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FOR THE AWARD OF A PH.D. BY PUBLISHED WORK

STATEMENT CONCERNING RESEACH AND PUBLICATION

PREAMBLE AND RESEARCH JOURNEY

It should be noted that my scholastic career falls into two distinct but loosely related parts. From 1964 to 1987 I was engaged in what I term 'environmental history' – urban and rural planning, landscape architecture, architecture, housing, and conservation. I published books, articles and essays on this theme in Britain, Canada and America, along with other ancillary activities, all of which are detailed in my c.v. (already submitted). The period I worked on was roughly the career of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (about 1890 to 1945) and, as already indicated, involving much research in the three North Atlantic countries. I was a pioneer in this field, although I cannot claim any major methodological innovations. My chief contribution in this field was to highlight the 'transatlantic traffic in ideas' (e.g., British ideas on garden cities crossing the Atlantic and American ideas of landscape architecture coming over here). I do not propose to enlarge on this work unless requested to do so. My work in this field was scholarship of the recognised kind and it was of importance for my later and current work on naval history as it gave me research and writing experience which has been invaluable in subsequent years. It gave me, too, a beneficial standing in professional circles and the confidence to tackle a new field. It also helped that I was familiar with the career, character and archives of FDR.

By 1979, I felt I had gone about as far as I could in the above field but felt, too, that I wished to explore further the career of Roosevelt, who had been a major sponsor of environmental concerns, I contacted the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N.Y., for advice. The career of this President is a 'burned over district' but they singled out an area which was relatively untouched – Roosevelt's long and close relationship with the U. S. Navy. This surprised me as FDR had thought of a career in the Navy and had served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy

in the administration of President Woodrow Wilson (1913 to 1920). Even out of office in the 1920s he continued to take an interest in the Navy and when he became President (1933 to 1945) he became in effect his own Secretary of the Navy. I also consulted the doyen of British naval historians, Captain Stephen Roskill, author of the official history of the Royal Navy in the Second World War, and of many other books and articles. He was then the founding Director of the Churchill Archives Centre at Cambridge. Most valuably, he was familiar with the U. S. Navy, its history, archives, personalities and historians, and gave me introductions to some of them. We explored the subject and came to the conclusion that, for a historian based in this country, a study of FDR and the U. S. Navy was not feasible. It was decided that I should edit a series of volumes on Anglo-American Naval Relations between 1917 and 1945. Roskill ‘strong-armed’ me into membership of the Navy Records Society and thus was born the long and fruitful association of the present editor and the Society. I should point out my use of the term ’Relations’ rather than ‘Co-operation’, for while there was undoubtedly co-operation, there was also much division on strategy and tactics, suspicion and distrust, and often awkward personal relations. It has to be borne in mind, too, that Britain and America are sovereign countries, occupying radically different positions on the globe and with different outlooks, resources, structures, policies and interests. These considerations are sometimes overlooked by scholars, perhaps unduly influenced by the warmth of wartime and post-war co-operation.

I could not begin work on naval history full time in 1979 as I had continuing commitments in environmental history. The period 1979 to 1987 was therefore one of transition. I had done a great deal of preliminary work on naval history nevertheless and since 1987 to date I have been fully committed to naval history – indeed I am planning three ‘spin-off’ articles which will go beyond my existing corpus of work.

What follows is not a thesis in the conventional sense but nonetheless fulfils the requirements for one. It is a significant and original body of work, constituting cumulatively more than would be required in a doctoral thesis. It is conventional narrative empirical history with important analyses and observations. It is a distinct contribution to knowledge underpinned by new primary sources, as the whole object of Navy Records Society volumes is to present, often for the first time, original archives, along with analytical commentary, notes and other ancillary features, and learned, deep and often original interpretations. The work has been spread over thirty years and each volume was abreast of the relevant scholarship at the time it was published. Each volume is divided into Parts, each given over to a single topic (such as ‘Anti-Submarine Warfare, October 1943 to May 1945’).

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE PUBLICATIONS

SCHOLARLY APPARATUS

These works are based solidly on extensive archival research in several places in three countries over a 40-year period. The Introductions to the Parts refer to the appropriate documents.

CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

The vast majority of these documents have never seen the light of day. They form the basis of as pyramid of knowledge and other scholars have profited from them. The ones selected are the key papers concerning the subject under discussion. Their inclusion is therefore inescapable. The effort to chronicle and analyse Anglo-American Naval Relation between 1917 and 1945 has never before been attempted.

CLAIMS TO ORIGINALITY

The traditional monograph, like my biography of Cunningham, is heavily footnoted, including original materials as well as a host of secondary works, backed by a substantial bibliography.

In the case of the edited volumes, there is, of course, much primary evidence from which I have analysed and drawn conclusions, formatted in accordance with Navy Records Society practice, with a brief bibliography and footnotes where needed. However, my choices in the editing process are also underpinned by a great deal of further secondary material.

Due to the pioneering nature of this work, I have analysed topics either little referenced or ignored elsewhere, for example the informal co-operation of the U. S. Navy and the Royal Navy on the rivers of China between 1937 and 1939, or the Royal Navy's manpower crisis in the latter half of 1943. I have drawn attention to the need for British strategy in the Mediterranean to be re-thought on the hoof in June 1940. I have highlighted the switch in the Mediterranean from a battle fleet-oriented conflict to one involving smaller ships such as frigates and landing craft in 1942-43. One senses also that the navies became the handmaidens of the armies; in Europe at least, the focus of the war from November 1942 to its close in May 1945 was on the conflict on land, and a vast expansion in land-based air power. The navies and their leaders in the Western Hemisphere were a declining element in the struggle which, at the last, had to be the conquest of much of the European mainland. These are but a few examples of the original contributions and analysis in these works being presented here, all of which combine to provide new scholarly insights, and primary sources in this pivotal period in modern naval history.

In this Statement I have summarised each Part, bringing out the most salient points and findings, setting these as an analytical journey through the Anglo-American naval

relationship which they explore. I have provided references to the Volumes as appropriate, which contain the primary and secondary evidence underpinning these sections.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS INCLUDED

BOOKS:

1) Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917-1919 (Aldershot, 1991, Scolar Press for Navy Records Society). Pp. 648.
2) The Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Sir James Somerville (Aldershot, 1995. Scolar Press for Navy Records Society). Pp. 696.
3) The Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham, volume I, The Mediterranean Fleet, 1939-1942 (Aldershot, 1999, Ashgate for the Navy Records Society). Pp. 634.
4) A Life of Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham: A Twentieth Century Sailor (London, 2004, Routledge). Pp. 310.
5) The Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham, volume II, The Triumph of Allied Sea Power, 1942-1946. (Aldershot, 2006, Ashgate for Navy Records Society). Pp. 435.
6) Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1919-1939 (Aldershot, 2010, Ashgate for Navy Records Society,). Pp. 320.
7) Anglo-American-Canadian Naval Relations, 1943-1945 (London, 2021, Routledge for Navy Records Society). Pp. 491.

Essays

1) The First Sea Lords (ed. M. H. Murfett) (Westport, Conn., & London, 1995), Viscount Cunningham by MAS, Pp. 201-216.

2) Naval Power in the Twentieth Century (ed. N. A. M. Rodger). (Basingstoke, 1996, Macmillan), Wings over the Sea: The Interaction of Air and Sea Power in the Mediterranean, 1940-1942. Pp.134-150 by MAS.
3) Aspects of War in American History (ed. D. K. Adams & C. van Minnen, Keele, 1997, Keele U.P.). Maritime Strategy and the Crucible of War, 1914-1921, Pp. 149-172 by MAS.
4) Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean (ed. J. B. Hattendorf) (London & Portland, Ore., 2000, Cass). Superhighway to the World Wide Web: The Mediterranean in British Imperial Strategy, 1900-1945, by MAS. Pp. 51-76 by MAS.
5) Engaging the Enemy: Canada in the 1940s (ed. A. Hiscock & M. E. Chamberlain) (Gomer, Llandybie, 2006, for Canadian Studies in Wales Group). The Naval Child becomes an Adult: The Royal Canadian Navy, 193+9-1945, Pp. 19-30 by MAS.
6) The Naval Miscellany, volume VII (ed. S. Rose). (Aldershot, 2008, Ashgate for Navy Records Society). The Relief of Admiral North from Gibraltar in 1940, by R. H. Brodhurst & MAS, Pp. 463-510.
7) Dreadnought to Daring: A Hundred Years of Comment, Controversy and Debate in the Naval Review (ed. Capt. P. Hore) (Barnsley, 2012, Seaforth), Anglo-American Naval Relations, Pp. 224-235 by MAS.

ARTICLES

1) Admiral W, S. Sims, U. S. Navy and Admiral Sir L. Bayly, R. N.: An Unlikely Friendship and Anglo-American Cooperation, 1917-1919 (U. S. Naval War College Review, 1988). Pp. 66-80.
2) Force H and British Strategy in the Western Mediterranean, 1939-1942 (The Mariner’s Mirror, 1997). Pp. 62-75.

I also have three ‘spin-off’ articles to write, informed by my ongoing research:

The British Admiralty Delegation, Washington, D. C., 1941-1945, to be submitted to the U. S. Naval War College Review.

A Sailor’s Odyssey Revisited, to be submitted to The Mariner’s Mirror.

Samuel Eliot Morison’s History of U. S. Naval Operations in World War II, to be submitted to The Mariner’s Mirror.

ANGLO-AMERICAN NAVAL RELATIONS, 1917 TO 1945

There were no meaningful relations between the Royal Navy and the U. S. Navy before the U. S. A. became a co-belligerent in April 1917. Indeed, relations between the two had been characterised by war or talk of it from the War of Independence which began in 1775, another bout of fighting between 1812 and 1814, and wary hostility since then. When the sailors met in foreign parts, relations were much more cordial than those at higher and governmental levels, but such meetings were infrequent and not typical of the overall relationship.

On the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, President Wilson instructed his military representatives to have nothing but the most formal diplomatic contact with belligerent parties on either side. This meant that the army and navy had no first-hand knowledge of the conflict’s progress, its scale, its methods or its innovations. Furthermore, Wilson was incensed by Britain’s practice of blockade, whereby British men-of-war intercepted American merchantmen at sea, boarded them, checked their papers and, if they concluded that the cargo was destined by direct or indirect means to end up in enemy hands, they would take the vessels into an Allied port and confiscate the cargo. This ran contrary to America’s traditional policy of ‘freedom of the seas’, whereby American vessels were allowed to trade with any country even in wartime. It was all that Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, could

do to keep America neutral. Wilson exclaimed ‘Let’s build a bigger navy than hers and do as we damn well please!’ The upshot was an appropriation bill, quickly endorsed by a sympathetic Congress, in 1916 to expand the American Navy far beyond anything that Britain and her Empire could hope to match.

Until the end of 1916, there matters stood. In respect of Germany, however, America also had her grievances – the sinking of Allied merchant ships with American civilians on board, many of whom died or were injured. The most notorious incident concerned the sinking of the British liner ’Lusitania’ in 1915. The Germans apologised at once for these incidents and paid compensation, for the most part refraining from ‘unrestricted submarine warfare’.

The situation changed abruptly at the start of 1917, when Germany gave notice of resuming ‘unrestricted submarine warfare’ on 1 February, whereby any vessels, Allied or neutral, could be sunk on sight. Even then, Wilson waited for ‘overt acts’ and only after three American ships were sunk did he resort to a declaration of war, therefore, on 2 April 1917, an act endorsed overwhelmingly in Congress.

Anglo-American naval relations had to begin, therefore, more or less from scratch after the U. S. A. became a belligerent on 6 April 1917. The U. S. Navy was chronically underprepared in every way for the conflict it was about to enter. The war at sea was approaching its climax. Britain and her Allies lost 900,000 tons of shipping in April 1917 and replacements amounted to no more than 10%. Britain was within a few weeks of running out of food and fuel. If she was forced out of the war, her Allies would fall, too. The German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare was nicely calculated, for the Germans knew they risked American entry into the war but they believed, quite rightly, that the full impact of America’s tremendous resources would be felt only after eighteen months – by which time the Allies would have been defeated.

The first authoritative American move was Wilson's instruction to his Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, on 24 March to get in touch with the Admiralty – confidentially, since Congress had not met to debate the issue of war and peace. Daniels selected Rear Admiral William S. Sims, perhaps the ablest of the Navy's flag officers, who was then the President of the Naval War College. Sims had charm, dignity, tact, humour, shrewd judgement, dynamism and forthrightness. He was an Anglophile and had met Royal Navy officers at sea, forming an admiring opinion of the Senior Service. There is no doubt that he was the best man for the job.

Sims reported to Daniels on 19 April. He had been taken into the full confidence of the Admiralty to the extent of becoming virtually a member of the Board. He had met the Prime Minister and other people of power. His principal contact was with the First Sea Lord, Admiral Jellicoe. Sims formed the impression that the Admiralty was helpless and clueless regarding the increasing U-boat threat. He asked whether convoy had been considered, to be told that there were insufficient warships to institute such a system. Sims pursued the idea, nevertheless, with the support of the Ministry of Shipping.

Meanwhile, other steps towards practical co-operation had been taken, chiefly by the British (with the support of the French). Chief among these was the visit of Vice-Admiral Browning, C-in-C, North America and West Indies, and then a high-powered mission headed by Arthur Balfour, the Foreign Secretary. In the short run, these achieved little to alleviate the current critical situation. They did, however, strengthen ties, present shopping lists – chiefly for flotilla craft and merchant bottoms- and attempt to galvanise the Americans into a speedier full mobilisation. The British anxiety is understandable, given that they faced an apparently insoluble riddle with time rapidly running out. The Americans needed to be galvanised, for the Government, the people and the Navy were unprepared for war. Not only was it a far-flung contest, a fight to the death, but it also involved new challenges never before

encountered. All belligerents faced this situation but the Americans seemed very slow to mobilise people, funds and resources; most importantly, they were slow to create a war mentality (I, Part I).

Much of the rest of 1917 revolves around Sims. Despatched originally simply to gain information on the situation and the ways in which the U. S, Navy could help, he became by degrees Force Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in European Waters, though he never received orders to that effect. Nevertheless, by the time of the Armistice in November 1918, Sims commanded 45 bases, 375 warships, with 5,000 officers and 75,000 men, in addition to substantial air forces. He established a great deal of autonomy, though Washington made the key strategic decisions, such as devoting the greater part of the limited American destroyer force to the to the protection of American troopships to France rather than, as Sims wished, cargoes to Britain. Later in the war, Washington appointed other Rear Admirals to independent commands in Europe – for example, Wilson at Brest and Niblack at Gibraltar. This diminished Sims' authority and he was not consulted over it. He was suspected in Washington of being too pro-British and over-dramatizing the dire situation (I, Part I). Only a direct plea to President Wilson ensured wholehearted American co-operation in the convoy system, established in the nick of time in May 1917. This proved its success rapidly, until the U-boats were effectively defeated by the end of the year and new tonnage began to exceed losses. For the British, Sims was a God-send; their appreciation was unreserved (I, Part I).

Thus meaningful co-operation was established by the middle of 1917 but there also existed much mutual criticism, suspicion and mistrust. American complaints were centred on four themes: the Admiralty's lack of a coherent strategy, its refusal to consider offensive operations, its failure to keep the Americans fully informed and to consult them, and the lack of an efficient staff. The most notable gripe was that the Admiralty was obsessively defensive. This was an area in which two very different traditions of warfare clashed. The

British, long practised in the art of blockade, recognised it was slow to take effect and their offensive operations were peripheral and attritional. The American tradition was to go at once for the enemy's jugular. American exasperation with this seemingly endless strategy was reflected in comments from Wilson and senior naval officers. The British replied that blockade was the core of their war effort at sea and dismissed American suggestions for offensives. The British also took pains to counter American charges of lack of consultation and information. The efficiency of the Admiralty was improved significantly by the appointments of Sir Eric Geddes as First Lord and Admiral Wemyss as First Sea Lord and the adoption of a staff structure in 1918 (I, Part II).

For the second half of 1917, the concentration was on anti-submarine warfare. The sovereign remedy to the U-boat problem was the adoption of convoy. Many hands have claimed paternity for it but, while it is true that no one hand was responsible, advocates for it came from many quarters. Even after it was widely adopted by the autumn of 1917 and already showing impressive results, many voices were heard doubting its effectiveness and urging other forms of the defence of shipping. Fortunately, Jellicoe and Sims, supported by junior officers, held firm. Its effectiveness depended less on the escorting warships than the concentration of shipping in small areas of sea. A crucial factor in its operation was the new ability to marshal shipping in American and Canadian ports. The nub of its success, however, was the concentration of shipping in a small area, thus forcing U-boats into (an often vain) search for their prey. Even when they located it, they could at best sink two or three ships from a spread of torpedoes before the convoy left them far behind. Because of the presence of escorts they were compelled also to fire at long range. Of other counter measures, depth charges and mines were the most important, while in coastal waters the presence of aircraft forced them to submerge (I, Part IV).

Many people were not satisfied with reliance on the convoy system, despite its outstanding achievements. Much thought was given to blockading submarines' exit from port and two British expeditions attempted this, with minimal success and high casualties. Mines were sown freely by all the belligerents and had some successes but sweeping often cleared fields. Moreover, British mines until 1918 were notoriously unreliable. American mines seemed to be more efficient and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt almost single-handedly persuaded the Navy Department to lay a huge mine barrage in the northern exit of the North Sea. The British were sceptical of its cost effectiveness but went along with the Americans to keep relations sweet and wheedle more resources out of the Americans, and also British mine development had produced a far more reliable weapon. The North Sea Barrage, instituted in March 1918, involved the laying of 70,000 mines (57,000 of them American). The Barrage indeed proved relatively ineffective; certain losses of U-boats totalled three, with three more possibles (I, Part VI).

More useful was the reinforcement of the Grand Fleet by an American battle squadron. Initially, the Americans resisted the invitation, fearing that America might have to meet Germany alone, in which case the Japanese might seize their chance to embroil the United States in a two-ocean war. It did not add much value to the Grand Fleet, for apart from some distant escort of convoys and minelayers, little employment was found for it. It certainly lengthened further the odds in the Anglo-American favour should another 'Jutland' present itself, though that was a most remote possibility. There was an equally remote possibility of a German High Seas Fleet break-out, since the U-boat campaign was floundering, and three more American dreadnoughts were stationed at Berehaven in Ireland in August 1918 (I, Part V).

By the summer of 1917, with the convoy scheme in operation and already showing results and American mobilisation getting underway, the Americans offered to help in the

Mediterranean. That sea had been a perennial problem for the Allies, for while they held a comfortable superiority in surface craft, they suffered badly from the depredations of some 50 Austrian and German submarines. In part it resulted from a failure to co-ordinate the British, French and Italian navies but counter-measures – mines, nets, patrols and weakly-escorted convoys – failed to substantially cut losses. Any American help was therefore welcome. From July 1917, a small but growing and increasingly powerful and experienced squadron operated from Gibraltar, where it enjoyed excellent relations with the local British command. The American ships were employed on convoy duties to Britain and points east.

The American urge to take the offensive, use modern technology and adopt their typical 'can-do' approach was exemplified by young Franklin D. Roosevelt, who suggested a network of mine barrages criss-crossing the sea. Some were created but Roosevelt's breezy personality upset the more staid Europeans and his scheme had little effect, as did the small American 'sub-chasers' based on Corfu in the latter stages of the war (I, Part VII).

In the Western Hemisphere, British strength by 1917 was inevitably minimal. In any case, British appeasement of the United States since the Venezuela border incident of 1895 meant that the U. S. A. was no longer deemed a potential enemy. Though Vice Admiral Browning, the C-in-C, North America and West Indies, had been quick to establish cordial relations with Washington, little immediate help was forthcoming from America, in part because the country was slow to mobilise but also because the authorities in Washington were reluctant to adopt convoy. In due course the British came to control operations through a firm insistence on it backed by their team of experienced control officers. Despite Benson's overtures to base more strength on America's east coast, the British and Sims held firmly to the view that the focus of the war lay in European waters. These troubles were, however, minimal and relations between the two navies were close and efficient (I, Part VIII).

When the war came to an end on 11 November 1918, the Allies and the United States, an ‘Associated Power’, were unprepared for peace and the subsequent negotiations, as the enemy had crumbled so quickly. Wilson hoped that his semi-detached stance would permit him to act as an impartial chairman of the peace conference and in particular he wanted a firm but not harsh peace treaty; most Americans agreed with him. The European Allies, however, were out for revenge and furthermore had their own war aims, many of them enshrined in secret treaties.

Wilson based his approach on his Fourteen Points, at the heart of which was a League of Nations, designed to solve diplomatic problems by debate and to offer collective security. As to the seas, Wilson had remarked that ‘I cannot consent to take part in the negotiation of a peace which does not include freedom of the seas’ (David Trask, Captains and Cabinets, pp.337-8). This brought about the re-surfacing of an old problem, recently rehearsed in the American frustration at Britain’s blockade policy in 1914-1916. For their part, the British were determined to hold on to their equally traditional policy of blockade – even more so after their near-death experience in 1917.

Linked to American resentment of the blockade policy was the act of 1916 to build the largest navy in the world, designed to wield a big stick at blockades. That policy had been largely in abeyance in 1917 and 1918, as shipbuilding concentrated on merchantmen and anti-submarine craft. Now that the war was over, the big navy policy could be re-activated. The United States had enormous resources in manpower, money, materials and shipyards. No nation could outbuild her. The British had long held maritime primacy – it was an article of faith for the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, the Admiralty and the people. Moreover, it was not simply a matter of national pride, for Britain had a global empire to defend, a world-wide carrying trade, and the conduct of distant water operations against enemies.

There followed months of negotiations, in which many hands took part; they were conducted with civility for the most part but occasionally tempers were raised. Each side made threats – Lloyd George to abandon the League of Nations, the Americans to pass a new naval bill, doubling their 1916 programme. Wilson was determined to have Britain in his League and conceded ‘freedom of the seas’ to get Lloyd George’s agreement, saying that ‘Under the League of Nations there are no neutrals’. The Americans thus sacrificed the very reason for which they had gone to war. The threat of the United States to outbuild Britain, if latent, however, remained and two conciliatory statesmen, Edward M. House for the Americans and Lord Robert Cecil for the British, settled on parity between the two fleets. What was emerging was the concept of an Anglo-American condominium (I, Part IX).

The struggle between Columbia and Britannia for Neptune’s trident, however, went on. While parity had been agreed informally at Paris, its details continued to dog the relationship throughout the 1920s. A start on confirming the informal agreement of 1919 in treaty form was the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. This arose partly from American domestic concerns. The new administration of Warren Harding wished to respond to the national mood for a ‘peace dividend’. The Republicans wished to cut expenditure and the two strands coalesced in the Washington Conference. When it opened in November 1921, the American Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes startled the other delegates – from Britain, France, Italy and Japan – by proposing to scrap a substantial number of their and America’s dreadnoughts, on the stocks or contemplated; a few, close to completion, were spared. The resulting Treaty provided for the formalisation of parity between Britain and the United States, with smaller proportions for the other three nations. None of the other nations dared disagree, for they all knew that, if they disagreed, the United States, which had renounced its own former President’s League of Nations, could outbuild them. The formula thus agreed specified tonnages in all categories of warship. In Hughes’ eyes, the naval Treaty was only

one part of a trio of agreements. Having curtailed abruptly an incipient naval race, Hughes moved to ban further fortifications in the Pacific. The resulting Four Power Treaty bound the United States, Britain, France and Japan to abide by the existing situation in the Pacific but – and this was typical of the American foreign policy of the inter-war year – no provision for enforcement was made save the calling of a conference of the powers; diplomacy took the place of collective security. It led also to the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Forced to choose between the Americans and the Japanese, the British chose to side with the Americans. The results of the three Treaties were to confer on Japan supremacy in Far Eastern waters and to cause resentment in Japan at the abandonment of the Alliance. The third part of Hughes' treaty making was a Nine Power Treaty on China, long an American 'ward of court', designed to pledge countries with an interest in China to an 'Open Door' policy espoused by America since 1900. This, too, was dependent on good will and diplomacy. The ineffectiveness of the Treaties was to play into the hands of a future militaristic Japanese government. America dipped a foot in the waters of international relations but the other one was firmly on dry land. Robert Leopold has rightly called this policy 'the inter-war compromise'.

Like the other countries, the British were in no position to resist Hughes' proposals. They lacked the money, the resources and the national will-power to do otherwise (II, Part I).

Though parity had been attained, there soon arose another area of dispute between the United Kingdom and the United States – the issue of cruisers. The Washington Treaty specified merely maximum size and armament but said nothing about overall tonnage or numbers. The Americans pressed for heavy cruisers with long range and carrying 8-inch guns, for service in the vast waters of the Pacific, while the British, thinking of the defence of their vital sea lanes, preferred a larger number of light cruisers armed with 6-inch guns, short-legged because they would be working from Britain's world-wide web of bases. The conflict

dragged on but an attempt to solve it was held at Geneva in 1927. The Conference failed due to the general incompetence of the delegations and in particular the intransigence of Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones, the darling of a vociferous group of Republicans in Congress. This situation gave rise to Stephen Roskill's characterisation of the 1920s as the period of 'Anglo-American Antagonism'. In fact, only a small number of ultra-nationalists in the Navy and in Congress were at all antagonistic. The vast majority of Americans, including most senior officers, were untroubled by the controversy. The British remained indifferent, a former British ambassador remarking that some Americans enjoyed tweaking the lion's tail (II, Part II).

By 1929 there were new men in power, determined to improve Anglo-American relations.

They were Ramsay MacDonald, the British Prime Minister, and Herbert Hoover, the American President. Both men felt that naval officers had too much influence at Geneva and were determined consequently to keep the negotiations in the hands of politicians and diplomats. There were preliminary discussions before the matter was effectively sealed by MacDonald's visit to Washington in October ,1929, a meeting that would be termed later as a 'summit conference'

The resulting conference took place at London in 1930. The French and Italians, unable to resolve their differences, refused to attend. Other matters left over from the Washington conference were discussed but the main business was parity in cruisers between Britain and the United States. After much negotiation, in which the naval officers were reduced to mere onlookers, it was agreed that America should have 18 heavy cruisers, plus 10 existing light cruisers with power to add a further 10 of these ships. The British had already 15 heavy cruisers and were permitted 35 light cruisers.

Naval opinion in both countries was that these numbers were inadequate but at the start of the Great Depression both governments cut national expenditure and were supported by the mass of public opinion. The United States did not build up to its quotas until the late 1930s. The Japanese seemed content with the projection of the Washington Treaty, meaning that for every five ships for each of the British and Americans, they could build three. Everyone seemed satisfied, seeing that the London Treaty was due to expire in 1936. It must be stressed that this conference took place in a cloudless international sky, with no new conflicts on the horizon and the major powers imbibing the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1927, which was signed by 64 nations and promised to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. The London Naval Conference of 1930 was the high-water mark of naval limitation but it was also its death knell, for Hamaguchi, the Japanese Premier, who had willingly signed for his country, was assassinated several months later for having done so. Thereafter Japan slid quickly into a military dictatorship and rampant expansionism (II, Part III).

In the summer of 1934, Leslie Craigie, the British Government's chief diplomatic adviser on arms limitation, wrote to Ray Atherton, the long serving Counselor at the American Embassy, 'It is unfortunately the case that since the London Naval Treaty was concluded in 1930 a very serious deterioration in the international and political outlook has occurred'. In the interval, Japan had reverted to a military dictatorship and its conquest of the Chinese provinces of Manchuria in 1932 had gone unchecked by the weak response of the United States and the League of Nations. Hitler had come to power in Germany, determined to wreck the Versailles settlement of 1919, while Mussolini, dormant for a decade, now harboured hopes of a renewed Roman Empire, starting with the conquest of Abyssinia.

In this more threatening atmosphere preliminary discussions ahead of a further London Naval Conference began in 1934, with the intention of prolonging the Washington Treaty of 1921 and the first London Treaty of 1930 for another six to ten years. The omens were not good, for the Japanese, out of hubris and easy pickings in China, demanded parity with Britain and the United States. When those two powers refused, citing Japan's hegemony in the Far East as a result of the Washington Treaties, the Japanese then walked out. France and later Italy came on board, together with the Soviet Union and the Scandinavian countries, while Britain made a separate agreement with Germany. The 1936 Treaty was in effect a continuation of the Anglo-American agreement of 1930. 'The main success of the Conference was the continuing improvement of Anglo-American naval relations', wrote Anthony Clayton. Indeed, one can detect from the talks and the documents surrounding the Treaty an increasing closeness in the activities of the two navies, much helped by the American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Standley and his British counterpart, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Chatfield. Both faced an expansionist Japan and realised implicitly that only a united front between the two navies could curb her. In addition, Chatfield faced the prospect of war in three oceans against Germany, Italy and Japan with a two-ocean navy (II, Part IV).

This good feeling at the top reflected a friendly relationship among the sailors who met at sea. In fact, throughout the inter-war period the divisions, mistrust and suspicion which marked the negotiations of the 1920s were entirely absent from the meetings at sea or in harbour. What is particularly notable about their comments on each other, especially those of British officers, is the cultural difference between the two. For the British it seemed that what had been good enough for Nelson was good enough for George V's navy. The Spartan conditions were explainable only partly by British financial stringency. The Americans were more up to date in their equipment and

notably in their comfort, reflecting the expectations of American society. Nowhere was the American identification with the leading edge of technology more evident than in naval aviation. The U. S. Navy had retained control of its own air service, whereas the British were prisoners of the Trenchard doctrine of the indivisibility of air power. The R. A. F. retained control of naval aviation, rendering the Fleet Air Arm a Cinderella element. American sailors of all ranks were air-minded and the deck had been laid for the Pacific air war. By contrast, British officers were, on the whole, less attuned to the possibilities of air power at sea. It was not until 1937 that Chatfield, one of the few who appreciated the significance of naval aviation, managed to wrest back control of the Fleet Air Arm – too late to have a marked influence by the outbreak of war in 1939.

Friendly, often un-scheduled and informal contact not only removed the suspicion and divisions which marked the formal discussions but produced a cordiality and frankness in stark contrast, aided by a more-or-less common language. Friendship on an individual or shipboard basis, however, did not mask a competitiveness in the support of trade and influence - and rights to semi-barren rocks in the Pacific. The British, conscious of the likely need of American support in a future war, would have liked a closer and more formal relationship but, as one British admiral observed, ‘The public opinion cry is – at all costs keep out of everything European’. When British sailors came ashore, there was much talk by their hosts of an Anglo-American condominium to maintain world peace – but talk was cheap and easy in the 1920s (II, Part V).

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Standley, had forged a warm relationship with the First Sea Lord, Admiral Chatfield, during the preparatory and actual negotiations for the London Naval Treaty of 1936. There was good reason for this, as both were alarmed by the drift of Japan towards a militaristic nationalism which threatened not

only peace in the Far East but also the interests of the two powers there, especially in China. This was reinforced when the Japanese, unable to satisfy their demand for parity with the two western navies, stormed out of the Conference, followed by the resumption of substantial naval construction by Japan in defiance of Treaty limits.

Japan had been nibbling away at Chinese sovereignty since 1915, for the most part unhindered by the west. Driven by her own territorial and economic ambitions and led by a popular government of empire-builders, and also by fears of a united China under Chiang Kai-Shek, Japan had manufactured an 'incident' in July 1937 which was used to justify a full-scale invasion of China in July 1937. The British response was to blow hot and cold, since she lacked the local power to confront Japan and had increasingly to be mindful of the deteriorating European situation provoked by Mussolini and Hitler; furthermore they could not rely on American aid. The situation in the Far East created by the Washington Treaties conferred on Japan supremacy in the Far East, confrontable only by a combined Anglo-American riposte.

The American C-in-C of the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Yarnell, a confirmed Anglophile, worked closely with successive C's-in-C of the China Sation, Admirals Little and Noble. In the face of rising Japanese hostility, Yarnell and the British admirals exchanged information, made joint protests and worked out contingency plans to safeguard civilians and their nations' interests.

Yarnell was supported by the new CNO, Admiral Leahy, also pro-British and, more circumspectly by President Roosevelt who, like his cousin Theodore, had a global vision. Roosevelt was handicapped, however, by recent American neutrality legislation, which was strongly backed by Congress, most of the press and a definite majority of the people. Anything that Leahy could do to bring about effective Anglo-

American naval co-operation in the event of war was therefore to be done behind closed doors. Leahy took the initiative in a series of clandestine meetings between representatives of the two navies between 1937 and 1939. Tentative plans were laid for cooperation in a war against Japan. The British were secretly delighted at this new warmth, facing as they did a possible conflict in three seas with a two-ocean navy. Among the ideas they circulated among themselves to cement a partnership with America was that of ceding bases in British Western Hemisphere possessions to the United States. Herein lies the origin of the 'Destroyers for Bases' deal of 1940. This exhibited the increasingly global remit of the conversations, though no definite commitments were made by the Americans to British disappointment. The outbreak of war in Europe therefore found the two nations still far from a united front in the face of aggression, and Britain began that war still extremely uncertain of a still-neutral America's response (II, Part VI).

(I have not done extensive research on the period September 1939 to October 1943, nor have I written on it in terms of Anglo-American relations. This is because the two Volumes for 1939-1941 and 1941-1943 were to have been edited by Robin Brodhurst who has now died, before starting work on them. I have, however, drafted an article for the U. S. Naval War College Review on the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington in 1941 to 1945. I have drawn on that article and on my own wider general knowledge for the initial part of the section which follows, transitioning into the findings from my other research publications, including Volumes on Admiral Cunningham).

When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, the old issue of neutral rights arose again, reinforced by recent American legislation. Once again, the British imposed a blockade of Germany, and once again the United States reiterated its right to trade with whomsoever and wherever it chose. Roosevelt worked to circumvent this straitjacket,

although his powers were limited. The institution of a ‘cash and carry’ policy helped the British initially, as they had command of the Atlantic, while German ships were stranded in ports.

The situation changed dramatically with the fall of France in June 1940, for the Germans now had access to French Biscay ports, in addition to those in the northern waters that they had seized in Norway. It was merrymaking time for U-boats and other raiders. The American administration was alarmed at the new possibility that Britain might be starved into surrender (there was in reality little fear of invasion), or that she might lose command of the Atlantic. Within less than a week of the French capitulation, an American military mission arrived in London, the naval side led by Rear Admiral Ghormley. They met with an Admiralty committee headed by Admiral Bailey. The mission was termed an ‘Arms Standardisation Committee’ so as not to offend majority American opinion. As with the encounters of the years 1937 to 1939, no concrete agreements were arrived at, simply further progress on possible co-operation.

Roosevelt had welcomed Winston Churchill’s arrival back at the Admiralty on 3 September 1939, telling his Ambassador in London, Joseph P. Kennedy, ‘I’m giving him attention now because there is a strong possibility that he will become Prime Minister and I want to get my hand in early’ – evidence of the President’s political acuity. Few exchanges took place before Churchill did ascend to the highest office, mostly on naval matters of no great consequence and most of them initiated by Churchill.

After Churchill became Prime Minister on 10 May 1940, the exchanges became more frequent and, on Churchill’s part, more urgent. His request for 50 old destroyers could not be met at once but once Roosevelt and his new CNO, Admiral Stark, had worked out a way to grant the request, it was honoured in the ‘Destroyers-for-Bases’ deal of 5

September 1940. This, a clearly un-neutral action, was sold to the American people as an extension of the United States' own defensive wall, since America received permission to establish bases in British possessions in the Western Hemisphere. In truth, the Americans got the better part of the deal. It paved the way for further incremental additions to American support of a beleaguered Britain, as Roosevelt moved steadily to convince the American people that Britain's fight was also that of America, using education and the unfavourable trend of the war.

The Ghormley-Bailey discussions were wide-ranging and led to full-blown staff talks in Washington from 29 January 1941, this time involving the Canadians, too – hence the title the 'ABC' talks. By the time the talks ended on 27 March 1941, it had been decided to set up in Washington a permanent British Staff Mission (JSM), part of which was the British Admiralty Delegation (BAD). The initial head of BAD was Admiral Little, who had worked closely with the Americans in China in 1937. Although the BAD met frequently with senior American officers, its chief activity was to extort more and more material from the Americans, notably aircraft and later ships. Scientific and operational information was also exchanged. No less important was the agreement to repair British warships in U. S. yards. Meanwhile, FDR steadily expanded America's responsibilities in the Atlantic, culminating in an undeclared war against Germany by November 1941.

American belligerence was formalised on 7 December 1941 following Japan's unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor – and the more or less immediate declarations of war against America by Hitler and Mussolini. This was followed by the appointment of Admiral Ernest J. King as CNO and C-in-C, U. S. Fleet. Stark moved to London to oversee American naval operations in the European theatre and to liaise with the Admiralty.

An American squadron served with the Home Fleet but in the Far East, apart from Pearl Harbor, the Allies suffered crushing defeats as the Japanese swept west and south. It was not until the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway later in 1942 that this advance was stemmed.

Thus far, all had been sweetness and light in terms of co-operation in operational, intelligence and material terms. With America's precipitation into the war, that changed. Britain, the chief recipient of FDR's 'Lend-Lease' scheme of March 1941, now found herself in competition with other Allies like China and the Soviet Union but principally with the demands of the rapidly-expanding U. S. forces.

A significant change was marked by King's promotion to CNO. He was an extremely able man – abreast of modern technology, a fine administrator and a man with a global strategic outlook. He was also extremely difficult to deal with. A common remark in BAD was that King had three enemies, in order of priority 1) the U. S. Army; 2) Germany, Italy and Japan; 3) Allies. The head of JSM, Field Marshal Dill, remarked that 'King's war is in the Pacific', where America had that ocean more or less to itself – and King intended to keep it that way. Many British officers and later commentators thought that King was anti-British but he was rather an American nationalist. Although Admiral Cunningham termed him 'a bad co-operator', he did aid the Royal Navy to a considerable extent, providing American naval forces in the anti-submarine war, and landing craft and supporting warships for the Allied landings from North Africa in November 1942 to the south of France in August 1944.

Churchill first met Roosevelt in Nova Scotia in August 1941, the first of nine 'summits'. At these, the statesmen were accompanied by their civilian and military subordinates. The British already had the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) and the Americans followed

suit with their Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). When the two sides met (often accompanied by the JSM) they formed the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). Thereafter the military direction of the war was placed in their hands.

King's apparent unwillingness to collaborate resulted in the arrival as head of the BAD of Admiral Cunningham, as tough as King, in the spring of 1942. These two dreadnoughts exchanged several salvoes but Cunningham had so impressed the Americans that they clamoured for him to serve as the Allied Naval C-in-C for the forthcoming invasion of North Africa. Cunningham served in that role for the subsequent invasions of Sicily and Italy, willingly acting under the Supreme Commander, the junior American General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Cunningham was replaced at BAD by Admiral Noble, who had dealt with Americans while C-in-C China between 1937 and 1939. As anti-submarine warfare was a major issue, it helped that Noble had been C-in-C, Western Approaches. During his time in office, which extended into 1944, American 'Lend-Lease' aid was at its height, despite increasing demands from the American services, and collaboration between the two navies was close indeed (Cunningham, II, Part I).

Anglo=American combined operations in the European theatre were under the Supreme Command of General Eisenhower, with Cunningham as his Naval C-in-C, but it is also evident that Cunnigham was a wise adviser to the rather green Eisenhower. All the landings in the Mediterranean in 1942 and 1943 passed off relatively smoothly, though with a couple of heart stopping moments. That so little trouble was experienced is due to careful planning, air superiority, occasional surprise, the power of naval bombardment – and the flexibility of sea power; in the Mediterranean, no one was better equipped to exercise this than Cunningham (CII, Part II).

The Americans were reluctant to forego their cherished hope of an invasion of north west Europe in 1942 but British leaders were adamant that they lacked the power to do so. They were right, as the Normandy landings were to prove. They managed to secure the support of FDR for an attack on Vichy French North Africa, as the President was anxious to commit American ground forces in the European theatre in 1942. The American JCS, however, nervous about Spain's possible entry on the side of the enemy, vetoed Cunningham's plan for a landing deep inside the Mediterranean, in Tunisia, and insisted on a landing in Morocco as well as one in Algeria. As events proved, Cunningham was right in that a landing in Tunisia would have shortened the campaign materially. He master-minded a vast armada of ships of all kinds, supported by naval aviation. A formidable battle fleet was on hand to guard against a possible Italian foray but was not needed other than for bombardment and carrier air support. What this campaign marks, therefore, is the transition of naval warfare from ships of the line to the humblest of vessels – small landing craft. It ushered in also an era in which navies became the handmaiden of armies (CII, Part IIA).

When the campaign wound up in May 1943, the British pressed for a landing in Sicily to prompt Italy's surrender. Again, the Americans were reluctant, fearing that they were being dragged into the support of a post-war British hegemony in the Mediterranean. What probably turned the tide in favour of the British was the thought that thousands of Allied soldiers, their equipment, aircraft and landing craft would lie idle for at least a year before the invasion of north west Europe could take place. The landings in Sicily took place in July 1943 and at the end of the campaign in September Mussolini had been toppled. By that time, as is evident from the documents, the soldiers were calling the tune; Cunningham and Tedder, the air commander, had little influence on

strategy. By that time, too, the U. S. Navy had outstripped the Royal Navy, even in the hallowed Mare Britannicus of the Mediterranean (CII, Part IIB).

The Americans considered the Mediterranean a strategic dead end but were once more persuaded by the British to invade Italy, a lure being the acquisition of airfields in southern Italy from which their bombers could attack southern Germany. The invasion passed off relatively smoothly, but the campaign soon ran into stubborn and skilful German resistance, aided by difficult mountain country. An attempt to use sea power to outflank the enemy at Anzio was thwarted by the Germans, assisted by Allied errors once the landings had been successfully accomplished. Cunningham had but a brief and rather remote association with the campaign, although he sensed that Italy presented good defensive country – but once again the soldiers called the tune (CII, Part IIC).

Cuningham became First Sea Lord in succession to the dying Pound on 5 October 1943. At once, he was plunged into a manpower crisis in the Royal Navy, which caused a brief hiatus in manning the increasing flow of American built ships. He was not Churchill's first choice, but the weight of naval and public opinion carried him to the office. The Prime Minister feared, quite rightly, that Cunningham was a 'no' man who would block his wilder schemes. By the time Cunningham assumed office, however, the major strategic decisions had been made and the war in European waters and the Atlantic was centred on the approaching invasions of France and the final defeat of the U-boats (CII, Part IIIA).

A considerable point in Cunningham's favour was his excellent rapport with the Americans, most of whose leading lights he had come to know well. He became quickly a valued member of the COS and, more importantly, of the CCS, where again he had to battle

with the formidable Admiral King. Cunningham also attended the wartime ‘summit’ meetings with Churchill, Roosevelt and, from late 1943, with Stalin. The military men were now, however, mere spectators at these meetings, since there were no major strategic issues to debate, and the discussions centred increasingly on the post-war situation. In terms of relationships between the two navies, there had been a sea change since Cunningham’s brief sojourn in Washington in 1942. The pre-war American attitude of awe towards the Royal Navy had disappeared, swept away by America’s pride in having incomparably the largest navy in the world, reinforced by the string of American victories in the Pacific. Moreover, Americans came to disparage the British navy for its presumed backwardness technologically. The Americans enjoyed better power plants, superior aircraft and more habitable conditions, aided by air conditioning and soda fountains (CII, Part IIIC).

By the time of his appointment, the Royal Canadian Navy was the third largest in the world, having grown from a miniscule force of under 4000 men and a handful of ships in 1939 to a service of nearly 100,000 sailors. It played a major role in the North Atlantic, having its own area of command, and had an important role in the Normandy landings. Its ships and men served also in the Mediterranean and the Pacific, nor should the significant role of the Royal Canadian Air Force in convoy protection be forgotten. Apart from Canadians themselves, this major contribution is often ignored (V).

Much the most important venture at sea was ‘Neptune’, the naval side of the invasion of Europe in June 1944. The British were indebted again to substantial American assistance, while the invasion of southern France in August, about which the British were lukewarm, was almost exclusively an American affair. For ‘Neptune’, the Allies were indebted for its success to the lengthy and super-detailed planning led by the British Admiral Ramsay (CII, Part IIID).

The British and American navies, having borne together most of the fighting at sea, were determined to erase German sea power for ever. Though their political masters hoped for a post-war cordiality with the Soviet Union, the naval leaders were distrustful of the Russians and managed to gain for themselves most of the remaining German warships, especially the U-boats. Equally important was their acquisition of most of the German scientists and so were enabled to exploit their work (CII, Part IIIE). Much to Cunningham's regret, the Mediterranean became something of a naval backwater; it was never again to resume the eminence of Cunningham's time there (CII, Part IIIF).

Naval attention turned in 1944 to the Far East, where the Royal Navy's position had dwindled to a merely defensive role in the Indian Ocean, leaving the Pacific almost entirely to the U. S. Navy. When Britain was able to resume a more aggressive and substantial posture in 1944, it had perforce to be as a junior partner of the now-mighty American navy. A powerful Eastern Fleet under Admiral Somerville had been created in February 1942, but it was strength only on paper and Somerville spent two years on the defensive, his dwindling number of ships employed mostly in convoy work. When he did receive reinforcements in 1944 and was able to undertake offensive operations, he had the significant support of well-honed American carrier aviation. Several carrier air strikes were undertaken in the spring of 1944, two with American co-operation, though none of the attacks seriously weakened the Japanese hold on the eastern half of the Indian Ocean. The Americans showed the superiority of their carrier aviation in terms of numbers, aircraft and technique (Somerville, Part III).

Following Somerville's show of aggression, he was persuaded to go to Washington to head BAD by his friend Cunningham. Somerville was eminently suited to the role by his experience of working with the Americans and his service in eastern waters, important now that the war at sea was increasingly focused on the defeat of the Japanese.

Somerville was also well fitted for the post by his lively personality, which enabled him to become the most successful head of BAD in the war – a matter of some importance since the demands of the American services now threatened the flow of Lend-Lease material to Britain (Somerville, Part IV).

This had an adverse effect on the supply of American aircraft to the newly-formed British Pacific Fleet. Its origins were the subject of a row between the Prime Minister and the COS, led by Cunningham. Churchill wanted a fleet to help recover lost colonies in the Indian Ocean, but Cunningham argued that the correct strategy was to assist the Americans in the final drive against the Japanese homeland, after which the lost territories would fall into the Empire's lap. Moreover, Britain would then have a claim to the eventual post-war settlement and by fighting alongside the Americans would extinguish their suspicions that Britain would not pull her weight in the fight against Japan. Even after this quarrel had been settled in Cunningham's favour, there was another obstacle – Admiral King. He wished to claim the glory of a victory in the Pacific entirely for the U. S. A. He was over-ruled by the President, backed up by other military leaders. The process of assembling a formidable force was difficult, as most Royal Navy ships were not equipped for tropical service and the collection of a fleet train was even more of a frustrating problem.

When it arrived in the Pacific in the spring of 1945, it formed a mere task group in the mighty American Pacific Fleet. It fought well but a comparison of its striking force and its effectiveness with Americans reveals its shortcomings in enough satisfactory aircraft, manning levels and operating techniques. As it was, it depended on a great deal of local American good will, in a liberal interpretation of 'self -sufficiency'. The report of the C-in-C, Admiral Fraser and others shows that experience was a valuable lesson in aviation-based naval warfare, ship propulsion, fleet train support, modern radar and

anti-aircraft protection. Only in the carriers' armoured flight decks and fighter direction were the British able to outmatch the Americans (V, Part V).

The war being over in August 1945, the staff of BAD recounted their experiences. For the most part co-operation was smooth, relations between American officers and civil suppliers and the British were generally good and Britain and her Allies received the American bounty in ships, aircraft and equipment, supplemented by training facilities in America and the repair of Allied warships in American yards with grateful thanks. There were personal mis-matches and misunderstandings but the chief difficulty from 1944 was the insatiable demand for ships, aircraft, equipment and repairs from America's own forces. American-built ships for the Commonwealth in particular had exceeded Empire production in 1943 but the BAD noted a substantial decline from 1944. The BAD noted also the high level of American productivity, the astonishing speed and quantity of material, the modern industrial base, and the close association of universities and their scientists with the war effort. There were many disparaging, distrustful, snobbish and other criticisms on both sides in the course of BAD's work and operationally, too. It is sensible, then, to talk about 'relations' rather than relying solely on the warmth implied in 'co-operation' (V).

SOMERVILLE

When France collapsed in June 1940, British strategy in the Mediterranean had to be remade on the hoof. Apart from the loss of an ally responsible for the Western Mediterranean, the situation in the middle sea was complicated also by the entry of Italy into the war, and Mussolini possessed a powerful navy. There was some talk of abandoning the sea but wiser counsels, headed by Cunningham, prevailed. The upshot was the assembly of a scratch force at Gibraltar commanded by Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville. He

had been Rear Admiral (Destroyers) in the Mediterranean Fleet at the time the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936 and later commanded in the Indian Ocean. Invalided out of the navy for suspected ill health, he came back to active service as a pioneer of naval radar and later assisted Admiral Ramsay in the evacuation of Dunkirk. Somerville was a lively character and very able in terms of all modern naval technology. His new command, Force H, consisted chiefly of the modernised battlecruiser *Renown*, the modern aircraft carrier *Ark Royal*, the new cruiser *Sheffield* and a flotilla of 'F' class destroyers. With Somerville at Gibraltar and Cunningham with the Mediterranean Fleet at Alexandria, the Italian Fleet was bottled up in the inland sea by what Somerville referred to as 'Gog and Magog'. His first duty was the distasteful one of neutralising a substantial proportion of the French fleet at Oran. When the French Admiral Gensoul refused British offers of comradeship or neutrality in French Caribbean colonies, Somerville was forced by his government to open fire, destroying ships at great cost in French casualties in order to prevent their seizure by the enemy.

Much of his time was employed escorting relief convoys to beleaguered Malta, which he accomplished with conspicuous success. The one offensive operation in which he was engaged was in the hunt for the German battleship *Bismarck*, eventually crippling her by carrier aircraft. Indeed, so profound was Somerville in his understanding of the capacity of air power at sea that he can be described as the Royal Navy's first true 'air admiral'. After nearly two years in command of Force H, he was called upon to serve as C-in-C of the newly-formed Eastern Fleet in February 1942, following Japan's entry into the war (Somerville). [The rest of his wartime career is detailed above, as it fits in with Anglo-American naval relations].

CUNNINGHAM I

[Cunningham's whole career is detailed in my biography. This volume of his papers is concerned solely with his command of the Mediterranean Fleet between June 1939 and February 1942].

Cunningham had unrivalled knowledge and experience of the Mediterranean stretching back a quarter of a century when he took command of the Mediterranean Fleet in June 1939. It was based then at its traditional home port of Malta, but the threat of Italian belligerence and the resulting air attacks forced its later concentration at Alexandria.

Cunningham was a seaman through and through and intended to use his fleet in an aggressive manner. He usually had a squadron of dreadnoughts, a carrier (sometimes two), cruiser squadrons and flotillas of destroyers, together with submarines and sloops. He felt his force to be more than a match for his Italian opponents. This confidence was put to the test by an early encounter between the two fleets off Sicily. Most accounts record the Italians fleeing to port, shielded by bombers. It is true that they avoided action, having suffered one damaging blow but it was not in the Italians' interest to seek a fleet action. The Italian Navy had two clearly-defined objects in view. One was to remain as a fleet in being, tying down substantial British forces. The other was to convoy military supplies and troops to Italian possessions in North Africa. In spite of Maltese air, submarine and light forces' attacks, they largely succeeded in this endeavour.

Cunningham was for the most part thus frustrated but he had his own escort tasks to deal with – the transfer of forces to Greece and then Crete, evacuations from both places, the supply of Tobruk, and the destruction of Vichy French naval forces in the Middle East. In addition, there was the frequent and often costly supply run to Malta, often in conjunction with Somerville.

A bold and resourceful admiral, Cunningham and his staff devised a cunning plan to hit the Italian fleet in harbour in Taranto. This took place in November 1940, using carrier air power in a night attack. It was remarkably successful, sinking one battleship and severely damaging two others; half of Italy's battle fleet was put out of action and the rest moved hurriedly up the coast and out of range. It is instructive to observe that the destruction was accomplished by a score of obsolete Swordfish. It was a small operation in comparison with those staged later in the war, with modern aircraft. As an Admiralty staff member remarked, it really required at least double the strength employed.

When the Germans took a hand in 1941 with submarines and aircraft, both Cunningham and Somerville quickly lost key units. However, Cunningham was reinforced by a new carrier and, thanks to British code breaking, was able to surprise a rare Italian fleet foray off Cape Matapan in March 1941. Three Italian heavy cruisers and two destroyers were sunk but a new battleship, though damaged by a carrier air strike, managed to get away. That was the last of Italian fleet operations butt it was also Cunningham's last hurrah, for his fleet was steadily reduced by German aircraft and submarines and by Italian frogmen and explosive motor boats.

Cunningham was a strong supporter of the Army – 'The Navy must not let the Army down' - though he chafed at the lack of RAF reconnaissance and fighter cover. Much of his last year in command was marked by the large-scale evacuations of the Army from Greece and Crete. Most of the losses his fleet sustained were the direct result of the lack of land-based air cover. By early 1942, the once formidable Mediterranean Fleet was now no more than a light cruiser squadron with a handful of destroyers and submarines. It was at this point that Cunningham went ashore and, much to his distaste, to Washington.

Cunningham's time with the Mediterranean Fleet had seen much hard fighting, with heavy casualties in men and ships. Nevertheless, though a hard taskmaster, he enjoyed the support of his fleet. He emerged from his Mediterranean ordeal as the Royal Navy's premier admiral. His reputation as a bold fighting admiral so impressed the Americans that they implored him to become Allied C-in-C for the subsequent landings in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. It was this redoubtable career that got him promoted to the First Sea Lordship in October 1943, as he had overwhelming service and public support – strong enough to defeat Churchill's objections.

[The rest of Cunningham's career is bound up with Anglo-American naval relations]

THE CUNNINGHAM BIOGRAPHY

I have written a classic monograph, based on extensive research here in the UK and in America, supplemented by interviews and a large array of secondary material, with voluminous footnotes and an extensive bibliography. After twenty years, it is still in print. It builds upon the two volumes of Cunningham papers, which are discussed above. It covers a substantial array of other primary and secondary sources. It places Cunningham in the context of the other British Services and discusses the political and diplomatic world within which he had to work. Of particular significance, it addresses his relations with the U. S. Navy, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and joint operations with American forces. While the broad outlines of Cunningham's career are well known, this study highlights several lesser-known features of his service – for example, his long and deep association with the Mediterranean, his unexpected skill in diplomacy leading to the neutralization of the French squadron at Alexandria in June 1940, without bloodshed, and his seamless translation from a deck admiral to a desk admiral.

I believe that the combination of my published works presented here, including the empirical historical research and writing, my editing and analysis of major bodies of new primary sources, and my exploration of fresh insights into these neglected subjects and figures has made a substantial, scholarly and original contribution to this crucially formative period of Anglo-American naval history.

I have valued greatly the positive responses over many years of researchers drawing on these works in their invaluable efforts further advancing the field, as indeed the supportive scholarly environment of the Navy Records Society, and hope that my works will continue to benefit future scholars in the decades to come.

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