Lee, Yoonseong (2022) The interplay of reason and emotion in legal reasoning. LL.M(R) thesis, University of Glasgow.
Full text available as:
PDF
Download (818kB) |
Abstract
Until now, the law has been thought to be rational, but there have been many problems that cannot be explained by reason. To solve this problem, this thesis uses a utilitarian approach. Hume says that reason judges whether or not the relations between the two objects are in agreement, and that emotion is a fact itself and cannot be subject to truth or falsehood. Reason has long been thought to include the ability to reflect, but reflection itself cannot judge right or wrong. We can also reflect on our feelings or preferences, which are not subject to truth or falsehood. However, reason can judge whether the expressed emotions are consistent and whether the internal actual mind and the external expressed mind are different. Due to the bounded rationality of humans, utilitarian calculations to maximise happiness cannot be made for all problems; thus, in everyday life, we make rules, abide by them, and judge with them in general. Bounded rationality is the reason why law and deontological thinking are necessary in practical reasoning. The content of the law is the value system shared in society, which changes over time. In the economic method based on emotivism that supposes differences in preference, fairness can be maintained by adhering to the consistency of value judgement and principle of protecting minorities. In an economic form of utilitarianism, it is possible to explain the weighing of values, the exception of the law, and the development of legal systems. On top of that, we can improve the welfare of society and protect the rights of minorities by using the above mentioned approach.
Item Type: | Thesis (LL.M(R)) |
---|---|
Qualification Level: | Masters |
Subjects: | K Law > K Law (General) |
Colleges/Schools: | College of Social Sciences > School of Law |
Supervisor's Name: | Pavlakos, Professor George |
Date of Award: | 2022 |
Depositing User: | Theses Team |
Unique ID: | glathesis:2022-82826 |
Copyright: | Copyright of this thesis is held by the author. |
Date Deposited: | 26 Apr 2022 10:08 |
Last Modified: | 26 Apr 2022 10:56 |
Thesis DOI: | 10.5525/gla.thesis.82826 |
URI: | https://theses.gla.ac.uk/id/eprint/82826 |
Actions (login required)
View Item |
Downloads
Downloads per month over past year