Perception and judgement

Peebles, Graham (2012) Perception and judgement. PhD thesis, University of Glasgow.

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Printed Thesis Information: https://eleanor.lib.gla.ac.uk/record=b3031292

Abstract

In this thesis, I am arguing for a single claim, namely that perceptual experiences are judgements,
and I am arguing for it in a very specific way. This has not been a popular theory, although some
have defended similar theories. One main reason that this has been a historically unpopular theory
is to do with the problems of conflicting beliefs. I can see (strictly speaking, experience) the
Müller-Lyer lines as being of different lengths, they look different lengths, and yet I know that they
are the same length. Hence, I have explicit contradictory judgements on a judgement-theory of
experiences. However, despite this being the major historical obstacle, two widely held theses in
the philosophy of perception in recent times also stand as an impediment to this theory, namely the
theses that experiences have a phenomenal character which individuates them from judgements,
and that experiences, unlike judgements or beliefs, have non-conceptual content.
I seek to offer an ''incremental defence'' of the judgement-theory of experiences by arguing in stages
against the competing theories, and defending the judgement-theory from the objections that arise
from the motivations for these other theories. As regards the phenomenal character of experience, I
argue that once the representational theory is accepted, the path is open, should a range of
individuating conceptual contents for experiences be found, to analyse the psychology of
experience in terms of this content. I define this conceptual content, and then I motivate and defend
the theory that experiences are judgements.

Item Type: Thesis (PhD)
Qualification Level: Doctoral
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Colleges/Schools: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Supervisor's Name: Weir, Prof. Alan
Date of Award: 2012
Depositing User: Mrs Marie Cairney
Unique ID: glathesis:2012-5080
Copyright: Copyright of this thesis is held by the author.
Date Deposited: 01 Apr 2014 07:58
Last Modified: 24 Apr 2017 11:17
URI: https://theses.gla.ac.uk/id/eprint/5080

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