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Governmentality in British and Russian Higher Education

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Abstract

The focus of this thesis is on how the area of higher education (HE) and people involved in HE – more precisely, students and academics, are disciplined by the governments of two different political settings. By this, I mean how governments use HE to enforce societal and political norms that suit the overarching goals of government. The HE systems of two countries are examined in this respect: the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation. At first glance, it might be possible to claim that the political systems of the mentioned states are considerably different and therefore HE as well as students and academics are also disciplined in different ways. The approach of the UK Government can be described as the one which revolves around neoliberal values, that is, around market-oriented politics, the aim of which is to strengthen the economic welfare of the country. In contrast, the approach the Government of Russia takes can be defined as authoritarian, the key goal of which is to preserve and consolidate the power of the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin. Considering these standpoints, it is reasonable to assert that HE, as well as students and academics, will be disciplined in different ways because of the different routes taken by each government.

I partially agree with the previous elaboration. However, it is, firstly, necessary to add that Russia has been integrated into the global market economy after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. This has left its government with no other choice but to be also market oriented in relation to different spheres including HE so that they can strengthen the economic welfare of their country as well. As such, it seems to be more appropriate to define the Russian political regime as hybrid because of two layers of focus: one authoritarian and one neoliberal. Considering these intricacies, the situation with the disciplining of HE in Russia is more complex than it might appear at first glance and in fact, there are surprising commonalities between the disciplining of HE in Russia and in the UK. Secondly, when attempting to analyse the disciplining of HE in both countries, this thesis avoids looking at it through the judicial exercises of power in both countries. Instead, it utilizes the ideas of Foucault on the operation of power which provides a more nuanced perspective on how control and discipline are non-judicially enforced in both countries' HE.

The operation of power can be analysed through the study of top-down judicial practices of both governments to get an understanding of how HE as well as students and academics are disciplined and controlled. The approach of this research, on the other hand, is to study the operation of power in HE of two countries through the ideas of Foucault. According to

Foucault we should not understand the operation of power as a solely top-down judicial exercise of governments. Instead, we should be looking at non-judicial discourses and practices that are dispersed by governments and circulate in a society. This thesis examines the non-judicial discourses and practices that are dispersed by both governments in higher education.

By reconceptualizing the concept of power, Foucault eventually, developed a theory of governmentality. Governmentality is a neoliberal form of governing that aims at producing *homo-economicus* through the dispersed non-judicial discourses and practices. According to this theory, various discourses and practices are dispersed by governments (technologies of domination as Foucault refers to it) across their societies to direct them towards being market oriented. This leads to a more economically productive society which, as a result, strengthens the economic welfare of the country overall. In other words, governmentality is a disciplining that is directed towards producing *homo-economicus*. It is necessary to remember that governmentality does not judicially coerce population to become *homo-economicus*. It provides them freedom to deviate from the imposed set of discourses and practices – something that is examined by Foucault through the concept of technologies of the self. I examine how governmentality is enacted in HE of Russia and the UK. It becomes evident from this research, that both governments attempt to discipline HE as well as students and academics in accordance with neoliberal values that prioritize market needs. This is more of a case in the UK HE than in the Russian one. However, it is important to state that governmentality exists in the Russian HE as well. This is because with the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has been integrated into the global market economy. In this sense, the existence of governmentality in Russian HE is more of an inevitability than a planned way of governing. Along with that, the Russian Government also attempts to discipline HE, and consequently students and academics, with the ideas of Slavophilism that signify the loyalty to the Russian state and aim at consolidating the power of Vladimir Putin allowing him to remain in power for as long as possible. Before mentioning the findings in a more detailed way, it is also necessary to quickly cover the methodology I used in this research.

As one of the approaches to my methodology (Part 3), I used the critical discourse analysis (CDA) espoused by Fairclough (2007) to analyse the governmental perspectives on higher education in two states. This has been accomplished through the analysis of news articles published by the departments of education in the two countries, covering a period from

October 2019 – October 2022. The analysis allowed me to detect the dominant discourses of technologies of domination regarding HE, that is, of governing in relation to higher education. In addition to this, the dominant discourses and practices in HE in both countries have been identified through interviews with university teachers. This allowed me to analyse the individual reflections and conduct (technologies of the self) to the imposed disciplining which is a substantial part of the theory of governmentality. Despite considerable difficulties thirty-two online semi-structured interviews were conducted with lecturers in both countries. However, unfortunately, I was not able to observe the real practices within universities due to the COVID-19 pandemic and then due to the war in Ukraine. This has substantially impacted this research as I could not observe the way power operates in person (explained in Part 3: Methodology).

As mentioned earlier, the findings reveal that governmentality exists in both countries' HE. Higher education in the UK is being marketized and commodified. This is also the case with the Russian HE but to a lesser extent. All the identified discourses promoted by the UK Government in relation to HE marketize higher education in the UK. These are: the discourse of students as consumers, STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) subjects and apprenticeship programs. When it comes to the case of the higher education in Russia, there is the discourse of technological entrepreneurship that is directly linked to the marketization of HE in Russia. In addition, according to the interviewed academics in Russia, the Russian Government often demands universities to cooperate with employers and to be market-oriented, especially in relation to the sciences related to STEM subjects. In other words, the Russian Government attempts to connect HE with the market economy, that is, to discipline HE as well as students and academics in accordance with market priorities. Moreover, as they mention there is a growing popularity of corporate universities in Russia which can again be connected to the marketization of HE in Russia.

Along with this, the Russian Government also disciplines HE, and consequently students and academics, in accordance with the ideas of Slavophilism. This is evident from the discourses of patriotic upbringing, hard sciences as connected to the development of military industry, and student communities. The overall target of Slavophilism is to promote loyalty to the Russian state. The loyalty to the state, in its turn, implies the prioritization of the ideas of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The key value of ROC that stands out is placing the figure of the ruler of Russia almost at the same level as God and providing him or her with absolute and supreme power. The reason behind such a disciplining is potentially to

allow Vladimir Putin to remain in power for as long as possible – one of the key goals of an authoritarian political regime. In fact, the Russian Government seem to reach this aim as there are cases when students record unpatriotic words (as they perceive them) of some lecturers, which can lead to a prosecutor investigation later at the university.

Speaking of the attitudes of students in both countries towards HE, it is possible to claim that they have become passive learners who aim at graduating as soon as possible to get a job afterwards. The interviewed academics in the UK argue that such an approach of students towards HE is the result of marketization of HE by the UK Government which they are unhappy with and try to change through their teaching practices. Along these lines, most of the interviewed academics in the UK often attempt to distance themselves somewhat from teaching practices because of the described attitudes of students towards HE, instead prioritizing research and managerial practices. The interviewed academics in Russia, on the other hand, claim that the passive learning of students in Russian HE is also connected to the visible disciplinary techniques of the Russian Government in relation to HE. They argue that the design (linear set up of desks) of the classrooms in Russian HE initiates a militarized order which breaks down any communication and critical thinking. This leads to the inability to independently analyse information, as described by one of the interviewed academics. Interestingly, despite different approaches to HE by both governments, the result in terms of students' attitudes towards their studies is often quite similar (in both countries the academics reported that students are passive learners). As such, academics in both countries attempt to change the disciplining of HE through their teaching practices. In other words, both in the UK and in Russian HE, academics attempt to go against the imposed governmental disciplining of HE to a possible degree and as such shift the operation of power. This also indicates that it is indeed possible to speak of the ability to deviate from the imposed governmental disciplining of HE to a certain extent in both countries.

Finally, this research argues that it is not possible to speak of an absolute freedom in the UK HE as there are various practices and discourses that are non-judicially imposed on students and academics that discipline them in specific ways. It is also not possible to speak of an absolute authoritarianism in the Russian HE due to the conduct of academics who can resist governmental disciplining in their teaching practices.

Contents

Abstract.....	1
Acknowledgements.....	8
Author’s Declaration	9
Part 1: Introduction.....	10
A Brief Overview	11
Why Higher Education?	17
State and Government.....	20
Research and Literature Timeframe	22
Research Questions:	25
Thesis Structure	27
Part 1: Theoretical Framework	28
Chapter 1: Power; Power/Knowledge; Discipline; Resistance.....	29
Chapter 2: Discourse.....	43
Chapter 3: Subject – Technologies of the Self	52
Chapter 4: Governmentality	56
Part 2: Literature Review	66
Chapter 5: The United Kingdom	67
What is Neoliberalism and its development in the UK.....	67
Neoliberalism in the UK Higher Education.....	73
Technologies of Domination – Disciplinary/Regulatory techniques of the government	74
Technologies of the Self in the UK Higher Education	84
Chapter 6: Russia	90
Authoritarianism, its existence in Russia in combination with neoliberalism	91
Technologies of domination in Russian HE	102
Technologies of the Self in Russian HE	113
Part 3: Methodology	120
Chapter 7: Ontology and Epistemology	121
Chapter 8: Research Methodology and Methods.....	126
Participant Observation Method	128
Semi-Structured Interviews	130
Critical Discourse Analysis.....	134
Part 4: Findings and Analysis.....	141
Chapter 9: CDA of the news articles published by DfE in the UK	143

Section 1: The central 'regime of truth' portrayed by the UK Government in relation to HE – The discourse of neoliberal economy.....	144
Sub-Section 1.1: The Identification of HE through neoliberal economy	147
Section 2: The discourse of students as consumers	151
Sub-Section 2.1: The identification of students as consumers	152
Section 3: The Discourse of STEM subjects.....	154
Sub-Section 3.1: The identification of STEM subjects.....	155
Section 4: The discourse of apprenticeships.....	157
Sub-Section 4.1: The Identification of apprenticeships	157
Conclusion.....	159
Chapter 10: The CDA of news articles published by MSHE in Russia	161
Section 1: The discourse of patriotic upbringing	162
Sub-Section 1.1: Identification of patriotic upbringing in articles	165
Section 2: The discourse of hard sciences	170
Part 1: The discourse (representation) of technical (hard) sciences as useful for the economic progress – technological entrepreneurship	171
The identification of the discourse of technological entrepreneurship in texts	173
Part 2: The discourse of technical sciences in connection with military affairs	175
The identification of the connection between the discourse of technical sciences and military industry by the texts	178
Section 3: The discourse of student communities – student clubs	179
What is represented?.....	181
Identification of student clubs in articles.....	182
Conclusion.....	185
Chapter 11: Interviews with academics in the UK	186
The overall views of lecturers on HE.....	188
The practice of managerialism.....	190
Teaching and Research	192
More on teaching practices	197
Conclusion.....	199
Chapter 12: Interviews with academics in Russia.....	200
The overall views of lecturers on HE.....	202
The practice of lectureship	205
The practice of self-censorship	209
The practice of administrative work	211
Conclusion.....	213
Chapter 13 - Conclusion	214
List of References.....	219

Appendix 1 – News Articles Used in CDA.....	245
Appendix 2 - Interview Questions Sample.....	248

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Author's Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Printed Name: Rarif Abdullayev

Signature:

Part 1: Introduction

A Brief Overview

The goal of this research is to understand how the governments of the political regimes in Russia and in the UK discipline higher education, and consequently students and academics. To put this differently, my interest is to analyse the operation of power in HE of the mentioned countries. It is important to highlight the fact that I utilize the ideas of Foucault on power to examine the disciplining of HE in this thesis. This implies that I take a poststructuralist approach in relation to the concept of power. This is because the ideas of Foucault on power question the traditional understanding of power operation, that is, the linear axiom that power operates in a judicial hierarchical top-down manner only. Poststructuralists take a dissenting position towards traditional ways of understanding various phenomena (Williams, 2014). I will expand on the concept of poststructuralism in Chapter 1. However, in this section of the thesis, it was important to mention it to explain that the operation of power could have been studied using the traditional approaches to it as well. For instance, it was possible to analyse the judicial top-down exercises of power by both governments in relation to HE to get an idea on the route of higher education in both countries. My approach, on the other hand, examines the discourses and practices that do not have a judicial nature, however, still discipline higher education as well as people involved in it, more precisely, students and academics.

It is also important to mention that this thesis provides only a snapshot of power operation in both countries' HE. To put it differently, this thesis demonstrates a snapshot of how HE as well as students and academics are disciplined by both governments. This is because, the discourses and practices that circulate in higher education of both countries do not have a static nature. Discourses are connected to specific practices. Practices, in their turn, are embedded into the relations of people (students and academics) which are always in motion. For instance, there is the discourse of patriotic upbringing that is promoted by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in Russia (MSHE) (Part 4: Findings). In other words, the Government of Russia aims at disciplining students of HE to be patriotic. As I will demonstrate later in the thesis (Chapters 6, 10, 12) patriotism, in this specific sense, implies the ideas of Slavophilism which consequently seem to be directed towards providing the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, with absolute power and consolidating his power (Chapter 6). According to the interviewed academics in Russia (I will discuss the methodology later in this section), there are cases when students record the unpatriotic words (as they perceive them) of some academics which can then lead to a prosecutor investigation

at the university. This initiates the practice of self-censorship from the academics (Chapter 12). As it is possible to notice from this example, one discourse (promoted by the government in relation to HE) that circulates in Russian HE shifts the power relations between teachers and students and initiates a new practice from the teachers. This nexus of practice-discourse or power-knowledge as Foucault (1980) refers to it never stops. It is never static, and it is interdependent. It is, therefore, this thesis demonstrates only the snapshot of power operation in HE or a snapshot of disciplining of HE and of students and academics in both countries.

Foucault's interest was to identify what constituted various discourses that became dominant in different historical periods (in Burchell et al., 1991). He was specifically interested in the discourse of state, more precisely, the focus was on how the discourse of state started to be understood through the practice of governing the population, which Foucault (2007) referred to as "governmentalization of the state" (Foucault, 2007, p. 144) (Part 1: State and Government; Chapter 4). The analysis he made brought the idea that it was the phenomenon of population that led to the change in understanding of what the state is and what the ruler's objective is in a state. With the sharp rise of population, in the eighteenth century, the discourse of state started to be understood from the point of governing the population (Foucault, 2007). The governing of the population, in its turn, started to imply the improvement of its conditions. This was due to the economic effects that population could bring to the welfare of the state (Danaher et al., 2000). Simply speaking, the better the conditions of people, the better their productivity is and as such, the better is the economic welfare of the state (Chapter 4).

Finally, Foucault claimed that it has become clear for the rulers that the less governmental intervention there is into the affairs of population (specifically economic ones), the better is their productivity (Danaher et al., 2000) (Chapter 4). The less governmental intervention into the economic affairs of people, in its turn, started to imply free unregulated by the government market (Patton in Lemm & Vatter, 2014, p. 144). This demonstrated line of thinking eventually led to the emergence of the theory of governmentality, where the population's economic affairs are guided by the market which is unregulated by the government (Chapter 4). In other words, governmentality is a neoliberal governing the aim of which is to create *homo-economicus*. Foucault (2007) claimed that "we live in an era of governmentality discovered in the eighteenth century" (p. 109). Governmentality as it can be understood from the previous elaboration is a specific disciplining of population targeted

at increasing the economic welfare of the state. The central aim of this thesis is to understand how governmentality is enacted in higher education of two different political regimes.

While analysing governmentality in HE of both countries, I refer to the two constituents of it: technologies of domination and technologies of the self (Foucault in Martin et al., 1988). Technologies of domination, sometimes referred by Foucault (1980) as technologies of power, aim to “determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends of domination...” (p. 18). For instance, the UK Government attempts to connect higher education to the market economy. That is, it attempts to marketize higher education (Part 4: Findings). This is the technology of domination when the UK Government attempts to submit higher education to certain ends. This approach of the UK Government initiates the discourse of students as consumers. In other words, it disciplines students to act like consumers in relation to HE. However, it does not coerce them to behave like consumers. It provides them freedom to deviate from such a disciplining. This ability to deviate from the governmental disciplining is covered by Foucault through the idea of technologies of the self. Technologies of the self are the techniques “which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection and immortality” (Foucault as cited in Martin et al., 1988, p. 18). I analyse both constituents of governmentality as avoiding one of them would lead to a partial analysis of governmentality. Moreover, if, for instance, we skipped the analysis of the technologies of the self, we would pretend people (students and academics) to be robots who strictly obey non-judicial governmental disciplining of HE. However, “we are not just helpless objects formed and moved by power” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 128). This is not to say that students and academics can completely transform the imposed set of practices and discourses, however, they can resist them to a certain degree (Chapter 3: Subject – Technologies of the Self). Summarizing the previous points, when studying governmentality, there is a need to analyse both its layers: technologies of domination and technologies of the self.

Before I overview the situation with the disciplining of HE in both countries, it would be useful to mention the methodology that I have used in this thesis. It is important to state that unfortunately it was not possible to conduct a study as initially planned due to the COVID-19 pandemic and then due to the war in Ukraine (explained in Part 3: Methodology). Nevertheless, it was possible to analyse the governmental perspectives on higher education

in two states. This has been accomplished through the critical discourse analysis (CDA) of news articles published by the departments of education in both countries, and the period it covers is October 2019 – October 2022. The analysis allowed me to detect the dominant discourses promoted by the governments in both countries in relation to higher education (technologies of domination). In addition to this, the dominant discourses and practices in HE have been identified through the interviews with university lecturers in both countries (technologies of the self). Despite considerable difficulties (mentioned above), thirty-two online semi-structured interviews were conducted with lecturers in both countries. Unfortunately, I was not able to observe the real practices within universities due to the COVID-19 pandemic and then due to the war in Ukraine. This has substantially impacted this research as I could not observe the way power operates in person (explained in Part 3: Methodology).

To understand the technologies of domination of both countries' governments in relation to HE, we need to get an idea on the political regime existing in each of them. At first glance, it might seem that the political regimes of Russia and the UK are completely different and as such, the disciplining of HE is also completely different. The approach of the political regime in the UK can be defined as neoliberal, that targets to increase its economic welfare through market-oriented politics. Such an approach of the UK Government is often associated with the figure of Margaret Thatcher who popularized neoliberal rule of governing in the UK from 1979 to 1990s (Garnett et al., 2020). However, the discourse of neoliberalism was circulating in the UK even before the rule of Margaret Thatcher (Rollings, 2013). This neoliberal governing or governmentality exists in the contemporary UK higher education. In other words, the UK Government aims at marketizing higher education. Higher education is being commodified. This implies that universities in the UK need to adopt an entrepreneurial rationale as they depend on a market economy. Simply speaking, market means that there are buyers and sellers, which in the context of HE implies that a university is selling its services and students are buying them. In this sense, it is possible to define students as consumers and universities as services providers. Such a context of HE is being promoted by the UK Government and I will demonstrate it later in the thesis (Chapter 5; Part 4: Findings). The discourses such as students as consumers, STEM subjects, apprenticeship programs are the dominant ones that the UK Government actively promotes in relation to HE. All these discourses are being connected to the market economy and as such it becomes possible to speak of the governmentality in the UK higher education. The demonstrated disciplining of HE in the UK leads to the change in the conduct of students who tend to be

passive learners and perceive higher education as a tool to get a job after graduation (Part 4: Findings). This conduct leads to the unhappiness of academics with the teaching practices, and they try to distance themselves from it to a possible degree by focusing more on research and managerial practices. Nevertheless, since it is not possible for them to completely avoid the teaching practices, they try to change the described attitudes of students towards HE in their teaching practices (Part 4: Findings).

As it is possible to notice, governmentality is a neoliberal form of governing that presupposes certain control and discipline but of non-judicial nature. In fact, this was one of the central points of Foucault (1980) in relation to the governing existing in the West that began in the eighteenth century. In the context of HE described earlier, it becomes hard for students and academics to live a life when their actions and thoughts are tied to their own “values, habits and beliefs” (Dean, 2002, p. 50). In fact, can we really speak of an absolute freedom of students and academics in the UK higher education? Considering the described disciplining of the UK HE as well as students and academics, the answer is “NO”. However, isn’t it an exaggeration? In order to understand this, we need to compare the situation in the UK higher education with the Russian one where the political regime exercises visible restrictions on various forms of freedoms (e.g. no free elections, no uncensored media, no unbiased courts) (Gelman, 2015), but nevertheless, integrated into the global market economy which drives it towards being market oriented in relation to HE as well (Smolentseva, 2017).

The political regime of Russia can be shortly defined as hybrid that encompasses “authoritarian politics and neoliberal economy” (Gallo, 2022, p. 555). The authoritarian politics, as it will be demonstrated later in the thesis, aims at allowing the President Vladimir Putin to stay in power for as long as possible and consolidating his power (Chapter 6). When it comes to the existence of neoliberal economy, that is, of governmentality, it intervened into Russia with the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. This is the period when “planned economy was abolished, and unbridled market forces took over the country” (Belyakov in Rodriguez-Garavito, 2019, p. 187). In other words, the economy of Russia became a market economy. This had its effect on the area of higher education as well. Higher education in Russia became partially marketized, commodified (Yakovleva, 2022). From being totally state controlled, it was partially reoriented towards meeting the needs of the labour market. As Smolentseva (2017) puts it “evaluation of the higher education sector is now expected to comply with the structure of labour market needs” (p. 1100). In addition to that, although partially, but higher education tuition fees were also introduced in Russia (Chapter 6) which

implied the birth of student as consumers discourse in Russian HE as well. As such, it is precisely because neoliberalism intervened into Russia in 1991, it is possible to talk about the existence of governmentality in the Russian HE. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 10, the discourse of technological entrepreneurship promoted by the Russian Government in relation to HE is directly linked to the market economy which confirms the existence of governmentality in HE of Russia. The attention of the Russian Government on employer needs while disciplining HE (which is also an indication of governmentality in HE) will also be demonstrated and discussed in Chapter 12.

Apart from the partial market orientation of higher education in Russia, the Government also attempts to discipline it as well as students and academics with the narratives of Slavophilism the key goal of which is to signify loyalty to the state which implies loyalty to the supreme and absolute power of Vladimir Putin (Chapter 6). The discourses promoted in this context are patriotic upbringing, technical sciences (or hard sciences) as connected to the development of military industry and student communities. All these circulating discourses in Russian HE along with the one of technological entrepreneurship initiate certain power relations between students and academics in HE of Russia. They give rise to the specific conduct of students and academics. As it will be demonstrated in Chapter 12, some of the students in Russia record unpatriotic sentiments (as they perceive them) voiced by some academics which can later lead to a prosecutor's investigation at the university. This is the result of the disciplining targeted to signify the loyalty to the state. Because of this, some academics engage in self-censorship practices.

On the other hand, there also students who just like in the UK HE became passive learners and come to study at the university just for the sake of getting the degree. The passive learning of students in the Russia HE is also connected to the visible disciplinary techniques of the Russian Government in relation to HE. The design of the classrooms (linear set up of desks) in Russian HE creates an army-like order which breaks down any communication and critical thinking as reported by the interviewed academics in Russia (Chapter 12). The interviewed academics in Russia attempt to change such an attitude of students through various active learning exercises which could improve the critical thinking of students. In fact, academics in both countries attempt to resist the governmental disciplining of HE through various practices. The interviewed academics in the UK often try to distance themselves from the practice of teaching as much as possible because they don't like the passive attitude of students towards their studies (Chapter 12). In other words, as much as

the disciplining of HE in both countries aims to fashion students and academics “to lead docile and practical lives” (Olssen, 1999, p. 29), there is still freedom to deviate from that disciplining and the resistance of academics to it in both countries’ HE is the confirmation of that. I will discuss all findings in detail in Part 4 of the thesis, however, in this brief overview, it is necessary to state the key finding of this research. Despite being considerably different in terms of the political regimes, governmentality exists in both countries’ HE and it is enacted in a surprisingly similar way. In addition to that, this thesis argues that it is not possible to speak of an absolute freedom in the UK HE as there are various practices and discourses that are non-judicially imposed on students and academics that discipline them in specific ways. It is also not possible to speak of an absolute authoritarianism in the Russian HE due to the conduct of academics who can resist governmental disciplining in their teaching practices.

In the next section, I will discuss why I chose to focus on comparing the disciplining of higher education in both countries as it can be argued that it was perhaps possible to compare the disciplining existing in other areas of both countries as well.

Why Higher Education?

As I have already pointed out earlier, I have chosen to focus on the disciplining of higher education in the UK and Russia. The main logic that I pursued here is connected to the parsimony. In other words, as I will demonstrate later in this section, it is easier to identify the circulating dominant discourses and practices initiated by the government in the area of higher education. In addition to that the area of higher education can also be considered as closely connected to the route of the political regime in a country (Nordensvard, 2014). I will demonstrate this connection in the next few paragraphs and then talk about the parsimony mentioned earlier.

There is a huge amount of academic literature that delves into the details of explaining the connection between higher education and the political pathway of a government. The issue of the relationship between the government and higher education was raised long before this thesis has been written. For instance, Neave (1984) by analysing it claimed that there are three elements in particular that governments usually consider in relation to higher education. These include economic element where government “sees higher education as an instrument by which the resource development of a country may be advanced...” (p. 112); social element where higher education acts “in a distributary manner by providing the

opportunity and the facilities for those duly qualified to study, irrespective of income and background” (p. 112); and finally, the political element, where the government views HE “as a good to be broadcast amongst as many as are qualified or who feel the need to avail themselves of the opportunity as a means of raising the overall level of education amongst the population in general” (p. 112).

The relationship between the government and higher education continued to draw attention of academia in the 21st century as well. For instance, Nordensvard (2014) is quite direct in claiming that “traditionally education has often been directly linked to political and social discourses...” (p. 340). Along these lines, Marginson (2011) referred to the explored relationship claiming that “the nature of higher education is policy-determined; and while limited by its forms of production these are themselves open to politically-driven change...” (p. 413). In other words, higher education is often understood to be regulated by the government or to put this differently, it is subject to political discourses. In this respect, Smolentseva (2023) argues that despite the fact that higher education might position itself “as the producer of universal culture and knowledge...nevertheless, most contributions of higher education have a political dimension” (p. 236). Considering these points, it becomes possible to argue that politics and higher education are closely interlinked. Following these lines, Cantwell et al (2018) insists that “higher education is an inherently political activity” (p. 1). When we think of the described points, it seems to be possible to argue that this link between politics and higher education is ripe for analysis of governmentality. I could have chosen other spheres such as policing, sports, family, healthcare system to study the way states discipline each of the mentioned spheres as well. Nevertheless, apart from the parsimony that I will explain in the next paragraph, I have decided to focus on the disciplining of HE because of the explained direct link between the government and HE.

As stated earlier, I have chosen to take higher education as the case study in this thesis, mainly for the sake of parsimony. Basically, the interdependence between power and knowledge is clearly visible within the field of Higher Education, which is crucial to understand power operation from the perspective of Foucault. It is important to keep in mind that “in much of the work that purports to be Foucauldian in educational studies, power is reduced to domination, and knowledge is detached from power” (Ball, 2013, p. 19). As such, I do not intend to detach power from knowledge in Higher Education. Instead, my central aim is to study the interdependence between them. Moreover, I argue that within higher education, the possibility of detecting the interconnection between power and knowledge is

more accessible compared to all other areas. This is because there are continuous practices that are often sufficiently transparent between lecturers and students, lecturers and administrative employees, which are connected to the various circulating discourses which the government largely promotes.

A substantial part of higher education in Russia receives public funding (Barinova et al., 2016, Huisman et al., 2018) and it is subordinated by centralized executive power (Platonova, Semyonov in Huisman et al., 2018). Therefore, the discourses promoted by the Russian Government are inevitably directly reflected in universities' affairs which is different from the case in the UK. In the UK, universities, by being heavily dependent on funding, are indirectly affected by the strategy of the Government in relation to higher education which has gradually resulted in the adoption of the policy "students as clients" (Williams, 2013, p. 115) (or students as consumers). Leaving these issues aside for now, it is important to remember that no matter what strategy the Government is pursuing in relation to higher education, its coordination of power is reflected in universities' affairs. As Fairclough (1992) describes it, "any system of education is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledges and power which they carry" (p. 51). Different strategies of governments in relation to Higher Education mean different discourses circulating within universities and, as such, mean different practices that are exercised within them. These mentioned points are clearly visible in higher education and make it accessible to identify the intricacies of power operation in HE of two states.

Continuing the previous points, the complexity behind the interconnection of circulating discourses is possible to detect in Higher Education because the very mode of existence of universities in any country is closely related to the coordination of power at the macro-level, that is, to the strategy of a government; to the technologies of domination. Moreover, the change in the political direction of a country is almost immediately reflected in the affairs of universities. Take, for instance, the war in Ukraine that was started by the Russian military aggression in February 2022. The University of Glasgow, among many universities across the world, suspended its partnership with Russian universities in March 2022, which was provoked by the statement of the Russian Union of Rectors that has supported Russia's invasion (University of Glasgow, 2022). The Russian invasion of Ukraine is an event that has little or no relation to Higher Education (HE). However, this event has affected the mode of existence of HE in both countries to a certain extent. As such, the rules of Higher Education formation as a system, as Torfing (1999) would put it, "is articulated with its non-

discursive conditions” (p. 90). The fact that the discourses circulating within HE are closely connected to the macro-level order and very transparent allows me to detect the complexity behind the interrelations of different circulating discourses and practices that consequently, demonstrate the operation of power in HE of both states.

State and Government

It is also necessary to state that I use the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘government’ interchangeably in this thesis. I acknowledge the fact that these concepts might have different meanings and definitions in political sciences, thus leading to different understandings of these concepts along with the implications of those understandings. Robinson (2013), for instance, claims that there might be situations “where governments can be removed through revolution, but the state (with its rights and obligations) remains” (p. 555). In fact, a lot has been discussed about the differences between those concepts. In this respect, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx are among the most prominent thinkers. Relatively up to date elaborations on this issue have been carried out by Fukuyama for instance. The author provided quite a direct definition of state claiming that the state is “an institution that accumulates and uses power” (Fukuyama, 2013, p. 1). The government, on the other hand, is an organization responsible for a set of functions aimed at the regulation of a society (ibid). In other words, an organization that uses the power accumulated by the state. In this sense, government is an instrument of a state the goal of which is to “make and enforce rules, and to deliver services” (Fukuyama, 2013, p. 3). While this thesis acknowledges the existence of various academic definitions of the terms such as ‘government’ and ‘state’, it is necessary to point out that the inclusion of different theoretical underpinnings related to those concepts would only appear as a brief and ad hoc engagement with the complex ideas because they have little relevance to the key theoretical background of the thesis.

On the contrary, the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis, allows me to use the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘government’ interchangeably. In fact, Foucault often avoided separating between those concepts. Here is why. To understand the reason behind this, there is a need to delve into their understanding of power operation in a society in a bit more detail. I will go into the intricacies of the Foucauldian concept of power in the following sections of this thesis (Chapter 1). Nevertheless, at this point, it is necessary to state that according to Foucault, power is not to be solely understood as, first, to be held by someone, instead it is dispersed across the society through various discourses and practices. Secondly, power,

according to Foucault, should not only be studied as a top-down exercise by those who rule the country. It is certainly, the case, that those who rule use different practices and discourses to govern the societies and Foucault has elaborated on it a lot by introducing the concepts of disciplinary power and governmentality. Within this framework, my aim in this thesis is to understand how this is happening in the UK and Russia in the area of higher education.

Nevertheless, in addition to the previous line of thinking, Foucault's another interest was on understanding how the discourses and practices circulating at the bottom, that is, among ordinary citizens of the country, are producing new discourses and practices that are becoming "statified" (Foucault, 2004, p. 191) as he calls it or becoming the ways of governing by those who rule. He refers to this process as the "statification" (Foucault, 2004, p. 77). In this sense, he often insists that power "arises from the bottom up" (Olssen, 1999, p. 19). To put this differently, according to Foucauldian line of thinking, those people who rule the country, do not take discourses and practices that they use to discipline the societies out of nowhere. These discourses and practices already circulate in the society and some of them become dominating ones through the "warlike crash between forces" (Nigro in Lemm and Vatter, 2014, p. 130) and consequently start to be used by those who rule to govern the society. In this respect, it is often possible to come across the quote that Foucault's interest was "to cut off the king's head in political thought" (Jessen, Von Eggers, 2020, p. 54). Continuing these lines, by studying the discourses and practices circulating at the bottom in different historical periods, Foucault's aim was to understand how they are producing the prevalent practices and discourses that are consequently used by those who discipline the society. In this respect, Foucault (2004) often insists that his attempt in the study of power operation can be described as "doing without a theory of the state" (p. 77).

Considering the points above, Foucault's primary interest was not in differentiating between the concepts of 'state' and 'government'. His interest was in how the discourses and practices circulating at the bottom produced what people then referred as the way of governing in different historical periods. As Foucault (2004) claims "the problem of bringing under state control, of 'statification' (*etatisation*) is at heart of the questions I have tried to address" (p. 77). In fact, not only, the author refers to the goal of government as governing, which I explore in detail in the theory of governmentality (Chapter 4), but he does the same to the term of the 'state' as well. As Foucault (2007) describes it "What if the state were nothing more than a way of governing?" (p. 248). Along these lines, by being aware of the potential problems that could arise in political sciences due to such a definition, Foucault (1980) states

“I don’t want to say that the state isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state” (p. 122). In other words, since the key concern that the author had was about the way the societies are being disciplined and the way the power relations at the bottom produce what it is to be understood by disciplining, he often referred both to ‘government’ and to ‘state’ as an apparatus directed towards governing the population.

While Foucault (2007) acknowledges that the concept of state might be discussed through different political sciences lens at times meaning “a domain, a territory” (p. 256), at times conveying a meaning of “a milieu of jurisdiction” (p. 256) and at other times meaning “institution” (p. 257), he, nevertheless, insists on viewing it as a way of governing. This is because the discourse of ‘state’ as I will demonstrate in Chapter 4, has been transformed into the ‘state as government’ with the emergence of the phenomenon of population in the eighteenth century. In other words, with the sharp rise of population, the concept of state started to be understood from the point of governing this population. He calls us to think of a state through the practices of governing that it uses. The state is an empty signifier which can imply something only when it is filled with certain practices of governing. As Foucault (2007) describes it “after all, maybe the state is only a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction whose importance is much less than we think. Maybe. What is important for our modernity, that is to say, for our present, is not the state’s takeover (etatisation) of society, so much as what I would call the “governmentalization” of the state” (p. 109). While I understand that for example the Russian State and the Russian Government may have different meaning in political sciences, I refer to them interchangeably, because in this theoretical framework the state is to be understood through the practice of governing the population. It refers to the “disciplinary mechanisms and technologies” (Foucault, 2004, p. 77).

Research and Literature Timeframe

It is also necessary to clarify the timeframe both with respect to the actual research and when it was carried out and to the literature providing the background description of both cases under this research. This thesis, in short, is about the analysis of power operation in two different countries, more precisely in their higher education systems. The operation of power is analysed to understand how two states discipline their HE and consequently, students and academics. The chosen theoretical framework is adopted from the ideas of Foucault on the

concept of power. I will delve into the details of Foucauldian power which leads to the concepts of disciplining and governmentality later in this thesis (Chapters 1-4 in particular). However, at this point, it is worth considering the fact that according to this theoretical framework power operation is not static and constantly changing in accordance with the discourses circulating in a society that are connected to specific practices. Practices, in their turn, are embedded into the relations between people. When we speak of power operation, at large, we speak of the relations between people which are always in motion. These relations or practices between people, in their turn, are connected to the discourses that are also in constant change for several reasons but can be summed up by indicating to three reasons in particular. First, discourses are dependent on the historical period which Foucault refers to as the episteme. Secondly, discourses are shaped by the governments, which he refers to as disciplining and in his later works reaches to the concept of governmentality. Third, discourses are shaped by the practices between people as well, the point that he used to indicate that the operation of power can also be studied through the analysis of the relations of people at the bottom meaning between ordinary citizens of a country.

Considering these points, when one attempts to demonstrate the operation of power in a society through the ideas of Foucault, there is a need to acknowledge that it is only possible to demonstrate a snapshot of power operation in a specific timeframe as the ideas of Foucault do not view it as having a static, ahistorical, apolitical and non-social nature. In other words, the analysis of a power operation in this thesis, can be regarded as being achieved through the lens of poststructuralism. This approach can be criticised because of its relativist ontological assumption which I examine in methodology of this thesis (Chapter 8). It is not possible to generalize the findings of this research as well which at times might be regarded as a limitation (Polit and Beck, 2010). In addition to this, this work of this thesis might be regarded as “an endless critical and constructive work, with no final truth in sight” (James, 2014, p. 6). However, my aim is not to provide a final or absolute truth in respect to power operation nor to generalize the findings to the whole population in both countries. Instead, my goal is to contribute to the comparative studies that are based on relativist ontological assumption which as discussed in methodology (Chapter 8) can be beneficial to denaturalize possible dominations of certain discourses and practices existing in higher education systems of both countries.

Nevertheless, considering the fact that the adopted theoretical framework views power operation as something that is always changing, this thesis demonstrates only the snapshot

of power operation in HE that covers the period of October 2019 – October 2022. This is because I have tried to provide a snapshot of power operation that would be more up to date. Along these lines, it is necessary to keep in mind that the political regimes of both countries are changing in terms of their direction, and this is especially related to the situation in Russia that invaded Ukraine in February of 2022. As such, the studied disciplining of HE certainly changes to a certain degree as well. This is why, I do not intend to claim that the analysis of power operation of this thesis can be regarded as valid beyond 2022. Nor it is valid for the period preceding 2019. In fact, even if I would have an intention to generalize the findings of the analysed power operation, it would not be possible in a chosen theoretical framework as it is against generalizations overall as indicated earlier.

When it comes to the clarification of the timeframe of the literature provided in this thesis as the background of both cases, I have chosen to focus on the literature that has been written roughly between the late 1990s and the present times. This is because the academic literature on neoliberalism (which is the dominant political regime in the UK (Chapter 5)) and higher education as well authoritarianism under the reign of Putin and its connection to the higher education in Russia began to be written during this period. It is certainly the case that there is literature preceding that period as well especially regarding neoliberalism in the UK and authoritarianism in Russia. I very occasionally refer to the academic works conducted prior to the late 1990s. However, it is only done to get a better understanding of the discourses and practices that exist in contemporary higher education systems of both countries. For instance, there is a discourse of patriotic upbringing used by the Russian Government to discipline students in higher education (Chapters 6, 10, 12). However, the notion of patriotic upbringing has a rich history in Russia and was cultivated in the Soviet times as well which I talk about in the literature review (Part 2). To understand the logic of this discourse today, we need to understand the way it was developing throughout the years. It is certainly beyond the scope of this research to refer to all the literature that was written in this regard, however, it is possible to refer to some of it. Again, the aim is to understand the way the discourse was evolving in terms of its meaning.

The similar work was conducted by Foucault as well who as mentioned earlier viewed discourses and practices as constantly changing (in Burchell et al., 1991). He reached this conclusion by conducting an archaeological and genealogical analysis of various values, discourses, practices, knowledges in order to uncover what constituted them (McNay, 1994; Smart, 1985; Fairclough, 1992; Lemm and Vatter, 2014; Haugaard, 2022). This analysis was

at heart of his work overall. Without such an approach, he would probably not be able to provide a comprehensive explanation of the discourses and practices that he was referring to in his works, such as, for instance, the discourse of liberalism and neoliberalism. As James (2014) describes it “you have to identify something in order to be able to speak of it” (p. 5). I have attempted to provide as much comprehensive identification of specific discourses and practices used by both governments in relation to HE as possible by referring to a wide range of resources written in this regard throughout the years.

Finally, as mentioned the discourses and practices are both at heart of Foucault’s analysis on power and in fact, on many other ideas that he was discussing about (Part 1). However, it is worth noting that the examples of practices existing in HE of both countries that I have included in chapters preceding the actual analysis of research data, unfortunately, cannot be situated against the research framework. In other words, I cannot verify those examples by personal observation. This is because, unfortunately, the method of participant observation which was of paramount importance for this thesis was cancelled due to the Covid-19 Pandemic and the war in Ukraine which both prevented me from travelling to Russia (Chapter 8). However, I was still able to get the secondary data on practices existing in higher education of Russia through online semi-structured interviews conducted with lecturers in Russia. Eventually, I still managed to get the data even though it was from the secondary sources.

Research Questions:

In previous sections, I have already touched upon the main research question, which is the following:

- How is governmentality enacted in higher education of two different political regimes?

I came up with the previous question from my interest in how power operates in two different countries; that is, my concern was (and it is) investigating how power works in two different regimes. I was, and still am, deeply interested in the effect of a political regime and culture on how people think of their everyday life, family, career, politics, country, history, music, and many more. I was always impressed by the ability of a human being to absorb a common rationality of the place he or she is in. Interestingly, individual rationality is being considerably shaped by the social and political setting, especially in the long term. The same

person can argue in favour of or against something perfectly well, depending on the social and political context. More importantly, the individual often genuinely believes in what he or she is saying. What has become clear to me is that an individual's rationality is constantly shaped to a certain degree by the social and political setting. The concepts of disciplining and governmentality help us to track the mentioned processes.

During my research's initial stages, I searched for a sphere in which it would be more accessible to track the process discussed above and then came up with focusing on HE for the reasons explained earlier. I have then formulated sub-questions of this research, the answers to all of which allow me to respond to the central question in a more detailed way. These are the following:

- Is it possible to claim that there is an absolute freedom in the UK HE and an absolute authoritarianism in the Russian HE?
- What are their key similarities and differences in terms of the disciplinary techniques they use?
- How is power in this non-traditional sense exercised in both countries HE?
- What does this exercise consist of?
- What are the mechanisms of it in both countries?
- What circulating discourses can be observed in HE in both countries?
- What kind of a subject is being created in both countries?
- Is there any resistance by the subjects to the dominating discourses?
- If Yes, what are the results of this resistance?

Thesis Structure

The focus of the theoretical framework is to explain the theory of governmentality. I argue that in order to understand it, we first need to elaborate on three other concepts developed by Foucault which together lead to the theory of governmentality. As such, it is needed to focus first on the concept of power (Chapter 1), then on the concept of discourse (Chapter 2) and finally on the concept of subject (Chapter 3). In the last chapter of this part, I discuss the theory of governmentality (Chapter 4).

The literature review comes next the central aims of which is to examine the existing literature on political regimes of two countries examined in this thesis and how these regimes are reflected on their higher education systems. The governing of higher education is explained under the section of technologies of domination where I review the literature on the way HE is being controlled and disciplined by both governments. In addition to this, I turn my attention to the reviewing of the literature that speaks of the conduct and thoughts of people involved in HE in both countries. This is explored under the section of technologies of the self. This part is divided into two chapters: Chapter 5 – the United Kingdom; Chapter 6 – Russia.

This is followed by the methodology which I have chosen to apply in the thesis. It discusses the ontological and epistemological perspectives of the research in more depth (Chapter 7) along with methodology and research methods (Chapter 8). It then, advocates for the inclusion of Norman Fairclough ideas (Critical Discourse Analysis, CDA) that are more useful in analysing the discourses. Along with this, it speaks of other methods used in the research and emphasized the limitations that occurred during the course of the research.

Finally, there is the part on findings and analysis which is divided into five chapters. Chapter 9 is on the CDA of the articles in the UK; Chapter 10 is on the CDA of Russian articles. The aim of both chapters is to illustrate the discourses both governments attempt to submit higher education to. The focus of Chapter 11 is on the interviews with academics in the UK, whereas Chapter 12 analyses the interviews with academics in Russia. These two chapters focus on how academics in both countries view HE and examines the practices they are engaged with in HE. The last chapter of this thesis is the conclusion where I draw out the main findings and elaborate on them (Chapter 13).

Part 1: Theoretical Framework

Chapter 1: Power; Power/Knowledge; Discipline; Resistance

I have pointed out that my main interest is to analyse how governmentality is enacted in higher education in two different political regimes. I also claimed that governmentality is a neoliberal way of governing the aim of which is to produce *homo-economicus*. Now, in order to understand the concept of governmentality in full depth, we need to refer to several other ideas developed by Foucault. The first is definitely the concept of power, which I will speak of in this chapter. The remaining two are discourse and the subject (technologies of the self). Let us start with the concept of power (Chapter 1), then discourse (Chapter 2) and subject (Chapter 3) and finally end this part by referring to the idea of governmentality (Chapter 4) that encompasses all these concepts.

Following the lines above, we need to understand what power is and how it operates, according to Foucault. The ideas of Foucault are usually put among the post-structuralist thinkers (Agger, 1991) because, most importantly, he questioned the linear axiom regarding the concept of power. For Foucault, power isn't something that belongs to or is held by anyone and does not operate only in a strictly hierarchical top-down manner (Danaher, 2000). Foucault challenged this understanding of power that usually views it as a solely judicial exercise. In essence, this is what post-structuralists usually do. As Agger (1991) mentions, "post-structuralism is often seen as a dissenting position... post-structuralism does not simply reject things. It works within them to undo their exclusive claims to truth and purity" (p. 8). Following these lines, Foucault questioned the deterministic statement that power should solely be viewed as something that could be owned by a person, institution or any group and exercised in a judicial way. It is worth keeping in mind that Foucault never rejected the existence of judicial power. However, he argued that firstly, it is not the only form of power, and secondly, even this power as well has taken other forms through the course of history.

By digging into history, in his book *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison* (1975), Foucault attempted to demonstrate how power gradually took a form that he later defined as the disciplinary one. The book begins with a discussion of the public execution of Robert-Francois Damiens, who was convicted of an attempted assassination of King Louis XV in the 18th Century. He states that this was the demonstration of the judicial power the state had. However, Foucault (1975) draws attention to the fact that this power had taken the form of disciplinary power by the time. He provides an example of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon

prison, which is designed so that a single guard can observe all the prisoners, however, they are unable to know if they are being watched. Consequently, they watch and regulate their own behaviour. As such, Foucault (1975) aimed to demonstrate how the concept of power changed throughout the 18th century. In addition, he argued that back in those days, the government's main concern was the manipulation of the body (Marshall, 1996). It was the body that needed to be trained and disciplined. As such, the sovereign was not concerned about the thoughts of an individual (Hindess, 1996). By the time, this line of thinking was also shaped by the rapid growth of the world's population, the case study that Foucault used to explain his theory of governmentality (Burchell et al., 1991). Nevertheless, what is important at this point is the fact that power, from being excessively judicial, became overwhelmingly disciplinary.

The power became dispersed across society through different institutions such as prisons, schools. It started functioning through the relations between people, institutions, and other groups. The question is how? It is important for us to understand the following points because they explain to us how the interests of governments circulate across societies. Foucault claimed that there are different discourses and knowledges that circulate in every society, in every institution, such as schools, for example, that are engaged in a struggle with each other (Danaher et al., 2000). It is the question of which discourse or knowledge has more influence over the other. This is how Foucault developed the idea of the power-knowledge nexus. He insisted that power should be recognized “not as a property of the mighty, but rather as a set of forces which establishes positions and ways of behaving that influence people in their everyday lives” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 48). There are always power struggles between individuals, groups, and institutions that are linked to various discourses, which in turn produce new discourses and knowledges.

Foucault, in a way, inherited the hypothesis of Nietzsche that locates the power relations in an engagement of forces (Marshall, 1996). These forces are closely connected to specific knowledges and discourses. As such, Foucault did not identify knowledge and power separately, but his claim was “where there is power there is knowledge, and vice versa” (Marshall, 1996, p. 120). Eventually, he reached the point that it is not anymore the ruler or the King, President who, by exercising his or her power, produce a particular truth or knowledge for the population. As he puts it, the “relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State... The State is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality,

the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth” (Foucault, 1980, p. 122). There are power relations that extend beyond the state and operate on another level. It is not just about identifying who are the rulers and who are the ruled if the aim is to understand the power operation in society. The situation is more complex than that and requires to analyse discourses and knowledges that circulate between people.

Why is it so important to pay attention to the circulating discourses and knowledges to identify the operation of power, and how has it happened that power became closely interconnected with these discourses and knowledges? One can argue that various discourses and knowledges existed before in history as well. However, during the Renaissance the monarch held power and was in charge of exercising it, as in the example of Louis XV mentioned above. The point that the previous argument is missing is that during the Renaissance, the overwhelming number of discourses and knowledges was authorised by the Church only. As Danaher et al (2000) put it, there was a “relative homogeneity and unity of authorised discourses” (p. 72). With the rise of democracy, however, this homogeneity of discourses and knowledges has gradually evaporated. Leaders were now to be elected by people who approve or disapprove numerous various discourses and knowledges circulating in society (ibid). It has become the task of political groups to identify a discourse supported by the majority and stand in for those people to be elected. As such, power, in this sense, has flipped upside down. This is one of the key points to consider when we speak about the Foucauldian power that is commonly viewed as the one that “arises from the bottom up” (Olssen, 1999, p. 19). It is one of the points that Foucault (1980) went on to assert while discussing the power-knowledge nexus. As he notes “there can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth...” (p. 93).

In this context, it might be appropriate to claim that Russia seems to operate much more top-down, while the UK is a more bottom-up type of government. However, it becomes evident from the research that both governments attempt to control and discipline their HE systems and consequently, students and academics by less visible tools, more precisely, by dispersing the discourses of their interests across HE. In other words, both governments use more of a top-down non-judicial strategy.

The idea of disciplinary power, in many ways, goes in line with the previous point regarding the top-down non-judicial operation of power. Emerging in the seventeenth century, the primary goal of this power was to render people “amenable to instructions or to mould their

characters in other ways” (p. 113) through schools, prisons and other institutions (Hindess, 1996). As such, the dispersed nature of power that Foucault was discussing should be primarily viewed in this way. There is no doubt that the government is involved in an exercise of power and aimed at the regulation of conduct (referred to as the technologies of domination in the theory of governmentality, Chapter 4) (Martin et al., 1988). However, along these lines, it seems to be fair to ask where do the governments take their perspectives and positions from? Certainly, interests do not arise out of anywhere.

The critical point that Foucault is making in relation to the previous question is that power acts on everybody, both on “the dominant as well as the dominated” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 74). In other words, the dominant as well is “written by various institutional contexts, ideas and discourses” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 74), overwhelmingly by the discourses that have an internal nature (closer to personality itself), such as culture, family. This is worth remembering because, for instance, Russian patriotism meaning loyalty to the ruler first and foremost (Chapters 6, 10, 12), is heavily promoted by the Russian Government in HE. Yes, the Russian Government attempts to discipline students in HE in this specific way, and this is called the disciplinary power that we are covering in this chapter. However, the Russian Government did not invent such an understanding of patriotism. Such an understanding of patriotism existed and circulated across Russian society for centuries for various cultural reasons (Chapter 6). The Russian Government has also been affected by this understanding of patriotism, along with many other meanings. In this sense, the power of different discourses on patriotism in Russia also acted on the Russian government’s members. This is happening to everyone in a society, both to the dominant and the dominated. The Russian Government, in its turn, selected specifically this understanding of patriotism due to its interests (such as to remain in power for as long as possible) and promotes particularly this patriotism (as a loyalty to the ruler) in higher education.

It can, therefore, be argued that the state (the government) is certainly, involved in power relations and, in a way, coordinates power by regulating the conduct of individuals. However, the state representatives themselves are involved in power relations that is closely connected to the discourses, which could be viewed as internal such as the body, family, kinship (Foucault, 1980). As such, in this sense, power circulates between the dominant and the dominated (See Figure 1).




Figure 1. Author's conception of power operation between the dominated and the dominant

↔ - signifies power relations

As it can be observed from above, every discourse, the relationship between the dominant and the dominated, between the discourses, are all interdependent. Based on this interconnectedness, the government (the dominant) attempts to regulate the conduct and thoughts of the dominated. The task of the government clearly seems to be complicated. Hindess (1996) suggests that the rise in the number of various discourses led to “an expansion of government itself relative to straightforward domination on the one hand and to unstable and reversible relations of power on the other” (p. 107). In other words, the dominant attempts to act on the dominated by the discourses that it is itself embraced with. In this sense, there is a viability to Foucault's claim that power operates “from the bottom up” (Olssen, 1999, p. 19).

Based on the previously demonstrated interconnection, “power produces; it produces reality, it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault as cited in Rabinow, 1984, p. 205). This power is exercised through the relationship between people that is linked to the existing discourses. Consequently, new discourses, knowledges, rituals of truth are produced through this relationship between people, various institutions and groups. Power flows very quickly depending on the relationship the discourses are involved in. It is, therefore, “mobile and contingent” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 71). It flows from one discourse to another depending on the outcome of the struggle the discourses have between each other.

The power, apart from producing reality, new knowledges and discourses, also produces resistance, which is an important point to consider, especially because the results of this thesis demonstrate that both regimes produce resistance of lecturers to the regime of truth of higher education. I will discuss the resistance produced by power in detail in Chapter 3. However, at this point, it is necessary to mention it because it is an important part of the Foucauldian understanding of power. As such, the competing discourses always result in a situation when one dominates over the other. The dominated one finds itself in a position of resistance. Therefore, as Danaher et al. (2000) put it, “as soon as you produce categories of what is normal, healthy and good, you produce other categories – the pervert, sexual, the hysteric, the kleptomaniac, the pyromaniac, the psychotic” (p. 79). Despite the fact that some of the existing academic literature considers Foucault’s concept of resistance as the “blind spot” of his works (Stehr, Adolf, 2018, p. 194), it, in fact, conveys crucial messages that opens a “space of a potential politics” (Flohr, 2016, p. 39).

Foucault (1997) insists that where there is power, there is always resistance and vice versa. Moreover, the multiplicity of points of resistance should not only imply a potential of a rebellion (Smart, 1985). The concept of resistance is more complex than that, and Foucault was not interested in discovering resistance just for the sake of identifying the potential of revolutions in different societies. More than that, the resistance is deeply connected to the concept of freedom, the freedom of a soul, consciousness, thoughts. Consider the following words of Foucault (1997), for example: “If there was no resistance there would be no power relations, because it would be a matter of obedience. You have to use power relations to refer to the situations where you’re not doing what you want. So resistance comes first” (p. 167). The quote requires us to think of what we cannot do in the social and political setting that we are in. It is about discovering the limits of our actions and thoughts. If there would not be power relations (competing discourses) in a society, we would not be able to think of those limits. Therefore, for Foucault, power produces resistance. In relation to this thesis, I demonstrate that there is resistance from the academics to the disciplining of HE in both countries which has an effect on the way power operates in both higher education systems. This implies the practices and discourses of academics in both countries that considerably deviate from the ones that the technologies of domination (governments) attempt to impose on HE.

I also wanted to briefly cover some of the criticisms that Foucault’s understanding of power often gets. The ideas of Foucault are usually criticized by French structuralists who argue

that there is, basically speaking, nothing extraordinary in his elaboration on power as the point that “we can know ourselves only on the basis of what a cultural totality dictates” (McHoul, Grace, 1993, p. 64) has already been discussed. However, what is crucial to note here is that Foucault, by digging into history, attempted to deconstruct the totality of power itself. In other words, the Russian Government, for instance, does not hold the discourse of patriotism in its possession. It does not have total control over it. It just selects this discourse that is already circulating in society, however it attempts to give it a shape that would meet the interests of the Russian Government. It constructs the meaning of patriotism as a loyalty to the ruler and uses various methods to disseminate this understanding of patriotism across higher education. I am demonstrating how the previously mentioned process is being realized in both countries’ HE. Along these lines, McNay (1994) also criticized Foucault for demonstrating power as a form of total control over society and human minds. Nevertheless, once again, it is important to note that, on the contrary, Foucault rejected the proposition that power takes a certain form. It is just invisible, dispersed across society and does not belong to anyone in a sense as if someone could hold it (Danaher et al., 2000). It is abstract, mobile and contingent, closely interdependent with the circulating discourses.

It is also necessary to dig deeper into some of the criticisms the ideas of Foucault are often faced with. Firstly, it seems to be appropriate to begin from placing the ideas of Foucault under the movement of post-structuralism that is often considered to be started in France in the second half of the twentieth century (Haugaard, 2022; Williams, 2014; Howarth, 2013). There are various definitions of post-structuralism across academia. At times, post-structuralism is even considered to be non-existent because it is quite challenging to provide a clear definition of it. For instance, Dillet (2017) is quite direct in claiming that “poststructuralism as such does not exist” (p. 517). Along these lines, Anthony Giddens, according to Howarth (2013), “doubts whether these styles of thinking actually exist” (p. 2). Other authors state that it is problematic to define post-structuralism because the line of thinking that it suggests involves inconsistencies and inaccuracies (Lundy in Dillet et. al., 2013, p. 69). As Williams (2014) notes “it takes on positions that are marginal, inconsistent and impossible to maintain” (p. 1). In addition to this, it’s been argued by Lundy (in Dillet et. al., 2013) that “almost none of the thinkers identified today as ‘poststructuralist’ ever used this term, let alone self-identified with it” (p. 69). Nevertheless, it is still possible to find common points among many of the academic explanations of post-structuralism.

As such, post-structuralism can be defined as a line of thinking that takes a “dissenting position, for example, with respect to the sciences and to established moral values” (Williams, 2014, p. 1). Along these lines, Foucault, briefly speaking, takes a dissenting position in respect to the concept of power (Olssen, 2003). In other words, post-structuralists are often described as those who question traditional, established lines of thinking and those who question objectivity and universality of knowledge (Dillet, 2017; Howarth, 2013). They “abandon the search for context-independent or universal validity claims that can lead to the establishment of more emancipated social formations” (Howarth, 2013, p. 66). Dillet (2017) claims that post-structuralism is “neither a worldview, nor an ontology, nor a speculative philosophy, but another way to conceive the order of thought, founded on a new evaluation of the relations between theory and practice” (p. 518). To put it differently, post-structuralism is about disintegration from the established common perspectives. As Dews (1987, as cited in Howarth, 2013) describes it, post-structuralists “seek for difference, but it does so through an immersion in fragments and perspectives...” (p. 71). This can be understood as post-structuralists are in favour of characterizing knowledge as a context-dependent concept.

In addition to that, post-structuralism, at times, can also be described as “against the order, unity and purity...sometimes invoke the contingency, the pluralism...” (Angermuller, 2015, p. 18). In arguing for the “subjectivity of knowledge” (Dillet, 2017, p. 518), post-structuralists often claim that “any settled form of knowledge or moral good is made by its limits and cannot be defined independently of them” (Williams, 2014, p. 2). As Williams (2014) continues “it is not that poststructuralists reject the self, the subject, the “I”..., it is that it cannot claim to be an independent secure core” (pp. 8-9). One of the reasons of placing the ideas of Foucault into the framework of post-structuralism is because he aimed to demonstrate that “the categories of thought are historically contingent social constructions” (Haugaard, 2022, p. 342). Finally, post-structuralists, as mentioned earlier, are often viewed as supporters of decentring the structures. As Angermuller (2015) states “poststructuralism decentres the notion of structure, be it through the temporalization of structure or through the discovery of marginal or excluded elements seen as constitutive for the structure” (p. 19). In this sense, Foucauldian line of thinking on power fits quite well into the narratives of post-structuralists as he not only added “various pictures of power” (Howarth, 2013, p. 187) meaning the invention of a disciplinary power for instance, but also questioned the centrality of power operation arguing that power, more precisely, power relations may “extend beyond the limits of the State” (Foucault, 1980, p. 122).

Speaking of the criticisms addressed towards the ideas of post-structuralism, it is necessary to state that there are many of them. They start from accusing the supporters of it in giving a way to the emergence of post-truth politics (Prozorov, 2018) in which a relativist ontological stance is also dominating which causes problems in distinguishing “truth and lies, honesty and dishonesty, and fiction and non-fiction” (Ghosh, 2022, p.9). The critique of post-structuralism ends with its possible “destructive nature of radical opposition to tradition” (Williams, 2014, p. 4) overall. In fact, there are many points of critique that could be addressed to the stances of post-structuralists. As Howarth (2013) describes it “there is a considerable disagreement about the meaning and scope of poststructuralism...about substantive content of the approach, especially its ability to tackle the problems of social structures and institutions...” (p. 56). Perhaps, the key criticism that it receives is its denial of a universality and centrality of knowledge. As Williams (2005) puts it “to deny a core is to fall into relativism, where all values are relative. If all claims are relative to different values, how do we choose justly between different claims? How do we deny extreme values?” (p. 5). In other words, post-structuralism is accused of its insistency on the contingency of knowledge and its decentralization. Post-structuralists are often viewed as against “foundations, centres and origins” (Angermuller, 2015, p. 20). Based on these points, Giddens (1987 in Howarth, 2013) referred to post-structuralism as “dead traditions of thought, which despite the promise they held in the fresh bloom of youth...have ultimately failed to generate revolution in philosophical understanding and social theory that was once on the pledge” (p. 2).

Nevertheless, despite all these criticisms, post-structuralism still has critical ideas to offer, especially in regard to a comparative scientific inquiry of this research. This is because “to deny absolutes, such as a certain core, is not to deny significant differences that we can act upon” (Williams, 2005, p. 5). In other words, it is true that post-structuralism may deny centrality of a knowledge in conventional sense, that is, the core as defined by Williams (2005), however, it still works on “practical expression of the limits in a given core” (p. 6). For instance, if we speak about this thesis, this implies that we have a core in the name of the political regimes of two countries and we study them through their practice of governing higher education to identify the limits of both systems through the differences that we find. It is also necessary to state that identifying the limits does not provide final answers, which is another criticism often referred to post-structuralism. In this sense, it is often accused of “downplaying the reality” (Howarth, 2013, p. 56). However, it questions them (the limits of the cores) which sometimes can serve to the appearance of “new claims to universal truths”

(Williams, 2014, p. 6). In addition to this, the post-structuralist analysis helps us to uncover contingencies of practices and knowledges and to denaturalize possible domination of certain values of the systems.

The ideas of Foucault are often criticized through the same narratives referred to post-structuralism overall. Not only is it possible to trace certain inconsistencies in his works (Sangren, 1995), but it is quite problematic to characterize them, that is, to place them into a certain area of study. In fact, the title of Foucault at the College de France was ‘Professor of the History of Systems of Thought’ (Martin et al., 1988). As such, while reading Foucault, it is necessary to understand that there are many “interrelations between the different axes of his work” (Borg, 2015, p. 2). It is possibly because of this, the ideas of Foucault are placed under the movement of post-structuralism which is also known as a term “designating various strands” (Angermuller, 2015, p. 16). Considering the fact that this thesis, in short, is about studying the operation of Foucauldian power, it is necessary to focus on the criticisms that this specific concept of power often gets. As mentioned throughout this work, Foucault, questioned the traditional understanding of power operation claiming that it should also be studied through practices and discourses revolving in a society rather than solely focusing on judicial top-down exercise of it. In other words, he criticised the linear axiom of power operation. In this sense, he took a dissenting position in relation to the concept of power. Foucault decentralized the notion of power, which is the approach of post-structuralists overall. What is interesting to notice, nevertheless, that despite this decentralization of power, he still discussed the concept of a disciplinary power that could be understood as going back to the idea of centralization. As Haugaard (2022) puts it “yet, if there is no center of power, as Foucault maintains, who or what is doing disciplining?” (p. 349).

The previous question of Haugaard (2022) can, in fact, be considered as an appropriate one to raise, however, it is also necessary to remember that Foucault did not deny the existence of a centralized judicial power. As he puts it “the state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth” (Foucault, 1980, p. 122). In this sense, while referring to disciplinary power, Foucault, suggested an analysis of power networks that are non-judicial practices circulating in a society, that is, the power that is dispersed across the society through non-judicial practices and discourses. It is possible to claim that Foucault did not want to essentialise the judicial aspect of power operation and by doing so allowed academia to place his ideas under post-structuralism once again. This is because, post-structuralists

“are opposed to all forms of essentialism, determinism and naturalism” (Williams, 2005, p. 11).

Nevertheless, even within the described operation of power, Foucault faced with criticism that he is inconsistent with his line of thinking. This is because the operation of power demonstrated by Foucault, denies any autonomy that could be exercised by an individual. In other words, an individual, according to Foucault, seems to be the subject that is solely formed by power relations of a society. As McNay (1994) puts it, the operation of power suggested by Foucault implies that “the subject is dead” (p. 129). To put this differently, the subject cannot pre-exist the social order formed of power relations. Foucault’s ideas are being criticized because he “over-emphasized the effects that technologies of power have on the subjection of humans, rendering attempts of resistance futile and reducing the subject to a mere passive effect of power” (Borg, 2015, pp. 1-2). Along these lines, it’s been argued by Haugaard (2022) that Foucault “misses the fact that social actors seek to socially construct themselves as subjects as a way to empower themselves, to gain access to power-to resources within a context of social structures” (p. 348).

However, it is necessary to remember that Foucault did, in fact, discuss the ability of a subject to resist the power relations circulating in a society. He referred to that ability as the technologies of the self. Technologies of the self as Foucault (as cited in Martin et al., 1988) defined them are the techniques “which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection and immortality” (p. 18). It is because Foucault eventually allowed his ideas to “make room for the subject” (Borg, 2015, p. 2), he is being accused of inconsistency. I discuss the concept of subject in Chapter 3, however, at this point, I am referring to this concept for the sake of demonstrating the slight change of Foucault’s line of thinking. Nevertheless, even this slight change of the direction of Foucault’s thought can also be viewed from the positive angle. It can be referred as an openness to new perspectives. In fact, this is what post-structuralists are often praised for. As Williams (2014) describes it “post-structuralism is not against this and for that – once and for all” (p. 4).

Finally, it is also worth mentioning why broadly speaking adopting a post-structuralist lens is beneficial to the context of contemporary Russia and the UK. More precisely, why

Foucault's ideas are useful to compare those countries. Firstly, it is crucial to understand that while elaborating on power operation and reaching the concept of governmentality, Foucault's concern was the limitation of an individual freedom through the controlling practices that existed throughout the history in the West. As he notes "humanity does not start out from freedom but from limitation" (Foucault, 1995, p. 293). While discussing governmentality and power operation overall, he was referring to the dominating practices and discourses that are dispersed across the societies in the West. According to him, neoliberalism and liberalism in general were not about the systems that provide absolute freedom to individuals. It is the system that utilizes freedom. As Walters (2020) described it "liberalism utilizes freedoms..." (p. 31). Foucault (1979) himself is quite direct in claiming that "the formula of liberalism is not "be free". Liberalism formulates simply the following: I am going to produce what you need to be free. I am going to see to it that you are free to be free" (p. 63). Considering these points, neoliberal governmentality, for Foucault, was about the governing that aims at "reconstituting social life and individual behaviour in the image of the market...The very 'soul' of the individual, and all human activity and interactions are reduced to homo economicus..." (Newman, 2019, p. 99). In other words, neoliberalism as well as liberalism for Foucault was more about the specific control of a population.

I speak of his ideas on neoliberalism in Chapter 4 dedicated to the concept of governmentality. At this point, it is necessary to understand that rather than portraying liberalism in general or more specifically, neoliberalism as a system which could potentially imply that an individual is in "a state of perfect freedom to order their actions" (Locke, 1960, p. 287), Foucault believed that it is a system of control designed to utilise freedom of an individual to reach certain aims. In neoliberal governmentality that aim is to increase the economic welfare of the country (Chapter 4). The question is how did Foucault reach such a conclusion? The direct answer to it is through the ideas that are commonly referred today as being post-structuralist. In other words, Foucault made such a conclusion on neoliberalism because of his reconceptualization of power operation. This implied the decentring of the traditional structure of power operation from solely direct judicial practices of government to the practices that are disciplinary, dispersed and indirect (Chapter 1). It is only through this line of thinking he reached a conclusion that neoliberalism is more about control and domination of population rather than an absolute freedom of it. As Tobbias (2005) describes it, for Foucault, "freedom is no longer conceived as the absence of constraint, but as the utilization of the power which circulates in all relations, not least repressive ones, and which

is productive as much as it is constraining” (p. 66). Considering all these points, my research interest is to analyse the governmental control and domination (disciplining) in the higher education of the UK which becomes possible through the described post-structuralist lens. Moreover, I compare the situation in the UK HE with the one existing in the Russian HE. There are two questions that might arise from the previous sentence. The first one is why Russia? The second one is why post-structuralist lens or, more specifically, Foucauldian reconceptualization of power is useful to study Russia, more accurately, Russian higher education?

Regarding the first question, it is necessary to come back to the ideas of Foucault which argue that the concern of political regimes in the West is more about controlling and regulating population rather than providing it with an absolute freedom. In other words, the question here is about the specific non-judicial limitation of freedom or the utilization of it, aimed at disciplining a population in a specific manner. The political regime that comes to mind when we think of the issues related to the constraints of an individual’s freedom and a specific disciplining is probably authoritarianism. As Radkiewicz (2021) describes it “from the beginning, the theory and research on authoritarianism have been closely related to the concept of freedom” (p. 1). Authoritarianism is often described as the political regime that aims at self-reproduction through various constraints of freedom (Belyaeva, 2019). In other words, it is the regime that aims to stay in power for as long as possible through the limitations of various individual freedoms (Gelman, 2015). This implies the political regime that “restricts the freedoms of association and speech, monopolises the media and employs unfair electoral practices...” (Golosov, 2011, p. 623). I delve into the details of authoritarianism and its existence in Russia in Chapter 6. However, at this point, it is necessary to demonstrate that the issues of constraints of freedom are existent in the regimes defined as authoritarian. It is the regime where there is a strong state control over the individual freedom (Makarychev, Medvedev, 2015). Yes, it is certainly the case that authoritarian measures described here are of judicial and coercive nature and undoubtedly there are more of them in Russia than in the UK. However, I suggest analysing these countries through the perspectives of Foucault, that is, through non-judicial aspects of power operation, which indicate to surprising similarities. Considering these points, my intention is not to argue that the political regime of the UK is authoritarian in the sense described above. Instead, what I want to demonstrate is that the topic of discussion in both countries is the non-judicial control and regulation of HE through limitation or utilisations of a freedom of individuals (students and academics) over their affairs. In both countries, more

specifically, in their higher education systems, it is possible to notice the non-existence of an absolute freedom or as Radkiewicz (2021) defines it “unconditional freedom, called “negative”, means that an individual is free from external constraints and restrictions” (p. 2).

Moreover, and this is of crucial importance and related to the question on why to adopt a post-structuralist analysis to the context of contemporary Russia, it has been claimed by various scholars that the control and regulation of the society existent in Russia should not be solely understood as being implemented through the coercive judicial tools of power operation. As Lewis (2020) describes it such an interpretation of the Russian regime offers little understanding of how the system works in practice. As the author puts it this framework “produced only a partial picture of Russia’s complex realities” (Lewis, 2020, p. 2) and “we need to understand the realm of ideas, the shared worldviews, ‘frames’ and discourses that interpret and impose order on reality...” (Lewis, 2020, p. 5). In other words, this is the call to refrain from analysing the situation in Russia from the point of judicial aspects of power operation only. It is the call to consider the discourses that circulate in a society. In this sense, Lewis (2020) calls us, to firstly, analyse the discourses that the Russian state “actively maintains and reproduces” (Kukshinov, 2021, p. 164) and secondly, to examine the discourses that are socially constructed as well (Filimonov, Carpentier, 2023). More broadly, such an approach requires to adopt post-structuralist philosophical stance because it, firstly, decentres the understanding on operation of power and secondly, invites to analyse different perspectives. As Angermuller (2015) states “poststructuralism decentres the notion of structure, be it through the temporalization of structure or through the discovery of marginal or excluded elements seen as constitutive for the structure” (p. 19). Along these lines, it has been argued by Morozov (2015) that such a post-structuralist perspective “remains rather limited in terms of its generalization capacity beyond an individual case” (p. 42). Keeping in mind these potential criticisms, I do not intend to generalize the findings of this research and instead aim to demonstrate the case in higher education only.

In the next section, I will discuss the concept of discourse that is more than often used by Foucault throughout his works and constitutes a substantial part of this thesis as well. I intentionally used this concept alongside the concept of knowledge up until this point because, as the following section will demonstrate, both of these concepts signify the same meaning in many ways; that is, it means anything that people regard as truth in a given time. Foucault discussed discourse more in the sense of the statement that leads to the emergence

of certain knowledges-discourses. The statement is the condition here (in French: *enonce*) which is necessary to understand as a state for the being, a certain rule, function.

Chapter 2: Discourse

As mentioned at the beginning of this part on the theoretical framework, it is not enough to understand what power is, according to Foucault, if we aim to study governmentality. We also need to analyse the concept of discourse. This is because power, as it is evident from the previous chapter, is always connected to specific knowledge. But what initiates a particular power-knowledge connection is a discourse. For instance, a relationship between a dad and a child is based on power-knowledge nexus; however, this nexus is embraced by the family discourse, which can signify different meanings in different cultures and, as such, lead to different power relations within that family. As such, let us analyse what discourse is.

Despite the fact that in this thesis, the concept of discourse closely correlates with the idea of knowledge, Foucault considerably differentiated these terms even though, at times, both signified something that is regarded as truth in a given moment of history. The existing literature also often presents these two terms as carrying the same meaning (e.g., Marshall, 1996; Danaher, 2000). Moreover, it should also be noted that Foucault formulated and spoke of discourse in several ways, often leading to struggles in understanding what he precisely meant by the term discourse. Discussing the concept, Foucault (1972) admits: “I believe that I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements...” (p. 80). In fact, different formulations of the term do not take him away from the discussion of statements. The concern was about the rules of formation of different statements.

Following the lines above, it is crucial to note that it is the rule of formation of statements and not the statement that interests Foucault. His initial works essentially included an archaeological analysis of the rules of formation of different discourses. He also defines discourse as “a space of differentiated subject-positions and subject-functions” (Foucault as cited in Burchell et al., 1991, p. 58). How and what conditions lead to the emergence of this space at different times in history? This is the question that Foucault was interested in analysing. It is “the law of existence of statements, that which rendered them possible – them and none other in their place: the conditions of their singular emergence; their correlation

with other previous or simultaneous events, discursive and otherwise” (Foucault as cited in Burchell et al., 1991, p. 59). The Archaeology of Knowledge, therefore, attempted to conduct a descriptive analysis of these rules and laws of existence (space) (Smart, 1985).

The question of what constitutes the limits and forms of the ideas, sciences, of what is sayable provoked an approach that required excavations of history, that is, it required an archaeological analysis. McNay (1994) describes this as “an interpretative strategy based on the uncovering of deep structures constitutive of all thought...” (p. 50). It is interesting to note here that such a work is quite controversial and risky because if the discursive formations largely constitute our thoughts and actions, as Foucault claimed, then it should be extremely challenging, at times, even impossible to detect the rules of formation of the human thoughts with the mind that is already constituted by the different discursive formations, by the different episteme. The episteme is “a priori set of rules of formation that allows discourses to function, that allow different objects and different themes to be spoken at one time but not at another” (McNay, 1994, p. 52). Foucault admits the risk of falling into the analysis that would certainly not allow him to be as precise as he would want to be, but he attempts to answer these questions “without trying to capture the fugitive unheard subtlety of a word which has no text” (Foucault as cited in Burchell et al., 1991, p. 59).

Nevertheless, continuing the elaboration on discourse, it should again be stated that Foucault defines discourse as the space in which all human actions and thoughts take place, and his interest is in identifying the rules of formation of this space. As such, the discourse for Foucault would not simply be a speech, act, statement or thought. Instead, it is “whatever constraints – but also enables – writing, speaking and thinking” (McHoul, Grace, 1993, p. 31) within various historical periods (epistemes). As Fairclough (1992) notes, “the focus was on types of discourse as rules for constituting areas of knowledge” (p. 39). Moreover, it is also important to consider that Foucault was not speaking of discourse in a singular term. In other words, we cannot individualize discourse. Not only there are various discourses, such as, for example, the discourse of medicine, grammar, economics (and some of which have disappeared throughout history), but each of them is, firstly, connected to one another and secondly, each of them is linked to numerous criteria, which are “more enigmatic” (Foucault as cited in Burchell et al., 1991, p. 54). These criteria, as Smart (1985) puts it, “are literally located at the ‘prediscursive level’, they constitute the conditions in and under which it is possible for a discourse to exist...” (p. 39). These criteria are also often referred by Foucault (Burchell et al., 1991) as the functional units of discourse defined as ‘*enonce*’.

The French word '*enonce*' often leads to confusion in theorising Foucauldian discourse as it is commonly translated as the 'statement' in English (e.g., McHoul, Grace, 1993, Smart, 1985). The 'statement' implies a speech, an act, utterance, however, these are not what Foucault wanted to be discussed when he touched upon the concept of discourse. As McHoul and Grace (1993) put it, "Foucault argues that formal and empirical approaches have tended to work on the side of enunciation (enonciation) of discourse" (p. 35). These are the techniques, the structures, and the forms of know-how using which people are capable of producing and recognizing utterances (ibid). Leaving this aside, Foucault's primary interest here was to learn the criteria of those techniques, structures. Identifying these functional units of discourse gave him answers on what constituted knowledge in a certain period of history. For example, during the Renaissance (episteme), as mentioned before, most discourses were homogenous, and their functional units were often connected to Church. That is, there was a unity of these functional units or statements that constituted the knowledge, and it was closely connected to knowledge promoted by the Church.

This study attempts to identify the discourses promoted by governments in Russia and the UK in relation to HE and observe how those discourses circulate in HE of those countries. Some authors suggest a useful way of identifying what constitutes a certain discourse in a society. For example, Smart (1985) claims that if, in a certain discourse, it is possible to notice anything that there is constant reference to, then that 'something' is among other functional units that constitutes that discourse. Fairclough (1992), for instance, completely disqualifies Foucault's analysis of discourse by arguing that it "does not include discursive and linguistic analysis of real texts" (p. 56). He suggests TODA (textually oriented discourse analysis) instead. However, it should be kept in mind that Fairclough (1992) also admits that Foucault's aim wasn't devoted to analysing the actual texts.¹ Foucault's concern, as it has been mentioned before, was about identifying the rules of formation of a specific discourse. In this sense, the actual texts are already the product of a certain discourse and not the discourse itself. It is therefore, this chapter began with a claim that I use the concepts of discourse and knowledge as the two concepts that convey almost the same meaning in this thesis.

¹ In fact, Foucault ideas are useful in helping us reconceptualise power. However, they are less useful in terms of providing concrete methodological guidance. This is why, as I demonstrate in Methodology (Part 3), I adopted Fairclough's tools to analyse texts and identify the discourses promoted by both governments in relation to HE.

It is necessary to understand the reasons behind my attention to Foucauldian understanding of the term discourse. As it can be understood from the above, Foucault's interest was in exploring the rules that lead to an emergence of a specific discourse. For instance, he would refer to the 'patriotism' currently promoted by the Russian Government in HE (Chapter 10) as a discourse. Patriotism is a space (discourse) within which different knowledges are contained and shaped according to a society's power relations. Power relations, in their turn, are constructed by disciplinary techniques (disciplinary power) of a government. Undoubtedly, the discourse of patriotism can signify numerous meanings, and various knowledges can be related to this discourse. However, as mentioned earlier, the government aims to shape this discourse in accordance with its interests and provide dominant knowledges within this discourse. As such, in relation to this thesis, the aim is to identify the rules of formation of, for instance, the discourse of patriotism promoted by the Russian Government. That is, what techniques, tools and meanings the Russian Government uses and provides to this discourse of patriotism it supports. In this sense, the understanding of discourse provided by Foucault is helpful for this thesis because we are trying to understand the rules of formation of various promoted discourses in both countries' HE. It should nevertheless be acknowledged that Foucault was digging more into the archaeological causes of different discourses overall, and his analysis mainly revolved around the countries in the West. For instance, Foucault would be interested in identifying the rule of formation of the discourse of patriotism overall in Russian culture, while my interest is to identify the rules of formation of the discourse of patriotism specifically promoted by the government in relation to HE.

Still, I do go into the cultural aspects that could cause the 'birth' of patriotism in Russia, and this is done to understand better the points of Russian patriotism that are strengthened and weakened by the government in Russia. However, an in-depth archaeological and genealogical analysis of the rules of formation of the discourse of patriotism in Russia is beyond the scope of this research. Following the analysis above, both governments (the UK and Russia) promote particular discourses across HE so that certain knowledges within each discourse become dominant and others fade into the background. To use Foucauldian terms, both governments create a specific regime of truth in higher education, which I intend to identify in this research. The truth is the dominant discourse and knowledges in it promoted by a government.

The importance Foucault (in Rabinow, 1984) places upon the role of the state or government in producing a certain regime of truth is evident in the following points: Foucault (as cited in Rabinow, 1984) argues that “truth is centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement... it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great economic and political apparatuses” (p. 73). Along these lines, it should be kept in mind that the government representatives themselves are involved in power relations that are connected to the circulating discourses in a society (Chapter 1). However, the government is still involved in producing a certain truth, which becomes clear from the previous quote. He referred to this production of truth as the games of truth: “a set of procedures that lead to a certain result, which on the basis of its principles and rules of procedures, may be considered valid or invalid” (Foucault, 1997). Therefore, when we speak of truth in relation to something in a particular society, we speak of the dominating discourses and knowledges associated with them. The discourses and knowledges that are overwhelmingly promoted by the government but nevertheless are the product of the power relations across the society overall. In this context, the technologies of domination (governments) do not invent certain discourses, they just accept some discourses, shape them in accordance with their interests and “make them function as true” (Foucault as cited in Rabinow, 1991, pp. 72-73).

It is also important to note that since there are continuous power struggles in a society that are closely interconnected to the circulating discourses, the truth is being constantly shaped and transformed. It is therefore, Foucault denies the idea that discourses are static and do not change. They are constantly transforming as there are always power struggles in a society that bring new dominating discourses. As he puts it, “each discourse undergoes constant change as new utterances (*enonces*) are added to it” (Foucault as cited Burchell et al., 1991, p. 54). As such, every concept that Foucault is referring to is in a continuous motion. Specifically, this has been confirmed by Foucault since he introduced his understanding of power and knowledge relations (Smart, 1985). This is why, in this thesis, when I speak about the operation of power in HE of two different political settings, I provide a snapshot of it and do not intend to argue that it always remains the same. Undoubtedly, it is contingent upon the power-knowledge or practice-discourse nexus existing in the HE and, as such, transforms because the relations between people in HE continue.

Within this discussion on discourses and knowledges, or to put it shortly, on the regime of truth explored by Foucault, it is possible to identify some similarities with the concept of

post-truth politics, which is relatively a “new term” (Ghosh, 2022, p. 8), however, still deserves consideration, especially in regard to the relativist ontological perspective utilised in this thesis (Chapter 7). As it becomes evident from the previous points raised in this chapter, Foucault did not believe in an existence of universal absolute truth and referred to it as a historically contingent concept which was dependent of power-knowledge nexus existing in a society. In fact, he was known for his “critique of the Enlightenment idea of a universally valid truth” (Newman, 2019, p. 104). In this respect, when we think of the discourses promoted by governments to discipline HE, it is possible to claim that they do not have a universal character. As Foucault (as cited in Rabinow, 1984) described it “truth...is subject to constant economic and political incitement” (p. 73). As such, it is, in fact, possible to claim that there is a certain similarity between Foucauldian understanding of the regime of truth and post-truth politics as both of them do not consider truth to have a universal absolute character.

Before proceeding with the demonstration of the similarity between the Foucauldian thought on the regime of truth and post-truth concept, it is necessary to define the post-truth. In an attempt to define it, numerous academic studies refer to the definition of Oxford Dictionary (e.g., Czyzewski, 2021; Ghosh, 2022). Post-truth, according to the Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries (2023) is an adjective that means “relating to circumstances in which people respond more to feelings and beliefs than to facts”. It’s been argued by various scholars that in contemporary politics it is possible to find examples when politicians tend to deceive population through manipulation of beliefs that have no relation to objective facts and as a result get the support of people. This is achieved through “the inundation of fake news, mis/dis-information, alternative facts, fact-checking, multiple forms of expertise; dog-whistle politics, appeals to emotions, denial of science...” (Kwok et. al., 2023, p. 106). Politicians by using the previously mentioned tools invent a certain reality that is used to serve their “personal and political interests” (Ambrosio, 2022, p. 2135). As Newman (2019) describes it “in inventing ‘alternative facts’, post-truth discourse creates new realities...” (p. 103). The examples that are often provided in this context are the Brexit Referendum in the UK in 2016 and the election of Donald Trump as US President in 2017 (Czyzewski, 2021). In both examples, it is possible to notice the appeal of politicians to “emotion rather than reason and to heighten fear and resentment rather than promote rational debate” (Newman, 2019, p. 93). For example, as Newman (2019) continues “the Brexit referendum was marred by egregious lies and false promises, such as the notorious claim that the UK sent £350

million per week to the EU, money that could otherwise be spent on the National Health Service” (p. 93).

Kwok et al (2023) summarize the characteristics of post-truth in a quite concise manner by claiming that it includes: “the denial or ignorance of science, intensification of emotions in public debates, mass circulation of rumours, and polarisation of political views” (p. 107). In fact, it is possible to relate the emergence of post-truth politics to the ideas of Foucault. This is because in post-truth era as it is in the ideas of Foucault, there is no universal truth or to put it differently, there can be multiple regimes of truths depending on political interests. In other words, truth is a relative term (Ghosh, 2022). In fact, Foucault is often considered to be responsible for the ‘birth’ of post-truth era. As Prozorov (2018) describes it “Foucault’s thought is held to be directly or indirectly responsible for the onset of the post-truth disposition, because of his anti-foundationalist approach that undermines both the truth claims of modern science and the legitimacy of liberal-democratic regimes” (p. 18). Foucault offered “relative truths as opposed to absolute truth” (Ghosh, 2022, p. 8). On the contrary, Plato, for instance, did not consider truth to be contingent on aspects such as culture, history, society (ibid). In other words, Plato believed in an existence of an absolute truth, whereas Foucault, and some other post-structuralist thinkers (such as Derrida) completely dismissed that point claiming that the truth is a historically contingent concept (Prozorov, 2018). Since, in the post-truth politics, it is possible to notice the examples of manipulation of the truth, this concept can in fact be correlated to the ideas of Foucault. He referred to this manipulation of truth as the games of truth explained earlier when governments produce a certain regime of truth through a set of procedures that are subject “to constant political and economic incitement” (Foucault as cited in Rabinow, 1984, p. 73). In this sense, Foucault is contributing to the “a relativization of truth and therefore to the loss of epistemological certainty” (Newman, 2019, p. 104).

Considering the previous elaboration, the discourses promoted by the governments in the UK and Russia can be identified as the ones that are deliberately directed towards specific disciplining and my aim is to compare the disciplining of the UK with the one existent in Russia, more specifically, the disciplining of higher education of those two countries. In fact, none of the discourses used by the governments in Russia and in the UK to discipline higher education which are identified in this thesis can be considered as absolute universal truths. This is because, firstly, if there would be an absolute universal truth in relation to higher education, the discourses promoted by both governments to discipline it would not differ.

Secondly, as it is evident from the findings of this research (Part 4), there is a considerable difference between the governmental portrayal of higher education and the views of academics on HE in both countries. I will demonstrate this in Chapter 11 and 12, however at this point a short example can be provided.

As such, while the UK Government attempts to discipline higher education, more specifically, universities to operate as factories that should produce subjects for the strengthening of economic welfare of the country, most of the interviewed academics hold a different view claiming that a university should not be a place of transmitting a specific knowledge useful for the economic prosperity only. Instead, it should be a place that encourages an intellectual exchange overall. In Russian HE, while the government attempts to promote patriotism that signifies loyalty to the state which can be put under the umbrella of Slavophilism (Chapter 6), interviewed academics strongly oppose this view and attempt to rediscipline students in this sense, despite the fact that it becomes more and more difficult with the Russian invasion in Ukraine (Chapter 12). These points only confirm the non-existence of an absolute universal truth in relation to the idea of higher education overall. Summarizing the previous points, it is possible to claim that both post-truth politics as well as the idea of the regime of truth developed by Foucault deny the existence of a universal absolute truth which is the key common point between those two concepts.

Following the notes on post-truth, it is also possible to notice that the discourses promoted by both governments in relation to HE are often unilateral. In other words, they seem to obliterate the possibility of other truths that could also be used to discipline HE. In this regard, the UK Government, as I will demonstrate in findings (Part 4), attempts to discipline higher education in accordance with the values of neoliberalism only. The aim seems to be the reconstitution of “social life and individual behaviour in the image of the market” (Newman, 2019, p. 99). To put it differently, the aim is to produce a *homo-economicus*. The Russian Government, on the other hand, attempts to discipline HE with the values of neoliberalism and Slavophilism (Part 4: Chapters 10, 12). It seems to be appropriate to claim that the discourses used by both governments to discipline higher education “circumvent truth” (Ghosh, 2022, p. 9) that could also be related to higher education. For instance, as demonstrated earlier, most of the interviewed academics tend to have views on HE that considerably differ from those discourses promoted by the governments in both countries. In this sense, it becomes possible to speak of post-truth politics implemented by both governments in relation to HE because there seems to be a governmental “indifference of

how things really are” (Frankfurt, 2005 in Czyzewski, 2021, p. 55) from the academics’ points of view. In other words, the regime of truth presented by the governments in relation to HE seems to bypass some of the perspectives of academics on HE and therefore could be considered to be engaged in post-truth politics. A certain truth related to higher education that is revealed by the interviewed academics is “ignored and bypassed...” (Newman, 2019, p. 93). In this sense, it is indeed possible to speak of the existence of post-truth politics in both countries towards higher education.

Finally, the concept of post-truth could also be valuable for this thesis to differentiate between the discourses that are factually correct or deliberately misleading by the governments in relation to HE. For instance, there is a discourse of patriotic upbringing that is being used by the Russian Government to discipline higher education, more specifically, students of HE (Chapters 6, 10, 12). Considering the notes on post-truth, it is possible to ask whether the use of this discourse is linked to the appeals on emotions of people rather than reason. In other words, does the Russian government invent a certain reality that has no relation to objective facts? Is this discourse backed up with non-existent, fake facts by the Russian Government to serve their political interests? In fact, these are quite interesting questions that certainly deserve attention and similar questions could be raised in relation to the discourses promoted by the UK Government in higher education. What is certainly the case is that both governments create a certain reality of higher education, a certain regime of truth. However, to analyse whether that reality is based on fake or true facts is beyond the scope of this research. The key aim of this thesis is to understand how the discourses used by both governments discipline their HE and consequently, students and academics. It is out of focus of this research to differentiate between possibly untrue and true-correct discourses meaning that they are based on some facts rather than emotions of people. In fact, I agree that the discourses used by both governments could be fake or true in this certain period of history, however, to delve into such an analysis would take the focus of this thesis away from the main goal of it and eventually would appear as an ad-hoc engagement with the complex ideas of post-truth politics. Firstly, this work would require a fact-checking analysis of each of the promoted by the government discourse in relation to HE. Secondly, to do so, there would be a need to compare the presented facts in the articles with some other facts that should be undisputable, that is, to have a character of an absolute truth. This, in itself, would contradict the whole theoretical framework of this thesis which is based on a relativist ontological perspective meaning that there is no absolute universal truth. Considering all these points, I suggest to avoid differentiating between the discourses and to stick with the

initial aim of this work that is to study how the discourses promoted by both governments discipline their HE and consequently, academics and students. As such, my suggestion is to include the concept of post-truth politics in this thesis primarily for one reason, that is, to expand on relativist ontological perspective adopted in this research.

Concluding this chapter, it is, once again, important to repeat that when I speak of the discourse in this thesis, I speak of the specific space created by the government within which particular knowledges become the dominant ones. For instance, as mentioned earlier, when referring to the discourse of patriotism that the Russian Government actively promotes (Chapters 10, 12) in HE, my aim is to identify what the government conveys as patriotism and what tools it uses to promote it.

Chapter 3: Subject – Technologies of the Self

Up until this point, I have discussed the issues related to the concept of power and discourse and demonstrated their usefulness for this paper. To sum up, power is dispersed across society (in our case, in higher education) by governmental disciplining. Governmental disciplining means using specific tools and techniques to produce a certain reality (in HE). For instance, in Russia, there is a compulsory course on Russian history at all universities promoted by the government. The Russian Government, as it will be demonstrated in the next parts of this thesis (Chapters 6, 10, 12), participates in editing the textbook's material to meet their interests. Nevertheless, these are the tools that are quite visible. A more hidden disciplining occurs with the provision of specific discourses that convey meanings (knowledges) a government desires to be the dominant ones within HE. All of those create a particular regime of truth in HE—a regime of truth that aims to produce subjects (people) in accordance with the government's interests. However, as mentioned in the introduction part of this thesis, people, in our case, students, lecturers, have the freedom to deviate from the governmental disciplining (from the given regime of truth) to a certain degree. In other words, while the disciplining attempts to produce a certain reality in HE, it is also important to think about how individuals self-regulate because, as it becomes evident from this research, they shape the operation of power in both countries to a considerable extent. Let us have a look at the short example below.

Academics in Russia usually have to lecture in a classroom, the setting of which creates an army-like order, as one of them noted (Chapter 12). The desks in the classroom of Russian universities, as they claim, are set up in such a linear manner that breaks down any

communication between a lecturer and a student and, consequently, leads to the distancing between a lecturer and a student. The final result of this is the strengthening of the hierarchical relationship between students and lecturers, that disciplines students to be passive and obedient, non-critical learners. Nevertheless, some lecturers attempt to resist those techniques of the government and reconstruct the power relations between them and students by redesigning the classroom setting to the greatest possible extent (in fact this confirms the idea that in governmentality there is a freedom to self-regulate within disciplining). Again, this is an example of changing the visible instruments of government to discipline students. There are also attempts by lecturers in Russia to change the knowledge that the government desires to be imposed on students, especially regarding patriotism. While the government attempts to portray patriotism as a loyalty to the ruler (Chapters 6, 10, 12), lecturers (interviewed) attempt to deviate from that presentation of the discourse of patriotism and teach it according to their understanding of patriotism. This is an act that is going against the more hidden disciplining of HE by the Russian Government.

When we speak about power operation, we need to understand the margin between governmental disciplining and an individual's freedom because an individual's freedom shapes the operation of power, although to a lesser extent than disciplining. Still, it is essential as it participates in the functioning of power. Foucault's ideas on subjects' freedom are helpful for the purposes of understanding what the freedom of an individual within the disciplining is and how they can use it. Without understanding the role of the subject in shaping the way power operates, this research would be incomplete as it would only focus on disciplining, thus pretending people to be robots (without the ability to self-regulate themselves). Let us track the thinking of Foucault regarding the concept of the subject and its freedom in the next few paragraphs.

According to the ideas of Foucault, a government is involved in disciplining society according to its interests. These are the technologies of domination discussed by Foucault that are largely based on the dominant discourses (Martin et al., 1988). The formation of subjects occurs through these technologies of the domination exercised by the government. Modern states "do not rely on force, but on forms of knowledge that regulate populations by describing, defining, and delivering the forms of normality and educability" (Olssen, 1999, p. 29). The individual here is not a source of meaning but produced "out of network of discourses, institutions and relations, and always likely to change according to circumstances" (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 123). Insisting on this idea, Foucault rejected the

suggestion that the subject can pre-exist the social order. For example, he stood against the phenomenology of Sartre that we should understand the conception of the subject as the one that “is prior to and constitutive of history” (Olssen, 1999, p. 31). As such, subjects (in our case: people who are within the higher education system in both countries, including students) are always constituted by the power-knowledge nexus existing in a society shaped by governmental disciplining to a great extent. Bevir (1999) describes it as “the individual is the arbitrary construct of a social formation...Society gives us the values and practices by which we live” (p. 66).

The important question in this context is, aren't we more than just docile bodies? By following Nietzsche (1968), who rejected the idea of an autonomous reasoned thought as well, Foucault, nevertheless, in his later works, in particular in *The History of Sexuality* (1976), Volume 1, slightly changed the direction of his thoughts in a way that “we are not just helpless objects formed and moved by power” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 128) and we can choose to either respond to or to resist to practices that we are being subjected to. Foucault referred to this autonomy of a subject as the technologies of the self (Martin et al., 1988). Danaher et al (2000) provides a good example in this context by referring to the school, where students can either accept the regulatory normalizing techniques such as various rules, codes that exist in a school, or they can resist them. In other words, we can still affect our bodies, souls, thoughts, and conduct (Smart, 1985), however, through the avenues placed upon us by the dominant discourses and normalising techniques (Danaher et al., 2000). In this sense, “Foucault offers us, not so much a way out, but rather, another way to think about ourselves in relation to power” (Fuggle, 2013, p. 154). In other words, we cannot escape from being subjected to dominant discourses and practices, but we can identify them and formulate the most comfortable way for us to live in given conditions of what is possible. It is necessary to remember that while we are capable of choosing the best route available for ourselves, we are still operating within the limits of availability. Continuing this line of thinking, Foucault started to discuss what he referred to as ‘The Care of the Self’ (the third volume of *The History of Sexuality* (1976)).

The attempt of Foucault was to call people to recognize and resist “the monopolistic pattern that is infiltrating their own organizations and infesting their minds individually” (Alirangues, 2018, p. 2). The inquiry was about disengaging ourselves from the dominant discourses and practices. He often discussed the ancient principles of the Christian era, for example, when “it was the duty of the individual to try to perfect the self – not only for self-

improvement, but for the betterment of society” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 130). His point was not about requesting people to adopt the ancient principles once again but to provide those times as examples when people were engaged in self-formation not through the principles of dominant discourses of various institutions but through learning about themselves. More precisely, the care of the self needs to be focused on “the axis of correction-liberation rather than on that of training and knowledge” (Foucault as cited in Doran, 2015, p. 147). The objective here is to try to escape from the given knowledges, discourses, practices. One might reasonably ask why did Foucault call for these self-practices? The answer to this question lays on his belief that since there are power relations everywhere, then “it is the power over self which will regulate the power over others” (Foucault as cited in Danaher et al, 2000, pp. 162-163), the work on which, as Danaher et al (2000) put it would “ensure harmony in our engagement with the broader community” (p. 163).

As it can be understood from the previous paragraph, Foucault aimed at stabilizing power relations. It is beyond the scope of this research to excessively focus on the practices of caring for oneself, however, what is crucial, nevertheless, is the minor shift of Foucault’s ideas towards the suggestion that we can indeed act autonomously even though this autonomy is still located within the dominant discourses. In other words, it is down to an individual whether to respond to the dominating practices or resist them. Despite the fact that critics of Foucault claim that his notions on resistance lack the possibility of any social change or the dominant order (Smart, 1985), his elaboration on resistance, nevertheless, was not aiming at demonstrating it as a tool for social change. The claim was that where there is power, there is resistance. It is just his observation, and it is quite an important observation regarding this thesis because the results of the thesis demonstrate that both systems produce resistance, specifically from academics, in relation to their practices of teaching. They either attempt to distance themselves from teaching as much as possible and focus more on other practices such as research (the case in the UK HE) or try to change the imposed by the government teaching practices (the case in the Russian HE). As such, both governments provide certain freedom to HE academics, which they use to resist disciplining. This manner of governing, which could be defined as an attempt to discipline the population while providing freedom to individuals to self-regulate, can be defined as governmentality, which I will talk about next in the thesis.

Chapter 4: Governmentality

The way of governing that disciplines the population and at the same time provides freedom to it to self-regulate within the disciplining (regulation) is what we can refer to as governmentality. In fact, when we talk about governmentality, we refer to the operation of power in a country. The power that is dispersed across the society and regulates a population in a certain way - the population, which nevertheless, enjoys the freedom to a lesser or greater degree within that governmental regulation. My interest is to demonstrate two different governmentalities in the area of higher education (two different operations of power).

What is governmentality? Foucault formulated the concept of governmentality in his attempt to explain the way power operates in liberal regimes in the West. He conducted an archaeological and genealogical analysis of the roots of liberalism and, later, of neoliberalism, which is the predominant ideology of governing in the West, to demonstrate that both liberalism and neoliberalism do not necessarily mean freedom from governmental control and regulation. In fact, he did not view liberalism as a regime that provides an absolute individual freedom. He insisted that the goal that the government chases is to utilise individual freedom in such a way, which would enable the increase of productivity of everyone in society and, consequently, lead to the strengthening of the economic welfare of a country. Consequently, he concluded that the lesser government intervention in the affairs of the population, the more productivity there is. He referred to such governing as neoliberal governmentality, which can also be defined as disciplining a population by providing it with the freedom to be productive. In the following few paragraphs, I will demonstrate the line of thinking of Foucault in his discussion of governmentality.

Foucault, throughout his career, suggested several definitions of governmentality, all signifying the following: the neoliberal governing of a population. It is worth mentioning that his initial thoughts on governmentality did not consider the ability of an individual to self-regulate within governmental disciplining (Chapter 3: Subject). He was exploring the history of governing. Let us look at some of the most common definitions he provided.

“By this word I mean three things:

The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.

The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this

type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific of governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savoirs.

The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually become ‘governmentalized’” (Foucault in Burchell et al., 1991, pp. 102-103).

As it can be observed from all the definitions of governmentality provided, none speak of the ability of the governed (of an individual) to self-regulate within the disciplining. All of them are directed towards pointing out the changing affairs of the government, that is, to the technologies of domination. In other words, to the new way of governing. Along these lines, governmentality is also commonly referred to as the art of government (see Burchell et al., 1991; Walters, 2012; Lemke et al., 2010; Danaher et al., 2000).

However, governmentality can also be viewed from the point of view of the technologies of the self, that is, from an individual’s ability to self-regulate within governmental disciplining. As such, later in his works, he mentions the “contact between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self I call governmentality” (Foucault in Martin et al., 1988, p. 19). Considering this, we can look at this theory in two ways. One is referring strictly to the way a state governs its population, and the other is referring to the inclusion of governing the self of a citizen as well. It is, in fact, necessary to adopt the second approach to governmentality in this thesis as it is not only the latest definition of it, provided by Foucault in 1988, but it allows me to think about how power works from a more comprehensive perspective. We are focusing not only on the regulatory activities of the government but also on how citizens self-govern and inevitably affect the operation of power (discussed in previous chapter 3). Nevertheless, I will first discuss governmentality, excluding the issues on the technologies of the self as Foucault did and then demonstrate how they have become an integral part of governmentality.

According to Foucault, the art of governing has a long history and was always based on the rationale of the rulers (Burchell et al., 1991). The rationale of the governor, in its turn, was consistently shaped by the discourse of ‘state’. In other words, this rationale depended upon what was to be understood by the ‘state’. The discourse of ‘state’ could revolve around protecting the principality of the ruler or, for instance, conquering new territories (Foucault as cited in Burchell et al., 1991). To put this differently, rulers understood and taken for granted various meanings of ‘state’ throughout history. With the emergence of the phenomenon of population, the discourse of ‘state’ began to be understood through the prism

of governing, what Foucault (2007) referred to as the “governmentalization of the state” (p. 144). The concern now became managing or governing the population. As he puts it:

“a state of government that is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality, by the surface occupied, but by a mass: the mass of the population, with its volume, its density, and, for sure, the territory it covers, but which is, in a way, only one of its components. This state of government, which essentially bears on the population and calls upon and employs economic knowledge as an instrument, would correspond to a society controlled by apparatuses of security” (Foucault, 2007, p. 145).

Within this context, governmentality should not be understood as a policy or governing that can be presumably dropped or adopted by the governments. It is rather a necessary way of governing that occurred with the emergence of the phenomenon of population. It is, therefore, Foucault (2007) claimed that “we live in an era of governmentality discovered in the eighteenth century” (p. 109). The governing of population, in its turn, began to be viewed through the economic effects it could bring. It was precisely because the population had specific economic effects that the ruler's rationale shifted towards improving the conditions of the population. The state's population began to be understood as a resource, and this resource needed to be productive which meant the growth of economic wealth of the state (Danaher et al., 2000).

Furthermore, it has become clear to the government that “people were more co-operative, and worked more productively, it seemed, when confronted with the carrot, rather than a stick” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 90). In other words, the government's concern now became less intervention in the affairs of the population. If before the state aimed at “completely controlling social life and seeking to adjust the happiness of individuals to the happiness of the state” (Olssen, 1999, p. 30), now the least control would lead to the happiness of individuals and as a result, of the state as well. In this sense, we talk about the “strategic reversibility of power relations” (Olssen, 1999, p. 30). In a sense, this move of the government that aimed at increasing the productivity of the population provoked the idea of liberalism to emerge and strengthened its position. As Danaher et al. (2000) describe it, “liberalism took advantage of the growing importance of economics to the state, and of state's inclination to draw back from intervening...” (p. 91).

In this sense, the theory of governmentality is commonly referred to as the liberal art of governing (e.g., Walters, 2012). It is also important to mention here that these ideas of Foucault are sometimes criticized because they contradict his proclamation that the “subject is dead” (McNay, 1994, p. 129) (because it started to exercise freedom now). Nevertheless,

Foucault aimed to demonstrate the indirect form of rule. In other words, there is still a rule even in a liberal art of government, but it is indirect. Alternatively, it can also be said that all the ideas related to liberalism, such as *laissez-faire*, free individual, autonomy still operate in a close relationship with power. The liberal point of view, on the other hand, views “power and freedom in opposition” (McNay, 1994, p. 130). The work of Foucault (1979) *The Birth of Biopolitics* was directly devoted to an examination of this paradoxical coexistent relationship between freedom and control that emerged with this new liberal art of governing. Within the same work, Foucault (1979) touched upon the issues related to neoliberalism as well, but I will leave them aside for now and focus solely on liberalism, more precisely, on the paradox mentioned above.

It is important to mention that Foucault (1979) was aware of the issues that emerged with the rise of liberalism as an art of government. As he puts it:

“The formula of liberalism is not “be free”. Liberalism formulates simply the following: I am going to produce what you need to be free. I am going to see it that you are free to be free. And so, if this liberalism is not so much the imperative of freedom as the management and organization of the conditions in which one can be free, it is clear that at the heart of this liberal practice is an always different and mobile problematic relationship between the production of freedom and that which in the production of freedom risks limiting and destroying it” (Foucault, 1979, p. 63).

As it can be observed from the quote above, despite all the criticism that Foucault received for moving away from his original thesis on the “formation of a hermeneutics of the self” (Nigro in Lemm & Vatter, 2014, p. 128), he, nevertheless, demonstrated an awareness of the arising problem and there is a quite straightforward answer to it. That is, the liberal art of governing is also extensively dependent upon the nexus of power-knowledge. Accordingly, firstly, in a liberal art of governing, the disciplining power still remains in operation, but it has been redirected towards improving the conditions of the population as a whole and not towards being centered “on the body as a machine, which ensured the optimization of its capabilities” (Nigro in Lemm & Vatter, 2014, p. 136). In other words, the government's intervention now operated on the population level and not on that of a family as it was before. The concern of the government was redirected towards improving the welfare of the population overall (Smart, 1985). In other words, there is still a need to administer life, but the regulation is reoriented towards the population. It is indeed the case, nevertheless, that in comparison to the previous forms of governing, which, for example, primarily focused on maintaining the principality of the sovereign, this liberal form of governing is interested in “self-limitation of governmental reason” (Foucault, 1979, p. 20). Foucault, therefore, was

not talking about the disappearance of governmental intervention. The point of his discussion was the extent of that intervention. In this respect, he brought a metaphor of “frugal government” (Foucault, 1979, p. 29). The question that he poses is about the extent of this frugality.

Secondly, the topic that is under discussion is power again. It kept its centrality in the theory of governmentality primarily in two ways. Firstly, in the way of domination over others (even though the extent of which is less than before) and secondly, in the sense of power-knowledge nexus. In other words, the liberal art of governing is the result of a power-knowledge relationship. It is the competition between various forces that eventually produced the emergence of governmentality, the emergence of the liberal art of governing. This liberal governmental practice is the result of:

“a polygonal or polyhedral relationship between: the particular monetary situation of the eighteenth century, with a new influx of gold on the one hand, and a relative consistency of currencies on the other; a continuous economic and demographic growth in the same period; an intensification of agricultural production; the access to governmental practice of a number of technicians who brought with them both method and instruments of reflection; and finally a number of economic problems being given a theoretical form” (Foucault, 1979, p. 33).

The previous quote demonstrates various discourses (and knowledges) and practices that, in relationship with each other, transformed the governmental rationality towards adopting liberalism. These discourses were a site of veridiction for the governmental rationale. In this sense, the relationship between power and knowledge remained at the centre of Foucault’s attention while discussing the emergence of governmentality. However, now the knowledge and discourses that circulate are predominantly of an economic nature. This is precisely the way the UK Government attempts to regulate higher education in the country.

Let us have a look at the example of the UK Government’s policies in regard to higher education. As I will demonstrate in Chapters 9 and 11, one of the central aims of the UK Government, both in regard to higher education institutions and in regard to academics and students, is to direct them towards focusing on the increase of their productivity that would bring economic benefits to the country. The UK Government constantly talks about the central role of higher education in strengthening the state’s economic welfare and attempts to regulate the conduct of universities and people involved in higher education so that they all adopt the characteristics of an entrepreneur first and foremost. In addition, huge attention is paid to the development of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM)

subjects at universities which, according to the government, is the area that needs specialists. Students are encouraged to study STEM subjects, universities are funded in accordance with their interests in STEM. It is worth mentioning that no one is forcing UK universities and people within them to follow such a disciplining, and there is the freedom to reject such a strategy of the government. However, in case of resisting, people run the risk of being left outside the dominant societal environment. To put these points differently, neo(liberalism) or neoliberal governmentality first provides freedom to produce, and second, it provides even more freedom to those who aim at producing what the government expects it to produce. Such an operation of power or to use the terms of Foucault, this governmentality initiates the pressure of being under the hegemony of neoliberalism (Lemm & Vatter, 2014).

It is interesting to note that some authors describe the elaboration of Foucault on governmentality as a significant shift from his previous ideas. As such, for instance, Nigro (in Lemm & Vatter, 2014) argues that Foucault “was questioning his interpretation of power relations as a warlike clash between forces” (p.130). What is crucial to consider, nevertheless, is that when speaking of a warlike conflict between various forces, Foucault was referring less to the surface-level power relations between people that might be observable in everyday life. In other words, it is much more than the power relations that exist between an employer and an employee, for example. As Danaher et al. (2000) describe it, “he doesn’t think that societies and governments are always characterized by warfare directed by one group against another. Foucault suggests that, within societies, power circulates and people are dominated and repressed, but it is more complex than simply identifying who are the oppressors, and who are the oppressed” (p. 87). In fact, Foucault was talking about a warlike clash of forces that prevent “non-definitive nature of liberty” from emerging (McNay, 1994, p. 131), that is the liberty that is not located within the neoliberal framework. I will speak about this liberty later in this chapter (as it is linked to the technologies of the self), but for now, it is important to keep in mind that Foucault (1979) did not detach his previous ideas on power-knowledge from governmentality. As discussed above, the relationship between various practices and discourses (power-knowledge) transformed the government's rationale towards adopting liberalism as an art of governing.

As such, based on the previous discussion, we need to keep in mind two points: 1) Governmentality doesn’t presuppose a complete disappearance of management, it is about the self-limitation of government from interfering in the affairs of people, and 2) power-knowledge nexus still plays an important role within the formation of a liberal art of

governing, and this indicates to the consistency of Foucault's ideas. In addition to this, there are still power relations that are inextricably connected to the circulating discourses, however, this time, the discourses are predominantly linked to economics, in particular those related to the freedom of the market (Foucault, 1979).

Regarding the points mentioned above, we can now speak of no paradox between the coexistence of freedom and control in a society. There is still the disciplining, which is based on providing the conditions for people to trade, to exchange and, as such, there is still governmental intervention despite being based on self-limitation of its actions. Walters (2012) elaborates on it as "the new art of government appears as the management of freedom. Liberalism utilizes freedoms: it seeks to cultivate freedom to trade, to work, to exchange" (p. 31). In fact, the paradox that Foucault (1979) referred to was related to an argument that states by being tempted by the provision of economic freedom for everyone and by desiring "to secure states against communism, socialism, National Socialism, and fascism..." (Foucault, 1979, p. 69) started to exercise "coercive interventions in the domain of economic practice..." (Foucault, 1979, p. 69). In other words, the government attempted to provide freedom by intervening more in it. Furthermore, these two aspects led to the emergence of neoliberalism.

Aiming at limiting its intervention government's concern became "how to take the free market as the organizing and regulating principle of the state" (Patton in Lemm & Vatter, 2014, p. 144). This initiated various discussions on economic issues that later distinguished permissible and impermissible governmental interventions and led to neoliberal governmentality (ibid). For example, the government intervenes when there is a monopoly in economic affairs as it contradicts free-market relations (ibid). What is crucial, nevertheless, is that interventions are still in place, and this is the greatest problem Foucault (1979) aimed to elaborate on. He insisted on the thesis that "the best government is the one governing least" (Nigro in Lemm & Vatter, 2014, p. 131). Neoliberalism, by being the closest to practice the minimum intervention exceeded in such endeavours that resulted in requiring everyone to become an entrepreneur now (Lemm & Vatter, 2014). As such, again, there is no non-definitive nature of liberty mentioned before. Undeniably, a person is free not to be an entrepreneur, however, he or she is under the pressure of neoliberal hegemony (ibid). It is the neoliberal ideology that prevails in society. It does permit a certain freedom, however, you are free to choose from being consent to the hegemonic ideology or not. Concluding this paragraph, it is worth mentioning that Foucault's understanding of

liberalism (and of neoliberalism) still presupposed control but of different nature. The control that aims at producing freedom and leads to a specific subject formation whose focus would be on increasing his or her productivity and, as such, that of a country.

The subject that the liberal art of governing or, more precisely, neoliberal governmentality is pursuing to form is an entrepreneur, a neoliberal individual. This is perhaps the point when Foucault started to include the technologies of the self in the definition of governmentality. The “contact between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self I call governmentality” (Foucault in Martin et al., 1988, p. 19). The concept of technologies of the self, on the other hand, is defined by Foucault (as cited in Martin et al., 1988) as the techniques “which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection and immortality” (p. 18). As mentioned before, neoliberal governmentality permits individuals not to conform or adapt to the neoliberal ideology, that is, it presupposes this freedom. However, as it is in all the ideas of Foucault, the situation is more complex than that. As such, first, this is not the real freedom that Foucault (2012) was primarily discussing. It is indeed the case that “the individual is accorded greater autonomy than in the previous theory of biopower, but Foucault is adamant that this does not represent a retreat to a liberal view of the constitutive subject” (McNay, 1994, p. 131). The freedom that he was referring to is a non-definitive liberty that Foucault elaborated on in the third volume of the *History of Sexuality* (1984).

Non-definitive liberty is the freedom that is, simply speaking, not restricted by the dominant discourses (McNay, 1994). For example, in neoliberal governmentality, there is freedom defined by the neoliberal ideology. That is the freedom to choose between being an entrepreneur or not, for instance. However, the actual “liberation opens up new relationships of power, which have to be controlled by practices of liberty” (Foucault, 1980, p. 98). In other words, non-definitive liberty should be capable of transforming the system itself (ibid). The freedom of neoliberal governmentality, on the other hand, does “not liberate man in his own being; it compels him to face the task of producing himself” (Foucault as cited in Rabinow, 1984, p. 42). For this reason, Foucault placed so much attention on the technologies of the self and included it as an integral part of governmentality in his later works. The technologies of the self, as he viewed it, promised the liberation that could lead to the transformation of the system at one extreme, and as a minimum, it could result in a

more conscious and “better fitted life with the self and with others” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 131).

Considering the points mentioned above, it would be misleading to discuss governmentality just in terms of the state domination over a population as it also implies the techniques of the self, which examines, as Fuggle (2013) puts it, “the conduct of conducts” (p. 15). Consequently, I suggest focusing on the definition of governmentality that was provided by Foucault in his later works that included both of these aspects in the theorization of governmentality. Once again, it is “the contact between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self I call governmentality” (Foucault as cited in Martin et al., 1988, p. 19). Finally, in his elaboration of governmentality, Foucault was primarily referring to the countries in the West. However, it becomes evident from this research that there is neoliberal governmentality in Russia as well, more precisely, in higher education of Russia. This should not be understood as the Russian Government simply decided to adopt neoliberalism. On the contrary, neoliberalism intervened into Russia with the end of Soviet Union in 1991. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 6, neoliberalism or neoliberal governmentality was more an inevitability for Russia rather than a planned way of governing.

In fact, it is interesting to analyse the way the Russian Government attempts to govern HE (including students and academics) by combining neoliberal governmentality with authoritarian methods. On the one hand, we have a neoliberal form of governing aimed at providing freedom to the population (more accurately, to students and academics in HE) to increase its productivity and consequently increase the economic welfare of Russia, which is what the UK Government is implementing in relation to its HE. On the other hand, we have the authoritarian tools of governing of HE used by the Russian Government as well. That is, it attempts to preserve the principality of the ruler, directs the population towards being loyal to the state and its decisions, limits the freedom of speech, and intervenes in the affairs of higher education institutions to a great extent by providing specific textbooks on Russian history, makes them compulsory, and there are many more authoritarian methods used by the Russian Government which I will demonstrate in the next chapters of this thesis. For now, it is possible to get the impression that the Russian Government attempts to control everything in HE apart from affairs that could lead to an increase in the welfare of the country. In fact, this is true to a great extent, as it will be illustrated in the findings (Chapters 10, 12).

Concluding this chapter on governmentality, it is necessary to briefly summarize all the points discussed before. As such, governmentality is the liberal (later neoliberal) art of governing the population. It entails a certain degree of governmental regulation and intervention, however, it aims at limiting them. The goal of this type of governing is to utilise the freedom of individuals so that they could be more productive and consequently lead to an increase in the economic welfare of a country. In addition, governmentality is the rule of governing that came to be existent as the result of the power-knowledge nexus, and Foucault demonstrates a certain consistency in theorization of governmentality in relying upon his initial thoughts in this sense. Nevertheless, there is room for freedom to be practiced in governmentality, that is, to deviate from the imposed set of practices and discourses. This is the case with both Russian and the UK HE. Despite being different, both regimes provide freedom to students and academics from the disciplining of HE. Considering this, this thesis argues that it is not possible to speak of an absolute freedom in the UK HE and of an absolute authoritarianism in Russian HE, which is the main original contribution of this thesis. Considering these points, it is interesting to dive into the intricacies of power operation in both regimes to explore how both governments attempt to regulate their higher education systems, and consequently, students and academics.

Part 2: Literature Review

Chapter 5: The United Kingdom

Governmentality is a way of governing that attempts to discipline a population in such a way that it could become more productive. Governmentality is a neoliberal way of governing, the aim of which is to create subjects whose productivity would lead to an increase of the state's economic welfare. This is the governing existent in the UK. In this chapter, my first aim is to review the current literature on the founding ideological principles of neoliberalism and then move on to demonstrate the route of the UK Government's drive towards a more neoliberal system. This is required to understand the roots of discourses promoted by the UK in contemporary higher education. I will then turn my attention to the academic works covering UK governmentality in higher education. I will focus both on neoliberal disciplining, which can also be referred to as technologies of domination (Foucault in Martin et al., 1989) and then on the self-regulation (technologies of the self) of people in higher education within that disciplining. As mentioned in the previous part of the thesis, we should not ignore the factor of self-regulation because by doing so, we would miss the effect of freedom provided by governmentality, which inevitably affects how power operates in society, in our case, in higher education. In other words, people are not robots and react differently to the imposed by the UK Government discourses and practices of neoliberalism. The aim of government may be (and it is, in fact, the case as this research demonstrates) to direct an individual towards focusing on something. However, whether he or she indeed focuses on it is another question. Nevertheless, let us leave these points aside for now and look at what neoliberalism is or, as Foucault defined it, governmentality.

What is Neoliberalism and its development in the UK

In the following few paragraphs, I will first discuss neoliberalism as an ideology and then proceed with demonstrating its rise in the UK. Foucault referred to neoliberalism as governmentality claiming that it is a way of governing that intends to discipline a population in such a way that it becomes more productive, which eventually leads to an increase in the welfare of a state. In fact, this is what makes his ideas different from the others. Foucault agreed with other opinions on the fact that neoliberalism is a rule of the market broadly speaking, the points which I will demonstrate in a moment. However, he continued that this should not be understood as the primacy of the market over the government. It is still the government that presents the rule of the market as an essential direction for the population

to focus on. It disciplines a population in such a way. There are, nevertheless, numerous other interpretations of neoliberalism which have been widely discussed across academia.

What seems to be shared among all the definitions, including the Foucauldian approach, is that they all relate to the “substantive political, economic philosophy” (Schmidt, 2018, p. 3). Generally speaking, neoliberalism primarily argues against the regulation of the market by the state. It claims that political freedom should not pre-date economic freedom (ibid). In other words, there should be economic freedom first, which would then enable political freedom. This is because, without economic freedom, individuals are unable to fully exercise their rights and make decisions about the allocation of their resources. This lack of economic freedom can lead to a concentration of power in the hands of the state or a few wealthy elites (Centeno, Cohen, 2012), ultimately undermining political freedom. Therefore, economic freedom cannot be regulated by the state. Economic freedom should mean free, market-based competition between individuals. The fundamental principle of neoliberalism, as Mudge (2008) describes it, is “the superiority of individualized, market-based competition over other modes of organization” (pp. 706-707). This conveys a message that there can’t be “the primacy of the state over markets” (Schmidt, 2018, p. 4). Considering these points, it is possible to claim that neoliberalism is “an ideological movement that disempowers the state” (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009, p. 421).

Neoliberalism, sometimes referred to as the strategy of “rolling back the state” (Garnett et al., 2020, p. 33), works on the principle of transferring responsibility from the state to individuals. “Mrs Thatcher’s oft-quoted ‘No such thing as society’” (Duncan, 2022, p. 497) sent a message to individuals “to assume greater responsibility for their own circumstances” (ibid, p. 497). Free, unregulated market relations are favoured. Neoliberalism requires individuals to be “competitive, entrepreneurial, individualistic, and individually responsible actors: or so-called *homo-economicus*” (Duncan, 2022, p. 496). The government rarely interferes only to “correct market failures and foster the conditions for efficient market operations” (Silverwood and Woodward, 2018, p. 632). It is again worth reminding that the conceptual framework of neoliberalism varies across academia. It can, for example, imply a form of “financialized capitalism” or be associated with “individual post-social governmentalities” (Peck, 2013, p. 134). Nevertheless, most definitions tend to explain neoliberalism as the ideology that signifies the rule of the market, which eventually harmonizes with “a primary objective of establishing a stable monetary framework to maintain a low inflation environment” (Wood, Ausserladscheider, 2021, p. 1491). As such,

the underlying trajectory of neoliberalism is to strengthen the state's economy by enabling the rule of the market and prioritizing individual responsibility over his or her affairs within this market.

The interesting point to notice is that various interpretations of neoliberalism seem to assume an individual's rational choice to be based on market logic. As Fitzpatrick (2016) puts it, "neoliberalism is built on a rational-choice ontological foundation; that is, it assumes every individual is a rational, self-interested calculator of his or her own utility" (p. 102). However, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, what makes the Foucauldian approach to neoliberalism significantly different from theirs is that individual rationality is the product of governmental disciplining. In other words, as mentioned in the previous part of this thesis (Part 1), an individual's rationality is constructed by the rational choice of the state and not of a market. Considering this, an autonomy of an individual is subjugated by *raison d'état* or political rationale, which disciplines a population in such a way that it assumes that it is placed in *laissez-faire* circumstances. Basically, the claim of neoliberalism is that if an individual cannot be an entrepreneur (or, more precisely, *homo-economicus*), then it is his or her fault and not the government's. On the other hand, Foucault claims that it is the fault of the government that disciplines the population according to the ideology of neoliberalism. As such, such an argument of neoliberals would have been fair if governments would not impose the neoliberal idea of *homo-economicus* on the population, which is evident in this research. As Foucault (2008) describes it, "neoliberalism should not, therefore, be identified with *laissez-faire*, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity, and intervention" (p. 132). There is always a governmental disciplining, according to Foucault. However, this disciplining has taken the form of neoliberal rule of governing that provides freedom to individuals to participate in a free market that is unregulated by the government. The question now is how did neoliberalism become a pervasive form of governing in the West?

To explore all the existing academic literature on the nature of neoliberalism is beyond the scope of my research. However, it is necessary to touch upon some of them in order to gain a better understanding of how neoliberalism became the dominant form of governing in the West, particularly in the UK. There are prominent thinkers who are considered to be the founders of different neoliberal schools of thought, such as Hayek, Friedman, Buchanan and many more (Schmidt, 2018). Much of the academic literature, while discussing neoliberalism, refers to the ideas of those people, which is understandable as their ideas, in fact, had a profound impact on our understanding of neoliberalism. There is also a substantial

amount of literature that attempts to trace the historical and political context that has led to the emergence of neoliberal ideas (e.g., Schmidt, 2018, Harvey, 2005). Foucault is certainly among these thinkers.

As mentioned in the theoretical framework (Part 1), Foucault believed that it is the discourse of 'state' that has been changing over time that has caused the emergence of governmentality, neoliberal rule of governing. The most profound change occurred with the phenomenon of the population that has significantly transformed political rationale in the West. As Walters (2012) puts it, "as much as we might consider population an obvious and self-evident phenomenon, this is far from the case" (p. 34). Moreover, if before the term economy referred to the correct management of individuals, which primarily signified "the wise government of the family for the common welfare of all" (Foucault as cited in Burchell et al., 1991, p. 92), it was now to be understood as the science of managing the whole population. The effect of the notion of the population "was a displacement of the family as a model of government and its adoption instead as a privileged instrument for the regulation of population..." (Smart, 1985, p. 129). The aim of the government became "to manipulate populations in such a way as to increase their wealth, longevity, health, productivity, etc." (McNay, 1994, p. 116). It was precisely because the population had specific economic effects that the techniques of government shifted towards the improvement of the conditions of the population. The state's population began to be understood as a resource, and this resource needed to be productive, which meant the growth of the state's economic wealth (Danaher et al., 2000).

Neoliberal rule of governing became to be acknowledged even more after WWII, the event that has led to the economic crisis. This required European states to rethink the economic strategies and plans. One of the plans was the introduction of free trade as part of the liberation of the economy from state interventions, and free trade implied an internal free market (Foucault, 1979). The world at the time (in 1948), as Foucault (1979) describes it, was in a "requirement of reconstruction" (p. 79). This reconstruction was associated with three key aspects: "the conversion of a war economy back to into a peace economy"; "planning as the major instrument of reconstruction"; and finally, "to avoid the renewal of fascism and Nazism in Europe" (Foucault, 1979, pp. 79-80). Faced with these problems, at the Council at Frankfurt on 18th of April 1948, a German politician Ludwig Erhard suggested that "We must free the economy from the state controls, we must avoid both anarchy and the termite state because only a state that establishes both freedom and responsibility of the

citizens can legitimately speak in the name of people” (Foucault, 1979, pp. 80-81). Considering the previous points, the nature of neoliberalism can be rooted in the emergence of the phenomenon of population along with the effects of world wars, specifically WWII. I do not intend to claim that these are the only reasons behind the dissemination of neoliberal ideas in the West. My intention was to demonstrate that the development of neoliberalism did not appear out of nowhere. As Schmidt (2008) describes it, “neoliberal ideas, in other words, may result...also from the historical and political context that has been created by the activation of those ideas at any given time as well as over time” (p. 10). In fact, this is related to the development of neoliberalism in the UK as well, which I will discuss next.

Following the notes above, when we talk about the rise of neoliberalism as the rule of governing in the UK, it is necessary to describe the process of its development rather than pointing out to one specific factor that should supposedly explain it. In fact, there is a common misconception that revolves around the discussion of how neoliberalism occurred in the UK. Most of the literature indicates to the figure of Margaret Thatcher while speaking of neoliberalism in the UK. Certainly, the impact of Thatcher on the development of neoliberalism in the UK cannot be overlooked, and I will show it below, however, the discourse of neoliberalism was circulating in the UK society even before the rule (1979) of Margaret Thatcher. As such, Rollings (2013) points to the importance of evaluating the business community in the UK prior to Thatcher. According to Rollings (2013), there were prominent individuals with neoliberal backgrounds who shaped the direction of the business community in the UK. The focus of the author is on two individuals in particular: Arthur Shenfield, economic director of the Federation of British Industries (FBI) and J. B. Bracewell-Milnes, “who held the same position from 1968-1973” (Rollings, 2013, p. 640). These people, along with other neoliberalism supporters, engaged in a contest with the supporters of Keynesian economics roughly throughout the period from the mid-1950s to 1973. The debate was about the role of government in managing the market. The supporters of Keynesian politics that viewed the government as having an active role in regulating the market gradually lost to the supporters of neoliberalism, who were against governmental regulation of the market overall (Rollings, 2013). The key point of Rollings (2013) is that we need to pay more attention to the role of various individuals who had the power to direct the discourse of neoliberalism towards being dominant in the UK society.

In fact, Foucault (1979) touched upon the other figure that had an impact on how British civil society viewed the role of government overall, which dates back to the eighteenth

century. He referred to the ideas of Thomas Paine, in particular, who was an English-born American political activist. His question, “does civil society really need a government?” (Foucault, 1979, p. 310) gained popularity in the UK back then. The claim of Paine was “we should not, he says, confuse society and government. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness” (Foucault, 1979, p. 310). Considering these points, when speaking about the rise of neoliberalism in the UK, we need to consider the overall atmosphere in the UK that was shaped by different individuals and strengthened the position of neoliberalism prior to the rule of Thatcher. Thatcher has taken it even further by making it a rule of governing in the UK.

Following the lines above, Margaret Thatcher, who served as the UK Prime Minister from 1979 until 1990, did not start to popularize neoliberal rule of governing just out of nowhere. The grounds for it were already there. The economic crises that continuously occurred in the UK due to the debates on the best economic policy for the country (mentioned above) have been finally addressed by Thatcher. As Garnett et al. (2020) describe it, “‘Thatcherism’ was a conscious reaction against the trend of previous post-war policies” (p. 45). Margaret Thatcher was “seen as ‘strong leader’, prepared to ignore the dissident voices of some of their backbenchers and even carry out unpopular social policies” (Watts, 2003, p. 5). Thatcher “was not interested in encouraging discussions and contributions from around the cabinet...” (Garnett et al., 2020, p. 186). As such, she was deterministic in relation to the promotion of *laissez-faire* politics.

Thatcher was interested in diminishing the government’s regulation over economic affairs (Fitzpatrick, 2016; Garnett et al., 2020; Watts, 2003). In other words, the aim was to provide free market relations. The reason behind the adoption of such an approach is again the mentioned earlier post-war crisis (WWII) that led to the deindustrialization of Britain (Silverwood and Woodward, 2018). Prior to Margaret Thatcher, the UK Government attempted to stop the process of deindustrialization by “selective industrial policy, the intent of which is to promote certain industries over others irrespective of market signals” (Silverwood and Woodward, 2018, p. 630). In contrast to that, Thatcher’s concern was those market signals. As such, the program she implemented was in favour of liberating the market from state interventions. Free-market capitalism, in other words, was seen as the way out of the continuous crises emerging in the UK. In this sense, the previously practiced regulatory tradition was at stake in the UK, an approach which was criticised back then, probably

because the public in the UK is, at times, as Watts (2003) puts it, “resistant to new thinking” (p. 4).

It is interesting to note that neoliberalism remained consistent in the UK despite its supposable preference towards the regulatory traditions (meaning the government’s interventions in the market) of the past. There was a “continual contestation between the British regulatory tradition...and a neoliberal tradition that advocated a new ‘British model’...” (Fitzpatrick, 2016, p. 97). It should also be mentioned that the UK Government increased its intervention in times of crises, for instance, the global financial crisis of 2008 (Duncan, 2022). However, apart from these cases, neoliberalism seems to have won the battle over the traditional regulatory system. It’s the contemporary politics of the UK Government in relation to higher education as well. It attempts to discipline HE in accordance with neoliberal values of individualism and free-market relations aimed at producing entrepreneurs or *homo-economicus*.

Neoliberalism in the UK Higher Education

Let us now review the existing literature on neoliberalism in the UK higher education. My first aim is to discuss the literature on how higher education in the UK is being disciplined by the government through neoliberal ideas discussed in the previous section. My second aim is to review the literature that focuses on people’s (students and academics) actions and perceptions towards the neoliberal disciplining of higher education in the UK. What is the literature telling us about the beliefs and practices of people within the neoliberal disciplining of HE? Using the terminology of Foucault, we first focus on technologies of domination (the government’s disciplining) and second, dive into the ways people self-regulate themselves in an imposed social and political setting, which is referred to as technologies of the self by him. We need to refer to both mentioned sides because in neoliberalism or governmentality, people, despite being disciplined to be focused on such ideas as marketization, individualism, still have the freedom to deviate (and resist) from those ideas and as such, have an impact on the way power operates in society overall. For instance, lecturers in the UK, as it is evident in this research, try to avoid teaching practices and focus more on research practices when it is possible (Chapter 11). This is being done because they often dislike the imposition of neoliberal ideas that indoctrinated (or disciplined) students towards behaving like consumers at universities. They have the freedom to avoid the teaching practices they don’t like, or even if they can’t avoid them, they attempt to redirect the

perceptions of students on higher education. Consequently, all these actions shape the way power operates within HE. Leaving these points aside for now, let us first review the technologies of domination in the UK higher education or how does the UK Government discipline HE using neoliberal ideas?

Technologies of Domination – Disciplinary/Regulatory techniques of the government

As discussed above, neoliberalism implies the existence of free market relations. It is about governmental non-interference. The question that arises, then, is in what kind of a situation do institutions in the country find themselves in an era of neoliberalism? In the context of the thesis, a more accurate question would be how does Higher Education, more precisely, universities, operate in an age of neoliberalism? Free market relations imply that a university in such a setting must comply with this new approach. In other words, the rationality of an entrepreneurial institution needs to be adopted by a university. We can speak of “a marketization of higher education” (Varman et al., 2011, p. 1166). Moreover, as mentioned earlier, it is not just a university that has to comply with the marketization of higher education, but also everyone within universities, starting from the students, lecturers and ending with those people who work in administration. As Varman et al. (2011) put it, “In summary, under neoliberal capitalism, marketisation of higher education is becoming ubiquitous” (p. 1168). There are numerous discourses circulating at every level here that are in an interdependent relationship with numerous practices, which are all promoted by neoliberal disciplining. It is my aim to study those discourses and practices as far as possible to demonstrate the power operation in HE of a neoliberal regime. Following the lines above, let us first focus on the following questions: how does the neoliberal art of governing transform the operation of universities in the UK? What is expected from universities?

While discussing the HE discourses and practices that have been initiated by neoliberalism, it is necessary to distinguish policies implemented in England and Scotland as one of the key discourses in HE: marketisation, which will be discussed later, is “less pronounced” in Scotland than in England (Raffe, Croxford, 2015, p. 318). In 1992 the binary system of Higher Education in the UK was replaced with a unified system, the key implication of which was the shift towards the formal acquirement of all polytechnics and institutions in Scotland (and Wales as well), the status of universities (ibid). This was the regulatory strategy of the UK that aimed at limiting the diversification of statuses that higher educational institutions

had before 1992. At the same time, decentralization in terms of management occurred during that time as well (ibid). As such, it is possible to speak of the devolution that occurred during the 1990s in the UK that affected the regulation of universities across the country. Separate funding councils were established in England, Scotland and Wales. As Raffe and Croxford (2015) mention, “formally, the administrative system of HE changed from a binary system covering the whole of Great Britain to three unified systems covering England, Scotland and Wales respectively” (p. 314).

Let us discuss a bit more in detail the role of the devolution and its repercussions on higher education that occurred in the UK in the late 1990s. It is worth considering the devolution in the UK as it implies difference in governance of higher education in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (Shattock, Horvath, 2020). The difference in governance of higher education, in its turn, might suggest the difference in disciplining it. In other words, for instance, the disciplining in Scottish higher education might differ from the one existent in England due to devolution. I will explain some of the critical points that we need to consider in this respect, however, at this point, it is necessary to state that the existence of devolution does not necessarily indicate to critical differences in disciplining of higher education between the mentioned countries. I will demonstrate this through the governmental acts and information published on the UK Government websites along with academic references. As Shattock and Horvath (2020) describe it, the devolution “was not a radical step it was initially thought to be” (p. 45).

Devolution, as it is stated on the website of the UK Parliament (2023) is “the decentralization of governmental power”. The devolution occurred in the UK in 1998 (Boggs and Middlehurst in Cantwell et al., 2018) and “was expected to redistribute power within each ‘home country’ of the UK as well as between each country and the UK centre” (Raffe as cited in Riddel et al., 2016, p. 19). As such, three legislative acts were set out in 1998: Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (The UK Public General Acts, 1998). In other words, each country, for instance, Scotland, more precisely, the Scottish Government was now responsible for the governing of several matters including higher education. As Boggs and Middlehurst (as cited in Cantwell et al., 2018) put it “the home nations (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) have responsibility for higher education policy” (p. 46). There are various explanations existing in academia on the reasons of devolution. For instance, Raffe (as cited in Riddel et al., 2016) claims that “it was to herald a more open, participatory and inclusive form of democracy” (p. 19). On the

other hand, Shattock and Horvath (2020) argue that the “devolution was prompted not so much by recognition of deep-seated national differences...but because of political impracticability...” (p. 18). Nevertheless, what is important for this thesis is to understand what devolution concretely implies overall and what are the effects of it on higher education in the UK.

It is stated on the website of the Government of the United Kingdom (2019) that “devolution is a process of decentralization. It puts power closer to the citizen, so that local factors are better recognized in decision making” (para. 1) . In other words, it is the act that is intended to bring certain areas “closer to the centre of national life” (Raffe as cited in Riddell et al., 2016, p. 19). Along these lines, it is necessary to mention which areas we are speaking about. As such, devolution implied partial transfer of the responsibility meaning that there are areas that are devolved to home countries and there are other areas that remain the responsibility of the UK Parliament alone. This is stated, for example, on the website of the Scottish Parliament which also explain what the devolution is, which matters are devolved to Scottish Government and which matters remain reserved meaning under the rule of the UK Parliament. As it is described there devolution “allows decisions to be made at a more local level” (The Scottish Parliament, 2023). There is no point in listing all the devolved and reserved matters in this thesis apart from pointing out to the fact that education and training is a devolved matter (The Scottish Parliament, Devolved and Reserved Powers, 2023). In this sense, as claimed earlier higher education in Scotland became to be governed by the Scottish Parliament. As Boggs and Middlehurst (as cited in Cantwell et al., 2018) describe it “administrative and legislative responsibility for higher education passed to the Scottish Parliament...” (p. 50).

It is also necessary to mention that I focus more on demonstrating the issues related to the Scottish higher education in the context of devolution than on those in Wales and Northern Ireland. This is because “Welsh higher education is more integrated with English higher education than those of the other devolved nations” (Shattock and Horvath, 2020, p. 47) whereas higher education in Northern Ireland is facing with “increasingly scarce public funding” (Boggs and Middlehurst as cited in Cantwell et al., 2018, p. 62) which results in more convergence than divergence from English higher education (Gallacher and Raffe, 2012). Scotland, on the other hand, “is particularly distinctive” (Boggs and Middlehurst as cited in Cantwell et al., 2018, p. 50). It was quite distinctive in terms of features of higher education even before 1990s and was “including four-year degrees, higher participation rates

among young people, and a more significant role for further education colleges in providing higher education” (Boggs and Middlehurst as cited in Cantwell et al., 2018, p. 50). In fact, the case of Scotland requires more elaboration. It’s been argued by several academic scholars that the divergence of Scottish higher education from the other three countries in the UK is often higher due to the political priorities of the Scottish Government, especially after the Scottish National Party (SNP) came to power in 2007 and remains in power ever since (Shattock and Horvath, 2020). SNP is often being referred as the party that does not really understand the traditional autonomy of universities in Scotland and attempts to regulate higher education primarily through its contribution to the economic development of the country (ibid). In this respect, the Scottish Government “is pursuing a directive relationship with universities rather than respecting their autonomy...” (Boggs and Middlehurst as cited in Cantwell et al., 2018, p. 60). Following these notes, a centralising and ostensibly interventionist government in Scotland (Shattock and Horvath, 2020; Raffe in Riddell et al., 2016) is often viewed as a threat to an institutional autonomy in Scotland (ibid).

Continuing the lines on Scotland, the latest legislative act on higher education in Scotland the “Higher Education Governance (Scotland) Act 2016” (Acts of the Scottish Parliament, 2016) confirms the fact that higher education institutions in Scotland are governed by the Scottish Government. Perhaps, the key distinctive feature of higher education in Scotland that deserves considerable attention is the fact that Scottish students do not need to pay tuition fees. In fact, “Scotland’s decision not to charge tuition fees to Scottish students” (Shattock and Horvath, 2020, p. 167) has paradoxical repercussions on higher education in Scotland. As stated earlier, the SNP Government is often described as a centralising government which attempts to intervene into institutional governance of a university often “in regard to the economic role of the universities” (Shattock and Horvath, 2020, p. 171). However, even without the rule of SNP, it is possible to state that devolution of higher education in fact implied more governmental intervention into the governance of higher education in home countries than it was before the devolution. As Raffe (as cited in Riddell et al., 2016) describes it devolution “made the missions, achievements and failings of individual higher education institutions much more visible to government, and consequently, more likely to be the subject of government intervention” (p. 25). As such, universities in Scotland found themselves in an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, there is a decision not to introduce tuition fees to Scottish students, on the other, there is a demand to contribute to economic development of Scotland (Shattock and Horvath, 2020). In this respect, some courses were even closed due to their low economic contribution to the national economy in

Scotland in 2011 (Boggs and Middlehurst as cited in Cantwell et al., 2018). In addition to this, the governmental funding allocations in Scotland are relatively lower than in England because of the less generated income from the tuition fees which exist in England for all students (Shattock and Horvath, 2020; Raffe in Riddel et al., 2016). This increasingly complex environment has in fact caused universities in Scotland to turn to the recruitment of international students and to begin international partnerships to solve economic issues they have faced with (Shattock and Horvath, 2020). Interestingly, this has led to a more market orientation of Scottish universities than of those in England (ibid). In this respect, it is possible to notice more convergence than divergence between the higher education governing of home countries in the UK (Boggs and Middlehurst as cited in Cantwell et al., 2018). This is a critically important point for this thesis which indicates to the market orientation of universities in the UK overall.

In addition to the previous described situation which indicates to an existence of a common path of home countries in regard to HE, which is “at least as strong as” (Boggs and Middlehurst as cited in Cantwell et al., 2018, p. 53) the separating path, it is also necessary to demonstrate some of the points that imply a direct dependence of higher education governance in Scotland on the Westminster rule. Firstly, there are many elements of higher education that remain UK wide policies. These include research councils “which remained the main source of research funding...” (Shattock and Horvath, 2020, p. 47). Along with this, there is also Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) which is a “UK-wide framework” (Boggs and Middlehurst as cited in Cantwell et al., 2018, p. 56). It works with universities across the UK to examine their academic quality (Shattock and Horvath, 2020).

Secondly, and this is of crucial importance, there is a legislative act called “Higher Education and Research Act 2017” which provides interesting points that indicate to the existence of a common path of universities across the UK. It is “An Act to make provision about higher education and research; and to make provision about alternative payments to students in higher or further education” (The UK Public General Acts, Higher Education and Research Act, 2017). As it can be noticed, the act implies provisions to the whole of the UK as there is no reference to Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland in the description of it. According to this act, “a body corporate called the Office for Students is established” (ibid, Section 1). It is responsible for a wide range of duties including the protection of an institutional autonomy, the promotion of quality, greater choice and opportunities for students, to

encourage competition between English higher education providers (ibid, Section 2). However, I want to draw attention on the sections 25, 79, 123 of this act in particular. Despite the fact that duties of the Office For Students (OfS) are often related to higher education providers in England, the section 25 deserves more consideration giving the fact that it is also related to the other three home countries in the UK. As such, the section 25 is about the duty of OfS to rate “the quality of, and the standards applied to, higher education” (ibid). It is stated in the section that OfS “may make arrangements for a scheme to give ratings to higher education providers in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, in respect to whom the appropriate consent is given, regarding the quality of, and the standards applied to, higher education that they provide where they apply for such a rating” (ibid, Section 25, 1b). Considering these points, it is still possible to claim that, for instance, Scotland, is not in a direct dependence on OfS regarding the quality of its higher education providers as the universities in Scotland may not want to apply for such a rating and they have the legal right to do so.

However, section 79 which is called “power to require application-to-acceptance information” that is about a right of the university to accept a student for a course, claims that OfS has the legal right to interdict the acceptance of a student if a university in Scotland does not satisfy the Secretary of State with the information it provides to it (ibid, Section 79 (6)). Finally, and this is of critical importance, section 123 states that “the following provisions also extend to Scotland and Northern Ireland – (a) section 25 (rating the quality of, and the standards applied to, higher education), (b) section 79 and 80 (powers to obtain and use application-to-acceptance information), (c) section 83 (meaning of “English higher education provider” etc.), (d) Part 3 (research), (e) this part” (ibid). If we consider these points, it becomes evident that OfS has a certain power over the universities in all four home countries in the UK and this power relates to the quality and standards of higher education providers which are undoubtedly important aspects of a university overall, if not, the most important ones. To summarize all the discussion in regard to devolution that occurred in the UK in the late 1990s and its effects on higher education, it is possible to state that despite certain differences that exist between, for instance, Scotland and England in relation to the governance of higher education, they still seem to operate under the overall guidance of Westminster. Moreover, the existent differences between them paradoxically place them back to the common path which disciplines higher education providers to be market-oriented and consequently contribute to the economic development of the UK overall.

Let us go back to the question of what the policies implemented by the UK Government are in relation to universities. The first and perhaps the most important one that initiates all the rest is the policy of marketization of HE. This is the approach that neoliberalism directly implies. There is a trend “towards market-driven modes of governance of HE...” (Raffe, Croxford, 2015, p. 317). To put it differently, the adoption of an entrepreneurial rationale is required from universities. The adopted governmental policy regarding HE, universities in particular, “is based on a neoliberal regulation of higher education through market forces” (Ingleby, 2021, p. 93). What does this marketization of HE signify?

The first point worth considering is that market means that there are buyers and sellers, which in the context of Higher Education implies that a university is selling its services and students are buying them. In other words, this rationale claims to define students as consumers and universities as service providers. “This market strategy claims to place students at heart of the system” in this particular sense (Raffe, Croxford, 2015, p. 316). Why? The answer is quite straightforward, and it is based on the fact that universities needed to compete for funding (Keating, 2005), which inevitably requires the attraction of students as they are the ones who are paying tuition fees, who are consumers. As such, the discourses that “circulate about university becoming more ‘marketable’” (Mahony, Weiner, 2019, p. 568). It is, therefore, possible to argue that the students as consumers discourse has occupied the field of higher education, particularly in the West (Williams, 2013). The neoliberal art of governing has transformed the nature of higher education, and “the students are portrayed as consumers of educational products” (Ingleby, 2021, p. 92). Apart from this, a whole range of various discourses was initiated by the marketization of higher education. What are these other discourses that have emerged with the neoliberal type of governing?

The entrepreneurial rationale adopted by universities due to the commercialization of higher education also gave rise to the emergence of managerialism at universities across the UK. Aiming at bolstering and strengthening efficiency, quality, and productivity, which are the prerequisites of an entrepreneurial rationale, universities found themselves in a position in which they had to manage the work of their staff in accordance with these prerequisites (Hager, Peyrefitte, 2021). As such, the discourse of managerialism entered the field of higher education. Managerialism can be defined as “a belief system that regards managing and management as being functionally and technically indispensable to the achievement of economic progress, technological development, and social order within any modern political economy (Deem et al., 2008, p. 6). As such, the neoliberal disciplining forced universities

to implement “total quality management” (p. 98), as Ingleby (2021) describes it. What does this management involve? To put it simply, it involves almost everything that could potentially bring economic gain (Mahony, Weiner, 2019). In universities, the primary goal of which is the acquisition of funding in an era of neoliberalism, the practices include techniques to assess the “performance indicators, value added, peer review, academic audit” (Ingleby, 2021, p. 98), the effectiveness of which would, in turn, attract students and as such funding.

As such, managerialism is considered to be one of those discourses that exist in neoliberalism. It is the “thoroughly accessible, universally applicable, realm of audit” (Cocks, 2017, p. 18). It directly implies disciplinary techniques. In other words, it is the technology of domination over others described by Foucault. What are those managerial practices? There are numerous managerial practices that exist in the UK universities. Jarvis (2014), for instance, highlights “research assessment exercises, assessments of academic output quality (esteem, grant revenues generated, consultancies awarded and research ‘impact’), the intensity of research productivity, teaching quality” (p. 3). Along with these, the author mentions student satisfaction and graduate employability surveys as well (ibid). All of these are directed towards measuring the quality of work produced by academics, both in terms of teaching and research. Deem and Brehony (2005) describes the role of managerialism as the “greater external and internal surveillance on the performance of academics...” (p. 225). These tasks are either completed by the administrative staff of universities or by academics themselves who take managerial roles at universities along with their academic positions (ibid). In fact, it is possible to argue that there is nothing wrong with attempting to assess a university's teaching and research quality. However, the point is that these assessments are being done largely in accordance with the logic of the market. The quality of teaching, for instance, is measured less by the standards of academic peers and more by the standards of the market and by students who are being disciplined by the government to view higher education as a mean to get a job, which I will demonstrate later in the thesis. The key point, for now, is that higher education is being subjugated under the rule of the market, and managerialism is directed towards measuring a university's effectiveness in relation to market needs. As Brown (in Jarvis, 2014) describes it, it is not the question of “whether higher education should be subject to evaluation and assessment” but rather “who should do it?” (p. 3).

Following the lines above, it seems to be possible to claim that managerialism, by being a “paradigm which attempts to combine modern management practices with the logic of economics...” (Eagleton-Pierce, Knafo, 2020), exists to allow the neoliberal economy to succeed (Moore, Joyce, 2020). It is playing the role of “organizational glue” of neoliberal ideas (Harlow, 2012, p. 538). It is also worth mentioning that sometimes managerialism is differentiated as NM and NPM, which respectively mean New Managerialism and New Public Management (Deem et al., 2008), however, there is no reason to go into details in describing the intricacies between them as most importantly both signify the technology of domination over the efficiency and effectiveness of universities in neoliberal power regime.

The practices of managerialism mentioned earlier, which are directed towards measuring the performance of the university (the staff of the university in particular), imply specific power relations. In other words, power in the UK HE operates in connection with the neoliberal discourses, among which is managerialism. The entrepreneurial rationale required universities to adopt business practices that were not of primary importance before the neoliberal form of governing. If before the neoliberal turn, as Radice (2013) puts it, the purpose of the university was “the education of the elites in business, politics, culture and the professions” (p. 408), now it has become “the provision of marketable skills and research outputs to the ‘knowledge economy’” (p. 408). Even the curriculum in contemporary universities of the UK is being developed in accordance with market needs today when before it was subject to academic inquiry, as one of the interviewees mentioned (Chapter 11). As such, contemporary universities in the UK act as business entities.

There is also another discourse that is being cherished by the UK Government and consequently by students as well. This is the discourse of employability skills. As it also becomes evident from this research, the UK Government highlights “the importance of regulating the sector by market forces and emphasizing the importance of employability” (Ingleby, 2021, p. 98). As such, universities have been urged to reduce the expectations gap in relation to employer requirements (Lim et al., 2016; Smolentseva, 2017). In the UK, universities are adopting the policy defined by Deem et al. (2008) as ‘academic capitalism’, which presupposes the privatization of teaching and research with respect to employer requirements because otherwise, it would be a considerably challenging task to recruit potential students whose perceptions of universities are also inclined towards viewing degrees as the pathway for “future career prospects, or future earnings potential” (Williams, 2013, p. 105).

It is worth mentioning, however, that it is a complicated task to precisely define employability skills as there is an unclear narrative from the employers themselves who “prize most highly those skills that can only be feasibly developed in the workplace” (Hinchliffe, Jolly, 2011, p. 565). In other words, employers tend to value those skills that are developed within an organization and match its requirements. Considering the widespread range of industries, it is fairly impossible to accurately define the employability skills that would meet the requirements of each industry. It is achievable, however, to place all the skills into the framework of ‘hard and soft skills’ that can add more clarity to which skills employers are expecting from universities to incorporate into students.

Numerous research projects conducted in regards to the topic of employability skills indicate that the skills employers emphasize are the soft skills, which encompass a vast range of interpersonal qualities that can possibly be listed as follows: teamwork, communication, problem solving, critical and innovative thinking, creativity, self-confidence, ethical understanding, the capacity of lifelong learning, the ability to cope with uncertainty, responsibility (Matsouka, Dimitrous, 2016, Hinchliffe, Jolly, 2011, Succi, Canovi, 2020, Archer, Davison, 2008). As it can be noticed, almost all the skills mentioned are interpersonal qualities that possibly cannot be fully indoctrinated during the study at university as these are the skills that suggest continuous experience and lifelong learning (Harvey, 2000). As such, it can be claimed that despite the general consensus between academia and employers on the value of these skills, they, as Succi and Canovi (2020) put it, “operate in parallel universes” (p. 1837) because both sides understand each other but struggle to find a way out of this issue.

Nevertheless, income generation that has become a preoccupation within higher education in the UK due to market-driven policies (Fixsen et al., 2018) has considerably reoriented universities to focus on indoctrinating soft skills. The discussion now turns to how and which academic area is being conditioned upon strengthening the students’ interpersonal skills mentioned above. The research conducted by Telling (2018) has revealed that these skills have been at the heart of liberal arts for centuries, and in fact, the skills of team-working, leadership, communication, critical thinking, along with the general culture, have been adequately integrated into the studies of humanities even before the age of neoliberalism. Considering the overall emphasis on these skills by employers today, the school of liberal arts is gaining more popularity among students, and liberal arts degrees are rapidly emerging at both elite and non-elite universities (ibid). In fact, in given neoliberal circumstances that

portray universities and students as services providers and consumers, respectively, that leads, as it has been demonstrated to the focus on soft skills, the growing demand in studying liberal arts is “a rational choice” (p. 1295) as Telling (2018) notes.

Considering the points above, it is possible to claim that ‘students as consumers’, ‘managerialism’, and ‘employability skills’ are among the key discourses and practices that circulate in the field of higher education that lead to other different discourses and practices to occur such as assessing the performance of lecturers all of which aim at increasing the productivity and efficiency of a university. In other words, universities have been disciplined to achieve the wider government goals related to the UK's economic prosperity. Concluding this review on technologies of domination, it is necessary to repeat that this is only one part of governmentality. Apart from this, governmentality suggests self-regulation of people. In our case, the subjugation of higher education to the logic of the market affects the way students and academics conduct themselves. They might conduct themselves by demonstrating a rationality imposed by the neoliberal way of governing, for example, such as students who behave in a consumerist way, or they might resist that rationality, such as academics who attempt to either distance themselves from teaching practices as much as possible or to transform them as they wish to a possible extent. As such, it is important to consider these self-regulations of people in HE in an age of the neoliberal rule of governing that is dominant in the UK. In the next section, I will discuss the existing literature on these self-regulations or, as Foucault calls them: technologies of the self.

Technologies of the Self in the UK Higher Education

Let us now review the existing literature on the way people within neoliberal disciplining or rule of governing self-regulate themselves. As mentioned before, this is important for us as people, in our case, students and academics may react differently to the imposed and indoctrinated values of neoliberalism, such as individualization and market-subjectivity. Both students and academics have the freedom to resist those values and, as such, impact the way power operates in higher education. Let us start by reviewing the literature on how students behave in an age of neoliberalism of higher education and then move on to discuss the conduct of academics.

The consequences of the marketization of HE have had serious implications for the ways students discipline themselves. In other words, the persistence of neoliberalism traits in higher education has caused students’ technologies of the self to be transformed as well. The

outcomes of this tendency have been clearly illustrated in the study conducted by Bunce et al. (2017), one of the key findings of which pointed out to the shift “away from intellectual engagement with the content matter towards doing what is necessary to pass or obtain the desired degree classification” (p. 1970). Students have become more materialistic, self-centred and essentially view higher education as a means to get a job and a monetary reward (ibid). This is explained by constant governmental indoctrination that “the main purpose of higher education is to secure increased earnings potential and job security (Williams, 2013, p. 113). In other words, it is the effect of the dispersed technologies of power, as Foucault would describe it, the effect of the technologies of domination discussed before.

It is also necessary to mention that while seeking to examine students’ technologies of the self in neoliberal power relations, some of the studies engage in an analysis that lacks empirical evidence on the transformation of the student into a consumer. It is crucial, however, to voice students’ perspectives because it points to the discourses and practices in which students are engaged. These discourses and practices are not only inextricably connected to the overall circulating discourses but more accurately indicate the operation of power in a neoliberal governmentality. Continuing the lines on the lack of empirical evidence, Molesworth et al. (2009), for example, aimed at examining the transformation of students’ technologies of the self under the dominance of neoliberalism. The study reached a conclusion pointing to the specific transformation of students’ self-subjectification, which places more emphasis on acting as a consumer rather than a learner. However, the work did not critically engage with the empirical evidence from the students themselves. Instead, the focus was more on proposing Erich Fromm’s ideas to study students’ and lecturers’ perspectives on HE.

There are also studies that have, in fact, engaged with empirical evidence from the students and confirm the conclusion made by Molesworth et al. (2009). For example, studies conducted by Bunce and Bennett (2021), Bunce et al. (2017), Woodall et al. (2014), Williams (2013) used questionnaires, interviews, and surveys to analyse the transformation of the student into a consumer. Let us have a look at some of the interesting insights from these studies. The study conducted by Williams (2013) interviewed students regarding the issue of self-identification, and a significant number of students surprisingly opposed the narrative of students as consumers. Nevertheless, Williams (2013) explained this by claiming that students tend to reject viewing themselves as consumers because “the label ‘consumer’ is associated with the conspicuous excess of capitalism and therefore considered

politically objectionable” (p. 105). However, what is more interesting to note is that, according to Williams (2013), rejecting identification as a consumer does not automatically mean rejecting consumer behaviour. As Bunce et al. (2017) put it, the students in Williams (2013) study “appeared to ‘juggle complex identities’ (p. 1961). While rejecting to self-identify themselves as consumers, they are still assessing the financial worth of the degrees in accordance with “future career prospects, or future earnings potential” (Williams, 2013, p. 105). For instance, many students seek for coursework extensions (Williams, 2013) to get better grades that as they claim would lead to better employment chances after graduation (Bunce et al., 2017). In other words, they still engage in consumer behaviour, they tend to look at cost-effectiveness of a university in terms of future employment chances.

As it is evident from the study of Williams (2013), the rejection of labelling themselves as consumers was there, but it was not reflected in students’ behaviour. Considering this, it might be argued that the consciousness of students in the study of Williams (2013), as Olssen (1999) would describe it, is foreign and opaque to them, or even if it is not, it is certainly not reflected in their behaviour as they continue to demonstrate consumer attitudes. Moreover, this also leads to a certain degree of apathy that students demonstrate in relation to their studies (Bunce et al., 2017). In fact, as it becomes evident from this research as well, students’ apathy can be noticed in the lack of their interest towards an intellectual engagement with their studies. As the interviewed lecturers of this study claimed, there is a considerable number of students who tend to just aim at passing the course they took for the sake of graduating as soon as possible and finding a job (Chapter 11). The conclusion that can be made from these points is that the neoliberal form of governing higher education in the UK leads to certain inner struggles that students experience but nevertheless continue to apathetically submit to the dominant discourses. As such, the question is: Does the neoliberal form of governing provide the freedom to transform the system it provides? As Foucault (1983) puts it, “the important question here, it seems to me, is not whether culture without restraints is possible or even desirable but whether the system of constraints in which a society functions leaves individuals the liberty to transform the system?” (p. 16). Based on the findings of Williams (2013) and Bunce et al. (2017), we can possibly answer the posed question with ‘No’ in regards to HE.

The analysis above demonstrates the importance of engagement with the technologies of the self as the intricacies emerging from it point out to potential answers that not only assist in understanding the operation of Foucauldian power in a neoliberal regime but enriches the

genealogy of neoliberalism. Moreover, the comparative analysis with a less neoliberal regime allows cross-examination that adds even more knowledge to the elaboration of mentioned ideas. It also points out to the weaknesses and advantages of both types of governing in relation to HE that could be used for the benefit of students and academics in both countries. As will be discussed in the methodology of this thesis, unfortunately, I was not able to observe the practices of students and was not able to analyse their technologies of the self due to the COVID-19 pandemic and war in Ukraine later. I was also planning to employ classroom observations which would certainly provide interesting intricacies to analyse differences between the conduct of students in the UK and in Russia thus more clearly indicating to the behaviours of students and power relations between students and lecturers in both countries (Part 3: Methodology). Nevertheless, I have attempted to learn about students' technologies of the self through the conducted interviews with lecturers in both countries, which, even though do not directly represent the students' views but give us grounds to make certain points. I will now turn my attention to the self-regulation of academics within the neoliberal rule of governing.

Another question that is required to be raised in this study is how do lecturers self-subjectify themselves in an age of neoliberal governing of higher education in the UK? I have mentioned before that the discourse of managerialism has become the dominant one that intertwined into higher education due to the neoliberal subjugation of it by the government. The managerial practices include auditing performance indicators, target-setting, benchmarking and every other internal and external "performance metrics on academics" (McCarthy, Dragouni, 2021, p. 2339). Nevertheless, this should not necessarily imply though that the lecturers are happy with their managerial roles. On the contrary, most of them are concerned with the increased amount of work unrelated to academia that marks the potential existence of indirect coercion or obligation, widely described by Deem et al. (2008). In other words, lecturers often take these managerial positions "out of loyalty to their institutions" (p. 104). As such, it seems to be justifiable to claim that there are roles of "academic managers" and "managed academics" (Loveday, 2021, p. 905) within the discourse of the UK higher education that emphasizes "the dominance of management over research and teaching" (Pratt, Shaughnessy, 2021, p. 1123).

According to Deem et al. (2008), lecturers seem to comply with these dominant discourses of managerialism due to the loyalty to the universities that they work in. Moreover, the results of interviews in this study demonstrate that some lecturers also prefer to take

managerial tasks because it is part of the promotional criteria, as one of the respondents claimed (Chapter 11). What we get as a result of this is a whole range of other notions that are under pressure. As such, Deem et al. (2008) indicated several generic values that have been substantially influenced by the emerged managerialism in British higher education and, as a result, affect the relationship between academic scholars in British universities. These include collegiality, trust and autonomy. The occurrence of managerialism has affected all these three principles-values that are always cherished in academia (ibid). Jones (2018), for example, points out to the loss of collegiality underpinned by self-marketing bias. Considering these points, it is possible to argue that the existing managerial discourses and practices compete with the discourses of collegiality, trust, autonomy, loyalty, all of which affect the lecturers' self-regulation and lead to specific power relations. Power starts to be exercised through the mentioned struggle of practices and discourses.

There is a considerable effect on lecturers' technologies of the self that are brought by other discourses apart from managerialism. This is the discourse of employability skills discussed in the previous section. It's been argued by Hager and Peyrefitte (2021) that lecturers are under pressure because of the demands of students to improve their employability skills. As the authors describe it, "whenever we seem to fail to achieve student satisfactions, we fear institutional retaliation either by reprimands or, in the worst-case scenarios, by dismissal" (Hager and Peyrefitte, 2021, p. 8). As such, student satisfaction is of considerable importance for the technologies of the self of lecturers. In other words, the success of teaching within neoliberal discourse is often associated with the student satisfaction. Since students, as mentioned earlier, prefer to focus on improving their employability skills, so lecturers inevitably find themselves in a situation when they have to pay serious attention to this discourse of employability, as it is reflected later in student evaluations. Cannizzo (2018) puts it as "claims of success were often substantiated by reference to such metrics" (p. 83). As such, the practices of lecturers imply considering employability skills as well. Needless to mention, there are also lecturers' own understanding of what skills are important to improve, and employability skills may be among the least important for them. As Ball (2003) puts it, "hence there is a potential 'splitting' between the teachers own judgements about 'good practice' and students 'needs'... (p. 221).

Following the lines above, the lecturers are in a position when they need to perform also in accordance with students' satisfactions that are largely based on employability skills they get. As Ball and Olmedo (2013) mention, lecturers attempt to resist the practices aimed at

developing employability skills which can result in inner struggles for them. As they describe it, “demoralisation, depression, frustration, and stress are tropes of experience that recur” (Ball, Olmedo, 2013, p. 90) are the results of the discourse of employability skills imposed by the UK government on HE. Moreover, as described earlier, many lecturers find it needless and of secondary or even of thirdly importance to keep attention on these measurements of performance in accordance with students’ satisfaction that is based on employability skills. According to Butler (in Ball and Olmedo, 2013), lecturers describe this as being “in danger of becoming transparent but empty, unrecognizable to ourselves – ‘I am other to myself precisely at the place where I expect to be myself’” (p. 92).

Undoubtedly, the practices and discourses lecturers are involved in cannot be dismissed while studying governmentality as these are the factors that affect the power-knowledge nexus described by Foucault. We cannot detach them and focus only on the technologies of the self of students, for example, or on the technologies of domination on their own, as all the discourses circulating are interdependent and imply each other. On the contrary, the combined study of those factors can demonstrate the situation with power operation in contemporary higher education in the UK, that is located in an era of governmentality. The same logic applies to the operation of power in the Russian case as well, which is the topic of the next chapter.

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter on the UK, the aim here was to demonstrate founding ideological principles of neoliberalism and its development in the UK, then to discuss the way this neoliberal rule of governing (or governmentality) is existent in HE and to focus on self-regulations of people in HE within this disciplining. It becomes evident from this literature review that the area of higher education in the UK seems to be governed by the rule of market which is in fact the key priority of governmentality as it leads to an increase in productivity of HE institutions as well as people in them and consequently to an increase in the welfare of the state. People within HE, more precisely, lecturers and students are all affected by this disciplining and seem to self-regulate themselves in accordance with it. These are all important factors to be considered as they indicate to the way governmentality is enacted in the UK higher education which is the central question of this research. These points give us grounds to understand both the technologies of domination and the technologies of the self in the UK regarding the HE, the combination of which forms the theory of governmentality and indicate to the way power operates in HE in this country.

Chapter 6: Russia

Before I start to review the literature on the way of governing that exists in Russia and how it disciplines HE, let us reinstate what governmentality is and why I focus on Russia along with the UK. Briefly speaking, governmentality is a neoliberal way of governing that attempts to discipline a population in such a way that it becomes more productive. It attempts to subjugate individuals to the rules of the market that are unregulated by the government. This is the governing that exists in the UK HE, and I have reviewed much of the literature on it in the previous chapter. Now, considering the described disciplining of the UK HE, can we really speak of an absolute freedom of students and academics in the UK higher education? Perhaps, the answer is “NO”. However, isn’t it an exaggeration? In order to understand this, we need to compare the situation in the UK HE with the Russian one where the political regime exercises visible restrictions on various forms of freedoms (Gelman, 2015), but nevertheless, integrated into the global market economy which drives it towards being market-oriented in relation to HE as well (Smolentseva, 2017).

Let us now turn our attention towards reviewing the literature on Russia. In this chapter, my first aim is to analyse academic works on the way of governing that exists in Russia. The Russian Government implements two approaches to governing: authoritarian and neoliberal (governmentality). This is evident from my research and the academic literature that I will demonstrate in the following sections of this chapter. As such, in the next section, I will refer to the concept of authoritarianism and indicate the principles being implemented in it. In this section, I will also speak of authoritarianism in Russia and how and why it became combined with the neoliberal way of governing in this country. To put it in a few words, the authoritarian way of governing has been implemented in Russia to preserve and consolidate the power of Vladimir Putin, whereas neoliberalism, in many ways, intervened into Russia with the end of Soviet Union in 1991, which government attempts to use in a quite similar way as in the UK, that is, to increase the economic welfare of the Russian state. This analysis will be followed by a review of the literature on the situation with higher education in Russia, and as it was in the previous chapter, this section is divided into two. The central focus of the first one is on the technologies of domination or to put it differently, the aim is to review the literature on how the rule of governing implemented in Russia disciplines HE. The second section focuses on the technologies of the self or self-regulations of people within such a disciplining. Let us start by analysing authoritarianism, its existence in Russia and

how this governing became combined with the neoliberal way of governing or governmentality.

Authoritarianism, its existence in Russia in combination with neoliberalism

There is a vast academic literature, the focus of which is to define what is authoritarianism. In such endeavours, numerous scholarly works tend to define authoritarianism by starting from defining democracy. The logic pursued here is to explain authoritarianism or authoritarian rule of governing by pointing out the factors it misses compared to democracy. For instance, democracy implies freedom of speech. Basically speaking, if a government of a country 'X' restricts freedom of speech, then it is inclined towards being authoritarian. Undoubtedly, things are not that simple. However, it is possible to trace such a logic that is used to understand and explain authoritarianism in academia. This is being done because, as Glasius (2018) describes it, the study on the concept of authoritarianism "does not start with a definition of its own main subject...when attempting to investigate all authoritarian regimes, not just subsets, authoritarianism scholars still fall back on classic definitions of democracy..." (p. 519). As such, following the previous logic, authoritarianism is mainly defined in academic works as a political system in which the ruler's central goal is to consolidate power in its hands. The authoritarian rule of governing rejects political plurality, one of the critical prerequisites of a democratic system (Klein, Moraski, 2020). It exercises strict executive control over the primary sources of authority, such as "election bodies, the parliament, courts, regional authorities, the party system, and what is most important, the media", to consolidate its power (Lukin, 2008, p. 66).

By aiming to remain in power and consolidate it, the rulers in authoritarian regimes intervene in various spheres of social and political life in a country. They limit the freedom of expression, fail to provide free and fair elections and control citizens' access to information (Glasius, 2018). Simply speaking, they do as much as possible to remain in power. Such a regime aims at promoting its interests across various aspects of society, and the Russian Government largely implements it. According to Lewis (2020), "Russia under Putin corresponded to just such an understanding of authoritarianism, as a political regime above the law, a political system in which a single centre of power was able to make sovereign decisions without legal limitations" (p.2). An example of such an exercise of power is the amendments to the Russian Constitution that are being made by the regime throughout the time of Putin as the President (Petrov, 2011). Malinova (2022) describes this as the

legitimization of the nondemocratic regime. The system of governing existing in Russia can also be explained as the regime “where the state is ‘captured’ by self-serving elites, and decision-making is highly centralized” (Belyaeva, 2019, p. 394).

In fact, it is also possible to analyse such a regime from the Foucauldian perspective on power as well. Let us remember the point of Foucault that power is dispersed through various institutions and discourses. While neoliberal regimes are interested in disseminating discourses across the society that are mainly directed towards the rule of the market, authoritarian regimes are interested in disseminating discourses that are directed towards allowing them to remain in power. In addition, authoritarian regimes directly intervene in various areas, such as higher education, to promote its interests which I will demonstrate later in this chapter.

It is worth mentioning that countries like Russia do not openly declare they are authoritarian. Instead, they claim to be democratic. Consider the following words of Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov: “Russia is an absolutely democratic country, and very strong, very proud, and very free people live in Russia...” (Peskov in Tass Russian News Agency, 2021, para. 2). This façade of democracy (Hassner, 2008) can be initiated by the government for different reasons. In Russia, as Gerrits (2010) suggests, it is established primarily for two reasons: “Russians want Russia to be a democracy” and “legitimation by the West” (p. 35). Apart from referring to a country as a democracy, the government in an authoritarian regime may point out to the existence of elections to confirm that there is a democracy. This is commonly referred to in academia as electoral authoritarianism (Gill, 2015). To summarize the previous points, when I speak of authoritarianism, I refer to it as a political system in which the ruler aims to remain in power and consolidate it by using both judicial and Foucauldian dispersed power. Now the question is, what is dispersed? What are the interests of the Russian Government that are being disseminated across society in Russia?

It can be claimed that it is within the interests of the Russian Government to preserve centralization as a rule of governing (Surkov, 2008), the supreme power of the ruler (Kalinin, 2017) and the promotion of patriotism (Shaïdenko, 2013). Along with this, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia had to compete in the global market as well, which initiated the integration of neoliberal ideas on the market into the way of governing in Russia. As Kochtcheeva (2020) describes it, “to integrate or not to integrate was not a choice, because Russia had become part of the globalizing world...” (p. 13). Considering these

points, the Russian Government adopted a hybrid approach to governing, which means having two layers of focus: authoritarian and neoliberal. According to Lewis (2020), “the system of power developed in Russia under Vladimir Putin was always penetrated by and interwoven with a globalised economy and a set of liberal norms and ideas, creating a state marked by variegation, exception and hybridity” (p. 2).

As such, the political regime in Russia can be shortly defined as the hybrid regime that embodies “authoritarian politics and neoliberal economics” (Gallo, 2022, p. 555). Along these lines, it is necessary to consider that the political regimes can be described as hybrid not only because of the combination of authoritarian and neoliberal elements of governing. For instance, the regime might do “pretty well on political rights but had significant problems safeguarding civil rights” (Robertson, 2011, p. 5). In other words, hybrids are many and can be varied (ibid). However, academia tends to agree on defining a political regime as hybrid if it is “neither democratic nor closed authoritarian” (Robertson, 2011, p. 5). This definition can be applied to the regime in Russia that encompasses both authoritarian politics and neoliberal economy (Lewis, 2020). The question now is what precisely we need to understand by authoritarian politics and neoliberal economy in the context of Russian politics.

While speaking of an authoritarian politics existing in Russia, it is worth mentioning that it is the politics that aims at allowing the state officials to remain in power for as long as possible and every judicial act of power exercise is targeted to achieve this goal. The example of this are the amendments to the Russian Constitution that are made to allow the President of Russia to be elected several times (Petrov, 2011; Wengle, 2023). Continuing these lines, the Russian political system is designed in such a specific manner that places the ruler above the law. Authoritarian practices of governing, first and foremost, imply an “extra-legal character...which can trump any law...” (Galushko, 2021, p. 13). Since the beginning of Putin’s reign in 1999, Russian politics gradually became more centralized, exercising strict top-down control over “civil society, the party system and electoral politics” (Wilson in Gill, 2022, p. 64). As Gelman (2015) describes it “Russia not only failed to approach democratic standards, but moved away from the ideals that had seemed so attractive and had almost been achieved in August 1991” (p. 1). The key features of a democratic system such as free elections, the existence of strong competitive political parties, uncensored media, unbiased courts are almost non-existent in the political regime headed by Putin in Russia (ibid). In short, it is a political system that controls nearly everything. Starting from the control of the

media that avoids any criticism of Russian politics and propagates the loyalty to the decisions of officials (Wengle, 2023) and ending with the drafting the laws “so vaguely and all-encompassing that they render any conduct liable to punishment almost at any time” (Rothacher, 2021, p. 113). According to Lewis (2020), “Russia under Putin corresponded to just such an understanding of authoritarianism, as a political regime above the law, a political system in which a single centre of power was able to make sovereign decisions without legal limitations” (p. 2). While I speak of authoritarianism in Russia, I refer to this exercise of power that is top-down aimed at “exerting strict control over the mass media (particularly the national television channels), introducing a range of restrictions on the activities of NGOs (while forming and supporting pro-Kremlin groups), outright repression of outspoken critics of the regime...” (Wilson in Gill, 2022, p. 64).

Alongside the previously described authoritarian politics, the Russian state attempts to govern the economy of the country in accordance with the neoliberal values. It is therefore, the regime in Russia can be considered as the hybrid one. It embraces authoritarian politics and neoliberal economy. The first question is what is to be understood by the neoliberal economy in the Russian political context? The second question is why is it practiced alongside the authoritarian politics overall? Neoliberalism is a *laissez-faire* governing in regard to the economy or to put it differently, it is when the government does not intervene into the affairs of people allowing them to interact with each other on the basis of free unregulated by the government market priorities (see Chapters 4, 5).

Let us now refer to the first question raised in the previous paragraph: what is to be understood by the neoliberal economy in the Russian political context? To answer this question, it is necessary to briefly review the situation with the Russian economy after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. During the Soviet times, the economy of the country was planned by the Soviet Government. In other words, the prices of goods were regulated by the government, there was no private ownership of enterprises and property. However, after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, “the planned economy was abolished, and unbridled market forces took over the country” (Belyakov in Rodriguez-Garavito, 2019, p. 187). This implied “the liberalization of prices, a decline in the degree of centralized resource allocation, and the formal legalization of private property rights” (Connolly, 2018, p. 31). As such, there was a transition from the planned to market economy in 1991. It had huge impact on the society back then as this transition caused hyperinflation. As Belyakov (in Rodriguez-Garavito, 2019) describes it “most prices – especially those of food – were

deregulated, and shop owners released all of the food that they had been withholding. But predictably, these liberalized prices meant hyperinflation” (p. 188). Nevertheless, despite huge consequences on the society, the Russian economy was integrated into the global economy. According to Kochtcheeva (2020) “to integrate or not to integrate was not a choice, because Russia had become part of globalised world” (p. 13). At the time, the new Russian Government under the President Yeltsin aimed at primarily two goals. Alongside providing the political freedom to the citizens of Russia, one of the key targets was to provide an economic freedom as well. As Yeltsin described it “we have a unique opportunity to stabilize the economy within several months and start the process of recovery. We have defended the political freedom. Now we have to give people economic freedom, remove all barriers to the freedom of enterprises and entrepreneurship, offer the people possibilities to work and receive as much as they earn, after having relieved them of bureaucratic pressures” (as cited in Aslund, 2019, p. 21).

Without going into too many details, the political freedom of the Russian citizens was gradually taken away from them by the reign of Putin that began in 1999 as discussed before. However, the transition to a market economy was also part of the democratization process after the collapse of Soviet Union (Galushko, 2021; Belyakov in Rodriguez-Garavito, 2019; Aslund, 2019). The aim was to build “a new economy based on free-market principles to replace the command economy of the Soviet era” (Gill, 2022, p. 12). As such, in this sense the transition to a market economy was planned by the political authorities in Russia back at the time. However, is it still existent in contemporary Russia? In fact, it has been argued by Aslund (2019) that Russia “currently has a market economy” (p. 235). It is true that the words of Aslund may be outdated by the time this research has been finalised (2023) and there are authors such as Alexeev (2021) who seem to be criticising those words for not elaborating on them. Nevertheless, there are other more up to date academic works that also claim that the market economy is still operating in Russia. Rothacher (2021) is certainly among them who devoted a whole book discussing this issue. The author illustrates the articles of the Russian Constitution that are devoted to the preservation of market economy in Russia. As such, according to Rothacher (2021), “the Russian Constitution prescribes a free market economy (Article 8), albeit with mixed ownership for land and natural resources (Article 9), with free competition (Article 34)...” (p. 213). As such, the Russian Government seems to recognize the existence of a market economy in the country. Another scholar, namely Rosefielde (2021), is also on the side of claiming that the Russian economy is a market economy, despite the fact that it is imperfect and certainly has problems. As the

author describes it “Russia’s economy is an imperfectly competitive market system...” (Rosefielde, 2021, p. 3).

The imperfection of a market economic system in Russia is often supported by the claim that the political system of Russia is authoritarian which has negative consequences on the operation of a market economy and on people who are engaged in it. There are certain political risks for the people who, for instance, attempt to take advantage of a market economy and start their own business or in other words, to become entrepreneurs. This involves “predatory political risks” (Rosefielde, 2021, p. 3) as the Russian state “allows loyal insiders to steal public assets” (Rosefield, 2021, p. 3). This practice of stealing is linked to the concept of kleptocracy often related to the authoritarian political regime in Russia. There is a growing academic literature that tends to link the economic policies existent in Russia with the idea of kleptocracy (Gelman, 2015; Dawisha, 2014; Aslund, 2019; Rothacher, 2021). Before exploring the issue in detail, it is necessary to provide a definition of this concept. As such, according to the Cambridge Dictionary (2023), kleptocracy “is a society whose leaders make themselves rich and powerful by stealing from the rest of the people”. It has been argued by Dawisha (2014), for instance, that the Russian leaders take advantage of an economic system that allows them to maximize their personal financial capitals. In another book written by Gelman (2015), the author argues that Russian officials behave like a textbook example of *homo-economicus*, “with effective calculations of their costs and benefits” (p. 35). Rothacher (2021) also discussed the economic policies in the contemporary Russia through the prism of kleptocracy and claimed that the core interest of Putin is to secure “personal power and wealth” (p. 46). Considering these points, it seems to be appropriate to claim that an ordinary Russian citizen who thinks of starting a business in Russia risks losing it if the government decides to continue its practice of “a theft of the century” on the largest possible scale” (Rothacher, 2021, p. 46). This is one of the reasons behind the argument that the market economy existent in Russia is not perfect.

The second reason is the argument that the Russian Government can impose a more rigid control over the operation of a market economy, that is, for instance over the private property rights, direct foreign investments, depending on their political interests. Along these lines, Weber (2023) suggests that the existence of a market economy in Russia strongly depends on security issues. In other words, the correlation that the author suggests us to look at is the following: when the economic performance of the country is poor, the ability to defend it against the external threats is lower as well. As such, when, according to Weber (2023), the

Russian political leaders consider the economic performance of the country to be poor relative to their global competitors, they introduce less control over market so that the economy could become stronger and as such, the ability to defend the country in the case of a possible external threat as well. This implies the introduction of “a programme promising greater market elements, including greater acceptance of globalization and trade, foreign direct investment, foreign technology and expertise” (Weber, 2023, p. 3).

Following the notes above, it has been argued by Hass (2018) that the Russian Government introduces less economic control in specific sectors that are important in terms of the national defence industry. The author refers to those sectors as of “strategic value” (Hass, 2018, p. 338) which include “metallurgy, machine-building, production of goods (trucks, jets)” (Hass, 2018, p. 338). Similar suggestions were made by Rosefielde (2021) who claims that relatively poor technological competitiveness of Russia resulted in a new “Strategy for the Science and Technological Development of the RF till 2035” (p. 55). This strategy was developed in parallel with the national security strategy (*ibid*). One of the key priorities of it is to increase private investments into science and technology to the level when it could exceed government funding. This goal should be reached by 2035 (*ibid*). This, according to the plan of the Russian Government, would result in balancing the economy in terms of private and public investments. Continuing these lines, private investments, in turn, can be increased in a market economy as privatization is one of key features of it and was introduced in Russia since the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 (discussed earlier in this section). Moving towards the development of science and technology various scientific and technological centres were opened in Russia such as “Centre for Strategic Research” (Hass, 2018), the science city, “Skolkovo” (Rosefielde, 2021, p. 54). Along these lines, the findings of this research also reveal the existence of discourses related to market and entrepreneurship in relation to the field of technology, more specifically, in relation to the STEM related subjects in higher education (Part 4).

It becomes evident now that the market economy existent in Russia is not perfect and largely depends on the overall strategy or politics of the Russian Government. However, it is of crucial importance to notice that there is a market economy in Russia. This is because the Russian economy has been integrated into the global market more than thirty years ago. It is not a closed country as it was during the Soviet times and the economy is not completely regulated and planned as it was back then. As Connolly (2018) describes it “after decades of quasi-autarky during the Soviet period, Russia has become much more closely integrated

with the global economy since 1991” (p. 49). In fact, Russia by being “the most resource-rich country in the world” (Sharafutdinova in Gill, 2022, p. 268) uses its resources in an international trade and consequently not only contributes to the global market but strengthens its dependence on it and as such on market economy overall. According to Connolly (2018), the Russian economy is based on “the generation of rents from globally competitive sectors of economy...” (p. 30). Weber (2023) describes this by claiming that Russia has “the ability to generate trade surpluses selling commodities abroad to accumulate currency to cover imports...” (p. 105). Certainly, a lot will depend on the consequences of Russian invasion in Ukraine, however, at the moment Russia still has the market economy that is tighten up with the global one even though the imposed financial sanctions play a huge role in declining Russian international economic activity (Weber, 2023). Nevertheless, if we speak about contemporary times, while the war in Ukraine is still ongoing, Russia is still engaging in an international trade with the countries that are heavily dependent on its natural resources (Mardones, 2023). In other words, Russia may become “more susceptible to enduring international isolation” (Weber, 2023, p. 214), but it is still part of an integrated global market economy world.

As such, it seems to be reasonable to claim that the world we live in is highly interdependent in terms of economic affairs. As much as the world is dependent on the natural resources available in Russia, Russia is also dependent on the world. The income generated from an international trade is often redistributed by the Russian Government to the “less competitive sectors of the economy” (Connolly, 2018, p. 30). In fact, according to Connolly (2018), this is how the economy works in Russia. What is of critical importance for this thesis, is that there is a market economy in Russia even though it is imperfect. In other words, it is not completely unregulated by the government as the concept of governmentality developed by Foucault suggests, however it is still in operation. To put this differently, there is still regulation of economic activity in Russia by the government, however, there is no total control of it anymore. As Hass (2018) describes it “if total state economic control of the Soviet era had seemed to be disastrous, strategic control was not” (p. 336). Considering the economic interdependence existing in the world along with the points that indicate to the operation of market economy in Russia, it is, indeed possible to agree with Foucault (2007) that “we live in an era of governmentality discovered in the eighteenth century” (p. 109). In other words, whether the country, that is open to the world, wants it or not, it is ought to consent to the existence of market economy in its country. That is, consent to the existence of governmentality. It can regulate it to a certain extent, but it is not possible to completely

avoid it, if the country is not closed to the rest of the world as it was with USSR for instance. In this sense, when we speak of governmentality in Russia, we do not speak of it as an art of governing chosen to be implemented or adopted by the Russian Government. We speak of it as a necessary way of governing which the Russian Government faced with since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Following the lines above, it is possible to claim that the Russian Government aims to preserve both layers of focus in its governing, that is, one of neoliberal and one of authoritarian. The aim of authoritarianism is to preserve and consolidate the power of Vladimir Putin. Apart from various judicial exercises of power discussed above, there is also the dissemination of various discourses across the society in Russia, the existence of which I will demonstrate in the disciplining of HE. However, at this point, it is important to discuss one of the key discourses, that is, the discourse of patriotism, used by the Russian Government to preserve and consolidate its power. The Russian Government, as it becomes evident from this research, attempts to promote the discourse of patriotism in HE that signifies the loyalty to the state first and foremost. As Dahlin describes it, the aim is to “create a citizen identity and loyalty to the state” (Dahlin, 2017, p. 1073). This loyalty to the state remained the key target of the Kremlin even in contemporary Russia (ibid). Loyalty to the state, in its turn, involves remembering and preserving Russian history and religion, which allows Vladimir Putin to stay in power for as long as possible.

In this sense, it is interesting to have a look at the words of Vladislav Surkov, who was in charge of various high level governmental positions in the Russian Government until February 2020. As Bovt (2008) puts it “the text of the lecture that Vladislav Surkov delivered at the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences...is worthy of close study...It contains many clues to the future ideological evolution of Russia’s ruling elite...” (pp. 33-34). According to Surkov (2008), there are three main features of Russian political practice: “we have a striving toward political wholeness through centralization of power functions...second, we have an idealization of the goals of political struggle. Third, we have a personification of political institutions” (p. 12). It can be noticed that each of these features of Russian political practice closely resembles with the ideas of Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).

In this context, idealism can be referred to the ideas of the Russian Orthodoxy followers who acquired beliefs that “Russia (Holy Rus) had a particular, sacred mission in the world as the only truly Christian (i.e. Orthodox) Empire after the fall of Constantinople” (Skladanowski,

Borzecki, 2020, p. 70). In other words, “Russia’s true essence” is to be defined through the prism of Orthodoxy (Fagan, 2013, p. 1). In addition to that, ROC portrays its’ values as absolute and “marginalizes any other type of discussion, whether scientific or theological” (Zhuravlev, 2019, p. 191). When it comes to the idea of wholeness discussed by Surkov (2008) again, ROC seems to play a considerable role here because it is ROC that often discusses the issues related to the concept of wholeness. As Berdiaev in Surkov (2008) puts “it is the mission of the Russians to give...a philosophy of the whole spirit...” (p. 11). Finally, and this is of an utmost importance, ROC usually signifies the role of the ruler in the country. In fact, the Russian Orthodox Church in the course of history through different events “furnished fertile grounds on which political absolutism could flourish...a kind of religious formalism that replaced Christian spirituality and subordinated religious authority to state imperatives” (Pankhurst in Shalin, 2019, p. 134). Various political accomplishments combined with religious ideology historically led to the emergence of an idea the function of which was to “symbolize Muscovy’s direct succession from the great apostolic see” (Pankhurst in Shalin, 2019, p. 134).

Considering these points, it seems to be appropriate to claim that loyalty to the state that the Russian Government attempts to promote is, in many ways, connected to the loyalty to the ideas of ROC, because all three characteristics described by Surkov (2008) in relation to the Russian political practices closely correlate with the ideas of ROC. Loyalty to the values of the ROC, in its turn, initiates loyalty to the ruler, to his supreme and absolute power. As he continues “God commanded us to be ethnic Russians (*russkie*) as well as citizens of Russia (*rossiiane*). Such we shall remain” (Surkov, 2008, p. 18). It is necessary to remember that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has been the dominant religion in Russia since the tenth century and historically played a role of uniting the Russian nation (Pankhurst in Shalin, 2019). Church is associated as a source of moral authority around which the Russian identity is formed (Haft, 2021). When we look at the mentioned points of connection between the Russian political practices described by Surkov (2008) and ROC, the idea that can come up to mind, in a broader perspective, is the idea of Slavophilism. In fact, the described are the features that the supporters of Slavophilism in Russia promote. Historically, many scholars have focused on a broad division in Russia between Westernizers and Slavophiles (Neumann, 2017).

Westernizers believe that Russia is essentially a European country and “shares with the West basic values and institutions and that in spite of unfortunate historical detours, it evolves

according to Western historical blueprints” (Paramonov in Shalin, 2018, p. 12). Slavophiles, on the other hand, reject this conception of Russia and believe in Russia’s unique historical path, unique spiritual values (associated with the Russian Orthodox Church) and its loftier historical destiny (ibid). They believe in an “existence of a unique Russia civilization. In this context it is usually said to encompass Russian culture, nation, language, and the Russian Orthodox Church” (Kaczmarska as cited in Suganami et al., 2017, p. 278). Westernizers are convinced that Russia belongs to the West and that it is “gradually moving towards an increasingly modern, secular society along European lines, in which the autonomous personality would be protected by laws and rights” (Rampton, 2020, p. 46). This is where the views of Westerners and Slavophiles substantially drifted apart. Slavophiles were against the Western form of state that prioritized secularism, reason, laws, and rights. This form of state, as they claim, is “alien to the people’s ethical sensibilities and inimical to the nation’s historical identity” (Paramonov in Shalin, 2018, p. 14).

Within this discussion, it is necessary to mention that my aim is not to dive into details between Westernism and Slavophilism that exists in Russia throughout the centuries. Instead, I just want to mention that patriotism in Russia can also be understood from the Westernizers points of view. Nevertheless, the Russian Government, as it also becomes evident from this research, increasingly intends to precisely indoctrinate the patriotism of Slavophilism in HE, which highlights the supreme power of the ruler, Russian history, and Russian Orthodox religion (see Uspenskii et al., 2012; Kalinin, 2017; Kliucharev, Muckle, 2005). This seems to be justifiable because the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) emphasizes the figure of the ruler of a country, and throughout Russian history, it was portrayed as having absolute supreme power, at times even understood to be at the same level as God if not higher (Uspenskii et al., 2012). This perhaps explains the attention of the government in Russia on Russian history and ROC if we go back to the definition of authoritarianism: to remain in power and consolidate it.

As such, we talk of authoritarian and neoliberal approaches when we speak of governing in contemporary Russia. The focus of authoritarian rule of governing is to remain in power and consolidate it. To achieve this, the Russian Government promotes the discourse of patriotism, which signifies loyalty to the state, the ruler, and Russian history (and religion). In other words, the attempt is to signify Slavophilism. At the same time, given the circumstances of globalisation, Russia had to integrate into the market economy as well, and this has led to the emergence of the neoliberal rule of governing. The governing that places

attention on the rule of the market. It is necessary to state, nevertheless, that the aim of the Russian Government is selective neoliberalism, that is, it implements it only in the spheres that meet their interests. For instance, as it will be demonstrated in the findings (Chapters 10, 12), it promotes hard sciences in higher education by referring to the market needs. This leads to the development of technological advances (military in particular) and entrepreneurship that is needed to the Russian Government to catch up with the West. In the next section, I will focus on how this governing that combines both authoritarian and neoliberal ways of governing disciplines the area of higher education.

Technologies of domination in Russian HE

Considering the points mentioned in the previous section, the Russian system of HE is caught between two main logics – trying to catch up with the West (global market competition) and implementing modern HE structures and one of authoritarianism – placing serious attention on patriotism that involves the focus on the figure of the ruler, Russian history and religion. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the governmental policy regarding higher education in Russia aimed at reorienting it towards neoliberal values that presupposed less state control (Smolentsova, 2017). This primarily implied the cut in governmental spending on higher education. In fact, in contemporary Russia, this spending decreased by 40% compared to the times of the Soviet Union (Yakovleva, 2022). As such, after the end of the Soviet Union, the marketisation of higher education was underway, and it is also partially related to the current higher education system in Russia. Around half of the funding universities get from the market, whereas the other half is governmental spending (ibid). It is interesting to note that according to the latest figures from World Bank (2020), Russia spent only 3.7% of its GDP on higher education, while the United Kingdom spent 5.5%.

Considering the partial marketisation of higher education in Russia, it is indeed possible to speak of the same as in the UK discourses of managerialism, students as consumers, and employability skills as among the dominant ones in Russian HE as well. For instance, according to the research conducted by Razinkina et al. (2018), there is a tendency among students to view higher education primarily as a tool to get a job after graduation (just like in the UK). This is why “students put a special emphasis on practice-oriented approach to education” (Razinkina et al., 2018, p. 5) which supposedly should help them in orienting in their future jobs. The discourse of managerialism, nevertheless, has been gradually transformed from being focused on the market to being focused on the interests of

bureaucracy (Yakovleva, 2022). Let us now dig deeper into the partial neoliberal turn of HE in Russia.

The situation with the contemporary Russian higher education quite accurately reflects the political regime of Russia overall. The political regime of Russia, in its turn, can be defined as the hybrid regime that implies the combination of “authoritarian politics and neoliberal economics” (Gallo, 2022, p. 555). I have stated in the previous section that with the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, Russia faced with the intervention of neoliberal economy into the country as it became open to a globalized world. In this sense, Russia was integrated into the globalized economy whether it wanted it or not. At the same time, authoritarian politics which attempts to discipline population so that the ruler, in other words, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin, could stay in power for as long as possible and have an absolute and supreme power, is in practice in Russia as well (see the previous section). How does this combination of authoritarianism and neoliberalism is reflected in higher education is explored in this section of the thesis.

The case of higher education in Russia is quite complex and it is important to understand that the direction of higher education has been changing throughout the history of Russia and might be changing while this thesis is being written. Along these lines, this is another reason why this thesis intends to demonstrate only the snapshot of power operation in Russian and the UK HE (the first reason is that practice-discourse nexus is always in motion, please see the discussion in Part 1). Continuing the topic of HE, it is necessary to state that the sector of higher education in Russia is very dynamic as perhaps is every other sphere in Russia because of constantly changing priorities of the Russian political regime. As Lewis (2020) describes it “Putin himself remains an ultimate pragmatist, able to step outside any ideological straitjacket to unsettle his opponents with unexpected moves” (p. 5). Going back to the period of the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, Russian higher education faced with the reforms that were completely new to it. As Smolentseva (2017) describes it “for higher education the reform agenda implied the introduction of market into the sector, more emphasis on private higher education, cuts in public funding, the introduction of tuition fees, performance-based accountability and emphasis on higher education’s role in the economy” (p. 1092). In other words, higher education in Russia was marketized, commodified. To put it differently, it was neoliberalized. While higher education in Soviet Union was completely free for everyone and state controlled (ibid), with the emergence of neoliberalism in Russia,

higher education became commodified implying that HE became “payable” (Malinovskiy, Shibanova, 2023, p. 69).

When we think of the effects of neoliberal turn on higher education, it is also necessary to discuss the increased social stratification that it has brought into the society of Russia (Malinovskiy, Shibanova, 2021). There is a direct causal relationship between the emergence of tuition fees in higher education and the social stratification. Simply speaking, those with a better family background in terms of economic wealth had easier access to higher education in Russia as they could afford newly introduced tuition fees (Khavenson, Chirkina, 2018). As Malinovskiy and Shibanova (2021) describe it “postsecondary access and quality differentiation came to be more associated with family background” (p. 284). In addition to this, the discussed neoliberal turn of HE considerably reoriented the direction of higher education especially from the point of view of students who started to see higher education from the lens of consumerism. This is because students now needed to pay tuition fees to have access to some of the universities in Russia that became private. As Smolentseva (2017) puts it the quality of education started “to be evaluated from the standpoint of the consumer” (p. 1098). For the sake of comparison, the students as consumers discourse is also one of the most dominant ones of the contemporary HE in the UK (Chapters 5, 9, 11).

It is perhaps because of these emerging issues, the marketisation of higher education in Russia remained partial. In other words, there are public and private universities in contemporary Russia (Yakovleva, 2022). As it was in USSR, “the Russian Constitution *de jure* guarantees the right to free enrolment in public higher education, contingent upon demonstrated fitness for admission as assessed by formal examination” (Malinovskiy, Shibanova, 2021, p. 282). As such, the Russian Government gained back the partial control over higher education providers. Along these lines, it is interesting to point out to the argument of Nureev et al (2020) who claims that “state control in the field of education will inevitably lead to total state control not only over educational organizations, but also over the content of education” (p. 4). In fact, this is what happens in the contemporary Russian higher education, and I will demonstrate it in the following parts of this section of the thesis which indicate to the considerable state control over the higher education overall and over the content of it as well. At this point, we are speaking of the effects of neoliberal turn in Russian HE.

It is possible to argue that the key change that was brought by the neoliberalism turn in higher education of Russia is its considerable reorientation towards meeting the needs of the national economy in accordance with the labour market priorities. As Smolentseva (2017) describes it “evaluation of the higher education sector is now expected to comply with the structure of labour market needs” (p. 1100). It is of crucial importance to notice that the development of national economy was also among the priorities of the Soviet government in relation to higher education. However, during the Soviet times, the economy was planned by the government (Belyakov in Rodriguez-Garavito, 2019). This implies that concepts such as market forces, liberalized prices, private enterprises were non-existent in the Soviet Union as the economy was planned and regulated (see the previous section for a more detailed discussion on this). As such, the connections made between higher education and national economy were not based on market priorities.

They were based on planned economy priorities. As Shibanova and Malinovskiy (2021) put it “postsecondary institutions were integral components of the planned economy. Most institutions were subordinated and governed by branch ministries of the Soviet state...Particular categories of universities served specialized purposes” (pp. 279-280). Considering these points, it might be claimed that the contemporary Russian higher education system is still characterized by a rigid centralization and control of government (ibid). However, it is of crucial importance to notice that the neoliberal turn of HE implied the evaluation of it “on the basis of its contribution to economic growth and the extent of its compliance with the labour market” (Smolentseva, 2017, p. 1101). In other words, it is not the planned economy that drives higher education as it was in USSR. It is the higher education that should be driven by market forces and “the demands of employers” (Smolentseva, 2017, p. 1102).

It is also necessary to speak of another effect that was brought by the emergence of neoliberal values in Russian HE, which is the internationalization of higher education. As described before, after the collapse of Soviet Union, Russia was experiencing huge problems in terms of national economy. As Belyakov (as cited in Rodriguez-Garavito, 2019) describes it, with the collapse of USSR, “the Republics, including the Russian Republic, suspended the cash flow to the central government, meaning that central authorities could no longer fulfil their social and economic obligations” (p. 187). In terms of higher education system in Russia, this implied that universities were experiencing severe cuts in governmental funding (Yakovleva, 2022) and as mentioned earlier, higher education was partially commodified,

which meant that they started to be dependent on private funding. Considering the fact that most of the families in Russia could not afford paying tuition fees due to the huge financial problems with the end of Soviet Union, universities in Russia turned their attention to the recruitment of international students to generate income which is a worldwide practice overall (Chankseliani, 2018). Along these lines, according to the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of Russia (2022), the number of international students in Russia increased and reached 324 thousand from the period of 2019 - 2021 (para. 1).

One other effect of neoliberalism on higher education of Russia is its impact on directing higher education towards the development of “scientific and technical resources” (Smolentseva, 2017, p. 1098). It is not uncommon to come across the viewpoints in academia that Russia is lagging behind the West in terms of technological development, and it is therefore focused on directing higher education towards that specific area (Silova and Steiner-Khamsi, 2008; Smolentseva, 2017; Anikina et al, 2020). In fact, this is confirmed by the findings of this research as well (Chapter 10). However, how is neoliberalism related to the technological development is the question that requires more elaboration. A straightforward answer to the previously posed question is because Russia has been integrated into the global economy which is driven by the principles of neoliberalism, which consequently initiates the focus on technological development. Let’s have a look at how we reach such a conclusion.

I have already stated that with the collapse of Soviet Union, Russia was integrated into the global economy. But what is global economy? What are its priorities? In an attempt to answer those questions, James (2012) formulated a definition of a global economy claiming that it is “constituted, in a fundamental sense, by an international social practice in which societies mutually rely on common markets” (p. 3). In other words, global economy is the economy which is based on the priorities emerged from the common world market. Global economy, in this sense, is about studying “not the world of states, or of empires and colonies, but the world market” (Cammack, 2022, p. 17). The concern here is about “the mutually causative relationships between resources and rules in an integrated matrix where foreign commodities, foreign values, foreign languages and foreign people are crossing the borders...” (Reismann, 2019, p. 2). Considering these points, global economy can be characterised as a closely interdependent world market, which is also competitive.

In fact, competition is one of the key principles of a global market economy if not the most important one. Market regulated economy, even if it is global, implies competition. As Gent and Crescenzi (2021) put it “market power is the ability to generate prices that diverge from what would result from a fully clearing competitive market” (p. 10). Global economy, in its turn, if it is a market economy, also implies competition. As Sweeney (2009) describes it, in the globalized world, “promoting competition and efficiency has become a central economic principle” (p. 2). I will not delve deeper into the examining the reasons behind preserving competition in a global market. However, it is important to understand that Russia by becoming integrated into the globalized world (Kochtcheeva, 2020), entered into the global economic competition as well which in fact drives it towards disciplining higher education in accordance with what global market prioritizes.

Finally, the key or the leading area in the contemporary global market, is the technological advancement (Matyushok et al, 2021; Chlivickas et al, 2009). Considering the global trend of technological advancement, Russia is also disciplining its higher education towards focusing on technical sciences which I will demonstrate in findings (Chapter 10). It becomes evident now that it is not that Russia decided to promote technical sciences in higher education out of nowhere. Instead, it is the globalized market economy that Russia is involved in which drives it towards such a disciplining. In this respect, this disciplining of HE is quite similar to the one existing in the UK HE which is driven by the neoliberal economy as well and to a much greater extent (Chapters 5, 9, 11). Nevertheless, speaking of the attention on the development of technological advancement, it is possible to notice more attention from the Russian Government than from the Government of the UK (Chapters 10, 12), which could be possibly explained by the fact that it was in a position that was considerably lagging behind the West with the end of Soviet Union in 1991 (Smolentseva, 2017).

Despite the described partial marketisation, a substantial part (half of it) of Russian higher education receives public funding (Barinova et al., 2016, Huisman et al., 2018), and it is mainly subordinated by the centralized executive power (Platonova, Semyonov in Huisman et al., 2018). The Russian Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MSHE) closely monitors the effectiveness of higher education institutes (Ezrokh, 2017). The effectiveness, in turn, is defined by the targets set by the government. These targets are directly associated with the interests of “Russian elites” (p. 387), as Oleksiienko (2020) describes it.

It is also possible to argue that the public funding of Russian universities that is still existent was not the result of the desires of the Russian Government to govern the system of Higher Education in the country. Instead, it was the call from universities because, with the emergence of neoliberalism in Russia, educational institutions found themselves in a position that demanded funding for survival. As Forrat (2016) mentions “in the 1990s, they struggled to survive with one economic foot in the private market and another in the inherited Soviet economic model” (p. 300). Russian society was not used to viewing higher education as requiring payment. As such, society was reluctant towards the introduction of tuition fees (ibid). In fact, the Russian Government “was busy resolving more pressing issues in Russia in the 1990s” (Forrat, 2016, p. 302) and as such, it was also reluctant to provide resources to higher education. Nevertheless, the Russian Government started to fund universities, as it was the case before, which was nevertheless limited.

To a considerable extent, the emergence of neoliberalism played into the hands of the Russian Government’s strategy in relation to higher education. The fact that society was not ready to adopt a neoliberal approach towards higher education left universities with one choice: to compete for the governmental funding with other universities. As such, the Russian Government gained the control over HE as it was in Soviet times. The Russian Government, based on its interests, could initiate projects, and universities had to be involved in them as they pursued the generation of income. One example is the project called ‘5-100’, in which the government ordered universities in the country to work on getting into the top 100 universities in the world (Tsvetkova, Lomer, 2018). The goal was to reach a point when at least five universities in Russia would achieve that aim. As Tsvetkova and Lomer (2018) put it, “the project 5-100 provides an example of the Russian government’s attempt to strengthen state control in HE...” (p. 134). In other words, it is the performance-based funding strategy that the Russian Government started to implement in relation to higher education in the country (Oleksiyenko, 2020). The performance that is measured by the government.

As such, the authoritarian manner of governing remained largely the case in Russia even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By referring to the end of the Soviet Union as a genuine tragedy, the Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to exercise strict control over various spheres, including higher education (Chankseliani, 2021). According to Chankseliani (2021), “with this sentiment in mind, the Russian government...has been consistently making efforts to retain control over its spheres of influence...by promoting

Russian discourses on past and contemporary events through Russian higher education...” (p. 37). Oleksiyenko (2020) describes the higher education in Russia as a scapegoat for the government and Putin as a “whip-master” (p. 392). In other words, it is the area in which the discourse of patriotism could be easily implemented, considering the aforementioned dependency of HE on governmental funding. According to Lisovskaya and Karpov (2020), “as Putin assented to power, the higher education sector was increasingly re-subordinated to state control” (p. 290). In addition to this, as mentioned earlier, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had to compete in the global market as well. Based on the points mentioned above, let us restate that Russian higher education found itself in a position where it had to keep two layers of focus, one of competing in the global market and one of authoritarian.

It is also worth considering that some authors argue that Putin “hardly considered” the policy of education as an area of “a priority in his agenda” (Gelman, Starodubstev, 2016, p. 109). The previous argument is reasoned by the hypothesis that Putin was trying to distance himself from unpopular education reforms at the ministerial level, such as, for instance, the Unified State Exam introduced to Russian citizens as the way to be enrolled in university education (*ibid*). The disapproval of this exam by the Russian population was related to the issue of social inequality that it induced (Konstantinovsky, 2012). Despite being designed to promote equal opportunities for all the students in Russia, this project quickly adopted the past Soviet habits when “children of Soviet elite families had the most prestigious level of education and the most effective professions” (Konstantinovsky, 2012, p. 17). In other words, the proximity to the official power of the political leaders was a decisive factor in, for example, getting a high score in this exam (*ibid*). As such, Putin was trying to distance himself from these narratives, however, with time, Putin himself started to play a more serious and substantial role in the direction of higher education in Russia. For example, “President Putin has made public statements criticizing “unpatriotic” views on Russia’s history and recommended to develop a “unified” set of textbooks...based on the conceptions of “true” history...” (Lisovskaya, Karpov, 2020, p. 291).

Along with these apparent government interventions in education overall, the Russian Government initiates various other projects that imply the involvement of universities in them. Among these, the “Without an Expiration Date” project stands out as the most eye-catching. It aims at the “preservation of the historical memory of the war crimes of the Nazis and their accomplices during the Great Patriotic War” (Project: “Without an Expiration

Date”, 2023). As such, when we speak of technologies of domination in Russian higher education, it is necessary to point out that the area is being disciplined through these types of actions, such as implementing various projects inclined towards consolidation of nationalist ideology, the amendments of some and prohibition of other history books. As Danilov (2010) puts it, “a chief purpose of history education is to form people who are patriots and citizens of their country...” (p. 44). However, what is ‘true’ and ‘untrue’ history is decided, as mentioned earlier, by the government. The ‘true’ history, in turn, is the portrayal of Russia as the “great state,” which is the result of “Putin’s push for ‘national ideology, patriotism, and nation-building, where Russia is presented as a unique and great nation” (Zajda, 2017, p. 17). The above-described discourses of disciplining the Russian population towards viewing Russia as a unique, great state was also the case in times of the USSR. As Zajda (2017) notes, “they also paid a good deal of attention to the content of history textbooks” (p. 42).

These elements of disciplining higher education in Russia can be put under the umbrella of the notion called ‘patriotic upbringing’ (*Patrioticheskoe vospitanie* in Russian). Patriotism intervened in the notion of upbringing (*vospitanie*) that has begun to be cultivated in higher education in the early 1920s with the foundation of the Soviet Union. The common English translation for ‘*vospitanie*’ is ‘upbringing’, but it has a broader meaning in Russian, which means “an all-embracing process by which a youngster’s values, habits, and world vision are fashioned” (Black, 1991, p. 1). In other words, it is the education of a correct thinking about the world and the cultivation of correct behaviour in a society. In Soviet times, *vospitanie* (upbringing) embraced the previously existing patriotic feelings, and the willingness to defend the country against external enemies and added the cultivation (or training) of being beneficial for the society. It began to promote socialist ideas through higher education by instilling specific moral values, habits that would fit into the narrative of Marxism-Leninism and be propagandized as good for society (Dunstan, 1981). The political rationale of the Soviet Union has shifted the Russian social understanding of higher education from being only focused on protecting the homeland from external forces as being well-educated servants to adding socialist ideas. The combination of those two began to be regarded as ‘*vospitanie*’ (upbringing). The Soviet Union demanded higher education to nurture and form strong communist convictions in society (Black, 1991) along with the previous narrative of patriots “to lay down his life for the Fatherland” (Shaidenko, 2013, p. 70).

Up until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the system of higher education in Russia involved nurturing a patriotic and communist society. After the end of the Soviet era, however, the communist ideology has been replaced by neoliberal ideas, which promoted individualism over collectivism. As such, public consciousness fell into moral confusion by finding itself in between the strong social cohesion based on communism and patriotism and Western neoliberal ideas (Kliucharev, Muckle, 2005). As mentioned earlier, the higher education system began to adopt market-based relations, individualism, and democracy, leaving the ideas of Motherland, labour, history, revolution, and comrade behind (*ibid*). Continuing the lines on upbringing, it was precisely this public confusion that the regime of Putin apparently aims to clarify. It eliminates all moral nurturing regarding communism and replaces it by portraying Russia as a great and unique nation.

Following the lines above on the promotion of patriotism, the Russian Government uses it to exercise strict control over the professional life of academics. In terms Foucauldian theorization, this means an attempt to discipline academics using authoritarian technologies of domination. It is argued by Yudkevich (2014) and Oleksiyenko (2020) that academics in Russian higher education are subordinated to governmental discourses such as patriotism. There are conditions of “self-censorship and favouritism” (Oleksiyenko, 2020, p. 387). This is especially evident in academics’ inability to express their views in publications, research works that they conduct. Yudkevich (2014) describes this as “academic feudalism” (p. 1468). The implications of such a situation inevitably affect cooperation and competition within the academic community, which is necessary to enrich academic research (*ibid*).

Moreover, the described governmental regulation of educators’ conduct initiates mistrust within academia overall. As Oleksiyenko (2020) describes it, “one obvious aspect is related to the huge mutual mistrust between the scientific community and the administrators that make specific policy...” (p. 391). In other words, even if academics want to express their fair views in publications, for example, they are under the surveillance of top-down bureaucrats, managers whose task is to put the state goals higher than the work of academics. As Kaczmarska (as cited in Kinzelbach, 2020) describes it, academics “can easily become tools in the hands of bureaucrats and/or the security services” (p. 119). This clearly illustrates a disciplining described by Foucault or Bentham’s panopticon. Lecturers regulate their behaviours and thoughts not only by considering the potential negative consequences that those managers could initiate but also, they must consider “people who are associated with the KGB...” (currently, FSB, Federal Security Service in English) and who indeed work in

universities in Russia (Oleksiyenko, 2020, p. 389). The existence of security agents within higher education is not a new phenomenon in Russia as it was a common practice during Soviet times as well. Called “Unit 1”, it was “the formal office of an institutional curator from NKVD/KGB, protecting state secrets and performing supervision of the academic community” (Oleksiyenko, 2021, p. 1121). The difference with contemporary Russian HE is that these agents work informally at universities, which is under cover (Chapter 12). However, the key point is the existence of such a practice that disciplines people within higher education.

As such, professional educators in Russian higher education must primarily comply with the government’s narratives and requirements. According to Denisova-Schmidt (2020), “university departments and chairs “were turned into offices long ago”, and their primary role is to satisfy Russian officials” (p. 87). Academics “are afraid of their natural free-thinking, which disgusts” (ibid, p. 88) these requirements and discourses. It is interesting to note that direct judicial implications have also been applied in this context. For example, the laws on “export control” and “foreign agents” require academics to “ask permission before they present or publish their work abroad...” (Denisova-Schmidt, 2020, p. 88). Along with these direct judicial exercises of power, there are also disciplinary ones discussed above in relation to FSB officers working at universities. There are also indirect manners of regulating the conduct and thoughts of lecturers.

While discussing the indirect domination, it is possible to speak of the cases when certain members of the Russian Parliament who criticise, for instance, the teaching on gender studies, defining them as “fake studies” (Denisova-Schmidt, 2020, p. 89) result in governmental investigations and supervisions in universities which are afterwards penalized for violations unrelated to the initial accusations. In other words, investigations are formally called for other reasons, and then universities are penalized for “the absence of gym or failure to display anti-alcohol leaflets” (Denisova-Schmidt, 2020, p. 89). However, everyone understands that these penalties are connected to the initial accusations related to the existence of specific modules such as gender studies. Another example of an indirect regulation is related to publications. As Oleksiyenko (2021) describes it, “Imagine that a publisher has to make a decision on whether to accept or reject a paper on Russian imperialism, which has received a reviewer’s comment suggesting the paper’s author “lacks love for Russia, or even possibly “hates Russia” (p. 1118). Fears of repercussion arise in

such cases, eventually preventing publication (ibid). Considering the potential threats to their careers, academics tend to silence their actual views.

Concluding this section on the technologies of domination in Russian higher education, it is possible to speak of the disciplining heavily inclined towards promoting patriotic upbringing. Universities in Russia are in a dependent position because they require funding, and at the same time, they are under the authoritarian guidance of Putin's regime. Neoliberal ideals that started to be sharply developing between 1991 (the end of the USSR) and 1999 (when Putin came to power) are still to a certain extent revolving in higher education in Russia, as the political regime understands that there is a "worldwide spread of neoliberalism" (Smolentsova, 2017, p. 1092). The country does not want to lag behind the West (Silova, Steiner-Khamsi, 2008), specifically in terms of technological innovations. For instance, as the findings will demonstrate, the Russian Government actively promotes the discourse of technological entrepreneurship in HE which is directly linked to the market economy. In other words, the neoliberalism of technologies of domination in Russia regarding higher education is selective. Dubrovsky and Kaczmarska (2021) describe this governmental attitude towards higher education in Russia as "highly selective" (p.5). Therefore, we can speak of only partial neoliberalism in Russian HE. As such, the following interpretation of the Russian HE in terms of the technologies of domination is suggested: Selective neoliberalism in combination with patriotism. In the next section, I will focus on the literature that demonstrates how people within this Russian HE self-regulate themselves.

Technologies of the Self in Russian HE

Let us start from analysing the conduct of students first and then the conduct (or self-regulations or technologies of the self) of academics in Russian HE. I have touched upon the issue of patriotic upbringing in Russian higher education that aims at strengthening students' national identity. This involves the portrayal of Russia as a unique and great nation and all the factors related to Slavophilism discussed before. The disciplinary techniques which involve governmental interventions, such as the amendments of history textbooks, are directed towards students. According to Skrynnikova et al. (2022), "patriotism is referred to as something that can be sowed" (p. 350). In other words, it is presented as something that could be taught to students. However, the question is how do students react to these techniques? What is the impact of these techniques on students' technologies of the self in Russia? In fact, the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (RPORC) conducted a survey

on the issues of patriotism in Russian society in 2020. The results indicated that the relatively young part of the Russian population demonstrates less interest in patriotism than older generations. When asked, “what is the first thing that comes to your mind when you hear the word ‘Russia’”, people aged between 18-24 chose the answer “it induces a sense of patriotism/Great Power”, much less than people of older generations (46-60 or older). More precisely, only 11% of young people who participated in the survey replied that the word ‘Russia’ induces a sense of patriotism, which is not the case with people aged 60 or more: 37% (RPORC, 2020).

It is worth considering that we cannot completely rely on the results provided by RPORC as the results could easily be rigged, or falsified with the aim of strengthening the governmental discourse on the importance of patriotism in higher education. In other words, the aim could be to justify the disciplinary techniques of government in relation to the promotion of patriotism in HE. On the other hand, the results might be reliable. It is difficult to understand whether the findings of the mentioned survey are reliable or not. However, what is certain is that there is indeed a discourse of patriotism revolving around Russian society, and the existence of such a survey also confirms this. Nevertheless, these are the disciplinary technologies of domination. When it comes to the technologies of the self of students regarding the issue of patriotism, it is been argued by Trotsuk and Suvakovic (2013) that students in Russia, those who are in Moscow and St Petersburg, consider themselves patriots and show pride regarding the heroic history of Russia.

The study conducted by Trotsuk and Suvakovic in 2013 attempted to assess the patriotic feelings of students in Russia, however, the survey was conducted only in Moscow and St Petersburg, which is a considerable point to be mindful of as there is an “asymmetry in the socio-economic development of regions....which leads to an increase of tension in the society...” in Russia (Slepneva et al., 2016, p. 18). The level of democracy, for instance, also differs in the regions of Russia. As Herrera (2009) puts it, “there is a high degree of variation in terms of levels of democracy” in Russia (p. 27). It is therefore, the results of the study conducted by Trotsuk and Suvakovic (2013) hardly represent the overall perceptions of Russian students on the issues of patriotism. Nevertheless, the study is still thought provoking as it describes a specific trend in Russia. As such, the research illustrates that students in Moscow and St Petersburg, firstly, demonstrate a patriotic spirit, and secondly, this spirit is shown through emphasising the history and traditions of Russia along with an attention on military service (Trotsuk, Suvakovic, 2013).

It is also worth considering that the study demonstrated above was conducted almost ten years ago, and as such, there are questions on the situation with students' technologies of the self regarding patriotism and all the narratives related to Slavophilism in contemporary Russian HE. Nevertheless, it can be claimed that students' tendency to embrace the feelings mentioned earlier might be strengthening through the years. For example, the book by Zajda (2017), 'Globalisation and National Identity in History Textbooks: Russian Federation', confirmed the Russian Government's disciplinary intervention in changing the content of history textbooks and demonstrated the perception of some students towards the notion of patriotism. In addition to this, the view of Russian students towards the concept of "a strong man ideology" (Zajda, 2017, p. 47) was also studied. Regarding this, one of the students replied: "You always need a strong man...and then one day we maybe play democracy" (Zajda, 2017, p. 47). The previous words can be directly correlated to the ideology of Slavophilism, which portray the figure of the leader as a strong individual with supreme and absolute power. Furthermore, as it can be noticed the concept of democracy in this context is perceived as something that can be played with. In other words, this student's consciousness is far from understanding what democracy is. The term 'democracy' in this case is an empty signifier filled with the subjective meaning of democracy promoted by the Russian Government. As it can be observed, the students' technologies of the self seem to be embraced with the elements of Slavophilism that the Russian Government promotes. In the words of Oushakine (2010), it can be claimed that the university in Russia is "stirring the memory of feelings" (meaning to 'awaken') related to Slavophilism, and it seems to have strong feedback in terms of the students' technologies of the self.

As such, based on the previously examined literature, it seems possible to speak of the self-regulations of students (technologies of the self) in Russia as embraced with the discourses of patriotism that focus on Russian history, the army, and identity. In other words, the governmental intervention that promotes compulsory definitions and interpretations of, for instance, patriotism and history initiate the situation when we can possibly describe a student in Russia with the narrative that the "subject is dead" (McNay, 1994, p. 129). Let us not forget nevertheless, that there are discourses of employability skills, students as consumers as well within HE in Russia due to the partial marketisation of HE in Russia. The conduct of students seems to be impacted by these discourses as well, which will be demonstrated in the findings chapters of this thesis (Chapter 12). In fact, the case of Russian HE is interesting to analyse because there is a combination of governmentality and authoritarianism in HE which can either direct students towards neoliberal values or to the values of patriotism or,

in fact, to both. Along these lines, it might also be claimed that this is the possible reason the younger respondents in the survey of RPORC mentioned earlier seemed less inclined towards patriotism than the older generations. In other words, this is happening because the governing of younger generation is intertwined with neoliberal values as well.

Along with students' technologies of the self, it is also important to analyse the available literature on lecturers' technologies of the self as all the discourses that revolve around are dispersed and interact with each other through power relations. I have mentioned before that lecturers in Russia tend to silence their views which do not go in accord with the views of the government. As a result of this, they tend to identify academic freedom in a specific manner which is nicely described by Potapova (2022). Potapova (2022) defines academic freedom of academics in Russia as "the freedom from interference" (p. 21). Lecturers in Russia prefer to identify academic freedom by identifying the potential threats (ibid). It is the "freedom from interference in research and teaching, rather than freedom to do teaching and research" (Potapova, 2022, p. 21) that can be interpreted as the safe space, according to the author. In other words, academic freedom is defined by what is not under supervision. This is the prerequisite for determining academic freedom in contemporary Russian HE. In this context, some correlations can be made with the talks "in the private kitchens" where there is no threat to the freedom of expression (Oleskiyenko, 2021, p. 1119).

It is important, nevertheless, not to confuse this freedom in the sense of physical location because it is related to the freedom when lecturers "can do what they consider to be part of an academic job in conditions with which they are familiar and to which they have contested" (Potapova, 2022, p. 21). As such, it is a matter of learning the conditions first, and then behaving and expressing the views by these conditions. These conditions, in turn, are inherited from the Soviet practice of "pathological control over all contacts" (Denisova-Schmidt, 2020, p. 88) and are based on what could threaten the discourses promoted by Russian officials, which as mentioned earlier, excessively promote Slavophilism in HE. Basically speaking, an ordinary lecturer in Russia needs to understand that it is risky to teach or to publish something against the promoted governmental discourses. At times, they even publish a paper that harmonizes with those discourses.

Let us consider, for instance, the following article published by Plujnik, Oskolova and Herrington (2017) in the Russian language in the Western journal *The Education and Science*. It is called "The formation of national identity of Russian students in a multicultural

society”. It analyses various pedagogical methods used in the US, Australia, and Canada to formulate a method in Russia for educating national identity and proposes to use the following indicators to assess the formation of the national identity of a student in Russia: 1. a student can “position himself or herself as a citizen of a multi-ethnic state, interested in the cultural and historical heritage of the country, accepts national language, civil solidarity and collective responsibility”, 2. demonstrate “emotional attachment to his or her region and country, national dignity, patriotism”, 3. “implementation of national norms, the desire to interact with fellow citizens for the benefit of the country on the basis of humanistic guidelines and civilized universal norms of behaviour” (p. 142). As it can be observed, it is hardly possible to find something that would dispute the discourse of patriotism promoted by the Russian Government. In fact, most narratives described align with them, specifically the ones on cultural and historical heritage.

The described example can be interpreted by Oleksiienko’s concept of (2021) “surrogate academic freedom” (p. 1117), which is the freedom that emphasizes individual conscious avoidance of moral norms regarding fairness and truth-seeking. According to Oleksiienko (2021), it is “a hybrid form of freedom, one which implies individual escape from moral norms of truth-seeking, honesty, responsibility...all, while empowering corrupt elites as they spread post-truth techniques and...falsify memories...citizen’s rights and freedoms” (p. 1117). It is worth noting that this is not to say that academics in Russia are not able to understand what the freedom or morality is. However, within the given conditions, they are forced to avoid those honest understandings. The thoughts and conducts of some of them may indeed harmonize with the position of Russian Government. At the same time, other academics may be forced to express only specific views that do not contradict the discourses promoted by the government. What is certain, nevertheless, is that there is excessive pressure from those governmental discourses that affect academics’ technologies of the self in Russia. The thoughts and conducts of lecturers are in direct dependence on those discourses.

Furthermore, there is also a thought-provoking argument that lecturers in Russia can, in fact, feel more comfortable within these conditions rather than those of liberalism and neoliberalism because, historically, the rise of liberalism (and neoliberalism) was accompanied by failures in Russia. As Oleksiienko (2021) puts it, “Having learned of the risks and failures that come with unpredictable markets and free competition, many of the liberated want to regain the security” (p. 1120), the security that is supposedly provided by “supreme authorities” (p. 1120). As Kuraev (2015) puts it, “sovietism in Russian academia

dies hard” (p. 190). In addition to this, for example, “the fear of losing one’s job...make any serious resistance against direct violations of academic authority....almost impossible” (Dubrovskiy, 2017, p. 192).

On the other hand, there is a certain resistance to the trends described above even though it is “advocated by a relatively small number of social and academic innovators” (Oleksiyenko, 2021, p. 1120). Along these lines, Anikina et.al. (2020) suggest that Russian academics “are open to development and eager to improve themselves to become a part of global academia” (p. 865). In support of the previous lines, I argue that the liberty of thoughts and conducts indeed exists in Russian academia. The conducts and thoughts of lecturers, especially during teaching, resonate with the discourses of government on patriotism as the result of this thesis demonstrates.

Concluding this chapter on Russia, it is necessary to claim that despite being largely authoritarian, the Russia Government still implements a neoliberal way of governing as well. This is happening because Russia is integrated into the global economy which prioritizes technological development. The focus of Russia on technological development can be explained by the point that the country is lagging behind the West in this respect, which is not in the interests of the Russian Government. This is why, even if it is limited, there is freedom in Russia that is given to people in HE to be more productive, especially in the area of hard sciences. This is evident from the research findings (Part 4). People are being disciplined not only by the discourse of patriotism but also by neoliberalism, that emphasizes individualism and market relations.

When we think of both the case in the UK and in Russia, it seems to be possible to claim that governmentality, which is the neoliberal way of governing exists in both countries’ higher education. Both countries attempt to direct higher education and people within it towards focusing on the rule of market, however the degree of it varies. When in the UK, this governing seems to be overwhelmingly neoliberal, in Russia it is implemented in combination with authoritarianism. Nevertheless, this is not to say that there is an absolute freedom in the UK HE and an absolute authoritarianism in Russian HE. The UK Government, as it is demonstrated in Chapter 5, attempts to control and regulate HE and people in it which has its consequences on people’s self-regulations (conduct). Yes, it is neoliberal control, but it is still control in accordance with the interests of the government. The Government in Russia also attempts to control HE along with the conduct of lecturers

and students and the degree of this control seems to be higher than in the UK. Nevertheless, there is still a freedom to be enjoyed by both academics and students in Russian HE: freedom to deviate from the imposed set of practices and discourses. As such, there are certain similarities in these two countries both in terms of the technologies of domination (governing) and in terms of technologies of the self (the conduct of lecturers and students) which will be demonstrated in detail in Part 4: Findings.

In the next part of the work, I will focus on the methodological aspects of this work and describe the limitations that occurred during the study.

Part 3: Methodology

Chapter 7: Ontology and Epistemology

It is necessary to cover the ontological and epistemological framework of the thesis, as the used methodology is based upon them. As mentioned earlier my ontological assumptions are based on the theoretical concepts developed by Foucault. The operation of power in HE is studied through them. As it is evident from the theoretical framework, Foucault perceived power as dispersed, exercised through the relations between them, and inextricably connected to the circulating discourses. These relations initiate new discourses and since there is always a relationship between people, between different institutions, the discourses are in constant minor or major transformation as well as the relations between people which are also transforming due to those circulating discourses. As such, power and knowledge are interdependent; the relationship that is referred by Foucault as power-knowledge nexus. Power-knowledge is at the heart of Foucauldian theoretical perspective, and it questions the linear axiom regarding the power operation as it does not perceive power to be held by someone and practiced by the judicial top-down approach only. The power is dispersed through the technologies of domination which are in connection with the technologies of the self. The combination of these two form the theory of governmentality.

It is, therefore, the ideas of Foucault that are commonly referred to as having a post-structuralist approach. This perspective can be associated with post-structuralism because “it comes to replace universal truth and forms of rationality” (Agger, 1991, p. 14). As such, first, since Foucault reformulated the conception of power, his ideas can be included into post-structuralism and secondly, based on the described reformulation of power, truth is contingent upon and produced by the power-knowledge nexus in a particular time and place. The constant relations between people by being embedded in power-knowledge nexus permanently produce a regime of truth (Foucault, 1997). As explored before (Part 1: Theoretical Framework), Foucault viewed truth as being not outside the power-knowledge nexus, it is produced by it. As he puts it “truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth...that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true...”(Foucault as cited in Rabinow, 1991, pp. 72-73). As such, there is nothing static in Foucauldian perspective, and as it become evident, truth is not static as well. The question is what type of ontological assumption does the described post-structuralist theoretical perspective imply?

An answer to the posed question lays on the ontological perspective that can be defined as relativism combined with historical realism. However, before describing the mentioned stances, it is necessary to clarify what the ontology is. Ontology “can roughly be defined as presuppositions or innate conceptions about the nature of the world” (Chatterjee, 2011, p. 74). Ontology is “how we think the social world is constituted, or what we think it is...” (Mason, 2002, p. 59). As such, ontology is a particular perception of the world. In fact, it is a certain prejudice on the nature of the world, of the reality. This “prejudice is itself an ontological structure that represents the distillation of an individual’s experiences across his or her life span” (Peck, Mummery, 2018, p. 404).

A relativist ontological approach in turn is a certain presupposition about the nature of the world that perceives it as dependent upon individuals’ experiences and perspectives. It holds a narrative that “the world is different to different people” (Gemma, 2018, p. 2). For example, two opposing views on the same phenomenon might be equally valid for relativists (Dulles, 2017). Most importantly, “it rejects any universal moral law rooted in the nature of the human person” (Dulles, 2017, p. 731). It insists on the formula that “x is relative to y” (Kusch, 2020, p. 1). The ideas of Foucault fit into this ontological perspective because crucially they reject the existence of universal standards, moral laws, or, to put it simply, the existence of universal truth, the narrative which to a certain extent correlates with Kantian perspective (Kioupkiolis, 2012). Foucault’s interpretation of the nature of truth allows us to place it within relativist ontological perspective. The genius of Foucault as Turner (2015) describes it, is to be found in his “ability to find new things to problematize and relativize. A normative account of consciousness would be one of...easiest targets” (p. 256). Nevertheless, since Foucault’s interest was inclined more towards relativizing the historical perspectives of truth, it seems to be more appropriate to add historical realism as his ontological assumption as well.

Following the lines above, “historical realism is the belief that reality is shaped over time by values, for example, social, political, cultural or gender” (Gemma, 2018, p. 2). The interest of Foucault, as it is evident from his ideas (Part 1: Theoretical Framework) was in archaeological and genealogical work that would unpack those shared values that play a role in the formation of the regime of truth. In other words, the regime of truth is a historically relative concept that is explored by Foucault through power-knowledge nexus. As Scotland (2012) describes it “historical realism is the view that reality has been shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values...” (p. 13). As mentioned earlier, the

interest of Foucault was based on uncovering these values and claiming that these values were different in different epistemes. Along with this, he wasn't simply describing the differences, but he was critically analysing them through the developed by him power-knowledge nexus. As such, the regime of truth is "both socially constructed and influenced by power relations from within society" (Scotland, 2012, p. 13).

Considering the details mentioned above, it is possible to speak of historical relativism as the core ontological assumption that the rhetoric of Foucault is based upon. This ontology is often criticized for ignoring the fact that the researcher cannot stand "outside the community" (Kusch, 2020, p. 8). According to Kusch (2020) "if the relativist is a member of our culture, the relativist and the rest of us share the same S" (p. 8). Kusch (2020) referred to S as a stance, that is the set of beliefs. In other words, relativist is accused of forgetting about himself or herself. As O'Grady (2002) mentions "relativistic views of reality are accused of self-refutation..." (p. 33). To put it differently, it is criticised for ignoring the fact that a relativist himself or herself is embedded into the present common consciousness. Turner (2015) puts it as "the truth and falsity of the relevant claims are settled by present beliefs..." (p. 252). Relativist, on the other hand, "might insist that his position is justified by principles that are endorsed by relativists and non-relativists alike" (Kusch, 2020, p. 8). Then, this argument seems to play in hands of absolutists who as mentioned earlier believe in universal values. It is beyond the scope of this research to examine the issues between relativists and absolutists in this paper, however, the point is that the ontological assumption of Foucault can be defined as being embraced by the combination of relativism and historical realism as he rejected the existence of the universal truth. The combination of relativism and historical realism can in turn be defined as historical relativism.

This research follows the same ontological assumption of relativism as I use Foucauldian interpretations of the nature of the world, of reality. Certainly, there can be many different interpretations of the nature and essence of the world. It is necessary to point out that by relying on my own ontological assumptions, I do not intend to dispute other understandings. Nevertheless, if ontology is "how we think the social world is constituted, or what we think it is..." (Mason, 2002, p. 59), then in this thesis, I perceive the world to be constituted precisely as Foucault portrays it. The world or the reality (or the regime of truth) which is contingent upon the relations between people based on power-knowledge or practice-discourse nexus. In other words, the reality or the regime of truth is contextual, it depends on these relations. It is necessary to keep this understanding of the reality in mind, because

as every other ontology, “it generates theories about what can be known...”, which is defined as epistemology (Raadschelders, 2011, p. 918). Epistemology is the “theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective...” (Crotty, 1998, p. 3). In other words, it is about what is regarded as knowledge based on the ontological assumptions.

Following the lines above, epistemology is the theory of knowledge and “should therefore concern the principles and rules by which you decide whether and how social phenomena can be known, and how the knowledge can be demonstrated” (Mason, 2002, p. 16). Epistemology, in other words, is about finding the kinds of knowledge that would indicate “how we know what we know” (Crotty, 1998, p. 8). In other words, it is the theoretical perspective. Al-Ababneh (2020) emphasizes three major types of epistemologies: “objectivism, constructionism, and subjectivism” (p. 77). While choosing a certain theoretical perspective as an epistemological approach, it is often important to make it consistent with the ontological assumptions, because epistemology itself is utilized to assist “you to generate knowledge and explanations about ontological components of the social world” (Mason, 2002, p.16). In the case of this thesis, this implies to choose an epistemological approach that would assist to explain the ontological assumption of relativism.

There are several different epistemologies that exist in social sciences each of which implies a certain ontological stance. One of them, mentioned above is objectivism. This position implies that social entities exist in reality and meanings are just there, in other words, human do not create meanings (Al-Ababneh, 2020). A “tree in the forest is a tree, regardless of whether anyone is aware of its existence or not...As an object of that kind (‘objectively’, therefore), it carries the intrinsic meaning of ‘tree-ness’” (Crotty, 1998, p. 8). As such, it is not about viewing the meanings as created by human beings, they discover the meanings (ibid) in this epistemological stance. There is also a constructionism type of epistemology that to put it straightforwardly, implies that meaning is constructed. According to Crotty (1998) “in this understanding of knowledge, it is clear that different people may construct different meaning in different ways, even in relation to the same phenomenon” (p. 9). Finally, the last of the mentioned epistemological types, is subjectivism which is usually confused with constructivism as Crotty (1998) argues. Crotty’s (1998) line of argument is that while constructivists create meaning out of something, that is, the object, subjectivists “create meaning out of nothing” (p. 9). Roughly speaking, a person may insist that the sky is black or it is in the bottom, and it is his or her subjective interpretation of the sky, however,

as Crotty (1998) puts it “we humans are not that creative...even in subjectivism we make meaning out of something” (p. 9). As it can be observed, in an example provided above, the descriptions that I have provided in relation to sky are again based on some knowledge of colours, positionings and so forth. It is, therefore, possible to merge constructivism and subjectivism in this sense. Both epistemological stances favour the hypothesis that human beings create meaning.

This thesis is attempting to implement subjectivism as an epistemological stance. Subjectivism is “the idea or views that social life is the product of social interactions and the beliefs of the social actors” (Bahari, 2010, p. 23). The relativist approach described earlier locates the regime of truth within those social interactions. The subjectivism in turn initiates a theoretical perspective defined as interpretivism. Blaikie (1993 in Crotty, 1998) describes it as “Interpretivism entails an ontology in which social reality is regarded as the product of processes by which social actors together negotiate the meanings for actions and situations” (p. 11). This approach emphasizes “culturally derived and historically situated” interpretations of the social world (Al-Ababneh, 2020, p. 80). It is different from positivism for instance, in a sense that it does not define the phenomenon without considering the social context of it. The phenomenon is interpreted through the social cultural context. For instance, as mentioned earlier, historically, liberalism was differently perceived in Russia than in the UK. If I define liberalism (and neoliberalism) outside the cultural context of both countries, then it contradicts the whole ontological assumptions of thesis that the reality is contingent upon time, place and the relations between people, in other words it is contingent upon situational or cultural power-knowledge nexus.

Concluding the notes on ontology and epistemology of the thesis, let us reinstate the chosen stances. The ontological perspective that I have chosen is based on Foucauldian description of the world, that is the reality is contingent upon the power-knowledge nexus existent in a society. In other words, it is relativist ontological assumption. This is supplemented by an epistemological stance of subjectivism, that is the theory of knowledge that explains how we know what we know. Finally, subjectivism initiated the interpretivist approach discussed earlier. Concluding the previous points, the study follows ontological and epistemological stances of Foucault that imply qualitative methodology because it is “grounded on interpretivist paradigm” (Al-Ababneh, 2020, p. 90). The following chapter is devoted to an explanation of the research methodology and methods.

Chapter 8: Research Methodology and Methods

As mentioned earlier ontological and epistemological stances imply a methodology which is qualitative. This methodology reflects the aims of this study which is to interpret the operation of power in HE of two countries through the ideas of Foucault. According to Mills (2014) “methodology determines how the researcher thinks about a study...methodology is the lens a researcher look through when deciding on the type of methods...” (p. 2). In other words, the qualitative methodology is used in this thesis primarily for two reasons. Firstly, it allows to answer the central research question, it allows to achieve “a best effect” (ibid, p. 2) and in addition to this, secondly, it reflects the ontological and epistemological stances described above.

It is necessary to consider that the adoption of ontological and epistemological stances of Foucault does not necessarily imply adoption of a certain research method. However, it does suggest a certain methodological approach. As Kendall and Wickham (2007) describe it, Foucault’s focus was on “how-questions” (p. 132), which is especially evident from Foucault’s elaboration and questioning of power operation. Consider the following elaboration of Foucault (1980) on power: “If power is exercised, what sort of exercise does it involve? In what does it consist? What is its mechanism?” (p. 89). As it can be observed, a great deal of attention is placed on how is power exercised. Considering this, it is indeed possible to argue that Foucault’s analysis is inclined towards qualitative methodology which seeks to interpret the discussed phenomenon. In addition to this, the fact that a regime of truth is a historically relative concept as described earlier also indicates to the qualitative methodology that seems to be applied by Foucault. In qualitative methodology “reality is subjective and multiple...” (Al-Ababneh, 2020, p. 86).

The qualitative approach is often criticized for being “lightweight because it involves small samples which may not be representative of the broader population, it is seen as not objective, and the results are assessed as biased by the researchers’ own experiences and opinions” (Hammarberg et al, 2015, p. 498). On the other hand, the supporters of qualitative methodology “exemplify a common belief that they can provide a ‘deeper’ understanding of social phenomena...” (Silverman, 2000, p. 8). In fact, it is, certainly, possible to find drawbacks and advantages of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies and it is the researcher’s responsibility to adopt a method that would answer the posed research questions in a most rigorous, fair, and effective way. Every research implies a certain kind of

intellectual puzzle. As Mason (2002) puts it “intellectual puzzles can and do take a variety of forms connected to ontological and epistemological positions encapsulated in the research...” (p. 18). There can be developmental, mechanical, comparative, causal-predictive puzzles and many more (ibid), but it is the researcher’s responsibility to choose a methodology that would reflect the proposed intellectual puzzle in a most productive way.

Following the points above, it is necessary to acknowledge that the adoption of Foucault’s ontological presuppositions does not imply the adoption of exactly the same methods that Foucault used. It can indeed be claimed that his approach was inclined towards qualitative approach however the research methods can and should be chosen by the researcher to answer the posed research questions. As such, “researchers-as-methodological-bricoleurs” (Denzin, Lincoln, 2005, p. 379) seems to describe the responsibility of the researcher in choosing the methods quite accurately.

As mentioned before the key question of this research is how is governmentality enacted in higher education of two different political regimes? In other words, I study the operation of power in HE of two different countries. The concept of power as well as other theoretical conceptualizations that are used in this research are derived from the ideas of Foucault. As mentioned before, a relativist ontology along with interpretivist epistemology have been adopted in this research. Furthermore, since this research requires an interpretation (how question), a qualitative approach is being implemented. Moreover, the question implies a comparative intellectual puzzle as its focus is on two different settings. This puzzle is about “what we can learn from comparing x and y, and how we can explain differences between them...” (Mason, 2002, p. 18). I argue that the comparative analysis of power operation through the lens of Foucault points out to the weaknesses and advantages of both types of governing in relation to HE that could be used for the benefit of students and academics in both countries.

Finally, there is a need to choose research methods that would reflect the illustrated philosophical stances. Initially this research planned to use a mixed-method design often described as triangulation (Saunders et al., 2009). As Al-Ababneh (2020) describes it “triangulation methodology is a multi-method research using more than one approach for collecting data in order to enhance confidence in results” (p. 88). The plan was to use the data from participant observations, interviews and from discourse analysis. The method of observation was required as the power-knowledge or practice-discourse implies the

observation of the practices in Russian and UK classrooms. However, first, COVID-19 pandemic and then the Russian military aggression in Ukraine prevented me from collecting data through observations. I will discuss this in detail in the section that covers participant observation method in this chapter. The second research method which is interviews, more precisely, in depth semi-structured interviews, was also considerably impacted by the mentioned events. Nevertheless, it was still possible to conduct interviews online. The third method, which is the discourse analysis, more accurately, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was conducted without any limitations in this research and covered the analysis of news articles published by the Departments of Education in both countries within the last three years (October 2019 – October 2022). In the next few paragraphs, I will explain the reasoning behind each method that was chosen and describe their relevance.

Participant Observation Method

The central aim of this research is to analyse power operation in HE in two different political settings through the Foucauldian interpretation of the concept of power. Foucault reformulated the notion of power and eventually brought the idea of governmentality, in which power is dispersed in a society through the combination of technologies of domination (or disciplinary techniques) and technologies of the self (see Chapter 4). As such, if one wants to study power through the Foucauldian interpretation of it, there is a need to analyse both technologies of domination and technologies of the self. The question is how to analyse both these aspects? Since, power-knowledge or practice-discourse is central to the concept of governmentality as well, the examination of its constituents should involve the analysis of both discourses and practices in both the technologies of domination and technologies of the self. Certainly, the most accurate way to achieve this would be a first-hand experience, that is, the direct personal observation of the relations between people, that is, the practices that exist between them, which in turn, could give me an idea on the existing discourses. In this context, the participant observation research method was chosen.

The method was chosen primarily to observe the practices between lecturers, students and the other staff at universities which could provide me the data on the dominant discourses and based on this I would be able to interpret the power relations that exist between them. In other words, this method had a great potential to come closer to an understanding of power operation because it provides a chance to observe the natural social setting in practice. As Kawulich (2005) puts it “participant observation is the process enabling researchers to learn

about the activities of the people under studies in the natural setting through observing...those practices” (p. 2). It provides a “written photograph of the situation under study” (ibid, p. 2). The direct observation of the activities as mentioned earlier, would play a substantial role in achieving a close understanding of power operation, because power is exercised through these activities, through the relations between people. Moreover, this method would permit to observe nonverbal expressions that are a considerable part of the interactions between people. The chance to observe these expressions could bring more understanding in the perception of people towards the practices and discourses that exist between them and as such, provide more clarity into an understanding of power operation. Sometimes, people reject to share their opinions verbally due to various reasons and prefer to express their reaction through nonverbal communication (Marshall, Rossman, 1995). This is, especially, important for the regimes such as in Russia that largely practices authoritarian rule of governing as people in these types of regimes, first, think of their safety (see Chapter 6) and as such, may choose to share their view on something through nonverbal communication (e.g., facial expression).

Following the lines above, the participant observation method is of dominant importance in this research as it allows to not only achieve a first-hand experience on discourse-practice nexus which is central to an understanding of power operation, but also, this method can provide intricacies between the relations of people that are not possible to get without a direct observation. The absence of this method in the context of this research, leads to a situation when the collected data on practices is of a secondary nature. Unfortunately, this was the case in this research as I was unable to travel to Russia to observe the practices existing in relations between people in HE. The planned fieldwork was initially postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and then it was completely cancelled due to the war in Ukraine that was launched by Russian military aggression in February of 2022. As such, there was no other way but to rely on the data that’s been collected through the other two research methods, namely in-depth semi-structured online interviews with lecturers only and CDA of the news articles published by the Departments of Education in both countries. As such, this research has been severely impacted by the absence of the method that is of paramount importance in achieving the first-hand data on power-knowledge nexus that is central to an understanding of power operation in a society. I had to proceed with the other methods which are described in the next two sections.

Semi-Structured Interviews

Following the same aim of obtaining the data on power-knowledge or practice-discourse nexus existing in higher education, the research's plan was to conduct interviews with administrative staff of universities, lecturers, and students in both countries. Initially, the plan was to focus on interviews only from two universities, namely, University of Glasgow in the UK and Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod in Russia. The aim was to demonstrate the differences and commonalities in power operation in two universities located in two different political settings and as such to demonstrate how control and discipline are imposed in them. The plan was to conduct interviews using the sampling frame that "includes all important groups for the topic under consideration..." (Rehm et al, 2021, p. 162) which would allow to speak of the accurate representativeness of the research (ibid). As mentioned earlier, these groups included: lecturers, administrative staff, and students. The choice behind focusing only on two universities was reasoned by the argument that "the pursuit for representativeness often requires the construction of very large samples which...may...necessarily be rather superficial..." (Mason, 2002, p. 126). By focusing on several universities across both countries, the risks of providing superficial analysis were increasing. Considering these points, it was important to choose representative sample but not to use the collected data to make generalizations and descriptive statements about the operation of power in a country overall.

Following the lines above, in the context of this research, this implies to choose people who play a crucial part in universities (administrative staff, lecturers and students), however the data collected from them should not be used to make descriptive statements about the situation with HE in the country overall. In other words, the collected data should be viewed as the initial point of contact, the findings of which could serve to find directions for further research. Considering the points above, only two universities were chosen with using the sample that could be as representative as possible for those two universities only: University of Glasgow in the UK and Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod in Russia. Prior to the war in Ukraine, University of Glasgow was partnering with Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod. In this sense, it was convenient to get access to the university located in Russia and conduct research about it. Moreover, is also possible to state that these universities are comparable in terms of being provincial universities, that is, not located in the capital cities of both states. This is especially important in the context of Russia. As demonstrated in the literature review on Russia (Chapter 6), there is an

asymmetry in terms of socio-economic development in Russia and cities such as for instance, Saint Petersburg or Moscow are often enjoying more democracy and better economic and social benefits than ordinary provincial cities such as Nizhny Novgorod. In addition to this, both University of Glasgow and Lobachevsky State University are also quite comparable in size, more accurately, in terms of the total number of students. As such, according to the HESA (2023) (Higher Education Statistics Agency in the UK), the number of students enrolled to University of Glasgow in 2021-2022 academic year is 42980. The number of students in Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod (2023) is 30000 in 2023. Nevertheless, as soon as this partnership was suspended by the University of Glasgow (2022) when Russia invaded Ukraine, the plan of comparing these two universities was cancelled.

It was impossible to travel to Russia to interview lecturers, administrative staff, and students at Lobachevsky State University. Moreover, the University of Glasgow has suspended any partnership with this and other universities in Russia due to the war in Ukraine. As such, I had to find people to conduct interviews online and with the help of my supervisors and it was preferable if these people would work at the same university and at the same time, represent different groups in this university. This was reasoned by the issue of representativeness discussed earlier. With the aim of resolving this problem we started to contact people at different universities across Russia through email and asking them to participate in an online interview. After numerous attempts we found lecturers, each of whom, however, work in different universities in Russia. As such, the risk of generalization became of primary importance to resolve along with the fact that interviews should have been conducted online which is not without its problems.

Unfortunately, I was unable to interview enough people from a single Russian university. Nevertheless, I was able to find seventeen individuals from different Russian universities and had to settle for this in light of the complications I faced. Then I looked for people in the UK in different universities, despite having much better access to people at the University of Glasgow. This decision was taken to try to align the two samples a little more and was a damage limitation exercise. As such, nine interviews were conducted with the lecturers at University of Glasgow and the remaining six were conducted in other universities across the UK. It is worth mentioning that I had to conduct interviews only with those people who accepted my invitation. In total, thirty-two in-depth semi-structured interviews were possible to conduct with lecturers in social and political sciences, fifteen from the UK and seventeen from Russia (see Table 1). Out of seventeen interviews conducted with Russian lecturers

seven have been conducted with the lecturers who are not currently in Russia but had previous experience of working in Russian universities. The information given by these seven lecturers who currently work in the UK universities was beneficial for this research as they experienced both HE systems and offer interesting insights into the comparative analysis. It is necessary to point out that all the challenges described above have substantially limited this research. Nevertheless, it was still possible to demonstrate the way power operates in HE of both countries with the help of data collected from the interviews. Along with this, it was possible to focus on lecturers' practices, their technologies of the self in a more detailed way. As such, a limited sample allowed an in-depth critical analysis of the technologies of the self of lecturers in both countries.

Table 1. Universities in which interviewed lecturers currently work

Russia	UK
Chelyabinsk State University	London South Bank University (4 interviews)
Irkutsk State University	Newcastle University
King's College London (also experience in Tyumen State University)	Queen Mary University of London
Moscow State University	University of Glasgow (9 interviews)
Perm National Research Polytechnic University	
Perm State University	
Tyumen State University (5 interviews)	
University of Glasgow (also experience in Lobachevsky University)	
University of Oxford (also experience in Perm National Research Polytechnic University)	
University of St Andrews (also experience in European University at Saint Petersburg)	
University of Warwick (also experience in Moscow State University)	
University of Warwick (also experience in Nizhny Novgorod State Technical University)	
University of Warwick (also experience in Perm State University)	

It also worth mentioning that the interviews were conducted only with the lecturers who work in the social and political sciences. In fact, this was the initial plan as well which is reasoned by the parsimony. In other words, it is easier to detect the operation of power in the social and political sciences rather than in other departments at universities, because the practice-discourse nexus is more common in it. I have decided to conduct interviews with the lecturers from Social and Political Sciences departments in both countries because the power that circulates in Social and Political Sciences departments closely correlates with the discourses promoted by the government. Foucault (in Martin et al.,1988) viewed these sciences as such because according to him, it is the product of political rationality. According to Foucault (in Martin et al.,1988), the school of social and political sciences is, in many ways, the product of political rationality that aimed at examining life problems of individuals so that it could adapt the political power in accordance with those problems. In other words, these sciences are the arm of political rationality to study the lives of individuals. To put it differently, “the increasing importance of life problems for political power” (Martin et al.,

1988, p. 161) has led to the emergence of social and political sciences that would point out to those problems. As Foucault (as cited in Martin et al., 1988) describes it “the emergence of social science cannot, as you see, be isolated from the rise of this new political rationality and from this new political technology” (p. 162).

It is also necessary to provide the reasoning behind choosing to focus on semi-structured type of interview. Since governmentality implies the combination of both technologies of domination and technologies of the self, the interviews required a certain structure even if it is partial. Otherwise, there was a risk of getting the data that could be hardly related to the technologies of domination and as such to the concept of governmentality and power operation overall. The technologies of domination that were analysed through CDA (discussed in the next section) have guided the structuring of the interviews. At the same time, it was important to leave a room for the respondents to elaborate on the topics they perceived as important, worth of paying attention, because it directly indicates to the technologies of the self and to the potential conflictual points between governmental disciplining and technologies of the self which is important to describe the operation of power.

As such, with an aim of providing a room to elaborate on the technologies of the self for the lecturers and at the same time keeping a general framework from the narratives of technologies of domination was crucial in achieving an understanding on governmentality and as such on power operation. This is possible in semi-structured interviews which are designed in this specific way, in which “the researcher sets the outline for the topics covered, but the interviewee’s responses determine the way, in which the interview is directed” (Stuckley, 2018, p. 57). The researcher was not providing any other framework apart from several questions that were constructed through the narratives of both governments. To a certain extent, this type of an interview can also be defined as a phenomenological interview where the interest is “in examining the lived experience” of the respondents (Roulston, Choi in Flick, 2013, p. 234). The examining of the experiences, as mentioned earlier, needed to be within a certain framework which has been provided by the Critical Discourse Analysis, which is the final research method applied by this study.

Critical Discourse Analysis

Before elaborating on the Critical Discourse Analysis that has been applied in this research as the method to examine the technologies of domination, it is necessary to point out to the difference that exists between Discourse Analysis (DA) and Critical Discourse Analysis

(CDA) and explain the reasoning behind choosing to focus on CDA and specifically, on the type, developed by Norman Fairclough. As such, there are numerous approaches to discourse analysis (DA) that may vary across different disciplines (Van Dijk, 1993; Taylor, 2013; Fairclough, 1995). Discourse analysis, basically speaking, is the study of the language material, the study of texts. It can be talk, written texts or even the analysis of pictures, films. The key to discourse analysis is the study of language (Taylor, 2013). Discourse analysis is the “close study of language and language use as evidence of aspects of society and social life” (Taylor, 2013, p. 8). The goals of discourse analysis (DA) as Fairclough (1995) describes it, are either “non-explanatory, or explanatory within ‘local limits’...the objective is to describe without explaining...” (p. 43).

Critical discourse analysis, on the other hand, has been developed to analyse the relations between the language material and other social elements such as “power relations, ideologies, institutions, social identities...” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 9). It is in this sense, CDA is engaged into a more “global explanatory goals” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 43). As such, CDA takes a more “explicit sociopolitical stance” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 252). CDA is involved into a “better understanding of relations between discourse and other elements of social life, including social relations (and relations of power) ...” (Fairclough, 2012, p. 78). It aims at analysing how discourse “cumulatively contributes to the reproduction of macro structures...” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 43). The key difference between DA and CDA is that the focus of CDA is on analysing the combination of discourse with power. This power that CDA is concerned with should be differentiated from the “legitimate and acceptable forms of power” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 255). In other words, its focus is not on judicial forms of power. With an aim of clarifying the possible confusion in understanding the meaning of power in the context of CDA, Van Dijk (1993) proposed the term ‘dominance’ that is “enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, among other strategies ways to change the mind of others in one’s own interests” (p. 254).

In other words, it is the form of power that aims to “naturalize the social order” through “subtle, routine, everyday forms of text and talk” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 254). To put it differently, it is the form of power referred by Foucault as the disciplinary or technologies of domination. The power that does not “rely on force, but on forms of knowledge that regulate populations by describing, defining, and delivering the forms of normality and educability” (Olssen, 1999, p. 29). In relation to government, this implies the promotion of various narratives, discourses the target of which is to naturalize the social order in

accordance with its interests. The central aim of CDA is to identify those discourses and to denaturalize them. As Fairclough (1995) describes it “the goals of critical discourse analysis are also therefore ‘denaturalizing’” (p. 36). Considering the points mentioned above, it is possible to claim that CDA is engaged in focusing on “the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 249). The relation between discourses and dominance is of critical importance in CDA. It aims at, first, identifying “elites...who have special access to discourse...literally the ones who have most to say” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 255), and secondly, to detect and denaturalize the discourses that these elites promote.

In the context of this research, CDA is implemented to identify and to denaturalize the governmental discourses in higher education in both countries with the aim of obtaining an understanding on the technologies of domination. It is necessary to remember, that the role of state in regulating and coordinating the power in a society was never ignored by Foucault even though it seems to be reasonable to claim that the attention he placed on the discourses that circulate in a society beyond the state were also important, especially in relation to the concept of governmentality (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, the existence of such a conceptualization as technologies of domination in the rhetoric of Foucault confirms the importance of the role of the state. As he puts it “the State is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth” (Foucault, 1980, p. 122). As such, it is possible to speak of the importance of technologies of domination or the role of state in its endeavours to regulate the society through the promotion of various discourses that aim at coordinating, regulating, normalizing the society. The CDA as the research method in this thesis precisely aims at identifying and denaturalizing the discourses promoted by both governments in relation to HE.

As stated earlier, this research used the critical discourse analysis method to identify the discourses promoted by both governments in relation to the area of higher education. More accurately, the news articles published by the Department of Education (DfE) in the UK and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in Russia (MSHE) were analysed using CDA. The period that CDA covered is three years, between October 2019 – October 2022. I found the articles on the official websites of these government organizations under section of ‘News and Communications’ on the website of the UK Department of Education and section of ‘News’ on the website of MSHE. I examined all the news articles related to higher

education on both websites that covered the period of three years. One hundred and seven articles were published in the UK and two hundred and fourteen articles were published in Russia. The approach to CDA that this research has implemented is derived from Norman Fairclough's ideas because Fairclough (1992) has added practical tools to analyse the existing discourses, spoken and written language. In fact, the CDA of Fairclough was developed as a response to the missing practical tools of analysing discourse that could be noticed in the works of Foucault. As Fairclough (1992) puts it "Foucault's analysis of discourse does not include discursive and linguistic analysis of real texts" (p. 56). The concern of Foucault as described in chapter 2 was to analyse the conditions, the rules that underlie discourse. In other words, Foucault was interested in the conditions of formation of a certain discourse. As Fairclough (2003) mentions "the analysis of discourse for Foucault is the analysis of the domain of 'statements' – that is, of texts, and of utterances as constituent elements of texts" (p. 123). Considering this, Fairclough added practical tools to analyse "the real instances of people doing or saying or writing things..." (Fairclough, 1992, p. 57).

Fairclough has developed a critical discourse analysis that's been influenced by and resemble the ideas of Foucault, however, as mentioned earlier, he introduced a practical guidance to analyse the real texts. Foucault's introduced tools to analyse the formation of discourses, or more accurately, the formation of meaning, which are: "relations of control over things, relations of action upon others, relations with oneself..." each of which intended to analyse "the axis of knowledge, the axis of power, the axis of ethics..." (Foucault, 1994, p. 318). The argument of Foucault was that the relation of control over things, that is, the axis of knowledge induces the next one which is the relations of action upon others (the axis of power) which, in turn, causes the relations with oneself (the axis of ethics) to emerge. It is unnecessary to dive into details of the described ideas of Foucault that form the meaning or the discourse, as the research's key focus is on the real existing discourses and not on their formation. However, it was necessary to mention it, because Fairclough (2003) has developed the three major types of meaning: "action, representation, identification" (p. 27) to analyse the real texts precisely on those foundations. As he notes "representation is to do with knowledge but also thereby 'control over things'; action is to generally with relations with others, but also 'action on others', and power. Identification is to do with relations with oneself, ethics, and the 'moral subject'" (Fairclough, 2003, p. 28).

This research proposes to analyse the discourses promoted by both governments through the prism of these three major types of text meaning developed by Fairclough (2003). The goal

of representation is straightforwardly to identify “what is represented...” in the text (Fairclough, 2003, p. 27). Action “implies a social relation...the relations between someone who has knowledge and opinions and someone who is eliciting them” (ibid, p. 27). Finally, identification is “an undertaking, a commitment, a judgement...” (ibid. 27). As such, representation, in the context of this research, is the knowledge or discourse itself narrated by the governments in the published news articles; identification is the degree of attention, commitment or judgement of government in relation to the discourse that it promotes. In addition, it is necessary to mention, that the act of government which is publishing an article is considered as an ‘action’ and skipped overall.

I suggest drawing more attention on the representation and identification types of text meaning only, because the first one illustrates the discourses that could be found and the second one examines the ways the articles perceive those discourses. It is of critical importance to identify which discourses are promoted by the governments in both countries and how they perceive those discourses as this combination indicates to the direction of technologies of domination, that is, to the direction of disciplining that the governments are taking in relation to their HE. Therefore, this research derived some of the most salient questions related to the identification type of text adopted by Fairclough (2003) that could assist to analyse the way governments in both countries identify, perceive the discourses they promote in HE. The questions are demonstrated in the Table 2 below.

Table 2. Fairclough (2003): Analysing Discourse: Textural analysis for social research

- 1) What social event, and what chain of social events, is the text a part of?
- 2) What social practice, or network of social practices can the events be referred to?
- 3) Is the text situated within a genre chain? Is the text characterized by a mix of genres? What genres does the text draw upon, and what are their characteristics?
- 4) Which (combination) of the following scenarios characterize the orientation to difference in the text?
 - a) An openness to, acceptance of, recognition of difference, an exploration of difference
 - b) An accentuation of difference, conflict, polemic, a struggle over meaning, norms, power
 - c) An attempt to resolve or overcome difference
 - d) A bracketing of difference, a focus on commonality, solidarity
 - e) Consensus, a normalization and acceptance of differences of power which brackets or suppresses differences of meaning and over norms
- 5) Of relevant other texts/voices, which are included, which are significantly excluded?
- 6) Where other voices are included? Are they attributed, and if so, specifically or non-specifically?
- 7) Are attributed voices directly reported (quoted), or indirectly reported?
- 8) How are other voices textured in relation to the authorial voice, and in relation to each other?
- 9) What existential, propositional, or value assumptions are made?
- 10) Is there a case for seeing any assumption as ideological?
- 11) What are the predominant semantic relations between sentences and clauses (causal – reason, consequence, purpose; conditional; temporal; additive; elaborative; contrastive/concessive)?
- 12) What are the predominant types of exchange (activity exchange, or knowledge exchange)?
- 13) What types of statements are there (statement of fact, predictions, hypotheticals, evaluations)?
- 14) Are there ‘metaphorical’ relations between types of statement?
- 15) What is the predominant grammatical mood? (declarative, interrogative, imperative)?
- 16) What discourses are drawn upon in the text, and how are they textured together? Is there a significant mixing of discourses?
- 17) What are the features that characterize the discourses?
- 18) What elements of represented social events are included or excluded, and which included elements are most salient?
- 19) How are social actors represented? (activated/passivated, personal/impersonal, named/classified, specific/generic)?
- 20) What do authors commit themselves to in terms of truth? Or in terms of obligation and necessity?
- 21) To what extent are modalities categorical (assertion, denial etc.)?
- 22) To what values (in terms of what is desirable or undesirable) do authors commit themselves?

Concluding this part on methodology of the work, it is necessary to mention that the research has been severely impacted by the events described earlier which resulted in substantial limitations. Nevertheless, two research methods were still applied (among which interviews were also negatively impacted) targeting the analysis of the technologies of the self and the technologies of domination in HE in both countries. The combined analysis of these two allowed me to speak of governmentality and as such of contemporary power operation in HE that is located in two different political settings. The research acknowledges the fact that limitations that occurred do not allow to speak of complete representativeness of the result, however, even without those limitations, complete representativeness would be impossible (at least because it is impossible to analyse the technologies of the self of each member of the HE). As mentioned before, the core aim of the thesis is to provide a snapshot of power operation in two different regimes in the area of Higher Education. This snapshot can serve as the point of contact for future academic endeavours in this direction. The focus of the following part of the thesis is on findings-analysis from the CDA in both countries that elaborates on technologies of domination in HE which will be followed by the findings-analysis from the conducted interviews that elaborates on that disciplining and analyses more the technologies of the self of the lecturers. All of this allow to demonstrate the way power operates in two different regimes and how governmentality is enacted in both countries' HE.

Part 4: Findings and Analysis

To understand the operation of power in a modern society (as Foucault views it), there is a need to identify the domain of its operation. As described in previous parts of the research, this domain is located within the concept referred by Foucault as governmentality. As he puts it: “We live in an era of a governmentality discovered in the eighteenth century” (Foucault, 2007, p. 144). It is necessary to mention that Foucault referred primarily to the societies in the West and defined governmentality as the neoliberal art of governing. In fact, governmentality can be referred to Russia as well which will be discussed later in findings (chapter 10 and 12) and have been discussed before as well (Chapter 6). Leaving this aside for now, the key point is that power operates in an age of governmentality. Governmentality is its domain. As mentioned before, there are two constituents of governmentality: technologies of domination and technologies of the self. Considering the mentioned points, it seems to be reasonable to claim that in order to understand how power operates in a modern society through the ideas of Foucault, there is a need to analyse the two constituents of its domain: technologies of domination and technologies of the self. These constituents form the domain of power operation in HE of both countries.

Following the lines above, the focus of the next chapter is on technologies of domination that have been examined through the critical discourse analysis of the published articles by both governments in relation to HE. The technologies of domination, sometimes referred by Foucault (1980) as technologies of power, aim to “determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject” (p. 18). As such, the CDA of the news articles published by the Departments of Education aims at identifying the discourses, the goal of which is to determine the conduct of individuals, submit them to certain ends or domination and to specifically objectify the subject. To put it differently, the goal of CDA is to identify the “regime of truth” (Foucault as cited in Rabinow, 1991, p. 72) of higher education as portrayed by both governments. That is, to detect “the types of discourses which it accepts and makes function as true” (ibid, pp. 72-73). The focus is on two questions: Which discourses are dominant in HE as portrayed by the UK Government? (Representation of CDA); How does the Government identify them? (Identification of CDA). The answers to the posed questions allow us to obtain an idea on the technologies of domination in two countries’ HE, which, as mentioned earlier, is one part of the domain of power operation. Before moving on to the detailed analysis of the news articles published by the UK Department of Education, it is necessary to state that the central ‘regime of truth’ (which initiates all the others) in relation to HE as portrayed by the government is neoliberalism. Whereas in Russia, the technologies of domination are inclined more towards

patriotism, more specifically to Slavophil patriotism despite having some neoliberal ideas in relation to HE as well.

Chapter 9: CDA of the news articles published by DfE in the UK

This chapter of the thesis is divided into four main sections, each of which is divided into two parts. One part focuses on representation type of text meaning, that is, it demonstrates what is represented in the texts and another one's focus is on identification type of text meaning the goal of which is to analyse the way those discourses are identified (or described, perceived) in the articles. The focus of this second part is to analyse the way the UK Government identifies, describes, or perceives the discourses detected in the previous section. The goal is to dive into the governmental descriptions of those discourses. For instance, the question of the following type is raised: What is the grammatical mood of the text of the Department of Education (DfE) that speaks of market and employers? The answer to such a question would indicate to the perception of the UK Government towards the represented discourse of neoliberal economy for instance. This section of identification is of critical importance because it clarifies the perceptions of the technologies of domination towards the represented discourses. While the first part demonstrates the regimes of truth that are the types of discourses which the UK Government "accepts and makes function as true" in relation to higher education (Foucault in Rabinow, 1991, pp. 72-73), the second part focuses on the way it perceives those types of discourses.

As such, the most relative questions on identification (see Table 2 in Chapter 8: Research Methodology and Methods) are selected to describe the way the UK Government identifies the discourses found in the first part of each section. It is necessary to keep in mind that some of the discourses are directly stated in the articles such as 'STEM subjects' or 'apprenticeship programs' while others have been found due to the use of specific terms that point to the existence of a particular discourse. For example, the articles do not explicitly discuss 'neoliberal economy' as the central regime of truth, however the terms such as 'market', 'employers', 'taxpayers' all indicate the existence of that discourse. In these cases, the questions of Fairclough (2003) are directed towards those terms. More precisely, if the article in context of HE discussed the term 'market' for instance, then it indicates to its perception towards viewing HE through the discourse of neoliberal economy. On the other hand, in the cases of direct statements of the discourses such as, for instance, 'STEM subjects', the task to identify the governmental perception towards this discourse is easier as it does not require

finding the relative terms that would indicate to the existence of such a discourse. The discourse itself is mentioned in the text.

The focus of the first section is to demonstrate the central regime of truth of HE as portrayed by the UK Government. This is the regime of neoliberal economy that is used by the UK Government to describe higher education. The section firstly illustrates what is represented in the articles, that is the discourse of neoliberal economy and secondly analyses the way the articles judge or assess (perceives, identifies) this discourse (Fairclough's *identification*: how does the UK Government identify the represented discourse?). The same line of analysis is applied in the following from it sections, each of which examines other key discourses that are initiated from this central regime of truth, most of which reinforce the discourse of neoliberal economy in HE as portrayed by the articles. The discourses are: 'students as consumers'; 'STEM subjects'; 'apprenticeship programs'. As such, the next section starts from demonstrating the central regime of truth, the central discourse, which is the discourse of neoliberal economy in HE.

Section 1: The central 'regime of truth' portrayed by the UK Government in relation to HE – The discourse of neoliberal economy

The major discourse or the regime of truth of higher education that can be noticed in the news articles published within the last three years (Oct 2019 – Oct 2022), is the portrayal of HE through the connection that's being made between HE and the economy, more accurately and crucially, with the neoliberal economy. In other words, there is a continuous attempt of the Department of Education to link higher education to neoliberal economic progress which is explicitly evident throughout the articles. One hundred and seven articles have been published in total that cover the topics of higher education, most of which facilitate the neoliberal narrative of viewing HE as the key tool to strengthen the wider economy. Perhaps, the most illustrative quotes that can be demonstrated in this respect are the following: "Universities and other higher education providers play a key role in the national economy" (DfE, 10.09.2020, Link 1, Table 3²); "We will not see growth in the economy if universities do not play their part" (DfE, 10.09.2020, Link 1, Table 3); "Bringing...education system closer to the employer market..." (DfE, 01.06.2021, Link 2, Table 3). These quotes directly represent higher education in terms of its connection to the economic prosperity. However,

² The links to all quotes from the Department of Education (DfE) are numbered respectively and available in Table 3 in Appendix 1.

and this is the key point worth of consideration, the established connection is the one that indicates to the placement of higher education onto the platform of neoliberal ideas because, roughly speaking, HE is invited (not forced) to play a central part in economy that is regulated not by the Government but by the market.

To clarify the previous lines, it is necessary to remember that neoliberalism aims to strengthen the economy of the state through non-judicial disciplining of institutions (and individuals overall) to participate and compete in a free market (not regulated by the government) (see Chapter 5). As it can be observed from the quotes, the UK Government does not explicitly enforce universities to play their part in strengthening economy, it invites them to do so. To put it differently, the UK Government attempts to indirectly “determine the conduct” (Foucault, 1980, p. 18) of higher education providers to incline it towards the strengthening of the economic welfare of the country, in neoliberal terms. The goal is to indirectly submit universities into the narratives of neoliberal ideas. This focus on establishing such a link in the UK can hardly be regarded as the new global phenomenon. As Radice (2013) describes it “in an increasingly competitive post-imperial international environment, higher education needed to be harnessed systematically to improving economic performance” (p. 411). However, the key point, is that the mentioned harnessing of higher education is intended to be indirectly brought into existence using the neoliberal ideology.

There are more quotes which confirm the governmental portrayal of HE through the discourse of neoliberal economy. “You are helping to create a dynamic economy” (DfE, 12.09.2019, Link 3, Table 3); “Now is the time for a new era in which our world leading sector will go from strength to strength. One with a focus on the individual, on skills, on rigorous academic standards and on outcomes to fill our productivity gap, fuel our economy and create opportunities” (DfE, 21.07.2020, Link 4, Table 3); and higher education “should be geared to real jobs and the actual skills needs of local employers and the economy” (DfE, 24.06.2021, Link 5, Table 3). As it can be noticed none of the mentioned quotes presupposes the direct judicial enforcement that would compel universities to be inclined towards connecting with the economy. Universities are only encouraged to be responsive to the demands of economy, but they are not compelled to act in this way. The connection is made using the narrative of neoliberalism.

In other words, the efforts to promote cooperation between higher education and economy are noticeable, but these are the efforts to orient universities towards operating for the benefits of economic welfare of the country in a neoliberal sense. To put it differently, the UK Government “expect universities...to be dynamic and responsive in order to meet broader socio-economic objectives” (Blackledge, 2021, p. 525). As such, it can be reinstated that the key type of discourse (representation) which the UK Government “accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault in Rabinow, 1991, p. 73) in relation to higher education is the narrative of neoliberal economy.

It is necessary to remember that this section aims to specifically demonstrate the neoliberal link that is being made by the UK Government between higher education and economy. The connection between higher education and economy can also be utilized through other ideologies unrelated to neoliberalism. For example, Soviet higher education, apart from “umbilical connection to the communist party ideology and Soviet autocracy” (Kuraev, 2015, p. 182) also aimed at serving the needs of the national economy (Kuraev, 2015). However, we cannot speak of neoliberalism as the portrayal of higher education by the Soviet Government. In other words, the link that is being made between higher education and economic prosperity should not necessarily imply the existence of neoliberalism. Why? The answer to the posed question has been already provided before in thesis (see Chapters 4 and 5) and can succinctly be articulated as the following: under neoliberalism the free market is “the organizing and regulating principle of the state” (Patton in Lemm & Vatter, 2014, p. 144). Considering this point and the elaboration made regarding the quotes from articles above, allow us to claim that, it is the economy, that is specifically neoliberal, that can be regarded as the key dominant discourse that the UK Government uses to portray higher education.

This subtext is noticeable in the demonstrated quotes because there is no word that could be defined as the direct governmental judicial enforcement of higher education providers to work for the strengthening of economy. In addition to this, the references to the market and employers that regulate the economy can also be noticed in the articles published by the Department of Education which only confirms the claim that the UK Government takes the ideology of neoliberalism for granted in relation to higher education. Consider the parts of the following quotes, for instance: “bringing...education system closer to the employer market...” (DfE, 01.06.2021, Link 2, Table 3); “more emphasis on the part time leaning that links with labour market...” (DfE, 21.07.2020, Link 4, Table 3); “stabilizing the labour

market...” (DfE, 15.11.2021, Link 6, Table 3); “employers expecting...” (DfE, 14.07.2020, Link 7, Table 3); “to acquire skills that are valued by employers...” (DfE, 26.05.2021, Link 8, Table 3).

As it can be observed, and perhaps, the first quote is the most illustrative in this context, such a statement as ‘the employer market’ in an article that is published by the Department of Education, directly implies the governmental portrayal of HE within the neoliberal economy discourse. As such, answering the first question adopted from Fairclough, which is, what is represented in the text, it is possible to answer it by pointing out to the discourse of neoliberal economy. It is the central regime of truth in relation to higher education as portrayed by the UK Government. The discourse of neoliberal economy is the prepotent discourse of the technologies of domination. In other words, the aim of the technologies of domination seems to be to initiate such a power operation in which the relations between people within higher education would be defined by this neoliberal narrative, more specifically, the one in which the discourses of market, employers dominate in power-knowledge nexus of Foucault. In other words, such a governmental disciplining is intended to promote power relations in HE that would prioritize those discourses related to neoliberal ideas. To take it to a more general level, the operation of a university in the UK would be defined by those promoted by the government discourses. For instance, in such conditions, a university adopts a rationale of entrepreneurial institution that leads to the emergence of managerialism in universities (see Chapter 5), which inevitably influences power relations within the university and consequently, on the technologies of the self of everyone at university (see Chapters 5, 11).

Continuing the lines on the neoliberal narratives of technologies of domination that could be identified in the articles, it is necessary to state that the representations of ‘market’, ‘employers’ already indicate to the existence of the discourse of neoliberal economy, however, it is also important to analyse the way these narratives are identified in the articles in order to confirm and clarify the governmental positioning of HE by neoliberal ideas. In other words, let us examine the way these representations are identified in the articles (Fairclough’s identification).

Sub-Section 1.1: The Identification of HE through neoliberal economy

It seems to be necessary to start analysing the way the UK Government identifies HE through the discourse of neoliberal economy from the following question: What is the predominant grammatical mood of the articles that include terms such as ‘market’, ‘employers’? Is it

declarative, interrogative or imperative? (Table 2 in Methodology). The answer to the posed question allows us to get an idea on the overall approach of the UK Government towards its attempt to connect the discourse of neoliberal economy with HE. As such, if we speak about the grammatical mood (Fairclough, 2003) of the articles that make references to ‘market’, ‘employers’, it seems to be reasonable to claim that these are more of declarative nature rather than of an interrogative or imperative. For instance, consider the following quote: “For our country to thrive and prosper with the highly skilled individuals that businesses need we must work with employers to tackle this gap...” (DfE, 16.11.2017, Link 9, Table 3). Certainly, there is nothing in the quote that questions (interrogative mood) the importance of linking higher education with employers’ needs. In addition to this, even though the quote uses an adverb of ‘must’, it should not, nevertheless, be interpreted as having an imperative mood, because the sentences that imply imperative mood are usually written using the exclamation mark for instance (Fairclough, 2003). As Fairclough (2003) mentions “imperatives are distinct in their grammatical form...” (p. 117). It is, therefore, the quote above should be interpreted as having a declarative mood in this context. The declarative grammatical mood and this is the crucial point, has the speech function of demand (ibid). Considering this assessment of the quote, it seems to be reasonable to claim that the UK Government identifies higher education as the sphere which ought to be in connection with the employers’ needs. It does not present any other alternatives, any other voices, it just presents it as the necessary approach. There are more quotes that all indicate to the existence of declarative mood that seems to demand higher education to adopt the discourse of neoliberal economy. Consider these ones, for example: “...bringing our skills and education system closer to the employer market” (DfE, 01.06.2021, Link 2, Table 3). “This includes working with employers...” (DfE, 14.07.2021, Link 10, Table 3); “My vision is for a system which learners and employers have true confidence in for providing the skills they need to succeed” (DfE, 10.09.2020, Link 1, Table 3).

In addition to the declarative mood, at times, the texts of the articles make propositional assumptions as well which provide grounds to argue that the UK Government attempts to redefine the purposes of universities. “Since 2004, there has been too much focus on getting students through the door, and not enough focus on how many drop out, or how many go on to graduate jobs. Too many have been misled by the expansion of popular sounding courses with no real demand from the labour market” (DfE, 01.07.2020, Link 11, Table 3). Firstly, this type of a statement proposes universities to be evaluative of the market first, that is of the jobs in demand. In addition to this, secondly, the text draws on the semantic relations

between sentences and clauses the focus of which is on consequences and purposes (Fairclough, 2003) of higher education, more precisely, of a university. As it can be observed from the quote, the text demonstrates the consequences of universities' actions of getting the students in who are unable to get the jobs after graduation because the fields they have chosen to study did not correspond to the demands of market. Considering this consequence, the text invites universities to redefine their purpose in accord with the demands of the market, first and foremost. As such, the orientation of the text is towards "recognition of a difference" (Fairclough, 2003, p. 41) that could be achieved with the redefinition of the purpose of universities. Considering these points, it is possible to describe the authors of the text as committing themselves (ibid) to the neoliberal regime of truth, because it portrays the purpose of universities as the one that should be primarily submitted to the demands of the market. Considering the previous points, at this point, it is possible to claim that the UK Government identifies higher education in connection with the discourse of neoliberal economy. The way the government identifies it, is declarative, demanding universities to be evaluative of the market first and foremost while using primarily the voices of students and employers only, which is an interesting point to discuss as well.

As such, while supporting the discourse of neoliberal ideas to be adopted by universities, the articles usually reason this by rereferring not only to the market and employers but to students as well. In fact, the voices of students are significantly included in texts as well (Fairclough, 2003). In other words, the articles give the impression that they report the issues primarily on behalf of students and employers only. For instance, let's examine the following quotes:

"True social mobility is when we put students and their needs and career ambitions first, be that in HE, FE or apprenticeships. Whatever path taken, I want it to lead to skilled, meaningful jobs, that fulfil their ambitions and improve their life earnings, whether that's as a teacher, an electrician, a plumber, a nurse or in business...and universities do need to do much, much more to ensure that all students – and particularly those from the most disadvantaged backgrounds – are recruited on to courses that will deliver good outcomes..." (DfE, 01.07.2020, Link 11, Table 3).

"One only has to look at the Guardian subject league table to see there are too many courses where well under 50% of students proceed to graduate employment... We have already announced that, over the next few years, we will be establishing a system of higher technical education where learners and employers can have confidence in high quality courses that provide the skills they need..." (DfE, 10.09.2020, Link 1, Table 3).

As it can be observed, the voices of students are put as the primary ones that the UK Government calls universities to prioritise along with the demands of employers. There are several implications and questions that arise from the quotes above in relation to the operation of power in a university. Firstly, of relevant other voices that could be mentioned, the voices of academics in this context are significantly excluded from the quote. The question is shouldn't academics be prioritized as well? What roles should academics take? Is it about "working to fulfil traditional institutional aims" or about "working at a pace and in ways to suit professional bodies and employers"? (Martin et al., 2020, p. 526). In addition to this, when it comes to the attention on students, how is the aim of putting the needs and ambitions of students first regardless of the subjects they decide to study, correspond to the primary support of higher technical education? Finally, and this is the important point to consider as well, the narrative of placing students' aims and ambitions as priorities has its consequences on the emergence of the 'students as consumers' discourse which will be discussed later in the thesis (Section 2).

To better understand the effects of this governmental prioritization of students on power operation in HE, there is a need to discuss the above raised questions one by one. As such, firstly, as it has been mentioned, the voices of academics are significantly excluded from the quotes. This absence of "intertextuality" (p.197) as Fairclough (2003) would describe it, triggers a propositional assumption that academics are of secondary importance in a discussion of values of higher education in this specific context. As it can be noticed, the voices of academics were excluded "from the debate itself" (Fairclough, 2003, p. 197). As such, it seems to be possible to argue that the technologies of domination in the UK initiate a particular power operation in HE that in response to the prioritising of students and employers by the Government, may have provided little room for the academics' technologies of the self. Moreover, this leads to a construction of relations between students and academics in which students would take a role of the dominator. Regarding the former (academics technologies of the self), issues such as stress and anxiety may occur as the key feelings that academics experience in such conditions. They are "being subject to continual pressures from the perceptions of others..." (Martin et al, 2020, p. 532). Regarding the latter, it is worth remembering the argument of Hager and Peyrefitte (2021) on the way students' satisfactions with the course have started to play a critical role in assessing the success of teaching. In other words, the prioritization of students by the government, which is evident from the quotes demonstrated above, can result in "strategic reversibility of power relations" (Olssen, 1999, p. 30) in HE. The support of primarily students by the technologies of

domination results in a specific power relation in HE. In other words, power-knowledge nexus in HE is being affected by such a governmental prioritization. This is an illustration of how the way the UK Government identifies students may have a negative effect on power relations within university.

The second point that it is also initiated by the way the technologies of domination perceive higher education, is the contradiction that is observable in the statements of articles demonstrated above. As mentioned earlier there is demonstration of support to ensure that every students' choice of subject leads to a job, but at the same, there is another statement that is inclined towards supporting only a specific field of study. As such, it is not clarified if the authors commit themselves to the first aim or to the second, because keeping two of these aims at the same time seems to be unachievable. In other words, these aims are incompatible with each other. Using the terminology of Fairclough (2003), in this context, it is possible to argue that the quotes demonstrated above accentuate "a struggle over norms" (p. 117). What is the norm in other words? Should the society consider as the norm that the government's support is towards ensuring that every subject choice leads to a job, or should it consider that the norm is to apply for technical subjects as it is also prioritized by the government?

What is clear, nevertheless, is that the technologies of domination are inclined towards promoting neoliberal values, because all the narratives discussed such as students' choices of subject, the prioritized field of study, are all identified in association with the market in the above demonstrated quotes. As such, it seems to be possible to claim that the UK Government demands higher education to be evaluative of market and students' choices first and foremost, which as illustrated earlier implies a certain type of power relations in higher education. Finally, and this will be discussed in the following sections, the attention on students and market that could be noticed in the articles also initiate a discourse of 'students as consumers', which again implies a redefinition of power operation in HE.

Section 2: The discourse of students as consumers

The discourse of students as consumers is certainly among the ones that is constantly presented in the articles as well, which not only initiates a specific relationship between students and HE but overall reinforces the discourse of neoliberal economy described above. The articles continuously use the words such as 'value for money', 'well spent money', 'course money', 'taxpayers' in relation to students, all of which indicate to the placement of

students into the framework of consumerism in higher education. For instance, let us consider the following quotes: “How else can we guarantee that students get the best possible experience from their studies... which also represent good value for money?” (DfE, 09.09.2021, Link 12, Table 3); “This is clearly not providing the kind of outcomes that students and taxpayers would expect” (DfE, 24.06.2021, Link 5, Table 3); “...not all students will be able to say at the end of their course that that was time and money that was well spent” (DfE, 24.06.2021, Link 5, Table 3,); “This is taxpayers money. This is students’ money” (DfE, 12.09.2019, Link 3, Table 3).

The references to students as the taxpayers, to the money that they spent in HE all indicate to the certain relationship between students and higher education promoted by the UK Government. The relationship that is based on predominant neoliberal discourse within which higher education in the UK is placed. As such, not only, this representation causes “a more stringent consumerist set of demands” (Tomlinson, 2015, p. 577) from students (see Chapter 5), but also strengthens the neoliberal positioning of higher education in the country. There is an ongoing subjectification of higher education and consequently, everyone who has any relations with higher education (in this case, students) are also submitted into the narrative of neoliberal ideas by the UK Government. Considering the short quotes above along with, for instance, this one: “I look forward to working with you to ensure that we have a joined up post-18 education system that...provides value for money for students and for taxpayers” (DfE, 12.09.2019, Link 3, Table 3) permits us to define the inclination of articles towards producing the discourse of students as consumers which strengthens the central regime of truth, the regime that promotes neoliberal values. The discourse of ‘students as consumers’ can be recognised as the one that the UK Government “accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault in Rabinow, 1991, pp. 72-73) which reinforces the neoliberal portrayal of HE by the government. As such, when we speak of the technologies of domination in relation to higher education in the UK, it is possible to claim that they are heavily inclined towards the promotion of neoliberal ideas that is reinforced by the discourse of students as consumers.

Sub-Section 2.1: The identification of students as consumers

Continuing the topic on students that are constantly mentioned in the articles, it is necessary to describe the way they are identified as consumers. In the previous section the focus was on what is represented, which is the discourse of students as consumers, this section, on the

other hand, is devoted to demonstrating the way this discourse is being brought into existence by the manner the government uses to identify students in the articles. Referring to the questions posed by Fairclough, more specifically, to the one that asks to choose the scenarios that characterize the orientation of the texts, it is necessary to mention that most of the articles identify students in association with various economic issues (incentives, loans etc.). The orientation of texts is, for instance, towards resolving the problems that arise with loans. The texts usually accentuate solidarity with students' economic issues in HE. For instance:

“Under the current system, more people than ever are going to university but too often, students are racking up debt for low-quality courses that do not lead to a graduate job with a good wage...The government is today taking action to tackle the problem head-on, rather than passing the problem on to future generations...” (DfE, 24.02.2022, Link 13, Table 3).

“We need students to have confidence that the investment they make in their education is fair and supports the system that benefits them” (DfE, 24.02.2022, Link 14, Table 3).

As it can be observed the students are usually associated with the issues related to economy, which is reasonable to some degree as students need to pay tuition fees in the UK (See Chapter 5). However, the key point is that the constant identification of students primarily in association with loans, taxes, fees, initiates the discourse of students as consumers which consequently reinforces the neoliberal framework of higher education in the UK. To use the terminology of Fairclough (2003), the overall genre of the texts is neoliberal. Moreover, this genre of the text can also be defined as ideological. As Fairclough (2003) notes “ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation” (p. 218). In this context the identification of students with the aspects related to economy maintain the neoliberal relations of power promoted by the government in relation to HE. In addition to this, this type of referral to students, inevitably reinforces the students' behaviour which as discussed earlier in the thesis adopts consumerist characteristics towards higher education.

Furthermore, the articles while associating students with the economic issues often uses the terms such as “fairer” (DfE, 24.02.2022, Link 13, Table 3), “best outcomes” (DfE, 24.02.2022, Link 13, Table 3), “good value for money” (DfE, 09.09.2021, Link 12, Table 3), “to extract absolute maximum out of their time in education” (DfE, 12.09.2019, Link 3, Table 3). It is necessary to point out to the fact that all these claims are mentioned within the framework of neoliberal ideas. For instance, regarding the ‘fairer system’ the text says:

“student finance will be put on a more sustainable footing by ensuring more students are paying back their loan in full...” (DfE, 24.02.2022, Link 13, Table 3). As such, ‘fairer’ system is understood in this specific context, the context that aims at regulating the relationship between students and higher education in economic terms, more specifically, in the context of neoliberal ideas. In other words, the technologies of domination impact the relations between students and higher education providers in such a way that the discourse of ‘fair system’ would be primarily understood in terms of economy. To put it differently, the attempt is to determine the relationship between students and higher education within which the discourse of an ‘economically fair system’ would dominate. To use Foucault’s terminology, the power-knowledge (or practice-discourse) nexus would be impacted by this discourse. Considering the previous points, it can be claimed that the way the technologies of domination portrays students firstly, initiates a consumerist behaviour from students in relation to HE, more generally, it causes the discourse of students as consumers to emerge, which consequently reinforces the central discourse of neoliberal ideas in HE primarily promoted by the UK Government. As such, HE is regulated in such a way by the technologies of domination that it is inclined towards promoting power relations between students and higher education providers primarily in economic terms.

Section 3: The Discourse of STEM subjects

With respect to the discourses that consolidate the central neoliberal ‘regime of truth’ of higher education, it is also necessary to discuss the STEM subjects that are often mentioned in the articles published by the Department of Education. The focus on technical education is noticeable in the articles, that is, on the subjects referred to as STEM (science, technology, engineering and maths). The following quotes are representative in this context: “...higher technical skills will support more people to secure exciting and rewarding careers, fill skills gaps in our economy” (DfE, 11.06.2021, Link 15, Table 3); “to drive an increase and innovation and encourage STEM subject take up” (DfE, 30.07.2020, Link 16, Table 3); “...key subjects like STEM” (DfE, 13.10.2021, Link 17, Table 3). The support of STEM is again linked to the demands of employers, that is to the demands of market. The emphasis is on “providing employers with the skilled workforce they need” (DfE, 13.10.2021, Link 17, Table 3) and the skilled workforce is STEM specialists that are regarded by the Government as “vital” (DfE, 30.07.2020, Link 16, Table 3). I will speak of this identification of STEM discourse by the Government later in the next short section, however at this point, it is important to note that STEM discourse is prevalent in the governmental portrayal of

higher education as well and reasoned by the “market subjectivity” (Varman et al, 2011, p. 1167), that is, by the subjectivity that is not regulated by the government but by the employers. As such, it is possible to state that the discourse of STEM is another prevalent one that can be noticed in the articles which again reinforces the neoliberal portrayal of higher education. In other words, governmental support of STEM is another dominant type of discourse that can be observed in articles. Along these lines, it can also be claimed that the UK Government attempts to use it to “determine the conduct” (Foucault, 1980, p. 18) of higher education providers in accordance with the central regime of truth, that is with the discourse of neoliberal economy. The conduct which would be inclined towards the accentuation (Fairclough, 2003) of STEM subjects in HE.

It is also worth mentioning that the STEM related articles, at times, provide the opinions of representatives of private businesses on the importance of these subjects in higher education. For instance, the following are the word of Julian David, techUK CEO: “Such courses provide flexible, affordable and effective routes for learners to acquire skills that are valued by the employers which is crucial as we continue to support people into secure, resilient jobs” (DfE, 26.05.2021, Link 8, Table 3). In this context it is possible to speak of the “intertextuality” within the articles, that is the “presence of actual elements of other texts within a text” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 39). It is necessary to remember that these types of quotes are published in relation to higher education and in fact, are external to the primary affairs of higher education, because supposedly, a university should be aimed at dissemination of universal knowledge (De Campos, 2015). Nevertheless, these references highlight specifically STEM subjects which orients the text towards focusing on the importance of STEM subjects in HE even to a greater extent. The intertextualities are usually made to accentuate a value assumption made in the articles (Fairclough, 2003). In this context the value assumption of the texts is towards demonstrating an importance of STEM subjects in HE. The subjects in turn, are important as portrayed by articles because they fill the gaps in the market and provide a skilled workforce to the employers. Again, the link to neoliberal portrayal of HE by the government is quite straightforward.

Sub-Section 3.1: The identification of STEM subjects

With the aim of clarifying the way the articles on STEM reinforce the neoliberal regime of truth in HE, it is also necessary to draw attention on some of the associations that are made in texts regarding STEM. The STEM subjects are often described in the articles in

connections with the words such as “vital” (DfE, 30.07.2020, Link 16, Table 3), “key” (DfE, 13.10.2021, Link 17, Table 3), “shortages” (DfE, 17.12.2021, Link 18, Table 3), “overhaul” (DfE, 14.07.2020, Link 7, Table 3), “important” (DfE, 25.08.2021, Link 19, Table 3). These types of terms are mentioned in the articles to demonstrate the importance of the STEM subject area, but they are portrayed as important not for students but for the economy, which once again indicates to the discourse of neoliberal ideas in HE of the UK. For instance, the following quotes seem to be most illustrative in this context: “the higher technical STEM skills...the economy need” (DfE, 08.10.2020, Link 20, Table 3); “subjects vital for economic growth including STEM...” (DfE, 15.07.2022, Link 21, Table 3). By looking at these quotes, one might reasonably ask if higher education is only operating for the benefits of economic growth of the country? As such, with respect to the way the UK Government identifies the STEM subjects, it can be reinstated that they are also used to direct universities towards operating within a market-driven economy (Hammesly-Fletcher, Qualter, 2009). It is possible to observe the “normalization over norms” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 141) in the governmental portrayal of HE. The norms of HE which should prioritize the development of STEM subjects. The grammatical mood of the quotes mentioned above is demanding as there are terms such as ‘the economy need’. As such, both in regard to students as well as in regards to STEM subjects, the authors of the articles commit themselves towards creating a regime of truth that fits into the narrative of neoliberal ideas promoted by the Government in relation to HE.

It is also interesting to observe how the governmental support of technical subjects, in other words, the discourse of STEM is being reflected in the society. As such, the number of people who apply to study STEM subjects at universities across the UK, especially undergraduates, has slightly increased since 2010 (Hoyle, 2016, p. 7). However, students who choose to study STEM subjects are mostly of an international background, whereas the number of students from the UK is making a small portion of that increase (Gatsby Foundation, 2020). Nevertheless, the number of students from the UK applying for STEM subjects has indeed increased and this increase is considerably higher than the increase in all other subjects which is 8.9% (Gatsby Foundation, 2020). This is an interesting point to consider because it indicates to the relationship between the technologies of domination and the technologies of the self both of which affect the power operation. In the context of STEM discourse, it is noticeable how the aim of technologies of domination to “determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends...” (Foucault, 1980, p. 18) is being realized in the technologies of the self. Without going too far from the topic, it is necessary

to reinstate that the discourse of STEM is being continuously mentioned in the articles published by the Department of Education which as mentioned earlier seems to reinforce the central regime of truth of higher education as portrayed by the UK Government, the regime of neoliberal ideas.

Section 4: The discourse of apprenticeships

Another topic that is being constantly mentioned in the articles is the theme of apprenticeships. To use the terminology of Fairclough, the topic of apprenticeships is the one that is often represented in the texts. A considerable focus on apprenticeships again provokes the neoliberal narratives the government uses to portray HE, because as it will be demonstrated, the focus on apprenticeship in HE is again initiated with the market related issues. Apprenticeship is the system “which requires business involvement in skill development” (Benassi et al, 2021, p. 377). It is the model that encourages employers and universities to take part in the development of specific skills that are in demand in the market (Blackledge, 2012). It is useful to demonstrate couple of quotes that seem to clarify the apprenticeship strategy of the UK Government: “it builds on the extensive action already underway to protect, support and create more jobs while bringing our skills and education system closer to the employer market...” (DfE, 01.06.2021, Link 2, Table 3); “...more high quality training alternatives for people, empowering them to get skills they need to build the life they want, wherever they live” (DfE, 11.06.2021, Link 15, Table 3). As it can be observed, the UK Government expects universities to get involved into the collaboration with different industries in the market. It should be once again emphasized that universities are not coerced to participate in these programs, however they are invited to do so, which takes us back to the argument that in neoliberal regimes, institutions are self-governing entities and cannot be forced to act in a certain way by the government. Nevertheless, the attempt to discipline HE in accordance with apprenticeship can indeed be observed which is discussed in more-depth in the following section.

Sub-Section 4.1: The Identification of apprenticeships

It is worth mentioning that apprenticeship program on its own is not something that should be analysed in this paper. That is, it is not about examining the benefits or drawbacks of it. What is of crucial importance is that the program of apprenticeship is mentioned in association with higher education. In fact, the program has been developed in 2015 and aimed at establishing a system which would allow businesses and universities to cooperate

and provide students the opportunity to “combine both the academic study from a traditional university degree with the practical experience and wider employment skills vital for career success” (DfE, 12.03.2015, Link 22, Table 3). It is necessary to remember that this quote largely reflects on the issue of employability skills that is been discussed in the literature review (Part 2). Succi and Canovi (2020), for instance, claimed that universities and employers “operate in parallel universes” (p. 1837). The apprenticeship program can be defined as the response of the Government to the argument mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, without going too far away from the topic, it is necessary to state that the support of apprenticeship programs by the government initiates power relations between universities and businesses within which businesses seem to have a role of the dominator as the following few paragraphs will demonstrate.

Following the lines above, the terms such as “critical role” (DfE, 29.06.2022, Link 23, Table 3), “quickly” (DfE, 08.02.2021, Link 24, Table 3), “within 6 months” (DfE, 08.02.2021, Link 24, Table 3), “flexible” (DfE, 10.02.2022, Link 25, Table 3), “placements” (DfE, 10.02.2022, Link 25, Table 3), “cash incentives for employers” (DfE, 10.02.2022, Link 25, Table 3), “build future workforce” (DfE, 07.02.2022, Link 26, Table 3) are all used in the articles to describe the program of apprenticeship. In fact, such an identification reminds us of the McDonaldization theory developed by Ritzer (2014), the key idea of which is revolving around the relationship that’s been constructed between consumers and producers in a modern society. Ritzer (2014) identified four key factors that characterize this relationship, which are: efficiency, calculability, predictability and control. These four factors, as Ritzer (2014) argues that were initially developed for the fast-food restaurants started to dominate different aspects of social life as well including education (ibid). It is interesting to observe the existence of all these factors in apprenticeship programs. The program, as mentioned above, is usually described as being quick (efficiency), ensuring job placements (predictability), controlled by the government and calculable by the government as well. In fact, apprenticeship programs in the context of the Ritzer’s theory can be described as the McDonalds of government. The aim is to deliver the “skilled workforce” (DfE, 10.02.2022, Link 25, Table 3; 29.06.2022, Link 23, Table 3) to the market through apprenticeships. Universities on the other hand are encouraged take part in the development of specific skills through the partnerships with apprenticeship programs (Blackledge, 2012). In other words, there is an attempt to discipline universities into the partnership with businesses. Moreover, and this is an important point to consider, the power relations between universities and businesses, considering the support of apprenticeships by the government,

are to be controlled more by businesses than by universities. In other words, businesses are placed into a leading position in the relations with universities, because the government heavily supports the program of apprenticeship. Perhaps, the most illustrative quote on the value of apprenticeship in education overall for the Government is the following:

“Degree apprenticeship are another good example of that sort of partnership and demonstrate how the different parts of the education and skills system can come together to offer new opportunities and support a more productive economy” (DfE, 24.02.2022, Link 13, Table 3).

Considering the discussion on apprenticeships through the lens of McDonaldization theory and the incentive of government to identify education by favouring partnership with apprenticeship, it might also be claimed that ideally the UK Government expects universities to be delivering the same productivity as delivered by the apprenticeship. That is the productivity which enables an economic growth. Nevertheless, what is certain is that authors of the articles commit themselves to a certain regime of truth that favours the combination of apprenticeship programs with education. This discourse reinforces the central neoliberal regime of truth of HE as portrayed by the government, because it is again inclined towards the support of employers, market, businesses and of economic welfare of the country overall.

Conclusion

This section of the findings from CDA aimed at identifying the key discourses that could be observed in the articles published by the Department of Education in the UK and to describe the way the articles identify those discourses. The goal was to understand the points of direction of technologies of domination in the UK in relation to higher education in the country. These technologies of domination, as described earlier, attempt to regulate power operation in a society in accordance with its preferences. The identified points of direction of technologies of domination in the UK in relation to higher education are the following: neoliberal economy, students as consumers, apprenticeship programs, STEM subjects. These are the dominant discourses or as Fairclough (2003) would put it, key representations that could be detected in the articles.

Considering all the discourses discussed earlier, it is possible to claim that the governmental portrayal of higher education in the UK is inclined towards placing it onto the platform of neoliberal ideas that, consequently, identifies higher education providers (and people who

have any relationship with them: students, academics) as self-governing entities that are subjected primarily to the rules of market. Based on this, it is possible to claim that the technologies of dominations in the UK attempt to submit higher education to create a citizen who would understand their role in society as an economic labourer first and foremost (*homo-economicus*). Following Foucault, in this context, it can be claimed that power seems to produce precisely this type of a subject mentioned before. Power “produces reality, it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Olssen, 1999, p. 20). On a more general level, it can be argued that the technologies of domination produce the reality, domain of objects and the ritual of truth that is inclined towards promoting neoliberal values in HE. This implies a specific rationale of government that portrays the HE, more precisely, students as the resource to use for the development of the economic welfare of the country (Danaher et al., 2000).

The discourses that could be found in the articles indicate to that conclusion as the focus is on portraying HE through its usefulness to the market. As mentioned before, it is necessary to keep in mind, that the technologies of domination do not invent the promoted discourses. They coordinate the discourses that already revolve in a society. However, this coordination, in turn, depends on governmental preferences. The government chooses the discourses that it wants to promote and submit a society (in our case, HE and students and academics) to it to a greater extent. For example, there is a discourse of ‘British nationalism’ in the UK as well (Vines, 2015) or any other discourse, however it is up to the government, to the technologies of domination to either promote them in HE or not. As such, in the case of HE, the promoted discourses of technologies of domination to portray higher education and to determine the conduct of it (as well as of students and academics) are the discourses of neoliberal nature discussed in the previous section. The discourses of neoliberal economy, students as consumers, apprenticeship programs, STEM subjects are all promoted by the government to portray HE as it is evident from the articles. These discourses were chosen by the government in accordance with their preferences, the aim of which is “to determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject” (Foucault, 1980, p. 18).

Concluding this section, the key point to remember, is that despite the fact, that the discourses promoted by the government in HE are not invented by it and already revolve in a society, the government (or the technologies of domination) still chooses some of the existing discourses and certainly attempts to determine the conduct of individuals (students

and academics) and entities (universities) in accordance with them. In other words, the technologies of domination have a great influence on power relations in a society, in our case in higher education. In the case of the impact of technologies of domination on HE in the UK, it is possible to speak of attempt to submit higher education to the rule of market. The focus of the next chapter is on the CDA of Russian articles which in fact have some similarities with the narratives of technologies of domination in the UK towards HE as there is also a certain attention on neoliberal economy, however, there seems to be more attention placed on Slavophil patriotism as well.

Chapter 10: The CDA of news articles published by MSHE in Russia

Following the same logic demonstrated in the previous chapter on the CDA in the UK, in order to understand the way power operates in Russian higher education, it is necessary to analyse both technologies of domination and technologies of the self which together indicate to the way power operates in HE and how governmentality is enacted in it. This chapter's focus is on technologies of domination in Russia in relation to HE which is studied through CDA of articles published by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MSHE). A very straightforward logic is applied here as it was in the case with the CDA of the UK articles. Articles are published by MSHE, that is by the government, which means that the dominant discourses of these articles are the discourses that are promoted by the technologies of domination in association with higher education. In other words, these are the discourses that the Russian Government uses to submit higher education (and everyone working or studying at them) to.

This analysis allows us to get an idea on the direction of governmental disciplining in Russia towards higher education. As mentioned in the previous section, it is necessary to remember that the discourses that could be identified in the articles aimed at determining the conduct of individuals and higher education providers, are not invented by the government. These are "the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true" (Foucault as cited in Rabinow, 1991, pp. 72-73). It accepts and makes function, but not invents. "State is superstructural" (Foucault, 1980, p. 122), it coordinates the society in accordance with the discourses that already exist in it. It chooses certain discourses and ignores others in accordance with its understanding of what it accepts as 'truth'. Nevertheless, the state, is still certainly important and reflected by the concept of technologies of domination by Foucault. Basically speaking, technologies of domination choose discourses to dominate the society

with. Technologies of domination attempt to determine the conduct of individuals in accordance with those selected (or chosen) types of discourses which “it accepts and makes function as true” (ibid, pp. 72-73).

With respect to the CDA of the articles published by MSHE in Russia, the aim is to understand which discourses the government uses to submit higher education to. As it was in the case with the CDA of the articles in the UK, this chapter is also divided into several sections, more precisely, into three, each of which is divided into two parts, one focusing on representation, that is, what is represented in the articles, and the other one, on identification, that is, how this representation is identified in the article. The first section is devoted to the demonstration of the discourse of ‘patriotic upbringing’ often used in the articles published by MSHE. The second section is on another discourse which is also evident in the articles, which is ‘hard sciences’ heavily promoted in the published articles. The third and the final section is about the discourse of ‘student communities’. It is necessary to mention that all the three promoted discourses by the Russian Government are heavily inclined towards determining higher education under the ideas of Slavophilism, at heart of which is the demonstration of uniqueness of Russian nation, history, military, religion (see Chapter 6). Nevertheless, the echoes of neoliberal ideas are also evident in the articles, specifically in relation to the second promoted discourse which is ‘hard sciences’. While promoting this discourse, articles, also, refer to the benefits of it for the economy and market. As such, it becomes possible to speak of governmentality in Russian HE as well. Nevertheless, even within this discourse, the narratives of Slavophilism are evident as these sciences are promoted by the Government in HE also due to its usefulness in increasing the military capacity of Russia which as it will be demonstrated largely reflects the narratives of Slavophilism. The following section starts from analysing the discourse of ‘patriotic upbringing’.

Section 1: The discourse of patriotic upbringing

The MSHE has published eighty-six articles in total on the topic of patriotic upbringing that cover the period from October 2019 until October 2022. Before demonstrating some of the quotes that are represented in the articles in relation to this discourse of patriotic upbringing, it is necessary to remind ourselves what is to be understood by this concept. Firstly, it is worth mentioning that patriotism in Russia implies the preservation and remembrance of the key features of Russian culture. These features include the attention on the figure of the ruler,

Russian uniqueness, wholeness, history, missionary ideology, religion (ROC) which can all be placed under the umbrella of Slavophilism. To put it another way, to be patriot in Russia primarily implies to be loyal to those key aspects mentioned earlier. Upbringing (*‘vospitanie’* in Russian language), on the other hand, is the education of a correct thinking about the world and cultivation of a correct behaviour in a society. Upbringing can take various forms such as moral upbringing for instance, that was largely cultivated in Soviet time (education of communism). It can also imply patriotic upbringing which can be defined as the education of patriotism (see Chapter 6 for more detailed discussion on the topic of patriotism and patriotic upbringing). In contemporary Russian higher education, as it will be demonstrated later in this section, patriotic upbringing implies education of correct patriotism that implies the cultivation of factors related to Slavophilism described above. This is precisely, what is happening in contemporary Russian higher education. More accurately, this discourse of patriotic upbringing is what the technologies of domination (the Government of Russia in the name of MSHE) use in the articles as one of the dominant discourses and attempt to submit higher education to. In other words, the Russian Government constantly connects higher education to patriotic upbringing. This can be observed in the articles published in MSHE.

Following the lines above, patriotic upbringing is the type of discourse that articles on higher education “accept and makes function as true” (Foucault in Rabinow, 1991, p. 72-73). The articles constantly refer to the discourse of patriotic upbringing. The attempt is to submit higher education “to the certain ends” (Foucault, 1980, p. 122), to the ends of patriotic upbringing. As mentioned earlier, there are eighty-six articles in total on the topic of patriotic upbringing. I will demonstrate some of them which seem to nicely illustrate the attention that is placed on it in the articles.

“A “Train of Memory and Glory” from Brest to Vladivostok. A “Train of Memory and Glory” is a unique project. I am sure that it will be of great interest to young people in the year of the 75th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War. And our task is to make the travel program interesting and useful, taking into account the general patriotic orientation of the project... Both in terms of patriotic upbringing, and in its educational component, it would allow to strengthen friendly ties between young people, as well as to maximize the use of the regions through which the “Train of Memory and Glory” will pass, taking into account their history and traditions, contribution to the Victory” (MSHE, 24.09.2019, Link 1, Table 4³).

³ The links to all quotes from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MSHE) are numbered respectively and available in Table 4 in Appendix 1.

There are several issues to address in the quote above. Firstly, the attention placed on patriotic upbringing is certainly evident. The quote discusses a project called ‘Train of Memory and Glory’. The idea of the project is about the train that passes across the Russian and Belorussian (Brest is the city in Belarus) territories which symbolizes the 75th anniversary of victory in WWII. The narratives on war, victory, history, traditions are all evident in the quote. In this context, it is possible to claim that patriotic upbringing implies the attention on history, traditions, war, and victory. As mentioned before these are the narratives that closely correlate with the ideas of Slavophilism. As the counter argument, it might also be claimed that the attention on history, traditions does not necessarily imply the promotion of Slavophilism.

It is possible to argue that there may be various reasons behind studying history, such as, for instance to avoid making the past mistakes (Kliebard, 1995), or because students’ imagination “is exercised as they engage in historical study” (Berg, 2019, p. 57). Nevertheless, one of the key points is that the attention on history in the quote above is placed upon both the role of Russia and Belarus in WWII. In other words, there is an attempt to promote the preservation of “collective/national identity” (Berg, 2019, p. 57) of two Slavic countries. The goal seems to be to unite the two Slavic countries through the use of WWII narratives. It is appropriate to remember the words of Putin in this context who often refers to the consequences of the collapse of Soviet Union, one of which is the “divided nation” (Lisovskaya, Karpov, 2020, p. 292). As such, answering the question of what is represented in the article (Fairclough’s representation), it is possible to answer it by pointing out to the narratives of Slavophilism more generally, but more specifically, there is an attempt to promote patriotic upbringing that emphasizes the narratives of war, history, traditions. This is the key point that could be identified in the article published by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in Russia.

There are more articles which use the discourse of patriotic upbringing and directly associate it with the purposes of higher education in Russia. “It is planned that universities will launch the project “Without an Expiration Date”, aimed at preserving the historical memory of Great Patriotic War, and other initiatives” (MSHE, 15.08.2020, Link 2, Table 4); “Issues of patriotic upbringing in universities discussed at the Russian Ministry of Science and Higher Education” (MSHE, 28.09.2020, Link 3, Table 4); “The feat of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War – the basis of patriotic upbringing and civic responsibility...Belarus and Russia discussed issues of scientific support for the preservation of historical memory of the

Great Patriotic War...” (MSHE, 28.09.2020, Link 4, Table 4). In all the three quotes, the discourse of patriotic upbringing is portrayed as dominant at universities. Again, the references are made to the preservation of historical memory from WWII; the Russian-Belorussian cooperation is also evident. There is no point in describing the relativeness of all these narratives to the ideas of Slavophilism as it has been already discussed before.

Nevertheless, it is still important to remind ourselves that besides the Slavic unity that is being promoted here in association with patriotic upbringing, the accentuation on the preservation of historical memory is what can also be regarded as the reference to Slavophilism because one of key ideas behind Slavophilism is to remember and preserve the past heroic deeds of Russian nation (see chapter 6). Considering the previous illustrations, it is possible to argue that the discourse of patriotic upbringing that is embraced by the ideas of Slavophilism is certainly among the dominant ones published in the articles. It is now worth considering the way this discourse is judged in the articles, to whom it is addressed, what do authors seem to expect from higher education overall and in particular from the people who work or study at universities while promoting the discourse of patriotic upbringing. In other words, let's examine the identification type of text meaning of Fairclough which allows to answer the previous questions and get closer to an understanding of the way power operates in higher education of Russia.

Sub-Section 1.1: Identification of patriotic upbringing in articles

The first point that deserves attention is the fact that the quotes of the articles demonstrated above, address the topic of the relationship between young people while discussing patriotic upbringing. Not only the quote speaks on behalf of young people in Russia by saying that this project is certainly interesting for them (“it will be of great interest to young people”), but at the same time, one of the primary goals of the project is to ‘to strengthen friendly ties between young people’ (see quote above). In relation to former, it can be claimed that the voices of students are “indirectly reported” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 197) in the text which “raises questions about the relationship between what was actually said and how it is summarized here” (ibid, p. 197). In other words, it is not clear if students are indeed interested in this project or not. The text is simply taking in for granted. In this sense, the government views individuals as already submitted to “certain ends” as Foucault (1980, p. 122) would describe it, to the ends of patriotic upbringing. In relation to latter, the fact that this project is aimed at strengthening the relationship between young people directly

indicates to the form of relations between students that the Government in Russia ideally desires to have. The relations in which the discourses of WWII, history, traditions are dominant. To use the terminology of Fairclough (2003), authors of the text (which is the Russian Government in our context) commit themselves to the values of history, WWII, traditions as the central ones to be revolving in relationships between students. In other words, the government desires the discourses of WWII, traditions, history to be the dominant ones in power-knowledge or practice-discourse nexus between students. The aim is to “determine the conduct” (Foucault, 1980, p. 18) of students in accordance with these promoted narratives.

In the context mentioned above, it seems to be necessary to remember the survey conducted by RPORC in Russia in 2020, the results of which demonstrated the existence of the discourse of patriotism among the Russian youth. Along these lines, the research conducted by Trotsuk and Suvakovic (2013) indicated to the dominance of feelings of patriotism among the students in Russia, more precisely, the majority of them referred to the heroic history of Russia in this respect (for more detailed discussion see Chapter 6). It is necessary to point out that these results should not lead to the argument that the discourse of patriotism among youth has been originated by the technologies of domination, that is, by the promotion of patriotic upbringing in HE demonstrated in the quotes above. The key point is that this promotion or governmental support has strengthened the discourse of patriotism in Russian youth. In other words, this discourse was not invented by the Government of Russia.

The discourses of patriotism and patriotic upbringing already existed in Russian society even before the contemporary governmental support of it (see chapter 6). For instance, with the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, the patriotic clubs of the system of education (which will be discussed in detail later in the section of ‘student communities’) that aimed at promoting patriotism among Russian youth, experienced a decline in its popularity (Laruelle, 2015). The orientation of Russian Government at the time was towards “de-ideologization” (p. 283) as Lisovskaya and Karpov (2020) describe it and as such patriotism was on the brink of disappearance as it’s area of operation so to speak is within the ideological sphere. Nevertheless, from the beginning of 2000s, the narratives on patriotism re-emerged as one of the central pathways pursued by the Russian Government and as such, the discourse of patriotism and patriotic upbringing experienced a “revival in the 2000s” as Laruelle (2015) describes it. The previous elaboration is important to consider because it indicates to the fact that the technologies of domination use the discourses that already exist in society and do

not invent them. Nevertheless, they surely embellish and alter them as it is the case in Russia where the government attempts to promote a very specific understanding of patriotism in HE. Continuing the lines on the role of technologies of domination, the government “accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault as cited in Rabinow, 1991, pp. 72-73) only certain types of discourses and uses them to “determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject” (Foucault, 1980, p. 18). This is evident in the case of patriotic upbringing in higher education that is constantly referred to in the articles published by MSHE and supposedly has an effect on strengthening the feelings of patriotism in students’ technologies of the self, on the relationship between students if we consider as examples the results of survey of RPORC in 2020 and the research of Trotsuk and Suvakovic in 2013.

Whether the previous implications of the effect of technologies of domination on students in Russia is the case in contemporary Russian higher education or not, is another question and requires an analysis of students’ technologies of the self, which as mentioned in methodology was unachievable in this research (See Part 3). What is, certainly, the case, nevertheless, is that the constant references to patriotic upbringing in articles published by the MSHE and the fact that the texts address students while promoting it, more precisely, the goal is to promote patriotic upbringing to “strengthen friendly ties between young people” (MSHE, 24.09.2019, Link 1, Table 4) indicates to the desire of the Russian Government to place the narratives of WWII, history, traditions as the dominant ones in power-knowledge or practice-discourse nexus of students relations with each other. In other words, these are the dominant discourses in power relations between students as Government (articles) views it. To put it differently, a friendly relationship between students can be achieved as the Government defines it through the discourse of patriotic upbringing that involves the narratives of WWII, history, traditions.

Apart from identifying patriotism primarily in relation to students, the articles often refer to the job that should be done by the university itself, more precisely, by the staff of universities that includes academics which also has important implications to the way power operates in Russian HE. Perhaps, the following quote is the most appropriate in this context that illustrates the role of lecturers at universities in patriotic upbringing.

“Issues of patriotic upbringing in universities discussed at the Russian Ministry of Science and Higher Education...The Ministry is forming two working groups. The first working group will develop a methodological base, identify key areas for

organizing upbringing work in universities, and the second will work out the issue of implementing the tasks of patriotic upbringing in relation to the target group – Russian student youth” (MSHE, 28.09.2020, Link 3, Table 4).

As it can be noticed in the quote above, universities in Russia are directly responsible for educating (upbringing) patriotism. This includes the organization of methodological base as well implementing it on students. The first point worth considering in this context is that authors of the quote (that is the Government of Russia) attempt to determine the conduct of universities’ staff, that is, of academics using the “obligational modalities” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 173). In other words, the government does not expect universities to teach patriotism, it directly, requires them to do this. To put it differently, the task of patriotic upbringing is an obligation of universities. If we use the ideas of Foucault (in Rabinow, 1984) in this context, this implies the exercise of judicial power rather than a disciplinary one. A judicial power is the one that is “possessed by agents of action” (Turek, 1990, p. 170). In other words, it is the power that is hold by someone (contrary to the Foucault’s concept of power). The agent of action in this context is the Government that requires universities to educate (upbring) patriotism to students. This seems to be essentially a form of direct, institutionalized control.

This obligation that is possible to observe in the quote, again, as it was in the case with students, demonstrate a desire of the government to place the discourse of patriotic upbringing among the dominant ones in power-knowledge or practice-discourse nexus that universities, more precisely in this case, academics are engaged with. In other words, the discourse of patriotic upbringing is ought to be inextricably connected to the power relations that academics are involved in at universities. For instance, as discussed in the literature review (Part 2), this governmental intervention into HE resulted in “academic feudalism” (Yudkevich, 2014, p. 1468). Moreover, there is also mistrust in the relations between academics and administrators, as the latter usually control if governmental initiatives are realized by academics (Oleksienko, 2020, p. 391) (See Chapter 6). Considering these points, it is possible to observe the way power relations are being shaped at universities due to the discourses promoted in HE by the Russian government, in this case, due to the discourse of patriotic upbringing.

Following the lines above, it is also worth mentioning that not only academics are submitted by the government to promote patriotism as it is evident from the quote above, but also, they are obliged to promote *correct* patriotism, that is, the patriotism as it is understood by the

government. Academics cannot deviate from that understanding. What does this understanding imply? The answer to this question has been already discussed in the literature review that reached a point when patriotism could be defined as a loyalty to the state, which should be reflected in remembering and preserving the Russian history and religion (Surkov, 2008). This is clearly evident in the articles published by MSHE as well. In this respect, consider the following quote which is about studying history in Russian HE, for instance:

“The MSHE has determined a mandatory minimum for studying the history of Russia in universities...According to the document, changes are made to educational standards in all specialties for undergraduate and specialist levels in terms of fixing the mandatory study of the discipline (module) “History of Russia” in the amount of at least 4 credits (144 hours), while the amount of contact work of full-time students with pedagogical employees must make up at least 80%...The order was developed as part of systematic work to realize the patriotic upbringing of youth...” (MSHE, 10.10.2022, Link 5, Table 4).

It was important to demonstrate as much information as possible from the previous article published by MSHE as it touches upon crucial points regarding power operation at universities in Russia. As such, continuing the lines on what patriotism means for the Russian Government, it becomes evident from the quote, that is about studying the Russian history, which is compulsory, and academics must educate it to students during the course of their study. Moreover, academics are expected to follow the course material and deviation from it is not welcome, which is evident from the words of Deputy Minister Pert Kucherenko in of the published articles: “The approach of conducting research and practical work on patriotic upbringing...should completely exclude the possibility of silence and ambiguous interpretation of historical facts” (MSHE, 28.09.2020, Link 4, Table 4). As it can be observed from the quote, there is a control over the module, or more generally, over the interpretation of Russian history and as such, not only lecturers (or academics) must educate the history of Russia as a separate module, but they also must follow the material as it is. Along these lines, it is necessary to reinstate that this type of power exercise is more of a judicial one rather than a disciplinary one. This power “censors, ‘masks” (Tutel, 1990, p. 194).

In addition, this type of governmental intervention reminds of the ideas of Althusser (1970), more specifically, the elaboration on Repressive and Ideological State Apparatus (RSA, ISA). In the former, the state uses the instruments “of violence that can coerce compliance upon an unwilling subjects” (Andrews, Skoczylis, 2022, p. 412), while in the latter, it seeks to “create a subject that complies by their own volition” (ibid, p. 413), that is in Foucault

terms disciplinary power. In the context of governmental promotion of patriotic upbringing in Russian HE, it seems to be more applicable to speak of the combination of those two Althusser's ideas. It is possible to argue in this respect, that the Russian Government seeks to create a subject using more generally the ideology of Slavophilism (that includes Russian patriotism) in HE and in this sense, it can be regarded as an Ideological State Apparatus. At the same time, the government is repressive in terms of its intervention demonstrated above regarding the course of history that is aimed at promoting Russian history. Concluding these notes on patriotic upbringing that is constantly mentioned in the texts published by MSHE, it is necessary to reinstate that this inevitably has its implications on power operation at universities in Russia. For instance, as mentioned earlier, it affects the relations between academics and administrators at universities. In other words, the discourse of patriotic upbringing is pushed forward by the Russian government to dominate in power-knowledge or practice-discourse nexus in higher education. As such, technologies of domination submit Russian HE to the discourse of patriotic upbringing that aims at determining the conduct of everyone at universities in Russia in accordance with it.

Section 2: The discourse of hard sciences

Another discourse that is constantly presented in the articles of MSHE is hard sciences. Before demonstrating it in the texts (Fairclough's representation type) and examining the way it is perceived in them (Fairclough's identification type), it is necessary to briefly elaborate on what is to be understood as hard sciences in this research. As such, all sciences are usually divided into two groups, the focus of the first is on development of soft skills and the focus of the other is on hard skills. Soft skills training implies "interpersonal or intrapersonal focus" (Laker, Powell, 2011, p. 113), whereas hard skills is technical training that usually involves "working with equipment and software" (ibid, p. 113). As such, when I speak of hard sciences, I speak of sciences that implies technical training. These are, to put it differently, the STEM (Science, technology, engineering, mathematics) subjects discussed in CDA of the UK articles. The articles published by MSHE often discuss hard sciences, that is, technical sciences, primarily in connection to two ideas. One is mentioning them in connection to the economic growth of the country which as it will be demonstrated later reminds us more of the neoliberal policy implemented by the UK Government in HE. On the other hand, technical or hard sciences are also presented in the articles as fundamental for advancement of military-industrial complex which as it will be illustrated later closely correlates with submitting higher education again to the narratives of Slavophilism.

It is necessary to divide this section of the CDA into two main parts, one is examining the discourse of hard sciences which submit higher education to the economic issues, and the focus of the other one is on analysing this discourse that is being presented using the narratives of Slavophilism. More precisely, the analysis of the second part is about the texts that present the discourse of hard sciences in connection with the military-industrial complex of Russia. Each part, in turn, is focusing first on Fairclough's representation type of text meaning, that is, roughly speaking, it demonstrates the existence of the discourse of hard sciences in the articles, and secondly, the attention is on Fairclough's identification type of text meaning that analyses how the texts perceive, identify this discourse. As such, there are hundred and six articles in total that have been published by MSHE that include the discourse of hard sciences throughout the period of three years (October 2019 – October 2022).

Part 1: The discourse (representation) of technical (hard) sciences as useful for the economic progress – technological entrepreneurship

The articles published by the MSHE often touch upon the technical sciences in connection with its usefulness for the economic progress of the country. More precisely, it is the discourse of technological entrepreneurship that is often presented in the texts and connected to the economic growth. "One of the main tasks facing us is to bring about 30,000 technology entrepreneurs out of universities into the country's economy by 2030" (MSHE, 30.09.2022, Link 6, Table 4); "The economy needs tens of thousands of new technology start-ups, and they can emerge if there are hundreds of thousands of new entrepreneurs" (MSHE, 07.10.2021, Link 7, Table 4). There are more articles that demonstrate the connection that is being made between the technological entrepreneurship and economic growth. It is also possible to notice the references to the market which imply neoliberal economic perspective (See Chapters 5, 6, 9). As such, while discussing the importance of technological entrepreneurship one of the texts continues: "Thus, university graduates will understand the subject not only from the technical side, but also from the economics of production and market prospects" (MSHE, 07.10.2021, Link 7, Table 4). Considering the previous quote, it might be claimed that the Russian Government attempts to submit higher education to the perspectives of neoliberal ideas because there are references to market as it can be noticed.

It also seems to be necessary to remember some of the discussion made before in the thesis in relation to the Russian economy. It is worth remembering the situation in the 1990s when Russia had to integrate into the global economy with the collapse of Soviet Union. As Kochtcheeva puts it (2020), "to integrate or not to integrate was not a choice, because Russia

had become part of the globalizing world...” (p. 13). As such, while discussing the technical sciences, articles, firstly describe them as “strategic initiatives” (MSHE, 07.10.2021, Link 7, Table 4) and secondly reason the focus on them by referring to their global importance. “Projects for strategic development were chosen to match global” (MSHE, 19.09.2021, Link 8, Table 4). Therefore, it can be argued, and it is evident from the quotes above, that the Russian Government “is always penetrated by and interwoven with a globalised economy and a set of liberal norms and ideas” (Lewis, 2020, p. 2).

However, it is also interesting to notice that this connection between technological entrepreneurship and the economic growth that is being discussed in the articles seems to be more inclined towards fulfilling the interests of the ruler rather than the market. In other words, the gaps of economy seem to be determined not by the market as it is in neoliberal policy (see Chapter 5 and 9), but by the government even though some references to the market as mentioned earlier are noticeable as well. The references to the President are more common compared to the narratives of market in this respect. For instance, let’s consider the following quote: “1000 of the most interesting and strong student projects were selected. Their implementation will contribute to the fulfilment of the tasks set by the President to achieve technological sovereignty and ensure the economic security of the country...” (MSHE, 26.10.2022, Link 9, Table 4). As it can be observed from the quote, the attention is placed upon fact that this is the task set by the President of Russia, according to whom, the Russian economy requires technological entrepreneurship. Along these lines, it seems to be necessary to remember the words of Belyaeva (2019) that Russian regime is “where the state is ‘captured’ by self-serving elites and decision-making is highly centralized” (p. 394).

As such, despite the fact that the quote refers to the economic progress that could be brought with the development of technological entrepreneurship, this trajectory of economy seems to be identified by the President in Russia and not by the market. Following the lines above, most of the articles that discuss the importance of the technological entrepreneurship for the development of economy, usually include at least couple of sentences that point out that the focus on this issue is initiated by the Russian Government. “Let’s recall that the draft initiatives were prepared based on the instructions of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin” (MSHE, 07.10.2021, Link 7, Table 4). As it can be observed the references to the President are quite straightforward in the context of supporting technologies entrepreneurship and its importance for the economic growth of the country.

With respect to the point that it is the government that decides what area should be promoted in higher education, it seems to be necessary to remember the concept of managed democracy discussed in the literature review (Part 2). Managed democracy is an approach to governing that has some democratic tools such as elections for instance (Gerrits, 2010), however it suggests the control over “all significant areas of societal activity” (Ljubownikow, Crotty, 2017, p. 941). This includes the control over economy as well. In other words, in managed democracy there is “little space for political, economic or social life independent of the state” (Lipman, McFaul, 2001, p. 116). In the case with technological entrepreneurship, it is observable from the quotes, that the attention on it is placed primarily by the President who has decided that it is the required area for the development of economy. In fact, it is interesting to draw some parallels with the discussion on the economic policy of the UK implemented prior to Thatcher when the government in the UK attempted to stop the process of deindustrialization by “selective industrial policy, the intent of which is to promote certain industries over others irrespective of market signals” (Silverwood and Woodward, 2018, p. 630). The difference of Russian policy in this respect, is that the President justifies his selective policy by claiming that this is what market needs. In other words, it is supposedly reflective of market needs. As such, the discourse of technological entrepreneurship seems to be promoted in the articles of MSHE primarily because of the interests of the Russian President and not of the market (even though he arguably relies on market when justifying their initiatives).

Nevertheless, it is possible to claim that it is not of critical importance whose idea is to focus on the market, more generally, on neoliberalism. Eventually, it is the Russian Government that decides to promote this discourse in HE, which is the case in the UK as well where the Government attempts to submit HE to the narratives of neoliberalism (Chapters 5, 9). It is, therefore, possible to speak of governmentality in Russian HE as well. Yes, the degree of the neoliberal governing seems to be much less in the Russian HE than in the UK HE, however it still exists and has its implications on the technologies of the self of people within HE, more specifically, on the conduct of academics and students, which will be demonstrated in Chapter 12. In the next section, I will demonstrate the way the discourse of technological entrepreneurship is identified in the articles in more details.

The identification of the discourse of technological entrepreneurship in texts

With the goal of understanding the way the discourse of technological entrepreneurship is perceived in the articles, it is necessary to refer to some of the questions of Fairclough (2003)

illustrated in methodology (Part 3). Regarding the overall genre of the texts that include the discourse of technological entrepreneurship, it can be reinstated that it is being portrayed in connection to neoliberal economy. It is also important to notice that almost every text that discusses this discourse refers to the voices of students only which has important consequences to the way power operates in HE.

Following the lines above, by referring predominantly to the voices of students while discussing technological entrepreneurship, the texts usually give the impression that the Russian government by focusing on technological entrepreneurship in higher education realizes the dreams of students in Russia. Consider the following quote, for instance: “According to...a student of the Department of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics...he always dreamed of building an airplane. The leadership of the university supported and allocated funds for this project...The next step...is cooperation with companies” (MSHE, 07.09.2020, Link 10, Table 4). In fact, such an attention can be explained by the previous drawback of higher education in Russia, specifically during the times of Soviet Union, when the dreams of students regarding the technical sciences did not meet the reality (Leasure, 1994). The level of computerization overall in the country “was incompatible with their western counterparts” (Leasure, 1994, p. 10). As such, considering these points, it could be argued that there is nothing critically wrong with the Russian higher education that is being inclined towards technical sciences, more specifically, towards technological entrepreneurship. The government seems to determine the conduct of students in connection with their own desires. In other words, the technologies of domination seem to go in line with the technologies of the self in this respect. The attempt of the texts is to demonstrate the homogeneity between the discourses promoted by the government in higher education and the discourses that supposedly dominate between students. As Danaher et al (2000) would probably describe it, there seems to be a “relative homogeneity and unity of authorised discourses” (p. 72) in Russian higher education in the context of technological entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, this argument can be questioned if we pay attention to survey conducted by Russian Public Opinion Research Centre in 2021 on the issue of Russian citizens’ (including students) preferences in terms of the area of study and the skills they want to acquire.

The results of the survey by RPORC (2021) demonstrate that Russians (including students) prefer to raise the skills in goal-settings, creative thinking, management skills such as team management, planning, negotiation skills, leadership development skills all of which are

primarily the features of social sciences. Considering the results of this survey, it could be claimed that the Russian Government is actually failing in its arguable efforts to fulfil the dreams of students by focusing on technical sciences. In fact, it seems to be appropriate to claim that some students might prefer to study technical sciences and others might want to focus on social sciences. What is important, nevertheless, is the fact that the texts of MSHE only include the voices of those students who favour technical sciences while the voices of other students are excluded along with other disciplines such as for instance, education, law, psychology, sociology. In this respect, it seems to be appropriate to remember the term ‘subjugated knowledges’ brought by Foucault and defined as the knowledge “that is located down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity” (Foucault, 1980, p. 82). In other words, the government seems to locate knowledges unrelated to technical sciences down on the hierarchy and as such promote the power-knowledge in higher education, within which the discourse of technical sciences would dominate. The same point can in fact be applied to the situation in the UK HE as well, where there is a huge attention on STEM subjects from the UK Government (Chapter 9).

Concluding the previous notes, it is possible to speak of the overall attempt of technologies of domination to submit higher education to the certain ends, more precisely, to the ends of technological entrepreneurship and more generally, to the discourse of technical sciences. This discourse is presented and identified in texts with references to the economic growth and students’ desires. The references to economic growth and market demonstrated at the beginning of this part can be interpreted as an attempt to submit HE to the narratives of neoliberal ideas, however, it is also important to note that this supposedly neoliberal policy is selective as it is only implemented in relation to technological entrepreneurship. In the next part, I will demonstrate the way the discourse of technical sciences is portrayed in the articles now in connection with military affairs which seems to aim to submit higher education in Russia back to the ideas of Slavophilism as it is the case with patriotic upbringing.

Part 2: The discourse of technical sciences in connection with military affairs

Apart from presenting the discourse of technical sciences in connection with economic growth, the articles also discuss the discourse of technical sciences relating it to the military industries. This again can be interpreted as an attempt of technologies of domination to submit higher education to the narratives of Slavophilism. In this respect, before starting to demonstrate some of the quotes from the articles, it seems to be necessary to briefly explain

why such a presentation of technical sciences closely correlates with the ideas of Slavophilism. As mentioned in the literature review (Part 2) the ideas of Slavophilism are primarily inclined towards preserving Russian uniqueness, identity, unity, religion. This is the narrative of us against them has been existing in Russia for centuries. At times, it has been even strengthened if we consider, for instance, Mongol-Tatar reign in Russia during the XIII-XV centuries. As Tsygankov et al (2010) describe it “ever since the two-centuries-long conquest by Mongols, Russians have developed a psychological complex of insecurity...” (p. 669). As such, it seems to be possible to claim that both the narratives of Slavophilism along with the historical events in which Russians have found themselves initiated the focus on militarism in Russia. Carleton (2017) even claims that “war saturates Russian culture” (p. 2). This background seems to explain the attention placed by the articles of MSHE on promoting the discourse of technical sciences in connection with military affairs. Nevertheless, I will speak of it in more details in the second half of this part, in the part that focuses on the way texts perceive, identify the discourse of technical sciences (Fairclough’s Identification) in relation to it. At this point, I will just demonstrate some of the quotes from the MSHE articles that illustrate the connection between technical sciences and military industries.

The articles often discuss technical sciences in relation to military industries. “A quantum computer is a matter of national security” (MSHE, 07.04.2022, Link 11, Table 4); “Military training Centre (MTC) at Far Eastern Federal University...provides training for mechanics...” (MSHE, 23.02.2022, Link 12, Table 4); “We are developing the Russian military-industrial complex and Armed Forces on a new technological base, based on the achievements of our science...” (MSHE, 23.08.2021, Link 13, Table 4). As it can be observed there is an attempt to determine higher education, in specific, technical sciences to the ends of military industries. Military training centres are being opened in various universities across Russia (MSHE, 30.04.2021, Link 14, Table 4) with the focus of all on technical sciences that are important for the national security as mentioned earlier. Considerable attention “will be paid to such areas as the use of artificial intelligence and robotics in the troops, the latest communication and control systems...” (MSHE, 23.08.2021, Link 13, Table 4). Considering these quotes it seems to be possible to claim that the discourse of technical sciences in Russian HE is the type of discourse that the Russian Government “accepts and makes function as true...” (Foucault as cited in Rabinow, 1991, pp. 72-73) in relation to the military industries in particular.

With respect to the visible attempt of Russian Government to combine technical sciences with military industries, it seems to be appropriate to also mention that this type of a governmental intervention into higher education goes beyond the promotion of certain discourses (knowledges) only. This is the intervention that implies a certain action. In other words, apart from determining the conduct of individuals and submitting them to certain ends by the use of certain discourses, this intervention is physically “objectivizing of the subject” (Foucault, 1980, p. 18). In other words, these technologies of domination objectify higher education providers as the subject that contains military training centres as well. To a certain extent, this is the redesign of the meaning of what university is in terms of its physical appearance (as it now includes the entity such as military training centre) in addition to its moral redesigning through certain discourses or knowledges. More generally, it can also be stated that this is the type of intervention that subjectifies the whole system of higher education under the narratives of militarism. In fact, as Dyundik et al (2020) describe it, the global development of military technologies has initiated the “demand for new competencies of personnel” (p. 1) for the Russian military-industrial complex. Nevertheless, at this point, it would be an exaggeration to claim that the system of higher education in Russia is totally subjected to narratives of military affairs. What is certainly the case, nevertheless, is that the discourse of technical sciences in higher education of Russia is being connected to the military affairs as it is evident from the articles published by MSHE.

Continuing the discussion on the connection between technical sciences and military affairs, it is also necessary to draw attention on the fact, that these texts often refer to words of President of Russia as this was in the previous section that elaborated on technical sciences as useful for the economic growth. This is an important point to consider because it demonstrates the attention to the figure of the ruler which reminds us of Slavophilism once again. As such, consider the following two quotes for instance: “In his welcoming speech, Valeriy Falkov recalled the instruction of President of Russia to expand the availability of military training for students” (MSHE, 30.04.2021, Link 14, Table 4) (Valeriy Falkov is the Minister of Higher Education in Russia); “In the message of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly in March, the importance of improving the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was noted. Today, one of our tasks is to create military training centres in all universities of the country” (MSHE, 30.04.2021, Link 14, Table 4). As it can be observed the references to Vladimir Putin are quite straightforward and as it has been illustrated in one of the quotes above, it is Putin who believes that technical sciences should primarily focus on the development of Russian military industry. These narratives on

militarism in higher education, specifically, its connection to the discourse of technical sciences, as well as the fact that this has been initiated by the President of Russia, once again illustrates the attempt of technologies of domination to submit higher education in Russia to the ideas of Slavophilism. This is more evident in the way the connection between technical sciences and military industries is identified in the articles which is discussed next in this part.

The identification of the connection between the discourse of technical sciences and military industry by the texts

While describing the connection between technical sciences and military industries, the articles of MSHE often refer to the narratives that resemble the arms race of the Cold War between USA and USSR in the 20th Century. Arms race is “the competitive, resource constrained dynamic process of interaction between two states or coalitions of states in their acquisition of weapons” (Michael, Brito, 2000, p. 46). In other words, arms race is the competition between two countries over weapons. This is precisely the narrative that could be observed in the articles that discuss the connection between technical sciences and military industries. Perhaps the most illustrative quote in this respect is the following the topic of which is the quantum computer developed by the engineers of the Novosibirsk State Technical University:

“The country that is the first to create a quantum information processing system will have a huge advantage over other countries. A quantum computer will be able to process in minutes or even in seconds the number of calculations that would take years for modern computers to complete. This compromises any public security systems based on data encryption, including government and military communication channels. A quantum computer is a matter of national security, so all of its components must be of domestic production” (MSHE, 07.04.2022, Link 11, Table 4).

As it can be observed, words such as ‘first’, ‘huge advantage over other countries’ initiate the narrative of arms race in Russian higher education. It strengthens the nexus of us against them, which is, as mentioned earlier, at heart of Slavophilism. As such, if we speak of the overall genre of these types of texts, it is possible to define them as orientated towards accentuation of competition (Fairclough, 2003) with other countries. The narratives that closely correlate with the previous discussion can also be found in other articles. For instance, the articles the topic of which is outer space also emphasizes the importance of being first: “They were the first!” (MSHE, 12.04.2022, Link 15, Table 4). If we speak using the terminology of Fairclough (2003), it is possible to describe the previous quote as the one

that demonstrates the “categorical modality of assertion” (p. 122). This is the modality of the text that indicates to “no room for other possibility” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 46). In the current context, this implies that the Russian Government desires technical sciences to be directed towards producing military equipment that ideally would be ahead of other countries. As such, not only the discourse of technical sciences is heavily promoted in higher education by the technologies of domination as it can be observed from the texts, but also this support is accompanied by other discourses such as ‘being first’, ‘national security’, ‘advantage over other countries’ which are all made under the umbrella of military industry.

Concluding all the previous points on the discourse of technical sciences that is among the dominant ones in the published articles of MSHE, it is possible to claim that this discourse is used to submit higher education both to the ends of Slavophilism and neoliberalism. This is because there is an attempt to connect technical sciences both to military industries and to market as well. Considering this, it is possible to claim that the Russian Government attempts to submit higher education to the situation, in which power-knowledge or practice-discourse nexus that universities along with all people working or studying in them are engaged with, would be dominated by the discourses of technical sciences which is inclined primarily towards developing military industry and technological entrepreneurship.

Section 3: The discourse of student communities – student clubs

Another discourse that dominates among the articles published by MSHE is the discourse of student communities or, more accurately, the discourse of student clubs which is another attempt of Russian Government to submit higher education to the ends of Slavophilism because the focus here is again on preserving historical, cultural traits and patriotism. In fact, this discourse is closely connected to the discourse of patriotic upbringing, however, it is more appropriate to discuss it as a separate topic because patriotic upbringing as it has been demonstrated, is inclined more towards teaching of patriotism in universities (e.g., the course of Russian History), whereas student clubs are organizations that students can voluntarily join outside of their study time. These clubs are formed by the non-governmental youth organization called “Russian Student Brigades” which “provides temporary employment for...young people...and also engages in civic and patriotic upbringing, develops the creative and sports potential of young people” (Russian Student Brigades, 2023, para. 1). As it can be noticed from the previous quote, these clubs are involved into activities related to patriotic upbringing. For instance, as it will be demonstrated later, there are clubs that are

involved into the archaeological work to find the remains of USSR soldiers who fought in WWII. However, these activities seem to be voluntary, more accurately, of civic nature. It is the young Russian civil society that is voluntarily engaged into this work. In terms of governmentality, this implies that the technologies of domination (the Russian Government) attempt to demonstrate that it does not intervene into the technologies of the self (to the conduct of people). It is necessary to note as well that despite the fact that the activities of student communities might indeed be voluntary, however it is in the hands of government whether to embellish this discourse of student communities or not. We are looking at the technologies of domination in this CDA and as such, we are looking for the discourses that the articles emphasize the most. This discourse of student communities is among them and the Russian Government portrays them specifically with the narratives of Slavophilism, which I will demonstrate in the next sections of this part of the thesis.

It is important to consider the previous point because it implies that the Russian Government or the technologies of domination are not directly involved into the formation of students' clubs and the website of the organization is claiming this to be the fact as well (Russian Student Brigades, 2023, para. 1). Nevertheless, as Hemment (2009) describes it, there are "generous allocations from the federal budget" to fund these students clubs and Kremlin, for instance, "set up a number of national youth organizations" in 2005 (p. 38). At the same time, the organization "Russian Student Brigades" claims to be a non-governmental civic organization. It defines itself "in terms of its separateness from the activities of the state" (Cheskin, March, 2015, p. 263). Considering the previous points, it can be argued that there are certain questions regarding the civic nature of this organization. Nevertheless, whether it is indeed a civic organization or not, what is certainly clear is that the Russian Government supports the formation of various student clubs in higher education, especially the clubs that are engaged in patriotic activities, which becomes evident from the articles published by MSHE.

It can be argued that the discourse of student clubs in higher education is the type of discourse that the Russian Government "accepts and makes function as true" (Foucault in Rabinow, 1991, pp. 72-73). The attempt of the government seems to be to use this discourse to determine the conduct of students and "submit them to certain ends..." (Foucault, 1980, p. 18), which are again, the ends of patriotism, more generally, the ends of Slavophilism. It is necessary to point out that this discourse of student clubs is regarded in this paper as the attempt of the Russian Government to submit higher education to the narratives of

Slavophilism not only because of the issues related to patriotism but because student clubs largely resemble the narratives of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), specifically the ones related to the issues of morality and etic responsibilities of individuals.

Russian Orthodoxy favours the freedom of morality and etic responsibilities of individuals from state intervention. In fact, it recognizes the ontological freedom of an individual which should not be placed within the framework of any type of ideology, apart from the one that it favours itself (Zhuravlev, 2019). In other words, these aspects related to morality should not be regulated by the government. Student clubs, in turn, possess themselves as free from governmental regulation and describe their activities as voluntary actions caused by their moral duty. Perhaps, precisely because of this fact “Russian Student Brigades” organization rejects to portray itself as the governmental organization despite the existence of governmental funding mentioned above. Moreover, as some of the chosen quotes from the articles will demonstrate, the Russian Government also pay a considerable attention to its non-interference into the student clubs. As Laruelle (2015) puts it “these clubs present themselves as apolitical” (p. 9). In addition to this, student clubs seem to play a role of unifying the Russian nation, which is again, one of the core interests of ROC (Pankhurst in Shalin, 2018).

It seems to be appropriate to claim the Russian Government once again attempts to submit higher education to the narratives of Slavophilism. This time this is realized using the discourse of student clubs which is another one that is dominant in the articles published by MSHE and mostly presented in association with the knowledges (or discourses) of patriotism, moral duty, etic responsibility, unity, militarism, which will all be demonstrated in the next paragraphs. I will first briefly demonstrate the existence of the discourse of student clubs in articles, which is Fairclough’s representation (What is represented in the articles?) and secondly examine the way it is described in them, that is Fairclough’s identification (What connections are being made in association with this discourse?).

What is represented?

There are twenty-two articles published on the website of MSHE, the focus of which is on the discourse of student clubs. “Student brigades celebrate their professional holiday in Russia” (MSHE, 17.02.2022, Link 16, Table 4); “Russian student brigades are one of the largest youth organizations...” (MSHE, 17.02.2022, Link 16, Table 4); “The gathering of student brigades in an online format brought together more than five thousand participants”

(MSHE, 15.11.2021, Link 17, Table 4). There are more articles that demonstrate the dominance of the discourse of student clubs in published texts and it seems to be more appropriate to focus on Fairclough's identification type of text meaning in this context, that is to analyse the connections that are being made in the articles in association with student clubs. At this point, it is sufficient to claim that the fact that this discourse is among the dominant ones published by MSHE allows us to argue that it is within the area of technologies of domination in Russia in relation to higher education. In other words, it is the discourse that is pushed forward by the Russian Government to dominate in power-knowledge or practice-discourse nexus of higher education.

Identification of student clubs in articles

It is necessary to mention that articles often use the word 'brigade' ('*otryad*' in Russian,) rather than the 'club' which is an important point to consider as well because the word 'brigade' etymologically implies military narratives. It means "a large group of soldiers" (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023). Such a military association with student clubs or communities already resembles the ideas of Slavophilism discussed in the previous section (see the discussion on 'us against them' in particular), but this point alone could hardly be used to claim that student clubs in Russia are located under the ideas of Slavophilism. At least this is because, at times, the discourse of student clubs is, for instance, presented in articles in association with various temporary job opportunities for students which has no relation to Slavophilism. Consider the following two quotes for instance: "Young people acquire practical skills that allow them to get jobs during the holidays in construction, transport, agricultural companies, as well as in children's clubs, hospitals and clinics, etc...most importantly, get invaluable labour and management experience" (MSHE, 17.02.2022, Link 16, Table 4); "We also do not forget about student brigades and plan to employ a large number of students in the summer labour semester 2020" (MSHE, 18.05.2020, Link 18, Table 4). In fact, this type of an association made with student clubs is more inclined towards the Soviet narratives on the importance of labour (Laruelle, 2015). In other words, it is quite straightforwardly emphasizing one of the central points of communism, that is labour. The idea of the Soviet communism was about the society in which "the distribution of wealth would depend on the labour performed by each worker" (Resnick, Wolff, 2002, p. 6). It is beyond the scope of this research to dive into the implications of narratives on labour in contemporary Russia. The previous discussion was made only to demonstrate that the discourse of student clubs, at times, is mentioned in the

articles in connection with other ideas unrelated to Slavophilism. This supports the argument that the reliance on the word ‘brigade’ only is not enough to argue that the articles published by MSHE regarding the discourse of student clubs emphasize the narratives of Slavophilism.

What in fact supports the previous argument are the associations made with patriotism, moral duty, etc responsibilities, unity, militarism while discussing student clubs. Consider the following quotes, for instance: “community is united” (MSHE, 18.05.2022, Link 18, Table 4); “Forum ‘Origins’ began to work...the forum is organized by... Pskov diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church... ‘Russian Student Brigades’...the goal of the forum is to create an ecosystem of historical and cultural education for the development of the personal, spiritual, moral and professional potential of young people in the Russian Federation...” (MSHE, 23.08.2022, Link 19, Table 4); “Here are the origins of Orthodoxy, Princess Olga was born here, Pushkin, Rimsky-Korsakov worked here” (MSHE, 11.08.2022, Link 20, Table 4) (the elaboration is about the school opened by ‘Russian Student Brigades’ in the town of Pechory, Russia). As it can be observed the references to student brigades are made in connection with personal, spiritual, moral development. As such, to use the terminology of Fairclough (2003), the “value assumptions” (p. 122) made in text orient the discourse of student clubs towards emphasizing the development of morality and spirituality of students. The professional development is also mentioned as it can be observed, however the narrative is inclined towards the personal, ethical and moral development. The inclusion of Russian Orthodox Church along with for instance describing students of these clubs as the “fighters” (MSHE, 17.02.2021, Link 21, Table 4) demonstrates an inclination towards the emphasis of the development of morality of students that is located within the framework of Slavophilism. In addition to this, the references to unity can also be observed which is as mentioned earlier in the thesis is one of the core priorities of ROC and closely correlates with the ideas of Slavophilism (Chapter 6). Furthermore, there is also a connection with Russian patriotism as well that is made in the articles the focus of which is student clubs. “Brigade ‘Unicorn’...its participants are searching for unregistered military graves from the Great Patriotic War and finding the names of Red Army soldiers who are still listed as missing” (MSHE, 17.02.2021, Link 21, Table 4). The narratives of patriotism are quite straightforward.

As it can be observed from the previous examination, the discourse of student clubs is often linked to the ideas of Slavophilism such as Russian patriotism, militarism, morality, unity. It is necessary to point out that what makes the student clubs even more inclined towards the

ideas of Slavophilism is the supposedly apolitical nature of them. In other words, students as articles describe it, are involved into the work in these clubs due to their sense of moral duty. There is no state intervention into the issues of morality of people, which, as mentioned earlier, is one of the key priorities of ROC and more generally of Slavophilism. For instance, consider the most recent quotes from the articles on the work of student brigades that is initiated by the war in Ukraine in February 2022. These are the opinions of students published in articles:

“The commander of our regional branch informed that it is necessary to help refugees...In the shortest possible time, the fighters of the student brigades were already at the forefront providing assistance. Volunteering is one of the most important points of our activity” (MSHE, 24.02.2022, Link 22, Table 4).

“Decided to help because there was such an opportunity. Previously, I also took part in various volunteer activities” (MSHE, 24.02.2022, Link 22, Table 4).

“Volunteer activity, providing assistance is valuable in itself” (MSHE, 24.02.2022, Link 22, Table 4).

“As part of helping refugees...I, together with other volunteers, worked at the registration and accommodation point...We met refugees, helped them to pass the initial registration, provided hot meals” (MSHE, 24.02.2022, Link 22, Table 4).

All individuals emphasize that the work they are doing in student clubs is a voluntary activity. The goal that is pursued in demonstrating the previous quotes is not to judge the work of students, but to emphasize that articles place a considerable attention on the fact that students are involved into the work with these clubs voluntarily. That is, the texts describe student clubs by pointing out to the governmental non-intervention to it. Nevertheless, what is more important for us, is to identify the discourses promoted by the Russian Government through articles published by MSHE and the discourse of student clubs (or communities) is certainly among them.

Concluding all the points, it seems to be appropriate to claim that articles identify the discourse of student clubs in connection with primarily five narratives: patriotism, governmental non-intervention, development of morality and spirituality, unity, militarism. In other words, the Russian Government “accept and makes function as true...” (Foucault

in Rabinow, 1991, pp. 72-73) the discourse of student clubs in connection with those previously mentioned narratives, all of which closely resemble the ideas of Slavophilism. As such, it is possible to speak of another attempt of Russian Government to submit higher education to the ends of Slavophilism, but this time using the discourse of student clubs.

Conclusion

It is necessary to reinstate that the discourse of student clubs along with previous two, patriotic upbringing and technical sciences are the discourses that are all primarily associated with the narratives of Slavophilism which has been chosen by the technologies of domination in Russia to submit higher education to. At the same time, it is important to remember that the discourse of technical sciences is also being connected with neoliberal values as there is attention on the market related issues. In other words, Slavophilism along with selective neoliberalism are the ideas that the Russian Government accepts and attempts to submit higher education to. However, it is important to remember that these discourses along with Slavophilism revolve in Russian society beyond the state for centuries. The same applies to the ideas of liberalism as well for instance. In other words, the Government has not invented Slavophilism, Westernism and all the discourses mentioned before in this chapter. It nevertheless embellishes and strengthens some of them as the types of discourse that it accepts and makes function as true in relation to higher education. For instance, the Russian Government might illustrate its desire to portray the discourse of student clubs using the terms of Slavophilism, however, this does not necessarily imply that students accept this understanding of student clubs. In fact, Laruelle (2015) claims that the understanding of patriotism of students in these brigades considerably differs from an understanding that the government attempts to instil. When Russian Government as mentioned before in the thesis, defines patriotism in terms of loyalty to the state (Dahlin, 2017), that is, “a true patriot” (Laruelle, 2015, p. 9) is the one “who actively supports the regime, believes in the state as responsible for the common good... (p. 9), students, on the other hand, prefer to be inspired by some of the features of Russian Orthodoxy such as for instance, “love of one’s family, fellow-tribesmen and fellow-citizens” (Rousselet, 2015, p. 50) or-with opposing the violent actions of state (Kharkhordin, 1998, p. 956). This example of Laruelle (2015) is a concise illustration of the fact, that technologies of domination, definitely, promote certain discourses and place them as dominant in a society (in our case in HE), however the power-knowledge or practice-discourse nexus operating between the relations of people (students and academics) is not totally dependent on them. This domination might result in production

of resistance or consent from individuals. In other words, power operates through the combination of technologies of domination and technologies of the self, specifically in an age of governmentality that we live in as Foucault (2007) claims. In such a regime, technologies of domination certainly attempt to promote its preferences in a society, however, at the same time it provides freedom for individuals that is exercised through the technologies of the self. Even though Foucault was primarily discussing the situation in the West, it is possible to claim that the same logic applies to Russia as well, more specifically, to the disciplining of HE in Russia.

It is necessary to remember that Russia's political approach towards HE is not a totalitarian, despite all its attempts to instil its interests into the conduct of students and academics. Moreover, even if it desires to be totalitarian, there are roots of liberalism (and neoliberalism) that revolve in Russian society for centuries (Chapter 6, see the discussion on Westernizers) that would at least be involved into the power-knowledge nexus of HE and possibly play a role of a barrier for the desires of the Russian Government. In fact, this is confirmed by the data collected from the interviews with lecturers and from the CDA of the articles which indicate to the existence of governmentality in HE as well. As Petrov (2011) describes it, moving towards democracy seems to him "not only preferable but also more likely" (p. 59) in Russia. As such, when we speak of power operation in HE, more precisely, of governmentality both in the UK HE and in the Russian HE, it is not sufficient to demonstrate the technologies of domination only. There is also a need to study the reflections of people involved in HE: technologies of the self.

Chapter 11: Interviews with academics in the UK

In the introduction of the chapters related to the analysis of articles published by the Departments of Education of both states, this research claimed that the analysis is crucial to understand the way power operates. As mentioned earlier, technologies of domination attempt to discipline population in a certain way, however there are also the technologies of self. The technologies of the self "permit individuals to affect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality" (Foucault in Martin et al., 1988, p. 18). In other words, it is the relative autonomy of an individual within the context that is regulated by government institutions. This autonomy is capable of transforming the system

as a maximum through resistance to dominant discourses and practices and as a minimum it could result in a more conscious and “better fitted life with the self and with others” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 131).

To understand the way the dispersed disciplinary power operates there is a need to analyse the power relations. Foucault (as cited in Rabinow, 1984) believed that power operates within a “network of relations, constantly in tension, activity” (p. 174): in other words, the practices that lecturers, students, and administrative staff are involved in at universities in both countries. These practices are affected by the technologies of domination, but at the same time, people can resist them to a certain possible extent if they wish to. As explained in the Methodology (Part 3), it wasn’t possible to directly observe the practices that exist in universities and this research had to rely on the data provided by the interviewed academics.

Interviews were needed to gain an understanding on power-knowledge nexus of Foucault, that is, how control and discipline is enacted in HE according to them. In other words, the information provided by the interviewed academics allowed me to speak of the enacted neoliberal rule of governing (governmentality) HE in a more detailed way. Moreover, the interviews were helpful in getting insights into the technologies of the self of lecturers which undoubtedly have an effect on the neoliberal disciplining (technologies of domination). People have the freedom in governmentality to react to the imposed disciplining more than before in history and as such affect the way power operates in a society (see Chapter 4 on governmentality). I have conducted fifteen interviews with academics in the UK, fifteen in-depth semi-structured (online) interviews. It is also worth mentioning that the interviews were conducted with the academics in Social and Political Sciences which was done due to the point that it is easier to identify the power operation in those departments rather than in any other. This is the point of Foucault (in Martin et al., 1988) who claimed that these sciences are largely the product of political rationality. In other words, the control and regulation of technologies of domination (or disciplining) is easier to detect in Social and Political Sciences (see Chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion).

Speaking of the results of the interviews conducted with lecturers in the UK, it is possible to claim that the practices existing in the UK higher education are designed to produce a form of knowledge that fits into neoliberal ideas. They are overwhelmingly directed towards producing a social subject that would be first and foremost useful for the strengthening of the economic welfare of the UK. The interviewed lecturers only confirmed the previous

proposition. In other words, they all confirmed that power operates in such a way that it disciplines higher education and everyone within university to be inclined to neoliberal ideas. All the interviewed lecturers seem to comply or agree with the technologies of domination (governmental disciplining) of HE in terms of their conduct, however the same cannot be said in terms of their perceptions of the practices they engage in. Most of the interviewed lecturers do not like the practices of managerialism and teaching and tend to give more value to the practice of research. They also try to change students' conduct and thoughts on HE which they claim have adopted characteristics of a consumer due to the governmental disciplining. In other words, it is possible to claim that there is a relative homogeneity between the technologies of domination and technologies of the self in the UK HE in terms of the conduct of lecturers, but not in terms of the perceptions of HE. I will first demonstrate the overall impression of academics on the system of higher education, that is, the way they describe it. I will, then, continue by demonstrating the practices they are involved that will illustrate the "ongoing chaotic struggle between different forces" (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 101).

The overall views of lecturers on HE

It is necessary to mention that all the interviewed lecturers demonstrated an awareness of the discourses promoted by the UK Government in higher education and referred to them as dominant. The overall regime of truth of higher education is confirmed by them to be embedded in neoliberal ideas. More precisely, all the respondents stated that the UK government expects from higher education to be primarily useful for the economic growth of the country. The following quote seems to be the most illustrative in this context:

"There is a shift in governmental attitudes towards higher education in Britain. And that shift entails or that shift moves away from thinking of the university as a kind of space of intellectual exchange and development and towards the university as an engine of economic growth" (Lecturer A, University of Glasgow).

As it can be observed the importance of higher education for the strengthening of economic welfare is evident. In describing the government's expectations from higher education, lecturers often used the phrases such as 'market-oriented' (Lecturer A, University of Glasgow), 'employability skills' (Lecturer C, London South Bank University), 'managerialism' (Lecturer B, University of Glasgow), 'STEM subjects' (Lecturer D, London South Bank University), 'students as consumers' (Lecturer, Newcastle University), 'apprenticeship programs' (Lecturer E, University of Glasgow) all of which have been

discussed before in the thesis (specifically in Chapters 5 and 9). The fact that government in the UK desires HE to be focused on market directly indicates to the neoliberal regime of truth of higher education in the UK. Another illustrative quote reinforces the previous arguments in an even more concise way:

“What they want is a bunch of well educated, relatively well educated but non-critical drones who do what they’re told and you know, will fit well into the modern economy but aren’t going to rock the boat and aren’t going to look to change any sort of broader social structures” (Lecturer B, University of Glasgow).

In fact, the previous quote deserves a little more in-depth discussion as there is an impression that UK Government views higher education as a factory that should produce subjects whose primary role would be to strengthen the economy of the country first and foremost. Such a portrayal of higher education again reminds of Ritzer’s (2014) McDonaldisation theory. I have spoken about the applicability of this theory to the apprenticeship programs before, however, it seems to be applicable to the higher education overall if we pay attention to the words of the academic illustrated above. All four factors that characterize the relationship between consumers and producers (efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control), can indeed be used to characterize the relationship between the UK Government and universities. Efficiency in this context is the governmental expectation from students to be “more pragmatic and less interested in intellectual side” (Lecturer C, London South Bank University); calculability is basically speaking the attention of government to the number of students who get a university degree, which as one of the academics mentioned, should be more than “50% of the population”(Lecturer D, London South Bank University). Predictability in this context is the inclination towards ‘STEM subjects’ (Lecturer E, University of Glasgow) and towards the development of ‘employability skills’ (Lecturer, Newcastle University). Finally, the university, more precisely, academics are responsible for the control of those three factors. In this case, it is possible to agree with Ritzer (2014) that these four factors that were initially developed for the fast-food restaurants started to dominate different aspects of social life as well including education (ibid). The aim is to deliver the “skilled workforce” (DfE, 29.06.2022, Link 23, Table 3) to the market through higher education.

As such, the technologies of domination have initiated a certain regime of truth of higher education and the practices existing in it are dependent on it. All the lecturers are aware of the discourses promoted by the government in relation to higher education. As one of the lecturers noted, higher education is moving “towards a more capitalist model nowadays, where you are attracting students and making money and

it feels very much like a corporate environment” (Lecturer C, London South Bank University).

The practices that academics are involved in is “teaching, research and administration” (Lecturer F, University of Glasgow). During the interviews, lecturers pointed out to the pressure to focus more on managerial work (administration). This pressure comes from the technologies of domination. It is the government that indirectly forced universities to implement managerialism that is “functionally and technically indispensable to the achievement of economic progress...(Deem et al, 2008, p. 6). In fact, most of the lecturers have negative perceptions to this dominant discourse of government in relation to HE and prefer to focus more on teaching and specifically on research. As such, there is an “ongoing chaotic struggle between different forces” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 101) in higher education of the UK. There is a struggle between managerialism promoted by the technologies of domination and teaching and research preferred by the technologies of the self. The analysis of this competition indicates to the way power operates in higher education. As mentioned earlier there are three “subject positions” (Olssen, 1999, p. 31) that lecturers take at universities in the UK. In the next sections I will demonstrate how they are interconnected and what academics prefer to stick with at the end of this “ongoing chaotic struggle...” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 101).

The practice of managerialism

Many of the lecturers referred to the practice of administrative work that they are expected to take at universities in the UK. Administrative work, for instance, may range from being a course convenor to being a research director of the department. “There are various administrative roles, both small and large that I’m expected to take on” (Lecturer A, University of Glasgow); “I have to convene a level two...I have to organize the course as well” (Lecturer B, University of Glasgow); “We have quite an extensive part of administration” (Lecturer G, London South Bank University). The administrative practices that academics are engaged with usually imply the organizational work which is quite extensive and covers at least 1/3 of the overall workload that the lecturers have. “So there is teaching one third, research another third and then the last third has more to do with sort of service or roles that are related to advising or serving as the convenor for a module or for a degree and so on and so forth” (Lecturer B, University of Glasgow). As such, all the interviewed lecturers stated that their work has three directions: “It’s teaching, it’s research and administration” (Lecturer A, University of Glasgow). Such an extensive focus on

administration is tightly linked to the policy of the UK Government, more precisely, to the devolution occurred in 1992 (Part 2).

The devolution implemented by the UK Government has led to the situation when universities could not rely on government in terms of funding and had to find the ways to survive in this sense. As one of lecturers mentioned, this has “created a whole range of problems because universities also cutting down staff, professional services, admin staff...” (Lecturer G, London South Bank University). As such, the administrative work was left to academics. “Academics, I think, are left with more workload in terms of administrative duties...” (Lecturer C, London South Bank University). The connection between the government policy and the administrative work that has occurred because of it, is quite straightforward here. In this sense, it is possible to speak of the practices of academics (technologies of the self) that is directly caused by the technologies of domination. Lecturers are aware of their positions “in the general economy of space associated with disciplinary power” (McHoul and Grace, 1993, p. 69).

It is interesting to demonstrate some of the most illustrative opinions of the interviewed lecturers on the administrative work that they are expected to take. As such, some lecturers described it as a part of promotional criteria. “The university is set up in a particular way to encourage me...to pursue as many administrative roles...in order to further my career...it is part of promotional criteria” (Lecturer A, University of Glasgow). Firstly, it is possible to notice the signs of disciplinary power of Foucault, as there are phrases such as ‘set up’, ‘encourage me’ that indicate to the point that lecturers are not coerced to take a large amount of administrative work. A minimum of administrative work is already given as mentioned earlier, however, basically speaking, the more you take it, the higher the chances of getting promoted. What is crucial nevertheless is that this disciplining is connected not to the teaching and research practices which is among the core affairs of a university as Taylor and Braddock (2007) view it. This disciplining is tightly linked to managerialism which largely reflects the possible aims of the UK Government to transform the identity of a university from being “a space of an intellectual exchange” (Lecturer E, University of Glasgow) to the space that supports “corporate environment” (Lecturer D, London South Bank University). In fact, the technologies of domination seem to produce a “reality...ritual of truth” (Foucault, 1997, p. 194) that favours managerialism over teaching and research.

However, it is up to the technologies of the self to resist to or to consent to the possible prevalence of the discourse of managerialism. In fact, lecturers seem to resist this discourse in terms of their opinions on it as they often emphasize that they would want to focus more specifically on research. “I would like to see research more heavily emphasized” (Lecturer E, University of Glasgow); “Research hopefully comes next” (Lecturer H, University of Glasgow). It is important to notice that lecturers tend to demonstrate more desire towards research and not teaching, which will be explored in the next section. At this point, it is crucial to point out that the lecturers seem to agree with the prevalence of managerialism in terms of their practices. Consider the following quote for instance: “There are some people in the industry in the higher education sector who respond to those workloads pressures by reducing the time they spent on their teaching and things like that are not uncommon” (Lecturer A, University of Glasgow). As such, it seems to be possible to argue that power (or practices) operates in connection with primarily the discourse (knowledge) of managerialism rather than teaching and research. The claim on the cases when some lecturers prefer to reduce the time on teaching in favour of administration (possibly because it is administrative work that seems to play a considerable role in promotional criteria) elevates the importance of managerialism and deemphasizes teaching and research. As such, speaking of the contemporary “ritual of truth” in higher education of the UK, it is possible to claim that the practices of lecturers are inextricably connected to the discourse of managerialism which seems to dominate over the discourse of teaching and research.

Teaching and Research

Apart from the work related to managerialism, lecturers are certainly expected to teach and to conduct research. It is necessary to point out that when the discussion touched upon the practices of teaching and research, most of the lecturers emphasized primarily research. In order to explain this emphasis, there is a need to refer back to the effects of technologies of domination in this respect. As discussed before, the UK Government seems to expect universities to produce subjects (students) who would be useful for the strengthening of economic welfare of the country. To a large extent, this clarifies the open support towards STEM subjects for example, which is promoted by the UK Government to “fill skills gaps in our economy” (DfE, 11.06.2021, Link 15, Table 3) (see Chapter 9). Students are expected to obtain mostly technical skills. There is almost no support from the UK Government towards the skills that would raise the critical thinking for instance. In other words, the social sciences do not enjoy the same support from the government. In fact, it is possible to observe

an almost complete missing of the topics related to social sciences in the articles published by the Department of Education in the UK (see Chapter 9). The technologies of domination seem to ignore social sciences as a whole and the skills related to it as well.

The lecturers (who are the lecturers of social sciences as mentioned and explained in methodology Part 3), on other hand (technologies of the self) are aware of the governmental deemphasis of the social sciences. One of the lecturers argues:

“I think it is pretty clear that the government is trying to...remove social sciences and humanities from the space of educational system...and one of the big drivers of that is the quality of outcomes data and things like that...It’s very overtly neoliberal approach” (Lecturer C, London South Bank University)

Here is the point of the other interviewed lecturer:

“There is a real sense that those degrees aren’t valued as much” (Lecturer, Queen Mary University of London)

In other words, the UK Government seems to expect universities to transmit the knowledge that is needed to promote economic growth. As mentioned earlier this reminds of McDonaldisation theory of Ritzer (2014). Nevertheless, what is important in this context is that lecturers are clearly not interested in such a transmission of knowledge. The most illustrative quote in this context is the following:

“A university for me is not only a place where you transmit knowledge, but it is the place where you create knowledge...and this means for me that one of the main purposes of university is not only teaching, but it is actually more research...and my feeling is that this is not always captured in political sensitivities or in funding structures and so on and so forth” (Lecturer E, University of Glasgow)

As such, on the one hand, we’ve got the government that is supposedly interested in universities as in the entities that would provide the required knowledge (transmit the needed knowledge for the growth of economy) and on the other, we’ve got lecturers who are resistant to such a policy. In other words, it is possible to observe an “...engagement of forces” (Foucault, 1997 in Olssen 1999, p. 22). There is an ongoing struggle between the government and lecturers in this context. However, it is important not to confuse this relationship in a form of “domination-repression” (Smart, 1985, p. 78). It is certainly the case that “where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1976, p. 95) and this can be

observed in the given context, however, lecturers are not repressed to only transmit the knowledge and can approach their teaching practices as they wish to (this is the ability of technologies of the self, that's been enabled in an era of governmentality). To use the words of Olssen (1999), "while there is a push, no one is pushing" (p. 22). In fact, all the lecturers described their approach to teaching practice at the core of which is the development of critical thinking. "I want to make my students think about things from a different way, to look at the world in a different way...I mean I don't really believe in the giving them knowledge..." (Lecturer G, London South Bank University); "So, I think what sets us apart from other disciplines is really this ability to think critical..." (Lecturer B, University of Glasgow). As such, despite the visible aims of the technologies of domination to supposedly deemphasise critical thinking and social sciences overall, the lecturers clearly resist it in their practices.

To a certain extent, contrary to the discussion above, it can also be claimed that the UK Government in fact also attempts to promote the skills within which the skills related to critical thinking can also be found. These are commonly referred as the employability skills (see Chapter 5). These skills as mentioned before in the literature review include soft skills which can be listed as follows: teamwork, communication, problem solving, critical and innovative thinking, creativity, self-confidence, ethical understanding, capacity of lifelong learning, the ability to cope with uncertainty, responsibility (Matsouka, Dimitrous, 2016, Hinchliffe, Jolly, 2011, Succi, Canovi, 2020, Archer, Davison, 2008). To put it shortly, these are as one of the lecturers describes it "societal skills" (Lecturer B, University of Glasgow). It's been stated by most of the academics, that the skills they are encouraged to develop in students in their teaching practices are the market-oriented skills, more precisely, employability skills.

Speaking of the government's expectation in terms of the teaching practices related to employability skills, one of lecturers mentions: "This is the general impression that I have that they would like students after completing three years, four years or five years of education...they would like them to be prepared for the job market...market-oriented skills" (Lecturer A, University of Glasgow). As such, it seems to be indeed the case in the UK that universities have been urged by the government to reduce the expectations gap in relation to employer requirements (Lim et al, 2016). Again, this teaching practice is directly initiated by the technologies of domination. It's been even claimed by another respondent that they are working on the curriculum in her university that will include the module on the

employability skills. “We had to revalidate what is called our program. So, we basically rewrote the curriculum...and they told us you have to put skills and employability in the curriculum...and I know the fact that this is coming out of government pressure” (Lecturer C, London South Bank University).

As such, it seems to be possible to claim that since critical thinking is among the skills that is located within the employability skills (Fearon et al, 2020), the aims of technologies of domination seem to go in accord with the desires of technologies of the self. In other words, lecturers of social sciences are in consent with the demands the UK Government regarding the issue of employability skills. Nevertheless, it is often quite hard to understand what is to be understood as the employability skills. As Sarkar et al (2020) describe it “employability is a complex construct – there is no unified view of what it comprises and no universally agreed definition of the construct available” (p. 347). Along these lines, the critical discourse analysis of the articles published by the Department of Education, also could not identify what is to be included in the employability skills. In other words, the topic of employability skills is quite indistinct and as Sarkar et al (2020) puts it that lecturers “lack the confidence to teach them...” (p. 355). In addition to this, the teaching of employability skills again hardly reflects on the desires of academics to “create the knowledge” rather than “to transmit it” (Lecturer E, University of Glasgow).

To summarize, it is possible to argue the following: 1. the UK Government supposedly expects universities to transmit the specific knowledge that is useful for the economic growth first and foremost that does not specifically require the development of critical thinking; 2. Even when the UK Government seems to promote the critical thinking through the topic of employability skills, it is still unclear if that indeed implies critical thinking or not. In addition to this, what seems to promote even further antipathy of lecturers in the UK towards the teaching practices, is the point that their work is often evaluated by the students’ satisfaction metrics. There are numerous issues that arise from such an evaluation of teaching practices. Along with the fact that students obviously have different opinions on what teaching practices are beneficial for them, there are also instances of racial and gender discrimination of some lecturers on these grounds. As one of the lecturers stated: “students tend to give high scores to white men... it’s not fair on my colleagues who aren’t white and who aren’t male” (Lecturer H, University of Glasgow). There also cases when students assess the teaching practices in accordance with the marks they get. “I have heard people

saying, like, we're paying for these degrees, we deserve a good mark" (Lecturer H, University of Glasgow).

All the previous points seem to result in a situation when conducting research is preferred more by the academics in the UK than teaching. To put it differently, they tend to distance themselves from teaching practices. When I say they distance themselves, I do not mean that they do not teach. Certainly, they have to teach as it is part of their contracts. However, given the described perceptions of students on HE, lecturers seem to enjoy research practices more than teaching. In their teaching practices, on the other hand, they try to promote intellectual exchange more than simply transmitting the knowledge. They attempt to prioritize values such as critical thinking. Power operates in this specific way. It seems to be necessary to remember the elaboration of Foucault on power in this context. He states that the "relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State... The State is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth" (p. 122). It is certainly the case that the technologies of domination must be analysed as well when we speak of power operation and in this case of this research, this implies the policies of the UK Government in regard to HE. These policies, as mentioned before, emphasize market-orientation of the higher education, portray students as consumers, support the development of STEM subjects. Technologies of domination produced such a reality of HE. At the same time, there are those issues related to student satisfaction forms, unclarity around the employability skills which can be described as the "micro-physics of power" (Olssen, 1999, p. 22-23). It is through that combined network of relations, academics finally decide to value research more than teaching. In this sense, power produced a reality, "a ritual of truth" (Foucault, 1997, p. 194) that resulted in favouring of the discourse of research by the academics along with the discourse of managerialism, which is also more dominant than teaching as described in previous section. As such, when we speak of power-knowledge nexus of Foucault in relation to primarily academics in the UK, it is possible to state that it has taken such a specific form that lecturers prefer to focus more on research and managerialism rather than teaching. Out of the three possible "subject positions" (Foucault, 1982 in Olssen, 1999, p. 32) they tend to prefer researching and managerial tasks more than teaching whenever it is possible.

It is also important to remind ourselves, that all the three subject positions are expected to be taken by the academics in the UK, however, academics in the UK, as it is evident from

the interviews, can demonstrate a positive attitude towards one practice and negative towards the other. In fact, as one of the respondents claimed, “the idea of an expectation that one has to be a good researcher and a good lecturer at once is ridiculous and not correct” (Lecturer C, London South Bank University). As demonstrated above, most of the interviewees tend to dislike the teaching practices that according to them taken a form of transmitting the knowledge only due to the governmental disciplining of HE. In fact, teaching seems to come after research and managerial affairs. Nevertheless, academics are certainly required to teach as well, and it is important to speak of these practices because they illustrate the power dynamics between the government and academics (e.g. in terms of material to teach) and between the lecturers and students.

More on teaching practices

The first aspect that is worth mentioning regarding the teaching practices of lecturers is that there is almost no external control over the course materials that lecturers teach. In other words, to a great extent, the UK Government does not intervene into these affairs of academics. In some rare cases, as described earlier, it might pressure universities to add ‘employability skills’ module for instance, however, there is no direct governmental intervening when it comes to the material of the course itself. It is important to mention it because that is not the case in Russia (Chapter 12). In Russia, as mentioned earlier in this thesis (Chapter 6), the Government intervenes into curriculum and even controls the material provided in specific modules such as ‘Russian History’). Continuing the lines on the situation in the UK, it is possible to claim that regarding the control over the course material within the university, the respondents’ answers varied. In fact, this part of the work of academics depends on their positions, in other words, on their ranks. For instance, if it is a junior lecturer position, then there can be an internal control from the senior levels over the reading material that the lecturer provides to students. “I had a more junior position...and I was not the one designing the reading list” (Lecturer I, London South Bank University). On the other hands, in more senior positions, academics enjoy almost a complete freedom over the teaching material.

“To be honest, I feel 100% free, this is also one of the great advantages of working here. I don’t honestly, I never sense any pressure of any sort by anybody...” (Lecturer B, University of Glasgow); “We have flexibility in terms of teaching what we what, what we care about” (Lecturer H, University of Glasgow).

As such, considering the previous points, it is possible to speak of almost no direct control from the technologies of domination over the course materials in universities of the UK. As such, in the context of course material, the power relations between lecturers and students in the UK within which the knowledges are produced (Ball, 2013), are not directly affected by the technologies of domination. However, it is possible to speak of an indirect control over the teaching practices overall which is initiated by the expectations of students from higher education.

According to the interviewed lecturers, most of the students expect “value for money” (Lecturer, Queen Mary University of London) regarding their studies. In other words, they perceive university degree as something that they invest in, and this investment must provide returns in terms of increasing their chances to find a job after graduation. “They expect to use the degree in order to have a career in something they have chosen and studied” (Lecturer C, London South Bank University); “They just want to get a degree because they think it’s important to them to get a better job afterwards” (Lecturer A, University of Glasgow). It is necessary to mention that most of the academics illustrated a sense of tolerance towards such expectations of students. Phrases such as ‘I understand’, ‘fair enough’, ‘I don’t want to blame students either’, are often used when speaking of the described earlier desires of students. However, at the same time, most of the students, according to academics, crucially became less interested in intellectual side of their studies.

“They’re maybe not particularly interested in the subject...” (Lecturer H, University of Glasgow);

“Implicitly everybody who comes to university wants to come for knowledge, but with that said, I think in reality, in actual practice...the government reforms created this system which stultified students’ creativity” (Lecturer J, University of Glasgow).

Moreover, it’s been also mentioned by the academics that most of the students are worried about getting the degree as fast as possible. “Oh, we need to get first, we need to get first” and they study “just for the sake of passing” the course (Lecturer J, University of Glasgow). In addition to this, students prefer “not to be challenged with marks and they don’t want to be charged with it...as a whole, this is a destructive system” (Lecturer I, London South Bank University); “we are paying for these degrees, we deserve a good mark” (Lecturer J, University of Glasgow). In fact, this kind of an approach by some students, which is considered to be prevailing in universities, according to academics, gives an impression that

students tend to think of the degree as a product that they purchase. Most of them do not realize that they are paying for the “opportunity to achieve this degree” (Lecturer H, University of Glasgow) and not for the guaranteed degree. This discussion closely resembles the discourse of ‘students as consumers’ described in the CDA of the UK articles (Chapter 9).

Considering the previous point, it seems to be possible to claim that the technologies of domination affected the students’ attitudes towards higher education, which seems to change the relationship between students and lecturers. Students start to perceive academics more as service providers and this service seems to be not assessed in accordance with the intellectual development that they have a chance to get. In fact, such a transformation of power relations between students and academics might have caused even further distancing of academics from the practices of teaching. As mentioned earlier, academics seem to be favouring the practices of researching and those related to managerialism more than teaching and the previous discussion on students’ expectations from higher education strengthens this proposition even to a greater extent.

Conclusion

It can be claimed that the technologies of domination, that is, the UK Government has initiated a reality which seems to perceive higher education as a factory that requires the production of subjects who would be first and foremost useful for the strengthening of economic welfare of the country. It can be argued that this is the overall discourse that’s functioning as the “truth” (Foucault 1997, p. 194) of contemporary higher education in the UK. This discourse or the knowledge or the regime of truth in fact is an “instrument and an effect of power” (Foucault, 1998, p. 100). It is an instrument for the lecturers and used by them in their practices and at the same time it is to a large extent the effect of technologies of domination. This regime of truth, on the one hand, “transmits and produces power” (Foucault, 1998, p. 100), which are the practices of lecturers demonstrated above, enabled by the contemporary regime of truth. However, on the other hand, this regime of truth “undermines and exposes” (ibid, p. 101) power, that is, it makes certain practices, which is teaching in our case, to become “fragile” (ibid, p. 101). Finally, in an era of governmentality, academics can resist such a regime of truth. In other words, this neoliberal regime of truth or the overall discourse of higher education can be “a starting point for an opposing strategy” (Foucault, 1998, p. 100) for the academics.

Academics in the UK prefer to focus more on research first, secondly, on managerialism and only then on teaching. While “no one is pushing” (Olssen, 1999, p. 22), the network of power relations authorized such a situation, produced such a knowledge or discourse or the regime of truth, when lecturers prefer to engage less in the practices of teaching compared to the practices of managerialism and research whenever it is possible. To a certain extent, they seem to comply with the technologies of domination (governmental disciplining) in the UK. However, at the same time, they attempt to make amendments to some of the practices they do not like. This is related to the teaching practices which they try to amend in accordance with what they believe is important. While the government disciplines students to act as consumers and to be largely interested in getting the knowledge and to be less interested in an intellectual engagement with the material, lecturers attempt to resist this perception in teaching practices by talking about the value of critical thinking and to the value of a university as a space of an intellectual exchange. In terms of governmentality, the situation described earlier can be defined as the following: While technologies of domination certainly discipline HE in a specific way, technologies of the self of lecturers comply with the disciplining (in terms of their conduct) to a partial extent only. The snapshot of power operation indicates to this conclusion. The power-knowledge or practice-discourse nexus produces this type of a reality in contemporary higher education of the UK. Higher education is commercialized, adopted a corporate environment, where students behave like consumers and academics attempt to resist it, to a degree that it is possible to resist.

Chapter 12: Interviews with academics in Russia

As it's been explained in methodology (Part 3), it was quite challenging to access Russian academics after February 2022 due to the Russian military re-invasion of Ukraine. My interview request emails to academics across Russia often remained either unanswered or rejected. Nevertheless, it was still possible to conduct seventeen online interviews in total with academics in Russia. Seven interviews have been conducted with the lecturers who had an experience of working in Russian university before, however currently work in one of the universities in the UK. The rest of the interviews (ten) are with the lecturers who currently work in one of the Russian universities. In fact, the interviews with academics who had an experience of working in Russian allowed this research to trace the transformation of the regime of truth of higher education throughout the years, which indeed underwent a certain transformation. This is important, on the one hand, because it confirms the proposition of Foucault (1991) that the regime of truth is in constant influx and being shaped by the power-

knowledge nexus. As such, it was possible to observe how this regime of truth of higher education in Russia “undergoes constant change as new utterances (*enonces*) are added to it” (Foucault in Burchell et al., 1991, p. 54). This information, on the other hand, added more data to understand the current power operation in Russian HE. It was possible to observe which discourses have been transformed, which ones have completely disappeared and what are the roots of the discourses that currently revolve around in Russian HE and connected to the current practices existing in it, which finally illustrates the way power operates in HE and how governmentality is enacted in Russian HE.

The results of the interviews indicate that the current regime of truth of Russian higher education is largely embraced by the ideas of Slavophilism however there are narratives of neoliberalism as well (Chapters 6, 10). The goal of the Russian Government while disciplining HE as discussed before (Chapter 10) is to produce a subject (a citizen) who would be loyal to the state (the promoted understanding of patriotism), and crucially would not question the ideas of it. At the same time, the target of the government is to produce a subject who would be also useful in strengthening the technological industry of Russia, which to an extent resembles the narratives of the UK Government, because it is also inclined towards the development of economic welfare of the country. This approach implemented by Russia can also be viewed as not neoliberal because the economic gaps that are targeted to be fulfilled are identified not by the market as it is in the UK, but often by the President of Russia. Roughly speaking, if one day, the interests of Vladimir Putin change towards improving the other sphere apart from technological industry, then Russian HE would be inclined towards producing the subjects who would be working towards improving that new direction. However, this argument can be countered by claiming that it is not clear if certain politicians or a certain class of people in the UK have vested interests in the current neoliberal model of governing in the UK or not. What is certainly the case is that the UK HE is being disciplined in accordance with neoliberal values and Government applies the neoliberal rule of governing to higher education and the same can be said regarding the governing of HE in Russia as well. Undoubtedly, in Russia it is implemented to a lesser degree, but it exists and has been demonstrated in Chapter 10 in the section of technologies entrepreneurship. All these points, both related to the promotion of Slavophilism and selective neoliberalism, have been confirmed by the lecturers during the interviews. The interviews with lecturers were crucial to get an understanding on the practices that exist in Russian HE, to obtain an information on the “power networks” (Foucault, 1980, p. 122)

within the universities they work in. In other words, it was important to detect the dominating power-knowledge nexus in HE.

The interviewed academics have touched upon their own practices to a large extent, but they also elaborated on the practices that they observe both from students and from the administrative staff at universities. As it becomes evident from the interviews, despite an increasingly centralized and hierarchical institutional context, the practices of academics are to a certain extent dominated by the knowledges that they perceive as important, not the government. In fact, this confirms that it is possible to speak of power operation in Russian higher education as located within the episteme of governmentality. The academics have freedom to deviate from the imposed discourses and practices of the Russian Government.

Certainly, most of the practices and discourses in HE are the ones initiated by the technologies of domination, however, there is a huge resistance from the academics to them. As such, the dispersed power produces the practices of self-censorship of lecturers, the administrative work, the lectureship ability, the students as passive and obedient learners, which all reflect the narratives of Slavophilism and will be explained later. Nevertheless, there are certain neoliberal attitudes towards HE developed by the Russian Government which will be described in the next section. At the same time, the existing regime of truth also produces a resistance by the academics towards it. As such, it is possible to speak of and “ongoing chaotic struggle between different forces” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 101) in Russian HE. Interestingly, while in the UK the resistance of academics seems to adopt rather fatalistic attitude towards neoliberalism and the way HE is moving, in Russia academics try to resist government policies to a greater extent. When it comes to the situation in Russian HE, since there are less possible “subject positions” (Olssen, 1999, p. 31) that academics could take (see below), their resistance produces more deviation from the government’s policies in regards to HE. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first one demonstrates the overall views of lecturers on HE and the remaining three sections focus the practices that academics are engaged in.

The overall views of lecturers on HE

While describing the situation in contemporary higher education, all the interviewed academics referred to the issues discussed in the critical discourse analysis of the articles published by the MSHE (Chapter 10). The discourses of patriotism, technical sciences (primarily directed towards the strengthening of economic welfare of Russia) along with the

compulsory teaching of Russian history were mentioned. The module on Russian history is “compulsory for all the students in all universities” (Lecturer, Irkutsk State University). Furthermore, according to respondents, the domination of all these discourses and practices is expected to be strengthened considering the Russian military aggression in Ukraine. “It is clear that probably, now, in the current conditions, the patriotic component will be strengthened, at the same time...there will be...growth of IT specialties” (Lecturer, Chelyabinsk State University). The support of technical sciences and the pressuring of social sciences is clearly evident in the following quote: “One of our Vice-Chancellors has such an idea to unite all the humanities, including lawyers, economists, social sciences, philologists, foreign languages into one faculty. And we perfectly well understand that this is a completely different funding, a huge reduction in funding” (Lecturer K, Tyumen State University). In addition, there is also a hostile relation towards something that can be defined as “pro-European, pro-Western” (Lecturer L, Tyumen State University). As she mentions “some programs, now, are being closed, because they don’t like their names as they are too liberal...”.

Furthermore, there is “the emasculation of all democratic procedures” (Lecturer, Moscow State University, currently University of Warwick) within administration of the university. According to this lecturer “formally the Charter of the university provides incredible democracy at all levels” (ibid). For instance, the staff of the department formally elects its head, however, after everyone voted, there is the “approval procedure and the academic council. They can say yes, we approve the candidate or we do not approve for such and such reasons and that’s it” (ibid). As such, if we put it differently, the messages that are conveyed here is that there is democracy on paper, however, on practice there is the system that is hierarchically constructed.

On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, there is an attention from the Russian Government towards the promotion of technical sciences. This support is being tightened to the strengthening of national economy. As one of the interviewees notes, there is an attempt to “produce personnel for the real sector of the economy...of course, there will be the growth of IT specialties” (Lecturer, Chelyabinsk State University). The focus on STEM related subjects as well as on economic issues, can be noticed here and closely resembles the situation in the UK HE. “In the first place, the natural sciences are prioritized, that is, everything related to geological exploration, space development, IT sphere and so on” (Lecturer, Perm State University). The aim of the Russian Government as another lecturer

mentions is to produce “a technological breakthrough in the Russian Federation” (Irkutsk State University). Let us reinstate that the primary aim here is to strengthen the economic welfare of the country. In this sense, apart from prioritizing STEM subjects, the Russian Government also “demands collaboration between universities and employers...corporate universities are gaining popularity in Russia” (Lecturer, Chelyabinsk State University). At this point, the similarity between the systems developed in the UK and in Russia is quite evident. Apprenticeship programs promoted in the UK closely resemble the described strategy of the Russian Government in relation to HE. Continuing the lines on Russian HE, another lecturer notes that the government views it as “necessary to invest, first of all, into technologies, in all those industries that will later help to strengthen the economy” (Perm State University). Considering these points, it seems to be possible to speak of the existence of governmentality (neoliberal rule of governing) towards higher education in Russia as well. Perhaps, one of the most illustrative comments of lecturers in this regard is the following:

“It seems to me that the state needs specialists from higher education. Qualitatively prepared specialists who will be market-oriented, who will be able to find themselves in this market...that is, they will be able to bring benefits to the economy of the country” (Lecturer M, Tyumen State University).

Reference to the market orientation of students is a direct indication of neoliberal values practiced by the government in Russia in relation to higher education. In elaboration on the reasons behind the adoption of such a policy in Russia, most of the lecturers referred to the point that Russia needs to be globally competitive, especially, in technical advances. As one of the respondents mentioned “in general, of course, these goals are connected with reaching a certain international level” (Lecturer, Irkutsk State University). At this point, it is worth remembering the argument of Lewis (2020) that “the system of power developed in Russia under Vladimir Putin was always penetrated by and interwoven with a globalised economy...” (p. 2) (Chapter 6). On the other hand, there is a point, raised by the lecturer who had experience of working in Russian university before, more precisely, in Perm National Research Polytechnic University and who claims that “the link between education and job is very very weak in Russia” (now in University of Oxford). At this point, it is necessary to remember the point of Foucault (1991) that the regime of truth is in constant influx and being shaped by the power-knowledge nexus. As such, in relation to the situation in Russian HE, it seems to be possible to claim that the contemporary governing of HE in Russia is putting more weight than before on issues such as economic welfare, market,

competitiveness, collaborations with different industries (primarily STEM related). In fact, all these factors are evident in the UK HE as well and as such it is also possible to speak of the existence of governmentality in Russia. Certainly, the degree of it is less than in the UK, however it exists and has consequences on the operation of power in Russian HE, especially in regard to the conduct of students (technologies of the self), which is again quite similar to the one existing in the UK.

Continuing the lines above, according to the interviewed lecturers, students in Russian universities became less interested in an intellectual engagement with the material and come to university primarily for the sake of getting a better job opportunity in future if they have a university degree. This is precisely what the lecturers in the UK were talking about as well (Chapter 11). I will speak about this in detail in the next section of this chapter as the decrease in the interest of students in the course material seems to be more connected with the discourse of upbringing (*'vospitanie'*) rather than with the discourse of neoliberalism that the Russian Government attempts to submit higher education to. What is important, at this point, is the fact, that students in the UK and in Russia seem to adopt similar attitude towards their studies which can be interpreted as the following: the difference in core goals does not necessarily mean the difference in results. In other words, despite the fact, that the Russian Government is adopting a different strategy towards HE than the UK (even though there are certain similarities discussed above), the conduct of people, specifically students, is quite similar regarding their studies in both countries.

Concluding this section, it is necessary to reinstate that the governing of Russian HE has two layers of focus: one of neoliberalism and one of authoritarianism (inclined towards Slavophilism). I have discussed the issues related to the neoliberalism, let is now turn our attention to the practices existing in Russian HE as described by the interviewed lecturers which all indicate to the existence of authoritarian rule of governing of higher education in Russia as well.

The practice of lectureship

Most of the interviewed lecturers whether they currently work in one of the Russian universities or not, referred to the fact that the setting of classrooms in the university they worked in or currently work, is inclined towards the development of the ability to just speak on your own and not to interact with students. This is what can be defined as the 'lectureship' (Lecturer, Moscow State University, currently University of Warwick) which is to a certain

extent initiated by the setting of the classroom. It is necessary to briefly explain what is to be understood by the setting of the classroom. As such, the desks of most of the classrooms in Russian universities according to the interviewed academics, are put in accordance with the design of an auditorium. Nevertheless, most of the academics referred to the point that such a classroom setting not only provokes the definition of a lecture as “an absolute and perfect monologue” (Lecturer, Moscow State University, currently University of Warwick), but also crucially strengthens the distance in the relationship between students and lecturers. As one of the lecturers mentioned “this is some kind of an army order...which breaks the communication” (Lecturer K, Tyumen State University). Another academic describes this as “I would even say that I am simply infuriated by the design of our classrooms” (Lecturer L, Tyumen State University). It is interesting to notice that these types of classrooms exist in the UK as well, but the interviewed academics in the UK did not consider this factor. Perhaps, this is because the relationship that exists between students and lecturers in the UK significantly differs from the one existing in Russia.

Following the lines above, in Russia, there is a strong hierarchical relationship between students and academics. This is not the case in the UK HE where, as one of the academics mentioned the goal is “kind of putting the teacher on equal grounds with the students...to make students much more active learners rather than passive recipients” (Lecturer C, London South Bank University). In fact, within the UK higher education, as another respondent claimed, it all got to the point where “we need to be clear that the university is not a debating club or is not a conversation in a pub...” (Lecturer B, University of Glasgow). This situation in combination with the explained in the previous chapter, demands of students, possibly resulted in dislike of teaching practices by the lecturers in the UK (Chapter 11). The Russian case is completely different from it and perhaps the following quote is the most illustrative in this context:

As a student “you have to listen a lot. You have to read a lot before you even get the right to say something about some of your own ideas and put forward some kind of hypothesis or judgements. You must first deeply study what has been done for you, before you. You have to digest the textbook, you have to digest the lectures, you have to read a set of books. The more you read, the better. So you have to be a ‘walking encyclopaedia’” (Lecturer, Moscow State University, currently University of Warwick).

As it can be observed, the student in Russia is expected to listen to the lecturer, first and foremost and only then, maybe allowed to express his or her opinion. In this context, the design of classrooms becomes a considerable aspect to consider because it strengthens the

discussed hierarchical relationship between students and lecturers. As one of the lecturers notes: “it is just a discipline for the sake of discipline where you need to be just doing what was said...which is, in principle, an army order” (Lecturer M, Tyumen State University). Consequently, the classroom design which is “just incredibly disciplining” (Lecturer K, Tyumen State University), also “doesn’t promote any sort of normal communication” (Lecturer, Perm State University). This, according to lecturers, results in a situation when students become passive learners, who rarely have the skills of an independent critical thinking. There is “this inability to independently analyse information” (Lecturer, Perm State University). The described circumstances do not “give the opportunity to form a good analytical apparatus” (Lecturer, Perm National Research Polytechnic University). The aim of most students is to “kind of accumulate the material, pour it into yourself, try not to spill it on your way to the exam and that’s it” (Lecturer, Moscow State University, currently University of Warwick). Students become less intellectually engaged with the course material and “who come just to get a ‘*korochka*’⁴” (Lecturer K, Tyumen State University). In this context, it is possible to speak of the aim of the government in HE to fashion “individuals to lead docile and practical lives” (Olssen, 1999, p. 29) as Foucault would probably describe it.

As it can be observed the dispersed power within the university is inextricably linked to the discourse of hierarchy between students and teachers. This discourse of hierarchy, according to the interviewed academics, is reinforced by the classroom organization. As such, classroom organization is an “instrument and an effect of power” (Foucault, 1998, p. 100). It is an instrument of technologies of domination. However, as mentioned before, there is also technologies of the self, that can consent to the imposed disciplining or can resist it. In fact, all the interviewed lecturers are on the side of resistance.

According to academics, these types of auditorium classrooms are usually selected for the lectures and “you cannot really change it, there is no way to change it” (Lecturer L, Tyumen State University). In these cases, even if lecturers attempt to promote active learning, discussion and communication during the lectures, it is still really hard for them as there are “too many students in the classroom” (Lecturer M, Tyumen State University) and because students are not really used to engage in any sort of discussion (see the illustrative quote above). In these conditions, lecturers, firstly, attempt to reduce the number of lectures overall

⁴ The translation of ‘*korochka*’ (which is the diminutive of ‘*korka*’) is ‘crust’ (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023) which in this case implies ‘graduate diploma’

and increase the number of seminars. As one of lecturers mentioned, the emphasis is to promote “more seminars” (Lecturer, Irkutsk State University). Secondly, during the seminars, lecturers often ask students to rearrange the lined-up order of the desks so that they can sit in the circle. For instance, a lecturer K from Tyumen State University notes that he “started the seminars by asking students to arrange their desks in a circle”. In addition, to this, various teaching methods are implemented to develop the critical thinking skills of students. These includes the introduction of courses such as “academic reading” (Lecturer N, Tyumen State University); the “promotion of group work” (Lecturer, Perm State University). Nevertheless, all the respondents appealed to the fact that it is quite challenging to obtain positive results as most of the students continue to “give up on any sort of discussion” in the classrooms (Lecturer, Chelyabinsk State University) and prefer to stick with the conventional for Russian HE way of behaving.

As it can be observed there are various discourses that revolve around the Russian higher education among which the ‘hierarchy between students and lecturers’, ‘students as passive uncritical learners’ can be possibly detected as the dominant ones. Academics refer to the design of the classrooms that in their views reinforces the domination of the mentioned discourses. In fact, it is quite complicated and even to an extent impossible to find the starting point of all the discourses and practices. What is certainly possible, on the other hand, is to demonstrate the way the discourses and practices are interconnected, that is, to provide a snapshot of practice-discourse nexus, a snapshot of power operation in HE. The goal is to demonstrate how one discourse is connected to another, what practices are linked to them and what are the practices that are produced either through the consent of those people who exercise them or through the resistance. In fact, this research demonstrates the relation to “a whole series of power networks” (Foucault, 1980, p. 122). The practices and discourses are interdependent, and it is not clear which one causes another to emerge, however, what is certainly clear is that there is an “ongoing chaotic struggle between different forces” (Danaher et al., 2000, p. 101).

In this section, the thesis illustrates the struggle between the discourses of “hierarchy between students and lecturers”, ‘students as passive and uncritical learners’ and the practices of academics that are inclined to resist the domination of those discourses. Academics attempt to reduce their practice of lectureship and provide more room for the students to voice their opinions on various subject matters and this practice is inclined towards dismantling the hierarchy between lecturers and students. In fact, the attempt of the

Russian Government to strengthen the hierarchical relationship in HE, is evident within the university as well, specifically, in the practices of administration which will be discussed later in this chapter. Before moving to this analysis, it is necessary to speak of another practice of lecturers caused by the struggle of other discourses. This is the practice of self-censorship exercised by the academics during the lectures and seminars.

The practice of self-censorship

While speaking of the practice of self-censorship exercised by academics in Russian HE, it is necessary to mention that this issue has been emphasized primarily by those academics who currently work in Russian HE. On the contrary, those who do not currently work in one of the Russian universities, claimed that during their time of working, it was possible to speak of almost anything during the lectures and seminars. As one of the lecturers mentioned, even when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, he and his students in the classroom (and this was Moscow State University), referred to those actions of the government “as madness and savagery, however no one knocked on our door, no one wrote anything to me, called me anywhere and did not call me for any conversations either at the department, or at the dean’s office or anywhere at all” (Lecturer, Moscow State University, currently University of Warwick). As such, it can be claimed that the discourse of free speech during the lectures was quite dominant before in Russian HE.

To a certain extent, this discourse of free speech in classrooms of Russian universities continues to circulate in Russia, however the dominance of it, seems to gradually evaporate. While discussing it, quite a few interviewed lecturers used the phrase ‘so far’ (Lecturer K, Tyumen State University) in relation to the freedom of speech. “So far, it is more or less free” (Lecturer K, Tyumen State University); “so far, thanks God, no one interfered into what we say in the audience” (Lecturer, Perm State University). However, there is an interesting relatively new practice occurred from the students that seems to limit the freedom of speech of lecturers and promote the practice of self-censorship. Many of interviewed academics referred to the point that they are afraid that their opinions on various subject matters may be recorded by the students and used against them later on. The following quote seems to be the most illustrative in this context:

“Perhaps what can be called self-censorship already exists. We understand that there is no need to speak about some things, because this can cause potential conflicts. There is no organization within university that we need to report what we say to our students. However, there is this idea that in the current conditions, there might be a need to

soften some corners while speaking. This has been probably caused by some precedents...when you hear stories, for example, there is a teacher who said something during the lesson and the student recorded it on his or her phone and then prosecutor's office came to sort this out" (Lecturer, Chelyabinsk State University).

The previous references to students who can possibly record the voices of lecturers and then post it somewhere, were made by most of the academics who currently work in one of the Russian universities. For instance, another lecturer mentions that "what is true, is that students are now recording and posting anything anywhere" (Lecturer, Perm State University). As such, the practice of self-censorship begins to dominate among the lecturers. Moreover, this limitation of freedom of speech of academics expands even beyond the classroom. Regarding this, one of the respondents referred to the point, that as an academic you cannot really post anything critical on social media. As the lecturer N from Tyumen State University mentions "one of my colleagues, actively uses social media and actively criticizes the actions of the government...in March he was asked, they didn't even ask, but directly put an ultimatum that he should leave the university...".

While it is possible to link the previous case to the direct intervention of the Russian government into the affairs of lecturers, more precisely, to the freedom of speech, the situation with students who supposedly record the opinions of lecturers is more complicated. One might reasonably ask, why do students behave in this way while no one is pushing them to do so? Perhaps, the most interesting answer provided to this question was given by the academic who does not currently work in Russian higher education. She claimed that in Russia: "You know I think the word that comes to my mind is diligence which has a very rich historical context in our society...on the one hand, there is such a recognition of the power of the other, but on the other hand, there is also a sufficient energy of zeal and almost sincerity in the reproduction of this general discourse" (Lecturer, European University at Saint Petersburg, currently, University of St Andrews). In other words, the messages that is conveyed by the lecturer here closely resemble the ideas of Slavophilism explained in Chapters 6 and 10, when people not only accept the absolute power of the ruler but moreover demonstrate a sincerity in helping the ruler to stay in the power unless he or she doesn't intervene into their affairs. Since students are relatively free of governmental intervention in terms of the freedom of speech as this has not been mentioned by the lecturers as the issue that exists in Russian HE, it seems to be possible to state that students, in fact, sincerely believe that their actions of recording the voices of academics is the correct way of behaving. Nevertheless, whether the previous argument can be considered as truth in this context or not is another question. What is certainly the case is that there is the practice of self-

censorship that lecturers exercise which is largely caused by the students and by the Russian Government.

As it was the case in the previous section, it is possible to notice a “whole series of power networks” (Foucault, 1980, p. 122) regarding the practice of self-censorship of lecturers in Russian HE. There are various practices both by students and the government that initiate the self-censorship of academics, which certainly, they try to resist. However, while in the case of lectureship discussed before some resistance is possible, in the case of self-censorship, there is no other way rather than “learning to survive” (Lecturer K, Tyumen State University) as one of the academics mentioned. The final practice described by academics during the interviews, is the practice of administrative work.

The practice of administrative work

The administrative work has been mentioned by all the interviewed academics whether they currently work in one of the Russian universities or not. As it is in the case in the UK, academics in Russian HE are also expected to take administrative work. However, this practice differs from the one existing in the UK, firstly, by the fact that while in the UK, it is usually included in the contract as one of duties of the academics, in Russia it is not. As the lecturer from Perm National Research Polytechnic University stated “nothing about the administrative work is mentioned in Russian contracts”. Moreover, while in the UK, as it has been mentioned earlier, the administrative work, can play a role in a promotional criteria, this is not the case in Russian higher education as well. As such, while in the UK, lecturers are expected to take three “subject positions” (Olssen, 1999, p. 31), in Russia it is usually two, which are teaching and administration. Along these lines, conducting research is also expected from the academics in Russia in the recent years as one of respondents claimed however it is a relatively new phenomenon that has occurred with the project called “5-100-2020” the central goal of which was levelling up the standard of higher education in Russia so that at least five Russian universities could enter the top 100 of one of the world university rankings by 2020. As such, the lecturer from Irkutsk State University mentions “sometimes, high ratings in academics journals are also set as a goal”. Nevertheless, the practice of research was rarely mentioned by the Russian academics during the interviews.

Continuing the discussion on the administrative work, all the interviewed lecturers referred to it as practice that is expected from them and the amount of that work is increasing every year. As the lecturer from Moscow State University stated there is “an increase in the flow

of administrative reporting”. As it can be noticed from the previous words, administrative work in Russian HE implies reporting to the higher positioned staff of university. This reporting is often about the “educational standards” (Lecturer, Moscow State University) or about the syllabus of the modules (Lecturer L, Tyumen State University). In this context, the key point that seems to deserve attention is the fact, that the administrative work implies reporting to the higher positioned staff of a university. In other words, it is the practice of building a vertical hierarchical power within the university. As the lecturer from Moscow State University noticed “we, in fact, reported every step to the central reception”⁵ and he continues that this practice was usually explained to them by the argument that it “ensures the greatest efficiency, the greatest, so to speak, legitimacy of the process”. In this context, it is possible to speak of an attempt of the Russian Government to gain more control over the affairs of academics. As the lecturer L from Tyumen State University mentions, throughout recent years there was “gradual centralization of management...the autonomy of the faculties was gradually evaporating”. It is also worth mentioning that both systems (the UK and Russian) include higher level of administration to support the central goals of their governing of HE, the difference is the end goal. In the UK HE, it is being applied to promote neoliberalism and in the Russian HE it is being done to secure authoritarianism.

Foucault (as cited in Rabinow, 1984) would probably refer to the previously mentioned exercise of power in the Russian HE as one that “represses” (p. 194). It is a top-down strict hierarchical power. Nevertheless, it also “produces; it produces reality, it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault as cited in Rabinow, 1984, p. 205). The first ritual of truth that it has produced is the administrative work itself, in other words, the practices. However, and this is one of the crucial points of this section, in an era of governmentality, it is also about the reflections of people (technologies of the self) to the imposed practices and discourses. The following quote seems to be the most illustrative in this context:

“And still there is some room for manoeuvre. The head deans understand that some minimum of autonomy is important, because students’ needs change and their ideas about what they need also change. And if you would just impose on them from above what the ministry or administration says, we won’t get anything good from it either, everyone understands this very well” (Lecturer M, Tyumen State University)

As it can be observed, there is a clear understanding that this hierarchical exercise of control over the educational standards, syllabuses of modules won’t probably provide positive results. In fact, many of the interviewed lecturers referred to this practice of administrative

⁵ Reception implies an administrative committee of the university

work using the phrase of ‘formality’. As the lecturer (Moscow State University) elaborates on it “the reality was that for the most part, everyone understood that this process was formal”. As such, it all got to the point when “nobody looks at the content of these reports, nobody cares about the content. The main thing is that the front page should be formulated correctly so that all the competencies are spelled out there” (Lecturer K, Tyumen State University). However, on the other hand, it can also be claimed that this practice of administrative work certainly takes time, and this has been mentioned by the lecturers as well. Some of the academics, as the lecturer K from Tyumen State University notes “ask teaching assistants to fulfil those tasks instead of us. We provide passwords of our personal pages, and we ask them, on our behalf to complete all the necessary documents that are constantly required from us. And then we ourselves pay extra money from our pockets to these teaching assistants”.

Concluding these notes on the practice of administrative work that is required from the lecturers in Russian HE, it is necessary to mention that there is certainly an attempt from the technologies of domination to control the affairs of lecturers regarding the syllabuses of their modules, the educational standards, however, as mentioned before in the thesis, within the episteme of governmentality, the technologies of the self play a considerable role in an actual practice-discourse nexus that is revolving in the society. To use the words of Danaher et al (2000), in an “ongoing chaotic struggle between different forces” in Russian higher education the practice of administrative work, the discourse of hierarchical control seems to be gradually dominated by the preferred practices of lecturers.

Conclusion

As it can be observed from the previous analysis, there is indeed “a whole series of power networks” (Foucault, 1980, p. 122) that embrace the universities the academics work in. It is evident that there is an attempt of the Russian Government to discipline HE along with everyone involved in it, in a certain centralized hierarchical way that is supplemented by the aims of producing the subject who would work towards the fulfilling the goals set out by the head of this hierarchy. Students are expected to be patriotic, inclined towards technical sciences and alien towards anything liberal, democratic, Western. As one of the lecturer notes “there are no individual oriented principles in this system at all” (Lecturer, Irkutsk State University). Compared to the UK HE, it is possible to claim that this type of higher education can also be regarded as a factory, however this factory has two layers of focus:

neoliberalism and authoritarianism. Apart from producing the previously mentioned reality or the regime of truth, this power also produced the resistance of lecturers. This resistance at seems to overlay the disciplinary practices promoted by the government. In fact, apart from self-censorship, other practices of lecturers seem to deviate from the governmental disciplining to a considerable extent. This could be possible only in a place that has the freedom even if it is limited. As such, it seems to be possible again to speak of an episteme of governmentality in Russian HE as well. Perhaps since the number of the possible “subject positions” (Olssen, 1999, p. 31) that academics can take in Russian HE is less than in the UK, the resistance of Russian academics seems to be closer to the change of the system overall, which is closer to what Foucault (1980) referred to when spoke about the non-definitive liberty (Chapter 4).

Chapter 13 - Conclusion

Let us go back to the main research question of this thesis: how is governmentality enacted in higher education of two different political regimes? My goal was to understand the logic of two different systems in terms of the way governments discipline the area of HE and consequently, students and academics. I was expecting the results to be completely different as the political regimes of Russia and the UK are different to a substantial extent. There are indeed critical differences which I will sum up in the next few paragraphs. However, it is also possible to come across the surprising commonalities when we talk of the way these regimes attempt to discipline higher education systems overall. Firstly, governmentality exists in both governments’ attempts to discipline HE. Secondly, the attitude of students towards HE and the thoughts of academics about HE in the UK are quite similar to the ones existing in the Russian HE. Leaving these points aside for now, let us, firstly, talk about the existence of governmentality in both countries’ attempts to discipline higher education and consequently, students and academics.

Referring back to my conceptualization of governmentality, governmentality is a way of governing that attempts to discipline a society using the principles of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism, on the other hand, implies the rule of market. As such, governmentality is the way of governing that attempts to discipline a population so that citizens can be guided by the rule of market. Neoliberalism requires individuals to be “competitive, entrepreneurial, individualistic and individually responsible actors: or so called *homo-economicus*” (Duncan, 2022, p. 496). However, there is also space for individuals to deviate from this disciplining.

This freedom is exercised, to various degrees, by academics in both countries' higher education systems, which I will speak of later in this chapter.

As evident from this research, governmentality exists in both countries' higher education systems. Certainly, it is possible to claim that it exists in the UK HE to a larger extent than in the Russian one. However, it is important to emphasize that governmentality is enacted in both countries' higher education systems. This is because, the political regimes of both states, despite being considerably different, still have certain common points of focus which revolve around neoliberal values. It is necessary to understand that in Russia, where there is an excessive authoritarian rule of governing, neoliberalism is also existent. This is not because the Russian Government decided to adopt or implement a neoliberal form of governing (governmentality) alongside the authoritarian one; in many respects, neoliberalism inserted itself into Russian society with the sudden end of Soviet Union in 1991. In this sense, neoliberal governing was an inevitability for Russia rather than a planned way of governing. As such, it is not that the Russian Government adopted governmentality as a way to discipline higher education. It is rather that the Russian Government had to adapt to the existence of neoliberalism in Russia in the beginning of 1990s (Chapter 6). When it comes to the situation in the UK, the dominance of neoliberalism can be regarded as starting from the times of Margaret Thatcher (1979) even though the roots of neoliberalism in the UK go back to the mid twentieth century (Chapters 5). The question now arises: how is governmentality enacted in higher education of both countries?

Both states attempt to connect higher education to its usefulness in increasing the economic welfare of their countries. More accurately, both governments attempt to demonstrate the importance of connecting higher education with the market economy. This directly confirms the existence of neoliberal values as evidenced in the many references to the market by the UK and Russian ministries of education. In other words, we see evidence of the marketization of higher education. However, this is more of a case in the UK higher education rather than in the Russian one. All the discourses identified through the critical discourse analysis of the articles of the UK Department of Education provide evidence for this argument. These are the discourses of students as consumers, apprenticeship programs, STEM subjects which are all directly and, at times, indirectly, connected to the issue of marketisation of higher education.

The situation in Russian HE is different in this respect. There is one discourse that could be related to the marketisation of higher education, and this is the discourse of technological entrepreneurship often mentioned in the articles published by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of Russia. Nevertheless, the level of marketisation of higher education should not be downgraded in Russia. As it is evident from the interviews conducted with the lecturers in Russian universities, the Russian Government often demands universities to collaborate with employers and to be market oriented, especially in relation to the sciences related to STEM subjects. In addition to this, as one of the interviewees claimed, there is a growing popularity of corporate universities in Russia. Considering all these points, it seems feasible to claim that there are certain similarities between the disciplining of HE in both states. To summarize the previous points, governments in both countries attempt to marketize higher education, which is an attempt to discipline HE under the rule of neoliberalism, that is, of governmentality. The extent of it seems to be higher in the UK HE than in the Russian one. However, it is certainly the case that there is governmentality in HE in both countries.

Alongside the mentioned marketization of HE, the Russian Government also attempts to discipline HE, more precisely, students and academics, using the ideas of Slavophilism. This involves the promotion of the discourse of patriotic upbringing, technical sciences as connected to the development of military industry, and student communities or student clubs. It seems appropriate to argue that all the mentioned discourses are related to the disciplining of Slavophilism, because, crucially, they promote the loyalty to the Russian state. The loyalty to state, in its turn, involves the values which are quite similar to the ones of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Among many of the values of ROC, the key value that stands out is placing the ruler of Russia almost at the same level as God, if not higher, and providing him or her with absolute power (Chapter 6). When we think of the reasons behind such a disciplining, embraced by the ideas of Slavophilism, it seems to be possible to argue that this is done to allow the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, to stay in power for as long as possible – a key feature of an authoritarian political regime. Along these lines, it is interesting to consider the conduct of some of the students in Russia who, according to the interviewed academics, at times, have audio and video recorded some academics who have voiced (from their perspective) unpatriotic sentiments. This can later lead to a prosecutor investigation at the university. This results in a practice of self-censorship of academics in Russia. Considering these points, it seems possible to argue that the disciplining existent in Russian HE may in fact provide the results the Russian Government seems to desire.

Finally, it is also necessary to point out that there is always a freedom to deviate from the governmental disciplining and this was one of key points of Foucault when he was elaborating on the notion of subject, defined as the technologies of the self. In other words, according to Foucault, we are largely, produced by the nexus of practice-discourse or power-knowledge circulating in a society and this nexus often depends on the governmental disciplining or as he puts it “subject to constant economic and political incitement...” (Foucault as cited in Rabinow, 1984, p. 73). In this respect, the disciplining existing both in the UK and in Russia in relation to higher education initiates a situation when the conduct and thoughts of students and academics are not simply tied to their “own values, habits and beliefs” (Dean, 2002, p. 50). This is evident not only from the described conduct of students in both countries, but also from the thoughts of academics about the role of higher education overall. As such, my research showed that a number of academics in both countries are unhappy with the governmental disciplining of HE and prefer to view it as a place where knowledge is created rather than simply transmitted to students. The question now is the following: Can this unhappiness lead to the conduct that would contradict the imposed governmental disciplining or we are just docile subjects?

In fact, the earlier works of Foucault were criticized precisely because he used to refer to subjects as “dead” (McNay, 1994, p. 129). Nevertheless, in his later works, he slightly changed the direction of his line of thinking and claimed that people can deviate from the imposed disciplining to a certain degree and referred to this ability through the concept of the technologies of the self. In this respect, academics in both countries tend to deviate from the governmental disciplining in terms of their conduct in universities. The interviewed lecturers in the UK often appeared to prioritize research and managerial work over the practice of teaching. This is because the practice of teaching, as they view it, often implies the transmission of knowledge rather than the creation of it and moreover, they dislike the behaviour of students who tend to be passive learners, interested in graduating as soon as possible. Nevertheless, since they cannot completely avoid the teaching practices, they try to change the described attitudes of students through their teaching practices. The interviewed academics in Russia, on the other hand, since they do not usually have research practices, and managerial work is often not included in their contracts overall, tend to solely focus on their teaching practices and change them to a degree that it is possible to change. They are introducing various exercises which as they hope will enable more active and critical learning of students, who are also passive learners as the interviewed academics claimed. Along these lines, the passive learning of students in Russian HE isn't solely

connected to their interest to graduate as soon as possible (as it is in the UK HE) but also to the design of the classrooms (linear set up of desks) in Russian HE. This creates a regimented, army-like order that impedes the ability to independently analyse the information, as reported by one of the interviewed academics. Academics in Russian HE, as mentioned earlier, attempt to resist the non-critical attitude of students through various active and critical learning exercises. Considering the resistance of academics to the disciplining of HE in both countries it is, in fact, possible to claim that the technologies of the self, have a certain role in the way power operates in HE of both states. Finally, we should not think that the UK system of HE can be characterized by absolute freedom. While the UK system contrasts to the Russian one in terms of the authoritarian controls the government attempts to apply to HE, there are still various practices and discourses that are non-judicially imposed on students and academics that discipline them in specific ways. It is therefore, not possible to speak of an absolute authoritarianism in the Russian HE, or an absolute freedom in the UK HE. In Russia, there is still limited space (at least at the time of this research) for academics to resist governmental disciplining in their teaching practices, while in the UK academics are still constrained by a range of practices that are described by the phenomenon of governmentality. Of course, if we analyse the respective systems from a more traditional, judiciary understanding of power, then it is undeniable that the Russian system is more authoritarian than the UK system in relation to the area of higher education. Nevertheless, as this thesis has sought to underline, both systems enact control over HE, and both systems have varying space for freedom in HE, despite that control.

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Appendix 1 – News Articles Used in CDA

Table 3. Department of Education (DfE) News Articles used in CDA.

Number	Weblinks
1	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/education-secretary-sets-out-aims-for-higher-education
2	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cash-boost-for-apprenticeships-launched
3	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/education-secretary-addresses-universities-uk-conference
4	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/universities-minister-speech-at-festival-of-higher-education
5	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/education-secretary-at-hepi-conference-learning-from-the-crisis
6	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/skills-and-post-16-education-bill-second-reading-opening-speech
7	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/major-overhaul-of-higher-technical-education-announced
8	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/dwp-and-google-join-forces-to-grow-jobseekers-digital-skills
9	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-announces-landmark-campaign-to-inspire-next-generation-of-engineers
10	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/expert-report-every-uk-job-has-the-potential-to-be-green
11	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/universities-minister-calls-for-true-social-mobility
12	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/education-secretary-speech-at-universities-uk-annual-conference
13	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/fairer-higher-education-system-for-students-and-taxpayers
14	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/higher-and-further-education-minister-michelle-donelan-speech-on-the-augar-review
15	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/more-high-quality-degree-alternatives-to-boost-adult-skills-and-job-prospects
16	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/extra-university-places-for-vital-courses-announced
17	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/thousands-more-adults-set-to-benefit-from-new-technical-skills
18	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/skills-boost-to-support-more-people-into-jobs
19	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/short-university-courses-to-provide-flexible-training
20	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/competition-opens-for-new-wave-of-institutes-of-technology
21	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-bursaries-to-help-learners-to-upskill-and-retrain
22	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-rolls-out-flagship-degree-apprenticeships

23	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/top-apprenticeship-employers-for-2022-announced
24	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/building-back-better-with-apprenticeships
25	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/flexible-apprenticeships-to-boost-jobs-in-key-sectors
26	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/call-for-transport-leaders-to-help-super-charge-skills-and-build-future-workforce

Table 4. Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MSHE) News Articles used in CDA.

Number	Weblinks
1	https://www.minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-ministerstva/21840/
2	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-ministerstva/21445/
3	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-ministerstva/25197/
4	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/nauka-i-obrazovanie/25265/
5	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-ministerstva/59646/
6	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-ministerstva/59224/
7	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-ministerstva/40974/
8	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/nauka-i-obrazovanie/40154/
9	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-ministerstva/60263/
10	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-ministerstva/25239/
11	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-podvedomstvennykh-uchrezhdeniy/49651/
12	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-podvedomstvennykh-uchrezhdeniy/47719/
13	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-ministerstva/38927/
14	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-ministerstva/33332/
15	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-podvedomstvennykh-uchrezhdeniy/49866/
16	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/molodezhnaya-politika/47134/
17	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/molodezhnaya-politika/42318/
18	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-ministerstva/21587/
19	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/announcements/57555/
20	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/molodezhnaya-politika/56331/
21	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/obrazovanie/29494/
22	https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-podvedomstvennykh-uchrezhdeniy/47754/

Appendix 2 - Interview Questions Sample

1. Take me through your experience please. Where did you teach? When?
2. What do you think are the general differences between British and Russian HE?
3. How much freedom do you have as a teacher?
4. Do you feel there is any kind of external control that impacts your ability to teach?
5. What are the main objectives of HE in Russia? (in the UK?)
6. Is your teaching monitored in Russia and if yes, then how?
7. How is the classroom organized or structured? (seminars, lectures etc)
8. We have talked about your pathway. Do you think it is reflected in your colleagues' approaches as well?
9. What do you think is better in Russian HE?
10. Are there any issues that you would like to talk about?

