Three essays on information and behavioral economics

Zhang, Tiannan (2026) Three essays on information and behavioral economics. PhD thesis, University of Glasgow.

Abstract

This thesis comprises three essays that explore the interplay between strategic behavior, information transmission, and welfare-enhancing policy interventions.

The first chapter develops a multi-receiver incomplete information coordination game with unbiased and biased agents. Unbiased agents aim to align with the underlying state of nature and coordinate with others, while biased agents favor a specific collective outcome. A randomly selected sender observes the state and communicates strategically to the group. I show that truthful communication and full social learning can be sustained in equilibrium provided the degree of conformity among unbiased agents does not exceed one-half and the share of biased agents remains below fifty percent.

The second chapter examines rumor propagation on networks by modifying the communication–coordination game introduced in the previous chapter so that conformity depends on local interactions only. I demonstrate that introducing a small degree of conformity enlarges the parameter space in which truthful communication occurs, thereby relaxing the constraints on biased participation compared to existing models.

The third chapter shifts focus to consumer behavior and welfare by analyzing optimal taxation of sin goods under self-control problems. Using the temptation model of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) in a monopoly setting, I characterize an endogenous quality–price ceiling and derive welfare-maximizing tax policies. I show that optimal ad valorem taxes decline with market size, potentially turning into subsidies, while specific taxes are not optimal for domestically produced goods. By contrast, for imported goods, both ad valorem and specific taxes improve welfare, with ad valorem taxes yielding substantially larger gains.

• Item Type: Thesis (PhD)
• Qualification Level: Doctoral
• Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
• Colleges/Schools: College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School
• Supervisor's Name: Hayashi, Professor Takashi and Sorokin, Dr Constantine
• Date of Award: 2026
• Depositing User: Theses Team
• Unique ID: glathesis:2026-85713
• Copyright: Copyright of this thesis is held by the author.
• Date Deposited: 23 Jan 2026 16:19
• Last Modified: 25 Jan 2026 09:04
• Thesis DOI: 10.5525/gla.thesis.85713
• URI: https://theses.gla.ac.uk/id/eprint/85713