefs instead of participating in a run on the bank.

4.2.4 Advantages of ideological analysis

Ideological analysis improves the macro-micro link in several ways. First, whether or not an individual reacts to changes in macro conditions (line 1 in Figure 3) can be explained by the ideological morphology of an individual and their subscription to dominant, subordinate, or radical groups and organisations within the field of power. For example, an individual who has integrated dominant concepts within their ideological morphology may, following challenges to normative practices, reconstruct their ideological morphology in a way that continues to reinforce their acquiescence to dominant groups and organisations.

Second, ideological analysis can use the concept of permeability to predict which group or organisation an individual re-vests control with (line 2 in Figure 3). The strength of predictability is aided by the concept of a field of power which can be used to map the availability of subordinate and radical concepts which individuals can reorient around during the milling process and across the other phases of the revolution. Finally, resultant macro-outcomes (line 3) can be determined by analysing the ideological morphologies (goals, methods, practices) of the group and organisation which individuals vest their control with. The above demonstrate how ideological analysis improves RCTs, while, like RCTs, overcomes the problematic of using macro indicators instead of causal analysis.

The brief account of RCTs provided above identified that the critical weakness in all these theories is that they do not explain how interest or preferences are organised, can be identified, or studied. The method of ideological analysis developed in the previous chapter explains how individuals, groups, and organisations develop their interests and preferences through the process of sense making and framing to build an ideological morphology. This ideological morphology is divided into core, adjacent, and periphery concepts, which help explain the priority of preferences and how they are organised or change.

Despite this critical weakness, RCTs still poses some important strengths. RCTs' emphasis on agency shows that it is the action of individuals, groups, and organisations, which constitute structure and events (Aya, 2001: 149). RCTs also

explain how the cost associated with making individual decisions sees power vested in others (Coleman, 1990, 199). The model of withdrawing right of control before vesting it elsewhere is congruent with the four-stage model of revolution, especially the revolutionary window identifiable by the presence of negative demands. It is once the rights of control have been withdrawn that individuals begin to seek alternative decontestations of concepts or to integrate new concepts into their ideological morphology. RCTs, even if unintentionally, show that ideologies play a critical role in the process of revolutions by providing normative behaviours and radical alternatives.

4.3 Subordinating Resource Mobilisation to ideology

This section critiques Resource Mobilisation Theory (RM) focusing on the canonical work of Charles Tilly (1978). RM asserts that any realistic study of SMs should focus on the resources available to groups and the probability that these resources will be delivered when needed (Tilly, 1978: 78). According to RM, it is the availability of resources which provides groups and organisation with the capacity to mobilise and conditions (constrains or enables) the form mobilisation will take (Bell, 2001: 190). Resources are thus seen as a prerequisite for the mobilisation of groups and organisation since the absence of resource would negate any interest and opportunity for mobilisation.

RM theories classify resources as tangible, such as money, facilities, arms, tools of communication, and intangible, such as volunteer time, and skills and know how (Jenkins, 1983: 533). The resources available to groups and organisations are not limited to what they directly possess but extend to external resources available through alliances (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1213). RM theorists argue that there is a direct relationship between how much control of resources a group or organisation has acquired or “stocked up” and its ability to mobilise when the opportunity presents itself (Tilly, 1978: 141).

RMs relevance has been “undiminished” (Edwards et al., 2019: 79) since its emergence as a theoretical perspective. This is as the availability of resources is critical to the mobilisation of both contenders and defenders and, as explained in section 2.5, allows for the reproduction of domination. This section first identifies three strengths within RM, including its concretisation of contention,

its view of revolutions and social movements as dynamic processes, and affirming that what groups and organisations were doing in the past matter to and in revolutions. The section then addresses RM's weaknesses and illustrates how they are remedied by ideological analysis.

The overarching argument this section presents is that, while resources and how they are mobilised are critical to the revolutionary process, it is the ideological morphology of a group or organisation which determines what resources are sought out and acquired, and when and to what end these resources are mobilised. As such, convincingly using resource mobilisation to explain revolutions first requires understanding how ideology enables and constraints that mobilisation.

4.3.1 The strengths of RM

RM's first strength is that it concretises and reinforces the revolutionary process argued for in the previous chapter by using the resources available to groups and organisation to explain outcomes. As has been consistently argued, revolutions, like wars, are waged by groups and organisations where access to resources, tangible or otherwise, can determine the outcome. Section 3.4 argued that a transitional stage of a revolution is when contenders or coalitions of contenders advance exclusive alternative claims to power over the government or sections of a territory and its resources. To be credible, any alternative claim to power must be "backed up" by the resources necessary to enforce it. Unlike a war, these resources do not need to be military in nature, such as arms, soldiers, supply lines (although they can be), but can be intangible such as the withdrawal of control from dominant groups and organisations and its re-vestment in radical ones providing legitimacy as discussed in the previous section.

Groups and organisation are less likely to make alternative claims to power until they are certain they have the resources to enforce their claims. For example, the M-26-7 argued that a new leader for Cuba should be selected by various civic organisation. However, once they secured a military victory, ensuring their material superiority over dominant groups and other contenders, they argued that those "to whom more credit is due have more right to speak" (Castro, 1959: 6). As chapter five shows, the Bolshevik Party also refused to make an

alternative claim for power until they received a majority in the soviets which they viewed as signifying a transfer of resources in the form of legitimisation from the provisional government to them. The analytic use of resources has been incorporated by competing theories to explain other phases of the revolution. For example, Theda Skocpol's structuralist account of the Russian Revolution argues that control over the railroads were critical in providing an edge over competing organisations during the civil war (Skocpol, 1979: 212, 218).

While the above may seem to suggest that resources take primacy over ideology, all the organisations mentioned already had concepts within their ideological morphology which justified the capture of power. The availability of resources did not, on its own, determine if groups and organisations would make alternative claims to power, but it constrained or enabled when such claims were made and whether or not these claims were viable.

RM's second strength is that it presents social movements and revolutions as dynamic processes at the level of groups and organisation. RM argues that, within social movements and revolutions, the resources mobilised by challengers come against the resources mobilised by those attempting to maintain power as they seek to demobilise challengers (Tilly, 1978: 76). This reinforces the argument of the field of power advanced in section 2.5 and the process of revolution argued for above which highlights how the magnitude of force possessed by various groups and organisations, and how they decide to use this force, determines the process of revolution. The availability of resources is a good indication of the magnitude of this force, although, the availability of resources does not translate into their automatic use. As chapter six shows, ideological differences between the CNT and the Republic, allies during the civil war, meant that a resource advantage was wasted leading to defeat.

While RM's presentation of the conflict between challengers and dominant organisation is dynamic, they do not adequately explain how or when resources may change hand leading to a change in the equilibrium point within the field of power. This weakness is addressed more thoroughly later.

Finally, RM affirms that what groups were doing in the past is important to their role during revolutionary processes. As argued in section 3.4, it is often the same

groups and organisation present within social movements that play a role in revolutions. Thus, both the resources and the ideological morphologies these groups and organisations enter the revolutionary process with play an important role. For example, the availability of a stock of resources can translate into a shortening of the transition between stages in the four-stage process of revolution. This is as the quick deployment of resources may help monopolise the competitive space and accelerate the process in which individuals withdraw rights of control from dominant groups and vest them with competing or radical groups or organisations.

4.3.2 The weaknesses of RM

Despite these strengths, RM contains three critical weaknesses. The first weakness replicates that found within RCTs, an inadequate method of identifying the interests of groups and organisations. For example, Tilly argues that community, associations, and relations to social structures of power and production reflect average and long run interests, while a group or organisation's own articulations reflect short term interests (Tilly, 1978: 61).

Assuming interest based on social structures ignores research and historical records which shows that groups holding the same positions within the social structure can have different interests and can be influenced by different mobilised groups (Goldstone, 2001: 151-152). The previous section has shown interest, and the prioritisation of multiple interests and preference, is determined by the ideological morphologies of groups and organisation and not the position of groups and organisations in the social structure. Additionally, although the availability of resources constrains or enables the form mobilisation will take (Bell, 2001: 190), it is ideology that determines what resources a group or organisation seeks to obtain. For example, the M-26-7's belief in an armed revolution led them to seek military training and war materiel. This as opposed to the Cuban Communist Party which initially constrained itself to a strategy of "mass struggle" and sought to build resources in the form of expanding its ranks with the working class (Cushion, 2016: 106).

The second weakness of RM is that it assumes resources available to a group or organisation will be called on and used when the opportunity presents itself.

This problem is partly a result of RM's inadequate method of defining opportunity. RM borrows the language of RCTs, arguing that individuals, groups, and organisation mobilise their resources when expected costs are low and benefits high based on the repressive or facilitative action of dominant groups (Tilly, 1978: 115). RM slightly improves on RCTs by quantitatively tying the repressive abilities of dominant groups (the costs experienced by those who mobilise) to the resources available to them (Tilly, 1978: 142). A reduction of resources available to dominant groups means a reduction in their ability to coercively maintain their power. This has been identified as the critical and direct cause of revolutions for some structural theorists as section 4.5 explains.

While RM's account of costs and opportunities improves on that of RCT, it fails to identify these costs and opportunities with the ideological morphology of individual groups and organisations or changes within these ideological morphologies. Therefore, RM cannot explain why groups and organisations may elect to mobilise their resources or not when repressive costs are absent. As chapter six shows, the CNT chose against mobilising to make alternative claims on power despite having a material advantage. Additionally, both Republican forces and the CNT benefited from resource advantages over their opponents. Despite this advantage, the way in which these resources were mobilised rendered them ineffective. In both cases, resource mobilisation was constrained by ideology, not the other way around. As some critics of RM have noted, this means that the strategic consideration and decisions made by groups and organisations should take priority (Jenkins, 1983: 528). Ideological analysis presents the method in which such decisions can be understood.

Since RM inadequately explains interest and opportunity, it also poorly explains when individuals and groups change their interests and decide to mobilise in opposition to groups and organisation they may have tacitly supported in the past. As such they do not account for the transfer of resources from one group to another in the form of supporters. The previous section has shown how this transfer of control occurs and argued that this transfer is a result of the permeability of ideological morphologies.

The final weakness of RM is that although it can help explain which groups have a higher chance of success, it cannot explain what these groups will do once and

if they are successful in their bid for power (Tucker, 1989: 33). For example, the Bolshevik Party's ability to effectively mobilise resources does not explain the type of government it later formed. This can only be determined by studying the ideological morphology of groups and organisation and the changes this morphology underwent throughout the revolutionary process.

While the resources available to groups and organisations is a good predictor of mobilisation (Edwards et al., 2018: 92), RM still fails at answering critical questions such as to what end do groups mobilise, or why do they not mobilise even if they possess access to the resources needed to meet their goals. This task remains that of ideological analysis.

4.4 Understanding deprivation as ideological construction

This section critiques classical and relative theories of deprivation. Both theories argue that revolutions occur due to reversals in conditions after a period of prosperity. These reversals create an expectancy gap in which declining or stagnant living conditions, or other perceived reversals, diverge from the expectation for continued improvement. This divergence leads to mobilisation and revolution.

Deprivation theories reinforce two key arguments of ideological analysis. First, deprivation theories highlight that changes in normative resource distribution, cultural resources, or practices are critical to understanding revolutions. These changes cause a sense of deprivation which spurs people into action. Second, deprivation theories acknowledge that reversals depend on the subjective understanding of individuals, groups, and organisations of their social and historical contexts (Power et al., 2020: 119). If this understanding includes readily available explanations for reversals, then mobilisation potential is blunted. These arguments have been incorporated into RCT and structural theories which agree that revolutions and SMs are emotional processes which occur when there is a sense of illegitimate overreach by the state violating a sense of fairness (Goldstone, 1991: 409; Taylor, 1989: 119). As such, the concept of deprivation remains central to the explanation of revolutions.

While deprivation theories reinforce arguments advanced in this dissertation, they do not explicitly refer to the role of ideology. This leaves at least four weaknesses unaddressed. First, deprivation theories do not advance a method which helps researchers understand what an individual's subjective understanding of their social and historical context is. Second, the theories do not adequately explain how much deprivation is needed before revolution breaks out (Wolpe, 1970: 142) as opposed to mobilisations seeking redress. While the theories argue that deprivation is result of "sharp reversals" across a short period of time (Geschwender, 1968: 128) how "sharpness" can be quantified is not explained.

Third, deprivation theories do not link experienced deprivation with the mobilisation of specific groups and organisations. For example, not all groups and organisations react in the same way to stagnant or declining wages (Dudley, 2000: 79). Additionally, the theory fails to connect the portion of society experiencing a supposed deprivation with those mobilising. Thus, deprivation theories fail to explain the incongruence between those supposedly experiencing deprivation and those who mobilize (Wallis, 1975: 360, 362). The absence of such analysis means that deprivation theories substitute macro-indicators for causal analysis at the level of groups and organisations. Finally, there will always be one segment of society or another that is experiencing deprivation, especially if this is taken to be perceived (Stone, 1966: 167). Even if these groups mobilise, it does not automatically result in a revolution.

This section puts forward two arguments which show that deprivation, on its own, is a poor indicator of mobilisation and is limited in explaining the revolutionary process. First, it is the ideological morphologies of individuals, groups, and organisations which determine what is seen as deprivation. This can be approximated by looking at the normative practices encouraged by groups and organisations in the field of power and the relationship of individuals to those groups and organisations. Second, deprivation theories, even if they could define deprivation, are better at explaining when individuals may mobilise as opposed to when revolution may break out. This is because, in addition to deprivation, which creates ideological openings for revolutions, changes in the ideology of those mobilised are necessary to push the revolutionary process towards contesting power itself.

4.4.1 The classical theory of deprivation

The first, and classical, conception of deprivation theory was developed by James Davies (1962) to counter "pressure cooker" theories of revolution which argue that immiseration leads to mobilisation. In contrast to this view, classical deprivation theory argues that revolutions do not break out if there is a consistent sense of deprivation or if that deprivation seems inevitable (Davies, 1962: 7). During such times, individuals are preoccupied with survival, which stands in the way of building a consensus on joint political action (Davies, 1962: 7). Revolutions happen once objective factors such as economic and social development are increasing and suffer a sudden reversal (Davies, 1962: 6). These sudden reversals, Davies argues, leads to "a mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality" where "the actual state of socio-economic development is less significant than the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and must continue in the future" (Davies, 1962: 6).

Davies argues that "a mental state of anxiety", however, is not enough on its own. Even if such a state exists, the existence of "official dogma" (Davies, 1962: 16) can blunt this anxiety and the development of a revolution. As an example, Davies explains how the "belief in individual hard work, self-resilience, and the promise of success" (Davies, 1962: 16) impeded the development of a revolutionary situation in the United States during the 1930s despite sudden and sharp reversals in objective conditions. This means that the notion of deprivation can only be useful if the state of mind of people and their adoption or avoidance of dogma can be assessed (Davies, 1962: 18).

Contemporary research has partially verified Davie's formulation. For example, deprivation-based mobilisation has also been found to be conservative in nature as opposed to radical (Varaine, 2018:264-266), validating Davies' emphasis on the role of "official dogma". Ideological analysis supports this finding. Individuals, groups, and organisations which subscribe to the dominant ideology, or "official dogma" are more likely to interpret deprivation based on the concepts found within the ideological morphology of dominant groups. These interpretations result in an enlargement, a change in proportionality, of conservative elements within these morphologies – a "doubling down" since

competing decontestations can be framed as the cause of the deprivation. For example, Chapter six shows how conservative groups and organisations were able to direct blame at Republicans for increases in deprivation during the revolutionary window of the Spanish Revolution and Civil War by reinforcing dominant concepts.

Despite the validity of Davies' emphasis on official dogma, he does not explain how the absence of such dogma translates into revolution or the development of an anti-dogma. The classical formulation of deprivation theory, therefore, does not help answer the questions of how deprivation leads to radical mobilisation, or who is more likely to mobilise.

RM researcher combined with ideological analysis can close one of these gaps. RM researchers have found, similar to Davies' assertion, that SMs are more likely to occur when there is an overall increase in the societal level of resources (Edwards et al., 2018: 92). This suggests that an overall increase in the societal level of resources translates (although disproportionately) into an increase in the resources of radical groups and organisations enabling them to mobilise. This mobilisation results in an increased proliferation of radical concepts and decontestations.

The availability of alternative or radical decontestations increases the likely hood of radical decontestations of concepts (anti-dogma) boosting the probability that groups and organisations will advance the revolutionary process. For example, the Bolshevik Party' successful penetration of the working class between 1905 and 1914 enabled them to mobilise workers as war time deprivations set in. Therefore, as argued in section 3.2, the changes in ideological morphology which occur "behind the scenes" (Fominaya, 2015: 149) are as important to the process of revolution as the ideologies held by groups and organisations within them.

While this better explains how deprivation leads to mobilisation, especially revolutionary mobilisation, it does not yet explain who will mobilise. A solution to this problem is attempted by those advocating for the usefulness of relative deprivation.

4.4.2 Relative deprivation

Relative deprivation theories expand on the sense of a “mental state of anxiety” advanced by the classical version and makes it the central feature of the theory. Removing the link with objective (economic) conditions, relative deprivation depends on an “actors' interpretations of the situation, of the meanings with which they endow social circumstances and a movement's message” (Wallis, 1975: 361). Due to its broader, and more interpretive scope, relative deprivation can be classified across different categories such as material deprivation, a perceived decline in status, failures of others to meet expected relationship obligations, a perceived fall in self or group worth, or psychic, where a group experiences a loss in their ability to make sense of events around them (Allan, 1974: 298). While this improves on the overly mechanical nature of classical deprivation theory, it still does not answer the questions of how much deprivation is needed before mobilisation can be expected. Additionally, even though the theory draws a more direct relationship between those subjectively experiencing deprivation and those who mobilise, the removal of objective factors re-opens the question of how can we tell if relative deprivation is being experienced?

Section 3.3 has argued that feelings of deprivation can be tied to disruptions of normative practices. Two examples reinforce this argument. Researchers have noted that increased wealth generated by economic growth in developing countries transforms the delivery of services and amenities such as power supply, garbage collection, functioning sewage systems, and create new consumption patterns and an understanding of “urban rights”. These goods and services become internalised within the ideological morphology of individuals as “entitlements”. In this way, the removal or disruption of these entitlements become a source of grievances, demands, and desires (Bayat, 2017: 121-126). While these issues seem “practical” they are embedded in an ideological conception of the state as a provider of goods or services and a maintainer of a certain quality of life. A failure to deliver these goods and services is thus seen as a divergence from the ideological concepts which justifiy continued support to current power distribution. Critical here is that it is specifically that these changes have practical impact on the masses, that is they disrupt normative practices, which possess them with revolutionary potential.

A similar example can be found in the Russian Revolution of 1917. The nationalist fervour which quelled labour disputes slowly eroded as the military losses of the war increased. The increased production demands placed on urban workers to meet the requirements of the war effort quickly transformed their outlook. Trotsky (2017) generalises this process into a theory of revolution saying that:

> The swift changes of mass views and moods in an epoch of revolution … derive, not from the flexibility and mobility of man's mind, but just the opposite, from its deep conservatism. The chronic lag of ideas and relations behind new objective conditions, right up to the moment when the latter crash over people in the form of a catastrophe, is what creates in a period of revolution that leaping movement of ideas and passions which seems to the police mind a mere result of the activities of "demagogues." (Trotsky, 2017: xvi).

Trotsky, however, argues that for this "leaping movement of ideas" to become a revolutionary movement requires changes within the ideological morphology of the masses. This can happen when there is a political program guiding the masses (Trotsky, 2017: xvi). In other words, a political program which presents alternative decontestations.

Critics of relative deprivation theory agree with Trotsky, rightfully arguing that "feelings of relative deprivation or frustration do not necessarily evoke agreement with the goals of a movement which pretends to remedy these feelings: goals have to be perceived as instrumental to the elimination of these feelings" (Klandermans, 1984: 597; see also Wallis, 1975: 363). Therefore, to create mobilisation, a process of collective definition is needed where the source of deprivation and the best way it can be dealt with is considered (Blumer, 1971: 301; McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1214). Thus, deprivation becomes relevant to individuals only in so far as those experiencing deprivation enter into the process of collective definition (Blumer, 1971: 305). It is through this process of collective definition and not social position (as argued by RM) that determines who is mobilised (Blumer, 1971: 298).

It is thus useful to think of the link between deprivation and mobilisation as a multi stage process similar to the one presented in Figure 3. Not only does the ideological morphology of individuals, groups, and organisations determine what

is subjectively perceived as deprivation, but their participation in processes of collective definition determines how they react to this deprivation. Chapter two and three have shown how the debate and deliberation inherent to framing tasks undertaken by groups and organisations constitutes such a process of collective definition. Through these framing processes, groups and organisations become the sites around which social problem are identified, grievances legitimized, individuals mobilised, and plans of action thought up and carried out (Blumer, 1971: 301; Aya, 1979: 76-77; Jenkins, 1983: 530). The concepts generated and promoted by these groups and organisations proliferate through the field of power entering the culture. As such, they become resources for individuals to draw on when normative constructs are denied or questioned by reality (Allan, 1974: 299).

Since deprivation theories do not comment on the availability of alternative conceptual decontestations, their usefulness is, at best, limited to explaining how deprivation leads to mobilisation, pre-revolutionary unsettledness, not any challenges to power. In other words, deprivation can only be used to explain the movement represented by line 1 in Figure 3 a withdrawal of control. It is only if this control is vested in radical groups, indicating a transfer of resources away from dominant groups, that a revolutionary process can progress to its further stages.

To effectively argue that deprivation leads to revolution therefore requires the integration of ideology in two ways. First, deprivation itself must be recognised as a product of the interaction between the ideological morphology held by individuals, groups, and normative practices. Second, deprivation must be linked to the availability or absence of proliferated alternative and radical decontestations. Absent this understanding of ideology, deprivation theories cannot but substitute macro-indicators for causal analysis. Like the two theories discussed before it, deprivation theories remain incomplete and unable to explain revolutions as effectively as ideological analysis.

4.5 Breaking structure down

This final section critiques structural theories of revolution. Structural theories argue that revolutions happen when changes in macro-economic variables such

as population, food supplies, modernisation, or success or failure in war are constrained by the social structure of a country such as class, power, and resource distribution. According to structuralists, the determining factor of revolution is thus not change, but whether or not a specific social structure can accommodate change.

Structural theorists have become the dominant tool of analysing revolutions following the publication of Theda Skocpol's canonical *States and Social Revolutions* (1979). For example, Joseph Daher (2019) analyses the Syrian revolution of 2011 with an emphasis on how the "patrimonial" structure of the state and its global economic position clashed with the social structure of the country creating a revolutionary situation. This mimics, even if unintentionally, Skocpol's later work on revolutions in "third world" countries where she argues that specific types of regimes are more likely to result in revolution including those which are "neo-patrimonial" or reflect "sultanistic dictatorships" (Goodwin and Skocpol, 1989: 498).

While Skocpol's 1979 work has been thoroughly criticised, attempts to overcome identified weaknesses, particularly by "fourth generation" theorists, have recreated the false structure-agency dichotomy found within her work. Skocpol's formulation is worth engaging with because of these failures and because of her explicit opposition to the use of ideology to explain the process of revolutions.

This section first assesses Skocpol's structural approach before moving on to address the failure of "fourth generation" theorists to remedy weaknesses in structural theories. The section argues that structural factors are themselves shaped by the ideologically driven actions of groups and organisations. There can therefore be no priority between either.

4.5.1 Assessing the structural approach

Skocpol's structural theory can be summarised as a "nonvoluntarist, structural perspective" (Skocpol, 1979: 14) which focuses on "the institutionally determined situations and relations of groups within society and upon the interrelations of societies within world-historically developing international structures" (Skocpol, 1979: 18) and how the interaction of these two variables

can lead to a “collapse or incapacitation of central administrative and military machineries” (Skocpol, 1976: 178). Skocpol argues that it is only after a state breakdown has occurred that “politically powerful and mobilized groups” (Skocpol, 1979: 32), such as peasants, begin to play a role in revolutions. This is as “even after great loss of legitimacy has occurred, a state can remain quite stable - and certainly invulnerable to internal mass-based revolts - especially if its coercive organizations remain coherent and effective” (Skocpol, 1979: 32). Since groups and organisation play a role only after state breakdown has occurred, Skocpol concludes that revolutions “happen” and are not made (Skocpol, 1979: 18).

Skocpol draws on the examples of the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions to highlight how intensified global competition and war (the interrelations of societies within world-historically developing international structures) refracted through the class structures of society (the institutionally determined situations and relations of groups within society) to create state breakdown. She argues that the interaction of the internal social structure of those countries and international pressures not only determined that a revolution would break out but also the type of new regime that emerged afterwards (Skocpol, 1979: 18). Thus, according to Skocpol, both the emergence of revolutions and outcomes are pre-determined by the friction caused between internal structures and international pressures.

Skocpol also argues that although ideologies are necessary ingredients in revolutions, as they encourage individuals to work together, mobilise the masses who become crucial resources for politico-military struggles, and provide justifications to achieve political goals, they remain constrained by structural conditions and suffer rapid change during revolutions (Skocpol, 1979: 170). Thus, ideologies cannot be seen as predictive, especially since the regimes that emerge after a revolution are significantly different from what organisations originally aspired to institute (Skocpol, 1979: 170-171).

There are three main weaknesses of Skocpol’s approach. First, as with RM, the interest of groups and organisations is assumed based on their position in the social structure. However, there are numerous examples of individuals within the same social group participating in different ways within the same event. For

example, Russian peasants mobilised to fight in Red, White, and "green" armies. The Parisian workers fought on the barricades and in the National Guard during the revolution of 1848 (Goldstone, 2001: 151-152). This shows how mobilisation is competitive and can result in diametrically opposite actions from individuals belonging to the same social position. As argued above, the ideological morphologies of groups and organisation is a better indication of the interests and preferences of individuals, groups, and organisations that their social position.

Furthermore, Skocpol focuses on the existence of groups and organisations with high levels of solidarity and autonomy from the state (Skocpol, 1979: 115) as a condition of revolution. However, such groups do not always exist to take advantage of a crisis but can emerge from one. Skocpol herself points out how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organised peasants in an autonomous way to press redistributive demands. Even when they exist, such autonomous groups do not represent haphazard "historically specific institutional arrangements" (Skocpol, 1979: 116), but groups with specific ideologies and goals which have been successfully recreated across time. In other words, groups and organisations which have managed to institutionalise themselves. For example, the Russian peasant practice of redistributing land amongst members of a commune is a central feature of their ideological morphology. It is this feature, and the peasant's ability to maintain it despite state attempts to overcome this practice, which brought the peasants out against the Tsar. Without this ideological feature, the peasants would have no reason to take advantage of a state collapse. Their "historically specific institutional arrangements" were thus ideologically informed.

The ideological morphology of the Russian Peasants not only defined, negatively, their mobilisation against the Tsar, but also their support for the Bolsheviks. As Skocpol herself argues, although peasants "resented both Red and White attempts to involve them and their resources in the Civil War, they feared … that White victories would entail the return of the landlords they had expropriated" (Skocpol, 1979: 218). This provided the Bolsheviks wish "popular preference over the whites" (Skocpol, 1979: 218). These arguments suggest, without explicitly confessing, that the behaviour of peasants is a result of the permeability between their ideologies and the ideological morphology of the

Bolshevik party. As chapter five argues, this is in fact the case. This makes ideological analysis a stronger tool for analysing revolutions than structural approaches.

The second weakness relates to explaining the behaviour of dominant groups and organisations. Here, Skocpol recreates the problem of RCTs by arguing that the participation of dominant groups and organisations, particularly the state, in projects of modernisation and war is a rational response to international pressures. However, the participation of states in these projects is itself ideologically driven. For example, the Tsar's project of modernisation and Imperial Russia's participation in the First World War was based on the Tsar's desire for Russia to be competitive with other European countries. In other words, the Tsar chose to participate in a game of global competition. It is only after the acceptance of the rules of this game that outcomes can be said to be consistent with self-preservation, but the Tsar could have chosen to maintain an isolated empire with a moderate rate of modernisation and diversified foreign investment avoiding war altogether. Thus, the Tsar's participation in global competition itself must be understood ideologically.

Furthermore, Skocpol and other structural theorists, argue that a state always acts in a way to re-impose obedience and preserve itself, regardless of its ideology (Amann, 1962: 43-44). However, the way in which a state preserves itself, whether it leans on repression, co-optation, compromise, or if it moves to protect itself at all, depends on its ideology. For example, the Iranian revolution of 1976 was noted for the Shah's reluctance in mobilising the coercive apparatuses of the state which were firmly intact during the revolution (Keddie, 1995: 15-16). During the Cuban revolution, Bautista's forces remained intact enough that the M-26-7 feared the army might stage a coup after Bautista was driven from the country by them (Cushion, 2016: 197). These examples do not only show that the actions of dominant groups and revolutions which lead to state collapse need to be understood ideologically, but that state collapse is not a central cause of revolutions at all.

Third, dismissing ideology as having no casual impact or explanatory value because outcomes differ from intentions can only be done if an ideology is perceived as constant throughout the revolutionary process. As has been argued

in this dissertation and by others, the ideologies of groups and organisations change and evolve across the different phases of revolutions (Goldstone, 1991: 406). It is subject to "compromises, concessions, trade-offs, deference to influence, response to power, and judgments of what may be workable" (Blumer, 1971: 304) all of which impact the final outcome of a revolution. Ideologies are thus subject to "mid-course" adjustments (Gurr and Goldstone, 1991: 341). While Skocpol's stance on the impact of ideology on the outcome of revolutions softened following critique (Skocpol, 1985: 86-87), she maintained the position that ideology cannot explain the beginning of revolutions. Thus, she continues to prioritise structural factors as the determining factor in the actions of groups and organisations.

The previous chapters identified three critical junctures during the four-stages of revolution in the revolutionary process where the ideology of groups and organisations may change. The fact that ideologies change during revolutions does not remove their explanatory efficacy, but requires a more applicable method to incorporate such changes. Ideological analysis is that method.

Even without this method, Skocpol herself implicitly agrees that ideology plays a role in determining the outcome of revolution. For example, she argues that "world-historically available models" (Skocpol, 1979: 234) explain differences in outcome between the French and Russian revolution. In France, unlike in Russia, no mass-mobilising party could consolidate state power because "domestic socioeconomic structures favoured market-oriented economic development" (Skocpol, 1979: 234). In other words, "domestic socioeconomic structures", or revolutionary groups and organisations, possessed an ideological morphology, which favoured market-oriented economic development which was, and continues to be, the globally dominant ideology.

4.5.2 The failures of fourth generation theories

"Fourth Generation" theories have attempted to address the weaknesses left by Skocpol. Fourth generation theories abandoned the search for a set number of causes of revolution in favour for a conjunctural process-based theory. Revolutions happen, they argue, when there is a conjuncture of state breakdown, elite alienation, and mass mobilisation, each which can be caused

by several factors (Goldstone, 1995: 44-45). As mentioned in chapter one, “fourth generation” theorists attempt to integrate “revolutionary leadership, ideology, and identification” (Goldstone, 2001: 139) into the study of revolutions arguing that “the shape and outcome of that struggle is often determined only in the course of the revolutionary conflict itself” (Goldstone, 2001: 152). Finally, fourth generation theorists argue for a process approach to revolution as explained in section 3.2.

Despite these attempts at improving on structural theories, fourth generation theories fail to meet their objective of overcoming the “false dilemma” between material and ideological factors (Goldstone, 1991b: 446) and recreate the structure-agency dichotomy found within structural theories in two ways. First, they maintain that ideology, leadership, and identification come into play and gain importance only after a “state’s fiscal and political woes reduce its authority to nill” (Goldstone, 1991: 411). This collapse can be promoted by the existence of oppositional ideologies but are produced by structural factors (Goldstone, 1991: 405; Goldstone, 1995: 187; Goldstone, 1991b: 44). Thus, it is only after this collapse that other elements rush in to fill a void (Jones, 1992: 876).

Second, fourth generation theories undermine the ideological innovation groups and organisations are capable of, replicating Freeden’s error of arguing that groups and organisations only simplify, make user-friendly, internally harmonize, and assertively energize, and overblow aspects of an ideology (Freeden, 2006: 18). For example, fourth generation theorists argue that “any cultural framework may provide the basis for revolutionary or antirevolutionary ideologies” (Goldstone, 2001: 155). It is the role of groups and organisation to “manipulate perceptions by relating their actions and current conditions to existing cultural frameworks and to carefully constructed ideologies” (Goldstone, 2001: 155). This argument is taken to the extreme by arguing that “an ideology needs a well-organized carrier capable of interpreting that ideology for a mass audience" (Goldstone, 1991b: 412). Therefore, ideology is taken as pre-existing and exogenous to groups and organisations which are seen as nothing but a vessel for their transmission. However, as argued in chapter two, groups and organisations are the owners of ideologies and are sites in which

ideologies are produced and maintained (Benford and Snow, 2000: 613; Gillian, 2008: 253).

Contrary to what structuralists and fourth generation theorists argue, groups and organisations and the fault lines on which they fight do not emerge after a collapse, but exist well before revolutionary situations begin (Aya, 1979: 72). Indeed, the need for an organisation, its structure, and its objectives are themselves ideologically formulated and emerge almost simultaneously. There is thus no sequential order of a state collapse followed by the emergence of groups, which is then followed by the adoption of an ideology to manipulate neutral bystanders. Revolutions are themselves clashes of ideological individuals, groups, and organisations.

Both structural and fourth generation theories of revolution suffer from ignoring or underrepresenting the role of ideology in revolutions. While fourth generation theories improve on structural theories by presenting revolution as a process, thus arguing against structure determining both the onset and outcome of revolution, they still wrongfully restrict their explanation of state breakdown to structural factors. Ideological analysis shows how structural factors are themselves ideologically shaped and occur due to the conscious decisions of dominant, subordinate, and radical groups and the individuals. The ideological nature of structural factors therefore requires a historical look at the groups and organisations within a field of power and how their ideologies enable and constrain practice. A task this dissertation undertakes for the Russian and Spanish Revolutions in the following two chapters.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter critiqued rational choice, resource mobilisation, deprivation, and structural theories of revolution. The critiques showed how each of these theories contribute to the persistence of the main problematics in the field of revolutionary studies and illustrated how ideological analysis overcomes these issues. While these theories suffer major weaknesses, it was shown how their strengths contribute to the arguments advanced by this dissertation.

RCT was critiqued for its inability to adequately identify interest or preference. But it was commended for its emphasis on the agency of actors, and a model which highlighted withdrawal and vesting of control. RM's strength was identified as providing concrete ways to identify the viability of alternative claims to power but criticised for inadequately explaining when and how groups and organisations mobilise their resources.

Deprivation and structural theories were both criticised for promoting an automatic relationship between deprivation or state breakdown and the development of revolution. However, their emphasis on material changes provided an opportunity to tie the role of dominant ideologies with generalised changes in practice to explain why transfer of control may take place.

The following section applies ideological analysis to two historical case studies. The cases illustrate how ideological analysis generates a richer reading of revolution than RCT, RM, deprivation, and structural theories. Chapter five, on the Russian Revolution of 1917 explains the development of the revolutionary situation through the ideological morphology of the Bolshevik Party. Chapter six focuses on the actions of the CNT to explain the revolutionary window and revolutionary situation of the Spanish Civil War and Revolution.

Section Two: Case Studies

Chapter 5 Explaining the Russian revolutionary situation of 1917 as conceptual conflict

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapters developed a method in which the ideologies of groups and organisations can be used to study the process of revolution. Ideologies were defined as constellations of core, adjacent, and periphery concepts which form an ideological morphology. Concepts within a morphology interact with and mutually define each other so that their meaning changes if any of the concepts alter (Freeden, 1996: 67). In addition to their priority (position as core, adjacent, or periphery), concepts within a morphology also relate to each other based on their proximity, permeability, and proportionality (Freeden, 2003: 60-66).

Groups and organisations determine which concepts are admitted into their ideological morphology, and the relationship of these concepts, through interpretive discussion and debate relating to diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing (Benford and Snow, 2000: 615). This makes groups and organisation owners of their ideologies (Schein, 1984: 5) and sites where ideologies are produced and maintained (Benford and Snow, 2000: 613; Gillian, 2008: 253). The ideological morphologies of groups and organisations can be deduced by studying the writings, speeches, and debates conducted by active members of a group or organisation including early joiners, leaders, creators, or its cadre.

Ideologies, and the groups and organisations which “own” them, interact with each other across a field of power organised into dominant, subordinate, and radical value systems (Abercrombie and Turner, 1978: 158). Changes in the ideologies of any group and organisation can trigger a revolution if these changes cascade through the field of power. This is most likely to happen when normative practices are disturbed by changes in the dominant ideology or challenges from radical groups and organisations. These changes in the field of power create the ideological openings necessary for revolutions. These openings do not automatically result in revolutions but can trigger social movements which have the potential of driving the revolutionary process forward.

The relationship between revolutions and social movements was clarified with a four-stage process of revolution consisting of pre-revolution, revolutionary window, revolutionary situation, and institutionalisation. The four-stage process showed how revolutions represent open conflicts between groups and organisations and demarcates when changes in the ideology of groups and organisation are expected. It is the ideology of the groups and organisations involved in this conflict, and how these ideologies change, which determines how each revolution unfolds. This preserves the uniqueness of each revolution while highlighting the commonality within revolutionary processes. Although a group or organisation's ideology may change as it passes through the revolutionary process, the way in which these ideologies change is constrained and enabled by the concepts already present within the ideological morphology. As such, the structure of an ideology maintains continuity despite change.

It was shown that ideological analysis provides a better tool for explaining revolutions than competing theories such as rational choice, resource mobilisation, deprivation, and structural theories of revolution. This is because ideological analysis addresses the three main problematics which other theories continue to reproduce. This includes, poorly defining interest and ranking competing preferences, advocating for a false structure/agency dichotomy, and substituting macro-economic and class markers for causal analysis. While other theories make important contributions to the field of revolution studies, this dissertation has demonstrated that they are incomplete without explicitly accounting for the ideological morphologies of individuals, groups, and organisations. This is as it is the ideology of individuals, groups, and organisations which determines what is seen as rational, what deprivation justifies mobilisation, what resources are gathered, when those resources are mobilised, and shapes the creation of structural factors.

The next two chapters apply ideological analysis to specific phases of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Spanish Revolution and Civil War of 1936. The case studies further the central argument of this dissertation, that ideological analysis is better suited at explaining revolution than competing theories. The chapters focus on the ideologies of the Bolshevik Party and the CNT, who, as radical groups, challenge dominant groups' claim to power and seek to replace dominant concepts with concepts found within their ideological morphologies.

The case studies contextualise the ideologies of these radical organisations by situating it within their relationships to the ideologies of dominant and subordinate groups and organisations. Concepts within the ideological morphologies of these radical organisations are also contextualised historically by explaining how internal debates have led to their integration within the phase-specific iteration of the ideology. In addition to showing how ideologies impact the process of revolution, the cases also reinforce the four-stage process of revolution, especially by providing evidence for how revolutions overlap with or occur alongside mass protests, civil wars, coup d'états, and rebellions (Goldstone, Gurr, and Moshiri, 1991; Allinson, 2019: 2; Lawson, 2016: 107; Beck and Ritter, 2021: 5; Goldstone, 1991: 407).

This chapter focuses on the revolutionary situation phase of the 1917 Russian Revolution during which various contenders, or coalitions of contenders, advanced exclusive alternative claims to the control over the government (as defined in section 3.4). This period stretched from the first transfer of power from the Tsar to the Provisional Government in February 1917 and extends until the end of the Civil War in early 1921 where the Bolsheviks were able to secure their claim to power.

The revolutionary situation contained within it two transfers of power, a civil war, a collapse of a dominant coalition, several uprisings, and intersected with the First World War. These complexities means that the Russian revolution cannot be simply seen as one of “dual” power where two “sides” (traditionally reduced to the Reds – Bolsheviks and Whites – counter revolutionaries) fought for control. Rather, the revolution consists of a conscious struggle between multiple groups and organisations which, at times, practiced their own sovereignty over different territories of Russia based on their ideological morphologies. This complex interaction of groups and organisations included the Bolsheviks, the Soviets, the Mensheviks, the Social-Revolutionaries (SRs), peasant communes, factory committees, and the “green armies” to name a few.

The Russian revolution has been extensively researched and there is general agreement that the revolution resulted in an authoritarian outcome in the form of a party-state contrary to the shared democratic aspirations most participants held. Despite this agreement, there remains a lack of clarity among historians on

the role the Bolsheviks played in creating this outcome. Analysis usually falls into two trends, either attributing this degeneration to factors outside the control of the Bolsheviks, or attributing it directly to the machinations of the Bolsheviks without thoroughly considering the relationship between the Bolsheviks and other groups and organisations. The later trend creates a false sense of historic inevitability, the first of tragic defeat.

This chapter eschews the above trends and presents a novel look at the Russian Revolution. It argues that the authoritarian outcome of the revolution should be attributed to changes within the Bolshevik party's ideological morphology. The transformation justifies the interpretation of the Bolsheviks as a mass democratic organisation but links the authoritarian outcome of the revolution to the changes that took place within the Bolshevik's ideological morphology as it responded to challenges within the revolutionary situation and changes in the field of power. These changes were constrained by the concepts already present within their ideology preserving continuity within the party. Before exploring these changes is detail, a closer look at the two historiographical trends through their most prominent interlocuters helps highlight their weaknesses and how ideological analysis improves on their arguments.

Neil Faulkner (2017) fits well within the first trend. Writing sympathetically about the Bolsheviks, he attributes the authoritarian outcome of the revolution to external factors but develops a contradictory argument around the role of the party. He argues that "The [October] revolution was a mass movement of the people based on participatory democracy, not a coup to set up a dictatorship" (2). This democracy, he argues, was eroded due to the Civil War which led to the near disappearance of the industrial proletariat, the core constituent of the pre-revolutionary party. This transformed the structure of the party (239) towards a bureaucracy practicing power over the de-proletarianized population as opposed to power practiced by the proletariat through the party. The bureaucracy eventually transformed into a counter-revolution led by Stalin, constrained by the "relentless external pressure of economic and military competition" (247).

While pointing to the Civil War as the cause of this bureaucratisation, Faulkner also claims that "the fundamental problem [of counter-revolution] was not that Stalin was a boorish bureaucrat. It was that the political leadership of the

emerging party-state apparatus required a boorish bureaucrat" (241). Thus, Faulkner admits that there were conscious internal changes within the party, represented by the "political leadership", that enabled the emergence of a bureaucracy. Yet Faulkner does not engage with these ideologically driven decisions effectively attributing no fault to the Bolsheviks. The ideological analysis in this chapter shines a light on this oversight and illustrated how ideologically driven decision making is better at explaining the outcome of the Russian Revolution than relying on external factors alone.

Theda Skocpol (1979) parallels Faulkner's conclusions but provides a different rationale. For Skocpol "the logic of their [the Bolshevik's] claim to state power, given the circumstances…also prompted them to begin at once to rebuild administrative and military organisations and to enforce ever more centralized discipline within the party" (214-215). The difference between Faulkner and Skocpol's interpretation is minor. For Faulkner, external conditions tragically forced changes within the party. For Skocpol, the conditions would have prompted any group or organisation towards a centralised state. While it is plausible to argue that a centralised state was the only feasible option for any party that claimed state power, it is difficult to explain why it was the Bolsheviks that accepted this task and succeeded where others have failed. In other words, this structuralist perspective cannot explain why the Bolsheviks followed the "logic" of maintaining state power (or why their logic included that at all) when the parties of the provisional government, who had similar claims, did not. This chapter accounts for these variations by studying the differences in ideological morphologies between the various groups and parties involved in the revolutionary situation.

Orlando Figes (1997) encapsulates the second historiographical trend. He argues that "what began as a people's revolution contained the seeds of its own degeneration into violence and dictatorship. The same social forces which brought about the triumph of the Bolshevik regime became its main victims" (xviii). Figes uses Lenin's insistence on the seizure of power in October, the closure of the Constituent Assembly, and the strategy of Terror used during the Civil War as examples of how the Bolshevik's successfully overcame and dominated the social forces which originally brought them to power. These

events, according to Figes, indicate planned dictatorial intent on the part of the Bolsheviks.

Figes thus emphasises the agency of the Bolsheviks and utilises their strength, embodied in Lenin, to draw a direct causal link between a stable interpretation of the Bolshevik's ideology and the outcome of the revolution. Figes' over emphasis on Bolshevik intent ignores how the actions of other groups, including the failures of the provisional government, shaped the field of power the Bolsheviks operated in. Changing dynamics were refracted within the Bolshevik's ideological morphology which also changed. This means that a straight line cannot be drawn between the Bolshevik's ideology (as a fixed conceptualisation) and the outcomes of the revolution as their ideology did not remain uniform. Pointing at a stable dictatorial intent is thus erroneous.

Accounts of the revolution which utilise specific concepts found within the Bolshevik' ideology recreate this error. For example, Robert Mayer (1997) ties the authoritarian outcome of the revolution to Lenin's "theory of class" which tied proletarian status to submission to party discipline (99, 107). Similarly, in his critique about the centrality of taking power in socialist theories of revolution, John Holloway (2019) argues that Lenin's interpretation of "scientific Marxism" negated the self-emancipatory character of Marxism making the party, not the proletariat, the emancipating vehicle of revolution practicing power over the proletariat (127-132). Like Figes' analysis, both these arguments present a sense of inevitability tying specific concepts found within the Bolshevik ideological morphology to the outcome of the revolution.

Thomas Remington (1984) escapes this sense of inevitability by focusing his analysis on the Bolshevik's ideology during the industrial reconstruction following their seizure of power. Remington convincingly argues that the Bolshevik conception of a socialist economy, called "state capitalism" in this chapter, was incompatible with the goal of building a socialist society. This is since building "state capitalism" necessitated a mobilisation which drew "the independence of the working class into its [the state's] formal authority" (12). This form of mobilisation, according to Remington, stifled the democratic impetus of workers. Remington's analysis is highly useful; however, he does not explain why the Bolsheviks continued to think that "state capitalism" was

compatible with building a socialist society despite the costs he points out. He thus erases the historical processes in which the concept of “state capitalism” came to play a central role in the party-state apparatus.

While these authors are correct in pointing to the Bolshevik’s conceptions of party discipline, consciousness (represented in the concept of “democratic centralism and the party” within this chapter), and “state capitalism”, as critical to the revolutionary process, they do not explain why these concepts came to play a disproportionate role when compared to other concepts found within the Bolshevik’s ideological morphology. This chapter explains this dominance by looking at the relationship of concepts within the ideological morphology of the Bolsheviks and how these relationships changed across the revolutionary situation to result in a dictatorial outcome. Despite the erroneous or incomplete conclusions drawn by the above historians and theoreticians, their historiographical contributions remain useful and are referenced throughout this chapter to further its own argument.

As mentioned, this chapter argues that the authoritarian outcome of the revolution was a result of changes within the Bolshevik party’s ideological morphology. Figures 4 and 5 below show how the ideological morphology of the Bolshevik party changed from the beginning of the revolutionary situation to its end. The changes can be summarised as a cannibalization of the core concept of “all power to the soviets”, a move of the adjacent concept of “the dictatorship of the proletariat” to the core, the emergence of new adjacent and periphery concepts such as “cultural development” and “market control”, and an increase in the proportionality of the adjacent concept of “state capitalism”. It is this transformation which reconciles various historical interpretations and explains how the Bolshevik’s ideological morphology enabled it to capture power on democratic lines and then constrained its development along authoritarian lines producing the party-state apparatus.



Figure 4 – The Bolshevik Party's ideological morphology at the beginning of the revolutionary situation

The chapter explains the changes within the Bolshevik's ideological morphology and its impact on the revolutionary process in three sections. Each section focuses on a set of concepts and how they impacted the strategic decisions made by the Bolsheviks and some competing groups and organisations around key historic events. The sections show how ideology enables and constrains practice and how ideological analysis is better than rational, resource mobilisation, deprivation, and structural theories of revolution.

Section 5.2 focuses on the core concepts of "socialist revolution" and "all power to the soviets", and the adjacent concept of "internationalism". These concepts differentiated the Bolsheviks from other major radical organisations, namely the Mensheviks and SRs. The section argues that this created a fundamental ideological deadlock critical to understanding the Bolshevik's ability to seize power from the provisional government during the October revolution, the collapse of the soviet (council) mode of governance, the disbandment of the Constituent Assembly (CA), and the advent of civil war. This deadlock better explains the Bolshevik's ability to mobilise for the capture and retention of power than resource mobilisation theory. It is also better at explaining the refusal of the provisional government to make self-saving decisions despite the costs better than RCTs.

Section 5.3 explains the adjacent concept of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and the core concept of “democratic centralism and the party”. The section argues that the collapse of the soviet system of governance “activated” the authoritarian elements found within these concepts. This lead to the cannibalisation of the concept of “all power to the soviets”, and moved the concept of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” from an adjacent to core position. This triggered the beginning of what would become the Bolshevik party-state apparatus. This presentation counters the inevitability presented by other historians while providing evidence that changes within the ideological morphology of groups or organisations are themselves constrained and enabled by the concepts already found within them.



Figure 5 - The Bolshevik Party’s ideological morphology at the end of the revolutionary situation

Section 5.4 focuses on the adjacent concepts of “state capitalism”, which grew in proportionality as the revolutionary situation progressed, and “cultural development”. The section argues that the emergence of these concepts completed the transformation of the Bolshevik’s ideological morphology within the revolutionary situation, including the cannibalisation of “internationalism”, resulting in a new decontestation of the concept of “socialist revolution”. These changes solidified the authoritarianism of the Bolshevik party-state. Contrary to structuralist interpretation, it is this ideological morphology which enabled the

creation of a centralised bureaucracy and not international pressures. This is as the Bolsheviks had at their disposal alternative forms of organising which would have met their needs but were excluded due to their ideological preferences.

By utilising ideological analysis, the following three sections show that it was neither factors external to the Bolsheviks, nor a fixed interpretation of their ideology which led to the emergence of an authoritarian party-state. Rather, it was the changes in the Bolshevik's ideological morphology, which was constrained and enabled by the concepts already present within it. This analysis reinforces the need to study revolutions as conceptually driven struggles between various groups and organisations.

5.2 Defining revolution through a Bolshevik lens

This section first looks at how the ideological morphology of the Bolsheviks changed at the beginning of the revolutionary situation to include the new or differently decontested core concepts of "socialist revolution" and "all power to the soviets", and the adjacent concept of "internationalism". These changes enabled the Bolsheviks to make exclusive alternative claims to power and eventually secure it despite beginning in a minority position (Carmichael, 1964: 61).

The ideological morphology of the Bolsheviks is then contrasted with that of the provisional government which is used to explain their multiple failures. The section argues that differences between these ideologies were irreconcilable and are critical to understanding the Bolshevik's seizure of power, the withdrawal of the Mensheviks and SRs from the soviet system of governance, the disbandment of the Constituent Assembly (CA), and the onset of civil war.

The section also argues that if Bolshevik's ideology did not incorporate these new concepts or altered the decontestation of older concepts at the beginning of the revolutionary situation, then it is likely that they would have endorsed the provisional government in power since February 1917. This is as the ideologies of the various radical groups would have been permeable enough to allow for collaboration and a transition of the revolutionary process towards institutionalisation.

The arguments made in this section illustrate how ideology precedes resource mobilisation as it determines what resources become available (are transferred) to groups and organisation through the process of revolution. Furthermore, they highlight that even if structural factors are enough to explain the onset of a revolution, they cannot explain how the rest of the revolutionary process unfolds.

5.2.1 Bolshevik reconceptualisation

Advancing the argument that an irreconcilable ideological divide constrained collaboration between radical groups despite their previous permeability requires explaining how the ideological morphology of these groups were originally similar. This is facilitated by looking at the decontestations of revolution within the various groups and their differences.

Preceding the first world war, all tendencies within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), of which the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks were a part of, held a similar conception of revolution built on a rigid interpretation of Marxist theory. This interpretation, held in common with the then still functioning Second International, dominated by the German SDP, posited that history passes through specific phases of evolution determined by the development of the means of production. Engels, in his *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* summarised these phases as Medieval society, Capitalist revolution, and Socialist revolution (Engels, 1892/1989: 109-111). These three phases, Engels argued, relate directly to the dominant "mode of production" found within a country.

Based on this progression, it was believed that Russia's next revolution would fall under the category of Capitalist revolution and establish all the expected institutions and rights available in the more advanced Western European countries (Carmichael, 1964: 17). This was as Russia was still a "backwards" country whose economy was dominated by peasant and feudal relations.

Lenin agreed with this conception arguing that a revolution in Russia would in no way "extend beyond the scope of bourgeois social and economic relationships" (Lenin, 1963[1905]: 45). In the event of such a revolution, Lenin argued that the

RSDLP, yet to formally split, should participate in the government and enact a minimum program which will "guarantee the proletariat and the peasantry the benefits accruing from the democratic revolution" (Lenin, 1963[1905]: 40) and:

> bring about a radical redistribution of landed property in favour of the peasantry, establish consistent and full democracy including the formation of a republic, eradicate all the oppressive features of Asiatic bondage, not only in village but also in factory life, lay the foundation for a thorough improvement in the position of the workers and for a rise in their standard of living (Lenin, 1963[1905]: 45).

Doing this would require a peasant-proletarian alliance which, upon carrying out a minimum program, will "repel the counter revolutionary attempts" (Lenin, 1963[1905]: 45) and "rouse Europe, and the socialist proletariat of Europe, [who] after throwing off the yoke of the bourgeoisie, will in its turn help us to accomplish the socialist revolution" (Lenin, 1963[1905]: 69).

Lenin's description of the expected revolutionary process and its outcomes were clear. A revolution in Russia should establish a bourgeois democracy which the RSDLP should participate in, this revolution would encourage Europe to have a socialist revolution which Russia would then follow. It is worth emphasising that this conception was not Lenin's alone, but was widely accepted by the RSDLP less some differences about the participation of the RSDLP in a post-revolutionary government.

This all changed quite abruptly in April 1917 when Lenin publicly abandoned the previous conception of revolution and proclaimed that the revolution should, instead of installing a bourgeois democracy, take "immediate steps towards socialism" (Lenin, 1917: 424). According to Lenin and this new decontestation of "socialist revolution", Russia should no longer wait for Europe to have its own socialist revolutions, which Russia would follow. Rather, Russia should lead the way and inspire Europe.

This shift can be attributed to two events explained below. First, the collapse of the Second International at the start of the First World War. Second, the emergence of the soviets as an alternative form of governance. The Bolshevik's understanding of these events is reflected in the concepts of "internationalism" and "all power to the soviets" respectively.

The Second international was the organisation meant to bring together the proletariat of all countries against their respective bourgeoise. This objective was shattered by the First World War when the largest Social-Democratic Party, the German SDP, endorsed its governments participation in the war. This forced a cleavage within the International between socialists who opposed the war and those who, giving into nationalist sentiment, supported their respective bourgeois governments (Service, 1979: 35).

Firmly against the war, the cleavage pushed the Bolsheviks towards conceptual innovation in order to make sense of what they perceived as a betrayal. This innovation appeared in Lenin's *Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism* where he argued that

> Imperialism, which means the partitioning of the world, and the exploitation of other countries besides China, which means high monopoly profits for a handful of very rich countries, creates the economic possibility of corrupting the upper strata of the proletariat, and thereby fosters, gives form to, and strengthens opportunism (Lenin, 1916/1987: 250)

As such, Lenin argued that social-democratic parties have been corrupted and are operating in a way to preserve the monopolistic profits their respective governments accrue and which they benefit from. This not only meant that those countries with opportunistic social-democratic parties will not act on their supposed solidarity with the proletariat of the world, but that socialist revolutions will not take place in those countries on their own. This makes it unfeasible to wait for the socialist revolutions in Western Europe to trigger a revolution in Russia. Rather, it was now the role of the Russian Revolution to transform the imperialist war (the First World War) into a global class-based civil war. This can only be achieved if the Bolsheviks capture power, which signals

> the beginning of a "break-through" on a world-wide scale, a break-through in the front of capitalist interests; and only by breaking through this front can the proletariat save mankind from the horrors of war and endow it with the blessings of peace (Lenin, 1917c/1970: 30).

At the time, this "break-through" seemed at hand. The Bolsheviks pointed to the "the revolt in the German navy" and other countries as an example of the "extreme manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world socialist

revolution" (Lenin, 2000[1917]). A revolutionary wave was indeed sweeping across Europe and labour mobilisations were also taking place in Canada, the USA, and Australia. Lenin saw it imperative to set up a Third "Communist" International to unite all true revolutionary forces and help this wave along (Lenin, 1917b/1970: 9).

This concept of "internationalism" also constrained the understanding of "socialist revolution". Lenin and other Bolsheviks argued that a socialist revolution in Russia can only be sustained if socialist revolutions follow in Western Europe. Leon Trostky, leader of the Petrograd Soviet and future leader of the Red Army, made it clear as early as 1906 that "Without the direct State support of the European proletariat the working class of Russia cannot remain in power and convert its temporary domination into a lasting socialistic dictatorship" (Trotsky, 1906/1975: 237). The ABC of Communism which provided commentary on the 1918 Bolshevik party program echoed this claim stating that "the realization of proletarian dictatorship in one country is gravely imperilled unless active assistance is given by the workers of other lands". This meant that "the international solidarity of the working class is an essential preliminary to victory" (Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, 1970[1919]: 186). Section 5.4 shows how this constraint played a major role in the reconceptualization of Bolshevik ideology near the end of the revolutionary situation.

The second development which Lenin used to justify his new decontestation of "socialist revolution" was the appearance of the soviets. The soviets were not an invention of any one party but represented the independent and autonomous role of the worker (Castoriadis, 1964: 7-6). Soviets originally appeared in 1905 in St Petersburg, first as a strike committee and then a revolutionary assembly representing 200,000 workers. The St Petersburg soviet virtually ruled St Petersburg for 50 days during the 1905 revolution (Faulkner, 2017: 24). In 1917 they reappeared bringing together various trade union and co-operative representatives, political prisoners, peasant communes, soldiers, and socialist party members. The soviets united in a Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies (Carmichael, 1964: 51-52) and operated in the Tauride Palace, the same location of the provisional government.

Lenin argued that the soviets were a superior form of government which already represented the “direct and immediate organisation of the majority of the people” (Lenin, 1917c/1970: 17-18). He described them as the contemporary equal to the Paris “commune” presenting a form of organization that made social relations equal among workers and provided them with the opportunity to practice their power and test and expand their capacities in self-governance (Harding, 2003: 254). While the soviets and provisional government existed “side by side”, Lenin noted that they were “voluntarily ceding power” to the provisional government (Lenin, 1917/1970: 14-15). To complete the revolution, the soviets themselves need to take power. As such, Lenin concluded that a “return to a parliamentary republic from the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies would be a retrograde step” and what is needed instead is “a republic of Soviets of Workers’, Agricultural Labourers’ and Peasants’ Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom” (Lenin, 1917/1970: 7).

The mutually defining relationship of the concepts of “socialist revolution” and “all power to the soviets” resulted in a co-dependent decontestation for them which was also enabled by the adjacent concept of “internationalism”. First, Lenin was able to argue that a transition to socialism is feasible due to the existence of a superior form of government, the soviets. Second, the accomplishment of socialist revolution was understood as a transfer of power from the provisional government to the soviets.

The above explanation of the concepts of “all power to the soviets”, “socialist revolution”, and “internationalism” show how the ideological morphology of the Bolsheviks at the beginning of the revolutionary situation differed from its own ideology before this phase and the ideologies of the Mensheviks during it. Now that the ideological differences between the two groups have been explained, their impact on the revolutionary process can be assessed.

5.2.2 The limits of the provisional government

The revolutionary situation in 1917 was triggered by the abdication of the Russian Tsar. The Tsar’s abdication resulted from a build-up of resistance to his rule following the onerous demands dominant groups placed on the people of Russia in their pursuit of victory during the First World War. In pursuit of this

aim, the Tsar and capitalists extended the workday, enforced compulsory overtime, removed health safeguards, and depressed wages (Faulkner, 2017: 102). The diversion of the rail network towards military purposes also resulted in its collapse leading to insufficient grain reaching the urban centres. Additionally, the retooling of production for war materiel resulted in a fall in the production of agricultural machinery to 15 per cent of pre-war levels hampering agricultural productivity (Service, 1991: 25). Finally, 14 million Russians were conscripted to fight in the war (Service, 1991: 25). Soldiers received inadequate equipment and were suffering serious defeats (Faulkner, 2017: 105-106). This led to mass desertions with soldiers returning to their villages to join in and lead land seizures (Skocpol, 1979: 136).

The above macro-economic indicators of crises, while useful to explain growing discontent, should not be substituted for causal analysis. The structural factors listed were caused by practices of militarism, capitalism, and global competition central to the Tsarist system's ideological morphology. These altered dominant practices during the period of the war leading to a generalised sense of deprivation and resistance (fostered by radical groups and organisations) creating a revolutionary window. The presence of groups and organisation with radical ideologies who have been mobilised since before the failed revolution of 1905 were then able to progress the revolutionary process into a revolutionary situation by making exclusive alternative claims to power. These claims were made concrete by their ability to win over adherents.

The unity of this alternative claim to power was found in the provisional government which took power after the abdication of the Tsar. The provisional government was formed by an unofficial group of the state Duma which was the only national assembly in existence (Carmichael, 1964: 50; Service, 1991: 28). The establishment of a Duma was a demand from the failed 1905 revolution, it sat for the first time in 1906 but had extremely limited powers. It could not appoint ministers, pass laws autonomously, or hold the government accountable (Service, 1991: 15). Despite this, the Duma represented the revolutionary desires of a large section of society that wanted to see Russia progress towards a liberal democracy.

Since its inception, the provisional government, which would become dominated by Mensheviks, was wracked by discord and had to be reconstituted twice between February and October 1917 following public outrage to its decisions. This discord resulted from the provisional government's self-imposed constraints, themselves a result of its ideological morphology, specifically its conception of revolution.

The provisional government's subscription to a classical Marxist interpretation of revolution meant that they believed their rule as a liberal democratic body would only be legitimate if it was endorsed by a CA, a nationally elected body that would draft a new constitution and establish a national parliament (Figes, 1997: 507, 519; Carmichael, 1964: 109). This conception also meant that the provisional government saw the soviets as temporary easing measure to help cope with the crises caused by Russia's participation in the war. They were regarded as no different from the various committees and *Zemstvos* (local assemblies) created under the Tsar after the abolition of serfdom and used to support civilian and military needs during war time (Skocpol,1979: 97). They would thus either be incorporated into or disappear once the liberal democratic state was institutionalised.

Absent legitimation from a CA, the provisional government refused to make critical decisions and forbade the expropriation of land, cattle, or machinery belonging to large estate-holders (Faulkner, 2017: 175). In other words, it continued to act as if it was the Tsarist state. This course of action ignored the popular demands of mobilised groups and organisations such as the workers' desire for self-management, the soldiers' demands for an end to the war, the peasants actively engaged in land redistribution, and other nations wish for self-determination.

These conflicts of interest saw the first provisional government fall in April after a letter from the Foreign Minister which expressed Russia's Imperial ambitions was revealed (Faulkner, 2017:146; Service, 1991: 33). This went against popular demands for an end to Russia's participation in the First Word War or for waging it as a "defensive" one only. The second government collapsed after the "July days", a series of violent protests which erupted after the government attempted to send the 1st machine gun battalion to the front (Faulkner, 2017:

153). The battalion had been at the forefront of the revolution and called for the mobilisation of other regiments and large factories against the provisional government resulting in as many as half a million marching. The July days resulted in a change of government and the persecution of the Bolsheviks who were blamed for the protests despite their attempts to quell them as they viewed them as premature. This persecution led to the imprisonment of many Bolshevik leaders and the escape of others into exile, including Lenin.

This provisional government's deferral of decision making cannot be explained from the perspective of instrumental RCTs which argue that action is driven by egoistic and self-serving interest (see section 4.2). From that perspective, the costs associated with deferral are correctly seen as too high to maximise benefit (the retention of power and institutionalisation of liberal democracy). The fact that the provisional government chose to defer despite these costs strengthens the argument that ideology defines what is seen as rational and the understanding of costs and benefits. From the perspective of the provisional government, and based on its conceptual understanding of revolution, the cost of making decisions without the convocation of the CA presented a greater threat to the revolution than deferring these decisions.

It's worth noting that the provisional government, at the beginning of the revolutionary situation, had the support of the main radical groups and organisations. For example, 381 out of 400 delegates to the soviet assembly endorse the provisional government. Additionally, 13 out of 16 Bolshevik leaders rejected Lenin's April thesis where he introduced the new decontestation of "socialist revolution" in favour of supporting the provisional government (Faulkner, 2017: 145). Pravda, the organ of the Bolshevik party, sounded its support of the provisional government and for the continuation of the war with Germany so long as German soldiers obeyed the Kaiser (Faulkner, 2017: 142-143).

If the Bolsheviks continued to support the classical formulation of socialist revolution summarised above, there is no reason to believe that they would have mobilized to undermine the rule of the provisional government but would have rather sought to operate within it to bring about "the benefits accruing from the democratic revolution" until such a time that Western European countries have

socialist revolutions. While hypothetical, it is plausible that strong support of the provisional government from the Bolsheviks would have resulted in a coalition government which implemented the “minimum program” Lenin had previously argued for. This would have resulted in a land distribution, the establishment of a liberal government, and ended the revolutionary situation making way for institutionalisation.

Had this been the case, the structuralist argument (Skocpol, 1979: 41, 115) that the course of the Russian Revolution was determined by the breakdown of the state and the relative autonomy of peasant communities would have been more credible. The argument could have been made that, recognising the structural limitations of creating a liberal democracy without allowing peasants control of their land forced all parties to make concessions and build the “centralized, bureaucratic, and mass-incorporating nation-state” (Skocpol, 1979: 41) meant to be a result of the aforementioned structural factors. However, this did not happen specifically because of the divergence between the ideologies of the main contending radical groups and organisations. Part of which refused to concede to the autonomy of peasants, the other which, with the emergence of the soviets, refused to enter a liberal government. Thus, the extension of the revolutionary situation is explained ideologically, not structurally.

5.2.3 The consequences of the conceptual divide on the seat of power

The dithering of the provisional government, a product of its ideological morphology, meant that it began to be seen as a barrier to change leading to the radicalisation of groups and organisations which previously supported it. It was the Bolsheviks who would benefit from this radicalisation.

Lenin’s new conceptualisation became dominant within the Bolshevik party in April. Some historians argue that it was Lenin’s superior debate skills or his “towering domination of the party” which eventually convinced Bolshevik leaders to endorse the new conception of revolution, or rather, “forced his position down the throat of his party” (see for example Figes, 1997: 389, 391 and Carmichael, 1964: 77). However, this is an incomplete picture. Lenin’s position became dominant during the seventh all-Russia conference of the party

after town, suburb, and provincial committees had time to use their voting power to change the political makeup of the party. This change tended towards a radical direction. For example, only 15 per cent of the provisional delegates present at the March gathering which endorsed the provisional government re-appeared at the April gathering signifying rank-and-file displeasure and the replacement of those delegate with more radical ones (Service, 1979: 54). As such, the change of the Bolshevik's ideological morphology is a consequence of internal debate which resulted in a dominant discourse, not the overpowering strength of one person.

Equipped with a new ideological morphology which supported soviet power and socialist revolution, the Bolsheviks were able to advance a program which was highly permeable with the ideological morphologies of other groups and organisations. The program included objectives such as "peace to the peoples" including an immediate peace with Germany and freedom for every nationality to determine if it wishes to form a separate state. The Bolsheviks also agitated for "land to those who till it", and the immediate introduction of workers' control of production (Lenin, 1917d/1971: 383-386). These policies appealed to a broad range of groups and organisations including peasants, industrial workers, and minority nationalities which had suffered under Tsarist rule. The Bolsheviks were able to forward such a radical program specifically because of the concepts of "socialist revolution", "all power to the soviets", and "internationalism". Since the Bolsheviks saw the revolution moving immediately to socialism, this meant that, unlike the provisional government, they did not need to consider previous agreements made between the Tsar and other capitalist countries or the needs of domestic capitalist enterprises which were tied to foreign investment.

The radicalisation of the Bolsheviks and other groups and organisation against the provisional government led Lenin to believe that "the bourgeois, or the bourgeois-democratic, revolution in Russia is completed" (Lenin, 1917a/1970: 13) and has failed. This made the provisional government "only a passing moment in the development of the fundamental class contradictions of our revolution" (Lenin, 1917b/1970: 57). By early June, the soviets began voting in favour of and passing Bolshevik resolutions (Carmichael, 1963: 88). By the end of September most soviets had elected Bolshevik majorities (Faulkner, 2017: 183).

These changes within the soviets signalled a transfer of control and resources (see section 4.2) in the form of legitimisation and labour-power, away from the provisional government towards the Bolsheviks who could now use the soviets to enact their political and economic programs. The only thing left to do was to remove the provisional government.

The transfer of resources away from the provisional government to the Bolsheviks reinforces the argument that ideology precedes resource mobilisation. As argued in chapter three, it is only through the revolutionary struggle itself that groups and organisation learn what resources are truly available to them.

With the resources needed to seize power from the provisional government now in their hand, the Bolsheviks determined that

> the international position of the Russian revolution … and the fact that the proletarian party has gained a majority in the Soviets… in conjunction with the peasant revolt and the swing of popular confidence towards our Party … places the armed uprising on the order of the day (Lenin, 2000[1917])

By October 25, 1917, the provisional government had been deposed and state power transferred to the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies acting on behalf of the soviets (Lenin, 1971: 507). This second transfer of power did not end the revolutionary situation and the ideological deadlock between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks and SRs would continue to play an important role until the conclusion of the civil war in 1921. The immediate aftermath of which would be the quick collapse of the soviet mode of government during the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, followed by the disbandment of the CA.

The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets was held in St Petersburg as the Bolshevik seizure of power was taking place (Faulkner, 2017: 193). The Bolsheviks held about 60 per cent of seats at the congress, providing them with a majority. They were also supported by another 15 per cent of the seats which were held by the Left SRs, a breakaway group from the SRs which supported the Bolshevik's call of "all power to the soviets" (Faulkner, 2017: 208). The congress voted to recognise the insurrection and soviet power and it was proposed that a united democratic government be elected. However, the Mensheviks and the SRs

rejected both proposals and labelled the Bolshevik's insurrection a "criminal venture" which would only lead to civil war (Figes, 1997: 489-490). The withdrawal of this minority did not hamper the rest of the congress and a new 15-member government, Sovnarkom, consisting only of Bolsheviks and, later, Left SR members, was elected (Faulkner, 2017: 208).

Figes argues that the withdrawal of the Mensheviks and the SRs was a result of the Bolshevik insurrection which was a "planned provocation". This provocation was intended at securing Lenin's leadership of the party and to thwart any attempts of a coalition government which would stand in the way of the Bolshevik dictatorship which he "had no doubt intended all along" (Figes, 1997: 471-472, 490). However, there are several issues with this position. First, Lenin's argument for soviet power and an insurrection was consistently supported by majorities within the party and the soviets. To credit Lenin alone with the decision of insurrection and claim it as a "provocation" is simply inaccurate. Second, although Lenin pushed for an insurrectionary strategy, he did not put the Bolsheviks at the forefront of this insurrection. In fact, Lenin argued that it does not matter who undertook the physical act of seizing power as long as it was caried out by an institution which "will declare that it will relinquish power only to the true representatives of the interest of the people" (Lenin, 1917f/1971: 505-506), the soviets.

The insurrection itself came about as a reaction to the decision of the provisional government to transfer the bulk of the Petrograd garrison to the Norther front to stop a German advance towards the capital (Figes, 1997: 480). As with the July days, this decision triggered a large-scale mutiny. Soldiers withdrew the rights of control from the provisional government and vested them in the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC). While the MRC was a Bolshevik majority body, it acted in the name of officers and on behalf of the soviets which then ratified the decision during the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Finally, and most importantly, the Menshevik and the Socialist-Revolutionaries' rejection of the popular insurrection was a result of their ideological opposition to the Bolshevik's conception of "socialist revolution" and the belief that Russia must first pass through a bourgeois phase and transition to socialism following western European countries. Thus, despite any claims to the contrary, the Menshevik and the Socialist-Revolutionaries did not reject the

insurrection because of the Bolshevik's role in it, but because they opposed the concept of soviet power altogether.

The complexities of the decisions taken by the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and SRs, as the main radical groups of the revolutionary process, are lost to deprivation and structural theories, and to historians like Figes who take a fixed approach to ideology. For example, while deprivation theories can help explain how the provisional government's inaction led to further agitation and a second transfer of power, they cannot explain why this power was transferred to the Bolsheviks. Structural theories replicate this error. A dominance of autonomous peasant communities (Skocpol, 1979: 114) could have resulted in the rise of independent rural communes disinterested in the machinations of a power struggle taking place in the country's industrial centres. Yet, for the most part and until the development of the civil war, peasants participated in the soviets and actively supported the Bolsheviks. Figes' analysis also removes the Menshevik and SR's sense of agency making them appear as reactive stooges succumbing to the manipulation of the Bolsheviks. Ideological analysis overcomes these limitations by highlighting the relational and competitive aspects of revolution and how resources in the form of support, legitimacy, and availability of arms can change hand based on the permeability of the ideologies held by groups and organisations.

5.2.4 A deepening of the revolutionary situation

The withdrawal of the Mensheviks and the SRs from the soviet congress did not yet indicate their willingness to transform a political confrontation into an armed one. This is because they were hoping to secure a victory in the elections from the CA. The CA was seen by both as the final chance of averting a socialist revolution, reverting the insurrection, and creating a collaborative government including other parties (Wade, 2006: 80).

The Bolsheviks had used the provisional government's reluctance to call for the CA to legitimise their insurrection, arguing that the later was intentionally delaying elections to suppress the will of the people and that it was only once power was transferred to the soviets that a CA could be constituted (Wade,

2006: 76-77). The Bolsheviks kept their word, elections began in November, and the CA finally convened in January 1918 (Figes, 1997: 507; Faulkner, 2017: 224).

The fast elections and convocation resulted in a serious error. Election ballots did not differentiate between Left and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries except for in a few provinces as the split within the party was too recent (Figes, 1997: 507-508). This meant that the SRs were overrepresented at the CA. While the SR did not possess an outright majority, even with the support of the Mensheviks (representing 41% of the vote), the threat of alliances with other parties made a majority a possibility (Figes, 1997: 508). The Bolsheviks, Sovnarkom, and the Third Soviet Congress, convened before the CA, agreed that if the CA would not endorse soviet rule, then it should be abolished (Figes, 1997: 513). The opening session of the CA put the question of Soviet power to vote, it was rejected by 237 votes to 146 (Figes, 1997: 516). Considering the CA a counter-revolutionary institution, the Bolsheviks and Left SR walked out and the CA war forcibly closed to eliminate an oppositional political centre (Faulkner, 2017: 224).

Historian Rex Wade (2006), concerned with distinguishing the Russian revolution from the civil war, correctly notes that the closure of the CA made civil war inevitable as all routes for constructive political struggle were closed (Wade, 2006: 82). However, he wrongfully argues that the closure of the CA signified the "end of the revolution" (Wade, 2006: 82). As argued in section 3.4, revolutions overlap with other contentious episodes such as civil wars. The four-stage process of revolution clarified how this overlap can occur. This is an important point because the dispersal of the CA did not end multiple sovereignty but changed its character into an armed confrontation that would last until 1921. It is only retrospectively, knowing the outcome of the civil war, that one can claim that the revolution ended with the dispersal of the CA. However, a revolution ends only once multiple sovereignty disappears, and a new dominant group is able to institutionalise its power through control over the superstructure. Until then, changes in the ideological morphologies of competing groups can reverse or lead to an outcome distinct from who currently holds power over the state apparatus. The four-stage process of revolution thus allows for a more accurate depiction of the competition that occurs during a revolution than those models which separate, especially in the context of 1917 Russia, revolution from civil war.

It is also inaccurate to link the civil war exclusively to the dispersal of the CA. As this section has consistently argued, the three main events of the early revolutionary situation (Bolshevik seizure of power, withdrawal of the Mensheviks and SRs from the Soviet Congress, and the dispersal of the CA) were the result of the same ideological rift that existed between the main radical groups which emerged in April 1917. Civil war became inevitable then, not simply because of the closure of the CA, but because of fundamental ideological differences between various groups within the revolution.

Additionally, the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and other oppositional groups could have conceded defeat instead of taking up arms. Afterall, there was no mass reaction to the closure of the CA including the peasant strongholds of the Socialist-Revolutionaries as they had already been granted the redistribution of land that they fought for (Figes, 1997: 518-520). Their choice to engage in armed struggle to overturn soviet power is indicative of their commitment to a specific interpretation of what the future of Russia should look like as constrained by the ideology. At each stage, their actions represent ideologically driven choices and not simple reactions to the Bolsheviks.

Finally, it is worth noting that Lenin did not anticipate such a violent reaction to the seizure of power by the Soviets or the closure of the CA. Lenin believed that transfer of power to the soviets would facilitate the recovery of the country from the disorder caused by the First World War and that “no class will dare start an uprising against the soviets” (Lenin, 1917d/1971: 388). He believed that any attempt to fight against soviet power will result not in a civil war but a “hopeless revolt” which would be put down as easily as previous failed coups. This is as the soviets represent the true will of the people (Lenin, 1917e/1971: 452). The onset of the civil war then cannot be credited exclusively to any one party. Rather, it confirms the need to study revolutions as a struggle between groups and organisations, and the practices that emerge from their corresponding ideologies.

This section has shown how the ideological divergences between the Bolsheviks and the parties of the provisional government resulted in a second transfer of power and a deepening of the revolutionary situation. Ideological analysis was shown to be better than structural, deprivation, and rational choice theories of

revolution as they fail to explain why the provisional government refused to make important decisions and how the Bolsheviks were able to capitalise on this to secure power. While the above analysis explains the early stages of the revolutionary situation, it does not explain how the Bolsheviks transformed from a party encouraging the practice of democracy through the soviets to the main body of a dictatorship, this is the task tackled by the next section.

5.3 Transforming soviet power into the Bolshevik dictatorship

The previous section explained how the concepts of "socialist revolution", "all power to the soviets", and "internationalism" allowed the Bolsheviks to seize power from the provisional government. Those concepts also created an irreconcilable ideological difference between the Bolsheviks on one hand and the Mensheviks and SRs on another. This difference was used to explain the withdrawal of the Mensheviks and SRs from the soviet congress, the disbandment of the CA, and the onset of the civil war. Those concepts and events, however, do not explain how the soviet system of government transformed from a pluralistic and autonomous one to a Bolshevik dictatorship.

This section explains this transition through the concepts of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "democratic centralism and the party". It argues that these concepts are not inherently authoritarian, however, the withdrawal of the Mensheviks and SRs from the soviet congress, a significant change in the field of power, "activated" the authoritarian elements found within them. This was also facilitated by the collapse of their alliance with the Left SRs.

This isolation resulted in the cannibalisation of the concept of "all power to the soviets" into the concept of "socialist revolution" and moved the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" from an adjacent to core position. These changes resulted in a new decontestation of the concept of "democratic centralism and the party". It is these changes which triggered the emergence of the Bolshevik party-state apparatus which was not as inevitable as other historians argue. The changes explained in this section reinforce two key point. First, that the way in which ideological morphologies transform is constrained and enabled by the concepts already found within them. Second, that the

changes in dominant discourses within an organisation are critical to fully understanding the process of revolution.

5.3.1 Power through a "dictatorship of the proletariat"

The "dictatorship of the proletariat" was conceptualised as a historical transition period between capitalist and communist society where the majority (peasants and proletariats) dominated over the minority (the bourgeoisie) until a classless society was achieved. The concept was never tied to a specific timeframe. In his *State and Revolution* (2002[1917]), written during the revolution, Lenin hints at this transition requiring the emergence of a new generation. *The ABC of Communism* hints that it will end as soon as the "exploiters have been "bridled and tamed" (Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, 1970[1919]:221). This dictatorship, according to Lenin, would be characterised by a simultaneous "immense expansion of democracy", since it would allow for the participation of the majority through the soviets, and "a series of restrictions on the freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists" who must be supressed and "crushed by force" (Lenin, 2002[1917]: 73).

Focusing on the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", Richard Sakwa (1987) argues that the emergence of the party-state was due to the contradictory nature of the concepts of "all power to the soviets" and the "dictatorship of the proletariat". This is as the latter rests on unrestrained political authority and the first on democratic involvement of workers (Sakwa, 1987: 429). However, Lenin made it clear that the dictatorship of the proletariat was to be practiced by the soviets themselves which already represented the "direct and immediate organisation of the majority of the people" (Lenin, 1917c/1970: 17-18). As organs of the majority, the soviets had at least two advantages. First, they presented a form of organization that made social relations equal among workers while also providing the ground on which they can practice their power and test and expand their capacities in self-governance (Harding, 2003: 254). In Lenin's words, the soviets were an "apparatus" through which the party can "elevate, train, educate, and lead" the entire working class and bring them into the political process (Lenin, 1917/1971: 434). The democratic structure of the soviets, where personnel are elected and subject to recall by the people, means they forged a bond, which Lenin described as "so

intimate, so indissoluble, so easily verifiable and renewable" (Lenin, 1917/1971: 433) and free of bureaucratic measures. Finally, their dual legislative and executive role means that they provide "close contact with the most varied professions, thereby facilitating the adoption of the most varied and most radical reforms without" (Lenin, 1917/1971: 433) allowing for the raising of the entire working class.

Second, according to Lenin, the soviets provided the best means through which the dictatorship of the proletariat can be practiced (Lenin, 2002[1917]: 99). This is as they contained "an armed force of workers and peasants" which is "not divorced from the people" and "is incomparably more powerful than previous forces" (Lenin, 1917/1971: 433). As such, the soviets were not just a vehicle for capturing power, but also contained within them the means to advance and maintain the dominance of the entire working class.

In addition to the critical role the soviets had in enacting the dictatorship of the proletariat, it's worth highlighting the fact that Lenin saw the party, at least at the beginning of the revolutionary situation, as subordinate to the soviets. It is for this reason that he argued against the seizure of power from the provisional government through a minority insurrection led by the party and emphasises the need for a "revolutionary upsurge of the people" (Lenin, 1917e/1971: 393-394). As such, the role of the party was to engage in "a struggle for influence within the Soviets" (Lenin, 1917c/1970: 17-18) in which Bolsheviks were "to present a patient, systematic, and persistent explanation" of "the necessity of transferring the entire state power to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies" (Lenin, 1917b/1970: 7).

As such, Lenin saw the Bolshevik's route to power as passing through the soviets. It was only once the soviets endorsed a transfer of power away from the provisional government could any concrete actions to enforce this transfer be pursued. This meant that, for the Bolshevik party, seizing power for the soviets and the party seizing power within the soviets became synonymous. This created an "interlacing" between the soviets and the Bolsheviks. By winning majorities in the soviets, the Bolsheviks could legitimise party choices and use the soviets as instruments to enact the transfer of power. This was not seen as contradictory to the autonomy of the soviets as they would have transferred

control to the Bolsheviks by virtue of electing them to a majority position within the individual soviets. The Bolsheviks would retain this legitimacy so long as they continued to be elected to majority positions. This made the soviets sites of political struggle where the Bolsheviks could measure the correctness and relevance of their political programs against the will of the proletariat and peasants.

Instead of revealing a contradiction, the "interlacing" of the party with the soviets reveals the overlap between the concepts of "socialist revolution", "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "all power to the soviets". The subordination of the party to the soviets and the presentation of the soviets as sites for the democratic involvement of workers *and* the suppression of counter-revolution, itself a result of the democratic involvement of the proletariat justifies the positioning of the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as an adjacent concept at the beginning of the revolutionary situation.

The above lends weight to the argument that the emergence of the party-state was not premeditated. As other researchers have correctly pointed out, Lenin saw no role for an "omniscient, omnipotent party" (Marik, 1991: 904) and did not foresee the party-state that was soon to rise (Cohen, 1970: 457). This holds true for at least the beginning of the revolutionary situation. Understanding the emergence of the party-state thus requires a look somewhere other than the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to explain how the party moved from a subordinate position to the soviets to a dominating one.

5.3.2 The leading role of the party

Even though Lenin saw the party as subordinate to the soviets, he still believed the party had a distinct role to play within the revolution. This conception of "democratic centralism and the party" contained three elements which remained relatively stable since Lenin first set it out in 1902. The first of these elements is the party as a vanguard of the proletariat. According to Lenin, the RSDLP should only accept "real Social-democrats" into its ranks (Lenin, 1902/1987: 57). Lenin explained "real Social-Democrat" as the most advanced section of workers, that can develop the revolutionary theory needed for the revolutionary movement (Lenin, 1902/1987: 69). He juxtaposed these workers

with those who have “trade-union consciousness” (Lenin, 1902/1987: 74), defined as an understanding of class struggle that corresponds to the defence and expansion of workers’ rights within capitalism instead of a struggle for revolutionary change towards socialism.

The role of these “real Social-democrats” is to provide “broader, more varied, richer, and more fruitful” interpretations of historical events to influence “the working-class masses surrounding [the party] and guided by it” (Lenin, 1902/1987: 57). This meant that the role of the party was to influence the masses and generate unique decontestations of concepts or supply conceptual innovations which the masses can integrate within their own ideological morphologies to make them more permeable with that of the party. This is exactly what the Bolsheviks did when they engaged in “patient, systematic, and persistent explanation” (Lenin, 1917b/1970: 7) of why power should be transferred from the provisional government to the Soviets.

Despite this leading role, Lenin also argued that “the Party, as the vanguard of the working class, must not be confused … with the entire class” (Lenin, 1902/1987: 57). This reinforces the argument made in the previous section that Lenin saw the role of the party as leading the soviets and not substituting themselves for it. This distinction became harder to maintain following the withdrawal of the Mensheviks and SRs from the soviet congress. This difficulty was partly due to the second element within the conception of “democratic centralism and the party”, the emphasis on securing power. In 1917, Lenin argued that

> a political party—and the party of the advanced class in particular—would have no right to exist, would be unworthy of the name of party, would be a nonentity in any sense, if it refused to take power when opportunity offers (Lenin, 1917/1971: 420)

While this element of the concept may be taken, as Figes argues, as an indication of the Bolshevik’s desire to set up a dictatorship from the beginning, this would be a mistaken conclusion. As explained above, the concept’s decontestation with “all power to the soviets” constrained the transfer of power to the soviets. However, the “interlacing” of the Bolshevik party with the soviets enabled their merger into a party-state apparatus, this is explained later.

The third element in the concept of "democratic centralism and the party" dictates the structure of the party. Lenin argued that in addition to restricting membership to "real social-democrats", the Bolshevik party should be centralised in a way that a core group had control over local committees and that minorities should be subordinate to majorities (Lenin, 1969[1904]: 183). This, argued Lenin, would allow the party to operate as "one whole" (Lenin, 1969[1904]: 52).

Once again, while this element can be interpreted as a seed of the authoritarian party-state to come, there was no indication that Lenin saw the future socialist state as one that would emulate the party structure. Indeed, as shown in the previous section, Lenin saw the soviets as prefiguring the post-revolutionary state. Rather, Lenin's conceptualisation of a centralised and disciplined party had more to do with the authoritarian conditions under which they were trying to organise (Lenin, 1902/1987: 135; Shandro, 1995: 293).

If the concepts of "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "democratic centralism and the party" did not point to an inherent or inevitable dictatorialism, then how did the Bolsheviks move from seeing themselves as subordinate to the soviets, to the later becoming a tool in the party-state apparatus? This requires looking closer at the interlacing of the Bolshevik party and the soviets, and the counter-revolutionary threat perceived by the Bolsheviks.

5.3.3 Ideologically responding to shifts in the field of power

While the Mensheviks and the SRs withdrew from the soviet congress, they continued to participate in the soviets at a local level. While they were minorities in the soviets, the Bolsheviks perceived them as a potential counter-revolutionary threat. On October 30, 1917, Sovnarkom vested itself with the legislative power needed to make decisions without the ratification of the soviets. This vestment of power was meant as a temporary measure until the convocation of the CA (Bettelheim, 1976: 107). After the CA rejected soviet power and was dispersed, Sovnarkom maintained this power and expelled the Mensheviks and SRs from local soviets claiming that they have both proved their counter-revolutionary tendencies (Figes, 1997: 626). This expulsion however was not straight forward, and the parties, or sections of the parties, were allowed to

run in soviet elections throughout the revolutionary situation based on their political positions in relation to the Bolsheviks (Bettelheim, 1976: 266). Despite this, the soviet mode of government had effectively collapsed.

With the other main radical groups and organisations labelled as "counter-revolutionary", a claim that Lenin had used before (Lenin 1917/1971: 313), the Bolsheviks became the de-facto only major organisation operating within the soviets. Due to their previous "interlacing", the soviets effectively became extensions of the party while not officially a part of them. Afraid that the soviets, like the CA may become alternative centres of power to Bolshevik rule, the party dispatched its cadre to artificially inflate and maintain dominance in them (Service, 1979: 72).

This merger presented a clear contradiction. Lenin had previously argued that Bolshevik legitimacy came from the will of the majority as expressed by the soviets and warned against substituting the vanguard for the working class. Yet the collapse of the soviets and the onset of civil war had left the Bolsheviks an isolated party with no effective way of identifying the will of the majority. To justify the continuation of the revolution, Lenin leaned on the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" arguing that the revolution has shown who the true representatives of the proletariat are and who the counterrevolutionaries are by virtue of their opposition to the soviet system. This meant that:

> the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be exercised through an organisation embracing the whole of that class, because in all capitalist countries (and not only over here, in one of the most backward) the proletariat is still so divided, so degraded, and so corrupted in parts (by imperialism in some countries) that an organisation taking in the whole proletariat cannot directly exercise proletarian dictatorship. It can be exercised only by a vanguard that has absorbed the revolutionary energy of the class. (Lenin, 1921)

Lenin's explanation points to three important developments within the ideological morphology of the Bolsheviks after the collapse of the soviets. First, it illustrates how the concept of "all power to the soviets" was subsumed into the concepts of "democratic centralism and the party". The soviets, moving forward, would be democratic only in so far as they correspond with the will of the vanguard. Second, Lenin's rationalisation indicates a move of the concept of

"dictatorship of the proletariat" from an adjacent position to a core position. Third and finally, the new position of "dictatorship of the proletariat" resulted in a decontestation of "democratic centralism and the party" which brought forth the elements of vanguardism, centralisation, and discipline within it.

This decontestation was solidified when in March 1918, the dominant coalition between the Left-SRs and the Bolsheviks collapsed after a decision was made to seek an immediate peace with Germany (Service, 1979: 68). This decision, ratified by the Seventh Party Congress of the Bolshevik Party and the Third Congress of Soviets, was itself subject to intense debate within the party leaving the impression that "the party might at any moment be split asunder by the disagreements convulsing it" (Service, 1979: 79). To make matters worse, the delay in accepting an immediate peace with Germany caused by this infighting resulted in humiliating terms for what would come to be known as the Brest-Litovsk treaty. This included a loss of 34 per cent of the population, now living under German occupation, 32 per cent of agricultural lands, 54 per cent of industrial enterprises, and 89 per cent of coalmines (Figes, 1997: 548) worsening the multiple crises faced by the country since the beginning of the First World War. Sovnarkom's legislative independence from the soviets meant that, in effect, decisions made by the Central Committee (CC) of the Bolshevik Party automatically became the law of the land (Bettelheim, 1976: 108).

The independence of Sovnarkom from the soviets, and the collapse of the soviet system meant that both the emergent state and the Bolshevik party apparatus became disconnected from the masses and their needs (Bettelheim, 1976: 108; Remington, 1984: 20). Decisions began to be increasingly made at the top. This is not entirely by design, the Bolsheviks had nearly no presence outside of central Russia and other industrial regions (Service, 1979: 45). Now in full control of the state machinery, the Bolsheviks were inundated with requests to send support, instructions, information, and personnel to carry out tasks of management and governance (Service, 1979: 61). Lenin, once confident that the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik party will be able to govern the entirety of Russia (Lenin 1917/1971: 441) had to concede that there was a shortage of cadres even after party members were assigned to two or more party jobs (Service, 1979: 47-48). By the end of 1918 not only did food shortages and incapacity make town committees the most ardent supporters of centralisation,

but local leaders were also admonishing the CC for taking too narrow a view about its responsibilities towards the challenges faced by the country (Service, 1979: 104-106). Thus, internal changes in discourse further amplified the centralising elements of the concepts found within the Bolshevik's ideological morphology.

Furthermore, these demands reinforced the hierarchical relationship between the centre and the periphery. Collective decision-making processes were abandoned for hierarchical command structures (Service, 1979: 101). The Central Committee became the only body in a logistical position to identify national trouble-spots (Service, 1979: 78). As the periphery had a lack of capacity and information to deal with small or large problems, the CC began appointing plenipotentiary officials to tackle specific problems which further depressed worker initiative at a local level (Service, 1979: 78).

To adapt with these demands and its new position as the sole party of government, the Bolshevik party changed its structure. The Eighth Party Congress, held in March 1919, established the party's organisation and political bureaus as well as a secretariat (Service, 1979: 123). These new structures were aimed at consolidating the work of the party and imposing greater control (Service, 1979: 123). Appointism reached new heights with the organisation and political bureaus appointing officials to vacant posts both inside and outside the party without consulting the bodies these officials were being appointed to (Service, 1979: 123). Officials were moved at will based on need or as punishment enabling the Bolsheviks to alter the balance of political forces in its favour in any body (Bettelheim, 1976: 305). By 1922, appointments had replaced elections nearly everywhere (Service, 1979: 170) Finally, to ensure compliance, individual officials were made personally responsible for the decisions of committees effectively putting an end to democratic debate and majority rule (Service, 1979: 147).

Building this new state apparatus required the mobilisation of workers into administrative positions both within the party and outside of it. The number of government employees quadrupled from 1917 to 1921 meaning that there were double the number of government officials than there were industrial workers, the supposed backbone of the Bolshevik party (Figes, 1997: 688).

The collapse of the soviets did not necessitate the creation of a vast and totalitarian party-state apparatus. There were other bodies that the Bolsheviks could have used to practice the dictatorship of the proletariat and maintain the democratic process they were striving for. The reason these alternatives were not pursued, however, is because they conflicted with the adjacent concept of "state capitalism". The next section turns its attention to this concept to explain how the development of the party-state apparatus was constrained and enabled by the economic goals pursued by the Bolsheviks.

5.4 Solidifying the dictatorship through "State capitalism" and ending the revolutionary situation

Despite the soviets becoming un-official extensions of the party, the Bolsheviks could have still built a participatory democracy through other workers bodies such as trade unions and factory committees. This section argues that the option to use these institutions to expand the democratic nature of the new state was constrained by the concept of "state capitalism" which increased in proportionality after the collapse of the soviets. The growth in the concept's proportionality, combined with the Bolshevik's new ideological morphology reinforced the process of centralisation and solidified the party-state apparatus.

This section first explains the concept of "state capitalism". This is followed by assessing the impact of this concept on the revolutionary window. Finally, the section explains how the final form of the Bolshevik's ideological morphology, including the new concepts of "market control" and "cultural development", successfully brought an end to the revolutionary situation in Russia.

The section argues that the revolutionary situation ended with the 10th Party Congress. The congress represents the symbolic end of the revolutionary situation for three reasons, First, the civil war had come to an end and the crushing of the Kronstadt uprising meant that there were no longer any credible domestic military threats to the Bolshevik's control over state power. Second, the passing of the resolution "On the Unity of the Party" meant that any internal threats that would challenge the Bolshevik's singular hold on state power were also removed. Third, the NEP and the lifting of the economic blockade of Russia in January 1920 (Service, 1979: 113) meant that any future urban or peasant

disturbances could be adequately dealt with by the new state apparatus which now effectively controlled the superstructure.

5.4.1 The constraining nature of "state capitalism"

The concept of "state capitalism" set out the Bolshevik's vision of the post-revolutionary economy. As with all other concepts, the decontestation of "state capitalism" changed after the collapse of the soviet mode of governance to highlight more centralising features within it. In his *State and Revolution*, Lenin noted that the Bolsheviks needed to capture state power not only for the purpose of "crushing the resistance of the exploiters" as per the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", but also to guide "the great mass of the population … in the work of organizing Socialist economy" (Lenin, 2002[1917]: 23). As such, the concept of "state capitalism" also decontested the concept of "democratic centralism and the party" in a way which informed the tasks and objectives of the party.

The socialist economy should, according to Lenin, emulate monopoly capitalism – a centralised form of capitalism where entire national industries are in the hands of a few capitalist firms. Thus, after the revolution, the state, as opposed to capitalists, should centralise national industry. Lenin drew his inspiration for this socialist economy from the German war state which forcefully amalgamated factories under state control. This state control, under a worker's state, Lenin argued, would enable the introduction of organisation, accounting, and the proper distribution of resources needed to improve the production process (Lenin, 1917/1971: 438). This system of accounting was already made available by capitalism in the form of Taylorist scientific management (Figes, 1997: 744). By applying processes of scientific management, the Bolsheviks believed that the new state could act as an impartial and neutral arbiter of quarrels that only require the correct technical solutions (Remington, 1984: 137).

As with the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", Lenin thought that the task of building the socialist economy would be "impracticable" without the soviets (Lenin, 1917/1971: 436). Lenin saw the soviets as the nervous system through which information on production and distribution needs are communicated and determined. This, once again, reinforces the argument that

Lenin saw the party as subordinate to the soviets even in matters of the economy and provides further evidence that the Bolsheviks were not operating with dictatorial aspirations in mind from the onset of the revolution.

A socialist nervous system was beginning to form in the early stages of the revolutionary situation. By October 1917, half of the 123 soviets in existence were taking direct charge of economic affairs including production and food deliveries (Remington, 1984: 25). Additionally, a network of factory committees had emerged which actively coordinated production and supply. These factory committees were present in 22.5 per cent of all factories and 68.7 per cent of factories with over 200 workers. 79 per cent of enterprises with over 200 workers had committees taking an active part in management and not just negotiating or representing workers' interests (Remington, 1984: 37). The committees, first established in individual factories, organised themselves on a city-wide level in 50 cities before forming an all-Russian organisation across the nation. The organisation played an active role in supervising production, overseeing the storage and distribution of supplies, and controlling procurements and sales (Remington, 1984: 33-35). Trade unions were also thoroughly organised, and a majority were under "Bolshevik sway" since before the start of the First World War (Service, 1979: 32). Just like the soviets, the factory committees and trade unions had a critical role in legitimising the Bolsheviks seizure of power by transferring control away from the provisional government over to the Bolsheviks thus providing them with the resources needed to further the revolutionary process. Both also reflected worker's aspiration of workers control over the means of production.

The development of worker-controlled networks such as the factory committees show that the Bolsheviks possessed the ability to further workers' aspirations even with the collapse of the soviets. Lenin had, before their collapse, expressed his willingness to abandon the soviets as revolutionary bodies in favour of the unions and factory committees after accusing the Mensheviks of turning them into "fig leaves of the counter-revolution" following the July days (Lenin 1917/1971: 313). Why then, did the Bolsheviks refuse to do this after the collapse of the soviets? Two critical factors help explain this.

First, the end of the Bolshevik alliance with the Left-SR left them more wary of a counter revolutionary threat. This threat was seen as all the more real with the development of the civil war within the revolutionary situation by the spring of 1918. Trusting the building up of the socialist economy to worker led democratic bodies brought with it the risk of those bodies becoming sites of counter-revolution. The process can thus only be entrusted to the party which remained the only real revolutionary organisation.

Second, multiple factors obstructed the efficient functioning of production and distribution through factory networks making it unfeasible and costly. For example, by the middle of 1918, most factories had fallen into a form of "disruptive localism" where the interests of individual factories were placed before the interests defined by Sovnarkom (Service, 1991: 52). The civil war also meant that the Bolsheviks lost effective control over most of the rural areas (which they never had a strong presence in). This translated into a lack of foodstuffs entering major industrial cities. By January 1921 even the most privileged workers could access food equalling to about 1,000 calories a day (Figes, 1997: 759). Food shortages forced factory worker into a nomadic lifestyle travelling back and forth from rural areas in hopes of finding food. Factory supplies were diverted to produce goods to barter with peasants and skilled labourers would try to move between factories to secure better conditions (Figes, 1997: 723).

The economic demands of the new state and the Bolshevik's political isolation enlarged the concept of "state capitalism". The movement of the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to a core position, as explained in the previous section, meant that the role of building the socialist economy now fell exclusively to the party. Factory committees were placed under the control of the trade unions whose role was limited to accounting. One-man management, the running of factory affairs by a party appointed representative, was introduced to raise productivity (Marik, 1991: 905-906; Remington, 1984: 44). By the end of 1920 only 300 out of 2,483 factories still ran under the collective management workers fought for in 1917 (Remington, 1984: 88). The centralised form of planning also meant that wages were now to be determined by the new party-state apparatus which expanded at the expense of the trade unions (Remington, 1984: 79). Additionally, labour conscription, the practice of

forcefully assigning people to work and accounting for their labour through “labour books”, became the norm in 1919 (Remington, 1984: 84).

The dominant wing of the Bolshevik party, represented foremost by Lenin and Trotsky saw no contradiction between this form of economic control and their socialist goals. Trotsky, defending these measures, argued that while workers are subordinate to the state, the state, by virtue of it being a Bolshevik state, represents their interests, the soviet state is therefore the worker’s state (Trotsky, 2017 [1920], 157). This allowed Trotsky to conclude that "Socialism lies through a period of the highest possible intensification of the principle of the State" (Trotsky, 2017[1920]: 158). Lenin, based on this rationale, separated worker’s control from self-management by arguing that self-management has been achieved by virtue of the worker’s state practicing direct control over the economy. Since the worker’s state was controlling the economy, what was left for workers to do was to control it, ensure that the state’s plans are being followed in a “precise and conscientious” way (Lenin, 1917/1971: 435). The interaction of the concepts of “state capitalism”, “democratic centralism and the party”, and the “dictatorship of the proletariat” thus further solidified the party-state apparatus.

5.4.2 Less power, more centralisation

The attempts to set up a centralised economy backfired spectacularly. The technocratic tendency found withing Taylorism encouraged the status stratification and the need for hierarchical control (Remington, 1984: 139). Key industries were militarized. Workers within these industries received military rations which were significantly better than regular workers could expect (Figes, 1997: 724). A multitude of agencies were created to administer the numerous rationing systems, enforce labour discipline and conscription, and coordinate between local, provincial, and national levels. This multiplied the lines of command reducing centralised control (Remington, 1984: 70). Agencies were involved in continuous bureaucratic conflict over the allocation of resources. To resolve these conflicts, inter-agency bodies were created adding more confusion (Remington, 1984: 147-148). To feed the Red Army and the urban centres, the Bolsheviks resorted to brutal forceful requisitions (Figes, 1997: 622).

These failures led to the development of a virulent black market. Thousands of workers carried whatever they could in bags to barter with peasants for food (Figes, 1997: 610). Rural areas saw the development of cottage industry as they sought to manufacture household products they used to purchase or receive from towns and urban centres (Figes, 1997: 608). Despite the chaotic nature of these developments, they were arguably more efficient than the centralised economy and helped alleviate some of the suffering of workers (Figes, 1997: 612). Yet the Bolsheviks responded by nationalising cottage industries and outlawing "bag men" (Remington, 1984: 170) since they were seen as anathema to the centralised socialist economy they were attempting to build – another example of how ideology constrains practice.

In addition to economic inefficiency, the pursuit of "state capitalism" came with high political costs for the Bolsheviks. The party continued to push forward with their ideological practices despite these costs, again highlighting the primacy of ideology over rational choice theories.

Within the party, and as early as March 1918, a "left opposition" developed to fight against the centralisation pursued by the Bolshevik central committee, the overturning of workers control, and its direct involvement in production which undercut the initiative of workers (Bettelheim, 1976: 374). This left opposition would remerge under different names and in 1920 it waged a battle against the subsuming of trade unions into the party where it threatened to set up an independent party separate from the Bolsheviks (Bettelheim, 1976: 385).

In the summer of 1918, a "Military Opposition" emerged to fight against the inclusion of Tsarist officers in the newly founded Red Army (Bettelheim, 1976: 381). While not a serios tendency, the opposition captured the shift within the Bolsheviks which had gone from advocated for the establishment of a workers' militia which can elect its officers to recreating a traditional military structure with discipline and a centralised hierarchy of command (Figes, 1997: 590). These changes were justified the same way as the abolition of worker's control, by claiming that the Red Army was "under proletarian control" making the question of electing officers a purely "technical" one – to be determined by the state (Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, 1970[1919]: 266).

Internal factionalism was mild when compared to the reaction of the groups and organisation which had originally supported the Bolshevik's call for all power to the soviets. For example, mass strikes were taking place in Petrograd and Moscow, the traditional bastions of Bolshevism. Strikers put forward demands for free elections in soviets, and end to privileges for party bureaucrats, and the ability to freely trade with peasants in the countryside (Figes, 1997: 759).

By the autumn of 1918, many village communes established themselves as neutral republics championing the autonomy of soviets and fought against grain requisitions and conscription that was forced upon them by both the Bolsheviks and the various "white" armies (Figes, 1997: 596). These neutral republics became known as "green armies" and were often led by local SR or ex-SR peasants (Figes, 1997: 754). By March 1921, soviet power in the countryside had almost disappeared in the face of these rebellions and grain moving to the urban centres had virtually come to a halt (Figes, 1997: 758).

The opposition to requisitioning, conscription, and the centralising tendencies of the Bolsheviks found its zenith in the Kronstadt rebellion. Kronstadt sailors had consistently been at the forefront of the Russian Revolution propelling it forward (Castoriadis, 1964: 3). Faced with the reality that the soviet system they fought for was disappearing, they chose to rebel. They raised the banner of "Soviets without communists" and their demands included an end to grain requisitions, stern labour discipline, and for free elections within the soviets (Faulkner, 2017: 233; Service, 1979: 137). The Bolsheviks were able to crush the Kronstadt uprising, but the defection of what used to be seen as the vanguard of their party created a sense of extreme crisis within the party. It was now clear that the Bolsheviks are losing the resources which had allowed them to gain power and needed to make adjustments if they were to retain it (Remington, 1984: 178).

5.4.3 Postponing socialism for "cultural development"

At the 10th party congress held in March 1921, the party adopted two resolutions which would secure its power. These resolutions help explain the final form of the Bolshevik's ideological morphology at the end of the revolutionary situation in three ways. The congress, which occurred during the same time as the

crushing of the Kronstadt uprising, represents the symbolic end of the revolutionary situation as all credible military threats to the Bolshevik's control over state power had been eliminated ending multiple sovereignty.

The first resolution, "On the Unity of the Party", banned the formation of factions and imposed major restrictions on party debate and democracy under threat of expulsion (Faulkner, 2017: 240). The second resolution saw the party abandon grain requisitions and replace them with a tax which allowed the peasants to sell their surplus as they wished after the tax was paid (Figes, 1997: 765). This system, known as the New Economic Policy (NEP), restored and sanctioned market relations in rural areas, relieving the shortages of grain to the urban centres, and indicated the abandonment of the idea of an immediate transition to socialism.

The decision on banning internal factions sought to artificially put an end to the "wavering and instability" (Lenin, 1902/1987: 57) within the party. Lenin had previously theorised that such wavering and instability would be avoided by only admitting "real-socialists" into the party, a central feature of the concept of "democratic centralism and the party". In its new decontested form party members would now be forced to be "real-socialists", disciplined and uncritical vessels to the direction set out by the party's central committee.

The introduction of the NEP was made possible by abandoning the elements of "socialist revolution" which argued for an immediate transition to socialism. The collapse of the soviet system of governance and the civil war was taken by the Bolsheviks as proof that the country was not ready to progress immediately to socialism. The failure of revolutionary movements in Western Europe also left Russia isolated (Faulkner, 2017: 213-222) meaning the Russian Revolution no longer represented a "break-through" of the class war on a world-wide scale. However, the introduction of the NEP was perceived as a temporary retreat, one that needed to be closely controlled. This required the introduction of the new periphery concept of "market control" which, by mutually decontesting "democratic centralism and the party" would also avoid "panic" and breaks in order lest a temporary retreat become permanent or devolve once again into a threat against the Bolshevik's claim to power (Lenin, 1922/2017: 56-57).

Despite these setbacks, the Bolsheviks needed to ensure that a transition to socialism remained on the agenda. This meant protecting the revolution until the “correct” conditions for its realisation matured. Therefore, while it remained core, the concept of “socialist revolution” was decontested by the concept of “state capitalism” to mean further developing the mode of production within the country and carefully monitoring and controlling the retreat towards market relations (Service, 1979: 156).

Additionally, the concept of “internationalism” was absorbed into “socialist revolution”. The Third International, established in 1919 to further socialist revolution across the world became an implement for the defence of the newly formed party-state apparatus and its own interests. This would have an impact on the Spanish Revolution and Civil War (see chapter six) 17 years later.

When the correct conditions for the realisation of socialism was explained through the adjacent concept of “cultural development”. This concept posited that the Russian workers and peasants were too backward to make an immediate transition to socialism. The Bolsheviks argued that workers lacked initiative, creative faculty, and stood aside and let others take the first steps. It was thus the role of the party to systematically and gradually attract this backward strata to participate in the general work of administration and raise their cultural level and their capacity for organization (Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, 1970[1919]: 219-220). This further justified the role of the party-state apparatus.

Not much was said in relation to how or when this backwardness would be overcome. Lenin argued it would be expressed through a “cultural revolution” (Lenin, 1923/2017: 134), but decontested this revolution with “state capitalism” by arguing that “to be cultured we must achieve a certain development of the material means of production” (Lenin, 1923/2017: 135). This further justified the dictatorship of the party-state since "Industry is indispensable, democracy is not" (Lenin, 1921: 5). The Bolshevik’s ideological morphology by the end of the revolutionary situation thus solidified the dictatorship of the party in a way that it could be maintained until such a time that it determined was no longer necessary. In effect securing its power in perpetuity.

Did the Bolshevik's adoption of NEP represent an abandonment of their ideology to accommodate "reality"? No, as explained in chapter two revolutions take place in a field of power, Revolutions represent attempts to move the equilibrium point to a new position which favours specific groups, organisations, or a coalition. This equilibrium point becomes set when dominance is established over the historical bloc, the political and civil society levels of the superstructure. Unable to win over the entire superstructure the Bolsheviks conceded to other groups, mainly peasants, so that they could maintain an equilibrium point in their favour. Which concessions the Bolsheviks made were determined by which concepts became prioritised over others as they passed through the revolutionary window. These changes in priority were not driven by external factors alone, themselves partly created by the Bolsheviks, but by their interpretation of external factors according to the concepts already within their morphology.

This section has shown how the concept of "state capitalism", "cultural development", and "market control" interacted in a way that constrained the Bolshevik's choices away from pursuing and building new democratic structures after the collapsed of the soviets. The introduction of these concepts, combined with the changes in priority and proportionality of older concepts within the Bolshevik's ideological morphology allowed them to secure the superstructure and provided them with the tools necessary to deflect future challenges to their hold on power.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has consistently argued that the Russian Revolution, and particularly the revolutionary situation, is best understood by studying the ideologies of the groups and organisations that waged it. The chapter explained the authoritarian outcome of the revolutionary situation by focusing on the changes within the ideological morphology of the Bolshevik party. These changes simultaneously enabled the Bolsheviks to capture power on democratic lines and then constrained the development of the revolution along authoritarian lines.

Changes within the ideology were explained using the adjusted conceptual approach developed in chapter two. The chapter showed that between the

beginning and end of the revolutionary situation, the core concept of “all power to the soviets” was cannibalised into the concept of “democratic centralism and the party”. The adjacent concept of “the dictatorship of the proletariat” moved to the core. The adjacent concept of “state capitalism” increased in proportionality”. And the adjacent and periphery concepts of “cultural development” and “market control” emerged.

The chapter argued that while changes within the Bolshevik’s ideological morphology were triggered by developments outside of the party, such as the collapse of the soviet system and the failure of socialist revolutions to develop in Western Europe, these changes were constrained and enabled by elements already present within the concepts of the morphology. This account differs from that presented by other historians (Faulkner, 2017; Figes, 1997; Skocpol, 1979) who explain the outcome of the revolution through structural constraints, or by exclusively crediting the ideology of the Bolshevik party without accounting for its changes or interaction with other groups and organisations. The analysis found within this chapter thus shows how the conceptual analysis provides a better historical account of revolutions. This same method is applied to the Spanish Civil War and Revolution in the next chapter.

Chapter 6 Understanding the failure of the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT)

6.1 Introduction

This chapter, like the preceding one, applies ideological analysis to a specific historical case of revolution to show how it is better at explaining the process of revolution than rational, resource mobilisation, deprivation, and structural theories of revolution. This chapter analyses the Spanish Civil War and Revolution of 1936 focusing on the revolutionary window and revolutionary situation stages of the revolution and civil war. The former begins with the declaration of the Second Republic in 1931, the later extends from General Francisco Franco's failed military coup of 1936, to his defeat of Republican forces in 1939.

The two stages are studied through the ideological morphology of the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT, National Confederation of Labour) and the changes it underwent. The CNT is a radical trade union established in 1910 who's state objective from 1919 has been to secure the "absolute moral, economic and political liberation of mankind" which will be achieved once the "land, means of production and exchange have been socialised and the overweening power of the state has vanished" (statement of the principles of the CNT, 1919 quoted in Peirats, 2001: 11).

The CNT played a leading role in the revolutionary process first mobilising against the Republic during the revolutionary window, in line with its objective of abolishing the state, and then mobilising alongside the Republican state against Franco's rebellion during the revolutionary situation. Throughout that period, the CNT practiced control over autonomous areas within Republic held territories. As a leading radical organisation, the CNT's ideological morphology and the changes it underwent (summarised in the below two figures) is critical to understanding the revolutionary process and its eventual defeat at the hand of Franco's forces. The chapter uses ideological analysis to present an original interpretation of events that uses the CNT's ideology to explain what seems like a sudden shift in the organisation's goals and practices.



Figure 6 - The CNT's ideological morphology during the revolutionary window

While the CNT played a leading role, the Spanish Revolution and Civil War resulted in a situation of multiple sovereignty where various contenders, or coalitions of contenders, advanced exclusive alternative claims to control over the government or over sections of a territory and its resources (see section 3.4). Spanish historian Pelai Pagès i Blanch, focusing on the revolutionary process in Catalonia, justly described this state of multiple sovereignty as a "triple standoff" between Republican reformists, right-wing reactionaries, and revolutionaries (Blanch, 2013: 9). This chapter contextualises the CNT's ideology based on its relationship to other groups and organisations participating in this triple standoff to highlight how shifts in the field of power impact the revolutionary process and highlight the conflict inherent in revolutions. This is done specifically in relation to the military, church, and major landowners all representing what Blanch called "right-wing reactionaries", and the groups and organisations representing Republican reformists including the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) and the *Partido Comunista de España* (PCE, Spanish Communist Party) which grew in strength after the coup.

This chapter puts forth three main arguments across three sections. The first section argues that the revolutionary process advanced from a revolutionary window to a revolutionary situation due to the ideological opposition of

dominant and radical groups to the project of the Second Republic and not due to structural causes or deprivation. This opposition is best summarised, from the radical end, by the CNT's core concepts of "direct action" and "insurrectionary revolution". Dominant groups that opposed the Second Republic include the army, Church, and large landowners which maintained control over the means of material production and coercion.

Three key factors show that structural claims that revolutions only occur after a state has collapsed or become incapacitated (Skocpol, 1976: 178) does not apply to the Spanish case. First, the Second Republic was established on and maintained through widespread consensus (Ben-Ami, 2002: 17-20) providing it with temporary stability. State collapse occurred in Spain *after* dominant groups determined to mobilise their resources and directly confront it. Second, structural factors usually seen as contributing to mobilisation, such as mass unemployment and supressed wages, particularly acute in Spain (Preston, 2002: 167), led to mobilisation because the CNT was able to involve individuals in a process of collective definition where the source of deprivation and the best way to deal with it was considered (Blumer, 1971: 301; McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1214). Absent this process, there is no guarantee that workers would have mobilised to undermine the republic in the way that they did. Finally, the transition from a revolutionary window to a revolutionary situation, demarcated by Franco's failed coup, was a result of changes within the field of power which were seen as a threat to dominant groups.

The second section of the chapter argues that the core concepts of "federalism" and "insurrectionary revolution" transformed the adjacent concept of "cooperation" to the core concept of "collaboration" upon the start of the revolutionary situation. This transformation resulted in a limited permeability between the ideological morphologies of the CNT and the Republic and enabled the CNT to participate in a revolutionary government. The transformation also led to the cannibalisation of the concept of "federalism" and "insurrectionary revolution". Elements of these concepts were diverted into the new concepts of "anti-fascist unity" (core) and "industrial federalism" (adjacent) which played a more significant role during the revolutionary situation, and the new periphery concept of "revolution", which signified the postponement of revolution till after the hoped defeat of Franco's forces.

These changes within the ideological morphology of the CNT shows how conceptual analysis better explains the process and outcome of revolutions than Rational Choice Theories (RCT). This is as RCT cannot explain why the CNT chose to work with the Republic as opposed to pursuing its stated interest in a low-cost high benefit situation created by the collapse of the state. This section reinforces the argument, made in section 2.3, that changes within the ideological morphology of groups and organisations and the emergence of a dominant discourse have a critical impact on the process of revolutions.



Figure 7 - The CNT's ideological morphology during the revolutionary situation

The third and final section of this chapter argues that the eventual defeat of Republican forces, to which the CNT aligned itself to at the onset of the revolutionary situation, was caused by the ideological deadlock between the Republic and the CNT. This deadlock was caused by the practices encouraged by core concept of “insurrectionary revolution” which enabled the CNT to carry out a thoroughgoing reorganisation of economic and political relations in areas under its control. This revolution, achieved within the first days of the failed military coup and included the setting up of rural and urban collectives, gave the CNT a material and military advantage over other forces loyal to the Republic, including the Republic’s own forces. These practices contradicted the Republic’s ideologically driven goal of preserving its standing as a democratic republic. This

goal was partly to win the favour and military support of other western democracies, namely the United Kingdom and France.

The Republic opposed the CNT's claims of autonomy to prove it possessed exclusive sovereign control in Republican held territories. To prove this control, the Republic undermined the urban and rural collectives established by the CNT instead of financially supporting them or maintaining their autonomy and the increased production that came with that. This meant that the Republic was unable to utilise the collectives as a resource to its advantage in the war against Franco's forces. While sections of the CNT resisted these attempts of the Republic to practice control over the collective, the concepts of "collaboration" and "anti-fascist unity" constrained it from forcefully, with a few exceptions, fighting against this trend.

Refusing to empower collectives, and facing an arms embargo, the Republic became increasingly dependent on the support of the USSR which was able to opportunistically use the Civil War to further its own foreign policy. The deadlock thus resulted in a loss of the Republican forces despite the resource advantage they possessed at the beginning of the civil war and revolution. This section furthers the argument that ideology precedes resource mobilisation and is therefore a better tool at analysing the process and outcomes of revolutions.

The ideological morphologies of the CNT presented above excludes core concepts such as "anti-hierarchy" (Amster, 2018) or "prefiguration" (Franks, 2018) which are usually included in the ideological families of anarcho-syndicalism or anarchism, which the CNT is considered a member of. These concepts are not given "stand alone" space because they are counted as elements emergent from the interaction of the concepts listed above or imbedded within them. For example, "anti-hierarchy" and "prefiguration" are emergent from the interaction of the core concepts of "direct action", "federalism", and "insurrectionary revolution". Therefore, there is no need for a conceptual illustration of "prefiguration" and "anti-hierarchy" because the CNT is actively engaged in, that is to say they are doing, prefiguration and anti-hierarchy. Since this chapter is looking at the specific practices of the CNT, and therefore, necessarily, the ideologies that enable and constrain them, there is less need for the abstracted "general concepts" (Freeden 2000: 306) needed in

ideological families (see section 2.2). Additionally, elements which reflect future economic arrangements such as workers control and self-determination are elements imbedded in the concept of “insurrectionary revolution”.

Therefore, while the above morphologies may seem “thin” it is only because each concept is complex. This in part reflects the bombastic ideology of the CNT, and other anarchist inspired organisations, which values autonomy, is non-prescriptive, and sets broad yet strict boundaries on conceptual interpretation (Amster, 2018: 23). The CNT’s ideological morphology during the revolutionary situation appears particularly thin due to the dominance of the unitary goal of defeating Franco. This subordinated the CNT to the Republic and made other priorities, expressed as concepts, secondary or themselves subordinate to the remaining core concepts of “collaboration” and “anti-fascist unity”.

Another impact of the “thinness” of the above ideological morphologies is that they may seem discontinuous, especially since none of the concepts retain their original names. However, this change in name only signifies their new decontestations based on the shifts of elements within these complex concepts and their rearrangement. The transfer of elements between concepts and their new decontestations justifies new names but also ensures a sense of continuity as explained in the following sections.

The account of the Spanish Revolution and Civil War given in this chapter differs substantially from two other popular interpretations. These differences highlight the benefit of applying ideological analysis to revolutions. The first interpretation is best presented by Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm (2017) (for a similar account see Baily, 2002 or Graham, 1987) who argued that the CNT’s ideology, particularly its rural contingents, is “primitive” in that it is “incapable of adaption to modern conditions” (121) and unable to put up “in an organised fashion” the resistance needed to oppose the “genuinely efficient repression” of the modern state (121).

Hobsbawm’ identifies three main characteristics of this ideology. First, that it is “messianic”, couched in a belief of a sudden, immediate, and thoroughgoing transformation as opposed to “a series of campaigns and battles culminating in the seizure of national power” (119). Second, that it relied on propaganda and

agitation instead of organisation. This meant depending on the initiative of peasants who would only act when there was a “peculiar groundswell of village opinion” (114) usually brought about by changes in the local situation or news from the “outside” such as news of the Russian revolution, a new agrarian law, or news of an insurrection elsewhere. The previous two points led him to identifying the third characteristic, that village anarchism cannot but be localised or “at best regionalised” (120). These characteristics meant that the revolutionary impetus of the anarchists remained “spontaneous and unstable” leading to “unrelieved failure” (121-122).

While Hobsbawm’s analysis rightfully acknowledges the role of ideology in revolutionary processes, he mischaracterises the CNT’s ideology in several ways. First, the CNT, through the concept of “direct action” engaged in campaigns and battles which increased the antagonism between radical and dominant groups helping create the conditions for the transition of the revolutionary process from window to situation. Hobsbawm’s emphasis on capturing state power obfuscates this process and the role of the CNT’s ideology within it.

Second, the CNT was a highly organised, albeit not centralised, organisation. As Hobsbawm himself notes, this organisation allowed the CNT to successfully penetrate rural Spain. This chapter also highlights how this organisation enabled the CNT to launch successive insurrections and remain highly mobilised during the revolutionary window.

Third, Hobsbawm presents the fact that peasants and others relied on “peculiar groundswells” of opinions (114) as unique to Spain or Spanish anarchism. However, as argued in chapter three, shifts in ideology are explicitly caused by peculiar shifts in the distribution of power within the field of power and its impact on normalised practices. This occurs when dominant groups alter their ideological morphologies which cascade through the superstructure, or when dominant groups and organisation are significantly challenged by radical groups forcing dominant group to make adjustments. Hobsbawm has therefore done nothing beyond identifying “peculiarity” as a central feature of revolutions.

Finally, Hobsbawm’s claim that the CNT is unable to resist the “genuinely efficient repression” of the modern state (121) is simply untrue. It was the CNT

which led the suppression of Franco's forces during the first days of the coup. The CNT also made impressive territorial gains against Franco's forces. These gains are more impressive when considered against the failures of other organised and modern forces, namely the Republic.

Opposed to Hobsbawm's interpretation of a uniform anarchist ideology which led to failure, this chapter shows how changes within the CNT's ideology enabled it to make impressive gains while at the same time constrained its ability to consolidate or further those gains. This provides a richer interpretation of the revolution and the role of the CNT within it.

A second popular interpretation lacking analytical rigour presents Franco's eventual success as a result of a "betrayal" from outside forces, especially the USSR. For example, Burnett Bolloten (1991), takes an international relations perspective dedicating a significant portion of his seminal book to explaining the foreign policies of Britain, France, and the USSR. There is no question that the foreign policies of Britain, France, and the USSR are important in understanding the civil war and revolution. However, their relevance can only be established in relation to the ideological morphologies of the groups and organisations waging and resisting the civil war and revolution within Spain. Section 6.4 argues, largely in line with Bolloten, that the ideological morphology of the Republic prioritised securing legitimacy in the eyes of international actors. This emphasis provided the opening for the USSR to leverage its "aid" to the republic to directly and indirectly, through the PCE, influence the policies of the Republic and the outcome of the revolution and civil war. While shedding light on the Republic's actions, Bolloten's focus on international relations fails to adequately explain why the CNT, despite, as he points out, "the seismic proportions of the revolution that shattered the democratic Republic of 1931" (Bolloten, 1991: 638) chose to participate in the rebuilding of the same Republic it shattered, and then refused to expand the gains made in the revolution or seriously defend them against any foreign manipulations. The international relations perspective thus undermines the agency of groups and organisation within Spain.

By focusing on the ideologies of the groups involved in the Spanish Civil War and Revolution, section 6.4 shows that the ideologies of the Republic and CNT forces were permeable enough to allow for a certain level of collaboration but

remained different enough to detriment the anti-Franco war effort. Additionally, the ideological morphology of the CNT allowed it to make impressive gains in line with its ideological aspirations, but also limited its ability to consolidate or further these gains. Before explaining this, the next section looks at the revolutionary window and the role of the CNT in advancing this window into a revolutionary situation.

6.2 Progressing the revolutionary window to a revolutionary situation

This section shows how the conditions of a revolutionary window emerged alongside Spain's Second Republic in 1931. The section argues that ideological opposition to the republic from conservative and right-wing groups and organisations based in the army, Church, and large landlords, as well as the CNT prevented the new Republic from institutionalising itself and dominating the "historical block" (Gramsci, 1971:137, see section 2.5). As argued in section 3.4, a revolutionary window presents a clear break from normalised practices under a dominant ideology. This break in practice leads to groups and organisation engaging in "shadow boxing" where they "feel each other out, try their strength and solidarity, build their confidence or lose it" (Pettee, 1971: 112). Both these elements were present within the revolutionary window created by the transition from a monarchy to a republic.

This dual opposition resulted in greater polarisation within the field of power. The revolutionary window phase was thus characterised by instability and included a failed coup in 1932, government failures leading to recurring elections in 1933 and 1936, and regular insurrections and general strikes, predominantly led by the CNT, the most major of which took place in 1933 and 1934. The 5 years of the Second Republic thus reflected a long form "protest spiral" (Lawson, 2019: 184, see section 3.4) where responses by competing groups resulted in increased militancy and escalating confrontation. It is this polarisation, which is fundamentally ideological, that holds the key to the eventual collapse of the republic (Ben-Ami, 2002: 29) and not structural issues such as mass unemployment, poor harvests, and supressed wages (Preston, 2002: 167), which only played a contributing factor in so far as they were refracted through the ideologies of groups and organisations.

The section begins with an explanation of the CNT's core concepts of "insurrectionary revolution" and "direct action". It then explains the ideology of the army, Church, and large landlords. Due to space limitations, and since the dissertation focuses on the role of radical groups and organisations, the ideologies of the army, Church, and large landlords are explained through their interests and not a full illustration of their morphologies. As argued in section 4.2, interest and preferences are determined by the ideology of groups and organisations. While interest, in general, is not enough to explain multiple decisions within a revolutionary process (since it changes along with an ideological morphology), it is acceptable here since it is being used to explain one action within a specific phase of the revolution, an endorsement of a coup.

Following the explanation of respective ideologies, the section illustrates how the decisions of the groups and organisations involved in the "triple standoff" increased polarisation within the revolutionary window. This is done with three historical examples including the efforts of the Republic to pass an Agrarian Reform Law and the failed 1932 coup, the unemployment crisis and the 1933 insurrection, and the 1933 parliamentary elections and the following 1934 insurrection. Each of these examples show that the progression from a revolutionary window to a revolutionary situation was caused by the ideologically driven action of groups and organisations and not structural or deprivation factors.

6.2.1 The interdependence of "insurrectionary revolution" and "direct action"

As mentioned in section 6.1, the CNT was a radical organisation whose stated objective since 1919 has been the "absolute moral, economic and political liberation of mankind" which will be achieved once the "land, means of production and exchange have been socialised and the overweening power of the state has vanished" (statement of the principles of the CNT, 1919 quoted in Peirats, 2001: 11). The core concepts of "insurrectionary revolution" and "direct action" are both critical to understanding how the CNT expected to achieve these goals.

The core concept of “insurrectionary revolution” refers to the revolutionary theory of the CNT and the loose blueprint of the society that would replace capitalism. This conception included the abolition of wages and worker’s control of the means of production. A motion passed during the May 1936 Zaragoza conference (near the end of the revolutionary window) entitled *the confederal concept of libertarian communism* helps explain this concept.

The motion argues that revolution ultimately reflects “a violent act” in which the capitalist state is swept away. This violent act in enabled by a culmination of psychological, social, and organisational development and is thus “merely the phenomenon which effectively clears the way for a state of affairs which has slowly taken shape in the collective consciousness”. These developments are based on contradictions between “individual aspirations and needs” and “a given state of affairs”. This contradiction may lead to collective action, “clashes with the capitalist system”, and generate a feeling that organisation is needed “to create a force capable of imposing the realisation” of the revolution (the confederal concept of libertarian communism cited in Peirats, 2001: 104).

The goal of the revolution was to establish libertarian communism, an egalitarian society where private property, the state, the principle of authority, and classes have been abolished. The new society would be structured on the “libertarian commune” which is to be established in each locality and freely enter into agreements with other communes to federate at regional and national levels (the confederal concept of libertarian communism cited in Peirats, 2001: 105-106).

Three key elements are important in the CNT’s conception of revolution. First, the CNT sees revolution as an aggregated individual process. The need for organisation, or the need to take action emerge only after a feeling of divergence between individual aspirations and “a given state of affairs” is present. This does not mean that the CNT leaves the emergence of this divergence to chance. As discussed later, the concept of “direct action” helps shape both individual aspirations and needs and the perception of a given state of affairs. This signifies a close proximity between the concept of “insurrectionary revolution” and “direct action”.

The description of revolution as an event "which effectively clears the way for a state of affairs which has slowly taken shape in the collective consciousness" highlights the prefigurative element of the CNT's ideology. Thus, unlike the Bolsheviks, the CNT believed that changes in individual disposition needed to occur before a revolution could take place. Indeed, this change was what caused revolution itself. While the emphasis on revolution as a violent act can be interpreted as messianic (Hobsbawm, 2017: 119), the CNT's clarification clearly shows that this "clearing" involves a process which includes clashes (plural) with capitalism and experimentation with forms of organisation. Representing the CNT's revolutionary theory as "spontaneous and unstable" (Hobsbawm, 2017: 121-122) is therefore unjust.

A second key element in "insurrectionary revolution" is its emphasis on autonomy. Since the revolution depends on a subjective assessment of conditions, any group of workers within or outside of the CNT could determine that the time for the "violent act", an armed insurrection, has arrived. This laissez-faire approach towards starting the revolution corresponds to the core concept of "federalism", explained in the next section, which provided individual unions within the CNT autonomy of action. Due to the proximity of the concepts of "direct action" and "insurrectionary revolution", any false start of the revolution, regardless of the severity of the repression it would invite, was still viewed by the CNT as a school of revolution with valuable lessons for the future (Alexander: 1999: 108). This approach highlights elements of autonomy, self-determination, and anti-hierarchy as the CNT did not see its role as determining when, how, or who, should launch these insurrectionary actions. The CNT's focus on autonomy of action saw insurrections take place in January 1932, January 1933, and August 1934.

Third, since the revolution is seen as a "violent act", that simply "clears the way for a state of affairs which has slowly taken shape in the collective consciousness", the CNT does not see the violent act as one which may involve a prolonged process including the construction of a new society or the suppression of those who have not developed the necessary collective consciousness. In other words, the CNT does not see revolution as a process including a state of multiple sovereignty, but as a switch, an event, after which all the workers have to do the next day is to "do the same as they did the day before the upheaval"

(interview with García Oliver, CNT Cadre, cited in Christie, 2008: 121). As the next section illustrates, the fact that the revolutionary situation in 1936 was created by Franco's coup and not a worker led insurrection, left the CNT with a viscous conceptual explanation of what was taking place.

As mentioned, the concept of "insurrectionary revolution" is difficult to understand without the proximate concept of "direct action". "Direct action" refers to a range of actions which allowed the CNT to fight its revolutionary struggle on a day-to-day basis (Maura, 1970: 467). These actions ranged from workplace struggles including strikes, boycotts, and various forms of sabotage, and could spill out into the street in the form of a political general strike. "Direct action" could also extend beyond workplace disputes and into the use of calculated violence to rob banks with the purpose of funding union or revolutionary activities, or to assassinate certain oppressive employers or public and church officials (Alexander, 1999: 82-83).

"Direct action" does not only refer to a list of actions but the way in which these actions are deployed. In this sense, it represents a method. Vicente Ordóñez (2018: 77) identifies two key features of this method. The first is an absence of a corrective or regulatory actor. This means that direct action should be voluntary and independent of instruction from a higher body. Second, it is the role of those engaged in political struggles to define what action to take and what objective to pursue. This means a rejection of mediation between workers and employers or other targets of an action such as landlords or the state. As with "insurrectionary revolution", elements of democratic decision making, agency, and anti-hierarchy are embedded within the concept of "direct action" emphasising the autonomy of workers in deciding what, when, and how to take action.

The CNT extended its rejection of mediation to participation in electoral politics and the state which is taken to represent the largest mediator between the employing and working classes. Electoral politics, the CNT argued, would result in a deviation of the union from its working-class base. This is as electoral politics creates a layer of professional politicians who would dominate the movement and attempt to control it (Garner, 2006: 297). Theoretically, "direct action" also included abstention from participating in voting. However, as the

next section shows, the adjacent concept of “cooperation” and the periphery concept of “prison support” allowed the CNT to take a more flexible approach to voting.

“Direct action” decontested, and was decontested by, “insurrectionary revolution” in a way that enabled both, the improvement of current working conditions and exposing class contradictions to help engender class consciousness, solidarity, and the antagonism between workers and bosses (Rocker, 2004: 78). By class consciousness, the CNT meant increasing a worker’s “questioning of the fundamental principles of the social, political and economic system, and the affirmation of the will to destroy it" (Casanova, 2005a: 48). As such, the CNT hoped that the outcome of “direct action” would be an increased radicalism among workers through the day-to-day struggle which shaped “individual aspirations and needs” away from dominant value systems and towards collective action and libertarian communism. Any step in that direction by workers, be it a meeting, stoppage, or strike, was seen by the CNT as a heroic deed providing evidence of workers increasing their questioning of the social, political, and economic system. Even if a step taken by workers failed, it was still seen as a moral triumph or sacrifice towards the ultimate end (Casanova, 2005a: 45-46).

6.2.2 Conservative opposition to the Republic

The CNT was not the only organisation which opposed the republic during the revolutionary window. They were joined, for different reasons, by conservative groups and organisations, particularly the army, major landowners, and the Church (referred to as conservative forces here-on-in). These conservative forces saw the republic as a threat to their interests and launched a ceaseless campaign portraying the Republic as a threat to Hispanic civilization (Ben-Ami, 2002: 22) and mobilised “all the powerful resources at their disposal as a crusade to reassert the ‘traditional’ values of pre-Republican Spain” (Christie, 2008: 146). A closer look at how this campaign played out during the revolutionary window is aided by an understanding of the different yet converging interests of these three groups and organisations.

For the Church, the coming of the Republic meant the separation of Church and state, the introduction of civil law for marriages and divorce, the removal of state subsidies of clergy salaries, the banning of religious figures from teaching, and the disbanding of religious societies (Lannon, 2002: 35-36). While these new laws limited the power of the Church, its power had already been significantly eroded by 1931 with parishes struggling to maintain adherents (Lannon, 2002: 64). Despite this erosion, the Church was able to continue practicing its influence through the support of the dictatorship. However, with the arrival of an unsympathetic Republic, which embedded the removal of Church privileges in the constitution (Lannon, 2002: 35-36), the only hope the Church had to restore its privileges lay in its opposition to the Republic as a whole and a warmer embrace of the conservative forces that sought to unseat it. As such, the advent of the republic pushed the Church's ideology towards permeability with other undemocratic groups.

Large landholders also held anxieties about the new republic, however, they held significantly more power than the church due to their control over the means of production. Large landholders controlled over two-thirds of the country's arable land giving them immense power (Bailey, 2002: 6). Agricultural products also constituted half of Spain's income and two thirds of its exports. Landholders feared the redistribution of their land, a widespread demand among the 3 million sharecropping and landless agricultural workers (Bailey, 2002: 6) which the Republic promised to meet through an agrarian reform law. This made rural agitation a priority for landholders (Preston, 2002: 161-162) bringing them closer to the Church which they financially supported in lieu of their defence of private property (Lannon, 2002: 44).

Like the church, the army also lost some of its privileges with the coming of the Republic. For example, the army was stripped of its ability to make statements on civilian issues. Commanding generals were also no longer able to carry out judicial functions (Alpert, 2002: 205-206). In addition to losing some of its privileges, the Republic had promised to grant greater autonomy to regions in Spain, such as Catalonia, that had their own cultural identities (Alpert, 2002: 203, 206-207). This was seen as a threat to the unity of Spain. Finally, the increased antagonism between the working-class and employers created a sense of "disorder" the army could not stand by. This brought them closer to the

Church and landlords and all three began to view the Republic and the CNT as one and the same.

6.2.3 Struggles within the revolutionary window

For the ideologies of the CNT and conservative forces to be useful in explaining the polarisation that took place within the revolutionary window, they need to be contextualised within the Second Republic and the actions of the Republican government. The remainder of this section uses three historical examples to illustrate how the decisions of the groups and organisations involved in the "triple standoff" increased polarisation within the revolutionary window. These examples evidence that ideologically driven actions are more suitable for explaining the transition towards a revolutionary situation than structural factors or deprivation alone. Some background into how the Second Republic came to be and the reaction of conservative forces and the CNT to this event aids this endeavour.

The proclamation of a Second Republic on 14 April 1931 represented the culmination of a rapid process of democratisation which began with the collapse of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (in power since 1923) in January 1930. Rivera's dictatorship collapsed after an indication of no confidence from military generals and the king who were frustrated by economic mismanagement, inflation, and favouritism. In April 1931, municipal elections were held for the first time in nine years. Republican parties saw these elections as a plebiscite on the future political structure of Spain. Results would determine if Spain would continue as a Monarchy or become a Republic once again.

The election returned a landslide victory to Republican parties who won the election in 45 out of 52 provincial capital cities and several traditionally conservative villages (Ben-Ami, 2002: 23). These results represented the widespread consensus among various sections of society who aspired to escape the ills of dictatorship and the economic failures that came with it. Proletarians, who were growing in number, and the petty bourgeois sought to escape increasing taxation; rural districts sought protection from foreign imports; and professional classes desired to practice their political independence away from autocracy (Ben-Ami, 2002: 17-20). The results of municipal elections triggered

an orderly transition towards a republic. A provisional government was established, and the first democratic elections were held in June 1931 resulting in a socialist majority for the PSOE making it the "linchpin of the Second Republic" (Graham, 1987: 107).

While opposing the Republic, conservative forces operated within its structures (or de facto constituted a part of it, such as the army). However, this participation was confined to frustrating change and opposing Republic initiatives. This extended to a rejection of campaigning for constitutional change to regain their privileges as it was the democratic structures of the republic itself which they opposed (Lannon, 2002: 39, 41).

The CNT, on the other hand, refused to engage with the Republic. Buenaventura Durruti, a leading anarchist organiser and theoretician in the CNT and the *Federación Anarquista Ibérica* (FAI, Iberian Anarchist Federation), an anarchist group with significant overlapping membership with the CNT with a mission to uphold the revolutionary goals of the CNT (Alexander, 1999: 19; Christie, 2008: 36), and later militia column leader during the civil war, argued in 1931 that

> The Spanish Republic, as presently constituted, is a great threat to libertarian ideas, and of necessity, unless anarchists act vigorously, we will inevitably lapse into social democracy. The revolution has to be made: and made as soon as possible, since this Republic has offered the people no guarantees, economic or political. No way can we wait until the Republic finishes consolidating itself in its present makeup (Durruti, 1931 cited in Christie, 2008: 112)

The first example of the ideological conflict and polarisating characteristic of the revolutionary window coincides with the Republic's first task, the passing of an Agrarian Reform Law. As mentioned, this law was a popular demand and the Republic hoped that by challenging the large landholders it would relieve the hunger, unemployment, and poor wages experienced by rural workers.

Conservative forces immediately mobilised to frustrate this initiative in two critical ways. First, large landholders and the Church used various new founded or reinvigorated employers' associations to launch massive propaganda campaigns claiming that the Republic was destroying the agricultural industry. These efforts found their political expression in the *Confederación Española de*

Derechas Autónomas (CEDA, Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right). CEDA's short term objective was to block the roll out of land reform by playing an obstructionist role in parliament and mobilising Catholic smallholding peasants by generating fear around the collectivisation of land, a stated objective of the Socialists (Preston, 2002: 161, 163). The CEDA's long term objective, however, was nothing short of establishing an authoritarian Catholic state (Bolloten, 1991: 8), an ideological goal completely incompatible with the Republic.

When it seemed that political pressure was not enough to stop the roll out of a new agrarian law, conservative forces resorted to their second tool, a coup. In August 1932, in a prelude of what would happen in 1936, former general José Sanjurjo along with a handful of other officers and Carlists, who sought to re-establish the monarchy, launched a failed anti-republican coup. The failure of the coup was a result of division within the army rooted in the failures of Primo de Rivera's authoritarian model which had discredited military rule of the old caudillo type (Ben-Ami, 2002: 24). Despite this failure, it was clear that the army was willing to use unconstitutional means to restore its privileges. The cohesiveness and civilian support needed to successfully carry this out, however, would become available only after the elections of 1936 (Alpert, 2002: 208).

The Republic succeeded in passing the agrarian reform law in September 1932. However, it was so moderate that it had nearly no impact. Implementation of the law was also easily avoided by big landowners who had the support of the Civil Guard and provincial officials which left the federal government rather impotent (Preston, 2002: 168). It was not only conservative obstructionism that created such a toothless reform law. Land in Spain was heavily mortgaged and indebted to banks. A serious redistribution would have undermined not only the large landholders but would have crippled the entire Spanish financial system (Bailey, 2002: 6). The Republic's ideological adherence to market economics thus meant that its practice was constrained away from implementing a more comprehensive reform law.

The obstruction of conservative forces and the Republic's devotion to market economics reinforce a critical argument advanced by this dissertation; that ideology creates the structural conditions associated with crises. The actions of

both conservative forces and the Republic ensured that landlords could continue to pass losses experienced due to poor harvests to the workers in order to protect their profits (Preston, 2002: 167). This allowed for the continuity of hunger, unemployment, and low wages. However, these macro-factors which indicate deprivation are not enough to explain how they led to mobilisation and opposition. A look at the CNT's response to the unemployment crisis provides the second historical example and helps make that link.

6.2.4 The crisis of unemployment and the CNT

Writing about unemployment during Spain's revolutionary window, Jason Garner and José Benclowicz (2018) argue that, while unemployment figures are hard to establish due to the lack of reliable data, it is clear that by 1933 Spain was dealing with an acute crisis of unemployment. The CNT's main newspaper *Solidaridad Obrera* claimed that more than half a million workers were unemployed in January 1932, with 80% unemployment in the construction industry and 50% unemployment in the automobile industry (Garner and Benclowicz, 2018: 9). Official records released in August 1933 claimed that more than 280 thousand workers were out of work and slightly more than a quarter of a million only worked three or four days in a week (Garner and Benclowicz, 2018: 9).

The Republic attempted to tackle the problem of unemployment through arbitration committees. These committees brought together representatives for workers and employers to improve wages, cut working hours without cutting wages, and gradually extend social provisions (Juliá, 2002: 142). Arbitration committees were spearheaded by the PSOE and its affiliated Unión General De Trabajadores (UGT, General Union of Workers). The arbitration policy was largely successful, the UGT controlled almost all the workers' representative posts on the jury and there was a general increase in wages, labour laws were better enforced, and the working day was shortened (Juliá, 2002: 142).

However, arbitration committees had two weaknesses. First, the improvements they accrued largely benefited established trades such as telephone, rail, and commerce leaving out industries dominated by precarious work such as construction and hospitality. Second, arbitration was coupled with a government

policy aimed at balancing the budget and undertaking massive public work projects. This resulted in a lack of finance for commercial construction projects which further exacerbated mass unemployment already high due to the global economic crises (Blanch, 2013: 12; Juliá, 2002: 143-144).

The CNT explicitly rejected the arbitration committees as they represented mediating bodies between workers and employers, something which contradicted their conception of "direct action". Instead of the arbitration bodies, the CNT launched a national campaign aimed at the unemployed and organised them into committees of the unemployed (Garner and Benclowicz, 2018: 14). This campaign formed the basis of the periphery concept of "unemployment mobilisation" which, decontested by "direct action" helped interpret the deprivation experienced by the un and under-employed in new radical ways resulting in mobilisation.

Based on these concepts, the CNT argued that there was no reason for unemployment and that the state, local governments, and workplaces should immediately give work to the unemployed based on the size of their enterprises and as negotiated with the union (Garner and Benclowicz, 2018: 9). Additionally, they argued for the implementation of a 6-hour workday without pay cuts, the suppression of overtime, abolition of piecework pay, and the rejection of benefit pay which they saw as palliative (Garner and Benclowicz, 2018: 10, 13). While the CNT proposed policy alternatives to the government, they also consistently argued that policies are temporary fixes and the cause of the problems can only be remedied through revolution (Garner and Benclowicz, 2018: 17).

The CNT's opposition to arbitration committees saw the CNT's membership grow from 800,000 to over a million (Christie, 2008: 136), two-thirds of which were unemployed (Garner and Benclowicz, 2018: 9). In this example, the CNT's core concept of "direct action" not only allowed them to gain new members disenchanted with the policies of the PSOE and the Republic, but it also allowed them to create the conditions of this disenchantment. Through the committees of the unemployed, the CNT successfully involved those experiencing unemployment to collectively define the problem and propose solutions that effectively discredited the government's actions. As argued in section 4.4, this process of collective definition is critical in transforming deprivation into

mobilisation. Thus, it was the CNT's ideology, especially the core concept of "direct action" (as decontested within the CNT's morphology), not deprivation, which helped shape the mobilisation of workers and the form of restitution they sought, swaying them away from the solutions advocated for by the government and the PSOE.

In January 1933, in response to the unemployment crisis and the failure of the land reform law, the CNT planned a "coordinated national revolutionary insurrection" (Christie, 2008: 136) to overthrow the Republic and install libertarian communism. The insurrection was met with brutal repression from Republican forces. The most brutal of which was in the town of Casas Viejas where the local CNT leader and his family were burned alive in their home. Those who attempted to escape the flames were shot, as were other prisoners who were brought to the house following the fire and summarily executed (Alexander, 1999: 316-317; Christie, 2008: 140). The massacre in Casas Viejas, widely reported in print media, led to public outrage and the collapse of the PSOE-Republican government triggering early parliamentary election which were held in November 1933 (Preston, 2002: 172).

The CNT's 1933 insurrection reinforces the proximity between the concepts of "direct action" and "insurrectionary revolution". "Direct Action" relating to unemployment and deprivation engendered the contradiction between "individual aspirations and needs" and "a given state of affairs", cited as necessary for organisation and action within "insurrectionary revolution". The interaction of these concepts helped interpret deprivation and mobilise it towards undermining the Republic. The Republic's actions of responding to the insurrection by using the same methods of the dictatorship, itself a result of its market driven ideology, also further radicalised workers and peasants.

6.2.5 The *bienio negro* and the 1934 insurrection

The elections of November 1933 provide the third example of how the CNT facilitated polarisation within the Republic. In response to the collapse of the PSOE-Republican government, and in light of the repression it faced, the CNT launched an aggressive abstention campaign. The elections resulted in an overall abstention rate of 32 per cent and the PSOE only received 60 seats compared to

the 116 they gained in 1931, a clear indication of the dissatisfaction of workers with their past performance (Christie, 2008: 151). The new parliament was dominated by the CEDA with 115 seats.

The loss of the PSOE led to a genuine fear that Spain was following the example of fascist Germany (Blanch, 2013: 9) as the conservative parties, led by CEDA, promised to overturn all the reforms introduced in the first two years of the Republic. From 1933 to 1935, laws that fixed wages were revoked or left to lapse, labour courts were politicised to benefit employers, the institute of agrarian reform was stripped of its funding, and the Catalan statute of Autonomy was suspended (Bolloten, 1991, 3; Blanch, 2013: 11). For this reason, the period was dubbed the *bienio negro* (the Black Biennium) by the Socialists.

In response to their defeat and the overturning of reforms, the PSOE and the UGT adopted a more radical stance promising to bring around a revolution through a revolutionary general strike. The newfound radicalism of the PSOE and UGT consolidated the right around the belief that continued disruption was part of a plan to bring the economic collapse needed as a precondition of revolution (Preston, 2002: 160; Bolloten, 1991: 16). The CNT's abstention campaign, a practice emanating from the core concept of "direct action", thus helped further polarise groups and organisations during the revolutionary window.

While the elections of 1933 produced a CEDA majority, the Spanish president refused to let CEDA members enter the cabinet in an effort to maintain the peace. However, in October 1934, after a campaign against this exclusion, the CEDA was given three ministerial seats. This was seen as an existential fascist threat by the PSOE who, spurred by their newfound radicalism, called for a revolutionary general strike without seeking the support of the CNT (Bolloten, 1991: 8-9; Christie, 2008: 161).

The general strike failed to make headway except for the northern mining regions of Asturias which saw socialists, anarchists, and communists work together to carry out an insurrection (Bolloten, 1991: 9). In the rest of the country, the strike failed to bring about any change. The PSOE and UGT put forward a program that only sought to subdue the military forces of the state and replace the existing political authorities (Shubert, 2002: 130). These

moderate demands led to workers staying at home instead of remaining mobilised in the streets and factories as they had in the past. The attempted revolution fizzled away in the face of repression and workers simply drifted back to work (Julia, 2002, 148-149).

In the Asturian region, however, 30,000 workers gained control over one-third of the province and 80% of the population, they established libertarian communism by setting up revolutionary committees, and through their control of industries, abolished money and even started producing armoured vehicles (Shubert, 2002: 130). However, after close to two weeks of fighting, sections of the army, supported by Moroccan troops and Foreign Legionnaires led by General Francisco Franco crushed the uprising (Bolloten, 1991: 9; Christie, 2008: 161).

Despite its failures across the rest of Spain, the 1934 uprising illustrated the proliferation of the radical concepts within the CNT, especially that of "insurrectionary revolution". The lengthy contact of socialists with militants of the CNT made them more willing to coordinate action at local levels even if this went against the wishes of their national organisations (Julia, 2002: 146). While muted, even the general strike called for by the PSOE represented an adoption of forms of "direct action" which were central to the CNT's practices during this period. For the CNT, the libertarian communism established in Asturias would become a model of the many collectives they would control throughout the revolutionary situation. The 1934 insurrection also convinced Conservative forces that any future failure at the ballots would spell the end of traditional Spain. Thus, a coup was recognised as the only remaining option available to them (Christie, 2008: 165).

This section has shown how the mobilisation taking place during the revolutionary window was not a result of structural factors or of deprivation. The section argued that structural factors, such as high unemployment and low wages, were a result of conscious decisions made in accordance to the ideologies of groups and organisations. Large landlords suppressed wages to pass on the costs of bad harvests and protect their profits. Unemployment was exacerbated by the Republic's policy of balancing the budget which resulted in capital being diverted away from the private market. The PSOE's policy of arbitration committees also excluded a large section of the workforce form the benefits

they offered. The deprivation caused by these decisions led to mobilisation due to the process of collective definition enabled by the CNT's concepts of "direct action" and "insurrectionary revolution". Absent this process, workers may have acquiesced to other solutions or simply accepted deprivation. This analysis provides evidence of the advantages of ideological analysis in explaining mobilisation during revolutionary processes over structural and deprivation theories.

6.3 Abandoning insurrection for collaboration

The previous section argued that mobilisation towards a revolutionary situation was a result of the polarisation caused by the ideological opposition of conservative forces and the CNT to the Republic. This section explores how the revolutionary window was pushed into a revolutionary situation, and how this transition was interpreted by the CNT. The section argues that the CNT's decision to join the Republic after the onset of the revolutionary situation, and therefore the process of revolution, is better understood by studying the changes that took place within its ideological morphology, particularly the interaction of the concepts of "federalism", "cooperation", and "prisoner support". Studying the changes within the CNT's ideological morphology provide a better understanding of why the CNT abandoned its goal of revolution than rival, purportedly ideologically neutral interpretative frameworks such as Rational Choice Theories (RCT).

The section begins by explaining the core concept of "federalism" and its decontestation within the CNT's ideological morphology. This conceptual analysis is followed by an account of the 1936 election campaign highlighting the adjacent and periphery concepts of "cooperation" and "prisoner support" and their role in altering the decontestation of "direct action". The section ends by explaining how the transition into a revolutionary situation, caused by Franco's coup, resulted in two critical changes in the CNT's ideological morphology. First, the cannibalisation of the concepts of "insurrectionary revolution" and "direct action" whose elements, in part, formed the new core concept of "anti-fascist unity" and the new adjacent concept of "industrial federalism". Second, the movement of the concept of "cooperation" from an adjacent to core position and its new reconceptualization as "collaboration". The section critically

assesses the account of this change provided by other historians and researchers to reinforce the argument, made in section 2.3, that changes within the ideological morphology of groups and organisations and the emergence of a dominant discourse have a critical impact on the process of revolutions.

6.3.1 The flexibility of "federalism"

The core concept of "federalism" represented the organisational and decision-making processes of the CNT which, like the other core concepts of "direct action" and "insurrectionary revolution", contained elements of prefiguration and anti-hierarchy. It thus reflected both, the way the CNT organised itself, and an example of what a post-revolutionary society could look like. The building block of the CNT was the *sindicato único,* industrial unions where skilled and unskilled workers in a workplace are organised together instead of by trade or craft (Alexander, 1999: 74; Bookchin, 1998: 154, 165). Individual industrial workplace unions were grouped into local confederations. Local confederations were grouped into regional confederations. The regional confederations represented the national organisation. And the entire union was guided by the National Committee, elected by delegates at national conferences. Despite having a guiding body, the federalist structure of the CNT ensured the complete autonomy of its lower bodies. This meant that no section of the CNT was bound to or could be compelled by the decisions made by the National Committee (Bookchin, 1998: 144, 154). The CNT was thus built from the bottom up and related to each other the same way that "libertarian communes" would once libertarian communism was achieved.

Murray Bookchin, writing on the history of anarchism in Spain before the civil war and revolution explains that "federalism" within the CNT was meant to avoid the domination of decision making by a minority of individuals and maintain "vitality at the base of the organization" ensuring "living control and initiative from below" (Bookchin, 1998: 146). The mutual decontestation of "federalism" with "direct action" reinforces the CNT's emphasis on the self-direction and agency of the workers themselves. To ensure the autonomy of workers, the CNT's only paid members were the general and regional secretaries. This was meant to safeguard the union from the creation of a middle-level bureaucracy that would direct the union as it pleases (Maura, 1970:

471; Bookchin, 1998: 47). Decisions at all levels were meant to be made by elected delegates, not representatives, who would have been informed on how to vote on specific issues by the bodies they were sent to represent.

While federalism created a perception of equality amongst members, the same names of CNT militants (cadres) continue to appear at regional and national levels and the average union affiliated to the CNT did not play a major role in the decision making of the CNT outside of their union (Garner, 2006: 297-298). "Federalism" also created confusion around who had delegated authority to make critical decisions especially when cadres were members of more than one CNT body. The insurrection of 1933, explained above, provides a good example of how "federalism" led to unnecessary loss and suffering making it worth looking into in some more detail.

The 1933 insurrection began in Catalonia. Manuel Rivas, who was based there, was the Secretary of both the National Defence Committee and the CNT National Committee. Rivas sent a telegraph to other regional committees to inform them of the start of the insurrection in Catalonia. However, the telegraph did not have a signature making the intention of the telegraph unclear. This was critical as, based on CNT rules, defence committees were not permitted to call for mobilisations, that task was reserved to the National Committee (Casanova, 2005: 43). Regional committees mistook Rivas' informational telegraph for an order from the CNT National Committee to join the insurrection. This was not the case as the National Committee had opposed the insurrection, and the insurrection had already been crushed in Catalonia by the time the telegraphs were received (Christie, 2008: 137-139). Regional committees still answered the "call" for an uprising resulting in unnecessary losses for the CNT.

Even when proper procedure was followed, "federalism" meant that a minority could influence the direction of the overall union in a disproportionate manner. For example, during the extraordinary congress of 1931, a motion was proposed on the establishment of National Industrial Federations (NIFs). NIFs were meant to help organise individual industrial unions into a national framework to counteract the concentration of capital and help guide the work of individual industrial unions. The motion found its detractors who charged it with creating a bureaucracy and breaking with federalist principles. Nevertheless, the motion

was passed with an overwhelming majority of 302,343 votes in favour to 90,671 against with 10,957 abstentions (Peirats, 2001: 41- 45). Despite such a majority, this mandated change never came about as minority opposition was successful at frustrating its implementation at local levels of the union successfully sabotaging its implementation across the whole of the union.

The core concept of "federalism" thus successfully safeguarded the union from the creation of an official bureaucracy that will practice power over the organisation. However, it also allowed for the activities of an *unofficial leadership* which faced little accountability due to the diffuse nature of the CNT's structure and its emphasis on autonomy. This was not a result of a lack of formal structures but a consequence of it (for a broader discussion on power and leadership in anarchist organising see Gordon, 2008: Chapter 3). The critical effects of the concept of "federalism" are better understood when looked at in relation to the concepts of "cooperation" and "prison support" during the 1936 elections.

6.3.2 "Cooperation" and "prison support"

The previous section briefly explained how, following the socialist defeat at the polls in November 1933, local UGT and CNT committees saw increased "cooperation" amongst each other despite the disapproval of the UGT's national executive committee (Julia, 2002: 146). This included collaboration during the 1934 insurrection in Asturias where socialists, anarchists, and communists worked together to run factories and councils under workers' control (Bolloten, 1991: 9). By May 1936, CNT delegates at the Zaragoza conference passed a motion arguing for a "revolutionary unification" with the UGT (motion on revolutionary alliances, cited in Peirats, 2001: 100).

This "cooperation" was indicative of an increased, and historically specific, radicalism among the working class. The CNT's willingness to cooperate with other groups was thus also historically specific and dependent on the stances other unions and organisation took towards the CNT. As such, the concept of "cooperation" was shaped by changes within the field of power and the relationship of groups within it. The adjacent position or "cooperation", due to its historical dependency, and its decontestation by the core concepts of "direct

action" and "insurrectionary revolution", constrained and excluded direct collaboration with the state. However, it was also decontested by the periphery concept of "prisoner support" which played a central role in the 1936 elections.

Like the 1933 elections, the 1936 elections were not scheduled but called following the dissolution of parliament after it was rocked by several corruption and embezzlement scandals (Blanch, 2013: 13-14). The 1936 elections saw the emergence of the Popular Front (PF) coalition which brough Socialists, Communists, and Republican parties into an alliance to challenge CEDA's hegemony (Graham, 1987: 109). The centre piece of the PF's electoral campaign was an amnesty law to release the more than 30,000 prisoners held in Republic jails, most of which were CNT members (Peirats, 2001: 88; Graham, 1987: 109).

While not a member of the PF, the CNT had been actively organising prisoner-solidarity committees. These committees were meant to agitate for prisoner releases and fund-raise for family members (Casanova, 2005a: 43-44). Embodying the concept of "prisoner support", prisoner-solidarity committees, as decontested by "direct action", allowed the CNT to maintain a high level of mobilisation among CNT members therefore highlight the antagonisms that would form the basis of the PF's campaign. The periphery concept of "prisoner support" was thus highly permeable with the ideological morphology of the PF and their amnesty law.

Since concepts mutually decontest each other, the concept of "prisoner support" also softened the CNT's interpretation of "direct action" expanding the meaning of "cooperation" permitting the CNT to put on, what Italian Anarchist and critic of the CNTs actions during the revolution Vernon Richards called, a timid abstention campaign in 1936 when compared to 1933 (Richards, 1983: 18). Thus, although the CNT passed a resolution committing itself to abstention (Peirats, 2001: 91), several publications and speeches made it clear that the release of prisoners can only be secured by a victory of the Popular Front (Ealham, n10, in Peirats, 2001: 93). Under these conditions, the 1936 elections saw the highest level of electoral participation during the Second Republic resulting in a narrow victory for the Popular Front (Blanch, 2013: 15).

The concept of “cooperation” was also shaped by the increased agitation of the Right. Even before the elections were held, the CNT was preparing itself for the eventuality of a military coup, warning its members of increased activity amongst military generals, identifying Morocco as their staging grounds (Richards, 1983: 20-23). A statement from the National Committee of the CNT issued two days before the elections warned that "No matter who opens the hostilities seriously, democracy will perish between two fires because it is irrelevant and has no place on the field of battle. Either fascism or social revolution" (cited in Christie, 2008: 175-176). Based on this assessment, the CNT signed an agreement with the Catalan government, the Generalitat, stating that it would work with any other groups and organisations willing to fight the fascist threat (Christie, 2008: 181-182).

While “cooperation” was, through its decontestation with “prisoner support”, extended to voting and working with groups and organisations to fight fascism, it was still firmly rooted in “insurrectionary revolution” and the assumption that the Republic was likely to collapse. The concept was thus constrained from participating directly in parliamentary politics as the CNT did immediately after the failed coup. The final part of this section will show how the interaction of “federalism” with the concept of “insurrectionary revolution” allowed for the transformation of the concept of “cooperation” into “collaboration” through its movement from an adjacent to core position.

6.3.3 “Collaboration” and the revolutionary situation

The revolutionary situation in Spain came about quickly after the results of the February 1936 elections were announced. Franco and the CEDA immediately called for the election results to be annulled (Blanch, 2013: 16) plunging the country in a state of “latent civil war” which would continue until the start of the coup on 19 July 1936. Summarising the period, Stuart Christie, anarchist activist and historian of the FAI says

> there were an estimated 113 general strikes and 228 partial stoppages; 1,287 people were wounded in clashes with the security forces or political confrontations, and 269 people killed. There were 213 recorded assassinations, or attempted assassinations, the majority of them carried out by gunmen of the Falange Española, the Spanish

> fascist organisation called into being by a desperate and cornered agrarian capitalist class (Christie, 2008: 177).

With no immediate political route to implement change, conservative forces mustered around the army for salvation. A plan was drawn up for a coup and support was garnered from the Falange and Carlists. These two parties would legitimise the coup by providing it with civilian support (Alpert, 2002: 208).

The coup began in Spanish Morocco and the Canary Islands on July 17, 1936, where General Franco was based (Alexander, 1999: 124). By July 20, Franco's rebels successfully controlled most of Andalusia, except for its capital, Malaga, the central areas of Old Castile and Leon, and the northern areas of Navarre and parts of Galicia (Alexander, 1999: 139).

Despite this success, the coup was foiled in other areas by the majority section of the army which remained loyal to the Republic, including 50 per cent of the Civil Guard, and 70 per cent of the Assault guards (Alexander, 1999: 123; Yeoman, 2019: 431). Collaborating in this resistance was the CNT and the UGT who on July 18 declared a general strike, acquired weapons by storming rebellious military barracks, and organised their members into armed militias (Alexander, 199: 126; Peirats, 2001: 116). As a result of the failed coup, Spain was broken into 4 isolated sections.



Figure 8 - Division of Spain after the failure of Franco's coup (Bolloten, 1991: 44)

The government's response to the coup was confused. On the 17th they issued a statement claiming that the rebellion had been thwarted. The next day, they had to concede that Seville, in the south of Spain, had fallen to Franco's rebels. The government then resigned and a new one was formed with the intent to compromise with the rebels. That government lasted barely 24 hours before it was replaced by yet another one (Peirats, 2001: 116; Alexander, 1999: 124). Between its own confusions and inaction, and its loss of control over the coercive apparatus, the republic, as the CNT expected, had melted away and was unable to enforce its sovereignty. The republic's loss was largely the CNT's gain, with weapons now in its arms it had emerged as the dominant organisation in post-coup Spain (Peirats, 2001: 131).

Workers within Republic held territories organised themselves into revolutionary committees in factories, neighbourhoods, and rural communities (Alexander, 1999: 332; Christie, 2008: 186; Thomas, 1971: 240). These committees practiced legislative and executive powers while also carrying out forms of popular justice (Bolloten, 1991: 65-66). The committees sought to fundamentally transform the

economic and social relations in the territories under its control by setting up urban and rural collectives. Collectives were not exclusively run by the CNT, they were usually proportioned based on union representation among the workers, thus a vast majority were organized based on an alliance between the CNT and the UGT despite the differences these organization held at the top (Thomas, 1971: 242 - 243), recreating the grass roots alliances seen during the uprising of 1934.

Despite this domination over the Republic, the CNT, instead of completing the revolution and abolishing the state, chose to become a part of it. In July 1936, they joined the Catalan government (Bolloten, 1991: 393). In September 1936, they fought to gain four ministerial positions within the national government in Madrid (Bolloten, 1991: 200-205).

Why did the CNT choose to collaborate with the state instead of striving for its stated objective of libertarian communism? According to Rational Choice Theories, the CNT should have balanced their preferred outcomes with possible costs to maximise benefits (Friedman and Hechter, 1988: 202). The CNT's preferred outcome was clearly libertarian communism which it consistently fought for throughout the revolutionary window. Within the revolutionary situation, the cost of state repression, which denied the transition to libertarian communism was removed. Yet, the CNT did not act on its objectives. It can be said that the perceived costs and benefits changed within the CNT, this would be correct, yet RCT does not provide the tools through which this change can be studied or explained. More importantly, it cannot explain how any changes in cost-benefit analysis became dominant across the entire organisation.

Historians have successfully identified the changes of perceived costs and benefits within the CNT. Yet, they mimic an RCT approach by not adequately engaging with the question of how or why these perceptions became dominant. For example, Burnet Bolloten (1991: 210, 391), a journalist who was based in Spain during the Revolution and Civil War, and later historian, uses the CNT's own words to present four key justifications of why the CNT entered the government. First, to ensure that the anarchists were not "dislodged" from the revolution (cost avoidance). Second, to provide the appearance that a legal government was in control to secure military aid from capitalist countries

(benefit in the confrontation with Franco's forces). Third, to give legal validity to the gains of the CNT, discussed in the next section (cost avoidance). Fourth, to avoid declaring the government moot and installing in its place an "Anarchist dictatorship" (negative opportunity cost). While Bolloten's breakdown is useful, the first three justifications are contingent on the final one. That is, the benefits and costs of "collaboration" can only come into play after the decision against declaring the government moot had been taken. Bolloten does not highlight this critical feature undermining any explanation of how these cost benefit valuations changed. He also does not explain how these justifications became dominant across the whole organisation.

Stuart Christie (2008) adequately confronts the question of how these calculations became dominant by pointing out that the start of the civil war saw decision making power shift from rank-and-file members to the regional committees now staffed by active militants (189). Christie correctly identifies this as "leaderism" (198), in other words, a failure and overriding of the concept of "federalism" in favour of the experience of active members, the cadre. As such a select few were able to unilaterally decide to join the Catalan and national governments.

Despite this accurate analysis, Christie argues that this transfer of power was caused by a fear that by ushering in libertarian communism, the role of militants will become superfluous (186). In other terms, that the cost of libertarian communism is too high for militants. This, on its own, is unconvincing since, as Christie notes, militants had expressed a lifelong commitment to libertarian communism up to that point. Thus, while Christie's analysis helps explain how "cooperation" moved from an adjacent to core position within the CNT's ideological morphology, his reliance on RCT analysis still does not explain why "cooperation" was transformed into "collaboration" or the role a fear of an "anarchist dictatorship" played in the process.

To answer the question of why the CNT abandoned their goal of libertarian communism, and therefore how "cooperation" transformed into "collaboration", involves looking at the specificity of the historical moment and the relationship of the concepts of "cooperation" to the concept of "insurrectionary revolution". As explained in the previous section, the concept of "insurrectionary revolution"

saw revolution as a “violent act” representing a switch between capitalism and libertarian communism. As such, it does not account for a state of multiple sovereignty.

Since the near collapse of the state was not brought about by a “violent act” led by the workers after they developed a revolutionary consciousness but by a failed military coup. And since, in whatever reduced capacity it existed, the state remained a social force standing in the way of Franco’s rebels. And since the revolutionary committees which emerged in Republican held territories developed along lines that represented a division of power between the CNT and the UGT, and not along the lines of libertarian communism. Key members of the CNT, assessing the situation, decided that replacing the newly emerging structures with libertarian communism would require their elimination. This, they theorised, would be tantamount to installing an “anarchist dictatorship” as it would not reflect the consent of workers who had fought alongside the CNT in other groups and organisations to crush the coup. Militant in the CNT, enabled by the concept of “federalism” thus concluded that the objective condition for social revolution was not ripe (Yeoman, 2019: 438; Peirats, 2001: 131; Baily, 2002: 15; Bolloten, 1991: 391-392; Christie, 2008: 186). Therefore, “cooperation” was extended to include “collaboration” with the government which was now on equal footing with the CNT in its opposition to Franco’s rebellion.

Once the leading members of the CNT had decided that the objective condition for social revolution was not ripe, they began seeing their participation in the government as a right. Through its role in suppressing the rebellion, the CNT’s leaders argued that it deserved recognition and needed to be accepted as a legitimate voice of the people (Peirats, 2001: 165). This recognition was to be sought from the central government in the form of government seats, not from the membership. Revolutionary duty became defined as gaining as much influence as possible within state institutions which was the exclusive and only acceptable battle ground in which unity of action with all other parties can be taken (Peirats, 2001: 154). Even the FAI, considered the most militant section of the CNT, was arguing that "it is the duty of all anarchists to take a place in whatever public institutions may serve to consolidate and to bolster the new state of affairs" (cited in Peirats, 2005: 209). The justifications provided by

Bolloten and Christie, only make sense once the interaction of the three concepts of “insurrectionary revolution”, “federalism”, and “cooperation” are taken into consideration.

It is worth clarifying that the ideological analysis above differs from the conclusion reached by Jamie Balius (1978[1934]). Balius was a member of the CNT and the *Friends of Durruti* group, a left opposition operating within the CNT fighting against the concept of “cooperation”. He argued that the CNT lacked an “organism” capable of repressing, “in an organised sense” and “with the utmost energy”, “hostile sectors” who “are not identified with the working class”. While the CNT had a theoretical, and in turn an organisational weakness, around their role should a situation of multiple sovereignty arise, their motion on *the confederal concept of libertarian communism*, passed a few months before the coup, had detailed instruction on what the post-capitalist society would look like. The 1934 insurrection also gave them practical experience in organising such a society. As the next section shows, CNT run collectives also had no problem supressing “hostile sectors”. However, they were unable to do this in a concerted way without the support of the entire organisation. The weakness of the CNT thus lay in the ability of a minority to override, based on their own interpretations, previously dominant discourses.

The interaction of “federalism” with a specific interpretation of “insurrectionary revolution” resulted in a new decontestation of “cooperation” as “collaboration” and its move from an adjacent to core position. With “collaboration” now a core concept in the CNT’s ideological morphology, “insurrectionary revolution”, “direct action”, and “federalism”, were cannibalised. “Insurrectionary revolution”, was reconceptualised as “revolution” and moved to a periphery position indicating the importance the CNT placed on first crushing the rebellion. Only after that eventuality could revolution be discussed under new historical circumstance. Other elements of “insurrectionary revolution” including its anti-capitalist connotations merged with the remaining elements of “federalism” to form the adjacent concept of “industrial federalism”. Finally, “direct action” was integrated into the concept of “anti-fascist unity” which maintained “collaboration” within the shared collectives. The next section turns its attention to these concepts of “anti-fascist unity” and “ industrial federalism”.

6.4 Wasting the material advantage and losing the war

The CNT's abandonment of "insurrectionary revolution" and their inclusion in the post-coup Republican government meant that the Republic could now benefit from the collectives under the control of the CNT. This provided the Republic (now including the CNT) with a mobilised material advantage over Franco's rebels. The Republic still held control over 60 per cent of the population, key for conscription, the main commercial cities, and almost the entirety of Spain's industrial bases. Additionally, the Republic had control over the central administration apparatuses and the central bank which held the second largest gold reserves in the world (Marti-Acena et al., 2012: 146; Richards, 1983: 36). Despite this material advantage, Franco's forces would emerge victorious by April 1939.

Irrespective of the CNT's post-coup ideological permeability with the Republic, the Republic continued to see the CNT as a threat to its sovereignty. This constrained it from utilising resources controlled by the CNT which were readily available to it, especially the war industries in Catalonia. Instead, the Republic focused on subduing these collectives. This diverted important resources to the rear and undermined the operation and efficiency of the collectives. The Republic's refusal to use unsubdued CNT collectives increased its dependence on foreign aid leading to the loss of sovereignty it was attempting to avoid sabotaging its own ability to wage war effectively.

While the concept of "collaboration" dominated the CNT's ideological morphology making it highly permeable with the Republic's morphology, it was still decontested by the concepts of "anti-fascist unity" and "industrial federalism". These concepts meant that the CNT, especially at local levels, resisted full submission to the Republic if this submission was not seen as necessary to the war effort. However, this resistance, due to the concept of "collaboration", excluded any practices that would threaten the existence of the Republic. This left the CNT unwilling to directly confront the Republic and overcome its consistent failures in waging war or its increased dependence on foreign aid.

This final section argues that the eventual defeat of Republican forces was caused by the ideological deadlock between the Republic and the CNT. This deadlock is better at explaining the eventual defeat of the Republic and, by virtue of their collaboration, the CNT, than resource mobilisation theory. The section first provides more details on the collectives under the control of the CNT through the concepts of "anti-fascist unity" and "industrial federalism" which contained the remaining elements of "federalism" and "direct action". The section then explains the Republic's attempts at subduing these collectives, its dependence on foreign aid, and how this resulted in the atrophy of its sovereignty. Finally, the section explains the final break between the Republic and the CNT a few months before Franco's victory and the end of the revolutionary window.

6.4.1 Collectives in the civil war

As mentioned in the previous section, Franco's failed coup left the state without effective control over its coercive apparatus and resulted in a transfer of weapons to the CNT and workers in general. In most areas, it was the workers, the unions, and the parties they belonged to who mobilised to crush the coup. This initiative allowed them to replace local state apparatuses with revolutionary committees in factories, neighbourhoods, and rural communities (Alexander, 1999: 332; Christie, 2008: 186; Thomas, 1971: 240). These committees practiced legislative and executive powers while also carrying out forms of popular justice (Bolloten, 1991: 65-66). Regional and local committees carried out all the functions that a regional government would organising on lines closer to war communism that the free association the CNT had argued for (Alexander, 1999: 818). The committees fundamentally transformed the economic and social relations in the territories under their control by setting up urban and rural collectives.

One-third of all rural land in Republican Spain, representing two-thirds of the cultivated land, was taken over by the collectives (Alexander, 1999: 326). Urban collectives, on the other hand, spanned from all sorts of factories including heavy industry, textiles, and wares, utilities, transport, and commercial functions including international import and export. Workers took over 80 per

cent of firms in Catalonia, 60 per cent in the Levante, and 30 per cent in Madrid (Alexander, 1999: 463).

CNT members within the collectives built genuine alliances among workers belonging to the UGT, CNT, and the *Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista* (POUM, Workers' Party of Marxist Unification), an independent, revolutionary, Marxist organisation. Seats on collective committees were distributed on a proportional basis representing the distribution of workers across the unions and were usually assigned not elected (Alexander, 1999: 818). Workers and organisations who were active in or sympathised with the rebellion were denied the opportunity to speak or vote (Peirats, 2005: 28). The arming of the workers also meant that they could use coercive force to carry out forms of popular justice against priests, landowners, money lenders, and merchants (Bolloten, 1991: 78). These alliances, best represent the concept of "anti-fascist unity" and were fully compatible with the core concept of "collaboration" as all unions and parties were united in their goal of opposing Franco's rebellion. Despite this compatibility, the primary goal of defeating Franco meant that the concept of "anti-fascist unity" was proportionally smaller than the concept of "collaboration". This meant that the collectives remained subordinate to the Republic and could only play the role of "loyal opposition" even when they disagreed with decisions made by the central government.

While not reflective of the CNT's final goal of libertarian communism, the collectives preserved elements of the core concept of "insurrectionary revolution" most prominent of which was workers control. In line with the confederal concept of libertarian communism passed by the CNT in May 1936, a producers (workers) assumed "charge of the direct administration of production and consumption" (the confederal concept of libertarian communism cited in Peirats, 2001: 105). This meant that workers themselves determined what is to be produced, how it will be produced, and how it should be distributed for consumption. In many situations, previous employers or managers were retained as advisors while decision-making power lay in the hands of the committees elected by workers (Thomas, 1971: 244).

The commitment to libertarian communism could also be found in the collectives' relationship with money. In rural collectives, money was replaced by

ration cards based on family size, allowing workers to freely access foodstuffs based on the number of members in their family (Alexander, 1999: 329; Thomas, 1971: 250). Urban collectives implemented a system of producers' cards where measures of output were interchangeable for supplies. In some collectives, however, salaries and the money system were maintained due to opposition by non-CNT members (Alexander, 1999: 533). Even though wages were maintained, they were increased and a slew of benefits previously unavailable to workers, from days off to free medical care and spousal benefits were.

To help organise work on a national level, the CNT implemented national industrial federations (NIFs) which were previously jettisoned by a minority within the union (Peirats, 2005: 32). Rural collectives engaged in trade and barter with neighbouring cities and soon set up local, provincial, and regional federations (Alexander, 1999: 329). This form of organising the collectives reflected the remaining elements of the core concept of "federalism" now reconceptualised as the adjacent concept of "industrial federalism". The reconceptualization of "federalism" into "industrial federalism" reflects the restriction of autonomous decision making, previously the centrepiece of CNT organising, to the economic functioning of collectives alone. Decisions involving the political position of the CNT were now made by the National Committee. Regional bodies became largely cosmetic, their role reduced to ratifying recommendations put forward by the National Committee without reverting to the membership (Alexander, 1999: 682).

By any metric, collectives were a "considerable social success" (Thomas, 1971: 254). Collectives were able to substantially increase levels of output. Those which did not abolish money sold or exported their goods instead of trading them and were financially successful. Collectives also had a critical impact on morale as the anarchists had a focus on education and health, converting many churches into schools or hospitals (Alexander, 1999: 353, 675).

Not only were collectives successful in the conventional economic sense, but they also saw a great deal of innovation and self-organisation. New mines were opened to supply factories with raw materials, especially coal (Alexander, 1999, 387), factories were rapidly transformed to produce arms and war equipment (Alexander, 1999, 467), these "war industries", were virtually non-existent in

Spain before the war. Thus, collectives played a central role in ensuring the Spanish economy returned to and continued to function as best as possible in wartime conditions (Alexander, 1999: 487). The ability of collectives to increase production, establish new workplaces, and undertake rapid transformation is even more impressive when considering the conditions of war under which they were being managed. Most detrimental to their functioning was the mobilisation and conscription of workers into combat which left collectives with staff shortages (Peirats, 2006: 127).

The ability of the CNT to collaborate with other unions and parties to fundamentally transform social and economic relations within the collectives' points to the availability of and viability of alternatives to "collaboration". The fact that this alternative was not taken by the union reinforces the argument made in the previous section, that it was not simply the concept of "insurrectionary revolution" which limited the CNTs fulfilment of libertarian concept, but its interaction with "federalism" which allowed decision making power to be concentrated within the cadre. It is this interaction of the two concepts which resulted in a decontestation that favoured "collaboration".

The Republic's reaction to the collectives was negative. Instead of working with the CNT and other collectives, it quickly moved to subdue them. These actions meant the Republic would squander its material advantage over Franco's forces. The Republic's ideological commitment to subdue collectives reinforces the argument that the availability of resources to groups and organisations, and the probability that these resources will be available when needed (Tilly, 1978: 61), is not enough to understand the process of revolution. It was not the resources which either the Republic or Rebel side began with which determined the outcome of the war, rather it was how these resources were managed (Marti-Acena et al., 2012: 161). Section 4.3 argued that the manner in which groups and organisations manage their resources and the ends to which they chose to mobilise them is a product of their ideological morphology. A closer look at the ideology motivating the Republic and its allies explains how this material advantage was wasted.

6.4.2 Republican opposition to collectives and the growth of the PCE

The Republic's opposition to the collectives was motivated by the hope that it could gain the support of Britain and France in the war. In trying to make its ideology more permeable with those liberal countries, the Republic sought to eliminate any sources that could be seen as a challenge to its sovereignty or, by virtue of their anti-capitalist rhetoric, create anxiety for potential liberal allies. If it succeeded in doing this, the Republic hoped to raise the issue of Italian and German intervention in the war on the side of Franco to the League of Nations. The Republic also assumed that legitimacy in the eyes of France and Britain would allow it to purchase weapons freely (Bolloten, 1991: 168). The collectives and the CNT's revolutionary mission were seen as direct threats to these goals.

However, no curtailing of the revolution would have resulted in Britain and France sending aid to Spain (Bolloten, 1971: 153). Both countries were more fearful of being drawn into a confrontation with Germany (Graham, 1987: 117), which they saw as a bulwark against communism, than a fascist Spain (Bolloten 1991: 171, 176). Not only did France and Britain not help the Republic, but they initiated a Non-Intervention Agreement (NIA) which included 26 other countries. The Non-Intervention agreement meant to maintain a neutral stance towards the civil war among its signatories (Whealey, 1977: 146-147). In reality, the NIA denied the sales of armaments to the Republic, stripping any privilege implicit in the diplomatic recognition they were fighting for. The Non-Intervention policy thus gave Germany and Italy a free hand in supplying arms to the rebels (Peirats, 2005: 1). Eventually, the US also launched an embargo on weapons sales to Spain leaving the Republic even more isolated (Peirats, 2005: 6). This isolation did not push the Republic to reconsider its stance towards the collectives, but resulted in a closer alliance between Spain and the USSR.

The USSR's interest in Spain lay in its fear that Britain, France, and Nazi Germany may unite against it. Believing that France and Britain could not allow Spain to fall under the tutelage of Italy or Germany to preserve their own interests (Bolloten, 1991: 184), the USSR, led foremost by Russia, hoped that they would be able to draw out France and Britain from their isolation in the name of "collective security" (Kowalsky, 2014: 164) by intervening in Spain. The

USSR could either intervene to prolong the civil war until it developed into a European war in which they would be observers, use their support to wrangle political concessions from Germany, or win the civil war allowing it to control Spain and use it as leverage to influence French and British policy (Peirats, 2006: 113).

The Republic's emphasis on subordinating the collectives left it dependent on foreign aid. But this aid would only come from Russia which, in pursuit of its goals, was willing to circumvent the Non-Intervention policy. The Republic's ideology thus resulted in a contradiction, ensuring its sovereignty meant increased dependence on a country that was motivated to make Spain a vasal state. This resulted in yet another contradiction. Since the French and British were more fearful of communism than fascism, the more the USSR tightened its grip on Spanish politics, the more it alienated the western democracies and the less likely it was to secure victory in Spain (Bolloten, 1991: 639). Despite this contradiction, the Republic and the USSR's goals both required that the control which competing groups and organisations had over resources, namely the CNT, was revoked.

Ensuring the USSR's interests in Spain were met became the role of the *Partido Comunista de España* (PCE, Spanish Communist Party). A small party before the civil war, the PCE's numbers grew alongside Russian aid. The PCE was one of the main supporters of shutting down the collectives and establishing state control. This was consistent with its own ideological morphology which, determined by the policies of the third international, itself constrained by the ideological morphology of post-civil war Bolshevik Russia, favoured state centred politics and alliances with liberal and bourgeois parties.

Assuming the role previously occupied by the CEDA, the PCE launched coordinated propaganda campaigns against the collectives accusing them of inefficiency and of threatening the rights of small land holders (Alexander, 1999: 427). They targeted these campaigns at small landholding peasants, barbers, bakers, carpenters, sandal makers, doctors, dentists, teachers, blacksmiths, and tailors advising them to join the party to secure protection from collectivisation (Alexander, 1999: 308-309; Peirats, 2005: 108).

While the PCE propagandised against collectives, the Republic legislated against them. In October 1936 the Generalitat, with the support of the CNT, passed a "Collectivization and Workers' Control" decree. The decree automatically collectivized and gave legal recognition to any firm with more than 100 workers (Bolloten, 1991: 224). While meant to empower collectivization, the decree cleared the way for state intervention in collective business and undermined their autonomy (Alexander, 1999: 526). That same month, the Republic's Minister of Agriculture issued a decree claiming that the state will only legally recognize rural collectives set up on land seized from those involved in the insurrection.

The process of legalizing rural collectives was complicated and those who did not follow it correctly could either be dismantled, with their land returned to their previous owners, or would not receive financial support. These steps disadvantaged CNT collectives who resisted state intervention (Alexander, 1999: 318-319, 322). The most significant of this resistance was in Aragon where the CNT implemented the most extensive change. However, in August 1937, Communist-controlled army groups, now a formidable force in the country, were sent in to dismantle the collectives by force (Alexander, 1999: 307). Furthermore, in August 1938, the central government issued a decree on the militarization of the war industries (Bolloten, 1991: 637). The decree saw the effective nationalisation of all factories related to the production of war materials and extended to transport (Alexander, 1999: 586).

While collectives were brought under control through legalisation, revolutionary committees, which the CNT had hoped would be legally recognised due to their entrance into government, were replaced with local provincial and municipal councils. These councils had equal representation of all Popular Front parties eroding the strength of the CNT (Bolloten, 1971: 132: Bolloten, 1991: 214).

The PCE and the Republic also sought to limit the influence of the CNT by regaining control over arms. While the Republic technically continued to possess control over a large portion of its military apparatus following the failed coup (Alexander, 1999: 123), many soldiers and members of Civil Guard joined union militia columns (Bolloten, 1991: 47-49). The militias included and were often led by civilian volunteers with no military training. To help them with military

decisions, militia columns recruited sympathetic professional officers who acted as advisers (Alexander, 1999: 274). CNT militias operated using unconventional structures. They had no ranks and no form of martial discipline. Decisions were made in assemblies where the behaviour of officers, condition, and strategy was discussed (Yeoman, 2019: 436).

Despite their spontaneous emergence, militias were still effective enough to crush the rebellion in several areas and even successfully recaptured a third of Aragon in the first few weeks of the war. CNT militias, concentrated in the east of the country, also gave aid and sent reinforcements to Republican and Socialist militias in the Centre and South of the country (Yeoman, 2019: 436; Alexander, 1999: 166, 169, 172). The militias also played non-military roles and supported the work of building communes in the areas which they were positioned, bringing in the harvests, and in educating peasants (Alexander, 1999: 227, 358).

By March 1937, the Republic moved to control the autonomy of militias and the union's access to arms. To this end, the Republic banned the presence of the control patrols, the makeshift public order units established and controlled by the unions, and declared that anyone carrying arms without authorisation can be disarmed and charged (Peirats, 2005: 110). Militias were "militarised", transformed into companies, regiments, brigades, divisions and larger regular military units within a new Popular Army. Military rank was reintroduced as was military discipline and law (Alexander, 1999: 249). Militarization also meant adopting a system of political commissars. Instead of a military advisor being attached to a union militia column, now, a political commissar would be attached to a military unit (Alexander, 1999: 273; Peirats, 2006: 88).

The PCE quickly built power within NCOs in a bid to penetrate the ranks of the new Popular Army and gain control of it (Peirats, 2005: 57; Alexander, 1999: 276). By 1938, the PCE had managed to capture between 80 to 90 per cent of army command positions (Peirats, 2006: 140). CNT members continued to make up the majority of rank-and-file soldiers within the republican army (Alexander, 1999: 149-150, 295), however, Communist control meant that CNT soldiers became nearly indistinguishable from civilian conscripts in their function within the army. By gaining virtually complete control over the military apparatus, the Communists were able to use their position to stop resources from getting to

anarchists. They also assigned themselves military battles that were more likely to have favourable outcomes and assigning those which would end in defeat to anarchist groups (Alexander, 1999: 153, 154).

The Aragon front provides a good example of this tactic. CNT divisions stationed in Aragon were denied weapons making it impossible for them to mount an offensive (Peirats, 2005: 85). The lack of movement on that front was used in Communist propaganda to promote the inefficiency and cowardice of anarchists and collectives. CNT army units there received adequate weapons only after their collectives had been subdued. It was only once the Communists suppressed the collectives and took charge of military affairs in the region that they launched a military offensive, but even that was mostly intended as a propaganda tool and had little military value (Peirats, 2005: 233, 241).

The growth of the PCE was also supported by Russian “Aid”. Free aid was itself limited to military advisors, support for the Republic in international relations, and organising an army of international volunteers who would fight on the side of the Republic, the International Brigades (Kowalsky, 2014: 164). Weapons provided by Russia did not constitute part of this aid but were paid for by Spanish gold. In one of the largest scandals of the civil war period, the Republic’s Finance Minister, Juan Negrin, who was sympathetic to the communists, transferred the entirety of Spain’s gold reserves to Russia as advanced payment for weapons. This transfer had not been approved by the government (Bolloten, 1991: 151) and left Spain with no leverage against Moscow (Bolloten, 1991: 157). The reserves were exhausted by early 1938 and there remains a lack of evidence that explains where and how the gold was spent (Bolloten, 1991: 151-153). The weapons the Republic received in exchange for this gold was of a low quality, difficult to maintain, and sometimes obsolete. The diversity of weapons sent also made it impossible to source or manufacture ammunition in the industrial methods required to sustain a war (Kowalsky, 2014: 168-169).

The incredible growth and penetrative abilities of the PCE should be understood not as a reflection of the PCE’s unique capabilities for organisation, but as a reflection of the weaknesses of the Republic and the CNT (Graham, 1987: 122-123; Richards, 1983: 42). The Republic’s ideological commitment to sovereignty

from the collectives gave the PCE the opportunities it needed to grow. The CNT's core concept of "collaboration" meant that the PCE faced little resistance. Joining the government put the CNT in a minority position powerless to influence decision making (Christie, 2008: 213; Peirats, 2001: 180). Having committed to collaborate with the government, any effective resistance against this PCE takeover would have had to been extra-parliamentary. This would have risked the collapse of the government and discredited the CNT's decision to join the government in the first place along with everything else they had done (Christie, 2008: 223).

This does not mean that sections of the CNT did not resist Republic efforts to subdue them. For example, the Iron Column, a staunch anarchist militia and critic of CNT collaboration, resisted militarisation the longest until it voted to be rolled into the new Popular Army in March 1937 (Bolloten, 1991: 341). The eventual subduing of the Iron Column is an example of what happened to all other rank-and-file initiatives within the CNT which, without the support of the rest of the organisation, were forced to fall in line or fall into irrelevance as an isolated outpost.

Another example of resistance can be found in May 1937 when a police raid organised by the Communists attempted to take over the Telephone Exchange in Barcelona which was being run by the CNT. The raid triggered intense street battles across Barcelona between the CNT and the Communists leaving 500 dead and up to a 1,000 wounded (Peirats, 2005: 131). Throughout the "May days", the CNT's central committees urged for moderation and a cease fire while the Friends of Durruti group urged for the creation of a revolutionary Junta to face the subversion of the government (Peirats, 2005: 122,124). The central committees' stance won out. Despite an agreed truce, many of the CNT prisoners taken by the Communists during the fighting were not released from jail, a key condition of the truce (Peirats, 2005: 131).

The core concept of "collaboration" thus not only constrained the CNT from mobilising its resources against the Republic which it now identified with, but slowly suffocated the possibility of autonomous resistance. This created a self-reinforcing cycle akin to path dependence where the longer the CNT held on to collaboration, the more difficult it became to alter its course. The concept of

"collaboration" thus not only constrained the CNT's ability to utilise the resources available to it, but also saw the CNT lose access to resources it previously controlled.

6.4.3 The impact of Republican obstructionism

The economic and military reorganisation of Republican forces had a devastating impact. The revocation of workers control had two deeply negative outcomes on the war effort. First, morale suffered greatly as all the gains made by the workers since the rebellion seemed to be reversed with workplace democracy substituted by military discipline (Alexander, 1999: 561). Second, the Republic lost any chance of developing a war industry that could free it from its dependence on foreign arms (Alexander, 1999: 563). The exercise of militarization, meant to create a more efficient military fighting force, failed as the Republic lost battle after battle. Many volunteers who operated in the militias and opposed their militarisation left the fronts for the rear-guard (Peirats, 2005: 22). The ideological division between the Republic and the CNT, despite the partial permeability of their morphologies, hindered the war effort as opposed to allowing them to take advantage of their material advantage.

Following the May days, the PCE's stranglehold on the Republican state increased. They used the May days as a pretext to successfully instigate a governmental crisis by withdrawing from the cabinet. The Prime Minister, Largo Caballero, head of the UGT, was replaced by Juan Negrin, the finance minister who smuggled the gold reserves out of Spain. Neither the CNT nor the UGT were offered seats in the government (the CNT regained a seat in April 1938) (Peirats, 2006: 53). Despite this, the central bodies of the CNT continued to support the government even promoting a new war and political plan it released "as its own" (cited in Peirats, 2006: 72). The Republic continued to lose territory and remaining areas suffered increased food and material shortages and inflation. Barcelona fell to Franco's forces on the 26th of January 1939 and the rest of Catalonia in February. Remaining Republican territories were confined to the central-south area. That same month, France and England recognized Franco as the leader of Spain (Peirats, 2006: 235).

In March 1939, the Ministry of Defence published a memo handing all remaining military posts to the Communists. In response, the remainder of CNT forces and army generals still loyal to the Republic established a National Defence Junta, ousted Negrin, and defeated Communist army units in Madrid (Alexander, 1999: 1063-1073). This effort came too late. In the one month that the Junta functioned, it attempted to and failed to negotiate an "honourable peace" before finally focusing on evacuating refugees (Peirats, 2006: 250). The war ended on April 1, 1939, with the total defeat of Republican forces bringing the revolutionary situation to an end.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated how ideological analysis is more effective at explaining the process of the Spanish revolution and Civil War than deprivation, structural, resource mobilisation, and rational choice theories of revolution. The first section argued that it was the ideological morphologies of conservative groups, the Republic, and the CNT which created the structural conditions on which each reacted such as unemployment. Additionally, deprivation only led to the increased radicalisation and mobilisation of workers because of the concepts found within the CNT's ideological morphology such as "insurrectionary revolution" and "direct action". These concepts helped forge a collective definition of grievances and solutions leading to increased confrontation with the Republic. This confrontation was met in kind by conservative groups which, to protect or reinstate their privileges, also attacked the foundations of the Republic. This led to a "protest spiral", increased polarisation and violence, until the army took initiative and transitioned the revolutionary process into a revolutionary situation.

The second section argued that the choice of the CNT to collaborate with the Republic and join the government cannot be explained through Rational Choice Theories. This is since the decision reflects an abandonment of the CNT's stated objectives at a time of low costs when benefits could be maximised. Ideological analysis however, explains how the interests of groups can change, especially during unsettled times. The section argued that the CNT's choice can be explained by the movement of the concept of "collaboration" from an adjacent to core position. This change was enabled by the core concepts of "federalism"

and “insurrectionary revolution” and altered the union’s perception of costs and benefits.

The third and final section produced evidence showing that a resource disparity or the ability to mobilise resources was not the cause of the Republic’s eventual defeat. Rather, the Republic’s own ideological preferences led to inefficiencies in the mobilisation and use of resources once again showing that ideology precedes resource mobilisation.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

This dissertation set out to meet two objectives which illustrate how ideological analysis is better suited at explaining revolutions than competing theories, namely, rational choice, resource mobilisation, deprivation, and structural theories. The first objective was met in the first section of the dissertation which developed a theoretical framework explaining the process of revolutions through the ideologies of the groups and organisations which wage and resist them. The second objective, tackled in the second section, demonstrated how this framework can be applied using two case studies, the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Spanish Revolution and Civil War of 1936.

The aims and the main line of argumentation found throughout this dissertation were in part inspired by my own experiences as a participant and witness to the revolutions in North Africa and West Asia including the 2005 Cedar Revolution in Lebanon and the 2011 Revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, and others. These experiences highlighted the need to study revolutions away from simple reductions across the lines of elites and masses and instead focus on the concerted thoughts and actions of the multiple groups and organisations operating within revolutionary periods. It is the interaction of these groups and organisations, with sometimes overlapping, sometimes antagonistic, perspectives and objectives that determines the process of revolution and the eventual outcome. As this dissertation has shown, the thoughts, actions, objectives, structures, and resources mobilised by groups and organisations are best understood through their ideologies and how these ideologies change as they navigate and create the revolutionary process.

The objective of this concluding chapter is to briefly summarise the findings of my research and offer some additional reflection. The chapter will first review the theoretical advancements made in section one and how these advancements have overcome the prominent problematics in the field. It will then offer a summation of how applying ideological analysis to the two case studies reinforces the main arguments advanced by this dissertation. Finally, the chapter ends with a brief assessment of the findings emerging from the two case studies and reflection on what this research means for the field and my own understanding of revolution.

7.1 Theoretical advancements

As explained in the introductory chapter, this dissertation was shaped by the existence of a research gap around the use of ideology to study the process and outcomes of revolutions. This methodological gap persisted due to three challenges, the seemingly intangible nature of ideology, a confused overlap between social movement studies and revolutionary theories, and the siloed advancement of ideology studies from research into revolutions and social movements. The persistence of this methodological gap has led to the reproduction of three key problematics within new research: a false structure/agency dichotomy; substituting macro-economic and class markers for causal analysis; and an inadequate method of determining the interests and preferences of groups and organisations and how these interests and preferences impact practice.

This dissertation overcame this methodological gap and these problems within the first section by developing and advancing a method for *ideological analysis*. It did this by first improving on Michael Freeden's (1996) conceptual approach by combining it with framing theory to create a single framework which allows for studying ideology at the level of groups and organisations. Through this framework, the dissertation presented evidence that ideology is as tangible as any "material" or "structural" variable as it enables and constrains practice, and informs the objectives, structures, tactics, and resources of groups and organisations.

Utilising the Marxist concepts of dominant ideology and the superstructure, the dissertation showed how the ideologies of groups and organisations do not develop in a vacuum but exist in a field of power divided into dominant, subordinate, and radical value systems. Dominant groups and organisations control the means of material production and use this control to reinscribe the concepts they believe are "correct". Subordinate groups and organisation are accommodating to the ideologies of dominant ones. Radical groups and organisations contest both, the ideologies of dominant ones and their hold on power. The field of power reinforces the argument that ideology is a tangible force and ever-present social force.

The interaction of groups and organisation within a field of power was elaborated into an original four-stage process of revolution which emphasised the role of groups and organisations, through their ideologies, in influencing, and being influenced by, the unfolding of revolutions. The four-stage process of revolution addressed the remaining two challenges perpetuating the longstanding methodological gap, unclarity around the relationship between social movements and revolution, and the research silos which have developed between social movement studies and revolutionary theory on the one hand and ideology studies on the other.

The four-stage process of revolution differs from previous processes which emphasise the uniformities of revolution. Instead of presenting revolutions as necessarily passing through all four stages, the dissertation argued that there may also be reversals in the process resulting in a movement back and forth between one or two phases. This preserves the uniqueness of individual revolution highlighting the dependence of each process on the ideologies of competing groups and organisations, their priorities, and their practices.

After developing the method of ideological analysis, the dissertation weighed it against rational, resource mobilisation, deprivation, and structural theories of revolution. While these theories make important contributions to the field of revolutionary studies, it was argued that they are incomplete without explicitly accounting for the role of group ideology. Through this assessment, the dissertation showed how ideological analysis overcomes the three problematics recreated by these competing theories which has resulted in a sense of frustration in the field of revolutionary theory.

Rational choice and resource mobilisation theories were criticised for inadequately determining interests and preferences or how these are ranked, ordered, or change within a group or organisation. Deprivation and structural theories were criticised for substituting macro-economic and class markers for causal analysis and advancing a false structure/agency bias. Ideological analysis overcomes these weaknesses because it shows how groups and organisations determine and change their interests and preferences through internal debate focused on diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing tasks. These debates determine which concepts are integrated into their ideologies, how

those concepts are organised, and how they change. Ideological analysis also shows how “structural” variables are shaped by the ideologically driven actions and conflicts of groups and organisations. The assessment of ideological analysis against competing theories illustrates that it warrants being considered as an independent theory of revolution.

The theoretical advancements made in this dissertation and summarised above break through the methodological gap which has so far impeded the adequate integration of ideology into the study of social movements and revolutions. This method can benefit from further improvement and will set my research agenda for the future. This includes further developing the link between ideology and mobilisation to provide more detail on the transition between settled and non-settled times and how ideological change is transmitted between individual, group, and state levels. The four-stage process of revolution developed in this dissertation can also benefit from a wider readership to counter the weaknesses identified within other process-based approaches in chapter three. These objectives can only be met by continuing the path set by this dissertation in bridging the silos between ideological analysis and the fields of social movement studies and revolutionary theory.

7.2 Applying ideological analysis

The case studies in the second section of the dissertation applied ideological analysis to the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Spanish Civil War and Revolution of 1936 with a focus on the main radical organisations within them, the Bolshevik Party and the CNT. These cases illustrated how ideological analysis can be applied to produce unique insight into revolutionary processes highlighting the agency of groups and organisations and how their interaction with other groups within a field of power determines revolutionary outcomes. These two case studies were selected because the main actors possessed iterations of socialist ideologies and shared their commitment to the undoing of private property and the power relations that maintain them. They are also both well researched cases, this meant that applying ideological analysis to them helped highlight the original contributions this method can make in a way that would not be possible with less researched, more contemporary, revolutions.

While both cases occurred under varied circumstances, proceeded in unique ways, and resulted in different outcomes, they reinforce the key arguments of this dissertation. First, they both show that it is not sufficient, when it comes to studying the process of revolutions, to investigate ideology at the level of "ideological families", even if the groups and organisations under investigation belong to the same family. For example, while both the Bolshevik Party and the CNT subscribed to revolutionary socialist ideas, their conceptions of revolution, and how this conception interacted with other concepts within their ideological morphologies resulted in unique decontestation and derivative practices. It is these practices, emergent from their ideological morphologies which determined the process of revolution. Therefore, as argued, it is the specific iterations of ideology held and formed by groups and organisations which matter in and during revolutionary periods, not abstracted ideological families.

Second, the case studies also reinforced the argument that ideological morphologies are subject to change within revolutionary periods and that these changes are more likely to occur within the four-stage process of revolution. Within the Russian Revolution, it was shown how the Bolshevik Party's ascension to power required changes to their practices resulting in a corresponding change in their ideological morphologies. Some concepts were "swallowed up whole", others were "cannibalized for useful parts" (Freeden, 1996: 67), and new concepts were introduced to add stability. These changes happened within the revolutionary situation phase of the revolution which includes transfers of power. The ideological morphology of the CNT underwent such changes as it transitioned and helped shape the move between a revolutionary window and revolutionary situation. Thus, the cases reinforce the argument that not only do ideologies need to be studied at the level of groups and organisations, but that we must understand the how internal debates and changes in the field of power lead to phase-specific iteration of an ideology.

Finally, the dissertation has shown that while the ideologies of groups and organisations change and evolve across the different phases of revolution (Goldstone, 1991: 406), are subject to "compromises, concessions, trade-offs, deference to influence, response to power, and judgments of what may be workable" (Blumer, 1971: 304), and undergo "mid-course" adjustments (Gurr and Goldstone, 1991: 341). These changes are constrained by the concepts

already found within an ideological morphology. The case studies therefore illustrate how continuity within the Bolshevik's and CNT's ideological morphology existed despite change.

It is worth emphasising that the objective of the case studies was to demonstrate how ideological analysis is better than other theories of revolution at explaining the process and outcomes of the two revolutions, and not to assess the conduct of the Bolsheviks or the CNT. Nevertheless, it is possible to use the analysis found within to critique the concepts and practices of both groups and revolutionary theory more broadly. The next section will engage in such a preliminary assessment in the context of my own activism and the revolutionary aspirations in North Africa and West Asia. Before this assessment this section will outline the links this dissertation established between the ideologies of the Bolshevik Party and the CNT and the process and outcomes of their corresponding revolutions.

The chapter on the Russian Revolution asserted that, contrary to the argument that the Bolshevik Party had authoritarian objectives from the onset of the revolution (Figes, 1997), or the argument that the Bolshevik Party's democratic project was jettisoned by the civil war (Faulkner, 2017), this dissertation argued that changes in the Bolshevik's ideological morphology during the revolutionary window magnified authoritarian concepts already found within it resulting in new decontestations. This happened through: 1) the cannibalisation of the concept of "all power to the soviets" 2) the move of the adjacent concept of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" from an adjacent to a core position and 3) the introduction of the new concept of cultural development.

These changes occurred after the Bolsheviks succeeded in capturing power from the provisional government and transferred it to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Ideological opposition between the Bolsheviks and other parties such as the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks led to the collapse of the Soviets as a new body of democratic governance leading to the emergence of the Party-State apparatus of the Bolsheviks with an altered ideology. This ideology dominated the revolutionary situation and brought it to an end.

Ideological analysis revealed that the Bolshevik's domination during the revolutionary situation was a result of the permeability of their ideology with the urban proletariat, peasants, and minorities hoping to gain independence from the Russian Empire. This ideological permeability, and the Bolshevik's emphasis on the urban proletariat as the leaders of the revolution provided them with a material advantage in adherents and control over material resources such as trains and weaponry over competing organisations.

Ideological analysis also offers a unique perspective into the CNT and Republican forces' failure to overcome General Franco's military rebellion which succeeded in overthrowing the Second Spanish Republic. Contrary to the argument that the CNT's ideology was primitive and therefore did not allow it to put up an organised form of resistance (Hobsbawm, 2017), the dissertation argued that the CNT's ideological morphology during the revolutionary window allowed it to become the leading radical force in the country. This radicalism and its opposition to both Republicanism and Fascism helped progress the revolutionary process from a revolutionary window to a revolutionary situation by creating greater polarisation within society.

The advance of the revolutionary process resulted in changes within the CNT's ideological morphology reflected by 1) a decontestation of the adjacent concept of "cooperation" to a core concept of "collaboration" 2) the core concept of "federalism" being decontested as "industrial federalism" and moving from a core to adjacent position and 3) the core concepts of "insurrectionary revolution" and "direct action" being cannibalised into "anti-fascist unity". These changes made the CNT's ideology permeable enough with that of the Republic allowing it to enter the government but remained different enough to detriment the united fight against Franco despite a material advantage.

This analysis showed how the ideological morphology of the CNT preceded and constrained the mobilisation of resources. Thus, the CNT and Republic's material advantage in the war against Franco was wasted due to ideological divergences. The chapter also reinforced the argument that the definition of deprivation and the responses to it, as well as structural crises, are ideologically shaped. The ability for the CNT to mobilise its adherents in response to the unemployment crisis of the 1930's in an insurrectionary way attests to this. Finally, the chapter

highlighted the importance of identifying changes in dominant discourses within an organisation as these changes explain seemingly sudden ideological shifts. It is only by looking at these changes that the CNT's seemingly indecipherable shift from seeking to overthrow the state in whatever format to collaborating within it can be understood.

7.3 Final reflections

The arguments and findings developed in this dissertation will find currency and traction among researchers of social movements, revolutions, and activists looking for political change. The fields of social movement studies and revolutionary theory will benefit similarly from the richness ideological analysis presents with its focus on the level of groups and organisations. Activists, with the help of further research by academics, must start accounting for the role ideology plays in facilitating the spread of ideas or in hindering their transmission. Ideological analysis can also be used as a tool of self-critique for groups and organisations who want to audit their decision-making processes and how dominant discourses emerge.

The overcoming of the methodological gap which hindered the adequate integration of ideology into the study of revolutions opens the gates for the integration of ideology in other fields. For example, ideological analysis can be blended with world-systems theory to help explain the movement of concepts on a global level, a key component of international relations. Historians, even those not concerned with conceptual history, can utilise ideological analysis to establish firmer causal links between the decisions of actors and their impact on events, even non-revolutionary ones.

The findings of this dissertation, especially the analysis emerging from the case studies, have also altered my own understanding of revolution in at least four critical ways. First, it is hard to understate the importance of viewing revolutions as explicitly agentic social processes. All elements critical to the formation of revolution such as structure, availability and mobilisation of resources, mobilisation of adherents, supporters, and an opposition, and the concepts which come to prominence are shaped by the conscious actions of groups and organisations and their social interaction with other actors.

Most important of these processes is the development of networks of support and solidarity and how they intersect with groups and organisations. These networks form the "blocks" of mobilisation which determine how the equilibrium point within the field of power shifts and how based on the interaction of the ideological morphologies of these blocks. Research into revolution would highly benefit from the increased incorporation of network analysis to track how such networks evolve and change overtime to enable revolution. Fertile ground for this would be the Lebanese Revolution of 2019. Scholars have come to a consensus that the revolutionary mobilisation of 2019 would not have occurred without the development of networks during the 2011 anti-sectarian protests, the 2015 "You Stink" protests, and 2018 parliamentary elections (Saab and Ayoub, 2020: 116-118; Karam and Majed, 2023: 1-2; Khattab, 2022). Moving forward, my own activism will focus on developing such networks.

Second, these networks of solidarity and their intersection with groups and organisations do not exist in an ideological vacuum. How and if they come into play during revolutionary times is dependent on their ideological morphologies and the availability of radical decontestations of concepts found within them. Both cases attest to this importance. In 1917 Russia, Lenin's intervention on the need "to present a patient, systematic, and persistent explanation" (Lenin, 1917b/1970: 7) expounds how the Bolsheviks were able to mobilise the Soviets to their favour. In 1936 Spain, the CNT's emphasis on direct action allowed for an interpretation of deprivation that enabled mobilisation as opposed to limit it or allow for the onset of despair. It is therefore the agency of radical groups and organisations and their embeddedness into networks which determines mobilisation potential based on shifts in ideological morphologies. This stresses the importance of understanding the interface of radical ideologies under development with dominant ideology and maintaining a robust an innovative approach to developing radical decontestations. This is critical in the case of Lebanon where sectarian pluralism challenges the ability to contest the dominant ideology held by the ruling groups and organisation who allow and benefit from such pluralism.

Third, both cases highlight the importance of actively pushing the revolutionary process into a revolutionary situation and advancing exclusive alternative claims to control over the government or over sections of a territory and its resources.

The Bolsheviks were bold enough to assert such claims and fight against an already transitory revolutionary body, the provisional government, which was constructed on the lines of a dominant ideology. The CNT, on the other hand, failed to do this and suffered the consequences. The timidity of groups and organisations to make such claims has been a noted weakness of the 2011 revolutions and those which followed it in North Africa and West Asia. In the face of this timidity, it has been other dominant groups which advanced revolutionary processes in a way that allowed for the re-composition of a dominant ideology defeating revolutionary aspirations. Any revolutionary actor in the region must thus ensure that their revolutionary theory accounts for states of multiple sovereignty and their role within such a state.

Finally, the case studies also revealed that both the Bolsheviks and the CNT had important theoretical weaknesses when it came to the function of their organisations in a post-revolutionary society. Within the CNT, this weakness meant that it subsumed itself within a democratic wartime state. For the Bolsheviks, it meant merging with the state to become the linchpin of the party-state apparatus. These failures highlight the importance of prefigurative practice and clarity on the function of an organisation beyond the revolutionary process. Addressing and finding a resolution to this weakness will require the study of other revolutionary cases and the ideologies of their main radical groups and organisations and an integration of their concepts within revolutionary practice by those who seek revolutionary change.

The end of this dissertation does not spell the end of my engagement with ideological analysis. I hope to continue to develop the method and apply it to more contemporary cases of revolution in North Africa and West Asia as well as the study of revolutionary thought in the region across time. I also hope to integrate other tools, such as network analysis, to better explain mobilisation and the changes the ideologies of groups and organisations go through between various cycles of contention. Regardless of this further research agenda, and as argued throughout this dissertation, the feedback loop between ideology and practice means that the influence of ideology on my actions is inescapable. A reality we are all subject to.

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