Attentional differences in autism – the Priority Monotropism account

Annan, Heather May (2026) Attentional differences in autism – the Priority Monotropism account. PhD thesis, University of Glasgow.

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Abstract

I will introduce the heterogeneity problem and explain that it poses a serious threat to essentialist theories of autism. I will explain that the heterogeneity problem of autism has two prongs. The first prong of the heterogeneity problem is that autism is associated with a wide range of seemingly disparate symptoms and behaviours that do not share a clear conceptual link. The second prong of the heterogeneity problem is that there is individual variance between the symptom profiles of autistic individuals. I will introduce the following essentialist theories of autism: Weak Central Coherence theory, Theory of Mind theory, Enhanced Perceptual Functioning theory, and Executive Dysfunction theory. I will demonstrate that these theories are unable to overcome the heterogeneity problem. I will then introduce a further essentialist theory of autism—Monotropism. I will show that while Monotropism has the potential to overcome the heterogeneity problem, it is insufficient in its current form. I will claim that this is largely due to the lack of a clear definition of key terms, such as ‘attention’ and ‘interest’. This is especially problematic since this theory proposes that the core essence of autism is a difference in attentional style preference.

I will introduce the heterogeneity problem and explain that it poses a serious threat to essentialist theories of autism. I will explain that the heterogeneity problem of autism has two prongs. The first prong of the heterogeneity problem is that autism is associated with a wide range of seemingly disparate symptoms and behaviours that do not share a clear conceptual link. The second prong of the heterogeneity problem is that there is individual variance between the symptom profiles of autistic individuals. I will introduce the following essentialist theories of autism: Weak Central Coherence theory, Theory of Mind theory, Enhanced Perceptual Functioning theory, and Executive Dysfunction theory. I will demonstrate that these theories are unable to overcome the heterogeneity problem. I will then introduce a further essentialist theory of autism—Monotropism. I will show that while Monotropism has the potential to overcome the heterogeneity problem, it is insufficient in its current form. I will claim that this is largely due to the lack of a clear definition of key terms, such as ‘attention’ and ‘interest’. This is especially problematic since this theory proposes that the core essence of autism is a difference in attentional style preference.

In order to resolve this issue, I will create a revised account of Monotropism that makes clearer claims about these terms. In order to do this, I will examine three philosophical theories of attention and assess their suitability for providing a foundation for a revised account of Monotropism. These three theories are: the Selection for Action theory, the Cognitive Unison theory, and the Priority Structure account. I will ultimately conclude that the Priority Structure account provides the best foundation, and I will develop a revised account of Monotropism—Priority Monotropism—by using this theory as a foundation. I will then demonstrate that Priority Monotropism can overcome both prongs of the heterogeneity problem. Additionally, I will also demonstrate that considering autism through the lens of Priority Monotropism can allow for potential explanations about other previously unexplained aspects of autism, such as why it commonly co-occurs with a wide range of seemingly unrelated conditions.

Item Type: Thesis (PhD)
Qualification Level: Doctoral
Additional Information: Supported by funding from the CK Marr Educational Trust and Kennedy Memorial Trust.
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Colleges/Schools: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities
Funder's Name: CK Marr Educational Trust, Kennedy Memorial Trust
Supervisor's Name: Macpherson, Professor Fiona and Simmons, Dr. David
Date of Award: 2026
Depositing User: Theses Team
Unique ID: glathesis:2026-86260
Copyright: Copyright of this thesis is held by the author.
Date Deposited: 14 Oct 2026 15:43
Last Modified: 14 Oct 2026 15:46
Thesis DOI: 10.5525/gla.thesis.86260
URI: https://theses.gla.ac.uk/id/eprint/86260

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